Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa 3031233824, 9783031233821

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Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa Edited by Moosa A. Elayah · Laurent A. Lambert

Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa “The book deals with a particularly important issue (public policies during and after conflicts) after the failures of the Arab Spring revolutions in the MENA region, which had started in late 2010, and the tragic civil wars that have plagued that region as well as Africa over the past dozen years. The mix of both empirical and theoretical constitutes a positive element and the book is a useful resource for policy (vs. politics or conflict studies) graduate students, researchers and professionals based in or working on the Middle East and Africa.” —Dr. Omar Ashour is a Professor of Security and Military Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. He is the Founding Chair of the Critical Security Studies Graduate Program (MCSS) and the director of the Strategic Studies Unit in the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies

Moosa A. Elayah · Laurent A. Lambert Editors

Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa

Editors Moosa A. Elayah Doha, Qatar

Laurent A. Lambert Doha, Qatar

ISBN 978-3-031-23382-1 ISBN 978-3-031-23383-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

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Introduction Moosa A. Elayah and Laurent A. Lambert

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Part I Policy Challenges Amidst Arab Spring Revolutions and Civil Wars 2

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The Role of Sazman-e-Honari Rosanai Oax (Owj) During the “Maximum Pressure” Campaign Against Iran Moises Garduño García Seeing Like a State: The Crisis of Building the State of South Sudan Moosa A. Elayah and Matilda Fenttiman Policing Coexistence Through Economic Incentives: An Analysis of Nir Barkat’s Policies on Education in East Jerusalem During His Tenure as Mayor (2009–2018) Ignacio Rullansky An Exploration of the Dimensions of Exclusion Associated with Intimate Violence Among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Maryam Alkubati and Ako Muto

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CONTENTS

Part II Looking Forward: The Challenge of Building Sustainable Peace 6

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Post-conflict Heritage Reconstruction: Who Owns the Past? Nour A. Munawar

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The Psychopolitics of Motherhood in Post-conflict Public Policies: The Cases of the PKK and ISIS Hamoon Khelghat-Doost and Deniz Ülke Arıbo˘gan

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The Call for Reconciliation in the Middle of Conflicts: An Alternative Dispute Resolution for Global and Domestic Conflicts from Theory into Practice Iyad Muhsen Aldajani and Martin Leiner European Union Activities in Libyan Post-revolution Environment: The Triad—Migration, Security, and EU Special Agencies Magdalena El Ghamari Conclusions Moosa A. Elayah and Laurent A. Lambert

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Bibliography

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Dr. Iyad Muhsen Aldajani holds a Ph.D. from the University of Jena in Internet communication technologies for reconciliation. He is a specialist on Applied Phronesis in internet research methodologies and his research areas are in Applied Computer Science and Digital Humanities for reconciliation and peace education. He is an ICT application reconciliation studies educational scholar who earned a Bachelor’s in Computer Sciences and was awarded a Certificate of Completion for the Executive Education Program in Cybersecurity: The Intersection of Policy and Technology Program, at John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Awarded a certificate of completion for the Leading in Artificial Intelligence: Exploring Technology and Policy Program from Harvard Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Executive Education, and awarded a certificate from Oxford Artificial Intelligence program from Saïd Business School, the University of Oxford and a Reference Class Forecasting practitioner for the Oxford Global Projects Academy School, University of Oxford, a Master’s in Regional and American Studies from the Al-Quds University. He then became a webmaster and obtained a Master’s in a web-development certificate from HackerU in Tel-Aviv. Dr. Maryam Alkubati holds a Ph.D. in Social Sciences from the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Alkubati works as a gender and policy researcher for the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and Enjoi Japan—a diversity

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and inclusion company. She was a MEXT scholar (Japanese government scholarship recipient) for six years. She worked with JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) Ogata Research Institute for Peace and Development on Conflict and Gender-Based Violence from 2019 to 2021. Her research interests lie primarily in areas of gender and development, gender policy, and human security, specifically women’s participation in peacebuilding and politics within the Arab region. Prof. Deniz Ülke Arıbo˘gan the academician known for her work in the field of Political Science and International Relations is appointed as Üsküdar University Advisor to President. Prof. Arıbo˘gan graduated from Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International Relations. She completed her Master’s and Doctorate degrees in Istanbul University and graduated from Scotland’s University of St. Andrews, Terrorism and International Security Studies in 1995. Prof. Arıbo˘gan intensified her efforts to study security issues from a political psychological perspective and to resolve conflicts with peaceful methods. She became a member of the International Dialogue Initiative (IDI) board, which is an international and interdisciplinary working group. Dr. Magdalena El Ghamari completed her Ph.D. at the National Defence Academy in Warsaw, Department of Joint Action. Her doctoral research focused on culture security, NATO operations specializing in strategy and operations, radicalization, FTFs/Travel Terrorist, migration, and the case of the MENA region (Libya) and Balkans issues (with a focus on Kosovo). Assistance Professor at the Collegium Civitas University— Head of Cultural Security Department. Currently conducting research related to FTFs. Dr. Moosa A. Elayah is Assistant Professor in Public Administration, specialized in Conflict Studies, Peacebuilding, and International Development at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies (Qatar) and at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He has extensive research experience in international development administration, peacebuilding, crisis and conflict management, public policy, nonstate actors for service delivery and peacebuilding during the war, and regional development programs and social protection in post-conflict economies. He has extensive teaching and research experience in conflict-affected and post-conflict economies of the Middle East, most particularly Yemen. Dr. Elayah holds a B.A. degree in public administration from the University of Sanaa and

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M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in public administration from the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. He is a prolific author in English and Arabic. He published, in 2022, a book with Palgrave Macmillan, Europe and the MENA Region: Media Reporting, Humanitarianism, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding. He is the main editor of this book. Matilda Fenttiman is a Young Researcher at the Good governance center for consulting and studies. Dr. Moises Garduño García is Full-Time Professor in the Center for International Relations at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He holds degrees in International Relations, Asia and Africa Studies, and Anthropology. He received his Ph.D. in Arab and Islamic Contemporary Studies by the Autonomous University of Madrid. Some of his books include: Thinking Palestine from the Global South (2017); MKO: History, Rise and Fall of an Islamo-Marxist Opposition (2020); Iran after 40 Years of Revolution. State, Society and Foreign Relations (2020); and Social Justice, Sectarianization, and the role of MENA in World Order after 10 Years of Arab Revolutions (2022). Professor Garduño is a reference to Middle Eastern Studies produced from Latin America. He has been awarded by distinguished institutions such as Academia Mexicana de las Ciencias, The Coimbra Group, the International Convention of Asian Scholars, and others. His current research project supported by UNAM is entitled “Authoritarianism and Militarism in the Middle East after pandemics: new perspectives”. Dr. Hamoon Khelghat-Doost holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the National University of Singapore (NUS). His main fields of interest include gender, forced migration, political violence, international security, terrorism, and sustainable development with a special focus on the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. Dr. Laurent A. Lambert is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies (Qatar). He teaches energy policy, climate change politics, and energy diplomacy at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies as well as the global energy transition and energy diplomacy at Sciences Po Paris. A former analyst/writer at the French Ministry of Defense, Dr. Lambert is also an expert on technology transfer and a former representative of the Research & Non-Governmental Organizations (RINGOs) at the United Nations (2013–2016). A geographer by

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training, Dr. Lambert has been teaching postgraduates in the Middle East and North Africa since 2014. He is well-published in English and French, especially on strategic issues of water and energy policies, disaster risk management, and energy geopolitics in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia. Dr. Lambert speaks Arabic, English, and French. He holds a master’s degree in Geography from the University of Paris 1 Sorbonne and a D.Phil. from the Oxford University School of Geography and the Environment. His research and policy interests lie at the intersection of public policy and environmental risks, including climate change, humanitarian innovation, the science-policy interface, and national security. He is the co-editor of this book. Prof. Dr. Martin Leiner holds a Chair in Systematic Theology/Ethics at the Faculty of Theology at Friedrich-Schiller-Universität (FSU) Jena, Germany, since 2002. He is also the Founder and Director of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS). Leiner studied philosophy and Protestant Theology at the University of Tübingen. In 1994, the Faculty of Theology at the University of Heidelberg awarded him the degree of Dr. Theol., for a dissertation in the New Testament. From 1998 to 2002, Dr. Leiner was Assistant Professor and Professor for Systematic Theology and Hermeneutics at the University of Neuchâtel, in the Francophone part of Switzerland. From 2000 to 2002 he was the President of the Institute Romand de Systématique et d´Éthique (IRSE) in Geneva and has been a permanent member of the Board of the Ethikzentrum at the FSU since 2003. Dr. Nour A. Munawar is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. He holds a Ph.D. degree in archaeology and heritage studies from the University of Amsterdam UvA (Netherlands). Before joining the Doha Institute, he held a position at Brown University, USA, as a Postdoctoral Research Associate, and he also worked at UCL-Qatar in Education City, Doha, as Associate Research Fellow. Munawar participated in several archaeological excavations in Syria, Poland, and Italy. Munawar is a UNESCO expert on Safeguarding Syrian Cultural Heritage and a member of several international organizations, such as the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), the European Association of Archaeologists (EAA), and the Association of Critical Heritage Studies (ACSH). He has published several articles and book chapters in peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes in critical heritage studies and archaeology. His research interests are

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focused on critical heritage studies, politics of the past, uses and abuses of cultural heritage in contemporary history, politics of identity and memory, de-colonialism, archaeology of migration, postcolonialism, and destruction and reconstruction of cultural and archaeological heritage in conflict zones. Dr. Ako Muto serves as Executive Senior Research Fellow at the JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) Ogata Research Institute. She holds a Ph.D. in Global Society Studies from Doshisha University, Japan. As an aid practitioner in the bilateral international cooperation agency under the Japanese government, she has been involved in research for humanitarian crisis, peacebuilding, and human security, bridging aid practices and academics. She is the co-editor, with Cedric de Coning and Rui Saraiva of Adaptive Mediation and Conflict Resolution: Peace-making in Colombia, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Syria, and the author of “Exploring Mediation Efforts Amid Systemic and Domestic Constraints: The Case of the Syrian Conflict” in this volume, and also the co-editor, with Yoichi Mine and Oscar A. Gómez, of Human Security Norms in East Asia. Dr. Ignacio Rullansky is Postdoctoral fellow at National Research Council, Argentina (CONICET) and National University of San Martín. Head of the Middle East Department, Institute of International Relations, National University of La Plata.

List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2

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Fig. 6.4

Fig. 6.5

Fig. 6.6

Fig. 6.7

Fig. 8.1

Dimensions of exclusion associated with DV/IPV (Source Author) Ruins of the Reichstag building in Berlin, July 1946 (© German Federal Archives [accessed on 25.03.2021]) Destruction of Berlin’s City Centre displaying the Berlin Palace (Stadtschloss ) and Cathedral, 1945 (© Association Berliner Schlosses E.V. [accessed on 25.03.2021]) Represent the religious affiliations of people in Lebanon–Palestinian and Syrian refugees are not included (© Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2017 [accessed on 25.03.2021]) French post card of Damascus City after the Destruction of Sidi Amoud Quarter (G. Degeorge, Damas Perle Et Reine D’orient, 2005) (Reproduced from Soufan, 2015) The Sykes–Picot Agreement map between the UK and France 1916 (© Palestinian Academic Society for The Study Of International Affairs [Passia] [accessed on 25.03.2021]) Images of the destruction of Hama City in the aftermath of Hama Massacre 1982 (© Wikimedia [accessed on 25.03.2021]) Destruction of Hama 1982 in the aftermath of the Muslim Brotherhood Uprising (© Library of Congress, reproduced from Blanton 2012 [accessed on 25.03.2021]) The theoretical framework foundation

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Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4

Applied phronesis for conflict transformation towards the reconciliation process The cycle of transformative action towards the reconciliation process The ICT was developing the cycle for conflict transformation (Al-Dajani, 2020)

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List of Tables

Table 8.1 Table 8.2

ICT for reconciliation process ICT Netnography approach for reconciliation process

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Moosa A. Elayah and Laurent A. Lambert

Armed conflicts and their aftermaths on local and displaced populations are characterized by several political, social, psychological, and cultural features and implications that can be substantially different in the Global South and the Global North (Elayah, 2022a, Elayah et al, 2020). Armed conflicts are rarer in the Global North, and regional solidarity is better financed and particularly resilient, as the 2022 Russia–Ukraine war has recently illustrated in Europe (Lambert et al., 2022). In the Middle East and Africa, by contrast, the distribution of power, resources, and wealth are often the reasons and means behind the continuation of strife within and among countries and areas coming out of, or recovering from, violent conflicts (Elayah, 2022b; Okechukwu et al., 2022; Zartman, 2019). However, there is currently a dearth of research on the matters of governance and public policy during and after conflicts in the Middle

M. A. Elayah (B) · L. A. Lambert Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_1

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East and Africa, and particularly so in terms of publications coming from researchers based in the Global South. This book incorporates case studies, theoretical works, and policy recommendations as to the governance, public policies, and reconciliation processes during and after armed conflicts in these two inter-connected and partly overlapping regions of the Global South.1 All the chapters of this book are intertwined with important issues that need more academic attention. This book has been designed and written in a manner so that it could be of interest to decision-makers of countries suffering from a conflict as well as in countries that are trying to help mitigating or resolving these conflicts. The book is divided into two parts. Part I “Policy Challenges Amid Civil Conflicts, Foreign Pressures, and Revolutions” has four chapters spanning from Teheran’s dealing with Iranophobia and national public discourse, to building the nation of South Sudan in the face of ethnic tensions and armed struggle for power, to the conflict of governance in East Jerusalem under the mayoral term of Nir Barkat, and finally the dimension of exclusion and its impact on the Syrian refugee women who are survivors of domestic violence and interpersonal violence in Lebanon. The second part of the book, “Looking Forward: The Challenge of Building Sustainable Peace”, spans the important yet oft-neglected issues of heritage reconstruction policies, the potential of political psychology and motherhood identity for post-conflict public policymaking and countering radical groups, to using a transdisciplinary scientific approach to conflict resolution and reconciliation during a conflict, and, finally, the European Union’s (EU) policies in post-revolution Libya regarding migration, security, and the EU special agencies.

1 These chapters were thoroughly chosen by a scientific committee of the conference of Governance of Public Policies during and after Conflicts in the Middle East. This threeday virtual conference was organized in May 2021 by the School of Public Administration and Development Economics (SPADE) at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies (DI). Leading scholars specialized in the field of conflict and governance in MENA region participated in this conference whose papers were subjected to a confidential peer review. The selected papers evaluated by the scientific committee were then gathered to be included in the manuscript after refining the work and finalizing the scientific essence of this edited book. At the same time, the manuscript was subjected to a blind peer review by the publisher, Palgrave, and the comments that came from the reviewers were considered within the time allowed. The editors and authors thank the peer reviewers for their constructive and useful feedback.

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Chapter 2 “The Role of Sazmen-e-HonariRosanaiOax During the ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign Against Iran” discusses the Trump Administration’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran that developed psychological tensions in the Iranian public sphere. The portrayal of Iran as a “sponsor of terrorism” called for a solid media strategy from the Iranian government to contain and pivot the representation in global media. To this end, Tehran implemented the counter-campaign of “maximum resistance” spanning the economic, political, and, of course, the social media spheres. This policy was spearheaded by Sazmen-eHonariRosanai (Owj), the foremost cultural production entity in the Iranian public sphere. Based on an interpretive framework of the relationship shared by culture, war, and spectacle, Chapter 2 provides an analysis of productions by Owj—one of the main tools of Iranian soft power. Drawing from examples of cinematic works and visual arts pieces, the chapter argues that Owj positioned their multimedia content in accordance with the national and international contexts—first, when faced with Donald Trump’s maximum pressure campaign and then, amid crises emerging in the realm of domestic politics. The cause was more than a declaration of war; it was the constant streaming and viewing of the “state of war”. The chapter utilizes and builds upon Robert Stahl’s theoretical concept of militainment to understand how Revolutionary Guards (Sepah Pasdaran) empower themselves inside Iran via mainstream culture, to build upon the framework of the relationship among media, militarism, and popular culture. The idea of militainment begins with the acknowledgment that “the line between war and entertainment has always been permeable and negotiable” (Stahl, 2009), and particularly with the advent of electronic media. Military propaganda and entertainment have shared a porous relationship since the invention of mass media, and government bodies and private organizations have evoked the nature of war as playful to invite citizens to participate via their consumption of normalized violent content which, in turn, furthers the propaganda of these organizations. Then, the chapter provides an overview about the history of Owj and its role in the making of militainment media, including television, films, and even online video games. Some of the content produced by Owj includes popular films and TV series such as Agha Zadeh, Gando, KhaneyeAmn, Exit, Mansur, and The Holy List. They constitute clear examples of how popular Iranian militainment became a central space

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to offer “national security” justifications for Iran’s national and international policies. Targeting first and foremost the national audience of Iran, these programs orchestrate a relationship between the civilians, who are portrayed as being unsuspecting, while the intelligence wings are portrayed as the saviors or guardians who risk their lives to keep the audience (the civilians) safe and protected from grave potential harm. The chapter also discusses the murals created by Owj which are displayed in popular public spots. It depicts episodes from contemporary Iranian politics such as Iran’s protection of Bashar al-Assad, the celebration of relations between Abu Mahdi al Muhandis and the Pasdaran, the demonization of US policy in Iraq, and others more connected to domestic politics, like the role of the armed forces as protectors of society in the economic crisis (thereby only blaming US sanctions), during the COVID-19 health crisis and regional security crises. Finally, it addresses some concrete examples in three phases of study from 2017 to 2021 to tackle the Iranophobia coming from abroad as well as to maintain the concrete nationalist foundation of the 1979 revolution for future generations. The first context was the formation of a common front of Washington and some Arab countries against Iran in 2017; the second was the aftermath of Abol Qassem Soleimani’s assassination in 2020; and the third was the impact of COVID-19 in Iran. The Iranian militainment policy combatted these situations through imaginaries, symbols, and soft-power mechanisms. In this way, the idea of the nation as a form of entertainment narrative and its various cultural industries create the conditions for the legitimation of power against all odds. Chapter 3 addresses the daunting process of building the state of South Sudan and its various successes and failures. Borrowing the imagery from James Scott (2008) (“Seeing Like a State How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed”), this chapter analyzes the largely unsuccessful state-building efforts in South Sudan on the political, economic, societal, and cultural levels. The youngest country in the world and Africa’s 54th state, South Sudan gained independence in 2011, amidst cripplingly low levels of social and economic development, and was engulfed in a brutal civil armed conflict and a widescale humanitarian crisis by 2013. When the civil war broke out between the Dinka (the country’s largest ethnic group, estimated at 35.8%) and the Nuer (the second largest group, estimated at 15.6%) as part of a power struggle between President Kiir (a Dinka) and then Vice-President Machar (a Nuer), the country’s

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political trajectory changed entirely, calling for alternative modes of governance delineated in this chapter. The mainstream methods of governance, the chapter illustrates, have been profoundly inefficacious and, along with the pre-existing ethnic divisions and tensions, had instead aggravated and exacerbated the conflict. From the angle of public policy, the chapter aims to create normative and collective insights from the experiences of crisis and conflict. The chapter first discusses the theoretical base of building and rebuilding states in a post-conflict milieu to understand the real challenges faced during the undertaking of such a task. The main reasons why state building, defined here as “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security” (Chandler, 2006), proves to be a challenge in a post-conflict setting is most often because of fragile institutions, unstable political structures, infrastructural weaknesses, and/or large-scale involvement from the international community (Brancati & Snyder, 2013; Jarstad & Sisk, 2008; Lyons, 2005; Paris, 2006). After having identified deep-seated structural issues within the South Sudanese leadership, the chapter proposes alternative solutions for a more successful and smooth governance in the future. These modes include delegating more power to local communities; a more even distribution of power at the top levels of the government; a regular and thorough analysis of potential threats to the nation’s governance accompanied with appropriate risk mitigation strategies and mechanisms to cope with conflicts. The chapter provides a critical observation of the role of the state in South Sudan and contributes to the emerging scholarship on post-war governance and conflict in South Sudan by mapping the several governmental crises and providing an understanding of the relationship between conflict and poor governance. Next, the chapter goes a step further to propose potential solutions to ameliorate the conflict situation and establish effective and productive governance in South Sudan. One of the solutions is to have a more equitable and inclusive distribution of power at the center to prevent the oppression of different ethnic groups and minorities (International Crisis Group, 2021). Decentralized modes of governance can possibly help ease ethnic tensions and narrow the ethnic divides of a “winner takes-it-all” presidential system. After discussing the notion and challenges of state building in the case of South Sudan, we move on to a chapter about co-existence policy in another challenging setting.

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Chapter 4—“Policing Coexistence Through Economic Incentives: An Analysis of Nir Barkat’s Policies on Education in East Jerusalem During His Tenure as Mayor (2009–2018)”—looks at a unique dimension of crisis governance relating to the Israeli–Palestinian cohabitation, or the regular lack thereof, in the city of Jerusalem. The recent military escalation in the area illustrates the protracted and violent nature of the cohabitation among the ethnonational components of Jerusalem. Following Hannah Arendt’s The origins of totalitarianism, the chapter discusses democracy as an organized collective structure with respect for plurality on all fronts like culture, religion, and ethnicity. However, in many cases cohabitation is often concerning and taken in different directions by social movements, political parties, and government coalitions. The chapter discusses the structure of the political rationality of the cohabitation of the ethnonational groups by studying the design of public policies in this context of conflict, foregrounding Nir Barkat’s administration as mayor of Jerusalem (2009–2018) to understand the emergence of a specific modality of conceiving the task of governing both Israelis and Palestinians. The study of the educational policies in East Jerusalem and the municipal sponsorship of Palestinian schools that adopted the Israeli curriculum and “Bagrut” (a certificate giving access to higher education) will help elucidate Barkat’s promotion of the processes of subjectivation applying the grid of intelligibility of the homo economicus of neoliberalism. By studying the on-the-ground reality of Jerusalem, the chapter intends to politically situate cohabitation in its context of conflict. This is significant in the context of the holy city wherein the dominant ethnonational group’s political project has resulted in the production of the diasporic condition of the cultural Other. This brought up the question of governance of such an ethnonational diversity and the chapter provides an inquiry into the emergence of this contemporary political rationality. Chapter 5 explores another policy dimension that characterizes conflicts—exclusion. Exclusion, especially of a social nature, can negatively affect communities and individuals as well as their livelihood, their social and support networks. According to the United Nations, the causes of exclusion of an individual or a group can be multifaceted and driven by different motivations. This can lead to the isolation or marginalization of groups, and impede their access to opportunities, rights, and resources (UN, 2016). Chapter 5, titled “An Exploration of the Dimensions of Exclusion Associated with Intimate Violence Among Syrian Refugees in

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Lebanon”, explores one such dimension of exclusion focusing on genderbased violence. More specifically, it focuses on Domestic and Intimate Partner Violence (DV/IPV) that is directed toward women in a postconflict setting. The chapter takes up the case of the displaced Syrian refugees that nearly comprise one million of the population in Lebanon. Over the years, Lebanon has witnessed an influx of Syrian refugees, which has had an impact on the country’s economic condition and limited infrastructure. Moreover, in the absence of a concrete legislative framework and national response strategy to support Syrian refugees, they were faced with multiple forms of disadvantage—social, economic, and legal—which made it remarkably difficult for them to fully integrate into Lebanese society. With the ending of the open-door policy with Syria in Lebanon in January 2015, the government issued guidelines and regulations restricting the entry of Syrians as well as imposing high renewal of residency fees for Syrians residing in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2018). These restrictions limit Syrian refugees’ access to opportunities spanning across the social, legal, and economic fronts in Lebanon. These restrictions and regulations contribute to multiple dimensions of exclusion which impact the living conditions of the refugees as well as their interpersonal relationships. Due to economic, social, and legal limitations, there have been observations of increased DV/IPV toward women of the refugee community. The occurrence of DV/IPV usually leads to forms of exclusion of the survivors. This further leads to restricted mobility, which in turn creates livelihood problems and social isolation which seem to further exacerbate DV/IPV. This has particularly impacted the women and girls of the Syrian community, who constitute around three-quarters of the refugee population. Several studies demonstrate that due to displacement, the displaced and refugee communities experience the loss of family structure, social network, and economic resources which can lead to isolation from the larger community. Displacement, isolation, and the loss of these structures can make those vulnerable—in this case, women—more susceptible to intimate violence. It has also been contended that vulnerable women, who are cut off from their community, are more likely to be the targets and victims of DV/IPV as opposed to women who are involved and active in their host communities. However, there remains a dearth of scholarship on how social, political, and economic exclusion of refugees in host communities gives rise to DV/IPV. More specifically, the social conditions of IDPs and/or refugees in host communities that trigger DV/IPV

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need to be further explored as this gap currently hinders the establishment of evidence-based interventions for IDP/refugee women living in host communities. This makes this chapter, based on the interview-based qualitative exploration of the dimensions of exclusion experienced by Syrian refugees that could be associated with DV/IPV against women, even more valuable.

Looking Forward: The Challenge of Building Sustainable Peace This second and final part of the book addresses the aims and challenges of building sustainable peace in conflict and post-conflict situations. It starts with Chapter 6 “Post-Conflict Heritage Reconstruction: Who Owns the Past?”, a chapter which takes up the case of destruction in places like Berlin during the Second World War, Beirut, and the conflicts Lebanon faced during the twentieth century, and Syria during periods such as Ottoman Era, the French Mandate, and pre-war Syria. The main two reasons for choosing these areas and instances are that these three cases have seen destruction by a violent conflict that arose in these respective regions on the one hand. On the other, all the cases chosen for this research had plans to reconstruct the destroyed sites after their respective conflicts. In time of war or armed conflict, invaluable sites of cultural heritage are also threatened and often destroyed. In places such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, the rise of non-state radical actors, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Daesh, ISIS, or ISIL), has shed light on the destruction of cultural heritage sites. People in the Middle East, as well as observers and scholars from the West, have expressed their anger over the destruction of the pre-Islamic remains (Bowley, 2014; Danti, 2015). Two sites in Syria—the ancient city of Aleppo and Syria’s bride of the desert, Palmyra—were badly impacted by conflicts. The postconflict recovery of the affected urban areas could be a strong challenge for the governmental and non-governmental organizations who have planned the post-war reconstruction of Syrian cultural heritage (Azoulay, 2018; Isakhan & Meskell, 2019; McDowall, 2017; Munawar, 2019; Stoughton, 2017; UNESCO, 2015). The chapter discusses the three phases of post-war reconstruction: the emergency, the transitional, and the reconstruction phases. It is in the reconstruction phase that cultural heritage is entirely erased or selectively reconstructed, taking into account

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various political, social, economic, or cultural considerations. Who directs the funding, who conducts the conservation/restoration/reconstruction processes, and the future care of the sites entirely depends on these considerations which are usually in the hands of the winner of the conflict. The chapter adopts an analytical approach to discern and elucidate the political motives that bolster cultural heritage reconstruction processes in different post-conflict cases. The historical approach is significant in tracking the instances of construction, destruction, and reconstruction in contemporary history. It examines occurrences of war and violence to divulge the role of the different actors in the destruction of heritage sites. The nature of the reconstruction process and the reconstruction policies depend on different factors such as the perpetrator of the violence, geographic location, the geopolitical map that is drawn in the aftermath of the conflict, etc. Looking at academic reports, reports of international and regional organizations concerned with the destruction and reconstruction of cultural heritage (e.g., UNESCO), and media reports, the chapter critically examines the literature to uncover the impact of reconstruction policies on the collective identity and memory of the afflicted society in the aftermath of a conflict. Chapter 7, “The Psychopolitics of Motherhood in Post-Conflict Public Policies: The Cases of the PKK and ISIS”, looks at the destructive force of armed conflicts on the family unit, their interactions, and the challenges of post-conflict public policy and peacebuilding. However, the chapter takes on a unique angle with little pre-existing scholarship—it discusses the significance of bringing the distinctive approach of political psychology to the notion of post-conflict public policy. Political psychology can be defined as the exploration of political behaviors and their psychological roots (Cottam et al., 2015). The lens of political psychology and its application to understanding political acts and behaviors in depth can help with a renewed and deeper understanding of radicalization and its root causes. An understanding of this can, in turn, help policymakers design innovative and efficient modalities for post-conflict counter extremism. Considering the conflicts that challenge the Middle East, a complete overhaul of fundamental governance strategies—more than repair—is needed to combat the violence that would seem to be woven in the social fabric itself (Elayah, 2022a; Väyrynen, 2019). Bringing the perspective of political psychology to the post-conflict policymaking and reconfiguration table could help policymakers more effectively combat extremism in the Middle East region. Political psychology entails the analysis of

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psychological, socio-psychological, and cultural variables as they affect public and political attitudes and behaviors. Shedding light on the group of “Waiting Mothers” of Diyarbakir, in Turkey, this chapter proposes that motherhood and its psychopolitical potential can help with the designing of effective post-conflict governance strategies and policies. The construction of motherhood in the social and political sphere is heavily bolstered by psychology. The concepts of motherhood and identity are closely linked with political psychology as it positions them in the larger sociopolitical structure of society. Motherhood, as a political identity, has its own values and ideals. However, despite their active role in peace and non-violence informal processes, mothers fade into the background when official peace negotiations begin and the consolidation of peace and restoring public services becomes a formal exercise. Mothers, as an important part of the political and social fabric of society, can help facilitate the social integration of demobilized combatants, their families, and repatriated refugees. These groups constitute the most stigmatized social categories in need of assistance in post-conflict public policies. By examining the grassroots model of the waiting mothers of the PKK fighters in Turkey and using it as a successful touchstone, the chapter proposes that a similar mechanism can be utilized for other cases such as the ISIS family members in Iraq and Syria. This chapter effectively establishes that positioning mothers and the motherhood identity at the forefront of defense against terrorism could be a powerful approach in combating religious extremism and could empower more and more women to confront radicalization early on in life, potentially leading to a restoration of sustainable peace. As we consider the intersectional power of multi-disciplinary approaches to peacebuilding, Chapter 8, “The Call for Reconciliation in The Middle of Conflicts/An Alternative Dispute Resolution for Global and Domestic Conflicts/From Theory into Practice”, proposes a transdisciplinary scientific approach to reconciliation in the midst of conflicts. It investigates and bolsters social sciences’ integration in reconciliation and peace research studies within social, cultural, and political aspects in the academic spheres and delineates the dilemmas that crop up during conflicts. It examines the methodological and theoretical framework mechanism that promotes theoretical interventions for conflict transformation and peacebuilding toward the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict.

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Chapter 8 proposes a model that addresses the root causes of animosity during conflicts by using digital transformation methods before generating a destabilizing tension model and adopting the reconciliation process during the various steps of a conflict. The aim of the study is to recognize and define the philosophy that integrates the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict as an alternative dispute resolution for global and domestic conflicts. It adopts the dynamics of applied philosophical theories for reconciliation processes into practice. Reconciliation carries different meanings in varying contexts. It can be defined as the restoration of the relationship between individuals, groups, and states after violence, war, genocide, civil war, gross human rights violations like segregation (e.g., as in the South African Apartheid regime), enslavement, etc. Reconciliation as a policy requires a long-term strategy with many practices at multiple levels (Leiner & Flämig, 2012). The chapter first introduces the idea of applied philosophy into science to develop a scientific explanation for conflict transformation toward peacebuilding for the reconciliation process, based on principles in the tradition of Aristotle (384–322 BCE), such as phronesis/prudentia and hexis/habitus. The introduction of the philosophical approach in applying digital transformation toward the reconciliation process as a transdisciplinary approach requires research from theory to practice toward conflict transformation and transitional shifts toward the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. The chapter also explores the Hölderlin perspective, its background, and the advent of the reconciliation approach after the Second World War in Germany in both theory and practice. The chapter prescribes the methods and strategies for the reconciliation approach and process during and after conflicts. It features an emphasis on the methodologies for conducting research on reconciliation and peacebuilding, and their strategies and practices. It goes on to examine the theoretical and philosophical framework toward reconciliation and it demonstrates how to introduce theoretical concepts into praxis toward conflict transformation and transitional shift as an alternative dispute resolution in the midst of a conflict situation. It explores a transdisciplinary research approach to peacebuilding toward the path of the reconciliation process and goes on to adopt it as part of the philosophical domain for social transformation or transformative action in conflicts. This brings forth an alternative path toward conflict resolution and policy change.

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In the domain of internet research, the chapter illustrates applied philosophy from theory into practice by applying a theoretical approach to digital transformation to lead the reconciliation process. Regarding the Hölderlin Perspective, the chapter proposes applied Phronesis in social science to further the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict and develop from theory to practice as an alternative discourse for conflict resolution in the local and international disputes (Al-Dajani, 2020). This book’s final chapter, “European Union Activities in Libyan Post Revolution Environment. The Triad: Migration, Security and EU Special Agencies”, deals with the case of Libya and the post-dictatorship stabilization process being hindered by numerous threats to its transition to peace—largely stemming from the domestic and international struggle for power and stability in the post-Gaddafi era—. The chapter focuses on Libya’s relationship with the EU, and its implementation of The European Neighbourhood Instrument, supplemented by an analysis of the Libyan security in its post-dictatorship milieu as well an evaluation of the efficaciousness and impact of European Union activities on the organization of the security issues and capacity building of the civil society. The chapter predominantly focuses on the analysis of the factors specific to Libya and their interaction with the implementation of EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya with EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Due to widespread instability in Libya, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa acts in support of the migration and security-related issues. To tackle these issues, the chapter foregrounds the concept of the “Failed State” as put by Daniel Thürer in his work “The Failed State and International Law”. Thürer (1999) claims the notion of failed state as a broad concept and cannot be a sole tool for categorization. He delineates three approaches—geographical/territorial, political, and functional—that underpin the political and legal approach to the failed states. In Libya, the failure of the state emerges due to political and economic power being concentrated in a few hands, amid the widespread corruption of institutions and inconsistent governance. These, along with Libya’s fractured society, make the transition to democracy very daunting and has largely resulted in the maintenance of the status quo. The EU has been working with Libya in the transitional process toward democracy and a stable state. The European Neighbourhood Instrument is one of the EU’s financial instruments for bilateral cooperation with Libya (Anckar, 2012). The ongoing programs under the EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya have amounted to about e100 million and focus on

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sustaining and stabilizing Libya nationally and internationally, promoting active citizenship and the integration of the youth at the socioeconomic level, enhancing health services, supporting civil society organizations as well as the institutional dimension of the civil society sector. At the intersection of these dimensions, the chapter provides an analysis of the security environment in Libya and the efficiency of EU actions. The competence of the EU’s actions needs to be critically questioned and further investigated to provide useful insights as to the factors missing in the crisis management in and of Libya. The chapter uses a holistic and interdisciplinary approach to the issue, identifies several weaknesses and proposes theoretical recommendations for the future. The aims and hopes for this book are, on the one hand, to help better understand the challenges of policymaking during and after conflicts based on both theoretical chapters and important case studies. On the other hand, this book aims to make conflict resolution processes as effective as possible and minimize the suffering and incentives for conflict of those displaced by, those involved in, and those who survived armed conflicts. With effective policymaking and modalities in place, the process of building peace after a conflict can become robust and impactful, as in post-Nazi Germany, post-Imperial Japan, post-Apartheid South Africa, and post-invasion Kuwait, among others. Yet it may also gravely fail, as Chapter 3 illustrated with post-independence South Sudan or Chapter 5 with post-revolutionary Libya, for instance. By adopting different approaches and varying lenses, this book endeavors to help graduate students and academics, peace practitioners, and all related stakeholders, to venture beyond the conventional boundaries of public policymaking and better explore, appreciate, and understand the daunting challenges of building sustainable peace during and after conflicts in the global South, the many pitfalls to avoid along the way, and the vast range of creative approaches that can be deployed to that end.

References Al-Dajani, I. M. (2020). Internet communication technology for reconciliation: Applied phronesis netnography in internet research methodologies. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41203-6 Anckar, C. (2012). Religion and democracy: A worldwide comparison. Routledge. Azoulay, A. (2018). Exclusive—Reviving the spirit of Mosul. Asharq Al-Awsat. https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1178066/audrey-azo ulay/exclusive-reviving-spirit-mosul. Accessed 25 Mar 2021.

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Bowley, G. (2014). Antiquities lost, casualties of war: In Syria and Iraq, trying to protect a heritage at risk. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/arts/design/in-syria-and-iraqtr ying-to-protect-a-heritage-at-risk.html. Accessed 25 Mar 2021. Brancati, D., & Snyder, J. (2013). Time to kill: The impact of election timing on postconflict stability. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (5), 822–853. Chandler, D. (2006). Empire in Denial: The politics of state-building (1st ed., pp. 17–18). Pluto Press. Cottam, M. L., Mastors, E., Preston, T., & Dietz, B. (2015). Introduction to political psychology. Routledge. Danti, M. D. (2015). Ground-based observations of cultural heritage incidents in Syria and Iraq. Near Eastern Archaeology, 78(3), 132–141. Elayah, M. A. (2022a). Europe and MENA region: Media reporting, humanitarianism, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Palgrave Macmillan. Elayah, M. A. (2022b). Introduction national dialogues backed by EUinternational interventions in conflict-torn countries. In Europe and the MENA region (pp. 1–45). Palgrave Macmillan. Elayah, M. A., van Kempen, L., & Schulpen, L. (2020). Adding to the controversy? Civil society’s evaluation of the national conference dialogue in Yemen. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 14(3), 431–458. International Crisis Group. (2021). Toward a viable future for South Sudan (pp. 1–27). International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://d2071andv ip0wj.cloudfront.net/300-viable-future-for-south-sudan.pdf Isakhan, B., & Meskell, L. (2019). UNESCO’s project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’: Iraqi and Syrian opinion on heritage reconstruction after the Islamic State. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 25(11), 1189–1204. Jarstad, A., & Sisk, T. (2008). From war to democracy (1st ed., pp. 1–290). Cambridge University Press. Lambert, L. A., Tayah, J., Lee-Schmid, C., Abdalla, M., Abdallah, I., Ali, A. H., Esmail, S., & Ahmed, W. (2022). The EU’s natural gas Cold War and diversification challenges. Energy Strategy Reviews, 43, 100934. www.sciencedi rect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X22001286 Leiner, M., & Flämig, S. (2012). Latin America between conflict and reconciliation. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht LLC. Lyons, T. (2005). Demilitarizing politics: Elections on the uncertain road to peace (1st ed., pp. 1–232). Lynne Rienner Publisher. McDowall, A. (2017). Aleppo’s Old City can be rebuilt, UNESCO official says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-aleppo-ant iquities/aleppos-old-city-can-be-rebuiltunesco-official-says-idUSKBN1AJ1V0. Accessed 25 Mar 2021.

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Munawar, N. A. (2019). Cultural heritage and the Arab Spring: A review of (inter) national efforts to safeguard heritage under fire. The World Community and the Arab Spring, 83–115. Okechukwu, G. P. U., Arua, C. C., & Adedeji, A. O. (2022). Resources conflicts and governance: The Nigerian daunting challenge in the 21st century. ESCET Journal of Educational Research and Policy Studies, 3(1), 77–98. Paris, R. (2006). At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict (1st ed., pp. 1– 306). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scott, J. C. (2008). Seeing like a state how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. Yale University Press. Stahl, R. (2009). Militainment. Inc. War, media and Popular Culture. Routledge. Stoughton, I. (2017). Syria’s Civil War: Aleppo’s heritage sites ‘in danger’. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/ Aljazeera English. 01/syria-civil-war-aleppo-heritage-sites-danger-170111121954224.html. Accessed 25 Mar 2021. Thürer, D. (1999). The failed state and international law. International Review of the Red Cross, 836, 731–761. UNESCO. (2015). Post-conflict reconstruction in the Middle East context and in the Old City of Aleppo in particular (18–19 June 2015). https://whc.unesco. org/en/events/1286/. Accessed 25 Mar 2021. United Nations (UN). (2016). Leaving no one behind: The imperative of inclusive development. https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/2016/chapter1.pdf United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2018). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf Väyrynen, R. (2019). From conflict resolution to conflict transformation: A critical review. In H.-W. Jeong (Ed.), The new agenda for peace research (pp. 135–160). Ashgate Publishing. Zartman, I. W. (2019). Need, creed and greed in intrastate conflict. In I. W. Zartman (Ed.), I William Zartman: A pioneer in conflict management and area studies (pp. 95–117). Springer.

PART I

Policy Challenges Amidst Arab Spring Revolutions and Civil Wars

CHAPTER 2

The Role of Sazman-e-Honari Rosanai Oax (Owj) During the “Maximum Pressure” Campaign Against Iran Moises Garduño García

Militainment and Symbolic Power in Digital Times One of the most significant contributions to the study of power in the twenty-first century is the media theory proposed by Manuel Castells (2009). According to his approach, power is not an abstracted reification of something but a series of asymmetric relations that are manifested in our minds. For Castells, “always where is power, is also counterpower” (p. 78). For this reason, the legitimation process, the core Jürgen Habermas political theory (1976), “is the key to allow the state to stabilize the exercise of its domination” (p. 36) because legitimacy usually

M. G. García (B) National Autonomous University of Mexico, PAPIIT, Ciudad de México, Mexico e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_2

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depends on the consent obtained through the construction of meanings and symbols. So, the quest for legitimacy finds in the exercise of persuasion and propaganda one of its best means to be achieved. The use of propaganda by the ruling elite is not necessarily a new phenomenon. In fact, all governments use the power of media to promote their own interests. What is new in these times is the massive collaboration between the security apparatus of the state and the entertainment industries of the Internet, digital media, and multi-platform technologies for shaping popular culture. According to Roger Stahl, this strategy was introduced into the English language as militainment, this means, “one marker with which governments translate state violence into an object of pleasurable consumption for ordinary audiences in order to get popular legitimacy” (2009, p. 6). During the 1990s, the term infotainment fell from grace as a critical term and instead came to describe the new quotidian genre of soft news and tv shows. According to Stahl, some years later, “there is no reason why militainment would not be naturalized in the same way” (Stahl, 2009, p. 8), reflecting the increasing consumption and normalization of violence in the entertainment industry where governments and private firms are often inviting citizens to “play war” to normalize violence as one of the main social expressions of our everyday life. In this sense, and considering the solid study of Laura Finley (2019), it is true that at least in American society, the process of militarization of popular culture through television shows, films, and video games is an undeniable reality that has generated a concomitant concern in how this hyper militarized culture will affect coming generations. Rather, the availability of online filmviewing through services like Netflix or On Demand means consumers have more ways to view movies than ever before, spending more time in online activities than in the real offline life (Finley, 2019, p. 14: Valencia, 2019, p. 3).1 When the capacity of civil society to provide content to the government actions across the public sphere is limited, the idea of nation emerges as a form of entertainment. This level of persuasion creates the

1 Media consumption experienced a dramatic rise given the COVID-19 pandemic turning consumers to online media streaming. By June 2020, 48% of US online adults had subscribed to at least one streaming service, while in Western Europe subscriptions jumped 15.6% that very same year (Global Web Index, 2020).

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perfect conditions for the legitimation of power via its own cultural industries. Thus, on multiple fronts including sports, toys, video games, film, and TV shows, institutional stability is based on the ability to articulate different interests, symbols, ideas, and values through communication networks, producing not only a separation between an interventionist regime and a critical civil society, but also suppressing any kind of fragmentation that can be existing among the ruling elite itself. In other words, following Sayak Valencia’s concept of livestreaming regime (2019), this fact means the rise of a new political dimension in which emotions are used to create fascination with state violence through online technologies (2019, p. 3). This element permeates how one person can empathize or not with certain violent events, and how some other official imaginaries coming from fiction or symbolic representations are accepted or not by people (p. 5). Although multiple ruling elites certainly use this industry to create million-dollar business, it is also important to consider that one of the most important objectives by the state, in terms of political perspective, is the circulation of its own image as a strong, disciplinarian, and indivisible collectivity. So, should the state achieve this goal then it will be easier contributing to different ways of memorialization, construction of time, and framed futures to sustain the official mainstream among current and subsequent generations. One of the main characteristics of militainment is the production of new forms of memorialization in the digitalized interpretive space, this means, the place where the hegemony of representation over insurrectionary temporalities is disputed. In the digitalized space the representation of legitimate wars, holy defense, and security justifications is permitting the reinterpretation of the past and the reinvention of the present. As a result of these relatively new Internet tools, the meaning of wars, human rights violations, and other atrocities are being recontested or simply rewritten through images, videos, websites, virtual groups, and many other technology mediums (Zucker & Simon, 2020, p. 4). Indeed, these documents, which circulate rapidly in networks such as Facebook, Instagram, or YouTube, are producing new forms of nostalgia for a glorious past to be claimed for a particular political elite, as well as other sentiments of emotion, nationalism, heroism, and neo-sacrificing acts driven by a specific political agenda. The production of new identities, framed by the recapitulation of official history and the recognition of national ethics, culture, and unity, and other senses of belonging, allows that war cannot be contemplated just as a spectacle anymore, but as an act

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of interaction with it. In other words, if the citizen is not a single spectator of the show, then he becomes one more soldier in the battlefield (spectactor) who interacts with the national mission of the military-industrial complex. This perspective permits to say that militainment in the digitalized space goes beyond the control of public opinion instead of looking for a new behavior of this new citizen-soldier, what is making visible a new social engineering that explains the new relationship of the citizen with war, allowing the military-industrial complex new ways of manufacturing war itself. This marker, for example, was very useful to explain the flood of Pentagon-sponsored reality in television during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, permitting the US government not only to create a distractor in the public sphere but also an efficient educator of minds and behaviors through the impact of a militarized culture on both reason and people’s emotions. Although it is common knowledge that the relationship between Hollywood and the military-industrial complex in the United States has been a historical fact over the past century, now in the twenty-first century, taking advantage of the conjuncture of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and of the so-called “war against terrorism,” the binomial cultural industry-military violence overcame the cinematographic space and began to be expanded to the field of marketing, mobile applications, and virtual reality of pop culture. In this environment, “the discourse of recruitment consistently offers the civic sphere a standing invitation to become a virtual recruit ” (Stahl, 2009, p. 48). Also, “this virtual recruit is a product of the demilitarization of the citizen as subject on the one hand, and the remilitarization of the citizen as the object on the other” (p. 49). So, a “dangerous otherness” is used to extol the role of the armed forces as armies of peace and not as armies of war, mainly through game consoles and film productions. In the case of American society, 40% of Americans own game consoles where First Person Shooters (FPS) seek to destroy who they consider their main real enemies (Valeriano & Habel, 2016). In the case of cinema, Rebeca Keegan reported since 2011 that the Department of Defense regularly cooperates with Hollywood on projects like “Army Wives,” “NCIS,” “Transformers,” and other productions in collaboration with Paramount Pictures, Sony’s Columbia Pictures, and others (Keegam, 2011). Some examples around the world also can be mentioned as evidence of this transformation in military media politics. For instance, Michal Shavit (2020) documented how since the beginning of the twenty-first century

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the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) implemented an intensive process of mediatization of its military activities by utilizing media to garner public support and construct civilian perceptions of conflict and security through media activity. According to Shavit “this strategic stance has led the IDF to adopt a global media perspective using the most advanced digital platforms, designed to influence public opinion and to improve national narratives, both in Israel and the international community, through a Glocal Media Strategy” (2020). In another example, Gatopoulos (2020) reported the new strategy during Nagorno Karabagh’s latest war in which both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been using images of armored vehicles being destroyed for flooding Western media outlets with narratives in live. In this sense, this modern digital battlespace is filling up with sensors in the real battlefield, feeding vital information about “the enemies” to command centers, at the time that ordinary people can follow the development of war via Internet. It is true that, just like before, the international media focuses its attention on the fighting, but the novelty in these issues is that the conflicts are largely seen through official tweets, Facebook posts, and real time streaming via screens displayed in public spaces (Forestier-Walker, 2020). Similar strategies are seen in India– Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, or more recently in the new media strategy of the Chinese Communist Party through an app called “Study (Xi) Strong Country,” which allows users to see news reports of workers, retirees, police, and soldiers shouting, “only by studying (Xi) can we make China strong!” (Kuo & Lyons, 2019), as well as other multiple indoctrintainment strategies like the viral videos “I am a Chinese Communist Party Member,” “The 13what,” “How leaders are made?,” and Chinese sites like Bilibili via donmu popular messages (Wanning, 2019).

