Migration From North Africa and The Middle East: Skilled Migrants, Development and Globalisation 9780755608508, 9781780767130

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This volume is dedicated to all Arab migrants who have lent their skills to their new homes and to the participants in the CARIM-South.1 Experts and Policy-Makers meetings, co-financed by the European Union and held in Florence, Dakar and Beirut.2

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND CHARTS

Figures Figure 2.1. Arab migration stocks by level of education and region of residence (thousand values), c.2005. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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Figure 2.2. Proportion of highly skilled persons among migrants and the origin population, age group 25 – 34, c.2005. Source: own elaboration on data from Arab national statistical institutes and from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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Figure 2.3. Unemployment rate among the illiterate and graduates in Egypt and Tunisia, 1980– 2011. Source: own elaboration on Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics; Tunisia, ‘Institut National de la Statistique’.

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Figure 2.4. Proportion (in %) of highly skilled Lebanese migrants in Australia and Canada by generation (a) and duration of stay (b), 2006. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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Figure 2.5. Proportions (in %) of highly skilled Algerian, Egyptian and Mexican migrants in North American and European states, c.2005. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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Figure 3.1. Stock of migrants by origin country in main destination areas around 2000. Source: Beine, Doqcuier & Marfouk, 2009.

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Figure 3.2. Share of highly skilled migrants to main destination areas in 2005. Source: DIOC-OECD.

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Figure 3.3. Share of migrants to home labour force by skills in 2005. Source: DIOC-OECD.

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Figure 3.4. Enrolment in Tertiary Education in 1990, 2000 and 2007. Source: UNESCO.

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Figure 11.1. Concentration of higher educational levels in the various populations according to propensity to migrate.

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Charts Chart 8.1. Net migration, arrivals and departures of Jordanians (1990– 2012). Source: Public Security Directorate, data on entries and departures, published in the Central Bank of Jordan’s Monthly Statistical Bulletins.

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Chart 8.2. Remittances of expatriate Jordanians (1961– 2012). Source: Central Bank of Jordan.

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Tables Table 2.1. Proportion of highly skilled migrants from selected Arab countries to OECD countries by origin, destination and generation c.2005. Source: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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LIST OF TABLES , FIGURES AND CHARTS

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Table 2.2. Egyptian migrants and highly skilled migrants in Arab countries in 2007. Source: CAPMAS, www.capmas.gov.eg.

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Table 2.3. Comparative framework of admission policies in 11 OECD countries of destination.

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Table 2.A.1. Proportion of migrants with a tertiary education by country of origin, country of destination and generation. Source: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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Table 3.1. Total and Highly Skilled Emigration Rate c.2000 Source: OCDE, 2011, DIOC.

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Table 3.2. Over-education and over-occupation of workers in various countries. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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Table 3.3. Growth of tertiary education and emigration rate.

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Table 6.1. The evolution of the active Lebanese population and the number of active university graduates, 1997–2007 (in thousands).

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Table 6.2. The evolution of the number of Lebanese residents and the number of university graduates employed in the different economic sectors, 1997– 2007, according to gender (number in thousands and average growth rate in % by year).

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Table 6.3. Evolution of the number of Lebanese residents and the number of university graduates employed in the public sector, 1997– 2007, according to gender (number in thousands and average growth rate in % per year).

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Table 6.4. Emigration rate and unemployment rate, 1997– 2007, in the total active population and in the active graduate population (in %). 102 Table 6.5. Distribution of graduates, male and females, who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to departure reasons (in %).

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Table 6.6. Distribution of university graduates, male and female, who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to destination country (in %).

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Table 6.7. Distribution of graduates, male and female, who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to their occupation in 2007 (in %).

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Table 6.8. Distribution of university graduate male and female who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to the country of their degree (in %).

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Table 6.9. Distribution of male and female graduates who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to specialisation (in %).

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Table 6.10. Distribution of graduates who emigrated, 1997–2007, and their activity rate, according to specialisation and occupation in 2007 (in %).

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Table 6.11. Distribution of male and female university graduates who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to the profession practised in 2007 (in %).

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Table 6.12. Distribution of male and female graduates, who emigrated, 1997–2007, according to the frequency of visits to their country of origin (in %).

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Table 6.13. Distribution of male and female graduates who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to the frequency of financial aid sent back to the country of origin (in %).

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Table 6.14. Distribution of male and female graduates, who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to their intention to return permanently to the country of origin (in %).

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Table 6.15. Distribution of active and inactive graduates, who emigrated, 1997– 2007, according to their intention to return permanently to their country of origin (in %).

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Table 6.16. Distribution of graduates, who emigrated, 1997–2007, according to their intention to return permanently to the country of origin and according to the country of residence (in %).

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Table 8.1. Jordanian workers in oil-producing countries: some estimates.

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LIST OF TABLES , FIGURES AND CHARTS

Table 9.1. Occupations of Egyptian migrants in Arab countries, 1985 and 2002. Source: Ministry of Manpower and Emigration in CARIM, in World Bank (2008).

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Table 9.2. Unemployment rate by education. Source: Based on CAPMAS estimates in 2005 by Mohamed Hassan and Cyrus Sassanpour, ‘Labour Market Pressures in Egypt: Why is the Unemployment Rate Stubbornly High?’. Source, (2012) CAPMAS ‘unemployed rate & annual estimates of labor status by education status and sex’ On line at: http:// www.capmas.gov.eg/pages_ar.aspx?pageid¼ 1504. 155 Table 10.1. Evolution of the budget of the Higher-Education Ministry (in million T.D.). Source: Ministry for Higher Education.

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Table 10.2. Evolution of number of students and graduates 2005–19. Source: Ministry for Higher Education, 2008.

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Table 10.3. Evolution of unemployment rate by educational level (in %). Source: National Institute of Statistics: General Census of Population and the Habitat (1984, 1994, 2004)/ National Survey on Employment (1999, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012).

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Table 10.4. Distribution of unemployed graduates according to graduate type (2006– 11). Source: National Institute of Statistics, Annual survey on employment, 2012.

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Table 10.5. Evolution of the number of skilled emigrants by category. Source: National Institute of Statistics, National Survey on Population and Employment.

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Table 11.1. Index of improvement (IA) in tertiary education Moroccans residing abroad at the beginning and in 2005 for each country of residence (in %). Source: Hassan II Foundation: ‘Moroccans residing abroad.

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The use of remittances. Survey results’, Research Institute for the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad. 2008.

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Table 11.2. Overall costs for training an engineer at the National Institute of Postal and Telecommunications Services (INPT), academic year 2007/2008 (in Dirhams). Source: Estimates on the basis of data from the Ministry of National Education and the National Institute of Postal and Telecommunications Services.

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Table 13.1. Number of Sudanese expatriates in some Arab countries. Source: Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad 2009.

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Table 13.2. Highly skilled Sudanese migrants by profession in 2010. Source: IOM, 2011.

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Table 13.3. Number of authenticated contracts during 1998–2007 by country of destination. Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development, 2009.

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Notes 1. http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/. 2. Thematic Session on Highly-Skilled Migration into, through and from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa; First Meeting between Experts and Policymakers on “Highly-Skilled Migration into, through and from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa”; Second Meeting between Experts and Policymakers on “Highly-Skilled Migration into, through and from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa”.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Philippe Fargues and Alessandra Venturini*

One out of four Arab migrants in the West has a university education. As elsewhere around the globe, those who leave Arab countries are typically more educated than those who stay. Education raises individuals’ expectations and, at the same time, creates opportunities in distant labour markets. This makes education a powerful migration driver. Several factors explain a worldwide emerging trend of highly skilled migration. We mention some here: tertiary education has risen everywhere and numbers of migration-prone graduates are booming; inequalities of income between countries have not receded, and this applies to highly skilled, as well as to low-skilled workers; information on employment conditions abroad circulates more than ever, to such an extent, indeed, that the labour market is becoming truly global in certain sectors; gaps in education between countries are continuously diminishing, so that skills acquired in one country can be employed in another. International highly skilled migration has become more controversial as it has become more frequent. Mainstream policy makers and development specialists in origin countries tend to see migration as brain drain or as brain flight, according to whether they explain migration in terms of the pull effect of the destination countries or the free choice of migrants. Those denouncing brain drain see developing countries as victims of more advanced predator economies, while those blaming brain flight point to collective interests being sacrificed to private ambitions. These schematic visions, however, do not fully

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reflect a more nuanced reality and interests that may be less conflictual than they, at first, seem. Confronted with the challenge of fostering development, most countries in the global south have expended considerable efforts promoting and spreading primary, then secondary and tertiary education. However, educating the young costs less than creating jobs for the tertiary-educated. Certainly, the kind of education provided by universities does not always correspond to the skills that local employers are looking for. As a result, specific shortages in highly skilled labour can coexist with generalised graduate unemployment. The drop in status of university education and the consequent frustration, explains, in part, why so many young graduates leave their country. The deficit in governance, which is in part responsible for the underor unemployment of local skills, operates against the backdrop of states’ disengagement from the social economy and wealth redistribution. This disengagement is usually the result of structural adjustment programmes adopted under IMF pressure in the 1980s and 1990s. Migrants, in fact, often represent a small, non-detrimental, percentage of the total number of graduates in countries where there are large numbers of graduates: e.g. Egypt where 1.5 per cent of graduates aged 25–34, in 2006, have emigrated. However, migrants represent, instead, a high percentage in countries where emigration is both intense and highly skilled: e.g. 10.5 per cent in Lebanon. And they represent an even higher percentage in countries where university education is not yet widespread: 16.8 per cent in Morocco and 44.1 per cent in Syria. There is a threshold below which the emigration of highly educated people cannot be regarded as brain-drain. Moreover, in any calculations the place where tertiary education was acquired matters: was the MENA graduate educated at home at his or her country’s expense or in the destination country? In sharp contrast with their often strongly critical discourses against brain drain, Arab states have barely implemented tools to adapt to, or to take advantage of, the emigration of their graduates. While all countries have put in place institutions to liaise with expatriates, these institutions have mostly worked along two lines simultaneously: attracting migrants’ financial remittances; and reviving Arab and Muslim identity, especially among the sons and daughters of migrants established in nonArab, non-Muslim countries. No specific action was taken to attract the knowledge of highly skilled migrants thereby fostering what has been

INTRODUCTION

3

called ‘social’ or ‘ideational’ remittances. Indeed, relations between Arab states and their expatriate elites have more often than not been marked by mutual distrust. Arab communities in the West have traditionally included political opponents to long-established regimes at home. Arriving in destination countries as students or professionals, voluntarily or in exile, some played a role in the revolutions and uprisings that broke out in 2011, particularly in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. The present volume comprises a selection of papers that were prepared for three meetings held in November 2009 in Florence, in March 2010 in Dakar and, in September 2010 in Beirut, in the framework of a research programme on highly skilled migration in the Arab region and Sub-Saharan Africa carried out by the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) as part of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC)1 at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. All the papers were updated between December 2012 and April 2013, to take into account new statistical data, legislation, policies and debates. In particular, new visions on highly skilled migration that the Arab uprisings and associated developments may have fostered were factored in. Three broad survey chapters review the characteristics of all highly skilled immigrants in the destination countries; their geography (Di Bartolomeo and Fargues), their role in the sending countries (Nazariani and Venturini); and their political role overall (Tabar). Di Bartolomeo and Fargues looked at the determinants and processes driving highly skilled Arab migration at both the sending and the receiving ends. They found that selective destination policies and labour market needs matter more than origin factors in explaining Arab educational profiles abroad and its change over the last generation. Unemployment and low returns on education at home explain the rest. The authors also found a significant divide between Mashrek and Maghreb migrants, with the former having, on average, higher skills than the latter. According to the authors, the reasons underlying these geographic differentials is to be found in history and origin-destination ties. Specifically, the Mashrek’s long emigration history – which started in Ottoman times – has fuelled a culture of emigration with education becoming a strategy for gaining a position in the world economy at individual as well as at state level. In the Maghreb, on the other hand,

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colonial ties have long triggered the emigration of low-skilled workers, who were later joined by family members, i.e. persons belonging to the same social class. Venturini and Nazariani point out that highly skilled migration is not limited to less developed countries. It is, indeed, present in many European countries, even if they are at different stages in human capital development terms. The population size of the country is not relevant in forecasting the dimensions of outflows, while population size does help forecast the damaging effect of highly skilled emigration in small countries of origin. The limited perceived drain effect of highly skilled migration is accompanied by unexpected levels of brain waste in the labour market of destination countries and is higher in labour markets that are more favourable to highly skilled work: the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Put simply the larger the number of accesses the higher the possibility for subsequent downgrading for some of them. Countries of origin face a dilemma: should they invest in more education and by this increase the future amount of highly skilled emigrants. This dilemma should be approached with pragmatic policies fostering monetary and human capital returns for home countries. Tabar stresses that it is not only the lack of economic opportunities in the south-eastern Mediterranean and the Sub-Saharan countries which spur highly skilled migration. There is also the question of unstable and oppressive political regimes. While the social remittances of migrants tend to change the culture of non-migrants in the origin countries, migrant communities are also increasingly engaged in trans-local and homeland politics. Each of the country chapters which follow frames both the contingent and structural characteristics of highly skilled migration and the effect of education and migration policies there. Sudan experienced highly skilled emigration long before the Arab Spring. But the number of professionals, university professors and medical doctors (60 per cent abroad) who have now gone to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries has increased greatly in the last decade. There is a mismatch between the results of educational reforms and limited labour market options. The first over-produces highly skilled workers and the second offers emigration as a short-term solution, but reduces the longterm benefits of investment in education both for economic and social development. The failure of the ‘Sudanese Spring’ could be imputed to

INTRODUCTION

5

the lack of a local political elite, due to the emigration of many of its members, who have little intention of returning; as well as to governmental indifference to highly skilled outflows. Jordan has long an ‘open door policy’, which does not oppose the emigration of the highly skilled and which does not invest in attracting them back because, in the past, many migrants were of Palestinian origin. For a long time Jordanian workers were cast as being part of a ‘regional labour market’. This position was supported by the Jordanian monarchy. Indeed, the monarchy saw emigration as a pressure valve against future political and economic discontent. of a possible future elite. Emigration was, thus, the best option for an increasing number of frustrated graduates in search of employment and career options: Jordan has growing university enrolment. These did not find a job because of the lack of opportunities and because of the Wasta (intermediation) system of job allocation, which fails to promote the brightest. Only recently the Ministry of Labour stressed that intensive migration is a short-run solution that damages long-run development and underlined the Jordanian government’s attempts to attract foreign investment (successful only in the ICT), not least from the diaspora abroad. Lebanon too had a long tradition of emigration with a large diaspora in far-off countries. This diaspora included highly skilled emigration due to the very high level of human capital development in Lebanon – Lebanese university enrolment is higher than in southern Europe – and due also to the chronic lack of opportunities at home. Outflows increased in the last decade because of an increase in the number of graduates, in general, and because of the even larger increase in women graduates in search of jobs. The growth of employed graduates reached 8 per cent on average per year against a not comparable GDP growth of 3 per cent, and university graduates reached, in 2007, 28 per cent of the labour force. If, on the one hand, emigration is in Lebanese culture and many nationals consider it a temporary or, in any case, a not definitive separation; on the other hand, the country, while in contact and attracting capital from the diaspora, has lost a dynamic elite capable of innovating in and reforming the region. The country that cares most about attracting the highly skilled home and in promoting the rights of highly skilled migrants abroad is Palestine. The emigration of highly skilled citizens there is perceived as a strategy to improve the survival of the country through

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remittances and the return of enriched human capital. However, political and security instability leads to ‘hardship and hopelessness especially for the young’ (Lubbad, 2008), who move abroad. Their return seems crucial for the building up of a Palestinian state, thus the PA should not only encourage their return, but should facilitate their establishment in Palestine. The permanent return of highly skilled migrants is encouraged too by TOKTEN (the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals). TOKTEN is a managed temporary return programme organised by the United Nations in conjunction with local institutions in origin countries. The programme provides an opportunity for expatriates to return to their homeland for a short period and to undertake consultancy missions there. The participants come as international experts who receive only a daily allowance and a round-trip ticket and who are engaged in specific and necessary projects. The programme incentivises the return of highly skilled expatriates. But it is difficult to evaluate its short-term, let alone its long-term effects. It seems to be most successful in countries with specific support needs (e.g. Palestine, Sudan and Lebanon); and countries with less structured relations with their diasporas (contrary to Morocco and Egypt). Highly skilled outflows from Egypt to the OECD and the Gulf countries are a recent phenomenon promoted by the Government, a consequence of high graduate unemployment among the educated youth. Returns are quite frequent, in particular among Egyptian migrants in the Gulf States, and 53 per cent of returnees consider their experience abroad professionally useful, something which can also improve their career prospects at home. After 2011, however, emigration to the Gulf was limited by destination governments, afraid of spreading protest. Europe became, increasingly, an important destination both for highly and low-skilled workers. Highly skilled emigrants from Mauritania are few in number. Most settle in the Gulf countries, especially since the Arabization of the education system, which produces Islamic magistrates, teachers and preachers. The lack of job opportunities in science pushes individuals to abandon the country for better paid jobs abroad. Political exiles and simple expatriates in Western countries may be few in number but they feel politically involved in the life of their home country. Occasionally they have been involved directly in the government without, however,

INTRODUCTION

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being able to cope with the poor quality of education and the lack of human capital, something which is particularly acute for doctors and technicians. Important reforms are needed and the diaspora could make these work, both in terms of providing competences and in terms of Mauritania’s acquisition of a good international reputation. Central Maghreb countries have had similar but, at the same time, different stories. Tunisia invested in education and, what is more, in quality education, in the last 10 years. Unfortunately, though, the country has been unable to produce enough jobs for graduates, and here there were also large numbers of women. Emigration was, thus, seen as a solution to rising unemployment among the better educated: 2.3 per cent in 1984, 3.8 per cent in 1994, 10.2 per cent in 2004 and 29.2 per cent in 2011. The increase in discontent among educated but unemployed workers may have played a role in the social and political revolt in Tunisia, while the role of expatriates is unclear. It is, instead, very clear that the present Government has prioritised the protection of highly skilled emigrants and the involvement of the diaspora in Tunisia’s development. In the last 20 years Algeria invested 25 per cent of its GNP in education, increasing the number of medium and highly educated Algerians, but creating, in the process, an excess supply of highly skilled Algerians. Many of these, rather than remain unemployed at home, emigrated and joined the already substantial Algerian diaspora abroad. The Arabisation of education reduced job opportunities offered by international companies, which proliferated after liberalisation. Revision of educational policies and the persistence of patronage and nepotism discouraged the return, meanwhile, of expatriates and any real involvement on the part of the diaspora. Something is, however, changing both because the government seems finally to grasp the importance of mobilising expatriates and because civil society has created the Algerian Association of Competence (ACA) to organise human capital at home and abroad. MOROCCO is, in many ways, an exception to the scenarios described above. Thanks to the reforms introduced in the 1990s and to the establishment of the Advisory Council by Hassan II and the elimination of art, 19 of the constitution the power of the King has been limited. There was also the sense of a fresh start and large social protests were avoided. In fact, Morocco, after the Arab Spring, experienced a return of migrants and inflows of investments from neighbouring countries and,

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indeed, from countries further away. Highly skilled migration remains a problem for the country and the drain on engineers is perhaps the most damaging form of migration. But migration is rooted in the complex demography of the country. The sheer range of different experiences under examination here makes it difficult to draw any generalised conclusions. But a better balance between education expansion and job availability in the labour market should reduce the pressure for emigration and a more active policy in attracting highly skilled human resources back home might reduce the cost of and favour long run development. After all, highly skilled circulation is functional and can bring benefits both for sending and destination countries.

Notes * We would like to thank Pauline Depierreux and Simon Young for helping us to edit this volume. 1. http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu.

CHAPTER 2 THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION Anna Di Bartolomeo and Philippe Fargues

Introduction Several years before the Arab revolts of 2011, a team of renowned Arab scholars and thinkers issued a series of reports on the state of their region. The Arab Human Development Reports, as they were called, opened a heated debate on why democracy and development had largely failed in this part of the world. The authors identified three deficits, which they believed were responsible: a deficit in civil and political freedom; a lack of women’s agency and power; and too little production and dissemination of knowledge (UNDP, 2002). The Arab Human Development Report on knowledge stressed that, not only were ‘Arab countries [...] far behind the leading developing countries [. . .] in the quality and quantity of their knowledge capital’ (p. 5), but also that this capital benefitted non-Arab as much as, if not more than, Arab states and economies: ‘arguably, [the] emigration of highly qualified Arabs to the West has been one of the most serious factors undermining knowledge acquisition in Arab countries. It is no exaggeration to characterise this outflow as a haemorrhage. The trend is large-scale and is steadily accelerating’ (p. 144) (UNDP, 2003). However, the Arab Human Development Reports failed to provide the levels, trends and patterns of highly skilled emigration from Arab countries because their authors lacked data. The result was that they

Figure 2.1 Arab migration stocks by level of education and region of residence (thousand values), c.2005. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

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22.3% 26.1% 28.3% 33.6% 40.6% 47.2% 50.2% 51.4% 52.7% 55.8% 30.4%

Young

Generation 18.6% 17.2% 18.1% 47.9% 36.9% 37.6% 16.2% 51.4% 46.4% 51.6% 23.6%

Old

Source: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

Morocco Tunisia Algeria Sudan Syria Lebanon Libya Palestine Jordan Egypt All origins

Country

A – By country of origin

Australia Belgium Canada Denmark France Greece Italy Spain Sweden United Kingdom United States All OECD

Country 32.3% 22.9% 68.6% 12.7% 29.5% 21.9% 8.8% 9.8% 22.9% 52.2% 53.9% 30.4%

Young

Generation

B – By country of destination

24.7% 12.9% 59.1% 28.1% 18.2% 29.0% 10.1% 14.5% 21.7% 47.8% 51.1% 23.6%

Old

Table 2.1 Proportion of highly skilled migrants from selected Arab countries to OECD countries by origin, destination and generation c.2005

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION 11

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failed to answer fundamental questions. For example, what is the magnitude of the phenomenon? Is highly skilled migration a ‘haemorrhage’ or, instead, a safety valve? If a safety valve what are its determinants? Does it affect the different parts of the Arab region in the same way or does it vary from state to state? Does highly skilled migration respond to conditions at home or, instead, to conditions in the host countries? Is highly skilled migration an obstacle to, or a consequence of, the acquisition of human capital in the region? This chapter will examine the contrasted geography of highly skilled migration and its authors will ask what geography reveals about the determinants of the phenomenon, with the first part focusing on the origin and the second part on the destination of migration flows. This study will be based on the most recent data at the time of writing, the OECD database of population censuses. However, the picture it provides is only partial as the Gulf States – major destinations for migrants from the Mashrek – provide no immigrant statistics by level of education and so there is an important gap in the information we have to hand.

A persisting divide: Mashrek vs Maghreb Universities and the long distance mobility of scholars have a long history in the Arab world, but their spectacular growth is recent. On average, 30.4 per cent of Arab migrants to the ‘West’ (actually to OECD countries), who were aged 25 –34 in 2005 (i.e. born in 1970– 9: ‘young generations’), have tertiary education, a significantly larger proportion compared with 23.6 per cent among those aged 35 and above (born before 1970: ‘old generations’). The only exception to this rule are the Sudanese, where there are more university-educated migrants among the ‘old’ generations. This is likely linked to a shift in the regional origin and status of Sudanese migrants, particularly with the surge in refugees from Southern Sudan and Darfur, where tertiary education is less developed than in Northern Sudan. Space variations, however, are much more marked than time variations and these show a contrasted geographic pattern with a clearcut divide between the two regions, which Arab geographers have distinguished from time immemorial: the Mashrek (Egypt and the east) and the Maghreb (west of Egypt). Indeed, emigration from the Maghreb

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION

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is predominantly low skilled, while emigration from the Mashrek is predominantly highly skilled, with Sudan lying somewhere between them (Table 2.1). This difference applies to the old as well as to the younger generations. Before discussing country-of-origin differences in more detail, it is necessary to stress that Table 2.1 covers only migration to OECD countries. The OECD (actually Europe) is the destination for most migrants from the Maghreb. But this does not apply to the Mashrek whose migrants go primarily to the Gulf States and to other Arab countries, like Jordan and Libya for Egyptians and Lebanon for Syrians.1 On the other hand, it seems that Arab migrants to Arab countries are predominantly low-skilled workers. Data are extremely scarce. But Egyptian statistics on work permits issued to Egyptians in the Gulf States and other Arab countries (Table 2.2) suggest the low-skilled character of this migration. The three largest Egyptian communities in Arab countries stand at only 29.4 per cent (Saudi Arabia), 27.2 per cent Table 2.2 Egyptian migrants and highly skilled migrants in Arab countries in 2007 Migrants with higher education Country Gulf States

Other states Total

Saudi Arabia Kuwait U.A.E. Qatar Oman Bahrain Jordan Lebanon Others*

All migrants

Number

%

449,493 193,185 110,095 32,473 9,817 2,814 148,671 6,990 2,696 956,234

132,124 52,558 40,746 10,568 6,329 2,005 6,169 593 1,165 252,257

29.4% 27.2% 37.0% 32.5% 64.5% 71.3% 4.1% 8.5% 43.2% 26.4%

*Libya not included. Egyptians who are working in Arab countries and who have obtained work permits in these countries. Data collected by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) from the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration. Source: CAPMAS, www.capmas.gov.eg.

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(Kuwait) and 4.1 per cent (Jordan) highly skilled migrants, compared with an average of 55.8 per cent among young Egyptians in OECD countries.2 It may be the case that what is true for Egyptians (who are the first nationality among Arab migrants to Arab countries) is not true for others. However, because the Gulf States and Libya do not produce any detailed data on immigrants to their countries, we can go no further and we must leave aside a large part of emigration from the Mashrek, which is probably less skilled than migration elsewhere. So why is Arab migration to the OECD typically low skilled when it originates in the Maghreb and highly skilled when it originates in the Mashrek? Does this reflect education and employment in the origin countries? Is it that the Maghreb produces fewer people with a university education – and, therefore, highly skilled migrants in smaller proportion – than the Mashrek? Or is it, perhaps, that the Maghreb retains its highly skilled population better than the Mashrek? Figure 1,

60% Egypt 50%

Migrants

40%

Jordan

Palestine

Lebanon

Syria

Sudan 30%

20%

Algeria Tunisia Morocoo

10%

0% 0%

10%

20%

30% Origin population

40%

50%

60%

Figure 2.2 Proportion of highly skilled persons among migrants and the origin population, age group 25 – 34, c.2005. Source: own elaboration on data from Arab national statistical institutes and from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION

15

comparing migrants’ educational level with that of their population of origin, offers a partial explanation. Figure 2.2 shows, first, that migrants are systematically more educated than the population from which they originate: all countries lie above the diagonal (dotted line), which represents the state in which the percentage of persons with a university education would be the same among migrants and the origin population. Migration is everywhere a selective process and education is one of its drivers. Second, Figure 2.2 shows a positive (even though weak r ¼ þ0.41) correlation: the more universities produce graduates, the more the country produces tertiaryeducated emigrants. Third, a neat geographic pattern appears. Maghreb countries and Sudan are all in the lower-left quarter, due to a belowaverage proportion of people with tertiary education in both the origin population and among migrants. Mashrek countries, on the other hand, are all in the upper half (above-average proportion of people with a tertiary education in the population of origin), some of them on the left side (under-average emigration of graduates, Syria and Jordan) and 35,0% 30,0% TUN, University

25,0% 20,0% EGY, University

15,0% 10,0%

TUN, Illiterate

5,0% EGY, Illiterate

0,0% 1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Figure 2.3 Unemployment rate among the illiterate and graduates in Egypt and Tunisia, 1980 –2011. Source: own elaboration on Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics; Tunisia, ‘Institut National de la Statistique’.

16 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

others on the right side (over-average emigration of graduates Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon). Schematically, the over-production of graduates results in over-emigration, and the phenomenon should be more marked in the Mashrek than in the Maghreb. Does this mean that persons with a tertiary education are under-rewarded, or under-utilised, in their home country and that the phenomenon is more marked in the Mashrek than in the Maghreb? The steady rise of unemployment among university graduates is a striking phenomenon of recent decades in the Maghreb as well as in the Mashrek. Graduate unemployment reaches unprecedented peaks across the entire Arab world: 20.4 per cent in Morocco at the end of 2011; 20.3 per cent in Algeria in 2010; 29.2 per cent in Tunisia in 2011 and 34.2 per cent in 2012; 20.1 per cent in Egypt mid-2011; 27.2 per cent in Palestine in 2012; 16.0 per cent in Jordan in 2012; and ‘only’ 11.4 per cent in Lebanon in 2009.3 Figure 2.2 shows that graduate unemployment is a relatively new phenomenon. Unemployment’s climb up the rungs of the educational ladder has marked a striking change in the last two decades: see Figure 2.3 for Egypt and Tunisia. Until the 1980s unemployed workers had typically little or no school education: most were illiterate or had an incomplete primary education. With the spread of school education this category shrank, as did unemployment among said category: individuals with no school education now belong to the very poorest sections of society, those who do not even have the means necessary to survive unemployment. Today, most of the unemployed have attended university and many have graduated. Education has developed faster than the opportunities it offers. In the 1960s and 1970s, when education came to be regarded as the avenue to development, several socialist Arab states, following Nasser’s Egypt, guaranteed employment in the public sector to any high school graduate (Vatikiotis, 1991). Families would see state school and university education as an open door for their children’s social promotion. One or two decades later, centrally-planned economies failed and Arab states started, one after another, to follow new IMF rules and to reduce the economic role of the state, including recruitment in public services. Education continued to grow, but it no longer automatically led to a job. Unemployment rose dramatically among graduates. In Morocco, a group, the Association nationale des diploˆme´s choˆmeurs du Maroc, was created in 1991 by ‘unemployed graduates’ who believed themselves to be entitled to a position

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION

17

in the public sector. The Association is still active, more than 20 years later. Indeed, in early 2012, 200 of its members threatened to set themselves on fire if they were not offered a job by the government.4 Moreover, unemployment is strongly gendered. Now that young Arab women attend university at the same rate (and in many places at a higher rate) than men and now too that they seek a job post graduation, a double transformation has occurred: unemployment, which was exclusively male in the past, today hits women at a higher rate than men; and while men eventually find a job, many women marry, effectively withdrawing from job market competition.5 Unemployment and low returns on education from Arab universities are strong reasons for graduates to migrate. But, as they are endemic across the entire region, these issues do not explain our problem: the question of why people with a university education migrate more from the Mashrek than from the Maghreb. In order to understand the difference between the two regions one must call on history and geography. Emigration from Lebanon, Palestine and Syria (‘Greater Syria’) started in the Ottoman era as a movement of individuals intent on making their fortune in a distant world, a world economically unconnected with the one left behind. Arriving in the Americas or Africa, they established their own economic bases, which soon became magnets for further migrants. In their homelands, a culture of emigration started to develop and acquiring education became part of a strategy for gaining a position in the world economy. For their states of origin, the emigration of the highly skilled was not a brain drain so much as an opportunity to expand the nation’s economic networks. Mashrek governments did not discourage their graduates’ expatriation. Indeed, they often facilitated the same. By contrast, emigration from the Maghreb started at the end of the colonial era as a temporary movement of low-skilled workers to feed the home industries of the colonial power. They were not migrating very far and they were destined to return to their countries of birth. Only much later – in the wake of the economic crisis in Western Europe during the second half of the 1970s – did they settle in their host countries. Then, migration continued under family reunion schemes, with new migrants belonging to old migrant families and, therefore, to the same working class as them. Not only were highly skilled migrants fewer than in the Mashrek countries, but home governments regarded highly skilled migration as a brain drain that was detrimental to national development and a disguised continuation of the old predatory colonial order.

18 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Governments tended to facilitate the emigration of their low-skilled citizens as a means to alleviate pressures on the job market.6 However, they saw the emigration of graduates to the West as a form of treason, and this view was reinforced by the fact that a number of students and highly skilled migrants from the Maghreb in Europe had been opponents of the regime in their homeland (Collinson, 1996; Fargues, 2004). The mutual distrust that, from time to time, characterised relations between Maghreb governments and their highly skilled emigrants explained why a number of Algerian students in North America decided to settle there instead of returning to their homeland (Khelfaoui, 2006). In the end these factors mattered as much as low returns on education at home. Migration, however, is not fully explained by looking at the sending end and the country of origin is not a sufficient predictor of the education of its migrants. Migrants with the same national origins have different educational profiles according to their destination. For example, Algerian immigrants in France have the lowest proportion of tertiary-educated persons: respectively 17 per cent and 27 per cent for the old and the young generations. However, in Canada we are at the other end of the scale: 76 per cent and 74 per cent. Only 23 per cent of Egyptian migrants (both young and old) have a university education in Italy against 90 per cent (young) and 76 per cent (old) in Canada. Lebanese migrants are poorly educated in Denmark (9 per cent with a university level in the young generation) and in Sweden (17 per cent), while in France many belong to a highly educated elite (69 per cent). These examples could be multiplied many times over. Indeed, as we are going to see, the country of destination matters even more than the country of origin in determining the educational profile of migrants.

Selecting graduates, workers or relatives? Considering now countries of destination (Table 2.1-B) spatial differences are bigger from 8.8 per cent young Arab migrants with a university degree in Italy to 68.6 per cent in Canada. Typically, non-European countries attract the highly skilled, while the less skilled go to Europe. Time differences are not systematically to the advantage of younger migrants over older. This is the case only for Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the United Kingdom. In Denmark, Greece, Italy and Spain old migrants are better educated, and no significant differences between generations are observed in Sweden and the United States.

1974 - > stop to labour immigration

1974 - > stop to labour immigration

1973 - > stop to labour immigration

BEL

FRA

DEN

Family: 58.9% Work: 9.0% Humanitarian: 32.1% Family: 48.4% Work: 28.9% Humanitarian: 22.7%

Majority of family reunification (Petrovic, 2012)

1. Labour market test: labour entries are possible only if no workers are found in the domestic labour market; 2. Applications must be submitted (before departure) by employers. Labour market test: labour entries are possible only if no workers are found in the domestic labour market. 1. Labour entries are possible only if labour-market demand exists; 2. Applications must be submitted (before departure) by potential migrants presenting an employment contract.

General provisions

(continued )

Competence and Talent Card (2006): simplification of procedures for highly skilled migrants Job Card Scheme (2003): simplification of procedures for highly skilled migrants

No labour market test for highly skilled workers

Provisions for highly skilled

Work admission policies and regulations

Admission policy (1970s - > )

Country

Admissions by category (1996 – 2011)

Comparative framework of admission policies in 11 OECD countries of destination

Table 2.3

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION 19

1972 - > stop to labour immigration

Admission policy (1970s - > ) Family: 56.5% Work: 20.3% Humanitarian: 23.2%

Admissions by category (1996 – 2011) General provisions

Need for highly qualified workers is taken into consideration when establishing the quota None

None

None

Provisions for highly skilled

Work admission policies and regulations

1. Applications must be submitted (before departure) by employers reporting that an available position exists. 2. The Country Labour Board takes the final decision on admission. GRE Since 1990s - > Majority of labour 1. Annual quotas (1998); Immigration country entries (Kasimis, 2. 6 regularisations 1996 – 2009 (First Law 2005) 2012) (c.942,000 foreign nationals). ITA (a) Since 1980s - > Family: 36.8% 1. Annual quotas (1986); Immigration country Work: 61.8% 2. 4 regularisations 1996 – 2009 (First Law 1990) Humanitarian: 1.4% (c.1,158,000 foreign nationals). SPA (b) Since 1980s - > Family: 27.8% 1. Two tools for hiring migrants: Immigration country Work: 71.8% a) annual quotas (1993) for (First Law 1985) Humanitarian: 0.3% migrants abroad; b) in case of ‘hard to fill employment’ for migrants in Spain; 2. 5 Regularisations 1996 –2009 (c.970,000 foreign nationals).

SWE

Country

Table 2.3 continued 20 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1967 - > explicit selective policy (Point System)

1973 - > explicit selective policy (Point System)

CAN

AUS

SELECTIVE POLICY: 1. ‘Independent economic migrants’ are admitted through a point system (state selection). Major weight is given to skill factors. 2. Other skilled categories are admitted without being point tested, e.g. entrepreneurs; investors, etc. Family: 36.3% SELECTIVE POLICY: (quotas) Work: 1. ‘Independent economic 62.9% (quotas) migrants’ are admitted through a Humanitarian: 0.8% point system (state-selection). Major weight is given to employability factors. 2. Other skilled categories are admitted without being point tested, e.g. business persons; distinguished talents, etc.

Family: 27.5% Work: 60.5% Humanitarian: 11.9%

(continued )

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION 21

Family: 15.5% Work: 70.6% Humanitarian: 13.9%

In both cases, migrants are directly called and selected by employers (employer selection). 1. Labour market test: the employer must demonstrate that no suitably qualified or experienced resident worker is available; 2. Applications must be submitted (before departure) by employers.

Quota system for giving legal permanent status to all migrants regardless of skills.

General provisions

1. Since 1998 - > simplification of procedures for highly skilled 2. 2006: Point system. Tier-1 - . highly skilled (state-selection) & Tier-2 - . medium-highly skilled (employer-selection)

Special visas (H1-B Visas) (1990) for tertiary-educated migrants in speciality occupations

Provisions for highly skilled

Work admission policies and regulations

Notes: (a) In Italy, admissions are proxied by the total number of residence permits granted to foreign nationals including first permits and renewals; (b) in Spain admissions refer to 2009– 12; (c) in the United States, admissions of family members do not include the category ‘immediate relatives of US citizens’, but they do include both permanent admissions and H1-B visas for specialty occupations. Source: Data on admissions by category are taken from national statistical agencies. Other info are taken from various sources (IOM, Laws for Legal Immigration in the 27 EU member states, International Migration Law No16, 2009; Kasimis C., Greece: Illegal Immigration in the Midst of Crisis, MPI Country Profiles, 2012; Petrovic M., Belgium: A Country of Permanent Immigration, MPI Country Profiles, 2012).

1990s - > from ‘zero-immigration policy’ to ‘managed migration’

UK

Admissions by category (1996 – 2011) Family: 25.6% (*) Work: 60.3% (**) Humanitarian: 14.0%

Admission policy (1970s - > )

USA (c) 1990s - > implicit selective policy (annual quotas)

Country

Table 2.3 continued 22 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION

23

Several factors contribute to this pattern. First, some countries select migrants by admission policies. Table 2.3 shows the diversity of admission policies adopted by OECD countries. Since the selection process depend on both the existence and the strength of specific provisions towards highly skilled migrants and on admission categories (i.e. family, labour, humanitarian admissions), all these features need to be considered. If Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom have attracted the lion’s share of highly skilled Arab migration, this is in line with the two strategies these countries have implemented in the last two decades: on the one hand, labour migration admissions – as opposed to family reunification and asylum – have represented the majority of total entries (70.6 per cent in the United Kingdom, 60.7 per cent in Canada and 60.3 per cent in the United States, 1996 – 2011); on the other hand, strict admission criteria have positively selected inflows. Canada was the first country to adopt a point system in 1967. This point system selected migrants according to ‘desirable’ characteristics. Later on, in the 1990s, the Canadian system explicitly evolved into a human capital model of migration where preference is given to skill factors (young age, high level of education and language) overemployment factors (work experience, labour market demand, etc.). In the point system, the weight of skills factors gradually rose from 32 per cent in 1978 to 59 per cent in 2013. The US quota system emphasises, instead, employers’ needs. While permanent admissions have historically been managed in order to match labour supply with demand (regardless of skills), the creation of H1-B visas, in 1990, has prompted increasing numbers of graduates to choose the United States. These visas enable employers to offer permanent jobs to tertiary-educated migrants in specialty occupations on a three-year, one-time renewable visa, after which migrants can obtain a Green Card granting permanent residency. 1996– 2006, H1-B Visas admissions represented 73.0 per cent of labour migration inflows, meaning that the US’s implicit selective migration policy has proved to be more successful than point-system programmes (Doomernik et al., 2009). Recent Arab migration towards North America has been further linked to study and high-level opportunities in local universities and research centres. Take the example of Algerian migration to Canada. This recent phenomenon (in 2006 75.9 per cent of Algerian migrants had resided in Canada for less than 10 years) is characterised by extremely

24 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

large proportions of young (34.6 per cent are aged 15–34) and well educated (75.1 per cent are tertiary-educated) migrants. Indeed, a significant part of the migrants arrived in Canada as temporary students and professors who – having integrated into Canadian society, more specifically into the Province of Quebec – decided to settle there. Today, this phenomenon is on the rise due to a gradual change in Algerian civil society, where Algerian emigrants are no longer seen as ‘deserters’, but as successful people who are openly admired (Khelfaoui, 2006). In the United Kingdom – with the appearance of labour market shortages in specific sectors, such as the IT industry, in the late 1990s – official policy evolved from ‘zero migration’ to ‘managed migration’, which explicitly facilitated entry procedures for highly skilled migrants. Simultaneously admissions for humanitarian reasons and family reunification have fallen off.7 In addition, as in North America, the Arab presence in the United Kingdom has increasingly included large number of students who, after graduating, have tended to remain there. From 1998 to 2010, Arab tertiary students passed from 2,843 to 10,239: at an annual average growth rate of 21.7 per cent. Only in 2010, 12,656 before-entry visas were granted to Arabs for study reasons.8 Finally, a further characteristic of highly skilled Arab migration in this country is linked to the fact that, for reasons of prestige, several Arab companies (from banks to television broadcasters) have opened offices in the United Kingdom, and especially in London. These have brought with them highly educated Arab nationals including journalists and bankers (Nagel, 2005). Among non-European states, Australia is instructive for our purposes. Despite a point system, it has attracted mostly low-skilled migrants from the Arab world. Arabs represent a very small percentage of total admissions (1.7 per cent in 1996–2011) and the Lebanese are the most important group: 58.0 per cent of Arab migrant stocks in 2006 and 41.7 per cent of flows, 1996–2011. While the Lebanese abroad typically have a high educational profile, the percentage of tertiary-educated among Lebanese migrants in Australia (15.0 per cent) is far below the average in other OECD countries (44.6 per cent). Why is it that tertiary-educated Lebanese are so few in Australia, by contrast with their predominance in other OECD countries? A plausible explanation is that recent migration from Lebanon to Australia has been characterised by chain migration channels, driven by family reunion.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION

25

This has led to the replication of similar characteristics in terms of skills over time and generation. The massive waves of migration from Lebanon to Australia which occurred during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) was largely unskilled and these workers filled gaps in Australian manufacturing (Tabar, 2009). Since then, family reunification has been the main channel for Lebanese migrants going to Australia. In 1996 – 2006, Lebanese admissions were distributed as follows: family reunion (89.2 per cent); labour (9.5 per cent); and other (1.3 per cent) (compared with, respectively, 39.9 per cent, 58.7 per cent and 1.4 per cent for all other nationalities). Would demographic profiles or the period of emigration from Lebanon bring an additional explanation? Comparing Lebanese migrants in Australia with those in Canada, it seems that this is not the case. Demographic profiles are similar: 54.2 per cent male in Australia and 53.3 per cent in Canada; young migrants are 19.3 per cent in Australia versus 21.2 per cent in Canada. Periods of migration are also close: those who stayed for fewer than 10 years stand at 16.1 per cent in Australia and 21.2 per cent in Canada. However, as shown in Figures 2.4a and 2.4b, the Lebanese in Canada are much better educated than the Lebanese in Australia, both in generational terms and in terms of duration of stay.9 A variety of reasons may, instead, explain why European countries have attracted mostly low-skilled migrants from Arab states. The southern European countries – Greece, Italy and Spain – have recently become countries of immigration, attracting Arab migrants a) Generation

80,0

80,0

60,0

60,0

40,0

40,0

20,0

20,0

0,0

b) Duration of stay

0,0 1936

1946

LEB in Australia

1956

1966

1976

LEB in Canada

Up to 1 "1-5" "5-10" "10-20" More year than 20 LEB in Australia

LEB in Canada

Figure 2.4 Proportion (in %) of highly skilled Lebanese migrants in Australia and Canada by generation (a) and duration of stay (b), 2006. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

26 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

with no tertiary education. Not only are migrants’ educations lower than average, but the education level decreases over time, from old to young generations. In these countries, specific labour market needs have attracted unskilled labour since the 1980s. Arab migrants have been attracted by job openings in emerging sectors. In particular, Italy and Spain represent two typical cases which show how different labour market economies may result in similar needs (of unskilled labour) and ultimately in similar migration policy making. In Spain, the construction industry and tourist activities – 31 per cent of GDP, 2000–10 – were the most attractive labour sectors. 48 per cent of Maghreb migrants worked there, 2008–11. Small-scale Italian industries and manufacturing activities – 33 per cent of GDP, 2000 to 2010 – employed, instead, 49 per cent Maghreb migrants over the same period.10 These two countries, together with Greece, have continuously pulled in unskilled Arab migrants, with an extremely similar migration policy management. For instance, at a time when zero immigration was a policy slogan across Europe these countries adopted annual entry quotas: 1985 in Spain, 1990 in Italy and 1998 in Greece. They did so, in order to strike a balance between negative public opinion towards migration and employers’ pressure to open the door to more generalised migration. However, cumbersome procedures and limited quotas were ineffective in addressing the needs of those who employed unskilled migrants. Regularising irregular migrants became, then, an unofficial migration policy and still today represents the main channel of entry for Arab migrants into Mediterranean Europe. A chain migration phenomenon started, by which new migrants enter, or stay, irregularly until a massive amnesty campaign allows regularisation.11 In brief, specific labour market needs, the absence of longterm policies, the frequent recourse to regularisation procedures and, finally, the large presence of irregular migrants has shaped the profile of Arab migrants in Italy, Spain and Greece. A ‘Mediterranean model of migration’ was born, characterised by first generation Arab male migrants, who move predominantly for economic reasons, show higher labour market participation and occupational rates (with respect to natives) and who are mainly concentrated in low-skilled jobs (Strozza et al., 2009). France has by far the largest migrant population from Arab countries; Belgium, Denmark and Sweden form a second European group. Here we can talk of a ‘continental model of migration’, characterised by family reunification: following on from the economic

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION

27

and employment crisis of the mid-1970s that put an end to labour immigration and that has made it more difficult for migrants to integrate into the labour market.12 It is worth mentioning that both France and Sweden recently put in place specific provisions to attract highly skilled migrants. But data on the success or otherwise of these schemes is so far lacking. Needless to say the predominance of family reunification has tended, over time, to perpetuate the low profile selection of migrants during the mass immigration period (before the mid-1970s). There, Arab unskilled workers arrived, typically with a lower level of education than the average level of their source countries. Along with selection policies, highly skilled mobility is also affected by distance. The highly skilled tend to go farther away. After all, they can afford a long-distance journey and have more global connections, allowing them to choose the most attractive destinations. Distance tends, thus, to further select migrants according to social, economic and eventually human capital characteristics: the longer the distance between origin and destination the more educated the migrants are, regardless of policies at either ends. This phenomenon is well expressed in Figure 2.5, which compares the educational profile of Algerian and Egyptian migrants with that of 100,0 80,0 60,0 40,0 20,0 0,0

65+

55-64

45-54

35-44

ALG-North America

EGY-North America

MEX-North America

ALG-Europe

EGY-Europe

MEX-Europe

25-34

Figure 2.5 Proportions (in %) of highly skilled Algerian, Egyptian and Mexican migrants in North American and European states, c.2005. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

28 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Mexicans in closer (Europe for the Algerians/Egyptians and North America for the Mexicans) and more distant (vice versa) destinations. Mexican migrants are here chosen as a control group, while, among Arab migrants, Algeria and Egypt were selected as they represent two opposite strategies in terms of spatial distribution: for instance, migrants from these countries show, in the case of Algeria, the most and, in the case of Egypt, the least concentrated communities across all observed destinations.13 Distance similarly affects highly skilled migration regardless of origin: the more educated tend to travel further to their destinations. Higher proportions of highly skilled Mexican migrants are found in Europe compared to North America, while the opposite is true for highly skilled Algerians and Egyptians. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that, while Mexican migrants are by far the most educated community in Europe, they show, instead, the lowest educational profile in North America.

Conclusion The vast majority of people live their whole lives in their country of birth and those who leave it are not, in many respects, representative of the population they come from. Migration has a reputation for selecting the best and brightest and this applies too to Arab migrants, whose average education largely exceeds that of their communities of origin. Arab universities produce talents for the global market. Looking at migration to OECD countries, the over-selection of highly skilled people is more pronounced for migrants from the Mashrek than for those from the Maghreb. This is partly due to their different histories of migration and integration into the world economy. Emigration from the Maghreb was pioneered by low-skilled workers employed in western European industries and followed by family reunification bringing in people with similar profiles. Migrants from the Mashrek were, meanwhile, from the onset, destined for more distant countries and a broader variety of economic activities. Variable immigration policies in the receiving countries explain the rest. Three country models can be distinguished. The first includes Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, where the highest proportions of highly skilled Arab migrants are found. In these countries a continuous increase in human capital is observed due to

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION

29

selection policies. The second group includes Greece, Spain and Italy, where the lowest proportions of highly skilled Arab migrants are found because of labour market needs and because of the absence of long-term admission policies (demonstrated by frequent recourse to regularisation schemes). The third group includes Belgium, France, Denmark and Sweden, where medium proportions (on average) of highly skilled migrants are found. Here only a moderate increase in human capital is observed given the predominance of family reunification schemes. What will the next decade look like? We know for sure that demography will bring to Arab labour markets the largest cohorts of young adults with the highest proportion of graduates. It is likely that the economic situation will not have improved sufficiently to employ all of them at the level of their expectations. Moreover, it may be that the revolts started in 2011 will still be reverberating, with governance issues translating into additional migratory pressures. In short, one can predict that highly skilled migration from the Arab countries will not only continue, it will very likely gain momentum. Where will they go? A rise in migration towards the Gulf States which have long been claiming their intention to indigenise their labour force, in particular for the highly skilled, seems unlikely. An upsurge in highly skilled Arab emigration towards the West is, instead, eminently possible. Considering that some Asian economies are gradually fostering the conditions for Asian migrants to remain in their home countries, the southern Mediterranean region might become a potential reservoir for young highly skilled migrants. Will Western countries be politically willing to manage this shift? Quantitatively and qualitatively, can Arab qualifications guarantee the same level of efficiency that migrants from other parts of the world can currently ensure? All these questions are linked with the political future of the Arab states which, at the time of writing, is more unclear than ever.

ALG EGY JOR LEB LIB MOR PAL SUD SYR TUN All origins MEX

49% 73% 68% 24% 66% 44% 50% 21% 26% 37% 32% 82%

AUS

74% 90% 70% 61% 81% 74% 64% 35% 65% 83% 69% 47%

CAN 31% 33% 16% 9% 15% 16% n.a. 22% 16% 16% 13% 62%

DEN 27% 33% 77% 69% 59% 28% 57% 35% 73% 30% 30% 80%

FRA 38% 61% 32% 17% 37% 30% 37% 42% 19% 27% 23% 70%

SWE 58% 71% 50% 56% n.a. 50% n.a. 32% 46% n.a. 54% 7%

US 28% 57% 34% 49% 63% 21% 55% 41% 26% 31% 23% 70%

BEL 32% 23% 49% 34% 39% 24% 60% 34% 11% 20% 22% 43%

GRE

Young generations (aged 25– 34 c.2005) Country of destination

10% 23% 32% 31% 15% 7% 35% 19% 21% 4% 9% 41%

ITA 11% 25% 50% 39% 43% 9% 0% 0% 34% 8% 10% 59%

SPA 36% 76% 79% 54% 66% 33% 67% 56% 62% 38% 52% 84%

UK

28% 58% 53% 48% 51% 22% 54% 33% 42% 26% 30% 8%

All destinations

Proportion of migrants with a tertiary education by country of origin, country of destination and generation

Country of origin

Table 2.A.1

Appendix

30 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

41% 42% 40% 13% 25% 38% 35% 37% 22% 27% 25% 67%

ALG EGY JOR LEB LIB MOR PAL SUD SYR TUN All origins MEX

76% 76% 70% 42% 75% 62% 58% 60% 50% 64% 59% 38%

CAN 35% 46% 30% 26% 26% 22% n.a. 32% 36% 28% 28% 49%

DEN 17% 45% 64% 51% 37% 18% 58% 31% 50% 17% 18% 63%

FRA 33% 55% 37% 15% 47% 22% 32% 54% 20% 17% 22% 61%

SWE

Source: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

AUS

Country of origin 54% 69% 43% 46% n.a. 46% n.a. 46% 38% n.a. 51% 8%

US 16% 54% 33% 51% 32% 9% 33% 37% 39% 23% 13% 62%

BEL 36% 27% 77% 39% 44% 30% 51% 37% 25% 25% 29% 37%

GRE

Old generations (aged 35 1 c.2005) Country of destination 14% 23% 55% 42% 9% 6% 48% 21% 41% 5% 10% 40%

ITA 15% 37% 58% 45% 64% 13% 50% 29% 55% 32% 15% 47%

SPA 50% 51% 66% 49% 50% 24% 59% 60% 61% 28% 48% 69%

UK

18% 54% 46% 38% 17% 19% 51% 48% 39% 17% 24% 8%

All destinations

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION 31

32 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Notes 1. Respectively 94 per cent, 93 per cent and 89 per cent of migrants from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia live in the European Union, while 61 per cent and 52 per cent of migrants from Egypt and Jordan live in the Gulf States (CARIM). (Chalcraft, 2009). 2. Jordanian data give different numbers but show the same trend: in 2009, out of 240,012 work permits delivered to Egyptians, only 88, that is 0.04 per cent had a university degree. The vast majority (212,200) had not finished secondary education. 3. Unemployment rates retrieved from: Morocco: Enqueˆte nationale sur l’emploi, Haut Commissariat au Plan (Direction de la Statistique); Algeria: Office National des Statistiques, Emploi et choˆmage au 4e trimestre 2010, http://www.ons.dz/ IMG/pdf/emploi_chomage_2010.pdf; Tunisia: Enqueˆte Nationale sur la Population et l’Emploi (Direction des statistiques sur l’emploi; Egypt: CAPMAS; Palestine, PCBS, Labour Force Survey of 2012; Lebanon: UNICEF and Central Administration of Statistics, Labour Force Survey of 2009 (in Arabic); Jordan: http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/index.htm. 4. France 24: Des ‘diploˆme´s choˆmeurs’ de Rabat s’immolent par le feu pour obtenir un travail, http://observers.france24.com/fr/content/20120119-diplomes -chomeurs-rabat-s%E2%80%99immolent-obtenir-travail-rabat-cadresannexe-sit-in-maroc. 5. This phenomenon was already visible in the 1990s in Egypt (Fargues, 1998) 6. This was true of Morocco and Tunisia, but not Algeria after its government unilaterally denounced its migration agreement with France in 1973. 7. In 2006, the United Kingdom adopted a point system managed both by the state (Tier 1 Visas) and employers (Tier 2 Visas) which explicitly targets medium and highly skilled migrants. Unfortunately, data on its effects are so far lacking. 8. Data are taken from OECD and UK Home Office, respectively. 9. It is important to note here that in both Canada and Australia, family reunification entries are not subjected to the point system (unlike labour entries) and that no quotas are imposed on this category. 10. Information on migrants by sector of occupation are only available for migrants originating in the Maghreb. This component of Arab migration represents 97 per cent in Spain and 83 per cent in Italy (c. 2005). 11. From 1996 to 2009, six regularisation campaigns took place in Greece for a total of around 942,000 migrants (87.7 per cent of all foreign nationals in Greece in 2006), five in Spain for a total of around 970,000 migrants (30.6 per cent of all third-country nationals residing in Spain in 2009; and four in Italy for a total of around 1,158,000 migrants (42.0 per cent of all third-country nationals residing in Italy in 2009). 12. 1996– 2011, family entries represented 58.9 per cent in France, 48.4 per cent in Denmark and 56.5 per cent in Sweden. Humanitarian entries represented, instead, respectively 32.1 per cent, 22.7 per cent and 23.2 per cent (see Table 2.3).

