Africa and the Middle East Conflict 9781685859541

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Africa and the Middle East Conflict

ARYE ODED

Africa and the Middle East Conflict

• Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder • London

Tables 4.1, 4.10, 4.11, and 4.13 are reprinted with permission from The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa: BADE A Annual Report 1983 and the BADEA Special Supplement in Jeune Afrique (1985). Tables 4.2,4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8,4.9, and 4.12, and Figure 4.1 are reprinted with permission from OECD: OECD Review (1984), Aid from OPEC Countries (1983), and OECD Annual Reports (1983 and 1984).

Published in the United States of America in 1987 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 948 North Street, Boulder, Colorado 80302 ©1987 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Oded, Arye. Africa and the Middle East conflict. Includes bibliographies and index. 1. Arab countries—Relations—Africa, Sub-Saharan. 2. Africa, Sub-Saharan—Relations—Arab countries. 3. Israel—Relations—Africa, Sub-Saharan. 4. Africa, Sub-Saharan—Relations—Israel. I. Title. DS63.2.A357034 1987 327.5606 87-9536 ISBN 1-55587-057-0 (lib. bdg.)

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. ©

Contents List of Illustrations Preface Acknowledgment

vii ix xii

1

Arab Achievements in Africa in 1973

1

2

Arab Activity in the Political and Information Spheres

7

3

Arab Islamic Activity in Africa

33

4

Arab Aid to Africa

55

5

Factors Disturbing Afro-Arab Relations

81

6

Causes for African Dissatisfaction with Arab Countries Since 1973

131

7

Africa and Israel Since 1973

161

8

African Attitudes Toward the Arabs and Israel Since the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement

175

9

Factors Disturbing Afro-Israeli Relations

197

10

Prospects for Change in African Attitudes Toward the Arabs and Israel

219

Appendixes 1

Severance of Relations Between African Countries and Israel: Dates and Main Reasons

224

vi

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

2

Division of African States by Percentage of Muslims, 1986

226

3

Qadhafi Versus Christianity in Africa

227

4

Arab League News Release, August 16,1983: Reacting to Liberia's Renewal of Relations with Israel

231

Bibliography

233

Bibliographical Abbreviations

238

Index

239

About the Author and the Book

245

Illustrations Maps 3.1

Islam in Africa

7.1

Israel in Africa, 1986

32 160

Tables 4.1

BADEA Commitments in African Countries

56

4.2

Concessional Loans to Non-Arab African Countries

61

4.3

Non-Concessional Loans to Non-Arab African Countries

62

4.4

Concessional Loans to African Member States

62

4.5

Non-Concessional Loans to African Member States

62

4.6

Concessional Assistance to Non-Arab Developing Countries

68

4.7

Concessional Assistance to African Arab League Countries

69

4.8

Grants to Non-Arab African Countries

69

4.9

Grants to Sub-Saharan Arab League Countries

70

4.10

Arab Aid Commitments to African Countries

72

4.11

Arab Commitments to Non-Arab African Countries

74

4.12

Bilateral DAC and OPEC Aid to Africa

75

4.13

Arab Aid to Non-Arab Africa

76

vii

viii

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Figure 4.1

Geographic Distribution of Net Disbursements

Preface The severing of diplomatic ties between the overwhelming majority of African nations and Israel in 1973, just before and during the October War, marked the high point of solidarity between the African states and the Arabs. For the Arabs, this represented a great success in their struggle against Israel in Africa. Less than ten years later, in May 1982, Zaire reestablished d i p l o m a t i c relations with Israel, a step that reflected an impressive achievement in Israel's effort to reconstruct its position in Black Africa. In Israeli political circles, the event was described as a breakthrough in African political and psychological barriers that would result in restoring Israel's previous position of influence in Africa. During the almost ten-year interval between the above mentioned events, two basic and parallel processes were discernible. First, Arab political, economic, and Islamic activities in Africa intensified, and this, in general, enhanced Arab standing in the continent. This expanded activity was also expressed in growing Arab influence and pressure in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the UN, and other international forums relevant to the Middle East crisis. The object of the increased Arab activities included liquidating what remained of Israeli diplomatic ties in Africa and thwarting the practical relationship between Israel and the African states. Second, despite the consistent and growing Arab activities, Israel was not pushed out of the continent entirely. On the contrary, during this period Israel generally succeeded in maintaining its position, and even extended its nonformal cooperation with many African countries in the economic, technical, and security spheres, and was able to maintain a political dialogue with leading African personalities. These Israeli efforts culminated in the resumption of diplomatic ties with Zaire in May 1982. There would seem to be a paradox or two contradictory processes here: the expansion of the Arab presence in Africa, and the continuation and even proliferation of the Israeli presence. My argument is that these contradictory processes work simultaneously because, from the African point of view, each of them has both positive and negative aspects. It would therefore seem necessary to examine both sides of the coin before reaching realistic conclusions ix

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AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

on the factors that shape African attitudes. Indeed, a glance at both Arab and Israeli involvement on the African continent during the past twenty years shows a wide fluctuation in relative position and influence. The Arab status has been significantly affected by the interplay between (1) its objective f u n d a m e n t a l strength in Africa, including historical a n d geopolitical ties, and (2) Arab weaknesses in Africa, some rooted in the past and some new. It is these factors that, since 1973, have induced many African countries to refrain from blindly supporting the Arab aim to remove every form of Israeli presence on the continent. Israel, too, has both strong and weak points in African eyes. Although it has been able to preserve a limited presence in Africa, this has generally been accomplished despite caution and reservation on the part of the Africans. There are also mutual influences between the two processes. Thus, although Israel's position in Africa is affected by its own successes or failures and its status in the world at large, the strengths and weaknesses of the Arab position at any given time also have an effect on African attitudes toward Israel and on Israel's prospects of regaining its pre-1973 position on the continent. As Arab and Israeli activities in Africa before and after 1973 caused many changes in African attitudes on cardinal issues related to the Middle East—the Occupied Territories, the Palestine Question, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—it is also necessary to follow these changes closely in order to avoid drawing incorrect conclusions a n d / o r exaggerated expectations based on outdated African stands and attitudes. The signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, for example, and Israel's withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982, caused both Israeli and non-Israeli observers to hope that a major factor behind the breaking of relations between Africa and Israel had thereby been eliminated, and that many African countries would resume diplomatic relations with Israel. After all, it was Egypt that had originally proposed that OAU members cut off relations with Israel for having occupied Egyptian land in Africa proper during the Sinai Campaign. Now that Egypt had itself signed a peace treaty with Israel, restored diplomatic relations, a n d exchanged ambassadors, these observers argued, there was no longer any rationale for maintaining a rift between Israel and those African states that had demonstrated their solidarity with Egypt. This same argument was used in some African mass media. It was also used by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe when they resumed diplomatic ties with Israel.

PREFACE

xi

Nevertheless, Israel's optimistic expectations that the Sinai withdrawal and Zaire's move would cause many other African countries to follow have not yet materialized. On the contrary, even moderate African countries rushed to declare that they had no intention of following Zaire's move. Thus it took eighteen months before Liberia followed suit, and it was not until three years later that Cote d'lvoire—after prolonged hesitation and debate-— announced the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel on February 12, 1986. Again, it was expected that immediately after Cote d'lvoire, several African countries would follow, but up until the spring of 1987 only Cameroon has renewed its ties with Israel (August 26,1986). No doubt, one of the main reasons for caution on the part of African leaders has been the changes in their attitudes toward the Middle East since 1973. Indeed, since the occupation of or withdrawal from Sinai has ceased to be the deciding factor in the restoration of relations with Israel, those aspects of the Middle East crisis that have entered the picture or taken on greater meaning since 1973 must be considered in order to arrive at a realistic appraisal of present African attitudes toward the Arabs and Israel. This book therefore deals specifically with 1. The main features of Afro-Arab and -Israeli relations since 1973 2. The factors that strengthened the Arab position in Africa and enabled them, in 1973, to induce most African countries to sever diplomatic ties with Israel 3. The new means and methods employed by the Arabs to overcome difficulties that have arisen since 1973 and to strengthen Afro-Arab relations, create positive African attitudes toward Arabs, and thwart Israel's efforts to renew ties with Africa 4. The factors that have hampered Arab activities in Africa, constricting their efforts to curb Israel's activities in the 1960s and sometimes causing African resentment, especially in 1974-1975—factors that have played a role in Israel's ability to maintain a wide range of activities in Africa despite the lack of formal relations 5. Israeli activities between 1973 and 1985, and the factors that restricted Israel's ability to i n f l u e n c e the d i p l o m a t i c situation in her favor The research is based mainly on African, Arabic, and Israeli written sources, and also on interviews and meetings conducted by the author in Africa.

Acknowledgment I wish to express my indebtedness to the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for its help in preparing the manuscript of this work for publication. My special thanks to Norma Schneider, who oversaw the entire project with much devotion and skill, and to Ron Duhl, who helped in the editing. I also owe a debt to Naomi Chazan for her encouragement and for her useful advice.

xii

• CHAPTER ONE •

Arab Achievements in Africa in 1973 Prior to the October War of 1973, Israel maintained cordial relations with most African countries. Diplomatic relations, the most public and effective expression of bilateral contact between states, were established between Israel and thirty-three of the forty-one independent African nations who were then members of the OAU. 1 In fact, Israel had maintained full diplomatic ties with all African states except the six Arab countries on the continent and Somalia and Mauritania, whose populations are so overwhelmingly Muslim that they joined the Arab League in 1974. In 1973, Israel's diplomatic success, achieved after years of effort and involvement in Africa, evaporated almost overnight; in the months leading up to and immediately after the October War, all but four African states severed diplomatic ties with Israel. In 1967, Guinea was the first African state to sever ties with Israel. Following the example of the Eastern Bloc communist countries, President Sekou Toure broke off diplomatic relations with Israel during the Six-Day War, accusing Israel of aggression toward its Arab neighbors. But Guinea-Conakry remained an isolated case in Africa until Uganda followed suit in March 1972. Uganda's action was, however, viewed as extraordinary and as having no direct influence on the impending wave that would soon sweep away most of Israel's achievements in Africa. Idi Amin, already known for his capricious, impetuous, and atrocious acts of terror, was disliked by many other African rulers. As a result, his decision to sever relations with Israel was widely regarded as an e x t r e m e , i l l - c o n s i d e r e d , and unconventional step; it was criticized by other African leaders, as well as by much of the African press, including some not regarded as staunch friends of Israel. 2 Furthermore, Israel's version of Amin's

l

2

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

ulterior motives for his decision—among others, its refusal to supply the Ugandan ruler with the sophisticated arms he requested in order to attack Tanzania—carried considerable credibility with other African leaders. 3 The first significant wave of diplomatic breaks with Israel began in late 1972 when Chad, Niger, and Mali—acting in the wake of a visit by Saudi Arabia's King Feisal—announced the severance of relations. The Congo Republic soon followed. Then Burundi, Togo, and Zaire severed relations on the eve of the October War, and twenty other African states followed their lead during and immediately following that war (see Appendix 1). By 1974, only four OAU member-states—Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Lesotho—still maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, and of these Mauritius suspended diplomatic ties with Israel in 1976, on the eve of the OAU summit to be held there. At present, Israel maintains diplomatic relations with only seven Black African members of the OAU: Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon. (Zaire officially resumed diplomatic ties with Israel on May 14, 1982, Liberia on August 13, 1983, Cote d'lvoire on February 12, 1986 and Cameroon on August 26,1986). The main reason for the Arabs' stunning success in 1972-1973 was their more efficient utilization of the objective advantages they have always enjoyed in Africa. These advantages are based on the geographical, religious, monetary, psychological, ideological, and propaganda factors outlined below. The fact that Egypt, Sudan, and the four other Arab states of North Africa are part of the African continent creates a feeling of geographical closeness between African and Arab. In addition, all six influence Africa's Middle East policy as members of the OAU. Among the myriad African religions, Muslims constitute either a majority or an important minority in many African countries (see Appendix 2), a factor that further binds the two regions. The Islamic connection serves a wide range of educational, cultural, and ideological purposes, not the least of which is that of strengthening the Arab vision of a moral imperative in bringing about the destruction of Israel. The decisive role of the Arab states in bankrolling many African governments and international bodies, including the OAU itself, is central to an understanding of Afro-Arab relations. The considerable funds made available by the Arabs to African rulers, together with the promise of even more money and with the threat to punish those who resume relations with Israel, play a significant part in

ARAB ACHIEVEMENTS IN AFRICA

3

persuading the Africans to adopt the Arab view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The African desire to preserve the unity and wholeness of the OAU and to demonstrate at least outward solidarity plays directly into the hands of the Arabs, who seek to forge a unified front against those whom they define as their common enemies. This desire is rooted in the weakness of the individual African states and their fear that each state can exert little influence on its own, but is capable of influencing international developments as part of a bloc. As Africans fear dissenters who would split the fabric of unity, Arab leaders have learned how to sweep most of the more moderate members along with them by exploiting these fears. In fact, the wish to demonstrate solidarity was one of the major reasons why most African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel. From an ideological point of view, ties between Israel and South Africa provided an issue that the Arabs efficiently and consistently used against Israel. When South Africa's premier visited Israel in 1976, the Arabs broadcast long descriptions of the joint economic and military interests binding Israel and South Africa. The two states are consistently labeled as the "common enemy" of Africa and the Arabs. This strategy proved particularly effective at the 1975 meeting of the thirtieth general assembly of the UN, where the Arabs succeeded in passing a resolution that equated Zionism and racism. Following their loss of territory in the Six-Day War of 1967, Arab propaganda efficiently exploited a highly sensitive theme among Africans: objection to the seizure of territory by force. Their fear of South African and Rhodesian military power, the wresting of territory by one African state from another, as well as the numerous border disputes on the continent all weighed heavily on the Africans' decision to align themselves with the Arabs in demanding Israel's withdrawal to her 1967 borders. The years between 1967 and 1973 marked a gradual, but consistent and noticeable change in African attitudes toward the Middle East crisis. It was during that time that the OAU sent a delegation of African presidents to visit the Middle East for the first time, in 1971. More significantly, it was during these years that persistent Arab efforts gradually succeeded in pushing more extreme anti-Israel resolutions through the OAU and other international forums. For example, in the days immediately following the 1967 war, most African states opposed any mention of the Middle East as a subject for debate at the OAU. However, since then, the Middle East has become the main item of discussion at O A U meetings.

4

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

While in 1967, the Africans opposed even "declarative" resolutions terming Israel the "aggressor" in the Middle East, the resolution of the eighth session of the OAU in 1971 spoke of Israel's "continued aggression" against Egypt. The OAU's 1972 Rabat resolution marked a further erosion in the situation when the convention demanded that Israel withdraw from all "African and Arab" territories taken in 1967. Similarly, although the Africans had for years opposed both the view that the Palestinian issue was an African issue and Arab attempts to compare Israel and South Africa, the OAU resolutions of February 1975 explicitly stated that the Palestinian issue is as much an African issue as are South Africa and Rhodesia. Also in 1975, representatives of the PLO have won observer status at OAU conventions. Finally, African opposition to Arab proposals demanding that they sever diplomatic relations with Israel was almost totally overcome by the end of 1973. These basic factors operating in the Arabs' favor are augmented by yet other general processes that affect Africa even though they are not directly connected with Israel. One such process is the profound and widespread disappointment in many African states at their difficulty in overcoming internal instability and at their lack of economic independence. The expectations and hopes for rapid social and economic development have not materialized; thus the importance formerly attached to all foreign technical aid, including from Israel, has lessened because it has not led to the affluence predicted. Nonetheless, while the activity of the Western nations (particularly the United States) decreased in Africa in the 1970s, the activity and influence of communist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China, increased during the same period. Africa's disappointment at the lack of economic and social progress in general, and at Western assistance in particular, has also spurred the tendency towards radicalization in both domestic and foreign policy to the point where protests against Western "neocolonialism" are heard increasingly, and even moderate African regimes endeavor to demonstrate a "nonaligned" stance in foreign policy. In the current context, this "neutralist" tendency usually means an increasing affinity with the communist states. For example, the presidents Grégoire Kayïbanda of Rwanda and Philbert Tsiranana of Madagascar, both of whom were known to support the West, have been overthrown. Domestically, this tendency finds expression in the "Africanization" of Africa and a heightened feeling against the economic advantages of "foreigners", i.e., Europeans, Asians, and even Africans who do not hold

ARAB ACHIEVEMENTS IN AFRICA

5

citizenship in their country of residence. These general processes, although seemingly unrelated to Middle Eastern issues, have been exploited by the Arabs in their war against Israel to the point where Israel is often described as a stronghold of Western imperialism and a racist and an aggressor state in the joint communiqués issued by African leaders and many Arab and communist states. The Arab claim that the Sinai Peninsula is part of Africa proved particularly convincing to moderate statesmen such as Presidents Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, and other moderate African leaders. Several of these leaders stated that, while Israel's presence in the West Bank and the Golan Heights was not their concern, as Africans they could not ignore the occupation of Sinai. The Arabs have also successfully promoted their cause by increasing Islamic activity against Israel. After Muammar Qadhafi assumed power in Libya in 1969, he made the ousting of Israel from Africa his "mission." Qadhafi did not hesitate to threaten a jihad (holy war) against those (such as Ethiopia and Chad) sympathetic to Israel, while offering financial rewards to those (such as to Uganda, Niger, Gabon, and the Central African Republic) antipathetic to her. Likewise, King Feisal visited five African states in late 1972 in an effort to recruit the support of Muslims for the Arab cause.4 In the early 1970s, in contrast to the previous decade, Israel lowered her profile in Africa; the drive and initiative that had characterized her activity in the 1960s lessened as priorities changed. Levels of Israeli assistance, never large-scale in comparison with aid from other sources, fell dramatically. In addition, errors were made by some Israeli companies, who operated in Uganda, for example, without supervision by the central state authorities. As a result of the decline in the value of technical assistance, the Africans began demanding increased investments and financial aid, which Israel could supply in only a very limited way. These were some of the main factors that aided the Arabs in bringing about the rupture of relations between the majority of the African states and Israel. Yet, as will be discussed later, there is another side to the story. The Arabs, too, suffer from disadvantages that weaken their influence in Africa and limit their ability to completely undermine Israel's position. Notes 1. See Appendix 1. 2. See, for example, The Renaissance

(Nigeria), December 10, 1972;

6

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Independent (Nigeria), December 10, 1972; Pioneer (Ghana), March 29, 1972; Daily Nation (Kenya), October 28, 1972; Nation (Sierra Leone), April 17,1972. 3. Foreign Report (London), October 4, 1972; Guardian October 9, 1972; Observer (London), November 12, 1972; Newsweek, October 16, 1972; Afrique Nouvelle (Senegal), April 24, 1972; The Times of Zambia, October 27,1972. 4. Al-'Usbu' al-'Arabi (Lebanon), October 23, 1972.

• CHAPTER TWO •

Arab Activity in the Political and Information Spheres The Arab political victory of 1973 turned out to be both the culmination of the first phase and the beginning of the second in the struggle for the hearts and minds of Africa. The Arab problem in the wake of the October War was one of unfulfilled hopes, for their generous promises of financial assistance raised African expectations far above the levels of aid actually delivered. This has caused Afro-Arab relations over the last decade to resemble something of a roller coaster, with periods of cooperation and agreement often followed by disappointment and recrimination. Thus the Arabs have invested a great deal of time and effort in Africa since 1973 in trying to develop an effective counterstrategy aimed at assuaging African criticism and preventing Israel from regaining a foothold on the continent. The first cracks in the façade of Afro-Arab solidarity began to surface as early as 1974, shortly after the series of diplomatic breaks with Israel. Expecting a fitting reward for the support they had given during the October War, the Africans were deeply disappointed by Arab unwillingness to lend them a "brotherly hand" during the oil crisis. The Africans, whose economies were hit hard by the rise in oil prices, had expected the Arabs to come to their aid by selling them oil at lower prices, as well as increasing aid to enable them to cope with the crisis. When their expectations were not met, many African leaders expressed their bitterness—at the 1974 OAU conference in Mogadishu, for instance, where the Arabs were sharply criticized. Afro-Arab conflicts over the oil issue, especially acute between 1974 and 1976, quickly overflowed into other issues that reflected mutual differences, thereby highlighting some existing points of Arab weakness in Africa. Indeed, one of the most interesting

7

8

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

phenomena observed in the Arab world, mainly since 1973, is selfcriticism and sensitivity about African complaints. Arab statesmen, scholars, journalists, and ambassadors have aired, even in public, sharp self-criticism, stressing the failures and omissions in their African activities; they have made a serious attempt to study African resentment, its reasons and motives, in order to learn from past mistakes. This has led many Arab commentators to caution against inactivity in the face of Israel's attempts to penetrate and regain a foothold in moderate African states, 1 and to recommend increasing financial assistance to Africa, opening additional embassies on the continent, and broadening highlevel diplomatic ties. 2 Some observers in the Arab world have also advised that additional emphasis be placed on elements common to both Arab and African cultures 3 and their common struggle against similar enemies, e.g., South Africa and Israel. 4 Other commentators point to the paralysis in Afro-Arab activity following internecine rivalries, such as the dispute over the Western Sahara, as the reason for the Arab failure to convene a second Afro-Arab summit after 1977. 5 They warn that without Arab unity there is no chance of renewing joint diplomatic initiatives in Africa. Israel's renewal of relations with Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon has intensified such self-critical sentiments. 6 Self-criticism and self-examination have had some influence in the decision-making circles of the Arab world. After having been caught off guard by the sharpness of African criticisms of them, the Arab states learned their lesson; they took notice of suggestions made by their African experts to intensify activities in various spheres and institute i m p r o v e m e n t s by introducing m o r e sophisticated methods of operation. Indeed, since 1976, there has again been an upward trend in the standing and influence of the Arabs in Africa because of their success in lessening the effect of their weak points and maximizing their strengths. Intensified Arab activity, primarily since 1976, has been evident in the political, informational, Islamic, and aid spheres. Expansion of Diplomatic Representation The Arab countries, particularly Egypt, have assumed a greatly expanded profile in Africa since 1973. Today Egypt has missions and consulates in some thirty African states. 7 Other Arab states, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Qatar, and South Yemen, which had taken little interest in events on the African continent up to 1973, entered the ring by opening missions. In Nairobi, for example,

ARAB ACTIVITY IN THE POLITICAL & INFORMATION SPHERES

9

there are thirteen missions operating, along with offices of the Arab League and the PLO—each one headed by a representative with the rank of ambassador—in addition to an active Islamic center supported by Arab funding. 8 A similar number of Arab missions can be found in Nigeria and Ghana. Besides Nairobi, the Arab League has offices in Addis Ababa, Lagos, and Dakar. 9 In short, it can be said that today there is Arab representation of some sort in every country in Africa. The number of African representatives in Arab countries, especially in Egypt, has also increased since 1973. In Cairo there are some forty African states represented by either resident or nonresident ambassadors. And Kuwait, one of the Arab states which became active in Africa only after 1973, has eleven African representatives, among them five resident ambassadors. Establishment of Ties with New African States Up to now, the Arabs have been successful in preventing the nine African states that gained independence after 1973 from establishing ties with Israel. (These states are: Guinea-Bissau, which became independent in 1974; Comoro, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sâo Tomé and Principe, which became independent in 1975; Angola, the Seychelles, which became independent in 1976; Djibouti, 1977, and Zimbabwe, 1980.) They developed contacts with these countries prior to their independence, sent delegations to their independence celebrations, and set up diplomatic representation as quickly as possible after independence. For example, even before Zimbabwe's independence, the Arabs developed connections with the major contesting liberation movements. Robert Mugabe, today Zimbabwe's prime minister, visited Libya, Egypt, and Syria during his country's struggle for independence, and met as well with representatives of the PLO. 1 0 Immediately after independence, representatives of the Arab League and the PLO visited Zimbabwe, and Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Algeria hurried to establish missions in Harare in an effort to block any possible official relations with Israel. 1 1 Intensification of Arab Activity Countries Not Severing Relations with Israel The fact that not every African state cut diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973 (Mauritius, Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho did not do so),

10

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

appeared to the Arabs as a breach of "African consensus" and what the Arabs like to call the Afro-Arab "solidarity front" against Israel. The Arabs have been extraordinarily active in these states since 1973 in an attempt to get them to toe the line and sever ties with Israel. Thus, in 1976, the Arab states (especially Libya and Egypt) exploited the scheduled OAU summit conference slated to take place in Mauritius, pressuring the host country to break ties with Israel by threatening to boycott the conference or to hold it in another country. The Arabs also attempted to block the rotation appointment of the Mauritian prime minister as chairman of the OAU, claiming that Mauritius was still linked to the British Crown and also maintained trade relations with South Africa. Responding to this pressure, on the eve of the conference Mauritius announced that it was suspending diplomatic relations with Israel. Today, six Arab countries are represented in Mauritius by either resident or nonresident ambassadors. Since 1975, Arab activity has also been evident in Lesotho. The United Arab Emirates, (UAE), which in the past had shown no interest in Africa, established diplomatic ties with Lesotho in July 1975, and in December 1981 the Iraqi ambassador presented his credentials. 1 2 Since 1975, high-level visits in both directions have taken place between Lesotho and Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Syria, Kuwait, and Libya. 13 Between 1973-1980, the aid agreements signed between Lesotho and Arab states amounted to $29.7 million, including $18.5 million allocated in 1978 as Arab participation in the building of a new airport in Maseru (the total cost of which was estimated to be $46 million). 14 In 1979, an additional $3.9 million was allocated by the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) for road construction in Lesotho. 15 An Egyptian ambassador was appointed in Swaziland in 1975; a year later, the prime minister of that country visited Cairo, and was followed by other Arab delegations. In April 1984, Algeria's foreign minister visited the country, and soon after that Algeria appointed a nonresident ambassador to Swaziland. Arab aid agreements with Swaziland between 1973-1980 totaled $4.2 million. 16 Malawi had not had any Arab representation for many years until 1981, when the credentials of the Egyptian and Algerian ambassadors were accepted, and Saudi Arabia sent official visitors. Arab aid agreements with Malawi between 1973 and 1981 reached $7.3 million. 17 The Arabs still hope that their increased presence in Lesotho,

ARAB ACTIVITY IN THE POLITICAL & INFORMATION SPHERES

11

Swaziland, and Malawi will eventually change the attitude of these countries towards Israel. Countries

Maintaining

Informal

Relations

with

Israel

Those states that have severed diplomatic but not economic and commercial ties with Israel have also been the target of concerted and increased Arab activity since 1973. The Arabs follow Israel's activities in Africa closely, and often publish fairly accurate details on the number of Israeli experts and the scope of Israeli trade and technical assistance in the various countries. 18 The Arabs usually concentrate their efforts in countries that seem the most friendly toward Israel. In Kenya, for instance, where Israel continues to carry on a high level of economic activity and uses the airport of Nairobi as a stopover for El A1 flights, Arab political and economic efforts have intensified in the last ten years. In addition to the increase in Arab representation already mentioned, numerous mutual visits at high level took place. During the time of the late President Jomo Kenyatta, the Arabs succeeded in recruiting the sympathy of his son Peter Kenyatta, who was deputy foreign minister, and he agreed to act as chairman of "The KenyaArab Friendship League." Peter Kenyatta made frequent visits to Arab countries delivering messages from the president of Kenya. In May 1977 the Kenyan foreign minister, Munyua Waiyaki, visited several Arab states, including Sudan, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. At the end of his visit to Egypt, a joint communiqué was issued supporting the Arabs in the Middle East crisis and denouncing Israel. It was also announced during this visit that Kenya had agreed to the opening of a PLO office in Nairobi. 19 President Daniel Arap Moi took office in 1978, and shortly thereafter visited Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. As a result of these visits, joint statements of a pro-Arab nature were issued and promises were made of generous loans.20 Since 1980, many Arab commercial, economic, and political delegations have visited Kenya. 21 Many of the promises were upheld. Between 1973-1982, the Arab countries increased both bilateral and multilateral financial aid commitments to Kenya, to a total of $367.6 million 2 2 Iraq, for instance, made a commitment in 1980 to lend Kenya $30 million on easy terms, as well as to sell oil directly to Kenya at lower prices. 23 Among the projects that the Arabs agreed to finance in 1982 was the Lodwar-Kakouma road costing $49 million. Of this, BADEA agreed to lend $10 million and the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) $19.4

12

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

million. 2 4 Similar Arab activity is taking place in other countries that still maintain nonformal relations with Israel, such as Ghana and Nigeria. In their efforts to check all economic relations between Africa and Israel, the Arabs rely on carrot-and-stick methods: if the inducement of additional aid does not convince the Africans, they threaten to boycott states and companies found cooperating with Israel. Their aim is to impose an embargo on Israel in the diplomatic sphere, and expand it to the economic and commercial fields. At a number of Arab League meetings, such as the December 1979 meeting in Kuwait, 2 5 one of the recurrent items on the agenda was the matter of how to deal with African countries cooperating with Israel. 2 6 To take Kenya again as an example, the Arab League office in Nairobi worked actively to prevent Kenyan companies from conducting business transactions with Israel, and even prepared a "black list" of firms who ignore the boycott. The matter eventually aroused the indignation of the Kenyan authorities, who issued a strongly worded statement condemning the Arab League for intervening in the internal and economic affairs of Kenya. 2 7 Similar reactions were heard in Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria.

Afro-Arab Conferences and the First Afro-Arab Summit The idea of the Afro-Arab conference was conceived by the Arabs in their post-1973 drive to solidify African unity behind their cause. The various conferences provided yet another sphere of activity and a channel for communication and cooperation between the Arabs and influential sectors of African society. Since 1973, many Afro-Arab gatherings have been convened at both governmental and nongovernmental levels, strengthening ties with professional unions, students, jurists, women, journalists, and other groups. At these gatherings, political resolutions were usually passed in keeping with the Arab line pertaining to Middle East issues. The most important governmental conference in this sphere was the first Afro-Arab summit, held in Cairo on March 7 - 9 , 1977. This conference should also be viewed in the context of steps taken by the Arabs to "mend the cracks in Afro-Arab solidarity" and to ensure African support of the Arab states on Middle East questions. 2 8 As this summit conference largely reflected the special character of Afro-Arab relations, it will be useful to elaborate on its preparation, discussions, and results.

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13

The Arab initiative to convene the Cairo summit began immediately after the 1973 October War. Their efforts met with numerous obstacles, mainly due to'the objections of the Africans, who asked for repeated postponements of the conference. In February 1975, at a meeting of OAU ministers in Addis Ababa, the African leaders expressed fears that such a summit would hitch them to the Arab wagon in all African and Middle Eastern affairs and force upon them policies not to their liking. 29 But the Arab states, especially the Arab League and Egypt, did not let up; some progress was made in July 1975, when a committee of twenty-four ministers (half of them Arab and half African) met in Cairo to draft a program for Afro-Arab cooperation in the political, informational, economic, and other fields. 30 Nevertheless in August 1975, when the draft was presented for the approval of African heads of state at an OAU conference in Kampala, the African delegates adjourned the debate and even refused to set a date for its resumption for fear of binding themselves politically without receiving an adequate quid pro quo.31 But again the Arabs did not despair. After the 1975 Kampala OAU summit conference, they enlisted the help of friendly African leaders, foremost among them the president of Senegal, Leopold Senghor. In October and November of 1975, Senghor carried out a comprehensive tour of Arab states, received promises of increased Arab aid to Africa, and undertook to persuade the African states to agree to an Afro-Arab summit. 32 An important step toward this goal was made in April 1976, when an Afro-Arab ministers' conference at Dakar, Senegal approved the draft scheme for Afro-Arab cooperation, denounced Zionism (with Cote d'lvoire and Liberia dissenting), and thereby paved the way for an Afro-Arab summit. 33 In November of that year, it was reported for the first time by Arab League sources that the secretary-general of the OAU had agreed to an Afro-Arab summit being held in Cairo in March 1977. From then on, the secretary-general of the Arab League and Egyptian officials worked hard for the summit to take place on schedule and achieve maximum success. Arab committees and subcommittees were set up to deal with the whole complex of issues involved and to ensure a united Arab front and a coordinated political line. 3 4 In November 1976, a committee of Arab League ministers met to consolidate the Arab position, and in mid-January 1977, an Arab foreign ministers' meeting in Cairo laid down concepts and principles for Afro-Arab cooperation, and resolved to increase the capital of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa from $231 million to $500 million. On February 19, 1977, Arab

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finance ministers convened to discuss the extent of the grants and loans to African countries, and the Arab League approved $250,000 to finance the summit. The Arabs believed that these measures would placate the Africans and still their critical response to what they saw as unsatisfactory amounts of aid. 35 The Lusaka Preparatory

Conference

Despite the new grants, the Arab states soon realized that the aid dispute between themselves and the Africans was unchanged and threatened to endanger the planned summit. This was demonstrated at a meeting of twenty-four African and Arab cabinet ministers in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, on January 22-28,1977, which was to draw up the agenda for the summit and discuss and approve a plan for Afro-Arab cooperation. The African representatives made it clear from the start that they were determined to focus the discussion on the extent of Arab aid. On January 19, three days before the opening of the Lusaka conference, President Kaunda of Zambia declared that the Africans would draw the attention of the oil-producing Arab states to the grave situation created in Africa by the rise of fuel prices. OAU Secretary-General William Eteki made a similar declaration on his arrival in Lusaka. 36 At the conference itself, the Zambian prime minister stated bluntly that "There are very rich countries among us. Afro-Arab solidarity requires them to help the poor ones." 37 The Tanzanian foreign minister, Ibrahim Kaduma, presented on behalf of the Africans a document demanding increased Arab aid for African countries hit by the rise of oil prices. Noting that the economic development of the African states was blocked and even set back by OPEC's price hikes, the document called on the oil-producing Arab states to allot $2.2 billion over five years for loans and grants to nonoil-producing African states through the African Development Bank. 3 8 The African states also demanded increased aid to the "confrontation states" struggling against the white regimes in Southern Africa. In answer to these demands, the Arab representatives referred to their decision to increase the capital of BADEA to $500 million and refused to add to that amount. A deadlock ensued and the question was passed on to the Afro-Arab foreign ministers, who met on March 3-5, 1977 to iron out the remaining difficulties prior to the summit. 39 The fact that the foreign ministers' meeting had to be extended by one day attests to differences of opinion among the participants. Arab leaders, quoted in a Kuwaiti newspaper, complained that the

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Africans were taking an inflexible "no aid, no cooperation" approach, causing "profound disappointment among the Arabs, who regard aid as a humanitarian matter arising out of a sincere wish to help." 4 0 The Cairo

Summit

Untiring efforts by Egyptian and Arab League officials, coupled with assurances that aid would be increased after all, eventually ensured the convening of the summit as scheduled on March 7. The conference was attended by thirty-nine African states (only Malawi did not take part) and twenty Arab countries. There were also representatives of the Arab League, the OAU, and African liberation movements (except the Polisario of the Western Sahara). Yasser Arafat represented the PLO. Most of the summit's speeches were conspicuous for two features: the emphasis on the common struggle of Arabs and Africans, and attacks against Israel. Regarding the first feature, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat stressed the "common struggle of the Arab and African peoples and their interdependence." He noted Egypt's part in the liberation of Africa since the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and Cairo's role as an African and Arab capital and an Afro-Arab culture centre. "Two ancient civilizations, the Arab and the African, are fused in the Egyptian people. The African civilization arose on the banks of the Nile 7,000 years ago, and since then Egypt has been an inseparable part of African civilization... . We are the bridge for the merger of cultures because of Egypt's geographical, political and cultural position. Egypt has not forgotten that its task is to enrich, not injure, African civilization. Africans should remember that the 100 million Arabs include 80 million African Arabs." 41 Zambia's President Kaunda, speaking from the African side, also compared the struggle of the African peoples for independence to the struggle of the Arabs in the Middle East. 42 As for the second feature, Arab representatives dedicated most of their speeches to attacks on Israel, identifying it with the white regimes in Southern Africa. For their part, African representatives mostly repeated their declared position advocating the evacuation of all the areas occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a PLO-led Palestinian state. Moderate African states joined their voices to the majority. Others were more extreme in their condemnation of Israel and Zionism, blaming the Middle East crisis on Israeli "aggression" and its "racist" policies. 43 In the ensuing discussion, the question of Arab aid to Africa was

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again the main topic. The Arabs stressed repeatedly that Afro-Arab cooperation must not be based on the extent of Arab financial aid, but on common principles. This attitude was also taken by some African representatives, especially those of Zambia and Senegal, who noted that African support for the Arabs in their struggle against Israel was rooted chiefly in the sacred principle of opposition to the acquisition of territory by force. At the same time there were others, such as the representative of the Congo Republic, who hinted that only increased Arab aid could reduce Israeli activity in Africa. 44 OAU Secretary-General William Eteki also said that the Arabs should take actions to develop the African continent, failing which Afro-Arab cooperation would run aground on the rocks of underdevelopment and poverty.45 In response to the African aid requests, the Saudi foreign minister promised to appropriate $1 billion for the development of Africa. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar announced additional appropriations of $137 million, $241 million, and $78 million, respectively. Out of an aggregate of $1.46 billion promised by these four states, $7 million was set aside for liberation movements. In addition, Egypt and Jordan promised $1 million each and Libya $2 million for the same purpose. During the careful preparations prior to the summit, efforts were made to keep controversial subjects off the agenda. Thus, unlike earlier African conferences, no serious confrontations developed and only a few criticisms were voiced, among them the following: 1. The representative of Benin accused Morocco of participating in an abortive attempt to overthrow the regime in his country in January 1977.46 2. The Libyan representative indirectly attacked the adversaries of his country in the Arab world, especially Egypt, for trying to undermine the Libyan regime. 47 Egypt accused Libya through the media of trying to sabotage, delay, or detract from the conference and of raising issues likely to cause discord. 48 3. Ethiopia's representative sharply d e n o u n c e d the involvement of "reactionary Arab states" (which he did not name) in Eritrea, stressing that Eritrea was not part of the Arab world but the northern part of Ethiopia. He also attacked Arab activities in the Red Sea area, declaring that it was not an Arab lake.49

ARAB ACTIVITY IN THE POLITICAL & INFORMATION SPHERES

The Resolutions Linking Middle Eastern and African

17

Problems

The conference participants unanimously adopted a political declaration and a program of action for Afro-Arab cooperation, both of which dealt with three main fields: the political, the economic, and the organizational. 50 In the political field, the resolutions passed were mainly concerned with Southern Africa and the Middle East, particular stress being laid on the connection between imperialism, colonialism, Zionism, and racial discrimination "in South Africa, Palestine and other occupied Arab and African territories." In addition, the resolutions 1. Pledged full support for the struggle of the peoples of Palestine, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Namibia, South Africa, and the Somali Coast (Djibouti) for the recovery of their national rights and the realization of their right of selfdetermination 2. Condemned South African and Rhodesian aggression against sovereign African peoples and "similar actions of Israel against Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria"; and, the same paragraph censured Israel for its activities in the administered areas 3. Demanded intensified efforts to increase the political and economic isolation of Israel, South Africa, and Rhodesia "as long as these countries persist in their racist, expansionist and aggressive policies"; for this purpose, economic and oil boycotts were proposed These resolutions demonstrate the Arabs' success in linking Middle Eastern with African problems while stressing similar features. There were no paragraphs in the texts dealing separately with Middle Eastern and Israeli affairs. This method deflected African criticism that the Arabs concentrated on Middle Eastern subjects at the expense of African problems at OAU meetings. By linking the two regions, the form and content of the political statement proclaim that the problems involved are common ArabAfrican matters. In the economic field, the resolutions pledged cooperation in the areas of trade, mining, industry, agriculture, energy, transport, communications, and financial institutions. One important practical achievement was the Arab undertaking to extend additional financial aid, which as mentioned amounted to approximately $1.5 billion.

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In the organizational field, the declared aim was to ensure Afro-Arab cooperation by establishing permanent institutions as follows: 1. An Afro-Arab summit conference, to meet once every three years (both Sudan and Uganda offering at that time to host the next summit in their capitals) 2. A council of ministers, to meet once every eighteen months 3. A permanent committee of twenty-four ministers, twelve elected by the OAU and twelve by the Arab League, which was to meet twice a year, and whenever necessary in special cases, to monitor developments in Afro-Arab relations and to be responsible for implementing Afro-Arab cooperation. The committee was to be the chief executive body, charged with setting up, supervising, and coordinating the activities of specialized working groups in the different spheres of cooperation. 4. An Afro-Arab special court of arbitration for the settlement of differences that might arise

Results

of the Cairo

Summit

The Cairo summit provided both the Arabs and the Africans with several achievements. The very fact that the summit went on as planned, despite Afro-Arab frictions and several postponements, was a considerable political achievement for the Arabs, especially since the conference had taken place in an Arab capital. Although some differences arose, especially concerning Eritrea, none of them led to confrontation and polarization. The Arab states had expected and prepared themselves for criticism, yet succeeded in averting it. The impending confrontation over aid was defused by impressive new promises on the part of the Arabs, even if these did not entirely live up to African hopes. The Arabs also achieved—at least temporarily—one of their most important objectives: to check the widening rift between themselves and the Africans, while simultaneously working to thwart Israel's efforts to renew its relations with the more moderate African states. 51 A meeting between the president of Côte d'Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Geneva on the eve of the summit alarmed the Arabs, and seemed to propel them in meeting the Africans halfway at the conference. In addition, the establishment of frameworks for Afro-Arab cooperation and the adoption of Article 17 of the Afro-Arab

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19

cooperation program, which requires the parties to coordinate their diplomatic activities in matters of common interest at the UN and other international bodies, made it more difficult, at least in the short run, for African states to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. The Arabs thus succeeded in strengthening the commitment of the Africans to support their political line on Middle East issues at international forums. The establishment of joint agencies and working committees placed Afro-Arab cooperation on a broad basis and served to strengthen the ties between the Arab League and the OAU. The two organizations agreed at the Cairo summit to exchange permanent representatives. In this way, member states of the League not situated in Africa have been drawn into the orbit of African affairs, and Arab countries with fewer financial resources to spare, such as Egypt, were able to exert influence in Africa thanks to the backing of rich, oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. 5 2 The conference enabled Arab leaders to make direct contact with many high-level African personalities; PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was also given an opportunity to address the delegates, meet with African leaders, and state his case. It was at the Cairo summit that Zambia and Cameroon agreed to the opening of PLO offices in their countries. The Arabs once again secured resolutions condemning Zionism and equating it with racism. Linking the affairs of the Middle East, the Palestinians, and the Israelis with those of Africa, the liberation movements, South Africa, and racism was a clever and successful move. By 1977, there were no reservations on the part of the Africans; the result was further injury to Israel's image in Africa and increased identification of Israel with South Africa and Rhodesia. African politicians adopted Arab phraseology when discussing Middle Eastern topics. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, for instance, described the Arab struggle against Israel and the struggle against white majority rule in Southern Africa as complementary parts of the same effort. 53 The success of the Arabs at the summit conference was modified by some disappointments. The great majority of African heads of state did not attend; despite Arab hopes, the presidents of only eleven of the forty Black African states showed; the other African representatives were of lower rank. Moreover, the absentees included the heads of key states, such as Nyerere of Tanzania, Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'lvoire, Mobutu of Zaire, and Obasanjo of Nigeria. Malawi was not represented at all.

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In addition, it was a fact well known to both Africans and Arabs that but for the promise of an additional $1.5 billion of Arab aid, the summit might well have failed. This fact indicates more clearly than anything else that beyond the phrases and declarations, AfroArab solidarity is based on Arab money. Thus the Egyptian Gazette commented at the end of the conference: "The question is what will happen after the Arab and African leaders have made their emotional solidarity speeches. Will the Arabs continue to offer seasonal bribes for African support?" 5 4 In fact, the Africans' principal objective at Cairo in 1977 was to pressure the oil-producing countries into granting more aid. In relative terms, they succeeded in doing just that. Whereas in 1974 it had been difficult to extract a promise of $200 million, in 1977 a price more than seven times that was offered in exchange for African support. But, as part of the bargain for increased aid, the Africans lost much of their freedom of action in Middle Eastern affairs, especially in international forums. Moreover, most Arab financial commitments were vague as to purpose or duration. The demand that the aid monies should be under African control has not been fulfilled to this day. According to a Cote d'lvoire newspaper: "Particulars as to Arab financial aid promised to Africa are lacking. It is not known for how many years aid will be g i v e n . . . . A substantial part of the promised amounts should be deposited with the African Development Bank or with African funds; only then will there be a chance of improving the atmosphere and of Afro-Arab cooperation." 55 The Ethiopian representative at the conference, Abo Berhano Dinka, expressed himself strongly on this subject: he claimed that the summit had in effect, become a "philanthropic forum." Dinka noted that 95 percent of the promised funds would be apportioned by the Arabs alone and only a negligible part by the African Development Bank. The Arabs, he warned, would not apply objective criteria but, as in the past, would allot aid according to their political interests. 56 The summit did not permanently solve 'the disputes and misunderstandings between Arabs and Africans, nor were the lavish promises of aid fulfilled to the satisfaction of the Africans. Nevertheless, the importance of the summit cannot be underestimated, as it was the first of many Afro-Arab meetings in which both sides could explain their attitudes and strengthen their ties. 5 7 Both Arabs and Africans showed interest in the continuation of these forums. Thus, at the OAU summit conference in Nairobi in June

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21

1981, although disappointment and criticism were expressed by delegates at the slow implementation of the Afro-Arab summit resolutions, all agreed to work towards strengthening and reviving the Afro-Arab organizations and streamlining their functioning. 58 Differences between the Arabs and the Africans (see Chapters 5 and 6) have prevented the resolution calling for an Afro-Arab summit every three years from being carried out to date. However, efforts are still being made by the OAU and the Arab League to convene a second Afro-Arab summit sometime in 1987, the tenth anniversary of the first summit. An additional goal in the establishment of Afro-Arab organizations was to lay a firm foundation for collective, multilateral cooperation and to strengthen the ties between the Arab League and the OAU. It was resolved that a representative of the Arab League would participate in OAU conferences and that an OAU delegate would attend the Arab League meetings. And, indeed, President Arap Moi did attend the Arab League summit conference at Fez in November 1981 in his capacity as chairman of the OAU. There he made political statements echoing the Arab line on the Middle East and the Palestinian problem. 59 The increased Arab activities in these Afro-Arab frameworks also influenced the voting pattern of the African bloc at the UN and its agencies. On Middle East topics, the vast majority of African countries voted with the Arabs. Only a few, such as Malawi, Swaziland, Cote d'lvoire, and sometimes Kenya, abstained occasionally. Even Zaire continued to vote with the Arabs in the General Assembly after diplomatic relations were renewed with Israel. Zaire rarely abstained, apart from a few special cases. 60 Information Dissemination The Arabs had already discovered, prior to 1973, the utility of information and propaganda as a tool in their war against Israel. Since 1973, they have intensified their operations in Africa, expanding their special broadcasts to Africa in African languages and distributing printed material through Arab embassies, offices of the Arab League in Africa, and offices of the PLO. Arab activity in the information sphere covers a wide range of media. In addition to the regular broadcasts and channels of information, Afro-Arab symposia for university scholars, government officials, and journalists are held. "Cultural centers" established in African capitals offer courses in Arabic history,

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culture, and language (which is now an official language in the OAU). Special information courses were organized for African journalists and radio and television broadcasters. 61 The Arab states send teachers and instructors to schools, universities, and Islamic institutions in African countries. The Information Committee of the Arab League coordinates such efforts and plans programs for AfroArab conferences and other cooperation in the field of information.62 The stated aim of these efforts is to promote greater closeness and understanding between Arabs and Africans, with particular emphasis on the notion that the Arabs are not to blame for Africa's economic problems; on the contrary, they have done more than others to aid the Africans. They are pushing for Afro-Arab political cooperation based on African support of the Arabs on Middle East questions, in exchange for Arab support for the Africans on the issues of South Africa and the anti-imperialist struggle. In general, the Arabs carefully avoid creating the appearance of seeking African political support in exchange for Arab money, preferring to emphasize the ideological basis of Afro-Arab cooperation. In Arab information strategies, great attention is given to demonstrating the common roots of African and Arab cultures and their common historical background and destiny.63 One important aim of Arab information activity is to criticize Israel's policies in Africa and the Middle East and to damage her image. Thus the bulletin The Arab World, published in English and Swahili by the Arab League office in Nairobi, dedicates most of its pages to attacking Israel. In a similar vein, one of the main topics discussed at a symposium held in Jordan in April 1983 on Afro-Arab relations concerned the need to check Israel's penetration into Africa. 6 4 Close examination of the African media and speeches delivered by prominent African leaders reveals that Arab efforts to damage Israel's image in Africa have partially succeeded. During the 1960s, Israel was viewed by many African countries as a small but hardworking state in which miracles had been accomplished in developing its barren land, a courageous state that had held its own against all Arab nations and had contributed to the development of new countries by offering them assistance without conditions or "imperialist intentions." By the 1970s this image had become noticeably tarnished. After persistently hammering at certain sensitive issues, the Arabs have brought public opinion in Africa almost to a consensus on many Middle East issues, among them the following:

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23

1. Israel is an aggressor state and represents a threat not only to Arab countries, but also to the African states in that it is an ally of the "imperialist states." 2. Israel and South Africa pose a joint threat to the African continent—Israel in the north and South Africa in the south. Here, the Arabs make effective use of any item concerning Israel's ties with South Africa, with particular emphasis on military cooperation between the two countries.65 3. Zionism, like apartheid, is racism, and that Israel is thus a racist state. An increasing number of resolutions of this type are introduced in Afro-Arab bodies and in international forums, providing strong evidence of how African media and leaders repeat anti-Israel slogans coined by the Arabs.66 For example, at the UN Conferences on Racism of 1978 and 1983, Israel was condemned alongside of South Africa for its "racist" attitudes. 67 These anti-Israel activities are mainly aimed at preventing renewal of diplomatic ties between Africa and Israel. The Arabs demand that the Africans continue to boycott Israel politically, economically, and militarily as long as Israel still occupies Arab lands and as long as the Palestinians have not won the right to establish their own independent state. They warn that renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel, before this time, will inflict a severe blow to Afro-Arab solidarity. 68 These arguments have been accepted on the whole by the majority of African leaders. Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, for instance, repeatedly declared that his nation will renew its diplomatic ties with Israel only after the Palestinians establish their independent state. 69 It should also be noted that, on the issue of renewal of relations with Israel, the Arabs do not always limit themselves to explanations and persuasion, but use the stick as well as the carrot by threatening to cut aid to countries that resume ties with Israel. These threats often seem to cause resentment among Africans. Trends and Methods in Arab Operations The course of Arab activity in Africa during the past decade reveals a higher level of sophistication in their means of operation. The Arabs have developed and adopted new methods and approaches, with an eye toward overcoming African opposition to the extreme tone of the anti-Israel resolutions at the OAU, Afro-Arab conferences, and the UN.

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One of these approaches can be termed the "softening up" method. On many occasions in the past, the Arabs' anti-Israel proposals appeared at first glance too extreme to the Africans and aroused their opposition. The Arabs would then agree to drop the idea for a time, but later returned to it repeatedly until it gained acceptance. This method requires cautious, step-by-step progress aimed at avoiding any permanent rift. In this manner, the Arabs succeeded in overcoming a series of African objections to their dictates. Numerous examples illustrating the "softening up" approach come to mind, including the very nature of the discussions on the subject of the Middle East at OAU conferences. For instance, the majority of African countries initially opposed convening an emergency session of the OAU to demand that Israel withdraw from the territory it had occupied after the 1967 Six-Day War. In the months immediately after the war, the Africans argued that the Middle East dispute should not be brought into African forums, and preferred a neutral stance toward the two sides. But, in time, these objections abated and today the Middle East question is a regular topic of OAU debates and resolutions. For example, at the Nairobi OAU summit conference in June 1981, the subject of the Middle East occupied a central position in the debates, generating four separate and lengthy resolutions that were accepted: a condemnation of Israel over the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, a general resolution on the Middle East question, a resolution on the Palestinian issue, and a resolution on the subject of Jerusalem.70 And even at the most recent OAU summit, held in Addis Ababa in 1985, the Middle East preoccupied the participants despite the pressing problems of drought and famine plaguing Africa. It should be noted, however, that there remain several African states that find the obsessive occupation with Middle East issues to be improper for the OAU. Kenyan President Arap Moi, then chairman of the OAU, expressed anxiety that the preoccupation with Middle East affairs could result in the shunting aside of important African matters, and added the hope that, in the future, "non-African" subjects would not take away so much time from OAU conferences and would not detract from important African issues. Arap Moi reiterated this position at a speech before the Arab League conference in Fez in November 1981, when he pointed out that while the Arab-Israeli conflict was of major concern to the Arabs and the Africans, "it should not be allowed to overshadow other issues calling for solutions."71

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As another example of the "softening up" approach, Israel's image has been transformed from that of a peace-loving country defending herself against foreign invasions to that of a condemned aggressor. At the OAU conference held in Kinshasa in September 1967, three months after the Six-Day War, the Arab states called for passage of a resolution labeling Israel the aggressor in the conflict. The majority of the African states opposed the resolution, and the Arabs dropped their demand. But several years later, at the OAU conference in 1972, a resolution was passed condemning the "continued aggression of Israel against Egypt." And at the AfroArab summit conference in Cairo in 1977, Israel was denounced "for her expansionist and aggressive policy." 72 By now, resolutions calling Israel an aggressor has become a matter of routine at the OAU. The Palestinian issue itself also has been pushed to the forefront of African affairs by this method of gradual persistence. For years, the Africans objected to the Arab demand that they treat the Palestinian question as an African issue. But this opposition was also gradually broken down, and the OAU conference in Kampala in 1975 resolved that the Palestinian issue was as much an African issue as Rhodesia and South Africa. 73 Today the subject of the PLO is a familiar one to African statesmen, and even moderate African countries such as Kenya, Cote d'lvoire, Liberia, and Zaire have accepted the Arab position that the Palestinians must be given a homeland of their own. Furthermore, a PLO representative participates in conferences of the African liberation movements, and at the Afro-Arab summit conference in 1977 PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat attended and addressed the meeting as the representative of Palestine—the twenty-first state of the Arab League. The growing African interest in the Palestinian issue is also reflected by the many seminars, exhibitions, and symposia held in Africa. One such symposium was The International Seminar on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which was held in Arusha, Tanzania in July 1980; here the PLO delegation set the tone. The representative of the host country, the Tanzanian Minister of Trade Ibrahim Kaduma, emphasized in his opening speech that "the Palestinians have a right to a homeland and an independent state" and that "any peace process in the Middle East that does not assign a central role to the PLO is bound to fail." The conference's resolutions were along the same lines. 74 Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon even after renewing diplomatic relations with Israel, emphasize their support for a Palestinian state. Thus the Liberian government, when announcing

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AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

its decision to resume normal diplomatic relations with Israel, added that "despite its decision, its Middle East policy continues to be based on the belief that a just and lasting peace cannot prevail in the region without due recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to a state of their own." 75 And when Cameroon President Paul Biya received the "Letters of Credence" of the first Israeli ambassador to Cameroon in December 1986, he too mentioned "the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to selfdetermination and independence." 76 The International Conference on the Question of Palestine held in Geneva in September 1983 called for "the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Palestine" and condemned Israel for its "expansionist policies." All the African states attending the conference, including those which renewed diplomatic ties with Israel, supported this declaration without any reservations. The issue of Israel's expulsion from the UN and the imposition of sanctions against her is a concrete goal of the Arabs as part of their "softening up" activities. When the majority of African states objected to a resolution demanding Israel's international ostracism at the OAU conference in 1975, the Arabs backed down and withdrew the proposal. However, it should be remembered that the Africans did not offer opposition in principle to the expulsion of Israel from the UN, and the final resolution stated that the possibility of ultimately depriving Israel of its membership in the UN still existed if other courses of action did not help the situation. It should be noted that, at another joint Afro-Asian forum, the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), (to which eighteen Black African states belong), resolutions have already been adopted demanding Israel's expulsion from the UN. This indicates that the Arabs had already managed, at this early stage, to introduce elements into the resolution that would ease the way for them in the future should they wish to propose the resolution again at a suitable opportunity. Then the issue would not be treated as an Arab dictate, but as a proposal based on an earlier OAU resolution—another of the characteristics of the Arabs' method of operation. Another Arab approach is the "interweaving" or "linkage" method—in other words, the interweaving of Middle East questions with African issues, linking them together in such a fashion as to make it difficult for the Africans to separate them and to object to the sections concerning the Middle East. In the thirteen-point political declaration issued by the Afro-Arab summit conference of 1977 held in Cairo, there is not one separate, specific resolution

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27

dealing with the Middle East. Instead, Middle Eastern and African issues are interwoven in each and every article of the resolution. For instance, the fifth article of the summary statement condemns Zionism together with imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and racial discrimination in "South Africa, Palestine and other Arab and African occupied territories." The article denounced the aggression of Rhodesia and South Africa against the African confrontation states while, in the same breath, condemning "the similar aggression of Israel against the Arab confrontation states." And in other articles as well, issues were linked in this manner: Middle Eastern with African issues, the Palestinian problem with the African liberation movements, Israel with South Africa and Rhodesia, Zionism with racism and apartheid. This method has proved successful because even the moderate African states can offer no objections to articles worded in this manner. 77 The Arabs have also employed this approach in UN debates. In 1975, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism. But this question led to a breaking of Afro-Arab ranks, and seventeen African states either voted against it or abstained. At the UN General Assembly in 1976, a separate resolution on the subject of Zionism was rejected; however, the resolution concerning South Africa includes a clear and explicit condemnation of Zionism—this time bound up in a "South African package." As a result of this approach, there were no African objections. By now, the Arabs no longer hesitate to propose separate resolutions condemning Israel, and are generally successful. Nevertheless, when necessary, the Arabs link Israel and South Africa to gain wider backing. At the latest OAU conferences, antiIsrael resolutions are permanent fixtures on the agenda. Conclusion The Arab countries have intensified their political, diplomatic, and informational efforts in Africa since 1973, thereby strengthening and expanding their presence on the continent. The main goal of their efforts has been to block the return of Israeli diplomats to Africa and to undermine Israel's economic and technical cooperation enterprises there. The Arabs achieved their goal in the diplomatic sphere during the 1970s. Despite the tensions and misunderstandings in Afro-Arab relations during those years, no African country renewed ties with Israel, not even the new states that gained independence after 1973.

