Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa 3031087127, 9783031087127

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Iyad Muhsen AlDajani Martin Leiner Editors

Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa

Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa

Iyad Muhsen AlDajani · Martin Leiner Editors

Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa

Editors Iyad Muhsen AlDajani Reconciliation Studies, Raum 15N03 Friedrich Schiller University, Jena Centre Jena, Thüringen, Germany

Martin Leiner Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies Jena, Thüringen, Germany

ISBN 978-3-031-08712-7 ISBN 978-3-031-08713-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

In 2015, Prof. Martin Leiner and his associate, Dr. Iyad AlDajani, researched “how to plant seeds of reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the middle of the conflicts.” As a result, they came up with an initiative to form “The Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa— AARMENA” to research the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. Visiting different universities in the Middle East and North Africa, without any funding, to raise awareness about reconciliation and peace studies in higher education institutions was their first step. Therefore, Prof. Leiner and Dr. AlDajani started to travel to Jordan, Palestine, Tunisia, and Qatar to develop cooperation with different universities. After signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with different universities in the Middle East and North Africa, other universities showed interest in taking part in the development of reconciliation and peace studies in the higher education institutions, HEI, such as Ibn Khaldun Center at Qatar University in Qatar, followed by the Egyptian universities of Tanta and Assuite, and Mohammad the first University of Oujda in Morocco, University of Jordan, Saint Joseph University, Notre Dame University in Beirut, and others. Fortunately, Prof. Leiner and Dr. AlDajani had understood that there is a potential to develop research on reconciliation and peace studies on the academic level, thus initiating research to develop a conference under the name of “Reconciliation in the Middle East and Interdisciplinary Research: Encountering Refugees in Crises.” Dr. Al Dajani reached out to the German Science Foundation DFG, and the fruit of the successful proposal was funding the conference held between August 10 and 15, 2018. The conference was successful, with 45 professors and presidents from higher education institutions in the Middle East and North Africa attending. Most participants, professors, and scholars, researchers, and international non-governmental organizations were from European and Middle Eastern and North African institutions. On August 14, by the end of the conference, the inauguration of the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa was held, with the consent of all participants, including their institutions, to be part of this alliance. AARMENA 2018 Symposium (Reconciliation with Refugees) affiliated academics of 45 members from different universities from Europe and the MENA region. v

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AARMENA 2020 Symposium (Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion) had over 107 participants and affiliated new members to support the AARMENA road map (AARMENA 2022 Symposium to be Digital Humanities for Reconciliation and Peace Education). AARMENA seeks to develop academic cooperation with all its new and old members who do not have MOUs. The AARMENA is still working to have MOUs with all member institutions and seeking funding to sustain such an alliance. Dr. AlDajani, who inspired the initiative, became the coordinator of the (AARMENA) projects. A doctoral school was initiated at Friedrich Schiller University—Reconciliation, Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies—and has many Ph.D. applicants worldwide. AARMENA is developed as academic cooperation with a wide network of old and new members, connected for joint research and projects. With cooperation in the publication of the books under the AARMENA book Series. Many HEI in Europe, the USA, and the MENA region cooperated with Prof. Leiner and Dr. AlDajani and trusted them to develop reconciliation and peace studies as a master program in the respected HEI. As a result, today’s academic alliance has over (45) academic institutions as partners and members from different universities in the MEAN region that seek cooperation with the AARMENA. Prof. Leiner and Dr. AlDajani inspired the AARMENA members to promote dialogue and scientific research between university scholars in the MENA region and European University scholars, including international reconciliation and peace researchers and institutions, focusing on reconciliation and peace studies and integrating the research into developing an academic degree at masters or a doctoral level. The Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa is an alliance between university members in the Middle East and North Africa under the umbrella of Friedrich Schiller University. The idea behind the AARMENA is to promote dialogue between university scholars in the MENA region and European higher education institutions representing professors, scholars, and sister ring universities with Friedrich Schiller University in Germany. Moreover, to develop academic research on a higher academic level, where scholars from different universities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can cooperate in developing research transdisciplinary studies on reconciliation and peace education in the middle of a conflict in a higher academic degree, at the end of the study the researcher would get either a high degree in maters or a doctoral degree. The Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and Northern Africa (AARMENA) is an alliance of universities and other higher educational institutions, scholars, and academics willing to do joint research and to build up teaching programs and curriculums in reconciliation peacebuilding studies as trans-/inter/multi-disciplinary studies and research for the higher education institutions in the Middle East and North Africa. Alternatively, integrate the new curriculums into their academic programs as in program courses and develop master’s degrees and Ph.D. programs in their educational, academic degrees in the higher education institutions in the Middle East and North Africa.

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AARMENA is initiating the means to strengthening the ties between higher education institutions in Europe, the USA, and the higher education institutions in the MENA region and to fostering academic reconciliation peacebuilding studies Ph.D. programs that will enhance cultural dialogue orientations in teaching programs on reconciliation peacebuilding studies, interactively benefiting scholars, students and young academics from Europe and Partner countries in the MENA region. AARMENA would exploit research and teaching programs on reconciliation peace studies through exchange scholarly work between academics by stimulating: 1. strengthen university cooperation by doing an event that corresponds to signing the memorandum of understanding between universities; 2. doing local and international workshops on reconciliation peacebuilding research between professors and new academics in the field; 3. developing a joint symposium, summers school, curriculum on reconciliation peacebuilding studies and research; 4. integrating courses in the teaching programs of the member countries; and 6. joint publication and a new perspective to develop joint research on reconciliation peacebuilding as transdisciplinary research. The programs would influence the integration of those teaching programs within the academic programs in the partner higher education insinuations in the member country. The academic universities and institutions that are part of the AARMENA enhance cooperation and dialogue orientation with academic institutions on building reconciliation studies programs and dialogue culture orientations in reconciliation peacebuilding studies within the MENA region. It is of great scientific importance to clarify whether there is a possibility, using a deeply understood principle of subsidiarity, to apply quite different reconciliation models of approaches that would assert to develop the societies at the hosting university member. Therefore, the AARMENA and its members will prepare a larger joint international project between the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies represented by Friedrich Schiller University and the perspective above universities. The subject areas are interdisciplinary studies of reconciliation in the middle of the conflict that covers fields of theology, philosophy, religious science, ethics, psychology, sociology, political science, economics, law, media studies, art, history, and information sciences. In addition, the AARMENA, with its university members, would seek to influence and impact societies throw education as part of the higherlevel curriculum. Furthermore, the AARMENA, together with its members, will serve as a means to prepare a larger joint international project between Friedrich Schiller University and the perspective universities mentioned above, under the theme reconciliation in the middle of the conflict. AARMENA is meant to become a sustainable organization to foster sustainable reconciliation in the MENA region and to become a driving force for academic development in interdisciplinary research and endure reconciliation wherever it is needed The AARMENA initiative developed three pillars, an academic research think tank that promotes joint research development on reconciliation and peace studies focusing on the MENA region conflicts with international cooperation with HEI and developing master programs and curricula. The second pillar developed the

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doctoral school reconciliation and peace studies at Friedrich Schiller University, developing the academic capacity for reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace education. Finally, the third pillar connected AARMENA to Springer International Publishing House, publishing two books every year. In addition, the AARMENA teams, consisting of European professors, USA, MENA Professors, and scholars, consisting of diverse professors, scholars, and Ph.D. students in the field of reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding in multiscale scientific disciplines. The AARMENA evolved into an alliance of universities and other higher educational institutions, consisting of professors, scholars, and academics willing to develop joint research and build up teaching programs and curriculums in reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace studies multi-/inter-disciplinary research theoretical framework. Alternatively, to Integrate the new curriculums into their academic programs as in program courses and develop master’s degrees for higher education in the MENA region and affiliate them with the AARMENA Ph.D. program at Friedrich Schiller University, strengthening research and studies in their educational, academic scale. The project with AlDajani leadership has initiated the means to strengthen the ties between higher education institutions in Europe and the higher education institutions in the MENA region and to foster academic reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace studies programs that will enhance cultural dialogue orientations in teaching programs on reconciliation studies, interactively benefiting scholars, students, and young academics from Europe and Partner countries in the MENA region. AARMENA is a gateway of knowledge transfer, research development, and curriculum building in reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace studies adopting a trans-disciplinary research approach that focuses on the philosophical, religious, political, cultural, and digital humanities impacting the MENA. Exploiting research and teaching programs on reconciliation conflict transformation and peace studies (RPS) through exchange scholarly work between academics by stimulating: 1. strengthen university cooperation by doing an event that corresponds to signing the memorandum of understanding between universities; 2. doing local and international workshops on RPS studies between professors and new academics in the field; 3. developing a joint symposium, summers school, curriculum on reconciliation studies; 4. integrating courses in the teaching programs of the program countries; 6. joint publication and a new perspective to develop joint research; 7. exchanges of academic material and information; 8. promote joint research projects and publications between European universities and universities in MENA region; and 9. conducting periodic academic meetings for academic purposes and discussing to increase the production and the development of scientific, academic, and research issues. AARMENA scholars became able to argue for the approach of reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace research in the face of current political and social challenges and reflect on its implementation in various fields of social practice against the background of their scientific theorizing. Through exemplary studies, scholars

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and Ph.D. candidates can independently apply methodological skills of reconciliation and peace studies, cultural, political, and religious studies disciplines and name and distinguish them concerning their meaningfulness. They can relate the different specialist discourses within the aforementioned academic disciplines to each other and integrate them in developing their position on a case-by-case basis according to the location in the MENA region. This will enable AARMENA scholars and Ph.D. candidates to shed light on current challenges in the MENA region in general and specifically their areas of origin against the backdrop of reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace research and to develop and practice science-based strategies for action in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and reconciliation. Research in reconciliation and peace studies may also create a culture of peace as an alternative to hostility and war in the Middle East and North Africa. Future fields of work will arise in the areas of reconciliation and peace research, as well as in educational institutions and in political consulting for governmental and nongovernmental organizations that will shed light on the MENA region as an alternative path for conflict resolution AARMENA institutes that are also collaborating to develop cultural heritage and social inclusions and dialogue orientation workshops in the Islamic world are as follows: Al-Salam Institute, USA International Center for Transitional Justice, USA, New York The Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace, Libya King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre For Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, Austria AARMENA is meant to become a sustainable organization to foster sustainable reconciliation in the MENA region and become a driving force for academic development in interdisciplinary research and endure reconciliation wherever necessary. AARMENA would build scientific capacities to interpret the causes of domestic and international conflicts in the social, political, and cultural contexts and develop strategies for peaceful management within and between states in conflict. Ph.D. candidates will place their interpretations in the current research in reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace studies and develop their exemplary positions within this. The AARMENA at Friedrich Schiller University has the following objectives to be achieved from the Project Dialogue with the Islamic world (project): • To have academic research on teaching methods on reconciliation peacebuilding studies. • To develop a master program curriculum that can be used by AARMENA members of higher educational institutions and to integrate teaching programs in their universities as a course or part of the master program or a Ph.D. program. • To have a joint conference to develop joint publications on reconciliation as inter/trans-disciplinary research publications in the MENA region.

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• Cooperate activities with higher education institutions in the MENA to strengthen international cooperation between the members and present all the scholarly work done in the project. • Universities and researchers to get more funding and advance in reconciliation peacebuilding research for the middle of conflicts in the MENA region. • To research and develop teaching programs on reconciliation peacebuilding research as a Transdisciplinary approach. • To integrate reconciliation peacebuilding research in a master’s program in higher education institutions in the MENA region within the bottom-up approach. • Promoting cultural dialogue and strengthening international cooperation with the MENA region through academic work by visiting and signing a memorandum of understanding and developing workshops, summer schools, and conferences. • Sustainably modernize in technological teaching in the member universities, advancing digital humanities program on teaching reconciliation peacebuilding studies and research, such as online courses and workshops between members of the AAREMENA with member universities and teaching how to teach and integrate research on common ground on teachings of reconciliation studies. • Provide targeted support for qualified young academics from the regions while ensuring gender equality. • Establish joint research projects and joint program teaching. The development of a vast knowledge-based society on reconciliation studies (AARMENA).

AARMENA Affiliated Partners The following members of the higher education institutions that are part of AARMENA: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany. The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan. Qatar University–Ibn Khaldun Center, Doha, Qatar. German Jordanian University, Amman, Jordan. Innsbruck University, Innsbruck, Austria. UNESCO Chair for Peace, Innsbruck Austria. Petra University, Amman, Jordan. Arab American University, Jenin, Palestinian territories. Tanta University, Tanta, Egypt. Notre Dame University-Louaize (NDU), Beirut, Lebanon. Saint Joseph University Beirut, Lebanon. Al-Najjah University, Nablus, Palestinian territories. Al-Istiqlal University, Jericho, Palestinian territories. Fayoum University, Fayoum, Egypt. Cambridge Muslim College, Cambridge, UK. Europa-Universität, Flensburg, Germany.

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• Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar. • University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands. • Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey. AARMENA institutes that are also collaborating to develop cultural heritage and social inclusions and dialogue orientation workshops in the Islamic world are as follows: • Al-Salam Institute. • International Center for Transitional Justice. • The Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace. New Member as of (2020): • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Al Amana Centre, Muscat, Oman. Al-Istiqlal University, Jericho, Palestinian territories. Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey. Conflict Resolution and Peace Centre University of Granada, Granada, Spain. Ez-Zitouna University Tunisia, Tunis. Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany. Hebron University, Hebron, Palestinian territories. International Peace Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. Notre Dame University, Beirut, Lebanon. Notre Dame University, Indiana, USA. Qatar University–Ibn Khaldoun Center for Social Sciences & Humanities, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar. Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Centre, East Jerusalem, Palestinian territories. Tx Architects, Berlin, Berlin, Germany. University Mohamed Lamine Debaghine Sétif 2, Sétif, Algeria. Université d’El Oued El Oued, Algeria. Yarmouk University, Yarmouk, Jordan. The Mary Hoch Center for Reconciliation, Washington DC, USA.

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AARMENA Symposium 2018, Theme: Reconciliation with Refugees

The Inauguration of the AARMENA August 14, 2018 The inauguration of the academic took place on August 14, 2018. As part of a conference held on academic research, the name of the conference was “Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa an Interdisciplinary Research.”

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The first photo illustrates the registered members of Professors, Presidents and scholars who are attending the conference, the second photo illustrates the conference flyer, the third photo, left to right, the director of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, Professor Dr. Martin Leiner, in the middle project coordinator the MENA region Dr. Iyad AlDajani, and Professor Dr. Walter Rosenthal, the president of Friedrich Schiller University. The inauguration started with Professor Martin Leiner’s speech, followed by project coordinator Dr. Iyad AlDajani, and then a supportive speech by Professor Dr. Rosenthal.

Professor Dr. Walter Rosenthal President of Friedrich Schiller University attended inauguration of the academic allinace for reconciliation in the middle east and north africa, as seen in the first picture on the left side.

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The inauguration was followed by a televised speech by Professor Dr. Adnan Badran, the former prime minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Head of Trusty council for the University of Jordan, and Petra University, and Philadelphia University in Amman.

The second letter for support was from Michelle Müntefering, Minister of the State of Germany for International Culture Exchange; another appearance was Prof. John Brewer from the Belfast University of Queens.

At the end of the inauguration, participants exchanged debates about the project. There was high acceptance to part of the AARMENA. Each participant and president from different universities showed support for the project and its implementation in their country.

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AARMENA Symposium 2020: Heritage, Reconciliation and Social Inclusion The symposium participants were from higher education institutions from all around the world. Attendance was (107) professors, scholars, students, and experts in the field. Specifically illustrated in the following list, that shows the members of AARMENA . • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UNESCO Chair for Peace–Innsbruck University, Austria American University, Washington, USA Al Amana Center, Muscat, Oman Al-Istiqlal University, Jericho, Palestinian territories Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Conflict Resolution and Peace Center University of Granada Ez-Zitouna University, Tunisia, Tunis Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany Hebron University, Hebron, Palestinian territories International Peace Studies Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Lybian Woman for Peace Center, Ibn Ghazi, Libya Notre Dame University, Beirut, Lebanon Notre Dame University, Indiana, USA

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• Qatar University–Ibn Khaldun Center for Social Sciences & Humanities, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar • Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, East Jerusalem, Palestinian territories • Tx Architects, Berlin, Germany • University Mohamed Lamine Debaghine Sétif 2, Setif, Algeria • Université d’El Oued El Oued, Algeria • Yarmouk University, Yarmouk, Jordan • The Mary Hoch Center for Reconciliation, Washington DC, USA

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AARMENA family.

AARMENA has an executive and research directore and a director of the scientific board presented by: Director of the Scientific Board: Prof. Dr. Martin Leiner Executive and Research Director: Dr. Iyad Muhsen Al Dajani Jena, Germany

Iyad Muhsen AlDajani Martin Leiner

About This Book

The AARMENA adopts the philosophy and theoretical framework of applied phronesis in the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict for Prof. Dr. Martin Leiner and Dr. Iyad Muhsen AlDajani, (aldajani, 2020). The figure below illustrates the phenomenology of the transdisciplinary approach from theory to practice within the reconciliation process (Fig. 1). The phenomenology of applied phronesis in the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict was the adopted discourse for the AARMENA for conflict transformation into transdisciplinary research applied from theory into practice in real life . AARMENA combines several transdisciplinary reconciliation conflict transformation and methodological peace approaches in scientific research for the Middle East and North Africa region: 1. Applied phronesis in the reconciliation process: Introducing the applied philosophy into science for developing a scientific explanation for conflict transformation toward peacebuilding for the reconciliation process based on principles inherited from natural things, according to Aristotle (384–322 BCE). In our modern age, applying digital transformation towards reconciliation process as a transdisciplinary approach with regard to applied research from theory to practice toward conflict transformation and transitional shifts toward the reconciliation process in the middle of a conflict. The research explores Aristotle’s claims of “Phronesis.” This kind of scientific knowledge (epistême) is of no use for day-to-day living. To lead their life, humans need skills to act (praxis) and to produce (poiêsis), and they need prudence (phronêsis) to deliberate about things that allow choice. So, the birth of science is based on a strict dissociation of scientific knowledge from the various aspects of practical knowledge (Aristotle, 2003). (Hirsch Hadorn, Hirsch Hadorn, and Hirsch Hadorn, 2008, p. 20) 2. Applying qualitative and quantitative methods, including interviews, surveys in the field, and real-life research activities.

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Fig. 1 Applied phronesis in the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict (Aldajani, 2020)

3. Recognizing the central role that reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding play in conflicts and thriving The Middle East and North Africa, affecting particular identities. Group narratives within conflicts, professors, scholars seek understanding of reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding potential for promoting an alternative path for conflict resolution. 4. Workshop research for analyzing collective narratives of individuals affected by the conflict and post-colonial, focusing on how the visits influence those narratives in historical and memorial sites in Berlin and other places affected by wars and future perspectives post- and pre-conflicts. 5. Combining various analytical methods to understand religious/ethical/political/ economical/media/psychology/sociology/economics/management/information technology and theoretical concepts and frameworks used in the discussions concerning reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding in the Middle East and North Africa MENA. There will be transdisciplinary cooperation in the five approaches to scientific research in multiscale disciplines. All project participants will work very closely on

About This Book

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the parallel experiences of professors and different scholars in researching reconciliation in the MENA region. In addition, parallel semester-long seminars with the scientific board and staff will be prepared and taught by a scientific board team and fellow professors from the MENA region covering multiscale scientific disciplines. 6.

Concepts and theories of reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace studies: The graduates are familiar with the history of reconciliation, peace, and conflict studies as an academic discipline. They are aware of its transdisciplinary character and understand the diversity of its methods. They can connect the epistemological foundation of reconciliation and peace philosophies with their practical application in conflict transformation. Moreover, they see the need for special didactics in strategic leadership, relationship, and teambuilding training. They are principally familiar with selected areas of energetic, moral, modern, postmodern, and transrational interpretations of reconciliation, conflict transformation peace in multidisciplinary applications. 7. Research methods in reconciliation, conflict transformation peace studies: The graduates are familiar with the main methodological approaches to reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace studies and know the most important schools and their different epistemologies. They can apply these epistemologies for doing research and writing academic papers. The graduates can identify relevant problems and questions adopting reconciliation conflict transformation peace research in their doctoral research with the proper academic methods, elaborate specific research questions of the field profoundly, and draft self-reliantly an individual and concrete research outline. The graduates can independently write academic papers. 8. Research in the rule of law and human rights: The graduates have practically and academically exercised topics from the main fields of the discipline. This includes humanitarian law and human rights, development, and social justice. They can contribute academically to these topics in written and oral form to draft and present respective projects 9. The idea and principles of cultures of reconciliation and peace: The graduates understand the relationship between peace and cultural activities. They understand human nature as a multilayer-relational phenomenon that can communicate via various techniques. They can handle some of these linguistic, physical, and acoustic tools. 10. Crisis management and the art of negotiation: introducing the elicitive conflict transformation, elicitive conflict mapping, by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Dietrich: The graduates are familiar with a minimum of two tools of elicitive conflict transformation. They have experienced, practiced, and applied them introspectively in the group context. They have access to experts in these fields and can contact them for advice in applied work. They can assess these tools academically and report their use in proper written form. 11. Applied methods of reconciliation, conflict transformation peace building: The students are trained in basic aspects of team building and leadership as required in all kinds of contemporary conflict work. They understand that conflicts are

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relational aspects of human nature and can only be addressed. They know their limits and resilience in stressful situations and understand the dynamics of operations in teams. 12. Digital humanities: The graduates understand the transdisciplinary character of reconciliation and peace studies within the sphere and domains of Internet communication technologies as a tool for advancing conflict transformation at an advanced level, which enables researchers to specialize in fields of data science and have a clear knowledge of data analysis and statistics using Internet communication technologies applications using artificial intelligence.

Contents

The Academic Alliance for Reconcilaition in the Middle East and North Africa–Heritage, Reconciliation and Social Inclusion Inclusive Reconciliation Process in the Middle of Conflict: A New Perspective Towards Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa . . . . . Iyad Muhsen AlDajani Peace and Reconciliation Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wolfgang Dietrich

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In Response to Wolfgang Dietrich’s Article About “Peace and Reconciliation Studies” or How to Catch a Unicorn? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Martin Leiner

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Autobiography as a Hermeneutic Practice of Reconciliation with Oneself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Francesco Ferrari

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Theories of Reconciliation—Basic Coordinates for Navigating Debates on Building Better Relationships in Societies in Transition . . . . . Luis Peña

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Digital Humanities in Social Sciences Netnography Internet Research Methodology into the Internet of Toys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abeer Abdel-Jabbar Abu-Zayed, Mohammad Alshraideh, Iyad Muhsen AlDajani, and Saleh Al-Sharaeh Netnography Internet Research Methodology Applications: A Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abeer Abdel-Jabbar Abu-Zayed, Esra Alzaghoul, Iyad Aldajani, and Mohammad Alshraideh

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Cybersecurity in Sovereignty Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Omar Mahmoud Omar, Iyad Muhsen AlDajani, Ma’en Juwaihan, and Martin Leiner Measuring the Academic Students’ Performance at the University of Jordan Using Netnography Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Sajeda Alnwairan, Iyad Aldajani, and Mohammad Alshraideh Research Science on Heritage, Reconciliation and Social Inclusion Exploring the Strengthening of National Research Capacity on Reconciliation Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Iyad Muhsen Aldajani Heritage, Social Inclusion, Refugees, and Reconciliation with Your Past: A Multidisciplinary Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Davide Tacchini Humanitarian Aid in Yemen: A Crisis of Sovereignty and Inevitable Harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Moosa Elayah and Noman Ahmed Do the Institutional Welfare Services Provide Social Harmonization? The Case of Syrians in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Nergis Dama Practices of Heritage and Reconciliation Indigenous Language Preservation for a Socio-political Reconciliation: Morocco as a Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Yamina Hakkou and Mahmoud Seddik The Muslim Custodian of King David’s Tomb Since 1529 al-Sayyid Sheikh Ahmad Dijani, the Jerusalemite (1459–1561) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Amjad M. al-Dajani and Muhsen A. al-Dajani Local Heroes: The Legacy of Christian Social Activists and Social Justice in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 Eugene Richard Sensenig Discourses on Statehood and Ethnic Diversity in Jerusalem: The Notion of Apparatus of Israelization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Ignacio Rullansky The Iraqi Marshland and the Quest of Tourism and Development . . . . . . 273 Hadeer Merza and Zeinab Ayad Muneam Creative Interventions as an Act of Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Hiba Sarrouj

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Cases Studies on Heritage, Reconciliation, and Social Inclusion Heritage in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Sociopolitical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Yaser Alashqar Religion, National Culture, and Peacebuilding in the Middle East . . . . . . 329 Issa Diab The Heritage of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America, the Omani Context, and the Work of Al Amana Centre . . . . 345 Justin Meyers Social Structure, Economic Exclusion, and Fragility? Pertinent Theories and Empirics from Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 Mesfin Mulugeta Woldegiorgis Security Sector Reform as a Process of Reconciliation, What Went Wrong in Palestine? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 Nizam F. Salahat The Spatiality of the Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 Luis Pena Bargaining Over What We Were All in Together: Citizenship and Belongingness in the 2017 Qatar-Gulf Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 Elmehdi Lahmamed Regional Geopolitical Conflict and the Fragile State: Foreign Influence and Lebanon’s Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443 Zinat Hassan Interfaith Dialogue: A Path to Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463 Mohammed Abu-Nimer

The Academic Alliance for Reconcilaition in the Middle East and North Africa–Heritage, Reconciliation and Social Inclusion

Inclusive Reconciliation Process in the Middle of Conflict: A New Perspective Towards Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa Iyad Muhsen AlDajani

1 Introduction Inclusive reconciliation in the middle of conflict starts with the historical record; we can go as far as the times of the Pharos; one significant image was found in the “Book of The Dead”, where an image presents justice, reconciliation, on a moral scale. This perpetuated the scale of justice and reconciliation in ancient Egypt, where more than one God measured the “MAAT”, meaning the justice and moral to the weight of the heart of the dead, for eternal life. In the same image, you notice more than one God working up for the measuring, which contributes to a type of reconciliation between the gods, whether the scale is more for justice and morality or for measuring moral balance, where balance can be contributed to opponents in the image of Gods that reconcile to have balance in the scale, this contributes illustrates a reconciliation as a kind of balance between the Gods in Ancient Egypt. Much research on reconciliation was done to counter humanity’s bitterness and the transformation towards the transitional shifts into intractable conflicts between nations. However, the reconciliation process usually is understood as a weak approach against aggression. Within the strongest domain in the conflict, this notion is at fault, referenced in different faiths as in reconciliation an ultra-dynamic power of relations between entities in conflict transformation which made reconciliation process more desirable than the continuation of an intractable conflict. The most common faith practised by the majority in the Middle East is the Islamic Faith, therefore referencing the Holy Book of Islam’s Quranic verses to promote reconciliation. But we should not forget that the Qoran is a continuous knowledge of faith for the monotheistic I. M. AlDajani (B) The Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa (AARMENA), The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS), Systematic Ethics in Digital Humanities for Reconciliation Process, Faculty of Social & Behavior Sciences, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_1

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faiths that came after Judaism and Christianity; therefore, let us for glimpse call verses from the Holy books to call for reconciliation and peace. In The Holy Quran: Allah Says: “In The name of the (The Most Merciful and Compassionate). “The reward of the evil is the evil thereof, but whosoever forgives and makes amends, his reward is upon God.” (Quran 42:40)”. Allah Almighty says: “... And let them pardon and overlook. Would you not like that Allah should forgive you? And Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.” (Quran 24:22). Allah Almighty says: “That [is so]. And whoever responds [to injustice] with the equivalent of that with which he was harmed and then is tyrannized—Allah will surely aid him. Indeed, Allah is Pardoning and Forgiving.” (Quran, 22:60). Allah Almighty says: “Seek forgiveness of your Lord and repent to Him, [and] He Will Let you enjoy a good provision” (Quran 11: 3). The subsequently prominent religions in the Middle East are Judaism and Christianity, whose Holy Books also include teaching about reconciliation. In the Jewish Bible: “One does not wage war, whether profane or holy, before one offers peace, as it is written [Deuteronomy (Devarim) 20:10]—When you come near a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it!” ~ ~ Rambam (Read more at: https:// www.jewishquotations.com/peace/). In the Holy Bible: Blessed the Pacemakers—because they will be called sons of God (New International Version, Matthew 5:9). Bear with each other and forgive one another if any of you has a grievance against someone. Forgive as the Lord forgave you. (Colossians 3:13). All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ and gave us the ministry of reconciliation (2 Corinthians 5:18). Such verses of the Holy Books make reconciliation efforts appealing as the only reward of forgiveness, empathy, and making amends to your enemies and relationships is to be bestowed upon God. Likewise, many verses teach believers to respond to evil with forgiveness and make amends. Making amends can happen with the reconciliation process to empower the weak and rebalance the scale of power. Most of those verses were acknowledged by different scholars, who agree for the use of Holy Books to seek forgiveness and empathy for oneself and for the other and enemies even before enemies seek forgiveness. This is a reconciliation path and a process, the path of peace, which is not taken in the many regions in the world amidst the turmoil, with seemingly no light at the end of the tunnel. “By which Allah guides those who pursue His pleasure to the ways of peace and brings them out from darknesses into the light, by His permission, and guides them to a straight path.” Quran Surat Al-M¯a’idah (5:16).

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Defining Inclusive Reconciliation Process. Reconciliation has a broad meaning. First, it suggests an open-ended interpretation for a process that may never end, but rather develop a better reality in intractable or other types of conflicts. Second, it combines many aspects of peaceful relations between enemies in protracted or intractable conflicts that exist as complementary elements. It provides a prosperous common future for both entities in conflict, develops a root understanding of the cause of conflict, and thrives in transforming the conflict into a perspective of a future peace process (AlDajani 2020, 80). Reconciliation “is the restoration of the relationship between individuals, groups, states after the violence, war, genocide, civil war, gross human rights violations like segregations (Apartheid), enslavement, or similar activities. Reconciliation as policy requires a long-term strategy with many practices with multiple levels” (Leiner 2016, p. 183). According to Bar-Tal, reconciliation constructs a formation of peaceful relations between societies that have been involved in many protracted conflicts. As the conflict evolves, the reconciliation process can open new ultra-dynamic relations for conflict transformation and transitional shifts in disputes between nations, altering the power relations in the conflict. (AlDajani 2020, p. 81). For Kriesberg, reconciliation is “a Process by which parties that have experienced oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable.“ (Kriesberg 2001, p. 48). Reconciliation is needed when “societies involved in a conflict evolve widely shared beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions that support adherence to the conflictive goals, maintain in the conflict, de-legitimize the opponent, and thus negate the possibility for a peaceful resolution and prevent the development of peaceful relations” (Bar-Siman Tov 2004, p. 13); therefore, reconciliation can be a continuous effort of a process to inherit a common future for the children of the future. Reconciliation has an ongoing holistic combination of a process as an outcome towards inclusivity. It is an ultra-dynamic process for power to shift into dynamic transformation to balance conflict and alters or amends it into conflict transformation through transitional shifts into a new reality within the reconciliation process as it occurs in the middle of the conflict. This conflict transformation process counters interactable-protracted conflicts and shifts power towards a new reality of a common future, a long-lasting peace process in the present dealing with the past and future. Both are combined in a recurrence of action according to the permanent effect on both parties in conflict. Inclusive reconciliation reaches a stable and lasting peace through a process that continues and builds on a new, better-shared common future for both entities in conflict.

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2 Reconciliation for Conflict Transformation and Transitional Shifts Reconciliation impacts social and ethical transformation within stagnated intractable conflicts by moving to change the societal beliefs about groups’ goals, social views about rival groups, societal assumptions about one’s group, the social beliefs about the relationship with the former enemy (Simon Bar-Tov 2004), and, the last and most important, the society’s beliefs about peace and a shared common interest for a future in the middle of a conflict. Therefore, reconciliation adheres to the later circumstances and encounters the latter future to develop social change and a commonly shared future in altering the conflict into conflict transformation segments. The inclusive reconciliation process develops a mechanism for balance in the middle of conflicts; it alters all parties within the conflicts and affects groups, and outer groups integrate parties within concern into the process. Such a process of inclusivity influences the transformation of the public sphere towards a process to reconcile. It adheres to the language and definitions of the conflicts into more reconciled definitions for transformation into a common future. The Arab language has many different meanings for the reconciliation process, political, religious, and economic structural definitions pronounced by different words. Inclusive reconciliation has a different interpretation and insight of the word. Some scholars referred to reconciliation as Musalah, which infers that reconciliation may also lead to coexistence; Ta’ayoush refers to invoking ideas of conciliation and appeasement in the light of the division and tension arising in the conflict. More terms such as Moujalassa, which means the act of sitting together or discussing issues that matter, or that are in conflict, and Moujayara, which alters to respect your neighbour. Other terms would include Moussamaha, meaning forgiveness, Moussafat which means resolution on the terms of the other and requesting forgiveness, Taswiya, which means the acceptance of the settlement. Tardiay means accepting and pleasing the adversary; lastly, the most common in conflict is Tatbi, which means normalization, which is not wanted in most conflicts. (Aldajani 2020, p. 96). A reconciliation process becomes inclusive within its purpose and its cooperating transitional and restorative justice mechanisms in conflicts. It also cooperates with the conflict’s truth and builds resilience to balance and develop conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards peace. Inclusive reconciliation includes incorporating political and legal issues in conflicts, creating a common sense of security, and crisis management in cooperating between enemies in conflicts. Apologies and symbolic acts spread empathy, forgiveness, compassion, kindness, and understanding of others’ narratives. Reparations and other attempts for justice restoration and restorative justice are equally important. Cooperation regarding transforming economic, legal, and international issues affects the political culture and economic capitals. Including cooperation in civil society, programmes can help conflicting parties understand the process and

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adhere to the strategies of reconciliation through the acceptance of the other’s historical narrative and the confrontation for the individuals and groups’ historical narrative and groups between victims and perpetrators within and outer groups. Integrating groups through a third-party intervention were the most common in many past conflicts. Still, mostly in reconciliation, the integration and the acceptance are initiated by both groups who then agree to hold a common prosperous future in the cultural, economic, and political sphere, integrate intentional strategies to humanize the other, and challenge their own reflection, attitude, or role in the conflict. The reconciliation elements are manifested by aspects such as the following (AlDajani 2020, p. 84). 1. Developing orientation towards the past to develop a better future for nations in conflict. The past should never be neglected or diminished, and it should be part of the reconciliation of the conflict. 2. Truth; truth refers to acknowledging both parties’ narratives, including the victims and perpetrators in the conflict. The knowledge for the truth acknowledges the other’s narrative and develops an acceptance of both sides’ wrongdoing. 3. The importance of conserving the past, preserving the past, and remembering the past is vital for both parties in conflict. It can involve memorials, museums, books, mutual recognition of history, and conservation of historical suffering. 4. The importance of guilt; both parties in conflict are guilty, accepting being a victim and a perpetrator of the other. It develops an understanding of a better common future for both generations, upholds the need to forgive and learn from the history of the conflict, and seeks a better common future for both victim and perpetrator in the conflict. 5. The importance of forgiveness compassion depends on the verbal expression of guilt and understanding for the evolution of hatred among the entities in conflict. 6. Understanding empathy; empathy refers to understanding the other’s narrative and knowledge for the narrative of hatred and encountering the bitterness of hatred in the heart of the conflict. 7. Emotions; emotions evolve in conflict and can make the path towards healing a victim’s feelings of atrocities done by a perpetrator and vice versa. The emotions must be restored to the original sentiments, neglecting hate and animosity for the other. 8. The vision for a shared future; the reconciliation prosperity leads to a new conflict reality to work towards the reconciliation process. Defining a new relationship between the victim’s identity and the perpetrator to acknowledge the other’s suffering and learn from the past to build a better future. The conflict can be altered and ultra-dynamically transformed with inter-integrative phases of transitional shifts within the conflict and amending for a better-shared future with the reconciliation process.

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3 “Holderlin Perspective” (Jena Approach from Theory to practice) The Jena approach towards reconciliation can be situated within the tradition of the theory of the “Holderlin Perspective”, challenging the concept of reconciliation. It does not always happen after a political agreement between leaders of political parties but includes altering the dispute in the middle of the conflicts. As Leiner explained in his book, Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation, the “Hölderlin Perspective”, which derived from the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770– 1843), who wrote in his novel, Hyperion: “Reconciliation is in the middle in a quarrel and everything separated is found again” (Leiner and Flämig 2012, p. 16). In English, this sentence reads as follows: “Reconciliation is in the middle of the strife, and all that was separated finds each other again” (p. 16). Although in every conflict there is a majority that is involved in the conflict and a minority that wants to end the conflict, this illustrates that the reconciliation process within the minority of participants in the conflict can transform into a majority. This develops conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict and transforms conflict relations into peaceful relations for a better common shared future between enemies (Aldajani 2020). Entities or groups in conflict always have aspects of the desire for peace and reconciliation. There will always be a dispute between enemies in conflict; there will never be a majority that wants the conflict process to stagnate. The Holderlin Perspective thrives on transforming the minority in the conflict that wants peace and prosperity into a majority, developing a reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict and altering it into transformation and transitional shifts. It integrates a new reality to diminish the unwanted stagnated, intractable, and protracted conflict. Figure 1 illustrates the integration of the knowledge “episteme” know-how and the “Techne” the how-to construct reconciliation process in the middle of conflict within an ultra-dynamic power shift for change; the knowledge can be known as the epistemology part that identifies reconciliation mechanism, strategies, methods, and know-how to understand “Holderlin Perspective”, the other aspect is the “Techne”, or the how-to, in this aspect, it is Internet communication technologies, application, and tools applied in the digitization world. Combining both elements develops the practice to influence social change altering the power shifts towards the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. Thus, integrations (epistemology, technology) thrive to “Phronesis”, wisdom to understand and practise reconciliation in the middle of the conflict. Figure 2 illustrates that reconciliation in the middle of a conflict between enemies can develop a new reality, a reality of reconciliation that develops a new shared common future between entities in the conflict. Thus, breaking the conflict into reality and the propensity is based on the reconciliation process. Figure 2 shows prosperity for a new reality of reconciliation, and the next section would introduce the need for Hölderlin Perspective to develop the inclusive reconciliation process in the middle of conflict.

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Fig. 1 Holderlin perspective “applied phronesis for reconciliation process” (AlDajani 2020, p. 39)

Fig. 2 Reconciliation reality for a common shared future

There is always a minority in any conflict, who do not want the conflict to persist, perhaps, because they have friends on the other side, want to continue their business, because they are afraid of themselves, or they fear that their children could be killed or become killers. They may want to end the violence or want a change for a better common future that can deal in prosperity, the pursuit of happiness, equality, and freedom. Therefore, the Hölderlin Perspective might be lighting the path in the tunnel.

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4 The Ramifications for the Ultra-Dynamic Powers Towards Peace in the Middle East and North Africa CAIRO (Reuters)—“The Abu Dhabi crown prince said on Monday, 18. August 2021, that the United Arab Emirates is committed to establishing a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, Dubai-based Al Arabiya TV reported”. The United Arab Emirates leadership has stated and affirmed its discourse for a viable Palestinian state, including East Jerusalem being the capital of that state of Palestine. The question that comes to the minds of the stakeholders is: How can the UAE play a significant role in creating peace in the region and affirm that Israeli policymakers accept peace within the parameters of a Palestinian State and East Jerusalem as its capital? This is understood from the illustration of the South African experience for the reconciliation process can help develop a vision towards reconciliation in the middle of a conflict in the Middle East. One of the dilemmas for reconciliation is how to apply (implement) the reconciliation process. For example, how did Mandela and his rivals strive towards peace? One of his famous statements is that “There is no road for peace; peace is the road.” From that aspect, one can derive that the UAE-Israel Peace deal can and must be more than its alleged normalization process, more than military arms, and more than economic growth. It can be a challenge into more thriving peace towards conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards the reconciliation process in the Middle East that transforms the peace path within other Arab countries. The reconciliation process can develop the ultra-dynamic powers needed for conflict transformation and transitional shifts for altering conflict towards a process of healing from atrocities that occurred in conflicts. It could impact the peace process in progress such as the stagnated Israeli-Palestinian peace process that took part fifteen years after the second intifada, which led to the deterioration of the conflict and the peace process (Oslo Peace Process). Moreover, the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict can alter the inclined ideology of hatred between nations in conflict such as the Arab nations and the Jewish nation. Ultra-dynamic powers illustrate conflict transformation, social change, and a breakthrough towards the path of peace, with relations that are dynamic whether it is a thriving power or soft power countries. However, peace is a word that nations have misappropriated in conflict. A new definition that must be realized is where reconciliation begins in the middle of conflict and becomes the engine for the path of peace. From the “The Holderlin Perspective”, there is a need for ultra-dynamic power relations that emerge from the reconciliation process transforming the minority into the majority in the conflict. For example, the UAE-Israel Peace deal was sanctioned by the right-wing government of the Israeli state. Furthermore, more is best to mention that peace agreements are not just agreements to be signed; they are agreements to build peace and reconciliation. The agreement signed neglected the left wingers, peace activists, peace researchers in Israel, and the Arab societies that needed to be strengthened to overcome the hard thoughts of negating the hard ideology of hatred among Jews and non-Jews or Arabs or none Arabs. A statement accepting the notion

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of a Palestinian State side by the side of the State of Israel, the notion of the Abrahamic agreement that Israelis can do peace with the Arabs without having peace or reconciliation with the Palestinians, is a statement that is at fault. The reason for advocating for the peace accords between Israel and the Arab nations in that it depended on peace with the Palestinians. This notion which, twenty years ago, was the right path, but after years of continuous failures between both parties to change their narrative to prosper within a process of peace, it has failed. Instead, both groups have been marred by the ideology of hatred and conflict for generations to come. In his book When Political Transition Works, Fanie Du Toit introduces reconciliation as part of developing interdependencies between two conflict entities and within a protracted intractable conflict, such as the South African experience, to develop a reconciliation process that continues forever. The concept asserts that interdependencies develop fragile beginnings within transitional shifts that work for a process of reconciliation and emerge through it in the middle of the conflict. Inclusive reconciliation introduces and develops ultra-dynamic power relations for new interdependencies that can be moved towards “The Hölderlin Preceptive”, encouraging conflict transformation and transitional shifts into a reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. Interdependences between ultra-dynamic powers develop inclusivity, fairness, and empowering political negotiations. It should involve credible efforts to extend disregarded voices and the most marginalized and disempowered peace activists and political stakeholders that want peace and reconciliation to thrive in the middle of the conflict. Such altering power dynamics can develop a reality check that will seek to transform co-dependencies that were developed from the stagnated peace treaties into interdependencies within exchanges of powers to emerge a new reality within the conflict that alters into transformation and transitions of power towards the peace process if it is respected. With the reality of transformation that inclusive reconciliation and peacebuilding can offer, new realities and ideologies are developed and conflict beliefs will be checked and challenged by their adversaries. The parties have to prove their intent for the inclusive reconciliation process and try to bring their adversaries into the realm of peace; this is where reconciliation in the middle of conflict thrives on transforming the minority who wants a reconciliation process into a majority for the inclusive reconciliation process. The reconciliation process can establish inclusivity by reconfiguring the asymmetrical power relationships in conflicts to drive within creating of a new power relation that is interdependent and that would be nature transitional shifts and conflict transformation in the middle of the conflict. If the peace deals can initiate the “Holderlin Perspective” reconciliation process in the middle of conflict, the road not taken. Introducing Jean-Paul Gustave Ricœur’s conception for the future misperception, that it is open ended, the future cannot be determined. In contrast, the assumption is that the past is fixed. On the contrary, Ricoeur asserts that what happens in the past always remains open to a new perception

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or interpretation for a better future and can be challenged in the present, altering them into conflict transformation towards an inclusive reconciliation process. This means that it is always possible to change the moral load of the past and shift its burden on the present to change the future, leading to the realization of the inclusive reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts.

5 Conclusion Visionary leaders usually act within the conflict’s political capitals that articulate the existing co-dependencies in the conflict and challenge the conflict’s complementary elements and develop a wide ideology of hatred and co-dependences between the dynamic powers, negating peace accords and stagnating it into an intractable conflict. The peace deals with affirmative leaders can develop the ultra-dynamic power shifts needed to transform those co-dependencies and use their potential to be altered into interdependencies. This will regain some momentum for rights, recognition, and acceptance for the upheaving level of the reconciliation process in conflicts within the element particularly shifting the transformation of the conflict. The UAE-Israel peace deal might develop ultra-dynamic powers that can articulate those co-dependencies into interdependencies that would develop the Middle East’s inclusive reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. As a result, inclusive reconciliation could evolve and become the path taken to articulate the peace that stagnated within the Arab peace treaty done by their forefathers such as the Arab Peace Initiative. It can then shape the conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards inclusive reconciliation in the middle of the conflict in the Middle East. Lastly, the inclusive reconciliation process needs good relationships for a longliving strategy for a better common future and challenging the future prosperity of the conflict. The future does not need a long, open, and frozen conflict that the children of the conflict inherit, where, victims and perpetrators exchange sides where none negate the other, developing a frozen or open-ended intractable conflict or a complementary element to the conflict. Frozen conflicts are such as stagnating peace treaties that lost their path and returned to their normal conflict process within societies and nations that lose the future and inherit the conflict. The inclusive reconciliation process is an open-ended process that includes theories, methods, strategies, and practices indicating transformation from theories into practice for developing a real-life momentum for transformation into a better common future. These are influenced by civil societies, governments, non-governmental organizations, political leaders, specialists of many disciplines, peace researchers, peace activists, lawyers in conflicts, psychologists, religious leaders, historians, social media, and other classical literature. It affects the lives of women, men, children, grandchildren, and the future of many generations. Inclusive reconciliation is already in the middle of violent conflict. In most cases, practitioners of reconciliation must assert tolerance, and understand the narrative of the other, to be followed for many years before such a process can be endured. Often

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reconciliation is lived as a spiritual path and a thought, but it can also be seen in completely pragmatic terms and transformed from theory into practice. Reconciliation does not mean cheap peace, giving up our rights, removing the history or the violent past, or altering the other; it is a path for truth, justice, and coexistence. All those who want a better future for themselves or their children and grandchildren are invited to take reconciliation as a possibility into consideration for a future that holds equality, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness. Reconciliation is inclusive.

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Peace and Reconciliation Studies Wolfgang Dietrich

1 Perspective In June 2008, UNESCO awarded the Leopold-Franzens University of Innsbruck with the establishment of Chair for Peace Studies and honored this university’s extraordinary achievements in didactics and curricular development in the field of peace and conflict studies. The MA Program for Peace, Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation at the University of Innsbruck had been founded in 2001 (University of Innsbruck 2001) and was by itself expression of the (trans-) discipline’s academic development since its first institutional attempts in the late 1950s, respectively, since its global dissemination in the 1970s. Since the millennium, Innsbruck’s project is built on the well-established academic understanding of peace studies at the Bradford University in England, where the first European chair for peace studies was installed as early as 1973. The anthropologist Adam Curle who has been appointed the first professor of this chair defined peace studies as a trans-discipline. This means that the systematic investigation on peace as a key value of humankind must not be limited by the epistemology of traditional disciplines but has to be open for the full range of academic methodology, knowledge, and wisdom. Forged ahead by his personal experience, Curle considered the methodological state of the art in anthropology, psychology, and political science as the required minimum for peace research and applied conflict work (Mitchels 2006: 22–38; Lederach and Woodhouse 2016: 20/21). Since then, academic requirements and experience enlarged this minimum dynamically to further disciplines such as law, philosophy, linguistics, sociology, arts, biology, neuro-science, economy, theology, and more.

W. Dietrich (B) UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_2

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Already the first curriculum of Innsbruck’s Master of Arts in Peace Studies took root on this insight. According to the then topical guidelines of UNESCO’s Manifesto 2000 and the decade of the Culture of Peace, it made scientificality, inter-culturalism, internationalism, and multi-confessional openness to its principles (University of Innsbruck 2021). This Master bloomed for 20 years and gradually gained reputation as the toughest program in the field, because it consequently combined the studies of trans-rational peace philosophy with practical training in order to prepare academics for applied peace work also in difficult environments. Simultaneously, Innsbruck’s staff worked in the applied field of conflict transformation, served as visiting faculty and supported the foundation of similar programs at many universities around the world. By doing so, interaction and cooperation with neighboring disciplines are a regular experience. In this context happened the encounter between Innsbruck and the 2012 founded Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies at the Department for Theology of the Friedrich Schiller University Jena. After some first contacts, both universities and their partners in the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa embarked into an Erasmus + project on Capacity Building for Higher Education (Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies JCRS). Such multi-disciplinary projects tend to consume academics with administrative, legal, budget, and normative management. Nevertheless, eventually the common efforts reach the ground of substantial epistemological questions. They ask for the own and the partners’ scientific identity. After approximately one year of cooperation, the AARMENA Erasmus + project arrived at this point. Consequently, I would like to discuss what reconciliation studies might be from a trans-rational peace studies point of view. What do we have in common? What separates us? What makes cooperation fruitful and recommendable?

2 A Hypothesis on the Difference Between Reconciliation Studies and Peace Studies Nelson Mandela’s famous definition of reconciliation from 1995, quoted after Leiner et al. (2014: 205), may serve as a starting point for this analysis: Reconciliation means working together to correct the legacy of past injustice.

In one of the most quoted handbooks of peace studies, Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 246) dedicate a complete chapter to reconciliation and state at the very beginning: Reconciliation—restoring broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differences—can be seen as the ultimate goal of conflict resolution. […] reconciliation constitutes the heart of deep peacemaking and cultural peacebuilding. […] politics of reconciliation, which is seen to involve reparation, truth telling and healing amongst former adversaries.

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In the frame of our joint AARMENA lecture, session of October 22, 2021, Reconciliation Researcher Martin Leiner presented the purpose of his discipline as follows: The scholarly description, interpretation and evaluation of processes of creating “normal” and if possible “good relationships” between states, groups, organizations, and individuals reacting against past, present or preventing future grave incidents such as wars, civil wars, genocides, atrocities, forced displacement, enslavement, dictatorship, oppression, colonialism, Apartheid and other human rights violations and injustices.

At the first glance then, reconciliation could be but another word for conflict transformation. Indeed, both terms appear in very similar if not the same contexts. Leiner continued: While on a surface, the good relationships are between states, groups, organizations and individuals, on a deeper level we always deal with 5 dimensions of reconciliation: 1. With oneself 2. With the other(s) 3. With the own group and its different parts 4. With environment 5. With transcendence.

While this structure strongly reminds of the Pancha Kosha or the Five Sheaths’ theory as presented in the Taittriya Upanishad (Satpathy 2018: 33–39), it comes very close to what we call Elicitive Conflict Mapping (Dietrich 2018) in trans-rational peace philosophy. Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 247) define the four dimensions of reconciliation as. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Accepting the status quo—Ending violence; Correlating accounts—Overcoming polarization; Bridging opposites—Managing contradiction; Reconstituting relations—Celebrating difference.

In this vein, they quote Donna Pankhurst (1999: 239–256) who stated the highest form of reconciliation as. Past enmity is set aside and emotional space is created for reforging new relationships.

It is obvious that all these approaches coincide fairly. However, the word transcendence in Leiner’s point 5 calls for the trans-rational peace researcher’s attention. It seems to be consequent that transcendence as a key word locates reconciliation studies at a Department for Theology while the immanent epistemology of transrational peace philosophy points rather to the Department for Philosophy and History, where peace studies are allocated in Innsbruck. Thus, if the hypothesis is that the main difference between reconciliation and peace studies can be found in their transcendent, respectively, immanent epistemologies (Dietrich 2021: 25), it is worth to begin really from the scratch, that is, from the etymological origins.

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I have discussed interpretations of peace(s) in history and culture extensively (Dietrich et al. 2011; Dietrich 2012), but until now I have never dived that profoundly into the history and meaning of reconciliation though it is frequently used and important not only in the discipline that carries its name but also in peace studies. So, what is re-con-cilia-tion verbatim?

3 An Etymological Attempt The etymological root of the operation that we express today as to reconcile is the Latin verb silere,1 which translates verbatim as to utter or make no sound. In contemporary English, the primordial Latin verb silere turned wondrously into an adverb, to be silent. The noun, which expresses the respective status, is silentium, the obvious root of the English noun silence (Glare 2012: 1941). The prefix con is the word-forming element that indicates in Latin together. Consilescere hence stands for to become silent together. The noun con-silium means a calm deliberation (Glare 2012: 456). Throughout history, those words have often got confused in the writings with con-ciliare for to bring together and its noun con-cilium for a public and friendly meeting (Glare 2012: 425). I argue that a transcendent understanding of the shared silence of con-silium will take us close to a structuralist definition of negative peace, that is, the absence of physical violence (Galtung 1969: 167–191). This is consequent, because imagined is a group of people in conflict sitting down in a resonance circle and discussing calmly their issues. By definition, they do not apply physical violence during the con-cilium and, following Leiner, in the best case neither after it, because in the con-silium they create normal and good relationships between individuals, groups, organizations, or states. If they succeed, the negative peace turns into positive, which means in this terminology also the absence of structural violence, another word for justice (Galtung 1969: 167–191). The characteristics of the transcendent notion unveil themselves in the words normal and good. These words belong to the epistemology of Moral Peace (Dietrich 2012: 65–115) that grounds in the undisputed belief into the existence of an ultimate point of reference who can define the normal and the good, but also the just, the right, and the beauty. Mostly, we call this ultimate point of reference God. It means a demiurge, who individually and eternally resides beyond the mundane sphere of time and space, but created it, knows and sees everything. On doomsday, he judges all human deeds. Requesting and expecting the normal and the good requires the belief into the existence of such a transcendent reference. In an immanent world, on the other hand, the purpose of the con-silium is not a good result, but rather the operation and its experience as such. The human sphere does not limit silere. It can also refer to weather conditions (Glare 2012: 1941). That is, it is about connectivity in the shared silence that the common frame, the system, 1

Indicative presence conjugation: sil¯eo¯ , sil¯es, sil¯et, sil¯emus, sil¯etis, and sil¯ent.

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existence provides. Silere is the purpose of con-silium. The verb defines the noun, not the inverse as imperative in modern European grammars. The procedure itself is the aim of immanent silere. Therefore, the human qualities required here are different to the transcendent approach. It is more about feeling, sensing, perceiving, enjoying, and celebrating silere than thinking, arguing, aiming, and hence talking and doing in a calm manner. The immanent worldview, as the word says, does not rely on One Almighty God beyond, but on the divine nature of all existence. The world per se is divine, no beyond, no individual God (Deleuze 1996: 30). Therefore, it does not know the transcendent notion of the normal, the good, the just, the right, or the beauty. These values depend holistically on situations and relations of individuals in the dynamics of human systems. They have to be re-negotiated and re-communicated in each moment, each situation, in each encounter, and each relation anew. The prefix re in re-con-ciliation hence stands for again. It indicates that the shared silence has got lost and needs to be re-established. In the transcendent worldview, the loss of silence necessarily roots in behavioral errors, sins. Sins need expiation, appeasement of God. In Christianity, the God-given 10 Commandments as normative list of right doing, or rather: no wrongdoing, come into the picture at this point. As long as people regard them, life will be normal and good. When somebody disregards them, re-conciliation becomes necessary. Moreover, if things get very bad, humankind needs a superior reconciler, Jesus Christ, who mediates between the human and the divine spheres, what is the typical function of shamans in all cultures throughout history around the world (Dietrich 2021: 69/70). It refers to a primordial human need. The immanent world does not need such a mediator between nature and supernature. Still joint silere can become unpractical due to human errors and turmoil in the system. Re-con-silescere and re-con-ciliare bring back into friendship (Glare 2012: 1745). The homeostatic flow (Bertanlanffy 1968) of the system returns to calm dynamics. Things do not get out of balance to the extent that the system falls apart at a bifurcation point, metaphorically, calm weather and no storms. Because in the worst case, the end of shared silere equals (sub-)system death. Homeostasis of the human system means the smooth flow of social dynamics and the ecstatic experience of shared silence, the calm individual breath in resonance with the divine breath of the whole world, as Taoists translate their immanent word for peace: He Ping in Chinese or He Wa in Japanese (Kam Por and Ping 2011: 244–259). Since both, Innsbruck and Jena, belong to the German-speaking world, I discuss briefly the etymology of the German word for reconciliation, Versöhnung. At a first glance, this word reminds of the German word for son, Sohn. However, this superficial impression comes only from a relatively recent sound shift from the Middle High German suone or süene. Suone vüegen meant to reconcile, versöhnen (Lexers 1976: 451). In Christianity, Suone, atonement, is necessary to heal Sünde, sin, because Sünde causes chasm between humankind and the One God. Thus, God came to Earth in the guise of Jesus Christ because the human sins, Sünden, caused chasm and required Ver-sühnung, appeasement, between humankind and God (Paul the Apostle: Second Epistle to the Corinthians 5, 19). The Latin root for the contemporary German verb versöhnen is propitiare, which roots in propitius, favorably inclined gods (Glare

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2012: 1644). The pre-Latin noun pro-pets means protector and Latin potis having power of a house/place (Glare 2012: 1561). If this place is the whole world, potis refers to the Lord of Hosts. This brief etymologic journey illustrates that German Versöhnung even more explicitly than English reconciliation denotes a transcendent and rather religious term.

4 Justice Based on the above said, it is consequent to focus on the logical relation between reconciliation and justice for the notion of peace. In trans-rational peace philosophy justice is one of the four “general directions”, that is, ingredients of peace. In this system, we know peace out of harmony, peace out of justice, peace out of security, and peace out of truth. The first one refers to the non-dual interpretations of peace, which we call energetic. The second group, which builds on the transcendent duality of good and bad, respectively, right and wrong, are the dual forms of Moral Peace. The third group is based on the notion of peace out of the security that modern nation-states promise. We congruously call it Modern Peace. The group that doubts these promises and opts for plurality of truths is the postmodern. Trans-rational is the attempt to unite them in one single method of conflict transformation since all of them can be found empirically in the perceptions, beliefs, and aspirations of real people (Dietrich 2012: 210–269). If I cling on this seminal systematization of peace interpretations, I have to place reconciliation studies logically in the field of Moral Peace. This requires a further debate on peace out of justice, the common ground of Jewry, Christianity, and Islam. Hence, I recap here briefly, what I elaborated and published on this topic earlier in Dietrich (2012: 72–76). The story begins with the prophet Isaiah who lived in the eighth century BCE and was the first to criticize the settled Israelite tribes’ ethics of war centered on Yahweh, by advocating a separation between God and military power. Trust in God and trust in the military were, for Isaiah, mutually exclusive. In order to maintain the community, he suggested a trustful and calm renunciation of violence as a feasible alternative to military security. He saw this renunciation as the only chance of survival for the community and as a basic requirement for peace with their neighbors (Koppe 2001: 70/1). Which peace did he mean? Schalom, the Hebrew word for peace, is the expression of a comprehensive wholeness and wellbeing that encompasses the complete person with body and soul, the community, the group, the natural Mitwelt, and even all the relations within which he lives (Huber and Reuter 1990: 35).

The closeness to Leiner’s above quoted definition of reconciliation is thrilling. It goes further: The seed syllable SLM for Jewish Shalom, Arabic Salam, Aramaic Shalim, or Assyrian Shlomo describes force, life, accomplished human being and

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manifest godhead. It means reconciliation in and with God and implies a way of life in which all those living together have enough, first of all in the sense of the fulfillment of their basic physical needs, but then also in a sexual–familial, emotional–communal, social–mental, and spiritual sense (Dietrich 2018: 25–106). Reconciliation and peace out of justice in this sense are not only close to each other. They are the same. Originating from such a basic meaning, this word spreads into a variety of different contexts, from a form of greeting, through physical or material well-being in everyday life, to transcendent connotations (Ellis 2011: 89). The word is interpreted as having enough, which implies that peace is understood as a way of life in which satisfaction is done unto all in all aspects. This raises the crucial question: Who is all? Does it only include the members of one’s own community or as well the re-humanized former enemies? If the latter was the case, such SLM required a sound way of dealing with the past, trauma, and atrocities. People have to deal with such a past in order to clear the ground in the present for the building of a shared future (Lederach 1997: 27). However, in biblical times, such measures were not available. Peace rather slanted toward a material interpretation of shalom as peace out of justice. The Hebrew shalom was only thinkable in connection to the specific Israelite God of war, as clearly expressed in Moses 26:3–7 (Schmid 1971: 57/58): If you follow my decrees and are careful to obey my commands, I will send you rain in its season, and the ground will yield its crops and the trees of the field their fruit. Your threshing will continue until grape harvest and the grape harvest will continue until planting, and you will eat all the food you want and live in safety in your land. I will grant peace in the land, and you will lie down and no one will make you afraid. I will remove savage beasts from the land, and the sword will not pass through your country. You will pursue your enemies, and they will fall by the sword before you.

It is a peace, which energetically connects society, nature, and supernature. Divisiveness is here the opposite of peace, as a domestic affair of the people chosen by the creator God and its friends. War as a means of combating enemies and improving the world is accepted. Shalom designates that point of reference starting from which the mending of the world shall take place, when the divisiveness of the world is ending in messianic times (Ellis 2011:89). Against this background Isaiah 32:17 sums up the meaning of shalom as follows: The fruit of righteousness will be peace; the effect of righteousness will be quietness and confidence forever.

The crisis of the Babylonian exile sparked an interpretation of Isaiah’s 11:1 prophetic message, which postpones its realization and the reconstitution of such a peace until the future, when the Messiah will create justice and peace in and with the world. This structure of thinking can easily be recognized as the anticipation of Idealism, which, not accidentally, adopted Isaiah’s famous quote 2:2–4 about the transformation of swords to plowshares and spears to pruning hooks. Isaiah thereby transforms the God of war, Yahweh, into a bringer of peace between the peoples. It is thus a veritable transformation of Yahweh’s belligerent energy.

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This has its price: Instead of a cosmic energy with its visible allegories, now the personified creator God Yahweh as sole and highest principle enters the believers’ conceptual horizon. The peace of this God manifests in worldly justice, also and just because it remains promised. Peace is thus no longer perceived in the here and now, but is projected forward from a pitiful now into a better future, which has to be imagined. If this vectoral understanding of societal time relates to the material aspect of justice, one may ask whether we talk about a peace out of justice or rather about the alternative between peace and justice. Is reconciliation possible under these premises of an ideology that has revenge for injustice suffered in the past, hate and envy toward others—the heretics—in the present, and greed for more of such justice in the future, written on its banners? To link revenge with the past, hate with the present, and greed with the future results in a highly problematic ethic of peace. It is thus much rather a fear-driven and exclusionary legitimization of violence and war (Maes and Schmitt 2004:191). Yahweh does not overcome his character as a God of war, because he remains jealous and vindictive if anybody venerates other gods besides him. The Lord of Hosts demands absolute loyalty on the road toward the future, assent to one’s own suffering in the now, and in return promises salvation. Crucial for this concept of justice is not the perpetrator’s outer punishment for his offense, but that disregard for divine law falls back onto the perpetrator himself. The Old Testament thus forms a kind of destiny-creating sphere of deeds for the human being. This sphere is similar to the Indian karma and, according to the human being’s actions, surrounds him in a wholesome or unwholesome manner. Yet it differs from karma, in that here the personified One God judges his people by completely abandoning them to the consequences of their own absolutely good or bad deeds. This creates a permanent fear of damnation and only a vague hope for salvation, tied to uncountable conditions (Schwager 1986:13). The believer pays for the latter by relinquishing his power of self-determination. Regarding the time of the Babylonian captivity, I could say that this price was traded in a currency, freedom, which was not available in any case. Yet such a connection misses the problem. More decisively, where there is a fear-driven surrender to the narrow standard of a divine hierarchy, consent to a worldly hierarchy soon follows, and from this, the people ultimately come to expect, and are given the illusion of, justice. The legitimization of authority through the exclusive interpretation of the will of the One God standing apart from the world, and thus the proscription of other alternatives, is the blueprint for a model of rule, which, over the generations, arises repeatedly in Mediterranean history. In this manner, the experts of belief inserted themselves, following the example of Jesus Christ and the shamans of all times, between the divine and the world. The peaceless and dualistic character of monotheism is thus already inherent as basic matrix to its original history (Assmann 2006; Maciejewski 2002; Danielou 1984: 226–235). This argument dates back to the last complete work of Sigmund Freud, published 1939 in English as Moses and Monotheism, which connects these considerations of ancient history with psychoanalysis of our days.

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Nevertheless, history exposed the archaic-biblical notion of justice to the changes of societies, philosophies, values, and languages. In the early nineteenth century, it appears in different guise. Hölderlin (1998: 760) stated as early as 1797 in his novel Hyperion that reconciliation begins in the middle of strife and anything separated finds each other. Since this is crucial for the JCRS approach (Leiner et al. 2014: 9), I leave the further elaboration of this argument for my colleagues from Jena. I just state here that this early Hölderlin quote draws the attention from the individual guilt of the perpetrator and individual right to retaliation of the victim to the relational aspect of the conflict. A decade later, in 1807, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel equaled in his seminal Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of the Mind/Spirit) reconciliation with excuse. He elaborated that only by a reconciling Yes, perpetrator and victim can recognize each other and thus escape from the infinite loop of justice in the sense of revenge and retaliation. The wounds of the Spirit, Hegel says, heal and no scars remain; the deed is not everlasting, but the Spirit takes it back into itself (Hegel 1986: 492). Equalizing reconciliation with excuse requires another etymological journey and a further distinction. Because excuse is not forgiveness. In an impressive way, Flaßpöhler (2016: 19–36) elaborates the difference between the German words verzeihen, to excuse, and vergeben, to forgive or pardon. According to Flaßpöhler (2016: 18), vergeben, to forgive, implies a greater degree of moral guilt than verzeihen, to excuse. The latter stems from Latin ex-cuso, meaning to release from a charge. The excuser does not seek a principally and ethically possible compensation. Middle High German z¯ıhen meant to name a cause, to accuse. The prefix ver- indicates the negation: not to accuse, to excuse. Thus, to excuse refers to an act below the application of the eternal divine or human law that punishes those who are guilty. Since excusing is at human disposition, it refers to acts of minor ethical and moral impact. Pardoning, from the Medieval Latin noun perdonum or the Vulgar Latin verb perdonare, forgiving, in German vergeben, on the other hand, is used in the religious context of sin or the mandatory regulations of penal law and crime, for severe acts of violence, insult, humiliation, deceit, and the like. Thus, this notion points morally to a transcendent authority entitled to absolve the perpetrator from guilt. In Christianity, guilt is a key concept of order, ritually followed by confession, remorse, and expiation. In the end, the authority, God, the king, or the court literally give the righteous affect to revenge away. In Middle High German, Jesus Christ is the Vergelter von der Schult (Lexers 1976: 478). Disagreeing with Hegel and quoting Jacques Derrida (2000: 10–18), Flaßpöhler (2016: 24/25) further separates excuse from reconciliation. A victim who understands, versteht, the motives of the perpetrator—and would eventually act in a similar way in his place—cannot excuse. With understanding/verstehen, excuse/verzeihen finds its end and reconciliation begins. Reconciliation demands mutual understanding, while excuse is unconditional. It asks neither for remorse nor for retaliation. It is neither normative nor normalizing.

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Flaßpöhler (2016: 34) discusses further, whether oblivion can enact peace. This is a difficult topic because common wisdom considers people who cannot forget irreconcilable. In reverse conclusion, those who forget are supposed to be peaceful. However, after a traumatizing past, can official amnesia be expected by minds whose memories are filled with atrocities? In some recent cases, for example after the Franco dictatorship in Spain, governments tried this route to peace. Others went the more conventional way of trials, reparations, and retaliation. A third way is honoring the past by Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. South Africa is probably the most known and successful case but far from the only one (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 252–256). Heidegger (1969: 5/6) and Vattimo (2006: 235) discriminate between oblivion/Vergessen and twist/Verwindung in the sense of descent/Überlieferung or remembrance/Andenken. For illustrating the difference: neither could I forget my late father as a beloved person nor did I overcome, überwinden, the pain that the loss caused with the day of his funeral. I had and have to twist/verwinden the pain while I keep the beloved person, who is physically not present any more, in memory in order to begin to live again. This kind of twist/Verwindung turns from simple mourning to a highly philosophical concept when we apply it beyond persons on experiences, perceptions, beliefs, truths, and feelings. Whatever they have been, they are not real in the presence any more since they belong to the past. Still we remember. Like a beloved person, we can only twist/verwinden but never overcome/überwinden them in a human life. Therefore, neglect/vergessen is not an option for unconditional excuse/bedingungsloses Verzeihen. Only twisting awareness/verwindendes Bewusstsein of the past suffering offers such a base. Twisting awareness then is the ground for immanent reconciliation, or call it elicitive conflict transformation (Lederach 1995: 55–72), and hence precondition for any kind of positive peace (Dietrich 2021). Since the critical debate on all these words, even more in various languages, confuses, I try now to organize and structure them according to the so far discussed. I begin with the observation that the idea of reconciliation stems principally from a Moral Peace understanding that delegates the ultimate ratio on human deeds to a transcendent Lord of Hosts. In such a worldview, conflicts can be overcome/überwunden. Perpetrators can be forgiven/vergeben, and suffering can be forgotten/vergessen. In this world, human individuals are accountable doers behind their deeds. If they commit an error in their conduct of life, they call it sin. The Lord of Hosts will make those deeds subject of his sentence on the day of judgment. Since this is a highly charged issue in this system, forgiving/vergeben is the exclusive privilege of God. Human individuals may be able to forget conflicts and suffering. However, they are not the masters and makers of their own forgetting/Vergessen. It is in God’s hands whether he grants it. Thus, the German proverb vergangen–vergeben–vergessen– vorbei (gone–forgiven–forgotten–overcome) illustrates pretty well the roadmap of transcendent reconciliation that ends in conflict resolution and a status of negative peace. Secular modernity followed the same pattern of transcendent reconciliation. God turned into reason; sin into crime but the roadmap remained the same.

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Transcendent Reconciliation A Roadmap to Conflict Resolution and Negative Peace. Vergangen

Vergeben

Vergessen

Vorbei/überwunden

Gone

Forgiven

Forgotten

Overcome

If we transfer the idea and praxis of reconciliation from its original transcendent structure into immanence, the notion changes significantly. Suffering, discrimination, and violation cannot be forgiven, forgotten, or overcome in this world, because there is no transcendent or secular authority morally entitled to do so. Reconciliation means immanently that pain has to be twisted/verwunden, that is, people keep it in their memory and narrative, while they acknowledge consciously the elapsed character of their suffering. This entitles them to excuse/verzeihen whatever they are ethically able to excuse unconditionally. Middle High German verzihen means literally treating something or somebody with defiance (Lexers 1976: 481). However, we discussed with Derrida that ethically excusable issues are not relevant for excuse. Subject of immanent reconciliation is rather the ethically not excusable that can only be twisted/verwunden by putting oneself into the shoes of the other and understand/verstehen the act that resulted in one’s own disadvantage. In peace studies, we draw here the line between transcendent conflict resolution and immanent conflict transformation. The same line separates the essentialist notion of negative peace, the singularetantum for the absence of war and violence, from existentialist notion of positive peace in systems and relations, which express themselves in plural or even verbs for to peace (Dietrich 2021: 10, 29). Immanent Reconciliation A Roadmap to Conflict Transformation and Positive Peace. Vergangen

Verziehen

Verstanden

Vorbei/verwunden

Gone

Excused

Understood

Twisted

This redirects to the beginning of this journey. Re-con-ciliare, becoming friends again through sound common negotiation, and re-c¯on-sil¯escere, being silent together again, may refer both to very similar activities. So similar that they often get confused, but the different terms may express different attitudes that in the end root in substantially different worldviews and hence different understandings of reconciliation.

5 Restorative Justice and Peace Studies This last point becomes evident when we follow the further career of the key term justice. The conventional understanding of retributive or distributive justice holds

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the transcendent focus on the tension between guilty perpetrator and individual or collective victim as subjects. It asks for evidence on the discrimination that may have happened and relies on guilt as the main normative tool in order to advance to confession, remorse, and expiation of the perpetrator, while the victim gets revenge, reparation, and retaliation. Anthropology often ascribes the immanent worldview to contemporary indigenous societies and their energetic interpretations of peace. However, the same applies to postmodernism, trans-rationality, and all those definitions of peace that ground in system theories. They logically cannot deal with transcendent ideas of ultimate truth, eternal free soul and hence individual guilt, sin, punishment, and retaliation. Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 256/257) report impressive results of traditional healers from Mozambique or lineage leaders, women’s initiatives, and local community peace processes in Somalia in conflict work. They all reside in an immanent worldview. However, Zehr (2005), the probably most known promoter of restorative justice, refers mainly to First Nations of Canada, the Maori in New Zealand and more indigenous groups, who often found their values and practices discounted and repressed by cultural imperialism. Their definition of justice focusses on the restauration of the damaged or harmed aspect of relations be they materially or ideally affected. Since this justice is strictly relational, it counts on restitution with input from both, offended and offenders. Zehr published his path breaking approach to an immanent understanding of conflict transformation first in 1990. He discriminated retributive justice, which views crime as an offense against the nation state and its normative order, from a restorative justice framework, where violence, community decline, and fear-based responses are indicators of broken relationships. In Dietrich (2013: 46–54) and more extensively in the German original of this volume (Dietrich 2011: 121–138), I took up from there and referred to the mechanics, the social meaning and effects of circles of law or circles of justice mainly in immanent Native American contexts. Concerned individuals meet with all parties to assess the experience and impact of the violent act. Offenders listen to victims’ experiences, preferably until they are able to understand with the experience. Then they explain how they decided to commit the offense. The purpose of the procedure is rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender into society. By understanding the circumstances, which contributed to the offense, restorative justice seeks to repair the harm to the relationships that resulted from the offense in order to prevent that the offender repeats the undesirable behavior. The aim of these circles, hence, is to repair the harm related to conflict, violence, and victimization in a restorative way. Since Zehr first issued restorative justice, it became very popular. It attracted many segments of society far beyond the limits of peace studies such as police, courts, schools, politics, and diplomacy who believe that restorative justice is more humane than punitive and criminal justice. Within the trans-discipline, it became a leading principle. Concisely, Zehr (2005: 271) draws the procedural line of restorative justice along a sequence of simple questions such as:

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Who has been hurt? What are their needs? Whose obligations are these? What are the causes? Who has a stake in the situation? What is the appropriate process to involve stakeholders in an effort to address causes and put things right?

This way may be effective, because it avoids stigmatizing individual offenders or groups of them and rather involves them into relational reflections of their ethic development by understanding the harm they have caused to the others. They do not feel forced to justify their behavior, and it is more likely that they acknowledge its consequences. Restorative Justice as a principle and method found its way into international law and from there into penal law of many countries, where it finds a wide variation of use. However, all of them share the foundation in the active personal role of offended and offenders, the possible participation of related communities, the focus on material and emotional needs of the offended, the insight into accountability on the offenders’ side, and the promotion of their reintegration into the communities. It was quite a remarkable step when the European Council (2000) recommended the application of these principles and methods in the national law of its member states. The UN Economic and Social Council based its Resolution 2002/12 on that and hence made fairly Native American practices integrative part of international law. Since then, the common academic understanding of restorative justice includes a minimum of three elements: – A participatory dimension, which requires the personal presence of all parties and the acceptance of accountability for their own deeds; – A social dimension, which regards the emotional relation between offender(s) and offended; – A restorative dimension, which regards the damage and its legal aspect by putting reparation of the caused loss higher than additional suffering of the offenders by punishment. Based on those principles, restorative justice allows to escape from the eternally turning wheel of guilt, revenge, envy, and greed, the archaic ingredients of retributive justice that became element of European deep culture. No surprise that the academic assessment of restorative justice in peace studies is very positive. Many studies indicate that restorative justice makes offenders less likely to re-offend in very different contexts, and it yields a higher rate of victim satisfaction than retributive methods of transcendent interpretations of justice. The obvious limits of punitive traditions lead from here to the question of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and the option of Transitional Justice on the higher political level of post-conflict societies. Since this type of conflict transformation and dealing with the past emerged first in 1974 in Argentina, it became a widely accepted standard. United Nations (2010) recommend it as a non- or sub-judicial fact

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finding method in addition to prosecution initiatives. Since the 1970s, this method has been developed and extended remarkably. With that, we reach the very domain of reconciliation studies. I leave it for my colleagues from Jena to pick up from here, respectively, to describe our common field of interest from their perspective.

6 Conclusion Concisely, I confirm that conflict transformation as applied aspect of peace studies and reconciliation refers to very similar, if not the same kind of operations. This goes to the extent that we find the same stakeholders operating under both titles and without serious consideration of differences, especially in the practical field. However, if we dive into the etymological grounds and follow the philosophical developments, we see that there are very different notions of reconciliation and justice, for example between the Jewish–Christian–Muslim deep culture and its transcendent tradition of norms, and the Native American, Maori, or African traditions that interpret reconciliation as immanent procedure of healing relations and communities. The latter often do not even have a single word for peace as a status but only descriptions of the more or less harmonious or chaotic but perpetual homeostasis of human relations. The purpose of this essay is not to choose between either, to place the one above the other, but rather to highlight the epistemological differences that result from the various linguistic frames and highlight the relevance of these differences for the practical work, because they can provoke serious misunderstandings before the agenda of factual issues opens.

References Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa AARMENA. https:// www.aarmena.uni-jena.de. Accessed 2 Nov 2021 Assmann (2006) Monotheismus und die Sprache der Gewalt. Picus, Vienna Bertalanffy LV (1968) General system theory: foundations, development, applications. Braziller, New York Council of Europe (2000) Mediation in penal matters. Recommendation No. R (99) 19, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 15 September 1999. Council of Europe Publications, Strassbourg Daniélou A (1984) Gods of love and ecstasy—the traditions of Shiva and Dionysus. Inner Traditions/Bear, New York Deleuze G (1996) Die Immanenz, ein Leben…; in: Balke, Friedrich, Joseph Vogl Hg.: Gilles Deleuze—Fluchtlinien der Philosophie. München Derrida J (2000) Jahrhundert der Vergebung. Gespräch mit Michel Wieviorka. In Lettre Int vol 48/2000 Dietrich W (2011) Elicitive Konflikttransformation und die transrationale Wende der Friedenspolitik (=Variationen über die vielen Frieden/2). Springer, Wiesbaden

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Dietrich W (2018) Elicitice conflict mapping (= Many Peaces Vol 3). Palgrave Macmillan, London Dietrich W, Echavarria J, Esteva G, Ingruber D, Koppensteiner N (eds) (2011) The palgrave international handbook of peace studies: a cultural perspective. Palgrave MacMillan, London Dietrich W (2012) Interpretations of peace in history and culture (=Many Peaces vol 1). Palgrave MacMillan, London Dietrich W (2013) Elicitive conflict transformation and the transrational shift in peace politics (=Many Peaces vol 2). Palgrave MacMillan, London Dietrich W (2021) Der die das Frieden. Nachbemerkung zur Trilogie über die vielen Frieden. Springer, Wiesbaden Ellis MS (2011) Shalom—a meditation on the future of the jewish people after the Holocaust and Israel. In: Dietrich W, Echavarría J, Esteva G, Ingruber D, Koppensteiner N (eds) The palgrave international handbook of peace studies. A cultural perspective. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Freud S (1939) Moses and Monotheism. Knopf, New York Flaßpöhler S (2016) Verzeihen. Vom Umgang mit der Schuld; München: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt Galtung J (1969) Violence, peace and peace research. J Peace Res 69:167–191. (Oslo) Glare PGW (ed) (2012) Oxford latin dictionary. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hegel, GWF (1986) Phänomenologie des Geistes. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt [first published 1807] Heidegger M (1969) Zur Sache des Denkens. Niemeyer, Tübingen Höderlin F (1998) Sämtliche Werke und Briefe/ Bd.1. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt [first published 1797/98] Huber W, Reuter H-R (1990) Friedensethik. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies JCRS: Capacity Building for Higher Education Program (CBHE). https://www.aarmena.uni-jena.de/Erasmus, Accessed 18 Dec 2021 Kam-Por Y, He P (2011) A confucian perspective. In: Wolfgang D, Alvarez JE, Esteva G, Ingruber D, Koppensteiner N (eds) The palgrave international handbook of peace studies: a cultural perspective. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 244 259 Koppe K (2001) Der vergessene Frieden—Friedensvorstellungen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Leske & Budrich, Opladen Lederach JP (1995) Preparing for peace: conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse Lederach JP (1997) Building peace. Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington Lederach JP, Woodhouse T, Curle A (2016) Radical peacemaker. Hawthorn, Stroud Leiner M, Palme M, Stöckner P (eds) (2014) Societies in transition. Sub-Saharan Africa between Conflict and Reconciliation. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttinger Lexers M (1976) Mittelhochdeutsches Taschenwörterbuch. S. Hirzel Verlag, Stuttgart Maciejewski F (2002) Psychoanalytisches Archiv und jüdisches Gedächtnis. Freud, Beschneidung und Monotheismus. Passagen, Vienna Maes J, Schmitt M (2004) Gerechtigkeit und Gerechtigkeitspsychologie. In: Fuchs A, Sommer G (eds) Krieg und Frieden, Handbuch der Konflikt- und Friedenspsychologie. Beltz, Berlin Mitchels B (2006) Love in danger. Trauma therapy and conflict explored through the life and work of Adam Curle. Jon Carpenter Publishing, Charlbury Pankhurst D (1999) Issues of justice and reconciliation in complex political emergencies. Third World Q 20/1:239–256 Paul the Apostle: second epistle to the corinthians. https://www.uibk.ac.at/theol/leseraum/bibel/ 2kor5.html. Accessed 17 Nov 2021 Ramsbotham O, Woodhouse T, Miall H (eds) (2011) Contemporary conflict resolution. Polity, Cambridge Satpathy B (2018) Pancha Kosha theory of personality. Int J Indian Psychol 6(2):33–39 Schmid HH (1971) Shalom—Frieden im Alten Orient und im Alten Testament. KBW Verlag, Stuttgart Schwager R (1986) Für Gerechtigkeit und Frieden. Der Glaube als Antwort auf die Anliegen der Gegenwart. Tyrolia, Innsbruck

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United Nations (2010) United Nations’ approach to transitional justice. Guidance note of the secretary-general, March 2010. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_M arch_2010FINAL.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2021 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2002) Resolution 2002/12: Basic principles on the use of restorative justice programmes in criminal matters. http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/ 2002/resolution%202002-12.pdf. Accessed 12 Dec 2021 University of Innsbruck (2001) Mitteilungsblatt 60. Stück/823 vom 5. September 2001 https://www. uibk.ac.at/service/c101/mitteilungsblatt/2000/60/mitteil.pdf. Accessed 12 Dec 2021 University of Innsbruck (2021) Master of art program in peace, development, security and international conflict transformation https://www.uibk.ac.at/peacestudies/ma-program/index.html.de. Accessed 11 Nov 2021 Vattimo G (2006) Dialectics, difference and weak thought. In: Dietrich W, Echavarría J, Koppensteiner N (eds): Schlüsseltexte der Friedensforschung/Key texts of peace studies/Textos claves de la Investigación para la Paz (=Kommende Demokratie no 2). LIT, Vienna and Münster, pp 227–240 Zehr H (2005) Changing lenses—a new focus for crime and justice. Herald Press, Scottdale PA [first published 1990]

In Response to Wolfgang Dietrich’s Article About “Peace and Reconciliation Studies” or How to Catch a Unicorn? Martin Leiner

Perspective Since the beginning of 2021, I am enjoying the privilege to work together with professor Wolfgang Dietrich, UNESCO chair for Peace Studies at Innsbruck university, in the framework of the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation Studies in the Middle East and North Africa (AARMENA).1 Supported by a grant from the European Commission and in close cooperation with six universities in the MENA region, we are building MA-programmes in “Reconciliation and Peace Studies”. The partner universities are: University of Jordan, University of Petra, Al-Istaqlal University in Jericho, Al Azhar University of Gaza, University of Sétif II and university Al Qued. Both universities from Algeria work on the project until May 2022 only, the others until 2024. It is a very particular joy to be part of this AARMENA project, rich in human encounters and far reaching conceptual discussions. One of the questions which came recurrently up is how to relate the concept of Peace Studies professor Dietrich developed at Innsbruck university and Reconciliations studies as we teach and practise at Jena Centre for Reconciliation Studies in Jena. We decided to write two articles to start a dialogue. Even if we could have made our exchange in German, which is the mother tongue of both of us, we wanted the colleagues in AARMENA and beyond to understand what unites us and where are the differences. Wolfgang Dietrich started with his article. What follows is my first reply. The perspective I will present is rooted in the Jena Centre for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS).2 We started our work in 2008 with a series of Summer Schools on different regions of the world. They are published in RIPAR 1–5. The title for all 1 Cf. the website of AARMENA under www.aarmena.uni-jena.de the pages on the project: www. aarmena.uni-jena.de/Erasmus. 2 Cf. www.jcrs.uni-jena.de.

M. Leiner (B) Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_3

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is “Societies in Transition”. The subtitle mentions a region of the world and puts it “between Conflict and Reconciliation”.3 In the first volume already, we underlined that the idea was not that we would believe that there is first conflict and then, after a certain time Reconciliation, but rather that conflict and Reconciliation are present in the same time, sometimes even intertwined with each other and working on each other. Therefore, we chose a quote from German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) as our motto. Hölderlin, in his novel “Hyperion” wrote: Reconciliation is in the middle of strife and all things divided find each other again (2004, vol. 6, p. 169). In the first time, it was not decided which would be the place for peace in our studies. We rather focussed on the study on concrete processes of Reconciliation. There were the great examples of the 1990ies which inspired us. The end of apartheid in South Africa (1994), the National Reconciliation in Rwanda after the Genocide in 1994, the Good Friday Agreement for Northern Ireland (1998), Truth and Reconciliation Commissions around the world, beginning with Chile, where in 1990, the first commission choose Reconciliation as a part of its name. Particularly, complex issues such as the recognition of indigenous populations, their suffering and their rights, could be treated by such commissions,4 In Germany, we could go back to the decades of Reconciliation policies after World War II with countries such as France, Israel, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia,5 but also with the USA, Great Britain, Norway, former Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Greece and to some extend with countries from former Soviet Union. The fall of the Wall of Berlin, German reunification and the end of the Cold War, as well as the peaceful separation between Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2002/3, proved that important national and international transformations can be undertaken in completely new ways. Still in 1945, a mayor change of the borders in Europe and East Asia, only was possible through a destructive War with 75 million deaths. Now, at least in Europe, regimes, borders and political affiliations changed with much less violence, and violence only happening mainly in special war-zones such as former Yugoslavia or Romania. However threatened it may be today, we ask the question: was the transformation of the Cold War into European cooperation not nothing else that a great experience of Reconciliation, build on a sufficient level of trust and cooperation between enemies and courageous politicians such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Helmut Kohl or Vaclav Havel? In JCRS, we also are aware of the fights against this new style of politics. In fact, we are living in an era where the tendency is strong to go for a restauration of the old politics orbiting around national glory and overspending for military. The so-called “new era” after Russian invasion of Ukraine is nothing but the attempt to forget the lessons learned since the late 1980ies and to go back to Cold War policies and economies. In the USA and in quite many European countries, elections are won 3

All RIPAR volumes, published at Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht since RIPAR 1, Societies in Transition. Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation, published in 2012. 4 Today the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation commission (2008–2015) has become a certain model for Reconciliation between native populations and majoritarian societies based on settler colonialism and destruction of indigenous traditions and ways of life. 5 Cf. From a political science perspective the classical overview by Lily Gardner-Feldman, Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation, Rowman & Littlefield 2012.

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with always cheaper forms of nationalistic populism. Because of all those developments, we also study the many Reconciliation activities which got stuck and so far led to more mixed and ambiguous results. Russian–Polish rapprochement and common mourning of the victims of the Katyn massacre, especially around the tragic events of 2010 is only one example of such a frozen and incomplete process of Reconciliation between many others.6 In any case, I believe that one of the greatest tasks of our time is to learn the lessons of the end of the Cold War right and to do what needs to be done for a quality-based politics directed towards the Reconciliation between nations, within nations and in relation to nature. A first step is to get clear analyses of so-called “failed” Reconciliation processes. My hypothesis is that it was not Reconciliation as a concept or as a necessary approach that failed in those cases, but not enough time, efforts, money and other resources have been spent into Reconciliation. Those processes were also stopped or hindered in its effects through unfortunate individual decisions of rulers and social and political developments. The theory of “intractable conflict” as developed by Daniel Bar-Tal and his colleagues shows that without working on the social-emotional infrastructure of conflicts, a simple conflict resolution by signing an accord is not possible. The failure of the Annan plan for Cyprus,7 of problems met by the Oslo-accords and La Havana Agreement for Colombia shows that more deep work on the societies for Reconciliation with the “enemies” is required in order to overcome division, violence and war. “From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation” is not only a title of a book edited by Yaakov Bar Siman-Tov,8 but also a new direction to study and apply Reconciliation as an approach in societies where only a few actors aim at better relationships with their “enemies”. When it is impossible to go for conflict resolution, still several practices for Reconciliation can pave the way, change minorities into critical masses and later into majorities who opt for Reconciliation. To explain this point a bit more, I give an open, non-sequential list of practices of Reconciliation: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 6

(1) Treaties, legal provisions, diplomacy and classical conflict resolution (2) Common security structure (3) Apologies, reparations and common mourning (4) Generalized cooperation (5) Specific cooperation (City twinning, partnerships and common activities) (6) Confrontation with history in a reconciling orientation (7) Humanizing the image of the other (8) Change in the discourse of intellectual and religious leaders

Cf. Jolanta Janaszko, “Disarming Memory: The Katyn Massacre and Reconciliation in PolishRussian Relations 1990–2015”. In: Lily Gardner-Feldman/Raisa Barash/Samuel Goda/André Zempelburg (eds.), The Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between Conflict and Reconciliation. RIPAR 4. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2019, pp. 167–187. 7 Cf. Carolina Rehrmann, Der Zypernkonflikt. Eine sozialpsychologische Diskursanalyse. Springer 2020. 8 Yaakov Bar-Siman Tov (ed.), From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation. Oxford University Press 2002.

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(9) Trauma therapies, psychological and medical (10) Intergenerational work (schoolbook reform, etc.) (11) Forum to discuss multiple visions of justice and peace (12) Accompanied and ritualized reintegration of perpetrators (13) Etc.

Those practices are part of the tool-box for Reconciliation. To be applicable, these practices have to be linked to a theory of change, looking in a phronetic way (Aristotle and Flyvbjerg) into possibilities to create social change for the concrete contexts. To explain social change for Reconciliation, I often work with the model Harald Welzer (Täter, 2007) outlined, focussing on four points: 1. 2. 3. 4.

General ethics and values in a given society Emotions Organizations and Situations.