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HIGHLY SKILLED ARAB MIGRATION 33 13. The spatial distribution of migrants is measured through the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI), which is computed by squaring and then summing the proportions of immigrants originating in country i living in destination country j. Figures close to 1 indicate greater concentration (lower diffusenesses) of immigrants across all countries. As to Arab migrants, the HHI ranges from 0.22 (Egypt) to 0.86 (Algeria) show a greater concentration of Algerian migrants in a given country (France) and a more diffused residential pattern of Egyptian migrants all over the world.

CHAPTER 3 HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN: WHO, WHY AND WHAT IS 1 TO BE DONE Alessandra Venturini and Edlira Narazani

Introduction Highly skilled migration seems a phenomenon restricted to less developed countries. It is generally seen as being positive for the destination country and, generally, negative for sending countries. There are, it is true, occasions when it can engender education growth in the origin countries and thus produce positive effects (Stark et al., 1997; Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2001). But politicians in countries of origin tend to look askance at the migration of their brightest citizens. In this paper we will analyse the role played by highly skilled migration from the Arab Mediterranean. We will compare its characteristics, causes and effects with two groups of countries: more developed northern Mediterranean countries, which have experienced massive migration in the past, namely, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece; and less developed Sub-Saharan neighbours to the south, which have not yet exhausted their migratory potential. The definition of highly skilled migration used in the present volume encompasses migrant graduates and their degrees, be they obtained in the origin or in the destination country. If we adopt the human capital

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 35

theory (Becker, 1975) or the signal theory (Spence, 1973) a worker with a university degree is more productive because, respectively, education has increased his or her productivity or because education is a marker of higher abilities. The highly educated are, in any case, Becker and Spence allow, more productive. The outflow of highly skilled migrants has been referred to as ‘brain drain’: a vivid term for a loss to the nation and for corresponding damage to growth. This contrasts with Oded Stark’s ‘brain gain’, when the positive effect on the aggregate level of education induced in the country of origin is taken into account. In the past and still sometimes now the words ‘brain drain’ have also been applied to unskilled migrants. The point is that migration is a selective process and that the best migrate: in the case of unskilled migrants, perhaps ‘ability drain’ would, though, be more appropriate. The first part of the paper compares highly skilled Arab migrants from the Mediterranean with southern European and Sub-Saharan migrants. Here we employ data on migrants available from destination countries which refer to the years 1990, 2000 and 2005. We also employ the information available from Consortium for Applied Research in International Migration (CARIM) correspondents, set out in a number of papers2 in the sending countries to inquire into recent highly skilled migration. The second section looks at the use of education in the destination countries (over-education and over-occupation) comparing the four groups of countries. The third section, meanwhile, inquires into the evolution of the educational system in the origin countries and, in particular, into university enrollment and the quality of a university education there. The fourth part presents some new results on ‘brain drain’ in the south-eastern Mediterranean noting important differences between the Maghreb and Mashrek. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the emigration of the talented, its development and its likely effects.

Many migrant destinations: few highly skilled migrant destinations To get some sense of the size and the main characteristics of highly skilled emigration from the Arab Mediterranean we use information collected in the destination countries. The destination countries alone report migrant education and skill level. The most exhaustive sources are

36 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

now available from OECD census information, thanks to the efforts of Docquier and Marfouk (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006) and the OECD team (DIOC). These datasets also have their weaknesses, however. The first and most important weakness are time limitations. For many countries the last census is not yet available. Nor is there information available on the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’, nor, indeed, on the global recession which affected labour demand in the destination countries. On both issues we, happily, have though additional information, which, even if fragmented, we can and that we will exploit to complement and update the general picture. A second limitation is that different definitions are used in different censuses and, for the update in 2005/2006, the local registers have also been used. In addition, education levels are self reported and no external checks are possible. Being derived from censuses, the information is not in a time series. It also only covers OECD countries, reducing representativeness. Even if the DM and the OECD datasets are based on the same sources, they go in different directions. The DM dataset has been extended to include the year of arrival in order to check where the education of the migrant took place. Then, in the 2000 release, in addition to OECD countries, Gulf, African and Latin American states are included as destinations (BDM, 2009). This extension is particularly important for south-eastern Mediterranean countries. Unfortunately the quality of the information is not the same and our ability to compare all these different sources is limited. On the other hand, the OECD dataset has been extended by extracting the employment level from censuses. This permits the study of what has been called the ‘over education (brain waste) of migrants’. It now goes up to 2005. All these different sources can be used to build up the best possible picture of graduate emigration from the Arab Mediterranean, in addition, of course, to the information provided by CARIM correspondents.

The distribution and numbers of stocks by destination Different aggregate emigration patterns emerge especially among the Arab Mediterranean countries for the year 2000 (see Figure 3.1 derived from BDM, 2009). For the Maghreb countries, Europe and in particular France are the main destinations for total migration with just a minority going to

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 37

Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. For the Mashrek countries, instead, the Gulf countries are the main destination, followed by the non-EU OECD countries: the EU, in fact, is practically irrelevant. Southern European countries shared their emigrants between Europe, on the one hand, and Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, on the other. Indeed, the stock of migrants for the second group’ listed is very large, but old and free mobility has favoured the EU, while outflows to the Gulf and to Africa are very limited. For the Sub-Saharan countries, instead, inter-African migration is typically the most important, and when it is not the most important, it is, in any case, more important than emigration to EU countries. Even if there is a systematic under-reporting of internal migration among Sub-Saharan African countries – where boundaries are not so well defined and controlled and where the notion of ‘international migrant’ is only awkwardly applied to citizens of neighbouring countries – the total number of emigrants is not particularly important. A notable exception here is Mali where the number of migrants abroad is very large: 23 per cent of the total labour force; against an average of 3 per cent for neighboring countries. What also emerges is that countries have a large pool of potential migrants given their demographics: Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and, to a lesser extent, Morocco have large numbers of migrants abroad, but in percentage terms they employ this channel less and in different ways. Egypt, for instance, favoured or accepted temporary migration to Arab countries, keeping the size of the diaspora abroad down to 3.3 per cent of the resident population. If the information on total migrant flows by main destinations is relatively accurate, the information on the skill level in Africa and in the Gulf countries is much less so. Therefore, in terms of OECD countries we are almost certainly under-reporting Mashrek and Sub-Saharan African migration flows. Thus, looking at the emigration rate towards OECD countries (Table 3.1), we are not surprised at finding higher values in the Mashrek: Tunisia (6.46), Algeria (6.2), Morocco (8.7), with the notable exception of Lebanon (12.6),3 which is much lower: in between 2.4 and 1 (OECD DIOC, 2010). The Maghreb countries have an average 15 per cent share of highly skilled migration, while, with the exception of Lebanon, the share of highly skilled migrants in the Mashrek is lower: 5.6 per cent in Egypt, 4.7 per cent in Jordan and 7.9 per cent in Sudan.

6.49 6.2 8.7 2.2 1.01 0.8 12.61 2.4 1.81

Total Emigration Rate

4.7 12.36

15.8 14.8 14.3 4.5 7.89 5.6

Total Highly Skilled Emigration Rate

Total and Highly Skilled Emigration Rate c.2000

Source: OCDE, 2011, DIOC.

Tunisia Algeria Morocco Libya Sudan Egypt Lebanon Jordan Syria

Table 3.1

Italy Spain Portugal Greece Niger Mauritania Mali Senegal

5.22 3 15.3 7.1 1.06 1.63 1.05 3.45

Total Emigration Rate

7.07 2.4 12.21 7.56 6.26 10.26 14.57 14.81

Total Highly Skilled Emigration Rate

38 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 39 2000400 1500400 1000400 500400

Sp

ai n Ita G ly re ec Po e rtu M ga or l oc co Al ge Tu ria nn is Li ia by a Sy ria Jo rd Le an ba no Eg n yp t O PT M Se ali ne g Su al da n C ha d N ig M au er rit an ia

400

EU-27

Australia, USA, Canada, New Zealand

Arab gulf

Africa

Figure 3.1 Stock of migrants by origin country in main destination areas around 2000. Source: Beine, Doqcuier & Marfouk, 2009.

Sub-Saharan countries have low general emigration rates (2–3 per cent), but significant highly skilled migration rates (14 per cent). The southern European countries are also emigration countries with Portugal taking the lead both in terms of total emigration (15.3 per cent) and the highly skilled emigration rate (12 per cent). Greece (7 per cent), Italy (5.2 per cent) and Spain (3 per cent) have similar emigration and highly skilled emigration rates. In the last decade the recession has spurred southern European emigration with southern Europe taking the lead in the Mediterranean. Women are, on average, only 35 per cent (the range is 24 –46 per cent) of the migrant stock, something which points to a less settled community abroad, where male migration still dominates. For the Maghreb countries and for Lebanon and Libya the female share is higher due to an older emigration tradition. The destination countries not only attract immigrants in different ways. They also select migrants by education level. In Figure 3.2 (drawn from the DIOC-OECD, 2012) we compare the skill composition of outflows from south-eastern Mediterranean countries with southern European Mediterranean countries and with Sub–Saharan African countries. What quickly becomes apparent is the selectivity of emigration to North America, Australia and New Zealand. These were able to attract more

40 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

highly skilled than unskilled workers from ‘all’ origin countries. The European Union, instead, is less competitive in hiring the highly skilled. While only 30 per cent or fewer immigrants in Europe hold a university degree, in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States the average is 50 per cent. Migration to other African countries, not reported in the figures, are even less skilled than migration to the EU. The important Mashrek outflows to the Gulf include both the highly skilled and the low skilled. Heba Nassar (2010) states, in relation to Egypt, that highly skilled migrants range from 20 to 80 per cent according to destination. The positive skill composition of the flows relies fundamentally on three main factors: labour demand in the destination countries in terms of jobs available and the wage level offered; the selectivity of migration policy; and the linguistic affinity between destination and origin country, which, when close, helps with the adaptability of human capital. On the demand side, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have more jobs on offer for the highly skilled than European countries. In addition the Anglo-Saxon labour markets hold a higher wage premium which also attracts highly skilled workers from Europe. According to OECD data on earnings distribution (OECD, 2009 Employment Outlook), the dispersion between the first and ninth earning deciles in 2007 was: 4.85 in the United States, 3.75 in Canada, 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

l l t r li y e a a a a a si rdan non gyp OPT iby Ma ega dan had ige yri ani ain Ital ec uga cco eri ni e g S t a E o N n Su C L Sp rit e Al or Tu Jo Leb Gr Por S au M M EU

Aus tralia, USA, CANADA, New Zeland

Figure 3.2 Share of highly skilled migrants to main destination areas in 2005. Source: DIOC-OECD.

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 41

3.59 in the United Kingdom; while it was 2.91 in France, 3.26 in Germany, and 2.31 in Sweden. A second reason why Anglo-Saxon countries were able to attract more skilled migrants is their migration legislation. This legislation favours the entrance of skilled immigrants (point systems) and eases the entrance condition for the highly skilled among immigrants from all countries of origin. In addition, home universities are open to foreign students, who are trained and then work in the destination countries: this fact favours the recruitment of highly skilled foreign nationals. Last there is the question of language affinities and knowledge, which reduces the cost of emigration and makes human capital more marketable. This explains why highly skilled migrants from the Maghreb prefer France and Canada, while Egyptians tend to go to the United States or the Gulf. In these destinations, they get a higher return on their human capital and, in addition, for a similar economic return, there is a lower social cost because they tend to know the language. Our source for the most recent skilled emigration is derived from CARIM and MPC correspondents. Even if the trend which emerges is not directly comparable with the previous dataset, the trend is, broadlyspeaking, similar. The emigration outflows continue towards the same preferred destinations: emigrants from the Maghreb countries head mainly towards Europe. Mashrek emigrants, meanwhile, go mainly towards the Gulf. Much less is known about skilled migrants. Egyptian migrants are more educated than non-migrants: indeed, 40 per cent of Egyptian emigrants to Saudi Arabia and 70 per cent to Oman are highly skilled (Nassar, 2010). Of Moroccan migrants to Canada 36 per cent (2006) are highly skilled (Kachani M, 2010). Tunisian migrants in France are more highly educated than migrants to recent immigration countries like Italy and Spain (Fourati 2010). In Algeria investments in higher education create a larger pool of educated potential migrants, given the inability of the economy to create appropriate jobs at the same speed (Bouklia, 2011). In Jordan 40 per cent of emigrants are highly educated, and they are better educated than non-migrants. The share of highly educated migrants from Lebanon was already very high and is now even higher (Kasparian, 2010). A survey carried out in 2012 by Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich (2012) suggests that the propensity to migrate has been even higher since the Arab Spring. Indeed, Fargues claims that uncertainties about job options and the

42 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

home country’s democratic evolution are, in fact, increasing the propensity of potential migrants to leave their country. In southern Europe the trend towards higher migration is the same, even if less pronounced. In Sub-Saharan Africa highly skilled migration is not perceived as an important issue, not least because the total number of highly skilled migrants is limited. In Mauritania (Sidna, 2010) highly skilled emigrants make up 22 per cent of all migrants and 10– 12 per cent of the highly skilled labour force. In Mali (Traore, 2010) the share of students abroad is high as unemployment among the highly skilled stands at about 25 per cent (2005). But the beneficial effect of the diaspora is also understood. The same is true in Chad (Djonata, 2010), where the government has tried to attract the student diaspora abroad back home. In Niger two phenomena are mixed: the inflow of foreign nationals that go to make up 0.8 per cent of the population and 5 per cent of the enterprises; and a large share of the highly skilled among the diaspora (Maga, 2010). Senegal, after a long tradition of emigration to neighbouring countries, has seen more intense emigration toward Europe and North America. This change has also altered the composition of emigration flows and has increased the share of the tertiary-educated, including doctors, who are needed in the native health system (Tall, Tadian, 2010).

Stock of education migrants and brain drain in OECD countries Unfortunately, it is only possible to inquire extensively into the composition and the type of highly skilled migrants in OECD countries. This means that we cannot properly understand emigration from the Mashrek. Nevertheless, we focus on similar destination countries where the policy debate is lively and more easily comparable. The stock of highly skilled migrants is related to the stock of the highly skilled population at home and, thus, is related to the phase of human capital growth in the country. What is usually called ‘brain drain’, in the economic literature, is measured by the ratio of highly skilled migrants to the total number of highly skilled both in the country of origin and in the destination countries.4 If we limit our emigration analysis to OECD countries, Lebanon is the most exposed. Here the number of highly skilled workers abroad is about 80 per cent of the stock of the highly skilled population at home, thus the brain-drain indicator, as defined above, stands

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 43

Sp ai n Ita ly G re Po ece rtu M ga or l oc Al co ge r Tu ia ni si Jo a rd Le an ba no Eg n yp t O PT Li by a M Se ali ne g Su al da n Ch ad Ni ge r Sy M au ria rit an ia

0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

Total

Highly Skilled

Brain drain

Figure 3.3 Share of migrants to home labour force by skills in 2005. Source: DIOC-OECD.

at about 50 per cent. For all other countries, even the Maghreb countries, which typically send their migrants to the OECD, the share of the highly skilled population abroad is only a small share of the highly skilled stock at home: in Morocco 32 per cent, in Tunisia 19 per cent, in Algeria 25 per cent and, for the other countries, the rate is even lower. As the comparison with the North Mediterranean countries suggests brain drain is a common phenomenon, not limited to the southern Mediterranean. Portugal and Lebanon, for example, have comparable numbers, numbers that are higher than for other countries.

Over-education and over-occupation of migrants in OECD countries Is there a match between education and employment among migrants in destination countries? To understand this important issue better we use the OECD-DIOC dataset which only includes OECD countries. The data set, thus, covers the majority of Maghreb emigration, but a much smaller share of emigrants from the Mashrek. As before, we compare these two groups with southern European and Sub-Saharan countries. We have classified education and employment into three categories: high, medium and low. We computed, thereafter, the index of match, namely we established whether the ranking of education matches the job

South EU Spain Italy Greece Portugal Maghreb Algeria Morocco Tunisia Lybia Mashreq Jordan Lebanon Egypt Pse Sub-Sahara Mali Senegal Sudan Chad

Countries

Table 3.2

18.43 19.68 23.79 11.99

22.64 19.63 20.42 32.36

14.22 16.45 19.52 13.69

16.09 14.86 13.13 17.74

6.3 4.4 7.2 7.34

2.38 3.31 3.61 3.24

6.31 6.14 2.69 3.5

21

22

4.47 4.26 1.55 3.68

Light

Strong

Overoccupation

64.02 66.09 62.91 58.22

67.53 63.42 53.14 67.03

53.91 61.82 54 51.58

53.43 58.43 67.57 65.39

0

Matching

EU27 destinations

10.69 10.65 15.8 16.96

12.97 14.38 18.62 11.98

15.49 12.33 16.73 7.88

21.58 16.81 5.95 17.75

1

Light

2.89 2.26 5.47 3.58

2.91 2.44 5.1 4.05

1.65 1.82 1.66 0.83

2.08 0.83 1.14 1.20

2

Strong

Overeducation

23,052 57,356 6,031 2,683

5,051 35,346 56,667 2,220

516,759 600,215 127,355 21,323

119310 355817 63621 304949

all South EU Spain Italy Greece Portugal Maghreb Algeria Morocco Tunisia Lybia Mashreq Jordan Lebanon Egypt Pse Sub-Sahara Mali Senegal Sudan Chad

Countries

0.7 1.28 0.73 0

1.51 3.9 1.32 5.56

0.78 1.49 1.26 0.79

1.87 5.62 8.38 3.87

22

Strong

18.3 14.04 10.81 8.47

13.19 16.08 9.16 15.78

10.17 13.2 9.53 11.36

14.20 20.15 21.69 15.97

21

Light

51.86 51.64 45.2 40.92

53.31 54.83 60.17 52.81

57.03 55.92 61.91 56.53

58.77 52.12 50.89 58.70

0

Matching

21.69 27.47 31.04 38.5

25.72 21.28 22.54 19.83

23.68 23.91 21.46 25.43

22.27 20.02 16.85 19.65

1

Light

7.45 5.58 12.22 12.11

6.27 3.91 6.81 6.02

8.33 5.48 5.84 5.9

2.89 2.09 2.20 1.81

2

Strong

Overeducation

US, Australia, NZ and CANADA Overoccupation

Over-education and over-occupation of workers in various countries.

2,148 7,423 13,586 413

30,059 122,545 99,050 3,257

15,936 39,599 6,813 7,492

74089 433937 165436 222660

all

44 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

4.21 3.67 5.57 4.41 4.59 4.7

14.47 13.84 14.35 17.75 17.79 25.09

58.25 61.32 65.36 60.71 60.23 51.55

19.82 17.31 11.13 14.46 14.40 17.17

3.25 3.86 3.58 2.66 2.98 1.48

1,140 19,409 7,059

Niger Syria Mauritania Total mean Avg_Mena Natives 2.21 0.61 2.33 1.66 1.41

12.44 14.11 15.52 13.90 12.62 16.43

55.32 57.34 54.28 54.19 53.91 53.09

27.29 21.14 21.18 23.73 25.07 26.21

4.95 5.2 8.41 5.97 6.86 2.87

667 36,888 1,308

Note: Matching if education holds the same rank as occupation, Over-education ‘strong’ if education is two ranks above occupation rank, Overeducation ‘light’ if education is one rank above occupation rank, over-occupation ‘strong’ if occupation is two ranks. Source: own elaboration on Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

Niger Syria Mauritania Total mean Avg_Mena Natives

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 45

46 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

ranking in the two main destinations: Europe and the relevant Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). In Europe foreign nationals have a better education–occupation match than natives (60 per cent versus 52 per cent), while in the Anglo-Saxon countries the match is similar between natives and migrants (53 per cent). The index of over-education presented by the OECD (2007) has been revised into two groups: light over-education, where the education ranking does not match the job ranking by one rank; and strong overeducation, where the education ranking does not match the job ranking by two ranks (e.g. a university student doing a manual job). In Europe strong over-education is very limited: 1.5 for natives and 2.9 for foreign nationals. In Anglo-Saxon countries, meanwhile, light over-education is important (26 per cent among natives and 23 –25 per cent among foreign nationals) and strong over-education (brain waste) is much larger both for natives (2.9 per cent) and for migrants (6.9 per cent). Foreign nationals can, however, improve their career even without education, thus we also computed a ranking match of both light and strong over-occupation. Here there is a symmetry. Where there is less overeducation, i.e. in Europe, there is more over-occupation and vice versa in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In Europe the matching among national groups is very similar with values that range from 53 to 67 per cent, both in southern Europe and in the Mashrek, and 53–63 per cent in the Maghreb, while for Sub-Saharan countries it stands at 58–66 per cent. The share of strong over-education is similar in all the communities and light over-education is more important among Spanish migrants, 21 per cent, than among other nationals. Also strong and light over-occupation are similar, but stronger among Maghreb and southern European workers than among other nationals. A different picture is found in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States where the share of strong over-education is less important among southern European workers. It is much more important for migrants from the Maghreb and Mashrek, but also for Sub-Saharan migrants. Light over-education for natives, meanwhile, stands at around 26.21 per cent. Over-occupation is more likely for southern European countries than for other regions. These results might be surprising to some. In Europe there is less ‘brain waste’. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have more brain waste across all regions studied here and even more

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 47

among African migrants despite their reputation as being lands of migrant opportunity. The reason for this unexpected result is simple. It is easier to enter the non-European countries with a higher education degree, but it is more difficult to find a job at that level. While in Europe migrant selection is less important, the share of unskilled migrants is much larger and most hold unskilled jobs: this means that brain waste is far smaller. In Europe not only is brain waste smaller, but also the possibility of upgrading, the many forms of over-occupation, is higher: 4.6 per cent and 17.8 per cent versus 1.6 per cent and 13 per cent. In Europe entrance into the labour market is essentially from below: in low-educated and low-skilled positions and thus upgrading is more likely. In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States entrance is mainly from above. Brain waste is, therefore, more likely, but it is the result of the entrance type. This pattern is consistent with the native type of over-education and over-occupation (last line in Table 3.1). It is typical of the structure of the labour market and discourages any discrimination-based interpretation. If we look at the education level match and the destination match for the highly educated the numbers stand at 46 per cent for Europe and 58 per cent for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. The match for the low-educated, meanwhile, is 39 per cent in Europe and only 13 per cent in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This, again, suggests two different skill pools attracted to the two areas. What type of highly skilled education do immigrants hold? In the OECD-DIOC dataset sampling is limited and so caution is needed. The ‘hard sciences’ lose out against the ‘humanities’ broadly speaking: 34 per cent in sociology, business and law, 9 per cent in the classic humanities and 6 per cent in education; against 20 per cent in engineering and 13 per cent in hard science. The picture, however, changes if EU and non-EU OECD countries are compared. In both cases engineering represents about 20 per cent. But in Europe the sciences are less important (6 per cent against 16.65 per cent), while a large share of migrants hold a degree in health and welfare (17 per cent against 9.34 per cent). This last degree is particularly important for migrants from the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan and Syria (more than 30 per cent in Europe and 11 per cent in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and from Jordan (in Europe).

48 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The social sciences are more important than science and engineering in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, while in Europe the two groups have about the same importance. With the previously mentioned exception, the data do not show national specialisation in a single field of education. So a concentration in engineering on the part of Moroccan, Senegali and Malian migrants in Europe has no correspondence among the migrants from the same countries in North America, Australia and New Zealand. Jordan is very important in the health sector in Europe, but in engineering in the Anglo-Saxon countries listed above. It would be interesting to understand if the education field (humanities, sciences. . .) play a role in the misuse of education level. Unfortunately the data do not allow a specific answer to this question in terms of employment match. But we can, however, inquire into the possibility of employment by education field and destination area. According to the DIOC dataset engineering and health and welfare offer better employability: they are both above average in Europe and in North America, Australia and New Zealand.5

The evolution of education and of education quality The previous section shows that migrants from different countries in our group go to different destinations, but also that they differ in terms of human capital stock or better that they differ in human capital development. Tertiary enrollments represent crucial information for understanding the skilled human capital reservoir available in the country. Sub-Saharan countries lag far behind and never reach 30 per cent in secondary enrollment country rankings. In Morocco secondary enrollment stood, instead, at 55 per cent in 2007. For all the other countries in the Mediterranean secondary enrollment exceeds 80 per cent and it is just a little lower than southern European enrollment. The same ranking is replicated in the tertiary education stakes, with Morocco in an intermediate position between the lowest group (11 per cent) and the south-eastern Mediterranean countries (see Figure 3.4). All the countries experienced an increase in tertiary enrollment in the 2000s, but when the starting level is very low, as in Sub-Saharan African countries, the totals do not change significantly. However, we

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 49 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

l a li e n y n T o ia a pt a n ia al n d er ia a i tal ga eri ec cc is by y no OP Ma eg ud a Cha Nig Syr i tan d n S Sp I Gre ortu Al g oro Tun Li Eg Jor ba r e u S P a Le M M

1990

2000

2007

Figure 3.4 Enrolment in Tertiary Education in 1990, 2000 and 2007. Source: UNESCO.

have to emphasise here the recent impressive investment in human capital made by Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, the OPT and Lebanon. Two cases stand out: Lebanon and the OPT with more than 45 per cent tertiary enrollment: the OPT will be higher now after a spurt of growth, while Jordan lags a little behind with 37 per cent. There has also been an increase in Tunisia, and in Algeria (22 per cent) and Egypt (31 per cent), which were, though, starting from a higher level. Expansion is, naturally, constrained by population size. The countries in the sample are evidently in different phases of human capital accumulation. The southern European Mediterranean countries are in a mature stage of human capital development, with Portugal catching up. Some of the Mashrek countries are in an advanced phase of human capital accumulation, enrollment in tertiary education is high and one fifth of the population has been to university, with a value which is very close to Portugal’s. There is, then, an intermediate group, where between 30 per cent and 20 per cent of the university-age population is attending university. Then there are the Sub-Saharan African countries, still in an early phase of human capital accumulation, with only a very small fraction of the population (below 10 per cent), with school and university experience. How important is investment in highly educated students in comparison to total investment in education? The tertiary incidence is meant to give the incidence of students in tertiary centres as a proportion of all the school levels in terms of quantity (rather than in terms of costs). First of all, the increase in tertiary-educated students against the overall number of student is there

50 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

in all countries. But in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia the increase is striking and ranges from 5 per cent or less in 1990 to 13–15 per cent in 2007. Again three groups emerge among the countries studied here. There are the two leaders, Lebanon and Palestine, which had already shown a high value with about 19 per cent of students at university in 2007 (probably also Libya). These are similar to the southern European numbers: 20 per cent Portugal, 25 per cent Italy and Spain and 33 per cent Greece. Then, there is a second group: Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria where around 15 per cent attend university. Then, still other countries have around 7 per cent of students at university. The increase in the share of the tertiary education represents an important change for the labour force. Among the educated 15 per cent hold a university degree, and society experiences an increase in the share of people able to take on social and political matters. The countries in an initial phase of human capital accumulation do not, however, invest less than others in education. On the contrary, the share of GDP and the governmental budget invested in education shows a greater interest on the part of policy makers. In this regard, Morocco, Senegal and also Tunisia invest more than 20 per cent, similar to southern Europe at 20–25 per cent: in Mali and Niger the numbers stand at about 17 per cent, demonstrating a new interest there too. Special attention should also be devoted to tertiary education, in terms of its share of the total education budget: e.g. Tunisia (24.2 per cent), Morocco (16.9 per cent), Chad (18 per cent) and Senegal (23.5 per cent). Here it reaches a larger size than the size of this group in total education. The comparison with the southern European countries shows how size is similar, but how investment duration is far more recent and that, therefore, the aggregate effect is smaller.6 Public investment in education frequently fails to satisfy the general demand for education. This demand is then satisfied either by private institutions or by students studying abroad. Non-private enrollment shows that there is an important demand for secondary education which is not being satisfied by the public sector and that private institutions fill this gap. This role is particularly important in Sub-Saharan African countries where it represents 16 –49 per cent in the general programmes and 17 – 76 per cent in the vocational or technical programs and where Mali has the lead (Traore, 2010). In the same area the large number of students abroad, 18 – 24 per cent, offers another way to build up human

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capital in the initial phase of human capital development. For SubSaharan African countries the most popular destinations are France and Europe, but also the United States and Morocco. In Niger (Maga, 2010) the growth in demand for private education has been brought about, in part, by the economic and social crisis which has reduced the motivation of teachers and public education performance, in general. In Mauritania (Sidna, 2010, p.5) the government is, instead, supporting private education abroad by integrating the total cost with 36 per cent of the total budget for tertiary education in 2007, while families invest money equal to 80 per cent of the total government budget in tertiary education. This programme is now structural, that is to say that it has become a permanent part of the country’s educational project. The countries of origin try to keep in touch with their students abroad to avoid ‘brain loss’ by having them return home once they have their degrees or by involving them in educational programmes like TOKTEN in Mali, Chad and Niger. In Lebanon private universities have a long tradition and more than 50 per cent are enrolled in these. An important fact emerges from the research of CARIM and MPC correspondents. Large investments in tertiary education, undertaken by all countries, and increases in the enrollment rates do not, in themselves, guarantee quality in education. An accurate analysis of quality in education is, of course, difficult. World Bank research (2008) covers only some of the countries in the CARIM network, but the information collected shows that an increase in the number educated is taking place but that there is a likely fall off in quality (World Bank, 2008). The teacher – student ratio is not increasing proportionally so classes are growing larger. In addition, it is difficult to retain control over the university degrees provided by private institutions. The Algerian correspondent complains about the ordonnance (05/07) of July 2005 which demands that private institutions adopt the same programmes and rules as public ones. So, for example, all lessons have to be in Arabic – Arabic is the sole language used by the public sector. This naturally reduces competition between public and private institutions there (Bouklia-Hassane, 2010). The same issue has been reported by the Mauritanian correspondent (Sidna 2010, ordonnance 2006–7), who stresses how Mauritanian

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students with no knowledge of foreign languages suffer on the job market. In the Middle East and Northern Africa the time devoted in school to religious and moral education is almost double that found in other advanced and developing countries (World Bank, 2008). The recognition of educational level by immigration country, a problem behind many cases of brain waste, is becoming even more critical with the decline in education quality (Sabadie et al., 2010). Education quality also depends on the faculty that students attend. The humanities and social sciences and business dominate the picture: 45– 65 per cent. There is also a low percentage of engineers who are, however, in demand abroad. In the short term, sending countries, by investing in engineering and similar disciplines, risk, as Khachani (2010, 2010-) pointed out for Morocco, producing still larger outflows. On this issue Sultana and Watts (cited in Seyfried Erwin Quality and Quality assurance, 2007) of the ETF have a clear-cut position. Instead of increasing academic higher education the MENA countries should channel a larger number of young people into technical vocational education and training. This, they argue, would prove a more effective tool for combating poverty and unemployment.

The effect of highly skilled migration on the human capital of the origin country The literature on highly skilled migration has increased in the last 15 years, with a revision in understanding of the role played by highly educated emigrants advanced by Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, (1997), Mountford, (1997) and Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001). The loss in human capital – brain drain – could be transformed into human capital growth – brain gain – in the sending country. At least this would be the case if the probability of emigration among the highly educated to incentivise enrollment in higher education. Emigration being limited, the final result would be an increase in the highly educated labour force. In terms of endogenous growth theory a larger educated labour force should favour economic growth. The empirical evidence on this issue is, however, neither straightforward nor uniform. The model adopted is quite simple.

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 53

The change in the stock of human capital in the origin country dHO/ H – where HO is the stock of human capital in the origin country, and HF the stock of human capital in the foreign country, and H ¼ HO þ HF the total human capital – was caused by highly skilled migration in addition to other control variables. Highly skilled migration is here the change in the stock of human capital abroad (dHF/H) (Eq. 1), plus, the initial level of human capital in the labour force (H/LF) and according to the specification, additional explanatory variables and controls (X).7 dHO dHF ¼ a þ b ðH=LFÞ þ ðc 2 1Þ þ gX H H

Eq:1

The research of Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (BDR) and of Easterly and Nyarko (EN) (2008) is focused on the aggregate effect of highly skilled migrants on the highly educated population in the origin country. BDR consider all countries available in the DM dataset, while EN only looks at Sub-Saharan African countries, while employing the same DM source. As we explained before, the DM dataset has only two years, 1990 and 2000. Thus only a cross-sectional approach is possible with a beta-convergence analysis.8 The two estimates contrast. In BDR (2008) skilled emigration has a positive and significant effect on the education of the labour force at home. This suggests that brain gain and the initial stock of human capital is significant and negative as expected, indicating that the level of human capital in the country of origin matters. The lower the level of human capital, the larger the growth in education will be. The calculated effect of brain gain or brain drain for the south-eastern Mediterranean countries, in counterfactual terms, has only very limited effects on the highly skilled labour force. This effect is, though, negative for the Maghreb countries and Lebanon. But when the effect is measured in percentiles of the total highly skilled labour force, not surprisingly for the majority of the countries studied here the effect is nil or lower than 1 per cent, while the effect is significant and negative only for Lebanon (23.8 per cent). These results are not surprising and are in line with the descriptive evidence presented before. The sheer scale of highly skilled emigration from Lebanon and Palestine is, in itself, a prerequisite for brain loss, which is difficult to overcome with an increase in the

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tertiary-educated population. In Sub-Saharan African countries, instead, the small number of tertiary-educated could be beneficial for the educational system. A similar test by Easterly and Nyarko, limited to African countries, gives different results, the change in highly skilled migration is not significant and the only significant variable is population growth.9 Given the lower average level of tertiary education it might also hide a more pervasive effect on education. Faini (2003) suggests that the effect of highly skilled migration reverberates in tertiary, but also in secondary education – secondary education is, after all, a prerequisite for the continuation of studies. The results have been replicated by Docquier and Rapoport (2009). Both sets of results show the positive effect of highly skilled emigration on secondary enrollment, which is interpreted by Faini (2003) as the pursuit of secondary education to allow a later move abroad to complete tertiary studies. The effect of the tertiary emigration rate on tertiary enrollment is, instead, non significant in the Faini tests and negative in the DR (2009). These results are a very important stimulus for debate. However, the weakness of the tests rely on the dataset employed more than upon the specification adopted. As already mentioned, the DM dataset only correctly reports highly skilled emigrants to the OECD, while highly skilled migrants from the Mashrek go, in large numbers, to the Gulf countries. Likewise migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries go to neighbouring African countries and, indeed, almost everywhere else. A cross-sectional approach mixes countries for which the aggregate skill emigration pattern is well known, i.e. the Maghreb countries, with countries where a large share of the outflow is lacking. Thus the coefficient suffers ‘attenuation bias’ and the empirical results have to be taken with caution, even if the general conclusions of the empirical research are convincing. BDR conclude from their cross-sectional approach that the smaller the country and the larger the emigration rate (around 20 per cent), the more detrimental the effect of highly skilled migration will be. And, even without econometric analyses, the picture in Fig. 3 shows an instance where the share of educated workers abroad is large. This takes place because the country is small and advanced in educational terms.

HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS IN THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 55

For larger countries the highly skilled pool is larger and the effect on the number of the educated will be smaller. We replicate, for our four groups of countries, the analyses presented above, remembering the limitation of the OECD-DIOC data set, which provides three years: 1990, 2000 and 2005, Table 3.3. We first used the same model using area fixed effects.10 Country differences produce a non-significant coefficient for the emigration rate, col.1 (Table 3.3) and the only significant variable is the share of the tertiary education which stresses (given the negative sign) a convergence rate on growth among the tertiary educated. This is lower for countries with a high share of tertiary education and higher for countries with a lower share of the tertiary-educated. The introduction of area interacted dummies to allow a better control of the specific effect, in column 2, shows that both for the Maghreb and for the Mashrek the highly skilled emigration rate has a negative effect on highly skilled growth. However, the effect is stronger in the Maghreb than in the Mashrek. Brain drain seems stronger where the share of the highly skilled is lower. In column 3 we divided the effect in the two periods and while, for the Maghreb, the effect is persistent and negative in both periods, for the Mashrek it is negative in the first one but not significant for the second. For Sub-Saharan countries the effect of highly skilled migration is positive, while it is nil in the case of the southern European countries. We also replicated the analysis of the effects of tertiary education on tertiary and secondary enrollment. This last was not reported and the only positive effect detected was for Sub-Saharan African countries for both secondary and tertiary education. What emerges from the empirical analyses is in line with what was expected and with what has already been discussed in the research papers presented. Highly skilled emigration in Sub-Saharan African countries, which are in an initial phase of human-capital development, do not damage growth in the education sector: on the contrary, highly skilled emigration from there produces a positive effect on the enrollment rate. More problematic is the effect of highly skilled emigration on the growth of the tertiary-educated in the Maghreb countries. For the Mashrek the emigration of the highly educated has a very limited effect in slowing down the growth of the highly skilled population because the number of tertiary educated is already very high.

56 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 3.3

Growth of tertiary education and emigration rate Log change in tertiary human capital

Cons HSEm.rate HSEducation rate Maghreb Mashrek South EU Sub-Sahara EmRate Maghreb

2 0.006 0.03 2 0.08* 0.027 2 0.04 0.122 2 0.055 0.099 2 0.096 0.098 2 0.25 0.16

EmRate Mashrek EmRate Maghreb 2000

2

3

0.089 0.06 0.03 0.03 2 0.041* 0.0122

0.127 0.077 0.066 0.047 2 0.042* 0.01

2 0.1* 0.03 2 0.05** 0.025

EmRate Mashreb 2005 EmRate Mashrek 2000 EmRate Mashrek 2005 R2 Wald N.Obs

166 38

26 38

2 0.029* 0.06 2 0.167* 0.06 2 0.06* 0.039 0.057 0.076 32 38

Variables: EmRate Skilled emigration rate lagged one period; education ex ante proportion of tertiary-educated; Maghreb, Mashrek, southern European, Sub-Saharan dummies and interacted dummies with the emigration rate. Notes: Robust standard errors. White correction for heteroscedasticity.

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Conclusion In this chapter we have shown that highly skilled migration is not limited to less developed countries. On the contrary, it is present in southern Europe and in countries with different phases of tertiary education development. It is not even related to country size. Larger countries do not have more highly skilled migrants abroad, though highly skilled migration can be more serious if not necessarily more damaging in small countries. Highly skilled migrants from all origin countries are attracted to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States where, in general, half of the flow is highly skilled. The depends on the economic system in these countries, which offers highly skilled jobs, higher remuneration and, last but not least, a migration policy which favours the entrance of highly educated non-nationals. This last point has to be kept in mind when we refer to brain waste and over-education. For all countries under study – be they in southern Europe, the Arab Mediterranean or Sub-Saharan Africa – over-education is much worse among emigrants in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States than in Europe. In Europe, instead, over-occupation is a bigger issue. This surprising result is a consequence of the larger number and the larger share of the highly skilled entering the American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand labour markets. There is a higher probability of finding highly skilled jobs, but also a higher chance of downgrading there. In Europe, meanwhile, the low-skilled pool is much larger and, therefore, downgrading is less likely. But over-education is more common in the social and human disciplines than among the ‘hard sciences’ (mathematics, engineering etc.). This, however, encourages emigration. The origin countries have, then, a dilemma. They can invest more in education, which means more brain drain. Alternatively, they can favour economic development or find another way to favour development without brain loss. The origin countries are in different phases of human-capital development. The southern European countries are ahead of the Mashrek, and the Mashrek countries are ahead of the Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africans countries. All countries are investing in tertiary

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education: the highest share of GNP is 26 per cent in Italy, whereas the average is 20 per cent in other countries. Private investment in education complements public investment, but in all countries there is an increase in the number of university students. The increase is, frequently, obtained at the expense of education quality. However, it is the result of an important effort on the part of states and families which are frequently, though, unable to find adequate returns and this encourages a move abroad. The structure and the evolution of the origin country economy means a decline in public employment accompanied by an inadequate increase in jobs. The mismatch between job demand and the growing supply of skilled workers is, in many cases, induced by political instability, which slows down development and which also discourages the localisation of foreign investment. The emigration of the highly skilled is a loss for the country of origin, but is it compensated for by human capital growth? Both the descriptive part of the research and the empirical tests stress that the effect can be different. For Sub-Saharan African countries, brain drain induced by highly skilled emigration is not perceived as a problem. However, it has to be approached through the creation of more educated workers. The initial phase of human capital formation is probably reinforced by the return of emigrants through teaching programmes like TOKTEN (Fakhouri, 2013; Maga, Djonta, Traore, 2010). For the Middle East, with the exception of Syria, where reliable data is extremely limited, the high level of human capital formation and the difficulties that the economic system has in creating adequate job opportunities are a result of the political instability there. Instead of producing goods with a high level of human capital the region specialises in the production of highly skilled workers for emigration. Only a change in the political stability of the region will increase the incentive for FDI creating, in the process, adequate jobs. The empirical section shows a negative emigration effect on human capital growth, but it is less negative than in the Maghreb. Political variables are crucial not only in the Middle East, of course. Sudan also suffers from instability as do, in different ways, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, other countries push for an increase in tertiary education, including the tertiary education of women. But, at the same time, they implement legislation that discourages FDI and, thus, the local creation of appropriate jobs.

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It is in the Maghreb and Egypt that human capital loss is most pronounced, with fewer losses in Egypt because many skilled emigrants adopt ‘temporary migration’ to the Gulf. All these countries face a dilemma: should they or should they not invest in tertiary education with the certainty of losing a share of their tertiary-educated workers, especially their engineers? We would argue that, yes, they should invest, but that they should also try to get a return in monetary and in human capital terms by attracting migrants back home. The same question is asked in southern Europe, where the increase in education and emigration are strongly correlated and where the problem can be solved only through an increase in productivity and job production.

Notes 1. We would like to thank Frederic Docquier and Jean Christophe Dumont for making the relevant data available and Philippe Fargues, Anna Di Bartolomeo and Simone Bertoli for helpful suggestions. 2. CARIM special series of papers on highly skilled migration available at: http:// www.carim.org/index.php?callContent ¼ 210&sortVar ¼ &searchActive ¼ TRUE 3. 21 per cent of Lebanese citizens live abroad. 4. The Brain Drain index is calculated as the ratio between the number of tertiaryeducated migrants and all individuals with tertiary education at home and abroad. 5. In Europe the share of those employed on the labour force within the specific field of education is 64 per cent and 65 per cent versus a 63 per cent average; in North America, Australia and New Zealand the numbers stand, instead, at 71 per cent and 67.4 per cent versus the average of 67 per cent. 6. Portugal 18 per cent, Greece 24 per cent, Spain 22 per cent and Italy 26 per cent. 7. A problem is the plausible endogeneity of the highly skilled migration rate. This might be due to a causal relation that exists between the migration rate and human capital growth, thus the effect of education level on the migration rate has to be tackled by a Dzvimbo first-stage regression. 8. When the partial correlation between growth in human capital over time and its initial level is negative, there is b-convergence. In other words, a negative sign for the coefficient of the initial value of human capital would indicate convergence or a potential catching-up effect. Thus countries with a human capital rate close (far) to their steady-state level such as Lebanon (Mali) will experience a slowdown (speed-up) in human capital growth which is commonly referred as conditional convergence. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), Sala-IMartin (1996), Mankiw et al. (1992) are usually referred to as seminal works depicting the b-convergence models from a neo-classical standpoint.

60 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 9. The instruments used in the first stage are: dummies for the former colonies of the United Kingdom and France, the log distance from the United States, France and the United Kingdom and the log of population size. The most powerful instruments seem to be the distance from the United States and population size. In a companion equation Easterly and Nyarko present the results of the effects of highly skilled emigration on growth, and the variable is never significant, while secondary and tertiary enrolment and openness to trade are significant. 10. An important question raised by the authors is the plausible endogeneity of the migration rate. We follow BDR’s choice here and retain the country population size as a proxy of openness on migration and immigration quota aspects; the stocks of emigrants living in OECD area at the beginning of the period capture the network effect; and the Hausman test confirm that these variables were not correlated with unobservable effects.

CHAPTER 4 HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION INTO, THROUGH AND FROM THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Paul Tabar

Part I In the past 30 years, the migration of highly skilled individuals from developing to developed societies and from less developed to more developing societies has been a prominent feature of global migration. In what follows, I will discuss the socio-political impact of this phenomenon with particular emphasis on sending and receiving societies and on the transnational relations in which highly skilled migrants are emeshed.

The socio-political impact of highly skilled migration within the context of transnational political practice A growing interest in transnational politics has featured in recent writings on migration. This is reflected in the increasing numbers of publications on the subject and the continuing debate over this topic and its consequences.1 Serious attempts have been made to define

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political transnationalism and its implications for social science methodology: i.e. politics, sociology, anthropology, and economics. Attention has also been paid to the redefinition of citizenship and political practice (Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008: 645– 63). Undoubtedly, these discussions are very useful in that they delimit the term. Without this analytical exercise, transnationalism cannot be set apart from other related concepts in migration literature: e.g. diaspora, migrant politics and migrant communities. The consequence of this would be that the very validity of the term would become suspect. Having said that, researchers cannot remain indifferent to the complexity of transnational ties and more specifically to the transnational political practices of immigrants. For this reason, ‘transnational communities’ runs the risk of becoming a distracting term. After all, researchers must also look at the impact of class, gender and ethnic-cum-political allegiances on the composition and the behaviour of transnational migrants. This means that researchers need, first and foremost, to focus ‘on transnational practices rather than on transnational communities’ (italics in the original) based on the consideration that: while. . .the study of immigrants’ transnational activities must be connected to the social context in which it takes place, we nonetheless maintain that it is scientifically dubious to essentialize transnationalism because, although all migrants can potentially and to different degrees be involved in transnational activities, no migrant community is by nature transnational. Because community-based studies naturally tend to emphasize those factors that are specific to a community, they tend to essentialize transnationalism, while studies that focus on practices could provide researchers with a clear object with which to conduct comparative work from a non-essentialist perspective (Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008: 651). Indeed, I would argue that examining transnational practices rather than transnational communities gets us closer to the rich and multifaceted reality of transnationalism. The concept enables us to focus on specific aspects of transnationalism including the particular location and the role exercised by highly skilled migrants in the context of transnational socio-political ties. These migrants possess a lot of cultural

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63

and social capital and political activists are often recruited from their ranks. This obliges us to examine their socio-political practices and their impact on shaping political transnationalism.

The economic and socio-political contexts of highly skilled migration It is well established that, in the southern and eastern Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan African countries, highly skilled individuals seek to emigrate. Indeed, they cross vast spaces moving towards northern and western European countries as well as to North America and Australia to do so. This movement has to be placed in the context of the fundamental restructuring of the world economy that has taken place since the oil crisis in 1973 and more particularly since the rise of Ronald Reagan in the United States (1981) and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (1979). In trying to summarise the basic features of this restructuring, Castles mentioned that they included: changes in global investment patterns, with increased capital export from developed countries and the establishment of manufacturing industries in some previously underdeveloped areas; the micro-electronic revolution, which has reduced the need for manual workers in manufacturing; erosion of traditional skilled manual occupation in highly-developed countries; expansion in the services sector, with demand for both highly skilled and low-skilled workers. In assessing the impact of these developments on the shifts in migratory patterns and new forms of migration, Castles argued that they led to ‘increasing international mobility of highly qualified personnel, in both temporary and permanent flows’ and ‘recruitment of foreign labour, mainly from less-developed countries, by oil-rich countries’ (Castles and Miller (2003), pp. 78 – 9). These are deep economic changes in the world capitalist system. They need to be mentioned here to put the study of highly skilled emigration from developing countries (and the increasing mobility of skilled migration within developed countries) in its proper international and structural contexts.

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However, lack of economic opportunities in the south-eastern Mediterranean and the Sub-Saharan countries are mostly accompanied by unstable and oppressive political regimes. Countries like Lebanon and Sudan have suffered from major civil conflicts and, in addition, Lebanon has experienced devastating wars and Israeli occupation not to mention political and military intervention from neighbouring Syria. These dramatic events have caused many Lebanese and Sudanese migrants, including the highly skilled, to leave their home country to improve their economic status and to live in a better social and political environment. So economic and demographic (low fertility) factors in destination countries and economic hardship (lack of job opportunities and income differentials) in origin countries are only the beginning. They are certainly not enough to grasp the dynamics of highly skilled migration from these regions towards northern and western European countries. Political instability and lack of solid democratic regimes in most Sub-Saharan and south-eastern Mediterranean countries needs also to be set against political stability and democracy in destination countries. This too plays a crucial role in explaining highly skilled migration from the former to the latter.

The socio-political impact of highly skilled migration on sending societies A socio-political reading of highly skilled migration cannot, however, simply register the difference in the political and economic situations of the sending countries and those of the countries of destination. Other aspects pertaining to the political impact of highly skilled migration on the sending countries have also to be discussed. Previous studies show that mass emigration leads to the alleviation of political tensions in the sending countries. This is confirmed by a recent study on Morocco which concludes: Morocco became a massive workforce provider in the mid-1960s, when domestic political struggles were reaching an apex. Until the 1980s, emigration was similar to a safety valve which allowed political unrest to weaken. For this reason, it could be described as an ‘exit’ from a declining system, in terms of personal satisfaction (Dumont, 2008: 793).

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However, no attempt has yet been made to examine the specific effect of highly skilled migration on political tensions in the home country. This can be achieved by looking into the social composition of activists and the leaders of transnational politics in the diaspora. Broadly speaking studies in political sociology (Dekmejian, 1975; Stanworth and Giddens, 1974) show that many political activists and leaders of political parties are recruited from the middle classes. These are normally university graduates and thus highly skilled. This is also true when examining the social background of prominent political activists in the diaspora.2 Recent evidence shows that many political activists and leaders in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon (post-Syrian troop withdrawal) and amid the Palestinian authorities have been expatriates. In post-war Lebanon, a number of political activists who worked with the late Rafic al-Hariri, a past prime minister of Lebanon, were highly qualified emigrants. In due course, some of them became members of parliament and ministers: e.g. the late Minister of Trade and Economy Basil Flayhan and Farid al-Mikari MP. Moreover, political organisations pertaining to SubSaharan and south-eastern Mediterranean countries are often led and mobilised and/or supported by highly skilled migrants in the diaspora. A recent case study of how Lebanese nationals in Australia participated in the Australian general elections of June 2009, demonstrates that highly skilled Lebanese migrants organised the election campaign and mobilised the diaspora to return to Lebanon and cast their vote on election day. Engineers, architects and solicitors are found among these organisers (Tabar, 2011). Another study was conducted on Algerians in France and particularly the well-educated middle class of the Kabyle migrant population. This showed how this group framed Kabyle activism in France and the Kabyle ‘myth’, which is so crucial in codifying and reinforcing the ethnic divide between the Arabs and the Berbers. The author of the study agrees with others who ‘have seen the continuing development of Kabyle culture and transnational activism in France as an opportunity that would not have existed without significant emigration and [that] has permitted the continued existence and even flourishing of Kabyle culture, which would not have occurred in the hostile climate of Algeria’ (Collyer, 2008: 694). Highly skilled middle-class emigrants are not only found in the domain of what Ostergaard-Nielsen calls ‘homeland politics’. They are

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also encountered in translocal politics.3 In fact, my extensive fieldwork on Lebanese migrant organisations in Sydney, a city that houses more than 70 per cent of Lebanese migrants and their descendants, bears witness to this observation. It shows, first, that these organisations are engaged in the translocal type of transnational politics: they or individuals coming from the same area engage in fund-raising activities to provide financial support for development projects. Development project here might include the building of a school or a clinic or a hospital ward in their home villages (Tabar, 2009). The same is true of Morocco (see Lacroix, 2003). Second, leaders of these organisations tend to be highly skilled members from the first and second generation. In addition, it has been argued that the concept of immigrant transnationalism enables us to test the strong link between globalisation and immigrant practices. ‘Technological progress in communication technologies, the increasing intensity and velocity of exchanges of all sorts (goods, services and information) and the development of affordable long-distance travel have provided migrants with new means with which to connect with their home country’ (Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008: 654). Facing this development, the significance of transnational condition in the context of globalization becomes clear (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999), a significance which revolves around ‘the increasing duality that characterizes certain migrants’ lives’. However, this duality does not only refer to ‘speaking two languages, having two passports, owning two houses in two countries or earning money by doing business between two spaces’ (Martinielli and Lafleur, 2008: 651). It also implies the increasing engagement of migrant communities in translocal and homeland politics. In this context, migrant communities are able to forge strong relations with their country of origin. This means their engagement in social and political transnational practices. Indeed in many cases, highly skilled migrants are, at the same time, political exiles due to their opposition to the political regime in their homeland. In broader terms, the continuation of political engagement in home politics and the struggle against the home regime are made easier by cheap modern communication technology. There is also the growing interest of the diaspora in the political (social and economic) affairs of their country of origin. No analysis of the socio-political impact of highly skilled migration on the country of origin can ignore transnational political relations and its impact on the politics of the sending countries.

