Reconstructing Ancient Korean History: The Formation of Korean-Ness in the Shadow of History 1498521452, 9781498521451

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Reconstructing Ancient Korean History

Reconstructing Ancient Korean History The Formation of Korean-ness in the Shadow of History Stella Xu

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2016 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Xu, Stella. Title: Reconstructing ancient Korean history : the formation of Korean-ness in the shadow of history / Stella Xu. Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016014685| ISBN 9781498521444 (cloth : alkaline paper) | ISBN 9781498521451 (electronic) Subjects: LCSH: Korea--History--To 935--Historiography. | Historiography--Political aspects--Korea--History. | Nationalism--Korea--History. | National characteristics, Korean--History. | Politics and culture--Korea--History. | Korea--History--To 935--Sources. Classification: LCC DS911.19 .X8 2016 | DDC 951.9/01072--dc23 LC record available at http:// lccn.loc.gov/2016014685 TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

To my family.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments Notes on Romanization Maps Introduction Notes 1

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ix xi xiii 1 11

From Others to Barbarians: The Conceptualization and Evolution of Yi 夷 The Formation of Chinese Views on the Others Managing Frontiers, Embracing Others: Xiongnu, Nanyue, and Chaoxian in Han Foreign Policy The Interdependent Formation of Chinese-ness and Korean-ness Notes Negotiating the Past, Reinterpreting Ancient History: Legitimacy in the Lineage of Ancient Korean History The Three Chosŏn and Three Kingdoms Framework in the Koryǒ Period (918–1392) Stability after the Dynastic Transition from the Early to Mid-Chosǒn Period (1392-1600) Rethinking the Sino-centric World Order and Repositioning Chosǒn—Later Chosǒn Period (1600-1905) Notes Ancient History Reinvented: Another Battleground for National Prestige and Political Legitimacy Colonial Legacy: Japanese Scholarship on the Ancient History of Korea (seventeenth century-1945) Korean Historiography from the Late Chosǒn to Colonial Period (1900-1945) Post-1945: Studies on Korean Ancient History in the South Unresolved Issues That Still Matter Notes From a Marxist Universal History to an Ultranationalist Approach: Studies on Ancient History in North Korea Flourishing Period in the 1950s-1960s vii

15 16 19 31 38 45 46 58 68 83 89 90 96 106 112 126 137 139

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Relative Dormancy and Reorientation in the 1970s–1980s Turning to a New P’yǒngyang-Centered Korean History The International and Inter-Korea Relationship in History Studies Notes In the Name of History: Laying Claim to the Historical Sovereignty of Manchuria (Northeast China) Manchuria in the Pre-nineteenth Century Research on Manchuria since the Nineteenth Century Climax of Controversy: Dispute on the History of Koguryŏ Clash of Historical Views Notes

Conclusion: Living with the Legacy of the Past Notes References Primary Sources Secondary Works Index About the Author

150 151 156 161 165 166 169 180 184 187 195 205 209 209 209 221 233

Acknowledgments

Like many academic works, this book could not have been finished without help, advice, and kind encouragement from many people. The primary credit should be given to my academic advisor, Professor John B. Duncan, an exemplary scholar who cares deeply about teaching and who has established an excellent program in Korean studies at UCLA. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor David Schaberg, Dean of Humanities at UCLA. I still remember that he managed to attend my dissertation defense despite getting into a traffic accident on the way there. His sense of responsibility inspired me to think about my future career as not only a scholar, but also as a dedicated teacher. Professor Lothar von Falkenhausen is a model of superior scholarship and kind personality. I learned so much from the casual gatherings with visiting scholars and other students at his house. Professor Namhee Lee has been like a big sister, sharing not only her academic expertise, but also the experience of being a female scholar who balances family and work. In addition, I could always count on Professor Richard von Glahn for the sharpest perceptions of East Asia in the context of world history. I am very blessed to be part of the academic community at UCLA, which is home not only to one of the best Korean studies programs in the United States, but is also very strong in Chinese and Japanese studies. I will cherish my conversations with friends and our shared experience as graduate students at UCLA for the rest of my life. I am extremely fortunate to belong to a most collegial and supportive community at Roanoke College. My colleagues here not only helped me get through the early years of transition from a fresh Ph.D. to a teacher, but also to continue the rigorous track of research. My colleagues, John Selby, Tom Carters, Gary Gibbs, and Rob Willingham kindly read parts of the manuscript. Whitney Leeson dedicated some of her precious sabbatical time to reading the entire manuscript and offering valuable comments. The unfailing support and friendship from colleagues has been invaluable in the writing of this book. I would also like to thank all of the professors I studied with at Korea University in the 1990s. They not only very patiently and enthusiastically advised me about my academic work, but also helped me understand Korean culture and society on a deeper level. Over the years I have made many field trips to Korea and China, and to various libraries in the United States. These trips were funded through ix

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the Library of Congress Florence Tan Moeson Fellowship, a VFIC Mednick Fellowship, several Roanoke College Summer Research Grants, an AAS-NEAC travel grant, and a Harvard University Yenching Library Travel Grant. I am grateful to those dedicated librarians who helped track down rare materials for my research. The interlibrary loan service at Roanoke College has always been superb and indispensable to this project. I would also like to thank the editors at Lexington Books, Brian Hill and Eric Kuntzman, for their professional suggestions and timely support throughout the process. Last but not least, my family deserves special credit for supporting me throughout these years. Their tolerance and understanding have always been my source of strength and inspiration. Despite the advice, criticism, and support of many people, any mistakes remaining in this book are solely my responsibility. A small part of chapter 3 was previously published as “Reconstructing Ancient History—Historiographical Review of the Ancient History of Korea, 1950s-2000s” in ASIANetwork Exchange: A Journal for Asian Studies in the Liberal Arts 19:2 (2012):14-22, available at http://www. asianetworkexchange.org/articles/22/galley/53/download/. A small portion of the conclusion has been expanded and published as “A Common History Textbook in East Asia—A Resolution for Historical Disputes?” in Japan Studies Association Journal 9 (2011): 97-115. The author thanks the publishers for their permission to reprint materials from these journals.

Notes on Romanization

This book observes the following convention for non-English materials: McCune-Reischauer system for Korean; the pinyin system for Chinese; and the modified Hepburn system for Japanese. Korean, Chinese, and Japanese names are transcribed with surname first, then given name. Some exceptions are given to some commonly known names, e.g., Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and Park Geun-hye.

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Introduction

Historians often lamented the fact that people no longer care about history, and that historical knowledge has become negligible not only in the formal school curriculum but also in the public sphere. However, historical understanding still draws national and international attention at certain times and places. From 2003 to 2006, many non-Korean observers were surprised by a series of mass protests and campaigns in South Korea. These protests were unprecedented. First, the participants were of all ages: adolescents, adults (many of whom brought their small children), and senior citizens. Considering the level of democracy and diversity in contemporary Korean society, it was unusual to see such popular participation transcending class, gender, ideology, and age. Second, the protests centered on some politically significant sites, including Kwanghwamun Gate and T’apkol Park, two landmarks of the Korean independence movement from the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) through the democratization movement (1950s-1980s), and in front of the Chinese Embassy. Third, the protests assumed a variety of forms. In addition to common mass gatherings with giant placards, in some cases the participants also dressed up like Koguryŏ military generals of a thousand years ago. 1 Some campaigns solicited one million signatures on petitions, and numerous websites were created by Korean netizens to promote Koguryŏ culture and history. Protests are certainly not uncommon in Korea today. However, what were the reasons behind this unusual series of protests from 2003 to 2006? Quite unlike historians’ pessimistic projection about the importance of history, these protests were about the value of Korea’s ancient history; in particular, about the history of the Koguryŏ Kingdom (高句麗, Gaogouli in Chinese, first century BCE?-seventh century CE). The Korean people united in opposition to China’s Northeast China Project, a state-sponsored project aimed at redefining Northeast China (where most of Koguryŏ territory was located) within Chinese history, and affirming it as an inseparable part of China proper from time immemorial. 2 Simply speaking, the Korean people were condemning China’s attempt to “steal” Koguryŏ history from the Korean people; Koguryŏ is the jewel of Korea’s five thousand-year history, distinguished by its military prowess, uncompromising resistance to the Chinese invasions, extensive territory, and cultural accomplishments. 1

2

Introduction

The Northeast China Project was first reported in South Korea on July 14, 2003. 3 Since then, historians, civic groups, and social media have waged campaigns to attract the public’s attention through saturation coverage via newspaper and television, in academic conferences, street petitions, blogs, and internet discussions. Activists have demanded that the Korean government establish an institute to respond to the Northeast China Project. Bowing to public pressure, the Korean government founded the Koguryŏ Research Foundation in March, 2004 (now the Northeast Asian History Foundation). 4 The dispute over Koguryŏ history soon escalated into a serious diplomatic disagreement between China and Korea. The Korean government requested an official explanation of the Northeast China Project from the Chinese government. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wu Dawei responded with a five-point memorandum on his visit to Korea in August, 2004. 5 South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (No Muhyŏn, r. 2003-2008) discussed the implications of the Koguryŏ dispute in a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in September, 2005. 6 Thereafter the dispute over ancient history took up more of the South Korean government’s time than any other issue apart from North Korea’s nuclear program. Why and how did ancient history, despite its remoteness and apparent irrelevance to today’s world, become the source of unprecedented antagonism among East Asian countries and citizens? How did the history of Koguryŏ Kingdom become a subject of a transnational dispute in the twenty-first century? Why did Korean scholars label a historical research project in China as a national crisis, and why did this project incite a nationwide protest in South Korea? How has ancient history been understood, constructed and adjusted, and sometimes even fabricated and manipulated? What are the implications and repercussions of this controversy for contemporary East Asian society? The historical dispute in East Asia is plagued by its contradictory domestic and international discourses and rationales. The governments of China and Korea, along with prominent historians in both countries insist that historical research be kept separate from politics. However, in reality, Chinese historians launched the Northeast China Project because of concerns with Koreans’ irredentist claim upon Northeast China at least since the 1900s. They saw the Northeast China Project as an overdue and legitimate defense of China’s territorial sovereignty and national unity; South Korean historians warned that the Northeast China Project had been crafted more in preparation for China’s dominance over North Korea in the case of the collapse of the North Korean regime rather than a concern with the very ownership of Koguryŏ history. 7 The historical dispute over Koguryŏ Kingdom (in addition to the entire history of Northeast China) has become a political and contemporary matter of territorial

Introduction

3

and historical sovereignty, nation and national identity, and international politics. This book tackles these questions by exploring the transformation of historical understandings of ancient history and their relation to the construction of national identity in Korea. Throughout history, people have formed diverse identities, and historical writings have always been sources of information for these undertakings. The earliest written records on “Koreans” are found in Chinese documents made as early as the seventh century BCE, and mostly from the Han dynasty (third century BCE to third century CE). Since that time, these records have been used as primary sources by Korean, Chinese, and Japanese historians. Although the early inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula are believed to have begun keeping historical records no later than the fifth century CE, the earliest extant record is Samguk sagi 三國史記 or The History of the Three Kingdoms from the twelfth century CE. It was compiled about a thousand years later than its Chinese counterpart Shiji 史記or the Records of Grand Historian, and is known to heavily rely upon Chinese documents. This use of external sources to reconstruct Korea’s ancient history produced numerous reinterpretations and applications not only in Korea, but also at times in China and Japan. The modern historiography of Korea was additionally complicated by the thirty-five years of colonial rule (1910-1945) under Japan. Japanese colonial scholars had depicted Korean history as stagnant, heteronomous, and fraught with factional strife. 8 In contrast, Korean historians struggled to construct an indigenous and independent ancient Korean nation. By doing so, they hoped to rally Koreans’ sense of national unity and use it to reclaim the political sovereignty lost to Japan in 1910. Because of the ambiguity and scarcity of historical records, the study of ancient Korean history has revolved around contested and sometimes emotional interpretations of several issues. The related discipline of archaeology opened up a new space for the study of Korea’s prehistory and ancient history. Archaeological evidence has gradually attained greater credibility because it offers more tangible and objective evidence than historical records, which tend to be selective, retrospective, and subjective. However, the establishment of modern archaeology as an academic discipline coincided with the rise of modern nationalism and imperialism. As a result, scholars sometimes manipulated and interpreted archaeological discoveries for nationalist and imperialist ends. 9 Historical narrative has been confined to a national framework in the most recent three centuries, and it has been customary to construct a glorious ancient history that can instill a sense of enduring national pride. Only in the 1980s did a small number of historians begin to question the use of the nation as the singular unit of analysis. First, Benedict Anderson, Ernst Gellner, and others argued that the nation is a modern inven-

4

Introduction

tion. 10 Second, the concentration on nation relegates other categories of analysis such as gender and class to secondary or negligible status, thereby precluding a comprehensive and balanced understanding of history. 11 Third, the demarcation of historical studies on the basis of modern nation-states ignores interactions among nation-states, especially between the colonizing and the colonized. 12 And finally, ultra-nationalism remains a threat to peaceful coexistence and recognition of other cultures and values, and leads to the production of histories that advocate the racial and/or cultural superiority of some nations over others. 13 Unfortunately this critical approach to nationalist history has had limited resonance in East Asia. Scholars were disappointed that the collapse of the Cold War system did not usher in an era of peace and reconciliation; instead, international relationships in East Asia were characterized by a series of “history wars” (a series of emotionally charged controversies over interpretations of past events) which replaced the previous ideological hostility. In addition, intensive media coverage of these controversies has incited public attention and debate. For example, the repeated attempts by some conservative Japanese historians to revise the narratives of modern Japanese history, particularly Japan’s war crimes committed during World War II, have elicited outrage from historians in China and Korea. Although this dispute revolves around issues such as Japanese colonization and war crimes, it is also related to Japan’s ethnocentric descriptions of the sacred origins of the nation, accompanied by the degradation of Chinese and Korean people and cultures. At the same time, the Chinese Northeast China Project has extended the transnational historical disputes to the ancient period, and the history war over the Koguryǒ Kingdom has raged between Chinese and South Korean scholars and citizens since 2003. Historical debates have drawn new lines of confrontation and alliance. Chinese and Korean historians have joined forces against Japanese right-wing historians who have published textbooks that elide Japan’s colonialism and war crimes. However, when it comes to ancient history, Chinese scholars have emphasized China as the sole cultural creator of, and benefactor, to its surrounding areas, thus constructing a Sinocentric world order throughout the premodern periods in East Asia. In response to the Chinese one-directional dissemination hypothesis, Japanese and Korean scholars have the shared agenda of (re)discovering indigenous cultural development and of dating the inflow of Chinese influences to as late as possible. They hope to construct an image of equal-footing rivalry vis-à-vis China within the framework of tributary relationships by emphasizing the tributary system as a diplomatic expediency instead of a form of political subjugation or submission. As a result, the interpretations of East Asian history, especially in terms of inter-state relationships and issues of overlapping interests, have produced on-going debates that remain intensely contested and extremely varied.

Introduction

5

This book explores the constructions of Korean ancient history, their interactions with the formation of national identity, and their relevance to contemporary politics and international relations in East Asia. Chapter 1 explores early perceptions of non-Chinese people as found in early Chinese historical records. Initially, the Shang and Zhou people had only vague information about outsiders, and yi 夷 in the oracle bones and bronze inscriptions referred mostly to people who were not us. However, with more frequent contact and interaction, the late Zhou people started to use more specific terms for different groups, and yi also came to mean “barbarian,” along with other derogatory terms that referred to nonZhou people. The early residents in and around the Korean peninsula were categorized as the Dongyi 東夷 (K. Tong’i) or Eastern Barbarian. Chapter 1 also traces the earliest documents describing “Koreans” in the first four dynastic historical records of China: 1) the Shiji 史記or The Records of the Grand Historian (ca. first century BCE), 2) the Hanshu 漢書 or The History of the Han Dynasty (ca. first century CE), 14 3) the Sanguozhi 三國志 or the Records of the Three Kingdoms (ca. third century CE), and 4) the Hou Hanshu 後漢書 or the History of the Later Han Dynasty (ca. fifth century CE). These records of non-Chinese peoples were constructed by, and on the basis of, the Chinese worldview that took shape in the Han dynasty. These observations of the non-Chinese reflected the formation of a Chinese self-consciousness, and in doing so, created distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese people. Chinese perceptions of non-Chinese that accumulated through these historical records also strongly influenced Chinese policies towards these “others.” By tracing the inter-ethnic relationships between the people of Han China and their neighboring others--Xiongnu 匈奴, Nanyue 南越, and Chaoxian 朝鮮 (K. Chosǒn), the chapter also discusses how diverse policies originated, developed, and became institutionalized depending on Chinese perceptions of each group. These policies are: 1) a military resolution with regard to Xiongnu because of their ecological and cultural incompatibility with the Han Chinese, 2) an assimilation policy with respect to Nanyue, and 3) nominal submission of Chaoxian, which resulted in a semi-peripheral Chaoxian as the model of what the Chinese considered civilizable barbarians. These policies, initiated during the Han dynasty, remained important points of reference for later periods. More importantly, instead of military conquest, the Chinese developed a more efficient and pragmatic foreign policy that imposed a Sinocentric worldview upon non-Chinese peoples, and gradually induced them to participate voluntarily in the Chinese world order, the so-called Tributary System. Among the numerous ethnic groups that resided around China, Koreans were special, not only in that they withstood repeated Chinese attempts at invasion and annexation, but also in their ability to preserve their cultural legacy and identity throughout the rise and fall of several kingdoms and dynasties.

6

Introduction

The Chinese historical records on early “Koreans” became the primary sources for later Korean historians in writing ancient history. Chapter 2 discusses the politics of ancient history by Korean historians from the Koryǒ 高麗 (918-1392 CE) to the end of the Chosǒn 朝鮮 period (13921910 CE) with emphasis on the contested configuration of Korean historical lineages. Koreans started documenting their history in the Three Kingdoms period (first century BCE?-668 CE), though none of these records have survived. Other than some stele inscriptions dating from as early as the fifth century CE and recently discovered bamboo and wooden tablets, the earliest surviving Korean history is Samguk sagi, compiled by Kim Pusik in 1145. Since then, many historical records were compiled under state or private auspices. Throughout a thousand years of traditional historiography, historical narratives described the rise and fall of dynasties and rulers, as the ruling elites considered history a source of administrative guidance and of moral cultivation for future generations. The central issue of this period was the relationship ascribed to Tan’gun 壇 (檀)君, the mythological national ancestor of the Korean people and the founder of the state of Ko Chosǒn 古朝鮮, and Kija 箕子, the Shang aristocrat who is thought to have left China in the twelfth century BCE to become a sage king in Ko Chosǒn. In most cases, Chosǒn historians put Kija in a superior position to Tan’gun. Chosǒn literati praised Kija as the benevolent disseminator of universal (Chinese) civilization; his ethnicity did not detract from, but rather affirmed, the authenticity of Korean culture within the universal Confucian sphere. Based on the primacy of the Kija heritage, there is an argument about Samhan chǒ ngt’ongron三韓正統論 or the Legitimacy of the Three Han (in particular, Mahan 馬韓 of the Three Han 三韓). King Kijun 箕準, the last king of Kija Chosǒn, fled to the Mahan area and hence, it was Mahan that continued the heritage of Ko Chosǒn. The question of legitimacy became more complicated and contested for the period of coexisting entities, i.e., Three Han vs. Wiman Chosŏn, the Three Kingdoms (Koguryŏ vs. Paekche vs. Silla), and Unified Silla vs. Parhae 渤海 Kingdom. Consequently, the lineage of ancient history reflected numerous constellations of political agendas and intellectual inclinations. Chapter 3 investigates studies of Korea’s ancient history from the late nineteenth century through the post-1945 period in South Korea, in addition to Japanese colonial scholarship. Of all phases of Korean history, the ancient period possesses the greatest potential for manipulation and diverse interpretations due to the lack of written records. During the colonial period, the study of Korean ancient history became a battlefield between Korean and Japanese historians. Japanese colonial authority was less concerned with ancient than with contemporary history, thereby creating a space within which Korean historians could envision a strong, ancient Korean nation and national spirit, originating in the remote past and sustained into the present. Consequently, Tan’gun has become a

Introduction

7

symbol of national identity and unity, while Kija was minimized or ignored not only because Korean historians thought it was humiliating to have a foreign sage king, but also because China itself had already fallen to Western and Japanese imperialism. The investigations of Korea’s ancient history became more dynamic and diversified after liberation from Japan in 1945. The establishment of separate governments in South and North Korea as well as the Cold War ideological confrontation led to new ways of (mis)understanding Korea’s ancient history. In South Korea, professional and amateur historians alike committed themselves to the study of ancient Korean history. The latter are more inclined to resort to discourses of irredentism with respect to Manchuria (Northeast China), 15 or of imagining a Korean ancient empire dating from the thirtieth century BCE that extended from the eastern coast of China to the Maritime Provinces of Russia. It is ironic that despite the amateur historians’ staunch anti-Communism, their views on ancient history are similar to North Korea’s official stance, though of course they intentionally avoid acknowledging this striking coincidence. As the founder of Korean nationalist historiography, Sin Ch’aeho 申采浩 (18801936) is revered in both North and South Korea. However, Sin’s irredentism is most faithfully inherited by historians in the North and by amateur historians in the South. 16 Chapter 4 continues to discuss the changing views of ancient history in North Korea. North Korean scholars started their investigations into ancient history much earlier than their South Korean counterparts because the leaders in the North realized the importance of preserving and interpreting historical records and secured a better pool of scholars by persuading established South Korea-based historians to move to North Korea. Because of the geographical relevance to the northern peninsular, North Korean scholars prioritized their research on Ko Chosǒn, Koguryǒ, and Parhae. In addition to reconfiguring Korean history on a universal Marxist historical framework, they also asserted the uniqueness and superiority of Korean culture. Compared to their South Korean colleagues, North Korean scholars made significant progress in their studies of Ko Chosǒn, Koguryǒ, and Parhae, thanks to easier access to Northeast China for field research and some collaborative archaeological excavations conducted with Chinese archaeologists in the 1960s. Despite decades of special interest in Manchuria with regard to ancient history, North Korean historians turned their attention to the Korean peninsula with the rise of Juche (Chuch’e) 主體 or the Self-Reliance Ideology in the 1970s. It reached a climax in 1993 when the North Korean government announced the excavation of Tan’gun’s tomb in P’yǒngyang, and declared that Korean civilization originated and evolved in this area, which is the fifth center of world civilization named Taedonggang munmyǒng 大同江文明 or Taedong River Civilization. 17

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Introduction

Chapter 5 explores in depth how Northeast China became the heartland of controversy in modern historical inquiries into the premodern history of East Asia. Manchuria remained a largely marginalized area until the mid-nineteenth century. However, it suddenly became the focus of intense political competition and historical scrutiny for Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Korean scholars in the late nineteenth century. The unprecedented interest in Manchuria stemmed from the convergence of imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism in Northeast Asia. Recognizing that over the centuries Manchuria had maintained frequent interactions with China and Korea, Russian and Japanese scholars turned their interest to the prehistoric periods. These scholars placed tremendous weight on Manchuria’s relationship with the Altaic and Siberian areas for the purpose of segregating it from China proper, and deliberately depicted Manchuria as a fertile paradise with a small population, thus ensuring Manchuria was open to claims for sovereignty. Chinese views on Manchus and Manchuria reached a turning point in the early twentieth century. Remaining peripheral to the majority of Chinese people until the seventeenth century, Manchuria was further isolated from China proper with the establishment of the Qing dynasty. On the one hand, Manchuria officially became part of China for the first time; on the other hand, Manchuria became a sacred homeland and access to it was strictly prohibited, especially for Chinese farmers and merchants. Though the Qing government lifted the ban in the 1870s, it was only after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in the 1930s that mainstream Chinese intellectuals paid more attention to affirming China’s historical sovereignty over Manchuria. Koreans’ concerns about Manchuria were also transformed. From the thirteenth to the early twentieth century, Manchuria was largely dismissed as a remote barbarian border area, or a marginal space needing incorporation into the lineage of Korean history. 18 During Korea’s colonial period, Manchuria arose as an area of primary concern for Korean historians, taking center stage as the historical homeland of the Korean nation. Similar to Chinese historians who attempted to be more inclusive in their composition of the Chinese people from the beginning of the twentieth century, Korean historians began to turn their attention to Manchuria, and it was from this period that Manchuria (in particular, Mount Paektu 白頭, Changbai Shan 長白山 in Chinese) was identified as the birthplace of Tan’gun, and as the cradle of Korean (and East Asian) civilization. 19 Koreans also resumed an irredentist stance on Manchuria which had been the site of the most powerful state in Korean history, Koguryǒ Kingdom. Furthermore, Manchuria became a stronghold of the Korean independence movement, because it was almost impossible to conduct independence movements within the Korean peninsula due to the omnipresent surveillance of the Japanese colonial government. The drastic transformation of historians’ views on Manchuria escalated to the

Introduction

9

history war of 2003-2006 over Koguryǒ Kingdom among Chinese and Korean historians, illustrating why and how ancient history always matters, and how historical interpretations contribute to the deterioration of peaceful relationships among neighboring countries. 20 Differing views of ancient history have existed for centuries in East Asia; however, only since 2003 has a matter of historical interpretation drawn (inter)national attention and public support. Perceptions of East Asia’s ancient history, especially regarding international relationships and ancient entities with overlapping interests, have remained a source of on-going debate which could escalate into transnational disputes, depending on the historical and political circumstances. 21 Among various factors that complicate contemporary international relationships in East Asia, the frequent clashes over historical interpretations have become one of the most difficult issues to resolve or reach compromise. Korea has a long history of historical writing, which accompanied self-consciousness of an indigenous culture sometimes caught in a dilemma in relation to the universal (Sinocentric) civilization. However, this self-consciousness should be differentiated from modern nationalism, since the Korean aristocrats in the Koryǒ period and yangban 兩班 in the Chosǒn period would never have considered Korean commoners and slaves their equals. 22 Consequently, in their privileged appreciation of high culture, the Korean literati would have felt a stronger kinship with the Chinese literati than with Korean peasants. Since the rise of modern Korean nationalism in the late 1890s, nationalist passions redefined Korean identity and subsequently the pursuit of national independence. Historical writing during and after the colonial period also contributed tremendously to the formation of nationalism, national identity, and the modern nation-state in Korea. The study of nationalism, which had attracted academic interest from all over the world, became more controversial in the 1970s. Anthony Smith has identified four paradigms in the theories on the origin and development of nationalism: modernism, perennialism, primordialism, and ethno-symbolism. 23 Modernist views were proposed by Benedict Anderson, 24 Ernest Gellner, 25 and Eric Hobsbawm, 26 who contended that nationalism was of modern invention and imagination, and that nationalism was frequently mobilized to accomplish political goals. Modernist views, based largely on the European and Southeast Asian experiences, have been widely accepted since the 1980s; however, Korean nationalism seemed to have embraced both primordial (traced to a historical legacy) and modern, constructed elements (in the face of the threats of imperialism and colonialism). Disagreeing with the modernist perspective, Smith argued that nationalism takes different forms, and that there could have been a premodern sense of nation or of collective consciousness due to the ethnic and cultural traditions accumulated throughout history; a view that some scholars have applied to Korea. 27

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Introduction

The development of Korean nationalist historiography, especially in relation to ancient history, not only reflected the formation of modern nationalism in Korea, but also the international context, because the study of ancient Korean history has drawn international attention since the late nineteenth century. The Japanese and Russian scholarship on Korean history and archeology was undeniably related to their imperial designs on Korea, while Korean historians used ancient history to lay the foundation for future independence. If modern Japanese historiography was constructed with the purpose of presenting Japan to a Western audience, modern Korean historiography was also strongly influenced by the necessity of affirming Korean national identity vis-à-vis Japan and China. Because of the importance of nationalist historiography during Korea’s national crisis, it secured an unquestionable and unassailable status after 1945. As the crucial element of modern Korean nationalism, Korean nationalist historiography was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it rallied Korean national pride and created national support for independence. On the other hand, it resorted to assertions of Korea’s racial and cultural superiority and its expansionist tendencies. Therefore, the legacy of Korean nationalist historiography could be an unintended undermining of cultural diversity and political democracy in Korea, thereby jeopardizing peaceful co-existence with neighboring peoples. 28 Historiography is still a relatively underdeveloped field in the study of Korean history. Only a few scholars are conducting historiographical research, and their studies have concentrated on periods of their expertise rather than on larger trends in Korean historiography. A specialist in Chosǒn history, Han Yǒng’u 韓永愚 (1938-) has written two monographs: Chosǒn chǒn’gi sahaksa 朝鮮前期 史學史 or Historiographical Studies on Early Chosǒn, and Chosǒn hugi sahaksa 朝鮮後期 史學史 or Historiographical Studies on Late Chosǒn. 29 Despite Han’s pioneering research in Korean historiography, his criteria for evaluating the merits of a historical work have been oversimplified by focusing on historians’ attitudes toward Tan’gun Chosǒn and Manchuria. That is to say, a good historical study was characterized by a particular historian’s belief in the authenticity of Tan’gun and Tan’gun Chosǒn, and by the placement of the territory of Tan’gun, Kija as well as the Four Han Commanderies outside of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, Han, at best, questioned the work of Chosǒn historians who rejected or failed to mention these points. Another contemporary scholar of Korean historiography, Chǒng Kubok 鄭求福 (1943-), also published a two-volume series, Han’guk chungse sahaksa 韓 國 中 世 史學史, or The History of Korean Medieval Historiography, an anthology of his previously published essays on Korean historiography. 30 Chǒng’s discussion focused on the institutionalization of official historical records in the Koryǒ and Chosǒn periods. However, comprehensive analyses of historical writings in conjunction with issues in Korean ancient history are still lacking.

Introduction

11

This book fills the lacunae of historiography on ancient Korean history by offering a critical and comparative analysis of the vicissitudes of ancient history, focusing on the analysis of Chinese historical records pertaining to early “Koreans” as well as how they have been used to construct notions of Korean-ness since the twelfth century. The goal is to encourage readers to deliberate upon the construction of ancient Korean history in relation to contemporary political and intellectual developments, and to suggest a nuanced approach that can transcend the contested understanding of ancient history. This book is the culmination of years of research on Korean, Chinese, and Japanese primary and secondary sources on the ancient history of Korea. Historical understandings of ancient history among historians in East Asia are often divided and impeded by national border; fortunately, the academic training and career in the US offers me the advantage of maintaining a critical distance from these complicated, sensitive, and intertwined issues. Written with a deep concern for the crises and tensions that resulted from differences in understanding ancient history in contemporary East Asia, this book calls for a halt to the misuse of ancient history to promote national pride and racial superiority -- a practice which has only perpetuated hostility and intolerance -- and assists its readers to reconstruct a transnational history that is conducive to mutual understanding, respect, and peace-building. NOTES 1. Some representative placards used during the protests read as follows, “Mount Paektu is our mountain; Revoke the Northeast China Project; Wake up, the descendants of Tan’gun; NO to Northeast China Project; Let us protect the Mount Paektu; Stop Distorting History”; “Ko Chosŏn, Koguryŏ, and Parhae are OUR history”; “NO to Northeast China Project.” 2. In February 2002, Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin or the Center of China’s Borderland History and Geography Research affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), launched a five-year research project titled Dongbei bianjiang lishi yu xianzhuang gongcheng or the Research Project on the Historical and Current Situation of the Northeast China Borderland (hereafter the Northeast China Project). 3. Kim Ch’angho, “Koguryŏ rǔl chungguksa ǔi ilburo,” Chungang Daily, July 14, 2003. 4. http://www.nahf.or.kr, accessed August 31, 2015. 5. “Hangchung Koguryŏsa gyo chŏlch’ung mosaek”, Hangyerye, August 23, 2004, accessed August 13, 2015. http://legacy.www.hani.co.kr/section-003000000/2004/08/ p003000000200408231813145.html. 6. They met during the Sixth Asia-Europe Meeting in Helsinki, Finland. Chang Ch’ŏlgyu, “Paldǔng ǔi pul: pukhaek tongbuk kongjŏng ponghap,”Hangyerye, October 13, 2004, accessed August 13, 2015. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/china/ 164219.html. 7. Song Kiho, “Chungguk hakkye, Koguryŏsa ppaeagi t’ongil tui puk yŏngogwŏn chujang posŏk,” Munhwa Ilbo, November 28, 2003. Russia scholar Andrei Lankov echoed South Korean historians’ concern of China’s potential ambition over North Korea. See Andrei Lankov, “The Leagacy of Long-Gone States: China, Korea and the

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Koguryo Wars,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Jana Focus. September 28, 2006, accessed August 10, 2010. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrei-Lankov/2233/article.html. 8. Yi Kibaek, Hanguksa sillon (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1990). Newly revised edition. 1-3. 9. Phillip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett, “Introduction,” in Nationalism, P olitics, and the P ractice of A rchaeology, ed. Phillip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge, Eng.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9-14. 10. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991. Revised and expanded version of 1983 text). 11. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), chapter 2. 12. Andre Schmid, “Colonialism and the 'Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59:4 (2000): 951-976. 13. Henry Em, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999): 336-361. 14. Hanshu was a work completed through collaboration among the members of one of the most literate families in the Eastern Han period. Started by the father Ban Biao, it was continued by his son Ban Gu and finished by Ban Biao’s daughter, Ban Zhao. 15. In a geographic sense, this book uses “Manchuria” and “Northeast China” interchangeably. In terms of period, “Manchuria” is mostly used for the pre-1945 period, and “Northeast Asia” for the post-1945 period. 16. Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 226-236. 17. Chi Hwasan and Sǒ Kukt’ae, Taedonggang Munhwa (Pyǒngyang: Oeguk munmul ch’ulp’ansa, 2011). 18. The first and the most representative Chosŏn scholar concerned with Parhae and the northern lineage of Korean history was Yu Tŭkkong in the eighteenth century. See chapter 2 of this book. 19. Until then, most Korean scholars accepted Iryŏn’s comments on Mount Myohyang 妙香山, Mountain of Miraculous Fragrance, as being the birthplace of Tan’gun. It is located in the Py’ŏng’an province of the northern Korean peninsula. 20. Terence Roehrig, “History as a Strategic Weapon,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 45: 1 (2010), 7. 21. Jungmin Seo, “The Politics of Historiography in China: Contextualizing the Koguryo Controversy,” Perspective 32: 3 (2008), 40. 22. One of the defining characteristics of the formation of a nation is the elimination of the social status system. Korea officially nullified the yangban status system with the 1894 Kabo Reform. Therefore, it is hard to define certain collective identities existing before 1894 as nationalism; they were more affiliated with class and status than national consciousness. See No T’aedon, “Haebanghu minjok chuǔi sahak ŭi chŏn'gae,” in Hyŏndae Han’guk sahak kwa sagwan, ed. No T’aedon et al. (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1991). 23. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 43-61.Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000). 24. Anderson, Imagined Communities. 25. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 26. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 27. John B. Duncan, “Proto-nationalism in premodern Korea,” in Perspectives on Korea, ed. Lee Sang-Oak and Park Duk-Soo (Sydney: Wild Peony, 1998), 198-221. 28. Henry Em, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999): 336-361.

Introduction

13

29. Han Yǒng’u, Chosǒn chǒn’gi sahaksa y ǒn’gu (Seoul: Sŏ’ul taehakkyo, 1981). Han Yǒng’u, Chosǒn hugi sahaksa y ǒ n’gu (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1989). 30. Chǒng Kubok, Han’guk chungse sahaksa, 2 vols. (Seoul: Chimmundang, 1999).

ONE From Others to Barbarians The Conceptualization and Evolution of Yi 夷

From the beginning of history, populations have developed their selfimage by distinguishing themselves from “others.” The formation of selfimage and identity is closely related to historical writings and memories that have been accumulated and reformulated over the course of multiple historical periods. China has a long and rich tradition of historical writing, and these voluminous historical records were not only indispensable for narrating a Chinese past, but were also important sources for constructing the histories of the people who lived in the surrounding areas. Chineseness was simultaneously developed and affirmed by Chinese conceptions of non-Chinese “others.” Information on these non-Chinese peoples is scattered among many pre-Han writings, such as Shang oracle bone inscriptions, bronze vessel inscriptions, Chunqiu 春秋 or the Spring and Autumn Annals, and Shangshu 尙書 or the Book of Documents. It was, however, during the Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE) that Chinese historians first began to designate separate chapters for the recording of information about non-Chinese peoples, or “the others,” a tradition that continued in the following Chinese dynastic annals. 1 This chapter first examines the formation of views of non-Chinese with an emphasis on the development of yi and other terms referring to non-Chinese groups. It can be observed that views of non-Chinese were transformed from a stage of ambiguity and confusion to more concrete perception, and that these views became solidified during the Han dynasty through comprehensive records on non-Chinese peoples. The second part traces three major non-Chinese groups during the Han period— Xiongnu, Nanyue, and Chaoxian—described in the first four formal dynastic annals of China: the Shiji 史記 or The Records of the Grand Histo15

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rian (ca. first century BCE), the Hanshu 漢書 or The History of the Han Dynasty (ca. first century CE), the Sanguozhi 三國志 or The Records of the Three Kingdoms (ca. third century CE), and the Houhanshu 後漢書 or The History of the Later Han Dynasty (ca. fifth century CE). The information about and perception of non-Chinese people became a critical factor in the formulation of Chinese foreign policies, and the Han framework had been carried over throughout the following periods. The third part investigates how the formation of Chinese-ness and Korean-ness were intertwined and mutually affirmative, and how the issue of national identity became one of the most controversial issues in the study of East Asia’s early history. By tracing the development of Chinese perceptions of others in general and early “Koreans” in particular in these historical writings, I argue that records on non-Chinese peoples were constructed by, and through the Chinese worldview, and that these observations of non-Chinese reflected the formation of Chinese self-consciousness by creating distinctions between the Chinese and the non-Chinese. At the same time, the question of hua 華 (Chinese, or the civilized) and yi (barbarian) remained crucial for tracing the origin of the Korean people and constructing Korean identity, and a variety of interpretations has been proposed for the position of “Koreans” in Huayi tizhi 華夷體制 or the Chinese-Barbarian system, especially since the late Chosŏn period. THE FORMATION OF CHINESE VIEWS ON THE OTHERS Throughout Chinese history, the general term to designate non-Chinese is yi. Yi has two meanings in the contemporary Chinese dictionary. The first refers to ancient minority people who lived in the eastern area; the second is people (or barbarians) who live around China proper, 2 which can be inferred from the Chinese understanding of the world, Huayi tizhi. That is to say, the human world was composed of Chinese and nonChinese peoples; all non-Chinese peoples were culturally inferior to Chinese, and therefore were either barbarians or semibarbarians. Since the criterion of being Chinese or civilized was more cultural and political than racial or ethnic, the transformation from yi to hua or even vice versa was not impossible. In other words, Chinese people were culturally superior to non-Chinese peoples, and the barbarians should and could become Chinese if “they adopted Chinese ways—clothes, manners, family system, ethics, and so on.” 3 Shang Oracle Bone Inscriptions: yi 尸 (夷) and ren 人 Oracle bones are invaluable sources for investigating the early history of China. Up to the 1890s, historians who prioritized material evidence

From Others to Barbarians

17

still believed the Shang dynasty was a legendary period; fortunately, the discovery and decipherment of the oracle bone inscriptions not only put to rest doubts about the historical existence of the Shang dynasty, but also provided abundant materials for understanding China’s early history. In the Shang oracle bone inscriptions, the non-Shang people were called yi 夷 (尸) or fang 方. The later Han scholar Xu Shen 許愼 (58-147 CE) surmised that yi originated from da 大 or big and gong 弓 or bow, i.e., 大 +弓 = 夷. 4 There are various explanations about the origins of the yi character. 5 However, the distinction between “us” and “others” was not clear in the early period. It is now believed that yi was originally interchangeable with ren 人 (human being) in oracle bone inscriptions, a reference to people who resided around the Shang territory without discriminating nuances, 6 which can be confirmed by the similar appearance the characters of yi and ren in oracle bone inscriptions. 7 This can also be observed in Mengzi’s description of the origin of Shun 舜 (twenty-third century BCE?) and Zhou Wen Wang 文王 (?-1043 BCE?), though it was written much later. Mencius said, Shun was born in Zhuping, moved to Fuxia, and died in Mingtian; he is a man from near the wild tribe on the east. King Wen of Zhou was born near the Mount Qi of the Zhou, and died in Biying; he was a man who lived near the wild tribes on the west. Those regions were distant from one another more than a thousand li, and the age of the one sage was prior to that of the other more than a thousand years. But when they arrived and carried their principles into practice throughout the Middle Kingdom, it was like uniting the two halves of a seal. 8

Both Shun and King Wen of the Zhou were believed to be prominent ancestors of the Chinese people; therefore, yi here has the meaning of “people from afar” (frontier area) instead of “barbarians.” In terms of gradual accretion of a derogatory connotation of the “others,” ancient China was similar to other regions around the world. The term “barbarian” in Greek initially referred to people who spoke different languages. However, after the Persian War (500-449 BCE), the Greeks transformed the meaning of “barbarian” to stereotyped others, making it synonymous with exotic, slavish, unintelligible, and morally corrupt. 9 Zhou 周 Bronze Inscriptions: Dongyi 東夷, Xuyi 徐 夷, Huaiyi 淮 夷, and the Transformation from 尸 to 夷 From the time of Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145?-90 BCE) if not earlier, the Chinese people agreed that these three dynasties (Xia, Shang, and Zhou) were the beginning of Chinese dynastic history and succeeded one another in legitimate manner. 10 According to the Zhou bronze vessel inscriptions, the king of Zhou dispatched his clan members to different

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fiefs, especially to the newly conquered areas. Unfortunately the fiefs in Qi 齊 and Lu 魯 were unable to control the indigenous people, the yi. At the beginning of the Zhou dynasty, the Duke of Zhou attacked the Dongyi who assisted the rebellion of the Zhou’s Three Regents. Though the Duke of Zhou’s victory was significant, frequent conflicts between the Zhou and yi people continued, and occasionally, some Huaiyi and Xuyi people advanced westward to the inland of Zhou territory. These people frequently appeared in Zhou bronze inscriptions, especially the Huaiyi and Xuyi, who became formidable and persistent threats to the security of the Zhou dynasty. In the early Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, yi was still carved as 尸, and after the late Western Zhou period, 尸 was transformed into 夷. 11 The Spring and Autumn, and the Warring States Period: Contacts and Assimilation Rather than leaving fragmentary references to their neighbors, the Eastern Zhou people accumulated more detailed information and began to apply more precise directional terms to refer to them: east (dongyi 東 夷), west (xirong 西戎), south (nanman 南蠻), and north (beidi 北狄). However, yi 夷, rong 戎, man 蠻, and di 狄 were also used to denote barbarians, accompanied by various directional or other modifiers. Among the many vassal states during this period, Qi was the one that neighbored the largest number of yi groups and waged wars against Dongyi. The Dongyi group was gradually assimilated into the Huaxia 華夏 Chinese during the Qin and Han period. Thereafter, yi was often associated with the east, though its general meaning of non-Chinese peoples remained for centuries. Siyi 四夷 (裔) and Jiuyi 九夷 (裔) both describe non-Chinese barbarians. Jiuyi emphasizes many groups of barbarians, usually far more than nine, and Si 四 emphasizes the four cardinal directions. There are many versions of Jiuyi; 12 however, it is difficult to identify them or where exactly they lived. In the case of Liji 禮記 or the Classic of Rites, there were more than nine groups of yi. These were years of political and military conflict. Before the Chinese empire was formally established, there was still no clear-cut distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese. With the weakening authority of the Eastern Zhou regime, more fiefs than ever competed for hegemonic power, and the battlefields extended not only into the contemporary Zhou vassal states, but also dragged many non-Zhou people into conflict. The borders and frontiers of Zhou vassal states expanded further in all directions, and the most significant change was that formerly non-Zhou territory, such as Qin 秦 and Chu 楚, eventually merged into China proper during this period. Both the Qin and Chu peoples traced their ancestors to legendary Chinese sages, and were gradually transformed from less

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19

civilized outsiders into Chinese insiders, and even into the protagonists of Chinese civilization in the case of Qin, which unified China in 221 BCE. Chu culture also occupied a special position in the formation of Chinese civilization. 13 At this time, yi became the counterpart of hua. “The yi no longer had any desires on Xia; and the yi did not rebel against Hua.” 14 The Han Dynasty: A More Concrete Distinction Compared to an earlier period of confusion and ambiguity, Han historians developed more precise terms for the neighboring ethnic groups i.e., Xiongnu 匈奴, Nanyue 南越, Dongyue 東越, Dongyi 東夷, Xinanyi 西 南夷, Xiyu 西域, Liangyue 兩粤, Nanman 南蠻, Xiqiang 西羌, Wuhuan 烏 桓, Xianbei 鮮卑, and Chaoxian 朝鮮 (K. Chosǒn). Along with the formation and increasing prevalence of Confucianism, yi started to refer to “barbarians who have no civilization,” and the dichotomous division of the Huayi system became the theoretical foundation for the Chinese worldview and the tributary system, which lasted for centuries. Yi was used as late as the Qing 淸 dynasty (1644-1911), in reference to the less civilized people from the Chinese perspective. Even the ancestors of the Manchu people were called yi before they advanced from the northeast to inland China and established a new dynasty. At the same time, the Ming and Qing people used yi to describe the Europeans who first came to China as missionaries in the late sixteenth century. The Chinese people still believed that they were the only civilized people in the world. Due to the discriminatory connotations of yi, an Englishman appealed to the Qing court to call Westerners yangren 洋人, simply meaning “people from the ocean.” 15 More importantly, the discourse of yi became crucial in the clash between China and Britain in the 1830s and 1840s, which reflected their self-perceptions in the reconfiguration of international relationships. The connotation of yi as uncivilized barbarians was intentionally emphasized by the translator of the Qing diplomatic documents, infuriating Queen Victoria (r. 1837-1901), which expedited the decision of military intervention after the Qing government banned the opium trade in 1839. 16 MANAGING FRONTIERS, EMBRACING OTHERS: XIONGNU, NANYUE, AND CHAOXIAN IN HAN FOREIGN POLICY The collapse of the Western Zhou under the attack of the Rong 戎 stimulated a rising consciousness of Huaxia or Chinese-ness during the Spring and Autumn period. The self-esteem of being Huaxia was repeatedly emphasized through comparisons with non-Huaxia people in terms of mo-

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rality, ethics, and customs. At the same time, along with some common consciousness among the Eastern Zhou vassal states in opposition to non-Chinese barbarians under the slogan Zunwang Rangyi 尊王攘夷 or Respecting the (Zhou) King and Repelling the Barbarians, there were nonetheless many military alliances formed between the Zhou vassal states and the barbarians (Rong and Di in particular) in the competition for hegemony in the Central Plain of China. This was a crucial period for the development of a more eloquently defined Chinese-ness, and the frequent interethnic interactions were followed by assimilation and segregation, which contributed to the distinction between Chinese-ness and non-Chineseness. One of the most significant changes was that some previously non-Chinese groups, i.e., Qin 秦, Chu 楚, Wu 吳, and Yue 越, either transformed into, or voluntarily assimilated, as Chinese by fabricating memories of indigenous ancestors with a Chinese origin. 17 The first unified Qin dynasty was soon replaced by one of the longestlived dynasties of Chinese history, the Han. During the four hundred years of the former and later Han periods, the Chinese further clarified the distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese. The criteria however were still more cultural than racial, making the transformation from nonChinese barbarian to civilized Chinese or vice versa always possible. The Chinese documents on non-Chinese peoples were made within the broad context of a Chinese worldview. Strongly believing that China was the only center of the world, the Chinese called the world tianxia 天 下 or All under Heaven. Ideally, tianxia should be ruled by the Son of Heaven, i.e., the Chinese emperor, though it was not always the case. Chinese views on non-Chinese peoples can be perceived in and have been transmitted through historical records. The earliest comprehensive records on Xiongnu, Nanyue, and Chaoxian (and Dongyi) can be seen in the first four standard historical records of China—the Shiji, the Hanshu, the Sanguozhi, and the Houhanshu. Sporadic mentions of non-Chinese peoples are scattered among many pre-Han writings. However, it was Sima Qian, the author of the first comprehensive history of China from the time of the legendary sages to the reign of his contemporary Emperor Wudi 武帝 (r. 141-87 BCE), who first assigned separate chapters on nonChinese peoples in his Shiji. Sima Qian compiled Shiji from approximately 104 BCE to 91 BCE. He inherited his post as Taishiling 太史令 or Grand Historian from his father and fulfilled his father’s deathbed wish of compiling a comprehensive history of China. He not only read through the royal collection of written records, but also traveled around China to collect firsthand historical materials. He accompanied Emperor Wu’s royal inspections, which lent more authenticity to his accounts. The records on non-Chinese were assigned to the liezhuan 列傳 or biography section, mainly for recording heroes and villains in Chinese history, with the exception of emperors,

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21

royal family members, and feudal lords who were usually described in the section of benji 本紀 or dynastic annals and of shijia 世家 or hereditary families. The barbarian chapters became not only the primary source for the study of non-Chinese peoples of that period, but also established a format for incorporating non-Chinese peoples into the Chinese dynastic records, a model that Chinese historians faithfully followed for centuries. On the basis of their conceptions of non-Chinese, the Han Chinese formulated policies dealing with non-Chinese peoples; these policies remained the most important point of reference for later policy-makers. The Han Chinese rulers were known for their strategies of military conquest, assimilation, and/or allowing nominal submission to interact with Xiongnu, Nanyue, and Chaoxian, the three representative ethnic groups that inhabited the northern, southeastern, and northeastern borders of the Han Empire. The Han dynasty was founded on the basis of the short-lived Qin unification. Because of the numerous threats to the new dynasty, the early Han emperors paid more attention to domestic issues. From the reign of Emperor Wu, the Han court was able to turn its attention to external menace. Emperor Wu was especially occupied with settling the Xiongnu issue, which had been a serious problem since the Warring States period. He believed that the time had arrived to revoke his predecessors’ humiliating appeasement policy. For this reason, Sima Qian incorporated a comprehensive and systematic account of the non-Han people in Shiji. Still biased, it was nonetheless a remarkable departure from the earlier descriptions of non-Chinese as exotic, strange, and legendary non- or semihumans, as depicted in early texts such as the Shanhaijing 山 海經 or The Classic of Mountains and Seas. 18 Military Conquest: Xiongnu—Ecological and Cultural Incompatibility (209 BCE-140 CE) The records on the Xiongnu can be found in Shiji, Hanshu, and Houhanshu. Because of the crucial position of the Xiongnu throughout the Han period, they occupied the most important position in barbarian chapters in Shiji and Hanshu, and many Han figures appeared in Sima Qian and Ban Gu’s biography sections due to their involvement with the Xiongnu, either launching military attacks or acting as envoys. 19 In contrast, Fan Ye 范曄 included the Southern Xiongnu in the penultimate barbarian chapter in his Houhanshu, since the Xiongnu had disbanded and ceased to pose a serious threat to Chinese security in Fan’s time. Many nomadic groups had resided to the north of China, though the relationships among those groups are still unclear. In the Xiongnu chapter of Shiji, Sima Qian incorporated all northern nomadic groups into his contemporary Xiongnu, contending that the Xiongnu were descendants of Xia émigré Chunwei 淳維, and were called Shanrong, Xianyun, and

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Xunyu during the legendary periods of sage king Yao 堯 and Shun 舜. Moreover, Sima concluded most northern barbarian groups belonged to the Xiongnu group, including Rongdi 戎狄, Rongyi 戎夷, Quanrong 犬戎, and Shanrong 山戎. The name Xiongnu first appeared at the end of the Warring States period when Sima Qian mentioned the three vassal states of the Eastern Zhou (Qin 秦, Zhao 趙, and Yan 燕) that bordered Xiongnu. To defend their states from Xiongnu raids, Zhou vassal states built walled fortresses, which later were connected to each other by the first Emperor Shihuangdi 始皇帝 of the Qin dynasty. Since then the Great Wall became the northern boundary between the “Chinese” (or people living in the Central Plain) and the northern nomadic groups. 20 Around the third century BCE, Xiongnu chieftain Maodun Chanyu 冒 屯單于 assassinated his father Touman and unified a number of formerly independent Xiongnu tribes. He then attacked other ethnic groups, such as Donghu 東胡, Yuezhi 月氏, Loufan 樓煩, Baiyang 白羊, and Dingling 丁 零. The territory of the Xiongnu stretched from the Liao 遼 River to the east, the Congling 葱岭 to the west, Siberia to the north, and the Great Wall to the south. A strong nomadic Xiongnu Empire emerged almost simultaneously with the second unified dynasty of China, the Han. Taking advantage of the chaos right before the establishment of the Han, Maodun was able to conquer the land that had been taken by the Qin general Meng Tian 蒙恬 (?-210 BCE). 21 The following three centuries of Han-Xiongnu interactions can be divided into three phases. Appeasement Policy during the Reigns of Emperor Gaozu 高祖 (r. 206195 BCE), Wen 文帝 (r. 179-157 BCE), and Jing 景帝 (r. 156-141 BCE) From the beginning of the Han dynasty, the Xiongnu frequently raided the northern territory of the Han dynasty. The founder of the Han, Emperor Gaozu 高祖 was once besieged by the Xiongnu at the Mount Baideng 白登 and barely escaped by bribing the Xiongnu empress Yanzhi 阏氏. Later, Gaozu had to send Liu Jing to sign a humiliating peace treaty stipulating that the Han dynasty would pay annual tribute and marry Han women from the royal family with the Xiongnu chief. However, the Xiongnu remained a perpetual threat to Han security, and the peace treaty did not restrain Xiongnu from raiding the Han border area. Although Sima Qian assigned the Xiongnu a Chinese ancestor Chunwei at the beginning of his Xiongnu chapter, he also wrote that the Xiongnu people had human faces but the minds of beasts, that they respected the young and mistreated the elderly, and that sons married their widowed stepmothers while younger brothers married their widowed sisters-in-law—both of which were incestuous and therefore culturally unthinkable to the Chinese. Moreover, there were no cities nor sedentary farming in the Xiongnu areas, which was taken to prove that Xiongnu

From Others to Barbarians

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lacked civilization. 22 Because of ecological and cultural differences, the Han Chinese considered the Xiongnu impossible to civilize; therefore, the only purpose of Han interactions with the Xiongnu was to put a temporary pause to their plundering. In other words, Han’s appeasement policies were nothing but passive countermeasures to mitigate their military inferiority. Empress Dowager Lü 呂 (241-180 BCE), the ambitious widow of Emperor Gaozu and regent for her son-emperor, seriously considered retaliation when she received what she believed was an unbearable insult, a marriage proposal from the Xiongnu chief. She eventually gave up the idea of revenge after her ministers persuaded her to follow the example of Emperor Gaozu. This type of tolerance continued during the reigns of Emperor Wen 文 and Emperor Jing 景. Emperor Gaozu’s entrapment at Mount Baideng and the resulting appeasement policy had been regarded as the most shameful moments in Han history; nonetheless, later officials often quoted these events in their argument for a peaceful relationship with the Xiongnu. At the same time, despite the Xiongnu people’s military superiority, they did not intend to conquer and occupy Han territory. From the Xiongnu perspective, it was more beneficial to rely on economic exploitation instead of territorial occupation. 23 Military Confrontations (133 BCE-57 BCE) The Han government court had been planning a military resolution with respect to the Xiongnu, but they had to postpone it for decades because of their military inferiority and economic instability. 24 The Xiongnu’s frequent violations of the peace treaty and changing situations within the Han Empire finally forced Emperor Wu to resort to a military resolution to put a permanent end to the Xiongnu threat. Emperor Wu was one of the most expansionist emperors of Chinese history. This phase of military confrontations was unusually significant because the Han switched from a centuries-long defensive position to a full-scale military offense, a strategy only possible under Emperor Wu. The success of Emperor Wu was a result of social stability and prosperity after decades of political consolidation and economic development, and a strong desire to restore the past glory through the revival of Chinese classical learning. In addition, the determination of Emperor Wu and his gifted young generals were crucial and indispensable. 25 Emperor Wu’s favorite generals, Wei Qing 衛靑 and Huo Qubing 霍去病, carried out a series of successful attacks and pushed the Xiongnu northward. Despite military success, the Han troops had to withdraw from the occupied Xiongnu land in most cases because of environmental incompatibility, which always left space and time for the Xiongnu’s recovery and preparations for counterattack. At the same time, the years of continuing warfare had depleted the Han dynasty’s human and financial re-

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sources. Therefore, it was still far from reaching an end to the Xiongnu problem. The Han dynasty also needed to devise a new military strategy against the Xiongnu. After they realized that the conventional chariot was inefficient, the Han troops spent a long time mastering the use of cavalry. Though the relative success of the Han dynasty gave witness to this effort, the Han cavalry was still not on par with the Xiongnu equestrians. In contrast, compared to the decades of abortive attacks on the Xiongnu, it took the Han dynasty just a few years to conquer Nanyue and Chaoxian, thanks to their better trained infantry and navy. Division, Coexistence, and the Tributary System (57 BCE-91 CE) The most advantageous moment for the Han came with the Xiongnu’s internal divisions, instead of Han’s military victories. In 57 BCE, the Xiongnu was divided into five tribes in the wake of a power struggle for the position of Chanyu. One of the Chanyu, Huhan Ye 呼韓邪 (?-31 BCE), surrendered to the Han in 52 BCE. The Xiongnu was further divided into northern and southern tribes around 42 CE. The southern Xiongnu surrendered to the Han, moved south of the Great Wall, and were gradually assimilated into the Han Chinese; the northern Xiongnu were defeated again by the Han army in 91 CE, moved westward, and probably became the ancestors of the Huns, who terrified European countries (the Roman Empire in particular) centuries later. The other remnants of the Xiongnu were later absorbed into the Xianbei 鮮卑, another northern nomadic group that threatened the Han borders from the end of the Han dynasty. 26 Despite Sima Qian’s animosity to Xiongnu, he assigned a Xia ancestor, Chunwei, to the Xiongnu, as he did with most of the other neighboring ethnic groups. Therefore, the difference between Han China and Xiongnu was more cultural and ecological than racial. 27 Sima Qian also introduced an interesting passage proposed by the Yan eunuch Zhonghang Yue 中行 說 in defense of Xiongnu customs: The Xiongnu make it clear that warfare is their primary business. And since the old and the weak are incapable of fighting, the best food and drink are naturally allotted to the young men in the prime of life. So the young men are willing to fight for the defense of their country, and both fathers and sons are able to live out their lives in security. How can you say that the Xiongnu despise the aged? 28

However, it is unclear whether Zhonghang Yue genuinely appreciated Xiongnu customs or simply resented his enforced dispatch to Xiongnu by the Han court. A eunuch from the former state of Yan, Zhonghang Yue, had been forced to serve as an envoy. Instead of fulfilling his role as the Han court representative, Zhonghang Yue helped the Xiongnu, warning the Xiongnu Chanyu of the danger of diminishing their ethnic identity by

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becoming obsessed with Han luxury goods. He advised the Xiongnu Chanyu to improve his negotiation tactics with the Han dynasty, hone his governing efficiency, and ensure literacy in Chinese among the Xiongnu elites. 29 Therefore, the dispatch of Zhonghang Yue as an envoy to Xiongnu was a terrible mistake from the Han’s perspective. The second documents about Xiongnu, Hanshu, is almost identical with Shiji, except for more detailed information about Empress Dowager Lü and the Han officials’ reactions to Chanyu’s humiliating letter. 30 Ban Gu’s narratives start from the first year of Taishi 太始, 96 BCE. Inclined toward a more pragmatic resolution in dealing with the Xiongnu—entrenchment—Ban Gu suggested that if the Xiongnu invaded, the Han should fight back; if the Xiongnu retreated, the Han should be prepared to defend themselves. In sum, the barbarian Xiongnu were impossible for rational regulations and moral instructions; and therefore, the best strategy was to follow the way of the previous sage kings, induce Xiongnu to admire Chinese civilization, make tribute payment, and apply a jimi 羈靡 or loose-rein policy. 31 Assimilation Policy: Nanyue 南越 (204-111 BCE) Like the chapters about Xiongnu, the records on the Nanyue in Shiji and Hanshu are almost identical; the only difference is that the Hanshu contains more detailed information about a letter from Zhao Tuo 趙佗 (240-137 BCE) to the Han Emperor Wen, in addition to Ban Gu’s assessments of Han interactions with barbarians. Up to the third century BCE, many indigenous groups resided across southeastern and southern China, who were called Baiyue 百越 or One Hundred Yue in general, though they might not have been ethnically or politically related. During the Warring States period, the state of Yue 越 became one of the strongest vassal states of the Eastern Zhou, coexisting with Wu 吳 and Chu 楚 in southern China. The Nanyue was a group among the Baiyue that settled in what is currently southern Hunan 湖南, Guangdong 廣東, and Guangxi 廣西, as well as part of northern Vietnam. The Qin dynasty first established three military commanderies in this area: Nanhai 南海, Xiang 象, and Guilin 桂 林. However, Zhao Tuo, a magistrate of Longchuan 龍川 county and a Chinese émigré, occupied three commanderies in the chaos of the late Qin period. 32 Zhao soon established the Nanyue Kingdom and proclaimed his kingship with his capital at Panyu 番禺 (present-day Guangzhou). At the beginning of the Han dynasty, Emperor Gaozu chose a pacifist foreign policy in the wake of his humiliating defeat by the Xiongnu, and thus sent Lu Jia 陸賈 to Nanyue to grant his approval of Zhao’s virtual rule of this area in 196 BCE. There were some interesting conversations between Lu Jia and Zhao Tuo, though they did not appear in the Nanyue

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chapter but rather in the biography of Lisheng and Lu Jia 郦生陸賈 in the Shiji. 33 Lu, while a descendant of the state of Chu (initially a non-Chinese state), accused Zhao of forgetting his Chinese origin and discarding Chinese garments when Zhao met him with an indigenous Yue hairstyle and sitting posture. 34 Lu Jia convinced Zhao to make a concession by explaining how Han Gaozu became the Han emperor with the Mandate of Heaven. Lu Jia further argued that even though Emperor Gaozu could easily extinguish Nanyue, he decided to accept the status quo to rescue people from the chaos of war. Zhao admitted that Nanyue was incomparable with Han China in territorial size and military power, and thus promised to be a Han vassal. Zhao’s voluntary submission resulted in Lu Jia’s promotion for his successful mission. Later, Empress Dowager Lü of the Han prohibited the iron trade with Nanyue, which caused Zhao to declare himself emperor (and thus no longer a vassal) and attack the Changsha area, the southernmost frontier of the Han territory. However, Emperor Wen of the Han insisted on showing tolerance by ordering someone to tend to the Zhao family cemetery in addition to observing regular rituals on behalf of Zhao. Moreover, Emperor Wen bestowed treasures and an official position upon Zhao’s cousin as a preliminary step for peaceful negotiation with Nanyue. At the same time, Zhao never intended to conduct a total war against the Han. When Emperor Wen of the Han again sent Lu Jia to Nanyue, Zhao agreed to repeal his title and pay regular tribute. Zhao referred to himself modestly as a barbarian chieftain and an old minister of the Han emperor, and dismissed his proclamation of emperorship as a joke. Zhao complained about Empress Dowager Lü’s ban on trade with Nanyue, the King of Changsha 长沙王 who drove a wedge between him and the Han, and receiving inaccurate information that the Han emperor had destroyed the Zhao ancestral cemetery, all of which contributed to Zhao’s rebellion against the Han. Zhao excused his behavior by comparing Nanyue with his barbarian neighbors who dared to proclaim kingship with only one thousand people and not even knowing the shame of being naked (thus uncivilized). After Zhao Tuo died, there was internal strife in the Nanyue court between the Chinese dowager and the Nanyue prime minister Lü Jia 呂 嘉 over Nanyue’s relationship with Han China. It is interesting to note that the Nanyue people disliked the Chinese dowager not because of her ethnic (Han) background, but because of her adultery with a Chinese envoy named Anguo Shaoji 安国少季. The empress dowager had a close relationship with this Chinese envoy before she married the then hostage-prince Yingqi 婴齐 who later became the King of Nanyue. There is no information about why the Han emperor dispatched Anguo Shaoji to the Nanyue Kingdom; the Han emperor might have believed that Anguo’s acquaintance with the empress dowager would help him accomplish his mission.