It is important to build change in the first three points in order to create situations which will give the chance that Reconciliation will happen. Those were the earliest theories of Reconciliation, I worked with. From case studies as presented for example in RIPAR, which we treat in a transdisciplinary and globally comparative manner, Reconciliation studies have been developed. It is important that we are mainly following an inductive logic of research. Even the word “Reconciliation” is used because it or its translation into local languages has been used by actors in the field or because concrete social practices can be described as acts of creating better relationships after grave incidents. As a protestant theologian, I am very much aware of the danger to import a Christian, Jewish or Muslim concept into completely different cultures. Therefore, I opted for a broad definition of Reconciliation: Reconciliation is the process of creating “normal” and if possible “good” relationships between states, groups, organizations and individuals reacting against past, present or preventing future grave incidents such as wars, civil wars, genocides, atrocities, forced displacement, enslavement, dictatorship, oppression, colonialism, Apartheid and other human rights violations and injustices. It is important that forgiveness or confession of guilt is not mentioned as a necessary part of Reconciliation. They can happen, but Reconciliation can advance without them as well, depending on the persons and the cultural scripts they use. In this definition “normal” and “good” are written into quotation marks because for Reconciliation studies the subjective evaluation of the people concerned by the conflict is more important than views from outside or data taken as indicators such as numbers of deaths or intermarriage. Nevertheless also “objective” indicators are required to minimize misinterpretations. “Normal” is a relationship if the relationship to others which were not part of the grave incidents are not different from the relationship with the perpetrators or victims and their descendants. The word “good” means that the relations are considered to be good by the stakeholders. Underlining the subjective

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definition, we also want to draw critical lines against misuses of the word “Reconciliation”, when Reconciliation sometimes is imposed by powerful actors in the field. With gratitude, we read that funding fathers of Peace Studies Johan Galtung9 and John Paul Lederach used the term of “Reconciliation” and found it helpful to work with. Through his book with “Reconciliation” in the subtitle,10 Lederach considerably contributed to spread the concept of Reconciliation. However, in at least one central point of their theory, I disagree with them. John Paul Lederach wrote that Reconciliation shall provide “spaces and opportunities for encounters at various levels, bringing together people from opposing sides and encouraging them to articulate their pain and to envision an interdependent futures” (p. 150). Drawing on the example of the separation of Czech and Slovak Republic on New Year’s day 2003, and even more on indigenous people who want a certain distance and fewer interdependence from the surrounding populations, I would not underline strong interdependence as a necessary goal for Reconciliation. It should rather be the right relation between closeness/interdependence and distance/autonomy which should be found. If we integrate the relationship with nature as part of Reconciliation processes, in some cases and for special areas, even complete non-interference could be the best form of relationship. We also are not following Johan Galtung’s theory of positive peace, because it set the goals too high. There is probably never a situation where structural and cultural violence is completely absent and where human beings can fully fulfil their human potential. Positive peace is a goal impossible to achieve. Negative peace only can be achieved if violence is limited to direct physical violence in its most obvious forms such as war or torture. But this notion, as well, has to be packed out to understand the different realities of frozen conflicts and remaining tensions. With those critics, we approached the understanding of peace. A resolute step was taken in the Zürich Conference, published in the book: “Alternative Approaches to Conflict Resolution” (edited by Martin Leiner and Christine Schließer) when I changed my definition of Reconciliation. Before 2017, I considered Reconciliation as a process and an outcome. After that I reserved the term of Reconciliation to the process and peace for the temporary result, and the goal Reconciliation is aiming at. As the notion of peace can be misused in Reconciliation studies, our goal is a reconciled peace.11 From this time on, I began to gain more interest in the Innsbruck approach. I was enthusiastic about the way how Wolfgang Dietrich introduced the plural voice and 9

Joanna Santa Barbara, Johan Galtung, Diane Perlman, Reconciliation: Clearing the Past, Building a Future. Kolofon Press, 2012, available trough www.transcend.org/tup. 10 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington: USIP Press, 1998. 11 To quote just one of the scholars who prepared the change to define Reconciliation as a process, German Cultural Anthropologist Birgit Bräuchler in her book “The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia” (Palgrave 2015) wrote: “In the past, Reconciliation has too often been perceived as as something peacebuilders are aiming for, a result. If is nowadays common sense that Reconciliation is not only the outcome, but foremost a long-term,

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talks about “many peaces”.12 My first encounter with Wolfgang Dietrich’s thoughts was his article “A Call for Many Peaces”,13 which was written more than 10 years before the trilogie “Variations of the many Peaces” whose 1st volume was published in 2008. As Wolfgang Dietrich said to me, I used the reference to the many peaces in a different way, than he does. From the case study perspective, to talk about many peaces helped me to conceptualize the fact that different actors have different and sometimes very different ideas what peace is and how it should look like. Some underline security, others justice and economic well-being, others speak about harmony, trust and Convivencia, others include human rights and democracy in it and so on. In the real world, in every conflict, a particular compromise must be found about which peace we are aiming at. Better than a compromise which negotiates fixed different points of view on peace, peace as a result of a Reconciliation process would be better, because Reconciliation implies learning from the other, enlargement and change of everybody’s point of view. For Dietrich, the five families of peace, energetic, moral, modern, postmodern and transrational are an instrument to understand historical affiliations. This seems to me not only a typology, but an evaluative classification. If this is right, the family of transrational peace is the best in comparison with the others. Moral and modern peace seem to be the most problematic. This leads to two reactions: one in respect of our reception of the concept of many peaces: Understanding that Wolfgang Dietrichs’ five families of peace are not used by him as a tool to understand the visions of peace of different conflicting parties, does not mean that his theory of the many peaces is not helpful to understand clearer what different parties might have in mind, when they talk about peace. I continue to believe that it is important to learn the Innsbruck approach in order to understand better the discussion when for example groups of Muslim fighters are talking from the perspective of moral peace when they are in conflict with Western governments advocating a certain concept of modern peace. The families of peace are corresponding as well to families of Reconciliation. Wolfgang Dietrich’s model can be compared with Fanie du Toits’ (2018) four types of Reconciliation theory: The type du Toit calls “forgiving embrace” corresponds to moral peace, liberal Reconciliation to modern peace, agonistic Reconciliation to postmodern and transrational peace is somehow close to de Toits’ own model of peace as interconnectedness. Wolfgang Dietrich’s five families of peace

Fanie du Toit’s four types of Reconciliation theory

1. Energetic peace

0. Reconciliation as interconnectedness I

2. Moral peace

1. Loving embrace (continued)

deep, broad, inclusive, and voluntary process” (p. 10 with reference to David Bloomfield, Reconciliation: an Introduction. In: D. Bloomfield, T. Barnes and L. Huyse (eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook. Stockholm: IDEA 2003, pp. 10–18. 12, 13). 12 Cf. Dietrich (2008). Only recently Dietrich changes the concept of many peaces as substantives into peace as a verb, see Dietrich (2021). 13 Wolfgang Dietrich & Wolfgang Stützl: “A call for many peaces”, in Schlaining Working Papers/7, Stadtschlaining 1997. Reprinted in : Wolfgang Dietrich, Josefina Echavarría Alvarez, Norbert Koppensteiner (eds.), Schlüsseltexte der Friedensforschung, Wien/Berlin 2006, pp. 282–301.

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(continued) Wolfgang Dietrich’s five families of peace

Fanie du Toit’s four types of Reconciliation theory

3. Modern peace

2. Liberal Reconciliation

4. Postmodern peace

3. Agonistic Reconciliation

5. Transrational peace

4. Reconciliation as interconnectedness II

The other reaction is that from JCRS point of view, it cannot be the last word that what we are doing is classified as moral peace based on the distinction between transcendence and immanence. Objection, your honesty Having narrated the perspective, many scholars at JCRS have developed together during the last years, I slowly moved into what can be a direct answer on the text Wolfgang Dietrich has written. Here now a more detailed answer in 6 steps: 1. Closeness. There are far reaching communalities between the way peace is taught in Innsbruck and Reconciliation in Jena. Coming from different experiences, we both have strong similarities with the already existing approach of Conflict Transformation, rather than any other approach, be it Conflict Resolution, Conflict Mitigation, Transitional Justice, or classical approaches of Peace building and security studies. This is why we are convinced that conflicts are not negative in themselves, but part of life and source of change. I was happy to read that Wolfgang Dietrich confirmed that closeness between Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation in his article. We are both convinced that the processes are so multi-facetted that only a transdisciplinary approach can lead to the required degree of understanding of Reconciliation processes and peace. Economy, population dynamics, education, Media, History politics, trauma therapies, new developments in technology, Legal frameworks, Diplomacy, positions of religious leaders and many, many other factors decide whether a situation moves towards war or peace.14 Even if Wolfgang Dietrich did not yet confirm, we also share a sympathy for restorative justice. Furthermore, I completely agree with the necessity to understand peace from positive experiences and not from the absence of violence. Wolfgang Dietrich’s criticism of substantives which suggest that there would be objective entities outside of human action, is very helpful to develop new ways of seeing and understanding peace.15 Verbal forms as Wolfgang Dietrich’s: “er sie, es friedet” often can open new and better understanding of reality. As a protestant theologian, I mainly think here of Swiss poet Kurt Marti who said that God should be a verb. 2. Hospitality. I am also grateful about the intellectual hospitality with which Wolfgang Dietrich receives Reconciliation Studies. In the framework of his thinking, Reconciliation has a place. For Dietrich, it is a part of moral peace, based on 14

The first publication underlining the transdisciplinary approach from JCRS was RIPAR 1. Wolfgang Dietrich speaks about the Trans-discipline Peace. Cf. Dietrich (2021), p. 2. 15 Cf. Dietrich (2021), pp. 16–18. 37–49.

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forgiveness, rooted in Judeo-Christian and Muslim traditions, based on transcendence and negative peace. As such it makes sense, but of course in contexts marked by those three religions. After all what has been said so far, it should not surprise that I feel welcome in a room in the Innsbruck system, but that this room seems very narrow to me and that it finally is not possible to squeeze the JCRS-approach in this room. My hope is that this solution is not a final word, but a first attempt to understand, which will be enlarged. 3. Wittgenstein, not Heidegger. There is a difference in philosophy of language between Wolfgang Dietrich and us. Dietrich often argues with the etymology of the words he uses. For us, etymologies only can be a source of inspiration, but we are following Wittgenstein, who underlines that the use of a word determines its sense, not the etymology. Dietrich connects Reconciliation with the etymology of silere, being quiet. This can open beautiful considerations. In history, however, Reconciliation was used for different processes which have not much to do with keeping silence, but with consultations, apologies, formation of relationships and settling legal problems. So far, nobody has written the history of the concept of Reconciliation and its translations. It changed several times from a more political term (Ancient Greek culture, Comedies such as Lysistrate) into religious discourse (Apostle Paul, connecting it to the Hebrew tradition of atonement) and legal discourse including the payment of a suona in old Germanic culture, it was used in private life, than had its great time in the philosophy of Hegel and Adorno applying to many different issues of moral, political, logical, epistemological, religious or esthetical impact, until it became again a mainly political term, but also experienced a new religious importance when in Roman Catholic Church the sacrament of penance was named “sacrament of Reconciliation”. The entire history contributes to the potential of sense Reconciliation has. It would seem strange to limit Reconciliation on an etymological sense or on a special field of human experience such as religion. Reconciliation is much wider than religion. It is a basic fact of human life. Without Reconciliation between children and parents, friends, lovers, neighbours, colleagues aso, all human relations would break down and within a few years, no human life would be possible. 4. The Process-Perspective. Reconciliation Studies so far has also a hospitality for the many peaces approach created in Innsbruck. Why I am so much interested in that model has already been outlined. But so far I did not give a model of opposition and cooperation between the Jena and the Innsbruck approach. For me not the terms of to forgive (Jena) and to understand (Innsbruck) are a central or somehow important opposition—both “Vergeben” and “Verzeihen” can happen as a part of Reconciliation process—, but the opposition, at least with the first volumes of the many peaces is between process with manifold external and internal moments (for Jena) and particular experiences which can be made if observers are observing them (so Innsbruck, if I understand well). The role of the observer is decisive, as in quantum physics. According to the conditions, the observation takes place, “piece” can be experiences and lived as

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energetic, moral, modern, postmodern or transrational peace. “It is observation itself, which determines which kind of peace is observed, whether there is peace observed at all, whether there is peace at all”.16 Innsbruck

Jena

Many peaces

Reconciliation

Specific experiences

Process or processes

If this is right, it seems to me that the difference is between a concept which sees “experiences” in the largest sense of the word as crucial (Innsbruck), and another which is based on change (Jena) and considers experiences of peace only as episodes within the stream of a creative process. If I understand well the Innsbruck approach, those experiences are in themselves in its highest forms of energetic and transrational peace not states, but movement, flow, energy and matter transforming into each other. As the observer is crucial for the experience to be made, in the end of the day, peace is an inner reality: “In its last consequences, metaphorical mountain lake is an inner lake”.17 In transrational peace, the transpersonal way of experience is key. Transpersonal experience opens to overcome ego-orientation and to consider enemies as not separated but as part of own’s life and consciousness. In our view in JCRS, we agree with the understanding that peace is an experience and would say: Reconciliation is a process and peace is an experience of a real (grounding and/slowly growing or suddenly lighting up) or imagined presence. In a process-based ontology, Reconciliation is the carrying element, peace is only the fruit actualized within, at the beginning and at the ideal end of the process. On a deeper level of ontological analysis, peace might be composed by a series of very different, inner and outer, human and non-human factors creating a distinct feeling and forming the condition actual entities can be in for a certain time. This should result in a certain experience, I will try to describe in the last part of the article using an inspiration from philosopher of process Alfred North Whitehead. This is not weak position for peace, since peace is an attractor for human agency, because we all time and again seek peace. At the end of the article, I will also show that peace is necessary to be there at the start of Reconciliation. In philosophy, Reconciliation studies are more influenced by thinkers of process, dynamics and change than by thinkers of form, systems or being. This is why we are studying Hölderlin, Hegel, Schelling, Bergson, the hermeneutical tradition since Dilthey, and the American Pragmatists and Process thinkers William James, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Royce and Pierce and their neo-pragmatic disciples today. Here, the newest development in Dietrich 2021 gives me hope that maybe the decision to see peace more as a verb and not as a substantive could lead to further rapprochement between the Jena and the Innsbruck approach. Because, if peace is a verb, it can have its past, presence and future like all process. 16 17

Cf. Dietrich (2008), vol. 1, p. 411. Dietrich (2008), p. 411.

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5. Beyond the transcendence-immanence distinction. The second fundamental difference between Innsbruck and Jena, Wolfgang Dietrich describes in his article in this present book, is between transcendence and immanence. Jena would adopt a transcendent approach, and Innsbruck an immanent one. To explain this, I would like to start with some ideas which might be less controversial between Innsbruck and Jena. In Jena, we are not believing that there is a given goal for Reconciliation process, but that it is guided by an emerging future, by possibilities and realities appearing in the process. Therefore, the distinction between twisting (Verwinden, Innsbruck) and forgetting (Jena) is not in our sense. Forgetting in many cases is a sign of trauma or oppression,18 and even if it can be experienced as a relief, the transformation and the healing of the memories are much better than forgetting. But it might happen, individuals and societies might have forgotten the violent past. Swedish soldiers for example committed terrible acts of violence during the 30 year’s War in Germany (1618–1648), but today nobody seems to feel any grief against Swedish people, though the centuries it seems forgotten in social memory. Researchers on Reconciliation have to work on the very multiple ways how Reconciliation happens in different cultures, at different times, for different individuals using different scripts for what is needed for Reconciliation. Forgiveness is only one and probably not the most common in Reconciliation processes.19 In the trilateral project with Israelis and Palestinian, we found out that even without apologies and forgiveness, significant steps towards self-critical tragical wisdom and empowerment to speak with each other can be made.20 The reason why we have to act with that phronetic approach21 is that all persons concerned not only have to deal with one relation, but with at least five groups of relations, which play a role in Reconciliation processes at the same time: 1. Reconciliation with oneself and the different tendencies within a person 2. Reconciliation with the other(s): the adversary persons, groups, institutions and so on 3. Reconciliation with one own’s group and its distinctive subgroups considering maybe Reconciliation with the enemy as treason 4. Reconciliation with the human and natural environments 5. Reconciliation with what can be called the unconditional, the sense of life, supreme values, transcendent believes about sense of life and God or Gods aso. According to us, those five relationships are universal and apply, unless the opposite has been proven, to everybody in every conflict. Even if relation 5 is understood by several actors as a subcategory of relation 1 or 3, sense in life, transcendence 18

Cf. Aleida Assmann, Formen des Vergessens. 3rd ed. Wallstein 2016. Fanie du Toit (2018) underlined that in South Africa forgiveness was not the most important factor but recognition of interdependence cf. pp. 17–38. 20 To be published by: Francesco Ferrari, Martin Leiner, Zeina Barakat, Michael Sternberg, Boaz Hameiri (eds.), From Hearts of Stone to Hearts of Flesh, RIPAR 7, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2022. 21 Cf. AlDajani (2020), pp. 3–74. 19

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or unconditional values are experienced as a somehow distinct problem because it provokes deeper problems of moral consciousness and identity than just conflicts with oneself or with one’s own group. A simple acceptance by oneself or by the group are not enough to overcome a conflict with deeply felt unconditional values. This all is meant in a descriptive way and shall in no way propagate any specific religious worldview. However, I have to make clear what I mean be “transcendant”. My background is Slovenian-German sociologist Thomas Luckmann’s (1927–2016)22 phenomenological distinction between small, medium and great transcendence. Inspired by Edmund Husserl, Luckmann described transcendence as a part of everybody’s life-worldexperience (Lebenswelt). Small experiences of transcendence are when a person overcomes a limit she could not overcome before. For example, yesterday she could not remember a name, and today she can. Germans say: “es fällt ihr wieder ein”. This means that something happens to a person which opens a small transcendence. Medium transcendence experiences are for example experiences of the inner life of other persons making that the other is not only a body (Körper) but somebody (Leib). Experiences of great transcendence are experiences of different worlds such as in a dream. In many senses, transcendance is experienced by human beings. In many cases, we are overestimating immanence, for example when we see the colours as a closed circle because ultraviolet seems to us very similar to red. For natural scientists, however, there are so many frequencies we cannot see with our eyes. They are transcendant and only can get accessible though technology. The enormous worlds of frequencies we cannot see, hear or feel are part of our world, just as dark energy and dark matter and so many other things as well. Furthermore, it makes to me not much sense to draw a line and to distinguish transcendent objects such as God, Angels and demons from immanent objects. Either you know about those objects, then why to draw a line separating them from immanent objects, or you do not know them, then why to talk about them as objects or entities. Why do we not just say there is a beyond, but we do not know what or there is a beyond we can only express through metaphors and models. Dietrich (2021, p. 14) brings transcendence together with Plato. If I understand him well, he describes this distinction in a very critical way. “This diabolic idea of a kingdom of spirit and love on one side and a kingdom of flesh and sin on the other finally determines history through Apostle Paul’s Theology”. The separation of a spiritual and a sinful kingdom, however, is more a phase in the history of religion, a phase Hegel called unhappy consciousness (“unglückliches Bewußstsein”). This means that people know that the absolute exists, but they are excluded from it. For Hegel, this distinction is overcome in consummate religion (“vollendete Religion”), where God incarnates and connects himself with flesh and humanity. Because of what has been said starting from Luckmann and Hegel, to say that there is a choice in favour of immanence against transcendence as claimed for the Innsbruck approach, and choice in favour of transcendence as pretended for Jena

22

Cf. Thomas Luckmann, Die unsichtbare Religion. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1991.

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by Wolfgang Dietrich, makes for me no sense at all. We all are living with immanence and transcendence and both are intertwined and inseparable from each other. Religion can underline immanence or transcendance, it always build on a specific understanding—you may say as well on a specific construction of the intertwinedness of both, transcendence and immanence. 6. Summary. Looking back over the points evoked in this paragraph, I would say that Reconciliation studies as developed in Jena only have one basic difference to Innsbruck. Reconciliation is a process and we try to understand peace as a part in this ongoing and endless process. a. How to catch a unicorn? The more exact science we are trying to do, the more the world seems to us mysterious. To thank Wolfgang Dietrich for his connection between silence and Reconciliation, I would like to finish with a metaphorical story and a kind of mediation about the experience of peace. In myths and fairy tales, the unicorn is a wild animal representing superhuman power. In medieval times, in Thuringia, painters used the unicorn to give an allegory. They claimed that the unicorn only can become silent and satisfied in the arms of a true virgin. To get there, the angels are hunting the unicorn with four dogs. The names of the dogs are: Truth, Compassion, Justice and Peace. Truth, Compassion, Justice and Peace are chasing the unicorn into the arms of the Virgin Mary. Truth, Compassion, Justice and Peace are also the experiences, the values and the qualities which bring the wild energy people have to wage war in a situation where they are open to a new life as symbolized by the virgin. Why people are fighting? It is often that they feel a superhuman energy and an unconditional call to risk one own’s life and to kill others to achieve something really important. But that superhuman power can get quiet and tame, when chased by Truth, Compassion, Justice and Peace. Without the experience of peace, we never will find Reconciliation. b. What is peace in a Reconciliation approach?—A Whiteheadian perspective. After presenting the allegory of the hunt of the unicorn, we not only have to translate one by one the words of the allegory, but the theory behind. To answer Professor Dietrich, we have to say what we understand by peace. It might not be astonishing that at least I am following a philosopher of process: Alfred North Whitehead. In 1933, he published a book about the role of ideas in Human History. The title of the book is Adventure of Ideas. In the last part of the book, he describes five ideas which he considers essential for civilization: Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art and Peace. Peace is necessary, because “the pursuit of ‘Truth, Beauty, Adventure and Art’ can be ruthless, hard, cruel, and thus, as the history of the Italian Renaissance illustrates, lacking in some essential quality of civilization (Whitehead (1933) 1967, p. 284). Whitehead considers different competing ideas with peace such as tenderness, impersonality or love. He opts for peace, because peace can bind together the four other ideas in a kind of harmony of harmonies.

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From here, Whitehead formulates a positive understanding of peace. Peace is, like for Wolfgang Dietrich, not the absence of violence, killings, aso, but a positive experience. Given the wide notion of feeling, Whitehead advocates for, he can say that peace is “a positive feeling” (p. 285). Whiteheads definition of peace, however, goes beyond this: Peace “is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet momentous in its coordination of values. Its first effects is the removal of the stress of acquisitive feeling arising from the soul’s preoccupation with itself. Thus peace carries with it a surpassing of personality. There is an inversion of relative values. It is primarily a trust in the efficacy of Beauty” (p. 285). This experience of the broadening of the soul is for Whitehead the basis of what we mean when we talk about peace. Peace appears more like a grace than like a result of intentional work. “The experience of peace is largely beyond the control of purpose, it comes as a gift” (p. 285). Is what Whitehead describes as peace rational peace? Is it transrational? According to the Anglo-American philosopher, the main effects of peace go beyond reason: “The trust in the self-justification of Beauty introduces faith, where reason fails to reveal the details” (p. 285). I think this important observation clearly shows that peace never can be build on reason, or convincing arguments or on security alone. It needs trust going beyond what can be controlled. It is an attitude where people always can say: don’t you see the danger? This quote shows as well that, according to Whitehead, peace is not so much transrational but rather pre-rational as a condition of a certain form of rational thinking. Peace is also beyond reason, somehow hyper-rational. Both relationships seem to me very important. There is rationality born from fear. Thomas Hobbes says it very explicitly that fear was his twin staying with him his whole life.23 But there is also a rationality built on peace and trust. It seems even that fear is a feeling which can, if it becomes too strong, hinder and even destroy clear rational thinking. For peace and trust, this is not the case. Peace provides a wide view and the capacity to focus with patience on a topic. Peace is not anaesthesia or fearful flight of ideas, but “preserves the springs of energy, and at the same time, masters them from the avoidance of the paralyzing distractions” (Whitehead (1933) 1967, p. 285). As a Christian theologian, this idea of an hyper-rational peace creates some connections to biblical verses: Philippians 4, 7, a verse with is part of liturgy and has its place after the preaching, reads: “And the peace of God, which passes all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus” (King James Version). In Luthers translation it is said: “The peace of God which is far beyond human reason (der höher ist als alle Vernunft)”. St Pauls letter expresses the experience of a peace which is the precondition as a context for thinking. We could also add John 14, 27: “Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I unto you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid”. In this verse, we find a respect for peace human beings can have already without Christian religion. Christ leaves with everybody that peace he has

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Thomas Hobbes (1679). Opera Latina, Vol. I. London. p. 86.

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already, but he adds a supplementary peace, a peace which goes so far and comes in such an unworldly way, that it might create fear. I am aware that with those biblical quotes, I probably provide additional proof that I am still thinking in the framework of moral peace and Christian religious thinking. However, I think that the mythological worldviews of the Bible are not anymore ours, but we nevertheless can find expressions of the truth, and of extremely valuable experiences in the Bible: Peace is a grace, people can receive before and above all reasonable arguments, and it creates its own rationality. On this basis, we also have to rethink the relationship between peace and Reconciliation. There are two legitimate readings. One would underline that those experiences of broadening and trust are the reasons why a process of Reconciliation can start. Only after people have experienced peace they can be peace, bring peace, go for peace and make peace. Another reading would say experienced peace is already a result of Reconciliation which happened somehow in the human body, in the human soul, in the natural world, in human relationships, or with God or what people are believing in. The many conscious and unconscious conditions come together, and a person feels peace. I opt for this second reading, but consider the first legitimate as well.

References AlDajani IM (2020) Internet Communication Technology (ICT) for Reconciliation. Applied phronesis netnography in internet research methodologies. Springer Nature Switzerland, Cham Assmann A (2016) Formen des Vergessens, 3rd edn. Wallstein Bar-Siman Tov Y (2002) (ed) From conflict resolution to Reconciliation. Oxford University Press Bloomfield D, Barnes T, Huyse L (eds) (2003) Reconciliation after violent conflict: a handbook. IDEA, Stockholm Bräuchler B (2015) The cultural dimension of peace. Decentralisation and Reconciliation in Indonesia. Palgrave, London Dietrich W (2008) Variationen über die vielen Frieden. Vol 1: Deutungen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden Dietrich W (2011) Variationen über die vielen Frieden. Vol 2: Elicitive Konflikttransformation und die transrationale Wende in der Friedenspolitik. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/Springer, Wiesbaden Dietrich W (2015) Variationen über die vielen Frieden. Vol 3: Ellictive conflict mapping. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/Springer, Wiesbaden Dietrich W (2021) Der die das Frieden. Nachbemerkungen zur Trilogie über die vielen Frieden. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/Springer, Wiesbaden Dietrich W, Echavarría Alvarez J, Koppensteiner N (eds) (2006) Schlüsseltexte der Friedensforschung. Lit-Verlag, Wien/Berlin DuToit F (2018) When political transition works, Reconciliation as interdependence. Oxford University Press Ferrari F, Leiner M, Barakat Z, Sternberg M, Hameiri B (eds) (2022) From hearts of stone to hearts of flesh, RIPAR 7. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Gardner-Feldman L (2012) Germany’s foreign policy of Reconciliation. Rowman & Littlefield

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Gardner-Feldman L, Barash R, Goda S, Zempelburg A (eds) (2019) The Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between conflict and Reconciliation. RIPAR 4. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Hobbes Th (1679) Opera Latina, vol I. London Hölderlin F (2004) Sämtliche Werke, Briefe und Dokumnete Herausgegeben von D.E. Sattler, vol 6. Luchterhand, München Lederach JP (1998) Building peace: Reconciliation in divided societies. USIP Press, Washington Leiner M, Flämig S (eds) (2012) Societies in transition: Sub-Saharan Africa between conflict and Reconciliation. RIPAR 1. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Leiner M, Palme M (eds) (2014) Societies in transition. Sub-Saharan Africa between conflict and Reconciliation. RIPAR 2. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Leiner M, Schließer Chr (eds) (2018) Alternative approaches in conflict resolution. Palgrave/Macmillan Leiner M, Ferrari F, Barakat Z, Sternberg M, Hameiri B (to be published in 2022 as RIPAR 7) From hearts of stone to hearts of flesh. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Luckmann Th (1991) Die unsichtbare Religion. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Rehrmann C (2020) Der Zypernkonflikt. Eine sozialpsychologische Diskursanalyse. Springer Rehrmann C, Biermann R, Tolliday Ph (2020) Societies in transition. The Balkans and the Caucasus between conflict and Reconciliation. RIPAR 5. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Santa Barbara J, Galtung J, Perlman D (2012) Reconciliation: clearing the past, building a future. Kolofon Press available trough www.transcend.org/tup Tacchini D, Barakat Z, AlDajani I, Leiner M (eds) (2022) Reconciliation and refugees. The academic alliance for Reconciliation studies in the Middle East and North Africa I. RIPAR 6. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Tolliday Ph, Palme M, Kim D (eds) (2016) Asia-Pacific between conflict and Reconciliation. RIPAR 3. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Welzer H (2005) Täter. Wie ganz normale Menschen Massenmörder werden. Fischer, Frankfurt Whitehead AN ((1933) 1967) Adventure of ideas. Frankfurt: Main, Suhrkamp

Autobiography as a Hermeneutic Practice of Reconciliation with Oneself Francesco Ferrari

Abstract This paper presents autobiography as the life narrative that, put in place by a retrospective look, articulates the reconciliation of the particular of a single occurrence within the universal provided by the perception of one’s own life as a “whole.” This study is part of a wider investigation on the concept of reconciliation after Auschwitz. In dialogue with contemporary hermeneutics and moral philosophers, it deals with the writings of Shoah survivors such as Améry and Frankl. Its goal is to show how and to which extent one’s life writing is a hermeneutic practice of reconciliation with oneself. Facing occurrences that appear in a first moment as contingent and unrelated (potentially irrevocable), autobiography enacts a work of appropriation of one’s heritage of lived experiences through their emplotment, by the unfolding of a narrative identity. This takes place as a meaning-making process, which in turn requires a framework of value orientation. Autobiography becomes, therefore, the diachronic reading of the story of oneself in terms of the narrative of the progressive actualization of one’s agency. Agency, indispensable for the fulfillment of one’s project of a good life, is linked, in turn, to the perception of one’s own life as a “whole.” In the mediation that leads the single occurrence back to the perception of one’s own life as a “whole,” autobiography therefore traces a hermeneutic arc from the particular to the universal, whose stake is reconciliation with oneself.

1 The Knowledge of the Aut´os There are innumerable perspectives with which we can approach autobiography (Wagner-Egelhaaf 2019). We can interrogate it as a literary genre, by attempting a definition that enucleates its affinities and divergences with similar writings, such as the diary, the memoir, or the Bildungsroman. We can consider the link between narrator and protagonist, discovering them to be, at least in the first instance, as coinciding. We can unravel cultural-historical itineraries that show us when, where, and why autobiography emerged (Weintraub 1975; Gusdorf 1980 [1956]) and developed F. Ferrari (B) JCRS, FSU, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_4

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over time. Along this way, we would start from authors and contexts that, in the words of Blaise Pascal, dismiss the “me” as “hateful,” to reach others that place it as the (declining) foundation of the episteme-man (Foucault 1966). As important as these issues are, this paper investigates a different question: it thematises the course by which autobiography can be regarded as a hermeneutic practice of reconciliation with oneself. Auto-bio-graphy is a tripartite word. It is about writing by oneself the (story of one’s own) life. Autobiography is the “writing” of an aut´os, who interrogates him-herself through a narrative of his/her own life. But who is this aut´os? An epistemological issue lies at the core of autobiography, namely, that of self-knowledge. Those who are dedicated to their own life writing, by asking themselves: “What has been my life?,” try first of all to answer a question, often implicit: “What can I know about myself?” Replying via autobiography means to develop the written story of one’s own heritage and past lived experiences, in which the diachronic knowledge of the autÒs is articulated through a specific epistemic form, which Jerome Bruner aptly names “narrative thought” (Bruner 1986, 39). Understanding autobiographical narration as a self-knowledge issue shows its further peculiarity compared to other forms of writing. The one who raises the question (the seeker, the “subject”) and the question itself (the sought, the “object”) coincide in autobiography. We owe Wilhelm Dilthey seminal reflections in this regard: A life course stands as an external phenomenon from which understanding seeks to discover what produced it within a particular environment. The person who understands it is the same as the one who created it (Dilthey 2002 [1927], 221—italics mine).

This conception of the autobiographical process presupposes a certain idea of transparency and sovereignty of the subject, which, in the wake of the discoveries of psychoanalysis and the theses of deconstruction, is not sustainable anymore. Interrogating autobiography is a complex and insidious undertaking, exposed to countless conditions, limits, and aporias, proper to a “narrative truth” (Spence 1982) that, as such, is constitutively immersed in time. No less than autobiography, paths of reconciliation are articulated over time, as processes of healing and repairing relationships that appear, if not destroyed, at least severely damaged by a violent event, “to create ‘normal,’ “trustful,” and if possible “good” and “peaceful” relationships” (Leiner 2018, 179). These processes involve different forms of injured relationships and address as much reconciliation with oneself as with the other, as much reconciliation with one’s in-group as with the environment and with the transcendence. In the present study, reconciliatory processes revolve primarily around an occurrence that is recognized as a caesura of the continuum of lived time, that is (ethically speaking) as an “irrevocable” event (Jankélévitch 1974; Ferrari 2019), but also (psychologically speaking) as a “trauma.” Expressions such as “fragmentation” (Fisher 2017), “dissociation” (Van der Hart et al. 2006), “disintegration” (Bettelheim 1979), and “undoing” (Brison 2002) of the self show trauma healing as a central moment in the paths of reconciliation with oneself.

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Autobiography is thematized in this essay as a practice that, by confronting irrevocable occurrences, can offer a new interpretation to one’s lived time, and can thus make an important contribution in processes of reconciliation with oneself . Georges Gusdorf was able to identify the existential relevance that underlies autobiography as a practice of reconciliation with oneself through a philosophical sensitivity, saying: The task of autobiography is, first of all, a task of personal salvation. […] For the one who takes up the venture, it is a matter of concluding a peace treaty and a new alliance with himself and with the world. The mature man or the man already old who projects his life into narrative would thus provide witness that he has not existed in vain; he chooses not revolution but reconciliation, and he brings it about in the very act of reassembling the scattered elements of a destiny that seems to him to have been worth the trouble of living (Gusdorf 1980 [1956], 39—italics mine).

As we are about to see, autobiographical narrative traces a hermeneutic arc that reconciles the particular of the single occurrence within the universal provided by the perception of one’s own life as a “whole.” As the emplotment of occurrences that appear in the first instance as contingent and unrelated (“potentially irrevocable”), autobiography enacts a work of appropriation of one’s heritage of lived experiences, through the unfolding of a narrative identity. This takes place as a meaning-making process, which in turn requires the framework of a value orientation. Autobiography becomes, therefore, the diachronic reading of the story of oneself in terms of the narrative of the progressive actualization of one’s agency. Agency, indispensable for the fulfillment of one’s project of a good life, is linked, in turn, to the autobiographical perception of one’s own life as a “whole,” i.e., as reconciled in itself.

2 A Game of Mirrors A game of mirrors takes place in writing autobiography. It does not happen sic et simpliciter that I “portray” myself. Rather, I portray that myself of that time, or better, those myself (since the moments recalled and recalled are multiple) on which I place my gaze today, inaugurating what Brockmeier (2000) calls “autobiographical time.” In this regard, Lejeune (1975) aptly articulated the thesis that autobiography is: a retrospective narrative in prose by a real person of his-her own life, where the focus is on his-her individual life, especially on the history of his-her personality (Lejeune 1975, 14—italics mine)

With this reflection he identifies two decisive practices for the present discourse: – (2a) as a “retrospective narrative,” autobiography operates through “autobiographical retrospection,” linked to what I am going to call the “autobiographical hermeneutic circle”; – (2b) “retrospective teleology” (Brockmeier 2001), through which it is possible to outline what Lejeune qualifies as the “story” or even the “genesis of a personality” (Lejeune 1975, 15).

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As we are going to see, there is then a third decisive practice in self-writing: – (2c) “meaning-making” (Bruner 1990), which takes place through “autobiographical sense-making.”

2.1 Autobiographical Retrospection and Autobiographical Hermeneutic Circle It emerges from Lejeune’s definition that the act by which autobiographical practice begins is that of a look back in time, starting from the specific conditions of a given present. I call this act “autobiographical retrospection.” Through it, autobiography arises as a hermeneutic process, in which certain events of the past are awakened to the present of consciousness. Within the linear and irreversible temporality, the implementation of autobiographical retrospection triggers a torsion: if life proceeds forward-oriented, day after day, along a straight line having only one direction, that of the future (life as lived), autobiographical retrospection (life as told) moves in the opposite way. Consciousness opens to that “lived time” (Minkowski 1933), characterized by the opportunities and dangers of looking backwards (cf. Freeman 2009). Moral feelings emerge, some of them peculiarly reluctant to reconciliation (resentment, remorse, regret, and nostalgia), Jankélévitch (1974) calls these “diseases of temporality” (cf. Ferrari 2019). Not everything experienced, however, is remembered; forgetting, therefore, also takes place in many ways (Assmann 2016). Not everything remembered is also, in turn, recounted. Autobiography is an interpretative process, autonomous and free; it is a selection that sanctions what is relevant (and what is not). Writing is the result of a decision, which in turn requires a capacity for self-determination and action (agency). Ex negativo, neither forgetfulness nor erroneous recollection are trivial gaps or negligible mistakes. They too speak of the self that is struggling with autobiographical retrospection. The truth of self-writing is a “narrative truth,” instituted from the structural impossibility of an axiologically neutral approach to the observed historical material. In other words: in the retrospective look of autobiography, it gains evidence that any attempt at self- knowledge necessarily takes place from a hermeneutic perspective. Autobiographical retrospection starts from a “beginning,” that is, from a “today,” always available within the sequence of linear and irreversible temporality. Starting from such a beginning, the terminus ad quem of autobiographical retrospection is the past. As Brockmeier (2015) has aptly shown, this process does not involve inert images that, as deposited in an archive, would be reproducible without modification whenever subjected to interrogation. Evoking an image from a certain “today” means instead to come into contact with it hermeneutically, to establish a “second reading” of experience (Gusdorf 1980 [1956]) full of consequences. In the present act of autobiographical retrospection, one casts their gaze toward the past. It is, however, that past which, from time to time, has led to this present, shaping it. The present is the

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present of all our past. But the past is, nevertheless, always read from the vantage point of the present, and cannot, therefore, be recovered in its pastness. Analogous to the hermeneutic circle, we can then speak of an “autobiographical hermeneutic circle,” which oscillates between the “beginning” (Anfang) that inaugurates autobiographical time today, and the origin (Ursprung) in question, which one goes in search of by interrogating the past. Such a practice shows a certain aporetic character, which emerges clearly when we reflect on it in the terms of “retrospective teleology.”

2.2 Genesis of Personality and Retrospective Teleology According to Lejeune, the outcome of autobiographical retrospection consists, therefore, in the written account of an individual life in terms of the “genesis of the personality.” It is not the simple “person” whose origin is being traced by autobiographical practice. Autobiography, on the other hand, has to do with the construction of a “personality,” and it becomes a precious opportunity insofar as it allows today’s self, often lost in the indigence of the “beginning,” to rediscover those sources, testifying to a more or less consistent fidelity to the opulence of the “origin.” For the human existence that unfolds on its way through irreversible time, writing one’s life, inaugurating autobiographical time, means attempting a return to the archái: seeking that daily stifled voice of one’s daimon (Hillman 1996), attempting the rediscovery of one’s “true” self (Miller 1979). As Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo expresses in a paradigmatic way, autobiography is attestation of the progressive unveiling of character, vocation, and destiny. Furthermore, it is the expression of a passage from potency to act, of a telos that retraced backwards, insufflates, and shapes an entire life. In a time like ours, however, in which skepticism toward any form of finalistic order is an unreflected pre comprehension, all this seems excessively emphatic, ludicrous, or even delusional. And yet, we cannot do without taking autobiography seriously, as a text in which the journey of the individual’s existence expresses its own narrative truth, personal and unique. As such, this truth emerges in time, and stands as testimony of the mutual entanglement between one’s own individual story and the universal history (Schapp 1953). It is clear that the stakes of autobiographical practice are very high: the “genesis of the personality,” which this goes in search of, expresses the fulfillment (or not) of its ethical destination. In the words of Alberto Caracciolo, Autobiography is, in its ultimate substance, evocation and rethinking of our unrepeatable journey with and in the time of the mortal world, drama of truth as understood in the gradually emerged sense (Caracciolo 1993, 230–231).

Autobiography then emerges as the story of an identity that, challenged by a plurality of unpredictable occurrences as well as by the numbing of ordinary life, finds cohesion through a unifying narrative. By locating the hidden origin of the self by means of autobiographical narrative, human beings can thus reconstruct their “genesis of personality,” thereby achieving reconciliation with oneself.

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By virtue of the aforementioned autobiographical hermeneutic circle, it is the “beginning” of today that goes in search of its “origin.” There is an undeniable tension between the perception of life in real time, as something fragmentary and with an uncertain outcome, and the work of autobiographical retrospection, which, in reading backwards many episodes of a life, reconstructs its unfolding in the course of time by establishing connections of meaning, often as the fulfillment of a development, if not as the explication of a purpose progressively at work, attributed tendentially ex post. Not without a veil of sarcasm, Lejeune urges us to be cautious, and to consider autobiography as the paradigmatic expression of the “law of every narrative: the sense determines the events, and not vice versa. All narratives are constructed from the end” (Lejeune 1975, 228). Such a mechanism, already identified by Raymond Aron in the terms of “retrospective illusion of fatality,” particularly operating in Hegel’s philosophy of history (Aron 1938, 230; 291), was then qualified by JeanPaul Sartre in the terms of “retrospective illusion” in his autobiography Les mots (Sartre 1964). The relationship between autobiographical retrospection and attribution of finality has been aptly defined by Jens Brockmeier in terms of “retrospective teleology,” describing the hermeneutic process by which one’s life, once shaped and sequentially ordered as a narrative event, appears as a kind of development toward a certain goal – as if the end (that is, the present of the narrative event) were the destination of one’s journey (Brockmeier 2001, 251—italics mine).

The here and now that inaugurates autobiographical time appears, by virtue of retrospective teleology, as the apex of an accomplished process. Starting from an ending that coincides with the instant in which the autobiographical retrospection takes place, one searches ad hoc for its origins (“genesis of the personality”) and vicissitudes, as if they were the inescapable presuppositions of a paradoxical “necessity, retroactive so to speak, of the history of a life” (Ricoeur 1995 [1990], 147). Decisive, then, is whether this goal, that is, the telos of the autobiographical narrative, was defined as narrative truth in itinere, or whether it was instead established a posteriori, contextually with the retrospective look that inaugurates autobiographical time.

2.3 Autobiographical Meaning-Making (or: Autobiographical Sense) It is a well-established literary topos that of the omniscient autobiographical narrator, who, endowed with the so-called “hindsight,” can understand retrospectively, years and years later, the meaning of an event that befell them in their youth. The “after” interprets the “before” by lending “meanings on events that they did not and indeed could not possess at the time of their occurrence” (Freeman and Brockemeier 2001,

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82). The autobiographical hermeneutic circle is at work here through a further interpretative process of returning to oneself, which is decisive for reconciliation with oneself: the “autobiographical meaning-making,” or “autobiographical sense.” In many languages, the word “sense” has three distinct declinations yet related at the same time. First, there is “sense” as a perceptive faculty: from Heraclitus to Deleuze, Western philosophy has questioned “sense” as “sensory” perception, the five “senses,” and, by extension, “sentiments.” Second, there is “sense” as “meaning.” Whether one asks the meaning of a word or of a life, sense as meaning decodes a portion of reality via signs and allows one to understand something that was previously obscure. Finally, there is “sense” as “direction,” as a “way.” Whether one travels a “two-way” or a “one-way” road, sense is given as an oriented line, and indicates movement, a path. “Autobiographical sense” is given in all three the cases: as perception of life, as meaning of life, and then again as direction of life. Autobiographical sense always implies connection. One who is writing their autobiography, according to Wilhelm Dilthey, “seeks the overall coherence of the story of his life” (Dilthey 2002 [1927], 221). Through meaning-making, it is autobiographical sense that gives narrative cohesion to contingent and fragmentary individual mnestic traces. The look of autobiographical retrospection contemplates a multitude of images, which would remain, however, a mere collection of unrelated snapshots, painful epiphenomenon of the fragmentation of the self. A criterion is needed to order them, and the mere chronological succession is far from being adequate to such a task. What connects the multitude of traces is not a deterministic cause-effect relationship. Remembering, narrating, and, even before, understanding a past event requires the use of “narrative thinking” that, theorized by Jerome Bruner, connects and integrates, as meaning-making, the events remembered, inserting them into the coherent and consistent plot of the story of oneself. It is through this mediation that autobiography traces “the trajectory of a life and, via narrative, giving it meaning” (Freeman and Brockmeier 2001, 79), is fundamental to the processes of reconciliation with oneself, and is expressed in the redefinition of personal identity as a “narrative identity.”

3 Narrative Identity as a Process of Reconciliation with Oneself In antithesis to essentialist conceptions of subjectivity and identity, Paul Ricoeur investigated the processes by which narrative can offer the foundation of personal identity through the notion of “narrative identity” with unparalleled thoroughness, producing reconciliation with oneself. This thesis is introduced at the completion of his three volumes of Time and Narrative (Ricoeur 1988 [1985], 244–249), then unfolds in a more articulate manner in the sixth study of Oneself as Another (Ricoeur 1995 [1990], 140–168), and returns, finally, in his late works such as Memory, History, and Forgetting (Ricoeur 2004 [2000]) and The Course of Recognition (Ricoeur 2005

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[2005]). If the conception of narrative identity requires in Time and Narrative a close confrontation both with great philosophers such as Aristotle and Augustine, and with a wide debate of narratological and historiographical theories, it rests instead in Oneself as Another on an investigation of two hermeneutical models that underlie the very concept of identity: idem-identity and ipse-identity (Ricoeur 1995 [1990], 113–139). The idem-identity model expresses the ideal of unconditional sameness towards a previous self, to be regained as coherence towards an unchanged “idem,” in the purity of its pastness, without taking into account how such an act is condemned to be hermeneutically impossible. Uniqueness, similarity, and continuity are its keywords. The model of ipse-identity, by contrast, emancipates itself from the imperative of sameness, and posits itself as a recognition of the persistence of oneself (“ipse”) over time as selfhood. The identifications of ipse-identity are acquired through lived experience, as the Other by which the Same allows itself to be permeated and reshaped. Plurality, difference, and discontinuity are its keywords. Ipse-identity places otherness in the process of self-making. Through the active exercise of memory, this self oscillates constitutively between estrangement and appropriation (cf. Ferrari 2016). The self of ipse identity is hence a porous totality, whose conclusion is always provisional, constantly exposed to the risk of a new disaggregating occurrence, which assumes, therefore, the connotation of a “potentially irrevocable” (Jankélévitch 1974; cf. Ferrari 2019). Whereby ipse-identity pays with vulnerability the price of its openness to “diversity, variability, discontinuity, and instability” (Ricoeur 1995 [1990], 140), it finds in narrative identity, at the same time, the hermeneutic process that offers cohesion, connection, and reconciliation with oneself. The narrative operating in the narrative identity works as an act of “configuration” (Ricoeur 1984 [1983], 64–70) that puts together contingent, episodic, and heterogeneous occurrences, integrates them in a plot, and, finally, builds a story (in the case of autobiography, a life-story) out of them. A mere succession of occurrences, typical of linear and irreversible temporality, thus becomes, as a narrative configuration, an expression of “lived time.” By leading the particular of the single episode back to the universal of story, this hermeneutic process operates as “emplotment.” Emplotment is crucial, since it is a mediation between the individual events or incidents and a story taken as a whole. In this respect, we may say equivalently that it draws a meaningful story from a diversity of events or incidents (Aristotle’s pragmata) or that it transforms the events or incidents into a story) (Ricoeur 1984 [1983], 65—italics mine).

The configuration implemented by emplotment is the driving principle of narrative identity. Narrative identity incessantly weaves and reweaves the plot of the self from a disjointed plurality of happenings, and operates, therefore, as a “synthesis of the heterogeneous” (Ricoeur 1984 [1983], 66). These occurrences appear in the first instance as unrelated fragments of a radical, even alienating, contingency. Emplotment operates on them as a “discordant concordance” (Ricoeur 1984 [1983], 42), making them understandable and therefore tolerable thanks to the conferral of that “autobiographical sense” which, in the terms

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of Durcharbeiten theorized by Freud, substitutes “for the bits and pieces of stories that are unintelligible as well as unbearable, a coherent and acceptable story, in which the analysand can recognize his or her self-constancy” (Ricoeur 1988 [1985], 247). Without implying a forced harmonicism, ipse-identity hosts, in its constitutive emplotment, even those “fearful and pitiable” happenings, which, as such, are “the major threat to the plot’s coherence” (Ricoeur 1984 [1983], 43). As a “discordant concordance,” the narrative configuration operated via emplotment challenges disintegrating forces, peculiar of traumatic experiences, and is exposed, likewise, to turning points and ruptures of the irrevocable. The construction of a story of oneself is hence an essential resource for the “narrative” redefinition of one’s identity and, therefore, for “self-constancy” and “cohesion,” i.e., for the hermeneutic process of reconciliation with oneself. In the author’s words, this “identity” can be understood as a “narrative” because it rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. The self characterized by self-sameness may then be said to be refigured by the reflective application of such narrative configurations. Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of self-constancy, can include change, mutability, within the cohesion of one lifetime. The subject then appears both as a reader and the writer of its own life, as Proust would have it. As the literary analysis of autobiography confirms, the story of a life continues to be refigured by all the truthful or fictive stories a subject tells about himself or herself. This refiguration makes this life itself a cloth woven of stories told (Ricoeur 1988 [1985], 246—italics mine).

Narrative identity, operating paradigmatically in autobiographical writing, is a fundamental hermeneutic device for the repair and the (re)construction of the plot of the self, therefore, for reconciliation with oneself. Narrative, established by the emplotment of occurrences, transposes, as a narrative identity, the substrate of that plot from the action to the writing subject. By making the logic of the configuring act its own, narrative identity provides connection and order to the amorphous and confused material of occurrences, thus enabling interpretation and implementation of the action, by identifying goals, motives, agents, circumstances, interactions, and outcome (Ricoeur 1984 [1983], 55), through the intelligible totality of a “meaningful” story of oneself. As expression of a narrative identity, autobiography shows the story of a subject who is able to recognize themselves in their past, since they are ready to answer for themselves as the author of the action (Ricoeur 1988 [1985], 246, referring to Arendt 1958). Dilthey (1954 [1927]) already recognized that understanding life does not imply a mere descriptive act. On the contrary, this narrative arises through a nexus between individual episodes linked together by moral judgment, through practical categories such as value, purpose, and meaning. The narrative identity profiled by Ricoeur also serves as a bridge between describing and prescribing. A responsive and responsible autobiographical subject emerges from it, endowed with “narrative agency” (Brockmeier 2015, 177), that is, capable of offering an account of the actions of their self-narrative, as their legitimate agent.

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Ricoeur’s conception of acting also encompasses the no less formative experience of suffering, i.e., of being exposed to those occurrences in which ipse-identity passes through the torment of non-choice and involuntary. All this becomes crucial to reconciliatory processes when the subject of narrative identity is faced with the irrevocable and irreconcilable.

4 Facing the Irrevocable and the Irreconcilable Average everyday life, busy with “doing” and marked by poorly resonant relationships to the world (Rosa 2016), rarely has the power to trigger autobiographical retrospection. This implies the suspension of linear and irreversible temporality and the interrogation of the abysses of one’s heritage of lived time, inaugurating “autobiographical time.” Willing to confront them, the autobiographer is sometimes accompanied by the perception of the parable-character (as in Augustine), or even by the feeling of the uniqueness of their own existence (as in Rousseau). In other cases, autobiographical writing is driven by the perception of a harmony between one’s own particular story and the great universal history (as in Goethe), or by the readiness to give voice to those dialectics by which the writing of life turns into a writing of death and mourning (as in Derrida). For the purposes of this paper, autobiographical time seems to require a decisive turning point recognized as irrevocable to be inaugurated, in which our “openness to the world” (Scheler 1928) dramatically exposes human being in all their vulnerability to the lived experience of pain. Offering testimony to the irrevocable and traumatic event of Auschwitz paradigmatically lies at the core of the autobiographical volumes of the survivors of the concentration and extermination camps. Such writings take their start from a moment of caesura, which is found by interrogating the time of the universal history as much as the lived time of one’s own particular history. Diner 1988 aptly spoke in this regard of “breach of civilization” (Zivilisationsbruch) just as Alexander (2012) defined Auschwitz in the terms of a “cultural trauma,” whose indelible marks can be found on the memories and identities of its direct victims, their following generations, and has been progressively extended by institutionalising a duty of memory for the whole humankind. Survivors, in several cases far from professional writers, embraced autobiographical writing moved by the ethical imperative to give memory to the irrevocable of an experience, that of the Lager, which placed millions of innocent human beings in front of the extreme (Todorov 1991). In doing so, they report the story of a life traumatically broken by the event of the irrevocable in a “before” and “after,” deeply shaken, if not disintegrated in its own reconciliation of oneself. The experience of autobiographical writing about the atrocities of concentration and extermination camps is a dialectical experience for the survivor. On the one hand, meaning-making of the trauma of the Lager through the act of enunciation of one’s own narrative has a therapeutic value for the survivors themselves and finally fosters reconciliation with

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oneself. On the other hand, such recollection of memories can be extremely painful, even retraumatizing, as Semprùn (1994) paradigmatically witnesses. Bruno Bettelheim, psychologist, and concentration camps survivor himself, was aware that by discussing the psychological effects of imprisonment in concentration camps, one must always bear in mind that this experience has been a traumatic one since it destroyed one’s “personal integration” (Bettelheim 1979) completely or to a very considerable extent. Regaining one’s own personal integration implies the restoration of the self and the reclaiming of one’s sense of control of memory, of the capacity to reflect, understand, and to perceive things as they are or were, requires transformation of traumatic memory into narrative memory (Gobodo-Madikizela and Van der Merwe 2007, VII).

Post-traumatic autobiographical writing hence proceeds through (and leads to) the recovery of the self’s capacity to act, and thus restores one’s narratively structured memory, identity, and agency. This article examines the works of two survivors of the Shoah, Viktor Frankl, and Jean Améry, who are at opposite ends of the spectrum in their life and thought yet converging on a point: nothing is the same as before. The human and philosophical ways of both show the memories of Auschwitz survivors as the extreme and crucial place for autobiography which, when faced with the irrevocable, can attempt to do the impossible as a hermeneutic practice of reconciliation with oneself.

4.1 Jean Améry’s Entbildungsroman Jean Améry’s work bears witness to the post-Auschwitz breakup of the autobiographical subject with that sovereign ego which could retrace the various stations of his-her story as expressions of a self-determined life, fulfilment of a teleology capable of prevailing over any accident. To this, well exemplified by the Bildungsroman by Goethe or by Nietzsche’s “How One Becomes what One Is,” he contrasts a narration in the terms of a “novel of deformation” (Entbildungsroman) (Ferrari 2021). A subjectivity, systematically exposed to torture and violence, dispossessed of agency, condemned to the suffering that is proper to a radical passivity, raises his voice in its pages. Améry’s reflection is based on the dualism between natural (irreversible) time and moral (irrevocable) time, in consonance with Jankélévitch (1974). To reconciliation produced by the progressive passing of linear time, Améry (no less than the French philosopher) contrasts resentment, qualifying it as that moral sentiment which, protesting against the oblivion ratified by the irreversible, expresses the resistance of those who recognize a certain event as irrevocable: In two decades of contemplating what happened to me, I believe to have recognized that a forgiving and forgetting induced by social pressure is immoral. [...] Man has the right and the privilege to declare himself to be in disagreement with every natural occurrence, including the biological healing that time brings about. [...] The moral power to resist contains the

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Amery’s reappraisal of resentment as the foundation of morality is the consistent outcome of the embodied thought of a suffering subject, who could only express action as reaction, given the radical self-exposure to torture and detention in the Lager. This goes hand in hand with rethinking an autobiographical retrospective look that posits illness as an integral trait of personality, till recognizing in the distorted condition of the “offended life” (cf. Adorno 1951), expressed by resentment, a higher morality than the “straight” posture of the so-called healthy people (Améry 1980 [1966], 110). Améry gives then voice, in the formulation of his ethics, to an experience in which the contingency of what comes to pass has tragically prevailed over any selfdetermined purpose. This occurrence is Auschwitz, an event capable of obscuring the transcendence of the spirit (Geist) over reality (Améry 1980 [1966], 7), thus, extinguishing all production of meaning, including autobiographical sense. In his words: We did not become wiser in Auschwitz. [...] In the camp, too, we did not become “deeper.” [...] in Auschwitz we did not become better, more human, more humane, and more mature ethically. You do not observe dehumanized man committing his deeds and misdeeds without having all of your notions of inherent human dignity placed in doubt. We emerged from the camp stripped, robbed, emptied out, disoriented — and it was a long time before we were able even to learn the ordinary language of freedom (Améry 1980 [1966], 19; 20—italics mine).

The subjectivity thematized by Améry is deprived of its “trust in the world” (Améry 1980 [1966], 28) and, in the rupture of a dialectic that links cognition and recognition, also of the capacity to speak and act (agency) (Améry 1980 [1966], 47). His work witnesses a refusal of reconciliation (with oneself and with the other) which, through an enduring resentment, describes a widespread alienation (Améry 1980 [1966], 95; Améry 1971) to which corresponds a loss of meaning and agency and finally leads to the loss of one’s own self. In the words of the author: “I was a person who could no longer say “we” and who therefore said “I” merely out of habit, but not with the feeling of full possession of my self” (Améry 1980 [1966], 44).

4.2 Meaning and Value Orientation in Viktor Frankl Faced with the radical suffering of the concentration camps, Viktor Frankl wrote arguments antithetical to Améry’s, developing, under the influence of Max Scheler’s ethics, a connection between occurrence, meaning and value. In his autobiographical volume dedicated to the experience of the Lager, significantly entitled in the German edition Trotzdem ja zum Leben sagen, he writes: An active life serves the purpose of giving man the opportunity to realize values. [...] If there is a meaning in life at all, then there must be a meaning in suffering. Suffering is an ineradicable part of life, even as fate and death. Without suffering and death human life

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cannot be complete. [...] Here lies the chance for a man either to make use of or to forgo the opportunities of attaining the moral values that a difficult situation may afford him. And this decides whether he is worthy of his sufferings or not (Frankl 1984 [1946], 87–88—italics mine).

Meaning is what is shaken by suffering and what can enable to overcome such suffering at the same time. Pain, Frankl teaches us, does not come from an event in itself, but from the existential frustration linked to the impossibility of finding a sense to it. Frankl (1982 [1946]), 5 identifies in an “orientation towards meaning and values” a response to those occurrences that, in their impact on us, shake and upset the cohesion of our existence. Such an orientation confers the “force of reaction of the spirit” (Trotzmacht des Geistes) (Frankl 1982 [1946], 30), and it is thanks to values, therefore, that human beings actively experience their constitutive “openness to the world” à la Scheler. Frankl (1982 [1946]) redefines this openness in terms of “selftranscendence” when he writes: “By essence human beings are open, open to the world. To be a human being means to go beyond oneself. The essence of human existence is found in one’s own self- transcendence. To be a human being is to be turned towards something or someone” (Frankl 1982 [1946], 33—italics mine). Whereby our existence involves going beyond ourselves, turning to something or someone, it is through a “responsibility to values” (Frankl 1982 [1946], 33) that we provide meaning to interhuman relations, and human life can, therefore, maintain its meaning. One can then find reconciliation with oneself by mediating the uniqueness of a situation through values, which Frankl appropriately defines as “universals of meaning referable to the human condition as such” (Frankl 1982 [1946], 58). Frankl’s subject is, therefore, as much open to the world as they are historically structured by their own experiences. Reconciliation with oneself emerges from his pages as a constant narrative work that involves a tollere et conservare in the sense of an Aufhebung à la Hegel (Frankl 1982 [1946], 47), which does not ignore the permanence, rather demands the eternity of the irrevocable. Notwithstanding the diversity of their paths, both Améry and Frankl teach us how the process of meaning-making of occurrences, in particular of the irrevocable trauma, is an essential prerequisite for one’s own agency and, through it, for reconciliation with oneself. Frankl’s thesis on the attribution of meaning through values was developed in conjunction with such radical suffering as to make its implementation difficult, if not impossible for many of his fellow inmates. Améry (1980 [1966]) himself, however, will ratify ex negativo this thesis, recognizing how “the grip of the horror reality was weaker where from the start reality had been placed in the framework of an unalterable idea,” whether religious or political (Améry 1980 [1966], 13) (cf. Frankl 1984 [1946]). There is, therefore, a link between irrevocable, trauma, meaning, values, and agency. Post-traumatic crisis of meaning-making, which Améry called the loss of “trust in the world,” triggers feelings of alienation that immobilize action, whereas instead, autobiographical meaning-making, in the terms of value orientation proposed by Frankl, contributes to reconciliation with oneself as an agency-endowed subject.

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5 Appropriation, Agency, and the Project of a Good Life as Resources for Reconciliation with Oneself Operating through meaning-making, narrative identity provides a solid foundation for reconciliation with oneself, even in front of events recognized as irrevocable and traumatic ones. This process involves the inseparable complementarity between the “systole” of past-appropriation and the “diastole” of future-planning. One does not simply have a past but must be able to represent it as one’s own past. Past is not just something that happened to me, like an inexorable “given” that might overwhelm me with its contingency, abandoning me to a condition of radical passivity. On the contrary, as suggests Peter Bieri, I can relate hermeneutically to the episodes of my past by leaning meaning to them, so that what appeared extraneous and, therefore, alienating, is understood as part of my story, and, in it, of a unity: As a person I must try to take possession of the things that happened to me in the past and to understand them as parts of me, so that they no longer appear to me as extraneous things. Put differently, this ideal states that I must try to bring a unity to my past life (Bieri 1986, 273—italics mine).

Rahel Jaeggi has carefully reconstructed such a process, through which the extraneity (Fremd) of the single, new, and contingent occurrence carries within itself a threat of estrangement and alienation (Ent-fremdung) but can nevertheless be reversed into the “own” (Eigen), through a hermeneutic process of appropriation (An-eignung). In such a perspective, alienation is a deficient relation to world and self that […] can be understood as a disturbed relation of appropriation. Alienation is an impeded appropriation of world and self (Jaeggi 2014 [2005], 151).

so that autobiography can foster reconciliation with oneself in the terms of overcoming alienation through the appropriation of one’s own self-story. Such a process refers to the particular-universal dialectic that, mediated by the autobiographical sense, relates the fragment of the single occurrence to the entire of one’s story, unfolding what MacIntyre calls the “narrative unity of life.” By it, he means a subjectivity that rests on the concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end (MacIntyre 1981, 204).

MacIntyre’s “narrative unity of life” also shows that there is no “good life” except in a life that is perceived as unity, as a “whole,” as the one that achieves reconciliation with oneself. Narrative, particularly autobiographical narrative, is the hermeneutic practice that, through the progressive unfolding of a “life plan,” from time to time at work in single actions, traces “life as a whole.” In this way, autobiography operates at the same time as written testimony of one’s own “project” of “good life” and as a hermeneutic practice of reconciliation with oneself. Autobiography arises, as Dilthey (2002 [1927]) had already understood, from the exposition of those “nexuses of meaning,” through which each remembered

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particular moment possesses its own value by being linked to the sense of the whole. Alienation implies fragmentation, low perception of self-efficacy (Bandura 1982), and reduced agency, “that is, the feeling of [not] being in charge of your life: [do not] knowing where you stand, that you have a say in what happens to you, that you have some ability to shape your circumstances,” (Van der Kolk 2014, 95) and, therefore, unhappiness. From the other side, the appropriation of oneself as a “whole,” made possible by the autobiographical process, becomes an essential condition for the good life. Therefore, autobiography is the retrospective reconstruction of one’s own project of good life, and of its relative implementation in the course of time. Autobiography, then, counts the story of one’s identity, understood as a process oriented and, defined by a certain idea of what is Good (Taylor 1989), chronicles of recognition and appropriation of oneself in the single events of one’s lived experience. In this and because of this, autobiography offers a specific contribution to reconciliation with oneself. As a mediation between the particular of a single occurrence and the universal of a project of a good life, autobiographical practice would not be possible without the capacity to judge what is good, exercised both toward action in the present situation and as an a posteriori backward look on single past occurrences. It is the capacity to judge that provides meaning to what happens, through values. We have already had occasion to reflect on Frankl’s thesis according to which it is possible to provide meaning to an event or an action always and only through a value orientation. The autobiographical sense also operates as a mediation between the particular of the single event and the universal of values. These, according to Taylor, offer a framework of universals, by which it is possible to make sense of the single occurrence or action. Along this way, values constitute parameters for judgment, which, operating through “qualitative distinctions” and “strong evaluations” (Taylor 1985 [1977]), enable the exercise of agency. The importance of such a thesis emerges with particular force when considered ex negativo, observing the crisis of self-conciliation triggered by being deprived of one’s own framework of values with which to identify what is good. Not being able to make sense of what happens, according to Taylor, stems from the disorientation of the capacity to judge and implies, therefore, lack of criteria for the exercise of the capacity to act (agency). As we have already learned from Améry’s testimony, the irrevocable trauma bursts as an unprecedented event, shaking the narrative plots of the self-conciliation and preventing the appropriation of one’s own circumstance. The suffering that accompanies such an experience can agitate every sense, and equally damages those who experience it in their own agency, collapsing the framework of values at the base of their project of a good life. By subsuming an occurrence under a value, autobiographical meaning-making is actualized not only as capacity to judge, but also above all as capacity to act (agency). By reconciling the particular of the single act and the universal of value, meaning-making becomes a condition of possibility for action. In particular, one’s own project of a good life, articulated through value orientation, is recognizable (or not) in individual events and actions through the mediation of a “life plan.” The selfnarrative of autobiography is therefore the story of the exercise of one’s own agency,

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and, through it, the story of one’s progressive advance (or retreat), via individual actions and occurrences, in the realization of one’s “life plan,” and, through it, of one’s own ideal of “good” at the basis of one’s project of a good life. In the words of Taylor: Making sense of my present action, when we are dealing with [...] the issue of my place relative to the good, requires a narrative understanding of my life, a sense of what I have become which can only be given in a story (Taylor 1989, 48—italics mine).

Autobiography emerges as a life-narrative that, through a retrospective look, reconciles the particular of a single occurrence within the universal of the perception of one’s own life as a “whole.” In this way, the story of one’s own life constitutes a hermeneutic practice of reconciliation with oneself. As emplotment of events that are, in the first instance, contingent and unrelated (“potentially irrevocable”), autobiography works as a process of appropriation and deployment of a narrative identity, enabled as meaning-making toward what happens, requiring, in turn, the reference to the framework of a value orientation. In the diachronic retracing of the history of oneself, autobiography becomes, therefore, the history of the implementation of one’s capacity to act (agency), indispensable for the fulfillment of one’s own project of a good life, which, in its unfolding, makes possible the perception of one’s own life as a “whole.” In bringing together single occurrences, meaning, values, appropriation, narrative identity, agency, the project of a good life and the perception of life as a “whole,” autobiography is a practice that traces a hermeneutic arc that, vibrating from the particular to the universal, enables reconciliation with oneself.

References Adorno TW (1951) Minima moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main Alexander JC (2018 [2012]) Trauma. A social theory. Polity Press, Cambridge Améry J (1980 [1966]) At the mind’s limits: contemplations by a survivor on Auschwitz and its realities. Indiana University Press, Bloomington Améry J (1971) Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre. Klett, Stuttgart Arendt H (1958) The human condition. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Aron R (1938) Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire. Essai sur les limites de l’objectivité historique. Gallimard, Paris Assmann A (2016) Formen des Vergessens. Wallstein, Göttingen Bandura A (1982) Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. Am Psychol 37:122–147 Bettelheim B (1979) Surviving and other essays. Knopf, New York Bieri P (1986) Zeiterfahrung und Personalität. In: Burger H (ed) Zeit, Natur und Mensch. Berlin Verlag, Berlin, pp 261–281 Brison S (2002) Aftermath. Violence and the remaking of the self. Princeton University Press, Princeton Brockmeier J (2000) Autobiographical time. Narrat Inq 10/1:51–73 Brockmeier J (2001) From the end to the beginning. Retrospective teleology in autobiography. In: Brockmeier J, Carbaugh D (eds) Narrative and identity. Studies in autobiography, self, and culture. John Benjamins, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, pp 246–280

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Brockmeier J (2015) Beyond the archive. Memory, narrative, and the autobiographical process. Oxford University Press, New York Bruner J (1986) Actual minds, possible worlds. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (USA) Bruner J (1990) Acts of meaning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Caracciolo A (1993) Politica e autobiografia. Morcelliana, Brescia Dilthey W (2002 [1927]) The formation of the historical world in the human sciences. Princeton University Press, Princeton Diner D (ed) (1988) Zivilisationsbruch. Denken nach Auschwitz. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main Ferrari F (2016) Memory, identity, forgiveness. Archaeological and teleological perspectives of reconciliation from Paul Ricoeur. In: Polylog. Forum Intercult Philos 34:151–167 Ferrari F (2019) Vladimir Jankélévitch’s “diseases of temporality” and their impact on reconciliatory processes. In: La Caze M, Zolkos M (eds) Contemporary perspectives on Vladimir Jankélévitch. Rowman & Littlefield, London, pp 95–116 Ferrari F (2021) Between quest for a Heimat and Alienation. Jean Améry’s journey after Auschwitz. In: Pinto V (ed) Remembering the holocaust in Germany, Austria, Italy, and Israel. Brill, Leiden, pp 89–98 Fisher J (2017) Healing the fragmented selves of trauma survivors. Overcoming internal selfalienation. Routledge, New York Foucault M (1966) Les Mots et les Choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines. Gallimard, Paris Frankl V (1982 [1946]) Ärztliche Seelsorge. Deuticke, Wien Frankl V (1984 [1946]) Man’s search for meaning. Beacon Press, Boston Freeman M (2009) Hindsight. The promise and peril of looking backward. Oxford University Press, New York Freeman M, Brockemeier J (2001) Narrative integrity: autobiographical identity and the meaning of the “good life.” In: Brockmeier J, Carbaugh D (eds) Narrative and identity. Studies in autobiography, self, and culture. John Benjamins, Amsterdam & Philadelphia, pp 75–99 Gobodo-Madikizela P, Van der Merwe CN (2007) Narrating our healing. Perspectives on working through trauma. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle Gusdorf G (1980 [1956]) Conditions and limits of autobiography. In: Olney J (ed) Autobiography. Essays theoretical and critical. Princeton University Press, Princeton Hillman J (1996) The Soul’s code. Ballantine Books, New York Jaeggi R (2014 [2005]) Alienation. Columbia University Press, New York Jankélévitch V (1974) L’irréversible et la nostalgie. Flammarion, Paris Leiner M (2018) From conflict resolution to reconciliation. In: Leiner M, Schliesser C (eds) Alternative approaches in conflict resolution. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp 175–185 Lejeune P (1975) Le pacte autobiographique. Seuil, Paris MacIntyre A (1981) After virtue. An essay in moral theory. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame Miller A (1979) The drama of the gifted child. The search for the true self. Basic Books, New York Minkowski E (1933) Le temps vécu. Études phénoménologiques et psychopathologiques. D’Artrey, Paris Ricoeur P (1984 [1983]) Time and narrative, vol 1. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ricoeur P (1988 [1985]) Time and narrative, vol 3. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ricoeur P (1995 [1990]) Oneself as another. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ricoeur P (2004 [2000]) Memory, history, forgetting. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ricoeur P (2005 [2005]) The course of recognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Rosa H (2016) Resonanz. Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main Sartre JP (1964) Les mots. Gallimard, Paris Schapp W (1953) In Geschichten verstrickt. Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding. Hamburg, Meiner Scheler M (1928) Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. Otto Reichl, Darmstadt Semprùn J (1994) L’Écriture ou la vie. Gallimard, Paris

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Theories of Reconciliation—Basic Coordinates for Navigating Debates on Building Better Relationships in Societies in Transition Luis Peña

1 Introduction Reconciliation, a term that seems clear to define in everyday life, turns out to be something of extreme complexity when described and implemented. In the everyday language of people, between officials, and academia, reconciliation consists of improving relationships between people and groups involved in a conflict. However, the complexity lies in the fact that there is no definition of what should be improved in relations damaged by violence, what the mechanisms of reconciliation should be, or how the relationships of reconciled individuals and groups are perceived in everyday life. This complexity, more than a blockage or a weakness, expresses the vitality of reconciliation as a project of social transformation and as a field of study. In this chapter, we are interested in showing the diversity of perspectives on reconciliation, having in mind members of social organizations, academia, and politicians who are beginning to take an interest in reconciliation. We want to show that reconciliation is a multifaceted and disputed term. Of course, the text is also of interest to researchers and implementers of reconciliation strategies. To present reconciliation approaches, we critically use the four models of reconciliation proposed by Du Toit (2018) and Murphy (2010). In Fanie du Toit’s typology of theories are mentioned: liberal reconciliation, moral reconciliation, agonistic reconciliation, and reconciliation as interdependence, while in Murphy’s classification of theories, she mentions reconciliation as forgiveness, reconciliation as creating and stabilizing normative expectations and trust; reconciliation as a political value; and reconciliation as constituting a political community. Among the multiple bibliographies that exist to expose approaches to reconciliation (Abu-Nimer 2001; Bar-Siman-Tov 2004b; Chapman 2009; Charbonneau and Parent 2013; Maddison 2015b; Philpott 2012; Schaap 2005), L. Peña (B) Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, International Association for Reconciliation Studies, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_5

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the classification of these two authors is helpful to contrast three themes within this field of studies: (a) how the beginning of reconciliation is understood; (b) how to implement actions for reconciliation; and (c) what shortcomings and weaknesses each approach has. Du Toit and Murphy’s classification proposals are also interesting as an introduction because it allows us to show that there is a diversity of thematic axes within reconciliation that are not reduced to forgiveness. Of course, this is one of the fundamental themes of reconciliation studies. However, the association according to which reconciliation studies are the study of forgiveness does not offer a complete perspective of what is discussed in this field of research and action. The chapter is organized as follows. First, we trace the basic coordinates of reconciliation studies within peace studies. Then, we describe the four perspectives of reconciliation. We conclude with a reflection of the relevance of recognizing these schools and the dimension of reconciliation for the practices and research on reconciliation.

2 The Basic Coordinates of Reconciliation Studies Reconciliation studies can be mainly placed within the enormous field of peace studies. While there are notions of reconciliation between various intellectuals and thinkers in the past, it was with the end of the Cold War that this issue gained space into the social sciences (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004b). The breakdown of that planetary order uncovered a pandora’s box that led to processes as diverse as the fall of Apartheid in 1994 and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, the genocide in Rwanda and the conflict in Balcans, peace in Ireland, which motivated interest in understanding how to create better relations between former enemies. In this context, peace scholars realized that conflicts are not resolved with diplomatic agreements and strategic arrangements alone but when are conditions to live together without resorting to violence are constructed (Lederach 1997; Nadler et al. 2008). The notion of conflict resolution even began to be criticized by introducing the concept of conflict transformation to emphasize that the cessation of physical violence (negative peace) is not the end of conflictivity but a turning point for a society to process its conflicts through nonviolent means (Boege 2006; Buckley-Zistel 2008; Dayton et al. 2009; Lederach 2015). Since the mid-90s, reconciliation studies were configured to understand the various dimensions relevant to creating a positive peace and understanding how former enemies build relationships without violence (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004; Kriesberg 1998). In Martin Leiner’s terms, reconciliation studies can be defined as the “description, interpretation and evaluation of the processes of creating “normal” and, if possible, “good” relations between States, groups, organizations and individuals that react against serious incidents past, present or that prevent future serious incidents such as wars, civil wars, genocides, atrocities, forced

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displacement, slavery, dictatorship, oppression, colonialism, Apartheid, and other injustices and human rights violations. (Leiner 2018). In the same vein, research on reconciliation also aims to understand the social transitions (Bourgine et al. 2014; Chapman 2009; Dudouet 2009; Maddison 2015b). Because reconciliation is just one possible and sometimes the less frequent path that society takes after serious human rights violations, reconciliation studies seek to understand why the transition from war is not necessarily peace and why a political transition leads to the search for reconciliation and why others do not. Thus, reconciliation is studied not because it is present but because its construction is a fragile and complex possibility. As a field of research interested in social transitions, an essential issue is when the conditions for reconciliation begin to be created and what actions are necessary to promote it. Normally, it is understood that reconciliation is the outcome of positive peacebuilding, but other authors understand that this process begins amid conflict (Leiner and Flämig 2012). On that basis, several questions give life to studies on reconciliation that could be summarized, according to Bar-Siman-Tov, in the following terms: 1. What is the meaning and nature of reconciliation? What are its main characteristics? How can we differentiate reconciliation from stable peace? What are its major dimensions? 2. Why is reconciliation so difficult for former enemies? What kinds of conflict require reconciliation? What is the role of reconciliation in domestic and international conflicts, respectively? 3. What are the differences between reconciliation as an outcome and as a process? What are the necessary, sufficient, and favorable conditions for reconciliation? What methods and techniques should be used in a reconciliation process? 4. What are the structural and psychological barriers to reconciliation? How can they be overcome? 5. What can theoretical and empirical knowledge about reconciliation contribute to peace studies? 6. In terms of policy implications, what lessons can be drawn from our theoretical discussions for current domestic and regional conflicts? (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004a, p. 6) Addressing the questions that arise within reconciliation studies calls for the concurrence of multiple theoretical approaches, methodological tools, and disciplines (see Fig. 1). Although the graph does not seek to be exhaustive, it shows that the relationships, scales, temporalities, ethical issues that make it possible to get out of violence and build positive peace derive in an intricate network of themes and involvements of reconciliation studies. Thus, understanding reconciliation at the level of different relationships (oneself, with others, with other groups, with the environment, with senses of transcendence) implies considering theoretical discussions, temporalities, and complex scales that make the questions mentioned above a transdisciplinary enterprise.

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Fig. 1 Reconciliation coordinates. Converging dimensions, scales, and theories in reconciliation studies. Source Own elaboration based on Martin Leiner seminar on reconciliation at Jena Center for Reconciliations Studies

3 Four Approaches to Reconciliation Moral reconciliation: reconciliation as forgiveness for social restoration This type of reconciliation is called moral because it aims to create norms of coexistence (moral community) by putting forgiveness at the center of the reconciliation process. From this perspective, forgiveness promotes the restoration of social relations and the creation of a new sociability to escape the spiral of revenge and retaliation (Narvaez and Armato 2010). Moral reconciliation theorists argue that forgiveness breaks the political economy of hate: the circuit of production, circulation, and consumption of hate that creates and reproduced groups and people’s hostility (Narvaez 2017). It is important to note that the perspectives of social restoration have strong roots in theology. However, the emphasis on attitudinal changes has arisen the interest in neuroscience and psychology to understand the creation and reproduction of prejudices, trust, compassion, and negative and positive emotions.1 Forgiveness is deemed the fundamental vehicle for building moral community because, according to this perspective, reconciliation is observed in attitudinal changes of individuals to overcome negative emotions such as anger, hatred, resentment, and indignation, which are natural responses to abuse (Murphy 2010). Overcoming negative emotions through forgiveness is interpreted as the basis for building security, a sense of life, a new sociability, and a new narrative about the future (Narvaez and Armato 2010). In addition, forgiveness is comprehended as the means 1

Three examples of this growing bond between forgiveness and neuroscience are (1) The Schools of Forgiveness and Reconciliation (ESPERE) https://fundacionparalareconciliacion.org/escuelasde-perdon-y-reconciliacion-espere/ (2) Templeton World Charity Foundation https://www.temple tonworldcharity.org/about-us and (3) Positive Psychology Center en the University of Pennsylvania https://ppc.sas.upenn.edu/.

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to overcome trauma, promote reparation for victims, and restore the perpetrator’s humanity (Philpott 2012). In moral reconciliation, all these elements are associated with forgiveness’s effect on the restoration of social relations. As Murphy explains, the sociological reasoning behind reconciliation as forgiveness is that if an individual or a group retains resentment and hatred, social interactions can worsen or cease. Hence, restoring long-term social relationships depends on the willingness to overcome resentment and pain as well as on the willingness to trust that wrongdoing does not represent the core of the other individual. In other words, maintaining good relationships depends on the ability and willingness to forgive (Murphy 2010, p. 10). In terms of Miroslav Volf, the willingness to forgive is reflected in a moral call to individuals to embrace those they have seen as enemies and to restore the moral community based on the recognition of the other (Volf 2000, 2010). From a Protestant theological perspective, this author has constructed a series of arguments about the relationship between forgiveness, justice, and reparation, taking the image of the embrace as the referent. He considers that the embrace is a metaphor for reconciliation and, more specifically, for the phases of an embrace can be taken as a model for promoting reconciliation as social restoration. He explains that the embrace between people has the following phases, which he describes as the Drama of the Embrace: (a) open the arms; (b) wait; (c) close the arms on the other; and (d) open your arms to let go. That translates into creating space for the other to enter, in the will to give ourselves to others, to welcome them, to readjust our identities, of reciprocal exchanges based on trust and the recognition of the other as another different and not threatening, to create a new relationship based on trust (Volf 2010, p. 108). Daniel Philpott and Desmond Tutu interpret the embrace metaphor in a sequence of actions aimed at reconciliation (see Table 1). For Philpott, it would be (a) recognition, (b) apologies, (c) forgiveness, and (d) repair (Philpott 2012, 2014). Desmond Tutu, on the other hand, translates them as (a) telling the story of the conflict; (b) naming the pain; (c) to grant forgiveness; and (d) the renewal or release of the relationship (Tutu and Tutu 2014). This interpretation assumes that the way in which individuals reconcile each other offers essential lessons on how groups can be reconciled and that the realm of the interpersonal and the social is characterized by continuity and not by a discontinuity (Du Toit 2018). The perspective of reconciliation as forgiveness presumes that social restoration results in the establishment of correct relationships and that there are tools to heal relationships within people. As Fanie Du Toit explains, there is a social ontology at Table 1 Translation of the metaphor of the embrace into practical actions for reconciliation

Miroslav Volf

Daniel Philpott Desmond Tutu

• Open arms, • Wait • Close arms on the other, and • Open arms to let go

• • • •

Recognition Apologies Forgiveness Reparation

• Telling the story of the conflict • Naming pain • Grant forgiveness • Renewal or release of the relationship

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play within this kind of reconciliation theory that sees human society not as an arena of danger and violent competition, but rather as a delicate network of cooperation, through which sufficient levels of trust exist or can be generated (Du Toit 2018). A key element of the practice of moral reconciliation is restorative justice. Restorative justice promises healing and justice of the victim as the primary objective (Zehr 2002). This usually materializes in establishing truth commissions, historical memory measures, public acts of forgiveness, or public acts of apology. These actions show that this type of justice is achieved not by implementing abstract judicial principles that do not take context into account but by restoring damaged relationships in ways that allow society to overcome historical injustices (Du Toit 2018). In Howard Zehr’s terms, restorative justice is the answer to the needs of victims ignored within criminal justice. He mentions four needs that victims have in the healing process: 1. Information: Victims need answers to the questions they have about the suffered wrongdoing. They need to know why it happened and what has happened since then. 2. Tell the truth: An essential element in healing or transcending the experience of crime is the opportunity to tell the story of what happened in meaningful settings, often where they may receive public recognition. This has therapeutic effects in the way people create a new identity and touch those who caused the harm because it confronts them with the impact of their actions. 3. Empowerment: Victims need to regain control over their property, bodies, emotions, and dreams broken by violence. 4. Restitution and vindication: Due to material losses, restitution by perpetrators is essential to the victims’ needs for justice. However, restitution should be complemented with the vindication of the victim’s humanity through symbolic actions (Zehr 2002, p. 26). Similar senses about restorative justice are found in authors such as Marta Minow, who also mentions four victims’ needs within the social restoration. She argues that restorative justice is set in motion by building the mechanisms for telling the truth about conflict, for the empathetic reception of testimonies (the presence of sympathetic witnesses), for putting individual suffering in a broader context to help people make sense of their experiences, and, finally, for identity recognition (Minow 1998). In addition, she agrees with Zehr that when one of these elements is absent, the whole process is affected. Fanie du Toit, Colleen Murphy, Ernesto Verdeja (Verdeja 2004, 2009, 2017), Pablo de Greiff (De Greiff 2006, 2011; De Greiff and Duthie 2009), among others have raised questions about the perspectives of moral reconciliation and its emphasis on forgiveness as a fundamental result and vehicle of the reconciliation process. Here, we can only summarize the criticisms in the following list of postulates: ● Forgiveness is not an appropriate goal for social restoration in societies in transition. ● Forgiveness makes reconciliation a result-oriented practice and forgets that reconciliation should be process-oriented.

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● ● ● ●

There is a danger that forgiveness and truth will replace justice. There is a danger of instrumentalizing forgiveness. Victims feel pressure when aggressors have offered forgiveness to victims. The prospects of social restoration do not have a Plan B when forgiveness is not possible. ● Reconciliation cannot wait for the day when all differences have been resolved before it begins or even progresses. Waiting for the “moment of forgiveness” can block progress in the social restoration. ● It is unclear how the new moral community should be defined and how to prevent the reconciliation of one group from being imposed on the others. Whose morality should determine the form of the restored community and trace the steps that society will take to achieve coexistence? Who makes the call to the moral community, who decides on its implementation, and who should follow? ● Forgiveness cannot be translated into political practice. The institutions created in restorative justice neglect long-term political and institutional reforms and respect mediated by stable institutions (Fig. 2). Liberal reconciliation: establishment of the rule of law and liberal institutions There is an idea among some authors who make criticisms of moral reconciliation that there is a “South African bias” in debates about reconciliation and justice mechanisms. They postulate that reconciliation processes should not depend on forgiveness or truth commissions but on establishing reliable political institutions that promote democracy, economic development, and the prosecution of atrocities committed in the context of a violent conflict (Corradetti et al. 2015; De Greiff 2006). The so-called South African bias, according to the main critics of moral reconciliation, is that the search for restorative justice does not lead to retributive actions of punishment and represents a moral burden for the reconciliation process to the extent that it privileges an unrealistic social achievement (building a moral community) over the processes of building liberal political institutions (Gutmann and Thompson 2009). In this sense, a transition does not advance toward reconciliation if the society is not aimed at embracing liberal democracy and belonging to the liberal international community under the premise, widely disseminated by organizations such as the United Nations, that liberalism is the only valid criterion of any political progress. Despite recurrent calls for a more locally rooted approach to building “local capacities,” peacebuilding today is primarily conceived as the process of transforming war-torn societies under neoliberal premises, both in the political and economic spheres (Andrieu 2010). Specifically, under this perspective, reconciliation is seen as the process of generating civic trust and security based on the predictability of citizen and institutional behavior that is achieved with the rule of law and the economic institutions of capitalism (De Greiff 2011; Murphy 2010). Civic trust as one of the indicators of reconciliation is justified in moral terms, but here, the argument is different from reconciliations as forgiveness approach. In her book, Moral Repair, Margaret Urban Walker explains that political relations are damaged when shared normative expectations are

Fig. 2 Fundamental elements of moral reconciliation. Source Own elaboration

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transgressed and trust is undermined. Hence, the task of reconciliation processes is to develop and reinforce the normative expectations constituting moral relations and cultivate trust (Walker 2006). Unlike reconciliation as a forgiveness, this conception does not focus on the change demanded of victims but on the establishment of relevant and appropriate political commitments in transitional contexts (Murphy 2010). Also, as Andrew Schaap explains, the liberal perspective of reconciliation is built under a pessimistic view of human nature as opposed to the perspective of reconciliation as forgiveness. He argues that for liberal theorists and, consequently, in measures aimed at reconciliation inspired by liberal ideas, it is assumed that people are driven to create a social pact not because people are intrinsically good but because political relations are full of insecurity, fear, resentment, and hostility (Schaap 2005). In the same vein, reconciliation in liberal terms is based on the idea that it is necessary to repair social relations first to produce just and democratic political relations. In contrast, attitudinal change is secondary in relation to the institutional change that should be undertaken by leaders committed to liberal democracy (De Greiff 2011; De Greiff and Duthie 2009). In terms of justice, liberal reconciliation theories favor transitional justice measures, which refers to the set of measures implemented to address the effects of mass human rights abuses and ensure non-repetition. These measures typically include criminal prosecutions, disclosure of the truth, reparations, and different types of institutional reform, particularly of the security forces and the judiciary (Corradetti et al. 2015). It should be noted that none of these measures is tied to forgiveness either as a vehicle or as a result. Instead, these transitional justice measures aim to create increasing levels of civility, security, and trust. For Pablo de Greiff, one of the most influential advocates of reconciliation in liberal terms, transitional justice is a holistic but imperfect process with two pillars: recognition and public trust (De Greiff 2012). He explains that the first consists of making visible the effects suffered by the person to repair his agency not only as a victim but as a full citizen, as a bearer of rights. Recognition is then the principle to deactivate the ideas of superiority or privileges of some people over others on which criminal behaviors are based and install the notion of equality of all citizens before the law (De Greiff 2012, p. 15). On the other hand, civic trust is not trusting in abstract institutions but trust between individuals who know and admit specific values as valid, which results in the recognition of the meaning of norms and sufficient active support for their norms (De Greiff 2012, p. 18). Under these principles, transitional justice seeks not to repair damaged relationships or social restoration but rather to rehabilitate both the perpetrator and the victim as citizens. Perpetrators can only be rehabilitated by judging and punishing their personal responsibility; victims are rehabilitated through material reparation and effective incorporation as rights-bearing citizens. In short, reconciliation as a dimension of liberal peace has the individual as its axis (Du Toit 2018). Although the liberal perspective has made visible the relevance of the political reforms aiming at non-repetition, several criticisms have been formulated to this perspective, mainly for its assumptions of how the social world operates and

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the closure of the political debate to restricted frameworks. Based on Fanie Du Toit and Andrew Shaap, the main criticisms could be summarized in the following propositions. ● Liberal theories of reconciliation have a narrow view of the conflict that results in a mechanical perspective of social change. They equate the lack of modernity and capitalism as the source of conflict and, consequently, the installation of these to solve conflicts. ● By criticizing theological positions, liberal perspectives equate secular norms and liberal institutions as non-dogmatic while regarding liberal institutions as the only valid path to reconciliation. ● It splits from the private/public as a guarantee of freedom and refrains from addressing issues such as attitudinal change, deeply rooted in systemic exploitation. ● Restricting political transition to political reforms and not promoting economic transformations and economic empowerment. ● It does not grasp the diversity of victims and does not understand questions of identity because people are understood as homogeneous citizens before the law. In addition, identity becomes a subject of private life. ● Liberal instruments are incomplete in addressing the challenges of societies in transition. Transitional justice measures may be unsuccessful in addressing other forms of destructive power that challenge societies in transition and may count among the root causes of conflict. Liberal reconciliation does not bring substantive conversations about morality, values, the value of things, etc., which can undermine the justifications of former enemies to live together. ● Liberal categories are usually regarded as fixed. The perspective circulating in international agencies, the media, and influential intellectuals is that the liberal paradigm should be the unbreakable normative framework for political transitions globally. This may result in the absence of policy innovations for reconciliation beyond turning citizens into consumers. ● Reconciliation in liberal terms is based on the result (trust, establishment of liberal relations) and the search for certainties closing the spectrum of issues and political perspectives. Agonistic reconciliation: creating an open political space Based on the criticisms exposed to the two previous perspectives, has appeared an approach is known as Agonistic Reconciliation. Here are two central authors: Schaap (2005, 2009) and Maddison (2015a, b). They are strongly inspired by Hannah Arendt’s conception of the art of togetherness, which translates into the idea that nonviolent political confrontation is the surest sign of progress toward reconciliation. These authors consider that moral and liberal approaches conceive that reconciliation begins and seeks to create a consensus in precise terms (forgiveness and adoption of liberal institutions) and that this consensus closes the political world of societies in transition by reducing the themes and instruments of the reconciliation process prematurely. This occlusion of the political space is considered a risk

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because it implies the suppression of voices and demands that do not fit into the idea of reconciliation as forgiveness or the establishment of liberal institutions. To face the closure of the political space, agonistic reconciliation proposes that peaceful coexistence should be based on the cultivation of differences and disagreements. This means that reconciliation is not initiated by calls for restoring a moral community or liberal peace but by the willingness of enemies to “appear” to one another on behalf of a community that is yet to be born. We detail the approach a little below. Andrew Schaap argues that in contrast to the two dominant approaches to explaining the conditions and possibilities of political freedom—that of normativized deliberation and that of communicative rationality—lies the agonistic approach. Agonism—from the root ag¯on, struggle—beyond emphasizing the inevitability of conflict, shows that politics is composed of divergence and lack of consensus and that the vitality of the political space derives from the cultivation of differences. Agonist thinkers accuse theories of deliberative democracy of depoliticizing social conflict by representing it in terms of an anticipated or counterfactual consensus. “Whereas deliberative democracy establishes the legitimacy of democratic procedures by appeal to the meta-political ideal of consensus, agonistic approaches typically insist that the democratic contest can and should go all the way down to include the principles and procedures that are supposed to regulate political life” (Schaap 2009, p. 1). In this line of argument, it is understood why the agonist perspective of reconciliation considers that forgiveness or the installation of liberal institutions as a way of arbitrarily interrupting the political life of a society in transition. The authors mentioned above claim the value of political difference and understand that reconciliation is not overcoming differences but a call to create and expand political space under the principle of nonviolence. They understand that violence is always an attack on diversity. Moreover, the agonistic approach holds that assuming that conflict is reconcilable, in the sense of one day achieving harmony and consensus, obscures the policy of reconciliation and, on the contrary, sustains the hope that in the midst of spaces of unresolvable conflict, divided societies will expand their political capacities, embrace conflict without violence, and find new ways to respect old adversaries (Maddison 2017, p. 158). Agonist reconciliation is the opposite of assimilation, integration, absorption, or unification and interprets that overcoming the conflict by searching for some kind of political homogenization is futile. Schaap argues that, rather than seeking to reestablish unity based on a common identity, political reconciliation would presuppose a plurality of potentially immeasurable perspectives, not only among the communities to which the perpetrators and victims belong but between them. He further argues that reconciliation cannot be conceived in terms of an ahistorical ideal of harmony or consensus according to which discord and antagonism would be flattened out once and for all. “Rather, it must be understood as a striving for a sense of commonness that might be disclosed from the clash of perspectives we bring to bear on the world in our historical relation to each other. As such, reconciliation would not be about transcending the conflicts of the past by striving for social harmony. Rather, reconciliation would condition the possibility of politics by framing a potentially agonistic

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clash of worldviews within the context of a community that is not yet” (Schaap 2005, p. 4). What defines this political community and ultimately reconciliation in agonistic terms, following Schaap, is the transformation of relations of enmity into one of civic friendship that translates into the care of a common world, the will to live together and take the risk of joining a fragile pre-moral community. The risk of politics, in this context, is that the world continues to be perceived from the radically opposite perspectives determined by a relationship of enmity. In that case, agonistic reconciliation promises that people, by engaging in an ongoing debate about the world between them, the world can reveal itself as an object that is kept in common but perceived from a multitude of perspectives, created intersubjectively between the former enemies (Schaap 2005, p. 69). According to the defenders of agonistic reconciliation, this fragile, intersubjective, contingent construction of reality allows the prevention of mass violence. Thus, the opening of the political space, the creation of civic friendship, the recognition of the risks of politics are intended not so much to punish but to prevent the reappearance of violence. The argument is constructed, Schaap and Maddison explain, on Hannah Arendt’s political theory in which she postulates that politics is nothing more than the refutation and sustained prevention of genocide. Arendt argued that genocide sought the disappearance of specific groups of people from public life and that, as a contrast, good politics could be understood as one that allows people to “appear” (or reappear) in the public space (Maddison 2015a; Schaap 2005). Once again, we have the idea that the origin of violence is the attack and concealment of diversity. How can be then put in practice the agonistic reconciliation ideas? Andrew Schaap summarizes the actions in the terms constitution, forgiveness, responsibility, and memory, topics to which he dedicates specific chapters in his book Political Reconciliation (Schaap 2005, Chaps. 6, 7, 8, and 9). Very briefly, the characteristics of each of the actions can be expressed as follows: Constitution: consists of adopting constitutional policies. A process that encourages all parties to reflect on what it would take to constitute a shared and acceptable political life after the war. This occurs by constituting legal institutions that guarantee this space for political interaction based on the future, resulting in the construction of a “we,” that translated into the political will of coexistence, the declaration of a “never again” and a new beginning. Forgiveness: willingness to stop judging others as enemies by recognizing the obligation to repair the damage and free the former enemy from the consequences of their past actions to allow them to act (politically) differently in the future. Forgiveness involves a willingness to explore ways of living with “the other.“ Forgiveness also brings to light the world that victims and perpetrators have in common. Responsibility: refers to how ordinary citizens can be held collectively responsible for tacitly supporting or benefiting from an unjust regime. This is equivalent to a declaration of irresponsibility, and, from the perspective of future generations, this lack of accountability may seem like an ongoing injustice. In other words, taking political responsibility is not about purifying a tainted identity through demonstrating

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one’s good intentions; it is about recognizing that one is implicated in past mistakes as a “consequence of one’s entanglement in history.” Memory: refers to actions aimed at remembering past wrongdoings to restore victims’ sense of moral and civic value and construct redemptive narratives that reveal the broader context of violence. Actions promoting memory work open up new possibilities to discuss the past, discover new forms of coexistence and frame the possibility of achieving freedom in the present. The declaration of a “never again” in a constitutional policy depends on disclosing victims’ damages truth. What the agonistic reconciliation proposes has led to a series of criticisms that Fanie Du Toit and Collen Murphy summarize as follows: ● It is unclear how to bring the parties into dialogue and get people involved in agonistic politics, especially when people’s lives are dominated by fear or the struggle to survive. ● Indefinite process without steps and an emphasis on the process at the expense of the result. Agonistic reconciliation seems to promise a sustained debate on the terms of political association to forge new political relations. ● There is no Plan B if the results hinder the creation of a civic friendship and the lack of trust between the parties. The call for former enemies to engage in agonist politics is difficult to justify with the argument “trust the process; it is for your benefit.” In this context, an open invitation to continue a risky encounter is unlikely to be sufficient: a more convincing and less fragile set of reasons must be available to validate and justify political commitment to the enemy. In fragile postviolence situations, the overwhelming need is not for risk and fragility but security, certainty, and consolidation. When political, economic, and social frameworks have been destroyed, an invitation to embrace a deliberate (and indefensible) suspension of certainty seems unlikely to gain much support. ● There is no explicit promise for everyone, especially for the victims. Following the same criticism above, creating an open political space does not meet the needs of many victims who seek material reparations and rights restitutions. The emphasis on civic friendship seems to disregard the questions of attitudes, emotions, trauma, ostracism, terror, guilt, and shame that are the products of civil conflict and repressive rule, nor can explain the role that tradition and social norms play in structuring political interaction and making evil possible. ● Socio-economic justice is overlooked or relegated to the task of creating civic friendship and valuing political differences. This has as a corollary that agonistic reconciliation does not raise the question of how economic inequalities and deprivations are related to how people can participate in creating a political community. Reconciliation as interdependence The notion of reconciliation as interdependence was introduced by Fanie Du Toit to respond to the shortcomings of the agonistic, liberal, and moral reconciliation theories and recuperate from them its most valuable contributions. This position includes European philosophical arguments but receives a clear influence from ubuntu’s

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ethical tradition, a philosophy of dialogue that offers instruments to understand interdependence and whose best-known motto is “I am because we are.“ Here we describe the broad features of his argument, which he expounds in Chap. 8 of his work entitled When Political Transitions Work (Du Toit 2018, pp. 189–225). The principle of interdependence, Du Toit argues, provides direction for crucial conjunctures of society in transition, such as the creation of nonviolent relations amid unfavorable conditions, the expansion of dialogue beyond political elites, and the generation of just socio-economic relations. Du Toit expresses the centrality of interdependence as a fundamental designator of reconciliation by maintaining that “…the conditions for reconciliation are created amid adversity when both sides acknowledge that the realization of their own hopes and dreams are impossible without the cooperation of the other side… interdependence as reconciliation does not require fully restored trust, political forgiveness, or indeed any form of intimacy. It does, however, imply a break with the politics of violent hostility and the willingness to embrace seeking to work with and understand the enemy (Du Toit 2018, p. 197). One image that Du Toit finds significant of interdependence is that of a couple of enemies who are trapped in the same lifeboat after a shipping disaster many miles offshore. To begin, trust and hope would be low and animosity high. Some will choose a dual to death with their fellow survivor or swimming for the shore, rather than having to cooperate with the very person they have learnt to hate so passionately. But should sanity prevail, there would eventually be a gradual, perhaps grudging acknowledgment that chances of survival are greatly improved first by remaining inside the boat; and furthermore if the boat is rowed by two rowers rather than one, working in rhythm toward the shore line (Du Toit 2018, p. 17).