Iranian Militainment and the Formation of Sazman-e-Honari Rosanai (Owj) Just like the psycho-nationalist ideology of Reza Pahlavi needed the “Arab other” to essentialize the Iranian self, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also distinguished between the “revolutionary self” and the “enemy of the nation.” First, by using different framing modalities in the public sphere since the 1979 revolution, the classic slogan “Not West, nor East, Islamic Republic of Iran!” meant an important tool for keeping safe the idea of mostazefeen revolution. Then, the satanization of Saddam Hussein underlined elements like martyrdom and jihad, as well as anti-American,

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anti-imperialist, and anti-Zionist sentiments in the making of one of the most important nationalistic projects in the country known as the Cultural Revolution (Hashemi, 2019). After the post-Cold War period, and given the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran transmuted his public discourse into a process of modernization and a semi-open economy where the military began to control every single space of power in the country. In fact, since the late 2000s, the monographs published on the role of the military in the political life of Iran stood out, particularly on the role of the Revolutionary Guards in regional and international investments (Alfoneh, 2013; Forozan, 2018; Ostovar, 2018; Uskowi, 2019). The dynamics of the external factor, particularly after the events of September 11 and the subsequent military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, implied a new international security agenda promoted by Washington which caused several profound transformations in relations with Tehran, contributing to gradual pasdaranization of the national economy, politics, and culture. Throughout the twenty-first century, the Iranian soft power strategy consisted of using denigrating words in the official press where newspapers like Kayhan (Globe), Ettelaat (Information), and Hamshahri (Citizen) used completely ideological terms such as “anti-revolution,” “enemy,” “alien agents,” “non believers,” “separatist” (to refer to some Kurdish militias), and many others to condemn the political rivals of Pasdaran and hardliners in both domestic and international politics (Dehghan, 2009, p. 260). During the presidency of Mohammed Khatami, the call for “Dialogue among Civilizations” was first articulated as a response to Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, emphasizing cooperation and understanding between cultures instead of conflict. However, in terms of soft power, this concept was applied in Iran’s foreign relations more than in domestic affairs, permitting to his rivals the promotion of populist politics in mass media, which facilitated the arrival of people like Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 (Wastnidge, 2015, p. 371). After the demonstrations of 2009 and the political confrontations manifested in the Iranian press itself, the Islamic Republic of Iran accepted that one of the most important problems was not only the shape of its image abroad, but also the reconstruction of its own image in domestic affairs. The emergence of the new generations of Iranians and the social polarization originated by the Green Movement were turning points in terms of strategic thinking. As Tavakoli argues, “the question was how to transmit the ideological bases of the 1979 revolution to a new Iranian

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generation that did not experience this revolutionary process and did not know the founder fathers of the Islamic Republic” (2011). In 2019, almost 80% of the Iranian population was under 40 years of age (Iran Statistical Yearbook, 2019, p. 133), which meant the emergence of a generation that did not consume the meaning of jihad during the war with Iraq and that, on the other hand, is now very well connected to other ideas of Iran in the global public sphere through the Internet and satellite television. This situation brought some consequences in terms of governance. According to some indexes of state legitimacy, where the population’s level of confidence in state institutions and processes is considered, from 2014 to 2020 Iran presented many problems in terms of confidence given mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, and the rise of some armed insurgencies at both the south and north borders (The Global Economy, 2020). A strong social polarization, the increasing numbers of fugitive soldiers in the army (up to 1.5 million in 2016), cases of depression or suicide among low ranks, the erosion of a Khomeinist public discourse, and a constant social search for the meaning of Iranian national identity, are just some examples of concerns that are causing rethinking of public discourse by the Iranian government (Anisi et al., 2010; Bajoghli, 2020; Mohammadi et al., 2020). The previous problem, that coincided with the challenge of dealing with aggressive policies such as that of former President Donald Trump who unilaterally resigned from the JCPOA in 2018, has been approached by Iran via the strengthening of a communicative scheme led by the Revolutionary Guards with the objective of producing more attractive versions of the 1979 revolution and, above all, a fresh idea of the military speech of “maximum resistance” implemented in response to Trump’s rhetoric. The central element of this model is that the more aggressive rhetoric coming from abroad, mainly from United States and Israel, the easier opportunity is to produce neo-nationalist content to initiate a kind of re-khomenization of the Iranian public sphere via new technologies and militainment authority figures in the Iranian pop culture. Essentially, cultural policy under the Islamic Republic used to be summarized in a single word: Islamicization. However, according to Bajoghli, the new public discourse in Iran is fed not only with Islamist ideology, but also with a new kind of glocal nationalism that sees Iran as a protector of Islam, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the whole Persian civilization (2020, p. 103). This new nationalism is a combination of expansionist elements and anti-colonial sentiments that Iran has used to

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extend its interests in conflicts such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, in addition to some countries in Africa and, recently, in Latin America through its Spanish-language television broadcasting Hispan TV .2 Rather than working in classical forms of censorship, Tehran has projected new psycho-nationalist content on television, radio, cinema, and the Internet with the objective, on one hand, to influence the sphere of popular culture and, on the other, to compete against neoOttomanization strategies of Turkey and the Saudi-Wahhabization propaganda as regional narratives that aspire to permeate the realm of popular culture and the internet in the Middle East (Adib-Moghaddam, 2018). The formulation of this strategy began in 1986 through the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (IRNA), the charities and religious organizations, the Islamic Tourism organisms, as well as all printing and publication organizations, the Farabi Foundation, and all film production, regulation, and licensing like the Centre for the Documentation of the Islamic Revolution (Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1990, p. 40). Despite the Iranian Parliament having passed a law against using and trading in any kind of satellite equipment in 1995, the ambiguity of that law caused an increase in the ownership of satellite dishes and the rise of the digitalization of analog broadcasting in Iran. In 2007, there already existed Persian-language channels whose activities were in accordance with the principles and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Alikahah, 2010, p. 93). Now, this media policy is orchestrated by Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Vezarat-e Ershad-e Islami, where the Islamic Republic has a long history of resisting attempts at Western cultural penetration on Iranian society. However, given the success of digital media, the idea of “soft war” and the concept of “Iranian soft power” coincide with the increase in Iran’s international media operations by formulating the response to Western media operators equating them in style, language, and propaganda, creating “a war fought through cultural means and influence” (Wastnidge, 2015, p. 372). In 2011, the Arts and Media Organization (Owj) was created as a non-governmental organization under the umbrella of Organization for

2 HispanTV is a media project formed by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television, and the Venezuelan news channel Tele Sur, where some anti-imperialist narratives function as a performative mechanism of the public opinion that reaffirms the image of the United States as a colonial and military power not only in the Middle East but also in Latin America. See (Garduño, 2020b).

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Islamic Propagation (OIP) to reframe the ideological activities of Iranian public discourse via the spheres of art, culture, and mass media. From its beginning, the Owj was tied to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards by receiving permits for filming movies on sites used by military personnel, as well as for promoting new visual narratives of the war culture and the “defense of the nation,” with focus on the spirit of the martyrdom by young members belonging to Basijies, Hezbollahies, and the Intelligence Service. Beyond continuing to reproduce a classic idea of the 1979 revolution, Bajoghli (2020) establishes that Owj implements new techniques with both nationalist content and neo-Khomeninist symbology. In terms of distribution, it is established that the distribution channels of digital production emulate critical or independent productions and are distributed in the very same places as the black market where anti-regime films and productions are distributed, mainly in Tehran. In turn, the use of international film festivals is another strategic point to achieve a better distribution and circulation of this content. Owj is chaired by Ehsan Mohammad-Hassani, who has a background in security with experience in Syria and who, according to press reports, appears to be the Islamic Republic’s ideal “young cultural figure,” and “the commander in chief of the cultural front of the revolution” (Najdi, 2020). In fact, the militainment figures produced by Owj include the simulation of Hassani, that is, a common soldier-citizen who is member of the taradfaran-e hefz-e nezam (“the ones who are believers in the protection of the regime”); the reframing value of the Army during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war; the production of a great motivation to make a major change in Iran given difficult situations of the country against Trump, Israel and Saudi Arabia; the conviction of the need to go to fight in Syria or Yemen for the welfare of the country; the alliances with the “true Arabs” such as Hamas, Bashar al-Assad, and the Houthis, and the making of odes to important figures such as Abol Qasem Soleimani, Abu Mahdi Al Mohandis, Ali Jafari, and other “heroes of the nation” (Tehran Times, 2020a, 2020b). Regardless of the fundamentals, the nature of the identities of these figures is based on the notion of “children of the revolution,” “the retrieving of the experience,” the “planning of strategies for achieving the own destiny,” and the formulation of the “true youth” (Owj Arts

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and Media Organization, 2020). After four decades of gaining experience and studying the fate of formal and informal cultural institutions, some of the final products made by Owj include popular films and TV series such as Agha Zadeh, Gando, Khaneye Amn, Exit, Mansur, The Holy List, and many others that provide clear examples of how popular Iranian fiction militainment has become a central site to offer “national security” real justifications for national and international policies. Aimed at an Iranian national audience, this programming builds a very particular relationship between audience members as unsuspecting civilians unaware of the constant plots that threaten them, and portray intelligence services as protectors who bravely keep Iranian civilians safe. Another kind of product is the murals program. This is a program exhibited in popular public spaces by portraying specific episodes of contemporary regional and international politics such as Iran’s protection of Bashar al-Assad, the celebration of relations between Abu Mahdi al Muhandis and Pasadaran, the demonization of US policy in Iraq, as well as others connected to domestic politics like the role of armed forces as protectors of society in the economic crisis (blaming the US sanctions), the COVID-19 health crisis, as well as the security regional crisis. The main campaigns implemented by Owj in the last 5 years are “Our Teheran,” “Every procession is a Service,” “America will be always America,” and “We are a nation of martyrs.”

The Role of Sazman-e-Honari Rosanai During Maximum Pressure Campaign Donald Trump’s administration in the United States produced a new wave of Iranophobia in the international public sphere. This momentum can be divided into three phases. (1) The formation of a common front of Washington and some Arab countries against Iran in 2017. (2) The crisis of Abol Qassem Soleimani assassination in 2020. (3) The impact of COVID-19 in Iran. Firstly, in 2017, the American government along with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, Mohammed Bin Zayed, and Abdel Fatah Al Sisi, created the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (ETIDAL, 2021) which had a strong intention of generating an antiIranian media campaign in the Middle East by connecting extremist activities and international terrorism with Teheran. This situation coincided with the political conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia that

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led to the breakdown of their diplomatic relations, causing further links between Qatar, Turkey, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This conjuncture, which prompted a closer approach of Turkey to the Persian Gulf, marked the beginning of a competition for regional domination not only in political and economic terms, but also in cultural policies. This fact produced one important turning point to think in the formation of one new digital public sphere in the Middle East, where powerful narratives by the most influential countries in the area are coexisting in a competition for regional audiences. When Donald Trump withdrew from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018, his administration adopted one more aggressive “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran. This strategy aimed to push the Iranian government to the negotiating table and force it to make compromises on its missile program and on its influence in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. In mass media terms, the main bet of Trump’s administration was the reproduction patterns of antagonism and hostility against Iran in the marketplace of ideas, state identity, and speech acts such as those where the former president tweeted a photo of himself with the words: “Sanctions are coming,” in a play on the well-known “Game of Thrones” saying, “Winter is coming” (CNN, 2018). As a response, Teheran reactivated Owj organization that had gained attention since 2013 when its activist installed sarcastic murals around the country under the campaign “Honesty, American-style” (Jahan News, 2013). The purpose of this reactivation was to warn the Iranians not to trust their American counterparts given the continuity between the Obama and Trump administrations. According to Alipour, “since 2017 the work of Owj expanded significantly to the extent of producing 11,000 pieces of work in various fields in cooperation with 2600 artists” (Alipur, 2018). Among these works, as of the summer of 2017, the organization produced 700 documentary movies, 11 feature films, and almost 400 animation videos (Zimm, 2018, p. 8). Also, Owj was at the planning stages for producing 8 television series and 12 additional feature films, considering the work of popular and controversial film directors like Ebrahim Hatamikia (Faghihi, 2020). In fact, because of these efforts, the Iranian director, who enjoys a high reputation for his narrative of Iran–Iraq war, produced “Damascus Time,” the first major Iranian film about the country’s presence in Syria. This film, which narrates the story of an Iranian cargo plane that leaves Tehran for Syria, caused controversy both for its take on the subject and its artistic value

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because it was recorded at different air bases in Iran and Syria. Moreover, this film included several scenes of Islamic State fighters beheading hostages and it also depicts the propaganda work of the organization in a realistic manner (Faghihi, 2018). Between 2017 and 2019, Owj took part in the popular Fajr Film Festival with production costs estimated at around 150 billion Iranian rials ($4 million) (Alipur, 2018). During that time, Owj produced more materials like the documentary Why Syria?, the popular anti-Trump mural campaign “America will be always the same America,” the film “The Abu Ghraib Strait,” some videogames like “Teheran” (which is a story based on the wake of the two prevailing victories of the Islamic Revolution), “Defenders of Kerbala,” “The Eight attack,” “The Last Fight,” “Defenders of the Shrine,” and the relaunching of “Fighting in the Gulf of Aden” (produced directly by the Iranian army), all of them with the classic tactile controller and adaptability to smart phones (IRCG, 2020). This series of products have in common diverse manners to highlight the suffering of Syrian and Iraqi civilians and the necessity to fight against terrorism and extremist organizations despite the slogans and narratives coming from Western, Israel, and American media. Secondly, in the midst of the tensest part of the “maximum pressure” campaign, the rise of Owj in the Iranian public sphere coincided with the murder of Abol Qassem Soleimani in 2020. Unlike previous attacks (which Iran has responded to by shooting down some drones or by sending special forces to the Persian Gulf in a tic-tac-toe strategy), the January 2020 attack was considered as an act of war not only by Iran, but also by Iraq. Soleimani was one of the key figures of defense and strategic Iranian thinking, and an inspiration for the new digital culture of the Iranian militainment. According to a poll conducted by the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, “Soleimani had increased his popularity rating in Iran, surpassing the likes of Mohammad Javad Zarif and President Hassan Rohani himself” (2019). In the analysis of the moment, it was argued that the United States had not only assassinated Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al Mohandis in Baghdad, but days later it also executed the influential Mullah Nangyalay, an uncomfortable leader who worked in the Herat area, Afghanistan, and who would have separated from the main branch of the Taliban movement for the foundation of the Mullah Rasool Group, an organization known for its closeness to Tehran (Garduño, 2020a, 2020b). What Mohandis and Nangyalay had in common was their coordination

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of ground military operations with Soleimani in their respective areas of influence, which lead people to reflect that Soleimani’s assassination was not an isolated event, but part of a wide-ranging intelligence operation. These selective assassinations and covert operations were accompanied by a new campaign against Iran in the international public sphere where the Israeli-produced series “Tehran” was positioned as one of the main popular productions on platforms such as Apple TV. In addition, Englishlanguage anti-Islamic Republic channels such as Voice of America or BBC Persian began to criticize Iran for its human rights violations and for its military participation in Yemen. The Iranian government responded with the mural campaign “we are a nation of martyrs,” where the figure of Abol Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al Muhandis were portrayed praying together, inviting more people to show solidarity with the regime (Owj Arts and Media Organization, 2020). The new narrative was very successful considering that millions of people were attending Soleimani and Al Mohandis funerals around Iraq and Iran. For its part, Iranian and Middle East media could not prevent the transmission of people crying for Soleimani’s death and manifested a reality that had shocked an entire country by exalting nationalism and the need to cultivate unity with the government in times of crisis. According to the information base of the Office for the Conservation and Publication of the Works of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic Revolution Publications Office for Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Great Ayatollah Khamenei published “Khatam Soleimani,” a 72-page book with pictures and sermons by the Supreme Leader as a homage for Soleimani (IRNA, 2020). In this context, one report published by The Tehran Times, a hardliner newspaper, mentioned the possibility that Owj and Ebrahim Hatamikia would make a film about Soleimani (Tehran Times, 2020b). However, in a press release published in September 2020, Ali Sadrinia, an official of Owj, declared that Hatamikia’s new project was not about Soleimani, but about the marketing of his new controversial movie about the peasant protest against the local authority that symbolically resembles President Hassan Rouhani’s government. This film was called “Exodus,” a collaboration between Owj and the Iranian film company, Nurtaban. Hatamikia was one the first Iranian celebrities who sent messages of condolences after Soleimani’s death saying, “I warmly embraced him many times and I found myself thirstier at separation time” (Tehran Times, 2020b).

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The first months of mourning in Iran were characterized by graphic representations of shame and revenge. Not so much entertainment as previous years. It is possible that the aerial incident that followed the missile attack against the US military bases in Iraq had caused a clash of feelings among the Iranian society which has been affected by multiple crises in the same year. The catastrophic downing of Ukrainian International Airlines Flight 752, with 176 people on board, made the new anti-American public discourse based on the maximum resistance slogans a dubious strategy. The suffering of thousands of people caused anger in public opinion who immediately produced many demonstrations in the streets to repudiate the regime’s “miscalculations.” The crisis of 2020 suggested a shift in the dynamic of political protest in Iran toward an increasing radicalization not only of the educated or middle class, but also among the social forces of precarious neighborhoods and rural areas affected by inflation, unemployment, and the limitations of the informal economy. This context explains that militainment on TV and the Internet was not repeated with the same issues as in the previous years. In fact, TV programs were not directed toward Iran’s role abroad, but above all to criticize the Rouhani government for the mistakes made in economic and strategic terms. This explains the reproduction of the film “Exodus” and the reproduction of the series with themes related to inter-political politics. One of the few issues addressed abroad, following the postconflict context, was the nostalgia for Soleimani’s life, recalling specific issues such as the fight against the Islamic State in the Kurdistan area. The response to this perspective was the film titled “A History of Rescue of Iraqi Kurdistan by Soleimani,” a short film where Kurdish President Masoud Barzani appeals to allies for protection during his country’s war with the Islamic State in 2014 (Farsnews, 2021). This film angered the Kurdistan Regional Government, which lodged a formal complaint with Tehran over what it called “distorted facts” (Al Monitor, 2021). The third and current context is the one where the pandemic came to Iran. It is a context where the militainment finds an opportunity to resurface due to two fundamental factors. The first, wherein the Trump administration has left (with a very bad reputation); and the second, that social confinement opens the opportunity for more people to spend more hours in front of screens. In this sense, Owj has invested in more murals with martyr representations of both Soleimani and health professionals who have lost their lives treating patients affected by coronavirus. At the same time, newspapers present Joe Biden’s administration as “another era

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of lies and fantasies” for Iranian society (Barkhat News, 2021). Moreover, Owj has produced more series and documentaries in 2021 to expose the history of Iranian revolution via films like “Personal Clothes” (a narrative of Tudeh Party as an anti-democratic movement), “Convenience” (a film about justice), “Mansur” (a movie on the Iraq–Iran war martyrdom), and one big campaign about recovering nationalism in the young generation via “Every procession is a service,” a series of music videos with nationalist-religious language conducted by Basijies young leaders. The newest theme of this campaign is “Barcode 2,” a widely disseminated documentary that calls for improving Iranian production, in a call to dignify the role of the Iranian worker in the national economy (Owj Arts and Media Organization, 2021). During the coronavirus pandemic, many people have been stuck at home streaming the latest hit shows. According to Dagres, Owj invested in multi-screen productions about nationalism for ordinary people through series like “Aghazadeh,” which was released in June 2020 by the Iranian version of Netflix, Namava, which has about two million subscribers (Dagres, 2021). The dramatic style of “Aghazadeh” not only questions taboo subjects, but also attempts to address the Iranian public’s discontent over the blatant corruption of the political elite’s children, indirectly blaming the people responsible for the current government. By shedding light on the behavior of the Islamic Republic’s elite, the popular series has the potential to influence voters’ attitudes ahead of this presidential election, considering the powerful demonstrations of 2019 and 2020. According to Dagres, this series is expanding the persuasion power by polishing the image of the country’s judiciary. The protagonist is most like Rasoul Ghahremani, assistant prosecutor in Tehran in charge of economic crimes, who has become the poster boy of the anticorruption drive led by hardliner judiciary chief, Ebrahim Raisi, a top contender for future Supreme Leader (Dagres, 2021). The trajectory of Owj productions has varied based on the national and international contexts. According to this chapter, although the organization was founded in 2013, there are three stages in which it is possible to divide the contents of the Owj today. First, from 2017 to 2019, the Owj alluded to a context exclusively to answer an Iranophobic narrative coming from the Trump administration, emphasizing Iran’s role in Syria and the justification of maintaining political unity in the face of the maximum pressure campaign and economic sanctions. In this period, Owj spent a lot of money on particular films that were widely

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circulated not only in the Iranian public sphere, but also in regional domains. The second phase is the crisis after the murder of Abol Qassem Soleimani. In that moment, the Iranian propaganda saw a rise and fall because, although the representations of martyrdom of Soleimani were well received by Iranian society, the altercation of Ukrainian flight 752 caused a paradigm shift in Iranian media strategy by suspending militainment, on one hand, and reorienting new productions to domestic politics, on the other. Finally, the third phase is the current one, where most of the productions are made on the eve of domestic politics and the presidential elections of 2021 to support the current president Ebrahim Raisi. Given the confinement caused by the COVID-19 crisis, most of the content now is designed to be seen at home through platforms such as Namava, following the same model of militarized and romanticized nationalism, but oriented toward criticizing Rohani’s administration specially in economic terms and in the failed attempt to link Iran diplomatically with Trumpism. Now, in full coexistence with the Biden administration, the Iranian government media policy has not changed much despite returning to negotiations in Vienna in December 2021. The evidence for this argument is that the Owj has maintained the antiAmericanism language in the mural program, alluding to a latest mishap with an American ship which was accused of stealing diesel in the Persian Gulf on November 20, 2021. The referenced mural shows an American octopus stealing a ship and members of the Revolutionary Guard heroically avoiding the robbery. So, during these three stages, the concept of militainment is applied to explain the realization of productions where Owj’s work has gone from murals to cinema, and from there to digital screens. The media productions share a particular objective that is to reinforce Iranian nationalism, the identity of young people and strengthen the narrative of the 1979 revolution not only in the face of the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also in the face of the emergence of new generations who are consuming various forms of digital content through satellite television and the internet. Just as it was presented theoretically, the Iranian citizen is not a single spectator of the wars anymore, but a subject who is slowly becoming a soldier in the battlefield (spect-actor) who interacts with the national mission of the military-industrial complex via television series and hardliner cinema. This perspective permits to say that Iranian militainment in the digital space goes beyond the control of public opinion. Instead of

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looking for a new behavior of this new citizen-soldier, what is making visible a new social engineering that explains the new relationship that Iran is looking for its citizens when talking about war. Some scholars like Mohammed Tavakoli (2011) and Narges Bajoghli (2020) have argued that the idea of revolution, 41 years old, aims to reinvent itself through the promotion of a kind of internal quietism where the Iranian political system presents itself to young people as the constructor of the necessary conditions for the advent of the Hidden Imam, and to build a new cultural subjectivity with which to overcome the multiple liberation narratives that constitute, by far, a constant in the youth, particularly urban, of Iran. To theorize this phenomenon, Mohammed Tavakoli coined the term mushtahandes (a fusion between Mushtahid, an intellectual of jurisprudence, and Mohandes, an engineer) to describe the actors who are shaping the new cultural policy of post-revolutionary Iran. In this chapter, I have argued that it is not a mochtahandes but Pasdaran that is producing the new imaginary of official Iran, taking symbols such as the national flag and the intervention in Syria, or the popular national soccer team alongside doctors and nurses curing people affected by COVID-19. This narrative is combining new elements of classic anti-American and anti-Zionist nationalism with intelligent entertainment tactics that form new representations of the society that the government and Revolutionary Guard in Iran aspire to govern. Of course, these representations coexist with other representations based on the creativity of civil society that, at some point, it will be necessary to study and to talk about. However, for now it is necessary to see that these productions, in relation to other similar productions by influential countries in the Middle East such as Turkey, Qatar, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, are changing the constitution of the public sphere of the Middle East in the digital age, and that the understanding of these processes is extremely useful not only to see how public policies are carried out in the middle of conflicts, but also for understanding how people of the new and present generations engage with their digital culture amid globalization and the rise of digital capitalism.

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Kuo, L., & Kate, L. (2019, February 15). China’s most popular app brings Xi Jinping to your pocket. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/feb/15/chinas-most-popular-app-brings-xi-jinping-to-yourpocket Mohammadi, A. S., & Mohammadi, A. (1990). Hegemony and resistance: Media politics in the Islamic republic of Iran. Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 12(4), 33–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/10509209109361362 Mohammadi, M., Vaisi-Raygani, A., Jalali, R., Ghobadi, A., & Salalri, N. (2020). Prevalence of depression in soldiers of Iranian military centers: A meta-analysis. EBNESINA, 21(4), 34–40. Najdi, Y. (2020, August 11). Warrior, interrogator, artist; the man who leads IRGC’s cultural onslaught. Radio Farda. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/ warrior-interrogator-artist-the-man-who-leads-irgc-s-cultural-onslaught/307 78529.html Ostovar, A. (2018). Vanguard of the imam: Religion, politics, and Iran’s revolutionary guards. Oxford University Press. Owj Arts and Media Organization. (2020). Official Website. http://www.owj media.org/page/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-% D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86 Owj Arts and Media Organization. (2021). Official Website. https://owjmedia. org/post/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%86%DA%AF% D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C-% D8%AF%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B6-%DA%A9% D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AF Shavit, M. (2020). Media strategy and military operations in the 21st century mediatizing the Israel defence forces. Routledge. Stahl, R. (2009). Militainment. Inc. war, media and popular culture. Routledge. Tavakoli, M. (2011). Islam and the contest of faculties in Iran. Conference dictated in British Columbia University. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=ajtisLEaBFk Tehran Times. (2020a, June 8). Owj ready to collaborate with Iranian Army on film projects. Tehran Times. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/448651/ Owj-ready-to-collaborate-with-Iranian-Army-on-film-projects Teheran Times. (2020b, September 15). Owj denies movie deal on Commander Qassem Soleimani. Tehran Times. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/452 520/Owj-denies-movie-deal-on-Commander-Qassem-Soleimani The Global Economy. (2020). Iran. State of Legitimacy Index. https://www.the globaleconomy.com/Iran/state_legitimacy_index/ Uskowi, N. (2019). Temperature rising: Iran’s revolutionary guards and wars in the middle east. Rowman & Littlefield. Valencia, S. (2019). El regimen está transmitiendo en vivo. Revisiones, 9. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7211193

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Valeriano, B., & Habel, P. (2016, April 21). Which country is the most frequent enemy in violent video games? The Washington Post. https://www.washingto npost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/21/do-video-games-changehow-we-think-about-our-enemies-we-investigated/ Wanning, S. (2019, August 11). Chinese propaganda goes tech-savvy to reach a new generation. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/chinese-pro paganda-goes-tech-savvy-to-reach-a-new-generation-119642 Wastnidge, E. (2015, November 1). The modalities of Iranian soft power: From cultural diplomacy to soft war. Politics, 35, 364–377 Zimm, R. (2018, July 9). The Owj arts and media organization: An Iranian NGO, tied to the Iranian revolutionary guards corps, plays a central role in the struggle for hearts and minds at home and abroad. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/ uploads/2018/07/E_170_18.pdf Zucker, E. M., & Simon, D. J. (Eds.). (2020). Mass violence and memory in the digital age memorialization unmoored. Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 3

Seeing Like a State: The Crisis of Building the State of South Sudan Moosa A. Elayah and Matilda Fenttiman

After discussing the role of digital content in the formation of public opinion in Iran, we move on to the process of statebuilding in South Sudan. On the 9th of July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became the newest country in the world, Africa’s 54th state, and the United Nations’ 193rd member state. Millions of Sudanese people had the choice to vote either for “unity” or “separation” and a staggering 98.83% chose separation (Arnold & LeRiche, 2013). Celebrations took place across the nation as the South Sudanese people had longed for peace and justice after they had endured and lost so much during the 54 years it took to break away from the North. The main celebrations were held in Juba, the capital city, where jubilant crowds flooded the street waving flags, chanting “Junub

M. A. Elayah (B) Doha Institute for Grad Studies, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] M. Fenttiman Good Governance Center for Consulting and Studies, Doha, Qatar

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_3

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Sudan, oyee!” (“South Sudan, oh yes!”), among other slogans (Martell, 2018). Despite the hope of the South Sudanese people for peace and recovery, the conflict has been rife in South Sudan since its independence (Jok, 2015). In December 2013, South Sudan’s outlook for the future changed dramatically when a Civil War broke out between the Dinka (the country’s largest ethnic group, estimated at 35.8%) and the Nuer (the second largest group at 15.6%) as part of a power struggle between the President Kiir (a Dinka) and former Vice President Machar (a Nuer) (Department of Parliamentary Services, 2015; Johnson, 2013; UNMISS, 2014). Around the world, there are large numbers of refugees fleeing violence, civil wars, and the breakdown of states. As of the end of 2019, there were 79.5 million displaced people worldwide, of which 40% were children (Ilcan, 2021). This global displacement crisis stems from the vast number of failed, oppressive, and fractured states globally that are suffering from violence, corruption, and exploitative justice systems. Failed states are characterized by the breakdown of law and order, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions and the disintegrated capacity to respond to citizens’ needs, provide civil services, and support economic activities. Development plays an important role in rebuilding failed states. However, often in countries that are emerging from war, attempts have been counteracted by continued violence. This relationship has been prevalent in war-torn countries such as Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uganda, to name a few. Nations either seem unable or unwilling to find solutions to the origins of their domestic problems that are destabilizing the country and causing prolonged conflict (Elayah et al., 2020; Herbst, 2004; Jabareen, 2012; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Violence has been a prevalent issue in South Sudan, ignited by the crisis of governance, which has failed to build infrastructure and institutions, reduce poverty levels, or repair ethnic tensions (De Waal, 2014; Shulika, 2013). Instead, South Sudan has been propelled into an extreme humanitarian crisis, with 380,000 deaths between 2013 and 2018 (Refugees International, 2018), and more than half the population (8.3 million people) currently in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2021). Around 4 million people have been displaced internally and externally due to the severity of this conflict, most of whom have been women and children. South Sudan is also in an economic crisis. It is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with oil accounting for

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90% of the country’s revenue, and due to corruption, economic mismanagement, and the ongoing conflict, South Sudan’s economy is suffering (World Bank, 2020). Methodological statism “seeing like a state,” is borrowed from James Scott’s phrase (2008), which is an angle for analyzing the complete failed regime of South Sudan in instigating the statebuilding efforts in all aspects: political, societal action, the economy, and culture. By analyzing qualitative data from secondary sources and available reports, this chapter is providing a broader picture of South Sudan and the role of the state within it. It seeks to add to the body of research on post-war governance and conflict in South Sudan by providing an understanding of the link between poor governance and conflict, exploring the failure of the state to successfully build the country through improving human conditions and transforming visions, as Scott (2008) stated in his book “Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.” This chapter aims to map many crises of governance with the help of public policy view to create normative and collective learning from crisis and conflict experience. Theories about building and rebuilding states in post-conflict settings will firstly be discussed to understand why the task is so difficult. Second, an overview of the factors that have led to the crisis in South Sudan will be given, followed by potential solutions for the future. Finally, a concluding section will reflect on the findings within this chapter.

Building States in Post-Conflict Settings: Theory and History Statebuilding refers to the process of “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security” (Chandler, 2006). It is often difficult to build states in post-conflict settings because institutions are weak, political structures are unstable, infrastructure is lacking, civil society is generally politicized or has minimal influence, and there is large-scale involvement from the international community (Brancanti & Snyder, 2013; Jarstad & Sisk, 2008; Lyons, 2005; Paris, 2006). These terms make the success of the implementation of both a multi-party system and the institutions sustaining democracy uncertain (Ghani & Lockhart, 2009; Matlosa, 2017).

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In the transition from war to peace, we argue that it is essential to develop legitimate state institutions to enable the act of democratic politics and human perception. However, this comes with its own challenges, since this requires not only a drastic and fundamental reform of the social, economic, and political fabric of the country, but also time (Herbst, 2004; Jabareen, 2012; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Scott, 2008). Time is an important factor in post-war construction Thoradeniya et al. (2021) and Hudson (2013) states that in analyzing the lessons learned from the post-war reconstructions of the 1990s, there should be higher focus on expansive mandates rather than aiming to build the country as fast as possible. A large issue that countries have in rebuilding after conflict is that the fragility of post-conflict settings often means that the electoral process is often subjected to competition with violence used by opposition parties to further their influence (Daxecker, 2012; Fjelde & Höglund, 2014; Hafner-Burton et al., 2013). This often takes shape in the form of violent protests and ethnic rioting, which Wilkinson (2006) suggests is often the case in India where Muslim–Hindu riots break out during the election periods. This is particularly a problem in societies where there are high levels of patrimonialism, a societal feature which prizes ethnicity as the most important asset in the government, where power is highly concentrated. (Arriola, 2009; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2004; Ismail & Olonisakin, 2021). Various countries around the world have political systems based on this including Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, where the ethnic origin of politicians is used for their own political gain (Boone & Kriger, 2012; Boone, 2012). The desire for Sudan to split is thought to stem from the different tribal affiliations, as the North was mostly Arab Muslim and the South mostly felt their roots were tied to Sub-Saharan Africa, with Christianity being the most prominent religion. However, tribal and rigid cultural boundaries, which are largely a colonial construction, were exploited by the Northern political parties as a site of political control and exploitation both pre- and post-independence (see Abdelhay et al., 2011). Sudan as a state was labeled as “Arab” with a Muslim identity and the people of the South didn’t feel that this was representative of them (Rolandsen & Daly, 2016). However, since Sudan gained independence in 1956 many other factors have come into play. Sudan has been plagued by incompetent, corrupt leaderships, and a permanent state of economic crisis. The South Sudanese people have long felt oppressed by the northern Sudanese government’s consistent policy of marginalizing the south with

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impunity (Malwal, 2015). The people of South Sudan have attempted to restore a common identity and agency within Sudan, but this hasn’t been successful. Consequently, they contested the unity between the North and the South during two civil wars that came about in the second half of the twentieth century (Malwal, 2015). Sudan’s First Civil War broke out in 1955 and lasted until 1972. It was led by the southern separatist Anya-Nya movement, with the goal of independence but resulted in quasi-autonomy for Southern Sudan instead. The conflict led to approximately 500,000 deaths, 180,000 refugees, and around 1 million internally displaced civilians (Rolandsen & Daly, 2016). The second civil war which was from 1983 and until 2005 did not have separation as a goal. It was led by John Garang, who was a unionist, and his movement involved northern elites. His nation-building project was called New Sudan (Abdelhay et al., 2011). Southern Sudanese forces were comprised of people from Equatoria in the South during the first civil war, but the momentum gained force going into the Second Civil War. More groups were joining forces and the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups provided the majority of fighters, but as a result at least 2 million people died, over 4 million were internally displaced, and around 800,000 became refugees. Unlike previously, this wasn’t a war for independence, it was a war of revolution (Pinaud, 2021). On 9 January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, which brought the Second Civil War to an end. This peace agreement stipulated a permanent ceasefire, power sharing in the government, semi-autonomy for the South, and a South Sudanese referendum on independence to take place six years post-agreement (Breidlid et al., 2014). However, despite the peace deal, the relationship between the north and the south was still fragile and multiple conflicts occurred. This is mainly due to the immature death or murder of John Garang in a plane crash. In 2011, after over half a decade of war, South Sudan was left as a broken country (Fonkeng, 2021). When it became an independent state, it quickly sunk to the bottom of the UN’s development, health, education, and economic global rankings (Martell, 2018). At this point, a 15-year-old South Sudanese girl had a clearer prospect of dying in childbirth than achieving education, with conditions worse than in Afghanistan under the Taliban (Rai et al., 2011). South Sudan has the greatest population of children out of school in the world, with 2.2 million children not enrolled in education and one in three schools either closed, damaged, or destroyed (USAID, 2021).

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Poverty has been rampant with an absence of adequate infrastructure, electricity, and water access (Roach et al., 2021). Funds are often not funneled into the areas that are likely to benefit communities and reduce poverty levels. Around 82% of the population live below the poverty line yet the government expenditure thus far has consisted mainly of defense and security at the expense of the service sector (World Bank, 2020). Furthermore, rather than trying to build the country on the dreams of the people, the post-independence leadership has been corrupted and government officials siphoned away billions of dollars in aid money and oil revenue to grow wealth for themselves, their families, and their friends (Jok, 2021). Vertin (2018, p. 166) argues that “corruption nearly devoured the state before it was born.” South Sudan’s inequality started to grow significantly, and Catholic and Episcopal bishops of high importance issued a statement in 2012 that expressed concern about the significance of corruption among high-ranking officials (Njuguna, 2012). The SPLA elite enjoyed their bundles of cash, villas, and private jets while the rest of the country didn’t even have access to roads, clean running water, or electricity. Oil revenues amounted to around $12 billion between 2005 and 2011 and had the potential to transform the country for the better, but for most of the country, they did not see any money being injected into their communities (Vertin, 2018). Corruption had become so extreme that embarrassingly, letters were issued by President Salva Kiir asking 75 people, the majority of which were high-ranking officials, to return a total of $4 billion in unaccounted funds (Vertin, 2018). Concerns about the appropriation of oil were brewing even before independence, with conflict being rife in the oil producing parts of South Sudan (Seid et al., 2021). This has worsened since these areas have become increasingly militarized by the government (OHCHR, 2019). The government has expanded its involvement in the oil sector since independence, through the oil company Nilepet, established in 2009. This company is a commercial arm of the South Sudanese government and has been reported to be run by the “President and his inner circle, including ‘predatory elites’ and the head of South Sudan’s International Security Bureau, who sits on the board” (Global Witness, 2018, p. 2). The company is known for its secrecy and lack of transparency and the OHCHR (2019) claims that oil revenues have been siphoned off and filled the pockets of the political elites. This income from oil, along with

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other natural resources, such as illegal teak logging, has had a significant impact on the duration of the war. It is thought that this money is being used to fund the war effort, leading to a higher number of deaths and human rights violations. OHCHR (2019) suggests that economic crimes should be included in unlawful conduct prosecutions to tackle this problem. Knowing that independence was on the horizon, the government of South Sudan has had since 2005 to build the country, but no significant improvements in infrastructure and services were to be seen. Martell (2018, pp. 4&5) describes that there is little infrastructure beyond “wells and pipeline” and that when riding on a motorcycle he “could cover most of the country’s tarmac in half an hour” because Juba is “a ramshackle town of rapid construction, guns, thatched huts and dust.” Thus, many hold the government responsible for the situation in South Sudan because it failed to organize a discussion with citizens and the political elite to understand what type and structure of state they had envisioned (Johnson, 2013). In the years leading up to the election, concerns were growing about the direction in which the government was taking to deliver the aspirations that the South Sudanese people had for their country (de Vries & Schomerus, 2017).

Outbreak of Civil War: An Ethnic Divide and Humanitarian Catastrophe The 1990s witnessed a growth in ethnic tension between the Dinka and Nuer tribes during Sudan’s North–South war. Reports surfaced by the Human Rights Watch (1993) that claimed John Garang, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army’s (SPLM/A) leader of the time, had committed human rights abuses against the Nuer people. This news together with disagreements about the objectives of the insurgency against Khartoum led Machar to split from the SPLM, along with others, and instead he became a senior Nuer commander of the Southern Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) (Johnson, 2003). Machar and his allies then decided to become allies with the Khartoum government and even managed to secure positions in the Sudanese government, which heightened tensions between the Dinka and Nuer people and soon led to conflict (Johnson, 2011). Under Machar’s command in 1991, Nuer forces raided Dinka homes killing 2000 civilians in what is known as the Bor Massacre (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Continual abuse by

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both sides sparked ethnic hatred and fighting between the two groups, with violent conflict taking place particularly in the Greater Upper Nile state (now split into Northern Jonglei, Unity, and the Upper Nile states) throughout the 2010s (CRS, 2014). Religious extremism, both Islamic and Christian, has also had a detrimental role in the militarization of the South Sudanese population. There are few university-educated professionals and armament is widely available because the Arab region has provided a larger amount of financial support than the United States’ Bible Belt. Consequently, this has been funding and arming Khartoum’s regime and the South Sudanese people. In the early 2000s, Machar reconciled with the SPLM and was given the third highest position in government after Garang and Kiir, who was deputy at the time. However, in 2005, Garang died in a helicopter crash and Kiir then became head with Machar as his deputy. In 2005, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with Sudan, tensions started building again between the Dinka and Nuer. South Sudan had become semi-autonomous, something which triggered a conflict over which group had a higher political influence (Climate Diplomacy, 2021). It didn’t help that the Nuer ethnic group had supported the Sudanese government previously because the Nuer people were perceived as unsupportive of the government, thereby creating a divide. Until independence, there were various localized outbreaks of violence between the two ethnic groups, including a violent conflict in the southern town of Malakal in November 2006 where hundreds died, and in March 2008, in the oil-rich Abyei area, on the border of the north–south divide (Breidlid et al., 2014). Following decades of devastation, with a lack of basic infrastructure, poor governance, and continuous ethnic and tribal divisions, which didn’t ameliorate after independence, the country proved too fragile to hold.1

1 Local Christian leaders and international NGOs carried out heroic efforts, working hard to consolidate South Sudan. However, before the separation from the North Sudan, the Christian leaders related to the South of Sudan had a secessionist role, especially in the United States. As Kinzer wrote “Sudan has been ruled for a quarter-century by an old-style African dictator, Omar al-Bashir. Forces under his control periodically rampaged through the southern provinces. This would have attracted no more attention than other violence in Africa if it had not been for the presence of American missionaries in the south. They raised the alarm, framing the conflict as the oppression of black Christians by Muslim Arabs from the north. Led by the militantly anti-Muslim Rev. Franklin Graham, they activated networks of fundamentalist Christians in the United States and

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In December 2013, a power struggle between President Kiir and former Vice President Machar sparked a Civil War to break out as ethnic tensions heightened (Vertin, 2018). It is often the case that when a state is broken and dysfunctional the people look to their tribes for support, and this was the case in South Sudan. As a result of vast corruption, no significant change in poverty levels, a lack of infrastructure, and internal repression following independence, by 2013 Kiir’s popularity had plummeted (Rolandsen & Daly, 2016). Machar, knowing that Kiir was losing support, positioned himself as the next president. Consequently, in the summer of 2013, Kiir fired Machar and his entire cabinet, which tore apart the SPLM and propelled Machar into an independent position. During Kiir’s presidency, he never integrated the Dinka and Nuer groups into the armed forces; instead, the people of the Nuer tribe felt marginalized. Thus, Machar rallied together his own Nuer militia, who were keen to give their loyalty to him instead of the government, resulting in a strong ethnic divide. While the political clash that triggered this civil war was not due to a dispute over ethnic identity, it triggered fighting over the preexisting ethnic and political fault lines (Vetin, 2018). After tensions had been brewing, on the 15th of December 2013, an enormous fight erupted between Nuer and Dinka soldiers in Juba military barracks. President Kiir responded to this news by stating that Machar had plans for a coup, without any evidence to back up his claim (Vertin, 2018), and he unleashed his forces to begin an ethnic cleansing of the Nuer tribe (Martell, 2018). His forces comprised of the SPLA, which operated as a de facto Dinka force, and these soldiers swept through Juba, murdering Nuer men, assaulting their women and children, and destroying their houses and communities. Within 24 hours of this violent rampage, 16,000 Nuer people had poured into UN compounds seeking refuge (Vertin, 2018). Machar managed to escape safely to Bor in the North, where the Nuer White Army had heard of the atrocities in Juba

began agitating to turn the southern provinces of Sudan into a new Christian nation”. See for instance this propaganda: https://www.amazon.com/Salva-Kiir-Mayaardit-Presid ent-Independence/dp/1530038758. See also this reference on that issue of Christian fundamentalists (let alone Joseph Koney’s Lord Resistance Army) fueling tensions and violence in Sudan and, eventually, South Sudan: https://www.google.com/search?q= sudan+%2B%22fundamentalist+christians%22&rlz=1C1CHZN_enQA945QA945&sxsrf= AOaemvIp_OCKj3FCRldneSYagBCtPQzKbA:1631994578961&ei=0kJGYcCTOoyca97 CqqgM&start=10&sa=N&ved=2ahUKEwjAxJ3JpYnzAhUMzhoKHV6hCsUQ8NMDeg QIARBI&biw=1280&bih=609&dpr=1.5.

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and had aligned their troops ready to fight alongside Machar. Machar’s faction, known as the SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), set out to ambush and assault Dinka communities, committing the same crimes and acts of brutality as Kiir’s troops. Ethnic tensions then grew further again in 2015 after Kiir split 10 states into 30, gerrymandering the country to create Dinka majorities (International Crisis Group, 2021). This was the beginning of what would be a very long conflict and seeing like state concept. South Sudan has a high agricultural potential, with six agro-ecological zones containing over 30 million hectares of arable land. This is approximately 5 times the agricultural area per capital of Kenya, Uganda, or Ethiopia and has the potential to feed its own country as well as multiple others. Despite this, South Sudan’s agriculture and farmers are poor, with limited agricultural production per capita and output per hectare. The industry consists largely of subsistence agriculture, partly based on rapid cycles of slash and burn practices, which has been decreasing the fertility of the soils, and thus has shown to be highly problematic (Hauser & Norgrove, 2013). South Sudan’s climatic conditions have the potential to boost the economy as they enable a vast range of crops to be grown to meet dietary needs but there is currently almost no asphalted road nor cold chain for the commercialization of crops (World Bank, 2019). In contrast, Kenya and Uganda have tapped into their potential and export their productions across the world. Due to low population densities and the large share of people working in agriculture in South Sudan, the South Sudanese people rarely experience hunger in times of peace. However, during Civil War, the armies use food and starvation, “the cheapest weapon of mass destruction available to armies,” as a weapon of war on both sides, to achieve military and political goals (World Food Programme USA, 2020). Forces loyal to the government looted and burnt food supplies from the homes of the Nuer, as well as stole their livestock. In some cases, people that were hiding from the brutality of the armed forces had to survive for days, sometimes months living in isolated swamp areas, with a diet consisting mostly of the edible parts of water lilies (Amnesty International, 2018).2 Due to the severity of this conflict, the economy collapsed and CSIS (2018) predicts that if the conflict continues for 20 years the total loss to 2 This is also largely due to the limited density of population and the very large share of people working in agriculture.

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GDP could be up to $158 billion. Consequently, the country is dependent on international aid to survive. Since 2011, $9.5 billion has been donated to South Sudan, with 173 humanitarian organizations working in the state as of May 2018 (OCHA, 2018). More than half of the population is in desperate need of lifesaving aid, but supplies are not able to reach the people who need them most. The MLPSHRD (2017, p. 20) described aid to the region as South Sudan’s “new oil fields,” since it has been reported that the government has been confiscating supplies, diverting aid money into their own pockets, charging taxes at checkpoints, and increasing the price of work-permits for international aid workers (Armed Conflict Survey, 2019). The Ministry of Labour increased work-permits at the end of 2017 from $100 to in some cases $4000 (MLPSHRD, 2017), resulting in the diversion of more than $7 million worth of lifesaving aid that year (UNSC, 2018). This has had a huge impact on aid organizations. One claimed to have spent $350,000 in 2018 solely on administrative taxes and fees (Armed Conflict Survey, 2019). The different warring parties have also been looting, destroying, and blocking aid, as well as using it as a source of income (CSIS, 2018). Both sides have established bureaucratic impediments on international aid because they don’t want supplies to be given to the opposing side and, consequently, they want to control the activities of aid organizations. Thus, aid organizations are struggling to reach the areas in need due to this long process. One organization reported that they have had to negotiate with over 70 different armed groups around the country (Armed Conflict Survey, 2019). Additionally, Amnesty International (2018) stated that the government’s failure to ensure that war criminals are brought to justice is one of the factors that fueled the unlawful killings of civilians, abduction and the systematic rape of women and girls, and widespread looting and destruction. The OHCHR (2019) reported that when exploring the situation in Leer, over 8000 Dinka men were recruited to fight with the words “you go and get cattle from Mayendit, also abduct and rape beautiful women you find there, loot their properties.”3 The report claims that they were also told that if they wanted to seek revenge, now was their perfect opportunity. UNICEF reported that 25% of victims of sexual violence were children, some as young as 7. With these horrific crimes, OHCHR (2019) 3 This is a press release so there aren’t pages: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEv ents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24183&LangID=E.

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claims that to achieve peace will require “a tangible and credible pursuit of accountability and justice that meets the needs of the many thousands of victims.” The progress of establishing transitional justice mechanisms in South Sudan has been slow although this is an essential service to provide to make sure that people are brought to justice for their crimes.