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However, the Yue people soon realized that the Han envoy was a former lover of the empress dowager and that they had resumed their affair after Anguo’s arrival. Therefore, the Yue people decided to support Prime Minister Lü Jia, who had already served the three Nanyue kings, rather than side with the Chinese empress dowager. As a member of the most prominent family in the Nanyue Kingdom, Lü Jia had more than seventy relatives who were high officials in the Nanyue court, and Lü’s sons and daughters had all married into the royal family. Therefore, most Yue people supported Lü, and his popularity far surpassed that of the Nanyue king. Lü attempted to hijack the Nanyue king’s letter of submission to the Han emperor, but the young Nanyue king followed his mother’s advice. Deeply disappointed, Lü decided to feign illness to avoid meeting with the Han envoys. The empress dowager schemed to kill Lü at a court banquet. In the presence of the Nanyue king, Han envoys, and other court officials, the empress dowager intentionally requested Lü to explain the reason for sabotaging Nanyue’s submission to the Han court, which was beneficial to the Nanyue people. The empress dowager hoped that these questions would enrage the Han envoys to kill Lü. However, the Han envoys were hesitant, and Lü escaped with the help of his brother, the general-incharge of palace security. The empress dowager attempted to chase Lü herself, but the Nanyue king stopped her. Lü thereafter plotted rebellion with other ministers. However, the Nanyue king never intended to kill Lü; hence the stalemate continued. After the dowager’s failed assassination attempt on Lü, the Han emperor heard that Lü was insubordinate to the king, and that the Nanyue king and empress dowager were either too young or weak to control the situation. Moreover, the Han envoys were afraid to propose a resolution. 35 Following the proposal of Han Qianqiu, the Han emperor sent two hundred warriors to help the pro-Chinese faction of the Nanyue court, which drove Lü into rebellion. Lü and his general-brother murdered the Nanyue king, the Chinese dowager, and Han envoys, and then enthroned a new king who had been born to an indigenous Nanyue woman. Informed about the rebellion of Lü, Emperor Wu dispatched one hundred thousand soldiers to attack Nanyue in 111 BCE, which led to the execution of the new Nanyue king and Lü. Later, the Han court established nine commanderies in the territory of Nanyue, and made the whole area part of Chinese proper. The Han policy toward Nanyue was strikingly different from that of Xiongnu and Chaoxian. Realizing that the founder of Nanyue was initially a Chinese, the Han government opted for appeasement through repeated reminders of Zhao Tuo’s Chinese lineage and heritage. Even during the brief independent period of the Nanyue during which Zhao proclaimed himself a son of Heaven, equal to the Han emperor, the Han

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dynasty still attempted to lay the foundation for future reconciliation instead of military engagement. During the internal conflict between the pro-Han and anti-Han factions in the Nanyue court, the Han dynasty selected an envoy—the former lover of the Chinese empress dowager— who could take a peaceful approach to the pro-Han camp. The final military expedition was intended only to eliminate the anti-Han faction represented by Lü Jia, who rejected Han China’s request to make Nanyue a vassal state. Another interesting figure during the attack on Nanyue is the Han general Yang Pu 楊僕, who was given the title Louchuan Jiangjun 樓船將軍 or the General of a Multi-Floor Ship, the commander of the Han navy. After a victorious campaign against Lü Jia, Yang Pu was promoted to Lord of Liang. However, Yang Pu met an opposite fate three years later when he attacked Weiman Chaoxian. Repeatedly defeated by Chaoxian troops, Yang was accused of having an internal struggle with another Han general in the middle of a campaign and of arbitrarily deploying his troops without waiting for cooperation from another Han division. Blamed for the significant Han military casualties, Yang was sentenced to death but was demoted to commoner instead after paying penalties. Over the ensuing centuries, Chinese assimilation policies were more successful in Nanyue than in Xiongnu and Chaoxian. The Nanyue people gradually lost their collective memories of their indigenous history, and eventually became Chinese. 36 In contrast, the former land of the Xiongnu was occupied by other nomadic groups, and persistent pressure from the northern frontier remained the most serious threat to subsequent Chinese dynasties. The relatively peaceful sinification in southern China and continuing raids from the northern frontier also contributed to one of the most significant geographical relocations of Chinese civilization from north to south. Starting from the Eastern Jin 晉 dynasty (317-420 CE), Chinese literati opted for mass migration to the south of Yangzi River, which proved to be an ideal natural environment for rice cultivation. Thus, the center of Chinese civilization gradually transferred from north to south. Nominal Submission with Virtual Autonomy: A Semiperipheral Chaoxian Among the three major non-Chinese ethnic groups during the Han period, Chaoxian is the only one that thrived. There are sporadic references to the Chaoxian in some pre-Han writings, such as Guanzi 管子 and Zhanguoce 戰國策. However, Shiji was the first to include a separate and comprehensive account about Chaoxian. Similar to the cases of Xiongnu and Nanyue, Hanshu’s descriptions of Chaoxian were largely cited from Shiji with little new information. It is noteworthy that despite Sima Qian’s thorough preparation and his extensive travels to many places of the Han Empire to write a compre-

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hensive history of China, there is no reference to his visit to the northeastern area. Thus, it is likely that his narratives on Weiman Chaoxian 衛滿朝 鮮 (K. Wiman Chosǒn) were based on accounts by Han militants who fought with Weiman Chaoxian or Chinese merchants who traveled to Chaoxian for business. The Shiji was written immediately after Emperor Wu’s excursions on Weiman Chaoxian; therefore, Sima Qian concentrated on military episodes. Although Sima Qian mentioned Jizi’s 箕子 (K. Kija) enfeoffment with Chaoxian in the Biography of Song Weizi 宋微子, he did not make any direct connection between Jizi Chaoxian and Weiman Chaoxian. Sima Qian was critical of Emperor Wu’s reckless military expeditions and his description of Weiman Chaoxian was hostile, which might be the reason he avoided forging a link between the sage Jizi and the arrogant King Weiman of Chaoxian. Sima Qian attributed Weiman Chosǒn’s collapse to King Youqu’s 右渠 (K. King Ugǒ, grandson of Weiman) stubbornness and overreliance upon the geographical advantage of Weiman Chaoxian in the war against Han China. Regarding the reasons for the war, Sima Qian criticized She He’s 涉何 (Han envoy) killing of Chaoxian’s escort in exchange for his promotion; however, Sima Qian also implied that the conquest of Weiman Chaoxian was inevitable. Though apparently the Han dynasty won the war, all the Han generals who led the campaigns against Weiman Chaoxian were either executed or demoted to commoners. Some Han envoys were executed during the war due to their inability to manage appeasement negotiations. 37 Ban Gu offered a similar but more affirmative interpretation from the Han’s perspective. 38 Written two centuries after Shiji, Ban elaborated upon Han military expansions, and it was those envoys and generals who were responsible for the costly expansions. Ban used the words “haoshi zhi chen” 好事之臣 or “reckless adventurers” to describe the advocates of a military resolution. Therefore, She He 涉何 was depicted more positively, though Ban also expressed concern over the tremendous costs of these wars, which were made possible only because the Han dynasty was at the height of its political stability and economic prosperity. As a result, Ban was more inclined to credit moral virtues rather than military conquest with luring people from afar. This also corresponded with the ideal Confucian world order in which an ideal administration should be based on Confucian virtues not only in domestic affairs, but also in dealings with non-Chinese. More comprehensive and diversified information on early “Koreans” can be seen in the Dongyi 東夷 chapter in Sanguozhi and Houhanshu. Sanguozhi was written earlier than Houhanshu. Instead of a separate section on the Chaoxian, Sanguozhi and Houhanshu started with a section on the Dongyi, and the information on Jizi and Weiman Chaoxian was scattered

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among the sections for Dongwoju 東沃沮, Hui 濊, and Han 韓, taking the form of in-text comments instead of main text. With substantial reiteration from Sanguozhi, Houhanshu has limited additional information, mostly incidents that occurred after the completion of Sanguozhi. Therefore, most historians rely much more on Sanguozhi than Houhanshu as source materials. At the same time, Sanguozhi and Houhanshu also quoted from Weilüe 魏略, a lost text written by Yu Huan 魚豢 that offered much more vivid ethnographic information about early “Koreans.” The extant Weilüe Jiben 魏略輯本 was compiled by Qing scholar Zhang Pengyi by collecting Weilüe quotations scattered among other writings. 39 The most interesting information in Sanguozhi is the relationship between Jizi and Weiman Chaoxian. Rather than replicating the ambiguity or negligence of Sima Qian and Ban Gu, Chen Shou 陳壽 contended that Jizi and Weiman Chaoxian had a consecutive relationship with additional information regarding Weiman usurping power from King Jizhun 箕準 (K. Kijun, the legitimate ruler of Jizi Chaoxian). Moreover, Weiman was condemned for corrupting the pure and moral society of Jizi Chaoxian. 40 Originally from Yan, Weiman fled to Chaoxian in the wake of Lu Wan’s 盧 綰 escape to the Xiongnu. 41 However, the relationship between Lu Wan and Weiman is unclear, and it is interesting to note that instead of going to the Xiongnu, the most popular option for Han defectors, Weiman went to Chaoxian. 42 When Weiman fled to Korea, he was described in Shiji and Hanshu as wearing a zhuijie 椎結 or topknot hairdo and manyifu 蠻夷服 or barbarian garments, though the garments changed to hufu 胡服 (barbarian garments) in Sanguozhi. 43 King Jizhun specially favored Weiman, and appointed him boshi 博士 or erudite scholar to defend the western border of Chaoxian. 44 Later, Weiman accumulated more power by gathering refugees escaped from Yan 燕 and Qi 齊 as well as the indigenous Chaoxian people, and decided to rebel. He brought his troops together under the pretext of protecting King Jizhun from an alleged invasion by the Han troops. Totally unprepared for Weiman’s sudden rebellion, King Jizhun fled to the southern Korean Peninsula, and Weiman proclaimed himself king with his capital at what is now P’yŏngyang, continuing to use Chaoxian as the state title. Instead of military intervention, the Han dynasty accepted Weiman’s usurpation. As in the case of Nanyue, the Han government appointed Weiman waichen 外臣 or outer vassal to defend Han borders under the conditions of recognizing the suzerainty of the Han dynasty and not obstructing other barbarian chieftains’ tribute routes to the Han court. However, Weiman utilized his military power to monopolize trade and invaded neighboring small tribes to extend his territory. This situation persisted until the reign of Weiman’s grandson, King Youqu. He lured more refugees from the Han; moreover, he not only refused paying a visit to the Han emperor, but also blockaded the route

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between the Han and nearby small tribes. The conflict reached a climax in 109 BCE, when King Youqu again refused paying tribute to the Han court in front of the Han envoy She He. She He then killed his Chaoxian escort and received a promotion by boasting about his act to the Han emperor. King Youqu was enraged and sent troops to kill She He in revenge, which made the Han emperor decide to conscript Han prisoners and attack Chaoxian from land and sea. This war almost ended in defeat because of internal strife among the Han generals and was barely won thanks to assistance from Chaoxian collaborators. Unlike Zhao Tuo and his successors in the Nanyue Kingdom, King Youqu of Chaoxian repeatedly confronted Han power and refused to surrender. He was eventually assassinated by his Chaoxian subjects. Quite surprisingly, it was the indigenous Chaoxian people who were eager to surrender and collaborate with Han troops. Some Chaoxian officials fled to the southern Korean Peninsula right before the war because King Youqu rejected the proposal to surrender. Later, some Chaoxian officials also killed King Youqu and other defiant Chaoxian ministers who advocated resistance. 45 After the conquest of Weiman Chaoxian, Emperor Wu established Four Han Commanderies in 108 BCE: Lelang 樂浪, Xuantu 玄菟, Lintun 臨屯, and Zhenfan 眞番. However, the latter two commanderies were soon abolished, and the Xuantu Commandery was moved westward twice and thrived outside of the Korean Peninsula. The Lelang Commandery was the only one that survived until its annexation into the Koguryǒ 高句麗 Kingdom (C. Gaogouli) in 313 CE. In general, the Chinese treated early “Koreans” more generously than they did other non-Chinese peoples. Except for Koguryǒ, depictions of early Koreans were favorable, praising them as a people who observed ritual protocol and upheld honest and sincere folk customs. In particular, Fan Ye added more records about tributary service from these Dongyi to the central Chinese government, and the Dongyi were praised for adopting Chinese civilization. 46 There is also a significant contrast between Fuyu 夫餘 (K. Puyǒ) and Koguryǒ. Fuyu usually maintained a peaceful relationship with China, and even assisted China in containing Koguryǒ’s expansion, thus Chinese views on Fuyu were friendlier than their depiction of Koguryǒ as an arrogant and bellicose polity. THE INTERDEPENDENT FORMATION OF CHINESE-NESS AND KOREAN-NESS The early residents of the Korean Peninsula were categorized as Dongyi 東夷 (K. Tong’i) or the Eastern Barbarians in the Chinese dynastic annals,

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Table 1.1. Historical Record

Shiji

Hanshu

Sanguozhi

Houhanshu

Author

Siam Qian (c. 145-86 BCE)

Ban Gu (32–92 CE)

Chen Shou (223–297 CE)

Fan Ye (398–446 CE)

Date Written

c. 104-94 BCE

82 CE

c. 289 CE

5th century

Related Chapter

Chaoxian

Xinanyi, Liangyue, Chaoxian

Weishuu, Dongyi

Dongyi

Subjects

Chaoxian (Weiman)

Chaoxian (Weiman)

Preface, Fuyu, Gaogouli, Dong Woju, Yilou, Ye, Han

Preface, Fuyu, Yilou, Gaogouli, Dong Woju, Ye, Han

“Koreans” in Early Chinese Records

starting from Chen Shou’s Sanguozhi. 47 The issue of Dongyi is not only crucial to the ancient history of Korea, but also closely related to early Japan and China. The early residents of the Japanese archipelago were also allocated to the Dongyi chapter in Chinese dynastic records. Dongyi has two meanings in early Chinese documents. In most cases it refers to the inhabitants of Shandong 山東 Province, northern Jiangsu 江蘇 Province, northeast of China, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan; but it has also been used in a narrower sense, to describe the people who lived to the northeast of China and in the Korean Peninsula, i.e., the ancestors of the Korean and Jurchen peoples. The use and scope of Dongyi depends on the period and the historian. At times, Dongyi is more a geographic than an ethnic term; at other times, it denotes specific ethnic groups. Taking into account that Yi/Dongyi had had frequent contacts with central China since the Shang period, Chinese scholars of the early twentieth century redefined the nature of Dongyi in reexamining the formation of Chinese people. 48 It became more confusing in the Houhanshu compiled by Fan Ye in the mid-fifth century. Dongyi was described as a consecutive group between the pre-Qin 秦 and post-Qin period. In other words, the original Dongyi who resided in Shandong and northern Jiangsu provinces migrated to the northeast due to Chinese expansions during the chaotic Warring States and Qin periods. In addition, the Chinese perceptions of Dongyi became more favorable in Houhanshu—the land of the Dongyi was a remote paradise where ritual propriety was still observed, while China fell in chaos. 49 At the same time, the evolution of yi and the changing position of early “Koreans” in Huayi system has been crucial in tracing the formation of Korean people and identity.

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Yi in the Korean Context: Internalization and Subdivision The earliest reference to yi on the Korean side appears in the inscription on Chungwǒn Koguryǒ Stele, which was rediscovered in 1979 in Ch’ungju, Ch’ungch’ǒngbuk-do. As the only Koguryǒ stele found inside the Korean Peninsula, Chungwǒn Koguryǒ Stele has become one of the most important primary sources on Koguryǒ history and inter-state relationship among Koguryǒ, Paekche, and Silla in the fifth century CE. 50 The most intriguing part of the inscription relating to the early utilization of yi is about the relationship between Koguryǒ and Silla. The king of Koguryǒ should have known that Koguryǒ was categorized as Dongyi in Chinese historical records along with Silla and other states and tribes. However, Koguryǒ reapplied this term to Silla, considering Silla less civilized than Koguryǒ. Located at the southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula, Silla was politically and culturally the underdog of the Three Kingdoms. Silla not only had to rely on Paekche and Koguryǒ to obtain information on Chinese culture, but also had to constantly switch alliances between Paekche and Koguryǒ for survival. Therefore, Koguryǒ further stratified the definition of yi, making another distinction between the civilized Koguryǒ and less civilized Silla. In this context, King Kwanggaet’o considered Koguryǒ another center of the world, and called Silla Eastern Barbarians, and the Silla king Tongi maegǔm 東夷寐錦 or the chief of the Eastern Barbarians. This indicated Koguryǒ’s attempt to construct its own world system with Koguryǒ at the center, and other entities such as Silla as the less-civilized other. 51 Reconfiguring the Division of Chinese and Barbarians Earliest information on “Korean” people (more precisely, the early residents of the Korean Peninsula and the southern part of today’s northeast China) can be seen only in Chinese documents. Most historical writing on the early history of Korea had to rely on these Chinese documents, and the question of the Dongyi’s relationship with the later Koreans remained the most perplexing issue. From the Chinese side, people in the Korean Peninsula were still frequently categorized in the Dongyi chapter, while it was more common to use specific states and dynastic titles from the Three Kingdoms period. The ambiguous and sometimes contradictory perceptions of the Dongyi in these Chinese records produced diversified interpretations regarding the origins of the Korean people and civilization. The variety of interpretations reached its peak during the colonial period (1910-1945) in the construction of a unique and uncontaminated Korean national identity and tracing it back to the remote past. Because it was one of the most crucial issues of Korean national identity, Korean scholars have been

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debating the relationship between the pre-Qin and post-Qin Dongyi and its relationship with the modern Korean people. The Continuity of Dongyi from the Pre-Qin to the Post-Qin Period During the Koryŏ (918-1392 CE) and Chosŏn (1392-1910 CE) dynasties, many Chosŏn Confucian literati were proud of their capacity to appreciate and absorb Chinese (or universal) civilization, and thus considered the migration of the Dongyi into the Korean Peninsula as a process of cultural dissemination. This view was also related to the worship of Kija, who was cherished by most Chosŏn people for a long time. In addition, Confucius’ desire to live in the land of the Eastern Barbarians further affirmed their pride as residents of Chosŏn, a land of civilization. 52 Thanks to Kija, the Chosŏn literati were confident in claiming the authenticity of Confucian tradition in Korea. It became quite common that Korean literati attempted to legitimize their reform as steps in the restoration of an ancient Confucian golden age whenever necessary. 53 Although dominant from the Koryǒ period (if not even earlier) to the late Chosǒn period, this view came under fire in the 1890s, not only because the Confucian tradition did not advance the urgent agenda of protecting Korean sovereignty from the Western and Japanese aggressions, but also because affiliation with Confucian civilization and a junior membership in a traditional Sino-centric world order has become a humiliation for Koreans. 54 However, in the twentieth century, the connection of contemporary Koreans to the ancient Dongyi group was revived in a radical and irredentist way by Korean nationalist historians. To them, Dongyi has been a racially homogenous (or at least racially related) concept; and therefore, whenever and wherever Dongyi was mentioned in the Chinese records, those people were ancestors of modern Koreans and those Dongyi lands need to be reclaimed. 55 Therefore, the Dongyi territory ranged from the east coast of China, Southern Siberia, northeast China, the Korean Peninsula, and as far as Japan. 56 If the previous pride in the Dongyi was based on an affiliation with Chinese civilization and the Confucian tradition, the latter was based on territorial scope and cultural prosperity. This view is also closely related to the Korean people’s concern with Manchuria. From the final years of the Chosŏn and colonial periods, Korean intellectuals questioned Korean “backwardness” and “heteronomy.” Sin Ch’aeho, the forerunner of Korean nationalists and the founder of Korean nationalist historiography, ascribed Chosǒn’s contemporary illnesses to the loss of Manchuria followed by the collapse of the Koguryǒ Kingdom, a land that was the birthplace of Tan’gun and the cradle of Korean national culture. 57 Another nationalist historian in the early twentieth century, Ch’oe Namsŏn 崔南善 (1890-1957), argued that Tan’gun was not only the ancestor of the Koreans but also the god of all

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Northeast Asian people within the Purham Munhwa kwŏn 不咸文化圈 or Purham Cultural Sphere. The Purham Culture spread from Mount Paektu to the surrounding areas of the Korean Peninsula and Japan, China, Mongolia, and as far as Siberia and the Altaic areas. 58 Both Sin and Ch’oe tried to incorporate most or all ethnic groups in Manchuria as ancestors of modern Korean people, so that Korea can always lay a legitimate sovereignty claim over Manchuria. Interestingly, this type of ultranationalistic view was shared not by mainstream postwar historians of South Korea, but by some amateur historians supported by conservative rightists, and the sense of irredentism was utilized to stimulate Korean military morale to confront North Korea. 59 At the same time, these amateur historians also promoted the idea of an ancient golden age as a way of alleviating the national humiliation under Japanese colonial rule, and also counteracting the predominant influence of Western civilization in Korea since the early twentieth century. Discontinuity of the Pre-Qin and Post-Qin Dongyi Today, mainstream South Korean scholars deny any connection between the pre-Qin and post-Qin Dongyi. 60 After comparing the Dongyi chapters in Sanguozhi and Houhanshu, Chǒn Haejong criticized Fan Ye’s ambiguous description of Dongyi, which implied a consecutive relationship between the pre-Qin and post-Qing Dongyi and caused centuries of confusion. 61 However, the view of discontinuity has two contradictory variations. One asserts a completely indigenous origin of Korean ethnicity and civilization, while the other suggests a new route of mass migration from the Altaic-Siberian area to the Korean Peninsula. 62 The former is the official stance of North Korean scholars, and the latter is widely accepted among South Korean scholars, although recently a younger generation of South Korean scholars have started to embrace the indigenous origin hypothesis. The scholars who support the concept of indigenous origin describe the migration hypothesis as the lingering legacy of Japanese colonial historiography, and argue that there was no substantial archaeological evidence for mass migration during the Neolithic and Bronze Ages from the northern area of Altai and Siberia to the Korean Peninsula. 63 The antisuccessive views on Dongyi accorded with the strenuous efforts of Korean historians to exorcize the Japanese colonial legacy; in particular, the charges of stagnancy, heteronomy, factionalism, and the inevitability of living as a peninsular people, implying that the Korean people had to rely on external inspiration and were always at the mercy of the continental power. The thousand-year-long close connection with Chinese civilization became a humiliating burden in the effort to discover and promote a unique Korean national culture. As one of their most

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efficient strategies, Korean historians redated cultural interactions with Chinese culture and made it as late as possible, which led to an indigenous or the Altai-Tungus origin for the Korean people and civilization. 64 The inclination toward the northern origin is also related to the reassessment of Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn in Korean history. For scholars who argued for the discontinuity between pre-Qin and post-Qin Tong’i, Kija Chosŏn came to be considered the fabrication of some Chinese scholars who aimed to glorify the Han civilization. This fabrication was voluntarily propagated among Chosŏn literati who wanted to affirm Korea’s genuine Confucian tradition. Instead of a migrant sage-king from the Shang, Tan’gun was more appropriate as the symbol of the uninterrupted national spirit of Korea, and scholars spared no effort in transforming the mythical age of Tan’gun into a historical era, particularly through the use and manipulation of newly discovered archaeological data. The Han dynasty was a crucial period not only for the formation of Chinese civilization, but also for its foreign policies based on the Chinese understanding of the world represented by tianxia 天下, zhongguo 中國, huayi 華夷, sifang 四方, and wufu 五服. 65 During the Han period, Chinese views of themselves and of non-Chinese became more clearly defined. As one of the longest-lasting Chinese empires, the Han’s active and frequent interactions with neighboring groups systematized Chinese perceptions of non-Chinese peoples. Moreover, these views of non-Chinese were recorded in formal dynastic records and transmitted to later generations. 66 Chinese views of non-Chinese were also related to the political situation in China. If it was peaceful in China, then views of non-Chinese peoples were more hostile. If China was in turmoil, then many Chinese literati turned their hopes to a civilized barbarian land transformed by cultural interaction with Chinese peoples. Therefore, it is common to craft ancestor myths for non-Chinese people that justify Chinese expansions when needed and also explain the difference between Chinese-ness and non-Chinese-ness. Such constructed difference reaffirmed the necessity of disseminating civilization, though sometimes the contempt for non-Chinese-ness was little more than a self-comforting attempt to ease the frustration caused by a sense of military inferiority compared to the nomadic groups. One common tale is that certain Chinese went to a barbarian area and civilized the indigenous people. Sima Qian assigned Chinese ancestors to most non-Chinese groups, which justified the incorporation of non-Chinese people into his historical records. The difference, however, is that some groups, like the Qiang 羌 at the western border of China, were linked to Chinese civilization by a Zhou slave named Yuanjian 爰劍; while in the case of Chaoxian it was a Shang aristocrat and sage, Jizi. From the perspective of the Han Chinese, this implied a stratified feeling

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of affinity in the sense of cultural similarities and compatibilities, and convertibility to (civilized) Chinese. 67 Within this framework, Korea occupied a semiperipheral position in the Chinese world order, which often made Koreans the model of civilizable barbarians. Like the central plain of China, Korea also practiced agriculture from the prehistoric era, and the Chinese perceived the region as a land inhabited by righteous and gentle people. In general, the Chinese treated Koreans much more generously than they did other nonChinese peoples. Except for Gaogouli, depictions of the early Koreans were favorable, as people who observed the proper rituals and maintained honest and sincere folk customs. The views on the Dongyi became even more positive when China was in chaos. Chinese literati often dreamed of an unspoiled outer land that was transformed by Chinese civilization and still observed ritual propriety. 68 Consequently, the Han dynasty developed different policies pertaining to the three largest ethnic groups. The Han court sought a military resolution with respect to the Xiongnu from the beginning due to ecological and cultural incompatibilities, though they had to postpone their counterattacks until the Han accumulated sufficient military (especially cavalry) and economic resources. Both Nanyue and Chaoxian were depicted as having ancient ancestors from China, and their affinities with the Han Chinese were reaffirmed through the contemporary Chinese émigrés, Zhao Tuo and Weiman. This is the reason that Han courts first resorted to an appeasement policy and recruited them as outer vassals helping with border defense. Nonetheless, these are also some differences between Nanyue and Chaoxian. Nanyue was more sinicized and remained as part of China, while Chaoxian was able to maintain a distinctive identity and virtual autonomy throughout its history. However, Han policies toward the people in the Korean Peninsula were successful from a different perspective. The costly war with Weiman Chaoxian and the subsequent difficult administration of the Four Han Commanderies made policy-makers of the Han and the following Chinese dynasties turn to an indirect involvement, and the people in the Korean Peninsula became what the Chinese considered a model of civilizable barbarian. The formation of Korean-ness was a process of long-term interactions and negotiations, and the perception of the Dongyi from the Korean side also underwent tremendous changes in different periods. The positive assessments of Confucius stimulated and sustained the pride in being Dongyi felt by Korean literati for a long time, and this type of self-assertion flourished among Korean literati in the seventeenth century. Due to the collapse of the Chinese Ming dynasty and the occupation of China proper by the barbarian Manchu people, the Chosǒn literati began to consider Chosǒn as the only carrier of Confucian (universal) civilization.

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However, the connection to Chinese civilization became less desirable from the late nineteenth century onward, as reflected in the priority assigned to the national ancestors. Instead of the Chinese sage king Kija, the beginnings of Korean history and culture were constructed along with the resurrection and reassessment of the indigenous ancestor Tan’gun. The historicity of Tan’gun, however, was questioned because the Tan’gun myth did not appear in any early Chinese documents, but first appeared in the thirteenth-century Korean source Samguk yusa or Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms, written by the Koryǒ monk Iryǒn 一然. Thus, many scholars, especially Japanese colonial historians in the early twentieth century, considered this legend a late fabrication created during the Mongolian invasion (1234-1273). As a postwar decolonization project, Korean scholars argued that the Tan’gun legend might have been formed not much later than the Kija legend considering Korea’s persistence as an independent ethnic and political entity in spite of the more likely possibility of assimilation into the Chinese. 69 NOTES 1. For most recent archaeological studies of yi, see Lothar von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (Los Angeles: Costen Institute of Archaeology, University of California, 2006), chapters 5 and 6. 2. Xiandai Hanyu cidian (Beijing: Shangwu yishuguan, 1983), 1483. Ciyuan (Beijing: Jingguan jiaoyu chubanshe), 271. 3. Patricia Ebrey, Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 179. 4. Xu Shen, Shuowen jiezi 說文解字. 5. Guo Moruo argues that yi (shi 屍, corpse) came from a curse on the barbarians. See Guo Moruo, Liangzhou jinwenci daxi tulu kaoshi (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1957); Wang Xiantang contends yi is a pictograph that describes the squat-pose of barbarians. See Wang Xiantang, Yanhuang shizu wenhua kao (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1985). 6. Wang Xiantang, “Ren yu Yi,” Zhonghua wensihi luncong (1982): 203-226. For a comprehensive discussion of the pre-Qin Dongyi, see David Cohen, “The Yueshi Culture, the Dong Yi, and the Archaeology of Ethnicity in Early Bronze Age China” (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 2001), 251-52. 7. K. C. Chang contends that those places related to Renfang are now in Shangdong province. See K. C. Chang, The Archaeology of Ancient China (Fourth Edition, Revised and Enlarged, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Also K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 216. 8. Mengzi, chapter 8, Lilou. Adapted from James Legge’s translation. James Legge, trans., The Chinese Classics (Taibei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, printed in 1984), 316-17. 9. Mu-chou Poo, Enemies of Civilization: Attitudes toward Foreigners in Ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and China (Albany: State University of New York, 2005), 8. 10. After decades of archaeological excavations and studies, it is now believed that the Xia, Shang, and Zhou cultures chronologically overlapped at certain times, and originated in different areas. K. C. Chang, The Archaeology of Ancient China. Also, “China on the Eve of the Historical Period,” in The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origin to 221 B.C. ed. Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 54-59. 11. Wang Xun, Dongyi wenhua yu Huaiyi wenhua yanjiu (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1994), 84.

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12. In Zhushu jinian, there are quanyi, yuyi, fangyi, huangyi, baiyi, chiyi, xuanyi, fengyi, yangyi. We also can see huanyi, daoyi, niaoyi, lanyi, heyi, xuyi, zhuyi, jieyi, lüyi, qiyi, eryi, liyi, and chuanyi in other pre-Qin records. Though it is difficult to locate all these yis, it is clear that not all of them were located in the eastern area. Therefore, Li Xuezhi contends that throughout the Zhou period, Jiuyi is identical with Siyi and refers to all non-Zhou people. 13. For recent studies on Qin and Chu, see Mark Edward Lewis, “Warring States Political History,” in The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origin to 221 B.C. ed. Michael Loewe and Edward Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 587-650. 14. Zuozhuan, tenth year of King Dinggong. Ruan Yuan annotated, Shisan jing zhushu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 2148. 15. An Englishman from the East India Company named Huynh Hamilton Lindsay protested the use of this term to the Qing court in 1832. Later, the ban of using yi was officially specified to the Treaty of Tianjin (1858), Article LI. It is agreed, that henceforward the character “I” 夷 (barbarian) shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese authorities, either in the capital or in the provinces. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Tien-Tsin_between_the_Queen_of_ Great_Britain_and_the_Emperor_of_China, accessed June 1, 2015. 16. Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2004), 31-69. 17. Qin 秦—Zhuanxu 颛顼, Chu 楚—Zhurong 祝融, Wu 吳—Wu Taibo 太伯, Yue 越—Xia Shaokang 夏少康. It is not clear who created these ancestor legends, but they were recorded in Shiji, and were widely accepted and frequently cited for their authentic Chinese-ness. 18. Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 290. 19. They are Wei Qing, Huo Qubing, Huo Guang, Ji Bu, Fan Kuan, Liu Jing, Li Guangli, Li Ling, and Xiao Wangzhi. 20. Here Sima Qian used Hu 胡 and Xiongnu interchangeably. However, Hu mentioned that Donghu 東胡, should be differentiated from Xiongnu. 21. The information on Xiongnu was based on the Xiongnu chapter in Sima Qian’s Shiji. 22. For most recent studies on Xiongnu culture, see Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 23. Thomas J. Barfield, “The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organization and Foreign Policy,” Journal of Asian Studies 41:1 (1981), 59. For detailed information on the economic relationship between Han and Xiongnu, see Ying-shih Yü, Trade and Expansion in Han China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). 24. Western scholars have long been interested in the origin of the Xiongnu because of their relationship with the Huns who invaded the Roman Empire centuries later. There are many opinions about the ethnic origin of the Xiongnu people; linguists have argued that the Xiongnu originated from the Tartar race, comprising Huns, Turks, and Mongols (H. Deguignes). Some other scholars have proposed a Turkish origin (Hirth de Groot and Shiratori Kurakichi). Like Sima Qian, Pristsak has argued that the Xiongnu, Hunyu, Xianyun, and Quanrong all emerged from a common ethnic origin. There are also other arguments favoring Altaic, Yenissei, or Iranian origins. Wang Guowei has argued that Kuifang, Kunyi, Xunyu, and Xianyun of the Shang and Zhou periods, the Rong and Di of the Spring and Autumn periods, and the Hu of the Warring States period all belonged to the same ethnic group, the Xiongnu. Some other scholars have

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argued that Xiongnu were not quite different from Chinese, and that they established the state of Zhongshan 中山 in the sixth century BCE. Most official historians of the People’s Republic of Mongolia have emphasized the relationship between the Xiongnu and the Huns, and have argued that they were proto-Mongolian tribes of the Tungus group. See Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 163-66. 25. Chang Chun-Shu, “Military Aspects of Han Wu-Ti’s Northern and Northwestern Campaigns,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 26 (1966) 148-49. 26. The Xiongnu temporarily reemerged when they invaded Luoyang and captured the Western Jin 晋 emperor in 311 CE. Chang’an also fell into the hands of the Xiongnu in 316 CE. Xiongnu Chanyu Liu Yuan established a new dynasty on the basis of his Chinese educational background. Besides Liuhan, the former Zhao, later Zhao, northern Liang, and Daxia were established by Xiongnu descendants; however, these were also the last moments of the Xiongnu and they eventually disappeared from the stage of northern Chinese history. See Lin Lüzhi, Xiongnushi (Hong Kong: Xianggang zhonghua wenhua shiye gongsi, 1963), 132-43. 27. Regarding the Han-Xiongnu war, Sima Qian attributed Han China’s mismanagement of Xiongnu affairs to Emperor Wu’s failure to select capable ministers and generals. But he also regretted that he could not give more honest and direct assessments because he was living in the same period. 28. Shiji 110: 2898-901; translated by Burton Watson, Records of the Grand Historian (Revised Edition, New York: Columbia University, 1993), 143-44. Describing Xiongnu marriage customs, Zhonghang Yue has argued: “The people eat the flesh of their domestic animals, drink their milk, and wear their hides, while the animals graze from place to place, searching for pasture and water. Therefore, in wartime the men practice riding and shooting, while in times of peace they enjoy themselves and have nothing to do. Their laws are simple and easy to carry out; the relation between ruler and subject is relaxed and intimate, so that the governing of the whole nation is no more complicated than the governing of one person. The reason that sons marry their stepmothers and brothers marry their widowed sisters-in-law is simply that they hate to see the clan die out. Therefore, although the Xiongnu encounter times of turmoil, the ruling families always manage to stand firm. In China, on the other hand, though a man would never dream of marrying his stepmother or his brother’s widow, yet the members of the same family drift so far apart that they end up murdering each other! This is precisely why so many changes of dynasty have come about in China! Moreover, among the Chinese, as etiquette and the sense of duty decay, enmity arises between the rulers and the ruled, while the excessive building of houses and dwellings exhausts the strength and resources of the nation. Men try to get their food and clothing by farming and raising silkworms and to insure their safety by building walls and fortifications. Therefore, although danger threatens, the Chinese people are given no training in aggressive warfare, while in times of stability they must still wear themselves out trying to make a living. Pooh! You people in your mud huts—you talk too much! Enough of this blubbering and mouthing! Just because you wear hats, what does that make you?” 29. Throughout the Han dynasty, Xiongnu remained the first choice of asylum for Han traitors, starting from Han Xin, Zhao Li, Wang Huang, and Lu Wan, who held prominent positions in the Han government but went into exile in Xiongnu because of their failures in Han internal politics. Some Han generals such as Li Ling, Li Guangli, and Zhao Xin surrendered after being captured. They chose Xiongnu as their destination because it was the only place that could offer them protection regardless of Han pressure. Further, to attract more defectors, Xiongnu treated them very well, usually allocating lands and prestigious titles. However, Han defectors’ cooperation and contributions were not significant, with the exceptional case of Zhonghang Yue who was a Yan eunuch. The Han dynasty also attracted many Xiongnu defectors, who were

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used to fight against their fellow Xiongnu warriors, that is, the strategy of yiyi fayi 以夷 伐夷 or “using one barbarian to attack another barbarian.” 30. Regarding the relationship between Shiji and Hanshu, scholars have long been believed that Ban Gu simply copied large portions from Sima Qian. However, recent scholarship argues that both Sima Qian and Ban Gu relied on much earlier sources, and that because of the limited circulation of Shiji during the early periods, some chapters were lost. According to this argument, some chapters of Shiji were actually reconstructed on the basis of Hanshu. In particular, the account of the Xiongnu found in Hanshu preserved an older and better version of Sima Qian’s original historical narrative. See David B. Honey, “The Han-shu, Manuscript Evidence, and the Textual Criticism of the Shih-chi: The Case of the ‘Hsiung-nu lieh-chuan,’” Chinese Literature 21 (1999): 67-97. 31. Because of the serious threat from the north, the treatment of non-Chinese neighbors became one of the most common issues of debate among Han officials. Michael Loewe contended that there were two opposing camps among Han officials— modernist and reformists. The modernist foreign policy was directed toward expansion, and that of the reformists toward retrenchment. See Michael Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China: 104 B.C. to A.D. 9 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), 13. Ban Gu mentioned two camps of policy-makers, but his criterion for distinguishing these two groups is their professional category: Confucian scholars versus military officials, who insisted on the appeasement policy of marriage and military attack respectively. This was not always true, because Jia Yi and Chao Chuo were Confucian scholars who rejected compromise and proposed a hard-line policy against the Xiongnu. Jia Yi insisted that Han China was the head, and that the barbarian was as humble as the feet. See Hanshu 48:2240. Also Yu Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 11. 32. Shiji 53:2967. Hanshu 69:3847. 33. Shiji 37:2697-698. 34. Wang Chong also accused Zhao Tuo for a similar reason. See Wang Chong, Lunheng (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), 28. 35. This again raised questions about the qualification of Anguo Shaoji as a capable envoy. 36. There are also arguments that regional separatism existed in Guangdong and Guangxi; these arguments became more significant after the excavation of the tomb of the king of Nanyue in 1983. See Diana Lary, “The Tomb of the King of Nanyue—The Contemporary Agenda of History, Scholarship and Identity,” Modern China 22:1 (1996). 37. Shiji 115:2985-2990. 38. Hanshu 28:1658. Jizi’s enfeoffment with Chaoxian and his civilization project appeared in the Treatise of Geography section, but not in the Chaoxian chapter. 39. Chǒn Haejong, Tongichǒn ǔi munhǒnjǒk yǒngu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1980), 148-51. 40. Shiji and Hanshu do not have a section describing Weiman’s usurpation of power from Jizi. This first appeared in Weilüe and was then quoted in the Hui 濊 and Han 韓 chapters of Sanguozhi. 41. Lu Wan was Emperor Gaozu’s childhood friend and favorite subject, and was appointed as the Lord of Yan. However, Lu’s position became precarious because of suspicion of his possible betrayal of the Han court. This situation became even worse after Emperor Gaozu died. He then decided to go into exile in Xiongnu, and the Xiongnu treated him well by appointing him King of Donghu Lu. See Shiji 93:2368. 42. There are some striking similarities between the treatment of Weiman and Zhao Tuo by recent Korean and Vietnamese nationalist historians. Vietnamese historians do

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not see the Nanyue as an alien colony; on the contrary, they honor Zhao Tuo as the man who defended their homeland against Han expansion. See Keith Weller Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 27. 43. Some Korean scholars have attempted to use Weiman’s hairstyle and clothes to argue that Weiman was a Korean patriot who led his compatriots to return to his motherland. See chapter 3 of this book. 44. It is not clear why Weiman was appointed to the title of paksa or erudite scholar, even though he performed the duty of military defense for Jizi Chaoxian. 45. It was said that Weiman Chaoxian was Xiongnu’s left arm (Hanshu 73, 3126), and that the Western Region (Xiyu) was Xiongnu’s right arm; however, there were many cases of Xiongnu’s alliance or interactions with the Western Region (such as Dayuan, Wusun, and Yuezhi), while there were no records of Weiman Chaoxian’s connections with the Xiongnu. 46. Houhanshu 85:2810. 47. In addition to Tongyi, there were some other ethnic names that Korea scholars believed to be early Koreans, such as Ye, Maek, and Yemaek. For details, see Pak Daejae, Chungguk Komunhŏn e nat’anan koae Chosŏn kwa Yemaek (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2013). 48. Chinese historians did not pay much attention to the Dongyi in most historical eras. The positive reconsideration of the Dongyi did not begin until the twentieth century, particularly in the redefinition of the Chinese nation and affirming territorial claims over Manchuria. Fu Sinian was one of the first prominent scholars who proposed a “yixia dongxi shuo,” arguing that yi and xia were both crucial components of the Chinese nation. Fu Sinian’s hypothesis was supported by not only by contemporary nationalist scholars, but also by archaeological excavations. It seemed that Xia culture was represented by Yangshao culture, and the Yi culture was represented by Dawenkou culture and Longshan culture. However, from the 1960s, it turned out that the distribution of Longshan culture also reached far to the western area, which made scholars question the validity of Fu Sinian’s hypothesis. Despite the ambiguity of ancient documents and contradictions in the archaeological data, most Chinese scholars agreed that the Dongyi later became Chinese and Dongyi culture contributed to the development of Chinese civilization. For the most recent research and reaffirmation of yixia dongxi shuo, see Wang Xun, Dongyi wenhua yu Huaiyi wenhua yanjiu (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1994). 49. Houhanshu 85:2807. 50. For the complete inscription of King Kwanggaet’o stele, see Saryo ro pon Han’guk munhwasa, ed. Kim Chǒljun and Ch’oe Pyǒnghǒn (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1986), 417-19. 51. No T’aedon, “Osegi kǔmsǒngmun e po’i nǔn Koguryǒ in ǔi chǒhakwan,” Han’guk saron 19 (1988). 52. Lunyu 9:6b. The master wished to go and live among the nine Yi-barbarian tribes. Someone said, “They are rude. What are you going to do?” The Master said, “If a gentleman dwelt among them, what rudeness would there be?” Translated by James Legge, The Chinese Classics 1 (Taipei: Southern Material Center, 1985; reprint of 1885 edition), 221. 53. Yi Kibaek and Yi Kidong, Han’guk kodaesa kangjwa (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1982), 45-46. 54. Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), chapter 2. 55. An Hosang, The Ancient History of the Korea-Dong-I Race: The Korea-Dong-I Race, Creator of East Asian Culture (Seoul: Institute of Baedal Culture, 1974). 56. An Hosang, The Ancient History of the Korea-Dong-I Race: The Korea-Dong-I Race, Creator of East Asian Culture (Seoul: Institute of Baedal Culture, 1974). 57. Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895-1919. 58. Chizuko Allen, “Northeast Asia Centered around Korea: Ch’oe Nam-sǒn’s View of History,” Journal of Asian History 49:4 (1990): 787-806.

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59. Cho Insǒng, “Kuksu chuǔi yǒksahak kwa hyǒndae ŭi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 20 (1997): 1-13. 60. Chǒn Haejong, Tongichǒn ǔi munhǒnjǒk yǒngu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1980). Yi Sǒnggyu, “Sǒnjin munhǒn e po’i nǔn Tongi ǔi sǒnggyǒk,” Han’guk kodaesa nonch’ong 1 (1991). Very few South Korean historians still lean toward the continuity of pre-Qin and post-Qin Tongi by supporting the migration hypothesis. See Kim Sanggi, “Han Ye Maek idonggo,” Sahae 1 (1948); “Tongi wa hoeyi, sŏyung e taekhayŏ,” Tongbang hakchi 2 (1955): 1-35. 61. Chǒn Haejong, Tongi Hachǒn ǔi munhǒnjǒk yǒngu. 62. Kim Chǒngbae, Han’guk minjok munhwa ǔi kiwǒn (Seoul: Koryǒ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1973). 63. Yi Sǒnbok et al., Han’guk minjok ŭi kiwǒn kwa hyǒngsǒng, 2 vols. (Seoul: Sohwa, 1996). Also Hyung Il Pai, Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-formation Theories (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000). 64. Kim Chǒnghak, Han’guk sanggosa yǒngu (Seoul: Pǒmusa, 1990), 77-85. Kim Chǒngbae, Han’guk mijok munhwa ǔi kiwǒn, 1-2. 65. The Chinese world order was usually understood in the framework of the Wufu 五服 system, that is, China was divided into five concentric and hierarchical zones. The central zone tianfu was the royal domain, under the direct rule of the king or emperor. Then there was a zone that surrounded the central zone, the houfu or the lords’ zone. Beyond the houfu were the Chinese states conquered by the reigning dynasty, which constituted the pacified zone, namely suifu or binfu. The last two zones were reserved for the barbarians. The Man and Yi barbarians resided in yaofu, which indicated Chinese control though a rather loose kind. And the last zone was occupied by Rong and Di barbarians, who were their own masters in the wild zone huangfu, where the Sino-centric world order reached its natural end. See Yü Ying-shih, “Han Foreign Relations,” in The Cambridge History of China: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 BC-AD 220, ed. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 1. 66. Wang Mingke, Huaxia Bianyuan: Lishi jiyi yu zuqun rentong (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1997), 290. 67. Ibid. 68. Houhanshu 85: 2810. 69. Yi Kibaek ed., Tan’gun sinhwa nonjip (Seoul: Saemunsa, 1988).

TWO Negotiating the Past, Reinterpreting Ancient History Legitimacy in the Lineage of Ancient Korean History

The first known written historical records in the Korean Peninsula date from the Three Kingdoms period (first century BCE?-668 CE); unfortunately none of those documents have survived. 1 The earliest Korean historical records are thought to have been written in the Koguryŏ Kingdom. The paksa 博士 or erudite scholar Yi Munjin 李文眞 summarized the Koguryŏ history in his five-volume Sinjip 新集 or the New Collection, an abridged version of an earlier one-hundred-chapter Yugi 留記 2 or the Remaining Records written when Koguryŏ first started keeping written records. 3 A scholar of the Paekche Kingdom, Ko Hŭng 高興, 4 also made historical records known as Sǒgi 書記 or the Chronicles. 5 According to Nihon shoki 日本書記 or the Chronicles of Japan, Paekche also made the famous Paekche samsŏ 百濟三書 or the Three Records of Paekche (sixth century BCE?), consisting of Paekchegi 百濟記 or the Chronicles of Paekche, Paekche pon’gi 百濟本紀 or the Annals of Paekche, and Paekche sinch’an 百濟新撰 or the New Records of Paekche. 6 The Silla Kingdom kept its own Kuksa 國史 or the State History, written by Kŏch’ilbu 居柒夫. The reason for compiling historical records is stated as follows: Yisabu 異斯夫 7 [a general-minster in the Silla period] proposed that state history is for recording the good and bad aspects of the king and minister so that they could be shown to the following thousand generations. If there is no effort at making historical records, there would be nothing available for our descendants. The king whole-heartedly agreed with it, and commanded Kŏch’ilbu to summon scholars and compile the historical record. 8 45

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Kŏch’ilbu was promoted for his contribution to the completion of state history. 9 Historical writing in the Three Kingdoms was a crucial step for ancient state-building and internal solidarity. At a time when the Three Kingdoms started crafting legal codes, organizing institutions, and preparing for military campaign, the project of making historical records could display the state’s reputation at home and abroad. Therefore, the keeping of official records was a milestone in the formation of a centralized state. 10 In addition to these official records, many records existed exclusively for private use during the Unified Silla period (or Later Silla period, 668935 CE). These records are indispensable in understanding the historiography of Silla period. One of the Silla’s most prominent scholars Ch’oe Ch’iwŏn 崔致遠 (857 CE-?) wrote Chewang yŏndaerok 帝王年代錄 or the Records of Emperors and Kings. 11 In hinting at the most puzzling relationship of Three Han with the Three Kingdoms, Ch’oe suggested that Mahan 馬韓 was the predecessor of Koguryŏ. 12 Ch’oe’s view of the Parhae 渤海 (C. Bohai) Kingdom was also noteworthy. Despite his recognition of Parhae being established by the descendants of Koguryŏ people, Ch’oe’s antipathy to the Parhae Kingdom made him deny Parhae’s position in Korean history. 13 Another prolific Silla historian, Kim Taemun 金大問 (?-?) was born into a prestigious aristocratic family. He was famous for writing biographies, especially, Kosŭngjŏn 高僧傳 or the Records of Prominent Monks, Hwarang segi 花郞世記 or the Records of Flower Youth, Akbon 樂本 or the Records of Music, Hansangi 漢山記 or the Records of Han Mountain, and Kyerim chapchŏn 鷄林雜傳 or the Miscellaneous Accounts of Silla, none of which have survived. 14 The oldest surviving Korean historical record is Samguk sagi, compiled by Kim Pusik in 1145 during the Koryǒ period. Since then, numerous historical records were compiled for state and private purposes. With an enthusiasm for historical recording peaking in the Chosǒn dynasty. In a millenium of traditional historiography, historical narratives concentrated on the rise and fall of dynasties, using history as a guide and reference for political administration and moral cultivation. THE THREE CHOSŎN AND THREE KINGDOMS FRAMEWORK IN THE KORYǑ PERIOD (918–1392) For more than seven hundred years the Three Kingdoms shared the Korean Peninsula with Koguryǒ, extending to what is now Northeast China and Russia’s Maritime Provinces. Despite Silla’s unification in the seventh century, Koreans’ deep-rooted affection for the former Koguryǒ and Paekche Kingdoms thrived. The Silla court fell into trouble when ruling elites fought over succession and taxation in the late ninth century,

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and local strongmen became too powerful for the state to control. Two of those strongmen, Kungye 弓裔 (870-918 CE) and Kyǒnhwǒn 甄萱 (867936 CE), took advantage of the chaos by leading rebellions in the name of restoring the Koguryǒ and Paekche Kingdoms. Wang Kǒn 王建 (877-943 CE), one of Kungye’s generals, overthrew Kungye, seized the throne, and renamed this kingdom Koryǒ. After Wang Kǒn secured power, he and his supporters applied different policies to Silla and Later Paekche. Insisting on a military resolution with Kyǒnhwǒn of Later Paekche, Wang Kǒn’s troops gradually won the upper hand in 930 after a decade-long series of repeated defeats. In contrast, Wang Kǒn maintained such cordial relations with Silla that the last Silla king voluntarily surrendered to him (although Silla had no real choice given Wang Kǒn’s power). Wang Kǒn gave the Silla king an honorable title, and married one of his daughters to him as a show of goodwill. After years of military campaigns, Wang Kǒn reunified the Hu Samguk 後三國 or the Later Three Kingdoms and established the Koryǒ dynasty with a capital at Song’ak 松嶽 (now Kaesǒng in North Korea). Considering the less prestigious background of Wang Kǒn and the complicated process of reunification of the Later Three Kingdoms, a critical question arises about political legitimacy during the early Koryǒ period; more specifically, whether Koryǒ succeeded Koguryǒ or Silla. Some scholars have argued that Koryǒ considered itself the successor of Koguryǒ because the original name of the state was Hu Koguryǒ, later shortened to Koryǒ after the foundation of the dynasty. Others argued that Koryǒ was a continuation of the previous Silla Kingdom considering the more than two-hundred-year gap between Koguryǒ and Koryǒ. The debate has extended to the modern period, as scholars concur that affiliation with Koguryǒ reflects a more positive and subjective sentiment; while a successor consciousness to Silla connotes a negative and passive one in terms of self-esteem. 15 In addition to these opposing viewpoints, there is a middle ground, whose proponents suggest a dual heritage in the historical consciousness of Koryǒ elites. Yi Usǒng argued that during the earlier Koryǒ period, the dominant inclination was the connection to Koguryǒ; during the later period, it transformed into a strong affiliation with Silla, which continued until the end of the Koryǒ period. 16 In terms of utilitarian adaptation, Ha Hyǒn’gang suggested that the Koryǒ ruling class used a pro-Silla sentiment to secure internal solidarity, and used a pro-Koguryǒ sentiment to repel the Khitan, so that Koryǒ could assert its territorial sovereignty over the northern border area of Koryǒ that had formerly belonged to Koguryǒ. 17 However, Michael Roger has thrown doubt upon the reliability of diplomatic records in Koryǒsa describing conversations between Sǒ Hǔi 徐熙 (942-998 CE) and Khitan generals, suspecting that it was more likely of later provenance; 18 nonetheless, it is sufficiently indicative of the Koryǒ (or Chosǒn) literati’s appreciation of Koguryǒ heritage.

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The question of Koryǒ’s lineage with Koguryǒ versus Silla becoming a point of contention in 2003, with the Sino-Korea conflict over the history of Koguryǒ. While Chinese scholars argued that no evidence existed between Koryǒ and Koguryǒ to fill the two-hundred-fifty-year gap between the two regimes, Korean scholars proposed a continuous ethnic, political, social, and cultural lineage between the two kingdoms. Compared to Koryǒ’s strong and consistent continuity with Koguryǒ, the Silla affiliation was very brief and limited to Silla elites who were incorporated into Koryǒ’s ruling class after Silla’s demise; the strong affection for the Koguryǒ heritage preceded the establishment of the Koryǒ dynasty and continued throughout the Koryǒ and Chosǒn periods. 19 Samguk sagi 三國史記 (1145) by Kim Pusik (1075-1151) Inheriting the tradition of passing down historical records, the Koryǒ court established a special institute for recording state affairs, named Ch’unch’ugwan 春秋館 or the Hall of Spring and Autumn. 20 In addition to recording daily affairs at the court, Koryǒ King Injong 仁宗 (r. 1112-1146) commanded Kim Pusik to compile Samguk sagi, which is now Korea’s oldest surviving historical document. 21 Kim Pusik was a descendant of old Silla aristocracy, although the reputation of his family was based more on his and his brothers’ success on the civil service examination and on their high positions in the Koryǒ bureaucracy. The peak of Kim’s political life came when he crushed the rebellion led by the monk Myoch’ǒng’s 妙淸 (?-1135 CE) in 1136. Kim believed that this was a righteous war against a faction of separatists, the faction led by Chŏng Chisang 鄭知常 (?-1135 CE), who attempted to move the Koryŏ capital from Song’ak to Sŏgyŏng 西京 (P’yŏngyang). Kim Pusik was famous not only for his official career but also for his erudition in Confucian classics. The Chinese envoy Xu Jing 徐兢 (10911153 CE) praised him as the finest of the Koryǒ literati. 22 However, after his brothers’ death and the rehabilitation of his political rival Yun Ǒnyi 尹彦頤 (?-1149), Kim Pusik retired at the age of sixty-eight, and three years later he started compiling the Samguk sagi. Scholars believe that there was an earlier version, Ku Samguksa 舊三國 史 or Old History of the Three Kingdoms, 23 possibly written 150 years earlier than the Samguk sagi. Kim Pusik went to Song 宋 China three times as a Koryŏ envoy, and his communication with Song scholars also expanded the channels of available sources and methodologies in his historical writing. This stimulated Kim’s his curiosity about Koryŏ and promoted his belief in the necessity of writing a new history of the Three Kingdoms. At the beginning of Samguk sagi, Kim quoted the king’s comments affirming the value of this project.

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Most of the contemporary [Koryŏ] literati are well aware of the Five Confucian Classics, the various treatises written by Chinese scholars as well as the Qin and Han historical records. However, they did not know the beginning and the end of our own history; isn’t this a miserable situation? Moreover, Silla, Koguryŏ, and Paekche all established their own states and existed simultaneously, and communicated with China according to the principle of ritual propriety. All of these activities were recorded in the biography section of Hanshu 漢書 and Tangshu 唐書. However, the Chinese records made detailed information about themselves, and only kept brief descriptions on the Three Kingdoms [of Korea]. In addition, the language in the ancient period was ambiguous, and many events were left unrecorded; hence, it is impossible to show clearly the good and bad aspects of the king and queen, the loyalty and evil of the subjects, the danger and security of the state, the order and disorder of the people, which must be preserved as lessons for later generations. Therefore, scholars with the three talents are needed to make a new history so that it could become a sun or star that preserves lessons for thousands of generations. 24

Kim intended to write a history for the purpose of educating the Koryǒ literati, and the history of the Three Kingdoms provides insights into and solutions for contemporary issues, especially Koryǒ’s relationships with other states. Despite repelling the Khitan invasion, Koryǒ still faced imminent pressure from newly ascendant Jurchen. In his writing, Kim considered internal strife the single most important reason for the collapse of Paekche and Silla. In doing so, Kim underscored his concern about contemporary problems in Koryŏ and reaffirmed his objection to internal strife. 25 Kim divided the fifty chapters of the annals into three sections: Silla, Koguryŏ, and Paekche. Since its first appearance, Samguk sagi elicited both praise and criticism. The earliest critiques of Samguk sagi appeared a century after its compilation, when Yi Kyubo complained about Kim’s neglect of the importance of King Tongmyŏng 東明, the founder of the Koguryŏ Kingdom. Kim Pusik only gave a very brief description of King Tongmyǒng when he recompiled the history. It seems that Kim believed that history should be made for the purpose of rectifying the world. He may have thought that mythical things should not be shown to the people; isn’t this the reason that he only gave minimum coverage of miraculous things? 26

Yi accused Kim of removing myths about King Tongmyǒng from its prototype, Ku Samguksa. During the early Chosǒn period, Kwǒn Kŭn 權近 (1352-1409 CE) criticized the format and structure of Samguk sagi, complaining that Kim’s division of the narratives into three parts on the basis of the Three Kingdoms resulted in duplicated and confusing information,

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and that the book was replete with vulgar vocabulary that did little to promote good politics and wise strategies. As a result, Samguk sagi was not a useful reference for later generations. 27 An Chǒngbok 安鼎福 (17121791) added that Kim had failed to incorporate all available materials into his compilation. 28 However, the critiques of Samguk sagi took a new direction during Korea’s colonial period. Unlike the previous critiques that had stressed apparent problems in organization, incomplete information, and factual mistakes, Kim Pusik was charged with founding the Sadaejuŭi 事大主義 or serving the great (China). 29 Critics blamed Kim for devaluing Korean national culture. By leaving out the Tan’gun myth, they made Kim responsible for the lack of a Korean national spirit and centuries of spineless admiration of Chinese culture. Critics assumed that Kim ignored the Tan’gun myth because it contradicted Confucian rationality, the standard for historical writing in his time. According to Sin Ch’aeho, Most scholars lamented that historical records about the Three Kingdoms period were destroyed due to the wars, and that therefore, Kim Pusik did not have sufficient materials, which made his book brief and insufficient in details. However, in fact it is rather because of Kim’s principle of Sadae [serving the great] that really destroyed many historical materials. . . . After Kim successfully suppressed Myochǒng’s rebellion at Sǒgyǒng [P’yǒngyang], Kim was obsessed by the obligation of Sadae and cut the territory of Korea into half with only concern for south of the Taedong or Han River. At the same time, Kim selectively chose materials that fit his Confucian values, while despising, distorting or ignoring those that contradicted with his taste.

Sin thus blamed Kim for Koreans’ servility to China. However, Kim’s position has more to do with the moral and rational inclination of Confucian tradition than with his admiration of Chinese culture. Contradicting Sin’s judgment, Kim Pusik actually preserved other founder myths regarding the supernatural origins of the Three Kingdoms, i.e., the legend of Pak Hyŏkkŏse of Silla, King Tongmyŏng of Koguryŏ, and King Onjo of Paekche. Therefore, other reasons may exist for Kim’s omission or negligence (if he had access to older documents) of the Tan’gun myth. Kim did not talk about the pre–Three Kingdoms period in his main text, and only made vague references about a mysterious immortal sǒn’in 仙人, Kija, and Wiman in the Tables. It has been a long time since the “East of the Sea” [Koryŏ] formed the state. From the time that Kija was enfeoffed by the Zhou king to the time that Wiman usurped the title at the beginning of the Han dynasty, it went through a long period, and only a few records survived. Thus it is hard to conduct detailed investigations. . . . 30

Regarding Ko Chosǒn, instead of specifying Tan’gun or Tan’gun Chosǒn, Kim Pusik mentioned Sǒn’in Wanggǒm 仙人王儉 or an immortal named

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Wang Kǒm, who resided around P’yǒngyang. 31 Although Kim admitted that there were some internal connections among the Three Kingdoms, the historical significance of the Silla unification was more important to him. Kim not only omitted Tan’gun, but also Kija and Wiman in his annal sections, although Kim certainly had access to information on Kija and Wiman from the Chinese sources. Therefore, Kim’s lineage of Korean history started with the Three Kingdoms period. Kim’s lack of interest in the pre-Three Kingdoms period may also be related to his attempt to distance Koryǒ history from the P’yǒngyang area. As a Koryǒ official who had just suppressed Myochǒng’s attempt to move the Koryǒ capital to P’yǒngyang, it is not surprising that Kim avoided the pre-Three Kingdoms period of Tan’gun, Kija, and Wiman Chosǒn, all of which seemed staged around the P’yǒngyang area. 32 Kim was sensitive to the political currents of his time, and his work should be assessed by the standards of his time, not of later periods. 33 Tongmyǒngwang p’yǒn 東明王篇 or the Saga of King Tongmyǒng (1197) by Yi Kyubo 李奎報 (1168–1241) Yi Kyubo was famous for his literary skills, and his Tongmyǒngwang p’yǒn was collected in the third volume of his anthology Tongguk Yisangguk chip 東國李相國集 or the Collected Works of Minister Yi. Tongmyǒngwang p’yǒn was based on annals of King Tongmyǒng in Ku Samguksa. As a biographical saga of the founder of the Koguryǒ Kingdom, King Tongmyǒng, Yi described his miraculous birth, his establishment of Koguryǒ, and his successor King Yuri 琉璃 (r. ?-18 CE), the second king of the Koguryŏ Kingdom. Yi’s appraisal of King Tongmyǒng reflected his longing for a heroic sage king for his own time, and a strong sense of Koguryǒ-successionism among Koryǒ literati. 34 There are several speculations about Yi Kyubo’s reasons for writing this saga. Yi elaborated his intention: People know about the mysterious anecdotes of King Tongmyǒng. The miraculous aspects of the Tongmyǒng legend did not intend to confuse people; however, there were truly some sacred aspects of his founding of the state. If it is not narrated, then what would be available for later generations to read? Therefore I wrote this saga as a record, so that we can let the world know that our country is the land of a sage. 35

At the end of the saga, Yi wrote: When there emerged a king, it was accompanied by many auspicious signs. However, by the end of a dynasty, the king became lazy and tended to stop observing rituals to respect the earlier kings. Then one realizes that those kings who can sustain a lineage are those that could even be careful about minor issues. The throne should be upheld by generosity and benevolence, so that the people can be civilized by ritu-

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According to Yi, King Tongmyǒng was the epitome of the sage king. However, Yi confined his saga to the early period of Koguryǒ; hence, it is impossible to perceive his overall understanding of the early history of Korea. To him, the important issues were the responsibilities and morality of the king. Hence, only those rulers who upheld the Confucian order could prosper. Samguk yusa 三國遺事 or the Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms (1281) by Iryǒn 一然 (1206-1289) During the Mongol period of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Koryŏ remained a son-in-law court 37 of the Mongol Yuan 元 Empire (1271-1398) and had to endure Mongol interference in its internal affairs. As part of its intervention policy, the Yuan court requested that Koryǒ submit historical records. According to Koryǒsa 高麗史 or the History of the Koryǒ Dynasty, the Yuan emperor first requested a comprehensive and detailed report on Koyǒ in 1278. 38 To comply with the request, King Ch’ungyǒl 忠烈 (r. 1274-1308) of Koryǒ ordered scholars to compile a national history for submission to the Yuan court. 39 Koryǒ sent 185 volumes of historical records to Yuan. 40 Many Sillok 實錄 or Veritable Records were produced in the second half of the Koryǒ dynasty, although none of them have survived. Instead, what endured are many private documents and records, the most important of which is Iryǒn’s Samguk yusa. The Samguk yusa attracted much attention from later historians for many reasons: first, it is the earliest surviving record about Tan’gun; second, it was written right after one of the most chaotic periods of Korean history, the era of military rule (11701270) 41 and in the middle of the Mongol intervention (1274-1351); and third, it was written by a Buddhist monk, not a conventional member of the Confucian literati. Iryǒn lived under the combined legacies of military rule and the Mongol intervention. Born to an ordinary family in Kyǒngsang province, he obtained special favor from King Ch’ungyǒl in the 1270s. Iryǒn finished Samguk yusa when he was more than eighty years old in 1285. Knowledgeable not only about all schools of Buddhism, Iryǒn was also wellversed in the Confucian classics. His Samguk yusa supplemented materials that Kim Pusik had neglected, especially pertaining to the pre–Three Kingdoms history. The structure of Samguk yusa was influenced by a Chinese book, San Gaoseng Zhuan 三高僧傳 or the Biography of Prominent Monks from the Liang, Tang, and Song Dynasties. 42 However, Samguk yusa has several entries not found in San Gaoseng Zhuan, probably because Iryŏn intended

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to make a historical record that was more than a purely Buddhist text. 43 Iryŏn’s book is unique with a title Yusa 遺事 (C. yishi), which means “collection of forgotten anecdotes.” Iryŏn collected all available materials, and attempted to give as many citations as possible. Some literature scholars argued that Samguk yusa was more of a literary collection than a history due to its incorporation of folklore and legends. 44 Recent researchers have noted that Iryǒn used the Chinese literary genre yishi in order to produce a comprehensive collection of informal narratives and miscellaneous anecdotes, which allowed Iryǒn to be more flexible in structure and organization. 45 Samguk yusa was greatly admired for its incorporation of epigraphs, ancient texts, and legends. Iryŏn not only relied on Chinese records, but also reproduced many Korean texts that have since been lost, such as Kogi 古記 or the Ancient Record. He claimed that miracles could happen when someone destined to rule appeared. Iryǒn started his Wangnyǒk 王曆 or the Lineage of the Kings with the Silla kings at the beginning of Samguk yusa, and the pre–Three Kingdoms period was allocated to the second section, Ki’i 紀異 or the Records of Miraculous Things. Samguk yusa received special praise for including the legend of Tan’gun and placing it chronologically at the dawn of Korean history. However, Iryǒn also mentioned Kija and Wiman Chosǒn. At the same time, unlike other historical books written by Confucian scholars, Iryǒn cared about promoting Buddhism, and the Tan’gun myth was decorated with Buddhist colors by giving the Heavenly God another name: Chesǒk 帝釋. Under the entry for Ko Chosǒn (Wanggǒm Chosǒn) at the beginning of his Ki’i section, Iryǒn wrote: The Wei Shu 魏書 tells us that two thousand years ago, at the time of Emperor Yao 堯, Tan’gun Wanggǒm chose Asadal 阿斯達 as his capital and founded the state of Chosǒn. The Old Records notes that in olden times, Hwan’in’s 桓因 son, Hwanung 桓雄, wished to descend from heaven and live in the world of human beings. Knowing his son’s desire, Hwan’in surveyed the three highest mountains and found Mount T’aekbaek the most suitable place for his son to settle and help human beings. Therefore he gave Hwanung three heavenly seals and dispatched him to rule over the people. Hwanung descended with three thousand followers to a spot under a tree by the Holy Altar atop Mount T’aebaek, and he called this place the City of God. He was the Heavenly King Hwanung. Leading the Earl of Wind, the Master of Rain, and the Master of Clouds, he took charge of some three hundred and sixty areas of responsibility, including agriculture, allotted lifespan, illness, punishment, and good and evil, and brought culture to his people. At that time a bear and tiger living in the same cave prayed to Holy Hwanung to transform them into human beings; the king gave them a bundle of sacred mugworts and twenty cloves of garlic and said, “If you eat these and shun the sunlight for one hundred days, you will

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Chapter 2 assume human form.” Both animals ate the spices and avoided the sun. After twenty-one days the bear became a woman, but the tiger, unable to observe the taboo, remained a tiger. Unable to find a husband, the bear-woman prayed under the altar tree for a child. Hwanung metamorphosed himself, lay with her, and begot a son called Tan’gun Wanggǒm. In the fiftieth year of the reign of Emperor Yao, Tan’gun made the walled city of P’yǒngyang the capital and called his country Chosǒn. He then moved his capital to Asadal on Mount Paegak, also named Mount Kunghol, or Kŭmmidal, whence he ruled for fifteen hundred years. When, in the year kimyo [1122 BCE], King Wu of Zhou enfeoffed Chitzu [K. Kija] to Chosǒn, Tan’gun moved to Changdanggyǒng, but later he returned and hid in Asadal as a mountain god at the age of one thousand nine hundred and eight. 46

Iryǒn pointed out that Ko Chosǒn was also called Wanggǒm Chosǒn, and that ko 古 referred to both Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn. Wiman was listed under a separate title; therefore, ko distinguished Tan’gun from Wiman Chosǒn. Quoting from Weishu 魏書 and Kogi 古記, Iryǒn described the miraculous birth of Tan’gun with his patriarchal lineage from a Hwanung, the son of Heavenly God. Tan’gun established the first ancient state of Tan’gun Chosǒn, and the year was set to the fiftieth year of the reign of Emperor Yao. Iryǒn affirmed that Kija was enfeoffed to Chosǒn by King Wu of the Zhou. However, Iryǒn did not specify the relationship between Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn, nor did he name this phase of history as Kija Chosǒn. 47 It seems that Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn had a similar territorial scope, and that the transition of power from Tan’gun to Kija was peaceful. After Kija’s enfeoffment, Tan’gun moved his capital to Changdanggyǒng, and became first a hermit and then a mountain god at Asadal. Iryǒn’s description of Wiman followed the Chinese records from the Han period; the only difference is that he used Wi 魏 as Wiman’s surname, instead of Wi 衛, which had been used in Sanguozhi and Hou Hanshu. More importantly, Iryǒn did not mention Wiman’s betrayal and usurpation of power in his section of Wiman Chosǒn. Instead, that information appeared at Mahan section, but in a much more ambiguous tone. According to Weizhi, Weiman attacked Chosǒn, and the King of Chosǒn led his court servants and followers to go across the sea, and reached the land of Han 韓. The new state was named “Mahan.” 48

Iryǒn had made Wiman Chosǒn a phase of Korean history; however, his brief description of Wiman was different not only from earlier Chinese documents (Sanguozhi and Hou Hanshu), but also from later Koryǒ and Chosǒn works. In relation to the Three Kingdoms period, Iryǒn agreed with the primacy of Silla, because he believed that Silla was chronologically the oldest of the Three Kingdoms. However, in his Ki’i section, Iryǒn put Koguryǒ at the beginning of the Three Kingdoms, followed by

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Pyǒnhan, Paekche, Chinhan, and Silla. Therefore, Iryǒn’s interest in Koguryǒ was different from Kim Pusik’s Samguk sagi, in which Kim insisted upon the overarching importance of Silla. 49 Iryǒn attempted to construct a more comprehensive account of ancient history. The components of his ancient history included not only Tan’gun, Kija, and Wiman, but also Samhan 三韓, Yemaek 濊貊, Puyǒ 夫 餘, Kaya 伽耶, Nangnang 樂浪, Taebang 帶方, and even Malgal 靺鞨 and Parhae 渤海. His incorporation of all related entities influenced later generations of historians. Iryǒn ascribed all Three Chosǒn to the P’yǒngyang area; despite his quotation of Weishu, which placed the founding of Tan’gun Chosǒn in the same year that Emperor Yao of China took the throne, Iryǒn leaned toward his second quotation from Kogi, the fiftieth year of Emperor Yao. Chewang ungi 帝王韻記 or Songs of Emperors and Kings (1287), by Yi Sŭnghyu 李承休 (1224–1300) Chewang ungi is a historical saga about Chinese and Korean history, one of the three essential historical sources in the Koryǒ period along with Samguk sagi and Samguk yusa. Volume one of Chewang ungi is about the history of China from the legendary figure Pangu 盤古 to the Jurchen Jin 金 period (1115-1234 CE). In his account of the dynastic lineage of China, Yi took the Yuan dynasty into the official lineage of China history. Volume two is about Korean history, with part one of Korean history, Tongguk kunwang kaeguk yǒndae 東國君王開國年代 or the Founding Era of Eastern Monarchs, covering from Tan’gun to Parhae. It includes the following entries: Chǒn Chosǒn 前朝鮮 or the Former Chosǒn (refers to Tan’gun Chosǒn), Hu Chosǒn 後朝鮮 or the Later Chosǒn (refers to Kija Chosǒn), Wiman Chosǒn, Han Sagun 漢四郡 or the Four Han Commanderies, Samhan 三韓 or the Three Han, Silla, Koguryǒ, Paekche, Hu Koguryǒ 後高句麗 or the Later Koguryǒ, Hu Paekche 後百濟 or the Later Paekche, and Parhae. The second part is about Yi’s contemporary era from the beginning of the Koryǒ period to the reign of King Ch’ungyǒl. Written from a Confucian perspective, this saga also incorporated Buddhist and Daoist elements. It was written when Yi Sŭnghyu lived in exile in 1280 in the wake of his criticism of the pro-Yuan clique in the Koryǒ court. Yi was frustrated by Mongol intervention and other problems caused by the dysfunctional Koryǒ court notably the king’s hedonism and the fact that state affairs had fallen into the hands of evil officials. 50 Yi wrote Chewang ungi and sent it to King Ch’ungyǒl in 1287, hoping that the king “[would make] the good things the norm and the bad things warnings.” This saga is famous for the Tan’gun myth, which incorporates slightly different details from Samguk yusa even though it was written at around the same time. It states that Hwanung 桓雄, the son of the Heavenly God

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Hwanin 桓因, let his young granddaughter drink some tonic that transformed her into a woman. She then married a Tangsusin 檀樹神 or Sandalwood Tree Spirit, which resulted in the birth of Tan’gun. Therefore, instead of Tan’gun’s patriarchal connection to the Heavenly God depicted in Samgu yusa, Yi chose a maternal connection. 51 In other words, the Heavenly God became the maternal great grandfather of Tan’gun. In this new setting of family clan, Hwanung may represent the migrant group, and the granddaughter from this group married an earthly (indigenous, local) spirit—the Sandalwood Tree—and later gave birth to the founder of Ko Chosǒn, Tan’gun. This is also a case of referring to Tan’gun using Tan 檀 (sandalwood tree) instead of 壇 (altar), which was used by Iryǒn. Since then, most writings on Tan’gun chose the character of the sandalwood tree, though the reason for preferring sandalwood over the altar (檀 over 壇) is unclear. Yi’s narrative of the ancient history started from Tan’gun Chosǒn, continued with Kija and Wiman Chosǒn, and was followed by that of Samhan and Samguk, and then Parhae and Koryǒ. Chewang ungi was more special because, for the first time, Tan’gun was recognized as the common ancestor of the Korean people. 52 There were separate ancestor myths for Puyǒ, Koguryǒ, and Silla; however, Yi contended that they were all descendants of Tan’gun, along with other coexisting groups, such as Sila 尸羅, Korye 高禮, North and South Okjǒ 沃沮, East and North Puyǒ 扶餘, Yemaek 濊貊, and Samhan 三韓. It is also noteworthy that Parhae was included in Tongguk kunwang kaeguk yǒndae, which was quite a contrast from the neglect and even contempt for Parhae among his Koryǒ contemporaries. Yi offers a much more inclusive perspective than that found in Samguk yusa in the lineage of early history, which could be considered the precursor of twentiethcentury Pan-Tan’gunism. 53 Despite Yi’s inclusiveness in relation to the ancient period, he placed the Korean Peninsula at the center stage of Korean history. The hypothesis of Yodong-centered (C. Liaodong 遼東) Ko Chosǒn appeared two centuries later, first proposed by Kwǒn Nam 權 覽 during the early Chosǒn period, and then refined in the second half of the Chosǒn dynasty. This saga made a perplexing compromise among pride in Koryǒ’s historical tradition, Confucian rationality, and the reality of Mongol intervention. 54 Apparently, Yi was supportive of the Yuan’s presence in Koryǒ, praising the Yuan as unique in history and claiming that the prosperity of Koryǒ under the Mongol intervention had been unprecedented. At the same time, by incorporating and uniting multiple groups of early residents in Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula into a single category as descendants of Tan’gun, it also reflected Yi’s effort to establish an unbroken lineage of Korean history. The single origin of Korean history influenced not only those late Chosǒn scholars interested in the northern

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lineage of Korean history, but also contributed to the formation of Korean nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Among the four most notable historical writings in the Koryǒ period, Samguk yusa and Chewang ungi started in the pre–Three Kingdoms period. Most contemporary scholars gave credit to these books for preserving records on Tan’gun. However, Iryǒn and Yi Sǔnghyu also reaffirmed Kija’s migration and enfeoffment with Chosǒn; 55 therefore, Samguk yusa and Chewang ungi also marked the beginning of considering Kija Chosǒn as one of the Three Chosǒn in Korean history. In particular, Yi Sŭnghyu designated Kija as the founder of Hu Chosǒn. Consequently, along with the rising ritual value of Kija in the Koryǒ court, Kija Chosǒn officially became a legitimate phase of Korean history and the importance of Kija was inherited by Chosǒn literati. Yi Sŭnghyu also configured an interesting relationship between Tan’gun Chosǒn and the subsequent establishment of Kija and Wiman Chosǒn. According to Yi, Tan’gun became a mountain god after having ruled for 1,038 years. One hundred and sixtyfour years separated Tan’gun from Kija Chosǒn, and Kija came to Chosǒn as a benevolent ruler. After Kija established Hu Chosǒn, King Wu of the Zhou enfeoffed Kija with Chosǒn to reaffirm this fait accompli and Hu Chosǒn lasted for 928 years. Quoting from Shangshu 尙書 or the Book of Documents, Yi also stated that Kija paid a visit as a feudal subject to King Wu to observe the ritual code, and delivered lectures about Hongbŏm kuju 洪範九疇 or the Nine Grand Plans to King Wu during his stay in the Zhou. 56 Hu Chosǒn’s era of peace and prosperity was interrupted by Wiman, a general of Yan origin, who raided the Hu Chosǒn state in 191 BCE. 57 King Kijun was forced to flee to Kǔmmagun 金馬郡, where he established a new capital and continued his rule. Unlike the benevolent King Kijun, the arrogant King Ugǒ, the third king of Wiman Chosǒn and the grandson of Wiman, brought invasion from the Han dynasty. Yi addressed his hostility to King Ugǒ and even seemed in favor of the Han invasion, saying that “the people of Wiman Chosǒn killed King Ugǒ and welcomed the Han troops, and it is natural as the [punishment] of [Wiman’s] betraying the Han dynasty and expelling King Kijun.” 58 To Yi, Kija and the descendants of Kija Chosǒn possessed political legitimacy and would have remained in power had it not been for Wiman’s coup d’état. In this sense, the Han invasion seemed more like a rational trial upon traitors than an external invasion. The terminology of ancient history has been problematic since the mid-Koryǒ period, Tan’gun Chosŏn 檀 (壇)君朝鮮, Kija Chosŏn 箕子朝鮮, and Wiman Chosŏn 衛(魏)滿朝鮮. They were sometimes labeled Ko Chosŏn 古朝鮮, Chŏn Chosŏn 前朝鮮, and Hu Chosŏn 後朝鮮. With no difference between the former or later Chosŏn appearing in the Chinese records, only Korean records distinguished them. There was only one Chosŏn until the Koryŏ period, and Iryŏn used Ko Chosŏn to refer to

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Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn. However, since the Chosŏn dynasty (13921910 CE), Chosǒn literati had to distinguish the earlier one from the contemporary Chosŏn. Sometimes Ko Chosŏn meant Tan’gun Chosŏn, sometimes it referred to Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn, and at other times, it included all three Chosŏn, Tan’gun, Kija, and Wiman—a confusion that continues today. Iryǒn and Yi Sŭnghyu listed many coexisting entities with less concern for choosing the primary one, and organized them in a loose framework based on their affiliation with Tan’gun. However, during the following Chosŏn dynasty, the writing of early history had to deal with chǒngt’ong 正統 or political legitimacy. If two or more regimes coexisted, only one could be legitimate. Hence, the new historical writing required a reconfiguration of early history based on political legitimacy. Obliged to choose a legitimate regime, historians had to dismiss the rest as illegitimate. In the following period, historians paid special attention to the relationship between Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn. Wiman was cast as an immoral usurper, and was thus either minimized in the history of Korea or left out entirely from the narrative. Consequently, political legitimacy was transmitted from Kija Chosŏn to Samhan. At the same time, Silla’s legitimacy among the Three Kingdoms was occasionally questioned, and some scholars argued that Koguryŏ should be the one considerd legitimate before the unification period. In the second half of the Chosǒn dynasty, interest in Koguryŏ history increased along with concern for the northern expedition, which led to a new hypothesis embracing the northern lineage in the framework of the South-North States. Occasionally, the heritage of Koguryŏ was prioritized over Silla because of its possible affiliation with Tan’gun. STABILITY AFTER THE DYNASTIC TRANSITION FROM THE EARLY TO MID-CHOSǑN PERIOD (1392-1600) The tremendous changes that Korea underwent in the fourteenth century paralleled the dynastic transitions in China. By the end of the Yuan period, the Mongol ruling class was threatened by persistent anti-Yuan sentiment among Chinese literati, natural disasters, and peasant uprisings. In 1368, the rebel leader Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (r. 1368-1398) overthrew the once-powerful Yuan Empire and established a new Chinese dynasty, the Ming 明 (1368-1644 CE). This put an end to the centuries-long harassment, intervention, and occupation by the northern nomadic people in China proper, which had started at the end of the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127). At the same time, the chaos in China proper and the inability of the Yuan to contain it emboldened Koryŏ’s attempts to shake off the Yuan grip and reclaim its political autonomy.