Interdependence is then not expressed as a desire and a will; it is a condition born of sharing a common space. Interdependence is then irrevocable, and there is no other option than to work together with the former enemy to achieve a future goal. This means, Du Toit explains, that reconciliation begins to take shape amid deep antagonistic relationships that are transformed as a shared future is embraced on the basis that this is not only desirable but (eventually) inevitable. Working toward equity and inclusion, reconciliation involves mutual recognition, progressive institutionalization, and the long-term socialization of an integral and fundamental interdependence (Du Toit 2018, p. 202). It also suggests that reconciliation operates both “vertically” by trying to restore relations between citizens and the State (encapsulated in the “social contract”) and “horizontally,” improving social cohesion marked by fairness and inclusion. Moreover, it implies that reconciliation begins, not with a clear and well-articulated moral commitment shared across enemy lines, but rather with the acknowledgment by all sides of reality that envelops all of them, namely, that no segment or class of society can easily exist, and indeed cannot prosper, in the absence of the security and prosperity of others. A gradual movement toward shared norms and values comes from that acknowledgment to build a more just future. This shared acknowledgment implies a conception of justice that is fundamentally future-oriented, though not

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excluding dealing with a problematic past to the extent that it impedes the realization of a desired future (Du Toit 2018, p. 192). In practice, reconciliation as interdependence is not seen as applying an orderly sequence of steps and measures. Rather, Du Toit explains, this is a process where there are no absolute certainties, and it is necessary to develop “a sense of momentum” but where there is an institutional and attitudinal platform for peace. He mentions that in practical terms, reconciliation policies should promote four strategies: 1. Acquire a sense of interdependence to deactivate discourses that promote the idea of hierarchies or natural privileges. Acknowledgment, respect, and the will to justice are the pillars of this practice. 2. Establish the aspiration for a just and interdependent future that consists of establishing justice measures to challenge structural economic asymmetries, transform power relations in favor of victims, address inequality and lack of political participation. 3. Dealing with the past, which translates into establishing strategies to deal with the past by putting the victims at the center of the process. This means promoting the work of memory, establishing accountability measures, seeking the victim’s sense of justice. 4. Promote the rule of law, considering regional cultural diversity and the impact of conflict. The difference with the liberal perspective of the rule of law is that in the case of interdependence as reconciliation, measures and strategies are defined locally regardless of the entire reconciliation package to the country. The idea is that the gradual and local introduction of the measure will produce a virtuous circle of engagement that will bring more actors and more subjects to the table. The approach of reconciliation as interdependence offers answers to the flaws of other forms of reconciliation and seeks to create bridges between arguments stemming from the different reconciliation theories, which makes it a conciliatory, holistic, and practical approach. However, as in the other perspectives, it is pertinent to raise some criticisms. We propose four. First, the concept of interdependence and the ethics that emerge from it are expandable. The reading of interdependence in Du Toit has as principal references the political science and ubuntu philosophy. However, a series of authors outside those fields can provide complementary notions to think about the concept, practice, and notion of reparation and justice that comes from interdependence. Complementary readings on interdependence can help to transform the notion of reconciliation into broader areas than improving relations between former enemies. We think specifically about the notions of interdependence that come from the various environmental epistemologies: post-developmentalism, Marxist political ecology, environmental history, theological ecology, ecological anthropology, ecofeminism, environmentalism of the poor, transhumanism, decolonial ecology, environmental justice, deep ecology, ecocentrism, the phenomenology of nature, among others. Notions such as sustainability, rhizome, the ethics of care, co-construction, enskillment, embodiment, autopoiesis, antifragility, ecology of knowledge, assembly, etc., are all relevant notions for expanding the notions of interdependence.

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Second, the notion of interdependence is not carried to its most profound consequences. The notion of interdependence should be scaled up to broaden the boundaries established in reconciliation studies limited to the reparation of relations between former enemies. Interdependence is a strategic narrative to bring enemies into a common space, but limiting it to this specific field of relationships would make it impossible to create support in the rest of society. The task of expanding the notion of interdependence, then, is not merely a question of recognizing the interdependence of the former enemies. It is a question of acknowledging the interdependence of all at different levels, not only economic and political but ecological and identitarian ones. Third, the visibility and expansion of interdependence is understood as a process that trickles down from the elites to the rest of society. The idea transmitted in Du Toit’s argument is that, based on a culturally rooted ethic such as ubuntu, the elites have managed to understand the meaning of interdependence and are in charge of spreading this notion in society. However, is this process not the other way around? Is not interdependence being practiced between grassroots social organizations between neighbors? What other notions and practices of interdependence are circulating in society? How have the elites or public figures who promote reconciliation learned these practices and notions of interdependence? Four, the distinction between interdependence and co-dependence and how this would translate into strategies to break economic inequalities and exclusions is unclear. Understanding that Du Toit does not seek to offer an economic recipe, he rightly insists on the need for reconciliation to promote a more inclusive economy. However, he leaves us with many questions about how he conceives “the political economy of reconciliation.”

4 Conclusions The revision of reconciliation theories shows us not only the contrasts between the different perspectives but also allows us to distinguish some of the most prominent dimensions of reconciliation, such as: ● The change of attitudes between people involved in a conflict. ● Restoration of the victims’ dignity and rights through material-economic reparation, prosecution of the perpetrators, knowledge of the truth and memory work. ● Opening of the political space and creation of a political community. ● Promotion of the sense of interdependence to transform social representations that promotes exploitation, segregation, enmity. ● Transformations in the economic structure to break the cycles of exclusion. Some of these dimensions enjoy more attention than others, as we saw. For example, changing attitudes, restoring victims, and creating a political community

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are more present than the themes of economic transformations necessary for reconciliation (the political economy of reconciliation) and the promotion of a sense of interdependence. What is relevant in an introductory discussion is to ask why it is relevant to consider these dimensions and the theories of reconciliation. On the understanding that the study on reconciliation is a transdisciplinary field but that, at the same time, researchers interested in this subject come with a disciplinary identity, we consider that it is essential to take into account the dimensions and theories raised here to reflect on how a particular interest (law, economics, neurology, linguistics, social geography, history, digital humanities, theology, sociology, environmental epistemologies, etc.) intersects with reconciliation as a research topic and how social practice. Recognizing theories and dimensions is also a starting point to propose practical and theoretical research that allows expanding reconciliation studies. What we reviewed here, for example, shows that studies on reconciliation have been mostly concerned with the question of how to improve relations between former enemies and between victims and perpetrators. However, after mass violence, many relationships should be repaired. This situation invites us to think about reconciliation beyond these two nuclei of relationships. Alternatively, at least, it invites us to reflect on how the improvement of relations between former enemies and between victims and perpetrators is related to the improvement of other types of broken relations in the context of violence. Among the relationships that are damaged and need to be repaired during a period of massive human rights aggression are relationships between people who cannot be identified as victims, perpetrators, or enemies. There are also the relationships between citizens and officials (people and State institutions), the relationships between ethnic groups, and people’s relationships with the environment. Martin Leiner raises this when he mentions that reconciliation implies thinking about the dimension of oneself, others, other groups, environment, and with the senses of transcendence.

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Digital Humanities in Social Sciences

Netnography Internet Research Methodology into the Internet of Toys Abeer Abdel-Jabbar Abu-Zayed, Mohammad Alshraideh, Iyad Muhsen AlDajani, and Saleh Al-Sharaeh

Abstract The Internet of Things (IoTs) is one of the most important technologies of the twenty-first century, as it has presented a widespread around the world. The IoT or recently called Internet of Everything (IeT) has the potential to deliver solutions that dramatically improve energy efficiency, security, health, education and many other aspects of our daily life. One of new applications of IoT is online gaming. Online games mean games that connect one or many players or even a database that utilize embedded devices. Based on its spread and the increase in individuals’ use of this technology, it affected them either positively or negatively. In this paper, we study the opinion of university students in Jordan about online games and study the extent of their impact on their mental, behavioral, and physical health using a research method based on digital humanities called Netnography methods of research. The results showed that students believed that online games harmed them. Keywords Internet of Toys (IoToys) · Netnography · Analysis · Content analysis · Research methodologies · Internet research · Internet of Things (IoT)

1 Introduction The Internet of Things (IoT) is a recently emerging topic in technical, social, and economic issues. It is one of the indispensable topics of the twenty-first century, which means (s) connect things to the Internet via embedded materials (Rouse 2019). The Internet of Toys (IoT) is a new modernistic paradigm or model fast spreading around the ground in the modern wireless connection (Atzori et al. 2010). It means merging consumer products, cars, sensors, and other devices and equipment linked to the Internet. The (IoT) where physical machines or devices are embedded with A. A.-J. Abu-Zayed · M. Alshraideh (B) Computer Science Department, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan e-mail: [email protected] I. M. AlDajani · S. Al-Sharaeh The Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa (AARMENA), Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_6

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electronics, sensors, software, and some connections activities allow the exchange of data (Alshraideh et al. 2015; Holloway and Green 2016; Alfayoumi et al. 2021). Internet of Toys (IoToys) is one of the (IoT) fields. The germination and diffusion of broadband access networks to the home have serviced online games’ growth across the Internet. Every day, millions of people communicate with each other in an online society known as online games environments. Online games are widely popular among children and youth in particular. The annual research conducted by OFCOM appears gaming is still one of the most practiced activities for youth to enjoy 18–30 years (Safadinho et al. 2017). From sports-related online games to mission-based game types and topics that inspire users to complete tests, interactive entertainments feed a wide scope of benefits. They can empower users to bond and play commonly (Schiele et al. 2007). The story of online games begins with the initial days of packet-based computer networking in the 1970s (Woolley 1994). From the 1978s to the 1980s, a popular game during this period was launched and subsequently developed called MUDs (Mulligan and Patrovsky 2003). Games continued to be designed and developed with various technologies until they became a part of our lives in which we share our details and our time. With the introduction of online games, users are now combined with gamers and companies every day (Monu et al. 2016). The hypothesis that online games, in general, are populated regularly by males has continued moderately accurate for years, and recent research begins to reduce the male domination myth in gaming society (ESA 2015). The Online Games Market Outlook considers global income from online games to reach $31 billion by 2025, compared to $19 billion in 2011 (Gaudiosi 2012). The term Netnography or the Ethnography of Internet is a form of qualitative research conducted by researchers who enter and gather data from the cultural or sociological context (Belk and Kozinetz 2017). The Netnography methodology provides an informed space in privacy. It is more naturalistic than reviews and examination, and personal interviews. This methodology is used to discover the difference between what people do with the truth and what they say about their truth (Kozinets 2016). Besides, Netnography can be used to study the social behavior of Internet users and participants of various social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube (AlDajani 2020). The research has been separated and structured as follows: Sect. 2 presents the background of the main terminology while Sect. 3 has the literature review and state of the art. Section 4 displays the research methodology, and Sect. 5 has review of the results gained. Finally, Sect. 6 posts a conclusion of the work.

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Fig. 1 Online games model

2 Background 2.1 Internet of Toys The Internet of Toys not just connects one-to-one player, but it could connect other toys to each other via a shared database server. For that, games divide the Internet into categories based on the number of players or participants: (a) Single players games (SPGs): It needs new levels to keep player interest, like shooting, word games, etc. (b) Multiplayer online games (MOs): Hundred to thousands of players can use them and interact with each other at any time (Fig. 1).

2.2 Netnography This methodology contains fixed steps and processes which the research should be constructed to include under the Netnography methodology. Firstly, (Kozinets 2016) redefinition of research questions and target (problem definition and research objectives). In the second step, collect data and identify the community and media mapping, filtering, and selection. Thirdly, digital associate observation and applying

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its ethical rules and principles through internet communication technology application. Fourthly, the use of data analysis and visualization tools in data mining procedures. Finally, report the research results with the strategy you used and sent feedback on the work (representation). The sites selected to applied the Netnography methodology must be communities that offer a context that (Belk et al. 2015): (1) Is more straight connected to the study’s research direction, issue, or question (relevant); (2) has a larger number of postings collections; (3) offers a more extensive number of discrete message notices (traffic); (4) has a lively feel and quality; (5) has rich data between member interaction; and (6) finally, it shows data that is more detailed or descriptively fecund. Netnography methodology tacks the Internet (the community which is a source of consumer’s lifestyle), keeps recording the interactions, checks and confirms changes over time and completes analysis (Kozinets et al. 2010). Also, it provides clear knowledge and explanations of language and practices related to a specific topic (Belk and Kozinetz 2017). Some ethical rules must adhere to when applying Netnography methodology in research (Kozinets 2002): (1) Fully reveal and disclose your identity; (2) ensure the identity be a secret of members; (3) integrate feedback; and (4) acquire permission before publishing.

3 State of the Art Ustek-Spilda et al. (2020) proposed a new framework and approach for data analysis by collecting tweets about ethnographic using a methodology mixing qualitative and quantitative methods divided into two types: tweets written using hashtags, tweets written using a selected number of qualitative, and following or follower networks of users. Then, we check the similarity between the content of tweets and the dictionary using the graph approach. The relationship between psychometric indicators and his digital footprint in the social network sites has been studied based on data from social networks like Facebook (Deeva 2019). Deeva et al. compared multi-response forecasting and univariate models for each personality trait. The author analyzes the data to determine whether any psychometric could correlate equally well in different media environments. Hajra provides a way to access tourists’ opinions about the services received over the Internet and under the so-called Netnography (Hajra 2020). They will study the relationship between big data, Internet networks, and smart tourism to know the marketing effects of tourism. They found that the impact of smart tourism on tourists is greater than traditional tourism because Web sites are widely spread on smart devices. In (An and Alarcón 2021), the study aims to contribute a basis for developing appropriate response strategies by concluding tourists’ natural attention relevant to their rural tourism experiences and the features of the rural tourism business sections. The principle of Netnography was applied to 1002 tourists in three different online

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communities. Their study concluded that the tourist adopts his comfort and green countryside. The research of Shaw (2020) deals with thinking of applying negative summary content analysis, the Netnography method, and how it can be used in marketing research. The aim of research was to launch a metric that allows users to measure energy consumption. The first step was to identify suitable sources of information to analyze. The author elected to focus only on how those letters are printed during the six months and copied a part of the data onto the NVivo and later selected the data that needs to be encoded and define the sectors. The fourth stage is based on data coding. Finally, integrate the encoded data into the NVivo tool in order to analyzing the data. The negative Netnography result was 73.73%. Previous research has provided us with the results of analyzing the opinions and behavior of people in the field of tourism and museums, in addition to analyzing negative opinions. In this research, we introduce Netnography as it is related to the field of the Internet of Things and we analyze Jordan’s’ Universities about the effects of online games.

4 Research Methodology 4.1 Dataset We have collected data from seven hundred university students in Jordan, where we started from August 20 to September 20, 2020, that is by collecting the history of these students before starting to play online games five years ago. Then, from October 5 to December 12 of the same year, we collected students’ data after playing online games. The data of seven hundred students was used to analyze and determine the students’ opinions about online games. The data collected by questionnaire is divided into questions that collect information about the opinion of university students about the effects of online games on their health.

4.2 Netnography Data Analysis It is the phase of filtering and examining the collected data to access and discover useful information on a specific topic and taking the necessary decision (Xia and Gong 2014). For data analysis, there are several methods, procedures, and special tools, and this topic is included in most scientific and humanitarian fields, the world of business, and companies (Xia and Gong 2014). Figure 2 illustrates the method for extracting information and conclusions of data analysis.

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Fig. 2 Network analysis procedure

Fig. 3 Visual representation of the main themes

The steps mentioned in Fig. 2 are conclude as follows: The first process prepares a question about the research subject. Secondly, collect the dataset and then make a quantitative content. Thirdly, design the framework and prepare the samples and inferring. Fourthly, applying inductive and deductive methods in qualitative content analysis. Finally, observing the explication and the reflection of the results. Figure 3 displays a diagram of the most important data that Netnography will analyze, the aim of which is to know the students’ positive and negative opinions about the effects of online games on health, the body, and psychological behavior.

4.3 Ethical Consideration in the Research In this part, research ethics and data collection for the analysis will be discussed, which takes place in several steps that are mentioned:

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1. The researcher’s full name has been mentioned, the intention to ask these questions and the intention to research have been fully disclosed. 2. The identity of the people who participated in completing the questionnaire was hidden. 3. We tried to incorporate community reactions across the Internet in question. Take permission from the participating community members to present their answers to the questionnaire. However, the main role of applying research ethics is to make students aware of the experience to give correct and accurate answers. It is worth to be noted that all participating students are anonymous, as no names or personal information have been collected. Finally, it can be said that the answers that are collected online are part of the public domain and public opinion, which means that the user, according to the definition, gives them permission to view, review, and examine this public action. This, however, can, of course, be discussed.

5 Experiment and Results 5.1 Performance Metrix The system was run under windows Intel® Core™ i5 2450-M [email protected] GHz 2.50 GHz, 4.00 GB RAM PC, with Windows 10 64-bit operating system.

5.2 Why NVivo NVivo is a software program used for qualitative research. Especially, it is used to analyze the unstructured text, audio, video, and image data, using interviews, surveys, social media, and articles (Edhlund and McDougall 2019). We can use NVivo software to analyze and organize unstructured lines, audio, video, or drawing data. In addition to easily playing audio files and audio data, fluency captures social media data like Twitter™ and Facebook™ .

5.3 Results and Discussion This section analyzed the data using the NVivo tool to study students’ opinions about IoToys. Several methods can be used to obtain the data to do an analysis using the NVivo tool (AlDajani 2020): 1. Web links and online social media.

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Fig. 4 Word cloud (frequency word)

2. 3. 4. 5.

Online article about the subject. Reconciliation forum and videos. Reconciliation polls and courses. Online questionnaire and online applications.

At first, we divided the data into six files to facilitate the search process. Then, we analyzed the whole data without searching for a specific word, but rather measuring the most frequent words in the data documents. The number of repetitions of each word in the files appeared that the word “Yes, definitely” is the most frequent rate of 15.66% and 3306 times repetition. And, “probably” represents the second-highest recurrence rate by 11.9% (Fig. 4). Figure 5 shows “Females” word references, a word tree created of the word “Females”; it appeared that most females have “Excellent” and “very good” GPA, while the male’s GPA was “Good” and “Acceptable.” In addition to this, females agreed with most of the suggestions and questions asked where most of their answers were “Highly Agree.” As for the males, their answers were limited between disagreeing and neutrality. In Fig. 6, it appears that university students do not agree that online games positively good for the health of well-being of the mind and it is a good way to take advantage of their spare time and do not simulate reality. Also, Fig. 7 shows the agreement of most students that online games cause social exclusion, addiction and may cause violence among individuals. Figure 8 shows the word “Agree” to a large extent, so student approval shows that online games develop their computer skills, but universities policy restrict the use of the Internet in their campus.

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Fig. 5 Word tree (females) Fig. 6 Word cloud (feed mind, spare time)

Fig. 7 Word cloud (social exclusion, addiction, and violence)

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Fig. 8 Word cloud (computer skills)

6 Conclusion With the spread of Internet of Things in the twenty-first century, the term IoToys was introduced, that is, playing games that are connected to the Internet through modern devices such as computers, tablets, and mobile devices. Online games can be played individually or in groups of different geographical locations. Therefore, we conducted this scientific work to study the opinion of university students in Jordan about the Internet of Games and predict its effects on students in terms of psychological, physical, and behavioral health. At first, we collected data through an electronic questionnaire that returns data to university students in Jordan. Attention and focus have been on the Netnography ethical consideration. Most importantly, we applied the principles of the Netnography methodology. The results of analyzing the data that were collected indicate that students know the effects of online games, as ‘Yes, definitely’ was the most frequent answer with 15.66% as the students agreed with most of the questions asked. The questionnaire also showed that the rate of females was higher than males, as most of them were ‘Excellent’ and ‘Very good’. Also, many students do not agree that games nurture the mind and that it is a good way to take advantage of free time. All students agreed that online games cause depression and violence, as well as social isolation and violence. Finally, through data analysis, students agree that online games develop students’ computer skills. Acknowledgements The researchers would like to express their sincerest gratitude to the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa (AARMENA) Capacity Building in Higher Education Project (CBHE), co-founded by the Erasmus+ Program of the European Union.

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References AlDajani IM (2020) Internet Communication Technology (ICT) for reconciliation. Springer International Publishing Alfayoumi B, Alshraideh M, Martin Leiner, Iyad Muhsen A (2021) Machine learning predictions for the advancement of the online education in the Higher Education Institutions in Jordan. J Hunan Univ Nat Sci 48(9) Alshraideh M, Mahafzah B, Al-Sharaeh S, Hawamdeh Z (2015) A robotic intelligent wheelchair system based on obstacle avoidance and navigation functions. J Exp Theor Artif Intell 27(4):471– 482. https://doi.org/10.1080/0952813X.2014.971441 An W, Alarcón S (2021) From netnography to segmentation for the description of the rural tourism market based on tourist experiences in Spain. J Destin Mark Manag 19:100549 Atzori L, Iera A, Morabito G (2010) The internet of things: a survey. Comput Netw 54(15):2787– 2805. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2010.05.010 Belk R, Kozinets RV, Dicks B, Mason B, Coffey A, Atkinson P, Kozinets RV (2015) Netnography: redefined (first two chapters). Formative research methods in social marketing: innovative methods to gain consumer insights, pp 7–52. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118290743.wbiedc s067 Belk R, Kozinetz R (2017) Videography and netnography. In: Formative research in social marketing. Springer, Singapore, pp 265–279 Deeva I (2019) Computational personality prediction based on digital footprint of a social media user. Procedia Computer Science 156:185–193 ESA, Entertainment Software Association (2015) Essential facts about the computer and video game industry Gaudiosi J (2012) New reports forecast global video game industry will reach $82 billion by 2017.https://www.forbes.com/sites/johngaudiosi/2012/07/18/new-reports-forecastsglobal-video-game-industry-will-reach-82-billion-by-2017/?sh=31746b78440a. Accessed 18 Mar 2021 Hajra V (2020) Big data, netnography and smart tourism Holloway D, Green L (2016) The internet of toys. Commun Res Practice 2(4):506–519. https://doi. org/10.1080/22041451.2016.1266124 Kozinets RV (2002) The field behind the screen: using netnography for marketing research in online communities. J Mark Res 39(1):61–72. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.39.1.61.18935 Kozinets RV, Handelman JM, Lee MS (2010) Don’t read this; or, who cares what the hell anticonsumption is, anyways? Kozinets RV (2016) Amazonian forests and trees: multiplicity and objectivity in studies of online consumer-generated ratings and reviews, a commentary on de Langhe, Fernbach, and Lichtenstein. J Consum Res 42(6):834–839 Monu K, Zhang JX, Ralph P (2016) Introduction to the online games and game-like systems minitrack. In: 2016 49th Hawaii international conference on system sciences (HICSS). IEEE, p 3768 Mulligan J, Patrovsky B (2003) Developing online games: an insider’s guide. New Riders Rouse M (2019) What is IoT (Internet of Things) and how does it work? https://internetofthingsag enda.techtarget.com/definition/Internet-of-Things-IoT. Accessed 19 Oct 2020 Safadinho D, Ramos J, Ribeiro R, Caetano R, Pereira A (2017) UAV multiplayer platform for realtime online gaming. In: World conference on information systems and technologies. Springer, Cham, pp 577–585 Schiele G, Suselbeck R, Wacker A, Hahner J, Becker C, Weis T (2007) Requirements of peer-topeer-based massively multiplayer online gaming. In: Seventh IEEE international symposium on cluster computing and the grid (CCGrid’07). IEEE, pp 773–782 Shaw A (2020) Netnography and a summative content analysis approach to market research. J Emerg Trends Market Manag 1(1):12–22

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Ustek-Spilda F, Vega D, Magnani M, Rossi L, Shklovski I, Lehuede S, Powell A (2020) A twitterbased study of the European Internet of things. Inf Syst Front 1–15 Woolley DR (1994) PLATO: the emergence of online community. https://www.thinkofit.com/plato/ dwplato.htm. Accessed 26 Jan 2021 Xia BS, Gong P (2014) Review of business intelligence through data analysis. Benchmarking Int J

Netnography Internet Research Methodology Applications: A Survey Abeer Abdel-Jabbar Abu-Zayed, Esra Alzaghoul, Iyad Aldajani, and Mohammad Alshraideh

Abstract Where social media plays a huge role in people’s lives as the primary communication tool nowadays, it is a huge data source for people’s opinions. Hence, conducting analytics on social media data can help different organizations make decisions. For that, social media analytics is the primary focus of researchers nowadays. In this paper, we presented this survey that has a literature review for researchers in Netnography. The primary focus is on the topic of analyzing user opinions regarding different issues based on Netnography research methodology. The survey presented studies with their contribution, strengths and limitations along with some details for each study. Keywords Netnography · Analysis · Content analysis · Research methodologies · Internet research · Customer reviews · Social media

1 Introduction Social media such as Twitter, Facebook and Flickr have gained a lot of importance in our life in the past few years, and thus, it became a source of a huge volume of data that can be extracted and analyzed. In order to make decisions, we need to know and understand the new trends in the behavior of groups of people (AlDajani, 2020). Recently, social media platform content has taken a high interest of researchers nowadays in order to analyze and come up with a correct decision: Some characteristics of Twitter, for example the text size, are relatively short. Therefore, this is suitable for quick processing. And, the use of hashtags facilitates the search for files in specific fields. A. A.-J. Abu-Zayed Computer Science Department, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan E. Alzaghoul · I. Aldajani Computer Information Systems Department, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan M. Alshraideh (B) Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS), Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_7

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With the Introduction of Digital Humanities, recently, there has been an increase in the study of the opinions of human society in the fields of tourism, marketing, and museums. Netnography has been used to analyze the opinions of societies on specific issues (Drucker 2013). Netnography is intended to analyze the opinions of community members through social media, or web platforms, or forums, about their experience with a specific topic. In this survey, we investigate and summarized several different research papers regarding Netnography, that is, methodology applications, including e-tourism research, cultural understanding, Parkinson’s disease, and marketing, showing their techniques, contribution, strengths, and limitations. This survey paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a background with a brief description of some important terms, while Section III explains the research methodology for the proposed survey. In Section IV, we present the literature review of Netnography methodology applications. The summary table that provides the most important points were also provided. Finally, Section V clarified the conclusion.

2 Background 2.1 Digital Humanities Digital humanities (DH) is an emerging and diversified field, as this specialization includes research and applications of human sciences through information technology, and how it develops through mathematical and technological operations (Zorich 2008). It is a field of activity and scientific research study the commonalities between computing, data science, and the humanities disciplines (Drucker 2013). That is, it is a means to the use of computer and data sciences in certain fields of human sciences, as well as analyze their data and requested application (Drucker 2013). In (Moretti 2005), the researcher resort in order to points out, the traditional humanities that focus on a small part and the literary field. The DH aims to bring computer tools and techniques to study humanity, to reach that printed words are not the only means of knowing and analyzing information and generating knowledge (Burdick 2012). DH introduces new types of research processes by introducing new technologies and studying how they affect cultural heritage and criticizing it (AlDajani, 2020, Alfayoumi et al., 2021). For the digital humanities to become important in studying the culture and beliefs of a particular society, some positives research attitude must be provided for this process (Spirits 2021): (a) integration of quantitative and qualitative approaches, where digital texts can be presented with pictures, tables, and maps, and work on linking them; (b) content and data can be managed and analyzed as you search and prospect for resources, organize and restructure them to reach the goal; (c) access to the information easily and directly and may mean that more people can read the project and benefit from it; (d) improved teaching and increased cooperation as digital

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humanities help to learn through seeing, experiencing more through cooperation, and providing a common model for project development; and (e) finally, it has a public impact, as it urges people outside the specified areas to enter the field of digital humanities.

2.2 Netnography Netnography is a specific set of research practices related to data collection, analysis, and research ethics. Netnography is the name declared on a critical set of viewing ethnographic, data interpretation, and ethical applications conducted and collected through people who join and expressing their cultural opinions views in social media and the Internet in general (Belk and Kozinetz 2017). In another word, it is called an online ethnography. Netnography is similar to ethnography in the ways it is naturalistic in studying online social interaction and adaptable, that is, in studying many types of online sites and technology related to social media. Furthermore, it seeks rich contextual of online social life, interviews, and social interaction (Kozinets 2015). The positions selected to applied Netnography methodology must be centers that offer a context that (Belk et al. 2015): (1) is more vertical connected to the study’s research track, issue, or question (important); (2) has a larger quantity of postings examples; (3) gives a more extensive number of discrete information notices (traffic). (4) It has a lively character and quality; (5) has deep data and between member cooperation; and (6) finally, it displays data that is more detailed or descriptively fecund. This methodology includes fixed steps and methods which the research should be built to include below the Netnography methodology. First is (Kozinets 2016) redefinition of study questions and target (problem description and research goals). The second step is to gather data and identify the community and media mapping, filtering, and selection. Third is digital associate investigation and implementing its ethical rules and policies. Fourth is data analysis and visualization. Finally, it describes the research results with the approach we used and sent feedback on the work (representation).

3 Research Methodology To achieve the objective of analyzing an existing study and find the summary of Netnography methodology applications in social media, we followed this methodology. The survey presents each paper along with the proposed method. We conducted the simple random sampling (SRS) by Research Methodology for Social Sciences. The research strings were these keywords (“Netnography application” or “Netnography methodology examples”).

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The number of papers searched is classified along as follows: Sage journals

2

ScienceDirect

5

Springer

2

Others

2

4 Literature Review Researchers (Coombes and Jones 2020) provide modern methods for consumers to share their experiences via the Internet. Communities of brands that influence consumer opinions about a particular product have been studied. The citation has been searched from the Web of Science Core Collection, the index (WoS) that was conducted toward the end of 2019. The authors focus on publications in English. Divided into 536 articles were studied in WoS as business (26%), management (15%), and hospitality (12%), communication (9%), sociology (8%). A new proposed structure and procedure for data investigation (Ustek-Spilda et al. 2020) in which they obtained tweets that are related to ethnographic using a methodology combining qualitative and quantitative techniques that are divided into two types: tweets that are written while applying hashtags and tweets that are written using a chosen number of qualitative users, and following or follower networks of users. Then, we check the relationship between the content of tweets and the dictionary, and then, we use the diagram approach. The correlation between psychometric signs and their digital footprint in social network sites has been analyzed based on data from social networks such as Facebook (Deeva 2019). They compared multi-response forecasting and univariate criteria for each character quality. The author’s examination of the data to decide whether any psychometric could interact equally well in different media environments. In (Hajra 2020), the research paper contributes to a way to enter data on tourists views about the service and co-operations taken over the Internet and under the socalled Netnography. The author studied the relationship between huge data, Internet network interfaces, and smart tourism to know the marketing outcomes of tourism. They found that the influence of smart tourism on tourists is greater than regular tourism because Web sites are widely spread on smart devices. This research (An and Alarcón 2021) aims to present a basis for generating appropriate response strategies through the conclusion of tourists’ simple awareness related to their rural tourism experiences and the opinions of the rural tourism business sections. The principle of Netnography was applied to 1002 tourists in three different online communities. They decided that the tourist selects his warmth and green countryside.

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In (Shaw 2020) paper, they deal with thinking about the application of negative review content analysis, the Netnography method, and how it can be used in marketing investigation. It aims to launch meters that allow users to estimate energy consumption. The first step was to distinguish fitting sources of data to analyze. The author has chosen to focus only on those letters that were published during the six months and copy a part of the data into the NVivo (URL). The NVivo is a software tool that conducts deeper analysis from many sources, by importing data from virtually any source and then analyze data with advanced management, query, and visualization to draw clear conclusions that answer the researcher question. The second step is to select the data that he/she needs to encode and define the sectors. The fourth stage is based on data coding. Finally, it combines the encoded data into the NVivo tool and starts analyzing the data. The negative Netnography result was 73.73% according to research by (Shaw 2020). The authors of (Bayen et al. 2021) proposed a way to discuss user’s experience with Parkinson’s disease (PD). Twenty-three forum threads were analyzed: Three hundred two reports were posted by seventy users (70% were females; the average sickness duration was six years); hundred fifteen encoded nodes were created. Five user profiles appeared: leader, follower, specialist, mixed, and undetermined. Three ideas appeared: managing signs, living with PD, and sharing illness adventures. First, a users’ speech was independently analyzed by two separate researchers. Important words and word associations were identified and selected as “nodes”. Once a week, both researchers came together for triangulation of their data analysis. In case of rare variances between the researchers, a consensual version was obtained by cross-checking their points of view. This paper helped to understand Parkinson’s disease and its symptoms such as Parkinson’s and other symptoms. (Tavakoli and Mura 2018) The authors used web 3.0 to allow tourists to undergo highly immersive and multi-sensory experiences. And by collecting and analyzing their opinions about tourism, using the Netnography research methodology, which showed that most tourists preferred e-tourism to traditional tourism. The authors (Tavakoli and Wijesinghe 2019) have a method for increasing knowledge of tourism via the Internet. First, they searched for keywords that would aid in the search. Then, they identified and searched the most popular magazines. Then, they analyzed the posts and divided them into posts related to tourism or not. They analyzed 116 papers focusing on the type of participants and observation types. This study revealed that Web 2.0 and Web 1.0 are the most popular, and objective analysis is the most common technique of applied analysis. In (Maya-Jariego et al. 2021), the authors studied the prevalence of illegal practices among underwater recreational fishermen in the area of the influence of Cabo Roche in southern Spain. To document illegal practices, 429 photographs shared online were analyzed. And, the Facebook Friends Network includes 61 underwater recreational fishermen. The results showed that illegal systems were popular in the group analyzed, as lots of black money emerged, it explains performing the impermissible activities. All studies were listed in Table 1 clarifying their strengths and limitations.

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Table 1 Studies with their contribution, strengths, and limitations The Authors

Contribution

Strengths

Limitations

Coombes and Jones This paper presents a – Use of Netnography (2020) method for studying research consumer experiences, methodology to opinions, and study consumer experiences by taking experiences notes

– Research sample and database not specified

Ustek-Spilda et al. (2020)

Proposed a new framework and approach for data analysis by collected tweets about ethnographic using a methodology mixing qualitative and quantitative methods

– No standard information was available confirming how the proposed system would operate

Deeva (2019)

Relationship between – Use the authors’ psychometric psychological scale indicators and his to analyze the data digital footprint in the social network sites has been studied based on data from social networks

–

Hajra (2020)

Provides a way to – Increase the spread access information on of tourism tourists opinions about information and its the services received dynamism over the Internet and under the so-called Netnography

– There is no scholastic measurement application

An and Alarcón (2021)

The study aims to – Experimenting with contribute a basis for three different developing appropriate communities response strategies indicates the through the conclusion comprehensiveness of tourists’ natural of the experiment attention relevant to their rural tourism experiences and the features of the rural tourism business sections

–

– Use social media data and analyze it using digital humanities Netnography

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued) The Authors

Contribution

Shaw (2020)

Deals with thinking – Using the NVivo tool – about the application to analyze the data of negative summary content analysis, the Netnography method, and how it can be used in marketing research

Strengths

Limitations

Bayen et al. (2021) Study some articles to – Using the NVivo tool – Limiting data to the analyze when people to analyze the data word frequency – Use of Netnography became aware of analysis search methodology Parkinson’s disease, its symptoms, and effects Tavakoli & Mura (2018)

Use Web 3.0 to study tourists’ opinions about modern e-tourism

– Proposing new ways for tourism

Tavakoli & Wijesinghe (2019)

Authors want to expand their knowledge using information technology in tourism to conduct studies via the Internet in general

– Shedding light on – The analysis needs to studying the role of be explained in the Internet with the simpler ways for the expansion of tourism reader through the Internet

Maya-Jariego et al. Analysis of some posts – Apply ethical (2021) to study the extent of consideration in illegal fishing studying and gathering data

– Not identifying the study dataset

– Database size is relatively small

5 Conclusion In conclusion, we summarize and organize recent research in Netnography methodology and their results in a novel way that integrates and adds understanding of the field. We emphasize the classification of the existing literature, development in the Nenograpgy field, and evaluate their trends. This is especially true, with the spread of the Internet and social media, in particular, nearly 60% of the topics have become related to the Internet. We summarized ten studies on the applications of the Netnography research methodology, summarized their contributions, strengths, and weaknesses, and made a comparison between them.

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References AlDajani IM (2020) Internet communication technology (ICT) for reconciliation: applied phronesis netnography in internet research methodologies. Springer, New York. https://www.springer.com/ gp/book/9783030412029 Alfayoumi B, Alshraideh M, Al-Sharaeh S, Leiner M, AlDajani IM (2021) Analyzing the sentiments of Jordanian students towards online education in the higher education institutions. Int J Adv Comput Sci Appl 12(11). https://doi.org/10.14569/IJACSA.2021.0121108 An W, Alarcón S (2021) From netnography to segmentation for the description of the rural tourism market based on tourist experiences in Spain. J Destin Mark Manag 19:100549 Bayen S, Carpentier C, Baran J, Cottencin O, Defebvre L, Moreau C, ... Messaadi N (2021) Parkinson’s disease: content analysis of patient online discussion forums. A prospective observational study using Netnography. Patient Educ Couns Belk R, Kozinets RV, Dicks B, Mason B, Coffey A, Atkinson P, Kozinets RV (2015) Netnography: redefined (first 2 chapters). In: Formative research methods in social marketing: innovative methods to gain consumer insights, pp 7–52https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118290743.wbiedcs067 Belk R, Kozinetz R (2017) Videography and netnography. In: Formative research in social marketing. Springer, Singapore, pp 265–279 Coombes PH, Jones S (2020) Toward auto-netnography in consumer studies. Int J Mark Res 62(6):658–665 Deeva I (2019) Computational personality prediction based on digital footprint of a social media user. Proc Comput Sci 156:185–193 Drucker J (2013) Intro to digital humanities: introduction. UCLA center for digital humanities. Accessed 26 Dec 2016 Hajra V (2020) Big data, netnography and smart tourism Kozinets RV (2010) Netnography: the marketer’s secret weapon (NetBase White Paper) Kozinets RV (2015) Netnography: redefined. Sage, London Kozinets RV (2016) Amazonian forests and trees: Multiplicity and objectivity in studies of online consumer-generated ratings and reviews, a commentary on de Langhe, Fernbach, and Lichtenstein. J Consum Res 42(6):834–839 Langer R, Beckman SC (2005) Sensitive research topics: netnography revisited. 8(2):189–203 Maya-Jariego I, Martínez-Alba I, Alieva D (2021) “lenty of black money: netnography of illegal recreational underwater fishing in southern Spain. Mar Policy 126:104411 Moretti F (2005) Graphs, maps, trees: abstract models for a literary history. Verso Paccagnella L (1997) Getting the seats of your pants dirty: strategies for ethnographic research on virtual communities. J Comput-Med Commun 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.1997. tb00065.x Rheingold H (1993) The virtual community: homesteading on the electronic frontier. AddisonWesley, Reading, MA Reid B (1995) USENET readership report for March 1995 Shaw A (2020) Netnography and a summative content analysis approach to market research. J Emerg Trends Mark Manag 1(1):12–22 Spirits A (2021) Benefits of digital humanities|Duke digital humanities. https://digitalhumanities. duke.edu/benefits-digital-humanities. Accessed 27 Feb 2021 Tavakoli R, Mura P (2018) Netnography in tourism–beyond web 2.0. Ann Tour Res 73(C):190–192 Tavakoli R, Wijesinghe SN (2019) The evolution of the web and netnography in tourism: a systematic review. Tourism Management Perspectives 29:48–55 Terras M (2012) Quantifying digital humanities. Melissa Terra’s Blog Ustek-Spilda F, Vega D, Magnani M, Rossi L, Shklovski I, Lehuede S, Powell A (2020) A twitterbased study of the European internet of things. Inf Syst Front 1–15 URL: https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home

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White E (1999) ‘Chatting’ a singer up the pop charts: how music marketers used the web to generate buzz before an album debuted. Wall Street J. pp B1, B4 Zorich D (2008) A survey of digital humanities centers in the United States. Council on Library and Information Resources, Washington, DC

Cybersecurity in Sovereignty Reform Omar Mahmoud Omar, Iyad Muhsen AlDajani, Ma’en Juwaihan, and Martin Leiner

Abstract The creation of Cyberspace made the presence of cybersecurity more clear and dominant in our information technology world. Cybersecurity became a part of the governance that led to competition for sovereignty in the online sphere, or cyberspace domain, which promoted the idea of a transition to coexistence in these sovereign governments as Cyberspace crossed borders, away from chaos, violence, and amnesty against each other. Recognition of this sovereignty diversity would lead to competing forces peacefully and homogeneously, acknowledging cybersecurity as a space for cooperation for the better good of humanity, which made its importance in the humanitarian laws. The international nature of digital conflicts is certainly a source of difficulty in defining applicable law and jurisdiction. Preventing cybersecurity technologies was important in societies and humanities in Internet communication technologies. Cybersecurity has made national boundaries transparent because inter-network overlaps have made the boundaries intangible but promoted security presence within Cyberspace and the domain of the Internet communication technologies. So, it is not surprising that the State loses its legitimacy regarding regulatory matters by supporting Internet applications that cross borders such as social media, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube. The contradiction between the geographical and territorial boundaries of national laws and the universality of the Internet led to the loss of the State part of its sovereignty and created the presence of cybersecurity. Limits are not fixed and unchanging, but they evolve in place and time and are losing importance in many areas. Global understanding in information technologies made the illustration of the virtual world more imminent for the speed of information and the need for cybersecurity to become part of the humanitarian ethics and laws. Cybersecurity

O. M. Omar · M. Juwaihan Faculty of Law, University of Petra, Amman, Jordan I. M. AlDajani (B) Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa – AARMENA, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] M. Leiner Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_8

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made the existence of a networked world have contributed to building areas where it is difficult to set boundaries accurately. Keywords Cybersecurity · Sovereignty · Cyberspace · Information sovereignty · Virtual sovereignty · Humanitarian law

1 Introduction Sovereignty was originally a French idea in the Middle Ages. It was used to indicate the superiority of authority over another and to define an authority that is not subject to any other authorities and does not acknowledge any superior authority.1 On the other hand, territory represents the space protected and secured by the State. Therefore, the boundaries were made and defined and created territorial space, which the State imposes its legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, to define the space of State sovereignty. The national territory defines the context where the State Law is systematically applicable; the national juridical authorities shall consider all cybercrimes of this territory, irrespective of the perpetrators of victims. Accordingly, the boundaries are a legal fact that constitutes the borderlines of other competencies in which the State practices its jurisdiction. The uniqueness of cybersecurity2 is represented in the fact that any State cannot contain it through imposing its monopoly and sole sovereignty on the Internet space without developing security apparatus to protect its interest in various ways. It became a symbol of exceeding boundaries, which will lead to a path that shall protect and harm humanities. Furthermore, the doubt surrounding cybersecurity as a mere material space, such as Earth, air, and sea, led to new disputes over its hegemony and sovereignty.3 According to those above, two approaches are presented: The first 1

Bacot, G. (1985), Carré De Malberg Et L’origine De La Distinction Entre Souveraineté Du Peuple Et Souveraineté Nationale, Paris, Éd. Du C.N.R.S, P. 9. 2 Cyberspace is the space which ICT has created, especially, the Internet. Cyberspace is closely related to physical world through the various infrastructure of communications and information systems and through many services that could not be obtained without it. Geo-cyberspace is also known as “the relationship between the internet and the geography, demography, economy, politics and foreign policy of a State.” “Geo-cyberspace stability” is defined as the ability of all countries to take advantage of the Internet to achieve economic, political and demographic benefits while refraining from activities that could cause unnecessary suffering and destruction: This definition was first presented at the Internal Security Institute conference of Analytical Services. Inc. (ANSER), with title: “homeland Security 2005: Charting the path Ahead” University of Maryland, a lecture by Judy Westley, “A Shift in Geo-Cyber Stability and Security”, 6–7 lhd, 2002. The Cyberspace means A human-made environment or space where the electronic communications occur through the interconnected networks of the information and communication infrastructure, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, and computer systems: Kittichaisaree, K., (2017) Public International Law of Cyberspace, Law, Governance and Technology, Series 32, P. 2. 3 Kilovaty, I. 2019. The Elephant in the Room: Coercion. American Journal of International Law Unbound, 113, 87–91. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.10.

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approach describes Cyberspace as an extrajudicial area protected by cybersecurity laws. On the other hand, the second approach states otherwise that Cyberspace did not implement cybersecurity. When it was created, it was not subject to law, but its area is currently subject to the law.4 Ignoring limits by cybersecurity makes it difficult to impose national legal rules to control it due to the contradiction between geographical boundaries, the territoriality of the national laws, and the universality of the Internet. This led the nation to lose part of its sovereignty as the Internet may be considered an area without boundaries nor laws5 developed the importance for cybersecurity. In the field of cybersecurity, the efforts of various States are combined and integrated, which imposes the question about the nature of the relations of those who are involved in the communications community and active in the Internet communication domain or cyber-domains, and this makes it inevitable for States to give up part of their sovereignty in return for who controls servers that can control and observe millions of participants or members or civilians. Besides Internet users, they resort to mere concepts or general principles with unstable content because it is in constant movement, which is the very evidence for the hierarchical roles played by each user. Some claim that the user is the sovereign entity in virtual space that cybersecurity can control. On the other hand, some claim that sovereignty is represented in the Internet domains itself as the rate of users is estimated at 30–40% of the Earth.6 Currently, the concept of State sovereignty has begun to be interpreted in the light of relativity and the user’s activities. Cybersecurity has reviewed and redefined this concept and other key concepts of political science, international public law, and constitutional law that affected the Internet and made it part of cybersecurity enhancement as the economic and customs boundaries became incompatible with the political borders that the traditional concept of sovereignty is based on.7 International law evolves correspondingly with State’s evolution, but it does not keep the same pace with this evolution; for instance, States prohibit espionage within their borders under domestic laws, but international law does not prohibit espionage.8 Regardless, no one can deny the State’s leading role in the field of information technologies and Internet advancement, which is a significant element to operate many of the political activities and practices related to gathering information in Cyberspace. The State is the important pivot in defining the reasonable risks or people identity, the 4

Musa, Talib Hasan, Omar, Omar Mahmoud, (2016) “Internet Qanoonan” The Internet in Law, Journal of Sharia and Law, United Arab Emirates University, (27), 333–388, p. 339. 5 Jacques, L., (1996) Cyberspace Et Droit International: pour UN nouveau Jus Communications, Revue de la Recherche Juridique–droit prospectif, pp. 830–832. 6 Shen, Y. 2016. Cyber Sovereignty and The Governance of Global Cyberspace. Chinese Political Science Review, 1(1). 7 Al-Essa, Talal, (2010) Sovereignty between its traditional and contemporary concept, “A study of the internationalization of sovereignty in the contemporary era” Al Syada bayn Mafhomha Al Taqlidy Wal Mo’sir “Drasa fi Mada Tadweel Alsyada fi Al A’sr Alhader”, Damascus University Journal of Economic and Legal Sciences, 26 (1), p. 54. 8 Corn, G., & Taylor, R. 2017. Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber. American Journal of International Law Unbound, 111, 207–212. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.57.

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contractual practices, and the information flow. Still, it cannot impose its unilateral authority without the development of cybersecurity. The State sovereignty over the infrastructure and electronic activities within the cybersecurity has two main consequences so that the State may issue and apply its local laws and regulations to its cybersecurity domains; furthermore, sovereignty gives the State a right under international law to protect cyber-infrastructure and protect cyber-activity presented in its territory, or that happens in its, this defines the terms of cybersecurity in humanitarian laws.9 This study is divided into two chapters. The first revolves around the modern concept of national sovereignty with cybersecurity domains. The second discusses the concept of the diversity of sovereignty and the use of cybersecurity under the jurisdiction of governments.

2 Modern Concept for National Sovereignty Over Cybersecurity The concept of sovereignty and equality between States is one of the basic rules in public international law. For example, the first paragraph of Article Two in the United Nations Charter stipulated that the organization is based on the equal sovereignty of all States. The State authority shall not be marginalized by the other interventions that affect the concept of traditional or symbolic sovereignty. Still, theoretically, that may seriously undermine its authority by facing competing sovereignty that claims to be a substitute for its authority in certain territories. In addition, the State will face competition over sovereignty in multiple matters such as international trade and finance, human rights, electronic environments, international trade practices, and the acting authority within the domain of cybersecurity. This chapter will be divided into two topics; the first discusses the modern approaches for sovereignty within cybersecurity. The second discusses the elaboration of the “Sovereignty for the use of cybersecurity” concept.

2.1 Modern Approaches for Sovereignty Over Cybersecurity The boundaries lost their significance at the current time as the boundaries are not separated and fixed but rather evolve and space. However, global understanding has contributed to establishing a domain linked to the web and constructing spaces that are difficult to define precisely and can only be protected by online security software or only assessment for security apparatus. 9

Schmitt, M., (2017), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, (1st Edition) Cambridge University press, first publishes, p. 13.

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“Cybersecurity” has become a security element for the online domains for data exchange and storage, using electronic technologies that include the Internet, communication networks, and computer systems that can be accessed everywhere in the world, a symbol of exceeding boundaries.10 If the sovereignty concept is limited to specific physical spaces, the Internet connects all territories as a virtual space, making cybersecurity the domain for the apparatus of secure communication. In addition, the digital technologies are designed by circulating streaming media and non-physical data. Therefore, cybersecurity secures information in constant motion, while imposing sovereignty of the State requires the existence of clearly defined territorial laws that take physical evidence. Therefore, the State can claim sovereignty only if it can control all its information activities within its territory and outside its borders, which provides the implementation of cybersecurity apparatus in each country.11 Furthermore, cybersecurity brings back the sovereignty of the State in implying humanitarian laws on the Internet and other online applications. The territorial sovereignty cannot be easily applied to virtual reality. Therefore, it is necessary to give a new concept to this territorial sovereignty by changing the name from “Territorial Sovereignty” to “International, Universal or Digital Information Sovereignty. And other ideas of governance or citizens such as e-government, or global citizens or e-citizens.“ The “Universal Information Sovereignty,” otherwise “Territorial Sovereignty,” or “cybersecurity,” means the ability of the State to develop a new system able to deal with virtual activities and control virtual liability, which means providing new virtual sovereignty that can secure online application for its online citizens and their applications. It also means the right to limit or subject the virtual activities to some conditions to transmit and transfer them across other States under safe virtual private networks that act under their sovereignty. Under this sovereignty, the State can claim it, when it can control the ongoing activities in its territory and abroad, on its claim that these activities affect its interests; this is called the external controller12 even in the Internet sphere. This is not an unprecedented idea as it applies to civil and penal laws, international private law, and criminal law; this illustrates the understanding of e-government. Furthermore, so that the State can have cybersecurity to detect the related information from the Internet domain which is followed up before transferring it across communication satellites and before breaching its information space, therefore, the State could make a virtual wall, what we call a Firewall or a virtual private network or filters to defend against all of the above so that the information cannot pass without promoting the access across this filters or wall. This is called the “Firewall” in China13 ; those activities are defined under cybersecurity actions.

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Melzer, N., (2011) Cyberware fare and international law, UNIDIR, Ressources, p. 4. Bouchera, L. (1996) “La souveraineté informationnelle: entre utopie et projet” Le Monde 1er février 1996. 12 Jean- Jacques Lavenue, Op. Cite, 830–832. 13 Musa, Talib Hassan, Omar, Omar Mahmoud, ibid., p. 339. 11

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According to the nature of cybersecurity actions, the concepts of sovereignty contradict from one State to another when using cybersecurity notions. Determining the scope of sovereignty over cybersecurity is a political issue rather than a legal issue.14 It should be noted that the value of information in the decision-making process is essential for the State since information sovereignty is an expression of State central authority. It must control the export of information that appears crucial for discharging its duties of the public authority. Maintaining State control over its information and not exposing it are within the concept of information sovereignty.15 This information is of prominent strategic importance in the implementation of State policies. Although this control seems unrealistic about the electronic web, such control can be envisaged when main acting authorities are still limited, for electronic environments, to large multinational companies. However, the concept of information sovereignty seems outdated in the light of new electronic environments.16 The practice of information sovereignty is not easy, especially with no access and transference of information; besides the encryption and anonymization techniques, above all, the ever-increasing number of information users by quick ways, practically, they are opposed to any attempt to place them under control.17 Practically, the State cannot prevent disseminating information and data about it in all cases. One of the most important characteristics of Cyberspace is that it covers all electronic communications satellites. It cannot be limited by any physical geo-territorial borders, meaning that the nature of virtual space contradicts limiting it within a certain scope of miles or kilometers, such as the borders of territorial or international waters. The State that is a victim of an electronic crime (often the perpetrator is outside the State or maybe inside it but anonymous), when the State claims, under its domestic law, its right after a crime, its claim is shortly considered ineffective. When the information is sent from the territory of the State, it cannot impose its control and sovereignty over the sent information through the World Wide Web, which contradicts such territorial sovereignty. The relationship that demonstrates a cybersecurity apparatus defines relations with State, citizens, companies, and consumers that shape a new sovereignty network and 14

Khanna P. (2018) State Sovereignty and Self-Defence in Cyberspace. Brics Law Journal, 5(4): pp. 139–154. https://doi.org/10.21684/2412-2343-2018-5-4-139-154. 15 Benyekhlef, K. & Guy Lefebvre, G., (1993) L’internationalisation Du Droit Et L’affirmation De La Souveraineté: Réflexions Théoriques Et Pratiques, Dans Souveraineté Et Intégration, Montréal, Éd. Thémis, PP. 443–446. 16 Gotlieb, A., Dalfen, C., & Katz K., (1974) «The Transborder Transfer of Information by Communications and Computer Systems: Issues and Approaches to Guiding Principles», American Journal of International Law, 68, P. 227. 17 Post, D., (1995) Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, J. Online L. art.3, disponible également à: http://www.law.cornell.edu/jol/post.html. L’auteur y développe la théorie de l’exit: (paragr. 39 et 40). The nature of the web is to depart from the control because of its decentralization which lead to difficulty in controlling and detecting irregular behaviors. So that the irregular behaviors are out of the domain of any authority of physical sovereignty or jurisdiction. In case of a contradiction between a particular rule of the web and the law of sovereignty in a State, This web rule can be easily referred to another another jurisdiction.

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a new area with indefinite rules that define a new online government such as egovernment that illustrates cybersecurity. In this environment, there are many areas of sovereignty: The first is the personal information, which gives the citizen the right to provide this information besides having the right to assign it and to entrust it to other partners18 in addition to the information transferred by the citizen to the State and some administrations. The main mission of the first area is represented in the State’s role in protecting the citizens’ confidentiality and their information. At the same time, the second area involves companies and organizations sovereignty, through data which are the main resource of companies, while the third and the last area, which discusses the sovereignty of the States to face Internet giants, raises the debate on data protection within territorial organizations, such as European Union, to face US domination.19

2.2 The Elaboration of the “Cybersecurity in Sovereignty Reform” Concept The Territorial Airspace Sovereignty is no longer an effective term due to the breach of boundaries through these signals and radio waves, which necessitated the issuance of international air law for communications in addition to the air navigation laws to protect this use by all. Therefore, the concept of joint human liability replaces individual personal liability for either States or normal people that develop sovereignty. States have the right to exercise their sovereignty and impose their laws on their land through its means. Still, States do not always have the means to guarantee compliance with their laws within their borders, even when States require Internet service providers to prevent illegal sites from reaching their lands. Therefore, cybersecurity develops a role of reforming the sovereignty of a State over its citizens. They are ordered to block unwanted sites, as such measures are time-consuming, expensive, and maybe ineffective. Cybersecurity in sovereignty reform is related to all competencies sectors and fields of the European Union in all its forms: digital sovereignty, information sovereignty, citizens’ individual sovereignty, cloud sovereignty, e-government, ecitizens… Currently, the features of the sovereignty concept tremble due to instability and constant development of the Internet application and its use.20 While the 18

Étienne, J., «Google Health, un carnet de santé personnel en ligne», futura-sciences.com, 22 mai 2008 (www.futura-sciences.com/sante/CVactualites/medecine-google-health-carnet-sante-per sonnelligne-15600/). 19 Gueham F., Vers La Souverinete Numerique: Pour Une Nouvelle Gouvernance De L’Internet, 2017, p. 10. www.fondapol.org. 20 See the draft of the Arab Convention for the Protection of Cyberspace between Reality and Ambition “Mashroo’a Al Itifaqiya Al Arabiya lihimayt Al Fadaa Al sybrani bayn Al waq’a wal tomoh”, Arab Center for Legal and Judicial Research, Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, League of Arab States, Beirut, 23–25 July 2018.

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European Union works on improving its policy to protect data, another authority writes special rules to govern cybersecurity. The fundamental right in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and citizens’ data protection inside and outside European territories, does not allow the transference of personal data outside the European Union unless the European Union considers the receiving State is “appropriate” for that.21 The US dominance on the Internet technically, economically, or politically pushes Europe to support its role by defining new skills, privileges, and values to face the States and giant companies, which renews the urgent need to establish and define an international framework for sovereignty. The data continue to evolve, as the new market value for the Internet and the spread of services across the Internet increase the division for the use of cybersecurity, thus raising questions around Internet neutrality22 and who owns the Internet. In contrast, online economists have a vested interest in maintaining and developing an open and interoperable environment, expanding their business activities, and using Internet applications such as artificial intelligence in blockchains and other applications. Internet fragmentation resulting from the conflict among the sovereignty aspirations of the States, acting authorities, corporations, and citizens is considered a punishment for all actors. Developing a sovereign operating system using e-government as the main and head law order apparatus. Still, it is not viable due to several obstacles awaiting its implementation: Sovereign encryption tools aim to protect citizens’ and corporations’ data by encrypting messages and data, and the State is the only owner of it. However, these tools often have harmful effects.23 Article 8/3 of the Directive 2001/80/E.C. of the European Parliament stated three techniques for the Member States, to act accordingly, to protect their national sites by banning the “Uniform Resource Locator” (URL), “Internet Protocol” (IP), or by blocking the domain name (“Domain Name System” or “DNS”).24 The law was generally proven insufficient to ensure the nation’s ability to face attacks and extend the sovereignty of other States because the measures taken against cybersecurity which are technical rather than legal as the States wish to restore its 21

«Les nouvelles règles de l’UE sur la protection des données placent les citoyens aux commandes», Actualité du Parlement européen, europarl.europa.eu, 1er juin 2016: (www.europarl.europa.eu/news/fr/newsroom/20160413BKG22980/nouvelle-législationeuropéenne-sur-la-protection-des-données). 22 «Les contours de la neutralité du Net en Europe se précisent», lemonde.fr, 31 août 2016 (www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/08/31/les-contours-de-la-neutralite-du-net-en-europese-precisent_4990450_4408996.html). 23 It is noted that the Content-control software of the mentioned States does not give 100% conclusive results, as it may lead to some unwanted results. In 1995 “Internet Assigned Numbers Authority” used a system that prevented sexual messages from being sent, but this program led to blocking messages that include the word breast “sein” (Because it starts with “se”), thus prevents the messages contain information about treating breast diseases, therefore, many women complained about that. Jean-Jacques, Cyberespace et Droit International: pour un nouveau Jus Communicationis Lavenue, op, cité, P. # 23. 24 A new European regulation draft, which was formulated more than twenty years ago and became enforceable as of 2018 year, replaced the existing Directive 95/46/EC 26 in regard to the personal data protection.

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independence and develop its digital network to ensure a secure information system in the State. China, Russia, and Iran opt for restricted and controlled “Cyberspace,” using cybersecurity tools that map the fragmentation features of Cyberspace, hardware, software, and information fragmentation into several isolated regions.25 Some opt to implement a social contract regarding the sovereignty of cybersecurity.26 Another opinion objects to the expansion in implementing the traditional concept of “cybersecurity in sovereignty reform” in a way that opposes the nature of Internet use.27 Economic integration, whether it is territorial as in the European Union or the International Free Trade Agreement or North American Countries Free Trade Agreement, cannot reduce the legal intervention of States as in the case of the World Trade Organization. Likewise, the national financial markets that are almost independent create “external markets” outside the jurisdiction of the States,28 where deal emerges outside the territorial borders, and everything that happens during trade exchanges is only an exchange of authorities. Therefore, sovereignty became mobile and no longer had a physical location.29 The protection of the environment, human rights, indigenous people rights, shared strategies, and goals is interstate activities. Yet, at the same time, they are considered national for all States. The possibility of applying national law outside the borders of the State is tantamount to ignoring the sovereignty of other States. Moreover, beyond technical difficulties, technical measures and blocking foreign sites on national territory may impact the sovereignty of other States. For example, in the dispute between Germany and the American company “CompuServe,”30 the judiciary has ordered forums not to be accessible on German territory based on German law prohibiting its contents. This decision prevented 4 million CompuServe subscribers from accessing 140 locations in 140 States.31 In another case, the Court of First Instance in Paris has claimed the American company “Yahoo” sets up a purification system to identify the French Internet users’ identity to prevent them from accessing the sales site by auctioning Nazi symbols.32 On the other hand, Yahoo Company considered that the 25

Voir Politique de sécurité des systèmes d’information de l’État-ANSSI du 17 juillet 2014. Tsagourias, N., (2018) Law, Borders and the Territorialisation of Cyberspace. Forthcoming, Indonesian Journal of International Law, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213511. 27 Corn, G. P., & Taylor, R. 2017. Concluding Observations on Sovereignty in Cyberspace. American Journal of International Law Unbound, 111, 282–283. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.201 7.77. 28 Benyekhlef, K., (2002) L’Internet: un reflet de la concurence des souverainetés Lex Electronica, vol. 8, n°1, automne 2002, p. 6. http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v8-1/benyekhlef.htm. 29 John Gerard Ruggie, «Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations», (1993) 47 International Organization 139, 164–165., note 19, 141. 30 Affaire Ministère Public de Munich Allemagne contre CompuServe, jugement du 28 mai 1998– 8340, Ds 465. 31 Affaire Ministère Public de Munich Allemagne contre CompuServe, jugement du 28 mai 1998– 8340, Ds 465. 32 TGI Paris, ordonnance du référé du 20 novembre 2000: http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ tgiparis20001120.htm. 26

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foreign jurisdiction could not interfere with its servers in the USA and that forced action against it could not lead anywhere because it contradicted the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression every citizen. This shows that the application of national law beyond borders and when it applies to all web users located in other regions can give the State additional authority in the scope of its sovereignty, which may enter it into competition with the forces of other countries.33 There may be other violations of State sovereignty in international criminal investigations. For example, States may generally be claimed to send the login data to determine the perpetrator of an online dispute related to the Internet within their territory to foreign legal authorities. To access this technical information from ISPs, prior approval shall be provided by the State that maintains the contact information.34 According to the Permanent Court of International Justice ruling in the Lotus case, the ruling stipulated that any exercise of State authority could not be exercised outside its territory unless there is a rule that would otherwise allow, under customary international law or the convention.35 Theoretically, only seven States allow contact information to foreign authorities: Finland, Portugal, Poland, Chile, Montenegro, Japan, and the USA. On the other hand, unapproved entry is no longer permitted by nine States: the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Estonia, and the Netherlands.36 In practice, despite the obligation to obtain the consent of the concerned State, foreign authorities often gain access to information stored abroad through cooperation with private companies, without any request for legal aid from the State in which this information is located. The ICC has revealed that many companies are under strong pressure from foreign governments to obtain contact information, while such access is not permitted in their State legislation.37 The many States undermine the national sovereignty of other States in the context of international investigations to eliminate computer crimes. Many of the “Great powers” or “Great States” that dominate the Internet do not recognize the existence of sovereignty reform due to cybersecurity. Still, in practice, most States exercise their sovereignty objectively over Cyberspace because it is inconceivable that a State allows its cybersecurity without sovereignty.38 That created the need to cyber-reform that developed cybersecurity and reformed the sovereignty of the government. 33

Me Cécile Doutriaux, 2015, Frontières légales et souveraineté dans le cyberespace? Chaire Cyber-Défense et Cyber-sécurité, p. 5. 34 Articles 31 et 32 de la convention de Budapest du 23 November 2001. 35 Affaire du Lotus (France c/Turquie ° CPIJ série A, n°10, p. 18 (1927). 36 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/TCY2012/ TCY(2012)3F_transborder_repV31public_7Dec12.pdfV31public_7Dec12.pdf. 37 ICC Policy Statement: Cross-border law enforcement access to company data—current issues under data protection and privacy law» (février 2012). 38 Fang, B. (2018) Objective Existence of Cyberspace Sovereignty in Countries’ Affairs. In: Cyberspace Sovereignty. Springer, Singapore, p. 199.

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It is not possible to talk at this time about the sovereignty of States over Cyberspace because some of the main components of the Internet are managed outside the international legal framework by39 (ICANN) and with the authorization of the US government since 1988, and this company has the responsibility of managing and distributing websites names and domain addresses on the Internet, including “International Numbers,” which is a private company subject to California law. It is known that the USA has control over the Internet. Sovereign States should submit their applications to the ICANN to create the Internet protocols, which are crucial for local, national networks. For this reason, the World Summit on the Information Society WSIS in Geneva in 2003 and Tunisia in 2005 called for broad participation in Internet governance and management. The European Union and China have laid a participation claim to the USA, but this claim has been rejected.40

3 The Diversity of Sovereignty Scopes Over Cybersecurity Apparatus The creation of a virtual globe parallel to the physical world created a kind of competition for sovereignty that reinforced the idea led to the study of coexistence in these sovereign centers, away from chaos and violence and the recognition of that sovereignty diversity would create a peaceful and harmonious deployment of competing authorities. The result is greater democracy, an issue that should not suffer from the claims of the dominant State. The cybersecurity apparatus took over and developed the support for e-government and e- citizens, which cybersecurity tools can protect. The authority of the State to control its borders and impose its laws on its territory is diminishing with the emergence of new electronic communication channels. Therefore, the implications of information technology for the national sovereignty concept must be studied. Information technology is a factor that explains the slow declination of the national sovereignty concept. Then, it will be logical not to talk about sovereignty but the diversity of sovereignty. This chapter will be studied through two topics; the first studies the hardness of exercising sovereignty over cybersecurity apparatus in the State, and the second can, cybersecurity, be shared as a sovereignty concept.

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Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). In this subject see: Mustafa Naous, State Sovereignty over Cyberspace “Siadet Al Dawla fi Al fadaa Al electrony”, Journal of Sharia and Law, College of Law, United Arab Emirates University, Issue 51, 2012.

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3.1 The Hardness of Exercising Cybersecurity in Sovereignty Reform The concept of sovereignty is discussed widely, where sovereignty has been defined as the fundamental features of the State that allow it to directly influence the social, economic, and cultural policies of a particular group. But at the same time, the State has recognized its sovereignty limits imposed by international law. Respecting the territorial sovereignty of the International Court of Justice is a prerequisite for relations between States. The mere connection of the State infrastructure to the Internet and the implementation of cybersecurity rules cannot be considered a waiver of its sovereignty.41 States are free to exercise their sovereignty and impose their laws on their national territory, but they do not always have the means to ensure compliance within their borders. The international nature of digital conflicts42 is certainly a difficult source in determining applicable law and competent jurisdiction. Still, otherwise, to control the Internet with the implementation of cybersecurity, States use national and international law to punish cybercrime perpetrators. Because cybersecurity defies physical boundaries, its users are real, and all are located on State territory and beyond the borders. Despite the phenomena of illegal abstraction and porous boundaries generated by the globalization of networks, the territory concept is still a standard in the law. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the conflict parties who are the perpetrator and the target of the attack on the computer or the State representative and the location of the conflict on networks whether within or outside the borders of the State.43 The ruling of the case on October 14, 2011, by the Court of First Instance in Paris, Copwatch located in the USA, which condemn police violence by posting personal data to them (Names, I.P. addresses, Phone numbers, and photographs), was banned by Internet service providers.44 A year later, a similar copy of Copwatch was posted on mirror websites. In a new legal procedure, the Court decided to ban it from all sites inside the French country. However, experts said that the necessary time to carry out these technical measures would be six months to one year. It represents an initial investment of approximately e10 million per operator. In a resolution issued on November 28, 2013, the Paris Court ordered five Internet service providers to block Allostreaming websites and three search engines (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo) to stop the illegal presentation of films or series for French Internet

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Affaire du Détroit de Corfou (Royaume-Uni c Albanie), CIJ Recueil 1949, 4, 35. The idea of “digital sovereignty” emerged at the beginning of the 2000s, and in 2011, Pierre Bellanger made a first attempt to define its concept as controlling our present and destiny while guiding itself through the use of technologies and Computer networks. Pierre Bellanger, «De la souveraineté en général et de la souveraineté numérique en particulier», Les Échos, 30 août 2011 (archives.lesechos.fr/archives/cercle/2011/08/30/cercle_37239.htm). 43 Doutriaux, Frontières légales et souveraineté dans le cyberespace? OP. Cite, p. 2. 44 Tribunal de grande instance de Paris Ordonnance de référé 10 février 2012. http://www.legalis. net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=3337. 42

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users.45 Here again, Internet service providers have indicated that targeted sites will circumvent these provisions. In this regard, it does not fail, but the State cannot exercise its full sovereignty on its lands and ensure the effectiveness of judicial decisions when servers and data are located abroad.46 We should consider the fact that the Internet “is a web of switching packets, which makes it difficult for anyone or even the government to prevent or control the flow of information from users’ origin.“ The Internet is one of the webs that connects millions of users worldwide. The decentralized nature of the web is another example of difficulties in controlling the information circulating through it. The technology of “Packet” practically makes it impossible to detect millions of accessible data on networks that may violate national legislations47 AS proxy, and virtual private network VPN allows access to the Internet and browsing. However, these sites are blocked in the user’s country. This defines how cybersecurity is and will have a rule in the law-making apparatus that would affect the sovereign State. In the field of virtual law, the efforts of various States are combined and overlapping, where the need for the question of the relations nature of those who are involved in the communications society, and this makes it imperative for countries to give up part of their sovereignty to who controls links, besides the web users and resorting to concepts or general principles with unstable content because it is in constant movement which proves the varied role played by each user. Through Internet, some claimed that the user is the sovereign entity in the virtual space.48 Therefore, cybersecurity seeks digital sovereignty that represents a joint target for companies and public authorities, using and protecting Internet users, citizens, and consumers49 alike. Indeed, France’s war on data sovereignty cyberwars has already begun; in 2009, the government funded two sovereign cloud projects. The goal was to provide French companies and management with information technology infrastructure capable of hosting data and applications and access to them remotely securely.50 Moreover, cyberwars are ideological and cultural, as the European Digital Library was created as a reaction to the success of Google Books.51 Given the steadily growth of economic weight of Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon (GAFAs), economic dependence and a massive transfer of value are 45

Tribunal de grande instance de Paris Ordonnance de référé 28 November 2013. Doutriaux, Frontières légales et souveraineté dans le cyberespace? OP. Cite, p. 3. 47 Karim Benyekhlef, L’Internet: un reflet de la concurence des souverainetés Lex Electronica, vol. 8, n°1, automne 2002. http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v8-1/benyekhlef.htm. 48 Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, Eric Germain, Claude Kirchner, La souveraineté à l’ère du numérique. Rester maîtres de nos choix et de nos valeurs. CERNA. 2018. 49 Nicolas Colin et Henri Verdier, «ouveraineté numérique: la piste industrielle», paristechreview.com, 30 juin 2014 (www.paristechreview.com/2014/06/30/souverainete-numerique). 50 Sandrine Cassini, «Cloud souverain, un gâchis à la française», lesechos.fr, 24 février 2015 (www.lesechos.fr/24/02/2015/LesEchos/21884-030-ECH_cloud-souverain--un-gachis-a-lafrancaise.htm). 51 Karim Benyekhlef, L’Internet: un reflet de la concurence des souverainetés Lex Electronica, vol. 8, n°1, automne 2002. http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v8-52. 46

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increasing the imbalance that forces public authorities and economic acting authorities to implement regulatory tools compatible and equal to the freedom space provided by Internet.52 States want to confirm and impose their Cyberspace rules and have a political, technical, and legal framework. But to what extent can national intervention be legitimized and excused, driven by recent skepticism about the superiority of the USA on the Internet. The ideal situation for free, open, and accessible Cyberspace is deteriorating, not only because of the political and economic tensions that pass it but also because of the many regimes that are imposed on it. The Internet covers a complicated reality and multiple and often contradictory dynamics of fragmentation and openness, which occur at different physical or legal levels of the web. Hence, the difficulty is for the State to impose its sovereignty on political and commercial issues. In the face of distrust between users and consumers, companies are committed to five ethical practices, including implementing datagrams, to meet new requirements for confidentiality, transparency, assistance, and security in the data processing. This ethical data processing represents the issue of sovereignty that requires establishing an appropriate legal framework, as it was established through the development of European laws, which are already among the best security laws in the world on these issues.53

3.2 Cybersecurity in Joint Sovereignty The role of the State today is more important than that of sovereignty in feudal eras. Modernity has established long-standing connections and structures that make the State an essential component in many territories, which cannot be avoided. For example, the State competes for sovereignty in international trade, financing, human rights, and electronic environments. However, the State still enjoys sovereignty and the full meaning in various sectors such as defense and foreign affairs, the conclusion of treaties and conventions, and the implementation of cybersecurity into its Internet sphere. In these sectors, the States are divided into two groups who are the controller of the system, and in other territories that are beginning to retract their strength, the State can try to intervene directly. But, it will face strong resistance from competing sovereigns, as well as from other States. For example, the State’s desire to require everyone to comply with its standards of free expression on the Internet. The Internet

52

Voir «Les géants du Web menacent-ils la souveraineté des États?», vidéo du forum «Qui gouverne Internet?», organisé par Libération le 21 mai 216 (www.liberation.fr/evenements-libe/2016/05/21/ les-geants-du-web-menacent-t-ils-la-souverainete-des-etats_1454219). 53 Institut de la souveraineté numérique, «Les nouveaux enjeux européens de la souveraineté numérique», Cahiers de la souveraineté numérique, n° 1, 2015 (www.souverainetenumerique.fr/ sites/default/files/Cahiers-de-la-SouveraineteNumeriqueN1.pdf).

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is a reflection of these external and multiple goals.54 However, the Internet can appear as a mirror to these goals because of the unique nature of this medium. Creating a virtual world parallel to the physical world in a cross-border context is unique. Participants have already begun to develop their own rules similar to national legislators,55 introducing the joint venture between the sovereignty of the State with cybersecurity. This competition cannot fail to increase freedom for individuals and intermediaries when they share in authority or its spread in many sovereign centers while acknowledging the importance of the symbol of State sovereignty in an international system that strengthens those who are concerned about the seizure of authority by one party. This distribution of authority is a certain democratic safeguard assured by cybersecurity measures. Another effect of this competition is the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of international legal pluralism. It has already been proven that the State or States do not have a monopoly alone on setting special standards on cybersecurity, which confirms the idea of coexistence of these sovereign centers.56 Beyond the chaos and violence often associated with the concept of domination, concurrent authority can be exercised, and it is already exercised practicality through relative harmony. However, friction points are expected to occur in the light of the attempts made by the State to assert its sovereignty reform by the use of cybersecurity and over the Internet.57 Realizing this diversity in sovereignty, it is now necessary to devise models for the peaceful and harmonious deployment of competing authorities; at this point, cybersecurity has become an important element for peace. The result is greater democracy, an issue that should not suffer from the claims of the dominant State. However, this greatest freedom has a price: That is represented in less security into cybersecurity, and the user does not benefit from the citizens’ similar protection. Therefore, there is a priority to protect the State, public order, and competing interests against freedom of expression. In addition, all the values that, sometimes, the State desperately defends may prevail in the physical world. Therefore, this security appears to be fundamentally ethical: Protecting an individual against a specific content is considered offensive by a particular community.58

54

Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society”, (1992) 21 Millenium. Journal of International Studies, note 31, 391. 55 Arlene H. Rinaldi, “The Net: User Guidelines and Netiquette”, (1995) disponible à l’adresse suivante: Tim North, “The Internet and Usenet Global Computer Networks: An Investigation of their Culture and its Effects on New Users”, disponible à http://foo.curtin.edu.au/thesis/defautt. html. 56 Roderick A. Macdonald, Pour la reconnaissance d’une normativité juridique implicite et «inférentielle», (1986) 28(1) Sociologie et sociétés, 47. 57 Débat entourant l’adoption par le législateur américain du Communications Decency Act of 1996, codified at 47 U.S.C., Section 223(a) to (h). 58 Vanderlinden, J. «Vers une nouvelle conception du pluralisme juridique», (1993) 2 Revue de la recherche juridique- Droit prospectif, 573; Guy ROCHER, «Pour une sociologie des ordres juridiques», (1988) 29 C. de D. 91; J. GLISSEN (dir.)., Le pluralisme juridique, Bruxelles, Institut de sociologie, Éd. de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1972.

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In cybersecurity, there is no place for prohibitions of a mandatory nature found in national laws or even in international conventions. Therefore, replacing this security model with another model that can overlap with the reforming sovereignty concerning governance is important. The only way is to use countermeasures for drastic approaches, as military ones or other divisive approaches to ensure a plurality of opinions for Internet users.59 The freedom of this competition can be beneficial. After all, it allows the individual to know pluralism without submitting to the policies of only normative authority because it is no longer possible to limit the concept of sovereignty by a purely spatial perspective.60 It is important to note that the new electronic communication channels are just one of the many stress factors regarding national sovereignty. Electronic communication networks do not care about the traditional national borders and do not fit in with them. Finally, suppose sovereignty is understood as the right to exercise or exclude any other State or its privileges over its territory. In that case, it implies a duty to protect the territory of other States by the principle of equality and respect for the principle of State sovereignty set out in Article 2\1 of the Charter of the United Nations, implemented by the new rules cybersecurity. Then, we can illustrate the reforms that are needed for a sovereign State under cybersecurity laws. In international law, “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause harm in or to the territory of another State”.61 In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice stated that every State has an obligation “Not to allow its territory to be used for acts incompatible with the rights of other States”.62 According to the Tallinn Manual, there is an obligation of the State, which is the responsibility to prevent illegal acts in the Cyberspace in its territory and that cause severe damage to people or property, whether on its territory or any territory of another State.63 However, the application of the duty of prevention in Cyberspace must take into account the true ability of States to control the infrastructure located in their territory. But, these businesses are often run by private companies, which are not always under the control of the States.

59

Benyekhlef, K., (2002) L’Internet: un reflet de la concurence des souverainetés Lex Electronica, vol. 8, n°1, automne 2002, p. 11. http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v8-1/benyekhlef.htm. 60 Gotlieb, Dalfen et Katz, Op. Cite. 227. 61 Affaire Fonderie de Trail (United States v Canada) Recueil des sentences arbitrales internationales, vol III, pp. 1905–1982, 1965 (1941). 62 Détroit de Corfou, fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. # 21. 63 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, op. Cite, p. 11.

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4 Conclusion Nowadays, the concept of traditional sovereignty is no longer valid concerning controlling the Internet, but it can be moderated and regulated by the use of cybersecurity apparatus, and it can transform the sovereignty to protect its government and it citizens. Today, it is time to realize the diversity of sovereignty and its impact on the Internet sphere. In this regard, the Internet expands this phenomenon due to the virtual world that it supports as a different, complicated, and distinguished from the real world. Some cases are getting out of the national control or even the international control resulting from user actions, which requires the division of authority regarding the implementation of cybersecurity and introducing the concept of “Multiplicity of Sovereignty-citizens, e-government, e-state” and relationships among these different and competing authorities. Cybersecurity in sovereignty reform must be understood in a different sense than actual sovereignty, which refers to the ability of a particular entity, State, company, or individual to control the digital features of this new and virtual space (data, information, knowledge… etc.). The principles that apply to space should be a barrier to prevent dangers that might contribute to the risk of a State claiming sovereignty through using it. Certainly, the State will not simply disappear, but we should realize that some sectors of human activity have got out of government control. It is ludicrous to think that the emergence of the Internet has denied the ability of States to intervene in electronic activities. There are almost daily examples of States having a great deal of control over online activities and its use of cybersecurity to protect its interest, where it is in the Internet sphere or political culture and social domains. But, the role of the State and its nature and scope depends on the mechanism of coexistence with the interventions of competing authorities that are expending the reform of their sovereignty with the use of cybersecurity. Recommendations ● The territorial sovereignty of States over cybersecurity should be regarded as a joint liability or a joint heritage of whole humanity. The organization of these activities must reflect global solidarity that goes beyond the framework of State sovereignty, not limited to its inventor or funder. ● Working on strengthening international solidarity instead of national solidarity and the use of such space should be in the interest of everyone. ● Setting new concepts for the principle of sovereignty for reconsidering territorial and physical space standards as the concept pivots of national sovereignty. ● States must consider cybersecurity in sovereignty reform in twenty-second century. ● The Arab States should work as soon as possible to conclude a special convention for the protection of cybersecurity which has currently become one of the most important pillars of the establishment and provision of the proper conditions for comprehensive development based on safe circulation and providing useful

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information using cybersecurity and information technology as a crossing point, a means, and a porter for this vast amount of information.

References Arabic References Al-Essa T (2010) Sovereignty between its traditional and contemporary concept, “A study of the internationalization of sovereignty in the contemporary era” Al Syada bayn Mafhomha Al Taqlidy Wal Mo’sir “Drasa fi Mada Tadweel Alsyada fi Al A’sr Alhader”. Damascus Univ J Econ Legal Sci 26(1):54 Draft Arab Convention for the Protection of Cyber Space between Reality and Ambition “Mashroo’a Al Itifaqiya Al Arabiya lihimayt Al Fadaa Al sybrani bayn Al waq’a wal tomoh”, The Arab Center for Legal and Judicial Research, Council of Arab Justice Ministers, League of Arab States, Beirut, 23–25 July Musa TH, Omar OM (2016) The internet in law “internet Qanoonan”. J Sharia Law, United Arab Emirates Univ 27, 333–388, 339 Naous M (2012) State sovereignty in cyberspace “Siadet Al Dawla fi Al fadaa Al electrony”. J Sharia Law, College of Law, United Arab Emirates Univ 51

Foreign References AlDajani IM (2020) Internet communication technologies for reconciliation: applied phronesis in internet communication technologies. Springer, p 450 Affaire Du Détroit De Corfou (Royaume-Uni C Albanie), CIJ Recueil 1949, 4, 35 Affaire Du Lotus (France C/Turquie ° CPIJ Série A, N°10, p 18 (1927) Affaire Fonderie De Trail (United States V Canada) Recueil Des Sentences Arbitrales Internationales, vol III, pp 1905–1982, 1965 (1941) Affaire Ministère Public De Munich Allemagne Contre Compuserve, Jugement Du 28 Mai 1998– 8340, Ds 465 Arlene H, Rinaldi A (1995) The net: user guidelines and netiquette, Disponible À L’adresse Suivante: Tim NORTH, “The internet and usenet global computer networks: an investigation of their culture and its effects on new users”. Disponible À http://foo.curtin.edu.au/thesis/defautt.html Bacot G (1985) Carré De Malberg Et L’origine De La Distinction Entre Souveraineté Du Peuple Et Souveraineté Nationale, Paris, Éd. Du C.N.R.S, p 9 Bellanger P, De La Souveraineté En Général Et De La Souveraineté Numérique En Particulier, Les Échos, 30 Août 2011 (Archives.Lesechos.Fr/Archives/Cercle/2011/08/30/Cercle_37239.Htm) Benyekhlef K, Guy Lefebvre G (1993) L’internationalisation Du Droit Et L’affirmation De La Souveraineté: Réflexions Théoriques Et Pratiques, Dans Souveraineté Et Intégration, Montréal, Éd. Thémis Benyekhlef K (2002) L’Internet: Un Reflet De La Concurence Des Souverainetés Lex Electronica, vol 8, N°1, Automne 2002, p 6. http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v8-1/benyekhlef.htm Bouchera L (1996) La Souveraineté Informationnelle: Entre Utopie Et Projet. Le Monde 1er Février Cassini S (2015) Cloud Souverain, Un Gâchis À La Française, Lesechos.Fr, 24 Février. www.les echos.fr/24/02/2015/LesEchos/21884-030-ECH_cloud-souverain--un-gachis-a-la-francaise.htm

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Colin N, Verdier H (2014) Souveraineté Numérique: La Piste Industrielle, Paristechreview.Com, 30 Juin 2014. www.paristechreview.com/2014/06/30/souverainete-numerique Corn GP, Taylor R (2017a) Concluding observations on sovereignty in cyberspace. Am J Int Law Unbound 111:282–283. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.77 Corn G, Taylor R (2017b) Sovereignty in the age of cyber. Am J Int Law Unbound 111:207–212. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.57 Cubertafond B (1989) Souverainetés En Crise? Revue De Droit Public Et De Sciences Politiques Débat Entourant L’adoption Par Le Législateur Américain Du Communications Decency Act of 1996, Codified at 47 U.S.C., Section 223(A) To (H) Détroit De Corfou, Fond, Arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1949 Doutriaux M, Frontières (2015) Légales Et Souveraineté Dans Le Cyberespace? Chaire CyberDéfense Et Cyber-Sécurité Étienne J (2008) «Google Health, Un Carnet De Santé Personnel En Ligne». Futura-Sciences.Com, 22 Mai. www.futura-sciences.com/sante/CVactualites/medecine-google-health-carnet-sante-per sonnelligne-15600/ Fang B (2018) Objective existence of cyberspace sovereignty in countries’ affairs. In: Cyberspace sovereignty. Springer, Singapore Ganascia J, Germain E, Kirchner C (2018) La Souveraineté À L’ère Du Numérique. Rester Maîtres De Nos Choix Et De Nos Valeurs. CERNA Gotlieb A, Dalfen C, Katz K (1974) The transborder transfer of information by communications and computer systems: issues and approaches to guiding principles. Am J Int Law Gueham F (2017) Vers La Souverinete Numerique: Pour Une Nouvelle Gouvernance De L’Internet, p 10. www.fondapol.org ICC policy statement: cross-border law enforcement access to company data—current issues under data protection and privacy law (Février 2012) Institut De La Souveraineté Numérique, «Les Nouveaux Enjeux Européens De La Souveraineté Numérique», Cahiers De La Souveraineté Numérique, N° 1, 2015. www.souverainetenumeri que.fr/sites/default/files/Cahiers-de-la-SouveraineteNumeriqueN1.pdf Jacques L (1996) Cyberspace Et Droit International: Pour UN Nouveau Jus Communications. Revue De La Recherche Juridique–Droit Prospectif, pp 830–832 Khanna P (2018) State sovereignty and self-defence in cyberspace. Brics Law J 5(4):139–154. https://doi.org/10.21684/2412-2343-2018-5-4-139-154 Kilovaty I (2019) The elephant in the room: coercion. Am J Int Law Unbound 113:87–91. https:// doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.10 Kittichaisaree K (2017) Public international law of cyberspace, law, governance and technology, Series 32 La Convention De Budapest Du 23 Novembre 2001. La Recherche Juridique- Droit Prospectif, 573; Guy ROCHER, «Pour Une Sociologie Des Ordres Juridiques» Les Contours De La Neutralité Du Net En Europe Se Précisent, Lemonde.Fr, 31 Août 2016. www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/08/31/les-contours-de-la-neutralite-du-net-eneurope-se-precisent_4990450_4408996.html Les Nouvelles Règles De L’ue Sur La Protection Des Données Placent Les Citoyens Aux Commandes», Actualité Du Parlement Européen, Europarl.Europa.Eu, 1er Juin 2016. www.europarl.eur opa.eu/news/fr/newsroom/20160413BKG22980/nouvelle-législation-européenne-sur-la-protec tion-des-données Lipschutz R (1992) Reconstructing world politics: the emergence of global civil society. Millenium 21. J Int Stud. Note 31, 391 Macdonald R (1986) Pour La Reconnaissance D’une Normativité Juridique Implicite Et «Inférentielle» 28(1) Sociologie Et Sociétés 47 Melzer N (2011) Cyberware fare and international law. UNIDIR, Resources, p 4

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Measuring the Academic Students’ Performance at the University of Jordan Using Netnography Methodology Sajeda Alnwairan, Iyad Aldajani, and Mohammad Alshraideh

Abstract Today, university education is the most important stage in young people’s lives, and Jordanian society is among the most interested in education and the least ignorant and illiterate. The student is the most important element in the educational process. With the development of electronic data about students, it has become necessary to study student information because of the positive and negative impact on the student’s academic performance. In this study, we present research to predict the final estimate of the students of the three medical faculties (Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Dentistry, and Faculty of Pharmacy), which is real data were taken from the Department of Admission and Registration of the University of Jordan. As for the prediction process, we used machine learning algorithms to apply four algorithms to predict the final estimate of students. The results showed the superiority of the decision tree (DT) algorithm over all other classifiers with an accuracy of 100%, followed by the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm, which achieved the second-highest accuracy of 96.69%, then the random forest (RF) algorithm, which achieved an accuracy of 93.86%, with the K-nearest neighbor (KNN) algorithm showing less accuracy among the set of classifiers used with 79.71% accuracy. Keywords Academic performance · Prediction · Machine learning · Medical faculties · Final estimate

1 Introduction Increased e-learning resources, the use of the Internet in education, instrumental educational software, and the establishment of government databases for student information have led to the creation of large data repositories. All this information S. Alnwairan · I. Aldajani (B) Computer Science Department, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan e-mail: [email protected] M. Alshraideh Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_9

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provides a gold mine of educational data that can be exploited and explored to understand how students learn. Today, one of the biggest challenges facing educational institutions is the massive growth of educational data and such data to improve administrative decisions. Education data mining (EDM) is concerned with researching, developing, and applying computerized methods to detect patterns in large sets of educational data that are difficult or difficult to analyze because of the sheer volume of data within them (Koedinger et al. 2008). The higher education system in the country witnessed a marked improvement in enrollment rates. The gross enrollment rate in higher education is about 40%. Jordan has ten public universities, 20 private universities, 42 community colleges, and two regional universities (M. H. E. S. Research 2015). The significant development of higher education in Jordan has led to an increase in the number of students. Thus, over the years, the data have become classified into large data. Many researchers have pointed to the importance of this huge data in expanding our vision of the world. With the rapid development of modern communication technologies and mobile devices, databases and educational data systems have been established (Cen et al. 2015). Therefore, some researchers have suggested that it is important to study student information to extract new insights and useful information from educational data that benefit teachers, students, and the entire education (Asif et al. 2017).