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AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

T h e A f r o - A r a b s u m m i t c o n f e r e n c e held in C a i r o in M a r c h 1 9 7 7 r e p r e s e n t e d the A r a b s ' s e c o n d v i c t o r y since the 1 9 7 3 Y o m K i p p u r W a r . T h i s c o n f e r e n c e s u c c e e d e d in m a i n t a i n i n g the b a r r i e r s a g a i n s t d i p l o m a t i c r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e t w e e n A f r i c a a n d Israel. It d i f f u s e d the m o u n t i n g tension b e t w e e n Africa a n d the A r a b s b y i n d u c i n g the A r a b oil p r o d u c e r s to substantially i n c r e a s e their a i d c o m m i t m e n t s to A f r i c a . T h e A r a b s also m a d e significant p r o g r e s s in the i n f o r m a t i o n w a r a g a i n s t Israel: T h e O A U a n d o t h e r African f o r u m s a d o p t e d the 1 9 7 5 r e s o l u t i o n e q u a t i n g Z i o n i s m w i t h r a c i s m a n d t h e y c o n t i n u e d to s u p p o r t the A r a b political line o n the M i d d l e E a s t conflict. The m o s t significant i n d i c a t i o n s of A r a b s u c c e s s o n the c o n t i n e n t is A f r i c a ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of the P L O as the sole a n d l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s a n d its s u p p o r t f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a n i n d e p e n d e n t P a l e s t i n i a n state. Notes I. See, e.g., Elias Zain, "Gloomy Arab Report on Afro-Arab Relations," Al-Hawadith (Lebanon), June 13,1975. 'l. Al-Shab (Algeria), February 21, 1976. 3. See, e.g., "A Pessimistic Report by an Arab Emissary in Africa," Alfadid (Lebanon), December 6, 1974. 4. See, e.g., "The Failure of Arab Informational Activity in Africa," AlAhram (Egypt), December 19, 1975. 5. See, e.g., v Ali Abu Sin, "The Aims of Afro-Arab Cooperation," Ruz alYusuf (Egypt), December 19, 1977. 6. Al-Ahram (Egypt), February 11, 1985; Al-Medina (Saudi Arabia), J u n e 3 , 1 9 8 5 ; Al-Majala (Saudi Arabia), March 6, 1985. 7. Egypt, Directory of Diplomatic and Consular Corps, Cairo 1982. 8. R e p u b l i c of Kenya, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directory of Diplomatic Corps, Nairobi, January 1985. 9. Al-Riad (Saudi Arabia), December 12,1981. 10. On Muzorewa's visit to Libya, see S.W.B. February 23, 1977, ME S446 B4; on ZANU's secretary general's visit to Damascus as the guest of the Ba'th Party, see SANA, December 1, 1977; on the visit of Robert Mugabe to Syria h e a d i n g a delegation of Z A N U and his m e e t i n g s with P L O representatives, see Tishrin (Syria), May 18, 1978; on the visit of Mugabe to Egypt, see Al-Ahram (Egypt), January 19, 1979. I I . The Herald (Zimbabwe), May 20, 1980. 12. Al-Thaura (Iraq), December 28, 1981. 13. Al-Fajr al-Jadid (Libya), July 26, 1975; Al-Ndfidha (Kuwait), July 20, 1976. 1 4 . Aperqu du programme arabe de cooperation avec I'Afrique (Khartoum, 1981).

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15. La Parole est à la BADEA, Khartoum, 1982. 16. Aperçu, op. cit. 17. BADEA Annual Report, 1983, 74. 18. See, for example, Al-Majala (Saudi Arabia), August 6 , 1 9 8 3 . 19. The Washington Post, J u n e 7, 1977. 20. Daily Nation (Kenya), S e p t e m b e r 25, 1979; The Standard (Kenya), M a y 26, 29,1980. 21. On the visit o f a delegation from the United Arab Emirates, see Daily Nation (Kenya), M a y 28, 1980; on the visit of a Kenyan delegation to O m a n , see Daily Nation ( K e n y a ) , April 22, 1980; on the visit of the d e l e g a t i o n of the U n i o n of Arab C h a m b e r s o f C o m m e r c e , see Business (Kenya), October 1981; on the visit b y a P L O special envoy, see Daily Nation (Kenya), August 1 9 , 1 9 8 3 . 22. La Parole est à la B A D E A , Khartoum, 1983. 23. The Standard (Kenya), M a y 28, 1980. 24. La Parole, op. cit. 25. Al-Quds (Jerusalem), D e c e m b e r 7, 1979; see also Al-Ahram (Egypt), J u n e 23, 1977: "The diplomatic boycott against Israel must b e accompanied by an economic boycott." 26. On the Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting of September 1 2 - 1 4 , 1983 in Tunis, see Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), September 19, 1983. 27. The Standard (Kenya), N o v e m b e r 1, 1979. 28. See, e.g., an article by Syria's Ambassador to Tanzania in Al-Thaura (Syria), February 1 2 , 1 9 7 7 . 29. Cameroon Tribune, February 21, 1978. 30. ARB (London), August 15,1975, 3685. 31. Le Monde (Paris), August 4, 1975. 32. Al-Ahram (Egypt), N o v e m b e r 16, 1975; Le Monde, N o v e m b e r 20, 1975. 3 3 . " A f r o - A r a b C o o p e r a t i o n : S l o w P r o g r e s s , " African Review (Washington), J u n e 1976, 1-4. On the program of cooperation discussed in Dakar, see also Al-Anwär (Lebanon), April 15, 1976. 34. Al-Akhbär (Egypt), December 23, 1976; Al-Thaura (Syria), J a n u a r y 7, 1977. 35. On the m e e t i n g of Arab finance ministers, see Al-Ahram (Egypt), February 20, 1977. 36. The Times of Zambia, J a n u a r y 2 1 - 2 2 , 1977. 37. Associated Press, from Lusaka, January 2 4 , 1 9 7 7 . 38. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), January 26, 1977. 39. On the d i s a g r e e m e n t s at the Lusaka meeting, see Sunday Times of Zambia, January 3 0 , 1 9 7 7 ; also, ARB, January 1977, 4379. 40. Al-'Anba (Kuwait), March 5, 1977. 41. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 8, 1977. 42. New York Times, March 8, 1977. 43. MENA, March 8 , 1 9 7 7 ; Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), March 9 - 1 0 , 1977. 44. MENA, March 1 1 , 1 9 7 7 . 45. Cairo Radio, April 9, 1977.

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46. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), March 9, 1977. 47. SWB, March 9,1977, M E / 5 4 5 8 / A / 1 . 48. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 3, 5, 1977; Al-Watan al-'Arabi (Paris), March 9, 1977. 49. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 9, 1977; Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), March 9,1977. 50. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 10, 1977; for the English text, see SWB, March 11, 1977 M E / 5 4 6 0 / D 1 - 5 . 51. See, e.g., the Tunisian foreign minister's statement that "Afro-Arab cooperation will frustrate any effort by world Zionism and Israel to return to Africa," Al-Sha'b (Jerusalem), January 31, 1977. 52. For more on the Arabs' efforts to organize their cooperation with African states on a collective basis, see the paper of Abdel Malek "Oda and Mohammed Aly el-Oweiny, "The October War and the Changes in the African Stand," presented to the International Symposium on The October 1973 War, Cairo University, 27-31 October 1975. 53. New York Times, March 8 , 1 9 7 7 . 54. Egyptian Gazette, March 10, 1977. 55. Fraternité Matin (Abidjan), March 10, 1977. 56. Zambia Daily Mail, March 14, 1977. 57. On the numerous meetings and conferences held within the AfroArab framework, see White Paper on Afro-Arab Cooperation 1977-1978, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Cairo 1980. 58. Resolution C M / R e s / 8 6 2 XXXVII on Afro-Arab Cooperation, Organization of African Unity Declarations and Resolutions Adopted by Ministers (Nairobi, Kenya, June 15-26, 1981). 59. Daily Nation (Kenya), November 26, 1981. 60. See also Susan A. Gitelson, "UN-Middle East Voting Patterns of the Black African States," Middle East Review 7 (Spring-Summer 1975): 33-37. 61. On the course held in 1979 in Damascus, see Al-Ba'th (Syria), April 6,1979. 62. For details of these programs, see Akhbär al-Yöm (Egypt), February 26,1977; Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt), Octobcr 26,1977. 63. Al-Ra'i (Jordan), June 17,1983. 64. Al-Fajr (Jordan), May 26,1983. 65. See, e.g., the article in Al-'UsbiT al-'Arabi (Lebanon), of April 26, 1976. 66. The Arab World (Nairobi), 62 (September-October 1980): 2,3. 67. West Africa (London), September 12, 1983, 2113. 68. Al-Dustür (Jordan), November 30, 1976; *Ukäz (Saudi Arabia), May 7,1982. 69. See Nyerere's interview in Al-'ltihäd (Abu Dhabi), August 11, 1977. 70. OAU Declarations and Resolutions, above, note 58. 71. Weekly Review (Kenya), November 27, 1981. 72. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), October 9 , 1 9 7 7 . 73. ARB, August 15,1975. 74. Daily News (Tanzania), July 1 3 - 1 8 , 1 9 8 0 .

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75. The Jerusalem Post (Israel), August 14, 1983. 76. SWB December 29, 1986, ME/8451/B11. 77. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 10, 1977, quotes the full text of the resolutions.

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ALGERIA EGYPT

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ETHIOPIA

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ZAIRE TANZANIi

ISLAM IN AFRICA

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States where Muslims are more than 50%

ANGOLA

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States where traditional religions and Christianity are more than 50%

NAMIBIA

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Boundaries between mainly Islamised regions and other religions Source Arye Oded

'RWANDA BURUNDI

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SOUTH AFRICA o

SWAZILAND J LESOTHO

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CHAPTER THREE

•

Arab Islamic Activity in Africa

The battle for the hearts and minds of Africa extends beyond the spheres of information and diplomacy. The Arabs have long encouraged and exploited the spread of Islam on the African continent, but in recent years, as part of their increased efforts to win influence in Africa, the Arabs have also stepped up their activities in the Islamic sphere. Islamic activity by Arabs in Africa dates back to the rise of Islam itself in the seventh century. Islam was spread both by peaceful means, along the trade routes by Arab merchants, and by f o r c e — j i h a d , the holy war. Today, an estimated one-third o f Africa's inhabitants are Muslim. Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser was the main force behind the recent drive to advance Arab political interests in Africa through the manipulation of Islam. In the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser's Egypt initiated intensive Islamic activity, seeking to strengthen Egyptian influence in Africa while at the same time eliminating Israel's presence on the continent. Since those years, Libyan ruler Muammar Qadhafi has sought to claim Nasser's mantle of leadership b y exploiting Islam to gain influence in Africa, but Saudi Arabia and other Arab states are also active in this sphere.

Machinery and Institutions The Islamic activity of many Arab states is modeled, to a large extent, on Egypt's earlier efforts. 1 Those efforts centered around the campus of Al-Azhar University, which accepts students from Africa, sends teachers to postings in Africa, aids I s l a m i c institutions, and establishes Islamic centers in various countries. AlAzhar has long served Egypt in her Islamic activity in Africa. In 33

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AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

addition, a special department, headed by a senior religious leader with the title of delegations director (mudir al-ba'that), was established at Al-Azhar to coordinate contacts with other African countries.2 Other Egyptian institutions coordinating Islamic activity throughout the world are the Office of Religious Trusts (Wizárat al-Awqaf) and the Supreme Council for the Propagation of Islam (al-Lajana al-^Ulya Lishu'ün al-Da^wa al-lslamiyah). The latter is composed of the Egyptian ministers of Information, Education, and Culture, the Waqf (religious trust), and the mufti of Egypt, and is headed by the Sheikh al-Azhar. The council's main activity is to send delegates of religious leaders and teachers of the Koran to Islamic communities throughout the world. During Ramadan in 1983, for example, 115 religious leaders traveled under the council's auspices to various African and Asian countries, in order to aid the Muslim communities in properly observing Ramadan. 3 The council also provides grants and donates libraries on Islamic subjects and Arabic language instruction to Muslim institutions abroad. Since Qadhafi took power in Libya, he has established a number of special organizations for promoting Islamic activity, including the Association for the Propagation of Islam (al-Da v wa al-lslamiyah), which was founded in 1972 with the declared purpose of propagating Islam in Africa, Asia, and even in Europe and America. The association's bylaws state that its aim is the dissemination of Islam throughout the world, especially among Christians in the Western world, and it sends emissaries abroad for this purpose. The association reported in 1976 that it had 265 emissaries, including 150 in Africa, sixty-one in Europe, and thirteen in North and South America. The Association is financed by a "jihad tax" of four percent of the country's income, which is earmarked for the "jihad fund" (sundüq al-jihad). Its chairman, Muhammad Subhi, reported in 1975 that the association had about thirty-five branches, and that it sent 200 preachers to various countries. According to Subhi, the association has been especially successful in spreading Islam in Africa: "Islam, due to its principles and its call for equality between people, is the natural religion of humanity, and attracts many people." 4 Qadhafi has also established a fighting force of the righteous, the Islamic Legion, a militant Islamic body in which Muslims from African countries serve. It numbers several thousand combatants, and actively participated in the civil war in Chad against President Hisséne Habré. The Kuwaiti Office of Religious Trusts and Islamic Affairs

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35

(Wizârat al-Awqâf wal-Shu'ûn al-Islâmiyah) deals with the propagation of Islam in Africa and encourages ties with African Muslims. It distributes grants, gives financial aid to Muslim institutions, and donates copies of the Koran and other Islamic books.5 In addition to the state-sponsored institutions listed above, there are a number of general Arabic and Muslim bodies that are also active in the Islamic sphere. Among these is the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO—Munazamat al-Mu'tamar alIslàmi), headquartered in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. The ICO coordinates inter-Islamic relations on a governmental level, manages Arab aid to Muslim African states for development programs and the construction of mosques and schools, and organizes courses for Muslim religious leaders in Arab and African countries. At present (April 1987), the ICO has forty-five members, including eighteen African countries. 6 The Muslim Solidarity Conference (Lajnat al-Tadàmun alIslâmi), which is connected to the ICO, administers the Solidarity Fund, (Sundûq al-Tadâmun), which functions to aid Islamic countries and associations to "spread Islam. The fund is mainly financed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Libya. The conference last convened in January 1983 in Jiddah, in order to draw up lines of action for aid to the drought-stricken Sahel countries, and to provide them with emergency assistance. 7 The Muslim World League (Râbitat al-^Alam al-lslàmi), founded in 1963, is older than the ICO. Its goal is to further the interests of the Muslims and to defend them. With its center in Mecca, the Saudis operate this body in Africa. The league deals chiefly with the establishment of Islamic cultural centers and with the organizing of courses for religious leaders. It includes several subordinate bodies, such as the Supreme Council for Mosques (aZMajlis al-a^la lil-Masâjid), which held a number of conferences in the 1970s. The last conference, held in Mecca in 1979, was attended by Religious Trust ministers and senior religious leaders from about forty countries; the subject of Jerusalem, among other topics, was discussed. 8 The league has a special body active in Africa, the African Council for Islamic Cooperation and Coordination. The second conference of this council, for example, convened in Dakar, and was chaired by the president of Senegal, Abdou Diouf. Resolutions were adopted concerning ways to spread Islam and Arabic, and the establishment of institutes for this purpose in African countries. 9 While the ICO is a governmental body, the league is nongovernmental. Founded jointly by Arab states, the "African Islamic Center"

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also has as its goal the spreading of Islam. Former Sudanese President Numeiri participated in the center's opening ceremony in 1977.10 In addition to Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman also fund the center's activities. The center's objectives, as stated at the opening ceremony, are the propagation of Islam and Islamic culture in Africa, the training of Islamic preachers, the maintenance of ties with Muslim institutions in Africa, and the training of African Muslims for religious activity within their communities. The center can accommodate five hundred students, and has branches in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria. 11 In March 1979, the center held a conference with the participation of delegates from all parts of the continent to discuss methods of spreading Islam and of strengthening the religious ties between African and Arab countries.12 Another conference, held in early 1982 with the participation of the Muslim vice-president of Tanzania, Aboud Jumbe, also discussed strategy and planning for spreading Islam in Africa.13 Arab embassies also play an important role in Islamic activity in Africa, mainly in countries with a high percentage of Muslims, such as Nigeria, Senegal, and Chad. The ambassadors participate in religious ceremonies on Muslim holidays, make presents of Islamic and Arabic books, and distribute donations of food and clothing to needy Muslims. The Saudi Arabian embassy in Nigeria publishes a Muslim magazine. Ways and Means Delegations of religious leaders are often sent to Africa during Muslim festivals such as Ramadan to strengthen ties between Arab and African Muslim communities. Egypt is especially active in this area, with a special department at Al-Azhar University to coordinate such visits. On one such visit, Sheikh al-Azhar, head of the Supreme Council for the Propagation of Islam, visited Nigeria in February 1983, at the head of a large delegation. He toured the Muslim areas of the country, mainly in the north, and met with the leaders of the Muslim communities. At times, the delegations are composed of representatives from several Arab countries, such as the group which visited Nigeria in March 1983 with fifty Muslim representatives, religious leaders, and businessmen from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Pakistan. 14 The combination of businessmen and religious leaders testifies to the Arabs' promotion of religious influence through economic cooperation.

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37

Invitations to African religious leaders to visit Arab countries are extended in the name of either a single Arab country or interArab and inter-Islamic institutions. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the ICO are especially active in this area. For instance, when Mansur Gay, a leader of Senegal's Muslim community, visited Cairo in January 1982 as a guest of the ministry of religious trusts, an agreement was reached on Egyptian aid to religious institutions in Senegal and on the dispatch of teachers and preachers to the latter. 15 Likewise, two Muslim delegations, one from Kenya and one from Sierra Leone, arrived in Cairo in February 1983 as the guests of Sheikh al-Azhar. The latter delegation was headed by the mufti of Sierra Leone, Sheikh Jibril Sisi. 1 6 In March 1982, the Egyptian minister of religious trusts hosted a delegation of imams from Senegal, 1 7 and later that year the mufti of Uganda arrived on an official visit. 18 In 1983, an Islamic delegation from Nigeria, headed by the education minister of Sekoto State, visited Egypt as the guest of Al-Azhar. The ways and means of increasing cooperation between the African Muslim organizations and the Egyptian religious establishment, as well as the possibilities of granting aid and sending teachers and preachers, were discussed during each of these visits. And in July 1985, the secretary-general of the Islamic Solidarity Association of the Comoro Islands arrived in Cairo as the guest of the Supreme Council for the Propagation of Islam. 19 The ICO is also active in this sphere. It invites many Muslim delegations from Africa to visit Saudi Arabia. One such visit illustrates how African Muslims are used for political ends. This was when Tanzanian Vice-President Aboud Jumbe, one of the Muslim African leaders most active in increasing African-Arab ties, met with ICO heads for the July-August 1983 hajj pilgrimage and requested aid for Tanzania in the form of teachers and preachers. Interviewed by the Islamic newspaper Akhbdr al-^Alam al-Islami, he stated that 55 percent of Tanzania's inhabitants are Muslims, and that the country is rapidly turning Muslim. (The accepted estimate is that 30 to 40 percent of Tanzania's population is Muslim.) Jumbe took the opportunity to denounce the renewal of diplomatic relations between Zaire and Israel and to support Arab positions on Middle East issues. Agreement was reached, during his visit, on the opening of a branch of the World Muslim League in Dar es Salaam. 20 Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the ICO, and the Islamic Development Bank made grants available to Muslim African students for Islamic studies in Arab countries. 21 Al-Azhar University attracts hundreds of African Muslim students yearly. The Egyptian

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establishment weekly Mayo reports that Al-Azhar granted, in 1983 alone, 1,416 scholarships to Muslims throughout the world, including 818 to Muslims from thirty African countries, while the Supreme Muslim Council gave 900 grants to Muslims, including 300 Africans. 22 According to Saudi Arabian sources, hundreds of African students, mainly from Nigeria, are studying in Muslim universities and institutes in Saudi Arabia. 2 3 Libya and Sudan have also established study centers for African Muslims. The establishment of Islamic centers in Africa is an additional method of strengthening ties with local Muslims and of propagating Islam. An Islamic center usually consists of an institute for Arabic and Islamic studies and sometimes a mosque, a medical clinic, and sports facilities. As a general rule, these centers have been established in countries with a high percentage of Muslims, such as Senegal, Niger, and Nigeria, but are gradually being established also in places where Muslims do not constitute a majority, such as Rwanda and Burundi. In the latter countries, propagation of Islam is the main goal. Sometimes the establishment of the center is linked to technical cooperation: Libya and Burundi signed an agreement in February 1977 for the establishment of a joint company for agricultural, industrial, and fishing development. It was also agreed at the same time to establish an Islamic cultural center and an Islamic school in the capital of Burundi. 24 The Qadhafi Library and the Chair for Arabic Language Study have been established at the University of Burundi; Libya also assists high schools and elementary schools in Burundi. In Madagascar and Mauritius, other countries with small Muslim populations, Libya is also active in disseminating Islam. In 1977, Libya announced the establishment of Islamic centers in these two countries, offering courses in the Koran, Islam, and Arabic. 25 In Mauritius, where Muslims are a politically active minority (about 18 percent), Libya introduced the study of Arabic in the primary schools and granted financial assistance to these schools; Libya also aids the Muslim political parties. 26 The Libyans were also active in three other African countries. In the Central African Republic, Libya established Islamic cultural centers in 1976. More recently, the Libyans set up similar centers in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana (1982), and in Nouakchott in Mauritania (1983), where Libya is also helping to establish an institute for advanced Islamic studies. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates are also active in establishing Islamic centers. In 1971, Egypt founded an Islamic cultural center in Dar es Salaam, with the aim of

ARAB ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN AFRICA

39

introducing Islamic consciousness to Tanzania's Muslims. The center also includes a clinic, and three Egyptian doctors were sent there in 1977.27 In November 1981, the Egyptian minister of religious trusts decided to step up the center's activity, and sent four religious officials to strengthen cooperation with Tanzania's Muslims. 28 In 1980, Al-Azhar University helped found an Islamic center in Chad; the university sends Muslim teachers and lecturers, and pays their salaries. Saudi Arabia established an Islamic studies institute in Niger in 1971,29 and an Islamic center in Dakar in 1973, in accordance with a commitment made by King Feisal when he visited Senegal in 1972. 30 Iraq also has been active in Senegal: in 1981, the Iraqi minister of religious trusts laid the cornerstone for an Islamic studies institute in Dakar to be named after President Saddam Hussein. 31 The Joint Organization for the Establishment of Islamic Cultural Centers in Asia and Africa, centered in Tripoli and funded by Libya and the United Arab Emirates, promotes cooperation between the two Arab states for the establishment of Islamic centers. In 1977, the two countries allocated $12 million for the establishment of centers in Togo, Gabon, and Niger. 32 It was reported in 1983 that the organization had completed the establishment of centers in Togo, Rwanda, and Mali.33 In September 1983, a delegation from the organization visited Kenya in order to establish an Islamic cultural center in Mombasa; however, the delegation encountered reservations on the part of the government, which made clear its preference that activity be conducted under its own auspices. The Kenyan government also claimed that it feared creating the impression that one part of the population, Muslims, were getting more attention and benefits than the others, which would tend to lead to dissatisfaction.34 It may be assumed that this resistance was also based on the fear of undesirable religious political activity. The Muslim World League was active in Nigeria, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, establishing an Islamic center in Ibadan as early as August 1969.35 The league allocated $20 million to the center in Uganda, and in 1980 an agreement was signed between the government of Uganda and the league for the establishment of a project in Kampala that would include a high school, a mosque, a library, a clinic, an assembly hall, sports fields, and a dormitory for students. In 1984, the Muslim World League established an Islamic Center in Sierra Leone, with branches around the country.36 The ICO is also active in establishing Islamic centers. The 1981 ICO summit conference at Mecca resolved to establish a number of additional Islamic centers, including a center in Guinea-Bissau. It was reported in 1983 that the ICO allocated $50 million for the

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establishment of this center. 37 The ICO also grants aid to existing research institutes for the purpose of including Islamic subjects in their curriculum. For example, $285,000 was allocated in 1981 to the Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu in Mali (Centre d'Etude de Documentation et de Recherche Ahmed Baba de Timbouctou) so that it would also serve as a regional institute for Islamic studies. 38 The Arabs also fund the construction of mosques and the establishment of elementary and high schools and libraries within the context of their aid to Muslim communities in Africa. A special ICO-affiliated body is entrusted with the construction and renovation of mosques throughout the world. In addition, Arab states act bilaterally in this sphere, since the construction of a mosque is excellent public relations, bringing its donors affection and gratitude. For example, in 1969, the cornerstone was laid for a central mosque in Accra, with funds donated by Saudi Arabia; government representatives, Muslim leaders from throughout the country, and Arab ambassadors stationed in the country participated in the ground-breaking ceremony. 39 And in March 1976, Saudi Arabia granted Gabon $1.7 million for the building of a central mosque in Libreville. In the same year, Libya granted funds for the construction of a central mosque in the capital of Gambia. 40 Even in Zaire, where Muslims number only about 5 percent of the population, Saudi Arabia donated $20 million to the local Muslim community for building mosque, schools, and hospitals.41 Egyptian architects drew the plans for a mosque in Lagos, and in 1985 Egyptian engineers erected the dome of the Great Mosque in Monrovia, Liberia. 42 In February 1977, the prime minister of Niger laid the cornerstone for a large mosque in Niamey with the participation of a Libyan representative, whose country had promised funding.43 A large mosque is currently under construction in Conakry, Guinea; according to its builders, it will be the largest mosque in Africa—Saudi Arabia and Libya have promised $25 million to fund the mosque. The Arabs also view the establishment of schools as an important means of strengthening and spreading Islam. During Africa's colonial period, education was an effective tool of the Christian missionaries for spreading Christianity. Thus Muslims suffered from an educational gap, and their chances of holding key positions in the colonial administrations were slim. The Arabs today are increasing their activity in this realm, and Islamic schools are located not only in countries with a Muslim majority, such as Niger, but also in countries where the Muslims are a minority, such as Kenya and Sierra Leone. In 1975, Libya and Saudi

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41

Arabia established La Medresa de Say, in Niger, for Koranic and Islamic religious studies. 4 4 Following the visit of four Muslim members of the Kenyan parliament in 1978, the United Arab Emirates donated $5 million for the construction of an Islamic school in Mombasa 4 5 Historically, Mombasa has been an important Islamic center in Kenya. Muslim schools are also being established in nonMuslim areas of Kenya, such as the areas of the Kikuyu, a predominantly Christian tribe, in order to strengthen the small Muslim communities there. When Saudi Prince Abdullah Aziz visited Kenya in December 1981, he promised to establish a madrasa (school for the study of Islam) in Karai village in the Kikuyu area. 4 6 In 1983, Egypt aided in the establishment of a Muslim teacher training college in Muranga, also in the Kikuyu area. 4 7 (The Arab states are increasing their activity with this tribe because of its political importance.) Also in Kenya, the secretary general of the Muslim World League opened in May 1985 an Islamic school for girls in Nairobi. 48 In 1985, Saudi Arabia donated $15 million to the Muslim community in Sierra Leone for building an Islamic high school in Magburuka. 49 Arab countries also donate collections of books for the study of Islam, Arab culture, and the Arabic language to schools and universities, written in French and English, as well as in Arabic. The Arabs conduct a wide range of activities, such as Koran quizzes, to increase interest in studying the Koran. Thus, for example, the Saudi Arabian embassy organized a competition on knowledge of the Koran in Kenya in July 1981 for Muslim school children. An international Koran quiz was held in Libya in January 1982, with the participation of representatives of Muslim institutions in Africa. Libya's Qadhafi opened the gathering, repeatedly emphasizing the importance of transforming the religion of Islam into a political force. 50 The Arab states also send Arab teachers to African nations in order to strengthen the teaching staffs in Muslim schools. Because of their knowledge and prestige, the Arab teachers wield influence in the African Muslim communities. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the Arab League are among the major suppliers of teachers. Egypt alone sent about 1,000 teachers in 1983, mainly to Arab countries, but also to Africa. 51 African teachers and religious officials are also trained in special courses conducted in African countries. In Mombasa, in 1981, Saudi Arabia allocated $75,000 to a Koran study society in Mombasa that organizes courses in basic Islamic education, and in 1982, Saudi Arabian teachers organized a three-month course for local Muslim

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AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

teachers of Islam. 5 2 In 1982, the World Muslim League organized a seminar in Uganda for 150 sheikhs in order to broaden their knowledge of Islam and to learn advanced methods for preaching Islam. 5 3 In August 1983, the ICO organized in the Comoro Islands a course run by Arab teachers for imams, preachers, and Islamic missionaries (du^at); the prime minister, ministers, and other public figures attended the course's opening. It should be noted that the Comoro Islands is a special case, since from the beginning of the twentieth century, it was traditionally an area from which many religious leaders emigrated to the Muslim communities of East Africa. In recent years, the ICO has been active in advancing not only basic Islamic education, but also higher Islamic education by establishing Muslim universities in Africa itself. Until recently, higher education had existed only in the Arab states, such as at AlAzhar. The advantage in establishing institutions of Islamic higher learning in Africa is that Islam can now exert a more powerful and effective influence on its surroundings. It was decided at the ICO summit meeting in Lahore in 1974 to establish two Muslim universities: one in Niger, for West Africa, and a second in Uganda, for East Africa. In February 1976, the president of Niger laid the cornerstone for the university in the city of Say, near the capital of Niamey. When Idi Amin was deposed, the future of the university in Uganda appeared doubtful, but the new president, Milton Obote, assured the ICO delegation that visited Uganda in April 1982 that he would carry out completion of the university. 5 4 The ICO allocated $60 million to each of the universities. 55 The ICO also aids in establishing chairs for the study of Islam and Arabic in established universities, such as Ibadan University in Nigeria, Makerere University in Uganda, and Nairobi University. Libya established a chair for Arabic studies in the Malagasy University in 1969 5 6

The Islamic Development Bank Islamic activity in Africa is made possible by the economic strength of the oil-producing Arab countries. The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), established at the ICO summit meeting in Lahore in 1974, is one of the most active of financial institutions in Muslim countries. The bank was formally opened in October 1975, and approved its first loan agreement in 1976. Its headquarters are in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. The initial subscribed capital was fixed at $900 million; it

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43

had grown to $2.15 billion by the end of 1981. Gross disbursements totaled $1,152 billion, and capital paid in totaled $906 million by then. Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait were the four major contributors: they committed themselves to twothirds of the subscribed capital and hold 50 percent of the bank's voting power. Arab countries as a whole control 80 percent of the voting power. Only Muslim countries, members of the ICO, are eligible to participate in the bank's activities: these numbered forty-five countries by 1986 including eighteen African countries. The bank's objectives include the fostering of economic development and social progress in member countries, as well as in Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries. 57 Loans totaling $282,864,000 were granted to the countries of Black Africa during the years 1976-1980. 5 8 Cameroon, Guinea, Uganda, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad were among those that benefited from such loans. 59 It was reported in February 1982 that the bank signed an agreement for a $7.25 million loan with the Comoro Islands for the development of a port. 6 0 In 1985, the IDB announced the following loans: $6 million to Niger for the purchase of refined petroleum products, $600,000 to Guinea for a survey of forest resources, $1.04 million for a study of Guinea's underground water potential, and $285,000 each to Mauritania and Mali for a feasibility study for a road linking the two countries. 61 Despite the importance of these loans, Africans are critical of the gap between the aid that the IDB grants to Arab countries as opposed to African countries. The bank also established a special office for the granting of scholarships to Muslims in African countries called "The Scholarship Program for Muslim Communities." These scholarships are also awarded to Muslims in non-Muslim African countries, such as Cote d'lvoire and Kenya. In 1982, for example, the special office announced in the Kenyan press the granting of ten scholarships for university studies for Muslim candidates, through the Supreme Muslim Council of Kenya. 62 In 1985, it granted the council $1 million for Islamic education purposes. 63 Arab Activity for the Propagation of Islam in Africa Arab-Islamic activity in Africa, in all its forms, is aimed both at solidifying the status of the Muslims on the continent and propagating Islam in Africa in a deliberate and organized manner. The construction of mosques, schools, and Islamic centers, and the

44

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

study of Arabic are intended in great measure to advance these aims. Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are the most active in spreading Islam. While the latter two prefer quiet, persuasive methods, Libya's Qadhafi often resorts to more aggressive methods. When the cornerstone was laid for the Libyan-financed mosque in Niamey, Niger, the Libyan representative emphasized that the mosque's main purpose would be to spread Islam in the region and "to fight foreign neocolonialist influences." 64 When Qadhafi opened the cultural center in 1985 in Bujumbura, Burundi, he declared: "A massive Islamic achievement has been realized. This center will spread the Word of truth and faith, so that Islam's voice reaches out beyond the equator, deep into the known continent."65 The dissemination of Islam in the modern age is also aided by Muslim religious professionals (du^at), who, like Christian missionaries, are specially trained for this purpose. The du^at are something new; they did not exist in earlier times, when Islam was spread by merchants, religious scholars, and others for whom the dissemination of Islam was not their main and sole task, and who were not directed by overseas organizations. Today, several Islamic organizations of Arab countries devote special attention to the dissemination of Islam. One such organization is the Islamic Solidarity Fund (Sunduq al-taddmun al-Islami), which is affiliated with the ICO. Fund members decided at Abu Dhabi in March 1977 to allocate $14 million for the propagation of Islam (dawa Islamiyah) in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Saudi Arabia doubled its contribution to the fund, from $5.5 to $11 million, at the same meeting. 66 In Egypt, the Supreme Council for the Propagation of Islam (al-Lajana al*Ulya Lishu'un al-da^wa al-lsldmiyah) deals with disseminating Islam. The Islamic Association for the Propagation of Islam, financed by the jihad fund, performs the same task in Libya. In 1977, Saudi Arabia allocated $20 million to Islamic institutions in Africa working for the propagation of Islam and Islamic culture. 6 7 According to Saudi newspaper reports, 200 Muslim propagandists, directed by the Islamic propagation section in the Saudi embassy are active in Nigeria. The journal of the World Muslim League reported in 1983 that a branch of the league that is active in disseminating Islam was established in Dakar. According to the report, Christians, as well as pagans, are converting to Islam as a result of the propagandists' (du^at) efforts. 68 The conversion of African leaders to Islam is a chief objective in the spreading of Islam in Africa, on the assumption that a leader's

A R A B ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN AFRICA

45

conversion will be followed by that of many of his followers, members of his tribe, and countrymen. Conversion of African kings and chiefs was the aim of the propagators of Islam in previous centuries; today, Qadhafi is striving likewise to convert African presidents. The president of Gabon, Albert Bongo, converted to Islam in September 1973 after a visit to Libya, and changed his name to Omar Bongo. Bongo announced his conversion on his return to Gabon in the presence of Arab delegations from Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and members of the radio and press. Bongo claimed that his conversion stemmed from his belief that Islam is the religion that professes equality and does not discriminate between peoples. Immediately afterwards, a Libyan goodwill mission arrived in Gabon, headed by the religious leader Sheikh Subhi, to instruct the distinguished convert in the religion of Islam. This was followed by the arrival of economic delegations and the implementation of joint cooperation agreements that had been signed between Libya and Gabon.69 Jean Bedel Bokassa, former president of the Central African Republic, is another African who converted to Islam, also under Qadhafi's influence. The conversion was announced in October 1976, during Qadhafi's visit to Bangui. Bokassa also adopted an Arabic name, Salah al-Din (Saladin) Ahmad. His son, vice-president, and four of his ministers also converted. 70 Qadhafi viewed this as a major victory. In letters sent to the heads of Muslim states throughout the world, he described Bokassa's conversion as a "historic event," and requested that all possible assistance be extended to the Central African Republic.71 Qadhafi called upon all the inhabitants of Africa to follow in Bokassa's footsteps and abandon Christianity, which he described as racist and exploitative. 72 A month later, in an elaborate ceremony at Tripoli attended by Qadhafi, the Central African Republic's ambassador and the embassy staff converted to Islam.73 Other African leaders, such as Benin's president Mathieu Kerekou, also converted to Islam while visiting Libya.74 The process of Islamization is being conducted in Africa together with Arabization. In order to give Islam in Africa an Arab character, the Arab states are actively spreading the Arabic language and culture in Islamic schools and centers. The September 1978 report of the Arab League stated that league activities were being conducted in Mali, Djibouti, Mauritania, the Comoro Islands, and Kenya. The report noted that Arabization activities are of great importance and recommended increasing budgets for this purpose.75

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AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Media Activities In the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser's Egypt expanded its broadcasts to Africa, calling for a holy war against imperialism and unbelievers and preaching Muslim unity. 7 6 Christianity was identified with imperialism, while Islam was presented as a tolerant a n d egalitarian religion. 7 7 In 1964, Egypt established a special station for Islamic broadcasts, Saut al-Islam (the Voice of Islam), affiliated with Al-Azhar University. The station expanded its broadcasts in 1965 to include sub-Saharan Africa as well. 7 8 Today, the Libyans are the most active in this field, broadcasting Islamic propaganda and Arabic language lessons to Africa; in 1976, the Libyans established a radio station in Benghazi for their programs to Africa. In addition, Arab countries distribute Islamic booklets and magazines through the Islamic centers in Africa. The Saudis finance the Nigerian Islamic Review, a magazine which first appeared in September 1969. The Muslim World League publishes pan-Islamic magazines, News from the Muslim World (Akhbar aWAlam alIslami) and the Muslim World League (Rdbitat al-^Alam alIslami), which report on details of Islamic activity throughout the world. The February 1984 issue of the Muslim World League w a s dedicated to Islam in Africa. In Senegal, where there is extensive activity for spreading Arabic, the first issue of the monthly AlAfkar was published in May 1980 by the Senegalese Authors' and Journalists' Association. The magazine's main purpose is to spread Arabic culture and Islam, and to encourage cultural ties between Arab and African countries. 7 9 In Senegal, Iran finances an Islamic weekly called Wal-Fadjri, the mouthpiece of the Muslim fundamentalists, which demands the imposition of Islamic Law (shari'a) on the country. 80 Local Muslim Societies African Muslim societies, such as the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SCKM), which receives financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya, serve as important channels for the Arab states' Islamic activities. The council arranges reciprocal visits between Kenya and various Arab countries. Scholarships and aid from the ICO and the Muslim World League are channeled through SCKM. The Libyans established an additional society in Kenya, the League for Muslim Awakening, with the declared purpose of strengthening and spreading Islam among the inhabitants of Kenya.

ARAB ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN AFRICA

47

Extensive Islamic activity is conducted in Uganda through the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, which was especially active when Idi Amin held power. Arab countries are still active in Uganda, using the council to establish the Islamic University in Kampala, as well as other educational and cultural institutions. In March 1983, for example, the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council received 60,000 copies of the Koran from Saudi Arabia, the first consignment of a gift of 300,000 copies.81 Islamic influence, especially that of Libya, has increased in Niger since the 1974 coup d'etat by Colonel Seyni Kountche. Kountche founded the Association islamique du Niger immediately after the coup, in order to firmly entrench and disseminate Islam in the country, as well as to spread the Arabic language and to strengthen Niger's ties with Arab states and Islam. 82 The Hajj The hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, is especially important in strengthening ties between Arab and African Muslims. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who spoke of the "Islamic circle" and its utilization for political aims, realized the importance of the hajj within this context. Nasser urged that the pilgrimage to Mecca "should not be regarded as only a ticket of admission into Paradise," but rather "it should become an institution of great political power and magnificence." 8 3 The number of pilgrims from Africa has increased as the means of transportation has improved and the Islamic consciousness of Africa's Muslims intensified. Each year, between 50,000 to 100,000 Muslims make the pilgrimage from Nigeria alone, and about 100,000 from other African nations. 84 In addition to the ICO, Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, place great emphasis on providing lavish treatment for African Muslim leaders during the hajj. Political, economic and technical cooperation are discussed and joint announcements are issued. In July 1983, Sékou Touré of Guinea made the pilgrimage, meeting with King Fahd and several of his ministers; talks were held on bilateral and Middle East subjects. In their joint communiqué they called on the Muslims of the world to join ranks and unite for "a war against common enemies."85 African Participation in Pan-Islamic Congresses Arab activity has also expanded in this sphere in the past decade. African participation in pan-Islamic congresses had been modest in

48

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

the past. Only seven of the fourteen African countries invited to the first ICO summit meeting in September 1969 attended, despite the fact that the conference dealt with an issue that had inflamed the Islamic world—the fire which damaged the Al-Aqsa mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in August of the same year. 86 One reason for the Africans' absence from Islamic conferences was based on their fears of negative local consequences from the mixing of religion and politics. Nevertheless, despite their reservations, the number of African nations participating in Muslim congresses has risen since the first conference because of ceaseless efforts by the Arab countries. Nine African countries were represented at the second Islamic summit conference in Lahore in February 1974.87 The third ICO summit meeting, which convened in Mecca in January 1981, was attended by all fifteen African member-states of the ICO. In addition, the representatives of Nigeria attended with observer status. 88 It should be noted that there are member countries of the ICO that have a small percentage of Muslims, such as Uganda (about 10 percent), Burkina Faso (about 20 percent), and Gabon (about 5 percent). Two new African countries, Benin and Sierra Leone, joined the fourth ICO summit meeting, which was held in Casablanca in January 1984, making seventeen African members of the ICO. In January 1986, Nigeria joined the ICO, and the number of Black African members at the fifth ICO summit was eighteen, out of fortyfive member-states. The resolutions adopted at the Islamic conferences reflect the increase in anti-Israel activity in Africa by Arab countries. Within the ICO, more African countries, mainly the Muslim ones, are enlisted to support the Arab line on Middle East issues. For example, the ICO-affiliated Jerusalem Committee, which has fifteen member states, including four African members (Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, and Niger) is pledged to "mobilize the Islamic potential in order to liberate holy Jerusalem [al-Quds] and the Palestinian and Arab territories which have been occupied since 1967." 89 Conventions on special subjects, such as the convention of Islamic university societies held in Morocco in May 1976, include the participation of Muslim delegates from African universities. An ICO-organized Afro-Islamic conference was held during the same month in Nouakchott, Mauritania. 90 Five of the seventeen countries participating in the Islamic Conference on Cultural and Social Affairs that convened in Karachi in January 1977 were African: Guinea, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, and Uganda. 9 1 African representatives also participated in the Supreme World Council of Mosques that was held in Mecca in 1979, 9 2 and in the World

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49

Conference of Muslim Youth that convened in Riyadh in March I979 93 j n April 1981, a conference of Muslim youth from southern Africa was held in Blantyre, Malawi, with delegates from Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates.94 Arab activity among Muslim youth was also reflected in the decision of the Egyptian ministry of religious trusts in July 1983 to set up a camp for Muslim youth in Egypt to which 1,600 delegates from Asia, Africa, and other areas in which Muslims live would be invited. The avowed goal was to strengthen ties between Muslim youth throughout the world. It should be noted that Egypt, expelled from the ICO for signing a peace treaty with Israel, finds independent channels for its Islamic activity throughout the world. 95 Arab-Islamic Activity Against Israel The goal of the Arab countries' Islamic activity in Africa includes not only the strengthening of ties with the continent's Muslims and the reinforcement and spread of Islam, but also the harnessing of African support for the Arab position on Middle East issues. The Islamic factor contributed to the decision to sever relations with Israel in at least seven out of the twenty-nine countries that did. 96 The importance of Islam increases proportionally to the percentage of Muslims in any given country. The presence of a Muslim ruler also weighs heavily in determining relations with Israel. Islamic anti-Israel activity is especially prominent in the Islamic congresses, which frequently issue extreme condemnations of Israel. In May 1976, the ICO foreign ministers meeting at Istanbul adopted resolutions equating Zionism with racism, called for the expulsion of Israel from the UN and its agencies, and demanded the imposition of sanctions against Israel to force it to return the territories conquered in 1967 and 1948. ICO foreign ministers met in Dakar in May 1978 to condemn the Camp David agreements and to call for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 97 In May 1979, the meeting of ICO foreign ministers in Fez, Morocco decided to suspend Egypt's membership in the ICO for signing a peace treaty with Israel.98 The ICO summit conference held in Mecca in January 1981 also denounced the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and called for a holy war against Israel in order to establish a Palestinian state. The conference even drew up a detailed plan of action against Israel and called upon Muslims to impose a general boycott on Israel, as well as to give moral and material support to the PLO."

50

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Anti-Israel, Arab-Islamic activity is spearheaded by the ICO. Recently, in the wake of the renewal of diplomatic relations between Zaire and Liberia and Israel, and the fear that additional countries may follow in their footsteps, the ICO has been active among African Muslim leaders, mobilizing them for the struggle against the renewal of relations. This is illustrated by the visit of the Muslim Tanzanian Vice-President Aboud Jumbe and his pronouncements of the renewal of relations with Israel. And, at the ICO summit held in Kuwait in January 1987, African countries that had restored ties with Israel were denounced as having broken OAU resolutions. 100 In general, the prospects of Israel's renewing relations with African ICO member states are dimmer that they are with non-member states.

Conclusion Arab activity in the Islamic sphere is an additional component of the efforts to enhance Arab influence in Africa. This activity has been on the increase in recent years. The most important institution in this sphere, and the highest Islamic intergovernmental body, is the Islamic Conference Organization, in which eighteen Black African countries became members between 1969 and 1986, most of them since 1973. These countries constitute almost 40 percent of the forty-five member states. ICO, the Muslim World League, and individual countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Egypt have initiated and financed Islamic missionary activities to propagate Islam in Africa. The main agents of these activities are professional Muslim missionaries (du^at), who are specially trained by the ICO to disseminate Islam. This represents quite a new phenomenon in Islam, which prior to this had never financed organizations to direct missionary activities, as the Christians do. The politicization of Islam is deepening, especially in regard to Israel and the Middle East. Qadhafi, in particular, uses Islam against Israel, Christianity, and the West, as well as against his African rivals. Further, recent Arab-Islamic activities in Africa have resulted in the passage of extreme resolutions against Israel at ICO meetings, including a call for a jihad against the "Zionist enemy." While the Islamic factor did not play a significant role in inducing African countries to sever diplomatic ties with Israel in the 1970s, political Arab-Islamic operations in the 1980s make it much more difficult for Israel to renew relations with ICO members. There has, however, been some

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51

backlash against such activities, in particular against Qadhafi's use of religion to achieve political aims, which has aroused fears, reservations, and objections in several African countries. One of the most conspicuous trends in arabization is the emphasis placed on spreading the Arabic language and culture among African Muslims through the many Islamic cultural centers, Islamic institutes, and schools that have been established on the continent by the Arab states. In the long run, Arab attempts to arabize African Islam and to inject into it their African policy are likely to weaken the Arab position in Africa. This is due to the fact that, although Islam has become solidly entrenched in wide areas of Africa over the centuries, it has always been perceived as a local African religion and not (in contrast to Christianity) as an imported foreign one. Thus any arabization of Islam in Africa can only serve to emphasize its "foreign" elements and thereby to increase African suspicion regarding the political aims of the countries involved. The increasing economic component of Arab-Islamic activity is particularly evident in the operations of the Islamic Development Bank, which gives a considerable amount in loans and grants, but only to those who are members of the Islamic Conference Organization. Notes 1. Al-Ahram (Egypt), November 17 and 20, 1975. 2. Al-Akhbdr (Egypt), March 2, 1979. 3. Al-Liwa al-lslami (Egypt), June 23, 1983; October (Egypt), January 24, 1982; Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 8 , 1 9 8 3 . 4. Al-Fajr al-Jadid (Libya), October 30, 1975. 5. Al-Yaqza (Kuwait), March 3 1 , 1 9 7 8 . 6. See Appendix 2. 7. Al-Sha^b (Jerusalem), January 16, 1983. 8. Al-Ahram (Egypt), February 23, 1979, April 6, 1979; Al-Thaura (Syria), March 28, 1979. 9. Bulletin d'Africjue (Paris), December 23, 25, and 26, 1981. 10. Akhbar al-'Alam al-lslami (Saudi Arabia), August 1, 1983. 11. Al-Sihafa (Sudan), October 6, 1977. 12. Al-Ahram (Egypt), February 2 3 , 1 9 7 9 . 13. Al-Ahram (Egypt), February 2, 1983. 14. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 6, 1983. 15. October (Egypt), January 24, 1982. 16. Al-Ahram (Egypt), February 2 4 , 1 9 8 3 . 17. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 8, 1983. 18. Al-Ahram (Egypt), April 9 , 1 9 8 3 .

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19. Al-Nür (Egypt), July 17,1985. 20. Akhbär aWÄlam al-Islämt (Saudi Arabia), August 1, 1983. 21. Al-Ahram (Egypt), February 3, 1977; Daily Nation (Kenya), August 17,1983. 22. Mayo (Egypt), March 28, 1983. 23. Al-Biläd (Saudi Arabia), March 17,1980. 24. Al-Watan (Kuwait), February 12, 1977. 25. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), February 18, 1977. 26. Al-Thaura (Syria), November 29,1977. 27. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 20,1980. 28. Minbar al-Isläm (Egypt), November 1981, 85. 29. Jean-Louis Triaud, "L'Islam et l'état en République du Niger," Le Mois en Afrique (Paris) 194, 195 (Janvier-Fevrier 1982): 35-48. 30. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), October 26 and 27, 1975. 31. Al-Thaura (Iraq), December 8, 1981. 32. S WB, January 5,1977, M E / 5 4 0 4 / i i . 33. Daily Nation (Kenya), September 9, 1983. 34. Ibid. 35. Daily Sketch (Nigeria), August 19, 1969. 36. Akhbär al-^Àlam al-lslàmi (Saudi Arabia), May 13, 1985. 37. Al-Fajr (Jerusalem), May 10, 1983. 38. Bulletin D'Afrique (Paris), September 13 and 14,1981. 39. Ghanaian Times, November 10, 1969. 40. West Africa (London), September 6, 1976. 41. Al-Nür (Egypt), March 6,1985. 42. Al-Akhbär (Egypt), December 5, 1976; also Lina (Sierra Leone), April 2,1985. 43. Triaud, op. cit., 43. 44. Ibid., 44. 45. Daily Nation (Kenya), December 5, 1981. 46. Ibid. 47. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 18,1983. 48. Akhbär al-Älam al-Islämi (Saudi Arabia), May 13, 1985. 49. FBIS, January 1 , 1 9 8 5 , 1 6 . 50. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), January 17 and 18, 1982. 51. Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 9,1983. 52. Daily Nation (Kenya), March 17, 1981. 53. New African (London), 176, May 1982; on the establishment of Islamic teachers training college in Accra, Ghana, in 1983, see Al-Liwa (Jordan), November 23, 1983; Akhbär al-'Àlam al-Islämi (Saudi Arabia), August 1,1983. 54. New African (London), No. 176, May 1982. 55. Al-Medina (Saudi Arabia), June 22, 1981. 56. Daily Sketch (Nigeria), August 19, 1969. 57. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), January 23, 1982. 5 8 . Aperçu du programme arabe de cooperation avec l'Afrique

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53

( K h a r t o u m , F e b r u a r y 1981); O E C D , Aid from OPEC Countries, Paris, 1983, 117-122. 59. Rapport annuel, B a n q u e arabe pour le d é v e l o p p e m e n t é c o n o m i q u e en Afrique (Khartoum, 1980). 60. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), February 19, 1982. 61. West Africa (London), M a y 20, 1985. 62. Daily Nation (Kenya), D e c e m b e r 2, 1982. 63. Daily Nation (Kenya), J u n e 18, 1985. 64. Triaud, op. cit., p. 43. 65. SWB M E / 7 9 5 3 / 4 May 7 , 1 9 8 5 . 66. Al-Sha'b (Jerusalem), March 17, 1977. 67. Al-Ra 'i al-'Äm (Kuwait), J u n e 1 7 , 1 9 7 9 . 68. Akhbär al-^Âlam al-lslämi (Saudi Arabia) 5, D h u al Hija 1403 (1983). 69. Jerusalem Post (Israel), October 9, 1973. 70. Le Monde (Paris), October 20, 1976. 71. Al-Fajr al-Jadïd (Libya), October 19, 1976. 72. Al-Jihäd (Libya), October 21, 1976. 73. SWB, N o v e m b e r 10, 1976. 74. Africa Research Bulletin (London), September 1 - 3 0 , 1980, 5818. 75. Al-'Usbü" al-^Arabi (Lebanon), September 25, 1978. 76. Y . O r o n , " T h e N a t i o n a l M y t h in M o d e r n E g y p t " ( H e b r e w ) , Hamizrah Hehadash 10 ( 1 9 5 9 / 6 0 ) : 1 5 3 - 7 7 . 77. SWB, M E / 3 1 4 , April 2 9 , 1 9 6 0 , quoting Radio Cairo in Somali; SWB, M E / 1 2 1 , January 14, 1960, quoting Radio Cairo in Somali. 78. Y. Ismail Tareq, "UAR Policy in Africa" (The G e o r g e University, Ph.D. diss., 1967), 222. 79. Al-Sha'b (Algeria), May 2 2 , 1 9 8 0 . 80. Le Monde diplomatique (Paris), April 1985, 15. 81. Reuters from Nairobi, March 25, 1983. 82. Triaud, infra note 29. 8 3 . G a m a l A b d e l N a s s e r , The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington, 1955), 110. 84. Al-Biläd, (Saudi Arabia), March 17, 1980; Triaud, op. cit., shows t h e increase of pilgrims in recent years. 85. Al-Riäd (Saudi Arabia), July 1 9 , 1 9 8 3 . 86. Niger, Senegal, Chad, Mali, Guinea, Somali D e m o c r a t i c Republic, a n d Mauritania. 87. Niger, Somali Democratic Republic, Mauritania, G a b o n , G a m b i a , C a m e r o o n , Uganda, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Bissau. 88. Saudi Arabia News Agency, January 29, 1981. 89. Press release, O b s e r v e r Mission to the U N , O r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Islamic Conference, N.Y., September 19, 1983. 90. Morocco News Agency, M a y 1 2 , 1 9 7 6 ; SWB, M a y 18, 1976. 91. Al-Quds (Jerusalem), January 26, 1977. 92. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 2 3 , 1 9 7 9 and April 6 , 1 9 7 9 . 93. Al-Ahram (Egypt), March 2 3 , 1 9 7 9 .

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 94. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), April 14,1981. 95. Al-Ahram (Egypt), June 12,1983. 96. See Appendix 1. 97. Al-Thaura (Syria), May 3,1978. 98. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 10, 1979. 99. Daily Nation (Kenya), February 3, 1981. 100. Al-Qabas al-Dauli (Kuwait), January 30, 1987.

• CHAPTER FOUR •

Arab Aid to Africa Arab financial aid to Africa has increased dramatically over the last decade and is, at present, one of the most important vehicles the Arabs use to enhance their influence in Africa and to block the return of Israel to the continent. Although it does not meet the expectations of many Africans, who are occasionally critical of the methods and terms the Arabs dictate in giving assistance, the amount of aid is nevertheless significant. Documenting this facet of Afro-Arab relations is a problem because of the many discrepancies between sources concerning this aid. Frequently, there is no clear distinction between Arab bilateral or multilateral aid, between concessional (soft- or easy-term loans) or non-concessional loans, or between commitments and net disbursements. Tables and diagrams referring to "Africa south of the Sahara" do not indicate whether they include countries that are members of the Arab League, such as Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Mauritania. Even so, there is sufficient evidence to outline the main characteristics of Arab aid to Africa; it is given through three m a i n c h a n n e l s : m u l t i l a t e r a l , bilateral, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions.

Arab Multilateral Aid The wealthy Arab countries have established about a dozen multilateral organizations and funds for assisting developing countries. Most of those institutions assist other Arab countries, but the following are relevant to Africa.

55

Table 4.1 BADEA Commitments in African Countries, 1975-1982 (in $m.) Beneficiary Country

1975-78

1979

Sahel Countries Burkina Faso Cape Verde Chad Gambia Mali Niger Senegal Sahel Unspecified

6.379 0.964 1.902 3.898 21.860 15.868 9.727

Total Sahel Countries

60.598

—

—

2.400 —

5.200 10.000 — — —

17.600

' Other LDC's Benin Botswana Burundi Central African Republic Comoro Islands Ethiopia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Rwanda Tanzania Uganda

12.600 2.200 10.00 — —

0.540 5,869 1.116 6.000 11.000 15.000 4.850

Total LDCs

120.046

— — —

—

1.570 —

6.000 —

3.900 — — —

29.070

Other Countries Angola Cameroon Congo Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Gabon Ghana Kenya Liberia Madagascar Mauritius Mozambique Säo Tomé and Principe Seychelles Sierra Leone Swaziland Togo Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe Africa Unspecified

—

20.000 10.000 3.330

Source: BADEA

1983, 74.

— — — —

5.000 —

— —

—

—

—

—

—

—

5.000

—

—

—

3.340 10.000 10.000

Report,

—

—

— — —

—

—

6.609

—

255.410 Annual

—

—

18.330 5.000 7.120 16.908 10.000

Grand Total

10.000

44.070

ARAB AID T O AFRICA

BADEA Loans

SAAFA LOaflS

1980

—

1981

—

1982

9.000 10.000

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

— —

10.000 —

10.000

5.000 0.046 0.280 5.326

— — —

19.000

2.700 7.250 10.000 —

8.000

— —

5.000 —

10.000 — — —

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

25.250

12.980

10.000 —

8.000 — —

47.000

10.000 9.000 —

—

10.000

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

— —

10.000 —

8.000 — —

— —

10.000 —

5.000 —

10.000 — —

8.000 —

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1.200 8.500

— — —

63.950

10.000 10.000 —

61.026

* Least developed countries.