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King Kongmin 恭愍 (r. 1351-1374) of Koryŏ intended to conduct reform during the late Koryŏ period. He targeted the powerful aristocrats who were abusing their power in the Koryŏ court, relying on their backing from the Yuan court. However, a sea change occurred with the emergence of Yi Sŏnggye 李成桂 (1335-1408), who was from a military family residing in the northern border area under the Yuan control (K. Ssangsŏng 雙城 Commandery; C. Shuangcheng). Yi’s family later turned to Koryŏ, and Yi Sŏnggye became famous for his military campaigns against Japanese pirates at the end of the Koryŏ period. As one of the country’s most powerful military figures, Yi was appointed to lead a northern expedition against Ming China along with General Ch’oe Yŏng 崔瑩 (1316-1388). However, unlike Ch’oe who was determined to undertake the northern expedition, Yi led his troops back and took over virtual control of Koryŏ in 1388, which became the prelude to a dynastic transition. Yi and his loyal followers carried out land reform in 1390 and other policies to eliminate political opponents, including the influential Buddhist sector. Two years later, Yi proclaimed a new dynasty and became King T’aejo 太祖 (r. 1392-1398), the first king of the Chosŏn dynasty. 59 Koryŏ survived a chaotic period of military rule and the Mongol invasion from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. However, it was Yi Sŏnggye, a general from a nonaristocratic background, who brought the 474-year-long Koryŏ dynasty to an end. As one of the most important transitions in premodern Korea, the early Chosŏn period had to legitimize the overthrow of the Koryŏ dynasty by a former subject of Koryŏ and to convince the people that Chosŏn bore the Mandate of Heaven. Not surprisingly, they resorted to history. According to Ming Shilu 明實錄 or the Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty, Yi Sŏnggye sent a letter to Emperor Taizu of the Ming 明太祖 asking for a name for his new dynasty. Ming Taizu chose Chaoxian (K. Chosŏn) because it had been known for a long time in China, and he affirmed the connection with the Korean Peninsula through the Chinese sage Jizi (K. Kija). 60 In other words, Ming China reminded Yi of Chosŏn’s historical subordination to the Chinese dynasties since the Zhou period (twelfth to third century BCE). However, the name Chosŏn was also Yi’s preference. It gave the Chosŏn ruling class a dual affiliation with both Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn. During the early Chosŏn period, the court performed rituals honoring both Tan’gun and Kija, and it assured Chosŏn more latitude to use both heritages in constructing political legitimacy and consolidating internal stability. 61 Along with the issue of the legitimacy of a new dynasty, the early Chosŏn soon faced additional challenges. The fifth son of King T’aejo, Yi Pangwŏn 李芳遠 (1367-1422), resorted to military force in opposition to his father’s appointment of one of Yi Pangwŏn’s younger half-brothers the new crown prince. Yi Pangwŏn killed his half-brothers and many supporters of his father who helped to found the dynasty, and forced his

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father to abdicate. One of his elder brothers was temporarily enthroned for two years to disguise Yi Pangwŏn’s intentions, and thereafter, Yi Pangwŏn took the throne as the third king of Chosŏn, King T’aejong 太宗 (r. 1400-1418). The next bloodshed was King Sejo’s 世祖 (r. 1455-1468) murder of his nephew, King Tanjong 端宗 (r. 1452-1455), and usurpation of the throne. These incidents caused strife among Confucian literati over the Confucian morality of loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, and righteousness. Therefore the historical records of the early Chosŏn period reflected historians’ confusion, anxiety, reluctance, and reservations in narrating and assessing these events. It is not surprising that the attitude toward these incidents remained controversial for the Chosŏn dynasty, which contributed to four rounds of literati purges and chronic factional strife. 62 Despite political tensions, the production of historical records flourished. Most of the early Chosŏn records were made in response to official requests. Since the first T’aejo Sillok 太祖實錄 or the Veritable Records of the King T’aejo (commissioned by his son, King T’aejong), the convention of making official records upon the death of a king continued, and these records later became Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok 朝鮮王朝實錄 or the Veritable Records of the Chosŏn dynasty, the most widely consulted and authoritative source on Chosŏn history. The compilation of the history of the fifteenth century was shaped by Confucian values, particularly for legitimizing the containment of attacks on Buddhism, and for Yi Sŏnggye’s retreat from the northern expedition. 63 These views were represented by Chŏng Tojŏn 鄭道傳 (?-1398) and Kwŏn Kŭn 權近 (1352-1409), the strongest advocates for Neo-Confucianism, land reform, and the establishment of a new dynasty. The immediate past Koryŏ dynasty needs to be understood from the perspective of the necessity and legitimacy of a new dynasty. The comprehensive collection of the Koryŏ dynasty was made early in the Chosŏn, titled Koryŏsa 高麗史 or the History of the Koryŏ dynasty and Koryŏsa Chŏryo 高麗史節要 or the Concise History the Koryŏ dynasty. There were also efforts to write a comprehensive history of Korea, such as Tongguk T’onggam 東國通鑑 or the Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom, which covered from Tan’gun to the late Koryŏ period. 64 Following the tradition of Iryŏn and Yi Sǔnghyu from the Koryŏ period, many historical records named both Tan’gun and Kija as the ancestors of the Chosǒn people. Among the early Chosǒn historical records, Tan’gun and Tan’gun Chosǒn were frequently mentioned, but Kija was usually placed in a superior position to Tan’gun. Kija was depicted as a benevolent disseminator of civilization from China. His ethnicity was not only innocuous, but also affirmed the authenticity of Korean culture within the universal Sino-centric sphere. Corresponding to the priority placed on Kija, the early Chosǒn period witnessed a proliferation of investigations of Kija and Kija Chosŏn, represented by Yi Yi’s 李珥 (1536-

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1584) Kija Silki 箕子實記 or the Veritable Records on Kija in 1580, and Yun Tusu’s 尹斗壽 (1533-1601) Kija Chi 箕子志 or the Records on Kija. There was also a new trend to reassess the Three Kingdoms. Influenced by Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130-1200 CE) discourse of legitimacy, there was an argument about Samguk sidae mut’ongron 三國時代無統論 or the Illegitimate Era of the Three Kingdoms period. According to the new theory, neither Silla nor Unified Silla was legitimate; therefore, the legitimate lineage of Korean history started only in the nineteenth year of Koryǒ King Taejo’s reign (918-943 CE), the year that Wang Kǒn unified the Later Three Kingdoms in 936 CE. 65 The historical records of the sixteenth century became more diverse. Besides the official records, the emergence of numerous private historical records reflected the consciousness of individual historians, such as Pak Sang’s 朴祥 Tongguk saryak 東國史略 or Abridged History of the Eastern State, 66 and Yu Hŭiryŏng’s 柳希齡 P’yoche ǔmju tongguk saryak 標題音註 東國史略 or Annotated Brief History of the Eastern State. Sejong sillok chiri chi 世宗實錄地理誌 or The Geographical Treatise in the Veritable Records of King Sejong (1432) Sejong sillok chiri chi is a collection on Chosŏn geography with comprehensive information about economic, social, military, and regional administration. As a historical document, it details the vicissitudes of historical sites, particularly with the information on Tan’gun and Kija allocated to the temple and shrine section. It is one of the first official references to Tan’gun and Kija in the Chosŏn period. Once upon a time there was a spiritual figure that descended to a sandalwood tree. The country folks made him the king, and his title is Tan’gun. The capital was at P’yŏngyang. 67

Sejong sillok chiri chi states that it quoted from Tan’gun Kogi 檀君古記 or the Ancient Record of Tan’gun. The Tan’gun legend is different from the versions of Iryǒn and Yi Sŭnghyu. Without a patriarchal or matrilineal affiliation, Tan’gun appeared without direct connection to the Heavenly God. Tan’gun was a title rather than an individual name, and the capital was at P’yǒngyang—a much simpler version than the multiple capitals appearing in other books. Despite a short geographic entry under P’yǒngyang, this version was later adopted by many Chosǒn historians. Koryŏsa 高麗史 (1451) Koryŏsa is a collaborative work by early Chosŏn literati Chŏng Inchi 鄭 麟趾 (1396-1478) and Kim Chongsŏ 金宗瑞 (1390-1453). Instead of Pongi 本紀 or the Annals, Koryŏsa used Sega 世家 or the Hereditary Family, and the structure of Koryŏsa was similar to Yuanshi 元史 or the History of the

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Yuan Dynasty. 68 Koryŏsa put the last king of Koryŏ, King U 禑 (r. 13741388) and his son in the rebels section, to endorse the establishment of the new Chosŏn dynasty. Regarding the early history of Korea, except for adding the founding year of Tan’gun Chosŏn, the year of Mujin (twenty-fifth year of Emperor Yao, the middle one among the three assumed dates), Koryŏsa followed Sejong sillok chiri chi. A spiritual figure descended to the sandalwood tree, and local folks made him king. That was the year of Mujin, and his capital was at P’yŏngyang. 69

Tonguk saryak 東國史略 or the Concise History of the Eastern State (1396) by Kwŏn Kŭn 權近 (1352-1409); Ŭngjesi chu 應製詩註 or Commentary on Ŭngjesi (1457) by Kwŏn Nam 權覽 (1416-1465) Tonguk saryak was written in 1396, in the third year of King T’aejong’s reign. It starts as a concise version of Samguk sagi, but differs in terms of dynastic lineage, especially in relation to early history. Kwŏn Kŭn put Tan’gun Chosŏn at the beginning, followed by Kija and Wiman Chosŏn, the Four Han Commanderies, Samhan, and the Three Kingdoms. It indicated that Kwŏn’s views on ancient history were more influenced by Iryŏn’s Samguk yusa and Yi Sŭnghyu’s Chewang ungi. Unlike Kim Pusik, who started his record from Silla’s first king, Pak Hyŏkkŏse 朴赫居世, Kwŏn traced ancient history back to the Tan’gun and Samhan periods, and the title of the book also changed from Samguk saryak 三國史略 or the Concise History of the Three Kingdoms to Tongguk sarak. 70 The way that Kwŏn used Tongguk or Eastern State to replace Samguk implied that a strong sense of solidarity had developed over the long course of unification of the Koryŏ and Chosŏn periods. From then on, more historical writing used Tongguk to refer to Chosǒn. 71 Tongguk sarak has five chapters of annals, which were organized not only to create a more systematic narrative, but were also for the benefit of the new Chosŏn dynasty. Kwŏn started his narrative from Tan’gun, and it was listed as woegi 外記 or an outer record. As a historical record made in response to an official request, it was the first to incorporate detailed information about Tan’gun and Samhan. However, Kwŏn left out information on Puyŏ 夫餘, Okjŏ 沃沮, and Tongye 東濊. 72 In general, Kwŏn gave priority to the history of Silla; therefore, Kwŏn exclusively used the reign name of Silla without cross-referencing the other two kingdoms in his discussion of relations between Silla and Paekche/Koguryŏ. Kwŏn explained that he placed priority on Silla because Silla was established first and lasted the longest of the Three Kingdoms. 73 In addition to Sejong sillok chiri chi’s narrative, Kwŏn commented that the year of Tan’gun’s ascendance was the twenty-fifth year of the Chinese sage king Yao, and

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that Tan’gun Chosŏn thrived for the next thousand years. It was not Tan’gun, but his lineage that lasted for the next thousand years. As one of the most prominent court officials and literati of Chosŏn, Kwŏn Kŭn wrote poems on his visits to Ming China as an envoy, 74 and his grandson Kwŏn Nam later made a commentary to his grandfather’s poems, Ŭngjesi. This commentary is famous for having another version of the Tan’gun myth. In narrating the early history of Korea, Kwŏn Nam not only quoted from Samguk Sagi and Samguk yusa, but also from other sources that were normally neglected by other literati for their unreliability, such as Kogi 古記 or The Ancient Record; Sinji pisa 神誌秘詞 or The Miraculous Record; and Tosŏn ki 道詵記 or The Record of Monk Tosŏn. Kwŏn Nam stated that Tan’gun’s son Puru 扶婁 paid tribute to the Xia 夏 dynasty, and that most parts of the Han Commanderies were located outside of the Korean Peninsula, in Manchuria. Kwŏn suggested a new definition for Yodong (C. Liaodong) 遼東, arguing that it not only included the land to the east of the Liao River but also the western bank, which implied a much larger territory for Tan’gun Chosŏn, and the Han Commanderies were installed outside of the Korean Peninsula. Kwǒn Nam was the only member of the Choson literati to propose that Ko Chosǒn was located in the Yodong area. His interpretation was closer to those of late Chosŏn historians who had special interests in northern expeditions and Manchuria. 75 Tan’gun was the son of Hwanung and a bear-woman, and he ascended to the throne on the same day as King Yao of China. His capital moved from P’yŏngyang to Paeg’ak. Tan’gun entered Mount Asadal and became a spirit in the eighth year of King Wuding of the Shang. Puru went to Mount Tushan to pay tribute to the Xia dynasty. 76

Kwŏn Nam followed the Samguk yusa version of the birth and foundation of Tan’gun Chosŏn, and added information on Tan’gun’s son, Puru, visiting China to pay tribute. According to Kwǒn, Tan’gun remained a supernatural figure, assuming the throne on the same day as the Chinese sage king Yao, and living a thousand years until his transformation into a mountain god. 77 The arrival of Kija seemed peaceful. Though Kwŏn did not specify the chronological sequence; the way that Kija chose Chosŏn instead of a different title implied a smooth transition. Besides his relocation of Ko Chosǒn to the Yodong area, Kwŏn was the first to claim a relationship between Tan’gun and the Tong’i group, naming Tan’gun Sigo kaebyŏk Tong’i chu 始古開闢東夷主 or the epoch-making first lord of Tong’i. Kwǒn was also the only one who insisted that the founding date of Tan’gun Chosǒn was the same day as Emperor Yao’s ascension to the throne. Despite Iryǒn’s quotation of Weishu, which indicated the simultaneous ascendance to the throne by Emperor Yao and Tan’gun, most Koryǒ and Chosǒn literati chose the twenty-fifth year of Emperor Yao’s reign as the date of Tan’gun Chosǒn, if not even later in the fiftieth year.

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Tongguk t’onggam 東國通鑑 or the Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom (1484-1485) by Sŏ Kŏjŏng 徐居正 (1420-1488) and No Sasin 盧思愼 (1427-1498) Tongguk t’onggam is a typical state project. It is organized in chronological order starting from woegi 外紀 or the outer record, the Three Kingdoms, Silla, and Koryŏ. The outer record is from Tan’gun Chosŏn to Samhan, and along with the following Three Kingdoms period, they were allocated to the outer records because they were believed to be a period of Muchŏngt’ong 無正統 or illegitimate phases of Korean history. Among Samhan, the authors gave priority to Mahan 馬韓, as by their reasoning, Mahan continued the Confucian tradition of Kija Chosŏn, and therefore was culturally and politically superior to Chinhan 辰韓 and Pyŏnhan 弁韓. The hallmark of Tongguk t’onggam was the authors’ reconsideration of the Silla Kingdom. Tongguk t’onggam divided Silla into two phases—preunification and the Later Silla period—which made preunification Silla a part of the Three Kingdoms period and hence an illegitimate phase. Implying that a new era of Silla had not begun until the Silla unification in 668, the authors placed special weight on the significance of the Silla unification. Since Silla, Paekche, and Koguryŏ were all equally illegitimate during the preunification period, Tongguk t’onggam gave equal treatment to the Three Kingdoms. Describing the beginning of Korean history, Tongguk t’onggam states, Initially there was no chief at the Eastern State. A spiritual figure descended to a sandalwood tree, and the local folk made him king. This was the Mujin year of the Emperor Yao. The capital was at P’yŏngyang at the beginning, and then moved to Paeg’ak. In the eighth year of Shang King Wuding, Tan’gun entered Asadal and became a mountain god. Comments: This is doubtful. Emperor Yao took the throne in the year of Kapcha kapchin, and Tan’gun was enthroned twenty-five years later. Therefore, those who contended that Emperor Yao and Tan’gun ascended in the same year were wrong. 78

Following the version in Sejong sillok chiri chi, Tongguk t’onggam omitted Hwan’in and Hwan’ung from Tan’gun’s lineage, and had Tan’gun descend directly from heaven. It also supported the twenty-fifth year hypothesis of Tan’gun Chosŏn and denied the possibility of the sameyear hypothesis, though no reason was given for this choice. They attempted to give a more reasonable interpretation of the Tan’gun myth by correcting Tan’gun’s age, saying that 1,048 years should be the length of the Tan’gun lineage. Despite his mythical descent from heaven, Tan’gun was human, and his years of life were made realistic. However, it continued the supernatural destiny of Tan’gun by describing his transformation into a mountain god in the year of 1317 BCE, and it was more of a

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voluntary seclusion. Therefore, the enfeoffment of Kija and establishment of Kija Chosŏn proceeded peacefully. With detailed information of Kija’s remonstration to the last Shang King Zhou and his consequent retreat to Chosŏn, Tongguk t’onggam assumed that “it was Kija that made Chosŏn a country that possessed poems, writings, ritual propriety, and music, in addition to benevolence and righteousness.” 79 Following the orthodox Sŏngnihak 性理學 or Nature and Principle school, their emphasis in Korean history was allotted to the southern lineage of Korean history (Tan’gun Chosŏn-Kija Chosŏn-Silla). 80 Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam 新增東國輿地勝覽 or the New Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea (1486) Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam is the most comprehensive geographical encyclopedia in the Chosŏn dynasty. Recognizing its necessity for efficient administration, King Sejong 世宗 (r. 1418-1450) requested that a geographical treatise be made, which was completed in 1432 with the title Sinch’an P’aldo chiri chi 新撰八道地理志 or Newly Compiled Geographical Records of the Eight Provinces. It was soon revised by adopting the Ming style, and titled Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam 東國輿地勝覽 (1481). It eventually took the form of a thirty-five-volume Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam 新增東國與地勝覽 in 1486 with revisions and additions. Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam contains detailed information about the Chosŏn capital, provinces, and major cities. Each section opens with a provincial map, followed by a history, descriptions of local customs, temples, royal tombs, palaces, office buildings, schools, local products, filial sons, chaste women, fortresses, mountains and rivers, pavilions, shrines, post offices, bridges, and famous sites. The entry on Tan’gun, Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam states: P’yŏngyang was initially the capital of Three Chosŏn and Koguryŏ. In the year of Mujin during Emperor Yao’s reign, a spiritual figure descended to a sandalwood tree at Mount T’aebaek, and local people made him king. This is the Chŏn Chosŏn or the Former Chosŏn. The Emperor Wu of the Zhou conquered the Shang dynasty and enfeoffed Kija here, and this was Hu Chosŏn or Later Chosŏn. In the forty-first generation of King Kijun, Wiman from the Yan raided the area, and made Wanggŏm the capital [Comment: this is P’yŏngyang]. . . . The capital moved from P’yŏngyang to Paeg’ak, and further to Changdanggyŏng. Tan’gun later returned to Mount Asadal and transformed into a spirit. 81

The authors of Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam also adopted aspects of Sejong sillok chiri chi and combined them with additional information from Samguk yusa about Tan’gun moving his capital. The authors pinpointed the spot where Tan’gun landed: a sandalwood tree on top of Mount T’aebaek. As an interesting combination of sandalwood tree and

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Mount T’aebaek, this is the place that Tan’gun’s father Hwanung descended to earth according to Samguk yusa. The following information on Kija and Wiman was similar to Chewang ungi. There seemed to be no transition between Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn, and Kija came because he was enfeoffed with Chosǒn by the Zhou King. Tan’gun still turned into a mountain god when he returned to Mount Asadal. The most notable information in Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam is about a huge tomb attributed to Tan’gun which served as definitive evidence for the rediscovery and excavation of the Tan’gun tomb in North Korea in 1993. 82 P’yoje ŭmju Tongguk saryak 標題音註東國史略 or Annotated Brief History of the Eastern State by Yu Hŭiryŏng 柳希齡 (1480-1552) Like many literati of his time, Yu Hǔiryŏng was a victim of purges, first in 1519 and again in 1545. Yu devoted himself to historical writing when he was in exile, and produced one of the most detailed descriptions on Tan’gun in Chosŏn dynasty. At the beginning of his book, the chapter of Chǒn Chosǒn 前朝鮮 or the Former Chosǒn, Yu wrote: Tan’gun’s surname was Hwan, and his name was Wanggǒm. Initially there was no chief in the East. The son of a spiritual figure Hwanin, named Hwanung, led three thousand followers to descend down to the Mount T’aebaek below a sandalwood tree, and named this place Sinsi 神市. Hwanung administrated human affairs, and later had a son named Tan’gun. After Emperor Yao [of China] ascended to the throne, Tan’gun also named [his state] Chosǒn and assigned P’yǒngyang as the capital. Tan’gun later moved the capital to Paeg’ak, married the daughter of the River Spirit of Pisǒgap, and had a son named Puru. At the year of Chǒngsa when King Yu 禹 [of China] hunted in the south and met all the feudal lords at Mount Tushan, Tan’gun also sent his son Puru to pay tribute. Tan’gun built Chamsǒngdan in the middle of an island, and also ordered his third son to construct a fortress. Tan’gun died and was buried at Songyang. His descendants tried to avoid Kija’s enfeoffment and moved the capital to Changdanggyǒng, and it continued another one thousand five hundred years. Tan’gun was buried in Songyang [at Kangdong County]. 83

Yu’s first section followed the Samguk yusa version, and he agreed that Tan’gun Chosǒn had been founded after Emperor Yao’s reign, although he did not specify the year. Tan’gun’s surname was Tan, and his given name was Wanggŏm 王儉. However, in other records, Wanggŏm was the name of Tan’gun Chosŏn’s capital. Yu omitted information on Tan’gun’s maternal lineage, but offered some intriguing accounts about his wife (the daughter of the River Spirit of Pisǒgap) and his son Puru. Tan’gun

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sent his son Puru to meet Emperor Yu in China, and his third son was an expert at constructing fortresses. The more interesting part of this work describes the relationship between Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn. Yu implied that there was no direct conflict between Tan’gun and the Kija group. Tan’gun’s descendants decided to move the capital to Changdanggyǒng; therefore, the Kija group must have established Kija Chosŏn at P’yŏngyang. Though there was no information about what happened to the remnants of Tan’gun’s group, they apparently coexisted with Kija Chosŏn for another 1,500 years. Instead of becoming a mountain god, Tan’gun died and was interred in Kangdong County. Tan’gun became human, and there was more detailed information about the political structure of Tan’gun Chosŏn that relied on patriarchal lineage. Tan’gun’s father had already established a protostate, but it was Tan’gun who proclaimed the formation of a state after Emperor Yao in China, and designated P’yŏngyang as the capital (instead of Sinsi, the place where his father had descended to earth). Tan’gun also entrusted the management of state affairs to his sons. Yu pointed out that Kija was the uncle of King Zhou 紂 of the Shang. After King Wu of the Zhou conquered Shang, Kija led five thousand Shang refugees to Chosǒn, many of whom had specialties in composing poems, writing essays, ritual, and governance. Kija was critical of the ruthlessness of the Shang King, and taught King Wu of Zhou about Hongbǒm kuju. 84 Instead of insisting on a clan affiliation with the Shang King, Kija upheld the virtues of righteousness and ritual propriety, and taught King Wu about government and administration. Kija Chosǒn was subordinate to the Zhou dynasty, remained a fief of the Zhou dynasty, and maintained as a state of ritual and propriety. 85 Among the Three Kingdoms, Yu gave priority to Koguryŏ. 86 In the first half of the Chosǒn dynasty, the state put more effort into compiling and commissioning historical records. As part of power consolidation, historical writings not only covered the recent past of Koryǒ and the contemporary Chosǒn period, but also served as a comprehensive history. On the one hand, after the long unified Koryǒ and the first half of the Chosǒn period, Tongguk or the Eastern State was commonly used to refer to Korea vis-à-vis Zhongguo 中國 or the Central Kingdom. On the other hand, with the exception of Kwǒn Nam, historical writings in the first half of the Chosǒn dynasty concentrated on the Korean Peninsula, especially regarding the location and territorial scope of the Three Chosǒn. Ko Chosǒn was not relocated to the northern area until the second half of the Chosǒn dynasty, in the wake of two invasions from Japan and Manchu in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.

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RETHINKING THE SINO-CENTRIC WORLD ORDER AND REPOSITIONING CHOSǑN—LATER CHOSǑN PERIOD (1600-1905) Despite intervals of peace, wars have been contributed significantly to the formation and reconfiguration of the East Asian world order. The three East Asian countries experienced their first full-scale interstate war in the seventh century. Emperor Wen 文 of the Sui Dynasty (r. 581-604 CE) mended the south-north division of China that had lasted more than three hundred years, and then attempted to expand his power to the frontiers, especially the Koguryŏ Kingdom. Despite withstanding repeated efforts by Emperor Wen, Emperor Yang of the Sui (r. 604-617), and Emperor Taizong (626-649 CE) of the Tang Dynasty, Koguryŏ fell to the concerted attacks by Tang China and Silla in 668. Yamato Japan also sent troops to help Paekche’s restoration, although it ended in vain. Yamato Japan’s defeat in the battle at Paekch’ongang 白 村江 (663 CE) laid the foundation for the East Asian world order. Consequently, Tang China reaffirmed its political, military, and cultural supremacy in East Asia. By allying with Tang China, Silla was able to unify two-thirds of the Korean Peninsula despite its cultural and geographic disadvantages, which had previously relegated it to an inferior position in relation to its rivals Koguryŏ and Paekche. However, most of the Koguryŏ territory was incorporated into Tang China and the later-established Bohai (K. Parhae) Kingdom (698-926 CE). After seven centuries of peaceful coexistence (eighth to fifteenth centuries CE) that were only briefly interrupted by the Mongols (mid-thirteenth century), there came a resurgence of international warfare. Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 豊臣秀吉 (1536-1598) unification of the Japanese archipelago stimulated his ambition to invade the Asian continent. Despite the victories of the Ming Chinese and Chosŏn Korean allied forces against the Japanese in 1598, this war drained the Ming treasury and exacerbated its problems with peasant rebellions. The regime was overthrown by the Manchu in 1644. 87 In the wake of Hideyoshi’s invasion, Chosŏn Korea took more than a century to restore its political and economic order. Moreover, Chosŏn Korea suffered an additional political and psychological trauma with the collapse of the Ming dynasty and the ascendancy of the Qing dynasty in China proper. The establishment of the Qing dynasty was a tremendous shock to the Chosŏn literati, which enforced the reorientation of their worldviews. They considered Chosŏn to be the sole authentic inheritor of the Confucian (universal) civilization, the so-called So Chunghwa 小中華 or last bastion of civilization, because China was now occupied by the Manchu barbarians. 88 As a result, the pride in Korean civilization stimulated an unprecedented interest in the study of Korean culture and history, along with interests in the northern territory and irredentism.

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The crucial issue was the reconfiguration of Chosǒn’s relationship with the Qing. Chosǒn literati vigorously debated whether Chosǒn should attack the Qing in defense of Confucian orthodoxy (Chonju non 尊 周論 or respecting the Zhou) and repay the favor the Chosǒn had received from the Ming dynasty during the Hideyoshi invasion (Chaejo chiŭn 再造之恩 or the grace of restoration). The issue of the northern expedition first appeared at the end of the Koryǒ period. The founder of Chosǒn, Yi Sǒnggye, retreated on the way to attacking the Ming in 1388, taking the opportunity to solidify his base of support so that he could found a new dynasty four years later. For the early half of the Chosǒn dynasty, Chosǒn literati reached a tentative consensus that Yi Sŏnggye had been wise to renounce the edicts of the northern expedition by Koryǒ King U禑 (1374-1388). As Chosǒn was a younger brother of China, an attack would have been ill-advised. Moreover, the Ming dynasty was militarily much stronger, and most importantly, King U was an illegitimate ruler of Koryǒ, and therefore did not deserve loyalty from his generals. 89 However, attitudes toward China had changed in the second half of the Chosǒn dynasty. The target became the seminomadic Qing dynasty. The Manchus had invaded Chosǒn in 1627 and 1636, not only inflicting enormous economic and cultural damage upon Chosǒn, but also humiliating the Chosǒn King Injo 仁祖 (r. 1623-1649) by compelling him to kneel in surrender to the Manchu generals—something that not even the barbarian Mongols demanded. Hence, there was a strong desire for revenge in the Chosǒn court debate about the northern expedition, and in the matter of defending orthodox Confucian ethics and repaying the Ming. Most of the Chosǒn literati realized that the chances of a victorious northern expedition were slim at best; nonetheless, this issue recirculated and remained a sore point. Two historiographical tendencies dominated at the second half of the Chosǒn dynasty and corresponded to the political environment and interstate relationship of East Asia: Neo-Confucian orthodoxy and Sirhak 實學 or Practical Learning. In writing the ancient history of Korea, along with the issues that carried over from the early half of the Chosǒn dynasty, new concerns arose. In addition to Tan’gun Chosŏn, some writings extended to the pre-Tan’gun period. Chosŏn literati also had the dilemma of making Tan’gun a virtual ancestor of the Korean people while preserving his sacred and supernatural veneer. The relationship between Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn was still a matter of debate. On the one hand, Tan’gun seemed to merit recognition as the earliest ruler and common ancestor for Koreans. On the other hand, Kija had brought civilization to Korea. But as a sage king, he should not have taken power by force. Hence, there were different assumptions about the transition from Tan’gun to Kija Chosǒn. Tan’gun (or the last ruler of Tan’gun Chosǒn) may have voluntarily conceded power to Kija; some scholars argued that

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more than a century had passed between the two monarchs, 90 which meant that Tan’gun became a hermit first and Kija came to Korea at least a century later. However, this interpretation provided no information as to what happened in the intervening time. Historians attempted to prove the benevolence of Kija by describing him as the hero who rescued the land of Chosǒn once it fell into chaos after the withdrawal of Tan’gun (or Tan’gun’s descendent). Kija led Chosǒn in momenteous steps forward to a universal civilization by introducing an advanced culture to the people. Though Kija had been revered as a sage king and carrier of civilization from China, Wiman was the opposite model of a migrant-ruler. Wiman came to Korea with his followers, and the last king of Kija Chosǒn not only gave Wiman permission to settle there, but also invested him with the title of paksa 博士 or erudite scholar and let him lead the defense of the northwestern frontier of Chosǒn. However, Wiman betrayed the king, and fabricated a rumor of Han invasion so that he could march on the capital of Kija Chosǒn, P’yǒngyang, expel King Kijun, and install himself as the new king. In this sense, Wiman is unmatched as a notorious usurper and traitor. Along with the northern expedition, there was rising concern about the northern territory (to the north of the Yalu River) among Chosǒn literati. The location of the Four Han Commanderies, crucial to defining the lineage of Korean history, remained unclear. The scholars who argued that all of the Four Han Commanderies were located within the Korean Peninsula were those who opposed the northern expedition. Others argued that most (or all) of the Han Commanderies were located outside of the Korean Peninsula. Since the Han Commanderies were established within the borders of the former territory of Wiman Chosǒn (and Kija Chosǒn), there was legitimate reason and necessity for Chosǒn to conduct the northern expedition. As long as Manchuria could be proven to be the lost land of Chosǒn, Chosǒn should reclaim it like Sǒ Hŭi supposedly had in his negotiations with Khitan, through which he took part of the former Koguryǒ land back to Koryǒ. The northern expedition and northern territory was also related to a new framework of ancient Korean history: the northern and southern lineage. During most of the Koryŏ and early Chosŏn periods, the territorial scope of Korean history was confined to the Korean Peninsula. The strong Mongol Empire to the north and the actual subordinate status of Koryŏ prevented Koryŏ literati from cherishing any ambitions on Manchuria, a situation that changed in the second half of the Chosŏn dynasty. Concurrent with the hypothesis of the northern and southern lineage of Korean history, there was an emerging nostalgia for the lost land of Ko Chosŏn, which included part or all Manchuria, especially the Yodong area. Many scholars contributed to the geohistorical studies on Ko Chosŏn and the Han Commanderies, thanks to the combined influence of

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the discourse of the northern expedition and the northern lineage of Korean history. The seventeenth century continued the tradition of basing historical records on Confucian values. In contrast to the early Chosŏn’s Samguk mut’ongron, or the Illegitimate Lineage of the Three Kingdoms, the late Chosŏn scholar Yi Ik 李瀷 (1681-1763) proposed a Samhan chǒngt’ong ron 三韓正統論 or Legitimacy of the Three Han. According to Yi Ik, Wiman Chosǒn was a deviation from the legitimate lineage and needed to be eliminated from Korean history. Therefore, the lineage of Korean history was transmitted from Kija Chosǒn to Samhan in the southern Korean Peninsula, since King Kijun fled to this area after being defeated by Wiman. This was also the reason that some historians put more emphasis on the southern part of Korea while despising or ignoring the northern part of Korean Peninsula, not to mention further north to Manchuria. At the same time, the Pukhak 北學 or Northern Learning Scholars emerged on the basis of their trips to Qing China. Opposing the Chosǒn literati stereotype of a barbarian Qing dynasty, the Northern Learning Scholars’ direct experience with the Qing dynasty made them realize that the Qing continued to refine Chinese civilization and had reached an apex of cultural prosperity that Chosǒn should emulate. The Northern Learning Scholars started to investigate the new intellectual developments in the Qing and through their communication with Qing scholars they acquired the evidential approach that flourished among them. The interest in the northern lineage and Manchuria contributed to new interpretations of ancient history. The central figure who advocated the northern lineage of Korean history was Yu Tŭkkong 柳得恭 (17491807), who wrote Parhae ko 渤海考 or the Treatise on Parhae and proposed a new phase of Korean history, Nambukkuk sidae 南北國時代 or the South-North States to replace the conventional Unified Silla period. Yu complained that the loss of Manchuria was the primary reason for Chosŏn’s decline, and his emphasis on Manchuria and the northern lineage of Korean history was continued by Yi Chonghwi 李種徽 in his Tongsa 東史 or Eastern History. Tongguk chiri chi 東國地理誌 or Treatise on Geography of Chosŏn by Han Paekkyŏm 韓百謙 (1552-1615) Han Paekkyŏm started his career as a proofreader for commentaries on Confucian classics. As one of the earliest Chosŏn scholars who took an evidential approach to Korean geography and history, his efforts resulted in Tongguk chiri chi. Among three Chosŏn, Han was particularly interested in Kija, which stimulated him to write Kija ko 箕田考 or the Investigation on Kija Field, composed of Kija to 箕子圖 or the Diagram of Kija and Kijŏn sŏl 箕田說 or the Treatise of Kija Field based on his field trip to the P’yŏngyang area. 91

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Tongguk chiri chi is a geography book with an emphasis on history. Han’s concern with his contemporary Chosŏn period coincided with the sense of crisis among Chosŏn literati in the wake of the Hideyoshi invasion. Influenced by the framework of a dual lineage (north and south), Han proposed a new hypothesis on the location of Samhan area: there were three Chosŏn in the north, and three Han 韓 in the south. Han concentrated on the northern area, but also emphasized that Samhan predated the Four Han Commanderies. Interestingly, Han still located Ko Chosŏn in the Korean Peninsula, and his concern about the northern territory was reflected in his argument that Koguryŏ was superior to Paekche and Silla. 92 Han was one of the first Chosŏn literati who proposed the dual lineage of Korean history. 93 He not only stimulated interest in the northern lineage, but also influenced many later historians. Most notably, the founder of modern nationalist historiography in Korea, Sin Ch’aeho, was impressed by Han’s hypothesis on Samhan and elaborated upon Han’s dual Samhan hypothesis in the 1920s. 94 Tongsa 東事 or Eastern Affairs (1667) by Hŏ Mok 許穆 (1595-1682) Prohibited from taking the civil service examination, Hŏ gave up his dream of becoming an official. Although he was later appointed to some minor positions, he either deferred or resigned shortly thereafter. His career prospects turned promising in 1675, and eventually he became one of the rare Ŭijŏng 議政 or Prime Councilors in the Chosŏn period who had not taken the civil service examination. He was interested in history and geography because he believed people could solve contemporary problems by looking to the past. Tongsa collected information about the geographical and agricultural conditions, customs, and politics of Chosŏn. Divided into a preface and followed by chapters on hereditary houses, biography, geography, and outer records, the Tongsa was unique in allocating the history of the ancient states to the sega 世家 or hereditary houses section, starting from Tan’gun, Kija, Wiman, Sagun ibu 四郡二府 or Four Han Commanderies and Two Administrations, and continuing with Silla, Koguryŏ, and Paekche, which implied Hŏ’s intention of assigning equal status to these entities in Korean history. Moreover, Tongsa has records about Puyŏ, Suksin 肅愼, Samhan, Karak 駕洛, Tae Kaya 大伽倻, Yemaek 濊貊, Malgal 靺鞨, and Mora 毛羅, in addition to an extra record called Hǔkch’i 黑齒列傳 or Biography of Black Teeth, which is about the history of Japan. Hŏ claimed that people of those seventy small states of Samhan were Tan’gun’s descendants and could be considered a legacy from Yi Sŭnghyu’s Chewang ungi from the Koryŏ period. 95 According to Hŏ, Sinsi 神市 was not a place name or sacred altar, but the son of Hwanin and the

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father of Tan’gun. Instead of Hwanung, Hŏ made Sinsi the link between the Heavenly God Hwanin and the founder of Chosŏn Tan’gun. Hwanin gave birth to Sinsi 神市 . . . Sinsi gave birth to Tan’gun . . . Tan’gun gave birth to Puru, also named Haepuru, his mother is the daughter of Pisŏgap . . . Tan’gun died in the eighth year of King Wuding of the Shang. The tomb of Tan’gun is located west of Songyang. Someone also said that Tan’gun entered Asadal, and nobody knows where he died. There is a Tan’gun Shrine located at Mount T’aebaek. 96

Hŏ’s interpretation of Tan’gun’s lineage was more realistic and all rulers were succeeded by their sons. Despite his supernatural age of more than a thousand years old, Tan’gun died in the eighth year of King Wuding (1317 BCE) and was buried to the west of Songyang, 97 which was far ahead of the arrival of Kija (1123? BCE). In addition, Hŏ incorporated other hypotheses claiming that Tan’gun moved to Asadal and probably became a mountain god. Hŏ’s chronology of early history followed through the line of Tan’gun Chosŏn, Puk Puyŏ 北扶餘 or Northern Puyŏ, Tong Puyŏ 東扶餘 or Eastern Puyŏ, and eventually to Koguryŏ. According to Hŏ, these regimes all had their origin in Tan’gun Chosŏn. 98 Tongguk t’onggam chegang 東國通鑑提綱 or Outline of a Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom by Hong Yŏha 洪汝河 (1621-1678) Tongguk t’onggam chegang is an abridged version of Tongguk t’onggam in the format of annals. It spans from Kija through the Three Kingdoms period, and begins with An Chŏngbok’s preface. Hong explained that “The Way is in the Confucian Classics; however, the function of the Way is in history, hence I complete this book.” The author intended to Kwŏnsŏn Ching’ak 勸善懲惡 or encourage good and punish evil, so that his book could instruct future generations. Hong assigned Kija to the beginning of Korean history, and praised the relationship between Kija and the King of Zhou as like that between a guest and host. 99 Kija was the beginning of legitimate rule in Korea; consequently, Mahan was more important among Samhan due to Mahan’s connection to Kija Chosŏn. Hong affirmed a dichotomy between China and Chosŏn as hua or civilized, and Khitan Jurchen and Japan as yi or barbarians. Among the Three Kingdoms, he gave emphasis to Silla, because the political legitimacy of Paekche and Koguryŏ was questionable. Giving primary attention to Kija Chosŏn, Hong only gave a cursory and vague description of Tan’gun under the title of Ŭnt’aesa 殷太師 or the Grand Master of Yin, despite the variety of sources during his time: A spiritual figure descended to a sandalwood tree at Mount T’aebaek. The local folk made him king; this is Tan’gun . . . in the eighth year of

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Hong emphasized that Tan’gun Chosŏn had collapsed more than a thousand years earlier, and this is also the reason that Kija was enfeoffed with, and came to reside at, Chosŏn. It reaffirmed Kija’s arrival as a civilizing mission. Sŏngho sasŏl 星湖僿說 or Random Treatise of Yi Ik by Yi Ik 李瀷 (1681-1763) Prohibited from taking the civil service examination, Yi Ik moved to the countryside and concentrated on his studies. Yi Ik was especially interested in astronomy, geography, mathematics, and medical practice, in addition to Sŏhak 西學 or Western Learning (Catholicism). Yi Ik attempted to resolve the dichotomy between hua and yi, and criticized the So Chunghwa consciousness that had been predominant in Chosŏn since the Qing’s takeover of China proper in 1644. Yi Ik was more sympathetic to the Qing dynasty, arguing that the debate on the northern expedition had already become outdated. Yi Ik was a precursor of the Northern Learning School in the late Chosŏn period. 101 Yi Ik stated his Korean history from Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn. Despite the hypothesis of simultaneous foundation, Yi argued that Tan’gun assumed his rule during the Emperor Shun period (? 2317-2208 BCE), later than Emperor Yao’s reign. He believed that Tan’gun’s son Puru paid tribute to the Xia dynasty, and thanks to the Chinese sage Kija being enfeoffed with Chosŏn, Chosŏn was no longer a barbarian land. Yi Ik’s understanding of Korean history was famous for the discourse of Samhan chŏngt’ong ron, which argued that political legitimacy passed from Kija to Mahan. 102 Wiman’s usurpation of power paralleled the barbarians’ occupation of the Zhou and Wang Mang’s treachery during the Han dynasty. Samhan therefore should be incorporated into the lineage of Korean history to replace the conventional Wiman Chosŏn period. 103 It is interesting to note that even though King Kijun had conquered the Mahan area, Yi Ik justified this conquest as the effort of Kija’s descendants to carry on the legitimacy of the eastern state. Further, the Paekche Kingdom was condemned as a “thief state” for occupying Mahan, which interrupted Kija Chosŏn’s lineage and legitimacy. Firmly believing in Kija’s enfeoffment with Chosŏn, Yi Ik argued that the implementation of a well-field system at P’yŏngyang was a project made possible ony because of Kija’s sagacity. 104 Tongguk yŏkdae ch’ongmok 東國歷代總目 or Encyclopedia of the Eastern State by Hong Manjong 洪萬宗 (1643-1725) Aiming at a juxtaposition of Korean history with its Chinese counterparts, Hong Manjong argued emphatically for Tan’gun chŏngt’ongron 檀君

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正統論 or the legitimacy of Tan’gun. Hong provided more detailed information on Tan’gun, and denied the subordinate relationship of Kija to the Zhou dynasty. In order to collect all the available information, Hong did not hesitate to cite some less reliable sources that other scholars had avoided. 105 In his Sun’oji 旬五志 or the Record of Fifteen Days, Hong argued that Tan’gun was the common ancestor of all eastern people, and that Tan’gun lived during the same period as Emperor Yao of China, a position that had been rare since Kwŏn Nam of the fifteenth century. 106 Giving Kija the same importance as Tan’gun, Hong also affirmed Kija’s merit for transforming Korea from yi to hua, and contended that Korea had possessed everything of the same standard as China ever since. Hong was critical of Wiman Chosŏn, and along with the subsequent Four Han Commanderies and the Two Pu 府, they were all categorized as illegitimate phases of Korean history. 107 Describing the emergence of Tan’gun, Hong wrote: A spiritual figure descended to a sandalwood tree at Mount T’aebaek, and the local folk made him king; a long time ago a heavenly spirit landed under a sandalwood tree on the top of Mount T’aebaek. There was a bear . . . the son was named Tan’gun . . . Tan’gun reigned for one thousand and seventeen years. From the year of Kapcha 甲子 to King Wu of the Zhou Chosǒn was ruled by the descendants of Tan’gun. Tan’gun taught people how to braid their hair, how to deal with the relationships of lord and minister, men and women, eating and living. He also ordered P’aeng’o 彭吳 to manage domestic mountains and rivers so that they could be more suitable for the people’s life. 108

Following the Samguk yusa version of Tan’gun’s mystical birth, Hong added more information about the achievements of Tan’gun based on new sources. Accommodating different versions of the sacred birth, Tan’gun was either a heavenly descended figure or born of supernatural origin between the Heavenly God father and a bear-woman mother. More importantly, Tan’gun was not only the ancestor of all Koreans, but also the creator of numerous practical skills and an educator. Like China’s legendary sage kings, Tan’gun was omnipotent, benevolent, and had made the natural environment more inhabitable for Korean people. Tongsa hoegang 東史會綱 or Outline of Eastern History by Im Sangdŏk 林象 德 (1683-1719) After passing the civil service examination in 1699, Im was appointed to an official position where he had the honor of delivering lectures to the king. The primary sources of his Tongsa hoegang 東史會綱 ranged from Korean sources such as Samguk sagi, Koryŏsa, Yŏsa chegang 麗史提綱 and Tongsa Ch’anyo 東史纂要, to Chinese sources from the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties.

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Im argued that history should transcend the division of Korea and China, equally judged only by Confucian morality. 109 In this sense, Korea was a culturally advanced country capable of representing Chinese civilization. Dating Tan’gun to Emperor Yao’s reign, Im argued that Tan’gun’s alleged age of 1,418 years was actually the length of Tan’gun lineage. Im was among the first to suggest that Chosŏn should adopt the Tan’gun calendar. 110 At the same time, Im asserted that Kija came to Korea after the collapse of the Shang dynasty, and that he and his followers had laid the foundation for Korea’s cultural and political development. However, he was suspicious of the Kija’s enfeoffment with Chosŏn by the Zhou king, and instead suggested that Kija Chosŏn and Zhou were separate entities. Im advocated the ethics of Sadae according to the ideas of Neo-Confucianism, and his writing of Tongsa hoegang reflected an attempt to rehabilitate the confidence in Chosŏn literati, which had been severely damaged by the Hideyoshi and Manchu invasions in the early Chosŏn period. 111 Tongsa kangmok 東史綱目 or Annotated Account of Eastern History by An Chŏngbok 安鼎福 (1712-1791) Among the factional divisions prevalent in Chosŏn politics, An Chŏngbok belonged to the Southerners. Having studied with Yi Ik 李瀷 about Confucian classics and history, An’s scholarship was recognized by most of his contemporaries. He wrote Tongsa kangmok 東史綱目 or the History of Korea and Yŏljo t’onggi 列朝通紀 or the Comprehensive Records of Various Dynasties. In addition, he also produced a collection based on his discussions of history with Yi Ik entitled Tongsa mundap 東史 問答, with a question-and-answer format. Following the manner and format of Chach’it’onggam kangmok 資治通鑑綱目, An developed a self-conscious and evidential approach to Korean history. By tracing Korean history back to Tan’gun Chosŏn, An also paid special attention to Koreans’ resistance to foreign invasions in the earlier period. 112 An advocated the legitimacy of Kija Chosŏn, arguing that Tan’gun was only supplementary to Kija. 113 As a Southerner who studied with Yi Ik, An continued Samhan chŏngt’ong ron, or the theory of the legitimate lineage of Tan’gun-Kija-Mahan-Silla (from King Munmu)-Koryŏ (from the nineteenth year of King T’aejo’s reign) in Korean history. According to An, although King Kijun lost the state and fled southward, he was still able to conquer Mahan and restore the state, thus the lineage of Kija thrived. In contrast, An was critical of Tongguk t’onggam, which juxtaposes Wiman Chosŏn with Tan’gun and Kija as the Three Chosŏn as if these three Chosŏn were equal in morality and righteousness. According to An, Wiman was nothing but a thief, and Wiman Chosŏn a “usurping state.” 114

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At the beginning of Tongsa kangmok, An described the birth of Tan’gun: Initially there was no chief at the eastern area. A spiritual figure descended to a sandalwood tree at Mount T’aebaek. The local folk made him king, and he became the so-called Tan’gun. Some also said his name was Wanggŏm. The state was titled Chosŏn, and it was the twenty-fifth year of Emperor Yao. Tan’gun taught people to braid their hair to cover the head, in addition to the principle of being ruler and subjects, men and women, making food and building houses. He reigned for one thousand and seventeen years, and he lived for one thousand and forty-eight years. 115

An attempted to make sense of the overlap between Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn, by suggesting that Tan’gun entered Asadal, became a mountain god, and then died. Further, Kija was enfeoffed with Chosŏn 196 years after Tan’gun’s death. This again implied that Kija did not have any direct confrontation with Tan’gun Chosŏn, and that Kija became a new ruler without any opposition from the local people. The distinction of hua and yi remained a crucial issue for Chosǒn literati, and An attempted to rectify the conventional definition of huayi: The Confucian scholars used to strictly demarcate the Chinese from the barbarians. All people that were not born in China would be called barbarians. However, it does not make any sense. How could heaven categorize people on the basis of the place that they were born? 116

An indicated that the definitions of Chinese and barbarian should not be based on geography; location also involved perspectives and circumstances. Quoting Fan Ye’s Hou Hanshu about Tong’i, An suggested that Tan’gun could have been one group of the Jiuyi 九夷 or nine barbarian groups of Tong’i because Tong’i’s obedience was consistent with the Chosŏn people. The arrival of Kija made Chosŏn civilized and virtuous; therefore, even Confucius was willing to live in Chosŏn. 117 After giving a detailed account of Kija’s achievements and contributions to the Chosŏn people, An concluded that “Without Kija’s teachings, Chosŏn could have remained as a land of barbarians who fastened their garments on the left side. Therefore, Kija’s teaching in the eastern area was equivalent to Emperor Yao and Shun’s teaching in China.” 118 Despite An’s revisionist definition of huayi, he still had to resort to Kija to reaffirm that it was Kija that made it possible for Chosŏn’s transformation from yi to hua. Initially written for family preservation, An’s book attracted the attention of the crown prince, the future King Chŏngjo 正祖 (r. 1777-1800). As one of the most representative historical works written during the second half of the Chosŏn dynasty, Tongsa kangmok became a textbook for the crown prince. Widely circulated among Chosŏn literati, it remained a model for its practical, critical, and evidential approach to historical writing. 119

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Tongsa 東史 or Eastern History (before 1776) by Yi Chonghwi 李種徽 (17311797) This book was collected in Yi Chonghwi’s anthology Susan chip 修山集 or the Collected Works of Susan. For the first time in Korea, Yi incorporated all genres of the annal-biographical style 120 to narrate Korean history from the ancient period to Koryŏ. By adopting the structure of Shiji, Yi differed distintivly from other Chosŏn literati, who adopted Kangmok pǒp 綱目法 or annotated topic style in their historical writing, which had prevailed in China and Korea because of Zhu Xi. Yi Chonghwi believed that Chosŏn became the only carrier of Confucian civilization, and possessed the geographical and natural conditions to become like China. He contended that Tan’gun Chosŏn was the origin of Korean history and was China’s equal. At the same time, Tan’gun was a counterpart to Fuxi 伏羲 and Shennong 神農, legendary sage kings in China. Influenced by Im Sangdŏk, Yi Chonghwi argued that Kija Chosŏn was an independent state that preserved universal civilization, and that Kija was never a feudal subject of the Zhou dynasty. Yi argued that Samhan predated Wiman Chosŏn, further justifying the importance of Samhan for the purpose of excluding Wiman Chosŏn from Korean history. Koguryŏ was established in the former territory of Ko Chosŏn and was famous for its Confucian ritual and culture. At the same time, Parhae was the state established by the descendants of Koguryŏ, Tae Choyŏng 大祚 榮, which again reflected Yi’s concern with the northern territory. 121 In addition, Puyŏ and Okjŏ were also ancient states in Korean history. As a scholar belonging to the Soron 少論 122 or the Young Doctrine, Yi was still influenced by the traditional huayi views. He ignored the changes in the Qing dynasty and considered it barbaric. Hence, it was the exclusive obligation of Chosŏn to recover the Confucian tradition; to accomplish this, it was necessary to reclaim Manchuria and make Chosŏn a rich country with a strong army. In particular, Yi suggested a singular blood lineage of Tan’gun to Puyŏ, Koguryŏ, Paekche, Yemaek, Piryu, and Parhae. A new term, Singyo 神敎 or Sacred Religion was used to name the indigenous belief in Chosŏn. Yi wrote: The ancestor of Chosŏn King Tan’gun was named Spirit Hwanin. Hwanin had a second son named Hwanung who lived above Mount T’aebaek. Some miraculous things happened with the Spiritual Bear, and she gave birth to Tan’gun under the sandalwood tree, and his name was Tan’gun. Someone also said that Tan’gun’s name was Wanggŏm (quoted from Tan’gun Pongi 檀君本紀). At the beginning of Chosŏn there was an emperor of the Hwan state named Chesŏk; his second son Hwanung descended to the top of Mount Paektu . . . Hwanung was the heavenly king of Sinsi. His son was named Tan’gun . . . (quoted from Sinsachi 神事志) 123

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Yi provided two accounts of Tan’gun’s birth. The first was similar to the Samguk yusa version; and in terms of lineage, the second was identical to the first. The only difference was that Sinsi was interpreted as the name of the state founded by Tan’gun’s father, Hwanung. Yi’s views were believed to be linchpin between premodern and modern Korean historiography in reconstructing the ancient history of Korea. Yi’s interpretation of ancient history influenced Taejonggyo, an indigenous Korean religion worshiping Tan’gun that was established druing a pivotal period in the early twentieth century. Therefore, it is not surprising that Sin Ch’aeho praised Yi Chonghwi as the most independent historian of the second half of the Chosŏn dynasty. 124 Haedong yŏksa 海東繹史 or History of Korea by Han Ch’iyun 韓致奫 (17651814) and Han Chinsŏ 韓鎭書 (?-?) Though he passed the civil service examination in 1789, Han Ch’iyun resumed his studies instead of waiting for an official appointment. He accompanied his cousin Han Ch’iŭng 韓致應 to Qing China, and later he introduced the Qing evidential school to Chosŏn literati. The evidential school emphasized two principles: silsa kusi 實事求是 or tracing truth from the real situation; and mujǔng pulsin 無徵不信 or no belief without evidence. Han compiled Haedong yŏksa in his later years but died before completing the Chiri chi or Treatise of Geography, which his nephew Han Chinsŏ finished. Haedong yŏksa is composed of eighty-five chapters in six volumes. Along with all available Korean sources, Han referred to five hundred thirty Chinese sources and about twenty-two Japanese sources. Chapters one through sixteen are a chronological history from Tan’gun to Koryŏ, and the remaining chapters are treatises on calendars, rituals, music, the military, legal codes, economic situations, local products, local customs, palaces, official institutes, foreign relationships, art, geography, security, and biography. Haedong yŏksa also has a special chapter on Suksin 肅愼 or Jurchens. 125 Haedong yŏksa started from a separate Tong’i Ch’onggi 東夷總記 or the Comprehensive Records of the Eastern Barbarians. Suspicious of Tan’gun, Han had more interest in the Tong’i, which made him start his narrative from Tong’i instead of Tan’gun or Kija Chosŏn. Han connected the Shandong Dongyi with the Tong’i in Korea and implied a successive relationship, an early migration of Shandong Dongyi to Korea. 126 He also argued against any fundamental difference between Chinese and barbarian, insisting that they belonged to the same cultural sphere. 127 Quoting from the lost Chosŏn segi 朝鮮世紀 or Annals of Chosŏn, Han wrote,

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Chapter 2 In the twenty-ninth year of Emperor Yao’s reign, the year of Mujin, Tan’gun Chosŏn was established. The capital was at P’yŏngyang, and the state was titled Chosŏn. This is the so-called Tan’gun Chosŏn. Hwanung was the son of heavenly god Hwanin, who descended to the sandalwood tree of Mount T’aebaek. Hwanung got a son by metamorphosis, and the son was named Tan’gun because he was born below the sandalwood tree. Tan’gun’s name was Kŏm, and he was born with supernatural powers. The nine barbarians made him king in the eighth year of Shang Wuding. Tan’gun entered Mount Kuwŏl and became a god, and he was one thousand and forty-eight years old. 128

Quoting from An Chŏngbok’s Tongsa kangmok and Im Sangdŏk’s Tongsa hoegang, Han addressed his suspicion of Tan’gun and Tan’gun Chosŏn. Interestingly, here Tan’gun became the king of nine barbarians. By collecting detailed information on Kija and Wiman Chosǒn, Han seemed to concur the Three Chosǒn framework, though Tong’i was more crucial to Han’s understanding of early history. Abang Kangyŏk ko 我邦 疆域考 or The Studies on Chosǒn Territory by Chŏng Yagyong 丁若鏞 (1762-1836) Because of his family background, Chŏng Yagyong affiliated with the Kiho Southerners 畿湖南人, a branch of the Southerner Faction based in the vicinity of Seoul. Chŏng was famous for his talent in poetry when he was still a little boy, and his interests in Korean history, geography, and Western learning enabled him to make impressive contributions to Chosŏn scholarship. Because of his affinity with Catholics, he was sent into exile many times, with the longest exile taking place at Tasan 茶山 where he spent eighteen years studying. He was a successor of Yu Hyŏngwŏn 柳馨遠 and Yi Ik’s scholarship, the reform-oriented school or the Practical Learning; at the same time, Chŏng was influenced by the Northern Learning promoted by Pak Chiwŏn 朴趾源 (1737-1805). Thanks to multiple intellectual heritages, Chŏng became one of the most versatile and prolific scholars of the second half of the Chosŏn dynasty. Chŏng Yagyong wrote a geographical treatise on China and Korea in 1811, entitled Abang Kangyŏk ko. 129 Chŏng criticized the source materials and offered reasonable revisions. Dissatisfied with some scholars’ preoccupation with Manchuria, Chŏng relocated Ko Chosŏn to the Korean Peninsula. Reserved about Tan’gun Chosŏn, Chŏng’s Ko Chosŏn meant Kija and Wiman Chosŏn. After a comprehensive investigation of the locations and evolution of the place names for Ko Chosŏn, Four Han Commanderies, and Samhan, Chŏng concluded that all these places were located within the Korean Peninsula. Due to Chŏng’s prominent position among late Chosŏn literati, Chŏng’s relocation of Ko Chosŏn and the Han Commanderies back to the Korean Peninsula represented reversal of previous emphasis on the northern lineage of Korean history. Another round

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of a reversal arguing for the Yodong hypothesis appeared one hundred years later, this time by Korean nationalist historians in the early twentieth century. Instead of territorial scope, Chŏng’s pride in being a member of the Chosŏn people manifested itself through a different channel. Chŏng contended that the Chosŏn people consisted of two groups: the people of Chinhan that originally came from the Qin dynasty of China; and the people of the Kija group. He reaffirmed the importance of Kija, but discredited Tan’gun on the basis of insufficient evidence. Chŏng attempted to differentiate Yemaek from Tong’i by arguing that “Yemaek were the original northern barbarians, and there were no Yemaek in our [Chosŏn] land.” 130 Although he devoted a separate section to Yemaek, he disproved any relationship between Yemaek and the ancestor of the Chosǒn people. Yemaek remained barbarians, while the ancestor of the Chosǒn people became civilized and observed rituals, which was the most significant difference between the Yemaek (or other northern barbarians) and the Chosǒn people. Those barbarians who lived to the east of China deserved to be called kind and generous. The Tuoba clan of Xianbei entered China, and they quickly started to respect rituals and music and promote literacy, which left a significant legacy; the Khitan belonged to Donghu . . . , their prosperity of administration could only be matched by the Chinese; the Jurchen also entered China and established the Jin Kingdom. They captured two emperors of the Song dynasty, but they did not hurt them. . . . Chosŏn is located at the exact east of China, and always respects civilian rule and despises military affairs. Chosŏn prefers weakness to violence. This is the state of gentlemen. Alas, if one cannot be born in China, isn’t there another option of being a Tong’i? 131

Chŏng attempted to go beyond the simplistic division of hua and yi based on racial or ethnic differences. 132 He also tried to distinguish Tong’i from the northern barbarians, and in particular, Chosǒn was the top among the Tong’i group. Regardless of the debates on the Chinese/barbarian status of the Qing people, Chŏng insisted that Chosŏn had already become Chunghwa (universal civilization). 133 The Koryǒ and Chosǒn dynasty witnessed dynamic and diversified interest in the writing of ancient history. Due to the lack of written sources on the Korean side, they had to rely on Chinese documents. The Koryǒ and Chosǒn historians had a mixed feelings about Tong’i. The definition, distinction, and categorization of hua and yi continued to be a sensitive issue, and instead of a civilized Tong’i praised by Confucius, Chosǒn literati inclined toward a hua category, and attempted to apply yi to other neighboring groups that they believed to be inferior to Koryǒ and Chosǒn.

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However, the affiliation with hua or yi also corresponded to the political situation in China. The transition in China proper from Mongol Yuan to the Chinese Ming dynasty made the Ming definition of hua exclusive by monopolizing the status of hua. 134 Therefore, the late Koryǒ and early Chosǒn literati had to be content with defining themselves as the civilized yi by referencing Kija and Confucius. After the occupation of China proper by the Manchu people, there was a period of self-affirmation in which Chosǒn was portrayed as the only carrier of Confucian civilization, and hence Chosǒn was not only transformed into Chunghwa, but also became the only Chunghwa. 135 However, some late Chosǒn literati soon realized the advanced stage of Qing culture, which made them surrender the proclamation of Chunghwa to the Qing dynasty. It was during this period that Chosǒn literati started to uphold a culture-based huayi discourse. 136 In addition to Tong’i, historians had to deal with the lineage of the Three Chosǒn. Most historians were familiar with the dilemma of the Three Chosǒn, and they adjusted their preferences and rearranged historical lineages to fit their value system. Tan’gun/Tan’gun Chosǒn was widely acknowledged as the indigenous origin of Korean people and culture; however, Kija was indispensable for the self-affirmation of Korean culture. Hence, the debates regarding Tan’gun Chosǒn’s reliability, its right to be placed at the beginning of Korean history, and the date of its foundation persisted. Most historical writings mentioned Tan’gun, but either in an outer record section or with a less reliable tone. When it came to the different dates of the beginning Tan’gun Chosǒn vis-à-vis Chinese chronology, most Koryǒ/Chosǒn historians had chosen the later one. In contrast, the reliability and importance of Kija/Kija Chosǒn was rarely questioned in the Koryǒ and Chosǒn periods. Historians tried to date Kija’s arrival more accurately, and make his establishment of Kija Chosǒn more legitimate. Unlike the historians who had concentrated on the Korean Peninsula during the Koryǒ and Chosǒn period, scholars from the second half of the Chosǒn dynasty started to relocate Ko Chosǒn in the Yodong area, which corresponded with the discourse of northern expedition and a more general concern with the northern territory, most notably Manchuria. Nonetheless, the importance of Kija Chosǒn among the Three Chosǒn had never changed despite the vicissitudes of Tan’gun Chosǒn. Korean historiography in the twentieth century continued the tradition of self-conscious historical writing that had flourished since the late Chosǒn period; however, there were fundamental transformations with the convergence of modern ideologies, nationalism in particular, into the writing of national history. Studies on Korean ancient history combined continuity and discontinuity thereafter, which led to unprecedented complexity in the twentieth century.