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Political organisations and lobby groups in the diaspora become all the more important when based out of a Western country with world influence and more particularly influence in the sending countries.4 Being based in a Western country gives the diaspora political clout. Striking examples of this include the Free Patriotic Movement led by General Aoun and the Lebanese Forces and the lobbying of these two political groups in the diaspora of the French and US government. This led, in no small part, to the international community forcing the Syrian government to withdraw its troops from Lebanon in 2005.5 Highly skilled migration becomes, then, a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it undermines political opposition to the regime as potential political opponents are effectively forced out of the country. On the other, it creates new opportunities for highly skilled migrants to politically mobilise the diaspora and exert their political influence from abroad. Well-orgaisend diasporas can even wield the host government as an international tool to force governments to change their political behaviour. This socio-political aspects of highly skilled migration should be investigated and explored in more detail so we can have a better understanding of its impact on sending countries.

The socio-political impact of highly skilled migration on receiving countries Highly skilled migrants are normally the migrant group which integrates fastest in the country of destination. Evidence shows that economic integration enables migrants to integrate successfully into mainstream society. However, there are other aspects pertaining to the socio-political impact of highly skilled migrants on the receiving societies. These include the transfer of political conflicts (and sometimes violence) from the sending country to the host country. Take, for example, the recent confrontations between Kurds and Turks in various European countries or the violence worked on Algerians living in France by the militant political opposition in Algeria in the 1980s. Moreover, conflict can emerge between political groups in the diaspora and the ‘host’ government if the political orientation of the former is in conflict with the foreign policies of the latter. Even when there is no direct clash between the two, the government of the sending country can exert pressure on its host counterpart if it feels threatened by its diapora. This, in turn, can cause the receiving state to

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constrain the political freedom of any political diaspora groups opposing the regime in the sending country. The French government’s attitude to the Moroccan diaspora in France is a case in point: co-operation between the French and Moroccan governments to politically control the Moroccan migrants has become a feature of French politics. France’s aim has been to suppress the political activities of left-wing Moroccans in France, leftwing Moroccans who oppose governments in their home and adopted countries. Receiving states may also decide to use political organisations to exert pressure on the sending countries themselves. Finally, in some cases countries of destination can be used by diaspora groups as forums to call for political changes in origin countries. The demands of diaspora groups might include questions of direct political change, not to mention specific issues such as the release of political prisoners and respect for human rights: e.g. the Syrian opposition parties’ lobbying in France and the United States against the Assad regime.

Civil society in receiving countries and the socio-political impact of highly skilled migration In many cases, diaspora groups are able to mobilise civil society groups in the receiving countries to support their demands concerning their country of origin. This gives more force to diaspora political groups vis-a`-vis the political regime of their country of origin. This is true, for example, of many Lebanese, Kurdish and North African migrant groups who mobilise civil society associations and leftist political groups in receiving countries in support of their political demands for sending countries. The emergence of transnational politics points, as discussed in the above section, to another crucial political role that highly skilled migrants who are politically active in the diaspora might play in the future. We refer here to the growing campaigns for diasporas to have the right to dual citizenship and the right to vote in absentia.6 As transnational ties are strengthened and are becoming more enduring, the call for dual citizenship and the right to vote in absentia is also becoming more widespread. This is particularly true in the case of Lebanon where some ministers in the present government and wide sections of the Lebanese diaspora are working together to make Lebanese citizenship more accessible to those of Lebanese descent abroad. They want also to

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implement the right to vote in absentia in the upcoming 2013 general elections. Ever since this suggestion was made, Lebanese diaspora political groups have asked vocally for its implementation. In addition, along with the right to vote comes the possibility of diaspora members joining the political elite of the country of origin. There have been signs of this happening even before the right to vote in absentia is implemented. The case of Lebanon and Iraq provide striking examples here. However, with the legitimisation of the right to vote for the diaspora, it is anticipated that more political activists drawn from the highly skilled diaspora will run for office and that they will represent national and transnational issues. To sum up, examining the socio-political impact of highly skilled migration is a complex exercise. It involves national and transnational factors embracing sending and receiving societies. Moreover, it introduces new dimensions into the study of politics, which go beyond the boundaries of the nation state. By including transnational ties and political relations, the new reality of transnational politics becomes tangible. And in the midst of this new reality, highly skilled migrants are found to play a crucial role thanks to their social and cultural capital.

Part II Further comments on this part of the book The chapters which make up this part of the book raise a number of points. First, with regards to the skilled migration of students, there seems to be inter-regional migratory movements inside the Sub-Saharan countries, as students often migrate to other African countries in order to continue their education. However, this migration is often transitory and the ultimate destination for these students is the West. The same applies for the south-eastern Mediterranean countries. Many students leave their countries to continue their higher education in Lebanon, though many ultimately prefer the West. To that extent, it should be noted that Sub-Saharan countries have concluded bilateral co-operation and integration programmes between African countries. They have certainly done so more than the countries of the south-eastern Mediterranean. There is the need for better regulation policies organising the mobility of people there.

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In socio-political and economic terms the Sub-Saharan and southeastern Mediterranean regions both suffer from continuous instability, turmoil, under-development and conflict, a state which boosts skilled migration. Nevertheless, each country is a case apart, as the socio-political and economic factors that come into play in each country are diverse and create unique dynamics which, in turn, affect skilled migration differently. The study of skilled migration must, therefore, differ according to the specific conditions present in each country.

Political motivations for neglecting statistical data on highly skilled migration It is clear from the literature that there is a lack of sufficient official data from this part of the world. This means that the researcher has real problems in obtaining accurate and reliable figures about the size and profiles of highly skilled emigrant communities in the south-eastern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. There is not the institutional support to investigate highly skilled emigration. This is very likely because any investigation might embarrass the authorities of affected countries. The receiving states, meanwhile, benefit from hosting highly skilled migrants. They also find that it makes sense to under-research this reality. After all, any careful estimation of the social, economic and political consequences of their action on the sending countries is better ignored by them. We live in an age when developed countries are competing to maximise the skill mix which favours their economic growth and which reduces the integration and assimilation problems of foreign citizens. Skilled migration seems an appropriate solution to squaring up international supply and demand in countries of origin. As such there is no pressing need to look into the broader implications of this phenomenon either in the destination or sending countries. Highly skilled emigration into, through and from Sub-Saharan and south-eastern Mediterranean countries is not, by any means, a simple phenomenon. Part of this type of emigration occurs between these countries and relates to the movement of highly skilled migrants to developed western countries such as France, Germany, the United States, Canada and Australia. In both cases, however, these emigrants are driven by the hope of better economic prospects or better opportunities for further education. In other instances, as mentioned previously,

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skilled emigration could be the result of political instability and violent conflicts in the sending countries. In the second case, skilled migrants cover a whole range of categories. They tend to leave their countries under the pressure of civil unrest, whereas in the former, they get selected by the receiving country depending on labour market needs. These intricate issues should be considered very carefully when addressing highly skilled migration into and from the south-east Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa. Highly skilled migration driven by humanitarian and refugee considerations will more likely exacerbate xenophobia and racist politics in the receiving countries than that which is motivated by the needs of the labour market there. In addition, the literature on highly skilled migration needs to be more careful in its definition of a highly skilled migrant: a more nuanced definition is essential for this complex phenomenon. When talking about highly skilled (and skilled) emigration, we normally define this category as referring to professionals and people with tertiary education. But what about business migrants? Their skills and competencies allow them to run their own firms and companies. Even though these skills are not acquired from formal institutions, would it not make sense to also include them as highly skilled (and skilled) emigrants? In the current migration literature, they are commonly referred to as ‘business migrants’, a fact that needs unpacking when discussing highly skilled emigration. Moreover, in discussing the outflow of highly skilled migrants, the present literature tends to emphasise the impact of income differentials on origin and destination countries. Alternatively, there is the mismatch between the capacity of the local labour market to employ newly qualified graduates every year (the demand side) and that of tertiary institutions to produce graduates (the supply side).7 In this discussion, not enough attention is paid to the undemocratic and corrupt character of the political regimes that are encountered in the region and that ultimately drive many skilled emigrants (especially writers and artists) to leave their country as a form of political protest. The role of politics in emigration has to be explained. This is particularly true, given the acute awareness among the educated of the corruption, clientelism, nepotism and undemocratic institutions so characteristic of developing countries. In fact, a critical examination of the socio-political context which encourages highly skilled migration to western and northern

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European countries may reveal a weak spot in the immigration policy of the state concerned. This might undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Nation building and the economic development of some southeastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan African countries are predicated upon the myth of emigration. In the case of Lebanon, for instance, this myth is propagated by political leaders and it is found in history and literary books taught by private and public schools as well as by tertiary institutions. For a graduate to leave his/her country to work abroad is becoming ‘normal’ and is no longer challenged. ‘Packing up and leaving’ after graduation is, indeed, now entrenched in the dominant ideology of Lebanese nation building and economic progress. In fact, emigration is praised in the early writings of ideologues of the Lebanese nation such as Michel Chiha and Youssef As-Sawda. This being said, we should also recognise that in other cases of postcolonial nation building the emigration of highly skilled people is discouraged. Indeed, it is considered an act of national betrayal: Syria offers an example here. This negative attitude towards emigration, however, is increasingly losing popularity in the post-colonial era, in a world that is becoming globalised and regionalised under the banner of neo-liberalism. Almost all governments adopting the Excreta and Wastewater Management EWM and in Sub-Saharan Africa are actively pursuing policies aimed at connecting the diapsora communities to their homelands. In this context, these communities are seen as essential agents in the building and developing of homeland economies.8 In any event, most governments in the south-eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa are guided by short-term gains when addressing highly skilled emigration. As mentioned by several authors in this section of the book, they see this type of emigration as a quick solution to alleviating the problem of unemployment (hence diluting social and political tensions) and a much needed source of foreign currency to resolve balance-of-payments problems and to serve as collateral for securing additional foreign loans (Guarnizo, 2003). Even when the opportunity for developing regional economic integration among Arab countries is presented no real policy is implemented by these states. There is no real interest in developing economic co-operation and fostering integration between their economies by gradually breaking down the legal, political and economic barriers that separate between

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them. An example here are the oil-producing Gulf States and the growing ability of their labour markets to absorb the excess qualified (and unqualified) labour from many Arab states such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan and Egypt. Yet, since 1979, the Gulf States have opted to gradually replace Arab migrant workers with cheaper south Asian migrants. This trend was reinforced after the second Gulf War in 1990 – 1. The lack of co-operation and economic integration between Sub-Saharan countries is arguably even worse. The structural reasons behind these economic policy failures are attributed to the dominant political regimes in these countries, characterised as they are by authoritarianism, corruption and lack of democracy. These political regimes seem also to fit the dictates of global neo-liberalism and its economic structural readjustments imposed by the world economic powers and their global agencies. Initiatives to use highly skilled emigrants in the development process of origin countries are taken by international organisations such as the UNDP, through the TOKTEN programme, for instance. However, this programme does not succeed in fulfilling its main objectives simply because the highly skilled diaspora is not motivated enough to take part. They are all too aware of the political and legal environment prevalent in their origin countries. If the diaspora is to contribute in transferring their knowledge and skills back to their country of origin, they have to be convinced that their efforts will not be wasted by lethargic, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, never mind political instability. Basic requisites for the success of programmes encouraging the return of highly skilled emigrants or the transfer of their cultural and economic capital to their origin countries are still lacking in most countries of the region. At the moment, the cultural and economic capital that is transferred to the sending countries is being utilised to reproduce the very same conditions responsible for the initial ‘expulsion’. Again Lebanon is a case in point here. The majority of highly skilled emigrants who leave Lebanon to work abroad remain permanently in the country of destination. Their relations with Lebanon could have economic benefits. But it does not assist the Lebanese economy in breaking free from the vicious circle of economic under-development and lopsided development. This is so because the financial remittances that migrants transfer to their home country are mostly spent on consumption: financial aid to family members, the purchase of an apartment or the

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building of a house in their home village, return visits, charitable donations. No serious effort is made by the government to channel these remittances into more productive, wealth-creating economic activities. The Investment Development Authority in Lebanon (IDAL), which was created to channel foreign and diaspora investments in productive sectors, has been neutered by political conflicts and instability. Even when return business people dare to invest in Lebanon, they eventually give up on their project because of the absence of the infrastructure required for any enterprise. Problems here include the lack of energy and its extremely high cost. There is also the attempt by Lebanese politicians to secure a ‘brotherhood tax’ in return for protecting businesses as well, again, as generalised political instability. In the south-eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa we are still a long way from the achievement of the Indian and Chinese diasporas. These have succeeded in transferring cultural capital back to their countries of origin. They did so by convincing their governments to provide the appropriate requisites for this transfer. The result was a revolution in high-tech industry at home (Portes, 2008). Pressure has to be applied on governmental authorities in the EU, in the south-eastern Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is a real need to devise policies that would put an end to the economic, political and social injustices resulting from highly skilled emigration. There is no solution to emigration problems through stricter and more rigorous border policies, i.e. maintaining the ‘sedentary bias’. Likewise, it is also appropriate to argue for the creation of a fairer and more equitable environment by which mobile citizens can move between countries. Under the present policies, certain countries in the EU and the south-east Mediterranean ‘want to have their cake and eat it too’. Some EU countries want to invite the most competent and skilled emigrants when their economies need them and they then shut them out when their economies are in recession. Most importantly, these countries cannot continue focusing exclusively on their national economies. They, in fact, ignore the economic and social well being of the Mediterranean basin and Sub-Saharan African countries, and the countries from which their highly skilled emigrants are extracted. Worse still are the immigration policies of the Gulf States: Arab skilled (and semi-skilled) workers are invited under strict work contracts by which their civil and political rights are completely denied. Yet, the Gulf States define

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themselves as Arab states and the national identity of the Gulf Arabs and those of Arabs from elsewhere is supposedly the same. UNDP initiatives such as the TOKTEN programme, mentioned above, and the recently launched ‘Live Lebanon’ should be encouraged to ensure a growing contribution to the diaspora in the transfer of cultural and financial capital to origin countries. Successful cases of highly skilled migration between Algeria and Canada, India and the United States and China and the United States should be celebrated. Ideally, these instances would encourage initiatives by the diasporas and governments of the EU, the south-eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan African countries. Perhaps they would even lead to reform of the unjust and inefficient institutional framework within which highly skilled migration presently occurs. The convergence between the bottom-up and top-down strategies would be the quickest and most effective way forward. As mentioned above, the socio-political implications of highly skilled emigrants and their impact on their country of origin cannot be overlooked. Previous research has shown that the receiving country itself has a considerable impact on the mode in which highly skilled emigrants integrate into the host society. In a non-racist environment ‘high human capital migrants tend to acculturate rapidly and seek entry into the middle-class mainstream, riding on their occupation skills and cultural resources’ (Portes, p. 20). But this does not mean disconnection from the country of origin, especially if a country is wracked by political crisis, civil strife or acute social and political problems. Evidence suggests that political activists in the diaspora are mainly drawn from among the highly skilled. After all, highly skilled migrants tend to have better organisational skills and are better able to understand the political situation in their country and they can express the political grievances of their co-nationals. Here once again Lebanon offers us a useful example: since the end of the civil war in 1989, the Lebanese diaspora has engaged in all sorts of activities directed at Lebanese politics. Many members of the diaspora in countries such as France, the United States, Canada and Australia, have organised themselves into political groups. Rallies and public demonstrations are organised in support of political causes. The diaspora Lebanese have been active in lobbying governments of host countries to support their political demands and they have welcomed political and religious leaders from their homeland, offering them all kinds of support for various political causes.

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Evidence also suggests that some highly skilled emigrants, who have been politically active in the diaspora, have decided to return to their homeland in pursuit of political activism. Some of them have even become ministers and members of parliament: e.g. Simone Abi Ramia and Yassine Jaber. Others too have returned to join their political party in their homeland: this is particularly true of highly skilled emigrants from the United States, France and Australia who have signed up to the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement. In this context, studying the return of highly skilled emigrants and the socio-political development of their home country becomes essential. The above example from Lebanon indicates that the highly skilled, could become a new source for the political elite in the homeland. There is, in fact, further evidence to show an important relationship between this kind of return migrants and the formation of vibrant middle and upper classes. The correlation between the formation of these classes among the Shiite community in Lebanon since the 1960s and the return of Shiite emigrants from the Gulf States, west African countries, and the United States is a case in point. Anecdotal evidence shows that many members of the Shiite upper (and middle) class, especially in the construction sector in Lebanon, were expatriates. They are still active in Lebanon and abroad. As mentioned before, political activism by diaspora members may lead a host government to apply pressure if their activities are not in line with their own foreign policy. In July 2009, many Lebanese Shiites (Naharnet claims they were in the hundreds whereas AFP stated there were dozens) were expelled from the United Arab Emirates because they were allegedly affiliated to Hizballah. Evidence from newspapers which reported the incident indicated that ‘Most of those expelled were top businessmen and have major investments in the Emirates.’9 The two persons who were quoted in the report were highly skilled emigrants, one a journalist and the other a physician. It has also been reported that Palestinians from the Gaza Strip have ‘also been forced to leave the UEA in recent months for security reasons’ (ibid). After the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation (February 1991), many Palestinians and Jordanians, including highly skilled emigrants, were expelled from Kuwait in retaliation for their government’s support of the Iraqi invasion. A complete analysis of the socio-political dimension of emigration cannot be achieved by ignoring the political affiliations of highly skilled

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emigrants or, for that matter, by ignoring the impact of state relations and international politics on these emigrant communities. The social remittances of the highly skilled should also be given more attention. Remittances of highly skilled emigrants encourage a consumerist culture which, in turn, fuels the development of the kind of rentier economy and rentier state which is found in some south-eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan African countries. Along with this economic behaviour comes the transfer of social remittances: namely, the dissemination of a Western style of life through return migration and return visits and contact with emigrant family members abroad. This further ties receiving societies to regional and global economies. It does so through the social habits and cultural values stemming from consumerism and the emulation of global western culture.

Notes 1. See, for example, the special issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies on Transnational Politics from a Transatlantic Perspective, 2008. 2. Commenting on the role of those migrant organisations in France who fought for the right of Moroccans to absentee voting, Dumont writes: ‘In the late 1990s, many migrants’ organizations brought up the absentee vote as a major problem in the maintaining of their homeland attachment. These organizations were mainly composed of elite migrants. For instance, the one which wrote to the Supreme Court in 2002. . . was a Moroccan associative network led by a doctor’ (Dumont, 2008: 800). 3. For a full discussion of types of transnational politics, see, Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 760–86. 4. For a discussion of the role of the Lebanese diaspora during the Civil War (1975 – 90) and thereafter, see, Marinova, Nadejda, 2010. 5. On this point, see, Trent, 2012. 6. For a good study on the role of external voting and the democratisation processes in the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, see Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008: 664– 86. See also Lafleur, 2012. 7. See chapter (in the book) by Assal on Sudan. 8. See for example, Dumont, 2008 on the way in which the Moroccan government is relating to its diaspora in France. 9. Naharnet, retrieved on 17 November 2009 and last updated on 4 October 2009.

CHAPTER 5 HIGHLY SKILLED DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS: TOKTEN IN THE ARAB WORLD Tamirace Fakhoury

Introduction The present chapter contributes to the debate on the interface between highly skilled migration governance and development in a transitioning Arab region. It problematises the extent to which international migration programmes, working in the region, can favourably exploit highly skilled migration and, at least to some extent, steer outcomes. The chapter cautiously proposes that managed temporary return should be studied as a factor optimising the diffusion of positive highly skilled migration externalities. The study limits itself to an assessment of one of the most visible channels mobilising expatriate professionals’ competences through temporary return, TOKTEN (the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals). This inquiry is to be read against the backdrop of the recent Arab uprisings, which have not only called into question the region’s alleged unreceptiveness to democracy (Bayat, 2011). These uprising are also changing relations between Arab states and their diasporas. The primary policy focus has been on the management of irregular migration in a trans-mediterranean context. However, little attention has so far been given over, in global policy circles, to the question of

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whether, and if so to what extent, these transformations provide an opportunity for tapping into the competences of the Arab diasporas, in current state-building processes. Although empirical research remains thin on the ground, Arab expatriates have shown increasing interest, with the revolts, in their countries’ political affairs (Fakhoury, 2013). Exchanges facilitated by visits and internet activism (Kuebler, 2011) have reinforced links between local and transnational Arab communities (Shiri, 2011), sucking Arab diaspora groups into post-authoritarian processes. Notwithstanding the diasporas’ renewed interest in their home countries, it must be remembered that Arab states have not particularly endeavoured to harness the positive effects of emigration. Emigration policies in Arab states have been conspicuous by their absence (Fargues, 2004). Typical authoritarian regimes have been reluctant to establish links with professional expatriates perceived as a threat to the regime. Except for some debatable cases where countries have adopted proactive policies to consolidate links with their diasporas (e.g. Morocco), Arab governments court their diasporas politically, but refrain from bold attempts to reach out to them. If they do embark upon such initiatives, governments will, naturally, ensure that the courting also involves control issues (Haas, 2007). Despite political liberalisation, uncertainty about post-authoritarian transitions casts a pall over any restructuring of highly skilled migration governance in the region. Then, given the policy-making vacuum towards diasporas, an important question is whether initiatives, such as TOKTEN, could constitute a vector for engineering ‘favourable conditions’ that enhance positive highly skilled migration externalities for local governance and development. On a broader level, the present study seeks to generate insights into whether guided diaspora involvement in homeland issues can provide a constructive form of external development for a transitioning region.

Study structure The chapter is divided into four major parts. The first part conceptualises skilled expatriate ‘feedback-effects’ in transnational studies. The second part offers an understanding of the mechanisms TOKTEN draws on to elicit diaspora engagement. After looking at TOKTEN’s approach,

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there is, in the third part, abbreviated brief description of the project in three Arab countries: Lebanon, Palestine, and Sudan. The choice is decided by the fact that TOKTEN has been particularly active in these countries over the last years. This comparative examination allows, in the fourth part, for insights into: (a) the programme’s benefits and shortfalls in different Arab contexts where highly skilled emigration has different implications; and (b) the differentiated determinants affecting the ways in which TOKTEN taps into highly skilled migrant competences. Reference is also made to Arab countries in which the TOKTEN experience has been temporary or unsuccessful. This section further explores some factors affecting the extent to which TOKTEN-style modalities can provide adequate channels for human capital diffusion in a transitioning region.

Methodology and study limitations The study should be regarded as a qualitative review of highly skilled knowledge transfers through TOKTEN. It makes no claim to measuring the extent to which TOKTEN expatriates affect local human capital development. The scarcity of available data on TOKTEN missions, the difficulty of accessing what information there is, and the fact that the author has not carried out in-depth field research all limit the findings. The author relied, instead, from September 2009 until January 2013, on qualitative appreciations, interviews1 with academics and UN senior officials, and on the available literature on highly skilled migration trends in the region and literature on TOKTEN. These sources provide, however, an incomplete picture. First, HSM trends in the region are under-researched and under-theorised. Second, TOKTEN missions have not been sufficiently evaluated, and tend to be described by official statements in a positive light with little reference to constraints on the ground.

Highly skilled diaspora contributions to development While research has long confirmed that diasporas are important agents of change both internationally and locally, one strand of studies has increasingly focused, since the 1970s, on the impact of highly skilled migrants on development. A focal point of interest is whether skilled

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immigration constitutes brain drain or, rather, brain gain and brain circularity. While the literature in this regard is divided, there are two visible trends: the traditional literature that considers highly skilled migration as a structural loss (Baghwati and Hamada, 1974); and a more recent trend that detects positive ‘feedback effects’, while offering at the same time a mitigated reading of the repercussions of skilled emigration on home societies (Docquier, 2006). The traditional approach usually argues that the emigration of highly skilled professionals exacerbates the developmental gap between north and south, and that it has a negative impact on human capital accumulation in the sending countries (Faini, 2003). The revisionist trend argues, instead, that highly skilled professionals produce positive spillover effects in their home society, in as much as they encourage locals to strive for higher levels of education, enriching thereby the reservoir of human capital (Beine et al., 2001). Provided that these expatriates remit on a certain scale, their financial transfers can also have a positive incidence on development (World Bank, 2006). Recent country-by-country research in the Arab world shows that in certain countries, where a mismatch between education and subsequent employment is observable, highly skilled emigration provides a relief valve and a livelihood strategy (Assal, 2010; Saki, 2010). Whereas many studies have examined the links between highly skilled migration and the brain-drain/brain-gain question, motivations underlying professional expatriates’ decisions to return or invest their skills in their home countries are under-explored. The premise of this study is that assessing TOKTEN skilled returnees’ involvement in homeland development is not a straightforward affair. First, their perceptions of their homeland, the choices they make to be involved or not are strong vectors affecting the link between highly skilled migration and development in the TOKTEN framework. Then, second, knowledge transfers induce diffusion processes whose effects cannot be quantitatively measured. The transnational immigration lens (Basch et al., 1991). offers a conceptual space to better grasp these considerations. The complex crossborder entanglement of diasporas has spurred debates on how these actors reconceptualise their homeland, develop different loyalties, and maintain connections across two or more countries (Levitt and GlickSchiller, 2004).

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While transnational migration leads to the reconstruction of migrants’ loyalties, it also stimulates knowledge spillovers and human capital gains, usually subsumed under the framework of social remittances (Levitt, 1998). Framing highly skilled diasporas’ externalities in this way can provide a conceptual key to any ‘feedback effect.’

The TOKTEN approach While TOKTEN has sustainably tapped into skilled diasporas’ competences, little attention has been paid to embedding the programme into a broader conceptual and comparative framework so as to critically appraise its potential. It is further posited that countries have not developed consistent approaches to gauging its success (Rao, 2006). First introduced in Turkey in 1977, TOKTEN is jointly implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) in conjunction with local institutions in origin countries. Categorised as an ‘expert pool assistance’ type of knowledge network (Meyer and Brown 1999), it provides an opportunity for expatriates to return to their homeland for a short period, and to undertake consultancy missions in host institutions. Objectives include empowering the home society so as ‘to facilitate national ownership of development processes’ (UNV documentation, Bonn), mitigating the adverse effects of brain drain through knowledge sharing while enhancing links between diasporas and their homelands. In the last years, TOKTEN missions have extended into the more sophisticated fields of democratic governance, conflict management, and educational reform. It is reported that the programme has been most successful in China, India, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Poland and Turkey (UNV documentation, Bonn). The programme addresses a given country’s development context by targeting priority intervention areas defined by the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Once these areas are defined, the United Nations’ (UN) agencies team up with the relevant governmental body. In general, a government ministry is designated to work as a liaison with the UN. Drafters for the TOKTEN programme study beforehand whether there is a significant diaspora that can supply TOKTEN consultants in a selected country, and whether there is a need for expatriate professionals

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to push the development agenda. Once the programme is set up, advocacy strategies mobilising professional expatriates are crucial in the success of the initative. Addressing the hubs where these expatriates reside has proven to be an efficient method. TOKTEN missions depend, of course, on the funds allocated by international donors (states or organisations) for each country. These funds vary according to the international interest in a given country. The TOKTEN approach has several advantages. It allows experts to be brought in to the origin country at low cost. Participants come as international experts, but they share the language and traditions of the country. Another advantage derives from an expert’s ability, as an outsider, to distance themselves from instability in origin countries. Moreover, TOKTEN is closely coupled with the volunteer approach in as much as recruits do not obtain direct salaries. They are eligible for a round-trip air ticket and a daily allowance. While the programme stands neither as a resettlement nor as an employment strategy for diasporas, it attracts experts who come to test the ground or who are interested in short-term return missions. The exchange of skills, which allows for ‘long-term association’ among several stakeholders leads to brain circularity. Another major advantage is TOKTEN’s demand-driven approach, which consists in addressing development sectors requiring improvement. This ideally provides an appropriate match between supply and demand.

Contextualising TOKTEN in the Arab world In the section below, the paper reviews the TOKTEN approach in the three countries where the programme has been carried out in the last years. This section provides some pointers for gauging the programme’s relevance in the Arab region today. It is noteworthy that some Arab governments have expressed interest in TOKTEN since its inception (Mahmoud and Rice, 1986). Also, the programme was temporarily run in Egypt, Morocco, and Syria. Still, the paucity of literature on these experiments, and the fact that institutional frameworks no longer exist, make it difficult to assess these cases.

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The TOKTEN programme in Lebanon Despite the fact that emigration in Lebanon has been on the rise since the 1990s and despite the fact that there has been a qualitative drain of human resources, there are, to date, no active governmental strategies to tackle this phenomenon (Kiwan, 2010). TOKTEN Lebanon takes on, then, a particular importance as it substitutes – albeit only partially – a policy gap. Launched in 1995, the TOKTEN programme, jointly administered by UNDP and the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), was temporarily interrupted in 2000 because of a lack of funding. Relaunched in 2006, the initiative focuses on implementing projects with a direct bearing on structural deficits in the public sector after the 15-year civil war (1975–90). Short-term consultancy missions consist either in implementing training programmes aimed at reforming institutions or in conducting studies that can help improve legal and governance frameworks. Projects undertaken in the last years target infrastructure, institutional capacity building and medical treatment in state hospitals.2 Important criteria conditioning the selection and the success of projects, as well as the allocation of funds include the absorption capacity, as well as the readiness of recipient institution. Contributions do not only occur by way of short-term return missions, but also through other transnational exchanges. Some contribute with donations. Others contribute through information sharing while remaining in the country of settlement. From the ministerial point of view, TOKTEN missions in Lebanon are usually welcomed for their free-of-charge technical assistance. These short-term returnees, typically come back with different mindsets. Feedback from previous missions has shown that experts have challenged post-war bitterness and the illusion in some host ministries that ‘abroad is better.’ Although the TOKTEN programme acts as a significant ‘migration vector’ spurring knowledge transfers, a series of obstructions limit its effectiveness. TOKTEN missions have, indeed, sometimes to be cancelled because of the country’s unstable political situation. The expert then finds themselves in relatively precarious and complex governmental structures. This too limits TOKTEN’s effectiveness.

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Given these structural constraints, TOKTEN Lebanon has favoured pragmatism. Priority is given to projects requesting minimal logistical services and minimal commitment from public institutions. Also, the programme’s approach consists in providing institutions with expertise not available in the local labour market, rather than attracting a large number of consultants. This probably explains why, in quantitative terms, TOKTEN Lebanon has not, to date, pooled a significant number of experts. While there are, on average, six missions per year, only six experts since 2006 have decided to settle.

The TOKTEN programme in Palestine Administered by UNDP and the Programme for Assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP) since 1994, TOKTEN Palestine is usually reckoned a success story (Hanafi, 2008; Murphy, 2006). The programme has, with the years, extended beyond the public sector into educational, associative, and cultural areas. It is reported that more than 600 Palestinian experts have returned to Palestine for short-term consultancy missions in the last decade. Benefiting from significant funding, the programme seeks to attract a large number of experts, while matching expatriates’ capacities with priority areas in the Occupied Palestinian territories (oPt).3 The TOKTEN experience in Palestine suggests that the programme has gone beyond the realms of ‘transferring skills’, by ‘solidifying transnational support for a democratic state’ (Murphy, 2006). As the programme was created in 1994, right after the appointment of the first Palestinian authority, it had nation-building connotations. TOKTEN’s success in Palestine can be largely ascribed to expatriates’ desire to mobilise against occupation and to help define a national project.4 One returnee even suggests that TOKTEN provides, amid difficult circumstances, a sort of ‘missing link’ facilitating permanent return to Palestine:5 With the establishment of the first Palestinian authority in 1994, TOKTEN was the propitious framework that enabled my permanent return to Palestine [. . .] Permanent return is a major commitment in the sense that one has [. . .] to pick up the pieces in a new environment especially in post-war places like Lebanon,

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Palestine, Iraq. It is in this sense that TOKTEN can provide an institutional channel bridging the gap [. . .]. Another notable advantage of TOKTEN Palestine is its capacity to surmount logistical difficulties hampering entry or re-entry. By facilitating the entry and stay of experts, the programme counteracts – albeit only to a small extent – the detrimental effects of occupation on development. TOKTEN Palestine has yet to be analysed against the prevailing difficult conditions in the country. But, in any analysis, it has to be remembered that the institutional and political void paradoxically empowers such initiatives. The emigration landscape in Palestine is heavily affected by the bleak socio-political situation, and hundreds of highly skilled Palestinians have decided to permanently settle abroad as a result of the failing Oslo accords. As a result, while TOKTEN is a success story in Palestine, it cannot, on its own, counter brain drain or provide a sufficient stimulus to bring emigrants back. A recent reading of the political situation in the country demands the factoring in of geopolitical dynamics limiting the programme’s effectiveness. Cleavages along party lines (e.g. pro-Fatah or pro-Hamas) have a bearing on TOKTEN contributions. Furthermore, it emerges from the author’s interviews that, in light of declining UNDP support and funding for the programme, TOKTEN Palestine has in the last years lost some of its momentum. It remains to be seen whether a revitalisation strategy is to be put in place.

The TOKTEN programme in Sudan Launched in 2006 in conjunction with the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), TOKTEN in Sudan/Southern Sudan came out of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. As the country has been hard hit by internal conflicts and displacement, expatriate contributions are seen as being particularly helpful in post-conflict management and recovery.6 While the programme bases itself on the motivation of Sudanese expatriates to contribute to post-conflict settlement, there is yet, in truth, only scanty research on Sudanese experts living abroad, and on

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where they live and on what they do. Identifying their skills and mobilising different networks of Sudanese professionals under TOKTEN has, therefore, come to be seen as being particulary relevant to Sudan’s realities. Before the 2011 Referendum, which resulted in the autonomy of Southern Sudan, TOKTEN targeted institutions that reached beyond the public sector to universities and civil society associations in both parts of the country.7 Various assignments focused on capacity building, research, and policy advice and these resulted in the training of thousands of employees in private and public institutions.8 In the evaluation of TOKTEN before the 2011 Referendum, accounts were mixed, however. On the one hand, it is reported that host beneficiary institutions liked the programme due to its cost-effectiveness and demand-driven approach. Further, the fact that the programme operates under UNDP has enabled the implementation of various projects in Northern and Southern Sudan notwithstanding internal cleavages. On the other hand, Sudan’s intractable north – south conflict has, in no small way, undermined overall project management and the matching of the consultant’s expertise with demand: ‘It has become extremely difficult to recruit a TOKTEN consultant originally from the North in the South even if the person happens to be the most qualified candidate in the field.’9 Also, some informants have confidentally suggested that the recruitment of experts might have been, in some cases, affected by patronage networks. Although TOKTEN’s overall approach, since the 2011 Referendum, remains unaltered, ‘an area-based project approach’ has been developed to address regional complexities.10 This author’s research shows that the programme has picked up momentum since 2011, and that it has expanded to new areas. Still there is an uneven regional distribution of TOKTEN assignments with the highest share going to Khartoum. Critics draw attention to unstable local management structures, which are incapable of duly addressing Sudan’s complex geography, as well as the lack of promoters for the programme, locally and in settlement societies. If project coordination with relevant stakeholders seems to have become easier since Sudan’s partition, it is still too early to measure the political transition’s impact on the project’s performance and its capacity to attract more experts.

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Empowering TOKTEN in a transitioning Arab world? This section, which bases itself on a comparison of the abovementioned country cases, as well as insights from the literature, provides an appraisal of TOKTEN’s capacity to act as a catalyst for the positive externalities of diasporas. It further suggests crucial requisites that help contextualise the usefulness of TOKTEN-style schemes in a transitioning Arab world. The cost-effectiveness of TOKTEN and its ability to meet the demand for various services in complex geopolitical constellations in the three countries explain, to a great extent, the resilience of the programme. The TOKTEN experience in the three countries seems to corroborate an array of studies showing that diaspora communities can be positive agents of change (Bercovitch, 2007), both in conflict transformation phases and in human capital development. The initiative is another reminder that highly skilled migration should be seen not only in ‘black-and-white terms’ (the brain-drain/brain-gain dialectic) but also in ‘shades’ of brain circularity. Evaluating the impact of these flows and contributions is, however, not just a question of immediate and tangible results. A far more challenging analysis would look at the cumulative and tacit benefits that migration-induced transfers can generate through TOKTEN. Even if a few volunteers do finally return, human flight capital is lessened by the establishment of relations between experts and the homeland allowing for a circularity of resources beyond the territory itself. This idea, however, of transforming human-capital loss into longstanding gains is marred by a more cautious reading of the TOKTEN experience. The ability of such programmes to capture positive highly skilled migration externalities are, as we saw in the three case studies, linked to a spectrum of domestic, international and transnational factors. The willingness of recipient governments and institutions to involve diasporas in national development seems to be particularly decisive. The three case studies suggest some contentiousness here. While some accounts signal that governments and beneficiary institutions have shown commitment, others maintain that local institutions display at times mistrust vis-a`-vis these ‘extraneous’ knowledge transfers. Attention is also drawn to the possibility that TOKTEN’s missions might be affected by client networks.11 Further, TOKTEN’s capacity to

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act as a channel for highly skilled migration transfers has to be looked at with care given the conflict lines in the three countries. There is also the problem that weak institutionalism and unstable management structures in local contexts circumscribe planning, the appropriate fit between supply and demand, and, in the longer run, knowledge assimilation. Instability, weak governance and authoritarian practices seem to have major effects on highly skilled professionals’ predisposition to engage in developmental practices. Preliminary inquiries by the author extending beyond the three case studies12 show that the diasporas’ trust or mistrust of the state plays an important role in TOKTEN’s operability. In Syria, past attempts to get TOKTEN to work (1986– 2001) had little impact. Assignments remained limited to certain ‘non-threatening’ sectors such as science and training. And, in any case, even there TOKTEN operatives encountered various bureaucratic obstacles. Then, highly skilled migrants were unwilling to return. Another important aspect hinges on the involvement of international actors. Whereas developed countries could, in principle, empower TOKTEN, funding remains an issue of high politics. A general assessment of TOKTEN practices to date suggests that the programme is not going at full speed, and that the initiative does not benefit from special UN empowerment.13 Further, there are, to date, no in-depth comparative studies that have established global evaluation frameworks. These would allow an assessment of TOKTEN’s capacity as a co-operative programme and its ability to tap into highly skilled competences, while duly addressing a variety of obstacles affecting knowledge transfer between the donor and the recipient. With reference to the three country cases, preliminary research suggests uncertainty when it comes to assigning impact to knowledge assimilation by host institutions. While certain missions have a clear policy impact, research-orientated missions may face not only logistical hurdles, but also impediments arising from lack of trust between donors and recipients. Attitudes on the ground are important in measuring to what extent information is shared and acquired. Professional expatriates sometimes have ‘preconceptions’ upon return or have stayed abroad so long that they have lost track of home realities. Then, emigrants are, in some cases, perceived as ‘outsiders’ by nonmigrants in local institutions.14

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It is contended that reference and monitoring mechanisms developed jointly by UNDP and by local institutions assess the success of TOKTEN assignments. But no external evaluation methods have yet been developed in these countries to verify the missions’ national importance. Furthermore, though TOKTEN experiments are varied, processes aimed at sharing best practices and learning from the experience remain rudimentary. Inter-regional meetings allowing for a comparative assessment of different past and present TOKTEN operations do not take place.15 It is against this backdrop that prospects for TOKTEN-style initatives in a transitioning Arab world need to be evaluated. Although the region is fertile ground for knowledge-sharing modalities, several considerations have to be factored in. In an Arab context characterised by a policy gap in migration governance structures, this study has pointed to the potential benefits of multilateral migration channels. The programme, which draws on convergent global and national structures to steer the untapped potential of diasporas, is a clear example. Moreover, TOKTEN’s joint management by multilateral and domestic stakeholders, and the fact that it taps into Arab countries’ own human capital confer on the programme a dehegemonic dimension in external development aid. Yet, while Arab political transformations offer an unprecedented opportunity to set up TOKTEN schemes in countries where UNDP has embedded structures,16 the author’s findings suggest that TOKTEN’s benefits have to be relativised. The programme is no panacea for inducing positive diaspora spillovers. The fundamental question is not whether TOKTEN is a relevant mechanism per se, but which contextually differentiated factors make it suitable for some Arab countries rather than for others. This preliminary study shows that TOKTEN’s importance is amplified in contexts with weak state-led diaspora structures. In the three country cases covered here, where governments have limited mechanisms to draw on emigrants’ skills, TOKTEN has done more than its limited scope or funding might have led an observer to expect. In other country cases such as Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia where the state has already developed institutional structures with its diasporas, TOKTEN’s potential contributions have to be more cautiously assessed. An important question

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is the extent to which former TOKTEN experiments in Morocco and Egypt have faded away because of government-supported diaspora links. At first glance, such instruments appear to have more relevance to transitioning states, such as Libya and Syria, where diasporas do not dispose of sustainable interactive mechanisms with their homeland. Yet, a closer look at other states in transition, for example Egypt and Tunisia, reveals that previously established governmental initiatives have not guaranteed inclusiveness in diaspora participation, and need today to be revamped. While TOKTEN-style modalities theoretically provide a yardstick to engage the Arab world’s skilled expatriates, the paucity of research on highly skilled migration dynamics and trends in the region makes it difficult to assess the terrain. Further, geopolitical constraints need to be accounted for. Notwithstanding the dissolution of some autocracies, Arab states still have different attitudes to their diasporas and their help.17 As prevailing governance and power dynamics in some countries are far from clear, TOKTEN-style initiatives carry with them risk-management costs. Given such changing geopolitical constellations, TOKTEN necessitates higher levels of commitment on the part of the international community. To ensure, for instance, that missions do not draw in diaspora actors with a politicised agenda, the modality would need to design stringent parameters ensuring impartiality. While the willingness of local institutions to enroll in the initiative would need to be further determined, two preparatory tasks are necessary in such co-operative migration ventures: a prior assessment of highly skilled migration trends, of diaspora actors, of the motivations prompting their involvement, and an operational study of whether, and if so in what contexts, TOKTEN assignments can match expertise with national requirements.

Concluding remarks This study suggests that skilled expatriates can, indeed, play a positive role in their country’s development through the deliberate crafting of migration channels. However, it also maintains that positive highly skilled migration ‘feedback effects’ in the Arab region are not

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straightforward. The potential to exploit highly skilled migration gains remains contingent on multilayered intervening factors. This critical appraisal hence draws attention to the need to pereceive TOKTEN-style initiatives as part and parcel of a broader migration governance strategy. While TOKTEN can in some responsive contexts help reinvest lost skills, it cannot substitute integrative national migration and development strategies. Further, TOKTEN, which targets limited sectors and stakeholders, is no far-reaching and bottomup transnational network. As such, it cannot replace state policies empowering the creation of inter-Arab, transnational and diaspora scientific communities. Our discussion of the relevance of TOKTEN-style modalities in a changing region finally raises the more fundamental question of regional migration governance. This has been unsatisfactorily addressed by the Arab League, and it has been affected by exogeneous frameworks such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This means that regional consultative processes tackling how Arab states envisage devising new ownership processes in migration governance structures will sooner or later be necessary. An additional question that faces us, however, is whether, over the long run, mechanisms underlying skilled migration management are not better tackled at a bilateral level (Betts, 2011).

Notes 1. Names are kept confidential so as to protect the anonymity of those who participated in the research process. 2. For a detailed account of implemented missions, see the TOKTEN Lebanon information leaflet, UNDP/CDR. 3. For an account of TOKTEN assignments in Palestine, see TOKTEN Booklet, UNDP-Palestine. 4. Communication with UNV Senior officer, Bonn, 15 October 2009. 5. Communication with TOKTEN Returnee in Palestine, 30 October 2009 and 28 January 2013. 6. Communication with UNDP officer in Sudan, 5 September 2009. 7. See http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/tokten.htm. 8. UNDP Official, Sudan 5 September 2009. 9. UNV officer, Bonn, 15 October 2009. 10. UNDP official, Sudan, 29 January 2013. 11. With regards to TOKTEN Sudan, for instance, some accounts suggest that local institutions have enthusiastically involved diasporas in post-conflict

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recovery. Other accounts draw attention to examples of mismanagement. Doubt has been expressed as to whether governmental officials have used TOKTEN to enable the return of senior officials’ relatives. In TOKTEN Lebanon, some local institutions have expressed sceptism regarding such modalities of reform. Despite the willingness to engage expatriates in institutional overhaul, weak institutionalism has hindered TOKTEN’s implementation in Chad. Interview with Chadian government official, Florence, 29 November 2009. UNV officer, Bonn, 15 October 2009. Lebanese professor, Beirut, 8 March 2010. Almost all of my informants had little if any knowledge on TOKTEN in Arab countries other than their own. The author is aware that TOKTEN might be launched in Iraq and Libya. Yet the information on such schemes remains inconclusive and limited. Interview with UNV senior officer, Bonn, 21 January 2013.

CHAPTER 6 YOUNG AND HIGHLY SKILLED: EMIGRATION FROM LEBANON Choghig Kasparian

Introduction For many centuries, Lebanon, a small mountainous country on the Mediterranean, has been an emigration hub. Indeed, since the end of the nineteenth century, waves of emigrants have created an international diaspora, most notably in Latin America, Australia and Africa. These networks have, in turn, facilitated the emigration of further waves of compatriots. Lebanese emigration has equally been facilitated by the development of secondary and tertiary education, first through Italian, then French and finally American institutions. Furthermore, migrant profiles are rapidly changing; they are no longer simple countrymen who leave their land in search of fortunes elsewhere. Increasingly, they are educated young men and women, capable of conversing in languages other than their mother tongue. The destinations also change depending on the work opportunities offered by different countries. In fact, Europe, and more recently the Arab countries of the Gulf attract increasing numbers of Lebanese nationals. This emigration trend has been galvanised by the internal conflicts that seriously disturbed Lebanon between 1975 and 1990. Entire families were forced to leave their homes in order to seek refuge abroad or in other parts of Lebanon. After peace was restored and displaced

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persons started to return home, Lebanon saw its first attempts at economic recovery. However, Lebanese society ultimately failed to give young people confidence in their future and so new outward flows began. These new emigration flows were made up, for the most part, of highly educated individuals looking for better professional opportunities or, simply, wanting to improve their life conditions. The emigration of educated youth, more specifically university graduates, has grown over the last years. Observers have even begun to ring alarm bells. Indeed, they have persuaded those responsible to take measures to limit ‘the brain drain’, so that the educated elite of Lebanon contribute to the country’s economic and social development. A commission responsible for initiating projects favouring the employment of a skilled workforce and also for limiting emigration has recently been set up. This commission takes its directors from the ministries involved in the project and it is assisted by the World Bank.1 Unfortunately, the Lebanese state has not yet produced official statistics on emigration in general or on the emigration of young graduates in particular. However, two recent studies by Saint Joseph University have evaluated these questions over the last 30 years:2 the first study (Kasparian, 2003) focused on migrant flows from 1975 to 2001; and the second focused on young migrants aged 18 and 35, 1995 to 2007 (Kasparian, 2009). Moreover, with recent publications on Lebanese economics, 1997– 2007,3 the problems relating to employment, unemployment and migration with regard to the structure and the development of the national economy can be studied. Based on the data available, this paper aims to analyse highly skilled emigration flows from 1997 to 2007, and to detect any advantages and disadvatages for Lebanon society. The subject is approached through the following three headings: 1. The employment market and the emigration of highly skilled workers. 2. The characteristics of highly skilled migrants. 3. Relations between highly skilled migrants and their country of origin.

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The employment market and the emigration of highly skilled workers In 1997, the Lebanese population residing in the country stood at about 3,700,000 of whom 1,222,000 were active.4 In 2007, the number of Lebanese residents rose to 4,043,000 and the number of active people to 1,512,000. The available workforce increased to 290,000, over ten years, and the activity rate rose from 33.0 per cent to 37.4 per cent of the total population. Over the same period, the number of employed individuals rose from 1,114,000 to 1,404,000, while the number of unemployed individuals remained stable with 108,000 job seekers. In fact, the unemployed would have been much higher if a proportion of job seekers had not left the country. According to the study at Saint Joseph University, the number of migrants 1997– 2007 is estimated to have been at least 322,000, of which 226,000 would have been active in 2007. In fact, in the absence of emigration, the active population would have reached 1,738,000, or 334,000 more people than the number of work places in the Lebanese economy.

University graduates in the labour market From 1997 to 2007, the number of university graduates working or seeking work has increased much more quickly than that of the active population. In fact, the proportion of university graduates in the active population jumped from 15.4 per cent in 1997 to 28.1 per cent in 2007. Added to the 425,000 active graduates in 2007, who had emigrated during the previous ten years, their number climbs to 534,000. This evolution is the result of two factors: the rapid growth in the number of university graduates; and an ever-increasing number of women graduates entering active life. Access to university education for young people has been facilitated by the proliferation of post-secondary teaching institutions. The number of registrations at universities increased from 87,757 in 1997 to 160,364 in 2007 (Source: Statistic reports published by the Centre for Research and Educational Development of the Ministry of Education, Lebanon). As a result, the resident Lebanese population at university almost doubled in ten years, increasing from 227,000 in 1997 to 516,000 in 2007.5 Then, too, the activity rate among women graduates has consistently been higher than that of women as a whole: in 1997 the activity rate of

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Table 6.1 The evolution of the active Lebanese population and the number of active university graduates, 1997 – 2007 (in thousands) Total Population M

F

Total

University Graduates M

F

Active resident population in 1997 976 246 1,222 123 65 Active resident population in 2007 1,110 401 1,512 245 181 Active migrants from 1998 189 38 226 82 27 to 2007 in 2007 Total active in 2007 1,299 439 1,738 326 208 Residents þ Migrants

Total 188 425 109 534

women aged 20 to 64 was 22.6 per cent, whereas it was 67.0 per cent for graduate women working or wanting to work. From 1997 to 2007, the number of active graduate women (aged 20– 64) was multiplied by 2.5, increasing from 65,000 in 1997, to 181,000 in 2007, or 208,000 if we add the 27,000 graduate women who left the country between 1997 and 2007. The rate of female participation in economic life also increased: 32 per cent for women as a whole aged between 20 and 64, and 73 per cent for those among them who have a university degree.

The employment supply In 1997, the Lebanese economy employed 1,114,000 people, of whom 176,000 (15.8 per cent) were university graduates. The latter mainly work in the services; 52.1 per cent of the workers in the business and financial services and 31.8 per cent in the social and administrative services. They are relatively more numerous in the public sector than in the private or combined sector; respectively 25.3 per cent against 14 per cent. But it is important to note that the private sector employs five to six times more workers. The frequency of university graduates among working women is higher still; 26 per cent overall, 50 per cent in business and financial services and 37 per cent in social and administrative services. Economic development, in these ten years, has favoured employment in the service sectors and, therefore, the employment of women and highly skilled workers. Furthermore, the general increase in the active

89 141 114 59 219 51 146 69 888 12 31 2 5 42 22 93

Agriculture Industry Construction Transport and communication Commerce Business and financial services Social and administrative services

1997

Agriculture Industry Construction Transport and communication Commerce Business and financial services Social and administrative services Other services Total

Sector

14 27 3 8 66 39 150

64 128 112 88 243 90 195 126 1,046

2007

a) Overall

1.6 21.3 4.7 5.6 4.7 6.1 4.8

23.3 20.9 20.2 4.2 1.1 5.8 2.9 6.2 1.7

Male

Female

Growth rate

0 2 1 1 7 11 34

1 8 8 4 21 27 41 6 116

1997

0 3 2 4 15 28 92

2 12 15 8 35 58 73 24 228

2007

7.4 2.3 3.9 14.6 8.4 10.0 10.3

3.6 4.5 6.5 8.5 5.2 8.0 5.7 15.1 6.9

Growth rate

b) University graduates

Table 6.2 The evolution of the number of Lebanese residents and the number of university graduates employed in the different economic sectors, 1997 –2007, according to gender (number in thousands and average growth rate in % by year)

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Agriculture Industry Construction Transport and communication Commerce Business and financial services Social and administrative services Other services Total

Other services Total 101 171 116 63 261 73 239 90 1,114

21 227 78 155 115 96 309 129 344 178 1,404

52 358 22.6 21.0 20.1 4.3 1.7 5.9 3.7 4.6 2.3

9.4 4.7 Overall 1 10 9 5 28 38 76 8 176

2 59 2 16 17 13 57 86 165 36 390

17 162

4.1 4.0 6.3 10.3 7.3 8.6 8.0 15.8 8.3

22.4 10.6

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population’s level of education translates to a higher rate among employed graduates. Lebanon’s economic growth between 1997 and 2007, measured by GDP growth, stood at an average of 3.1 per cent per year. However, growth has not always seen a significant rise in job creation. In a general sense, the growth in jobs over the same period was much weaker: 2.3 per cent on average with strong disparities between sectors. For the reasons mentioned above, the growth rate among employed graduates was much higher; 8.3 per cent on average per year. .