—

10.000 —

90.000

Total

1974-77

15.379 13.364 1.902 9.098 31.860 20.868 19.773 0.280

2.700 10.500 8.800 0.700 7.800 2.700 7.500

112.524

40.700

—

vjrana Total

18.079 23.864 10.702 9.798 39.660 23.568 27.273 0.280 153.224

15.300 19.450 20.000 5.000 9.570 0.540 11.869 11.116 9.900 19.000 15.000 4.850

2.400 5.400 2.000 2.400 10.500 14.200 0.250 2.800 2.000 14.200 11.300

17.700 24.850 22.000 7.400 20.070 14.740 11.869 11.366 12.700 21.000 29.200 16.150

234.346

100.650

334.996

20.000 29.000 20.000 13.330

13.244 2.850

—

5.000 18.330 20.000 7.120 24.908 18.000 10.000 —

1.200 13.500 —

3.340 10.000 20.000 20.000 6.609 514.456

—

— —

0.500 —

4.400 3.600 3.600 4.800 2.700 27.000 10.500 —

3.600 4.200 —

12.400 12.700 — —

214.244

33.244 31.850 20.000 13.330 0.500 5.000 22.730 23.600 10.720 29.708 20.700 37.000 10.500 1.200 17.100 4.200 3.340 22.400 32.700 20.000 6.609 728.700

58

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

The Arab Bank for Economic in Africa (BADEA)

Development

The bank headquartered in Khartoum, commenced operations in 1975 with capital of $231 million, subscribed by eighteen member countries. BADEA's subscribed capital reached $738.25 million in 1982, of which $735.48 million were actually paid. 1 This amount includes the capital of SAAFA (The Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa), which merged with the bank in November 1976. BADEA aid is in the form of loans for specific projects and also in the form of limited technical assistance. A large share of BADEA's loans is cofinanced with other sources. According to BADEA's 1983 report, the bank's pledge to thirtynine African countries in 1975-1982 was $514,456 million, plus $212,244 million of SAAFA's money. No details were given for the actual net disbursements. 2 Among those receiving the largest loans—more than $20 million each—were Mali, Niger, Cameroon, and Madagascar (see Table 4.1). According to the OECD Review of 1983, BADEA disbursed $31 million in 1982. Looking back over the organization's effort in its first decade of operations, bank President Chedly Ayari stated that BADEA has aided thirty-nine non-Arab African countries with loans for 128 projects totaling $679 million as of March 1985. Ayari added that in 1984 alone the bank approved $88 million in loans, slightly more than the $84 million approved in 1983. 3 BADEA capital has not been replenished since 1977 and the bank has not received any payments since 1981, while at the same time other Arab and Islamic funds have been substantially increased. 4 The Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA) This fund was established by the Arab oil-exporting countries in 1974 in response to African requests for aid to compensate them for the rise in oil prices. The fund's original capital of $200 million was later increased to $350 million. The administration of the fund was entrusted to the League of Arab States and, in 1976, SAAFA was amalgamated with BADEA. Up to that time, $221.7 million had been made available to African countries. 5

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

The Arab Fund for Technical Assistance Countries (AFTAAAC)

59

to African and Arab

This fund was established by the Arab League in 1976 with capital of $25 million contributed by thirteen Arab countries. Its main activities are dispatching experts, granting scholarships, and supplying technical assistance equipment; the emphasis is on education, and most of the experts are teachers. Between 1976 and 1980, the fund paid for approximately 1100 experts and granted about 400 scholarships. 6 Disbursements totaled $23 million. Among the main recipients were Djibouti, Uganda, the Comoro Islands, and Niger. The OPEC Fund for International

Development

The OPEC fund began operations in 1976, and the subscribed contributions as of 31 December 1981 totaled $3,324 billion, of which $415 million was earmarked for the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The OPEC fund contributed an additional $110 million to the IMF trust fund. The capital paid in at the end of 1981 reached $1,266 billion, of which $352.2 million was for IFAD. By far the largest contributions to the OPEC fund have been from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who together provide 40 to 50 percent of the fund's capital. Up to the end of 1981, the OPEC fund had concluded 267 loan agreements with seventy-nine developing countries totaling $1.3 billion. Cumulative loan disbursements reached $740 million at the time. Ninety percent of the loan commitments have been on concessional terms. On a regional basis, Africa was the main beneficiary of the OPEC fund. Forty-four percent of the fund's loan disbursements ($325.6 million) went to African countries, 39 percent to Asia, and 12 percent to Latin America. Mali was the largest of non-Arab African aid recipients. 7 Summing

up Multilateral

Aid

Between 1974 and 1981, the net disbursements of all Arab multilateral aid to African countries who were not members of the Arab League were as follows (in parentheses are the figures for 1981 alone):

60

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Concessional Non-concessional Total

$635.0 million SI 68.7 million S803.7 million

($112.0million) (S38.8 million) (SI 50.8 million)8

The four African countries south of the Sahara who are members of the Arab League—Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Mauritania— received 60 percent of the sums given to all the other non-Arab African countries in the period from 1974 to 1981. These four countries received $353 million in concessional loans ($62.7 million in 1981 alone) and $143.2 million in non-concessional loans ($4.9 million in 1981 ). 9 (For details, see Tables 4.2 through 4.5.) Putting Arab aid to Africa in context, the following figures show Arab aid worldwide during the same period: Concessional Non-concessional Total

$3747.2 million $737.3 million $4484.5 million

($414.4 million in 1981 alone) ($212.5 million in 1981 alone) ($626.9 million)

Arab Bilateral Aid The Arabs have always extended the major part of their aid, from 80 to 90 percent every year, bilaterally. The major Arab donors have established national aid agencies for the administration of their financial aid programs. Kuwait, for instance, established its first aid agency in 1961, and a second in 1966. Abu Dhabi established one in 1971, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1974. Algeria, Libya, and Qatar never established specialized aid agencies: in Libya, for instance, project loans are usually channeled through the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank. In most years, the overall grant element of the Arab countries' bilateral aid commitments was about 40 percent of the aid, lower than that of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. 10 Most of the grant monies went to Arab countries. Arab aid disbursements have increased steadily, from $400 million in 1970 to $9.1 billion in 1980. In 1981, they fell to $7.7 billion, the lowest sum in real terms since 1973. In relation to GNP, Arab-OPEC aid was the highest in 1975—3 percent—but since then it has constantly declined, and in 1981 it was 1.5 percent of GNP. In 1981, the four Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE) disbursed 95 percent of net Arab-OPEC aid. Saudi Arabia alone reported disbursements in 1981 amounting to almost three-

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

61

Table 4 . 2 Net Concessional Loan Disbursements from A r a b / O P E C Multilateral Institutions to Non-Arab African Countries 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.) 1974 Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon

— — — —

1975 —

—

1.0

—

2.9

—

Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad

—

Comoro Islands Congo Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia

—

—

—

—

Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritius Mozambique Niger Rwanda Sào Tomé & Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia South of Sahara Unallocated Total Grand Total: Source: Extracted from Aid

1.2 4.4

0.3 —

0.4 — —

0.3 — —

1.8 2.4 3.9 —

— —

1.0 — — —

1.8 —

7.1 5.7 — — —

31.3

—

2.4 5.4 2.7

1.0 —

1976

1.2 4.4

—

3.0 1.1

1.5 1.0

3.9 1.6 1.8 1.2

4.6 0.7

— —

— — — —

0.9 —

0.5 2.4 1.7 4.6

—

—

—

2.5 1.7

—

5.1

3.9 2.7

— —

3.1

—

4.6

—

26.0

0.5 7.5

10.0

— —

— —

1.8 2.1 7.1 5.7 12.4 12.7

—

111.0

—

3.3 2.9 0.9 0.2 1.7

—

1.2 1.2 1.4 —

2.4

1979 —

2.3 2.2

4.9 4.5 9.6

6.9 4.5

1.0

0.3 1.1

3.3 5.5 2.9 0.2 2.8 0.2 0.4

5.9

1.1

2.9 0.5 8.7 2.0 1.0 1.0 —

—

—

—

0.3 5.6

0.6 2.8 0.1

—

—

—

—

3.1 1.1 0.8

6.5 0.1

—

—

4.9 0.5 0.1

—

3.3 2.0

1981

—

2.4 4.4

0.1

—

1.3 0.6

1.3 1.7

—

1980

—

1.3 5.4 3.5 —

5.0 5.9 2.3 —

4.5 0.4

1.0 2.1 —

0.5 —

7.2

2.1

3.9 4.4

3.9

2.5 0.7 —

2.6 11.9 1.3 10.3 —

1.8 7.0 6.0 —

9.4 —

1.3

2.6

1.2

4.1

0.1

3.5 0.1

2.3 1.5 1.8 0.8 2.9 12.7 0.5 12.9 2.4 1.8 9.0 7.9 0.5 3.4 —

2.1

2.1 —

— — —

0.1

—

1.9 —

—

1.0 2.7 1.0

—

—

—

—

3.6 2.8 1.8 2.4

1978

—

10.5 2.1

0.3 14.2 0.4 4.4

13.2 3.6

3.4 0.1

10.5

—

1977

61.3

5.1 2.2 0.3 —

82.3

0.3 3.1 0.1 3.0 55.6

3.7 — —

74.2

8.9 —

0.1

0.3 2.7

1.9 7.8

0.3

5.1

107.3

112.0 635.0

From OPEC,

1983,

160-161.

Table 4.3 Net Non-Concessional Loan Disbursements from A r a b / O P E C Multilateral Institutions to Non-Arab African Countries 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.) 1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

Benin

—

—

—

—

1.0

1.8

—

1.0

Botswana Burkina Faso Cameroon

— — —

— — —

— — —

— — —

— — 17.1

— — 1.9

0.5 1.9 2.4

— — —

Comoro Islands Gambia Ghana

— — —

— — —

— — —

— — —

— — 2.9

— — 2.9

— — 3.6

5.8 5.8 0.6

Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia

— — _

— —

— —

— —

1.0 —

11.7 —

_

_

_

_

9.2 4.8 \2

9.5 1.3 0.4

Mali Mauritius Niger Senegal

_ — — _

_

_

_

_ — 4.8

2.7 — 10.2

_

_

_

_

_

— 2.0 11.1 10.3

— — 12.7 0.5

Seychelles Tanzania South of Sahara Unallocated

_ —

_

_

_

_

_ 5.9

0.5 0.6

1.1 0.1

—

—

—

—

6.7

3.3

Total

—

—

—

—

39.4

37.4

— —

— —

—

1 5

— —

—

—

1.4

1980

1981

—

—

48.1

38.8

Grand Total:

163.7

Source: Extracted from Aid

From OPEC,

1983, annex table 13,

162-163.

Table 4 . 4 Net Concessional Loan Disbursements from A r a b / O P E C Multilateral Institutions to African Members of the Arab League, 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.) 1974

1976

1975

1977

1978

1.7

4.1 22.4

Djibouti Mauritania Somalia Sudan

4.6 7.2 37.4

7.5 14.1

25.5

10.1 6.8 15.6

Total

49.2

21.6

45.8

34.2

—

Source: Extracted from Aid

—

—

16.1 4.2

—

From OPEC,

1979

1980

1981

Total 6.6 81.8 80.8 183.8 353.0

8.3 18.5

0.2 10.6 15.6

2.8 15.4 22.7

0.8 6.7 20.8 34.4

53.3

26.4

40.9

62.7

—

1983, annex table 12,

—

160-161.

Table 4 . 5 Net Non-Concessional Loan Disbursements from A r a b / O P E C Multilateral Institutions to African Members of the Arab League, 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.) 1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

Mauritania

—

—

—

—

—

6.4

1.2

Somalia

_

_

_

_

_

_

349

1981 — 2.0

Total 7.6 36.9

Sudan

—

—

—

5.0

2.3

37.0

6.5

2.9

98.7

Total

—

—

—

5.0

2.3

43.4

42.6

4.9

143.2

Source: Extracted from Aid

From OPEC,

1983, annex table 13,

162-163.

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

63

quarters of the O P E C total. Kuwait h a s been the second largest donor, in most years, and the UAE the third largest. The other Arab donors—Algeria, Iraq, and Libya—tend toward sharp fluctuations from one year to another. In recent years, there has been a trend t o w a r d a b r o a d e r dispersal of funds and, b y the end of 1981, over ninety countries had r e c e i v e d aid. N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is a l w a y s A r a b states that h a v e r e c e i v e d the preponderant share ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y four-fifths) of b i l a t e r a l A r a b - O P E C aid. Aid to n o n - A r a b A f r i c a h a s b e e n relatively insignificant, only about 6 percent of the total even at its peak in 1981. Information published by the national A r a b aid agencies is confined to commitments, making it difficult to determine the actual amounts disbursed bilaterally. Moreover, the geographic distribution and the financial terms are not always indicated. The following is a breakdown of the bilateral aid by donor country. Saudi

Arabia

T h e largest donor a m o n g the O P E C countries, Saudi Arabia has accounted in most years for between half and two-thirds of the total O P E C aid. T h e main channel for Saudi Arabian aid is the Saudi Fund for Development, an autonomous public organization established in 1974 a n d e n d o w e d with capital of $7.4 billion in 1981, of which $3.8 billion has been paid out. The fund, which started operations in 1975, had signed 132 loan agreements with forty-seven recipient countries by the end of 1981, totaling $3.2 billion. By the end of 1981, less than 45 percent of those commitments had been disbursed. Of the forty-seven countries, thirteen were Arab, twenty-one African a n d ten Asian. Of the total loan c o m m i t m e n t s , A r a b countries received 47 percent, Asian countries 30 percent, and African countries 15 percent ($480 million); the rest went to Latin America a n d Europe. 1 1 The share lent to non-Arab African countries b y the fund is not specified, but is very much lower than the 15 percent provided to Africa as a whole. 1 2 Most of the Saudis' financial aid is earmarked for the Islamic countries in Africa. For instance, in May 1985, the fund signed two loan agreements with Niger and Senegal totaling $11 million. 1 3 Most of Saudi Arabia's aid has been provided bilaterally, but it is also the largest O P E C contributor to both the m u l t i l a t e r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s set up b y the A r a b c o u n t r i e s a n d the o t h e r

64

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

international organizations that give aid to African countries. For instance, between 1974 and 1981, Saudi Arabia purchased $2 billion of World Bank bonds and provided $2.7 billion under the International Monetary Fund's Oil Facility and $2.4 billion under the Supplementary Financing Facility. In 1982, Saudi Arabia agreed to lend the World Bank $800 million. 1 4 In 1985, Saudi Arabia pledged $100 million to the Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa, set up by the World Bank to aid famine-stricken areas of Africa. Kuwait The second largest donor state after Saudi Arabia provides its official development assistance through various channels, chiefly the ministry of finance and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), established in 1961. Over the last twenty years, the ministry of finance has distributed grants totaling $4.7 billion, of which 97 percent was extended to Arab countries, 2 percent to Asian countries, 0.8 percent to non-Arab Africa (37.6 million), and 0.2 percent to other developing countries. Among the non-Arab African countries who benefited from grants, mainly for education, health, and relief assistance, were Ethiopia, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Niger, Senegal, the Comoro Islands, Mali, Uganda, Mauritania, and Somalia. 1 5 This fund has been permitted to operate in non-Arab countries only since 1974. In 1981, its capital was $7.2 million. Its commitments during the twenty years of its activity amounted to $3.2 billion, of which $3,126 billion were for 204 loans given to fifty-four countries and UN organizations. Among the beneficiaries were sixteen Arab, twenty-two African, and thirteen Asian states. Of the total loan commitments, Arab countries received 57 percent, Asia 28 percent and Africa 15 percent ($468.9 million). Tanzania has been the largest recipient among non-Arab African countries. In 1983, the fund reported that it had extended a $14.7 million concessional loan to Burundi for electricity development and another concessional loan of $9.5 million to the Central African Republic for road development. 16 More recently, in 1985, the fund signed $33 million worth of loan agreements for different development projects, specifically $7.2 million to Niger, $4.6 million to Mozambique, and $20.48 million to Togo and Benin for a joint water development project. All the loans were on easy terms. 17

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

65

Kuwait is also a major contributor to multilateral development institutions, mainly Arab institutions and the O P E C fund. The United Arab Emirates

(UAE)

T h e UAE disbursed almost $1 billion annually in aid from 1975 to 1980. The bulk of this aid came through the Abu Dhabi department of finance, and the rest through the Abu Dhabi fund. The major part of U A E aid has consisted of bilateral cash grants. The aid program started in 1971, but was limited to a few Arab countries during the first four years. The bulk of UAE aid has continued to be directed toward Arab countries. For instance, between 1977 and 1981, 96 percent of the UAE's bilateral grants went to Arab countries, while less than 3 percent was received by non-Arab Asian countries and less than 1 percent by non-Arab African countries. Among the non-Arab African countries, Muslim Somalia and Mauritania were the largest recipients. T h e A b u D h a b i F u n d for A r a b E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t (ADFAED) is the UAE's main channel for providing bilateral loans; it was founded in 1971 and started operations in 1973. In 1979 its p l e d g e d capital w a s $1.1 billion, but paid-in capital in 1981 amounted to only $580 million. By the end of 1981, cumulative commitments since the beginning of operations had reached $955 million. Of this, 60 percent was in the form of concessional loans and the rest in non-concessional loans. Cumulative gross disbursements amounted to $698 million by the end of 1981, over half from nonconcessional commitments. By the end of 1981, the Abu Dhabi fund had extended seventy-six loans to thirty-nine developing countries: seventeen African, eight Asian, and two European (Malta and Turkey). Arab countries have obtained over 75 percent of the total loan commitments, Asia 12 percent, African countries 8 percent ($76.4 million), and European countries 4 percent. Thus the share of the African countries remained rather small, despite the UAE's pledges at the 1977 Afro-Asian Summit. In comparison, Oman alone received three times the amount given to all African countries. A m o n g the main African beneficiaries of UAE loans were Somalia, Uganda, the Comoro Islands, and Zaire. According to ADFAED's annual report, the fund's commitments up to the end of 1983 amounted to $1.76 billion in loan g r a n t s a n d technical a s s i s t a n c e to forty-six countries. 1 8 Multilateral contributions b y the UAE, mainly to the Islamic Development Bank, have been small.

66

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Qatar Its aid program began in late 1973; by 1981, its commitments amounted to $1.835 billion, extended mostly to other Arab countries. Among the African countries that received aid from Qatar were Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Zaire. At the 1977 Afro-Arab Summit, Qatar pledged to increase its assistance to African countries; however, this promise has not yet resulted in any marked increase in aid to Africa. Q a t a r ' s m u l t i l a t e r a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s have been r e l a t i v e l y insignificant. Iraq It channels its aid through the Iraqi Fund for External Development, which was established in 1974. In 1979, its capital was $677 million. Accumulated commitments by the Iraqi fund reached $1.748 billion by the end of 1980. The fund has extended loans to twentyseven developing countries, of which eleven were African, eight Arab, five Asian, and three Latin American. Cumulative disbursements by the fund totaled about $337 million. As in the case of Qatar, there is no official account of the way the amounts are divided. Among the African beneficiaries were Chad, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Zambia, to whom a considerable part of the aid was extended as long-term loans in order to purchase Iraqi oil. 19 Contributions to multilateral institutions have been small and limited to Arab institutions. Algeria In 1974, Algeria established a $20 million trust fund for African countries, which is administered by the African Development Bank. Algeria also contributes to various multilateral institutions, mostly Arab agencies. Among African recipients of Algerian bilateral aid programs were Benin, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. 20 Egypt Although Egypt cannot grant financial aid, it provides teachers and experts, especially in the fields of agriculture, water resources,

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

67

housing, and medicine. In 1982, the Egyptian ministry for foreign affairs set up the fund for technical cooperation, with a capital of $2 million, which was increased by 1984 to $20 million. 2 1 In 1983, there were about 200 Egyptian experts in non-Arab Africa and about 5,000 African students in Egypt. 22 The net disbursements of bilateral OPEC concessional assistance in 1982 alone was as follows: 23

African countries (not beloning to Arab League) Arab League members All countries

$276.1 million $3,010 billion $5,507 billion 24

To summarize, net disbursements of bilateral aid to non-Arab African states, from 1979 to 1983, amounted to $1.1 billion in loans. The distribution of grants to the same countries from 1977 to 1981 amounted to $337.8 million. In contrast, over the same period, the four African members of the Arab League (Mauritania, Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan) received more than $2 billion in loans and $526.1 million in grants. Details of these grants are supplied in Tables 4.6 through 4.9.

Contributions of OPEC Countries to International Multilateral Institutions These contributions have been relatively small, usually less than 5 percent of annual OPEC aid. Among the recipient institutions are the International Development Association (IDA), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the African Development Bank (ADB). The African Development Bank, engaged in providing aid to African countries, was established in Abidjan in 1964 by the OAU. Its capital is $900 million. The bank extends easy-term loans for development projects to all O A U members. The Arab-African members contributed 40 percent of its capital and have an equivalent percentage of the voting power. Non-African Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, also contribute to the ADB, but hold no voting privileges. The ADB disbursed $744 million in development project loans in

68

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Table 4.6 Net Bilateral Concessional Assistance from OPEC Countries to Non-Arab Developing Countries, 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 3 (in $m.) 1982

1983

—

2.1

0.6 1.8

0.5

1.3

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1.7 16.2

3.7 21.8 2.0 2.1

0.2 2.6 8.5 0.5 7.2

1979 Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoro Islands Congo Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritius Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sâo Tomé and Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe South of Sahara Unallocated

1981

2.1 1.5

6.2 3.9 6.0 —

—

0.3 0.3 0.3 6.4 26.0

—

—

14.5 14.9

13.6 1.3

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

4.2

0 1 0.7 3.5 3.0 3.6 7.7 5.7

0.3 1.0 1.1

1.3 —

2.8 9.3

—

—

4.2 16.6 9.3 1.9

7.0 25.2 0.1 1.4

—

—

0.3 14.8 13.8

0.1 9.2 18.0

— —

14.5 3.3 11.0 14.3 0.3 0.1 2.1 0.2 2.4 5.4

—

—

—

13.3

17.3

9.2 1.0 0.9 27.8

—

—

10.1 0.6

10.3 1.7

—

—

1.3 4.5 0.1 24.7 1,8 3.2 84.8 0.1 0.1

— —

6.2 3.9 2.6 0.1 52.6 —

33.1 2.6 1.2 18.2

—

—

—

0.6

1.3

0.7

—

—

—

—

—

1.4 1.0 4.0

2.1

56.7 5.5 1.0

11.4 0.6 0.3

47.4 0.4 0.1

—

3.6

—

6.3

—

—

—

15.4 0.5 0.1 14.5 2.0 114.5

24.1 3.8 1.1 5.7

18.4 2.8 2.4 0.5 3.4 0.2 21.0

—

1.4 5.0

1983, 224

1.7

—

—

—

—

15.6

0.9 4.8 9.5 0.1

1.9 Report,

1980

1.5 1.2 3.8 10.3 6.8

—

144.1

Total Grand Total Africa Unspecified Source: OECD Annual

—

—

5.0 —

192.5 —

and 1984,240.

—

—

44.0 —

220.1

276.1

3.1

7.6

280.4 1113.2 —

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

Table 4.7 Net Bilateral Concessional Assistance from OPEC Countries to African Members of the Arab League, 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 3 (in $m.) 1979 Djibouti Mauritania Somalia Sudan Total Grand Total Source: OECD Annual

Report,

1980

1981

28.7

1982

1983

1.7

11.4

64.5

42.6

68.7

120.1

13.1 100.0

68.6 293.2

140.9 156.4

163.5

160.5 165.6

22.8 352.1

430.5

446.1

322.6

392.3

428.9 2020.4

—

1 9 8 3 , 2 2 4 and 1 9 8 4 ,

46.0

240.

Table 4 . 8 Distribution of Grants from OPEC Countries to Non-Arab African Countries, 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.) 1977 Angola Cape Verde Central African Republic Comoro Islands Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Madagascar Mali Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe South of Sahara Unallocated Total Source: Extracted from Aid

1978

1979

1980

1981

—

—

—

1.3

—

—

0.6 2.0

—

—

—

0.1

6.0 2.4

1.1

8.4

1.5 1.2 0.2

0.3 0.3 0.1

0.1 —

—

1.0 5.0 0.1

—

—

0.9 4.8

0.2

—

—

0.2

0.1

—

0.3 0.1

—

—

—

—

—

0.1

14.5

—

—

—

—

1.2

0.2 0.1

4.1

—

—

—

1.7

0.9 2.0

—

15.9

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.1

—

—

—

7.0

0.2 0.1

—

0.1 1.0

1.0

0.1 —

—

4.0

4.3

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.3

0.1

—

—

4.8

1.3 5.0

—

—

—

—

9.5 0.1

—

—

—

10.7 From Opec,

33.5

1 9 8 3 , annex table 3,

21.7 150-151.

—

13.0 —

38.7

1.3 1.0 0.3 0.1 —

2.0 8.0 7.0 45.9

69

70

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Table 4.9

Distribution of Grants from O P E C Countries to African Countries South of the Sahara Belonging to the Arab League, 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.) Mauritania Somalia Sudan Djibouti Total Source: Extracted from Aid

1977

1978

1979

1980

88.1

105.2

9.4

89.3 85.6 10.0

50.6 29.7 64.0

31.4

22.6 86.7

273.0

249.5

53.1

From OPEC,

1 9 8 3 , annex table 3,

12.3 —

1981 18.2

16.2 14.6

20.9 4.0 13.0

140.1

56.1

150-151.

1982, $930 million in 1983, and $574 million in 1984. Over the last two decades, the A D B has provided $5 billion in loans for approximately 700 development projects in Africa. 25 Contributions of O P E C countries in 1983 to multilateral organizations—both Arab and international—totalled $1.14 billion, 13 percent below 1982 levels. OPEC support concentrated on the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Islamic Development Bank. 2 6 OPEC's modest participation in the financing of UN agencies is compensated for by the creation of the Arab Gulf Program for UN Development. Arab contributions to this fund reached $91 million in 1980, of which two-thirds came from Saudi Arabia. In 1983, Arab contributions totaled $28 million. OPEC countries also cofinance projects with the World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral donors. Between 25 to 60 percent of OPEC's annual commitments are involved in such projects. By the end of 1981, over 350 cofinanced projects, to which $23 billion had been committed, had been undertaken. More than one-third of the funds for these projects had been provided by OPEC countries and institutions. 2 7 Conclusions The outline of Arab aid to Africa discloses several interesting trends and tendencies, particularly the gap between aid pledged and given. A c c o r d i n g to B A D E A ' s report, the total bilateral and multilateral Arab aid commitments to non-Arab African countries from 1974 to 1981 totaled $6.867 billion: $5.597 billion in concessional aid and $1.269 billion in non-concessional aid. 2 8

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

71

Table 4.10 gives the details, but does not indicate net disbursements nor does it distinguish between bilateral and multilateral aid. According to BADEA President Ayari, Arab aid to Africa, in all its forms, totaled $9 billion from 1973 to 1984.29 However, according to OECD data, the net disbursements of multilateral aid, both concessional and non-concessional, to African countries that are not members of the Arab League, was $803.7 million between 1974 and 1981. 30 The same source does not indicate the amounts of bilateral aid for those years. From the various sources it can be seen that the average disbursements of Arab aid to non-Arab Africa for the years 1979-1981 was less than one-third of the average commitment. Table 4.11 illustrates this. A second outstanding trend is the relative decline of Arab aid to Africa, in proportion to the aid from other sources, chiefly the West. In 1981, 1982, and 1983 there was a decline in OPEC aid as a result of the decline in oil revenues, and also as a result of the war between Iran and Iraq. At the same time, aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has continued to rise. Non-Arab members of OPEC (Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela) account for less than 5 percent of the OPEC aid commitments. The comparative volume of aid given by major donor groups is as follows in billions of dollars (the percentage of total world aid is in parentheses). 3 1

OPEC DAC CMEA a

1975 6.2 (29) 13.8 (65) 1.2 (6)

1980 9.7 (25) 27.3 (69) 2.4 (6)

1981 8.5 (23) 25.6 (70) 2.4 (7)

1982 6.8 (18) 27.9 (75) 2.4 (7)

1983 5.48 (15) 27.5 (77) 2.94 (8)

a

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (of Eastern bloc countries) Table 4.12 shows net disbursements of bilateral aid in Africa provided by the developed countries and the Arab oil-producing states. It can be seen that most OPEC aid went to the Arab countries of Africa, and, moreover, that Zaire and Liberia having resumed diplomatic relations with Israel, received no aid at all from OPEC in 1983. A glance at Table 4.13, which shows total Arab aid to non-Arab Africa, makes it quite clear that non-Muslim countries

72

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Table 4.10 Total Bilateral and Multilateral Arab Aid Commitments to African Countries, 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.)

1974

Beneficiary Country Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso

Equatorial Ethiopia Gabon

—

3.0

8.2 62.1

5.7

2.8

17.3

15.3

3.1 13.2

—

—

—

36.7

10.1

16.9 0.6 61.6 7.7

57.3 65.6

8.9 36.4

3.3 15.1

2.3 42.6 2.8 5.6 17.8 —

29.8 2.7 —

6.8 —

2.1

Annua!

Report,

1983,

73.

—

4.8 22.7 15.7

—

1.9

—

—

25.2 2.9 34.1 —

1.0 28.0 —

3.1 1.6 106.0 10.0 32.7 12.0 0.1 11.7 10.0

86.6

84.5

30.9

—

—

13.7

Total

1.6

—

38.4

Zimbabwe Africa Unspecified

—

18.8 1.2

8.8 4.2 48.4 1.7 38.7

Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia

31.5 24.4 36.1

7.4

43.9

Swaziland Tanzania

22.6

13.5 16.7 15.7 1.9 4.4

Principe

—

19.7

2.6 40.4 0.7

—

Seychelles Sierra Leone

Source: BADEA

—

8.0 5.4 2.6

8.4

Guinea

Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritius Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sâo T o m é and Senegal

—

—

Central African Republic Chad C o m o r o Islands Congo Côte d'Ivoire

1976

3.7 8.8 4.0

Burundi Cameroon C a p e Verde

1975

0.7 —

—

28.3 —

56.7 6.2

5.5 4.0

145.0 217.1 24.1

9.9 47.5 123.6

—

—

36.7

59.9

107.3

—

543.8

961.0

954.5

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

1977 13.2 8.2 6.5 42.4 6.3 34.1 0.5 0.7 32.2 1.6 1.5 1.0 0.5 —

21.3 18.3 49.2 17.8 8.6 33.5 0.8 24.6 35.3 1.8 27.9 0.1 —

23.5 2.0 8.8 0.4 16.9 0.6 4.3

1978 —

1979 10.6 4.5 2.0 25.5 4.8 27.7 4.4 3.9 20.9 19.6

—

—

—

—

1.0 4.8

— —

—

—

0.5 31.5 5.0 —

76.0 9.4 5.4 11.4 14.9 16.6

—

15.9 3.7 20.9 14.6 7.2 11.5 —

40.8

—

—

32.3 0.1 6.0 40.9

50.3 7.1 16.8 28.5

—

—

—

38.6

—

—

24.3 0.5

12.2 2.8 5.6

— —

—

10.0

10.5 2.5 49.9 76.6 0.3

207.1

112.2

30.0 19.0 10.4 11.8 71.1 0.5 4.0

691.0

668.3

553.0

—

—

0.3 —

3.0 4.5 26.6 19.8 20.8 12.6 18.2

16.4 2.2 10.6 26.3 16.7 3.7 0.7 32.7 14.7 17.5

—

29.2

1980

—

—

0.4 19.1 18.4

1981 24.0 9.7 3.9 51.9 21.5 60.1 13.5 7.6 23.7 50.8 45.2

64.3 7.4 50.1 20.0 26.0 131.8 104.3

40.8 49.3 46.6 181.3 93.0 213.3 63.6 16.9 129.1 138.6 151.8 6.0 19.2 28.1 76.5 101.0 120.7 621.1 89.1 254.8 35.5 44.2 139.0 2.8 386.9 65.3 66.5 350.3 0.2 90.9 17.6 328.4 34.7 60.5 4.2 233.3 35.5 263.8 116.4 175.7 132.3 573.0

1222.9

5597.8

—

1.0 1.1 —

24.9 7.5 371.0 16.6 167.6 3.4 5.0 12.6 —

57.8 7.8 18.0 84.2 —

7.0 —

71.8 21.3 17.5 —

81.0 0.5 14.5 —

64.5 —

74.9 1272.8

1974-•1981 NonConcesConcessional sional

19.0 14.2 44.1 25.4 32.4 3.7 —

18.0 1.0 73.1 37.5 2.0 139.3 0.1 5.3 6.0 62.5 14.4 7.0 —

10.0 8.7

Total

133.4

50.8 58.0 46.6 181.3 94.5 262.1 63.6 24.5 134.8 138.6 163.3 58.0 19.2 28.5 102.5 101.3 197.9 647.0 89.1 340.2 35.5 50.1 169.4 7.3 411.3 65.3 76.5 363.2 2.2 92.3 17.6 389.7 39.6 72.2 4.2 306.4 41.3 347.7 411.4 323.6 132.3 706.4

1269.5

6867.3

— —

1.5 48.8 —

7.6 5.7 —

11.5 52.0 —

0.4 26.0 0.5 77.2 25.9 —

85.4 —

5.9 30.4 4.5 24.4 —

10.0 12.9 2.0 1.4 —

61.3 4.9 11.7 —

73.1 5.8 83.9 295.0 147.9 —

73

74

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Figure 4.1 Geographic Distribution of Bilateral Concessional Net Disbursements from OPEC Donors by Region, 1971-1981

2.1%

Source: Aid from OPEC, 1983

Table 4.11 Arab Commitments and Net Disbursements to Non-Arab Africa, 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 1 (in $m.) Commitments' Net Disbursement Bilateral b : Multilateral': of which: — Non-Concessional — Concessional Sources: Extracted from: (a) BADEA (c) Aid From OPEC, 1982, 160.

Report,

1979

1980

1981

553.0 254.0 144.1 109.9

1272.8 347.0 192.5 154.5

1222.9 365.9 220.7 145.8

35.9 74.0

47.2 107.3

34.5 111.3

1983, Appendix II; (b) OECD Annual

Report,

1983;

A R A B A I D TO AFRICA

Table 4.12 Bilateral D A C and OPEC Aid to Africa, 1983 (in $m.) DAC grants Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoro Islands Congo Côte d'Ivoire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mozambique Niger Nigeria Reunion Rwanda St. Helena Sâo Tomé & Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe South of Sahara Unallocated Total Source: OECD, Annual Report, 1984, 153.

24 33 76 102 59 76 41 51 41 14 41 87 37 4 79 49 22 46 13 25 245 58 54 61 56 89 59 14 15 105 94 26 392 92 10 3 171 12 21 80 364 16 368 35 67 147 128 132 175 4010

DAC loans 5 8 -1 22 10 32 0 14 1 1 14 54 4

Total OPEC -

3 8 1 7 -3 -

6 27 -

11

-

-

-4 7 -1 12 12

-

0 1 1 -4 -1 6 4 3

34 53

53

-

90

-

-

-

6 12 11

33 43 3

-

-

23 5 3 -6 2

1 18

-

-

-

33 1 7 21 47 4 41 13 -25 46 50 50 27 739

-

2 -

47 -

23 352 -

18 3 2 -

3 -

21 695

75

76

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Table 4.13 Arab Aid to Non-Arab Africa, 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 3 (in $m.) Concessional Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoro Islands Congo Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritius Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sâo Tomé & Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe Total

Non-Concessional

41.7 59.6 76.2 258.5 146.5 269.8 115.9 26.2 107.9 140.9 151.8 97.4 7.2 22.5 70.0 112.8 136.4 702.5 116.0 330.9 39.7 48.9 164.1 2.8 487.1 56.0 114.1 486.9 0.3 123.7 16.8 574.3 55.2 106.3 4.2 240.3 62.2 270.3 104.9 264.1 155.9

10.0 13.6 10.0

38.9 5.0 77.6 254.7 147.7 8.0

6368.8

1212.9

—

9.5 43.3 —

5.8 1.6 —

11.5 38.5 —

0.4 31.0 0.4 178.2 73.7 10.0 56.4 3.0 3.9 28.2 4.5 19.6 8.0 20.0 20.9 2.0 1.4 —

65.3 3.8 6.5 —

Source: Extracted from BADEA Special Supplement in Jeum Afrique, April 10, 1985. (It is not indicated whether the aid is net disbursements or commitments).

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

77

that h a v e diplomatic tics with I s r a e l — e . g . , M a l a w i and Swaziland—receive almost nothing ($2.8 million and $4.2 million, respectively), while Muslim countries with no such ties receive up to more than two hundred times as much (e.g., Guinea, with $702.5 million). Another important trend in Arab aid programs is the contrast between aid received by African countries with the total amount of Arab aid worldwide. The following table shows the total concessional commitments by Arab OPEC members in 1981 and 1982 (net disbursements are in parentheses):

1981 1982

Bilateral 8086.8 (7765.2) 6572.9 (5584.8)

Multilateral 2329.9 ( 650.2) 800.4 (1122.1)

Total 10416.7 (9415.4) 7373.3 (6706.9)32

The table shows that net disbursement to non-Arab Africa in 1981, $365.9 million, was only 4.3 percent of the total Arab aid disbursed worldwide, $8,415.4 billion. Figure 4.1 shows the same trends. It is also notable that Arab-OPEC aid is restricted, for the most part, to a few Arab countries, in particular Egypt (before 1978), Jordan, and Syria. In most years, between half and two-thirds of the geographically allocated aid has been extended to these three Arab countries. 33 Finally, it is important to understand the Arabs' conception of aid as a political weapon. The declared aim of the Arabs in their assistance to Africa is to strengthen Afro-Arab solidarity and friendship and to help the development projects of African states. 3 4 But in reality, the basic aim is to check Israel's influence in Africa. Chedly Ayari, president of BADEA, has warned that "the Arab Bank will sever relations with any African state which restores diplomatic relations with Israel." 3 5 As noted above, BADEA has carried out this threat. Moreover, all Arab aid agreements include a paragraph committing the recipient to refrain from employing any Israeli company in carrying out projects. Cote d'lvoire, for example, refused to include such a paragraph in a $100 million aid agreement to build a hydroelectric project. Consequently, the agreement was not signed. 36 This attitude is resented by Africans, but despite their many criticisms of Arab aid, they appreciate what they get and, moreover, expect the Arabs to increase assistance still further. These

78

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

expectations continue to influence the African position in the ArabIsrael conflict.

Notes 1. BADEA

Annual

Report

(Khartoum, 1983): 61.

2. Ibid., 74. 3. The Standard

(Kenya), August 9, 1985.

4. OECD Review

(1983): 91.

5. Aid from OPEC, O E C D (Paris, 1983): 117. 6. Aid from

OPEC,

op. cit., 133. Data on the fund's activities a n d the

length of expert's missions are incomplete. 7. Aid from OPEC, op. cit., 124-129. 8. Figures derived from tables 12 and 13, in Aid from OPEC,

160-161.

9. Loc. cit. 10. T h e D e v e l o p m e n t Assistance C o m m i t t e e (DAC) is c o n n e c t e d to the O E C D and includes, as its members, most of the developed countries of Europe and North America. 11. Aid from OPEC, op. cit., 3 1 , 5 5 . 12. Ibid., 58. 13. OPEC News Agency,

J u n e 5, 1985.

14. Aid from OPEC, op. cit., 58. 15. Ibid., 44. 16. Al-ShaTb

(Jerusalem), D e c e m b e r 12, 1983.

17. The Financial 18. The Kenya

Times, (London), July 15, 1985.

Times,

D e c e m b e r 6, 1983.

19. Aid from OPEC, op. cit., 74. 20. Ibid., 20. 21. Al-Musawwar 22. October

(Egypt), February 3 , 1 9 8 5 .

(Egypt), August 13, 1983.

23. OECD Review

(1983): 2 2 4 - 2 2 5 .

24. Derived from Aid from OPEC, op. cit., Table 3. 25. West Africa (London), April 1 4 , 1 9 8 5 , 1 0 6 3 . 26. OECD Review (1984): 238. 27. Aid from OPEC, op. cit., 37. 28. BADEA

Annual

29. Jeune Afrique

Report

(1983): Appendix 2.

(Paris), April 1 0 , 1 9 8 5 , vi.

30. See p. 88. 31. OECD Review (1984): 113. 32. OECD Review (1983): 219. 33. Aid from OPEC, op. cit., 15. 34. See, for example, the introduction to BADEA

Rapport

Annuel,

1980.

ARAB AID TO AFRICA

35. SWB, December 18, 1979, ME/W162/121/1. 36. Jeune Afrique (Paris), April 10,1985, XII.

79

• CHAPTER FIVE •

Factors Disturbing Afro-Arab Relations In view of the Arabs' objective advantages and high profile in Africa, their success in gaining African support was predictable. What is surprising is that, despite their advantages over Israel in Africa—advantages that existed in the 1960s as well—the Arabs did not succeed in blocking Israel's influence before October 1973. It should be borne in mind that the Arabs had initiated their fight against Israel in Africa at least fifteen years earlier, at various Islamic and inter-African conferences, such as at the OAU, where Israel has no voice. Despite this constant anti-Israel activity, Israel succeeded throughout the 1960s in building up a wide network of diplomatic relations and technical cooperation in various spheres and in many countries, even in states with a large Muslim population, such as Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, Mali, Chad, and Nigeria. And even in the years from 1967 to 1973, when African public opinion began to swing in favor of the Arabs, and despite the appearance of new factors that aided the Arabs, they could not achieve their goal with ease, but only by constant struggle and through heated debate. The Africans constantly insisted on moderating extreme anti-Israel proposals, especially those which had practical implications, such as the proposals for an economic boycott, imposition of international sanctions, or severance of diplomatic relations. The latter proposal was raised several times at OAU conventions even before 1973, and for a long time was strongly opposed by most African states. As late as May 1973, at the tenth session of the OAU, the Arabs failed to pass the resolution; likewise at the Conference of Nonaligned States in Algiers in September 1973. Qadhafi's crude and heavy-handed threats only induced suspicion and even strong anti-Arab reactions, prodding the

81

82

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Africans to argue that the Arabs could not determine their enemies and friends for them. In fact, when most of the African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel in the course of the 1973 war, it was not generally because of financial temptation or fear of the Arab oil embargo, but because of inexperience and inability to withstand strong Arab pressure and insistence that they express solidarity with the African state (Egypt) whose territory had been overrun. Israel's pre-1973 success in Africa in the face of the Arab offensive is due to a number of factors, among them: Israel's strong desire to break out of the surrounding ring of Arab hostility and her initiative in making new friends; Israel's experience as a developing country and her readiness to share knowledge with the new states; Israel's emotional identification with the Africans, who, like the Jews, have suffered from racial discrimination for many years. There is no doubt, however, that both Israel's success in Africa in the 1960s and the Afro-Arab friction that manifested itself mainly in 1974-1975, are the result of additional factors whose common denominator is African resentment of Arabs. These feelings of resentment, deeply rooted in history, have found expression on different occasions, as will be shown in this chapter. Memories of the Arab Slave Trade Whereas there is no doubt that the Arab slave trade has historically influenced the attitude of Black Africa toward the Arabs, its effect on contemporary African politics is difficult to gauge. It is true that the Arabs were not alone in carrying out this inhuman trade; major powers such as Britain, France, and the United States also bought and sold Black Africans. Yet the Africans know that whereas the European countries fought against the slave trade from the late nineteenth century on and attempted to abolish it, the Arab slavers continue to engage in it until this very day. It is not the intention of this chapter to deal with the scope of the Arab slave trade; we shall mention here only relevant facts and figures, as our main interest is to examine African feelings on the subject.1 First, it should be indicated that the strongest feelings of resentment against the slave trade are centered in African Christian circles. Among African Muslims, such feelings of resentment against the Arabs either do not exist or are not publicly expressed. This fact must be taken into consideration when assessing the influence of the slave trade on Afro-Arab relations.

FACTORS DISTURBING AFRO-ARAB RELATIONS

83

The Middle East today remains one of the very few areas in the world where slavery still exists, although this is denied by the countries practicing it. Published reports indicate that despite all the efforts to eradicate the slave trade, African men are still sold throughout the Middle East and women slaves can still be found in the harems of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen. 2 The reports describe the slave routes leading from the African continent to the slave markets of Jiddah, Riyadh, and Mecca. Saudi Arabia's king decreed in 1962 that all slaves should be emancipated, but only a few of the estimated 250,000, were actually freed. The Anti-Slavery Society of London and the UN Commission for Human Rights estimate that there are approximately one million slaves or quasi-slaves in North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Western India. Of these, about 400,000 can be found in the Arabian Peninsula alone. Jonathan Derrick remarks: There are few parts of the world today where slavery has lasted so persistently as in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, for example Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Muscat and O m a n . . . . Africa here still presents what geography destined it to be for, in previous centuries—a source of slaves for kings, sheikhs, merchants and other property owners in Arabia. 3

African newspapers periodically decry with much indignation the continuing slave trade. The Sunday Times of Zambia, for instance, in following the historical process of slavery in East Africa, emphasizes that it is still going on: "So even in this age of moon flights, computers and Concorde jets, the chains of human enslavement still clank." 4 The Daily Nation of Kenya, in its issue of 10 November 1980, published a report of slavery in Mauritania under the headline "Slavery Alive." The report evoked numerous letters to the editor, among them one which called on the OAU and the UN to take immediate action against the practice of slavery. 5 The reaction of public opinion leaders in Africa is equally strident. According to Professor L. H. Ofosu-Appiah, a Ghanaian Christian who is Director of the Encyclopedia Africana Secretariat, On the Eastern coast of Africa and in the Sudan the Arab raiders started enslaving Negroes during the period of Islam's empire building. The difference between the methods of the Arabs and those of the European traders was that the Arabs actually went on slave-raiding expeditions and herded slaves to the coast. 6

Describing the destructive role of the Arab slave traders, OfosuAppiah indicates that they went as far as the Congo forests and traveled and settled around Lakes Victoria, Albert, Nyanza and

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Tanganyika. "Wherever they went, they burned down villages and carried off human beings to cart their ivory to the coast. For years the Arabs dominated this area of Africa, and, with the Portuguese, were the only slaving nations which settled in Africa and depopulated it." 7 Professor Ofosu-Appiah emphasizes that the Arab slave trade is not only a matter of the past, but that it has continued into the 1960s, although most of it has been done stealthily since the beginning of this century. He also mentions stories of African pilgrims selling their children to pay for the pilgrimage to Mecca. Even though Saudi Arabia officially abolished slavery in 1962, there is no doubt that the slave trade still affects Afro-Arab relations. The stories concerning the enslavement of pilgrims were confirmed by the chairman of the Anti-Slavery Society, Sir Douglas Glover, who told reporters in 1965 that slave traders are still active in parts of Africa, offering cut-rate one-way tickets to Mecca. Muslims who took advantage of the cheap passage often usually found themselves stranded in Saudi Arabia without money to return and were kept as slaves. As a result, some African countries, such as Nigeria, try to prevent the slave traffic by allowing only pilgrims with return tickets to leave for Mecca. 8 On the East African coast, the memories of Arab slave trade affected the preindependence election rivalries. For example, during the 1957 elections in Kenya, the Arabs' past sins as slave traders became an issue in the campaign between Kenyan Arab and African candidates. 9 The Africans' bitter memories of the slave trade are revived whenever a news item concerning the sale of Africans as slaves in Arab countries is published, or even whenever the Africans suspect that the Arabs disregard their interests. Thus Ghana's Weekly Spectator dedicated its front pages to the news that Arab traders had long been exporting Ghanian children "between the tender and undiscerning ages of 13 and 14 to become virtual slaves of wealthy Arab families." The information shocked the public for several weeks. Indicative of the fury and indignation aroused by the report as an editorial published in the above-mentioned magazine under the heading "A Case for Ruthless Action: Revival of the Slave Trade": Over the past t w o d e c a d e s Ghana has led the quest for the restoration of the Blackman's lost glory and set the pace for the rediscovery of the African personality. It is therefore revolting and exceedingly bewildering to note that this glorious land of liberty is being used for the watersheds of the revival of slave trade. . . . W e

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recall vividly the uncertain days of the struggle for independence, w h e n L e b a n e s e and Syrian m e r c h a n t s in Ghana constituted themselves into a volunteer force and with their foot-long batons in their hands, cudgelled down freedom-fighters in the streets of Accra in open daylight.

After enumerating various unlawful activities of the Lebanese and Syrians the writer adds: It would appear that we would have taken our tolerance too far and t h e y h a v e taken our leniency for weakness and are now adding injury to insult by trading our young daughters like apples or any o t h e r c o m m o d i t y . . . . O u r children must be defended against slavery. 1 0

The Arab slave trade was also mentioned in reaction to Colonel Qadhafi's call for a holy war against Christianity in Africa. In June 1974, the Most Reverend Bernard Yago, the Black African archbishop of Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire, wrote in L'Avvenire, the Milan weekly, that during the last decades of the nineteenth century the Muslim slave trade reached the figure of 80,000 Africans a year. 1 1 Yago accused the Arabs of collaborating with the colonialists in this crime. Interestingly, African disappointment at the Arabs' refusal to discount oil prices triggered their recollection of the slave trade. For example, the Daily Mail of Zambia charged that "the refusal by Arab countries to sell oil to African states at a reduced price is a tacit example that the Arabs, our former slave masters, are not prepared to abandon the rider-and-horse partnership. We have not forgotten that they used to drive us like herds of cattle and sell us as slaves." 1 2 The Uhuru of Tanzania condemned Arab indifference to African needs in nearly identical terms. 13 Phan Midamba, writing to the editor of The Standard of Kenya, charged that Once m o r e the Arabs have shown their keen interest in the bad old d a y s when we happened to be victims of their authority and when they regarded us with a sign of colossal disrespect. And it is not quite unforeseen that they still consider us a waste of their precious time . . . but, the Arabs should as well stick into their minds that the bad old days when they applied yokes to our necks and whipped our bare ends are gone. 1 4

Yet another scholar, William R. Ochieng of the University of Nairobi, wrote in Afriscope that "there are those among the Africans, particularly among the educated, who hate the Arabs because for many centuries the Arabs sold their ancestors into slavery." 1 5 Thus it is clear that the memories of the Arab slave

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trade are still alive and are used against the Arabs in various circumstances. Black Africans staying in Arab countries as visitors, workers, or students have also occasionally encountered discrimination and contempt, an attitude influenced by the long period during which the Arabs considered the Africans inferior. Many Arabs still subscribe to this superiority complex. In fact, in spoken Arabic, the word for a Black man is Nabd (a slave). 16 When the Egyptians realized that this attitude was deeply entrenched among the masses and might harm their relations with the Africans, they tried to propagate a new approach by emphasizing that the age of African servants is over. "This is the era of the thinking African," wrote a Cairo newspaper. 17 However, it is not easy to overcome long-held prejudices. Charles Diggs, a Black U.S. Congressman, pointed out in a speech in Nairobi that Black U.S. students complained that while staying in Cairo, they still had to overcome color discrimination. 18 A similar complaint was voiced by Kenyan Assistant Minister for Education S. K. Choge. In December 1977, he stated in Kenya's parliament that he received complaints from Kenyan students in Arab countries of maltreatment, and, as a consequence, many students quit the universities of those Arab states and registered at educational institutions elsewhere. 19 A tour for Black U.S. journalists organized by the Arab League in 1974 to strengthen relations between U.S. Blacks and Arabs also missed its target, apparently, for similar reasons. According to one of the visiting writers, the journalists were met in nearly every Arab country, except Jordan, with disrespect and coolness and "lightweight racism which marred that journey, giving it a negative picture instead of a positive image." 20 Another example illustrating how memories of Arab slave trade sometimes produce a hypersensitive and suspicious reaction to Arab treatment of African workers is the controversy over the recruitment of Kenyans to work in Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. In May 1977, Kenyan workers returning from Saudi Arabia claimed that several hundreds of their colleagues were forced to work under "slave conditions" in the desert areas of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. The secretary general of the Central Organization of Trade Unions of Kenya (COTU), Juma Boy, a Muslim, accused a number of Kenyan businessmen and politicians of complicity with the oil sheikhs in the Middle East to recruit Kenyans to work as slaves in road building and other construction projects. Abdallah Mwaruwa, Muslim head of the East African Seamen's Union, likewise claimed that Kenyan workers were being recruited into

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what he termed "modern slavery," and were paid slave wages. 21 Mwaruwa added that the Arabs have been "recruiting Pakistanis for several decades to provide cheap labor and now it appears that they are turning their attention to Africa and East Africa in particular. These Kenyans will be nothing but slaves." 22 In June 1977, the matter was raised at the conference of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva by Juma Boy, head of the COTU delegation, and a dispute erupted between the Kenyans and the Arabs. 2 3 In July 1977, the matter was revived in Kenya following disclosures to the press by a Kenyan who returned from North Yemen and described the deplorable "slave conditions" under which Kenyan nationals worked. He said that he had been expelled because of his demand for better terms of service. The Kenyan Daily Nation called on the government to inquire into the matter. 24 COTU Chairman, Fred Omido, likewise demanded an immediate government investigation, arguing that "unless recruitment is brought under control, nothing will prevent Kenyans from becoming slaves in a region where in most cases trade unions do not exist." 25 A few months later, a group of thirty Kenyans who had signed a twoyear contract to work in Arab countries, returned home after four months. They complained that before leaving to work in Arab countries they had been promised equal treatment and salaries. "We found our juniors earning 300 percent more than us. Indeed, we were called modern slaves and told to shut up." They also claimed that ninety-six of their colleagues in North Yemen wanted to return home to "escape the intolerable conditions" in that country. 26 Eventually, the government of Kenya sent a senior labor officer to North Yemen to improve the working conditions of its nationals. 27 But controversy was again stirred up in 1982 when the management of the Intercontinental Hotel chain in the Middle East recruited Kenyans to work in its hotels in Arab countries. The Standard of June 25, 1982 reported that the Kenyan Government was careful to ensure that the workers' interest would be guaranteed, thereby avoiding the problems of past experiences. In yet another instance, the Arab slave trade was recalled in reaction to Arab behavior vis-à-vis Zaire. In May 1982, the president of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, was severely criticized by the Arabs for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Israel. The Arabs also imposed economic sanctions on Zaire. Mobutu charged that the harsh Arab reactions were just another example of their disregard for and contempt of Africans. Otherwise, Mobutu asked, why do they not behave in the same way with European and other countries who maintain diplomatic relations with Israel? In a

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statement published under the heading "Neo-Slavery," Mobutu observed, with sadness, how African countries were bending before Arab pressure. "Faced with massive Arab interference in criticism of a sovereign country, they have no other reaction than to follow the slave caravan with its whips and turbans." The Arabs, he indicated, "still regard the African countries as those old slave traders." 2 8

"White" Africans and "Black" Africans Just as the memory of the slave trade serves to draw a line between Arab and African, so does race separate the two. In fact, the tendency among Africans to use the concept "Black Africa," to differentiate it from North Africa, is revealing. African writer Aludadare Aguda notes that African pioneer thinkers concentrated their efforts on liberating the Black man: Brandishing E d w a r d Blyden-Nkrumah's African Personality and Aimé Césare Senghor's Négritude, Black Africa m a d e it clear that they were going to fight for the dignity of the African as a Black m a n . The conflict in Palestine, w h o s e origins predated their independence, and, even though to a less extent, the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962) seemed to be no concern of theirs. In spite of the definition of "Africans" at the 1958 Accra Conference to include light-skinned North Africans, their attitude has only been changing very slowly. 2 9

Obafemi Awolowo, a prominent Nigerian leader, has also emphasized on various occasions that Arabs are not Africans: It is true that physically and geographically, Egypt is in Africa. But apart from the fact that her entire political heart is in the Arab world, she never regarded herself as having any social and cultural affinity with the Black races of Africa. . . . Egypt is the v e r y antithesis of a workable African community. 3 0

In East Africa, the Arabs of Zanzibar and the mainland coast of Kenya and Tanganyika considered themselves superior to the Black African majority. Until the end of the colonial period, they insisted on being treated as a separate "high caste" community with special privileges. Some Arabs even demanded full independence from Kenya and a union with Zanzibar, where their traditional privileges and status would be reinforced. 31 This brought them into conflict with the African national movements, and, while the coast remained part of Kenya, the government still regards the coastal

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Arabs and their Muslim supporters with suspicion. In Zanzibar, African hatred and resentment toward the Arab oligarchy exploded in the 1964 revolution, in which the Omani sultan was expelled and many Arabs were killed in racial riots. Recently, the lack of Arab support during the oil crisis intensified doubts regarding the ArabAfrican "brotherhood," prompting the Daily News of Zambia to observe: "Arabs have their Arab League, so why should they be allowed to join the OAU when their interests are not in Africa. If the OAU is to achieve unity for which it was set, the question of the Arab World in African affairs must be settled first." 32 This opinion was reiterated by Charles Njonjo, Kenya's attorney-general, who told the parliament in Nairobi that African unity would be appropriate only for countries south of the Sahara. 33 It should be noted that these separatist opinions are not acceptable to all African leaders. Njonjo's statement was criticized by President Kaunda of Zambia. 34 Nevertheless, some Africans go much further than Njonjo and demand the establishment of a "Black People's League" that unlike the OAU, will not admit the Arabs. 35 More militant opinion calls for "Africa for Africans," emphasizing "We the indigenous African country member states of the OAU must now resolve with determination to drive the Arabs not only out of the OAU, but altogether out of Africa (the land they have for many years been unlawfully occupying) and back to Arabia, their true homeland." 3 6 In an article under the heading "Replace OAU by Organization of Black African Unity," the Nairobi Times, explained the basic differences between the Arabs of North Africa and the Black Africans. 3 7 The struggle of the people of the Western Sahara against Morocco strengthens the demands of those who call for a separate organization for Black Africans. 38 The views of President Leopold Senghor of Senegal are of particular interest. When he explained his objection to Qadhafi's proposal to shift the OAU headquarters from Ethiopia to Egypt he pointed out: Of course, Colonel Qadhafi has his own thesis; he is an Arab and a Muslim. And I have one too, as a Black African whose country is a Black African country with a vast majority of Muslims, a country that is above racial or religious quarrels. 3 9

President Senghor opposed the participation of the North African states in the second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture, which took place in 1977 in Lagos and covered various aspects of Black African society and its future development.

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Senghor's stance caused tension between Senegal and Nigeria, and Senegal warned that it would boycott the festival if its demands for barring the North African countries from the central event of the Festival were not met. It is of special interest to note that President Senghor, who, in the political sphere, has usually acted to strengthen relations between Africa and the Arabs, should emphasize so strongly the basic racial differences between the two groups. Moreover, Senegal's Minister for Culture Allione Seme told newsmen that North Africans are Arab rather than Black in origin, and that he did not understand how non-Blacks could contribute to such discussions. He also warned that if the question was not resolved in Senegal's favor by the international organizing committee of the festival, Senegal would be joined in boycotting the event by other French-speaking West African nations and Black communities in Europe and in Latin America who held similar views. 4 0 The dispute between Nigeria and Senegal ended with a compromise that opened the festival to all the members of the OAU and the African Liberation movements. Libyan strongman Qadhafi is a favorite target of African critics. A journalist from Tanzania, writing in a Swahili newspaper, criticized Qadhafi's involvement in African politics thus: Colonel Qadhafi, when I notice h o w you poke your nose into African politics I ask myself, what has an Arab to do in our affairs? Historians claim that North Africa was inhabited once by Africans like me until it was occupied by Arabs like you and our forefathers were expelled. In the Encyclopedia Britannica, it is written that the origin of the Arabs is in Arabia, that is to say, not in Africa. The Arabs are like the Boers w h o invaded South Africa several hundred years ago. 4 1

Southern Sudan's Civil War The long and cruel war between the Arab Muslims of northern Sudan and the Black animists and Christians of the south, which broke out in 1955 and continues until today, is another reason for African resentment of the Arabs. The southerners broadcast and publish detailed descriptions of the atrocities committed by the Sudanese government and criticize its policy of Islamization and Arabization of the south. According to these sources, hundreds of thousands of Black southerners have been killed in the fighting. 42 The vast majority of Africans sympathize with the southerners' struggle and often expressed their support. Some of the neighboring

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countries accorded them more than moral support and provided refuge to their leaders and permitted arms shipments to pass through. Radio Nigeria, for instance, in a broadcast to Africa on 12 June 1973, accused the Sudanese prime minister of "an accelerated plan to bully the South into accepting a thoroughly centralized system with a single education program, a single language— Arabic—a single religion, and a single Islamic way of life." The African countries, while sympathetic to the southern Sudanese cause, generally avoided backing their demand for a separate state out of fear of creating a dangerous precedent that might jeopardize their own unity: many African countries, it should be remembered, have their own intertribal conflicts. As a result, expressions of support were limited to statements sympathetic to the struggle of the southern Sudanese and blamed the Arabs for atrocities. Even after the 1972 agreement which granted the south a certain measure of autonomy, the period of bitter struggle and the atrocities against the southerners left a wound that has not healed; on different occasions, the Africans use it against the Arabs as a warning for the future. Thus the Black African archbishop of Abidjan, warning against the jihad ideology, remarked that "Moslems conquered Southern Sudan, destroyed its long-established society and decimated its population." 4 3 And an African commentator pointed out that the long civil war in southern Sudan cannot be forgotten and is one of the factors that preserves the historical and psychological gap between Arabs and Africans. 44 Even after the 1972 agreement, tension in southern Sudan still exists and frequently comes to the fore. Southern Sudanese, both in Sudan and abroad, complain that the government has breached the agreement by discriminating against them in education, social services, and employment and development projects. They object to the government's imposition of the Arabic language in the south from grade one of elementary school. "Southern Sudan has its dialects and languages that should be encouraged to the fullest," wrote one southern Sudanese. "Imposing Arabic is preparing the ground for another trouble."45 President Numeiri's decision to carve the south into three administrative units was viewed by the southerners as further erosion of their autonomy. By 1983, the growing discontent burst out in renewed fighting, which was further accelerated when Numeiri imposed the shari'a (Islamic law) on the country, including the practice of amputating criminals' limbs. The renewed rebellion is led by Colonel John Garang, a Black Christian from the south who became the commander of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army

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and chairman of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLASPLM). The SPLA, which had its main base in Ethiopia, succeeded through the period 1984-1986 in inflicting heavy losses on the Sudanese Army. The fanatic Islamic policy of Numeiri had repercussions in Africa and once more it aroused fear and resentment, particularly in the neighboring countries. President Arap Moi of Kenya censured the growing religious fanaticism. 46 Zimbabwe's state-owned newspaper, The Sunday Mail, said Numeiri's decision to introduce Islamic law "is highly disturbing" and called on Africans to support the struggle of the black population of the south to form their own state. 47 African feelings of resentment on this issue were aptly expressed by Hilary Ng'weno, a leading African journalist and chief editor of Kenya's Weekly Review: There is, in addition, the racial factor in the Sudanese tragedy that Africans must address, for no matter how one looks at Numeiri's policies, there is no escaping the conclusion that there is a racist motive behind them. Numeiri appears bent on perpetuating the age-old domination of the African south by the Arab north and, in the process, is recalling for Africans all over the continent bitter memories of the turbulent relations that existed between Africans and Arabs in centuries g o n e by. Unless Numeiri can get his country back onto a saner path—and do so fairly quickly—those bitter m e m o r i e s could sound the death knell of A f r o - A r a b solidarity. 4 8

In April 1985, Numeiri was deposed by a military coup. Although the new regime expressed its willingness to compromise with the south and also hinted that it may relax, but not repeal, the imposition of Islamic law, fighting in the south is still going on. It seems that the tensions and suspicions separating Arab north and Black south are too deep to be easily overcome. John Garang demands the formation of a democratic civil government in Sudan with the fair participation of the southerners, and regards the new military regime as "a hyena which has simply changed its clothing." In any case, the continuing civil war between Arabs and Black Africans in Southern Sudan is another factor which disturbs Afro-Arab relations.