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NOTES 1. Yi Sejŭk and Kyŏn Hwŏn are believed to have burned many books at the end of the Silla period. However, many earlier historical works survived when Kim Pusik compiled his Samguk Sagi. Quoted by Cho Insŏng, “Samguk mit T’ongil Silla ǔi Yŏksa sŏsul,” in Han’guk sahaksa ŭi yǒn’gu, ed. Han’guksa yǒn’guhoe (Seoul: Ŭryu Munhwasa, 1985), 1, note 1. 2. It is not clear when this Yugi was made; there is also debate about whether the title of this book has a particular meaning or simply means the collection of some old oral narratives about legendary heroic ancestors. 3. Kim Pusik, Samguk sagi 20: 181. Annotated by Yi Pyǒngdo (Seoul: Ŭryu Munhwasa, 1977). 4. Kim Pusik mentioned that Ko Hŭng appeared only in Kogi 古記, so his identity remains a mystery. See Samguk sagi 24:221-22, King Kŭnch’ogo, 30. K. H. Gardiner suggested that Ko Hŭng was a Chinese who came to Paekche from the former Daifang Commandery. See Kenneth Gardiner, The Early History of Korea, the Historical Development of the Peninsula Up to the Introduction of Buddhism in the Fourth Century A.D. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1969), 45. 5. There is some debate over this record. Imanishi Ryū argued that this meant the recording of some events, but not necessarily of historical records, while other scholars argued that this is truly the first historical record of Paekche. See Cho Insŏng, “Samguk mit T’ongil Silla ǔi Yŏksa sŏsul,” in Han’guk sahaksa ŭi yǒn’gu, ed. Han’guksa yǒn’guhoe (Seoul: Ŭlyu munhwasa, 1985), 15. 6. Many scholars initially doubted the reliability of the earlier part of Nihon shoki. Now it is believed that three records were originally historical records of Paekche, but that they were revised or changed by either Paekche exiles to Japan or later Japanese historians after Paekche fell to the allied forces of Tang China and Silla in 660. See Yi Kidong, “Kodae kukka ŭi yŏksa insik,” Han’guk saron 6 (1979): 1-21. 7. Yisabu’s proposal is interesting, with his major duty of constructing fortresses during the Silla period. His proposal reflected his ambition of expanding Silla territory, and a historical record could further develop his intention. See Inoue Hideyo, Kodai Chōsen (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1972), 146-49. 8. Samguk sagi 4: 37 (King Chinhŭng 6 July). My translation. 9. Samguk sagi 44: 411. 10. Yi Kibaek, Hangusa si ll on (Seoul: Ilchogak, revised version, 1976), 75. 11. Samguk sagi 4 (King Chijŭng, the first year, comment). 12. Samguk sagi 46 (Biography of Ch’oe Chiwŏn). It can therefore be said that Ch’oe’s argument influenced the later Chosŏn literati Yi Ik 李瀷, and contributed to Yi Ik’s idea of the Samhan Chŏngt’ongron 三韓正統論 or the legitimate lineage of Samhan. Sin Hyŏngsik, Samguk sagi yŏn’gu (1981), 350. 13. Cho Insŏng, “Samguk mit t’ongil Silla ŭi yŏksa sŏsul,” in Han’guk sahaksa ŭi yŏn’gu, ed. Han’guksa yŏn’gu hoe (Seoul: Ŭllyu Munhwasa, 1985), 28. 14. Samguk sagi 46:432 (Biography of Shŏlch’ong). 15. Sin Hyǒngsik, “Koryǒ chǒngi ŭi yǒksa insik,” in Han’guk sahaksa ǔi yǒn’gu, ed. Han’guksa yŏn’gu hoe (Seoul: Ǔllyu muhwasa, 1985), 37-38. 16. Yi Usŏng, “Samguk sagi ŭi kusǒng kwa Koryǒ wangjo ŭi chǒngt’ong ŭisik,” Chidan hakbo 38 (1974). 17. Ha Hyŏn’gang, “Koryŏ sidae ŭi yŏksa kyesŭng ŭisik,” Yihwa sahak yŏn’gu 8 (1976). 18. Michael Roger, “P’yonnyon T’ongnok: The Foundation Legend of the Koryo State,” Journal of Korean Studies 4 (1982-1983), 3-72. 19. Pak Yongun, Kory ǒ ǔi Koguryǒ kyesǔng e taehan chonghapjǒk kǒmt’o (Seoul: Ilchisa 2006), 157. 20. Kory ǒsa 76, entry of officials. 21. Besides Kim Pusik, the chief-compiler, eight other scholars participated in this project: Ch’oe Sanbo, Yi Onmun, Hǒ Hongjae, Sǒ Anchǒng, Pak Tongju, Yi Hwang-

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jung, Ch’oe Wubo, and Kim Yǒng’on. Sin Hyŏngsik, Samguk sagi yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1981), 6-7. 22. Xu Jing, Gaoli tujing 8:432. Figure section. “Kim Pusik is big and tall. His face is tanned, and his eyes protrude. He is erudite and good at composing, and expert in the ancient and contemporary classics.” 23. Suematsu Yasukazu, “Ku Samguksa hwa Samguk sagi,” Chōsen gakuhō 30-40 (1966), 4. 24. Originally from Tong muns ǒn 44:12b-13b. Also Samguk sagi 1. My translation. See the complete translation of preface, Peter Lee, Sourcebook of Korean Civilization 1 (New York: Columbia University, 1993): 464-65. 25. Sin Hyŏngsik, Samguk sagi yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1981), 9. 26. Yi Kyubo, preface, “Tongmyǒngwang p’yǒn,” Tongguk yi sanguk chip 3. 27. Kwŏn Kŭn, Tongmunsŏn 44. 28. An Chǒngbok, “Tongsa mundap sǒ,” Sun’am sǒnsaeng munchip 10. 29. The term sadae dates from the Chosǒn period. However, Japanese scholars of the colonial period coined the term Sadae chu ŭi, and used it to distinguish Japan from Korea in the premodern Sino-cententric world system. Therefore, Sadae chu ŭi became an accusation against Korean people for their obsession with Chinese civilization and heteronomy of Korea under Chinese influence throughout historical periods. 30. Samguk sagi 29:253. 31. Samguk sagi 17: 158. King Tongch’ǒn, year 21. 32. Pak Kwangyong, “Kija Chosǒn e taehan insik ŭi pyǒnchǒn,” Han’guk saron 6 (1980): 251-96, 255. 33. Edward J Shultz, “An Introduction to the Samguk Sagi.” Korean Studies (2005), 5. 34. Michael Rogers, “National Consciousness in Medieval Korea: The Impact of Liao and Chin on Koryǒ,” in China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 165. 35. Yi Kyubo, Yisangguk chip (Seoul: Myǒngmundang, 1982), 33-34. 36. Ibid., 36-37. 37. Koryǒ kings and princes were required to take their first wife from the Mongol royal family. 38. Kory ǒsa 28, King Ch’ungyǒl 4, July. 39. Kory ǒsa 30, King Ch’ungyǒl 12, Nov. 40. Kory ǒsa 34, King Ch’ungsŏn 4, May. 41. For Koryǒ’s period of military rule, see Edward J. Shultz, Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000). 42. Min Yŏnggyu, “Samguk yusa, Han’guk ǔi kojŏn paeksŏn,” Sin Tong’a 1 (1969), 88. 43. Kim Sanghyŏn, “Koryŏ hugi ǔi yŏksa insik,” Han’guk sahaksa ǔi yŏn’gu, 95. 44. Hwang Paegang, “Samguk yusa wa Pulgyo sŏrhwa,” Samguk yusa ǔi yŏn’gu, 1982. 45. Richard McBride II, “A Koreanist’s Musings on the Chinese Yishi Genre,” Sungkyun kwan Journal of East Asian Studies 6:1 (2006), 31-59. 46. Peter Lee ed., Sourcebook of Korean Civilization l (New York: Columbia University Press), 6-7. 47. Samguk yusa 1:28. 48. Ibid., 1:29. 49. Kim Chǒljun, “Koryǒ chunggi ŭi munhwa ŭisik kwa sahak ǔi sǒngkyǒk,” Han’guksa yǒn’gu 9 (1974), 84. 50. Kory ǒsa 106, biography of Sim Yang. 51. Yi Sŭnghyu attributed his narrative of Tan’gun to Tan’gun pongi or Annals of Tan’gun, a text that has been lost. 52. However, unlike Iryǒn, who put the Tan’gun myth in the main text (although in the Kiyi chapter), Yi put the Tan’gun myth in the text annotation. 53. Han Yŏng’u, Yoksashak ǔi yŏksa (Seoul: Chisik sanŏpsa, 2002), 138.

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54. Kim Sanghyŏn, “koryŏ hugi ŭi yŏksa insik,” Han’guksa yǒn’guhoe ed., Han’guk sahaksa ŭi yǒn’gu (Seoul: Ŭllyu Munhwasa, 1985), 94. 55. Samguk yusa 1: 28. Chewang ungi 41. http://www.memorykorea.go.kr:7779/webs/search/view_seoji. jsp, accessed April 5, 2006. 56. Hongbŏm kuju is a chapter of the Shangshu or the Book of Documents. 57. Yi Sŭnghyu indicated that it occurred in the twelfth year of Han Gaozu’s reign. However, Han Gaozu reigned from 202 to 195 BCE, only seven years. If we still counted from 202 BCE, then the year the Wiman conquered Kija Chosǒn is 191 BCE. 58. Chewang ungi 43. 59. For more information on the reform and founding of the Chosŏn dynasty, see John Duncan, The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000). 60. Mingshilu 223: 3267. 61. Pak Kwangyong, “Kija Chosŏn e taehan insik ŭi pyŏnchŏn,” Han’guk saron 6 (1980), 251-96. 62. Edward Willett Wagner, The Literati Purges: Political Conflict in Early Yi Korea (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, 1974). 63. Chŏng Kubok, Han’guk chungse sahaksa 2 (Seoul: Chimmundang, 2002), 4-13. Confucian view of history: 1) human-based, human-centered but with emphasis on the king and his ministers. In terms of Veritable Records, even the king does not have the right to read the record; therefore, the king is self-conscious about his performance so that he will not be recorded as a despotic ruler. 2) Recording both good and bad sides so that they could be a mirror and political lesson for the future. According to Confucius, the Name is really important; rectifying the name (The Spring and Autumn Annals) is the ultimate goal and process for establishing political legitimacy. 3) Transmitting, not creating; allocating a separate section for comments, reasons for lacking historical critique. 4) Respecting the past. The golden age is the ancient sage period of Yao Shun and Yu, King Wen and Wu of the Zhou, Duke of the Zhou. 5) Dynastic cyclic views of history: a dynasty has stages of establishment, maintenance, decline and collapse. 6) Emphasis on peace and civil rule. Name, hierarchy among the states, respecting the bigger state as the norm: this is the axis for maintaining peace and security for Chosŏn. It is better to pay tribute and obtain investiture from China. 7) Universalism, part of the Confucian world, having culture within the East Asia context. 64. It seems that Yi Sŭnghyu was the first to use Tongguk or Eastern State to refer to Korea in his Chewang ungi. 65. Chŏng Kubok, Han’guk chungse sahaksa 2, 15. 66. Written in 1522, Pak Sang’s Tongguk saryak was also famous as a comprehensive history covering from Tan’gun to the end of the Koryŏ period. Besides Tongguk saryak written by Kwŏn Kŭn, there were four or five additional books with the identical title. Pak Sang’s Tongguk saryak followed the format of Tongguk t’onggam. The only difference was that Pak eliminated woegi 外記 or the outer record section, and made a higher evaluation of the Silla unification. This reflected a peninsula-centered view on the early history of Korea. 67. Sejong sillok chiri chi 152: 123. 68. The only difference is that Koryŏ used the second year of the coronation as the inauguration of the new reign (reserving a year for the decease of the former ruler), while Yuanshi used the year of the ascension as the beginning of the new reign, which gave more emphasis to the new ruler instead of the former one. 69. Kory ŏsa 58: 2377. 70. Chŏng Kubok, Han’guk chungse sahaksa 2 (Seoul: Chimmundang, 2002), 27. 71. The first occasion of using Tongguk to refer to the dynasty in the Korean Peninsula should be Yi Sŭnghyu in his Chewang ungi. 72. Chŏng, Han’guk chungse sahaksa 2, 29. 73. Ibid., 30.

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74. Ŭngche si was written by Kwǒn Kŭn in 1396. 75. Han Yǒng’u, Chosǒn chǒn’gi sahaksa yǒn’gu (Seoul: Seoul taehakkyo, 1981), 103. Sŏ Yŏngsu, “Ko Chosŏn ŭi wichi wa kangyŏk,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 2 (1988), 28. 76. It was written in 1462. This passage is from an in-text annotation attributed to Kogi, which no longer exists. Kwŏn Kwangŏk, annotated, Ŭ ngjesi chipchu (Seoul: Haedoji, 1999), 148-150. 77. The eighth year of King Wuding is 1317 BCE (Wuding’s reign was from 13241265 BCE). If Tan’gun became king in 2333 BCE, he would have been more than one thousand years old. 78. Tongguk t’onggam (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 1989), 11. 79. Ibid., 22-23. 80. Tonguk t’onggam was also different in the sense that it incorporated a section of historical commentaries. It is said that most of them were written by Ch’oe Pu 崔溥, a disciple of Kim Chongjik 金宗直. 81. Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngram 51: 920. 82. Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngram 55: 1000. 83. Kyogam P’yoche ŭmju Tongguk saryak (Sŏngnam: Chŏngsin munhwa yŏn’gu wŏn, 1985), 49. 84. Chŏn Tŏkjae, “Tongguk senyŏn’ga & Tongguk t’onggam,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 160. 85. Ibid., 163. 86. Kim Hangsu, “Tongguk yŏji sǔnglam & Tongguk saryak,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 174. 87. For more recent studies on the military aspect of the Hideyoshi invasion, see Kenneth M. Swope, “Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi’s Second Invasion of Korea, 1597-1598,” Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 6:2 (2006): 177206. 88. Cho Yŏngnok, “Chosŏn ŭi sochunghwa kwan: myŏngch’ŏng kyoch’e ki tong’a samguk ǔi ch’ŏnhagwan ŭi pyŏnhwa rǔl chungsim ǔro,” Yŏksa hakbo 149 (1996): 105-38. 89. King U ascended to the throne after his father King Kongmin’s mysterious death (probably by assassination). In addition, his biological mother was the monk Sindon’s concubine; hence, there were rumors that King U was not the son of King Kongmin at all. Yi Sŏnggye insisted on suspicion of King U and sent him into exile. This also became the legitimate reason for Yi Sŏnggye’s new dynasty. 90. It was first suggested by Yi Sŭnghyu of Koryǒ dynasty, but had been neglected for a while and reemerged from the second half of the Chosǒn dynasty. 91. In Han’s Kijŏn ko (1607), he argued that Kija’s field in the P’yŏngyang area took the shape of 田 (field) instead of 井 (well), which most scholars had believed so far, 176. 92. Ko Yŏngjin, “Han Paekyŏm,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 184. 93. Sŏ Yŏngsu, “Ko Chosŏn ŭi Wichi wa kangyŏk,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 2 (1988), 26. 94. Ko Yŏngjin, “Han Paekyŏm,” 187. 95. Hŏ influenced not only his contemporaries, but also other later historians such as nationalist historians during the colonial period, Taejonggyo 大倧敎 in particular, in terms of providing a new lineage for Tan’gun Chosŏn. 96. Kim Kihwan and Kwŏn Yŏngwŏn trans., Tongsa (Seoul: Pagyŏngsa, 1979), 16. 97. He followed Kwŏn Lam’s interpretation of the date of the death of Tan’gun. 98. Hŏ Mok, Tongsa, 18. 99. Ko Yŏngjin, “Hong Yŏha,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 207. 100. Hong Yŏha, “Tongguk t’onggam chegang,” Han’guk sasŏ ch’onggan (Seoul: Yŏgang ch’ulp’ansa, 1986), 532.

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101. Ha Ubong, “Yi Ik,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 236. 102. Ibid., 241. 103. Yi Ik, S ŏngho sasŏl 23:39-40 (Seoul: Minjok muhwa ch’ujinhoe, 1977). 104. Ibid., 47. 105. For example, books like Tongsa pogam, Pongi t’ongram, Chindan tonggi. 106. Han Myŏnggi, “Hong Manjong,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 219. 107. Ibid., 215. 108. Hong Manjong, “Tongguk yŏkdae ch’ongmok,” Hong Manjong chŏnjip (Seoul: Taehaksa, 1980). 109. Kim Musik, “Im Sangdŏk,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 226. 110. Ibid., 230. 111. Ibid., 231. 112. They are reflected in chapter 17 of Tongsa kangmok as well as in the section of Ko’i 考異 or Investigation on Miraculous Matters and Chiri ko 地理考 or Investigation on Geography. 113. An Chŏngbok, Tongsa kangmok (Seoul: Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 1970), 12. 114. Ibid., 12. 115. Ibid., 103-4. 116. An Chŏngbok, Sunam sŏnsaeng munchip 2, 30. 117. An Chŏngbok, Tongsa kangmok, 105. 118. Ibid., 109. 119. Tongsa kangmok was influential upon later nationalist historians such as Pak Ŭnsik 朴殷植, Chang Chiyŏn 張志淵 and Sin Ch’aeho. See Pae Usŏng, “An Chŏngbok,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 281. 120. They are Pongi 本紀 or Annals, Sega 世家 or Hereditary Families and Yŏljŏn 列傳 or Biographies. 121. Kim Musik, “Yi Chonghwi,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 263-65. 122. Tangjaeng or factional strife began in the sixteenth century (1575?-1776). Along with the perpetuation of Neo-Confucianism, disagreement over issues in state affairs, such as peace, population, expanded examination quotas, in addition to the worsening competition among yangban for official positions, the Chosǒn literati divided into factions. It was a struggle among political cliques, and membership was a matter of personal and regional affiliation; moreover, it was predetermined and unchangeable at an individual level. For details, see Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1984), 208, 221-23. 123. Kim Yǒngsim and Chǒng Chaehun annotated, Tongsa (Seoul: Somang ch’ulp’ansa, 2004). 124. Kim Musik, “Yi Chonghwi,” 267. 125. Haedong yŏksa 60, Suksinssi ko 肅愼氏考. 126. Han Ch’iyun, Haedong yŏksa (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe, 1996), 1-9. Han Yong’u, “Han Ch’iyun,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 353. 127. Ibid., 357. 128. Han Ch’iyun, Haedong yŏksa, 1-9. 129. Chang Chiyŏn revised and expanded it to Taehan kangyŏk ko 大韓疆域考 or the Territorial Treatise on the Great Han in 1903, in seven volumes. It was later collected in Chŏng Yagyong’s anthology made by Chŏng Inbo 鄭寅普 and An Chaehong 安在鴻 under the title Yŏyudang chŏnsŏ 與猶堂全書 in 1936. 130. Chŏng Yagyong, Abang kangyŏk ko. Chŏng Haeryŏm annotated (Seoul: Hyŏndae sirhaksa, 2001), 134.

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131. Idem, “Tongho ron,” Yŏyudang chŏnchip 1: 12-7b. 132. Cho Sŏngǔl, “Chŏng Yagyong,” in Han’guk ǔi yŏksa wa yŏksahak 1, ed. Cho Tonggŏl et al. (Seoul: Changbi), 340. 133. Ibid., 332-34. 134. To Hyǒnchǒl, Koryǒ mal sadaebu ǔi chǒngch’i sasang yǒn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1999), 195-20. 135. Chǒng Okja, Chosǒn hugi Chunghwa sasang yǒn’gu (Seoul: Ilchisa), 9-25. 136. Yu Ponghak, Yǒn’am ilp’a pukhak sasang yǒn’gu (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1995), 124-43.

THREE Ancient History Reinvented Another Battleground for National Prestige and Political Legitimacy

Understandings of Korean ancient history underwent a dramatic change in the late nineteenth century as a result of Korea’s changed political situation. Internally, the late Chosǒn court was plagued with corrupt officials, administrative inefficiency, and abuse of power by the royal inlaws. 1 The external threats to Korea were even graver. Along with the arrival of Western imperial powers, Korea’s Asian neighbors, China and Japan, were attempting to consolidate their influence in Korea as a diversion from their own internal problems. After some abortive attempts by France and the United States to open Korea for trade in the 1860s, Japan imposed the draconian Treaty of Kanghwa, upon Korea in 1876, which became a prelude of making Korea into Japan’s protectorate in 1905 and a formal colony in 1910. From the late nineteenth century, studies on the ancient history of Korea were conducted not only by Korean scholars, but also by scholars from abroad, especially Japan. To Japanese scholars, the study of Korea’s ancient history had at least two purposes. On the one hand, it mirrored the development of Japanese history, especially its prehistory and early history; on the other hand, by asserting that Japanese civilization was more advanced than its Korean counterpart, their research advocated the Japanese colonization of Korea and justified Japanese expansion as rescuing Korean (and Asian) people and civilizations. With the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule, the southnorth division in 1945, and the establishment of separate governments in 1948, studies on ancient history became more complicated. Both North 89

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and South Korean scholars invested tremendous effort into reconstructing ancient history on the basis of nationalist historiography written during the colonial period and archaeological data that became available from the 1950s. Despite the persistent complexity and discrepancy, studies of the ancient history of Korea flourished in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. COLONIAL LEGACY: JAPANESE SCHOLARSHIP ON THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF KOREA (SEVENTEENTH CENTURY-1945) Korea and Japan have a long history of political, social, and cultural interaction. The earliest contact can be traced back to the legendary periods with the migration across the strait from the Korean Peninsula to the Japanese archipelago. 2 From the fifth century CE, there is more reliable information about connections and communications. The erudite scholar of the Paekche Kingdom (first century BCE?-660 CE), Wang In 王仁, brought numerous Confucian classics to Japan, and it was also at this time that Buddhism spread to Japan through Korea. The people of the Japanese archipelago maintained frequent contact with the people of Korea. Peaceful interaction was the mainstream until the mid-nineteenth century, except for two major wars in East Asia, one is the seventh-century unification war by Silla-Tang against the KoguryŏPaekche-Yamato Japan; and the second was the Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea which escalated to an East Asia international war. 3 The transition from the Ming to the Qing in the seventeenth century had tremendous political and intellectual implications not only in China proper, but also in Korea and Japan. Japanese and Korean scholars needed to reconsider their conception that China was the singular source and center of civilization, as well as their relationship with the Qing dynasty. Japanese and Korean scholars began to take an unprecedented interest in their indigenous culture, and came to see their native country as the carrier of Confucian civilization. What became known as So Chunghwa 小中華 or Minor Universal Civilization consciousness was widely disseminated. With the disintegrating Sino-centric world order, the newly constructed Japan-centered system needed the image of Chosǒn to affirm the historical uniqueness and superiority of Japanese culture. Influenced by the intellectual legacy of the seventeenth-century Kokugaku 國學 movement, modern Japanese historiography in the late nineteenth century took the lead in defining Japanese national and cultural identity, and there was a growing demand for the definition of a Japanese national identity that struck a balance between Westernization and the preservation of Japanese culture after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. 4 At

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the same time, Japanese historians also needed to reorient Japan’s position vis-à-vis China and Korea. Writing national history became the most important element in the construction of Japanese identity. The first history department in Japan was established at Tokyo Imperial University in 1888, and it became the cradle not only of academic research, but also for training the next generation of historians in Japan. A student of Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), Ludwig Riess (1861-1928), started teaching in Tokyo Imperial University (now University of Tokyo) in the late 1880s, and introduced the modern methodology of history to Japan. 5 Modern historiography in Japan was also strongly influenced by the forces of colonialism, imperialism, and nationalism. Japanese scholars’ interests in history soon extended outside of Japan, which involved extensive fieldwork and excavations in Korea and Manchuria. Japanese interest and research on Korea correlated with Japan’s domestic situation and international relationships. Hatada Takeshi 旗田巍 (1908-1994) was one of the most influential Japanese historians of Korea in the twentieth century. A son of a Japanese family that settled in Korea after 1910, Hatada grew up in Masan, Korea, and later became a dedicated historian of Korea. As one of the most prominent postwar Koreanists in Japan, Hatada was famous not only for his academic achievements, but more importantly, for his groundbreaking introspective work on Japanese colonial scholarship of Korea. In his anthology, Nihonjin no Chōsenkan 日本人の 朝鮮觀 or Japanese Views of Korea, Hatada investigated the formation of Japanese perceptions of Korea from the Kokugaku school in relation to the transformation of a Japanese self-consciousness. According to Hatada, Japanese scholarship on Korea had the following themes. Between Common Ancestry Theory and Japanese Racial Superiority 6 Despite the isolationist policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate (seventeenth-nineteenth century), Korea was one of the few countries with which Japan maintained a consistent diplomatic relationship in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when twelve official Korean envoys were dispatched to Edo 江戶 (Tokyo). 7 Korea was a source of Confucian scholarship (Cheng-Zhu 程朱 Learning, Yi T’oegye 李退溪 school in particular) and culture, which was highly admired by, and indispensable to, Japanese intellectuals. 8 However, at the same time, the insistence on the superiority of Japanese over Korean culture had been passed down for centuries, from the Kojiki 古事記 or the Chronicles and the Nihon shoki日本書記 or the Chronicles of Japan (both compiled in the eighth century). Many Edo-era scholars believed that Shisano Nomikoto 素盞鳴尊 went to the Samhan 三韓 area (southern Korean Peninsula) and

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became the ancestor of the people there, which became the basis of naisen dōsoron 內鮮同祖論 or the common ancestry theory. 9 With the purpose of glorifying Japanese indigenous culture, the Kokugaku scholars attempted to recover the essence of Japanese culture and restore Japan to a sacred state. Eager to contruct an image of Japanese hegemony over Korea, the Kokugaku scholars contended that in ancient times Japanese emperors ruled over a substansive Korean ruling class. At the same time, China was transformed into a symbol of an advanced civilization whose geographical connotation lost some if not all of its relevance. In other words, due to the conquest of China by the Qing dynasty, Japan could be China as long as the Japanese possessed high culture. 10 Korea became more critical to Japan’s national interests in the nineteenth century, especially with the arrival of European powers. After the annexation of Ryūkyū and Hokkaido to Japanese territory, Korea became strategically crucial to Japanese national security, and studies of Korea proliferated. 11 Inspired by European powers, Japanese intellectuals conducted extensive discussions on the possibility of colonial expansion. After much debate on the position of Korea to Japan’s future, Japanese views of Korea transformed to seikanron 征韓論 12 or a discourse about conquering Korea, which was embraced by the Meiji government (18671912) hoping to use Korea as a test case to Japan’s new power. 13 Resonating with the rising influence of seikanron among Japanese intellectuals, the study of Korea also became a way of preparing Japan’s colonization of Korea. Most Japanese scholars of Korean history concentrated on ancient and the late Chosǒn period, since these phases supposedly revealed Koreans’ “innate national defects.” A latecomer imperialist power, Japanese scholars had to develop different slogans to justify the colonization of their neighboring countries, which led to the dōbun dōshuron 同文同種論 or the same culture and same race theory. It created a dual racial discourse among Japanese scholars. On the one hand, they affirmed Japanese racial and cultural superiority and Japan’s ability to adopt Western culture and achieve modernization. On the other hand, they needed dōbun dōshuron to distinguish Japan’s way of colonization from European powers, so that Japan could legitimize and/or disguise its occupation of other Asian countries. These Japanese scholars admitted that Japan had been influenced by Chinese culture for centuries; however, Japan had maintained its indigenous culture and that Chinese cultural elements were Japanized. In this sense, Korea became a contrastive model; Koreans had always accepted Chinese culture without subjective selection and adaptation. Therefore, Japan maintained independence, while Korea remained politically submissive and culturally indebted to China. In other words, despite the common ancestor of Japanese and Korean people, Koreans missed oppor-

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tunities for independent development under overwhelming pressure from the mainland, and had to be content in their role as a model tributary vassal state to China. This discourse reflected the new worldview of Japan in the late nineteenth century: within the dichotomy of advanced West and backward East, Japan had a unique ability to imitate the West and became “civilized.” Therefore, Japan was obliged to become a model for its Asian brothers and sisters. As a result, it was “the burden of the Japanese” to defend Asian countries against Western aggression. In the late nineteenth century, Japanese intellectuals were split between the proponents of datsua nyūō 脫亞入歐 (Escape from Asia and Join European Powers, advocated by Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤 諭吉, prevalent in the 1880s and 1890s) and datsuō nyūa 脫歐入亞 (the burden of the Japanese to lead Asian countries after Japan’s victory over Russia and the colonialization of Korea). As one of the most important thinkers in Japan’s modern history, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901 CE) wrote “Datsuaron 脫亞論” (Escaping from Asia) in 1885, in which he argued that even though Chinese and Koreans shared a cultural and racial affinity with the Japanese, it was time for Japan to separate from its backward Asian neighbors and protect its own survival in order for Japan to be accepted as an equal partner by the Western powers. 14 Fukuzawa’s contempt for Asian people impressed many Japanese intellectuals. It was further substantialized by the economist Fukuda Tokuzō 福田德三 (1874-1930) in his research on the economic history of Korea. After his brief visit to Korea in 1902, Fukuda published a series of essays explaining the success of the Japanese economy by contrasting it with Korea’s stagnancy. He argued that the Japanese situation paralleled Europe’s success, and that Japan’s ascendancy since the Meiji Restoration was not simply because Japan emulated Europe, but more so because Japan possessed the historical foundation for advancement. In contrast, Korea had been backward in politics, industry, commerce, landownership, and society, and Korea had never undergone a feudal phase. Therefore, Korea in 1900 was reminiscent of Japan’s prefeudal Fujiwara period (ca. tenth to twelfth century CE). Fukuda further claimed that Koreans had no potential for autonomous development, so it fell to Japan to rectify the flaws that had brought about Korea’s corruption and devastation, so that Korea could later assimilate into a “powerful and advanced [in other words, Japanese] culture.” 15 Despite Fukuda’s limited knowledge of Korea and his brief research trip to gather information, Fukuda’s views became emblematic of Japanese perceptions of Korea throughout and even after the colonial period. The Japanese scholarship on the early history of Korea can be divided into two perspectives: Japanese and East Asian. 16 Scholars taking the Japanese perspective were interested in Korean history, seeing in it some hints at the origin of Japanese history. They supported the common an-

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cestry theory, contending that a group of ancient people who were the descendants of a heavenly god initially lived in an isolated inland area and then migrated to places such as Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. This discourse laid the foundation not only for the Japanese invasion and occupation, but also contributed to war propaganda of PanAsianism and the Dai tōa Kyōeiken 大東亞共榮圈 or Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere during World War II. However, some Japanese historians were less intrigued by the common ancestry theory. Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 (1865-1942), Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉 (1873-1961), Ikeuchi Hiroshi 池內宏 (1878-1952), and Inaba Iwakichi 稻葉岩吉 (1876-1940) were trailblazers who questioned the Japanese Kokugaku learning; instead of relying on ancient Japanese sources, these scholars consulted Chinese sources of the Han-Tang era, which they believed to be more reliable. At the same time, scholars were critical of the early Confucian classics, especially sources about the sage kings of early China, namely Sanhuang wudi 三皇五帝 or the Three Emperors and Five Sovereigns. Their iconoclastic stance derived from their disdain for Asian peoples and cultures, and their suspicion of early Chinese history and the sage kings arose especially from their bias against Chinese civilization. 17 Their admiration for Western culture strengthened their contempt for China and also Korea, which as a minor replica of Chinese culture, proved even more inferior in their eyes. 18 The archaeological investigations of Japanese scholars were facilitated by the expansion of Japanese military power, especially following Japan’s military victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and the colonization of Korea in 1910. Japanese studies on Korea were connected with studies on Manchuria. Shiratori Kurakichi, the founder of Tōyōshi 東 洋史 or Oriental History in Japan, established the Mansen rekishi chiri chosashitsu 滿鮮歷史地理調査室 (Research Institution on the History and Geography of Manchuria) under the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMRC); since 1906, the SMRC became the headquarters for archaeological and anthropological investigations conducted in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea. 19 Korean history was subsequently subsumed within the project of Mansenshi 滿鮮史 or the History of Manchuria and Korea, and Korea itself became a mere geographical subcategory. As a result, Koreans and Korean history lost subjectivity in historical development, and the inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula became bystanders of history relegated to doing nothing but complying with changes on the continent. The Japanese considered Korea incapable of becoming an independent state, and portrayed Korea as a country usually ruled by someone from the mainland (often a loser from the continental competition came to rule the Korean Peninsula). 20 Colonial scholarship continued to influence postwar studies on Korea in Japan. One of the new hypotheses was the kiba minzoku setsu 騎馬民族 說 or the horse-rider theory proposed by Egami Namio 江上波夫 (1906-

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2002) in the 1960s. According to Egami, some horse-riding groups migrated from Eurasia, settled in Northeast China, and then migrated to the Korean Peninsula, and further on to Japan. They were the ancestors of the Japanese, and founded the early Japanese state. 21 Some Korean scholars welcomed this hypothesis because it confirmed their long-held belief that Japan benefited from Korea’s transmission of culture, and it could rebut colonial Japanese charges about Korean history. However, it also ran counter to Korean nationalists’ attempts to distance Korean from Chinese and Japanese culture, and emphasize the uniqueness of Korea’s cultural development. At the same time, some Korean scholars criticized Egami’s hypothesis as just a warmed-over version of the common ancestry theory and Pan-Asianism propagated by the Japanese colonial authority in the first half of the twentieth century. 22 One of the very few American historians specialized in early Korean history, Gary Ledyard took Egami’s hypothesis one step further by naming Eurasian migrants the Puyǒ 夫餘 people, who had been documented in both Chinese and Korean sources. 23 The Puyǒ people established a state in today’s Northeast China, and were the founders of the Koguryǒ and Paekche states. 24 Despite its sensational debut and apparent plausibility, the horse-rider hypothesis was gradually dismissed because most archaeological data discovered from the 1960s to the 1990s contradicted it. 25 Japanese archaeologists were the first group to conduct archaeological excavations in Korea. Japanese scholars denied the Paleolithic and the Bronze Age in Korea. Despite the excavation of bronze relics in the early twentieth century, most Japanese scholars insisted that Korea had progressed directly from the Neolithic to the Iron Age. 26 Iron was first introduced to Korea by the Chinese refugees who had fled China during the Warring States period (fifth century-third century BCE). During the colonial period, Japanese scholars invested resources on selective archaeological sites that affirmed their preferred viewpoints. One was the common ancestry theory; and the other was the Lelang Commandery. Japanese colonial scholars used the common ancestry theory to construct a fraternal Japanese-Korean relationship and to minimize the Koreans’ grievances against the Japanese colonial administration. The Lelang Commandery was a reminder of Korea’s distant past as a colony, thus normalizing current colonization. 27 The quality and quantity of Lelang excavations and excavation reports, which were outstanding even by today’s standards, testify to Japanese archaeologists’ fascination with the Lelang Commandery. In order to reinforce their theory of Korea’s destined heteronomy, Japanese scholars disputed the date and reliability of Tan’gun, labeling it as a folk story that began circulating among the Koryǒ (918-1392) people after the Mongolian invasion (1234-1273). As evidence, Japanese historians argued that the Tan’gun myth first appeared in Samguk yusa com-

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piled in 1284; there was no mention of Tan’gun in earlier Chinese documents, or in the Samguk sagi on the Korean side. 28 In order to argue that the first ancient state of Korea was created later than a Japanese equivalent, they also questioned Kija Chosǒn. 29 Their inquiry made for an interesting and ironical coincidence between Japanese colonial and Korean nationalist historians, despite their opposing agendas. Japanese scholars argued that the first state in the Korean Peninsula had been established by the Chinese refugee Weiman, and that the Lelang Commandery laid the foundation for political and cultural development in the Korean Peninsula. In other words, the Korean state arose from an imported foreign regime, initiating thousands of years of Chinese dominance over Korea and Korea’s obsession with Chinese culture. Mimana first appeared in Kojiki and Nihon shoki, texts compiled around the eighth century CE. According to the Nihon shoki, Empress Jingu 神功皇后 (r. 209-269? CE) of Yamato conquered the southern Korean Peninsula and established a Japanese colony that lasted from the third century to the sixth century. However, the Mimana had long been either ignored or disputed by Japanese historians, few of whom trusted the authenticity of early records in Kojiki and Nihon shoki. Nonetheless, seventeenth-century Kokugaku scholars began to attribute credibility to these early records, and Mimana became the focus of historical inquiry. They constructed Mimana as a virtual entity that existed in the southeastern part of Korean Peninsula and was ruled by Yamato until it merged with the Silla Kingdom in the sixth century. The study of Mimana became more popular with the rising seikanron in the late nineteenth century. Like the common ancestry theory, this argument was used to justify Japanese intervention in the Korean Peninsula. 30 KOREAN HISTORIOGRAPHY FROM THE LATE CHOSǑN TO COLONIAL PERIOD (1900-1945) During the late Chosǒn and Great Han Empire period, some Korean intellectuals realized the importance of writing a new history to fit changing domestic and international conditions. As part of the Kabo 甲午 Reform in 1894, the Chosǒn government established P’yǒnsaguk 編史局, the Committee for Historical Compilation, and many newly founded schools started to incorporate history classes into their curriculum. 31 The first Korean history textbook was published in October 1895, by an unknown author. 32 The Chosǒn government soon published three more history textbooks; two written by Kim T’aegyǒng 金澤榮 (1850-1927), and the third by Hyǒn Ch’ae 玄采 (1856-1925). However, Hyǒn Ch’ae’s Tongguk yǒksa 東國歷史 (1899) was more of an uncritical translation of Hayashi Taisuke’s 林泰輔 (1854-1922) earlier Chōsen shi 朝鮮史 or the History of Korea (1892). 33 Complied with historical background of this period, Kim

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and Hyǒn also accepted recent Japanese reinterpretations of East Asia’s ancient history, especially concerning the relationship between Japan and Korea with respect to Mimana. Determined to deconstruct the centurieslong submission to China, Kim and Hyǒn leaned toward Japanese claims about Mimana. 34 Studies on Korean history became more diversified after 1900. In addition to Japanese colonial historiography, there were three Korean schools of historiography. The school of Korean nationalist historiography, founded by Sin Ch’aeho 申采浩 and Pak Ǔnsik 朴殷植 (1859-1925), challenged Japanese interpretations of Korean culture and people. Sin, as will be discussed later, focused on ancient history; while Pak Ǔnsik tackled recent Korean history by publishing Han’guk tongsa 韓國痛史 or The Painful History of Korea (1915) and Han’guk tongnip undong chi hyŏlsa 韓 國獨立運動之血史 or The Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement (1920) after escaping to China. Pak paved the way for an understanding of modern history from the perspective of the Korean nation. It is therefore not surprising that the Japanese colonial government banned his books in Korea. 35 The school of socioeconomic historiography was founded by Paek Nam’un 白南雲 (1894-1979). This school was instrumental in deconstructing Japanese colonists’ devaluation of Korea’s history and its people. Paek studied at Tokyo Commercial College in 1918, where his mentor Fukuda Tokuzō became famous for designing a model of economic stagnancy for Korean history. Inspired by Marxism, Paek studied Korea’s socioeconomic history. His research took the form of two monographs: Chosŏn sahoe kyŏngjesa 朝鮮社會經濟史 (1933) or the Socio-Economic History of Korea and Chosŏn ponggŏn sahoe kyŏngjesa 朝鮮封建社會經濟史 (vol. 1, 1937) or the Socio-Economic History of Korean Feudal Society, published ironically in Japan because the Japanese Government-General in Korea prohibited their publication in Korea. By identifying the five phases of world history—primitive communal society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society, and social and communist society—in Korean history, Paek and his fellow Marxist historians framed Korea in terms of the universal development of world history. The affirmation of a feudal society in Korea proved inspiring to Korean people, because Japanese scholars attributed Korea’s incapacity to transform into a capitalist society to its absence of feudalism. 36 Unlike Japanese colonial historians and Korean national historians, Paek advocated the universal aspect of Korean history. 37 Instead of ancient history, he had a stronger interest in the medieval era. 38 Although socioeconomic historiography had the potential to rescue Korean history from the Japanese colonial depiction of Korean stagnation, the members of this school were later accused of dogmatically applying Marxism to Korea. Paek was skeptical of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP); however, most Korean socioeconomic historians dur-

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ing the colonial period embraced AMP in Korean history, thereby reinforcing Korean exceptionalism. 39 The evidential school was founded by Yi Pyǒngdo 李丙燾 (1896-1989) and other historians trained in Japan. Fully committed to the principle of “history for its own sake,” they confined their research to the premodern period. This was also the only school tolerated under Japanese colonialism, since their scholarship posed no immediate threat to colonial authority. Because of its insensitivity to Korea’s colonial situation, this school was later criticized for paying too much attention to antiquarian issues such as locating ancient places while avoiding their urgent duties as Korean intellectuals to stimulate the Korean peoples’ national consciousness for independence. 40 The ancient history of Korea became a contested field among Korean nationalist historians, evidential school scholars, and Japanese colonialist historians. 41 To Korean nationalists, the study of Korean ancient history became the venue to undermine Japanese colonial scholarship. The development of nationalist historiography in Korea can be divided into four phases: 1) from the late Chosǒn and the Great Han Empire to 1908, with the publication of Sin Ch’aeho’s Toksa sillon 讀史新論 or New Readings of History as the transitional point, 2) from 1910 to the early 1930s, 3) from the 1930s to the early 1950s; and 4) from the 1960s to the present. 42 Korean nationalist historians shared their goal of reconstructing a Korean ancient history focused on nation as a way of promoting a unanimous national consciousness, though they differed in terms of foci, perspective, and venue in their historical enterprise. The Early Nationalist Historians: Sin Ch’aeho and Ch’oe Namsǒn 崔南善 Modern Korean historiography stemmed from the Japanese colonial period and was strongly influenced by nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, Marxism, and Social Darwinism. Along with the formation of modern nations and nation-states in Europe and other continents, the historical narrative had been focused on the nation and nation-state. Although the details in the formation of Korean nationalism are still debated by scholars, it is commonly accepted that modern nationalist historiography was founded by Pak Ǔnsik and Sin Ch’aeho aiming to counteract Japanese colonialism and racism. The difference between Pak Ǔnsik and Sin Ch’aeho is that Sin resorted to ancient history, while Pak was more concerned with his contemporary period. 43 Initially a Confucian scholar, Sin Ch’aeho sought a way to salvage the Korean nation and state when Korea became prey to imperial ambitions. Sin started contributing essays to Hwangsǒn g sinmun 皇城新聞 or the Capital Gazetteer in 1907, and then became the chief editor for Taehan maeil sinbo 大韓每日申報 or Taehan Daily, owned by British citizen Earnest Thomas Bethell (1872-1909) and was relatively immune to Japanese cen-

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sorship. Therefore, Sin was able to criticize the Japanese occupation and Koreans’ collaboration with the Japanese, for the purpose of promoting Korean nationalism. 44 Sin’s works on history concentrated on ancient history, 45 and biographies of Korean and foreign national heroes. 46 After Japan annexed Korea in 1910, Sin took exile in Qingdao (China) and Russia, and later made a field trip to Manchuria, which he believed to be the birthplace of the ancient Koreans. 47 Sin became interested in anarchism in the 1920s, and his famous Chosǒn hyǒngmyǒng sǒn’ǒn 朝鮮革命宣言 or the Proclamation of the Korean Revolution was the product of his conviction that anarchism was the sole solution for Korea. 48 Sin resumed his research on the ancient history while living in Beijing, because he considered historical consciousness a prerequisite to national sovereignty and independence. In addition, Sin joined the military resistance in Manchuria in order to establish a Provisional Government of Korea. Arrested for counterfeiting in 1928, Sin died in a Japanese prison in 1936. Considering the nation the protagonist of history, Sin declared, “National history is the narration of the rise and fall of a nation,” 49 and “There is no history if there is no nation. If there is no history, then the nation has no consciousness about the state. Alas, how important the responsibility of history!” 50 These words testified to a fundamental shift in historical consciousness, where the nation replaced the dynasty as the focus of historical writing. 51 Sin insisted on an uncompromising national struggle against Korea’s enemies, and contended that independence should be won by struggle, not conferred freely as a gift. His views on national independence were reflected in his writings on ancient history. By setting Korean history as a ceaseless resistance against external enemies, Sin appealed for a restoration of the Korean national spirit that had been unfortunately weakened by Confucianism. Sin’s criteria for a nation were blood ties and territory. Sin defined the components of Korean race: Puyǒ 扶餘, the direct descendants of Tan’gun and the Chujok 主族 or major race, in addition to five other groups—the Sǒnbi 鮮卑, Han 漢 Chinese, Malgal 靺鞨, Yǒjin 女眞 and T’ojok 土族, which comprised the Kaekjok 客族 or the guest (minor) components. 52 Hence, the four thousand years of Korean history saw the rise and fall of the Puyǒ nation. Therefore, Sin rejected the previous understanding that the Han 韓 was the core component of the Korean people, and prioritized the northern lineage by emphasizing Puyǒ, Koguryǒ, and Parhae’s position in Korean history. Therefore, the pre–Three Kingdoms period of Korean history were the history of the Puyǒ people. In his Chosǒn sanggo munhwasa 朝鮮上古文化史 or Cultural History of Ancient Korea, Sin incorporated the Manchus and Kuyi 九夷 or nine barbarians into the Puyǒ lineage; hence, the realm of the Puyǒ people ranged from west of the Liao River 遼河 to Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula.

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Sin was critical of the legitimate lineage of the early history of Korea, conventionally framed as the sequence of Tan’gun-Kija-Mahan-Silla. He refuted the previous understanding of the relationship between Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn, that Kija was enfeoffed with Chosǒn, made P’yǒngyang his capital, promulgated legal codes and a Chǒngjǒn 井田 or well-field system, and educated and civilized the Chosǒn people. Instead, Sin proposed that when Kija came to the east, the King of Puyǒ invested Kija with an official rank and allowed him to reside in P’yǒngyang; hence Kija was the subject of the King of Puyǒ. Despite some conflicts and repeated division and unification, the Puyǒ state, Tan’gun Chosǒn, thrived. The Kija Chosǒn, Wiman Chosǒn, and Four Han Commanderies were just components of Tan’gun Chosǒn and were all located in Manchuria; therefore, there was no interruption in the history of the Puyǒ people. Sin was critical of the Silla “unification” and put Parhae prior to Silla, which was the result of his understanding of Manchuria as the primary stage of the Korean people. It is not surprising that Sin considered all people who lived in Manchuria, including the Jurchen, as the descendants of Tan’gun. 53 Moreover, Sin argued that Tan’gun was born on Mount Paektu 白頭, not Mount Myohyang, which had been believed since Iryǒn’s Samguk yusa. To Sin, Manchuria was the base for the Korean independence movement, and reclaiming Manchuria had to precede national salvation. 54 Targeting the Japanese colonial condemnation of Korean heteronomy, Sin relocated Wiman Chosǒn to the Yodong area, and consequently the Four Han Commanderies were also confined to the Yodong area. 55 In his research on the Nangnang Commandery, Sin proposed a hypothesis about two Nangnangs. One Nangnang Commandery was the Han Chinese colony located at the Yodong area; and the one at P’yǒngyang was Ch’oe Yi’s 崔理 Nangnang State, briefly mentioned in Kim Pusik’s Samguk sagi. 56 In his work on Imna (J. Mimana), another colony of early Korea, Sin contended that “it was a (Japanese) distortion of historical truth for invading Korea.” 57 Sin was the first Korean historian to pinpoint the agenda behind Japanese colonial scholarship on Mimana. 58 However, influenced by a Social Darwinism that advocated the survival of the fittest, Sin was incapable of articulating a more fundamental criticism of Japanese imperialism and colonialism. Moreover, his nationalist interpretations of Korean history were more emotional than substantial, and the dual aspects of resistance and expansion made Sin one of the most radical irredentists for reclaiming Manchuria, the territory of a strong Korean state that extended from Ko Chosǒn to Puyǒ and Koguryǒ. 59 Another nationalist scholar during the colonial period, Ch’oe Namsǒn 崔南善 (1890-1957), was a controversial figure. On the one hand, he was famous for organizing the Korean cultural movement in the first two decades of the twentieth century, and his Simungwan 新文館 or Hall of

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New Culture was the banner of the Korean national publishing and enlightenment movement. On the other hand, he was one of the most notorious collaborators with the Japanese colonial government, especially in advocating the Japanese total war mobilization. After studying for a short time at Waseda University in Japan, Ch’oe soon returned to Korea in 1906, where he published a magazine called Sonyǒn 少年 or Youth, which introduced new western-style poetry and the fiction of Yi Kwangsu 李光洙 (1892-1955?), the founder of modern Korean literature. Ch’oe was one of the initial organizers of the March First Movement in 1919, and participated in the drafting of Taehan Tongnip sǒn’ǒn 大韓獨立宣言 or the Korean Declaration of Independence, for which the Japanese colonial government imprisoned him for two years. In the early 1920s, Ch’oe was the first to promote Chosǒnhak 朝鮮學 or Chosǒn studies. Ch’oe started studies on Korea history in 1922, and became a committee member for the Chōsenshi henshūkai 朝鮮史編修會 in 1928. After a brief career as the advisor for Manmong Daily 滿蒙日報 or the Manchuria and Mongolia Daily, he accepted a professorship at Kengoku University 建國 大學 in Manchuria in 1939, an institution established by the Japanese Kantō 關東 Army. Upon his return to Korea in 1943, Ch’oe became a strong advocate for encouraging Korean students in Japan to join the Japanese imperial troops, and for calling Koreans to worship at Japanese Shinto shrines. Ch’oe was one of the most influential and prolific Korean nationalist historians from the mid-1920s to the early 1950s. Ch’oe’s achievements in ancient history can be seen in his Tan’gun non 檀君論 or the Studies on Tan’gun and Samguk yusa haeje 三國遺事解題 or An Annotated Introduction to Samguk yusa. Ch’oe provided new interpretations of the Tan’gun myth: that Tan’gun was a shaman, not a political leader; Tan’gun myth also contains historical aspects; a concept of totem in the Tan’gun myth; and the interdisciplinary application of folklore, mythology, linguistics, theology, and anthropology to studies of Korean history. 60 Ch’oe assumed that the territory of Tan’gun Chosǒn extended to Manchuria and the east coast of China, and that the core area was located at the Sungari River. Ch’oe proposed that Wangǒm 王儉 meant imgŭm, the chief or the king; hence, the era of Tan’gun Chosǒn was a period when rulers monopolized both religious and political authority. Ch’oe’s research on Tan’gun refuted Japanese colonial scholars’ rejection of Tan’gun as a late fabrication. In theorizing about Korean ancient history, Ch’oe Namsǒn proposed a Purham munhwa kwǒn 不咸文化圈 or Purham Cultural Sphere centered on Mount Paektu (C. Mount Changbai) and spanning from the Balkan Peninsula, Caspian Sea, Black Sea, Central Asia, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, Ryūkyū, to Japan. Sustained by Tan’gun worship, the center of this Purham cultural sphere was Chosǒn. Ch’oe insisted that the Purham munhwa kwǒn differed independently

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from the Chinese cultural sphere; at the same time, even though Koreans shared cultural elements with the Japanese, Korean culture was always superior—a fact that made Chosǒn the historical and geographical center of the Purham Cultural Sphere. 61 However, Ch’oe’s argument for a common origin for Korean and Japanese culture was criticized by his Korean compatriots, because Ch’oe’s Purham theory reiterated the Japanese common ancestry propaganda and thus provided “rationalization and legitimacy” to Japanese colonial policies. Despite Ch’oe contributions to Korean history, and Tan’gun studies in particular, he was remembered more as a traitor than a nationalist historian. Ch’oe and his works were seldom mentioned by postwar Korean historians, despite his pioneering work in Tan’gun studies and ancient history. 62 A Religious Approach: Kim Kyohǒn 金敎獻 (1868-1923) and Taejonggyo 大倧 敎 Taejonggyo was a religion that worshiped Tan’gun, his father Hwanung and his grandfather Hwanin. During the colonial period, it was almost impossible for independence movements to gain traction in Korea due to the thorough surveillance of Japanese colonial authorities. As a result, religion became a facade for resistance, and Taejonggyo became a proactive form of resistance inside and outside of Korea. The most influential figure in Taejonggyo was Kim Kyohǒn. Starting as a member of the Independence Club in 1898, Kim converted to Taejonggyo in 1910. Kim took over the position of Kyot’ong 敎統 from Na Ch’ǒl 羅喆 (1863-1916) and became the second leader of Taejonggyo in 1916. Due to the suppression by the Japanese Government-General in Korea, Kim had to move to Helong 和龍 County in Jiandao 間島 (K. Kando) in 1917, and then further north to Ning’an 寧安 County in Heilongjiang Province where he established Taejonggyo branches in Siberia, Mongolia, and on mainland China. 63 In addition to managing the Taejonggyo organizations, Kim dedicated himself to writings on Korean ancient history as a part of his efforts to develop Taejonggyo. Kim wrote Sindan minsa 神檀民史 or the History of the Sacred Sandalwood People and Sindan silgi 神檀實記 or the Veritable Records of the Sacred Sandalwood Tree in 1914. As Manchuria has become the base of the Korean independence movement, Kim spared no effort in reinforcing the importance of Manchuria in Korean history, contending that all people who lived in Manchuria were the descendants of Tan’gun. Kim incorporated Tan’gun, Puyǒ, Koguryǒ, Paekche, Silla, Parhae, Yemaek, Tong Okjǒ, Piryu, Samhan, Chǒng’anguk, and even Khitan Liao 遼 and Jurchen Jin 金 in the lineage of Korean history. 64 Kim further incorporated Sushen 肅愼 (K. Suksin) into Korean history, which is indic-

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ative of the special attention he paid to Manchuria. He named the Korean race Paedaljok 倍達族, and then subdivided it into Chosǒnjok 朝鮮族, Puyǒjok, Yemaekjok, Okjǒjok, and Suksinjok. 65 Among the many racial subcategories of Koreans, he considered Chosǒnjok the core element, while the other six groups also belonged to Korean history. The Korean nation, not the state, was the protagonist of his narrative. 66 Kim’s map of Paedal people ranged broadly across Korea, Manchuria, and parts of China. According to him, the territory of Ko Chosǒn encompassed Manchuria and the Liaoxi area; 67 and Manchuria was more important to Korean history than the peninsula. 68 Like Sin Ch’aeho, Kim argued that Mount T’aebaek in the Tan’gun myth was today’s Mount Paektu. Kim’s research on Korean ancient history, and especially on Tan’gun Chosǒn, contributed to the ideological consolidation of Taejonggyo, and influenced many nationalist historians including Sin Ch’aeho and Ch’oe Namsǒn. Kim’s Sindan minsa was a textbook for schools established by Korean independence activists in Manchuria. 69 Cultural Nationalist Historians (1920s-1930s): An Hwak 安廓 and Chǒng Inbo 鄭寅普 In 1919, the Japanese Government-in-General in Korea relaxed its colonial policy in Korea. Impressed by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, infuriated by the mysterious death of the deposed King Kojong (r. 1863-1907), and fed up with the nine-year brutal oppression, the Koreans launched a series of mass protests. 70 After crushing the protests, the Japanese colonial government implemented a new policy, the bunka seiji 文化政治 or the cultural policy to replace the previous budan seiji 武斷政治 or military rule. In the 1920s, Korean scholars were permitted to publish materials that were not subversive. Many Koreans became cultural nationalists who were reluctant to engage in military resistance. Among multiple endeavors for strengthening Korean cultural foundation, Korean history remained the center of intellectual inquiry. 71 One of these cultural nationalist historians was An Hwak 安廓 (18861946), who was strongly influenced by Yu Kiljun’s 兪吉濬 (1856-1914) Sǒyu kyǒmun 西遊見聞 or the Travelogue to the West and Liang Qichao’s 梁啓超 (1873-1929) Yinbingshi wenji 飮氷室文集 or the Collected Works of Yinbingshi. Believing that the only way to save Korea was to rediscover its culture, An visited Manchuria, the Maritime Provinces in Soviet Union, mainland China, and Hawaii where he investigated historical sites significant in Korean history. An agreed that Korea needed to be modernized based upon Korea’s national culture. Along with his research on Korean syntax and the history of Korean literature, he was famous for his Chosǒn munmyǒngsa 朝鮮文 明史 or the History of Korean Civilization in 1923. Unlike most historical

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books from the late Chosǒn dynasty, which put Tan’gun at the beginning, An Hwak identified an earlier period, which he named the prehistoric tribal period. The first Korean people resided in the Amur River area and later moved to the Sungari River Valley. Before the Tan’gun era, the Korean people had already spread and established a large colony, which reached to mainland China. An argued that Tan’gun laid the foundation for a unified Korea; but Tan’gun’s direct territory was rather small, and coexisted with many small states. An named this period the Great Disunion era, which was followed by the Three Kingdoms and the Northern and Southern States period. 72 An Hwak depicted an independent and progressive image of Korea by refuting the idea of sadae or serving the great. 73 He argued that Koreans had once ruled China, because one of the earliest sage kings in China, Shun 舜 (twenty-third century BCE ?), was a Korean, an idea inspired by Taejonggyo. Placing equal emphasis on Korea’s southern and northern lineages, An intended to discover unique and superior aspects of Korean culture on the basis of universal values. 74 The 1930s marked a new stage in Korean nationalist historiography. Compared to the previous decades when Korean historians adopted a spiritual perspective, there were more professionally trained historians practicing in the 1930s, and Chǒng Inbo 鄭寅普 (1892-1950) was one of the most prominent among them. Initially a student of the Yangming 陽明 school of Confucianism, Chǒng taught classical Chinese and Korean literature at Yǒnhǔi School (Yonsei University); he was also a commentator for Tong’a Ilbo 東亞日報 and Sidae Ilbo 時代日報. Chǒng’s proclamation of the five-thousand-yearold soul of Korea indicated his pride in Korean history. 75 During the Korean War, Chǒng was kidnapped and taken to North Korea, leaving behind his book Chosǒnsa yǒn’gu 朝鮮史硏究 or Studies on Korean History. His book on Korean history was written to understand the five-thousand-year history of Korea through ǒl 얼 or Korean soul. 76 Chǒng emphasized that Tan’gun was a human ancestor of Koreans, not a god. According to Chǒng, Ko Chosǒn was composed of many small states, and covered a large portion of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. Chǒng contended that the Four Han Commanderies were not located in the Korean Peninsula, but in the Bohai Bay area in China. Moreover, he argued that the Han Commanderies were temporary strongholds, not military or colonial fortresses. Chǒng also proposed Paekche yosǒ kyǒngnyak sǒl 百濟遼西經略說, a hypothesis arguing that Paekche Kingdom once occupied the area to the west of the Liao River and established a Chinp’yǒng 眞平 Commandery to administer interstate maritime trade. Believing a homogenous origin of the Three Kingdoms, Chǒng considered the battles between the Three Kingdoms and foreign powers (usually China) as efforts to defend the Korean nation. 77

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Neo-Nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s Nationalist historiography continued under the title of Sin minjok chuŭi ron 新民族主義論 or neo-nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s, advocated by An Chaehong 安在鴻 (1891-1965), Mun Ilp’yǒng 文一平 (18881939), and Son Chint’ae 孫晉泰 (1891-1965). The agenda for Korean nationalist historians changed at this time, because the internecine conflicts between leftists and rightists undermined the Korean struggle for independence. Consequently, neo-nationalism rejected both bourgeois and proletarian nationalism, and called for the construction of a unified nation-state without class distinctions. It was also these neo-nationalist intellectuals who worked strenuously to mend fences between the southern and northern halves of Korea from 1945 to 1950. 78 One of the founders of the neo-nationalism school, An Chaehong attended Waseda University in Japan, majoring in political science and economics. He returned to Korea and participated in the March First Independence Movement, and then was imprisoned for three years because of his connections with the Shanghai Provisional Government of Korea. After the liberation of Korea on August 15, 1945, An joined Yǒ Unhyǒng 呂運亨 (1886-1947) to organize Kŏn’guk chunbi wiwŏnhoe 建國準 備委員會 or the Committee for the Preparation for Korean Independence. Under the American Military Administration (United States Army Military Government in Korea, or USAMGIK), he was appointed minjǒng changgwan 民政長官 or Minister of Peoples’ Affairs in 1947. Influenced by Sin Ch’aeho and Chǒng Inbo, An agreed that the only way to save Korea was to rediscover the Korean national spirit; therefore, he devoted himself to refuting Japanese colonial scholarship on Korea. An called for mutual understanding and compromise among Koreans of all social strata after national independence. An’s idea of peaceful coexistence and class cooperation continued into the post-1945 period, and became the core of neo-nationalism. An’s study of ancient history started in 1930, when he contributed a series of articles to Chosŏn ilbo or Korean Daily under the title “Chosŏn sanggosa kwan’gyŏn 朝鮮上古史管見” or A Glimpse of Ancient Korean History. He was an active member of the Chosŏnhak movement and published Chosŏn sanggosagam 朝鮮上古史鑑 (1947-1948) or the Comprehensive Mirror of Korean Ancient History. 79 An proposed a matrilineal stage of the Asadal Society before the Tan’gun era, which developed into a patriarchal tribal society, and then to a Tan’gun confederated tribal society (for An, Tan’gun Chosŏn and Puyŏ Chosŏn are synonymous). More interestingly, An argued that Kija was not a name, but a general term for official rank, and that therefore, the emergence of Kija Chosŏn was the symbol of a dynastic transmission, rather than the coming of a Chinese sage king or a migration group. As a result, Kija was transformed into an indigenous group in ancient Korea, and Kija Chosŏn became an impor-

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tant phase of Korean history. 80 Like other earlier Korean nationalist historians, An considered Puyŏjok 扶餘族 the mainstream for Koreans, which was continued from Tan’gun Chosŏn to Koguryŏ. An’s interpretations proved to be significant because he attempted to balance Korean uniqueness with universality, which was different from the initial stage of Korean nationalist historiography in the 1910s and 1920s. Another neo-nationalist historian, Son Chint’ae 孫晉泰 (1900-1950?) also studied at Waseda University in the 1920s, majoring in history and sociology. Upon graduation, Son worked at Tōyo Bunko 東洋文庫 or the Oriental Library in Japan and started collecting Korean folklores in 1927. 81 Son devoted himself to the study of folklore because he considered folklore the ideal field for academic inquiry and believed that Korean history could solve contemporary problems. Joining Chindan hakhoe 震 檀學會 or the Association of Chindan in 1934, Son became a strong advocate of Sin minjok chuŭi sagwan 新民族主義史觀 or historical views of neonationalism, hoping to see the rebirth of a Korean nation based on equality and solidarity. 82 POST-1945: STUDIES ON KOREAN ANCIENT HISTORY IN THE SOUTH Thirty-six years of colonialism followed by three decades of dictatorship not only impeded a nuanced approach to history, but further placed historical interpretation at the service of justifying either the colonization of Korea by Japan or anticommunist authoritarianism under Syngman Rhee 李承晩 (Yi Sǔngman, 1875-1965) and the national modernization project under Park Chung Hee 朴正熙 (Pak Chŏnghǔi, 1917-1979). Contemporary Korean historiography on the ancient period stemmed from the three schools formed during the colonial period. Among them, the evidential school addressed the most lukewarm reaction to Japanese colonial scholarship, represented by Yi Pyǒngdo and other Korean historians trained in Japan. Unlike the Korean nationalist and socioeconomic historians, many scholars in the evidential school either voluntarily or inadvertently collaborated with the Japanese colonial government by confining their historical inquiry to topics deemed acceptable to colonial authorities. The 1950s-1960s: The predominance of the Chindan School Among the Korean historians from the colonial to the post-1945 period, Yi Pyǒngdo was no doubt the most influential and most prolific scholar. When he attended Waseda University to study history and sociology, Yi was stunned by the achievements of Japanese scholarship on Korean history, which inspired him to make historical research his life-

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long mission. Yi’s study with Ikeuchi Hiroshi and Tsuda Sōkichi laid the cornerstone for his future career. In 1925, Yi’s academic career began when Ikeuchi recommended he participate in the Chōsenshi henshūkai. The ensuing twenty years at Chōsenshi henshūkai gave him convenient access to primary sources at Kyujanggak 奎章閣 or the Chosŏn Court Library, and paved the way for his later academic achievements. Chōsenshi henshūkai was a Japanese colonial institution established after the publication of Pak Ŭnsik’s Chosǒn t’ongsa, and the purpose of this institution was to contain the Korean independent movement. Though Yi worked without pay, his involvement with the Chōsenshi henshūkai was later held as solid evidence of his collaboration with the Japanese. 83 Beginning in the 1930s, some Korean scholars allied to advocate a “pure academic approach” to the study of Korean history. In 1934, Yi established Chindan hakhoe or the Chindan Association 84 which published Chindan hakbo or the Chindan Journal, the first professional academic journal on Korean history. Korean scholars finally secured their own publication venue, unlike previously, when most historical studies could only be circulated in newspapers and magazines or through Japanese journals. Chindan hakbo’s stated goal was “research on the culture of Chosǒn and nearby area . . . [to] explore, develop and improve Korean culture. . . . ” It resonated with the Korean cultural nationalists’ appeal to improve Korean national characteristics instead of immediate independence; hence, it did not invite intervention from the Japanese colonial government. 85 Taking to heart Ranke’s principles of “history for its own sake,” and “fact as history,” Yi believed that the duty of the historian was to clarify historical truths through evidential textual analysis. Instead of challenging Japanese colonial scholarship, he showcased the work of Korean historians within the framework of Japanese scholarship: “cooperative participation with a competitive consciousness.” 86 Yi was unique among Korean historians. During the ideological rift between the leftists and rightists in the colonial period, Yi inclined to the right wing and attempted to compromise with the Japanese authorities while continuing to study Korean history. Yi remained the preeminent historian in South Korea after 1945, 87 and his interests spanned all periods of Korean history. His research in the ancient period was initially focused on the Four Han Commanderies whose location had been controversial for centuries among Korean and Japanese scholars. Concurring with the Nam’in 南人 or the Southern school scholars 88 of the late Chosǒn dynasty, Yi reaffirmed that most of the Four Han Commanderies were located in the Korean Peninsula, and that the Lelang Commandery was in the P’yǒngyang area. Hence, Yi’s research on the Han Commanderies marked a departure from the work of nationalist historians during the colonial period. In addition to the Four Han Commanderies, Yi also presented interesting interpretations on other issues in ancient history. Yi argued that

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King Kijun’s 箕準 surname was not Ki 箕 but Han 韓; hence, instead of Kija Chosǒn, this ancient state should be called Hanssi Chosǒn 韓氏朝鮮. Kija had never reached Korea, and the Kija Chosǒn was an indigenous regime established by local Korean people. 89 His more provocative idea was about Wiman. Paying special attention to Wiman’s hairstyle and dress when he came to Korea and the Han-Wiman Chosǒn relationship, Yi argued that Wiman was actually a descendant of Ko Chosǒn who stayed behind in the former Ko Chosǒn territory after the Yan general Qin Kai’s invasion in the late fourth century BCE. Therefore, Wiman was transformed into a genuine Ko Chosǒn patriot who brought his Chosǒn compatriots back to the motherland Korea, and whose grandson waged wholesale resistance against the Han invasion. This battle was depicted as the first national resistance and the origin of the Korean national spirit. 90 Aiming to distinguish himself from Japanese scholars, Yi refuted the presence of the Japanese colony Mimana on the Korean Peninsula. 91 Despite the important legacy of Korean nationalist and socioeconomic historiography of the colonial period, these schools ceased to develop in South Korea. Most socioeconomic historians went to North Korea before or during the Korean War, and the South Korean state favored the evidential school for its apolitical character. Consequently, the evidential school scholars monopolized teaching positions and dominated the field for the next two decades in South Korea. 92 The new trend only started in the late 1960s, thanks to the democratization movement and the emergence of a younger generation of historians who brought new perspectives and methodologies to their work. 93 The 1960s and 1970s: Decolonization Project Politically, socially, and culturally, the 1960s were distinctive in the history of South Korea. Overshadowed by the Korean War and anticommunism, the 1950s only postponed Korean people’s large-scale participation in the democratization movement. The April 19 Revolution in 1960 was a watershed in Korean historical studies by rejuvenating the legacy of the nationalist historiography from its enforced dormancy imposed by the anticommunist government in the 1950s. 94 The key achievement in the 1960s was its decolonizing agenda of reconstructing a Korean subjectivity and rectifying colonial distortions of Korean history. Efforts in decolonization focus on the nineteenth century and ancient Korea. In order to rectify the colonial charge of stagnancy, Korean scholars proposed an internal development theory emphasizing dynamic and diverse economic development at the end of the Chosŏn dynasty. 95 It was still taboo, though, to mention their intellectual indebtedness to the socioeconomic historiography of the colonial period. 96 Korean scholars’ deconstruction of heteronomy centered on the ancient history of Korea. This is not surprising considering that the ancient

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period was favored by Japanese colonialist historians for corroborating their belief in Koreans’ “innate national defects.” Korean historians first argued that Korean history was not just limited to the peninsula in the early period, and that therefore, it was groundless to attribute the fate of Koreans to Korea’s geopolitical location as a peninsula sandwiched between powerful China and Japan. Korean scholars contended that the ancestors of the Korean people lived not only in the Korean Peninsula, but also occupied a large portion of Manchuria. 97 Yi Kibaek 李基白 (1924-2004) was the most influential Korean historian from the 1960s to the 1990s. Yi was the pioneer who called for a fundamental critique of the Japanese colonial historiography on Korea. In his Kuksa sillon 國史新論 or the New National History of Korea (1961), Yi pointed out the necessity of eliminating “the obstacles (Japanese colonial legacy) to having a correct understanding of Korean history, which is free from distorted stereotypes and theories.” 98 [Italics added] In response to the needs of a more comprehensive and constructive reassessment of Korean historiography, Kim Ch’ǒlchun 金哲埈 analyzed the contributions and problems in the field of Korean history. Among the three schools from the colonial period, Kim was most critical of the evidential school, which he dismissed as a branch of the Japanese colonial school and which he accused of having failed to discover the nature and characteristics of Korean culture. At the same time, Kim also criticized socioeconomic historians’ dogmatic application of Marxism to the Korean context. Therefore, Kim favored Sin Ch’aeho’s understanding of ancient history as a saga of resistance against Japanese colonialism, based on Sin’s confidence in the potential of Korean culture and a critique of traditional Korean culture. Kim thus called for attention to a nationalist historiography that had been ignored and overshadowed due to the predominance of the evidential school in South Korea from the 1950s. 99 The 1970s also marked a new era of concern over the northern lineage. Despite the earlier interest in Manchuria from the late Chosǒn to the colonial period, South Korean historians concentrated on Silla and the southern lineage of Korean history in the 1950s and 1960s. Yi Usǒng 李 佑成 revived the theory of the South-North States in the 1970s, and request for embracing Parhae to the mainstream Korean historical lineage. The 1970s and 1980s: Historical objectivity versus national glory Ancient and modern history continued to be the two phases in Korean history that commanded the most attention in the 1970s. However, an unusual group joined in the study of Korean ancient history, which made ancient history a field of intense competition: professional and amateur historians. 100 The amateur historians demanded a complete overturning of the conventional understanding of ancient history in the name of restoring the Korean national glory and liquidating colonial remnants by

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accusing professional historians of doing little else but perpetuating the Japanese colonial legacy. There were a variety of people among the amateur historians. Some were right-wing politicians, some were educated people attracted to the idea of a glorious ancient history, and some were trained historians but not in Korean history. An Hosang 安浩相 (1902-1999) was one of the leading amateur historians. As a dyed-in-the-wool anticommunist politician and a minister of Culture and Education under Syngman Rhee, An was famous for his ilmin chuǔi 一民主義, or the ideology of one people. 101 He believed that the Korean people needed a unified vision in order to become a stronger state—a theory in support of dictatorship which could undermine the democratization of South Korea. As a combination of ultranationalism and anticommunism, An’s one people-ism justified the military dictatorships of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. An Hosang contended that all Tong’i were Koreans who resided in Northeast China, the Korean Peninsula, and the east coast of mainland China. 102 With strong support from the military government, An and his fellow right-wing intellectuals attempted to divert public attention from the pressing demand for democratization to the importance of rediscovering Korea’s national essence. Apparently the dispute between professional and amateur historians revolved around how to view the early history of Korea, especially Tan’gun and Ko Chosǒn. The dispute, however, was also related to the social function of history. The amateur historians wanted history to solidify national pride; the professional historians insisted upon historical rationality, objectivity, and their own professional authority. The professional historians also expressed concern with amateur historians’ emotional and arbitrary interpretations of ancient history as well as by their tendency to resort to bureaucratic and legislative procedures to implement and promote baseless claims. 103 The issues that separated professional from amateur historians were as follows. Is Tan’gun a historical figure or a figment of mythical imagination? When did Tan’gun Chosǒn begin? Was Ko Chosǒn a small protostate or a large and powerful empire? Where was the capital and what was the territorial scope of Ko Chosǒn? Are Kyuwǒn sahwa 揆園史話 or Historical Anecdotes of Kyuwŏn, Hwandan kogi 桓檀古記 or Ancient Record of Hwandan and Tangi kosa 檀奇古史 or the Ancient History of Tan’gun and Kija reliable sources for studying ancient history of Korea? 104 The amateur historians’ interpretations of ancient history were fraught with militarism and national essentialism. 105 The growth of these amateur historians was supported by ultraright organizations in the South, and their constant irredentist demands were embraced by Park Chung Hee’s military government. 106 The amateur historians established associations, such as Kuksa ch’atki hyǒbhoe 국사 찾기협회 or the Associa-