2 Literature Review In this section, the most important work related to the research study is presented. In Son and Fujita (2019), the researcher suggests a new method to deal with expecting a student’s academic performance. They called the new way (MANFIS-S) multiadaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system with representative sets, which uses multiple parameter groups and a special educational strategy to resolve weaknesses and deal with the problem of predicting academic performance of multiple-input students (MIMO SAPP). The idea of a particular learning strategy is to use local and global training. In global training, a group of random parameters is trained from the first register to the last database register. Each training results in a group of parameters. Global training will achieve and correct a meaningful subset of standards through the latest training exercise. In local training, there are two types of parameters in MANFIS-S, namely hypothesis and the result trained by improving gradient and particle swarm in a hybrid manner. They used fuzzy K-nearest neighbor to discover the group to which it belonged. The MANFIS-S model was proposed experimentally for ANFIS, MANFIS, OneR, and random tree validated in the UCI Standardized Student Performance Data Set; a true student performance dataset from VNU University Vietnam, Science, and three educational datasets from K Cup Dd. Experiments displayed in MANFIS-S were more accurate than the rest of the algorithm. In Yang and Li (2018), students’ progress, performance, and potential are important for measuring learning outcomes and choosing learning activities. However,

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current work does not provide sufficient analytical tools to analyze student performance. Researchers solved this problem by providing multiple analysis tools to analyze student progress, performance, and potential by formulating the student model with performance-related characteristics and non-performance-related characteristics through the Student Attribute Matrix (SAM) that defines student characteristics. Researchers also provided tools for estimating student performance using backpropagation neural network (BP-NN) based on the classification, which can estimate student attributes/performance based on prior students’ knowledge and the attributes/performance of other students with the same characteristics. They also suggested student progress indicators and attribute causal relationship index based on BP-NN to comprehensively describe student progress in different areas and causal relationships. In Su et al. (2018), the authors provided a new framework for exercise-enhanced recurrent neural network (EERNN) to predict student performance in the future (e.g., grades) by utilizing historical exercise records of students to model the student training process; they designed a BiLSTM to extract semantic exemplification of the exercise from texts. Then, they suggested an LSTM track of student cases by including exercise notations. To predict, they created two strategies under EERNN, then conducted extensive experiments on a realistic dataset. In their study (Daud et al. 2017), the researchers claim that most present ways use features mostly related to academic performance, family assets, and family income to build a system that can predict student performance. The features of family expenses and students’ personal information are often ignored. In this paper, researchers made a great effort to use and extract the features of family expenses and students’ personal information by collecting scholarship data containing students’ data from different universities in Pakistan. They then applied to learn analyses and generative and discriminatory classification models to predict whether a student was able to complete his degree or not. Empirical results display that the suggested way is significantly superior to current methods due to the exploitation of student personal information feature sets and family expenses. They note that results of learning analysis (LA) and educational data mining (EDM) could serve as a means of improving policies in higher education. In this study, we will focus on predicting the final estimate of students based on relevant demographic and academic factors using machine learning algorithms to improve the quality of educational processes.

3 The Methodological Aspects In this section, the methods used to reach the expected results will be presented. The methodology used and the steps necessary to understand student data and predict the final estimate of students will be discussed. Each step is based on guidelines and rules. More specifically, methods of data collection and preprocessing will be identified.

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3.1 Data Collection Data collection is the basic and most important step for research, regardless of the area of research. The approach to data collection varies depending on the areas of study and depending on the information required. The students’ datasets were collected from the University of Jordan. At the beginning of each year, the student fills in his personal information through an interface for admission and registration of new university students. These data were taken from the Department of Admission and Registration. The dataset that was collected consists of information about 1015 students from medical colleges. The data were taken as a snapshot for the year 2016. The data are considered real data. In this paper, data were collected from the students at the University of Jordan, which are the three medical faculties (Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Dentistry, and Faculty of Pharmacy). The level was determined for bachelor’s students so that data for medical students in the sixth year were taken, the data for dental students in the fifth year, and data for pharmacy students in the fifth and sixth years. For master’s students, data for medical students in the fourth year and the data on pharmacy students in the second and third years were taken. For doctoral students, data for pharmacy students in the third year were taken according to the data obtained. These data include 20 features, which have been classified into demographic features such as nationality and gender and academic features such as grade, admission, and specialization. The dataset variables collected are presented and described in Table 1.

3.2 Data Preprocessing Preprocessing the data is the step before applying the data extraction algorithm; it converts the original data into a suitable format to be used by a particular mining algorithm (Romero et al. 2014; AlFaouri et al. 2021; Alfayoumi et al. 2021a, b). Data preprocessing includes various tasks such as data transformation, data cleaning, and feature selection (Romero et al. 2014; AlFaouri et al. 2021; Alfayoumi et al. 2021a, b). The first step of data processing is to understand the data input and the target or purpose. The data come from the source in Arabic, so the second step here is to convert all data from Arabic to English, and then convert it into numbers. Then comes the last step, removing unnecessary, duplicated, and invalid data that might affect the suitability of data for being processed and analyzed. This process is reflected in the big picture of data quality and the appropriateness of data for analysis and recovery.

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Table 1 Description of the collected dataset features Demographic features

Academic features

Features name

Features description

Gender

Female and male

Nationality

All the nationality of students

Date of birth

A numerical variable

Academic degree

Bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, Ph.D.

College

Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy

Specialization

Doctor of Medicine, Doctor of Dentistry, Doctor of Pharmacy, etc.

Initial acceptance

Parallel program, Children of faculty members, Competition program

Current acceptance

Parallel program, Children of faculty members, Competition program

Acceptance semester

1, 2

Acceptance year

A numerical variable

Tawjehe rate

A numerical variable

Tawjehe year

A numerical variable

Tawjehe branch

Scientific

GPA

A numerical variable

Student status

Regular, graduate

Nationality of secondary certificate

All the secondary certificate nationality

Nature of the study

Certificate, thesis

Accounting

Accountant, non-accountant

Level code

A numerical variable

Scholarship organization

Exemption of employees’ children, Ministry of higher education, etc.

3.3 Proposed Algorithm This section will explain the supervised learning algorithms used in the paper, which are K-nearest neighbor, decision tree, support vector machine, and random forest algorithms.

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K-Nearest Neighbor Algorithm (KNN)

We used the KNN algorithm to predict students’ final estimates using student data collected from the Department of Admission and Registration, then converted into numbers and entered the model. There are 847 records with 20 features spread over 50 neighbors. Python Code was used to build a prediction module. The KNN algorithm is a technique for classifying organisms based on the closest examples of training in the problem space. The K-nearest neighbor algorithm is among the simplest: The object is classified by the majority vote of its neighbors, with the object being assigned to the class most common among its K-nearest neighbors (K is a positive integer, usually small). If K = 1, the object will be assigned to the category of its nearest neighbor. This algorithm works as follows (Amra and Maghari 2017): (a) Calculating the Euclidean distance from the target plot to those that were sampled. (b) Request samples considering calculated distances. (c) Select optimal K-nearest neighbor. (d) Compute the weighted average of the inverse distance with the closest K of the multi-variable neighbors. The principle of the algorithm is that if the majority of K samples most like a query point qi in the feature space belong to a particular category, then a verdict can be made that the query point qi falls in this category. The distance in the feature space can measure the similarity, so this algorithm is called the K-nearest neighbor algorithm. For a qi data query whose name is unknown and presented by a vector in the feature space, calculate the distances between it and each point in the train dataset. After sorting the distance calculation results, the class label of the test point qi can be made according to the label of the K-nearest points in the train dataset. Every point in the d-dimensional space can be expressed as a d-vector for coordinates, such as Eq. 1: p = ( p p1, 2, ..., pn )

(1)

The distance between two points in multi-dimensional feature space can be determined in several ways. The use of Euclidean distance is usually the most common method that is Eq. 2: ⎾ ⏐ n ⏐ dist ( p, q) = ⎷ ( pi − qi )2 i=1

(2)

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Support Vector Machine Algorithm (SVM)

We used the SVM algorithm to predict students’ final estimates using student data collected from the Department of Admission and Registration, then converted into numbers and entered the model. There are 847 records with 20 features as input, and one output which is the final estimate of a student is divided into five categories (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Accepted, Low). The SVM algorithm is a distinct classifier defined by a separate hyperplane. The SVM builds a hyperplane, which is used for regression and classification. It finds the nearest data vectors called support vectors (SV) to decide confinement in the training set and separates a particular new test vector using only the closest data vectors. The steps in SVM are described in the following Table 2 (Pratiyush and Manu 2016; Al-Shaikh et al. 2021; Almanaseer et al. 2021). The basic idea of support vector machines is to find the hyperplane (with the largest margin), which separates the categories. Table 2 Steps for SVM algorithm Step 1 Suppose there are two categories C1 and C2. Now an unknown feature vertex x either belongs to class C1 or class C2 Step 2 Specify a linear Discriminant Function g(x) = wT (x) + b where “T” means that the transpose is a weight vector and x is the input feature vector, and “b” is the bias in a two-dimensional space or vector Step 3 In a two-dimensional space, if the feature vector is a two-dimensional vector, this linear equation represents a straight line, i.e., wT (x) + b = 0 Step 4 If the input feature vector is a three-dimensional feature vector, this linear equation is equal to zero in the two-dimensional dimension; otherwise, it becomes a plane in the three-dimensional dimension Step 5 Suppose the dimension of the feature vector is more than 3. In that case, it will become Hyperplane. “w” is the perpendicular vector at the Hyperplane where the vector w represents the direction of the Hyperplane in the “d” dimensional space Step 6 Classification Rules: For each feature vector x, calculate a linear function. If x lies on the positive side of the Hyperplane, then g(x1 ) = wT (x1 ) + b

(3) wT (x1 ) + b > 0 x1 belongs to −ve side of Hyperplane, then wT (x1 ) + b < 0 (4) if this x1 lies on the Hyperplane, then wT (x1 ) + b = 0 (5) Step 7 SVM classifies data by finding the Hyperplane that separates all data points of one category from those of the other category The Hyperplane, which is considered best for SVM, means that it has the largest margin between the two categories

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Decision Tree Algorithm (DT)

We apply this algorithm to our dataset of student records to predict the final estimate for students. We have 847 records with 20 features as input and one output which is the final estimate of a student. The top-down approach is used for model building in the decision tree algorithm. The decision tree is a highly effective algorithm for learning supervised data. The best-known decision tree algorithm is ID3, where many features exist and the training set contains many objects, but a reasonably good decision tree is required without many calculations. A subset of the training group called a window is chosen randomly, and a decision tree is formed from it. This tree correctly classifies all the objects in the window. All other objects in the training group are then classified using the tree. If the tree gives the correct answer to all these objects, it is true for the entire training group, and the process ends. If not, selecting incorrectly classified objects will be added to the window, and the process continues (Quinlan 1986). The ID3 algorithm begins with the original set S as a root node. In each iteration of the algorithm, it is repeated during each unused feature of the S group. It calculates the entropy H(S) or information gain IG(S) of that feature. It then chooses which feature contains the smallest entropy value (or the greatest information gain). The selected attribute then splits the S group to produce subsets of the data. The algorithm continues to recur in each subset and selects only those features never selected before. The entropy H(S) is measured with the manner as (Ahmed and Elaraby 2014): H (S) =



− p(x) log2 p(x)

(6)

x∈X

S—the dataset to be calculated X—set of classes in S p(x)—the portion of element class x in the dataset of S. The information gain IG(S) is measured with the manner as (Ahmed and Elaraby 2014): I G(A, S) = H (S) −



p(t)H (t)

(7)

t∈T

H(S)—the entropy of dataset S T —the subsets created from splitting dataset S by attribute A p(t)—the portion of the number of element t in the dataset of S H(t)—the entropy of dataset t. 3.3.4

Random Forest Algorithm (RF)

We apply this algorithm to our dataset of student records to predict the final estimate for students. We have 847 records with 20 features as input and one output,

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which is the final estimate of a student. A random forest algorithm is a supervised learning algorithm used for classification and regression and proved to have excellent performance compared to other machine learning algorithms. A random forest is a classification consisting of a set of tree-structured classifiers {h(x, 8k), k = 1,…} where the {8k} is independent identically distributed random vectors and every tree votes for the most common category when input x (Pavlov 2019). Similarly, the random forest algorithm creates decision trees on data samples, gets predictions from every, and finally selects the best solution by voting and calculating the average result. Random forest algorithm working steps are: First, the data are divided into multiple random groups. Next, this algorithm will create a decision tree for each sample. Then, it will get the result of the prediction from every decision tree. In this step, a vote will be held on each predicted result. Finally, determine the most voted prediction result as the final prediction result.

4 Results This section will present the results of the experiment obtained from the study using the Python language to predict students’ final estimate using student data collected from the Department of Admission and Registration. The dataset consists of 847 records with 20 features as input and one output, which is the final estimate of a student by converting the dataset from the English language to the Arabic language and then converting it into numbers. The data are split into 75% as a training set and 25% as a testing set on all features. The learning algorithms used in this research procedure are support vector machine, K-nearest neighbor, decision tree, and random forest algorithms.

4.1 Support Vector Machine (SVM) Prediction SVM algorithms were used to predict the final estimate of students using student data collected from the Department of Admission and Registration.

4.1.1

Confusion Matrix

The confusion matrix for multi-class classification is shown based on five classes (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Accepted, Low) by applying the SVM algorithm. Table 3 shows a confusion matrix obtained using the SVM algorithm. In class Excellent, 60 students were correctly predicted, 1 incorrectly predicted as Good. In class V. Good, 18 students were correctly predicted, 1 incorrectly predicted as Accepted. In class Good, 65 students were correctly predicted, as there is no incorrect

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Table 3 Shows the confusion matrix for SVM Excellent

Excellent

V. Good

Good

Accepted

Low

60

0

1

0

0

V. Good

0

18

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1

0

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0

0

65

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0

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3

51

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Low

1

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0

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12

Table 4 Shows accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score for the SVM algorithm Algorithms

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1-score

SVM (%)

96.69

97

97

97

prediction in this class. In class Accepted, 51 students were correctly predicted, 3 incorrectly predicted as Good. In class Low, 12 students were correctly predicted, 1 incorrectly predicted as Excellent.

4.1.2

Performance Measures

Table 4 shows the four performance measures used in the thesis (accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score) calculated based on a confusion matrix to assess and test classification efficiency. Table 4 shows the results obtained using the SVM algorithm. The accuracy rate was 96.69%, a satisfactory result of predicting the final estimate of students, with a precision rate of 97%, a recall rate of 97%, and an F1-score rate of 97%.

4.2 K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) Prediction KNN algorithms were used to predict the final estimate of students using student data collected from the Department of Admission and Registration.

4.2.1

Confusion Matrix

The confusion matrix for multi-class classification is shown based on five classes (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Accepted, Low) by applying the KNN algorithm. Table 5 shows a confusion matrix obtained using the KNN algorithm. In class Excellent, 47 students were correctly predicted, 9 incorrectly predicted as Good, 5 incorrectly predicted as Low. In class V. Good, 13 students were correctly predicted, 6 incorrectly predicted as Accepted. In class Good, 56 students were correctly

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Table 5 Shows the confusion matrix for KNN Excellent

Excellent

V. Good

Good

Accepted

Low

47

0

9

0

5

V. Good

0

13

0

6

0

Good

4

0

56

5

0

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1

1

6

46

0

Low

6

0

0

0

7

Table 6 Shows accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score for the KNN algorithm Algorithms

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1-score

KNN (%)

79.71

80

80

80

predicted, 4 incorrectly predicted as Excellent, 5 incorrectly predicted as Accepted. In class Accepted, 46 students were correctly predicted, 1 incorrectly predicted as Excellent, 1 incorrectly predicted as V. Good, 6 incorrectly predicted as Good. In class Low, 7 students were correctly predicted, 6 incorrectly predicted as Excellent.

4.2.2

Performance Measures

Table 6 shows the four performance measures used in the thesis (accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score) calculated based on a confusion matrix to assess and test classification efficiency. Table 6 shows the results obtained using the KNN algorithm. The accuracy rate was 79.71%, an unsatisfactory result of predicting the final estimate of students compared to the SVM, with a precision rate of 80%, a recall rate of 80%, and an F1-score rate of 80%.

4.3 Decision Tree (DT) Prediction DT algorithms were used to predict the final estimate of students using student data collected from the Department of Admission and Registration.

4.3.1

Confusion Matrix

The confusion matrix for multi-class classification is shown based on five classes (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Accepted, Low) by applying the DT algorithm. Table 7 shows a confusion matrix obtained using the DT algorithm. In class Excellent, 61 students were correctly predicted. In class V. Good, 19 students were correctly

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Table 7 Shows the confusion matrix for DT Excellent

Excellent

V. Good

Good

Accepted

Low

61

0

0

0

0

V. Good

0

19

0

0

0

Good

0

0

65

0

0

Accepted

0

0

0

54

0

Low

0

0

0

0

13

Table 8 Shows accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score for the DT algorithm Algorithms

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1-score

DT (%)

100

100

100

100

predicted. In class Good, 65 students were correctly predicted. In class Accepted, 54 students were correctly predicted. In class Low, 13 students were correctly predicted, which means that the DT was correctly predicted in all classes.

4.3.2

Performance Measures

Table 8 shows the four performance measures used in the thesis (accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score) calculated based on a confusion matrix to assess and test classification efficiency. Table 8 shows the results obtained using the DT algorithm. The accuracy rate was 100%, a satisfactory result of predicting the final estimate of students, with a precision rate of 100%, a recall rate of 100%, and an F1-score rate of 100%.

4.4 Random Forest (RF) Prediction RF algorithms were used to predict the final estimate of students using student data collected from the Department of Admission and Registration.

4.4.1

Confusion Matrix

The confusion matrix for multi-class classification is shown based on five classes (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Accepted, Low) by applying the RF algorithm. Table 9 shows a confusion matrix obtained using the RF algorithm. In class Excellent, 61 students were correctly predicted. In class V. Good, 9 students were correctly predicted, 10 incorrectly predicted as Accepted. In class Good, 65 students were

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Table 9 Shows the confusion matrix for RF Excellent

Excellent

V. Good

Good

Accepted

Low

61

0

0

0

0

V. Good

0

9

0

10

0

Good

0

0

65

0

0

Accepted

0

0

0

54

0

Low

3

0

0

0

10

Table 10 Shows accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score for the RF algorithm Algorithms

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1-score

RF (%)

93.86

95

94

93

correctly predicted. In class Accepted, 54 students were correctly predicted, 9 incorrectly predicted as Accepted. In class Low, 10 students were correctly predicted, 3 incorrectly predicted as Excellent.

4.4.2

Performance Measures

Table 10 shows the four performance measures used in the thesis (accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score) calculated based on a confusion matrix to assess and test classification efficiency. Table 10 shows the results obtained using the RF algorithm. The accuracy rate was 93.86%, a satisfactory result of predicting the final estimate of students, with a precision rate of 95%, a recall rate of 94%, and an F1-score rate of 93%.

5 Conclusion Universities produce enormous data about students in electronic form due to the digitization of academic processes. It is important for them to effectively transform this massive collection of data into knowledge that will help teachers, policymakers, and administrators to analyze it to enhance decision-making. Furthermore, it may also improve the quality of educational processes by providing timely information to various stakeholders. Therefore, we conducted this study to predict the final estimate of the students of the three medical faculties (Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Dentistry, and Faculty of Pharmacy) at the University of Jordan. In the beginning, we collected data taken from the Department of Admission and Registration of the University of Jordan, where it contained real data. Second, we presented the confusion matrix for multi-class classification based on five categories (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Accepted, and Low). We computed the four performance measures

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(accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score) for each algorithm calculated based on a confusion matrix to evaluate and test classification efficiency. Third, we used machine learning algorithms so that we applied four algorithms to predict the final estimate of students; the results showed the superiority of the DT algorithm over all other classifiers with an accuracy of 100%, followed by the SVM algorithm that achieved the second-highest accuracy of 96.69%, then the RF algorithm that achieved an accuracy of 93.86%, whereas the KNN algorithm showed less accuracy among the set of classifiers used with 79.71% accuracy. Finally, believing in the importance of education, we hope in this thesis that we will have advised the new undergraduate student to raise the level of education. Acknowledgements The researchers would like to express their sincerest gratitude for the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa (AARMENA) Capacity Building in Higher Education Project (CBHE), co-funded by the Erasmus+ Program of the European Union.

References ABED Ahmed IS Elaraby 2014 Data mining: a prediction for student’s performance using classification method World J Comput Appl Technol 2 2 43 47 AlFaouri A, Alshraideh M, Leiner M, AlDajani A (2021) Syrian refugees information prediction system (RIPS) in Germany: applied digital humanities, ARMENIA—reconciliation with refuges book, pp 256–271 Alfayoumi B, Alshraideh M, Al-Sharaeh S, Leiner M, AlDjani A (2021a) Analyzing the sentiments of Jordanian students towards online education in the higher education institutions. Int J Adv Comput Sci Appl (IJACSA) 12(11). https://doi.org/10.14569/IJACSA.2021.0121108 Alfayoumi B, Alshraideh M, Leiner M, Aldajani A (2021b) Machine learning predictions for the advancement of the online education in the higher education institutions in Jordan. J Hunan Univ Nat Sci 48(9) Almanaseer W, Alshraideh M, Al-Kadi O (2021) A deep belief network classification approach for automatic discretization of Arabic Text. Appl Sci 11(11). https://doi.org/10.3390/app11115228 Al-Shaikh A, Mahafzah BA, Alshraideh M (2021) Hybrid harmony search algorithm for social network contact tracing of COVID-19. Soft Comput 1–23 Amra IAA, Maghari AYA (2017) Students performance prediction using KNN and Naïve Bayesian. In: ICIT 2017—8th international conference on information technology proceedings, pp 909–913. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICITECH.2017.8079967 R Asif A Merceron SA Ali NG Haider 2017 Analyzing undergraduate students’ performance using educational data mining Comput Educ 113 177 194 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compedu.2017. 05.007 Cen L, Ruta D, Ng J (2015) Big education: opportunities for big data analytics. In: International conference on digital signal processing, DSP, vol 2015, pp 502–506. https://doi.org/10.1109/ ICDSP.2015.7251923 Daud A, Lytras MD, Aljohani NR, Abbas F, Abbasi RA, Alowibdi JS (2017) Predicting student performance using advanced learning analytics. In: 26th international world wide web conference 2017, WWW 2017 Companion, pp 415–421. https://doi.org/10.1145/3041021.3054164 Koedinger KR, Cunningham K, Skogsholm A, Leber B (2008) An open repository and analysis tools for fine-grained, longitudinal learner data. In: Educ. Data Min. 2008—1st international conference on educational data mining, proceedings, pp 157–166

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M. H. E. S. Research (2015) Research, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific. http://rce.mohe.gov.jo/StudyInJordan/en/. Accessed 4 May 2021 Pavlov YL (2019) Random forests. In Random forests, pp 1–122. https://doi.org/10.1201/978042 9469275-8 Pratiyush G, Manu S (2016) Classifying educational data using support vector machines: a supervised data mining technique. Indian J Sci Technol 9(34). https://doi.org/10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i34/ 100206 JR Quinlan 1986 Induction of decision trees Mach Learn 1 1 81 106 https://doi.org/10.1007/bf0 0116251 Romero C, Romero JR, Ventura S (2014) A survey on pre-processing educational data. In: Educational data mining. Springer International Publishing, pp 29–46 LH Son H Fujita 2019 Neural-fuzzy with representative sets for prediction of student performance Appl Intell 49 1 172 187 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-018-1262-7 Su Y et al (2018) Exercise-enhanced sequential modelling for student performance prediction. In: 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018, pp 2435–2443 F Yang FWB Li 2018 Study on student performance estimation, student progress analysis, and student potential prediction based on data mining Comput Educ 123 May 97 108 https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.compedu.2018.04.006

Research Science on Heritage, Reconciliation and Social Inclusion

Exploring the Strengthening of National Research Capacity on Reconciliation Studies Iyad Muhsen Aldajani

1 Research Questions 1. How to classify reconciliation studies? 2. What is the impact of reconciliation studies in Europe? 3. Since when did the interest in reconciliation studies begin, and did it become more present lately? 4. Was there a variation in reconciliation studies development in terms of definitions, approaches, and theories based on the historical stages and scientific approches? 5. What are the spatial domains covered by reconciliation studies? 6. Can technical information be provided on reconciliation studies in general, the language used, type of publication, and funding?

2 Discussion Section Germany has a long history of reconciliation and conflict resolution since 1945. It is worthwhile to remind some events to characterize this astonishing process, where a country that is responsible for the most heinous crimes in recent history arrived to have good relationships with their former enemies and victims. We reference conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and reconciliation studies in German education institutions and centers with some events. Such as the one that happened in Tokyo on March 9, 2015, on an event organized by the left-leaning newspaper Asahi Shimbun, where Merkel (German Bundeskanzler) at the time referred to a speech in the year of (1985) done by then West German President Richard von Weizsäcker, who called Germany’s wartime in Second World War defeat a “Day of Liberation.” Merkel also I. M. Aldajani (B) Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_10

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added that “We Germans will never forget the hand of reconciliation that was extended to us after all the suffering that our country had brought to Europe and the world” (Greg Rienzi 2015).1 It is also good to reference the Kniefall that took place in Warsaw in Poland when signing the treaty of Warsaw, known as Kniefall von Warschau (1970), most of the events that were promoting reconciliation research as an alternative way for conflict resolutions. Educational centers and institutes were investigating alternative ways to conflict resolution, such as peacebuilding and reconciliation process, methods, strategies, and practices studies into conflict studies as a different variable of conflicts, adhering to peacebuilding and reconciliation studies that would refer conflict resolution and research. German reconciliation process started with it coping with the past, started in (1950) according to Hanns Maul, a German leading academic foreign policy analyst, and professor of strategic studies. The most noted event was the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials that took place in the (1963) until (1965). The reason that those cases against Nazis were significant, it was held by Germans and not by Allies; it was one of the most major war crime cases that took to condemn Germans for their actions in war times against enemies. Including soldiers who served in the concentration camps, which were brought to justice and were accountable for their actions. German reconciliation process is painted with gargantuan awkwardness, the feeling of guilt of a nation, for atrocities committed in WWII, against several nations. German leadership such as Konrad Adenauer, such as his reconciliation process with Israel and with the Jewish Nation, Willy Brandt with his reconciliation with Poland, set the path for reconciliation with victim nations and their enemies in war, were Brandt said: “No German is Free of History.2 ” Another example was in January (1963), At the Franco-German Youth Office, French President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer signed the “Élysée Treaty” that established a new foundation for relations and ended centuries of rivalry3 between both old enemies. According to Gardner Feldman, in her book, Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012). That the German policies relied on developing reconciliation with its former nations for atrocities committed by German Nazis, adhering rights of Germans to accept the guilt for crimes committed in their names against their old and present enemies. The reason to develop German’s economic and political relations with other former enemies, stating, she stated that: “German policies after World war II became reconciliation progressively.” We also must not forget that the German did not forget to forge the reconciliation process with various enemies of the past. German continued its reconciliation 1

Rienzi, Greg. “Other Nations Could Learn from Germany’s Efforts to Reconcile after WWII.” The Hub, June 4, 2015. https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/. 2 Rienzi, Greg. “Other Nations Could Learn from Germany’s Efforts to Reconcile after WWII.” The Hub, June 4, 2015. https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/. 3 Cf.

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process through educational centers and institutions, as they are taking parts until the present time, such as reconciliation process with England, Netherlands, France, Israel, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Reconciliation studies are researching peacebuilding, conflict transformation, and reconciliation processes, most adopted framework, encounter conflict studies and scientific research, to develop aspects known as shared common future for societies, communities, and nationas in conflict. In addition, to researching reconciliation studies into the other conflicts in various locations and disciplines, making an indepth, thorough investigation into its processes, its achievements, and its impact, past and future studies. Centers and educational institutions work in developing research on the joint or shared future into conflicts, to be studied in many different disciplines as an alternative way for conflicts resolutions and as researching peacebuilding and reconciliation studies into conflicts in regards to its methods, strategies, and practices, even in adhering into social, cultural, economic, and political policies for governmental, shared policy decisions and social change in its cultural, economic, and political capitals. Today, more research centers and educational institutions are focusing on conflict studies into more alternative ways adhering to peacebuilding and reconciliation studies. Conflict resolution studies are existing and obtainable in researching conflicts and appraising it with conflict transformation and applying peacebuilding and reconciliation, strategies, methods, and practices into the conflict studies and in researching conflict resolution in conflicts. There are many variations in reconciliation studies as in terms of a different approach and theories based on the historical stages in scientific research, taking into consideration events, such as the previous historical events, that promoted peacebuilding and reconciliation process, that promoted such studies, impacting entities, race, nations, and countries. It was because of atrocities conducted by conflicts that affected social, cultural, economic, political domains. Many reconciliation studies are related to conflict resolution studies exploring conflict transformation studies into intigrating different varieties of disciplines in social sciences and advancing those studies into more inter-trans-multi-disciplines research. In our present time, reconciliation studies are researched as an alternative study toward developing an interactive communication of knowledge about theories and methods of peace, conflict transformation, and reconciliation processes. It would emphasize more on peacebuilding studies toward conflict transformation through researching reconciliation processes in different areas, locations, and time impacting social, economic, and political capitals in conflicts in many regions. Reconciliation studies focuses on capacity building thorugh, researching the paths toward possibilities of transforming conflicts into developing a shared common future between enemies, and develop conflict transformation within protracted and tractable conflicts, that invistigate the causes of violence and develop violence prvention in conflicts.

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Reconciliation studies address tangible experiences of peaceful cohabitation and opportunities for the stabilization and enhancement of non-violent conflict resolution strategies, mechanisms, and processes into stagnated conflicts, advancing into impacting frozen conflicts or tractable conflicts or protracted conflicts or affecting change in frozen peace processes. Reconciliation studies are considered transdisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and multidisciplinary approaches toward scientific research. Its adheres to its theoretical and methodological approach within the cohabitations of various disciplines that develop intercultural social change into transformation; in integrating knowledge about different concepts, theories, institutions, and instruments of peacebuilding, conflict transformation within reconciliation strategies, methods, and practices is considered as part of the path for the alternative way for conflict resolution in our present time. Reconciliation studies ignite human rights policies and develop analytical and practical skills in effective conflict management toward conflict transformation for reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts. The studies cohabitate theories of international relations and cooperation between entities or enemies in conflict. It also integrates philosophical, ethical, psychological, sociological, anthropological, information technologies, and Internet communication technologies components in applied computer science. Moreover, developing peaceful forms in educational, cultural, and political spheres, to assist in redefining the context of conflicts one ruled by majority averting violence, violence prevention, and overdue the progress of conflicts in the future, develop shared comment future for enemies in conflicts. Reconcilaition studies develop tools for means and ends for advancing peacebuilding and the process of reconciliation in the middle of conflicts, diverting national and international social, political, and cultural policies in conflicts. The keynote is to develop strategies and methods, to overcome the impasse in social, political, or regional conflicts in analyzing and interpreting their causes researching different approaches for conflict transformation that adheres to conflict resolution and build reconciliation processes in conflicts. Today, such studies assist to evaluate political strategies and ongoing projects in the fields of peace studies, security, and human rights. alternative methods of conflict resolution. In Europe centers and educational institutions took a spin to understand reconciliatoin and peace studies approaches from theory-to-practice, developing many centers, such as Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, initiated in (1970), it is governmentally funded, and a think tank focused on violent internal and international conflict including conditions for and promotion of the concept of peace, peacebuilding, and reconciliation studies. Another institution such as The German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF) founded since April 2002 supports peace and conflict research in Germany and also international educational institutions, in research in peace, reconciliation, and conflict transformation projects that deal with relevant topics with innovative concepts, contributing to the structural development of the research field and produce results for scientific policy and social counseling for local and international spheres. It also promotes scientific research

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on critical issues arising from social conflict constellations and the task of securing peacebuilding and reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts. In particular, those centers support peace and conflict research and develop new alternative to research and study conflict transformation and conflict studies. It also funds research projects, networking with local and international research projects such as scientific research and international scientific conferences. In 2019, after a debate in the Bundestag, the German Peace Foundation became a Federal Foundation of German State. Other centers as well might support different approaches such as Berghof Foundation Operations (GmbH): The Berghof Foundation is an independent, nongovernmental, and non-profit organization that supports efforts to prevent political and social violence and to achieve sustainable peace through conflict transformation.4 The foundation supports conflict stakeholders and actors in their efforts to achieve sustainable peace through peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The foundation momentum is “5 Creating space for conflict transformation.” They work with like-minded partners in selected regions to enable conflict stakeholders and actors to develop non-violent responses in the face of conflict-related challenges.6 The foundation has international partners and local ones such as the European Peace Liaison Office (EPLO), Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitug. Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)/Working Group on Education and Fragility. Mediation Support Network (MSN). The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers NRTP. The Bergsträsse Institute (ABI) is one of Germany’s major research centers in the domain of both comparative area studies and transregional studies and develops cooperation for peacebuilding and reconciliation research. It is an independent, non-profit research institute associated with the University of Freiburg. The institute was founded in 1960 by Arnold Bergstraesser, at the time professor of political science and sociology at the University of Freiburg; its core funding was provided by the state of Baden-Württemberg. It also can behave as an additional third-party funding to be sourced from scientific institutions and development organizations. Fraunhofer Center for International Management and Knowledge Economy (IMW) focuses on the fundamental change processes in a globalized world. Some significant trends in its cooperation, within worldwide development toward a knowledge and economy, they research the global shift in generating value creation, and the growing realization of the need to promote sustainable development at a regional and international level also affected by atrocities and conflicts. From the Fraunhofer Center for International Management and Knowledge Economy point of view, these are the challenges to build share future or common future between enemies. Hamburg Institute for Social Research (HIS) has been organizing a large number of its activities for a long time, such as research projects, 4

Jobs Archive: Page 2 of 33: DME for Peace: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation for Peacebuilding. Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.dmeforpeace.org/opportunity/jobs/page/2/. 5 Berghof Foundation. Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.devex.com/organizations/ber ghof-foundation114118. 6 Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.scirp.org/journal/articles.aspx?searchCode=Instituto de Psicologia of the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, CNPq, Pedro Ernesto University Hospital, Rio de Janeiro, Brazild.

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conferences, lectures, in peacebuilding, reconciliation, conflict transformation, and conflict resolutions in cooperation with other domestic and foreign institutions. For several years now, efforts have been intensified by longer-term research collaborations, with agreements with the Leuphana University of Lüneburgas well as with the Institute for Social and Political Studies (IESP) of the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro7 (UERJ) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Institute of Political Science at the University of Tubingen: A similar cooperation exists around the GermanColombian Peace Institute CAPAZ with the University of Gießen and an office in Bogotà to organize some research around the Colombian peace and reconciliation process as one of the oldest political science institutes in Germany, founded in 1952. The instate focuses on the tradition of normatively guided research and teaching on democracy, development, reconciliation, and peace in conflicts. Reconciliation studies are committed to the requirements of modern science for social change towardts transformation and intigration; the studies focuses on researching the oriented, empirically inter-trans-multi-disciplinary sphere in science. However, at the same time, the approach is theory-led and takes up central questions of the public as well as the scientific debate, emphasizing on acts acquiring pluralistically, and promotes the exchange between different theory and method traditions for intigration and transformation, towards a path from theory to practice on the ground of conflicts. Moreover, research on reconciliation studies was inspired by rule-critical and gender-sensitive perspectives, specially dedicated to the issues of democracy, development, and peace at the national and international level, besides taking into account the development of Europe as a case study and its regional and global role as well as neighboring and partner regions of Europe. Those types of research studies always seek for national and international recognitions through appropriate funding and publications and to cooperate between researchers within international exchange through visiting scholars and integration into research networks, such funding entities as Erasmus Plus; and other funding bodies that Europe commission funds. Other centers, such as The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies at the Friedrich Schiller University8 :The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS) was founded in July 2013, aiming to achieve a theoretical understanding of the processes, measurements, and practices relevant to fostering best-possible relationships in contexts affected by violence, atrocities, genocides, wars, dictatorships, segregation, enslavement, and other crimes against humanity. The center research reconciliation studies in the transdisciplinary and multiscale scientific field that focuses on individual, group, inter-group, and political dynamics local and regional spheres. Other institution such as: Humboldt Foundation, government-funded— The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation’s strategy is closely related to the strategy

7

cf. Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS). (2017, December 11). Retrieved June 17, 2020, from http://www.jcrs.uni-jena.de/.

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process pursued by the Cultural Section of the Federal Foreign9 Office (AA) for the (2020, AKBP) Strategy on foreign cultural and educational policy: The Humboldt Foundation is represented in several of its working groups and has integrated insights gained from that process into deriving its strategy. When the AA’s AKBP Strategy has been passed, the Humboldt Foundation examines whether it has generated insights that suggest its strategy should be updated in researching disciplines. It is a worldwide foundation that promotes academic cooperation between excellent scientists and scholars from abroad with German scholars. It funds individual sponsorship to promote outstandingly qualified researchers and future leaders from science-related fields to create a world-spanning collaborative network of excellence. The resulting Humboldt network connects performance elites worldwide, both with one another and with German scientists. It thus reinforces the internationalization of the German academic and research landscape as well as German foreign cultural and educational policy beyond the scope of scientific cooperation. German Archaeological Protestant Institute. The German Protestant Institute of Archaeology, Research Unit of the German Archaeological Institute, operates in two locations—Jerusalem and Amman. Its high reputation as a cultural institution, help desk, and meeting place for European scholars makes it a sought-after partner for cooperation between German and international organizations and projects. The GPIA is a foundation administered by the German Protestant Church at the same time; it serves as a research unit of the German Archaeological Institute (DAI). They cooperate in several archeological projects, it is the biggest in Germany for archeological research, and its base is in Berlin. Mostly noted today and have significant importance is the DAAD German Exchange Services, which has a long tradition of uniting people and academia with Germans and international scholars. Founded in Heidelberg in (1925) on the initiative of a single student, the DAAD has since become one of the essential funding organizations in the world for the international exchange of students and researchers. Lastly, we must consent to mention DFG; the German Science Foundation: The DFG is the self-governing organization for science and research between for German institution and building research cooperation’s between them and other international educational institutions. It serves all branches of science and the humanities.10 In organizational terms, the DFG is an association under private law; its membership consists of German research universities, non-university research institutions, scientific associations, and academic centers, including the academies of science and the humanities. The DFG receives the vast majority of its funds from the federal government and the states, which are represented in all grants committees of different disciplines. At the same time, the voting system and procedural regulations guarantee science-driven decisions on projects that lead to decision-making spheres on local and international levels.

9

Our mission. Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/web/Strategy. html. 10 Keynote: Craig Calhoun. Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.vatmh.org/en/eventreader/ an-appeal-toreasonacademias-response-to-current-shifts-in-political-culture.html.

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Lastly, to consider that reconciliation studies are researching fields multi scale transdisciplinary approaches, such as peace studies, conflict transformation, International Law, International Organizations, violence, and crisis prevention, intervention in violent conflicts, peace consolidation after the end of violent,conflicts, arms control and disarmament, peace education, historical peace research, and promotion of intellectual discourse and interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, multidisciplinary collaboration with local and international cooperation’s and adhering toward peacebuilding and reconciliation studies that impact conflict transformation and conflict resolution.

References Berghof foundation. retrieved June 17, 2020, From https://www.devex.com/organizaBuilding. retrieved June 17, 2020, From https://www.dmeforpeace.org/opporChange info/our-collaboration Egy html From http://www.aarmena.uni-jena.de Jena center for reconciliation studies (JCRS). (2017, December 11). Retrieved June 17, 2020 Jobs archive: page 2 OF 33: Dme for peace: design, monitoring, and evaluation for peaceKeynote: craig calhoun. Retrieved June 17, 2020, From https://www.vatmh.org/en/eventreader/anappeal-to-reasonacademias-response-to-current-shifts-in-political-culOur mission. Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/web/stratRetrieved June 17, 2020, From https://www.scirp.org/journal/articles.aspx?searchcode=instiRienzi, G (2015, JUNE 4) Other nations could learn from germany’s efforts to reconcile after wwii. retrieved june 17, 2020, From https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconc iliation/ Studios, a. our collaboration. retrieved June 17, 2020, From https://www.knowledge-exTions/berghof-foundation-114118 Tunity/jobs/page/2/ Ture.html Tuto de psicologia of the universidade do estado do rio de janeiro, cnpq, pedro ernesto University hospital, Rio De Janeiro, Brazild

Heritage, Social Inclusion, Refugees, and Reconciliation with Your Past: A Multidisciplinary Approach Davide Tacchini

1 Heritage Features belonging to the culture of a particular society, such as traditions, languages, or buildings, that were created in the past and still have historical importance (“Heritage”, Cambridge Dictionary, online edition). More concretely, we can distinguish between cultural and natural, tangible and intangible, pre-existing and behavioural heritage, including customs and the habitus (Bourdieu 1982) of populations. Heritage may always be both a resource and an obstacle for future opportunities. From the 1980s to the present, a paradigm has been developed, which considers heritage as a positive contribution towards social inclusion and peace. Heritage provides “connective structure[s]” (Assmann 1992, p. 16) in time and between members of a group and creates “ligatures” (cf. Dahrendorf 2003, p. 44 ff) to maintain the social bond in a globalised world. UNESCO Secretary General Koïchiro Matsuura stated: The cultural heritage of a people is the memory of its living culture. It is expressed in many different forms, both tangible (monuments, landscapes, objects) and intangible (languages, knowhow, the performing arts, music, etc.). The origins of this heritage are multifarious, too. In retracing its own cultural lineage, in recognizing the many different influences that have marked its history and shaped its identity, a people is better able to build peaceful relations with other people, to pursue what is often an age-old dialogue and to forge its future (Matsuura 2002 quoted in Swenson 2013, p. 1).

In 2013, Swenson only expressed her astonishment because heritage has been conceived as a national issue until the end of World War II (Swenson 2013, p.2). During that time, a critical approach to the link between heritage and reconciliation D. Tacchini (B) Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_11

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(and social inclusion) has already been developed. After having stressed the compensatory effects of heritage in his volume The Past is a Foreign Country (1985), David Lowenthal described the ambivalence of heritage industry in his work The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (1997). In 2006, Laurajane Smith’s publication The Uses of Heritage (2006) advocated a shift of focus from the preservation of heritage to its selection and social use, including arbitrary and problematic aspects. Then, 2012 was the year when the Association of Critical Heritage Studies in Gothenburg was founded, and a similar centre was built in London, too. In that same year, Rodney Harrison asked for new inclusive, equal, and dialogical ways of decision-making about heritage. A clear step towards a direct encounter with peace and reconciliation research was made when Stanford anthropologist, Lynn Meskell, published the book A Future in Ruins: UNESCO, World Heritage and the Dream of Peace in 2018. In this volume, she describes the history of UNESCO’s world heritage policy and that in particular cases, the hope to foster peace and reconciliation via world heritage policies often fails. Meskell asks for a less modernist, less progressoriented, and less neoliberal approach to heritage and reconciliation. Previous publications of the author emphasised the need for social approaches to archaeology (Meskell and Preucel 2006), the importance of ethics in research (Meskell and Pels 2005; Meskell 2009), the attacks on archaeologists in the Middle East (Meskell 1998), and the difficulties of the reconciliation process in South Africa in terms of dealing with heritage (Meskell 2011). Today, it looks like the old paradigm that heritage is a positive resource for peace (and social inclusion) and the new paradigm that heritage is a conflictual construct are clashing.

1.1 Heritage as a Source for Conflict and Exclusion If we take North Africa and the greater Levant as examples, definitely two of those areas with rich and diverse heritage, we see how this heritage led to a series of conflicts both violent and non-violent. This requires a careful scientific description and systematic reflection. It is known that IS, Al-Qa ‘ida, the Talibans, and other radical groups directly targeted heritage sites, such as statues, considered as idolatry and symbols of polytheism. Already decades ago, tourists have been murdered on heritage sites, such as in Luxor, Egypt, or at the Al-Ghriba synagogue in Tunisia, with heritage sites used as target gatherers. During the war in Syria, IS murdered not only tourists (e.g. in Al-Karak in Jordan), but also archaeologists, think of Khaled Assad in Palmyra. Together with other criminal groups, the militant organisation profited from the theft of tangible heritage on a large scale. Those groups have been destructing heritage in the name of another heritage, the Salafist artificial construction of an early and pure Islam. Besides, in several countries, territorial claims are legitimised by archaeology; populations have been forcibly displaced to create tourist sites. Economic interests, the construction of roads and urban development projects, also contribute to conflicts around the preservation of heritage.

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1.2 Heritage as a Place/Time to Blame Another crucial consideration addresses the question of whether to preserve or forgetand-destroy memory sites which are perceived as “negative” places in which atrocities have been perpetrated, prisons were located, where people have been tortured, or where palaces of fallen dictators dominate the landscape. In Germany, a policy of careful preservation and interpretation has been developed on the ruins of the Nazi past and of the two countries time, at least until the fall of the Berlin Wall (1961– 1989). Let us think of the paradox that forced the Berlin administration to preserve a section of that wall. Finally, in all colonial and semi-colonial countries, the theft of ancient artefacts by Western states and actors plays a role. Even the leading interests of Western archaeologists for the classical and biblical culture and the lack of interest for Islamic heritage are conflict creating legacies. If we look at those regions outside the West, such as […] the Middle East […], what we often see is a widespread use and abuse of heritage due to either major conflict or rapid economic development and massive social transformation that often reaches a level of intensity, pace and impact that has few parallels in Western Europe or North America (Winter/Waterton 2013, p. 530).

Conflict resolution, reconciliation, and (as a frequently needed consequence) social inclusion have become daily-life issues in the MENA region, when researchers work on the topic of heritage.

2 Refugees Migration has major impacts on both the people and the places involved. When supported by appropriate policies, migration can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development in both origin and destination countries, while also benefitting migrants and their families (UN-DESA 2019). Human mobility, in all its different forms, has been a major factor concerning our life on the planet in the last few years and is still a growing phenomenon. Some of us have the chance to experience migration physically, in their lifetime, but if we go back to the history of our family, we will 100% find someone who came from another part of the world. Even in the three monotheistic religions, we can find that the idea of Exodus, the migration from Egypt and, as a consequence, the journey to the Promised Land that is a milestone in the origins of Judaism. In Christianity, Jesus Christ’s life can be considered as a journey from Nazareth to Jerusalem, the travels of S. Paul are a never-ending migration, and the message Go into all the world and proclaim the Gospel to the whole creation (Mark 16:15) is a call to move, to change, to challenge yourself and the others.

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In fact, the Latin root of the word, Migratio, is the opposite of Conservatio, and it actually means “to change”, “to modify”. In Islam, Hijra (an Arabic term that means precisely “migration”) from Mecca to Medina is so important that Muslims started counting their years from 622 A.D. Furthermore, during the first, failed, attempt of moving his group from Mecca to the city of Ta’if, the conversion of the Jinns, one of the very few miracles of the Prophet took place. It has been revealed to me that a group of the jinn listened and said, “Indeed, we have heard an amazing recital” (Qur’an 72:1).

International migration1 is a growing phenomenon which affects almost all countries in the world. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) estimates state that the number of international migrants was around 152 million in 1990 and reached 272 million 2019.2 According to these recent estimates, there is as much international migration between less developed countries (due to a large extent to the growth of emerging markets) as there is international migration from less developed countries to more developed ones (UN-DESA 2019). In recent years, forced migration3 (IOM Glossary of Migration 2019, p. 130) which includes refugees and asylum seekers has grown much faster than voluntary migration4 (UN-DESA 2019, p. 2). 1

Although at the international level, no universally accepted definition for “migrant” exists, the following was developed by IOM (International Organization for Migration), but it is not meant to imply or create any new legal category. A migrant is an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students. (https://www.iom. int/who-is-a-migrant, accessed January 29, 2022). There is also a “residualist approach”, defined by J. Carling which excludes from the term “migrant” those who flee wars or persecution (Carling w.d.), What is the meaning of migrant? Available online at www.meaningofmigrants.org, accessed December 8, 2021). For the purpose of collecting data on migration, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) defines the international migrant as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence (UN DESA, Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1 (1998) para. 32). The UN DESA definition excludes movements that are due to recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimages (ibid.). 2 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/ docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-04.pdf, accessed January 26, 2022. 3 A person subject to a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects), available online at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf, accessed January 26, 2022. 4 Available online at https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/ populationfacts/docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-04.pdf (accessed January 3, 2022).

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The number of refugees and asylum seekers increased by about 13 million between 2010 and 2017, accounting for close to a quarter of the increase in the number of international migrants. Refugees and asylum seekers increased at an annual average rate of over 8% between 2010 and 2017, while other migrants increased at an annual rate of under 2% between 2010 and 2019. As of 2017, over 83% of refugees and asylum seekers lived in the south. These stats do not include the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)5 which reached 41.8 million. Unlike what most of the mainstream European media are reporting on a daily basis, 90% of the refugees in the top 10 countries in the world do not choose Europe as their destination. In 2018, UNHCR6 registered 70.8 million forcibly displaced people, of which 41.8 Million are IDPs, 25.8 Million refugees, and 3.5 Million asylum seekers. Sixty-seven percentage of all UNHCR refugees come from just five countries: Syria (6.7 Million), Afghanistan (2.7 Million), South Sudan (2.3 Million), Myanmar (1.1 Million), and Somalia (900.000). The greatest number of asylum seekers in 2018 was from Venezuela7 (cf U.N.H.C.R. Global Trends: Case Study: the Venezuela Situation), and in the same year, 13.8 million people have been forced to flee because of conflict or persecution (that means 37.000 a day!), 2.9 Million returned to their areas of origin, and only 600.000 of them are refugees, the others are all IDPs. Only 16% of refugees are hosted by countries in developed regions, and over one-third of the whole global refugee population are in least developed countries. Top 10 refugee-hosting countries are: Turkey (3.700.000), Jordan (2.900.000), Lebanon (1.400.000), Pakistan (1.400.000), Uganda (1.100.000), Germany (1.000.000), Iran (979.000), Ethiopia (921.000), Sudan (908.000), and Bangladesh (906.000).8 Jordan and Lebanon ranked 2nd and 3rd in the world by number of refugees, and Germany is the only European country in the list. Although the number is affected by the many Palestinians who fled to Lebanon and Jordan in the past decades, Lebanon holds the highest rate of refugees per 1000 residents (157), followed by Jordan (72), Turkey (45), Chad (29), Uganda (26), Sweden (25), South Sudan (23), Malta (20), and Djibouti (19). We can immediately notice that South Sudan is both in the list of 5

Even IDPs do not have a legal definition, but the United Nations define them as (…) based on two components: 1) that the movement is coerced or involuntary (to distinguish from economic and other voluntary migrants), and 2) that the movement stays within internationally recognized state borders (to distinguish them from refugees). While there is broad international agreement about a definition that includes these two core components, interpretations of the definition and practical translations varies from state-to- state. (United Nations Eurostats Manuals and Guidelines, Technical Report on Internally Displaced Persons, Current Practices and Recommendations for Improvement, March 2018, p. 15, available online at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/Standards-and-Met hods/files/Technical-Report/national-reporting/Technical-report-on-statistics-of-IDPs-E.pdf). 6 The number of 25.9 Million refugees includes also the 5.5 Million Palestinians under the administration of UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 7 Available online at https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/ last accessed October 6, 2021. 8 https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/, last accessed November 12, 2021.

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the “source” of refugees and of the hosting one and that Sweden is the only European country in this group.

3 Reconciliation In contemporary literature, we can find several different definitions of reconciliation, depending on the discipline that provides it: political science, religious studies, theology, etc. We have decided to choose one of the most innovative and challenging approaches to the theory of reconciliation, the one embraced by Martin Leiner and the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies9 in Jena, Germany, one of the leading institutions on the topic worldwide. The contemporary idea of reconciliation, in fact, appears back in the 60s in some of the most prominent theologians of the twentieth century. Both Karl Barth and Jürgen Moltmann’s views of the topic can be considered close to the present idea of reconciliation (Barth 1961–1967; Moltmann 1967). The main features of the concept are related to the non-violent settlement of conflicts but also to the holistic restoration of social relations and the healing of hearts and minds. Therefore it includes, within its deeper core, the concepts of forgiveness, healing, social justice, acceptance of the other, reparation, apology, interdependence, collaboration (cf. DuToit 2018). An interdisciplinary approach is essential to the contemporary stage of reconciliation studies. The one of the Jena Center is based on the concept of “Hölderlin-perspective”. The German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), in his novel Hyperion, wrote: Reconciliation is in the middle of strife and everything apart finds each other again (Hölderlin 1797 in Sattler 1988, p. 760).

This perspective is the antithesis to a widespread notion in political science, according to which reconciliation is seen as an event that occurs only after the end of the conflict. The Hölderlin perspective focuses on the factors in a conflict that may potentially pave the way to a possible reconciliation. These factors might be groups that have been involved in the conflict but that do not agree with it, but also individuals or civil society actors who are against the conflict for personal, moral, economic, or other reasons. Although reconciliation is not to be considered as a single event, but as a process,10 impromptu situations, cooperation, sincere, non-staged expression of common feelings, unexpected ceasefires, or reactions in a conflict scenario11 might 9

https://www.jcrs.uni-jena.de. See, among others, the works of Joram Tarusarira, Martin Leiner and Mohammed Abu Nimer (see bibliography). 11 The famous Christmas Truce, during WWII, can be considered as one of these cases. For a quick overview of the event, see: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/england/10455611/ England-v-Germany-when-rivals-staged-beautiful-game-on-the-Somme.html, accessed November 29, 2021. 10

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be significant in the framework of the Hölderlin perspective towards reconciliation. The original meaning of this perspective is to protest against the short-term approach proposed by the UN Agenda for peace in 1992 and all the scholars who have followed it (Leiner 2022, pp. 19–40). The Jena perspective aims to develop a scenario, in which reconciliation and conflict are in a constant relationship; therefore, you will never have a condition of full conflict, with no room for reconciliation. Conflict resolution begins when the conflict is still in full swing. This prepares the foundation for a long-term non-violent settlement of conflicts, but also for the overall restoration of social relations. Reconciliation studies is a transdisciplinary and multiscale scientific field that focuses on institutional, political, individual, group, intergroup, tribal, and religious dynamics. This process involves both the post conflict institutions, which bear the responsibility of providing the legal and political framework and tools for an actual reconciliation of the country12 and the civil society, individuals, groups, religious, and tribe leaders (cf Leone 2011; Appleby 2000; Abu Nimer 2003). In post-conflict societies’ ideas and feelings like trust, forgiveness, healing, acceptance of the other and his/her suffering play, at different levels according to the cases, prominent roles. Furthermore, understanding the suffering of the other, through a personal encounter with him/her, helps us appreciate the human dignity that we share despite our differences. This is what needs to be recognised and supported in the middle of conflict, in order to avoid the reminding of continuing animosity (Dajani-Daoudi et al. 2016). The expectation is that transdisciplinary research on reconciliation will lead to new findings about case-specific factors which could facilitate the transformation of violent conflicts into non-violent political conflicts (Leiner/Flämig 2012, pp.7–19). In current reconciliation processes around the world, reconstruction of destroyed buildings (as part of heritage) plays a vital role. Focussing on the uses and misuses of heritage.

4 Reconciliation and Refugees Despite its tradition and the fact that reconciliation as a process has shown to be effective in reality,13 reconciliation studies had a long way to go until they discovered refugees. This development has many reasons. One is the ongoing debate on how to define and identify reconciliation in the “real world” in an evident and, if possible, measurable way (Leiner 2022, pp. 19–40).

12

Let us think of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, (1996) and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda (1999). 13 South Africa, Rwanda and post WWII German–French relationships, just to name a few.

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The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies has built, in collaboration with some of its partners in the Middle East, a network of reconciliation studies centres and departments in the MENA. region. In fact, the area is among the most affected by wars, civil wars, and severe human rights violations on earth. Since the 1990s, reconciliation studies have strongly developed in some centres around the world. However, they still are relatively absent from the academic curricula of universities in the MENA. region. The title of the first gathering of the Alliance, back in 2008, was “Reconciliation and Refugees in the Middle East and North Africa: an Interdisciplinary Perspective”, and the programme also covered topics such as “Refugees and Reconciliation in Media”, “Reconciliation and Education”, and “Religion and Reconciliation”. The German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Ernst-Abbe-Foundation funded the conference (Tacchini et al. 2022). The subject Reconciliation and Refugees is, in fact, topical and still needs to be scholarly researched in the area. Recent international forced migrations from developing countries, especially sub-Saharan and West Africa, Central Asia (namely Afghanistan, Pakistan), and the Indian sub-continent (Bangladesh) towards Europe are a phenomenon that is in continuous evolution and that may affect tremendously the domestic policies (and political scenarios, as well as elections’ results) of several EU countries. The role of reconciliation in this kind of situations is still to be addressed, but what is out of doubts is that refugees are in need of reconciliation from many perspectives. Reconciliation within themselves, the elaboration of their traumas (PTSD is extremely frequent among forced migrants, see below) and reconciliation with the hosting societies (that are not very welcoming most of the times) are just two examples of the issue in which reconciliation may play a role in human mobility. The idea of the refugee, although difficult to categorise, given the high number of situations that “produced” refugees and, within these local conditions, the thousands of different cases, is connected to the concept of reconciliation from several different points of view14 (cf. Gold and Nawyn 2013; Volkan 2017; Fidian-Qasmiyeh et al 2014; Zito and Martin 2016). Percentages of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among refugees vary significantly in different studies and stats, especially according to the area refugees come from and their destination country or region. There is no doubt, though, that posttraumatic stress disorder is the most common psychological disease (Turrini et al. 2017; Morina et al. 2018) and that the majority of refugees from burning conflict areas, experience, together with PTSD, anxiety, and depression. Let us take, as an example, Syrian refugees in Iraqi Kurdistan: Almost all of the participants (98.5%) had experienced at least one traumatic event and 86.3% of them experienced three or more traumatic event types. The prevalence of probable PTSD was about 60%15 (Mahmood et al. 2019, p. 51).

14 15

See also Ai Weiwei’s documentary Human Flow (2017). Available online at https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-019-0238-5, accessed January 16, 2022.

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and Approximately the same rate of participants (59.4%) experienced probable depression, which was associated with gender, age, time spent in the camp, and the number of traumatic event types (Leiner 2022, p. 26).

One of the factors that contributes more deeply to the depression of forced migrants is the feeling of being guilty. The guilt they perceive (that, by the way, they share with some holocaust survivors) is the one of being safe, of having reached a safe shelter, while their family and friends may still be in danger of human rights abuse or even of being killed. This feeling may be individual or for example as it happens with some Syrian refugees, be more community-wise, they feel guilty because they are safe and their country is still burning. If they have witnessed, during their fleeing, the death of a family member, or even of someone with whom they shared part of the journey, it may worsen this feeling(Leiner 2022). A refugee who has reached a safe area may become A perennial mourner (who) daily expends energy to “bring back to life” or “kill” (make futureless) the lost person (or thing) (Volkan 2017, p. 19). This may significantly affect his/her chances of finding a job, of integrating into the hosting society, and even of rebuilding his/her life. Therefore, refugees need reconciliation with themselves, with their self , and with their past (Cf Leiner 2022, pp. 19–40). Psychological support and psychotherapy might be extremely important. Most of the European countries, the USA, and North America are developing new theories and techniques to deal with these issues in a more and more effective way. Erikssonian hypnosis with refugees is among the most innovative approaches to PTSD symptoms. It is absolutely clear that millions of people lost their homes and with them large parts of what brought sense to their lives and finally became refugees. As mentioned above, frequently they have a need for reconciliation: with themselves because of what they have left behind and what they experienced; with their families who remained in their countries of origin; with the hosting society that is usually hostile; with other refugees from different political orientation; and with the changed context in the case of a return. Those issues have become naturally linked to questions of the intangible and tangible heritage of refugees, problems of inclusion and exclusion as well as memory and identity.

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4.1 Psychoterapy as a Tool for Reconciliation and the Value of Heritage16 M., a 25 year old from Sudan, fled his country in 2003, after a few months of very hard imprisonment in a Sudanese gaol, during which he has been tortured and hardly beaten several times. He has been able to escape and reach Libya two years later together with a close friend (both of them were members of the party that was opposing the government). Even the trip from Sudan to Libya, on an overcrowded 4 × 4, was long and difficult. Stopped at the border, the two men have been imprisoned, tortured, and beaten for days for illegally crossing the Libyan border. During this hard time in the Libyan gaol, his friend died in his arms. He had been sick for some time and was suffering from high fever. M. has been able to escape, and for five more years, he wandered from town to town, finding temporary jobs, until his last employer proposed him to go to Italy, where he may have finally found peace after a 5 days trip on a small boat to cross the Mediterranean. He currently lives in a city in the north, and he is trying to rebuild his life. He had no news from his family since his departure, and he is tormented by the memories of the massacres he has witnessed, and by the death of his friend, through nightmares and frequent flashbacks. He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. With the precious help of a qualified cultural facilitator, Dr. Miboli started a psychotherapy programme. She decided to use hypnosis as the main technique, to try to help him re-elaborating his memories, and to make his anguish more bearable. The good relationships based on confidence and trust with Noreddine, the cultural facilitator, has helped making M. visualise his last prison and the death of his friend already during the first induction. One of his strongest pains was the one not having been able to help his friend when he realised he was seriously ill, he would have wanted to take him to the doctor, to call the doctor of the prison. Creating the hypnotic bubble was unexpectedly smooth, M. was completely at ease experiencing the trance. During inductions he could see his friend, lying down, pale, cold sweating, and unable to speak, he tried to talk to him, but he had no answer. There was nothing he could do. His friend had died and nobody could bring him back, of course, but the therapist asked him if there is anything he could not do and he would have done, to find more peace. His face showed relief after this question, and he said that he would have asked the guard to help both of them escape. He did it during the trance, the guard agreed, since he realised that the situation was critical in that cell, when the guard turned his face towards him, he recognised the eyes of his brother! Carrying the body of his cellmate on his shoulders, he went out of the prison and started walking towards the hospital. It was a long walk, he was extremely tired and could not see anyone around him, as if they were in the middle of 16

For the full description of the psychotherapy on this case (performed by psychologist Dr. Elena Miboli) see Eriksson Institute Turin, at https://www.ericksoninstitute.it/en/125/hypnosis-and-tra uma/elena-miboli-s-experience/ accessed October 1, 2021.

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the desert. Dr. Miboli asked him if there was anything around him or within himself that could have helped. “My strength”, he replied firmly, and said that he started feeling a strong power coming from his stomach, he described it “a white strength”, Dr. Miboli told him to expand it throughout his body, he did and was able to reach the hospital. Doctors started treating his friend and he was at his bedside, and he could see a market full of colours through the window. The face of his friend was still pale and expressionless. Dr. Miboli asked him if he wished to tell or ask him anything to make him smile. He decided to look at him in the eyes and smile first, and his friend smiled too, before leaving him forever. When he opened his eyes, at the end of the induction, he became emotional and said “it was true, I was with V17 !”. He said that he has been able, finally, after years of pain and remorse, to do what he has always wanted to do, helping his friend. He looked relieved after this induction, it was evident, and he confirmed it. Even during the following meetings, M. kept on saying thank you to his psychologist. Of course, this technique did not solve all M’s problems and did not suddenly turn his life into a happy life. Not being in touch with is family will keep on being difficult for him, and he will think of his dying friend again, but after the induction, he did not have any nightmares about the death of his cellmate any more. The effective relationship of trust and confidence between the psychologist and the patient has been pivotal in this case. We can say, though, that through psychotherapy and hypnosis, M. has reconciled with himself, and, going back to the source of his anguish even with his past (or at least, with part of it). This actually made his life better and allowed him not to become a perennial mourner (see above). Cases like M’s might be considered as practical applications of reconciliation, at the personal level. Once again, we see how reconciliation studies need an interdisciplinary approach and methodology. Sociology, geography, social science, and political science are as important as reconciliation studies in the settling of an armed conflict. Applied psychology and psychotherapy have been, here, a pivotal, necessary professional “tool” to reconcile. Reconciliation studies and refugee studies might have much more in common than we have thought so far. Aspects like the reconciliation with the self , that has been analysed above, can be approached working with the person, also through other disciplines, methodologies, and expertises. Other needs for reconciliations many refugees may feel, such as with the hosting society, require the involvement of many more factors and need more time, since culture, mentality, mass information, and politics play a prominent role. Although the world has always been on the move, and in recent years, we have witnessed a significant increase in the number of forced migrants (see part 1); for some European countries, refugees and asylum seekers still represent a new hot phenomenon. In fact, immigration is (also) a powerful tool for some political parties

17

The initial of the name of his friend.

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and leaders.18 What these parties have been doing for the last 3–4 years in the so called Western world is an updated and upgraded version of the post-2001 politics of fear (Altheide 2006, pp. 1–25). If we listen to the speeches of Donald Trump when he was in office, Jair Bolsonaro, Matteo Salvini (especially when he was at the ministry of the interior), Victor Orban, or Nigel Farage from 2016 on, we will find multiple references to immigration and, more specifically, to asylum seekers and refugees. These specious messages, often delivered through tweets, Facebook live broadcasts, etc., together with “neutral” mass information that tends to hammer the news day after day, have created an hostile environment for refugees in the public opinion in several European countries. Refugees are perceived as a burden for our society and the perception of their numbers if often much larger than reality. They are considered either a threat (violent people, drug dealers, rapists, etc.), or an economic burden; our weak economies cannot afford. (…) Europeans do not see growing diversity as making their countries better. In no EU country surveyed did more than four-in-ten say that having an increasing number of people from many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities makes their country a better place to live. And in two nations, Greece and Italy, more than half said that increasing diversity makes the country a worse place to live (Pew Research 2009).19

This new politics of fear inculcating in the public opinion the need for security is actually making our societies less secure and is feeding fear. The two countries that consider diversity more as a curse then a blessing (Greece and Italy) are among the ones that have been hit harder by the 10 years long economic crisis. Countries with poor economies, or in recession, are the ones that most hardly accept migrants, as if they may threaten their already instable situation. Rich countries, like the Gulf States or the USA until a few years ago, as well as poor countries, like Rwanda, Kenya, or even Sudan, seem to accept refugees better, for opposite reasons. The Gulf States have a strong immigration policy that frequently makes migrants live and work in harsh conditions; the USA is a country that basically has been made up by immigrants, and poor African countries feel solidarity towards their brothers. As we have seen in the first section of this research, the number of migrants and especially of asylum seekers in Europe is a minority, compared to the ones of other, less developed areas of the world. Unfortunately, not many citizens have access to these data or have time to read and analyse them in depth. Therefore, reconciliation of refugees and asylum seekers with their hosting society needs a process that involves all the above-mentioned actors. What can be done, both at the grassroot/local level and by the ones who have some kind of power or authority, is to spread knowledge and promote awareness. Knowledge, culture, information are the most powerful tools against prejudice, racism, xenophobia. Creating occasions to have close, personal encounters with refugees will allow our citizens, especially 18

Donald Trump in the US, when in office, Jair Bolsonaro in Brasil, Orban in Hungary and the populist parties that have been gaining consensus in the last few years (in Italy, Germany), have used immigration, sometimes in a very specious way, to win the elections. 19 Available online at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-ofthe-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/.

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students, to rely not only on media to know who refugees are. They will have the chance to get in touch and get to know the actual person, and not the idea they have of him/her.

4.1.1

Integration and Interaction

More effective policies of welcoming refugees and asylum seekers may definitely improve social justice and the integration of these new citizens in their hosting society. At a later stage, and of course not all of them, refugees may become active in their hosting society that has become, in the meantime, their own society. The creation of a new heritage, with immigrants and refugees as active factors in society, who help shaping their community is already a reality in some special contexts.20 On the one hand, the creation of the above-mentioned new heritage might be, of course, a challenge and a spur for integration and peaceful coexistence, interaction, and collaboration. On the other hand, the heritage refugees bring with them through their often perilous trips might be precious both for the citizens of their hosting society and for other refugees. This last topic has still to be thoroughly investigated, and especially elderly refugees or the parents and grandparents of refugees that join their sons or nephews through family reunification may help preserving the heritage of their homeland. Nor only Europe and the USA, but also Jordan, Turkey, or Lebanon may become shrines for the preservation of local heritages from Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, or even Myanmar or China. I am deeply convinced that one of the roles played by civil society, educated citizens, “normal” people, and even academic institutions should be that of helping to create a safe environment for this development to happen. Academia, especially may contribute, through scholarly production and live debates, to analyse and discuss topics that in other contexts could be too controversial. Reconciliation and the preserving of heritage are definitely among them.

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Let us think of Scandinavian countries (see: Colomer L 2013, “Managing the heritage of immigrants: eldery refugees, homesickness, and cultural identities”, The European Archaeologist, (39): 17-22, which focuses on elderly chilean refugees in Sweden).

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Arendt H (2008) We refugees. In: Kohn J, Feldman RH (eds) The Jewish writings. Schocken Books, New York, p 264 Assmann H (1992) Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. Beck, München Ayoub M (1983) The idea of redemption in Christianity and Islam. Mormons Muslims 34:105–116 Barth K (1961–1967) Church dogmatics, vol 4, the doctrine of reconciliation. T.& T. Clark, LondonEdinburgh Branca P (2010) Noi e l’Islam, dall’accoglienza al dialogo. Edizioni Messaggero, Padova Broodryk J (2007) Understanding South Africa: the ubuntu way of living. Ubuntu School of Philosophy, Pretoria Cantwell Smith W (1991) The meaning and end of religion. MI, Fortress Press, Minneapolis Clooney FX (2010) Comparative theology: deep learning across religious borders. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, UK Cole J (2018) Muhammad, prophet of peace amid the clash of empires. Nation Books, New York Collier P (2013) Exodus. How migration is changing our world. Oxford University Press, London/Oxford Colomer L (2013) Managing the heritage of immigrants: eldery refugees, homesickness, and cultural identities. Eur Archaeol 39:17–22 Dahrendorf R (2003) Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Ordnung. Vorlesungen zur Politik der Freiheit im 21. Jahrhundert. Beck, München Dajani Daoudi MS, Dajani Daoudi M, Leiner M, Barakat Z (eds) (2016) Teaching empathy and reconciliation in midst of conflict. Wasatia Press, Jerusalem-Jena Du Toit F (2018) When political transition works: reconciliation as interdependence. Oxford University Press, Oxford Dubensky J (ed) (2016) Peacemakers in action, profiles in religious peacebuilding, vol II. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York Dyer Saxon E (2018) Peacemaking and transformative mediation: Sulha practices in Palestine and the Middle East. Palgrave Mc Millan, London European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Available online at https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/current-migrationsituation-eu-education Fidian-Qasmiyeh E et al (2014) The Oxford handbook of refugee & forced migration studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford Frei N (1996) Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit, München, Beck Gold S, Nawyn S (2013) The Routledge international handbook of migration studies. Routledge, London & New York Gopin M (2002) Holy war, holy peace, how religion can bring peace to the Middle East. Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford Harrison R (2012) Heritage: critical approaches. Routledge, London/New York Hölderlin F (1797) Hyperion oder der Eremit in Griechenland. Tübingen, Cotta Irfan AO (ed) (2007) A Muslim view of Christianity, essays in dialogue by Mahmoud Ayoub. Orbis Markynoll, New York Khalifeh M (2018) Islam is the religion of justice and reform. Educational Press, Columbus, OH Kristeva J (1988) Etrangers a nous mêmes. Fayard, Paris Leiner M, Flämig S (eds) (2012) Latin America between conflict and reconciliation. (RIPAR 1) Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen Leiner M, Schliesser C (eds) (2018) Alternative approaches on conflict resolution. PalgraveMacmillan, London Leiner M (2022) The Hölderlin-perspective and its impact on reconciliation with refugees. In: Tacchini D, Barakat Z, Leiner M, Dajani A (eds) Reconciliation and refugees: the academic alliance for reconciliation studies in the Middle East and North Africa I. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, RIPAR Göttingen, pp 71–84

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Leone G (2011) La Riconciliazione fra Gruppi. Roma, Bussole Carocci Little D (ed) (2000) Peacemakers in action: profiles of religion in conflict resolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge New York Lowenthal D (1985) The past is a foreign country. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lowenthal D (1997) The heritage crusade and the spoils of history. Viking Maalouf A (2009) Les identités meutrières. Hachette, Paris Maréchal B (2009) The Muslim brothers in Europe, roots and discourse. Leiden-Boston, Brill Matsuura K (2002) Inauguration speech of ‘United Nations Year for Cultural Heritage’. In: UNESCO ‘United Nations Year for Cultural Heritage’. https://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev. php-URL_ID015418&URL_DO0DO_TOPICAL&URL_SECTION0201.html Meierkord A, Staring F, Day L (2017) Migrants in European schools. Publication Office of the European Union. Available Online at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/pub lication/c0683c22-25a8-11e8-ac73-01aa75ed71a1 Meskel L, Preucel R (eds) (2006) A companion to social archaeology. Blackwell Meskell L (ed) (1998) Archaeology under fire: nationalism, politics and heritage in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Routledge, London/New York Meskell L, Pels P (eds) (2005) Embedding ethics: shifting boundaries of the anthropological profession. Bloomsbury Meskell L (ed) (2009) Cosmopolitan archaeologies. Duke University Press Meskell L (2011) The nature of heritage. The New South Africa. Wiley Blackwell, London Meskell L (ed) (2015) Global heritage: a reader. Wiley-Blackwell Meskell L (2018) A future in ruins. UNESCO, world heritage and the dream of peace. Oxford University Press, Oxford Minow M (1999) Between vengeance and forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence. Beacon Press Moltmann J (1967) Theology of hope: on the ground and the implications of a Christian eschatology. SCm, London Morina N, Stam K, Pollet TV, Priebe S (2018) Prevalence of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder in adult civilian survivors of war who stay in war-afflicted regions. A systematic review and meta-analysis of epidemiological studies. J Affect Disord 239:328–338 Pew Research Center (2009) Mapping the global Muslim population: a report on the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population, “a new study by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life”. Available online at https://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mappingthe-global-muslim-population Philpott D (ed) (2006) The politics of past evil. Religion, reconciliation, and the dilemmas of transitional justice. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame Porombka S, Schmundt H (eds) (2006) Böse Orte. Stätten nationalsozialistischer Selbstdarstellung – heute. Ullstein, Berlin Rico T (ed) (2017) The making of Islamic heritage; Muslim past and heritage present. Palgrave -Mc Millan, London Ricoeur P (2013) Ermeneutica delle Migrazioni: Saggi, Discorsi, Contributi (a cura di Roberto Boccali). Milano, Mimesis Edizioni Roberts S (2010) Listening (and saving) world languages. In: The New York Times, April 29. Available online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/nyregion/29lost.html Rubenstein RE (2017) Resolving structural conflicts: how violent systems can be transformed. Routledge, London/New York Santerini M (2008) Educazione Interculturale e letteratura. Roma, Carocci Sattler DE (1988) Friedrich Hölderlin: Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, vol 1. Stroemfeld Verlag, Darmstadt Sayad A (2004) The suffering of the immigrant. Cambridge, UK/Malden, MA, Polity Smith L (2006) The uses of heritage. Routledge, London/New York Suárez-Orozco MM, Darbes TS, Sutin M (2001) Migration and schooling. Ann Rev Anthropol 40:311–328

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Davide Tacchini , Ph.D., is currently Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Ph.D. program “Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation” at the Friedrich-Schiller-Universität (Jena Centre for Reconciliation Studies) in Jena, Germany and Adjunct Professor of Arabic Language at the University of Parma, Italy. He is author of Islam and Democracy, Muslim Voices Amongst Us (with the Hon. Amédée Turner, London-Milan, Mimesis Int’l, 2020), of Radicalismo islamico: Il diario del soggiorno di Sayyid Qutbnegli Stati Uniti dal 1948 al 1950 (Milan, Obarrao Editore, 2015); has edited with M. Leiner, Z. M. Barakat and A. Dajani Reconciliation and Refugees, the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation Studies in the Middle East and North Africa I, (RIPAR Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2022), with A. Angelucci, M. Bombardieri, and A. Cuciniello, Chiesa e Islam in Italia: incontro e dialogo, (Bologna, EDB, 2019), with A. Angelucci and M. Bombardieri, Islam e Integrazione in Italia (Islam and Integration in Italy, Milan-Venice, Marsilio, 2014). He has authored a number of articles on radical Islam, Christian-Muslim relations, Islam in Europe and the West, and Islamic reform, Migration and Religion, Reconciliations studies. He lectures widely on both sides of the Atlantic and in the Arab world.

Humanitarian Aid in Yemen: A Crisis of Sovereignty and Inevitable Harm Moosa Elayah and Noman Ahmed

Abstract This paper uses a conceptual approach and a qualitative case study to investigate the harm arising from humanitarian aid provision (AP) in Yemen. The country suffers from limited sovereignty and various contesting political actors, which has led to complex and troubled relations between political actors and aid organisations. The paper details the harm posed by AP in Yemen; it finds that main harm of AP is in augmenting the crisis of sovereignty due to the involvement of aid organisations in the power struggles. Findings indicate that harm, in the case of Yemen, is an unintended consequence of various institutional and organisational disparities and it affects the economic and humanitarian situation of the local population. This unintended harm, we argue, stands in contrast with the morally perceived harm of injustice portrayed in the literature. The result of this research is the conceptual rendering of harm both as inevitable and non-moral. Keywords Humanitarian aid · Crisis of sovereignty · Inevitable harm · Yemen

1 Introduction Humanitarian AP in conflict zones is embroiled with challenges and can harm the local population. Gert (2005) identifies harm as situations, actions, practices, or outcomes that all rational creatures seek to avoid. The nature and characteristics of harm are debated on both moral and political grounds. Nevertheless, the harm this paper is interested in exploring occurs as a result of practices or policies enacted by sovereign actors in a given territory where aid is provided. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) identifies sovereignty as ‘supremacy in respect of power, domination, or rank’, while the sovereign is the ‘supreme dominion, authority, or rule’ (OED Online 2020). The OED describes supremacy as ‘absolute and independent authority’ M. Elayah (B) Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] N. Ahmed Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_12

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that is practised in a ‘territory under the rule of a sovereign’ (Ibid). To understand how harm emerges from APs, it is first important to be aware of how sovereign actors exercise their authority on aid organisations (AOs)1 that work locally to coordinate and deliver aid. These AOs and aid workers rely on local sovereign actors to collect data, gain access permits, and coordinate delivery. Sovereign actors provide access, logistics, and various bureaucratic necessities for APs, and when they do so, they subject AOs to a set of rules and regulations. This subjection can be overt or covert and can take various forms, but, in all cases, aid becomes no less than a policy in relation to which supremacy is exercised. In areas of conflict, the relationship between aid and the sovereign can turn unhealthy because the rules set by sovereign actors can contradict the objectives and operational proceedings of AOs. These contradictions then result in sovereign actors enforcing their authority on AOs and asking them to conduct practices that limit, restrict, or deny aid from certain communities in need. The literature on AP in conflict settings conceptualises this harm as injustice, due to the unequal distribution of aid. However, the supreme authority of sovereign actors is unclear and disputed in Yemen. Unlike other conflict-ridden communities, various political and non-political actors contest for ‘absolute and independent authority’, with no clear actor able to exercise this authority. We conceptualise this contestation as ‘the crisis of sovereignty’. The goal of this study is multifold: to demonstrate how harm comes to play in Yemen, where actors competing for supremacy defy the traditional nature of sovereignty, and to reconceptualise this harm. At the intersection of humanitarian crisis and the crisis of sovereignty, this study answers the questions: what is the harm emerging from AP in Yemen? How does this harm occur, and what are its outcomes? This paper argues that harm lies in the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty (due to the involvement of AOs), that it emerges as an unintended consequence of various institutional and organisational disparities, and that the outcomes of the augmented crisis on the local populations in need are economic and humanitarian (Cooper et al. 2004). These findings are contrasted with previous literature that depicts harm through the moral lens of injustice and offers a new rendering of harm as inevitable and non-moral. Firstly, the crisis of sovereignty in Yemen is briefly conceptualised and the debate on morality showcased. Then, the literature is reviewed, demonstrating what previous studies have found in regard to the research questions. Then, there is an explanation of the research design and how the study was conducted. Finally, the specific findings are discussed, contrasting them with literature and showing how the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty expands the understanding of harm.

1

For convenience, the acronym AO/AOs is used frequently in this paper to refer to international humanitarian aid organisations.

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2 Humanitarian Aid, Sovereignty, and Inevitable Harm: Theory and Critiques Sovereignty is a political and legal founding pillar of a modern state, but its function remains a matter of debate. Hansen and Stepputat (2006) build upon the Hobbesian account and claim that sovereignty is an ‘emergent form of authority grounded in violence that is performed and designed to generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy’ (p. 295). Others have viewed sovereignty in contractarian terms, with the role of maintaining harmony between the government and the governed (Schwartzberg 2003). In Yemen, the limits, claims, and practices to attain sovereignty are varied and continue to shift as no domestic or foreign actor can exercise absolute supremacy or respect any form of a contractarian agreement (Shakdam 2016; Dunning 2018; Center for Strategic and International Studies 2018). Foreign actors have also interfered and contributed to shaping the contested political order (Ibid). As such, repeated efforts are made to attain and contest supremacy over certain territorial spaces, while other spaces lack any form of political authority. Sovereignty in Yemen, or the lack thereof, is unique because the boundaries between these various actors are not clear because the situation is so volatile. Elayah and Verkoren (2019) state that ‘Boundaries between the state and non-state, civil and uncivil, and domestic and international domains are blurred’ (p. 1). Moreover, the actors in contestation are not easily identifiable either. Hence, what we describe as the crisis of sovereignty entails the presence of, and practices by, several non-sovereign actors in the pursuit of supremacy over the conduct of AP. This crisis of sovereignty suggests that harm may not have traditional outcomes as in any other conflict zone, as AOs operate in a territory with a limited and contested sovereign order. As this study demonstrates, AP is no less than a tool for political contestation and the crisis itself is augmented by AP. This harm is unique as it occurs in an arena where sovereignty is either absent or sporadic. As for harm, the concept is tied to either morality or unintended consequences. For Gert and Gert (2017), harm remains a core moral issue. The morality of an action can be judged as either an established moral norm, or as per codes put forward by a society and agreed upon collectively (Ibid). Scholars take two approaches to the concept of harm. The first is the normative deontological approach, which suggests that aid causes grave irrational and moral harm. A second positivist approach suggests that aid does not constitute an immoral or harmful practice. As this paper demonstrates, this perception of harm as immoral is the dominant view in the literature because APs breach normative established values of justice and impartiality. In contrast to Gert and Gert (2017), De Zwart (2015) argues that some outcomes can be anticipated and suggests that certain practices are unintended even if they are anticipated. These outcomes are not an ‘error, ignorance, or blindness as with conventional unintended consequences’ (De Zwart 2015, p. 295); but rather a well-calculated decision in which an act is still pursued with full acknowledgement of its negative outcomes. This study argues that harmful outcomes resulting from APs can be put in this category and understood as collateral and unintended. This leads to them becoming necessary and therefore ‘permitted’. This research does not endorse either the normative or

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positivist position but showcases that harm in Yemen can be positively understood as ‘unintended consequences. This section discusses the literature on the harm of humanitarian APs in conflict settings. The inquiry is divided based upon the study’s three main questions. To address the first question, what the harm is, the scholars fundamentally agree upon the materialisation of injustice. In considering the work of AOs in several conflict zones, Rubenstein (2015) argues that APs threaten humanitarian and justice-based norms. The injustice happens because APs pose a situation known as a moral compromise. Here, AOs have to choose between two options, yet both guarantee some form of moral damage, as certain people in need will not receive aid. This breach of normative morality and the materialisation of injustice takes place when warring factions in a conflict co-opt aid, prevent its provision, or distribute it to their beneficiaries only (Rubenstein 2015). The result is that some vulnerable populations might not receive it, while others who do not need it will gain it at their expense. When commanding belligerents of an ongoing conflict control an area, they pressure AOs to provide only to beneficiaries identified by the commanders and not to other targeted beneficiaries in need (Ibid). If AOs do not comply, they are faced with various logistical and accessibility challenges, which further restricts aid to the vulnerable. Rubenstein (2015) suggests that AOs succumb to the commanders’ restrictions and provide for certain people only, drifting away from justice-based norms and thus agreeing to a moral compromise. Redfield (2013), Thompson (2002), and Buth et al. (2018) are among the scholars who take this normative view on harm emerging from APs. The normative scholars argue that AP invokes injustice because those who need aid will be denied. By agreeing to the rules of the sovereign, AOs thus breach a moral responsibility to help the vulnerable. The harm, therefore, is essentially a matter of breaching a moral value, and thus aid provision, according to Rubenstein (2015), becomes a moral subject posing moral harm. The second question explores how this injustice comes to happen; namely, how does this unjust compromise occur? Literature suggests it happens because AOs agree to provide aid to recipients on unequal terms; i.e. recipients are given unequal chances to receive aid (Fassin 2007; Martínez and Eng 2016). Furthermore, it is this unequal view that legitimises the unjust provision, due to the control and manipulation by sovereign actors. Having studied the work of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Syria, Martínez and Eng (2016) claim that the WFP provided aid as dictated by a political actor. This actor restricted aid and if AOs did not comply, they would not be allowed to provide to anyone. In turn, WFP did not want to leave needs unmet and therefore decided to comply. Martínez and Eng (2016) claim that WFP’s acceptance of this restriction was based on moral judgement, because it did not want to entirely deny aid to the population and thereby abandon a humanitarian, moral principle that entails helping those in need. Therefore, they agreed to provide aid to some but not all: By creating the categories of people in need of assistance and by virtue of their (in)capacity to move supplies to certain territories rather than others, humanitarian organizations take part in decisions over human survival (Martínez and Eng 2016, p. 166).

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Martínez and Eng (2016) suggest that by agreeing to such restrictions, AOs expel communities outside of humanitarianism. The WFP differentiated aid recipients into those who would receive aid and those denied the necessary aid, thereby giving the populations an unequal chance of survival and consequently subjecting recipients to the harm of injustice. The third area of inquiry addresses the outcome of injustice on the receiving populations in need of aid. The literature points out that injustice might play out in the long run, by distorting economies and affecting local markets (Anderson 1999). This occurs because certain groups benefit economically from APs, while traditional trade linkages that previously existed are destroyed. Anderson (1999) studied AP in several African countries also suffering from conflict: Warriors often steal aid goods and use them to finance their war efforts. Stolen food, blankets, vehicles, and communications systems can be used by armies directly or be sold to buy needed supplies. Theft is the most widely recognized process by which aid feeds into conflict (Anderson 1999, p. 39).

Anderson (1999) argues that market disruption can occur in many ways. One possible way is when sovereign actors appoint specific groups or individuals to coordinate and distribute aid. These groups can range from local committees to armed militias, and they have been shown to either steal humanitarian supplies, or channel aid through specific business routes that benefit them, through wages and taxes (Ibid). Another way is when sovereign actors directly charge AOs for transport, protection, and access services, generating income in the sphere of the sovereign actors themselves, and for a small number of the local population associated with them (Anderson 1999). This industry creates jobs, wages, and income that favours AP over peacetime and developmental economic activities. Consequently, this injustice leads to the intensification of violence (Maren 1997; Anderson 1999), because this outcome is connected to market distortions. The beneficiaries of such distortions are often warlords or soldiers who now have extra cash to spend on arms, supplies, and military purposes. The military effort is thus enriched by APs and can lead to either intensified violence or prolonged military confrontation. This can also drive local populations to shift their pattern of production towards war products rather than food production. War economies are thus sustained and optimised. The literature tackles various countries where conflicts occurred on the national level and within defined boundaries. However, recalling Elayah and Verkoren (2019), these boundaries and sovereignty are neither visible nor imposed in Yemen. In the absence of the sovereign, one can ask if the same justice and equality-based harm manifests. The study questioned whether harm in Yemen follows the same trajectory and consequently posed the three questions. The economic and humanitarian outcomes in Yemen could also vary slightly from what has been reported in the literature. To address these questions, the study follows a qualitative conceptual design.

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3 Methodology and Selection of Literary Sources This study adopted two goals that ultimately shape the methodological design. The primary goal was to address the main research question of what harm is. How does it occur? And what outcomes result? These questions could not have been answered with mere empirical research. Rather, the topic of harm required a careful look at existing data, structures, and mechanisms within Yemen. The inquiry on Yemen was hence best addressed via a conceptual approach. As McGregor (2018) puts it, ‘A conceptual paper relates concepts to specific issues or research problems so as to advance and systematize knowledge … they address questions that cannot be answered with more facts, requiring instead a sound argument’ (p. 784). Answering the research questions is, however, not the end goal. The study attempts to reconceptualise harm based on how it is impacting Yemen. The second goal of the study is, therefore, a conceptual rendering or a reconceptualising of harm (McGregor 2018). One might be tempted to think that this study seeks to produce a review of AP in Yemen. However, the study does not aim to present data or to measure data against specific benchmarks. Rather, it seeks to broaden our understanding of how provision poses harm. The study answers the ‘what’s new’ about harm, by looking into the case of Yemen rather than reviewing what we already know (Gilson and Goldberg 2015, p. 128). Nevertheless, the concepts of harm and sovereignty and the case of Yemen alone do not constitute a backbone to conduct the study and answer the relevant research questions. There was a need for a conceptual framework that showcased the various interpretations and understandings of the concepts, before they could be applied to data from both the previous literature and Yemen. The role of the conceptual framework is to link ‘concepts and/or constructs that are broadly defined and systematically organized to provide a focus, a rationale, and/or a tool for the integration and interpretation of information’ (McGregor 2018, p. 782). Therefore, in the conceptual framework, we identify several definitions for both ‘sovereignty’ and ‘harm’ before demonstrating where they can be applied in the study. A conceptual framework acts as a bridge between the concept and the case under discussion. This bridge then helps to clarify the data and thus answer the research questions. With the help of a conceptual framework, the study transforms research questions to answers that identify harm, its cause, and its consequences in both the literature and, later, in Yemen. As such, the methodological framework of the study is conceptual rather than empirical. The conceptual framework attempts to: 1. show the various definitions or understandings of both harm and sovereignty and 2. allow these understandings to fit into a specific set of data (the previous literature and Yemen). This conceptual framework is best described as qualitative because it engages in textual non-quantitative descriptions and phenomena (Kelle 2014). The qualitative feature contributes to the study by allowing the researcher to examine the necessary detailed qualitative descriptions on Yemen, and it helps the conceptual study realise its potential by answering the questions and providing the space for a new conceptual rendering of harm. As such,

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qualitative methodology describes not only the result but also the method by which the study was conducted. Considering the health and accessibility challenges in light of both the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the pandemic outbreak, this study was limited to a single case study research method. The case study on Yemen collects data from a small number of literary sources such as academic studies, think-tank reports, and investigative journalism. The case study of Yemen used is not variable based; rather, it is based on a specific issue that is playing out in a specific place at a specific time. Ragin and Becker (1992, p. 5) characterise such case studies as, ‘Boundaries around places and time periods… (e.g. Italy after World War II)’. The boundary in this study is humanitarian AP, while the place is the legally recognised territorial boundaries of Yemen, and the period is March 2015 to March 2020. This period marks the start of the conflict, and the shift towards humanitarian assistance up until the study was conducted. The case study method was best suited because the conceptual nature of the study can benefit from the thick and in-depth data available. Since the goal is not empirical or experimental, no further data was collected via other methods such as interviews or ethnography. The conceptual approach of this study, by contrast, uses data available and obtained through the case study to address the two goals identified earlier. Yemen was also chosen due to the researchers’ familiarity with the country. Some possible design errors in this study are that a local knowledge case can open space for biased interpretations and a single case study can be difficult to generalise from. Nevertheless, Yemen was chosen due to its unique crisis of sovereignty. It has experienced something unusual, which was mapped out at an earlier stage of the study. The study seeks to initiate research on Yemen before other studies can be conducted on cases facing a similar and conceptualised problem. The single case study is also open to the possibility of adding additional methods or exporting the methods into further studies (Ahmed and Sil 2012). The type of case study used can best be characterised as a theoretical, because its purpose is to illustrate a concept rather than build a theory. A theoretical studies are what Lijphart (1971) describes as ‘entirely descriptive and move in a theoretical vacuum: they are neither guided by established or hypothesized generalizations nor motivated by a desire to formulate general hypotheses’ (p. 691). McGregor (2018) points out that the researcher raises a point and expands on it via debate. In this study, the debate was between the normative view of the literature and the data from Yemen, which suggests that a positivist analysis can better inform us about harm. The debate in the first step of the research does not aim to favour any position but only to demonstrate that harm in Yemen can be better understood and addressed with a positivist approach. The purpose of engaging in this debate is to realise the second and end goal of this study: the reconceptualisation of harm. In the second step, the study looks into the findings from the case of Yemen and draws two additional reconceptualisations of the concept of harm under the section below titled ‘Harm reconceptualized’. The second step is also based on a recommendation from McGregor (2018), as she declares the role of conceptual analysis is to draw ‘specific new concepts that contributed to their “overall conceptualization”’ (p. 373). Thus,

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the harm is reconceptualised as non-moral and inevitable. The second step reflects on the previous literature as we argue how this reconceptualisation can be useful. The case study of Yemen obtains data from textual sources outlined in Table 1. These include both academic studies and investigative reports on AP. Only a few sources were chosen, due to the small scope of the paper. The study was conducted using empirical data and observations in Yemen between 2015 and 2020. The textual sources were specifically selected because they originate from Yemeni scholars or journalists reporting on Yemen, who have a deep local knowledge. Therefore, the purposive selection provided insights on a specific and well-identified topic, considering the narrow scope of the research (Given 2008; McGregor 2018). The Sana’a Center is one of the main Yemeni think-tanks with a high ratio of Yemeni scholars and has published quality research on Yemeni political, social, and economic affairs. Investigative media reports were also conducted in Yemen by Associated Press, a credible news agency, using evidence collected by Yemenis. The coverage of the humanitarian situation in Yemen won Associated Press an award for professional excellence. These sources were obtained by researching literature on harm or by following media updates on Yemen. All literary sources are available and were obtained online as an open-source file. They were selected as they are the most relevant documents that concern the outcomes of aid provision. They are divided into three categories: academic content, think-tank report, and media report. The study attempts to avoid political biases by quoting and referring to reiterated information from the literary sources, rather than quoting explanatory jargon that could contain biased information. The data in the literary sources we used is also primarily based on investigations and data collection held on the ground vis-à-vis the periphery or any other non-credible media sources. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that misinformation or biases might still exist throughout the study. Lastly, the overall small number (n = 11) of literary sources used is both sufficient and necessary, considering the specific scope and limited time frame of the research. Each of these literary sources had ample information and data to analyse. Any extra data or sources could generate an excess of data that the study could not possibly have analysed in a satisfactory and timely manner.2

4 Findings: Aid Harm and Crisis of Sovereignty By analysing the data and descriptions collected from the above sources, in line with the first goals of the study, we argue for three major findings:

2

One source, however, was examined but later discarded as it provided repetitive data that has already been covered in other sources. This source is Beaumont, P. (2019, January 2). ‘Yemen: Houthi rebels’ food aid theft only tip of iceberg, officials say’. The Guardian. Retrieved from Yemen: Houthi rebels’ food aid theft only tip of iceberg, officials say.