"Arab Imperialism" and the Western Sahara One major source of tension between Arabs and Africans centers on the African fear of an Arab attempt to acquire a decisive influence in

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African organizations in order to dictate policy. In particular, the Africans view with anxiety the Arabs' immense economic power and their activities against existing regimes in Africa. These suspicions have even led some Africans to see the Arabs as neocolonialists who would jeopardize their recently gained independence. At the AllAfrican Peoples Conference held in Accra in December 1958, panAfrican leader President Nkrumah of Ghana warned that "Colonialism and imperialism may come to us yet, in a different guise—not necessarily from Europe." In the light of Nkrumah's reservations toward the Arabs at that time, the warning appeared to be directed, at least in part, at Egypt. An earlier example of opposition to "Arab Imperialism" is to be found on the editorial pages of Paris-Dakar in 1960: There are two Africas, white Africa and Black Africa. To liberate Black Africa is to free it from the yoke of former colonial power and to avoid Arab imperialism. Expansionist ambitions can already be detected. It is therefore necessary to check their progress. 49

Here, too, traditional arguments are used against the Arabs: "Military pan-Arabism is essentially racist and therefore is bound to favor slavery. It should not appeal to Black Africans." In discussing the various aspects of neocolonialism in Africa, the Tanzanian minister of lands and housing, J. W. Kihampa, mentioned the role of the Arabs: Africa before the arrival of the old colonialists was Africa for the Africans . . . then came the Arabs and then the white men. Both saw the riches of Africa and . . . began inciting one African community against another. Slowly they implanted and strengthened their policy of divide and rule and were able to build up strong feelings of hatred and disunity among Africans. 50

In May 1974, when African anger was directed at the Arab oilproducing countries, the fears of neocolonialism emerged again. The anxiety that Arab economic power might undermine African sovereignty instead of strengthening it was reflected in many news reports and commentaries: The Arab countries must come forth with a plan for economic cooperation . . . or will they develop a type of foreign trade bordering on exploitation which would cripple the development efforts of Africa? If this is what they are doing, then we do not hesitate to cry out, beware of growing Arab imperialism.51

In a letter to the editor published in West Africa magazine entitled

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"Black Africa and Arab Nationalism," an African student in London warned of the danger of identifying Middle East problems with African interests and concluded that "the greatest tragedy in Black African history would be to replace Euro-American imperialism with Arab influence; flying from the frying pan into the fire." 52 And the Daily Nation of Kenya objected to the intervention of the Arabs in the affairs of the coast province of Kenya, referring to the Arab efforts to annex the coast to Zanzibar. 53 The Western Sahara is another example of Afro-Arab friction. The seizure of Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara) by Morocco and Mauritania, both of them members of the Arab League, aroused indignation and fears of "Arab neoimperialism" in many African countries who publicly support the Liberation Movement of Sahara Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) and condemn the atrocities that, according to the Polisario, were committed against the local population. 54 For example, the Polisario has charged that Moroccan and Mauritanian armies "systematically carried out genocide" against the local population in order to strengthen their hold in the occupied Sahara. Special correspondent Jean-Pierre Candron, who visited the Polisario camps in Sahara, sent an eyewitness report confirming the atrocities. Saharans in refugee camps in the northern part of Western Sahara confirm this: "We fled from areas occupied by the Moroccans because we were beaten, robbed and tortured."55 In 1975 the Polisario declared the independence of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which has since been recognized by most African countries. African support for the rights to selfdetermination of the West Saharan people were expressed in the resolution of the OAU's Liberation Committee, which convened in January 1976 in Dar es Salaam. After the February 1976 OAU foreign ministers' conference in Addis Ababa, the OAU spokesman issued the following statement: "The delegates have unanimously agreed that every country has the right to self-determination, and the people of Western Sahara are now exercising their right by proclamation of their independence." Nevertheless, the OAU ministerial council agreed at that time to let individual memberstates decide whether to recognize the government proclaimed by the Polisarian Front. 56 At the OAU foreign ministers' conference later the same year in Mauritius, a major row erupted over whether the Western Sahara should be discussed at all. Benin had tabled a tough resolution calling for self-determination for the territory, and thirteen countries supported the draft. Morocco and Mauritania demonstrated

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their disapproval by walking out. After the heated debate, a compromise resolution was accepted that referred only generally to the right of self-determination. The resolution read as follows: The Council of Ministers, recalling UN Resolution 1514 (XXV) of 14.11.60, on the independence of peoples under foreign domination: 1) reaffirms the inalienable right of the West Saharan people to self-determination and national independence in conformity with the OAU and UN charters; 2) requests the UN Secretary-General to pursue his mission with a view to enabling the Saharan people to freely exercise their right to selfdetermination; 3) offers unconditional support to the just struggle of the Saharan people to regain their national rights; 4) demands immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces of occupation and the respect of the territorial integrity of West Sahara and of the national sovereignty of the Saharan people.

Twenty-nine countries voted for the resolution, with two against and ten abstentions. The vote clearly demonstrated that even then the majority of the African countries were against the occupation by force of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania. In August 1979, Mauritania concluded a peace agreement with the Polisario, renouncing all its claims on Western Sahara. But Morocco declared the whole area as its province, and the problem precipitated one of the sharpest disputes in all OAU meetings. While fruitless OAU efforts at mediation continue, an increasing number of African countries have recognized the Polisario. At the Nairobi OAU summit of June 1981, a resolution was adopted calling for a cease-fire and a referendum on self-determination under the supervision of the OAU. Morocco accepted the terms of the resolution, but insisted that she herself should supervise the referendum "to confirm the Moroccan identity of the Sahara." Moreover, Morocco refused to negotiate directly with Polisario, in defiance of the UN resolution of November 11, 1981, which called for direct negotiations between the two sides. The Western Sahara issue also precipitated the most serious crisis in OAU history, at its foreign ministers conference in Addis Ababa in February 1982. The OAU secretary-general granted the Polisario's delegation full status as a participant in the deliberations and the decision was accepted by thirty-one of the fifty members of the OAU. The remaining nineteen delegations objected and walked out in protest. The split on the Western Sahara question became critical when the OAU summit in Tripoli, scheduled for August 5-8,1982, was postponed for lack of a quorum.

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This was the first time in the history of OAU that a summit had to be postponed. The conflict in Western Sahara has caused consternation among many Africans, who fear that the OAU might split over a dispute that is essentially an intra-Arab problem. In an editorial, West Africa aptly reflected this feeling: The Sahara issue, which so troubles the OAU, has not intruded to disturb the Arab L e a g u e . . . . It has always been hard to justify breaking the O A U on this a c c o u n t . . . . It is not only that the three principal parties to the conflict are Arab, the whole Saharan issue is deeply enmeshed with the traditional rivalry between two major countries—Algeria and M o r o c c o . 5 7

While not all Black African states support the Polisario, most of them do support Western Saharan self-determination. At the same time, the majority of Arab countries side with Morocco's claim to the territory. The imminent threat of a split in the ranks of the OAU, due to a problem created by an Arab country, generates resentment among a broad segment of Black Africans. Many argue that the Sahara problem is an example of Arab neocolonialism, and that it takes up undue OAU attention and time, thus pushing aside other urgent and genuine African issues. For example, under the heading "Another Imperialism," Afriscope published a letter from one of its readers who accused Morocco of neocolonialism and called on it to withdraw from Western Sahara. 58 The Tanzanian daily Uhuru, the organ of TANU (the only party in the country), expressed Tanzania's support "for the bitter struggle of the people of Western Sahara to free their motherland" and condemned the Moroccan campaign "to annex other African lands to its soil through the use of force." 5 9 The Standard of Kenya titled a 1977 editorial "A Country That Asks for Uhuru [freedom]," and wholeheartedly supported the Polisario's fight for independence. 60 A letter to the editor published in the same newspaper (December 9, 1977) said that "both Morocco and Mauritania have been heard condemning colonialism and imperialism. But their sharing of Western Sahara between them is nothing but a glaring case of colonialism." 61 The Kenyan Daily Nation, commented on the Western Sahara crisis "caused by an OAU member state—Morocco—openly trying to colonize an African country." 6 2 Similarly, Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, upon receiving the credentials of SADR's ambassador, reiterated his condemnation of Morocco: "It was baffling that Morocco, which had suffered colonialism under the French, should now wish to colonize another country." 63

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African leaders also frequently refer in their statements to the Western Sahara question and support the struggle of the Polisario for self-determination. 64 When Liberia decided to recognize the SADR in July 1985, it explained the gesture as "Liberia's unbending support of the sacred right to self-determination of all peoples, as enshrined both in the charters of the United Nations and the OAU." 6 5 Gradually, more and more African countries accorded recognition to the SADR, and as of August 1985, thirty-one of the fifty member states of the OAU have recognized the SADR. At the twenty-first OAU summit in Addis Ababa in November 1984, Morocco protested the admittance of the SADR by withdrawing from the OAU. This did not change the OAU decisions, and at the 1985 summit the SADR was even elected to one of the eight OAU vice-chairmanships. The Sahara issue is also one of the main obstacles for convening a second Afro-Arab summit, since Morocco has warned that it will leave the Arab League if the SADR is allowed to participate in such a summit. 66 As a result, a preparatory meeting of Afro-Arab ministers due to be held in Tripoli, Libya in April 1985, could not take place and was postponed without fixing a new date. The inability to organize the Afro-Arab summit conference, which was originally scheduled for 1980, damaged the idea of "Afro-Arab solidarity," and reflects its weakness. The Sahara conflict also influenced the proposal of Zaire's President Mobutu to set up a Black African League that will dedicate most of its time to genuine African issues, and will not be paralyzed because of intra-Arab rivalries. African Fear of Militant Muslim Leaders Many African leaders, most of whom are Christians, are fearful of Arab attempts to extend their influence in Africa by using Islam as a political tool. These apprehensions are especially intense due to the efforts of some militant Arab leaders to revive the ancient idea of the jihad (holy war), exploiting the fact that about one third of Africa's population is Muslim, and to enhance their political designs. The Militant

Islamic Policy of Gamal Abdel

Nasser

The late President Nasser of Egypt, in his book The Philosophy Revolution, wrote:

of

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The 80 million Muslims in Indonesia, and the 50 million in China, and the millions in Malaysia, Siam and Burma, and the nearly 100 million in the Middle East, and the 40 million in the Soviet Union, together with the millions in far-flung parts of the world, when I consider these hundreds of millions united by a single creed, I emerge with a sense of the tremendous possibilities which we might realize through the cooperation of all these Muslims. 67

Nasser was convinced that Islam, if cleverly manipulated, could serve Egypt as a tool for the achievement of political goals. He therefore claimed that the pilgrimage to Mecca, for example, "should not be regarded as only a ticket of admission into Paradise," but rather "it should become an institution of great political power and significance." Nasser's interest in Africa also stemmed from the traditional Egyptian concern for her only source of water. Indeed, Nasser wrote that another reason why Egypt should seek to incorporate the African circle into its planned global policy was that the Nile is the "life artery of our country, bringing water from the heart of the continent." 68 As far back as the 1870s, during the reign of Khedive Ismail, Egyptian forces had penetrated deep into Uganda, conquered the ancient kingdom of Bunyoro, razed its capital Masindi to the ground, and hoisted the Egyptian flag. The triumphant Ismail published an official proclamation informing the world "of the annexation to Egypt of all the territories situated around the Great Lakes of Victoria and Albert." 69 As it happened, Egyptian jubilation proved premature. The ferocious local tribesmen launched a guerilla type of campaign and the Egyptians, cut off from their sources of supply and harassed day and night, had to evacuate Bunyoro and retreat down the Nile Valley. But times have changed. Nasser could not hope to achieve control of the Nile's sources by blatant aggression. For this reason, he invoked Islam—enhancing Egypt's national goals through the promotion of the Islamic faith. As early as 1953, Egypt sought to exploit anticolonial feelings in Asia and Africa and undertook to create an Islamic ideological front that would serve its political doctrine. In August of that year, Nasser organized the first Arab-Islamic conference of the Liberation Organization in Cairo. More than a thousand Muslims who reside in Cairo, but represented different countries, discussed the means to liberate the Islamic world from imperialism. 7 0 A year later, in December, 1953, Egypt attempted to use the first East African Islamic conference held in Nairobi to achieve the same aim; Egyptian newspapers stated that the purpose of the conference was

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"to discuss the creation of a political Islamic power in Africa." 71 In August 1954, Nasser, King Saud, and the prime minister of Pakistan established the Islamic Congress and proclaimed as its goal the strengthening of the "ties of confidence and Islamic brotherhood." 72 The first general secretary of the congress was Anwar Sadat. This congress, as noted above, became a pioneer in a wide range of ArabIslamic activities. Egypt's Islamic activities helped spread Islam throughout Africa. The rate of conversion to Islam was estimated by Western scholars to be three-to-one over Christianity. But politically, it seems that Nasser failed in his efforts. One indication of this is that he was unable to prevent Israel from developing friendly relations even with the Muslim countries in Africa. The Militant

Islamic

Policy of

Qadhafi

In Nasser's wake today is Colonel Muammar Qadhafi of Libya. Qadhafi regards Islam as an extremely useful political instrument. In a Libyan radio broadcast in October 1972, he announced that "there is a Koran verse regarding international dealings. We want to make certain that Islam is implemented in international dealings." 7 3 Qadhafi, even more than Nasser, tries to apply this philosophy. Libyan Prime Minister Abdel Salaam Jallud repeated the same idea at the fourth annual conference of Muslim foreign ministers in Benghazi in March 1973 when he declared that "Islam is a revolution and it is the duty of all Muslims to work for it because Islam stands for progress and revolution." Accordingly, he called upon all Muslims to lend their support to the Palestinians struggling against Israel, to the Muslim rebels in the Philippines, to Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia, and to the Arabs in Zanzibar. 74 In a speech to the third world competition of Koran readers held in Tripoli in January 1982, Qadhafi emphasized the importance of "politicizing Islam" in order to turn it into an important power in international affairs. "Islam must acquire a political meaning. The concept 'The Islamic World' signifies that the Muslim people are allies. They have common economic, political, and military interests as well as common enemies." 75 The late King Feisal of Saudi Arabia also used Islam—in addition to oil—to enhance his political interests. In October 1972, he launched an African offensive with state visits to five countries (Uganda, Chad, Senegal, Mauritania, and Niger) for the purposes of strengthening Arab influence in the tier of states just south of Arab

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countries and binding the Muslims to the holy lands to "consolidate Muslim preponderance in them." 7 6 His visit contributed to the inflammation of religious feelings and was one of the attributed causes of the rupture in diplomatic relations between Israel and Chad and Niger. African countries generally regard themselves as secular and progressive and object to the use of religion for political purposes. Moreover, countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Cote d'lvoire fear subversive activities against their governments through the activation and politicization of their Muslim communities. Many African countries are plagued by separatist movements and intertribal conflicts and would not like to add an additional factor—religious tension—which might further frustrate their efforts to achieve national unity and disturb the delicate internal balance between the different religions. Reacting to Nasser's tactics in Africa, Nigerian Chief Obafemi Awolowo, wrote: "With his undisguised totalitarianism and his territorial ambitions in Africa and the Moslem world, effective cooperation with Nasser, in any field at all, would be possible only if the Black races of Africa were prepared to remain as satellites in Egypt's orbit." 77 The Nigerian government's fear of Islamic political activities is especially deep considering the large number of Muslims in Northern Nigeria. The Nigerian authorities have repeatedly been challenged by the Muslim fanatic sect Maitatsine, which provoked bloody clashes in Northern Nigeria in 1980, 1982, 1984, and most recently in April 1985. 78 The Biafran civil war, in which religious factors played a significant role, demonstrated the danger of rousing religious feelings. As a result, the Nigerian federal regime strongly emphasizes its secular character. "As a secular state," a government circular emphasizes that it would be invidious for it [Nigeria] to participate, at government level, in any form of religious conferences. The government considers that, in consonance with its declared policy of nonalignment, any act which so positively identifies Nigeria with any religious bloc would not only weaken her influence in world affairs, but would also tend to introduce a new element of division and dissensions into the national life of the country. 7 9

Further, the government warned that it was taking action to curb all such activities that tended to tarnish the image of the government by portraying it as supporting a certain religion. It seems probable that this press release was a reaction to strong pressures on Nigeria from Muslim governments to participate

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officially in pan-Islamic conferences. Nigeria has refused to s e n d official delegations to pan-Islamic conferences since the R a b a t conference in 1969. It should be mentioned that the small number of Africans at the Rabat conference was very disappointing to the Arabs since the conference was convened to protest against the Israeli authorities, who were held responsible for the fire which broke out in Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Objection to religious fanaticism is common to all governments in Nigeria, civil or military. On 23 April 1985, Chief of Staff Major General Tunde Idiagbon warned Christians and Muslims alike of religious subversive activities and of "importing certain doctrines which were untenable and alien to the Nigerian way of life. Of particular note was the role of some Iranian and Lebanese religious teachers who had tried to introduce fundamentalist and revolutionary doctrines to corrupt Nigerian culture and worship." 80 More explicit criticism of pan-Islamic conferences came f r o m other countries, such as Benin and Cameroon. Cameroon, for example, found it necessary to deny the report that an official delegation represented it at the pan-Islamic conference in Jiddah in March 1973, emphasizing that it is a secular state. 8 1 On the eve of King Feisal's visit to Chad in 1972, Baba Hassane, Chad's minister of foreign affairs, found it necessary to declare that "Chad is a lay republic. All citizens are free to remain without religion." 8 2 Ghana, since its independence, has made it clear that it is a secular state and its president, Kwame N k r u m a h , had always insisted on keeping religion out of politics. In 1957, he published the Avoidance of Discrimination Act, which banned political parties from representing religious or ethnic communities in order to prevent Arab-Muslim influence. Nkrumah opposed Nasser's pan-Islamic and pan-Arabic ideas, and his fears of Egyptian activities in Ghana led him to close the United Arab Republic's cultural office in Accra. 8 3 Ghana also objected to the resolution adopted at the pan-Islamic conference at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in April 1969, which called on Muslims to stage a jihad in the Middle East. The Pioneer o f Ghana strongly criticized the resolution and warned that the Arab attempt to drag all Muslims into the Middle East war was dangerous and could cause a world catastrophe. 84 The activities of the large numbers of Muslims on the coast of East Africa are under strict government surveillance because of their past separatist aspirations. In Tanzania, as in Ghana, parties based on religious or ethnic elements were banned and the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika was outlawed. In Kenya, suspicions

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of Islamic political activities are even stronger because, in addition to the problem of the Muslims on the coast, there is also the question of the Muslim Somalis in the North-Eastern Province of Kenya, which Somalia wishes to annex. Arab and Muslim support for Somalia's designs increases Kenya's suspicions. Moreover, in February 1974, Somalia joined the Arab League; for many Africans in Kenya and Ethiopia, this was a clear sign that Somalia was trying to recruit even stronger support from the Arab world for its designs on northeastern Kenya. Therefore in Kenya one finds an especially strong resentment toward Arab activities among the Muslims, which is frequently demonstrated in official statements and in the press. For instance, the Kenya Mirror wrote After the departure of white colonial rule, the onslaught of the Arabized version of Islam in Black Africa is making inroads with predictable penetration. A n e w form of colonialism, this time thinly disguised and even more devastating in its impact than the neo-colonialism of which N k r u m a h had often warned us, is enveloping Black Africans. The winds blowing across the Sahara do not bring blessing and rain to Black Africa. These are the winds of destruction and herald altogether new and ominous signs of anxiety and worry. 8 5

When the mufti of Egypt declared during the October 1973 War that the battle should be considered a jihad, the National Union of Kenya Muslims (NUKM) urged all Kenyan Muslims to support the Arabs. This roused indignation in Kenyan newspapers and in the parliament. The Daily Nation reacted thus in an editorial: The present conflict between the Arabs and the Jews over their respective territories is not a threat to the Islamic faith. The Islamic Faith d o e s not depend on the survival of the Arab nations. . . . The position of the National Union of Kenya Muslims is divisive also because it puts a wedge between the Muslims and all the non-Muslims in this land. While the NUKM obviously feel that they can declare and join a war, the constitution of this country states clearly that these powers are vested only in the person of the Head of State. Where do their loyalties lie? To the Arab Muslims or the Kenyan Head of State? W e say to the NUKM: "render unto the Head of State what belongs to the Head of State "86

Kenya, which was among the last of African countries to sever diplomatic relations with Israel, did so, as did many others, out of an obligation to manifest solidarity with its African neighbors and in order to avoid a conflict within the OAU. Yet, during all this time, both before and after the November 1973 official rupture of

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relations with Israel, Kenya repudiated Arab pressure to adopt a clear pro-Arab stance in the Middle East conflict. Even at the height of the October war, Kenya's a t t o r n e y - g e n e r a l , C h a r l e s Njonjo sharply criticized some Muslim MPs who advocated a clear pro-Arab stand. Njonjo stressed that the Middle East war is not a religious war between Jews and Muslims and that those Kenyan Muslims who see the war as a religious one are not genuine K e n y a n s . 8 7 T h e Kenya Daily Nation expressed fear of Qadhafi's Islamic militancy: He [Qadhafi] considers himself the successor to great Muslim reformers and crusaders of the past who aimed at creating an ideal Islamic c o m m o n w e a l t h . . . . To date, his ambitions have manifested themselves to the stage where they present a real danger to m a n y countries in Africa and elsewhere. 8 8

In 1976, when relations between Kenya and Idi Amin of Uganda deteriorated, Kenya called on the Arab League to stop meddling in the dispute by pretending to assist a fellow Muslim. The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims also expressed its indignation that some Arab states were using Islam as a pretext to help Uganda against K e n y a . 8 9 The Daily Nation described the Arab aid to Amin as a "wicked act." 9 0 Somalia's 1977 invasion of the Ethiopian province of Ogaden intensified Kenya's fears, especially in the light of Arab moral and military support for Somalia. The fire that broke out at Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 was evidently a golden opportunity for the Arabs to kindle religious anti-Israel sentiments and to call for Islamic solidarity. The Arabs succeeded in this respect, and in several countries in Africa, as on other continents, there were stormy Muslim d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and excited protestations. At the peak of this passionate atmosphere, the Arabs convened the pan-Islamic confercnce in Rabat, Morocco, in September 1969. However, even under these circumstances, there were many sober and moderate reactions in Africa that warned against religious f a n a t i c i s m , preferring the liberal concept that religion should not be mixed with politics. As already mentioned, the number of official delegations from Africa was remarkably small. The statement of Alhaji I. M. Garba-Jahumpa, Gambia's minister of education, labor, and social welfare, is an example of such cautious reactions. The minister, a Muslim, denounced the Arabs' exploitation of the Al-Aqsa fire, pointing out "the current campaign is rooted either in ignorance or in propaganda opportunities. It has nothing to do with any genuinely

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religious motives." 9 1 (It should be borne in mind that about 80 percent of Gambians are Muslim.) A similar stance was expressed by Benin's Muslim minister of education, Chambi Mama. 9 2 The Times of Zambia also criticized the exploitation of the fire by the Arabs: "This is a step back into the era of crusaders . . . when the common man, in his ignorance was pressed into battle by his masters to die for the crescent or the cross." 9 3 In Tanzania, the National Council of Muslims decided not to react publicly to the fire, indicating that the Muslims of Tanzania should not meddle in conflicts between Arabs and Israelis that are political and not religious. 9 4 In Nigeria, there were many who advocated restraint and coolness: the Nigerian Tribune warned that the Arabs were trying to force Nigeria to take a political stand. "Religious sentiments," the paper advised, "must be avoided as much as possible." 95 In an article reflecting African fear of militant Islamic policy, a special correspondent for Africa warned that "African countries could become the playground of Arab 'mosque' politics if a theocratic country like Saudi Arabia begins to exert expansionist pan-Islamic d r e a m s on the c o n t i n e n t . " A c c o r d i n g to the writer, such representations were made by General Amin and President Barre of Somalia to King Feisal when the two were in Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage. Likewise, the display of aggressive cultural courtship of Muslim countries by both Feisal and Colonel Qadhafi also reflected this danger. 9 6 Another scholar, Dr. Bamisaiye of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, objecting to Qadhafi's use of the jihad, wrote that "the jihad attitude to international relations has long gone and can never be revived by Qadhafi or even by Feisal with the world's greatest reserve of petroleum." 9 7 Kenya's Daily Nation, in an editorial under the headline "Qadhafi's Tactics," expressed widespread African anxiety about the use of militant Islam as a vehicle for political aims: Qadhafi has attempted to infiltrate many other countries in Africa and the Middle East, especially in areas with substantial Muslim populations. W h e n e v e r regional or religious conflict e m e r g e s in s u c h places, Qadhafi sees the o p p o r t u n i t y to undermine g o v e r n m e n t s and to confuse and divide, using financial and military support, a n d a c a d r e of m e r c e n a r i e s h e has t r a i n e d to p r o p a g a t e revolution. Such have been his adventures in Ethiopia at the height of the Eritrean w a r of secession, in East Africa during quarrels between U g a n d a and T a n z a n i a , in J o r d a n and Syria w h e n Palestinian

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g u e r i l l a s clashed w i t h g o v e r n m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s and C h r i s t i a n populations. These excesses on Colonel Qadhafi's part, and their a s s o c i a t i o n with his p e r s o n a l i t y a n d p o s i t i o n , a r e e a s y to u n d e r s t a n d . T h e y a r e a t t e m p t s to attain h i s s e l f - c o n f e s s e d aspiration to obtain h e g e m o n y over the entire Muslim world. In his concept of international relations, C o l o n e l Q a d h a f i a p p e a r s to b e l i e v e not o n l y that the b o n d of religion e n a b l e s nations to transcend narrow nationalism, but also that this is a goal which, if necessary, should be enforced. H e considers himself the successor to great Muslim reformers a n d crusaders of the past who aimed at creating an ideal Islamic C o m m o n w e a l t h w h o s e political direction and cohesion would be based on the faith. Being a man of impeccable faith, and imbued with an abstract intuition and vision, Colonel Qadhafi has dedicated all the means available to him, including his country's vast resources, to the singular pursuit of this dream. To date his ambitions have manifested themselves to the state w h e r e they present a real danger to m a n y countries in Africa and elsewhere. W h a t has been seen as irrational conduct b y others is, in his eyes, his popular duty and God-given mission. He may yet emerge as a great Muslim reformer, but there is little doubt that nations will not tolerate the tactics he is using to reach that aspiration. 9 8

The Fear of Coercive Islamization and the Persecution of Christians Idi Amin's anti-Christian persecutions in Uganda increased African apprehensions that Arab involvement in other countries might likewise entail coercive Islamization and persecution of Christians. The expulsion of many Christian priests by Idi Amin and his continued threats against those who remained in Uganda caused deep anxiety throughout Africa: "This is a clear indication of General Amin's resolve to cut off his majority Christian subjects from international contacts while allowing, on a massive scale, Arabfinanced institutions to spread Islam." 9 9 Kenyan Minister of Education Taita Towett, in a warning to Christians in Africa, called on them "to realize that the Middle Eastern countries might endanger Christianity." 1 0 0 The Christian communities in many African countries, especially Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, and southern Sudan, are deeply distrustful of the Arabs' Islamic

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activities. And African suspicion deepens as a result of statements such as Colonel Qadhafi's charge at the pan-African youth conference held in Benghazi, Libya on March 23, 1974 that the Christian religion "had been used in Black Africa to obtain the annihilation of the African personality." 101 Qadhafi called for a "holy war" to expel Christianity from the African continent. Many of the delegates were embarrassed and shocked, and some protested that such statements were extremely provocative and would only cause unnecessary frictions in Africa. 102 It was this statement which aroused the Archbishop of Abidjan to warn Africa of a new and threatening jihad. Nevertheless, similar attacks on Christianity have been heard on various occasions. During Qadhafi's visit to the Central African Republic in October 1976, and on the occasion of President Bokassa's conversion to Islam, Qadhafi urged all Africans to join Islam. He pointed out that "Christianity brought to Africa racism, imperialism, and exploitation, while Islam brought fraternity and equality." 1 0 3 In Togo, Qadhafi stated that "when Africa revolts against Christianity it is simply revolting against the colonialism which established Christianity in Africa." 1 0 4 This attitude was also reflected in an interview with Qadhafi granted to Al-Safir; when asked what was to be the fate of the Christians in the Arab homeland, he replied: "The Christians have followed a mistaken path and they must change their ways to the extent they really and truly are Arabs." Interviewer: "But there is no doubt about their Arab identity?" Qadhafi: "If so they must convert to Islam." 105 An additional example: in January 1984, the prime minister of Mauritius ordered the closing of the Libyan embassy in his country and the expulsion of all Libyan diplomats. He explained this step by stating that the Libyan embassy had distributed a document, signed by Qadhafi, which was a "flagrant insult to Christianity." The document stated that Christians are ignorant of anything connected with Islam and called on them to study Islam. According to the prime minister of Mauritius, the document constitutes interference with Mauritius's internal affairs, incitement against the Christians, and an attempt to disrupt interreligious relations in order to create tension in the country and destabilize the government. The prime minister stated that "the Libyans have no right to attack any religion, even if they think that their religion is preferable to other religions." 106 A far more vehement attack against Christianity in Africa was launched by Qadhafi in May 1985, when he opened the Islamic Center in Kigali, Rwanda:

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Y o u must teach the children of Christians that Christianity is the r e l i g i o n of c o l o n i a l i s m , t h a t I s l a m is the religion of G o d . Christianity is the religion of the French, Belgian, G e r m a n and A m e r i c a n enemies; it is also the religion of the J e w s . . . . God willing, Islam will triumph in Africa over the religion of colonialism, Christianity. 1 0 7

In the same speech, Qadhafi called upon the Muslims of Zaire to kill President Mobutu, "the agent of Zionism." He urged them to declare jihad on Mobutu's regime and promised that "he who kills this agent will go to paradise." In an article titled "Storm Over Qadhafi Kill Cry," the Ghanaian daily The Pioneer described the indignation that Qadhafi's behavior caused in Rwanda and Burundi, as well as among African circles. Even a Muslim pro-Arab leader such as Senegal's President Abdou Diouf sent a message of solidarity to Mobutu condemning Qadhafi's incitements. 108 Such statements increase African fears of militant and fanatic Muslim leaders who claim that Islam is the only authentic religion. In Nigeria, for example, the general secretary and adviser on education of the Christian Council of Nigeria said in an interview that Christians are not opposed to Islam, and that it is being taught in Africa. "Our concern is with those of the methods used which are unorthodox, such as the ridiculing of the Church, false allegations about the Church and provocative pronouncements about the Bible and Christ.. . ." 1 0 9 Objections to Identification of African Islam with Arabism The Arab tendency, strongly advocated by Nasser and other Arab leaders, to identify the Islamic world with the Arab world is reflected in the 1959 map published by the Arab League in its organ the Arab World, which shows parts of Eritrea, as well as all of Chad, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and part of Niger as Arab. 110 In many parts of Africa, Islam was disseminated both by Arabs and by African Muslims, who, for various reasons (e.g. prestige) endeavored to imitate the Arabs in anything they could, including language, dress, food, and custom. Nevertheless, other African Muslims, more progressive and liberal, objected to the identification of Arabism with Islam. Ahmadou Hampate Ba of Mali, a leading African Muslim thinker and spiritual leader, pointed out that although the cradle of Islam was Arabia, he wanted African Islam to be "universal," free of political influence and untouched by Arab

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nationalism. He indicated that Islam's success in Africa was partly due to the fact that "it has no color of its own; it is like the water of the river which takes its color from the sand or the rock over which it flows." 1 " In Uganda, a young Muslim leader reiterated nearly the same views at the first Muslim Youth Conference, which was held in Kampala in 1963. Yosefaly Serugo-Lugo, president of the Uganda Muslim Students Association, criticized those African Muslims who try to imitate the Arabs in their dress and in their manners, referring in particular to "the strange idea of covering their heads with turbans or big kirembe like the Arabs." He warned that this identification may turn the African Muslims into a foreign element in the country. "This Arab influence is so strong in some homes that non-Muslims are compelled to look at us as Black copies of Arabs. To see that the Arab influence changed us to that extent is, I think, a very unfortunate happening." Serugo Lugo further explained that "Islam, like any religion, is the way we can communicate ourselves with God, and as such, similarity to another people is unnecessary in order to communicate with God." 112 Al-Haji Dauda Adeghenro, commissioner of finance in the Western Region of Nigeria, expressed nearly the same idea six years later. In the course of his address to the annual conference of Muslim Associations of Nigeria in 1969, Adeghenro objected to the mimicry of Arab manners. He deprecated the practice by some Muslims "of parading the streets in flowing robes, with heavy turbans on their heads, in addition to carrying rosary beads" like the Arabs of the Middle East. Since Nigerian Muslims were not in the same geographical and climatic circumstances as the Arabs there was no cause for imitating them. Adeghenro further disapproved of the parallel tendency to identify Islam with Arabism in the political sphere. 113 Objection to identifying Islam with Arabism is also expressed by those who disapprove of mixing politics with religion. Thus, on the eve of the Six-Day War, for example, Sheikh Musa Sebirumbi, general secretary of the Muslim Congress of Uganda, refuted the Arab argument that their war against Israel is an Islamic war, 114 and again in 1970 he stated: "Nasser cannot convince all of us that his conflict with Israel is religious. In reality the conflict is just political. It is known all over the world that there are lots of nonMuslims in the Arab world and likewise many Muslims in Israel who worship freely." 115

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African Objections to Arab Dictation of OAU Policies On Middle East issues, the Arab countries of the OAU can usually count on the support of other African Muslim countries, such as Somalia and Mauritania, and of the extreme anti-Israeli radical regimes, such as Uganda (under Idi Amin) and the Congo. With such a strong base of support assured, the Arabs often exert heavy pressure on the moderate African states to yield to their dictates. On several occasions, the Africans expressed resentment and indignation in response to the Arab pressure on them to follow their policy dictates. For instance, in April 1973, on the eve of the OAU's tenth anniversary celebrations in Addis Ababa, Qadhafi sent a message to all African heads of state threatening that "if the African states could not declare their position toward the 'Zionist enemy' in conformity to that of the Arab Republic of Libya, she will not participate in the celebrations." Moreover, Qadhafi threatened that he would propose the transfer of OAU headquarters to Cairo. 116 The threats created a wave of anti-Arab reactions in many African capitals. Again, most of the familiar anti-Arab arguments emerged; it was repeatedly stressed that Addis Ababa was a more suitable place for OAU headquarters than Cairo. As the president of Cameroon, Ahmadu Ahidjo, pointed out: "I see no point in transferring the seat of the OAU to Cairo. The OAU was born in Addis Ababa and it has developed there normally and harmoniously." 117 In addition, the Africans particularly objected to their Middle East policy being dictated by the Arabs. The ruling National Party of Zaire stressed that Zaire's foreign policy decisions "will not bow to any pressure of any sort." 1 1 8 The Daily Nation described Qadhafi's circular as "most provocative and undiplomatic," commenting: "Our Libyan friends have no right whatsoever to dictate other people's foreign policies. Still less are they entitled to dictate their own whims to any other equally sovereign and independent nation." 1 1 9 Several months later, Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta said, regarding Arab pressure to sever diplomatic relations with Israel, We should not poke our noses into the conflicts among other peoples . . . we will remain friends of all the world and enemies of none. . . . Any habit of following one side today, the other side tomorrow, would be tantamount to prostitution, and this is what we reject. 1 2 0

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Senegal's President Senghor expressed a similar opinion in Paris in an interview he gave to Combat on March 24, 1973. When asked about his reaction to Arab pressure to sever relations with Israel he replied, "We oppose anyone who wishes to dictate our foreign policy; Senegal is an independent state." Many commentators emphasized that the OAU is not a supranational institution that can formulate and impose a single foreign policy on the individual African member-states. The member states, they argued, were free to formulate their foreign policies in accordance with their individual needs and standing in the world. 121 As one Nigerian newspaper wrote: It is, therefore, normally wrong for any one state to urge all other states to share its enmity with a particular country or countries. If this happens Africa will be virtually without friends in the world. For w e will have to ostracize Britain, India and all Asian countries to please Uganda, withdraw all our relations with the United States a n d all W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s to gratify E g y p t , and maintain p e r m a n e n t enmity with the USSR, China and all C o m m u n i s t countries to gratify the Sudan. 1 2 2

Some countries regarded Qadhafi's threats as humiliating to African leaders. Especially irritating to them was Qadhafi's underlying assumption that, thanks to his country's oil wealth, he could "buy" the Africans. The Nigerian Tribune termed Libya's action "crude and undisguised blackmail." 123 The Nigerian Observer wrote: The blunt "no" from Dr. Okoi Arikpo, our External Affairs C o m m i s s i o n e r , to the d e m a n d for the removal of the O A U headquarters from Addis Ababa is well worded. There could not h a v e been a better w a y of expressing our profound sentiments that Nigeria is not a member of Colonel Qadhafi's household crew, w h o m he commands at will into easy submission... , 1 2 4

The bitterest accusation raised against the Arabs was that their uncompromising attitude would eventually destroy the OAU. 'The organization was created to forge closer economic, political and cultural links between the people of Africa," wrote the Daily Nation, "and if it abandons these objectives and becomes a diplomatic weapon against the Israelis then it will have ceased to be the organ for unity that its founders intended." 125 In the course of a long editorial criticizing the Arab attitude toward the OAU, the Ghanaian Mirror warned against destroying the harmony of the OAU. 1 2 6 The Daily Nation came to somewhat extreme conclusions: Let us in a cool manner, examine the proposition that nations

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which thwart the African c a u s e should b e excluded from the O A U ' s current celebrations. If it is to be something m o r e than n o n s e n s e then it m u s t b e u n i v e r s a l l y u s e d in all relevant circumstances. If this principle were to be followed, then the first nation out of the A d d i s Ababa celebrations should be Libya, which h a s been using divisive tactics against the O A U , and the second should b e Somalia, which is n o w bent on the iterative c o u r s e d e v i s e d to d i s m e m b e r , b y military a n d other m e a n s , the n e i g h b o u r i n g countries. The third g r o u p should be a conglomerate of Arab nations which have facilitated an unholy alliance between Islam and c o m m u n i s m in the h o p e that the latter will help the former triumph in political a s well a s religious terms.127

Similar reactions were voiced whenever the Africans felt they were being unduly pressed to follow Arab stands. During the Middle East war of October 1973, when Nzo Ekangaki, the OAU secretarygeneral, sent a message of support to President Sadat blaming Israel for launching the offensive, some Africans were annoyed at this onesided stand and publicly criticized it. 128 In recent years, the Arabs have succeeded in recruiting more African support for their Middle East policy. Nevertheless, when they try to push the Africans too hard to adopt their stand, the Africans sometimes react vehemently. For example, in October 1979, it was disclosed that the Arab countries threatened to boycott twenty-four Kenyan companies trading with Israel, and to list them on the Arab League's blacklist. It was further revealed that Arab embassies in Nairobi were instructed to gather secretly, through their agents, trading information from the port authorities in Mombasa and send it to the Arab League's Boycott Office in Damascus. The Kenyan government reacted furiously, and in a sharply worded statement it warned the Arabs to stop interfering in Kenyan affairs: The K e n y a n Government e x p r e s s e s its indignation about s u c h conduct, which is completely contrary to the obligations of the d i p l o m a t i c m e a s u r e s . . . . The K e n y a n G o v e r n m e n t can never accept that the Arab states, or any other state for that matter, h a v e a right to dictate to Kenya who to trade or not to trade with. This is utter c o n t e m p t of o u r s o v e r e i g n t y and i n d e p e n d e n c e . A n y attempt, therefore, by the A r a b L e a g u e to interfere with the t r a d i n g activities of K e n y a c o m p a n i e s will b e v e h e m e n t l y resisted. 1 2 9

Nigeria likewise voiced objections to Arab efforts to dictate policies. Indignant reactions were heard in Nigeria in response to

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the threat voiced at the Arab League's 1980 foreign ministers' conference to cut off economic aid to any African country that reestablished diplomatic relations with Israel. The Daily Times, which reflects the Nigerian government's views, reacted in an article titled "Empty Threats Won't Work", terming the Arab warning sheer arrogance. "It is still possible," the Times concluded, "for both sides to stick together for our own common good rather, than issuing threats that create the impression that Africa endorses the Arab cause for what it can gain. It is an unfortunate and dangerous assertion."130 The Nigerian Sunday Times commented: African nations should by now tell our Arab cousins that although friendly relations exist between our various nations they have no right to dictate to us or to choose our friends or enemies for us...it is the height of arrogance for them to issue such threats, because the amount of Arab aid to African nations in the last two years, since the first Afro-Arab meeting, is too meagre and unimpressive to talk about. . . . It is the sovereign and legal right of any independent nation to conduct its foreign relations free from external control, influence, and pressure. Therefore, the Arab Foreign Minister's threat directed at political entities which enjoy legal sovereignty regretably violates the principles of sovereign equality. 1 3 1

The same notion was expressed by Cote d'lvoire President Houphouet-Boigny in 1985. In an interview he gave to Jeune Afrique, he was asked whether he intended to resume diplomatic relations with Israel, despite Arab objections. He replied that this issue is solely the concern of C&te d'lvoire, and no other country has the right to dictate policy to his country. Houphouet-Boigny rhetorically questioned why the Arabs, and Saudi Arabia in particular, who lend and invest money in European countries, do not also dictate to these countries their policy toward Israel. 132 African Objections to the Identification of Middle Eastern Problems as African Problems Many Africans frequently argue that the continued Arab pressure on the OAU to discuss the Middle East conflict diverts attention from more pressing problems. As the Daily Nation of Kenya noted, "the question of differences between Israel and the Arabs is quite apart from the question of African unity." 133 In another editorial, the paper added: "Most of the OAU member states insist and would

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prefer to keep the Israeli-Arab conflict confined to the Middle East." 1 3 4 William R. Ochieng of the University of Nairobi is critical of African Middle East policy, arguing that while the Africans claim they are nonaligned, "in practice they have found themselves constantly dragged into entangling alliances and into issues which require them to take positions in international conflicts." 135 Another African writer warned that Africans meddle in the Middle East at the expense of African problems. "It pains me to find the OAU meddling in the Arab-Israeli conflict while our brothers are suffering in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Rhodesia and Namibia. The Organization should think of African interests first." 136 When, in February 1975, the OAU council of ministers were unable to agree on convening an Afro-Arab summit conference, some African commentators explained that the majority of African representatives "were wary of arrangements which tied Africa to the political problems of the Arab world." 137 In the wake of the 1976 OAU summit conference, the Daily Nation of Kenya commented that the meeting was ill-fated not only because of inter-African squabbles, but also because of disputes concerning the Middle East crisis. "The least one can say about this sorry scheme of things is that the Arab-Israeli quarrel is not an African issue and Africa should be kept out of it." 1 3 8 An African writer in West Africa magazine likewise remarked: "Black Africa has enough problems. Their solution does not lie in confusing them with the Middle East situation." 139 Similar criticism was voiced at the 1981 Nairobi OAU summit, where many African delegates resented Middle Eastern questions being given time and attention at the expense of urgent African problems. Several delegates argued that as Palestine is not physically part of Africa, it should not be given such prominence in OAU deliberations. 140 Kenyan President Arap Moi, the chairman of the OAU, expressed the hope that forthcoming OAU conferences would be able to concentrate on African issues.141 African objections that OAU is too deeply involved in Middle East problems stem also from the fact that the Arab world is divided among itself. There are strong feelings that the OAU suffers from the projection of Arab quarrels into its midst, notably the dispute between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara. These misgivings were strongly voiced in 1982 and 1983 when an OAU summit could not be convened because of the Saharan problem. Siradiou Diallo, a leading African journalist remarked, during a discussion on Afro-Arab relations, that the split in the Arab world

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confused the Africans. For example, he recalled that in 1973 the Arabs asked the OAU to support Egypt. Then, in 1978, the Arabs demanded the expulsion of Egypt from the OAU. Diallo also complained that individual Arab countries often ask the Africans for their support against other Arab states. This puts the Africans, he said, into an embarrassing situation. 142 The same complaint was raised by Guinea's President Sekou Toure, during the summit meeting of the ICO held in Casablanca in January 1984. Syria and Libya objected to a proposal backed by a majority of the participants to readmit Egypt into the ICO. Sekou Toure, who supported Egypt's readmission, warned the Arabs that their quarrels diminish their position in Africa and harm their struggle against Israel. 143 When explaining his resentment of the Arabs, Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe said: "We have permitted Arab problems to infiltrate the OAU, [such as the problems of] Western Sahara... . Libya and Chad. The Arabs meet [at the Arab League], but when we try to hold OAU summits, they disrupt them with their problems." 144 The feeling that Middle East issues divert OAU attention away from genuine African problems is one of the main causes inducing African leaders, from time to time, to support the establishment of a Black African organization. A new push to this idea was given recently by Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko. Interviewed by the Senegal government daily, Le Soleil, Mobutu said that the two conflicts that have deadlocked the OAU for the past two years—Chad and the Western Sahara—were both mainly Arab problems and should rightfully be tackled by the Arab League. But since these problems have long prevented the fifty-nation OAU from functioning normally, it was time for the African nations south of the Sahara to go beyond the OAU framework, and set up a "League of the States of Black Africa." The OAU is paralyzed by essentially "imported problems," Mobutu said. "The Sahara conflict is a purely inter-Arab conflict and the Chad problem is a case of an Arab state [Libya] occupying an African country." 145 Mobutu mentioned that the OAU's annual summit meeting was twice cancelled in 1982 because of political differences over Chad and the Western Sahara. And the 1983 summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia was unable to tackle any of Africa's crucial problems. Moreover, the numerous economic, social, and humanitarian activities of the twenty-one-year-old OAU are blocked by the two conflicts. In consequence, Mobutu said, the Africans south of the Sahara should discover in the framework of a Black African league ways of examining their problems and

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harmonizing their positions. "It's a question of dignity and also opportunity," he said. "Let us stop submitting to others and stop letting them manipulate us." 146 Mobutu emphasized that his proposal does not advance the founding of an organization to replace the OAU, but an auxiliary organization that will further the interests of Black African states and promote mutual solidarity and deliberation among them. 1 4 7 President Mobutu and his ministers are presently spreading the idea among other African leaders. In a press conference given on July 16, 1985 Mobutu explained: The Black people have a certain specificity. Therefore, they have the right to gather in a special organization. This cannot harm anyone. This league will not c o m p e t e with the O A U , but will complement it as far as possible. Moreover, the countries of North Africa have become members of the Arab League and the OAU. I do not see w h y we should not do the same thing. 1 4 8

Among the African leaders supporting Mobutu publicly was Bara Diout, a member of the executive council of the ruling Senegalese party, Union progressiste sénégalaise, and chief editor of the daily Le Soleil. Diout called on Africans to give all possible support for the establishment of the Black African League. 149 Cameroon President Paul Biya also publicly supported Mobutu's proposal, and in November 1984, when asked about it, averred that the Arabs themselves have their own league. Biya added that once a Black African League is established he would join it without any hesitation. 1 5 0 However, on his return from a visit to several African countries as a special envoy of OAU Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs Goshu Wolde indicated that Mobutu's proposal may cause a split in Africa along ethnic lines. Nevertheless, he found that in a few African capitals Mobutu's idea has widespread support, which he attributes to resentment of the Arabs for not fulfilling their aid promises. 151 Most of the African countries have not yet reacted officially to the proposal to establish a Black African League, but some observers think that several African countries discreetly support the idea, among them Nigeria, Gabon, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Niger. 152 Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have publicly objected to the idea, and warn that it will damage African interests. The Arabs, of course, oppose the idea vehemently and describe it as divisive and damaging to Afro-Arab solidarity. 1 5 3 Chedly Klibi, the Arab

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League's Secretary General, urged the Arab and African countries to convene the long-delayed Afro-Arab Summit "as a response to Mobutu's ideas." 154 This controversy between the Arabs and Zaire has added more fuel to the strained relations between the two sides. Zaire's press accused the Arabs of "néo-esclavagisme" and of wishing to dominate African policies and subordinate them to their own interests. 155

Involvement in Inter-African Conflicts The support given by several Arab countries to the Eritrean insurgent movements that aim to secede from Ethiopia provides another example of Afro-Arab tensions. The Eritrean conflict also reflects African Christian fears of Muslim-Arab political militants. The Eritrean rebels are predominately Muslim and get most of their assistance from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, the Arab Republic of Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, and the PLO. These Arab countries did not hide their active involvement in the conflict, and Arab aid to the Eritrean rebels is given in the following forms: 1. Military supplies and training 156 2. Financial aid and supplies of medicaments and foodstuffs 157 3. Establishment of offices of the rebel movements in Arab countries with facilities for broadcasting anti-Ethiopian propaganda and presenting their case in the local press 158 4. Rebel leaders regularly visiting Arab countries in order to arrange for aid (at the conclusion of such visits, joint statements usually expressing support for the insurgents) 5. Arab and Islamic conferences habitually supporting the rebels and denouncing Ethiopia. 159 (Libya—until 1976, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait looked upon the Muslim rebellion in Eritrea as a jihad against the Christian government, which they claim is supported by Israel.) 160 6. In the context of Arab pressures on Ethiopia, talk of an oil embargo against the Addis Ababa government; 161 7. In January 1985, Sudan and Saudi Arabia bringing about the unification of the three Muslim insurgent fractions. (The new Arab-backed coalition is called the Eritrean Unified National Council [EUNC]. Arab countries also support the dominant guerrilla movement, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF], which includes Christian rebels.) Arab aid has enabled the rebels to continue and even intensify

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their struggle. The Arab countries do not hide their hopes that an independent Eritrea will join the Arab League—as Somalia and Mauritania did in 1974—thereby putting all of the Red Sea under Arab-Muslim control. 162 The importance of Eritrea for the Arabs is explained by an official Syrian publication, which described Arab objectives in the region as follows: To turn the Red Sea into an Arab inland sea, by the participation of all countries on its coasts and entrances—Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, South Y e m e n , N o r t h Y e m e n , and Saudi Arabia—in a strategic framework for the security of the Red Sea; to secure the route for Arab oil and to strengthen Arab control on its export and transportation; to use Eritrea as a base for the completion of the liberation of the Somali coast at Djibouti; to limit Israel's freedom of action in the Red Sea and her gateways to Africa. 1 6 3

The rebel leaders, for their part, try to ensure Arab support by aligning themselves with the Arab world. In a memorandum presented by the Muslim insurgent movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front, to the Arab summit conference in Rabat on October 25, 1974, they say that "Eritrea is a second Palestine, a Palestine ot the Red Sea, linked to the Arab world by historical, geographical, cultural, spiritual and strategic ties." 164 Although Arab involvement in Eritrea acted to disrupt relations between the Arab states and Ethiopia, this involvement also affects Afro-Arab relations in general. For it was the Arabs, especially Libya, whose attempts at provoking a jihad against Ethiopia in the early 1970s caused Ethiopia's furious retaliatory attacks. When Qadhafi stated in May 1970 that he would launch a holy war against Ethiopia, the Ethiopian ministry of foreign affairs replied: "The Ethiopian government was dismayed that a member state of the Organization of African Unity should not only openly flout the Charters of the Organization and of the United Nations, but also harken back to the obsolete jihad state of mind, an antiquated fanaticism for this age and century." The ministry spokesman emphasized that the Ethiopian government "cannot be agitated by the statements of fanatical, misguided zealots who confused the territorial boundaries of Ethiopia with their so-called 'holy causes,' but it cannot ignore the actions of those government leaders who openly espouse the dismemberment of Ethiopia." 165 Reacting to the anti-Ethiopian resolution of the 1973 Benghazi Muslim conference, Ethiopia's government announced: The Conference . . . by expressing support for these bandits, has trampled underfoot other cardinal principles of international

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relations, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and the cardinal principle of coexistence has been openly violated by the Conference. The Conference has done a disservice to Africa by advocating dismemberment of an African state at a time when Africa is striving for unity of action and purpose. 1 6 6

After the 1974 military takeover in Ethiopia, the Arabs heightened their involvement in Eritrea and drew more violent Ethiopian reactions. In 1976, for example, the Dergue (Ethiopian Military Council) accused the Arabs of subversive activities that aimed to merge Eritrea into the Arab League. Ethiopian leader Mengistu also publicly denounced Arab intervention. Two days later, the Dergue announced that it had clear evidence in its possession to prove that certain oil-rich Arab countries render financial and military assistance to the EPLF. The Ethiopian Herald charged that the Arab countries, specifically Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, "and other neighbouring countries," constituted "a dangerous threat" to the integrity and sovereignty of Black Africa, clearly inciting a jihad against Ethiopia. 167 Ethiopia counterattacked against the Arabs in both international and African forums. At the First Afro-Arab summit conference held in Cairo in March 1977, the Eritrean issue was one of the topics which marred the discussions. The Ethiopian delegate accused "certain Arab states" of undermining the integrity of Ethiopia. He also declared that Eritrea is an Ethiopian region, and not an Arab one, and that the Red Sea is not an Arab sea. 168 Arab involvement in forming the Eritrean Unified National Council (EUNC) in Khartoum, in January 1985, drew another vehement attack against Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, and the PLO. In an official statement issued by the government of Ethiopia and circulated by its embassies in Africa, the Arabs were accused of meddling in Ethiopian internal affairs and of trying to undermine its unity. 169 Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden in July 1977, supported by the majority of the Arab League members (except the radical Arab regimes such as South Yemen, Iraq, and Libya) intensified Ethiopia's verbal attacks against the "Arab reactionary regimes." The active intervention of certain Arab states in Eritrea aroused irate reaction not only in Ethiopia but also in other African countries. The charter of the Organization of African Unity considers all present countries in Africa as legacies from the colonial powers, of a sacrosanctity that should prevent endless friction and boundary disputes among its members. Therefore Arab support for the secessionists in Eritrea is held by the vast majority of African

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States to be a breach of the charter. The main themes that recur in African reactions are these: 1. The Eritrean issue is an Ethiopian internal affair. 2. Arab assistance to the rebels is condemned. 3. Arab i n v o l v e m e n t infringes upon the integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia. 4. Arab support widens the religious schism in Africa since it emphasizes Muslim solidarity with Eritrea against the Christian regime of Ethiopia. 5. The persistence of Arab involvement in Ethiopian affairs harms Afro-Asian relations. As an example, the Tanzanian government officially condemned the support given to the Eritrean rebels and emphasized that its own attitude is guided by the principle that the integrity of Ethiopia should be honored. 1 7 0 The Daily News, Tanzania's official newspaper, editorialized that it was saddening to note that some of the Arab countries whose territorial integrity Ethiopia had b e e n championing in the Organization of African Unity and the United N a t i o n s "were now conspiring to u n d e r m i n e the unity of Ethiopia." 1 7 1 Kenya and Nigeria likewise expressed their strong opposition to Eritrean secessionist ambitions. 1 7 2 The Kenya Sunday Nation charged: It's c o m m o n knowledge that the Arabs are using their vast petrol wealth to finance the secessionist elements of Northern Ethiopia who want to form a separate state of Eritrea. The reasons for the Arabs' support of the Eritreans is simply because the people of that area are Muslims who detest taking orders from the mainly Christian Addis Ababa Government. 1 7 3

At the same time, the paper also opposed foreign involvement on Ethiopia's side. Afriscope, a popular African magazine wrote in an editorial: We cannot easily appreciate the jihad battle-cry of m a n y Arab States with their professed commitment to pan-Africanism and brotherhood with Black Africa. Kuwait, for instance, is interested in nothing short of an independent Muslim State of Eritrea, and two Arab countries have let fall threats of an oil embargo against Ethiopia. N o friend of Africa is helping its future by f a n n i n g primordial m e m b e r s . 1 7 4

The collective dismay of Africa, including those countries with a Muslim majority, was visible at the seventh Islamic c o n f e r e n c e

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held in Istanbul in May 1976, where the Africans successfully prevented the admission of Eritrean rebel delegates to the conferences. 175 Letters to African magazines from readers of different African countries also reflect feelings towards this issue. For example, C. Mwandalesa of Zambia writes: "The sooner the Arabs stop such support [to the Eritreans] the better it would be for Afro-Arab relations. Black Africans have great respect for the Arabs, but they should not divide the people of Africa because of religion." 1 7 6 And Femi Odedeyi of Nigeria wrote in the same issue under the heading "Arab Interference: An Objection to the Arab Arms Supply to the ELF," "The recent actions of some Arab States in the Ethiopian question are an indication of their willingness to have their way regardless of African opinion. It appears that they are committed to divide Ethiopia by all means." 1 7 7 Kayina Sanbah of Sierra Leone warns against the disintegration of the Organization of African Unity: By helping the Eritrean secessionists, the Arabs are creating a problem which will make it hard for the Organization to preserve African Unity. The Arabs are backing the Eritreans because of religious affiliation, thus creating hatred between followers of Islam and members of other faiths. The Organization must wake up now and do something or it will be too late. 1 7 8

These are only a few of many examples showing that Arab intervention in Eritrea is an issue of disagreement not only between Ethiopia, a leading OAU member, and the Arab states, but also one of the issues that disturbs "Afro-Arab solidarity." While Arab involvement in Eritrea was carried out by several countries, Arab intervention in the internal affairs of other African states is mainly the work of Libyan ruler Muammar Qadhafi. It should be noted that a number of Arab countries, such as Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan and, until April 1985, Sudan are often critical of Qadhafi's meddling. T h e s e countries have warned that Qadhafi's subversiveness damages the Arabs' collective image in Africa. 1 7 9 Indeed, not all Africans distinguish between Qadhafi and other Arabs and their resentment of Qadhafi often overflows to Arab leaders in general and to other African-Arab disputes, such as the oil crisis and the Arab slave trade. 1 8 0 This fear of Qadhafi's subversive policies caused several African countries to sever diplomatic relations with Libya, at one time or another, or expel its diplomats. Among those African countries who severed relations

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with Libya: Central African Republic (December 1979); Senegal (June 1980); Gabon (July 1980); Gambia (October 1980); Mali (January 1981); Sudan (June 1981); Somalia (August 1981). Those who expelled Libyan diplomats are: Chad (August 1971); Ghana (November 1980); Mauritania (January 1981); Nigeria (January 1981); Niger (January 1981); Kenya (January 1981); Uganda (July 1981); Burkina Faso (May 1983); Mauritius (January 1984); and Sierra Leone (May 1985). Regarding Uganda, the main supporters of Idi Amin's regime were Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the PLO. They regarded Amin's government as an "Islamic government" and Uganda as an "Islamic country," even though only about 10 percent of Uganda's inhabitants are Muslim. 1 8 1 Libya's support for Amin in his quarrels with Tanzania was sharply denounced by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, and the government-owned Times of Zambia blamed all the Arabs for "conducting their war against Israel in Africa," adding that "their intervention in Uganda was extremely dangerous to African Unity and would long be remembered with s h a m e . " 1 8 2 In 1979, Libya and the PLO took an active part in the fighting against the Tanzanian army. Nonetheless, when Amin's regime was eventually toppled by Ugandan guerilla fighters, it was with the help of the Tanzanian army. Qadhafi's use of Islam for incitement is evident in his frequent protests against the Zanzibar-Tanganyika unification that took place in 1964 to form Tanzania. Qadhafi claimed that Zanzibar is an Arab-Muslim country and should remain an independent state; he condemned those African inhabitants of Zanzibar who helped to topple the Arab Sultan. These charges brought angry reactions from Tanzania. 1 8 3 Again, when the Arab League called on its members to support Uganda in a 1976 border dispute with Kenya, the Arabs were warned not to meddle in this African conflict. 1 8 4 A leading Kenyan newspaper warned: "If the Arab League starts meddling in the internal affairs of OAU members, then such a move will disrupt and jeopardize the foundation of Afro-Arab cooperation." 1 8 5 Chad provides the most outstanding and continuous example of Libyan involvement in Africa, and strikingly illustrates the tensions between Arab North Africa and sub-Saharan Black Africa. Libya's involvement in Chad was accompanied by the occupation and annexation of Chadian territory. Qadhafi's intervention in Chad started immediately after he came to power in 1969. Qadhafi took advantage of Chad's internal unrest by providing financial and military support to FROLINAT (Front de libération nationale du Chad), the Muslim insurgents of the North who fought against

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Chad's Christian-pagan Government. The Muslim rebels aimed to topple Christian President François Tombalbaye and some even called for the establishment of "a Muslim Republic of Chad." 1 8 6 Tombalbaye's cordial relations with Israel increased Qadhafi's hostility towards his regime. In August 1971, tension between the two countries culminated in an attempted coup d'etat against Tombalbaye. Tombalbaye accused Qadhafi of "trying to impose Islam on Chad," and he expelled all Libyan diplomats from his country. 1 8 7 At the same time, Tombalbaye tried to recruit African support by describing his conflict with Qadhafi as reflecting the contradiction between Black Africa and Arab Africa. 188 Qadhafi's territorial ambitions in Chad became obvious when Libyan troops occupied the Aouzou Strip in North Chad, which contains rich uranium deposits. Justifying the invasion by historical and ethnic claims, Libya officially announced that "Aouzou town and surroundings were annexed to Libya." 189 The shock that this move caused in Africa induced the popular magazine Jeune Afrique to send a special mission to the area. Following its correspondent's report, the magazine published a strong call requesting Qadhafi to waive his claims on Aouzou and refrain from dangerous adventures of annexation which will seriously harm Afro-Arab relations. 190 Libya was not deterred, and its involvement in inter-Chadian rivalries continued when Libyan forces entered Chad in March 1980. At that time a civil war raged between Chad's President Oueddëi Goukouni and his rival Hissène Habré. Goukouni asked for Libyan help, and on December 1980 Libyan forces completed their advance by occupying the capital Ndjamena. In January 1981, Libya officially declared the merger of Chad and Libya despite the objection of southern Chadian leaders who warned that Qadhafi was trying to transform "Negro-African Chad into a Muslim-Arab state." 191 Objection to Libya's move was not limited to Chad. African reaction in many countries was of shock and revulsion. On 14 January 1981, the OAU committee on Chad, composed of twelve African states, declared the merger illegal and called on Libya to withdraw its troops from Chad. 192 African presidents, including Cameroon's Ahmadu Ahidjo, Gabon's Omar Bongo, Sierra Leone's Siaka Stevens, Niger's Seyni Kountché, and Guinea's Sékou Touré condemned Libya's "occupation" of Chad and accused Qadhafi of "imperialism" and "expansionism." 193 Most of the African countries that severed diplomatic relations with Libya in 1980 and 1981 were, as mentioned, motivated both by fear of Libyan subversion in their country and by resentment of Libyan policy in Chad. 1 9 4 Kenya's President Arap Moi, chairman of the OAU, hurried a message to

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Qadhafi demanding the evacuation of Chad. 1 9 5 As a result of the furious African reaction, which was unusually widespread and united in its opposition to Libya's de facto occupation of Chad, and because of Qadhafi's wish not to risk his 1982 election to OAU chairmanship, Libyan forces began to w i t h d r a w in N o v e m b e r 1981. O n e month later, the O A U peacekeeping force arrived in Chad. In June 1982, Hisséne Habré ousted Goukouni as President of Chad. The OAU peacekeeping force, which did not intervene in the fighting and which could not fulfil his objectives, evacuated the country. Goukouni and his men withdrew to the north. In June 1983, Libyan troops again invaded North Chad and advanced toward the capital in an effort to reinstate Goukouni. On Habré's request, France dispatched three thousand soldiers to meet the Libyan offensive. Africans again expressed their dismay of Qadhafi's renewed occupation of North Chad. During the UN Security Council debate on C h a d in August 1983, Liberia's delegate condemned the "expansionist policy of Libya." He was joined by the delegates of Niger, Kenya, Senegal, and Cameroon. 1 9 6 In September 1984, a Franco-Libyan accord was signed for the November withdrawal of all foreign troops. While the French pulled out their forces as agreed, Libyan troops still remain in the North. In January 1985, Chad lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council, accusing Libya of a plot to assassinate President Habré. 1 9 7 Consequently, the situation in Chad remains volatile, and the country is at present divided at the sixteenth parallel. Goukouni's forces in the North, b a c k e d by Libya's military, continue to challenge Habré's government. 198 The issue of Chad was repeatedly raised at the OAU. The nineteenth OAU summit, which was scheduled for 1982 in Tripoli, could not take place because of Qadhafi's insistence that Goukouni be invited, while the OAU recognized Habré as the president of Chad. Eventually the nineteenth summit was moved to Addis Ababa, despite the displeasure of Qadhafi. The conflict in Chad, like the Western Sahara conflict, is one of the motives behind the call to establish a Black African League to ensure and enhance Black African, rather than Arab, interests. Qadhafi's role in Africa has advantages and disadvantages, from the Arab point of view. In the context of the Arab struggle against Israel in Africa, he no doubt played an important role in the 1970s. By using financial inducement and "Islamic solidarity," he succeeded in pushing Israel out of Idi Amin's Uganda in 1972.