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tion for Rediscovering National History. They filed a lawsuit against the Department of Culture and Education of South Korea, and demanded the correction of “mistakes” in South Korean history textbooks. For the first time, the interpretation of ancient history became the topic of a hearing in the Korean National Assembly in 1981, at which Kim Ch’ǒlchun, Yi Kibaek, and other prominent Korean historians were summoned to testify. 107 The conflict between the professional and amateur historians over ancient history continued in the 1980s despite the weakened position of amateur historians. One unusual amateur historian in the 1980s was Yun Naehyǒn 尹乃鉉 (1939-), who was initially a specialist in early China but switched his research to ancient history of Korea. Unlike other amateur historians, Yun was a professor at Tan’guk University, and used Chinese historical documents instead of the suspicious Korean sources on the Tan’gun and pre-Tan’gun era that other amateur historians preferred. 108 Yun’s books Han’guk kodaesa sillon 韓國古代史新論 (1986) and Ko Chosǒn yǒn’gu 古朝鮮硏究 (1994) added fuel to the raging debate over the early history of Korea; and since then other amateur historians have regarded Yun as the ultimate authority. Yun’s arguments were similar to those of amateur historians, dating Ko Chosǒn to the thirtieth century BCE and characterizing Ko Chosǒn as a powerful empire that spanned the Hebei Province of China, Northeast China, and the northern Korean Peninsula. Yun also opined that Kija Chosǒn, Wiman Chosǒn, and the Four Han Commanderies were all located in the Hebei and Beijing area instead of the Korean Peninsula, which should be excluded from Korean history. After the collapse of Wiman Chosǒn, there emerged a yŏlguk sidae 列國時代 or multistate period. 109 By putting Kija, Wiman, and Four Han Commanderies outside of the Korean peninsula, Yun’s interpretation became attractive not only because of the territorial size and scope of Ko Chosǒn, but also for evading troubling or “humiliating” episodes of Korean history. However, this could be a paradoxical rearrangement. Yun envisioned a prosperous ancient Korea, but Korea was depicted as having occupied Manchuria for a much shorter period. By placing the “problematic” Kija, Wiman and Four Commanderies outside of the Korean Peninsula, Yun seemed to lean toward the peninsula-oriented historical view which implied that the center stage of Korean history had always been at the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, it still could be argued that Korea had never lost its splendid ancient tradition of independence as long as the peninsula was not colonized. The amateur historians gained support from the military government and attention from the media. However, with the decline and demise of the military dictatorship after the June 1987 Democratization Movement, their governmental support eroded. 110 In addition to their numerous factual mistakes and irrational logic, amateur historians showed a striking

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parallel to Japanese right-wing conservatives who demanded the revisions of Japanese history textbooks. Despite their starkly contrasting claims, the Korean and Japanese ultranationalist historians valued the political and social function of history over academic investigations. 111 Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the amateur historians also vigorously supported the authenticity of Tan’gun’s tomb excavated in the P’yǒngyang area in 1993. In contrast, most professional historians in the South however were inclined to believe that the scenario of Tan’gun tomb had been intentionally misinterpreted and manipulated by North Korean authorities since that tomb had been recorded in a geographical encyclopedia titled Sinjŭng Tongguk yǒji sŭngram 新增東國與地勝覽 in the fifteenth century. 112 Another interesting detour occurred in the twenty-first century. The alliance among amateur historians strengthened with the external crisis, stimulated by the Northeast China Project (2002-2007). The Korean media and some politicians took sides with the amateur historians, depicting them as the only true defenders of the Korean nation, its people, and their history. The early publications by amateur historians in the 1960s were at a fledging stage, but the recent revival of an amateur camp joined by scholars with professional training marked a huge difference. They formed new associations and published more books, and their repeated requests to change history textbooks eventually succeeded. Casual visitors to the bookstores in South Korea will find that books on Korea’s ancient history by amateur historians far outnumber those written by professional historians. The amateur historians are also savvy in choosing provocative titles, such as What We Learned about Ancient History Is All Wrong; Our Ancient History That Was Staged in the Northeast Asian Continent; and Ko Chosŏn Was the Hegemonic Ruler of the Continent, etc. The most sensational book by an amateur historian was written by Sŏng Samje, a member of the Korean Textbook Committee which was founded in response to the Japanese right-wing textbook in 2001. Koreans’ desire to read about their ancient glory was affirmed by the fact that Sŏng’s book, Ko Chosŏn sarajin yŏksa or the Lost History of Ko Chosŏn, had fourteen reprintings from 2005 to 2014. 113 It is fair to say that the Northeast China Project paradoxically helped the revival and justified the claim of a glorious ancient history strongly advocated by the amateur historians. UNRESOLVED ISSUES THAT STILL MATTER 114 The freedom of historical research since the 1980s stimulated a variety of issues and interpretations in tandem with the democratization movement. Instead of the previous concentration on Silla, South Korean historians took a new look at Puyŏ, Koguryŏ, Paekche, and Parhae history, which had been largely neglected since the 1950s. 115 In addition, access to

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North Korean materials inspired and influenced history research and teaching in South Korea from the late 1980s. 116 Consequently, it is thought-provoking to trace how historians examine, negotiate, and compromise contested issues in modern historiography. The origin of the Korean people, civilization, and state Tracing the origin of East Asian people and civilization has been crucial not only for establishing a historical timeline, but also for configuring international relationships. Postwar South Korean scholars have been leaning toward the migration hypothesis, which posited that the earliest residents of the Korean Peninsula were the Paleo-Asiatic people dispersed across Eurasia, northern China, and the Korean Peninsula. They manufactured cord-patterned pottery, and cherished shamanistic and animistic beliefs. With the emergence of Bronze Age culture, the newly arrived Altai-Tungus people absorbed and replaced the indigenous Paleo-Asiatic people, and became the direct ancestors of Korean people, described in the Chinese sources as Ye 濊 and Maek 貊. 117 The popularity of the northern origin hypothesis reflected the Korean scholars’ effort to refute the colonial scholarship. In response to the colonial charge of heteronomy, Korean scholars preferred connecting prehistoric Korean civilization to the northern areas, i.e., Altai and Siberia (Scythian culture), while having Chinese influence begin as late as possible. However, the problem is that the terms “Paleo-Asiatic” and “Tungus” were used to denote the ancient residents of Altai and Siberia based on eighteenth-century Russian ethnographic investigations. Moreover, it was the reviled colonialist historian, Shiratori Kurakichi, who first categorized Ye and Maek as Tungus for the purpose of validating the common ancestry theory for the Koreans and Japanese. 118 Japanese scholars used these bits and pieces of questionable evidence from Russian sources, inherited by postwar Korean scholars. Burdened by the obligation of refuting Japanese colonial stereotypes, Korean scholars ironically reiterated Japanese colonial scholarship. 119 The new discipline of archaeology expanded the horizon of prehistory and ancient history. Due to the ambiguity and limitations of written sources, research on contemporary archaeological remains can provide more substantial and reliable clues to the origin of the Korean people and civilization, as well as the formation of ancient state. 120 Archaeology in Korea after 1945 developed under the combined legacy of nationalist and colonial scholarship. Although Korean scholars realized the necessity of rectifying colonial scholarship, postwar archaeology is still not free from the colonial legacy. Archaeology has been indispensable in forging a national consciousness and will continue to flourish in the world of nation-states. The most serious impediment to a rational approach to archaeology is the blurry

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line between national pride and chauvinism. Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett have, however, proposed two criteria: the construction of one group’s national past should not be made at the expense of another’s; and concern and respect should be accorded to all cultural traditions. 121 National history is still the norm in Korea, and few scholars can challenge or provide an alternative to the centuries-long framework. Noticing the dilemma of nationalism and national history, recent Korean historians have proposed yǒllin minjok chuǔi or Open Nationalism, a compromise between the need for strengthening nationalism and the trend of globalization, though it is unclear how to implement such an agenda in historical studies and education. Tan’gun and Ko Chosǒn Among the unresolved issues pertaining to the early history of Korea, the most controversial is the historical lineage of the Three Chosǒn, especially that of Tan’gun and Tan’gun Chosǒn. The validation of an authentic national ancestor became a major priority for archaeological studies, and Korean historians spared no effort in their study of Tan’gun. Today most Korean scholars believed that the Tan’gun myth reflects certain aspects of history, and it was created soon after the twenty-fourth century BCE. However, the fatal flaw is that there was no support from (preSamguk yusa) textual or archaeological evidence. Korean scholars simply complained that it did not exist in Chinese texts because the Chinese were not interested in Korea—a questionable statement because Chinese historians preserved many texts that often constitute the only textual record about early “Koreans.” Korean scholars also blamed Kim Pusik for ignoring Tan’gun because it contradicted Confucian rationality—another unfounded claim—because Kim Pusik incorporated foundation myths for Puyŏ, Koguryŏ, Paekche, Silla, and Kaya. Finally Korean scholars turned to archaeology. After years of effort searching for archaeological evidence of Tan’gun, Kim Chaewǒn 金載元 (1909-1990) declared that there were Tan’gun-related motifs in stonecarved paintings located in Shandong, China. Since then, most Korean historians have believed that the Tan’gun myth is not a thirteenth-century fabrication, but something that had existed since the second century CE, the era when the Wuliang Shrine was constructed. 122 However, Kim never visited the Wuliang shrine; his article relied on publications by Japanese scholars and the French sinologist Edouard Chavannes. 123 Kim also admitted that the scene did not match perfectly with the Tan’gun myth, though Kim insisted that it was sufficient to affirm that Tan’gun’ myth at least existed in that period. 124 Kim Chaewǒn’s argument has been frequently cited since its publication in 1947. 125 The only exception is Kim Wǒllyong 金元龍 (1922-1993), the second-generation Korean archaeologist who wrote an article in 1980,

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arguing that the alleged scenes on Tan’gun actually represented the story of Chiyou, the Chinese god of war, and hence irrelevant to Tan’gun. 126 However, Kim Wǒllyong article has largely been ignored despite his prominence in Korean academia and his other highly regarded works. It is still common for Korean scholars to refer to the Wuliang Shrine to emphasize the authenticity and long history of the Tan’gun myth. Some scholars have also pointed out that the tree, bear, and tiger appeared together in one of the Koguryǒ mural paintings. 127 There is no definitive proof that indeed this mural was inspired by the Tan’gun myth; but if it is, the mural can only explain the legacy of the Tan’gun myth during the Koguryǒ era. The Koguryŏ mural paintings were made after the fourth century, and there was an over two-thousand-year gap between the Tan’gun myth and the Koguryŏ period. Scholars are still far from reaching consensus on Ko Chosǒn history. Ongoing debates place the center Ko Chosǒn as either in the Yodong Peninsula or P’yǒngyang, or according to the migration hypothesis, first located in the Liaodong Peninsula and then moved to P’yǒngyang because of the military invasion of the Yan state around the third century BCE. 128 For an archaeological index of Ko Chosǒn, scholars concentrated on dolmen, the stone cist tombs, and bronze instruments, especially a type of mandolin-shaped bronze dagger found across Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin Province, and the Korean Peninsula. 129 However, none of them is sufficient to define the Ko Chosǒn territory. The migration hypothesis was accepted by many South Korean scholars until 2003 when it was challenged by a young scholar, Song Hojǒng. His book, Han’guk kodaesa sok ǔi Ko Chosǒn sa or Ko Chosǒn History in the History of Ancient Korea, rejected the Yodong hypothesis as wishful thinking, and suggested basing the rational reconstruction of Ko Chosǒn history on the combined reinterpretations of textual documents and archaeological data. Song used pottery to differentiate Yemaek culture from the Ko Chosǒn; the people who used Misongni 美松里-type pottery were Yemaek, and those who used Paeng’ihyǒng 팽이형 or sharp-bottom pottery were Ko Chosǒn people. With pottery as the main index of evidence, Song concluded that the political center of Ko Chosǒn had to have been in the P’yǒngyang area. 130 However, other archaeologists question the use of pottery for demarcating archaeological evidence and defining ethnicity, because people of different ethnic groups could use the same type of pottery, and vice versa. Tan’gun has retained its significance in Korean history and in the Korean mentality for centuries. 131 The South-North Korean summit meeting between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jung Il in 2000 made the prospects for unification promising, and Tan’gun again became the cure for decades of hostility between the two Koreas. From 2002, several symposia commemorating Tan’gun have been held in North and South Korea. These activities contributed to the coining of a new term, Tan’gun minjok

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chuŭi 壇君民族主義 or Tan’gun nationalism 132 to describe the special Korean nationalism that focuses on the symbolic meaning of Tan’gun. 133 The Korean Ministry of Education has made two major revisions to high school history textbooks on ancient Korea in 2007. The Tan’gun myth has been moved to the historical era, following the literal quotation of Samguk yusa and Tongguk t’onggam; and Korea’s Bronze Age has been backdated by a millennium, to 2000 BCE. According to one official from the Ministry of Education, this revision was made because “there has been criticism from both political and academic spheres, pointing out that the overall treatment of Tan’gun Chosǒn was too passive . . . and upon this request, we plan to make a more proactive narrative about ancient history.” 134 The description of Tan’gun Chosǒn in the historical textbook now bears a closer resemblance to what amateur historians believe than to what professional historians have found in their sources. Kija and Kija Chosǒn Quite different from Tan’gun’s change from myth to reality, the longbelieved authenticity of Kija Chosǒn was repeatedly challenged in the twentieth century. Until the late Chosǒn period, Kija was revered as a righteous gentleman who brought advanced Chinese civilization to Korea; it was also because of Kija that Chosǒn literati could proudly claim to be the only carriers of civilization after the establishment of the Qing dynasty. However, in the nineteenth century, the pride in being Kija’s descendants declined with the fall of China. 135 After centuries of historical investigation, the essential questions about Kija persist. Was Kija an actual historical figure? Did he really come to the Korean Peninsula? Did he really establish Kija Chosǒn? Where was Kija Chosǒn located? The views on Kija and Kija Chosǒn are not only crucial in the framework of modern Korean historiography, but also became a criterion for evaluations of good or bad historical writing among twentieth-century Korean historians. Setting Tan’gun as the starting point of Korean history, contemporary Korean scholars agreed that Kija’s emigration to the Korean Peninsula had been fabricated by Chinese historians during the Han dynasty and later uncritically accepted and internalized by Koryǒ and Chosǒn literati. However, contemporary scholars differed in their interpretations of Kija Chosǒn. Some argued that Kija Chosǒn should be renamed as Hanssi Chosǒn 韓氏朝鮮 136 or Yemaek Chosǒn 濊貊朝鮮, 137 while some assigned Kija Chosǒn to outside of the Korean Peninsula, because bronze vessels with Ji 箕 inscriptions were excavated in Inner Mongolia and Shandong Province, far from the Korean Peninsula. 138 In addition, tombs attributed to Kija are located in Shandong Province. Some contended that Kija Chosǒn was just one of numerous coexisting primitive states founded by Chinese refugees. 139 Ch’ǒn Kwanu was one of the few Korean scholars

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who still believed in Kija’s migration to the Korean Peninsula, but he believed that Kija was Tong’i or an Eastern Barbarian, hence an ancient Korean. 140 Therefore, Kija Chosǒn was redeemed as an ancient Korean regime. 141 Wiman: A Chinese Exile or Korean Patriot? Wiman (C. Weiman) is one of the most controversial figures in Korean history. 142 Despite numerous attempts to reinterpret Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn, almost all of them were variations that had already emerged from the late Chosǒn to the colonial period. Interestingly, the most striking change that occurred during the postwar period involved Wiman Chosǒn among the Three Chosǒn. For almost two thousand years after the Wiman Chosǒn period, no Korean or Chinese historian (few Chinese historians were interested in Weiman) doubted that Wiman belonged to the Yan people (thus a Chinese). From the Korean side, Wiman was first mentioned in Samguk yusa, largely quoted from Chinese sources. Hence, Iryǒn was the first to propose a Three Chosǒn framework, and Wiman Chosǒn was included in the lineage of Ko Chosǒn along with Tan’gun and Kija Chosǒn. 143 Despite Wiman Chosǒn’s position in the lineage of Korean history, Wiman was thereafter condemned as a treacherous usurper who betrayed King Kijun, the legitimate ruler of Kija Chosǒn. Consequently, Wiman Chosǒn’s place in Korean history was minimized by Koryǒ and Chosǒn historians. The bitter assessment of Wiman peaked in the late Chosŏn dynasty under the rising dominance of the Samhan Chǒngt’ongron, making some late Chosǒn scholars expunge Wiman Chosǒn from the history of Korea and connect Tan’gun Chosŏn and Kija Chosŏn directly to the Three Han in the southern Korean Peninsula. During the colonial period, Wiman Chosǒn and the subsequent Four Han Commanderies were favorite topics of Japanese scholars in affirming the heteronomy of Korean history. Wiman was a Han Chinese general who came to the Korean Peninsula and established a conquest dynasty in the Korean Peninsula. Hence, it was Chinese refugees and migrants who brought advanced Chinese culture to Korea and paved the way for the development of Korean civilization. 144 Sin Ch’aeho and Ch’oe Namsǒn were two of the most influential nationalist historians during the colonial period; however, their assessments of Wiman differed. According to Sin, it was a mistake to include Wiman Chosǒn as a phase of Ko Chosǒn. Wiman, as a traitor, first amassed his power at the western border of Chosǒn, and Sin pointed out Wiman’s relationship with Lu Wan 盧綰, who fled to Xiongnu and was appointed King of Tongho 東胡 (C. Donghu). Therefore, Sin suggested that it was military support from Xiongnu that enabled Wiman to expel King Kijun from the northern Korean Peninsula, implying that Wiman

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Chosǒn was a puppet of the nomadic Xiongnu Empire. More importantly, Wiman Chosǒn was always under pressure from the dissent Korean people. 145 Depicting Wiman as an enemy of the Korean people and emphasizing Wiman’s connection with the Xiongnu Empire, Sin’s views on Wiman were quite unflattering. Although Wiman was still considered a foreign power, Ch’oe Namsǒn considered Wiman’s invasion more favorably, because it was this first external invasion that forced the Korean people to bring their latent national consciousness to the fore. For Ch’oe, Wiman relied more on Han power and tried to utilize the Han dynasty to monopolize economic interests in other surrounding tribes. Ch’oe specified that it was Wiman Chosǒn’s economic exploitation and failure to cooperate with the indigenous Koreans that brought Wiman Chosǒn down. 146 In contrast, Yi Pyǒngdo proposed the most radical reinterpretation of Wiman. In his 1956 essay, “Wissi Chosŏn hŭngmang ko” or The Study of the Rise and Fall of Wiman Chosŏn, Yi called attention to Wiman’s topknot and the barbarian garb that he wore when he fled to Korea, Wiman’s insistence that Chosǒn be the name of his new state, and Wiman Chosǒn’s obstinate resistance in the face of Han invasion. For all of these reasons, Yi concluded that Wiman was actually a descendant of the Ko Chosǒn. 147 North Korean scholar Ri Chilin concurred with Yi. 148 Some North Korean scholars acclaimed Wiman a Korean patriot who rebelled against Han dominance and led his fellow Korean compatriots back to the Chosŏn motherland. 149 Although it is difficult to find any evidence of Yi Pyŏngdo’s influence on North Korean scholars or vice versa, it indicated that the ideological division did not prevent them from reaching similar revisionist views on Wiman and Wiman Chosŏn. 150 Yi Pyŏngdo’s revisionist view on Wiman appealed greatly to South Korean scholars due to Yi’s academic reputation and the promising implications of his new interpretation. 151 Believing that Wiman was of Korean descent, Korean archaeologists attempted to bring Wiman Chosŏn into the considerations of early Korean state-formation. Ch’oe Mongnyong and Kim Chŏngbae both consider Wiman Chosŏn the first conquest state in Korean history. The conquest state has been popular as a theory of ancient state-formation, because it stresses state-building by military conquest. Contrary to the Japanese scholarship using Wiman Chosǒn as substantial evidence of the heteronomous nature of Korea, the newly invented ethnicity of Wiman was a complete reversal. Thus, Wiman Chosŏn was transformed into a legitimate phase among Korean ancient states. 152 Ch’oe Mongnyong emphasized the importance of trade in state formation and analyzed Wiman Chosŏn’s crucial location for interstate trade. Wiman Chosŏn was located between the state of Yan, the Han dynasty, Ye, and Chin’guk 辰國 of the Korean Peninsula, and profited from its trade monopoly. Evidence of this extensive and active trade can

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be found in the excavation of thousands of coins throughout the Korean Peninsula. Trade with the Chinese stimulated social stratification and the division of labor, and the economic profits enabled Wiman Chosŏn to prosper. 153 Based on Wiman Chosŏn’s political, bureaucratic, social, and cultural characteristics, Kim Chŏngbae has argued that Wiman Chosŏn was the first conquest state in Korean history. Kim framed Wiman Chosŏn in Korea’s national historical development not only because of Wiman’s “new” ethnicity, but also because the majority of the Kija Chosŏn and Wiman Chosŏn people were Yemaek, the ancestors of the Korean people. Although a pristine state called Yemaek Chosŏn (a substitute for Kija Chosŏn) preceded Wiman Chosŏn, it was Wiman who advanced Korea’s state structure. Therefore, Wiman Chosŏn was a state founded using military conquest to accommodate land and population pressures. At the same time, the transition from Yemaek to Wiman Chosŏn marked the development from a primitive to a conquest state. 154 The earliest records on Weiman are in the Chinese Shiji. There are two references to Weiman’s origin in Shiji: one is in the Chaoxian chapter, 155 and the other in Sima Qian’s final comments. 156 Weiman was described as a “Gu Yanren 故燕人” or a person from former Yan. This description is confusing because there were two Yans: the Yan state, which was one of the seven states during the Warring States period, and the vassal state of Yan of the Han dynasty. After the establishment of the Han dynasty, Emperor Gaozu of the Han invested in Lu Wan, a childhood friend from his hometown, the fief of Yan. Sima Qian was not clear about which Yan he meant. In the first record of Shiji, he described Weiman’s escape to Chaoxian right after Lu Wan’s flight to the Xiongnu, implying that Yan referred to Lu Wan’s Yan fief. However, in his second mention, Sima Qian connected Weiman’s emergence with the Prince Dan period; here Yan seemed to refer to the state of Yan, one of the seven competing states during the Warring States period. It is interesting to notice that in Shiji and Hanshu, there is no record of how Weiman tricked King Jizhun out of his throne, and Weiman has no surname in these two records. 157 The third book on Weiman is Sanguozhi; however, the detailed information on Weiman came from quoting Weilüe. 158 In the Weilüe text Weiman wore hufu 胡服, barbarian clothes (a different expression from “manyifu 蠻夷服,” which was used in Shiji and Hanshu), with no mention of a topknot; more importantly, it was in Sanguozhi that we find a reference to Weiman’s betrayal of King Jizhun’s trust and his subsequent usurpation of power. Houhanshu is another important source of information on this period, although it was compiled later than Sanguozhi. One of the most significant aspects of Houhanshu is the connection between the Dongyi of the pre- and post-Han period. 159 Wiman was described in the general framework of the Dongyi, and he went to Chaoxian during Chen She’s rebel-

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lion, which implied that this Yan is the Yan state (of the Warring States period) and not the later vassal state of the Han dynasty. Yi Pyŏngdo used Wiman’s topknot as decisive evidence of Wiman’s ethnicity. Unfortunately, there is no contemporary archaeological data on the hairstyles of that period. The only archaeological data that might be helpful in this regard is from the Bronze Age, which leaves a large chronological gap. 160 Another piece of evidence supporting zhuiji 椎髻/椎結 as a traditional Korean hairstyle was based on the records of Samhan in Sanguozhi. However, Samhan’s hairdo was described as kuitou louji 魁頭 露紒, which should be different from zhuiji. 161 There are some cases of zhuiji or zhuijie 椎結 hairstyles in the Han dynasty records. 162 The contemporary scholars Sun Ji and Hayashi Minao provided the most comprehensive information on Han material culture; however, according to their research, it seemed that zhuiji or zhuijie were women’s hairstyles. In addition, their understanding of zhuiji or zhuijie was far different from the sangt’u 상투 or topknot commonly understood by Korean scholars. 163 More importantly, the hairdo and clothes depicted by Sima Qian were not his firsthand observation; moreover, the hairdo and clothes do little to reveal Wiman’s ethnicity. Therefore, Yi Pyŏngdo’s revisionist views on Wiman seem more related to his own personal dilemma in the 1950s in South Korea. As a member of the Chōsenshi henshūkai in the 1920s, Yi was considered a Japanese collaborator because of his exceptional interest in the Four Han Commanderies (and his contention that the Han Commanderies were all inside the Korean Peninsula) and his compliance with the Japanese colonial authorities. Therefore, his redefinition of Wiman from Yan refugee to Ko Chosŏn patriot reflected his own desire to distinguish his work from the Japanese colonial scholarship, as well as the need to promote Wiman Chosǒn’s heroic battles against the Han invasion the inauguration of the Korean people’s thousand-year resistance against foreign power. Foreign Intervention: The Four Han Commanderies and Mimana The Lelang Commandery along with the other three Han Commanderies was crucial not only to the history of Korea and the Sino-Korean relationship from the first century BCE to the fourth century CE, but also for premodern East Asian history. Lelang (K. Nangnang) Commandery was crucial to understanding the early history of Korea, which lasted from 108 BCE to 313 CE around the P’yǒngyang area. However, as a Han colony and given the exceptional attention by Japanese colonial scholars to argue in favor of the innate heteronomy of Koreans, post-1945 Korean scholars deliberately avoided Lelang. 164 Although it has been long held that Lelang was located in the P’yǒngyang area, some extreme nationalist scholars contended that it was located as far as to the west of the Liao River rather than in P’yǒngyang,

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by attributing Lelang artefacts excavated around the P’yǒngyang area to an indigenous Korean state named Nangnangguk 樂浪國 rather than the Han Lelang Commandery. 165 The most recent studies on Lelang called for a more cultural and transnational perspective. Scholars argued that the installation of Lelang Commandery facilitated a wider and more convenient dissemination of Chinese characters, and simultaneously brought changes in the social and cultural dimension in the surrounding areas. Moreover, Lelang could be a case study of a regional development model, which could assist understanding of not only the 420 years of the Lelang Commandery, but also for a much longer period, about 700 years in terms of common understanding and recognition of Lelang power over the neighboring areas. 166 There is little written and reliable archaeological evidence about the other two Han commanderies, i.e., Chinbǒn (C. Zhenfan) and Imdun (C. Lintun), mainly because these two commanderies lasted for only twentyfive years. The fourth one, Hyǒndo (C. Xuantu) Commandery has also been neglected, not only because of limited sources, but also because it moved westward twice and remained outside of the Korean Peninsula thereafter. However, the Hyǒndo Commandery was crucial because of its relationship with the Koguryŏ Kingdom. According to Hanshu, “After the Emperor Wu of the Han quashed Chaoxian, he made Gaogouli a county subject to Xuantu Commandery. Emperor Wu also invested musicians to Gaogouli.” 167 However, there is scant information about the location, nature, and historical development of the Xuantu Commandery, not to mention its relationship with Gaogouli. This lacunae contributed to the present debate between Chinese and Korean scholars. Chinese scholars, especially the participants in the Northeast China Project insisted that because of the subjugation of Gaogouli to the Han Xuantu Commandery, Gaogouli had always been a Chinese vassal state. 168 In contrast, Korean scholars emphasized the independent formation of the Koguryŏ state, and the stiff resistance against the expansion and invasion of the Chinese dynasties contributed to making Koguryŏ one of the strongest empires in Northeast Asia. Despite its collapse in 668, Koguryŏ is remembered as one of the largest, most powerful, and most prosperous states in Korean history. The most recent discovery of wooden tablets in North Korea shed new light on the history of Nangnang and Ko Chosŏn. Some of these wooden tablets were inscribed with census information of the Nangnang Commandery, indicating that the Nangnang Commandery consisted of twenty-five counties and had a population of 280,561 in 45 BCE. 169 This is a crucial breakthrough in deciphering not only the history of Nangnang, but also of Ko Chosŏn. Opinions on the territorial size of Ko Chosŏn have ranged from viewing it as a huge ancient empire to a small entity on the northwestern Korean Peninsula. Now supported with census documents from Nangnang, scholars have projected the possible size of the popula-

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tion of Ko Chosŏn and drawn the conclusion that Ko Chosŏn was a chiefdom at an early stage of state formation with a small population. 170 Similar to the Four Commanderies, the issue of Imna (J. Mimana) has been used to justify Japan’s colonization of Korea. Because of the limited and contradictory written sources on Mimana, the late nineteenth-century rediscovery of the King Kwanggaet’o stele attracted tremendous political and academic attention. Japanese scholars were intensely interested in this newly discovered stele, which they believed to be the key not only for exploring the early history of Japan, but also the relationships among China, Japan, and Korea. This was also the reason that the research into the stele inscription obtained support from the Japanese Ministry of Army. Moreover, the founder of Japanese modern historiography, Shiratori Kurakichi, even proposed smuggling this stele into Japan. 171 The importance of the King Kwanggaet’o stele centered on a fourteencharacter sentence that described relationships among the Three Kingdoms in the Korean Peninsula and Wa Japan. Based on a conventional translation by Japanese scholars, it reads that “Wa 倭 (Japan) came across the sea and defeated Paekche, and Paekche and Silla became the subjects of Japan ever since.” Japanese scholars insisted that Wa Japan intervened in and even dominated interstate relationships in Northeast Asia. In other words, Wa came to the Korean Peninsula at the request of Paekche, confronted Koguryǒ, and invaded Silla. As a result, Japanese scholars claimed this stele offered the most substantial evidence for the existence of Mimana and the dominance of Japan over the Korean Peninsula. The interpretation of this crucial sentence and some of its characters was controversial not only among Japanese scholars, but also among many Korean nationalist historians of the colonial period. Chǒng Inbo once argued that the subject of this sentence should be Koguryǒ, 172 not Wa Japan. According to Chǒng, this was a stele commemorating King Kwanggaet’o’s military achievements; hence there should be no reason to mention Japan’s strength. The debate over the inscription reached a new height in the 1970s. Yi Chinhŭi 李進熙, a Korean resident of Japan who went to Japan during the colonial period and later devoted himself to the studies of Korean history in Japan, published a book titled Kōkaido ō ryōhi no kenkyū 広開土王陵碑の 硏究 or Study on the Stele of King Kwanggaet’o in 1972. 173 Yi argued that the Japanese military officials intentionally defaced the rubbing by applying lime on the stele so that the meaning would be favorable to Japan. This argument aroused a tremendous stir in Japanese and Korean academia as well as in the media. Given the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historical background, it seemed quite plausible that the Japanese military officials could have attempted to manufacture evidence to justify their imperial ambitions, and Yi’s idea took root among scholars who were interested in postcolonial studies.

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The controversy over the stele entered a new stage in the early 1990s. According to the Chinese scholar Wang Jianqun 王健群, the lime on the stele had been applied not by the Japanese, but by Chinese workers who had been making a living by producing the rubbings. Since Wang had been studying the King Kwanggaet’o stele for decades, the accusations of intentional fabrication became less convincing. 174 Due to its complexity and its crucial implications, it is not surprising that Mimana became a primary target for Korean historians from the North and South in the 1950s. The most controversial issues are whether Mimana really existed, where it was located, and what it was. Since the 1960s, scholars from North and South Korea proposed numerous interpretations on Mimana. The most striking of these was raised by Kim Sǒkhyǒng, who contended that Mimana was located not in the Korean Peninsula but in the Japanese archipelago, and that it was one of many small polities established by Paekche and Silla emigrants in Japan. The question of Mimana is still popular among scholars. 175 Although the colonial connotation had been deliberately minimized in the postcolonial era, many postwar Japanese scholars still believe a Japanese outpost existed in the Kaya area, the southernmost part of the Korean Peninsula. Some Japanese scholars suggested a much later formation of the Mimana—429 CE or as late as 530 CE—compared to the early hypothesized date of 369 CE. 176 There were also new interpretations of the nature of Mimana by arguing that instead of military administration, Mimana was more of a diplomatic or commercial station. Other scholars suggested that instead of Wa Japan, it was Paekche that had suzerainty over Mimana. 177 Chǒn Kwan’u and Kim Hyǒn’gu argued that although Imna was located at the Kaya area, it had been established by Paekche Kingdom for the purpose of governing the Kaya people. According to this theory, the ruler of Mimana was later mistakenly recorded as Japanese, because the Nihon shoki was written by Paekche refugees that went to Japan after the collapse of Paekche Kingdom in 660 CE and consequently presented all Paekche-related records with Japanese protagonists. 178 Since then, Kim T’aesik has pointed out that although some Japanese scholars postdated the beginning of Mimana from 369 to 429 or 530 CE, they expanded the scope of Mimana to the Paekche area based on the Wa’s military intervention, which Kim believed to be a “reverse/reactionary trend.” As a specialist in the Kaya confederation, Kim T’aeksik called for understanding Mimana in the context of Kaya history, and Mimana was renamed as Alla waesin kwan 安羅倭臣館 or the House of Wa Japanese Officials. Alla was a small state affiliated with the Kaya Confederation, and Mimana was a branch office of Paekche in the Alla area for securing the trade route to Wa Japan in addition to investigating the situation in Kaya. Despite the pressure from the stronger Paekche King-

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dom, the Alla people took advantage of the Alla waesin kwan by maneuvering the information about Japan to their advantage. 179 The issue of Mimana has continually attracted the spotlight, especially when there was a discovery of archaeological sites related to both the Korean and Japanese sides. Interestingly, the fundamental question is always about the authenticity of Mimana and the chronology of cultural relics—in other words, which side of the strait created and/or possessed certain items first. The dilemma of archaeology can be seen in the opposite applications of archaeological data: the Japanese scholars used it to confirm the existence of a Japanese colony in Korea, while the Korean scholars used it to prove the Korean origin of the early Japanese culture and/or royal clan. It is understandable that there might be a variety of interpretations due to inconsistent and ambiguous historical records; however, this debate is more a competition for national pride than an academic inquiry. Scholars also need to pay more attention to the fundamental principle here: regardless of the reliability of Mimana colony, this issue should not be used to legitimize the Japanese colonization of Korea in the twentieth century. With the convergence of modern nationalism, colonialism, and imperialism in the twentieth century, the interpretation of ancient history, especially regarding the origin of peoples and civilizations, has undergone tremendous changes among Korean, Japanese, and Chinese historians. The significant changes in the ancient history of Korea can be perceived in the revisions of history textbooks in South Korea. After much debate and compromise, Tan’gun and Tan’gun Chosǒn were transformed from myth to historical fact, and by using the ambiguous term seryǒk pǒmwi 勢力范圍 or the scope of power, the map of Ko Chosǒn was extended to cover a wide expanse from Northeast China to the Korean Peninsula. Despite the prominence of Kija in Korean history until the late nineteenth century, Kija and Kija Chosǒn vanished from Korean history, although scholars disagreed about how to name the intervening years between Tan’gun Chosǒn and Wiman Chosǒn. Instead of specifying Three Chosǒn, history textbooks (middle school and high school) used a more general term: Ko Chosǒn. Therefore, Tan’gun was the founder of Ko Chosǒn, and textbooks implied a continuity of this Tan’gun lineage by skipping the change of rulers in the following period, which was conventionally named the Kija and Wiman Chosǒn. Many South Korean scholars are sympathetic to the new view of Wiman as a former member of Ko Chosǒn after it was proposed by Yi Pyǒngdo in the 1950s. However, due to the prevailing view that Wiman was Yan Chinese, the textbook made a compromise between the previous definition of Wiman as a Han refugee and Yi Pyǒngdo’s new definition of Wiman’s ethnicity by stating that,

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At the end of the third century BCE, they were many migrants to Chosŏn because of the chaotic situation of transition from the Qin to the Han dynasty. There was a man named Wiman among them who came with many followers, and the King of Ko Chosŏn [here the textbook used Ko Chosŏn to avoid Kija Chosŏn] enfeofffed him with the western frontier for defense. However, Wiman later used military force to drive King Chun 準王 [again, the textbook used King Chun instead of King Kijun for the same purpose of avoiding Kija Chosŏn] out and made himself king. He further conquered the surrounding areas and his power prevailed. [Italics added.] 180

The nature and location of the Han Commanderies and Mimana have become the most contested issues since the late nineteenth century, not only because of the ambiguity of the textual records, but more so because of their potential implications in the reconfiguration of interstate relationships in East Asia. In spite of the complexity, importance, and sensitivity of these issues, both the Han Commanderies and Mimana have been written out of the history textbooks in South Korea. 181 Although these are ongoing debates, these new interpretations have failed to counteract the image of the Han Commanderies and Mimana as Chinese and Japanese colonies in the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, without any reference to the installation of the Four Han Commanderies, the textbook emphasized the Korean resistance against foreign power and hinted at the eventual triumph of the Korean nation: “Though the Han dynasty extended their power to a certain portion of the former Ko Chosǒn territory, our nation resisted and was finally successful at driving them [Han troops] out.” 182 With the disintegration of the Cold War framework and increasing multilayered cultural, economic, and political interactions among countries, studies of ancient history have been complicated by the burden of affirming a national essence/identity despite the blurry boundary among “national” cultures in the early history of East Asia. As a result, the “history wars” became a popular topic in the mass media, drawing attention not only from the academy, but also from the public, and historians often condemned their counterparts from other countries for “distorting history.” The politics of prehistory and ancient history is also conspicuous in North Korean scholarship, and the ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism seems indiscernible in the study of ancient history compared to histories of the medieval, modern, and contemporary eras. The similarity and contrast of new interpretations in ancient history between South and North Korea can provide a way to approach North Korean politics, history, culture, and society, as we will discuss in chapter 4.

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NOTES 1. Influenced by the Japanese colonial scholarship, in-law politics has been considered one of the most important reasons for Chosŏn’s deterioration. There is a new reassessment of in-law politics from a sympathetic perspective by Western scholars, especially regarding Min’s clique during the Great Han Empire period. See Michael Finch, Min Yǒng-hwan: A Political Biography (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002). 2. For archaeological connections between the Korean Peninsula and Japanese archipelago, see William Wayne Farris, Sacred Texts and Buried Treasures: Issues in the Historical Archaeology of Ancient Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 55-122. 3. For more information on Toyotomi Hideyoshi, see Mary Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). For more recent studies on the military aspect of the Hideyoshi Invasion, see Kenneth M. Swope, “Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi’s Second Invasion of Korea, 1597-1598,” Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 6:2 (2006): 177-206. 4. Yi Sǒngsi, Mandǔrǒjin kodae: kǔndae kungmin kukka ǔi Tong Asia iyagi (Seoul: Samin, 2001), 196. 5. Stephan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 24-26. 6. It includes the discourse of naisen dōsoron 內鮮同祖論 or common ancestry theory, dōbun dōshu 同文同種 or Same Culture Same Race, and naisen ittai 內鮮一體 or Japan and Korea Are One Body. 7. Kim Ŭihwan, Chosǒn t’ongsinsa ǔi pakchachui (Seoul: Chǒngŭm muhwasa, 1985), 29-31. 8. Hatada Takashi, Nihonjin no Chōsenkan (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1969). Yi Kidong, trans., Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1983), 13. 9. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 14. 10. After the arrival of Commodore Perry (1794-1858) and the encroachment of the Western imperial powers, Japanese intellectuals applied the concept of hua or high culture to Europe. For the discourse of hua and yi in nineteenth-century Japan, see Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Anti-foreignism and Western Learning in Early-modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986). 11. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 15. 12. One of the leading advocates of seikanron was Saigō Takamori (1827-1877). As one of the earliest advocates for the Meiji Restoration, he proposed that Japan should go to war with Korea. However, other Meiji leaders opposed the invasion plans thinking of the immaturity and unpreparedness of Japan at that time. Out of anger and disappointment, Saigō resigned and led the Satsuma rebellion against the government. After being defeated, Saigō committed ritual suicide. Interestingly, the Meiji government soon praised his bravery and pardoned him with the recognition of his contributions as a genuine samurai on February 22, 1889. In addition, his statue was erected in Ueno Park, Tokyo. 13. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 11. 14. Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Datsuaron,” Jiji sinbo 時事新報, March 16, 1885. 15. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 35. 16. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 39. 17. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 41. 18. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 42 19. For the formation and development of Tōyōshi or the Oriental History of Japan and its founder Shiratori Kurakichi, see Stephan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 20. Hatada, Ilbon’in ǔi Han’guk kwan, 43. 21. Egami Namio, Kiba minzoku kokka: Nihon kodaishi e no apurōchi (Tōkyō: Chūo Kōronsha, Shōwa, 1967).

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22. Kim Chǒngbae, Han’guk minjok munhwa ǔi kiwǒn (Seoul: Koryǒ taehakkyo chulp’anbu, 1973). 23. Gari Ledyard, “Galloping along with the Horseriders: Looking for the Founders of Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 2 (1975): 217-55. 24. Puyǒ remained a popular option for official titles, name of states, and places, especially in the Paekche Kingdom. For example, the King of Paekche was often named the Governor of Puyǒ from China, and Paekche once changed the state title to Nam Puyǒ 南夫餘 or Southern Puyǒ when they moved the capital to Sabi 泗比. Today, this city is named Puyǒ. 25. Mark J. Hudson, Ruins of Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Japanese Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii’ Press, 1999). 26. The Kinseki heiyōki 金石倂用期. 27. Hyung Il Pai, Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), chapters 2 and 5. 28. Shiratori Kurakichi, Shiratori Kurakichi zenshū (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1969-). 29. Shiratori Kurakichi, “Mishi wa Chōsen no shisō ni arazu,” Tokyo ii shinbun, August 31, 1912. Collected in Shiratori Kurakichi zenshū (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 500-503. 30. For more contemporary discussions about Mimana, see below. 31. Cho Tonggǒl, “Kǔdae cho’gi ǔi yǒksa insik,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2 (Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa pip’yǒngsa, 1994), 14. 32. Chu Chin’o, “Kim Taegyǒk and Hyǒn Ch’ae,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 36. 33. Cho Tonggǒl, “Kǔdae cho’gi ǔi yǒksa insik,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 21. 34. Hyǒn Ch’ae’s activities after 1910 were condemned as collaboration with the Japanese. He contributed essays to Mae’il sinmun since 1915, reaffirming that Japan and Korea had become one family, and his early history of Korea and Japan focused on Japan’s Mimana colony in the southern Korean Peninsula and Empress Jingu’s invasion of Samhan. In 1926 he also participated in the Chōsenshi henshūkai. See Chu Chin’o, “Kim Taeyǒng and Hyǒn Chae,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yoksahak, 41. 35. To counteract the influence of Pak’s books, the Japanese colonialists also founded the Chōsenshi henshūkai 朝鮮史編修會 or the Committee for Compiling Korean History in 1922, and soon published the thirty-five-volume Chōsenshi or History of Korea. 36. Although Paek Nam’un did not elaborate his opinions on feudalism and capitalism in Korea, it was from Paek that later Korean scholars obtained inspiration about the sprouting of capitalism and the internal development theory, flourished in the 1960s in the process of the decolonization project. 37. Yi Kibaek, “Yumul sagwan kwa hyǒndae ǔi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 20 (1997), 17. 38. Pang Kijung, “Paek Nam’un,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 216. 39. Regarding Korean socioeconomic historians’ opinions on AMP, see Yi Kibaek, “Yumul sagwa kwa hyǒndae ŭi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 20 (1997), 19. More importantly, this school’s overemphasis on class consciousness and class struggle impeded cooperation between the leftists and the rightists in the 1930s and 1940s, when a united front was urgently needed for the Korean independence movement against the colonial situation. 40. Yi Kibaek, Minjok kwa yǒksa (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1971), 66-71. 41. The socioeconomic historians were more interested in Korea’s medieval period, since it was important for them to sift out the existence of a feudal society in Korea and thus affirm Korea’s capacity and potential to automatically transform into a capitalist society. For the ancient period, they were only interested in proving the existence of a slave society in Korea, which could further demonstrate the correctness of Marxism’s five-stage theory and the universal development of Korean history. 42. Adapted from Han Yŏng’u, Han’guk minjok chuŭi yŏksahak (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1994), 1.

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43. Pak Ch’ansung, “Sin Ch’aeho,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 94. 44. Pak Ch’ansung, “Sin Ch’aeho,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 79. 45. It includes the following books: Chosǒn sanggo munhwa sa 朝鮮上古文化史 or the Early Cultural History of Korea (1909-1920), Chosǒn sanggosa 朝鮮上古史 (early 1920s) or the Early History of Korea, Chosǒn sa yǒn’guch’o 朝鮮史硏究草 (1920s) or Preliminary Research on Korean History, Chosǒn saron 朝鮮史論 or Reviews on Korean History. 46. They are Kǒnguk samgǒl chǒn 建國三傑傳 or The Biographies on Three NationBuilding Heroes, Ŭlchi mund ǒk chǒn 乙支文德傳 or The Biography of General Ŭlchi Mundǒk, Yi Sunsin chǒn 李舜臣傳 or the Biography of General Yi Sunsin, Tongguk kǒgǒl Ch’oe dot’ong chǒn 東國巨傑崔都統傳 or The Biography of the Grand Hero of Korea, Ch’oe Yǒng. 47. Sin exclaimed that “it is much more efficient to pay a visit to Koguryǒ historical sites in Ji’an 集安 County than to read Kim Pusik’s Samguk sagi a thousand times.” 48. Pak Ch’ansung, “Sin Ch’aeho,” in Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 81. 49. Sin Ch’aeho, “Toksa sillon,” Yi Manyǒl annotated, Chusǒk Chosǒn sanggo munhwasa (Seoul: Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho sǒnsaeng kinyǒmsaǒphoe, 1992), 1. 50. Ibid., 1-2. 51. The March First Movement made Shin realize the power of the people, and his attention turned from minjok 民族 (race, nation) to minjung 民衆 (the people)—that is to say, he differentiated minjung within the nation. 52. Pak Ch’ansung, “Sin Ch’aeho,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 87. 53. Kim Kisǔng, “Pak Ŭnsik,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 100. 54. Pak Ch’ansung, “Sin Ch’aeho,” in Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 88. 55. Pak Ch’ansung, “Sin Ch’aeho,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 90. 56. Samguk sagi 14:140. 57. Sin Ch’aeho, “Toksa sillon,” Yi Manyǒl annotated, Chusǒk Chosǒn sanggo munhwasa (Seoul: Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho sǒnsaeng kinyǒmsaǒphoe, 1992), 48-49. 58. Sin Ch’aeho argued for eliminating Confucian values and the Japanese influence on Korean historical textbooks, especially regarding Empress Jingu’s invasion of southern Korea, the Japanese colony of Mimana, and the brotherhood between Tan’gun and the Japanese gods. 59. Sin contended that the stage of Korean history reached as far as China proper in the ancient period, believing the Eastern Barbarians in the Chinese historical records were the ancestors of Koreans. 60. Ch’oe Namsǒn, “Tan’gun kǔp ki yǒn’gu,” Yi Kibaek ed., Tan’gun sinhwa nonjip (Seoul: Saemunsa), 1-21. 61. O Yǒngsǒp, “Choe Namsǒn,” in Han’guksa simin kangjwa, 214. Also Chizuko T. Allen, “Northeast Asia Centered around Korea: Ch’oe Nam-sǒn’s View of History,” Journal of Asian History 49:4 (1990): 787-806. 62. O Yǒngsǒp, “Choe Namsǒn,” in Han’guksa simin kangjwa, 213. 63. Kim led an anti-Japanese movement in Ning’an, China. During the March First Movement in 1919, many Taejonggyo disciples died fighting the Japanese soldiers. 64. According to Kim, the nine Barbarians in the East, including Suksin, were the mainstream of Korean people. 65. Kim Kyohǒn, Sindan minsa (Seoul: Honppuri, 1986; written in 1923), 319. 66. Chǒn Uyong, “Kim Kyohǒn and Yi Sangnyong,” in Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2,113. 67. Chǒn Uyong, “Kim Kyohǒn and Yi Sangyong,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 119. 68. Kim agreed with the dual lineage of Korean history, north and south, but with the north as the mainstream. 69. Kim’s book was recently utilized as a primary source by South Korean amateur historians for affirming not only the splendid era of Tan’gun Chosǒn, but also for further tracing back to the pre-Tan’gun era named the Era of Sinsi 神市, or Sacred City. Kim Kyohǒn, Sindan minsa (Seoul: Honppuri, 1986; written in 1923), 29-30.

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70. For historical background and development of the March First Movement, See Frank Baldwin, “Participatory Anti-Imperialism: The 1919 Independence Movement,” Journal of Korean Studies 1 (1979): 123-62; also, The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1969). 71. For Japanese colonial policies and the Korean cultural nationalist movement, see Michael Edson Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988). 72. Chang Sŏkhǔng, “An Hwak,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 149. 73. Chang “An Hwak,” 147. 74. Chang, “An Hwak,” 153. 75. One of his most important achievements was the compilation of Yǒyudang chǒnsǒ 與猶堂全書 or the Complete Writings of Chǒng Yagyong 丁若鏞 (1762-1386). 76. According to Chǒng, “ǒl or soul is the core of a human being, it is subjectivity and eternal; moreover, it is always active and becomes the primary drive for historical devolvement. Hence, the fundamental purpose of studying history should be pursuing ǒl.” 77. O Yǒnggyo, “Chǒng Inbo,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 177. 78. Many neo-nationalists went to North Korea during the Korean War period, and nationalist historiography was severely restricted under the brutal anticommunist environment in South Korea throughout the 1950s. 79. Along with his studies on folklore, he also wrote Chosŏn minjoksa kaeron 朝鮮民 族史槪論 or the Brief History of the Korean People and Kuksa taeyo 國史大要 or the Concise National History in 1948, and Kuksa kanghwa 國史講話 or Lectures on Korean National History in 1950. 80. Yi Chiwŏn, “An Chaehong,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 203. 81. He also organized the Association of Korean Folklore with Song Sŏkha 宋錫夏 (1904-1948) and Chŏng Insŏp 鄭寅燮 (1905-1983), which resulted in the first journal of Korean folklore, Han’guk minsok 朝鮮民俗 or Chosŏn Folklore. 82. Similar to An Chaehong, Son was abducted by North Korea during the Korean War, and his whereabouts remain unknown. 83. From 1926 to 1934, Yi’s research focused on geomancy in the Koryǒ period, Confucianism in the Chosǒn period, and the geographical location of the Four Han Commanderies. See Han Yǒng’u, “Yi Pyǒngdo,” in Han’guk ui yǒksa wa yoksahak, 254. 84. The first temporary office of Chindan hakhoe was at Yi Pyǒngdo’s house. 85. Yi had many followers who studied in Japan (mostly at Waseda University). 86. Han Yǒng’u, “Yi Pyǒngdo,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 259. 87. Right after the Korean liberation from the Japanese, Yi first became a professor at Kyǒngsǒng University (Seoul National University), and then became more influential as a member of the National Academic Association and of the Korean National History Compilation Committee. He took the office of Minister of Culture and Education in 1960. 88. Represented by An Chǒngbok and Han Chinsǒ. 89. Kim Munsik, “Yi Chonghwi,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 261. 90. Yi Pyǒngdo, Han’guk kodaesa yǒn’gu (Seoul: Pakyǒngsa, 1975). 91. Han Yǒng’u, “Yi Pyǒngdo,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 263. 92. Yi Pyǒngdo, Yi Sangbaek 李相佰, Kim Sanggi 金庠基 and Yi Hongjik 李弘稙 became the major Korean historians of the 1950s and 1960s. 93. Han Yǒng’u, “Yi Pyǒngdo” in Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 265. 94. Pak Ch’ansung, “Pundan sidae Namhan ǔi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 332. 95. Sometimes synonymous with the sprouts of capitalism theory. 96. There are at least two types of internal development theory in South Korea. Yi Kibaek was the representative of the elite-led internal development theory, which emphasized the leading role of the ruling class and the development from above. The other is the Minjung-led internal development theory, the development from below.

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Besides the entrepreneurial peasants and private merchants in the late Chosǒn dynasty identified by Kim Yongsǒp and Kang Man’gil, Yu Sǔngju and Yi Paeyong recognized the existence of Tǒkdae 德大, who managed mines in a primitive capitalist mode of production. The internal development theory also contended that Chosǒn had taken steps along its own path to modernization, and would eventually complete this process through its internal development, but that external intervention, (Japanese colonization) interrupted and impeded this development. The theory of internal development and the sprouting of capitalism first appeared among North Korean scholars in the late 1950s (Kim Sǒkhyǒng and Ch’oe Pyǒngmu), and then was systematized by Japanese scholars who looked back on Japanese colonial historiography and were sympathetic to the Korean people, such as Hatada Takashi and Kajimura Hideki. 97. Song Ch’ansǒp, “Ilche ǔi singmin sahak,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 322. 98. Pak Ch’ansǔng, “Pundan sidae Namhan ǔi Han’guk sahak,” in Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksaha 2, 333. 99. Pak Ch’ansǔng, “Pundan sidae Namhan ui Han’guk sahak,” in Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 336-37. 100. Yun Chongyǒng, Kuksa kyokwasǒ p’adong (Seoul: Hye’an, 1999). 101. An Hosang, Ilmin chuŭi ŭi ponjil (Seoul: Ilmin chuŭi yǒn’guwǒn, 1950). 102. An Hosang, The Ancient History of the Korea-Dong-I Race: The Korea-Dong-I Race, Creator of East Asian Culture (Seoul: Institute of Baedal Culture, 1974). 103. Cho Insǒng, “Kuksu chuǔi sahak kwa hyǒndae ŭi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 20 (1997), 7. 104. Tan’gi kosa was attributed to Tae Yabal of the eighth century, the younger brother of the founder of the Parhae Kingdom Tae Choyǒng; Kyuwǒn sawa was attributed to Pug’ae no’in of the seventeenth century; Hwandan kogi was attributed to Kye Yǒnsu, written in 1911, but was a collection of fourteenth-century sources. However, most scholars are inclined to believe that these three books were written in the 1920s. See Cho Insǒng, “Kuksa chuǔi sahak kwa hyǒndae ŭi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 20 (1997), 8. 105. Pak Ch’ansŭng, “Pundan sidae Namhan ŭi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 351. 106. The slogan of “Reclaiming the Lost Land 故土恢復” remained as a motto for stimulating Korean soldiers’ morale until the late 1980s in the South Korean Military Academy. See Our History for Unification and Great Leap (Seoul: Department of National Defense, 1983), 33. Quoted in Cho Insǒng, “Kuksa chuǔi sahak kwa hyǒndae ŭi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 20 (1997), 11. 107. Yun Chongyǒn, Kuksa kyogwasǒ p’adong (Seoul: Hye’an, 1999). 108. Song Hojǒng, Tan’gun: Mandǔrǒjin sinhwa (Seoul: Sanchrǒm, 2004), 239. 109. Yun Naehyǒn, Han’guk kodaesa sillon (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1986), 284. 110. Pak Ch’ansŭng, “Pundan sidae Namhan ŭi Han’guk sahak,” in Han’guk ŭi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 351. 111. Im Chihyǒn, “Kuksa ǔi yǒnsoe wa orientalism,” Han’guk sahaksa po 10 (September 2004), 163-72. 112. Yi Sǒnbok, “Ch’oegŭn ǔi ‘Tan’gun nǔng’ munje,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 21 (1997), 51. 113. Sŏng Samje, Ko Chosŏn sarajin yŏksa (Seoul: Tong’a ilbosa, 2005). 114. A small part of the chapter has been expanded, revised, and published as “Reconstructing Ancient History—Historiographical Review of the Ancient History of Korea, 1950s-2000s” in ASIANetwork Exchange: A Journal for Asian Studies in the Liberal Arts 19:2 (2012), 14-22. 115. Pak Ch’ansŭng, “Pundan sidae namhan ǔi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 358. 116. Pak Ch’ansŭng, “Pundan sidae namhan ǔi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak 2, 355. 117. Kim Chǒngbae, Han’guk minjok munhwa ǔi kiwǒn (Seoul: Koryǒ taehakkyo chulp’anbu, 1973).

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118. Shiratori Kurakichi, Shiratori Kurakichi zenshū 4 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 537-38. 119. For critique of Korean scholars’ migration hypothesis and the paradoxical legacy of Japanese colonial scholarship, see Hyung Il Pai, Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asian Center, 2000), chapters 1 and 2. 120. It is contended that the most significant achievement of Korean archaeology since 1945 is the confirmation of Korea’s Paleolithic and Bronze Ages. Yi Yǒngmun, Han’guk Chǒngdonggi sidae yǒn’gu (Seoul: Churyusǒng, 2002), 22. 121. Phillip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett, “Introduction: Archaeology in the Service of the State—Theoretical Consideration,” in Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology, ed. Phillip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge, Eng.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1-18. 122. For a comprehensive analysis on Wuliang stone carved painting, see Wu Hung, The Wu Liang Shrine: The Ideology of Early Chinese Pictorial Art (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). 123. Kim Chewǒn. Tanguu sinhwa ŭi sinyǒngu (Seoul: Chǒngŭmsa 1947). Revised edition, 1987. Recollect to “Mussisa sǒksil hwasangsǒk e poi nŭn Tan’gun sinhwa,” in Tan’gun sinhwa nonjip, ed. Yi Kibaek (Seoul: Samunsa, 1987). 124. Despite acknowledging a counterargument raised by Kim Wǒllyong in 1980, Kim stood by his claim when his revised version of this paper was published in 1987. 125. Yi Kibaek, Tan’gun sinhwa nonjip (Seoul: Saemunsa, 1987), 65. 126. Kim Wǒllyong, “Mulyangsa hwasangsǒk kwa Tan’gun sinhwa e taehan chaego,” Kogo misul: 146-7 (1980). 127. Kang Ryongnam, “Tan’gun e taehan koguryŏ saramdǔl ǔi rihae wa sungbae,” Ryŏksa kwahak 96-3 (1996). Cho Pŏbjong, “Koguryŏ pyŏkwa e natanan Tan’gun insik kŏmt’o: Hanguk Kodae tongmul sungbae chŏnt’ong kwaǔi kwanryŏnsŏngǔl chungsimǔro,” Ko Chosŏn Tan’gun hak 12 (2006), 365-86. 128. No T’aedon, “Ko Chosǒn chungsimji ǔi pyǒnchǒn e taehan yǒn’gu,” in Tan’gun kwa Ko Chosǒnsa, ed. No T’aedon (Seoul: Sagyechǒl, 2002), 75. 129. Yi Ch’ǒnggyu, “Ch’ǒngdonggi ch’olgi sidae ǔi sahoe wa munhwa,” in Han’guksa, ed. Kang Man’gil et al. (Seoul: Han’gil sa), 238-41, 260-69. 130. Song Hojǒng, Han’guk kodaesa sok ǔi Ko Chosǒn sa (Seoul: P’urŭn yǒksa, 2003). 131. The Tan’gun hakhoe or the Association for Tan’gun Studies was established in 1997 in South Korea. For more information, see http://www.dangunhak.or.kr/ modules/doc/index.php?doc=greet&___M_ID=22, accessed April 10, 2015. 132. This was proposed by Chǒng Yǒnghun. See Chǒng Yǒnghun, “Han’guksa sok ŭi esǒ ‘Tan’gun minjok chuǔi wa kŭ chǒngch’ijǒk sǒngkyǒk,” Han’guk chǒngch’ihak hoebo 28:2 (1994), 34. 133. On the other hand, the worship of Tan’gun also became a matter of dispute for Korean Christians. The South Korean government attempted to install a Tan’gun statue in some elementary and middle schools; however, this has long been opposed by some Korean Christian organizations, and some Tan’gun statues were vandalized by radical Christians. 134. Yun Tuhyǒn, “Ko Chosǒn, sinhwa esǒ yǒksa ro,” Munhwa ilbo, February 23, 2007. http://kr.news.yahoo.com/service/news/shellview.htm?linkid=3&articleid= 2007022313465651516&newssetid=746, accessed February 24, 2007. 135. Han Yong-u, “Kija Worship in the Koryo and Early Yi Dynasties: A Cultural Symbol in the Relationship between Korea and China,” in The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush, et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 136. Yi Pyǒngdo, “Kija Chosǒn ǔi chǒngch’e wa sowi Kija p’aljogyo e taehan singoch’al,” Han’guk kodaesa yǒn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1976).

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137. Kim Chǒngbae, Han’guk minjok munhwa ǔi kiwǒn (Seoul: Koryǒ taehakkyo chulp’anbu, 1973). 138. Shim Jae-Hoon, “A New Understanding of Kija Choson as a Historical Anachronism,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 62:2 (December 2002) 271-305. 139. Yun Naehyǒn, “Kija sin’go,” Han’guk kodaesa sillon (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1986), 239. 140. Ch’ǒn Kwan’u, Ko Chosǒn sa Samhan sa yǒn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1989), 37-89. Ch’ǒn was a newspaper editor of Tong’a ilbo; however, he also made significant contributions to Korean historical studies from the 1950s to the 1980s, and his views were closer to those of the professional historians. 141. There is also a more radical claim about the Korean origin of Confucianism. Linking Kija as a Tong’i person and Confucius’s admiration of Kija and his willingness to migrate to the Eastern Barbarian area, some South Koreans argued that Confucius was also a Tong’i person, or in other words, the ancestor of contemporary Koreans. Therefore, Confucianism originated in Korea and was then transmitted to China, and was the typical example of Korea as the center and source of world civilization. Interview with Yi Kidong, Hankyerye sinmun, February 1, 2007. http:// kr.news.yahoo.com/service/news/shellview.htm?linkid=13&articleid=2007020118101544623&newssetid=85, accessed February 2, 2007. 142. Weiman’s relationship with Lu Wan is unclear, but Weiman came to Korea after Lu Wan’s escape to Xiongnu. Lu Wan was previously enfeoffed as king of the Yan by Emperor Gaozu of the Han dynasty because Lu came from the same town as the emperor. However, Lu later escaped to Xiongnu after an abortive rebellion against the Han government. 143. Wiman usurping power from King Kijun was not mentioned in the records for Wiman Chosǒn, but later in the records for Mahan in explaining the origin of Mahan. 144. Mikami Tsugio 三上次男, “Eishi Chōsen koku no seiji to sakai seikaku,” eds. Mikami Tsugio and Kurihara Tomonobu, Chūgoku kodaishi no shomondai (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1954), 211-31. 145. Yi Manyŏl, annotated, Chusŏk Chosŏn sanggo muhuwasa (Seoul: Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho sŏnsaeng kinyŏm sa’ŏphoe, 1992), 200-203. 146. Ch’oe Namsŏn, Asi Chosŏn (Keijo: Tongyang sowŏn, 1927), 41-44. 147. Yi Pyǒngdo, Han’guk kodaesa yǒn’gu (Seoul: Pagyǒngsa, 1976), 65-94. 148. Ri Chilin, Ko Chosŏn yŏn’gu (P’yŏngyang: Kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 1963), 362-65. 149. Chosŏn chŏnsa 2 (P’yŏngyang: Kwahak paeggwa sajŏn chonghap ch’ulp’ansa, 1991), 123. Also Kim Sǒkhyǒng, Chosǒn minjok, kukka wa munhwa ŭi kiwǒn (P’yǒngyang: P’yǒngyang ch’ulp’ansa, 1990), 40-42. 150. North Korean scholars completely denied Kija’s migration to the Korean peninsula or the existence of Kija Chosŏn in the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, Ko Chosŏn is synonymous to Tan’gun Chosŏn among North Korean scholars. 151. It was Kim Han’gyu who first appealed for a reconsideration of Yi Pyŏngdo’s opinion in the 1980s, contending that Wiman’s hairdo was not unique to “Koreans” but was also commonly used in the Southern Yue area of China, and that the Southern Yue also used the same state title after Han exiles took power. See Kim Han’gyu, “Wiman Chosŏn kwangye chungguk chǔk saryo e taehan chae kŏmt’o,” Pusak yŏdae nonmunjip 8 (1980). 152. The transformation of Wiman into a national hero of Korea is similar to the reputation of Zhao Tuo in Vietnamese national history. 153. Ch’oe Mongnyong, “The Trade System of the Wiman State,” Asian and Pacific Quarterly of Cultural and Social Affairs 15:3 (Autumn 1983), 30-37. 154. Kim Chŏngbae, “Wiman Chosŏn ŭi kuggajŏl sŏngkyŏk,” Sachong 21(1977): 5773, 73. 155. “The king of Chaoxian named Man was previously from the state of Yan. When Yan was powerful, it occupied Zhenfan and Chaoxian. Yan appointed officials there and established a fortress. After Qin defeated Yan, this area belonged to the Liaodong external fortress. Since the establishment of the Han, they considered it too remote to

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defend, and repaired the old Liaodong fortress and set Peishui 浿水 as a borderline that belonged to Yan. The lord of Yan rebelled against the Han and fled to Xiongnu, and Man also escaped. He gathered more than one thousand followers, made a topknot, wore barbarian (manyi) dress and moved eastward to pass through the fortress, pass across the Peishui and reside in the shangxiazhang 上下障 area, which was deserted since the Qin dynasty. Later, Man 滿 attracted people from Zhenfan, indigenous barbarians from Chaoxian and exiles from the previous state of Yan and Qi and became a king, and set the capital in Wangxian.” My translation. Shiji 115, Chaoxian liezhuan. 156. “Many people wandered around the Liao area since Yan Prince Dan’s failed assassination attempt on the king of Qin (later the first emperor of the Qin dynasty), and Man 滿 lured Yan’s descendants and gathered at the east side of the sea to further encroach Zhenfan.” My translation. Shiji 130. 157. It is in Qianfulun 潛夫論 or Discourses by a Hidden Man that Weiman’s last name Wei 衛 (K. Wi) was mentioned. However, it is not clear whether his real last name was Wei but was ignored by Sima Qian and Ban Ku, or whether from a certain point of time, Weiman was given a last name according to Chinese tradition. Wei was a common last name at that time, including General Wei Qing who obtained his reputation by fighting against the Xiongnu, and his sister Wei Zifu, who was the favorite consort of Emperor Wu. The Han general who was sent to Korea was also named Wei Shan. 158. “The descendant of Jizi, the lord of Chaoxian, crowned himself king and attacked Yan for deferring to the royal authority of Zhou. After he realized that the Zhou Dynasty was declining, the lord of Yan also claimed to be king and intended to invade eastward to Chaoxian. The minister of Chaoxian, who was named Li, persuaded him not to do it and the lord of Chaoxian gave up his plan. After this, Li went to Yan and stopped Yan (their intention to attack Zhou). Later, his descendant became more arrogant, and so Yan sent General Qin Kai 秦開 to attack its western territory, occupied two thousand li and reached Manbohan as the border. Chaoxian then weakened. After the Qin unified all under heaven, it send Meng Tian to build up the Great Wall and it reached the Liaodong area. At that time, Pi took over the kingship and he was afraid of a Qin invasion, so surrendered and belonged to the Qin but did not pay tribute. Pi died, and his son Zhun became the king. After twenty years, Chen Sheng and Xiang Yu rebelled (against the Qin) and it became chaotic. The people of Yan, Qin and Zhao suffered from chaos and fled to Zhun. Zhun allocated them to live in the western area (of Chaoxian). Later, Han enfeoffed Lu Wan as the king of Yan, and Chaoxian began to border Yan at Peishui. Soon Lu Wan rebelled against the Han and fled to Xiongnu, then a man from the Yan named Weiman fled to Chaoxian wearing barbarian dress and went eastward to cross Peishui and surrender to Zhun. Weiman persuaded Zhun to allow him to live in the western border and collect Chinese exiles to demarcate a protected area for Chaoxian. Zhun trusted him, appointed him boshi (erudite scholar), gave him Gui as investiture, enfeoffed him with one hundred li of territory and ordered him to defend the western border. Man 滿 induced many exiles and when he had enough followers, he sent a delegate to make a false report to King Zhun saying that the Han army was coming and that Weiman requested to enter the Chaoxian capital to defend King Zhun. Weiman soon came to attack Zhun; Zhun could not match Man 滿, and therefore he led his followers to go to the sea and reside in a Han area, proclaiming himself king of Han.” My translation. Sanguozhi 30, Wuhuan xianbei dongyi zhuan, Hanzhuan. 159. “After Qin merged six states, the Siyi and Huanyi were dispersed as common people. When Chen She aroused a rebellion, the world collapsed, and a man named Weiman from the Yan escaped to Chaoxian and became the king of that state. After about one hundred years, Emperor Wu extinguished that state.” My translation. Houhanshu 85, Dongyi leizhuan. 160. The earliest information on people’s hairstyle in the Korean Peninsula can be seen from the Nonggyŏngmun Ch’ŏngdonggi or the Bronze Instrument with agricultural

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ornament. This is a rare bronze instrument collected in what is currently Kuijŏngdong, Taejon City of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. There is one man carved on each side: one is using a plough to till land, the other is filling grain into a pottery jar. One man has a topknot on his head, and another figure has loose hair over his shoulders. This is one of the first visual images that indicate contemporary people’s hairstyles. Some scholars contend that this is the beginning of Korean men’s topknot; however, this place is far from the P’yŏngyang area, the capital of Wiman. Some scholars assumed that the adults used topknots, and younger people just had loose hair. But in this bronze instrument, it is the figure with loose hair that is plowing the land. This is also evidence that people might use different types of hairdos depending on different situations. See Han Pyŏngsam, “Sŏnsa sidae nonggyŏngmun chŏngdonggi e taehayŏ,” Misul sahak yŏn’gu 112 (1971), 2-13. 161. kuitou louji 魁頭露紒. See Sanguozhi 30, chapter of Wuhuan xianbeidongyi. 162. Besides descriptions of Weiman’s hairdo when he fled to Chaoxian, the closest contemporary example is the case of Li Ling. Li Ling was a famous general in the Han dynasty’s war against Xiongnu. Later, he was caught by the Xiongnu and surrendered. When a Han envoy went to Xiongnu and tried to persuade him to come back to the Han, he refused and specifically mentioned his clothes and hairdo, emphasizing that he had already become Xiongnu. However, his appearance was different from other typical Xiongnu; therefore, it seemed that Li’s self-identification by referring to his hairdo and clothes were for his Xiongnu-nization, i.e., a Han Chinese who had surrendered to the Xiongnu. From Li Ling’s experience, it seems that Weiman was wearing the mark of the Han surrender to Xiongnu, and there is one more reason to believe this if we consider that Weiman was mentioned after Lu Wan fled to Xiongnu. Later, Weiman Chaoxian remained a potential ally to Xiongnu, and Emperor Wu of Han China decided to invade Weiman Chaoxian also in order to truncate the “right hand” of the Xiongnu, since it would cause trouble if Weiman Chaoxian allied with the Xiongnu and attacked the Han dynasty. However, despite the likely opportunity and Han suspicion, there is no evidence of any virtual connection between Weiman Chaoxian and Xiongnu. 163. Sun Ji, Handai wuzhi wenhua ziliao tushuo (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1991), 245. Hayashi Minao, Kandai no bunbutsu (Kyōto: Kyōto Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 1976). 164. Regarding historiography on Lelang, see Pai Hyung Il, Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean StateFormation Theories (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000). Also, Yi Sǒngsi, “Tong’asia esǒ ŭi nangang—kwaje wa pangpǒb e taehan siron,” Han’guk kodaesa yǒn’gu 34 (2004). 165. Yun Naehyǒn, Han’guk kodaesa sillon (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1986), 340. 166. Yi Sǒngsi, “Introduction for Research Center for Enhancing Local Cultures in Asia.” See http://www.enhan.waseda.ac.jp/sanka/sanka_chosen.html, accessed April 20, 2008. 167. Hanshu 85: 2813. 168. Ma Dazheng et al., Gudai Zhongguo Gaogouli lishi xulun (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 61. 169. Son Yŏngjong, “Rangnanggun nambu chiyŏk ŭi wich’i—Rangnanggun ch’owŏn hyŏnbyŏl ch’ogu daso t’onggye charyo rŭl chungsim ŭro,” Ryŏksa kwahak 198 (2006): 30-33. 170. Jung-bae Kim projects that Ko Chosŏn’s population was 56,297 in 200 BCE, and later had grown to 113,836 in 108 BCE when Wiman Chosŏn collapsed. See Jung-bae Kim, Ko Chosŏn e Taehan Saeroun Haesŏk (Seoul: Korea University Press, 2010). 171. Geng Tiehua, Haotaiwang bei yiqina wubai bashi nian ji (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 34-35. 172. No T’aedon elaborated upon Chǒng’s argument, and contended that Koguryǒ had an independent worldview, and used tianxia 天下 (K. Ch’ǒnha) (all under heaven) to describe a world system with Koguryǒ as the center, using degrading terms to name

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Paekche, Silla, and Wa (Japan). Tianxia is a symbolic term for the Chinese worldview, representing confidence and pride in being the center of the world and civilization. Korea was stereotyped as the model tributary state for a long period. However, recent Korean scholars attempted to reconsider international relationships from the third to the sixth centuries. Since China was in the chaotic Northern and Southern dynasty at that time, it was impossible to pay tribute to China. See No T’aedon, “Osegi kǔmsǒngmun e po’inŭn Koguryǒ in ŭi chǒnhagwan,” Han’guk saron 19 (1988), 31-66. 173. Yi Chin’hǔi, Kōkaido Ō ryōhi no kenkyū (Tōkyō, Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1972 ). 174. Wang Jiaqun, Haotaiwangbei yanjiu (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1984). Yi Sǒngsi, Mandǔrǒjin kodae: kǔndae kungmin kukka ǔi Tong Asia iyagi (Seoul: Samin, 2001), 49. 175. The reaffirmation of Mimana by Suematsu Yasukazu 末松保和 (1904-). See Suematsu Yasukazu, Mimana kōbōshi (Tōkyō: Ōyashima Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1949) 176. Yamao Yukihisa, Kodai no Nitchō kankei (Tōkyō: Hanawa Shobō, 1989). Suzuki Hideo, Kodai no to Wakoku Chōsen shokoku (Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten, 1996). 177. Kim Hyǒnggu, Imna Ilbonbu yǒn’gu: Hanbando nambu kyǒngyǒngnon pip’an (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1993). 178. Kim Hyǒn’gu, Imna ilbonbu yǒn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1993). 179. Kim T’aesik, Kaya yǒnmaengsa (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1993). 180. National History Compilation Committee, National History (Seoul: Middle School National History Textbook, 1990), 15. 181. National History Compilation Committee, National History, 15 & 30. 182. National History Compilation Committee, National History, 15-16.