Short- and Long-Term Conflict Resolution In February 2020, the Dinka and Nuer started forming a unity government in accordance with a peace deal that was signed a year and a half earlier, in September 2018. However, the situation has remained fragile as the country has long experienced mediation followed by renewed conflict and bloodshed. The next elections will be a test for the peace deal but the International Crisis Group (2021, p. i) states that “conflict will continue to plague South Sudan until its leaders forge a political system that distributes power more widely.” It is unclear when the election will take place, but it is thought that it will likely be held in 2022 or later. Stakes are high in these elections because access to state power is often a means for politicians to secure their own personal wealth as well as providing significant benefits for their own supporters (Bratton & Van De Walle, 1997; Posner, 2005). Given the pattern of conflict in the country, it is important for both the government and external actors to carefully manage the pre-election period. It is essential to not rush the country into a vote if conflict seems to be brewing, nor should the election be postponed indefinitely as this could also cause conflict, though this time between President Kiir and an embittered opposition. Furthermore, if elections go ahead, measures should be put in place to mitigate tensions as and when they arise. Political tensions often seem to trigger conflict in South Sudan, as was the case of the Civil War that broke out in 2013. Therefore, it is important to explore other ways to structure the government to prevent the oppression of minority ethnic groups, the resulting high levels of extreme poverty and the violent behavior that has taken so many lives. Maintaining a working relationship between Kiir and Machar is of high importance, although given their bitter rivalry, this is a difficult task. Machar currently has little power in Juba, being only junior partner in the unity government. In comparison, Kiir commands the security services, who have higher power than Machar’s appointees in both state and local governments, and they thus have the authority to remove members from their

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positions. This causes friction and with both men continuing to command their own armies, war could be on the horizon. However, even without these two leaders the country would still be divided, because the ethnic divide has become so extreme after decades of conflict, the people have amassed a lot of weapons during this time and without basic infrastructure and institutions, South Sudan is continually on the brink of war. Thus, it is essential that any long-term strategy to sustainably develop the nation must focus on stabilizing the country and developing infrastructure (Leonardi, 2013). It is particularly important to focus on methods of peaceful resolution in the Equatoria region because of the current rebellion against the state (International Crisis Group, 2021). Boin et al. (2016) claim that crisis framing by the government is an important process for stabilization, because this would enable the government to respond more effectively to crisis situations. This involves working through the crisis management system by defining the situation and assessing the time span to identify the risks, followed by creating a decision-making strategy. This system ensures early signs of conflict are identified, so that precautions can be put in place and consequences can be predicted (Coccia, 2020; Sawakar & Sawakar, 2020). In South Sudan, conflict has occurred due to ethnic groups feeling oppressed by the Dinka government and excluded from powerful positions in government. A solution to prevent this from happening again in the future is to build a political system where power is shared at the center more equitably (International Crisis Group, 2021). Progress has been made in South Sudan; a unity government was formed in February 2020 under the terms of the 2018 peace agreement. However, if this peace deal were to collapse, focus should be made on reforming the political structure to prevent the cycle of conflict from occurring. A possible way to do this would be to have a rotational leadership, such as the one in Nigeria, where between 1960 and 1996 the country saw ten different presidents. Nigeria’s presidency rotates between the Northern and Southern areas of the country, with the geo-ethnic origin alternating every election also (Akinola, 1996). The idea of this was to keep all the political parties engaged, unify the people, prevent discrimination, and create stability throughout the country. However, this hasn’t solved all of Nigeria’s problems as corruption and inequality are still considerable (Uwazurike, 1997) and this solution makes tribalism an essential governance resource, and thus reproduces the existing problems. Tanzania uses

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a similar method of rotational leadership where the president rotates between a Muslim and a Christian after two five-year terms. It’s not in the constitution but it occurs due to the religious divide in the country, enabling the two groups to cooperate more peacefully (Tanoukhi & Mazrui, 2011). Although, it’s important to note that this has done little to prevent the rise in authoritarianism (International Crisis Group, 2021). In light of South Sudan’s ethnic divide, adopting this method of rotational leadership may not fix all their issues but it could encourage some working unity between the two sides. It could also prevent the losers of the election from protesting and responding with anger because they would know that the executive power will become theirs the following election. The International Crisis Group (2021) proposes a second option, which is to create prominent positions within the government for the runners up of the election. As explained previously, the current winnertakes-all nature of elections has not given Machar an adequate amount of authority despite him being Vice President and it has created political tensions, although the power has been shared more within the new unity government that has formed. Thus, this method would reduce conflict leading up to the elections and afterward, as the unsuccessful presidential candidate would be guaranteed a high level of influence even if they lose the vote. There are multiple ways to do this, one of which is that the first Vice President position could become the presidential runner-up and the third runner could be granted the other Vice President position. This would stay within the criteria of the 2018 peace deal and prevent innocent lives being lost. This could be a very successful approach although a critique is that it would risk further entrenching those who have been at the very forefront of the power struggle and corruption. Another solution would be to transform the whole political system into a collegial presidency, with members electing a rotating chair (International Crisis Group, 2021). The way this system would work is that there would be a Prime Minister with two deputies; these three members would be the elected representatives from the three administrative subdivisions of South Sudan, grouped into the three historical provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and the Greater Upper Nile. These members would work at the top of the government and the cabinet would report to a collegial presidency made up of five members, who don’t have an active role in the day-to-day running of the government but rather more of an oversight one, where they can step into grill ministers or veto decisions

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if needed (Deng et al., 2014). This would make sure that all the ethnic groups are represented in the decision-making process about the state, reducing the likelihood of ethnic fighting. However, it is important that ethnic minorities within each region are not excluded from the vote for regional representatives as this would trigger further conflicts (Diehl & van der Horst, 2013). The region of Bahr el Ghazal could be particularly susceptible to this because it is predominately Dinka followed by large Fertit and Luo communities, who already feel sidelined in politics. Expanding on the previous idea, to alleviate ethnic tensions further, power could be shared not just within political parties but within all aspects of public life. Ethnic quotas by the government, together with robust action programs could ensure that all ethnicities are represented in both civilian and military public institutions (International Crisis Group, 2021). Since a lack of diversity and an under-representation in government is a huge driver for civil unrest this integrative approach could build stability, and thus, a stronger South Sudan for all. A way to ensure that conflict does not arise from the power struggles within both the government and the general population is to give more authority to regional, local, and state administrative bodies. When there are tensions within the centralized government, history has shown that the conflict worsens as “communal elites and armed actors believe they need to join a national coalition to uphold their cause in Juba” (International Crisis Group, 2021). Furthermore, after signing the peace agreement, the conflict still hasn’t been resolved on a local level. Community voices need to be heard and effective feedback mechanisms need to be implemented to empower people to undertake local ownership of peace processes (Boswell, 2019). There are three main advantages of decentralizing the government as outlined by Smoke (2003). The first is improved efficiency, because different areas of the country will require different services, thus having a sub-national government that understands the local context improves the speed and ease of the allocation process. Another advantage is improved governance, the people are more likely to have a strong connection with their local government and if their wishes are granted, they will likely feel a sense of empowerment and control. Thirdly, decentralization leads to improved equity because if local government understands the needs of the community, then they are more likely to be able to distribute public resources more equitably. The combination of these will enable economic growth and poverty alleviation (Smoke, 2003) and consequently, the

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debate is growing over the ideal political model for South Sudan moving forward, with the idea of decentralization coming up in many discussions in both academic and political circles (International Crisis Group, 2021). The case of Kenya is a good example of how structure at a local level can reduce the risk of large-scale conflict and political instability, particularly around election time. After a referendum in 2010, the state was remodeled into a federal devolution system after the election crisis of 2007, to reduce the all-or-nothing power of the presidency and redistribute power over resources on a more local level (International Crisis Group, 2021). In this new model, 47 counties have their own governors who distribute resources depending on the needs of the area and so far, this has been more successful than previously (International Crisis Group, 2015). However, there is still a risk of minorities being neglected in the local elections and increased competition between the different ethnic groups within an area, which could lead to tension and conflict (International Crisis Group, 2017). In South Sudan, President Kiir’s National Dialogue discovered that there is an increasing popularity of decentralization among the public, including a 100-page proposal by the NAS (2020) laying out how a decentralized federal system would work. Despite originally being outwardly opposed to the idea, Kiir hired a minister of foreign affairs to the cabinet. However, this minister has not made much progress because Kiir has kept the power tightly contained in Juba. This shows that Kiir might just be playing along with the idea while he is actually keen on keeping the power centralized. His past actions also show that he is supportive of the idea of centralization. For example, he split South Sudan’s 10 states into 32, thereby reducing their political authority, geographical area, and economic importance, leading to higher power for the centralized government (International Crisis Group, 2021). Given the duration of conflict in South Sudan it has become essential to explore new ways of governance and one only has to look at the government’s role in past patterns of conflict in South Sudan to see the rationale for decentralization. However, this comes with challenges, such as those explained in the case of Kenya. Reducing the power from the central government could increase conflicts and corruption within local communities. Nevertheless, this is a step that should be taken as it may mitigate the risks of conflict as well as the level of poverty throughout South Sudan, something that could contribute save innocent lives.

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These examples show that there are alternatives to the current system of governance that is failing the people and leading to a continuation of conflict. The main challenge will be persuading the elite members of government to adopt new solutions. At this moment in time, the power struggle between Kiir and Machar suggests that they will likely resist reforms, with Kiir hoping to retain his and Machar hoping to capture it for himself. Even if one of these solutions is introduced, it will make minor differences within the country if the political elites continue to bend the constitution and laws for themselves, while siphoning away billions of dollars that could have been used to develop communities, the infrastructure, and the economy. This chapter has shed light on the crisis of governance that has occurred since South Sudan became an independent nation. The foundations of the country are seriously lacking as the SPLM failed to build robust infrastructure and institutions prior to the independence referendum of 2011, which would have created an easier transition. The government did have the funds to be able to transform the country, with the billions of dollars from humanitarian organizations and oil revenues that have been received. However, billions of dollars have been siphoned off and enriched the elite, and not in a not subtle manner, with some people flaunting their luxurious lives in the world’s poorest country. Another significant problem is that the government has failed to ease the ethnic tensions, particularly between the Dinka and Nuer groups, and they have even exacerbated this divide as a result of their own political disagreements, as in the most recent civil war. The current South Sudan crisis reflects decades of civil war and corruption, a lack of development and vision from the government, centuries of marginalization and, arguably, the curse of non-state-contained tribalism. The latter, rather, is instead being used by parties in the conflict to bolster their respective claims and mobilize their power basis, leading to a well-entrenched zero-sum game wherein the common good remains an elusive dream and the Res Publica ideal has been replaced by a Res Tribal to the detriment of most. As the Sudanese Catholic Bishop, Macram Max Gassis once explained, “Africa is suffering from one big cancer: tribalism. And as long as tribalism prevails, people will suffer a lot” (Catholic News Service, 2018). It seems that so far, a lack of collective vision by the government has been a significant factor in South Sudan’s lack of peace and development. Moving forward, it is thus essential that those in power come

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up with a clear vision and integrative path for the country to reduce levels of conflict and poverty. Knopf (2016) suggests that there are three ways for South Sudan to transition away from conflict and instability, “by relying on existing authorities to manage the process, by creating a new power-sharing arrangement, or by engineering a clean break from the past that essentially establishes a new governing authority, usually with major international support.” The first approach, relying on existing authorities, would result in less involvement and oversight by international actors than was envisioned in the 2015 agreement and therefore would not be a viable alternative to the current failing model. However, the second and third approaches both have their benefits and could possibly be used in conjunction with each other (Haysom & Kane, 2013). Peace agreements reflect the second model, but the peace agreement of 2015 quickly collapsed, and the country descended into a Civil War. The 2018 peace pact was more successful in creating a ceasefire, but it has left high levels of competition and tensions brewing between opposing political parties (Knopf, 2016). Both of these agreements suggest that solely relying on peace agreements is unlikely to provide the long-term relief and widespread consensus that South Sudan is desperately in need of. Instead, the structure of the government needs to change to ensure that power is shared between various governmental parties. A stable future is likely to be one that is a combination of sharing the power and decentralizing the state. Political leaders could work on a rotational basis, with power being distributed at a local level, to reduce the political tensions from the current winner-takes-all system and the long presidency terms of one party. This will mean that more voices can be heard, government would be representative of the population and consequently ethnic tensions would reduce (International Crisis Group, 2021). The third approach, establishing a new governmental authority, could be a possible solution. There are two different angles to take, the first is that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar step down to make way for new political leaders and the other is to form a whole new government from the outside. Many South Sudanese from both sides are tired with the conflict and believe that it will only be possible to have inclusive talks, about visions for the future, if both men step down from their positions (International Crisis Group, 2021). New members could then be voted into power, but it is difficult to know whether the power struggles will extend to the next President and Vice President. Knopf (2016) proposed a solution in her report, calling for a “clean break” from the current leaders

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and power structures of South Sudan. She put forward the idea that an international transition administration governs the country instead, stabilizing South Sudan and putting it on the right track for self-rule in the future. This is a very extreme method to take but given the instability of the country and the extreme levels of conflict Knopf (2016, p. 18) claims that this is “the only viable option.” However, a key issue with this model lies in convincing the government to accept this high level of external influence. Any solution that is implemented in the future needs to have a larger distribution of power at the top, striving toward a more inclusive future. Modi et al. (2019) also highlight how in order to achieve and sustain peace in South Sudan “a robust reconciliation process” must occur between the different ethnic groups, a statement made by religious and civil society leaders. The importance of healing divisions and restoring trust has been emphasized in order for the country to move forward. Many religious initiatives have attempted to reconcile the people, but these efforts have been hindered by the “intensity of ethnic antagonisms” together with a lack of cooperation by political rivals and “inadequate institutional and financial resources” (Modi et al., 2019).

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CHAPTER 4

Policing Coexistence Through Economic Incentives: An Analysis of Nir Barkat’s Policies on Education in East Jerusalem During His Tenure as Mayor (2009–2018) Ignacio Rullansky

Cohabitation means sharing the Earth with others. Following Hannah Arendt (1976), democracy can be conceived as a form of organization of collective life based on its respect for plurality, namely, for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, granting that no one should exercise the right to choose with whom to cohabit. Nevertheless, historical experiences have shown time and again that cohabitation is a matter of concern,

I. Rullansky (B) National Research Council (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] National University of San Martín, San Martín, Argentina Institute of International Relations, National University of La Plata, La Plata, Argentina

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_4

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being channeled by social movements, political parties and governments. The question on how to politically institute cohabitation in contexts of conflict is what I have tried to make intelligible by studying the Jerusalemite reality, where the dominant ethno-national group’s political project has derived in the subsequent production of the diasporic condition of the cultural Other. This feature has prevented Smooha (1997, 2002) and Yiftachel (1998, 2000) from using the concept of democracy to apprehend the socio-political reality of Israel–Palestine. Demographic trends, from 1967 to date, showed that the Arab population has grown in greater proportion than the Israeli Jewry, among which the Haredi have developed a higher birth rate than the Zionists (DellaPergola, 2003). This raised the perspective among Israeli political and military authorities that the preservation of the State requires a correlative governance of the demographic behavior of the population. Here, I intend to outline an analysis about the exercise of political power according to one specific form of representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, this is an inquiry about the way in which a contemporary and particular political rationality emerged to provide meaning to a distinctive modality of governing such ethno-national diversity. Accordingly, I will share some findings from my analysis on the irruption of an original political economy in the exercise of power in the city of Jerusalem between 2009 and 2018, the years when Nir Barkat served as mayor. I argue that Barkat introduced a mutation in the order of execution of the tactics to govern the city and sustain Israeli sovereignty. With the purpose of examining this, I return to the concept of the apparatus of Israelization, with which I traced the sets of visibility and enunciation curves between discursive and extra-discursive elements on the exercise of power in Jerusalem, as a local empirical referent of a broader political regime (Deleuze, 1992; Foucault, 2008; Rullansky, 2019). Hence, with this notion I intend to unveil a power diagram in which these curves are manifested, as well as the resulting processes of subjectivation-objectification derived from a certain exercise of political power. The question that guides this research establishes that Barkat introduced an original political rationality on the question of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and with regard to the demographic balance between the ethno-national groups that inhabit the city while possessing different citizen status. According to Barkat’s political rationality, the same grid

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of intelligibility would be applied to configure the subjectivity of Jerusalemite Jews and Palestinians alike: that of the homo economicus of neoliberalism. The general objective proposed here is, therefore, to inquire about the adoption of such political rationality and to apprehend if it implied a subsequent mutation in the outline and implementation of public policies aimed at each group during the period. I will focus on the exploration of a particular policy that assumed a distinctive deployment with respect to Barkat’s predecessors: educational policies. During Barkat’s mandate, several schools in East Jerusalem began to replace the Jordanian-Palestinian curriculum, the Tawjihi, with the Israeli, the Bagrut. Former mayor Barkat noticed this trend and advocated to strengthen it, not aiming at the incorporation of the Palestinian population to the Israeli citizenship, but at maintaining a certain margin of “controlled” integration, as this would have constituted, in his rationality, a way to more efficiently govern them and at a lower cost.

Theoretical-Methodological Strategy: Grounded Theory and Content Analysis For this research, I implemented a methodological approach that responds to the qualitative paradigm, involving the survey of official documents by the Municipality of Jerusalem together with a multiplicity of secondary sources that were published during Nir Barkat’s mandate. Among the first group, I selected memos, open letters published in the media and urban planning documents that encompassed statements by the former mayor. With regard to the secondary sources, this group included a vast archive of articles and journalistic interviews, accompanied by a series of reports by NGOs, think tanks and international organizations. The main criterion that led me to select the analyzed sources responds to the identification of the theoretical relevance that they presented in relation to the objective and the questions that guided this project. In that sense, I was especially interested in understanding the ways in which Nir Barkat, as mayor, expressed a political rationality regarding the ways of governing Jerusalem’s ethno-national diversity amidst the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Succinctly, the objective was to apprehend how Barkat’s political rationality materialized in the design of public policies—here, I focused on educational policies—that advocated for specific historical dynamics of integration and exclusion between

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both ethno-national groups, which in turn possess different civic status as citizens and permanent residents of the State, respectively. To be more concrete, in this chapter we can appreciate not only some of the interviews given by Barkat and municipal officials to the media, but also fragments of speeches delivered in think tanks such as the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Furthermore, I enclosed reports provided by Human Rights NGOs such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), as well as an English translation of a ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court delivered by Hamoked—Center for the Defense of the Individual, regarding this chapter’s topic. Moreover, I also surveyed the Municipality’s and former mayor’s activity on social media, which allowed me to trace relevant posts like the one I hereby share, which corresponds to the opening of a public school in East Jerusalem in 2019. Moreover, I analyzed the aforementioned documents by applying the constant comparison technique introduced by grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) as well as content analysis techniques (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). While the first is based on existing theory and explores the emergence of new notions from the collected data, the second is supported by a specific state of the art, providing flexibility to the development of interpretive categories through a process of systematic classification of coding and identification of themes and patterns, contemplating the benefits of new contributions: questioning the theory, re-examining and consolidating hypotheses, and looking for possible validations, criticisms and/or conceptual extensions (Neuendorf, 2002). Content analysis delves into language structures by understanding that there are meanings that can be extracted from a text and synthesized thanks to the potential of conceptual categories. Accordingly, in this case, I followed an integrating model of existing theory, open to the emergence of new notions, with the purpose of expanding the toolboxes that triggered this project’s research questions. Having done this, I displayed the sources in hermeneutical units of Altas.ti software and proceeded to review and conceptualize the arc of properties that the events in question presented carrying out a process of operationalization of the concepts, which served to initiate an intuitive coding scheme that allowed me to compose a codebook (Neuendorf, 2002). On this occasion, I used the “direct” approach, considering that formal theory and the state of the art on a phenomenon can benefit from new contributions. The production of new conceptual tools emanating from

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the data occurs from the identification of features or qualities whose specificity can be captured in categories: labels that distinguish or enhance the strength of certain features of the obtained statements. The theory is questioned in a deductive way and can provide predictions on concepts and variables of interest or on their relationships, helping to determine the initial coding schemes. Furthermore, I tested my codebook procuring that the categories and sub-categories were mutually exclusive and exhaustive by taking reports from Atlas.ti to differentiate code families and observe the selected fragments, considering the ways in which relationships were manifested between the in vivo codes I had created, with respect to preexisting concepts. The systematic dialogue between surveyed documentation and the creation of categories and their properties led to an axial coding stage, where the relationship within a category was intensively examined, and then, to a selective step where I structured code families checking their strength and stability. In short, I composed and distinguished about eleven general families covering large dimensions of analysis, for example, distinction between new and old politics, nativity and belonging to Jerusalem, construction of political subjectivities, among others. Thus, the point of theoretical saturation was reached once no further properties would emerge. This methodological strategy was key for me to interpret how a specific semantic was expressed in certain statements that gave the exercise of political power in Jerusalem an original meaning. The notion of “Open Jerusalem” is the main emerging category I applied to designate this feature, characteristic of Nir Barkat’s art of governing, and its centrality will be verified throughout the chapter.

Politics of Politicians and Professionals: The Entrepreneur as a Shepherd Nir Barkat’s political rationality can be apprehended as an exercise of neoliberal governmentality. The neoliberal political reason, according to authors such as Michel Foucault (2008), Wendy Brown (2015), ByungChul Han (2017), and Thomas Lemke (2001), produces a kind of subjectivity that can be found in the figure of the entrepreneur; namely, the homo economicus of neoliberalism. This subject consecrates the vocation of personal fulfillment as a rational actor that calculates costs and benefits in every sphere (Brown, 2015; Han, 2017). Since the

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entrepreneur’s site of inscription is the marketplace, the realization of a citizenship that possesses, observes, and respects individual and collective rights is relegated to the background. The collective dissemination of the same incentives and passions is presented as a stage that surpasses the differences that emanate from the national histories and biographies linked to them, potentially preventing multicultural and pluralistic encounters. In Barkat’s political rationality, an “open Jerusalem” means that the city is open for business: open for international markets, thus, open to Jews and Palestinians, that could aspire to better conditions of living by behaving like homines economici of neoliberalism. If acting like such, their expectations will converge in the market instead of crashing in the streets. Thus, a pacified city can be advertised as if there were no surreptitious conflicts hidden in its entrails.1 This rationality proclaims that the status quo can be “better,” and that implies that Jerusalem does not have to be separated, nor does it have to integrate the Palestinians as full citizens. Therefore, a diasporic condition and non-statehood will continue to occur. On this point, the unequal possession of cultural, symbolic, economic, and social capital is a substantive obstacle for a Palestinian to achieve the economic success achieved by Barkat. The unfolding of this is found, again, in the notion that the best shepherd in the city, according to neoliberal rationality, will emerge from the ranks of the business community. The most complete understanding of the problems of the city and of the Jerusalemite question arises not only from the perspective derived from the nativity but from the episteme of neoliberal governmentality. This episteme separates the language and procedures of the “old politics,” 1 Governmentality aims to distinguish power relations as “strategic games between freedoms” in which an actor or group of actors intend to regulate and conduct the conducts of others. Between strategic games of freedom and states of domination (power), the technologies of power stand out (Foucault, 2008). Power can then be perceived as strategic games (the structuring of possible fields of action of others), as government (the systematized, regulated, and reflected modes of power that follow a rationality to define horizons of action or adapting the means to achieve it: technologies) and as domination (the systematic and stabilized asymmetric relationship between actors in a field based on the effects of technologies). The specificity of this type of technology lies in the configuration of subjectivitie “base” on the notion of homo economicus of neoliberalism: the State emerges from a set of responsibilities that fall on the individual who, as a “rational” actor, is oriented to calculate costs and benefits as an economic actor in practically every area of his/her life (Brown, 2015).

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the politics of politicians, to be replaced by an alleged truthful saying stripped of corruption.2 That old policy of fraud scandals and embezzlement of public funds was responsible, according to Barkat, for the outbreak of the Second Intifada and provoked the discussion to divide the city during the Olmert administration.3 On the other hand, the policy of entrepreneurs and professionals assists the dominant ethno-national project not willing to give up sovereignty over East Jerusalem. The politics of the politicians are not only shameful for their immanent corruption, Barkat would say, but for having put Jerusalem on the negotiating table. The program of government articulated by Barkat, following the political economy of the open Jerusalem, was oriented to undermine that horizon, outlining instead, one in

2 The centrality of parrhesiastic truth-telling in the public sphere is evident in Barkat’s

speeches, who often distanced himself from his predecessors by contrasting an old politics associated with fraud with a new politics allegedly characterized by its transparency: “The public doesn’t know the details, and I think that what you are about to hear will scare them, too. […] I changed the approach that existed here in the period of Olmert and [the mayor who succeeded Olmert, Uri] Lupolianski. They gave politicians influence and power equivalent to that of cabinet ministers. With me, the power resides mainly with the professional experts. In addition, all the municipal resources are now managed with total transparency, all the hearings are open to the public in a way they never were in the past, everything is done with working plans. What happened during this process? Those who were used to working with methods different from the ones that are now employed don’t know how to communicate with me. They use the language of the manipulators. There is a group of functionaries who tried to intercede and tried to hint. I don’t understand that language.” Hasson, N. & Weitz, G. (2013, October 5) If Jerusalem Forgets Thee, O Nir Barkat: Can the Mayor Hang On? Retrieved, May 12, 2019, from https://www.haa retz.com/will-jerusalem-forget-thee-nir-barkat-1.5344158. 3 Barkat would not only highlight the quality of being a Jerusalemite himself as a feature that guarantees transparency, efficiency, and an understanding of the city’s problems, but he would also oppose this feature to the frauds related to the “old politics” of Ehud Olmert and Uri Lupolianski: “The vast majority of the residents of Jerusalem understand why you need a Jerusalemite whose heart and soul is all into managing and leading Jerusalem. Jerusalemites don’t want to gamble on someone who doesn’t know the city, who doesn’t live and breathe it. There’s a big question mark on why he’s actually here. Who’s pushing you to come here? What are you interested in? Jerusalemites trust my judgment and leadership. You see it on every occasion. The residents of Jerusalem are a bit insulted by all kinds of kombinot [sly deals]. We all had enough and we want straightforward focus on the future of the city. And no gambling. This is Jerusalem, the Holy City, the City of Justice—we want to focus on that and on nothing else.” See: Ahren, R. (2013, October 10) Nir Barkat: Don’t gamble on someone who doesn’t live and breathe the city. Retrieved, May 12, 2019, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/nir-bar kat-dont-gamble-on-someone-who-doesnt-live-and-breathe-the-city/.

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which the Palestinians would not find ways to inscribe their freedom by renewing their identity among the whole of the community and the mere account of its parts. If, following Rancière (1999), politics ceases to be when the whole of the community is reduced to the sum of its parts without offering conditions of appearance for one of them to renew the terms of the identity between the whole and the parts, then, Barkat’s open Jerusalem aspired to empty the public sphere of its politicity.4 Instead of opening that space of appearance of the people, where the identity between the whole and the parts can be disputed, reworked, thematized according to new terms (Rancière, 1999), Barkat maintained the privilege consecrated to only one ethno-national group. Now, not only he did not extend it to the Jerusalemite Palestinians, but he narrowed that same space for those who already belonged to it, because the mold to configure the subjectivity of Jews and Palestinians, alike, is that of the homo economicus. In this sense, the Jerusalemite case provides an empirical experience to observe the complementarity of Rancière’s writings on post-democracy and those of the global and at the same time problematic expansion of neoliberal governmentality, according to Brown (2015). Barkat’s program offers an empirical correlate of Rancière’s and Brown’s accounts of the emptying of politics of its political content. Studies on political theory concerned with understanding the features of politics and democracy today, have to find communicating vessels in the study agenda on the power of the government of Foucauldian stamp, and it works on governmentality and neoliberal rationality. Said dialogue would allow to illustrate how the configuration of subjectivities occurs, from the elaboration of discursive fields about social reality to the technologies of power designed to specify the horizons arranged by said fields as “ideals.” The phenomenological roots of the concern to elucidate the Jerusalemite social reality led me to observe how a discourse was forged 4 Authors such as Rancière (1999) understand politics as the organization of bodies as a community, involving the management of the places, powers, and functions of said bodies, reaching a notion of democracy that presents this collective way of life as a mode of subjectivation of politics. Democracy is the type of community that is defined by the existence of a specific sphere of appearance of the people. Rancière apprehends that democracy institutes subjects that do not coincide with the parts of a State or society, nor do they identify with a determinable part of a population or with the sum of the groups that constitute it.

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on the conditions of appearance of the parts that make up the population of the city, although they do not fully constitute part of the entire political community. On the basis of this fundamental division and inequality, Barkat devised an organization of the cohabiting multiplicity of the city based precisely on its most elemental trait and condition: that of its cohabitation and not the choice of with whom to share the territory, the resources, and the day-to-day life.

Open Jerusalem: Nir Barkat’s Political Rationality Here, I will synthesize what was evidenced by the analysis of the exercise of power in the period for the city of Jerusalem. I will apply the notion of the apparatus of Israelization (Rullansky, 2019). I argue that it will allow to elucidate more than the structuring of a process of overwhelming Judaization and retreating de-Arabization (Abowd, 2014; Abu El-Haj, 2001; Barghouti, 2009; Monterescu y Rabinowitz, 2007; Yiftachel, 1999). Likewise, the concept of the apparatus of Israelization puts the accent on the political dimension: on the governance of diversity and on the constitution of subjectivities, rather than on a process of urban and cultural homogenization or modulation of demographic behaviors (Cheshin et al., 2001; Khamaisi, 2003). Following Foucault (1978) and Deleuze (1992), the notion of apparatus allows us to take these dimensions and combine them to illuminate the knots and juxtapositions of curves of enunciation and visibility, of discursive and extra-discursive practices of a sovereignty construction project. Particularly, the concept refers to the multiple ways of conceiving certain aspects of reality as problematic and, consequently, of translating faculties, institutions, calculations, and procedures into technologies of power that allow to forge the subjectivity of the governed by affecting their behaviors. In light of the analysis of the aforementioned sources in which Nir Barkat spoke about exercising political power and the Jerusalemite question, I will highlight the following points. First, according to him, a substantive trait to effectively officiate the role of mayor is being a Jerusalemite, a condition that presupposes cohabitation with locals and strangers, by belonging to the city either as a permanent resident or a citizen. Moreover, Barkat referred to the city’s ethno-national diversity as

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“tribes.”5 In order to understand what this means we have to consider that in this rationality nativity is perceived as an attribution that would enable a better understanding of the situation and of how it should be approached.6 This would not only have served to distinguish Barkat from other candidates, but to highlight the emergence of those who demonstrate a vocation for public service to the community. Being a native of Jerusalem is sufficient, according to the former mayor, to govern with an efficiency that will be endorsed by the constituents: the evidence will be found in benchmarks that translate representations into numerical values of conformity and exclude the content of concepts such as equity, justice, and democracy from the discussion.7 When it comes to being a Jerusalemite, we observe that Israeli Jews and Palestinian are not in equal positions to access the educational system or the labor market yet, according to Barkat, both groups could be simultaneously addressed as Jerusalemites and as entrepreneurs. Indeed, Barkat introduced himself as a successful businessman.8 His outstanding career in the private sector would have inspired his latter vocation for public service as he transitioned from IT to philanthropy 5 This thematization reveals that the coexistence of an ethno-nationally diverse population could be compatible within the hegemonic political project. Not only that, but the technologies aimed at reproducing such social order can be modulated to produce a truth regarding what the subjects who are the object of said technologies think or believe regarding Israeli state domination. See: Horovitz, D. (2013, May 8) One Jerusalem. Undivided. Open to all. Controlled by Israel. Retrieved, May 6, 2019, from https://www.tim esofisrael.com/one-jerusalem-undivided-open-to-all-controlled-by-israel/. 6 Ahren, R. (2013, October 10) Nir Barkat: Don’t gamble. 7 Best practices and benchmarking constitute two examples of how the transference

of practices from the private to the public sphere enables the incorporation of allegedly successful models into the governmental sphere for multiple purposes and needs (Brown, 2015). The notion of maximizing the effectiveness of the exercise of political power entails that it will increase in terms of strategic competitiveness. Benchmarking practices are an integral part of neoliberal governance, facilitating quantitative forms of comparative evaluation assessing competence and efficiency by measuring formulation, application, and results with regard to proposed objectives (Broome & Quirk, 2015). 8 Barkat concisely presented professional success as a guarantee of suitability, compli-

mentary with nativity: “I am a Jerusalemite who spent fifteen years in the high-tech sector, taking Israeli companies and ideas into the global marketplace. I retired seven years ago, and since then have been working for a shekel a year promoting and developing the city of Jerusalem.” Barkat, N. (2010, January 08) The Mayor’s Vision for Jerusalem. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 5.

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and, later on, to the Municipality. Briefly, we could say that Barkat spoke of himself as that subject who embodied the best possible ruler for Jerusalem. This only makes sense on the premise that equates Barkat with the ideal subject to inhabit the city: an exceptionally successful homo economicus. To become such a ruler, he understood he had to strengthen certain instincts and forms of reason among the population, rectifying the way of weighing specific practices over others thus giving the population a similar image to his. To reduce poverty in Jerusalem, the flock should, in this rationality, resemble the shepherd, assuming the principles and values of the entrepreneur of homo economicus of neoliberalism.9 Barkat understood that if his constituents thought like him, not by virtue of biography or due to cultural, religious or ethnic sources of identity, but by reasoning as rational economic actors, then, the conflict between two different sovereign and political projects would be neutralized and Jerusalem could be pacified under Israeli rule. In this way, he would turn a city of religious and cultural others into a city of “tribes” of entrepreneurs that would each prioritize social mobility over political aspirations. What this reason loses sight of is that the equalization of the parts in a homogeneous whole that reduces heterogeneity excludes the recognition of the suffering and mourning of the parts (Butler, 2012). This virtual interruption of the temporality of the collective experience of a group due to its homologation to the whole, in unbalanced terms, proclaims a type of amnesia regarding the contexts of material encounters that make the same inequality between the parties. More significant still, the space for a Palestinian voice to break into dispute the account between the parts that make up a whole was already obstructed by the technologies 9 Satisfaction from the improvement in material living conditions and religious practices were associated with a type of pastoral government: “This is a five-year plan that I am promoting, without waiting anymore for the budgets of the various ministries. […] The children of Jerusalem come first […].” See: Cidor, P. (2017, September 22), One on one with Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat, Retrieved January 22, 2019, from https://www.jpost. com/in-jerusalem/one-on-one-with-mayor-nir-barkat-505114. Also: “Well, first of all, my residents, I care about them all equally. All the children are my children. We are improving the quality of life of all of our residents. I’m committed to serve them. By the way, in Jerusalem, of course, you probably know we have freedom of religion, freedom of movement. […] And we’re very, very committed to serving all of our residents and maintaining that freedom that does not exist in our neighboring countries in the Middle East.” See: NPR (2017, December 7) Jerusalem’s Mayor On The U.S. Embassy Move, Retrieved January 22, 2019, from https://www.npr.org/2017/12/07/569039647/jer usalems-mayor-on-the-u-s-embassy-move.

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of the apparatus of Israelization, which does not imply national reconciliation; rather, it has produced the diasporic condition in which the Jerusalemite Palestinians find themselves immersed. This same condition is reflected in the behavior of secular Jews who leave Jerusalem toward other areas where they can find a lifestyle closer to their expectations, due to their rejection of the observance of religious practices in the public space, as well as regarding social mobility and security.

Precarious Life and the Non-choice of Proximity In other words, taking up Butler’s (2004, 2012) essays on Levinas and Arendt, the question returns to the problem of in whose hands our life becomes precarious and of the non-choice of proximity to the other. I believe that this is the primary principle on which Barkat built the political economy of the open Jerusalem: his modality of operating the apparatus of Israelization, managing tension, pointing directionality, and threading the articulation of the technologies deployed to lead the behavior of the population. Neoliberal reason enabled the codification of the problem of conducting behaviors in the terms of the homo economicus of neoliberalism: as human capital. When Barkat disdained the politics of politicians it was not only a question of presuming the effectiveness of entrepreneurs who have known how to be successful: it was a matter of enunciating the operative terms in the type of subjectivity that he tried to disseminate among the population. If there is something as elementary as the question of cohabitation and the non-choice of with whom the land is shared, that is the mutual dependence between humans for survival. In Barkat’s political rationality, all the constituent parts of a community, from the most to the least included in it, have to respond to the same incentives. It is not about the mere necessities of subsistence, but a singular thematization of the economic expectations of the population: one that enhances individual success in the market as a cardinal site of personal fulfillment. The grid of intelligibility of the homo economicus as a subject composed, in this historical experience, the mold of the ideal subject in order to rule at a lower cost and by virtue of minimizing, as much as possible—but never completely—the alterity derived from ethno-national and religious heterogeneity. However, the resulting collective way of life would in no way be one that assumes equality on the inclusion of the cultural Other to

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the polity as a full citizen. Instead, the exercise of governmental power outlined by Barkat constituted a government of cohabitation that once again prevented one of its parts from emerging as part of the political community, disputing the account of the sum among themselves. Delving into this point, the space of appearance of the city would be restricted, according to Barkat, to an area in which a herd of entrepreneurs would recognize the merit of the one best qualified to shepherd the vocations of upward social mobility from their inscription in the market. Barkat did not substantially modify the articulation of the same battery of public policies present in previous governments. In any case, he opted to draw a qualitatively different directionality to the deployment of the compendium of preexisting technologies, endowing them with a new political economy. Barkat made explicit in which political traditions he recognized himself with and from which he detached. The following excerpt from a 2012 interview illustrates the point: And the challenge of dealing with all these issues is via a different philosophy of management. […] in the two terms prior to mine, the city was managed similarly to the Israeli government: meaning a mayor, the elected officials, the deputies and the portfolio holders and the organization. It’s the wrong way. The right way to do it is the mayor, the managing director of the municipality and the professional team, where the portfolio holders don’t get involved in the day to day. I don’t expect the elected officials to be managers. This change created some friction initially because the old elected officials wanted to manage. And I said, No, we’re going to do it through the professional team […] we sit every quarter and check where we are in reaching the goals and the plans that we have, this works very well. The professional team is becoming much more professional.10

This appointment exemplifies the dynamics established within the Municipality: one of meeting deadlines and objectives, optimizing time and resources to address the “problems of the city.” With the latter, I refer to the fact that Barkat linked the ineffectiveness of his predecessors to the growing tendency within the secular Jewish population to migrate to

10 Horovitz, D. (2012, February 29) Nir Barkat: How I’m ensuring Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem. Retrieved June 4, 2019, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/nir-barkathow-im-ensuring-israeli-sovereignty-in-jerusalem/.

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other cities in search of a more favorable context in terms of the labor market. If Olmert and Lupolianski were presented as responsible for these demographic trends, at least for the variables that pertain to the competence of local authorities, Barkat thought of himself as his rectifier. In a certain way, it would be the policy of the technocrats, of the expertspecialists, the one that would execute measures designed to encourage certain practices, eminently, in the economic sphere. The expertise and know-how about the type of political intervention to be carried out to generate a certain coexistence, consistent with the notion that Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem must be preserved from an ethno-national Jewish majority in the territory, is key in this political rationality. Therefore, it is about a differentiation of ways of “doing” politics within municipal bodies, that is, of the State, and of different ways of conceiving politics and its concerns. Again, those who are best qualified, according to the former mayor, to govern, are those who stand out from their recognized trajectories in the market. These shifts give rise to a continuity of preexisting technologies of power within the framework of a new political economy. In this chapter, I would like to focus on the educational policies in order to apprehend how this political program paved the way to technologies of power that translated the vocation to exercise power into reality. Precisely, the Municipality’s encouragement of the adoption of the Israeli curricula by schools in East Jerusalem. Along with the encouragement of a controlled integration propelled by Barkat, a certain tension arose among Jerusalemite Palestinians over the decision of which school curriculum to choose for their children: whether to stay with the Tawjihi,11 the traditional Jordanian secondary program taught today by the Palestinian Authority in the Occupied Territories, or to choose the Israeli Bagrut.12 Both are general secondary level exams that enable passing to higher education but, since there were no equivalences between them, the acceptance or rejection by universities resulted from the exam taken by the candidate. Traditionally, the formation of Jerusalemite Palestinians through the Tawjihi blocked their access to Israeli institutions, since they did not recognize its validity.

11 12

in Arabic, secondary general exam. , in Hebrew, Teudat Bagrut, which means, “Bagrut Certificate.”

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Pedagogy for an Open Jerusalem: Promoting the Bagrut in East Jerusalem During the Barkat era, a trend was inaugurated. Progressively, some schools in East Jerusalem adopted the Bagrut and a growing number of parents were willing to send their children to schools that would prepare them to take this test. In the 2015 EduAction conference, it was published that the number of Jerusalemite teenagers enrolled or preparing for the Bagrut rose from 1392 in 2013 to 1934 for that year: 542 more students, that is, a growth of 38.9%.13 The Municipality responded by granting an economic stimulus program directed to Palestinian schools adopting the Bagrut. In other words, a governmental mode of intervention aimed to consolidate this practice by appealing to material incentives, crucial for a population that lives in marginal conditions. Precisely, economic resources are key to improve educational establishments in East Jerusalem since, otherwise, the Municipality would keep them unattended. Therefore, underlying this economic grant is a broader notion of accountability: the opportunities for growth and fulfillment go through decisions that must sacrifice some elements (the Tawjihi) to see alleged prospects of access to higher studies and a different kind of lifestyle. Likewise, “taking charge” of the children’s education by sending them to a school that incorporates the Bagrut, returns to the governed authority to decide how to act: this has an impact on the destinies of population groups. The promotion of this adoption could be seen as a policy of “normalization” in which the Palestinian is “Israelized” according to the assemblage of practices that constitute a rather broad apparatus. The subtlety, however, lies in the political economy at stake. The population was told that staying in a marginalized situation rested upon a strictly personal decision. The immediacy of economic necessity can push toward Bagrut, thus, producing some kind of alignment with the acceptance of the general scheme of exercise of power. The school system in East Jerusalem features a diversity of institutions—municipal, without municipal recognition, and private. Additionally, there is a percentage of young people not officially counted due to 13 Hasson, N. (2018, April 10) More Arab students in East Jerusalem seeking Israeli matriculation certificate. Retrieved June 15, 2019, from https://www.haaretz.com/.pre mium-more-arab-high-school-students-in-east-jerusalem-seeking-bagrut-1.5356651.

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irregularities faced by their parents. For example, when they lack a residence permit.14 This illustrates the structural differences regarding access to education in general. In relation to more specific aspects, some problems are the availability of funds, of trained personnel for pedagogical cabinets, and the school dropout of young Palestinians compared to their peers from the Western side of the city.15 In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled16 based on a petition filed in 2008 by Palestinian parents of school-age children with ACRI, urging the Jerusalem Municipality Education Authority (and the Nation’s Ministry of Education) to resolve the deficit of classrooms in schools, compelling the city government to create within five years, the necessary physical infrastructure to absorb people interested in enrolling in official municipal schools out of a total of 40,000 with the right to do so.17 Barkat used to refer to his work as mayor by using the word “accountability.”18 With it, he differentiated himself from his predecessors by providing a supposedly transparent and effective professionalism to exercise political power. The shortage of sufficient classrooms to house Palestinian students in East Jerusalem was due to, according to him, the incompetence and the overlapping of tasks of unsuitable personnel to plan building expansions. Barkat boasted of the assumption of responsibility

14 Association for civil rights in Israel (ACRI) (2008, February 20) Denial of Citizenship Retrieved August 23, 2019, from https://law.acri.org.il/en/2008/02/20/denial-ofcitizenship/. 15 See: ACRI (2011, September) The East Jerusalem School System–Annual Status Report. https://law.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Education-rep ort-2011-FINAL.pdf. 16 The ruling is labeled “HCJ 5373/08 – Abu Libdeh et al. v. Minister of Education et al. Judgment.” An English translation can be found on the website of HaMoked (Center for the Defense of the Individual). See: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2013/ 113481_eng.pdf. 17 For more, see: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2013/113481_eng.pdf. 18 “What we decided to do is to take responsibility. I think I shared with you last

time I was here that the word “accountability” does not translate to Hebrew. When I asked who’s in charge of building all these classrooms, everyone looked at each other and said “They are.” The municipality didn’t know how to deal with this and they rolled the challenge to the school principals. […] the municipality was not accountable; and we’re paying the price today.” Horovitz, D. (2012, February 29) Nir Barkat: How I’m ensuring.

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for making public management intelligible: he would abide by the transferring best practices to the State, ordering hierarchies, and empowering the Municipality to intervene in this matter. He expressed it as: What I’ve brought is a little bit of accountability to the system. Today we have 300 classrooms in different phases of being built (in East Jerusalem) and approved and funded by the government and the municipality. It took some time – because you have to allocate the land. You have to outsource – because the municipality doesn’t have the tools — to start planning and manage a huge number of new buildings. Today I feel comfortable not only that we’re pushing these classrooms into the pipeline, but that we’re seeing the results. We’ve given each neighborhood an aerial photo of where we’re building, what we’re building, when we’re building. So those 300 classrooms are in a matrix and we’ve shown this to the public so that we can be accountable for delivering these classrooms on time.19

This rationality presumptively encompasses a normalization of the procedures to govern the Municipality, since such statements reveal the glimpse of a securitization policy that rests on “intelligibility,” on the “transparency” of ordering the dispersed. The institutionalization of the passage from Tawjihi to Bagrut exemplifies one way in which this may take place. Economic incentives aimed to promote behaviors considered virtuous by investing in the inclusion of part of that non-citizen cultural “Other,” may enable to legitimize its membership as a kind of an ethno-class (Yiftachel, 2000). Can the access of the Jerusalemite Palestinians to the Israeli school system represent a key to a controlled integration that turns a growing number of Palestinian students into future competitive human capital? Is this an alternative through which this part of the population can more “comfortably” inhabit the city? In 2012, the State launched a pilot program throughout the 125 secondary schools financed or administered directly by the Municipality in East Jerusalem, promoting enrollment in the Israeli curriculum, announcing for 2013 to doubling or tripling the number of students within the program, that is, raising the figure to 2500 out of a total of 100,000 of school-age Palestinians for that year.20 On the eve of the start 19 Horovitz, D. (2012, February 29) Nir Barkat: How I’m ensuring. 20 Eglash, R., & Booth, W. (2013, September 14) Israeli officials try introducing

Israeli textbooks in East Jerusalem’s Palestinian schools. The Washington Post. Retrieved

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of the 2013 school calendar, the Municipality offered an incentive of $550 per student enrolled in the Bagrut for Palestinian schools. Five of the 185 institutes contacted accepted. In those schools, students could take one of the two programs, but not both. There were other cases where the schools agreed to maintain (or open) preexisting extra-curricular courses consisting of complementary classes where they prepare for the Bagrut outside of school hours (the Hebrew language, essential to study at Israeli universities, is also taught). On the one hand, there is a governmental vocation of exercising power over the population and, on the other, several possible responses among which, it is possible to observe these Palestinian schools’ responses to the Municipality’s policies. The fact that a handful of schools accepted the subsidy does not imply a mere accommodation to power. I propose to see this as one of the many ways this population can make use of the deployment of techniques and take advantage of them in other ways. Is it not the prospect of social mobility derived from Bagrut a strategy capable of increasing individual freedom? If so, is this a kind of freedom we can identify as democratic or, rather, a possibility of compensating for the unequal possession of economic capital? School funding of “excellence,” as labeled by municipal authorities such as David Koren,21 former advisor to Barkat, is apprehended here as a sophisticated technique. In short, this technique points to the displacement of a pedagogical program designed to transmit a certain history, narrative, and national identity, together with an array of values and attitudes, by one that establishes a different account of the same historical events, thus, a different kind of subjectivity that pertains to another ethno-national identity. Moreover, the kind of trajectories and access to other types of symbolic, social, and economic capital that each

March 23, 2021, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israeliofficials-try-introducing-israeli-textbooks-in-east-jerusalems-palestinian-schools/2013/09/ 14/b2c3b9bc-1ca3-11e3-80ac-96205cacb45a_story.html. 21 “‘Offering the bagrut is not a political issue, it’s an education issue. It’s a

humanitarian duty, a religious duty. It’s about quality of life, offering new horizons in education.’ Mr. Koren said.” See: Shuttleworth, K. (2014, January 19) For Arabs in Israel, Curriculum choice is politically charged. Retrieved March 23, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/world/middleeast/for-arabs-in-isr ael-curriculum-choice-is-politically-charged.html.