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U g a n d a , w h i c h h a d m a i n t a i n e d f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h I s r a e l until t h e n , b e c a m e t h e first A f r i c a n s t a t e to c u t d i p l o m a t i c l i n k s w i t h Israel

and

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Qadhafi's

aggressive

m e t h o d s a n d s u b v e r s i v e n e s s is o f t e n c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e a n d s e r v e s f r e q u e n t l y to d a m a g e t h e A r a b i m a g e in A f r i c a . Notes 1. For a well-documented research effort on the subject, see Jonathan Derrick, Africa's Slaves Today (New York, 1975). 2. See, for example, La Tribune de Genève, 30 N o v e m b e r 1973. 3. Africa's Slaves Today, op. cit., 134 4. Sunday Times (Zambia), June 4, 1978. 5. The Daily Nation (Kenya), December 19, 1980. 6. L. M . Ofosu-Appiah, Slavery (Accra, 1969), 21. 7. Loc. cit. 8. Uganda Argus, July 2 4 , 1 9 6 5 . 9. A.I. Salim, Swahili Speaking Peoples of the Kenya Coast (Nairobi, 1973), 223. 10. Weekly Spectator (Ghana), February 17, 1973. 11. L'Avvenire, (Milan), June 1 9 , 1 9 7 4 . 12. Daily Mail (Zambia), June 21, 1974. 13. Uhuru (Tanzania), May 5 , 1 9 7 3 . 14. The Standard (Kenya), July 2, 1974. 15. Afriscope (London), February, 1974. 16. See, for example, I.J. Baulin, The Arab Rule in Africa (London, 1962), 40; Bernard Lewis, "Race and Colour in Islam" Encounter, (August 1970): 28. 17. Nahdatu Africjiyya (Egypt), N o v e m b e r 1960, quoted b y J. Baulin, ibid, 40. 18. Ha'aretz (Israel), December 13, 1973. 19. The Standard (Kenya), December 7, 1977. 20. Chicago Daily Defender, July 7, 1974. 21. Reuters from Nairobi, May 26, 1977. 22. Reuters from Nairobi, June 25 and 26, 1977. 23. Reuters from Geneva, J u n e 6, 1977. 24. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 7, 1977. 25. The Standard (Kenya), July 8, 1977; Sunday Nation (Kenya), A u g u s t 21,1977. 26. Daily Nation (Kenya), January 9, 1978. 2 7 . Daily Nation ( K e n y a ) , J a n u a r y 10, 1978; The Standard (Kenya), January 1 3 , 1 9 7 8 . 28. L'Agence Zaïre-Presse, M a y 21, 1982.

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29. Afriscope (London), July 1973, 32. 3 0 . O . A w o l o w o , The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Cambridge, 1960), 312. 31. See H. al-Hindy, Life and Politics in Mombasa, (Nairobi, 1972). 32. Daily News (Zambia), J u n e 21, 1974. 33. Times of Zambia, J u n e 24, 1979. 34. Loc. cit. 35. See, for example, Beran Goye from Gambia in a letter to the editor in Africa (London) 40 (December 1974): 15. 36. Francis S a n d e in The Standard (Kenya), July 2, 1974. 37. Nairobi Times, March 12, 1978. 3 8 . See, for example, letters to the editor in the Daily Nation (Kenya), September 25, 1980 and October 6 , 1 9 8 0 . 39. Le Soleil (Senegal), N o v e m b e r 7, 1973. 40. Associated Press report from Lagos, December 4, 1975. 41. Uhuru (Tanzania), M a y 5, 1973; see also Daily Times (Malawi), July 11,1974. 42. J. O d u h o , The Problem of the Southern Sudan ( L o n d o n , 1963); Albino Oliver, The Sudan—A Southern Viewpoint (Oxford, 1970); The Voice of Southern Sudan (London), March 15, 1969; Grass Curtain (London), T h e Southern Sudan Association; see also A. Oded, "The Southern Sudan Civil W a r , " Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (The Hague) 4 (1976): 2 3 0 - 2 6 1 . 43. New York Times, J u n e 20, 1974. 44. Africa (London), January, 1974. 45. Africa (London), November, 1974. 46. Africa Confidential (London), M a y 2, 1984, 2; see also The Standard (Kenya), March 14, 1984. 47. The Sunday Mail (Zimbabwe), October 29, 1983. 48. Newsweek, July 2 , 1 9 8 4 , 1 7 . 49. Paris-Dakar (Senegal), July, 1960. 50. The Nationalist (Tanzania), March 10, 1970. 5 1 . Liberian Age, J a n u a r y 31, 1974. On A f r i c a n fear of e c o n o m i c i m p e r i a l i s m , see also The Standard (Kenya), July 2, 1974; New York Times October 23, 1975 quotes African diplomats in the U N who express similar sentiments. 52. West Africa (London), July 19, 1976, 2020. 53. Daily Nation (Kenya), April 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 . 54. Al-Mujähid (Algeria), December 27, 1975. 55. T h e report was published in Croissance des jeunes nations (Paris), February, 1 9 7 6 , 1 1 - 1 3 . 56. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), March 2, 1976. 57. West Africa (London), September 20, 1982. 58. Afriscope (London), vol.4., no. 9 (September 1974): 4. 59. Uhuru (Tanzania), March 9 , 1 9 7 7 . 60. The Standard (Kenya), November 10, 1977. 61. Ibid., D e c e m b e r 9, 1977.

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62. Daily Nation (Kenya), February 9, 1980. 63. The Times of Zambia, April 23, 1985. 64. See, for example, the statement of the Ethiopian foreign minister in SWB, M.E. B / 3 September 17, 1976; that of the president of Angola in SWB, B / 3 N o v e m b e r 13, 1976; and the president of Zimbabwe's call to recognize the Polisario in The Standard (Kenya), July 4, 1980. 65. Footprints Today (Liberia), August 1, 1985. 66. West Africa (London), J u n e 19, 1985, 1158. 6 7 . G a m a l A b d e l N a s s e r , The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington, 1955), 110. 68. Loc. cit. 69. S. Baker, Ismailia (London 1974), vol.11, 136. 70. Y . Ismail Tareq, "Religion and U A R African Policy" The Journal of Modern African Studies (1968): 4 9 - 5 7 . 71. Ibid., p. 52. 72. Ibid., p. 53. 73. Qadhafi refers here to the passage in the Koran that deals with the jihad. See Koran chapter 61, phrase 2. T h e statement is quoted from the B B C Service of World Broadcasts (S.W.B.) H E / 4 1 1 4 / A / h of October 10, 1972. 74. Radio Cairo, March 25, 1973. 75. Bulletin d' Afrique (Paris), January 17 and 18, 1982, no. 10677, 17. 76. Al-'UsbtT a K A r a b l (Lebanon), October 2 3 , 1 9 7 2 . 77. O . O w o l o w o , The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Owolowo, (Cambridge, 1960), 312. 78. AFP Afrique, April 2 8 , 1 9 8 5 . 79. Federal Government Press Release No. 664 (Nigeria), 10 July 1971. 80. FB1S, T3, April 24,1985. 81. C a m e r o o n N e w s Agency, (Yaounde), March 25, 1973. Since 1973, C a m e r o o n has reversed its position and eventually joined the Islamic Congress Organization. 82. West Africa (London), December 25, 1972. 83. V. McKay, "The Impact of Islam on Relations A m o n g N e w African States" in J.H. Proctor (ed.) Islam and International Relations (New Y o r k , 1964), 173. 84. The Pioneer (Ghana), J u n e 4, 1969. 85. Kenya Mirror, May 1974. 86. Daily Nation (Kenya), October 17, 1973. 87. East African Standard (Kenya), October 18, 1973. 88. Daily Nation (Kenya), September 9, 1975. 89. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 3 0 , 1 9 7 6 . 90. Daily Nation (Kenya), J u n e 30, 1976. 91. Daily Graphic (Ghana), September 5, 1969. 92. Q u o t e d in the Jerusalem Post (Israel), S e p t e m b e r 9, 1969, a n d L'lnformation (Israel), August 28, 1969. 93. Times of Zambia, S e p t e m b e r 3, 1969. 94. Ngurumo (Tanzania), September 25, 1969.

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95. Nigerian Tribune, September 4, 1969. 96. Africa (London), no. 31, March 1974, 40. 97. Afriscope (London), vol. IV, no. 7, July 1974. 98. Daily Nation (Kenya), September 9, 1975. 99. Kenya Mirror, December 1, 1972. 100. Daily Nation (Kenya), November 29, 1973. 101. Reportedly made at the Pan-African Youth Conference at Benghazi on March 23, 1974; see Le Soleil (Senegal) March 28, 1974. 102. Le Soleil (Senegal), March 28, 1974; see also Jeune Afrique (Paris), May 4,1974,11; Africa, October 30,1975, 25. 103. Al-Jihâd (Libya), October 29, 1976. 104. SWB M E / 5 4 2 2 / B / 3 , January 26, 1977. 105. Al-Safir (Lebanon), August 15,1980. 106. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), January 9, 1984, January 17, 1984; Reuters from Mauritius January 14,1984. 107. FBIS, S2, May 20,1985. 108. The Pioneer (Ghana), July 17, 1985; about Abdou Dioufs message, see L'Agence Zaïre-Presse, June 16, 1985. 109. The Week in Religion (New York), July 9, 1982. 110. Arab World (Geneva) no. 101, 1966. 111. From an interview with Ahmadou Hampate Ba published in The New York Times, February 5, 1961. 112. Report of the First Muslim Youth Conference (Kampala, 1963), 31-32. 113. Daily Times (Nigeria), September 9, 1964. 114. Uganda Argus, June 1, 1967. 115. Sunday Nation (Kenya), June 28, 1970. 116. Sunday Nation (Kenya), May 13, 1973. 117. The Pioneer (Ghana), May 9, 1973. 118. Daily Graphic (Ghana), May 4, 1973. 119. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 3, 1973. 120. Sunday Nation (Kenya), October 23, 1973. 121. Ghanaian Times, May 12, 1973; Daily Times (Nigeria), June 19, 1973; Daily Nation (Kenya), May 15, 1973. 122. Nigerian Observer, May 19, 1973. 123. Nigerian Tribune, May 9, 1973. 124. Nigerian Observer, May 19, 1973. 125. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 15,1973. 126. Ghanaian Mirror, May 11, 1973. 127. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 24, 1973. 128. Daily Nation (Kenya), October 11, 1973. 129. The Standard and Daily Nation (Kenya), November 1, 1979. 130. Daily Times (Nigeria), January 2, 1980. 131. Sunday Times (Nigeria), January 6, 1980; see also Daily Times (Nigeria), January 13, 1980. 132. Jeune Afrique (Paris), August 13, 1985. 133. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 15, 1973.

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134. Daily Nation (Kenya), June 2 9 , 1 9 7 3 . 135. Afriscope (London), "What Is Africa's Business with the Middle East War?" February 1974, 40-42. 136. Africa (London), 38, October 1974. 1 3 7 . Voice of Uganda, February 20, 1975; see also The Economist (London), March 1 - 7 , 1975. 138. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 20, 1976. 139. West Africa (London), July 19,1976. 140. The Times of London, June 24, 1981. 141. Daily Nation (Kenya), June 28, 1981. 142. Jeune Afrique (Paris), April 10, 1985, IV. 143. Akhbär al-Yöm (Egypt), January 21, 1984. 144. Interview in Africa Now (London), May 1985, 42. 145. Le Soleil (Senegal), June 29, 1984. 146. Loc. cit. 147. Op. cit. 148. Elima (Zaire), July 17, 1985; see also February 8, 1985 and July 24, 1985, where Mobutu describes the motives behind his proposal. 149. Elima (Zaire), January 28,1985. 150.Jeune Afrique (Paris), December 13, 1984. 151. AFP Afrique (Paris), July 27,1984. 152. Le Figaro (Paris), June 10, 1984. 153. AFP Afrique (Paris), July 13, 1984; West Africa (London), July 23, 1984; Al-Mujähid (Algeria), July 12, 1984; see also Muhamed Hasani's article "Arabes et Africains" in La Presse (Tunisia), August 9, 1984. 154. AFP Afrique (Paris), July 19, 1984. 155. Elima (Zaire), July 26,1985. 156. Le Monde (Paris), February 7, 1975; Africa no. 44, Aprii 1975, 12; AlQuds (Jerusalem), January 26, 1977; Al-Nahär (Lebanon), December 3, 1976; fl/-7mam (Lebanon), N o v e m b e r 28, 1975; New African (London), November 1985, 20-21. 157. Le Monde (Paris), February 4 and August 11, 1975; Jeune Afrique (Paris), February 21, 1975. 158. Africa, no. 44, April 1975,12; Arabia (Saudi Arabia), February 1984, 26. The magazine calls Ethiopia the "common enemy of the Arabs;" Akhbär al-^Àlam al-lslämi (Saudi Arabia), February 13, 1984, calls the Ethiopian government a "contemptible Christian regime" and reports on the success of the "Eritrean heroes." 159. Al-Ra'i (Jordan), May 21, 1975, on the resolutions of the Muslim World League; on the anti-Ethiopian resolution adopted by the fourteenth Islamic conference of foreign ministers held in Dhaka in 1983, see Final Declarations, document marked I C F M / 1 4 - 8 3 D FIN. D E C of Islamic Congress Organization. 160. Al-Quds (Jerusalem), May 31, 1976. 161. Afriscope (London), vol. 5, no. 4, April 1975, 10. 162. Sabäh al-Kheir (Egypt), March 20, 1975. 163. Jaish al-Sha'b (Syrian Army Organ), October 12,1976, 31.

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164. Loc. cit. 165. Ethiopian Herald, May 14, 1970. 166. Ibid., March 24, 1973. 167. Ibid., July 11, 1976. 168. SWB, March 10, 1977. 169. Ethiopian Herald, February 4, 1985. 170. Daily News (Tanzania), April 4 , 1 9 7 5 . 171. Ibid., February 2 7 , 1 9 7 5 . 172. Africa Report (New York), J u l y - A u g u s t 1975. 173. Sunday Nation (Kenya), May 29, 1976. 174. Afriscope (London), vol. 5, no. 4, April 1 9 7 5 , 6 . 175. AP from Istanbul, May 1 4 , 1 9 7 6 . 176. Africa, no. 44, April 1975, 8. 177. Loc. cit. 178. Africa, no. 45, May 1975, 8. 179. Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt), July 26, 1983; Al-Thaura (Iraq), August 6, 1983; Al-Shab (Jordan), August 1 5 , 1 9 8 5 . 180. See, e.g., a letter to the editor in Times of Zambia, October 18, 1982. 181. SWB, M E / 4 1 1 4 / A / 4 of October 10, 1972. 1 8 2 . The Times of Zambia, S e p t e m b e r 26, 1972. See also L'Echo de l'Afrique (Côte d'Ivoire), October 10, 1972 for a condemnation of Qadhafi's involvement in the border dispute between Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. 183. See, e.g., Uhuru (Tanzania), M a y 5, 1973; Daily News (Tanzania), November 6, 1972. 184. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 27 and 3 0 , 1 9 7 6 . 185. Ibid., July 30, 1976. 186. B. N e u b e r g e r , Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal, Qadhafi's Libya and Chad, 1969-1981 (Tel Aviv 1982), 19. 187. West Africa (London), September 10 and October 22, 1971. 188. Loc. cit. 189. Daily Nation (Kenya), September 9, 1975. 190. Jeune Afrique (Paris), September 26, 1975. 191 .Le Matin (Paris), January 29, 1981. 192. West Africa (London), January 26, 1981. 193. B. Neuberger, op. cit., 53. 194. Jeune Afrique (Paris), January 21, 1981. 195. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), October 31, 1981. 196. AP, August 12,1983. 197. West Africa (London), February 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 , 287. 198. West Africa (London), J u n e 10, 1985, 1154.

• CHAPTER SIX •

Causes for African Dissatisfaction with Arab Countries Since 1973 Between October 1973, when the majority of African countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel, and about 1975, Africa's disappointment with the Arabs deepened considerably. Although criticism of the Arabs has lessened since then, it has never stopped completely. After October 1973, African expectations naturally grew stronger: they hoped for a reciprocal manifestation of solidarity in their time of need in return for supporting the Arab Middle East cause. But the greater their expectations were, the deeper their disappointment. Disputes between Africans and the Arabs during these years focused on several key issues, which are examined below.

Problems Connected with Arab Technical Aid and Economic Assistance Very few African countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel in consideration of material reward from the Arabs, either in the form of financial or of technical assistance. Moreover, it was well known in Africa that most of the Arab states lacked the know-how and expertise needed by the developing countries. As Zaire's President Mobutu noted, "While the Arab may be able to provide more funds, the problem of expertise to replace the expelled Israelis is a more difficult one. The Arab world itself has a desperate shortage of such experts and wants to attract rather than export brains." 1 And it seems that even in the economic sphere the Arab nations, especially Libya, have occasionally disappointed and embarrassed the Africans. Some Africans are constantly suspicious of Arab promises of economic cooperation. For example, when the Arabs

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proposed in 1973 to set up a "nonaligned" development bank from contributions of oil-rich Arab states such as Libya and Kuwait, African leaders insisted that the bank be established in Africa and be under African supervision. Many of the African delegates were not enthusiastic about the idea at all, fearing that it would subject them to political pressure from Arab sheikhs or revolutionaries like Qadhafi. 2 When Uganda and Chad severed diplomatic relations with Israel, cases in which it seemed clear that Libyan money was involved, some African newspapers openly rebuked them. The Renaissance of Lagos, normally critical of Israel, warned under the heading "Libya Buys Two Satellites," that "dollar imperialism" was returning to Africa. The paper cautioned: This imperialism is quicker in its effect than the physical imposition of one's will over some territory. That is true if we consider the role of Libya as a new power-house of m o n e y . . . . Since March, for example, Libya has acquired two satellites in Africa. The first was U g a n d a . . . . [And] it is the power of Libyan gold which last week claimed a second victim—Chad. 3

The feelings of shame aroused by those who yielded to Arab "dollar imperialism" is reflected in the following comment by another Nigerian newspaper: It is a pity that African states south of the Sahara are giving the world the impression that their friendship is always available to the highest bidder. In other w o r d s , if w e are sure of substantial financial assistance from the devil we shall become a friend of the devil. If this continues a time will come when no country will take relations with African countries seriously. 4

There were also predictions that Libya would not long be able to sustain the massive aid promised to Uganda and Chad. Indeed, it seems that this prediction was to some extent correct, but at that time the main criticism of the Arabs had been that they had not kept their undertakings of economic assistance. For example, Zambia denounced Libya for her "affront" to Zambia in not sending trucks as promised to enable her to withstand the closure of the Rhodesian border. 5 A Zambian newspaper complained that no Arab country among those that pretend to be African came to the help of Zambia in her struggle against Rhodesia. This struggle, indicated one commentator, was not a Zambian one but an African one, whose aim was to protect African dignity. 6 This was not an isolated case; the Gabonese government, on 22 May 1974, abrogated the cooperation agreement signed with Libya

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in 1973 because it claimed that the engagement as a whole was not respected. The president of Gabon, Albert Bongo, indicated that, with the exception of Algeria, "the balance of Gabon's relations with the Arab states is decidely negative. These are not serious people and they do not keep agreements signed by them." 7 According to African sources, Niger and Chad were also disappointed at the support received from the Arabs. As of 1974, Niger actually obtained only $7.5 million of the $44 million promised. Chad, according to these sources, received "very little" of the $93 million promised by Tripoli and "must by now have realized, however belatedly, that Colonel Qadhafi's financial promises can be hollow." Even Ugandan President Amin, who identified himself fully with the Arab cause against Israel, began at that time to show his frustration with his foremost Arab ally, Muammar Qadhafi. On 13 May 1974, Radio Uganda announced that Uganda would no longer accept loans from Libya. General Amin explained that "it is better to be poor and free rather than be rich and controlled." Also, the level of Uganda's representation in Tripoli was lowered to express Ugandan indignation. 8 Observers reckoned that only a small part of about $60 million offered to Uganda by Libya as financial aid had been delivered. As late as March 1976, Amin expressed disappointment with Arab assistance and criticized the Arabs, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, for their indifference to Uganda's economic troubles.9 One year later Somalia, a Muslim African country that joined the Arab League in 1974, found it necessary to publicly express its deep disappointment in Arab indifference to its plight. In an interview with the Syrian newspaper Al-Ba'th, the Somalian foreign minister indicated that although Africans were not expecting any reward when they severed diplomatic relations with Israel, because they acted out of principle and solidarity with the Arab states; nevertheless, "after the Arab victory of October 1973 and the world economic crisis it was natural that African states severely handicapped by the situation expected a more openhanded attitude from the oil producing Arab states." The Africans welcomed Arab commitments made at the Rabat and Algiers conferences to assist them with loans, technical help, and the establishment of joint financial institutions, added the minister. But in reality, he noted, these resolutions were not carried out—hence the disappointment. He warned Arab states that if they allowed this situation to continue, their interests in Africa would be damaged. 1 0 It should be noted that Somalia, at that time, suffered from drought and that the Arab League had promised her $103

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million. In July 1975, the Somalian president dispatched an urgent note to the Arab League in which he complained that only $17.5 million of the promised sum was received from the Arab League, Libya, and Jordan, while the other Arab states ignored their promises. 11 Uganda and Somalia were not the only countries that voiced complaints of Arab indifference in time of economic crisis. The Arabs' meager contribution to the drought-stricken Sahelian countries (Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso), where in 1974 millions of Africans were threatened with famine, caused deep indignation in African mass media. Statistics published at that time showed that less than one percent of international aid to those countries came from the Arab states. 12 A Kenyan newspaper wondered whether the rich, oil-producing Arabs could not contribute several millions to those dying from hunger in the Sahel, out of the many billions of profit they received weekly. 13 Another African daily wrote: "Our wealthy friends do not seem to have responded appreciably to the call for assistance to those perishing in the Sudano-Sahelian and other zones, notwithstanding the large number of Muslims in the areas. Humanitarian response from the colonialists has been substantial." 14 At the Afro-Arab summit conference held in Cairo in March 1977, the Arab countries tried to silence this criticism by pledging large amounts of aid. Nevertheless, even after this summit, African criticism continued. The Zambian Daily Mail, for example, published an article entitled "Differences Rock Afro-Arab World," which quoted the Kuwaiti daily Al-'Anba' reporting that several African countries, including Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, and Cape Verde, had strongly questioned the Arabs' intentions concerning Afro-Arab cooperation. They believed that the Arabs' aim in cooperating with Africa was merely to gain African political support in international forums. They also maintained that the promised Arab financial aid had never been delivered, but had been accumulated in Arab development funds and invested in Arab banks. 15 Another African complaint was that Arab assistance was contingent on politics. This claim was strengthened in light of the announcement by Chedly Ayari, director of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. In a news conference in Brussels, Ayari warned that the bank would desist from granting aid to any African countries resuming diplomatic relations with Israel. 16 In reaction to these efforts to dictate policy by economic pressure, one African newspaper wrote, "The pledge would be even more hollow if

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the trade-off for that help will take the shape of a demand by the Arabs that African countries south of Sahara, and particularly those involved in the liberation struggle, support them at all times, no matter what the issue is." 17 At the Afro-Arab conference in Dakar in April 1976, the African delegates condemned the Arab League's refusal to grant aid to Malawi because the latter maintained diplomatic relations with Israel. They insisted that grants should not be conditioned by political attitudes. 18 Moreover, the procedure the Arabs used to channel aid to Africa was abhorred by many Africans who felt that the need to forward their requests and applications to the Arab League or to Arab financial institutions was degrading. They demanded that Arab donors treat them as equals and stop demonstrating superiority. 19 At the OAU council of ministers, held in Addis Ababa in February 1975 to discuss Afro-Arab cooperation, the deputy leader of the Zambian delegation, G. B. Siliwizya said: "Unless we accept the principle of equality in our relations with our Arab brothers we may end up destroying the fraternal relations built in the past. We should stick to the principle of treating Africans and Arabs as equal brothers." 20 The foreign minister of Senegal, Assane Seek, added: The offer of Arab cooperation had come only after the 1973 Middle East W a r when Africa pledged its support for the Arab cause. Since then, the principle of the two sides being equal partners had w e a k e n e d . The idea of being a beggar of the Arabs is not acceptable to Africans. 2 1

Another African, writing about Afro-Arab cooperation, indicated that what the Africans were demanding was "equal footing with the Arabs, for cooperation built on inequality can be neither viable nor fruitful." 22 It is interesting to note that the criticism against disrespectful Arab treatment of Africans was also voiced by several Arab writers. Dr. Elias Zain, for example, published a detailed summary in the Lebanese press of the weaknesses of Arab aid to Africa. He indicated that Arabs disregarded, among other things, the sensitivity of African feelings pertaining to aid procedures and channeling. Zain warned that the style and forms of granting aid should be modified to avoid degrading African recipients, who feel like beggars. Methods regarded by Africans as disgraceful might jeopardize the future of Afro-Arab solidarity and cooperation, warned Zain. 2 3 Indeed, the Arabs made an effort to remedy the situation after 1976, but not always with success.

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In 1980, the Arab League again threatened to cut off all Arab economic aid to those African countries that reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel. And again the Africans strongly objected to the Arabs' dictate, while criticizing the meager amount of aid they received. When Zaire eventually reestablished ties with Israel, the Arabs immediately condemned the action, and cut off all economic assistance. Some Arab countries reviewed their diplomatic relations with Zaire or recalled their ambassadors from Kinshasa. Mobutu reacted angrily, indicating that the Arabs have not yet freed themselves from the mentality that regards Black Africans as slaves who must obey their masters. Dr. Zain also pointed out that the Arab donors gave preference to Muslim developing countries, and dedicated sizable grants to Muslim religious institutions such as mosques and Koranic schools. Other Arab critics also tackled this issue, warning against the preference in aid given to Muslim states and the identification of Arabism with Islam. 2 4 This issue was raised at the 1975 O A U summit by some African delegates, who argued that Arab aid was unfairly distributed to benefit only pro-Arab states. 2 5 The same complaint was repeated at the Afro-Arab conference at Dakar in April 1976 and in other different African forums. 26 The Africans also found fault with oil-rich Arab countries that did not invest in industrial and agricultural projects in Africa that would enhance trade and economic cooperation between Africa and the Arab world. 2 7 Louis Pascal-Nègre, Mali's former minister of finance and c o m m e r c e and vice-president of the African Development Bank, pointed out that, although African countries still possess immense reserves of essential raw materials, they do not have the financial means necessary for their exploitation. Here, he emphasized, there would be a wide scope of vital cooperation with Arab oil-exporting countries, who could invest part of their profits in industries to exploit these raw materials. In this way, they could effectually aid the economic development of Africa. "Such is therefore the new axis of solidarity around which AfroArab cooperation can revolve." Pascal-Nègre was critical of the relative m e a g e r n e s s of A r a b financial participation in the development of Black Africa, and expressed disappointment that Arab capital "was directed towards the large financial centers" of Europe and the United States. "Psychologically, the Africans have wrongly or rightly the feeling that. . . the Arabs do not trust them." 2 8 Likewise, Tanzania's President Nyerere urged visiting Arab delegates to advise their governments to invest at least some

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petrodollars in joint Afro-Arab projects in Africa. According to the report of the delegation's leader, Nyerere expressed disappointment that Arab money went mainly to the United States or Europe. 2 9 William Eteki, the secretary-general of the OAU, made similar remarks at a 1974 press conference at the UN. Eteki criticized the Arabs for investing their swelling fortunes in the West and not in Africa, in disregard of Afro-Arab solidarity. 3 0 The Sunday Times of Zambia wrote, "It is indeed not only embarrassing when we learn that our Arab brothers are pumping billions of kwacha (Zambia's currency) to pep up the sagging Western economy at the expense not only of their developing and struggling African brothers but also at the expense of their own development." 3 1 The feeling that the oil-blessed Arab countries had not done enough for their "African brothers" has not changed since 1973. Radio Ghana, for example, commented on April 16,1981: T h e A r a b c o u n t r i e s h a v e not been helping their fellow d e v e l o p i n g states a s s h o u l d h a v e been the case. O n e need not be a political or economic analyst to recognize that assistance from these i m m e n s e l y rich A r a b c o u n t r i e s is not c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h t h e political a n d m o r a l s u p p o r t g i v e n t h e m b y t h e T h i r d W o r l d , especially Africa, in their conflict with Israel. 3 2

As part of their process of self-criticism and reexamination of their mistakes in Africa, the Arabs did not disregard these African remarks and complaints in an effort to remedy the situation. 33 Another question repeatedly raised by the Africans is what contribution rich oil-producing countries had made to the African struggle against Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. One letter writer reached this disappointing conclusion: "Records show that Arab support for Black Africa against the white regimes in the south is delusive. . . . It seems that the Arabs only identify themselves with Black Africa because of its votes at the UN and at other conferences." 3 4 A Zambian semiofficial newspaper warned that "African countries are gradually losing faith in their Arab brothers because the latter just do not care a damn for the liberation of Southern Africa." 3 5 In a letter to Africa magazine, Moinina Conteh from Sierra Leone queried: "What support did they [the Arabs] give to the OAU after the Rhodesian UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence]? What support have they given for the liberation of Guinea-Bissau, Namibia and other African countries under the colonial rule?" 3 6 Another African editorial noted that, while at international forums, the Arabs have always voted with the Africans on issues

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such as liberation, they have been in a position to do more than just vote. 3 7 And Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania, expressed disappointment with the rich Arab countries for not contributing enough to the African liberation movement. 38 At the 1977 Afro-Arab summit conference, seven Arab countries pledged $11 million to the liberation movements and thus, to some extent, muted African criticism.

The Effect of the Oil Crisis on Afro-Arab Relations The factor that harmed Afro-Arab relations after 1973 more than any other, causing the bitterest disappointment and most vehement anti-Arab outbursts and that once again brought to the fore the fundamental and historic contrasts between the two sides, was the oil crisis. Black Africa's frustration grew over the ineffective assistance offered by the oil-rich Arab world when the high prices of imported fuel aggravated the continent's economic maladies and threatened her welfare. The anti-Arab outburst was especially bitter from 1973 to 1975; the Arabs, surprised by the intensity of African criticism, increased their efforts in the field of financial and technical assistance in 1976 and, as a result, African criticism was somewhat moderated, although it did not stop altogether. When the African countries first realized that the Arab oil weapon cut as deeply into their economies as into the West, they appealed to the Arabs for special concessions to help overcome the effects of rising oil prices. The issue was raised by the Africans at various African and Islamic conferences. As early as November 1973, at the emergency meeting of African foreign ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ghana's then Foreign Minister Kwame Baah warned that solidarity between Black Africa and the Arab world could only be maintained if the Arab oil states took account of the special needs of the developing African countries. Njeroge Mungai, Kenya's minister of foreign affairs, urged the Arab oil-producers to sell their oil directly to African governments at reduced prices and also to finance refineries in Africa. Instead, the Arabs proposed setting up an Arab bank for industrial and agricultural development with a capital of $130 million. At the end of 1973, the OAU appointed a committee to negotiate with the Arab oil-producing countries to see what could be done to alleviate the damage caused to African countries. At a meeting in Cairo between the two sides in January 1974, the Arabs promised to accelerate the establishment of the Arab Bank for

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Economic Development of Africa and to increase its capital. They also pledged to speed up the establishment of an Arab Loan Fund for Africa with $200 million for immediate relief measures. The Cairo meeting did not, however, satisfy the Africans. They argued that the bank was a purely Arab, and not Arab-African bank, and thus the Arabs alone would make all the decisions on projects under consideration. Fearing a new Arab hold over Black Africa, they insisted that the money be given to an African development bank. They were also worried that the proposed Arab bank would be a commercial institution whose main objectives would be profit, rather than an interest-free loan fund whose main objective was aid. 3 9 No satisfactory compromise could be reached, despite several attempts. The African countries were told that since lower-priced oil might find its way to other markets, the Arabs could not grant them concessionary oil prices. The oil dispute reached its peak at the 1974 O A U c o n f e r e n c e at M o g a d i s h u , S o m a l i a . The unsatisfactory Arab response was included in the report of the OAU seven-member committee of foreign ministers, and this sparked off angry exchanges between Arab and Black African delegates. With regard to the development bank, the Africans again demanded that its capital be increased from $130 million to $500 million and that its base of operations be headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. African representatives, led by those of Ghana and Ethiopia, sharply criticized Arab oil producers' refusal to treat OAU African countries as a special case by allowing them a price reduction. Several African delegates complained that the Arabs had only paid lip service to African support and solidarity during the October 1973 Middle East War. Kenya, Zaire, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Ghana, and M a d a g a s c a r described their difficulties a n d e c o n o m i c hardships as a result of Arab oil policy. In fact, the conference turned into a tribunal arraigning the Arabs for not fulfilling their promises of help to their African brothers. 40 Moreover, the Arab Loan Fund, whose purpose was to distribute immediate hard cash in soft loans, did not begin operations as promptly as the Africans had expected; with each passing month, the Africans became increasingly frustrated with Arab inaction. African sentiment held that Arab-African friendship has been sacrificed "on the altar of black-gold-oil." The Arabs were regarded as ungrateful allies who were reaping billions of dollars in profits as a result of the increase in oil prices, while offering friendly African countries minimal sums of aid. 4 1 The non-oil-producing A f r i c a n countries are nearly totally dependent on oil from Arab sources. Oil imports cost them $4.8 billion in 1974 alone. 4 2 In expressing their

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frustration, Africans once again raised historic grudges against the Arabs, many of which are not directly connected with the oil crisis. Togo's minister for foreign affairs, upon his return from the Mogadishu OAU conference on 21 June 1974, publicly expressed his frustration at a loan offered by the Arabs that he thought too small to enable the Africans to overcome the oil crisis.43 Senegal's minister of finance pointed out in a public statement that the money offered by the Arabs to African countries "does not adequately compensate for increased oil prices." 44 Robert K. A. Gardiner, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, said in an interview that, while the African countries have to meet an extra oil bill of about $1.5 billion, the oil-producing countries have offered only $200 million to be used as an emergency relief fund. 4 5 Zaire's President Mobutu also voiced his dissatisfaction with Arab efforts to offset the impact of the steep increases in oil prices on the developing countries. 4 6 Similar official statements were issued in Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and Mali. 47 In East Africa, especially Kenya, official reaction was even harsher. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere complained that oilproducing Arab states were spending millions of dollars buying gold from South Africa. This money, he indicated, could have helped African development that had been hit by the increase in oil prices. 4 8 Zambian President Kaunda described the Afro-Arab disputes concerning the oil issue as "most regrettable," 49 and urged the Arab states to fix special oil prices for Africans. 50 In Kenya, whose tourist industry was greatly affected by the oil crisis, the Arabs were sharply attacked. During the parliamentary debate on the budget, Assistant Minister for Home Affairs Martin Shikuku recalled that Kenya had, together with the rest of Africa, gone out of its way to support the Arabs in good faith. "But how much did we get from the Arabs?" he asked, noting that "African countries forebore projects and aid given by Israel, in support of the Arabs." Shikuku further asked: "Must we continue to sever diplomatic relations while the Arabs are reestablishing a n d o p e n i n g diplomatic relations with European countries and the United States? African countries will remain the biggest fools." 51 Shikuku was backed by Kenya's assistant minister for foreign affairs, who pointed out that Kenya was in the grip of inflation because of the oil crisis, and the $200 million offered by the Arabs to the entire continent was woefully inadequate. Kenyan Member of Parliament Ndolo Ayah recalled "the previous experiences with the Arabs, who commercialized in the slave trade using Africans." He called on the minister for foreign affairs to announce at international meetings

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that the Arabs "have indicated they are not friends of Africa." 52 African anger had not subsided by the time the East African Legislative Assembly met in June 1974. Joseph Nyerere, brother of the Tanzanian president, suggested that since the Nile's source was located in East Africa, Egypt and Sudan should pay for the use of the Nile waters. "The water enjoyed by friendly states should be sold," Nyerere said, "to cut heavy expenditures on oil imports." He further urged: "Let us make a deal with the Arabs—a gallon of water for a gallon of oil—a barrel for a barrel." 53 The practical and political difficulties that might arise from this proposal were not mentioned in the atmosphere of anger and enthusiasm with which the idea was discussed and adopted. The African mass media were even more stridently anti-Arab, reflecting the mood of the times. They pointed out that all the pledges made by the petroleum producers to the African countries hard-hit by the fuel crisis represent about one-tenth of the additional oil bill they faced in 1974. "With earnings from oil reaching $30 billion this year," pointed out Africa, "the Arabs could plainly do more to help." 54 Afriscope published an article entitled "No Brotherhood in Oil," and added a cartoon showing a dying African surrounded by Arab sheikhs, with the caption: "We shall provide Burial Funds." 5 5 Côte d'Ivoire's Fraternité Matin wrote: "Our Arab brothers now refuse to grant preferential prices to African states affected by the crisis. To certain African countries, this is a great deceit and betrayal." 5 6 An editorial in the Ghanaian Echo regretted that Arab "oil money" was used only for blackmail. 57 Another Ghanaian daily recalled that the Africans gave their full support to the Arabs against Israel "out of genuine consideration of principles" involved in the Middle East War. Nevertheless, it continued, "the Arabs ought to reciprocate in more meaningful ways than they so far have been able to do. The Special Fund created by the Arabs for this purpose is no more than chicken feed." 58 The state-owned Ghanaian Times urged the OAU to make "positive demands" from the Arabs on behalf of Africa's non-oil-producing countries. 5 9 In Zambia, the widely circulated Daily Mail pointed out angrily that last week Zambians experienced a short increase in bus fares as well as fuel prices. But are Arabs in Africa Africans? Are they our brothers? Can they truly come to our aid, say in the event of being attacked by South Africa? They have refused to sell us oil at a reduced price. Does this in any way show brotherhood they so much speak about? . . . The refusal by Arab countries to sell oil to African states at a reduced price is a tacit example that the Arabs,

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our former slavemasters, are not prepared to abandon the riderand-horse partnership. W e have not forgotten that they used to drive us like herds of cattle and sell us as s l a v e s . . . . 6 0

The same bitter tune can also be found in the Swahili-language Tanzanian newspaper Uhuru. What is especially interesting here is that, in addition to the criticism of the Arabs on the oil issue, other historic Arab sins were reiterated, which had been considered long forgotten. Kenya's newspapers were even more strident in their attacks. "We now realize that events since the October War have proved catastrophic for Black Africa," declared the Kenyan Mirror magazine: The point at issue is not that we are learning in easy stages the lesson of Arab treachery at its worst. No. The point is that while supporting just causes we ran across some crooks w h o used us without shame to advance their dirty and questionable motives in political m a n e u v e r s . . . . This feeling of universal desertion by Arabs is keenly felt in East African c a p i t a l s . . . . Extortionist Arab d e m a n d s seeking manifold oil-price increases with d e v i o u s political strings attached have dumbfounded Black Africans. 6 1

The writer, a Muslim normally critical of Israel, also called for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. Explaining the eruption of anti-Arab feeling in Africa, Kenyan Professor Ali Mazrui remarked: "They [the Africans] expected a quid pro quo. They found that the Arabs agreed to sharing enemies but not energy." 62 The anti-Arab outburst was particularly harsh immediately after the October War, because the Africans had shown complete solidarity with the Arabs against Israel and they expected more from the Afro-Arab alliance. At the same time, the Arabs were not yet familiar with the role expected of them by Africans, nor did they have the necessary know-how and experience needed for largescale financial assistance programs. African criticism since the period 1975-1976 has focused on complaints that funds promised were inadequate and that their distribution was delayed by complex administrative and political hitches. While some Africans pressed for an increase in the Arab Special Fund, from $200 million to $500 million, others proposed that the funds be distributed by African institutions that would not humiliate the recipients. 63 In addition, the continuing petrol price hikes by OPEC during 1975 and 1976 were another source of indignation to many African countries. At the 1975 OAU meeting of foreign ministers held in Addis Ababa, African delegates complained that of $200 million that the

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Arabs promised to channel through the African Development Bank in Abidjan, only $25 million contributed by Algeria and Libya had come through to date. Arab delegates then intimated that a further $100 million would be made available at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, but added that only African states endorsing the document on Afro-Arab solidarity drawn up in Rabat would be entitled to its benefit. This condition angered the African delegates: for example, Sierra Leone's foreign minister warned that Africa was not going to get down to its knees before the Arabs. 64 The oil crisis was also a point of contention at the Kampala OAU conference in July 1975, when some African delegates blamed the Arabs for failing to distribute enough aid to compensate for increased oil prices. 65 Even in Uganda, oil-rich Arab states were heavily criticized for not giving adequate help to Africa, and they were warned that the oil issue is "an area of potential misunderstanding between the oil-rich Arab nations and poorer African states suffering from rising oil prices." 66 The issue of the oil crisis and Arab aid continued to disturb AfroArab relations, even at later conferences. At the Afro-Arab ministerial-level conference held at Dakar in April 1976, t h e Africans demanded that Afro-Arab solidarity be given real content. 6 7 At a meeting of the Afro-Arab committee to prepare for the 1977 Afro-Arab Summit, President Kaunda again mentioned African expectations of Arab aid and expressed hope that they would do more to assist the development of Africa. In Kenya, dissatisfaction was evident throughout 1975. Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Babu Wood met the Egyptian ambassador in September and requested that Egypt exert more pressure on Arab oil-producing states to consider special treatment for African nations and a direct supply of oil "in the spirit of brotherhood and solidarity." 68 The governor of Kenya's Central Bank indicated that Kenya's balance of payments deficit grew from $12.8 million to $36.6 million in 1974, and one of the main causes was the increase in the price of crude oil. Again, anti-Arab resentment was sometimes reflected in more intemperate statements suggesting unrealistic steps. Thus Charles Njonjo, Kenya's attorney-general, suggested that parliament stop the export of Kenyan charcoal to the Arab world, where it is used as a basic fuel for cooking. "Let us wake up" Njonjo declared, "and tell the Arabs we are not prepared to send them our charcoal. . . . Kenya should use its charcoal weapon against Arab oil-producers who are damaging the economies of African countries by increasing oil prices." 69 At that time, Nigeria donated $80 million to the African

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Development Bank without any conditions, and West Africa magazine commented that Nigeria also wished to demonstrate that Arabs should not base their aid on political and economic conditions. 70 The many letters received by African magazines at that time are extremely instructive since they reflect the views of Africans from different circles. Where some of the letter writers cast doubt on Arab intentions to implement Afro-Arab solidarity, others called for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel. For example, C. F. Amogba from Benin wrote in Jeune Afrique: "I really don't understand our Arab brothers. The negotiations which took place between the seven representatives of the OAU and the Arab League resulted in nothing, as the Arabs have no intention of granting us a special price for the purchase of oil." The writer urged the Arabs to do something for their "brothers," warning that "if the Arabs remain deaf to our demands we will be forced to reestablish our diplomatic relations with Israel." 71 The same sentiments were expressed in other letters received by The Standard of Kenya, the official Tanzanian newspaper Daily News, and Africa magazine. Many editorials in the African press during 1975 urged the Arabs to fulfill their promises. Africa surveyed the promises given by the Arabs to Africans, among them Libya's promise to contribute $30 million. Up to that time, the magazine reported, "Libyan support was limited to lip service." 72 In Ghana, the Daily Graphic warned the Arabs to speed up implementation of their promises if they wished to preserve Afro-Arab solidarity. The daily Zaire complained that Arab aid was not sufficient. 73 Following the December 1976 OPEC meeting and another 10 percent increase in the price of crude oil, African anger erupted again. In a letter to the editor entitled "Arabs have no African feelings at heart" James Mabuthu from Mombasa asked, What good are the African countries getting from the Arabs? One would h a v e expected that as the African countries sacrificed Israeli assistance in the Arab cause the Arabs would do something to justify their brotherhood with the Africans. The Arabs have no give-and-take spirit; theirs is only take. 7 4

The writer then called for the reestablishment of ties with Israel. In general, however, African criticism grew less frequent and more moderate by 1976 because, by then, the Arabs had reacted to earlier African criticism by stepping up both their assistance and activity in Africa. Furthermore, an understanding of sorts had been reached between the two sides, and some of the Arab arguments and

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explanations concerning the difficulties in organizing their aid programs were accepted and understood by several African leaders. The Arab awakening was evident in the Arab media, which attempted to analyze the causes for anti-Arab sentiments in Africa, its effects on Afro-Arab solidarity, and to offer possible solutions. 75 The Arabs proposed to convene an Afro-Arab summit conference in order to pacify their African critics and to thrash out misunderstandings between the two sides. At the preparatory committee meeting in Lusaka in January 1977, the gap between the two sides was very wide and the issue was referred to the summit that was due to be held in Cairo in March of that year. In Lusaka, the African representatives suggested that over the following five years Arab oil producers should contribute $2.2 billion to the African Development Bank's special fund to offset oil price hikes. In addition, the Africans demanded that the Arab states establish new institutions to channel some of their oil wealth to bolster the flagging African economies. 7 6 As mentioned above, many of the African demands were met at the Cairo Afro-Arab summit, and since then African criticism of Arab aid programs has lessened, although it has never completely vanished. Even after 1977, the Africans complained that all too frequently the Arabs increased oil prices without giving African countries adequate compensation. For example, in 1979, after several OPEC price increases, Kenya's minister for natural resources announced that African countries "had been held ransom by the Arab world." Although the government favored strengthening relations with the Arabs, Kenya had to "frankly tell our brothers that we are not happy about their constant price hikes of a commodity we can hardly do without—oil." 7 7 Kenya's Sunday Nation published an article titled "A Stab in the Back by So-called 'Brothers,'" charging that OPEC's aid to the developing countries amounted to only a tiny fraction of the additional billions they earned from the oil price increases. The paper also pointed out that the hope and the efforts of the Africans to raise their standard of living were shattered by OPEC, which they termed "a neck-strangling club." 7 8 Another Kenyan journalist commented: "The Arabs tried to make slaves out of us 500 years ago, and now they are trying to do it again." 79 In Zambia, Southern Province Political Secretary Axon Soko publicly accused the Arab countries of disregarding the needs of the African nations: "While the oil-producing countries are making millions of kwacha which they do not even know what to do with, other nations are scratching the ground to buy commodities at the expense of other development programs." 80 Soko also hinted that

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Zambia had expected better treatment from the Arabs, whom she had supported by cutting her ties with Israel.81 The sentiment was repeated by many in Africa. In Ghana, in an article titled "Ghana and the Afro-Arab Solidarity," C. A. Lokko charged that the sacrifice Ghana made when she cut diplomatic relations with Israel to manifest solidarity with the Arabs was not reciprocated: Since the Arabs started to wield the oil weapon against the West, they have deliberately and resolutely refused to make any discrimination between brothers and the imperialists; no concessions are forthcoming by way of lower prices or credit facilities. The result is that the oil weapon has dealt a more terrible blow to non-oil-producing African countries than to the Western capitalists, because of the resilience of their economies. 82

Illustrations of African disappointment and indignation are ample. The mood of frustration can be felt in the following letter to the editor, written by P. R. Githinji of Mombasa and titled "Tit for Tat to Arabs." The writer asks, Can we not also punish the Arabs or the oil-producers as they are doing to us? Surely if the countries that sell food to the Arabs combine forces they can actually make the Arabs not raise oil prices any more. If we sell them meat or cattle we should sell them at 100,000 shillings per head [8 shillings = $1] so that they can also feel the pinch of inflation... 8 3

The Struggle for Leadership The split between Black and white Africans is also significant in terms of the struggle between Africans and Arabs for leadership on the continent. Nasser considered Africa to be one of three areas—the other two being the Arab and Islamic world—where he wished to extend his leadership. The rivalry throughout the 1950s and the 1960s between Ghana's Nkrumah and Egypt's Nasser was never secret. Nasser regarded Africa as an "unexplored jungle," an attitude Nkrumah found patronizing. 84 Many other Africans also found Nasser's leadership a distasteful prospect. "No African nationalist movement would regard Nasser today as a prospective leader," wrote one African journalist. 85 The president of the Malagasy Republic, Philibert Tsiranana, plainly stated in May 1961 that he would reject any Muslim or Arab leadership over Africa. The struggle for leadership came to the fore again at the 1974 OAU summit conference. The formal closing of the four-day heads-

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of-state conference was delayed for fifteen hours by wrangling over the election of a new secretary-general. The Arab states were determined supporters of Somalian Foreign Minister Omar Artheh—Somalia was a new member of the Arab League—while most Africans supported Zambian Foreign Minister Vernon Mwanga. Only after an unprecedented twenty ballots were cast was a compromise found—the former Cameroon education minister, Eteki Mboumooa. Mwanga later explained that he decided to give up his candidacy "in order to save Africa from permanent division and perhaps even eventual collapse." The Somalian candidate supported by the Arabs was unacceptable to Black Africa, Mwanga added, because Africans wanted to find a candidate to "stop the Arab monopoly.... The OAU must not become an appendage to any other organization because if it did so it would lose the correct sense of direction." He added that African delegates felt that the Arabs were trying to control all the important posts in the OAU. If they succeeded, they would endanger the regional balance of the organization and would have full control of the OAU. 86 Opposition to the appointment of the Somalian candidate was explained by West Africa as "opposition to the growth of Arab influence in the organization and fear of Arab predominance." 87 Africa magazine reported that the Arabs "through the subtle touch of Algeria and Egypt are trying to enhance their interests in the organization." In fact, one hears the complaint increasing among Black African diplomats that the Arabs are trying to take over the OAU. 88 Likewise, at the May 1975 meeting of the African Development Bank in Dakar, Senegal, another sharp contest took place between the representatives from Ghana and Libya regarding the presidency of the bank for the next three years. The Arabs supported the Libyan candidate, while the majority of the Africans stood behind the Ghanaian one. At that time no compromise could be reached, and it was decided to defer the election for the following year in order to prevent a possible rift in the organization. The Africans felt that the bank was under "Arab domination," as more than half of the strategic posts in the bank were held by Arabs. 89 An African observer remarked that the Arab stand at Dakar was "another move to extend their control in Black Africa." 90 Eventually, the Ghanaian candidate was elected. 91 The fear of Arab control was also reflected in African hesitation and suspicion toward the idea of an Afro-Arab summit conference. Since 1973 the Arabs tried to convene such a conference, but the Africans several times put off the date of its opening. Thus, at the OAU foreign ministers' meeting in Addis Ababa in February 1975,

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the Africans turned down a proposal to place an Afro-Arab cooperation office in Cairo. They also complained about the use of the OAU office in Geneva for Arab League purposes and revealed fears "that President Amin of Uganda may act as an Arab cat's-paw when he takes his turn as Chairman of OAU." 92 Later that year at the OAU summit conference in Kampala, African heads of state again put off discussion on the working paper concerning Afro-Arab cooperation, without fixing an alternative date for convening the proposed Afro-Arab Summit. One explanation given in the African media indicated that the recurring postponements resulted from worries lest such a summit tie African countries to the political problems of the Arab world and perhaps "affect their sovereignty." 93 Only with the help of President Senghor of Senegal did the Arabs finally succeed in convening an Afro-Arab conference on the ministerial level in Dakar in April 1976. After more efforts, the Afro-Arab summit eventually convened in Cairo in March 1977; the mere fact that such a conference did take place can be considered as an important Arab achievement. Nevertheless, in the course of this conference, there were also many differences of opinions between Arabs and Africans, especially pertaining to Arab assistance to Africa. It is interesting to note that Dr. Elias Zain, one of the most active Arab League propagandists, emphasized in one of his articles the existing rivalries between the Arabs and the Africans and their contest over key posts in the OAU. Zain warned that such disputes might severely harm Arab influence in Africa. 94 The Arab-South African Connection Given the extent of African dissatisfaction with Arab aid to Africa in general, and to the Black liberation movements in particular, it is not difficult to understand the angry African reaction to evidence of links between South Africa and the Arabs. Officially, the Arabs responded to the call for sanctions against the white regimes in Southern Africa by announcing in November 1973 the break of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia, and the imposition of a strict oil embargo on countries. The sanctions expressed the stated Arab wish to cooperate with African countries in their fight against racism and apartheid, and also reciprocated for Africa's solidarity with the Arab cause in the October 1973 War. Africans were therefore amazed when Great Britain officially