FOUR From a Marxist Universal History to an Ultranationalist Approach Studies on Ancient History in North Korea

North Korea is one of the most enigmatic countries in the world. Its isolation is a result of mutual reservations: North Korea strictly controls the information it releases to the outside world, while at the same time, the outside world has had limited interest in North Korea, except when the North Korean nuclear issue comes into the spotlight. In recent years, there have been some promising events in North Korean studies, including the call for moving beyond a simple condemnation of North Korea’s Juche (chuch’e) 主體 or Self-Reliance ideology, which frequently takes the shape of a bellicose manifesto against the whole world. Alternatively, it has been recognized that it may be more productive to reconsider North Korea within the international system, 1 and to focus on the everyday life of North Koreans. 2 Despite the rising interest in North Korea, there has been a regrettable lack of English scholarship on the historiographical development of North Korea; such scholarship could be invaluable in understanding North Korea. Compared to the difficulties in obtaining reliable data in social science disciplines, source materials for North Korean historiography are both abundant and accessible. Since it is crucial to understand North Korea through the transformation of its historical views, this chapter traces the evolution of historical research, with a focus on how North Koreans’ interpretation of ancient history has evolved from the 1950s to 2000s. Issues include preferred topics and venues of research, and changes in interpretations based upon the country’s political and ideological vicissitudes. 137

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Although the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945 and the Korean War (1950-1953) inflicted tremendous damage on the Korean land and its people, both Korean governments established thriving academic institutes for historical studies. Korean politicians were sensitive to the need for a national history of nation-building, and realized that building historical narratives has become a race in which governments compete for political legitimacy. North Korean historiography is unusual in the following ways. First, North Korean historiography is intertwined with politics and ideology. Second, because of history’s importance to the government’s legitimacy and authority, the state has strictly controlled historical studies. Third, especially after the 1970s, most historical studies have been published by group authors make it difficult to express personal or dissident views. Similar to what has happened in other socialist states, state institutes have monopolized historical research in North Korea, and almost all scholars are affiliated with the state research institute or the history departments of national universities. Most historical scholarship is produced by the Institute of Historical Research under the auspices of the Academy of Social Science, with supplementary contributions from Kim Il Sung University and a few other national universities. From research, to publication, to circulation, all aspects of publication are the result of state planning and management. North Korean historiography on ancient history has had its own political and ideological trajectory; fortunately, the condition of ancient history is slightly better than that of modern history, which has become the saga of Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla movement. The study of ancient history has possibilities for a more nuanced approach, or at least it did in the 1950s and 1960s. However, with the rise to prominence of Juche in the 1970s, ancient history became the primary field and repertoire for constructing from the remote past an image of the everlasting self-reliance, independence, and uniqueness of Korean culture. On the one hand, North Korean historians were no less interested than their South Korean colleagues in their interest in the origin of the Korean people and civilization, especially in Tan’gun and Ko Chosŏn. On the other hand, North Korean historians have shown a stronger need to identify when a slave society existed and to define the socioeconomic nature of each stage of Korean history. In search of evidence of a slave society, North Korea historians turned to the archaeological exploration beyond the Korean Peninsula. 3 However, along with political and ideological shifts in the 1970s, especially the spread of Juche ideology, researchers in ancient history turned their attention to the construction of Korean uniqueness and superiority; this culminated in the “rediscovery” of Tan’gun’s burial site in 1993 and the construction of a massive mausoleum in his honor in 1994. As a result, Tan’gun was transformed from a mythical figure to a historical

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ancestor of the Korean people, and a state-sponsored project to glorify Tan’gun soon led to the next step—claiming Taedonggang 大同江 Civilization as the fifth center of ancient civilizations. North Korean historiography of ancient history consists of three phases: 4 1950s-1960s; 1970s-early 1990s; and 1990s-present. FLOURISHING PERIOD IN THE 1950S-1960S 5 North Korea enthusiastically launched studies of Korean history immediately after the establishment of two separate governments in 1948. The North Korean government realized the importance of historical studies, and established official research institutes so that scholars could conduct

Figure 4.1. Tan’gun Mausoleum. Tangun: Founder-King of Korea, Pyongyang, 1994.

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academic work. Many South Korea-based historians, especially those who were sympathetic to the socioeconomic approach, moved to North Korea after 1945. During the Korean War, North Korean agents recruited and even abducted prominent intellectuals, and brought them to North Korea. 6 These factors combined to lay a stronger foundation for historical research in the North. The priorities of postwar historical studies in North Korea were to refute Japanese colonial attacks on Korean history, and to reframe Korean history within Marxist universal history, albeit with caveats about the uniqueness of Korean culture. Proper periodization is the first step in utilizing a Marxist universal framework, and North Korean historians spared no effort to identify the five stages of Marxist historical development in the Korean context. Another similarity to their colleagues in the South was their obsession with the ancient period. Inherited from the nationalist historiography conceived during the colonial period, all Korean scholars considered the discovery of the unique and pure origin of the Korean people and civilization a prerequisite for postwar decolonization and for the restoration of Korean national pride and identity. History as a Decolonization Project Like their South Korean colleagues, North Korean scholars pondered how to shatter the Japanese colonial stereotype of Korean history: that its hallmarks are centuries of stagnation, factionalism, and reliance on foreign influence. Japanese scholars had had the upper hand in conducting research on Korean history during the colonial period thanks to substantial support from the Japanese colonial government in Korea. Having adopted the socioeconomic approach, North Korean historians substantialized the so-called hypothesis of Internal Development, or the Sprout of Capitalism, in the late Chosǒn period. By identifying a feudal stage of Korean history in the Three Kingdoms period and pointing to evidence of commercialization in the late Chosŏn economy, this testified to Korea’s potential for the indigenous development toward a capitalist society if there had been no Japanese colonization. This is believed to be the most convincing rebuttal to Japanese charges of Korean stagnancy and heteronomy. North Korean historians were ahead of their South Korean colleagues in this respect; a similar hypothesis, initiated with the publication of Kim Yongsǒp’s book on agricultural economy of the late Chosǒn period, did not take shape in the South until the late 1960s. 7 Golden Age of Historical Studies The 1950s and 1960s are believed to be the golden age of historical studies in North Korea for several reasons: the consistent support from

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the state, the unprecedented open discussion and debates even on controversial issues, and the quality and quantity of academic publications, especially those from individual authors. State Support As early as 1948, the North Korean administration issued its decision to appoint a Korean History Compilation Committee to conduct historical studies in a “scientific and advanced manner.” 8 The History Compilation Committee was inaugurated on March 27, 1952, in the middle of the Korean War. The committee was soon absorbed by the Korean Academy of Science and became the Institute of Historical Research in October 1952. The importance of historical studies can be affirmed by its committee members, who were all either prominent politicians or established scholars, such as Nam Il 南日 (1913-1976) and Paek Nam’un 白南雲 (18941979). The Academy of Social Science was founded in 1963, and the Institute of Historical Research became one of its branches; thereafter it became the headquarters for the training of historians as well as for historical research and publications in North Korea. 9 The preface of Chosǒn chǒnsa stipulated the role of Kim Il Sung in launching the fledging historical studies in North Korea: Kim Il Sung searched for historians in the middle of the Korean War and showed them the direction and task of historical studies . . . the main issues in historical studies are Korean peoples’ racial category, Ko Chosǒn, slave society, Koguryǒ, as well as the origin of capitalism and bourgeois reform and revolution . . . Kim lightened the road [for historical studies] . . . Kim Il Sung helped provide a superb research condition, organized a research team . . . and supplied all modern facilities needed for historical research . . . 10

The North Korean state was also committed to the recruitment of historians from the South from 1945 to 1953. Some prominent historians, such as Paek Nam’un, 11 Ch’oe Ikhan, Yi Mangyu, and Yi Yǒsǒng, stayed in North Korean after the South-North joint meeting held in P’yǒngyang in 1948. The leading socioeconomic historian during the colonial period, Ri Chǒngwǒn, went to North Korea in 1946. Pak Sihyǒng (1910-2001?) and Kim Sǒkhyǒng (1915-1996?), who would become the two most influential historians in postwar North Korea, left for the north in 1946. They were joined there by Chǒn Sǒkdam (1916-?) in 1950. Kim Sǒkkyǒng was born in Taegu, Kyǒngsang Province, into a Christian family. He received his undergraduate education at Keijō Imperial University, majoring in law. Answering a call from the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim left for North Korea in August 1946, and soon became a professor at Kim Il Sung University, founded in October 1946. He was one among dozens of South Korea-based scholars who went to the North at

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this time; his trip might have been arranged by Kim Kwangjin (19031986). 12 In the 1950s Kim Sǒkkyǒng conducted research on the social status system in premodern Korea, and in the 1960s he switched to the relationship between premodern Korea and Japan. Kim was also a major contributor to two voluminous history series, Chosǒn T’ongsa or Comprehensive History of Korea and Chosǒn Munhwa sa or Cultural History of Korea. He also headed North Korean academic delegations to Romania, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, where he represented North Korean historians and intelligentsia for decades. Pak Sihyǒng was born in Kyǒngsang Province and studied history at Keijō Imperial University. After he went to North Korea, he became a professor at Kim Il Sung University, and was the first Director of the Institute of Historical Research. In the 1950s his research centered on land systems, taxation, social status, and science in the Chosǒn dynasty. In the 1960s his research extended to ancient history, especially Parhae, Kwanggaet’o Stele, and Kija/Wiman Chosǒn. North Korea also recruited two outstanding archaeologists who had been trained in Europe. Very few Koreans could study abroad during the colonial period, much less in Europe where they could undergo formal training in archaeology. To Yuho (1905-?) earned his doctorate from the University of Vienna, and later worked at the Xinjing (Changchun, China) Museum in Manchukuo. Han Hŭngsu (1909-?) lived and worked in Austria, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia from 1936 to 1948. He studied in Vienna and Berne, and earned his doctoral degree in Fribourg, Switzerland. 13 These two archaeologists were among the most sought-after scholars in postwar North Korea when the study of archaeology and ancient history started to gain momentum. Another instrumental group of future historians who came to North Korea were students from Seoul National University (founded in 1946 to replace Keijō Imperial University), who moved north and later became influential scholars; the group included Rim Kǒnsang, Hong Huiyu, Chǒng Ch’anyǒng, Kim Seik, Kim Saǒk, and Son Yǒngjong. In particular, Son Yǒngjong was one of the most prolific historians in North Korea from the 1960s to the 2000s. Relative Freedom of Academic Inquiry Pursuing historical studies in North Korea is not a personal matter. Usually a research topic is assigned by the authorities based on state demand, and each research team is assigned specific tasks, starting with the collecting of primary and secondary sources. There are multiple discussions among group members as research progresses, with one last round of comprehensive discussion before consensus as a group research outcome is presented. In most cases, it is difficult to detect individual opinions after work has reached its final stage. 14

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Nonetheless, the 1950s and 1960s stand out because in spite of the prevalence of group projects; at that time it was still possible to see single-author publication. In particular, despite the preassigned topics, there were free discussions, and the multiple rounds of discussion contributed to a publication boom in the early 1960s. 15 More importantly, academic journals sometimes published detailed discussion reports with individual opinions, and readers could trace the progress of participants’ positions in the various debates. Another singular phenomenon was that young scholars could challenge established scholars and conventional viewpoints. The emergence of young historians with professional training and the freedom to address a variety of issues resulted in views that differed from or opposed conventional interpretations. For ancient history, the two most contested issues remained the periodization of Korean history and Ko Chosǒn. Surprisingly, there were twenty rounds of discussion about Ko Chosǒn from 1960-1962, with participation of historians, archaeologists, folklorists, and linguists. 16 The detailed reports as well as accounts of individual opinions were accessible to the public through historical and archaeological journals, and collected work such as Ko Chosǒn e kwanhan yǒngu nonmunjip, or the Collected Papers on Ko Chosŏn, published in 1963. 17 This was a more productive and inspiring phase than in South Korea, where historical studies were still under severe censorship from the military government and most historians were following the evidential approach. During this period, there were at least two interpretations on the origin of the Korean people, advocated respectively by Chǒng Huiyǒng and Chang Chinsǒk. The former placed more emphasis on Korean peoples’ connection with the Shang (Chinese) people, while the latter drew a connection to Paleo-Asiatic and Tungus peoples. 18 Archaeologists and historians also fell into two camps regarding Ko Chosǒn: most archaeologists tended to believe that Ko Chosǒn was centered in the P’yǒngyang area; while historians leaned toward the Yodong hypothesis. 19 This open discussion was reminiscent of the One Hundred Flowers Campaign in China during the 1950s. To Yuho, the most representative archaeologist in North Korea, proclaimed that history should be separated from politics, and any unconventional historical interpretation should not be criticized for its political implications: The relation of Han-style relics with the location of the Han Commanderies has become an issue now. However, we should not talk about political implications and should avoid labelling scholars with different opinions as counter-revolutionary. Even if once the Han Commanderies reached the northwestern area of Korea, it is not the shame of our nation. 20

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Publication Boom: Journals, Comprehensive History, and Monographs The new North Korean state prompted the publication of academic journals. The first issue of the journal, Yŏksa che munje 歷史諸問題 or Various Issues in History, was published in August 1948. Considering the tenuous political and material conditions in the late 1940s, Yŏksa che munje was of high quality, and each volume was more than a hundred and fifty pages long. Four issues were published in 1949, ten in 1949, and four in 1950. The last one, volume 18, was published in May 1950, right before the Korean War, which was a very interesting coincidence considering the important connection between history and politics. The only original copy of Yŏksa che munje is housed in the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, DC (National Archives Collection of Foreign Records RG 242). 21 The Library of Congress carries what is most likely a replica of the National Archives copy. A PDF version is available for download through the Central Library of South Korea. The copy in the National Archives was among the documents that American troops acquired during the Korean War. Moreover, quite a few volumes indicated on the cover page that those copies were reserved for Pak Hŏnyŏng 朴憲永 (1900-1955), vice prime minister during the Korean War. It again proved how important this journal in particular, and historical studies in general, were. Twenty thousand copies of each issue of Yŏksa che munje were published; this was quite a large quantity considering the chaos in the late 1940s, and that later historical journals in North Korea had a limited circulation of five thousand to ten thousand copies per issue. The most widely circulated historical journal in North Korea is Yŏksa kwahak 歷史科學 or Historical Science, started in 1955. The inaugurating editors were Ri Chŏngwŏn, Kim Kwangjin, Kim Chŏngdo, To Yuho, Pak Sihyŏng, Chŏn Sŏkdam, and Hŏ Kap. Yŏksa kwahak is believed to be the successor of Yŏksa che munje, but it targeted a more generally educated readership. Another small journal, Yoksa nonmunjip 歷史論文集, or Collection of Historical Papers, was for professional historians. Yŏksa nonmunjp was an occasional collection of research papers and may have published only five issues from 1957 to 1961. 22 Yŏksa kwahak was the most reputable historical journal from 1955 to 1967, but it mysteriously ceased publication in 1968; it resumed publication in 1977 and continues today. 23 Some scholars have suggested that the ten-year hiatus was to revise the journal to make it more consistent with Juche ideology. 24 North Korean historical journals in this boom period usually contained four sections: research paper, discussion, report, and international trends (woeguk sajo, or foreign intellectual trends). Compared to later periods, the last three sections are unusual, and all of them had disappeared by the 1970s. The discussion section covered ongoing academic debates

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on controversial issues; the report briefed readers on international academic news, either of foreign scholars visiting North Korea or vice versa, or summarized the proceedings of academic conferences. The international trends section presented research from other socialist countries, mostly from the Soviet Union, China, East Europe, and Mongolia. It showed not only that the North Korean state was receptive to cultural exchange with these countries, but also that North Korean historians were eager to accommodate intellectual trends from other parts of the world. Another distinctive feature of this period was that all journals have their tables of contents printed in both Russian and Chinese. A couple of journals contain tables of contents in English. 25 At this time journals were open for individual submissions. A “Call for Papers” section provided detailed instructions on how to submit a paper. 26 Occasionally Yŏksa kwahak also ran surveys and solicited readers’ feedback. The surveys asked readers to indicate which parts of the journal they found helpful; what they would like to see in future volumes; whether they had comments on published articles; and whether they had any other helpful feedback. 27 Yŏksa kwahak did not simply disseminate party propaganda, its editors were eager to solicit their readers’ impressions of the journal in the 1950s. North Korea also realized the importance of compiling a comprehensive history. The two most important historical series in the past six decades are Chosŏn T’ongsa and Chosǒn chǒnsa. Chosŏn T’ongsa (1956, 1958) was published immediately after the Korean War. 28 T’ongsa is the condensed two-volume version of the comprehensive history, and despite multiple revisions and editions, it has kept the two-volume format. Despite discrepancies and errors in the hastily published first edition, the first T’ongsa laid the framework of the North Korean version of ancient history. It declared that Ko Chosǒn was Korea’s first ancient state; a slave society existed; and most importantly, instead of Silla, it was Koryǒ that first established a unified Korean dynasty. Also important were the ideas that Parhae was not only a part of Korean history, but also paralleled Silla, and that this was a period of Nambukguk sigi or South-North States period. T’ongsa continued to be revised, and newer editions were released in 1977 and 1987. 29 Despite the state-control pattern and the dominance of group projects in North Korea, the 1960s saw a peak in single-author monographs; their contribution was significant because their interpretations became the official stance on some contested issues. Two of the most prominent works were Ko Chosǒn yǒn’gu 古朝鮮硏究 (1963), or The Study on Ko Chosǒn, by Ri Chilin 李址麟, and Ch’ogi Cho-Il kwan’gyesa yǒn’gu 初期朝日關系史 (1966), or the History of Relations between Early Korea and Japan, by Kim Sǒkhyǒng 金錫亨. Ri Chilin first studied in China, probably under the auspices of the China-North Korea cultural exchange program in the late 1950s. Ri stud-

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ied with Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893-1980), the most prominent Chinese historian of the time who was famous for his iconoclastic critique of preQin texts and for questioning the authenticity and reliability of accounts of the ancient history of China. 30 Ri returned to North Korea, and his monograph Ko Chosŏn yŏn’gu, published in 1963, made him the authority on Ko Chosŏn studies in North Korea from the 1960s to the early 1990s. One of the most contested issues during this period was about the capital of Ko Chosŏn. Despite multiple rounds of debates and strong arguments advocated by established scholars for the P’yŏngyang-centered hypothesis, Ri put an end to this debate, and thereafter the official standpoint of North Korea was the Yodong-centered hypothesis. This was further supported by the excavation of tombs with evidence of human sacrifice (slave society) in the Yodong area. Until 1993, North Korean historians agreed that the center of Ko Chosŏn was located in the Yodong area in China. 31 Another unconventional point Ri Chilin developed concerned Wiman Chosŏn. Ri argued that Wiman was a descendant of the Ko Chosŏn people. When Wiman first came to Ko Chosŏn, he wore a Chosŏn-style hairdo and clothes. Upon arriving in Ko Chosŏn, he met King Kijun, who trusted him enough to appoint him paksa 博士 or erudite scholar, and charge him with defending Chosŏn’s western border against the Han dynasty. Wiman staged a military coup and took the throne as the king of Chosŏn. Wiman continued to use Chosŏn as the state name, which would make no sense if Wiman was from the Yan Kingdom. After his service to the Han dynasty, Wiman turned his back on it. Even after becoming King of Chosŏn, he was still extremely hostile to the Han dynasty and passed on this antipathy to his grandson King Ugŏ, who refused to surrender to Han troops. Finally, Wiman was supported by Chinbŏn Chosŏn 眞蕃朝鮮 in his coup against King Kijun. 32 Taking into account of all these factors, Ri concluded that Wiman was a Korean, and that Wiman Chosǒn should be associated with a proud phase in Korean history, especially for his valiant resistance against the Han invasion. Ri Chilin’s Ko Chosŏn yŏn’gu influenced not only the studies of Ko Chosǒn in North Korea, but also reached South Korea academia by the 1990s. It was quite a sensation when Ri Chilin’s book was introduced there. By that time, most South Korean historians believed in the P’yŏngyang-centered hypothesis, though a very few advocated a migration hypothesis. Despite brief mention of the Yodong-centered hypothesis in the Chosŏn and colonial period, it was only in the 1980s that this hypothesis again attracted substantial attention in South Korea, starting with the publication of Yun Naehyŏn’s book Han’guk Kodaesa sillon or New Studies on the Ancient History of Korea. 33 Later scholars pointed out that Yun’s unconventional interpretations of many contested issues were reminiscent of Ri Chilin’s arguments. 34

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Chinese scholars had ignored the implications of North Korean scholars’ Yodong hypothesis. However, contemporary Chinese scholars who participated in the Northeast China Project criticized Gu Jiegang and his colleagues in the 1950s for accepting Ri and North Korean scholars’ nostalgic and irredentist views of Northeast China. These Chinese scholars accused the Chinese government of tolerating Ri’s viewpoint in the name of Sino-North Korean friendship, and Chinese scholars were discouraged from rebutting the Yodong-centered hypothesis. Chinese scholars now proclaim that it is time for research free from political concerns, and to correct past distortions and misinterpretations. 35 Aside from Ko Chosǒn, the other controversial issue in Korea’s ancient history is Mimana. The most revolutionary reconfiguration of the early Korean-Japanese relationship was proposed by Kim Sǒkhyǒng. Since 1945, most Korean scholars have had questions about Mimana, and argued that Mimana was an intentional fabrication by Japanese colonial scholars on the basis of unreliable early Japanese documents. However, Kim Sǒkhyǒng’s interpretations went beyond the debate about whether Mimana really existed or whether it was a Japanese colony. Kim not only denied the existence of a Japanese colony in Korea, but argued that a Korean colony or stronghold was located in the Japanese archipelago. 36 According to Kim, the first millennium of Japanese history brought Korean migration to the Japanese archipelago, which continued until the sixth and seventh century CE. Emigrants from the Korean Peninsula not only created the Japanese Yayoi 彌生 (ca. third century BCE-third century CE), Kofun 古墳 (third-sixth century CE), and Asuka 飛鳥 (sixth centuryeighth century CE) cultures, but also directly contributed to the formation of the ancient Japanese state. In contrast to Japanese scholars who insisted that Yamato Japan decided to send troops to Korea to restore the Japanese Mimana colony in 663, Kim instead argued that the ruling class of Yamato was from Paekche and that Yamato Japan, as a branch state of Paekche, could not wait to see the collapse of its headquarter state, and dispatched troops to intervene in the first full-scale interstate war in East Asia. 37 Kim’s argument was refined by his colleagues. Based on the Shinsen shōjiroku 新撰姓氏錄, or the New Registration of Surnames, compiled around 815 CE, North Korean scholars argued that the most prominent clans in Shinsen shōjiroku were originally from Paekche and Kaya of the Korean Peninsula. These Korean emigrants had been dominant in the Kinai 畿内 area, the core area of the Japanese archipelago, and were later decisive in the foundation of the first Japanese state, Yamato, during the sixth and seventh centuries. 38 Therefore, Korean emigrants were the Japanese people’s cultural benefactors in the first thousand years of Japanese history. Moreover, Korean emigrants founded numerous small states all over the Japanese archipelago. 39

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Between Universal History and National Uniqueness The intertwined issues that engage the attention of North Korean historians are the periodization of Korean history, the existence of a slave society, the socioeconomic nature of the Three Kingdoms period (i.e., slavery vs. feudalism), and Ko Chosǒn. North Korean historians have had to reinterpret Korean history within a universal Marxist historical framework, and to glorify the uniqueness and superiority of Korea’s historical legacy. 40 By identifying the five phases of world history—primitive communal society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society, and socialist and communist society—North Korean historians labored to prove that Korean history followed the universal path of world history. Having accepted Marxism, the applicability of a Marxist framework to Korean history became a matter of national pride. 41 The only drawback is that historians have to selectively reject the Marxist concepts of the Asiatic mode of production and the oriental despotic that are used to characterize a case for stagnancy and backwardness in Asian society. By the same token, the sense of Korea’s cultural uniqueness correlated with the redefinition of the Sino-Korean relationship. Centuries of Chinese influence on Korean culture were minimized and eventually erased. Therefore, North Korean historians advocated that Korean culture had always been independent from the prehistoric to historic eras, with no influence outside from China or elsewhere. 42 The balance of Marxist universal history and national uniqueness was also a common theme in postwar socialist China. It is not surprising to see that the two countries have similar views regarding the origin of capitalism and the Asiatic mode of production. North Korean historians were inspired by their Chinese colleagues both in terms of raising questions and coming up with answers. 43 Competing for Political Legitimacy Based on Regionalism Historical research is not only important for national identity, but also for asserting political legitimacy in the age of the South-North division. North Korean historians constructed a lineage of Korean history that privileged the northern tradition: it started from Ko Chosŏn and continued with Puyŏ and Koguryŏ, then Parhae, and was followed by the Koryŏ and Chosŏn periods. North Korean historians favored Koguryŏ’s history over that of Silla for two reasons. First, Koguryŏ indeed was a time of military prestige and territorial expanse, in contrast to the later Korean kingdoms that failed to hold onto their land and restore their former glory. This is also the reason North Korean historians downplayed or even dismissed the Silla unification, because Silla secured only about two-thirds of the Korean Peninsula, and it was in this time that a foreign power—China—was brought in to fight in a Korean civil war.

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North Korean historians were notably critical, blaming Silla for Sadae Chuǔi, or serving the great, which they believe corrupted the Korean spirit of independence and impeded Korea’s indigenous development. Sadae Chuǔi was initiated in Silla by Kim Ch’unch’u 金春秋 and Kim Yusin 金庾信 (leaders of the seventh-century Silla unification), and later consolidated by Kim Pusik in his compilation of Samguk sagi. 44 Second, the obvious reason for favoring Koguryŏ is because of the division of South and North, which places most of the Koguryŏ Kingdom on North Korean territory. So while South Korean historians preferred working on the history of Silla, North Korean scholarship on the early history of Korea centered on Ko Chosǒn, Koguryǒ, and Parhae. They also attributed the first national unification to Koryŏ because it was during the Koryŏ period that Korea recovered some parts of the northern Korean Peninsula that Silla had lost to China and to nomadic peoples. In addition, the capitals of Koguryŏ and Koryŏ were at P’yŏngyang and Kaesŏng, respectively, now in North Korea; while the Silla capital Kyŏngju is in what is now South Korea. Politics in Historical Studies The historiographical evolution in North Korea correlated with political struggles and purges. As one of the few scholars from outside North Korea who had studied in North Korea, Leonid Petrov emphasized the role of politics in historical studies. Petrov identified the striking similarities of historical writings and historical education in the Soviet Union in the 1930s-1940s and in North Korea in the 1950s-1960s. North Korean leaders quickly recognized the importance of history, with a belief in the idea that “whoever controls the past controls the future, and whoever controls the present controls the past.” 45 Therefore, national history can claim legitimacy and attack political enemies, internal and external. According to Petrov, the debates on periodization, slave society, and feudalism among North Korean historians in the late 1950s did not just underscore different understandings of history, but also challenged the “old intellectuals” (e.g., Paek Nam’un and Ri Chǒngwǒn) who embraced Marxist dogmatism and formalism in their treatment of Korean history. Ironically but also predictably the old intelligentsia happened to be associated with rivals of Kim Il Sung and his “guerrilla faction.” 46 As the old intelligentsia was still intrigued by class-based Marxist history, the new intellectuals were keen on creating a nation-based new history and promoting Korean nationalism and patriotism. Therefore the new intellectuals were welcomed and encouraged to attack old scholars as Kim Il Sung’s political purges unfolded. Therefore, even during this unusual period, which tolerated discussion and debate, historical studies were akin to political trials. 47 As a result, most of the old intellectuals were expelled from the party, dismissed from their positions, publicly

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humiliated, and replaced with new and politically reliable scholars. 48 The writings of old intellectuals that advocated a universal approach were banned as anti-party and anti-revolutionary. Such polished action again proved that the responsibility of an ideal scholar in a socialist state was to serve the party, not to conduct academic inquiries. 49 The mid-1960s were difficult years for North Korean historians because of the Sino-Soviet ideological rift. In 1967-1968, Juche ideology required the revision of a class-centered universal history. By 1967, all debates and discussion on historical issues were shut down, and most historians were demoted to submissive scholar-bureaucrats whose job was simply to reiterate party policy and conduct research that complied with the party’s needs. The result was a series of constantly changing viewpoints that shifted with the political winds. 50 RELATIVE DORMANCY AND REORIENTATION IN THE 1970S–1980S The tolerant atmosphere in historical studies gradually diminished in the late 1960s, and the penetration of Juche ideology in the early 1970s became a turning point for historical studies in North Korea. A research topic ceased to be based on a scholar’s academic interests or expertise, but rather an assignment from a state or party authority. Most research was conducted collectively, and it is impossible to detect any individual opinion. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that North Korean historians presented a consensus on the rediscovery and authenticity of the Tan’gun tomb in the 1990s. The period that tolerated discussion and debates was gone; Juche become the predominant ideology and singular standard in historical narrative. After an almost ten-year suspension, Yŏksa kwahak resumed in 1977 with a very different format. The issues had shrunk from one hundred pages to around fifty. The quality of research articles, even the very quality of paper and print, also declined tremendously. Since the 1970s, each journal, each article, and sometimes each page contained quotations from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il, and all titles and references related to Kim were printed in bold. The transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il occurred in 1987; the third volume of 1987 featured the last excerpt from Kim Il Sung, and in the fourth volume, there were excerpts mostly from Kim Jung Il. 51 The Supreme Leaders’ instructions were a research topic’s seal of approval. Academic journals had become a definitive venue for propaganda despite their academic veneer. Scholars outside of North Korea can only speculate on the transition to a new Juche history. Although it was a top-down process with no outwardly observable signs of resistance, it may still have taken historians some time to adjust to narrating all historical events using Juche as the standard. The number of publications in history dwindled, with only

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a handful of monographs (mostly collected works) in ancient history, including Ko Chosǒn munje yǒngu (Ri Chirin and Chǒng chuhyǒp, 1973) and Ko Chosǒn munje yǒngu nonmunjip (Cho’oe Taek’sǒn and Ri Ranwu, 1976). Instead of taking any new approach, they parroted earlier interpretations from the 1960s. It is not surprising that the journal sections indicating academic freedom—discussion, report, international trends, and call for papers—all disappeared. Research papers were preassigned and prearranged. With the establishment of Juche ideology and its omnipresence in the political and cultural spheres, North Korean research on ancient history shifted to establishing the subjectivity, uniqueness, and superiority of Korean culture and identity, and tracing that back to the immemorial past, which led to a new interpretation of Tan’gun and Ko Chosǒn. TURNING TO A NEW P’YǑNGYANG-CENTERED KOREAN HISTORY From the 1960s to the early 1990s, most North Korean scholars accepted a Yodong-centered hypothesis of Ko Chosǒn history. 52 This is the legacy of Korean nationalist historians’ emphasis on Manchuria from the colonial period; more importantly, it is also related to the fact that Kim Il Sung based his anti-Japanese guerilla movement in Manchuria. The stage for early Korean history was Manchuria, not the Korean Peninsula; thus, the legitimate lineage of Korean history followed the path from Ko Chosǒn, Koguryǒ, Parhae, Koryǒ, and Chosǒn to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 53 The other reason for the Manchuria-oriented sentiment was the perceived necessity of identifying a slave society in Korean history. For a long time, the existence of human sacrifice in the burials located in the Yodong area was the only evidence of a slave society. 54 The discovery and excavation of Tan’gun’s tomb in 1993 changed the conventional narrative of ancient history in North Korea. According to the first collected papers on Tan’gun published in 1994, the excavation of, and research about, Tan’gun’s tomb was requested and supervised by Kim Il Sung. 55 Kim personally visited the excavation site and issued onsite instructions more than twenty times. The excavation and the new history of Tan’gun is allegedly a result of Kim Il Sung’s “wise leadership.” 56 The tomb was dated to 3000 BCE, and the remains were believed to be those of Tan’gun and his wife. Tan’gun was estimated to be 170 cm tall, taller than the average “Koreans” of 163 cm of that time. North Korean scholars also claimed that Tan’gun's tomb was looted and that the Japanese also destroyed the mural paintings inside the tomb during the colonial period. 57 Scholars outside of North Korea believe that Tan’gun’s tomb was an intentional fabrication by the North Korean authorities, because this site had already been documented in the fifteenth century. Some South Kore-

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Figure 4.2. Tan’gun Portrait. Tangun: Founder-King of Korea, Pyongyang, 1994.

an scholars pointed out that the tomb structure is more like one from the Koguryŏ period, and that the date of 3000 BCE is unreliable. North Korean scholars used ESR (Electron Spin Resonance) to date the tomb; however, South Korean scholars argued that this technique is more appropriate on materials ten thousand years or older. The most suspicious part is that the ESR test was repeated fifty-four times during a six-month period with the same result of 5011 ± 267 obtained each time. 58 In 1994, the North Korean government constructed a splendid mausoleum and museum commemorating Tan’gun, which quickly became a

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new site for fostering Korean patriotism and nationalism. The affirmation of a common ancestor for all ethnic Koreans (on the Korean Peninsula and in the diaspora) demonstrated the necessity and inevitability of a national reunification, and by securing the sacred site in P’yŏngyang, it implies that the current North Korean government should take the lead in the unification process. Coincidentally but not surprisingly, the North Korean state also renovated the mausoleum for King Tongmyŏng (founder of the Koguryŏ Kingdom) and King Wang Kŏn (founder of the Koryŏ dynasty) in 1993. In sum, the sudden enthusiasm and new interpretation on Tan’gun and Ko Chosŏn history can be seen as a major step toward embracing a new history-making process centered on P’yŏngyang. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il were very involved in the construction of the Tan’gun mausoleum. The design of the monument paid homage to the pyramid shape of Changgun Ch’ong or the General Mausoleum and measured 50 × 50 meters at the base, and 22 meters in height. 59 The structure used 1,994 marble blocks to symbolize the year of construction. All symbolic icons related to Tan’gun are clustered here: four statues of tigers on each of the four sides and statues of Tan’gun’s four sons (Puru, Puso, Pu’u, and Puyŏ), in addition to the mandolin-shaped bronze dagger towers surrounding the mausoleum. Tan’gun’s portrait attributed to a famous court painter of the Silla period named Solgŏ 率居, was placed inside. The sudden shift from a Yodong-centered (1960s-early 1990s) to P’yǒngyang-centered (since 1993) hypothesis of Ko Chosŏn corroborated an indigenous origin for the Korean people and civilization centered on the P’yǒngyang area. Tan’gun’s status was upgraded from a mythical to a historical figure. 60 Instead of mourning the loss of Manchuria, it proved more uplifting to relocate the core of Korean civilization to P’yǒngyang, and make it the center of Taedonggang civilization; placing it on par with the great ancient civilizations of India, Egypt, China, and Mesopotamia. 61 According to contemporary North Korean scholars, P’yǒngyang was always the center of Northeast Asian civilization, not simply the cradle of Korean culture, and that its culture inspired those of China, Siberia, and Japan. 62 The evidence used to support these declarations is the discovery of Tan’gun’s tomb with its date of 3000 BCE, and the claims that the Ko Chosŏn state had an advanced state administration, bronze culture, agriculture, and an indigenous writing system (sinji kŭlja). 63 Unfortunately the only evidence for the Ko Chosŏn script was from Kyuwǒn sahwa 揆園 史話, a dubious text probably written during the colonial period. Since 1993, official North Korean publications have all changed the narrative of ancient history to fit the new P’yǒngyang-centered scenario emphasizing the virtual ancestor Tan’gun for all Koreans, reaffirming the homogenous origin and purity of the Korean people and culture. 64 The comprehensive history series published in 2010, Chosǒn tandaesa, Ko

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Chosǒn volume, summarized this new version of ancient history. 65 In it, Tan’gun established the first Korean state around 3000 BCE (Chǒn Chosǒn or the Former Chosǒn, thirtieth-fifteenth century BCD), and it was continued by Hu Chosǒn (Later Chosǒn) from the fifteenth century BCE to 194 BCE. Hu Chosǒn was a Korean state that had nothing to do with Kija Chosǒn. The transition from Chǒn Chosǒn to Hu Chosǒn was peaceful and resembled a rotation of power among members of the ruling class. 66 Interestingly, at least for Kija Chosǒn, the North Koreans’ reinterpretation is almost identical to that of their South Korean counterparts: Kija and Kija Chosŏn was nothing more than a complete fabrication. The third phase Man Chosǒn (194-108 BCE) was founded by Man 满, a Korean hero. Completely abandoned Ri Chilin’s Yodong-hypothesis, his iconoclastic interpretation of Wiman nonetheless continued—Wiman is a descendent of Ko Chosǒn, and his new ethnicity has resulted in Wiman being resurrected as a Korean national hero. The decisive factor for Man’s “nationality” is still his clothes and hairdo, the description of which is translated here as “Korean clothes.” 67 Throughout these long five millennia P’yǒngyang has always been the capital, and the Ko Chosǒn territory extended to Liaodong, Jilin, and the Changchun area of Northeast China, and as far as the southern part of the Maritime Provinces of Russia. 68 Chosǒn tandaesa elaborates Ko Chosŏn’s political, economic, and cultural system; however, all textual evidence is based on Kyuwŏn sahwa and Tanggi kosa 檀奇古史. Socioeconomically, the Ko Chosŏn period is described as having a slave system. Despite their unprecedented emphasis on Korean uniqueness and superiority, North Korean historians have preserved the five-stage Marxist framework of historical development. As for the evidence of the slave system, they continue to point to Gangshang (which belongs to the final stage of Chŏn Chosŏn) and Loushang (which belongs to Hu Chosŏn stage) burials in the Liaodong area, which they have identified as tombs of Ko Chosŏn local aristocrats. However, they did concede that this area is far from their newly claimed center— P’yŏngyang; hence they added that “the royal family and central aristocrats [in P’yŏngyang] must have had much bigger numbers of slaves.” 69 To resolve this dilemma, North Korean archaeologists found a Ryongsanri grave in 1994, about 11.5 kilometers from the Tan’gun mausoleum. They dated this tomb to the thirtieth century BCE, which means that it was constructed at the beginning of the Chŏn Chosŏn period. The only drawback is that the Ryongsanri burial site is very small (4.7 × 3.6 meters, with human remains of about 30 people, versus the Gangshang burial which is 28 × 20 meters, and with remains of more than 130 people). 70 The excavation date of Ryongsanri is an interesting coincidence, given that the construction of the Tan’gun mausoleum occurred in the same year. Another dilemma for North Korean historians is explaining the tremendous number of Nangnang 樂浪 artifacts excavated near the

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Figure 4.3. North Korean Ko Chosŏn map. Chosǒn Tandaesa, Ko Chosŏn volume, 2010.

P’yŏngyang area; previously these had been taken as hard evidence of Chinese influence. 71 North Korean historians compromised by attributing them to Nangnang Kuk, a Korean state that appeared only once in an anecdotal conversation in Samguk sagi. 72 The numerous seals of Nang-

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nang officials were dismissed as forgeries made by “reactionary Japanese scholars.” At the same time, the Chinese Nangnang Commandery was relocated to Northeast China; accordingly, the land of the Korean Peninsula could be said never to have directly experienced foreign dominance. Since the Nangnang Commandery founded by the Han Emperor Wu was located in Manchuria, it was excluded from Korean history. 73 Like Nangnang, Mimana has been another symbol of foreign dominance in Korea. Thanks to Kim Sǒkhyǒng’s argument, North Korean historians continued to believe that there had never been a Japanese colony in Korea. In addition, the “Korean” emigrants to Japan acted as cultural benefactors and formed numerous small states all over the Japanese archipelago. Though North Korean historians avoided acknowledging legacy of Ch’oe Namsǒn, the emphasis on a Korea-centered Asian civilization resonated with Ch’oe Namsǒn’s Purham munhwa kwŏn 不咸文化圈 or the Purham Cultural Sphere Theory proposed in the 1920s; the only difference is that now North Korean scholars claim that P’yǒngyang, not Mount Paektu or Manchuria as Ch’oe argued, was the core area of civilization. North Korean historians have continued to show no interest in outside scholarship; however, they are eager to introduce this new ancient history to foreigners. They translated two monographs about Tan’gun and Taedonggang Civilization into English and Japanese, and have made them available for purchase in foreign language bookstores. 74 THE INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-KOREA RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORY STUDIES North Korean historians have made significant progress in reconstructing an ancient history that strikes a delicate balance between a Korean national identity and a Marxist universal framework. Historical studies flourished in the 1950s and 1960s thanks to the state’s limited tolerance of academic freedom. In the 1970s, history was reduced to political propaganda replete with intentional and teleological adjustments. Nonetheless, tracing the historiographical evolution in North Korea can lead to an understanding of contemporary North Korea. Another important aspect of North Korean historiography is North Korean historians’ interaction with the outside world. North Korean Communication with China and the Soviet Union Due to their isolation, it is not easy for North Korean scholars to maintain connections with the international academic community. In most cases, they do this through China and the Soviet Union. 75 While somewhat successful, those relationships have also brought controversy.

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The Sino-Korean archaeological collaboration on the Gangshang and Loushang burial sites ended with mutual suspicion, and North Korean scholars’ definition of a Korean slave society located in the Liaodong area implied that Ko Chosǒn territory extended to today’s Northeast China. North Korean scholars occasionally attended international conferences in China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and in Eastern European countries. 76 North Korean and Chinese scholars maintained contacts from the 1950s to the 1980s, and it seemed that both sides tried to refrain from direct arguments over history (Koguryǒ and Parhae history in particular). However, North Korean academic networks with Chinese historians have deteriorated over the years. Most Chinese scholars who conducted research on Bohai or Gaogouli history seldom referred to North Korean scholarship except occasionally citing some archaeological reports from North Korea. Since the late 1980s, South Koreans have been permitted to travel in a professional capacity to Northeast China, and scholars from China, North and South Korea have organized and attended international conferences. As a result, mutual indifference and ignorance on these topics gave way to enthusiasm about controversial issues. Chinese scholars began to be more proactive in their historical interpretations, which made North Korean scholars reluctant to attend international conferences. Coincidentally, North Korean scholars also lost their interest in Northeast China because they officially sanctioned the P’yǒngyang-centered scenario of Ko Chosŏn history. In the South Korean-Chinese dispute over Koguryǒ history, North Korean historians were hesitant to make a public counterattack on the Northeast China Project; however, China’s claim over the Koguryŏ history clearly made North Korean scholars more cautious. North Korean historians in the 1950s and early 1960s saw the historical theory and methodology from the Soviet Union as sources of authority and as subjects for emulation. North Korean historians eagerly referred to and applied Soviet scholarship to the Korean context. Some history textbooks adopted in North Korea were direct translations of Russian ones. For the international trend section in historical journals, academic exchanges with Soviet historians were always highlighted. However, North Korean historians soon realized that foreign theories were not always applicable to Korea. Moreover, North Korean historians were required to be sensitive to the Sino-Soviet conflict. The discomfort with Soviet scholarship reached its peak in North Korean historians’ critique of a world history textbook published in the Soviet Union. North Korean historians accused Soviet historians of simply repeating Japanese colonial scholarship on Korean history and distorting the national image of Korea. 77 North Korean historians hoped that the Soviet authors would take responsibility for correcting their mistakes, and inform their readers accordingly. However, this

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critique seemed to be an overreaction and related more to the political tension with the Soviet Union rather than a purely academic concern. 78 One of the few international academic associations with which North Korean historians are affiliated is Kukche Koryŏ Hakhoe, or the International Society for Korean Studies. 79 Based in Japan, this is almost the only venue through which North Korean historians can secure easy access to an international conference. Initially the conference was held in Japan or China, and lately the conference venue has traveled to such diverse locales as the United States (Hawaii), Canada, Britain, and Austria. 80 Inter-Korea Communication South Korean historians have always been curious about their colleagues on the other side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and they have perceived and received North Korean historiography in various ways over the years. Due to the military dictatorship and anticommunist policy from the 1950s-1970s, it was impossible for South Korean historians to access North Korean materials. Some books may have circulated as handcopied versions in a very limited manner; however, South Korean historians could neither admit nor acknowledge their reference to North Korean sources, because this could immediately result in a charge of committing pro-Communist crimes. In contrast to South Korea, libraries in Japan and the United States readily acquired books published in North Korea, 81 and South Korean historians were able to read them when they visited Japan and the United States in the 1980s. 82 South Korean President Roh Tae-woo 盧泰愚 (No T’aewu, r. 19881993) has a mixed reputation in the contemporary history of South Korea. On the one hand, he supported a military dictatorship and was handpicked by Chun Doo-hwan 全斗煥 (Chǒn Tuhwan, r. 1980-1988) to be his successor; on the other hand, his Pukbang chǒngch’aek 北方政策, or Northern Policy, was a turning point in South Korea’s foreign policy with socialist countries. Despite his anticommunist credentials, South Korea resumed diplomatic relationships with most socialist countries under his administration, including the Soviet Union and China. It was also during this time that some restrictions on access to North Korean materials were lifted. The Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Determination, Unification, and Prosperity announced on July 7, 1988, expressed the government’s vision for reunification; furthermore, it endorsed and stimulated interest in North Korea among academics and citizens alike. With this more tolerant policy on North Korean materials, the research on North Korean history and historiography became more than an interest of a handful of scholars. Some historical associations organized collaborative projects for introducing and analyzing North Korean scholarship. With the South-North summit meeting in 2000, many scholars predicted an imminent reunification or at least reconciliation, and Korean

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history—ancient history in particular—was unanimously believed to be prerequisite for a unified national identity. Therefore, the president, civil society, and academic associations all recognized the need for a systematic understanding of North Korea. The study of North Korean historiography started with some articles published in the late 1980s in two journals, Yǒksa wa hyǒnsil or History and Reality, and Changjak kwa pip’yǒng or Quarterly Changbi. One of the first monographs was Pukhan ŭi Hanguksa Insik or Historical Views in North Korea, published in 1990 and edited by Yǒksa hakhoe or Historical Association. The book particularly called for understanding North Korea in a manner that would replace the prevailing perception of North Korea as an object of simple curiosity, outright condemnation, and Cold War ideology. 83 It also proposed a comprehensive approach that would culminate in a new Korean history that fits the agenda for reunification. Indeed, advocates of this view believe that a shared historical vision is a prerequisite to unification. Despite promising progress from the 1990s, it is still difficult to secure a stable and reliable exchange venue with the North Korean academy, since doing so has been tied to the politics of North Korea and the SouthNorth relationship. One of the very few successful examples of direct communication between North and South Korean historians centered on ancient history, about which scholars were barely able to find common ground. In 2002 a joint symposium on Tan’gun and Ko Chosŏn took place thanks to the temporary reconciliation that followed the first summit meeting of South-North leaders in 2000. Since then, political tensions had interfered with most academic communication; as of this writing (late 2015) the only active venture is a collaborative archaeological excavation of Manwŏldae 滿月臺, the site of Koryŏ Palace arranged through the Nambukhan Yŏksa hakja hyŏbǔihoe, or The Committee of the SouthNorth Korean Historians. A new round of excavations started in June 2015. 84 South Korean historians in the 1960s and 1970s admired North Korean historiography when North Korean scholarship was strictly banned in South Korea. However, once they were able to consult North Korean documents, South Korean scholars became more critical. This critical turn unfortunately coincided with a degeneration in the quality of North Korean scholarship that began in the 1970s. North Korean historians’ obsession with and obligation to comply with the Juche ideology led to a teleological approach that in many cases came at the cost of fabricating history to fit a political agenda. Today most South Korean historians are quite critical and even dismissive of North Korean scholarship from the 1990s, especially regarding the discovery of the Tan’gun tomb and the ensuing new narrative of Ko Chosŏn history. Because of the official intervention by the Kim family and government in Tan’gun and Ko Chosŏn studies, South Korean histo-

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rians believe that North Korean historical studies have lost their academic value and repeated little more than propaganda to spread Juche ideology. Despite this, most South Korean historians still believe that it is necessary to foster inter-Korea academic communication, though the proper way to do so remains unclear. The North Korean state had two objectives in the 1950s. One was to compete for political legitimacy with the South and to gain a positive reputation among socialist countries and in the world at large; the other was economic reconstruction from wartime damage. The construction of North Korea as a modern state and strong nation was the top priority, and efforts to achieve these goals were closely related to historical studies; in fact, the efforts relied upon them. There are many criticisms of North Korean historiography. History in North Korea is categorized as social science, and the most serious paradox in North Korean historiography has been the overemphasis on the practical use of history at the cost of academic objectivity and neutrality. The official narrative of history is often judgmental and binary. North Korean historians divide historical events and issues between the internal and the external. For the former, the principle for historical judgement is class struggle, while for the latter the principle is patriotism. 85 Hence, all internal issues are focused on the relentless, hostile, and persistent struggle between the rulers and the ruled, and it is always a narrative about innocent people resisting an evil ruling class. A middle class is nonexistent and seen as an unimportant subject of inquiring. Any attempt at class reconciliation is seen as a betrayal of the people. A similar bias has applied to North Korean’s perception of Korea’s international position. The narrative on international relationships is focused on antiforeign invasions, and has ignored peaceful coexistence and cultural interactions. The narrative also stresses the importance of Korean indigenous cultural development and minimized or ignored external influence. To serve political purposes, it is common to apply an emotional narrative using a deferential tone when discussing important figures in Korean history, but simultaneously adopt a derogatory tone on issues considered harmful to Korea. 86 Another good example of the politics in historical studies is the uneven attention paid to different periods. Despite North Korea’s emphasis on ancient history, when it comes to the compiling of a comprehensive history, North Korean historiography places an extremely disproportionate emphasis on modern history, 55 percent for history from 1926 to 1980. 87 And of course for modern history, the theme is the antiforeign movement led by the Kim family, and all other resistance movements were written off as ineffective. Despite its problems and drawbacks, North Korean historiography offers a unique way to understand the modern trajectory of North Korea, and the dramatic reconfiguration of Tan’gun and Ko Chosŏn history

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since 1993 has showcased an intricate convergence of politics, ideology, and history in North Korea. NOTES Most sources on North Korean historiography were available through the Library of National Assembly in South Korea, the Yanbian Library of Jilin Province in China, and the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. The Yanbian Library has had a long-term partnership with North Korean libraries and usually receives copies of new publications right after their release in North Korea. In North America, the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, is the best repository of North Korean journals and other publications. 1. Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013). 2. Suzy Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013). 3. Hwang Kidǒk, “Ko Chosǒn kukka ŭi kiwǒn,” Kogo minsok nonmunjip 12 (1990): 2-27. 4. Other scholars attempted a more detailed periodization, such as 1945-1950 for the foundation; 1950s-1960s as the golden age of the Marxist approach; the late 1960s1980 as the foundation of Juche (Self-Reliance) ideology; and 1990s to the present as emphasizing the superiority of the Korean people. See Pukhan ŭi yŏksahak, vol. 1, 2002. 5. Kidong Yi, “Pukhan yŏksahak chŏngae kwajŏng,” Hanguksa simin kangjwa 21 (1997): 1-42. 4 6. To Chinsun, “Pukhan yǒksa hakkye ǔi tonghyang kwa yǒksa insik ǔi tǔksǒng,” Han’guk ǔi yǒksa wa yŏksahak, 375. 7. Kim Yongsǒp, Chosǒn hugi nongǒpsa yǒngu (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1970). 8. “Cabinet Resolution, No. 11, The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea,” Yǒksa che munje 5 (1949). 9. The other headquarters for historical studies is the Research Institute of Chosŏn Workers’ Party. However, this institute conducts research primarily on modern and contemporary history. 10. Chosǒn chǒnsa (P’yǒngyang: Kwahak paekkwa sajǒn ch’ulp’ansa, 1979). vol. 1, 23. 11. Paek Namun went to North Korea in opposition to U.S. occupation forces’ design for Seoul National University, because it employed Korean historians affiliated with the positivist school. See Henry Em, The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 14. 12. Kwangrin Yi, “Pukhan ŭi yǒksahak,” Tong’a yǒngu 16 (1988): 37-63, 49. 13. http://www.mzv.cz/file/1021791/HHS___very_final_text_RASKB_od_ br_Anth.pdf, accessed January 27, 2015. 14. Kidong Yi, “Pukhan esŏ ŭi Kochosŏn yŏngu,” Hanguksa simin kangjwa 2 (1988): 89-108, 91. Quoted from Hatada Takeshi, Chosŏnin kwa ilbonin (Tokyo: Keisoshobo 1983). 15. Sin Hyŏngsik, Nambukhan yŏksagwan ŭi pikyo (Seoul: Sol, 1994), 19. 16. Ha Wǒnho, “Pukhan ǔi yǒksa yǒngu, p’yǒnch’an kwajǒng yǒngu,” Pukhak ŭi yǒksahak, vol. 1, 18. 17. Cho Pǒpjong, “Pukhan ŭi Kochosǒn yǒngu,” in Pukhan ŭi kodaesa yŏnʾgu wa sŏngkwa, ed. Kim, Chǒngbae (Seoul: Taeryuk Yŏnʾguso Chʻulpʻanbu, 1994), 156-62. 18. Ch’oe Kwangsik, “Minjok ŭi kiwǒn kwa kukga hyǒngsǒng e taehan Pukhan ŭi yǒngu sǒngkwa,” in Pukhan ŭi kodaesa yŏnʾgu wa sŏngkwa, ed. Kim Chǒngbae (Seoul: Taeryuk Yŏnʾguso Chʻulpʻanbu, 1994), 111. 19. Cho Pǒpjong, “Pukhan ŭi Kochosǒn yǒngu.”

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20. To Yuho, “Minjok muhwa yusan ŭi kyesŭng paljǒn kwa kogohak mit minsok,” Muhwa yusan 1 (1957). 21. The author is unable to ascertain if there are copies in North Korea. 22. The Yanbian Library in China carries vols. 1 to 5. Other journals in archaeology and folklore also publish historical research. For example, Munhwa yusan, started publication in 1957. 23. Six occasional volumes might have been issued between 1968 and 1978, because the serial number of December 1967’s volume is 74, and the first volume in 1977 was numbered 80. However, most libraries that carry Yŏksa Kwahak do not have these six volumes. 24. The last volume for this period is volume 4, from 1967. It contains an article by Kim Il Sung, titled “Strengthen the Anti-imperialism and Anti-America Campaign”; however, in it there was no mention of its imminent suspension, which would last for the next ten years. 25. Yŏksa Kwahak 1 (1952). 26. Though it was true that most authors still have to have a university appointment, or some sort of affiliation. 27. Yŏksa Kwahak 1 (1960). 28. It is hard to find the original North Korean copy, but this series was republished in Japan, though it was divided into three volumes due to the large size of vol. 2. 29. In addition to Chosŏn t’ongsa, there are three other series of comprehensive history: Chosǒn chǒnsa (34 volumes; published in 1979-1984 and 1991); Chosǒn pumunsa (60 volumes; published in 1990); and, most recently, Chosǒn Tandaesa (38 volumes; published in 2010). 30. Tze-Ki Hon, “Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism: Gu Jiegang’s Vision of a New China in His Studies of Ancient History,” Modern China 22:3 (July 1996): 315-39. 31. The last article by Ri Chilin in Yŏksa Kwahak appeared in 1967; the last publication of Ri’s work might be “Chosǒn kodae sahui ǔi sǒngkyǒk,” Yǒksa kwahak nonmunji 2 (1971). 32. Ri Chilin, Ko Chosŏn yŏn’gu (P’yŏngyang: Kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 1963), 362-65. 33. Yun Naehyǒn, Han’guk Kodaesa sillon (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1986). 34. Yun denied having consulted Ri Chirin’s book. However, South Korean historian Yi Hyǒnggu claimed that Yun Naehyǒn must have based his research on Ri Chilin’s work. See Yi Hyǒnggu, “Ri Chilin kwa Yun Naehyǒn ǔi ‘Ko Chosǒn yǒn’gu’ ŭi pigyo,” Yǒksa hakbo 146 (1995): 285-319. Also Kidong Yi, “Pukhan esŏ ŭi Kochosŏn yŏngu,” Hanguksa simin kangjwa 2 (1988), 99. 35. For details on contested issues raised by the Northeast Asia Project scholars, see chapter 5. 36. Kim Sǒkhyǒng, Ch’ogi cho’il kwan’gyesa yǒn’gu (P’yǒngyang: Sahoe kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 1966). 37. Kim Sǒkhyǒng, Chosǒn minjok, kukka wa munhwa ŭi kiwǒn (P’yǒngyang: P’yǒngyang ch’ulp’ansa, 1990), 75-98. 38. Kim Ŭnt’aek, Kodae Ilbon Kinai chibang ŭi Chosǒn keyt’ong mubǒldŭl e kwanhan yǒn’gu (P’yǒnyang: Sahoe kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 1993), 4-5. 39. Cho Hŭisŭng, Ilbo esǒ Chosǒn soguk ŭi hyǒngsǒng kwa palchǒn (P’yǒngyang: Paekwa sajǒn ch’ulp’ansa, 1990), 548. 40. Ch’oe Yong-ho, “Reinterpreting Traditional History in North Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 40:3 (May 1981): 503-23, 503. 41. Ibid., 514. 42. Ibid., 506. 43. Q. Edward Wang, Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography (City: State University of New York Press, 2000). 44. Sadae chuŭi ŭi chaejomyǒng (Pyǒngyang: Pyǒngyang ch’ulp’ansa, 1990), 23. 45. Leonid A. Petrov, “Turning Historians into Party Scholar-bureaucrats: North Korean Historiography in 1955-1958.” East Asian History 31 (June 2006): 101-24.

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46. Petrov, “Turning Historians into Party Scholar-bureaucrats: North Korean Historiography in 1955-1958,” 101. 47. Petrov, “Turning Historians into Party Scholar-bureaucrats: North Korean Historiography in 1955-1958,” 118. 48. Petrov, “Turning Historians into Party Scholar-bureaucrats: North Korean Historiography in 1955-1958,” 123. 49. Petrov, “Turning Historians into Party Scholar-bureaucrats: North Korean Historiography in 1955-1958,” 114. 50. Leonid A. Petrov, “North Korean Historiography in Crisis (1956-1967),” in Korean Studies at the Dawn of the Millennium, ed. Youngho Choe (Korean Studies Association of Australasia, 2001). 51. It is interesting to note that power transition occurred here earlier than the death of Kim Il Sung. It again tells that Kim Jung Il secured power far ahead of his father’s final days. 52. It became difficult to distinguish individual opinions among North Korean historians starting from the mid-1960s. For general observations on North Korea historical methodology, see Yi Kidong, “Pukhan yǒksahak ǔi chǒn’gae kwajǒng,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 21 (1997): 3. Regarding the consolidation of the Yodong-centered hypothesis of Ko Chosǒn, see Ko Chosǒn munje yǒn’gu (P’yǒngyang: Sahoe kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 1973). 53. Chŏn Hot’ae, “Koguryŏ chungsim ǔi samguk sidaegwan,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 21 (1997): 58-83. 54. “Chungguk tongbuk chibang yujǒk palgul pogo 1963-1965,” Kogo minsok 2 (1967). For further discussion, see Kim Sǒkhyǒng, Chosǒn minjok kukka wa munhwa ŭi siwǒn (P’yǒngyang: P’ǒngyang ch’ulp’ansa, 1990), 34-35. 55. Yŏksa p’yŏnjipsil, Tan’gun kwa Ko Chosŏn e kwahan yŏngu nonmunjip (Pyŏngyang: Sahoe kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 1994), 13 56. Yŏksa p’yŏnjipsil, Tan’gun kwa Ko Chosŏn e kwahan yŏngu nonmunjip, 48. 57. Ibid., 24. 58. Ibid., 33. 59. Changgunch’ong is one of the most representative Koguryǒ tombs with mural paintings. It is located in Ji’an, China, which was the capital of the Koguryǒ Kingdom. The tomb owner is believed to be King Changsu, the twentieth king of Koguryǒ. He is also the son of King Kwanggaet’o, and made the Kwanggae’to Stele to commemorate his father’s extraordinary accomplishments. 60. Ironically, even in an article published in 1990, Kang Insuk insisted that Tan’gun was a myth. “Tan’gun sinhwa ǔi yǒksa,” Yǒksa kwahak 1 (1990). After 1993, Kang joined other North Korean scholars to promulgate the historical reality of Tan’gun. 61. This was first proposed by Hǒ Chongho in 1999. See Hǒ Chongho, “Haggye sosik: Chosǒn ǔi ‘Taedonggang munhwa’ nǔn segye odae munmyǒng ǔi hana,” Yǒksa kwahak 1 (1999). Chi Hwasan and Sǒ Kukt’ae, Taedonggang munhwa (Pyǒngyang: Oeguk munmul ch’ulp’ansa, 2011), 6, 205. 62. Son Yǒngjong, “Tan’gun Chosǒn ŭi sǒngnip,” in Tan’gun kwa Ko Chosǒn yǒn’gu, ed. Tan’gun hakhoe (Seoul: Chisik sanǒpsa, 2005), 282-3. 63. Chi Hwasan and Sǒ Kukt’ae, Taedonggang munhwa, 203. 64. Chang Ujin, Chosǒn minjok ŭi yǒksajǒk ppuri (Pyǒngyang: Sahoe kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 2002), 133. 65. Chǒn Taejun and Ch’oe Inch’ǒl, Chosǒn tandaesa: Ko Chosǒnsa (Pyǒngyang: Kwahak paekkwa sajǒn ch’u’lp’ansa, 2010), 8-9. This book is approved and endorsed by Son Yŏngjong, the most famous North Korean historian since the 1960s. 66. Chǒn Taejun and Ch’oe Inch’ǒl, Chosǒn tandaesa: Ko Chosǒnsa, 18. 67. Ibid., 54. 68. Ibid., 9. 69. Ibid., 141. 70. Ibid., 138.

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71. Some scholars also claimed the Nangnang relics excavated near the P’yŏngyang area belong to Mahan. See Ri Sun-jin and Chang Chu-yŏp, Ko Chosŏn munje yŏngu, 17186; or Ko Chosŏn, See Ko Chosŏn munje yŏngu ronmunjip, 115. 72. Samguk sagi 14:140. 73. Minjok sagwan ŭi chaejǒngrip (Pyǒngyang: Pyǒngyang ch’u’p’ansa, 1990), 20-28. 74. Ri Sunjin and Chang Ujin et al., Taedonggang Culture (Pyǒngyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2001). Tangun: Founder-King of Korea (Pyǒngyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1994). This book is an English translation of Tangun kwa ko chosǒn e taehan yǒngu nonmunjip (Pyǒngyang: Sahoe kwahakwǒn ch’ulp’ansa, 1994). 75. One exceptional case was the North Korean scholars who visited the United States. It is said that Ch’oe Chinhyŏk, Director of the Historical Research Institute, attended a conference in the United States on issues about the Korean Peninsula. See Kim Poyŏng, “Pukhan ǔi yŏksa yŏnguja yangsŏng kwajŏng kwa yŏnguja ǔi hwaldong sanghwang,” Pukhan ǔi yŏksahak, 39. 76. Three North Korean scholars, Chǒn Yǒngryul, Chang Kukjong, and Han Myǒngho, participated in an international conference on Parhae history in July 1992, at Yanbian University in China. 77. Kim Sǒkhyǒng, Kim Hŭiyǒl, and Son Yǒngjong. “Chǒn Segyesa Chosǒn kwanryǒn sǒsul ŭl ǒmchunghan chagodŭl e taehayǒ (P’yǒngyang: Rodongdang chu’p’ansa, 1963). 78. Ch’oe Yong-ho, “Reinterpreting Traditional History in North Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 40:3 (May 1981): 503-23, 522. 79. http://www.isks.org/aboutus/prof01.html, accessed July 8, 2014. 80. The most recent 12th ISKS conference (August 2015) was held in Vienna, Austria with participation of twelve North Korean historians, all affiliated with the Academy of Social Science of DPRK. 81. The collection of North Korean books in the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, is impressive. The acquisition of materials started right after the Korean War, and has continued. It is interesting that the purchasing agents were in the Soviet Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and China. 82. For example, No T’aedon from the Seoul National University mentioned that he first got a chance to read North Korean materials when he was a visiting scholar at Harvard in 1986-1987. 83. Pukhan ŭi Hanguksa Insik. 84. Kim Chŏng’an, “Nambuk, Kaesŏng manwŏldae palguk chaegae,” http:// news.donga.com/3/00/20150601/71567517/1, accessed June 1, 2015. 85. Song Kiho, “Pukhan ŭi Parhae T’ongil Silla sa yǒngu,” in Pukhan ŭi Kodaesa yŏngu, ed., Yŏksa Hakhoe (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1991), 214. 86. Song Kiho, “Pukhan ŭi Parhae T’ongil Silla sa yǒngu,” 219. 87. Sin Hyŏngsik, Nambukhan yŏksagwan ŭi pikyo (Seoul: Sol, 1994), 27. However, this is not saying that South Korean comprehensive histories have the right proportion. There has been consistent criticism of the lack of research on contemporary history in South Korea, which was a result from the decades of censorship under the military dictatorship in South Korea.