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curriculum enables is likewise quite different.22 Therefore, even when both Jews and Arabs may be appealed as homines politici alike, the young people who attend these schools would “sacrifice” part of their cultural heritage in order to enhance their traits as eventual “achievementsubjects.” According to Brown (2015), this would affect and reduce this group’s freedom. In such a context, is it not possible to consider that this strategy “from below,” rather than submission, implies a way of taking the mechanisms that power assembles to access cultural capital and obtain the freedom that are otherwise denied? Even if the adoption of the Bagrut does not imply a massive movement, it shows the irruption of attitudes and original representations on the relationship that the Jerusalemite Palestinians have with the Israeli authorities and society and with their own community. We speak of only a handful of schools that adopted the Bagrut (others faced the rejection of the families23 ), which does not exempt directors and parents from having reservations about it,24 but it shows how certain values begin to weigh more than others. Thus, the expectation of ensuring access to a better quality of life for the younger generations becomes a deciding factor that does not contradict the perspective of transmitting the Palestinian identity to the family. Second, let’s focus on the governmental deployment of technologies that tend to regulate trends and behaviors, unleashing mechanisms for their accommodation. This exercise of unraveling the dispersed and channeling it, making it intelligible, is an expression of Barkat’s commitment 22 “I speak to a lot of youngsters, and they tell me, ‘I will finish high school at 19 and what are my options? I will go to Wadi Joz and work in a car garage, or will I have a better future?,’” Eglash, & Booth, (2013, September) Israeli officials. 23 For instance, the Ibn Khaldoun school for boys, with 1400 students. See: Shuttleworth, K. (2014, January 19) For Arabs in Israel; “The teachers have had many threats over the past week, and they are having many problems,” said Lara Mubarichi, Jerusalem’s deputy director of education for East Jerusalem. “In one school, there were 300 parents who signed up, and now it has gone down to 86,” she said. “In another school, all the parents pulled out.” Eglash, R. & Booth, W. (2013, September) Israeli officials. 24 “The Abdullah Bin Al Hussein Middle and High School for Girls,” where the Israeli curriculum is being introduced in two classes in the seventh and eighth grades, sits on the seam of the Green Line […]. “If I want my students to do better in math, English, Arabic and science, I think this will be the better. If I want to open opportunities for better jobs and higher education, this is better,” said Liana Jaber, principal of the middle school for girls. “But on the other side, I personally feel it will come at the expense of their Palestinian identity.” Eglash, R. & Booth, W. (2013, September) Israeli officials.

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to accountability. Within this rationality, the Municipality reported on a situation and thematized that the responsibility of the State was to intervene in it. This entailed the feature of a binding ethical obligation25 directed to empower those who act in accordance with the Israeli institutional framework, holding them responsible for their future and that of their children. This accountability is sensitive to what it configures as “problematic” (young people wanting to study in Israeli universities, and prevented from doing so) and rigorous in the fulfillment of their ethical duty (the future civic, economic, and political life of the subject that helps to constitute, seems to depend on the intervention that this rationality is capable of conceiving). It could be said that the inoculation of the presence of the Other in its configuration as a subject is carried out according to the mold of the homo economicus of neoliberalism. In this case, via its insertion in the academic system, that is, according to a type of normative constitution of subjectivity. This exercise may be appreciated as a “means of good rapprochement” between ethno-national communities in conflict. The adoption of the Bagrut represents a technology of power that directs practices to points of contact and assimilation of the irreducibility of the Other in the same regime of truth: first the school, then the workplace. It becomes distinctive of the period that, for reasons beyond their own sphere of action and interference, it became possible for the authorities to represent themselves in a way that makes the reproduction of territorial sovereignty compatible over time without this, demanding the expulsion of the other. The political rationality of the indefectible and eternally united Jerusalem can admit the presence of its Palestinian population, producing even greater diversity in its field of representations, and shaping of identities: instituting a collective way of life that, internally, is even more fragmented in terms of ethno-classes.

25 “Moshe Tur-Paz, director of the Jerusalem Education Administration, said he visited a school in the Arab neighborhood of Beit Hanina two weeks ago with Mayor Nir Barkat. “The mayor asked one of the students what he does in the afternoon, and we expected him to say that he plays soccer, but instead he said that he goes to a class to study for the Israeli bagrut and pays 12,000 shekels ($ 3100) to a private school […] That was a turning point for us. We understand that it is our obligation to offer this option. We are not imposing it on anyone, but we have to offer it.” Hasson, N. (2018, April 10) More Arab students.

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A last and third factor has to do with the establishment of another dimension of discourse that overlaps with the ethical obligation of government accountability. Palestinian officials linked to the PNA in Jerusalem, such as Amir Jibril,26 director of the local office of the Palestinian Ministry of Education, and late chief negotiator Saeb Erekat,27 harshly criticized the promotion of Bagrut to the detriment of Tawjihi and its consequent displacement of the instruction on the history of the Palestinian people. For his part, Mazen Jabari, director of the Youth Department of the traditional “Orient House,” added in his rejection of this measure, a significant contextualization—it arises due to the restricted institutional presence of the PA in the city, linked to the construction, and expansion of the “hard border” (Dumper, 2014) that the Separation Wall established between the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Since the late 2000s, Palestinian residents can only look to the Israeli authorities to compensate for the loss of opportunities, responses, and support that certain PA structures once provided and that have been banished with the erection of the Wall.28 Thus, the same technology that was designed to regulate the movement of the population between the Occupied Territories and East Jerusalem, typical of an apparatus of security, led to the dismantling of proto-state and party structures. Therefore, it progressively made Jerusalemite Palestinians see the Israeli institutions as a safe conduct to anchor the center of life in the city. In this vein, Israeli authorities would become for them the main authorities to demand a better quality of life, as the adoption of the Bagrut program illustrates. The deployment of the apparatus of Israelization demonstrates its intelligibility through the exercise of governmental power. In this experience, such exercise recognizes scenarios raised from the process of its own configuration: some that should be promoted and some that should be constrained since the new millennium, the advent of a society of security progressively revisited and refined the strategic uses of the instruments it relied on in order to consolidate itself. Moreover, it achieved this by apprehending more efficient ways of sustaining and reproducing these instruments within a new political economy. 26 Shuttleworth, K. (2014, January 19) For Arabs in Israel. 27 Eglash, R. & Booth, W. (2013, September) Israeli officials. 28 According to Mazen Jabari: “Frankly, we feel that we are in the middle, and we

don’t know what to do” […] “We have two authorities squeezing us—the Israelis and the Palestinians.” Eglash, R. & Booth, W. (2013, September) Israeli officials.

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An important dimension to account for the formation of a certain form of society is to observe the link between the agency of local actors with respect to the economy of power rendered by the political authorities. The present analysis sought to show how these elements interact by configuring themselves in a reciprocal and undetermined way, considering a specific spatio-temporal articulation of coordination, points of support, resistances, and dynamism in the power relations assumed by the actors. Far from accepting that subordinates are due to mere resistance or that those who hold the control mechanisms embody pure oppression, I prioritized elucidating the process of building power through multiple angles and by virtue of levels of inspirations, collaborations, and rejections that shape the processes of planning and executing public policies. Below, the translation of the legend of a poster in Arabic that the Municipality made for the 2016–2017 school year and that was shared through mayor Barkat’s29 Facebook account will illustrate the emergence of the political economy in question: Announcing the opening of a mixed primary school in Shuafat, in which the curriculum to be taught will be according to the Bagrut […] format, beginning in the academic year, 2016-2017. Registration will be at the Department of Education of the Arab sector, […] in Safra Square, Monday-Thursday from 08: 30-13: 30. Documents required for registration: - Father’s identity card - Academic bulletin of the first semester of the academic year 2015-2016. For more information, please call the registration department: 02-6296626. Wishing you success.

This document condenses the enunciation of a political aesthetic horizon, a form of society that reflects the elements studied. Shuafat, a traditional Palestinian neighborhood in which Israeli Jews have settled, becomes the location of a school that will teach the official curriculum of the State of Israel. Admission does not require more than the parents’ identity document—a condition subject to a multiplicity of situation—and the academic bulletin, which may come from unofficial types of schools. None of these documents presents innocuous features, therefore, access to this

29 See: @JerusalemMayorArabic (Facebook account) Retrieved June 4, 2019 from https://www.facebook.com/330826680435156/photos/a.332030060314818.107 3741829.330826680435156/519383318246157/?type=3&theater.

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auspicious project is based on the distinction between those who voluntarily nationalized themselves as Israelis, who adopted the Bagrut, who tried both things unsuccessfully due to a precarious exercise of the right of access to the city and those who reject these policies. The Municipality manifested an aspiration to ingratiate with, at least, part of the cultural Other: the statement shows the unequal proportion of forces between the person who pronounces it and the one who is the object of its message. The Jerusalemite Palestinians may well reject it as there will also be sectors that are increasingly reflective and persistently prone to saturate that instance in which it is possible to approach the Municipality. The school, as it appears in the text, can be conceived as the metaphor of that horizon in which the city can be configured as a space of shared life for Israelis and for Palestinians in the process-of-becoming Israeli citizens, or at least, subjects that are assimilable and compatible with a form of society that claims the complete sovereignty over the city instituted by the Israeli identity (embodied here by the Bagrut). Also, although it is not a municipal policy, it is highly noteworthy that, in 2017, and two years after announcing the opening of preparatory courses for entry to higher studies for Palestinian Jerusalemite, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJ) announced the recognition of the Tawjihi, a gesture that was hailed by NGOs in the field of human rights. It might be thought that this obstructs the need for local schools to move from one curricular program to another, but it must be considered that access to the HUJ continues to require a high score that students trained in schools affected by a shortage of classrooms and basic resources, may not necessarily reach.30 In Barkat’s recognition of ethno-national diversity, his concern about the problem of cohabitation arises and benchmarking practices that follow trends among the population’s conducts illustrate the translation of best practices from the private to the public sector. Moreover, by reading trends such as the adoption of the Bagrut among East Jerusalem schools, the display of political power through the apparatus of Israelization allows the Municipality to correspond such behavior with an incentive that could inoculate or neutralize the otherness that the Palestinians represent through their controlled incorporation to the Israeli educational system. Thus, Barkat conceived a political economy that enabled the expansion

30 For more, see: ACRI (2017, May 21) East Jerusalem: Facts and Figures 2017.

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of the State’s institutions in the territory and the dissemination, based on the apparatus of Israelization, of techniques aimed at configuring a subjectivity according to common but not community values. Barkat’s political economy implied emptying the public sphere of deliberation and contention in order to establish mechanisms for the management and administration of resources at the service of individual vocations. A group of neighboring “tribes” that share, without having chosen, the same city, is the theoretical result of the collective way of life thought by Barkat: a component that becomes common by the mere fact of being born in the same space, without sharing, therefore, the same civic-political status.

A Unified City, a Community of Entrepreneurs Mutual correspondence by cohabitation is the binding factor that forces the sphere of government to rule the lives of the multiple groups that dwell in Jerusalem, modulating their behaviors in such a way that the lives of some in the hands of others, may not be perceived as threatened. Such a society of security would enable to sell the city to the international markets: by opening Jerusalem to its own “tribes,” namely, the necessary human capital to make it competitive, then, it would be easier to attract foreign investors and tourists. Between the two major ethno-national groups, the decency of the rules of the game would stand over solidarity as a principle of interaction. The political rationality of neoliberalism then aims to forge moral, responsible, economic-rational individuals (Lemke, 2001). The adoption of the Bagrut can be perceived as the assumption of individual responsibility for social risks and material needs, reconfigured as problems subsumed in the field of technologies of the self. If, as Barkat posed it, coexistence is not incompatible with the exclusion of one part of the population from its political body, but possible through the homologation of expectations through the marketplace, then part of this marginalized minority must perceive that it will be able to access a better quality of life if Israeli sovereignty endures. Thus, for Barkat, the ductility of the population and their acceptance of such individual responsibility would lead each Jerusalemite to see that control over his/her fate falls into their own hands. Some will want to be less perceived as a threat by those who will appreciate, in turn, their complacency with Israeli sovereignty.

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This is but one possible analysis on a matrix of political representations about the exercise of governing Jerusalem. As a public policy, the incentive to adopt the Bagrut can be read as a technology of power within an assemblage of practices that tend to the Israelization of the Jerusalemite Palestinians. The expectation of the schools and families that actually adopted it is no different from that of any other family that did not: the hope that there will be upward social mobility at the intergenerational level. The publication of the Tawjihi results is celebrated as a rite of passage to adulthood in addition to a potential stepping stone for children to achieve a better lifestyle than that of their parents. If education represents the key to personal fulfillment at the individual and family level, it also implies a collective dimension: the celebration of the Tawjhi results involves celebrations in public spaces and the shooting of fireworks. It is both a little personal independence as much as a little collective independence: a multi-dimensional form of realization that the Bagrut simply does not claim to promote. The exaltation of the subjectivity of the homo economicus of neoliberalism by the Municipality reflects that there is no educational policy that, in an integral way, understands the characteristics of each curricular program by virtue of the historical and cultural narratives of each group equally. Hence, the decision to split the educational formation among the Palestinians of Jerusalem is being raised. This brings us to the beginning of the chapter: if cohabiting means sharing with others, plurality implies difference. Thus, the integration of diversity enables potential paths of encounter and the bifurcation of paths, stories that instead of being positively and reciprocally affected, will go on highlighting their material, cultural, and symbolic differences.

References Abowd, T. P. (2014). Colonial Jerusalem: The spatial construction of identity and difference in a city of myth, 1948–2012. Syracuse University Press. Abu El-Haj, N. (2001). Facts on the ground: Archaeological practice and territorial self-fashioning in Israeli society. University of Chicago Press. Arendt, H. (1976) The origins of totalitarianism. Harcourt Brace & Company. Barghouti, O. (2009). Derailing injustice: Palestinian civil resistance to the Jerusalem Light Rail. Jerusalem Quarterly, 38, 46–58.

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Broome, A., & Quirk, J. (2015). Governing the world at a distance: The practice of global benchmarking. Review of International Studies, 41(Special Issue 5), 819–841. Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism’s stealth revolution. Zone Books. Butler, J. (2004) Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence. Verso Books. Butler, J. (2012). Parting ways: Jewishness and the critique of Zionism. Columbia University Press. Cheshin, A. S., Hutman, B., & Melamed, A. (2001). Separate and unequal: The inside story of Israeli rule in East Jerusalem. Harvard University Press. Deleuze, G. (1992). ¿Qué es un dispositivo? In G. Deleuze, A. Glucksmann, M. Frank, E. Balbier et al. (Eds.), Michel Foucault filósofo. Editorial Gedisa. DellaPergola, S. (2003). Demographic trends in Israel and Palestine: Prospects and policy implications. The American Jewish Year Book, 103, 3–68. Dumper, M. (2014). Jerusalem unbound. Columbia University Press. Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. Volume I: An introduction. Pantheon Books, Random House. Foucault, M. (2008). The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79. Palgrave Macmillan. Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory strategies for qualitative research. Sociology Press. Han, B.-C. (2017). Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and new technologies of power. Verso Books. Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277–1288. Khamaisi, R. (2003). Mechanism of land control and territorial judaization in Israel. In M. Al- Haj & U. Ben Eliezer (Eds.), In the Name of Security (pp. 421–449). University of Haifa. Lemke, T. (2001). The Birth of Bio-Politics—Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality. Economy & Society, 30(2), 190–207. Monterescu, D., & Rabinowitz, D., (2007). Mixed towns, trapped communities historical narratives, spatial dynamics, gender relations and cultural encounters in Palestinian-Israeli Towns. Ashgate. Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). The content analysis guidebook. Sage Publications. Rancière, J. (1999). Disagreement: Politics and philosophy. University of Minnesota Press. Rullansky, I. (2019). Ethnocracy and governmentality in Jerusalem: Towards a provisional definition of the notion of apparatus of Israelization. De Prácticas y Discursos. Cuadernos de Ciencias Sociales, 8(11), 153–178.

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Smooha, S. (1997). Ethnic democracy: Israel as an archetype. Israel Studies, 2(2), 198–241. Smooha, S. (2002). The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Nations and Nationalism, 8(4), 475–503. Yiftachel, O. (1998). Nation-building and the social division of space: Ashkenazi domination in the Israeli ‘Ethnocracy.’ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 4(3), 33–58. Yiftachel, O. (1999). Ethnocracy: The politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine. Constellations, 6(3), 364–390. Yiftachel, O. (2000). Social control, urban planning and ethno-class relations: Mizrahi Jews in Israel’s ‘Development Towns.’ International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(2), 418–438.

CHAPTER 5

An Exploration of the Dimensions of Exclusion Associated with Intimate Violence Among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Maryam Alkubati and Ako Muto

After discussing the approach to applied philosophy to the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict, this chapter talks about the dimensions of exclusion and occurrences of GBV among the Syrian refugee community in Lebanon. The number of people forcibly displaced worldwide, including refugees, asylum seekers, and others, was around 20 million at the beginning of this century. By 2019, this number had increased to nearly 80 million (UNHCR, n.d.). Studies show that

M. Alkubati (B) University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan e-mail: [email protected] A. Muto JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_5

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the risk of gender-based violence against women increases in refugee settings because they are easier targets for abuse, exploitation, violence, and discrimination (Bouta et al., 2004; UNHCR, 2018; WHO, 2017). Moreover, refugees are more likely to be affected by social exclusion (Phillimore & Goodson, 2006; Taylor, 2004). However, few studies have identified the relationship between gender-based violence (GBV) and social exclusion (Damonti, 2014). This gap denotes the need for more studies examining different forms of GBV and social exclusion, especially in refugee settings. Thus, this study seeks to uncover the possible links between the exclusion of refugees and the occurrence of GBV against women. Sixty-eight percent of the eighty million people displaced worldwide come from five countries, and Syrians constitute the largest group among those five countries (UNHCR, 2018, p. 8). Of the millions of Syrians displaced globally, about three and a half million are registered as refugees in Turkey, nearly one million are in Lebanon, and hundreds of thousands are in Jordan. However, Lebanon hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees per capita, with one person among every six people being Syrian (UNHCR, 2018). Hence, this chapter examines Syrian refugees in Lebanon as a case study. About three-quarters of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon are women and children. As refugees, women and girls face different forms of exclusion and violence; thus, this chapter focuses on the relationship between exclusion and DV/IPV, one of the most common forms of GBV1 The influx of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has caused an immense burden on the country’s economy and infrastructure; in addition, the absence of a legislative framework or national response strategy to protect and support the needs of refugees has created multiple social, economic, and legal challenges. As a result, UNHCR, in collaboration with several local and international organizations, has been actively engaged in addressing the needs of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Boustani et al., 2016). These organizations have also initiated multiple activities

1 The UNHCR indicates that “the term gender-based violence is used to distinguish

common violence from the violence that targets individuals or groups of individuals based on their gender (UNHCR, n.d.).” Among this broad form of GBV, we will henceforth use the term domestic violence/intimate partners violence (DV/IPV) in this chapter, which defines violence between family members and intimate partners (the form of GBV that occurs in situations of social isolation).

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to protect women against violence in their public and private lives. Their activities aim to change public opinion and advocate for legal reform and policy change in Lebanon. As a result, a law was introduced in 2014 (Law 293/2014) to protect women and girls against DV/IPV and this included Syrian refugees. As such, the role of local and international organizations in protecting and supporting DV/IPV survivors in Lebanon cannot be overlooked. In sociology, the links between exclusion and DV/IPV have remained understudied. This chapter attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by qualitatively exploring the aspects of exclusion experienced by refugees that could be associated with DV/IPV based on a case study of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. From the perspective of humanitarian agencies in Lebanon, this chapter draws out the dimensions of exclusion affecting Syrian refugees and examines its relationship with DV/IPV. Our research proposes a conceptual framework interlinking exclusion with DV/IPV in refugee settings which can be found later in the chapter. The relationship between the exclusion of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and DV/IPV against women is explored. Interviews were conducted with humanitarian agencies that support Syrian refugees and address DV/IPV issues in Lebanon. The secondary data used in this study was obtained from previous studies and international reports. This study then draws conclusions from the results, and recommendations are proposed to policymakers, humanitarian organizations, and aid donors.

Key Terms and Methodology Utilizing a purposive sampling approach, we selected local and international organizations—UNHCR (n = 2), local NGOs (n = 5), and international NGOs (n = 2)—that work with refugees and address DV/IPV issues in Lebanon. Semi-structured interviews were administered in January 2020, followed by another set conducted between July and September 2020, using Skype, ZOOM, and telephone interviews. The duration of each interview was between 60 and 120 minutes. Since the data for this research was only collected from interviews with humanitarian organizations in Lebanon, some limitations existed. First, data from Syrian refugees and refugee survivors were not collected because of the sensitive nature of research topic and fieldwork limitations following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, statistical analysis was not feasible for this study due to limited sample size and time

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constraints. Nonetheless, the findings of this research provide relevant insights on the correlation between exclusion and DV/IPV in refugee settings that can be examined further utilizing quantitative and statistical methods. Acknowledging that a unified definition of exclusion or domestic and intimate partner violence does not exist, this research employs their uniqueness (Fragonard, 1993; Silver, 1994) to interpret each concept based on the context and timeframe being examined. To avoid ambiguity, the key terms—exclusion, domestic and intimate partner violence, and refugee settings—are clearly described as follows: Exclusion (referred to as social exclusion in literature) has become a familiar concept used to examine aspects of social disadvantages (Damonti, 2014). In this chapter, “exclusion” is used to describe the social, economic, and legal disadvantages experienced by Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Domestic and intimate partner violence (DV/IPV) is violence that occurs in personal relationships. In conflict settings, refugee women are more vulnerable to domestic and intimate partner violence (Damonti, 2014; Masterson et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2019; WHO, 2013). The term DV/IPV is used to describe all forms of violence against women that occur within the family by an intimate partner, ex-partner, or a family member in refugee settings (DEVAW, 1993; UNHCR, 2019; WHO, 2013). Refugee settings (also referred to as conflict settings) describe the environment of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon either within local communities or informal settlements and shelters (UNHCR, 2019; WHO, 2013).

Conceptual Framework---Exclusion and Domestic/Intimate Partner Violence in Refugee Settings Domestic and intimate partner violence is a universal phenomenon. It occurs in varying contexts and settings. Hence, it is necessary to understand why violence occurs in specific situations and which social conditions trigger violence in such environments. Previous studies have generally focused on individual or psychological factors that drive domestic and intimate partner violence (O’Leary, 1993). Pandemics, like times

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of political uncertainty, conflict, and disaster, have been associated with multiple risk factors that trigger DV/IPV (Fraser, 2020; Palermo & Peterman, 2011). The fear and insecurity related to pandemics create favorable environments for DV/IPV to ensure (Peterman et al., 2020). Studies have shown that the likelihood of the pandemic affecting vulnerable populations and exacerbating interpersonal issues such as DV/IPV is exceptionally high (Perez-Vincent et al., 2020). Some prominent sociologists have also stressed the social structure of interactions within society as a key to understanding the conditions and situations that precipitate the usage of violence (Michalski, 2004). The social aspects associated with DV/IPV, and the conditions that produce opportunities for violence to arise, need to be examined further. This chapter proposes a framework that integrates the concept of exclusion with DV/IPV, enabling us to shed light on the dimensions of exclusion associated with DV/IPV in refugee settings. The concept of exclusion is multifaceted, with several dimensions that contribute to its complexity. The idea has been used in different ways and remains challenging to define. Exclusion, also known as social exclusion, was first used to refer to the poor in the 1960s in France. However, by the 1980s, its scope had widened to encompass different aspects of social disadvantage, specifically concerning economic growth (Laparra et al., 2007; Levitas et al., 2007). By the mid-1980s, exclusion was used both objectively to refer to an individual or group’s condition and subjectively to refer to the struggles of people and social movements. It became a standard policy issue discussed within the political sphere of France, which later spread to other parts of Europe and the Americas. Exclusion or social exclusion came to refer to long-term unemployment and social issues, lack of family stability, social isolation, inability to enter the job market, the weakening of social networks, and so on (Silver, 1994). Since then, it has been variously interpreted depending on the context and time being examined. Laparra et al. (2007) have defined exclusion as a social process— structurally rooted, multifaceted, and ever-changing. It focuses on overall social structure rather than individual behavior; it does not constitute a single factor or reason but exposes the disadvantages in different interconnected domains and evolves based on the time and context studied. Thus, the exclusion does not represent a point; instead, it is a condition or a process whereby an individual or a group is continuously deprived of several rights (Silver, 1994). For example, the lack of resources and

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opportunities that are worsened by a continuous amassing of disadvantages. Consequently, studies examining exclusion have interpreted it from economic, social, and political dimensions. The cessation of social, economic, and institutional ties results in exclusion because of the disruption of one’s links to society (Silver, 1994). Sociologists (Laparra, 2007; Silver, 1994) have associated exclusion with disaffiliation. For example, the longer a period of unemployment, the more likely it is for an individual to develop personal issues leading to isolation. Research has shown that a lack of access to the labor market can cause withdrawal from family, friends, and society due to the humiliation attached to being unemployed (Levitas et al., 2007; Silver, 1994). The continuous loss of social bonds or remoteness from a social network or community contributes to isolation (Levitas et al., 2007). In this sense, the condition or process results in subjective features such as losing one’s identity, or the loss or detachment from social connections and bonds. Thus, exclusion includes limitations on or lack of access to resources, services, and rights, and the lack of capacity to form social relationships and participate in different activities that are easily accessible to the betterconnected members of society. Thus, exclusion affects the quality of life of individuals socially, culturally, economically, and politically but it also affects the community’s cohesion in general. Inclusion and exclusion are facets of hierarchies. The concepts of inclusion and exclusion are features used to explain social positioning in a society, specifically that which is systematically hierarchal (Pocock, 1957). The terms have been used to refer to a group situated in an environment or setting of exclusion such as ideology and the exercise of power against them, socially, economically, and politically, that creates different forms of oppression, abuse, and exploitation (Allman, 2013). Therefore, the term exclusion is significant in underlining the scope of social inequalities experienced by individuals, the specific situations they develop or face, and the dimensions of these that occur (Allman, 2013). Exclusion can be caused by the isolation or marginalization of an individual or a group of people in a society because of their gender, education level, disability, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, religion, or migration status, which can affect their access to opportunities, rights, and resources (UN, 2016). An individual or group that is socially, economically, or politically excluded experiences stigma and a loss of social status (Shaaban, 2011). Depending on the condition, such as unemployment, dependence on social aid, or cessation of social bonds, individuals attempt

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to re-establish their identities and restore their former position. Still, for individuals who experience all states of disaffiliation, this can lead them to feel inadequate and distressed. Consequently, they can become hostile and lack the resources and the ability to return to society (Damonti, 2014). Social scientists examining exclusion generally identify those groups in a state of exclusion or experiencing cumulative disadvantage for long periods without any integration prospects. Silver (1994) has identified the different dimensions that an individual or group can be socially excluded from—citizenship, education, income, accommodation, health services, legal support, and access to daily necessities. Due to their migration status, refugees and asylum seekers generally face a loss of social class and thus face stigmatization in the process. Like the poor in any society, refugees need to be identified to examine their eligibility and legitimacy to receive humanitarian assistance. Consequently, the need to be helped that arises from a loss in social status can lead to stigmatization (Silver, 1994). Due to displacement, refugees and asylum seekers may also experience a loss of family bonds, social networks, and the resources embedded within those networks, contributing to isolation from the host community (Silver, 1994). These forms of exclusion negatively impact the structural features of their everyday lives, creating favorable conditions for intimate partner violence to occur.

Interrelating Exclusion in Refugee Settings and DV/IPV In this section, we further develop the concept of exclusion from a sociological perspective by introducing social aspects in specific environments that create conditions for DV/IPV to occur. A study by Damonti (2014), among the few examining IPV and exclusion in the literature, reveals a link between IPV and exclusion. For battered women, for example, this study showed that violence could cause social isolation and exclusion from the job market and access to accommodation. The literature on domestic and intimate partner violence has also identified some social aspects linked with a lesser likelihood of violence. Domestic violence is claimed to be less likely to occur among partners in specific situations. These include partners with less social isolation, lower reliance on one another, more integrated social networks, equal dispersion of and control over resources, less centralized authority, a lower level of closeness, greater social distance, and more mobility (Black, 1990; Michalski, 2004).

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In a study examining wife-beating in fifteen Western and non-Western countries, Brown (1992) explains that a wife’s mistreatment is more likely to occur when she moves far from her community because of marriage and is isolated from her immediate family. Thus, having social support against violence can reduce the possibility of intimate partner violence occurring. In families with a centralized authority system, such as families with patriarchal structures and relations, one person (usually the male figure) has complete control and power over crucial decisions. Studies have shown higher rates of violent social control in such settings than in families with equal distribution of authority and power (Brown, 1992). Based on a theoretical model by Black (1990), Michalski (2004) investigates social structural characteristics that create conducive environments for domestic and intimate partner violence to occur from a comparative perspective. Michalski (2004) argues that certain factors, such as having greater access to community and family support, can decrease the likelihood of violence against a female partner. In contrast, a lack of social pressure from family members or third-party interventions during interpersonal disputes can create conducive environments for violence to occur (Michalski, 2004). Some studies have also shown that women with limited access to resources and opportunities (economic, social, or legal) are more vulnerable to domestic and intimate partner violence. Furthermore, their dependency on men makes it challenging for women experiencing violence to escape (Erchak & Rosenfeld, 1994). Hence, domestic and intimate partner violence is more likely to occur against women who are socially, economically, and legally vulnerable than women who are socially integrated within a community. More integrated women have greater access to economic resources and opportunities, and are financially less reliant on men (Erchak & Rosenfeld, 1994). There is also compelling evidence in the literature linking mobility restrictions to DV/IPV (PerezVincent et al., 2020). Following the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown measures, several studies, and international reports have reported a substantial increase in DV/IPV due to confinement and restricted mobility (Bradbury-Jones & Isham, 2020; Ertan et al., 2020; Hingray, 2020). In specific mobility settings, such as refugee and conflict situations, the exclusion is more obvious and can also create favorable conditions for domestic and intimate partner violence against women to emerge. Asylums, informal settlements, and similar places are generally alienated

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from the wider community, which prevents people from engaging in everyday life, marginalizes them, and creates extreme forms of exclusion (Damonti, 2014). Refugee women face different forms of exclusion and are at a higher risk of violence because of their gender and status. They are easier targets for abuse, exploitation, violence, and discrimination (Bouta et al., 2004). In refugee settings, DV/IPV is more likely to transpire when refugee families are socially isolated and confined in camps or shelters for extended periods (Peterman et al., 2020; Wako et al., 2015). Furthermore, refugee women are more vulnerable to violence when socially isolated because it is less likely that a family member, neighbor, or friend will intervene. In addition, refugee and displacement centers commonly experience forced quarantine measures and other mobility restrictions, causing refugee families to be confined in small spaces for prolonged periods, which can increase the likelihood of DV/IPV against women. Confinement has been shown to negatively impact refugee family income, which is another trigger for DV/IPV (Perez-Vincent et al., 2020). Akhter and Kusakabe’s (2014) research has established an interrelation between domestic violence and refugee men’s inability to provide for their families financially. Their study revealed that unemployment or limited economic activities can negatively impact refugee men’s lives. As a result, it is necessary for women to take on additional financial responsibilities, and this gender role reversal has been associated with the emergence of DV/IPV cases against them in refugee settings (Akhter & Kusakabe, 2014). In summary, this section has integrated the relevant literature interrelating DV/IPV with exclusion in refugee settings. Refugees experience different forms of exclusion due to lack of social networks and familial bonds, lack of economic resources, mobility restrictions, and confinement, all of which have been shown to be associated with DV/IPV against women. Using this framework, we now examine the impact of exclusion on DV/IPV among Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

Dimensions of Social Exclusion Associated with DV/IPV This section reveals the dimensions of exclusion affecting Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the possible interrelation between exclusion and DV/IPV against women. The findings presented are based on interviews conducted

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Fig. 5.1 Dimensions of exclusion associated with DV/IPV (Source Author)

with humanitarian organizations and the secondary data collected. Two critical dimensions of exclusion—policies of exclusion and community exclusion—are associated with DV/IPV among Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Fig. 5.1). The UN (2016) has identified exclusion as a concern for persons who cannot contribute socially, economically, or politically and sustain such a state. The multifaceted process of exclusion includes limited access to resources, services, and rights and the lack of capacity to form genuine relationships or participate in the open or easily accessible activities that most members of society can (Levitas et al., 2007). Lebanon’s open-door policy with Syria ended in January 2015. The GoL issued new guidelines and regulations that restrict the entry of Syrians and imposed high renewal residency fees for Syrians residing in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2019). Furthermore, restrictions imposed by the government to protect Lebanese citizens are limiting Syrian refugees’ access to social, legal, and economic opportunities in Lebanon. All these restrictions have combined to form multiple dimensions of exclusion, which have a huge impact on the living conditions of Syrian refugee

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families and their interpersonal relations. Increased domestic and intimate partner violence (DV/IPV) has been documented among Syrian refugees because of the various factors triggered by economic, legal, and community exclusion in Lebanon. Specifically, exclusion has caused restricted mobility of Syrian refugees, created livelihood challenges, and social isolation, all of which create conditions for DV/IPV to occur or be exacerbated.

Policies of Exclusion Refugees—permanent or temporary—have the right to be legally recognized and have access to basic services, protected under the International Refugee Convention. In Lebanon, a legal framework or domestic legislation that protects Syrian refugees’ rights does not exist. Starting in April 2015, the government of Lebanon implemented stricter policies and regulations on Syrian refugees and suspended registration with the UNHCR (Yahya et al., 2018). Consequently, most Syrian refugees in Lebanon are residing there illegally (UNHCR, 2019). Syrian refugees are also faced with limited housing options—they rent spaces, live with family/friends, or settle into shelters and informal settlements (UNHCR, 2019). Lack of legal status, the change in the open-door policy, and the high renewal residency fees have created more challenges for Syrian refugees, putting women and children at an increased risk of domestic and intimate partner violence. • Policies of Legal Exclusion Municipalities in Lebanon have been responding to the influx of refugees autonomously, and many have imposed regulations that have restricted the mobility and freedom of Syrian refugees (Janmyr, 2016). One of the most common regulations imposed on Syrian refugees is implementing curfews at the municipality level, strictly enforced, and monitored by the municipal police. During the interviews, the majority mentioned lack of documentation and formal residency as having a significant impact on Syrian refugee households, causing increased psychological problems and access to basic needs and services. Their restricted mobility has negatively impacted refugee families.

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A respondent from a local organization (Participant A, personal communication [Skype Interview], July 10, 2020) mentioned that: ..it [DV/IPV] increased a lot after coming to Lebanon and [Syrian refugees] having to go through all the challenges like for example, with the UN banning of their cards of support, they can no longer buy their food from the supermarket from the card they had, and then for example he [breadwinner/Syrian refugee father] cannot work, their papers[legal documents] passed their deadline, they have no money to renew the papers, so he [breadwinner/Syrian refugee father] cannot go out of the house because they [Syrian refugee families] might meet police asking for his papers...

Interview respondents also mentioned that DV/IPV survivors refrain from reporting violence or incidents to authorities because of their illegal status and out of fear of being arrested or deported. The fear of police and security authorities usually prevents survivors among Syrian refugees from seeking help or disclosing DV/IPV incidents. A respondent from a UN agency (Participant B, personal communication [ZOOM Interview], August 31, 2020) stated that: ..when it comes for example to the legal status of many refugees in the country when they don’t have formal legal residency and there are issues regarding their legal status that for example, can involve lack of documentation, that has a serious impact because with the lack of documentation or with let’s say a regular legal status in the country a lot of refugees in general but also for example, SGBV survivors, DV and IPV survivors, they face the fear of arrest and deportation as well so sometimes it prevents them from seeking for health services or disclosing an incident or from really going forward you know when it comes to seeking support right, so their legal status has an impact on that indeed.

Furthermore, health and GBV-related services may require Syrian refugees to present any formal documentation or proof of legal status before receiving treatment. This remains an obstacle for DV/IPV survivors who lack necessary documentation or illegally reside in Lebanon. As mentioned by a respondent from a UN agency (Participant C, personal communication [ZOOM Interview], August 31, 2020):

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We also have another issue, still regarding the legal status, which is to access services, because some services in Lebanon, they require for example that the person presents a document or you know, the person has a legal status in the country, so eventually for those cases where Syrian refugees don’t have the necessary documentation or a regular legal status in the country, they are prevented from accessing certain services and that can be challenging for a survivor that needs you know, a service from, or a specific service related to for example the violence they experience.

As for legal exclusion, findings from the interviews reveal that the strict policies imposed when obtaining legal documents and the suspension of registration with the UNHCR had a major impact on Syrian refugee families. Furthermore, this has created mobility challenges and fear of engaging with the police authorities. Thus, DV/IPV incidents are less likely to be reported since Syrian refugee survivors need to avoid encountering police officers. Moreover, Syrian refugee survivors have difficulty accessing health care and GBV services due to a lack of formal documentation. • Policies of Economic Exclusion Before 2015, Syrians were free to work and engage in economic activities in Lebanon because of the Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation established in 1993 between Syria and Lebanon. However, the situation has changed; Syrian refugees now have limited work opportunities and face difficulties obtaining a working permit due to strict policy restrictions by the Lebanese government. The new law limits their working options to three sectors: construction, agriculture, and sanitation (UNHCR, 2019). Residency requirements needed to acquire a work permit have also become extremely difficult to establish. Furthermore, the request by the government for all UNHCR-registered refugees to sign a pledge that they abstain from working in Lebanon has forced refugees to be dependent on aid assistance for their survival (Janmyr, 2016). All this means that most Syrian refugees are working illegally in the informal sector in Lebanon, which leaves them vulnerable to several human rights violations and exploitation (IRC, 2012). Moreover, as per the law, any Syrian found working illegally in Lebanon without a work permit will be deported back to Syria (Faek, 2017). The restrictions and bans imposed have created anxiety and fear

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among Syrian refugees and posed significant livelihood challenges. For refugee families where the men cannot find work and carry out their roles as breadwinners, women are forced to find means of financially providing for the family, which has highly affected the dynamics within the family and resulted in DV/IPV incidents. A respondent from a UN agency (Participant D, personal communication [ZOOM Interview], July 21, 2020) interviewed stated that: From the socioeconomic conditions view the impact is also very significant, because Syrian refugees in Lebanon overall, they have a minimal livelihood opportunity which means for example, that sometimes they have to struggle to meet their basic needs and that has an impact indeed in the domestic violence and intimate partner violence, why? Because quite often because of the social norms in the country, women are responsible for taking care of the household, for taking care of the kids, and eventually when women are not able to feed the kids properly, or to dress them properly, or to meet their basic needs, sometimes this burden fell on women, in the country, refugee women sometimes they are blamed by husbands by their other members of the family for not being able to provide the basic needs, and that is, limited socioeconomic conditions really impacts on women and really functions as a contributing factor let’s say for in SGBV, for domestic violence and IPV.

Since Syrian refugee men are often subject to questioning and random document checks by the Lebanese police authorities (more than Syrian refugee women), they refrain from leaving the house out of fear of interacting with the police and possible deportation. Furthermore, although work opportunities are limited for all Syrian refugees, Syrian men face more difficulties finding work opportunities in Lebanon. As a result, Syrian women and mothers have been forced into being the breadwinners of their families in place of the men. A survey conducted in 2017 showed that 19% of Syrian refugee households were headed by women in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2017). Households headed by women are faced with several challenges due to their newly acquired roles as breadwinners. The households headed by women were shown to have higher food insecurity, be less likely to have legal residency, and more likely to be located in informal settlements than men-headed households (UNHCR, 2017). The mobility restrictions and lack of economic opportunities also force men to stay at home feeling restless, creating psychological problems, and

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isolating them from the rest of society. In many cases, this has increased interpersonal tension between partners, worsening or putting women at higher risk of DV/IPV. A respondent from a local organization (Participant E, personal communication [Skype Interview], July 25, 2020) stated that: …whose men [refugee men] for example couldn’t work but women had to go working, and this also affected the dynamics of the family and this also sometimes causes the IPV because if she didn’t go to work, for example, there would be no income for the family so she might be subject to be abused if he is not going to work he is in anxiety, he’s in depression, he is also in stress, he is violent and being aggressive to his family, to his wife and kids, and if the income is not much or enough for the family, there will be further stress; also the man will be aggressive to his family, so, all of these works negatively in the dynamics of the family.

All local organizations have stated that DV/IPV survivors reported DV/IPV violence even before moving to Lebanon. However, these types of abuse have increased since moving to Lebanon because of the socioeconomic exclusion faced by their husbands. A respondent from a local organization (Participant F, personal communication [Skype Interview], August 17, 2020) stated that: The violence existed…because most of the women who entered the counseling room said it existed but not as much as it happened to them in Lebanon after the refugee, after the refuge situation...and having to go through all the challenges like for example with the UN banning of their cards of support, they can no longer buy their food from the supermarket from the card they had, and then, for example, he [the man] cannot work, their papers passed their deadline, they have no money to renew the papers so he cannot go out of the house because they might meet police asking for his papers, so she [ the woman] has to go, and if she didn’t go because she was tired or she didn’t get an income this might also affect the dynamic and he might also be aggressive...so after coming to Lebanon it [IPV] increased, but that does not mean that it didn’t exist [in Syria], it existed but as stated, on a personal level, as stated in the counseling room, it raised a lot after the refugee situation.

Some respondents stated that men can become aggressive and violent toward their wives when they cannot provide for the family. However, Syrian women face difficulties finding job opportunities due to a lack

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of experience or low education levels. The sudden shift in responsibilities making women the breadwinners of the family is a challenge for both partners. Local NGOs have witnessed that Syrian refugee men who consider themselves as the leading providers and supporters for the family end up feeling depressed and having mental health issues, leaving them feeling isolated, and this can result in violence and aggression on their partners. A respondent from a local organization (Participant G, personal communication [Skype Interview], July 25, 2020) stated that: …you can imagine Syrian family refugees, they came, they rented a small house, they have for example 5 or 6 children, one year between one child and another, the man can’t find a job the woman has to find a job though she might not be having any, she might be illiterate cause she didn’t took all her education for example because of she got married and then she has to work and then if the man finds a work she has to stay with children and this dynamics of being responsible of children and not finding at least the basic needs is affecting the whole mental health of the family, especially man who considers himself or he is raised as the main provider of the family when he fails as he seems himself failing to provide his family with the basic needs, causing mental health challenges like depression. We saw it a lot, and this might further cause the man to become aggressive with everyone, aggressive with his family, isolated from the community, etcetera.

Some respondents also stressed that gender inequality and family dynamics stemming from social norms play a vital role in the socioeconomic conditions of Syrian refugee families and can impact DV/IPV. A respondent from a local organization (Participant H, personal communication [Skype Interview], August 3, 2020) stated that: …the social norms particularly the gender equality in the country and particularly also when it comes to the refugee community, we know that still, the gender inequality gap is high, so quite often women are rather marginalized or discriminated, or they have access to resources denied or even sometimes too small things that now in Corona makes a lot of difference for example like phone devices or technology devices for communication, for keeping in touch with SPs so, these gender inequality and social norms that are very restrictive and conservative they play a key role in terms of you know the socioeconomic conditions and the impact of violence on women as well.

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Masterson et al. (2014) conducted interviews with 452 Syrian refugee women in Lebanon. Their findings revealed that most women who experienced violence did not seek medical care. The study has also shown that among Syrian refugees, women, and girls usually hesitate to inform anyone of DV/IPV out of fear of being blamed for causing the violence or other consequences such as provoking more violence, being divorced, being forbidden from seeing their children, and being deported, among others (Masterson et al., 2014). Overall, women mostly perceived survivors as being at fault for the violence. Hence formal help-seeking was seen as the last option (Masterson et al., 2014). The few women who reported to a formal source contacted women’s NGOs and the police and only did so because of the severity of the violence. In summary, local organizations pointed out that the burden on women, especially mothers responsible for taking care of the household and providing basic needs for the children, is a contributing factor that makes them susceptible to DV/IPV. Respondents have stressed the interrelation or linkage between livelihood and DV/IPV. There is a dire need for livelihood opportunities, and respondents believe that this will decrease the occurrence of DV/IPV.

Community Exclusion Some local communities in Lebanon are not as accepting of Syrian refugees as others. Local organizations have observed evident separation between the Lebanese host communities and the Syrian communities. This separation includes exclusion from common and shared activities, events, and gatherings. Local organizations also mentioned that the Lebanese and Syrian refugees avoid interacting and intermingling with each other in many communities. An interview respondent from a local organization (Participant F, personal communication [Skype Interview], August 17, 2020) mentioned that: It differs from one community to another, there are communities that are till now not coping with the idea of having Syrians in their villages or having Syrians in their communities. It is known that they are separated they don’t deal with each other, they don’t go to each other, they don’t do any activities, common activities even if it something social or within the municipality or the main village square.

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NGOs stated that refugees living in informal settlements and shelters are more isolated from the wider Lebanese community. They do not socialize or integrate within the Lebanese community. Instead, they create their social networks within the informal settlements. For example, Syrian refugees in informal camps and settlements were isolated from the Lebanese community and depended on one another for support. An interviewee from a local organization (Participant H, personal communication [Skype Interview], August 3, 2020) said: To be honest, like no Lebanese go to the camp to visit someone or to make some connections unless we as the NGOs are going to do some support or anything. It is considered that refugees in the camps are closed from the outside community, like socially, they are connected within the camp and not making any connection outside.

Another interviewee (Participant E, personal communication [Skype Interview], July 25, 2020) also mentioned that: Also, the situation of the Syrian refugees. For example, the Syrian refugees who stated in the camps that they didn’t do much connection with other Lebanese because they are considered to live in the camps alone like together in as Syrians, but the other Syrians who went and rented some small houses within the city or the village were more integrated, they were also more independent and able to be living alone.

This separation was also evident in local organization’s safe spaces for women and girls. Psychosocial support (PSS) workers detected community exclusion in many areas all over Lebanon. Local organizations mentioned that, in women and girls’ spaces, depending on the site, it was a challenge to bring together Lebanese and Syrians to participate in shared activities as one group. However, in some other communities, it was easier to have Lebanese and Syrian women and girls working together as a group. Nonetheless, overall, the PSS workers did observe community exclusion as a challenge. Local organizations have stressed the importance of social cohesion and integration within the host community to address the community exclusion of Syrian refugees. Some local organizations have attempted to integrate more comprehensive approaches when addressing Syrian refugees’ needs by including the host community to mitigate tension and ensure no competition for resources. Nonetheless, this remains a

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challenge for local organizations depending on the location or local community. As mentioned by an interviewee (Participant I, personal communication [ZOOM Interview], August 27, 2020): And there are other villages where Syrians were integrated and they are like, you don’t differentiate them from other Lebanese or Palestinians present in this community because they are having connections with others and with other Lebanese, they go to each other, they do activities with each other.

One of the humanitarian professionals interviewed stated that “religion” and “religious sects” of the local community plays a vital role in the social acceptance of Syrian refugee families (Participant E, personal communication [Skype Interview], July 25, 2020). The organization found that Syrian refugees located in a Sunni Muslim community were more socially accepted than in Lebanese communities of other religious sects. The respondent from a local organization (Participant A, personal communication [Skype Interview], July 10, 2020) stated that: …if a refugee family is based in a Sunni locality [Sunni Muslims], it is easier for them to be socially accepted, this can be generalized with law, with a lower percentage of communitarian or social tension between host and refugee communities but for example, in Christian areas, there is a different context and... refugee communities are not socially accepted.

Some respondents pointed out that Syrian refugee women that are socially isolated are unable to access GBV-related services. The local community’s lack of acceptance and social support can create enabling environments for domestic/intimate partner violence to occur or remain underreported. Thus, from the interviews conducted and the secondary sources reviewed, it can be said that legal, economic, and community exclusion have negatively impacted Syrian refugees in Lebanon. These dimensions of exclusion have restricted the mobility of Syrian refugees, created livelihood challenges, and socially isolated refugees, all of which have increased interpersonal tension between intimate partners, therefore, exacerbating violence or putting women at higher risk of DV/IPV.

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Impact of COVID-19 on DV/IPV In Lebanon, DV/IPV has increased substantially since the COVID-19 lockdown measures were implemented, which has affected all women in the country. Between March and June 2020, the lockdown measures imposed by the government have caused an upsurge in domestic and intimate violence cases within the household. As mentioned by an interviewee (Participant F, personal communication [Skype Interview], August 17, 2020): DV/IPV has increased in COVID-19, our helplines and main helpline [national help line] … to report domestic violence has reached 100% capacity.

For Syrian refugee families and other vulnerable populations in Lebanon, COVID-19 and the lockdown measures have negatively impacted the informal livelihood sector, mobility, and community engagement, all of which have contributed to the emergence of new DV/IPV incidents, escalation of previous cases, and the inability to access to GBV services. A humanitarian professional (Participant I, personal communication [ZOOM Interview], August 27, 2020) stated that: COVID-19 can be seen as a contributing factor that has heightened the violence in the household, during March-June … we doubled the GBV cases we dealt with through case management services, this is a clear indication that women and girls were more exposed to violence in the household, but we were also faced with the challenge of how to help or support them because in time of lockdown because of mobility limitations, how to address this kind of request was more problematic, our care workers were mainly operating services using phones, but in high-risk cases we had a physical deployment to meet the survivors in a safe space to be able to discuss emergency safety plans according to the need.