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Employment in agriculture, industry and construction fell even though production in these sectors increased on average between 1 per cent and 2 per cent per year. It must be noted that this regards the employment of Lebanese residents. Yet these sectors also employ large numbers of non-Lebanese workers (in particular Syrians) who tend to have poorer skill sets. On the other hand, the employment of highly skilled Lebanese workers has increased notably (between 4 per cent and 6 per cent per year). The transport and communication sector has seen the greatest increase (almost 10 per cent per year) thanks to the remarkable development in mobile telephone and internet services. Employment in this sector grew on average by 4.3 per cent per year and that of university graduates by 10.3 per cent. Commerce, which employs just over a fifth of the active Lebanese population, is very sensitive in this respect. The employment growth rate stood at an average of 1.7 per cent per year for a production growth of 2 per cent per year. There the development in the employment of highly skilled workers was more marked; an average of 7.3 per cent per year. After the communications sector, services saw the greatest development, from 1997 to 2007, with a real average growth of 3.7 per cent per year. The employment supply in this sector increased sizably too; the number of Lebanese workers in the services multiplied by 1.62 between 1997 and 2007, which represents an average yearly growth rate of 4.9 per cent. We notice in particular the marked increase in employment across the business and financial services (þ5.9 per cent per year). As for graduates working across all the services, their number more than doubled in ten years from

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122,000 to 287,000, showing an almost 9 per cent rise on average per year. Moreover, many service groups set up in Lebanon employ highly skilled personnel to carry out managerial work from abroad employing modern means of communication. Here there is the development of ‘telework’ or distance work, which allows for limited travel abroad. The growth in the employment of university graduates correlates to that of female employment; while male employment has increased by an average of 1.7 per cent per year, women’s employment leaped to 4.7 per cent. Moreover, the growth rate of female graduate employment reached an average of 10.6 per cent per year against 6.9 per cent for male university graduates. The employment rate of graduate workers would have been able to grow more if the branches of the public sector employing the highly skilled had developed more stably. In fact, if the total number of workers in the public domain had increased with the same rhythm as other sectors, it would have lifted the number of graduates by only 5.6 per cent per year.

The emigration of workers, balance factors between employment supply and demand Although substantial, development in the employment of tertiaryeducated people within the different sectors of the Lebanese economy has been weaker than that among university graduates seeking work: 8.3 per cent against 11.0 per cent on average per year. In fact, in 2007 we counted 346,000 active graduates more than in 1997, but only Table 6.3 Evolution of the number of Lebanese residents and the number of university graduates employed in the public sector, 1997–2007, according to gender (number in thousands and average growth rate in % per year) a) Overall

b) University graduates

Gender

1997

2007

Growth rate

1997

2007

Growth rate

Males Females Overall

125 37 162

154 50 204

2.1 3.0 2.3

26 15 41

40 31 71

4.2 7.7 5.6

102 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 6.4 Emigration rate and unemployment rate, 1997– 2007, in the total active population and in the active graduate population (in %) a) Overall population Unemployment rate in 1997 Overall rate of emigration among active people* Unemployment rate in 2007

b) University graduates

M

F

Total

M

F

Total

9.1 14.5

8.0 8.6

8.8 13.0

5.8 25.0

8.3 13.1

6.6 20.4

6.2

12.0

7.7

6.9

10.2

8.3

*This rate is equal to the number of migrants between 1997 and 2007 active in 2007, divided by the total number of active residents and migrants.

61.8 per cent of them had found employment in the country. 31.5 per cent of them (109,000 people) had emigrated, leading to 23,000 jobless graduates remaining in the country. This influx of university graduates on the labour market has mainly been caused – as mentioned above – by the increasing number of women graduates wanting to carry out an economic activity. Fewer of them have emigrated and a higher number of them are unemployed. In conclusion, we can see in the table below that the emigration of highly skilled workers has not been entirely eliminated. There remains the surplus of job demand over job supply, which provoked a rise in the unemployment rate among active people at graduate level. This rise has been more marked among women, who tend to emigrate less than men.

The characteristics of highly skilled Lebanese migrants The emigration of highly qualified Lebanese nationals is not only linked to the labour market. In the first instance, not all the graduates who left the country are necessarily engaged in active life. If we estimate that 136,000 left Lebanon between 1998 and 2007, only 109,000 (80 per cent) were active in 2007. Furthermore, those active did not leave Lebanon because they could not find work in their country. Their departure was often for other reasons, as the table below shows. If women mainly emigrate for family reasons (marriage, family gathering), three male graduates out of four left Lebanon for

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Table 6.5 Distribution of graduates, male and female, who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to departure reasons (in %) Reason Professional reasons Study Family reasons Other reasons Total Number of people asked Estimated

Male

Female

Overall

75.7 13.2 2.8 8.3 100.0 938 88,123

30.7 9.0 52.8 7.4 100.0 497 48,170

59.8 11.8 20.5 8.0 100.0 1,435 136,293

professional reasons. Among other reasons given were higher and further education, the political situation and the general environment in Lebanon.

One highly qualified migrant out of two lives in an Arab country The strong economic development of the Gulf countries following the rise in oil prices in recent years has attracted a foreign workforce with all levels of qualifications. Many of the most qualified Lebanese workers found well-paid jobs here. From 1997 to 2007, North America, and more specifically the United States, has remained the second destination for graduate migrants, especially for women. By contrast, as many men emigrate to Europe as they do to the United States (see Table 6.6).

Table 6.6 Distribution of university graduates, male and female, who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to destination country (in %) Country

Male

Female

Overall

Arab countries North America Europe Africa Other countries Total

52.4 18.2 18.5 6.8 4.1 100.0

45.0 25.0 19.2 5.0 5.8 100.0

49.8 20.6 18.7 6.2 4.7 100.0

104 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 6.7 Distribution of graduates, male and female, who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to their occupation in 2007 (in %) Occupation

Male

Women

Overall

Work Seeking employment Study Other occupation Total Economic activity rate Unemployment rate

91.0 1.7 4.4 2.9 100.0 92.7 1.8

53.9 2.8 4.3 38.9 100.0 56.7 5.0

77.9 2.1 4.4 15.6 100.0 80.0 2.6

The majority of graduate migrants are young men Between 1997 and 2007, around two-thirds (64.7 per cent) of highly qualified migrants were men. Almost none of them were aged over 64. The majority were young people between 20 and 34: 68.7 per cent overall, 65.5 per cent male and 74.4 per cent women. Some university graduate migrants are seeking work Of the 109,000 university graduate migrants that were active in 2007, 106,000 were employed and around 3,000 were seeing work, so there was an unemployment rate of 2.6 per cent. With the weakest activity rate, it is mostly women who have a higher unemployment rate (5 per cent against 1.8 per cent for men). We will note that otherwise 4.4 per cent of graduates who emigrated from 1997 to 2007 still continue to study and inflate the position of inactive people. However, given the size of the sample, the figures of the unemployed and of students are not statistically significant. Table 6.8 Distribution of university graduate males and female who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to the country of their degree (in %) Country

Males

Females

Overall

Lebanon Europe North America Other countries Total

79.1 10.2 8.3 2.4 100.0

90.2 4.4 3.7 1.8 100.0

83.0 8.2 6.7 2.2 100.0

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The vast majority of highly skilled migrants obtained their degree in Lebanon Following a programme of study abroad certainly favours emigration, but the data seems to indicate that its impact is not especially significant. Only 9.9 per cent of women and 20.9 per cent of men at university level who emigrated, 1997– 2007, had obtained their degree abroad, mainly in Europe and the United States (see Table 6.8). Half of graduate migrants are specialised in science and technology Around a third of highly qualified male migrants are engineers or technology specialists. Another third graduated in management or commerce. By contrast, women are relatively more numerous in literature, humanities and law (see Table 6.9). A brief comparison with the profile of young graduates remaining in the country seems to indicate that engineers and managers are over-represented among highly skilled migrants. Graduates in literature, humanities and law are mostly inactive women As previously mentioned, not all graduate migrants are engaged in economic life. Many engineers carry out a professional activity; 91.3 per cent of active people against an average of 80 per cent among all graduates who emigrated after 1997. Graduates in the humanities are relatively less active. Table 6.9 Distribution of male and female graduates who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to specialisation (in %) Area of specialisation

Male Female Overall

Engineering, technology 32.5 9.2 Science, mathematics and information technology 15.5 9.8 Medicine 9.2 13.1 Humanities, law, political sciences 8.4 34.9 Management and services 33.1 28.9 Others 1.3 4.0 Total 100.0 100.0

24.3 13.5 10.6 17.8 31.6 2.2 100.0

106 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 6.10 Distribution of graduates who emigrated, 1997 –2007, and their activity rate, according to specialisation and occupation in 2007 (in %) Occupation Area of specialisation

Active Inactive Overall

Engineering, technology 27.7 Science, mathematics and 13.5 information technology Medicine 10.8 Humanities, law, political sciences 13.1 Management and services 33.3 Others 1.7 Total 100.0 Number of people asked 1,149

Activity rate

10.6 13.6

24.3 13.5

91.3 79.9

9.8 36.3 25.2 4.5 100.0 286

10.6 17.8 31.6 2.2 100.0 2,584

81.4 59.1 84.1 59.4 80.0

Among highly skilled migrants the scientific professions and the intermediary professions are the most common A sizable number (14.4 per cent) of highly skilled male migrants are senior executives or business managers. Those who practice the scientific professions, such as engineers, are the most numerous (30.4 per cent). With regard to women, they are less often senior executives or in scientific Table 6.11 Distribution of male and female university graduates who emigrated, 1997 – 2007, according to the profession practised in 2007 (in %) Area of specialisation

Male

Female

Overall

Senior executives Science specialists Health specialists Teaching specialists Other specialists in science and art Intermediary professions Administrative employees Employees in the services and sales Other workers and undeterminated Total

14.4 30.4 6.8 3.1 5.2 23.8 6.2 6.2 3.8 100.0

5.3 10.4 12.3 23.5 9.0 21.3 12.2 4.7 1.3 100.0

12.1 25.5 8.2 8.1 6.2 23.2 7.7 5.9 3.2 100.0

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professions; we see them more in teaching. The intermediate professions, which are practiced by 23.8 per cent of male and 21.3 per cent of female migrants do not all require higher or further education. However, it is impossible to attribute this downgrade in employment to emigration in the light of the training acquired. It seems that the relative frequency of those who practise a profession not requiring higher qualifications, such as office work or the services, are no longer sizable.

Relations between highly skilled migrants and their country of origin From 1997 to 2007, more than 80 per cent of highly skilled migrants kept in close touch with Lebanon Only 17.7 per cent of men and 21.9 per cent of women graduates who emigrated between 1998 and 2007 never returned to visit their relatives in their country of origin. Others have kept up their connections and visit fairly regularly. From 1997 to 2007 half of Lebanese graduates send remittances to their country of origin There are, of course, more men who send financial aid back to their country of origin as they are more active: 23.8 per cent regularly and 27.5 per cent on occasions. One Lebanese graduate out of five who emigrated from 1997 to 2007 intends to return permanently to the country If we say that a little fewer than half (47.6 per cent) of the graduate migrants, 1997 to 2007, do not intend to return to the country, it is Table 6.12 Distribution of male and female graduates, who emigrated, 1997–2007, according to the frequency of visits to their country of origin (in %) Frequency of visits

Male

Female

Overall

Yes for work Regular visits Occasional visits No visits Total

2.0 43.0 37.2 17.7 100.0

0.8 47.8 29.5 21.9 100.0

1.6 44.7 34.5 19.2 100.0

108 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 6.13 Distribution of male and female graduates who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to the frequency of financial aid sent back to the country of origin (in %) Frequency of financial aid sent

Male

Female

Overall

Regular aid Irregular aid No aid Undetermined Total

23.8 27.5 45.9 2.8 100.0

12.2 27.2 57.2 3.4 100.0

19.7 27.4 49.9 3.0 100.0

Table 6.14 Distribution of male and female graduates, who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to their intention to return permanently to the country of origin (in %) Intention to return permanently

Male

Female

Overall

Intend to Do not intend to Have not decided Total

20.6 47.8 31.6 100.0

19.9 47.3 32.8 100.0

20.3 47.6 32.1 100.0

Table 6.15 Distribution of active and inactive graduates, who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to their intention to return permanently to their country of origin (in %) Intention to return permanently Intend to Do not intend to Have not decided Total

Age , 35

Age . 34

Overall

20.4 49.7 29.9 100.0

20.2 43.0 36.8 100.0

20.3 47.6 32.1 100.0

worth stating that 32.1 per cent are still undecided. In fact, it is important for Lebanon to recover its elites. However, older and more inactive people remain undecided as to whether to return permanently.

Intend to Do not intend to Have not decided Total Sample Estimated number

Intention to return permanently

23.7 42.8 33.5 100.0 717 67,876

Arab countries 15.4 54.8 29.8 100.0 259 25,542

North America 18.0 50.4 31.6 100.0 301 28,049

Europe 23.1 39.2 37.7 100.0 83 8,403

Africa

Country of residence 12.2 67.4 20.4 100.0 75 6,423

Other countries

20.3 47.6 32.1 100.0 1,435 136,293

Overall

Table 6.16 Distribution of graduates, who emigrated, 1997 –2007, according to their intention to return permanently to the country of origin and according to the country of residence (in %)

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110 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Furthermore, the relative frequency of those who do not intend to return varies depending on the country of residence. It is greater for those who have moved to Arab (23.7 per cent) or African (23.1 per cent) countries, and weaker for residents in North America (15.4 per cent) and in other far off regions such as Australia and South America (12.2 per cent).

Conclusion Emigration has denied Lebanon an important part of its active highly skilled population. However, can we conclude that this phenomenon represents a handicap for its economic and social development? It is difficult to respond to this question, at least until the development mechanisms have been analysed in detail. In strictly economic terms, it might be argued that these migration flows have acted as a brake on development. Economic growth conforms to the regional context, to its security and to its political risks. Yes, the country’s productive apparatus has been able to find the skilled workforce necessary for its functioning, thanks to a surplus of graduates in the different areas. However, the emigration of highly skilled workers might have had a negative effect in as much as it denied the country a dynamic elite, capable of innovating and creating new jobs. We should have no doubt though that change would only come should the political environment be amenable. Moreover, the emigration of highly skilled workers has potentially had positive consequences. In the first instance, highly skilled migrants returning to the country can benefit the local economy by providing the competences and know-how that they have acquired abroad. We do not yet know the frequency of such returns, but by observing what has been done in the country in terms of architecture, the creation of hotels and of businesses linked to new technologies, we can see that the transfer of know-how has been significant. Moreover, the fact that 20.3 per cent of highly skilled migrants intend to return to their country is encouraging. Finally, remittances from migrants have been one of the driving forces for economic growth in Lebanon. These represented around 3.8 billion dollars per year from 1997 to 2007, 20 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) over that period. Money transfers on the part of highly skilled and, therefore, high-earning migrants are substantial then and half of all highly skilled migrants admit to sending remittances home.

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Notes 1. Project entitled ‘MILES’ (Macroeconomy, Investment, Labour, Education and Social Protection). 2. The information here regarding employment, study levels and emigration from 1997 to 2007, has been taken from the study carried out by Saint Joseph University, ‘The emigration of the Lebanese youth and their future projects’, completed at the end of 2007 and published in May 2009, set up especially for this paper, with the authorisation of the ‘Observatoire Universitaire de la Re´alite´ Socio-Economique/University Observatory on the Socio-Economic Reality’ (OURSE) at Saint Joseph University in Beirut. The study publication spans 16 years, from 1992– 2007. This study includes 8,061 returning households from throughout Lebanon, including 33,958 individuals of whom around 10,000 were young people aged between 18 and 35. It also includes information relative to around 5,700 migrants, where the Lebanese left their country between 1992 and 2007 and who have families in Lebanon. A study entitled ‘The entry of young people in their active life and the emigration of the Lebanese between 1975 and 2001’, was also completed by OURSE and published in 2003. This gave a time dimension to the question. Indeed, the study covered 18,243 returning households from throughout Lebanese territory, including around 83,000 individuals. The information is relative to 19,928 migrants between 1975 and 2001. A further study was led by OURSE regarding Saint Joseph University graduates from 2000– 2004. Published in 2006, the results of this study have not been taken into consideration here as they only regard students from one university. The criterion adopted to define the highly qualified is that of study level: all those who have obtained a university degree are considered to be highly skilled. 3. Source: the economic accounts of the Lebanese retrospects 1997– 2007, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Lebanon. 4. Source: study on household life conditions, Central administration for statistics, 1997. 5. The definition of a university degree can differ from one study to another and the number of universities in 2007 might be slightly overestimated with respect to the situation in 1997.

CHAPTER 7 LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION: THE CASE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY Asem Khalil

Introduction1 This chapter will discuss highly skilled migration to and from the occupied Palestinian territory. The migratory movement of Palestinians of the diaspora from the countries of their habitual residence (with the exclusion of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) to third states (again, with the exclusion of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and back again is of very great importance. However, this paper will limit itself to those laws and policies of the Palestinian Authority (the PA) that are related to highly skilled migration. This chapter is largely descriptive, in that it will not presuppose an ideal model against which the PA’s performance should be tested, or to which it should aspire when dealing with issues of migration. It is also analytical in that it will build a theoretical construction out of the laws and policies regulating highly skilled migration or the absence of said laws. Available empirical data, based largely on secondary sources, will be exclusively used for the support of the arguments I intend to make.

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In contrast to its theoretical character and in order to meet the expectations and needs of the groups targeted in this chapter, I will include, in the conclusion, some prescriptive statements for policy makers. Although it may seem to be biased in terms of certain solutions, this paper does not include open-ended arguments; rather it aims to encourage policy makers to explore new options. The arguments advanced will set the path for a largely normative statement that I defend in the conclusion: namely that the PA should take heed of the needs of its population and that it should act accordingly. Ignoring issues related to migration in general, and highly skilled migration in particular, is no solution. In fact, it has become part of the problem. The actions that the PA can undertake include, but are not limited to, regulations codified in legislative texts. Most importantly, the PA needs to adopt policies, based on knowledge of the issues at stake, rather than on their consequences. The aim of these policies is: to plan for the departure of skilled Palestinians, and the accommodation of skilled immigrants, and their possible movements; and to anticipate the effects of highly skilled migration on the Palestinian economy, on Palestinian society as a whole, and on Palestinian national interests in building a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I will, in the first section, assess the legal framework for highly skilled migration in the territories under PA control. I will show how the absence of a definition and legal regulation is related to the anomalous jurisdiction of the PA, which exercises its authority in the so-called ‘autonomous territories’, thus coexisting with the Israeli occupation authorities. I will, in the second section, insist on the need to consider issues of migration (to and from the occupied Palestinian territory) in a larger context, which goes beyond economic factors. The transnational dimension of migration will be covered in the third section. This is particularly relevant for Palestinians, who are, for the most part, abroad (the diaspora) rather than in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The second part of the chapter concerns policies aimed at attracting skilled migrants, the facilitation, the coordination, or the hindrance, of the departure of skilled Palestinians. There are – as we see in the fourth section – indicators that the PA encourages diaspora Palestinians to make their ‘return’ to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.2 At the same time, the fifth section, shows reticence in dealing with the ‘problem’ of the emigration of skilled Palestinians. However, there are some signals that this is no longer

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the case. This revival should, we suggest in the sixth section, be encouraged, without being given a weight that it does not or cannot pretend to have. Finally I will be interested in initiatives that connect the skilled Palestinians of the diaspora with the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These initiatives are not carried out only at the official/PA level. They are, as we will see in section VII, often initiatives undertaken by civil society itself, whether by universities, aiming at coordinating, making agreements, and encouraging coordination with foreign institutions. Alternatively, there are also, in the seventh section, initiatives by other organisations and programmes, often carried out with the support of the international community or UN agencies, particularly UNDP. I will conclude, in the eighth section, with some remarks and evaluations of the existing legal framework and policies, suggesting that highly skilled migration should be looked at more carefully and expressly, and that not only the consequences, but also the roots of this phenomenon should be dealt with.

Defining ‘highly skilled migration’ While ‘immigrant’ refers to a non-national,3 the difference between a national and a foreign national is often blurred in the context of the occupied Palestinian territory. Many Palestinians are de facto denied access to the territories under PA control and have been denied an ID number (still under Israeli control as part of the population registry). In fact, immigrants are often simply Palestinians who are denied an ID number. Many of them may have entered the occupied Palestinian territory with a visa, and overstayed. For Israel, these subjects are illegally residing in the occupied Palestinian territory, despite, or maybe regardless of, being ‘Palestinian nationals’. Many of them do not have any other travel document or permit or visa to reside legally in other countries. Those Palestinians, who do not have an ID card, are, for Israel, inexistent in legal terms. If they are arrested by Israeli soldiers, they risk deportation. If they leave the country, they are not able to return. This is a major obstacle towards free movement within the territories under the PA control, and, hence, the productivity of these territories. Accordingly, it may be asserted that, in the case of most Palestinians, their decision to emigrate from, to return or not to return to, their home country is affected not only by economic factors but also by political and security considerations.4 Besides, many Palestinians have their habitual

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residence in a foreign country, due to their having been, for decades, refugees abroad. Legal instability and economic fragility, coupled with refugeehood and statelessness, push many refugees into migrating: it should be remembered that access to territories under PA control is not an option, due to Israeli restrictions (Khalil, 2009b). Arab states (mainly the oil-producing Gulf States) have been home to large flows of skilled and professional labour migrants (Hilal, 2007: 1, 3; Rosenfeld, 2002: 520). Other highly skilled Palestinians, however, have tended to emigrate to the Americas and Western Europe (Farsoun, 2005, 238). Some Palestinian refugees have obtained citizenship in a host country. Jordan, for example, is an exporter of skilled labour (mainly of Palestinian origin) to oil-producing Gulf countries (Hilal, 2007: 29). Accordingly, the migration of highly skilled Jordanian citizens (of Palestinian origin) may constitute a matter of interest for both the Palestinian and Jordanian authorities and necessitate coordination. PA law does not define highly skilled migration. In fact, it does not define migration in general.5 The only legal provision dealing with ‘foreigners’ as a category of persons that are distinguished for the purposes of the law appears in the Palestine Labour Law No.7 of 2000.6 According to art.14 of the Labour Law a foreign national, willing to work legally in territories under PA control, needs to obtain, first, a work permit, issued by the PA Ministry of Labour. Council of Ministers Decision No.45 of 2004 (art.2) determines the conditions for granting this permit, which are, inter alia: non-competition with the local labour force; the need for his or her work; and reciprocity of treatment. The same article grants the permit on the basis of the suitability of the skills and professional experience of the foreign national, requesting the permit and the job that he or she is able to fulfill. It should be noted, however, that the Labour Law does not condition the granting of a work permit for foreign nationals with a legal title of stay in the territories under PA control. This situation is largely related to a jurisdictional anomaly of the PA itself, since the title of stay (the visa or permit) is not granted by the PA, but rather by the Israeli occupation authorities (Khalil, 2008b, 8–9).7

Bilateral and multilateral agreements Since only one-third of the Palestinian population resides in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the majority of Palestinians are expatriates.

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Most of those Palestinians are refugees, especially from neighbouring Arab countries. Others may have migrated voluntarily but are unable to return to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This means that, for Palestinians, the bilateral as much as the regional dimension needs to be taken into account when dealing with highly skilled migration. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (the PLO) for the benefit of the the PA concluded several bilateral agreements with foreign governments and international organisations: for example, the EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement (1997).8 However, most of these are trade agreements9 that have no relevance for highly skilled migration.10 Accordingly, for Palestinians, an important forum for dealing with highly skilled migration is the League of Arab States (‘Arab League’), of which ‘Palestine’ is an active member. The Arab League has recently undertaken several different initiatives relating to migration. Highly skilled migration is often referred to, by the Arab League, as the ‘migration of brains’ or ‘brain drain’. The Arab Declaration on International Migration can be cited here as an example.11 In this declaration the Arab league recognised the negative impact of highly skilled migration on development efforts and its negative effect on the achievement of Millennium Development Goals in developing countries. They proved particularly conscious of the impact of the migration of workers in vital sectors such as health, education and research and development. The declaration called on Arab States to adopt necessary procedures and measures to benefit national competencies to ensure their stability and to prevent possible brain drain. The declaration calls for reinforcing relationship networks with migrant competencies and their institutions, engaging them in development efforts and in the transferal and the resettlement of knowledge. In order to carry out this declaration, the Arab Observatory for International Migration12 was launched by the Population Policies and Migration Department of the League of Arab States.13 Many activities were undertaken in this framework, limited though to enhancing knowledge14 and the exchange of data.15 The available information suggests that the number of highly skilled migrants doubled during the last decade (between 1990 and 2000) all over the world. According to data collected by the Population Policies and Migration Department of the League of Arab States, this was also the case for skilled Arab migrants,16 with some professional sectors being affected more than others.17

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An increasing Palestinian interest A Palestinian Expatriates Affairs Department (PEAD) was established only in 2007 by PLO Executive Committee Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas.18 PEAD is responsible for establishing contact with Palestinian communities in the diaspora.19 PEAD participated in the Arab League’s Meetings related to Migrants and Expatriates by the Arab League: Palestine is, it must be remembered, an active member of the League. It should be noted, however, that PEAD is not the only Palestinian institution interested in keeping up links with expatriates. PEAD, in fact, coordinates with the PLO Department of Refugees Affairs, the PLO Department of Political Affairs, and the PA Ministry of Foreign Affairs so as to safeguard the right of return for Palestinian expatriates, and, more generally, to ensure their protection.20 Finally, it should be noted that the PA is playing an increasingly central role in coordinating with host countries and defending Palestinian migrant rights in Arab host states.21 Most importantly, the PA, as the only Palestinian entity exercising direct jurisdiction over (parts) of the Palestinian people and land, revived the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which plays the role of ‘centre’ with regards to Palestinian expatriates, and the Palestinian people as a whole. The laws and policies, affecting the Palestinian people are debated, decided and applied around that authority (the PA), that land (the occupied Palestinian territory), and that people (the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip). They are not applied with reference to the PLO, the host countries, and the diaspora.22

Incentives targeting skilled immigrants23 The PA, since its establishment in 1994, has encouraged diaspora Palestinians to return to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to invest in its economy and to help build up national institutions. Most importantly, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians did, in fact, return to the occupied Palestinian territory thanks to the Oslo agreements. The numbers, the names, and the modalities of this return, were rigorously scrutinised, debated and negotiated with, and finally approved by, Israel. The attitude of the PA towards the ‘return’ of diaspora Palestinians may have a national dimension. However, their return was also perceived as being necessary in building a Palestinian economy and to establish the new PA bureaucracy;

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while, both viable economy and viable institutions were deemed necessary for the establishment of the state. In its earliest years, the PA adopted an ‘Investment Promotion Law’ (Law no.1 of 1998, replacing Law no.6 of 1995) aimed at attracting or encouraging foreign nationals to establish businesses in Palestine. As its title suggests, this law is related to investment (the attraction of capital) and does not target particular kinds of migrants. The law, in fact, targets any investor, whether foreign or not; the law also does not distinguish between foreign nationals and diaspora Palestinians.24 In both cases (attracting foreign nationals and encouraging diaspora Palestinians to ‘return’) the final word remains though with Israel. Since 1967, Israel has maintained full control over borders and the Palestinian population registry (Khalil, 2008a; Khalil, 2008b).25 Issues related to the exit of residents and foreign nationals from or to territories under PA control, and their re-entry, are still under direct Israeli control. Accordingly, a foreign national (for Israel, this term refers to any nonID holder and Israel itself determines who can be granted an IDnumber) wanting to access the territories under PA control needs a visa or permit; any visa needs to be renewed every three months and does not grant any right to work in Israel or in the territories under PA control (Khalil, 2008b).26 This goes a long way to explaining why PA laws avoid defining who is a Palestinian for the purposes of the law, and always make reference to ‘Palestinian’, not to ID card holders, or to those legally residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This means that the law applicable to diaspora Palestinians who ‘return’ to the territories under PA control, even if they are not ID holders, is not the law for foreign nationals but the law for nationals (Khalil, 2008a). Those Palestinians migrating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not dealt with as immigrants, but as ‘returnees’.

Incentives targeting Palestinians emigrants The establishment of the PA and the prospects for peace, as much as the agreement aimed at permitting the return of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians of the diaspora, made the West Bank and Gaza Strip attractive for skilled migration. This phenomenon was, however, shortlived, and both Palestinian regions went back to exporting skilled

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labour after the onset of the second Intifada at the end of September 2000 (Hilal, 2007: 3).27 Some reports suggested that, two years after the Intifada had begun, the number of those who had left the West Bank had reached 100,000; these migrants were young, well-educated persons employed by the private sector, and PA employees who resigned their positions and left the territory (Sletten and Pedersen, 2003: 31). Other reports bear witness to an increase in the number of visas or migration requests from western embassies and emigration offices between 2000 and 2001 (Bocco et al., 2001: 36).28 In 2006 some 10,000 requests had been accepted, mostly from Palestinian graduates.29 A survey, carried out in 2006, showed that almost one Palestinian in three was seriously thinking about emigrating.30 In 2010, the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics undertook a large-scale survey to determine, inter alia, the number of Palestinians who emigrated 2005 –2009. This was determined at 6,570 Palestinians per year (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011, 58 cited by Malki, 2013: 13). There have been critiques over the survey method, including the lack of information for the emigration of whole families where there are no remaining relatives to give information (Malki, 2013: 12). Majdi Malki (2013: 13 –14), nevertheless, reached the conclusion that the emigration of Palestinians is mostly temporary. He argued, first, that the emigration of Palestinians is directed towards education (34.4 per cent), then work (28.3 per cent), and, then, accompaniment of a member of family who is emigrating (21.9 per cent): it follows that those who emigrate for education will possibly return after the completion of their education. Second, Malki noted that most of those who emigrate, reside in Arab countries (52 per cent), particularly in Jordan (23.5 per cent) and in the Gulf States (20.4 per cent): this means, of course, that most Palestinian e´migre´s will have neither citizenship nor permanent residency status in those countries. This is because of the restrictive measures adopted by most Arab countries towards naturalization or residency rights for foreign nationals in general and Palestinians in particular. The emigration of skilled Palestinians, often connected to political and economic deterioration in the occupied Palestinian territory, is dealt with as a problem because it deprives Palestinian society of highly skilled professionals. It makes it impossible for them to contribute to the

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Palestinian economy. Various works have shown that ‘the continual loss, through emigration, of skilled and highly educated individuals from Palestinian communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip meant their deprivation from the more innovative and dynamic members’ (Hilal, 2007: 30). And in the PA Council of Ministers annual report (for the period 16 June 2007– 16 June 2008) this phenomenon was considered one of the obstacles to re-construction and development (PA-Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 2008: 37). The danger of this phenomenon, however, goes beyond economic and social factors; and thus, beyond the emigration of skilled Palestinians. It has a clear national dimension (perceived as dangerous for the Palestinian cause, and for resistance to occupation), and more interestingly, it has even acquired a religious dimension!31 The main concern of the PA was in encouraging the ‘return’ of Palestinians, not their departure. It seems comprehensible, then, that the PA would be reticent in encouraging, coordinating or giving incentives for emigration. The PA, fearing the impact on Palestinian unity,32 did not even deal publicly with the issue; but when it did, it was clear that the PA did not have a specific policy with regards to emigration (Hanafi, 2005b: 14). The PA had recently adopted certain policies and undertaken certain actions, aiming at creating job opportunities – and thus reducing pressures on skilled and university-educated Palestinians to emigrate: including (1) the activation by the Ministry of Labor of the Fund for Employment and Social Protection of Labourers, that was founded by Presidential Decree No. 9 of 2003;33 (2) the creation of the Labour Market Information System;34 (3) the agreement of all universities to establishing an Alumni Unit in each University to help graduating students in getting better access to labor market;35 (4) the determination of the Minimum wage in 2012,36 as requested by the PA Labour Law No.7 of 2000;37 (5) the establishment of a National Team, presided over by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad himself, for the planning of a Social Security Law.38 Such undertaken actions are coherent with the priorities set forward by PA National Development Plan (2011–13): the Establishment of the Palestinian State and the Construction of the Future.39 However, despite this reticence, there are no laws forbidding, or policies restricting the migration of highly skilled professionals.40 But even if there were, it is difficult to imagine how the PA could enforce

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such rules, while not in control of its own borders. The PA, indeed, has no legal tools or, indeed, jurisdiction to enforce policies aimed at reducing or regulating this issue.41 The lack of jurisdiction partially explains the lack of correct numbers concerning the phenomenon of migration. With the exception of the 2010 Survey cited above, there are, indeed, few resources and little research on migration in the Palestinian territory.42

Cooperation with foreign academic institutions The Higher Education Law No.11 of 1998 states that higher education institutes should aim, inter alia: at opening the way for all qualified students to enter higher education; and developing their educational capabilities domestically and abroad (art.4/1). The law, then, enumerates the ‘responsibilities’ of the Ministry of Higher Education in this regard.43 It should be noted, however, that Palestinian universities are older than the PA. As a matter of fact, they are mostly autonomous private institutions. Many Palestinian universities established co-operation agreements with other universities to facilitate the exchange of students and professors. Since only limited PhD programmes have recently been adopted in a few Palestinian universities, Palestinian students often need to study abroad.44 Agreements with foreign universities regularly include arrangements to host Palestinian students in foreign universities. Those who receive a scholarship through a university frequently sign an agreement with the local university to return, once their studies abroad are terminated, to work at local universities for a number of years. There are also several joint programmes (and joint degrees) between Palestinian local universities and foreign universities. Such programmes encourage the exchange of students and professors. This is the case, for example, with ‘Erasmus Mundus University II’,45 and the PEACE Programme.46 It should be noted, finally, that the crucial problem pertaining to higher education in the occupied Palestinian territory is not necessarily a lack of academic skills, but rather the negative correlation between the growing numbers of academically skilled Palestinians and the narrow opportunities for the exploitation of these skills in the underdeveloped local labour market (Rosenfeld, 2002: 531). Accordingly, it is crucial that any policy or law dealing with highly skilled migration

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investigates the incentives and opportunities that the local work market is offering.

Temporary and virtual return The participation of skilled Palestinians is vital in the construction of a viable Palestinian state (Hanafi, 2005c). However, given the impossibility of permanent physical return due to Israeli restrictions, even a temporary return remains an option worth exploring.47 Here, two initiatives, referred to rightly as ‘Promising Arab Initiatives’,48 are worth exploring: TOKTEN and PALESTA. Both are unofficial (that is they are sponsored by neither the PLO or PA) and aim at establishing contact between highly skilled Palestinians in the diaspora and the country of origin. The former encourages their temporal or permanent return, the latter aims at creating links, using technology (internet) as a way to help local Palestinian institutions profit from highly skilled Palestinians in the diaspora. TOKTEN stands for the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals. It is a global UNDP mechanism to attract expatriate nationals, who have migrated to other countries and who have achieved professional success abroad. It aims to mobilise them in undertaking short-term consultancies in their countries of origin, under the UN umbrella.49 TOKTEN is often cited as a ‘Brain Gain’ success story. More than 400 Palestinian experts have contributed to Palestinian development through TOKTEN.50 Successful and promising as this may be, the number of skilled professionals has hardly been significant (Hanafi, 2005a: 586). PALESTA (Palestinian Scientists and Technologists Aboard) is an internet-based network. It is funded by UNDP and hosted by the PA Ministry of Planning (Hanafi, 2005b: 27). Its aim is to cover the gap created by the limited physical return of Palestinian professionals, enabling communication and exchange between Palestinian professionals and the Palestinian homeland.51 UNDP, however, reported several challenges facing PALESTA, including: a low participation rate; the lack of interaction among network members; the inability to mobilise local organisations to identify problems that obstruct development in the Palestinian Territories; and insufficient co-operation between PALESTA and local institutions and ministries (UNDP- Capacity Development Group, 2007: 17).

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Conclusion The PA has no jurisdiction over the borders of the occupied Palestinian territory, nor, indeed, does it control the Palestinian population registry. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are still deemed occupied territory, and Israel remains an occupying power. This fact explains why the PA did not legislate much on migration; and why, in those few cases where it did, the legislative product was ambiguous and indeterminate, with regards to what makes a Palestinian (and a non-Palestinian) in legal terms.52 PA policies towards the ‘return’ of Palestinians, though largely compatible with the objective of establishing a Palestinian state for all Palestinians, were nonetheless typically dealt with on an ad hoc basis. The first waves of Palestinians were, for the most part, absorbed by the nascent PA bureaucracy and security services; the PA has been the major job provider for the last 15 years. Now that it is saturated, and the tendency is reversed, different options need to be explored. The Palestinian economy is dependent, to a very great extent, on the Israeli market. It is also undermined by Israeli unilateral restrictive acts, while depending on foreign aid. The local labour market is consequently poor. The utopia of Palestine (now taken to mean the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while in reality the real jurisdiction of the PA is more restricted) for all Palestinians, needs to come face to face with reality. Indeed, the PA must meet its many internal challenges, both social (the integration of newly arrived Palestinians, with different cultures, different levels of education, different experiences. . .) and economic (the possibility of creating new jobs, the viability of the PA public sector to absorb and maintain its huge number of civil servants and military and security agents, the poverty level and the dependency on international aid). Similar doubts can be raised with regards to the possibility of accommodating skilled Palestinians in jobs that are adequate to their specialisations and professions, in order to make it possible to profit from their knowledge and skills. The doubts I express and the arguments I make are not related to the incapacity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to accommodate new arrivals, and new skilled immigrants. It is rather related to the absence of a migration framework, in general, and a highly skilled migration framework in particular: the absence of legal regulations makes the process unpredictable, depending on ad hoc measures undertaken by the

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PA, host countries, and Israel. Besides, the absence of policies means that national concerns will be left to individual initiatives. Such individual initiatives will be vulnerable to crisis, whether related to the occupation itself or not. The fact that Israel maintains control of Palestinian borders and the population registry does, indeed, mean that the PA can postpone dealing with issues of migration, and avoid the formation of laws, regulations and even policies. The weak labour market, the high level of unemployment, and the fragmented and dependent economy, are all depressing indicators. They show that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are incapable, in their current shape, of absorbing new arrivals and of satisfying the needs of its population. Given that highly skilled migrants will likely find their labour markets unattractive, the West Bank and Gaza Strip may witness a very pervasive movement of migration: the tendency of skilled Palestinians to migrate may intensify, while only under-skilled Palestinians, with no better chances abroad, will make their ‘return’ to the stuttering economy of the West Bank and in Gaza Strip. In this sense, the recent interest of the PA in migration is something to be encouraged: better late than never!53 This revival should not be limited in the interests of the ‘dangerous’ phenomenon of skilled Palestinian emigration; rather, the PA should also look at the reasons for migration: lack of economic opportunities, political and security instability, which leads to ‘hardship and hopelessness, especially for the young’ (Lubbad, 2008: 3). The PA should concentrate on the creation of an attractive economy and a market that can absorb skilled Palestinians.54 If, and when, this happens, many skilled Palestinians would have less temptation to leave because they would be absorbed into the national labour market. The skilled Palestinians of the diaspora, meanwhile, would not only be able to ‘return’ to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They would also be motivated to stay longer, maybe permanently in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, so building up the Palestinian state. PA policies should be based on knowledge of the real capacity of the local market and of the needs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PA, in other words, does not only need to encourage the return of skilled migrants; it needs to make their return work. This return should not be a burden for the PA, nor should it be a disappointment for skilled and professional Palestinians; rather it should be a success story. These skilled Palestinians may be facing the hard reality of whether to remain put but

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unemployed in Palestine, and so to suffer political and economic instability there, or to re-emigrate to other countries. Migratory movements intensified, according to available data, during the second Intifada,55 and following the Siege of Gaza, in 2007,56 This suggests that the Palestinians in question may choose the second option. However, it must also be said that the fact that the Palestinians look for better jobs and a better level of life, in the absence of alternatives in the territories under PA control, is a completely understandable concern. This has been the case historically, and still is, for many populations all over the world. The ‘national’ interest in keeping Palestinians in Palestine, and most importantly, keeping skilled Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories to build ‘Palestine’ is also though a legitimate national concern. This does not mean, of course, that the PA should reject, a priori, a variety of options because they are, or seem not to be, ‘politically correct’. To ‘put an end’ to the emigration of skilled Palestinians, the PA need not adopt restrictive measures towards those Palestinians wanting to exercise their right to freedom of movement. Rather, this phenomenon needs to be dealt with by looking at the reasons behind their departure, and the necessary incentives for them to stay. One may object: ‘easier said than done’. And the point is a valid one. After all, there is no denying the already difficult financial problems of the PA. There is also the economic fragility of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the PA’s complete dependency on donors; not to mention the internal division between the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and the PA-controlled West Bank. But what is the alternative? People are already emigrating. It is most important not to force them to stay. It would, in any case, be impossible! Given this, why not encourage them to reach their objectives in a way that marches hand-in-hand with national interests? The PA, despite the reticence it has, thus far, shown should work on arranging and coordinating with host countries to facilitate migrant integration in host countries’ work markets. Indeed, their work situation, their rights and their freedoms in Arab or foreign markets should be at the centre of the PA’s concerns. Given the nature of the PA, as a non-sovereign entity, there is a need for full co-operation with PLO offices and host countries. Most importantly, given the current waves of migration, so dependent on unofficial networks (family or relatives, or private initiatives), the PA does not need to replace but to compliment a

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pre-existing structure. These networks are often the only safety nets for Palestinians out in the diaspora. The PA might even work on arranging the departure (and later on the return) of skilled Palestinians, in the framework of bilateral agreements with neighbouring Arabs or other states: if people emigrate, why not make planned arrangements? Despite the many likely inconveniences, the emigration of Palestinians may contribute to decreasing unemployment rates within the young, well-educated and highly skilled population, a population that the local market cannot fully absorb. The PA may also give due consideration to the positive impact of the work of Palestinian migrants in foreign countries, towards the development of the Palestinian national economy: they inject remittances into the local economy. This may also increase PA assets, thus decreasing the dependency of the PA on foreign aid. In all circumstances, the Israeli occupation, the siege of the Gaza Strip, and the fragmentation of the West Bank are major obstacles to developing a viable and attractive Palestinian economy. Many issues related to migration, currently unregulated and unplanned, will need to be dealt with, when and if the PA takes control of the movement of population, to and from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While still under occupation, the legal regulation, the definition of Palestinians and non-Palestinians will, at best, be irrelevant. Given the Israeli control of both the borders and the population register it cannot be otherwise. This does not mean though that the PA has to avoid dealing with migration issues all together. Some may suspect that any policies aimed at coordinating the departure and the arrival of skilled Palestinians are contrary to Palestinian national interest: there is the fear of losing the demographic challenge and fear of their impact on the right of return. This may, in fact, be the case. However, this author would argue that, the PA needs to take the needs of the population under its jurisdiction seriously, and also to take the necessary actions to ameliorate their living conditions. Most importantly, this author would challenge the overwhelming tendency to prioritise national interests over an individual’s freedom to opt for a better life, for themselves and for their families. The PA may decide to continue, as a matter of national policy, to discourage the departure of Palestinians, and to encourage the ‘return’ of Palestinians from the diaspora maintaining, in this way, the status

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quo. But if they do so, it will no longer be an arbitrary decision, a reaction to circumstances and others’ decisions (whether host countries, Israel, or even private initiatives). It will, rather, be a reflected and planned solution. Not taking action is a decision that one may or may not agree with, but it remains a more attractive option than not taking a decision.

Notes 1. This chapter was written originally in 2010, and was published by European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. The paper was updated in 2013, with few changes on the main argument advanced in original paper with regards to the PA but the researcher was not able for lack of resources and information to update situation of migration issues in Gaza Strip. Also, as Israel controls the borders of the West Bank, there is no direct impact on migration issues raised in this chapter, as a result of changes in the neighbouring Arab countries, despite massive refugee problem in some countries: such as in Jordan, where many Palestinian refugees of Syria are fleeing Syria to Jordan, seeking safe refuge. Special thanks to Hiba Saida and Zeinab Tanbouz for their assistance in updating the chapter. 2. The word ‘return’ and ‘returnees’ is often used to describe the migration of Palestinians of the diaspora into the territories under PA control, carried out since Oslo, in agreement with Israel. The interesting thing about these terms is that they imply ‘return’ even if many of these Palestinians have never been in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip before, and even if they, or their ancestors, were supposedly to return to the (1948) territories that are now part of the state of Israel. For this reason, I use inverted commas when talking about ‘return’ and ‘returnees’, in order to make a clear distinction between the right of return, and the ‘return’ to the territories under PA control. 3. Reference in this chapter is exclusively to international migration, not internal migration. 4. For this reason, it is suggested that the issue of the emigration of highly skilled Palestinians be seen in the light of Palestinian refugees’ many exoduses, since 1948 (Hanafi, 2008). 5. For more about the reasons why many issues related to migration are still unregulated, cf. Khalil (2006; 2007). 6. There are other references to foreign nationals in different PA laws, such as in the Law on Civil and Commercial Procedures No. 2 of 2001, related to determining cases of the jurisdiction of Palestinian courts over foreign nationals; or in the Law on Charitable and Non-Governmental Organizations No. 1 of 2000, which determines the conditions in which foreign nationals can be part of these associations or in which foreign associations can open a branch in the territories under PA control (for more, see: Khalil, 2006). However,

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7. 8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

for the purposes of formulating incentives for foreign nationals to establish themselves in the territories under PA control, and the legal constraints for their stay, there are few references. For more, see p. 118 et seq. The ‘Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part’ Official Journal L 187, 16/07/1997 P. 0003 – 0135. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri¼ CELEX:21997A0716(01):EN:HTML The Palestine Trade Center documents trade arrangements with the United States, Canada, the European Union (EU), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and GAFTA. Cf. http://www.paltrade.org/en/about-palestine/trade-agreements.php. To the best of my knowledge, there is no similar agreement related to arranging or organising the departure of skilled Palestinians to work in host countries. Emigration is often based on individual initiatives, making use of unofficial networks, such as family or relatives, or members of the same local community (Lubbad, 2008: 3) who are already in the host country. Resolution 1664- G.A 78- 4/9/2006, adopted by the League of Arab States, Social-Economic Council in its general assembly (78) in 2006 at ministerial level. Available at: http://www.poplas.org/upload/mig_dec_en.pdf. Interesting data is available on the website of the Observatory: http://www. poplas.org/migration/index.asp. http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/seventhcoord2008/P12_LAS.pdf. This is done through the organization of conferences, workshops and other kinds of meetings, such as the Coordination Meeting on Fostering More Opportunities for Legal Migration in Cairo, Egypt, from 8 to 9 October 2008, held in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM); and the Arab Ministerial Meeting for Migration and Expatriates in Cairo, Egypt, from 17 to 18 February 2008, organised by the League of Arab States, a conference held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, from 21 to 22 October 2008, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. For more, http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/ seventhcoord2008/P12_LAS.pdf. The Population Policies and Migration Department of the League of Arab States published a report in 2008, which is available in Arabic at: http://www.poplas. org/upload/migration_2008_ar_1.pdf; for a summary of the findings in English, http://www.poplas.org/upload/migration_2008_en.pdf. See the summary of the report, available at: http://www.poplas.org/upload/mi gration_2008_en.pdf. According to the above-mentioned report, the Arab world suffers ‘Brain drain in the Health Sector’, noticing that ‘[t]he percentage of migration of doctors born in Arab countries is higher than the total percentage of skilled migrants[.]’

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18. For more, see the official website of PEAD: http://www.pead.ps/. 19. With the exception of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, where UNRWA is present and where the issue of Palestinian refugees is followed by another PLO department of Refugees Affairs. 20. For more about the mandate of PEAD, see: http://www.pead.ps/page.php?do¼ s how&action ¼ ta3. 21. In September 2009, for example, three bilateral agreements were signed between the Cuban and Palestinian authorities aiming at boosting their co-operation in higher education, culture and sports. The agreement on higher education included clauses on how to boost the two countries’ work in developing science and education in favor of both peoples’ welfare. The news was reported by: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009 – 09/27/ content_12115780.htm. 22. The centrality of the PA and PA institutions with regards to Palestinian ‘expatriates’ explains the earlier interest of the Palestinian Legislative Council in the issue. According to the Palestinian Legislative Council By-Law of 2000 (art. 48), a permanent committee is established (Refugees Committee) which is responsible for following up issues related to expatriates, as much as to refugees and internally-displaced Palestinians. 23. Given the difficulty of determining who is a Palestinian national for the purposes of PA laws, the distinction between incentives for attracting Palestinians of the diaspora to the territories under PA control, and other incentives targeting foreign nationals, in general, needs always to be kept in mind. 24. The reference here is to all those Palestinian nationals who do not have an ID card and are, thus, de facto denied access to the occupied Palestinian territory, unless provided with a visa or permit by the Israeli occupation authority. For more, see p. 115. 25. The way Rafah was regulated and administered following the Israeli withdrawal in 2005 did not change, until a deal was reached between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Agreement on Movement and Access and the Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing). This agreement was later on suspended following Hamas’ taking control of PA institutions in 2007, and the retreat of the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EU BAM Rafah). Since then, the Gaza Strip has been under siege. For more, cf. Khalil (2009a: 271 – 2). 26. In recent years, Israel has started to apply restrictive measures on foreign nationals wanting to enter territories under PA control. Many of those denied access to territories under PA control are of Palestinian origin, others are married to Palestinians. Many others work in international NGOs and Palestinian institutions, such as in Palestinian universities or are working with PA institutions such as the PA Ministry of Planning. A campaign was organised in order to urge the international community to intervene in this matter. For more about the Campaign for the Right to Enter the Occupied Palestinian Territory, cf. http://www.righttoenter.ps/.

130 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 27. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (Hanafi, 2008), the number of Palestinians with habitual residence abroad, who returned to the Palestinian territories rose to 267,355, i.e. 10 per cent of the total population. A report was published in 2007 by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (available at: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1487. pdf). According to the report (p. 92) the number of Foreign-Born Palestinian Population (only in the Remaining West Bank) in 2007 was 125,581. This number is slightly inferior to the number of foreign-born Palestinian population in the West Bank 1997 (available at: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/ Portals/_pcbs/phc_97/2037c758-f8db-4f66 –9a0f-e5bcea387235.aspx). 28. It should be noted that, the fact that a large number of Palestinians hold a foreign passport (besides their PA travel document), that they have relatives in foreign countries, and that they may not need a visa to enter certain countries (such as Jordan for Palestinians on the West Bank) facilitated this movement (Bocco et al., 2001: 36). 29. According to reports by the PA Foreign Ministry, reported in The Jerusalem Post (10 June 2007): http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid¼1181228581339& pagename ¼ JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 30. 29 per cent of people surveyed; see: http://www.neareastconsulting.com/surveys/all/ p43/. The former PA Minister of Planning, Samir Abdalla, is reported by PNN (Palestine News Network) to have said (in 25.3.2008) that the migration of highly skilled Palestinians has slowed since relations with donor communities have been restored. http://arabic.pnn.ps/index.php?option¼ com_content&task¼view& id¼28509&Itemid ¼ 45. It is unclear though, to which data (if any) the former Minister of Planning was referring in making this claim. 31. The PA grand mufti had taken an unprecedented step of issuing a fatwa forbidding Muslims to emigrate (Abu Toameh, 2007). As for Christian churches, the emigration of Christians from Palestine was always a matter of concern, though it is not limited to the occupied Palestinian territory, it is often related to the Israeli occupation. See different reports published in local and international news, such as: ‘Strife Spurs Slow Exodus of West Bank Christians’ published in Los Angeles Times (14 April 2005): http://articles.latimes.com/ 2005/apr/14/world/fg-holyland14 and a report about a recent document from the Vatican, published on Al-Quds (20 January 2010): http://www.alquds.com/ node/231015. 32. Until recently, the issue of emigration was not well debated, researched or assessed. As noted by (Bocco et al., 2001: 35), ‘[t]he emigration phenomenon seems to be a well-kept secret, and it is easy to understand why. Reporting about it may well be perceived as detrimental to Palestinian national unity.’ 33. Available at: http://muqtafi2.birzeit.edu/en/Legislation/LegCard.aspx? id¼14222. 34. Check website at: http://lmis.pna.ps/ 35. At Birzeit University for example: the unit was under construction as this chapter was being finalised for publication.

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36. The Council of Ministers No.11 of 2012, available at: http://muqtafi2.birzeit. edu/Legislation/PDFPre.aspx?Y¼2012&ID ¼16472. 37. Available at: http://muqtafi2.birzeit.edu/Legislation/PDFPre.aspx?Y¼ 2000& ID ¼13975. 38. As confirmed by Asef Said, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Labor for Districts Affairs, in an interview with research assistant Zeinab Tanbouz on 12 March 2013. 39. Available at: http://www.mopad.pna.ps/attachments/article/3/Arabic NDPforwep.pdf. 40. As confirmed by Fahoum Shalabi, Undersecretary of the PA Ministry of Higher Education in an interview with research assistant Zeinab Tanbouz on 12 March 2013. 41. While one may argue that Israel, which often restricted entry or re-entry of Palestinians, would have no particular interest in coordinating the issue of emigration of Palestinians with the PA, it is a matter of fact that, during the second Intifada, it was Jordan that unilaterally imposed restrictions on the entry of Palestinians to the West Bank so as to avoid mass migration (Hanafi, 2005b: 11). Similarly, it was Egypt, again unilaterally, that imposed restrictions on the entry of Gaza Palestinians to Egypt in 2007, following the Israeli siege of Gaza. 42. According to Mohammad Dreidi, from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Phone interview with research assistant, Hiba Saida, 14 March 2013. 43. The Ministry of Higher Education has the following responsibilities: ‘. . .3) To conclude official governmental agreements relating to the organization of international cooperation relations in the field of higher-education development. . . 10) To coordinate the affairs of expatriate students and teachers according to the agreements and contracts concluded with their States. 11) To recognize Arab and foreign higher-education institutions, form the committees which are concerned therewith, organize the activities of student service offices, supervise the affairs thereof, publish the tables relating to the names and addresses of the recognized universities and any amendment made thereon. 12) To specify the conditions according to which foreign higher education institutions would be allowed to establish branches or institutions thereto in Palestine as well as grant them the necessary licenses for the carrying out of the work thereof. 13) To formulate the general policy for scholarships, grants, education assistance and to follow up the affairs within the country and abroad as well as formulating the regulations and instructions for the implementation of this policy. 14) To recommend the consultants and attache´s for the strengthening of cultural relations with sister and friendly countries. 15) To provide the additional sources of funds necessary for making up the coverage of the expenses relating to Palestinian higher-education and scientific research institutions as well as defining the basis and mechanism of the distribution thereof. 16) To coordinate with the Ministries and concerned parties in formulating the regulations for licensing the practice of occupations which require scientific qualifications. 17) To determine the minimum averages in the

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44. 45.