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announced, in September 1974, that Jordan admitted selling tanks and surface-to-air British-made missiles to South Africa. 95 Africa magazine later published a detailed article entitled "Apartheid's Secret Friends," disclosing documents proving that Jordanian arms sold to South Africa were to be transferred to Rhodesia. The report concluded: "Jordan's arms deal with South Africa has cast bitter doubt upon the Arab world image in Black Africa." 96 Jeune Afrique also commented on this, adding that Jordan supplied to South Africa about 50 percent of all the heavy weapons that South Africa purchased in 1974. 97 The magazine also reported that some of the weapons were resold to Rhodesia. These disclosures generated criticism in Black Africa. The OAU officially protested to the Arab League and expressed its deep concern. 9 8 "Africans should reassess their relations with the Arabs," wrote a Nigerian daily and demanded an emergency meeting of the OAU. 9 9 Others called on the African countries to sever diplomatic relations with Jordan. 1 0 0 The Daily Graphic of Ghana urged the Arabs to expel Jordan from the Arab League, and charged that the sale of British-made military equipment to Rhodesia and South Africa made King Hussein "an errand boy of Western Imperialism." 1 0 1 Africa magazine commented: "There is a feeling among some Africans that their demonstration of solidarity with Arab nations during the war with Israel has been met with little evidence of reciprocal Arab generosity. The scandal with Jordanian arms sales to South Africa has exacerbated African suspicions." 102 Adebayo Dele Opawoye from Liberia wrote in the same magazine that "King Hussein's arms deal with South Africa need not be a surprise. Members of the OAU are to blame for slavishly breaking ties with Israel. Black Africans are now the l o s e r s . . . . One can only hope that when next the Arabs call for help Black Africans will remember this Arab hypocrisy." 103 And a Tanzanian wrote: "It is really a pity to see Jordan selling arms to the most racist and apartheid country in the world. Though the action may have been a mere trade, it's really a political blow to Africa." 104 Military links with South Africa were not limited to Jordan. According to information published in the British press in April 1985, the South African state-owned armaments company Armscoor has sold 100 G-5 155-mm howitzers to the Iraqi Government. 105 This information was later circulated among UN members by Iran, who complained to the secretary-general of the UN, quoting from the British press reports. 106 African newspapers published the charges, calling it a flagrant breach of the UN boycott of South Africa. 1 0 7 Shortly thereafter, an arms deal between South Africa and Somalia

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was disclosed. According to press reports, Somalia granted South Africa access to the port of Berbera, as well as airline landing and refuelling rights. In return, South Africa agreed to supply arms, military training, and financial aid. 108 And, according to Newsweek magazine, South African military advisers were also training several Moroccan army units. 109 Links with South Africa were not limited to arms deals. Throughout 1975, both African and Western sources uncovered evidence of growing trade relations between Arab states and South Africa, such as Saudi Arabia's direct bid to the Reserve Bank in Pretoria for gold purchases. A Saudi trade mission visited South Africa to discuss the possibility of increasing food imports. At the same time, the Saudis contracted for the import of several million pounds sterling worth of prefabricated building materials. South African businessmen toured Egypt and Jordan to discuss package tours and to expand trade. A number of Persian Gulf states, including Dubai and Bahrein, traded openly, while others, such as Abu Dhabi, adopted a lower profile. Until the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, South Africa maintained an Office of South African Interests in Beirut, and South African diplomats openly drove around the city with diplomatic license plates on their cars, despite the lack of official relations between Lebanon and South Africa. 110 The London Sunday Times reported in 1976 that South Africa is believed to be building closer ties with Egypt. It disclosed that a South African government official had made several secret trips to Egypt in that year, and that "Cairo is mentioned as one of the Arab cities to be visited later this year by a top-level South African delegation." The paper added that even though South Africa and Egypt were still a long way from resuming diplomatic relations broken off after the Suez crisis in 1956, covert ties between the two countries had strengthened markedly since Cairo's break with Moscow. Dr. Connie Mulder, the South African Minister of Information, was believed to be in the forefront of the Cairo offensive. 111 The Standard of Kenya reported from Pretoria that discrete cooperation appeared to be developing between South Africa and Saudi Arabia. For instance, the two states arranged an exchange of visits by doctors and scientists, including heart transplant surgeon Dr. Christiaan Barnard, who visited Jiddah at the Saudi government's invitation. The paper added that scientists from Jiddah's King Abdul Aziz University had visited South Africa as Dr. Barnard's guests. The Saudi group was headed by the university's vice-president, Dr. Abdullah Nasseef, who was

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accompanied by the Dean of Medicine, Dr. Abdullah Balsamah, and Professor Usama Shobosi. 112 Another report from South Africa indicated that trade links between Saudi Arabia and South Africa continued to grow in 1978 and that Saudi purchases of gold from South Africa exceeded those of any other country in the world. In fact, more than one-third of Pretoria's gold output was sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, the report added, Saudi agents were recruiting skilled technical workers, engineers, and medical personnel in South Africa. 1 1 3 The Kenyan Daily Nation reported that "Arabs are buying South African gold like hotcakes, thus helping to sustain that country's abominable policy of apartheid. Arabs who sought and continue to woo our support have become business partners in building the South African economy." 114 Reporting on the soaring price of gold, the New York Times remarked: "Today the hungriest market for gold is the oil-rich Middle East, which last year absorbed almost 16 million ounces, or, one-third of the total mine output." 115 The Metal Bulletin was even more specific, naming Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen as major gold markets. "Direct shipment to these countries amounted to 500 tons of gold, one-third of the global supply." 116 Ties between the Arabs and South Africa caused indignation in Africa. At the 1975 OAU conference in Kampala, African delegates criticized the trade and financial contacts of "some Arab states with South Africa." 1 1 7 Jeune Afrique accused the Arabs of playing a double game with Africa and South Africa. 118 Even Idi Amin, a staunch supporter of the Arabs, cabled the Arab League secretarygeneral to express his dissatisfaction over the number of Arab states investing in and doing business with South Africa. According to Radio Uganda, Amin pointed out that Africa was "surprised at the behavior of Arabs who have neglected Black Africa and have decided to do business with South Africa." 119 Reports in the British and South African press that a consortium of Arab companies called Medi Depius was investing in Transkei Homeland in 1978 also aroused angry African reaction. According to these reports, Arab financiers, represented by Salim al-Hajj, signed in Transkei a low-interest loan agreement for $506 million to finance various projects, including a deep-water harbor and a large airport. In a strongly worded statement, African nationalist leader David Sibeko, director of foreign affairs of the Pan-African Congress of Azania (South Africa), indicated that these Arab loans were "a stab in the back of the South African liberation movement." 1 2 0

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Sibeko, who was in Geneva attending a UN conference on ways of combating racism and racial discrimination, pointed out that the loans also violated UN resolutions against the creation and support of Black Homelands (Bantustans). Saudi Arabia, in 1985, granted South African Airlines permission to operate flights from Johannesburg via the Comoro Islands to Jiddah. For this purpose, South Africa's Foreign Minister Botha visited the Comoro Islands to organize the service indirectly linking South Africa to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis' official explanation was that the flights were necessary for the convenience of South African Muslims making their pilgrimage. Saudi Arabia later stopped the flights when they became a public embarrassment. 121 It seems that the sale of Arab oil to South Africa was frowned upon by Africans with special severity. Indeed, it was not until after the African states broke diplomatic relations with Israel in late 1973 that Arab oil producers agreed to comply with the OAU request that they impose an oil embargo on South Africa. Nevertheless, there was evidence that this obligation was not strictly observed. Although the South African government employs elaborate methods to conceal the sources of its oil, substantial amounts of information on these sources are revealed from time to time. According to 1975 UN data, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates supplied over 50 percent of South Africa's oil imports that year (7.87 million tons of 13.66 million tons imported to South Africa). 122 African representatives at the Joint Ministerial Committee for Afro-Arab Cooperation held in Cairo in July 1975 maintained that South Africa continued to receive 65 percent of its oil from the Middle East and Arab world. At that meeting, Arab League Secretary-General Mahmoud Riad had to reassure Africans that Arab states would respect the embargo on South Africa. 123 In its issue of 14 December 1980, the London Observer disclosed South Africa, violating the embargo imposed by OPEC. The supertanker allegedly loaded at Gulf ports, usually Saudi Arabia's Ras al Tannurah. While false destinations were often given to suggest she was bound for legitimate customers, the tanker ended up at either Durban or Cape Town. The tanker was said to have transported millions of tons of crude oil to South Africa during the two preceding years, about 10 percent of total needs. 124 One source on oil shipments to South Africa is the Shipping Research Bureau, a Netherlands-based antiapartheid organization. The bureau is associated with the UN Center Against Apartheid and monitors oil tankers making deliveries to South Africa and

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their port of origin. In a report published in 1982, the bureau reported that several tankers sailed from the Arabian Gulf to South African ports and back again on a shuttle service. Of the fifty-two ships "most likely" to have delivered oil to South Africa, monitored from 1980 to mid 1981, twenty-eight sailed there from the Arabian Gulf. 125 In another report published in 1984, forty-nine oil shipments to South Africa were recorded from mid-1981 to the end of 1982. Of these, thirty-seven, or 76 percent, came from four Arab countries: Saudi Arabia (39 percent), the United Arab Emirates (24 percent), Oman (10 percent), and Kuwait (2 percent). Another 6 percent came from Iran. The forty-nine shipments traced by the Bureau were valued at $1.1 billion, and equal to about 50 percent of South Africa's oil imports. 126 The data, which were also published in the Arab press, caused embarrassment. The Arab countries concerned denied that they had any trade contacts with South Africa and claimed that they have no control over the oil companies. 127 But in July 1985 Norwegian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs T. Froysnes stated that 95 percent of the oil supplied to South Africa arrived from the Gulf states. 128 These disclosures angered many Africans. Tanzania's government-owned newspaper, the Daily News, in an editorial called on Arab oil-producing countries to impose a total oil embargo against South Africa. The newspaper, which usually reflects official thinking, said the Arab states would be well-advised to remember that the principle of reciprocity was an important aspect of international relations. The newspaper pointed out that "only a total oil embargo against South Africa by the oil-producing Arab states would definitely confirm the truth that the Arab and African peoples' struggles are complementary." 129 The Daily Times of Nigeria reported that "Arab oil still finds its way to South Africa. Arms and armaments from some Arab countries still find their way to South Africa." 1 3 0 Under the headline "We Should Reopen Diplomatic Ties with Israel," a Nigerian correspondent wrote: "It is disgusting to see that we are prepared to go to any length with the Arabs even when they supply oil to South Africa. Do we pretend not to know that the Arabs still sell oil to the apartheid administration in Pretoria?" 131 Ethiopian leader Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, in a nationwide radio and television address in 1978, attacked the Arabs for supporting the rebels in Eritrea and Ogaden: Instead of siding with the African peoples who sympathize with them in their conflict with Israel, these Arab countries are doing

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their utmost to support the economies of the archenemy of the African people, the racist and fascist minority regime in South Africa, by investing in its commercial and industrial development. They have ignored repeated calls by Africa to cut off oil supplies to this racist and illegal regime. They are at the same time generous in financing efforts made to divide, bleed and weaken Africa." 1 3 2

Even commentators sympathetic to Afro-Arab solidarity felt compelled to speak out on this point. For instance, Olayiwola Abegunrin of Nigeria's University of Ife, strongly criticized the Gulf States in a research paper that was otherwise favorable to the Arabs. "In spite of all the OAU and UN resolutions demanding that member-nations stop sending oil to South Africa, Arabian Gulf States nevertheless continue to allow their oil to flow to South Africa." 1 3 3 In an editorial entitled "Scandaleux," Man Less Dia, editor of the weekly Le Politicien, mentioned the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau and reproached the Arab Gulf states, questioning the existence of genuine Afro-Arab solidarity. 134 Criticism of the Arab-South African oil connection can also be found in the Arab media. A Lebanese newspaper, Al-Hadaf, blamed the Arab reactionary circles who "scored maximum success in their attempts to conceal the fact that South Africa is receiving Arab oil." 135 The newspaper reproached the Gulf Arabs for "reciprocating African support against Israel by ensuring the flow of oil to Black Africa's major racist enemy." That the Saudi press was also critical of the oil sales can be seen by journalist Abdullah al-Hassan's attack on Arab oil sales to South Africa as a major obstacle to the Arab position in Africa. 136 Conclusions Some of the issues dealt with in the last two chapters are historical (e.g., the Arab slave trade) and some are modern (e.g., the oil crisis and the question of Arab aid to Africa). But all the issues dealt with therein represent weak points in the Arab countries' position in Africa. It should be noted, however, that African criticism of the Arabs has not in itself had any significant effect on African attitudes toward Israel; since Afro-Arab disputes have, on the whole, remained within the Afro-Arab framework, they have had more influence in shaping the relationship between the two parties involved. In fact, many African states that criticize Arab conduct—Ethiopia, Somalia, Senegal, Uganda, etc.—have not

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become any less hostile to Israel. But what did happen as a result of African criticism is that the Arabs were forced to reexamine their relations with the Africans. This reexamination has been reflected in policy statements, as well as in articles expressing criticism of Arab operations in Africa and suggestions on how negative aspects can be remedied. One such article was that of Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs Boutros Ghali, titled "The Crisis in AfroArab Cooperation." 137 In many instances, the Arabs learned from their mistakes. This has resulted in an intensification and improvement in diplomatic, economic, and informational operations and in a considerable increase of aid to Africa since 1973, although by not as much as the Africans would like. Thus, in order to get a true picture of Afro-Arab relations, Arab weaknesses should be assessed not only in accordance with African criticism, but also with respect to the strong Arab efforts to better their political and economic relationship with Africa, for it is such efforts that have eventually had an effect on mellowing African criticism. It should also be mentioned here that the Arabs, too, have complaints. In a section on Arab resentment against Africa and the Africans in the above-mentioned article, Boutros Ghali mentioned the African proposal to establish a Black African league that would exclude the Arabs, and complained about the way in which Arab aid was squandered by African governments. Indeed, Arab donors have been increasingly expressing their dissatisfaction with the way Africans are using their aid. Thus, in summing up ten years of BADEA's activities, its president, Chedly Ayari, said: Among donors, there is a sense almost of failure. . . . Donors are becoming disillusioned. It is aid fatigue, a sense of despair which I think all of us share. Whatever has been done we have the impression Africa has not moved an inch. Where did those billions of dollars go?

Ayari noted as well that BADEA had recently become more selective in its grants, paying more attention to aid aimed at improving social conditions, which included many projects that were smaller than in the past. Moreover, with aid resources becoming ever scarcer, he said, BADEA will concentrate on the neediest. 138 Another BADEA official has also indicated that, although the bank's main aim is to build Arab-African cooperation in a broad range of spheres, this had not materialized; for example, the AfroArab summit initiated in 1977 failed to meet since because of disagreements among its members. 139 In other Arab quarters, it is felt

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that any Afro-Arab alliance should be based on genuine solidarity and common interests, rather than on financial aid. 1 4 0

Notes 1. An interview with Al-Ahram (Egypt) quoted in The Middle East (London), April 1975. 2. Foreign Report (London), September 12, 1973. 3. The Renaissance (Nigeria), December 10, 1972. 4. Independent (Nigeria), December 10, 1972. 5. Times of Zambia, October 28, 1973. 6. Daily Mail (Zambia), June 26, 1974. 7. See, also, Peter Enahoro's article "Qadhafi: A Falling Star?" Africa, no. 36, August 1974,12-15. 8. SWB, May 15,1974 ME/4600/B/5. 9. SWB, March 27, 1976 quoting Radio Kampala, March 25,1976. 10. Al-Ba'th (Syria), November 2, 1975. 11 .Al-Ahram (Egypt), July 12, 1975 and August 30, 1975; Al-Qabas (Kuwait), July 6, 1975; see also Al-Nahär (Lebanon), July 8, 1975. 12. New York Times, April 4, 1974. 13. Sunday Nation (Kenya), June 16, 1974. 14. Ethiopian Herald, August 14, 1974. 15. Daily Mail (Zambia), May 8, 1982. See also the report of James Buxton and David Lennon in the Financial Times (London), August 31, 1979 on the dissatisfaction in Black Africa over Arab promises of aid. 16. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), September 17, 1975. 17. Daily Nation (Kenya), March 20, 1976. 18. Al-Thaura (Syria), May 21, 1976. 19. Africa, April 1974, no. 44, 12; Africa Report (New York), July-August 1975,10. 20. Daily News (Tanzania), February 21, 1975. 21. Ibid. See also West Africa (London), March 8, 1975. 22. Jeune Afrique (Paris), March 14, 1975. 23. Al-Hawädith (Lebanon), June 13,1975. 24. Al-Sha'b, February 2, 1976. 25. ARB, August 15,1975,3685. 26. Al-Thaura (Syria), May 21, 1976. 27. Le Monde (Paris), April 20, 1976. 28. Jeune Afrique (Paris), March 14, 1975. 29. Al-Jadid (Lebanon), December 6, 1974. 30. The Ethiopian Herald, October 5, 1974. 31. Sunday Times (Zambia), January 30, 1977. 32. SWB, ME/6704/B/1, May 22,1981. Similar opinions were published in The Echo (Ghana), July 13,1980. 33. Al-Sha'b (Algeria), February 21,1976.

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34. West Africa (London), December 3, 1973. 35. Zambia Daily Mail, June 24, 1974. 36. Africa, no. 36, August 1974. 37. Daily Nation (Kenya), March 20, 1976. 38. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 5,1974. 39. Africa, no. 34, June 1974, 48; Guardian (London), December 13, 1973; East African Standard (Kenya), June 19, 1975; Sunday Nation (Kenya), June 16,1974. 40. Daily Graphic (Ghana), June 10, 1974; Ghanaian Times, June 10, 1974; West Africa (London), June 24,1974. 41. Afriscope (London), September 1974, 24. 42. To the Point International (South Africa), 28. 43. Le Monde (Paris), June 22, 1974. 44. Daily Report (Washington, D.C.), February 19, 1974. 45. The Ethiopian Herald, August 8, 1974. 46. The Middle East (London), 1975. On Mobutu's disappointment with Arab assistance, see also Jeune Afrique (Paris), October 3, 1975. 47. Le Soleil (Senegal), February 25, 1974; Radio Yaoundé, September 9, 1973; Le Monde (Paris), February 10, 1974. 48. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 5, 1974. 49. Daily Mail (Zambia), June 25,1974. 50. SWB, October 20, 1974. 51. Daily Nation (Kenya), June 19,1974. 52. East African Standard (Kenya), June 20, 1974. 53. Daily Nation (Kenya), June 12-13, 1974. 54. Africa, no. 40, December 1974. 55. Afriscope (London), vol. 4, no. 12,1974,19-22. 56. Cited in Daily Report (Washington, D.C.), March 6, 1974. 57. The Echo (Ghana), May 20, 1973. 58. Daily Graphic (Ghana), October 30, 1974. 59. Ghana News Agency, February 14, 1975. 60. The Daily Mail (Zambia), June 21, 1974. 61. The Mirror (Kenya), May, 1974. 62. Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1974. 63. Ash-Sha'ab (Algeria), February 21,1976. Tribune, 64. The Economist (London), March 1, 1975, 50; Cameroon February 21,1975. 65. ARB, August 8,1975,3685. 66. Daily Times (Malawi), December 12, 1975. 67. Le Monde (Paris), April 20,1976. 68. SWB, September 13, 1975. 69. International Herald Tribune (Paris), October 8, 1975. 70. West Africa (London), August 4, 1975. 71. Jeune Afrique (Paris), August 3, 1974. 72. Africa, October 1975, no. 49, 25. 73. Both quoted in Jeune Afrique (Paris), December 12, 1975. 74. Daily Nation (Kenya), January 1, 1977.

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75. See, e.g., Elias Zain, Al-Hawädith (Lebanon), June 13, 1975; Al-Sha'b (Algeria), February 21,1976. 76. Daily Nation (Kenya), January 28, 1977. 77. Sunday Nation (Kenya), July 15, 1979. 78. Ibid., July 1,1979. 79. New York Times, August 27, 1979. 80. Zambia Daily Mail, August 4, 1979. 81. Loc. cit. 82. The Echo (Ghana), July 13, 1980; see also the Palaver Tribune (Ghana), February 16, 1977. 83. Daily Nation (Kenya), January 11,1981. 84. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington, D.C., 1955), 110. 85. Quoted in J. Boulin, The Arab Role in Africa (London), 1962,102. 86. Zambian Daily Mail, June 20, 1974. 87. West Africa (London), June 24, 1974. See also Africa, no. 37, September 1974, 31; Daily News (Zambia), June 21,1974 for a critical view of the Arabs for preferring the Arab League's interests to those of the OAU. 88. Africa, no. 34, June 1974,9-13. 89. Africa Conßdential (London), January 10, 1975. 90. International Herald Tribune (Paris), May 13, 1975. 91. Ghanaian Daily Times, May 27, 1976. 92. The Economist (London), March 1, 1975, 50. 93. Cameroon Tribune, February 21, 1975; Voice of Uganda, February 20,1975. 94. Al-Hawädith (Lebanon), June 13, 1975. 95. SWB, September 22, 1974. 96. Africa, no. 39, November 1974, 41-43. 97. Jeune Afrique (Paris), December 26, 1974. 98. SWB, September 22, 1974. 99. Daily Express (Nigeria), September 24, 1974. 100. New Nigeria, September 23, 1974. 101. Daily Graphic (Ghana), according to Ghana News Agency, September 26, 1974; see also Daily Times (Nigeria), July 15, 1974. 102. Africa, no. 40, December 1974. 103. Ibid., no. 41, January 1975. 104. Daily News (Tanzania), September 30, 1974. 105. Africa Confidential (London), April 10, 1985, 4; Foreign Report (London), April 11,1985,5. 106. UN General Assembly, Security Council, A/40/464 s/17326 of July 5,1985. 107. Ghanaian Times, July 10, 1985. 108. Foreign Report (London), April 11, 1985, 5; Africa Confidential (London), July 17,1985,4. 109. Newsweek, August 20,1984, 5. 110. Observer (London), March 18, 1975; see also Daily Nation (Kenya), August 27,1975.

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111. Sunday Times (London), June 13,1976. 112. The Standard (Kenya), November 3, 1977. 113. A dispatch from Daniel Druze, Ma'ariv correspondent in South Africa, published in Ma'ariv (Israel), January 27, 1978. 114. Daily Nation (Kenya), September 2, 1977. 115. New York Times, November 4, 1977. 116. Metal Bulletin (New York), June 14, 1977. 117. Africa Research Bulletin (London), August 15, 1975, 3685. 118. Jeune Afrique (Paris), March 7, 1975, 21. 119. Daily Times (Nigeria), February 5, 1975. 120. Pretoria News (South Africa), August 22, 1978; The Standard (Kenya), August 25,1978. 1 2 1 . Mid-East Report (Washington), February 1, 1985; Africa Confidential (London), July 17, 1985. 122. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, Statistical Papers, table 7, 1975. 123. Africa Research Bulletin (London), August 15, 1975, 3686; Togo Press Agency, July 12,1975. 124. Quoted in the Daily Nation (Kenya), December 15, 1980. 125. Research report by the Shipping Research Bureau of Amsterdam, "How They Break the Oil Embargo: Oil Tankers to South Africa," 1980-1981. 126. Near East Report (Washington), September 3, 1984, 146. 127. Al-Watan (Kuwait), April 5,1985. 128. Norwegian News Service (Oslo), July 9,1985. 129. Daily News (Tanzania), November 7, 1975. 130. Quoted in Daily Times (Nigeria), April 10, 1977. 131. Daily Times (Nigeria), July 27, 1977. 132. Bulletin of the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations (n.d.). 133. Olayiwola Abegunrin, "The Arabs and the Southern Africa Problems," International Affairs (London), vol. 60, no. 1 (Winter 1983-1984): 97-105; see also a letter to the editor by E. Alexander in the Daily Nation (Kenya), September 22, 1983, "Arabs are to Blame." 134. Le Politicien (Senegal), December 10, 1084. 135. Al-Hadaf (Lebanon), April 24, 1976. 136. Al-]azirah (Saudi Arabia), January 30,1982. 137. Boutros Ghali "Azmatu al-Ta'äwun al-'Arabi al-'Ifriqi" (The Crisis in the Afro-Arab Co-operation") Al-siasah al-duwaliya, 87, January 1987, 4-7. 138. Africa Economic Digest (London) March 15, 1985, 27. 139. Ibid., 27. 140. Al-Ahram (Egypt) January 18,1985.

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• CHAPTER SEVEN •

Africa and Israel Since 1973 We have thus far outlined some of the main factors of dissension between Africans and Arabs, as well as the long-standing suspicions and fears that cloud relations between them when they surface from time to time. It should be made clear at this point that reactions to the various Arab activities in Africa are not all unfavorable. However, following the severance of diplomatic relations between African states and Israel, an impression has been created that African-Arab relations are always friendly and smooth; it is therefore important to show the other side of the coin in order to get a more balanced assessment of African attitudes toward the Arabs and Israel. While the anti-Arab reactions quoted in previous chapters cannot be said to represent either the African press as a whole or all circles of African politics, they are sufficient to reveal many blemishes on the Arab image in Africa. Each of the factors of dissension mentioned may not, by itself, carry much weight, but the accumulated impact has worked to restrain Arab influence and to decelerate anti-Israel incitement in Africa for years, both before and after the 1973 break in relations. In fact, it was after 1973 that the strains of dissension most affected relations between Arabs and Africans. Anti-Arab utterances on the subject of oil and lack of Arab aid reached new levels in the last decade and were among the sharpest ever heard in Africa. After the break of diplomatic relations with Israel, African disappointment deepened as their expectations of a fair recompense and display of solidarity in their hour of need grew. Libya's President Qadhafi, who played an important role in undermining Israel's position in Africa, became a main target of African criticism after 1973 because of his extremist and militant policies. Africa's post-1973 disappointment with the Arabs and the

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desire to retain the advantages gained from technical cooperation with Israel, together with renewed Israeli initiative and activity, had a moderating effect on African attitudes toward Israel. These new attitudes found expression in more sympathetic statements and moderate positions by African states toward Arab-Israeli issues. Further, African-Israeli ties in the fields of economics and trade, as well as cultural and technical cooperation, continued unbroken. After 1973, such Israeli activity in Africa usually lacked formal and diplomatic backing, and a number of African countries suspended even these contacts after the October War. Today, Israel's technical assistance is concentrated in those African states that are generally considered pro-Western or nonaligned and that have strong Christian populations, or in states with a pragmatic approach to development and economic policies—for example, Cote d'lvoire, Kenya, Zaire, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Mauritius. At the same time, there are African countries that reject any contact with Israel. These have generally strong Arab or Easternbloc ties or an overwhelming Muslim population: e.g., Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Mauritania, and Senegal. Between these two extremes stand countries that agree to maintain some ties with Israel, but of a low-key nature and usually in a limited and indirect form, such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In the post-1973 period, Israeli activity is carried out mostly by corporations and individuals working on a nongovernmental basis, and it has developed a more practical and businesslike character.1 This chapter will detail African attitudes to Israel since 1973 and will describe recent Israeli activity in Africa. African Reluctance to Adopt Extreme Positions Against Israel Most African countries support Arab positions regarding the Middle East in international forums. Nevertheless, there were cases in which many Africans opposed extreme anti-Israel resolutions introduced by the Arabs. Many Africans vote against the Arabs when the latter do not limit themselves to declarations condemning Israel, but propose such extreme anti-Israel operative resolutions in the OAU or at other international forums as demanding economic sanctions or Israel's expulsion from the UN and its agencies. At the 1975 OAU conference held in Kampala, most of the sub-Saharan African delegates refused to support an Arab draft resolution calling for Israel's expulsion from the UN or even a less extreme resolution

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calling for Israel's suspension. Despite strong pressure from Arab states, particularly Libya, and after long debate, the conference agreed to a mild recommendation for increased pressure on Israel in the U N while the subject of expulsion was put aside. And even this amended draft met with reservations from five African countries: Zaire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Liberia. A resolution calling for an African economic boycott of Israel on the lines of the Arab boycott was dropped. 2 Observers explain African refusals to support the more extreme resolutions as a sign of their independent stand on an important political issue. 3 The same phenomenon occurred at the Conference of the Nonaligned Countries in Lima, Peru, in August 1975. The extreme Arab line demanding the expulsion of Israel from the UN was rejected; among the countries objecting, the Africans were prominent. 4 Since then, the Arabs have tried in nearly every international forum to press for the expulsion of Israel, while African delegates are among those objecting. At the International Labour Organization meeting in Geneva in 1979, many African representatives objected to an Arab-sponsored resolution that condemned Israel and called for its suspension from the ILO. The draft resolution was rejected. 5 A similar Arab resolution at the UNESCO Conference in Belgrade in September 1980 met with the same fate. And all Arab proposals to expel Israel at the April 1982 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting in Lagos failed, the Nigerian government making it clear that, although it had cut its diplomatic ties with Israel, the Israeli delegation would be treated as all other delegations. 6 The most recent attempt to expel Israel from the UN occurred at the fortieth session of the UN General Assembly in October 1985: Arab delegates sponsored a draft resolution calling for rejection of the Israeli delegation's credentials. Against this draft resolution the Nordic countries sponsored a counterresolution confirming Israel's credentials, which was eventually accepted. Fifteen African countries supported the Nordic resolution (Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cote d'lvoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, The Seychelles, Swaziland, Togo, Zambia). Only five objected (Angola, Burkina Faso, the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, and Mali). The rest of the African countries abstained or were absent. This again proved that the majority of African countries refuse to support extreme resolutions against Israel. Moderate African countries also refuse to toe the Arabs' extreme line concerning the identification of Zionism with racism. For a long time, the Arabs tried to mold an African consensus supporting a

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resolution equating Zionism with racism, but such a consensus could not be reached. There were always several African states that expressed reservations and objected to the proposal. When UN Resolution 3379, which labeled Zionism as a form of racism, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 1975, five African States voted against it (Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, the Central African Republic, Malawi, and Swaziland) and twelve African countries abstained (Ethiopia, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Togo, Burkina Faso, Zaire, and Zambia). It should be added that even in those African countries that did not abstain, reservations were voiced. Jeune Afrique published a letter by a Zairian who described the resolution as "contemptible and disgraceful," claiming that in the same way one can easily identify Arabism with racism. 7 The Kenyan Daily Nation sharply criticized the Arabs for their constant wars against the Jewish nation, describing the latter as the nation that had suffered more than any other from racism. 8 A Ghanaian journalist writing in The Echo mentioned the damage caused to Africa by supporting extreme Arab stands in the OAU and UN: 'To those of us who believe in the ideals of UN, resolutions such as the one equating 'Zionism' with 'Racism' do the UN no credit whatsoever. It tends to prove the point that the organization has lost its lustre and bearing. I take consolation in the fact that Ghana abstained on the said resolution." 9 Later, both at the 1976 UNESCO conference in Nairobi and at the thirtieth session of the UN General Assembly, the Arabs failed to pass a resolution condemning Zionism as a racist movement. The African states largely deserted the Arabs on these votes. The Africans were fearful lest their excessive indulgence in the issue of Zionism might harm their fight against apartheid. It was clear to them that the United States and other Western countries would not support a resolution against apartheid that also condemned Zionism. Indeed, the Liberian delegate warned the UN in his speech before the voting in November 1975, that the condemnation of Zionism will harm the African struggle against apartheid, adding that Zionism is the "Liberation movement of the Jews who themselves suffered from racial discrimination." Another African expressed his objection to the resolution in a letter to the editor of West Africa: "The main problem for Black African nationalism is apartheid and racism. It is illogical to identify these with the situation between Israel and the Arabs. Yet many Black African leaders have been persuaded by Arab propaganda and manipulation of the OAU to confuse Zionism with apartheid." 10

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At the July 1985 Nairobi conference marking the end of the UN Decade for Women, Arab efforts to pass a resolution equating Zionism with racism also failed to overcome the host country's objections, which were supported by Western and moderate African countries. 11 Nevertheless, as will be shown, persistent Arab pressure on this issue succeeded at some meetings in weakening African objections to the condemnation of Zionism in international forums. Appeals for the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with Israel The earliest appeals for resumption of relations with Israel were heard in the more moderate African capitals as early as 1974. In Kenya, which imported most of its oil from Arab countries and was greatly affected by high prices, sharp criticism of the Arabs was voiced in the mass media and in the parliament immediately after the 1974 OAU conference in Mogadishu, which dealt mainly with the oil crisis. Martin Shikuku, Kenya's assistant minister for home affairs, recalled that, together with the rest of Africa, Kenya had gone out of her way to support the Arabs in good faith. 12 Shikuku added further: The Israelis have trained African pilots, trained Africans in the field of poultry projects, trained eye specialists and helped to form cooperative movements in addition to assisting many African nations in military and police organization.

Shikuku was supported by James Osogo, Kenya's minister for local government and other members of Kenya's parliament. 13 Kenya's press vigorously joined those who called for the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel. The media emphasized that Israel was never an enemy of Africa and that Israeli-African cooperation programs were most useful. 1 4 The Sunday Nation favored renewing Kenya's diplomatic relations with Israel and voiced objection to blindly following the Arabs, asking, "With such friends who needs enemies?" 1 5 Numerous letters to the editor advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel. 16 In Tanzania, whose government was much less favorably inclined toward Israel, there were not as many official expressions of support. The Tanzanian press conducted a long and stormy discussion for and against resuming diplomatic relations with I s r a e l . 1 7 In Zambia, a member of parliament requested the government bring back the Israeli experts. 18

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The Ethiopian

Herald

wrote:

Ever since the total break of diplomatic relations between Israel and Africa a great deal of re-thinking has been going on in m a n y African States. Here in Ethiopia, although this issue did not get to be debated through the m a s s media, a significant portion o f opinions advanced charges that we are fools. Others simply feel that was the g r e a t e s t diplomatic e r r o r in Ethiopian history. . . . Ethiopia has always been a friend of the Arabs as well as of the Israelis. She must remain so. 1 9

In Madagascar, the oppositionist Malagasy Union Party called for the reestablishment of friendly relations with Israel. 20 At the same time, a lawyer from Cameroon set up, at his own incentive, a Cameroon-Israel Friendship Association based in Paris. 21 In West Africa, especially in Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, and Benin, there were similar expressions of friendship to Israel, most of them unofficial. 22 Afriscope published an article entitled "Anger Against the Arabs," indicating that African anger against the Arabs had reached a point "where not only Kenya, but other African countries are repeatedly putting out feelers for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel." 23 An interesting official comment in this respect was that of Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1975. According to Newsweek, he complained to an Arab economic mission that visited Zaire that Africans had received only "moral aid" and much higher oil prices from the Arabs. He would not be surprised, Mobutu told his Arab visitors, "if certain African nations resume diplomatic relations with Israel." 2 4 Indeed, the common motive mentioned by all who demanded the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel was their disappointment in Arab aid. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there were other motives, such as the claim that by severing diplomatic relations the African countries had lost a useful source of technical assistance. Thus a Kenyan writer noted, "So long as Israel is friendly and provides technical aid and training assistance to Kenya, I do not see any genuine reason why we shall insist on diplomatic severance with Israel." 25 In Zambia, several members of parliament called on the minister of rural development to expel "expatriate" civil servants and bring Israelis back to boost agricultural production. "We want the Israelis back," said one member of parliament. "Ten of them did more for us than a thousand of the present advisors." It is interesting to note that this was the main headline of The Times of Zambia.26

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Similar ideas were voiced by well-known Ghanaian columnist Roy Karaba-Quarshie. H a v i n g regard to the great work Israel has been doing in our country, it w a s not surprising that popular reaction to Ghana's break of diplomatic relations was adverse. In fact, if there had been an opinion poll on the issue at the time, there is little doubt that about 80 percent of Ghanaians would have voted against the m o v e . . . . It is m y suggestion, that our national interest demands that Ghana should restore diplomatic relations with Israel to enable her to r e s u m e her assistance to various fields of our national e c o n o m y . 2 7

William Ochieng of the University of Nairobi raised political and moral arguments for the resumption of relations with Israel. In an article entitled, "What's Africa's Business with the Middle East War?" he wrote, H o w is it that we Black Africans always only identify injustices when they are committed outside our continent? W h y should Black African States sever diplomatic ties with Israel because she is killing "brother Arabs," and yet keep diplomatic links with some independent Black African States where hundreds of thousands of Africans are still being butchered in cold blood and m a d e homeless?

Ochieng argued that when Africans sever diplomatic ties with one side in the conflict, they lose possible influence over that side and thus cannot contribute toward solution of the crisis. Ochieng concluded that "Black African States should begin to reexamine their stand in the Middle East in the light of the moral contradictions in their policies." 28 Another point made was that by severing relations, the Africans had taken a step more extreme than the Arabs themselves were prepared to take against their adversaries. One writer, noting that the Arabs had resumed relations with the Western countries and the United States after severing them in 1967, concluded, "Are we not in fact being more Arab than the Arabs themselves?" 29 This motif grew more significant after the signing of the IsraeliEgyptian interim agreements. African representatives at the thirtieth UN General Assembly in 1975 welcomed the agreement that they regarded as a step toward peace, although they credited Egypt for this achievement. 3 0 The calls for the resumption of relations did not escape the notice of Arab experts on Afro-Arab relations, who saw them as developments undesirable from their point of view. Dr. Elias Zain reported that following the Israeli-

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Egyptian disengagement agreement and the resumption of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States, a Kenyan cabinet minister had remarked to him, "The president of Egypt has carried out a disengagement of forces with Israel. Why are we still footing the bill?" 31 It should be mentioned that most of the calls for resuming relations with Israel were made on an unofficial level during this period, i.e., in newspaper articles or letters to the editor. On the official level, however, even those states friendly to Israel usually fell back on the expression that diplomatic relations could be resumed only after the Middle East problem, particularly the Palestinian question, was settled. As will be shown, the calls for renewal of diplomatic ties with Israel intensified after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and again after the signing of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979. Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982 spawned concrete results—the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Zaire in May 1982 and later with Liberia in August 1983. The development of Afro-Israeli relations after Sadat's visit will be discussed in the following chapter. Political and Formal Connections Another area in which a limited rapprochement with Israel occurred after 1973 centered around the renewed dialogue between Israeli and African politicians. In May 1974, President Tolbert of Liberia sent an amicable message to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, expressing satisfaction at the signing of disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria and hope for further progress towards Middle East peace. Publicly reported high-level meetings included one between Israeli and Ethiopian foreign ministers at the UN General Assembly in 1974. 32 Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon reported to the Knesset that "there are feelers and contacts as to a resumption of relations, but there is as yet no room for a detailed statement." 33 The Israeli press reported further meetings between the Israeli foreign minister and African officials at the 1975 UN General Assembly. 34 At a conference of the Socialist International in Geneva in 1976, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met with Senegalese President Leopold Senghor. 35 Another meeting much publicized in the media in Israel and abroad was that between Prime Minister Rabin and President Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'lvoire in Geneva on February

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4, 1977. Mr. Rabin flew to Geneva specially for that meeting. According to a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the two statesmen discussed the Middle East situation and agreed that the best way to achieve peace in the region was a dialogue on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The communiqué stressed that the talks had been conducted in an atmosphere of mutual trust and complete frankness. Rabin declared on his return to Israel that his meetings with the presidents of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire had been within the framework of activities to promote the normalization of relations between Israel and the African continent. At the same time, it was noted that the African presidents had refrained from mentioning any date for the resumption of relations. 36 A further indicator of links between Africa and Israel were visits by Africans to Israel in various capacities. Besides the visits of cabinet ministers from the countries with which Israel maintained diplomatic relations (Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho), officials and journalists from African countries that had severed their diplomatic relations with Israel also arrived. The group of visiting journalists included George Githii, editor of the influential Kenyan Daily Nation,37 and A. Babili, secretarygeneral of the journalists' union of the Central African Republic. 38 Hundreds of African pilgrims visited Israel in 1975 on the occasion of the Christian Holy Year, including 350 from Nigeria and several dozen from Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Benin. 39 Immediately after Idi Amin of Uganda was toppled in 1979, hundreds of Christian pilgrims arrived in Israel with the blessing of new President Godfrey Binaisa. In the same year, several groups of Christian pilgrims arrived also from Kenya. By now the arrival of African Christian pilgrims to Israel from countries that severed relations with Israel has become routine. Friendship associations with Israel were established in a number of countries. One example is the Mauritius-Israel Friendship Association, which maintains close contact with Israeli institutions, and another is the Ghana-Israel Friendship Association, which was founded in July 1980. 40 Other friendship societies with Israel exist in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kenya. Some countries agreed to the presence of Israeli diplomats as "interest officers" within the framework of the foreign embassy of a third state. Thus, it was disclosed that Israel had such officers in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Togo, and Cameroon. 41 Furthermore, in 1986 two of these countries, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, renewed full diplomatic relations with Israel. Africans also continued to participate in conferences held in Israel. An international seminar

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on law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1974 was attended by lawyers from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya, and Ethiopia. 4 2 Engineers and architects from Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia, and Burkina Faso participated in an engineers' congress in Tel Aviv in December 1976. 43 At the International Trade Unions Conference held in Tel Aviv in 1978, there were delegates from Nigeria, Kenya, and Sierra Leone. 44 At the 1979 Hapoel Sport Olympiada, sportsmen from Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire took part. 45 Nor did the absence of diplomatic relations stop the participation of Israeli delegates in various international conferences held in Africa. An Israeli delegation was seated at the International Conference on Social Services in Kenya in August 1974 46 Israeli scientists participated in an international symposium on tropical agriculture in Nigeria, March 1975. 47 The deputy chairman of the International Relations Department of the Histadrut (Israel's labor federation) visited a number of African countries—Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire—where he met trade union leaders and politicians. 48 The director-general of the ministry of foreign affairs headed a large delegation to the UNESCO conference in Nairobi in late 1976. At the Interpol conference in Nairobi held in 1979, the Israeli delegation was headed by the inspector-general of the Israeli police. 49 A highranking Israeli parliamentary delegation attended the Lagos meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in April 1982. 50 Technical Cooperation and Trade African students continued to arrive in Israel after 1973, although their numbers declined in comparison with pre-1973 levels and a number of African countries ceased sending trainees to Israel. From 1957 to 1971, 6,797 African trainees participated in courses in Israel, and they came from nearly all of the Black African countries; in 1972 alone, there were 402 African trainees in Israel. 51 In 1977, four years after the rupture of relations, there were 108 African students from fifteen countries in Israel. 52 Since then, their number has again been on the rise, and in 1981 there were 272 trainees from seventeen African countries, mainly from Kenya (82), Nigeria (25), Zaire (17), Burkina Faso (14) and Togo (12), studying in Israel. In 1982, there were 212 African trainees in Israel, but by 1984 the number had dropped to 165.53 In 1985, Guinea sent twenty-five trainees to a public administration course in Israel, and Israeli instructors organized on-

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the-spot courses on the same subject in Conakry. 54 Among the Israeli training institutions absorbing these students were the Afro-Asian Institute for Development Cooperation and Labor and the Mount Carmel International Training Center for Community Services. It is interesting to compare the number of African students in these two institutions before and after 1973. Year

Institute

No. of Students No. of Countries

1971-1972

Afro-Asian

70

22

1981-1982

Afro-Asian

121

15

1971-1972

Carmel

162

24

1981-1982

Carmel

112

16

In addition, in the period 1981-1982, the two institutes organized joint courses in which thirty-nine students from Africa took part. 55 In the first International Leadership Workshop held at the AfroAsian Institute in 1984, nineteen Asian and African countries participated. The African trainees came from Ghana, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Kenya. 56 Israeli experts continued to serve in Africa on government contracts after 1973, but their numbers sharply declined. Between 1958 and 1971, 2,763 Israeli experts were based in Africa, both on long-term and short-term assignments. In 1972, there were 139 Israeli experts in Africa on government contracts. 57 In 1973, after the break of relations, nearly all of them returned to Israel. In 1981, there were ten Israeli experts on long-term assignment in Africa: Lesotho (3), Malawi (3), Kenya (3), Swaziland (1). In the same year, there were seventeen experts on short-term assignments: Kenya (7), Swaziland (3), Lesotho (2), Zaire (2), Ghana (1), Gabon (1), Malawi (1). The number of Israeli experts in Africa did not change much in the following years: in 1985, there were eleven Israeli experts on longterm assignment working in Kenya (4), Malawi (2), Swaziland (2), Lesotho (1), Zaire (1), and Liberia (1). The Israelis worked in agriculture and medicine. 58 Israel's presence in Africa after 1973 centered mainly in the economic and commercial fields in which nongovernment companies and private businesses were active. Israeli corporations that became well-known in Africa include Solel Boneh (construction), with branches in Kenya, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Tanzania, and Cameroon; 5 9 Tahal (water development) in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Kenya; the Koor Company (trade and agricultural development) in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Zaire; 6 0 and Plassim and Agridev (agricultural development and irrigation) in Kenya. Israel's

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minister of foreign affairs stated publicly, as early as 1974, that several African countries permitted Israeli business firms to continue operations notwithstanding the severing of diplomatic ties. 61 In the same month, the Ethiopian Herald carried a report praising the work of Solel Boneh, which built roads in Ethiopia. 62 Israel Radio disclosed that several Israeli companies were operating in Africa, and that Solel Boneh was engaged in projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 63 In Cote d'lvoire, Solel Boneh undertook jobs worth tens of millions of dollars, employing dozens of Israelis and some 3,000 local workers. The number of Israelis working in Nigeria was even greater. 64 Despite the break in diplomatic relations, there has been a considerable increase in trading volume between Israel and Africa over the past decade. In the years 1971-1973, before the rupture of relations, Israeli exports to Black Africa ranged between $30 to $40 million per year. Ten years later, exports had tripled, reaching 4 percent of Israel's total exports. The drought years of 1982-1984 and the ensuing economic recession resulted in a decline in Israel-Africa trade. The following table illustrates the point. Israel Export and Import to Black Africa (in millions of U.S. dollars) 65 Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Export 30.9 38 37.4 30.3 41.7 38.9 42 57.2 72 75.4 109.1 110.1 87 68.8 58.3 Import 19.9 17.1 20.4 24.6 42.5 28.7 24.8 35.3 28.8 20.9 18.7 33.6 24 14.1 12

Israeli exports to Black Africa consist mainly of chemicals, fertilizers, textiles, electronic equipment, machinery, and rubber and plastic articles. Imports from Africa consist mainly of coffee, cocoa, wood, skins, and diamonds. Israel maintains commercial relations with more than thirty African countries, principal among them being Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, Zaire, Tanzania, Cote d'lvoire, and Gabon. In conclusion, despite the break in diplomatic relations with many African countries, Israel has remained economically and politically active in the continent, maintaining technical cooperation with many of the African countries with whom it no longer has other ties. In other words, the main difference since 1973 has been that, in most African countries, where they exist, such relations lack formal and diplomatic status. The following chapters will analyze the factors that have had both positive and negative effects on Israel's resumption of full diplomatic relations with African countries.

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Notes 1. Naomi Chazan, "Israel in Africa," The Jerusalem Quarterly, 18 (Winter 1981): 29-44. 2. Africa Research Bulletin (London), August 1975, 3685. 3. Le Monde (Paris), August 4, 1975; The Times of London, August 4, 1975. 4. The Times of London, August 29-31, 1975. 5. Ma'ariv (Israel), July 9, 1979. 6. Daily Times (Nigeria), Aprii 16, 1982. 7. Jeune Afrique (Paris), December 12, 1975. 8. Daily Nation (Kenya), October 16,1975. 9. The Echo (Ghana), August 13,1976. 10. West Africa (London), July 16, 1976. 11. Weekly Review (Kenya), August 2, 1985. 12. See Chapter 5 text and Note 51. 13. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 5, June 19, and June 20, 1974. 14. East African Standard (Kenya), June 27, 1974. 15. Sunday Nation (Kenya), June 16, 1974. 16. For example, East African Standard (Kenya), July 1, 2 and 9, 1974. 17. Daily News (Tanzania), June 27 and July 17,1974. 18. The Times of Zambia, May 6, 1975. 19. Ethiopian Herald, August 25, 1974. 20. Reuters from Tanzania, cited in the Jerusalem Post (Israel), October 26,1973. 21. Ha'aretz (Israel), July 7, 1974. 22. See, e.g., the editorials in Fraternité Matin (Abidjan), February 3, 5 and 8, 1974; The Echo (Ghana), August 13, 1976; Jeune Afrique (Paris) published a letter of a reader from Benin, August 3, 1974; Africa, 43 (March 1975) published several letters to the editor to this effect. 23. Afriscope (London), September 1974, 23-25. 24. Newsweek, May 5, 1975. 25. East African Standard (Kenya), July 1,1974. 26. The Times of Zambia, May 6, 1975. 27. The Echo (Ghana), June 6,1976. 28. Afriscope (London), February 1974, vol. 4, no. 2, 40^12. 29. The East African Standard (Kenya), July 9, 1974. 30. Daily Nation (Kenya), October 2, 1975. 31. Al-Hawädith (Lebanon), June 13,1975. 32. Ha'aretz (Israel), September 29, 1974. 33. Ibid., December 4, 1974. 34. Ibid., December 28,1975. 35. Ibid., February 6, 1977. 36. Ibid., February 7, 1977. 37. Davar (Israel), September 1, 1976. 38. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), February 15, 1976. 39. Ha'aretz (israel), July 16,1975.

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40. The Echo (Ghana), July 13, 1980. 41. Africa Research Bulletin (London), November 1976, 4241, quoting Radio Israel; see also an article by David Lamb "Israel Maintains Low-key Presence in Black Africa" in Los Angeles Times, January 2, 1978; Weekly Review (Kenya), February 13,1981,16. 42. Jerusalem Post (Israel), July 25, 1974. 43. Ha'aretz (Israel), December 14, 1976. 44. Ma 'riv (Israel), September 29, 1978. 45. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), May 3, 1979. 46. Ha'aretz (Israel), August 22,1974. 47. Ibid., March 31, 1975. 48. Labor in Israel, July-August 1976, 2. 49. Ma'ariv (Israel), September 2, 1979. 50. Daily Times (Nigeria), April 16,1982. 51.Shimeon Amir, Israel's Development Cooperation with Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Praeger Publications (New York, 1974), 72, 96. 52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of International Cooperation, Jerusalem, Report for 1977. 53. Private Communications with the Division of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, March 29, 1982 and October 27, 1985. 54. 'Al-Hamishmar (Israel), May 5, 1985. 55. Details obtained through private communication with the AfroAsian Institute, Tel Aviv, January 5, 1983 and the Carmel Institute, Haifa, February 17, 1983. 56. Afro-Asian Institute Circular, July 10,1984. 57. Amir, op. cit., 97. 58. Private communication with the Division of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 6,1985. 59. Davar (Israel), March 29, 1977; Ma'ariv (Israel), November 5, 1978. 60. Koor Inter-Trade Division Bulletin, Tel Aviv, 1979. 61. Ha'aretz (Israel), August 13, 1974. 62. Ethiopian Herald, August 25, 1974. 63. Israel Radio, February 12, 1977. 64. Ma'ariv (Israel), March 23, 1975. 65. Directive of Trade Statistics: Annuals 1970-1976 and 1982-1984 International Monetary Fund (Washington); Israel Foreign Trade Statistics 1984-1985, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem).

• C H A P T E R EIGHT

•

African Attitudes Toward the Arabs and Israel Since the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement President Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreements evoked generally positive repercussions in Africa. Sadat was congratulated and encouraged to proceed with his peace initiative, and the African media intensified calls for resuming ties with Israel. This led Israel to increase political and propaganda activities in Africa, in t h e expectation that new opportunities would open up for the resumption of diplomatic relations with African states. These expectations were at least partly realized when Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, and Cameroon renewed ties with Israel. African Reaction to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement Immediately after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, several African leaders issued statements supporting his initiative as the right step toward solution of the Middle East crisis. The visit was hailed by President Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'lvoire as a "most courageous act, which deserves great respect and admiration." 1 Sadat's initiative was also publicly supported by the presidents of Liberia, Chad, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Malawi, and officials in Ghana, Zaire, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and the Central African Republic. 2 After the signing of the Camp David accords in September 1978, for which both Sadat and Begin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, both received cables of congratulations from the presidents of Cote d'lvoire, Zambia and Liberia. 3 At the 1978 UN General Assembly, eleven African countries expressed their support for the Camp David agreements: Liberia, Cameroon, Gambia, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sierre Leone, Nigeria, the

175

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AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Central African Republic, Lesotho, Cote d'lvoire, and Ghana. Only two countries—Ethiopia and Angola—actually denounced the agreements; the rest avoided any specific reference to the agreements. It should be noted that even those who supported the agreements found it necessary to indicate that these accords should be considered only as an initial step toward solving the Middle East issue, and that comprehensive peace could not be attained without a solution to the Palestinian question. In Nigeria, the Camp David accords were among the issues raised in that year's election campaign. The Nigerian government supported the agreements, albeit with some reservations: it insisted that a solution to the Palestinian question be found and criticized Egypt for not consulting with the OAU before signing the accords. On the other hand, some Nigerian opposition leaders were more unreserved in their support. Dr. N. Azikwe, head of the Nigerian People's Party, declared that the Camp David agreements open the way for his party "to smooth relations with Israel." 4 Among other supporters of the agreements was Sudan's President Numeiri, who praised Sadat for his courageous policy.5 The signing of the Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel on 26 March 1979 was received with even greater enthusiasm. OAU Assistant Secretary-General Peter Onu declared in Zambia in May 1979 that OAU was seriously considering the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in light of the Middle East peace initiative. Onu added that most African countries supported Egypt's move to reach an agreement with Israel because they all wanted peace in the area. The OAU, he concluded, would have to discuss the issue at its next meeting to be held in Monrovia in July of that year. 6 Among the strongest declarations of support for the peace agreement, and one that also demanded a reconsideration of African policy toward the Middle East, was that of Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel Mathews. In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 1980, Mathews declared support for Sadat's initiative and emphasized that the Middle East problem could not be resolved peacefully unless a dialogue could be opened between the parties. "For that reason," he added that m y government believes that the time has come for all states that have severed diplomatic links with Israel to begin a reexamination of their policy, with a view to the establishment of some links, however limited, that would facilitate communication. For us that reexamination seems all the m o r e appropriate since o u r sister African state, Egypt, in whose support o u r diplomatic ties with

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Israel were severed, has n o w established formal ties with that country. 7

A year later, Mathews again expressed his government's support for Egypt in another address to the General Assembly: W e are convinced that the C a m p David A c c o r d s represent a m e a n i n g f u l initial a p p r o a c h . W e believe E g y p t n e e d s the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of men of g o o d will. . . . W e find that the ostensible reason for the severance of ties with Israel—solidarity with E g y p t on the m a t t e r of the violation of its territorial integrity—no longer obtains. Cairo has effected a m o d u s vivendi with Tel Aviv and Liberians ought not be more Egyptian than Sadat. 8

Among groups that demanded a change of attitude toward Israel was the Ghana Bar Association, which in December 1979 called on the government to reconsider diplomatic relations with Israel. 9 The press and other mass media in various African countries also joined in support of Sadat's move and the peace agreements. 10 It should be noted that the announcements in support of President Sadat's initiative and the Camp David accords were bolder, more numerous, and more openly declared than calls demanding the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel. Sadat was given the lion's share of the credit for achieving peace between Egypt and Israel, and most of those who supported Egypt did not refer to the possibility of improving their own relations with Israel. Moreover, it seems that while enthusiasm in Africa was high immediately after the signing of the peace accords, as time passed it gradually subsided. One reason was the angry reaction of the Arab states to the peace treaty and their condemnation of Sadat. At the OAU summit convened in Monrovia in July 1979, the Arab states even demanded the expulsion of Egypt from the organization. Most African states objected to such a radical move, but they could not resist the heavy Arab pressure and were obliged to support a resolution condemning the Camp David accords. A similar stand was adopted by African countries at the Summit Conference of Nonaligned Nations held in September 1979; the Camp David accords were condemned, but most African members—headed by Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, Senegal, and Cameroon—objected to moves aimed at expelling Egypt from the meetings. On the other hand, African members of the Islamic Conference Organization could not prevent the suspension of Egypt from that organization in 1979. It is interesting to note that Egypt's membership in the ICO was renewed in March 1984, owing largely to the support of the Africans and especially that of

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Guinea's President Sekou Toure, who played a leading role in bringing Egypt back into the ICO and who strongly supported Egypt's decision to sign the Camp David accords and Sadat's "peace strategy." 1 1 Arguments for Renewing Diplomatic Relations with Israel The principal and most widely mentioned argument says that AfroIsraeli relations were severed out of solidarity with Egypt, a leading member of the OAU, whose territory was occupied by Israel. Therefore, after Egypt itself renewed relations with Israel, there was no reason why African countries should continue boycotting Israel. This argument, as mentioned, was raised at the UN General Assembly by the Liberian foreign minister and by other African leaders. Nigerian Foreign Minister Ishaya Audu, in an interview to the Sunday Times of Lagos, remarked that, in light of the EgyptIsrael rapprochement, Nigeria should also reconsider its stand toward Israel. 12 Michael Ajasin, governor of the Ondo State and chief of Nigeria's ruling party, said that Nigeria should not share in the prejudices of the Arabs. "Egypt and Israel have settled their differences; why should Nigeria not reopen relations with Israel?" he asked. 13 Nigerian opposition leaders and press were even more vocal. In May 1982, E. C. Ebo moved a draft motion in the national assembly, on behalf of 106 members, entitled "On the Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with Israel by Nigeria and Other African States." In its second paragraph the motion stated: Cognizant of the fact that Israel and Egypt, the principal belligerents, have already established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial levels; and that the two Heads of State exchanged visits; and that some African States, in sympathy with Egypt, severed normal relations with Israel in 1973, but have not, unfortunately, relaxed their decision; that delay lacks merit, that policy is now baseless, and overtaken by events. Be it hereby resolved that this House directs that Nigeria should, with immediate effect, reestablish, renew and seek normal diplomatic, consular, trade and cultural relations as well as technical cooperation with Israel at ambassadorial levels. 14

During Nigeria's 1983 presidential election campaign, the issue of relations with Israel was raised by all three main contenders. Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Nnamdi Azikwe of the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) declared that they would consider reestablishing relations with Israel if

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elected, while the incumbent president, Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), opposed the idea. Favorable attitudes toward Israel could also be found in Nigeria's semiofficial newspapers, although less frequently. The Daily Times wrote: "Anwar Sadat of Egypt made an equally moral sacrifice by giving up on war and hostility and by entering into a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, our agreement upon the survival of the State of Israel could be expressed most profitably and morally by reopening diplomatic relations with Israel." 15 In the opposition newspapers, this argument was raised repeatedly; in an article titled "Time to Think," the Nigerian Sunday Observer said, In 1973 Africa, especially Black Africa, broke with Israel because of Israel's occupation of African soil and because of the Israeli war w i t h E g y p t . Both r e a s o n s have n o w been neutralized. The exchange of ambassadors is the final act of Egyptian recognition of Israel. If this is the case, Africa's a r g u m e n t s for maintaining hostilities with Israel have been plummeted. 1 6

According to another opposition daily, The Punch, about 70 percent of Nigerians polled favored renewing diplomatic relations with Israel, and many explained that since Egypt and Israel had resolved to normalize relations, Nigeria should follow suit. 17 The issue of normalizing relations with Israel was also continually discussed in Ghana. Ghana's press, both governmental and opposition, hotly debated the issue. For example, the stateowned Ghanaian Times urged the government to renew diplomatic relations with Israel: "Egypt, the nation which led the Arabs to get the OAU to break relations with Israel, signed a treaty with Israel. . . . In that case the rationale for the continuous hostility towards Israel is no longer there." The writer further warned: "We shall appear extremely ridiculous in the eyes of right-thinking people if Africans should continue their blind opposition to Israel when the man [Sadat] Africa appears to be supporting, made peace with his enemy." 1 8 In an editorial entitled "Resume Diplomatic Relations with Israel," the Ghanaian weekly Palaver, argued: With the C a m p David Agreement coming into force, the O A U decision with regard to diplomatic relations with Israel no longer makes sense. This is because Egypt, which spearheaded the w a r against Israel, has not only restored relations with Israel but has also opened her doors to the Jewish State in pursuit of peace in that turbulent part of the world. 1 9