UN agencies stressed that lockdown measures contributed to the upsurge of DV/PV cases in Lebanon during the pandemic due to the emergence of new DV/IPV incidents. The violence escalated against DV/IPV survivors and vulnerable women forced to remain home with the perpetrators during the pandemic. Other root causes mentioned by international and local organizations were limited income sources, confinement, blaming dynamics, closure/suspension of GBV service delivery.

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As mentioned by an organization (Participant E, personal communication [Skype Interview], July 25, 2020) handling DV/IPV cases: Even for those cases [DV/IPV cases] that were never reported, we saw new cases emerging, because of different contributing factors, for example, confinement …, blaming dynamics..., many SPs [service providers] were closed or suspended their in-person operations and service delivery, some had to adapt to remote service delivery…., access for justice against perpetrators [was a challenge].

Another organization (Participant I, personal communication [ZOOM Interview], August 27, 2020) handling DV/IPV cases stated that: Whether those [DV/IPV survivors] already facing violence it was very hard for them, they were forced to stay at home with the quite often with the perpetrator, so the risk and prominence of the violence were already there but when the lockdown imposed, those women and children faced the problem of cohabitating forcibly with the perpetrator without being able to move around to go and seek services in person with freedom of movement. Also, considering the lack of privacy, they were unable to remotely access.

COVID-19 also caused increased tensions between the host community and refugee communities; this resulted in intensified public stigma against Syrian refugees. As mentioned by a humanitarian professional being interviewed (Participant H, personal communication [Skype Interview], August 3, 2020): Stigma on refugees because of COVID and increased tension between the host community and refugees because the relief items and emergency distribution for basic needs happened [were given] to Syrian refugees and no one considered Lebanese vulnerable communities and households which increased highly since January 2020…

The COVID-19 pandemic, the ongoing economic crisis, and the recent ammonium blast in Lebanon have left the country in extreme economic and humanitarian crises. Moreover, it has isolated Syrian refugees further from the wider community and facing confinement and mobility restrictions (Perez-Vincent et al., 2020) that have not only worsened living

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conditions (Kattaa et al., 2020) but have created conditions for DV/IPV to occur or be exacerbated. Based on the interviews conducted and the review of secondary resources, it was possible to correlate the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown measures, and DV/IPV.

Discussion and Conclusion Some researchers have argued that Lebanon has voluntarily applied the principles of the Refugee Convention; therefore, being a party to the convention is not necessary (Janmyr, 2016). Officially, however, a voluntary application does not require Lebanon to grant any legal rights to refugees. Furthermore, Lebanon has been hosting refugees from neighboring countries for over sixty years. Since the declaration of the Israeli state and the Arab–Israeli conflicts that followed, Lebanon, has opened its doors to refugees from Palestine (Halabi, 2004; Suleiman, 2006). Palestinians presently constitute about 10% of the Lebanese population (Halabi, 2004; Suleiman, 2006). Nonetheless, Palestinians have continued to face numerous restrictions including labor law restrictions which have made it difficult for refugees to find housing and employment (Andersen, 2016). Throughout the years, Palestinian refugees have been separated from the Lebanese society, living in refugee camps and informal settlements, and receiving support from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) (Andersen, 2016; Halabi, 2004; Suleiman, 2006). However, since the Syrian war started and the influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon, many Syrians have settled in the Palestinian refugee camps and informal settlements which has also intensified social problems and worsened the relationship between Palestinian and Syrian refugees. Furthermore, Palestine refugees have experienced a decrease in access to services and intense competition for scarce resources (Andersen, 2016; Halabi, 2004; Suleiman, 2006). The Syrian crisis and inflow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon has resulted in the marginalization of Palestinian refugees who have been living there for several decades (Kelley, 2017). The influx of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has also caused an immense burden on the country’s economy and infrastructure, which has created tensions among the Lebanese people and is sometimes reflected in the form of discrimination and violence toward Syrian refugees. Since Lebanon does not have a legislative framework or national response

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strategy to support the needs of refugees, this has created multiple social, economic, and legal disadvantages for Syrian refugees. Using a conceptual framework that interlinks exclusion with DV/IPV, this chapter qualitatively extracted the dimensions of exclusion affecting Syrian refugees in Lebanon that create enabling environments for domestic and intimate partner violence against women to occur. Since the active role UN agencies, international and local NGOs have been playing in addressing the needs of Syrian refugees and DV/IPV in Lebanon cannot be overlooked, this study conducted interviews with humanitarian organizations. The purpose of the interviews was to identify the dimensions of exclusion experienced by Syrian refugees that could be associated with DV/IPV, which was further supported with secondary data sources. The findings reveal that the legal and economic (policies of exclusion) and community exclusion of Syrian refugees has created significant socioeconomic challenges, which have been associated with DV/IPV in Lebanon. Among the exclusion policies and regulations affecting Syrian refugees in Lebanon are the discontinuation of UNHCR’s registration, the increased cost of obtaining legal documentation, the complicated process required to obtain the documents, and the implementation of curfews by certain municipalities restricting the mobility of Syrian refugees. In addition, the economic and legal exclusion of Syrian refugees has created legal challenges and fear of police authorities, which prevent DV/IPV survivors from seeking help or disclosing incidents. Moreover, Syrian refugee survivors can be denied access to health and GBV-related services because of their illegal status and lack of formal documentation. The lack of legal documentation also causes fear of deportation, which socially isolates DV/IPV survivors, preventing them from seeking help or accessing GBV-related services. The exclusion of women from economic opportunities also increases their vulnerability to domestic and intimate partner violence; it increases their dependency on men, which makes it difficult for vulnerable women to escape domestic and intimate partner violence when it occurs (Levinson, 1988). In Lebanon, the economic exclusion of refugees through the limitation of work opportunities, difficulties in obtaining work permits, and the ban on UNHCR-registered refugees from participating in any economic activity has made daily life a struggle for Syrian refugee families. Furthermore, the strict and random police checks, especially on Syrian refugee men, have forced the gender dynamics within the family to change, increasing women’s responsibilities as financial

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supporters (a role that had previously been for men). This change in gender dynamics has created a burden on mothers, who lack experience and qualifications, to find job opportunities and provide for the family while isolating men at home, which has also contributed to Syrian refugee women’s increased susceptibility to DV/IPV. This study was able to identify possible interrelations between livelihoods and DV/IPV. Increasing livelihood opportunities among Syrian refugees are expected to decrease the occurrence of DV/IPV against women. Based on the interviews conducted, it is also possible to correlate the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown measures, and DV/IPV. Hence, there is a dire need to implement policies in Lebanon that protect the basic rights of refugees, and provide freedom of mobility and economic engagement for refugees. The exclusion of Syrian refugee families living within Lebanese communities from participating in shared activities and events isolates them from the wider community, which can be linked to DV/IPV. Syrian refugee women in Lebanon have lost access to community support, familial bonds, and other resources since leaving Syria; this has made Syrian refugee women more vulnerable to DV/IPV. Local organizations in Lebanon have stressed the importance of social cohesion and integration within the host community to address the social exclusion of Syrian refugees. Interviews from this study revealed that in local communities with less social cohesion and integration of Syrian refugee families, there is a higher likelihood of social isolation. There is also a lack of access to GBV services, and hence, a higher chance of DV/IPV escalating, remaining unnoticed, or being underreported. To tackle this issue, some local organizations have suggested implementing comprehensive approaches such as integrating the host community when addressing Syrian refugees’ needs to mitigate community tensions and ensure no competition for resources. However, the Lebanese and Syrians still have difficulties coexisting and interacting with each other depending on the location or local community. This study has uncovered that economic and legal exclusion policies have created livelihood and mobility challenges for Syrian refugees. These challenges have limited the refugee families’ sources of income and reversed gender dynamics, all of which have created conditions where DV/IPV is more likely to occur or escalate. Similarly, many Syrian refugee families face community exclusion, lack social networks and family support, isolating women and increasing their susceptibility to DV/IPV.

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Thus, based on the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we were able to identify a correlation between policies of exclusion, community exclusion, and DV/IPV in refugee settings. Acknowledging that correlation doesn’t imply causation, the findings of this research need to be further investigated. We call on future studies to utilize quantitative methods to test whether the correlation between dimensions of exclusion and DV/IPV also reflects causation. Overall, more efforts for inclusion are needed in Lebanon, at the policy and local community level, to improve the livelihoods, mobility, and social integration of Syrian refugee families, and strengthen the community response to domestic and intimate violence to reduce DV/IPV cases.

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PART II

Looking Forward: The Challenge of Building Sustainable Peace

CHAPTER 6

Post-conflict Heritage Reconstruction: Who Owns the Past? Nour A. Munawar

Wars and conflicts are undeniably the most devastating human-made reasons that threaten any cultural heritage site. The current conflicts in the Arab region, and the rise of non-state radical actors, such as the socalled Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (Daesh, ISIS, IS, or ISIL), have certainly placed a spotlight on the destruction of cultural heritage in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere. The deliberate devastation of preIslamic remains has obviously angered many people in the Middle East, as well as Western observers and scholars (Bowley, 2014; Danti, 2015). The ancient city of Aleppo, one of Syria’s six World Heritage Sites, has been drastically damaged by the Syria’s contemporary conflict (Munawar, 2018). Similarly, Syria’s bride of the desert, Palmyra, has been hit hard during the warfare hostilities between the Syrian government and armed

N. A. Munawar (B) Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_6

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opposition groups, and the destruction later intensified during Daesh double-occupation of the World Heritage Site. Several governmental and non-governmental organizations have started to plan the post-war reconstruction of Syria’s cultural heritage (Azoulay, 2018; Isakhan & Meskell, 2019; McDowall, 2017; Munawar, 2019a; Stoughton, 2017; UNESCO, 2015, 2018). Since the war in Syria appears to be coming to an end at the time of writing this chapter, the possibility to reach a sustainable consensual route for heritage reconstruction is not an easy task (Munawar, 2018). The major challenge that could face post-war Syria lies largely in the post-conflict recovery process of the damaged urban areas. Typically, a post-war recovery process has three recognizable phases: the emergency phase which is the period that follows a disaster or a conflict, regardless of the original causes of destruction (natural or man-made catastrophe), this phase is dedicated to assess, rescue, and repair the infrastructural facilities; the transitional phase, this period is crucially important for the local people, regardless of whether they were internally displaced or sought refuge out of the conflict zone, during this phase inhabitants go back to their usual lifestyle of social gatherings and work, while the actual repairs of public facilities are taking place; and the reconstruction phase, which is considered as the final phase (for further discussion on the phases of post-war recovery plans, see: Cuny, 1994). In the latter phase, cultural heritage is either erased or selectively reconstructed based on political, social, economic, or cultural considerations. It is worth noting that enriching the knowledge about the social conditions of the concerned community or sector could help and facilitate the work of agencies responsible for the post-war reconstruction (Calame, 2005). The flow of funding, conservation expertise, and future care of monumental heritage buildings, which are of international significance, predominantly depends on how the conflict ends, and frankly the winner often becomes the main decision maker and establishes a selective reconstruction and preservation processes. The German art historian, Paul Clemen, who dedicated himself to the reconstruction of Second World War-damaged monuments in Germany, indicated that reconstructing wardamaged heritage sites and monuments was ‘…not only a precondition to rebuilding the nation […] in the spirit of a historically conscious, humanistic culture, but also an obligation [in order] to make it again possible for future generations to experience historical continuity’ (cited in Diefendorf, 1993; Qudsi, 2017: 4).

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Hence, it is pertinent to examine the challenges that faced previous post-war reconstructions in different areas of the world. For instance, how were European cities, such as Berlin, rebuilt in the aftermath of the Second World War? Was the reconstruction of devastated cities influenced by the geo-political map that is often drawn in the aftermath of conflicts? Who made the decision about whether or not to rebuild ‘negative heritage’ sites? (For further discussion on negative heritage see: Meskell, 2002; Rico, 2008). Did the post-war reconstruction help the local people to overcome the war trauma? Or was it another chapter of history that was written by the winners?

Research Methodology The methods used in this study have already been developed by various disciplines such as archaeology, heritage and memory studies, media, conflict and identity, and sociology of art. This study utilizes the analytical approach to identify and analyze the motives and politics that lie behind cultural heritage reconstruction policies in different post-conflict reconstructions, such as post-Second World War Berlin and the reconstruction of Hama city in the aftermath of 1980s uprising. The main aim of this method is to collect the available data and information about the semantics of damaging, destroying, and reconstructing cultural heritage sites in the below case studies. The historical approach is used to track the cycles of construction, destruction, and reconstruction of the case studies in contemporary history. Additionally, historical analysis seeks to investigate how war and violence—perpetrated by different involved actors—have played a key role in damaging cultural heritage. The significance of using the aforementioned method is to understand how the escalated violence has rapidly reached the point of sweeping complete heritage sites and monuments for the sake of cultural cleansing or punishing locals who ignited public uprising. The comparative method aims to compare the recent damages that affected the cultural heritage sites and monumental buildings of the discussed case studies. Hence, this method seeks to clarify how armed conflict has ruined or demolished, either partially or entirely, the ancient ruins and whether the ideology and policies of post-war reconstruction were the same or they differ depending on other factors (e.g., object history, destroyer, location of the damaged sites, winner of the conflict etc.).

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The main criteria for selecting the cases of study in this research relied on two crucial factors. The first factor is that each of the examined cases have been destroyed by the violence of a conflict that erupted in their respective regions and/or states, that is, destruction of Berlin during the Second World War, destruction of Beirut during the different conflicts that Lebanon experienced in the twentieth century, and heritage destruction in Syria during different conflicts that damaged historic buildings in contemporary periods, for example, Ottoman era, French Mandate, and pre-war Syria. The second factor to select the cases of study is that all of them had plans to reconstruct them in the aftermath of their respective conflicts. This chapter reviews the relevant literature in a critical qualitative way since it includes academic articles, existing reports of international and regional organizations concerned with the destruction and reconstruction of cultural heritage (e.g., UNESCO), and media reports that covered the destruction and reconstruction of heritage are utilized. Selecting those reports took into consideration different factors, such as the quality, objectivity, accuracy, and diversity. The future-making of heritage and the politics of shaping and making post-conflict spaces in the present are complex processes and need critical thinking to include the different interconnections and forms of the material remains. The importance of broadening the thinking horizon of policy makers, heritage professionals, and even archaeologists is a crucial point to think critically and deeply about the future as a part of investigating the remains of the past. This chapter relies mainly on an analytical approach to understand what impact the reconstruction policies of war-damaged historic cities can have on the collective memory remembrance and cultural identity construction of the concerned society in the post-conflict contexts.

Post-Second World War Rebuilding of Berlin In May 1945, the Second World War finished after a near-complete annihilation of several major European cities, such as Berlin, Warsaw, Rotterdam etc. The war, which started with a Nazi German invasion of the Polish harbor town of Gdansk, or as it is called in German, Danzig (Diebelius, 2016), split the World powers into two different camps, Allied forces (UK, France, Netherlands, USA, Soviet Union and many others) against Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies). The Second

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World War devastated many parts of Europe; more than 60 million people lost their lives during the six-year-war. MacMillan (2009) considers the Second World War as the period during which the term ‘genocide’ entered the English language to describe the massacres committed by the Nazi forces when they murdered millions of Jews, Roma, and other people. In their book Dirty Little Secrets of World War II , Dunnigan (1996) refers to this armed conflict as the deadliest war in human history. After the surrender of Germany in May 1945, many German cities were destroyed, and two-thirds of Germany’s industrial power were ruined (Komp, 1999). Berlin, for instance, was extensively damaged, losing about 2 million of its inhabitants. Most of Berlin’s buildings, houses, and infrastructure were also destroyed (Taylor, 1997). Diefendorf (1993) considers that Berlin faced the greatest destruction among the German cities with 55,000,000 cubic meters of debris. Clay Large (2002) portrays the destruction of built heritage in West Berlin as ‘cultural barbarism with a vengeance’ since the ruins and buildings were entirely demolished and disappeared into what is called nowadays Teufelsberg (Devil’s Mountain), a huge 120-metre mound.

Heritage and Nazism in Pre-war Germany After the war, Berlin was divided into an Eastern (under the Soviet control) and a Western part (under the Allied forces control). This postwar division of Berlin demonstrated how the Soviet victors implemented their success in the war by imposing their political systems on their newly acquired territories in the aftermath of the war (Sandes, 2010). Several notable historic buildings suffered during the war, such as the Reichstag (House of Parliament) (Fig. 6.1), Stadtschloss (Neill, 1997) (Fig. 6.2), the Berliner Dom and the Charlottenburg Palace (Bartmanski & Fuller, 2018; Sandes, 2010). The destruction of Berlin’s heritage did not stop after the war as the rebuilding plans of Berlin, which were encouraged by political and competitive motivations between the East and West of Berlin, caused further destruction of the historic fabric of Berlin (Taylor, 1997). Wolfram (2000) pointed out that this particular post-war destruction involved archaeological rescue excavations, and the damage caused to urban areas resulted in the emergence of medieval archaeology in Germany, along with the development of urban conservation, similar to what happened in the UK after WWII (see Moshenska, 2009). It is perhaps worth noting that Germany has a long history of archaeology

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and conservation, in addition to a huge interest in historic monuments. Jokilehto (1999) indicates that the national German architecture was seen in the rediscovery of Gothic and medieval architecture which was encouraged by the German Romanticism in the early nineteenth–late eighteenth century. The German regional organizations and state laws, at the end of the nineteenth century, which were concerned with the protection of monumental buildings, were one of the most developed monument conservation legislations in Europe (Koshar, 2000). Diefendorf (1993) explains that Nazis supported the traditional approach of restoration which was mainly based on demolishing old buildings and replacing them with new ones in the traditional style, such as by adding ‘medieval’ facades to Baroque houses. Furthermore, the German architect, Albert Speer, who was the Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production for Nazi Germany and was in favor of the neo-classicist and historical styles (for further reading, see: Fest, 2007), had developed a ‘theory of ruin value’ ‘Die Ruinenwerttheorie’ that recognized that all buildings will eventually decay. This theory guided Speer to encourage the notion of constructing buildings and monuments that have a grand and impressive appearance and was reflected later on in

Fig. 6.1 Ruins of the Reichstag building in Berlin, July 1946 (© German Federal Archives [accessed on 25.03.2021])

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Fig. 6.2 Destruction of Berlin’s City Centre displaying the Berlin Palace (Stadtschloss ) and Cathedral, 1945 (© Association Berliner Schlosses E.V. [accessed on 25.03.2021])

his plans for Berlin, which were welcomed by the Führer, Hitler (Koshar, 2000) who aimed to deploy Germany’s monuments to transmit the glory of his Reich to future generation. Hitler’s passion of being seen as the savior of the Aryan race fueled his interest in art and encouraged his belief that Germany’s monuments and public spaces could play a pivotal role in awakening the nation after the failures of the First World War (Stangl, 2018). Put simply, in the eyes of the Nazi leader, art and architecture were tools for revenge, cultural triumph, and spiritual regeneration, In Hitler’s words: ‘Art is the clearest and most immediate reflection of the spiritual life of the people. It exercises the greatest conscious and unconscious influence on the masses of the people... in its thousandfold manifestations and influences it benefits the nation as a whole’ (cited in Hagman,

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2005; Spotts, 2003). In his book Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics, Spotts (2003) argues that Hitler’s social policy was largely influenced by culture, art, and aesthetics. This shows how cultural life was controlled by the Nazi regime and how it was appropriated to serve the causes of Hitler’s ideology. It can be argued that the main reason behind the enormous Nazi interest in art and culture was to establish ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 2006). In this way, Nazi leaders were able to select particular historical narratives from the past to create a concrete grounding for their political agendas, and to mold a type of unified identity that enhanced their public support. Härke (2002) considers that during Hitler’s dictatorship, evidence from archaeology was also actively utilized as a political tool to serve the Nazi agenda. Dolukhanov (1996) goes further and argues that the concept of archaeological culture has been promoted as an equivalent to ethnicity and specifically in the mid-nineteenth century, however, such utilization of culture happened not only in Germany but also in Russia. After the death of the German archaeologist, Gustaf Kossinna, who in 1920 published a book on ‘Die Herkunft der Germanen’ and developed the idea of how the Aryan, Nordic and German races descended from an Indo-German ‘superior’ core (see for further reading, Arvidsson, 2006). The Nazis used his nationalistic methods and theories to develop their ideology of a ‘master race’ (Hodder, 1991). In a nutshell, following the humiliation of defeat and economic collapse after the First World War, the Nazis rose to power by introducing and later using an imagined Germanic culture; that was a reaction to what came before—mixed up with nineteenth-century nationalism and myth histories. Hitler’s fascination in utilizing culture to promote German Nationalism can also be seen in the music produced by the German composer, Richard Wagner.

Rebuilding Berlin In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, a new tendency to get rid of the horrors and the history of Hitler’s regime emerged which was encouraged by the desire to forget the immediate past of the totalitarian Third Reich and to present the German people as the victims of Hitler’s dictatorship. In his books, Germany’s Transient Pasts (1998) and From Monuments to Traces (2000), Koshar explained how Germans, in the post-war period, opted to remove all buildings that were associated in one way or another with the Nazi regime. This desire to forget the trauma

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of the past was faced with a need to create a new historical orientation which aimed at acknowledging what had happened in terms of specific times and places. These opposing views led to complications in making decision on what to rebuild or remove (Sandes, 2010). An ‘Allergy to ruins ’ is how Koshar (2000) describes what emerged when these different views started to oppose each other. To be fair, this allergy was a collective one, in which the German people sought to revive a specific period of their history. In her book Archaeology, Conservation and the City: Post-Conflict Redevelopment in London, Berlin and Beirut, Sandes considers that the redevelopment of Berlin after the war may be divided into two main periods: from 1945 till 1989; and after 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. The German experience of rebuilding cities after wars is one of the most poignant examples of cultural reconstruction after catastrophic events. Many elements played major roles in the success of the German postwar rebuilding experience, including the involvement of local people. Taylor (1997) indicates that most of the cleaning of rubble after the war was done by Trümmerfrauen, ‘rubble women,’ since two-thirds of the surviving people were females. Another major stimulus that helped to rebuild devastated European cities, particularly West Berlin, was financial support from the Marshall plan, which was declared in 1947 by the United States Secretary of State, George C. Marshall (1947–1949). The plan aimed to restore ‘the confidence of Europeans in the economic future of their countries and all of Europe’ (Komp, 1999). The Marshall plan was intended to start in 1948 and Western Europe’s economy within 4 years. The American plan had other indirect motives, one of which was to stop the Communist expansion in Europe, establish a modern European economy influenced by the Americans, and the removal of trade obstacles between Europe and the US (Hogan, 1987; Maier & Bischof, 1991; Warner, 2005). Diefendorf (2009) explains that the Marshall plan had several preconditions for the recipients of the aids, such as the acceptance of market capitalism, multilateral decision-making and free trade, and most importantly restrictions on the national sovereignty. The first reconstruction plan for Berlin was proposed by the architect, Hans Scharoun, who presented his plan to people in an exhibition titled Berlin plant—Erster Bericht, ‘Berlin Plans—First Report,’ among the ruins of the Berliner Stadtschloss in summer 1946 (Diefendorf, 1993;

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2015; Sandes, 2010; Syring et al., 2004). Scharoun’s plan was ultimately rejected for several reasons, one of which was that it would require cleaning large parts of the city and replacing all of Berlin’s underground services, although not all of those facilities and buildings had been destroyed. Furthermore, the plan was not feasible financially and it was condemned and later rejected by the public and the allied forces because of its radical ideas (Diefendorf, 1993; Gutierrez, 1999; Sandes, 2010; Schildt, 2002). The year 1949 has witnessed the establishment of two German governments. The first was formed in May 1949 by the Allied forces (UK, USA, and France), and was called the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the second was established by the Soviet Union, and called the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This turn of events established two German states, with two completely different political systems and continuous competition on the political and military levels, produced what has later termed the Cold War between the West and the East (Betts, 2017; Clay Large, 2002; Gilpin, 2018). In the aftermath of the Second World War, guilt from the consequences of the Second World War emerged in Germany on a social level. Sandes (2010) suggested that German guilt was hidden by a process of forgetting which was implemented in different ways in the two German states. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or West Germany considered themselves as victims of dictatorship that was established by Hitler’s regime. While the German Democratic Republic (GDR) or East Germany ‘felt exonerated by becoming a socialist republic’ (Sandes, 2010: 55). This hidden process of forgetting, alongside what Habermas (1998) considers about how Germany had learnt how to ‘publicly confront’ their traumatic past, played a key role in how Berlin’s heritage was reconstructed when it first was divided, and later reunited in 1990 (Sandes, 2010). In the immediate post-war period, the Allied forces (UK, France, USA, and Soviet Union) had instituted a program for the de-Nazification of Germany, which aimed at forbidding all former Nazis from work. This process of de-Nazification targeted the purging of any Nazi influences and presence from German cultural and public life (MacMillan, 2009; Zeren, 2017). The East of Berlin became a socialist place as its rebuilding was undertaken by Communist regime that was part of the Soviet Union. The post-war plans of East Berlin adopted the post-Lenin Soviet artistic theories of Stalinism, which favored neo-classicism (Balfour, 1990; Ladd,

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1998; Sandes, 2010). However, the planning of post-war reconstruction in East Berlin was later dominated by a combination of the MarxistLeninist theory of art, that is, ‘social realism,” which was developed in 1930s and advocated by Soviet Union (Stangl, 2018), and a complete devotion to a national tradition in architecture (Schildt, 2002). The architects and planners received their instructions entirely from Moscow and they were focused on rebuilding East Berlin in a centralized and monumental way (Ladd, 1998). In his book Risen from Ruins, Stangl (2018) argues that post the Second World War Communists exploited and politicized historic monuments, memorials, common architecture, and most importantly the new designs and plans of cities. This Communist politicization of the post-war reconstruction of East Berlin shows how the rebuilding of war-damaged monuments—with strong influences and political control from outside—can reshape public spaces, street names, cultural memory and attitudes toward the preservation of historic monuments. Moreover, there was an extra interest on a political level in developing a sort of ‘German architectural identity’ since there was no idea, back then, what socialist planning truly meant (Sandes, 2010). In East Germany, there was a tendency to make a break with the past which started a process of altering and demolishing some of the remaining historic buildings in Berlin (Jokilehto, 1999; Sandes, 2010), such as the sixteenth-century monument, Stadtschloss, which was demolished in 1949 to free Berlin from any ‘dishonourable’ past (Koshar, 2000: 159; Stangl, 2006: 354). The slow progress of rebuilding Berlin’s historic center eventually saved several historic monuments from being demolished. This was the case with Berlin’s Dom which was supposed to be demolished in the early 1950s (Clay Large, 2002). Archaeological excavations were undertaken for political reasons even after the fall of the Third Reich. In the case of East Germany, Communist archaeologists implemented Marxist archaeology which arguably had some positive impacts as the Marxist ideology promotes the rejection of cultural-ethnic models (Barley, 1977; Dolukhanov, 1996; Sandes, 2010). In his article Double Restoration: Rebuilding Berlin after 1945, the urban historian Brian Ladd (2005) explained that the reconstruction in the aftermath of World War II was different in the Western and Eastern sides of Berlin and that the division of the city played a key role in creating such differences. In his words: ‘The East wanted to present itself as the heir and guardian of German national culture’ since both sides of Berlin

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aimed at pursuing different styles to implement a breakaway from Hitler and his legacy (Ladd, 2005: 123). Therefore, the instructions of Soviet architects, who aimed to implant socialism through urban planning and architecture resulted in a hybrid model that combined Nazi and Soviet architecture in East Berlin (Qudsi, 2017). On the other side of the city, the plan to reconstruct West Berlin was based on the guiding principles of modernism and democracy (Strom, 2001; von Beyme, 1990). The destruction of Berlin was seen by several modernist planners, such as Hans Scharoun, as an opportunity to build a new Berlin. Scharoun’s plan, however, was not implemented and was later replaced by a plan by Karl Bonatz, who was the head of the city planning department. Bonatz’s modernist plan made Berlin a ‘genuine capitalist showcase’ with plenty of cafes, cinemas, expensive shops, prostitutes and nightclubs during night times in addition to a few old buildings (Ladd, 1998: 151). In 1955, the Berlin Senate and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) announced ‘Capital Berlin,’ an international competition to rebuild the war-damaged central part of Berlin. This plan included a conservation strategy for a number of the historical buildings of Berlin, such as the Museum of Ethnology or the Anhalter Bahnhof , based on several considerations such as their artistic or historic values or their financial value and ability to generate revenue (Rürup, 2003; Sandes, 2010). During the implementation of the rebuilding plan of Berlin, several historical buildings, some dating back to the nineteenth century, which had not been destroyed during the war, were demolished (Clay Large, 2002). The Modernist approach to rebuilding post-war cities was fully implemented in West Berlin, and this caused the continuous decay of historic buildings and the introduction of Western styles of architecture (Sandes, 2010). A look at the satellite images of Berlin today, reveals the enduring structural differences and historical twentieth-century divisions between East and West Berlin. The retired Canadian astronaut, Chris Hadfield, who published a space image of Berlin at night, notes: ‘Berlin at night. Amazingly, I think the light bulbs still show the East/West division from orbit’ (Vasagar, 2013). During the Second World War, Berlin, Rotterdam, Warsaw, and other European cities were deliberated targeted by carpet bombing aiming at destruction and devastation of cities. It is clear that the winners of the Seconds World War had the last word in deciding what and how to rebuild Berlin (East and West). The winners who made the decisions were also

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outsiders who imposed their views on the architecture of Berlin and of Germany in general.

Lebanon Lebanon, one of the smallest countries in the Middle East, has experienced several conflicts since the end of French Mandate in December 1946. The country, which has been characterized by the diversity of its religious sects, that is, Shia’a and Sunni Muslims, Druze, Maronite, and Orthodox Christians etc., has witnessed two civil wars, several smaller insurgencies, and an occupation by Israeli forces in 1982 (see Fig. 6.3). The major war that re-drew the geo-political map of Lebanon was the civil war that occurred in 1975, between nearly 17 ethno-religious groups, and lasted for almost 14 years (Khalaf, 2002; Makdisi & Sadaka, 2005; Perring, 2009). Diab (1999) considered that the main reasons behind the breakout of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 came from the disappearance of balances between the different parts of Lebanon and Beirut, with growing societal inequalities, and ‘development without growth’ (Diab, 1999: 31; for further discussion on the complexities of Lebanon’s civil war, see Fisk, 2001). In June 1982, while the whole world was busy following the news of the 1982 FIFA World Cup in Spain, Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied the Eastern part of Beirut to demolish the stronghold of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). During the Israeli occupation, Beirut was heavily bombed and Palestinian refugee camps were targeted by the Israeli forces and their Lebanese allies that is, a Christian party called Kataeb, resulting in killing about 3500 civilians, mostly Palestinian and Lebanese Shia’a (Schiff & Ya’Ari, 1985). By 1990, Lebanon had lost more than 100,000 people and about half a million locals had been displaced according to the US Committee for Refugees report (2004) (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004).

Rebuilding Beirut The destruction of Beirut was massive, and it included private and public properties (Nanaa, 2017). The situation of Beirut during the Civil War (1975–1990) was very similar to that of Aleppo in the years between 2012 and the end of 2016; both cities were divided into East and West. The Civil War in Lebanon ended in 1990 after the Taif Agreement was

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Other 1,5% Druze 5,2% Sunni 28,4%

Christian 36,2%

Shia 28,4%

Sunni

Shia

Christian

Druze

Other

Fig. 6.3 Represent the religious affiliations of people in Lebanon–Palestinian and Syrian refugees are not included (© Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2017 [accessed on 25.03.2021])

reached, in Saudi Arabia, to ‘return to political normalcy in Lebanon’ (Bahout, 2016, 2018; Hanf, 2015; Krayem, 1997; Rizkallah, 2017). The Taif agreement has legalized an indefinite presence by the Syrian army in Lebanon as Syria was declared as the enforcer of the agreement which ultimately resulted in dividing the Christian front between accepting or rejecting it (Rizkallah, 2017). This agreement has empowered the Sunni sect, which ultimately gave a boost to Lebanon’s Sunni Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, who controlled the post-war reconstruction of Beirut’s downtown. Hariri established the Solidère company in 1990, ‘a

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French acronym for Sociét´e Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de Beyrouth,’ to reconstruct the city center of Beirut (Nanaa, 2017: 48, for further discussion see: Becherer, 2005; Larkin, 2009). In his article ‘Reconstruction and Fragmentation in Beirut,’ Randall (2014) states that the Solidère project was backed by the Gulf countries to rebuild Beirut. However, Ilyes (2015) believes that the Solidère company has made several violations to the constitution and demolished many buildings in Beirut’s historic city center. Ilyés adds that the Solidère’s reconstruction of Beirut has been largely criticized due to the approach used to rebuild Beirut, which focuses on taking the points of view of Lebanon’s elite class, the people who left Lebanon during the war, in order to bring more money back into the market. The aim of the people who were responsible of the reconstruction of Beirut was to turn Beirut into an economic center which could compete with Doha, capital of Qatar, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This approach has triggered a huge influx in property prices, and has led to calls of corruption as the company responsible for the reconstruction was owned by the Lebanese Prime Minister, Hariri (Ilyes, 2015; Larkin, 2009; Randall, 2014). Becherer (2005) states that two-thirds of the 800 war-damaged buildings in Beirut were demolished. The destruction of those buildings was encouraged for political reasons, as some were old souks, constructions from the Ottoman era, and others were part of the Jewish district that was demolished during the reconstruction of Beirut. Nearly 80% of Beirut’s architectural heritage has been destroyed by the ‘raze-andrebuild’ approach of the Solidère’s reconstruction (Lepeska, 2015). Haidar, a 50-year-old Lebanese citizen who lived in Beirut during the war, experienced the trauma, describes the reconstruction of Beirut, ‘This led to a collective amnesia, which ultimately trickled down to policy and urban planning’ (Lepeska, 2015). The post-civil-war reconstruction of Beirut shows that the Solidère project aimed at erasing the traces and memories of war. Wainwright (2015) explains that the plan to rebuild Beirut was ‘a desire for collective amnesia, wiping away all reminders of the conflict.’ Daher, a Lebanese academic, architect and one of Beirut’s residents, elaborates on the reconstruction plan of Beirut and claims that: The whole concept of land ownership, and of memory, was completely obliterated, instead of owning a property or a piece of land or an apartment or an office building, now you own shares in a company, where 50

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percent of the shares are controlled by certain individuals. So the whole concept of ownership is completely shattered, and this makes a big difference regarding change. Most of the changes that are happening there are corporate in nature, not individual changes. So this part of the city, of downtown, is not growing naturally, like any other downtown or any other city; it’s growing artificially, because most of the decisions for inducing change are taken in the boardroom of a company.

Daher adds, ‘There is a lot of fakeness that takes place’ (Irving, 2009). On the one hand, the reconstruction of Beirut has been considered unique by Gavin and Maluf (1996), who listed the three reasons for this uniqueness as: ‘the innate value and special qualities of the place itself, a comprehensive Master Plan, and the unique private sector vehicle created to implement the reconstruction.” On the other hand, Sandes (2010) deemed that the reconstruction of Beirut was conducted in a rapid way compared to other post-war reconstructions, and that this particular rebuilding of Beirut had intentionally eradicated the evidence of war and violence (for further discussion on the post-war remaking of Beirut, see also Larkin, 2009). Clearly, the reconstruction of Beirut has few supporters, particularly among the local people. This can be noticed in the responses of Nassif’s research (2012) ‘The Politics of Memory: Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut: An Anthropological Study’ which interviewed the Lebanese people about their opinion on the reconstruction of their home city. One of the overwhelming responses was: ‘When you are there you think of yourself as a customer, because that is all you do, buy stuff and eat …” (Nassif, 2012). Undoubtedly, Solidère’s reconstruction has not focused on the wills and interests of the local people; instead, they focused on generating more funds in the post-war period out of tourism by demolishing most of what remained of Beirut’s downtown and replacing it with modern architecture. The post-civil-war reconstruction of Beirut had a large impact on the physical memory of the city and its locals (see also, Sawalha, 1998). Any sense of history in Beirut’s center has arguably been removed. The reconstruction has turned one of the world’s oldest cities into a luxurious modern city center that reflects the globalization and Westernization trends of the contemporary Middle East.

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Post-July War Reconstruction of Beirut In 2000, Israel withdrew from South Lebanon after about 18 years of occupation. The Syrian army, which had been sent there as part of the Taif agreement to enforce the agreement and stop the civil war, also withdrew from Lebanon after the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, in February 2005 (Wight, 2013). In July 2006, the tension on the Lebanese-Israeli boarders escalated and resulted in a war between the Israeli forces and fighters of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The war was called later, H uz, which, in Arabic, . arb Tamm¯ means the ‘July War.’ The 33-day war resulted in about 2000 deaths and more than 900,000 displaced people (Kalb & Saivetz, 2007; United Nations, 2006). The United Nations report (2006) points out that the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war caused a large amount of damage to the infrastructure, housing, numerous churches and mosques, along with the archaeological, historical, and cultural sites of Lebanon. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1 indicates that the reconstruction of all war-damaged buildings of Lebanon will take years. The World Heritage site of Byblos has been hit hard by the hostilities. The UNESCO report outlines the destruction that occurred to other cultural and archaeological heritage sites, such as the sites of Baalbeck and Tyre, as a result of Israeli attacks. The destruction of the July War was mainly in the Southern parts of Lebanon. After the war ended, the United Nations Development and Planning (UNDP) organized a conference ‘Reconstruction and Recovery Cell ’ in Sweden to gather international donors (Nanaa, 2017; UNDP, 2006). On a national level, the Hezbollah party, Shia party supported by Iran and Syria, has worked on compensating the people who were affected by the war through the framework of the Jihad Al Binaa Foundation, real estate establishment run by Hezbollah (Al-Harithy, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2007). Simultaneously, the regional power that supports Hezbollah, Iran, backed the efforts of the Hezbollah and started a quick reconstruction to facilitate the return of people who had fled. Hezbollah’s efforts were aimed at generating more public support to their party and claimed the territories for the Shia sect (Randall, 2014). One of those efforts was a project called, Waa’d, which means ‘promise’ in Arabic. This project aimed to rebuild replicas of the buildings that had been destroyed during the war. Randall (2014) considers that the Waa’d approach to rebuild the

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damaged buildings, was driven by the fact that changes in the old design could result in delaying the project. In her book: Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War, the Lebanese architect, Howayda Al-Harithy, describes how the academic community had participated in the reconstruction of Lebanon by establishing a multidisciplinary group called: ‘Reconstruction Unit.’ This working group helped to bring public attention to the issues related to urban planning, and most importantly to incorporate the voices of locals in the decision-making of policies (Al-Harithy, 2010). The reconstruction of Lebanon was conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which received funds from Western states, such as Japan, Sweden, and others. Nanaa (2017) considers the efforts of the international organizations special since their contribution was focused on prioritizing the most vulnerable victims of the war, regardless of the religion, ethnicity, or political affiliations. The reconstruction of Beirut after the last war has shown uniqueness in its recovery, especially after the Lebanese government used an innovative approach called ‘adoption scheme.’ This new approach is mainly ‘individuals, institutions, or foreign states’ who ‘could adopt an area and directly contribute to its reparation and reconstruction process’ (Ghosn & Khoury, 2013: 8). This participatory approach has assisted local Lebanese, who were affected by war, to respond faster. However, people who were not ‘adopted’ by foreign states felt excluded (Ghosn & Khoury, 2013). Randall (2014) notes that non-state participating actors dominated the reconstruction since they have managed the process of rebuilding Lebanon. Nevertheless, serving the politics of space was the driving factor of all the initiatives that were conducted by architects, civil society, and engineers. Archaeologically, the Lebanese archaeologist, Hanan Charaf, describes the reconstruction of Beirut as ‘In the name of modernity, ancient landmarks of Beirut, such as elements of the ancient port, Roman baths, and Byzantine churches were either destroyed or dismantled’ (Charaf, 2015: 3). The post-war reconstruction of Beirut has been widely criticized, however, as it failed to create a space for social inclusion. This shows why it is crucial to think ahead before starting rebuilding plans, and most importantly, why such recovery processes should not be selective, rushed, or targeted to satisfy a specific class in society. The reconstruction of Beirut is a clear example of how top-down approaches can exclude large

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parts of society and how such approaches can prolong social divisions, inequality, and violence within a city.

Heritage Reconstruction in Pre-war Syria The destruction of cultural heritage that has been taking place in Syria since the armed conflict started in March 2011 is not the only time that Syria has witnessed unprecedented damage to its cultural patrimony. Syria’s heritage has experienced several human-made and natural disasters which have affected cultural heritage sites and monuments over the past centuries. Citadels, old souks, and monumental buildings in Syria have been affected by urban plans and modifications that occurred for several reasons, such as ‘the usual utilization upgrading; the demolition in the framework of urban redevelopment operations; and the destruction after disasters or military confrontations’ (Nanaa, 2017; Soufan, 2015). By the end of the nineteenth century, the notion of heritage started to appear in the local community in Syria together with the voices that were raised to promote the Arab Awakening ‘Al-Nahda,’ since the Arab region was part of the Ottoman Empire (1516–1918) (Antonius, 2015; Soufan, 2015; Tauber, 2013). In the mid-nineteenth century, the SublimePorte initiative of the Ottoman Empire aimed to improve the political, economic, and military situations of the Ottomans (see also, Donald & Halil, 1994; Calder, 2016). The main objectives of the initiative were twofold: to let the Ottomans enter modernity, to face the Modernist movement which was spreading both in the West and in Russia; and to propose a ‘radial rupture with the past’ (Soufan, 2015: 3) which could have slowed down or hibernated the Arab Awakening movement which called for independence from the Ottoman Empire. A series of Ottoman reforms, called Tanzimat (Turkish word for Reforms), resulted in a sort of Westernization of urban planning and architectural space (for further discussion on Ottoman Reforms ‘Tanzimat,’ see Cleveland & Bunton, 2016; Ersoy, 2017; Kawtharani, 2018). One of the consequences of this movement was the intellectual development of Syrian civil society through the production of Arabic journals, such as Al-Jin¯ aan (the Gardens), alMuqtat.af (the Extract), and al-Hilαl ¯ (the Crescent) (Beshara, 2011; Sheehi, 2005). Those journals, which had secular, Christian, and Islamic tendencies promoted several new concepts within the Arab region, such as the valuation of local heritage, and the idea of Modernity. However, this movement has been faced by Arab nationalists, who strongly supported

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the idea of linking the pride of Arabs to non-Ottoman heritage (Makdisi, 2002; for further discussion on the Arab nationalism during the Late Ottoman era, see: Deringil, 1991; Harik, 2015; Sharabi, 1970). By the late nineteenth century, and as a result of the Ottoman movement of Tanzimat, a new national Ottoman architectural style, inspired by both the local fabric and Europe influences, emerged in newly built administrative buildings, such as the Horologe Bab al-Faraj Clock Tower in Aleppo (1899) (see also, UNESCO, 1983; Salkini et al., 2016) and al-Hejaz Railway Station in Damascus, built between 1908 and 1914 (Billings, 2006; Ozyuksel, 2014). These monumental buildings were designed to enhance the common identity of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Soufan, 2015). The period of the Ottoman reforms has clearly witnessed the emergence of new architectural styles in the heritage-making process, however, it has shown that during this particular period the destruction of heritage took place for various reasons, such as the destruction of the Christian district of B¯ ab T¯ uma in Damascus in 1860 (Rafeq, 1988; Soufan, 2015). The following section explores how heritage has been destroyed and then rebuilt in three different historical periods of Syria, Ottoman Syria (1516–1918), Syria under the French Mandate (1923−1946), and Syria during the reign of Hafez al-Assad (1971–2000).

Heritage Destruction and Reconstruction in Ottoman Syria The summer of 1860 witnessed an outbreak of violence in the streets of Damascus, which was under Ottoman rule. Bloody hostilities and riots erupted between two sects (Maronites and Druze) in the Christian quarter of B¯ ab T¯ uma in Damascus and in Mont-Lebanon (Alsalloum, 2017; Khoury & Khoury, 2003; Rafeq, 1988). The ferocity of these hostilities resulted in the displacement of thousands of local people and the killing of hundreds. In 1862, the Ottoman army attacked MontLebanon and B¯ ab T¯ uma district and caused great damage to the historic buildings (Nanaa, 2017). The reformist Foreign Minister of the Ottomans, Fu’ad Pasha, sought to avoid any Western intervention, especially from France, under the so-called ‘Oriental Christendom.’ Fu’ad Pasha also imprisoned, exiled, and killed many of the Muslim locals who had been unable to stop the bloodshed and appointed a committee, consisting of local people from

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Damascus, to compensate the inhabitants of B¯ ab T¯ uma, who had suffered from the riots (Khoury & Khoury, 2003). Rebuilding the destroyed parts of the historic district of B¯ ab T¯ uma began when an international committee was established to fund the reconstruction process (Fig. 6.4). This committee consisted of representatives from France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria, and the extraordinary envoy of the Sublime-Porte, Fu’ad Pasha (Soufan, 2015). The reconstruction work started in 1863 and continued until 1870. The records of this international committee indicate that about 80% of the houses in B¯ ab T¯ uma had been destroyed; in total about 1413 houses had been badly damaged by the unrest. Reimbursement for the damaged properties was one of the biggest concerns of the international committee. Therefore, the Ottoman government decided to reimburse the locals to start the reconstruction work by themselves. The reconstruction of B¯ ab T¯ uma was not as successful as planned, however. The rebuilding of ¯ ab T¯ uma’s historic monuments was not able to return the district to its former state as most of the Christian inhabitants had fled the area, and the economic situation did not improve until locals returned in 1880s (Nanaa, 2017; Soufan, 2015). This example of rebuilding damaged cultural heritage by the Ottomans shows how local people can be involved in the decision-making process with the help of international committees.

Syria’s Heritage Under the French Mandate When the First World War ended in November 1918, Arabs sought to implement the British promise that assured them the right to establish an independent state, called The Arab Kingdom. The Arab Kingdom was established in March 1920 but only lasted for four months (Antonius, 2015; Kuhn, 2011). The British imperial promise came about as asked to start a revolution against the Ottomans during the First World War. In return they were offered their own independent state after the war. The promises for an Arab state took place in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence (July 1915 to March 1916) between Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner to Egypt (Zeine, 1977). France, however, opposed the idea of establishing an Arab Kingdom on the lands of Greater Syria. As a consequence of this, the newly established kingdom had to surrender to France, who failed to recognize the new state. France was also promised, by the British government, that it would receive a larger piece of property

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Fig. 6.4 French post card of Damascus City after the Destruction of Sidi Amoud Quarter (G. Degeorge, Damas Perle Et Reine D’orient, 2005) (Reproduced from Soufan, 2015)

from the former Ottoman Empire in the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 (Fig. 6.5) (Simon et al., 2004; Zeine, 1977). The French Mandate was declared on Syria and Lebanon in 1923 and lasted until April 1946 (Khoury, 2014; for further discussion on the mandate system, see: Myers, 1921). Several rebellion movements erupted during the French occupation of Syria. In October 1925, some hundreds of Syrian revolutionists attacked the al-Azem historic palace, the headquarter of the French Haut-Commissaire, in Damascus. The French army began to bomb the city which resulted in great damage to the historic buildings and monuments in the Sidi Amoud district (Fig. 6.4). The Damascene district of Sidi Amoud is still called al-hariqah, which means in Arabic ‘The Fire’ (Nanaa, 2017). Soufan (2015) notes that the reconstruction of the damaged parts of the city took factors into consideration: The central location of the district in the heart of Damascus’s Old City; the symbolic character of the place as it had witnessed the fight against

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Fig. 6.5 The Sykes–Picot Agreement map between the UK and France 1916 (© Palestinian Academic Society for The Study Of International Affairs [Passia] [accessed on 25.03.2021])

colonizers; the necessity of maintaining the image of France; and technical and financial constraints. The order to reconstruct was issued in April 1926 and was aimed at preserving the local heritage and defining the modern character of the district, that is, new constructions, heights, and colors (Soufan, 2015).

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According to Nanaa (2017), the approach to this reconstruction satisfied both the foreign governors, as well as the Syrian people.