2020

2019

2017

Humanitarian Aid in Yemen: Collaboration or Co-Optation?

Civil society during war: The case of Yemen

Geneva Conference (2017) for Relieving Yemen: between the hopes and the complex reality

Type

Academic

Academic

Academic

Academic

Academic

Publisher

Awam Center for Peacebuilding and Development & Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN)

Routledge

SAGE

SCIENCEDIRECT

EPSJ

Link

(continued)

Geneva Conference for Relieving Yemen: Between the hopes and the complex reality

Civil society during war: the case of Yemen

Humanitarian Aid in Yemen: Collaboration or Co-Optation?

The evolution of poor food access over the course of the conflict in Yemen

Humanitarian aid and war economies: The case of Yemen

The paper is qualitative and does not seek to validate any data, but to showcase the types of harm in Yemen.

2020

The evolution of poor food access over the course of the conflict in Yemen

3

Publication year

2021

Title

Humanitarian aid and war economies: The case of Yemen

Table 1 Overview of the literary sources used3

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Media

Media

2019

2020

2019

Yemen’s Houthi rebels accused of diverting food aid from hungry

Yemen’s Houthi rebels impeding UN aid flow, demand a cut

Vaccines blocked as deadly cholera raged across Yemen

Source the authors

Report

2020

The War Over Aid

Media

Report

The Need to Build 2018 State Legitimacy in Yemen

Type

Academic

Publication year

Humanitarian and 2018 Relief Assistance between the Hammer of the Lords of Poverty and the Anvil of the Warlords in Yemen

Title

Table 1 (continued) Link

Associated Press

Associated Press

The Guardian

Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies

Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies

Vaccines blocked as deadly cholera raged across Yemen

Yemen’s Houthi rebels impeding UN aid flow, demand a cut

Yemen’s Houthi rebels accused of diverting food aid from hungry

The War Over Aid—The Yemen Review, January/February 2020

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/6496

Centre for International https://www.ru.nl/rscr/@1157586/the-humanitarian-and-relief-assistance/ Development Issues Nijmegen and Centre for Governance and Peacebuilding Yemen

Publisher

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1. In Yemen, the harm of AP is the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty, as AOs become involved in the contestation of power—shifting the role of aid to political contestation. 2. The augmented crisis of sovereignty, and thereby harm, occurs as an unintended consequence due to various institutional and organisational disparities. 3. The augmented crisis of sovereignty weakens the economic prospects of the local communities while also intensifying the humanitarian crisis. The data from Yemeni sources indicates that there are many unwanted outcomes of AP, yet the primary outcome in Yemen is the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty. The augmentation entails an increased tension over the acts of AP between actors who had already struggled to establish supremacy and AOs. These disagreements relate to what timeline, approvals, and checks should be put in place, and which communities should receive aid. This consequently shifts the role of aid from helping vulnerable populations to augmenting and fuelling these tensions, thereby creating harm. The augmentation occurs in two distinct yet connected ways. Firstly, the provision of aid involves the AOs in contestation of sovereignty with local political actors, and secondly, it gives certain actors in Yemen leverage over AOs. These two factors combined eventually augment the crisis of sovereignty, as AOs and local actors challenge each other over the supremacy of AP, with no actors able to exercise independent and supreme authority. To showcase how AOs become involved in the contestation for supremacy, we use data from Elayah and Verkoren (2019) and Alqatabry and Butcher (2020). Their research argues that in areas where major political parties lack legitimacy, or are unable to exercise it, other non-traditional actors (tribal leaders and chiefs) practise state functions, such as collecting taxes, organising infrastructure, and providing healthcare (Elayah and Verkoren 2019). By performing these acts of governance, those actors legitimise themselves in a certain geo-temporal space. The authority of these non-traditional actors is respected due to religious and tribal traditions. International AOs seeking to provide aid in these areas often work alongside civil society organisations (CSOs), because they can mobilise on the ground by recruiting locals and reaching distant geographical locations. However, CSOs find themselves in a clash with the non-traditional authorities, as they often have different sociopolitical backgrounds and are perceived to be the arms of foreign powers. Due to the outbreak of the conflict, these CSOs have shifted to short-term humanitarian relief work. However, the aid is subjected to manipulation and restrictions by the political actors, and CSOs become part of this crisis of sovereignty as actors unable to exercise supremacy over AP: Each group regulates access to foreign aid into the areas under its control … Relief materials are sold in the black market … CSOs are forced to bribe officials or pay ‘taxes’ to militias (Elayah and Verkoren 2019, p. 18).

To mitigate threats from local political actors, CSOs allow these actors to monitor and regulate AP. When CSOs accept these restrictions, they allow actors to exercise leverage over them, and consequently, the aid providers not only become part of the crisis of sovereignty, but also become unable to exert authority over AP due to

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their weaker position. The involvement of CSOs and the subjugation by actors of these CSOs paves a path for the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty, with no actors able to exercise supremacy over AP. In this augmentation, the harm derails the capacity of AOs to deliver aid and alleviate needs. The augmented crisis of sovereignty can also lead to confrontation between AOs and political actors. Investigations conducted by Associated Press show the manipulation of aid by Houthis, one of Yemen’s largest political actors functioning predominantly as armed militias in the north-western and tribal regions of the country. The documents obtained by Associated Press also show Houthis attempting to push back accessibility and monitoring missions, while conducting a wide range of restrictive actions: The rebel group has made granting access to areas under their control contingent on a flurry of conditions that aid agencies reject, in part because it would give the Houthis greater sway over who receives aid, documents and interviews show (McVeigh 2019).

This manipulation could potentially serve as a tactic to grant the group more control over the humanitarian campaign: ‘These instances of conceding allowed Houthis to gain upper hand and consequently limiting visas and access to UN monitoring missions’ (Michael 2020). After stories of manipulation made headlines, several AOs and Houthis exchanged accusations and threatened to withdraw aid. Tensions led to talks between the WFP and the Houthis, but the situation did not improve drastically. Amid this confrontation, aid became primarily a political tool to contest supremacy. In February 2020, at a meeting in Brussels, AOs described the situation as at breaking point. The media has reported on the AOs’ acquiescence to the Houthis, which allowed the Houthis to gain the upper hand. Moreover, the internationally recognised government, which has been in a clash with the Houthis since 2014, only controls patches of the country and has itself placed a set of limitations restricting the conduct of APs all over Yemen (Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies 2020). The Houthis as a supreme political actor and the government as a legal supreme actor do not have absolute uncontested sovereignty over the territory except for their regions. Both of these actors used limitations to AOs’ work, resulting in ongoing tensions between all these groups but also between the AOs themselves, thereby augmenting the crisis of sovereignty. USAID announced in February 2020 that it would suspend aid to Houthi-held areas unless the obstacles were removed. The British government followed suit, and most AOs announced that they might scale back their operations (Ibid). The Houthis, however, asserted their stance by stating that they would not be bullied and that Yemen can survive without aid (Michael 2020). To summarise, the augmented crisis of sovereignty occurred as AOs became actors seeking authority over AP, being subjected to less authority and eventually in contesting this authority with Yemen’s local political actors. This augmentation constitutes harm because aid continues to be restricted and denied, as the focus of AOs is shifted from helping those in need to widening the gap between them and other actors, because they have failed to establish any authority or independent coordination for the provision. The augmentation leaves a gap as aid becomes in effect

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a policy without a sovereign to implement or coordinate. In Yemen, the AOs did not directly breach justice-based norms, as claimed by Rubenstein (2015), but rather became enmeshed in the crisis of sovereignty. This augmentation has not been motivated by a deviation from morally inspired justice-based norms. Rather, it has arisen because of involvement in the contestation for supremacy. The augmentation occurs because the lack of sovereignty in Yemen gives no other choice but for aid providers to engage in politics. Not only was aid delayed or denied, but the crisis that caused its restriction is now augmented, with the AOs taking part in contesting authority over how aid ought to be provided. As we argue in the next section, this augmentation has occurred as an unintended consequence due to disparities rather than a breach of moral values.

5 Disparities Behind the Augmented Crisis Yemen is a complex and violent reality, where the harm of the augmented crisis of sovereignty occurs as an unintended consequence due to various disparities—both institutional and organisational. They are posed either by AOs themselves, or by political actors or foreign militaries, and all affect the provision of aid. They have created a hospitable environment for the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty. One series of disparities is organisational and includes weak humanitarian planning and guidelines that have hampered provision efforts. Elayah and Abu-Osba (2017) suggest that the humanitarian aid response ignores the fact that the CSOs often do not have acceptable legitimacy on the ground and cannot access all populations in need. Citing the Geneva Humanitarian Response Plan of 2017, the researchers claim that the plan ‘did not include clear operational mechanisms and guarantees by conflicting factions not to impose restrictions on the movement of the humanitarian assistance’ (p. 5). The study also suggests that AOs do not disclose their financial information for fear that political actors could manipulate aid workers and draw them into corruption (Ibid). These organisational weaknesses have led to differences between what the AOs seek to do and the reality on the ground. Another set of disparities are institutional and involve decisions made by actors contesting for sovereignty. As an example, the international military coalition imposed a naval blockade, which delayed and restricted AP (McVeigh 2019). The WFP has criticised this blockade and the resulting restrictions. As far as the data stands, both AOs and local political actors were unable to influence or alter a decision of institutional supremacy from a sovereign. Local militias on the ground have also hampered AP. The Houthis established the National Authority for Managing and Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (NAMCHA) to coordinate aid delivery, replacing the existing Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. In the absence of state institutions, AOs have no option but to allow AP to be dependent solely on these institutions created by Houthis. The disparity lies in the difference between the AOs and the Houthi-affiliated institutions in terms of objectives and mechanisms

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deployed. The AOs seek a smooth, efficient process to provide aid, and the Houthis pose a wide range of restrictions. Due to these disparities, AP has been met with disruptions and delays. Houthis, benefiting from these disparities, turned to ‘siphoning off public funds to support their war effort, however, public service delivery in areas under their control has suffered heavily’ (Ahmed and al-Rawhani 2018, p. 16). The syphoning was coupled with bureaucratic impediments, such as delaying clearances and visas for aid workers. In one instance, clearance for cholera vaccines was blocked (Michael 2019). The NAMCHA was later replaced by the SCMCHA, which was investigated by Associated Press. The investigation confirmed the bureaucratic impediments and instances of corruption that gave the Houthis the upper hand. The investigations report that: Houthi authorities delayed permission to distribute food ... granting approval only in November after the food had spoiled ...; since November, SCMCHA has imposed more than 200 new directives and demands, including requiring the disclosure of aid recipients’ identities, allowing Houthi authorities to take over the budgets of monitoring programs, involving Houthi authorities in need assessments as well as in assigning suppliers for UN contracts and selecting local partners for UN programs… (Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies 2020, p. 8).

These institutional impediments exposed the disparities between the on-ground reality and the need for efficiency and transparency by the AOs. The disparities involved the AOs in the contestation of authority in matters regarding AP. As reported above, UN agencies took part in instances of corruption in order for their AP to proceed. The combined effect of organisational and institutional disparities in light of the crisis of sovereignty suggests that entire state institutions are dysfunctional and exist under the authority of local political actors. By agreeing to work within the rules set by these actors and their institutions, AOs become part of the power struggle in Yemen. However, this involvement is unintentional as they were not aware of the possibility of such disparities and neither did, they intend to make aid contingent upon restrictions. These disparities that allowed for the augmented crisis fall under the banner of unintended consequences, which mainly affect the local populations in need of aid.

6 Economic and Humanitarian Price The augmented crisis of sovereignty and the disparities behind it contribute to several humanitarian and economic outcomes for the local population, which often occur in tandem. An economic advantage is gained through the use of taxes and also through looting (Elayah and Abu-Osba 2018). This finances the war effort and can result in human rights violations (Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies 2020). According to Elayah and Abu-Osba (2017, p. 5): ‘The money made from the sold relief items is normally used to finance armed operations and paying fighters as well as recruiting children in absurd wars and conflicts’. The level of benefit that local

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political actors gain from these restrictive actions is not precise, but the report (Ibid) dubbed AOs as ‘prisoners of the ongoing war’. The result of this manipulation is that humanitarian aid does not reach vulnerable populations. Aid was therefore held responsible for prolonging and increasing human suffering. Furthermore, to avert the threat of poverty, many youths join militias to gain a source of income, which contributes to an environment hospitable to conflict. In some cases, the provision of aid becomes contingent on how many youths per village are joining the militias. The options for locals are either to accept their weaker economic standing or join militias. As such, AP was accused of prolonging (or intensifying) the humanitarian crisis (Ibid): This creates a welcome space for the war and conflicts to continue due to the continuous flow of fuel of war from fighters from various regions of Yemen to various ongoing battle fronts (Elayah and Abu-Osba 2018, p. 6).4 The complexities of the conflicting faction on the ground and their acquisition of most of the aid earmarked for the poor are two of the main factors that have increased the pace of human suffering in Yemen (Elayah and Abu-Osba 2017, p. 5).

In the case of the cholera vaccinations shipment, a report stated that the scale of the cholera outbreak was unprecedented in recent history and could have been avoided with better management (Michael 2019). Another form of humanitarian outcome was the threat to withdraw or scale back operations. David Beasley, executive director of the WFP, called on Houthis to adopt an agreement safeguarding its independence. If not, the organisation would begin phased suspension of food assistance. The Houthis agreed but impede the implementation of the new measures. Albeit in the form of threats only, the statements by WFP and USAID are outcomes of accusations made due to the augmented contestation for supremacy. Unlike that reported in previous literature on outcomes of harm, the data from Yemen both aligns with and deviates from what outcomes occur and how they manifest. Both in Yemen and the previous data, outcomes play on the economic level by benefiting certain groups who are mostly involved with the war effort. In Yemen, the effects of economic manipulation were witnessed from earlier in the Yemeni context as prices increased and purchasing power declined (Elayah and Abu-Osba 2018). These outcomes intensify the conflict and harm development prospects in the long term, worsening the humanitarian situation; a point that has not been covered adequately in the previous literature (Maren 1997; Anderson 1999). Another difference between the literature and Yemen concerns the augmented crisis of sovereignty. Maren (1997) and Anderson (1999) have not spoken widely about the political drivers behind these economic outcomes and the contribution to the war effort. However, the crisis of sovereignty in Yemen and the involvement of AOs shape how outcomes come to play. The outcomes in Yemen are portrayed as non-moral harm posed by intensifying political clashes. In the previous literature, however, the outcomes are presented as a result of moral harm that has withheld help for local communities. 4

This quote is translated from Arabic. The original text can be found at: https://www.ru.nl/rscr/ @1157586/the-humanitarian-and-relief-assistance/.

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In either scenarios, harm plays on the economic level by helping those not in need, while aggravating the demand of those in need.

7 Harm Reconceptualised This section addresses the goal of reconceptualising harm by showing how the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty expands our understanding of harm as non-moral and inevitable. First, we demonstrate why harm can be conceptualised as non-moral. As Rubenstein (2015) has argued, the restriction of aid to vulnerable people breaches normative values of justice and thus harm constitutes an immoral act. In Yemen, aid was also denied, delayed, or restricted; however, these actions were not entirely enacted to breach normative values or invoke injustice. Restrictive behaviour, we argue, was implemented to limit the supremacy of AOs and contest their rising power regarding AP. As demonstrated in this study, when AOs attempt to provide, they find themselves clashing with political actors. It is this clash that then leads to accessibility restrictions and delays. Yemen faces a gap of sovereignty, where the primary interest of various political actors is to extend their supremacy over AP and limit other actors with similar interests, including the AOs and CSOs. In this line, aid becomes an arena for power contestation. This entrance of AOs into the game of power politics expands our understanding of aid, from a mere justice-based commodity to a political tool that requires a positivistic analysis. We argue that the depiction of harm as non-moral in Yemen is vital, because a normative and moral judgement can limit our understanding of how and why these restrictions happen in a politically contested area. On the other hand, the added nonmoral depiction of this augmentation helps address aid not only as a humanitarian tool, but also as a political tool affecting power relations in a given territory. The non-moral positivistic approach allows us to confirm if, and how, the augmentation occurs. Although actions leading to the augmented crisis of sovereignty do not occur daily, their recurring effect could worsen the humanitarian situation and increase the divide between Yemen’s political actors and aid providers. To test this impact, however, the normative feature of harm would be sidelined in favour of a positivist perception. Therefore, the depiction of augmentation as non-moral can help unravel further questions and scientific inquiries regarding humanitarian aid. We have also demonstrated that harm can be conceptualised as ‘inevitable’ as well as being ‘permitted’. This study shows that augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty occurs as an unintended consequence of several disparities between AOs and political actors that shape the restrictions. Recalling De Zwart (2015), these harmful consequences are collateral and anticipated and can be described as ‘permitted’. However, in Yemen, not all aid providers always succumb to the wishes of actors contesting for sovereignty. There have been instances where AOs refused and rejected attempts to manipulate aid and addressed corruption allegations (McVeigh 2019). These instances suggest that the augmented crisis is not always permitted. As collateral damage, the augmentation of the crisis of sovereignty in Yemen can also be

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labelled as ‘inevitable’ because it is irresponsible for AOs to pretend that their work does not clash with political actors. It is also irresponsible to assume that these AOs will succeed in avoiding these manipulations, despite trying to avoid the restrictions. Therefore, the inevitability of the augmentation stems from AP being meshed into the very contestation of power. Accordingly, the inevitability of the augmented crisis debilitates the humanitarian response and vitalises the crisis of sovereignty. This debilitation is witnessed in the threat by AOs to withdraw from AP. It is also witnessed in the political actors’ willingness to hold a standoff against the humanitarian aid regime as depicted in Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (2020) and Michael (2020).

8 Conclusion This study demonstrates how the coordination and conduct of humanitarian AP, in Yemen and other conflict zones, poses harm due to the unique interdependency of political actors and AOs. This is due to AOs and locals often having contradictory goals, practices and motivations, regarding who is to be helped and in what ways. The literature covering AP in several conflict zones suggests the harm lies in denying aid to specific populations while causing various economic hardships for the local populations. The harm manifests once AOs succumb to the authoritarian order posed by a sovereign actor. AOs, therefore, treat recipients unequally, and the harm is dubbed ‘immoral’ as it breaches a justice-based norm. In Yemen, however, provision poses harm differently because political actors do not maintain or exercise supreme authority over the entire country. Instead, these actors are constantly engaged in establishing their supremacy across blurred political and geographical boundaries. The harm is especially notable in Yemen as it has a crisis of sovereignty caused by the lack of legitimacy, and this complicates AP. It is the contestation and pursuit of sovereign authority that could pose a different shape of harm. The harm in Yemen is the involvement in and contestation by AOs themselves of power politics, shifting the attention from conducting relief work to political contestation to establish authority over AP. This contestation suggests that no actors, including the AOs themselves, can exert supreme authority on how aid is to be provided and thus AOs augment the crisis of sovereignty. The shifting role of AOs from relief to political contestation comes about because of various institutional and organisational disparities. The outcome is the economic challenges and worsening humanitarian situation. The harm in Yemen, therefore, is not a direct breach of justice-based norms but rather a non-moral and unintended outcome, because the primary damage is the augmentation of the political crisis rather than the restriction of aid. The harm in Yemen exposes different and complex relationships between AOs and political actors that make this harm not only permitted but also inevitable. To decipher these relationships and the causes of harm, the study argues that AP in Yemen can be best examined via a non-moral positivistic outlook. The value of this study lies precisely in the conceptual rendering of harm as non-moral and inevitable.

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It therefore achieves its objective by discovering the harm in Yemen and offering a new understanding of the concept. The limitation of this study is the reduced ability to generalise without further empirical data on unintended consequences. Another weakness lies in viewing the issue of harm from a binary perspective (moral and non-moral, providers, and receivers, supreme vs. non-supreme). Some policy implications that can be drawn out concern the level of citizen and society engagement, i.e. the need to include local populations in all phases of AP. Aid providers can design programmes and develop supply chains with better local knowledge. Aid providers also need to include the concept of harm and how it materialises in their feasibility studies. Moreover, it is important not to immediately categorise AP as a success or failure without looking at the long-term picture and what harms can emerge in future. Nonetheless, with the blurred boundaries, one cannot offer binding conclusions on Yemen. Whether the crisis of sovereignty will continue to pose various forms of harm is contingent upon how the political atmosphere reacts to emerging humanitarian needs but also the unfolding political crisis.

References Alqatabry H, Butcher C (2020) Humanitarian aid in Yemen: collaboration or co-optation? J Peacebuild Dev 15(2):250–255 Ahmed A, Sil R (2012) When multi-method research subverts methodological pluralism—or, why we still need single-method research. Perspect Polit 10(4):935–953 Ahmed E, al-Rawhani O (2018) The need to build state legitimacy in Yemen. Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies Anderson M (1999) Do no harm: how aid can support peace, or war. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London Buth P, de Gryse B, Healy S, Hoedt V, Newell T, Pintaldi G, Wong S (2018) He who helps the guilty, shares the crime’? INGOs, moral narcissism and complicity in wrongdoing. J Med Ethics 44(5):299–304 Center for Strategic and International Studies (2018) The humanitarian crisis in Yemen Cooper N, Pugh M, Goodhand J (2004) War economies in a regional context: challenges of transformation. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London De Zwart F (2015) Unintended but not unanticipated consequences. Theory Soc 44(3):283–297 Dunning T (2018) Yemen—the ‘worst humanitarian crisis in the world’ continues. Parliament of Australia Elayah M, Abu-Osba B (2017) Geneva conference for Relieving Yemen: between the hopes and the complex reality. Awam Center for Peacebuilding and Development & Centre for International Development Issues, Nijmegen Elayah M, Abu-Osba B (2018) Humanitarian and relief assistance between the hammer of the lords of poverty and the anvil of the warlords in Yemen (in Arabic). Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen and Centre for Governance and Peace-building Yemen Elayah M, Fenttiman M (2021) Humanitarian aid and war economies: the case of Yemen. Econ Peace Secur J 16(1) Elayah M, Verkoren W (2019) Civil society during war: the case of Yemen. Peacebuilding 8(4):476– 498 Fassin D (2007) Humanitarianism as a politics of life. Publ Cult 19(3):499–520 Gert B (2005) Morality: its nature and justification, Revised. Oxford University Press, New York Gert B, Gert J (2017) The definition of morality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Gilson L, Goldberg C (2015) Editors comment: so, what is a conceptual paper? Group Organ Manage 40(2):127–130 Given L (ed) (2008) The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative research methods. SAGE, Los Angeles/London Hansen TB, Stepputat F (2006) Sovereignty revisited. Annu Rev Anthropol 35:297 Kelle U (2014) Theorization from data. In: Flick U (ed) The SAGE handbook of qualitative data analysis. SAGE Publications, London, pp 554–568 Lijphart A (1927) (1971) Comparative politics and the comparative method. Am Polit Sci Rev 65(3):682–693 Maren M (1997) The road to hell: the ravaging effects of foreign aid and international charity. Free Press, New York Martínez JC, Eng B (2016) The unintended consequences of emergency food aid: neutrality, sovereignty and politics in the Syrian civil war, 2012–15. Int Aff 92(1):153–173 McGregor S (2018) Understanding and evaluating research: a critical guide. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks McVeigh K (2019) Yemen’s Houthi rebels accused of diverting food aid from hungry. The Guardian Michael M (2019) Vaccines blocked as deadly cholera raged across Yemen. Associated Press Michael M (2020) Yemen’s Houthi rebels impeding UN aid flow, demand a cut. Associated Press Oxford English Dictionary (2020) ‘sovereignty, n.’ Ragin C, Becker H (1992) What is a case? exploring the foundations of social inquiry. Cambridge University Press. Redfield P (2013) Life in crisis. University of California Press Rubenstein J (2015) Between samaritans and states: the political ethics of humanitarian INGOs. Oxford University Press Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (2020) The war over aid. Yemen Rev Schwartzberg M (2003) Rousseau on fundamental law. Polit Stud 51(2):387–403 Shakdam C (2016) Yemen’s resistance is about reclaiming sovereignty. Crescent International. Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought (ICIT) Thompson A (2002) Ethics in international politics? the contradictions and ethical implications of foreign aid in Africa. UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, MI

Do the Institutional Welfare Services Provide Social Harmonization? The Case of Syrians in Turkey Nergis Dama

Abstract After 2012, Turkey has faced a migration flow because of the Syrian war. According to international migration law, they are not called refugees, so a new status has emerged which is called “people are under temporary protection status.” Based on the status, many economic and social policies have been implemented by the government in Turkey. Syrian people benefit from welfare services such as accommodation, food, health, and education. Given that the Syrian population is huge, and their socio-economic features are different, micropolicies have emerged as well as macro policies. Women and children have been selected as the target groups, so education and training programs were held which are at the center of policies. Though implemented policies aimed at ensuring Syrian people adapt to the economic and social system in Turkey, the perception of local people who are the citizens of Turkey has also gained importance to ensure mutual social cohesion. This study attempts to reveal the opinions and perceptions of Turkish people who live in Sanlıurfa ¸ province. This province is selected since Sanlıurfa ¸ is similar to Syrian provinces in terms of social and cultural life. This study aims to comprehend whether the similarity between Syrian and Turkish people helps to accommodate the social cohesion or not. The qualitative research design for the study is the phenomenological design, given that we intend to guess what Turkish people think about the adaptation of Syrians. Their perceptions thus obtained will help us understand whether the welfare services (including education, accommodation, social assistance, employment, training, health, etc.) implemented by the government have an impact on the Turkish people’s understanding of Syrians. Hereby, the question might be answered whether the institutional welfare services provide social harmonization or these implementations might lead to conflict between Turkish and Syrian people due the reactions against sharing welfare. Keywords Social policies · Welfare services · Social cohesion

N. Dama (B) The Faculty of Political Science, Department of Economics, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_13

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1 Introduction As a consequence of the chaos and strife in Syria, first migrations to Turkey began in April, 2011. According to the November 2021 data, the number of Syrians who could enter Turkey under the later-defined “temporary protection status” is 3,735,807.1 Due to the increased duration that they have spent/lived in Turkey, the temporary solutions for the welfare of Syrians were rendered to become permanent. The residence of Syrians in Turkey began based on “hospitality” concept, who were accepted by the local population with reference to the “charity culture,” and yet, problems emerged when Syrians were issued shares from economic and social welfare. The perception that they benefitted from food, accommodation, education, and health services without providing any contribution and without being present in production processes caused changes in the perception of the local population toward Syrians. According to research conducted in 2017 and 2019, the anxiety levels of local population regarding Syrians were on the rise. While the perception that they will cause harm to the economy of Turkey rose from 3.4% to 3.7%, the perception that they are a threat to the morals and peace of the society grew stronger (Erdo˘gan 2020). It is of importance whether this changing perception is valid for all Syrians and whether it fluctuates based on socio-economic characteristics such as gender, education, age, and occupation since the most vulnerable groups during war and crisis periods, women and children, are also considerably open to threats and risks in the receiving country (Lindsay 2001). However, it is also true that women have a strong and important role in the post-war, post-conflict, and post-crisis reorganization periods (Sami et al. 2014). Therefore, the perceptions of the local population regarding migrant women and girls are significant indicators of social cohesion. Syrians have a considerably high population in Turkey, amounting to the 4.5% of the population of Turkey. While the 1,726,347 individuals of the Syrian population are women, the number of girls and women between the age range of 0 and 29 is 1,229,518. Children and young women form the 71% of the total female population.2 Due to the bonds that women form with children and since they assume a transformative role in cohesion in social life, social policies that target migrant women, and girls are given precedence. Yet, in advance of the design process of the social policies that will select this group as the target group, it is imperative to identify the perceptions, the thoughts, and the considerations of the local population. Policies that are to be formed without such evaluation cannot ensure permanent social inclusion. As a result, this study attempts to formulate suggestions for social inclusion by studying the thoughts and opinions of local citizens toward Syrian women and children that form a considerable population size. The status of Syrians in Turkey is no longer temporary. They require access to rights and services such as education, health, accommodation, transportation, and 1

Directorate General of Migration Management [https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638, [Accessed on November 24, 2021]. 2 The upper limit for the age range is defined as 29, since the upper threshold of the active age group is considered to be 29 years of age.

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employment. Therefore, being accepted in economic and social life shall facilitate a common life for both parties in Turkey. However, studies conducted reflect the fact that the positive attitude based on the formerly accepted idea that the Syrians will return their own country is changing. Within this scope, this study attempts to learn the thoughts of local population regarding women and children who are stronger in social cohesion and more resilient to challenges. In order to contribute to social cohesion, the goal of the present study is to reveal the meaning attributed to Syrian women and children in the minds of the local population. Women have an important role in the construction of social cohesion; at the same time, women and children form the most vulnerable category in migration process. This dilemma is reflected in two different dimensions, as reaction against and support toward welfare services provided to women and children. While on the one hand education, health, accommodation, employment, social protection, and other welfare services are required for the social cohesion of women and children, on the other hand, the fact that migrants receive a share from welfare causes discontent and negative reactions. This study focuses on how local population interprets institutional welfare services to migrant women and children.

2 Literature Whether migrants should receive a share of economic and social welfare from the host country is a subject in dispute. With the assumption that by benefitting from welfare services, migrants’ social inclusion is facilitated, and it is proposed that migrants and local population should access health services equally: There should be equal access to health and education services in order to provide social welfare to protect women and children from the risk of abuse and exploitation (Sami et al. 2014). In turn, this requires social inclusion and social cohesion policies planned at macro-level, along with selective and special policies that specify women and children as their target group. The policies that will be implemented to facilitate the access of women and children to food, accommodation, education, and health services shall prevent the deepening of the inequalities experienced by this most vulnerable group. Following this targeting mechanism, the women and children can be categorized by evaluation of their different socio-economic characteristics among themselves, and thus, social inclusion policies can be organized according to their individual requirements and deprivations. Otherwise, the policies would focus just on the survival of the women and children, the specified target being just to meet the basic necessities, instead of achieving high-quality life standards. Defining and limiting Syrian women within the extent of certain adjectives cause building uniform social inclusion policies. Current prevalent gender narratives assert that for the first time after migration from Syria, Syrian women could become the head of the household, and prior to that they could not assume such a role. The general characterization of Syrian women is that they are unemployed, they have low-education levels, and that they are primarily tasked with the care of their spouses

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and children. However, each of the displaced Syrian women display different socioeconomic characteristics. There are narratives of Syrian women who share their experiences and state that while they were present in the work life in Syria, they could not do so after coming to Turkey and had to stay at home (Lokot 2018). The prevalent perception toward Syrian women, claiming that they do not want to work, that they have low-education levels and that they prioritize marriage reinforces the negative perceptions toward these women. In Turkey, this situation causes concern among women regarding their family life and reactions against the inclusion of migrants to social life, forming a basis for social exclusion. Evaluating an individual with the typology of “Syrian woman” creates certain prejudices and resistance to social cohesion. These aspects, with increased concerns for life, security, and livelihood due to migrations, reduce the capacity of the migrant women to struggle against challenges. Welfare policies implemented for their inclusion to the social and economic life strengthen the vulnerable socio-economic characteristics of migrant women. Yet, how local population reacts to these welfare services are a factor that renders the inclusion of women to social life as something beyond a numerical value, facilitating or hindering their existence in the society. Although women do not actively participate in the theater of war or regions of conflict, they are harmed more (Erikkson 2011). Yet, women have an important role in the reconstruction of the fields of nourishment, education, and health, both in the post-war era and in the new living environment (Klot 2007). In addition, excluding the migrant women from the reconstruction process in the economic, politic, and social field prevent the success and sustainability of these practices (Miklaucic and Civic 2011). The policies to be formed to ensure the social cohesion of migrant women and children require that the perspectives of the host country society about the migrants are known beforehand. This research aims at providing a perspective for the policies to be developed for women and children –the primary actors to construct the social cohesion between migrant and host societies. In order to manage the intense migration of Syrians that Turkey was caught unprepared, social cohesion policies are important. However, to define such policies, first, the expectations, demands, and complaints of local populations must be known to frame their perspectives toward migrants. Despite the fact that there are many studies that lay bare the problems experienced by Syrians in Turkey regarding social cohesion, there are limited number of studies that investigate the perceptions of local populations regarding Syrian migrants. The object of this research is to study the current perceptions of local population regarding Syrian women and children to contribute to the construction a common life.

3 Method In this study, phenomenological design was used as the research design. This research design aims at revealing the perceptions and comments regarding a phenomenon

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of individuals. This design uses the common definitions of persons who experienced a phenomenon for finding the common meanings at the background of that particular phenomenon (Baker, Wuest, and Stern 1992; Rose, Beeby, and Parker, 1995). Phenomenology focuses on the evaluation of the experience (Jasper 1994; Miller 2003). In the phenomenology design, the data are obtained from verbal definitions, expressions, and written texts. The phenomenology methodology employs the unstructured or semi-structured interview form the explain the phenomena (Wimpenny and Gass 2000). Within this scope, the phenomenon in the research is defined as “the perspective of the local population regarding the benefitting of Syrian women and children from welfare services.” The respondents were specified by purposeful sampling from Sanlıurfa, ¸ Turkey, one of the cities with the highest Syrian population, based on the following 4 criteria: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Being a resident of Sanlıurfa ¸ for more than 10 years Desire to live in Sanlıurfa. ¸ Being above the age of 25. Willingness to express opinions on experiences with Syrians

As an analysis method, primarily conversation analysis, then content analysis method was adopted. Using conversation analysis, first of all, the oral communication practices of local population regarding Syrian women and children were identified. CA is an analysis which is the analysis of routine oral communication practices on a subject. In order to define the details of the interview and the characteristics of the nonverbal behaviors, the semi-structured interview form is transcribed (Drew, Chatwin & Collins, 2001). In the later stage of this study, the codes were formed using content analysis method. The most repeated codes were transformed into categories, and later, the categories are converted into themes. As a result of the conversation analysis and content analysis stages of the study, 6 themes were revealed: rent increase, housing shortage, privilege in benefitting from welfare services, cultural difference, responsibility for rising unemployment, responsibility for rising crime, remoteness to the state, independence in social life.

4 Findings 4.1 Demographics of the Respondents Purposeful sampling method was chosen to determine the respondents of the study. The 4 criteria in selection of the respondents were being a resident of Sanlıurfa ¸ for more than 10 years, desire to live in Sanlıurfa, ¸ being above the age of 25, and willingness to express opinions on experiences Syrians. Since the objective in creating these criteria was in general to obtain their perspective on Syrians, and in particular, Syrian women and children benefiting from welfare services in social life, the selection criteria focused on people with a sense of belonging to Sanlıurfa. ¸ Therefore,

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all respondents participating in the research were asked primarily about the duration they resided in Sanlıurfa, ¸ their desire to stay, their age and whether they were willing to express their opinions on Syrians, and 36 people who could answer all of these questions were selected as interviewees. Afterward, 20 respondents answered all questions in the interviews conducted using a semi-structured interview form. 13 of these respondents were women, and 7 were men (Fig. 1). Although the total number of respondents were not composed of equal proportions in the classification according to education, this does not pose a problem since the criteria for the purposeful sampling were not based according to gender, but on duration of city residence, age and the willingness to express opinions. Among the respondents who took part in the research, there were 2 women in the 25–29 age range, 1 woman in the 30–34 age range, 6 women in the 35–39 age range, 4 women in the 40–44 age range; there were 4 men in the 30–34 age range and 3 men in the 40–44 age range (Fig. 2). 13

14

10%

12 35%

10

25% 7

8

man

6

woman

30%

4 2 0

25-29

Total Toplam

30-34

35-39

40-44

Fig. 1 Distribution of respondents by gender and age

3

40-44

4 0

35-39

6 4

30-34

1 0

25-29

2 0

1

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Fig. 2 Distribution of age ranges by gender

4 Female

5

6

7

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The distribution of the respondents by marital status reveals that they are generally married with a rate of 90%. The gender of 2 single people is male. The prevalent tradition in the city that holds marriage and family in very high esteem was also reflected in the marital status indicator of the respondents. In the evaluation according to occupations, the classification was made as private sector and public sector employees. Accordingly, 20% of the respondents were public sector employees, 30% were private sector employees, whereas 50% were unemployed. All of the non-working respondents were women (Fig. 3). When examined according to education level, 1% of the participants were primary school graduates, 20% were secondary school graduates, 50% were high school graduates, and 25% were undergraduate graduates. 60 percent of the undergraduates were female, and 40 percent are male. While the distribution of the high school graduates was 50% male and 50% female, all secondary and primary school graduates were female respondents (Fig. 4). The examination of the number of children among married respondents reveals that the number of children is high, in line with the demographic structure of the city. There are 4 participants with 2 children, 6 participants with 3 children, 5 participants with 4 children, 2 participants with 5 children, and 1 participant with 1 child (Fig. 5).

4.2 Research Themes In this study, 6 open-ended questions were asked to the respondents. These questions are provided below: 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Public Sector

Private Sector Female

Male

Fig. 3 Distribution of the sector employed by gender

Unemployed

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5 4

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3 2

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1

1 0

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Secondary

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High School Male

Undergraduate

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Fig. 4 Distribution of educational status of respondents by gender

Fig. 5 Distribution of participants by number of children

11%

6%

22% 28%

33%

1 child

2 children

3 children

4 children

5 children

1. What is the most important issue regarding change in the city after Syrians’ migration to the city? 2. Do you have any experience or observation regarding Syrians’ access to welfare services? 3. How would you evaluate the adaptation of Syrian women and children to economic and social life? 4. How do you think the labor market has been affected after the arrival of Syrians? 5. Do you consider the city safe? 6. How do you evaluate the adaptation of women and children to social life?

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The responses to each question were analyzed through conversation analysis and content analysis, and the data obtained were turned into codes, and then, into categories. In the last stage, these codes and categories were further grouped into 6 themes.

4.2.1

Accommodation: Rent Increase and Housing Shortage

Through the question “what is the most important issue regarding change in the city after Syrians’ migration to the city?” What emerged was the theme of “accommodation.” Respondents state that with the arrival of immigrants, first, the rents increased in the city, and then the housing problem occurred. Table 1 provides the frequently expressed phrases within the “rent increase and housing shortage” theme.

4.2.2

Welfare Services: Privilege in Benefitting from Welfare Services

When the answers given to the question “do you have any experience or observation regarding Syrians’ access to welfare services?” were analyzed through content analysis, the theme of “decrease in the quality of welfare services and privilege in benefiting from welfare services” came to the fore. The common complaint of the respondents was regarding the Syrians benefitting from health and education services. It was emphasized that Syrians were given priority in benefiting from health services, while the citizens of the Republic of Turkey remained in the background. In healthcare, the density in hospitals leads to long waiting times. From this aspect, since Syrian women and children are more visible in hospitals than Syrian men, dissatisfaction from health services attributed to the presence of migrants is channelized toward Syrian women and children. The present conditions in child and obstetrics branches, one of the busiest clinics in Turkey, are challenged further with the arrival of Syrians. Therefore, we observe that the negative perception of Syrians in health care is focused on women and children. Another welfare service that is a subject of complaint in the interviews is education. Due to the prior planning for a temporary stay of Syrians in Turkey, the education services were also planned to be provided temporarily. In the 2016–2017 academic year, temporary education centers, opened for the education of Syrian children, were Table 1 The most frequent response phrases within the theme of rent increase and housing shortage

Question 1. What is the most important issue regarding change in the city after Syrians’ migration to the city? Theme 1: Rent increase and housing shortage Rental rates are very high

A1, A2, A3, A4,

No houses left in town

A6, A12, A16

Syrians in each building

A13, A14, A20

Syrians gets the houses

A11, A17, A19

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Table 2 The most frequent response phrases within the theme of decrease in the quality of welfare services and privilege in benefiting from welfare services

Question 2. Do you have any experience or observation regarding Syrians’ access to welfare services? Theme 2: Decrease in the quality of welfare services and privilege in benefiting from welfare services Problems in accessing public services A1, A2, A4, A18, A20, Crowded hospitals

A3, A5, A6, A12

Density of Syrians at school

A2, A4, A5, A8, A11

Priority to Syrians

A3, A7, A13, A19

gradually closed. The main purpose of education that thereby commenced in public schools is to prevent Syrian children from being excluded from education and to facilitate the integration of Syrians into social and economic life. However, Syrian children’s lack of adequate level of Turkish, their unfamiliarity with the education curriculum in Turkey, and other factors such as having to adapt to school rules negatively affect their academic success. Yet, in the interviews, we observed that the local population were anxious about their own children, instead of the adaptation problems of the Syrian children. Respondents claim that the Syrian children increase the size of the class and decrease the quality of education, and that a lot of fights occur at school, since Syrian children are prone to violence. During research, respondents from local population also claimed that the education with Syrian children reduced the education levels of their children. These statements demonstrate that in education dimension, dissatisfaction with the welfare services offered to Syrian immigrants is directed toward Syrian children (Table 2).

4.2.3

Economic and Social Life Integration: Cultural Difference

Responses to the third question of the interview, “how would you evaluate the adaptation of Syrian women and children to economic and social life?” asked within the scope of the research revealed the theme of “cultural difference.” The respondents characterized Syrians as more modern and defined themselves as living conservatively. The subjects of complaint were clothing, make-up, and demeanor. Respondents provided examples of cultural incompatibility, such as female students coming to school with make-up, women being well-groomed, and Syrians’ keen enthusiasm for music. They also rendered their examples concrete with comments on Syrian males walking in sleeveless undershirts, Syrian females wearing headscarves and make-up, frequenting the parks until late hours, littering the streets and not complying with traffic rules. The respondents underlined the conservative structure of the study did not welcome the life styles of Syrians. In the responses regarding Syrian women’s integration to economic and social life, 7 respondents commonly expressed that polygamy was becoming widespread, stating that despite the fact that polygamy was already present in the city prior to the migration of Syrians, this became a widespread practice following migration.

Do the Institutional Welfare Services Provide Social Harmonization? … Table 3 The most frequent response phrases within the theme of cultural difference

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Question 3. How would you evaluate the adaptation of Syrian women and children to economic and social life? Theme 3: Cultural difference Women being well-groomed

A1, A2, A5, A11, A13

Girls having make-up

A3, A4, A17, A20

Relaxed behavior

A2, A6, A17, A19

Conservative structure of the city

A7, A8, A9, A12

Polygamy

A2, A6, A8, A9, A13, A19, A20

Female respondents had serious concerns that this distinct problem of polygamy in the city would continue increasing. While considered normal for Syrians, polygamy, legally banned in Turkey, spread after the arrival of Syrians and increase the anxiety level of the female local population. The family structure is being harmed since legal sanctions are not implemented (Table 3).

4.2.4

Responsibility for Rising Unemployment

The responses to the question “how do you think the labor market was affected after the arrival of the Syrians?” within the scope of the research received responses that indicate that Syrians were assumed to be responsible for the rising unemployment. However, rather than women, the increase in unemployment is due to the informal employment of men and children in the labor market. Respondents state that the seasonal workers are now chosen from Syrians, that the number of seasonal workers in the city has decreased, and that there are many economic activity areas dominated by Syrians –especially areas such as home renovation, auto-repair, construction, painting, tile work, animal husbandry, agriculture, paper, and plastic waste collection. The fact that many economic activities are now managed by Syrians reinforces the perception that the economy in the city is under the management of Syrians: Syrians have first entered the labor market as workers, and then, after a certain period of time, have risen to the position of employers. This is a new challenge for the local population, who equated Syrians with weak socio-economic characteristics. Therefore, complaints arising with Syrians benefiting from welfare services turn into a concern with the empowerment of Syrians in the labor market. When the most frequently used phrases of the participants were examined, what emerged was the concept of “cheap labor.” Syrians work informally, and for very low wages, and thus reduce the wages, leading to the preference of Syrian workers in the labor market. The process of employing foreign workers in Turkey is carried out by the General Directorate of International Labor Force under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. An administrative fine of 16,066 TL per foreign worker

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Table 4 The most frequent response phrases within the theme of responsibility for rising unemployment

Question 4. How do you think the labor market was affected after the arrival of the Syrians? Theme 4: Responsibility for rising unemployment Rising unemployment

A2, A7, A11, A14

Employers prefer Syrians

A1, A5, A8, A17, A20

Cheap labor

A2, A5, A11, A12, A19

Dominance of Syrian worker in sectors

A3, A4, A15, A16, A20

is imposed on employers who employ foreigners without a work permit.3 Despite such fines, employing Syrian wage workers for daily for very low wages reduces costs for employers, and thus, increases the unemployment rate for local population. Since the local population perceives that the cause of additional economic costs along with the rising unemployment are Syrians, social costs occur in tandem. Although the employers who employ cheap workers are Turkish, the subjects to whom the frustrations are directed are Syrians. This situation widens even more the gap between the migrants and the host population. The perspective toward Syrian women and children, the main subjects of the research, differs in employment dimension. While the respondents consider Syrian men and children as the cause of unemployment, the only economic activity area stated in which they observe Syrian women are hairdressers. Respondents emphasize that women do not adversely affect the labor market, do not cause unemployment, and do not pose a problem, since they operate within a certain field. However, this perspective changes when it comes to Syrian children. Respondents state that Syrian children commence working in the industry and service sector at a very early age, and within a few years, become indispensable workers, having learned the profession. Respondents have expressed their concern that within 5–10 years, all of the economic activities in the city might be under the control of Syrians (Table 4).

4.2.5

Responsibility for Increased Crime

In response to the question “do you consider the city safe?”, the common assessment of the respondents was that the crime rates in the city have risen. Despite the fact the question held no word connotation with Syrians, Syrians were seen as those responsible for the increase in the crime rate. Although there is no concrete data that verify this opinion, the local population’s perception equates crime with the Syrian identity. Respondents state that the types of crime vary according to the socioeconomic characteristics of the Syrians. In such a claim, an example elaborates how poor Syrians are involved in substance abuse and drug deal, and how rich Syrians are involved in smuggling. They also assert that there is an increase in substance 3

https://www.csgb.gov.tr/uigm/genel-bilgiler/idari-para-cezalari/ [Accessed on 2 January 2021].

Do the Institutional Welfare Services Provide Social Harmonization? … Table 5 The Most frequent response phrases within the theme of responsibility for rising crime

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Question 5. Do you consider the city safe? Theme 5: Responsibility for rising crime Rising substance abuse

A2, A4, A5, A7, A11

Children being in danger

A3, A5, A6, A13, A16, A19

The problem of prostitution

A1, A5, A6, A8, A12, A17

Ethnic change

A10, A13, A14, A18

abuse in the city, becoming widespread among the children and the youth, and that the reason for this situation is Syrian migration. In the study, the fact that whereas the participants matched Syrian women with prostitution and Syrian men with substance abuse, dealing drugs, and smuggling supports the finding that local people evaluate crimes differently according to the gender of Syrians. Respondents emphasize that the crime of prostitution is increasing and becoming widespread, that there is an ongoing moral corruption, and that the family structure, revered highly in the city, has suffered great harm. In addition, they also assert that after the change in the social structure, the city moved away from its former quality of a safe city. Stating that chaos and fighting increased in the city after the migration of Syrians, the respondents claimed that Syrians were a dangerous group from the aspects of public order and social peace, due to their low loyalty to the state (Table 5).

4.2.6

Remoteness to the State and Independence in Social Life

The responses to the question “how do you evaluate the adaptation of women and children to social life?” within the scope of the research were first about Syrians in general and then specific to women and children. The respondents stated that Syrians had priority and privilege in every field that they benefited from health and education services free of charge and without paying taxes, despite not complying with the rules of social life. The fact that Syrians get their share of wealth without paying taxes is regarded by local population as disturbing. There is a common opinion that taxes are a big cost for the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, but Syrians enjoy every right even though they do not pay taxes. The respondents emphasized that Syrians could open a business without paying taxes, and that the health and education services were provided to them free of charge, and that they received national and international aid. The respondents expressed the view that despite not contributing into anything, Syrians gradually gained social control of the city, and that situation reached to a level of discomfort for the local population. The respondents elaborated on the perceived general attitude of Syrians to the state and claimed that the women and children did not comply with the rules of social life and established their own ghetto. Accordingly, they claimed that instead of following the established rules, Syrians lived by their own rules and shaped the

206 Table 6 The most frequent response phrases within the theme of remoteness to the state and independence in social life

N. Dama Question 6. How do you evaluate the adaptation of women and children to social life? Theme 6: Remoteness to the state and independence in social life Ghettoization

A3, A4, A11, A17

New owners of the city

A1, A5, A8, A14

Change in family structure

A2, A4, A7, A13, A17

Socio-economic differentiation of the city

A5, A7, A9, A12

life practices of the city according to their own cultural characteristics: Adaptation of women and children to economic and social life took place according to their own rules, not existing rules and the ethnic structure of families changed after marriage with Syrians. The respondents assert that although Syrian women and children learned Turkish, they insisted on using the Arabic language in daily life. Their claims also include the opinion that due to increasing polygamy, families now hold two different ethnicity characteristics –Turkish and Arab. While the respondents state that polygamy causes serious problems between women and children, Syrian girls are married early without taking the legal obligations in Turkey seriously. For this reason, we observe that frustration has replaced the initial compassionate attitude toward women and children. Another finding is that there is no spatially common life. Syrian immigrants accommodate the buildings in the same region. The respondents underline their claim that local population moved to other regions after a certain period of time, thus allowing for ghettoization. They claim that in schools, Syrian children make friends with each other and that peer bullying is experienced among children. They add although the Syrian women only work in hairdressers, these places are preferred only by Syrian women. Thus, they conclude, it is not possible to talk about social interaction: Being remote to the state, it can be said that Syrians have established an independent order in social life, all according to their own rules. This situation not only makes it difficult for Syrians to adapt to the social life of Turkey but also carries the risk of having a negative impact on the local population’s attitude toward migrants (Table 6).

5 Results Since 2011, Turkey has been subject to an intense migration of Syrians. In the present condition, Turkey is the host country of the greatest number of migrants. The initial assumption that Syrians shall reside in Turkey temporarily has lost its validity through time. In the process of 11 years, Syrians benefit from welfare services such as accommodation, health, education, employment, and social protection as the new citizens

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of Turkey. During the process, many economic and social policies were implemented to ensure the adaptation of Syrians to Turkey’s economic and social rules. However, for such an adaptation to be realized, the host country should also be willing to accept this adaptation. The key actors of the adaptation process are women and children with their transformative power. This research was realized in Sanlıurfa, ¸ one of the cities with the most intense Syrian population, with the participation of 20 respondents, selected through purposeful sampling method. While the questions were asked about their opinions how the social and economic life have changed with the Syrian migration, the primary purpose was to obtain a perspective on how the local population perceived Syrian women and children. 6 questions were asked to the respondents within the scope of this study. The responses to these questions were analyzed through conversation analysis and content analysis, forming 6 themes. Subsequent themes were identified as rent increase and housing shortage, privilege in benefitting from welfare services, cultural difference, responsibility for rising unemployment, responsibility for rising crime and remoteness to the state, and independence in social life. Evaluation done according to the themes formed reveals that within this 11-year period, the meaning attributed to the Syrians by the local population has changed. Fingers point at Syrians as those responsible for the increasing rental rate and housing shortage in the city, and the rising unemployment and crime rates. The respondents stated that despite being geographically close regions and no language barrier exists, there is cultural incompatibility between these two societies. The main subjects of this incompatibility are specified as women and children. The respondents claimed that the family structure in the city was impaired since Syrian women normalized polygamy, a practice in breach of Turkish law. Another issue considered dangerous by the families of local population is that their girls change their clothing and behavior patterns in imitation of the Syrian girls and women. Again, Syrians are held responsible for the crimes of substance abuse and prostitution in the city. Thus, the compassionate attitude toward Syrians who took accommodation in Turkey, having fled from a state of chaos and strife is replaced with concerns about Syrian men during this process. However, it is also possible to claim that discontent regarding Syrian women and children has also gradually increased. The primary issue criticized by the respondents was the health and education services that Syrian women and children benefit. The respondents have stated that the quality of the welfare services that the local population is entitled to receive diminished and that Syrians receive a privileged service. Also, the spatial interaction required for social cohesion is gradually receding. Syrians formed groups among themselves and began living in separate regions. In time, areas in which Syrians are living are beginning to form. We observe that at the end of 11 years, the attitude of local population toward Syrian women and children exhibits a deceleration toward a negative direction. The expected skills of Syrian women and children to adapt to the host country society are not considered sufficient. On the contrary, the respondents emphasize their opinion that they are forming their own rules, instead of adapting to the social rules.

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References Baker C, Wuest J, Stern PN (1992) Method slurring: the grounded theory/ phenomenology example. J Adv Nurs 17:1355–1360 Eriksson M (2011) Defining rape: emerging obligations for states under international law? Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, p 156 Erdo˘gan M (2020) Syrians barometer 2019: a framework for achievıng social cohesion with Syrians in Turkey. Orion Publications, Istanbul Jasper MA (1994) Issues in phenomenology for researchers of nursing. J Adv Nurs 19:309–314 Klot, Jennifer F (2007) Women and peace-building. independent expert paper, commissioned by the united nations development fund for women (unifem) and the peace-building support office, social science research council. https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuil ding/files/documents/wgll_backgroundpaper_29_01_08.pdf [accessed on 10 November 2021] Lindsey C (2001) Women facing war. icrc study on the impact of armed conflict on women. Executive Summary. ICRC [accessed September 14, 2021] Lokot M (2018) Syrian refugees: thinking beyond gender stereotypes. Forced Migration Review 57:33–35 Miklaucic M, Civic MA (2011) Monopoly of force: the nexus of DDR and SSR. NDU Press, Washington, pp 78–79 Miller S (2003) Analysis of phenomenological data generated with children as research respondents. Nurse Res 10(4):68–82 Sami S, Williams HA, Krause S, Onyango MA, Burton A, Tomczyk B (2014) Responding to the Syrian crisis: the needs of women and girls. The Lancet 383(9923):1179–1181 Wimpenny P, Gass J (2000) Interviewing in phenomenology and grounded theory: is there a difference? J Adv Nurs 31(6):1485–1492

Practices of Heritage and Reconciliation

Indigenous Language Preservation for a Socio-political Reconciliation: Morocco as a Case Study Yamina Hakkou and Mahmoud Seddik

Abstract The current paper explores the Moroccan cultural diversity, where the indigenous ethnicities along with their languages have been undergoing an institutionalized discrimination. Such a status threatened a serious breach in the relation between the Amazigh ethnicities and the state authorities. Our hypothesis is that for a genuine and sustainable reconciliation with an oppressed cultural ethnicity to occur, there is a need for a state’s explicit recognition of their intangible heritage as a prerequisite for their socio-political inclusion. The current paper casts light on the struggle of the Amazigh movements and outlines the endeavors undertaken by the state and the civic society to publicly acknowledge the injustice inflicted upon the indigenous languages and constitutionally recognize their official status. Keywords Tamazight · Languages · Reconciliation · Socio-political inclusion · Identity · Recognition

1 Introduction Given its strategic position as a bridge between the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, Morocco has, throughout history, been the target of multiple invasions by Phoneticians, Carthaginians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, French, and Spanish. All these dynasties and empires have profoundly shaped the Moroccan cultural diversity and linguistic plurality, producing what is known today as multicultural/multilingual Morocco (Youssi 1995; Ennaj 1991). Therefore, the Moroccan multilingual repertoire incorporates the native languages of Berber tongues and Arabic varieties as well as the exogenous languages of French, Spanish, and English. In such a situation, adoption of a particular language as official or standard to the exclusion of Y. Hakkou Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Mohammed I University, Oujda, Morocco e-mail: [email protected] M. Seddik (B) Regional Center for Education and Training Profession, Fez, Morocco e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_14

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any other gives political legitimacy and prestige to one language variety and leads to feelings of exclusion, marginalization, and alienation of speakers of the excluded language. This paper explores the major challenges that the Amazigh languages went through toward its quest for recognition.

2 The Amazigh and Their Language Varieties The Amazigh, meaning the free people, is distributed over an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Siwa Oasis in Egypt and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Niger River in West Africa. Archeologists believe that Amazigh history goes back to prehistoric times, and they spoke the Berber languages, which is a branch of the Afroasiatic language family (Chafik 2004). Today, there are three distinct Amazigh varieties in Morocco: Tarifit, spoken in the Rif mountains, Tamazight in the Central and Eastern Middle Atlas and Tachelhit, spoken in the Central and Western High Atlas, in the Sous region and the Low-Atlas Mountains. The swift expansion of Islam in Morocco did not correlate with that of the Arabization. For the Amazighs, islamization was welcomed for its principles of equality, justice and freedom unlike Arabization that was perceived as overloaded with Arab ideology, advocating tribalism, and hegemony (Assid 2018; Hourani 1991; Suleiman 1994). To illustrate, according to the historian Ibn Abd al-Hakam, under the Umayyads caliphate, troops that invaded the Visigothic kingdom were made up mainly of the Amazigh soldiers led by Amazigh commanders (i.e., Tariq Ibn Ziad) as a sign not only of their unwavering loyalty to their identity, but of their attachment to the Islamic religion more than the Arab ethnicity. In this regard, the historian Abd al-W¯ah.id Dhann¯un T.a¯ h¯a (1989) refuted the widely spread narrative by surprisingly stating that Tariq Ibn Ziad, the commander, decided to cross the strait without informing his superior wali Musa ibn Nusayr, confirming what can be described as fragile connection between the Amazigh population and the ruling of Ummayads Caliphate which was soon revolted against. This revolution led to the emergence of the first Muslim states outside the Caliphate. It is sometimes also regarded as the beginning of Moroccan independence, as Morocco would never again come under the rule of an eastern Caliph or any other foreign power until the twentieth century for neither did the Abbassi caliphate nor the Ottoman Empire dare to invade this specific area of North Africa given the powerful ruling system of the Berber dynasties of Almoravids, the Almohads, and the Marinides. Another example illustrating the Amazigh unconditional acceptance of Islam more than the Arabic language was their revolts against the infamous Berber Decree (Dahir of 1914, enacted in 1930) that aimed at setting up different judicial systems for Arabs and Berbers, the decree was seen as an attempt to weaken Islam among the Berber community and to divide the country. Such a spirit of resistance to all what might threaten the Berber identity kept concretizing in a number of occasions including the establishment of an autonomous state in the Rif region under the French Colonial rule. Such a bold move was not

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recognized by the Moroccan government after independence and uprisings that came as a reaction in 1957 and 1958 were violently quelled by the newly consolidated Moroccan Royal Army under the leadership of then Crown Prince Hassan II (Kruse 2013). There was also a Berber revolt in 1973 in the Atlas and in the 1980s in the Rif. All these rebellions were fueled by the Amazigh desire to fully enjoy their socio-political rights without any sort of discrimination or categorization. Being a symbol of the Amazigh ethnicity, a hallmark of their identity, a vehicle for their oral culture, a sign of in-group belongingness, Tamazight, Amazigh language, was at the forefront of their struggle for recognition and pride. The Moroccan state, in the days of Hassan II, opted for the official version of the history based on the FrenchJacobin model, which was invoking the uniformity of a country through a single language, culture, and identity and canceling other identity forms (Assid 2015). In that, Arabic was stated as the only national and official language of Morocco. Giving children Amazigh names was forbidden in Morocco, and administrators would often refuse to enter these names into the civil registries. Amazigh students were forced to study in Arabic which puts them in a disadvantageous position with their Arab peers. Activists for a Berber cultural revival were arrested. Different Berber cultural meetings were banned. A long process of Arabization was imposed in education. This progressively institutionalized marginalization on the part of the state created a feeling of inferiority among the Amazigh speakers who start building a hostile attitude toward the authorities, the Arabs, and the Arabic language. Youth shunned all forms of political participations and civic engagement, and as protests and revolts were brutally treated, waves of Amazigh immigrated to Europe for better life conditions as well as for freedom of speech.

3 The Light at the End of the Tunnel In general, human rights gilding shone after King Mohamed VI’s enthronement that was described as an era of great reforms. The clearest example of this radical transformation was the establishment of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission. The monarch’s wanted to reconcile victims of human rights abuses, such as torture, forced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests, committed by Makhzen (the governing elite) during the years of lead, with the state. Through victim hearings, archival research, and interviewing government officials, the committee investigated approximately 20,000 cases, resulting in a number of recommendations to the state including: reparations (financial, psychological, medical, and social), modification of the constitution, and ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), among others. Sixty years ago, the idea of a distinct and vibrant Amazigh identity existing in Morocco would have been roundly rebuffed as far-fetched and unrealistic. Today, the Amazigh case has been benefitting from this tolerant and ideology-free environment. In that, the new monarch bravely admitted the injustice upon the Amazigh ethnicity and inaugurated an unprecedented process to right some of the wrongs of

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its predecessor and repair the breaches between the Amazigh and the state authorities through bold initiatives and innovative proposals. The prime aim was to unite different fabrics of the Moroccan society to make of plurality, instead of singularity, a point of a solid socio-political cohesion. The first of these initiatives was the exceptional visit in 2000 of king Mohamed VI to the Rif region that was highly welcomed with open arms from the inhabitants. The visit was perceived as a sign of an implicit top down apology that would start a new era of recognition, tolerance, and democracy. Another act within this environment of reconciliation was on October 17th, 2001 when the state officially established the Royal Institute of the Amazigh culture (IRCAM) and endowed it with a $100 million budget. The institute is in charge of the development and the promotion of the indigenous languages and culture and of the development of Tamazight courses for Morocco’s public schools. The establishment of the institute is considered a clear and explicit recognition by the state of the pluralistic character of the Moroccan national identity, which is based on different foundations and determinants that combine the Amazigh, the Saharawi, the Hassani, the African, and the Andalusian. The importance of the institute is evident as it functions as a link between the Amazigh culture and the state, by granting it a set of important powers that aimed at integration and then gradual reconciliation. Two methods are characterizing the institute’s work: 1. Creating a direct relationship with the political authority through: a. Expressing their opinion to the king on all measures aimed at preserving the Amazigh culture. b. The institute’s participation with the government in implementing public policies related to its field, by including Tamazight in the educational, social, cultural, and media activities. 2. Entrusting the institute with everything that would implant and consolidate the Amazigh culture on the largest scale, and bring it closer to all Moroccans through: a. Carrying out research and studies in the Amazigh culture and encouraging researchers and experts in related fields. b. Helping universities to organize centers concerned with Amazigh linguistic and cultural research and development. c. Openness to the international environment by creating cooperation and partnership relations with national and foreign bodies and institutions interested in cultural and scientific affairs and seeking to achieve similar goals Accordingly, within the framework of its communication policy, the institute may conclude cooperation contracts and agreements in its name with national and foreign bodies, like all other national scientific and cultural institutes and centers. Indeed, the institute has concluded a set of agreements and partnerships with national and foreign institutions and universities including: • Agreement with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

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• Agreement with the University of Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, • An agreement with Tilburg University/Babylon Center in the Netherlands. This vibrancy is indicative of the state’s desire to grant this institute, which speaks in the name of the Amazigh culture, with all its socio-political and scientific rights granted to all other non-Berber centers and bodies. In 2002, the monarch made another move indicative of a liberalizing political system when he amended his grandfather’s 1958 decree by delineating that only a court could dissolve a cultural association. The change also created a 60-day deadline for the provincial government to acknowledge the formation of an association or changes to its membership or statutes (i.e., Law 75–00). Failure to provide a provisional receipt was deemed as an acceptable permit to continue operations. More interestingly, Tamazight script of Tifinagh is being taught as a compulsory school subject in primary schools to all Moroccan students. In most Maghreb states, this type of minority language recognition is an uncommon occurrence. Nowadays, the script of Tifinagh, alongside Arabic, is characterizing the Moroccan linguistic landscape. The script can be seen on traffic signals, public and private institutions, media, advertisement…etc. Additionally, the Amazigh activists and intellectuals have access to wider public audience through a multitude of Tamazight-language television and radio news broadcasts. Numerous government TV and radio channels have been established to address Moroccans in their native tongue and as a sign of a cultural diversity. With the flames of the Arab Spring ablaze throughout the region, the monarch quickly responded with a speech on March 9th, 2011 calling for a new constitutional reform. The new constitution recognizes Tamazight as an official national language and Amazigh as an integral part of the Moroccan identity. It is worth mentioning that if the first official step for reconciliation—far from slogans and speeches—was the establishment of the Royal Institute in 2001, the constitution of the Amazigh language was considered a very crucial turning point in the reconciliation process. In other words, it is an official recognition by the political authority in the state of constitutionally embracing and protecting the Amazigh cause. The recognition was mentioned with the first pages of the constitution within the preamble, whose messages are so sensitive in the engineering of constitutions worldwide. It has been stated also that all forms of discrimination on the basis of sex, color, belief, or culture will be prohibited and combated. This is a clear indication of the need for integration and reconciliation with the various Moroccan components without exclusion or discrimination. Plurality and diversity were obvious in Chap. 5 of the constitution in stating that the Arabic language is the official language of the state, and Berber is also an official language as a common asset for all Moroccans without exception. The constitution also spoke—within the same chapter—with an imperative tone- of the creation of a National Council for Moroccan Languages and Culture, whose mission in particular is to protect and develop the Arabic and Amazigh languages. Practically, in order to activate the official nature of the Amazigh and to concretize this constitutional element, a regulatory law has been put in place that specifies a road map for integrating the Amazigh into public life according to the following steps:

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– The integration of Tamazight in the field of education: in a gradual manner at all levels of education, from the primary to the higher levels, with the possibility of opening university courses for specialized research in the Amazigh language and culture. – The integration of Tamazight in the field of legislation and parliamentary work by providing simultaneous translation of the works of Parliament, as well as issuing a copy of the official newspaper in Tamazight. Such a fact enables Moroccan society, with its various components, to track the work of Parliament, from legislating laws, to monitoring the government …etc. Such a fact put an end to a long political alienation that a large group of Moroccan society was suffering from. – The integration of Tamazight in the media and communication. – Using Tamazight in departments and other public facilities, and including them in addition to the Arabic language in all official documents of the citizen, even in coins and banknotes. – The integration of Tamazight in public spaces, along with Arabic, within the headquarters of public administrations, embassies and consulates, airports and ports…etc. – The integration of Tamazight in the field of litigation both in the stages of research and investigation, as well as hearing the pronouncement of rulings. Hence, it is clear that reconciliation did not aim at extinguishing a momentary anger, or unleashing promises of formality as much as it sought to contain and actualize integration. And because it is a huge project in the life of any country that wishes to reconcile with itself and its subjects, the time factor plays a very significant role. Therefore, Moroccan laws tried to set a timetable for the implementation of all these requirements ranging from 5 to 15 years as a maximum for implementation. Many other gains are well under way. The Amazigh are impatiently waiting for the government’s recognition of the Amazigh New Year as a national paid holiday. In addition, it is expected that the qualifier term “Arab” to be dropped from the official news agency Maghreb Arab Press (MAP) to embrace and include all identity forms in Morocco. The government may also proceed to name streets, boulevards, and institutions after well-known Amazigh people as a symbolic gesture of recognition of their struggle for independence of Morocco.

4 Conclusion The Amazigh activists and intellectuals kept emphasizing the idea that the aim of their struggle is recognition of the place of Amazigh in the Moroccan identity beyond the folkloric representation of their culture for tourism and entertainment. State recognition of their culture and language was believed to be the elixir that would regain the Amazigh’s pride and dignity and reconcile them and the Moroccan state for a tolerant democratic socio-political inclusion of the Amazigh ethnicities. So far, the state approach of respecting and upgrading the Amazigh intangible heritage

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was welcomed as long as it is a starting point toward other tangible socio-economic achievements.

References Chafik M (2004) A brief survey of thirty-three centuries of Amazigh history. Publications de l’Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe, Rabat Dhannun TA (1989) The Muslim conquest and settlement of North Africa and Spain. Routledge, London Ennaji M (ed) (1991) Sociolinguistics of the Maghreb. Int J Sociol. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin Grandguillaume G (1983) Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb. Maisoneuve et Larose, Paris Hourani A (1991) A history of the Arab peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Moroccan Constitution. pmbl. http://www.sgg.gov.ma/Portals/1/lois/constitution_2011_Ar.pdf Suleiman Y (1994) Nationalism and the Arabic language: an historical overview. In: Suleiman Y (ed) Arabic sociolinguistics. Curzon Press, Surrey, pp 3–24 Youssi A (1995) The Moroccan triglossia: facts and implications. Int J Sociol Lang 1(12):29–43

The Muslim Custodian of King David’s Tomb Since 1529 al-Sayyid Sheikh Ahmad Dijani, the Jerusalemite (1459–1561) Amjad M. al-Dajani and Muhsen A. al-Dajani

1 Introduction Sufism has long been part of Islamic culture. Its beliefs are grounded in the same beliefs as mainstream Muslims. However, Sufis strive to moderate their desires for worldly riches through meditation on the divine purpose for creation. This practice reached its zenith under the Ottoman Empire when its leadership adopted Sufism as their official practice of Islam. Sufi dervishes managed to “capture the hearts and minds of a majority of the Sultan’s subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike”.1 After the Ottomans expanded into the Muslim Arab territories and ousted the Mamluks from Jerusalem in 1516,2 they followed several policies to strengthen their legitimacy in these Arab territories. This was particularly evident in Jerusalem after Sultan Sulieman the magnificent ascended to the throne. He erected various buildings and established institutions to legitimize Ottoman presence in the newly conquered city. He sent his famous architect Sinan to Jerusalem with Mustafa Pasha to renovate the Dome of the Rock, religious buildings, and mosques. He renovated the Umar Mosque, the Salahuddin Mosque, the Prophet Samuel Mosque, and the Sheikh Jarrah Mosque, with labor brought from Egypt.3 The Sultan ordered the construction of the Sabil channel, the digging of the Uzbek well, and the “Sultan’s Pool” adjacent to the Jaffa gate entrance of the old city of Jerusalem.4 He also established various institutions to administer daily life in the city. One of these institutions was the Union of the Honorable “Naqabat al-Ashraf”. It was a governmental body whose membership was exclusively open to descendants of the Prophet’s family called in the Muslim world al-Ashraaf. It had its own elected leader known as the Naqib, and its members “were exempted from

A. M. al-Dajani (&) . M. A. al-Dajani North Park University, Chicago, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_15

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paying taxes, and could be prosecuted only by their own council, not Ottoman authorities”.5 This council was made of a high ottoman official and members of the Naqabat al-Ashraf. To establish such an institution, it was necessary to gather intelligence on these families to discern genuine from fake claims of descent. Clearly, the Ottoman authorities had gathered and vetted information on these families because they issued official Ottoman certifications of family trees belonging to the al-Ashraaf across the empire. This enabled the Sultan to issue various edicts “faramans” tailored exclusively for these families, giving them critical custodianships and public posts in the Ottoman Empire. The status of these families gave them access to the educational institutions in the Ottoman capital of Constantinople and religious institutions like Al-Azhar University in Cairo.6 As a result, members of these families were literate and therefore appointed to various positions of authority in the Ottoman Empire.7 Sultan Sulieman established this policy to secure the allegiance of al-Ashraaf families because they held political weight with their respective local populations.8 In “Legitimacy and Notables in Ottoman Jerusalem”, Jordan Toone describes it as a policy to empower “local notables to oversee provincial government operations and administer the local population’s political, economic, and social affairs”.9 This was particularly true in the case of Jerusalem, where the Ottomans “secured legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the local population through the traditions and authenticity associated with the tomb of David and other prominent endowments given to the Dajanis”.10 Subsequent Ottoman sultans continued this policy to legitimize their representation of the Caliphate before their Muslim subjects.11

2 Sheikh Ahmad Dijani (al-Daoudi) Sheikh Ahmad Ali Dijani (al-daoudi) (1459–1561) was a member of one of those families.12 He was born near the city of Nablus and died at his residence in the Nabi Daoud neighborhood in Jerusalem. Numerous sources relate his direct descent of the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima and his cousin Ali bin Abu Talib, the fourth Caliph in Islam, through their second son Hussein (al-Sibti).13 He is Ahmad (al-Yassini), bin Ali (al-Yassini), bin Mohammad (al-Yassini), bin Yusef (al-Yassini), bin Hussein (al-Yassini), bin Yassin (al-Badri), bin Mohammad (al-Badri), bin Yusuf (al-Badri), bin Bader (al-Husseini), bin Yakub (al-Husseini), bin Muzaffar (al-Husseini), bin Salem (al-Husseini), bin Mohammad (al-Husseini), bin Mohammad (al-Husseini), bin Zaid (al-Husseini), bin Ali (al-Husseini), bin Hussein (al-Hassan/14al-A'raide al-Akbar/15Zu al-Dam'a),16 bin Zaid (al-Shahid),17 bin Ali (Zain al-Abidin), bin Hussein (al-Sibti), bin Ali bin Abu Talib, the husband of Fatima (al-Zahra). According to the ancestry DNA test of Sheikh Ahmad's descendants, the results state “…this lineage is found at substantial frequencies within the Cohen model haplotype lineage, as well as the presumed lineage of the Prophet Mohammed…”.18

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His family name was initially al-Yassini al-Badri in reference to his ancestors Sayyid Sheikh Yassin and Sayyid Sheikh Bader (al-Husseini). However, Sheikh Ahmad later became known as Dijani (al-daoudi‫ )ﺩﺍﻭﺩﻱ‬by the residents of Jerusalem because of his temporary residence in the Dijaniya village located 8 km near the city of Ramallah, later known as Janiya village,19 and his custodianship of King David’s tomb. Two titles his descendants adopted as their family name. According to oral tradition, he was asked by the Mukhtar of the Dijanya village to arbitrate a conflict between two families according to Sharia law. After finding in favor of the weaker family, he was threatened by members of the offending family demanding a change in his verdict. He decided to depart from that village to keep the verdict in place. During a meeting with the Mukhtar of that village, who initially asked him to adjudicate the conflict, Dijani informed the Mukhtar of his intention to depart. Against the requests of the Mukhtar to remain, Dijani determined that it would be best to leave, so the verdict would stand. Realizing that Sheikh Ahmad was committed to leaving, the Mukhtar requested that Sheikh Ahmad carry the name Dijani so that those who encounter him would connect this virtuous man with the Dijaniya village. From that event, the Sheikh carried the name Dijani to fulfill his promise to the Mukhtar. After leaving, the Mukhtar associated the failing crops that year with the Sheikh’s departure. He blamed the villagers for the way they behaved toward the Sheikh and declared dropping the letter “d” from the name of the village Dijaniya, which became “al-Janiya” meaning the “Guilty one”.20 After leaving the Dijaniya village, Sheikh Ahmad settled in the “Ibn Daoud Mosque”, which he caused to be built to protect the tomb. His residence was built in the mosque and expanded the structure into various houses for his children. He also established the “Zawyat Nabi Daoud” where numerous students gathered to learn from him.21 The area later became known as the Nabi Daoud neighborhood in reference to the King David Mosque and Zawyeh (Study Corner). Jerusalemites called Sheikh Ahmad “ibn Daoud” and called his descendants Daoudis, which means “those who belong to David” because of their custodianship of King David’s tomb. Official documents in the Sharia Court archives in Jerusalem confirm his custodianship over King David’s tomb. One document dated 10th Shawwal 968 AH (1560) declares that Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent dedicated Maqam Nabi Daoud to the Sheikh Ahmad Dijani and his descendants,22 in 1529.23 This endowment included “the gardens surrounding the tomb…the portion (16/24) of the entire vineyard next to the tomb…the cellar next to the tomb…used for the extraction of oil… the entire estate located next to the tomb in the outskirts of Jerusalem…the stables neighboring the tomb of al-Nabi Da'ud”.24 Toone observes: The initial inheritances reveal the status and authority of Ahmad al-Dajani and the Dajani family in Ottoman Jerusalem, as well as a politics of notables which developed between the Ottoman officials and notable families.25

According to the Waqf records, which were officially created at later dates than the actual dates stated in the Sultanic farmans, Sheikh Ahmad was also awarded several endowments, three of which were given by Sultan Suleiman himself.

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He received “the entire village of Sawiya in the district of Nablus,...the entire cultivated area of Ra’s Abi Zaytun,...the entire cultivated areas of ‘Ayn al-Janan, … the entire cultivated area of Bayt Sila neighboring the village of Buyutina,...the entire cultivated area of Jarbut, which is located near the village of Bayt Awniy,... and the entire cultivated area of Dayr’ Amir near the village of Fajus” in the district of Jerusalem.26 According to Toone, Sheikh Ahmad’s family “received a total of 19 waqf records, spanning a period of over 300 years”.27 He explains that “the endowments per se were impressive; yet coming from the ruler of the Ottoman Empire enhanced the significance of the endowments and added great prestige to the Dajani family almost immediately”.28 Sayyid Sheikh Ahmad Dijani was the recognized head of Sufism in Jerusalem during the sixteenth century. According to the manuscript (316/19) in the Assad Library in Damascus, he regularly gave sermons in the Aqsa Mosque, which made him well known as Sheikh Dijani. At one point, he had 16 disciples studying under him in Jerusalem.29 He had a considerable reputation in Sufi circles as “Qutub” (Pillar of the faith) of Sufism in Jerusalem, a title of distinction for leading Sufi scholars of his day. Several contemporary sources describe him as “the leader of the judicious and the beauty of the virtuous, Hazrat al-Sheikh Ahmad Dijani”.30 He studied under (al-Shareef) Ali bin Maymon al-Hassani al-Idrissi (1450– 1511), the Moroccan, where he forged a friendship with Sheikh-ul-Islam of Damascus, Muhammad Ibn' Arraq (1473–1526), the Damascene, who was also a student of Ali bin Maymon.31 Dijani was well educated in the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence but was especially attached to the Hanafi School of thought and was well versed in the Holy texts of the Qur’an. He would meditate for long periods spanning several days in isolation from his family members in a room his children used to call the “Khilwat al-Jad” (the grandfather’s isolation room). Little is documented about Sheikh Ahmad Dijani’s younger years after finishing his learning at his father’s hand. However, tradition speaks of him and other family members joining the Muslim armies in Granada to defend the declining Muslim regime in Spain against its enemies, which explains why the Ottomans sought to reward him.32 Afterward, he settled in the city of Fez-Morocco, for a time where he led pilgrim caravans to Jerusalem and Mecca as an occupation because of his native knowledge of these cities.33 During his stay in Fez, he was exposed to Sufism and studied under Ali bin Maymon (al-Hassani al-Idrissi). Ali bin Maymon (al-Hassani) lived in the city of Fez, where he was a judge. He was also a Sufi master who authored numerous publications like Nahaw al-Qalb: Sharh al-Ajrumyah [Towards the Heart], and Ghurbat al-Islam biwasitat Muttafaqa fi Misr wa al-Sham [Alienation of Islam by two types of Scholars of Egypt and Syria].34 After one of Sheikh Ahmad’s caravan trips and during his temporary stay in the Dijanya village, King David appears to him in a vision telling him, “save me Ahmad, for my rescue is in your hands”.35 He set out to the area described in his vision on Mount Zion to find it a dumping ground. He had it cleaned up and had the Ottoman authorities prohibit continued dumping in that area because he had announced his intention of building a mosque on that site. The Ottoman authorities had the Franciscans driven out from their one-room residence adjacent to the

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dumping area and permitted Sheikh Ahmad to build the mosque in 1524.36 The mosque was called the “Ibn Daoud” Mosque (Son of David Mosque),37 a title given to Sheikh Ahmad by Jerusalem residents. According to tradition, after the cleaning of the site was complete, King David reappeared to Sheikh Ahmad, informing him that he gained divine favor and will be granted two blessings. The first was to be granted numerous male descendants and the blessing would pass unto his descendants.38 According to a plaque still located in the King David mosque today, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent issued a faraman in 1529 making Sheikh Ahmad officially the custodian of King David’s tomb in Jerusalem. Numerous sources claim that Sheikh Ahmad was associated with other various “Barakah”, or blessings, usually interpreted as a sign of Divine favor. One of the famous Barakahs associated with Sheikh Ahmad al-Dijani happened during his meditation in the al-Aqsa mosque. The Prophet Mohammad appears before him in this vision, instructing him to improve his Arabic language skills. Sheikh Dijani asked the Prophet to enlighten his mind to learn the Quranic language.39 After receiving another vision, he sent a letter to Sultan Sulieman the magnificent with Sheikh Issa, who was traveling to Constantinople, foretelling the future Ottoman conquest of the Island of Crete.40 In appreciation of the good tidings, Sultan Suleiman issued a faraman ordering the Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem to connect a water supply to the baths in Sheikh Ahmad’s residence at the King David complex.41 These various Barakahs were documented in several sources like al-Nabhani’s Jami' Karamat al-Awliya,42 al-Ghazi’s al-Kwakib al-Saira,43 and a manuscript called Manaqib Shykh Ahmad Dijani [Appraisals of al-Sheikh Ahmad al-Dijani].44 Sheikh Ahmad received special deference from Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent.45 He was given substantial lands as a personal gift from the Sultan and received daily sustenance from the Ottoman government’s soup kitchen cauldrons.46 The Jerusalem Tekhiyeh el-Khasseki [Soup Kitchen] was a charitable endowment set up by the Sultan to feed the residents of Jerusalem. The Tekhiyeh el-Khasseki-Sultane means Convent of the favorite Sultana. Twice a day locals, pilgrims, and visitors, regardless of religion, received “one pound of bread and one bowl of soup, made with olive oil and some vegetables”, and “bread and rice prepared primarily for them in enormous cauldrons”.47 However, visitors were prohibited from removing their meals from the Tekhiyeh’s premises, except for “the Sufi master in Jerusalem, Shaykh al-Dajjani and his sixteen disciples”.48 They had a special privilege to take their daily meal allowance back to Sheikh Ahmad’s residence. They received eight and a half cups of food and thirty-four loaves of bread, while the locals received two loaves and one-half cup of food per person.49 Dijani’s standing with the Ottoman regime made him the natural conduit of people’s grievances and requests to the Ottoman governor. He would regularly travel to Damascus to meet with the governor to bring their requests to representatives of the Sultan. On one occasion, he traveled to Damascus in 1544 to present the various grievances and requests the people needed the governor to address.50 During this visit, he stayed in the residence of Sheikh Muhyeh din al-Arabi. On

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Friday, he was asked to give the Friday sermon at the Umayyad mosque in Damascus. According to Mohammad bin Mohammad al-Ghazi, the attendees were so impressed by Dijani’s sermon that they lined up to thank him for it.51

3 Conclusion Sayyid Sheikh Ahmad Dijani (al-daoudi) was highly esteemed in Sufi circles and by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent who bestowed various endowments upon him. He remained in Jerusalem until his passing, and his funeral was held in the “ibn Daoud” Mosque in 1561. He was buried in the Cemetery of Mamilla, which is in West Jerusalem today. He is the founder of the Dijani (al-daoudi) family dynasty, who expanded the King David complex and continued to oversee the location during the Ottoman, British mandate, and Jordanian rule of Jerusalem until 1967 when Israel occupied East Jerusalem. His descendants continued his legacy by growing their influence in the community as academics, professionals, and religious figures. They played essential roles in the religious and political life of the city. Religiously, his descendant Shakir bin Khalil Dijani was “appointed in 1810 as Mutawalli and nazir of the waqfs of two mosques, one in the village of 'Allar and one in Bayt Nuba. Another Dajani, Darwish bin Sulayman, was appointed shortly after that as Mutawalli of the tomb of a shaykh in (Emmaus)”.52 Furthermore, Husayn Afandi Salim al-Dijani al-Hanafi al-Khalwati al-Qadiri was the Hanafi Mufti of Jerusalem.53 The Afghani Qadiri Sufis and the Bayt al-Jilani Sufi branch of Jerusalem were under the Dijani family’s authority.54 Furthermore, the Mufti in Jaffa “during the Hamidian period was almost invariably a member of the Dajānī family”.55 Furthermore, Sheikh Ahmad’s descendants played an important role in the local festivals in Jerusalem. For instance, the Nabi Musa procession was an important religious festival that shaped the identity of the city. It would “set off from the al-Aqsā Mosque in an impressive religious celebration which included the governor, the sharīʿa judge and the most important officials, notables and Muslim religious dignitaries”.56 During this procession, members of four families would lead the procession carrying flags. The Dijani (al-daoudis) family carried two flags, the King David crest purple flag and their family crest flag.57 Politically, several of Sheikh Ahmad’s descendants occupied various critical political posts. Before 1863, military officers administered Jerusalem. However, their primary responsibility was to manage Ottoman forces in the city, as was the case with officer Ahmad Agha Duzdar al-Asali, whose military title was Governor of Jerusalem.58 The Ottomans established the Municipality of Jerusalem in 1863,59 after establishing the Municipality of Constantinople. In 1863, Efendi Abdul Rahman Dijani (al-daoudi), became the first Mayor of Jerusalem,60 administering the city from 1863 to 1869.61 Pasha Aref Dijani (al-daoudi) was appointed governor of Yemen and then Anatolia.62 He was later Mayor of Jerusalem from 1917 to 1918, when he resigned after British forces entered Jerusalem.63 Pashas Aref Dijani and Mūsā Kāzim al-Husaynī, were the only locals awarded the title “Pasha” by the

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Sultan, and who “served as kaymakams and mutasarrıfs in various parts of the Ottoman Empire”.64 However, their political engagement was never easy and came at a cost in the 1930s. Cambridge-educated lawyer, the eminent Hassan Sidqui Dijani (1899–1938), was elected to the Jerusalem Municipality Council on 28th of September 1934.65 He organized the Jerusalem 1936 Strikes,66 and advised Emir Abdullah of Transjordan.67 He was assassinated in 1938 by supporters of Haj Amin Husseini because of Dijani’s opposition to the latter’s tyrannical propensities, which led Hassan Sidqui to publish his resignation as Secretary of Hizb al-Ummah al-Islamya al-Filistinia Conference on September 30th, 1933.68 Sheikh Ahmad Dijani’s legacy continues today through his progeny, who continue to break ground in their respective fields. The most recent was Dr. Mohammad Suleiman Dijani (al-daoudi), who broke an Arab political taboo by taking 27 Palestinian students to the Auschwitz concentration camps in Poland in 2014.69 Notes 1. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 153. 2. Amy Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem, Suny Series in near Eastern Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 74. 3. Mohammad Issa Salihiya, “Al-Uthmanyon Wa Madinat Al-Quds (the Ottomans and the City of Jerusalem),” in Dirasat Fi Al-Turath Al-Thaqafi Li-Madinat Al-Quds (Studies on the Cultural Heritage of Jerusalem) ed. Muhsen Mohammad Saleh (Beirut, Lebanon: al-Zaytouna Center for 2010), p. 164. 4. Ibid., p. 198. 5. Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer Hasan Aruri, Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political History, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2006), p. 46. 6. Kamel M. Dkhlah, Filistine Wa Al-Intidab Al-Britani (Palestine & the British Mandate 1922–1939) (Beirut-Lebanon: Center for Publishing and Research 1974), p. 28. 7. Farsoun and Aruri, Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political History, p.47. 8. Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables.” in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East; the Nineteenth Century, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 41–68. 9. Jordan Toone, “Legitimacy and Notables in Ottoman Jerusalem: A Case Study of Bayt Al-Dajani Using Waqfs and Marriage Records,” SSRN (2004): p. 2. 10. Ibid., pp.35–36.

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11. Ibid., pp.51–52. 12. Ahmad; Veeder Mahmoud, Anna, Hidden Heritage: A Guide to the Mamilla Cemetery, Jerusalem, (Jerusalem: Emek Shaveh, 2016), https://emekshaveh. org/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Mamila-Engish.pdf. p.8.[Cited on Jan 7, 2022]. 13. Ahmad Qashashi, Al-Samt Al-Majid Fi Silasil Al-Tawheed (the Light of the Aura in the Remembrance of Him and His Majesty), 1st ed. (Hyderabad, India: al-Ma'arif al-Nizamya Press, 1909), p. 181. 14. Haidar Husseini al-Milani, “Hussein (Al-Hassan) Bin Zaid Bin Ali,” (2022), http://qadatona.org/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9% 84%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84/3414. [Cited Jan 5th, 2022]. 15. “Dajani Forum” “Dijani Family Tree”. [Cited Jan 5th, 2022]. 16. Ali Bin Ibrahim Fouda, The Simplified Al-Mashjar in the Genealogy of Al-Hasan and Al-Hussain 3 vols., vol. 3 (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Kutob Press, 2016), pp. 223–24. 17. Ibid., p. 222. 18. The Genographic Project, “Dijani Family of Jerusalem DNA Results”, ed. Y-DNA Haplotree (USA2015). 19. Mahmoud, Hidden Heritage: A Guide to the Mamilla Cemetery, Jerusalem. p. 8. 20. Ibid. 21. Bashir Barakat, Tarikh Al-Maktabat Al-Arabya Fi Bayt Al-Maqdess (the History of Arab Libraries in Jerusalem (Riyad, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal Center for Islamic Studies and Research, 2012), pp. 49–50. 22. Mahmoud, Hidden Heritage: A Guide to the Mamilla Cemetery, Jerusalem. p. 8. 23. Salihiya, “Al-Uthmanyon Wa Madinat Al-Quds (the Ottomans and the City of Jerusalem),” p. 191. 24. Toone, “Legitimacy and Notables in Ottoman Jerusalem: A Case Study of Bayt Al-Dajani Using Waqfs and Marriage Records,” p. 39. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., pp. 30–34. 27. Ibid., p. 30. 28. Ibid. 29. Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem, p. 120. 30. Salihiya, “Al-Uthmanyon Wa Madinat Al-Quds (the Ottomans and the City of Jerusalem),” p. 191. 31. Yusuf al-Nabhani, Jāmiʻ Karāmāt Al-Awliyāʼ 2vols., vol. 1 (Beirut, Lebanon: al-Maktabah al-ʻAṣrīyah, 2001), p. 548. 32. Toone, “Legitimacy and Notables in Ottoman Jerusalem: A Case Study of Bayt Al-Dajani Using Waqfs and Marriage Records,” pp. 28–29. 33. Ibid.