The editorial concluded with the following: "If the century-old

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African adage that 'our friend's enemy is also our enemy' is true in the case of Egypt and Israel, then by the same token, Israel, which has become Egypt's friend under the Camp David accords, should also be our friend." In Kenya, this theme was raised by members of parliament. Chief Whip J. D. Kali said in parliament in July 1979 that Kenya should renew diplomatic relations with Israel "because African nations broke their relations with that country only because of Egypt." 2 0 While the Monrovia OAU summit was discussing the Middle East issue, Liberia's only Sunday newspaper, The Sunday Express, called on African countries to resume relations with Israel without further delay: "With rapprochement now a political fact of life between Egypt and Israel, member countries of the OAU no longer feel bound to maintain a diplomatic break with a country which can offer so much in the transfer of technology to them." 21 It should be noted that when Liberia eventually renewed diplomatic relations with Israel three years later the "Egyptian" argument topped the list of causes given to justify the move. 22 Another argument used by those supporting the resumption of relations with Israel stems from Africa's disappointment with Arab aid. It is argued that the Arabs have not fairly repaid the Africans who manifested complete solidarity with the Arabs during the 1973 Middle East war. To this point, discussed in Chapter 4, will be added here only the editorial of the Daily Nation in Kenya: African nations were to experience a high rate of inflation caused by the oil embargo in the way of costly imported raw and finished materials, and yet the Arab nations did not either increase their volume of trade or aid to compensate Africans for the oil-price rise and inflation. Instead most of the Arab aid has been going to Islamic nations. 2 3

A parallel argument often heard is that since Arab technical assistance and aid was disappointingly low, Africans should not give up Israel's effective and useful aid and know-how. Israeli assistance in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, and youth movements are often cited, fields in which the Arabs cannot or will not help. When an Israeli delegation arrived in Lagos in April 1982 to participate in the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting, numerous editorials, especially in the opposition press, called for the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel. Particularly emphasized was the importance of Israel's aid in agriculture, a field in which Nigeria's performance had greatly deteriorated in recent years, and in which the Nigerian government had decided to concentrate,

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embarking on a "green revolution" program. The Nigerian Tribune commented: "We say that Nigeria should renew relations with Israel immediately to see how Green Revolution fertilizer does not mean bloated fertilizer contracts." 2 4 The Satellite said: "There is much to learn from the Israelis, who, out of sheer industry, hard work and determination to survive, amazed the world that not long after successfully establishing a nation-state, they have turned their barren homeland into a first-class agricultural and industrial country." 25 Similar opinions were expressed in the progovernment press. For example, the Daily Times, a semiofficial newspaper, wrote: "Despite the break of diplomatic relations with Israel, she has played a great part in our agricultural and construction industries. We need the Israelis to help in the battle against desert encroachment. We need them in our hospitals We need them for quick development of our agriculture." 26 In March 1982, members of the house of assembly from Nigeria's Ogun State adopted a motion calling on the federal government to change its foreign policy toward Israel and to restore diplomatic relations. They pointed out that such a step would promote Nigeria's national interests, because the country would benefit tremendously from Israel's help, especially in the development of modern agriculture. 27 In Ghana, one of the first African countries to receive Israeli technical aid, many assert that ties should be renewed with Israel in order to renew technical cooperation. Roy Karaba-Quarshie, in an article published in The Echo under the title "Don't Pawn Ghana's Freedom for Arab Gold," wrote: I am yet to be told how many projects the Arabs are undertaking in this country while on the other hand I can easily name some of the projects which Israel has been undertaking in this country: t h e Central Accra Sewerage system, poultry farms, technical aid in the field of training of agricultural police and trade union personnel and social workers, to name only a few. It is interesting to note that our breaking of relations with the state of Israel notwithstanding, G h a n a i a n s c o n t i n u e to g o to Israel for training in several fields... 2 8

Ghanaian writer, J. W. K. Dumoga, said: Ghana m u s t re-establish relations with I s r a e l . . . because of the technical aid Ghana w a s receiving from Israel, especially in Agriculture before the break in 1973. Israeli agricultural extension officers can help Ghana in food production. Please do not forget that it w a s Israeli t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s w h o h e l p e d in t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the W o r k e r s / B u i l d e r s Brigade, t h e State

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Construction Corporation, the Black Star L i n e and several other national a g e n c i e s / 9

There were many similar articles in Ghana's press, and these arguments were also heard in other countries, such as Zambia and Kenya. 3 0 Another reason advanced for renewing relations with Israel was that such a move would produce a more favorable attitude toward compromise in Israel. This was neatly expressed in an article published in the Nigerian Daily Times: "It will be a step towards getting Israel to feel secure enough to consent to Palestinian rights." 3 1 A Kenyan writer who also dealt with this theme added, "This stratagem of isolation [of Israel] had the reverse effect and made Israel harder for the Arabs to bargain with." 32 Those African leaders who object to the reestablishment of Africa-Israel ties explain their stand by emphasizing Israeli collaboration with apartheid South Africa. The supporters of Israel reject this argument and maintain that the Israel-South Africa connection should not hamper the reinstitution of Africa-Israel relations. In Nigeria, the Sunday Observer wrote: T o claim that Israel deals with South Africa is o n l y a belated a t t e m p t at fault-finding. First, w e h a v e to r e m e m b e r that this reason was not the original one given for breaking relations with Israel. It was m o r e of an afterthought. Secondly, was it not the African cut-off of relations with Israel that d r o v e the latter to apartheid South Africa? And, in any case, when was it decreed that African states should have no relations with states that fraternize with South Africa? D o the United States, Britain, West G e r m a n y , C h i n a , the w h o l e o f W e s t e r n a n d Eastern E u r o p e and S o u t h America not fraternize with South Africa? Do we not have relations with these countries and those regions of the world? If foreign policy is based on the interests of states, then it is about time Africa normalize her relations with Israel. 3 3

The Ghanaian Times, a semiofficial organ, published an article by one of its readers who expressed objections to an editorial published in the paper a few days earlier: Y o u w r o t e that Israel was S o u t h Africa's ally a n d that a n y o n e seeking friendship with Tel A v i v must be prepared to wine and d i n e with the apartheid monsters of Pretoria. Are you seriously suggesting that all the states that have diplomatic relations with South Africa a n d the State of Israel at the same time are wining and dining with the monsters of Pretoria? If that is so then they are i n d e e d in g o o d c o m p a n y . T h e s e s t a t e s i n c l u d e t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , t h e United States, the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y ,

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France, and Canada, to mention just a handful. Don't you know t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s a r e established w i t h s t a t e s not necessarily because they are friends, but essentially to protect the national interests of the parties concerned? 3 4

In Kenya, the Daily Nation elaborated: W h e n they [the Arabs] c o n d e m n South Africa, they are merely playing with our feelings while having business contacts with her. Iraq sells oil to South Africa, Egypt until 1976 was sending teachers there, South Africa used to offer package tours to Egypt, and Saudi Arabia buys gold and d i a m o n d s from South Africa. Israel is c o n d e m n e d for her overt business dealings with South Africa, which amount to less than one percent of South Africa's foreign trade, while covert Arab business deals are colossal compared to Israel's. 3 5

Defenders of Israel also claim that Israel did not harm any African interests. Kenya's assistant minister for tourism and wildlife advocated the establishment of relations with Israel in parliament, adding that Africa should not harm Israel by a continuing diplomatic boycott. 36 The following is an interesting example of the kind of argument advanced in favor of Israel: if Africa wishes to play an active role in bringing peace to the Middle East, it must remain neutral in its relations with both sides in the conflict. Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe emphasized this point several months before he restored Liberia's diplomatic relations with Israel. In a speech in June 1983, Doe disclosed that Liberia would give due consideration to the establishment of relations with Israel and that he was seeking the consent of the People's Redemption Council to open talks with Israel to "determine the role Liberia can play in helping to establish genuine peace in the Middle East." Doe said that while he remained committed to the Arab cause, he noticed that in the few years since Liberia and other countries had severed relations with Israel, in accordance with the decision of the OAU, progress toward the achievement of peace in the Middle East had not been satisfactory: "This is because we avoided direct talks with Israel." 3 7 The same opinion was expressed in Nigeria's Sunday Observer: Africa should look upon her role in the Middle East as that of a searcher for peace. Maintaining no relations with Israel has given Africa no leverage with Israel and so she has not been in any position to play a positive role in the search for a Middle East peace. Ironically too, neither has she been able to exercise any

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influence with the Arabs either, since the latter look upon her as a very malleable and expendable ally. 3 8

Another argument frequently used by Israel's supporters in Africa was expressed by Roy Karaba-Quarshie in the state-owned Ghanaian Times: The establishment or otherwise of diplomatic relations between states is primarily a matter within the jurisdiction of sovereign states and has nothing to do with dictation from outside bodies. The O A U therefore has no business forcing its member-states to maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations with any state. 3 9

It is worth mentioning here that on the occasion of Zaire's resumption of diplomatic ties with Israel, the presidents of Zambia, Benin, and Burkina Faso emphasized that every state is free to decide on its internal or external policies. Liberian journalist Alex Barning, in a long analytical article entitled "The Organization of African Unity and Israel," emphasized this point. He wrote, "In the best interest of our people, individual countries should not hesitate in asking for restoration of ties with Israel. We would not look up to the OAU for a decision because it is bogged down by African politics, which has blocked the economic advancement of the continent."40 Renewal of Relations by Zaire and Liberia Zaire cited Israel's withdrawal from Sinai as the main reason for resuming ties with Israel; President Mobutu explained that when Zaire announced its decision to break relations with Israel at the United Nations on October 4,1973, this sovereign decision was occasioned by the fact that the African lands of Egypt had been occupied by the Jewish state. It w a s a reaction against this occupation by Israel of the African lands of Egypt which slighted African dignity and the rights of the African peoples on their own soil. After 25 April 1982, Zaire, following the same logic, declared that the reasons that had p r o m p t e d it to break with Israel no longer applied, since the Jewish occupation had come to an end and the African territories of Egypt had been restored. It must also be pointed out that in Zaire's historic stand in 1973 there w a s never a question of Arab lands a s such, but rather of the African lands of Egypt, although Egypt is an Arab state. This point must be clearly stated. 4 1

It is clear that Zaire also had other reasons for turning to Israel, among them Mobutu's basically sympathetic attitude toward that

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country. In fact the decision to renew ties was a personal one. Mobutu always admired Israel's prowess, military ability, and know-how in various spheres of economic development, and he had visited Israel to undergo parachute training. Nonetheless, his decision no doubt took a great deal of personal courage and determination, considering the fact that quite a few African leaders avoid ties with Israel out of fear for their own safety, especially after President Sadat's assassination. There were also economic reasons. Mobutu wanted to recruit the Jewish and Israeli lobby in the U.S. Congress to help him obtain more aid to alleviate Zaire's deep financial troubles. He believed that Israel could help in improving his image and standing in Washington. And, indeed, Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin promised Mobutu to build up Zaire's image in the United States. 42 When Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Zaire in December 1982 he stated that Israel would make special efforts to recruit American Jewish investments for Zaire. 43 Mobutu was also disappointed with Arab aid. It is true that in the years 1974-1981 Arab aid commitments to Zaire came to $411.4 million but net disbursement was only $150 million, and of this only $53.6 million were in soft loans. 44 The rest were standard loans at market interest rates. The gap between Arab promises and deeds was wide. Moreover, actual Arab disbursement was not significant, considering that Zaire's foreign debt came to $5 billion and the deficit in the balance of payments in 1981 came to $700 million. At the same time, Arab donors pressed Zaire to start repaying the loans. In comparison, in 1981 alone, development assistance from the West was $273 million; of this, $220 million was in grants. 45 Mobutu, who greatly appreciated Israel's military acumen, also needed Israeli security assistance to bolster his regime. He wanted Israel to send military experts and advisers to Zaire. Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's 1981 visit to Zaire strengthened Mobutu's expectations. Indeed, military cooperation between the two countries became an important element in the framework of Israeli technical aid to Zaire. During Sharon's visit to Zaire in January 1983, a number of military accords were signed and Sharon disclosed, upon his return to Israel, that he agreed to help Zaire reconstruct and enlarge its army on the basis of a five-year strategic plan drawn up at Mobutu's request. He added that Israel would help Zaire develop an antiterror unit, train its naval unit, and sell Zaire weapons and communications equipment. 46 In February 1982, Zaire's defense secretary visited Israel and signed an accord detailing Israeli aid programs, such as the training of Zaire's Kamanyola

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division for the defense of the mineral-rich Shaba province. Israel also undertook to train a special presidential brigade. 47 During his visit to Washington in August 1983, President Mobutu confirmed that Zaire was receiving agricultural, technological, and military training and advice from Israel.48 To the above factors should be added the generally pro-Western and anti-Communist attitudes of Mobutu and the fact that the Muslim community in Zaire is small, totalling less than 5 percent of the total population. Since the renewal of relations, Israeli activity in Zaire increased significantly. Israeli officers trained and expanded the presidential brigade and the Kamanyola division and Israeli experts established a center for agricultural training. Israel undertook to participate in setting up a medical center and granted thirty scholarships to Zairians to be trained in agriculture, irrigation, and other civil subjects. In January 1984, Israeli President Chaim Herzog paid an official visit to Zaire, heading a delegation which included representatives of Israeli companies and investors.49 On a five-day visit to Israel in May 1985, President Mobutu signed agreements expanding economic and technical cooperation between the two countries, and Israel agreed to guarantee Israeli investments in Zaire. 50 Israel also agreed to provide easy credit terms to Zaire for the purchase of Israeli equipment. In an interview, Mobutu hinted that by resuming relations with Israel, Zaire lost some Arab aid. But he added, "I do not aim at interests in my policies. It is the honoring of a word given that counts. Zaire had undertaken to renew relations with Israel as soon as that state restored to Egypt that portion of territory it occupied during the 1967 war. This precondition, having been fulfilled, Zaire honored its promise." 51 At the same time, Zaire's press expressed expectations that Israeli and Jewish businessmen will participate in Zaire's efforts to improve its economy.52 And, indeed, in January 1985, Leon Tamman, a leading Jewish entrepreneur, visited Zaire and it was disclosed that he signed an agreement to invest $400 million in various development projects in Zaire. 53 Israel makes special efforts in Zaire in the hope that if the planned projects will be implemented and other Israeli and Jewish investors will also agree to contribute to the economic development of Zaire, this may encourage other African countries to follow Zaire's example. A second Israeli breakthrough in Africa occurred on August 13, 1983, when the Liberian government announced its decision to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, Liberian Head of State

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Samuel Doe became the first African president since 1973 to pay an official visit to Israel when he arrived for four days on August 22, 1983. As in the case of Zaire, the government of Liberia emphasized in its official statement the "Egyptian" argument, saying that the main reason for severing ties with Israel in 1973 was the wish to manifest solidarity with Egypt over the occupation of its territory by Israel. "This reason," the statement explained, "no longer exists, since Egyptian territory has been restored and Egypt has established diplomatic relations with Israel." 54 Another reason that Doe cited, both in Jerusalem and later on a state visit to Sierra Leone, was that he was convinced that Israel's continued isolation by other countries would not help resolve the Middle East problem. 55 A combination of factors led to Liberia's renewal of links with Israel. The fact that Liberia is traditionally a pro-Western country receiving its main assistance from the United States is relevant. The bloody coup led by Doe in April 1980 in which President William Tolbert and a score of ministers were executed caused apprehension and distress in the U.S. Like Mobutu, Doe thought that the United States' good will could be strengthened through gaining the sympathy of the influential U.S. Jewish community by rapprochement with Israel. Indeed, during Doe's visit to Israel, Foreign Minister Shamir was asked by journalists if Israel would help lobby for Liberian interests in the United States and he replied, "Liberia knows Israel has good contacts in the U.S. and thinks perhaps rightly that those contacts will help Liberia." 56 Doe also believed that he could recruit financial and economic assistance from the U.S. Jewish community. While in Israel, Doe met the U.S. mission of the United Jewish Appeal and he invited them "to come and join with us and participate fully in this historic period of transition." 57 U.S. influence in Liberia probably influenced Doe's action. Washington hurried to welcome Liberia's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Israel while stressing that this decision by the African country was made on its own. 58 President Doe also wanted to utilize the technical assistance he could obtain from Israel, and here he was influenced by his veteran Minister of Foreign Affairs Earnest Eastmen, who admired Israeli ability. On his return to Monrovia from Israel, Doe delivered a speech to the nation in which he summed up his agreements with Israel: "The two sides agreed on wide-ranging areas of cooperation. These included economic development, defense, national security, road construction, housing, agriculture, communications, shipping, air transport, marketing, manpower development and banking." He

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added that the joint communiqué issued on the last day of his visit "contained a firm commitment by the Israeli government to assist Liberia in the above-mentioned areas of cooperation." 59 Israel's press reported that Israel promised to establish an agricultural company, AGRIMECO, which would be responsible for developing agriculture in Liberia and would recruit experts for agriculture project evaluation. The Israeli government also promised to encourage major Israeli construction companies to help Liberia procure both international financing and equipment for road and other construction projects. A major Israeli shipping company was to send a team to Monrovia with a view to setting up a Liberian shipping line. 60 Foreign Minister Eastmen, in an interview on Israel Television, stated that Israeli medical experts were to visit Monrovia to reopen an eye clinic that had been set up by Israeli doctors in the 1960s and later stopped functioning after they had left. 6 1 It should also be noted that Arab aid to Liberia was small, especially when compared with U.S. aid. In the years 1975-1982, BADEA's commitments to Liberia came to $10.7 million and all Arab multilateral and bilateral aid commitments totalled $50.1 million. In the years 1974-1981, Liberia actually received $13.6 million in repayable loans (see Chapter 4). But this amount is insignificant when compared with the foreign debt of Liberia, which, according to its minister of finance, came to $1.2 billion in 1984, with interest of $4 million due each month. Arab aid was small also in comparison to the West's assistance. In 1981 Liberia received $82 million in assistance from the world's developed countries, $53 million of which was in grants. 62 U.S. aid to Liberia in 1982 was $46 million, in 1983 $71.2 million; in 1984 it was set at $77 million and, for 1985, $91.7 million was requested. 63 Another factor instrumental in the renewal of Liberian diplomatic ties with Israel was Liberia's fears of Libya's Colonel Qadhafi; Doe wished to utilize Israeli intelligence ability to deal with Libyan subversion. This factor was emphasized by the Israeli and Western media. 64 The London Daily Telegraph, quoting Israeli foreign ministry officials, wrote, "Doe has a feeling he is a target of Libya's since he ousted friends of Libya and the friends of the Eastern bloc from his government." 65 Doe himself, at a state dinner in Jerusalem, expressed his attitude toward Libya when he said that Libya's continued intervention in Chad "is viewed by Liberia with utmost regret and dismay." 66 In an interview with Time, Doe even claimed that Qadhafi had inspired an assassination attempt against him. 6 7 At a press conference in Israel, Earnest Eastmen

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disclosed that "the life of the Head of State had been threatened over a year ago and there was ample evidence as to the source of that threat." 68 It is interesting to note that Egypt reacted to Liberia's restoration of links with Israel by naming Libya as the main cause, warning that "Qadhafi's policies will only drive more African nations into Israel's arms."69 In the joint communiqué published at the end of Doe's visit, both he and Israeli President Herzog denounced "Libyan expansionism."70 And according to Israeli sources, Israel agreed to assist Liberia also in setting up its intelligence apparatus and to give it access to intelligence material on Libyan activities in Africa.71 Nonetheless, in contrast to Zaire, Liberia did not ask for military assistance; in fact, both Doe and his foreign minister denied signing a military accord with Israel, stressing technical cooperation in the civilian sphere. 72 It should be noted here that the small and disunited Muslim community in Liberia—about 10 percent of the total population—made Liberia's resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel comparatively easy. To sum up, a combination of factors led Zaire and Liberia to renew relations with Israel, among them: both rulers were military men with the ability to take decisive action; both were able to ignore the attitudes of those who opposed their decision; both regimes were pro-Western and believed they could benefit from Israeli know-how, especially security assistance, and from the Israeli lobby in the United States; both were disappointed with Arab aid; both resented Qadhafi's militant policies, especially his involvement in Chad; in both countries the Muslim population was small and uninfluential. Israeli Reactions and Expectations The renewal of diplomatic ties between Zaire and Israel was the most significant political event in Israeli-African relations in the last decade and an encouraging precedent from Israel's point of view. Nevertheless, it seems that Israel's assessment of the implications of these events on Israel's standing in Africa was exaggerated. This was due to an unrealistic appraisal of Arab strength in Africa, and a misinterpretation of African attitudes toward resumption of ties. In Israel and other Western countries, Zaire's move aroused high expectations and optimistic assessments by both politicians and journalists, who predicted a chain reaction whereby a number of

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African countries would, one after the other, restore diplomatic relations with Israel much as they had successively severed those ties in 1973. Among those mentioned as likely to take the first step were Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, Ghana, and the Central African Republic. The Israeli daily Ma'ariv, for example, published in large headlines on its front page a statement by the director of Zaire's presidential office that "many other African countries will follow Zaire's step and resume diplomatic relations with Israel." 73 Quoting diplomatic sources in Jerusalem, the paper said "It was expected, at any moment, that Gabon and other African countries would announce their renewal of ties." Another daily of wide circulation, Yedi'ot Aharonot, quoting from "well-informed sources in Paris," reported that "five or six African countries are on the verge of following Zaire's move. Two of them would do so in the very near future and one of these two was Gabon." 74 Other Israeli newspapers expressed similar optimism. 75 In an interview with Ma 'ariv, Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon said confidently: It is impossible that African countries will not be able to see the blessings of cooperating with Israel. It is impossible that they will not see the benefit of having relations with Israel. It is impossible that African leaders will not be envious of the independent decision of Mobutu. Therefore, even if it takes time, our activities in Zaire in a wide range of economic and agricultural activities will induce other African nations to resume relations with u s . 7 6

A new wave of optimism surfaced after Liberia renewed ties with Israel. Yedi'ot Aharonot quoted President Doe as saying that "in the 'near future' leaders from eight African countries would meet in Abidjan to discuss the renewal of relations with Israel and also to decide on ways and means to check Libya's expansionism." 77 The Jerusalem Post, under the headline "More African States Seen Resuming Ties," quoted diplomatic sources in Jerusalem saying that among the states which would resume relations with Israel shortly were Cote d'lvoire and Togo. 78 A few days later the Post wrote that the Central African Republic also planned to resume relations with Israel. 7 9 The same optimistic mood was expressed in the media of some Western countries. Yedi 'ot Aharonot quoted from the French weekly L'Express, which disclosed that the special African gathering in Abidjan mentioned above, which was due to discuss the renewal of ties with Israel, would take place in September 1983. 80 Among the participants mentioned were Cote d'lvoire, Togo, Senegal, and Gabon. Another French newspaper, Quotidien, predicted that in the

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wake of Liberia, Togo, Sierra Leone, Cote d'lvoire, and the Central African Republic would resume links with Israel.81 The French daily he Matin announced with confidence that Israel was returning to Africa and among the reasons it mentioned to explain this development, special emphasis was given to the fear of Qadhafi's p o l i c i e s . 8 2 The Miami Herald, under the headline "Fruits of Cooperation," wrote that "Israel's seeds of friendship with Black Africa, after long years of latency, finally seem ready to sprout into full, formal relations. . . . The Liberia-Israel renewal of ties therefore is an important sign of shifting alliances and political maturation." 83 These are only a few examples demonstrating the optimism that prevailed in Israel and elsewhere in the wake of Zaire's and Liberia's resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel. The same phenomenon repeated itself three years later in 1986, when Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon restored ties with Israel. Renewal of Relations by Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon There is no doubt that the most important reason behind Cote d'lvoire's resumption of full relations with Israel in February 1986 was President Houphouet-Boigny's friendship toward the Jewish state. This friendship has been so strong that when Cote d'lvoire was forced to break diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973 in accordance with the OAU resolution, Israel was still allowed to maintain a presence in Abidjan in the form of an Israeli interest office run by an Israeli diplomat who, in fact, acted as an ambassador. Israeli companies also continued large-scale construction and agriculture projects in Cote d'lvoire. The dialogue between President Houphouet-Boigny and Israeli leaders did not stop when formal diplomatic ties were cut; the former even held meetings with his Israeli counterpart, usually in Europe. This is why it was assumed that Cote d'lvoire would be the first African country to renew ties, especially since Arab aid to that country was negligible because of its continuing cooperation with Israel—particularly when compared with Western aid. A second reason why it was thought that Cote d'lvoire would be the next country to reestablish relations is because, as in the cases of Zaire and Liberia, Muslims constitute only a small percentage of the population, and have very little political influence. According to the Arab Bank for Economic Development's annual report for 1983, total bilateral and multilateral Arab aid promised to Cote d'lvoire between 1974 and 1981 came to only $58 million, of which $6 million

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was to be in concessional and $52 million in non-concessional loans. And although BADEA does not report on actual disbursements, another source gives the total net disbursement to Côte d'Ivoire between 1974 and 1981 as only $100,00a 84 Cameroon's announcement of its restoration of relations with Israel on August 26, 1986, six months after Côte d'Ivoire, was much more surprising since the Muslims there constitute about 30 percent of the population, and they are quite important politically. Indeed, Cameroon is even a member of the Islamic Conference Organization and has received aid from the Islamic Development Bank. Moreover, Arab aid commitments to Cameroon between 1974 and 1981 totalled $213.3 million in concessional and $48.8 million in nonconcessional loans. 8 5 What facilitated Cameroon's renewal of relations with Israel was the 1983 change of regime that brought about the resignation of Muslim President Ahmadou Ahidjo and the ascension to power of the Christian Paul Biya. After two unsuccessful Muslim attempts to unseat him in 1984—one by Ahidjo and another by Ahidjo's supporters in the presidential guard—Biya asked Israel to help him rebuild his security services and train and equip a new guard made up mostly of Christians. An Israeli interest office was opened in Yaoundé later in 1984, upon which Israeli army officers arrived and started their work. 8 6 It should also be mentioned that commercial and economic relations between the two countries were reestablished quietly in 1980, since that time the Israeli construction firm Solel Boneh has been building housing projects throughout the country. The close relationship between presidents Biya and HouphouëtBoigny also influenced Biya's decision to renew ties with Israel once Côte d'Ivoire had done so. Cameroon's moderate pro-Western stance and its generally good economic situation made it easier for that country to risk giving up Arab aid. Biya also hoped that restoring diplomatic relations with Israel might help him get really massive aid investments and expertise from the United States, where the Jewish lobby is influential. Cameroon's restoration of relations with Israel was much more ceremonial than that of Côte d'Ivoire in that it was announced publicly during Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres' state visit in August 1986, and Peres and his large entourage were welcomed with a lavish reception and much publicity. The joint communiqué issued on this occasion said that "new impetus was to be given" in the fields of agriculture, trade and industry, tourism, town planning and construction, and communication, as well as in the field of security, and the two countries decided to set up a joint commission to promote cooperation.87

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W h e n explaining his decision to renew diplomatic relations with Israel, President Biya said that C a m e r o o n "undertook a general réévaluation of the situation," adding that the "African nations first broke off relations with Israel because of its occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. N o w that Egypt and Israel have signed a peace treaty and Sinai has been returned, there was no reason for African nations not to resume relations." 8 8 And, at the U N General Assembly in September 1986, Foreign Affairs Minister William Eteki said that renewal of relations with Israel was carried out as "an exercise of sovereignty as well as in persuance of the country's policy of non-alignment." 8 9 As in the cases of Zaire and Liberia, the renewal of diplomatic relations with Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon gave rise to a new Israeli optimism regarding an imminent and extensive renewal of ties with many other African countries.

Notes 1. Ma'ariv (Israel), December 1, 1977. 2. Al-'Anba' (Jerusalem), January 3, 1979; Al-Quds (Jerusalem), March 6, 1979; Al-Akhbar (Egypt), July 5, 1979; Washington Post, September 8, 1979. 3. Ma'ariv (Israel), November 1, 1978. 4. Ghanaian Times, February 26, 1979. 5. Al-Quds (Jerusalem), January 29,1979. 6. Zambia Daily Mail, May 30, 1979. 7. U.N. General Assembly Papers A/35/PV 13, September 27,1980. 8. Daily Times (Malawi), October 1, 1981. 9. Daily Graphic (Ghana), December 15, 1979. 10. See, for example, The Standard (Kenya), December 22, 1977; Daily Nation (Kenya), March 29, 1979. 11. Al-Musawwar (Egypt), January 27,1984. 12. Sunday Times (Nigeria), January 27, 1980. 13. Daily Times (Nigeria), February 21,1980. 14. The draft motion is quoted in full in Nigerian Forum (July-August): 740-745. 15. Daily Times (Nigeria), September 20, 1979. 16. Sunday Observer (Nigeria), February 24, 1980. 17. The Punch (Nigeria), April 17,1980. Other dailies adopted this stand: see, for example, The Nigerian Chronicle, January 10, 1980; Sunday Observer (Nigeria), February 24, 1980; Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 1982; Satellite (Nigeria), April 20,1982. 18. Ghanaian Times, January 26, 1980. 19. Palavar (Ghana), December 7-13,1981. 20. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 12,1979. 21. Quoted in the New York Times, February 11, 1980.

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22. Jerusalem Post, August 14, 1983. 23. Daily Nation (Kenya), February 9, 1978; also The Standard (Kenya), March 10, 1978; Daily Graphic (Ghana), February 1, 1980; The Weekly Review (Kenya), July 19,1985, the letter to the editor by Peter K. Heha. 24. Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 1982. 25. Satellite (Nigeria), April 20, 1982; see also the Nigerian Tribune, February 24,1980. 26. Daily Times (Nigeria), December 11, 1979. 27. Nigerian Tribune, March 30, 1982. 28. The Echo (Ghana), February 3,1980. 29. Ghanaian Times, November 3, 1979. 30. See, for example, Christian Messenger (Ghana), December 1979, vol. IV, no. 12; Liberator (Ghana), February 24, 1980; Pioneer (Ghana), February 5,1980. 31. Nigerian Daily Times, September 20, 1979. 32. Daily Nation (Kenya), June 15,1979. 33. Sunday Observer (Nigeria), February 24, 1980; see also a letter to the editor in Daily Times (Nigeria), December 20, 1979; also Satellite (Nigeria), April 20,1982. 34. Ghanaian Times, November 3, 1979. See also, Daily Times (Nigeria), December 20, 1979; Daily Graphic (Ghana), January 24 and 29, 1980; Satellite (Nigeria), April 20, 1982. 35. Daily Nation (Kenya), July 12,1979. 36. The Standard (Kenya), July 12,1979. 37. Fraternité Matin (Abidjan), June 20, 1983; Jerusalem Post, June 28, 1983. 38. Sunday Observer (Nigeria), February 24, 1980. 39. Ghanaian Times, January 26, 1980. 40. Footprints Today (Liberia), August 8, 1985, 8. 41. L'Agence Zaïre-Presse (Kinshasa), May 21, 1982. 42. Israel Radio, May 20, 1982. 43. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), December 1, 1982. 44. BADE A Annual Report, 1983, 73. 45. Development Cooperation, 1982 Review, OECD (Paris), 1982. 46. Jerusalem Post, January 24, 1983. 47. Ibid., February 14,1983. 48. Ibid., August 7,1983. 49. Ibid., January 22,1984. 50. Elima (Zaire), May 23 and 27,1985. 51. FBIS (Washington, D.C.), May 22,1985, 51. 52. Salongo (Zaire), May 25-26,1985; Elima (Zaire), May 27, 1985. 53. Elima (Zaire), January 28, 1985; Jeune Afrique (Paris), February 13, 1985. 54. Jerusalem Post, August 14, 1983. 55. Reuters, September 4, 1983. 56. Jerusalem Post, August 28, 1983. 57. Ibid., August 25,1983.

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58. Ibid., August 16,1983. 59. West Africa (London), September 5, 1983. 60. Loc. cit. 61. Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1983. 62. Development Cooperation, 1982 Review, OECD (Paris), 224. 63. U.S. Hearing and Mark-up, Congressional subcommittee, 34, 35. 64. The Times of London, August 23, 1983; Time, September 5, 1983; Ma'ariv (Israel), August 15,1983); Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), August 26, 1983. 65. Quoted in West Africa (London), August 21,1983. 66. Jerusalem Post, August 24, 1983. 67. Quoted in West Africa (London), September 5, 1983. 68. Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1983. 69. October (Egypt), August 28, 1984; Al-Gumhuriyah (Egypt), August 29, 1984. 70. West Africa (London), September 5, 1983. 71. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), August 24, 1983; Ha'aretz (Israel), August 26,1983. 72. Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1983; West Africa (London), September 5,1983. 73. Ma'ariv (Israel), January 28,1983. 74. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), May 16-17, 1982. 75. Ha'aretz (Israel), May 16, 1982; Al-Hamishmar (Israel), May 17, 1982. 76. Ma'ariv (Israel), January 28,1983. 77. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), August 14, 1983. 78. Jerusalem Post, August 21, 1983. 79. Ibid., August 25,1983. 80. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), August 29, 1983. 81. Quotidien (Paris), August 24, 1983. 82. Le Matin (Paris), August 24, 1983. 83. Miami Herald, August 25, 1983. 84. Aid from OPEC, OECD (Paris, 1983): 160-167. 85. BADEA Annual Report (Khartoum, 1983): 73. 86. Chicago Tribune, September 7, 1986. 87. Davar (Israel), August 28, 1986. 88. New York Times, August 26, 1986. 89. West Africa (London), October 20, 1986.

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CHAPTER NINE

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Factors Disturbing Afro-Israeli Relations Optimistic forecasts that many more African countries would soon follow Zaire and Liberia by renewing relations with Israel have yet to materialize. Even Liberia waited for a relatively long time before deciding to follow Zaire in this direction. Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon did not resume relations with Israel until February and August 1986, respectively. Other friendly African countries, such as Kenya, Togo, and Gabon have still not done so. Questions have risen both in and outside Israel as to why the prediction that if one African country dared to renew ties with Israel many others would follow suit has thus far missed the mark, and why Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and the peace agreement with Egypt has not significantly improved Israel's position in Africa. In order to arrive at a more realistic appraisal of possible developments in the relations between Israel and Africa, it must be borne in mind that changes have taken place in Africa's attitudes toward the Middle East since relations were ruptured in 1973. These changes were reflected in the Arab and African reactions to Zaire's and Liberia's move. It has now become obvious that, for the majority of African nations, Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai has ceased to be the sole or deciding factor affecting a restoration of relations. Other considerations have either emerged or acquired greater significance since 1973. For instance, it is impossible to ignore the Arabs' strengthened political and economic position in Africa since 1973, or their intensified propaganda operations on that continent. As a result of their improved standing, the Arabs have managed to transform the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Palestinian problem i n particular, into major "African issues" that must be resolved before there can be an i m p r o v e m e n t in A f r i c a n - I s r a e l i r e l a t i o n s .

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Furthermore, the Africans are today increasingly resentful of the Israel-South Africa connection, largely due to successful Arab propaganda. Finally, Egypt has not helped Israel in its efforts to return to Africa; on the contrary, Egypt acted to block such resumption of relations. Arab Reactions to the Resumption of Relations Zaire's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Israel alarmed the Arab states and spurred them to action, particularly in those African nations pinpointed by the media as being on the verge of following Zaire. The Arabs did not limit themselves to verbal condemnation of Zaire's initiative, but threatened to take concrete steps to punish those states that changed their attitude towards Israel. Saudi Arabia, a major aid donor, was the first to sever diplomatic relations with Zaire on May 18, 1982.1 Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq, and Bangladesh did the same in short order. Others, such as Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Iran, and Pakistan, recalled their representatives from Kinshasa. BADEA denounced Zaire's act as a gross infringement of Afro-Arab solidarity and announced its decision to stop all aid to Zaire. The Arab League, as well as the PLO, sent high-ranking emissaries to Africa to convince them not to resume ties with Israel. 2 Islamic Conference Organization Secretary-General Habib al-Shati asked the fortyone member-states to cut ties with Zaire. 3 The Arab countries emphasized that Zaire's move harmed not only the Arabs, but also the OAU. Chedly Klibi, secretary-general of the Arab League, issued the following statement on May 17,1982: Zaire's action constitutes an a b a n d o n m e n t of the principles adopted by African and Arab states at the first African-Arab Summit Conference in March 1977 and an evasion of resolutions adopted by conferences of the Organization of African Unity, the last of which w a s the Nairobi Summit Conference resolution, to continue the rupture in relations with Israel. 4

Official Arab reaction to Liberia's action was less vocal, but the Arab press was very harsh and threatening. A typical official reaction was that of the Arab League's secretary-general, who issued a statement expressing deep regret at the decision of the Liberian government to resume diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. The statement recalled "Israel's support for the racist

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regime of South Africa" and the common stand of all African nations against that relationship. "We further believe that this step by the Liberian government is a serious deviation from the recognized principles of African cooperation and a breach of the consensus of our entire commitment." The statement ended by expressing the hope that the Liberian government "will reconsider its decision and adhere throughout to the principles according to which our African and Arab nations struggle."5 The director-general of BADEA stated a few days later that the bank had decided to stop all aid to Liberia.6 The foreign ministers of the six countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation council—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar—decided unanimously to sever all political and economic relations with any state that resumed diplomatic ties with Israel.7 The governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Iran, Libya, and the leadership of the PLO condemned Liberia's move. Kuwait also criticized the United States for welcoming Liberia's decision. Libya's official reaction was the sharpest. Abdel Salam Jallud, Libya's number two leader after Qadhafi, denounced the visit to Israel by Liberian leader Samuel Doe as "an insult to Africa. . . . Regretfully, we find an agent of Zionism, racism and imperialism challenging the will of Africa by visiting the Zionist enemy.. . . The visit of the president of Liberia constitutes a challenge to the OAU."8 The Arab League's council of foreign ministers recommended to the Arab League summit that all aid to Liberia be cut and that economic and diplomatic ties be broken with her. The group also urged that Arab diplomatic delegations be sent to Africa to dissuade others from resuming diplomatic relations with Israel.9 In the Arab press, however, Liberia's move was termed an insult to the OAU, one that undermined Afro-Arab solidarity, and would encourage Israel's "aggressive policy" and cooperation with South Africa. 10 The Arab press also criticized the Arab governments for neglecting cooperation with Africa and for not giving enough aid. In Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the press blamed Liberia's decision on the lack of Arab unity, which enabled Israel to promote her interests in Africa.11 The press in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq blamed the renewal of Liberian-Israeli relations on Qadhafi's subversive activities, which, according to these writers, pushed African countries into Israel's arms. 12 Libya's press, for its part, blamed Egypt, noting that "the gains achieved by the Zionist entity of penetrating the dark continent is no doubt one of the results of the Camp David Middle East Agreements between Egypt and Israel."13 The steps taken against Liberia were not as harsh as those taken

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against Zaire. Despite their threats, Liberia still maintains diplomatic relations with Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Mauritania. In Monrovia there are resident ambassadors from Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, and Morocco, and nonresident ambassadors from Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. Liberia has resident ambassadors in Cairo and Beirut and nonresident ambassadors in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It was only a year after Liberia's decision, in August 1984, that Kuwait announced her decision to break off all diplomatic and economic ties with Liberia. Up to now, no other Arab country has followed suit. The explanation lies in the Arab hope that they can still persuade Liberia to change its decision by diplomatic means, especially since the harsh measures taken against Zaire were not successful. Another factor may be connected to the disputes in the Arab world, which were exacerbated during this period: the Gulf War, the crisis within the PLO, and the war in Lebanon. Arab reactions to Cote d'lvoire's resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel were generally moderate: the secretarygeneral of the Arab League sent a protest note to President Houphouet-Boigny; BADEA announced that it would halt even the small loans it had been giving to Cote d'lvoire. Individual Arab states did not react publicly, and those Arab countries with diplomatic missions in Abidjan—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon—did not close them. The only Arab threat to close embassies in Abidjan came when Cote d'lvoire decided to locate its embassy in Jerusalem, a decision that President Houphouet-Boigny has since rescinded. Neither was any practical Arab action taken when Cameroon reestablished ties with Israel. Instead the Arabs contented themselves with announcing their protest collectively through an August 27,1986 announcement expressing grave regret and condemnation of the resumption of diplomatic relations b e t w e e n C a m e r o o n and Israel. . . . The C a m e r o o n President's d e c i s i o n constitutes a violation of his country's commitments to the resolution of the 1977 Arab-African Summit, the s u c c e s s i v e resolutions of the O A U and the a g r e e m e n t s contracted b e t w e e n the Arab League and the O A U regarding boycotting South Africa and the Zionist e n t i t y . . . . The decision to r e s u m e relations constitutes a severe b l o w to the liberation struggle carried out by the Arab and African people against the Pretoria and Zionist regimes. 1 4

It is interesting to note here how the Arab League again connected

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Israel with South Africa and Zionism with apartheid, hinting that if the Africans want help in the struggle against South Africa and apartheid, they should not desert the Arabs in their struggle against Israel and Zionism. However, no Arab embassy was withdrawn from Yaounde, nor was Cameroon's membership in the ICO canceled. In fact, Cameroon was the only Black African participant having diplomatic relations with Israel to send a delegate to the ICO summit held in Kuwait in January 1977, although rather than having the president attend, the deputy minister of foreign affairs was sent instead.

African Arguments Against Renewal of Ties. Since 1973, there has been a continuing debate on the renewal of links with Israel. While Israel's supporters call for the reestablishment of ties, others justify the continued rupture. 15 Most prominent among the opposition is the claim that while Israel's conquest of Egyptian territory in the 1973 war was one of the major causes for the break in relations, Israel has meanwhile committed other acts counter to OAU principles, e.g., expanding relations with South Africa. Therefore Israel's returning Egyptian territory was not enough to justify lifting the ban. 16 This argument was used by the Egyptians themselves to justify their opposition to Israeli-African ties. Israel's relations with South Africa is one of the most frequently cited arguments. It is claimed that, since 1973, Israel has expanded such ties in the political, economic, and military spheres. Cooperation in the development of nuclear weapons is considered especially serious. Moreover, it was claimed that Israel's military cooperation not only encouraged South Africa to continue its apartheid policy, but also endangered the security of African countries. According to Professor A. B. Akinyemi, director general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, "Thanks to Israel, the strategic and security imbalances between Nigeria and South Africa have been adversely and negatively widened to the detriment of Nigeria and Africa as a whole." 17 This argument, fully exploited by the Arabs, was mentioned by nearly all of Israel's detractors, but especially by Nigeria, which considered the struggle against South Africa as one of the mainstays of its foreign policy. For example, when Nigeria's President Shagari explained his objections to resuming ties with Israel, he emphasized that Israel's close links with South Africa frustrated all prospects of coming to an

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agreement with her. 1 8 Shagari and others claim that the Arabs, unlike Israel, rejected diplomatic relations with South Africa and helped to enforce the diplomatic boycott against that country. This "sacrifice" was made solely in order to show solidarity with Africa; thus Africa should also show solidarity with the Arab countries, according to this argument. 19 Indeed, Israeli relations with South Africa expanded greatly in the 1970s and 1980s, both politically and economically. In 1974, Israel upgraded its representation in Pretoria from consulate to embassy. In 1976, Prime Minister B. J. Vorster visited Israel and the event received wide publicity both in Israel and abroad. More recently, President P. W. Botha visited Israel. El Al, Israel's national airline, r u n s weekly flights to Johannesburg. Israeli leaders, including several government ministers, have likewise visited South Africa. Israeli exports to South Africa, which in 1974 totalled $23.9 million, reached $177.5 million in 1984. Imports from South Africa increased during this period from $54.3 million to $183.4 million. 20 Well-informed sources, sympathetic to Israel, admit that Israel has supplied six Reshef-class missile boats to protect the South African coastline. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Israel also sold Gabriel 2 missiles for these boats. 21 While Israel does not hide the existence of political and trade relations with South Africa, it strongly denies that there has been any military or nuclear cooperation. Israel claims that her overall trade with South Africa is less than one percent of South Africa's total trade with the world, which includes Western countries, the Eastern bloc, and Africa. Israel complains of the double moral standard that singles it out from all other countries trading with South Africa and having diplomatic and military links. 22 Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Israeli-South African relations are one of the major factors hampering the progress of Israel-Africa relations. They are used against Israel by both the Arabs and those African circles that object to the renewal of diplomatic relations. 23 Another argument often heard is that since the decision to cut relations with Israel was passed by the whole OAU, any change in policy must be taken collectively by the same organization. Otherwise, it is claimed, the power and prestige of the OAU would be severely damaged. 2 4 The opinion that the OAU is the proper forum to decide relations with Israel was supported by Kenya's President Arap Moi when he chaired the OAU, even though his

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country is considered friendly to Israel and maintains economic and technical cooperation projects with her. 25 The Palestinian issue is also important to those Africans who opposed the reestablishment of ties with Israel. As long as the Palestinian problem is not solved, they argue, it is necessary to continue the boycott against Israel. This argument was also cited by African countries considered moderate, such as Kenya and Cote d'lvoire. They have called on Israel to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. President Senghor of Senegal, who was active in trying to find a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict, frequently declared that as long as Israel would not withdraw from the occupied territories, he would not resume relations with it. 26 Many Africans emphasize the need to show solidarity with the Palestinians as "front-line fighters against a neo-colonialist o u t p o s t . " 2 7 Further, it is claimed that the central issue of the Middle East crisis is the Palestinian problem and, therefore, as long as it is not solved, the tension in the area will continue. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, for example, while visiting Sweden in 1985, conditioned the renewal of relations with Israel on solving the Palestinian question. 28 The Weekly Review of Kenya editorialized that the withdrawal of the Israelis from Sinai was not enough. "The very Camp David Accords which won back the Sinai for Egypt logically call for Israel to address herself to the next stage of the peace negotiations that involves direct participation by the Palestinians in determining their own future. Without the Palestinians, peace in the Middle East will remain elusive." 29 In African countries where Muslims constitute an important segment of the population it is also argued that there was a need to show solidarity with the Muslim world. Nigeria's President Shagari, during the election campaign of 1983, criticized his rival for demanding renewal of relations with Israel when such a step would alienate Saudi Arabia, the "spiritual home" of Nigeria's Muslims. 30 All of the above arguments were stated publicly, but, for obvious reasons, some of the real causes deterring Africans from resuming relations with Israel were not stated publicly. The fear of Arab reprisals, such as the stopping of financial aid, or even the threat of subversive activities against their regimes also work to deter Africans from reestablishing ties with Israel. 31 It also seems that some African countries, such as Kenya, adopt an attitude of realpolitik: Why lose the benefits of Arab friendship when they can get what they need from Israel without establishing diplomatic relations?

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African Reactions to Zaire's Initiative. When Zaire reestablished diplomatic ties with Israel, most of the arguments mentioned above were raised by those who disapproved of the move. Most African countries stated that they had no intention of following Zaire in resuming ties with Israel. They indicated that the resumption of ties depended on solving the Palestinian problem. This was the reaction of Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Gabon, Togo, the Central African Republic, Benin, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mali, Senegal, and Cameroon. Interestingly, among the first to react publicly were those moderate countries that had accepted an Israeli diplomat as an interest officer, such as Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Gabon, and Togo. The reason can probably be traced to the press reports published in Israel and abroad naming those countries as likely to resume relations with Israel. Cote d'lvoire, for example, reacted by refuting all speculations, announcing in May 1982 that "it has no intention of resuming its diplomatic ties with Israel."32 Ghana emphasized that it would not renew its links with Israel because of Israel's connection with South Africa. 33 Gabon, whose President Omar Bongo had converted to Islam, stressed his loyalty to the Islamic Conference Organization's resolutions and his commitment to solidarity with the Islamic world. 34 These announcements probably strengthened the obligation these countries felt in sticking to Arab policies that objected to the renewal of relations with Israel. It seems that the negative reactions of moderate African states such as Cote d'lvoire were also influenced at that time by the fact that Zaire's President Mobutu did not consult with them before taking his decision. A small group of African countries, including Chad, Comoro, Congo, and Mauritius, denounced Zaire's move. Others such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania, did not react officially. Some countries, while expressing reservations about Zaire's step, did, however, a d d that all decisions pertaining to the establishment or rupture of diplomatic relations were the sole responsibility of the country concerned, and that each sovereign country was free to make its own decisions on its internal and external relations without outside interference. Thus, President Kaunda of Zambia announced that while he did not intend to resume ties with Israel "as long as Arab lands were occupied and the Palestinians were deprived of their rights," he was of the opinion that each country was entitled to set its own foreign relations. Therefore, Kaunda did not denounce Zaire, even though he made the above statement when he was on a tour of the Gulf countries. 35 A

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similar stand was taken by Benin, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon. Benin's government, for example, while expressing its full support for the PLO and its struggle for an independent state, stated that Benin would not intervene in other countries' affairs and in their sovereign decisions. 3 6 It is clear that if such an opinion prevails among more African states, it is bound to weaken the 1973 OAU decision that called for the severing of ties with Israel. African Reactions to Liberia's Move It seems that Liberia's move did not promote the strong repercussions in Africa that Zaire's had. Reactions to Liberia's move were few in number and, in general, moderate in tone. Even those expressing reservations did not condemn Liberia, directing their criticism against Israel. In an interview on Israeli television (August 24, 1983) Liberia's Foreign Minister Eastmen said, "We communicated with all our brothers, informing them that it was the time to disengage from nonreality, and we got no negative response." In fact, Liberia gave notice of its intention at the OAU's nineteenth summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983 when Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe called on African leaders to "adopt a new and more constructive attitude to Israel." 37 Liberia had already expressed similar views at the UN General Assembly. Therefore, Liberia's action was not altogether unexpected. Senegal, which strongly denied any intention of resuming diplomatic relations with Israel, was one of the few to react to Doe's decision. It seems that Senegal found it necessary to react publicly because the French weekly L 'Express had written that in the wake of Liberia's move, African representatives from Senegal, Togo, Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, and the Central African Republic would meet in Abidjan to discuss the possibility of resuming ties with Israel. Senegal denied the report, saying that it would not resume diplomatic relations with Israel as long as the Palestinian people were denied their rights to a state of their own. 38 Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, at a press conference at the UN, expressed disappointment that Zaire and Liberia had recognized Israel: "It was regrettable. The Palestinian cause cannot be served by normalizing relations with Israel." Mugabe added that Zimbabwe would not follow suit.39 In Kenya, although the press did not denounce Liberia, the general opinion was that the time was not ripe for the resumption of

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relations with Israel as long as the OAU did not change its resolution and as long as Israel maintained wide-range cooperation with South Africa. The Daily Nation expressed the general view when it wrote in an editorial: Israel has not provided African nations with convincing reasons why they should renege on their obligation to the OAU. So far all it has offered is a promise of technical cooperation. While m a n y African nations need it, it is not enough to offset the political and economic considerations involved in boycott. It may be true that Arab aid has been far short of African expectations, but it is much more than what Israel could possibly o f f e r . . . . Israel has identified itself closely with South Africa, and is cooperating with it in raising its military capability. Renewing links without Israel's cutting its links with the racist regime will be rewarding its collusion with an enemy.40

African Reactions to the Moves of Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon In contrast to what happened when Zaire and Liberia resumed ties with Israel, there were almost no protests against Cote d'lvoire from Black African countries. It seems that the prestige of HouphouetBoigny, a veteran leader who is generally regarded in Africa as experienced, careful, and judicious, was strong enough to carry the day. Further, Houphouet-Boigny's action had been expected for a long time, especially because close cooperation between the two countries had continued even after the formal break. And his prestige made the step taken by Cote d'lvoire much more significant that those of Zaire and Liberia, no doubt having an impact on Cameroon President Paul Biya's decision to renew relations six months later. It seems that by the time Cameroon decided to reestablish ties with Israel, Black Africa had become used to the process. The fact that there were no condemnations seems to indicate that these countries acquiesced in the opinion that every country is entitled to have diplomatic relations with whom it wishes. The reaction of OAU Chairman Sassou Nguesso of Congo may also be considered moderate. Although he said on Brazaville television in August 1986 that African countries should not resume relations with Israel until the Palestinian question was solved, he also pointed out that Cameroon was a sovereign state and should as such, make its own decisions regarding diplomatic relations.

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Egyptian Activities Against Israel The main argument put forward by those advocating renewal of ties with Israel—what might be called the "Egyptian" argument—held that most African countries severed diplomatic links with Israel out of solidarity with Egypt. But, according to this reasoning, now that Egypt had itself established diplomatic relations with Israel, there was no longer any justification for continuing the boycott. This argument lost much of its force, however, because of Egypt's weak standing in Africa compared to those Arab rivals who objected to the Camp David accords, a weakness that became especially noticeable in the years immediately after the signing of the accords. Moreover, in recent years, particularly since President Mubarak assumed power in October 1981, Egypt has itself acted to block an Israeli-African rapprochement. Regarding the first point, the balance of power between Egypt and its Arab rivals at the OAU conferences has changed to Egypt's disadvantage since the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978. On the eve of the 1979 Monrovia conference, there was hope that the restoration of relations between Israel and Africa would be considered by the OAU. Not only was the issue not raised, but Egypt itself faced a difficult struggle against an alliance of Arab-African states that demanded her expulsion from the OAU because of the Camp David accords. The majority of African states objected to such an extreme step, but a resolution was nonetheless passed condemning the accords. Furthermore, several extreme anti-Israeli resolutions were passed, with Egypt voting in favor. By 1980, at the OAU summit conference in Freetown, the situation had not changed much. Egypt managed to thwart a resolution explicitly condemning the Camp David accords, but it again joined in resolutions sharply critical of Israel, thus earning—at Israel's expense—a toning-down of the anti-Egyptian sentiments of the Arab rejectionist states. At the eighteenth OAU summit conference in Nairobi in 1981, the Arab states, headed by Libya and Algeria, launched another effort to condemn the Camp David accords. Once again Egypt succeeded in blocking them after a difficult struggle, and once more she joined in resolutions denouncing Israel. The same story, with slight variations, was played out at the nineteenth summit conference in Addis Ababa in 1983 and at successive OAU conferences. Egypt must be prepared for more struggles on this issue. Regarding the second point, Egypt made no effort to induce other

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African states to follow in establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. On the contrary, Egypt advised them to wait until a solution to the Palestinian problem was found. At the 1981 OAU conference in Nairobi, Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali stated that Egypt would not try to persuade African countries to follow its lead. Ghali stated that "Egypt cannot dictate Africa's stance in international relations, despite her diplomatic ties with Israel. This is because African nations are sovereign states." 41 Later, in an interview given to The Standard of Kenya, Ghali was asked whether Egypt and Israel would adopt a joint approach to Africa. He answered in the negative: "Relations between African states are controlled by the charter of the OAU" and Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai and the peace treaty were insufficient in and of themselves to change the position of the OAU and the African states with regard to Israel. 42 Egypt's reservations about Israel's return to Africa were clarified in another interview that Ghali gave to the Egyptian weekly Al-Musawwar. Asked how Egypt viewed Israel's efforts to renew ties with Africa, he answered, "African countries are morally committed to support the Arabs' rights and Palestinian rights and to use every means to exert pressure on Israel; within these means, not to renew relations with her until she carries out international resolutions." 43 Since President Mubarak came to power, Egypt's position in Africa has gradually improved. Egypt is hopeful that by strengthening its standing in Africa and in the Third World in general, it will reduce its isolation in the Arab world and even induce the Arab countries to lift their boycott. The Arab countries, Egypt hoped, would need Egypt's political backing on Middle East issues in international forums. Therefore, during Mubarak's presidency, Egypt greatly increased its diplomatic and economic activities in Africa. Egypt's efforts showed results when it was elected to the UN Security Council for 1984, mainly due to the support of the African bloc in the UN. Again, in 1984, the African countries, headed by Guinea's President Sekou Toure, helped Egypt gain readmittance to the Islamic Conference Organization from which it was expelled after signing the Camp David accords in 1978. But even while Egypt strengthened its position in Africa, it intensified its criticism of Israel. For example, President Mubarak visited in Africa in February 1984 to demonstrate Egypt's devotion to the Palestinian and Arab cause and to counter Israel's diplomatic efforts on the continent. In the course of his visit to Zaire, Kenya,

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Somalia, and Tanzania, Mubarak and his aids publicly attacked Israel's policy in Lebanon and in the West Bank, describing it as a racist state that cooperated with the apartheid regime of South Africa. At the same time, Mubarak expressed support for the PLO and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. These statements were an obvious hint to the Africans, designed to instruct them on how Egypt expected them to treat Israel.44 Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali, expressed Egypt's opinion of Afro-Israeli relations in even more blatant terms when he visited Nigeria in March 1984. Ghali urged Nigeria not to renew diplomatic links with Israel, arguing that Palestinian interests were best served by a "carrot and stick policy." Egypt, he explained, "had a leverage over Israel because it had renewed ties with her. Nigeria also had influence because of its break with the Jewish State. In this way we use the carrot. You [Nigerians] have the stick—use it." 45 With such reasoning, Ghali succeeded in explaining why Egypt demanded Africa not resume relations with Israel even while she herself had renewed them. As already mentioned, Egypt's press was even more adamant in its objections to the renewal of Afro-Israeli relations, and criticized all those that did so.46 To sum up, Egypt's activities against Israel in Africa, especially under President Mubarak—when Egypt's position in Africa was improving—constitute another factor which undermines Israel's efforts on the continent. Arab Moves to Check Recent Israeli Advances in Africa The renewal of relations between Israel and four African countries aggravated the Arab-Israeli political struggle in Africa. Israel, for its part, tried to take advantage of its new gains by inducing other countries to follow the example of Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, and Cameroon. The Arab states countered with intensified efforts to close the gap that had been opened in the "wall of Afro-Arab solidarity." In Israel, it had been believed for many years that the main obstacle to the renewal of ties lay in the fact no African country dared to be the first. Therefore there were high hopes that if one country were to resume ties, others would soon follow suit. This is why Israel tried to use the precedent of Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, and Cameroon as a springboard from which to reopen ties with other Black African states. At the same time, a special effort was made to intensify

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economic and technical cooperation with these four countries in order to entice others to follow suit. For example, Defence Minister Ariel Sharon noted, after he had signed the accords with Zaire, that Israel's position in Africa would be upgraded when Zaire's neighbors saw the effective assistance being given to President Mobutu. "Once Black Africa compares what the Arab states and Israel are capable of proving, the prospects of Israel's political comeback will be vastly improved," 47 Sharon said. It was clear that if Israel's African friends were able to overcome Arab pressure and did not suffer politically and economically from an Arab Boycott, other countries might be encouraged to follow them. Since 1983, Israeli envoys, including the director-general of the f o r e i g n ministry, have visited African countries with whom Israel had no diplomatic relations in an effort to renew ties with them. 48 In January 1984, President Chaim Herzog visited Zaire and Liberia in an effort to consolidate and strengthen Israeli cooperation with them. Herzog was accompanied by a large number of businessmen and experts in various fields, and in the wake of his visit more cooperation agreements were signed. In Liberia, a joint communiqué was issued stating that "the government of Israel and its people will recruit the goodwill of the Jewish world in order to assist Liberia in its effort to improve its economic situation and the standard of living of its population." 49 As mentioned, the hope of receiving political and economic assistance from U.S. Jewry was one of the factors that induced Zaire and Liberia to renew ties with Israel. Another crucial visit was that of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to Cameroon in August 1986; for it was during this visit that diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored. Israel also tried to urge some moderate African countries to simultaneously declare their renewal of relations. The Israeli media frequently refers to the possibility of convening such a gathering but, up to now, this idea has not materialized. 50 As was expected, the Arab countries reacted to Israel's African offensive by intensifying their own efforts. The Arabs reacted against Zaire and Liberia both verbally—through statements and threats published in the media—and practically, by enforcing sanctions against the wayward transgressors of A f r o - A r a b solidarity. Israel's success in Zaire and Liberia gave rise once again to Arab self-criticism. An effort was made to analyze the reasons that enabled Israel's return to Africa. The Arab media blamed Arab leaders for not doing enough in the areas of foreign aid, economic cooperation, and propaganda, thus abandoning the field to Israeli

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initiatives. Several Arab countries were criticized for maintaining diplomatic and economic links with Zaire and Liberia, thereby breaking the Arab League boycott and encouraging other African states to follow suit. 51 A Saudi newspaper, for example, wondered, "why the Arabs did not send agricultural experts in order to help African countries in their efforts to develop their economy and thus improve their image and decrease the importance of Israel." 52 Another newspaper noted the Africans' complaints that the Arabs did not invest in Africa, and argued that it was necessary to correct this omission. 5 3 A Kuwaiti daily published an interview with Abdallah Adam, who was in charge of Afro-Arab relations in the Arab League, in which Adam analyzed the reasons for Israel's success and listed the steps that the Arabs should take to check her advance. 5 4 Others attributed Israel's gains to the rivalries in the Arab world that distracted attention from developments in Africa. 55 Egypt's opponents, Libya and Syria, put the blame on the EgyptianIsraeli peace agreement, 5 6 while Egypt and its supporters, Iraq, Sudan, and Jordan, saw the main cause of Arab failures in Africa's fear of Qadhafi. 57 An Egyptian weekly pointed out that the Arab countries did not fulfill their promises of aid. 58 The Arab media repeatedly warned that in the wake of the many visits to Africa of David Kimche, the director-general of Israel's ministry of foreign affairs, several African countries intended to reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel before the end of 1984. The Arab states were urged to wake up and to increase their activities. Similar reactions were heard after Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon renewed relations with Israel in 1986. 59 Another fact that is considered significant is that the second Afro-Arab summit, which was due to be held in 1980, has not yet been convened. 60 The Arab states, in their efforts to check Israel's advance in Africa, are presently increasing their efforts to convene the second Afro-Arab summit in 1987. They hope that the summit will persuade the African leaders to comply with the OAU decisions calling for the severing of diplomatic relations with Israel. 6 1 The Arabs are also attempting to block Israel's advances in Africa giving special attention to those countries mentioned by observers as likely candidates to follow Zaire and Liberia, such as Kenya, Gabon, and Togo. President Mubarak's visit to Kenya in February 1984 was mentioned above. In April 1984, the UAE president also made an official visit to Kenya which resulted in a communiqué signed jointly with his host, Kenya's President Arap Moi, which supported Arab policies and called for the

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establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO. 6 2 Saudi Arabia increased aid to Kenya's development projects while forbidding Israeli companies from participating in the tenders, such as the one for the construction of a 125-kilometer road financed jointly by the Saudi Fund for Development and the Kenyan government. The tender clearly indicated that interested contractors must provide a boycott certificate together with their application to prove that they have no contacts with Israel. It should be noted that in the past, Kenya had objected to Arab boycott activities. Arab activity also intensified in Gabon. The Arab bulletin Kul al-'Arab disclosed that at the 1984 Islamic summit held in Morocco, attended by Gabon's President Omar Bongo, the Arab countries promised to increase both aid and the number of embassies in Libreville "in order to counter the Zionist expansion." 63 And before Cote d'lvoire reestablished ties with Israel, the secretary-general of the Arab League and a representative of BADEA met, in May 1983, with President Houphouet-Boigny in Abidjan and offered him aid and soft loans for various development projects in the hope that he would not follow the example of Zaire and Liberia. 64 According to Jeune Afrique, Houphouet-Boigny criticized the Arabs' pressure tactics and their efforts to dictate policy. 65 The development of relations between Israel and Zaire and Liberia also spurred the Arab states to increase their representation in Africa. Since 1983, several Arab League delegations visited East and West Africa in order to "frustrate the efforts of the Zionists in Africa." 6 6 In addition, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat has given increased attention to Africa since Zaire and Liberia resumed diplomatic relations with Israel. In February and March 1983, a special PLO envoy visited C6te d'lvoire, Tanzania, and Kenya. In January 1984, Arafat himself visited Senegal and C6te d'lvoire, and in February 1984 another PLO special envoy visited Nigeria, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, the Seychelles, and Mozambique. 67 In March 1983, Zimbabwe and Nigeria announced an agreement to open PLO diplomatic missions in their countries. 68 In August 1984, Yasser Arafat embarked on another African tour, visiting Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, whose heads of state repeated publicly their unequivocal support for the Palestinian cause and for the struggle against Israel. In Tanzania, for example, after meeting President Nyerere, Arafat warned African nations that restored diplomatic ties with Israel that "the Zionist State was using them to spread its propaganda through the continent." 69

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During this visit, Arafat placed special emphasis on the "South African-Israeli connection" and its dangers to Africa. In Zimbabwe, Arafat was given a head of state's reception with a twenty-one-gun salute. He was met at Harare airport by President Mugabe, who expressed his full support for the PLO and harshly condemned Israel. The Herald, Zimbabwe's largest-selling daily, accused Israel of seeking to impose, in cooperation with South Africa, "a political, economic and military hegemony based on racism." 70 Arafat's visit no doubt hardened Zimbabwean resolve not to reestablish relations with Israel. Moreover, it seems that the Arabs have not given up hope that Zaire and Liberia will reverse their decisions and rejoin the Arab camp. A Lebanese weekly disclosed in June 1984 that the Arab League was trying to renew contacts with these two countries by offering them increased aid if they would sever relations with Israel. 7 1 In the course of 1986, PLO leader Yasser Arafat made three rounds of visits to Africa, where he visited twenty-one countries in East and West Africa. His main objectives in these visits were to open new PLO offices and to prevent African countries from renewing ties with Israel. In their wake, new PLO diplomatic offices were opened in Ghana, Benin, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, and Togo, bringing the number of PLO embassies in Africa to eighteen, and the total number of diplomatic offices to twenty-seven. 72 The PLO and the Arab states consider every occasion on which diplomatic status is granted to PLO offices as an erosion in Israel's position in Africa. 7 3 Whereas the Arab countries could not prevent Cote d'lvoire's and Cameroon's renewal of ties with Israel, to date their efforts in Togo have been more successful. After Cameroon restored relations with Israel, the media, particularly in Israel, predicted that Togo would soon follow suit. But when it was disclosed that Togo President Gnassingbe Eyadema had promised an Israeli delegation that he would announce renewal of relations with Israel during his party's annual conference in December 1986, the Arab countries intensified their pressure on Togo by sending Arab League and PLO delegations to dissuade Eyadema from taking the step. 74 In fact, Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, the former representative in Jerusalem of the Greek Catholic patriarch (who had been imprisoned by Israel for smuggling PLO arms to Lebanon), was one of Arafat's envoys to President Eyadema. 75 Obviously the Arab efforts paid off, for Togo has not yet renewed relations with Israel and has allowed a PLO embassy to open in Lome.