46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

general secondary education certificate examinations or the equivalent thereof as a basis for acceptance in the Palestinian higher education institutions. 18) To fix the number of students who are permitted to be accepted with every one of the Palestinian higher education institutions on the basis according to which such institutions and educational programmes are accredited in the light of the potentials thereof. 19) To approve the holding of any general examinations after the general secondary exam which the higher-education institution deems necessary. 20) To equalize and certify higher-education certificates and the general secondary education certificate or the equivalent thereof according to the equalization and certification regulations.’ For Mirvat Bulbul, Head of the Accreditation and Quality Assurance Commission, the lack of a PhD program is considered one of the major reasons for emigration. Interview with research assistant Zeinab Tanbouz, 12 March 2013. This programme, established within the framework of the new European mobility program (Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window), was approved by the European Commission. The Vrije Universiteit Brussel took a lead in setting up a consortium of 20 universities, 10 from Europe and 10 from Egypt, Palestine and Israel which are partners of Erasmus Mundus University II. Partner Palestinian Universities are: An Najah National University, Nablus, Al Quds University, Jerusalem, Arab American University, Jenin, Al Azhar University, Gaza, Community College of Applied Science and Technology, Gaza. For more about the program, see http://portal.unesco.org/education/ en/ev.php-URL_ID¼54247&URL_DO¼ DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION ¼201.html. PEACE stands for ‘Palestinian-European-American Cooperation in Education’. The programme was established in 1992 under the direction of UNESCO. The objectives of PEACE are: ‘Promoting international cooperation with Palestinian Universities through: exchange of staff and students; grants for Palestinian students and young academics to complete graduate studies abroad; academic projects aimed at enhancing teaching and research at Palestinian higher education institutions.’ There are 61 member institutions in 18 countries and territories in this program. For more, see: http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID¼52853& URL_DO¼DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION¼201.html. For more about such initiatives for facilitating the temporary return of skilled Palestinians from the diaspora see Hanafi (2008: 99) who refers to ‘virtual return’, see p. 122. This is the way the Population Policies and Migration Department of the League of Arab States referred to these initiatives in its report of 2008. For more, see p. 117. For more, http://www.toktenpalestine.org/page.aspx?pid¼1. http://www.toktenpalestine.org/page.aspx?pid¼3. For an extended discussion of TOKTEN and PALESTA and their impact, see Hanafi (2005a). For more, see: Khalil, 2006.

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53. See p. 117. 54. I am aware of the fact that many of the issues that I have raised here are largely out of the control of the PA itself, given the unilateral Israeli acts towards the Palestinians people and their land which renders impractical any developmental efforts. 55. See p. 121. 56. According to Associated Press, thousands of Palestinians are faking illness to flee the Gaza siege. See full article in Haaretz (12 October 2009), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1134137.html.

CHAPTER 8 JORDAN, A LAND OF NO RETURN? HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION, BEFORE AND DURING THE ARAB SPRING Franc
oise De Bel-Air

Introduction Jordan seems to have been little affected by the violent uprisings that overthrew decades-old regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and now apparently Syria. Only in November 2012, during street protests against the rise in energy prices, did some slogans call for ‘the downfall of the regime’ of King Abdullah II. Does this mean that the Jordanian population is reconciled to the economic, social and political prospects? If this is the case, it would be difficult to explain why between 600,000 and 670,000 Jordanian citizens are said to be working abroad1 most of them in the Arab Gulf. Moreover, these migrants are found in various sectors including the media, telecommunications, information technology sectors, in consulting and management, engineering, in the financial and banking sector, in teaching and research. Highly skilled professionals seem especially prone to migrate. Consequently, however, professionals in several sectors claim that there is a ‘drain’ on highly skilled, employed professionals in Jordan. This chapter explores the reasons behind highly skilled emigration2 from Jordan. It focuses on structural, socio-political factors explaining

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such dynamics, as well as on public policy choices. Throughout its history Jordan has always practised an ‘open-door policy’ towards emigrating citizens. After briefly tracing the dynamics of highly skilled emigration, this chapter highlights views about migration policies, before adding some socio-political glosses to explain the relative neglect of HSM policy making in the Kingdom. The chapter shows that whether you define skilled emigration from Jordan as ‘brain drain’, ‘brain gain’, ‘brain strain’ or even ‘brain circulation’, emigration is rooted in the peculiarities of its political and social history, which tie labour to citizenship and development. Migration is thus a political issue. The paper consequently suggests that Jordan’s relatively low exposure to anti-regime protests may stem, to a certain extent, from this ‘open-door’ policy to the emigration of the most educated. Moreover, Jordanian expatriates may be reluctant to return, due to the slow pace of business reform, and to the deteriorating political context in the Kingdom.

Dynamics of skilled emigration from Jordan Little data is available on migration from Jordan. This does not have to do with technical and administrative inefficiency, but rather with Jordan’s long-standing ‘open-door’ policy: keeping records of stocks and flows of migrants is not yet part of the Kingdom’s administrative ‘culture’. There is, first, the political sensitivity of certain information, which means that said information cannot be disseminated publicly. Then, second, enforcing data collection systems demands popular and institutional involvement, for which political consensus is indispensable. Despite some datacollecting attempts in the 2000s3 which have yet to be released to the public, the dearth of data reveals political concerns over emigration from Jordan. For similar reasons, receiving countries such as the Gulf States are reluctant to publish detailed statistics on foreign communities.

Jordanian migrants: stocks and flows Table 8.1 gives various estimates of the numbers of Jordanian workers in the Gulf States today.4 The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, estimated from 800,000 to one million Jordanian expatriates (workers and family members), prior to launching a survey on Jordanians abroad on the basis of Consular Reports (Abd el Had, 2009) in 2009.

136 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 8.1

Jordanian workers in oil-producing countries: some estimates

Libya UAE Qatar Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia Egypt TOTAL

Ministry of Labour

DoS (estimates) (unchanged)

2007

2008

2009

n.d. 250,000 27,000 – 36,000 42,000 n.d. 250,000 – 300,000 n.d. 500,000 – 600,000

52,000 n.d. 75,000 10,000 32,000 3,000 Nd 172,000

50,928 3,060 54,834 30,748 18,888 3,396 n.d. 161,854

50,928 3,750 54,834 9,500 18,888 2,822 924 141,646

As for flows, they are subject to great variations and change from one period to another. Following the 1973 oil boom, emigration from Jordan to the Gulf’s oil-producing countries surged. However, the progressive replacement of Arab by Asian labour after 1979 led to the gradual return of Jordanian migrants from the Gulf countries during the 1980s. 1000 3500

100

3000 50 0

2500 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*

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-50

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-100

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-150 year * data for December 2012 is estimate.

2000

Arrivals, departures (in thousands)

net migration (in thousands)

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net migration departures arrivals

Chart 8.1 Net migration, arrivals and departures of Jordanians (1990–2012). Source: Public Security Directorate, data on entries and departures, published in the Central Bank of Jordan’s Monthly Statistical Bulletins.

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The 1990–1 Gulf War then forced a further 300,000 expatriates back to Jordan. Displayed in Chart 1, data on entries and exits for Jordanian nationals show that net migration has remained negative since 1995, after a brief upsurge in returns following the signing of the peace process between Jordan and Israel in 1994. After 2003, the increase in oil prices led to considerable investment in all sorts of projects in the Gulf region, projects that required highly skilled workers in numerous sectors. However, in the mid-2000s, net migration rates remained sizeable but the amount of border crossings (arrivals and departures) started surging upwards. This suggests a growing feeling of instability within the expatriate community, probably accentuated by the 2008 financial crisis and by post-2011 Arab Spring attacks on regimes. It may have spurred professionals and businesspeople to adopt strategies of risk diversification. Therefore, and this is confirmed by direct observation, there seems to be an acceleration in migratory circulation by professionals who take up activities in several locations. This is true too for the investors, who keep some businesses running in the Gulf, while at the same time setting up start-ups in Jordan and elsewhere5 and exploring new investment opportunities in more politically-stable environments, e.g. western countries.

Profile of migrants As opposed to foreign workers in Jordan who are almost exclusively lowand semi-skilled, Jordanian expatriates are mostly skilled and highly skilled. The last reliable statistical survey on Jordanians employed abroad, conducted in the 1980s, found that 32 per cent held a university degree (7.3 per cent in the non-migrant population), while 36 per cent were employed as technicians (RSS, 1983). The public sector and, especially, the Jordanian army trained a number of these highly skilled migrants. At present, with an overall literacy rate of 93 per cent and 27 public and private universities, Jordan has seen an increased demand for higher education. Since 2000, enrolments have tripled reaching 240,000 in 2011. The gross university enrolment rate for the 18 –25 age group increased from 18.5 per cent in 2001 to 22 per cent in 2006, among the highest in the Arab world (World Bank, 2009: 1 –2). Consequently, Jordanian emigrants in the Gulf filled skilled or highly skilled posts there. The Bahraini army, as well as that country’s public sector and

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intelligence services, hired Jordanian soldiers, some of whom had retired. The Qatar-based TV channel Al-Jazeera, various private and public TV and press groups, not to mention the emergent UAE had also relied heavily on Jordanian professionals. The recent development of some Emirates like Sharjah and Al-Ain owes much to a regular flow of Jordanian professionals and university teachers. The UAE and Qatar, where the construction sector is booming, hired skilled Jordanian workers.6 Very recently, skilled medical staff from the Kingdom were hired in Bahrain (Al-Khitan, 2009; Petra News Agency, 2009), while it was noted during the first six months of 2010, that 200 medical doctors had left Jordan to work abroad (Malkawi, 2010). In the late 1980s, Jordanians of Palestinian origin were by far the biggest group among expatriates in the Gulf: some 95 per cent of Jordanian nationals in Kuwait, for instance, according to L. Brand (1988: 115). Today, most of those expatriates having returned from the Gulf countries in the early 1990s, there exists no data available to assess the ethno-national background of Jordanians currently in the Gulf. Popular perceptions still depict Jordanian expatriates as predominantly of Palestinian origin. However, higher education has now spread among the population as a whole, so that even rural Jordanians go to university. Also, structural adjustment programmes run since 1989 coupled with a general economic downturn in the Kingdom, hit rural communities hard, rural communities that had previously relied on state allowances and employment. Therefore, it can reasonably be assumed that labour outmigration now includes a sizeable share of non-Palestinian Jordanians.

Motives for highly skilled emigration According to various highly skilled migrants from Jordan, motives for moving abroad include: an increase in the household’s financial income; meeting needs for important purchase purposes; and strategies for professional status enhancement or training. These are among the main ‘positive’ motivations for short-term emigration. Emigrating is also a response to unemployment, which hits highly educated young people, both male and female, particularly badly: in 2011, the rate of unemployment for holders of university degrees (bachelors and above) was high, standing at 16 per cent, as compared to an average unemployment rate of 13 per cent among people aged 15

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and above all levels of education combined.7 Similarly, low salaries in the public sector also led to protests and eventually to emigration. The public medical sector, for instance, witnessed several strikes through 2010 – 12, which suggested the distress of skilled personnel: a Health Ministry doctor earns no more than J.D. 360 – 450 (USD 500 – 635) a month. This inevitably encourages doctors to search for better employment opportunities outside the Kingdom. To a certain extent, emigration from Jordan from the 1990s onwards could also be seen as a liberalisation-led ‘migration hump’ (Martin, 2001). Indeed, young professionals often argued that labour has become devalued in the context of Jordan’s massive liberalisation and deregulation policy drive, a drive that has been in place since the mid1990s. This led employers to invest in sectors that were characterised by relatively low-wage jobs and that do not satisfy financial, social and political ambitions in the professional class. Highly skilled young nationals have high-reservation wages, ‘based on expectations of obtaining [protected and influential] public sector or foreign jobs. Highly skilled Jordanians, indeed, often come from middle- or upperclass families, which themselves benefit from remittances sent by family members abroad (Razzaz/Iqbal, 2008). More generally, however, emigration can also be a reaction to the nepotism and clientelism that plagues all countries in the region and their educational and professional systems (Fayez, 2009). Given this situation, employment is not based on qualifications and merit but rather on personal connections or Wasta (intermediation). Even entrepreneurs and investors may need such connections in overcoming administrative slowness, accessing markets, and developing a business.

Actors and policies: ‘open-door’, brain gain vs. brain drain Beyond ‘self-selection factors’ there is also the effect of ‘out-selection factors’ (Beine et al., 2009) on the emigration of the highly skilled: namely, the various actors’ views and policies.

Views Historically, skilled emigration was a non-topic with the ‘open-door’ policy. Only a few technocrats raised the issue of ‘brain drain’ after the

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upsurge of emigration in 1973, among them the former Crown Prince Al-Hassan bin Talal. In general, the migration of Jordanians was considered as a way to publicise the Arab identity of Hashemite Jordan, as well as a way of exchanging assets with Arab oil-producing countries in return for development aid (De Bel-Air, 2003). Some voices today speak up against ‘brain drain’. Yes, degree holders deplore the generally poor working conditions and the absence of rewarding salaries and packages offered to them by employers in Jordan, in comparison to the Gulf countries. But business people lament the lack of available professionals and technicians in the country (Ghazal, 2011), for example in the booming ICT sector. Mid-2009, a study revealed that 17 per cent of public university teachers in the Kingdom had quit their jobs during 2007 – 8, raising fears for the quality of higher education as a whole.8 The need to improve higher education through better remuneration for university professors and researchers is a recurrent claim from professionals and employers, university employees and students. In the health sector, the agreement between Bahrain and Jordan, aimed at providing the Gulf Kingdom with skilled medical personnel from Jordan, was also criticised, given the deteriorating quality of care in Jordanian public hospitals (Al-Khitan, 2009). This deterioration is partly due, as noted above, to the decision of trained personnel to go abroad in search of better salaries and better work conditions. Today, the economic reform process, aimed at attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs), promotes Jordan as a regional technology hub. The development of the IT sector, especially, is an agenda reform priority. Therefore, brain drain is sometimes mentioned in public discourses as a handicap. For instance, in the early 2000s, King Abdullah acknowledged: [W]e have a problem of brain drain in Jordan, and we want to be able to change that into brain gain. We want to be able to give the opportunity to Jordanians all over the world to come back to their country, because we can offer them the opportunity to excel in their own homeland.9 However, the dominant view of decision makers is rather ‘technocratic’. For example, take a speech by the head of a research and education body dedicated to the advancement of science, technology, and innovation in

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Jordan and the region: while advocating the involvement of the Jordanian diaspora in addressing the depletion of expertise in scientific domains, the speaker also advocated ‘supranational thinking’, stating that ‘the movement of human capital across borders is not a zero-sum game’ and, rather, a ‘brain gain’ (Bint al-Hassan and Steityeh, 2007). The members of the Jordanian royal family, through an impressive network of internationally funded semi-public or non-governmental scientific institutions and programmes, promote a vision of modernity, excellence and above all, international influence and connections for Jordan. The pan-Arabist view, typical of King Hussein’s times, has shifted to an economically-geared advocacy connecting Jordan to international business networks. According to this world view expatriates are merely a commodity; expatriation is seen, if mentioned at all, as a potential ‘brain gain’. By contrast, professionals and, indeed, ‘average’ Jordanians are more ‘nationalist’ (i.e. demanding certain levels of well-being and certain resources as citizens) in raising the issue of deteriorating services and the lack of challenging prospects for graduates and young professionals. Expatriation is seen, rather, as a necessity and a constraint, not as a potentially enriching option.

Policies Migration, in most cases, is left to the initiative of individuals who mobilise all sorts of information sources and mechanisms in their decision to leave Jordan.10 However, despite the lukewarm regrets expressed by officials regarding ‘brain drain’, a range of policies are implemented that effectively encourage the migration of skilled Jordanians. The National Agenda11 in the mid-2000s set out to ‘create an Outplacement Department, with the aim of matching regional and international demand with the Jordanian labour force and providing assistance to Jordanians working abroad’. It set as a target for 2012 the outplacement of 1,000 Jordanians abroad; for 2017, the Agenda hoped for 3,000 such outplacements. Similarly, the Planning Ministry noted that it intended ‘[t]o streamline the Jordanian labour market and [to] explore the potential for finding job opportunities abroad, and [to] encourage the private sector to invest in this field’ (MoP, n.d.: 25). Another set of measures can be taken as incentives for skilled Jordanians to migrate, especially to the Gulf: bilateral agreements in

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targeted professional fields were renewed in 2009 with Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain. At the 2008 Doha Arab Economic Development and Social Summit, Jordan had called for the implementation of a regional labour market by 2020. This labour market would have permitted administrative procedures allowing manpower to circulate between countries. More recently, in May 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council announced its decision to broaden its membership to include Morocco and Jordan (before withdrawing the proposal a few months later). On economic terms, this decision was lauded in Jordan, as it may have provided an outlet for Jordanian jobseekers. Nevertheless, the idea of more tightly connecting Gulf markets for Arab and Jordanian professionals came up again in the wake of the Arab Spring. The 2011 Deauville partnership document12 recommends: [A] deepened cooperation [which] would allow citizens of member countries to enjoy equal rights and privileges, including the rights to move, settle, and work; receive social protection, retirement, health, education, and social services; and engage in various economic activities and services. It also advocates ‘promoting intra-Arab regional integration’ (World Bank, 2011: 15– 16). The public sector acted as a facilitator for connecting Jordanians with job opportunities abroad, even if these jobs were in the private sector. The Ministry of Labour launched, in August 2004, a National Employment Centre, which advertises job opportunities in Jordan as well as abroad. The Ministry also appointed ‘labour consultants’ in Jordanian embassies in the Gulf, in the United States, in Egypt and in Libya, who were to organise training and placement abroad for unemployed Jordanians, while defending the rights of expatriate Jordanian workers (MoL, 2009: 24 – 6). Similarly, the Al-Manar project at the National Center for Human Resources Development (NCHRD) developed a web-based employment system (ELE). This matched job seekers with labour vacancies, most offering opportunities in the Gulf and other Arab countries.13 More generally, the current public policy target, which has not changed since the mid-2000s, is the development of a ‘knowledge economy’ in Jordan. The aim is to create a skilled and flexible workforce,

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and to increase student opportunities through the transformation of the education curriculum, the development of professional programmes and the integration of ICT-based learning and skills improvement.14 Indeed, all this presupposes the increasingly fluid mobility of capital, innovation, business and, above all, of skilled and of highly skilled people for the dissemination of knowledge, all things that are characteristic of a deregulated economy (Dahlman, 2003). No barriers are put in the way of the expatriation of skilled citizens. Likewise, promoting non-economic ties or encouraging the migrant’s return to the Kingdom are not high on the national agenda. We have pointed already to the lack of existing figures and studies on the volume and profiles of expatriates abroad, which suggest a lack of trust between parties. As a matter of fact, despite repeated calls on the part of some prominent Jordanian figures during the election law debate, prior to the 23 January 2013 legislative elections, Jordanian expatriates did not gain the right to vote from abroad. The government pleaded organisational difficulties. Yet, other interpretations focussed on the supposed Palestinian origin of most expatriates (Brand/Hammad, 2012).15 In fact, the only policies specifically targeting Jordanian expatriates of a high socio-economic background and skills are geared towards attracting their investment to Jordan. Annual conferences were organised by the Labour Ministry between 1985 and 1989 for this purpose. In 1998, the initiative resumed and conferences were held in 2001, in 2003, in 2005 and in 2008.16 These conferences enjoy royal patronage and involve high-ranking political and economic actors including the Royal Court, various government ministries, the Jordan Investment Board and the Jordanian Businessmen Association. Such conferences are the occasion for discussing the shortcomings and legal and technical improvements necessary for ensuring greater access to investment in Jordan: fighting red tape and providing guarantees against frauds. However, no specific incentives are granted to potential expatriate investors. The 1995 Investment Promotion Law, for example, does not grant any incentives to Jordanian expatriates, something foreign investors do benefit from. In spite of such half-hearted policies some specific fields such as the ICT sector have, nevertheless, benefited not only from foreign investment from Jordanian expatriates, but also from their know-how (Oxford Business Group, 2005: 132).

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Skilled emigration as ‘brain strain’: a political calculus Such success stories are not yet so common. Leaving the door open to emigration is now increasingly acknowledged as a short-term ‘easy’ solution to the mismatch between the skills needs of the economy and the outputs of the education and training system. A study of the net effect of ‘brain drain/ brain gain’ on human capital accumulation and GDP per capita in Arab countries even concluded that Jordan experiences a negative net effect from emigration: a GDP per capita loss of 1.5 per cent (MoP/ MoL, 2011: 47).

Short-term benefits Jordan, throughout its history, has always resorted to short-term economic policies in order to reap rapid political benefits. Indeed, freedom of emigration compensates lagging average incomes and, more generally, helps the political stability of the country. First, emigrants abroad guarantee families a supplementary income through remittances. Chart 2 shows that, despite the sharp decrease in their contributions to national revenues, remittances still accounted for 12 per cent of GDP in 2011. Also, overall remittances are still on the rise. Remittances are a private asset, which means that they help families keep up with access to infrastructures and with high levels of goods consumption. Therefore, they also help smooth out the socio-political effects of the economic transition underway in Jordan. We refer here to the liberalisation of the economy, which led to a drop in the standard of living for the lower classes and the erosion of the middle class. Second, as earlier in Jordan’s history, continuous emigration is a short-term opportunity for Jordan, as it provides an ‘exit’ for citizens. These may feel cut off from the redistribution process, due to the economic crisis and the post-rentier economic transition (De Bel-Air, 2003). The new upsurge in emigration alleviates the country’s high rates of unemployment, which have increased with privatisation and as the average standard of living declines. Home salaries are also low and prevent access to social capital in the country: starting a family, independent housing, leisure etc. Emigration thus gives young people a way to find short-term economic capital outside the country during the process of economic adjustment and lets the highly skilled middleclasses meet their expectations in terms of wages and living standards. It is interesting to note that, in such a setup, highly skilled migration

145 3000,0

25,0

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20,0

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In Thousands of Jordanian Dinars

In percentage of the GDP

JORDAN, A LAND OF NO RETURN ?

Year Remittances of expatriates ( in % of GDP ) Remittances of expatriates ( in thousands of J.D.)

Chart 8.2 Remittances of expatriate Jordanians (1961 – 2012). Source: Central Bank of Jordan.

appears ‘natural’, an ‘a-cephalic’ phenomenon (Levatino, 2010), which is thus apolitical and in tune with neoliberal globalisation narratives of migration as decisions of rational agents. Third, emigration in general, particularly for the highly skilled (‘exit’), compensates for a lack of public expression or ‘voice’ (Ahmed, 1997). It conveniently allows for the exit of potential opponents, thus alleviating the risk of political destabilisation brought about by the frustrated would-be middle or upper classes. Moreover, a lack of attempts at involving Jordanians abroad in the development process responds to similar concerns. Diasporas have often worked political change in their countries of origin (Koslowski, 2005), not least in the recent uprisings in the Arab world. Even though a sizeable proportion of emigrants reside in politically and socially conservative Gulf countries, their involvement back in Jordan is effectively channelled and limited to

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the economic sphere. This containment of the political opposition or of reformists through exit may actually be one of the (many) reasons that Jordan has not yet experienced serious anti-regime protests.

Citizenship, elite change and institutional reform for development However, beyond the short-term socio-economic and political ‘profits’ reaped from such a (no)-policy, the absence of voluntary policies tackling brain drain or promoting brain gain raise three sets of questions. First, there is the issue of Jordan’s self-definition, as a nation, as part of a subregion (the Arab Middle East, a common labour market with Gulf countries), and as a globalised entity. Second, there is the lack of attempts to measure, let alone control, the brain drain, which brings up the question of relations between policy makers and intellectual elites, i.e. the question of social contract and the distribution of roles within the decision-making process. Third, in connection with the last point though more generally, there is the issue of how the Kingdom sees the link between migration and its national development process: i.e. whether development should depend on the agency of the migrants themselves or on institutional change. First, assessing the outcome of skilled emigration depends on the scale of observation and action. In the case of Jordan, most influential policy makers officially adopted, at least until recently, a globalised view on the issue.17 The increasing connection between the Jordanian and Gulf labour markets substitutes the very notion of brain drain for supply/ demand within a homogeneous economic system, at the regional level. Symmetrically, the notion of brain drain is only valid at the national level, within a national framework for development. Perceptions of highly skilled migration thus can be seen as being aligned in terms of the national territory and the national population. Therefore, perceptions of HSM reveal conflicting perceptions of citizenship and national sovereignty. The debate on brain drain is, then, another facet of the multidimensional debate on citizenship that is being redefined in Jordan as elsewhere. And this is all the more true now that international financial institutions (IFIs) and foreign donors are heavily involved in monitoring and funding Jordan’s economic reform process. The second issue is the reluctance of the current political leadership to welcome the input of the new business and intellectual elites, a hesitancy

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to open up to new talents. Indeed, one can argue that, as of today, there are more highly skilled citizens (be they resident or expatriates) than opportunities in Jordan’s economy, even as some sectors are developing successfully, e.g. IT. Immigrants, as noted above, are overwhelmingly unskilled or semi-skilled workers while, as of now, market needs are mainly in low-wage economic sectors due to the structural economic reforms in place since the early 1990s. However, the main issue at stake is the control of elite renewal. Jordan (like many other countries) suffers from a blockage of social mobility and professional advancement outside of clientelist networks in the public and private sectors. In such a system the reproduction of elites guarantees client networks, which in turn guarantee elite reproduction. The renewing of elites thus becomes problematic18 as innovation and self-merit threaten the patronage-based social contract. This leads us to the third issue, that of the role given to migrants in the development process in Jordan. The high levels of remittances to Jordan, for instance, serve consumerist rather than investment purposes. As a matter of fact, the success or failure of diaspora involvement in the development of their country of origin depends on the quality of infrastructures and, more generally, on the institutional context of said country, both conditions for the efficient channelling of funds to meet needs (De Haas/Vezzoli, 2010). Thus, placing the responsibility for development on the ‘agency’ of migrants (Skeldon, 2008) rather than on the reform of institutional structures will not necessarily produce more results; yet this is what has happened at the (few) meetings organised with expatriate businesspeople. Moreover, this appeal to ‘agency’ is used as a justification for policy makers’ reluctance to incorporate expatriates into Jordan’s development process. In any case, direct or indirect encouragement for skilled workers to emigrate contrasts with certain voluntary policies. These policies promote vocational training and skills acquisition for unemployed Jordanians, which aim, in turn, at the replacement of unskilled and semi-skilled foreign laborers by locals (De Bel-Air, 2008). This setup tells us a good deal about the short- to mid-term development strategy followed by Jordan under international and foreign donors’ monitoring, until very recently: a low-level service and consumerist economy. Highly skilled professionals are thus not in demand within Jordan’s development process. However, this may slowly change with popular

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demands for reforms in the wake of Arab uprisings and with any sociopolitical repercussions these may cause.

Conclusion Management of highly skilled migration and popular claims for reforms: where next? In this chapter we have pointed to the way that certain developmental and economic choices, in a context of economic opening combined with political closure (or ‘authoritarian liberalism’ to use the phrase coined by C. Geertz) actually generate the emigration of the highly skilled: the resilience of clientelism in society and the patterns of adjustment to free trade, the latter partly explaining the stagnation of salaries and living standards. We also emphasised the emergence, in the 2000s, of proactive discourses and policies encouraging highly skilled expatriation. Such measures respond to a range of sociopolitical challenges: they compensate for lagging income and they offer opportunities for higher salaries and business investments, and stimulate private revenues through workers’ remittances. The expatriation of the highly skilled also ensures control over potential political opposition and, particularly, citizenship definition, elite reproduction, as well as institutional stability, at the expense of economic, social and political reforms. Perhaps as a ‘lesson’ from the Arab uprisings and the subsequent political imperative to address peoples’ concerns, at least in public discourse, a slight shift can be observed in recent policy documents. Lack of training, the decreasing quality of education, granting degrees devoid of economic value and barring educated citizens from access to economic, social and political capital, are all slowly being acknowledged as bad economic and political governance. In the 2011 National Employment Strategy, the Minister of Labour advocated that the government: [S]hift away from short term solutions such as absorbing more young Jordanians into the public sector, opening its doors to cheap foreign labor, or sending Jordan’s best and brightest to work abroad. These ‘solutions’ to Jordan’s labor market problems only exacerbate them in the long term (MoP/ MoL, 2011: i).

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Is such a trend likely to develop and lead to the reforms demanded out in the streets of Jordan? As mentioned previously, expatriates did not gain the right to vote from abroad for the 23 January elections, though it would have been a strong signal of the regime’s will to reform its ‘authoritarian liberal’ system. Moreover, this mistrust of expatriates (in part because of their supposed Palestinian origin), points to the deteriorating political climate in Jordan, which deters expatriates from settling back there. It is another example of the wide-reaching political background to migration-monitoring schemes in general and to highly skilled migration in particular. This should most certainly be addressed by IFIs and foreign development agencies.

Notes 1. Interview, Department of Statistics, Amman, later published in Ghazal, 2008. This estimate was still used by Jordanian officials in 2012. 2. Highly skilled migration is defined as the migration of persons with tertiarylevel education, whether they achieved that level before or after migration. 3. From the Ministry of Planning in 2001, from the Department of Consular Affairs and Jordanian missions abroad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009. So far (January 2013), no results of such operations have been released to the public 4. Sources: personal communications and press quotations for DoS estimates: JT. ‘Expatriate remittances drop’, The Jordan Times, 12 June 2009; Petra News Agency. ‘Shbeikat discusses with Qatari envoy means to recruit Jordanian workers’, The Jordan Times, 19 March 2009. For the Ministry of Labour data, see Ministry of Labour. Annual Reports 2007; 2008; 2009, Amman: MoL, 2008; 2009; 2010. Estimates are provided by the Ministry’s labour advisors posted in Jordanian diplomatic missions in the Gulf States, Egypt and Libya. Therefore, they only record the expatriates in touch with these services. 5. Founder and CEO of Aramex Company Fadi Ghandour stated, at the end of 2012, that Jordan was a regional hub for Internet start-ups, leading ‘in terms of animation, e-commerce, creating original Arabic content online and in terms of pure outsourcing opportunities,’ with Egypt as a close second (Salih, 2012). 6. For example, the 2009 bilateral negotiations with Qatar were aimed at recruiting ‘trained and skilled workers, especially in the construction field’ (Petra News Agency, 2009). 7. http://www.dos.gov.jo/owa-user/owa/emp_unemp_y.show_tables1_y?lang¼ E&year1¼2011&t_no ¼19. 8. Survey by Dr Anwar Al-Battikhi, Higher Council for Science and Technology, Amman. Results taken from Al-Jazeera TV, 01/07/2009 and http://ammonnews. net/print.aspx?Articleno¼41025, 30 June 2009 (accessed January 2013).

150 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 9. King Abdullah’s closing speech, Second ICT Forum (30 September– 1 October 2002). 10. These include word of mouth, recruiting agencies collecting CVs or hiring specific professionals, spontaneous applications to companies abroad and secondments from Jordanian private-sector companies operating abroad. 11. Issued by Royal Decree in 2005, it outlines a ten-year action plan for the reform of the Jordanian economy. 12. The Partnership was launched by the G8 in Deauville, France, in May 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring. 13. http://www.almanar.jo/ele/web/. 14. The leading initiative in the matter is the Second Educational Reform for a Knowledge Economy (ERfKE II) project, funded by a variety of international donors. 15. This brings us to domestic politics in Jordan, where, since 2010, some nationalist Transjordanians have started advocating the withdrawal of Jordanian nationality from Jordanians of Palestinian origin. They claim that they are concerned over the non-implementation of the refugees’ right of return to Palestine. 16. Fifth Conference for Jordanian Businessmen and Investors, held in August 2008 under the title ‘Together We Build the Future Jordan’. 17. There are though contradictory signals for resident citizens, to Arab economic and political partners and to the international community, the last exerting pressure on the Kingdom’s developmental patterns, which have to fit within structural adjustment programmes. 18. Even if patronage networks do evolve and even if some lose their preeminence. However, as noted above, what matters is one’s presence in such networks, not one’s merit or skills.

CHAPTER 9 HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT Nadine Sika

Introduction Debates concerning the pros and cons of migration, especially highly skilled migration, are manifold. Does migration lead to development or under-development? Does the migration of highly skilled individuals lead to brain drain, or to brain gain? Egypt is an interesting case study here. Prior to the 25 January 2011 uprising, governments promoted migration, especially among the highly skilled, as a way to bring down unemployment pressure in the country, especially among the educated youth. After the uprisings, and the downfall of the Mubarak regime, unemployment levels increased, and GDP growth slowed. As a consequence, the new Egyptian regime still promoted migration, to decrease pressure on the Egyptian employment market, and to increase the inflows of much needed remittances. To acquire a deeper understanding of the impact of highly skilled migration on Egyptian development, this chapter will first shed light on the characteristics of highly skilled Egyptian migrants in both OECD countries and in the Gulf region. Second, it will analyse any policy implications for the Egyptian government. Third, the numbers and policy implications of highly skilled immigrants who have come to work in Egypt will be analysed.

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Highly skilled migration: bane or boon for development? Research in the migration field has revealed that policy regimes in both developed and under-developed countries favour highly skilled migrants over unskilled ones (HDR, 2009: 35). This finding has excited much debate. Why do receiving countries favour highly skilled migrants, and how much does this affect development in the sending country? From a positive perspective, migration is a phenomenon that develops an individual, and furthers the development of both countries of origin and countries of destination (DeHaas, 2009: 22). Migration is an integral part of human development for it can increase an individual’s subsistence level and also advance a person’s social, economic and political freedoms (DeHaas, 2009; 22). In addition, migration can generate development at the community level in the home country through remittances, which can then improve access to education, healthcare, and housing (DeHaas, 2009: 31). Highly skilled migration can also be read as ‘brain circulation’ (Stark et al., 1997; IOM, 12). In this regard, many migrants do not permanently migrate to their receiving country. On the contrary, they return to their country of origin, bringing with them the training and experiences that they acquired abroad (Macha, McDonnald and Dhananjayan, 2006). The other side of the development debate sees migration as a loss of human capital and a cause of ‘brain drain’. According to this argument, the migration of highly skilled workers causes under-development in the country of origin. The reasoning behind these arguments is that skilled workers who attain their education, skills, and training in their country of origin have a positive impact on individuals who work around them. This, in turn, makes those individuals more productive, and thus highly skilled workers are an asset. Consequently, when these workers leave their country of origin, they negatively affect its development process (Lucas, 2005: 117). They deprive, in some senses, their country of its capacity to earn, and to invest in its own future (Aitken, 1968). Empirical research has found that in many developing countries a high proportion of skilled workers migrate (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006; Chen and Boufford, 2005). Take medicine. Thirteen African countries, mainly in Sub-Sahran Africa, suffer from healthcare shortages (Docquier, 2006: 10). Countries that have high educational achievement accompanied

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by low levels of worker migration are believed to have high economic growth (Rogers, 2008). Egypt is an important country for migration patterns in the Mediterranean region. Historically known as a migrant-sending country, Egypt has developed into a transit and a receiving country of migration over the past two decades. Few studies have analysed migration patterns in Egypt, within the larger context of migration for development. Taking these opposing views into consideration, an important question arises: to what extent would highly skilled workers have contributed to the development of their country if they had stayed put, that is if they had not migrated (DeHaas, 2009: 33)? The following pages will attempt to answer this question, in light of the Egyptian experience.

Egyptian migration to OECD countries and the Gulf The Central Agency for Population Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) estimates the total number of migrant Egyptians at 2.7 million. Of this number, 1.9 million reside in Arab countries and 0.8 million in OECD countries. Eighty per cent of Egyptian migrants to the OECD reside in the United States and Canada (World Bank, 2008: 254). In Europe the largest number of Egyptian migrants head for Italy and Greece, respectively 10 per cent and 7 per cent. Previously most Egyptian migrants to the EU had been return migrants. However, this phenomenon has changed since the 1980s, especially for Italy, where Egyptian migrants are increasingly residing as permanent migrants (World Bank, 2008: 254). The highest percentage of migrants in OECD countries are those with higher education, representing 47.3 per cent. These must be compared to the 18.8 per cent who have less than upper secondary education levels, and the 30.7 per cent with an upper secondary level of education but no higher education. Likewise, the lowest rate of Egyptian unemployment in the OECD is among the highly skilled with 6.5 per cent, as opposed to 12.9 per cent among the unskilled (Human Development Report, 2009: 164). Thus, the supply of highly skilled migrants is higher than for the unskilled, and also the demand for highly skilled Egyptian migrants is higher than for the unskilled. By 2007, the Italian employment market had absorbed almost 8,000 Egyptian migrants (IOM, 2010). In the MENA region, Egypt is considered to be the largest labour exporting country, with almost 10 per cent of its labour force being

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exported to the region. During the 1970s most Egyptian migrants to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries were unskilled labourers employed in construction. However, the percentage of highly skilled migrants, especially scientists and technicians, has increased in the past decade, while the share of unskilled labourers has decreased (World Bank, 2008: 251). The highly educated workforce is mainly directed towards the GCC temporarily, with Saudi Arabia absorbing the greatest share. World Bank estimates suggest that most Egyptian migrants in the Gulf are skilled, whereas unskilled migrants are mainly recruited in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq (World Bank, 2008: 252). In the past years, about 1.5 million Egyptian migrants have turned to Libya as Egyptian workers in the Gulf have been replaced by migrant workers from Asia (Sanz, 2011). With the escalation of events and with the consequent civil war in Libya after its 2011 uprising, many Egyptian migrants returned home, precipitating a fall in remittances, and increasing the pressure on the volatile Egyptian employment market. The main question pertaining to this high number of highly skilled Egyptian migrants is whether these migrants would have had a chance of employment in Egypt if they had remained there. Therefore, it is important to understand the unemployment levels of highly skilled workers in Egypt. For instance, data based on CAPMAS, indicates that unemployment rates in Egypt stood at 8.7 per cent in 2008 (Hassan and Sassanpour, 2008: 3). This figure increased to 12.3 per cent in 2011 (CAPMAS, 2012), as a result of the increased tumult in Egypt after the January 2011 uprising. The educated youth face the highest unemployment rate within this category. For instance, the unemployment Table 9.1 and 2002

Occupations of Egyptian migrants in Arab countries, 1985

Occupation of Egyptian migrants in Arab countries

1985

2002

Scientists, managerial, and technicians Clerical work Sales and service Agriculture Production

20.70 8.80 18.50 8.90 43.00

43.40 1.50 12.70 8.60 33.80

Source: Ministry of Manpower and Emigration in CARIM, in World Bank (2008).

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rate among the 20–25 year age group was somewhere between 30 to 40 per cent, in 2008 (Hassan and Sassanpour, 2008: 7). By the end of 2011, youth unemployment levels in the 15 to 20 years age group, hit 77.5 per cent. It was much better for those aged 20 to 24 years: 41.4 per cent. According to CAPMAS data, highly educated young Egyptians with university degrees form the highest unemployed category in the country, with eight out of ten being unemployed (El Behery, 2012). According to Assaad (2008: 148), university graduates were the main educational group to see an increase in unemployment between 1998 and 2006 (Assaad, 2008: 148). Various studies have shown that unemployment among educated workers is worsening. For example, in 2005 unemployment rates for post-secondary graduates without higher education stood at 16 per cent while for university graduates the rate was 18.1 per cent. On the other hand, unemployment for low skilled workers was only 1.2 per cent (Hassan and Sassanpour, 2008: 6). This phenomenon can be traced back to the fact that new entrants into the labour force with tertiary education increased dramatically from 20 per cent in 1975 to more than 40 per cent in 2005 (Assaad, 2008: 167). The percentage of university graduates also increased dramatically to more than 30 per cent in 2005, as opposed to fewer than 20 per cent in 1975 (Assaad, 2008: 168). The jobs generated for university graduates are primarily in the public sector, whose share in employment creation dropped from one-third in 1975 to 15 per cent in 2003 (Assaad, 2008: Table 9.2

Unemployment rate by education

Education Level Below Intermediate Intermediate Post Secondary University and above Total

% of Unemployment (2005)

% of Unemployment (2012)

1.2 21.4 16.0 18.1 11.2

8.7 16.1 15.9 20.1 12

Source: Based on CAPMAS estimates in 2005 by Mohamed Hassan and Cyrus Sassanpour, ‘Labour Market Pressures in Egypt: Why is the Unemployment Rate Stubbornly High?’ Source, (2012) CAPMAS ‘unemployed rate & annual estimates of labor status by education status and sex’ On line at: http://www.capmas.gov.eg/pages _ar.aspx?pageid¼1504.

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169). The private sector does not favor the highly educated because they often lack managerial skills (Galal, 2002: 6). It is, therefore, no surprise that highly skilled unemployed Egyptians migrate to OECD countries, and to the Gulf in the greatest numbers. As shown above, the Egyptian labour market is unable to accommodate the high numbers of individuals with post-secondary education and university graduates, especially since the uprising. However, migration is not only the result of a lack of opportunity in Egypt; it is also the result of the higher wages that these people can attain when they migrate either to the OECD or the GCC. Young Egyptians argue that employment opportunities for the highly skilled are better in Europe than in the Gulf, which is not as financially rewarding as it once was (Zohry, 2006: 6). The young claim that they are interested in traveling as temporary migrants to Europe, since savings from one year there would equal their life salary in Egypt (Zohry, 2006: 8). The new trend in Egyptian highly skilled migration is, then, towards the OECD, rather than towards the Gulf. Even though the numbers of Gulf migrants are still higher, migration trends are changing. Nevertheless, according to a 2011 study conducted by the IOM in Egypt, the number one destination for the educated youth is Saudi Arabia, followed by Libya (IOM, 2011).

Characteristics of temporary and return migration An important factor in highly skilled migration is that most temporary migrants pass through different channels, like for instance public sector employees who travel with contracts to Arab countries. Migration for employment in Arab branches of private Egyptian companies, mainly in the construction sector, have also increased as a new form of highly skilled migration from Egypt to the Arab word (IOM, 2003: 30). The percentage of scientists and technicians has increased while the numbers of low-skilled workers has decreased (IOM, 2003: 33). According to McCormick and Wahba (2001), almost 53 per cent of highly skilled return migrants believed that the skills they acquired abroad are beneficial to the jobs they attained after they returned to Egypt. Evidence suggests that upon their return home, highly skilled migrants moved into higher skilled employment. For example, Wahba (2003: 7) found that the majority of return migrants work in the clerical, sales and services fields: ‘The share of migrants engaged in technical, scientific and management occupations have risen on return suggesting

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that working overseas may enable migrants to acquire new skills or enhance their human capital’ (Wahba, 2003: 7). It is, therefore, suggested that employment opportunities for Egyptian migrants abroad increase the likelihood that these migrants will save money and return to their country with more skills and more entrepreneurial activities (McCormick and Wahba, 2001). Thus, highly skilled Egyptians experience ‘brain circulation,’ which should be considered a form of human and community development. After the uprising, some observers saw an upsurge in the return of highly skilled migrants. However, the exact numbers are not clear. Some economists were optimistic for a better future for the Egyptian economy and Egyptian politics, after the uprising. Nevertheless, this slight optimism has largely gone unrewarded with a great deal of political and economic turmoil in the last two years, turmoil which is most likely to cause yet more migration (Hafez and Ghaly, 2012).

Egyptian migrants and the importance of remittances for the Egyptian economy Among the world’s developing nations, Egypt was ranked fifth in volume of remittances in 2001. It received almost $3 billion annually, which increased to almost $5 billion in 2007, close to 4 per cent of Egypt’s GDP (World Bank, 2008: 263; Nassar, 2010). The highest share of remittances is received from the United States, 34.5 per cent, followed by Saudi Arabia with 22.1 per cent (World Bank, 2008: 263). After the international financial crisis and the Egyptian uprising, remittances skyrocketed to $4.3 billion, almost 6 per cent of GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2012). Even though the debate in the first section of this chapter shows that remittances might only be used for increased spending, evidence from Egypt suggests that remittances were used to invest in microenterprises (Wahba, 2003; World Bank, 2008: 263). Remittances are believed to have positive effects on decreasing poverty in Egypt. For instance, 14.7 per cent of the estimated total per capita income of poor households was acquired through remittances (Nassar, 2010). Some recent data indicate that almost 74 per cent of migrant household income is spent on daily expenses, while the rest is spent on buying, building and/or renovating a house, and on education (Nassar, 2010). Households that receive remittances in Egypt are believed to have a

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higher mean standard of living, 30.05 per cent, compared to 28.51 per cent among non-migrant households (Nassar, 2010). These findings reveal that highly skilled migration from Egypt to the OECD and the Gulf is an important factor in filling the unemployment void among highly skilled Egyptians. It is also an important contributor to Egyptian development, through increased remittances and the large number of return migrants with higher skills, which have proved to be more important than had previously been acknowledged. After the 2011 uprising, however, two main countries of destination in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, closed their doors to Egyptian migrants. According to Dina Abdelfattah (2011), the UAE is not allowing new migration flows from Egypt and is refusing to renew existing work permits for Egyptians. Saudi Arabia is also blocking Egyptian migration, and has changed its labour laws to that end. According to the new labour law, Saudi private companies, which comprise less than 10 per cent of Saudi workers, are not allowed to hire or to renew contracts for foreign workers. These restrictions are political in nature. There is the fear that Egyptians will ‘contaminate’ those in the Gulf with their political views. These developments will have a profound impact on the volatile Egyptian economy.

Highly skilled migration and government policy Egyptian policy makers saw the importance of easing restrictions on migration, as far back as the mid 1970s. The government favoured migration flows from Egypt to the GCC for various reasons: the Egyptian market’s inability to absorb the growing numbers of workers seeking employment; the government’s need to use remittances to reduce deficit in the balance of payments; and the oil boom of the 1970s (IOM, 2003; Ghoneim, 2009). By the 1980s, Egyptian policy makers established specialised agencies, including the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs (Presidential Decree 574/1981), to help migrant Egyptians and to provide them with special services (IOM, 2003). Law 111/1983, concerning the sponsorship of Egyptians living abroad, remains the main law on migration. This law identifies the rights of both temporary and permanent migrants, especially their financial rights, primarily in the form of tax waivers and fees for the deposit of money in Egyptian Banks (Ghoneim, 2009; Roman, 2006, IOM, 2003). The

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Ministry of Manpower and Emigration (MME) was later established in 1996, replacing the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs, and it is now responsible for the migration process and for Egyptian migrants abroad (Ghoneim, 2009). The MME subsequently became responsible for more migration-related issues, such as enacting new policies regarding sponsorship and setting up facilities for both Egyptians living abroad and for Egyptians intending to migrate. One of the main goals of the MME is to link Egyptian migration policies with Egyptian national interests by advancing migration policies that can foster social and economic development. Accordingly, the MME endorses and provides all necessary means for migrant Egyptians (Ghoneim, 2009). The importance of migration in the development process was advanced even further with the creation of the Higher Committee for Migration, which was created by Presidential Decree no. 2000/1997 (Ghoneim, 2009; Roman, 2006, IOM, 2003). The head of this Committee is the Minister of Manpower and Emigration. But the Committee also includes representatives from other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior. The Higher Committee for Migration, along with the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, endorses the creation of training centres for potential migrants and defines policies and solutions to potential migrants’ needs. However, according to some studies, the legal and political performance of these two bodies, particularly the negotiation of agreements to protect the legal rights of Egyptian migrants, is limited (Ghoneim, 2009; Roman, 2006). Throughout this period, migration has been a socio-economic affair. However, during the 18-day uprising against Mubarak, Egyptian migrants demonstrated in front of different Egyptian embassies abroad, in solidarity with Egyptian revolutionaries. Migrants have also lobbied extensively for their right to vote abroad and it was granted to them by the Ministerial Legislative Council in April 2011 (Sika, 2011).

Multilateral and bilateral agreements In addition to the internal legal and policy structure concerning migration, the Egyptian government is keen to establish bilateral and multilateral agreements, ensuring the continued flow of emigration from Egypt. Multiple bilateral agreements have been signed by Egypt,

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ensuring the protection and the continuation of migration flows to the Arab World and to OECD countries. According to the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, the main strategies for enacting bilateral agreements are twofold. First, it is necessary to ensure that migration flows in Egypt are legal and organised. Second, it is important to enhance Egyptian emigration, therefore, increasing the international demand for Egyptian labour migrants (MME, 2009: 22). In this regard, the Egyptian government is seeking to open new venues for Egyptian migrants in Africa, and to ensure the legality of migration flows from Egypt to the EU (MME, 2009: 22). The Ministry of Manpower and Migration, signed 12 bilateral agreements with different countries for the promotion of Egyptian emigration. Three new agreements have also been signed with three different Arab countries, namely Libya, Qatar, and Jordan so as to revitalise and modernise migration (MME, 2009: 22). This strategy is consistent with the Egyptian government’s view of the positive impact of migration on development. In this sense the MME seeks to promote development through migration in two ways: .

.

The development of special safeguards for enhancing legal migration, and for removing obstacles to migrants travelling from their countries of origin to countries of destination; The legalization of irregular Egyptian migrants abroad through negotiations with host countries (MME, 2009: 25).

An important milestone in promoting migration was the agreement between the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to establish a project for the development of an Integrated Migration Information Systems (IMIS) between Egypt and Italy (Roman, 2006: 6). The IMIS system was mainly concerned with the storage of migration related policies and data. This system was able to enumerate Egyptians living abroad and to update their profiles. The system also allowed: prospective migrants to assess international labour market conditions; a better understanding of the procedures for applying for jobs and the process of getting a job; in addition to a better understanding of their rights and obligations during employment (Roman, 2006: 7). From another perspective, this information system allowed Egyptian migrants to make the most of the

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opportunities associated with returning and investing in Egypt (Roman, 2006: 7). The IMIS has a further capacity-building department concerned with assisting in language skills, information technology skills and the technical needs of prospective migrants (Roman, 2006: 8). It was within this framework of migration policies that the Egyptian Labour Code was enacted in 2003. The Egyptian Labour Code enables the recruitment of Egyptian workers in receiving countries through the MME or through private employment agencies (ILO, 2006). As of 2008, a second project, IMIS Plus, was initiated and endorsed by the Italian government for two years. The main fields for Egyptian highly skilled migrants are in tourism and the hotel business sector (MME, 2009: 25). According to Ghoneim (2009), in 2007, the quota was for 7,000 migrants, increasing to 8,000 in 2008. However, fulfilling the quota proved to be difficult, because of an absence of the skills and job specifications required by the Italian government. Thus the greatest benefit obtained by Egypt was not in the allocation of highly skilled jobs, it was, rather, in the legalisation of almost 5,000 irregular Egyptian migrants already in Italy (Ghoneim, 2009: 9). In the meantime, the MME asserts that it is negotiating 12 different bilateral agreements with OECD and Arab countries for the promotion and facilitation of Egyptian emigration (MME, 2009: 22). Of these 12 sets of negotiations, three are primarily concerned with highly skilled temporary and permanent emigration from Egypt. The government is negotiating an agreement with Canada for highly skilled Egyptian migrants in energy and construction. Again for highly skilled migrants, bilateral agreements are also being negotiated with Germany and France for the creation of quotas for both temporary and permanent Egyptian technical labour migrants (MME, 2009: 23). Within the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean, there are no specific provisions for highly skilled migrants. However, the 2009 Paris Declaration stated the importance of promoting a managed form of legal migration, which would work for the developmental interests of all parties involved in the Union (Ghoneim, 2009: 12). As noted above, highly skilled migration has been rising in recent years. However, there are some structural problems, especially the mismatch between education supply and the skills demand in OECD countries (Galal, 2002). To enhance the demand side for Egyptian labour, Egyptian educational standards need to be upgraded in competitive

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terms (Shain, 2008: 9). The Ministries of Education and of Higher Education should have more insight into the role of the educational system in training students and they need to try to target better international educational standards for highly skilled migrants. Another weakness in Egyptian policies on migration is ignorance about the private sector in major international treaties for trade and labour mobility such as the GATS agreement. For instance, Orascom telecom a one-time Egyptian-owned telecommunications company, which has two subsidiaries in Italy and Greece, has only three Egyptians in managerial positions out of 6,700 employees in Italy (Shahin, 2008: 9). Thus the three main aspects of the World Trade Organization’s GATS Mode 4, are being neglected: . . .

the length of a migrants’ stay, in agreement with the receiving country; the level of skills, which varies from highly skilled to low-skilled migrants; the nature of the contract, where an individual can be transferred from the headquarters to any local branch (Shahin 2008, 10) are not clear to many Egyptian companies operating abroad.

This example demonstrates the problem of coordination amongst service suppliers in Egypt, since there is no service sector organisation. This gap in coordination means that different service suppliers work privately and in isolation (Shain, 2008: 20). The different Egyptian ministries lack coordination on migration matters as well. For instance, under the Labour Agreement between Egypt and Italy in 2005, the MME did not coordinate with the Ministry of Trade, and hence, Egypt granted concessions over the capacity building of young Egyptians and the elimination of irregular Egyptian emigration to Italy. The MME did not consider in its negotiations how to further liberalise labour mobility under GATS Mode 4 for the liberalisation of services (Shahin, 2008: 27). Despite the availability of different migration divisions in some ministries like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, this lack of mutual coordination undermines the ability of the Egyptian government to facilitate Egyptian migration abroad (Ghoneim, 2009; IOM, 2003).