Syria Under the Rule of Hafez Al-Assad Syria declared its independence from the French Mandate on April 17, 1946. The period that followed independence was marked by political instability and witnessed a series of military coups. For instance, in the period between 1946 and 1963, the Syrian government had drafted several different constitutions and formed about 20 cabinets (Seale, 1990). In the same period, the Middle East had witnessed several significant events that shaped the political, economic and cultural life of the region. When the State of Israel was declared in May 1948 on the land of historical Palestine, this was followed by the Arab–Israeli War of 1948. A few years later Nasserism ideology, which was Pan-Arabist and antiWestern colonialism, came to prominence when Gamal Abdal Nasser, who had led a revolution that had overthrown the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, became the Egyptian president in 1956 (Lippman, 1989; for further discussion on Nasserism ideology, see Abdel-Malek, 1964; Mansfield, 1973). Two years later, Syria and Egypt announced the merging of the two states and established the United Arab Republic in 1958. The Republic was short lived, however, and was dissolved in 1961 (Be’eri, 1982; Cook, 2011). The major event that has changed the modern political map of Syria was the eighth of March coup in 1963, led by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party (Fildis, 2012; Ginat, 2000; Pipes, 1989; Talhamy, 2009). In 1967, Israeli forces occupied the Syrian Golan Heights during the Six-Day War. In response to this crisis the Syrian Minister of Defense, Hafez Al-Assad, overthrew the government in another military coup which was later called ‘The Corrective Movement’ in 1970. Assad became the president of Syria in 1971, ending a series of coups that had destabilized Syria since independence (Be’eri, 1982; Seale, 2000). In 1982, the Muslim brotherhood started an uprising against Al-AssadBa’thist regime (Fisk, 2001; Talhamy, 2009). This rebellion was mainly centered in Hama city and resulted in massive damage and the destruction of whole areas in Hama—al-Kilaniyyeh, and al-Baroudiyyeh districts (Figs. 6.6 and 6.7). According to Western reports, about 1000 people were killed, as a result of the hostilities in Hama city, while the Syrian Human Rights Committee (2006) indicated that the human causalities

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reached about 40,000 people (Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2006). The differences in the numbers of casualties are due to the fact that media coverage was very limited as the area was extremely inaccessible. The plan to reconstruct the damaged districts of Hama city was formalized in 2005, almost 23 years after the destruction had occurred, by

Fig. 6.6 Images of the destruction of Hama City in the aftermath of Hama Massacre 1982 (© Wikimedia [accessed on 25.03.2021])

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Fig. 6.7 Destruction of Hama 1982 in the aftermath of the Muslim Brotherhood Uprising (© Library of Congress, reproduced from Blanton 2012 [accessed on 25.03.2021])

the Municipal Councilor of Hama (Nanaa, 2017). Soufan (2015) indicates that the local inhabitants participated with a sincere will to aid the reconstruction of their city; locals provided documents, photographs and archives. The participating parties in the reconstruction opted to preserve the religious buildings and to restore their functions to as they had been before the riots. The main aim of the reconstruction plan of Hama’s historic buildings was to overcome the Muslim Brotherhood’s riots of 1980s and to erase these negative representations from the collective memory of the Syrians. The plans were also intended to revive the heritage of a city that had been intentionally neglected for almost three decades. The decision to start reconstructing the city of Hama was only taken after the death of Hafez al-Assad. It can be argued that the reason for such an extended delay in the reconstruction was perhaps down to a desire in the Ba’athist regime to punish the city and its citizens for starting an uprising.

Discussion The ever-growing momentum in cultural heritage conservation, preservation, and reconstruction in conflicts zones, and particularly post-conflict contexts, has drawn the attention of several prominent scholars who

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have debated how best to understand and deal with heritage in postwar frameworks (Bernbeck & Pollock, 1996; González-Ruibal, 2005; Meskell, 2006, 2010). Since 2011, promoting cultural heritage protection in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been at the top of UNESCO’s agenda and its implementing partners. In an attempt to respond to the unprecedented destruction of cultural properties, the world community has immediately opened the door for reconstruction to rebuild what conflicts in MENA have destroyed, even as armed conflicts were taking place (2019b; Munawar, 2017). In the aftermath of the ‘liberation’ of Aleppo in December 2016, UNESCO launched the first emergency assessment of damage to the Old City of Aleppo. Shortly afterward, UNESCO organized the First International Coordination Meeting for the recovery of Aleppo’s heritage in Lebanon, in March 2017, to set up action plans to restore Aleppo’s Old City. However, the process of post-war reconstruction has been limited to rebuilding replicas of what had been destroyed by the war. Syria’s former Director-General of Antiquities and Museums (2012–2017), Maamoun Abdelkarim, stated ‘We will never rebuild new buildings in the ancient city. We are archaeologists, we do traditional work’ (Meskell, 2018). This one-way understanding of the past could result in decoupling the past from its post-war future. This can be noted clearly in the enduring efforts to reconstruct the Great Umayyad Mosque of Aleppo to its former status before 2012. The reconstruction project has started with funds about £5.5 million, which was donated by Ramzan Kadyrov, president of Chechen Republic. Another example is the reconstruction of Palmyra’s Arch of Triumph, when the local authorities in Syria sought to replicate what Daesh destroyed in Palmyra. Similarly, the approach used in the reconstruction of Hama is relatively similar to the one used to reconstruct the Palmyra’s replica of the Arch of Triumph monument in 2016, although the replica project was evidently faster and conducted during an ongoing conflict (for further discussion on the reconstruction of Palmyra, see: Munawar, 2017). Both reconstruction projects, however, were clearly aimed at erasing parts of the collective memory of the local people and the reconstruction of Hama was undoubtedly intended to instigate and activate a process of forgetting. The contemporary conflicts in MENA offer an opportunity to establish a radical change in our understanding of the past (Bullock, 2002). This change can help to expand the way we see the destruction of cultural heritage, and the building of post-war monuments, and would enable

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people to look beyond the last day before the war started. At the same time, the notion of heritage reconstruction should not focus solely on planning the future based on an image of the recent past. Post-war reconstruction should be able to look back at the first constructions of damaged monuments to understand: what lies beneath the destroyed heritage, why the destroyed or damaged building was first built; what narratives colonial and post-colonial regimes aimed to hide or to publicly present; and most importantly, how the pre-war heritage was shaped, why and for/by whom. Bullock (2002) has argued that a desire to establish an unbroken and consistent existence with the past is often attached to planning for the future. However, the post-war changes can provide new interpretations, meanings, and understanding of our past and present them in a way that can help people to transform what was considered, before the war, unjust or presented in an inappropriate, or perhaps what has been politicized and propagated for political gains. In that way, post-war reconstruction can be re-imagined as a healing process for the people who have suffered which could eventually help them to create their own present with future monuments that offer shared social benefits.

Conclusion This chapter explored the different policies and experiences of heritage reconstruction of war-torn historic cities, such as Berlin and Beirut. The chapter investigated the relationship between heritage and political regimes by reflecting on incidents of heritage reconstruction, uses, and abuses in post-conflict contexts. The chapter illustrated how heritage reconstruction plans in post-war countries have been designed and politicized by political elites. For instance, how Berlin (East and West) has been reconstructed in the aftermath of the Second World War, and what factors played a role in rebuilding Berlin’s monuments. The chapter discussed several post-conflict heritage reconstructions in the Middle East and specifically in Syria and Lebanon during different historical periods (Ottoman, French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and post-civil-war Lebanon). Previous heritage reconstructions have shown that such postwar crucial processes could lead to creating a one-sided history of the nation written by the winners which would ultimately play a major role in further fragmenting the fractured national identity and prolong the violence on a social level. This chapter signified the role that agency and the wills of local people can play in post-conflict heritage reconstruction.

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Post-war reconstruction policies may have the potential to help local and displaced people to overcome the war trauma when conducted in an open and inclusive way.

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CHAPTER 7

The Psychopolitics of Motherhood in Post-conflict Public Policies: The Cases of the PKK and ISIS Hamoon Khelghat-Doost and Deniz Ülke Arıbo˘gan

After discussing the reconstruction of heritage sites in post-conflict regions, this chapter takes up the unique angle of psychopolitics to look at the potential power of motherhood in post-conflict public policy-making. The current research on conflict and its psychopolitical impacts is mostly centered around individuals; either the victims or the perpetrators (Jensen et al., 2020). What is also mostly ignored in the formulation of current

H. Khelghat-Doost (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Üsküdar University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] D. Ü. Arıbo˘gan Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Do˘gu¸s University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_7

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conflict and post-conflict policies is the impact of those individuals and their actions on their families and also the societal challenges these families experience when a family member is convicted of an act of terror. At the same time, what is also sidelined in conducting such public policies is the psychopolitical impacts of conflict on the families’ internal structure (the relationship among the family members) and external interaction, and the way these families are treated and framed by society, their communities, their relatives, and also major political parties (Comer et al., 2019). Among the family members, even less attention has been paid to the more vulnerable female members—mothers. The public policy works on mothers of perpetrators are also mainly focused on finding familial reasons for members to join terrorist organizations (Sikkens et al., 2017). A large section of current policies emphasizes the role of mothers in radicalization of their own family members (Zuhdi & Syauqillah, 2020). The roots of such approach in policies can be found in the way of thinking which has been entrenched in the public mind as a result of dramatic media reporting or pre-existing, negative, stereotypes we hold about the perpetrators of political violence. The main reason for the failure in noticing the mothers is that the current public policies are mainly focused on the individuals. Therefore, exploring the causing factors of the individual to participate in acts of political violence has gained more attention than personal relationships and family dynamics. From the limited public policy research that has been conducted, the findings are positively ambivalent. Some mothers were cited to have supported the cause of their children, some spoke out against it and others were simply unaware of their child’s susceptibility (Sikkens et al., 2017). Mothers of the members of terrorist organizations in the Middle East and their potential for restoring peace and stability have received the least amount of policy and programmatic attention (Schmidt, 2020). The lack of in-depth qualitative data and inconsistent findings are arguably a clear indication that it is not possible to make sweeping generalizations and form judgements in the way it was mostly happening. Instead, in-depth public policy research can provide both academicians and policymakers with richer insight into the details of these mothers’ experiences. Understanding radicalization through political psychology can greatly help policymakers to design effective, innovative, and implementable mechanisms for post-conflict counter-extremism. Political psychology can be broadly defined as exploring the psychological origins of political

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behaviors (Cottam et al., 2015). This approach provides a more in-depth understanding of different political acts and behaviors. Understanding the root causes of certain political behaviors certainly paves the way for policymakers to adopt relevant strategies. By showcasing the waiting mothers of Diyarbakir in Turkey, this chapter argues that the psychopolitical understanding of motherhood can effectively assist policymakers to combat extremism in the Middle East. Psychology is one of the main contributors to the construction of motherhood in both social and political forms. Closely affiliated with the political psychology of motherhood, identity construction of motherhood plays a vital role in positioning mothers within sociopolitical structure of every society. Motherhood should be also understood as a collective political identity with its own collective values and ideals (Brewer, 2001). Within this political construction of motherhood identity, psychology plays an important role in defining what is socially considered “good mothering” in different societies. At the heart of each family, mothers are usually the first family members to realize the early cautioning signs of radicalization in their children. While the observation of changing or changed behavior of their children may be intuitive for many, the awareness and understanding of the process of radicalization are not. Even if mothers recognize extremists in their children, they often lack the skills needed to intervene. Mothers need to be equipped and supported in their efforts to prevent their children from joining extremist groups, and also to build their own capacity to reject the influence of extremism and violence (Roble, 2019). The psychopolitics of motherhood could be therefore instrumented effectively by the policymakers to restore sustainable peace and to end political violence especially in the Middle East. Following the above argument, the case of the waiting mothers of Diyarbakir in Turkey can be used as a model of grassroots effort to end terrorism and radicalization. As an indigenous movement, the model can be modified and utilized in different war-torn societies in the Middle East including Syria and Iraq. In August 2019, a mother started a sit-in protest in front of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) office in the city of Diyarbakir in southern Turkey to demand the return of his son who has been abducted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Soon, hundreds of other mothers and families joined her to demand the return of their children. As a result of the protest, 24 of the abducted children have returned to their families and the PKK’s recruitment pace has dropped

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from 5600 in 2014 to only 59 in 2020 (Algan, 2021). The waiting mothers’ movement signals a reconstruction of psychopolitical identity among these mothers which can be modified and instrumented as a practical approach in countering extremism in other parts of the Middle East as well. For this research, an in-depth literature review of the areas of interest was conducted examining the previous and current work of experts in the field of political psychology and its connection to motherhood. A wide range of qualitative secondary data was reviewed and analyzed. These included news articles and other news media, transcripts of speeches or radio or television broadcasts, official reports, legislation and other enactments, notes, academic journals, communiques, photographs, previously published research, documentaries, biographies, and, memoirs. As waiting mothers have an active presence in cyberspace, social media and networks were also employed to approach the objective of this research. Waiting for mothers effectively use social networks such as Facebook, Telegram, Twitter, Instagram, and other platforms to spread their message. Thus, investigating and following these mothers and their related events on social media provided insights into their behavioral patterns of them. The secondary sources were reviewed to create an indepth analysis of the historical background of this grassroots movement within the context of political psychology. The relationship between women and violent non-state actors such as terrorist organizations is viewed by many policymakers as an exploitative relationship in favor of the masculine structure of these groups. Several researchers including Peterson (1992), Kaufman-Osborn (2005), and Eisenstein (2004) argue that women are traditionally assumed to be “pure, maternal, emotional, innocent and peace-loving” (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015). Such an assumption makes women fall victim to institutions with violent modus operandi. As war and violence are considered masculine phenomena, women are assumed to be cowed into victimization. This approach is in line with a dominant body of literature in international relations and public policy which views women as more peace oriented than men (Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Jaggar, 1991). Contrary to men who are described as rushing to commit violence in wars, Elshtain depicts women as beautiful souls searching for peace (Elshtain, 1987). Likewise, Shapiro and Mahajan conclude that the vast disapproval of the United States’ interventions in World War II, Korea and Vietnam by women proves their peace-seeking nature in comparison

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to men (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). A group of other researchers, such as Miller, is of the opinion that a combination of different socio-economic experiences makes more women pacifists than men (Miller, 2012). This approach to studying women is well depicted in Sara Ruddick’s work (Ruddick, 1998). She counts three characteristics for women in confronting violence namely, mater dolorosa (The mother of Christ [Virgin Mary] sorrowing for her son), outsider, and, peacemaker. The first characteristic emphasizes motherhood through which women grieve for the devastating consequences of violence and conflict. The images of grieving mothers sobbing over their dead sons have become the symbol of war’s atrocity and these mothers are elevated to symbolize the suffering of the entire nation (Healy, 2006). At the end of violence, the women’s grieving character reproduces itself in the public sphere in the form of protesting the aggressor and asking for justice. This is evident in the case of Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo (The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) in Argentina. Mothers of more than 15,000 people who disappeared during Argentina’s military rule since 1977 started to get together in Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires to ask for information about their missing children. As several researchers (including Bertha von Suttner, Rosa Luxemburg, and Emma Goldman) view conflict as a masculine affair, the second characteristic describes women as outsiders who are strangers to men’s war (Chatterjee, 2016). The masculinity of war therefore distances women from an effective involvement in acts of violence. Such distance matched with the assumption of women’s non-violent nature makes them easy targets for men’s violence in wars several ways. Being systematically sexually victimized (through rape) is one of them (Turshen, 2001). The third characteristic, women as peacemakers, is also rooted in their assumed nonviolent nature. When confronting violence, it is argued women react through non-violent means, including peaceful demonstrations or hunger strikes. By the end of the twentieth century and with the rapid expansion of globalization and worldwide movements toward democracy, women’s efforts for more vigorous participation in political activism at different levels increased accordingly. Although as a global trend, women’s participation in political activism is increasing, however, the quality and quantity of such increasing trend vary in different societies. One of the main

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barriers blocking the progressive participation of women in political activities, especially in the Middle East is the patriarchal structure of the societies in this part of the world. Patriarchy and its definition have been one of the most debated topics in studying gender relations in different disciplines. The existence of various definitions for patriarchy has been also one of the sources for such debates. The word patriarchy originated from the Greek word patriarkh¯es which can be literally translated as “the rule of the father” (Green, 2018). Originally, the concept of patriarchy was referring to the rule of any elder male over other younger members of the family regardless of their gender. This has been the basis for Weber’s approach toward patriarchy as a special form of household in which “the father dominated other members of an extended kinship network and controlled the economic production of the household” (Barrett, 2014). However, in recent times, the definition of patriarchy in the context of gender relations is mostly narrowed down by feminist scholars to the dominating role of men in subordinating women. Referring to Walby’s well-known argument of private and public patriarchy, politics is considered a public sphere which traditionally is not a place for women who are expected to be a part of the private sphere namely household and family (1989). This approach has been well materialized in the Nazi’s view of women with the infamous slogan of ‘Kinder, Kirche, Küche’ (children, church, kitchen) (Liegt der Sinn, 2014). Furthermore, and related to peace politics, maternal practice, and motherhood reject militarism and design a model of nonviolent action in which the safety and wellbeing of children are of utmost importance (Lakezi & Curzel, 2016). In realpolitik, women (especially mothers) have been advocates of nonviolent activism in different parts of the world including the Middle East. However, much of public policies on connection between motherhood identity and radicalization are focused on the process of motherhood identity radicalization. The research on the reverse mechanism is still limited. Investigating the process of motherhood identity deradicalization from the political psychology point of view can open a new horizon before policymakers utilize motherhood as an effective tool to combat terrorism and to restore sustainable peace. Studies clearly indicate that women are more in favor of preventing and stopping violence connected to political and religious extremism (Nwangwu & Ezeibe, 2019). Women’s approach toward preventing extremism is mainly identified through their roles within the institution of family as mothers (Idris, 2019). One of the main mechanisms

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used by mothers to challenge extremism is to offer a counter-narrative of violent extremism by using their motherhood identity. Directly relevant to policymakers in the Middle East; “tapping into mothers’ preventative potential, establishing capacity-building mechanisms for mothers, as key security allies, is an essential part of effective and cost-efficient security architecture” (Schlaffer & Kropiunigg, 2016). What makes the case of waiting mothers in Turkey significant and exemplary is that these mothers have taken motherhood out of the conventional private sphere of the household and combined it with political activism. Bridging the gap between private and public motherhood in practice is not common in conservative societies such as those in the Middle East. Bridging this gap could not be materialized in the absence of social identity transformation of motherhood. Social identity provides a critical link between the psychology of the individual and the structure and function of sociopolitical groups they belong to (Brewer, 2001). The following sections will demonstrate the process of the motherhood identity transformation among the waiting mothers and how the construction of the new identity can be helpful in designing post-conflict public policies in other parts of the Middle East, especially those affected by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The Waiting Mothers of Diyarbakir Protests organized by mothers of victims have long been a part of the political scene in different countries around the world including the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina (Adair, 2019) and the mothers of the Palestinian detainees in Israel (Diab et al., 2018). However, currently, Turkey is facing a relatively unique experience with regard to the protests by mothers. Unlike other protests by the mothers of victims, a group of perpetrators’ mothers is protesting for peace. In a rare event, since September 3, 2019, dozens of mothers (referred to here as the waiting mothers) began protesting outside the offices of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in the southern Turkish city of Diyarbakir, demanding the return of their children who are members of the militia organizations of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG). PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union and has been responsible for the deaths of 40,000 people, including women, children, and infants. The YPG is believed to be the PKK’s Syrian offshoot

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(Caymaz, 2021). PKK is the second deadliest group in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries with the average age of recruitment ranging from 20 to 22. Fifty-eight percent of the recruits for which data are available come from low socio-economic backgrounds (OECD, 2016). On September 3, 2019, while holding the pictures of their children, a group of mothers started a protest in front of the Diyarbakir Provincial Directorate building of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in the heartland of Turkey’s Kurdish population. HDP is perceived by many including the Turkish government as having ties with the PKK. The protest initiated spontaneously where mother Hacire Akar started a sit-in, claiming that HDP members kidnapped her son and moved him into the mountains of northern Iraq where PKK military bases are located (Aydin, 2019). Akar’s son, Mehmet, returned home on August 24, 2019, giving hope to the other mothers. Hacire Akar’s fight to return her son soon became an example for other Kurdish mothers and families with the same dilemma in southern Turkey. Inspired by Akar, hundreds of mothers and family members joined the sit-in protest, denouncing the violence by the Kurdish militias and demanding their children to return home (Karadag & ˙ 2020). The protests continued even during the outbreak of the Ismail, coronavirus. While the elderly and chronically ill mothers and fathers were advised to stay home and not to directly participate in the sit-in protest, the rest of the mothers continued the struggle while wearing masks and observing social distancing at the protest site. As the peaceful sit-in protest by the waiting mothers of Diyarbakir reaches its 600th day, the impact of the protest on local, regional, and international public policies is becoming clearer. A spontaneous movement initiated by a mother has now grown into a national-wide demand for change. The waiting mothers have challenged some of the fundamental components of the Kurdish society in Turkey and have impacted state’s post-conflict public policies toward more inclusive grassroots based political settlement initiatives. The success story of the waiting mothers protest can be expanded beyond the borders of Turkey to neighboring countries including Iraq and Syria which are heavily impacted by terrorist organizations including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Some of the significant impacts of this campaign include.

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Creating a New Motherhood Identity The political identity of Kurdish mothers whose children have joined groups such as PKK or YPG is relatively constructed around the Kurdish ethno-nationalism led by YPG/PKK and HDP. This constructed identity frames these Kurdish mothers as procreators of a revolution-to-be; as matriarchs of the family; and as the most visible face of the suffering of Kurdish women (Göksel, 2018). A part of the literature on motherhood in Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey argues that Turkish modernization has ended up in marginalizing Kurdish women by dismantling their Kurdish ethnic identity and putting them in a more underprivileged position compared to their Turkish counterparts who greatly benefited from the country’s rapid modernization and secularization (Yüksel, 2006). In practice, the same argument was instrumented by Kurdish militant organizations such as PKK to frame motherhood as a symbol of resistance against what they claim as the Turkish state’s cultural, political, and military invasion. This in turn transformed Kurdish motherhood into a political identity and subsequently, reframed Kurdishness as a politically loaded collective identity with mothers as its protectors (Ça˘glayan, 2019). As the birth givers to the new generation of Kurds, mothers play a key political and ideological role in the narrative of Kurdishness among militant organizations such as the PKK. Therefore, the waiting mothers’ attempt to oppose this identity by demanding the return of their children is assumed to deconstruct their existing congruent identity and reconstruct it in a transformative version (Snow & McAdam, 2000) which is closer to the state narrative of identity. Traditionally, the current ruling party in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been framing motherhood identity as an important element of its plan in catering a moral political system (Aysan, 2018). Within the same discourse, being a mother and therefore capable of reproduction was playing a central role. The newly constructed transformative identity of these mothers in favor of peace and reconciliation can ultimately encounter the violent collective Kurdish congruent identity constructed and heavily promoted by the Kurdish terrorist organizations in southern Turkey. The waiting mothers of Diyarbakir have practically deconstructed their ideological übermensch identity as the custodians of Kurdishness as defined by militant Kurdish organizations. In this transformation, they have started to redefine their motherhood identities as real mothers

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dealing with the real pain of losing their beloved children to terrorist organizations. Stepping down to reality has enabled the waiting mothers to reconstruct their new political identity of motherhood toward social activism in favor of peace and political settlement. As motherhood is traditionally affiliated with peace, the shift of motherhood identity among the waiting mothers created a high degree of support from the Turkish public and the international community. The waiting mothers have also helped to recover the Turkish public suspicion around the families of PKK fighters. Traditionally, the public was viewing the mothers of Kurdish guerrillas as supporters of terrorism and therefore “pseudo” mothers while praising the motherhood of soldiers’ mothers (Aslan, 2008). For the first time, the newly transformed identity of the waiting mothers together with their demand for bringing back their children from PKK camps have put these mothers on the same side as the soldiers’ mothers, who are highly respected by the Turkish public. The waiting mothers have paved the path for different sectors of Turkish society to better understand each other and to overcome some social stereotypes.

Challenging Social Hierarchies Waiting mothers of Diyarbakir have had a significant impact on the socio-cultural dimensions of the Kurdish society in Turkey as well. Conventionally, mothers involved in social activism are known as catalysts for change (Collins, 2002). In the case of the waiting mothers, they have reconstructed the dynamics of the private sphere through their public performance of gender (Taylor, 2001). As a patriarchal community, the Kurdish society in Turkey often follows an authoritarian family setting in which male family members are distant and dominant while female members (including mothers and daughters) are subservient (Lichter, 1979). Traditionally, politics and social activism are regarded as existing within the public sphere, which is considered by the male hegemony as unsuitable for women who are expected to remain in the private spheres of household and family (Walby, 2005). The dichotomy of public/male and private/female is the foundation stone of designing the current structure of patriarchal politics and social activism in many parts of the world including the Kurdish community in Turkey. Within this structure, women’s agency in political and social activism is sidelined and

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instead, women are encouraged to remain within the private sphere of the household. The waiting mothers’ protest however challenged these social hierarchies in favor of a more collaborative and equal structure of political and social activism. The sit-in protests constructed a new dynamic of inter/intra solidarity among these Kurdish families against the political violence imposed on society by the terrorist organizations. Soon after the start of the struggle, fathers joined the protest to sit in turns with their wives (the waiting mothers) from time to time. While the waiting mothers were protesting, their husbands took the responsibility for parenting the children at home. Active participation of the male family members in the protests signals a gradual shift in the patriarchal gender structure and stereotypes of the Kurdish society in Turkey where the traditional lines between the public and private spheres for women are fading. It is also important to realize that fifty-eight percent of PKK recruits come from low socio-economic backgrounds with more conservative patriarchal social practices (OECD, 2016). This makes the impact of the waiting mothers’ movement on challenging social hierarchies even more significant. As the protest continues, more male family members start to join the waiting mothers demanding the return of their beloved children. The growth signals a shift in the gender hierarchy of the Kurdish society as well in which in a rare event, a peaceful socio-political movement is led by women. In another progressive-related event, Sevket ¸ Altınta¸s, one of the fathers participating in the sit-in protest wrote a book titled From Diyarbakır Mothers to the World explaining the stories and experiences of families who have been protesting since 2019. The spontaneous sit-in protest by the waiting mothers soon created a new system of support among the families. While at the initial stages of the campaign some of the waiting mothers were protesting with their young children and infants under harsh climate conditions and even sometimes sleeping on the sidewalk, an informal grassroots support system gradually shaped to help the mothers. Within this informal support system, some of the community members (both men and women) volunteered to take care of the waiting mothers’ children while they were at the protest site. This informal volunteer-based system provides food and shelter for the children and takes care of their education and wellbeing. Some community members also provide financial support for those waiting mothers in need. This grassroots volunteer-based support system ultimately aims to support the waiting mothers during their struggle to bring back their children from the terrorist camps.

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Unifying the Public for Peace The waiting mothers’ movement has also made a significant impact on unifying the Turkish public against political violence and terrorism. The movement has narrowed the societal gap between the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Turkey. It is argued that the as a result of the terrorist operations by organizations such as PKK, a dichotomy between “proper” motherhood of soldiers’ mothers and “pseudo” motherhood of terrorists’ mothers has been developed throughout Turkish society (Ça˘glayan, 2008). However, the surprising amount of support for waiting mothers from thousands of people from all walks of life indicates the success of this movement in narrowing the motherhood dichotomy in Turkey. The sit-in protest by the waiting mothers has successfully created a massive wave of support among different sectors of Turkish society and has opened a new window before the eyes of the nation with regards to the child recruitment practices of the PKK—an act of war crime according to the international law. Thousands of Turkish citizens from different parts of the country have expressed their support of these mothers in different ways including through social media. Many artists, journalists, writers, and television hosts have also met with families, listened to their experiences, and conveyed their support. In a recent act of support, a group of 2000 people from the city of A˘grı in eastern Turkey are set to make a mass rally to Diyarbakir in Spring 2021 to visit the waiting mothers. The 450-kilometer walk will take almost a week to complete. It is expected that people from different cities and towns will join the rally along the way. The waiting mothers’ campaign received positive feedback from the media as well. Both national and international media have reported extensively on the events related to these mothers. It is usually argued that media can play a destructive role for the family of the extremists. These families are constantly under pressure by the press and are often demonized by them. This eventually acts as an additional enforcement of the trauma and prevents any healing or closure (Koehler & Ehrt, 2018). Nevertheless, in the case of the waiting mothers, the press played an important role to unite the public against the political violence of the PKK and to pressure the organization and its political affiliates to respond to the waiting mothers’ demands.

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Following the public support for the waiting mother’s movement, President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan and other high-ranked Turkish politicians also expressed their support of the movement. The sit-in protest was also well received by the international community as well. European Parliament member, Tomas Zdechovsky, and several foreign ambassadors to Turkey also expressed their support for the waiting mothers and demanded PKK end child recruitment. In an act of solidarity, several Kurdish mothers in Germany also joined the movement by starting a sitin protest in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The action was covered widely by the German media and made the waiting mothers a topic of political debates in Germany as well. Up to this moment, 23 families have been reunited with their children owing to the waiting mothers’ protest’s success. As time passes by, the participating parents are being more determined to continue protesting until their beloved children are home safe again. The example of waiting mothers of Diyarbakir clearly demonstrates the importance of considering motherhood in developing public policies after and during conflicts with a special focus on disengagement and deradicalization practices. The case of the waiting mothers could be also practiced as an implementable grassroots initiative in other war-torn societies in the Middle East including Syria and Iraq.

The Case of the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) Since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011, and with the rise of new jihadi organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and Jaish al-Fatah, there was an alarming new wave of youth joining jihadi groups. According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), the conflict in Syria and Iraq is “the largest mobilization of foreigner fighters in Muslim majority countries since 1945” (Basra & Neumann, 2016). The mobilization counts for both men and women. It is estimated that ISIS had nearly 100,000 members at the peak of its operation in Iraq and Syria (Aljazeera, 2014). Now that ISIS’s caliphate has collapsed, the question of how to face the challenges caused by the current ISIS members, defectors, supporters, sympathizers, and their families becoming a pressing concern for the world community as well as the public policymakers in Syria and Iraq.

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As the war-torn nations of the Middle East are gradually preparing themselves to enter the post-conflict phase, finding effective public policies to confront radicalization and to prevent extremism has become a public demand. The successful case of the waiting mothers in Turkey demonstrates the great potential of the psychopolitics of motherhood to be an integrated part of any future counter-extremism public policy in the region.

From Demonization to Humanization Thousands of Iraqis and Syrians have lost their lives in different ISIS operations and the organization has promoted a climate where Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments have become legitimized (Zempi & Awan, 2019). For this reason, the families of ISIS members are viewed as a suspect community around the world (including the Middle East) and in many cases outcasted by their own societies (Breen-Smyth, 2014). While most of these families have denounced the violence committed by their members, they are still being portrayed as dangerous, risky, suspicious, and therefore worthy of negative commentary (Awan & Guru, 2017). Many of these families all around the world are under severe official and social pressure at their workplaces, schools, public spheres and among their peers. Contrary to the expected result, such pressure can eventually push other members of these families toward radicalization. In many cases, ISIS family members are the target of systematic and strategic psychopolitical demonization by both the state and the society they live in. Indiscriminate demonization of ISIS family members as evildoers paves the way to dismiss them all together (Jones, 2008). This approach misses the important fact that the families of ISIS members and the victims of ISIS violence have similar experiences of this conflict (Geron et al., 2014). Demonizing these families is therefore too easy and far too convenient. In several cases, such families feel reduced by the rest of society to unwanted others, which positions them as potential terrorists and sometimes as part of a wider group of undesirable aliens (Cameron et al., 2013). The point to notice here is that this negative public perception ultimately shapes public attitudes and even public policies toward these families. The social prejudice resulting from the demonization of these families will leave long-term psychological scars on their self-worth, self-esteem, and wellbeing (Brown, 2006).

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An example of such an approach could be seen in the case of the AlHawl (also Al-Hol) refugee camp in northern Syria. The camp is home to nearly 100,000 refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). The camp hosts more than 20,000 women and 50,000 children who had lived under the ISIS caliphate and are suspected of being ISIS family members (Loveluck & Mekhennet, 2019). People from several different nationalities are kept in this camp under dire conditions. As a part of the ongoing demonization of ISIS family members, most countries with their citizens in Al-Hawl refuse to repatriate them. The case of Shamima Begum, who fled the UK to join ISIS in Syria at the age of 15, is a classic example of this demonization. Shamima Begum, who was married to an ISIS fighter in Syria, gave birth to three children. All three children passed away, the third while they were detained at Al Hawl camp. In 2019, she was stripped of her British citizenship on national security grounds. In February 2020, a tribunal ruled that removing her citizenship was lawful because she was a citizen of Bangladesh by descent. The government of Bangladesh also refused to repatriate her. The fate of Shamima and thousands of other female ISIS family members who have denounced extremist ideologies is now uncertain because of the demonization of this population by both the society and the states’ public policies. A sustainable solution to overcome such demonization is to adopt grassroots approaches such as the waiting mothers in Turkey. The public and policymakers should further recognize the power of mothers as the frontline of defense against terrorism. Thousands of ISIS members’ mothers live across the world under severe social stigmatization and demonization. While most of them constantly express their disgust and sorrow for the crimes committed by their children, they are yet viewed by society as partners in crime. It is therefore a need for mothers of ISIS members to break their social isolation and to actively contribute to the process of protecting their family members against social demonization. This will eventually empower these mothers to approach their sons and daughters with concerns that previously they had been too ashamed or scared to address (Women without Borders, 2010). A similar initiative to the waiting mothers in Turkey can empower the mothers of ISIS members to play a more active role in urging their children to denounce violence and to return to their families. The engagement of mothers should be also extended to counter violent extremism policies as well.

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Redefining Counter-Extremism Policies The current approach toward incorporating motherhood in counterextremism initiatives is mostly top-down. The importance of motherhood in combating radicalization is realized in only a few post-conflict policies however, the focus of these policies is mostly on the private sphere of household than the public sphere. They mostly expect mothers to report their radicalized children to the authorities (Awan, 2012). This approach only strengthens the conventional dichotomy of private/public spheres and underestimates the full potential of motherhood in combating extremism and restoring sustainable peace. This strategy has also ended in creating a feeling of being criminalized among these mothers and their families. The approach is also argued to create a moral dilemma for these mothers as they will be alienating their own children by reporting them to the authorities (Awan & Guru, 2017). These complexities have made it difficult for policymakers to effectively utilize motherhood to combat radicalization by jihadi organizations. Simultaneously, utilizing motherhood in public policies aiming to combat ISIS and other jihadi organizations is mostly focused on the prevention phase. Since young adults normally experience a period of transition in pursuit of their own identity as individuals, the role of mothers in guiding them through this phase is emphasized in several public policies (Barna, 2018) In this approach, the idea of the mother as a nurturing and caring subject is instrumented to prevent radicalization of family members (Andrews, 2020). The main objective of such policies is to increase mothers’ awareness of the radicalization of their children. Mothers are understood as the first line of prevention in this strategy (Gasztold, 2020). This approach however strengthens the traditional dichotomy of private/public positioning of mothers by restricting their roles to within households only. The overemphasis of the current policies on prevention phase and the mothers of suspects has left no room to utilize the capacity of mothers whose family members have been either radicalized or already joined terrorist organizations. The review of post-conflict public policies for countering jihadi organizations such as ISIS clearly demonstrates that the mothers of suspects and victims (including the Yazidi mothers) are primary paid attention. Sidelining the mothers of ISIS members has practically blocked the path for public policies to have an impact on the actual challenge: the terrorist organizations.

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It is important to realize that these mothers have witnessed their children joining extremist groups such as ISIS and, on several occasions, never to come back. Apart from their children, from time to time, other family members were radicalized too. It is therefore important for these mothers to get together and to share the burden of having seen how radicalization processes can destroy the emotional bonds within a family and feeling helpless when confronted with such a process and loss. Like the case of the waiting mothers in Turkey, mothers of ISIS members can create a united front by offering an effective counterargument to that of ISIS and encouraging their family members to denounce the radical ideologies of ISIS. A grassroots movement such as the waiting mothers in Turkey can provide a platform for the mothers of ISIS members to be heard by their societies to provide them with the safety of a secure network of other families who share those experiences and can help to heal the wounds. Like the mothers of PKK fighters in Turkey, mothers of ISIS members can also play a critical role in calling their children and family members to denounce violence and return home. There are a handful of such grassroots movements active in a number of European and North American countries including “Mothers for Life.” However, there is not yet an organized grassroots movement in the Middle East especially in Syria and Iraq where the majority of ISIS members originate from. Grassroots community actors including mothers can take the leading role in bottom-up counter-terrorism policies especially in the Middle East (Puigvert et al., 2020).

Creating National Solidarity Bringing the mothers of ISIS members into the process of public policymaking to counter radicalization can also increase social solidarity on the whole. As the case of waiting mothers in Turkey demonstrates, grassroots networks have been organically developed among different sectors of society to support these mothers. These networks can better bridge the societal gaps in fragmented societies such as in Iraq and Syria. The networks can help societies to overcome racial and religious stereotypes related to radicalization as well. For instance, Sunni families of ISIS members are viewed by the majority Shi’a population of Iraq as supporters of ISIS. Vice versa, Sunni populations is suspicious of the Shi’a population for supporting the extremist activities done by the Shi’a militias. Grassroots support networks with motherhood at the center can narrow the

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gap between these conflicting populations and restore trust among them. Grassroots participation in policy formulation significantly makes them implementable and result-based public policies (Ali & Ariffin, 2017). In the case of waiting mothers in Turkey, mothers of perpetrators have practically demonstrated their capability to bridge social differences and to improve social justice and human rights. At the same time, these mothers were also capable of providing practical solutions to overcome discrimination, exclusion, and inequality based on their personal experience. Several formal and top-down initiatives to strengthen national solidarity among different religious and ethnic groups in Iraq and Syria have failed as they were lacking organic connections to the society. The active involvement of mothers in society is essential to mitigate these differences and build lasting peace. Mothers have been traditionally one of the pillars of nation-building around the world (Bagchi, 2017). It is clear that the current top-down processes of nation-building have failed in several parts of the Middle East including Iraq and Syria. The fragmented social and political structure of these countries asks for a supra agent to bridge these gaps and to hold these conflicting parties together as a nation. Motherhood can act as the supra agent in this case. In this case, motherhood can be viewed as a public role that carries national significance (Berkovitch, 1997). Similar to the case of the waiting mothers in Turkey, the significant moral authority of mothers to shape behavior and influence decisions among their family members can be extended to the society level in Iraq and Syria to build and strengthen attitudes toward non-violence (Muna, 2020). The waiting mothers of Turkey have demonstrated the capability of extending their moral authority beyond their households and to society. Fragmented societies such as Iraq and Syria can also benefit from this extension of moral authority to bind different sectors of the society. Motherhood has not only been traditionally defined as a private affair within the borders of a household, but also in conflict with political participation altogether. Important questions to be asked are, however; are discourses of motherhood necessarily conflicting with those of politics? Can motherhood effectively help post-conflict public policies by restoring sustainable peace and combating political violence? The case of the waiting mothers in Turkey opens a new window for revising the concept of motherhood identity and its power in formulating public policies. While staying faithful to traditional expectations of motherhood, there is a need to consider the role of motherhood in combating extremism beyond

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the household framework. The case of the waiting mothers is a successful story of mothers who decided to step out of the private sphere of their household and to exercise their power of motherhood in sociopolitical activism. Psychopolitics of motherhood is capable of developing motherhood beyond its protective duties of mothers and modifies their identity as mentors and leaders in public sphere. Along with this argument and in practice, the waiting mothers in Turkey could also have an impact on the long-lasting gender stereotypes of their society as well. As discussed earlier, by pushing the traditional patriarchal boundaries, the waiting mothers improved the condition of women within their localities. Public involvement of women in political activism against extremism should be viewed as a progressive approach to utilize motherhood as a binding element to bring together different political and social entities including the government and civil societies. The literature on sociopolitical activism identifies several identities capable of creating political mobilization including ethnic, religious, and gender identities. However, another strong identity capable of mobilizing mass political protests is significantly sidelined in the Middle East: motherhood. Motherhood contains a universal kind of legitimacy that can bridge different societal and political gaps within societies and to bring together and to mobilize various segments of society for a common objective. The case of the waiting mothers in Turkey clearly demonstrates the utilization of this capacity where these mothers could unite various sectors of the Turkish public together with different segments within the Turkish politics for achieving the common goal of countering terrorism and political violence. The case of the waiting mothers also proved that the power of media, which is usually understood destructive, for mothers of extremists can be positively utilized. One of the main reasons for the success of the waiting mothers’ campaign is argued to be the support they received from media both nationally and internationally. Motherhood identity once again demonstrated its capability of overcoming different sociopolitical fractions in favor of national interests. Utilizing motherhood to motivate and justify political action is significantly missing in the post-conflict public policy discourse throughout the Middle East. The role of mothers in public policies related to combating terrorism is still confined within the household as the detectors of early radicalization signs among their family members. Terrorism and political

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violence are the major challenges the war-torn societies in the Middle East are facing now. Any effective post-conflict public policy should have a specific plan for restoring sustainable peace and political settlement. The case of the waiting mothers in Turkey has practically demonstrated how public policymakers in the Middle East can benefit from the psychopolitics of motherhood to effectively unite and mobilize society to combat terrorism and political extremism. As countries such as Iraq and Syria are gradually entering the post-conflict phase, there is a need for effective utilization of motherhood in their national public policies for combating terrorism. Thousands of Iraqis and Syrians have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in different capacities. While the ISIS caliphate has fallen, there are still thousands of ISI fighters operating within the two countries and challenging sociopolitical stability in both countries. Mothers of these ISIS members can play a significantly effective role in the post-conflict public policies in Iraq and Syria to confront political violence in a sustainable manner. Public policymakers can use the case of the waiting mothers in Turkey as a practical example to engage mothers in a bottom-up all-inclusive process of peace-building, deradicalization, and at the same time, to overcome gender stereotypes. Motherhood can be instrumented as a biding factor to further narrow the ethnic and religious gaps in the highly fragmented societies in the Middle East. The case of waiting mothers in Turkey also demonstrates the variety of ways by which motherhood and its affiliated psychopolitics can contribute to public policy for countering terrorism and extremism, especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The case of the waiting mothers in Turkey clearly demonstrates that the role played by mothers in countering extremism can go way beyond only entry points for deradicalization and prevention efforts within the current public policies. They can be active and reliable partners throughout the whole process of post-conflict public policies as well.

Conclusion We conclude this chapter with a call to academicians, scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to participate in furthering this effort. Reviewing the literature reveals some of the efforts made by different social sectors in various societies to utilize the potential power of motherhood to restore peace and stability. However, many such efforts are not

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well documented and reflected. There is a need for policymakers in the Middle East to be aware of these grassroots efforts and to try collecting and organizing these efforts. The case of the waiting mothers in Turkey proves that a well-coordinated and organized movement can attract better societal support and media coverage. This in turn helps the voices of these mothers to be better heard by a wider number of people around the world. At the same time, collecting and organizing such grassroots projects will provide a platform for them to correspond with each other, share success stories, and to learn from each other. Social movements are not one-size-fits-all. Localization of objectives, strategies, and tactics are vital for the success of any social movement. However, being aware of successful movements such as the waiting mothers in Turkey will assist similar community action program around the world to adopt innovative approaches and to gradually increase their influence and impact over local and national policymakers. Notwithstanding the power of motherhood in countering extremism, they have been mostly marginalized in the process of defining, designing, and implementing public policies concerning security, counter-extremism, and counter-terrorism. Looking at grassroots initiatives such as the waiting mothers of Turkey can open a new chapter in engaging the psychopolitics of motherhood in the public policy arena. From academic point of view, drawing on the collection of these social movements can enrich the current literature on the psychopolitics of motherhood in post-conflict public policies and further develop grounded theories and normative prescriptions on this subject. Social movements such as the waiting mothers in Turkey and similar programs in other countries can provide useful guidance for future work by academics and practitioners alike.

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CHAPTER 8

The Call for Reconciliation in the Middle of Conflicts: An Alternative Dispute Resolution for Global and Domestic Conflicts from Theory into Practice Iyad Muhsen Aldajani

and Martin Leiner

In the last chapter, we looked at one of the unique angles of approaching conflict and post-conflict governance. This chapter makes the claim for reconciliation in the middle of conflicts. Philosophy explores Aristotle’s claims of “Phronesis ” adopted for conflict transformation for peacebuilding towards the reconciliation process as a theoretical framework for the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. Illustrating an

I. M. Aldajani (B) Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the middle east and north Africa, Friedrich Schiller Univeristy, Jena, Germany M. Leiner Friedrich-Schiller-Universität (FSU), Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_8

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alternative philosophical approach for dispute resolutions for global and domestic conflicts to be applied from theory to practice. We may grasp the nature of prudence [Phronesis] if we consider what sort of people we call prudent. Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to deliberate rightly about what is right and advantageous…But nobody deliberates about things that are invariable…So…prudence cannot be a science or art; not science [episteme] because what can be done is variable (it may be done in diverse ways, or not done at all), and not art [techne] because action and production are generically different. For production aims at the end other than itself, this is impossible in the case of action because the end is merely doing well. What remains, then, is that it is a real statement, reasoned, and capable of action about things that are good or bad for man. We consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the management of households or states. (N.E., VI pp. 1140a24–b12)

Hence, as Habermas states, Phronesis is prudent to attain the best judgment for an argument. Therefore, reaching the best alternative dispute resolution for global and domestic conflicts is to attain the best judgment through an inclusive reconciliation process. The scientific field of knowledge (epistême) is of no use for day-to-day life if not integrated into practices to formulate the best action. Therefore, to develop a scientific work that can be of impact on real life, humans need to develop skills to act for better practice (praxis) and to produce (poiêsis) and reach prudence (phronêsis) to deliberate about things that allow choice and develop best practices for a specific theory for doing well, meaning having best real-life approach, and seek the alternative resolution for conflicts of today. So, science’s birth is based on a strict dissociation of scientific knowledge from the various aspects of practical knowledge (Aristotle, 2003; Hadorn, 2008, p. 20). “Applied Phronesis” was researched in many aspects for best practice to develop a theoretical path from theory to practice in the sphere of Mega Projects that impact real life (Flyvbjerg, 2013). Therefore, Applied Phronesis can be defined as prudency to integrate the theories of knowledge into the practice of best communication actions that thrive into transformative action for best real-life living applied to develop an inclusive reconciliation process as an alternative dispute for domestic and global conflicts. Applied Phronesis, in the inclusive reconciliation process, adopts conflict transformation and develops transitional shifts towards peacebuilding for the reconciliation

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process to thrive for best judgment for an argument, thriving towards a shared common future of both entities in the middle of the conflict (Al-Dajani, 2020). The theory attempts to apply Aristotelian philosophy “Applied Phronesis” for the reconciliation process applied in internet communication technology through methods, strategies, and practices to develop a transformative action and transitional shifts towards peacebuilding during conflicts. Adopting the philosophy of Phronesis applied in an active communication process integrating the methods, strategies, and practices of a reconciliation process creates conflict transformation and transformative actions into transitional shifts towards peacebuilding for the reconciliation process (Al-Dajani, 2020). The approach develops the synthesis theory that combines applied philosophy in science and real-life effect—Applied Phronesis in social sciences (Flyvbjerg, 2013), Hölderlin Perspective (Leiner, 2016) applied in Internet communication technologies application best practice transitional shifts towards peacebuilding for reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. It goes beyond the negotiation of substantive interests and issues in conflicts and develops methods and strategies into a reconciliation practice in the middle of conflicts. Besides, the theory adopts a transformative communication action that illustrates the know-how and how-to conduct methods that can be part of conflict transformation into peacebuilding for a reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. Its applications in internet communication technologies for the reconciliation process can develop comprehensive concepts that encompass, generate, validate, and sustain an array of strategies and practices towards a social change and conflict transformation to develop a sustainable, peaceful relationship based on a reconciliation process that can keep on building a better common future of both entities in that conflict. The adopted philosophical and theoretical framework can assist in exploring the restoration of relationships by creating a dynamic conflict-responsive peacebuilding infrastructure, according to Lederach (1997). There is a need to develop a model that can prepare communities for peacebuilding, emphasizing a process-oriented and contextresponsive approach that applies Phronesis in the reconciliation process using internet communication technologies (ICTs) to adopt that mechanism towards conflict transformation protracted, stagnated (“frozen”), or intractable conflict. Such long-term conflicts lead to what can be called, according to Aristotle and Bourdieu, a habitus of conflict, a kind of habit

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Fig. 8.1 The theoretical framework foundation

to see the other as an enemy to speak about him in stereotypes and to behave against him in a way that creates feedback loops of violence instead of creating at least small spaces for change. Only if there are, according to the Hölderlin perspective, some small acts of reconciliation in the middle of strife, such habits can be changed, and transformative shifts can be operated. The figure below illustrates the philosophical and theoretical framework for the feature’s mechanism for such a process (Fig. 8.1).