FIVE In the Name of History Laying Claim to the Historical Sovereignty of Manchuria (Northeast China)

The region once known as Manchuria consists of the provinces of Liaoning 遼寧, Jilin 吉林, and Heilongjiang 黑龍江 in present-day China. 1 Mongolia lies to the west, Russia to the north, and North Korea to the south. For most of its history, this was one of China’s peripheral regions because Chinese civilization presumably originated and flourished in the Yellow River Valley. 2 There was no common toponym for the area of Manchuria until the Qing dynasty (1644-1911 CE). While Manchuria is now the internationally accepted name, it is unclear when and how the term evolved from an ethnic descriptor, Manchu 滿洲, into a toponym. During the late Qing period, the region was called Dong Sansheng 東三省 or the eastern three provinces, indicating its geographical location in relation to the Qing capital of Beijing. The name dongbei 東北, or Northeast, came into circulation at the beginning of the Republican Era (1912-1949) situating the region with respect to the Republican capital city of Nanjing. Since 1949, this region has been recategorized: first as three provinces of the People’s Republic of China, and then as a common geographic unit on par with other regional designations. As part of northern, northwestern, southwestern, and southeastern China, the status of northeastern China as a part of Chinese territory has been substantialized. The Chinese have kept voluminous records throughout their history; however, records on the residents of northeastern China are scattered and fragmentary compared to those of central China. In most cases, information about northeastern China was limited to the biographical chap165

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ters on the “barbarians,” in keeping with the records of other non-Chinese people living to the west, north, and south of China proper. 3 These records were often based on secondary sources because it was not easy for early historians to travel to the remote regions and obtain firsthand information. Nonetheless, Chinese records predating the nineteenth century are almost the only available written sources on this area. MANCHURIA IN THE PRE-NINETEENTH CENTURY Manchuria from Chinese Standard Records (pre-Qin 秦 to the seventeenth century) Some pre-Qin documents mentioned the people of Manchuria, vaguely and in passing, categorizing them as Beidi 北狄 or Northern Barbarians, and Dongyi 東夷 or Eastern Barbarians. Occasionally more specific terms were used, such as Sushen 肅愼 and Chaoxian 朝鮮 in Shangshu 尙書 or the Book of Documents, Shanhaijing 山海經 or the Classic of Mountains and Seas, Zhanguoce 戰國策 or the Intrigues of the Warring States and Zuozhuan 左傳 or Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals, though at some time they referred to the people and at other times to the land. More detailed descriptions appeared during the Han dynasty, when Sima Qian wrote the first comprehensive historical record, Shiji. This masterwork became the standard structure for later Chinese historical writings not only in regard to Chinese history, but also by incorporating the non-Chinese inhabitants of China’s borderlands in its biographical section. 4 One of the earliest known toponyms in Chinese historical records in relation to this area was Youzhou 幽州. 5 Later, in Shiji 史記 and Jinshu 晉 書, the southern part of Manchuria came to be known as Liaodong 遼東 or Liaohai 遼海, derived from the Liao 遼 River, the principal waterway through the region. Official administration of the western part of Manchuria began from the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE), when the first Qin emperor, Qin Shihuangdi (r. 246-210 BCE), established four commanderies—Yuyang 漁陽, You Beiping 右北平, Liaoxi 遼西, and Liaodong 遼東. The Han dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE) essentially continued the Qin dynasty’s domestic administration. 6 Moreover, in the wake of his conquest of Weiman Chaoxian in 108 BCE, Emperor Wu of the Han established four commanderies in the former Weiman Chaoxian territory to the east of Liaodong Commandery—Lelang 樂浪, Xuantu 玄菟, Zhenfan 眞蕃, and Lintun 臨屯, stretching from eastern Manchuria into the northern Korean Peninsula. 7 After the collapse of the Han dynasty, Manchuria became an arena of military competition among many non-Chinese regimes from Fuyu (K. Puyŏ) 夫餘, Gaogouli (K. Koguryŏ) 高句麗 to Bohai (K. Parhae) 渤海, Liao

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遼, Jin 金, and eventually became part of the Qing dynasty in the seventeenth century. Consequently, Manchuria was the homeland for many peoples over the centuries, including Sushen 肅愼, Donghu 東胡, Huimo 濊 貊, Yilou 挹婁, Woju 沃沮, Xianbei 鮮卑, Fuyu 扶餘, Gaogouli, Mohe 靺鞨, Qidan 契丹 (Khitan), Nüzhen 女眞 (Jurchen), Menggu 蒙古 (Mongolian) and Manzhou (Manchu) in addition to the Han 漢 Chinese. Most of the early inhabitants of eastern and northeastern China were categorized as non-Chinese Dongyi. The term Dongyi had been used as early as the Zhou dynasty and scholars still have not reached a consensus about the relationships among all of the groups labeled as Dongyi. Among numerous ethnic groups and kingdoms in Manchuria, Gaogouli was one of the strongest in military terms with respect to other indigenous neighboring groups, and posed a formidable challenge to the regimes in mainland China. Gaogouli was first briefly mentioned in the biography of Wang Mang 王莽 in Hanshu. 8 It was from the Sanguozhi and Hou Hanshu that Gaogouli was recorded under a separate entry, and listed along with Fuyu, Yilou 挹婁 (presumably related to the Jurchen and Manchu people of later periods), Dongwoju 東沃沮 (K. Tong’okjǒ), Hui 濊 (K. Ye), Han 韓, and Wo 倭 (early residents of the Japanese archipelago). Most Korean scholars now agree that Ye, Puyǒ, Tong’okjǒ, and Han 韓 were ethnically related to, and assimilated into, the Korean people. However, the ethnic origin and status of the Yilou and Wo people remains controversial, especially for those scholars who believe that all Dongyi were the ancestors of today’s Korean people. 9 The Chinese records on Gaogouli continued in the Tangshu 唐書 or the History of the Tang Dynasty (Jiutangshu 舊唐書 or the Old Version of Tang History and Xin Tangshu 新唐書 or the New Version of Tang History); but thereafter, separate chapters on Gaogouli were no longer written. Defeated by the allied forces of the Tang and Silla in 668 CE, it became unnecessary to keep records on Gaogouli. However, the Chinese dynastic annals continued to document the contemporary regimes in the Korean Peninsula, such as Koryǒ (918-1392 CE) and Chosǒn (1392-1910 CE). At the same time, most records on the history of the Koryǒ or Chosǒn traced back to, or at least mentioned, Koguryǒ. Most of the regimes and peoples in Manchuria maintained their contacts with central China. Some established peaceful and tributary relationships; others engaged in warfare. However, it was not until the Qing period that the central government incorporated the whole area into China proper and administered it. It is also noteworthy that Manchuria was brought into the Qing Empire in a way that other borderlands were not. Territories such as Xinjiang and Tibet consisted of lands that the Qing dynasty had newly conquered. However, Manchuria was brought into China proper when the Manchu occupied inland China and became the ruling class in China.

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The Qing Period (seventeenth century-1850s) The Sushen was one of the earliest groups residing in Manchuria that appeared in Chinese records. It is believed that the Sushen were succeeded by the Yilou, Wuji 勿吉, Mohe, Nüzhen (Jurchen) and then the Manchu. The Jurchens, long-term residents of this area, established a strong regime Jin 金 (1115-1234 CE), which was sovereign over the northern part of China and Manchuria during the Song period (tenth centurythirteenth century CE). Another major component of the people in Manchuria, the Khitan, also established the Liao dynasty (907-1125 CE) that stretched from Manchuria to northern China. Despite its early dominance over the Jurchen people, the Liao dynasty was conquered and incorporated into the Jurchen Jin dynasty in the twelfth century. After the Mongol Yuan dynasty conquered the Jin Kingdom in the thirteenth century, the Jurchen people returned to Manchuria and resumed a seminomadic life. At the end of the seventeenth century, Nurgaci (1559-1626), the legendary hero of the Jurchen people, used his charisma and military talent to end the internecine wars among the Jurchen tribes. Nurgaci then established the Later Jin 後金 state to restore connections to the previous Jin dynasty. The name “Manchu” was formally adopted by Hong Taiji (1592-1643) to name the Jianzhou 建州 Jurchens in 1635, although it may have been used as early as 1605. There are several interpretations of the origin of Manchu, all of them speculative. 10 Later, Manchu was transformed from an ethnic to a geographical term, 11 and circulated among European missionaries through their cartographic projects. After the Qing ruling class advanced to inland China and moved its capital to Beijing, most of the Manchu people followed, some venturing further south to become garrison soldiers under the Banner System. 12 At the same time, the Qing government designated a large portion of Manchuria as a forbidden land (fengjin 封禁) to prevent the Han Chinese from migrating and farming there. 13 From the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, very few people had access to Manchuria, except some smugglers searching for ginseng, sable, and herbs of the highest quality. It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the Qing government relaxed the Forbidden Policy as a means of relieving population pressure in China and containing Russia’s southward expansion. After the 1860s, large-scale migration of Han people from inland China (especially Shandong Province) to Manchuria became legal and possible. The ensuing mass immigration of Chinese was called Chuang Guandong 闖關東, literally “surpassing the fortress,” since the migrants had to pass Shanhai Guan 山海關, the fortress marking the boundary between inland and outland China. More importantly, these Chinese migrants ensured that Manchuria would later remain part of China. 14 At this time, Chosǒn peasants also started to migrate to Manchurian border areas for a better life. 15

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RESEARCH ON MANCHURIA SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY After centuries of neglect, Manchuria became a site of political and military competition in the nineteenth century due to its strategic location at the intersection of Russian, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese national interests. 16 Russia and Japan conducted numerous large-scale geographical, historical, ethnographical, and archaeological investigations in the region. After its victories in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the RussoJapanese War in 1905, Japan gained the upper hand in Manchuria. The Japanese later established the South Manchuria Railway Company to maximize the economic exploitation of Manchuria. 17 The people of Manchuria had maintained frequent communication with regimes in China and Korea. Therefore, Russian and Japanese scholars turned to research on the prehistoric periods. Consequently, these scholars emphasized Manchuria’s relationship with the Altaic and Siberian areas, which cut it off from China proper. The Russians used their studies to justify their southward expansion, while the Japanese proposed a dōbun dōshu 同文同種 or common ancestor hypothesis for Manchuria, Mongolia, Japan, and Korea to support their imperial expansion and colonization. This hypothesis later contributed to the propaganda of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere during World War II. Korean scholars tended to agree with Russian and Japanese interpretations of the origins of the Korean people and civilization, at least insofar as they implied non-Chinese origins. In constructing an ethnic and cultural connection between Korea and the Altaic or Siberian areas, Korean scholars deconstructed the stereotype of Korea as a minor participant in or mere replica of China in the Sino-centric cultural sphere. When studying Manchuria, Korean scholars cherished an irredentist stance because Manchuria had been the site of the most powerful state of Korean history, Koguryǒ Kingdom. In addition, along with a new wave of Korean migrants to Manchuria escaping political suppression, economic hardship, and natural disasters in Chosǒn Korea, Manchuria became a stronghold for the Korean independence movement after 1910. Due to the rising international tensions in the late nineteenth century, it is not surprising that the conclusions of Russian, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese research on Manchuria reflected their respective national interests. Russian Scholarship Russia developed an interest in Manchuria in the seventeenth century, when its southward expansion reached Siberia. The Russians waged wars against the Qing dynasty throughout the eighteenth century and eventually negotiated a border demarcation with the Qing government along the Amur River (Heilongjiang). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russian ethnologists conducted fieldwork in Siberia and

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Manchuria, and their scholarship was used to justify Russia’s expansion into Manchuria. 18 Toward this end, Russian scholars coined some ambiguous terms, such as “Paleo-Asiatic,” for the Paleolithic people of this area and to link Russian Siberia and the Maritime Province to Manchuria. By the same token, they used “Altai” and “Tungus,” which had initially been linguistic categories, to group together diverse populations of contemporary inhabitants. At the same time, they emphasized the cultural primitiveness of the residents. 19 The Finnish linguist Juha Janhunen thus criticized Russian scholarship: In spite of its undeniable significance, not only for the Manchurian region but also globally, much of Russian ethno-historical research suffers from a chronic problem in that it stresses ethnic unity at the expense of diversity. Combining the one-to-many and many-to-one approaches to ethnic history, Russian scholars, even more than their colleagues elsewhere, seem to have a tradition of emphasizing monogenetic disintegration at the distant ends of the time scale as well as polygenetic consolidation at the near end. The latter aspect of ethnic unity was, without doubt, until recently stimulated by political consideration connected with the consolidating doctrine of the Soviet state, but even the former aspect may have a hidden ideological background. . . . 20 [Italics added]

The Russian scholars intended to create an ethnic affiliation between the people in Manchuria to the populations under Russian rule in Altai, Siberia, and the Maritime Provinces. Therefore, they contended that the people in Manchuria had descended from a monogenetic group from the Altai area, and that the contemporary disintegration would ultimately lead to future consolidation, thereby justifying Russia’s southward expansion. Along with studies of indigenous people residing in contemporary Siberia and Manchuria, Russian archaeologists excavated the sites and relics of the Bohai 渤海 Kingdom, which covered the area from Manchuria to the Maritime Provinces of Russia. They also discussed the cultural and ethnic relationship of the Bohai Kingdom with China, Koguryŏ, and Central Asia. Pinpointing that the Bohai Kingdom had been established by the Malgal people, they placed more emphasis on the influence from Koguryŏ, Silla, Uyghur, Turkish, and Nestorian elements as well as Bohai’s indigenous traits. 21 As a result, the complexity of the Bohai culture overshadowed the influence from Tang China and countered the image of Bohai as a Chinese vassal state that had been insisted upon by Chinese historians. Japanese Scholarship Japanese research on Manchuria changed dramatically with the SinoJapanese War (1894-1895). Japan’s victory paved the way for a Japanese expansion onto the continent that directed an unprecedented amount of

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attention to Manchuria. Japanese research benefited first from the withdrawal of Russian military forces in 1905 in the wake of Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, and then from the establishment of the South Manchuria Railway Company, which relentlessly exploited Manchuria’s resources. 22 Japanese scholars were enthusiastic about tracing the ethnic and cultural origins of their people through archaeological and ethnographic investigations in Manchuria. They created and promoted some new units of historical analysis, the “Manchu-Korean History” (J. Mansenshi 滿鮮史) 23 and “Manchu-Mongolian” History (J. Manmōshi 滿蒙史), contending that Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea comprised a common ethno-geographic ground for ancient peoples, including the ancestors of the Japanese. By depicting Manchuria as the shared birthplace of the Japanese, Manchu, and Korean peoples, they legitimized Japan’s expansion into and colonization of these areas. While waging wholesale war in the Asian-Pacific, Japanese colonial scholars promoted the propagandistic idea of a Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere on the basis of racial commonality. 24 These theories coalesced into the concept of minzoku kyōwa 民族協和 or Ethnic Harmony, and Manchuria was touted as Ōdo Rakudō 王道樂土 or Imperial Paradise for Five Ethnic Groups. 25 In their studies of Korea, Japanese scholars developed the theory of Naisen ittai 內鮮一體, which held that Japan and Korea were a single body (Japan as a head). In addition to their insistence on Japanese racial superiority, these slogans derived from the common ancestor hypothesis that facilitated Japanese war mobilization by rationalizing Japan’s expansion and assimilation of other ethnic groups. At the same time, it underscored the necessity of Japanese leadership, the Japanese “burden” of being a big brother to underdeveloped Asian countries, 26 and Japan’s ability to bring a shared prosperity to the region that would protect Asian people from the white aggressors. 27 Chinese Scholarship Late Qing and the Republican Period The Qing Emperor Qianlong (r. 1735-1796) consolidated a multiethnic empire and depicted himself as a universal sage king, claiming the Mandate of Heaven and making the Qing a legitimate successor to the Chinese dynastic lineage. 28 However, there remained persistent pressures to reinforce differences between the Manchu and Han peoples. The Manchu leaders spared no effort to safeguard their privileges as the ruling class, while the Han perpetuated a doctrine of their own racial and cultural superiority over the barbarians. Thus there were chronic ethnic tensions for the duration of the Qing dynasty, and strong anti-Manchu sentiment among the Han could be traced back to the seventeenth century. The

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memory of the brutal suppression of Ming loyalists, the ruthless massacre of Chinese urban residents as well as the policy of terror by the Qing rulers still haunted the Chinese, and the late Qing corruption and incapacity to defend China from Western and Japanese encroachment further justified the overthrow of the alien (and barbarian) Qing government. 29 Consequently, along with other Chinese nationalists of the late Qing period, the father of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan 孙中山, 1866-1925), launched his revolutionary slogan of “Expelling the Barbarians [Manchus] to Restore Chinese Civilization.” However, due to the necessity of constructing a unified national identity to fight Western encroachment and Japanese invasion, Chinese intellectuals realized that it was time to set aside the divisions and distinctions between the Han and the Manchu. Given that the collapse of the Qing dynasty was merely a matter of time, the Chinese perception of the Manchu people was transformed from that of ruthless oppressor to possible ally. As a result, even Sun Yat-sen modified his earlier anti-Manchu proclamation to “Chinese Republic for the Five Peoples, namely, Chinese, Manchus, Mongolians, Tibetans, and Muslims.” 30 Due to the need to construct the image of a strong and unified Chinese nation and nation-state, Chinese nationalist historians abandoned the earlier dichotomy between the Hua and the yi, by recasting the origins of the Chinese people in a more inclusive and multiethnic light. In tracing the origins of the Chinese people and civilization, Xu Xusheng 徐旭生 (1888-1976) contended that the modern Chinese were composed of three racial groups: huaxia 華夏 (the original inhabitants of the North China heartland), dongyi 東夷 (the Eastern Barbarians), and miaoman 苗蠻 (the ancient inhabitants of South China around the Yangzi River Valley). 31 Fu Sinian 傅斯年 (1896-1950) also proposed the hypothesis of Yixia Dongxi shuo 夷夏東西說, claiming that Xia 夏 (Chinese) in the West and so-called yi in the East were the two major population groups of the Chinese people and formed a unified Chinese nation during the Han period. The reason that dongyi had long been ignored as a source of the modern Chinese nation was that the original dongyi groups in Shandong and Jiangsu areas had been assimilated into the Chinese people during the late Western Zhou and the Spring and Autumn Period (twelfth centuryfifth century BCE). 32 The efforts to redefine the concept and scope of Chinese nation and civilization extended to the studies of Manchurian history. With the encroachment of Japanese imperial power, Manchuria became a primary concern of Chinese intellectuals struggling to rescue China from deterioration that had started with the Opium War in the 1840s. After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, Manchuria was linked to the fate of the Chinese nation, state, and people. Therefore, Manchuria drew attention in the context of the Chinese national salvation project. In this period, histories of Manchuria were written by prominent Chinese nationalist

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historians, such as Fu Sinian and Li Ji 李濟 (Li Chi, 1896-1979), who condemned Japanese imperial ambitions and asserted China’s centuries of sovereignty over this area. Their books were published immediately after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and Fu Sinian argued that even the name “Manchuria” had been concocted by Westerners and Japanese to facilitate their seizure of economic privileges and territory in China. 33 Another prominent historian of the Republican period, Jin Yufu 金毓黻 (1887-1962), produced the first regional history of Northeast China, Dongbei tongshi 東北通史 or the Comprehensive History of Northeast China. 34 His works laid the foundation for historical studies on Northeast China written by Chinese scholars after 1949. 35 Difangshi 地方史 or Regional History since 1949 Since 1949, Chinese scholars have referred to Northeast China as a part of China as a matter of course, and the region’s ethnic and indigenous characteristics were quickly subsumed into a larger Chinese identity. In particular, the Manchus in this area made great efforts to integrate their community into the Chinese nation in order to shed the burden of the recent historical “wrongdoings”—the collaboration of the last Qing emperor Puyi 溥儀 (1906-1967) with the Japanese Empire during the Manzhouguo period (1932-1945). The Manchu collaboration with Japanese resulted in the extended delay in governmental approval for a Manchu autonomous region until the 1980s, despite the high Manchu population density in this area. 36 During this period, Dongbei, or the Northeast, became a regional designation similar to those used to designate other regions within China, such as Southeast, Southwest, and Northwest. Most of the Chinese scholarship from this time was written by local historians and published under generic titles such as Dongbei shi 東北史 or History of Northeast China, Dongbei lishi dili 東北歷史地理 or History and Geography of Northeast China. 37 As part of China proper, the connection of the early peoples in the Northeast to central China was based on ambiguous references in early texts such as the Shanghaijing 山海經 and Zuozhuan 左傳. Chinese scholars, especially those from Northeast China, argued for a close and continuous relationship between Northeast China and central China dating from the prehistoric period. 38 They claimed that the Shang 商 people originated in Northeast China, migrated to the Central Plain, and later became the ancestors of the Han Chinese. 39 Chinese scholarship on Northeast China reflected a typical case of regional history within a national framework. On the one hand, Chinese scholars emphasized the unique origins and independent cultural development of Northeast China. 40 On the other hand, they insisted upon a parallel developmental scheme with the Central Plain as the dominant

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stimulus. In other words, Chinese scholarship highlighted Northeast China as having had a unique local culture without challenging its subordination to the central lineage of Chinese civilization. This was also a clever bid for preferential treatment and funding from the central government. 41 Despite the incorporation of Northeast China into Chinese history from the remote past, Gaogouli was often acknowledged as one of the Three Korean Kingdoms, and was therefore treated as a part of foreign history by Chinese historians. Recognizing the complexity and potential problems of the history of Gaogouli, some Chinese historians suggested a two-phase theory, yishi liangyong 一史兩用. In other words, the first Gaogouli phase belonged to Chinese history because its capital Ji’an 集安 fell within what is now Chinese territory, while the second phase belonged to Korean history, because Gaogouli moved its capital to P’yǒngyang. 42 Bianjiangshi 邊疆史 or a Borderland History since 2002 The People’s Republic of China defined the Chinese people as Zhonghua minzu 中華民族, a term that was used from the Republican period (1912-1949) and thereafter popularized. The definition of China as a Tongyi de duominzu guojia 統一的 多民族國家 or a unified multiethnic state made every ethnic group a member of the Chinese family regardless of history, and the connections (or more accurately, subordination) between those groups and the central Chinese government were traced as far back as possible. One consequence of this definition was to declare that the land inhabited by minority peoples had been a part of Chinese territory from time immemorial. With particular concern for territorial integrity, Chinese scholars contended that a considerable degree of self-determination or autonomy (including the Tributary System) did not mean sovereign independence from the central government. This discourse was distilled into a Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju 中華民族多元一體格局 or the Unified Multi-Ethnic Framework of the Chinese People, proposed by one of the most prominent sociologists in China, Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 (1910-2005). 43 Using Fei’s framework, Chinese scholarship of Northeast China entered a new phase in February 2002, when the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) launched an official project for comprehensive and interdisciplinary research on Northeast China aiming to reaffirm that Northeast China has always been a part of China, and all historical residents of this area were members of a multiethnic Chinese nation. This project is a long-term preemptive strategy for preventing any possible external claim on contemporary Chinese territory in Northeast China; and to assure the other border areas, northwest and southwest in particular, are under control of the central government and safe from any separatist attempt. 44

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Korean Scholarship (Twelfth Century-Present) Koryŏ Period and the Construction of the Three Kingdoms Framework 45 Making historical records was one of the most important projects for solidifying the political structure and providing lessons in administration. The Three Kingdoms, Koguryŏ, Paekche, and Silla, composed their historical records no later than the fifth century CE. 46 Unfortunately, none of the earlier records have survived; the oldest extant one is Samguk sagi compiled by Kim Pusik. A descendent of Silla aristocrats, it is not surprising that Kim prioritized Silla over Koguryŏ and Paekche in the structure and content of Samguk sagi. Therefore, Kim was castigated by twentieth-century nationalist historians for excluding the pre-Three Kingdoms (i.e., Tan’gun and Ko Chosŏn), for not naming Parhae as the legitimate successor of Koguryŏ, and for ignoring Manchuria’s position in Korean history. Contemporary Korean scholars also argue that Kim’s depictions of Koguryŏ focused too much on its tributary relationship with China and with little mention of Koguryŏ’s military strength, cultural prosperity, and territorial magnificence. 47 Nevertheless, Kim’s records incorporated Koguryŏ into the mainstream narrative on the Korean historical lineage and established a Three Kingdoms framework for subsequent Korean historical writings. The second-oldest surviving historical record, Samguk yusa, was written by the Koryŏ monk Iryŏn right after the Mongol invasions of Koryŏ. Before the invasions (1231-1270), Koryŏ had maintained internal political autonomy with nominal recognition of China’s (and to a lesser extent, with Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin) superior status. At the same time, paying tribute to China was considered an affirmation of political authority as well as a cultural and economic exchange, not an acknowledgment of China’s sovereignty over Koryŏ. 48 However, the situation changed during the Mongol intervention. As a “son-in-law” court to the Yuan dynasty, Koryŏ was compelled to pay enormous amounts of tribute. Moreover, Koryŏ was forced to support the Yuan’s invasion of Japan with soldiers and military supplies. The Yuan therefore were deeply enmeshed in Koryŏ’s internal affairs, which in turn inflected the agendas of historical writing in subsequent periods, including the Samguk yusa. Since its completion, Samguk yusa occupied a place of distinction in Korean historiography because it contained the first record of the Korean foundation myth of Tan’gun, who embodied the Korean independent spirit. Iryŏn’s account was significant in setting an almost simultaneous starting point for Korean and Chinese history in the legendary Emperor Yao 堯 period (ca. 2300 BCE). 49 However, Iryŏn’s main narrative was confined to the Korean Peninsula with no particular mention of the lands to the north of the Yuan-Koryŏ border. Moreover, he assigned the birthplace of Tan’gun to Mt. Myoh-

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yang 妙香山, a mountain in the northern Korean Peninsula, which implied a peninsular origin for the Korean people and culture. The Chosŏn Period (Fourteenth Century-Early Twentieth Century): From Koryŏ to the first half of the Chosŏn dynasty, most historical writings maintained the Three Kingdoms framework. 50 Except for some rare cases, most early Chosŏn literati confined the history of Korea to the Korean Peninsula. Although most writings mentioned Tan’gun and Kija Chosŏn, they prioritized Kija by describing Tan’gun in a more suspicious tone or placing Tan’gun in the supplementary section to Kija Chosŏn. These historical writings reflected the authors’ primary concern with the Korean Peninsula and an intentional refraining from attacking or reclaiming Manchuria, now under Ming rule. In addition, this stance was consistent with the defense of King T’aejo’s withdrawal from his northern expedition in 1388 right before the establishment of the Chosǒn dynasty. The second half of the Chosŏn period (1650-1905) is significant in the emergence of reform-oriented scholars who committed themselves to evidential investigations to identify the location of the Four Han Commanderies and of Ko Chosŏn. There were three hypotheses about the location of Ko Chosŏn. The first favored the Yodong area in Manchuria; the second, or “the migration hypothesis” argued that the core area of Ko Chosǒn was initially located at Yodong but then moved to the Korean Peninsula, around what is now P’yǒngyang; and the third, the Korean Peninsula theory, hypothesized that Ko Chosǒn was always located in the Korean Peninsula. 51 Meanwhile, perceptions of Manchuria did change in comparison to the first half of the Chosŏn era, as scholars began to debate the possibility and necessity of incorporating Manchuria into Korea’s historical lineage. Among Chosǒn literati who expressed their interest in the northern lineage, Han Paekkyŏm 韓百謙 (1552—1615) was the first to argue that it was the loss of Manchuria that confined Korean history to the Korean Peninsula. 52 The most iconoclastic Chosŏn historian who called for attention to the northern lineage and Manchuria was Yu Tŭkkong 柳得恭 (1748-1807). Yu Tŭkkong visited many historical sites in Korea; in addition, his visits to Qing China further stimulated his fervor for Korean history. He was particularly frustrated by the loss of Manchuria in the Koryŏ period. Among Yu’s numerous writings, the most influential are Parhae ko 渤海考 or the Treatise of Parhae, and Sagunchi 四郡志 or the Record of Four Commanderies, which reflected his interest in “northern history.” 53 In his preface to Parhae ko, Yu proposed a South-North States phase of Korean history. He was dismayed by the Koryŏ dynasty’s failure to produce a comprehensive history of the South-North States, which did not fulfill the

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mandatory obligation of making a standard historical record for the previous dynasty. Yu insisted that the founders of Parhae were the Koguryŏ people, and that Parhae also inherited the territory of Koguryŏ. Therefore, Parhae was the legitimate successor of Koguryŏ. Despite rising interest in and concern with respect to the northern land (Manchuria), the primary lineage of Korean history was still reserved for the southern part of the peninsula. Yu Tŭkkong’s idea of South-North States and research on Parhae was ignored for centuries, and attracted only passing attention during the colonial period. The South-North State hypothesis was revived in the 1970s, when national history with irredentist and expansionist viewpoints became popular with the support of the South Korean military government. 54 Protectorate and Colonial Period (1905-1945) Korea became a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and a formal colony in 1910, and at that time most Korean nationalists went into exile to escape the constant surveillance and persecution by the Japanese colonial government. Stunned by the March First Independence Movement, the Japanese colonial authority allowed the Korean people to engage in some commercial and publishing activities, but only under strict censorship. Korean intellectuals were consequently divided in their attitudes toward the Japanese colonial administration. Some accepted the colonial occupation, seeing it as a necessary evil but others formed an uncompromising independence movement against Japanese. Some turned to the study of ancient history, which was relatively less rigorously monitored by the Japanese colonial censorship because of its apparent irrelevance to colonial society. Korean concerns about Manchuria became more pronounced during the colonial era, when the question of the Manchurian origins of the Korean people and culture became intertwined with questions of nationalism and irredentism. Korean nationalist historians strove to be more inclusive in their ethnic genealogies of Korean people, which included not only the Puyŏ and Parhae, which had formerly been ignored, but also brought the (semi-) nomadic groups Suksin 肃慎 (Malgal, Jurchen, and Manchu) and Sŏnbi 鲜卑 into the broad category of Korean people, groups which had been despised, discriminated against, and excluded from the “civilized” Korean people by Koryŏ and Chosŏn literati until the early twentieth century. Interestingly, this resonated with the Chinese practice of incorporating borderland “barbarians” into the origins and development of the mainstream Chinese nation, an unprecedented phenomenon in China that started in the 1920s. The most famous nationalist scholars of the colonial period, Sin Ch’aeho and Ch’oe Namsŏn, cited Manchuria as the primary stage in the development of the Korean people and history. Sin considered Manchu-

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ria the cradle of Korean civilization, and the loss of Manchuria as the greatest tragedy in Korean history. Consequently, Sin accused Kim Pusik of being a traitor who had expunged the Tan’gun Chosŏn and Parhae from Korean history, thereby permanently surrendering Korea’s rightful claim to Manchuria. Many Korean nationalists agreed with Sin Ch’aeho; Sin, hailed as a national hero during his lifetime, was elevated to the status of a martyr after his death in a Japanese prison. 55 Sin Ch’aeho was critical of the historical significance of the Silla unification as the seminal event in the formation of the Korean people and civilization, a conclusion which had been widely accepted until Sin’s revisionist assertions. Sin denounced Kim Ch’unch’u 金春秋 and Kim Yusin 金庾信, the king and the general of the Silla Kingdom, respectively, who requested help from Tang China (a foreign power) to conquer their fellow Koreans, Paekche and Koguryǒ, in the 660s. 56 In contrast, Sin lavishly praised Ŭlchi Mundǒk 乙支文德, the Koguryǒ general who defeated the Sui (Chinese) troops in the early seventh century. Sin also depicted the Koguryŏ usurper Yŏn Kaesomunn 淵蓋蘇文 (?-665 CE) as a national hero who confronted the formidable Tang troops and defended the Korean nation from crises. In sum, Sin reconstructed a Manchuria-centered history of Korea, and reassessed Korean historical developments and figures by their intentions or contributions to reclaiming Manchuria. Sin’s irredentism was intertwined with his acceptance of Social Darwinism and his observation of the decline of the Qing dynasty. From the late nineteenth century, Korean intellectuals not only witnessed the deterioration of the once formidable Qing dynasty, but were also impressed by the meteoric rise of Japan after the Meiji Restoration. Korean intellectuals were convinced that international society was the competition arena for nations and nation-states, and that the cure to Chosŏn’s illness was to become the fittest and the strongest. In addition, events such as the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the flight of Koreans into Manchuria, and Manchuria’s potential to become a headquarters for a Korean independence movement all supported Sin’s conviction that regaining Manchuria was the prerequisite in the construction of a strong Korean nation and nation-state. 57 The other Korean nationalist scholar, Ch’oe Namsǒn, was one of the first to apply linguistics, mythology, and ethnography to Tan’gun studies in the 1920s. 58 Paying special attention to the birthplace of Tan’gun, Ch’oe claimed that Mount Paektu (C. Changbai Mountain) was the cradle of Northeast Asian civilization. 59 By framing a Purham Cultural Sphere centered in Manchuria, and incorporating all historical residents in Manchuria to Korean ancestors, Ch’oe was successful in justifying Korea’s claim over Manchuria. Ch’oe’s views on Manchuria and northern people were synthesized in his Manmong munhwa 满蒙文化 or the Studies on Manchurian and Mongolian Culture, which was based on his lecture notes for Kengoku University students. 60

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Postwar Period (1945-Present) A proliferation of research on Tan’gun marked postwar scholarship in both North and South Korea. This boom was most evident in an enthusiastic search for the core area of Ko Chosǒn through archaeological excavations. From the 1950s to the early 1990s, North Korean scholars attempted to locate Ko Chosŏn (a slave society in the Marxist historical framework) in Manchuria. North Korean scholars had been looking for evidence of a slave society in Korea’s historical development, and relics of human sacrifice at the Liaodong Peninsula led them to conclude that Korea’s slave society was located in Northeast China. Consequently, North Korean archaeologists and historians attempted to prove that Ko Chosǒn was a huge Korean empire spanning from the east coast of China and Northeast China to the Korean Peninsula. 61 However, the overwhelming inclination toward the northern lineage among North Korean scholars drastically changed with the excavation of what is asserted to be Tan’gun’s tomb in the P’yŏngyang area in 1993. Since then, North Korean historians have contended that P’yŏngyang was the origin and central stage of Korean civilization throughout the prehistoric and historical periods. 62 Consequently, North Korean scholars rejected their predecessors’ research on the Yodong hypothesis, and numerous publications were produced to redefine a P’yŏngyang-centered Ko Chosǒn. The historical research in North Korea has paralleled contemporary political vicissitudes. Instead of unrealistic laments about the loss of Manchuria and the minimal chance of reclaiming it, it was more worthwhile to relocate the origin of Korean people and civilization to P’yŏngyang, establishing the image of a consistently self-reliant Korea and tracing this self-reliance back as far as possible. From the 1950s to the 1980s, South Korean scholars were more interested in the Silla period not only because of the abundance of written and archaeological resources, but also because of the South-North division, which required South Korean historians to defend the Southern lineage of Korean history. It is only from the late 1980s that South Korean historians expanded the horizon to the northern lineage, and their research was facilitated by the opening of mainland China in the 1980s for tourism, especially historical sites located in Northeast China. Professional and amateur historians clashed over Ko Chosŏn, and especially the place of Manchuria in Korean history. 63 Despite some diversity in their topics, most amateur historians adopted an ultranationalistic agenda, including theories about the earlier formation of an authentic and unique Korean civilization, the role of Tan’gun as the national ancestor and first sage king, the extent of Ko Chosŏn’s territory, and the “Korean” origin of the Shang people (which can transform Kija from Chinese to a “Korean” sage).

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The influence of amateur historians soared when they gained the backing of the authoritarian military dictators of the 1970s and 1980s. 64 Manchurian irredentism not only appealed to the public, it was also used to raise Korean soldiers’ morale and compete with North Korea for political legitimacy. According to Our History for Unification and the Great Leap published by the Department of National Defense in South Korea in 1983, What is the current task for our nation? It should be national unification, a necessary leap forward for our national prosperity. Then what would be the next step? It should be reclaiming the Manchurian continent, the land that still has the vestiges of our ancestors’ strength and bravery. Hence we should establish progressive, unification-oriented views of national of history that cherish the aspiration of reclaiming the Manchurian continent. 65 [Italics added]

Here irredentism with regard to Manchuria was linked to the project of national unification of South and North Korea, and the ultimate goal of a unified Korean state included not only the Korean Peninsula but also Manchuria due to Koreans’ historical affinity with Manchuria. These two camps both have a vested interest in rejecting the Japanese colonial legacy and establishing a nation-centered history with Korean subjectivity, and both groups consider Sin Ch’aeho to be the founder of modern Korean nationalist historiography. However, the professional historians are more attracted to Sin’s project of establishing the minjok, or nation, as the primary unit of historical analysis and to Sin’s contributions in stimulating Koreans’ drive for independence during the colonial period. The amateur historians, in contrast, have continued Sin’s primary concern of reclaiming Manchuria to retrieve an imagined prosperity in terms of territory and military strength. 66 Determined to abandon Chinese sources replete with biases against non-Chinese people, the amateur historians turned to questionable Korean sources, such as Kim Kyohŏn’s religious writings during the colonial period. In addition to the consistent claims of the historicity of Tan’gun and Tan’gun Chosŏn, these amateur historians also argued that there were two consecutive periods ruled by Hwanin and Hwanung before the power passed to Tan’gun. Therefore, the origin of Korean history was traced to the thirtieth century BCE or even earlier, adding another thousand years to Korean history. 67 This also prolonged the length of time that Koreans occupied Manchuria. CLIMAX OF CONTROVERSY: DISPUTE ON THE HISTORY OF KOGURYŎ Established in 1983, Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin 中国边疆史地 研究中心 or the Center of China’s Borderland History and Geography Research is a research institute under the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS). In February 2002, this center launched a five-year re-

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search project, Dongbei bianjiang lishi yu xianzhuang gongcheng 东北边疆历 史与现状系列研究工程 or the Research Project on the Historical and Current Situation of the Northeast China Borderland (hereafter the Northeast China Project). 68 The Northeast China Project was proposed by specialists in borderland history and the provincial governments of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. 69 As a component of Chinese borderland history, Northeast China was listed as a core issue along with Uyghur, Inner Mongolia, and the Tibetan area. Funding comes from both the central and local governments. The key researchers are from the Center of China’s Borderland History and Geography Research, with the assistance of prominent local scholars. The local Northeast Chinese historians were concerned with the ambiguous status of Gaogouli and wanted to redefine Gaogouli within the framework of a unified multiethnic history of China. 70 Of the many ancient states and regimes in Northeast China, only the Gaogouli Kingdom left behind numerous tumuli with mural paintings that are the most valuable artifacts of that period. Northeast China Project researchers contend that all regional political entities were administrative bodies of the Chinese central government, therefore making the regional residents Chinese minorities. 71 Therefore, it had been wrong to ignore Gaogouli history for the past thousand years. These historians not only intend to refute scholarship from both North and South Korea regarding Koguryŏ, but also to repudiate previous Chinese scholarship that ignored or tolerated such Korean scholarship. 72 Recognizing the difficulty of this project, they admitted that Gaogouli had been remembered as part of Korean history for a thousand years, but they still insisted that the project go forward, claiming that it was time to correct past mistakes. 73 As a gradual but drastic transformation of the Chinese attitude toward Gaogouli, the Chinese scholarship has evolved from indifference, to tolerance, to compromise (the two-phase theory, yishi liangyong), and now to an adamant conviction in an exclusive monopoly over Gaogouli history through the historians of the Northeast China Project. This project could be understood on two levels: the central Chinese government’s concern with Chinese borderland integrity and security, and the regional governments’ attempts to attract the Beijing’s attention and to revive local economies. This new direction transformed Northeast China’s status in two contradictory ways: it relegated a regional history to a borderland history, while elevating that regional perspective to a national one. 74 In addition to political considerations, the launch of Northeast Asia Project implies an economic vision for local economy. Northeast China had been the most industrialized area of China because of Russian and Japanese economic investment and reconstruction since the late nineteenth century. It also played a crucial role in the civil war (1946-1949) between the Guomingdang or Nationalist Party (GMD) and the Chinese

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Communist Party (CCP). The seizure of Northeast China and use of the area as the base for counterattacking the GMD became one of the most successful CCP strategies, placing the CCP in a more advantageous position and contributing to its final victory. It has therefore been claimed that “the Communist triumph in the Northeast accelerated the time-table of victory on a nation-wide scale by producing a kind of internal domino effect.” 75 In addition, the Soviet Union’s economic assistance programs in the 1950s concentrated on this area. Northeast China was arguably the core of Chinese heavy industry and military manufacturing until the early 1980s. However, Northeast China began to lose its political and economic prominence, with the withdrawal of Soviet power in the late 1950s, and the situation was only exacerbated by the open door policy of the late 1970s. This gave the government of Northeast China another reason to make a bid for more attention from the central government and stimulate economic development. 76 One of the priorities of the Northeast Project was to register the Gaogouli mural tumuli located in Jilin Province as a UNESCO Cultural Heritage site and to make it an international tourist attraction. The Korean public did not become aware of the Northeast China Project until more than a year after its inauguration, when a South Korean businessman casually mentioned it to a journalist. Since November 2003, both Korean academics and citizens have been protesting this project. Korean scholars’ concerns about Northeast China Project revolve around four issues: Ko Chosŏn, Parhae, Kando, 77 and most importantly, Koguryŏ. National newspapers published front-page articles about the Koguryŏ controversy, 78 and academic and other institutions organized conferences to present the Korean perspective. 79 Koguryŏ occupies an incomparable position in the Korean historical memory, a status that resulted from irredentism and from colonial trauma. During the colonial period, Korean nationalist historians looked to earlier periods for patriotic inspiration, and Koguryŏ’s military might, stalwart resistance against the Chinese dynasties, and territorial scope made it the ideal (or more accurately, the only) candidate. Korean academics and nonspecialists take deep pride in Koguryŏ’s significant accomplishments, which only added insult to injury when they learned of the Northeast China Project. Koguryŏ was so indispensable to Korean nationalism that the denial of Koreans’ ownership of Koguryŏ history was tantamount to the wholesale rejection of Korean nationalism. 80 Most Korean historians had two grievances against the Northeast China Project—deprivation and distortion. They argued that Chinese scholars had previously admitted that Koguryŏ belonged to Korean history by treating it as a part of world history, or at least had divided Koguryŏ history into two phases without attempting to incorporate into Chinese history the phase since 427 CE, when Koguryŏ moved

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the capital to P’yŏngyang. There is a consensus in Korea that the Northeast China Project exposes China’s expansionist intentions and neo-Sinocentrism. The rhetoric between Chinese and Korean scholars has become a war for “history” in which the Koreans need to defend the most prestigious part of their history against Chinese neo-expansionism. 81 After a series of public demonstrations, academic conferences, and hearings, the South Korean government launched the Koguryǒ yǒn’gu chaedan 高句麗硏究財團 or Koguryŏ Research Foundation to study history of Koguryŏ, Ko Chosŏn, Puyŏ, and Parhae, and on the interstate relationships and ethnicities of Northeast China. 82 The founding ceremony was held on March 1, 2004, the national holiday commemorating Korea’s anti-Japanese Independence Movement in 1919. The Koguryŏ Research Foundation was merged into the Tongbuga yǒksa chaedan 東北亞歷史財團 or Northeast Asian History Foundation in September, 2006. Instead of concentrating on ancient history and especially the history of Koguryǒ, the Northeast Asian History Foundation aims to conduct comprehensive and strategic research on controversial historical matters, and to arrive at an accurate understanding of history in the interest of peace and reconciliation in Northeast Asia. 83 While Chinese scholars declared that their intention was not to politicize history, it is impossible to introduce alternative opinions as long as the project’s stated purpose is to defend China’s national “security” and “stability.” Therefore, the publications released under the auspices of this institution followed strict official guidelines. According to some recent conference report in 2004, Chinese scholars are still obsessed with the issue of guishu 歸屬, or “historical ownership” of Gaogouli. From the Chinese perspective, Gaogouli was a regional government established by a “Chinese” minority group, and was a tributary state to the central Chinese government. In addition, the subsequent Koryǒ dynasty had no direct connection with the previous Gaogouli Kingdom. Meanwhile, some Korean scholars have critiqued the situation from other vantage points. The Korean historian of China, Kim Hankyu, has proposed a brand new historical community, Yodong sa 遼東史 or History of Yodong (Liaodong), making Northeast China neither a Chinese nor Korean category, in reaction to the Koguryŏ dispute. 84 However, it is debatable whether “Yodong,” which is just a small portion of Northeast China and has not been used consistently, can accurately encompass all historical developments in this area. The Korean historian of Europe, Im Chihyŏn, has theorized concepts of national boundaries and frontier history, arguing that Koguryŏ should be studied as a frontier area between China and Korea. 85 Despite the near-unanimity among Korean historians of Korea on this issue, Yi Chong’uk has maintained a different position. Yi is critical of Korean scholars’ obsession with the northern origin, with their insistence that the Korean people and civilization originated from the northern area,

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and with the assumption that the northern lineage became the mainstream following the line of Tan’gun Chosŏn, Kija Chosŏn, Wiman Chosŏn to Koguryŏ and Parhae. As a Silla specialist, Yi claims that Silla or the southeastern area was the cradle of Korean civilization. Therefore, his purpose is more likely directed toward reasserting a Silla-centered national history. 86 Under pressure from Korean historians and the public, in 2004 the South Korean government requested an explanation of the Northeast China Project from the Chinese government. 87 The two governments have agreed not to further politicize this issue and leave it to the scope of academic exploration. In an interview with South Korean news agencies in April 2007, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao asserted that “China and ROK have enjoyed a shared history and cultural and economic exchanges for thousands of years,” and that “There are no territorial issues between the two countries, which serve an important political foundation for bilateral relations.” Wen suggested that scholars on both sides should respect “the principle of separating research from politics and reality from history, and avoid any negative impact on bilateral relations” 88 (two-separation policy). However, many Korean scholars only felt frustrated and betrayed when they realized that instead of rectifying the “mistakes” and terminating the Northeast China Project, the Chinese government first deleted the Koguryŏ section from Korean history, and then deleted the introductory note on Korean history prior to 1948 from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. 89 Chinese and Korean historians have attended international symposia and conferences on Koguryŏ history. However, it is difficult to conduct any further dialogue as long as the question is framed as “either Chinese or Korean.” Hence at present, it appears that Chinese and Korean researchers in this area will remain deadlocked. An apparently easy compromise—Koguryŏ as shared history—would not be possible at this stage because both sides have asserted a firm stance of exclusive ownership and indivisibility of Koguryŏ history and legacy. 90 CLASH OF HISTORICAL VIEWS The history of Manchuria has been one of the most controversial issues in East Asian historiography since the nineteenth century. 91 In Korean historiography since the thirteenth century, Manchuria has been treated either as a forgotten barbarian border area or as a supplementary territory that needed to be incorporated into Korean history. Only with the colonial period did Manchuria take center stage in studies of the origin of the Korean people and civilization. Like Chinese historians who attempted to be more inclusive in the composition of Chinese people, Korean nationalists turned their attention to Manchuria, designating it as the

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birthplace of the Korean national ancestor Tan’gun and the cradle of Korean (or more widely, East Asian) civilization. 92 Similar to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 1990s brought another turning point for studies on the ancient history of East Asia, thanks to more diversified and concentrated research on Northeast China by Chinese, South, and North Korean scholars. With the collapse of the Cold War system in East Asia, debates over history only became more intense and fraught with difficulty. Such debates are more than differences in the interpretation of the premodern history of East Asia; they reflect changes in international relationships. The Northeast China Project was inaugurated in the midst of rising interest in Northeast China among Chinese and Korean scholars. The debates over Koguryŏ history became entangled with issues of national history, borders and frontiers, ethnicity, nationalism, irredentism, and territorial and historical sovereignty. Although Korea has made no official attempt to reassert a claim to Manchuria, Korean scholars’ overwhelming concerns over Koguryǒ history as well as the popular demonstrations protesting the Northeast China Project imply latent irredentism rooted in a nostalgia for a prosperous past with a grand territorial sweep. 93 In discussing the Korean Peninsula’s relationships to and qualifications for claiming Manchuria, Korean scholars cited the years when the Korean people presumably occupied Manchuria starting from the legendary Ko Chosŏn period (twenty-fourth or as early as thirtieth century BCE) to the Parhae Kingdom in the tenth century, but intentionally minimized or ignored the more recent occupation of Manchuria by nonKorean peoples. 94 Many other controversial issues might cause disputes, such as the history of Fuyu 95 and Bohai. The historical ambiguity and strategic location of Manchuria certainly make it one of the most contested fields in East Asian history. As long as Chinese scholars emphasize tributary and investiture relationships and interpret them within the modern framework of sovereignty, as long as Korean scholars emphasize Koguryŏ’s brave resistance against the Chinese dynasties, and as long as ancient history remains the most abundant source from which to draw national essences for contemporary needs, this dispute will rage on. 96 Would Korean scholars and citizens be satisfied with definitive proof that the Chinese scholars working on the Northeast Chinese Project are wrong? Even if it were possible to “prove” that Koguryŏ was an independent entity and not a regional regime of China, would it then become a part of Korean history? Would this “either Chinese or Korean” question still be valid? 97 These are key questions not only for Chinese and Korean, but also for all historians. How might one look beyond one’s own national boundaries? Can and should the history of Koguryŏ be studied from Koguryŏ’s perspective? 98 Is it possible to rethink East Asia from a broader perspective and to rescue history and archaeology from being appro-

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priated by competing agendas for racial superiority and cultural originality? 99 The Koguryŏ dispute has reformulated relationships among scholars. In Korea, “the Koguryŏ dispute” also generated monumental changes in the way that Korean historians “do history.” From the late 1990s, some Korean historians engaged in reflective criticism about the essentialist, self-centered descriptions of national history at the cost of relegating other peoples to an inferior position. 100 However, since the eruption of the Koguryŏ dispute, the condemnation of the Northeast China Project has become almost unanimous. 101 More importantly, the professional historians became closely allied with amateur historians for believing that Koreans need to be united for an external “invasion” from China. On the international level, Korean scholars sought cooperation from Japanese and Western scholars in order to affirm Korea’s authority over Koguryŏ history. Meanwhile, in a different field, Chinese and Korean historians have joined forces against Japanese attempts to rewrite modern history through textbooks that elide Japan’s colonialism and war crimes. Though one must be cautious in comparing Korean social reactions to these separate historical issues, the Koguryŏ dispute seems to have aroused greater anger than the revisionist Japanese textbooks. 102 As the dispute changed many Koreans’ views of China, it may be considered the nadir of China-South Korean relations since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992. 103 The Koguryŏ dispute also generated calls for collaboration between South Korean and North Korean historians. 104 After the South-North summit meeting in 2000 between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jung Il, the cultural and social overtures became stronger. Tan’gun has been a source of common ground between South and North, and a joint ceremony and academic conference was organized on National Foundation Day, October 3, the anniversary of Tan’gun’s founding of the first ancient state of Korea, Tan’gun Chosŏn. Thus, Tan’gun is a reminder of the unity of Korean people and the urgency of national unification. Issues over the historical representation of Koguryŏ underscored another impetus for reunification, and Korean historians and citizens demanded the cooperation of South and North Korean historians to defend Korean national history against Chinese “distortions.” The five-year Northeast China Project was completed in 2007. The Sino-Korean historical dispute over Koguryǒ has been temporarily toned down, mostly because of the diplomatic intervention from the two governments. As of this writing (late 2015) scholars on both sides have simply resumed their own research while ignoring that of their opponents. However, the present dormancy is more of an expedient compromise and it is yet unclear how these historical disputes over areas of conflicting interests will be handled in the future.

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NOTES 1. According to the 1978 demographic census, residents in Northeast China include the Manchu, Korean, Heze, Mongolian, Dawoer, Ewenke, Elunchun, and Xibo peoples. In addition, there are Ke’erkezi, Russian, Hui, Miao, and Yi minorities. Fu Langyu and Yang, Dongbei minzu shilüe (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1983), 1. 2. From the fourth century CE onward, the central stage of Chinese civilization gradually moved southward to the Yangzi River Valley, as people tried to escape military pressure from northern nomadic peoples and to seek more fertile farmland. 3. The exceptions are the “alien rule” periods, such as the Jurchen Jin, Khitan Liao, Mongol Yuan, and Manchu Qing dynasties. 4. Records on non-Chinese can be seen from most twenty-four standard dynastic records. 5. Youzhou is one of the nine provinces mentioned in Zhouli 周禮 or The Ritual Records of the Zhou. 6. The discovery of Qin Quan 秦權 (Qin Standard for Weight) and Han Yin (the Han Seal) verified the extension of Qin and Han power over these areas. 7. The exact location, administration, and historical development of these Han commanderies remain unclear. 8. Hanshu 99: 4130. 9. For detailed discussion on Dongyi, see chapter 1 of this book. 10. Huang Pei, “New Light on the Origins of the Manchus,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 50:1 (1990), 239-282 and 272-282. 11. Mark Elliott suggests this change had taken place by 1877, when the scholar Gong Chai wrote an essay titled “Manzhou Kaolüe” (A Brief Study of Manchuria). See Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” Journal of Asian Studies 59:3 (August, 2000): 603-646, 632. 12. Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 128-131. 13. Robert H. G. Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in Ch’ing History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 182. Also Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 41-44. 14. Thomas R. Gottschang and Diana Lary, Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2000), 2-4. 15. Yang Zhaoquan, Zhongchao guanxi lunji (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1988), 304. 16. Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 1932). 17. Since then, “Manchuria” became more widely accepted as a geographic toponym for this area, and is particularly favored by the Japanese to emphasize its unique and indigenous characteristics compared to mainland China. Manchuria was acknowledged along with the establishment of Manzhouguo 滿州國, the puppet state created by Japanese Kwantung Army in 1932. 18. For a critique of Russian scholarship, see Pai Hyung Il, Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean StateFormation Theories (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), 42-49. 19. S. M. Shirokogoroff, Social Organization of the Northern Tungus (New York: Garland Publishing, Reprint of the 1929 edition (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1979); A. P. Okladnikov, The Soviet Far East in Antiquity: An Archaeological and Historical Study of the Maritime Region of the U.S.S.R. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). 20. Juha Janhunen, Manchuria: An Ethnic History (Helsinki: Finno-Ugrian Society, 1996), 28. 21. Song Kiho, “Several Questions in Studies of the History of Parhae,” Korea Journal 30 (June 1990), 13.

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Aleksei Pavlovich Okladnikov, “The Mo-ho Tribes and the P’o-hai State,” in The Soviet Far East in Antiquity: An Archaeological and Historical Study of the Maritime Region of the U.S.S.R. ed. Henry N. Michael (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). Also Ernest V Shavkunov, “Russian Studies on Bohai: A Seventh-Tenth Century Kingdom in Northeast Asia.” Asian Research Trends: A Humanities and Social Sciences Review 6 (1996): 97-105. 22. The South Manchuria Railway Company, the largest economic enterprise in Manchuria and the main agency of Japanese penetration, was organized shortly after the Russo-Japanese War. It undertook the construction of towns, harbor improvements, coal and iron mining companies, utility development, and agricultural experimentation. When the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang refused to halt construction of a competing Chinese railway network, the Japanese Kwantung army staged the Manchurian Incident (1931), establishing the state of Manzhouguo (1932). At the end of World War II, China expropriated the SMRC’s property. See “South Manchurian Railway Company,” http://www.infoplease.com, accessed September 3, 2005. See also John Young, The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company 1907-1945: A History and Bibliography (New York: Columbia University, 1966), 1-12. 23. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Manssen shi kenkyū (Kyōto: Sokokusha, 1933-1963). Mikami Tsugio, Mansen genshifunbo no kenkyū (A Study of Primitive Tombs in Manchuria and Korea) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1961). 24. Mariko Asano Tamanoi, ed., Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 10-15. 25. These five groups are Japanese, Russian (sometime Mongolian), Korean, Manchu, and Chinese. 26. Influenced by Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden” describing Britain’s imperial mission to civilize and rescue African indigenous people. 27. Shiratori Kurakichi, Shiratori Kurakichi zenshū (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969). 28. Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2. 29. However, it seems that this was not an effective slogan. The earlier reformoriented Chinese intellectuals, such as Kang Youwei, reacted by becoming diehard advocates for constitutional monarchism and insisting on maintaining the Qing dynasty. See Chow Kai-wing, “Imagining Boundaries of Blood: Zhang Binglin and the Invention of the Han Race’ in Modern China,” in The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Frank Dikötter (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). Edward J. M. Rhoads, Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late and Early Republican China 1861-1928 (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2000). 30. Chŏn Haejong, Han’guk kwa Chungguk: Tong’a sa nongjip (Seoul: Chisik san’ǒpsa, 1979), 55. At the same time, despite the national unity among different ethnic groups, Sun Yat-sen also emphasized that eventually all those non-Han groups would be sinicized and assimilated into the Han majority. See Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California, 1998), 2-3. 31. Xu Xusheng, Zhongguo gushide chuanshuo shidai (Shanghai: Shangwu yishuguan, 1943). 32. Fu Sinian, “Yixia dongxi shuo,” in Fu Sinian quanji, vol. 3 (Taibei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980. First published in 1933). 33. Fu Sinian, Dongbei shigang (Beiping: Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1932), 3. Li Chi [Li Ji], Manchuria in History: A Summary (Peiping: Peking Union Bookstore, 1932).

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34. Jin Yufu, Dongbei tongshi (Reprint. Taipei: Hongshi chubanshe, 1976). 35. However, Jin was more interested in the Bohai Kingdom, which led to his twovolume monograph on the history of Bohai, Bohai guozhi changbian 渤海國志長編. 36. Shao Dan, Ethnicity in Empire and Nation: Manchus, Manzhouguo, and Manchuria (1911-1952) (Ph.D. Diss: University of California at Santa Barbara, 2002), 243-245. According to the 1990 census, there were about 10 million Manchu people in China. 37. Zhang Boquan, Dongbei difang shigao (Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 1985). Sun Jinji, Dongbei minzu yuanliu (Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1989). Sun Jinji, Dongbei ge minzu wenhua jiaoliushi (Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe, 1992). Sun Jinji, Dongbeiya minzu shilun yanjiu (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1994). 38. Tong Zhuchen claimed that early residents of Northeast China, the Shanrong and Sushen, started interacting with Huaxia Chinese as early as the Neolithic period, and that the civilization of Northeast China originated from Yan 燕, located in the southern part of Northeast China. Chen Mengjia argued for a common racial origin for the Shang 商 and Yi 夷. Fu Sinian and Zhang Boquan elaborated that the Shang people originated in Northeast China and then migrated to central China, becoming one of the major components of the Chinese nation, huaxia minzu. The ancestors of the Shang people resided in Bo, now assumed to be the Liaoxi area of Northeast China. Jin Jingfang contended that the Hongshan Culture belonged to the early Shang culture during the Xia period. Later, the Shang people established a regime in central China, and enfeoffed their clan members to different areas. After the collapse of the Shang Dynasty, Jizi (K. Kija) was sent to the Korean Peninsula, and Zhi 旨 was sent to Yan 燕, now the Liaoxi area. The lord of Ji later changed his title to Chaoxian Hou, the Lord of Chaoxian, and later this Chaoxian was replaced by Weiman Chaoxian. Chinese scholars thus considered Northeast China an inseparable part of central China from the remote prehistoric period. 39. Cheng Ni’na agrees with the northern origin of the Shang people: Shang power was dominant throughout the Shang period, and their origin in the northern area was also the reason that the Shang aristocrat Jizi led his followers to Northeast China before the collapse of the Shang. Jizi’s given name was Xu Yu 胥余 (his clan name was Zi 子), and he might have been King Zhou’s 紂 uncle or stepbrother. He was once appointed taishi 太師, the prime minister of the Shang. Confucius listed Weizi, Bigan and Jizi together and called them the “Three Benevolent Sages of the Shang,” which influenced later views of them. See Cheng Ni’na, ed., Dongbeishi (Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 2001). 40. For example, they pointed out that early relics of dragons, the symbol of Chinese culture, were first found at the Zhahai 査海 site, earlier than the counterparts from the central plain. See Li Zhiting, ed., Dongbei tongshi (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 2003), 23. However, the establishment of the dragon as a totemic animal for all Chinese was a recent construction. See Barry Sautman, “Myths of Descent, Racial Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in the People’s Republic of China,” in The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Frank Dikotter (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 76. 41. Lothar von Falkenhausen, “The regionalist paradigm in Chinese archaeology,” in Phillip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett, eds., Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology (Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 210-215. 42. Jiang Mengshan, “Gaogouli shi de guishu wenti,” Dongjiang xuekan 16:4 (1999): 38-41. 43. Fei Xiaotong, “Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju,” Fei Xiaotong et al., Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju (Bejing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1989), 136.

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44. Mark Byington, “The War of Words between South Korea and China over an Ancient Kingdom: Why Both Sides Are Misguided,” http://historynewsnetwork.org/ article/7077, accessed September 14, 2006. 45. Koguryǒ was one of the strongest states in Northeast Asia, which put pressure not only on Paekche and Silla to the south, but also created one of the major threats to mainland China to the west for centuries. For the most recent scholarship on the Sui dynasty and the Sui invasion of Koguryǒ, see Victor Cunrui Xiong, Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty: His Life, Times, and Legacy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). 46. For the historical records made in the Three Kingdoms period, see chapter 2 of this book. 47. Sin Hyǒngsik, Han’guk chǒngt’ong sahoe wa yǒksa insik (Seoul: Samchiwǒn, 1995), 286. 48. Peter Yun, Rethinking the Tribute System: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstate Relations, 600-1600 (Ph.D. Diss.: University of California at Los Angeles, 1998). 49. Iryǒn quoted two sources for the founding date of Tan’gun Chosǒn, the same year and the fiftieth year of the Emperor Yao’s reign. However, Iryǒn seemed to lean toward the fiftieth year in his Samguk yusa. 50. John Duncan, “Historical Memories of Koguryǒ in Koryǒ and Chosǒn Korea,” Paper presented at the First International Conference hosted by Koguryǒ Foundation, Seoul, Korea, 2004. 51. For details, see chapter 3 of this book. 52. Yun Huimyǒn, “Han Paekkyǒm kwa kǔi hangmun,” in Ku’am Yugo Tongguk chiriji (Seoul: Ichogak, 1987, 1997 printing), 44. 53. Chǒng Chinhǒn, Sirakcha Yu Tǔkkong ǔi kodaesa insik (Seoul: Sinsǒwǒn, 1998). 54. As the crucial link between the late Chosŏn and colonial period, Yi Chonghwi’s (1731-1797) interest in Manchuria was continued and perpetuated by Korean nationalist historians in the twentieth century. Yi Chonghwi, Susanjip (Seoul: Kyǒngmunsa, 1976). 55. Henry H. Em, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999). 56. Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 230. 57. Andre Schmid, “Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch’aeho and the Politics of Territorial History in Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 56:1 (February 1997): 26-46. 58. Ch’oe Namsŏn, “Tan’gun kŭp ki yŏn’gu,” in Tan’gun sinhwa nonjip, ed. Yi Kibaek (Seoul: Saemunsa, 1987), 7-22. 59. Chizuko T. Allen, “Northeast Asia Centered around Korea: Ch’oe Namson’s View of History,” Journal of Asian Studies 49:4 (November 1990): 787-806. 60. Ch’oe Namsŏn, Yukdang Ch’oe Namsŏn chŏnjip, vol. 10, 403. 61. Li Chilin, Ko Chosǒn yǒn’gu (Tonggyŏng: Hagu Sŏbang, 1964; first published in 1963). 62. Yŏksa p’yŏjipsil, ed., Tan’gun kwa Ko Chosŏn e kwanhan yŏn’gu nonmunjip (P’yŏngyang: Sahoe Kwahak Ch’ulp’ansa, 1994). 63. These two camps are kangdan sahakcha or professional historians (most of them are professors of history) and chaeya sahakcha or amateur historians. 64. An Ho’sang’s book has been used in Korean military academies, and “Claiming the Old Territory (Manchuria in Particular)” is one of the mottos for training Korean soldiers. See An Hosang, The Ancient History of the Korea-Dong-I Race: The Korea-Dong-I Race, Creator of East Asian Culture (Seoul: Institute of Baedal Culture, 1974). 65. Our History for Unification and Great Leap (Seoul: Army Department, 1983), 33. Quoted in Cho Insǒng, “Kuksa chuǔi sahak kwa hyǒndae ŭi Han’guk sahak,” Han’guksa simin kangjwa 20 (1997), 11. My translation. 66. Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 273.

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67. For more detailed discussion on the professional and amateur historians, see chapter 3 of this book. 68. Information on the background and processes of this project can be accessed through http://chinaborderland.cass.cn, accessed February 2, 2007. 69. Among very few Chinese scholars working on this issue outside of China, Dingding Chen suggested that there could be different opinions between the Chinese government and the Chinese historians. However, due to the fact almost all Chinese historians are affiliated with national universities and government research institutes, it is so far hard to detect the distinction. Dingding Chen, “Domestic Politics, National Identity, and International Conflict: the Case of the Koguryo Controversy,” Journal of Contemporary China 21:74 (2012): 227241. 70. http://chinaborderland.cass.cn/show_News.asp?id=1787, accessed February 2, 2007. Introduction of Northeast China Project, posted on June 1, 2004, accessed February 2, 2007. 71. Ma Dazheng, ed., Gudai Zhongguo gaogouli shi xulun (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003). Ma Dazheng, ed., Zhongguo Dongbei bianjian yanjiu (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003). 72. The emphasis of the Chinese scholars is visible in the following quote: “During the past several decades, with the rise in the political and economic position of Northeast Asia, it became one of the hottest areas of the world. The Northeast borderland of our country is located at the center of Northeast Asia. Therefore, it is tremendously important as a strategic juncture. Some foreign institutes and scholars intentionally distorted historical facts in their research. Some foreign politicians publicly proclaimed various fallacies and fostered a chaotic situation regarding Northeast China, which brought tremendous difficulties and challenges to academic research.” My translation. See http://chinaborderland.cass.cn, accessed February 2, 2007. 73. Ma Dazheng, Zhongguo gudai Gaogoulishi xulun (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 4. 74. The chief director of the research committee, Ma Dazheng, is a borderland specialist who majored in Northwestern history. The most noteworthy point here is that Northeast China was transformed from a region into a borderland of China. However, Chinese scholars reject the most significant characteristics of a borderland, that is, its hybridity and ambiguity in terms of identity and sovereignty. 75. Steven I. Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 19451948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 5. 76. The sense of crisis in the Northeastern local governments intensified after the central government’s announcement of “Developing the Great Northwest Project.” The purpose of the project was to stimulate economic development in the Northwestern area, which might again leave Northeast China out of the attention from the central government. 77. Kando is a border area between today’s North Korea and China. Today, most of this area is part of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous District of Jilin Province, China. See Andre Schmid, “Looking North toward Manchuria,” South Atlantic Quarterly 99:1 (2000): 219-240. Also Erik W. Esselstrom, “Rethinking the Colonial Conquest of Manchuria: The Japanese Consular Police in Jiandao, 1909–1937,” Modern Asian Studies 39 (2000): 39-75. Some Korean historians claimed that it was time to rectify the “illegal” agreement between the Japanese and the Qing government over the territorial sovereignty of Kando. Moving one step further, fifty-nine South Korean congressmen proposed a “Kando Resolution” to Korean National Assembly on September 3, 2004, demanding nullification of Qing-Japan Kando Convention signed in 1909. http://news.donga.com/ 3/all/20040903/8102891/1, accessed October 25, 2010.

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78. A Korean news search for the keywords of “Koguryŏ” or “Northeast China Project” would return thousands of entries from major newspapers since June 2003, which is a significant contrast with a similar keyword search of the Chinese news. Only one Chinese newspaper, Guangming Ribao, published an article about the Northeast China Project. As a newspaper with a small readership of Chinese intellectuals, Guangming Ribao did not generate much publicity. See Bian Zong, “Gaogouli shi gudai zhongguo de yige defang minzu zhengquan,” Guangming ribao (June 24, 2003). However, China invested more effort in a different arena of national education. The local governments have renovated many local historical sites, Ji’an Museum in particular, to which they have attached signs asserting that “Gaogouli was a regional minority government of China.” It is interesting to note that this Northeast China Project has attracted attention from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media for the purpose of criticizing the Chinese expansionist policy. In terms of media coverage, the Northeast China Project also shows a significant contrast with other government-funded projects conducted by CASS. The 1996-2000 Three Dynasty Chronology Project was quite a hot issue among Chinese media, and its consequent project, Zhonghua wenming tanyuan gongcheng, or the Project of Seeking the Roots of Chinese Civilization, was also frequently spotlighted, as was its chief director, Li Xueqin, one of the pre-eminent scholars of early Chinese history. 79. Ch’oe Kwangsik, Chungguk ŭi Kogury ŏ sa woegok (Seoul: Sallim, 2004). 80. Jungmin Seo, “The Politics of Historiography in China: Contextualizing the Koguryo Controversy,” Perspective 32:3 (2008): 39-58, 43. 81. Song Kiho, “Chungguk ŭi Han’guk kodaesa ppae’agi kongjak,” Yŏksa pip’yŏng 65 (2003). 82. Information on Koguryŏ Research Foundation can be accessed through http:// www.koguryp.re.kr, discontinued in September 2006. 83. Information on Northeast Asia History Foundation can be accessed through http://www.historyfoundation.or.kr. 84. Kim Hangyu, Yodongsa (Seoul: Munhak kwa Chisŏngsa, 2004). 85. Im Chihyŏn, Kundae ŭi kukkyŏng yŏksa ŭi pyŏngyŏng (Seoul: Hyumonisutu, 2005). 86. Yi Chong’uk, Yŏksa ch'ungdol: Han’guk kodaesa ŭi minjok mandulgi, yŏksa mandulgi sinhwa munotturigi (Seoul: Kimyŏngsa, 2003). 87. The Sino-ROK diplomatic negotiation settled on a vague five-point “verbal understanding” regarding the Koguryŏ dispute. 1. China is mindful of the fact that the Koguryŏ question has emerged as a significant pending issue between the two countries. 2. The two sides will make efforts to prevent the history issue from harming the friendship between the two countries, and to improve the comprehensive partnership between the two countries as signed during the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992 and summit in 1993. 3. Both sides agree to prevent the history disputes from developing into a political issue by seeking a fair solution and taking necessary measures. 4. China expresses understanding about Korea’s concerns about descriptions on Koguryo by central and provincial governments of China and will take necessary measures to prevent any complication of the issue. 5. The two sides will make efforts to open academic exchanges between the countries and to enhance understanding between citizens of each country. Hyun-jin Seo, “China-Korea Truce in Ancient-Kingdom Feud,” Asia Times Online. August 25, 2004. http://atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FH25Dg01.html, accessed June 12, 2006. 88. http://en.people.cn/200704/06/eng20070406_364215.html. April 6, 2007, accessed September 17, 2010. 89. Terence Roehrig, “History as a Strategic Weapon,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 45:1 (2010): 13.

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90. Dingding Chen, “Domestic Politics, National Identity, and International Conflict: The Case of the Koguryo Controversy,” Journal of Contemporary China 21:74 (2012): 227-241, 240. 91. U.S. historians also contributed to studies on the history of Manchuria, first from the perspective of the late imperial history of China, emphasizing the aspects of sinification of the Qing dynasty and that the Qing was just another dynasty of Chinese history that happened to be the last one. This direction prevailed until the 1980s. See Ho Ping-ti, Journal of Asian Studies 26:2 (Feb, 1967): 189-195 . However, along with the opening of China and accessibility of Manchu archives since the late 1980s, there was a significant change in the studies of the Manchus and the Qing dynasty. Despite some accommodation of Chinese practice, the success of the Qing was more attributed to their efforts to maintain their ethnic identity and their strategic application of the northern tradition. Though the scholars of this Manchucentered Qing history did not reach a consensus on the origin and development of Manchu ethnicity and the durability of Manchu system, the studies on the Manchu people and Qing dynasty are undergoing a change toward more dynamic and diversified interpretations. See Pamela Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), Evelyn Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies 55:4 (Nov. 1996), 829-850, and Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial :China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 92. The Manchu people also claimed Changbai Mountain as their sacred site. It would be worthwhile to conduct additional research into Korean historians’ views of this Manchu claim. It seems that Ch’oe Namsŏn attempted to settle this conflict by predating Korea’s affiliation to this mountain to the prehistoric era, assigning a common ethnic origin for not only early Koreans, but also to other people within the Purham Cultural Sphere. 93. The majority of South Korean scholars are convinced that Ko Chosŏn is located somewhere in Manchuria. School textbooks use vague terms such as “activity scope” or “power scale” to demarcate Ko Chosŏn on maps, covering almost all of Northeast China, the Maritime Province of Russia, as well as the Korean Peninsula. Of course, reclaiming Manchuria has always been a crucial issue for Korean amateur historians, and they call Manchuria Kot’o 故土, literally translated as “the Old Land,” or “the Lost Land.” 94. It is also interesting to note that the Korean word for this area continues to be “Manju” or “Manchuria,” a term that has been abandoned not only by China, but by most Japanese and Russian scholars since 1949. Northeast China had been the homeland for Jurchen (Mohe) people since the seventh century, and the power of the Jurchen peaked during the Qing period. There were also other minority peoples historically living in Northeast China. See note 3. 95. Pak Yangjin, “Contested Ethnicities and Ancient Homelands in Northeast Chinese Archaeology: The Case of Koguryo and Puyo Archaeology,” Antiquity 73 (1999): 613-618. Mark Byington, A History of the Puyǒ State, Its People and Its Legacy (Ph. D. Diss., Harvard University, 2003). 96. Both Chinese and Korean scholars still believe in the myth of historical objectivity. In other words, they still believe that textual and archaeological studies can bring truth to history. 97. Russian scholar Andrei Lankov also supports a “neither Chinese nor Korean” exclusive ownership of Koguryŏ history. See Andrei Lankov, “The Legacy of LongGone States: China, Korea and the Koguryo Wars,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Jana Focus. September 28, 2006. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrei-Lankov/2233/article.html, accessed August 10, 2010.