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Immigration in Egypt Highly skilled immigration to Egypt is not held up as being important in public debates, and is mostly not on the policy-making agenda (Ghoneim, 2009: 11). Immigrants in Egypt, amount to only 0.2 per cent of the total Egyptian population (IOM, 2009). According to World Bank estimates based on all forms of migration in Egypt (irregular, asylum seekers, transit and labour migrants) the number of migrants workers in Egypt stands at between 500,000 and three million (Schramm, 2009). However, the most reliable number is just under 1.6 million (World Bank, 2008). Therefore, the total number of migrants does not threaten the labour market in Egypt. In fact, most migrants, especially Sudanese and Iraqi migrants, establish their own businesses, which in turn contribute to the Egyptian economy. In addition, many migrants in Egypt work in an informal manner as domestic servants, as a result of the lack of a clear and coherent institutional framework governing migration (Ghoneim, 2009). For highly skilled migrants in Egypt, there are some thousand from OECD countries who work on projects sponsored by their respective governments, or by international organisations (IOM, 2003: 40). According to estimates based on the 1996 CAPMAS census, more than half of the employed immigrant population was from Arab countries, namely 58.1 per cent, followed by Europeans at 21 per cent. Most of these migrants worked in the private sector, primarily in the highly skilled sectors, where scientists, professionals and technicians represent 92 per cent of working immigrants (IOM, 2003: 42). The low-skilled, like craftsmen and agriculture workers, have the least important percentage of foreign nationals residing in Egypt. However, these estimates do not include the large numbers of labourers in the informal sector.

Policies concerning migrants residing in Egypt Egyptian Labour regulation law no. 12/2003 stipulates that foreign nationals may not constitute more than 10 per cent of the semi-skilled and unskilled sectors of any given Egypt-based business. On the other hand, as much as 25 per cent of the skilled workforce can be foreign (IOM, 2003: 41). Recruitment agencies under this law are an important factor in the labour market, and accordingly they have the right to recruit Egyptian nationals in the international labour force and vice versa.

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However, the founders of these agencies are required to be of Egyptian nationality. Egyptians should also constitute at least 51 per cent of the shareholders within these organisations (IOM, 2003: 42). According to the same law, foreign nationals must obtain a work permit before being employed, which according to the IOM are more easily granted for highly skilled workers than for semi-skilled and unskilled ones (IOM, 2003: 42). Thus these projects seek to attract highly skilled labourers and this endorsement of highly skilled migrants is compatible with the favourable view on migration held by the Egyptian government. The Egyptian government has been applying stricter rules on foreign workers in Egypt, since the 2011 uprising. No work permits will be granted to foreign nationals, save in very few occasions and under very tight rules. Any foreign expert working in Egypt is required to hire at least two Egyptian workers before arriving in the country. If any migrant fails to follow these rules, he/she will face expulsion from the country (Hassan, 2011).

Conclusion In light of this study, migration, it might be said, brings about development through three different trends. First, highly skilled individuals, who migrate from Egypt, do so as a result of their inability to find employment on the Egyptian labour market. Hence, their migration is not a drawback for Egypt as highly skilled individuals are able to find more challenging employment opportunities elsewhere. These migrants attain more individual development skills, which increases the probability that they will return to Egypt to introduce small-scale private businesses, helping Egyptian employment generally. Moreover, the migration of highly skilled individuals is beneficial in the sense that it reduces the high demand for jobs in Egypt. Second, the remittances received from highly skilled Egyptian migrants are positive both for individual and country. On the individual level, remittances generate income for households, which are mostly spent on consumer goods. However, a large amount is also spent on education services and access to better healthcare and sanitation. Hence, households with highly skilled migrants typically have more income and better acquired services than households with the same socio-economic backgrounds with no migrants. As to the country level, migration brings

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in almost 6 per cent of the Egyptian GDP, through remittances (World Bank, 2012). In this sense, migration has almost the same impact on development, as foreign direct investment, which constitutes 5.83 per cent of Egyptian GDP (ESCWA, 2009). Third, the high level of Egyptian skilled migration has showed itself to be ‘brain circulation’. This means a form of continuing and practical education, which increases the entrepreneurial skills of a large number of Egyptian migrants, and that leads to higher levels of private small-scale employment. Brain circulation advances different skills, which would not have been advanced had an individual stayed in Egypt. As to highly skilled immigrants in Egypt, their presence is no threat to the Egyptian development process; on the contrary, as was shown in the case of Iraqi and Sudanese immigrants, their presence produces more small-scale businesses, which, in turn, creates employment in the Egyptian labour market. As was demonstrated throughout this chapter, successive Egyptian governments have supported highly skilled migration. They have also enacted different policies to encourage highly skilled individuals to migrate in addition to the creation of some centres for the training of potential migrants. However, these policies are not sufficient, and should be accompanied by more bilateral agreements both in the OECD and Gulf countries. This would mean more skill match-making between the supply side of the Egyptian highly skilled migrants and the demand side of the OECD and Gulf countries.

CHAPTER 10 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION IN TUNISIA Abderazak Bel Hadj Zekri, Hassan Boubakri and Habib Fourati*

Introduction Prior to the revolution of 2010 – 11, Tunisia invested in higher education, producing a notable increase in the number of students and graduates. However, despite an active employment policy, the Tunisian job market has not been able to give jobs to all highly skilled graduates. This is why the state has chosen to support the emigration of skills. This policy, in addition to reducing pressure on the market, was also seen as a way of promoting Tunisian skills abroad. It coincided with a more selective qualification-based immigration policy in host countries. However, social partners were sceptical about highly skilled migration, and they particularly expressed their doubts about longterm development. Moreover, the 2010– 11 revolution, and the events that followed, led to a rethink on Tunisia’s migration policy. Would Tunisia be able to manage highly skilled migration and so reap benefits in terms of investments in education and training?

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167

In the first part, we will review the determinants of skills migration developed in the years preceding the revolution. We will then see, in the second part, that civil society positions, as well as the first post-revolutionary reforms, open up new policy possibilities for highly skilled labour.

The emigration of highly skilled labour, a solution to structural problems in the national job market A growing highly skilled workforce in a maladjusted national job market Human resource development and the promotion of the knowledge economy has long been a priority in Tunisia. The higher education system was massively developed, in the years preceding the revolution. In fact, Tunisia created an average of 12 university institutions per year, 2000–8, having 190 institutions by 2008, double the institutions available in 2000.1 Tunisia monitored the improvement in teaching quality in these institutions by consolidating the co-operative links between Tunisian universities and French universities. It also signed assistance and cooperation agreements with other European and American universities. The Higher-Education Ministry budget rose from 493.4 million Tunisian dinars in 2002 to 1236.9 million Tunisian dinars in 2012: an average annual growth rate of 13.7 per cent. The share of the highereducation budget in relation to the total budget of the state went up from 4.6 per cent in 2002 to 7 per cent in 2008. Then it dropped to 4.9 per cent in the second year of the revolution. Significant results were recorded in terms of graduate flows, from teaching and vocational training in general and higher education in particular. The data and the projections prepared by the HigherEducation Ministry show that student numbers have grown since 2002 and that they reached a peak in 2011 with 492,560 students. However, projections suggest a continuous fall off from 2012, linked to the demographic transition, with 383,990 students in 2020. The numbers of higher graduates have the same evolution and will peak at 100,000 in 2013. This spectacular growth in graduates in general, and women in particular, who have higher success rates than men (in terms both of numbers and those leaving), is primarily the result of schooling. The rate

5.6%

4.6%

Source: Ministry for Higher Education.

588.6

493.4

Higher-Education Budget % of the national budget

2003

2002

4.9%

625.0

2004

5.0%

651.2

2005

5.8%

714.8

2006

6.2%

815.5

2007

7.0%

974.1

2008

6.5%

1035.2

2009

Evolution of the budget of the Higher-Education Ministry (in million T.D.)

Year

Table 10.1

6.1%

1111.1

2010

6.1%

1163.1

2011

4.9%

1236.9

2012

168 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

THE SOCIO -POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN TUNISIA Table 10.2

Period 2005 –09 2010 –14 2015 –19

169

Evolution of number of students and graduates 2005 –19

Average number of students

Average additional number of students per year

Average number of graduates

Average additional number of graduates per year

418000 479906 422248

þ 23400 2 5394 2 10904

60898 94052 95136

þ 5556 þ 3630 2 1924

Source: Ministry for Higher Education, 2008.

of schooling for the 20 –24 age bracket should rise from 14 per cent during the 1996–7 academic year to 37.5 per cent, 2006– 16. However, the government’s efforts in education were not matched by new employment positions allowing graduates to be integrated into working life. The logical consequence of this supply-demand gap was an increase in the number of unemployed graduates. Some of these are now among the long-term unemployed. By looking at unemployment data and its characteristics we can start to grasp the weight of graduates in terms of additional job demands. The unemployment rate among graduates rose from 3.8 per cent in 1994 to 10.2 per cent in 2004, and from 20 per cent in 2008 to 29.2 per cent in 2011. The following table shows the evolution of the unemployment rate according to educational level and suggests that unemployment affects graduates more. The available data,2 as well as several national and international studies (Ben Sedrine and Hallab, 2006; Mahjoub, 2009; Ministry of Employment and the Integration of the Youth, 2004) carried out on the job market in Tunisia and the competitiveness of the Tunisian economy, have revealed a material change among Tunisian job-seekers. Graduates accounted for 70 per cent of the additional demand for employment in 2006 against 35.3 per cent in 2002. In the orientation note on the 11th economic expansion plan (2007–11), this rate was estimated at approximately 75 per cent. The total additional demand for employment was estimated at 88,000 per year, 2007–16. As a consequence of this situation, several reforms aimed at improving the employability of graduates were introduced: the diversification of

15.2 22.4 11.7 2.3 16.4

Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher Total

16.8 19.2 13.0 3.8 15.8

1994 11.9 18.9 16.4 8.6 16.0

1999 12.7 15.7 14.7 10.2 14.2

2004 6.3 14.3 13.33 14.0 12.9

2005 6.4 13.0 12.5 16.9 12.5

2006 4.4 11.5 13.5 18.2 12.4

2007 4.2 10.6 13.4 20.0 12.4

2008

6.1 10.4 14.0 21.9 13.3

2009

5.7 9.2 13.7 22.9 13.0

2010

8.0 12.4 20.6 29.2 18.3

2011

Source: National Institute of Statistics: General Census of Population and the Habitat (1984, 1994, 2004)/National Survey on Employment (1999, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012).

1984

Evolution of unemployment rate by educational level (in %)

Educational Level

Table 10.3

170 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

THE SOCIO -POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN TUNISIA

171

Table 10.4 Distribution of unemployed graduates according to graduate type (2006 – 11) Year Diploma Higher technical diploma Master’s degree in Social Sciences Master’s degree in Law, Economics and Management Master’s degree in the natural sciences (Maths, Physics, Chemistry, Sciences) Other higher diplomas (Medicine, Pharmacy, Engineers, Master’s degree) TOTAL

Percentage 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 35.5 17.4

38.9 17.5

39.1 16.4

41.8 14.6

41.6 15.2

43.1 15.8

24.6

21.2

19.7

18.1

16.5

15.2

15.7

15.5

18.0

19.1

19.6

18.2

6.8

6.9

6.8

6.4

7.1

7.7

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: National Institute of Statistics, Annual survey on employment, 2012.

specialities and short vocational courses meet market needs best. An active employment policy providing different induction programmes among the unemployed, especially starter job-seekers and higher graduates, were also implemented. However, despite the creation of these various induction mechanisms and the mobilisation of public players (the Employment Ministry, the National Agency of Employment and Free-Lance Work and the National Employment Fund), not to mention various private players (the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, etc.), the results obtained did not reduce unemployment among young graduates. Several factors are responsible for this situation, in particular the mismatch between education and employment. The Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts Industry (UTICA) was approached to sensitise business leaders into recruiting graduates. In this way, it was hoped, that they would participate in job creation and improve the staffing rate of companies. The programmes and mechanisms relating to the employment of junior managers provided benefits for companies: tax incentives, exemption from payroll taxes, etc. Campaigns organised by UTICA3 have certainly encouraged the placement of young people. But they showed obvious mismatches: job-seekers held master’s degree in

172 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 10.5

Evolution of the number of skilled emigrants by category

Category Completion of tertiary education Students in first year Students in final BAC class final BAC Total

May 01 May 05 May 06 May 07 May 09 May 02 May 06 May 07 May 08 May 10* 4,240

4,280

4,340

6,810

5,410

640 950

640 830

810 510

620 570

– –

5,830

5,750

5,660

8,000

–

*Data on Students in their first year and students in the final BAC class is missing. Source: National Institute of Statistics, National Survey on Population and Employment.

finances, economics, languages, computing, accounting, not to mention electrical engineering or engineering in rural economy; moreover, they were coming from different regions of Tunisia. Yet, offers, mainly limited to the Greater Tunis region, concentrated on certain specialities: building technicians, secretaries, executive assistants, and especially commercial workers and ICT technicians.

The development of policies favouring the emigration of highly skilled workers An increasing number of young tertiary-educated Tunisians left university only to find themselves, as indicated in Table 10.3, without a job. By 2006 emigration was clearly bandied around as an option at the national conference for employment,4 even if it had not been an explicit option in the early 2000s. This was confirmed in 2007 ((Institut tunisien des e´tudes strate´giques, 2007) in a study of the Tunisian Institute of Strategic Studies (ITES). Said study was extended in 2009 and took into account the national, regional and international context. It was submitted to a Council of Ministers,5 which adopted measures for migration and highly skilled migration. The 2007 study relating to ‘a national policy as regards emigration and immigration’ developed a new approach in terms of migration management. The report stressed that if the 4–5 per cent growth rate envisaged came to pass, the graduate unemployment rate would rise from 16 per cent in 2006 to an alarming 26 per cent in 2016. However, if Tunisia recorded a higher growth rate of 6–7 per cent, the unemployment

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173

rate of graduates would drop to 10.3 per cent in 2016. The study noted that ‘Tunisia would gain from admitting that the emigration of its many executives will be an unavoidable phenomenon for the coming 20 years at least’ (Institut tunisien des e´tudes strate´giques, 2007). Consequently, the country should be prepared to organise and develop education as a national resource and should integrate it into its development strategy. The approach recommended by the strategic study rested on improving the quality of education. It was necessary to match the profiles required by worldwide employment markets, to improve language training, while informing potential migrants of employment abroad through the consular institutions established in immigration countries. This ‘preparation’ of the highly skilled should make it possible for ‘Tunisia to take advantage of the needs of the European employment market’.6 The study also presented the highly skilled labour needs of principal OECD countries and developed a south–south co-operation strategy articulated around direct technical collaboration and three-way north–south–south co-operation. Ultimately, these elements promoted an emigration policy which was then developed by political and employment players (Institut tunisien des e´tudes strate´giques, 2007). The 2009–14 presidential electoral programme,7 which had initiated the development of a governmental program for this period, made a sure contribution towards the placement of Tunisian skills on the worldwide market. It envisaged the adoption of an active policy as regards technical collaboration, by offering better prospects for employment abroad for Tunisian skills, on the one hand; and by allowing them, in addition, to acquiring more experience and professionalism in their field of specialization, and the necessary support to learn foreign languages.8 The reform process in higher education was described in these terms: ‘quality and conformity with international standards’, with the objective of aligning Tunisia, ‘in the various scientific and technological disciplines, with the most important advanced university systems’.9 The placement of Tunisian skills abroad was seen not only as a means of reducing the pressure which graduates exerted on the Tunisian job market. It was also seen as an opportunity for development at home thanks to the strengthening of links with Tunisians abroad.

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The statistics suggested the emigration of approximately 8,000 graduates10 between May 2007 and May 2008. There were between 5,700 and 5,800 a year from May 2001 to May 2002 and from May 2005 to May 2006, according to the former national surveys on population and employment. The number of skilled emigrants increased by 38 per cent during May 2007 –May 2008 compared to the constant numbers of the earlier seven years. Among the reasons employed for justifying skilled emigration, the pursuit of studies always appeared at the top of the list with 3,560 cases between May 2007 and May 2008: 44.5 per cent of the total. In relative terms, one notes, however, a slight downward trend: the pursuit of studies explained 51 per cent of skilled migration between May 2005 and May 2006, against 48.9 per cent between May 2006 and May 2007. Work constituted the second reason with rates that oscillate between 28 per cent and 35 per cent and as many as 2,530 skilled Tunisians emigrated between May 2007 and May 2008.

Towards a redefinition of policies concerning the migration of highly skilled labour? A mixed view of the emigration of highly skilled labour within Tunisian civil and political society By virtue of its importance, the emigration of highly skilled labour has interested all society: civil society and political players (public authorities, employers’ organisations, trade unions, associations, political parties), as well as the media. It has fuelled debates on the effects of this mobility on graduate unemployment, and the education costs as well as the advantages that this kind of migration could bring to the country of origin. The state and the private sector have developed strategies over the migration of skills, while taking into account the employment situation. But the position of the employers’ confederation (UTICA) was mixed on the issue of migration of skills, a phenomenon, which it could not, however, ignore. This attitude reflected the position of some employers, who saw in highly skilled migration, and especially the migration of those with professional experience, a loss of human resources; human resources which would be necessary for the development of their companies. The mobility of highly skilled labour was perceived as being

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175

an ‘inescapable’ consequence of the globalisation and the internalisation of companies. It seemed to be dictated by: . .

adherence to the choices of the state, which saw the placement of skills abroad as a way to reduce pressure on the national job market; a growing understanding of the need to benefit from expatriation: expatriation allows the advancement of skilled returning Tunisians, when and if they come back to Tunisia, and gives a positive image of skilled Tunisians abroad, which could encourage foreign companies to establish themselves in Tunisia.

The trades union confederation (Tunisian General Union of Work, UGTT) has demonstrated a special interest in the emigration of skills and it has developed a more critical approach focusing on its economic and social costs. In fact, it has worked towards coordination with its European and sub-Saharan trades union partners,11 in order to develop a common strategy which would treat emigration comprehensively taking into account the interests of southern and northern countries.12 In their analyses, trade unionists have stressed that the emigration of highly skilled people seemed to solve employment problems over the short and medium term. However, they went on to say that it was likely to have negative long-term consequences both for the Tunisian economy and for Tunisian society. In fact, the training costs remained high, and this training was not even used for a short period within Tunisia itself, something that could have, to some extent, justified the expense. Some trade union sectors13 called for a better management of skills emigration and, in particular, those equipped with professional experience, which could bring dynamism and profitability to their companies. Some trades unionists talked of ‘compensation’ for the countries of origin for the loss arising from the emigration of their highly skilled human resources. This compensation could be given both by host countries and by international institutions. Before the 2010–11 revolution, all political parties, save for the RCD, which was then in power,14 seemed to demote migration or evoked it only during national events.15 They favoured, instead, development issues. The debate on skills emigration has not been a central concern for a large segment of Tunisian associations. Three associations have shown a very recent interest in this topic.16 They recommended a dialogue between

176 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Tunisian and European partners. They also asked for the joint management of job markets on either side of the Mediterranean through a complimentary system between the country of origin and the host country. In this way they hoped that both countries would draw advantages from the situation: a win/win strategy.17 In addition, the analysis of the phenomenon by the media18 has created an interest among the general public. There are now questions about any repercussions and the development of an equal partnership between Tunisia and host countries as regards mobility, which takes into account the interests of both parties.

Post-revolution changes The events subsequent to the December 2010 revolution created a new state of affairs for migration policy in general and for highly skilled labour in particular. Many expressed the wish that the state strengthen the bond between Tunisia and its ‘children abroad’. One of the fruits of the Tunisian revolution for Tunisians Resident Abroad (TRA) was the election, for the first time in the history of Tunisia, of their representatives to the National Constituent Assembly, 23 October, 2011. In addition, following the elections, a Secretary of State for Migration and Tunisians Abroad (SEMTE) was created under the supervision of the Ministry for Social Affairs. In addition to taking responsibility for the harragas – the young people who left the country illegally on boats, risking their life – SEMTE also provides the foundations of a new way of managing migration based on ‘[. . .] the clarification of its competences and its mission for better serving the Tunisian community abroad in collaboration with the authorities concerned, the civil society and international organisations [. . .]’ (OTE, 2012).19 One of the SEMTE’s priorities is the setting up of mechanisms to help plan and organise the migration of skilled labour and graduates, as well as the mobilisation of Tunisian skills abroad. The hope is to associate them with the design and the implementation of public actions and programmes in the development field. Technical collaboration, i.e. the expatriation of civil servants and government officials (secondment) to countries importing labour (especially the Gulf countries and Libya), is also among the objectives of this expected reform. Conditions for a more open debate on migration policy in Tunisia seem also to be met following the freeing up of civil society, which

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allowed old and new civil society organisations (CSO) to really get to grips with migration-related issues. Among these issues are the guidelines for the new Tunisian migration policy and the re-establishment of relations between Tunisia and the Tunisian diaspora. In the months which followed the change in regime and until the elections of 23 October 2011, these organisations, through their representatives, took part in the political transition20 and worked for the participation of the diaspora in the electoral campaign. In addition, a new framework of dialogue with the European Union was created, a framework that should allow Tunisia to better manage the migration of highly skilled labour, while taking into account the interests of both partners. In fact, the landings of tens of thousands of migrants from Tunisia and Libya during the revolution in Tunisia and the war in Libya led the European Commission to act. The Commission proposed, 24 May 2011, the launching of a new dialogue with Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco to set up a framework for co-operation in the management of migration, personal mobility and security.21 Meetings of the European authorities followed in June 201122 and led to a proposal for a ‘Partnership for Tunisia-EU mobility’.23 The political declaration of the privileged partnership was signed by Tunisia and the EU, 19 November 2012. At the end of December 2012, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European neighbourhood policy, Stefan Fu¨le, reaffirmed the commitment of EU vis-a`-vis Tunisia and confirmed that the EU has [. . .] decided that Tunisia should be the first recipient of the SPRING program (a program to support partnerships, reforms, and an inclusive growth for the countries of the region of the southern neighbourhood). It is also proposed to start discussions with Tunisia over a mobility partnership and a complete and deep free-trade agreement which should multiply the exchange and mobility opportunities for the Tunisian citizens and businesses. The objective is to establish a privileged partnership between the European Union and Tunisia. . .24

Conclusion Policies favouring the migration of skills were developed prior to the 2010–11 revolution and these were aimed at dealing with the pressure

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on the Tunisian highly skilled job market. However, as noted by social partners, unless carefully managed the emigration of highly skilled labour threatens Tunisian development. A clear strategy here would reward the efforts carried out by Tunisia in education. This strategy might include measures strengthening the employment capacities of the Tunisian job market, as well as its attractiveness: the stimulation of investments in research and development; the creation of a skilled job pool; the creation of favourable conditions for innovation and entrepreneurship in high technology; and, inter alia, the development of centres of excellence for scientific research. Also important would be the strengthening of mechanisms supporting the return of emigrants, in particular the mobilisation of e´migre´ skills in national projects. Finally, it is vital that this strategy be accompanied by a dialogue between sending and host countries. The changes which occurred following the 2010– 11 revolution seem to open the way for such a strategy. There is a clear will to strengthen bonds with the diaspora and to set goals as regards the management of the migration of skilled labour. In parallel, a new framework of dialogue is being opened up with the European Union. However, this kind of strategy can only be carried out in a stable political framework. As such, the legislative and presidential elections envisaged for 23 June 2013 will be decisive both for the country and for migration from the country.

Notes * Text revised and amended by Aure´lie Boursier drawing on three contributions by Abderazak Bel Hadj Zekri, Le cadre sociopolitique de la migration Hautement qualifie´e en Tunisie, 2009: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13863/ Carim_ASN_2010_38_Fr.pdf?sequence¼ 2; HabibFourati, La Migration hautement qualifie´e depuis et vers la Tunisie, 2010: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/13455/CARIM_ASN_2010_18.pdf?sequence¼ 1; Hassan Boubakri, Migrations internationales et re´volution en Tunisie, 2013: http://www.mi grationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC-RR-2013 – 01.pdf. 1. Source: Ministry of Higher Education. 2. Source: Statistics of employment from the National Institute of Statistics (INS). See Fourati, 2008. 3. The first was launched following an exceptional meeting of the national council of the central organisation (UTICA), 12 June 2007 in Tunis under the slogan ‘determined to succeed, the campaign of employment for young graduates’. A national surveillance unit, consisting of 24 regional units, working closely with the

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4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

179

employment offices, was responsible for monitoring the evolution of supply and demand on the labour market and for finding concrete answers to job applications. National Conference of ‘Fonds National de l’Emploi 21 – 21’ (National Employment Fund 21– 21) held June 2006 and the recommendations of the ‘Commission permanente pour la promotion de l’emploi relevant du Conseil supe´rieur du de´veloppement des ressources humaines’ (Standing Committee for Promotion of Employment of the Higher Council of Human Resource Development) at its meeting, 11 August 2006. Journal le Renouveau, June 2009. Idem. The political program of President Ben Ali for 2009– 14 with 24 points including a point reserved for Tunisians abroad. Regarding the migration of skills, this programme provided, in para. 6 on employment, for the placement of skills abroad. In addition, and to ensure the better employability of Tunisian skills abroad, the text of the programme included in its parts related to higher education (item 16) and scientific research (para 17), the formulation of actions that enhance training in higher education with international standards and the certification of qualifications that could facilitate the integration of graduates into worldwide labour markets. The importance of this program lies in its translation into the governmental programme immediately after the president’s inauguration. Idem. Presidential Programme of President Ben Ali for 2009– 14, point 16 on Higher Education. Tunisian emigrants that pursued higher education in Tunisia or abroad are included in this figure. This organisation has attempted to coordinate between European, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa trade unions on the various aspects of migration in the Mediterranean. To do this, it has held, from 2007, conferences in Tunisia relating to the new directions of migration in the Mediterranean region, causes and consequences of skilled emigration from southern countries, and, finally, the impact of the crisis on flows, migration policies and practices in the region. This is especially so given that skilled migration does not affect the development of the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa sending countries. The Federated Union of Hostelry emphasised that increased job opportunities in the Gulf countries and the Middle East and also in some European countries have created a vacuum due to the departure of experts, which may affect the operation of the tourism sector. This point was also expressed by the Federation of Health which has noted that the migration of high level management medical specialists and paramedical staff to European countries generate a ‘negative impact’ on the health sector. Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). In fact, it has been observed that political parties showed their positions in the elections, during the sitting of the National Employment consultation in

180 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23.

24.

September 2008 and on the occasion of the annual meeting of the High Council of Population and Development. These are (a) the Mohamed Ali club association of working culture, which organised the 16 session of the Summer School under the theme: ‘Maghreb integration, knowledge transfer of highly skilled emigrants and euroMediterranean union movements facing global financial and economic crisis’ 17, 18 – 19 July 2009; and (b) the North African association of Human Resources Development, section Tunisia, whose president gave a paper presented at a seminar organised by the National Agency for Employment and Free-Lance Work in collaboration with the EU, dedicated to professional mobility, Tunis 1– 3 December 2009; and (c) the Association of Tunisian Women for research and Development, who led a research project funded by the EU in collaboration with community partners in Italy. However, development NGOs, for example, have not taken up a position on the issue. In practical terms the need for human resources in specific sectors (NTI, engineering, health, etc.) in the northern countries of the Mediterranean could lead to the mobility of skills originating in Tunisia, for example, accompanied by compensations in terms of aid and development and training projects. Findings from the collection and analysis of major dailies and the weekly of the Trade Union Confederation in the years 2007, 2007 and 2009. Interview with the new Secretary of State after his appointment (January 2012): http://www.ote.nat.tn/ote_ar/index.php?option¼com_content&task¼view&id ¼253&Itemid¼1. Representatives of the diaspora and of these associations sat on the HCPRTD (High Commission for the Protection of the Revolution and Democratic Transition), which served as an interim legislative body between March and September 2011. It should be noted that the idea of a mobility partnership between the EU and third countries in the EU neighbourhood is not new. It was launched in 2007 (Communication of the Commission of 16 May 2007, COM (2007) 248: http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼ COM:2007:0248:FIN:FR: PDF). http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/documents/press_corner/discours_icm pd_13_juillet_2011_fr.pdf. The EU defines the mobility partnership thus: ‘These initiatives consist of a specific and concrete offer of dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and its Member States in the areas of legal immigration, as well as the migration and development in exchange for greater cooperation in third countries in the area of the fight against illegal immigration and readmission.’ (source: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/cape_verde/eu_cape_verde/political_ relations/partnership_mobility/index_fr.htm). http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/documents/press_corner/stefanfule_ 1an_dec_fr.pdf.

CHAPTER 11 HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION: MOROCCO Mohamed Khachani

Introduction Since the 2000s, the importance of highly skilled migration from Morocco has grown. This form of migration differs from traditional economic emigration, which has been, since the 1960s, a major social phenomenon. Earlier economic emigration generally concerned only the most vulnerable economic elements and the least educated within the society of origin. The phenomenon is rather complex. Brain drain is, in fact, the consequences of occupational, economic, social and political factors. This trend is supported by fierce competition among northern countries. These countries, with lacunae in some segments of the job market, recruit manpower from those developing countries with established education systems. It must be noted, however, that parallel to the exit flow, under the impact of economic and political changes, particularly the world economic crisis and the Arab Spring, new trends are beginning to emerge in Morocco. In fact, we are starting to see return migration. The analysis of this phenomenon requires special attention in terms of: . .

the international context; the magnitude and main characteristics of this form of migration;

182 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST . .

the impact of the Arab Spring on brain drain; the impact of brain drain on the country of origin.

The international context The dialectical relation between knowledge and development has been increasingly recognised over the years. In a world condemned – to paraphrase Alfred Sauvy – to perpetual progress where the knowledge economy is the development lever, the Ricardian theory of comparative advantages seems obsolete. Competitive benefits are now the driving force of growth. The annual World Bank report on development (World Bank Report 1998–9) had as its theme ‘knowledge in the service of development’. ‘Being poor’ one can read there ‘is not only having less money, it is also having less knowledge’. The most prized elements of ‘third capitalism’ are no longer material with an inversion of the hierarchy of assets. The determining factor is now intangible: knowledge, information processing, etc. In cognitive capitalism, scientific research and technological innovation have increasingly become the key factors of progress. Indeed, cognitive capitalism has relegated natural advantages – tangible assets and the labour force – to second place as evidenced by the breakthrough of technological products and the predominance of the new economy in international exchanges. This ‘knowledge-based power’ is stimulated in many industrialised countries by the influx of skills coming from abroad. Restrictive immigration policies are adjusted according to market needs for highly qualified workers. Take the measures taken by industrialised countries. In France, for example, the then President Sarkozy created the concept of ‘select immigration’ so as to recruit more skilled labour with technical and university education.1 France wishes to increase the rate of occupational immigration from 7 per cent to 50 per cent.2 A new ‘skills and talents’ residence came into being in July 2006. Renewable and of three years’ duration, it is for scientists, intellectuals, company founders, artists, high level sportsmen and high potential executives. In the United States, a selection of highly skilled migrants allows this country to welcome a scientific elite coming from different countries, including Morocco (Zekri, 2002).

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In Quebec, migration policy trends have allowed the province to bring in more highly educated Moroccans whose professional profile matches the needs of the labour market there (Dioury, 2001). The United Kingdom offers a visa called ‘Tier 1 Visa for General Highly Skilled Migrants (GHSM)’.3 Sweden laid down special access provisions to qualified individuals to make up the shortfall in qualified workers.4 Switzerland envisaged similar provisions in art.23 of the ‘federal law on foreign nationals in Switzerland’, 16 December 2005.5 Brain drain then is not a straightforward phenomenon. Rather, it is an implicit mechanism that has become increasingly explicit through ‘global migration’, with highly qualified migrants coming from all over the world.6 The branches where the greatest deficit is recorded and where we see a fight over the highly skilled includes, above all, the NTIC sector (new information technologies and communication). Recruiters from around the world compete for NTIC specialists trained in countries like India. No wonder, then, that the most coveted candidates in Morocco are those coming from three major schools: the Mohammedia School of Engineers (EMI – l’Ecole Mohammedia des Inge´nieurs), the National Advanced School of Computer Science and System Analysis (ENSIAS – l’Ecole Nationale Supe´rieure d’Informatique et d’Analyse des Syste`mes) and the National Institute of Postal and Telecommunications Services (INPT – l’Institut National des Postes et Te´le´communications).

Evaluation of brain drain Graduates educated in Morocco or elsewhere, in the 1960s and the 1970s, were absorbed by the local job market, primarily in public administration. Since the 1980s, and following the country’s structural adjustment programme, the state, which was the main employer, offered fewer job opportunities. This led many graduates to emigrate or encouraged those who had studied abroad to seek employment there. The evaluation of these departures is all the more difficult as the traditional channels of recruitment tend to have been made obsolete by the internet. The internet allows one to find the right skills, wherever they are in the world, in a relatively fast time and at lower costs. Globally, the growth in the profiles of the Moroccan community abroad is marked by a clear improvement in terms of education level, as

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confirmed by the survey conducted by the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad (MRA) (Table 11.1). As to their departure from Morocco, 10.4 per cent of emigrants have studied in institutions of higher learning. To these it would be necessary to add those who have completed secondary education (40 per cent) and those who can start higher learning in host countries. These numbers give some idea of the graduate exodus. While the number of MRAs (Moroccans Residing Abroad) with secondary education remains stable at 40 per cent, those with higher education have doubled going from 10.4 per cent to 21.3 per cent. This is especially true in the old immigration countries, in particular, France and Belgium which respectively recorded improvement indices of 2.7 and 2.2. In the recent immigration countries, meanwhile, progress is weaker (1.2 in Spain and 1.1 in Italy). A recent survey into the migration of skills (2012) evaluated the intention of Moroccans to emigrate.7 The survey differentiated three categories of people based on pre-defined criteria: . . .

Non migrants ‘N.M’: 58 per cent. Migrants with low migration potential ‘M.P2’: 33 per cent. Migrants with strong migration potential ‘M.Pþ’: 9 per cent.

Table 11.1 Index of improvement (IA) in tertiary education Moroccans residing abroad at the beginning and in 2005 for each country of residence (in %) Country of residence France Belgium Germany The Netherlands Italy Spain Other countries All

Higher level at the beginning (a)

Higher level in 2005 (b)

IA: (b)/(a)

8.4 9.8 15.5 19.0 14.0 10.2 30.3 10.4

22.8 21.8 31.8 31.3 15.8 12.6 41.5 21.3

2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.1

Source: Hassan II Foundation: ‘Moroccans residing abroad. The use of remittances. Survey results’, Research Institute for the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad. 2008.

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This survey revealed that people with tertiary education are overrepresented among those who have a strong potential for emigration (13 per cent) compared to those who have a low migration potential (4 per cent) and the non-migrants (8 per cent) (Figure 11.1).8 The last OECD report on international migration trends (OECD, 2011) estimates the number of Moroccan students in the OECD countries at 37,350 (2009), or 1.7 per cent of all foreign students in these countries. Other indicators of the extent of this Moroccan brain drain include the number of Moroccans with higher education in the OECD countries, namely 207,243 people. The magnitude of those with higher education explains the significance of highly qualified workers in these countries where the percentage of residents of Moroccan origin reaches 14.4 per cent (Conseil de la Communaute´ Marocaine a` l’Etranger, 2012). Some of these skills are demonstrated through entrepreneurship. According to a survey conducted by the Demographic Research and Studies Centre (CERED – Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches De´mographiques),9 9.4 per cent of Moroccans residing abroad are employers or independents: 10.9 per cent for men and 5 per cent for women. One of the countries

100 83

86

83

80

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60 40 20 0

19 10

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9

7

8

Non migrants Low

Medium

10

13

4

Migrants with low potential

Migrants with strong potential

Higher

(Diagram text Total Population, NM, MP −, MP + Level 1, Level 2, Level 3)

Figure 11.1 Concentration of higher educational levels in the various populations according to propensity to migrate.

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where entrepreneurship has made a breakthrough is Italy where there are 27,952 in this category (Ci Siamo – Fondazione Ethnoland, 2009).10 Morocco does not have a complete database of its nationals operating abroad. Information on these individuals remains, indeed, fragmentary. A study conducted by the Ministry in charge of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad in partnership with the International Organization for Migrations gives interesting details (Ministry for the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad and International Organization for Migrations, 2009). According to this study, different institutions have partial information on these highly skilled migrants: .

.

.

.

the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad, has information on Moroccan migrants who have made economic investments in Morocco; the portal of the International Forum of Moroccan Personnel Abroad (FINCOME – Forum International des Compe´tences Marocaines a` l’Etranger) counts the profiles of the Moroccan migrants who have posted their CVs there in order to find employment or to take part in a work exchange project in Morocco; the National Scientific & Technical Research Centre (CNRST – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique) has information on the scientific skills of Moroccan expatriates who have come to Morocco for a short teaching or research assignment; Lastly, Moroccan professional associations through the world have lists of their members. The main associations with these lists are: – Association of Moroccans of the Grandes Ecoles (AMGE – Association des Marocains des Grandes Ecoles): 3,600 members. – Association of the Moroccan Information Technology Specialists in France (AIMAF – Association des Informaticiens Marocains en France): 650 members. – Careers in Morocco: 770 members.11 – Club of Moroccan Investors Abroad (CIME – Club des Investisseurs Marocains a` l’Etranger): 550 members. – Moroccan Entrepreneurs (ME): 14,500 members.

The members of these two last associations are productive players in the host countries. They guide SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in several sectors (construction, distribution, maintenance, audit,

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data-processing, etc.). The main objective of these associations consists in assisting expatriate Moroccan investors and their possible foreign partners in any efforts to invest in Morocco. Other associations of lesser importance include: the Moroccan Association of Biologists in France; the Moroccan Association of Biologists in the United States; Moroccan Academic Research Scientists (United States); the Network of Moroccan Intellectuals in Europe; and the ‘Knowledge and Development’ association. Generally, the goal of these associations is to promote the professional interests of these members and their collectivisation, while ensuring exchanges and partnerships with institutions in the country of origin. In sum, the study of the ministry and the IOM (International Organisation for Migrations) indicate the existence of a skills base of nearly 20,000 members.

Determinants of the phenomenon Brain drain is produced by the conjunction of several different factors. Their cumulative effect seems to lead to a strong propensity to emigrate. The logic that underlie these flows are both endogenous and exogenous (push and pull factors) (Zekri, 2002). The endogenous ‘push’ factors are of a varied nature and do not have the same intensity. In addition to the economic reasons, which are among the leading causes of migration in all its forms, other factors also encourage skilled personnel to become expatriates. . . .

.

Political factors: the failure of the democratic mechanisms ensuring equal opportunities and a meritocracy for all citizens. Professional factors: the inability of the national economy to meet the aspirations of those who have acquired a tertiary qualification. Social factors: total or partial unemployment, often ascribable to the gap between education policy and employment policy. Since the 1980s, and following the application of the programme of structural adjustment, the state that was the principal employer, offers fewer employment opportunities. This has led many graduates to emigrate and has encouraged those pursuing studies abroad to remain and seek employment there. This absence of connection between the university and the economy is worsened by the failure of an entrepreneurial system that is

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characterised by few resources being given to research and development and by the sub-management of the Moroccan company. The big industrial groups such as the OCP, the ONA, etc. . . undertake research as a part of their development strategy and they also try to develop links with universities. The SMEs, though, which represent more than 95 per cent of Moroccan industry, are not particularly interested in research and are poor in terms of innovation.12 Low funding for research. This budget is difficult to evaluate because of the absence of statistics and/or sometimes the withholding of information by institutions carrying out Research & Development activities. Overall, the total expenditure in Morocco on R&D is estimated at 0.8 per cent of GDP.13 To these deficiencies, one can add other factors like the lack of opportunities for intellectual stimulation (laboratories, libraries, professional associations) and bureaucratic inertia (rigid hierarchical structures in companies and public institutions alike).

But the decision to emigrate is often triggered by exogenic factors. Brain drain, has, as we have seen, intensified because of the international demand for skilled labour. Globalisation plays a significant role in the acceleration of the exodus of the most highly trained. In fact, the deregulation of economies and the opening of markets have significant consequences for work organisations. The restructuring of productive systems generates highly qualified workers. In these new organisational structures, innovation plays a central role, which requires ‘a significant pool’ of scientific skills (Bouoiyour, 2001). This phenomenon is reinforced by the adoption of policies supporting the recruitment of highly skilled migrants (see above). These policies lead to the proliferation of recruitment companies and the multiplication of specialised ‘talent hunting’ sites. Other exogenic factors encourage these highly qualified workers to emigrate. This is due to an environment marked by attractive work conditions and an attractive life: . .

the search for excellence in a favourable environment for skills deployment; organisational flexibility;

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competition; prospects for promotion and access for opportunities; sectoral attractions of new professions in new technologies.

These professional factors are supported by other factors of a personal nature: . . .

wage incentives, promotion schemes and opportunities; powerful social security schemes; the ability to help family and access to better opportunities for the education of dependants (Zekri, 2002).

These encouraging factors were, nevertheless, affected by reforms undertaken in the context of Arab Spring.

Impact of the Arab Spring on brain drain In the Arab world, there are several political, economic, social and cultural realities. Some speak about ‘the Moroccan exception’ with the extent of highly skilled migration being dampened by: .

At the political level, the process started in the 1990s. The former left-wing opposition began to govern and militants, at times from the far left, came to occupy positions of power. Moreover, there was the founding of an Advisory Counsel on human rights, in the reign of Hassan II – a fresh start after some dark years – and the establishment shortly thereafter of the Equity and Reconciliation Authority (Dupret and Ferrie´, 2011). The 20 February movement included above all Islamist radicals (Adl Wal Ihsane), parties of the far left and human rights groups who did not use violence. But, politically speaking, they had a striking impact on politics. The new constitution voted on 1 July, 2011 marks an undeniable advancement in terms of democratic liberties. Article 19 of the old constitution which gave exorbitant powers to the King was removed and these powers were restricted in favour of the head of government. Among the constitutional innovations, for the first time, four articles were devoted to Moroccans residing abroad (arts 16, 17, 18 and 166).

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In the social sphere, the King himself launched a major project, the National Initiative of Human Development (INDH – Initiative Nationale de De´veloppement Humain) stepping into a role where, previously, Islamist parties had operated. In the economic sphere, important works are underway in various areas of the country: Emergence (industry), Green Morocco Project (agriculture), Morocco Azure (tourism), etc. In parallel, major infrastructure projects for highways and harbours were carried out (Tanger Med).14

All these changes encouraged foreign investors, but also for executives and Moroccan graduates working abroad to come to Morocco. It is clear, therefore, that in Morocco, the Arab Spring did not drive people away; in fact, it attracted expatriate Moroccan skills. This return was accentuated by the economic crisis, which had caused so many problems in host countries. It is certainly difficult to evaluate this return movement, but one can approach it through the survey referred to above on skill migration. Among the conclusions of this survey, the distribution by educational level of the return migrants, during the last 10 years, shows that 21 per cent possess higher education degrees. These data reveal that the Moroccan migrants that returned are better educated than the remainder of the Moroccan population. This return generates a contribution in human capital terms, which attenuates the loss of capital resulting from the emigration of qualified people. In addition, Morocco proved a refuge for Arab skills. Information available for Tunisia indicates that more than 2,600 Tunisian businessmen chose to invest in Morocco. Among these entrepreneurs, we can distinguish three categories: (i) those who seek to diversify their investments; (ii) those who seek a foothold in African markets; and (iii) those who have transferred their business to Morocco while waiting for an improvement in the business climate in Tunisia.15

Brain drain: the cost for Morocco If for the individual and his or her family the socio-economic benefit of emigration is obvious, brain drain leads to immense losses for the country of origin. It is disadvantageous for this country on at least three levels:

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the highly qualified represent one of most precious resources of the country: the departure of HSM means a degradation of the skills and knowledge reservoir and a block on sustainable development; the country is sometimes constrained to seek expensive foreign expertise for work that could have been carried out by nationals if they had not left to work elsewhere; lastly, the education of these skilled individuals wastes national resources as it is expensive and time-consuming (Khachani, 2009).

In order to understand this cost, it is advisable to recall that higher education (universities, management training and vocational training post-baccalaureate) takes on today nearly 351,000 students from a total school population of 6,730,511 (2011). These students thus account for 5.2 per cent of the school population. The national education budget absorbs a significant part of the general state budget, more than 48 billion dirhams in 2011, which is to say nearly a quarter of the budget (23.4 per cent). Higher education and scientific research absorb 4.1 per cent of it, a level which has been maintained since 2002. But overall, the cost of brain drain includes various components: . .

the educational cost from pre-school; the opportunity cost for the country of origin: losses the country bears in the absence of educated personnel (productivity, incomes, etc.).

To these costs, it is advisable to add other additional costs: . .

costs borne by the families of trained people (education, health, housing, leisure, etc); the cost resulting from the absence of highly skilled individuals on family and possibly on children.

Any costing of brain drain requires the availability of multiple and detailed data. However, in the case of Morocco, some of these data are either unavailable, or difficult to access. For example, a costing of the training of executives requires the joint examination of the operational budgets and the investment budgets of the institutes and the training

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schools of these executives (and likewise those of educational establishments from pre-school to university). However, in most cases, information on investments and their breakdowns are difficult to come by.16 Thus, the evaluation of this cost is a complex operation, which explains the divergences noted in the estimates available. The UNDP, for example, estimates the investment required for the education of an African executive emigrant at $184,000, ‘a truly inverse debt’. In Morocco, the estimate put forth by the Minister for Higher Education is more than one million Dirhams for a medical specialist and between 400,000 and 500,000 Dirhams for an engineer. (NB 1 Euro ¼ approximately 11 Dirhams.)17 In order to better understand this reality, we tried, based on a report prepared for the ILO, to evaluate the training cost of an engineer (Khachani and Bensaid, 2010). Education included primary, secondary and qualifying college education, the preparatory classes and engineering school.18 The available data for 2005 show that in Morocco that education costs, before the school or institute of engineers, an average of 95,460 Dirhams (8,600 euros approximately).19 As already noted, the INPT, EMI and INSEAS are the three schools or training institutes for engineers, which saw more or less significant starting flows. For this reason we will limit any costing to these three institutions, focusing though on INPT for which fairly precise data is available. Within INPT, the unit costs for training an engineer are about 93,380 Dirhams a year. This figure has the advantage of including the investments (depreciation), INPT having adequate cost accounting. If one adds to it the expenses for scholarships (excluding the institute budget institute), and the preliminary training costs, the training of an INPT engineer comes to about 389,700 Dirhams (Table 11.2). Table 11.2 Overall costs for training an engineer at the National Institute of Postal and Telecommunications Services (INPT), academic year 2007/2008 (in Dirhams) Education before INPT INPT education Total

95,460 294,240 389,700

Source: Estimates on the basis of data from the Ministry of National Education and the National Institute of Postal and Telecommunications Services.

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Two remarks need to be made here. First, the education cost before the institute does not include investment. In this sense, it is an under-estimate. Second, the education cost of an INPT engineer has fallen in these last few years. According to some estimates, this represented at the end of 1990 and the beginning of 2000 double its current value (some 600,000 Dirham for three years of education). The lowering of this cost is due, in part, to the increase in manpower among student engineers and, also, in part to the rationalisation of management operating within the institute. As regards EMI and ENSIAS, the average unit costs of education for an engineer, 2000–7, was 144,000 Dirhams over the three years of education, for which it will be necessary to add scholarship expenses, which gives us a total of 158,100 Dirhams per engineer. The average overall costs for education are thus about 253,560 Dirhams.20 But, contrary to INPT, this cost does not include investment either within the schools in question or during the preliminary period of education from primary onwards. This mainly explains the difference between the training cost of an INPT engineer and engineers graduating from other institutions. In order to estimate the cost of brain drain, it is necessary to know the number of engineers who migrate abroad. However, such data is again difficult to come by. In the case of EMI, the annual survey conducted by the school does not indicate how many engineers trained within the school work abroad.21 Nevertheless, it is known that the rate of migration for engineers was very high towards the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, not least because of the shortage of engineers and IT specialists in Europe. This rate exceeded, according to certain persons in charge of the school, 50 per cent in certain years. Currently, it would be about 5–10 per cent. As regards INPT, the annual survey conducted by INPT and their graduates association make it possible to estimate that between 12 per cent and 15 per cent emigrate, with a downward trend in these last few years. If we project an average rate of migration of 10 per cent among new graduates, taking into account the improvement in the socio-political climate. Morocco is, then, likely to see 1,000 of its engineers emigrating each year: on the basis of a projected number of 10,000 engineers being educated each year. With unit costs (of operation) estimated at 250,000 Dirhams,22 the annual cost of exodus of engineers is likely to rise to 250 million Dirhams (approximately 22 million euros). This estimate is restricted to engineers and needs to be re-calculated upwards while including the investments and the opportunity costs for the economy and for Morocco.

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Conclusion Jean Bodin noted that: ‘human resources are the only power and wealth’. In the current context, the intellectual capital represented by human resources seems a major asset to be leveraged in any development policy. But the paradox of globalisation is that it allows a circulation of capital, projects and ideas, but limits the circulation of personnel with skills which the developing countries badly need. As regards the irreversibility of this trend, the most important thing is to set up mechanisms so that the flux of migratory skills becomes a mutual asset. The home countries of highly skilled emigrants are important partners in the mobilisation of expatriate skills. This is why their involvement is necessary in the various phases of the integration of expatriate skills in home country development, for example, while considering a return policy for these skills, within the framework of shuttle migration. This involvement should be based on a comprehensive policy of co-operation between the migrants’ home countries and Morocco and the strengthening of institutional paths which integrate knowledge transfer and qualified migrants into the modalities of co-operation.

Notes 1. ‘La France veut choisir ses e´trangers’ (France wants to choose its foreigners) in Le Matin, 23 January, 2006. 2. leFaso.net, 25 October, 2007. 3. See http://www.workpermit.com/uk/tier-1-visas-general-highly-skilledmigrants.htm site. 4. See sweden.se. The official gateway to Sweden http://www.sweden.se/fr/Accueil/ Travailler-vivre/A-lire/Sweden-relaxes-labor-migration-rules/. 5. http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/1/142.20.fr.pdf. 6. According to an UNCTAD report, ‘these are the Least Developed Countries (LDC) which posts the highest rate of brain drain, at 18.4 per cent, a rate a good deal higher than the 10 per cent observed in other developing countries.’ Cited in APS, 26 November 2012. 7. AMERM (Moroccan Association of Studies and Research on Migrations)/ETF (European Training Foundation) survey: Migrations of skills in Morocco covering a sample of 2,600 people across eight regions of the country. In press. 8. The criteria employed here for education are broken down as follows: low level (first cycle of secondary education or below); medium level (second cycle of

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9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

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general or professional secondary education and post-secondary professional education); higher level (higher education and doctorate). HCP-CERED, ‘L’Enqueˆte sur l’Insertion Socio-e´conomique des MRE dans les pays d’accueil’, 2005. It is probable that the relatively significant number of these entrepreneurs includes independents. Careers in Morocco have forums for Moroccan graduates and professionals residing abroad, which constitute meetings for those in search of employment and entrepreneurship opportunities in Morocco. In 2012, three forums were held, on 16 June in Paris, on 6 October in London and on 10 November in Montreal. La Vie Economique, ‘La part du prive´ dans la R&D ne de´passe pas 6 per cent’, 11 June 2007. Le Matin, ‘La recherche scientifique: plaidoyer pour l’augmentation du budget’, 3 August 2012. A national strategy of innovation and advanced technologies was set up and funds to support innovation were created for 380 million DH 2011– 14. The funds finance projects of technological innovation and development primarily through three instruments ‘Intilak’, ‘Tatwir’ and ‘Technological Service network’ (Le Matin 28 June 2012). Akhbar Al yaoum No 901, 7 November, 2012. More precisely, the problem lies in the evaluation of all the investments of the institution in question, which must be dated and disaggregated according to type (grounds, buildings, equipment) in order to calculate the corresponding depreciation. The absence of rigorous accounting systems, and in particular cost accounting, in the vast majority of institutions of state education and higher education prevents us from precisely taking into account the share of the investment (in its various components) in the annual unit costs (or over the entire period of education). Interview with the minister Lahcen Daoudi in La Vie Economique, 21 September 2012. For this entire course, we suppose that the person doing engineering studies have, generally, concluded the course without incident, i.e. they took the minimal number of years for each stage of education. Data available from the Ministry of National Education: Directorate of Evaluation and Long-term Planning. Estimates based on data from the Ministry of National Education. According to the director of EMI, the response rate from graduates being weak, no reliable conclusion can be drawn from this survey. This minimalist estimate is based on the fact that the majority of engineers are university graduates, and that engineer manpower in each institution of education tends to increase, which reduces the educational costs.

CHAPTER 12 ALGERIAN HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION: THE AETIOLOGY OF A DISASTER Ali Mebroukine*

Introduction At the rate of 6,000 annual departures, in the last 25 years, 130,000 Algerian graduates (with at least four years of university) have left their homeland. Some have careers abroad that match their degrees. Others, meanwhile, occupy insecure part-time jobs outside Algeria, to finance their studies and to prepare for their master degrees and doctorates, hoping for highly qualified employment as engineers, as medical specialists or for work in the liberal professions. During the same period, many Algerians decided to invest outside their country, in states or regions with good incentives: e.g. North America, Europe, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan. Today they manage important companies: the number of Algerian SME/SMI managers in southern Europe – Spain, Portugal, Italy and especially France – has also increased. Brain drain has slowed since 2010, not least because of the economic crisis, which Western host countries have faced. However, it remains a major challenge for the Algerian authorities. Substantially improving the quality of Algerian education is, unfortunately, a non-starter. How, then, will Algeria, unable to win back its highly skilled diaspora, be able to implement its ambitious

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development plans? Since independence, the gap between the development needs of the country and the quality of human resources has never been wider. The authorities in Algeria have certainly sought to dampen down highly skilled migration from their country. They did so with the adoption of numerous voluntary measures and the creation of institutions dedicated to the return of expatriated skills. The question that arises today is whether highly skilled migration must be organised and even pursued by public institutions? Or, on the other hand, is it best to let the labour market work according to the rules of supply and demand, with highly skilled Algerians trying to fit in as well as they can? Or should, instead, state institutions link themselves to civil society organisations associated with migration? There is unquestionably an increasing number of initiatives from the various diaspora communities abroad and generous declarations from politicians on the need for contributions from Algeria’s expatriated elite. There has also been the emergence of a knowledge economy, to which hundreds of billions of dinars were allotted in support of the five-year plan, which came into effect in April 2010. In order to understand highly skilled migration from Algeria, it is necessary, to examine, as we do in the first part, the main causes leading to the migration of skills. Following on from this we, in the second part, review the main factors that drive the process inexorably on. Then, in the third part, we offer some conclusions as to the quality of the solutions adopted by Algerian decision makers for a judicious use of highly skilled migration.