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34. Yusuf al-Hazymry, “Ali Bin Maymon Al-Ghmari (Abu Al-Hassan): 1450– 1511,” (2014), https://www.arrabita.ma/blog/%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-% D8%A8%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8% A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D9%85%D9%80%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-% D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9% 86-854-917%D9%87%D9%80-1450-1511/. [Cited Jan 5th, 2022]. 35. al-Nabhani, Jāmiʻ Karāmāt Al-Awliyāʼ 1, p. 548. 36. Ora Limor, “Sharing Sacred Space: Holy Places in Jerusalembetween Christianity, Judaism, and Islam,” in In Laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies in Crusades and Medieval Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar, ed. I. Shagrir, et al. (University of Michigan: Ashgate Press, 2007), p. 227. 37. Ibid. 38. Muhsen S. Dijani Daoudi, interview by Amjad M. Dijani, 2021. 39. al-Nabhani, Jāmiʻ Karāmāt Al-Awliyāʼ 1, pp. 547–48. 40. Salihiya, “Al-Uthmanyon Wa Madinat Al-Quds (the Ottomans and the City of Jerusalem),” p. 191. 41. Ibid. 42. al-Nabhani, Jāmiʻ Karāmāt Al-Awliyāʼ 1, pp. 547–48. 43. Mohammad Al-Ghazi, Al-Kwakib Al-Sa'ira Bi A'yan Al-Miya Al-Ashira (the Orbiting Planets with the Notables of the Tenth Century), 3 vols., vol. 3 (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1997), p. 109. 44. Mohammad bin Saleh bin Mohammad bin Ahmad Dijani, “Risala Fi Ziker Manaqib Al-Shaykh Saydi Ahmad Al-Dijani (Appraisals to Al-Sheikh Ahmad Al-Dijani),” ed. The National Library of Israel (Jerusalem, Ottoman Palestine: The National Library of Israel, 1753), 71B-87A. 45. Salihiya, “Al-Uthmanyon Wa Madinat Al-Quds (the Ottomans and the City of Jerusalem),” p.191. 46. Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem, p.74. 47. Ibid., pp. 75–78. 48. Ibid., p. 120. 49. Ibid., pp. 120–21. 50. Al-Ghazi, Al-Kwakib Al-Sa'ira Bi A'yan Al-Miya Al-Ashira (the Orbiting Planets with the Notables of the Tenth Century), 3, p. 109. 51. Ibid. 52. Toone, “Legitimacy and Notables in Ottoman Jerusalem: A Case Study of Bayt Al-Dajani Using Waqfs and Marriage Records,” p. 35. 53. Thierry V. Zarcone, Sufi Pilgrims from Central Asia and India in Jerusalem (Kyoto, Japan: Kyoto University Press, 2009), p.105. 54. Ibid. 55. Johann Bussow, Hamidian Palestine: Politics and Society in the District of Jerusalem 1872–1908, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy (Boston: Brill, 2011), p. 230.

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56. Ibid., p.184. 57. Ibid. 58. Kamel Asali, “Al-Quds Tahta Hukum Al-Uthmanyin (Jerusalem During Ottoman Rule, 1516–1831),” in Al-Quds Fi Al-Tarikh (Jerusalem in History), ed. Ibrahim al-Hassanat (Amman, Jordan: University of Jordan Press, 1992), p.236. 59. Falestin Naili, “The Ottoman Municipality of Jerusalem and the Application of the Tanzîmât Reforms in Jerusalem,” in The 10th International Conference for the History of Bilad al-Sham: Ottoman Tanzimat and its Implementations in Bilad al-Sham (Amman, Jordan: The Center for Documents and Manuscripts and the Study of the Bilâd al Shâm of the University of Jordan 2017), p. 3. 60. Nabil K. Al-Agha, Mada'in Filistine (Cities of Palestine) (Beirut, Lebanon: The Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, 1993), p. 60. 61. Bussow, Hamidian Palestine: Politics and Society in the District of Jerusalem 1872–1908, p. 554. 62. Adel Mana', A'lam Filastin Fi Awakhir Al-'Ahd Al-Uthmani (Notables of Palestine in the Late Ottoman, 1800–1918) (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestinian Studies 1997), p. 174. 63. Ibid. 64. Bussow, Hamidian Palestine: Politics and Society in the District of Jerusalem 1872–1908, 376. 65. “Fawz Hassan Sidqi Bek Dijani (Hassan Sidqui Dijani’s Win),” Filastine September 29, 1934. 66. “Etiqal Hassan Dijani Wa Saleh Abduh: Haza Anifa Fi Sukan Al-Quds. (the Arrest of Hassan Sidqui Dajani & Saleh Abduh Shakes Jerusalemites),” Filistine, May 6th 1936. 67. “Friend of Emir Shot: Fate of Moslem Politician,” Derby Evening Telegraph, October 13, 1938. 68. “Estiqalat Hassan Sidqui Bek Al-Dijani Min Secretaria Hizb Al-Ummah Al-Filistinia”, Filistine September 30th, 1933, p. 4. 69. Neta Alexander, “The Palestinian Professor Who Took Students on Auschwitz Trip and Paid a Heavy Price,” Newspaper, HAARETZ (2016), https://www. haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-the-palestinian-who-leadstours-through-auschwitz-1.5435444. [Cited Jan 5th, 2022].

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Farsoun SK, Aruri NH (2006) Palestine and the palestinians: a social and political history, 2nd edn. Westview Press, Boulder, Colo Fouda ABI (2016) The simplified Al-Mashjar in the genealogy of Al-Hasan and Al-Hussain [in Arabic] 3 vols, vol 3. Dar al-Kutob Press, Cairo, Egypt Hourani A (1968) Ottoman reform and the politics of notables. In: Polk WP, Chambers RL (eds) Beginnings of modernization in the Middle East; the Nineteenth Century, vol 427. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA Limor O (2007) Sharing sacred space: holy places in Jerusalembetween Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. In: Shagrir I, Ellenblum R, Riley-Smith J, Ḳedar BZ (eds) Laudem hierosolymitani: studies in crusades and medieval culture in honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar. Ashgate Press, University of Michigan, pp 219–231 Mahmoud A, Veeder A (2022) Hidden heritage: a guide to the mamilla cemetery, Jerusalem. Emek Shaveh, Jerusalem, 2016. https://emekshaveh.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/MamilaEngish.pdf [Cited on Jan, 5th 2022] Mana’ A (1997) A'lam Filastin Fi Awakhir Al-'Ahd Al-Uthmani (Notables of Palestine in the Late Ottoman, 1800–1918). Institute for Palestinian Studies, Beirut, Lebanon Naili F (2017) The Ottoman municipality of Jerusalem and the application of the Tanzîmât reforms in Jerusalem. In: The 10th international conference for the history of Bilad al-Sham: Ottoman Tanzimat and its implementations in Bilad al-Sham. The Center for Documents and Manuscripts and the Study of the Bilâd al Shâm of the University of Jordan 2017, Amman, Jordan, pp 1–11 Qashashi A (1909) Al-Samt Al-Majid Fi Silasil Al-Tawheed (the Light of the Aura in the Remembrance of Him and His Majesty), 1st ed. al-Ma'arif al-Nizamya Press, Hyderabad, India Salihiya MI (2010) Al-Uthmanyon Wa Madinat Al-Quds (the Ottomans and the City of Jerusalem). In: Saleh MM (ed) Dirasat Fi Al-Turath Al-Thaqafi Li-Madinat Al-Quds (Studies on the Cultural Heritage of Jerusalem). al-Zaytouna Center for 2010, Beirut, Lebanon, pp 161– 207 Shaw SJ, Shaw EK (1976) History of the Ottoman empire and modern Turkey, 2 vols, vol 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York Singer A (2002) Constructing Ottoman beneficence: an imperial soup kitchen in Jerusalem. Suny Series in near Eastern Studies. State University of New York Press, Albany The Genographic Project (2015) Dijani family of Jerusalem DNA results, edited by Y-DNA Haplotree. USA [Cited Jan 5th, 2022] Toone J (2004) Legitimacy and notables in Ottoman Jerusalem: a case study of Bayt Al-Dajani using Waqfs and marriage records. SSRN, 1–71 Zarcone TV (2009) Sufi Pilgrims from Central Asia and India in Jerusalem (in English). Kyoto University Press, Kyoto, Japan

Local Heroes: The Legacy of Christian Social Activists and Social Justice in the Middle East Eugene Richard Sensenig

Abstract This article deals with Christian social justice traditions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) using a comparative approach. Focusing on Lebanon as a case study, the trajectory of faith-based social welfare and social advocacy policy is explored from the time of the Great Plagues in the late Roman Empire, through the Great Famine of Mount Lebanon during WWI up until the revolutionary uprising (thawra) in the fall of 2019 and its ultimate failure in 2020. An attempt is made to determine why in the MENA progressive Christian movements have not exhibited the same vitality as was the case in the Global North as of the mid-nineteenth century and in many predominantly Christian regions of the Global South beginning with the anti-colonial uprisings in the twentieth century. The main cause for the weakness of progressive Christian movements in the MENA is located in the legacy of the Ottoman millet system which has been perpetuated within the sectarian power sharing mechanisms which are arguably at the root of the multiple crises now plaguing Lebanon. The author argues that the religious power elites (sulta) are one of the main pillars propping up systemic corruption in Lebanon and that currently the only Christian voices “speaking truth to power” are individual “local heroes” who base their social justice activism on both their personal faith and the traditions of Christian activism in other regions of the Global South. The article includes reference to an empirical study of 170 predominantly Christian social justice activists in the MENA, an overview of the best know “local heroes” in Lebanon, and an analysis of the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant social justice traditions in the MENA region from the mid-nineteenth century until today.

Social justice is a rare commodity in the Middle East. Focusing on the Lebanese experience, this article deals with the role played by faith-based Christian activists on the political Left. It traces the current conflicts in a highly sectarian environment E. R. Sensenig (&) Gender, Communications & Global Mobility (GCGM) Studies Unit, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Notre Dame University-Louaize, Lebanon, Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_16

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at the beginning of the twenty-first century back to the origins of modern Christian Leftist politics in nineteenth century Europe; and then back even further to the roots of the Christian social justice agenda in the centuries after the life of the historical Jesus Christ. The purpose of this exercise is to deal with several long-standing questions posed by scholars and activists alike. Although progressive, faith-based Christian politics originated in the Global North, it spread rapidly to many parts of the predominantly Christian Global South. Why was this not the case in the Middle East? More importantly, how can it be explained that when faced with choosing between three options—that is, either sectarianism, universal Christian charity, or a radical questioning of the socio-political power elite (“sulta” in Arabic)—most Lebanese Christians on the left have been unable or unwilling to speak truth to power. The reasons for this will be located within the logic of the nineteenth century Ottoman millet system and its perpetuation during the last hundred years in the form of confessional sectarianism. Throughout the Middle East, faith-based activism remained within the confines of social welfare and caregiving for the needy. It struggled unsuccessfully to break out of the logic of charity and paternalistic largesse, which was regularly used as a means to service and even discipline confessional constituencies and beat back the influence of the state and rising secular middle class elites. Instead of developing an emancipatory approach to faith and social justice, as was the case for example in Latin America, most Christians who were unhappy with the restrictions placed on them by confessionalism and clerical control opted out and embraced Nationalist, Liberal or Socialist, and later Feminist, ideologies within the secularist camp. This trajectory has been particularly evident in Lebanon over the last two centuries. In order to stake out the analytical territory at the outset of this study, a pandemic in the middle of the third century will be juxtaposed to a famine at the beginning of the 20th. Based on a wealth of secondary literature, the attempt will be made to illustrate that the vulnerability and marginalization of the Church at the time of the Plague of Cyprian (249–266 AD) allowed it to serve all of humanity, whereas the cooptation and subservience of the Church during the late Ottoman period encouraged a sectarian approach to charity during Great Famine of Mount Lebanon (1915–1918). Following this introductory section of the study, I will provide the reader with a much needed overview of the three strands of Christian Social Theory globally and then link their development to the interdependency of the Global North and Global South. Building on this foundation, the general trend away from progressive, faith-based Christian social activism will be compared to the one example in which, at least initially, mainstream Catholic Social Teaching and nascent Liberation Theology did take hold in Lebanon during the presidency of Fuad Chehab in the late 1950s and 1960s. At the end of this study, I will return to the present and demonstrate that both the historical development of the Christian Left and the current crisis situation are full of “local heroes” who break the sectarian mold on an individual basis but are unable to have an impact on the Church in an institutional and organizational manner. Reference will be made to an empirical survey which was carried out for this article over a year prior to the revolutionary “thawra” period

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in late 2019 and early 2020 in Lebanon. Linking it to the seemingly desperate situation at the present, I will maintain that we have seemingly come full circle and have most likely returned to a situation which would substantiate the claim that faith-based Christian politics is ultimately unable to speak truth to power. It should be noted here that this article was completed before the phase of economic collapse and state failure as of the spring of 2020.

1 Comparing Confessionalism (Taeefiya/‫)ﻃﺎﺋﻔﻴﺔ‬ to Sectarianism (Mazhabia/‫—)ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻴﺔ‬The Old and the New Confessionalism and sectarianism have long been considered impediments to expressions of Christian solidarity in what is now referred to as the Middle East North Africa (MENA). Dating back to the time of Christ, the issue of exclusion based on social class, gender, citizenship, and even age group has led to much controversy within the Church. At stake were initially two divergent approaches to social engagement within an ultimately unjust society. The more common approach was inherited from both the Hebrew and Greco-Roman traditions and assumed that what is today termed “identity politics” was justifiably the foundation for caring and giving. In the story of the Good Samaritan, the historical figure Jesus Christ broke radically with tradition by expanding solidarity to include society as a whole. Almost two millennia later, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Vatican expanded this approach even further in order to deal with the socio-economic causes of poverty, oppression, and suffering. The original dichotomy between constituency-based service and care for all of humankind has played an important role over the centuries. In the MENA region, confessionalism has structured interaction between Muslims, Christians, and Jews for well over a millennium and is based on the ancient Arab-Muslim concept of the People of the Book. The Ottoman Empire built on this foundation in order to bridge and integrate the region’s long-standing social, economic, and cultural divisions. Rooted in the realities of confessionalism, the Ottoman millet system mutated into what is today referred to as sectarianism during the radical transformation period within the region during the nineteenth century (Makdisi 2000; Rogan 2004). This shift from traditional confessionalism (taeefiya/‫ )ﻃﺎﺋﻔﻴﺔ‬to modern sectarianism (mazhabia/‫ )ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻴﺔ‬has important implications for an understanding of the turbulent anti-sectarian movements in the MENA today. The division of Middle Eastern society along denominational or confessional lines is deeply rooted in the realities of the region. Using these divisions in order to enhance the dominance of the socio-economic “sulta” and leverage its relationship with foreign powers transforms cultural and religious diversity into sectarian divisiveness and hostility. As mentioned above, I will trace Christian solidarity in the region from the Plague of Cyprian during the late Roman Empire to the Great Famine of Mount Lebanon during World War I in order to lay the foundation for an interpretation of

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ongoing social-political events. During both crises, the Church was in a similarly precarious position with respect to its social, political, and economic status. Christian responses to mass suffering and persecution during the Plague and the Famine were, however, quite different. It will be argued here that this disparity is primarily the result of the sectarian structures and mindset which was introduced to the region as a result of its integration into the global economy during the late Ottoman period. The rise of modern sectarianism in the MENA led to an undermining of the traditional Christian concepts of love of neighbor and love of enemy at the very moment at which these age-old beliefs were being transformed into modern concepts of solidarity, subsidiarity, corporatism, and the common good on a global scale. Thus, the MENA region found itself not only out of sync with developments in the Global North, but also unable to keep up with the rise of radical Christian solidarity movements in Latin America and the rest of Asia and Africa. The case will be made here that both class-based social justice movements and sectarianism are modern faith-based phenomena. Both are responses to the global market economy and the resulting undermining of traditional agrarian and artisan production. The anti-sectarian movements in the Middle East today initially appeared to be a long overdue realigning of Christian loyalty networkers, away from the pillarized “sulta” structures inherited from the mid-nineteenth century and toward a model prevalent in the rest of the Global South. It still remains to be seen whether the revolutionary Christians supporting the “thawra” in the MENA will be able to build on this momentum along the lines of similar faith-based social justice movements around the world, or whether “mazhabia” will prevail. As will be demonstrated below when dealing with the three strands of Christian Social Theory, progressive movements focusing on climate change, slavery, forced labor, and gender equality, as well as more traditional concerns such as access to welfare and infrastructure services, have been gradually mainstreamed into the social agendas of all branches of Christianity during the last two centuries. Although these issues are also at the center of concern in the Middle East, the root causes of environmental destruction, enslavement, racism, sexism, and the glaring gaps in access to healthcare, education, housing, and utilities such as water, power, and waste management are rarely dealt with from a faith-based perspective. This disparity between the MENA region and the rest of the Global South highlights the marginalization of the Left within Christianity in the MENA. Starting in the nineteenth century, the age-old dichotomy between focusing on one’s own community as opposed to caring for society as a whole was replaced by something new. With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, Christians were faced with the mass suffering caused by Liberal policies of laissez-faire capitalism and an upswing in radical Socialist revolutionary movements. They were confronted with the urgent necessity to take action and deal with human suffering and injustice from a more holistic perspective. The Roman Catholic Church in the Global North was the first to respond to this challenge. Because of its confessional and cultural proximity, Christians in Latin America soon followed suit. One of the most prolific expressions of this link between Christian faith and this new form of social activism is the statement attributed to the late Brazilian Roman Catholic

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Archbishop, Dom Hélder Pessoa Câmara: “When I give food to the poor, they call me a saint. When I ask why they are poor, they call me a communist” (Rocha 2000, 53). Câmara’s inclusive position is a reflection of the good news “of the new things” first codified by Leo XVIII in the Papal Encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891. Catholic Social Teaching (CST) is now well anchored throughout the world and has inspired and provided a role model for Protestants and Orthodox Christians interested in moving from traditional charity to a more radical social justice agenda, with one exception, the Middle East (Sensenig 2019).

1.1

Tracing Christian Solidarity from the Plague of Cyprian to the Great Famine of Mount Lebanon

As mentioned above, the response of the Church in the MENA to the third century Plague of Cyprian is exemplary of the inclusive approach to love of neighbor demonstrated in the biblical story of the Good Samaritan. It stands in stark contrast to the strategies followed by the Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant Churches during the twentieth century Great Famine of Mount Lebanon. During both periods, Christians in the Middle East were confronted with persecution, exploitation, and extermination at the hands of dominant state and religious authorities. The major distinction between the two periods was the level to which Christian communities had been assimilated into the power structures of the societies to which they belonged. Third century Christianity was still largely marginalized. By comparison, early twentieth century Middle Eastern Christians had been partially integrated into pillarized confessional communities based on the Ottoman millet system, which gave their respective leaders limited power vis-à-vis the central government in Constantinople, but enormous influence over their respective Catholic, Orthodox— and marginally also Protestant—constituencies. Third century Christians thus had little to lose during the Plague of Cyprian in the way of earthly wealth and power, but expected huge rewards on the spiritual level for their love of neighbor and love of enemy (Stark 1996, 73–94). Twentieth century Middle Eastern church leaders by comparison utilized the Famine—according to the most recent research on the topic (Tanielian 2018; Watenpaugh 2015)—to expand clerical control over their millets and further cement their spiritual influence within their pillarized constituencies. The Church set a high benchmark for Caritas, or unselfish neighborly love, during the Plague of Cyprian and the simultaneous, though unrelated, Decian Persecution. The Roman Empire had suffered from a series of plagues because of urban overcrowding coupled with the far-reaching nature of its trade and military expeditions, which often brought disease back to its large cities around the Mediterranean. The outbreak of a major pandemic throughout much of the Empire in 249 was followed within a year by the issuing of an edict by Emperor Decius in January 250 ordering annual sacrifices to the gods by everyone except the Jews upon threat of death. This resulted in the first systematic imperial persecution of

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Christians. Faced with a dual threat to their survival, i.e., at the hands of their pagan persecutors and through the rapid spread of contagious disease in their places of residence and business, third century Christians found a unique response which not only enhanced their stature in the eyes of their neighbors, but also set a precedent for coming centuries of believers (Stark 1996). At the peak of the Plague of Cyprian between 250 and 262 AD, up to 5000 people were dying on a daily basis in the city of Rome alone. Similar numbers were recorded in other major cities in the Empire. Christians at the time set up networks of charitable welfare services, caring for both their coreligionists and their pagans neighbors and thus potentially even those who were directly responsible for their persecution and death (Harnack 1908.I, 171–173). Reflecting back on this experience a century later, Emperor Julian chastised his own clergy for not living up to the Christian role model. According to Johnson, the Church at this time— ran a miniature welfare state in an empire which for the most part lacked social services. The Emperor Julian, seeking to revive paganism in the fourth century, tried to introduce similar charitable funds for the poor. In a letter ordering imperial clergy to set these up, he noted: “Why do we not observe that it is in their benevolence to strangers, their care for the graves of the dead, and the apparent holiness of their lives that they have done most to increase atheism?” (i.e., Christianity). (…) “The impious Galileans support not only their poor, but ours as well, everyone can see that our people lack aid from us” (1976, 75).”

Stark emphasizes that Julian’s faith-based charity campaign was a futile enterprise from the outset because there was no equivalent to the concept of a loving God in ancient Greek or Roman theology and philosophy. “Equally alien to paganism was the notion that because God loves humanity, Christians cannot please God unless they love one another. Indeed, as God demonstrates his love through sacrifice, humans must demonstrate their love through sacrifice on behalf of one another (1996, 86).” The Great Famine of Mount Lebanon is emblematic of the response of Christian communities to extreme suffering and pervasive injustice in the MENA. As opposed to the Ottoman Genocide against the Armenian population of the region during World War I, the Famine did not significantly disrupt existing social structures and left the Arab Christian millets largely intact at the end of the war. Recent research on this topic has benefited from a rigorous study of relevant archival material linking it to new research on humanitarianism and confessionalism in the Middle East (Tanielian 2018; Watenpaugh 2015). Much work remains to be done to test the assumption that the Famine played a significant role in promoting sectarianism and undermining attempts to secularize both the charity and social justice agendas. According to Tanielian, the Ottoman Tanzimat reform period had unleashed a set of countervailing forces pushing, on the one hand, for increased secularization based on integration into the global market economy and a strengthening of clerical economic and political power, on the other. The landed nobility were the overall losers during this period. In the three-way conflict between the clergy, bourgeoisie, and aristocracy, the Famine served as an unexpected and arguably unintentional catalyst tipping the balance of power in the favor of the Church elites within the Christian millets. The Maronite Church had gradually

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expanded its influence at the expense of the landed feudal classes in the semi-autonomous region of Mount Lebanon throughout the Tanzimat period, a process which continued uninterrupted leading up to the outbreak of war (Traboulsi 2007). However, the Ottoman reorganization and reform movement had, in combination with a gradual integration of agricultural production into the world market, also strengthened the influence of the bourgeoisie in the rapidly expanding coastal urban centers. The main structural vehicle facilitating the expansion of liberal, secular power in the region was the introduction of the Administrative Council (AC) for Mount Lebanon. In the years leading up to the war, the clergy reestablished close ties to historic adversaries renewing their alliance with the old notables focusing their efforts on maintaining the status quo in rural areas and countering the gains of the middle classes in the urban centers (Tanielian 2018). With the outbreak of the war, the Ottoman administration of its Arab territories became more severe. Progressive and anti-clerical forces suffered a significant setback when the Governor of Greater Syria Cemâl Paşa first weakened and then dissolved the liberal-minded AC. The pre-war clerical counter offensive against progressive reforms thus scored a decisive victory during the war. Ottoman oppression undermined “secular government, which was seated within a newly configured, reform-minded secular middle class and had increasingly challenged the church’s dominant political status. For the church, the war presented an opportunity to reverse this trend” (Tanielian 2018, 111). The unexpected side effect of this process was that efforts to provide aid during the Famine through the official agencies of the AC, and secular benevolent societies were largely sidelined leaving clerical charity as the primary source of relief for the general population suffering from poverty, starvation, disease. In Christian areas, this aid was linked to a campaign against “spiritual decay.” “The leadership strategically combined material distributions with prayer, services, hearing confession, and absolutions” (Tanielian 2018, 129). Although criticism of Church efforts to deal with the Famine was widespread at the time and remains prevalent to this very day within popular memory of World War I, there is little to no reliable evidence that the Maronite Church abused its position to profit directly from the crisis during the war years in a material sense. Tanielian has documented cases in which Greek Orthodox charities “acted on good investment opportunities, using the accumulated pre-war surplus” of their clerical benevolent societies in Beirut to expand their ownership of properties at the expense of impoverished property owners who were forced to sell. Such activities were, however, rare and only serve to highlight the otherwise exemplary efforts of the Orthodox charities throughout the country (2018, 179–180). Protestant charities benefited from the strong German military presence in the Ottoman Empire as well as American neutrality until 1917 and were able to provide limited amounts of famine relief during the war years. In all cases, the Christian charitable organizations claimed that they aimed at serving all inhabitants of the region, whereas archival material and contemporary reports indicated that aid was compartmentalized along sectarian-pillarized lines based on the logic of the millet system (Tanielian 2018; Watenpaugh 2015).

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In summary, whereas the early Church took a revolutionary stance toward solidarity and love of enemy during the third century Plague of Cyprian, the modern, pillarized Maronite, Orthodox, and Protestant Churches in the MENA during the twentieth century Great Famine of Mount Lebanon largely refrained for radical responses toward human suffering caused by systemic oppression and exploitation. As will be demonstrated below, this stark contrast between the two cases can largely be explained by the integration of the Church into the Ottoman millet system. Not only did Christian leaders not speak truth to power during World War I, but they also utilized the crisis to further cement their control over their respective millets and push back against attempts to secularize state social services during this period. This tendency was to play an important role in determining the future development of the Christian social justice agenda in the following century. Furthermore, social services of all kinds became an important tool in the hands of sectarian leaders to help carry the system of patron-client loyalty from the Ottoman period over to the establishment of an independent Lebanon.

2 Overview of Christian Social Theory—CST, PSE, and OST and the MENA The Arab states with a significant Christian population, which were carved out of the former Ottoman Empire, were all either directly ruled or significantly influenced by the French and British. After the Russian Revolution, external Eastern Orthodox influences in the MENA declined drastically. Germany all but disappeared as a foreign power and was replaced by a new international donor and power broker, the United States of America. Italy’s influence on the Christian communities in the Middle East was comparatively minor, as were other imperialist states with a strong Christian social legacy, such as Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Because of the important role played by the various Catholic denominations in the MENA, the Vatican enjoyed enormous prestige. In order to understand the interdependency between the Global North and Global South with respect to faith-based social justice discourse, the following overview of all three strands will be provided. The foundations of modern Christian social thought are rooted in the impact of the Industrial Revolution, from the 1760s to the 1850s, depending on the country. The first wave of massive technological innovation in manufacturing, transportation, and communication—and the faith-based responses to it—were centered in Great Britain, Belgium, and the United States, and somewhat later in France, Germany, Sweden, and northern Italy. Rapid industrialization occurred first in the predominantly Protestant areas of Northern and Central Europe and North America, and spread later to the Catholic countries, with Belgium being the exception. The Eastern Orthodox regions of Europe remained largely outside the realm of the First as well as partially the Second (c. 1870–1914) Industrial Revolutions. The lives of the Christians within the Sunni-Muslim Ottoman Empire and Shia-Muslim Persian

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Empire were for all extents and purposes rarely directly impacted by both Industrial Revolutions. CST in the Global North and South is rooted in the concept of corporatism which sees a complex capitalist society as a replication of the body of Christ, based on the biblical concept of “many members in one body” (Romans 12:4). Although the right to form labor unions and bargain collectively was already well established from a Roman Catholic perspective in 1891 in Rerum Novarum, Pius XI anchored corporatism more specifically within Catholic dogma in Quadragesimo Anno in 1931. §93. The associations, or corporations, are composed of delegates from the two syndicates (that is, of workers and employers), respectively, of the same industry or profession, and as true and proper organs and institutions of the state, they direct the syndicates and coordinate their activities in matters of common interest toward one and the same end.

It should be noted here that, as opposed to the authoritarian model prevalent in Fascist regimes in Italy and Austria, or in the Argentinean Justicialist system of Juan Peron, Catholic corporatism is purely voluntary in nature. “Anyone is free to join a syndicate or not, and only within these limits can this kind of syndicate be called free” (Quadragesimo Anno, §92). CST sees workers and employers “syndicates” as the building blocks upon which social justice can be constructed from the ground up using the grassroots principle of subsidiarity as a guiding light. Accordingly, all decisions related to social justice should be made on the lowest possible level with the intervention of the central state considered legitimate only as an option of last resort (Shuck 2005). This approach requires that the Church plays an important role as a champion of the social needs and protection of the rights of all members of any given society. These encyclical benchmarks will be applied below to the social thought and activities of the Catholic Church in Lebanon, which includes the Maronites, Melkites (Greek Catholics), Syriac, Chaldean, Armenian, and Latin Catholics, as well as their individual members. Social justice within the Protestant tradition deviates from the Catholic role model in many ways. Although the predominantly Protestant countries of Great Britain, the Netherlands and later the United States and Germany already had a strong colonial presence in the Global South during the early years of European imperial expansion, their respective church leadership did not develop a social doctrine similar to that of the Vatican until well into the twentieth century. Protestant Social Ethics (PSE) is traditionally divided along the lines of the three main centers of the faith, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States (Long 2015). Although German Catholics such as Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler played a leading role in establishing CST at the end of the nineteenth century, German Protestants paid little attention to the Catholic theological and political role model positions at the time. Von Kettler’s “Die Arbeiterfrage und das Christenthum” (The Labor Issue and Christianity 1864) was a highly practical treatise on the nature of capitalist exploitation and his concept of subsidiarity ultimately found its way into the above-mentioned encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. Catholic “Solidarismus” gave this thinking a concrete perspective of achieving

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Christian Socialism in the foreseeable future (Grebing et al. 2005). German Protestant social thinking, however, was far less focused on solving the urgent problems facing the working class at the time through the agency of the Church. Basing its approach on the thinking of Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Ernst Troeltsch, and Max Weber, Evangelical Social Ethics (ESE) focused on analyzing the relationship between believers and the state in a fallen world. As opposed to the concept of subsidiarity in the case of Catholicism, ESE emphasized the guiding hand of the social welfare state (Sozialstaat) within a Protestant majority nation. Combined with a more traditional charitable concept of “inner mission,” preaching salvation to the recipients of Protestant Church welfare, and self-help projects aimed at encouraging members of the marginalized working class to pull themselves out of poverty, ESE focused on “feeding the poor” and allowing the supposedly neutral welfare state to ask the right questions about “why they were poor” and find the proper solutions for the overall social malaise. The German Protestant model can thus be considered state-centric as opposed to the grassroots subsidiarity approach prevalent among German Catholics. Because of Germany’s late unification and limited colonial expansion, ESE had little direct impact on the Global South, but it did have a decisive influence on its British and American coreligionists. Compared to ESE in Germany, both Anglican Social Theology (AST) in Great Britain and the Protestant Social Gospel (PSG) in United States were developing in largely secular societies in which the influence of the Protestant and Catholic Churches was waning throughout the 19th and early twentieth centuries (Dackson 2012, 630). Significant for this study is the assumption among most Protestants active in the tradition established by Troeltsch, but also within the Anglo-American churches, that Christians in a secular society should witness to their faith directly through good deeds (“feed the poor”) and appeal to the constitutional-democratic state and secular society at large to deal with social evil (“ask why they are poor”). The most pronounced example of this state-centric approach within American PSG was the 1908 Social Creed rooted in Walter Rauschenbusch’s concept of Christianizing the Social Order (Long 2015, 94). More recent manifestations of PSE can be found in the African-American civil rights movement, the anti-Apartheid movement in Southern Africa and the various church-based sanctuary movements in the Global North, as well as global faith-based solidarity supporting migrant workers, refugees, and displaced persons. The German, British, and American Protestant state-centric approaches to social justice are important here because they impacted the thinking of the newly formed Protestant Churches in the MENA region. Along with the direct influence that the British had in the Middle Eastern countries with significant Christian populations including Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Sudan during the age of imperialism and the interwar mandate period, American and German missionaries where very active throughout the Ottoman Empire (Masters 2001; Braude 2014; Sharkey 2017) during the nineteenth century and have played a pronounced role in shaping the trajectory of the social justice activities of the Protestant Church to this very day (Watenpaugh 2015).

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Finally, the social justice traditions of the Orthodox Church are of particular importance considering that the overwhelming majority of all MENA Christians belong to this faith community. The theological, political, and ultimately financial tie between the MENA Orthodox communities and the Global North are, however, much weaker than in the cases of the region’s Catholics and Protestants. The Eastern and Oriental Orthodox are indigenous churches and trace their existence back to the early Christian communities during the period of the late Roman Empire in today’s MENA region. All Protestants and many Catholic confessions trace their founding back to either homegrown schisms within the predominantly Orthodox tradition, to interference in the region by the Latin Catholic Church in Europe, or missionary activity on the part of European and American Catholics and Protestants. The Maronite Catholic Church-based primarily in Lebanon- is the most significant, but not the only, exception to this picture (O’Mahony and Flannery 2010; Sharkey 2017). The almost complete independence of the Arab and Armenian Orthodox Churches from developments in the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe during the centuries of rapid industrialization in the Global North prior to World War I (about 1760–1914) adds an additional layer of separation between social justice traditions in the MENA and rest of the Orthodox world. One mitigating circumstance is the membership of most Orthodox Churches in both the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Middle Eastern Council of Churches (MECC) which encourages them to share a global perspective on social justice agenda-related issues. The MENA is unique in that although the Roman Catholic Church is not a member of the WCC, most Arab Catholic confessions have joined the MECC. The most significant distinction between the Orthodox Christians on the one hand and the Catholics and Protestants on the other is the delayed and limited influence of industrialization and globalization on the predominantly Orthodox regions throughout the world. As described above, CST was a direct response to the horrendous impact of advanced capitalism on urban laborers, marginalized agrarian workers, and traditional craftsmen and merchants whose enterprises were being decimated by the competition of the large corporations. Rerum Novarum offered a faith-based alternative to the abuses of laissez-faire Liberalism and the threats of revolutionary Socialism. Protestant responses along similar lines quickly followed suit in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. This was not the case in the Orthodox heartland of Czarist Russia, Ottoman Turkey, or the newly independent Balkans states of Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, or Serbia. Following the Russian Revolution, the country rapidly industrialized. However, Orthodox Social Thought (OST) was not able to prosper under Soviet-style totalitarianism, which spread to most of the Balkans after World War II. As Novik (1998) and Knorre (2018) have convincingly illustrated, the causes for the weakness of social theory in the Orthodox world are partially structural and partially inherent in the theological tenets of the faith itself. Both the Mongol–Tatar yoke (about 1240–1480) which isolated Russia from the neighboring Orthodox majority countries in the south and the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans (1453) have distinguished “the “Orthodox world” from Western Christianity (by) the fact that large parts of this

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world have known long periods of political repression” (Hoppe-Kondrikova et al 2013, 202, 207). Furthermore, economic underdevelopment and a lack of freedom rooted in foreign domination went hand-in-hand with long periods of Czarist and Soviet state control of social affairs and social welfare discourse. It was only after the fall of Communism as of 1991 that OST was able to develop its own authentic voice (Payne 2014; Encyclical Crete 2016; Gärde 2017). The traditional reluctance of the Orthodox Church to grapple with its role in a globalized society has, however, not been overcome to date. By comparison, Protestant and Orthodox social theories do have one key characteristic in common, which distinguishes them from CST. Whereas the core Catholic concepts of solidarity, subsidiarity, corporatism, and the common good are rooted in a perception that central state intervention in the social justice agenda should be an option of last resort, PSE and OST are highly state-centric. Of interest to this study in particular are modern-day divergences from the “one body” Catholic principal of corporatism which might prove to be similar to the traditions of confessionalism in the MENA. These include Liberation Theology (LT) among Catholics on the Left in the Global South (Wielenga 1999) and the politically and economically conservative thinking of far-right Catholic luminaries ranging from Julius Evola to Steve Bannon in the Global North. Whereas the reactionary ideology of the Alt-Right refers back theologically to the pre-secular thinking of seventeenth and eighteenth century European theocracy, LT is a uniquely modern blend of Catholicism and Marxism and as such violates the principals of subsidiarity and corporatism from a Leftist perspective. Archbishop Hélder Câmara is considered to be one of the early thinkers laying the groundwork for LT, but not formally part of the larger movement. Led by his contemporaries Leonardo Boff in Brazil, Gustavo Gutiérrez in Peru, Juan Luis Segundo in Uruguay, and Jon Sobrino in Spain, LT has been accused of an illegitimate synthesizing of revolutionary state-centric theology and CST, thus compromising the subsidiaric principal of autonomy in labor-employer relations. With respect to the MENA region, the only example of an explicitly LT-based movement, which bears some similarity to its Iberian role model, can be found within the ranks of Palestinian Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants, who have linked their struggle for peace, freedom, and social justice to the traditions of CST, as well as to faith-based Protestant anti-racism movements in the United States and Southern Africa (Raheb 2012). Their focus is, however, primarily on national liberation and not on class conflicts within Palestinian society.

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3 From the Millet System to Democratic Corporatism: The Foundations of Confessional and Sectarian Social Justice Discourse Christian Social Teaching has made tremendous strides since its introduction in the decades prior to World War I in Europe and North America. It was severely tested and sometimes failed during the period of European Totalitarianism in the 1920s to 1990s, often unable or unwilling to stand up to the dual threats of Fascism and Soviet Communism and their intentional perversion of the corporatist project. As described above, real corporatism as envisioned by CST is voluntary, democratic, and sees the state as an agent of last resort. It champions the rights of organized labor and cooperatives for the poor to help them fight for better infrastructure and social services. It embraces the inherent conflicts between workers and employers and attempts to transform them into a source for social change for the betterment of all. A foundational element of CST is the comparison of society in general to the body of Christ, as exemplified in biblical verses such as 1 Corinthians 12:24–26. But God has put the body together, giving greater honor to the parts that lacked it, so that there should be no division in the body, but that its parts should have equal concern for each other. If one part suffers, every part suffers with it; if one part is honored, every part rejoices with it.

As opposed to the Global North or Latin America, the cross-cutting cleavages dividing the peoples of the MENA along the lines of identity and belonging are rooted more in religion than in loyalties based on social class. The recognition of special rights and protections for non-Muslims in the region can be located in the millet system which according to Sharkey dates back to the sixteenth century. The modern understanding of the concept, as it relates to twenty-first century confessionalism, is rooted in more recent developments in the Ottoman Empire related to reforms in its administrative system. According to the logic of the millet system, the “state tolerated diverse religious communities but the religious communities had to tolerate each other, too: they all had a stake in keeping the peace and maintaining public order” (Sharkey 2017, 82). Within these millets, Muslims, Christians, and Jews enjoyed semi-autonomy with respect to their religious, cultural, and social needs and practices. Important for this study, the Muslim concept of “waqfs,” or social welfare associations, originated in Islam, but was soon embraced by Jews and Christians in terminology and in practice. Masters, Braude, and Sharkey have all argued that the millets were not only important with respect to the relationship between Christians and the Muslim state but also helped regulate power relationships between the various religious confessions. Thus, the Greek and Armenian Orthodox made good use of the millet system in order to ward off the encroaching political and cultural hegemonic expansion of the Catholics and Protestants from Europe. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the Orthodox were forced to relinquish their religious domination of Christianity in the Ottoman Empire, as a large number of Catholic and Protestant millets were eventually recognized and

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given equal rights. “The nineteenth century saw what can only be described as the “cracking of the shell” of the traditional religious structure in the Ottoman Empire as schism followed schism and the state tried to regularize and regulate” (Deringil 2012, 7). This diversification of recognized religious communities also facilitated a rapid increase in the number and function of social welfare providers leading to the sectarian-consociational system which exists today in the MENA region. For many centuries, the millet system also had a sinister counterpart, namely the “dhimmi” status which relegated non-Muslims to the position of second class citizens. This discriminatory practice was largely eliminated by the mid-nineteenth century through a series of reforms which attempted to create a new image of the Ottoman people seen less as subjects and more like citizens. Importantly, although the new policies abandoned the classification of non-Muslims as “dhimmi,” it maintained the millet system which was benefiting not only the central state but also the leaders of the respective confessional pillars. “It is worth emphasizing, nevertheless, that the Ottoman state after 1856 continued to recognize non-Muslims as members of millets, that is, religious communities endowed with corporate identities resting on the cultural life of their places of worship and associated institutions (such as church-run schools)” (Sharkey 2017, 136). The nature of these corporate entities is important when considering the interface between the Ottoman millet system and the Latin Catholic concept of corporatism. In Kettler’s, “The Labor Issue and Christianity” (1864) workers and employers associations should attempt to regulate their affairs autonomously, with the benevolent state looking on and intervening only when this collective bargaining process broke down. The mid-nineteenth century Ottoman state was a bystander of a completely different nature. Whereas it allowed the Christian millets the freedom to regulate their own affairs, it viewed the clergy and laity of each confessional pillar as an extended arm of the power of the state in the region. According to Hathaway (2008, 192): “Unlike previous regimes, the Ottoman central authority was most concerned with the lay leadership of these communities, as opposed to rabbis, bishops, and even patriarchs, for the lay leaders ensured that the communities paid their taxes to the imperial treasury.” Christian lay leaders used their abundant economic resources, preferential status with the Ottoman authorities, ties to European powers and trading companies, and the loosening of the “dhimmi” restrictions on construction and commerce to increase their influence within their confessional pillars exponentially. By donating large amounts of money to the operating expenses of churches, schools, hospitals, and other welfare and cultural services, they expanded their position throughout the nineteenth century. Together with their respective clerical leaders, they applied pressure on the Ottomans to maintain the privileges of the millet system which was arguably benefiting them more than the central government in Constantinople by this time (Sharkey 2017, 117). This power sharing arrangement between the sectarian commercial and religious elites within the MENA region continues to dominate politics and social life to this very day. Although it clearly contradicts the “body of Christ” universalism prevalent in European Catholic corporatism, the sectarian-confessionalism of the respective MENA Christian communities has proven to be resilient over time.

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Following the defeat of Fascism in Europe in 1945 and the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1991, Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox alike attempted to deal with the legacy of Christian collaboration with totalitarian regimes and reinvigorate faith-based workers organizations and cooperatives. Leaders such as Cardinal Joseph Cardijn in Belgium, Mayor of Florence Giorgio La Pira, co-founder of the Catholic Workers Movement in the United States Dorothy Day, and French social reformer Louis-Joseph Lebret, all drew consequences from their experience with Fascism, systemic racism, as well as religious and ideological oppression to promote democratic corporatism in the Global North and the recently independent European colonies of the Global South. This was largely successful, after many detours as in the case of Latin America in the 1960s–1980s, except in the MENA region. The short-lived Lebanese reform period between 1958 and 1964 under the presidency of Fuad Chehab is, however, an exception to the rule. It stands out as the one example of a faith-based social justice experiment which tackled the root causes of inequality, oppression, and underdevelopment (“asked why they are poor”) in the Arab world without sacrificing the higher ideals of rule of law and a dedication to the democratic principles of checks-and-balances. The Chehab administration is often portrayed as the last attempt to combat the sectarian tendencies prevalent in the Lebanese political system by introducing the social justice principals designed and championed by the above-mentioned French Dominican social scientist, labor union activist, philosopher and pioneer of development ethics, Louis-Joseph Lebret. Founder of IRFED (Institut international de recherche et de formation éducation et développement), Lebret attempted to apply mainstream CST to Lebanon between 1960 and 1964. IRFED’s declared goal was to adapt CST to the needs of the Global South, in particular in Latin America and the former French colonies in Africa and Asia. Under Chehab, IRFED reforms enjoyed an early phase of success in the 1960s. After the completion of his six years in office Chehab respected the constitutionally mandated one-term limitation for the presidency, refusing to change the constitution to extend his mandate. Although IRFED’s reform policies were unable to survive the push-back from the sectarian forces opposed to CST-based policies (Salibi 1966; Verdeil 2003), they did have a lasting impact of the Christian Left. Combined with the social and infrastructure development strategies championed by the Chehab government, IRFED viewed close cooperation with advocacy and service-oriented NGOs as a key strategy to weaken the sectarian elites. This prompted the launching of multi-confessional and anti-sectarian associations such as the Mouvement Social Libanais (MSL) which was unique in that it signaled an attempt to shift from charity to rights-based Christian social activism (Karam 2006). (…) these new voluntary-based associations—fueled by the supportive framework provided by the Chehabist state, by the growing numbers and influence of students, and by the increase in the size and wealth of the country’s middle classes—established themselves as prominent players in Lebanon’s pre–civil war public sphere. Perhaps the most symbolically important of these was le Mouvement Social Libanais (MSL), founded in 1956 by Gregoire Haddad, a Greek Catholic bishop with a long-standing interest in promoting the social gospel well before Vatican II. Motivated by a vision of promoting “comprehensive

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secularism” within Lebanon, the MSL’s main activities revolved around the promotion of social development within the remote, often Muslim, areas of the country through the establishment of medical clinics, social development centers, and the recruitment of volunteers from all of the various regions and communities of the country (Kingston 2013, 63).

Although the work of Louis-Joseph Lebret and Grégoire Haddad was highly impactful, it did not enable the Leftist Christian principles upon which is was based to prosper in Lebanon. With the exception of the MSL, progressive Christian organizations focused primarily on service provision, training, and awarenessraising and not on empowering the poor and marginalized to struggle for their own rights (Jawad 2009; Hamd 2012). Movements encouraging the fight for workers’ rights, improved social services and access to infrastructure did not base their work on Christian faith and spirituality, or the tenets of CST, PSE, and OST as was the case for example in Latin America, Africa, or elsewhere in Asia. This general tendency continued throughout the years of the Civil War in Lebanon, the post-war reconstruction and the decades leading up to the current anti-sectarian protests which began in the fall of 2019. As opposed to the international experience with Fascism and Soviet Communism, there has been no great reckoning with sectarian corporatism in Lebanon. The consequences of this failure are evident in the chain of crises the country is currently experiencing.

4 Returning to the Source—Christian Approaches to Power and Justice In preparation for the writing of this article, an empirical survey on the experience of the Lebanese with the Christian Left was designed and carried out in 2019. It was completed and integrated into the first draft of this text in the fall of the same year, immediately prior to the outbreak of the anti-sectarian “thawra” on 17 October. Based on the analysis presented above, an attempted was initially made to discover the perceptions and positions of both participants in and analysts of Christian welfare and social justice activism in the MENA region. The survey of a total of 170 potential respondents and the interviews with 12 key informants in the field distinguished between three approaches to mitigating poverty, countering inequality, and improving access to basic services and infrastructure. These three political options were analogous to the theological alternatives presented above. At issue was whether advocacy, training, and care giving is pillarized along confessional lines or whether attempts were being made to deal comprehensively with the social needs of recipients irrespective of their religious affiliation. These two charity-based alternatives were then juxtaposed to a rights-based understanding of social justice in which both clergy and laity not only “feed the poor” but “ask why they are poor,” along the lines of Hélder Câmara. Respondents were also asked if they agreed with the positions currently taken by Christian institutions and activists and whether they saw a direct link between the various forms of charity covering

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the basic survival needs of the poor and the quality of social and cultural service provision (education, sports, healthcare, housing) and infrastructure (water, power, waste management, transportation, and communication) networks. Finally, the issue of whether Christians have a faith-based, scriptural, and spiritual obligation to fight poverty and structural sin was dealt with. Along the same lines as the literature on faith-based social welfare and religion in the Middle East (Jawad 2009; Kingston 2013), the overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that Christian welfare and social justice activity are routed primarily along confessional lines. Respondents were divided on whether such activity should transcend traditional confessional lines or not. Most significantly for this study of the Christian Left in the region, none of the interview partners or the 53 questionnaire respondents agreed that Christians in the MENA would ever speak truth to power and criticize the religious and secular leaders of their respective confessional pillars in the foreseeable future. This position was also shared by the handful of respondents from other Arab countries. A detailed analysis of this survey was removed from the final version of this article, which was completed at the beginning of 2020 because, as it then seemed, the results were no longer applicable and had been clearly “punished by history” during the anti-authoritarian and anti-sectarian “thawra” which was still ongoing and appeared to be succeeding. At the time of this final writing, the revolution in Lebanon had failed, and sectarianism and oppressive clerical corporatism had conclusively reasserted themselves. The original conclusions of the empirical survey were apparently correct after all. Faith-based Leftist opposition to the socio-economic and clerical “sulta” is unlikely, if not impossible, in Lebanon in the foreseeable future. However, the survey, made of up closed ended and semi-structured open ended questions, also included an open ended set of questions at the bottom of the questionnaire, which yielded interesting results and might provide some indication about the future of Christian Social Theory and the Left in the MENA. In reference to Hélder Câmara, all interview partners, as well as those survey partners whose responses had enabled a follow-up loop, were asked the following guided questions. Are you aware of the history of social welfare in the MENA region? Are you familiar with any faith-based social justice movements in the Global North and Global South? Can you tell me about individual Christians who were or are active in speaking truth to power by asking why so many people are poor?

The responses of Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox survey and interview partners deviated significantly. Grégoire Haddad was at the top of almost all respondents lists, followed by various Orthodox leaders such as the Metropolitan of Mount Lebanon George Khodr or the Orthodox Youth Movement (MJO) leader Costi Bendaly. Whereas Orthodox respondents tended to choose social justice leaders from the ranks of their leading clergy, this was seldom the case for Catholics and even rarer for Protestants. Many Maronites mentioned Youakim Moubarac, a Maronite priest who founded the Lebanese Development Cooperative based on the principle of “basic ecclesial communities” established in Latin America. Afif

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Osseiran, a Latin Catholic priest who converted from Shia Islam and was primarily involved in promoting projects focusing on homeless youth and impoverished working class children, was also mentioned by many respondents, along with Majdi Allawi, a Maronite priest who also converted from Shia Islam and founded the association Bonheur du Ciel, which helps young drug addicts. Several secular Leftist respondents mentioned the “Red Priest of Batroun,” Mtanio (Tanos) Men’em, a Maronite priest and village schoolmaster in the 1950s with openly Leftist leanings who worked on a blend of Catholicism, Islam, and Marxism. According to these respondents, Men’em was well known for championing the needs of the poor in his parish from a political perspective. His legacy has, however, yet to be studied in a rigorous manner. Reference was also made to 99 year-old Lebanese philosopher Paul (Boulos) Khoury whose teachings on theology, liberation, and secularism strongly influenced Grégoire Haddad and encouraged him to work with Lebret and President Chehab. It is significant that none of the respondents mentioned the role played by Louis-Joseph Lebret and IRFED, and no one mentioned current advocates of the Christian Left. Thus, a pantheon of “local heroes” was presented by the respondents, but institutional options were not considered relevant. From the early days of the “thawra” until the present, Church leaders in Lebanon have voiced their support for the overall demands of the revolutionaries, calling for an end to systemic corruption, sectarianism, violence, and the pervasive culture of impunity. None of them have linked this support to the rich development of CST, starting with above-mentioned encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, through John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris, Benedict XVI’s Caritas in Veritate or Francis I’s Laudato Si’. No reference was made to the wealth of social teaching produced by Council of Catholic Patriarchs of the East and the ecumenical documents published by Middle East Council of Churches, which includes important Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic voices. Most significantly, none the Church’s official statements refer to Christian faith, spirituality or the salvific power of Jesus Christ as the driving force behind combatting corruption and sectarianism. Hamd explains this delinking of the Church from Leftist demands through the pervasive “biblical illiteracy” of all three branches of the faith. Biblical illiteracy occurs when key clergy are culturally conditioned not to critique culture Biblically, or do not read their Bibles or allow themselves to be self-critiqued or have their ministry practices informed by the normative Scriptures that challenge them to be faithful to the missio Dei (Hamd 132).

Symptomatic of this illiteracy is the statement of the Maronite Bishops from early days of the “thawra” on 30 October 2019 in which their solidarity with the revolutionaries was rooted in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Fathers call upon the countries in the region and the major powers to understand the need for the Lebanese to be liberated from the dilemma which has lasted for decades resulting in pain and delaying their freedom from regional and international conflicts on their soil. This call is based on the Charter of the United Nations and the rights of peoples to self-determination (Bkerki 2019).

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This approach reflects the Christian leaders desire to avoid the impression that they are supporting sectarianism. By embracing a universal, “catholic,” and technocratic route to solving the problems of the nation, the Church is, however, avoiding the question that has confronted believers in the region for centuries. Should Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants—based on their common faith and spirituality—merely help the poor or deal with the root causes of structural sin in Lebanese society?

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Makdisi US (2000) The culture of sectarianism: community, history, and violence in nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon. University of California Press, Berkeley CA Masters B (2001) Christians and jews in the ottoman Arab world: the roots of sectarianism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Novik V (1998) Social doctrine: will the Russian orthodox church take a daring step? Relig State Soc 26(2):197–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/09637499808431822 O’Mahony A, Flannery J (eds) (2010) The Catholic Church in the contemporary Middle East: studies for the synod for the Middle East. Melisende, London Payne DP (2014) Eastern orthodoxy’s theology of economics. Paul Oslington, The oxford handbook of Christianity and economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 197–205 Raheb M (2012) Toward a new hermeneutics of liberation: a Palestinian Christian perspective. In: Rabeh M (ed) The biblical text in the context of occupation: towards a new hermeneutics of liberation. Diyar Publishers, Bethlehem, pp 11–27 Rocha Z (2000) Helder, O Dom: uma vida que marcou os rumos da Igreja no Brasil. Editora Vozes, Petrópolis Rogan E (2004) Sectarianism and social conflict in Damascus: the 1860 events reconsidered. Arabica 51(4):493–511 Salibi K (1966) Lebanon under Fuad Chehab 1958–1964. Middle East Stud 2(3):211–226 Sensenig ER (2019) Catholic social theory and practice in the 21st century: a challenge for believers in the Middle East’. In: Alam EJ (ed) Thomas More’s Utopia: 500 years on... and counting. Notre Dame University Press, Zouk Mosbeh, pp 108–141 Sharkey HJ (2017) A history of Muslims, Christians, and jews in the Middle East. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Shuck MJ (2005) Early modern roman catholic social thought, 1740–1890. In: Himes K et al (eds.) Modern catholic social teaching: commentaries and interpretations. Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. Stark R (1996) The rise of Christianity: how the obscure, marginal Jesus movement became the dominant, religious force in the western world in a few centuries. Princeton University Press, Princeton Tanielian MS (2018) The charity of war: famine, humanitarian aid, and world war I in the Middle East. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA Traboulsi F (2007) A history of modern Lebanon. Pluto Press, London Verdeil E (2003) Politics, ideology and professional interests: foreign versus local planners in Lebanon under president Chehab. In: Joe N, Volait M (eds) Urbanism imported or exported: native aspirations and foreign plans. John Wiley and Sons, Chichester UK, pp 290–315 Watenpaugh KD (2015) Bread from stones: The Middle East and the making of modern humanitarianism. University of California Press, Oakland CA Wielenga B (1999) Liberation theology in Asia. In: Rowland C (ed) The Cambridge companion to liberation theology. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, pp 39–62

Discourses on Statehood and Ethnic Diversity in Jerusalem: The Notion of Apparatus of Israelization Ignacio Rullansky

1 Introduction Countless pages were dedicated to narrating the history of Jerusalem. There were those who refused to admit that it was merely a city. Sixteen years after the establishment of the State of Israel, in 1964, professor and activist Don Peretz called it a city divided against itself. Three years later, as a corollary to the Six Day War, Israel seized the Old City from the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan and alongside it, a constellation of villages around it. This region, East Jerusalem, became part of the municipal boundaries, which were drawn up by the military authorities who considered the tactical virtues of its topography. The Palestinians, for their part, claim East Jerusalem as the capital of a future sovereign state. In 1980, the Knesset passed the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, which legally formalized the annexation of this territory. Therefore, East Jerusalem gradually became part of the city’s metropolitanization process. In the new millennium, researchers such as Alice Hills (2009) referred to Jerusalem as a “post-conflict” city and Michael Dumper (2013, 2014) as a divided or many-border city. Meir Margalit (2014, 2016, 2018), for his part, has come to baptize it as a “non-city”. These categories refer to those instances that produced a difference between the two ethnonational populations that inhabit Jerusalem, the Israeli Jews (citizens of the State) and the Palestinian Arabs (permanent residents whose civic and political rights are not full). The demographic balance between both populations and its relationship with political representation has been a fundamental concern among Israeli political authorities since the birth of the State (DellaPergola 2003). Consequently, State institutions, using multiple associations with the private sector, have mobilized resources I. Rullansky (B) School of Interdisciplinary Advanced Social Studies, National University of San Martín, Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_17

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and implemented public policies that limited the incorporation of East Jerusalemite Palestinians into civil-political life and the nation. A question posed by scholars such as Sammy Smooha (1997, 2002) and Oren Yiftachel (1998, 2000) is if the State of Israel be considered a democracy. If the answer is no, then how can this particular form of society be apprehended? In short, the prevalence of a sovereign project developed by a dominant ethnonational group that succeeds in consolidating political power in an asymmetrical manner with regards to other minorities, ultimately produces a diasporic condition that is incompatible with the kind of inclusion that democracy allows for. As a result, Smooha understands that Israel can be conceived as an “ethnic democracy” while Yiftachel rejects this term, stating that an undermined version of democracy cannot be considered as such. Hence, he introduced the concept of “ethnocracy”. Following Yiftachel, even if segregation and exclusion of minorities also occur in democratic societies, an ethnocracy would be an entirely different type of political regime, where the ethnic dimension decisively determines whether a group will be fully included to the demos or not. Since 1967, demographic trends have shown that the Arab population has grown in greater proportion to the Israeli Jewry, whose more eminently religious and ultraOrthodox sector has grown, in turn, more than the Zionist. This has raised the perspective among Israeli political and military authorities that the preservation of the State requires a correlative governance of the demographic behaviors of the population. Here I intend to outline an analysis about the exercise of political power according to the forms of representation of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. In other words, this is an inquiry about the way in which a contemporary political rationality emerged to make sense of a distinctive modality of governing the ethno-national diversity. It is easy to observe that the understanding of both the Jerusalemite and the Israeli realities, in the local and national level, arouse no minor degrees of disconformity with regards to analytical efforts that attempt to capture their socio-political specificities in adequate categories. Like an elusive beast of unique features, unbeknownst to any classification, the Israeli form of society appears different to the eyes of researchers who, in their fascination, have opted to create neologisms. To them, the kind of institutionalization of cohabitation between ethno-national groups that characterizes Israel/Palestine makes it impossible to accept that Jerusalem is a city and that Israel is a democracy: it is unlikely that two terms could possibly be more related. While the city, the medina, was the seat of government and law in the Ancient Eastern Mediterranean, in Ancient Greece, the polis was more than the center or jurisdiction of the State. Indeed, the city was the place where freemen—adult male citizens who possessed land, wealth and slaves—would encounter their equals—not freewomen and children, nor freemen who had to work to provide for themselves—while acting politically, in the public sphere. Having said this, I pose the question: how is presentday Jerusalem, a city of covenants and revelations, understood by Israeli official authorities? This is a State that portrays a particular constitutional openness, legal and territorial ambiguities, and complex dynamics of inclusion/exclusion with regards to the

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population’s ethno-national and religious groups. Notwithstanding its specificities, it is fair to say it is not the only State that produces non-statehood for part of the minorities that live within its jurisdiction. Thus, and indeed considering how particular the State of Israel is, how necessary is to identify it as a complete different political entity? Moreover, how does this help to grasp those dimensions that constitute it as unique? On this occasion, I will continue the challenge that many of my predecessors and colleagues had taken up for years, however, I will slightly change the question. While the task can be conceived as the need to achieve an eloquent definition of what the Israeli form of the society should be addressed, I will focus on the question of how power is exercised. Indeed, instead of supporting the legitimacy of a term such as ethnocracy or ethnic democracy, I am interested in understanding how political authorities conceive the challenge to rule and deploy political power in Israel. I understand that by putting the accent on how power relations and political subjectivities are configured it is possible to comprehend how democratic and nondemocratic dimensions may arise at the same time with no need of expanding the bestiary by creating a new classification. Along these pages, I will therefore share some findings of my analysis on the irruption of an original political economy in the exercise of power in Jerusalem between 2009 and 2018, which correspond to Nir Barkat’s tenure as mayor. I argue that in that period, Barkat introduced a mutation in the order of execution of the tactics to govern the city and sustain Israeli sovereignty: my challenge is to understand what, if any, these mutations and continuities consisted of. To do this, I will offer a systematization of literature were the recent history of the Judaization process, particularly in Jerusalem, has been thoroughly examined. Furthermore, this will allow me to introduce a critical contribution to the issue by presenting the concept of the apparatus of Israelization, with which I traced the sets of visibility and enunciation curves between discursive and extra-discursive elements on the exercise of power in Jerusalem, as a local empirical referent of a broader political regime. Following Deleuze’s interpretation on the Foucauldian notion, an apparatus can be understood as a “wool” or “yarn” ball, that is, a network or assemblage of discursive and extra-discursive practices that configure modes of exercising of power and of production of knowledge in a given field. An apparatus is, therefore, a multilinear set of (a) visibility curves (how and to what extent an element is exposed, distributed, partially hidden); (b) enunciation curves (epistemic regimes); (c) networks of force (the transit of power as a relationship between individuals and actors that make up a field as effects and relays of power); (d) and processes of subjectivation-objectification. This notion aims to elucidate the contingent variations in the possible entanglements of such curves paying attention to, firstly, the role of the individuals-subjects, secondly, to the formulation of statements, also, to the configuration of power relations and, lastly, to the development and deployment of technologies and infrastructures. Particularly, the notion of apparatus of Israelization will enable to make intelligible the multiple discursive fields that intertwine and compete with each other.

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These possible articulations reveal how actors conceive the nation—its characteristics and composition—as well as how they understand the conformation of the political community, the relationship between the nation, the State and the territory, among others central aspects that are key for the study of the construction of statehood, the dissemination of control functions and the configuration of subjectivities and power relations in Israel/Palestine.

2 Ethnocracy and Ethnic Democracy: A Debate on Collective Life in Israel Thirty years ago, Smooha and Yiftachel established the basis for a debate based on the same premise. In their own way, each apprehended the difficulty of characterizing the Israeli political regime as democratic, given the complex coexistence between the Jewish identity and the democratic form of society. Both authors concluded that this socio-political order required the development of an original notion that better captured its features, not being able to be understood merely according to the category in question. One of the main contributions that I proposed to carry out is to contribute to the generation and expansion of theoretical tools to apprehend the tension between this problematic collision between democratic and non-democratic elements. To do this, I decided to adopt a counterpoint regarding the epistemological attitude of both authors. Instead of presenting a negative or alternative category of democracy based on its empirical contrast with the features of the Israeli socio-political reality, I will attempt to suggest a notion that enables to interrogate contemporary modes of institution of the political in contexts of ethnic-conflict such as this one: the apparatus of Israelization. On the one hand, both Smooha and Yiftachel identified a theoretical inconsistency that can be appreciated taking into consideration the definition of democracy as a form of society according to Claude Lefort (1990, 2004), where the institutionalization of political practices is enshrined by displacing the markers of certainty, characteristic of theological-political regimes. The ethnic component in the definitions of ethnic democracy and ethnocracy stands out as an inextricably relevant variable to understand the specificity of the Israeli form of society with respect to democracy. In relation to this, Smooha (1997, 2002, 2010) maintains that in Israel there is a “stretch” of expressions of democracy that are not typically liberal, conceiving its political regime as an ethnic democracy, while Yiftachel (1998) rejects this perspective, suggesting that Israel must be understood as a completely different social order: an “ethnocracy”. The common starting point is that although the State of Israel is not conceivable as a democracy, according to them, its silhouette remains as a guide: an epistemological orientation. Another notion of interest is that of esthetic political horizons by Martín Plot (2008, 2018), who critically recovers the Lefortean perspective. In short, they operate

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as identifiers of objectives that are not fully achieved, yet they establish coordinates. In other words, horizons can be thought of as compasses that suggest directions. Moreover, horizons institute practices, discourses and expectations that give rise to the generation of a plurality of perspectives that compete and confront each other in the work of the political self-configuration of society. Thus, what characterizes such democratic political horizons is the consecration of an institutionalization of politics as a specific form of institution of society, which houses an environment where disputes and conflicts are not only possible, but are subject to indeterminacy and contingency. With regard to the Israeli experience and, in particular, the Jerusalemite experience between 2009 and 2018, the double impact of the institutionalization of the political conflict in an ethnically divided social order is the main factor that undermines such indeterminacy. Based on these notions, I return to the discussion between Smooha and Yiftachel proposing that the question underlying the theoretical debate about democracy in political regimes such as the Israeli one can be formulated as follows: what we should understand is what prevents us from easily perceiving the emergence of a democratic framework for conflict to arise. I propose to briefly cover this debate. To begin with, Smooha’s (1997, 2002) concept of ethnic democracy starts from an epistemic argument that presupposes a normative form of democracy, pathologically weakened by ethnic conflicts at the national level, compared to three ideal–typical forms. Liberal democracy, first, restricts ethnic origin to the private sphere. Second, the “consociational” type reconciles ethnic and national differences through participatory and inclusive mechanisms related to collective decision-making. Finally, a combination of these, “multicultural” democracy, recognizes the rights of minorities without formalizing them, nor institutionalizing consociational mechanisms. These democracies share three interrelated fundamental principles: the centrality of citizenship, equality, and the idea of a civic nation. That is, all citizens make up the nation, citizenship is a necessary condition for such inclusion and for their participation in public bodies. However, there are States that, following Smooha (1997, 2002) are “manifestly ethnic”: despite international recognition as democracies, they “deviate” from the types mentioned before regarding the triple requirement of principles given that an ethnic identity prevails in terms of citizenship. Such theoretical “inconsistency” raises the dilemma of “stretching” the concept of democracy or rejecting it. Smooha (2002) proposes to apprehend the Israeli case according to a distinctive and diminished expression: an “ethnic democracy”, driven by an ideology or movement, where an ethno-national majority claims the ownership of a territory considered exclusively as its national home. This entails exclusive aspirations to exercise the right of self-determination, reflected in the adoption of symbols, the enactment of laws and state policies that benefit this group to the detriment of other minorities. The criterion of distinction between members and non-members of the ethno-nation is observed in the separation between citizenship and nationality, present in the so-called pure types of democracy (Smooha 1997). Among the elite of the dominant ethno-national group, minorities represent an undesirable presence, a threat to the survival of the existing political order. Therefore,

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the condition of subordination to this group must prevail to fulfill the aspirations of its elites. In light of these features, Smooha (2002) suggests understanding this form of democracy as “defensive”: within state jurisdiction, all permanent residents can be citizens and enjoy collective and individual rights; even to achieve substantive degrees of autonomy. Furthermore, these minorities can enjoy sufficient freedoms to publicly protest and demand the expansion of their rights without being repressed by the State, and also form governmental coalitions with members of the dominant ethno-nation. The problem is that the enjoyment of rights is not equitable and, if the status quo were to change, that would “endanger” the dominant group. In sum, this type of “diminished” democracy would meet minimum conditions: merely procedural ones. For his part, Yiftachel argues that such institutionalization of inequity, structurally fused within a democratic form of government, is unacceptable. For him, Smooha’s appreciation between individual and collective rights makes them “indistinguishable”, since the limitation imposed on collective rights implies the collapse of a fundamental democratic principle: the violation of individual civic equity (Ghanem et al. 1998). There is a contradiction between ethnic descent and civic equality: minorities cannot fully identify with the State or the dominant majority, or confer legitimacy on their domination. Smooha (2002), who recognizes this, affirms that the conditions for establishing such a form of “ethnic” democracy are based on the preexistence of ethno-nationalism, on the real or perceived threat to the ethno-nation that requires the mobilization of the majority to preserve their position, as well as their adherence, pragmatic or ideological, to democracy. Furthermore, Smooha (2002) considered Yiftachel’s comments on the inadequacy of the concept as a “contradiction in terms”, and responded that every democracy has internal contradictions and tensions, which do not corrode his epistemological correspondence with such a notion. With respect to Yiftachel, the concept of ethnocracy designates a different approach, although based on similar conditions. The aforementioned contradiction in terms arises, for him, from the lack of clear legal and political limits to the expansive hegemonic aspiration of an ethno-national group that imposes its privileged right of self-determination. A precarious integration into the political system emanates from this condition, synthesized in an ethnocracy: a regime that, despite having “democratic” features and maintaining a “relatively open” character, cannot be thought of as such (Yiftachel 1999; Ghanem et al. 1998). Another significant aspect distinguishes the perspectives of these authors. Precisely, the lenses of political geography of Yiftachel (1998) grant an inevitable centrality to the ongoing process of “Judaization” in Israel/Palestine, while the point of view of ethnic democracy does not necessarily contemplate it. In summary, the process of Judaization includes local and state dynamics of displacement and settlement of the population according to ethno-nationality, facilitated by official institutional mechanisms. This notion highlights how an ethno-nation exercises political power in a privileged way at the expense of other groups. Likewise, a key dimension of Yiftachel’s (1999, 2000) definition is the broad stratification of ethno-classes, since distinctions occur, even within the dominant

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ethno-nation, in terms of unequal possession of economic, cultural and social capital. Although the Israeli case can serve to forge a general concept of “ethnic democracy”, Yiftachel affirms that the notion of ethnocracy is applicable to other cases as well. Ethnocracies, henceforth, develop eminently when control over a territory is disputed and a dominant group aims to unilaterally determine the nature of the State. Therefore, they can be seen as unstable regimes, with opposing forces of expansionism and resistance in constant conflict. Marked by different key principles, expressed in a complicated coexistence with democratic features, ethnocracy implies the appropriation of State institutions by a particular ethno-nation, hence its dominance over other minorities. Yiftachel (1998) identifies the premise of the Israeli ethnocracy in the Declaration of Independence of the State (DI), since self-determination was enshrined in Jewish identity and not in Israeli identity, which differs decisively from Western democracies. The prevalence of an ethno-nation over the demos implies a complex stratified series of multiple accesses and enjoyment of rights, duties and capacities. All in all, on the one hand, Smooha’s definition formally satisfies the requirements of what Max Weber defined as “plebiscitary leadership democracy”, where the “legitimate ruler” is freely chosen by the electorate, on the merits of his charisma, through of periodic elections. However, as discussed above, this does not compensate for the lack of equality. Therefore, it could be argued that there is not a single hegemonic project, but rather multiple competing platforms in Zionism, from left to right, from secular to national religious expressions, a pluralistic characteristic (Ram 1995, 2011). In addition, the dominant group may, due to its internal heterogeneity, reverse the enactment of the law in future instances by opening the existing political regime to uncertainty.

3 A Brief Genealogy of the Judaization Process in Jerusalem One of the direct consequences of the Six Day War in 1967 was the military occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem and of a surface whose extension was projected surrounding its walls. This region is known as East Jerusalem, and until then, it was since 1948 under the jurisdiction of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. The expansion of the Jerusalem Municipality, from the west to the east, included the annexation of 6.5 km2 corresponding to what was considered East Jerusalem at that time, plus 65 km2 of adjacent areas of the West Bank that is, reaching approximately 71 km2 total that were unified and integrated into Israeli state sovereignty unilaterally, at the expense of the international community not recognizing the legality of said annexation. This initial expansion of the municipal area, which surface grew from 38 km2 to 108 km2, was followed by a second expansion in May 1993—extending it to 126.4 km2 —and, since 2002, as a result of the construction of the separation wall that wades the Green Line and discretionarily penetrates into West Bank territory, new territorial

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gains followed. Also, complementary to this, the wall’s irregular outline generated an effect of contiguity between the Israeli settlements located in the West Bank and that make up the Jerusalem metropolitan area even though they do not formally constitute part of the municipal jurisdiction, at the same time that it disconnected a series of Palestinian villages integrated to the municipality among themselves, with respect to the city center, and also, to the West Bank (Abuzayyad et al. 2013; Shlay and Rosen 2010; Hasson 2007). The annexation of the territories that make up East Jerusalem constitutes a fundamental element in the symbolic construction of Israeli national identity: the holy city of Judaism and the alleged Israeli capital had been “reunified”. The narratives that emanated from that milestone involved mutations in the discourses of different sectors of the Zionist movement and of Israeli society, from secular political parties to orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jewish communities (Dumper 2009). Among the most immediate gestures with which the political authorities of the late 1960s sought to crystallize the correspondence between the Israeli national identity and the Jewish culture. In 1968, the State of Israel established the 28th of the Hebrew month of Iyar as the “Day of Jerusalem”, celebrating the reunification of the city. Thirty years later that date was elevated to a national holiday. As a result of the annexation, waves of pilgrimages and a progressive concentration of activities of religious groups occurred. Rabbinical schools (yeshivot) were established in the vicinity of the Western Wall and in general, along the Jewish quarter of the Old City, which was the subject of extensive works that modified its esthetic aspects through the redesign and reconstruction of building structures for shops, synagogues and residences (Dumper 1992, 2013; Kimhi 2010; Khamaisi et al. 2009; Monterescu and Rabinowitz 2007; Ricca 2007). An extensive research agenda agrees that all this can be understood as part of the Judaization process that gained momentum in Jerusalem since 1967 (Masalha 1992, 2012; Al-Khatib 1980), and that in particular, was supported by urban planning policies that through building and zoning codes, reoriented previous planning logics according to new political rationalities. The esthetic orientalization of the Old City and the ordering of the spaces initiated during the British Mandate, entailed the creation of green spaces and parks that were preserved, giving a visual aspect to the urban fabric and enabling the exercise of government functions to govern the behavior of the city’s population by regulating the ways of building, the height of the buildings, the materials to be used, according to the neighborhood or area. Since 1967, these measures, as technologies of power, have acquired a qualitatively different application. Open green spaces no longer represented a use of urban space as a containment to the expansion of residential and commercial neighborhoods due to the preservation and exacerbation of an urban esthetic ideal whose main criteria was to order the trend dynamics of growth. Rather, the location of open spaces and national and archeological parks was recovered by a program of government that inserted them within the framework of the Judaization process. According to Yiftachel, what we identify as a political rationality about Jerusalem as a capital and sacred city, unified, under sovereignty Israeli, would be part of a project to consolidate the hegemonic aspirations of different groups in Israeli society that

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would lead to what he calls an “ethnocratic regime” (Yiftachel and Legrand 2013; Yiftachel 1998, 1999, 2000, 2006; Ghanem et al. 1998). This leads to a variety of different experiences of being a citizen. In Jerusalem, the Palestinians are mostly permanent residents, not full citizens, which translates into different qualities in accessing to public services, to the labor market, and applies to multiple dynamics of inclusion/exclusion. The exercise of governing Jerusalem in this scenario implies addressing a multiplicity of contexts of encounters between its two major groups, involving direct and indirect contacts in practices of everyday life and also with regard to infrastructure: interactions intimately linked to spatiality and a differential exercise of the right to the city (Harvey 2012). In other words, the distribution, access and movement of the population to these spaces varies according to their ethno-national identity, reflected in the possession of identity documents: a passport or national identity card (Israeli) or a permanent resident card (Jerusalemite Palestinian). Following Yiftachel, it could be said that the exacerbation of the intensity of the radicality of the difference that minorities represent with respect to the universal that the dominant actors embody in this social order, displaces these minorities to a situation of exteriority with respect to the Israeli nation. Indeed, the Jerusalemite Palestinians lack the right to vote in national elections and their prospects for social mobility are conditioned by the position of otherness they occupy according to the prevailing political rationality. The concern to govern and reproduce a status quo in which a certain national project must prevail together with the inevitable presence of groups that do not comprise it, gave rise to the establishment of biopolitical techniques: a regime that administers, governs and regulates the population’s demographic behaviors. The dispossession and expropriation of lands from Palestinian permanent residents of Jerusalem that has occurred in East Jerusalem since 1967, facilitated the conditions for the progressive settlement of the Jewish population in new urban compounds. From then on, the Israeli authorities formulated representations and designed policies in order to symbolically consecrate the city’s belonging to the State as a Nation State. A few months after the Six Day War, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, leader of the left-wing Mapai party (Party of the workers of the land of Israel) signed the enactment of the “Law for the Protection of Holy Places”. Thirteen years later, during Menachem Begin’s first tenure—of the right-wing liberal Likud party—the “Basic Law: Jerusalem, capital of Israel” was enacted in 1980, declaring the unified and complete character of the capital of the country, as the seat of its highest political authorities and public buildings: the government, parliament, the presidency and the Supreme Court. Likewise, its 3rd clause insists on the principles of the Law for the Protection of Sacred Places, making its text its own and incorporating it literally. In sum, the prevailing political rationality among the Israeli authorities over Jerusalem was to preserve sovereignty over the city. As a consequence, the State deployed an assemblage of technologies of power that projected that very vocation. To do that State agencies took the government of the city’s cultural diversity as the main object of this concern. Having said this, I propose to examine what are the main discursive fields that make up the framework of the

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dominant political rationality about Jerusalem as a sacred city and as an “eternally unified” capital, an association that became “indispensable” for the official political authorities and the majority of the Zionist, orthodox and ultra-orthodox population, as a step to fulfill the constitution of the State.

4 Discursive Fields of the Judaization Process in Jerusalem In Israel, and specifically in Jerusalem, the process of Judaization implies the production of discourses by political authorities on population growth, the classification of the population according to the proportion of ethno-national groups and, therefore, of groups that enjoy differential degrees of citizen status. The representations on these questions are often characterized by the complementarity of multiple notions about the city, its political status as well as its sacred and patrimonial character. These discursive fields emerge from qualitatively different truths. Among them, the historical one relies on a religious-millenarist discourse and in an academicarcheological one. The first is governed by a primacy of moral responsibilities over the expansion of the Jewish presence and the State in Jerusalem as a sacred city and, therefore, a capital city: here a sense of historical fulfillment operates, as a contemporary recreation of the past. On the other hand, the second, as an instrument of discernment and restitution of truths based on scientistic empiricism, operates as a guarantor and support of other discourses, such as the religious one. Although both regimes of truth rely on different epistemological premises, this does not prevent them from reinforcing each other, as it occurs with the financing of archeological excavations by foundations that belong to the settler movement. Furthermore, I identified a strategic-military discursive field and a technicalbureaucratic one. Both show coincidences; more importantly, the cooperation among these two discursive fields is also evident in the deployment of the technologies of power that they engender. The strategic-military dimension led to the annexation of territorial portions—from the Six Day War in 1967 onwards—and the installation of security devices and technologies in said territories according to tactical considerations. The main purpose was to control, anticipate and exercise functions of surveillance on the population under the recently annexed jurisdiction (East Jerusalem) or that under occupation (the West Bank).1 On the other hand, the technical-bureaucratic discourse had to base the ethical responsibilities of exercising governmental functions over the same population, only in a differential way, according to their political status. Precisely, the intersection and overlapping between these discursive fields led to the tactical criteria that proposed the incorporation of a series of villages scattered 1

The episteme of the military sector provided tactical justifications for the preservation of areas that granted territorial depth to prevent future attacks and have a greater margin of military maneuver. Hence, it advocated for the dissemination of military and police outposts, which would be followed by checkpoints and the separation wall in the 2000s (Abowd 2014; Abuzayyad et al. 2013; Shlay and Rosen 2010; Cheshin et al. 2001).

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in the valleys, slopes and hills to the east of the city into the municipality. As a result, this aroused the proliferation of new requirements. To be more concrete, this implied that urban planning, for example, aimed at strengthening Israeli jurisdiction and expanding the process of morphological acculturation over vacant areas and led to the expropriation of lands based on different practices. Among them, the drafting of building and zoning codes, planning of housing complexes and new urban concentrations stand out.2 The exercise of governmental power over this irregular topography represented an “advantage” from a military-tactical perspective, but it provoked political concerns among Israeli authorities since they had to govern and attend the needs of a population whose members were not recognized as full members of the State. Urban planning grew exponentially as a technology, since the technical-bureaucratic discursive field allowed to satisfy the ethical justification—another field in itself—of governing in accordance with the law and with liberal democratic principles, because despite the invariable basis of derived inequality of the ethno-national identity, housing solutions, services, streets, education and security had to be provided. From an esthetic dimension, urban planning promoted morphological acculturation by creating new urban locations and settlements for Haredi population, establishing corridors of continuity between them and the western region of Jerusalem and its Old City. For their part, Palestinian villages were subsumed and integrated into the metropolitan area, undergoing radical transformations.

5 Confluence of Discursive Fields Between Multiple Actors The process of Judaization has involved different attempts to regulate the demographic behavior of the population according to an ethno-national criterion. There are different ways of addressing the implantation of diasporic Jewish population in Israeli territory—from 1948 onwards—as in the Occupied Territories and East, although many refer to it as a case of settler colonialism (Khalili 2013; Veracini 2006; Farsakh 2006). Be that as it may, the introduction of this population resulted in the displacement of the native one and has been reflected in the creation of a new political—crystallized in the identity between this part of society and the State—and cultural hegemony. Such a situation led to the representation, among different sectors of Israeli society that a certain demographic balance is, more than desirable, essential to sustain it. Precisely, the expansion of the demographic presence in the Occupied Territories and in East Jerusalem was manifested in the intensification of the activities of the settler movement, a non-organic agglomeration of foundations, civil organizations 2

For example, the national and archaeological parks that limit the expansion of buildable area between Palestinian neighborhoods; the profusion of security devices such as cameras, armed personnel—both public and private—and the separation wall and checkpoints, which modify the experiences of commuting and inhabiting the city (Margalit 2014; Chiodelli 2012a, b; Haggerty and Ericson 2000).

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and religious communities that promoted the establishment of the Jewish population—in particular, ultra-orthodox—in the Palestinian villages that were integrated into the municipal jurisdiction of the city, in vacant or expropriated areas, and in the belt surrounding the Old City of Jerusalem, both within the municipal boundary and outside of it, in the West Bank. In sum, the conformation of the Jerusalem metropolitan area is a consequence, among others, of the demographic expansion driven by the settler movement and facilitated by the State’s promotion of access to housing in the creation of residential settlements conceived as bedroom communities in previously non-residential areas (Abowd 2014; Beinin 2013; Braier 2013; Dumper 2013, 2014; Dumper and Larkin 2012a, b; Kimhi 2010; Reiter and Lehrs 2010; Shlay and Rosen 2010; Pullan and Gwiazda 2009; Staiger et al. 2009; Khamaisi 2006, 2003; Abu El-Haj 2001; Cheshin et al. 1999; Rabinowitz 1997). On the other hand, one of the rationalities that guided and gave meaning to the praxis of the settler movement is the perception that the promotion of the Jewish presence in the city and its surroundings becomes a condition to favor the arrival of the messianic era. Specifically, the representation of Jerusalem as a site of symbolic and effective realization of a full Jewish life, constitutes a factor that allows establishing an identity between a confessional community and the—sovereign—territory in which one cannot exist without the other. However, this community cannot be presented as just one more among the many that inhabit the city, but as one that claims that its bond to the city is a privileged one by virtue of this sacred relationship. Indeed, this has motivated certain organizations within the settler movement to intervene in politics. All in all, their rationality on Jerusalem combines a nationalist claim with a religious demand that once again, cannot be consecrated without a political and sovereign affirmation (Abowd 2014; Beinin 2013; Reiter and Lehrs 2010; Yiftachel 1998, 1999, 2006; Ghanem et al. 1998; Rabinowitz 1997). In general, the task of exercising political power and expanding the institutional presence of the State was conceptualized from a multitude of secular politicalideological inspirations. Sometimes, the articulation of certain public policies obeys strategic criteria to ensure communication and connectivity between the western region with the Old City and the settlements built in the East. The most notorious aspect of these secular technocratic perspectives on the uniqueness of Jerusalem, is that it involves a symbolic character derived from the historical role the city plays in the history of Judaism: the return to Jerusalem is a feat that the State of Israel must preserve, keeping the Old City and its neighboring regions to the East and West, unified. For the liberal Zionist camp, the conquest of the Old City and its adjacent areas in 1967 has represented the materialization of the most important symbolic victory around the sovereign consecration of the State, since its Declaration of Independence in 1948. This is demonstrated by the deployment of a range of technologies that as a whole, allow the State to exercise governmental power to study and produce knowledge on the behaviors of the groups that inhabit the city. Subsequently, this enables state agencies to expand surveillance, control and punitive mechanisms on a network scale.

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6 The Apparatus of Israelization in Jerusalem: Nir Barkat’s (2009–2018) Political Rationality In Jerusalem, the Municipality exercises a monopoly of violence through a set of institutions that are combined with other bodies of national jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the mayor does not have sufficient authority to intercede in the positions assumed by legislators in the Knesset regarding the status of Jerusalem, it is through his/her authority that facts are, in the words of Nadia Abu El Haj, created on the ground. To be more specific, there is a consensus about how the processes of Judaization are carried out from the expansion of the activities of the settler movement in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. These processes imply a subtle deployment of technologies of power that affect space in such a way that they facilitate the demographic and institutional presence of the Israeli population and State institutions to the point that it becomes “impossible” to dismantle them completely. This articulation of technologies, which often contradict international law, facilitates a de facto expansion of their sovereignty (Yiftachel and Legrand 2013; Cheshin et al. 2001). As an illustration, the separation wall, the checkpoints, roads and tunnels, and mainly, the settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, create corridors of continuity that interrupt contiguity between Palestinian villages and towns. Consequently, this has rendered economic development rather inviable for communities in the Occupied Territories and, at the same time, it favored the metropolitanization of Jerusalem (Chiodelli 2012a, b; Ricca 2007). Since 1967, the official authorities’ representations of the status of Jerusalem mutated in unprecedented ways: across the vast diversity of political parties, sovereignty over the new boundaries of the city was perceived as an inalienable cause. From a militaristic perspective, territorial strategic depth was a key asset to protect the State from further threats whereas for the Haredi, it represented the opportunity of fulfilling a religious call and, for the Zionist, it epitomized the ultimate yet unimagined victory for a project that started before 1948. The State symbolically consecrated this assimilation between the city and its new territorial extension—yet without conceding the citizenship to the whole of the population that inhabited it— with different technologies of power. It is worth mention that in 1980, the Knesset passed “Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel”, which instituted the city as the eternally unified capital of the State. To a greater or lesser extent, the elements of each of these discursive fields gave way to the process of Judaization in East Jerusalem. If we accept the notion, it is possible to say that the Municipality is the main official entity that mobilizes the process of Judaization in the city. Accordingly, its authorities dynamize and adapt it to its own reality, deploying mechanisms that may be present in other contexts. In other words, it develops its specific articulation of the “apparatus of Israelization” through a program of government that seeks to translate into the realm of reality that series of idealizations over the State of Israel, Jerusalem and the question of capital city. For the past ten years, before the COVID-19 pandemic started and before Moshe Lion rose as mayor, Nir Barkat ruled for two consecutive

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terms. During his tenure, he conceived the problematic cohabitation between Israelis and Palestinians and the vocation to preserve sovereignty in an original way: My mandate and my vision are to strengthen the unity of the city, to improve quality of life for all sectors, honestly and openly. I believe there is a strong majority in the country, thank God, that supports strengthening the city of Jerusalem as a united city. I definitely will do everything I can to fulfill that vision and to manage the city better in this spirit. The vision is to develop the economy in ways that will benefit all areas of the city, including the Eastern part. In particular, with our planned dramatic increase in tourism, the economic benefits will rain down on all sectors so that it will create jobs and enhance opportunities for Arab residents just as it will for Jews and Christians.3

This quote reveals a peculiar thematization regarding the perspective of keeping Jerusalem unified. Precisely, one where the governmental sphere echoes the potential in its intervention regarding this end. Moreover, the unification of Jerusalem would be achievable if the population’s living conditions were substantially improved. This, however, did not necessarily imply altering the citizen status or the general features of the social order. It is stated that the economy and the grid of intelligibility of the entrepreneur, the homo economics of neoliberalism, could facilitate inscribing both Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites in the city by addressing them as rational economic actors that reacted to economic stimuli, rather than as political actors. Statements like this show how authorities enunciate the premises of a program of government program that can undergo multiple thematizations, rationalizations, designs, procedures and tactics in order to forge reality according to an ideal. The recognition of how economic incentives operate in Barkat’s political rationality, in relation to the regulation of demographic practices, can be seen in quotes such as the following, where it is revealed that Jerusalem was not an attractive so important for secular Israeli Jews –behavior that as will be seen, Barkat tended to “redirect”–but it is for Jerusalemite Palestinians: The average income of Jews in Jerusalem is about $16,000 a year. In the center of Israel, this figure is approaching $30,000 a year. The average income for Arabs in Jerusalem is about $4,000 a year, but in the West Bank it is less than $1,000 a year. When a young Jewish graduate from Hebrew University sees that the job market is not strong in the city, he migrates out of Jerusalem. However, when the Arabs in the West Bank see that the job market in Jerusalem is so much better than where they live, this encourages Arab migration into Jerusalem.4

The economic factor presents, according to Barkat’s perspective, the potential to reverse this trend. Had we to summarize Barkat’s terms in a sentence, it could be said that in his rationality, economic incentives will equally appeal to both Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites. In other words, that they would be governed more effectively and at a lower cost if addressed as economic actors that would rationally and positively ponder incentives that allow for upwards social mobility over religious, cultural or national claims and demands. This key enables us to distinguish 3

Levine, Charley J. (2010). Interview: Nir Barkat. Hadassah Magazine. Barkat, Nir (2010). The Mayor’s Vision for Jerusalem. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 10, N° 5.

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a key aspect of Barkat’s program of government by virtue of its political economy. Subsequently, in this rationality, the entrepreneurial spirit of each ethno-national group would represent the target that allows to configure a type of subjectivity that subordinates cultural otherness, ideological differences, ethno-national diversity, to the same and single atom. Following Wendy Brown (2015), it could be anticipated that the scope, the site where the regime of verification of this rationality is located, is the market, and that the subject the Municipality intended to constitute was characterized by general attributes that transcend human diversity: those of the homo economicus of neoliberalism. This thematization reveals a singular feature: the coexistence of an ethnonationally heterogenous population could be compatible within the framework of the hegemonic political project. Not only that but the technologies that support the statu quo can be modulated to produce a truth regarding what the subjects who are the object of such technologies, think or believe regarding Israeli state domination: you have to understand what happened here when Jerusalem was functional for a thousand years. When Jews came to the Land of Israel, each tribe had a piece of the territory, except Jerusalem. It was not divided among the tribes. For a thousand years, it was managed as a city that all people came to, and they felt, “Wow, the city belongs to me as much as it belongs to the other tribes.” And Jews and non-Jews alike that used to come to Jerusalem felt respect… for people different from them. It is sort of the foundation of modern democracy – where different people were equally accepted into the gates of Jerusalem. It does not necessarily mean that it is a great idea for all tribes or all peoples around the world. But when something was successful in Jerusalem, by definition it is accepted by all tribes, Jews and non-Jews alike. Jerusalem had a role as a united city, whole, not divided into tribes. That is the DNA we have to develop because nothing else will ever work. The city has to work for all sectors. By definition that DNA cannot be divided. I will give you another perspective. Not one city in the world that was ever divided stayed functional.5

The presentation of a thematization that combines millenarist aspects with the features of a pluralist democracy once again exemplifies that for Barkat, the problematic coexistence between Israelis and Palestinian can become sustainable without profoundly altering the current social order. It would be just a matter of making it resilient to crisis by cementing a common site of inscription for both ethno-national groups. The terminology applied in this quote is reiterated in other interviews and speeches: here, I am interested in underlining how a disparity is codified in the modes of accessing and enjoying of civil rights and responsibilities according to ethno-class cleavages through terms that are intended to be innocuous. When speaking of “tribes”, Barkat likened the features of the contemporary social order with a collective way of life, allegedly, democratic that recreates or continues a mythical past of, also seemingly, full equity. This characteristic would be endorsed by the less favored sectors, according to quotes such as the following, in which Barkat boasted of the support that the Palestinian population gave to his administration: The Washington Institute does independent polls of the Arab residents of East Jerusalem and you see a very nice growth in (levels of) satisfaction. The last poll was done last September. 5

Horovitz, David (2013). One Jerusalem. Undivided. Open to all. Controlled by Israel. The Times of Israel, 08/05/2013.

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Compared to November, 2010, general satisfaction with the quality of life in Jerusalem grew from 44% to 56% in one year. The vast majority of the Arabs in Jerusalem prefer to be on the Israeli side. They do not want the city divided. Dissatisfaction with municipal services went down to 15% from 36%. And you see that they acknowledge and understand that we care for them.6

This evocation of the Palestinian Jerusalemites’ alleged support or acceptance of Israeli sovereignty is crucial for authorities such as Barkat to publicly legitimize the exercise of power and to factually and symbolically justify that the “tribes” of citizens and residents enjoy an experience of full democratic life. The production of data carried out by a think-tank provides a knowledge which is built around the population’s behaviors and representations that becomes available to political authorities, and which they can use in their favor. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the measurement of something as intangible as the legitimacy of a highly contested regime is expressed in the form of a benchmark: a quantitative indicator that subsumes multiple values regarding attitudes, feelings, positions and practices around the municipal government. The numerical variation of this indicator was often taken to endorse the exercise of power, a feature that evokes the displacement of the political by the economic that Brown (2015) highlights as characteristic of contemporary neoliberal democracies. Finally, the quote expresses that the deployment of public policies in Jerusalem finds its correlation in the increase in levels of satisfaction with the municipal government. In other words, in Barkat’s perspective, the Palestinian demographic question can be neutralized by virtue of an approach that leads the population to accept the validity of the Israeli political regime to the point that it allows its authorities to collect the voices of those who constitute the object of political intervention to speak in their favor.

7 Final Words: A Provisional Definition of the Apparatus of Israelization According to the composition of the actors involved in each particular scenario, it is expected that certain rationalities will prevail over others. It is important to bear in mind that even hegemonic groups show diverse and heterogeneous features within their own cleavages, as also do the minorities that are constituted as the target of political interventions (Rose and Miller 1992; Yiftachel 1998). Having said this, I will offer some justifications about of the development of the notion of apparatus of Israelization. To begin with, the notion of Judaization is often presented as a process, which implies the idea of a historical progression and carries the implications of a casuistry. Secondly, more than frequently, authors that refer to the “Judaization” of Jerusalem 6

Horovitz, David (2012). “Nir Barkat: How I’m ensuring Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem”. The Times of Israel, 29/02/2012.