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98. Yi Sŏngsi, Mand u rŏjin kodae (Seoul: Sam’in, 2001), 75-78. 99. “Rescue” is borrowed from Duara Prasenjit’s book, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questing Narratives of Modern China (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 100. Song Kiho, “Minjok chuŭi sagwan kwa Parhae sa,” Yŏksa pip’yŏng 58 (2002). 101. Song Kiho, “Chungguk ŭi Han’guk kodaesa ppaea’gi kongjak,” Yŏksa pip’yŏng 65 (Winter, 2003). 102. It is not within the scope of this chapter to compare these reactions. However, although Koreans approached both as victims, their emotional inflections are nonetheless different. In the Japanese textbook controversy, Koreans requested the Japanese to remember their war crimes, and to let Koreans recall their memories of national humiliation. The Koguryŏ issue, however, is more about protecting Korea’s treasured memories of once having been a strong and extensive empire. 103. Some Korean historians even contended that the Chinese distortion of Koguryŏ history was a more serious matter than the Japanese revisionist views on Japanese colonialism and imperialism, because ancient history has been the crucial part of fivethousand-year formation of Korean identity, and the Northeast China Project had removed not only Manchuria as a space for Korean ancestors, but also two thousand years of Korean history. See Ch’oe Kwangsik, Chungguk ŭi Koguryŏ sa woegok (Seoul: Sallim, 2004). 104. South Korean scholars have attempted to cooperate with North Korean scholars. However, North Korean scholars seem satisfied with UNESCO’s approval of both North Korean and Chinese proposals to register Koguryŏ sites as World Cultural Heritage sites, and refrained from any outright criticism of the Northeast China Project.

Conclusion Living with the Legacy of the Past

East Asian countries have a long tradition of historical writing, and these writings have been referred to, reassessed, and reinterpreted in later periods, particularly in the process of constructing their cultural traditions and national identities. More so than in western Europe, national identities in East Asia are historically oriented and accumulated. The emergence of modern nationalism and the formation of the modern nationstate in East Asia since the late nineteenth century has only complicated circumstances. In order to comprehend and redefine national cultures and identities, ancient history became one of the most contested arenas, replete with the selection and extraction of desirable elements for the construction of glorious national histories, while avoiding or simply neglecting elements that did not fit in. Given the desire to conduct a national history with the longest possible span of time and sustained prosperity, historians have devoted themselves to reinterpreting conventionally accepted images of the past. It became the norm to essentialize or beautify national history at the cost of subordinating the history of others. The situation became more rampant during the twentieth century in the wake of western imperial encroachment and changing interstate relationships in East Asia. According to the written records, the understanding of Korean ancient history has changed from the Koryǒ to the contemporary period across a span of time demarcated by four distinctive phases: 1) the Mongol invasion and intervention in the thirteenth century, 2) Hideyoshi’s invasion in the sixteenth century and the establishment of the Qing dynasty in the seventeenth, 3) the encroachment of the western imperial powers and the eventual colonization of Korea by Japan from 1860s to 1945, and 4) postwar Korea, accompanied by the Cold War and the national division between South and North. The first two stages stimulated the fledging interest in Tan’gun, and positioned Tan’gun as the national ancestor for Koreans and Tan’gun Chosǒn as the first ancient state of Korea. Despite different versions of the Tan’gun myth, the attention that Chosǒn literati paid to Tan’gun produced a variety of contending interpretations, especially after the Hideyoshi and Manchu invasions. Tan’gun was transformed from a vague mythical figure to the benevolent founder and ancestor of the Koryǒ and 195

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Chosǒn people (and by extension to all people in Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula). In addition to the brief Samguk yusa narrative, Chosǒn historians added more tangible episodes and anecdotes about Tan’gun’s achievements, family, and claimed his lineage was carried on through Puyǒ and Koguryǒ. However, Kija had always given primacy to Tan’gun in most Chosǒn historical writings. In particular, the worship of Kija peaked after the Manchu invasions. In order to affirm the authenticity of Chosǒn’s Confucian civilization, Kija became the symbol of the originality, longevity, and sustainability of universal (Confucian) civilization in Chosǒn. The views of Tan’gun and Kija reflected the evolving perceptions of the political situation in Chosǒn as well as Chosǒn’s relationships with contemporary China (Ming and Qing dynasties), which stimulated interest in repositioning Chosǒn vis-à-vis Qing China and Tokugawa Japan. More drastic changes occurred during the colonial period. At that time, the ancient history of Korea attracted attention not only from Korean historians, but also from scholars of neighboring countries, especially Japan. Targeting the previous “servile” attitude toward China by Chosǒn literati and the contemporary Japanese colonial scholarship, the Korean nationalist historians shared the following points as their criteria for a “good history” of Korea: whether it positioned Tan’gun and Tan’gun Chosǒn as the beginning of Korean history, whether it denied the existence of Kija Chosǒn, whether it put the Four Han Commanderies outside of the Korean Peninsula, whether it denied the existence of Mimana as a Japanese colony, whether it emphasized Manchuria as the central site of Korean history up to the pre-Silla unification period (before the seventh century), and whether it advocated a new framework for the SouthNorth States period to replace the conventional Unified Silla period, and extended Koreans’ possession of Manchuria to the end of the Parhae Kingdom period (tenth century). The colonial experience laid the foundation for Korea’s post-1945 intellectual culture. Disputes regarding interpretations of Korean ancient history existed at different levels and occasions, not only among professional and amateur historians in South Korea and South/North Korean scholars in competing the political legitimacy of their respective governments, but also among international scholars, whose perspectives seemed more closely related to their national affiliation and political inclinations. North Korean and South Korean historians’ interest in different periods reflected their ideological, political, and regional affiliations. Due to the location of North Korea and Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria, it is not surprising that North Korean scholars concentrated on the northern lineage of Korean history. Perceiving the importance of history in ensuring political legitimacy, the North Korean government paid special attention to historical studies. This is also the reason that before and during the Korean War, North Korean authorities persuaded,

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and even abducted prominent historians from the South to the North. With a better pool of specialists, the North Korean government spared no effort in supporting collaborative research on Korean history. Their interest in conducting fieldwork in Northeast China also facilitated their exploration of the northern lineage of Korean history. From the 1950s to the 1980s, South Korean scholars were more interested in the Silla period, not only because of the tremendous amount of available written and archaeological resources, but also because of the South-North division, which obliged South Korean historians to prioritize the southern lineage of Korean history. The situation changed only in the late 1980s, thanks to an increased academic latitude resulting from the democratization movement. South Korean historians attempted to expand the horizon of historical inquires to the northern lineage, and their research received an added impetus in the late 1980s when it became possible to visit historical sites located in Northeast China. Generally defined as Pukbang hak 北方學 or Northern Studies, numerous academic associations were established to conduct research on the Pukbang yǒngt’o 北方領土 or northern territory, i.e., Taeryuk yǒnguso 大陸硏究所, or the Association of Continental Studies, Paeksan Hakhoe 白山學會 or the White Mountain Association, and Koguryǒ yǒnguhoe 高句麗硏究會 or the Association of Koguryǒ Studies. The enthusiastic research on Ko Chosǒn with a focus on the location of its capital, territorial scope, and power structure corresponded with the proliferation of studies of the northern territory. 1 Along with the prevalence and resurgence of nationalism in the field of ancient history, the issue of irredentism became a concern for countries that share borders, especially regarding the ambiguity represented by Ko Chosǒn, Koguryǒ, and Parhae. Irredentism regarding ancient history remains at an imaginative and theoretical level. However, the issue of Kando 间岛 (C. Jiandao) is much more recent and complicated because of its relationship with the Japanese colonial legacy, in addition to the fact that Kando is densely populated by ethnic Koreans who settled there due to economic hardship and colonial oppression from the late nineteenth century. Korean scholars argued that Kando was illegally handed over to the Qing government by the Japanese colonial authorities in 1909. The ceding of territory should be reconsidered, if not nullified, because of the illegality of the Japanese colonization of Korea per se. Despite its appeal to some people, irredentism has the potential to lead to international conflicts, and irredentist claims have often evoked significant concern in the international community, often with undesirable results. 2 In terms of domestic conflicts among South Korean historians, the tension between the professional and amateur historians continues, and the questions center on historians’ ethical integrity and professionalism. The professional scholars were denounced for their “immoral persistence” to Japanese colonial scholarship, while the amateur historians were criticized for their irrational interpretations and uncritical accep-

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tance of some ambiguous sources that appeared only in the 1920s, e.g., Hwandan kogi 桓檀古記 or the Ancient Record of Hwandan, Kyuwǒn sahwa 揆園史話 or the Anecdotal History of Kyuwǒn, Tan’gi kosa 檀奇古史 3 or the Ancient History of Tan’gun and Kija, though the amateur historians claimed that these books were written much earlier and had only just become known. The amateur historians’ appeal for a glorious ancient history gradually reached a wider audience. The popular acceptance of amateur historians’ expansionist interpretations of Korean ancient history reached its climax along with the unprecedented euphoria of the 2002 World Cup in South Korea. Korea and Japan cohosted the 2002 World Cup tournament. The spectators were impressed by the Korean people’s passion in cheering on their national soccer team, and the red T-shirt also became a musthave for Koreans. Korean soccer fans named themselves the Red Devils, but interestingly, the mascot for the Red Devils printed in the middle of the shirt is Ch’iu 蚩尤 (C. Chiyou), which they called Ch’iu ch’ǒnwang 蚩 尤天王 or the Heavenly King of Ch’iu. 4 According to Hwandan kogi (one of the three works that amateur historians attempted to promote), the heavenly king Hwanung 桓雄 established the state of Paedal 倍達, and Ch’iu was the fourteenth king of this kingdom, who ascended to the throne in 2707 BCE and ruled for 109 years. First appearing in early Chinese sources, Chiyou was the chief of an ancient state Jiuli 九麗 (黎), initially located in today’s Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi provinces in central China. The Chiyou group clashed with the Chinese emigrants. As one of the earliest chiefs, Chiyou was also a tragic figure given his defeat by the Huangdi 黄帝 or Yellow Emperor (a legendary ancestor for Chinese). 5 Overshadowed by the significance of the Yellow Emperor in Chinese history, Chiyou was forgotten for a long time. Centuries later, he was revered as a God of War in China and was categorized ambiguously as one of the Chinese ancestors who appeared as a popular motif in artistic representations. However, the battle between the Yellow Emperor and Chiyou escalated into an ethnic conflict between the Chinese and Koreans in Hwantan kogi. Chiyou’s courage in challenging the formidable Yellow Emperor, in addition to his tragic defeat became the inspiration for the Korean necessity of self-defense. By equating Kuli 九黎/Kuryǒ 九麗/Kuyi 九夷/Kuryǒ 句麗, Ch’iu was recategorized as a heroic ancestor of the Koreans, though no reference of him in Korean records existed until the early twentieth century. Corresponding with some amateur historians’ claims that the Tong’i were the ancestors of modern Koreans, Ch’iu was resurrected as an ancient Korean hero, symbolizing Koreans’ unyielding spirit for victory. This mythical figure was accepted as the mascot for the Korean soccer fans’ association, which they believed to be a talisman for protecting and guaranteeing victory for the Korean soccer team. 6 The attempt to trace an older national ancestor (older than Tan’gun), and the ambiguous ethnic-

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ity of Chiyou (Chinese or Korean, though there was no concept of Chinese or Korean at that time even if Chiyou was a real historical figure) generated a new topic of heated debate among Chinese and Korean citizens. The questions of national ancestry, origin of people, and civilization are raised in the opening chapter of all history textbooks. National history is the most important component of an education for cultivating unconditional patriotism in order for people to become loyal citizens. To stimulate national pride, historians in East Asian countries resorted to ancient history for constructing a unique origin accompanied by ceaseless and progressive development throughout the historical periods, and a sense of cultural and ethnic superiority over neighboring peoples as a way of establishing an ideal self-image by comparisons with others perceived to be less advanced. The competition for cultural uniqueness continues, and the dispute over the ancient history of East Asia has often caused large-scale reactions because of media coverage. The issues related to the Sino-Korean relationship became more complicated with the Northeast China Project. An earlier example of state-funded research project in China was Sandai Duandai Gongcheng 三代断代工程 or Three Dynasty Chronology Project, launched in 1996 to trace the origin of Chinese civilization and promote Chinese patriotism. 7 This project was criticized by most foreign scholars for its teleological approach and political manipulations. The Northeast China Project, which ignited the history wars between China and South Korea in 2003, can also be understood as China’s strategy of solidifying internal unity in addition to fending off any potential offences from outside. 8 The controversy over the registration of Koguryǒ mural tumuli to the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage temporarily ended with the simultaneous approval of the North Korean and Chinese proposals in 2004. However, the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage registration process soon produced another round of conflict between China and Korea. South Korea proposed registration of the Tan’o 端午 (C. Duanwu) ceremony, which upset Chinese scholars and media. As one of the oldest folk festivals in China, Duanwu probably originated from the Chu 楚 state during the Warring States period for commemorating the prominent minister and poet Qu Yuan 屈原 (ca. 340 BCE-278 BCE), who was famous for his loyalty, uprightness, and literary skills. Qu committed suicide during his exile due to his disappointment with governmental corruption, slander from his fellow officials, and banishment by his own lord. Deeply moved by Qu’s spirit, the local people beat drums, splashed water with their paddles, and dropped rice dumplings into the water to exorcise fish and evil spirits away from Qu’s body. This developed into the tradition of dragon boat racing and eating zongzi 棕子 (Chinese sticky rice dumplings) during the Duanwu Festival to commemorate Qu Yuan’s

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royalty and patriotism on the fifth day of the fifth month of the lunar calendar. Throughout history, Qu Yuan has been cherished as the model of romanticism, political idealism, and patriotism. The Chinese people were unpleasantly surprised by South Korea’s proposal for registering such a precious cultural legacy that they believed to be the exclusive property of Chinese people. However, South Korean scholars insisted that Korean people have an indigenous tradition of Tan’o Festival entirely divorced from Chinese history, despite using the same name. 9 In terms of international conflict, the question of ethnic origin and cultural dissemination between Japan and Korea became more contested in the twentieth century. Korean people believed that they transmitted culture to the Japanese archipelago. In addition, some Korean scholars argued that the Japanese royal family originated from the Korean Peninsula, the Paekche Kingdom. Although some Japanese scholars insisted on the idea of Mimana, they had turned a deaf ear to the possible establishment of a link to the Korean Peninsula via the Japanese loyal lineage. Surprisingly, the Japanese emperor Akihito (1933-) admitted that the maternal side of the royal family came from the Paekche Kingdom when he held an interview before the 2002 World Cup. 10 The Japanese emperor’s sudden announcement astonished many people, and aroused quite opposite reactions in the Japanese and Korean media. The Japanese media allocated minimum coverage, while the Korean newspapers were ecstatic. Some Korean scholars contended that the Japanese emperor finally admitted the historical truth: the Korean origin of the Japanese royal lineage. 11 However, the fundamental question should be, why does this vague reference to a connection thousands of years old matter so much today? Even if there had been a Paekche empress who became the mother of a Japanese emperor, can and should it change the early history of Japan and Korea? Can it make Koreans feel prouder of their culture, and allow the Japanese to acknowledge their cultural and ethnic indebtedness to Korea? The link between Japan and the Korean Peninsula also depends on the development of archaeological studies, especially regarding the “keyhole tombs” found on both sides of the Korean strait. Japanese scholars have believed that this unique style of tomb belonged to the royal clan of Japan; in particular, the biggest one located at Osaka was attributed to Emperor Nintoku 仁德天皇 (r. ? 313–399 CE). 12 However, Korean archaeologists also discovered keyhole tombs in the southeastern and southwestern areas of the Korean Peninsula in the 1980s. The structure of the tomb and the similarity in the excavated material culture stimulated a new round of debate. Along with the stele inscription of King Kwanggaet’o, the Japanese scholars used keyhole tombs as additional evidence for the existence of Mimana Colony, arguing that Mimana covered a larger culture area due to the wider distribution of the keyhole tombs.

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Having been hot issues among Korean and Japanese archaeologists and historians, studies on the keyhole tombs have taken a new turn. In October 2005, Korean archaeologists announced that a much bigger keyhole tomb had been found in the Kangdong district of Seoul. 13 Thereafter, a new wave of arguments emerged reconsidering the origin and chronology of the keyhole tombs and any indication they might give to the direction of cultural flow between early Korea and Japan. 14 The origin of East Asian civilization remains controversial among East Asian countries. The crucial issues revolve about national ancestors, the first ancient state, the direction of cultural dissemination, and the lineage of early history. In terms of the ancient history of Korea, attention has focused on the lineage of early history, especially the relationship between Tan’gun, Kija, and Wiman Chosǒn, the scope and location of the Three Chosǒn and the Four Han Commanderies, their relationship (chronological and ethnic) with the Samhan at the southern Korean Peninsula, the nature and reality of the tributary system vis-à-vis China, and the Mimana issue, which is related to the cultural and political interactions between Korea and Japan before the seventh century. Along with the diversification of historical interpretations among scholars, history textbooks became one of the most contested fields within and across national boundaries. Despite numerous new channels of information, history textbooks are still the main vehicle through which young people acquire historical knowledge. Consequently, many modern states are extremely sensitive and selective about what they tell their citizens. It is quite common that modern states manage or supervise the compilation, circulation, and revision of history textbook, though the degree of intervention may vary. Textbook production is supposed to be a domestic issue; however, thanks to globalization and information technology, any change in a national textbook related to an international issue can quickly attract the transnational spotlight. In East Asia, the most controversial issues pertained to ancient and modern history. Starting from the early 1980s, some Japanese right-wing scholars attempted to whitewash the atrocities committed by Japanese troops during World War II. A new history textbook was published in 1983 that aroused strong opposition from the governments and general populace in China and Korea. With the steady growth of the right-wing camp, a second textbook dispute broke out in 2001, when the Japanese Committee for Rewriting History Textbooks released the New Japanese History Textbook. 15 More strikingly, the Japanese Ministry of Education approved it after much debate. Right-wing historians successful drew international and domestic attention to the book, although it was used by far fewer schools than expected. 16 In contrast, some historians in China, Japan, and Korea have called for a more nuanced understanding of history. Instead of criticism of the right-wing textbook per se, scholars advocated for an alternative textbook

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to fit the changing international environment. In 2001, an association for East Asian intellectuals was organized with the purpose of narrowing the gap in historical interpretations and promoting peace and human rights. This project initially focused on the modern period, but a separate volume for the premodern period is also under consideration. After four years of meeting and writing, the first joint East Asian history textbook came out in May 2005, first in Japanese, then in Korean and Chinese, with the title of The History That Opens the Future: The Modern East Asian History Textbook written by Scholars from China, Japan, and Korea. 17 The English translation was released in July 2015. 18 According to the participating scholars, compiling this volume was extremely difficult. Sharing concerns about the danger of the revival of Japanese militarism (gunkoku shugi 軍國主義) and critiques about some unreflective Japanese attitudes toward war crimes, the scholars also admitted that each meeting was more an act of give-and-take negotiation instead of a systematic discussion in the hope of reaching a consensus. 19 There are still many issues on which they disagree; nonetheless, this product of tri-national collaboration is certainly an unprecedented accomplishment. 20 This textbook received a range of responses in East Asia. Initially, the Japanese participants hoped to have it published by a more prestigious publisher, such as Iwanami 岩波 Shoten to ensure better circulation and a stronger influence among general audiences. However, no big publishers wanted to take on the risk, and eventually it was accepted only by a small publisher, Kobunken. Having failed to attract publicity from the Japanese media, sales were dismal. In contrast, this same textbook was released to sensational applause in Korea where it soon became a best-seller. 21 This project was also frequently mentioned in the Chinese major media outlets such as People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency. 22 Although many scholars believe in the necessity of a historical understanding based on social justice and mutual respect, there are still many obstacles to collaborative work, and disparities abound depending on the period of specialization. Chinese and Korean historians agree that their countries were victims of Japanese colonialism and imperialism in the modern era. However, Japanese and Korean historians with an interest in the ancient period shared more of an obligation to counteract Chinese political and cultural hegemony so that they could highlight the uniqueness and independent development of Japanese and Korean (national) cultures respectively. The debates and disputes on history have become an arena for competition, intertwined with the issues of national history, ethnicity, borders and frontiers, nationalism and irredentism, territorial and historical sovereignty, in addition to the reconfiguration of contemporary international relationships. Ancient history, as constructed through modern conceptions of national boundaries and nation-states, creates challenges to

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peaceful coexistence. Unfortunately, archaeology and history sometimes have been used to make arguments for racial superiority and cultural originality. Most East Asian historians still believe in a singular historical truth; they believe that their interpretations are the only truth and accuse other historians of being biased by their national or ethnic orientations, and thus, “distorting history.” Should history remain as a field for instilling national identity and pride? What is the ultimate purpose of historical education? For the sake of national pride, should history incur the cost of relegating neighboring peoples to inferior positions? Should history engender national pride and ensure national solidarity, or should it explore the universal justice and morality of human society? How do we go beyond a history for national pride and superiority? Could history facilitate a better understanding of different cultures on the basis of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence? In other words, how could historical education help promote global equality and democracy? The current tension in East Asian history has posed fundamental questions not only to Chinese, Korean, and Japanese historians, but also to historians in general on how to write history beyond national boundaries. People live with the legacies of the past; history and memory are crucial to politics, culture, and society. China, Japan, and Korea have a long period of cultural interaction that despite cultural elements flowing from China to Japan and Korea, the latter two countries transformed cultural influences to fit their local situations and transmitted some elements back to China. Therefore, neither similarities and continuities, nor distinctions and discontinuities can be dispensed with when reaching a balanced, comprehensive understanding of culture and history in East Asia. Instead of national histories, a new perspective of East Asian history in world history, with a focus on cultural and economic interactions, is needed to resolve current disputes over the history of East Asia. Taking into account more than two millennia of interaction in East Asia, we have sufficient reasons to be optimistic because the trend had been toward peaceful communication and cooperation, with sporadic periods of warfare. The present crisis and stalemate in historical disputes also demonstrate the need for the participation of scholars outside of East Asia; a critical distance from the research subject can help maintain a more nuanced approach. Ultimately, transnational and transcontinental cooperation can ease the tension and contribute to reconciliation in East Asia and around the world. As of this writing (December 2015), disputes over history textbooks in South Korea have reemerged into the national spotlight. 23 Unlike the previous textbook dispute which caused an international furor, this particular round arose from domestic reasons, and centered on the modern and contemporary history of Korea, especially its modernization and economic development at the expense of democratization under Park Chung

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Hee (r. 1962-1979). More importantly, far from a disagreement over a historical perspective and narrative, the textbook became a point of contention between the incumbent and opposition parties, neither of which was willing to compromise. Koreans still believe that the history textbook is the foundation of identity formation and political consciousness. Therefore, the history textbook has become a bellwether of political legitimacy and contemporary politics. Students in South Korea have had to use government-issued textbooks for a long time. It was only in 2010 (the section for contemporary history started earlier in 2002) that the government relaxed its control slightly by switching from the direct compilation to an inspectionapproval system, in response to common practice outside of Korea and to the domestic request for democratization in education. Private publishers can commission history textbooks; after the books have passed inspection and received state approval, they can be used in middle and high school classrooms. Despite its progress, there was still dissatisfaction with the inspectionapproval process, and some publishers and scholars complained that their textbooks were requested to go through more changes because of the inspectors’ ideological inclinations or prejudices. This outcry corresponded with the agenda of new administration, with Park Geun-hye (the daughter of Park Chung Hee) elected president in 2013. The New Right revisionist historians have been relentless in criticizing the current history textbooks of being uncritical of North Korea and for overemphasizing the Korean people’s mishaps under dictatorship which overshadowed South Korea’s unprecedented economic success. 24 After much preparation, the South Korean government announced that it would return to the system of government-issued history textbooks, and would require schools in South Korea to use them exclusively starting in 2017. The immediate reaction to the government-issued textbook was polarized. The reports related to the textbook and opinions from both sides occupied the front pages of South Korean newspapers and television news in October and November. Government officials, historians, and school teachers debated each other on television. Many historians signed the joint agreement opposing the government-issued textbook and boycotting the compilation committee. Scholars outside of Korea, especially those teaching about Korea paid close attention to this issue, and initiated a petition to protest the anachronistic and undemocratic attempt to return to government-issued textbooks. 25 However, aside from all pros and cons to the government-issued textbook, the more controversial issue is the consensus that a history textbook is decisive in teaching the rising generation, and that there is only one “correct” history. 26 More importantly, if there are irreconcilable differences in historical interpretation, the South Korean government has the right to make the final judgment of which one should prevail. More

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striking to observers outside of Korea is that President Park Geun-hye gave many speeches affirming her wholehearted support for the government-issued textbook. 27 With numerous unresolved issues over the writing and compilation of the textbook, the issue was eclipsed by other matters such as the KoreanJapanese agreement on the women’s comfort issue and North Korea’s hydrogen bomb. However, in a sudden and drastic reversal to the government-issued textbook system, which has been enacted over the opposition of many historians and the public, the debates over its consequences and ramifications will certainly resume in 2017 when the new government-issued textbook is released. NOTES A small portion of this chapter was previously published as “A Common History Textbook in East Asia: A Resolution for Historical Disputes?” in Japan Studies Association Journal 9 (2011): 97-115. 1. After about two decades of concentration on the northern lineage of Korean history in South Korea, there is a new call for a return to the Silla-centered, or the South-centered research on the ancient history of Korea. Yi Chong’uk argued that the Silla area was the origin of Korean civilization, and that Silla’s status as the central stage of Korean history has never changed. Yi Chong’uk, Yŏksa ch’ungdol: Han’guk kodaesa ŭi minjok mandulgi, yŏksa mandulgi sinhwa munotturigi (Seoul: Kimyŏngsa, 2003). 2. Naomi Chazan, ed., Irredentism and International Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1991), 7. 3. Here the character ki 奇 was used instead of ki 箕. 4. For detailed information about Ch’i’u and the symbolic meaning of making him the motif of the Red Devil T-shirt, see http://www.reddevil.or.kr/. For a critique of intentional misinterpretations of Ch’i’u, see Song Hojǒng, Tan’gun: Mandǔrǒjin sinhwa (Seoul: Sanchǒrǒm, 2004), 288-9. 5. Shiji 1:3. 6. This symbolic T-shirt, with its bright red color and devil design, has multiple meaning for Koreans. Some scholars argued that the choice of the red color was a significant departure from the former aversion to red that dominated South Korean society since 1950. Since the Korean War (1950-1953), the experience and memory of this brutal war became a trauma for Korean people both in the South and North. In South Korea, possible attack from the North became the best excuse for maintaining a military dictatorship, and the threat from North Korea (red terror) became the most reliable resource whenever the government needed to impose consensus upon the people. Therefore, the cheer team of South Korea choosing a bright red color for their T-shirt caused quite a sensational visual effect, especially when the stadium seats, the streets and squares of South Korea turned completely red during the World Cup period. 7. The state initiated the Three Dynasties Chronology Project to trace the origin of Chinese civilization. There has been debate about the existence of the first legendary dynasty of Xia as well as the year when King Wu of the Zhou conquered the Shang dynasty. This is a very politically orchestrated project. A Chinese political leader visited Egypt and was impressed by the accurate chronology of early Egypt. After he came back to China, he allocated special funds and authorized the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) to conduct a five-year research project to clarify the chronology

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of the three dynasties. The purpose of this project is more related to the contemporary need to boost Chinese patriotism. More detailed information on ancient history, or a more “scientific” affirmation of Chinese-ness from the earlier period could contribute significantly to patriotic education. 8. The unquestioned position of Chinese scholars on Korean ancient history maintains the continuous predominance of China over Korea in the framework of tributary subordination, one-directional cultural flow from China to Korea, and Kija as an actual historical figure who became the sage king in Korea. 9. The South Korean Tan’o Festival was approved as UNESCO Intangible Culture Heritage in November 2005. 10. An interview in December 2001. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T7H98orlMbc&feature=related, accessed August 11, 2005. 11. Sim Kyusŏn, “Il Ch’ŏnhwang ‘Kenmy tenno’ ŭi saengmo nǔn Paekche ŭi huson,” Tong’a ilbo, December 24, 2001, http://www.yesu.kimc.net/jarm60.htm, accessed January 24, 2005. 12. Daisenryo Kofun was dated to the fifth century, and is 486 meters long on one side. 13. In October 2005, the Korean Broadcast System (KBS) news claimed that this tomb is about 770 meters long on one side. Sim Kangmum, “Ch’o taehyŏng Paekche kobun’gun palgyŏn,” October 31, 2005, http://news.kbs.co.kr/article/culture/200510/ 20051031/792857.html. Kim Pŏmsik, “Sŏulsi kangdonggu esŏ Paekche sidae ch’ujŏng kobun sipki palkyŏn,” November 1, 2005. http://news.media.daum.net/snews/culture/art/200511/ 01/donga/v10649856.html, accessed November 2, 2006. 14. For the most recent English research on this issue, see Dennis Hyun-Seung Lee, “Keyhole-Shaped Tombs and Unspoken Frontiers: Exploring the Borderlands of Early Korean-Japanese Relations in the 5th-6th Centuries” ( Ph.D. Diss., University of California at Los Angles, 2014). 15. Atarashii Rekishi Kyosasho o Tsukuru Kai, Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho 新しい歴 史教科書 (Tōkyō: Fusōsha, 2001). 16. The adoption rate of Fushosa textbook was 0.039 percent in 2001, and 0.39 percent in 2005, far below the authors’ initial goal of 10 percent. Yang Mikang, “Tongasia ǔi hwahae rǔl yuha simin sahoe ǔi yŏksa taehwa,” in Tong asia esŏ yŏksa insik ǔi kukkyŏng nŏmgi, ed. Asia pyŏnghwa yŏnguso (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2008), 144. 17. The Japanese version, Mirai o hiraku rekishi: Higashi Ajia ssankoku no kingendai shi (Tokyo: Kobunken, 2005); Korean version, Mirae rŭl yǒnǔn yǒksa—Hanjungil hamkke ssŭnǔn tongasia samguk ŭi hyǒndaesa (Seoul: Han’gyere simunsa, 2005); Chinese version, Dongya sanguo de Jinxiandaishi (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2005). 18. The China-Japan-Korea Common History Text Tri-National Committee and University of Hawai’i at Mānoa School of Pacific and Asian Studies A History to Open the Future Translation Team, A History to Open the Future: Modern East Asian History and Reconciliation (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i at Mānoa School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 2015), Kindle edition. 19. Sin Chubaek, “Hanjungil kongdong yǒksa pugyojae ǔi chaengchǒm kwa kyǒllon,” May 27, 2005, http://news.media.daum.net/politics/others/200505/27/nocut/ v9189847.html, accessed May 20, 2007. 20. A small portion regarding East Asian common history textbook has been expanded and published as “A Common History Textbook in East Asia: A Resolution for Historical Disputes?” in Japan Studies Association Journal 9 (2011): 97-115. 21. Hanjungil samguk kongdong yǒksa p’yǒnch’an wiwǒnhoe, Mirae rŭl yǒnǔn yǒksa—Hanjungil hamkke ssŭnǔn tongasia samguk ŭi hyǒndaesa (Seoul: Han’gyere simunsa, 2005). 22. By, more than 230,000 copies had been sold, 110,000 in China, 70,000 in Japan, and 60, 2006000 in South Korea. http://japan.people.com.cn/GB/35465/35489/ 4375172.html, accessed on April 28, 2011.

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23. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/asia/south-korea-to-issue-state-history-textbooks-rejecting-private-publishers.html?_r=0. Accessed October 15, 2015. A version of this article appears in print on October 13, 2015, on page A9 of the New York edition with the headline: South Korea Orders State Control of History Textbooks. 24. http://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20151106010003801, accessed November 10, 2015. 25. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/international_general/714320.html, accessed November 10, 2015. 26. Some of the opponents of the government-issued textbook have questioned the “only one correct history” and argued that students should be encouraged to learn different views; however, the Korean government insisted that the diversified views only make students confused and misguided. 27. http://www.huffingtonpost.kr/2015/10/23/story_n_8364076.html, accessed November 10, 2015.

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Index

Abang Kangyŏk ko (The Studies on Chosǒn Territory) (Chŏng Yagyong), 80–81 academic journal publications, North Korean historiography and, 144–147, 150–151 Academy of Social Science (North Korea), 141 Alla waesin kwan, 124 Altai, 8, 35, 113, 169, 170 amateur historians, professional historian disputes with, 109–112, 179–180, 197–198 AMP. See Asiatic Mode of Production An Chaehong, 105–106 An Chŏngbok, 76–77 ancient history, Korean, 195; Confucianism view of, 85n63; contemporary debates over, 9, 124–125; on early “Koreans”, 6; inter-state relationships and, 4; Koguryŏ, dispute between China and Korea over, 1–3, 4; Manchuria and, 8; nationalism and, 197, 199, 203; North Korean focus on, 7; objectivity and, 11; Samguk yusa on components of, 55; terminology issues with, 57–58. See also historical records, on Korea; Japanese scholarship on Korean history; North Korean historiography; South Korean ancient history studies Anguo Shaoji, 26 An Hosang, 110, 190n64 An Hwak, 103–104 Annotated Account of Eastern History. See Tongsa kangmok Annotated Brief History of the Eastern State. See P’yoje ŭmju Tongguk saryak

April 19 Revolution of 1960, 108 archaeology: historical records and, 3; keyhole tombs and, 200–201; South Korean ancient history studies and, 113 Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP), 97, 127n39 Baiyue, 25. See also Nanyue Ban Gu, 21, 25, 29, 32, 41n30–41n31. See also Hanshu barbarians, 16; directional associations with, 18; garments of, 30; international origins and meanings of, 17; Zhou dynasty alliances with, 20. See also “others”; yi Biography of Prominent Monks from the Liang, Tang, and Song Dyanasties. See San Gaoseng Zhuan Bohai Kingdom, 68, 157, 170. See also Parhae Kingdom Buddhism, 52, 53, 60 CASS. See Chinese Academy of Social Science CCP. See Chinese Communist Party Center of China’s Borderland History and Geography Research. See Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin Chang Chinsǒk, 143 Chanyu, 24, 24–25 Chaoxian, 5, 15, 20; Han dynasty and autonomy of, 37; Han dynasty’s military episodes with, 29, 30–31; Houhanshu records on, 29–30; Sanguozhi records on, 29–30; Shiji records on, 28–29 Cheng Ni’na, 189n39 Chen Shou, 30, 32. See also Sanguozhi 221

222

Index

Chewang ungi (Songs of Emperors and Kings) (Yi Sŭnghyu), 55–58, 72 Chewang yŏndaerok (Ch’oe Ch’iwŏn), 46 China, 8; Dongyi assimilation in, 31, 42n48; dynastic history in, 17–18; historical records on Korea from, 32, 33; Koguryŏ history dispute between Korea and, 1–3, 4; Korea and culture from, 92; Manchuria incorporation into, 1949-present, 173–174; Manchuria records of, 165–168; as multi-ethnic state, 174; Northeast China Project and newspaper interest in, 192n78; North Korea communication with, 156–158; “others” and formation of views in, 16–19; Wufu system and zones of, 43n65. See also Manchuria Chindan hakbo, 107 Chinese. See hua Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), 11n2, 174, 180, 192n78, 205n7 Chinese-Barbarian system. See Huayi tizhi Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 181–182 Chinese identity: Han dynasty and clarification of, 20; Korean identity’s interdependent formation with, 31–38; “others” distinguished from, 15, 16 Chinese scholarship, on Manchuria, 171–174 Ch’iu ch’ǒnwang (Heavenly King), 198–199 Chiyou, 198–199 Ch’oe Chinhyŏk, 164n75 Ch’oe Ch’iwŏn, 46 Ch’oe Mongnyong, 118 Ch’oe Namsǒn, 100–102, 117–118, 156, 193n92; on Manchuria, 178 Ch’oe Yŏng, 59 Chŏng Chisang, 48 Chǒng Huiyǒng, 143 Chǒng Inbo, 104–105, 122 Chŏng Inchi, 61. See also Koryŏsa Chǒng Kubok, 10

chǒngt’ong (political legitimacy), 58, 148–149 Chŏng Yagyong, 80–81, 129n76 Chǒn Haejong, 35 Ch’ǒn Kwan’u, 132n140 Chōsenshi henshūkai, 106, 120 Chosǒn chǒn’gi sahaksa (Han Yǒng’u), 10 Chosŏn chǒnsa, 145 Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910 CE), 6, 10, 34, 57–58; Abang Kangyŏk ko on two groups of, 81; early challenges of, 59–60; factional strife and, 87n122; formation of, 59; historical records produced in early, 60–61, 67; Manchu invasion of, 69; Manchuria during, 70, 176–177; Ming dynasty allying against Japanese with, 68; Qing dynasty’s relationship with, 68–69, 71; Tan’gun and Kija historiographical debates within, 69, 82. See also Kija; Tan’gun; Wiman Chosǒn hugi sahaksa (Han Yǒng’u), 10 Chosǒn tandaesa, 153–154, 155 Chosŏn T’ongsa, 145 Christians, Tan’gun worship problems of, 131n133 Ch’unch’ugwan (Hall of Spring and Autumn), 48 Ch’ungyǒl (King), 52, 55 Chunwei, 21, 22, 24 Chu people, 18–19 Commentary on Ŭngjesi. See Ŭngjesi chu Committee for Historical Compilation. See P’yǒnsaguk Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom. See Tongguk t’onggam Comprehensive Records of the Eastern Barbarians. See Tong’i Ch’onggi Concise History of the Eastern State. See Tonguk saryak Confucianism, 34, 36, 52, 60; ancient history views of, 85n63; Dongyi pride and, 37; Japanese admiration for, 91; Korean origin theory of, 132n141 cultural nationalist historians, 103–105 datsua nyūō, 93

Index datsuō nyūa, 93 decolonization, 108–109, 140 Democratization Movement of 1987, 111 Dingding Chen, 191n69 Dongbei bianjiang lishi yu xianzhuang gongcheng. See Northeast China Project Dongyi, 18, 29–30, 166; Chinese assimilation of, 31, 42n48; Confucianism and pride from, 37; earliest historical records on, 33; Houhanshu records on, 32–33; Korean ethnicity and, 34, 35, 167; in Manchuria, 167; meanings of, 31; nationalism and, 34; pre-Qin to post-Qin continuity of, 34–35; preQin to post-Qin discontinuity of, 35–38. See also Manchuria; Tong’i people; yi Duanwu. See Tan’o ceremony Eastern Affairs. See Tongsa Eastern History. See Tongsa economics, 93, 181–182 Egami Namio, 94 Electron Spin Resonance (ESR), 151 Encyclopedia of the Eastern State. See Tongguk yŏkdae ch’ongmok ethnicity. See Korean ethnicity ethno-symbolism, 9 Fan Ye, 21, 31, 32, 35, 77. See also Houhanshu Fei Xiaotong, 174 Forbidden Policy, Qing relaxing, 168 Four Han Commanderies: amateur and professional historian disputes over, 111; establishment of, 31; Hyǒndo Commandery, 121; Lelang Commandery, 120; Lintun Commandery, 31, 121, 166; location of, 70, 100, 104, 107, 120; Nangnang Commandery, 121–122; South Korean ancient history studies and unresolved issues with, 120–122; Xuantu Commandery, 31, 121, 166; Zhenfan Commandery, 31, 121, 166 Fukuda Tokuzō, 93, 97

223

Fukuzawa Yukichi, 93 Fu Sinian, 42n48, 173, 189n38 Fuyu Kingdom, 31, 185. See also Puyǒ people Gaogouli, 121, 167, 174, 181. See also Koguryŏ Kingdom Gaozu (Emperor), 22, 25–26, 41n41 The Geographical Treatise in the Veritable Records of King Sejong. See Sejong sillok chiri chi Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 94, 169, 171 Gu Jiegang, 145 Guomingdang (GMD), 181–182 Haedong yŏksa (History of Korea) (Han Ch’iyun and Han Chinsŏ), 79–80 Hall of Spring and Autumn. See Ch’unch’ugwan Han Chinsŏ, 79–80 Han Ch’iyun, 79–80 Han dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE), 3, 5, 15; Chaoxian autonomy from, 37; Chaoxian’s military episodes with, 29, 30–31; Chinese identity clarification during, 20; Nanyue and trade ban of, 26; Nanyue assimilation with, 27–28, 37; “others” and policies of, 21, 36; Xiongnu and exiles of, 40n29; Xiongnu appeasement policy and, 22–23, 37; Xiongnu military confrontations with, 23–24, 40n27; yi in, 19. See also Four Han Commanderies Han’guk chungse sahaksa (Chǒng Kubok), 10 Han Hŭngsu, 142 Han Paekkyŏm, 71–72, 176 Hanshu (History of the Han Dynasty) (Ban Gu), 16, 21, 28, 32; Nanyue records in, 25; Shiji similarities with, 41n30; Xiongnu records in, 25 Hanssi Chosǒn, 107 Han Yǒng’u, 10 Hatada Takeshi, 91 Heavenly King. See Ch’iu ch’ǒnwang

224

Index

historical records, on Korea, 195; archaeology and, 3; from China, 32, 33; Chosŏn dynasty and early, 60–61, 67; Dongyi and earliest, 33; earliest, 3; Japanese colonial rule and, 3; nationalism and framework for, 3–4; on “others”, 5; of Silla Kingdom, 45–46; in Three Kingdoms period, 45, 46, 175, 176; on Xiongnu, 21–22. See also ancient history, Korean Historical Science. See Yŏksa kwahak historiography, 90–91, 137. See also Korean historiography; North Korean historiography History Compilation Committee (North Korea), 141 History of Korea. See Haedong yŏksa History of the Han Dynasty. See Hanshu History of the Koryŏ Dynasty. See Koryŏsa The History of the Later Han Dynasty. See Houhanshu The History of the Three Kingdoms. See Samguk sagi Hŏ Mok, 72–73 Hong Manjong, 74–75 Hong Yŏha, 73–74 horse-rider theory. See kiba minzoku setsu theory Houhanshu (The History of the Later Han Dynasty) (Fan Ye), 5, 16, 32, 77; Chaoxian records in, 29–30; Dongyi records in, 32–33; Wiman and, 119; Xiongnu records in, 21 hua (Chinese), 16, 19–20; Ming dynasty and definition of, 82; Tongsa kangmok on distinction of yi and, 77 Huangdi (Yellow Emperor), 198 Huayi tizhi (Chinese-Barbarian system), 16 Hu Chosǒn, 153–154 Huhan Ye, 24 Hu Koguryǒ, 47. See also Koryǒ dynasty human being. See ren Hyǒn Ch’ae, 97, 127n34

Hyǒndo Commandery, 121. See also Xuantu Commandery identity. See Chinese identity; Korean identity Im Chihyŏn, 183 Imna, 100, 122, 123. See also Mimana Im Sangdŏk, 75–76 in-law politics, 126n1 Institute of Historical Research, 141 internal development theory, in South Korea, 129n96 International Society for Korean Studies. See Kukche Koryŏ Hakhoe Iryǒn, 38, 175–176, 190n49; background of, 52; Buddhism promoted by, 53. See also Samguk yusa Japan: Chosŏn dynasty allying with Ming dynasty against, 68; as civilized model, 93; Confucianism and admiration in, 91; Korea’s historical relationship with, 90, 91; World War II and war crimes of, 4; Yamato, 68 Japanese colonial rule (1905-1945), 4, 6; historical records and, 3; intellectual culture birthed during, 196; Japanese scholarship on Korean history justifying, 92; Korean historiography and, 98; Korean shared ethnicity justification for, 92, 200; Manchuria during, 177–178; North Korean historiography and, 156; Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876 and, 89 Japanese identity, 90–91 Japanese scholarship on Korean history, 90; economics and, 93; Japanese colonial rule justification with, 92; kiba minzoku setsu theory and, 94–95; on late Chosŏn to colonial period, 1900-1945, 96–106; military expansion and, 94; Mimana and, 96, 123; on prehistoric period, 95–96; superiority in, 91–92; on Tan’gun, 95–96; two perspectives on, 93–94. See also ancient history, Korean; Korean historiography;

Index South Korean ancient history studies Japanese scholarship on Manchuria, 170–171 Jin dynasty (317-420 CE), 28, 168 Jing (Emperor), 23 Jingu (Empress), 96 Jin Yufu, 173 Jiuyi, 18 Jizhun (King), 30. See also Kijun (King) Jizi Chaoxian, 29, 30, 36, 189n39. See also Kija Juche (Self-Reliance Ideology), 7, 137, 150–151 Juha Janhunen, 170 Jurchen people, 168, 193n94 Kabo Reform of 1894, 12n22, 96 Kando, 191n77 Kang Insuk, 163n60 keyhole tombs, 200–201 kiba minzoku setsu theory (horse-rider theory), 94–95 Kija, 6, 34, 36, 50–51, 60; Chewang ungi and, 57; Chosŏn dynasty, historiographical debates on Tan’gun and, 69, 82; evolving perceptions of, 196; P’yoje ŭmju Tongguk saryak and, 67; in Samguk yusa, 54; Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam and, 65; South Korean ancient history studies and unresolved issues with, 116; Tongguk t’onggam and, 64; Tongguk t’onggam chegang and, 73–74; Tongguk yŏkdae ch’ongmok and, 74–75; Tongsa kangmok on legitimacy of, 76–77 Kijun (King), 6, 57, 71, 76, 107, 117, 146 Kim Chaewǒn, 114 Kim Ch’ǒlchun, 109 Kim Chŏngbae, 118 Kim Chongsŏ, 61. See also Koryŏsa Kim Dae-Jung, 115, 186 Kim Han’gyu, 132n151, 183 Kim Il Sung, 138, 141, 149, 150, 151, 163n51 Kim Jung Il, 115, 150, 163n51, 186 Kim Kyohǒn, 102–103, 128n69

225

Kim Pusik, 6, 46, 175; background and career of, 48; Samguk sagi’s origins and creation by, 48–49. See also Samguk sagi Kim Sanggi, 129n92 Kim Sǒkhyǒng, 123, 141–142, 147 Kim T’aegyǒng, 96–97 Kim Taemun, 46 Kim T’aesik, 123–124 Kim Wǒllyong, 114 King Kwanggaet’o stele, 33, 122–123 Kŏch’ilbu, 45–46 Ko Chosǒn, 6, 50–51; amateur and professional historian disputes over, 110, 111; Chǒng Inbo on, 104; hypotheses on location of, 176; Manchuria location of, 193n93; North Korean historiography debates over, 143, 146, 155; population size of, 122; in Samguk yusa, 53–54; South Korean ancient history studies and unresolved issues with, 115; Wiman as patriot and, 107, 118; Yodong relocation of, 63, 82 Ko Chosŏn yŏn’gu (Ri Chilin), 146 Koguryŏ Kingdom, 8, 46–47; formation of, 121; Fuyu kingdom compared to, 31; Korea and China’s dispute over ancient history of, 1–3, 4; Koryǒ heritage with Silla or, 47–48; Northeast China Project dispute on history of, 180–184, 185–186; North Korea favoring, 148–149, 196; Silla compared to, 33; strength of, 190n45; UNESCO World Cultural Heritage registration of sites in, 182, 199. See also Gaogouli Koguryŏ Research Foundation, 2 Koguryǒ yǒn’gu chaedan, 183 Ko Hŭng, 45 Kokugaku movement, 90 Kongmin (King), 59 Korea: Chinese culture and, 92; Confucianism origin theory in, 132n141; Japan’s historical relationship with, 90, 91; Koguryŏ ancient history dispute between China and, 1–3, 4; protests in, 2003-

226

Index

2006, 1, 8–9. See also Dongyi; historical records, on Korea; Japanese colonial rule; North Korea; South Korea Korean ancient history. See ancient history, Korean Korean Declaration of Independence. See Taehan Tongnip sǒn’ǒn Korean ethnicity: Dongyi and, 167; Dongyi connection to, 34, 35; Japanese colonial rule justification with shared, 92, 200; Sin Ch’aeho on, 99–100 Korean historiography, 11; evidential, 98, 106; Japanese colonial rule and, 98; from late Chosŏn to colonial period, 1900-1945, 96–106; on Manchuria, 175–180, 184–186; schools of, 97, 106; socio-economic, 97, 140; underdevelopment of, 10. See also Japanese scholarship on Korean history; nationalist historiography; South Korean ancient history studies Korean identity: Chinese identity’s interdependent formation with, 31–38; history textbooks and, 204; nationalism redefining, 9 Korean independence movement, 8–9, 102–103, 169. See also March First Movement of 1919 Korean War (1950-1953), 138, 140, 196, 205n6 Koryǒ dynasty (918-1392 CE), 6, 34; Koguryŏ or Silla heritage of, 47–48; Manchuria during, 175–176; Samguk yusa commissioned by, 52; Yi Sŏnggye and end of, 59 Koryǒ King Injong, 48 Koryŏsa (History of the Koryŏ Dynasty) (Chŏng Inchi and Kim Chongsŏ), 60, 61–62 Kukche Koryŏ Hakhoe (International Society for Korean Studies), 158 Kuksa (Kŏch’ilbu), 45 Kungye, 47 Ku Samguksa (Old History of the Three Kingdoms), 48, 49. See also Samguk sagi

Kwŏn Kŭn, 49–50, 61, 62–63 Kwŏn Nam, 62–63 Kyǒnhwǒn, 47 Ledyard, Gary, 95 Lelang Commandery, 120. See also Nangnang Commandery Liaodong, 100, 115, 132n155, 154, 156, 166, 179. See also Yodong Liji, 18 Li Ji, 173 Li Ling, 134n162 Lindsay, Huynh Hamilton, 39n15 Lintun Commandery, 31, 121, 166 Li Xueqin, 192n78 Longshan culture, 42n48 Lü (Empress Dowager), 23, 25, 26–27 Lu Jia, 25–26 Lü Jia, 26–27, 28 Lu Wan, 30, 41n41 Ma Dazheng, 191n74 Man (King), 132n155 Man Chosǒn (194-108 BCE), 154 Manchu invasion, of Chosŏn dynasty, 69 Manchuria, 7–8; ancient history and, 8; Chinese incorporation of, 1949present, 173–174; Chinese records on, 165–168; Chinese scholarship on, 171–174; Ch’oe Namsǒn on, 178; during Chosŏn dynasty, 70, 176–177; Dongyi in, 167; during Japanese colonial rule, 177–178; Japanese scholarship on, 170–171; Ko Chosǒn location in, 193n93; Korean historiography on, 175–180, 184–186; Korean independence movement and, 102–103, 169; during Koryǒ dynasty, 175–176; nationalism and, 34–35, 184–185; during postwar period, 1945present, 179–180; pre-Qin historical records on, 166–167; provinces of, 165; during Qing dynasty, 168, 171–173; Russian scholarship on, 169–170; Sin Ch’aeho on, 100, 177–178; Sushen in, 168; toponym origins of, 165, 166, 187n17; United

Index States historical studies on, 193n91 Mansenshi, 94, 171 manyifu, 30, 119 Maodun Chanyu, 22 March First Movement of 1919, 101, 105, 128n51, 177. See also Korean independence movement marriage customs, of Xiongnu, 40n28 Marxist universal history, North Korean historiography and, 140, 148, 154 Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms. See Samguk yusa Meng Tian, 22 Mimana, 96; Japanese scholarship on Korean history and, 123; Kim Sǒkhyǒng on, 147; King Kwanggaet’o stele and, 122–123; South Korean ancient history studies and unresolved issues with, 122–124. See also Imna Ming dynasty (1368-1644 CE), 58; Chosŏn dynasty allying against Japanese with, 68; hua definition of, 82 Ming Shilu (Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty), 59 Ming Taizu, 59 Minor Universal Civilization. See So Chunghwa modernism, 9 Mongol intervention (1274-1351 CE), 38, 52, 55, 56 Nambukguk sidae (South-North States), 145 Nangnang Commandery, 121–122 Nangnang relics, 154, 163n70 Nanyue, 5, 15, 20; Han dynasty and assimilation of, 27–28, 37; Han dynasty trade ban against, 26; Hanshu records on, 25; Qin dynasty and, 25 nationalism, 195; ancient history and, 197, 199, 203; Dongyi and, 34; historical records and, 3–4; Korean historiography and, 10, 97; Korean identity redefined by, 9; Manchuria and, 34–35, 184–185; neo-

227

nationalism, 1930s and 1940s, 105–106, 129n78; paradigms and theories on, 9; Samguk sagi and critique of, 50; social status system elimination and, 12n22; Tan’gun and, 115; yǒllin minjok chuǔi and, 114 nationalist historiography, 10, 97; Ch’oe Namsǒn and, 100–102; Chǒng Inbo and, 104–105; cultural nationalist historians and, 103–105; An Hwak and, 103–104; Kim Ch’ǒlchun and, 109; Kim Kyohǒn and, 102–103; neo-nationalism and, 1930s 1940s, 105–106, 129n78; phases of, 98; Sin Ch’aeho and, 98–100 Neo-Confucianism, 87n122 neo-nationalism, 105–106, 129n78 New Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea. See Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam New Japanese History Textbook, 201 New Registration of Surnames. See Shinsen shōjiroku Nintoku (Emperor), 200 Northeast Asian History Foundation. See Tongbuga yǒksa chaedan Northeast China Project, 1–2, 11n2, 199; amateur and professional historian disputes over, 112; Chinese newspapers and interest on, 192n78; completion of, 186; deprivation and distortion accusation against, 182–183; economics and, 181–182; Koguryŏ Kingdom history dispute and, 180–184, 185–186; proposal of, 181 northern origin hypothesis, 113 North Korea, 2; ancient history focus of, 7; China and Soviet Union communication with, 156–158; establishment of, 7; Koguryŏ Kingdom favored by, 148–149, 196; objectives of, in 1950s, 160; South Korea communication with, 158–160. See also Korea North Korean historiography, on ancient history, 125; academic journal publications and, 144–147,

228

Index

150–151; criticism of, 160; decolonization and, 140; flourishing period, 1950s-1960s, 139–150; Japanese colonial rule and, 156; Ko Chosǒn debates in, 143, 146, 155; lack of scholarship on, 137; Marxist universal history and, 140, 148, 154; Nangnang relics and, 154, 163n70; political legitimacy and, 148–149; politics in, 149–150; P’yǒngyangcentered, 1993-present, 151–156; relative dormancy and reorientation period, 1970s-1980s, 150–151; relative freedom of academic inquiry and, 142–143; slave society and, 138, 151, 154, 156, 179; South Korean criticism of, 159; state support for, 141–142; unusual nature of, 138 No Sasin, 64–65 Nurgaci, 168 Old History of the Three Kingdoms. See Ku Samguksa Open Nationalism. See yǒllin minjok chuǔi “others”: Chinese identity distinguished from, 15, 16; directional associations of, 18; formation of Chinese views on, 16–19; Han dynasty policies on, 21, 36; historical records on, 5; Shang oracle bone inscriptions and, 17; in Shiji, 20–21; Zhou bronze inscriptions and, 17–18. See also barbarians; Chaoxian; Nanyue; Xiongnu; yi Outline of a Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom. See Tongguk t’onggam chegang Outline of Eastern History. See Tongsa hoegang Paekche Kingdom, 45, 46–47, 83n6, 200 Paek Nam’un, 97, 127n36, 161n11 Pak Hŏnyŏng, 144 Pak Sang, 61, 85n66 Pak Sihyǒng, 142 Pak Ǔnsik, 97, 98

Pan-Asianism, 94, 95 Parhae Kingdom, 46, 56, 71. See also Bohai Kingdom Park Chung Hee, 106, 110, 203 Park Geun-hye, 204 People’s Republic of Mongolia, 39n24 perennialism, 9 Perry (Commodore), 126n10 Petrov, Leonid, 149 political legitimacy, 58, 148–149 primordialism, 9 professional historians, amateur historian disputes with, 109–112, 179–180, 197–198 Project of Seeking the Roots of Chinese Civilization, 192n78 Purham Munhwa kwŏn, 34 Puyǒ people, 95, 99, 127n24 P’yoje ŭmju Tongguk saryak (Annotated Brief History of the Eastern State) (Yu Hŭiryŏng), 66–67 P’yǒngyang-centered historiography, in North Korea, 151–156 P’yǒnsaguk (Committee for Historical Compilation), 96 Qianlong (Emperor), 171 Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE), 18–19, 20; Dongyi continuity from pre- to post, 34–35; Dongyi discontinuity from pre- to post-, 35–38; Nanyue and, 25 Qing dynasty (1644-1911 CE), 8; Chosŏn dynasty’s relationship with, 68–69, 71; decline of, 178; Forbidden Policy relaxed by, 168; Manchuria during, 168, 171–173; yi in, 19 Qin Kai, 133n158 Qu Yuan, 199–200 Random Treatise of Yi Ik. See Sŏngho sasŏl Records of Grand Historian. See Shiji Records of the Three Kingdoms. See Sanguozhi Reiss, Ludwig, 91 ren (human being), 17 Ri Chilin, 118, 145–147 Roger, Michael, 47 Roh Moo-hyun, 2

Index Roh Taw-woo, 158 Russian scholarship, on Manchuria, 169–170 Sadae chuŭi, 84n29 Saga of King Tongmyǒng. See Tongmyǒngwang p’yǒn Saigō Takamori, 126n12 Samguk sagi (The History of the Three Kingdoms) (Kim Pusik), 3, 6, 38, 46, 175; critiques of, 49–50; earlier version of, 48; nationalism critique of, 50; origin and creation of, 48–49; Silla’s chronology in, 54; structure and influence of, 52–53; Tan’gun omission in, 50, 51 Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms) (Iryǒn), 38, 175–176; ancient history components in, 55; Kija in, 54; Ko Chosǒn in, 53–54; Koryǒ dynasty commissioning, 52; Tan’gun included in, 53; Wiman in, 54 San Gaoseng Zhuan (Biography of Prominent Monks from the Liang, Tang, and Song Dyanasties), 52 Sanguozhi (Records of the Three Kingdoms) (Chen Shou), 5, 16, 32; Chaoxian records in, 29–30 seikanron, 92, 96, 126n12 Sejo (King), 60 Sejong (King), 65 Sejong sillok chiri chi (The Geographical Treatise in the Veritable Records of King Sejong), 61, 62 Self-Reliance Ideology. See Juche Shang oracle bone inscriptions, 16–17 Shang people, 5, 16–17, 189n38, 189n39 She He, 29, 31 Shiji (Records of Grand Historian) (Sima Qian), 3, 5, 15–16, 32; Chaoxian records in, 28–29; Hanshu similarities with, 41n30; “others” in, 20–21; Wiman and, 119; Xiongnu records in, 21–22 Shinsen shōjiroku (New Registration of Surnames), 147 Shiratori Kurakichi, 113 Shun, 17

229

Silla Kingdom: fall of, 46–47; historical records of, 45–46; Koguryŏ compared to, 33; Koryǒ heritage with Koguryŏ or, 47–48; legitimacy of, 61; Samguk sagi and chronology of, 54; South Korean interest in, 179, 197, 205n1; Tongguk t’onggam and phases of, 64 Sima Qian, 20–21, 21–22, 22, 24, 28–29, 32, 41n30. See also Shiji Sin Ch’aeho, 7, 50, 97, 117, 128n58, 128n59; death of, 99; on Korean ethnicity, 99–100; on Manchuria, 100, 177–178; nationalist historiography and, 98–100; Pak Ǔnsik compared to, 98; on Tan’gun, 100; Wiman and, 100 Sinjip (Yi Munjin), 45 Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (New Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea), 65–66 Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), 170–171 Sino-ROK diplomatic negotiation, 192n87 Siyi, 18 slave society, North Korean historiography and, 138, 151, 154, 156, 179 Smith, Anthony, 9 So Chunghwa (Minor Universal Civilization), 90 Social Darwinism, 100, 178 social status system, nationalism and elimination of, 12n22 socio-economic historiography, 97, 140 Sǒgi (Ko Hŭng), 45 Sǒ Hǔi, 47 Sŏ Kŏjŏng, 64–65 Son Chint’ae, 105, 106 Song Hojǒng, 115 Sŏngho sasŏl (Random Treatise of Yi Ik) (Yi Ik), 74 Sŏng Samje, 112 Songs of Emperors and Kings. See Chewang ungi South Korea: establishment of, 7; internal development theory in, 129n96; North Korea

230

Index

communication with, 158–160; North Korean historiography and criticism of, 159; Silla Kingdom and interest of, 179, 197, 205n1; World Cup of 2002 in, 198. See also Korea South Korean ancient history studies, 106; amateur and professional historian disputes in, 109–112, 179–180, 197–198; archaeology and, 113; Chindan hakbo and, 107; decolonization and, 108–109; Four Han Commanderies and unresolved issues in, 120–122; Kija and unresolved issues in, 116; Ko Chosǒn and unresolved issues in, 115; Mimana and unresolved issues in, 122–124; northern origin hypothesis and, 113; Tan’gun and unresolved issues in, 114–116; Wiman and unresolved issues in, 117–120. See also ancient history, Korean; Japanese scholarship on Korean history; Korean historiography South Manchuria Railway Company, 188n22 South-North States. See Nambukguk sidae Soviet Union, North Korea communication with, 156–158 The Studies on Chosǒn Territory. See Abang Kangyŏk ko Suksin, 102, 128n64, 177. See also Sushen, in Manchuria Sun Yat-sen, 172, 188n30 Sushen, in Manchuria, 168. See also Suksin Syngman Rhee, 106, 110 Taedonggang munmyǒng (Taedong River Civilization), 7 Taedong River Civilization. See Taedonggang munmyǒng Taehan Tongnip sǒn’ǒn (Korean Declaration of Independence), 101 T’aejo (King), 60 T’aejong (King), 59, 60 Taejonggyo, 102–103

Tan’gun, 6–7, 36, 61, 63, 152; amateur and professional historian disputes over, 110, 111; Chewang ungi and, 55–56; Chosŏn dynasty, historiographical debates on Kija and, 69, 82; Christian problems with worship of, 131n133; evolving perceptions of, 195–196; Japanese scholarship on Korean history and, 95–96; nationalism and, 115; postwar scholarship on, 179; P’yoje ŭmju Tongguk saryak and, 66–67; Samguk sagi omission of, 50, 51; Samguk yusa including, 53; Sin Ch’aeho on, 100; Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam and, 65–66; South Korean ancient history studies and unresolved issues with, 114–116; tomb of, 112, 139, 151–153; Tongguk t’onggam and, 64; Tongguk yŏkdae ch’ongmok on legitimacy of, 74–75; Tongsa kangmok and, 76–77; Tongsa (Hŏ Mok) on lineage of, 72–73; Tongsa (Yi Chonghwi) on lineage of, 78–79 Tan’gun mausoleum, 138, 139, 152–153, 154 Tanjong (King), 60 Tan’o ceremony, 199 textbook controversies and revisions, 4, 110, 111–112, 124–125, 201–202, 204, 207n26 Three Dynasty Chronology Project, 192n78, 199, 205n7 Three Kingdoms period (1st century BCE?-668 CE), 6; historical records in, 45, 46, 175, 176; reunification in later, 47. See also Samguk sagi tianxia, 134n172 Tokugawa Shogunate, 91 Tokyo Imperial University, 91 tombs: keyhole, 200–201; of Tan’gun, 112, 139, 151–153 Tongbuga yǒksa chaedan (Northeast Asian History Foundation), 2, 137, 183 Tongguk chiri chi (Treatise on Geography of Chosŏn) (Han Paekkyŏm), 71–72

Index Tongguk t’onggam (Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom) (Sŏ Kŏjŏng and No Sasin), 64–65 Tongguk t’onggam chegang (Outline of a Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom) (Hong Yŏha), 73–74 Tongguk yŏkdae ch’ongmok (Encyclopedia of the Eastern State) (Hong Manjong), 74–75 Tong’i Ch’onggi (Comprehensive Records of the Eastern Barbarians), 79 Tong’i people, 79, 81, 110. See also Dongyi Tongmyŏng (King), 49–50, 51–52 Tongmyǒngwang p’yǒn (Saga of King Tongmyǒng) (Yi Kyubo), 51–52 Tongsa (Eastern Affairs) (Hŏ Mok), 72–73 Tongsa (Eastern History) (Yi Chonghwi), 78–79 Tongsa hoegang (Outline of Eastern History) (Im Sangdŏk), 75–76 Tongsa kangmok (Annotated Account of Eastern History) (An Chŏngbok), 76–77 Tonguk saryak (Concise History of the Eastern State) (Kwŏn Kŭn), 61, 62–63, 85n66 Tong Zhuchen, 189n38 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 68 To Yuho, 142, 143 Treatise on Geography of Chosŏn. See Tongguk chiri chi Treat of Tianjin of 1858, 39n15 Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876, 89 Tributary System, Xiongnu and, 5, 24–25 Tungus, 39n24, 113, 143, 170 U (King), 69, 86n89 Ugǒ (King), 29, 57, 146 UNESCO World Cultural Heritage, 182, 199 Ŭngjesi chu (Commentary on Ŭngjesi) (Kwŏn Nam), 62–63 Unified Silla period (668-935 CE), 46, 68, 148

231

United States historical studies, on Manchuria, 193n91 Various Issues in History. See Yŏksa che munje Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty. See Ming Shilu Victoria (Queen), 19 Wang Jianqun, 123 Wang Kǒn, 47 Weilüe Jiben, 30 Weiman Chaoxian, 29, 30, 42n43, 42n45, 134n162 Wei Qing, 133n157 Wen (Emperor), 23, 25, 26, 68 Wen Jiabao, 184 Wen of Zhou (King), 17 Wiman, 50–51, 107; in Chewang ungi, 57; Houhanshu and, 119; as Ko Chosǒn patriot, 107, 118; Ri Chilin on, 146; in Samguk yusa, 54, 57; Shiji and, 119; Sin Ch’aeho and, 100; South Korean ancient history studies and unresolved issues with, 117–120; Tongsa kangmok and, 76; as traitor, 70, 71, 117 World Cup of 2002, 198 World War II, Japan and war crimes during, 4 Wu (Emperor), 20–21, 23, 27 Wu Dawei, 2 Wufu system, China’s zones and, 43n65 Xiongnu, 5, 15, 20, 40n26; Han dynasty appeasement policy and, 22–23, 37; Han dynasty exiles in, 40n29; Han dynasty military confrontations with, 23–24, 40n27; Hanshu records on, 25; historical records on, 21–22; Houhanshu records on, 21; marriage customs of, 40n28; Shiji records on, 21–22; Tributary System and, 5, 24–25; Western scholarship on origin of, 39n24 Xuantu Commandery, 31, 121, 166 Xu Jing, 48 Xu Shen, 17

232

Index

Yamato Japan, 68, 96 Yan, 132n155, 133n158 yangban status system, 12n22 Yang Pu, 28 Yangzi River valley, 187n2 Yao (King), 22, 62, 63, 64 Yellow Emperor. See Huangdi Yemaek people, 81 yi, 5, 15; ban on use of, 39n15; contemporary meanings of, 16; directional associations of, 18; Han dynasty distinction of, 19; on King Kwanggaet’o stele, 33; origins of, 17; in Qing dynasty, 19; Shang oracle bone inscriptions and, 17; Tongsa kangmok on distinction of hua and, 77. See also barbarians; Dongyi; “others” Yi Chinhŭi, 122–123 Yi Chonghwi, 78–79, 190n54 Yi Chong’uk, 183–184 Yi Ik, 71, 74 Yi Kibaek, 109, 129n96 Yi Kyubo, 49, 51–52 Yi Munjin, 45 Yi Pangwŏn, 59 Yi Pyǒngdo, 98, 106–107, 118, 120, 129n87 Yi Sŏnggye, 59, 60, 69, 86n89 Yi Sŭnghyu, 55–58, 72 Yi Usǒng, 47, 109 Yodong, 63, 82, 147, 151. See also Liaodong

Yŏksa che munje (Various Issues in History), 144 Yŏksa kwahak (Historical Science), 144, 145, 150 yǒllin minjok chuǔi (Open Nationalism), 114 Yŏn Kaesomunn, 178 Youqu (King), 30–31. See also Ugǒ (King) Yuan dynasty (1271-1398 CE), 52, 58 Yuanjian, 36 Yu Huan, 30 Yu Hŭiryŏng, 61, 66–67 Yun Naehyǒn, 111 Yun Ǒnyi, 48 Yu Tŭkkong, 71, 176–177 Zhang Boquan, 189n38 Zhang Pengyi, 30 Zhao Tuo, 25–26, 27–28 Zhenfan Commandery, 31, 121, 166 Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin (Center of China’s Borderland History and Geography Research), 180–181 Zhonghang Yue, 24–25, 40n28 Zhou bronze inscriptions, 17–18 Zhou dynasty, 5, 17–18; barbarian alliances with, 20; Qin and Chu expansion of, 18–19 Zhou Wen Wang, 17 zhuiji/zhuijie, 30, 120 Zhu Xi, 61 Zhu Yuanzhang, 58

About the Author

Stella Xu is an associate professor of history at Roanoke College in Virginia, where she teaches East Asian history. She received her Ph.D. at the University of California at Los Angles. Her essays and book reviews have appeared in Korean Studies, Journal of Korean Studies, Pacific Affairs, ASIANetwork Exchange: A Journal for Asian Studies in the Liberal Arts, Women and Social Movement in the United States, 1600–2000, and Japanese Studies Association Journal.

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