The worsening of the socio-cultural situation for intellectual elites The main reasons for the emigration of highly skilled labour is: (A), graduate unemployment; (B), the discontent of executives; and (C), the rise of speculative market activities.

Graduate unemployment Between 1979 and 2009, Algeria invested approximately 25 per cent of its national wealth in schools and universities. However, most Algerians would say that schools and universities no longer lead to social advancement. Indeed, education and training rank only fifth in their priorities. The reason is simple. Graduate unemployment is on the rise. In

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earlier years (1962–84), every graduate found a job, unless he or she chose to be unemployed.1 But this has now changed. There are many indices that flag up increasing social bitterness, as well as personal dramas.2 The number of graduates exploded between 1984 and 2009, whereas the number of available jobs fell. In 2009, 150,000 graduates left university compared to 40,500 in 1992: and these 150,000 were faced with fewer positions. The situation is particularly critical among Arabicspeaking graduates. These are growing in number and their percentage in global manpower terms has increased since 1986 because of the use of Arabic in teaching, while the economy has favoured French-speakers. According to the National Statistics Office (ONS), in 2008, there were 300,000 unemployed Algerians with a baccalaureate or a diploma: of whom 120,000 held a master’s degree. These graduates must now wait, on average, 36 months and they constitute 15 per cent of all the unemployed. The brain drain continues, notwithstanding the economic crisis in Western host countries. Graduates who lack the social clout to work their way gradually up the social scale are particularly likely to head abroad. In 2011, 1,280 Algerian graduates left Algeria for post-graduate education in Europe. They had, for the most part, the intention of seeking employment there and settling. In 2012, 1,150 Algerian graduates set off for the same destinations. Three-quarters of these graduates are scientists and engineers and these were trained, in part, free-of-charge in Algeria. If they have to return to Algeria, it will be as expatriates. They will have acquired the nationality of a host country and they will be employed by foreign companies. In this new guise they will come to explore markets in Algeria, but they are unlikely to settle there. For Algeria this is a major loss, particularly given that the country does not have enough high level technicians, engineers and technology experts to launch serious infrastructure and public works projects.

Discontent of executives Executives see limited professional prospects for their children and even the danger of unemployment. At the same time they themselves have seen their standard of living fall through rising inflation. As in other social categories, since 1986, the year when price of an oil barrel stood at 5 dollars, they have also suffered from rising food costs. Moreover, goods prices have increased more rapidly than wages. This is particularly true of vehicles, top-of-the-range electric household equipment, residences

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and spare-time activities: these prices are not taken into account in official statistics. The undeniable fall off in living standards is part of a generalised pauperisation. An Algerian senior executive, with the same level of qualifications, had in the 1980s, 80 per cent of the wages of a French executive, at the official exchange rate. In 2009, his wages were one-thirteenth of a European colleague’s. Between 1984 and 2009, in 25 years, 130,000 Algerian graduates left Algeria and their failure to return constitutes an increasingly worrying phenomenon.

Increasing rentier and speculative activities Since the opening of Algeria to world commerce, i.e. since the ending of the state monopoly over foreign trade in 1991, much has changed. There is a new class of businessmen and women, who, relying on contacts with the higher reaches of the state, have replaced managers in companies and public offices. These business persons now import equipment and goods for consumption and distribute them through the territory. Given the weakness of internal controls (the customs authorities, the tax authorities and banks), this group has been able to amass significant fortunes in Algeria and abroad in a relatively short period of time, mere years or even months. Yet, at the same time, the purchasing power of teachers and executives eroded appreciably, primarily because of inflation: an exogenous phenomenon traceable to the import of essential, consumables. 19 September 1988, the then President of the Republic, Chadli Bendjedid delivered an impassioned speech. In that speech he denounced speculators and those on rentier incomes, blaming them for making off with the wealth of the country. He also took to task the establishment, who had refused the political and economic reforms which he intended to undertake. Two weeks later the notorious events of October 1988 took place and more than 500 civilians were killed in riots. The Algerian elite can be split into two categories. First, there are those who belong to informal power networks through which they have access to information and even positions in the state apparatus and its periphery. Second, there are those who work on their own in a precarious fashion and who are quickly demoralised. In this respect, it is not rare to see researchers 50 years and older, who leave Algeria, often with spouse and children, after having devoted 30 years of their life to Algerian research and after having trained younger executives, some of whom have

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left Algeria before them. Today, the formerly prestigious professions of teacher, doctor, researcher, engineer and architect have lost their aura: speculative money making has taken their place. As prospects at home worsened highly skilled Algerians turned to more promising destinations, which included North America and in particular French-speaking Canada. Algerian migrants in the United States and Canada – scientists, university professors and engineers – are equipped with high level education, as the table below shows (Khelfaoui, 2006).

Brain drain acceleration The worsening of the socio-cultural situation among highly skilled elites is the main reason for the migration of skills. However, there are other factors, which have accelerated brain drain, including: (A), the Arabisation of teaching; (B), the bureaucratisation of research; and, (C), the lack of individual and collective freedoms.

The Arabisation of teaching At independence the Algerian authorities supported the Arabisation of Algerian society. The measures that the authorities employed to carry out this goal were particularly relevant in education. The Frenchspeaking elites – most of whom have since emigrated to France or to Canada – saw in the generalised use of Arabic, a commitment to reducing the use of French in the public sphere. Indeed, it sometimes seemed to this elite that the real purpose of these programmes was not the winning back of an Arab identity for Algeria, but rather the destruction of Francophone culture in the country. Faced with the proven failure of Arabisation, implicitly recognised by the President of the Republic, by 1999, a change was needed. The decision was taken to rehabilitate French at universities (at least in the natural and applied sciences). In any case, since the early 1990s, private schools of higher education (intended for graduates and post-graduates) had already provided teaching exclusively in French. However, teaching at elementary school, college and high school continues in Arabic. This situation generates perverse effects, of which the most remarkable is certainly the maladjustment of graduates. These have lessons in Arabic at school, only to enrol in French-speaking scientific sectors at

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university. One of the reasons why the cream of the Algerian intelligentsia left Algeria was the fear that their children would receive an incomplete education at school. They would consequently lack, later on, professional prospects. It should be stressed that today the teaching of foreign languages is strongly encouraged and that Algerian pupils tend to forsake classical Arabic in favour of French and English. However, the public authorities are now faced with a lack of foreign language teachers (particularly French language teaches). There is also the lack of French-language institutions to train up French-language teachers.

The bureaucratisation of research The Algerian research system is relatively new compared with its African neighbours. The first Algerian attempts to organise research date back to the early 1970s with the creation of the Ministry for Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESRS). This was followed by the Provisional Council of Scientific Research (CPRS) in 1971 and the National Office of Scientific Research (ONRS) in 1973. These centralised structures had very little effect on basic research, research being, at this date, the result of individual initiatives and informal groups. In 1982 the New Energies Commission (CEN) was set up. Recruitments shot up and, in 1986, CEN was replaced by the High Commission in Research (HCR). After three years of existence, the High Commission succeeded in implementing some 400 research projects in natural sciences and technology, and in the social sciences. The human and infrastructure resources set up during these years went to make up the essential core of non-university public research. However, the research programmes were seldom concretised and were, all too often, reduced to central structures or commissions without a future. Moreover, research in Algeria was stopped dead by the terrible events of the 1990s. The scientific community in universities, in the national research centres and in R&D departments in companies broke up: research teams, the result, often, of years of work, disintegrated. Scholars today speak of the ‘Algerian paradox’. After all, of all the countries of the south and east of the Mediterranean, Algeria has worked hardest at industrialising and equipping itself. Yet, notwithstanding this effort, there are significant delays in the development of new technologies. This was one of the factors that drove the best Algerian IT

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specialists, towards, in particular, Canada and the Gulf states. Generally, Algeria has a hostile environment for innovation and research, in administrations, universities and even in government-managed research centres. Many Algerian researchers – about 2,000 by one estimate – accepted, between 1985 and 2008, proposals from foreign research centres. They often declined, at first, but they soon lost their patience as the administrative hierarchy continued with its clan-like practices, nepotism and patronage, excluding outsiders from conferences, and seminars, in Algeria and abroad.

A lack of individual and collective freedoms It was only in 1989 that Algeria chose liberal constitutionalism, ensuring, for its citizens, rights and personal and collective freedoms. ‘Freedom’ here covers many different things: freedom of conscience; freedom of opinion; of intellectual, artistic and scientific creation; secrecy of correspondence; the inviolable character of private life; and the honour of the citizen. And to these were added other basic rights, like trade-union rights, the right to strike, private property guarantees and equal access to posts and employment within the State. The Constitution of 28 November 1996 consolidated all these rights. Moreover, Algeria, unlike many Arab countries, ratified all multilateral human rights agreements: the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the optional protocol allowing the state to be challenged before the International Human Rights Committee. However, democratisation in Algerian institutions and the more general freeing up of politics have done little to slow brain drain. In fact, liberal constitutionalism was adopted at a time when radical Islamism was already a force within the population and Islamist leaders wished to suppress fundamental freedoms. Moreover, from January 1992 to the promulgation of the Constitution in 1996, the founding Constitution (that of 23 February 1989) was put on hold, because of the civil war, which gradually took over the country. A state of emergency was declared in January 1992, authorising the executive and judiciary to restrict the exercise of individual and collective freedoms. Algerian intellectual elites were and felt restricted. Civil society organisations in particular suffered as a result of various limitations and constraints, since they were unable to organise themselves freely, to get in touch with foreign embassies or, indeed, to establish co-operative relations with foreign NGOs.

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It is interesting to note that a considerable number of company heads, doctors, architects, and entrepreneurs from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon have settled in Algeria since the autumn of 2011,3 following changes in the Arab world. Why did they choose Algeria? They valued the relative social and political stability of the country, as well as its prosperity. However, it is difficult to know whether these emigrants will stay. In addition, if this movement, on the one hand, makes up for the exodus of Algerian skilled labour, on the other, it may increase pressure on the Algerian skilled labour market, reinforcing the emigration of highly skilled Algerian workers. A return movement towards Algeria has not been observed among Algerian highly skilled migrants in the Arab countries affected by these changes. Two assumptions can be formulated. The first assumption is that the exile of these elite was driven abroad by Algeria’s social and economic poverty, this elite considering itself under-utilised and even marginalised. This feeling was exacerbated when persons of private means rose to power, persons who corrupted the market economy. For this expatriated elite, the institutional and political changes that have occurred in Algeria since 1989 did not modify the social and economic configurations so typical of an authoritarian regime and backed by oil resources. The second assumption is that Islamism, which prevailed across Arab countries after the ‘Arab Spring’, is common throughout Algerian society and makes return more difficult. For their part, a number of Algerian emigrants in Canada have also expressed their despair at the government’s failure to allow for the development of its expatriate elite. According to Hocine Khelfaoui, ‘the Diaspora often gives the impression that it feels unwanted and especially that it is difficult to do anything in Algeria’ (Khelfaoui, 2006).

Towards a judicious use of highly skilled migration In the first part of this section, we will examine the conservative policies carried out by the Algerian authorities to prevent brain drain. We will, second, look at the effort to insert the highly skilled into Algeria’s social and cultural space, something that takes into account the failure of the preceding policy. Then, in the third part, we will review the civil society organisations led by the Algerian diaspora, which struggles to involve highly skilled migrants in helping Algeria up to higher levels of development.

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Conservative answers There are three ways of preventing migration. The first consists in improving the living and working conditions of researchers, executives and academics, encouraging them to remain in the country. The second consists in launching appeals to the Algerian diaspora, hoping to get it involved in Algeria’s development. These appeals come in the form of an invitation made to highly skilled Algerians abroad: to register themselves with their local consulates; to vote in elections; and, for businessmen, in particular, to take part in fairs, exhibitions and other meetings organised by the Algerian Chamber of Commerce and Industry or by Algerian employers and other groups. The third strategy involves graduates, who acquired their degrees in Algeria and who increasingly face huge difficulties in working abroad because of the theoretical nature of their qualification. It should be noted that most of these graduates do not easily find qualified jobs in Algeria. This is, in part, because of the hiatus between the world of university and the world of work. However, it is also due to the gaps inherent in the education that they receive.4 The Algerian press has become the true vector of public dispute for Algerian graduates. However, nobody seems to have understood that a substantial improvement in teaching will be translated into highly skilled migration and by draconian selection with access to certain sectors in the best schools and the most famous higher education institutes. Algeria will only be able to prevent its highly skilled from leaving the country by making the country more attractive in terms of living and working conditions. Progressive answers Some members of the diaspora have expressed an interest in being associated with the scientific, technical, economic and cultural development of their country. Algerian political officials agreed, in the late 2000s, the creation of an institutional framework, in which a more judicious use of expatriate skills would be discussed. This framework was to take into account the needs of the country and the desire of highly skilled migrants to get involved. It is, however, necessary to note the teleology of this new policy. It is certainly not free from ambiguities. Political power brokers planned, with said policy, ‘to kill two birds with one stone’. By addressing indiscriminately seven million Algerians who live abroad, it intended to give the impression that it was not favouring

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highly skilled migrants: most of these seven million have only a modest education. But highly skilled migrants were, in fact, crucial in their plans. After all, the implementation of the complementary plan of support for growth, as well as the accompanying five-year plan, stressed the need for knowledge and know-how. There was also the lack of passion on the part of foreign investors for NTIC development or development in the intangible economy. To get some sense of the mindset of Algerian decision makers here it is worth recalling presidential decree no. 09 – 297, 9 September 2009 relating to the creation, organisation and operation of the Advisory Council of the national community abroad. Here there was a will to learn lessons from previous attempts to attract highly skilled migrants. For one, these migrants are regarded as technical co-operators who would agree to provide service in Algeria, for financial returns. The teleology of the presidential decree is not only a question of soliciting highly skilled migrants, but also of involving the same in a social project, which the public authorities try to define and to implement. This might be credible in the case of Algerians who left between 1990 and 2010. However, it is less credible in the case of Algerians of the second and even third generations, whose loyalty to Algeria has evaporated, if it ever in fact existed: they have another nationality and they have grown up in societies with different values. The Advisory Council of the national community abroad is responsible for opinions, proposals and recommendations on all questions referring to the national community abroad as regards diffusion ‘of the national values and ideals of the revolution of November 1954, the influence of civilisation and cultural values, in particular through the teaching and the training of the national language, the strengthening of the national conscience, a civic spirit and the meaning of national solidarity’ (art.4 of the decree). The Council has the following priorities: . . .

encouraging diaspora Algerians to participate in the economic and social development actions for Algeria; developing mechanisms likely to bring in experience and know-how from diaspora Algerians; promoting cultural and tourist exchanges, in particular for families, young people and children of the national community abroad.

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The legislative authority has tried to look ahead by seeking to involve not only the highly skilled migration of one or two generations but the whole national community abroad. In this way, the Algerian diaspora is no longer thought of merely in terms of economic services but also as an important contributor to the social life of the country.

Civil society initiatives These initiatives preceded the setting up of the Advisory Council. Of the civil society organisations that take an increasingly active part in the mobilisation of highly skilled migration for Algerian development, an important name is the Algerian Association of Competences (ACA). This body submitted its approval file, 5 May 2008, after having held, April 2007, the first conference on Algerian competences abroad in Algiers. The ACA is an association with educational, scientific, technical and cultural interests. It has drawn in academics, researchers and Algerian businessmen from Algeria and from abroad. Its objectives are the following: . .

. .

collaboration Algerians living abroad and those living at home in the arts, sciences and technologies; cooperation between Algerian institutions (public and private), the government, companies, academics and civil society in setting up operational solutions for problems encountered by economic, social and cultural stakeholders in Algeria; initiatives in the development of programmes in teaching and research and with hubs of excellence in scientific and technical domains; the organisation of conferences, seminars and workshops in Algeria and abroad to evaluate results and needs, and to define strategies for promoting the knowledge economy.

Two other important groups are the Algerian Association of Technology Transfer, a network of Algerian graduates from top Algerian and French Universities (the REAGE), and the Foundation of Research in Medical Sciences (FOREM). The involvement of highly skilled migration in the development of teaching curricula and research is positive and must be continued in the years to come. This would, in part, mitigate the failures of Algerian education, alluded to above, whether at primary school, high school, at university or in professional training centres.

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Conclusion The economic, social and cultural situation in Algeria is, in no small part, the result of poor governance. It has been a major push factor for highly skilled labour and an obstacle to the return and to the mobilisation of diaspora skills. The changes that have affected the Arab world since November 2011 led to the arrival of highly skilled migrants from elsewhere in the Arab world, but it is difficult to see what effects this will have. What we can say is that the creation of an attractive environment for highly skilled labour is one of the main challenges for Algeria in the coming years. The growing strength of civil society organisations, both in Algeria and among the diaspora is positive. However, only the public authorities can give a decisive impulse to the creation of a favourable climate for investments. The Conference of the Forum of Heads of Undertakings, 13 April 2010, was an occasion not only for the Algerian managers but also for experts, academics and researchers to express their grave concerns over the evolution of the economic, social and cultural situation in Algeria. The short-termism of the government, the absence of a proper development strategy, the reconsideration of some of the most fundamental market rules and, the growing unattractiveness of Algeria for foreign investments were all noted. It is quite possible that Algeria’s poor business climate will affect the diaspora and particularly highly skilled migrants. If the Algerian public authorities fail at credible and sustainable economic, social and cultural development, civil society, which has gradually developed within the highly skilled diaspora, will very likely wither. In fact, the participation of the diaspora in Algeria will be largely irrelevant if the country remains unattractive to foreign investment.

Notes * 1. 2. 3.

Text reviewed and amended by Aure´lie Boursier. Ministry of Plan, Statistics Department, 1988. A. Benachenhou, Review Tiers-monde, 1992. According to the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (data from February 2013), since the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’, 662 persons exercising a liberal profession, 771 academics/researchers and 577 company heads have left Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon to settle in Algeria.

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4. It is perhaps a mistake to class graduates (Bac þ 4, and even Bac þ5 and 6), who acquired their degrees in Algeria between 1990 and 2010 as highly skilled. This was a time when university education faced a noticeable falling off in quality, a phenomenon ascribable to several causes: weakness of the university staffing; Arabisation; worsening of work conditions of researchers and students; and the over-population of universities and higher education institutes, where it is not rare to see eight students sleeping in the same room.

CHAPTER 13 THE ARAB SPRING AND SUDAN BRAIN DRAIN Munzoul Assal

Introduction While for some Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, the Arab Spring brought down dictators and ushered in a new era of democracy and freedom, its clement weather did not reach Sudan. Taking the cue from neighbouring Egypt and Libya, the young of Sudan staged many protests in June 2012 in Khartoum and other major cities in Sudan. The regime in Khartoum, however, survived these fierce but limited protests. The government employed sheer force and intimidation, and manipulated the media so to scare people into believing that the downfall of the regime would mean the disintegration of the country. The weakness of the opposition parties also contributed to the ultimate failure of the protests. The protests of June 2012 were brought on by political repression and, in part, by the economic hardship resulting from the secession of South Sudan. The failure of the ‘Sudanese Spring’ coupled with dire economic conditions prompted the emigration of talents, particularly university professors, thus adding to the number of highly skilled abroad (Assal, 2010). These new migrants left the country in their thousands in the second half of 2012, heading off particularly to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries. But the Arab Spring also opened up other employment opportunities: Libya offers salaries to Sudanese professors many times those offered in Sudan.

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Sudan is now experiencing brain drain in as much as the emigrants leaving the country (especially the university professors) are highly qualified. It takes between 10 to 15 years for university teaching assistants to obtain a PhD in the country. The total number of university professors (those with PhDs) in Sudan in 2012 was 12,000. Around 10 per cent left the country in the course of that year. Unfortunately there have been no efforts on the part of the Sudanese government to curb this migration because, it has been alleged, there is no shortage of professors in Sudan. The literature on the Arab Spring is vast and cannot be dealt with here in this chapter. Of relevance and interest are, instead, the implications of the emigration of highly skilled Sudanese migrants. The literature on migration contains many definitions that deal with different categories of migrants. For the purposes of this chapter, highly skilled migrants include all tertiary educated migrants, regardless of whether or not their migration was voluntary and regardless of whether they migrated for economic or political reasons. Sudan actually represents a case where the distinction between voluntary and forced migration is extremely difficult to make (Hamid, 1996; Lucas, 2001; Elnur, 2002). The Sudanese situation presents many conceptual and analytical challenges with regards to highly skilled migration and other categories, too. Sudan is both a sending and a receiving country; in terms of economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. By 2007 there were 722,794 refugees in Sudan including Eritreans (60 per cent), Chadians (20 per cent) and Ethiopians (13 per cent). There were also Ugandan, Congolese and Somali migrants (Sudan Population Council, 2009). Another interesting development is the recent arrival of domestic workers from Asian countries including the Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh. In the last years, Sudan additionally received hundreds of thousands of Egyptians.1 The reception of highly skilled foreign nationals and refugees is, however, again beyond the scope of this paper. The importance and relevance of highly skilled migration can be studied from different perspectives. One can look at it from the perspective of remittances and contributions to household economies. Alternatively, highly skilled migration could also be conceptualised through its contribution to development. Generally, however, we can say that in recent years, there has been a growing interest in highly skilled migration. Attention has focused on whether or not highly skilled

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migration represents a brain drain. The debate about whether the migration of highly skilled persons represents a drain or gain is not new, and the answer to this question does not rest with either the receiving or sending countries alone. As this chapter shows, within the same country, highly skilled migration can be simultaneously a gain and a drain. This chapter is an updated version of an earlier article on highly skilled migration from Sudan (Assal, 2010). Since there have been no systematic efforts to study and document highly skilled migration, and since there is a lack of reliable data, the chapter is an attempt to provide a reliable overview for Sudan. It provides a general background on emigration, especially to the Gulf. It particularly examines the links between higher education policies and the increase in the number of highly skilled Sudanese emigrants. The migration of medical professionals and university professors is used to illustrate the extent of highly skilled migration. The policy environment with regard to migration is also discussed, with a view to determining its impact on highly skilled migration. Highly skilled migrants include all tertiary-educated migrants, whether or not their migration was voluntary and whether they migrated for economic or political reasons. But for the purposes of this chapter and also for the sake of simplicity and clarity, I will limit my analysis to migrants who travel for economic purposes and on the basis of qualifications that they had acquired when migration took place. Data for the article is drawn from a variety of sources, notably the Sudan Population Council, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development, and the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad.

Sudanese emigration: the Gulf Economic migration across international boundaries has long been a feature of livelihood strategies in Sudan. International migration generally follows a certain pattern: Gulf countries (male dominated) and Libya for semi-skilled labourers (Black et al., 2008). However, it is difficult to gauge the numbers of migrants involved, their destinations, the nature of their work, the volume of their remittances and any behavioural attributes related to their movements. The discovery of oil in the Gulf and in Libya2 and the subsequent boom during the 1970s and 1980s intensified labour migration and emphasised the role of

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external migration in the Sudanese economy. As far back as 1988, Galal el-Din (1988: 293) estimated the number of Sudanese migrants in Arab oil countries at 207,000. Abusharaf (2002: 73), meanwhile, provided a figure of 1,000,000. The purpose of external migration during the 1970s and 1980s was primarily economic. It is hard to document the economic contribution of Sudanese expatriates in the Gulf to gross national product (GNP), but judging from the numbers of expatriates, their contribution to families is significant. The economic success of Gulf migrants during the 1970s and 1980s was glorified, for example, in wedding songs that encouraged young men to migrate (Abusharaf, 2002: 174). The glamour of Gulf expatriates waned in the 1990s due to several factors in Sudan and the Gulf countries. In Sudan, the 1989 military coup inaugurated a long period of suffering, the effects of which are still felt.3 The purge carried out by the military government, along with economic policies that jeopardised whole segments of the population, siphoned off the savings of expatriates and increased their social and economic burdens (Assal, 2006: 5). This purge included the sacking of qualified civil servants whose loyalty to the new regime was in doubt. Between 1989 and 2003, the total number of those sacked came to 122,000 public sector employees, or 20 per cent of the same (SHRW, 2004: 14).4 Economic policies, notably privatisation, also resulted in the loss of jobs.5 The Sudanese in the Gulf faced yet another challenge during the period: the Gulf war of 1990 in which the Sudanese government sided with Iraq. Sudanese expatriates were hit hard by the conflict (Assal, 2004: 43–6). As a consequence, some expatriates (in Kuwait) were expelled and lost their savings and entitlements.

Basic data on international migration From 2002 to 2007, the level of emigration and immigration significantly increased. The total number of annual overseas arrivals and departures of nationals and foreign nationals increased 134 per cent in six years, from 532,064 in 2002 to 1,242,617 in 2007. Likewise, the number of Sudanese migrants departing or coming from other countries also rose significantly in the same years (2002–7). Departures increased from 185,985 to 417,359 (a 124 per cent increase) and arrivals increased from 228,265 to 388,930 (a 70 per cent increase). Since 2004,

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departures have exceeded arrivals, which means that net migration in Sudan is negative (Population Council 2009: 43). According to the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad (SSWA), the number of Sudanese citizens working outside the country in 2008 was 799,020 distributed across 108 countries. Saudi Arabia has the largest share of Sudanese expatriates. Figures show that there were 513,411 Sudanese migrants in Saudi Arabia in 2008, 64.2 per cent of the total number of Sudanese migrants working abroad. The table below gives the number and distribution of Sudanese expatriates in major Arab countries. Table 13.1 above provides estimates for the number of Sudanese migrants in Arab countries, the major destinations for Sudanese migrants. As can be seen, Egypt is not mentioned as a country of destination for Sudanese migrants. Historically, Egypt has been a popular destination for Sudanese nationals, though not as a country where they, skilled or otherwise, seek work. There is no accurate estimate for the number of Sudanese migrants in Egypt, but the number ranges between two and three million.

Highly skilled labour migration Databases on skilled Sudanese migrants working abroad are inadequate. Prior to 2007, no detailed databases existed. Also, the age and gender distribution of highly skilled migrants are not available. Table 13.2 Table 13.1

Number of Sudanese expatriates in some Arab countries

Country

Number of Sudanese expatriates

Saudi Arabia Libya United Arab Emirates Iraq Qatar Yemen Kuwait Oman Total Source: Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad 2009.

513,411 56,617 54,314 52,301 19,774 19,528 9,416 7,138 732,499

214 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Table 13.2 Highly skilled Sudanese migrants by profession in 2010 Category Medical specialists General practitioners Medical assistants Veterinarians Pharmacists Agricultural engineers Technical engineers College engineers Professors Lecturers Associate and assistant professors Seconded teachers Judges Lawyers Legal advisers Investors and businessmen Managers and organisations experts Employees Manual workers Soldiers Job seekers Not stated TOTAL

Total

Males

Females

999 6,545 175 931 909 692 2,181 11,256 876 1,298 579 4,366 208 679 444 669 176 90,705 480,397 921 188,342 1,029 794,377

761 4,857 130 563 642 453 1,573 9,121 732 894 414 3,443 162 506 303 624 149 71,841 369,380 679 109,406 879 577,512

238 1,688 45 368 267 239 608 2,135 144 404 165 923 46 173 141 45 27 18,864 111,017 242 78,936 150 216,865

Source: IOM, 2011.

shows the professional distribution of Sudanese migrants. Of the different categories in the table, two groups are of special interest and are central to the argument made in this chapter. These are medical professionals (including medical specialists, general practitioners, medical assistants, and pharmacists) and university professors (including professors, associate and assistant professors, and lecturers). There are respectively 8,628 and 2,753. The analysis of these two categories will be pursued after a discussion of higher education policies and their role in migration. Table 13.3 illustrates the number of registered contracts authenticated by the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development. The total

15,680 86 254 – 13 – 3 14 0 0 0 1 16050

Saudi Arabia U.A.E Qatar Kuwait Oman Bahrain Yemen Jordan Libya Lebanon UK Others Total

39,170 1,143 485 – 17 – 4 21 6 0 0 1 40846

1999 33,361 1,386 742 11 19 26 – 3 3 0 0 0 35551

2000 28,802 1,358 530 20 42 0 – 0 0 0 0 9 30752

2001 28,834 994 494 38 235 20 25 1 5 0 2 2 30648

2002

Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development, 2009.

1998 17,392 1,001 312 147 42 8 9 1 3 0 0 6 18918

2003 14,904 1,010 272 227 85 7 4 4 0 1 0 0 16514

2004 9,885 792 252 120 121 2 1 1 0 0 0 10 11154

2005

Number of authenticated contracts during 1998– 2007 by country of destination

Year/Country

Table 13.3 6,825 813 478 146 56 1 3 1 4 2 0 10 8329

2006 11,732 1,015 636 173 121 6 7 1 4 1 1 0 13697

2007

206,585 9,598 4,455 882 751 70 56 47 25 4 3 39 222515

Total

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number of these contracts is far less than the total number of emigrants shown in Table 13.2. Not all contracts go through the Ministry of Labour.

Higher education and migration The increase in the number of highly skilled Sudanese migrants is related to higher education policies implemented during the 1990s. In that period the student intake in universities jumped from 6,080 in 1989 to 13,210 in 1990–1 and to 38,623 in 1999– 2000. The number of female students rose by 40 per cent in 1995. In 2008 132,047 students were admitted to higher education institutions at the bachelor and higher diploma levels.6 The number of public universities increased from five universities and one polytechnic in 1989 to 26 universities in 1996 (the polytechnic, Khartoum Technical Institute, became a university). The number of private higher education institutions increased from one in 1989 to 16 in 1996 and to more than 22 in 2008. Over the last three to four years, an average 100,000 students in different specialisations graduated from higher education institutions. The increase was not well planned either in terms of total institutions or in terms of students. It was rather a political decision. One motivation for the increase in student numbers was financial. While the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR) can decide on a ceiling for admission to universities, universities admit more students for more revenue. Additionally, higher education institutions were also allowed to offer intermediate diploma programmes (El-Tom, 2006: 55). In effect, a mismatch was created between education and employment and, therefore, we can talk about ‘brain waste’. Given the fact that higher education institutions in Sudan are poorly equipped, in terms of staff and other facilities, the education exported abroad through skilled migrants does not, it might be argued, constitute a loss for Sudan. However, there are exceptions to this as we shall see below. The key point here is that the excess supply of graduates in the country reflects a governmental education policy that is not matched by job opportunities. A look at the number of medicine graduates provides a useful example for highly skilled migration in Sudan. There are 31 faculties of medicine in Sudan from which 3,000 physicians graduate each year.7 During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Sudanese Ministry of Health was facing a shortage in medical personnel (general practitioners and

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specialists) and so the Ministry banned the emigration of physicians. The situation changed in the late 1990s and currently there are thousands of medicine graduates who are unemployed in Sudan. The increase in the number of medicine faculties and students was not linked to the capacities of hospitals and training facilities for physicians, and there is no coordination between the ministries of health and higher education. While there are thousands of unemployed physicians, there is an acute shortage in specialists (consultants). The Sudanese Medical Council, established in 1999, is entrusted with the training of medical specialists. Between 1999 and 2009, the council trained 1,350 specialists; i.e. 135 specialists per year, while the need in Sudan would be closer to 500 specialists per year.8 It is estimated that 800 doctors migrate each year following on from the expansion in medical education during the 1990s. The Observatory Eye, a medical newsletter in Sudan, reports that of 21,000 doctors registered in Sudan, 12,000 (nearly 60 per cent) are now abroad. The brain drain among pharmacists is, likewise, considerable, involving 25 per cent of the total stock. The major destination countries for doctors and pharmacists include the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom and Ireland.9 The unemployment rate in Sudan was estimated at 28 per cent in 2008. It was reported that 57,000 graduates were unemployed.10 The public sector in Sudan is not enticing and for many graduates the private sector or the informal sector provides the best avenues for employment. Given the fact that the labour market does not have the capacity to absorb huge numbers of graduates, international migration represents one reasonable alternative. In this regard, the general assumption that the migration of highly skilled persons represents a brain drain does not hold up, at least not in general terms. However, the migration of medical specialists can justly be called a loss or brain drain since there is a shortage of doctors in Sudan.11 Likewise, the migration of university professors is a loss for higher education institutions and, indeed, for the country as a whole. The skills of specialists transferred through emigration represent the loss of a scarce resource in Sudan. It is estimated that the Sudanese spend $500 million annually seeking medical treatment outside Sudan. In addition to the number of emigrant university professors mentioned in Table 13.2, 2012 witnessed the migration of significant numbers of university staff, especially to Saudi Arabia. In June 2012, the State

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Minister for Higher Education requested that parliament intervene to support higher education. He stated that in one month 180 professors had left the country for Saudi Arabia, all of whom were employed by one Saudi university. In 2011, 625 professors left the country.12 While Saudi Arabia represents the main drain on Sudanese talents (especially professors), following the Arab Spring, Libya offered employment opportunities to Sudanese professors. To put all this in perspective: a monthly wage of USD 7,000 is offered in Libya. In Sudan, due to the weakness of Sudanese currency, the monthly wages for professors, associate professors, assistant professors and lecturers stands at respectively USD 662, 500, 486, and less than 400. This is the lowest salary package for academics in the Arab world (Abuelnur, 2012). The Arab Spring is thus contributing to the Sudanese brain drain in two ways: first, the absence of any political change in Sudan has frustrated academics and, combined with economic hardship, led to migration; then, second, its success in countries like Libya opened up opportunities for highly skilled professionals, like university professors, abroad.

Institutional and policy framework This section will assess the institutional and policy framework and its impact on highly skilled migration trends. To start with, there is no single or coherent emigration policy in Sudan. There are many factors that lie behind this. Above all, there is the fact that there are many institutions that are entrusted with the regulation of external migration. The Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development, National Intelligence and Security, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are among the institutions that are part of the policy framework mechanisms for international migration.13 There are other institutions that are either autonomous bodies or subsidiaries and that are also part of policy frameworks. One such institution is the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad. This section looks at how emigration policies are formulated. The Ministry of Interior is the first institution that regulates international migration. The basic functions which the Ministry undertakes with regard to facilitating travel and emigration include the following: (1) issuing passports; (2) emergency travel documents; (3) exit visas;14 (4) renewals of passports; and (5) the addition of children to

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the passports of their parents.15 The Passports, Immigration and Nationality Law came into effect in 1957 and continued until 1994 when a new law was introduced. The law specifies certain ports as entry and exit points through which departures and arrivals must pass. In other words, obtaining an exit visa alone is not always enough to leave the country. The Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development oversees contractual matters for those who intend to work abroad. It certifies work contracts based on art. (24) of the 1974 Labour Law. This law gives the right to anyone who wants to work abroad to register at the Ministry of Labour. Persons wishing to register must be 18 years or older. The documents needed for registration include a valid passport, credentials of experience, a birth certificate, and any other documents deemed necessary by the Ministry. Article (42) of Sudan’s Interim Constitution of 2005 grants Sudanese citizens the right to travel inside and outside the country. The 1974 Labour Law also grants the same right. Here are some of the laws that have regulated emigration: .

.

. . .

in 1979, the then President Jaafar Numeiri issued decree No. 781 on the basis of which the Central Administration for Expatriate Affairs was created. CAEA was part of the Council of Ministers and was under the supervision of the President; the Organization of Incentives of the Sudanese Working Abroad Act was issued in 1986. This was followed by the 1986 Compulsory National Contribution Act; the 1986 Act was nullified in 1989 and replaced with another act (with the same title as that of 1986); the 1989 Act was replaced with the 1993 Expatriates Act; in 1998, the Organization of the Affairs of the Sudanese Working Abroad Act was issued. This Act nullified the previous ones and remains in use.

Article (4) of the 1998 Act stipulated the establishment of the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad. The Act lists the following as functions of the Secretariat: (1) implementation of state policies with regard to international migration, in collaboration with other relevant institutions; (2) the organising of the relationship between expatriates

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and the state; (3) responsibility for the interests of expatriates inside and outside Sudan; (4) the development of the skills of expatriates; (5) recommendations with regard to policies pertaining to international migration; (6) a contribution to national gross product; and (7) any other objectives that might be appropriate. Articles (29) and (30) specified obligations and rights. Article (29a) and (29b) stated that expatriates are obliged to pay ‘national contributions’ and zakat.16 Article (2) describes the rights which expatriates enjoy. This includes, to a certain extent, custom exemptions, the right to general and higher education for migrant children, and entitlement to residential plots.17 Article (4) states that no expatriate will have their passport renewed or obtain an exit visa if he/she does not pay their national contribution and zakat as stipulated in Art. (29). These different Acts include difficulties. Some of the salient problems are: (1) a failure to tackle all issues related to international migration; (2) the fact that they are mainly concerned with ensuring expatriates’ financial contributions; and (3) the fact that they deal only with Sudanese expatriates registered at the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad. One of the functions of the Secretariat is to curb undesired international migration. In general terms, however, the government in Sudan seems to encourage migration, particularly to the Gulf countries as international migration is a source of foreign currency. Looking at the institutional policy environment, it can be said that institutional frameworks are not well structured or developed to deal effectively with highly skilled migration. Rather there are bits and pieces of policies administered by different bodies that lack coordination and synergies. The lack of a coherent institutional framework results in poor data and poor planning with regard to highly skilled migration.

Conclusions Sudan experienced the emigration of its highly skilled persons long before the Arab Spring. While the Arab Spring is yet to come to Sudan, it did affect the country especially with regard to the migration of highly skilled professionals. Higher education policies adopted in the 1990s resulted in a substantial increase in universities and other higher education institutions, as well as a dramatic increase in the number of

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students there. The different higher education institutions have supplied the labour market with an average of 100,000 graduates over the last three years. The Sudanese labour market cannot absorb these numbers and, therefore, international migration is one way for people to seek employment. Higher education in Sudan over-produces highly skilled workers. The increase in the number of universities and students was a political decision that was not subjected to careful consideration. The prime reasons for such an increase were political and financial. It is through the increase in students’ intake that higher education institutions are able to run their programmes in lieu of sufficient state funding. Thus, such increases are not a means to attain development or to serve the objective of producing the skilled workers needed for the local labour market. There is a dearth of data on highly skilled migrants in Sudan, and the data that does exist has gaps. For instance, the exact level of education is not mentioned for all highly skilled migrants. While there is the categorisation of highly skilled migrants by profession (table 2), there is no mention of their education level, though it is possible to gauge this by looking at the professions of migrants. For instance, looking at university professors and legal professionals it is possible to find the education level attained by persons in these categories. Moreover, information on highly skilled migrants lacks, too, data on gender. There is a gamut of institutions that deal with international migration, whether of skilled workers or of other categories. Yet, there is lack of synergy between these different institutions. The Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence and Security, and the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad are among the major institutions that deal with migration issues. In terms of policies, there are many laws that have been issued over the last three decades. These laws or acts have mainly dealt with emigration issues or with expatriate Sudanese. The 1998 Act is currently in place. The most recent policy action was the establishment of the Higher Council for Migration in 2008. The council is chaired by the Vice President of Sudan. This is a new development in state policies towards migration. The council has yet to embark on programmes that can be looked at or evaluated. While the article provided information on Sudan as a sending country, there is a need to look at the receiving end, particularly of the

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Gulf countries. The data in the article reveal that Sudanese expatriates are concentrated in certain oil-producing countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Libya, the UAE and Qatar). An examination of the receiving end would be useful as the viability of emigration, particularly that of highly skilled migration, is contingent on a propitious policy environment in both sending and receiving countries. Given the analysis and arguments set out in this chapter, the following recommendations are offered: 1. The government should streamline education and development policies in Sudan. The increase in the number of both higher education institutions and students has led so far to brain waste. The numbers of students admitted to higher education institutions need to be reconsidered so as to match labour market and development needs; 2. There is the need for a clear policy framework for migration. The establishment of the Higher Council for Migration is commendable; 3. A single institution should be entrusted with highly skilled or generally international migration issues so as to harmonise state policies.

Notes 1. In 2007, the number of foreign nationals granted residence permits in Sudan was 35,449. For more details on the total numbers of foreign nationals granted residence permits during 1989 –2007 (Sudan Population Council, 2009, p. 57). 2. Migration to Libya has historically been an important dimension in the economy of the Darfur region, which borders Libya. People from Darfur migrate to Libya on foot and by camel, and the journey takes around 30 days. The caravans, each led by a desert expert (locally known as a khabeer), travel by night and rest during the day. The introduction of trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles accelerated the process of migration and trade. For more on migration from Darfur to Libya and remittances, (Young, 2005). 3. Due to the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and the privatisation policies adopted by the government in 1990, subsides were removed from education and health services in Sudan. 4. This figure does not include those who lost their jobs due to the privatisation of public institutions and corporations. 5. The latest public institution to be privatised was Sudan Postal Services. The number of employees is 11,000. Due to privatisation, 50 per cent of employees

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7. 8. 9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

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will lose their jobs (http://www.rayaam.info/News_view.aspx?pid¼ 444&id ¼ 23909). Al-Ayam Newspaper, volume 9170, 29 July 2008. This figure represents the number of students who applied for admission during the first round. The number could be higher as more students are admitted during the second round of applications. In addition to the normal admission quota, students are also admitted through ‘private admission’ where places are made available for students with lower grades who can pay tuition fees at higher rates. Professor Mamoun Humeida, Vice-Chancellor, University of Medical Sciences and Technology, in an interview in Akhirlahaza Newspaper, 1 October, 2009 (http://www.akhirlahza.net/news/porta...ype¼3&id¼25840). Ibid. The Observatory Eye, Vol. (2), Issue No. 1, January 2009. The word ‘doctors’ is used ambiguously in the newsletter: does it stand for ‘physicians’ or ‘specialists’? This distinction is important in as much as migration by physicians or general practitioners is not considered brain drain, while that of specialists is. Al-Ayam Newspaper, vol. 9170, 29 July 2008. However, this figure (57,000) represents only those who registered their names with the Public Service Office. Many graduates either migrate or get employment in the private sector. The fact that medical institutions cannot absorb all physicians is not predicated on the capacities of these institutions alone. There is a problem in the distribution of both physicians and medical institutions in Sudan. While Khartoum and other major cities and towns are well covered, remote areas in the countryside are not. Sudan Tribune, 19 January 2013. Sometimes there are different departments or sections within the same ministry or institution that deal with emigration. For instance, the Ministry of Interior has many sections whose functions sometimes overlap. Sudan is among the very few countries that still apply exit visas. Obtaining an exit visa is a must for any Sudanese citizen who intends to travel abroad. For the Ministry of Interior, the exit visa is an important source of revenue. For instance, in 2007 the immigration authorities issued 416,331 exit visas. In terms of money, this amounts to $16.7 million per year. In 2009, Sudan introduced the so-called ‘electronic or machine readable passports’. Children can no longer be added to their parents’ passports. Every child must have a separate passport. The national contribution is a lump sum levied on expatriates. Until 2005, expatriates were required to pay $375 as an annual national contribution. In 2005, the Council of Ministers reduced this amount to $100 per annum. For more information see www.sswa.sd. It must be noted that expatriates pay higher tuition fees for the education of their children.

CHAPTER 14 HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION FROM MAURITANIA: SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS AND QUESTIONS Zekeria Ould Ahmed-Salem

Introduction Historically, migrants to Mauritania come from the neighbouring states of Sahel and French-speaking Africa. Migration from Mauritania, meanwhile, is towards neighbouring countries, and, to a much lesser extent towards Europe and the Gulf. In the mid-2000s, illegal immigrants from Mauritania began to sail to the Canary Islands and the number of transit migrants increased as a result. There were, for example, more than 10,000 deportations in 2006. Since then, this rate has been drastically lowered through flow controls, set up jointly by the EU and the authorities in Nouakchott. Highly skilled migration is, to date, not a priority. The focus has been, instead, on irregular migration, in particular transit migration towards the European Union. However, as we will show below, highly skilled migration has influenced both the way in which migration has been considered and also the political evolution of the country. Now we can no longer say that highly skilled migration is insignificant in Mauritania. In the 1990s and the 2000s, the presence of an intellectual diaspora abroad acted as a kind of mirror for political problems at home. That was particularly true in terms of ethnic

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tension, and in the struggle against authoritarianism and the emergence of a virtual public space where political discussions were held locally but also globally.

Imaginary problems? Mauritania does not attract highly skilled immigrants. This category is not, in any case, subject to any specific legislation since immigration, which is mainly African, is little regulated and not usually skilled: 80 per cent of foreign nationals in Mauritania are unskilled and work in secondary jobs (RIM Ministry of Employment, Integration and Vocational Training, 2007). In fact, out of nearly 200,000 foreign nationals present in the country, few have had higher education. A survey conducted in the three major cities of Nouadhibou, Nouakchott and Rosso reveals that only 6.9 per cent of surveyed foreign nationals classified themselves as being highly skilled.1 Admittedly, there are qualified foreign technicians employed in local industry. But these are insignificant in relation to the narrowness of the local industrial infrastructure. The principal mining company of the country, la Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle et Minie`re (SNIM), has, for 20 years, ‘Mauritanised’ its staff.2 During the last five years, the growing presence of foreign companies in mining and telecommunications has resulted in a considerable number of highly skilled foreign executives. It is, however, difficult to consider these executives as immigrants. They did not arrive by themselves, or, indeed, at the instigation of the authorities of the country. Most of them live in their workplaces, in the mining areas, without any contact with the rest of the country, in a sector that is export oriented. They operate, then, in isolation in what are effectively mining enclaves. The outsourced model of exploitation of mineral raw material resources does not allow ‘the massive import of foreign labour’ as promised by former president, Maˆaouya Ould Taya (1984 – 2005). However, the outsourcing of recruitment in certain sectors operated by foreign firms has led to protests on the part of Mauritanian graduates who believe that they are being marginalised. The press has, periodically,3 covered protests whose purpose was to get the authorities to force foreign mining companies to fulfil their commitments to technology transfer and local staff training. But this goal is rarely achieved because these firms tend to recruit only manual

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workers locally. Then, some firms prefer to recruit in the sub-region rather than in Mauritania itself. Behind the increasing protests of unemployed graduates, there is a problem of language, of education and of sector: most people entering the labour market in Mauritania were educated in literary subjects and in Arabic. This gap between education and the needs of the labour market has been repeatedly criticised by the authorities. It is the main obstacle to the recruitment of national graduates in technical areas. Over the last 20 years, the state, lacking resources and students from major Western or African universities, has had to accept almost all scholarship offers coming from abroad, without education being adjusted to the needs of the national or international economy. Similarly, while new graduates have given priority to ‘technical and scientific’ education, the hazards of living abroad forced some students to change their curriculum. They define their priorities according to their specialisation and their personal objectives and their own capacities. Finally, in OECD countries, companies often find themselves in competition with poor countries in recruiting the best candidates, particularly when these candidates are leaving schools and universities in the west. Thus poor countries indirectly and involuntarily provide a highly skilled workforce for rich countries. Mauritania is no exception to this rule. But, given the small number of Mauritanian students in developed economies (fewer than 1,000 for all specialities), we cannot speak about a massive Mauritanian brain drain. What though about the highly skilled workers that can be ‘exported’ by Mauritania?

Can a skilled workforce be found? The market for higher education in Mauritania can hardly provide a skilled workforce for the domestic market, let alone a surplus to send abroad. Relatively high unemployment rates (approximately 31.2 per cent) (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 2010) can certainly be explained by the inability of the economy to absorb potential candidates for employment. The glaring mismatch, though, is between the education received and the job market. According to one study only 10 per cent of graduates from the University of Nouakchott were trained in applied sciences (Ould El Mahjoub, 2006). Some countries in the region encourage highly skilled emigration. Mauritania though does not do so. Agreements on the regulation of flows

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that exist between neighbours (Mali, Senegal, Tunisia or Morocco) do not seem to concern this area. Similarly, we are not aware of agreements between Mauritania and other countries in this area. The circular migration agreement signed with Spain certainly does not concern highly skilled migration. It is true that the competitiveness of a structurally depressed job market remains in the background given the poverty that affects half the population.4 Public policies have, since the mid 1980s, set other priorities instead of university education: for one, the elimination of illiteracy (45 per cent of the country is illiterate (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 2010)) and, since the early 1990s, skilled manpower in the technical professions. Since 2000, the policy choice has been to strengthen vocational and technical training centres so as to train agents and middle executives for the local job market. It is assumed that, in an economy with an under-developed tertiary sector and with non-existent industry, highly skilled workers are not a priority. The education reform launched in 1999, the ‘Sectoral letter of educational policy’ of 2001, as well as the Education-Training projects have all proposed the introduction of vocational courses in higher education. Most recently, technical colleges like the Institut Supe´rieur d’Etudes Techniques Agricoles (ISET) and the E´cole des Mines of Mauritania have been set up. But only the first of these institutions has been operational since 2009. The objectives of this policy are to ensure adequate ‘education for the national job market’. However, until recently, tertiary institutions were created: either to give traditional general education, which was not vocational but which had low costs (economics, law, languages, ‘hard’ sciences and mathematics etc.) at the University of Nouakchott; or to train educators intended for primary and secondary cycles (Ecole Nationale des Instituteurs and l’Ecole Normale Supe´rieure). The University of Nouakchott was created in 1981. It was set up to accommodate the many graduates that the State could no longer afford to send abroad for higher education. It was not set up with long-term goals: namely, to train a skilled workforce for the local or international market. Under these conditions, it is clear that locally trained graduates do little to meet job market needs, and even less to boost the country in the global competition for skills. Moreover, the inadequacy of education in Mauritania could explain the levelling down of administrative and technical staff. In a country

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where the public sector, understood broadly, remains a major employer, competition in skills is doubtful. The disconnect between skills and jobs in the public sector is a factor which weighs heavily on the nature and the perception of skilled employment. The recruitment of elites is a highly politicised process and lacks transparency (Ould Ahmed Salem, 2000). This is particularly true of the highest management positions wherein politicisation dominates and where actual qualifications slip further and further into the background. Insecurity in employment because of political sacking (and promotion) could make ‘brain drain’ more significant in the future. During the 1990s, it was more difficult to find a skilled job if one was reckoned an opposition activist. This is expressed in some studies euphemistically: ‘The term “labour market” does not necessarily mean, in Mauritania, the existence of a physical place allowing confrontation between job providers and jobseekers’ (Ould El Mahjoub, 2006). Positions are not awarded in a transparent manner and this, of course, reduces the level of confidence in the system overall. The weight of regional, tribal, ethnic balances has been there, since independence. The sharing of ‘functions’ and jobs are subject to these balances. But this is not only true in the public sector. Private companies are also subject to tribal criteria and ethno-regional affinities, even for the most skilled and the most specialised jobs. Individual/family ‘businesses’ have recruitment procedures based on kinship, friendship and networks. The nature of Mauritanian entrepreneurship contributes to this state of affairs. We are speaking of little industry with a concentration on services: banks, insurance companies and import firms in a country, which imports almost everything that it consumes. We should also remember the political pressure exerted on employers to attune to the preferences of a given political or administrative regime. Business owners, in fact, tend to avoid arguments with the authorities. After all, the continuity of their business depends on said authorities, given that the state is at the centre of the economy, both as a customer and as an access provider to exploitable national resources. In this context, the attraction exerted on graduates trained abroad or, for that matter, in Mauritania itself is difficult to assess given the vagueness in the way in which career-advancement opportunities arise. Work conditions are not encouraging. There is the struggle to render profitable a position of power held in state administration or to

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undertake a ‘profitable’ job in the private sector duly authorised by an entrepreneur, a job based on gifts and favours. All these conditions mean that Mauritania does not produce a skilled elite and that it fails too in attracting executives who have been trained abroad.

Diaspora and qualification There are nearly 250,000 Mauritanians living abroad, that is 8 per cent of the total population. But the emigration of Mauritanians to SubSaharan Africa is largely made up of unskilled rural nationals ruined by the severe droughts of the 1970s, nationals who became retailers: this is the most important form of emigration in numerical terms.5 In Saudi Arabia, the Mauritanian community numbers some 20,000 individuals. This community consists of those attracted both by the sanctity of the country and the benefits offered by the Saudi Welfare State. The highly skilled included those qualified in religious sciences and those who have come to Saudi Arabia through teaching, research and theological exchanges. In this intellectual field, Mauritanians from the Arab-Berber majority in particular, have a comparative advantage because of the recognised performances of famous Mahzir (sing Mahzara: traditional teaching centres for religious sciences) and religious training institutes like the Higher institute of Islamic Studies and Research (Institut supe´rieur d’Etudes et de Recherches islamiques, ISERI) of Nouakchott. The settling of Mauritanians in Mecca or Medina, rather than in Riyadh or Jeddah, points to the religious brain drain which has occurred over the past 60 years. The installation of one or more imams or scholars of the same tribe in a Saudi mosque or university starts a migration network that creates ‘a tribal grouping’ abroad. Some tribes like Ideyboussat, Awlad Abyayri and Tajakanett are clearly dominant. However, there are no statistics which would make it possible to assess this category of migrants. Similarly, among the 4,000 Mauritanians established in the United Arab Emirates, it is not known how many practise intellectual/religious professions, which can be considered to be moderately or highly skilled. However, the agreements between Mauritania and these countries relates to professions requiring a high qualification such as those of Islamic magistrates, teachers and preachers (Ould Ahmed Salem, 2007). Gulf countries also often recruit police

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officers in Mauritania. In this specific case, it was noted that, attracted by the high wages and the prospect of living in rich countries, many higher graduates took advantage of this occasion to emigrate. The number of these candidates has increased as those leaving higher education struggled to find work in Mauritania. However this is long-term circular migration, with the workers returning at the end of five to ten years abroad. In recent times, more and more teachers of the University of Nouakchott have become highly skilled migrants (Research Centre for International Development, 2005). Likewise in the 2008 session of the Scientific Council of the Mauritanian Institute of Oceanographic and Fisheries Research (IMROP), it was noted that half of the centre’s specialists had left the Institute to work abroad.6 However, other than this specific case, little information on the profile or the destination of the highly skilled affected by this new process are available. It is known, for example, that Mauritanians are employed by Arab satellite channels (two dozen work with Al-Jazeera alone). There are also Mauritanians employed by foreign oil firms, these executives having been recruited directly at their training facilities in Europe and in the United States. Finally, it seems that in the United States, a small group of highly qualified Mauritanian immigrants settled in that country at the end of their studies: the number of Mauritanian students in this country being modest, the final number cannot be large. However, the Mauritanian diaspora has, since the end of the 1990s, been active and influential in Mauritanian politics. The reasons for this are both historical and political.