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or any other region do not establish a clear conceptualization of the term. In short, it is never operationalized. Therefore, as an analytical category that is indistinctly applied to cases that involve different levels of analysis it becomes imprecise and vague. This is due to the fact that when moving from one reality to another, the specificity of both the case and the theoretical solvency that should be built around empirical evidence are, at the same time, undermined. Fourth, Judaization is usually assumed as a central component of broader and more defined concepts, such as ethnocracy, as it was mentioned, which also demands proper operationalizations. Fifth, the notion of Judaization seems practical enough to offer such a kind of parsimony that its application does not arouse criticism or objection. All in all, so far, there is such a tacit consensus on this term’s use that for multiple reasons, it is hard to find efforts to refine its theoretical correctness. Sixth, derived from these motives, the use of Judaization puts the accent on an apparently overwhelming and unstoppable project: an effort of cultural homogenization on the part of one group over others on the basis of an ethno-national criterion. Therefore, it comprises an opposite dynamic of de-Arabization, as if such an effect was the maximum objective fostered. Consequently, the use of the dual notions of Judaization and de-Arabization essentializes an ontological and relational dynamic of dichotomous contrasts, based on ambiguously religious or cultural markers, but not political ones. Finally, referring to the “Judaization” of a territory, city or population leaves the general socio-political arrangement of each case out of the analysis, losing sight of the contingency in the relationship between the actors involved. Indeed, the dichotomic approach obliterates further explorations on how discursive and extra-discursive practices that, both from “above” and “below”, forge the network of relations of forces. If we consider a dual Judaization and de-Arabization processes in absolute terms, the exercise of power is equaled to pure domination. This renders quite difficult to appreciate the many instances the process of Judaization is reversed and conditioned by practices of resistance, or even when it operates, but not in the expected terms, due to possible negotiations and collaborations. In short, this look might exclude from the analysis the place of the less privileged actors, expecting, therefore, “less” from them, helping to reinforce an approach that even if unwillingly, becomes dominocentric. Once again, the notion of apparatus of Israelization places the accent on the question of power and not on the cultural dimension, implying that it is not the cultural, religious or national feature what operates in the cases referred to as “Judaization”, but something else. In particular, it is not a process or a project, although historical instances and series of projects sometimes coincide with respect to the content of their aspirations, be them contradictory or not entirely compatible with each other. The key will be to account for the ways in which certain concordances lead to the establishment of tactical alliances to make such political ambitions effective. Following the Foucauldian perspective, political authorities may belong or not to the political sphere. What constitutes them as such is their interest in conducting the conducts of others according to a multitude of representations of what behaviors should be promoted and which should be restricted. In this regard, political authorities

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attempt to institute modes of coexistence and collective life that are compatible with the achievement or reproduction of a hegemonic position. The apparatus of Israelization comprises an interweaving of political rationalities and technologies of power progressively designed and articulated according to different modalities. This dynamic combination of practices aims at designing and securing conditions for the success of a state-building project: one with ambiguous geographical borders, with constitutional foundations that are open to their own reelaboration and expansion by the sanctioning of new Basic Laws, and with the precarious inclusion of citizens—from Mizrahi and Ethiopian Jews to Bedouin, Druze and Arabs—and permanent residents. In other words, the apparatus of Israelization allows to identify discourses on the nation, on the State, on the nature of the demos and of the kind of collective life that the State should consecrate. Moreover, this notion makes it possible to conceptualize the articulation of all these discursive fields about the nation, its constitution, the ways of forging subjects upon the population’s diversity—ways of being citizen and resident—and to access the mechanisms to exercise power through the deployment of multipurpose technologies, capable of adapting to contingencies and realities of each context. To conclude, I examined the definition of ethnocracy in order to understand the Israeli political regime. This enabled me to offer a theoretical contribution. Precisely, the concept of apparatus of Israelization aims, for instance, to make intelligible the different economies of power with which different mechanisms can be operated. I am referring to the modalities in which certain technologies modify and adapt the physiognomy of the territory, hence, affecting the ways of living and circulating in the city. As a consequence of this, therefore, this brings us to consider the economic, social and political activities of its inhabitants. All in all, the notion aims to facilitate research on how political authorities that follow an ethno-national criterion to design public policies, rely on an array of techniques and technologies that affect demographic behaviors, produce different kinds of inscriptions to the territory and ways of belonging to the demos in the State of Israel. In this regard, the notion of apparatus of Israelization allows to comprehend the subtlety with which power is exercised, therefore, to appreciate how different esthetic political horizons may be evoked by political authorities. A detailed analysis of the configuration of power relations can facilitate the understanding of how different horizons can overlap with each other, in such a way that it is not necessary to formulate neologisms that account for the specificity of the Israeli political regime. In other words, the efforts to cage the political creature in a bestiary may lose sight of the fact that the convergence of non-democratic and democratic forms, whether due to ethno-national and confessional traits or not, is not typical of the Israeli political regime, but a contemporary reality that cuts across Middle Eastern societies, but also, the forms of institution of cohabitation among human diversity in Latin America, North America, among other regions. In further opportunities, I will provide analysis that consider the concept of apparatus of Israelization, again, a combination of discursive and extra-discursive practices linked to the production of subjectivities and to the elaboration of representations on democracy, the territory, the diverse groups that inhabit it, and the technologies

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that from a material standpoint, guide and modulate the behaviors of the population. This concept serves to understand how a sovereign project takes place in different levels and how it can adapt to different administrations, contexts, realities, time periods and locations. Analytically, it will help not to lose sight of two issues. On the one hand, the multipurpose nature of the technologies of power. On the other, the agency of formal and informal mechanisms, and of those more and less favored actors that constitute the network of force relations that therefore, may act, demand and resist with greater or lesser degrees of legitimacy acknowledged by the State (Foucault 2008; Deleuze 1992; Rose and Miller 1992; Gordon 1991).

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The Iraqi Marshland and the Quest of Tourism and Development Hadeer Merza and Zeinab Ayad Muneam

Abstract The “Ahwar” of southern Iraq (the marshland) has been listed as a world heritage site by UNESCO as a refuge of biodiversity and the relict of Mesopotamian cities. This is where UR, Uruk, Eridu, and Sumerian settlements developed in the area of the wetland in the southern part of Iraq between 4000–3000 years BCE. The international recognition for its outstanding universal value emphasized its historical, environmental, and cultural significance. The paper proposes a vision for development through drawing attention to the place and providing knowledge through research. A revival of the cultural environment to maintain and save the natural environment as a gateway to the marshland and a link between the two rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, and the translation into a planning proposal for development with an architectural vision reflects the local identity. The research adopts a quantitative approach, utilizing literature, secondary data of both qualitative and quantitative value, in addition to the design layout proposal for the site. This paper provides an important perspective into how design can provide solutions in natural heritage locations; it offers important contribution to the debates on how heritage can support sustainable development in a post-war context. Keywords Cultural heritage · Iraqi Marshlands · Eco-tourism · Sustainable development

1 Introduction “Where the water flooded the land welfare grow and wings of happiness show up to exist,” A Sumerian wisdom. The project takes place in the Marshlands of a country rich in its cultural backgrounds, historical sites, with treasures in every meter. Houses and “Mudhifs” sited H. Merza (B) · Z. A. Muneam University of Petra, Amman, Jordan e-mail: [email protected] Z. A. Muneam e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_18

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on floating islands built from Reed and mud, on reviver water, and all of it are floating over oil fields. The area that has suffered from wars for many years and years was damaged, abandoned, forgotten, and neglected. There is a treasure that needs to be noticed, introduced to the world, appreciated, and valued; it is the “Mesopotamian Venice” the “marshlands” (The Marshlands of Iraq inscribed on UNESCO’s world heritage list). In addition, the Ahwar has been through varied wars causing destruction. There has been a tremendous environmental damage, in addition to social, economic, educational, health, and the loss of security affected cultural and heritage tourism in the whole region of the Iraqi (wet area) marshland. Consequently, the place has not been identified for heritage and cultural tourism. Lacking facilities, accommodation, and services, in addition to poor living conditions, has led to the loss of many living species: many kinds of fish and animals, and rare kinds of birds. Having three archeological sites and four major wetlands “Ahwar,” there is a need for an interpretation center that also adopts sustainable development principles. The achievement of local and sustainable development, promoting the region as a destination for global tourism, restores the environment, establishing opportunities for better living conditions for both inhabitants and visitors.

2 Background 2.1 Marshland Introduction, History, and Time Line Marshlands in the southern part of Iraq cover a vast area with a range of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand square kilometers, thus representing the biggest and most extended wetlands in West Asia, covering a region where Euphrates and Tigris Rivers meet and create the biggest wetlands in their lower basin, forming shallow interconnected lakes, filled with fresh water from the two rivers (The United Nations Integrated Water Task Force for Iraq 2011). Where early civilizations were established in Mesopotamia earlier than 4000 BC.; Sumerian, Acadian, Babylonian, etc. (Fig. 1).

2.2 Previous Studies Many books, studies, and articles wrote about the Iraqi Marshlands’ natural environment and culture, as “Return to the Marshes, 2009,” “Restoring the Marshlands of Iraq, 2012.” Wide range of studies focused on the environmental problems in the Iraqi Marshlands, human study, demography, lifestyle, and natural resources. Studies were taken by UNEP in Iraq between years 2003–2006, and many united UN actions tried to continue in beyond 2007.

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Central Marshes

•The Central Marshes receive water from influxes of the Tigris's distributaries •Covering an area of 3,000 km2

Hammar Marshes

•The Hammar Marshes is primarily fed by the Euphrates and lies south of it with a western extent to Nasiriyah, eastern border of the Shatt al-Arab and southern extent of Basrah. •the marshes are a 2,800 km2

Hawizeh Marshes

•The Hawizeh Marshes lie east of the Tigris and a portion lie in Iran.

Fig. 1 (Main marshes) (Source: modified by the authors based on the study of (The United Nations Integrated Water Task Force for Iraq 2011))

The UNEP Studies focused on the description of the various activities, assessments, strategies, and the possibility of the support of sustainable management, and environmental Management. And to undertake field-based assessment of the environmental degradation of the Iraqi Marshlands, caused by the previous regime, wars, conflicts, and industrial activities in the region, also the focus was on energy natural resources in oil and gas, natural gas, and petroleum. The need for continuous interventions and initiatives was mentioned in all studies on the region, with no focus on the importance of the tourism movement to the Iraqi Marshes (United Nation Environment Programme 2007; IBP USA 2010).

2.3 Importance of Iraqi Marshlands The Wetlands have a unique environment; it is a haven of biodiversity and the relict landscape of the Mesopotamian Cities; it is an international approval of its outstanding universal value. With its cultural and natural features (The Ahwar of Southern Iraq: refuge of biodiversity and the relict landscape of the Mesopotamian Cities), the water-covered area in the Iraqi Marshes represents a unique model in semi-arid and arid areas, filled with fresh water, with such richness in natural cover, animals, fish, birds, and buffalo, in addition to vast extensions of reed beds and open theaters of water that geologically formed thousands of years ago because of the Tigris and Euphrates sedimentations in this plain area. Economically, the estimated fish production formed about 60% of overall fish production in Iraq in the eighties of the twentieth century (Alazzawi 1989). The area is also characterized by marshes climate, good for the cultivation of economic crops as well as the spread of reeds and papyrus where planted which can be used as feed for animals. They enter in the mat industry and as a raw material in paper, sugar, and are highly productive in reeds

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that are harvested commercially, used as a main building material, as well as mats and other household materials. Industry in the marshes provides a living for a large number of marsh dwellers who work in breeding buffalos and some kinds of fish, and birds, and others work in mat and rug industry and another section cultivation Alshilb (Rice). This local diversity is reflected in forming a unique ecosystem in the lower part of Mesopotamia: The Iraqi Marshes play an important role in the maintenance of biodiversity, due to size and richness of the aquatic vegetation in a unique ecosystem in the Middle East. The marshes act as a natural conservatoire, maintaining water levels represented in water storage during high flow and water release in low flow of the rivers. The Iraqi Marshes, during the previous rule period, suffered from drying processes through the implementation of many projects, decreasing dramatically the amount of stored water in proportion to the amount of reed that purifies water as a natural filter, and desalination of salty water, which is a method to treat water safely and with minimal energy consumption (Alazzawi 1989). The area is a home to two endemic species and subspecies of mammals, and two endemic species and two endemic subspecies of birds, and fish (Fig. 2). Fig. 2 (Marshland function to human) (Source: modified by the authors based on the study of (The United Nations Integrated Water Task Force for Iraq 2011))

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People and Culture, Animal Resources (Birds, Fish), Mammals, and Agricultural Resources

The marshes contain another important component, the Marsh Arabs, which directly affects and are affected by their ambience. Marsh Arabs inhabited this area thousands of years ago and became an integral part of the ecosystem of the wetlands. This vulnerable community is still practicing the same customs, traditions, and lifestyle of their Sumerian ancestors. The same reed house (Mudhif), the canoe (Mashhoof), and five-headed spear (fala) that is on the Sumerian cylinder stamps are still made and used by Marsh Arabs in the marshes. Sumerian cylinder seals, as well as mud clays and other remains, tell us much about the way they lived and interacted with the marsh ecosystem. Data on the fauna of Iraq dates back as far as the twelfth millennium BC and includes gazelle, wild goat, sheep, wild cattle, red or roe deer, boar, Onager, red fox, wolf, lynx, and hedgehogs. Cultivated goods as barley, wheat, and pearl millet (Alazzawi 1989), in addition to rice cultivation, which has a special importance as they grow some special kinds of rice (Anbar), carried out in small plots cleared in April and sown in mid-May.

2.3.2

Sustainable Architecture

Reed houses are the most characteristic features of the wetlands. Such houses, built on small artificial islands, are constructed with layers of reed and mud (Alazzawi 1989). These techniques highlight the richness and inventiveness of local builders and their ability to make the best possible use of the limited variety of locally available building materials (Fig. 3). Due to all the mentioned above, the Iraqi Marshes joined the UNESCO World Heritage Site during the 40th session (The Marshlands of Iraq inscribed on UNESCO’s world heritage list), looking forward to host new opportunities for international cooperation for a better sustainable and conservation management of the Marshlands.

2.4 Losing Heritage (Destruction Through Time) From years ago, the country went through several wars, damages, lack of attention and awareness on many sides; educational, economic, social, level of security, the diseases that spread after this tremendous environmental damage in the marshland that affected the movement of tourism and this was a meager part in reviving any heritage sites that are rich with cultural and natural resources As a result to the weak tourism to Al-Ahwar, this outstanding place is not known to others; it is not under light and will not become a tourist destination; even a great part of Iraqi residents have not visited the marshland and do not know its history.

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H. Merza and Z. A. Muneam people and culture •The Iraqi marshland community is still practicing the same customs, traditions, lifestyle of their Sumerian ancestors. •Building reedhouse (mudhif), canoe (mashhoof), five-headed spear (fala) that can be seen on the Sumerian cylinder stamps are still made and used by Marsh Arabs in the marshes Animal resources •birds : As for birds’ migration routes, the Iraqi wetlands lie within very important global flyways • fish : The Iraqi wetlands provide natural spawning grounds, nurseries and feeding places for fish. •mammals : includes gazelle, wild goat, sheep, wild cattle, red or roe deer, boar, onager, red fox, wolf, lynx and hedghogs Agricultural resources •cultivated crops such as rise, barley, wheat and pearl millet . Rice cultivation was especially important; it was carried out in small plots cleared in April and sown in mid-May. sustainable architecture •Reed houses are the most characteristic features of the wetlands, such houses are built on small artificial islands made from layers of reed and mud. •These techniques highlight the richness and inventiveness of local builders and their ability to make the best possible use of the limited variety of locally available building materials.

Fig. 3 (Marshland importance) (Source: modified by the authors based on the study of (The United Nations Integrated Water Task Force for Iraq 2011))

Al-Ahwar drained in 1970s, the reduction of the wetland area made many of the people who lived there lose their jobs and the chance to live there which made them immigrate to the surrounding regions to secure their living. None of the bad conditions was treated because of lack in equipped places and infrastructure to receive researchers and scientists in order to repair the depleted resources. All this continued damage will end in more migration, damage, and resource exhaustion. The lack of projects in Iraq focuses on the development of heritage sites and conserves culture. In addition to the tourist side, existing projects and proposals are mostly tourist complexes that impose the presence of tourists without their interaction with local inhabitants. As a result, the need for Iraq to undertake sustainable projects maintains the private and unique environment in the marshes. After entering the UNESCO list of world heritage sites, the scientific, cultural, and historical legacy became internationally important because it is the cradle of civilization (Matthews et al. 2020). The deterioration of the security situation in Iraq prevented the international organizations and firms from fielding staff there. Therefore, some projects had to be modified and redesigned, others were postponed or frozen, which is one of the factors that lead to the absence of a comprehensive development plan in the region (Fig. 4).

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Statement of problem

Treasure not used

Draining marshland

Lack of awareness

Migration

Bad economic condition

Damaging biodiversity

Unknown to the other nationalities

No entertain ment or settlement places

Fig. 4 (Statement of problem) (Source Authors)

2.5 Losing Identity as a Result of Neglecting As a wetland ecosystem, the Iraqi marshlands are still the largest in MENA region, with its sociocultural significance (United Nation Environment Programme 2009). Due to the construction of many canals and dykes in order to control the floods, the water amount that feeds the marshlands naturally was limited and controlled; thus, limitation caused reduction of the natural annual overflow. Not surprisingly, the persistent damage was still a major reason in losing identity, and the value of Al-Ahwar that was built over a multi-unique layer formed over years. Al-Ahwar is a living heritage site; its authenticity and value came out first from the ecosystem, the Marsh Arabs, and the unique architectural system. Desertification of Al-Ahwar: Marsh Arabs inhabited Al-Ahwar thousands of years ago and became an integral part of the ecosystem of the wetlands. Through time, this vulnerable community practiced the same customs, traditions, and lifestyle of their Sumerian ancestors. Losing this ecosystem will lead to dysfunction in their practices. Desertification of the marshes means reed nonexistence; this will affect their popular public transportation in the marshes (Al Mashoof), floating artificial islands, and building reed houses (Mudhif). The collapse of Al-Ahwar ecosystem made the Marsh Arabs have no affiliation and absolutely denudation from identity. Through the last 20 years, the marsh land is healing, in terms of level of water and reed agriculture. The images below show the development through the last 20 years but still not as good as 1970 (The Marshlands of Iraq inscribed on UNESCO’s world heritage list), which is a strong indicator for the need to revive this heritage site. This shows that the land can still be sustained and get the full attention to treat the water and to be developed to be a suitable destination for researchers and tourists. Since 2003, the re-flooding of the dried areas shows some signs of ecosystem recovery of the marshlands, with identified problems: degradation, lack of potable water, and sanitation (United Nation Environment Programme 2009). The development goal of the UNEP project focused on “the sustainable management and restoration of the Iraqi Marshlands” and thus included pilot projects to provide potable water and wetland water quality improvement, with other initiatives at the local community level (United Nation Environment Programme 2009) (Figs. 5, 6 and 7).

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Fig. 5 Iraqi marshland condition in 2000 (Source https://wvs.earthdata.nasa.gov)

Fig. 6 Iraqi marshland condition in 2010 (Source https://wvs.earthdata.nasa.gov)

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Fig. 7 Iraqi marshland condition in 2020 (Source https://wvs.earthdata.nasa.gov)

3 Interpretation of a Heritage Site Some of the main issues on interpretative programs, being provocative not instructive, should aim to present the whole and comprehensive image rather than a partial one and should be addressed to all people, nationally and internationally (Tilden 1957). The potentials to enhance public awareness and understanding of the cultural heritage can include media, publications, and interpretational and educational lectures, with community participation; research, training, and evaluation of the procedures taken for interpretation; and interpretative data and interpretive infrastructure, in addition to emphasizing physical access to the heritage site through museum-type display, cultural products, souvenirs, informative panels, site seeing tours, and guided tours (Tilden 1957). In order to reach the aims of interpretation to all visitors, the locations should stimulate their interest, and instill their desire for beauty and elevate their spirit, interpretation centers should have the ability to connect the experience with the message that reveals meanings, values and the history of the place and transmits the required information to the visitors, conveying the importance of the place with optimum interpretation activities and facilities, having administrative, financial, political, social, and voluntary support (Beck and Cable 1997).

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4 Tourism in the Marshland 4.1 Eco- and Nature Tourism With the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, their tributaries, including 5,275 km of canals and numerous lakes, Iraq is at an advantage over many of its neighbors in the Arab World for water-based tourism. There is great potential for private investments in river and waterfront tourism projects (Dabidian et al. 2013). Although tourism has considerable benefits on economy for local communities and countries, authorities should be aware of controlling tourism expansion in order to protect the natural cultural heritage site of the Marshlands from environmental degradation and depletion of its natural resources associated with the large number of visitors to the Marshlands (Neto 2003) (Figs. 8 and 9).

4.2 Sustainable and Cultural Tourism World Conservation Union, in 1996, defined sustainable tourism as “Environmentally responsible travel and visitation to natural areas, in order to enjoy and appreciate nature (and any accompanying cultural features, both past and present) in a way that promotes conservation, has a low visitor impact, and provides for beneficially active socio-economic involvement of local peoples” which provides the maximum benefits Fig. 8 (Principles of eco-tourism) (Source Authors)

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Fig. 9 (Components of eco-tourism) (Source Authors)

with minimum cost on both, economy and the natural and social environments (Bien 2004). “Cultural tourism: General term referring to leisure travel motivated by one or more aspects of the culture of a particular area.” (Dictionary of Travel, Tourism and Hospitality Terms, 1996). Travel intentions can be motivated for many aspects maybe for place or activity or some kind of adventure or learning about new culture or it can be all of them (Barré 2006). “Cultural tourism can be defined as that activity which enables people to experience the different ways of life of other people, thereby gaining at first hand an understanding of their customs, traditions, the physical environment, the intellectual ideas and those places of architectural, historic, archaeological or other cultural significance which remain from earlier times. Cultural tourism differs from recreational tourism in that it seeks to gain an understanding or appreciation of the nature of the place being visited.” (ICOMOS Charter for Cultural Tourism, Draft April 1997). “The movement of persons to cultural attractions away from their normal place of residence, with the intention to gather new information and experiences to satisfy their cultural needs.” (Barré 2006). Different types of cultural tourism, according to their purpose, focus on the motivation; sightseeing is the primary aim in tourist visit to the destination (World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 2005), as well as the importance of deep cultural experience in the location, on both environments, the natural and cultural. In “Al-Ahwar,” the Iraqi Marshland’s cultural heritage plays a main role; the tourist would experience the participation in the living style and customs, the original type of construction in the floating islands, and “the Mudhif” sustainable reed architecture.

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Source of revenue to the country

Economic

More employment opportunities for locals Propel development of infrastructure Preservation and promoting of local culture and heritage

Socio-cultural Positive exchange and interaction

Environmental

Increase environmental protection awareness

Fig. 10 (Impact of tourism) (Source Authors)

The tourists would have the opportunity to interact with their heritage, lifestyle, artifacts, cultural production in artifacts of the past and present, and performing visual arts, in addition to the experience of traveling through the wetlands with the traditional boats “Mashhouf.” In order to produce sustainable cultural and eco-tourism in the Iraqi Marshlands, a first step in the planning process is to: – Develop a vision of the best location; on planning level, and how to integrate the architectural intervention with new facilities and buildings in the development. – Enrich the visitor’s experience – Minimize tourists’ impact on the natural cultural heritage site at the same time. – Define stakeholders, such as NGOs, tourism industry, and local communities, need to collaborate to help local enterprises for local and economic benefits (Fig. 10).

5 Location Possibilities Study 5.1 The Four Microenvironments Al-Ahwar is composed of four main microclimates and each one has its own treatment approach: 1. Open marshes vicinity 2. Palm groves in the marshes 3. Irrigation areas with marshes edges

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4. Desert area with marshes edges. The central marshes, forming the biggest wetland, were chosen in this paper as a pilot case study, due to its centrality, between the cities of Nasiriya and Qurna as a prototype of “Chibaiysh.” Having many important features, the vast area links Euphrates River through the canals that feed the marshes with fresh floodwater and the vicinity to the main vehicular transportation line that links north and south Iraq (Baghdad–Basra highway), thus forming a strong interaction between the marshes with the easily accessible land, the inhabitants with the visitors, Marshlands, and the river, shaping, and characterizing the area. Irrigation areas with marshes edges Irrigation area environment consists of two regions, and by geographic miscarriage: one north of the marsh area and the second south of the region. Both regions provide all the necessary requirements for the establishment of agricultural land (Alazzawi 1989), while the settlements fall along the east side of the main channel and thus controlled the area as a channel that helps removing the waste and the pollution caused by boat engines, movement to agricultural land and then to the marshes. Thus, it is provided through secondary channels (orthogonal with the main canal (Channel)), on the principle of comb-like system, in reference to examples of the irrigation areas of the marshes: (Aljolh and Alinkarh villages) (Alazzawi 1989). – The nature of economic resources affects settlement planning irrigation village areas in which the rational organization of the houses appeared depending on the channels of irrigation used to agricultural fields. Settlement growth in the irrigation areas and the focus of growth and sprawl of residential linear extension of the nearby canal or irrigation channels are established by the locals. They grow and expand settlements along these channels, either peripheral or among the existing villages originally (Alazzawi 1989). Figure 11 shows the strong connection between Euphrates River and the central Marsh with the canals, the vicinity to the north–south road linking Baghdad–Basra road with the Marshland (Fig. 12).

5.2 Canal Site Comparison Study As choosing a site that is in abstract working like a connection between the Euphrates River and the marshes, such a location has many possibilities to interpret the marshes. The strong existence of visual axes from the river to the marshes in both directions; however, it is composed of multiple types of land that can be a good advantage to provide more than an experience to the visitors. The location is easily reachable as it is directly located on Baghdad–Basra Street, which will allow good transportation to visitors and services.

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Fig. 11 Connection between Euphrates River and the central Marsh through canals (Source Italian ministry for the environment land and sea, free Iraq foundation, nature Iraq (2008) New Eden village, Iraq ministries)

Fig. 12 Canals linking Euphrates River and the central marshes (Source Italian ministry for the environment land and sea, free Iraq foundation, nature Iraq (2008) New Eden village, Iraq ministries)

This kind of interesting location can attract more visitors and researches that will definitely enhance the economic condition of the marshes. The study took the same canal and studied three proposals to measure how each one can give a more sustainable, interesting, and environmentally friendly approach to interpret this heritage site in all of its layers. Proposal A First proposal studies the possibilities for interpreting the marshes as two separated plots on the two sides of the canal and overlooking the marshes with a weak link with the Euphrates River (Fig. 13). Proposal B Second proposal studies the possibilities for interpreting on one side plot on one side of the canal and overlooking the marshes with a weak link with the Euphrates River (Fig. 14).

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Fig. 13 Proposal A site area and S.W.O.T. analysis (Source Authors)

Fig. 14 Proposal B site area and S.W.O.T. analysis (Source Authors)

Proposal C Third proposal studies the possibilities to interpret above the canal and overlooking the marshes with a strong link with the Euphrates River that allows various possibilities to connect the river with the marshes in addition to the banks of the canal (Fig. 15). Due to the importance of the canal as a joint and link between the marshes and Euphrates River, and the rich opportunities, floating architecture is more sustainable to build; this site is chosen for the pilot proposal.

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Fig. 15 Proposal C site area and S.W.O.T. analysis (Source Authors)

5.3 Location Main Terms to Consider Site study leads to terms to consider when interpreting the marshes on any layer and time factor with the possibilities of growing and expanding in all aspects. The keyword map below shows the fundamental bases on choosing certain techniques of treatment (Fig. 16).

5.4 Abu Al Narsy Canal as a Gateway (Approach and Link) The canals all around the marshes form the main spine to irrigate the marshes around the year from the river as main entry from riverside; the canal can be the physical, functional, and visual link to marshes, giving strong visual axis directly into the marshes, allowing the canal to be an interpretational gateway (Fig. 17). Overlooking the Iraqi Marshes as piece of art and history. The visitors can be introduced through physical and visual access, starting from the river through the canal with series of interpret functions within raised platforms providing multispecial experience and overlooking the marshes in a wide-angle view introducing the visitors to the marshes through the river. In other words, maintaining a free visual spine focuses on the continuity of water level through the Canal, which links Euphrates River with the Marshlands.

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Fig. 16 Location main terms (Source Authors)

Fig. 17 The Canal can be the direct and main link to the Marshlands, a gateway, and interpretation joint (Source Authors)

5.4.1

Urban Fabric Layer Hierarchy

Analyzing the urban fabric layers of the Iraqi Marshes horizontally and vertically leads to a high sensitive approach that will be the canal host. The Iraqi Marshes are considered as environmentally sensitive areas, that need to be protected from devastating development, to minimize the negative impact; therefore, this paper focuses on the importance of the ecologically conscious design approach, on planning level as well as on architecture, with focus on the followings:

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Addition of raised platforms for natural species observation and photography from the edge (the leading joint to the entry of the Marshlands). Raised platforms as a sustainable environmental solution in order to maintain the visual axis link the river and the marshes through the canals, taking into consideration high chance of flood of The River at the Abu Narsy canal. Due to the several irrigation canals, the river splits in upstream. The amount of the presumptive flood is approximately 1,000 m3 /s., according to the numerical model developed for the irrigation canal for the design of the hydraulic structure for Al-Hammar Marsh (Italian Ministry for the Environment Land and Sea, Free Iraq Foundation, Nature Iraq 2008); in addition to the flood of the Euphrates, interpretation directly on the canal will be the direct reason to cause blockage in the irrigation system of the marshes, thus emphasizing the importance of the canal as land-Marshland link as a gateway, focusing on both sustainable and ecologically efficient designs. These raised platforms can act as an observatory for natural species, and as a photography platform from the entering joint of the Marshlands. The proposed conceptual layout, with the combination of the construction on the land, on canal sides, and the suspended platforms that hold the proposed activities, embraces the elevated reed structures that cool down the air as it enters naturally through the building, creating a visual frame, of the vistas from Euphrates River approaching the marshlands as an eco-cultural heritage site. The marshland area has a very low skyline consisting of maximal 2–3 stories high which leads to not exaggerating in the proposed height for the raised platforms but on the other hand can be an advantage only for the interpretation and research center as a landmark, empowering the idea of the canal as a gateway to the marshes. This approach can significantly enhance the efficiency in the most simplified forms of development and providing new opportunities for development. The possibility of giving the local cultural identity a contemporary creative approach in spatial design can stand out as an interpretational point and still have the coherence with its surroundings.

5.5 Canal Functional Layout Approach Proposal In response to user requirements and social needs, simple spatial organization is proposed with three categorized functions in level of privacy: private, semi-private, and public. The public and semi-private functions are located on the canal to interpret functions introducing the marshes through the canal, ending with the private functions, directly attached to the marshes enhancing the outside and inside experience. Organic spatial organization and layout form man–nature relationship in the marsh system, having the impact of three forces: growth, change, and decay (Alazzawi 1989). These forces affect the nature spontaneously and naturally away from any central control and create from the vicinity of the marshlands, characterized by the fact that its elements, parts, are directly linked with both: the local regime and the area around,

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maintaining a private entity within the system. The proposed output of this system gives the structure its characterized identity by: 1. The resulting shapes are not geometric, and the relationship between parts of the structure can recall the presence of geometric hydrosphere and reed forests of architectural heritage of the marshes. 2. Components can recall smooth and fabric lines to represent the vicinity of the marshes in the middle of the open water and the waterways connecting the villages. 3. The proposed layout integrates with the existing context without imposing any alien intervention that can cause a negative impact on the architectural heritage of the place. The public area representing the interpretative section and local industry section that serves the tourism sector directly, offering opportunities of employment for the locals, which will help to revive the area economically. A research center, in the semiprivate section for health and the management control of environmental sustainability and water quality, allows the private section to host the accommodation that serves the visitors and researches. Thus, this will add more value to the experience of the marshes and will promote better economic and ecological conditions to the marshes (Fig. 18) (Figs. 19 and 20).

Fig. 18 Left: spatial organization based on level of privacy. Right: functional spatial organization (Source Authors)

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Fig. 19 Left: site consideration, right: function distribution (Source Authors)

Fig. 20 (Objectives during urban and rural land development) (Source Authors)

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5.6 Sustainable Proposed Solution – Mass orientation The marshes are marked by two main themes of winter and summer, which clearly in turn influenced traditional solutions to climate processors, which resulted in some inconsistency in the treatment. Climatic conditions of the winter require different solutions than those of the summer. Therefore, mass orientation can play a major role in ventilation and controlling temperature. – Water sustainable treatment in Marshlands: The reed beds work as water purifiers by initiating bacterial activity that produces oxygen conveyed by airflow, but the aboveground biomass harvesting is beneficial in the reduction of secondary pollution arising from both plant decomposition and sedimentation. Removing nutrients from the Marshlands, as well as harvesting the reeds influence negatively the water quality, and ecosustainability because it removes the reed stalks that pump up nutrients from the roots. – Use of local materials: Renewable and ecological material can be successfully used in the construction process such as reed and straw. The utilization of reed construction techniques as sustainable construction material maintains the architectural local and cultural identity.

6 Conclusion The canals and dykes play an important role as joints that links the Iraqi Marshlands with the main two rivers Tigris and Euphrates before joining together to form “Shat Al Arab”; they form the main entrance points from both rivers for inhabitants, fishermen, visitors, and their role in water supply to the area. Our proposal focuses on the development of the urban joint that links one of the main supply canals from Euphrates River with Al-Hammar Marshland that forms the central vast wetland area “Al-Chebayish.” 1. 2.

3.

Local materials, used in sustainable techniques to produce energy and water purifying. The sustainability of floating architecture that is mainly supported by mooring piles, taking into consideration climate change and its impact on architecture and energy consumption. Ensuring safety feelings to the tourist, with the utilization of the local materials, and night light emphasizes project identity with minimum impact on land.

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4.

Photography can redesign architecture and make the project known to countries around the world, especially with existing social media, capturing memories, to enrich the experience of the interpretation goals. 5. Multi-experience in architecture and urban vista: Canal water level, suspended level over the water, lodges in between the reeds. 6. Inspire and reuse the marshland design elements from the traditional unique architecture in a modern way. 7. Use all the design principles that are extracted from the architecture of the area. 8. Keep the main path to the canal as the main entry spine. 9. Sustainable architecture adaptable with the environment. 10. The interactive architecture with enrichment of the area in nighttime. 11. The proposal has the ability to grow, change.

7 The Paper Proposes (Recommends) – Sustainable solutions on both macro and micro levels. – Maintaining a free visual spine that focuses on the continuity on water level through the Canal that links Euphrates River with the Marshlands. – The Canal works as a gateway and a visual spine that represents the “Entry." – Getting the inhabitants, the visitors, and the tourists emotionally involved with the cultural impact of the Canal development as interpretation urban joint in wetlands. – Using the canal to interpret the marshes can be a prototype of treatment all around the main canals in the marshes. – It is important to consider the environmental factors and the surrounding, direction of water stream, the prevailing wind direction, and the vast reed fields and, in addition, how to implement these factors in their natural environment. – Developing the economic base of villages in the open marshlands depends on the availability of local resources in the region: reeds, buffalo grazing fields, and fishing, along with the development of structural and traditional techniques in the future plans for the villages in the marshlands. – Giving attention to the night scene lighting, and the hierarchy of the functions proposed in the canal, and the functions of the buildings proposed. – Possibilities of creating a landmark in the skyline of the area.

References Alazzawi H (1989) The process of planning housing and communities in the marshes. MSc, University of Baghdad Barré H (2006) Division of cultural policies and intercultural dialogue. Culture and development section, UNESCO Beck L, Cable T (1997) Interpretation for the 21st century: fifteen guiding principles for interpreting nature and culture

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Bien A (2004) The simple user’s guide to certification for sustainable tourism and ecotourism. The International Ecotourism Society Dabidian H, Al-Ani M, Francke C, Redwan A (2013) Iraq’s tourism potential. Public Disclosure Authorized IBP USA (2010) IRAQI investment and business guide, vol 1-. Strategic and practical information. Italian ministry for the environment land and sea, free Iraq foundation, nature Iraq (2008) New Eden village, Iraq ministries (see also Volume II, Book VI of the New Eden Master Plan, September 2006) Matthews R, Rasheed QH, Fernández MP, Fobbe S, Nováˇcek K, Mohammed-Amin R, Mühl S, Richardson A (2020) Heritage and cultural healing: Iraq in a post-Daesh era. Int J Heritage Stud Neto F (2003) A new approach to sustainable tourism development: moving beyond environmental protection. United Nations The Ahwar of Southern Iraq: refuge of biodiversity and the relict landscape of the Mesopotamian Cities. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1481/. Accessed July 2020 The Marshlands of Iraq inscribed on UNESCO’s world heritage list. http://www.unesco.org/new/ en/member-states/single-view/news/the_marshlands_of_iraq_inscribed_on_unescos_world_h eritag/ The Marshlands of Iraq inscribed on UNESCO’s world heritage list. http://www.unesco.org/ new/en/iraq-office/about-this-office/singleview/news/the_marshlands_of_iraq_inscribed_on_ unescos_world_heritag/#.WAHynvkrJD8. Accessed July 2020 The United Nations Integrated Water Task Force for Iraq (2011) Managing change in the Marshlands: Iraq’s critical challenge Tilden F (1957) Established six fundmentals principles in his book interpreting our heritage United Nation Environment Programme (2007) UNEP in Iraq (Post Conflict Assessment, Cleanup & Reconstruction) United Nation Environment Programme (2009) Support for environmental management of Iraqi Marshlands 2004–2009 World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) (2005) City tourism and culture—the European experience

Dr. Hadeer Merza B.Sc. with honors in Architecture, 1982. M.Sc. in Architectural Design, Housing & planning, 1987. Ph.D. in Housing Design and planning in urban context, with special focus on conceptual changes due to cultural and ideological impact. 1999. University of Baghdad, College of Engineering. Department of Architecture. Associate Professor in Architecture, University of Petra, Jordan 2006 to date. In addition, University of Baghdad up to 2006. Former Dean of the faculty of Architecture and Design, Chair, Department of Architecture and the Department of Graphic Design. Special interest on social and cultural impact on architecture, and housing planning and design. Zeinab Ayad Muneam Architect with experience from Germany, Jordan, UAE. Currently, she is a master of Architecture and Urbanism (MArch) student in the program Design Research Laboratory (DRL).

Creative Interventions as an Act of Reconciliation Hiba Sarrouj

Abstract In this chapter we will review the collective memory of Lebanon. Both positive and negative connotations will be considered. We will highlight the positive aspects of heritage preservation through art and urban design as a way of moving forward after conflict. Reconstruction acknowledges past suffering. It changes destructive attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships toward a sustainable peace. The reconciliation process demands the commemoration of historical violations as well as esthetic beauty elements. The temporality of space is directly correlated with its esthetics and the social engagement it creates. If we change perspectives and consider urban heritage from a temporal point of view our understanding of nostalgia and memory will be totally different. The city will be shaped by rhythmic assemblages of festivals and events. They are no longer inert objects, but elements of life that can play a positive role in our get together. They allow us to find a safe and beautiful common ground where people can interact and meet which is an essential element of reconciliation.

1 Introduction Architecture has a fundamental role in forming and making collective sentiment. Art makes memories explicit within the context of social transformation. As reconciliation researchers we want to dismantle clichés away from nationalist reductionist views. In our approach we are rethinking urban design as a regional but holistic and visionary process. When we think of reconciliation some people imagine a Utopian city where the boundaries are permissive and allow cultural and commercial exchange. And who better than a visionary architect to execute this plan and concretely draw the orthographic lines on paper. The sole concept of perspective brings the infinite world to a finite element; namely, a point somewhere on a horizontal line. Buildings relate to each-other. We must preserve them as well as millions of stories of people who H. Sarrouj (B) Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_19

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passed through the city and made a positive impact. What traditions do we need to keep to have a peaceful and prosperous global society? Our civilization has mostly favored the logic of profit. But how can we preserve the essence and the soul of a place by conserving its architectural achievements? In the contest of our region, we are interested in the thought process that drives the world of art and education. In Lebanon, we are concerned by looking at post conflict society. Heritage should be the subject of public reflection. What is worth saving? What should we remember? How can we use heritage preservation as a mean for reconciliation?

2 Materiality of Reconciliation Reconciliation is a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace (Fig. 1). The reconciliation process is specific to every community and demands culturally appropriate responses. Recovery includes the commemoration of historical violations and esthetic beauty elements. The defense of human rights is a cultural act. That’s where the role of local artists becomes essential. They establish a group narrative based on collective memory.

Fig. 1 Art as an act of peacebuilding. Image taken at the October revolution in Beirut in 2019

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Art is able to foster social healing. “In the face of devastation we are forced to create,” says William Cleveland. According to Courtney Simon Grohs: “Art is the ability to engage diverse people and reveal new forms of expressions. A platform where people can listen to unheard stories.” It is a source of hope in situations of cultural and political repression (Grohs 2009). Artistic expressions create an esthetic distance capable of dissociating people from their act. And synchronizing their movement with their community. Theater, for example, acts as a mediator. It fictionalizes conflict and restores dialog. Other examples include music, storytelling, documentary filmmaking, murals, etc. (Nasma 2019). In this chapter, we will look at art and design from different angles to get the full spectrum of the experiences and expose what the role design plays in our feelings. Since they are the most sensitive to psychological complications and cultural context, artistic interventions are essential to the re-humanization of the other. Artists can look within the local cultural resources to achieve justice and forgiveness. They reclaim the lost relationship with the public spaces through street art for instance. Especially during the reconstruction period when the peace is still fragile. Their creativity promotes acceptance of diversity in culture. They encourage knowledge sharing and exchanging. Their works cannot only be judged by their artistic value but also by the reaction they incite. They elevate consciousness and lead the people to curiosity and discovery resulting in tolerance and appreciation. They help reconnect the rational to the emotional. They promote diversity. They prevent ideas from turning into fanatic ideologies. They facilitate mutual understanding which is one of the most difficult challenges in reconciliation management. They are not afraid of telling the truth. They use bold vocabulary. They create a language that induces hope and freedom. They document violations to promote the right for justice and induce the nation peacebuilding process. They are able to address devastated communities. They convert negative affects into positive energy that leads into healing. Art is the coping mechanism on the collective level (Kramer 2011). It can change consciousness. It is a source of inspiration that transcends colors, people and religion. It reaches everyone without any discrimination. It is a mirror that allows us to search for the unknown. We need to find a common ground for cultural encounters after conflict so that people may go beyond their conflictual past. The city is not merely a designed object but it is a monument evolving organically with time. Therefore we not only need to study its physical composition but we also need to consider it as a place for social interaction.

3 Rebuilding Our Communities Architects are public artists shaping the geopolitical space. They help us find a common ground for cultural encounters after conflict so that people can get over the past.

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The Bauhaus movement was established in 1919 Weimar. Practitioners like Walter Gropius, Paul Klee, Vasily Kandinsky, Ise Gropius, Gunta Stoezl, Marianne Brandt and Lilly Reich put together basic techniques of arts and craftsmanship to remake the world all new. Bauhaus was a peculiar school with short tenure but with a tremendous outreach. It blurred the boundaries between artistic disciplines. In this confined conservative space they set the rules to the Bauhaus spirit that was soon to take the world by surprise. In its beginnings, Bauhaus faced a lot of criticism. The city of Goethe and Schiller could not accept any variations in the creative process, then. It is now proud to have hosted this artistic revolution. Some philosophers, like Ernst Bloch, compared its houses to ships that would move away. And it is exactly this nomad aspect that makes it more interesting and makes its success continue till our current days (Neumann et al. 2019). What makes this design language universal is its optimization and utility. With its interdisciplinary approach, it was the remedy to the deadly acceleration of the world. Its philosophy established synergy between art and technology. A technology that had decided to speed the world and take it to its own destruction. The Bauhaus code was simple and its use of color minimalistic. Its visionary protagonists decided to put light in the center of all their composition. The maximization of natural light was their priority. Introducing glass facades which made the interface between humans and nature translucent. Annie Albers used a combination of natural and tech material to create wonderful tapestry. Herbert Bayer considered it as his duty to create a world side by side with nature, in total equilibrium. According to him, the outer and inner appearance should be in synergy. They constitute a harmonious landscape painting. He referred to this concept as Gesamtskunswerk: designed objects should be in tune with the nature around it. Maybe the legacy we can take of the Bauhaus is this existentialist way of thinking and collaborating with generosity; crossing thresholds and disciplines. It teaches us about ways to be in the world; acknowledging boundaries but crossing them. Bauhaus philosophy is dedicated to include art and culture for social transformation. It is a radical avant-garde artistic movement that emerged in the middle of the First World War. It was Walter Gropius’ answer to the question: “What is it that leads humanity to such a level of barbarity?”. Today, we ought to ask how artists, designers and crafts people can create a better new world? The Bauhaus basic concept is rationalist; relationships of function and structure had to be made clear. It coined a social art according to the Zeitgeist ideology. It was an idea spreading among progressive people who thought of themselves as modern. “The happiness and fullness of those years made us forget our poverty” (Bayer et al. 2017). These women and men, Germans and foreigners thought they were living apart of time. They imagined taking singularity points and establishing them as a general statement by design. The social component of our topic has greater weight than all the subordinated technical, economic and esthetic problems involved, therefore we will discuss its intricate aspect. An inclusive society entails that we build projects for all income groups. We should integrate all the parts of the community into a diverse and indivisible unity. The

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society is like the human body, therefore all its parts have to be integrated. Otherwise it will sicken. This sickness was thoroughly documented in Walter Gropius’ book Rebuilding our Communities first published in 1945. The illness of our present communities is the dramatic result of our deficiency to put vital human needs above economical and industrial profit. Economic and technological figures are at the center of our post war business ideas. We speak about several digit numbers and forget about human emotions and well-being. Community rehabilitation seems to call first for drastic steps to stimulate the society’s interest of every citizen of the world by letting them participate actively in community life. For us to reach this stage, we must humanize our administrative framework. It should be formed by autonomous neighborhood units, small enough to act as organisms for normal social interaction. In order for our culture and society to flourish we need to reconstruct our materialistic and spiritual environment. We need to find a way to organize restoration projects in a well-balanced system with parts that commune. We need to let democracy, order and liberty rule. Social responsibility and structural beauty are indivisible. The Bauhaus movement has proven that the art of architecture has to be inclusive. With some ingenuity and patience we can build our future cities at any budget, using available material and the right insulators. Social housing, factory buildings, schools and academia have to follow a universal sense of esthetic. Trauma healing has to be taken into consideration when rebuilding our communities. We have to forget the idea of art for art’s sake and take beauty as a message of hope for the future. This content should be translated in every architectural model. Human needs have to be standardized. How will people open this door, walk on this sidewalk, look out of this window. Human safety and comfort should be put in front of profit and the laissez-aller policies. We need a revolution in our minds. We need to design happy and organic living spaces in which the inhabitants can easily be in contact with nature. In the future, we need a social change that includes all aspects of human life. It is no longer acceptable for the rich to live in high rise buildings made of glass and steel while the poor ones are excluded in nonviable slums. Social coherence has to enhance our together living. We can no longer admire stylish facades and endorse million dollar monumental building at the expanse of a starving population and a suffocating vegetation. New generations have the right for a decent lodging, lush parks, recreation centers and affordable transportation. One person cannot change the world alone. We all need to join hands with institutions to rebuild an egalitarian community that we would all be proud to live in.

4 Constituting Memories Memory is necessary for us to remember what we have previously learned. It is a major topic in psychology. In this project we are interested in its properties and

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working methods in order to determine its consequences on learning and recovery. For the sake of clarity, we will focus on fake memories and subconscious memory of people who suffered from a shock or trauma. Most of the population we are interested in were eye witnesses to major cases of social injustice. Others were born in a community where collective memory was blurred due to the passing of time and the tendency of memory for self-suggestion. And we are still wondering about the causes of forgetting. The challenge comes from evaluating their narratives and ordering the facts. We need information from primary and secondary sources, books, movies and interviews. Memory transcends the past, present and future. It connects them with materiality. It is a multi-layered phenomenon that safeguards sociocultural continuity and transmission. Preservation is essential to prevent the city from being swept by amnesia (Wright 2016). It maintains the communal coherence. Human memory is mostly spacial, it can be found in a country, a house or maybe a photograph. Cognition make us able to memorize the past and project into future by means of storytelling. What is individual is transformed to a social biography. This ensures the continuity across generations, while memory loss creates a different narrative. We cannot stress enough how important the modes of transmission are for the consistency of the past. Buildings are a mute witness. War is a taboo subject that cannot be discussed. Even if people have not agreed on how to tell their history to their children, walls will. When we evoke history and the past in the projection of identity, we are immediately confronted with the theory of memory, diversity and geopolitics, particularly in capital cities (Yahya 2005). Researchers and artists, who have adopted this mission, are dealing with the inconsistencies of the past. Therefore, they started the work on reconciliation between the perceived space and the representational space. First, the Poets and writers adopted the narrative of the residents’ lived space. Then, architects and engineers took care of the administrative documentation of the represented space. Lebanon has a tumultuous past. If we leave the recent wars behind us, we have trouble reconciling the past with the future and preserving memories. This preservation can be realized not only through the materiality of walls but also with the memories of the people. Once the violence is erased we can rebuild distant memories and conserve them. Random gentrification and the loss of population diversity is putting our mission of heritage preservation at risk. Trauma is something you cannot change. While we cannot deny war as an event that happened in the past, we need to talk about how things were built. Lebanese houses are crucial to the identity of the people. When you walk into an abandoned house, you feel the memory of its inhabitants encoded into its walls and you learn about its terror. You need to find the demarcation line between the past and the present. You ought to make sense of it all, in order to make sure the right information is transmitted to future generations. Post war reconstruction’s effect on collective memory representation has been long proven by scholars such as Lebbeus Wood (2011). How this process affected the reconciliation after the war is still to be proven. With frontlines of war moving into the cities, Beirut and Tripoli still have to address the trauma caused by war. If

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the Beirut city center has been reconstructed hastily. Promoters still do not know how to deal with the social aftermath. Nobody has forgotten the tragedy but they went back to live normally. Whether or not the buildings that have been lost were put back to their prewar condition is a questionable fact (Linenfelser and Aleiwi 2017). In my Tripoli neighborhood, old traditional houses were abandoned by their initial residents. The newcomers are poor and cannot restore them. This resulted in a desolate juxtaposition of old and new, as if Tripolitans need to escape the past that hurt them by living in luxurious modernized buildings. Everyone longs to feel as if they are in Paris or London and wants to erase their majestic past. Another factor that plays a crucial role on Tripoli’s city map is sectarianism. The “fear of the other” is encouraged by some sectarian leaders. Poor urban districts are segmented according to one’s religion. Hopefully mixed neighborhoods exist in the dashing part of the city.

5 Tripoli City Complex Today, Tripoli still has issues dealing with its distant memories: From the destructive civil war to the race to modernization. The Tel square is a living example of that challenge. The Nawfal palace could be the first museum in Tripoli, breaking barriers and reconciling the Tripolitans with a memory that is still too difficult to be remembered. Preserving heritage can be expensive. We lost our national theater and arty photographers were replaced with a high end shopping mall juxtaposing dollar stores. This cityscape is in tune with our many conflicting memories. In her 2020 online exhibition at the Alice Moghabghab gallery, Houda Kassatly a well-known Lebanese ethnologist and photographer takes us along her peregrinations in the city streets. Her esthetic approach is unique. She captures the light of ruins. Her vision transposes it into brilliant orange that wants to be seen. As colors become more vivid and appealing, you hear the sound of the coppersmith artisanal crafting, inviting you for further exploration. These mental images help us reimagine how life could have been in the past. They invite us to know more and make us willing to preserve our national treasures. Our virtual adventure starts in the narrow alleys of the souks of Tripoli where farmers of the neighboring villages sell their goods and hasty men and women buy fresh produce at affordable prices. The soundscape is a one of a kind. It has the dynamics of various accents that merge and reverberate against the thousand year old houses. It has been told that Byzantine remains are on the right bank of the river. This juxtaposition of stones tell the story of the city. Baptized as Tripoli by the Greeks. Tarablous al Sham, the oriental and multiethnic Arab city was successively a Roman province, a Byzantine metropolis, a Persian satrapy, a Crusader county and jund Mamlouk then an Ottoman wilaya. Over the centuries, civil and religious monuments were built to represent a national identity that will remain. From its glorious past, Tripoli has retained this cosmopolitan liveliness, embodied in a city where cultures, ethnicities and traditions coexist. People from the Mediterranean,

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the bilad al Sham interior to the steps of central Asia have sought refuge behind the city walls. The legacy work of Georges Doumani is visible at every street corner. While walking along Azmi street, the nerve center of the city, that links the old town to the new. His superstructures are interspersed among the city skyline. His designs are authentic and simple. Their lines are geometric and pure. For this mastermind symmetry is a key point. His plans are to be found among the memories of the city, among his friends and colleagues who set the tone of the era. By the time you reach the harbor (Mina) colors of the fishnets mix up with the octopus and by sunset the city seems endless. For a city that keeps reinventing herself what is the narrative we want to maintain? What can monumentality give to the story of the modern Arab city? Tripoli like every ancient city was built upon layers. Conservation of the architectural heritage is important in order to raise awareness about our history and avoid repeating the errors of the past. We should reclaim public space and reconsider the city as a designed object. Share our vision and communicate with our municipalities to remodel the city to fit our expectations. We could also join civic associations in order optimize the way we experience the city. The Abdel al Majid Karame square in Tripoli was transformed after the revolution by the pacifist mural of Mohammad Abrach. The nearby green square hosts the proclamation of thousands of young students and older protagonists. They all want peace and prosperity to take over the city. After the pacific occupation of the Tripoli International fair, young activists from different backgrounds performed the opening live in front of eager eyes. They all want to reclaim back what was taken away from them after the civil war and Syrian occupation. They all discovered the power of their unity in front of the sad billionaires. What unites all these people is the centralization of energy and light flow into structures that are now part of our conscious landscape. They transform our abandoned ruins into places to come back to. Therefore, ornaments are put aside only simple shapes and color combinations serve a highest purpose to offer a welcoming arena for the visitor. Hereby, white color becomes a revolution on the past. No need for outstanding doors and entrances a simple square is enough. Hereafter, it is functionality that prevails. Space allocation and topology become human centric before gaining back their proportions. Craftsmanship and artistic vision would hopefully become the manual for creating a functional building that fits well in its environment. But what is a city without its people to lead us through our daily endeavors? Mira Minakara is a freelance tourist guide. In 2010, she was the Beirut Art Center’s communication manager. Moreover, she worked as a coordinator for NGOs. If you visit Tripoli, you can spot her in one of the old souks’ sprawling branches, at the seaside, at the train station or at the international fair. By sharing the secret knowledge of the city, she turns walkabouts into spiritual experience. She sometimes refers to her tour as the “Modern Ruins of Tripoli”. For her, the old souks are the spotlight of the old town. She launched her movement in 2002 (Tekriti 2019) as a way to resist

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the patriarchal hegemony that poison the city (Traboulsi 2015). Because sharing knowledge is a great calling. Bassem Zodeh is an architect and tour guide would get you lost and found in Tripoli. He highlights the importance of art and urban design along with the Mediterranean cuisine heritage. He recently participated in archeological excavations that unleashed stratas of temples one wouldn’t even suspect existed in the undergrounds. He felt the need to document the designs of the walls of Tripoli that were disappearing due to weathering. Along with other architects and artists he contributes to shedding the light on the authentic Islamic art of Tripoli. Moreover, he was the first to survey the tiling of the Taynal mosque, revealing its Pagan and Christian elements to the public. Lastly, by disclosing its Jewish past he underlines what the non-Islamic capital might have looked like. Yasmin Makaroun has dedicated her whole career to teaching architecture and heritage preservation. Along with the architectural department of the Lebanese university, they started a tremendous work of sketching and documenting those treasures preventing them from disappearing into oblivion. Her mission is to put the fragmented image of the old town back together. She reveals the traces of the forms of life that once were the life of the community. By illegitimating destructive projects she marks the history of the town. She moves between architecture and heritage restoration producing a new representation of the city (Scott 2014).

6 Galleries of Art Limiting the Lebanese artistic scene to the postwar generation is erroneous (Rogers, 1997). The aim of this work is to determine the global dimensions of culture so that we can perceive modernity at large. Lebanon’s artistic cosmopolitanism is characteristic to its scene ever since the Phoenicians discovered the color purple. In the recent years, violence was extensively used as a source of inspiration. Our aim is to go beyond the civil war in order to establish the Lebanese artistic scene way before the country was established. We will highlight the fact that many of these artists practiced in European and American cities before establishing in Lebanon. We draw our inspiration from Edward Said’s musical concept of contrapunctuality (Said 1993). Said underlines a cross cultural movement in art history in which the superposition of several points of inspiration produced works of art that transcend the local culture. According to historians, oil painting was introduced to Lebanon to the late sixteenth century with the establishment of the Maronite College of Rome in 1584. The first artist that we know of is Daoud Corm who captured the changing face of Ottoman Beirut in the 19th century. He founded Maison d’art, a secular art market. He was the one who started producing Lebanon’s national cosmopolitanism. In the early nineties, Walid Sadek’s textual work explored the role of the visual in constructing identity by staging the retreat of the image (Jabra 2019). Further, he claimed a local label by refusing to translate a number of his works which hindered their international circulation. Sadek therefore highlights the politics of language governing the dynamics of

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a global art world. He consequently questioned the politics of language that limits of the visual representation in a global capital. “Lebanon may have lacked a politically engaged visual language rooted in a vernacular symbolism”, as Silvia Naef argues, “however, an infrastructure nonetheless existed that encouraged an examination of the various ways in which the nexus of art, nation, and identity were configured” (Naef 1996). “The materiality of the art object transformed the nebulous nature of that something, the idea of this heritage, into a tangible artifact,” said Ramzi Saidi, a Lebanese art collector. Furthermore, he awarded art a symbolic function in preserving Lebanese heritage for the future. Beirut in the sixties and seventies was a spirited Arab city. It was a regional cultural port and a showplace for the Arab world. Lebanon had acquired its own language after the independence. Artists expressed their newly established national identity. Their productions were individual and cosmopolitan. Recently inaugurated galleries were full of art aficionados. University art departments formed talented artists. Art journalism was founded to document cultural agendas for the curious elite. They all constituted a dynamic social network where the visual art had an ethical role and a practical mission. La Revue du Liban, an art magazine, was founded in 1920. It represented a Phoenician history and promoted a Mediterranean cosmopolitanism from a francophone perspective. It encouraged readers to discover new esthetic forms and embrace technological modernism. The national museum was founded in 1922 by the initiative of concerned artists like Georges Corm. In its collection, Lebanon was represented through its Phoenician and Hellenistic roots. As Beirut was becoming the cultural capital of the region, artists could finally receive local training. The Academie Libanaise des Beaux Art (ALBA) was founded in 1937. The American University of Beirut (AUB) art department was opened in 1953. They both trained the best painters of their time. At AUB everyone was encouraged to take optional art classes. It promoted innovation and progression. Finally, it started an American artist residency in Beirut. John Carswell, faculty member and Islamic art historian, helped forge the university’s confrontational approach. He even dealt with environmental issues through art. Farid Haddad, an AUB alumni, discovered abstract expressionism at the Modern Museum of Art in New York. He identified a new distance beyond the canva’s frame. His fascination with the city earned him an art residency and his first solo exhibition. In this context, the AUB art department brought the American and Bauhaus traditions to Lebanon. It opened this knowledge to all, and held exhibitions that were conceived in a spirit of confrontation gaining increasing critical attention (Short 2003). This was clearly translated in John Carswell’s work. He documented the revival of the Lebanese arts through an aggressive “confrontation” of the German Bauhaus tradition. He further suggested that Lebanese art is both geographically and historically removed from its European counterparts. Art and architecture are the core of social reality extending beyond the city lines (Wunderlich 2019). Delineating the contour of modernity and national identity directly evokes post colonialism intersecting with nationalism (Yahya 2005). “I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful the necessary in things then I shall be one who makes things beautiful,” says Friedrich Nietzsche. The developments of the

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20th century were heralded by historically and academically aware architects. This involved the revolution of esthetic values.

7 Beirut City Heritage When traveling to Beirut, you cannot but be struck by the beauty of this cosmopolitan hub. Today, the alternating Haussmanian and Ottoman upscale shopping boulevards of the city center are empty. Using the preservation of memory as an alibi, Solidere, a real estate company, has constructed a myth, a city of icons (Andraos 2015). If you are searching for more authenticity, you could move to the North West and have a look at the traditional Beiruti houses in Gemmayze. Higher up the hill, the Sursock castle has become the model of the aristocratic residence. It has been designed and built mostly by Italian architects and craftsmen. It comports Ottoman elements typical of the Lebanese architecture at the turn of the century. Moreover, wood carved walls and ceilings were imported from Damascus. Preserving Beirut’s artistic and architectural heritage was the lifelong mission of Yvonne Sursock Cochrane. Her passion lead her to direct the museum of art, situated in the palace that she inherited from her uncle Nicolas Sursock. Furthermore, she was the founding member and president of the Association for the Protection of Natural Sites and Ancient Buildings from 1960 till 2002. Besides architectural preservation, the association promotes rural trades in agriculture, textiles and other handcrafts. Sursock’s interest in conservation made her critical of the adverse environmental and esthetic impact of Lebanon’s development. In a Monocle interview in 2008, she described nostalgically the wonderful terraces she used to see full of green vegetables and fruits, as a child. She recalls how urbanization and centralization killed the mountain living. When the forest could not take over, the land slipped and villagers migrated to Beirut leaving behind what was made for them. Rural life got deteriorated and the local industries collapsed. Further, she condemned developers tearing down temples to build skyscrapers and hospitals and schools, once built for the poor that are now only accessible to the rich. She shared her vision of the golden era of the city has known is in everyone’s memory and is willing to be preserved for the next generations. She set the tone for a new centennial where Beirut would still live by the wind of the sea and merchants will establish their wholesale trade in Beirut Souks (FitzHerbert 2020). The bourgeois eclecticism of the Sursock residence has been selectively maintained by local builders. In the 1930ies, a standard model of the Lebanese house was developed. Cement produced locally was gradually integrated in domestic construction. What has become known as the Lebanese traditional house is a model of hybrid architecture and eclectic ornamentation. Its upper section incorporates decorative patterns. It is the combination of three generic elements: the window, the door and the arch which has the function of balcony or window bay. The lower section formed by light windows. The overall structure is supported by visually appealing slender marble columns. In the second half of the nineteenth century, this structure included

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L beams and roof tiles from France, mechanically sawn timber from Romania, cast iron balustrades from England and marble from Italy. Following the modernists movement of the 1950ies, the Canaanite cement know how with its typical 6 stories high building resurfaced in the agency of the space. And soon-after the resurgence of the powder on the international design scene brought it back in fashion, the high rise building were adopted locally. By the late fifties, the material would take over the city skyline. In 1965, the CETA group a dream team of international architects formed by Jacques Aractangi, Joseph Nasser, Pierre Neema and Jean Noel Conan won the competition for the electricity du Liban headquarters. They previewed a public piazza which was supposed to be open to the public and a view to the sea was intended to be enjoyed by every passerby. Despite everything the monument stands still as a witness of a tumultuous period. Which makes us think that architects capture the spirit of the time or Zeitgeist. Inspired by le Corbusier, Joseph Karam established an empire in the Beirut city center. The egg was an experimental theater. It was then an emblem for the Lebanese Avant-garde. It is now one of the main symbols of the Lebanese revolution. It hosts various artistic performances including a jugglers company. Its shape contains the reverberations of the Lebanese national anthems that was repeated in its multiple variations (patriarchal and gender inclusive versions) a thousand times. At the nearby martyrs square, the Lebanese people are claiming the public space with multiple actions. Following the tradition of their forefathers Lebanese architects took over the international design scene: Amale Andraos is now the director of Columbia’s Graduate School of Architecture Planning and Preservation. She studies the impact of climate change on architecture, identity and representation in the global world. The core mission of her New York City-based firm WORCac, is to engage people into making the world a better place to live in. She makes visual connections. She concertizes her designs to question the boundaries among buildings. For her architecture is all inclusive. She envisions off center and conterminous structures that are connecting people in unexpected ways. Her buildings have hybridized entrances that are enlightened and soft. They make a graphic and pictorial statement. They constitute a layer that is ready to embrace outsiders and reinvent a missing capital. Her esthetic philosophy is to create places to hang out. Open spaces where one can make time for gathering and plan events at night. In the architectonic plan she made for Beirut’s New Museum of Art, she evokes pop sensitivity, readability and accessibility. For her legibility is easy. The museum has to be connected with the surrounding natural aspect. She wrote many books including: We’ll Get There When We Cross That Bridge, Architecture and Representation the Arab City, 49 Cities, Above the Pavement the Farm. Lina Ghotmeh is the founder of an architecture practice based in Paris. Her innovative works deploy themselves at multiple scales in France and abroad. Her architectural philosophy is inclusive. She lets the people participate in the creative process of design and construction. According to her, buildings have to emerge from the earth and disappear into the landscape. She personalizes the edifice that is no longer a sheer structure made of concrete. It has generosity. It connects to people,

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it offers something. Each edifice relates to its site’s past and emerges as a dialog material, soliciting our memory and senses. Therefore it reconciles the past with the future. Just like the archeological excavations in Beirut’s city center (Ghotmeh 2019). Hashim Sarkis is the dean of Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Architecture and Planning. He established Hashim Sarkis Studios in Boston and Beirut in 1998. Along with Rafael Monco, he worked on the Beirut Souks project. In 2002, he became the Aga Khan Professor of Landscape Architecture and Urbanism in Muslim Societies. He wrote many books like: Circa 1958: Lebanon in the Pictures and Plans of Constantinos Doxiadis. He coedited Projecting Beirut in 1998 along with Peter Rowe. He was the curator of the Biennale de Architettura “(How) will we live together” that took part in August 2021. He invited architects from 60 different countries to inquire about innovation and exploration in urban design. For a week, Venice became the one world center to the future of our built environment (Stouhi 2021).

8 Conclusion The interface between local and global constitutes the modern geography of exchange between centers and peripheries. It is a fundamental instrument of reconciliation. It opens the discourse between former enemies with a common culture. Lebanon is an example of how we can disregard boundaries for the common good. We want to blur national frontiers between rich and poor, black and white, East and West. We need to reconnect and modify the traumatic landscape. We need to sanitize our cities and cultivate our common cultural heritage. This new political consciousness supports new habits of life and sustainable economy for future generations and reconciliation. We are moving beyond identifiers and labels in order to understand the hyper spectacle of the new metropolis worldwide. Anthropologists, urban designers and artists need to collaborate with communities in order to develop a new esthetic form that comports inclusive performances and support mental health and wellness in order to create a healing urban environment. Whether it is Beirut, Weimar or Tripoli cities have their own rhythms and patterns of life. They are submerged flow, immerse, choreography, eventful narratives, improvised plays, bundles of sensorial and affective meaning. Metropoleis are experience. Every time we see, we hear, touch or smell this altered matter in evolution, we are drawn into memories old and new. They bear the traces and scars of eventful pasts and hopeful presents. Philosophers access the perception of time. Urban designers can analyze their rhythm and measure its acceleration. For them, this data is a practical tool. They consider rhythm of place as the medium through which sense of place and time are induced. The temporality of a place is directly correlated with its esthetics and the social engagement it creates. If this rhythm is fast, the city is perceived as busy, complex and agitated. This creates the impression of homogeneity and receptivity

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for its citizens. If the city is slow, quiet and ordered, everyday life is perceived as easy to understand. People can have a distinctive social life. We therefore have to wisely avoid the stress, anxiety, dislocation and social alienation caused by the city acceleration in favor of time and space for interaction. We need to put our hands together and respond to our human need to connect and react positively. It is important to organize events that will make people evolve in their way of experiencing the city. Moreover we have to be aware of the structure code and control the conditions of reconstruction. These cities are a landscape of trauma, a constant reminder of atrocities and terrors for the victims. We have to protest against anonymity and respect temporal identities. The challenge is to heal and accept the other, to nurture everyday practices positively. We need to have a clear new direction, to know how to reset and rebuild our senses of identity and cultural diversity in urban design. However, thinking positively is not enough, we should use new technologies to preserve and cultivate our common cultural heritage. We need to have a clear esthetic vision rooted into our architectural traditions to deliver us from the colonial disfigurement. We want to persist into creating a meaningful temporal landscape. We need a promising urban design approach that focuses on experience, emotions and affect. We ought to use the existing activities and ways of movement to give an affective meaning to our city. We should practice modernist thinking in the building of streets squares and parks. These colorful materials and visual forms can give a brand new meaning to the life of urban citizens. For instance, if we include the work of a local artist in a public square, this will assign a brand new meaning to the space/time. This unique assemblage of everyday life and the way rhythms are synchronized make a place unique. The temporal esthetic associated with the perception of time will give the people a new sense of belonging. Everyone can contribute into the organization of social activities and performances. We all need to consider creating meaningful social cultural practices. Finally, anthropologists, sociologists, urban designers and artists need to collaborate to communities in order to develop a new esthetic of place. We need to shift from the physical form and embrace the design process so that it can include essential patterns and inclusive performances. We ought, to support mental health and wellness in order to create a healing urban environment.

References Andraos A (2015) Architecture and representation the Arab City. Columbia Books on Architecture and the City Bayer H, Gropius W, Gropius I (2017) Bauhaus 1919–1928. The Museum of Modern Art FitzHerbert L (2020) Doyenne of Lebanese philanthropy dies at 98. The Daily Star Ghotmeh L (2019) An archeology for the future. Beirut Design Week Grohs CS (2009) From destruction to creation: a normatively framed inquiry into how arts can inform peacebuilding. Virginia Tech University Jabra JI (2019) A celebration of life essays on literature and art. Dar al Mamoon Bagdad

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Kramer G (2011) Conflict resolution through cultural and civil society organisations in Lebanon and Morocco. Berlin Berghof research center Linenfelser E, Aleiwi AA (2017) Post trauma aesthetics. Agora Naef S (1996) A la recherche d’une modernite arabe l’evolution des arts plastiques en Egypte, au Liban et en Irak. Slatkine Geneve Nasma R (2019) The role of the arts and culture in reconciliation and civil peace. Ettijahat Independent Cult Neumann D et al (2019) Architecture and the Bauhaus. The Aspen institute Rogers S (1997) Postwar art and the historical roots of Beirut’s cosmopolitanism. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Said E (1993) Culture and imperialism. Vintage Scott F (2014) Architecture and representation of the Arab city. Columbia GSAPP Short R (2003) Former AUB professor returns to boast Beirut’s art scene. The Daily Star Stouhi D (2021) 2021 Venice Biennale curators share what they believe is the future of the built environment in one word. ArchDaily Tekriti O (2019) A city ground to a halt: policymaking in tripoly and the reality of promises. American University of Beirut Traboulsi K (2015) Tripoli Lebanon’s neglected archeological treasure trove. The New Arab Woods L (2011) War and architecture: three principles. Wordpress Wright R (2016) Beirut museums of war and memories. The New Yorker Wunderlich F (2019) Temporalities of nostalgia heritage in urban everyday life and design. Beirut Design Week Yahya M (2005) Unnamed modernisms national ideologies and historical imaginaries in Beirut s urban architecture. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cases Studies on Heritage, Reconciliation, and Social Inclusion

Heritage in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Sociopolitical Perspective Yaser Alashqar

1 Introduction This chapter explores heritage from a sociopolitical perspective and examines its evolving relationship with national narratives, colonialism, occupation, resistance, conflict, and conflict resolution. Drawing on the case study of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the chapter discusses the heritage of conflicting national narratives in the Israeli–Palestinian context, the uses of heritage in colonial processes and occupation, and the role of heritage in resistance and conflict resolution initiatives. The discussions are supported by research and a wide range of historical and contemporary examples. The chapter contributes to knowledge and research in the critical area of heritage in several ways. Firstly, the discussions demonstrate the power of national narratives in conflict and divided societies. Secondly, the chapter provides a critical examination of the uses of heritage in colonial and military occupation contexts. Thirdly, the analysis highlights the contributions of heritage to grassroots resistance and collective memory in situations of forced displacement and national struggles. Finally, the chapter identifies ways and methods in which heritage can play a leading role in conflict resolution processes. The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section defines the theoretical concept of heritage and its relationship with the key issues of history, identity, national narratives, conflict, and conflict resolution. The second section explores the case study of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and it focuses on the heritage of conflicting national narratives in the modern history of this continuing struggle for land and identity. The third section discusses the uses of heritage in Israeli colonial practices in 1948 and post the 1967 occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. The fourth and final sections examine the understanding of heritage as resistance and conflict resolution in the Israeli–Palestinian situation. The next section presents some conceptual definitions. Y. Alashqar (B) World Heritage Programme, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_20

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2 Key Concepts The original understanding of heritage placed a strong emphasis on physical sites and their cultural, historical, and religious significance to a particular community or society. However, the understanding of heritage has broadened and evolved in recent decades. It now includes both forms of natural and cultural heritage such as parks, buildings, monuments, language, dance, craftsmanship, ritual practices, oral traditions, and performing arts. Depending on the form, these representations of heritage can be inherited or transmitted from generation to generation (O’Keeffe 2014). In this context, the Oxford Dictionary defines heritage as “the history, traditions, buildings, and objects that a country or society has had for many years and that are considered an important part of its character” (Oxford Dictionary 2022). Thus, heritage currently represents a symbol of continuity and collective memory for many national groups around the world. It has also provided a strong source for the interpretations of the past and contributed to the construction of modern identities, including national narratives (Chilton and Silberman 2010). From this perspective, “heritage and identity have become part of a combined and complex structure, guaranteeing internal stability and external strength” among societies and nations (Dolff-Bonekämper 2010, p. 15). Other researchers have pointed to the issue of power and heritage, arguing that heritage “can never be outside of politics” and that “it is always embedded in changing power relations” in visible and invisible forms. This relationship between heritage and power materializes, for example, in “decisions about access, management, and financing of iconic ancient sites” (Sevcenko 2010, p. 24). Emphasizing the significance of the question of heritage, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has been tasked with the preservation and protection of cultural and natural heritage of outstanding value to humanity. According to UNESCO, heritage should be understood as “our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations. Our cultural and natural heritage are both irreplaceable sources of life and inspiration” (UNESCO 2022a, b). In practice, cultural and natural heritage sites of great importance to humanity have been included on the World Heritage List, which is managed by UNESCO. The List involves significant sites around the world, ranging from the Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan, national parks in Argentina, the Old Area of Mostar Bridge in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Great Wall in China, the Historic Centre of Rome in Italy, Babylon in Iraq, Robben Island in South Africa, through to the Old City of Jerusalem and its Walls, East Jerusalem, in the occupied Palestinian territories (UNESCO 2022a, b). Another important concept that should be critically considered in defining heritage is the evolving relationship between heritage, conflict, and conflict resolution. This is an area in which the contestation of heritage is recognizable and manifested in violent and peaceful means. Contested heritage brings out key questions: Does heritage in its multiple forms contribute to peace or conflict? Does heritage contribute to a culture of dialogue and coexistence, or does it represent a source of tension and violence? Does

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it facilitate unity and diversity, or does it lead to the dividing politics of identity and national narratives? And does it essentially carry the logic of inclusion or exclusion? Re-assessing the original and historical emphasis on the positive role of heritage, some academics and practitioners have taken on the task of confronting these critical issues in recent years. Their conclusions are revealing. For example, Elizabeth Chilton and Neil Silberman point out that throughout the world, “historic districts, archeological sites, religious monuments, ethnic traditions, and traditional customs” have transformed from originally representing symbols of continuity and collective memory to being “the targets of violence and a source of discord.” The authors provide significant examples of conflict and heritage from India, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq through to Israel/Palestine (Chilton and Silberman 2010, pp. 6–7). Other researchers have pointed out further that cultural sites, such as a “mosque, cemetery, church, or other building of significance, represent the presence of a community at a certain time in history.” Hence, as they illustrate, a war against cultural heritage signifies the “deliberate destruction of a people’s history” (Bleibleh and Awad 2020, p. 197). In a further acknowledgment of the complex role of heritage in armed conflict, Gabi Dolff-Bonekamper discusses the evolving role of “Heritage in Conflicts” and the relationship with identity. She observes: In cases of armed conflict, whether external or internal, heritage and identity will remain interwoven, not to the profit but to the detriment of both parties. Armies will attack buildings, sites and artifacts that are presumed to be a part of the enemy’s cultural identity, civil power and military strength. The bombing of the adversary’s national cultural heritage should not be misrepresented as senseless vandalism- it is mostly a well-aimed strategy (Dolff-Bonekämper 2010, p. 15).

Finally, heritage can equally represent challenges for conflict resolution processes after or during conflict. It is important to note that conflict resolution is understood here beyond the cessation of violence, and it includes practices and processes that seek to build the conditions and structures of peace, including “post-violence reconciliation, enhancing justice, establishing conflict management systems and many other issues” (Kriesberg 2009, p. 18). Thus, the practice of conflict resolution is essentially concerned with promoting non-violent alternatives to conflict and war. In the context of heritage and conflict resolution, certain sites will bring about painful memories of atrocities, displacement, loss of loved ones, and oppression. Not only does this difficult challenge serve as a reminder of the place of heritage in conflict, but it also demonstrates that heritage remains a contested domain in conflict resolution processes. Describing this as another key discourse of “Heritage of Conflicts,” Dolff-Bonekamper comments further that some buildings, sites, and artifacts “evoke the history of military, civil, social, or cultural confrontation, exploitation fraud, or even robbery.” Therefore, as the author concludes based on research and practice, “we have to acknowledge that monuments of the past will always carry the heritage of conflicts and thus may again be disputed” (Dolff-Bonekämper 2010, p. 15). It is within this overall context of memory and conflict that there have been calls by some academics and practitioners to shift the attention in post-conflict contexts from the physical reconstruction of monuments and heritage objects to the key dilemmas of

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addressing conflicting narratives concerning those heritage sites, which may continue to represent a future source of division and potentially violent tensions (Chilton and Silberman 2010). On the other hand, heritage can provide opportunities for conflict resolution and positive change in societies emerging out of long-standing conflicts and a history of divisions and atrocities. Contributions to conflict resolution processes and initiatives have been possible through the transformation of the role of heritage sites in the context of structures for peace and reconciliation. In other words, these sites of the past in post-conflict can transform into “sites of conscience,” helping people to remember the difficult past, seek truth through dialogue, and reflect on the future. In this context, heritage sites can serve as a trusted space for learning and understanding new perspectives on peace and conflict issues in many places around the world. From New York, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Bangladesh, the Czech Republic, and Germany to Northern Ireland, heritage discourses and museums have played a key role in facilitating dialogue concerning the past and educating future generations on the key questions of equality, justice, oppression, apartheid, victims, perpetrators, violence, criminals versus freedom fighters, democracy, and healing (Sevcenko 2010). Reflecting the power of physical structures and heritage sites in supporting peace and coexistence after armed conflict and violence, the project director for the reconstruction of Mostar Bridge, which was destroyed in the war in the City of Mostar, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, in the 1990s and re-built after the year 2000 with active support from the UN, said: “We do not want [the bridge] only to link two sides of a river like bridges usually do. We want to link peoples in Mostar” (BBC 2001). The UN also hailed the reconstruction of the bridge as a “symbol of reconciliation and human solidarity” (UN 2004). In Northern Ireland, after decades of conflict, violence, and community divisions, the City of Derry witnessed the building of “the peace bridge” in 2011, which has connected the existing communities across the two sides of the River Foyle. The two communities of Irish and British heritage have been separated by the political, social, and ethnic realities of the conflict in Northern Ireland and experienced enmity and divisions. In this context, a European official involved in the project described the opening of the bridge as a “beacon of hope for conflict zones around the world” (European Commission 2011), and other local sources recognized it as a “story of triumph over adversity” and “a symbol of peace, connecting the two sides of the River Foyle” (Visit Derry 2022). Following the previous conceptual introduction of the key heritage concepts and defining the relationship between heritage, people, identity, national narratives, conflict, and conflict resolution, the next section explores the case study of the Israeli– Palestinian conflict and discusses with supporting examples the role of heritage in the critical areas of national narratives, colonial practices and occupation, resistance by local communities, and conflict resolution processes. The following section explores the heritage of conflicting national narratives in the Israeli–Palestinian case.

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3 Heritage of Conflicting National Narratives in Israel/Palestine The tragedy of Palestine has been evolving ever since 1948, and it has taken many different forms. These are historical, geographical, national, revolutionary, political, military, peaceful, violent, and also that of fundamental denial. The history of the region is also deeply embedded in the European colonial enterprise in the Middle East during the era of the First and Second World Wars. In November 1917, the Balfour Declaration of the British government came to promise the Jewish Zionist movement in Europe a homeland in Palestine. Demonstrating a strong commitment to the Zionist quest for the colonialization of Palestine, the Declaration stated: His Majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object (Balfour Project 2022).

This Declaration, which later translated into active British policy in support of Zionism, “changed the course of Middle East history forever” as the Israeli historian Avi Shlaim describes it (Shlaim 2009). The creation of the State of Israel resulted in the annexation of approximately 78% of historical Palestine and the displacement of more than three quarters of a million people who fled to the West Bank and Gaza. Also, seeking safety from the Israeli atrocities of 1948 and the subsequent 1967 War, thousands of Palestinian people crossed the borders into Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and have stayed in these countries as refugees until this present time. The United Nations Works and Relief Agency (UNRWA) has been providing humanitarian services to Palestinian displaced persons and refugees outside Palestine, and inside the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem (UNRWA 2022). These areas are also recognized by the UN as the “occupied Palestinian territories” since Israel expanded its state and occupied them illegally during the 1967 War. The UN Security Council responded in 1967 by issuing 242 Resolution that called for the Israeli occupying power to respect international law and for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” Furthermore, it called for “achieving a just settlement of the [Palestinian] refugee problem” (UN 1967). According to the Israeli national narrative, the Zionist movement and Jewish forces won the 1948 War for independence and created the State of Israel. This State represents, as the narrative suggests, a national homeland for Jewish people who had historical connections to the land and suffered discrimination and existential threats in Europe. In this context, most Israelis adopt the Zionist logic that views Jewish and Israeli history and identity in terms of historical survival, victimhood, victory, and exceptional heroism against Arab and Palestinian attacks in the midst of conflict and war before and after 1948 (Shlaim 1995). In an overview of the Israeli national narrative, Israeli writers, Avraham Sela and Alon Kadish, observe: Israel remained largely committed to those narratives upholding the Jewish people’s historical bonds to the land of Israel and contribution to its redemption from centuries of neglect and wilderness. Underlying these claims was always the haunting traumatic Jewish historical experience on Israeli policymakers, before and after the advent of the state of Israel, in

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which the “Holocaust was merely the latest and most brutal chapter in a long history.”….. [F]requent employments of the Holocaust and its related memories significantly underlined Israeli-Jews’ self-image as victims (Sela and Kadish 2016, p. 6).

David Landy, coming from a critical Jewish and academic background, suggests that despite the horrors of the past, Zionism developed a policy of settler colonialism and denial toward the Palestinian people. As he points out, while Zionism carries different meanings to different people, at its core there is “the belief that Israel/Palestine is the home, not simply of Israelis, but of the Jewish people. A key element of this settler-colonial nationalism is a denial of the existence and the legitimacy of the indigenous Palestinian presence” (Landy 2015, p. 310). It is within this nationalist and colonialist context that Israeli leaders have not provided any formal acknowledgment of the expulsion of Palestinian refugee in 1948 and in 1967, Palestinian loss of land, killing, military occupation, and resulting deaths. Therefore, in the Palestinian national narrative, the establishment of Israel in 1948 has always meant the tragic loss of their land of Palestine, irrespective of their leadership shortcomings and violent resistance, and the failures of Arab leaders to effectively challenge the Zionist colonial project in the region. The fall of Palestine has led to the persisting Nakba (1948 Disaster). Therefore, from one generation to another, the Nakba brings about painful memories of massacres and forced exile, and exodus of 700,000 Palestinians caused by Israeli military forces (Masalha 2012). The Nakba, however, reinforced and sustained pre-existing elements of the Palestinian identity. Because of the 1948 traumatic displacement and disappearance of Palestinian national existence following the establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine, and the subsequent Israeli occupation of the remainder of the Palestinian territories in Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, the Palestinian national narratives and identity have continued to “evolve entirely around two binaries: erasure/affirmation and occupation/resistance” (Institute for Palestine Studies 2007). In this complex and historical heritage of conflict, Israeli–Palestinian narratives continue to show fundamental differences in relation, for example, to geography, demography, history, and nationalism. In the Palestinian narrative, the land of Palestine includes present-day Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. For many Israelis, there is a clear geographical difference between Israel and the Palestinian territories. In the Israeli narrative, the Palestinians are only those who live in Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinian narrative includes those Palestinians who live in the occupied territories, Palestinians in Israel, and Palestinian refugee communities in the Shatat (exile). The Israeli narrative recognizes Zionism as a national Jewish movement that re-established a Jewish historical connection with the land and created the State of Israel, while the Palestinian narrative characterizes it as a settler-colonialist movement, which is responsible for the loss of Palestine and the Palestinian Nakba in 1948. In addition, the Israeli narrative blames the Palestinians and Arab leaders for what they describe as “the voluntary flight” of Palestinians and denies any responsibility for their expulsion, whereas the Palestinian narrative describes it as forced dislocation and displacement by Israeli Jewish forces against innocent Palestinians from their

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land. Finally, the Palestinian narrative defines the Palestinian national and armed struggle as a legitimate anti-colonial and anti-occupation struggle seeking to achieve Palestinian national rights, self-determination, and statehood. The Israeli narrative rejects the legitimacy of Palestinianarmed struggle or armed resistance and defines it as a form of terrorism (Naser-Najjab and Pappe 2019). Palestinian intellectuals have historically rejected the terrorism label and presented the Palestinian struggle and narrative on the basis of Israeli exclusion and the Palestinian need for both a “homeland” and “the resolution of its exile since 1948” (Said 1984, p. 34). Having explored the heritage of conflicting national narratives in the Israeli–Palestinian case, the next section discusses Israel’s uses of heritage in the pursuit of policies of colonialization and occupation in the wider Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

4 Heritage in Colonialization and Occupation Israeli leaders employed heritage and archeological discourses as a means of achieving the validation of the national narrative of Jewish connections to the land of Palestine, and the confiscation of Palestinian land. This has included the control and the displacement of the indigenous Palestinian population. Therefore, Israeli practices in the area of heritage and archeology presented a combination of colonialist and nationalist agenda (Gori 2013). Rodrigo Deslo points to key examples such as Israel’s policy of restricting building permissions in Palestinian communities and declaring areas surrounding Palestinian communities as Israeli national parks. As he asserts, in practical terms, “Israel is using art, architecture and time to control Palestinian population” (Delso 2018, p. 58). Historically speaking, Jewish immigrants to Palestine “used archeology as a means of asserting an ancient Jewish presence and establishing shrines of national pilgrimage.” Therefore, archeology is still currently employed in Israeli policy to “further an exclusionary narrative of a Jewish state for a Jewish people, as well as a means to drive non-Jews out of their homes” (Landy 2015, p. 313). In 1948, translating this exclusionary and ideological narrative, Israeli leaders and military generals sought the erasure of Palestinian cultural heritage and engaged in the removal and deliberate destruction of more than 600 Palestinian villages and towns, an operation described in later years by some Israeli historians as ethnic cleansing (Pappe 2006). In his seminal book, All What Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, Walid Khalidi worked with thirty researchers and relied on Palestinian, Israeli, and Western sources, as well as field research, to document the history of more than 400 Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948 (Khalidi 2006). His work included remembering and recognizing this significant cultural heritage of Palestine, including the topography, architecture, institutions, and economic activity of these villages. Most critically, Khalidi and his large team of researchers have provided a detailed account of the current status of the destroyed villages and the establishment of Israeli settlements on confiscated village lands post 1948 (Institute for Palestine Studies 1992). The decision to destroy

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these Palestinian villages and their historical structures was not random. Instead, it reflected a strategic colonial policy to erase the cultural evidence of the historical continuity of a Palestinian nation in Palestine and to destroy any material proof of its social and cultural character. Most critically, the village life, prior to its destruction, represented the existence of a clear history of Palestinian cultural heritage, which contradicted the Israeli Zionist narrative and its exclusive claim to the land as Jewish and for Jews only. Jerusalem is another important example of Israel’s uses of heritage in colonial practices in the Israeli–Palestinian case. On 7 June 1967, Israel occupied Palestinian East Jerusalem along with Gaza and the West Bank. A few days later, the Israeli military acted swiftly and worked to reconstruct this part of the city. Israeli actions at the time represented an extension of the colonialist polices of displacement, erasure, and segregation, which were initiated in 1948 against the Palestinian population. In Jerusalem in June of 1967, this involved the demolition of key religious and heritage sites such as mosques, Waqf (endowment) structures, and the Moroccan Quarter, which included 125 homes and had been inhabited by several thousand Christians and Muslims (Smith-O’Neil 2018). Thomas Abowd describes the historical significance and deeper colonial motivations behind the demolition of this particular heritage site: The Harat al-Magharibah (the Moroccan Quarter), first constructed over 700 years ago in the age of the Ayyubids and Mamluks, was on the eve of the June 1967 War home to approximately 650 people and 100 families. The neighborhood was demolished by the Israeli state in the days immediately after it conquered East Jerusalem. This former space represents a site where practices of ethnic cleansing and wholesale dispossession have been combined with Israeli discourses of “the sacred” as well as others which promote exclusivist, transhistorical notions of Jewish entitlement to the city (Abowd 2000, p. 7).

Further actions were taken by Israeli leaders to ensure the reconfiguration of the Jerusalem’s cultural heritage and the control of local organizations which were concerned with promoting and preserving Palestinian cultural heritage. This included seizing the Palestine Archaeological Museum and its objects, involving the Dead Sea Scrolls. The Palestine Department of Antiquities in East Jerusalem was also taken over by the Israeli Department of Antiquities and Museums, and Palestinian employees in both organizations were dismissed (Taha 2019). From June 1967 and until the re-establishment of the Palestinian Department of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in 1994, the entire domain of Palestinian cultural and natural heritage in its material forms and institutional structures became entirely under Israel’s control and military power. The fate of Jerusalem, including national sovereignty and the ownership of heritage and religious sites, remains one of the core issues in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and one of the major challenges in which previous Israeli–Palestinian negotiations repeatedly failed to address. Given the significant status of Jerusalem in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism and its universal heritage, the UN General Assembly paid a special attention to the issue of the City in its consideration of “the problem of Palestine” in November 1947. The General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, suggesting that a special international regime for Jerusalem under the UN. The Resolution has also required that “Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious

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buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired” and that “Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character” (UN 1947). In recent decades, noting the continuing failure of Israel to comply with the UN resolutions regarding Jerusalem and illegal excavations, UNESCO issued a “Technical Mission Report” in 2007. The UN report and recommendations called upon the Israeli government “to comply with its obligations regarding archeological excavations and heritage conservation in World Heritage sites such as the Old City of Jerusalem” and to “stop immediately the archeological excavations” (UNESCO 2007). In addition, various field reports by local and international human rights organizations have focused in recent years on analyzing the occupied Palestinian territories and Jerusalem as a colonial space and identified Israeli practices of colonialization, apartheid, and persecution with convincing evidence (Human Rights Watch 2021; B’Tselem 2021). Academic studies have also demonstrated the active involvement of Israeli occupation in facilitating the “Zionist remodeling” of Jerusalem and its cultural heritage (Smith-O’Neil 2018, p. 87). It is within this overall context that Jerusalem continues to represent a mix of contested heritage, occupation, colonial policies, and intense politicization. Craiq Larkin and Michael Dumper elaborate: Jerusalem remains both an occupied and a contested city claimed by two national groups, and subject to dynamic regional trends and global strategic interests….. For Israelis it is a means of consolidating power and hegemonic control, for Palestinians it has become a rallying call for resistance and state-building (Larkin and Dumper 2009, p. 21).

Further examples of Israel’s uses of heritage in colonial processes and occupation in the Israeli–Palestinian case can also be identified in the ongoing process of building Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. Initiated in the late 1960s and 1970s in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the settlement project was originally motivated by colonial and political motivations concerning the control of the Palestinian population under Israeli occupation and preventing Palestinian national independence by allowing Israelis to settle in the occupied territories. The settlement project has incorporated various tactics to facilitate the wide scale confiscation of Palestinian land along with the construction of Israeli separate roads and infrastructure in the occupied territories. Therefore, the Palestinian areas “were being gradually transformed into agglomerations encircled by settlements and bypass roads” (Tufakji 2000). Moreover, as Sara Roy explains in Failing Peace, Israeli expansionist policy and the fragmentation of Gaza and the West Bank into small and isolated islands allowed Israel to create political and demographic “key facts” on the ground and expropriate more land (Roy 2007, p. 216). Crucially, the settlement enterprise has employed heritage and archeological justifications to confiscate more territory, exploit natural resources, and deepen the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian areas. Conducting research on this critical issue, David Keane and Valentina Azarov elaborate: Archaeology has been, and continues to be, used as a pretext for the procurement of territory. The presence of archaeological or biblical sites is used to justify confiscating Palestinian lands and building illegal settlements. For example, the construction of the road leading to

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the illegal settlement outpost Migron was based on the licensing of an archaeological dig. Land next to the Palestinian village of Susiya Al-Qadime was confiscated on the pretext of archaeological digs and a settlement established nearby, when a 4th century synagogue was uncovered by Israeli excavations in the 1970s. The occupation authorities declared the area to be an archaeological park, expelling local residents from their land (Keane and Azarova 2013, p. 316).