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Is Reconciliation Process Needed? The definition of reconciliation has a broad meaning, as it conjugates many different aspects in different domains to construct peaceful relations. Reconciliation is identified as: the restoration of the relationship between individuals, groups, states after the violence, war, genocide, civil war, gross human rights violations like segregation (Apartheid), enslavement, or similar activities. Reconciliation as policy requires a long-term strategy with many practices with multiple levels. (Leiner, 2016, p. 183)

It is the path where both past and future can meet, integrate and thrive for the best common future for both entities in conflict. It suggests the space and the mechanisms for acknowledging the past and envisioning the future and develops a best practice to ensure the best common future for both nations in conflicts (Lederach, 1997). The reconciliation process is needed when “societies involved in a conflict evolve widely shared beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions that support adherence to the conflictive goals, maintain in the conflict, de-legitimize the opponent, and thus negate the possibility for peaceful resolution and prevent the development of peaceful relations” (BarSiman-Tov, 2004, p. 13). Social beliefs where fear, anger, and hatred become part of society’s social ethos are formed in conflict, adopted by society members maintained from government institutions and stakeholders developing a complementary conflict, and supported as part of the collective social memory stagnates protracted conflict. A contemporary conflict element fuels the continuation of the conflictive relations and develops obstacles for sustainable peace; therefore, a mechanism is needed for peacebuilding in the middle of conflict, reconciliation. Developing contemporary conflict elements that do not change by day and night or by peace agreements needs a social change and conflict transformation and new beliefs for coexistence and harmony. Still, to reach social change, society must introduce conflict transformation towards the reconciliation process. The reconciliation process is needed for conflict transformation that inhibits peaceful relations between entities in intractable, protractible conflicts; otherwise, the conflict will transform into complementary conflict, and too wide of a spectrum of the society, and the conflict

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prevails for generations. Conflict transformation towards the reconciliation process evolves truth, forgiveness, acknowledgment, recognition, justice, and coexistence where those elements can meet and integrate part of the conflict resolution elements. It requires hard efforts to overcome social, cultural, and economic obstacles perpetuated by conflicts. There are two types of conflicts that need reconciliation; the first is the one that evolves inter-groups between the one state and another outer group such as two-state in conflict, inner groups, and outer groups presenting different social, economic, and political capitals that evolve with conflict transformation, either to a state of reconciliation process or to a state of a complementary conflict status. The inner-group reconciliation has to commit to conflict transformation, which means new belief, a united “ideology” in the neutral sense of Ideology one of the founders of sociology of knowledge Karl Mannheim introduced in his work “Ideologie und Utopie” (1929), promoting peaceful relations as a new form of interaction, and developing a stable foundation for cooperation and peaceful acts that symbolize the relation. Such as empathy to the other, truth, forgiveness, mercy, justice, and coexistence. The other type that needs reconciliation is between states in conflict, which sometimes involves only the leaders and agreements signed by them without concerning their nations. They hope to change the stagnated relations into peaceful relations based on recognition, respect, and the right to coexist and cooperate justly. The reconciliation process aims to change the motivations of the goals and beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of most societies or nations in conflict. The reconciliation process changes the relationship between the societies and evokes it towards harmony and empathy as developing respect for one another. Reconciliation must develop a comprehensive approach towards contemporary conflict to endure strategies and mechanisms towards developing a reconciliation process culture. The reconciliation process must enhance interdependencies for both nations’ best and common future in conflicts that encounter the painful past and the search for articulated long-term interdependent future, where truth, justice, and coexistence can endure (Lederach, 1997). When the reconciliation approach becomes a process within groups that conflict, in the intergroup, both groups become united in their political, economic, and cultural systems and develop a single political entity that can be acknowledged as an inclusive reconciliation process. Nevertheless, in conflicts between nations, it becomes a relation between two

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states that accept and recognize the other, forgiving each other for past adversaries, restoring good relations with good intentions, and developing a political restructuring of former relations. The reconciliation process calls for restructuring mechanisms of social, cultural, economic, and political spheres. This restructured system can be implemented on both outer groups, reconciliation between two states, and inner-group reconciliation within states’ entities. The development of tensions among groups is one of the properties for fertilizing social life conflicts for conflict transformation, whether between individuals or groups. That is because of conflicting ideas between them that developed a contemporary conflict. The reconciliation process usually involves conflicts within ethnic, religious or ideological, historical, and based future levels. Those conflicts might have contradictory goals that need to be met on both sides and harm them socially, culturally economically. For example, the inner Palestinian conflict between Hamas and Fateh parties and outer conflict between Palestinians and Israelis must be developed with a comprehensive, inclusive process for conflict transformation and peacebuilding towards the reconciliation process inner groups and other groups develop conflict transformation and social change in the conflict. According to (Bar-Tal, 2004, p. 14), reconciliation is the formation of peaceful relations between societies involved in the conflict after a former resolution is achieved. On the other hand, the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies adopted the notion of the “Hölderlin Perspective,” the concepts for reconciliation, emphasizing reconciliation during conflicts, as Leiner explained in his book Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation, the book explains “Hölderlin Perspective”; for the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), wrote in his novel “Hyperion:” “Versohnung ist mitten in Streit und all Getrennte find sich wider” (Leiner & Flamig, 2012, pp. 8–18). In English, it is translated as “Reconciliation is in the middle of the strife and all that was separated finds each other again” (Friedrich Hölderlin, 2004, p. 169). This notion adopts that reconciliation can be part of conflict transformation, transforming conflict relations into peaceful relationships within the conflict. Reconciliation is known to many scholars that it always requires most of society’s support to be possible. Still, in the aspect of the “Hölderlin perspective,” reconciliation requires to be in the middle of the conflict and can work even within the minority to change them into the majority. Reconciliation has a holistic and comprehensive combination as an outcome. As a process,

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both are combined in a recurrence action to establish an effect on both parties in conflict. The main focus for reconciliation is to reach a stable and lasting peace, this is merely a process that provides mutual recognition and acceptance for the narrative of the other, and accepting their interest and goals, providing mutual trust, mutual recognition, developing cultural, economic, political relations, and respecting the sensitivity and consideration of the other parties needs and interests (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 15). The structural elements that evolve from reconciliation are opening and maintaining regular channels of communication between the government of the two states; reducing violent threats and tensions on borders, demilitarization, disbarment, reduction of military human resources on borders, developing joint institutions and organizations, developing free and open trade, developing cooperative and economic projects, exchanging vital information, and developing free joint ventures in different areas, developing free and open tourism, and mostly exchanging cultural and social spheres (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 16). In addition to the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs (DDR) often used after Civil Wars, the reconciliation process contributes to security and stability by disarming combatants, removing them from military structures, and socially and economically integrating them into societies (Nezam & Marc, 2009). These illustrated principles and methods can be endorsed using ICT as a wide spectrum of the majority of societies can develop an inclusive reconciliation process.

Applied Phronesis in the Digital Transformation Towards the Reconciliation Process According to Newman in his book Networks, social networks and online social networks are considered a way to build egocentric networks; the approach illustrates the essence of developing the social networks in Internet communication technologies (ICT) that thrives community’s ideology; in this case, it is the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict the path to prudence (Phronesis). The theory explores the social network’s concept and drives towards conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards peacebuilding for a reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. The concept behind the approach is to explore a model that can develop sustainable peace that would endure

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the reconciliation process through sustaining and developing societies that are in transition of conflicts—intersecting a wide network of relationships, strategies, and mechanisms that promote restorative and transitional justice and address the roots of animosity and the ideology of hate between nations in conflicts, to endure conflict transformation and transitional shifts in the middle of conflict towards a reconciliation process and peacebuilding, that can draw the path towards violence prevention and end cold peace or stagnated protracted, frozen and intractable conflicts. Applied Phronesis in social science (Flyvbjerg, 2013) and Applied Phronesis in the reconciliation process (Aldajani & Leiner, 2019). Applied Phronesis in Internet Communication Technologies (Al-Dajani, 2020) introduces the recursive theory for social change towards conflict transformation integrating the communication action theory (Habermas) that emerges within societies that are in transition; its recursive impact develops the ultra-dynamic relation of power exchange, affecting conflict transformation and transitional shifts in the middle of conflicts. Ultradynamic means that there is not only one dynamic alteration of powers in the conflict involving one or a few actors in relatively constant ways but power shifts between many actors, sometimes in very short periods and dramatic ways, developing the balance needed for the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. A case study well to mention is the shit-storm people like Justine Sacco (cf. New York Times, February 12, 2015) experienced is an example of ultra-dynamic effects. Regarding reconciliation, the ultra-dynamic effect can be negative and positive, derived from the communities’ transition in conflicts. It develops a social– cultural and economic transformative action within societies in conflict, introducing different ways to understand the root of the conflict’s cause or the hatred and hostility and destabilize the conflict’s violence, adopting violent prevention and other aspects of the reconciliation process to be embedded into conflict. Applied Phronesis for the reconciliation process towards transitional shifts and conflict transformation theory is derived from the work done by (Flyvbjerg, 2013), accredited to his work on the Phronesis approach for megaproject in research. For him as well, Phronesis is used as an Aristotelian concept that means practical wisdom in a specific context; the theory would illustrate know-how and explore the development of the best practice; in the aspect of the reconciliation process, it would be best practice towards conflict transformation and transitional shift into

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the reconciliation process to local and global international disputes, that thrive to the development of sustainable peace. The theory aims to reach ultimate best practices from recursive efforts to reach practical wisdom utilizing strategies, methods, and practices of the reconciliation process for conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards a reconciliation process to develop sustainability dynamic conflict responsiveness towards continuous peacebuilding analogy, evolving to best common future defined as Inclusive Reconciliation Process. The idea is to develop a knowledge-based society that can affect the stakeholders and policymakers into transformative action policies in the middle of conflict towards adopting the reconciliation process from that thrive communities or societies searching for the best-shared future between entities in conflict. According to Flyvbjerg, “Phronesis ” is operational alongside with “Epistemology” “Episteme,” which means in our context information and knowledge-based development (know-how), and the second part, “Techne,” is illustrated as how-to, in our context for the reconciliation process, how does the strategies, methods, and practices in reconciliation process assets into developing conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards peacebuilding, through emerging knowledge-based societies that adhere into based reconciliation process in conflicts. Both parties can develop a recursive approach in transitions in their social networks through knowledge and practice using methods and strategies towards the reconciliation process. The theory develops ultra-dynamic power relations to exchange knowledge and practice in societies and communities in transition, transforming them into knowledge-based societies towards the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. The approach illustrates the approach from theory into practice by initiating conflict transformation and transitional shifts to develop an ultra-dynamic culture of a knowledge-based society that thrives into a reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. Figure 8.2 illustrates this recursive approach ultra-dynamic power relation exchange of conflict transformation into the reconciliation process. To explain this phenomenology of Applied Phronesis (Flyvbjerg, 2013), Flyvbjerg calls for the Phronimos, which are agents that start the interaction relationship between the two parts, the “Episteme” and the “Techni.” Flyvbjerg introduces the power relation with knowledge, “knowledge leads to power and power leads to knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 89) that develops the relations of the ultra-dynamic power (Flyvbjerg,

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Fig. 8.2 Applied phronesis for conflict transformation towards the reconciliation process

2001). Integrating strategies, methods, and practices develops Applied Phronesis’s phenomenology for the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict (Al-Dajani, 2020). Societies in transition develop a social transformation, positively or negatively, that eventually affects real communities in the middle of conflicts, taking the context of discussion into real life. When enduring mechanisms and strategies of the reconciliation process, it can depend on and endure a knowledge-based society that thrives within the practice of reconciliation in the middle of the conflict. Developing a conceptual framework for the reconciliation process becomes a counterpart of contemporary conflicts endured and stagnated into protracted conflict settings, a counter-strick mechanism, and violence prevention into societies and communities in conflict. The reconciliation methods are diverse, depending on the type of conflict, whether it is an interstate conflict or intrastate conflict according to (Bar-Tal, 2004), to influence change from conflict to reconciliation, there should be a social structure mechanism for transformation action in

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conflict, and a psychological structure for transformation in the conflict sphere. First, let us elaborate on the reconciliation methods introduced by (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, pp. 20–38) for social change, and they are according to those principles: 1. Societal beliefs about groups goals: This principle aims to develop a peaceful relationship with a former enemy, transforming conflict goals and social beliefs. To obtain in the conflict new goals and beliefs that hold the aspiration for both parties in conflict or postconflict or shaped by conflict resolution agreement, or in the middle of the conflict and adapt reconciliation in the middle of the conflict. Introducing both goals using ICT develops a social impact on society. It can reach a large spectrum of society and build a deliberative correspondence between the stakeholders in concern. For example, online deliberation can develop a transformation to justify the goals and social beliefs that breached or maintained the conflict. 2. Social beliefs about rival groups: The adversary group’s image has to change, asking two parties to define the adversary image and transform it to develop a peaceful relationship. In other meaning, it is important to recognize its members and legitimize its new role in advancing towards reconciliation. This approach develops the desire of both parties to develop and maintain the acceptance of the other. Furthermore, the other important aspect of this principle is to elaborate on the victimhood of the other. 3. Societal beliefs about one’s group: This principle elaborates on someone’s group’s social beliefs. It is part of the conflict and its new role in reconciliation. The previous part, where its actions glorified the group and no wrongdoing, must change by selfpraising, ignoring, and censoring information that might harm or give negativity towards the group. In that sense, the group must take responsibility for its actions in the conflict. It can be understood as self-recognition for actions being taken in conflict. 4. Social beliefs about the relationship with the former enemy: The relationship between the two groups in the former conflict must change. The new relations between the two groups must stress the

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importance of cooperation and its friendly relations. For example, by respecting each other’s needs, goals, and general well-being. 5. Social beliefs about peace: This is a very important aspect, can be referred to as the prosperity from reconciliation, and develop guidelines to achieve it. According to Bar-Tal, the process of reconciliation must describe a new definition for social beliefs and stress the multidimensional nature of Peace and Reconciliation. In outlining the cost and benefits of reconciliation and the methods to achieve it. Introducing the aspiration for living in peace and considering inconsideration’s two sides’ interest for prosperity and the pursuit of happiness.

Digital Transformation Methods for Inclusive Reconciliation Process The proper implementation of ICT towards the advancement of reconciliation and the transformation of conflict into a democracy endorses individuals and groups for reconciliation and democratic values. Moreover, ICT paves the way for a change into transformative recognition by replacing the negative image of the relationships between both entities of conflict, developing a renewed alternative positive image driven by prosperity for both entities in all levels of society, cultural, and economic domains. The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, under Professor Dr. Martin Leiner, presented different new elements that have a new approach towards the process of reconciliation to be applied in Internet communication technologies applications, and they are as follows (Leiner, 2016, p. 186): 1. An orientation towards the past: The past should never be neglected and should be part of reconciliation; the past must be dealt with, learning from past mistakes and emphasizing that the future is the path to a reconciliation process. 2. Truth: The acknowledgment of the truth by both parties, including the victims and their perpetrators. Accepting the other’s narrative and acknowledging the wrongdoing from both sides must lead to the reconciliation process.

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3. The importance of conserving the past: The remembrance of the past is important; this can be done by building memorials, museums, historians writing books, and conserving the site, suffering, and the history of the past should never be forgotten. 4. The importance of guilt: The individual perpetrator must accept his guilt of doing wrong and should be punished differently, which should be accepted by both parties. 5. The importance of forgiveness: It depends on the verbal expression of guilt. Forgiveness might reveal the harsh aspect of attitudes, drive attitudes towards the reconciliation process, and drive others’ acceptance of the change. 6. Accepting empathy: Understanding the narrative of the other and respecting each other’s narrative of history, culture, and future aspirations must be part of the reconciliation process. 7. The importance of emotions: emotions can heal the victim’s feelings to atrocities done by the perpetrator. The emotions must be restored to their original sentiments, neglecting hate and animosity for the other. 8. After accepting the apology, the perpetrator’s acceptance into the community’s moral or punishment or reparations. Finally, the changing of the image of the perpetrator must be accepted by society. 9. The vision for a common future: Both parties must understand the vision of a better future for both parties in conflict and the reconciliation process. 10. The victim’s identity and the perpetrator should be stable, with no change, not for future perspectives or historical aspects. Those principles stated above can be the epistemology part of the research. Phronetic empirical thought, known as Phronesis, adopts epistemology and Techni to approach practice wisdom and embed those parts in online social network sites integrated with social applications such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. The Techn part of the Phronetic Approach for Reconciliation is emphasized through Bar-Tal’s work on the methods for Reconciliation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, pp. 2–38), and Leiner’s empirical work for strategic practice of reconciliation process (Leiner, 2016, pp. 182–203), they are as follows:

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Apology: This type illustrates confrontation with the past, taking responsibility for the actions done during the conflict, and admitting them. If this type is not dealt with, reconciliation is not possible. Each party portrays its victim and harbors negative feelings, and those negative feelings might instigate new conflict. “Apology is a formal acceptance for responsibility for misdeeds carried out during the conflict and an appeal to the victims for forgiveness. It implies pursuing justice and truth” (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 29). Truth and reconciliation commissions: The commissions can deal with past atrocities and reveal the truth about what happened. It is considered a mechanism to serve justice for victims of past atrocities. In this act, compensation is impossible, but it reveals acts of violence, discrimination, violations of human rights, and other racist deeds in the conflict. Some of the aims of the truth and reconciliation commission are to establish a comprehensive record of the cause of the brutal acts, nature, and the extent of the violation of human rights. Those TRC gave amnesty to perpetrators to become part of the victimhood to disclose violent acts in a political context. TRC worked on restoring dignity for the victims by allowing them to recount their experience and share it. Lastly, preventing human rights violations and recommending measures for reparations. Public Trails: The public trails are a significant part of the reconciliation process, bringing the perpetrator to justice that committed human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This method aims to acknowledge and reveal the victim’s suffering and recognize the perpetrator’s violent acts. When trials are carried out, and the perpetrator is being punished, it gives a kind of retribution for the victim, and that justice was carried out. However, those trials are subjected to only the perpetrator and not the group; this reveals the group from the perpetrator’s violent acts, which allows them to be part of the reconciliation process. Reparations Payments: This method is most appealing in the reconciliation. It requests both parties to take responsibility for the wrongdoing and compensate the victims of this atrocity committed by the two entities in the conflict. This method indicates the admission of guilt and the recognition for the other’s suffering, and on the other hand, the victim is willing to forgive his perpetrator. Writing a common history: The method calls for recreating the history of the past that can be agreed upon by groups that were in conflict, the past that can be learned from its atrocities, and the idea of “never

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again.” It takes historians from both sides to agree on a common history and negotiate an agreed past of both nations’ events in the conflict. It also provides a basis for a new collective memory, which esteems towards reconciliation. Education: This method is very important as it is the only way to change the past’s psychological barriers through education that promotes reconciliation. This can involve peace studies and reconciliation studies; the method is significant, as it impacts the students and members of society vital for education. It will construct the student’s way of thinking, such as their values, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, skills, and behavior that endorses the reality of the reconciliation process and prepares them to live in an era of peace and reconciliation. Internet Communication Technologies: Can help bridge nations that conflict, as it is part of the internet viewers, and its applications are widespread all over the globe. Today ICT is electronic and part of daily human life as it is part of our mobility, social, communication, and political habits. ICT can spread information about new strategies for reconciliation, which can affect nations in conflict. Most importantly, ICT serves as a channel for communication and sends messages for peace and reconciliation to different rivals in conflict. For example, on October 27, 2017, Beirut and Telaviv were chosen as the Middle East’s best tourism cities. beirute.com, a media company, tweeted that “please remove us from this Narrative.” The tweet went viral, and the Mossad Hashtagged hashtag #TelAvivLovesBeirut. It went viral, and Lebanon rejected it negatively since they did not want their city to be affiliated with Tel-Aviv. This kind of communication in an open domain called the internet went viral to everyone worldwide; this kind of message can be sent over the internet to express the need to reconcile with the others. Nevertheless, it also illustrates the strength of the internet and can bring strong rivals to communicate with each other. Published meetings between the group presentations that conflict: When conflicted groups have joint meetings with their leaders or academics, it should be published. This illustrates that both groups are working for reconciliation and not one-sided counterparts. For example, Tzipi Livni, The minister of justice in the Israeli government in October 2017 on her official page, requested for recognition that Israelis and Palestinians are cooperating for peace and to fight crimes of terrorism, and denounced that the Israeli prime minister, who keeps saying there is no one to have

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peace with, is working with Palestinians as a counter measurement again terrorism. The Israeli and the Palestinians are meeting together to provide security for both nations. If announced, these kinds of meetings illustrate that both work to better their lives and be an aspect of the reconciliation process. If published, it would be a better aspect to spread reconciliation in the Israelis Palestinian conflict. The Work of NGOs: Non-governmental organizations, either from NGOs that are part of the society or from an international community, can contribute to reconciliation. Those NGOs can illustrate that peace relations can have brought benefits to societies that conflict, such as spreading messages about the importance of the reconciliation process, the prosperity of reconciliation, and the benefits of having peaceful relations with past enemies. Joint Projects: Those projects are very important as they can help bridge barriers between enemies in conflict by facilitating and researching psychological reconciliation. It can connect members of two groups from different levels of society in the same project. This provides the opportunity for different members from different nations in conflict to have personal encounters, which would foster the understanding of the other’s narrative and teach them about peace relations and why it is important for both nations. Culture Exchange: This can help each opponent in conflict learn about the other. Such as translation of books, visits of artists, and academics to different conferences, exhibitions, and festivals.

Internet Communication Technology (ICT) for the Reconciliation Process Internet communication technologies ICT applied in Internet platforms to encourage practices and methods towards reconciliation, strategies methods and practices to affect conflict transformation towards peacebuilding, can become a tool for developing a reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. The reconciliation process is in stages, and they are fiercely committed to and struggle to achieve the reconciliation process’s objectives in the middle of the conflict. Consequently, ICT could efficiently guide and facilitate online conversations and debates on extremism as a counterstrike method to radicalize large audience segments; such methods are

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used in online social networks. Using the ICT platform, creating awareness would ultimately increase audience numbers, likes on articles, posts, shares, and visits to the Facebook page and knowledge using Twitter and YouTube. Furthermore, the ICT platform can develop reconciliation networks and reconciliation workshops, aiming to transform the public sphere from the minority who wants reconciliation into a majority by interacting with polls, social network forums, articles, and posts posted on online social networks that influence the stakeholders and policymakers, that transforms conflict into reconciliation process as an alternative way for domestic and international conflicts. According to Habermas, developing the best judgment for an argument in his communication action theory illustrates the integration between activities and Internet communication technologies platforms that develop networks, leading to the reconciliation process and initiating conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards peacebuilding. In addition, the ICT platform illustrated the concept of the cycle of transformative change, where ICT can develop transformative action into conflict transformation (Al-Dajani, 2020), which demonstrated the relationship between moderation, reconciliation, and democracy (see Fig. 8.3).

Internet communication Technologies Platforms

Peacebuilding

Reconciliation

Fig. 8.3 The cycle of transformative action towards the reconciliation process

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The cycle of transformative action elaborates that ICTs can develop a reconciliation process in the middle of conflict, empowering mechanisms and strategies for democratic values towards respecting the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict, thus creating a political system characterized by political stability, economic development, and social prosperity impacting the alternative path towards conflict transformation. Furthermore, the reconciliation process allows respect for human rights and the rule of law and ends authoritarianism, corruption, and prejudice within the community, leading to equality in the pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, it is directed towards reconciliation methods for practice, by allowing the willingness to seek innovative solutions, enhanced by dialogue with others to understand the other’s narrative and the suffering of the other, checks and balances for the socialite beliefs between enemies on the other conflict. Finally, empowering democratic values guided negotiations in good faith with respect and adhered to making painful sacrifices to achieve a sustainable, just peace. Figure 8.4 illustrates the mechanism of ICT as the core motor for reconciliation and conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards peacebuilding.

Fig. 8.4 The ICT was developing the cycle for conflict transformation (AlDajani, 2020)

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Internet Communication Technologies Strategies for Reconciliation Process Strategies for the reconciliation process through the aspects of work done by (Leiner, 2016) are as follows: 1. Political and Legal Provisions. 2. The creation of common security, with disbarment and crisis management. 3. Apologies and symbolic acts that spread empathy and understanding. 4. Reparations and other attempts for justice restoration. 5. Cooperation regarding economic, legal, and international issues, for example, helps in cases of disasters. For example, in Haifa’s fires, on November 15, 2016, Palestinian firefighters went to Haifa as part of a mission to help Israeli firefighters control the fires that went all around the Haifa district, burning nature and houses around. 6. Cooperation in civil society, programs that can help understand reconciliation, and reconciliation’s benefit, such as hands for peace or seeds for peace. 7. The acceptance of history, which means the confrontation of each historical narrative of the other. 8. The confrontation for the historical narrative of the individuals between victims and perpetrators. The victims’ right to know, rituals, purification, encounters between victims and perpetrators, truth and reconciliation commissions. 9. The integration of both groups into common prosperous future in the cultural, economic, and political sphere. 10. Intentional strategies to humanize the other’s image, such as overcoming negative stereotypes, schoolbooks commission, changing the image of the other in media, and changing the educational materials about the other in a respected sphere towards reconciliation. 11. To change the discourse of religious leaders from the aspect of war to reconciliation and respect, understanding the other’s narrative. ICT is acknowledged as a means for development and social reconstruction in the interest of social justice that directs the reconciliation process.

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This introduces that ICT can renew social relations in a different context in conflict, criticizing the deterministic social model affecting the conflict; this transforms ICT into an instrument of social transformation for social justice (Vrasidas et al., 2009, p. 20). ICT can be the means for the reconciliation process (Crawford, 2007) introduced ways for using ICTs for peace and Reconciliation (Vrasidas et al., 2009, p. 221). Those tools can be applied to implement methods for the reconciliation process. Table 8.1 illustrates applied ICTs for the reconciliation methods to implement social change.

Case Studies from Theory into Practice a. Applied Phronesis for Reconciliation Process in the Middle of Conflict: we developed through eight-year of hard work the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa (AARMENA) www.aarmena.uni-jena.de: It is an alliance of universities and other higher educational institutions, scholars, and academics willing to do joint research and build up teaching programs and curriculums in Reconciliation Peacebuilding Studies as Trans-Inter-Multi-disciplinary Studies and Research for the higher education institutions. Alternatively, integrate the new curriculums into their academic programs in program courses and develop master’s degrees and Ph.D. programs in their educational, academic degrees in Higher Education Institutions. The AARMENA marks the unique significance of the “Reconciliation processes in the Middle of Conflict” concept for our present time. It recognizes the interdependence of political practice in understanding and actualizing authority in inter-trans-multidisciplinary spheres in the academic world. b. Applied Phronesis in Internet Communication Technologies: The case study would illustrate the documentary The Last Sermon for Jack Baxter; you can follow the link: https:// www.imdb.com/title/tt9300578/. The reader can follow the link https://www.facebook.com/thelastsermonmovie/videos/517 396822123378, following the Facebook link for the last sermon page, it illustrates that the movie had over 2.5 million viewers, and more than 400 K comments about terrorism and the interfaith dialog for religions in the name of reconciliation. The Movie was granted the Prize of Hope at the International Human Rights Film

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Table 8.1 ICT for reconciliation process Methods for the reconciliation process

Social change

Examples of ICTs

Apology Education Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments The work of NGOs’ Joint projects Writing a common history Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments The work of NGOs’ Joint projects Education Public trails The work of NGOs Joint projects

Provide information

Internet connectivity Mobile phones and personal data assistant Geographic information systems Forums Radio Chat Videos Social network sites and portals Data visualization tools Online dispute resolution tools

Apology Education The work of NGOs’ Joint projects Apology Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments The work of NGOs’ Joint projects Apology Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments Joint projects The work of NGOs’

Reduce scarcity

Help people process information

Improve decision making

Support relationship

Help people understand each other

Virtual command center Games and simulations Online dispute resolution tools Mobile phones A handheld portable device, such as an iPad, Tablets Social network tools Online collaboration tools Mobile phones Virtual reality Telecenters

Translation software Blogs Social network tools Multimedia

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Festival in Tunis in 2020 and the Truth Screen Award from the Queens world film festival. Moreover, the film was granted the First Documentary Feature at Queens World Film Award. The reader can watch the trailer that one the prize on this link: https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=o3e_Y2YoTZU.

Conclusion Reconciliation is “literally means repairing the damaged or broken bonds of unity and friendship between God and humanity and between human beings and their fellow beings on a personal and communal level” (Gathogo, 2012). However, reconciliation as a term has a different meaning and different metaphors; it is a means to an end, and the end is equality, freedom, prosperity, and the pursuit of happiness for the community or the nations in the middle of conflicts or after conflict, this can adapt the prosperity of reconciliation. The reconciliation process can be defined in reconciliation methods for conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards peace as an alternative to conflict resolution in local–global international disputes. The reconciliation term has many means and metaphors, and there is no end to it. Nevertheless, there is a prospering path from the process towards reconciliation in conflicts. The Jena Center for Reconciliation in Friedrich Schiller University in Jean, Germany, adopted the notion of the “Hölderlin Perspective” that reconciliation can be in the middle of conflict, build bridges and restore commonwealth and aspiration between inner groups or outer groups. Thus, reconciliation becomes a process, and the term used is the reconciliation process as defined previously. This process can be applied in the middle of a conflict or after the conflict has ended with a peaceful agreement to develop peaceful relations. Applying the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict breaks frozen, protractible, intractable conflicts to reach reconciliation’s prosperity for both inner and outer groups and build a common future for both groups. ICT is a powerful tool for the reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts. It starts with a path, breaking the wall of a frozen, protracted, or stagnated conflict. Then, it directs it towards the reconciliation process in conflict. At the economical level, ICT can build economical relations between thriving groups, in one group depending on the other group, by

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providing ICT business consultants and developing ICT applications, such as outsourcing software, web designs, and other ICT applications. ICT can harness oppositions from different parties, inner groups, and outer groups at the political level without any restrictions. ICT is an altered dynamic power, as it shifts from one end to another without having the authority to control it. It is called counter-hegemonic; it can disrupt ideological campaigns and control information by groups of people in a different opposition of power (Vrasidas et al., 2009, p. 219). ICT can be an ill tool used for terrorist agendas or a tool for reconciliatory ends, which means the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. ICT is a standard tool to build social, economical, political capital, and social capital. It builds bridges between communities at the cultural and social levels, opens dialog between groups in conflict, and builds normal relations. As stated in the previous section, the table was missing the approach used to conduct and study phenomenology by applied Phronetic Netnography for the reconciliation process. However, it can be illustrated in Table 8.2. The table is proof that ICT can be a powerful tool for social change towards reconciliation, in aspects of how, why, when, and where. This approach’s future perspective is that centers can apply this method to reach a reconciliation process or understand the reconciliation process within their communities.

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Table 8.2 ICT Netnography approach for reconciliation process Methods for the reconciliation process

Social change

Examples of ICTs

Apology Education Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments The work of NGOs Joint projects Writing a common history Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments The work of NGOs Joint projects Education Public trails The work of NGOs Joint projects Education The work of NGOs Joint projects Apology Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments The work of NGOs Joint projects Apology Truth and reconciliation commissions Public trails Reparations payments Joint projects The work of NGOs

Provide information

Internet connectivity Mobile phones and personal data assistant Geographic information systems Forums Radio Chat Videos Social network sites and portals Data visualization tools Online dispute resolution tools

Help people process information

Improve decision making

Reduce scarcity

Support relationship

Help people understand each other

Virtual command center Games and simulations Online dispute resolution tools Mobile phones A handheld portable device, such iPad, Tablets Social network tools Online collaboration tools Mobile phones Virtual reality Tele centers

Translation software Blogs Social network tools Multimedia

References Al-Dajani, I. M. (2020). Internet communication technology for reconciliation: Applied phronesis netnography in internet research methodologies. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41203-6

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Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (2004). From conflict resolution to reconciliation (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/prof:oso/978019 5166439.001.0001 Bar-Tal, D. (2004). The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a process. In Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (Ed.), From conflict resolution to reconciliation (pp. 13– 27). Oxford Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195166439. 003.0002 Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). Making social science matter. Cambridge University Press. Flyvbjerg, B. (2013 [2012]). Real social science: Applied phronesis (B. Flyvbjerg, T. Landman, & S. Schram, Ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780-521-16820-5; £18.99 (Pbk). Social Policy & Administration, 47 (1), 130– 132. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12007 Gathogo, J. (2012, November 8). Reconciliation paradigm in the postColonial Africa: A critical analysis. http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/ content/journals/10.1163/15743012-12341235 Leiner, M. (2016). Thinking differently about identity and harmony—The potential of Asian thinking for reconciliation. In Asia-Pacific between conflict and reconciliation (p. 293). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG. Leiner, M., & Flämig, S. (2012). Latin America between conflict and reconciliation. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht LLC. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. United States Institute of Peace Press. Mannheim, K. (1929). Ideologie und Utopoe. Bonn. Newman, M. E. J. (2010). Networks. Oxford University Press. Vrasidas, C., Zembylas, M., & Glass, G. V. (2009). ICT for education, development and social justice. Information Age.

CHAPTER 9

European Union Activities in Libyan Post-revolution Environment: The Triad—Migration, Security, and EU Special Agencies Magdalena El Ghamari

In the previous chapter, we took up a transdisciplinary approach to reconciliation in the middle of conflict. This chapter looks at the postrevolution milieu in Libya, and the activities of EU in the country. Libya is an interesting and feasible case study, since although it gained its independence from Italy in 1947, then declared its independence as the United Kingdom of Libya, a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King Idris in 1951, through Al Fateh Revolution and Muammar Gaddafi dictatorship 1951–2011, Arab Spring and post-Gaddafi era—the

M. El Ghamari (B) Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Collegium Civitas University, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_9

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country’s transition is incomplete, if not failing with stuck in domestic threats, immigration, proxy conflicts, and struggles for power. The main argument to be pursued by the chapter is that Libya’s stabilization is being held back by a number of significant “threats” related to the post-dictatorship environment. The effect of tightening Libyan cooperation within the European Union (EU) is increasing complexity and institutional multifariousness. Facing the migration and security threats and sustaining stabilization in Libya—EU increase in the number of instruments and action addressed to security and cross-border challenges (El Ghamari, 2017). The chapter will focus on the State of Libya and its evolving relationship with the European Union. It will systematically examine the implementation of The European Neighbourhood Instrument and analyze Libyan security post-dictatorship environment and evaluate the effectiveness and real impact of European Union activities on the management of the security issues and capacity building of civil society. More specifically, the chapter will innovate by analyzing the ways in which domestic factors and contexts specific to Libya interact with and shape of the implementation of EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya with EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Unlike most of the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood, Libya has not concluded an Association Agreement with the EU. Nevertheless, the EU is working with the Libyan people to back their transition toward democracy, a functioning stable State, and prosperity. The European Neighbourhood Instrument is one of the EU financial instruments for bilateral cooperation with Libya (Anckar, 2012). In the absence of a multiannual programming document since 2017, Libya benefits from annual Special Measures. Due to the unstable political and security situation on the ground, the EU support is under constant revision to enable it to respond optimally and with flexibility to the emerging needs. To date, the ongoing programs under the EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya amount to about e100 million and focus on the following priority sectors: 1. Sustaining Libyan stabilization at national and local levels; 2. Promoting active citizenship and socioeconomic integration of the young population; 3. Enhancing Libya’s health services delivery; 4. Supporting the capacity building of Civil Society Organisations as well as the institutional dimension of the civil society sector.

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Local and regional instability have turned Libya from a destination country into a transit country, requiring an important EU response to tackle the most urgent needs. Created in 2015, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and its North of Africa window are the main tools for actions in support of migration and security-related actions in Libya. It is built on the strategic lines set out in the Joint Communication of the European Commission “Migration on the Central Mediterranean route— Managing flows, saving lives ” and the Malta Declaration by the European Council to foster and support a security and migration management and asylum system in Libya that is consistent with international standards and human rights of migrants and refugees. To address this the chapter will mobilize and update the concept of “Failed State.” As widely agreed by many scholars Daniel Thürer in his work namely The Failed State and International Law, also approves a failed state notion as an umbrella concept and claims that it could not be used as a categorizing tool on its own (Thürer, 1999). But however, Thürer stressed on three main approaches that the definition could be grounded as it follows with the political and legal approach. There may be geographical and territorial aspects, namely the fact that failed states are essentially associated with internal and endogenous problems, even though these may incidentally have cross-border impacts. Secondly, there may be the political aspect, namely the internal collapse of law and order. The emphasis here is on total or near total breakdown of structures guaranteeing law and order. Thirdly, there is the functional aspect, namely the absence of bodies capable, on the one hand, of representing the State at the international level and, on the other, of being influenced by the outside world. “Either no institution exists which has the authority to negotiate, represent, and enforce or, if one does, it is wholly unreliable, typically acting as statesman by day and bandit by night.” International security (Rothschild, 1995) is a primary issue within this approach introduced by political science and international relations (Wolff, 2007). According to Wolff, state failure and its consequences have been no more in a regional prospect after the 9/11, but the most widely discussed issue in the international security context (Helman & Ratner, 1993). The chapter will be based on the following working definition of failed state, “systemic and widespread political corruption; where a tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions; state which cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil conditions, i.e. peace, order, security and be defined in terms of their demise

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of the practical operation of governmental functions for an internationally recognized state (…)” (Potter, 2004). With this working definition in mind, the chapter develops a security environment analysis in Libya and particularly the role in European Union actions efficiency. “Failed State” in Libya manifests in “post-dictatorship system” with a concentration of political and economic power, profound corruption in public and private sectors, inconsistency in the application of the rule of law and highly politicized corrupted institutions. The results of this “Failed State” are numerous, but include: . . . . . .

an unstable political environment; an inability to monopolize use of force within state borders; inability to control people and borders; inability to provide public goods to citizens; Libya’s fracturing society; and Libya’s strange economy.

As well as these indicators the chapter will take into account other Libya-specific characteristics and “realities” that contribute to and reinforce failed state and in turn affect Libya’s democratic transformation. First, Libya has a dictatorship system that revolves around one central regime that has strong vested interests in maintaining the status quo in order to preserve its own business and political interests. This is significant for the proposed project since a “dictatorship system” such as this entails a very strong concentration of power, which reinforces failed state by preventing economic and political liberalization and pluralism. Next, Libyan domestic politics remain heavily tainted with division of the country, terrorist activity, low public trust, contested elections, and corruption pervading private and public sectors. Evidence of highlevel paramilitary activities and corruption in the judiciary and national banking system are particularly evident and are major contributing factors to reinforcing state failure. Third, the past ten years have seen Libyan government institutions and foreign policies oscillate between pro-Government of National Accord and pro-Libyan National Army (Choudhury Majumdar Roy et al., 2011) directions and loyalties. This has had the effect of creating political instability and uncertainty, as well as inconsistency in stabilization, migration policy, and security issues.

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Libya’s incomplete transition has also been shaped by ideological debates on statehood and national identity, which have tended to distract from the process of state building. Significant political problems and the country’s divided economy are worsened by the fact that the state and civil society is hollowed out by mass outward migration, which also means that the country is heavily reliant on remittances, as well as international donors. Finally, what further compounds the problems associated with state failure is the fact that Libya is a state failure as a “crossroads” for extremists and increase in terrorism from the Sahara and Sahel to the Middle East.

Materials and Methods The nature of the subjects under study and the research questions being asked necessitates desk research to analyze security and political data, documents, and reports, together with a substantial amount of fieldwork and consultations with local authorities, stakeholders, including practitioners, academics, NGOs, and civil society. To reach an understanding of EU activities and its implications for Libya’s stabilization, the chapter analyzes the subject from multiple angles and through different levels of analysis. The nature of the Libyan crisis, its elusive yet palpably negative implications and its “domestic threats” content means that the research will rely to a large extent on testimonies and the author’s capacity to interpret findings (El Ghamari & Gabriela Bartoszewicz, 2020). The chief working hypothesis guiding the chapter is that European support for the Libyan stabilization processes is ineffective, and the assessment of the situation on the spot and the selection of partners are, in the opinion of the author, inadequate. Stabilization process in Libya over the past decade remains fragile. Despite the implementation of The European Neighbourhood Instrument and conducting EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya there are strong structural domestic barriers to the full implementation of these actions and establish security environment. The persistence of the condition of failed state in Libya presents a significant barrier to the stabilization of the State of Libya. The successful implementation of The European Neighbourhood Instrument and development of EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya rely to a considerable extent on there being secure environment and local authorities being able to interact with and benefit from new stability and trade

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opportunities. However, state failure, coupled with the nature and structure of the security environment and EU specialized agencies sector are conducive to the stabilization. There is a proven link between a well-functioning local authorities’ sector and sustainable development. At present, the local authorities in Libya are unable to play a constructive role in consolidating stabilization, solving domestic problems, and stabilizing security reforms. The ineffectiveness of the European Union in crisis management in Libya allows the conclusion that the activities and projects require modification. It is assumed that the competence of European actions should be better addressed and increased, as well as strengthening their authority among EU citizens. These are the main research questions that guide the chapter: “What is the specificity of threats for European Union actions in Libyan conflict and instability?”; “How does it work The European Neighbourhood Instrument and the EU’s bilateral assistance for Libya?”. Therefore, the chapter complements the already existing theories, both in the context of security environment in Libya and the functioning of organizational structures in the EU on the background of challenges and threats to its internal security. Holistic and interdisciplinary research approach to social science and security issue in this area will allow to show in a full and multifaceted way the spectrum of their capabilities and current potential, identify weaknesses and strengths of these activities, and in fact propose theoretical assumptions for changes that could improve them.

Results Libya, once a high-middle-income country with health and education indicators among the highest on the African continent, is now a lowermiddle-income country that is navigating a challenging situation. Fully supported by the EU and the international community at large, the United Nations-led political process is working to find inclusive and sustainable solutions to bring back peace, stability, security, and unified institutions. Nevertheless, political strife in Libya has taken a heavy toll on the well-being of the population and the economy. Libya’s economy still depends heavily on oil and gas, but these productions are susceptible to disruptions due to the conflict, and, lately, to the global crisis linked to COVID-19 (European Commission, 2020).

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Background of the situation of Libyan problems presented in this way, which the author managed to describe, based on empirical research conducted in recent years, the specter of a country in which it is complicated to act is shaped. The main reasons for this are the complicated internal situation of Libya’s security environment and the multitude of actors involved in shaping the national and international policy. These include the two operating Libyan governments. The first of these, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, is recognized by the United Nations and supported by numerous militias/self-proclaimed and paramilitary organizations and foreign actors the United States, Turkey, Qatar, and Italy. The second is the Government based in Tobruk, led by General Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army (LNA), not recognized by the United Nations, recognized by most Arab countries, supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and foreign actors including Russia and France. Foreign actors involved in Libya are Turkey, Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Arab countries: Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Qatar, Jordan, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Arabia Saudi Arabia—both in the form of states as well as private companies and consortia. Another actor operating in the country that is difficult to classify is “militia”—a problematic creation because it does not exist in the classifications recognized by international relations theories. From conducted research and numerous analyses of Libya’s situation, the author defines them as: combat organizations consisting of non-professional soldiers or previously having military experience, consisting of nationals, who do not need military training to function within it. They have a military or paramilitary character. These groups are not constrained by the applicable Libyan law, custom or generally accepted norms, and functioning rules in the state. They are also not subject to the restrictions of conducting military operations, they act illegally and choose their members according to their criteria, usually selected for their combat competence or experience. Members of the militia are often recruited from local youth. These groups operate for their own needs or on behalf of another larger organization that they often don’t know. These groups are usually motivated by financial reasons and are financed from illegal sources or subsidized by foreign actors.

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The militia includes the Haithem al-Tajouri, Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, Abdel Rauf Kara, Navas Brigade, and Suq al-Jouma groups, among others. The most powerful and most numerous militias are the Zintan and Musrata troops. Many of these militias, which were allied with the GNA or LNA, emerged after the Gaddafi regime’s defeat, helped by their abundance of weapons from deserted weapons arsenals and Libya’s economic situation and the lack of alternative employment options. Some of these organizations broke away from earlier groups, while others took advantage of the resulting weak state and its inability to provide security. The lack of a strong central government meant that various factors—regional, religious, neighborly, and tribal—provided the basis for creating many militias. To this has also been added the migration issue, which is a lucrative source of funding. It is worth emphasizing that the Libyan society is not friendly to these emerging groups but tolerates them and their presence is not openly discussed. Sometimes they are also considered helpful and useful, such as maintaining social order and dealing with a local crime not associated with them. The militias should undoubtedly be regarded as essential participants in Libyan events, as they have become part of the Libyan political system and society, and a decade of chaos helped them develop a strong national position and served them financially. Another group operating in Libya are mercenaries, fighting on the side of two governments, the militia or private companies and corporations—supported by local forces, including mercenaries from Sudan, Syria, Russia, Turkey, and terrorists from individual terrorist organizations: Al Qaeda and Daesh. Despite numerous appeals in 2020 to leave Libya, these requests were ignored, and the end of 2020 shows that they will continue to function in Libya. In early December, the acting UN envoy to Libya, American Stephanie Williams, said there were still some 20,000 foreign forces and mercenaries in Libya. She repeatedly stressed that “this is a shocking violation of Libyan sovereignty,” and at the December virtual meeting of the political dialogue forum, she stressed: “They are now occupying your home. This is a gross violation of the arms embargo… They are pouring arms into your country that needs no more arms” (The Arab Weekly, 2020). The terrorist activity in the Libyan case in 2020 should be based on the activities of the following organizations: The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya, Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In 2020, these organizations carried out over a dozen terrorist attacks. According to

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the Global Terrorism Index, when analyzing the level of terrorist activity, Libya found itself in one of the four main areas of terrorist activity, next to Somalia, Nigeria and Mali (Global Terrorism Index, 2020). The activity of terrorist organizations in Libya can be observed through the portal: Eye on Libya, where there is a calendar of Daesh activities (ISIS in action, 2019) and other jihadist organizations (Eye on ISIS in Libya, 2019). The researched source literature, statistics, and research show the presented country as dangerous by terrorist attacks, attacks on civilians, and internal power disputes. Main risks for the EU actions belong to two subsets of threats, which are linked to sustained insecurity warfare and further spiraling down of government and institutions and those linked to competing interests in the field, relevant for implementation. These are well-known risks in the Libyan context and the design of the action pre-empts them by proposing adaptive and flexible implementation modalities: . Insecurity and lack of concrete progress on the peace process, which results in continued impeded access for implementing partners/donors. . Continued absence of sector strategies and policies. . Low capacities in government institutions and lack of ownership by the partner government. . Limited human resource capacities in the Libyan political, education, security, and health sector and inadequate spread of staff. . Scarcity of implementing partners on the ground (also in light of COVID-19-related extra funding). The main problems related to completed and starting European projects are mainly their scales and marginal topics, which are undoubtedly essential and vital, although in the Libyan situation the number of people who can benefit from them is small. Based on the interviews conducted and conversations with employees and program participants, it is difficult to determine how many Libyans benefited from European aid. On the one hand, it is difficult to identify them, and on the other hand, not generally available data, except for the amounts and number of projects on the people involved in them. The researched source literature, statistics, and research show the presented country as dangerous by terrorist attacks, attacks on civilians, and internal power disputes.