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Conclusion The issue of diplomatic relations with Israel has received and continues to receive considerable attention among African decision makers, scholars, and journalists, as well as at OAU meetings, where Israel is usually criticized on ideological and moral grounds and African solidarity with the Arabs, especially Palestinians, is usually stressed. Israeli economic and military ties with South Africa are also used to justify the continued diplomatic boycott of Israel. But it is Arab threats of political and economic sanctions against countries that resume ties with Israel that really influence most African attitudes toward the Middle East conflict. The fact that African arguments against Israel are more common than those against the Arabs illustrates that, despite frequent African criticism of the Arabs, the latter's influence is still very strong in Africa. Nevertheless, the view that diplomatic relations should be left to the discretion of each country is also gaining growing support as, one by one, some African countries do dare to reestablish ties with Israel. Even the Arab countries reacted less harshly to Cote d'lvoire's and Cameroon's decision in 1986 than they had to Zaire's four years earlier. This mellowing was a result of growing African resentment of Arab efforts to dictate African policy on the Middle East and of the political strings attached to Arab aid. Lately, however, the Arabs have been trying to influence their African allies more by persuasion than by threats. In the meantime, Israel's partial success in renewing relations with four African countries out of the thirty that severed them has induced the Arabs to intensify their activities to check any further Israeli advances.

Notes 1. AFP from Khartoum, May 1 2 , 1 9 8 2 . 2. Daily Nation (Kenya), May 29, 1982; Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), May 26,1982. 3. AFP from Jiddah, May 1 2 , 1 9 8 2 . 4. N e w s release by the League of Arab States, A L / N R / 2 2 / 8 2 , N e w York, May 12,1982. 5. News release by the League of Arab States, A L / 1 8 / 8 3 , N e w York, August 16,1983. 6. Al-Medina (Saudi Arabia), August 21, 1983. 7. Reuters, August 27, 1983.

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8. Reuters, August 23,1983. 9. Al-Mustaqbal (Paris), September 17, 1983. 10. 'Ukäz (Saudi Arabia), August 15, 1983; Al-Sha'b (Jordan), August 15, 1983; Al-Gumhuria (Iraq), August 13, 1983; Al-Sha'b (Algeria), August 23, 1983; Al-Räya (Qatar), August 17, 1983; Al-Thaura (North Yemen), August 15, 1983. 11. 'Ukäz (Saudi Arabia), August 15, 1983; Al-Sha'b (Jordan), August 15, 1984. 12. October (Egypt), August 28, 1983; Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt), August 29, 1983; Al-Sha'b (Jordan), August 15,1983; Al-Thaura (Iraq), August 16,1983. 13. Al-Zahf al-Akhdar (Libya), August 29, 1983. 14. ARB September 15, 1986, 8200-8207. 15. See, for example, Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi, Director General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, "Open Letter to Members of the National Assembly on Nigeria-Israel Relations," Nigerian Forum, (JulySeptember 1982): 731-739. See also the Ghanaian Times, January 8, 1980 and February 25,1980. 16. Akinyemi, "Open Letter," 736. 17. Ibid., 737. 18. Nigeria Times, January 21, 1980. 19. Akinyemi, "Open Letter," 734. 20. Israel Foreign Trade Statistics, 1984-1985, Central Bureau of Statistics, (Jerusalem). 21. Michael Curtis, "Africa, Israel and the Middle East," Middle East Review, vol. 8, no. 4 (1985): 14. 22. Israel Versus Apartheid, Africa-Israel Friendship Association (Jerusalem), 1985. 23. Among the studies on this subject, it is worthwhile to mention the following: R. Stevens and Abdalwahab M. Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, of a Relationship (New Y o r k , 1976); Abdelkader The Progression B e n a b d a l l a h , Israël et les peuples noirs: L'Alliance raciste israélo-sud africaine (Montreal, 1984). These two books represent the Arab anti-Israeli point of view. Israel's point of view is explained in a paper titled "South Africa and Israel" issued by Israel's ministry of foreign affairs, information division, Jerusalem, Brießng Series no. 170, April 5, 1985. Israel's activities and pronouncements against apartheid were summarized in Israel Versus Apartheid, published by Israel-Africa Friendship Society, Jerusalem, 1985. An article describing in detail Israel-South Africa relations, and critical of Israel's policy in this regard, was written by an Israeli scholar Naomi Chazan titled, "The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israel Foreign Policy towards South Africa," African Affairs, vol. 82, no. 327, (April 1983): 169-199. 24. This explanation was cited by President Shagari in his abovementioned statement; see note 17. 25. Daily Nation (Kenya), December 16, 1981. 26. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), March 29, 1979. 27. Akinyemi, "Open Letter," op. cit., 732. 28. Ha'aretz (Israel), May 30, 1985.

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29. Weekly Review (Kenya), April 30, 1982. 30. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), August 3,1983. 31. See, for example, Akinyemi, "Open Letter," op. cit., 737. 32. Fraternità Matin (Còte d'lvoire), May 21, 1982. 33. A.P., quoted in Davar (Israel), May 21,1982. 34. L'Union (Gabon), May 18,1982. 35. Al-Riad (Saudi Arabia), May 17,1982. 36. Bulletin D'Afrique (Paris), May 22, 1982. 37. Daily Nation (Kenya), August 15,1983. 38. Ha'aretz (Israel), August 30, 1983; West Africa (London), May 9, 1983; Le Matin (Senegal), October 12, 1983. 39. New York Times, September 23, 1983. 40. Daily Nation (Kenya), August 8, 1983; see also Sunday Nation (Kenya), August 30, 1983; the Weekly Review (Kenya), September 2, 1983. 41. Daily Nation (Kenya), June 20, 1981. 42. The Standard (Kenya), January 13, 1982. 43. Al-Musawwar (Egypt), February 17, 1984; see also a previous interview to the same weekly, July 29,1983. 4 4 . The Standard (Kenya), February 4, 1984; The Kenya Times, February 5, 1984. For the full text of the Mubarak-Mobutu communiqué, see Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt), February 6, 1984; Mubarak-Arap Moi: Al-Ahram, February 5, 1984; Mubarak-Barre: Al-Ahram, February 6, 1984; MubarakNyerere: Al-Akhbar (Egypt), February 7, 1984. 45. Reuters from Lagos, March 20, 1984; AFP, March 21, 1984, quoting the Nigerian News Agency. 46. October (Egypt), August 28, 1983; Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt), August 29, 1983. Both newspapers are semi-official. 47. Jerusalem Post (Israel), January 24, 1983. 48. Radio Israel, March 18, 1984. 49. Yedi'ot Aharonot (Israel), January 25, 1984. 50. Ha'aretz (Israel), August 30, 1983, quoting the French weekly L'Express. 51. Falastin al-Thaura (Cyprus), June 22, 1985, 28. The magazine describes Israel's efforts to reestablish its position in Africa, especially her recent gains in Guinea and Cameroon, where Israeli interest officers were posted. 52. Al-Riad (Saudi Arabia), February 4, 1983; Al-Shira' (Lebanon), February 2,1985. 53. Al-Medina (Saudi Arabia), March 5,1983; 'Ukaz (Saudi Arabia), May 20,1985. 54. Al-Qabas (Kuwait), February 17,1983; Al-Thaura (Iraq), July 7, 1985. 55. 'Ukaz (Saudi Arabia), August 15,1984; Al-Siasa al-Duwaliya (Egypt), January 1985,11. 56. Al-Thaura (Damascus), February 10, 1983; Syrian Times, July 29, 1985. 57. October (Egypt), August 28, 1983; Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt), August 29, 1983; Al-Thaura (Iraq), August 16,1983; Al-Sha'b (Jordan), August 15,1983.

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58. Al-Musawar (Egypt), August 9,1984. 59. Akhbär al-'Usbu' Qordan), August 23, 1984; Al-Mustaqbal (Paris), August 19,1984; Boutros Ghali "The Crisis in the Afro-Arab Cooperation" op. cit. 60. Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi Arabia), February 9, 1983; Al-Gumhuriya (Iraq), August 13,1983. 61. West Africa (London), May 7, 1984. 62. Kenya Times, April 28,1984. 63. Kul al-'Arab (Lebanon), February 15,1984. 64. Al-Ahali (Egypt), June 8, 1983; Al-Sha'b (Jerusalem), May 22, 1983; Jeune Afrique (Paris), May 29, 1983; see also Al-Mustaqbal (Paris), July 13, 1985. 65. Jeune Afrique (Paris), May 29, 1983. 66. Al-Medina (Saudi Arabia), March 5, 1983; Al-Dustür (Lebanon), September 28, 1983. 67. AFP, January 24, 1984; Reuters, September 24, 1984. 68. Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), March 30, 1984; Ma'ariv (Israel), August 23,1983. 69. A.P., August 28,1984. 70. The Herald (Zimbabwe), August 28, 1984. 71. Al-'Usbü' al-'Arabi (Lebanon), June 4, 1984. 72. There are now PLO embassies in Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Lower-grade diplomatic offices are in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Seychelles, and Uganda. 73. Falastin al-Thaura (Cyprus), May 10, 1986. 74. Davar (Israel), November 11, 1986. 75. Reuters, December 3, 1986.

• C H A P T E R TEN

•

Prospects for Change in African Attitudes Toward the Arabs and Israel Since 1973, Afro-Arab relations have fluctuated considerably, and Israel's position on the continent has been influenced by whether the Arab position in Africa at any given time was strong or weak. Israel's place in Africa has also been influenced to a large extent by Arab activities to push it off the continent. During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Afro-Arab relations reached a peak that found expression in the severance of relations between most African states and Israel. However, Afro-Arab relations began to deteriorate in 1974 and 1975, mainly as a result of African disappointment in the lack of significant Arab aid during the oil crisis, and this revived deep-seated memories, for example of Arab involvement in the slave trade, and fears of militant Islam as a weapon of Arab Imperialism. Nevertheless, even in the period 1974-1975, the lowest point of Afro-Arab relations, the decline in Arab influence did not bring about a corresponding upswing in Israel's standing in Africa. Herein lies a paradox: while Afro-Arab solidarity at its height caused heavy damage to Israel's position in Africa, the Afro-Arab dispute at its worst—although it did occasionally lead to rifts—has not significantly improved Israel's relations with the majority of African states. One reason for this is that the vast majority of African countries are not interested in a split in the Afro-Arab alliance, which might occur if they resumed diplomatic relations with Israel. In fact, Israel has often served the Africans as a whip to push the Arabs into providing more aid, and disagreements between the Africans and the Arabs have forced the latter to pay a high price for African political support on issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Another reason for Israel's remaining at the outer edges of Africa is that the gap between African expectations and the Arab response has been gradually narrowing. In the years 1973-1975, African expectations were too high. The Africans expected prompt large-scale aid, including cheap oil. While not all the African states who severed ties with Israel in 1973 expected the Arabs to respond with aid (for several of them were acting out of solidarity with Egypt, a leading member of OAU), all of Africa did expect special Arab consideration at the time of the oil crisis. At the same time, the Arab states did not hold themselves responsible for the economic difficulties arising from higher oil prices. Nor did they feel bound to make large grants to suffering African countries. Although they were prepared in principle to set up economic institutions, this required time and experience. Thus, while 1973 was marked by great expectations on the part of the Africans and an inadequate response on the part of the Arabs, as the Africans became more practical in their requests and scaled down their expectations the Arabs were able to increase their assistance by establishing aid institutions. Also relevant in this connection is the fact that even though restoring relations with Israel is not a burning issue for Africans, Arab aid—with the hope of its being granted in evergreater amounts—is too important to risk losing. The Arabs improved and intensified their activities in Africa not only in the sphere of aid, but also in the diplomatic, economic, and propaganda spheres. They have stepped up such activities whenever they feared a drastic change in Africa's attitude to Israel, e.g., during the 1974-1975 oil crisis, and when Zaire, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon resumed ties with Israel. The Arabs were also assisted by OAU resolutions on Israel and the Middle East, which were cited frequently in explanation of the continued diplomatic boycott of Israel. Thus, while condemning Israel for annexing the Golan Heights in December 1981, OAU Chairman President Arap Moi of Kenya stressed that the African position on Israel and on the Arab-Israeli conflict is formulated in accordance with OAU and UN resolutions on the issue.1 This point of view was reiterated in the joint Kenya-UAE communiqué issued at the end of the UAE president's April 1984 visit to Kenya.2 In other words, the attitude of African states toward Israel is shaped more by developments in Arab-Israeli relations than by relations between Africa and Israel. This situation is brought about by the political and economic influence of the Arabs, as well as by their intense and varied activities on the African continent and at

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the OAU. In this context, it should be remembered that even Egypt, which has established diplomatic relations with Israel, makes use of OAU resolutions to justify her continued opposition to Africa's resuming ties with the Jewish state. As for Israel, its withdrawal from Sinai and the peace agreement with Egypt may eventually succeed in improving relations with Africa, particularly if these actions are used without too much accompanying publicity. Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, and Cameroon justified their renewal of ties with Israel by citing the Egypt-Israel peace agreements. Other countries may follow suit at a later date, especially if these four countries continue to stand up to Arab pressure. The decrease in Arab aid in recent years, as a result of the drop in oil prices, also benefits Israel. Therefore Israel's efforts to strengthen the regimes of these leaders by all means at its disposal, including the assistance of friends in the United States, Europe, and Africa, are understandable. The spirit of optimism heralded by Israeli leaders and its mass media with regard to the extensive renewal of African-Israeli diplomatic ties has proved unrealistic. Bold as the actions of Zaire, Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, and Cameroon were, they do not seem capable of moving many other African states in the same direction. Moreover, Israel has not yet succeeded in bringing together a group of moderate African states that would restore relations as a group. This indicates that Israel's expectations were based on an incomplete appraisal of Arab strengths and weaknesses in Africa and an unrealistic grasp of African attitudes toward the Middle East. Since the severance of relations in 1973, changes have taken place in African attitudes, so that Israel's withdrawal from Sinai is no longer the only factor involved. For the Arabs have managed to transform the elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict into major "African issues," whose resolution will influence whether or not there will be an improvement in African-Israeli relations. The speeches and voting patterns of an overwhelming majority of African representatives at the UN General Assembly in recent years offer ample proof of this. As far as the Middle East is concerned, the common denominator in those speeches has been demands for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and recognition of Palestinian rights to an independent state. The Arabs have also been successful in exploiting the issue of Israeli-South African relations, which have become a major influence on African attitudes towards Israel. As a result, the only African countries that have resumed ties with Israel are Zaire,

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Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, and Cameroon. And many of the rest have publicly declared that they will not restore diplomatic ties as long as Israel remains in the occupied territories. It therefore seems that Israel has exaggerated the influence of Arab weak points, which although partially influential on how Africans view the Arabs, have not been outweighed by Arab financial assistance to the area or by Arab influence within the OAU. One must therefore conclude that since 1973, despite periodic African resentment and occasional disputes inside and outside the OAU, the balance of African-Middle Eastern relations has definitely tilted in favor of the Arabs. And it appears that this will continue to be the situation until there has been significant progress in resolving some elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian question. Further, even if an Israeli-Arab settlement were likely, and more African states were to resume diplomatic relations with Israel, the Arab position in many African countries will remain strong and Israel will have to conduct her activities on the continent in full awareness of her own limitations and of the important role played there by the Arabs.

Notes 1. Daily Nation (Kenya), December 16, 1981. 2. Kenya Times, April 18, 1984.

Appendixes 1. Severance of Relations Between African Countries and Israel: Dates and Main Reasons. 2. Division of African States by Percentage of Muslims. 3. Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's Speech in Rwanda Against Christianity in Africa on May 16, 1985. 4. Arab League News Release of August 16, 1983, Reacting to Liberia's Renewal of Relations with Israel.

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Appendix 1 Severance of Relations Between African Countries and Israel: Dates and Main Reasons Country

Date

1. Guinea 2. Uganda 3. Chad 4. Congo 5. Niger 6. Mali 7. Burundi 8. Togo 9. Zaire 10. Rwanda 11. Benin 12. Burkina Faso 13. Cameroon 14. Equatorial Guinea 15. Tanzania 16. Madagascar 17. Central African Republic 18. Ethiopia 19. Nigeria 20. Gambia 21. Zambia 22. Sierra Leone 23. Ghana 24. Senegal 25. Gabon 26. Kenya 27. Liberia 28. Côte d'Ivoire 29. Botswana 30. Mauritius

6 June 1967 30 March 1972 28 November 1972 31 December 1972 5 January 1973 5 January 1973 16 May 1973 21 September 1973 4 October 1973 8 October 1973 9 October 1973 10 October 1973 13 October 1973 14 October 1973 19 October 1973 20 October 1973 21 October 1973 23 October 1973 25 October 1973 26 October 1973 26 October 1973 27 October 1973 28 October 1973 28 October 1973 29 October 1973 1 November 1973 2 November 1973 8 November 1973 12 November 1973 15 June 1976

Main reasons E,C A,B,D A,B E (China), A B,A E,B,A A,C A,C C,A C,A E,C C,E C,D C CD C,A C,A C D,C C,B C C C C,B C C C C C C

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Key of the Main Reasons for Severing Relations A Financial inducement, generally accompanied by poor economic and internal conditions within the severing state B The Muslim factor C Solidarity with African Egypt (either willingly, or under Arab pressure) D The aspiration of the leader of the severing country to assume a position of leadership in Africa E Radical regime and/or Communist bloc influence

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Appendix 2 Division of African States by Percentage of Muslims, 1986

Sizable Muslim minority (10-20 percent) 1. Burkina Faso (20)® 2. Côte d'Ivoire (10-20) 3. Ghana (10) 4. Kenya (20) 5. Mauritius (18) 6. Uganda (10)®

Arab-Muslim 1. Algeria* 2. Egypt 3 3. Libya® 4. Morocco® 5. Sudan 3 (including approximately 30 to 35 percent non-Muslims, residing in southern Sudan) 6. Tunisia®

Small minority (5-10 1. Liberia (5-10) 2. Rwanda (5-10) 3. Togo (5-10)

Muslim (100 percent) 1. Comoro Islands® 2. Djibouti® 3. Mauritania® 4. Somalia® Muslim majority (50-85 1. Chad (50)® 2. Gambia (75-80)® 3. Guinea (80)® 4. Mali (75)® 5. Niger (85)® 6. Senegal (85)®

percent)

Less than 5 percent 1. Angola 2. Botswana 3. Burundi 4. Cape Verde 5. Congo 6. Equatorial Guinea 7. Gabon® 8. Lesotho 9. Madagascar 10. Malawi 11. Sâo Tomé and Principe 12. Seychelles 13. Swaziland 14. Zaire 15. Zambia 16. Zimbabwe

percent)

Important Muslim minority 1. Benin (25-30)® 2. Cameroon (25-30)® 3. Central African Republic (25) 4. Ethiopia (35) 5. Guinea-Bissau (35)® 6. Mozambique (25-30) 7. Nigeria (40-50)® 8. Sierra Leone (25)® 9. Tanzania (35)

® Member of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO)

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Appendix 3

Qadhafi Versus Christianity in Africa: Colonel M u a m m a r Qadhafi's Speech in Kigali, Rwanda, at the Opening of the Muslim Center, as Broadcast by Radio Tripoli on May 17,1985

The brother leader of the revolution today led the Friday prayers at the mosque of the Islamic cultural center in Kigali, capital of Rwanda. Amid Muslims chanting Allahu akbar [God is great] the brother leader of the revolution made an address to praying masses. He said: Peace be upon you, together with the blessings and benedictions of God. I bring you the greetings and support of your brothers in Libya. They are putting their potential at your disposal. Libya is considered your first country. Libya is a shield and a refuge. The Islamic revolution stems from Libya, and the international Islamic call has emerged from Libya. It has reached this country. This mosque and this Islamic center have been built thanks to the international Islamic Call Society, which came from Libya. But at the same time, we should not forget the cooperation of your Muslim brothers in the UAE with you and with us. We appreciate the favor of our brother Sheikh Zayid ibn Sultan al-Nuhayyan, who put his hand in ours, so that with this cooperation we were able to build this Islamic center. You must rely on your Muslim brothers in Libya and the UAE. We are ready to share everything we have with you. From Libya and the UAE we thank you, because you are hoisting the banner of Islam below the equator, in the heart of Africa. You are the ones who declare that there is only one God in the heart of Africa; you are the ones who, from the highest podiums, declare that Muhammad is the messiah of God. You declare that there is only one God and say that your prophet Muhammad is the prophet of God, despite the Christians' nonbelief in Muhammad's mission. In this place, while you declare that there is only one God and that Muhammad is his prophet, you are facing up to great challenges in these lands. You are facing up to the challenge of the Christian church that does not recognize the prophecy of Muhammad. The Christian church wants to do away with Islam everywhere, despite the fact that the church is not right and has no case. Those who have said that God is one of a Trinity are wrong.

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The church, a declared infidel, does not admit to the fact that God is one, and you Muslims are right because you believe in the fact that God is one. But you must not allow the church to triumph over you. First, you must stick to your Islamic religion and insist that your children are taught the Islamic religion, and you teach them the Arabic language because without the Arabic language one would not understand Islam. Furthermore, you must encourage the children of Christians to embrace Islam, and the doors of the Islamic center, the Islamic school and hospital should be open to the children of Christians. You must teach the children of Christians that Christianity is not the religion of Africans, that Islam is the religion of Africa, that Christianity is the religion of colonialism, that Islam is the religion of God. Christianity is the religion of the French, Belgian, German, and American enemies; it is also the religion of the Jews. Africans are neither Belgian, nor French, nor German. In this way you would influence the children of Christians, and they would join the ranks of Islam. As long as you do not do this the church will be striving to fight Islam in these lands, because the church relies on Belgian, French, and American colonialism, whereas you count on your Muslim brothers in the Arab homelands, your brothers in Libya and in the UAE. Second, you must spread Islam among the idolaters in Rwanda because there is a considerable proportion of idolaters. If you do not rush in and make them enter Islam, the Christian church will be first and it will mobilize them against you. It is the duty of each of you to introduce a number of idolaters to Islam. Believers in God are brothers. They are your brothers, but they are living under an unjust rule in Zaire, under the rule of Mobutu, the agent of Zionism, who puts his hand in the hand of the Jews stained with blood of Muslims. Killing him is the duty of every Muslim, and so is the killing of all his infidel aides who have allied themselves with the Jews. Mobutu is a Zionist agent, and you must incite Muslims in Zaire and urge them to engage in the jihad so that Mobutu may be toppled, together with his regime. He who kills this agent will go to paradise. Muslims must become a force to defend their religion. You must raise your head high in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire. You must raise your voice high and declare that Allah is great because Africa must be Muslim. Africa is no Christian. Christians are intruders in Africa. Christians in Africa are agents of colonialism. We must wage a holy war so that Islam may spread in Africa. The first step to consolidate Islam in Rwanda is for you to teach

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your children the Arabic language and Islam; then idolaters in Rwanda must be introduced to Islam. Then there must be an attempt to introduce the children of Christians and your children to Islam so that they will not grow up to be Christians just because their parents were Christians. You would then be courageous. This land is yours, and this is your creed. You must defend your land and creed. He who ignores this land is a Christian; he has no right to spread Christianity in Africa. As for a Muslim, he must not be afraid, because he has the right to spread Islam in Africa. Afterward, you must send missionaries to your Muslim brothers in Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire, to unite them. You must unite your positions with theirs. If something happens to Muslims in Zaire, Muslims in Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda must stand by their side. If something happens to Muslims in Rwanda, there must be contact with Muslims in these countries so that they may side with them. You must cooperate among yourselves. If one of you needs something, you must cooperate with him and help him meet his need. You must understand that you are a great power in Africa, but the enemies want to divide you. We must love one another, whether the enemies like it or not. From this year 1985 on, you must start having contacts with Muslims in the neighboring countries so that Muslims may protect one another; so that you may be like a solid building, as God wants you to be. God wants you to be in one rank. God wants you to fight in one rank. God wants you to fight in one rank, and he who does not do this is outside Islam and God will not let him enter paradise. He who spreads Islam—God will bring him into paradise. He who learns the Arabic language and teaches it—God will bring him into paradise. He who introduces idolaters to Islam—God will bring him into paradise. He who introduces the children of Christians to Islam—God will bring him into paradise. And he who puts his hand in that of his Muslim brother at his side will be brought into paradise. I have stressed to you that your brothers in the Arab homeland, from Libya to the UAE, are behind you, standing by your side. They would wage the struggle with you. We build mosques everywhere together. We extend aid to anyone in need, and we do not forget to thank our friend who has helped build this Islamic center, President Juvenal Habyarimana. He is a Rwandan and an African of your kinfolk. He could have been a Muslim like you had not Christianity been imposed on him and on his family. So, you know that Christianity has turned Islamic families into Christian ones. There must be a struggle night and day for the spreading of Islam. You must

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unite. I speak with our friend Habyarimana about Muslims in Rwanda, and God willing, Islam will triumph in Africa over the religion of colonialism: Christianity. It will triumph over idolatry in Africa; it will triumph over the enemies of Islam in Africa because they live in Africa. We are struggling for this. We will be with you all our means for Islam in Africa. Muslims, here there will be glory and eternal life for you because you are spreading Islam throughout Africa, beyond the equator. You will be rewarded and you will go to paradise because you are spreading Islam. Glory for you. You have our appreciation, and we go forward with you. Note Source: FBIS, May 2 0 , 1 9 8 5 , S2, S3.

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Appendix 4

A r a b L e a g u e N e w s R e l e a s e , A u g u s t 16, 1983: R e a c t i o n to L i b e r i a ' s R e n e w a l of R e l a t i o n s w i t h Israel

Tunis, 16 August 1983 T h e s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l of t h e L e a g u e of A r a b S t a t e s t o d a y i s s u e d a s t a t e m e n t e x p r e s s i n g d e e p r e g r e t at t h e d e c i s i o n of the L i b e r i a n g o v e r n m e n t to r e s u m e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e s t a t e o f Israel. T h e s t a t e m e n t recalls Israel's s u p p o r t for t h e r a c i s t r e g i m e o f S o u t h A f r i c a a n d t h e c o m m o n s t a n d of all A f r i c a n c o m m i t m e n t s to the p r i n c i p l e s o f A r a b - A f r i c a n c o o p e r a t i o n a n d e x p r e s s e d h o p e in a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n b y the Liberian g o v e r n m e n t of its d e c i s i o n . F o l l o w i n g is the text of the statement: The general secretariat of the League of Arab States receive with deep regrets the decision of the Liberian government to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. The Arab League has been aware of the considerations for this decision and was careful to point out to the Liberian government the negative results that might ensue from taking such a step. The resumption of Israeli-Liberian diplomatic relations would adversely affect Arab-Liberian relations and undermine the credibility of official commitment undertaken by the government's concern. Such a development would be unacceptable and unexpected from neighborly and friendly states with whom we are joined by mutual aspirations and struggles for liberation, economic development, and cultural advancement. Arab-African relations were never built on utilitarianism, the expectation of material benefit or more verbal support that u n d e r m i n e the ethics of political behavior in return for instantaneous reward. It is our hope that this principle would remain unchanged. We further believe that this step by the Liberian government is a serious deviation from the recognized principles of African cooperation and the breach of the consensus of our entire commitment. The Arab nation does not oppose Israel for the sole reason of Israeli occupation of Arab land. We oppose Israel because it is the embodiment of an evil, racist ideology based on colonialism, aggression, and abrogation of liberties. Israel supports a regime of hideous racism in South Africa, a regime that subjugates and arbitrarily controls a people striving for liberation. Israeli-South African relations are no secret and have received the most strident

232

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT censure in international forums. Furthermore, these relations have b e c o m e an important c o m p o n e n t in the problem of the African l i b e r a t i o n c a u s e . W e n e e d o n l y recall the d e c i s i o n s o f t h e P e r m a n e n t C o m m i t t e e for Arab-African Cooperation in its last m e e t i n g in T u n i s i a , c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n t i n u o u s c o o r d i n a t i o n a m o n g member-states to oppose the two racist regimes. T h e Arab states, in their belief in the right to freedom for all Arabs a n d Africans, and in the principles of cooperation between Arab a n d African peoples will a l w a y s defend and support the South African liberation cause. T h e decision of the Liberian government has not induced the Arab states to refrain from drawing out their c o m m i t m e n t s t o w a r d s their A f r i c a n b r e t h r e n or their duties towards the peoples of South Africa and Namibia. The Arab states will continue to o p p o s e b y all m e a n s the raciest regime of South Africa, the source of aggression and the ally of Israel. T h e L e a g u e of A r a b States r e m a i n s hopeful that the Liberian government will reconsider its decision and adhere throughout the principles through which our African and Arab nations struggle.

Note Source: T h e League of Arab States, Office of the Permanent Observer to the UN, A L / 1 8 / 8 3 .

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LeVine, V. T., and T. Luke, The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities, (Boulder, Colo., 1979). Levtzion, Nehemia, International Islamic Solidarity and Its Limitations, The Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, (Jerusalem, 1979). Mertz, Robert Anton, and Pamela Macdonald, Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, (Munich, 1983). Nasser, Gamal Abdel, The Philosophy of the Revolution, (Washington, 1955). OAU, Organization of African Unity Declarations and Resolutions Adopted by Ministers, (Nairobi, 15-26 June 1981). Oduho, J., and W. Deng, The Problem of Southern Sudan, (London, 1963). OECD, Aid From OPEC Countries, (Paris, 1983). Ofosu-Appiah, L. H., Slavery, (Accra, 1969). Oliver, Albino, The Sudan—A Southern Viewpoint, (Oxford, 1970). Report of the First Muslim Youth Conference, (Kampala, 1963). Stevens, R., and A. M. Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa—The Progression of a Relationship, (New York, 1976). Tareq, Y. Ismail, U.A.R. Policy in Africa, The George Washington University, Ph.D. dissertation, (1967). Zoghby, Samir, Arab-African Relations 1973-1975: A Guide, Library of Congress, (Washington, 1976). Articles Abel, Jacob, "Israel Military Aid to Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, August 1971,165-187. Agyman, Opoku, "Pan-Africanism Versus Pan-Arabism," Middle East Review, vol. 16, no. 1,1984,5-30. Akinsanya, Adeyoe, "The Afro-Arab Alliance: Dream or Reality," African Affairs, no. 30, October 1976, 511-529. Chazan, Naomi, "The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israeli Foreign Policy Towards South Africa," African Affairs, vol. 82, no. 327, April 1983, 169-199. Chazan, Naomi, "Israel in Africa," The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 18, Winter 1981,29-44. Curtis, Michael, "Africa, Israel and the Middle East," Middle East Review, vol. 8, no. 4,1985,5-22. Decalo, S., "Africans and the Mid-Eastern War," Africa Report, vol. 12, no. 7, 1967,57-61. Ghali, Boutros, "Azmatu al-Ta'äwun al-'Arabi al-'Ifriqi" ("The Crisis in AfroArab Cooperation") Al-Siäsa al-Duwaliya, no. 87, January 1987, 4-7. Gitelson, Susan A., "UN-Middle East Voting Patterns of the Black African States," Middle East Review, vol. 7, Spring/Summer 1975, 33-37. el-Khawas, Mohamed A., "Africa and the Middle East Crisis," Issue, vol. 5, Spring 1975,33-42. Kochan, Ran, "An African Peace Mission in the Middle East," African Affairs, vol. 72, no. 287, April 1973,186-196.

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LeVine, V. T., "The Arabs and Africa: A Balance to 1982," Middle East Review, vol. 14, nos. 3 - 4 , 1 9 8 2 , 5 5 - 6 3 . Mazrui, Ali, "Black Africa and the Arabs," Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no. 4, July 1975,725-742. McKay, B., "The Impact of Islam on Relations Among New African States," in Proctor, J.H., ed., Islam and International Relations, 1964, 159-189. N a d e l m a n n , Ethan, "Israel and Black Africa: A Rapprochement," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 183-219. Oda, Abdel Malek, and Mohammed Aly el-Oweiny, "The October War and the C h a n g e s in the African Stand," a paper presented to the International Symposium on the October 1973 War, 2 7 - 3 1 October 1975, Cairo University, 1975, typescript. Oded, Arye, "Africa, Israel and the Arabs: On the Restoration of IsraeliAfrican Diplomatic Relations," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 6, no. 3 , 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 3 , 48-70. O d e d , Arye, "The Southern Sudan Civil War," Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1976, 230-261. Oguola, O., "The Arabs in North Africa," Afriscope, July 1973, 85-96. Ojo, Olusola, "The Role of the Arab World in the Decolonization Process of Black Africa," International Problems, vol. 20, nos. 2 - 4 , Summer 1981, 73-84. Oron, Y., "The National Myth in Modern Egypt" (Hebrew), Hamizrah Hehadash, vol. 10, 1959-1960, 153-177. Poli, François, "Pour ou contre la Ligue des états noirs," Jeune Afrique (Paris), nos. 1284-1285,14 August 1985, 32-35. Skinner, Elliot P., "African States and Israel: Uneasy Relations in a World of Crisis "Journal of African Studies, vol. 2, Spring 1975, 1-23. S o n o , T h e m b a , "Israel Repenetrates Africa: Zionism and Afro-Arab Solidarity," The International Journal of World Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, 1984, 258-287. Tareq,. Y. Ismail, "Religion and UAR African Policy," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 6, 1968, 49-57. Triaud, Jean-Louis, "L'Islam et l'état en Republique du Niger," Le Mois en Afrique, nos. 194-195, Janvier-Fevrier 1982, 35-48.

Newspapers and Periodicals AFP Afrique (formerly Bulletin d'Afrique) Africa (London) African Affairs (London) Africa Now (London) Africa Confidential (London) Africa Economic Digest (London) Africa Research Bulletin ( L o n d o n ) Africa Report (New York)

African Affairs (Oxford) African Review (Washington) Afrique (Paris) Afriscope (London) Al-Ahali (Egypt) Al-Ahram (Egypt) Al-Akhbar (Egypt) Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami (Saudi Arabia)

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Akhbâr al'Usbu' (Jordan) Akhbâr al-Yôm (Egypt) 1 Al-Hamishmar (Israel) Al'Anbâ' (Kuwait) Al-'Anba' (Jerusalem) Al-Anwâr (Lebanon) The Arab World (Arab League Office, Nairobi, Kenya) Arabia (Saudi Arabia) Al-Ba'th (Syria) Al-Bilâd (Lebanon) Al-Bilâd (Saudi Arabia) Bulletin d'Afrique (Paris), published as AFP Afrique as of 1985

Business (Kenya) Cameroon Tribune Christian Messenger (Ghana) Daily Express (Nigeria) Daily Graphic (Ghana) Daily Nation (Kenya) Daily News (Tanzania) Daily News (Zambia) Daily Report (Washington, D.C.) Daily Sketch (Nigeria) Daily Times (Malawi) Daily Times (Nigeria) Davar (Israel) Al-Dustur (Jordan) East African Standard (Kenya) The Echo (Ghana) L'Echo de l'Afrique (Côte d'Ivoire) The Economist (London) Egyptian Gazette Elima (Zaire) Encounter (U.S.) Ethiopian Herald L'Express (Paris) Al-Fajr (Jordan) Al-Fajr al-Jadid (Libya) Falastin al-Thaura (Cyprus) Le Figaro (Paris) Financial Times (London) Footprints Today (Liberia) Foreign Report (London) Fraternité Matin (Abidjan) Ghanaian Times

Guardian (London) Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt) Al-Gumhuriya (Iraq) Ha'arez (Israel) Al-Hadaf (Lebanon) Hamizrah Hehadash (Israel) Al-Hawadith (Lebanon) The Herald (Zimbabwe) 'Ila al-lmam (Lebanon) Independent (Nigeria) The International Herald Tribune (Paris) International Problems (Israel) The International Journal of World Studies (London) Al-'Itihad (Abu Dhabi) Al-Jadid (Lebanon) Jaish al-Sha^b (Syria) Al-Jazirah (Saudi Arabia) Jerusalem Post (Israel) Jeune Afrique (Paris) Al-Jihad (Libya) The Journal of Modern African Studies (London) Kenya Mirror The Kenya Times Koor Inter-Trade Division Bulletin (Israel) Kul al-^Arab (Lebanon) Labour in Israel Liberator (Ghana) Lina (Sierra Leone) L'lnformation (Israel) Al-Liwa' (Jordan) Al-Liwa' al-Islami (Egypt) Ma'arive (Israel) Al-Majala (Saudi Arabia) Le Matin (Paris) Mayo (Egypt) Al-Medina (Saudi Arabia) Metal Bulletin (United States) The Middle East (London) Middle East Review (New York) Mid-East Report (Washington, D.C.) Minbar al-Islam (Egypt) Le Mois en Afrique (Paris)

BIBLIOGRAPHY Le Monde (Paris) Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris) Al-Mujahid (Algeria) Al-Musawwar (Egypt) Al-Mustaqbal (Paris) Al-Nafidha (Kuwait) Al-Nahar (Lebanon) Nahdatu Afriqiyya (Egypt) Nairobi Times Near East Report (Washington, D.C.) The Nationalist (Tanzania) New African (London) New Nigeria Newsweek The New York Times Ngurumo (Tanzania) The Nigerian Chronicle Nigerian Forum Nigerian Tribune La Nouvelle Marche (Togo) Al-Nur (Egypt) Observer (London) October (Egypt) Palavar (Ghana) Palavar Tribune (Ghana) Pioneer (Ghana) Le Politicien (Senegal) La Presse (Tunisia) Pretoria News (South Africa) The Punch (Nigeria) Al-Qabas (Kuwait) Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Quotidien (Paris) Al-R'ai (Jordan) Al-Ra'i aVAm (Kuwait) Al-Raya (Qatar) The Renaissance (Nigeria) Al-Riad (Saudi Arabia) Ruz al-Yusuf (Egypt) Sabah al-Kheir (Egypt) Al-Sahafa (Sudan) Salongo (Zaire)

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Satellite (Nigeria) Al-Sha"b (Algeria) Al-Sha'b (Jerusalem) Al-Sha^b (Algeria) Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi Arabia) Al-Shira* (Lebanon) Al-Siasa (Kuwait) Al-Siasa al-Duwaliya (Egypt) Le Soleil (Senegal) The Standard (Kenya) Sunday Express (Liberia) Sunday Nation (Kenya) Sunday Observer (Nigeria) Sunday Times (Nigeria) Sunday Times of Zambia Syrian Times Al-Thaura (Arab Republic of [North] Yemen) Al-Thaura (Iraq) Al-Thaura (Syria) Time The Times of London The Times of Zambia Tishrin (Syria) To the Point International (South Africa) Uganda Argus Uhuru (Tanzania) 'Ukaz (Saudi Arabia) L'Union (Gabon) Al-'Usbu'al-'Arabi (Lebanon) Voice of Uganda The Washington Post Al-Watan (Kuwait) Al-Watan al-'Arabi (Paris) The Week in Religion (New York) Weekly Review (Kenya) West Africa (London) Al-Yaqza (Kuwait) Yedïot Aharonot (Israel) Al-Zahra (Kuwait) Al-Zahf al-Akhdar (Libya) Zambia Daily Mail

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Bibliographical Abbreviations ADB ADFAED AFP AFTAAAC AP ARB BADEA COTU DAC EPLF EUNC FBIS ICO IDA IDB IFAD ILO IMF IPU KFAED MENA NUKM OAU OECD OPEC PLO SAAFA SADR SANA SCKM SFD SPLA SPLM SWB UAE UAR UN

African Development Bank Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development A g e n c e France-Presse Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries Associated Press Africa Research Bulletin (London) Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Central Organization of Trade Unions of Kenya Development Assistance C o m m i t t e e (a specialized c o m m i t t e e of the O E C D ) Eritrean People's Liberation Front Eritrean Unified National Council Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Daily Report, Washington) Islamic C o n f e r e n c e Organization International D e v e l o p m e n t Bank Islamic D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k International Fund for Agricultural Development International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Inter-Parliamentary Union Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development Middle East N e w s Agency (Cairo) National Union of Kenya Muslims Organization of African Unity Organization for Economic Cooperation a n d Development Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries Palestine Liberation Organization Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa Saharan Arab Democratic Republic Saudi Arabian N e w s Agency S u p r e m e Council of Kenya Muslims Saudi Fund for Development Sudanese People's Liberation A r m y S u d a n e s e People's Liberation M o v e m e n t S u m m a r y o f World Broadcasts, printed and published b y the monitoring service of the BBC, London United A r a b Emirates United Arab Republic United Nations

Index Abegunrin, Olayiwola, 154 Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED), 66 Abdallah, Adam, 211 Adeghenro, Al-Haji Dauda, 108 ADFAED. See Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development African Council for Islamic Cooperation and Coordination, 35 African Development Bank, 14,143, 147 African Islamic Center, 36 Afro-Arab conferences, 12-21; Cairo summit, 15-21, 26, 27 AFTAAAC. See Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries Agridev, 171 Aguda, Aludadare, 88 Ahidjo, Ahmadu, 109,122,192 Ajasin, Michael, 178 Akinyemi, A. B., 201 Al-Aqsa mosque fire, 103,104 al-Azhar, Sheikh, 34, 36,37 Al-Azhar University, 33,34,36, 38,39 Algeria, aid by, 67 al-Hajj, Salim, 151 al-Hassan, Abdullah, 154 Allon, Yigal, 168 Amin, Idi, 1,103-105,121,133,151 Amogba, C.F., 144 Anti-Slavery Society of London, 83, 84 Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), 10,11,13,14,58, 71,78, 138,139,155,188,191,192, 198-200, 212. See also Arab financial aid Arab financial aid, 10-12,16, 20,

55-78,131-139,142,211,212,220; bilateral aid, 60-69; contributions to international aid, 69-71; Loan Fund, 139; multilateral aid, 55-60; political purpose, 74-78. See also Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Arab Special Fund, 142 Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries (AFTAAAC), 58,59 Arab League, 9,12-15, 111; Information Committee, 22 Arab Loan Fund, 139 Arab Special Fund, 142 Arab states; Afro-Arab summit, 12-21; anti-Israeli activity, 49, 50, 209-213; diplomacy, factors disturbing, 81-124; diplomatic methods, 23-27; diplomatic relations, 8-12; Eritrean conflict, 116-119; "imperialism" in Africa, 90-105; labor migration to, 86-88; oil crisis, effect on relations, 138-146; propaganda efforts, 21-23; slavery, 82-88; South Africa, relations with, 148-154; technical aid by, 131-138. See also Arab financial aid; individual countries Arafat, Yassir, 15,19,212,213 Artheh, Omar, 147 Association for the Propagation of Islam, 34 Audu, Ishaya, 178 Awolowo, Obafemi, 88,100,178 Ayah, Ndolo, 140 Ayari, Chedly, 58,71, 76,134,155 Azikwe, Nnamdi, 176,178

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Ba, Ahmadou Hampate, 107 Baah, Kwame, 138 Babili, A., 169 BADEA. See Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Balsamah, Abdullah, 151 Bamisaiye, Doctor, 104 Barnard, Christian, 150 Barning, Alex, 184 Barre, President, 104 Begin, Menachem, 175, 185 Binaisa, Godfrey, 169 Biya, Paul, 26,115,192,193 Bokassa, Jean Bodel, 45,106 Bongo, Omar (Albert), 45,122,133, 204,212 Botha, P.W., 202 Botswana, 38 Boy, Juma, 86, 87 Bunyoro, 98

Dinka, Abo Berhano, 20 Diouf, Abdou, 35,107 Diout, Bara, 115 Doe, Samuel, 114,183,186-189,199, 205 Du'at, 44

Cameroon, 101; renewal of relations with Israel, 191-193,200, 201, 206 Camp David Accords, 49, 207; African attitudes following, 175193, 221 Candron, Jean-Pierre, 94 Capucci, Hilarion, 213 Central African Republic, 38, 45,106 Chad-Libya conflict, 34,121-124 China, 4 Choge, S. K., 86 Christianity, fear of Islamic persecution, 105-107; pilgrimages, 169 Conteh, Moinina, 137 Cote d'lvoire, renewal of relations with Israel, 191-193, 200,206

Fahd, King, 47 Feisal, King, 5,39,99,101,104 France, 82,123 FROLINAT. See Front de libération nationale du Chad Front de libération nationale du Chad, 121,122

Derrick, Jonathan, 83 Dia, Man Less, 154 Diallo, Siradiou, 113 Diggs, Charles, 86

Eastmen, Earnest, 188, 205 Ebo,E.C„ 178 Egypt, 8,49,150; aid by, 67; antiIsraeli activities, 198, 207-209; Camp David Accords, African reaction, 175-193, 221; expansion by, 97-99; missionary activities, 34,39 Ekangaki, Nzo, 111 Eritrean conflict, 116-119 Eteki, William, 14,16,137,193 Ethiopia, Eritrean conflict, 116-119; Ogaden invasion, 118 Eyadéma, Gnassingbe, 213

Gabon, 132,133 Garang, John, 91, 92 Garba-Jahumpa, Alhaji I. M., 103 Gardiner, Robert K. A., 140 Gay, Mansur, 37 Ghali, Boutros, 155, 208, 209 Ghana, 101,179,181 Githii, George, 169 Githinji, P. R., 146 Glover, Douglas, 84 Goukouni, Oueddëi, 122,123 Gowon, Yakubu, 5 Great Britain, 82,148 Habré, Hissèné, 34,122, 123

INDEX

Hajj, 47-49 Hassane, Baba, 101 Herzog, Chaim, 186,189, 210 Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 18,19,112, 168,175,191,192,200,212 Hussein, King, 149

241

Liberia, renewal of relations, 186-189,198,199,200,205,206; military aid by, 185,186; political connections, 168-170; post-1973 African relations, 161-172; post1977 relations, 175-193; pre-1973 relations, 82; South Africa, relations with, 201, 202; technical ICO. See Islamic Conference cooperation, 170-172; trade with Organization Africa, 170-172,186; United IDB. See Islamic Development Bank Nations, expulsion from, 26,27, Idiagbon, Tunde, 101 162,163; Zaire, renewal of ILO. See International Labour relations, 184-186,198, 204,205 Organisation Ivory Coast. See Côte d'Ivoire International Labour Organisation (ILO), 87,163 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Jallud, Abdel Salaam, 99 163,180 Joint Organization for the Establishment of Islamic IPU. See Inter-Parliamentary Union Cultural Centers in Asia and Iraq, 149; aid by, 67 Africa, 39 Islam; African Islam, 107,108; antiJordan, 149 Israeli activity, 49-50; cultural centers, 36-42; Development Jumbe, Aboud, 36, 37, 50 Bank, 42,43; Hajj, 4 7 ^ 9 ; local societies, 46, 47; media, 46; Kaduma, Ibrahim, 14, 25 missionary activity, 33-51; Kali, J.D., 180 persecution of Christians, Karabe-Quarshie, Roy, 167,184 105-107 Kaunda, Kenneth, 15,19, 89, 96,140, Islamic Association for the 143,204 Propagation of Islam, 44 Kayïbande, Grégoire, 4 Islamic Conference Organization Kenya, 46, 84,102,103, 111, 165,180 (ICO), 26,35,37,39, 40,42, 44,177, Kenyatta, Jomo, 11,109 201; African participation, 48, 49; Kenyatta, Peter, 11 conferences, 48-50, 201 Kerekou, Mathieu, 45 Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Kihampa, J.W., 93 37,41,42,66 Kimche, David, 211 Islamic Legion, 34 Klibi, Chedly, 115,198 Islamic Solidarity Fund, 44 Koor Company, 171 Ismail, Khedive, 98 Kountché, Seyni, 122 Israel; aid by, 5; Cameroon, renewal Kuwait, aid by, 16,60,65; missionary of relations, 191-193, 200, 201, activities, 35 206; Côte d'Ivoire, renewal of relations, 191-193, 200, 206; Labor migration to Arab states, 86-88 Egypt, anti-Israeli activities, 198, Liberia, 40; renewal of relations with 207-209; factors disturbing Israel, 186-189,198,199,200,205, African relations, 197-214; 206

242

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Libya, aid by, 132,133; Chad, conflict with, 121-124; missionary activities, 38 Lokko, C.A., 146 Mabuthu, James, 144 Madagascar, 40,165 Mali, 40; aid to, 49 Mama, Chambi, 104 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 115,118, 153 Mathews, Gabriel, 176,177 Mauritania, Western Sahara Dispute, 94-97 Mazrui, Ali, 142 Mboumooa, Eteki, 147 Medi Depius, 151 Mengistu. See Mariam, Mengistu Haile Midamba, Phan, 85 Mobutu, President. See Seko, Mobutu Sese Moi, Arap, 11,21, 24,92,113,123,202, 211,220 Morocco, Western Sahara dispute, 94-97 Mubarak, President, 207-209, 211 Mugabe, Robert, 9, 205 Mulder, Connie, 150 Mungai, Njeroge, 138 Muslim Solidarity Conference, 35 Muslim World League, 35, 39 Mwandalesa, C., 120 Mwanga, Vernon, 147 Nasseef, Abdullah, 150 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 33, 47,97-99, 146 Ng'weno, Hilary, 92 Niger, 47 Nigeria, 36,100,101, 111, 112,178,179, 181 Njonjo, Charles, 89, 103,143 Nkrumah, Kwame, 93,101,146 Numeiri, President, 36, 91, 92,176

Nyerere, Joseph, 141 Nyerere, Julius, 19, 23,136-138,140, 203 OAU. See Organization of African Unity Obasanjo, 19 Obote, Milton, 42 Ochieng, William R., 85,113,167 October War of 1973, African reaction, 1, 219 Odedeyi, Femi, 120 Ofusu-Appiah, L. H„ 83, 84 Ogaden, invasion of, 118 Oil crises, effect on Afro-Arab relations, 138-146 Omido, Fred, 87 Onu, Peter, 176 Opa wo ye, Adebayo Dele, 149 OPEC, 14; aid by, 59-61, 71-78; Fund for International Development, 59 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 2-4, 222; Arabs, attitudes towards, 89,90; Liberation Committee, 94; 1967 summit, 25; 1974 summit, 7,139,146,147; 1975 summit, 136,143,151,162; 1976 summit, 10; 1979 summit, 177; 1980 summit, 207; 1981 summit, 21,24,113,207, 208; 1982 summit, 95, 96; 1983 summit, 114, 207; 1984 summit, 97; 1985 summit, 24; Policies, objections to Arab dictates, 109-116; Western Sahara dispute, 95, 96 Osogo, James, 165 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 4,19,21,25,116,121,198, 200, 209, 212; missions, 9 Palestinian issue, 15,19, 23, 25-27, 203, 209 Pascal-Nègre, Louis, 136 Peres, Shimon, 192, 210

INDEX

243

Sibeko, David, 151,152 Siliwizya, G.B., 135 Sisi, Jibril, 37 Six-day War of 1967,3,13 Slavery, 82-88 Soko, Axon, 145 Qadhafi, Muammar, 5, 33, 34, 41, 44, 45,81,85,89,90,106,108,117, 120, Solol Boneh, 171,172,192 Somalia, 149,150; aid to, 133,134; 121, 133,161,188, 211; Chad, Ogaden invasion, 118 conflict with, 121-124; militant South Africa, 3,4,8,19,22,25,137; policy, 99-105 Arab states, relations with, Qatar, aid by, 66 148-154; Israel, relations with, 201,202 Rabin, Yitzhak, 18,168,169 Soviet Union, 4 Race attitudes, 85-90 Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa Rhodesia, 19, 25. See also Zimbabwe (SAAFA), 58 Stevens, Siaka, 122 SAAFA. See Special Arab Aid Fund Subhi, Muhammad, 34, 45 for Africa Sudan, civil war, 90-92 Sadat, Anwar, 15,99, 111, 175-177 Supreme Council for Mosques, 35 SADR. See Saharan Arab Democratic Republic Tamman, Leon, 186 Saharan Arab Democratic Republic Tanzania, 101,165 (SADR), 94-97 Togo, 213 Sanbah, Kayina, 120 Saud, King, 99 Tolbert, President, 168 Tombalbaye, François, 122 Saudi Arabia, 150-153; aid by, 65; Touré, Sékou, 1,47,114,122,177,208 missionary activities, 39 Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), Towett, Taita, 105 Tsiranana, Philbert, 4,146 11,61,212 Sebirumbi, Musa, 108 UAE. See United Arab Emirates Seek, Assane, 135 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 19, 87, 88, 97,107, Uganda, 1,103,108,121,133 UN. See United Nations 114,115,140,166,184-186,204, United Arab Emirates (UAE); aid by, 210 16, 60,65,66 Seme, Allione, 90 United Nations (UN), 3, 221; Human Senghor, Leopold, 5,89,110,148,168, Rights Commission, 83; Israel, 203 expulsion, 26,27,162,163; Serugo-Lugo, Yosefaly, 108 Resolution 3379, 164 SFD. See Saudi Fund for United States, 4, 82,192 Development Shagari, Shehu, 178, 201, 203 Shamir, Yitzhak, 187 Vorster, B.J., 202 Sharom, Ariel, 185,190, 210 Shikuku, Martin, 140,165 Western Sahara, 94-97 Shobosi, Usama, 151 Wolde, Goshu, 115

Plassim, 171 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization Polisario, 94-97

244

AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Wood, Babic, 143 World Bank, 61, 70 Yago, Bernard, 85 Zain, Elias, 135,136,147,148

Zaire, 40; renewal of relations with Israel, 184-186,198, 204,205 Zambia, 165,166 Zimbabwe, 9,162,171. See also Rhodesia