Skilled immigration and political crises During the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania (El Yessa, 2009) nearly 80,000 Mauritanian citizens, mainly coming from the Hallpularen black ethnic group, were expelled towards Senegal and Mali. Some of these refugees were later able to obtain visas of readmission in Western countries. This is the period when the number of political refugees from Mauritania increased in particular in northern and western Europe as well as in the United States. Regime changes then took place in Mauritania (between 2005 and 2007) so that the state finally recognised its wrongs and acceded to the request for an organised return of forced exiles living in Senegal. It is true that, meanwhile, the executives of the Mauritanian

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Black African community in exile worked and prospered in their respective host countries. In a study devoted to migrant refugees, an anthropologist made the following point (Fresia, 2006). The most skilled refugees knew how to cash in their political capital within the framework of the African Forces of the Liberation of Mauritania (FLAM, a Hallpularen nationalist political movement). They mobilised their academic capital, meanwhile, in order to play the role of intermediaries with the Senegalese authorities and the High Commission to Refugees, who managed the refugee camps in Senegal. But when relations between Senegal and Mauritania improved in the 1990s, these militant frameworks broke down in political and administrative terms. Their members, therefore, seized new opportunities in the West. The possibility of becoming a political refugee mattered not only for Halpularen and FLAM militants and it has worked in favour of other highly qualified immigrants in the United States as in Western Europe. Indeed, in the 1990s and the 2000s, asylum requests filed by Mauritanians at the French Office in charge of asylum (OFPRA) ranked second in numerical terms among all African nationalities! In fact, the community of senior Mauritanians abroad, naturally modest as it is, plays a significant role in national policy. And even if Mauritania has not strictly speaking been affected by the ‘Arab Spring’, the question of the politicisation of its diaspora has become important in the last years.

Political agenda and highly skilled migration As long as immigration was not about skilled people, then politicisation was not marked. But things changed with the political mobilisation of the diaspora in France and in the United States. This was particularly true in the second half of the 1990s, a period that corresponds to authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in Mauritania. Executives readily participated in national debates in a context where, despite formal pluralism, the authorities did not tolerate freedom of opinion, especially when it came to the international plans of said authorities. Some students were tempted under these conditions to become permanent emigrants. Many people then sought employment abroad or political refugee status, allowing them to continue to influence national political life without taking direct risks. This was all the more important as homecoming hardly guaranteed professional integration. The example of

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some activists, who were arrested and imprisoned during their holidays in the country, encouraged highly skilled immigration from the country, as well as the feeling of political insecurity among the young trained abroad. At the same time, during this difficult period in the history of the country, we see the emergence of several political groups fighting the regime of Ould Taya (1984–2005) from abroad, primarily by internet. Here it is worth underlining the importance of two post-graduate students from the University of Lyon who launched the ‘Mauritania.net’ forum in the 1990s. The success of this electronic platform was outstanding until its creators closed it, choosing to settle in the United States where, since 1996, they have worked in state-of-the-art technology companies. Charged with destabilisation attempts, FLAM and ‘Conscience and Resistance’ ramped up ‘electronic’ activism and published numerous compromising documents. They acted as effective proxies for a gagged domestic opposition. This means that the authorities often see skilled emigrants as agents of destabilisation and political radicalism. Since then forums have been put up in the country itself. Their authors are no longer punished today as, since at least 2005, there has been greater freedom in Mauritania. However, some activists are still persecuted and imprisoned. The most recent example is that of the host of the site Taqadoumy.com, Hanefi Ould Dahah, who studied in the United States. This activist was picked up during a stay at Nouakchott and thrown in prison in June 2009. He spent two years in prison for ‘indecency’. His site has not been closed so far even though it is regularly subject to cyber attacks. It is true that governmental suspicion focussed on the skilled expatriate communities, until, at least, the coup of 3 August 2005. But the regime which succeeded President Taya, led by Ely Ould Mohamed Vall (2005– 7) called on skills from the diaspora. This regime was particularly keen to find help to manage: the Mauritanian Company of Hydrocarbons; the Industrial and Mining National Company (SNIM), by far the largest company in the country; and the Central Bank of Mauritania. The persons thus co-opted had previously worked in the French company Total, in the United Nations and in the African Development Bank. Similarly, the government formed by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz shortly after his coup of 8 August 2008 included at least two people who had recently ‘returned’ to the country. Prime Minister, Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf, still in office at the

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time when these lines are written (January 2013) was appointed ambassador to Belgium in 2007, while he was already in Brussels as a consultant. Similarly, Mohamed-Mahmoud Mohamedou, Minister of Foreign Affairs from August 2008 to August 2009 was at Harvard University until his appointment in 2008 as Head of Department to the same ministry. This return of the highly skilled from abroad is specific, elitist and sometimes purely instrumental. It proves, nevertheless, that the qualified diaspora is often concerned with the politics of their country. This trend is very visible in the comments posted on Mauritanian current affair sites.7 Thus, during the 2008 coup, a group of activists abroad created a pro-democracy movement opposed to the coup. This group called ‘For Mauritania’ still exists and acts as a virtual political party. Its members lead a network within the country and can even mobilise activists for specific actions (demonstrations etc).8 This association was created in solidarity with President Sidi Ould Sheik Abdellahi (2007–8), elected in March 2007, and overthrown by the army. President Ould Sheik Abdallahi had committed himself to an active policy of integration for highly skilled immigrants in national life.

Life (and death?) of association in the skilled diaspora When Sidi Ould Sheik Abdallahi came to power in April 2007 he was immediately approached by representatives of the highly skilled diaspora, who expressed their desire to be associated with national life and who particularly wanted to vote in national elections. Thus the Appel Citoyen was launched for the Recognition of Mauritanians Abroad (ACREME), whose initiators are actually 70 highly qualified immigrants (professors, engineers, international civil servants) established in Africa, in the United States and in Europe. The list of the first signatories shows the variety of profiles and the home countries. Under the leadership of Dr Yahya Ould Hamidoun, researcher at CNRS (France) for nearly 30 years, the signatories received the explicit support of key national organisations: trade unions, political parties, civil society etc. During his travels in Europe and in the United States, the Head of State even received representatives from this group and had promised the right to vote to emigrants and the creation of a ministerial department for Mauritanians Abroad. And, in fact, a Secretariat of State for Mauritanians Abroad was created in July 2008 only to be removed after the coup d’etat

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that occurred 6 August 2008. This did not prevent though the qualified members of the Mauritanian community living abroad from continuing to launch initiatives, even if they were often, alas, isolated. For example, in 2009, Baˆ Ibrahima, an engineer trained at the E´cole Des Mines of SaintEtienne (France), holder of an MBA and, Toka Diagana, Mathematics Professor (Howard University, Washington), circulated a study on highly skilled Mauritanians and their possible contribution to the development of the country. But this initiative, on a now inactive website (http://www. greenlogo.com/rimCV), did not lead to any concrete steps. Other databases are also sometimes developed by individuals in order to identify Mauritanians working in international organisations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Bank for Development. We note that this type of initiative is always taken by the same people. These individuals though have real difficulty in getting their ideas to work: a mix of the difficult conditions found in their home country; and the lack of interest on the part of the authorities. However, things are slowly changing in this respect. We have recently seen the government taking specific initiatives with skilled labour – for example, doctors – in the context of a deficit faced in the country. On several occasions during 2012, the Mauritanian government expressed its intention to bring doctors from Maghreb countries (for example, from Tunisia) to work in public hospitals. This decision came after many unsuccessful calls launched by the Minister of Health who invited, without success, Mauritanian doctors abroad to return home. Hence, at the beginning of 2012, about 20 Tunisian doctors were invited to fill job vacancies in the country, and an agreement signed with the Sudanese government in January 2013 should provide a similar transfer of practitioners from this country towards Mauritania. We do not yet know how this new policy of labour importing will be extended to other sectors or even if it will be continued in the future. We do know, though, that this is an exceptional admission by the Mauritanian authorities, who now ready to recognise a deficit in this area. It is true that the ability of the national medical structures to receive foreign doctors are limited, given the lack of both skilled personnel and adequate facilities. This is a longstanding problem. Until then, despite the efforts of successive governments, hundreds of patients will be forced to go to neighbouring countries (Senegal, Morocco, and Tunisia) for treatment. The state itself had to spend significant sums to cover medical care abroad for its civil

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servants and their families. Created in 2005, the Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie Universel (health insurance) is often deficient precisely because of the exorbitant cost of medical trips abroad. Moreover, this recent call to foreign and national doctors in exile is a way of recognising that the Faculty of Medicine, created in 2006, is not yet able to provide the staff required by the national health sector. This official recognition of the need for highly skilled foreign workers, meanwhile, is an absolute novelty in the country. The only equivalent came, in the early 1980s, when Mauritania imported secondary school teachers, specialised particularly in biology and mathematics, to fill gaps in secondary and tertiary education. Since then, the country has achieved a relative selfsufficiency in the field thanks, in particular, to the dynamism of the Ecole Normale Supe´rieur of Nouakchott founded in 1983 and thanks also to the University of Nouakchott.

Conclusion In view of the crisis that affects its education system and the weakness of its vocational training network, Mauritania, a small country with a modest population, cannot play a significant role on the international skills market. The country itself has its own needs for skilled personnel, in particular in the field of health. For mining foreign companies bring their own technical and even administrative personnel. Outside this sector the country is hardly a destination for any international expertise and has failed to attract highly skilled resources from its diaspora. Moreover, it has seen growing numbers leaving the country thanks to the continuous success of its religious elites abroad and thanks too to the refusal of students trained abroad to return to Mauritania after their studies. The emigration of highly skilled people of this type is expected to grow still more as economic conditions deteriorate and as the global circulation of skills becomes the rule on the international market. However, this latter process is widely marked.9 The desperate need for doctors and the call for diaspora doctors to come home shows that the attitude of the Mauritanian government towards highly skilled migration is changing. On the political front, Mauritanian expatriates will, in any case, continue to play an important role in the country, particularly in political terms. It remains unclear to what extent the diaspora and associated issues will affect highly skilled migration from Mauritania.

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Notes 1. RIM Ministry of Employment, Integration and Vocational Training, Directorate for Employment, Study on the situation of foreign workers in Mauritania, Report of the preliminary results of the survey on the foreign labour in Mauritania, Nouakchott, May 2007, p. 131. 2. Nationalisation of the precursor of SNIM, the MIFERMA in 1974 was subject to a political decision o taken at the same time as the creation of a national currency and the breach of co-operation agreements with France, under pressure from a broad political movement. 3. See www.cridem.org, accessed on 22 September 2009. 4. More than 42 per cent of Mauritanians live on less than 1 dollar per day (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 2010). 5. For a study of this question read Santoir, 1975. 6. Le Quotidien de Nouakchott, 25 March 2008. 7. See for example www.cridem.org where the stakeholders who post a comment on the information given by the site are classed by their home countries. 8. www.fr.for-mauritania.org/. 9. See for a subtle perspective: Dzvimbo, 2003.

CONTRIBUTORS

Munzoul Assal Munzoul Assal is Associate Professor of Social Anthropology and Deputy Director of the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum. Prior to his current position he was the Director of Graduate Affairs at the same university. His research focuses on refugees, internal displacement and citizenship. His major publications include Sticky labels or rich ambiguities? diaspora and challenges of homemaking for Somalis and Sudanese in Norway (Bric, 2004), Diaspora within and without Africa: homogeneity, heterogeneity, variation (Uppsala, 2006), and Annotated bibliography of social research in Darfur (Bric, 2006).

Abderazak Bel Hadj Zekri Abderrazak Bel Haj Zekri is a sociologist who worked for public institutions in charge of employment and emigration, including the Office of Tunisians Abroad and who was the head of the Studies Department. He has given lectures at the National Institute of Labour and Social Studies and at the Institute of Social Studies in Tunis. He is a member of national commissions for employment and emigration. He is the Executive Director of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LTDH).

Hassan Boubakri Hassan Boubakri is a geography lecturer at the University of Sousse in Tunisia. He is Chairman of the Tunis Centre for Migration and Asylum

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(CeTuMA). He is an associate researcher at the Research Institute on Contemporary Maghreb (IRMC) under the supervision of the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and an associate member at UMR ‘Migrinter’ at the University of Poitiers in France. He is also a visiting professor at the University C¸a Foscari of Venice in Italy and at the University of Poitiers in France. He has published extensively on migration from Tunisia. His most recent publications include: Revolution and international migration in Tunisia (Migration Policy Centre Research Report 2013/04, 2013), De l’e´lan citoyen a` la mise en place d’une politique migratoire en Tunisie: l’accueil des re´fugie´s libyens en 2011 (Boubakri, Hassen & Potot, Swani, In Migrations et Socie´te´, 2012), Boubakri, Hassen & Potot, Swanie. 2011; and Exode et migrations en Tunisie: Quand la socie´te´ civile se re´veille (Boubakri, Hassen & Potot, Swanie, In Blog Me´diapart & Lettre de l’IRMC N86, 2011).

Aure´lie Boursier Aure´lie Boursier graduated from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, where she received a Masters Degree in Public Affairs. She also holds a Masters Degree in European Law from the University Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne and the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Luxembourg. She currently works as an administrative assistant at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. Her previous positions include administrator at the European Parliament, policy officer at the European Commission and parliamentary advisor of a Member of the European Parliament.

Franc
oise De Bel-Air Franc
oise De Bel-Air is a researcher and consultant based in Paris (France). A socio-demographer by training, she specialises in the political demography of Arab countries. She has been a research fellow and programme manager in the French Institute for the Near East (IFPO) in Amman, Jordan. She is currently associate researcher with IFPO and member of the ‘Gulf Labor Markets and Migration Program’ with the Gulf Research Centre (Geneva/Dubai) and the Migration Policy Centre (Florence, Italy). Her present research focuses on family structures in the

CONTRIBUTORS

239

Arab world, Arab female and highly skilled migration, GCC migration dynamics and policies. She published about 30 book chapters, articles and research papers, and an edited volume on Migration and politics in the Middle East (2006).

Anna Di Bartolomeo Anna Di Bartolomeo holds a PhD in Demography from the University of Rome Sapienza. She was also educated at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock and the Institute National d’Etudes De´mographiques in Paris where she obtained the European Research Master of Demography at the European Doctoral School of Demography. She is currently in charge of the demographic and economic module of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute. Her research interests include international migrations and demographic determinants, migration and economic growth, integration of immigrants’ children.

Tamirace Fakhoury Tamirace Fakhoury is an assistant professor in Political Sciences at the Lebanese American University and visiting lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research explores the transnational political practices of Arab world diasporas, and democracy designs in powersharing societies.

Philippe Fargues Philippe Fargues is a sociologist and demographer. He is the founding Director of the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute in Florence. He held senior positions at the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris and the American University in Cairo and taught in various universities in France, Lebanon, Egypt and at Harvard. His research interests include migration, population and politics, demography and development. His recent publications include: International Migration and the Nation State in Arab Countries (Middle East Law and Governance, 2013); Demography, Migration and Revolt in the South of the Mediterranean (Brookings, 2012); Immigration

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without Inclusion: Non-Nationals in Nation-Building in the Gulf States (Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 2011); International Migration and the Demographic Transition: a Two-Way Interaction (International Migration Review, 2011).

Habib Fourati Habib Fourati is an engineer statistician economist from the ‘E´cole Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration E´conomique’ (ENSAE) in Paris. He was the Central Director for Demographic and Social Statistics at the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia.

Choghig Kasparian Choghig Kasparian is Professor of Statistics for the Human Sciences at the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences of Saint Joseph University (USJ) in Beirut. She is the Director of the University Observatory of Socio-Economic Reality (OURSE) at Saint Joseph’s. She is also a member of several academic and Mediterranean research networks (CARIM, FEMISE, IPEMED). Professor Kasparian holds a PhD in Human Sciences (Sociology) from Saint Joseph University’s (1990). She also received a Maıˆtrise in Sociology from the Universite´ de Lyon – Ecole supe´rieure des lettres, Beirut (1972) and a Diploˆme d’aptitude a` l’emploi des me´thodes statistiques from the Institut de statistiques de l’Universite´ de Paris - Centre d’e´tudes supe´rieures, Beirut (1972). Professor Kasparian has extensive experience, as an international expert and researcher, in in the leadership of national surveys for the human and social sciences (UNDP, WHO, World Bank, ILO).

Mohamed Khachani Mohamed Khachani is currently a professor at the University Mohammed V, Agdal, Rabat, Morocco and Secretary General of the Moroccan Association for Studies and Research on Migrations. He is a board member of the International Association of French Speaking Demographers. He is also a member of the Moroccan-Spanish Joint University Committee and a consultant to national and international organisations.

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241

Mohamed Khachani is the author of several publications on migration issues including: . . .

. .

Les Marocains d’ailleurs: la question migratoire a` l’e´preuve du partenariat euro-marocain (2004); Les Marocains dans les pays arabes pe´troliers (2009); Le tissu associatif marocain et le traitement de la question migratoire au Maroc (Publication of the Moroccan Association for Studies and Research on Migrations, 2010); La migracion subsahariana: Marruecos como espacio de transito (Publicacion CIDO, 2006); Co-director of the publication: Security and Migrations in the Mediterranean (eds Mendo Castro Henriques and Mohamed Khachani, 2006).

Asem Khalil Asem Khalil is an associate professor of Law, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Public Administration. He holds a PhD in Public Law from Fribourg University, Switzerland, and a Master in Public Administration from the National School of Administration, France. Dr Khalil published many books and articles related to Palestinian refugees, human rights, constitutional law and theory, and methodology of legal research.

Ali Mebroukine Ali Mebroukine Ali is a professor of International Law at the National School of Administration of Algiers and at the School for the Judiciary in Algeria. He is, too, a lawyer recognised by the bar of Algiers and President Zeroual in diplomatic affairs. Ali Mebroukine will publish in January 2014 a book on the legal instruments of Algerian migration policy.

Edlira Narazani Edlira Narazani is a research fellow at the University of Turin and the Albanian Centre for Socio-Economic Research. She holds a PhD and MA in European Economic Studies (University of Turin, 2006, 2001) and

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also several research grants from the Vienna Institute for International Studies, the ERSTE Foundation, Global Development Network and Essex University. Her research interests are in the field of Labor Economics and Migration. Current work includes the impact of migration and remittances on the socio-economic development of the Western Balkan countries. More specifically, she is currently devoting special attention to the role of migration and remittances on child growth and education attainment in Albania as well as cultural issues such as woman empowerment.

Zekeria Ould Ahmed-Salem Zekeria Ould Ahmed-Salem is Professor of Political Science at the University of Nouakchott, Mauritania. He has obtained a PhD in Political Science from the Institute of Political Studies at Lyon 2 University, France (1996). For a few years (2009– 11), he has been member of CARIM (Migration Policy Centre). His latest book is titled: Precher Dans le Desert. Islam Politique et Chanegement Social en Mauritanie (Karthala, Paris, 2013). He is the editor of: Les trajectoires d’un Etat-frontie`re. Espaces, e´volutions politiques et transformations sociales en Mauritanie (Dakar, CODESRIA, 2004). Other publications include: ‘Mauritania: A Saharan Frontier State’ Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 3/4, September 2005; ‘Islam in Mauritania between Political Expansion and Globalization: Elites, Institutions, Knowledge, and Networks’, in B. Soares and R. Otayek (eds.), Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Nadine Sika Nadine Sika acquired her undergraduate studies and MA from the American University in Cairo in Political Science. She earned her PhD degree from Cairo University, in Comparative Politics. She specialises in Comparative Politics and Development. Before joining AUC she, was a guest scholar at the Political Science Institute in Tuebingen University, Germany, and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Future University in Egypt. She was a consultant to the UNDP, Regional Arab Office on good governance until September 2011. She is a member of the

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243

board of directors of Partners in Development, an independent Egyptian think tank. She is also a member of the board of directors of the Egyptian Institution for Public Opinion Polling ‘Baseera’. Her research interests are in civil society and new social movements and democratisation in comparative perspectives.

Paul Tabar Paul Tabar is an Associate Professor in Sociology/Anthropology and Director of the Institute for Migration Studies at the Lebanese American University, Beirut campus. He is also an Associate Researcher at the Institute for Culture and Society, University of Western Sydney. Recently, he co-authored Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminilising the Arab Other (The Institute of criminology, Sydney University, 2004) and On Being Lebanese in Australia: Identity, Racism and the Ethnic Field (Institute for Migration Studies, LAU, 2010). He is currently working on transnational formations and activities among members of the Lebanese diaspora.

Alessandra Venturini Alessandra Venturini is Deputy Director of the Migration Policy Center (MPC), Florence, and Professor of Political Economy at the University of Turin. She holds a PhD in Economics from the EUI, and has held senior academic positions at various universities. She conducted joint research projects with organisations ranging from the OECD and ILO migration section and the World Bank, to the European Commission and the CEPR Migration Research programme. She is a fellow of IZA. Her research interests cover both the sending and the destination countries, with a focus on the demand of care givers in an aging society, the assimilation of migrants and their role in the EU innovation process but also the effect of remittances, and highly skilled migration in sending countries and on circular and irregular migration.

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256 MIGRATION IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ———, ‘Mobilisation for national voting abroad: The participation of LebaneseAustralians in Sydney in 2009 elections in Lebanon’, Metamorphose des Figures du Leadership au Liban: Champs et contrechamps des elections legislatives de 2009, The Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies, Presses de l’Institut Francais du Proche Orient, Beirut (in Arabic and French), 2011. Tahri, Hamid, ‘Qu’a- t- on fait pour empeˆcher la fuite des cerveaux ?’, El Watan, 2008. Tall, Serigne Mansour, and Aly Tandian, ‘La migration des personnes hautement qualifie´es depuis et vers le Se´ne´gal: historicite´, actualite´ et perspectives’, CARIM Analytic and Syntetic Notes 2010/22, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), 2010. Traore, Baba, ‘La migration hautement qualifie´e depuis et vers le Mali’, CARIM Analytic and Syntetic Notes 2010/35, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), 2010. Tunisian Ministry of Employment and the Integration of the Youth and World Bank, ‘Dynamique de l’emploi et ade´quation des formations, Rapport sur l’insertion des diploˆme´s de l’anne´e 2004, 2004. UNDP and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, ‘Arab human development report 2002. Creating opportunities for future generations’, 2002. ———, ‘Arab human development report 2003, Building a Knowledge Society’, 2003. UNDP – Capacity Development Group, ‘Case Evidence on ‘Brain Gain’, Capacity Development Action Briefs No. 1, April 2007. Available at: http://content.undp. org/go/cms-service/download/asset/?asset_id¼1634500. ———Development, ‘Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development’, UNDP, New York, 2009. Unesco, ‘Foreign students in higher education comparative statistical data for 1980 and 1990’, Unesco Statistical issues, 1993. Vatikiotis, Panayiotis J., The History of Modern Egypt, From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th edn, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991. Wahba, Jackline, ‘Returns to Oversees Work Experience: The Case of Egypt’, International Migration, Economic Development and Policy, World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006 – Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration, World Bank, Washington DC, 2006. ———, ‘The Road Not Travelled: Education Reform in the Middle East and Africa’, MENA Development Report, Washington DC, 2008. ———, ‘Shaping the Future: A long-Term Perspective of People and Job Mobility for the Middle East and North Africa’, World Bank, Washington DC, 2009. ———, ‘Project appraisal document on a proposed loan in the amount of US$25 million to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for a higher education reform for the knowledge economy project’, World Bank, Washington DC, 2009. ———, ‘Workers remittances and compensation of employees, received (% of GDP) and (current US $)’, World Bank, Washington DC. Available at: http://search. worldbank.org/data?qterm¼remittances&language¼EN. Young, Helen, Abdul Monim Osman, Yacob Aklilu, Rebecca Dale, Babiker Badri, and Abdul Jabbar Abdullah Fuddle, ‘Darfur: livelihoods under siege’, Feinstein International Famine Centre, University of Tuft, Tuft, 2005. Zohry, Ayman, ‘Egyptian migration to Europe after the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean: Do we expect any changes?’ Available at: http://www.zohry.com.

INDEX

AACA (Algerian Association of Competence), 7, 206 Abbas, Mahmoud, 117 Abdallahi, Sidi Ould Sheik, 233 Abdelfattah, Dina, 158 Abdullah II, King of Lebanon, 134, 140 Abi Ramia, Simone, 76 Abusharaf, Rogaia M., 212 ACREME (Appel Citoyen pour la Reconnaissance des Mauritaniens de l’Etranger) (Mauritania), 233 Advisory Council of the national community abroad (Algeria), 204– 205 AIMAF (Association des Informaticiens Marocains en France), 186 Al Adl Wal Ihsane, 189 Al-Ain, 138 Algeria/Algerian/Algerians, 7, t.2.1, f.2.2, 16, 18, 23 – 4, 27 – 8, f.2.5, t.2.A.1, 32n2, 32n6, 33n13, 37, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, 41, f.3.3, 43, t.3.2, f.3.4, 49 – 51, 65, 67, 75, 196– 207 Al-Jazeera, 138, 230 Al-Manar project (Jordan), 142 Alumni Unit (Palestine), 120 ambitions see expectations

America/American/Americans 17, 57, 115 see also Anglo-Saxon countries, Latin America, North America AMGE (Association des Marocains des Grandes E´coles), 186 Anglo-Saxon countries, 40 – 1, 46– 8, 57 see also Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States Aoun, Michel, 67 Arab-Berber majority, 229 Arab Declaration on International Migration, 116 Arab Economic Development and Social Summit (2008), 142 Arab Human Development Reports, 9 Arab League, 92, 116– 117 Arab Middle-East see Mashrek Arab Observatory for International Migration, 116 Arab Spring, 36, 41, 78, 134, 142, 145, 148, 151, 157– 8, 164, 166– 7, 176–8, 190, 209, 218, 220 Arabisation, 7, 200 As-Sawda, Youssef, 72 Asia/Asian/Asians 29, 73, 136, 154 aspirations see expectations

258 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Assaad, Ragui, 155 Association nationale des diploˆme´s choˆmeurs du Maroc, 16 – 7 Australia/Australian/Australians, 4, f.2.1, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 24 – 5, f.2.5, 28, t.2.A.1, 32n9, 37, f.3.1, 39 – 40, t.3.2, 46 – 8, 57, 59n5, 65, 75 – 6, 94, 110 Awlad Abyayri (Mauritania), 229 Aziz, Mohamed Ould Abdel, 232 Bahrain/ Bahraini, t.2.2, 137– 8, 140, 142, t.13.3 Bangladesh, 210 Becker, Gary, 35 Beine, Michel, 52 – 3 Belgium, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 26, 29, t.2.A.1, 184, t.11.1 Bendjedid, Chadli, 199 Bodin, Jean, 194 brain circulation, 152, 157, 165 brain drain, 1 – 2, 17, 35, 42 – 3, f.3.3, 52 – 3, 55, 57 – 8, 81 – 2, 86, 88, 95, 116, 128n17, 139– 41, 144, 146, 152, 181, 183, 185, 187– 8, 190– 1, 193, 194n6, 196, 198, 200, 202– 3, 210, 217– 18, 226, 228 brain gain, 35, 42, 52 – 3, 81, 88, 122, 140– 1, 144, 146 brain waste, 4, t.3.2, 46 –7, 52, 57, 216, 222 Brand, Laurie A., 138 businessmen, 76, 190, 199, t.13.2 CAEA (Central Administration for Expatriate Affairs) (Sudan), 219 Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie Universel (Mauritania), 235 Canada, 4, t.2.1, 18, 23, t.2.3, 24 – 5, f.2.4, 28, t.2.A.1, 32n9, 37, f.3.1, 40, f.3.2, 41, t.3.2, 46 – 8, 57, 75, 153, 161, 200, 202–3 Canary Islands, 224

CAPMAS (Central Agency for Population Mobilization and Statistics), 153–5, 163 Careers in Morocco, 186, 195n11 CARIM (Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration), 35 – 6, 41, 51 CDR (Council for Development and Reconstruction) (Lebanon), 84 CEN (New Energies Commission) (Algeria), 201 CERED (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches De´mographiques) (Morocco), 185 Chad/ Chadians, f.3.1, 42, t.3.2, f.3.4, 50– 1, 93n12, 210 Chiha, Michel, 72 China, 75, 82 CIME (Club des Investisseurs Marocains a` l’Etranger), 186 clientelism see nepotism CNRST (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique) (Morocco), 186 Compulsory National Contribution Act (Sudan), 219 Conference of the Forum of Heads of Undertakings (Algeria), 207 Conscience and Resistance (Mauritania), 232 Construction of the Future (Palestine), 120 Council of Ministers Decision No.45 of 2004 (Palestine), 115 CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) (Sudan), 86 CPRS (Provisional Council of Scientific Research) (Algeria), 201 culture of emigration, 4, 17 Dahah, Hanefi Ould, 232 Darfur, 12, 222n2 Deauville partnership document, 142 demography, 8, 25, 29, 37, 64, 126, 167

INDEX Denmark, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 26, 29, t.2.A.1, 32n12 Di Bartolomeo, Anna, 3 Diagana, Toka, 234 Din, Galal el-, 212 DIOC (Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries), 43, 47, 55 discontent, 2, 5 – 7, 124 DM dataset, 36, 53 – 4 Docquier, Frederic, 36, 52 – 4 doctors, 4, 7, 42, 128n17, 138– 40, t.10.4, 179n13, 192, 200, 203, 211, t.13.2, 214, 216– 17, 223n9, 223n11, 234– 5 Doha Arab Economic Development and Social Summit, 142 Easterly, William, 53 – 4, 60n9 E´cole des Mines of Mauritania, 227 E´cole des Mines of Saint-Etienne, 227, 234 E´cole Normale Supe´rieure of Nouakchott, 235 Egypt/Egyptian/Egyptians, 2, 6, t.2.1, 13 – 6, t.2.2, f.2.3, 18, f.2.5, 27 –8, f.2.5, t.2.A.1, 32n1, 32n2, 32n5, 33n13, 37, t.3.1, f.3.1, 40 – 1, f.3.3, t.3.2, f.3.4, 49 – 50, 59, 83, 90 – 1, 131n41, t.8.1, 149n5, 151– 65, 203, 207n3, 209– 10, 213 Egyptian Labour Code, 161 Egyptian Labour regulation law no. 12/2003, 163 EMI (E´cole Mohammedia des Inge´nieurs) (Morocco), 183, 192– 3 employment, and crisis, 27 education match/mismatch, 4, 43, 46 –8, 58, 71, 81, 144, 161, 171, 196, 222, 216, 226 information on, 1 market of see labour markets opportunities see job opportunities

259

supply/demand of, 6, t.2.3, 23, 40, 58, 71, 97 – 102, 146, 153, 160– 1, 165, 169, 197, 216 engineer/engineering/engeneers, 8, 47– 8, 52, 57, 59, 65, 105– 6, t.6.9, t.6.10, t.10.4, 172, 192–3, t.11.2, 198, 200, t.13.2, 233 enrolment in education, secondary, 48, 50, 54 – 5 tertiary, 5, 48 – 9, f.3.4, 51, 54 – 5,137, 216, 223n6 ENSIAS (E´cole Nationale Supe´rieure d’Informatique et d’Analyse des Syste`mes) (Morocco), 183, 193 Equity and Reconciliation Authority (Morocco), 189 Erasmus Mundus, 121, 132n45 Eritreans, 210 Establishment of the Palestinian State, 120 Ethiopians, 210 EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement, 116 Europe/European/Europeans, 6, f.2.1, 13, 18, 25, f.2.5, 28, 36, 40, 46– 8, 57, 59n5, 94, t.6.6, t.6.8, t.6.16, 153, 156, 163, 177– 8, 193, 198, 230, 233 see also southern Europe European Union (EU), 40, 37, f.3.1, 40, f.3.2, t.3.2, 47, t.3.3, 74, 177, 180n16, 180n21, 180n23 EWM (Excreta and Wastewater Management), 72 executives, 105– 6, t.6.11, 171, 173, 190–2, 198– 9, t.13.2, 225, 229–31 Expatriates Act (Sudan), 219 expectations, 1, 29, 70, 113, 139, 144, 187 Faculty of Medicine (Mauritania), 235 Faini, Riccardo, 54

260 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST family/families, 4, 16, t.2.3, 32n12, 51, 58, 73, 77, 94, 102, t.6.5, 119, 139, 144, 212, 228 reunification, 17 – 29, t.2.3, 32n9 Fandrich, Christine, 41 Fargues, Philippe, 3, 41 Fayyad, Salam, 120 FDI (Foreign direct investment), 58, 140, 165 FINCOME (Forum International des Compe´tences Marocaines a` l’Etranger), 186 For Mauritania, 233 FLAM (African Forces of the Liberation of Mauritania), 231– 2 Flayhan, Basil, 65 FOREM (Foundation of Research in Medical Sciences) (Algeria), 206 France/French, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 26, 27, 29, t.2.A.1, 32n6, 32n12, 41, 51, 65, 68, 94, 161, 167, 182, 184, t.11.1, 198– 9, 200– 1 Free Patriotic Movement, 67, 76 frustration see discontent Fu¨le, Stefan, 177 Fund for Employment and Social Protection of Labourers (Palestine), 120 GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), 162 Gaza Strip see Palestine GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), 142, 154, 158 GDP (Gross domestic product), and education, 50 and foreign direct investment, 165 growth/loss, 5, 100, 144, 151 and R&D, 188 and remittances, 110, 144, c.8.2, 157, 165 Geertz, Clifford, 148 Germany, 41, 161, t.11.1

Ghoneim, Ahmed Farouk, 161 GNP (Gross national product) and education, 7, 58, 212 GNU (Government of National Unity) (Sudan), 86 GOSS (Government of Southern Sudan), 86 Greece, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 25– 6, 29, t.2.A.1, 32n11, 34, t.3.1, f.3.1, 39, f.3.2, f.3.3, t.3.2, 50, 59n6, 153, 162 Green Card, 23 Gulf see Persian Gulf Gulf War, 73, 137, 212 Hamidoun, Yahya Ould, 233 Hariri, Rafic al-, 65 Hashemite, 140 Hassan II, king of Morocco, 7, 189 HCR (High Commission in Research) (Algeria), 201 health sector, 47 – 8, t.6.9, t.6.10, t.6.11, t.10.4,140, 152, 179n13, 216, 235 see also doctors, pharmacists Helmenstein, Christian, 52 High Commission to Refugees (Mauritania), 231 Higher Committee for Migration (Egypt), 159 Higher Council for Migration (Sudan), 221–22 Higher Education Law No.11 of 1998 (Palestine), 121 Hizballah, 76 human capital, 23, 53, t.3.3, 59n8 development/growth/accumulation, 5, 28 – 9, 49 –51, 55, 57 – 8, 59n8, 80 – 2, 88, 144 theory, 34 see also brain circulation, brain drain, brain gain, brain waste humanities, 47, 52, 105, t.6.9, t.6.10

INDEX Ibrahima, Baˆ, 234 ICT (Information and communications technology), t.6.9, t.6.10, 140, 143, 161, 183, 201, 205 ID card holder (Palestine), 114, 118, 129n24 IDAL (Investment Development Authority in Lebanon), 74 Ideyboussat (Mauritania), 229 IMIS (Integrated Migration Information Systems) (Egypt-Italy), 160– 161 IMROP (Scientific Council of the Mauritanian Institute of Oceanographic and Fisheries Research), 230 income see wages INDH (Initiative Nationale de De´veloppement Humain) (Morocco), 190 India/Indian, 74, 82 INPT (Institut National des Postes et Te´le´communications) (Morocco), 183, 192– 3, t.11.2 instability, 6, 58, 64, 74, 87, 89, 115, 124, 137 Interim Constitution (Sudan), 219 Intifada, 119, 125, 131n41 investment, in education, 7, 41, 49 – 51, 58, 166, 178, 192, 197 foreign, 5, 143, 207 see also FDI, GDP, GNP Investment Promotion Law (1995) (Jordan), 118, 143 Investment Promotion Law No.1 of 1998 (Palestine), 118 Investment Promotion Law No.6 of 1995 (Palestine), 143 IOM (International Organization for Migration), 160, 186– 7 Iraq/Iraqi, 163, 165, t.13.1 invasion of Kuwait, 76 see also Gulf war

261

irregular migration, 26, 76, 160–2, 176, 180n23, 224 ISET (Institut Supe´rieur d’Etudes Techniques Agricoles) (Mauritania), 227 Israel/Israeli, 114, 118, 123– 4, 126, 129n26, 131n41 occupation of Lebanon, 64 IT see ICT Italy, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 25 – 6, 29, t.2.A.1, 32n10, 32n11, t.3.1, f.3.1, 39, f.3.2, f3.3, t.3.2, f.3.4, 50, 58, 59n6, 94,153, 160–2, 184, t.11.1, 186 ITES (Tunisian Institute of Strategic Studies), 172 Jaber, Yassine, 76 Jeddah, 229 job opportunities, 6 – 7, 58, 120, 141–2, 179n13 Jordan/Jordanian/ Jordanians, 5, t.2.1, t.2.2, f.2.2, 16, t.2.A.1, 32n1, 32n2, 37, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, 41, f.3.3, t.3.2, 47 – 50, f.3.4, 76, 115, 119, 127n1, 131n41, 134– 150, 154, 160, t.13.3 judges, t.13.2 Kabyle, 65 Khachani, Mohamed, 52 Khartoum, 87 Khelfaoui, Hocine, 203 knowledge, economy 142, 165, 182, 197 transfer, 73, 116, 194 see also TOKTEN Kurdish, 68 Kuwait, t.2.2, 14, t.8.1, 138, t.13.1, t.13.3 Labour Agreement between Egypt and Italy, 162 Labour Law (Sudan), 219

262 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Labour Law No.7 of 2000 (Palestine), 115, 120 labour markets, 1, 4, t.2.3, 40, 47, 73, 96, 102, 123– 4, 142, 153, 156, 217, 221, 228 needs/demand, 3, 24, 26, 29, 71, 183, 226 Labour Market Information System (Palestine), 120 Laghdaf, Moulaye Ould Mohamed, 232 Latin America, 36, 94, 110 law sector, 47, 105, t.6.9, t.6.10, t.10.4 lawyers, t.13.2, 221 Lebanese Forces, 67, 76 Lebanon/Lebanese, 2, 5, t.2.1, t.2.2, f.2.2, 16 –8, 24– 5, f.2.4, t.2.A.1, 37, t.3.1, f.3.1, 39, 41 – 3, f.3.3, t.3.2, f.3.4, 49 – 51, 53, 59n3, 59n8, 64 – 69, 72 – 76, 77n4, 84 – 85, 94 – 133, 154, 203, 207n3, t.13.3 Libya, f.2.1, t.2.1, 13 – 4, t.3.1, f.3.1, t.2.A.1, 39, f.3.2, f.3.3, f.3.4, t.8.1, 154, 156, 160, 177, 203, 207n3, 209, 211, t.13.1, t.13.3, 218, 222n2 Live Lebanon programme, 75 Maghreb, 3 – 4, 7, f.2.1,12– 8, 26, 28, 32n10, 36 – 9, 41, 43, t.3.2, 46, 52 – 9, 68, t.3.3, 234 Mahzir/Mahzara, 229 Mali/Malian, 37, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, 42, f.3.3, t.3.2, f.3.4, 50, 59n8 Malki, Majdi, 119 management and services, 105, t.6.9, t.6.10, 156, t.10.4 managers see executives Marfouk, Abdeslam, 36 Mashrek, 3, f.2.1,12 – 7, 28, 37, 40 – 1, 46, 49, 54 – 5, t.3.3, 52, 57 – 8 mathematics, t.6.10, 57, t.6.9, t.10.4, 235

Mauritania/Mauritanian, 6 –7, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, 42, f.3.3, t.3.2, f.3.4, 51, 224–36 Mauritania.net, 232 McCormick, Barry, 156 ME (Moroccan Entrepreneurs), 186 Mecca, 229 Medina, 229 Mediterranean, 26, 48, 176 Mexico/Mexican/Mexicans, f.2.5, t.2. A.1, 28 Middle East see Mashrek Migration Policy Centre (MPC), 41, 51 see also CARIM (Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration) Mikari, Farid al-, 65 Millennium Development Goals, 116 Ministerial Legislative Council (April 2011) (Egypt), 159 Mohamedou, Mohamed-Mahmoud, 233 Morocco/Moroccan/Moroccans, 2, 6– 7, t.2.1, 16, t.2.A.1, 32n1, 37, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, 41, f.3.3, 43, t.3.2, 48, f.3.4, 50 – 2, 64, 66, 68, 79, 83, 90 –1, 142, 177, 181– 195, 227, 234 Mountford, Andrew, 52 MRA (Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad), 184, t.11.1, 186 Naharnet, 76 Nassar, Heba, 40 National Agency of Employment and Free-Lance Work, The (Tunisia), 171 National Employment Centre (Jordan), 142 National Employment Fund (Tunisia), 171 National Employment Strategy (Jordan), 148

INDEX National Intelligence and Security (Sudan), 218, 221 National Team (Palestine), 120 natural sciences sector, t.10.4, 201 nepotisme, 7, 71, 87, 139, 147– 8, 150n18 Netherlands, The, t.11.1 New Zealand, 4, 37, f.3.1, 39 – 40, 46 – 8, 57, 59n5 NGOs, 129n26, 180n16 Niger, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, 42, f.3.3, t.3.2, f.3.4, 50 –1 North Africa see Maghreb North America, f.2.1, f.2.5, 28, 39, 42, 48, 59n5, 103, t.6.6, t.6.8, t.6.16, 110, 198 see also Canada, United States northern Sudan, 12 Nouadhibou, 225 Nouakchott, 225, 232 NTIC (new information technologies and communication) see ICT Numeiri, Jaafar, 219 Nyarko, Yaw, 53 – 4, 60n9 Observatory Eye, The, 217 OCP (Office Che´rifien des Phosphates) (Morocco), 188 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, t.2.1, 12 – 4, t.2.3, 24, 28, 36 –7, 42– 7, 54, 153, 156, 161, 163, 165, 185, 226 data, 12, 36, 40, 185 see also DIOC OFPRA (French Office in charge of asylum) (Mauritania), 231 old generation, t.2.1, 12 – 3, 18, 26, t.2. A.1, 39, 108 Oman, t.2.2, 41, t.8.1, t.13.1, t.13.3 ONA (Omnium Nord-Africain) (Morocco), 188 ONRS (National Office of Scientific Research) (Algeria), 201

263

ONS (National Statistics Office) (Algeria), 198 opportunities see job opportunities OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territories) see Palestine Orascom, 162 Ordonnance (05/07) (Algeria), 51 Organization of the Affairs of the Sudanese Working Abroad Act, 219 Organization of Incentives of the Sudanese Working Abroad Act, 219 Oslo agreements (Palestina), 117 Ostergaard-Nielsen, Eva, 65 Ottoman era, 3, 17 Outplacement Department (Jordan), 141 over-education see brain-waste over-occupation, t.3.2, 23, 46 –47, 57 PA (Palestinian Authority), 6, 112–133 PA National Development Plan (2011– 13), 120 Pakistan, 82 PALESTA (Palestinian Scientists and Technologists Aboard), 122 Palestine/Palestinian/Palestinians, 5 – 6, t.2.1, f.2.2, 16 – 7, t.2.A.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, f.3.3, f.3.4, t.3.2, 47, 49– 50, 53, 76, 85 –6, 112–33, 138, 149,150n15 Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, 119 PAPP (Programme for Assistance to the Palestinian People), 85 Paris Declaration (2009) (Egypt), 161 Passports, Immigration and Nationality Law (Sudan), 219 patronage see nepotism PEACE Programme (Palestine), 121, 132n46 PEAD (Palestinian Expatriates Affairs Department), 117

264 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST permanent migration, t.2.3, 23, 73, 86, 152– 3, 231 Persian Gulf, 6, f.2.1, 12 – 4. t.2.2, 29, 37, f.3.1, 40 – 1, 59, 73 – 5, 94, 103, 115, 119, 135–36, 138, 140– 2, 154, 156, 211– 2, 217, 229– 30 see also Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE (United Arab Emirates) pharmacists, t.10.4, t.13.2, 214, 217 PhDs, 121, 132n44, 210 Philippines, the, 82, 210 physicians see doctors PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation), 116– 17, 122, 125 Poland, 82 policies, admission/immigration, t.2.3, 23 –4, 26 –9, 39– 41, 74, 182–3 emigration, 8, 42, 79, 159, 161, 166, 173, 176– 77, 218 ‘open door’, 5, 135, 139 point system, t.2.3, 23 – 4, 32n7, 41 political role of migrants, 3, 5 –6, 62, 64 – 9, 75 – 6, 77n2, 91, 145, 203, 231, 232– 3, 235 political science sector, t.6.9, t.6.10 Population Policies and Migration Department (Arab League), 116, 128n15 Portugal, 34, t.3.1, f.3.1, 39, f.3.2, 43, t.3.2, f.3.4, 49 – 50, 59n6, 196 Presidential Decree No. 574 of 1981 (Palestine), 158 Presidential Decree No. 2000/1997 (Egypt), 159 Presidential Decree No. 2000 of 1997 (Palestine), 159 Presidential Decree No. 9 of 2003 (Palestine), 120 Presidential Decree No. 09 – 297 of 2009 (Palestine), 205 pressure valve see safety valve

professors see researchers Prskawetz, Alexia, 52 Qatar, t.2.2, t.8.1, 138, 142, 160, t.13.1, t.13.3 Quebec, 24, 183, 199 Rapoport, Hillel, 52 – 4 REAGE (Algerian Association of Technology Transfer), 206 Referendum 2011(Sudan), 87 remittances, 2 –4, 6, 73– 4, 107, 110, 126, 144, c.8.2, 147– 8, 151– 2, 154, 157– 8, 164–5 social, 4, 77, 82 see also GDP researchers/professors, 4, 24, 140, 199– 200, 202, 206–7, 207n3, 209–11, t.13.2, 214, 217–18, 221, 233 return/returns/returnees, 5 – 7, 17 –8, 76– 7, 78 – 93, 107, t.6.14, 6.15, 6.16, 110, 111n2, 113– 14, 116–26, 127n2, 130n27, 135– 8, 143, 152– 4, 156–7, 164, 181, 198–99, 203, 207, 233 return programme, 6, 73, 121 see also TOKTEN Riyadh, 229 Rosso, 225 safety valve, 5, 12, 64, 81 Sahel see Sub-Saharan Saint Joseph University (Lebanon), 95– 6, 111n2 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 182 Saudi Arabia, 4, 13, t.2.2, 41, t.8.1, 154, 156– 8, 209, 213, t.13.1, t.13.3, 217– 8, 229 Sauvy, Alfred, 182 Secretariat of State for Mauritanians Abroad, 233 SEMTE (Secretary of State for Migration and Tunisians Abroad), 176

INDEX Senegal/Senegalese/Senagali, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, 42, f.3.3, t.3.2, 48, f.3.4, 50, 227, 230– 1, 234 Sharjah, 138 Shiite (Lebanon), 76 Siege of Gaza (2007), 125 Singapore, 198 SNIM (Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle et Minie`re), 225, 232, 236 social sciences sector, 48, 52, t.10.4, 201 Social Security Law (Palestine), 120 South America see Latin America south-eastern Mediterranean see Mashrek southern Europe, 5, f.2.1, 25, 35, 37, 39, 42 – 3, 46, 48 – 50, 55, t.3.3, 57, 59, 196 southern Sudan, 12, 86 – 7 Spain/Spanish, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 25 – 6, 29, t.2.A.1, 32n10, 32n11, 46, t.3.1, f.3.1, 39, f.3.2, f.3.3, t.3.2, f.3.4, 50, 59n6, 184, t.11.1, 196, 227 Spence, Michael, 35 SPRING program, 177 SSWA (Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad), 213, 218– 21 Stark, Oded, 35, 52 students, 18, 24, 41 –2, 49– 52, 58, 69, 121, 131n43, 132n46, 167, t.10.2, t.10.5, 185, 191, 216– 7, 221– 2, 223n6, 226, 231– 2, 235 Sub-Saharan countries, 34, 37, 39, 42, t.3.2, 46, 48, 49 –51, 54 – 5, t.3.3, 57 – 8, 61 – 77, 175, 179n11, 224, 229 Sudan/Sudanese, 4, 6, t.2.1, 12 – 3, f.2.2, 15, t.2.A.1, 37, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, f.3.3, t.3.2, 47, f.3.4, 58, 64, 86 – 7, 92n11, 163, 165, 209– 23, 234 see also northern Sudan, southern Sudan Sudanese Medical Council, 217

265

Sultana, Ronald G., 52 Sweden, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 26 –7, 29, t.2. A.1, 32n12, 41, 183 Switzerland, 183 Sydney, 66 Syria/Syrian/Syrians, 2, t.2.1, 13, f.2.2, 15, 17, t.2.A.1, t.3.1, f.3.1, f.3.2, f.3.3, t.3.2, 47, f.3.4, 67 – 8, 72 – 3, 83, 89, 91, 100, 203, 207n3 Tabar, Paul, 3 – 4 Taiwan, 198 Tajakanett (Mauritania), 229 Talal bin, Al-Hassan, 140 Talal bin, Hussein, 141 Taqadoumy.com, 232 Taya, Maˆaouya Ould, 225, 232 teachers, t.6.11, 107, 138, 140, l199– 200, t.13.2, 230, 235 technicians, 7, 137, 140, 154, t.9.1, 156, 163, t.10.4, 172, 198, t.13.2, 225 temporary migration, 17, 24, 37, 58, 78, 119, 122, 156 TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals), 6, 73, 75, 78 – 93, 122 TRA (Tunisians Resident Abroad), 176 transnationalism, 61 – 3, 65 – 6, 68 – 9, 79, 81 –2, 84 Tunisia/Tunisian/Tunisians, 7, t.2.1, f.2.2, f.2.3, 16, t.2.A.1, 32n1, 37, t.3.1, f.3.2, 41, f.3.3, 43, t.3.2, f.3.4, 49 – 50, 90 – 1, 166– 180, 190, 203, 207n3, 234 Turkey, 82 UAE (United Arab Emirates), t.8.1, 76, 138, 142, 158, t.13.1, 229 UEA (University of East Africa), 76 UGTT (Tunisian General Union of Work), 175 UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework), 82

266 MIGRATION FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 73, 75, 82, 85 – 7, 90, 114, 122, 192 unemployed/unemployment, 2, 7, f.2.3, 16 – 7, 32n3, 42, 52, 72, 96, t.6.4, 102, t.6.7, 104, 124, 126, 138, 142, 146– 7, 151, 153– 56, t.9.2, 169, t.10.3, t.10.4, 171–2, 187, 197– 8, 217, 226 Union for the Mediterranean, 161 United Kingdom, f.2.1, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 23 – 4, 28, t.2.A.1, 32n7, 41, 60n9, 183, t.13.3, 217 United Nations, 6, 82, 89, 232, 234 United States, 4, t.2.1, 18, t.2.3, 23, 28, 2.A.1, 37, f.3.1, f.3.2, 40 – 1, t.3.2,46– 8, 51, 57, 60n9, 67– 8, 75 – 6, 103, 105, 142, 153, 157, 182, 200, 230– 3 University of Lyon, 232 University of Nouakchott, 226– 7, 230, 235 UNV (United Nations Volunteers), 82 UTICA (Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts Industry), 171, 174, 178n3 Vall, Ely Ould Mohamed, 232 Venturini, Alessandra, 3 – 4

veterinarians, t.13.2 Visa, 23 – 4, 32n7, 118– 9, 219– 20, 223n14 GHSM (Tier 1 Visa for General Highly Skilled Migrants), 183 H1-B Visas, t.2.3, 23 vote in absentia, 68 – 9 wages, 1, 40, 64, 71, 120, 138–40, 144, 148, 156– 7, 164, 189, 198–9, 209, 218, 230 Wahba, Jackline, 156 Wasta, 5, 139 Watts, A. G., 52 welfare sector, 47 – 8 West Bank see Palestine women, 5, 7, 9, 17, 39, 58, 96 – 7, t.6.2, 101– 7, t.6.3, t.6.5, t.6.6, t.6.7, t.6.8, t.6.9, t.6.11, t.6.12, t.6.13, t.6.14, 167, 185, 199, t.13.2, 216 World Bank , 51, 95, 154, 163, 182, 234 Yemen, t.13.1, t.13.3 young, 2, 6, t.2.1, 12 – 4, 17 – 8, 24 – 5, 29, t.2.A.1, 94- 111, 119, 126, 138–9, 144, 148, 154– 6, 162, 171–2, 176, 209, 212