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The main problem of European–Libyan relations in the planned projects is the lack of an in-depth analysis of the country’s situation. European support is provided to only one of the governments operating in Libya—which is opposed to most of the Libyan population—and this is the main reason for European action’s ineffectiveness. Despite some activities and efforts—described above, main accusation against the EU on the Libyan side is the misunderstanding of the situation and the unavailability projects and support. Moreover, the involvement of various European actors on different sides of the conflict complicates all aid activities, as exemplified by the Italians, the French, Germany, Spain, the British, and several private institutions and corporations. Therefore, European actions run counter to the state interests of individual states that show their brutality and objectivity in the face of the Libyan conflict. Thus, on the one hand, after hundreds of reading pages of reports on European support for Libya, the author of the text found many excellent ideas, which, unfortunately, failed due to the lack of an appropriate partner for its implementation on the Libyan side or the fiction of the provisions themselves, which are a theory that does not correspond to Libyan reality. Despite enormous financial resources, European activities on a national scale are so marginal that they are almost invisible. Most of my respondents did not know about such help and were shocked by the number of funds and projects they could potentially benefit from, but they never had such an opportunity. During the empirical Libyan situation analysis, the author identified several risk factors contributing to its continuous transition. They can be grouped according to the theory of security into geopolitical, ideologicalpolitical, economic, legal-institutional, military, social, cultural conditions or the subject criterion for political, military, economic (raw materials, financial, technological, food), social, cultural (language, national values), ideological, ecological, and informational security. After the broadcasts and analysis of the approaches used in social sciences and International Relations approach, it turns out that in the case of African and Middle Eastern studies, such a division does not always apply and many aspects are omitted when assigning a given phenomenon to a given category. At this point, it should be emphasized that the author made such an attempt and initially segregated the risk factors according to both typologies, but these divisions did not reflect the entirety of the social studies issues. Therefore, the researcher uses the specification of risk factors to

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indicate which criterion of real impact for EU actions in post-dictatorship environment in Libya. On this basis, the following can be specified: . lack of a robust and stable state structure; . arming terrorist organizations from the outside—in particular, the role of Russia and Turkey in the Libyan conflict; . conflicting Italian and French interests in Libya and their rivalry— proxy in Libya; . mutual dislike of Libyan ethnic minorities, in particular, the conflict between the Tibu tribe and the Tuaregs living in the Fezzan region; . mercenaries from Sudan, Chad, and Niger and foreign fighters in the ranks of terrorist and criminal organizations. . nationwide activities of criminal groups, militias, and terrorist organizations that use the situation to recruit and earn money for smuggling; . terrorist tourism—mostly from neighboring countries; . armed groups and formations of unknown origin; . propaganda and disinformation; . ubiquitous weapons and hazardous materials—smuggled from outside and abroad; . control of the armed militias and militias over Libya’s critical infrastructure; . different political views and local power struggles; lack of adequate forces to control the security of cities throughout the country, competition for profits mainly from oil extraction; . ideological divisions and emerging religious aspects; . radicalization of young Libyans; . progressive radicalization of social, political, and in many cases also religious moods; . aversion to strangers; . scores, family and clan rivalry; including family revenge; . contract killings, kidnappings for ransom, house-robbing, rapes; . mass migration from African countries to or via Libya. . lack of leadership—visible in the first years of the conflict, and currently sold a large number of factions and groups fighting for power; . changing the demographic structure—more women, fewer men, a vast number of children;

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. migration processes and internal refugees, earning money on migration; . fornication as a social threat and a change in the cultural code; . drugs and alcohol reaching vulnerable audiences (trafficking); . destruction, theft of Libyan heritage sites; . change of the Libyan currency—physical shortage of banknotes; . uranium and gold deposits on Libya’s southern borders—a financial benefit for criminal groups; . high inflation; . the developing “shadow economy” and corruption occurring at every level of social life; . theft or seizure of Libyan assets (e.g. 43 tons of gold have disappeared; the Italian Financial Guard seized the regime’s support, frozen by UNSC resolutions of 2011, worth EUR 1.1 billion; the Italian guard held two financial funds: Lia [Libyan Investment Authority] and Lafico [Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company], as well as shares in Unicredit bank, ENI energy concern, Finmeccanica, Fiat Sp and Fiat Industrial concern and in the Juventus FC football club; Fiat shares, 150 hectares of land seized on the island of Pantelleria; in 26.052020 seizure of $ 1.1 billion of counterfeit Libyan currency printed by the Goznak joint-stock company); . gas deposits in the Libyan Mediterranean; . forgery of documents—including passports and citizenships, and their mass trafficking; . checkpoints—difficulties for travelers—often the obligation to “pay” for the ride; . damaged critical infrastructure: hospitals, airports, networks, telecommunications; . poverty—the impoverishment of society; . rising food prices; . a changing climate worsened the country’s humanitarian situation— since 2011, Libya has been hit by floods, downpours, and significant snowfall. Indeed, these are not all aspects, but they sufficiently show the Libyan conflict’s specificity and conditions and the environment with which EU actions and program cooperate and try to function. In such a divided Libyan environment, the European Union decided to help Libya and started a series of activities through The European Neighbourhood

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Instrument, EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya. Based on the interviews conducted and the analysis of the effects of the activities of individual organizations, it turns out that these activities, despite their assumptions, could be lucrative for Libya, unfortunately, due to the lack of knowledge of social complexities and aspects of the ongoing conflict, they are ineffective, and even in the eastern parts of the country from Syria to the border with Egypt. Similarly, to the classification of risks in the Libyan environment— it is also challenging to analyze these areas separately here, as each of the analyzed European projects fits into the essence of these elements. Therefore, exploration and verification of existing data, including documentation related to these projects, are carried out: Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument; UN Humanitarian Response Plan 2020 Libya, AUC, UNECA, AfDB and UNDP Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals MDG Report 2012, shows that they interpenetrate, sometimes duplicate, but also lack aspects relating to the role of individual member states EU— or exclusion of some of them. Analyses would facilitate and show the relationships that take place in the field. The best example is the analysis of the spheres of influence in Libya and their European players. All European funding goes to the GNA, operating in Tripoli and several cities as far as Sirte—because only there it has real support. This results in a significant degree of dissonance between what is written in the documents and what is happening on the spot and the functioning opinions about people’s activities associated with Tripoli’s government. To avoid any slander and actively stabilize Libya, in the author’s opinion, a social debate is needed and listening to its citizens, whose voice, as in other Arab countries, is often treated in their view of the situation in the country marginally. An in-depth needs analysis, because the decade of conflict significantly changed the position and its vision from 2011 and its citizens. And it turns out that doubts about the financing of projects and the effectiveness of their implementation remain open questions about loyalty, friendship, or business (it is not clear if this funding falls under the Treaty of Friendship or not). During the research, two activities of the European Union were analyzed—The European Neighbourhood Instrument and EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya–EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. An element of their joint activities is the stabilization of Libya and the presentation of

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an extremely interesting African security issue, which are an attempt to answer Libyan problems. A study of the literature source showed that The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) had replaced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument to reflect real needs and considerations that have emerged over the years. The Regulation setting up the ENI underlines that it should support the implementation of the political initiatives shaping the ENP, including the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Libya resisted any ENP-based partnership, but it did take part as an observer in a number of multilateral EU initiatives while signing bilateral programs with Italy to control illegal migration. Since 2009, the EU has defined areas “of common interest” based on fighting terrorism as well as illegal immigration in the Mediterranean while supporting partnerships centered around hydrocarbon energy resources (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2013). However, the 2011 upheaval brought with them a political crisis characterized by growing political fragmentation and violence, leading to the establishment of two rival governments. Under UN-led mediation in December 2015, the Government of National Accord was established in Tripoli in early 2016, cutting the Eastern authorities in Tobruk and Benghazi off from international support (Toaldo & Fitzgerald, 2017). In this context, both Western and Eastern Libyan governments have no or only very limited control over Southern land borders (Zoubir, 2009). In accordance with the analyzed documentation, giving incentives and rewarding best performers and offering funds in a faster and more flexible manner, are the two main principles underlying the ENI worth over e15 billion from 2014 to 2020. Based on the experiences gained until today, the ENI will support the European Neighbourhood Policy and turn decisions taken on a political level into actions on the ground. Effective from 2014 to 2020. The EU ENI project seeks to streamline financial support, concentrating on agreed policy objectives, and make programming shorter and better focused, so that it is more effective. The ENI will build on the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and bring more tangible benefits to both the EU and its Neighbourhood partners. It has a budget of e15,433 billion and will provide the bulk of funding to the European Neighbourhood countries through several programs. The EU is a major donor for the Neighbourhood. The total amount agreed for the EU’s external relations

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package is e51,419 million over the period 2014–2020. The Neighbourhood is also supported by some of the other instruments. The other instruments and money allocated are Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance: e11,699 million; European Neighbourhood Instrument: e15,433 million; Development Cooperation Instrument: e19,662 million; Partnership Instrument: e955 million; Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace: e2339 million and European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights: e1333 million (Zoubir, 2009). Based on the analysis and verification of source documents, the following ongoing projects dedicated to Libya and other associated countries from South Mediterranean region have been identified between 2020 and 2024: EUROMED Migration V (EMM5 2020a); MED MSMEs Programme—Policies for inclusive growth; Enhancing a gender responsive film sector in the South Mediterranean region (European Union, EU Neighbours, 2020b); South Programme IV—Regional Support to Reinforce Human Rights (EU Neighbours, South Programme IV, 2020c); Mainstreaming Employment into Trade and Investment in the Southern Neighbourhood (European Union, EU Neighbours, 2020d); support to the investment climate in the South Mediterranean region for sustainable jobs and growth (European Union, EU Neighbours, 2020e). EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya consists of many projects and tries to help the processes of Libyan stabilization and improve the lives of its citizens but still it is the problem of reaching places that require help and support for The Government of National Accord and mostly for people from this area. The rest of the country is left without aid, and the fact of the enormous amount of money flowing through Libya is highly controversial. Based on the analysis of the above document, The European Union’s humanitarian support for people in need in Libya has reached e44.3 million since 2014. Humanitarian aid is part of the EU’s broader support for Libya to address the ongoing crisis in the country. The EU is currently implementing 23 projects worth e70 million in bilateral support to Libya to promote governance, health, civil society, and socioeconomic development while e318 million have been mobilized under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa for protecting migrants, refugees, and internally displaced people in Libya and supporting local communities to cope with the security challenge (European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2019). The EU has been supporting efforts to implement the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) agreed in December 2015, the UN-backed Government of National Accord that was formed

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under the terms of the Agreement and local authorities through institution building, including the deployment of Stabilization Facility funding to restore public infrastructure and improve inter-governmental coordination. The EU works closely with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya under the leadership of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to facilitate the implementation of the LPA and support mediation efforts to ensure all parties in Libya come together in a spirit of compromise and reconciliation to make the Agreement work and prevent conflict, in the interest of all Libyans. The EU tries also to support the mediation activities of neighbors and regional partners including by coordinating efforts with the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the United Nations in the framework of the Libya Quartet in order to advance the political process and assist Libya in its democratic transition (EU–Libya relation, 2017). Based on interviews and analyses conducted noteworthy that the aid is linked to the recognition of only one government and society as a whole is not entitled to Libya. Moreover, on the scale of the entire country and its needs, it shows the lack of knowledge of the conflict’s context and the current realities. It is regrettable that despite all these activities, the situation is not improving.

Discussion It is arguably a challenge, but also a strength that the chapter’s area straddles a number of disciplinary boundaries. A study on Libya and EU policies and in particular the question of the implementation of The European Neighbourhood Instrument and conducting EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya necessitate an approach that draws from a relatively wide selection of a range of disciplines in order to get rich and nuanced picture. In terms of scientific work on Libya and the EU and the European Neighbourhood more generally, the vast majority of authors take an International Relations approach, which puts a substantial emphasis on European Union assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard through two civilian and military missions under the CSDP and EU specialized agency activity. Consequently, there is a vast amount of conceptually concerned scholarship examining the nature of EU power and in particular its role as a “normative” or “transformative” power, which draws from the seminal work of Diez in 2005 in the Millennium: Journal of International Studies “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’?” (Aggestam, 2008). A large part of this scholarship is

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concerned with “conditionality,” meaning the way in which the European Union sets down conditions for bilateral assistance, if they want to secure the Libyan environment. The chapter seeks to tackle the issue with this dominant paradigm, primarily because it tends to sidestep the determining role of domestic factors and actors such as Libyan authorities and specific circumstances of Northern African countries shape The European Neighbourhood Instrument, EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya and their sustainability. As the example of Libya over the past ten years shows; international support, bilateral assistance, and domestic actions do not affect the pace and depth of stabilization and should therefore be brought squarely into an analytical framework. Presented research results identifying the sources and manifestations of what is being called here “domestic threats” to Libya. Accordingly, this requires stabilization and the creation of an analytical framework, which questions the importance of privileging the “agency” of the EU. Meanwhile, there is a growing body of Think-Tank based research which is adept at describing and analyzing the importance of domestic threats and in particular problems associated with corruption and bad governance—in other words the manifestations and results of state failure. Such work, while valuable, does not offer a great deal in terms of aids to conceptualization and longer-term thinking, nor does it attempt to get to grips with the structural and historical reasons that lie behind postdictatorship era and security problems. A little closer to bridging the gap between the traditional International Relations approach on the EU as a normative/transformative and the domestic conditions specific to North Africa–Libya case states are articles by Z. El Zaidy (2019) F. Gaub (2014), Y. H. Zoubir (2009). Their studies on the EU migration policy toward Libya, The European Neighbourhood Instrument and Libyan stabilization provide the most up-to-date appraisal of the status of EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya, areas of discord between EU and domestic levels and describe how the capacity of the EU as an actor in the region is highly dependent on there being a conducive domestic environment with sufficient actors able and willing to engage. State failure is about the risks associated with political and security power and ownership falling into the hands of a small group of individuals—militias, non-military organization, who then use it for personal gain. In these studies, which used mostly data gathered from surveys of security, Libya emerged time and time again as a high-level failure state. Over time a number of studies and publications emerged that used state failure as an organizing concept to

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explain persistent corruption and to describe how and why business individuals or firms came to be able to “fail the state.” During the conducted analysis, it turned out: 1. There is an evident lacuna that needs to be filled in the International Relations literature with new research based on detailed and systematic authentic research examining the domestic contexts of the implementation of The European Neighbourhood Instrument and conducting EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya. This will provide a healthy corrective to the prevailing paradigm. 2. There is a palpable lack of research on the security sector and local authorities including non-state security actors, in the mainstream study of EU neighborhood policies, despite The European Neighbourhood Instrument being pillar of the EU’s assistance. 3. There is now a dearth of comprehensive and systematic research on the phenomenon of state failure in contemporary North Africa, including Libya. This is needed to update the concept of state failure and to understand its implications, especially vis a vis chances for stabilization. 4. Despite Libya being a prime example of high-level state failure there are no substantial publications that attempt to understand the roots and effects of state failure in the context of the country’s postdictatorship regime 2011 development and its relationship with the European Union. 5. It is an opportune moment to look more closely at scholarship and ideas present in Development studies, such as notions of resilient societies, security, and sustainable development—since these are pressing issues in North Africa. Such an angle would also provide a route to understand the potential of local authorities as drivers of democratic type reforms. EU actions have become more and more interested in supporting the development of the security environment in North Africa and has put an emphasis on providing funding, technical advice, and training for local authorities, who will be able to adapt themselves to prodemocratic system, so that they might benefit from new stability opportunities, investment, and modernization. In this sense, the EU recognizes the importance of specialized agencies in creating good conditions for reforms and creating

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stability. Both elements strongly indicate that the current approach, which focuses on border control and surveillance, is likely to meet with limited success in achieving the EU’s aims of stemming the flow of irregular migrants arriving from Libya in Italy and Malta, protecting the human rights of those in transit and ensuring humanitarian outcomes for them. The chapter reviews existing literature, theories about the role of EU selected actions toward Libya’s stability and presents significant missing link from a scientific perspective between the Libyan authorities: The Government of National Accord and Libyan National Army and EU agency level, lack of cooperation with LNA and shortage solutions addressed to Libyans’ real needs. Certainly, very important are projects supporting the investment climate in the south Mediterranean region for sustainable jobs and growth; mainstreaming employment into trade and investment; regional support to reinforce human rights and policies for inclusive growth. However, the field research continued to reveal several internal threats that stand in the way of all proposed actions by the European Union. Further research should critically engage with existing studies and challenge their conclusions by assessing how far Libya fits and conforms to existing analysis and theory and comprehensive analyses European Union assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard (EUBAM Libya and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia) and activity of European Border and Coast Guard Agency with Operation Themis. Already, it is anticipated that Libya will challenge some existing assumptions in the field, due to the specifics of the Libyan political and security environment and EU specialized agencies sector, which are characterized by: 1. European Union authorities are operating in a “post-dictatorship” system with weak formal GNA governance, which also means that EU actions have little leverage and power to shape the political and security environments in which they operate. This suggests that Libyan Authorities are not well placed to be transmitters or agents of democracy, security and political pluralism. 2. Unaccountable militias—some linked to the interior and defense ministries of the United Nations-backed GNA, and others linked to the LNA affiliated with the rival Interim Government—clash with each other in various parts of the country, as efforts to reconcile main parties in the east and west failed. In Libya’s south, Tebu, Tuareg, and Arab armed groups continued to clash for control of territory and resources.

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3. Armed groups, some of them affiliated with the GNA or the Interim Government, carried out extrajudicial executions, attacked civilians and civilian properties, and abducted, tortured, and disappeared people. 4. LNA authorities profile embodies the old model of Arab authoritarian rule, in which watchwords such as security and stability have emerged as the cornerstones of legitimacy. LNA mirrors the powerful centralized state and one-man military rule, which are precisely those features which popular protests were seeking to overcome in the context of the 2011 Arab uprisings. 5. Smugglers and traffickers run migrant detention centers and cooperate with EU specialized agencies and fake NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Sea. 6. Libyan Coast Guard are highly susceptible to carry out and also be corrupted and also have short-term horizons and, in the case of Libya, tend to be about subsistence and survival, thus Libyan authorities cannot necessarily afford to think about what the longterm consequences of engaging in corrupt activities might be. Briefly, Libya’s condition and the nature and structure of the EU specialized agencies sector suggest that the country is ill prepared for implementation of The European Neighbourhood Instrument and maintenance EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya. According to the relationship between European institutions and Libyan authorities a number of internal threats are highlighted. The toxic blend of state failure, post-dictatorship system, weak public institutions and growth of the informal sector, corruption, social problems, massive immigration, borders instability, which necessitate the rule of law, a public administration that is accountable, and an open and permissive security environment.

Conclusion While the February 17, 2011 revolution was inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings roiling neighboring Tunisia and Egypt (Wolfram, 2012), Libya’s revolution was and remains unique in that the state was completely supplanted by revolutionary bodies. Replacing the Qaddafi regime were the National Transitional Council and numerous militias formed along tribal, ethnic, ideological, or geographic lines. This total break from the past was made all the easier by Qaddafi’s personalization of every aspect

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of the Libyan government: the man headed the informal networks that made the state (Moss, 2010), and his removal left a void that has yet to be filled. After Qaddafi’s fall, President Obama anticipated a stabilization rule rife with challenges, noting that it “will not be easy…After decades of iron rule by one man, it will take time to build the institutions needed for a democratic Libya” (White House, 2011). Libya’s postrevolutionary transition was not destined to fail.1 With enormous proven oil reserves, the largest in Africa and the ninth largest in the world (Analysis Briefs, 2013), many of them underexplored, Libya was singularly well endowed. After the revolution, the country rapidly restored production to 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd) (Analysis Briefs, 2013), along with 3 billion cubic meters of gas, and held up to $130 billion in foreign reserves (Laessing, 2014). Estimates of Libya’s potential for post-war foreign direct investment ranged from $200 billion over ten years (Bailey, 2012) to $1 trillion more broadly (Bitar, 2012). In other words, Libya was well positioned to transition away from decades of authoritarianism, begin building much-needed state institutions, and provide significant goods and services to its population. Following the revolution, many Libyans dreamed—not unrealistically—of their country developing along the lines of Persian Gulf states with similarly small populations and abundant natural resources. Yet Libya has since become a failed state in what could be a prolonged period of civil war. Conflicts are occurring at the local, national, and even regional levels. Foreign powers are directly intervening militarily, as demonstrated by airstrikes on Tripoli by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates and more recent Egyptian and Russian involvement in military operations in Benghazi from 2014 (Michael & Almosmari, 2014). Fissures have emerged along ethnic, tribal, geographic, and ideological lines against the backdrop of a hardening Islamist versus non-Islamist narrative. Libyan foreign minister Mohamed Abdel Aziz (from GNA) acknowledged the country’s tailspin when he admitted that “70 percent of the factors at the moment are conducive to a failed state more [than] to building a state” (Libya Herald, 2014). The United Nations has estimated that 200,000 Libyan citizens were internally displaced and an additional 1 This sentiment was clearly acknowledged by President Obama in a speech to the Libyan people; see David Jackson, “Obama Pledges U.S. Help for Libya,” USA Today, 2011. Available online: http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/ 09/obama-pledges-us-help-for-libya/1#.U-f6qIBdVK0 (accessed on 11 September 2021).

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250,000 were seeking refuge abroad (UN News Service, 2014); and increase in fighting forcibly displaced some 490,000 people across the country (UN News Service, 2014). The country now has two rival parliaments: the democratically elected House of Representatives (HOR) in the eastern city of Tobruk, comprising a majority of nationalists and federalists, and a resurrected General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli, an entity dominated by Islamists and with a long-expired mandate. The EU’s policy toward Libya has never been consistent or coherent, as each of the different European states have always had conflicting priorities and interests in Libya. However, as a united institution, the EU continues to pursue a specific policy in Libya (EU special agencies actions) in accordance with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This policy includes supporting political transition, stability, and democracy, resolving the current political crisis, and reaching a multilateral consensus for conducting elections. Yet, in terms of its migration policy, the EU continues to externalize and outsource border management, political deal-making, and humanitarian assistance for displaced populations to Libya, with little to no advocacy for the human rights situation of said displaced migrants remaining on the Libyan soil. The EU’s externalization policy in Libya has always been weak. As a result, Libya’s policy regarding migration is constantly affected by the unilateral actions of European states, namely Italy and France, who represent the main interfering rivals. As the European state closest to Libya that still accepts migrants crossing the sea, Italy has fully adopted this externalization policy, constantly advocating for more EU support for ironclad borders, while also striking give-and-take political deals with whichever party controls the north-western shores of Libya to ensure less migrants reach its shores, whether that party be fragmented armed groups or the weak internationally recognized government. In the end, the rest of the EU considers this a win–win situation. The EU and several European States, especially Italy, have been working hard to implement policies that ensure less migrants reach Europe. These policies include externalizing border control and supporting tyrannical regimes that block people from leaving their country, regardless of the deteriorating human rights conditions therein. They have also promoted more awareness campaigns to warn migrants on the dangers of leaving North Africa and crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. In Libya, the current policy is to intercept/rescue migrants in the Mediterranean Sea and return them to Libya in degraded DCs.

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These DCs are in desperate need of rehabilitation and are currently unfit for holding large number of migrants inside. Libya then spends money repatriating these migrants back to their countries of origin. As Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention for Refugees, it cannot provide migrants with the ability to apply for asylum/international protection inside Libya. On the other hand, those migrants who manage to be rescued by NGO ships in the Mediterranean are not always welcomed and could spend days at sea before being allowed to disembark in a European state. In the light of the above remarks, it can be concluded that the issue of managing the security issues and migration crisis is a key issue in the eyes of the EU institutions according to Libya’s case. The problem of migration together with the growing fear of terrorism have become the most serious problems of the European Union (European Parliament, 2018). The significance of this problem is evidenced by the fact that in the future in the EU it will be necessary to allocate up to EUR 30 billion a year to finance the activities of the migration chain’s managers in order to ensure decent reception conditions, fair asylum procedures, and the possibility of integrating immigrants. In conclusion, European Union activities should direct Libyan funding programs that support better integration and target the root socioeconomic causes of migration and instability (security issues), rather than investing in increased security measures and expanding radicalization sentiment in Europe. The destabilized and radicalized Libya, which has become a foothold for armed criminal or terrorist groups, is a serious threat to Europe. Security is undoubtedly an essential element of Western life and a necessity, but without a stable neighborhood in North Africa and deliberate, particular action toward Libya—maintaining it is a challenge that the entire European Union will have to face soon. Therefore, the sooner the situation stabilizes, the better for all of us.

References Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical power Europe? International Affairs, 84, 1–11; Whitman, R., & Wolff, S. (Eds.), The European neighbourhood policy in perspective: Context, implementation and impact (s.7). Palgrave Macmillan. Anckar, C. (2012). Religion and democracy: A worldwide comparison. Routledge.

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Bailey, R. (2012). Betting on Libya’s future. Gulf Business. http://gulfbusiness. com/2012/06/bettingon-libyas-future/#.U_kTJrxdVK0. Accessed 25 July 2020. Bitar, Z. (2012). Libya hopes for $1 Tr. cash injection to help rebuild wartorn economy. Gulf News. http://gulfnews.com/business/economy/libyahopes-for-1tr-cash-injection-to-help-rebuild-war-torn-economy-1.1016776. Accessed 13 Sept 2020. Choudhury Majumdar Roy, L., de AlburquerqueBacardit, L. A., Kadlec, A., Kartas, M., Marjane, Y., Wilkinson, A. (2019, November 29). Final report of the panel of experts on Libya established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011). United Nations Security Council. https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/final-report-panel-expertslibya-established-pursuant-resolution-1973-2011-s2017466. Accessed 10 Dec 2020. El Ghamari, M. (2017). Migration crisis and the Libyan gate to Africa. Securitologia, 2.24 6-12. https://www.civitas.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 03/Securitologia_2_2016_035_049.pdf. Accessed 5 Jan 2020. El Ghamari, M., & Gabriela Bartoszewicz, M. (2020). (Un)sustainable development of minors in Libyan refugee camps in the context of conflict-induced migration. Sustainability, 12(11), 4537. European Commission. (2020). Commission implementing decision of 31.8.2020 on the special measure in favour of Libya for 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/libya_sm_2020_c_2020_5877_ commission_implementing_decision_en_merged.pdf. Accessed 4 Dec 2020. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. (2019). Libya: EU to provide e6 million in humanitarian assistance. https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/news/libya-eu-provide-%E2%82% AC6-million-humanitarian-assistance_en. Accessed 29 Sept 2020. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. (2013). Libya strategy paper & national indicative programme 2011–2013. http://eeas.europa. eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/country/2011_enpi_csp_nip_libya_en.pdf. Accessed 19 Sept 2020. European Parliament. (2018). Refugee and migration crisis: The financial cost. https://www.europarltv.europa.eu/programme/security/refugeeand-migration-crisis-the-financial-cost. Accessed 12 Nov 2020. European Union, EU Neighbours. (2020a). EUROMED Migration V (EMM5). https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/projects/ euromed-migration-v-emm5. Accessed 19 Sept 2020. European Union, EU Neighbours. (2020b). Enhancing a gender responsive film sector in the South Mediterranean region. https://en.unesco.org/partnersh ips/foe/gender-responsive-film-in-south-mediterranean-region. Accessed 28 Sept 2020.

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CHAPTER 10

Conclusions Moosa A. Elayah and Laurent A. Lambert

This book explored the challenges of the governance and public policymaking in the midst and after conflicts, revolutions, and civil wars in the Middle East and Africa. As anywhere else, the task of rebuilding peace and institutionalizing stability in countries experiencing a conflict or just emerging from it is daunting, uncertain, and context-specific. The first four chapters proposed different cases on the fundamental challenge of inclusion and cohesion as well as the recurring issue of exclusion in conflict-affected situations, with four different cultural and institutional settings. The fundamental matters of cohesion, inclusion, or exclusion were not artificially selected by the co-editors. They clearly arose from the numerous papers submitted by international scholars and practitioners to an international conference organized at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies in 2021. This edited book has been designed to be a helpful contribution to the subject of conflict and post-conflict governance in the two regions of the world the most affected by both

M. A. Elayah (B) · L. A. Lambert Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8_10

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intra- and inter-state conflicts. The book incorporates different lenses of social sciences, especially public policy and international relations, but also benefits from social psychology, political anthropology, and other disciplines that enable a more comprehensive understanding of multifaceted, complex, and dynamic issues. The main recommendation of this book is promoting political and social leadership, through developing knowledge of political processes and especially peace-building processes, with an emphasis on the participation of society in political zones. It is necessary to create projects for awareness-raising of and change in concepts and attitudes among individuals, especially young people as they are the majority of the population in the Middle East and Africa, in decision-making skills, involving them in activities at the local level, and highlighting the benefits of people’s participation in a democratic society. Despite important divergences in opinion among researchers worldwide, it is possible to signal aspects on which the local views as a group of local researchers differ from the way the conflicts in MENA and Africa are portrayed and assessed in the literature. In Chapter 1, “The Role of Sazmen-e-Honari Rosanai Oax (Owj) during the ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign against Iran,” we discussed the case of Iran under an integrated communication, diplomatic and economic war led by the Trump administration, and how the Owj (the Arts and Media Organization which started as an NGO within the Organization for Islamic Propagation) was instrumental in successfully responding to this maximum pressure campaign of the Trump administration. Its cultural productions were used to reexamine the government-crafted Iranian public discourse and its ideological undertakings in the creative fields of art, culture, and mass media, to generate a cultural soft-power—and not solely a counter-power—to the advantage of Iran and its unity against foreign aggressions. Roger Stahl’s (2009) concept of militainment, highlighting the blurred boundaries between entertainment and war, was applied to explain how media productions by Owj have evolved from mural art to electronic media on screens. The aim of these productions has been to reinstate Iranian nationalism back from the 1979 revolutionary fervor and call the young audience back to this specific Iranian identity, to constitute a unified front against the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The emergence of new generations who are consuming various forms of digital content through satellite television and the internet. The aim is to interpellate, a term introduced by Louis Althusser, the Iranian consumer and spectator from this role into the role

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of a new “citizen-soldier” who engages with the nationalist agenda of the military-industrial complex through cinema and television. In this way, the chapter proposes that Iranian militainment in the digital realm has advanced beyond the mere regulation of public discourse and opinion. It is instead looking to create a new and nuanced relationship between its citizens and their experience of the war. After looking at media and how it can be instrumentalized to influence and deeply change public opinion, we looked at the case of South Sudan and its tryst with peace restoration and reconciliation. Chapter 2, “Seeing Like a State: The Crisis of Building the State of South Sudan,” discusses the idea of Statebuilding and its implementation failure in South Sudan. Even with its independence in 2011, the country has been rife with conflict. Violence has been rampant due to a governance crisis, the failure to successfully build/rebuild institutions and infrastructure, alleviate poverty or ethnic clashes, etc. (De Waal, 2014; Shulika, 2013). With the prolonged conflict and strife, it has become crucial to investigate and explore alternate modes of governance that are customized to the societal and political imagination of South Sudan. Decentralization as a rationale for governance has emerged successfully in several past cases, however it doesn’t come without its challenges— the diminished power from the central authority could lead to increased conflicts and corruption within the local spheres of society. However, it could prove to be an important step to mitigate the threat of conflicts. The ongoing power struggle between President Kiir, a Dinka, and Vice-President Machar (a Nuer), suggests that it will be difficult to persuade the elite members of the system to relinquish some control, who will want to retain their respective power and add further to the ethnic divide. Even a small step toward decentralization could make a difference for the local population who are alienated from the billions of dollars that are siphoned by the elites for their own vested interests, instead of using them to develop upon the agricultural potential of the country. Another proposed solution was of the rotational leadership, such as those in Nigeria and Tanzania, which could instill some sense of unity between the divided sects of the society. While this may not be the only solution, it could help with the prevention of election losers from protesting and expressing anger in public as the rotational leadership will be assure that both groups will have their chance at higher leadership. Another solution to bolster this arrangement by the International Crisis Group (2021) is to institute positions in leadership for the runners-up of the election which

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could ensure a distribution of power and authority. This will ensure more diversity and representation in government which would contribute to greater stability in the South Sudanese society. With this we moved on to discuss the crisis of governance in West Bank and the Gaza Strip in Chapter 3, “Policing Coexistence Through Economic Incentives: An Analysis of Nir Barkat’s Policies on Education in East Jerusalem During his Tenure as Mayor (2009–2018).” The chapter examines the particular political rationality instated by Nir Barkat about the governance of Jerusalem’s ethno-national diversity. It studies the design of public policies, especially educational policies, in the conflict context with Nir Barkat’s mayoral administration and his political rationality at its forefront. During Barkat’s stint as mayor, numerous schools in East Jerusalem adopted the Israeli curriculum, Bagrut, to replace the Jordanian-Palestinian curriculum, the Tawjihi. Noticing this shift, Barkat and proposed to strengthen it, attempting to maintain a certain kind of “controlled” integration, as this, in this particular political rationality, would be an efficient way to govern them at a lower cost. Instead of aiming at the incorporation of the Palestinian population, this decision aims for the diasporic condition and non-statehood to continue. The research used a methodological approach, surveying official documents by the Municipality of Jerusalem along with various secondary sources published during Nir Barkat’s term. The research surveyed memos, open letters published in the media, and urban planning documents containing statements by the former mayor. Furthermore, the secondary sources, included articles and interviews, accompanied by a series of reports by NGOs, think tanks, and international organizations. With this, the chapter discussed the question of governance of an ethnonational diversity and Barkat’s conception of a political economy that entitled the expansion of the institutions of the state in the territory and the circulation of techniques that aimed at building a subjectivity “according to common but not community values.” After looking at the three different and nuanced cases of governance of three ethno-national diversity settings, in Iran, in South Sudan, and in Jerusalem, where inclusion and cohesion represent critically important challenges, we investigate the other dimension of the issue. Chapter 4 investigates exclusion. Chapter 4 “An exploration of the dimensions of exclusion associated with intimate violence among Syrian refugees in Lebanon” examines the social, political, and cultural exclusion of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon. Of these, women and children,

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who make up three-quarters of the population, are the worst affected, often being the victims of exclusion and violence. The chapter focuses on the relationship between exclusion and DV/IPV, one of the most widespread forms of gender-based violence. As Lebanon does not have a legislative framework in place to address the issues and needs of the refugee population, the Syrian population has been meted with severe exclusion on the social, economic, and legal fronts. With a conceptual framework to understand the correlation between exclusion and DV/IPV, this chapter demonstrates a qualitative extraction of the dimensions that affect and cause exclusion, and which, in turn, cause the exacerbation of domestic and intimate partner violence against women. The chapter used interviews with humanitarian organizations to identify the dimensions of exclusions that affect Syrian refugees who are survivors of DV/IPV, supported by secondary data sources. The findings of the research reveal that the social, economic, and legal exclusion of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has created many socioeconomic challenges exacerbating occurrences of DV/IPV among women. The legal and economic challenges such as discontinuation of UNHCR’s registration, high cost of processing and obtaining legal documentation, and curfews by certain municipalities restricting the mobility of Syrian refugees, has created the fear of authorities which further restricts the mobility of the refugees. This hinders those afflicted by DV/IPV from seeking help. Additionally, they could also be denied medical assistance due to their illegal status and lack of documentation which further isolates them from society and support systems. Uncovering these challenges, this chapter discusses the need to integrate the refugee community in the host communityHost community to ease the tension between the groups (Knopf, 2016). Overall, there need to be more efforts for inclusion at the policy and community levels to improve the conditions of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and ensure their livelihood, mobility, and social integration. After these enriching case studies, we moved on to Part II of the book titled “Looking forward: the challenge of building sustainable peace.” The second and final part of the book consisted of four chapters exploring and addressing the task of peace restoration and peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict regions. Part II presents a sophisticated analysis of the cases of post-conflict heritage reconstruction in Berlin during and after the Second World War, the reconstruction in Beirut, and rebuilding Syria during the Ottoman Era, French Mandate, and Pre-war

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Syria. The chapter also considers the geopolitical dimension in the postwar climate as war can often result in the redrawing of geopolitical lines in a region. Part II also presents a unique angle of political psychology and motherhood when considering post-conflict policy-making sustainable rebuilding of peace. By utilizing the untapped potential of motherhood, as is evident in the case of the waiting mothers of Diyarbakir in Turkey, the policy-making process and measures to counter extremism and terrorism can be strengthened and be more effective. After the exploration of a possibly multi-disciplinary approach, the following chapter presents another distinctive transdisciplinary scientific approach to reconciliation in the middle of the conflict. By utilizing the lens of applied philosophy and ICT, the transitional path of peace and reconciliation from theory to praxis can be used to break the stagnation of prolonged and cyclical conflict. And finally, the last chapter. Part II of the book dealt with the challenge of statebuilding and restoring peace in conflict and post-conflict zones in the Arab region. The second part of the book started with Chapter 5 “Post-Conflict Heritage Reconstruction: Who Owns the Past?” which tackles the case of cultural heritage sites that are destroyed in places like Berlin during and after Second World War, Beirut and the conflicts faced by Lebanon during the twentieth century, and Syria during the Ottoman Era, French Mandate, and Pre-war Syria. These regions have experienced destruction of infrastructure and heritage due to violent conflict that erupted in the respective regions and there were plans to rebuild and restore the sites after the conflicts. The chapter explored the various policies of heritage site reconstruction of war-affected historic cities such as Berlin and Beirut. The chapter investigated the relationship between political regimes, their ideologies and sites that embody cultural heritage. The chapter looked at how the Nazi regime and Ba’athism manipulated and exploited national heritage to bolster their own political agendas, develop a cult-like leader personality to support and lend legitimacy to the ruling party. In this way, political regimes influence and politicize the reconstruction of heritage in post-conflict countries. The chapter takes the cases of East and West of Berlin and their contrasting reconstruction in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the factors that played a role in rebuilding of Berlin’s monuments. Heritage reconstruction over the course of history has shown that the post-conflict practices and procedures can often lead to the dissemination of a unilateral perspective of history which is composed by the winners

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or those in power. This eventually leads to further fragmentation of the already fractured identity of the nation or region, which often prolongs the tension and violence. In this chapter, the agency and the collective force of the citizens and local people in the process of post-war heritage reconstruction was emphasized to signify the importance of the participation of the people in policy-making processes. With this we can establish that policies instated during post-war heritage reconstruction processes have the unique potential to help alleviate the trauma of the conflict among the displaced and local population. With this we moved on to discuss another crucial dimension of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding. As we explored earlier, women—especially mothers—are meted out the worst isolation and marginalization in conflict situations. Relegated to the private sphere, the domain of the home, they are stripped of much of their agency and don’t get to participate in any governance or peacebuilding procedures. However, with the case study put forward in Chapter 7 “The Psychopolitics of Motherhood in Post-Conflict Public Policies: The Cases of the PKK and ISIS,” it is evident that academicians, scholars, policymakers, and practitioners can benefit from utilizing the power of motherhood to facilitate the restoration of peace and stability in conflict-torn regions. The case of the waiting mothers in Turkey proves the organized and collective movement is powerful and such grassroots efforts can have a great impact. Adopting the approach of political psychology, the chapter presents a unique perspective to understand and design effective solutions for peace restoration and stability. The concept of motherhood within political psychology is situated on a larger sociopolitical plane making it an important part of public discourse. Motherhood, as a sociopolitical identity, has proven to be effective in countering terrorism and extremism. Providing a platform to mothers, in grassroots movements such as the waiting mothers of Diyarbakir in Turkey, will be effective in sparking community action and can influence local and national policymaking processes. However, the movements will have to be localized for maximum success. Overcoming the marginalization of women and mothers in society can prove to be effective toward designing and implementing effective public policies regarding security, counter extremism, and terrorism. A deep and comprehensive understanding of these social movements driven by the collective force of women and mothers can help enrich the existing scholarship around motherhood and political

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psychology. This can useful toward developing relevant theories and normative prescriptions. Chapter 7 “The Call for Reconciliation in The Middle of Conflicts/An Alternative Dispute Resolution for Global and Domestic Conflicts/From Theory into Practice” put forward a transdisciplinary scientific approach to reconciliation in the middle of conflict. It examined and further developed upon social sciences’ approach in reconciliation and peace studies within social, cultural, and political aspects in the research domain. Then, it investigated the various dilemmas that crop up during conflicts. Reconciliation, according to Gathogo, “literally means repairing the damaged or broken bonds of unity and friendship between God and humanity and between human beings and their fellow beings on a personal and communal level” (Gathogo, 2012). Although, it carries different meanings in different contexts. In the context of conflict, reconciliation can mean the restoration of the link between groups, communities, or states after the war, prolonged violence, human rights violations, etc. As a policy, reconciliation begets a multi-layered and multifaceted approach. It aims to transform the beliefs and attitudes in a society or nation that is experiencing conflict. The reconciliation process alters the relationships of societies, aiming for empathy and harmony. The chapter also explores the “Hölderlin Perspective” and the beginning of the reconciliation approach, from theory to practice, after World War II in Germany. Reconciliation as a process can be applied in the middle of the conflict or after the end of the conflict to develop and restore peace. The chapter proposes ICT as a tool for the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict. It starts with breaking the wall of conflict stagnation and then directs in the direction of the reconciliation process. The application of the philosophical approach to digital transformation toward the reconciliation process needs to be researched to produce solutions for conflict transformation and transitional shifts toward the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. Chapter 8 “European Union activities in Libyan post-revolution environment. The Triad: migration, security, and EU special agencies” dealt with Libya and the country’s struggle for stabilization in the postdictatorship period. Its transition to peace faced numerous threats from domestic and international forces, with their respective struggle for power. The chapter considers existing scholarship around the role of the EU in Libya and ponders solutions for the gap that emerges between the action of the Libyan government bodies such as The Government

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of National Accord and Libyan National Army and the EU bodies and tools for action. Research has revealed that there are many threats and obstacles that stand in the way of the EU’s action plans for Libya. These include militias and mercenaries, backed by both GNA and LNA, that are preoccupied with clashes over resources and territory. These, among other factors, pose barriers to the implementation of the EU’s bilateral assistance to Libya with EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Building upon the concept of “Failed State” put forward by Daniel Thürer in his work namely The Failed State and International Law, the chapter discusses the potential reasons behind state failure in Libya which include widespread political instability, corruption of institutions, concentration of power in a few hands, among others. The chapter provides an analysis of the security and migration issues of Libya along with solutions for the full effectivity of the EU’s plans for Libya. The chapter provides an analysis of the The European Neighbourhood Instrument and the gaps in crisis management that need to be addressed to build and sustain the stabilization of Libya and enable its democratic transformation. In co-editing this book, in 2022, while the world is facing a return of inter-state conflicts in Europe, as well as strong global inflation, growing food and energy insecurity amid the unfolding climate crisis, we are hoping that our contribution will prove useful to fellow scholars, students, and policymakers who are looking for a comprehensive approach to conflict and post-conflict governance and policies based on both case studies and inter- and transdisciplinary approaches to peacebuilding and peace restoration. Our case studies focused on the Middle East and Africa, where states are particularly contested, but we hope that colleagues from other world regions will also benefit from it and contribute as well to changing the dynamics of this century and making it a more peaceful one for the generations to come.

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Index

A Abuse, 47, 96, 100, 103, 109 al-Assad, Hafez, 4, 126, 144, 148, 150 Aleppo, 8, 125, 137, 151 Apparatus of Israelization, 68, 75, 78, 87, 89, 90 Arab region, 48, 125, 143, 246 B Barkat, Nir, 2, 6, 68, 69, 71, 75, 244 Beirut, 8, 128, 137–140, 142, 152, 204, 245, 246 Berlin, 8, 127–131, 133–137, 152, 175, 245, 246 C Civil war, 4, 11, 42, 45, 49, 50, 52, 57, 58, 137, 141, 196, 235, 241 Community exclusion, 104, 105, 112, 113, 117–119 Community response, 119

Conflict resolution, 2, 11–13, 194, 200, 211 Conflict settings, 98, 199 Conservation, 9, 126, 129, 130, 136, 150 COVID-19 pandemic, 20, 97, 102, 115, 116, 118 Crisis, 4–6, 13, 28, 31, 34, 42–44, 53, 56, 57, 115, 116, 148, 208, 219, 220, 228, 229, 236, 237, 243, 244, 249 D Daesh, Isis, Is, Or Isil: Islamic State In Iraq And Levant, 8, 125 Democracy, 6, 12, 43, 67, 68, 74, 76, 136, 167, 201, 206, 216, 233, 236 Destruction, 8, 9, 50, 51, 125–129, 131, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 144, 148, 149, 151, 226, 246 Devastation, 48, 125, 136 Digital capitalism, 35

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. A. Elayah and L. A. Lambert (eds.), Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle East and Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23383-8

285

286

INDEX

Digitalized interpretive space, 21 Dimensions of exclusion, 6–8, 95, 97, 99, 103, 104, 113, 117, 119, 245 Discrimination, 53, 96, 103, 116, 180, 203 Domestic and Intimate Partner Violence (DV/IPV), 7, 8, 96–99, 101–111, 113–119, 245 DV/IPV Survivors, 97, 106, 109, 114, 117, 245

E Economic exclusion, 7, 109, 117 Education, 6, 45, 80–82, 91, 100, 101, 110, 173, 204, 209, 220, 223 Effective interventions, 10 Entrepreneurship, 71–73, 76–79 Ethnicity, 6, 44, 100, 132, 142

F Film industry, 20, 21 French Mandate, 8, 128, 137, 144, 146, 148, 152, 245, 246

G GBV services, 107, 114, 118 Gender-based violence (GBV), 95, 96, 107, 114, 118 Governance, 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 25, 42, 43, 48, 53, 55–57, 68, 75, 76, 189, 229, 231, 233, 241, 243, 244, 247, 249

H Hama, 127, 148–151 Hatamikia, Ebrahim, 29, 31

Heritage, 2, 8, 9, 85, 125–129, 134, 139, 141, 143–145, 147, 150–152, 163, 226, 245–247 Host community, 101, 112, 115, 118 Humanitarian, 4, 42, 51, 101, 113–115, 226, 229, 233, 236 Humanitarian agencies, 97 Humanitarian organizations, 57, 97, 104, 117, 245

I Infotainment, 20 International organizations (Ios), 69, 96, 97, 142, 244 Internet, 12, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 32, 34, 191, 204, 205, 242 Isolation, 6, 7, 96, 99–101, 105, 118, 177, 247

J Jerusalem, 6, 68, 69, 71–78, 80, 86, 87, 90, 91, 244

L Lebanon, 2, 7, 8, 26, 95–98, 103–109, 111–119, 128, 137–139, 141, 142, 146, 151, 152, 204, 244–246 Legal exclusion, 107, 117, 118 Livelihood(s), 6, 7, 105, 108, 111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 245 Local community, 113, 118, 119, 143 Local organization(s), 106, 109–114, 118

M Maximum pressure, 3, 29, 30, 33, 242 Maximum resistance, 3, 25, 32

INDEX

Media, 3, 9, 19, 20, 22–24, 26–31, 34, 69, 70, 127, 128, 149, 164, 166, 174, 175, 181, 183, 204, 208, 242–244 Middle East, 1, 2, 8, 9, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 35, 125, 137, 140, 148, 152, 164–166, 168, 169, 175, 176, 179–183, 204, 219, 241, 249 Militainment, 3, 4, 19, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 242, 243 Mobility, 7, 77–79, 84, 91, 101–103, 105, 107, 108, 113–115, 117–119, 204, 245 Murals, 4, 28, 29, 32, 34 Mushtahandes , 35

N Namava, 33, 34 Nazism, 152 Negative heritage, 127 Neo-Khomeninist symbology, 27 Neoliberalism, 6, 69, 71, 72, 77, 78, 86, 90, 91 NGOs, 48, 69, 70, 89, 97, 110–112, 117, 205, 219, 234, 244

O Oil, 42, 46, 57, 220, 225, 235 Online life, 21 Ottoman, 128, 139, 143–145, 152

P Pasdaranization, 24 Platforms, 23, 31, 34, 166, 179, 183, 205, 206, 247 Policies of exclusion, 104, 117, 119 Political exclusion, 7, 90, 241, 244 Post-conflict, 2, 5, 7–10, 32, 43, 44, 126–128, 150, 152, 163, 164,

287

169, 178, 180–183, 189, 200, 241, 245, 246, 249 Politics of the Past, ix Poverty, 42, 46, 49, 52, 55, 56, 58, 77, 226, 243 Power, 1, 4, 5, 10, 12, 19–21, 24, 26, 33, 42, 44, 45, 49, 52–59, 68, 71, 72, 74–76, 79–82, 84–89, 91, 100, 102, 128, 129, 132, 141, 163, 177, 180–183, 197, 198, 212, 216, 218, 223, 225, 230, 231, 233, 235, 243, 244, 247–249 Preservation, 31, 68, 135, 150 Propaganda, 3, 20, 26, 30, 34, 225 Public discourse, 2, 24, 25, 27, 32, 242, 243, 247

R Reconstruction, 2, 8, 9, 24, 44, 126–128, 133, 135, 138–142, 145, 146, 148, 150–153, 163, 166, 208, 245 Refugee settings, 96–99, 103, 119 Refugee women, 8, 98, 103

S Sazmen-E-Honari Rosanai, 23, 28 Seeing Like a State, 4, 43 Sexual And Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), 106 Social cohesion and integration, 112, 118 Social exclusion, 96, 98, 99, 118 Social integration, 10, 119, 245 Social network(S), 7, 99–101, 103, 112, 118, 166, 196, 198, 202, 206 Soleimani, Abol Qassem, 4, 27, 28, 30–32, 34

288

INDEX

South Sudan, 2, 4, 5, 13, 41–43, 45–59, 243, 244 Spect-actor, 22, 34 Statebuilding, 41, 43, 243, 246 Syria, 7, 8, 10, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 42, 104, 107, 118, 125, 126, 128, 138, 141, 143–146, 148, 151, 152, 165, 170, 175, 177, 179, 180, 182, 222, 245, 246 Syrian refugee(s), 2, 6–8, 95–98, 103–108, 110–119, 244, 245 U UNESCO, 8, 9, 126, 128, 141, 144, 151

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 7, 95–98, 104, 105, 107, 108, 117, 245 V Virtual recruit, 22 Vulnerable women, 7, 114, 117 W World heritage, 141 World War II (WWII), 8, 11, 126–129, 132, 134–136, 152, 166, 245, 246, 248