The occupation and settlement project have impacted on Palestinian cultural heritage in the occupied territories in an irreversible and damaging manner. Examples of this damage have involved the destruction of Palestinian historical, cultural, and religious sites, the exploitation of natural resources and heritage such as underground water in the West Bank, the control of Gaza’s territorial waters by Israeli military, illegal excavations, looting of heritage sites, illegal trade of Palestinian artifacts through Israeli agents, and deliberate neglect or destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage (Keane and Azarova 2013). All these examples suggest that “Israeli involvement in the management of Palestine’s cultural heritage since the occupation of the Palestinian territory in 1967 has been intense, requiring investigation in terms of its compliance with international humanitarian law” (Keane and Azarova 2013, p. 317). The next and final section explores both the uses of heritage in Palestinian discourses of non-violent resistance, and the role of heritage in conflict resolution processes in the wider Israeli–Palestinian context.

5 Heritage in Resistance and Conflict Resolution An important case in point concerning popular resistance in the Israeli–Palestinian case is found through the Palestinian historical folklore and traditional dance of Dabke. The performances of the Dabke dance include formation of a line and a circle, joining hands, intricate steps, and stomps. It was traditionally practiced by rural communities and villagers in Palestine and the wider Mediterranean region, including Lebanon and Syria. Prior to 1948, Palestinian peasants, shepherds, and local communities would celebrate their weddings and joyous moments through Dabke and traditional songs. In later years, Israeli Zionist cultural groups started to perform this traditional dance and this cultural appropriation of the Dabke heritage was associated with the Zionist attempts to strengthen Israeli territorial and historical claims to the land of Palestine (Rowe 2011). However, after Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, Palestinian groups have actively engaged in reviving the Palestinian traditions of Dabke as part of a wider resistance movement toward Israel’s hegemony and occupation. The heritage of Dabke came now to represent Palestinian nationalism, nationhood, dispossession, the cultural identity of the indigenous and displaced Palestinian community, and more critically grassroots resistance. Nicholas Rowe notes in his study of Palestinian cultural heritage that the notion of Dabke as “resistance emerged more forcefully at the rallies of different political factions in the West Bank during the 1970s.” As he also illustrates further,

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by the late 1970s and early 1980s, Dabke in university competitions and folkloric festivities held in public places fostered a redefinition of Dabke as a “performance of Palestinian nationalism” (Rowe 2011, pp. 375 and 377). Other observers have noted how the modern performances of the Dabke have evolved and incorporated “stories about the Nakba, the mass expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland by Zionist forces in 1947–1948, as well as resistance to Israeli occupation and settler colonialism,” including the emphasis on the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the participation of young refugees in the dance performances locally and internationally (Barrows-Friedman 2017). One of those leading participants stated in 2015: “we believe that art is a part of the revolutionary and popular movement against the [Israeli] occupation” (Melhem 2015). Ultimately, the tradition of Dabke means the continuity of Palestinians on their land and remains as a significant form of cultural heritage with sociopolitical manifestations in Palestinian modern consciousness and identity. It also continues to demonstrate a strong link between heritage and resistance in the Palestinian national context within the wider Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In the area of conflict resolution, some attempts have also been made in the past two decades to utilize heritage as a constructive force for positive change, genuine dialogue, unifying narratives, and coexistence based on peace and justice. In 2007, UNESCO sought to play a mediation role in relation to heritage protection in Jerusalem. The UN agency representatives initiated a consensus-building process that involved Israeli, Palestinian Waqf, and Jordanian officials in a clear attempt to facilitate engagement and resolve increasing tensions concerning Israel’s contentious plans to renovate and expand the Mughrabi Gate Ascent with large ramp structures for Israeli groups. UNESCO’S mediation efforts produced some joint meetings between the concerned parties and technical groups, but the impact of such efforts has remained limited in the context of the ongoing struggle for Jerusalem’s heritage and the lack of enforcement powers by UNESCO. Other key issues presented major challenges to UNESCO’s mediation. These critical challenges have included Palestinian– Israeli accusations of the UN agency of either normalization or de-legitimatization of their historical claims and presence in Jerusalem, power inequality between Israeli– Palestinian actors, and Israel’s determination to unilaterally pursue exclusive heritage policies in Jerusalem (Larkin and Dumper 2009). Although UNESCO’s mediation did not lead to a conclusive and effective process of consensus-building, it introduced a role for the organization in promoting conflict resolution through shared heritage management in the Israeli–Palestinian case. Another significant example of employing heritage in conflict resolution initiatives in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict relates to the meeting of the World Archaeological Congress. It was held in 2009 in Ramallah, the West Bank, in the occupied Palestinian territories. The conference focused on Palestinian cultural heritage resources and placed a special emphasis on Palestinian voices and experiences in the heritage field. The conference also facilitated international and Israeli participation. One of the resulting initiatives was the drafting of “the Israeli–Palestinian cultural Heritage Agreement.” Written in thirty-nine pages by Palestinian, Israeli, and international archeologists, the Agreement was essentially concerned with the concept of

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“archeological peace” and the effort to address the central issues of power, territory, ownership, and management of cultural heritage in the Israeli–Palestinian context (Gori 2013). Despite its limited impact and criticism of weaknesses, this initiative has marked a further attempt in the search for a positive and constructive role for heritage in conflict resolution in the Israeli–Palestinian situation. Finally, a concluding example is the Push project which stands for “Promoting Understanding of Shared Heritage” and it involves academic and civil society actors from Palestinian, Israeli, and Jordanian organizations. Supported by European Union funding and developing between the years of 2006–2009, the project sought to “harmonize the region’s cultural and natural heritage by developing cross-border partnerships among academics, professionals, and community members.” It has also been designed to provide a “unique forum for cooperation involving archaeologists, architects, historians, ecologists and planners from Israel, Palestine and Jordan” (Ya’ari 2010, p. 9). Throughout the process, the participants engaged in reviewing the history of key cultural heritage sites and the local and national narratives of those sites. The participants have also produced leaflets and printed materials, raising awareness of the shared narratives of some sites and working closely with tour guides in the area of heritage. The participating groups reportedly struggled with the dividing narratives and conflicting political climate in the Israeli–Palestinian case and across the Middle East region. The project organizers also recognized a complex and deeper challenge, that is: “Space had to be provided for sites not only on the ground but in people’s minds” (Ya’ari 2010, p. 12). The Push initiative presents further evidence of the increasing acknowledgment of the role of heritage in addressing complex disputes and protracted conflicts. It also highlights the potential contributions of heritage discourses to conflict resolution in the Israeli–Palestinian case.

6 Conclusion This chapter discussed heritage from a sociopolitical perspective. Drawing on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and case study, the discussions explored the heritage of conflicting national narratives, the uses of heritage in colonial processes and occupation, and the role of heritage discourses in resistance and conflict resolution initiatives. The discussions were supported by research and key examples from the recent past and the present situation. The chapter has contributed to knowledge and research in the critical area of heritage and its evolving relationship with national narratives in conflict, colonial practices, occupation, resistance, and conflict resolution. Future research should seek a deeper exploration of this critical area of cultural heritage and identify further the complex and multiple uses of heritage in peaceful and conflict contexts.

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Religion, National Culture, and Peacebuilding in the Middle East Issa Diab

1 Introduction This is a theoretical discussion which examines the topic of religion, culture, and peacebuilding. It theorizes about “what to do,” but does not research the mechanisms required to apply the theories which are involved. The article has limitations: Its views apply to the countries and societies of the Levant more than the Middle East as a whole; nevertheless, several constituents are valid for other places and societies. “The field of religious peacebuilding has begun to move closer to the mainstream of conflict resolution practice and theory. The 2011 unrest in the Middle East and North Africa—the Arab Spring—reflects ongoing challenges and opportunities for the field.”1 Recently, conflict resolution practitioners and scholars have begun exploring the application and compatibility of theory and practice to different religious and cultural contexts and conflicts. These studies are inspired by the idea that religion and culture were the main cause of many conflicts that took place in several regions of the world throughout history. Such studies can contribute to conflict resolution if they are used properly. There is an organic relationship between religion and culture: Religion generates culture or, at least, it contributes to the formation of the culture of its adherents in a particular region. Culture shapes religious thinking and influences religious practices. This is confirmed by the history of religions and the history of civilizations. Religion and local culture together shape traditions, customs, and social values; they also influence the formation of the citizens’ relationship with each other and with the state. The influence of religion and culture on political performance and the direction 1

Hayward (2012).

I. Diab (B) Near East School of Theology- Saint Joseph University, Beirut, Lebanon e-mail: [email protected] United Bible Societies, Swindon, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_21

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of domestic and foreign policy of governments is constant and evident throughout history and across regions and continents. Consequently, religion and culture are important players in the work of reconciliation, peacebuilding, and consolidating civil peace and social justice. All of the above can be seen in an analytical reading of the Bible, especially the Old Testament, and a reconfiguration of the ancient history of Israel and the era of the Second Temple. The same applies to the Holy Quran and Islamic history.

2 Religion and Culture Religion and culture always exist in a close relation. Together with aesthetics and ethics, religion constitutes culture. Since ethnicity is a facet of the related concepts, its relation with religion also needs explanation.2 Most scholars have recognized a close relationship between religion and culture. This can be seen, for example, in the works of Paul Tillich, who envisioned religion at the heart of culture, while culture provided the structure for religion. He wrote: Religion as ultimate concern is the meaning–giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself. In abbreviation: religion is the substance of culture, culture is the form of religion. Such a consideration definitely prevents the establishment of a dualism of religion and culture. Every religious act, not only in organized religion, but also in the most intimate movement of the soul, is culturally formed.3

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are called heavenly (divine) religions, because each of them considers itself divine, given by God. This includes the “Holy Book” of each of these religions which is considered to be a “revelation” from God through prophets that are sent by God. This is a doctrine founded on faith, which cannot be examined by scientific methods; therefore, it is unverifiable. In this article, I deal with religion as a social phenomenon and cultural tradition. In the field of “sociology of religion,” this is a fact, at least with regard to the expression of faith by texts (written in human language) and rituals, as they stem from the customs and traditions of people, placed within the framework of divine commands, as it is believed. This is what prompts me to say that religion is a culture. It is part of the general culture of the country in which it was established or settled and is being practiced. When a religion is exported to a country with a culture other than the religion’s original culture, it enters into conflict with the new culture, and this conflict continues until the new culture is molded by this religion, or the religion is molded by the local culture. Thus, we can say that religion affects culture, and culture affects religion, especially with regard to the expression of faith and belief, and the form of practices. 2 3

Beyers (2017). Tillich (1959).

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Religion and culture, in a particular region, not only affect one another, but together they affect the way of thinking and analysis of the people of that region, as well as the social (and political) life they follow. Hundreds of studies have examined how religious beliefs mold an individual’s social and philosophical views, and psychological traits. In particular, research has explored how an individual’s religion (religious beliefs, religious denomination, strength of religious devotion, etc.) is linked to their cultural beliefs and background. Being an essential component of the human being, religion affects all aspects of a person’s life. The mutual influence between religion and culture, and their influence together on the individual in a region, results in a special culture and a distinct religious expression, specific to that region. All together, they contribute to the formation of one’s world view, including how one perceives others who are different, and how one determines moral values, such as what is permissible and what is prohibited (i.e., taboos). While some researchers have asserted that religion is an essential part of an individual’s culture, other researchers have focused more on how religion is a culture in itself. The key difference is how researchers conceptualize and utilize both of these terms. Moreover, the influence of communication in how individuals and communities understand, conceptualize, and pass on religious and cultural beliefs and practices is integral to understanding exactly what religion and culture are. Ernst Troeltsch also looked at culture as the soil of religion and thought. Therefore, transplanting a religion from its original culture to a foreign culture would actually kill it in the same manner that transplanting a plant from its natural soil to an alien soil would kill it.4 However, there have been many attempts in the modern pluralistic situation to distinguish culture from religion.

2.1 Influence of Religion on Culture and Behavior Religion is a socio-cultural system of designated behaviors and practices, morals, worldviews, texts, sanctified places, prophecies, ethics, or organizations that relates humanity to supernatural, transcendental, and spiritual elements.5 The concept of religion was formed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,6 despite the fact that ancient sacred texts, like the Bible, the Quran, and others, did not have a word or even a concept of religion in the original languages and neither did the people or the cultures in which these sacred texts were written.7

4

Sharpe (1977). Adapted from the definition of “religion” in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, accessed March 24, 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion. 6 Nongbri (2013), Harrison (1990). 7 Nongbri, Before Religion, 152; Morreall and Sonn (2013), 13. 5

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Religion can affect more than a particular person’s habits. Its beliefs and practices can influence an entire community, nation, or region. Religious practices shape, and are shaped by, the culture around them. Some religious systems affect an individual’s practice of eating and dressing. It might specify what foods are permitted and what are forbidden, how they should be eaten, and what practices are imposed before starting and after eating; or what parts of the body should be dressed and what parts should be hidden. Religion determines what topics people are allowed to think about, and what topics they are forbidden to think about, such as the topics of God’s existence, revelation, or creation. It also determines how to think: What is the supreme authority—the sacred text or reason? Many religions have value frameworks regarding personal behavior which are meant to guide adherents in determining between right and wrong, permitted and prohibited, and allowed and forbidden. Nevertheless, religion and morality are not synonymous, even though this is “an almost automatic assumption.”8 Religion has had, and continues to have, a significant impact on the political system in many countries.9 Notably, most Muslim-majority countries adopt various aspects of shar¯ıca, (the Islamic law).10 Some countries even define themselves in religious terms, such as The Islamic Republic of Iran. The shar¯ıca thus affects almost all the Muslims of the global Muslim community. However, religion also affects political decisions in many western countries, such as the influence of Evangelicals on foreign policy in the USA.11 Religion also has influence on economy. Sociologist and political economist, Max Weber, argued that Protestant Christian countries are wealthier because of the Protestant work ethic espoused by their citizens.12 Mayo Clinic researchers examined the association of religious involvement and spirituality with physical health, mental health, health-related quality of life, and other health outcomes. The authors reported that: Most studies have shown that religious involvement and spirituality are associated with better health outcomes, including greater longevity, coping skills, and health-related quality of life (even during terminal illness) and less anxiety, depression, and suicide.13

8

Rachels and Rachels (2011); see also p. 49ff. Christopher Callaway, “Religion and Politics,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed March 24, 2021, https://iep.utm.edu/rel-poli/. 10 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nai’m [sic, read An-Nacim], “Sharia Law—A Literary Zikr Project: Is Islamic Family Law Today Really Based on Shari’a? Why It Is Important To Know,” Muslims for Progressive Values, accessed March 24, 2021, https://www.mpvusa.org/sharia-law. 11 “The Economist explains: The role of religion in America’s presidential race,” The Economist, February 25, 2016, accessed March 24, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/ 2016/02/25/the-role-of-religion-in-americas-presidential-race. 12 Weber (2002). The original German text was written in 1904 and 1905. 13 Mueller et al. (2001). 9

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2.2 Influence of Culture on Religion Richard Eckersley wrote: Cultures are about how we think the world “works”: the language, knowledge, beliefs, assumptions and values that shape how we see the world and our place in it; give meaning to our experience; and are passed between individuals, groups and generations. Spirituality is a deeply intuitive, but not always consciously expressed, sense of connectedness to the world in which we live. Its most common cultural representation is religion, an institutionalised system of belief and ritual worship that usually centres on a supernatural god or gods.14

Religious people (in our context, adherents of the Abrahamic religions, i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) believe that their religions came from God by inspiration. However, many aspects of these religions and their related practices are greatly influenced by ancient Near Eastern culture, the birthplace of these religions. The indigenous customs, traditions, and social values in these societies continue to be imposed on the religious behavioral practices of the religion that is established in these societies, and they acquire a sacred character. The way religious occasions are celebrated, and the language used, are greatly influenced by the local way of life, traditions, and customs. We see one facet of the influence of culture on religion in the influence of materialism and individualism—prevalent in Western societies—on the spirituality and religious practice of these societies. We see the consequences of the cultural impact of materialism and individualism on religion, and its embodiment of the spiritual, at many levels: the decline of mainstream Christianity in Western countries; the rise of “New Age” beliefs, which are often individualist and consumerist; and the countertrend toward increasing religious fundamentalism, wherein strict adherence to the literal truth of sacred texts means too much power is ceded to religious authorities.15 Morality is an important dimension of religious belief and practice. Values provide the framework for deciding what is important, true, right, and good, and so have a central role in defining relationships and meanings.16 However, cultural influences do not just change the external “shape” of religion. Cultural messages can create tension, conflict, and confusion within individuals when they run counter to religious beliefs and teachings, making it harder to integrate religion into their lives.17 This, in turn, can lead to change and compromise within religions, including a greater tolerance of consumerism and self-gratification, so removing any need to choose between “God and Mammon.”

14

Eckersley (2007). Ibid. 16 Eckersley (2005, 2006). 17 Pargament (2002), Exline (2002). 15

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3 Ancient Semitic Culture Shaping Eastern Christianity and Islam Semites, Semitic peoples, or Semitic cultures were terms for an ethnic, cultural, or racial group.18 The terminology is now largely obsolete outside the grouping “Semitic languages” in linguistics.19 First used in the 1770s by members of the Göttingen School of History, this Biblical terminology for race was derived from Shem (Hebrew: ‫)םֵׁש‬, one of the three sons of Noah in the Book of Genesis.20 A “Semite” is a member of a people speaking any of a group of related languages presumably derived from a common language, “Semitic.” The term came to include Arabs, Akkadians, Canaanites, Hebrews, some Ethiopians, and Aramaean tribes. Mesopotamia, the western coast of the Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa have all been proposed as possible sites for the prehistoric origins of Semitic-speaking peoples, but no location has been definitively established.21

3.1 Religious and Cultural Characteristics of the Semitic Peoples On the issue of the characteristics of Semitic peoples, it is difficult to draw a line between what is cultural and what is religious, because religion and culture are more intertwined than any other feature. There is nothing purely religious nor purely cultural. The best way to present the ancient Semitic culture is to introduce the ancient Semitic religions, since the culture is embedded in these religions.22 Semitic religions are also known as “religions of the ancient Near East.” Their different pantheons fall into regional categories: Canaanite religions of the Levant; the Sumerian tradition that gave birth to the Assyro-Babylonian religion of Mesopotamia; the ancient Hebrew religion of the Israelites; and the polytheism of the Arabian Peninsula. The religions of the ancient Near East were mostly polytheistic, with some examples of monolatry, for example, Yahwism in Israel and Atenism in Egypt. Some scholars believe that the similarities between these religions indicate that the religions are related, a belief known as “patternism.”23

18

Liverani (1995). Anidjar (2008). 20 Baasten (2003). 21 “Semite,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 8, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/ topic/Semite. 22 Our first source is the Old Testament. However, with our prior knowledge that the Old Testament is not objective in describing these religions as competing with Yahwism, by critical reading, we may increase the degree of objectivity. 23 Hooke (1970). 19

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Semitic polytheism possibly transitioned into Abrahamic monotheism by way of the god El, whose name el, or elah ‫הלא‬, is a word for “god” in Hebrew, cognate to Arabic il¯ah ‫هلإ‬, and its definitive pronoun form all¯ah ‫هللا‬, “(The) God.” In my presentation of these religions, it will suffice for me to mention historical characteristics that are related to the inherited characteristics of the current inhabitants of the Middle East, whose ancestors practiced these religions. In these ancient religions, the emphasis was placed on the “anger” of the gods and the importance of appeasing them.24 The gods, to be sure, were easily aroused to anger, and in some of them, the harsh aspects predominated, but the view became more and more pronounced that there was always some cause for divine wrath. However, in accounting for the anger of the gods, no sharp distinction was made between moral offences and a ritualistic oversight or neglect. The anger of the gods provoked fear and terror in their worshipers; then, they began to search for pacification and appeasement of the gods. Yet the stress lay in the hymns and prayers, as well as in the elaborate atonement rituals prescribed. The rituals of atonement were material offerings, animal sacrifices, and sometimes human sacrifices. In the event that the worshiper failed to appease his angry gods, he would be punished. Punishment was determined according to the action that angered the god. Types of punishments included: exclusion, amputation, castration, imprisonment, starvation, surrender to the enemy, killing, and destruction. There were various methods of killing, including stoning, burning, and drowning in floods.25 We have mentioned all these details to say that the religions of the ancient Near East were bloody, focusing on fear of the wrath of the gods and the duty to appease them, or to be subject to harsh punishment. Another aspect of these religions was exclusivity. The god of the city forced all the inhabitants of the city to worship and serve him, otherwise they were liable to be expelled or killed.26 Every god was asking his followers to separate themselves from other gods and other people (see Exod. 23:29; Lev. 18:24; Num. 33:52; etc.). At the behest of Yahweh, his zealous worshipers exterminated the inhabitants who worshiped other gods and not him. There was no tolerance; worshipers of other gods could not live in the same place in peace. The worshipers of each deity had to submit others to the worship of their god, even by force. And if they refused, they had to be sent out or their extermination was required. Although the ancient Semites worshiped multiple deities, the great deity, the head of the Pantheon, was of particular importance and wielded his power over the rest of the gods, including harsh punishments, such as castration, amputations, and even murder. Some wars between peoples, or battles between cities, had divine 24

This is shown in many Old Testament passages (Exod. 15:7; 32:10-11; Num. 11:1-2; Deut. 9:8; Isa. 13:5; Jer. 32:29; etc.). 25 A typical example is 2 Samuel 24, where we find that King David decided to take a census of the men of fighting age. The prophet Gad was sent to David to announce God’s displeasure with the taking of the census. The punishment for David’s sin: “The Lord sent a pestilence on Israel from that morning until the appointed time; and seventy thousand of the people died” (2 Samuel 24:15). 26 This is one interpretation of Yahweh’s demand, in the Old Testament, for the extermination of pagan peoples and the taking of their lands; this is called “herem,” which means “ban” or “holy extermination” (see Lev. 27: 28; Deut. 7:1-2; Deut. 20:16–18; Josh. 6:17; 1 Sam. 15:1–3).

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provocation, that is, they were conducted to redeem the honor of the god, or because the god of a people was angry at the god of another people; and in all cases, they were carried out at the command of the gods. Semitic peoples are religious people. Both the ancient and modern Semitic peoples are religious peoples par excellence. The religious sphere and the civil sphere are intertwined. The religious sphere receives the greatest attention, even among nonbelievers. Many perform religious practices as a social duty. Holidays and religious celebrations are, at the same time, social occasions. The sense of religious belonging constituted and continues to constitute an identity of its own. It is stronger than other belongings by themselves like social, national, or ethnic. In view of the importance of religion and its role in the life of the individual, the inhabitants of the Middle East give their first allegiance to the religious sect, then to the religion to which the sect belongs, then to ethnicity, and finally to the homeland. Each religious community has a “religious institution”; this institution provides care for their adherents not only on the religious level, but on all levels: social, professional, and even political. Semitic people are tribal. Tribalism implies the possession of a strong cultural or ethnic identity that separates one member of a group from the members of another group. Based on strong relations of proximity and kinship, members of a tribe tend to possess a strong feeling of identity. Objectively, for a customary tribal society to form there needs to be ongoing customary organization, enquiry, and exchange. However, intense feelings of common identity can lead people to feel tribally connected. Tribalism, in the present Middle East, has taken the form of religious denominations, some of which are also represented by hereditary political leadership or political parties of religious hue. In societies of this kind, the culture of belonging to the “tribe” to which the individual belongs is strengthened, and the culture of national belonging weakens. Semitic peoples are fatalistic. Semitic thought is abstract and indefinite. The Semites use many words in their speech that have no specific meanings, or that mean the same thing. They also use words that express linking personal decision with the will of God, such as “God willing” or “If we remain living”; for a person’s death, they say “God took him”; on birth, “God has given”; if a family has no children, they say “God did not give them.” We can say that they are fatalists; they believe in divine predestination. In fact, one of the six articles of faith in Islam is belief in the existence of God’s predestination, whether it involves good or bad. Eastern Christians are also fatalistic, believing that whatever happens to them in life is arranged by the will of God, and whatever happens in the universe, or on earth, takes place by a divine order and with divine power. The Semites revere their history. However ugly their history is, it is a matter of pride; they even mythologize their history. They invoke history and its events in their traditional nationalistic speeches, and everyone tries to justify what they did. There is absolutely no self-criticism. Today, Middle Eastern Christians are fighting the doctrinal battles of their fathers that were fought in the first Christian centuries. And the Muslims are fighting the

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battles of their original leaders: The Sunnis are defending Umar, Uthman, and Aisha, while the Shicites are defending Ali. Most Islamic discourse also incorporates sharp criticism of both the Crusades and western colonialism. Naturally, in any ceremonial speech, we find more talk about history than the present and the future.

3.2 Islam as the Inheritor of Semitism in the Middle East In a doctoral thesis,27 I demonstrated how Islam preserved the characteristics of the ancient Semitic religions,28 and how Christianity lost them. Hellenistic thought prevailed over Syriac and Coptic thought and excluded them such that they became isolated. By the time Islam emerged, Christianity had been Hellenized. Then, after the Crusades, the thought of Thomas Aquinas entered Eastern Christian thought to produce what became known as “Eastern Catholic theology.” At the same time, it cannot be denied that the Christians of the Middle East have retained many ancient Semitic features, in addition to being influenced by Islam. Faced with this reality, Muslims today live the ancient Semitic thought in their expression of Islam. Meanwhile, Eastern Christians live in a state of division and tension: They have lost their ancient Semitic identity in their theology, but they keep it in their conscience, character, world view, and religious-social traditions. Christians live in the Middle East in a state of estrangement.

3.3 Religion and Cultural Heritage in the Present Situation It is my belief that the ancient Semitic features of culture and religion were most evident in the conflicts that took place within the framework of the so-called Arab Spring. Of course, the Arab Spring was caused by a multitude of factors: economic, political, social, cultural, and religious. However, amidst political and economic disputes, historical religious differences, as well as cultural and ethnic differences, erupted. The behavior of the warring groups showed that these groups still retained the main features of ancient Semitic religion and culture. The origins of the conflict lay in belief; not a singular belief, but a collective, multifaceted belief leading to the conviction that liberation was needed. Throughout history, religious ideology has played a key role in creating the causes of conflict and directing the course of events. The impact it continues to have on the mobilization of social networks and resources should not be underestimated.

27

Diab (2004). See especially the concluding section, “L’Abraham islamique est l’expression de cette phénoménologie religieuse sémitique” [The Islamic Abraham is the expression of this Semitic religious phenomenology], 444–457. 28 Albright (1940).

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Islam, the inheritor of ancient Semitic religious and cultural features, is the religion of the overwhelming majority in the Middle East, and its role in the existing conflicts is obvious. This role of Islam can be explored in two ways: first, by analyzing the discourse and networks created by religious communities, and second, by recognizing and appreciating the historical, social, and political influences in the region that continue to affect its religious practices. The conservation of ancient Semitic culture and religious traditions by the peoples of the Middle East, both Muslims and Christians, hinders communication between the different conflicting Islamic sects, and between Muslims and Christians. In my opinion, this is the reason behind the very weak results of Sunni–Shicite dialogues, and Muslim–Christian dialogues, despite their frequent occurrence and the huge sums of money spent on them. How have the features of ancient Semitic religion and culture been manifested in the contemporary events taking place in the Middle East arena? With a simple analysis of the religious discourse, political performance, and current events in the region, the following inherited Semitic religious and cultural characteristics can be discerned: 1. The inhumane picture of God. Literalists, in both Islam and Christianity, have depicted an image of God stemming from their historical experience of being serfs in feudal areas and subjects to violence by feudal lords. Thus, the image of God has become an image of a cruel feudal lord who is sovereign, having full authority to do whatever he wants with his serfs. Their obedience to him stems from their fear of him and aims to seek his sympathy and compassion so that he might provide them with shelter and food and offer them his forgiveness while refraining from his harsh punishments. Literalists have also produced and reflected this image of an “angry God,” who is intolerant toward those who break his law, and who tells his worshipers to punish anyone who does not maintain proper respect and recognition of his authority. This image of God has been reflected in the behavior of those involved in political disputes, motivated by economic and materialistic interests, driven by religious differences, manifested in violent activity. 2. Exclusivity; rejection of altruism, diversity, and difference. Much of what is going on in the region is due to the fact that religious groups do not accept each other and refuse to coexist with each other. Each claims to have the truth and that others have nothing of the truth. Each claims that God is on their side, supporting them and rejecting the others. There is a struggle for the control of God, according to the thinker Ridwan Al-Sayyed.29 Some Muslims consider Christians to be infidels (kuff¯ar), and some Christians consider Islam to be a false religion and that its followers are misguided and have no salvation. Some Sunni Muslims disbelieve the legitimacy of other Islamic sects, such as the Shicites and Druze, calling them “R¯afid.a” (“dissenters” or heretics). This exclusivist religious ideology negatively affects coexistence and civil peace. 29

Al-Sayyed (1998).

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3. The strength of religious affiliation and the weakness of national affiliation. Members of each of the different religious groups maintain their primary loyalty to the religious sect to which they belong, while their loyalty to the homeland comes in second place, because this sect gives them their social identity, manages their personal status, and defends their civil rights. There are few citizens who are truly secular and who put citizenship in first place. This strong loyalty to a religious community creates barriers among people of the same nation. In addition, Muslims accuse Christians of denying their affiliation with the Arabs, maintaining loyalty to the West, and not participating in national causes. 4. Evoking a bloody religious history in every kind of struggle. In any intellectual or material conflict, history is brought up. History is not forgotten for the peoples of this region, and history is fraught with painful memories. Muslims evoke the Crusades; Christians evoke the Islamic conquests; and Shicites evoke the tragedy of Karbala.

4 Producing a Religious Paradigm and a Culture for Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Producing a culture and a religious paradigm that can be used for reconciliation and peacebuilding is an important, even indispensable mission. It is far from being an easy task, but it is not impossible. Its implementation requires planning a long-term program that includes several factors, the most important of which is education. It is first necessary to consider the type of religious culture that must be produced and then to consider the mechanism for its implementation and propagation in society.

4.1 Pillars of Religious Culture for Reconciliation and Peace Building A religious culture for promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding should consist of three pillars that must be established and developed: (1) humanizing religion; (2) secularizing religious people; and (3) stimulating a sense of citizenship. Humanizing Religion In the Middle Ages, religion robbed humans of their humanism. One consequence of this is that the Enlightenment arose to criticize religion, retrieve from it the human value that it had robbed, and return that value to the human being. Swami Agnivesh and Rev. Valson Thampu wrote: Neither Buddha nor Christ nor Krishna nor Mahavir nor Ram came to establish religions. They came as servants and spokesmen of authentic humanity. They put the spotlight on the intrinsic and incomparable worth of every human being, irrespective of the accidents of birth

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and wealth. The social and moral ideals they advocated were revolutionary in character. They were stingingly subversive of the status quo.30

The time has come to liberate God from the pagan image of God in the actual religious culture of the majority in the Middle East. This image has caused, and is still causing, wars, genocides, migrations, displacements, famines, the deprivation of liberty, and torture. It is time to restore the true image of God stemming from a humanistic value which is God’s original image: the ideals of morality, love, esteem, respect, forgiveness, tolerance, compassion, and cooperation. The humanization of religion is also the proper interpretation of what Christ said: “The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath” (Mk. 2:27). Humanization of religion includes, at least, three areas: God, the sacred text, and humanity. Concerning God, humanizing religion involves: 1. Purification of the image of God from the violence attached to it due to a literal interpretation of some texts, or the reflection it mirrors of a feudal lord’s violence. What should be portrayed instead is the true image of God: moral perfection, perfect wisdom, love, mercy, justice, and strength. 2. Placing humanity at the center of religion. God does not need to be the center. Religion exists to serve people, not the other way around. It is a matter of making religion serve human causes. People approach God for their spiritual and psychological needs, and to develop divine morals within themselves, so that a process of character transformation takes place. Accordingly, humanity should be placed at the center of the religious process in that God is the one who serves people in order to promote them and employ them in the task of elevating society and the world. Concerning the sacred text, humanizing religion involves: 1. Acknowledging the human role in the formation of the sacred text, highlighting it, and taking it into account in every interpretive process. 2. Interpreting the sacred text in a way that understands the nature of humanity and people’s material, psychological, and spiritual needs that change from one era to another, and in a way that serves these needs and does not deny or condemn them. 3. Recognizing the text as a source of spiritual nourishment, moral guidance, and practical aid, not just as legal materials that are used to judge others. For humans personally, the humanization of religion involves: 1. Implementing religion to serve the human cause at all levels—material, psychological, and spiritual. 2. Implementing religion to help individuals get rid of the selfishness that is the source of their isolation and the barriers they create between themselves and others. 30

Swami Agnivesh and Rev. Valson Thampu, “Time to Humanize Relgion!” accessed August 9, 2020, http://www.swamiagnivesh.com/articles-detail.php?page=74.

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3. Implementing religion to help individuals develop their human value and enhance their high-end capabilities. 4. Implementing religion to assist individuals in liberating themselves from myths, legends, and taboos that restrict their freedom and impede their faculties. Secularizing Religious People Secularization is the transformation of a society from close identification with religious values and institutions toward nonreligious values and secular institutions. The secularization thesis expresses the idea that as societies progress, particularly through modernization and rationalization, religious authority diminishes in all aspects of social life and governance. Secularization of religious people consists of: 1. Introducing a religious renewal that allows religion to respond, at some point in time, to the genuine needs of people and society. 2. Separating between religion and governance. Religion exists for the development of the spiritual and moral life of humanity, not for civil legislation and governance. Sources of civil legislation other than religion should be recognized. 3. Separating between religion and human sciences. Sources of knowledge other than religion, such as scientific discoveries and human experience, should be recognized. Stimulating Citizenship In his book, Cultures and Human Rights, Selim Abbou demonstrates the disadvantages of focusing on the “right to difference” in a society.31 Yes, difference is a legitimate right. But when it becomes more important than the duty of national cohesion, it becomes a tool for fragmentation and division in a single nation. Thus, a religious culture that promotes reconciliation and peacebuilding should enable a society to develop a strong sense of citizenship. This required transition consists of: 1. Eliminating the logic of minority and majority which are derived from different religious or ethnic affiliations and emphasizing citizenship with freedom of belief. 2. The recognition that religious and ethnic belonging should not dominate over a sense of national belonging, nor work against it.

4.2 Implementation of Religious Culture for Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Undoubtedly, the whole MENA region is entering new and challenging times. Since the recent struggles in this region, it is more important than ever to reform the 31

Abbou (1998).

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educational system and the approach of teaching religion, history, and social studies. Educational programs must be closely tied to students’ understanding of citizenship and their awareness of the world in which they live. Educators and policy makers must develop new curricula and methods of instruction. In a report about history and citizenship education, Steven Stegers wrote: History and citizenship educators have to react to the socio-political changes which are taking place in the Arab World. The transition poses new questions and challenges to them, such as “How to teach about the former political leadership?” “How to teach history in a way that helps build democratic societies?” “What does citizenship mean in the new context?” “How to prevent the instrumentalization of history education by new groups in power?” The attitudes of students are also changing.… Students turn to the history teachers when societal change evokes questions. Educational practices that were common before the Arab Awakening are ill suited to meet the needs. These approaches, where teachers and textbooks are the authoritative source of information and students are passive recipients of information, are in stark contrast to the everyday reality where youth has more access to information than ever before and where youth has become one of the driving forces behind societal change.32

In addition to what Stegers states, it should be recognized that religious education programs are also to be included among the topics that must be reconsidered, and perhaps more importantly than history and citizenship. Besides the methodological challenges, there are also problems related to the politics of the past. History and religion are arguably the most politicized topics in society and are often used and misused by political and religious leaders. A good education in both history and religion—calling for democratic, open, and pluralistic societies—is a great need. An inclusive and critical approach to the teaching of history and religion is essential to change mentalities. There is an urgent need for a religious education with the methodology of the history of religions and the philosophy of religion, which includes the study of religion, or religions, as a historical and social phenomenon, and as a psychological phenomenon among the components of the human being. Religious education programs should work to educate each religious group with scientific information about other religions present in the country or region. This broad approach to culture should then be capable of removing many misunderstandings, stimulating acceptance of difference and diversity, and equipping citizens with tools for a good management of conflicts. History and religion can be used, as they are now, as political tools for nationalist agendas. But a strong civil society of educators, aware of these risks and committed to implementing responsible and innovative modes of education, could act as a counterweight to nationalist programs. Unfortunately, there is no sustained tradition of an active civil society in the Arab region. Therefore, we must develop a civil society free from sectarian, ideological, and opportunist agendas. Finally, it is not enough to deal with the curriculum, the content, and the student. The topic is not complete if teachers and clerics, who are the source and leaders of knowledge in this educational task, are not addressed as well. There is no dispute 32

Stegers (2012).

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regarding teachers, as there are many good education programs to qualify them; but there is a weakness in preparing the clergy. Clerics should have a broad knowledge of the humanities and be trained in critical and free thinking. The preparation of clerics of this type requires the possibility of qualifying them in universities that provide this type of education.

5 Conclusion I believe that religious reform in the Middle East is the basis of all other reforms. Building a culture of peacemaking and reconciliation is a long process. And for the Middle East, it starts with religious reform. Religion is the problem, and religion is the most important contributor in the recovery. In the Middle East, religion is the most important factor in shaping culture and guiding society. A religious reform can produce cultural, social, and even political reform. Religious reform depends on a review of the curricula and the training of clerics. It is necessary to bring critical thinking into the core of the educational process, and to open educational institutions qualified for this, in which clerics are trained. A word of truth must be said without prejudice that the Christian community has taken tremendous steps in this regard. But the Christian influence is weak, and it becomes weaker with the migration of Christians from the Middle East.

References Abbou S (1998) Al-Thaq¯af¯at wa H.uq¯uq al-Ins¯an (Cultures and human rights. D¯ar al-Mashriq, Beierut Albright WF (1940) Islam and the religions of the ancient orient. J Am Orient Soc 60:283–301 Al-Sayyed R (1998) Al-S.ir¯ac cal¯a al-Isl¯am: Us.u¯ liyya wal-Is.l¯ah. wal-Siy¯as¯at al-Dawliyya (Conflict over Islam: fundamentalism, reform, and international politics). D¯ar al-Kit¯ab al-cArab¯ı, Beirut, 2004, pp 7–12 Anidjar G (2008) Semites: race, religion, literature. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, p 6 Baasten MFJ (2003) A note on the history of ‘semitic’. In: Baasten MFJ, Van Peursen WTh (eds) Hamlet on a hill: semitic and Greek studies presented to Professor T. Muraoka on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday. Peeters Publishers, Louvain, pp 57–72 Beyers J (2017) Religion and culture: revisiting a close relative. HTS Theological Stud (Pretoria) 73. http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-942220170 00100010. Accessed 23 Mar 2021 Diab I (2004) L’Islam héritier des religions sémitiques: étude du phénomène abrahamique (Islam, inheritor to the semitic religions: a study of the Abrahamic phenomenon). Doctoral thesis, University of Bordeaux III Eckersley RM (2005) Well and good: morality, meaning and happiness, 2nd edn. Text Publishing, Melbourne Eckersley R (2006) Is modern Western culture a health hazard? Int J Epidemiol 35:252–258. https:// academic.oup.com/ije/article/35/2/252/694666?login=true. Accessed 24 Mar 2021

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Eckersley RM (2007) Culture, spirituality, religion and health: looking at the big picture. Med J Aust 186. https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2007/186/10/culture-spirituality-religion-and-healthlooking-big-picture. Accessed 24 Mar 2021 Exline JJ (2002) Stumbling blocks on the religious road: fractured relationships, nagging vices, and the inner struggle to believe. Psychol Inq 13:182–189. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965 PLI1303_03. Accessed 24 Mar 2021 Harrison P (1990) “Religion” and the religions in the English enlightenment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 1 Hayward S (2012) Religion and peacebuilding: reflections on current challenges and future prospects. United States Institute of Peace—Special Report 313, August, p 1 (“Summary”). https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/usip/0025807/f_0025807_21100.pdf. Accessed 23 Mar 2021 Hooke SH (1970) The Siege Perilous: essays in Biblical anthropology and kindred subjects. Ayer Publishing, North Stratford, NH, p 174 Liverani M (1995) Semites. In: Bromiley GW et al (eds) The international standard Bible encyclopedia, vol 4. William B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI, pp 387–392 Morreall J, Sonn T (2013) 50 great myths about religions. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, UK, p 13 Mueller PS, Plevak DJ, Rummans TA (2001) Religious involvement, spirituality, and medicine: implications for clinical practice. Mayo Clinic Proc 76:1225–1235. https://www.mayoclinicpr oceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(11)62799-7/pdf. Accessed 25 Mar 2021 Nongbri B (2013) Before religion: a history of a modern concept. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, p 152 Pargament KI (2002) The bitter and the sweet: an evaluation of the costs and benefits of religiousness. Psychol Inq 13:168–181. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1303_02. Accessed 24 Mar 2021 Rachels J, Rachels S (2011) The elements of moral philosophy, 7th edn. McGraw–Hill, New York, p 129 Sharpe EJ (1977) “Religion and cultures”, lecture presented on July 6, pp 51–52. https://openjourn als.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/ART/article/download/5496/6167. Accessed 23 Mar 2021 Stegers S (2012) History and citizenship education in the North Africa and the Middle East: challenges and opportunities for history and citizenship education from the viewpoint of educators from the region. Special report, Issue 7 (EUROCLIO—European Association of History Educators). https://www.euroclio.eu/special-report-history-and-citizenship-education-in-the-north-afr ica-and-the-middle-east-final/. Accessed 24 Mar 2021 Tillich P (1959) In: Kimball RC (ed) Theology of culture. Oxford University Press, London, p 42 Weber M (2002) The protestant ethic and the “spirit” of capitalism and other writings, ed and trans Baehr P, Wells GC. Penguin Books, New York

The Heritage of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America, the Omani Context, and the Work of Al Amana Centre Justin Meyers

Abstract The setting of the Sultanate of Oman combined with the heritage of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America has created a unique context for the work of the Al Amana Centre. This article will explore the history and modern-day experience of tolerance and pluralism in Oman, the historical, theological movements of the Reformed Church in America missionaries toward a more accepting view of Islam, and how these two combine to create opportunities for participants in Al Amana Centre’s programing to discover and experience reconciliation. This article will draw upon scholars who have a long history with Oman, the stories and history of the Arabian Mission, and accounts of the current work of Al Amana Centre. Keywords Al Amana Centre · Reconciliation · Pluralism · Tolerance · Oman · Reformed Church in America Global Mission · Arabian Mission

1 Introduction It is tempting to over romanticize the heritage and impact of the Reformed Church in America’s Arabian Mission to the Gulf region. In this day and age, where the news relating to the region can often seem negative, there is a strong urge to tell positive stories, perhaps even idealized stories, that counter the negative ones in the global news. While on the whole the story of the Arabian Mission is positive, there are accounts of challenges and obstacles, anecdotes of missteps and over reaches by Christian missionaries, instances of local Muslim leaders using the missionaries as political pawns, and reports of suspicion and of extreme mistrust. Now, after over one hundred and twenty-five years of history between the Arabian Mission, and its legacy organizations the Al Amana Centre and Protestant Church in Oman, and the Sultanate of Oman, a major story is of the patient endurance of all the parties Rev. Justin Meyers is the Executive Director of Al Amana Centre in Muscat Oman. Rev. Meyers is ordained in the Reformed Church in America and has lived and worked in Oman since 2013. J. Meyers (B) Al Amana Centre, Muscut, Oman e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_22

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involved and how it has led to an oasis in the middle of an often-turbulent region. This shared history and heritage, along with the recent memory of Arabian Mission doctors and nurses staying to help build the healthcare system in Oman after turning over the mission hospital to the government, has created a context and a relationship that allows the Al Amana Centre to become an organization that works to create a place and a space where people of different religions and cultures are able to meet together in peace. In this space, people can gather to build trust and understanding with the hope that reconciliation can be discovered. This article will highlight elements of the history and heritage of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America that have combined with the unique context of Oman to create the Al Amana Centre in Muscat, Oman. It will draw upon the recorded history of the Arabian Mission, scholarly works on the context of Oman, and the oral history passed down from Omanis, former missionaries, and their children to expose why Al Amana Centre can be what it is today. It will address how Al Amana Centre approaches the work of creating safe space to foster reconciliation and how the Omani context and Arabian Mission history are integral to this work.

2 Oman’s Heritage of Peace and Pluralism In Oman, under the wise leadership of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos, we are based upon principles of religious tolerance and the avoidance of conflict and violence. Other religious views or models of interpretation must be respected.—Dr. Mohammed Al Mamari—Advisor to the Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs, Oman (Al Mamari 2016)

The common narrative in Oman is that HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said led a renaissance of Oman and shaped it into the peaceful country that it is today. (Al Mamari 2016; Phillips and Hunt 2017) However, the foundation for the peaceful nature of modern Oman and its tolerance of other religions and cultures predates the reign of Sultan Qaboos. This foundation can be traced to a time well before the European colonial intervention in the Gulf region. The foundation was laid by Oman’s interaction with diverse peoples from the Indian Ocean region and Africa. (Al-Ismaili 2018; Jones and Ridout 2013: 25) This cosmopolitan history, combined with the predominant Islamic school of thought in Oman, Ibadism, has contributed to Oman being a place of religious tolerance and peace that it is today. Before going deeper into this tradition and the other factors that have led to ethos of modern Oman, it is important to note the unique religious diversity of the people who call Oman home. Oman is the only Muslim majority country where the Ibadi tradition is the majority tradition (Jones and Ridout 2013: 42). While there are various small Ibadi communities in Eastern and Northern Africa, Oman is the home of this tradition (B.C. 2018; Hoffman 2012). While officially the majority of Omani nationals would claim to be Ibadi, there is a large portion of the population that follow Sunni traditions and smaller, but significant, Shia and Hindu populations (Oman 2019 International Religious Freedom Report 2020). These now native populations come from a history of

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Oman welcoming people from other countries and Oman’s integration of them into their national life (Al-Ismaili 2018; Jones and Ridout 2013). It is also important to note that there is not a significant population of Omani nationals who are Christian. However, there is a large portion of the expatriate population from multiple traditions within Christianity that have places of worship in the country and whose worship is not controlled or interfered with by the Omani government. This is also true for other expatriates who are Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, and other non-Muslim religions. While Ibadi Islam is the official tradition in Oman, a more general version of Islam is taught in the schools and officially promoted by the Omani government. When Islam is spoken about in Oman, it is simply promoted as “Islam in Oman” and strives to not engage in sectarian debates or promote one sect over another (“Tolerance— Understanding—Coexistence Oman’s Message of Islam,” n.d.). In Oman, it is illegal to prohibit a person from worshipping in a mosque based on their adherence to a particular Islamic sect or tradition. It is also quite common for Sunnis and Ibadis to pray side by side (Jones and Ridout 2013: 42).1 The unique Islamic tradition found in Oman and the integration of other cultures into Oman have given it a heritage and a culture that values politeness in a pluralistic society. It also allows for tolerance of difference and an ability to maintain peace in the face of potential conflict. It is these two aspects, politeness and the heritage of pluralism, to which we now turn. While in many Western cultures politeness is seen as a mask to hide one’s authentic identity in public interactions, in Oman one’s true self is shown through public interactions (Jones and Ridout 2005: 379). This means for Omanis that they both “efface difference even in the act of acknowledging it” and express this by acting, as authentically as they can, by behaving in a way that leads the other to believe that they are the same as them (Jones and Ridout 2013: 43). Politeness and cultural adaptation are not seen as “false” or “pretend” but an expression of who they truly are as Omanis. It is an acknowledgement of their efforts to “behave as best I can as though I am the same as you” (ibid.). When Omanis are shown the same courtesy, of politeness and cultural awareness, it is the experience of the author, that they immediately engage in warm relationships with the non-Omani. This is particularly evident when Arabic phrases that are unique to Oman are used in daily conversation. This simple act shows that one cares about Omani culture, not just Arab culture in general. Likewise, in religious dialogue with Omanis, the first step is to establish common themes and practices between two religions or traditions, to show “alikeness” and willingness to behave, as much as possible, like the other. This is seen clearly when one visits the Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque visitor center in Muscat. Difference is acknowledged but will not be seriously engaged until a deeper relationship between the parties is established. This politeness, as well as the general Ibadi thought toward tolerating difference especially in other monotheistic traditions, has allowed them to create a peaceful pluralistic society (Hoffman 2004: 208). 1

More on the uniqueness of the political and theological traditions found in Oman can be found in works by John C. Wilkinson (1987), Marc Valeri (2009), Valeri Hoffman (2012), and Jones and Ridout (2013).

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Another benefit of the inherent pluralism found in Oman is the need to be secure in one’s own religious and political beliefs without revealing them or forcing them on others in order to maintain peace. This is the underpinnings of the Ibadi understanding of kitman, an Arabic term generally meaning—to conceal (Jones and Ridout 2013: 50). Kitman has been, and continues to be, practically applied by many Omanis by not politically intervening in society based on religious belief. As a minority tradition, this was a survival mechanism that grew into a general ethos. Kitman also means that one does not “insist upon the rights or responsibilities of (a religion’s) adherents to promote their beliefs” (ibid.). This may be the basis for Oman’s strong anti-proselytizing laws as it lends itself to promoting political stability and does not challenge the status quo. It should also be noted that non-Muslim traditions are also protected from proselytization by Muslims in Oman. In addition to kitman, wuquf , an Arabic term that connotates a state where judgment is withheld of an other’s belief, is an important part of Oman’s culture (ibid: 51). This contributes to the generally held practice that outsiders are not judged until their true motives and actions can be ascertained. This tradition of politeness within a culture of pluralism, combined with strong sense of political and religious tolerance and withheld judgment, led to the Omanis, in general, being unphased by the arrival of Christian missionaries on their shores in the latter part of the nineteenth century. They did not see these Christian missionaries as a religious or political threat because there was already religious diversity and tolerance built into Omani society, especially in Muscat where the missionaries first landed. In Oman today, religious tolerance has been codified by Sultan Qaboos bin Said (Al Mamari 2016; Elliott 2018; Kéchichian 2008) and there are provisions in the Basic Law or Constitution of Oman that states (Said 1996): Article 28: The freedom to practice religious rites according to the recognized customs is guaranteed, provided it does not disrupt the public order or contradict with morals. And Article 17: All citizens are equal before the Law and share the same public rights and duties. There is no discrimination between them on the ground of gender, origin, colour, language, religion, sect, domicile, or social status.

Further, in addition to these Basic Statutes, laws were enacted that prohibit the defamation of any religion (State 2018) and made it criminal offence to offend any Abrahamic faith (State 2020). While there is freedom to worship as one sees fit in Oman, it is with the caveat that it must not disturb public order or create social disharmony. Therefore, almost all public worship, for people of any religion including Muslims, must be done in designated mosques and houses of worship. There are Christian churches and Hindu temples that are located on land given to them by Sultan Qaboos (Al-Rabaani 2018; Al Sadi and Basit 2013). Proselytization in public is illegal for all religions, as per law, and is confined to the individual houses, as per practice. If one were to visit the Grand Mosque visitor center, they would find many volunteers eager to share their Muslim faith and invite them to embrace Islam. Likewise, if one were to enter

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a church, it could be assumed that they would be open to learning more about the churches Christian faith and be offered a chance to embrace Christianity.2 Converting to another religion in Oman is not illegal but it may still carry social ramifications and change parental rights (Al Sadi and Basit 2013). It would be hard to overstate the late Sultan Qaboos’s commitment to tolerance and peace in Oman, the Gulf region, and the world in general. His principles of religious tolerance and the avoidance of conflict and violence have become the backbone of Oman and key principles in both domestic and foreign affairs (Al Mamari 2016; Jones and Ridout 2013). As Oman celebrates the 50th anniversary of his coming to power in 1970 this year, carrying on the heritage of tolerance and peace appears to also be a priority for the new sultan, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq (Castelier 2020). This peace and security that Oman, under the leadership of Sultan Qaboos, and now Sultan Haitham, is the location for much of Al Amana Centre’s work in building trust and peace between people of different cultures and religions. But before continuing on to the work of Al Amana Centre today, we first return to the history of the Reformed Church in America and the Arabian Mission to explore the heritage that they have left in Oman and the Gulf.

3 The Arabian Mission and the Reformed Church’s Heritage of Commitment, Growth, and Change What redeemed the Arabian Mission was that, in most of its members, it had given up the crusader’s mind with which the mission had begun. It had found the liberation of the crucified mind, the mind of Christ. It was the mind of the mission.—Lewis R. Scudder III (1998: 357)

The primary founders of the Arabian Mission were Samuel Zwemer and James Cantine (Harrison 2008; Scudder III 1998). Both were inspired by their seminary professor John G. Lansing of New Brunswick Theological Seminary. Many of the early founders of the Arabian Mission, as products of their time, were heavily influenced by the Western orientalism and often spoke of their work in militaristic terms and with a view of Western culture and Western Christianity as superior to Islam and Arab culture (Al-hajri 2011; Harrison 2008: 28–29; Hubers 2004; Scudder III 1998: 142). Samuel Zwemer, who had a softening of his attitude toward Islam, as a religion, over his lifetime (Hubers 2004), in the end still saw much of Islam as a problem (Zwemer 1941). Zwemer, and his compatriots, felt it was their God given mission to bring the Gospel to Arabia and to go where few other Christian missionaries in modern times had gone. It was this sense of call that drove them to establish mission posts throughout the Arabian/Persian Gulf (Scudder III 1998; Thompson 2019: 95ff). Even though there was a change in most of the missionaries attitudes toward Islam, 2

The author of the article has witnessed both conversions to Islam and invitations to embrace Islam at events held at the Grand Mosque and in the visitor center. The author is also aware of non-Christians embracing the Christian tradition at the churches in Oman.

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the hope of a native church was still a dream of many of them carried that never died (Skinner 2019: 67f). However, most of the missionaries came to believe the being faithful to their call was enough and were not discouraged by the lack of conversions (Scudder III, 1998: 353). The seeds of this change were sown early in the mission. One of the more prominent missionaries of the Arabian Mission was Dr. John Van Ess. Dr. Van Ess was a talented linguist and would go on to author textbooks on the Arabic language (Harrison 2008: 33; Van Ess 1974). Dr. Van Ess at a mission conference in Cairo in 1906 said, Finally, our aim is to make converts and to that end we stretch all our energies and spend our money. But is that really our aim? Suppose now that we have the convert, does our endeavor stop there? Suppose the whole world converted, is that our goal? Our duty, rather our whole work, only begins there…..Our aim then is not converts, not churches, not schools, but harmony—harmony with God (Van Ess 1974: 31f).

Dr. Van Ess’s wife, Dorothy, remembers a lesson from her mother, “As you grow older you may keep your own convictions, but you must learn to be tolerant to other points of view and accept the fact that times change.” (Van Ess 1974: 26). Even though the founders of the mission had set out with a “crusader’s mind,” as Scudder (1998: 357) calls it, there were seeds that would sprout to grow into the “crucified mind” in most of the later missionaries. This change took time, but would lead to the Muslims and Christians who interacted with each other to gain new perspectives, respect, and affection for each other. There were three main ways that the missionaries would engage the people of Arabia: 1. Evangelism, 2. Schools and Education, and 3. Medical Work (Scudder III, 1998). Each of these engagements had their own trials that effected the missionaries involved in different ways and each has left a legacy with both the missionaries and the people encountered in Arabia. The first engagements of evangelism were mainly through preaching, bookstores with Christian literature, and what the missionaries called tours. There were both medical tours where doctors would travel throughout the country offering medical care, and there were evangelistic tours where preachers would preach and engage in theological debates. These often happened at the same time, but were also often at odds with each other (Harrison 2008: 68). At times, the pastor’s and evangelists were not bold enough in “proclaiming the gospel” while medical personnel were worried that the evangelist’s urge to preach would close off avenues of making in roads through the medical work (Harrison 2008: 68). Over time, however, the missionaries came to discover that debates, while fun for the missionaries, did not work in converting people from Islam to Christianity (Van Ess 1974: 49) They also had a change of heart from more aggressive views of Islam to seeing value in Islamic beliefs and practices, and could even see Muslims and Christians as sharing the same God (Scudder III 1998: 352). The missionaries also moved away from trying to change Islamic institutions and civilization, to more simply living out their faith in the hope that God will lead them to acceptance of the Christian message (Scudder III 1998: 355; Van Ess 1974: 34).

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Despite a lot of energy, effort, and even lives of missionaries given in the name of the Arabian Mission, there is not significant number of native Christians in the regions that the Arabian Mission was active. Yet, the mission continues after 128 years of continuous activity in the region. It is evident that the missionaries today see a mission that is not directly, or even indirectly, connected to evangelism in the traditional sense of seeking converts. However, there is a sense of evangelism that continues in hoping that others can see evidence of their belief in God and as Van Ess said of seeking “harmony with God” whether one is practicing Christianity or Islam.3 The doctors and their medical work, as well as the teachers and their educational work, were both seen as missionaries, and initially, their work was primarily an avenue for evangelism. Yet at the same time, they were also humanitarian endeavors, and the focus on the humanitarian part, over time, became the primary focus. While evangelism continued, the doctors and teachers strove to ensure that it did not jeopardize the other work. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Arabian peninsula had a great need for medical services and the Arabian mission provided all medical services in the Arabian Gulf for the better part of the first seventy plus years of its existence (Scudder III 1998: 258). In Oman, the hospital would become the largest employer second only to the Omani army (Bosch and Bosch 2000: 17). The doctors would pray with patients before preforming surgery, and Bible passages would be read in the recovery wards. In the schools, Christmas pageants would be performed by the students and Bible stories would be used during instruction. Two stories, recalled by the author, show both the power of the school and the hospital to express positive aspects of Christians and Christianity to the local population. The first story is from Sabah Al Bahlani, a health educator and CEO of the Association of Early Intervention for Children with Disability in Oman. Sabah related to me how as a child she attended the Al Amana School. She knew that the teachers were linked to the hospital. When her friend fell ill, she asked her teacher, Mrs. Eloise Bosch, if they could help. Mrs. Bosch helped her friend get care. It was at that moment she knew she wanted to help other people and later dedicated her life to public health education (Al Bahlani 2013). The second is from a long-time friend of Al Amana Centre, who says that as a child he would walk past the Al Amana School and hear the singing and wondered what it was all about. He also would scour the trash for discarded books in English to take home and read. He is now a devout Muslim, in the author’s opinion, and committed to interfaith dialogue. This commitment began by simply walking past the Christian school and enjoying the Christian singing. Beyond the doctors and the teachers, there were also pastors sent to Oman to offer spiritual care not only the Christians in Oman, but also serve the Omani people in any way they could. One such story is of Jay and Midge Kapinga, who returned to Oman, after Sultan Qaboos came to power, to work for Oman’s Ministry of National Heritage promoting Omani handicrafts in rural areas (Scudder III 1998: 326). There are also stories that are still told in the circle of missionaries how Rev. Kapinga also 3

The author works at the Al Amana Centre which is a legacy organization of the Arabian Mission, and this is his personal belief and he believes it to be shared by his colleagues.

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introduced Omanis to a concrete mold to produce “breeze” blocks that would allow for privacy as well allowing for air to circulate in the house. These blocks can still be found on old houses in Mutrah and Old Muscat to this day. While these are positive stories, there are negative stories as well. One in particular was a complaint from an Omani man, to the author, that the Bible was read to people who could not leave their beds and had no choice but to listen.4 Likewise, the missionaries did not always feel a warm welcome from Omanis and the government. There are stories of struggle in the early years of gaining the trust of the Omani government and fears that the hospital might be a platform for evangelism, which it was initially. Soon, however, the doctors gained the trust of the government through their care of the people (Thompson 2019: 105ff). The early missionaries were also a vehicle for Oman’s internal politics to play out in the early years of the mission. The imam who controlled the interior of Oman accused Sultan Faisal, who ruled Muscat and much of the coastal territories, of showing Christians favors and used this as a tactic to support his rationale in not supporting the Sultan (Thompson 2019: 107). While there are other stories of both positive impact and negative impressions, the predominant memory of the American Hospital and school in Oman is positive and favorable, even though questions of motives and proselytization have never completely vanished. When Sultan Qaboos bin Said came into power July 23, 1970, he soon wrote the mission hospital, less than one month later, where he stated that: In recognition of the humane and invaluable assistance, which by the selfless endeavor of your Mission has been available to our people in such generous measure over the years, we wish to inform you of our gratitude in the past, and open support in the future….. We feel sure that you will always bear in mind that being a Moslem country we do not accept the public evangelism of other faiths and, despite our stated intention of encouraging you in the vital and humane work that you are carrying out in the field of health we must make it clear to your Mission that public evangelism is forbidden. We see a close co-operation between you mission and our official medical service believing that there is much to be learnt by us from your many years of past experience (Bosch 2000: 126f).

Today, it is the experience of the author that, in general, the history of the mission and the current staff of Al Amana Centre are held in high regards. This is especially the case after the mission of Al Amana Centre is explained. However, there are still more than a few Omanis that greet the work of Al Amana Centre with some suspicion, even if it is quickly dispelled. Today, the Al Amana Centre and the Protestant Church in Oman, both legacies of the Arabian Mission established by the Reformed Church in America in the late 1800s, enjoy a close working relationship with the Omani government through the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. The story of the heritage of the Reformed Church in America is one of the faithful services to the people of Oman, perseverance, and holding fast to the faith that brought them to Oman while embracing an openness to encountering people of other faiths and working together for the greater good of all humanity. Even as this section began with a quote from Lew Scudder expressing how the mind of the mission moved from 4

This was told to the author by an Omani national visiting Al Amana Centre.

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a “crusader’s mind” to a “crucified mind” we will move into the work of Al Amana Centre with the work of Rev. Jay Kapinga, a long serving missionary and pastor in Oman: I think we need to consider the possibility that our mission may be to help Muslims become better Muslims, more true to the high ideals of their religion and ours.—Rev. Jay Kapinga— Arabian Gulf Mission Conference, Forest Park Hotel, Cyprus, Summer 19775

This in large part is the work of Al Amana Centre, to help people of different faith to hold to the high ideals of their faith, working for understanding while building trust and peace in our world.

4 Al Amana Centre and the Hope of Building Trust and Peace We do not walk ahead of people so much as alongside them, speaking with them, hearing their stories, comforting them, challenging them when necessary. Many of us need this kind of accompaniment on our journeys to reconciliation (Schreiter 1998: 42).

The most remembered legacy of the Arabian Mission in Oman is the hospitals. The work of Al Amana Centre, if it were to be oversimplified into one term, could be hospitality. While the hospitals sought to heal the body, Al Amana Centre seeks to heal the wounds caused by conflict created between people of different faiths and cultures. Both Christianity and Islam place a religious, moral, and ethical significance, if not imperative, in offering hospitality not just to neighbor and friend, but to the stranger and the “other” (Pohl 1999: 4; Siddiqui 2015: 30). As a Christian led organization, offering hospitality to others then becomes one of the many ways that it can express their values and beliefs in a way that will resonate with not only Muslims and Christians, but hopefully with people of faith, no matter their tradition. In offering hospitality in and with Oman, Al Amana Centre helps Muslims and Christians be true to the high ideals of their faiths. This ability to offer hospitality in the context of Oman, where tolerance, and even acceptance and mutual respect of other religions is a value, becomes one of Al Amana Centre’s greatest strengths. The virtue of being in the Omani context and being built upon the legacy of over 128 years of Christians offering hospitality in Oman through their hospitals, schools, and pastoral work gives Al Amana an ability that few other organizations enjoy. The rest of this paper will be unpacking how Al Amana Centre’s ability to offer this unique setting of hospitality allows it to accompany people on a journey toward reconciliation through the building of trust and understanding. Al Amana Centre has a variety of established programs ranging from Scriptural Reasoning to facilitating an undergraduate Semester Abroad (“Our Programs—Al Amana Centre” n.d.). While both Scriptural Reasoning and the Semester Abroad 5

This quote was confirmed by Margaret Shurdom, Jay Kapinga’s daughter.

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have element of hospitality embedded in them, the programs that include creating “safe space” and “intercultural immersion” best exemplify how the hospitality offered by Al Amana Centre in the Omani context can facilitate peacebuilding and reconciliation. Most of the “safe space” and “intercultural immersion” programs are short-term programs lasting between 5 and 14 days. These programs vary, but have included, predominantly, Muslim and Christians from around the world.6 These programs generally include time for “play” through taking cooking classes, travel throughout Oman, hiking, boat rides, swimming, and dining on a traditional Omani meal on a farm. There is also time for “mutual sharing” by visiting places of worship of different religious traditions, scriptural reasoning, lectures, and meetings with Omani scholars and government officials.7 Lastly, there is time for dialogue and practicing as participants practice dialogue and plan for initiatives once they return to their home context. The effectiveness of these programs is enhanced by Al Amana Centre’s ability to create a safe space for engagement. A safe place is a place where, among other things, people can speak for themselves and convey their feelings and needs, be free from fear of political or communal retaliation, can admit their mistakes, and apologize and be forgiven (Odendaal 1997; Spies 1997). Al Amana Centre, in Oman, can help facilitate these in a unique way. As a Christian organization in a Muslim majority country, both Muslim and Christian participants can sense that there are people around them who are co-religionist creating an inherent sense of community. There is also a sense of safety and respect evident when it is a Muslim country granting visas to a Christian organization to bring participants in to have dialogue and engage with each other. One Nigerian participant of a program once commented to the author how impressed he was that a Muslim country could be so well run and hospitable to a Christian organization. This led him to trust that this was a place that he, as a Muslim, could engage with his countrymen and have hope for a future in Nigeria where this tolerance and hospitality could be possible someday. Likewise, Sunni and Shia Muslims from Pakistan commented to the author on the way both Sunni/Ibadi call to prayer times were honored, as well as Shia prayer times. They loved how they heard calls to prayer spaced apart according to each sect’s tradition. They were impressed that both were allowed and that all mosques in Oman were open to all Muslims independent of their particular Islamic tradition. Beyond the ability to offer hospitality in unique way, the change over time in the attitudes of the Christian missionaries in Oman also gives us an example to build upon on how to understand reconciliation between people of different faith traditions. This transformation becomes a key to Al Amana Centre’s work as well. Reconciliation is a complex term and defining it can be problematic. Each context requires a clean definition and framework to discuss reconciliation. For the purpose 6

A small number of programs have also included Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Buddhists. Oman has sites of religious worship for Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhist, and Sikhs and allows provisions for other groups to worship in other designated spaces. Worship of any kind is allowed in homes as long as it does not disturb the public peace.

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of this article, reconciliation is defined as an ongoing process that has many stages or movements. In this context, it will be the process of people in conflict, not but not necessarily violent conflict, working to create together a community or society that can live together peacefully and work for the benefit of all people who call the community home. To further help clarify what reconciliation is we turn to (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:247) who identify four meanings or four dimensions of reconciliation. These are not so much separate meanings but stages along the way to reconciliation. They are: 1. Accepting the status quo—or accepting that even if violence has ended, it is not yet an ideal outcome. 2. Correlating accounts—or comparing accounts to see that while different they are not incompatible. 3. Bridging opposites—or bridging diversity as understanding that we can learn from each other and be open to new opportunities. 4. Reconstituting relations—or forming new ways of being together that allow for a better future for all. From a Christian perspective, Robert Schreiter, a Catholic theologian and peacebuilder, encapsulates this beautifully when he writes: …reconciliation makes of both victim and wrongdoer a new creation (2 Cor. 5:17). That is to say, the healing that takes place in reconciliation is not a return to the status quo ante, but something that takes all the parties involved to a new place, often a place that they could not have imagined (Schreiter 2005)

It is a goal of Al Amana Centre to accompany people on this journey, even as the missionaries of the Arabian Mission in Oman made this journey over the life of the mission to move from, as we have previously stated, from the crusader’s mindset to the crucified mindset, that is to a mindset where new ways of being with God and each other are possible. More concretely, the accompaniment journey through these stages of reconciliation by guests of Al Amana Centre can be seen in this way and in parallel to the movements made by the missionaries of the Arabian Mission. In each section, it will be highlighted how the missionaries and the history of the mission show the particular stage or movement of reconciliation and then an example of how Al Amana Centre either accompanies program participants on the journey of reconciliation or how reconciliation was discovered through a program. 1. Accepting the Status Quo. When the first missionaries came to Oman, they had come hoping to convert people from Islam to Christianity. However, they quickly came to understand that Islam would be the status quo in Oman and there was very little they would be able to do to change that reality. By coming to Oman and engaging in a program with Al Amana Centre in Oman, program participants agree that they will leave active violence and conflict behind as open hostile conflict in not allowed in Oman. They do not have to be

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happy about the status of a conflict in their home country, and they can come hoping to find pathways to change but the conflict at home needs to remain the conflict at home. There likely needs to be a realization that the programs of Al Amana Centre are unlikely to have an immediate large-scale effect on the status of a conflict in their home community. 2. Correlating Accounts. The early missionaries came to the Gulf region and Oman with a preconceived notion of Islam and the problems that they thought it inherently had both politically and theologically (Hubers 2004: 118; Zwemer 1941: 36ff) However, over time, many of the missionaries found that Islam and Christianity had many things in common, and even revered many of the same things and people, even if for different reasons. They found a change in not only themselves, but also in the Arabs and Muslims they encountered (Hubers 2004: 119; Zwemer 1941: 203). One of the ways this is achieved at Al Amana Centre is through the practice of Scriptural Reasoning (Ford and Pecknold 2006; “Scriptural Reasoning— Home” n.d.). This is a practice of sharing sacred texts through shared reading and commentary. For many of the participants of Al Amana Centre programs, this is the first time for people to hear and read the sacred texts of other religions. It is often the experience of Al Amana Centre staff to hear a participant proclaim, “We have a similar story in the Bible/Quran!” Through this sharing of texts, people discover that there is much in common that the religions hold, even if there remain significant differences. Also, through this practice and other opportunities for open sharing, participants realize that many of the moral and ethical obligations of each religion are similar. 3. Bridging Contexts. One of the key examples of the effect that Islam had on many of the missionaries was the deep appreciation many of them had for Abu Hamaid Muhammad alGhazzali (Scudder III, 1998: 351). They came to appreciate his mysticism, his awareness of humanity, and the struggle for faithfulness to God. Scudder notes that this led the missionaries to realize that they shared not only intellectual connections with Muslims, but also connections between their hearts and the hearts of Muslims. He also notes that many missionaries were touched and moved by their Muslims neighbor’s faith (ibid). This led the missionaries to be able to imagine new ways of doing mission and into new ways of interacting with their communities in Oman and the Gulf. One of the ways that Al Amana journeys with people is to help them realize a holy envy that they may have with another’s religion. This holy envy is not an abandonment of one’s own faith, but an ability to appreciate or deeply respect an aspect of another religion (Taylor 2019). In many ways, obtaining holy envy is one of the highest achievements of a person’s ability to empathize with another (Marks and Dollahite 2018). Al Amama Centre staff has often seen this holy envy in Christians who come to Oman and appreciate the dedication it takes to pray five times a day and come to see the call to prayer as extremely beautiful. Al Amana Centre has seen this in Muslims who have holy envy in the closeness Christians

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feel to the person of Jesus Christ. Both Muslim and Christian participants have come to express how encounters with the other have deepened their own faith and have brought new attention to aspects that were neglected or forgotten. 4. Reconstituting Relations. In most of the Arabian Mission, during the 1960s and 1970s after the discovery of oil, the hospitals as schools were sold to the local government or closed.8 This was also the case in Oman, where the hospital was sold at a very low price and the school was eventually closed.9 However, Dr. Donald Bosch remained in Oman and became employed by the Ministry of Health to help build new hospitals and train Omani staff (Scudder III 1998: 307).10 In reflecting on this change, Dr. Bosch reflected on this change: And of course a lot of people were opposed to it. They felt that we were surrendering our opportunity to witness (evangelize). I personally believe that it did exactly the opposite. It opened the door so that we did have the freedom to talk to everybody, and we were no longer salt grains in a salt shaker but rather shaken out into society…..For me that was the most significant point because it represented a real departure from traditional methods (ibid.).

This is a prime example of forming a new way of being together that benefitted all. Dr. Bosch and other Christian doctors in Oman were able to be very public Christians helping Muslims form an entire healthcare system while living out their Christian faith. An Omani government official once commented to the author with deep respect how Dr. Bosch adapted when circumstanced changed. This official encouraged the author to do the same. The mission had come full circle, from have deep critiques on Islam and Arab society, to partnering with it to provide health care for an entire nation. Omani Muslims and American Christian Missionaries had come full circle to not only celebrate differences but use those differences for the benefit of the whole community. At Al Amana Centre, this circle is often seen, but it is not usually as prominent as the image of the hospitals in Oman. And while Al Amana Centre has not been able to direct the journey of the guests to a particular state of reconciliation, the staff has witnessed moments where it is discovered. One instance was when the author was leading a session of Scriptural Reasoning with a group of Muslims and Christians from Nigeria. The passage was from Surah 49: 9–13 9. If two groups of the believers fight, you [believers] should try to reconcile them; if one of them is [clearly] oppressing the other, fight the oppressors until they submit to God’s command, then make a just and even-handed reconciliation between the two of them: God loves those who are even-handed. I0 The believers are brothers, so make peace between your two brothers and be mindful of God, so that you may be given mercy. Believers, no one 8

The expection to this is Bahrain where the American Mission Hospital remains an independent hospital and an independent school that are led by Reformed Church in America Global Mission personnel. 9 The legend is that the hospital was sold for 1 Omani Rial or about $2.60 USD. 10 Noted earlier Jay and Marjory Kapinga were recalled and hired by the Ministry of Heritage to work on promoting rural handicrafts.

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group of men should jeer at another, who may after all be better than them; no one group of women should jeer at another, who may after all be better than them; do not speak ill of one another; do not use offensive nicknames for one another.11

During the discussion of the passages, the author asked the group “If a Muslim saw another Muslim oppressing a Christian, who would they be obligated to stand with? The Muslim oppressor or the oppressed Christian?” A leading Imam from the group replied, “With the Christian!” After he said it, one of the Christians spoke up and said, “I never thought I’d hear a Muslim say that!” This led to further discussions on how they as Muslims and Christians could work together to combat oppression of each other in Nigeria. The time together at Al Amana Centre and in the program had led this group to a place where they could now imagine new ways of being together for the benefit of all. Al Amana Centre Staff did not lead them to this place, but instead through accompanying them on a journey, in the unique context of Oman and the programs of Al Amana Centre, we all discovered something of reconciliation between people of different faiths in a difficult context in their home community. These are just glimpses of some of the ways that the convergence of the history of the Arabian Mission and the context of Oman have created the mission and work of Al Amana Centre. Many more stories could be told.

5 Conclusion This article has traced some of the elements of the Omani context, both historical and current, that have fostered an environment of religious tolerance, mutual respect, and pluralism. It has also outlined some of the history and important movements in thoughts and attitudes of Christian missionaries from the Arabian Mission in the Gulf in general, and Oman in particular. These two histories have combined in a special way to shape the work of Al Amana Centre in Oman where they can create a safe space for people of different faiths and cultures to come and journey toward opportunities for reconciliation. While Al Amana Centre is not the only organization working toward reconciliation in the region, it is unique in that it is a Christian organization based on, and collaborating with, its Muslim majority hosts. Al Aman Centre seeks to be faithful to both its Omani context and the heritage passed down to it from the missionaries who dedicated their lives to the work of healing, educating, and pastoring the people of the Gulf region. It is with this legacy in mind that Al Amana Centre will continue to create a heritage of Christians and Muslims working together for reconciliation and peace.

11

Translated by Abdel Hareem and can be found at http://www.scripturalreasoning.org/uploads/8/ 0/7/8/80786736/peacemaking.pdf last accessed October 15, 2020.

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References Al Bahlani S (2013) The chosen: Sabah al Bahlani and Safiya al Bahlani at TEDxMuscat 2013— YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHkTiPEbUh8. Accessed 1 Oct 2020 Al Mamari MS (2016) Sulh: reason, justice, and morality a new vision for a New World. Kosovo Al Sadi FH, Basit TN (2013) Religious tolerance in Oman: addressing religious prejudice through educational intervention. Br Edu Res J 39(3):447–472. https://doi.org/10.1080/01411926.2011. 652071 Al-hajri H (2011) Through evangelizing eyes: American missionaries to Oman. In: Proceedings of the seminar for Arabian studies (vol 41). Archaeopress, London Al-Ismaili (2018) Ethnic, linguistic, and religious pluralism in Oman: the link with political stability. AlMuntaqa 1(3):58. https://doi.org/10.31430/almuntaqa.1.3.0058 Al-Rabaani AH (2018) Views of Omani post-basic education students about religious and cultural tolerance. Camb J Educ 48(1):87–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305764X.2016.1252314 B.C. (2018) The Economist explains—who are the Ibadis? https://www.economist.com/the-eco nomist-explains/2018/12/18/who-are-the-ibadis. Accessed 16 Sep 2020 Bosch D (2000) The American Mission hospitals in Oman. Mazoon, Muscat Bosch D, Bosch E (2000) The doctor and the teacher. Apex Publishing, Muscat Castelier S (2020) Oman’s foreign policy after Sultan Qaboos. Al Monitor. https://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2020/03/oman-foreign-policy-gulf-sultan-qaboos-haitham.html. Accessed 24 Sep 2020 Elliott CD (2018) Developing tolerance and conservatism: a study of Ibadi Oman. UCLA J Relig 2 Van Ess DF (1974) Pioneers in the Arab World. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids Ford D, Pecknold CC (eds) (2006) The promise of scriptural reasoning. Blackwell, Oxford Harrison TS (2008) Before oil: memories of an American missionary family in the Persian Gulf, 1910–1939. Rumfordbooks, Rumford Hoffman VJ (2004) The articulation of Ib¯ad¯ı identity in Modern Oman and Zanzibar. Muslim World 94(2):201–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2004.00048.x Hoffman VJ (2012) The essentials of Ibadi Islam. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse Hubers J (2004) Samuel Zwemer and the challenge of Islam: from polemic to a hint of dialogue. Int Bull Mission Res 28(3):117–121. https://doi.org/10.1177/239693930402800306 Jones J, Ridout N (2005) Democratic development in Oman. Middle East J 59(3):376–392 Jones J, Ridout N (2013) Oman, culture, and diplomacy. Paperback. Oxford Publishing Services, Corydon Kéchichian JA (2008) A vision on Oman: state of the sultanate speeched by Qaboos Bin said, 1970–2006. Middle East Policy 15(3):112–133 Marks LD, Dollahite DC (2018) Surmounting the empathy wall: deep respect and holy envy in qualitative scholarship. Marriage Fam Rev 54(7):762–773. https://doi.org/10.1080/01494929. 2018.1469578 Odendaal A (1997) For all its flaws the TRC as a peacebuilding tool. Track Two 6(3/4) Phillips SG, Hunt JS (2017) ‘Without Sultan Qaboos, we would be Yemen’: the renaissance narrative and the political settlement in Oman. J Int Dev 29(5):645–660. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3290 Pohl CD (1999) Making room: recovering hospitality as a Christian tradition. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids Our Programs—Al Amana Centre (n.d.) http://alamanacentre.org/our-programs/#safe-space. Accessed 14 Oct 2020 Ramsbotham O, Woodhouse T, Miall H (2011) Contemporary conflict resolution, 3rd edn. Polity Press, Cambridge Said S. Q. bin (1996) Basic Statute of the State-Ministry of Legal Affairs-Sultanate of Oman. https:// mjla.gov.om/eng/basicstatute.aspx Schreiter RJ (1998) The ministry of reconciliation: spirituality and strategies. Kindle. Orbis Books, New York

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Schreiter R (2005) Reconciliation and healing as a paradigm for mission. Int Rev Mission 94(372):74–83 Scriptural Reasoning—Home (n.d.) http://www.scripturalreasoning.org/. Accessed 15 Oct 2020 Scudder III LR (1998) The Arabian mission’s story: in search of Abraham’s other son. Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids Siddiqui M (2015) Hospitality and Islam: welcoming in god’s name. Kindle. Yale University Press, London Skinner RF (2019) Christians in Oman. Tower Press Spies C (1997) A safe space how local leaders can make room for. Track Two 6(3/4) State, U. S. D. (2018) Oman 2017 international religious freedom report. https://www.state.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Oman-3.pdf State, U. S. D. (2020) Oman 2019 international religious freedom report. https://www.state. gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/OMAN-2019-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOMREPORT.pdf Taylor BB (2019) Holy Envy: finding god in the faith of others. Kindle. Harper Collins Thompson AD (2019) Christianity in Oman: Ibadism, religious freedom, and the church. Palgrave Macmillan, London Tolerance—Understanding—Coexistence Oman’s Message of Islam (n.d.) http://www.islam-inoman.com/en.html. Accessed 17 Sep 2020 Valeri M (2009) Oman: politics and society in the Qaboos State. Columbia University Press, New York Wilkinson JC (1987) The imamate tradition of Oman. Cambridge University Press, New York Zwemer SM (1941) The cross above the crescent. Zondervan, Grand Rapids

Rev. Justin Meyers is the Executive Director of the Al Amana Centre in Muscat, Sultanate of Oman. Rev. Meyers has a M.Div from Western Theological Seminary and a M.A. in Peacebuilding and Reconciliation from University of Winchester. He is currently a Ph.D. student at University of Winchester studying Muslim and Christian theologies of reconciliation and their impact on peacebuilding. Rev. Meyers is an ordained minister in the Reformed Church in America and lives in Muscat with his family.

Social Structure, Economic Exclusion, and Fragility? Pertinent Theories and Empirics from Africa Mesfin Mulugeta Woldegiorgis

Abstract The current paper is keen to elucidating the nexus of social structure, economic exclusion, and wealth inequality as the instigating causes of political instability in the milieu of Africa. The paper uses eclectic notions including economic, sociological, and governance ideas. The panel dataset for the years 1990–2018 is amassed for 34 African countries, principally from the World Development Indicators, African Development Bank, and Fund for Peace databases. The country-specific fixed effects regression has been run using STATA software. The statistical finding suggests that hierarchical social structures cause economic exclusion and trigger conflict. Conversely, adapting an inclusive development approach is bearable remedy for the national social, economic, and political fragility of the countries. The foremost merit of the paper is that it encompasses the notion of structural and economic exclusion in the theories of peace and development. Keywords Social inclusion · Social interaction models · Conflicts · Social justice · Social economics JEL A13 · B55 · C31 · D74 · Q34

1 Introduction 1.1 Stage of Development, Economic Inequality and Political Conflicts The theory of peace explicates the relationship between peace and development (Barnett 2008; Galtung 1981; 1990; Hettne 1983; Sorensen 1985). Nevertheless, it has been claimed that peace has not received enough contemplation in economic development studies in the post-cold period. For instance, Barnett (2008, p. 76) states M. Mulugeta Woldegiorgis (B) Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_23

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that “since the end of the cold war, the concept of ‘peace’ has been notably absent in the development literature.” The account is indeed contentious. Whatever the case may be, this does not imply that the world has reached a state of peace, nor does it imply that the cold war “has ended” for good. Meanwhile, neither the theories nor the empirics show an unsophisticated linkage between the level of development and peace (Galtung 1981, 1990; Hettne 1983; Sorensen 1985). For instance, according to Sambanis (2004), compared to developing countries, developed ones are more victim of terrorism and vulnerable to nuclear war threats. Furthermore, the vast majority of the current terrorists are of middle-class reformers (Busher 2011). Conversely, Collier (2003) claims that the risk of political violence is four times greater in developing countries than in OECD countries. For example, despite the fact that civil wars are more common in less developed tribal states. As Sambanis (2004) points out, Duffield (2006) also underscores that there is no sustainable peace without sustainable development. Even intuitively, one can claim that not all underdeveloped countries are politically unstable, nor are all developed countries peaceful. This shows that there is no simplistic relation between the level of development and political instability. Thus, the tie-up between underdevelopment and political violence needs further scrutiny. The other intricacy is that contemporary conflicts encompass not only a complex set of local factions and inter-elite grievances but also foreign interest groups. Besides, political violence may appear in different forms, and the same is true for economic prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In the transmission mechanism between economic exclusion and political violence, there are intermingled drivers. For instance, some empirical evidences suggest that in the early stages of development, income inequality and authoritarianism are common as witnessed by the newly developed countries (Johnson 1982; Öni¸s 1991; Deyo 1987; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). The fascinating story is that in the newly developed South-East and North-East Asian countries, the power of the authoritarian states declined as the development matures because the more middle class increased, the more political freedom and inclusive governance were demanded. In 1980s, Japan faced civil society-led particularly student union-led political movements towards democratization (Öni¸s 1991). Although significant economic prosperity was achieved in Japan before 1980s, income inequality was high that triggered a political movement in the 1980s (ibid.). Likewise, for instance, inequality has been leading to a series of attacks in South Africa since 2008 (Kerr 2019). Although the country is democratic and it has a per capita income above the African average, because of the hightened inequality, unemployment and relative poverty, violence has been errupting since then (Woldegiorgis 2022). This leads to the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 1: Economic exclusion is a vigorous driver of political conflicts. Hence, addressing the exclusion through minimizing poverty and inequality is a sustainable resolution for conflicts.

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1.2 Social Structures, Economic Inequality, and Exclusion The foremost merit of liberal democracy and neoclassical economic theories is that they encourage competition among economic actors so that efficiency and propensity to innovate can be ensured, which ultimately causes economic growth. However, the main bottleneck in mainstream thought is that not all the rival economic actors are operating in equal structural and institutional settings. Yet, the heterodox economics hardly considers the social structures that significantly enable or disable economic development. Instead, it is assumed citrus paribus (Woldegiorgis 2020a). In practice, there are structural and institutional hurdles that stand in the way of fair competition (Woldegiorgis 2022). For instance, in ancient civilizations, social classes and their economic consequences were well documented. In ancient Egypt, slaves, peasants, craftsmen, merchants, scribes, soldiers, government officials, and pharaoh were arranged, respectively, from the broad bottom to the narrow top of a social (structure) pyramid, which ultimately constrains fair and free competition and the entitlement to, inter alia, resource ownership, freedom of education, and involvement in politics and religion (Okon 2012). Similarly, in ancient Greece’s social structure pyramid, slaves and immigrants, women and children, the jury, men from the country (assembly), the council, and gods and goddesses were arranged from the bottom to the narrow tip of the pyramid, respectively. The Athenians also had a social structure of slaves, freed slaves, middle-class free men who were born outside of Athens, and upperclass people who owned slaves. The slaves were responsible for taking care of the property of the upper class. Thus, the upper class has the time freedom to deal with government, war, education, philosophy, etc. The slaves, workers, and/or servants were from the lower class. The middle class comprises artisans, merchants, bureaucrats, officers, and commoners. Kings, priests, and nobles were from the upper class (Manstead 2018). Likewise, in the ancient Roman social structure pyramid, slaves, freemen, plebeians, and patricians were placed from broad bottom to narrow tip, respectively. Although slaves were responsible for many laborious jobs, such as mines, factories, farming, and road construction, they had a few rights and their role was undervalued. However, as the position on the pyramid gets higher, the social class is respected and entitlement to more wealth is guaranteed. Just like in the food chain, those at the top exploit those at the bottom. Those at the bottom were barred from reaping the economic benefits of their labour. Nowadays, concealed social structure causes exclusion at least through employability, land ownership, citizenship, and social mobility (Fang and Saks 2021; Rivera and Tilcsik (2016), as cited in Kish-Gephart (2022). The main takeaway from the above elucidation is that ancient societies had clear social hierarchies that determined resource and wealth ownership, freedom of movement, and freedom of opportunity such as education and civil and political rights. Even after democratization, this social class dichotomy has not been fully redressed. Do the social structures in modern days leave societies at the bottom of the hierarchy to be left behind and excluded from economic opportunity? Yes, indeed. Do women

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enjoy equal pay as men do? Do people of different races and nationalities have the same social class in different societies? Do immigrants and emigrants enjoy the same privileges as local people? The simple answer is “no” for almost ubiquitously. Moreover, one can also recognize how historical and current social structures can affect the productivity, efficiency, innovation, participation in decision-making, etc., that the subject matter of the mainstream economics often nosedive in the matter. The historical social hierarchy has also an effect on the social mobility of the next generation within or between social strata in a society (ibid.). In a Marxist perspective, the privileges of different social classes vary in different systems of governance, including slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism (Kish-Gephart 2022). Although people in the lower social class show strong empathy towards one another, there were historical revolutions in which different social classes clashed with the extractive regimes. To mention some, slavery abolitionist movements, land for the tiller activism (anti-feudalism), feminist movements, Bolshevik and Menshevik were radical and violent to change the political status quo. This leads to the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: Social structures cause inequity and injustice against the meaningful participating in economic decision-making and benefiting from opportunities in a society. In that case, though not always, the excluded group has the propensity to oppose the incumbent extractive governance system. This means that inequity in social structures may trigger violence. In that case, inclusive development approach is a multidimensional and multidisciplinary human-centred pro-poor notion, to comprehend the variables in a wholistic multidisciplinary framework (Draper et al 2019; Woldegiorgis 2022). As the exclusions arise from multidimensional causes, inclusion also needs the usage of eclectic approaches, including sociology and political economy (Sen 1981, 1999). Therefore, the current article is dedicated to showing how social structure, economic exclusion, and conflicts intermingle. It also offers a policy recommendation based on statistical analyses. This enables to ameliorate the precarious status quo of those people who are left behind for structural and institutional reasons and the overall fragility of states. Therefore, this paper aims to synthesize the intersection of peace and development theories and bring about empirical evidence. It particularly shows the transmission mechanism of social structures and economic exclusion into political instability and empirically proves that economic exclusion and inequality have been triggering political violence in Africa. The research questions are as follows: Is there a direct fundamental association between economic exclusion and conflict? Is variance in the social structure a driver of conflict?

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2 Literature 2.1 Theories 2.1.1

Exclusion and the Democratic Peace Theory

In his essay entitled “perpetual peace”, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant is credited as the originator of the democratic peace theory (Doyle 1983; Bharadwaj 2002). The theory claims that compared to other forms of governance, democratic countries are less likely to enter into war because of the fact that inhibiting people are more included in the politics. The idea is that in democratic societies, the political system and constitutional republics require the support of their citizens at least to enter into war. Therefore, the people are empowered to keep their political leaders accountable through their legislative procedure of consent. However, the theory is critiqued because the reverse does not always hold true. This means that not all peaceful countries are necessarily more democratic. In fact, the theory was justified by the notion that rich countries are less likely to enter into war because they do not want to lose their wealth because of conflicts or fullfledged wars. Therefore, if politics is inclusive enough and the economy is equitable, people have less propensity to enter into war. However, there are still critics claiming that the theory lacks empirical evidence on the causality of democracy, peace, and prosperity (Polard 1981; Owen 1994; Gat 2006; Cederman et al. 2014).

2.1.2

Exclusion and the Political–Economic Theories of Violence

The political theory of civil wars claims that there are two causes of civil wars: correlational and negotiation failures (Anyanwu 2002; Florea 2017). The correlational approach claims that there are socio-economic triggering factors that are often termed as correlates of civil war. According to the notion, ethnic segregation, economic exclusion manifested as poverty, unemployment, wealth inequality, and inflation, etc., may cause conflict and civil war. In the negotiation failure approach, political violence is caused by institutional and structural problems. Furthermore, a lack of legitimacy, as well as ineffective diplomatic or negotiation failures, may lead to violence (Florea 2017). Cederman et al. (2014) also claim that political exclusion triggers conflicts.

2.1.3

Structural Exclusion and Theory of Social Constructivism

According to the theory, conflicts and political violence are caused by inappropriate social positions and relations (Skelly 2002). However, it has been underestimated that excluding social relations manifested in terms of social classes, cultural differences, language, racial profiles, geographical affiliations, religious affiliations, etc., may

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trigger conflicts. According to the theory, embracing diversity is the key to socially inclusive and peaceful economic development (United Nations 2016; WEF 2017; UNDP 2018). The opposite is the cause of political violence (ibid.). Cederman et al. (2014, p. 57) also see “internal conflict as a function of political horizontal inequality, as manifested through the exclusion of ethnic groups from central executive state power.” They also underscore how nationalist politics leads to the expansion of horizontal inequality and its consequences for internal conflict. Economic exclusion in the form of inequality and poverty affects everyone, but culturally distinct groups are likely to be affected more than the dominant group (Alesina et al. 1999; Jackson 2013; Miguel and Gugerty 2005) as cited in Dzutsati (2021).

2.1.4

Economic Exclusion and the Marxist Theory of War and Peace

According to Marx, political violence in the form of radical revolution is caused by the rejection of the greedy exploitation system. According to him, there is no endless exploitation of the poor. When the poor, particularly labourers, are “alienated” from fair remuneration for their basic living conditions, it is unavoidable that the exploited groups reorganize and collectively pursue a radical revolution which aims at eventually ending the exploitation system and ensuring socio-economic and political inclusion. According to the theory, if one agent keeps on taking unfair advantage of another agent, then conflict of interest inevitably bears social unrest (Kára 1968).

2.1.5

Economic Exclusion and the Entitlement Theory

Entitlement theory is based on John Locke’s original ideas.1 Under the theory, people are characterized as ends and equals per se. Kant states, people are naturally entitled to own themselves and nature. Thus, for a peaceful and socially cohesive society, there is a need for justice in holdings (Nozick 1994, p.150). According to Nozick, “a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution” (Nozick 1974, p. 151). The other version of the entitlement theory is explained by Amartya Sen. Sen claims that every person is naturally entitled at least to basic necessities, fair treatment, and dignity. According to the theory, any form of exclusion and famine is linked to an inability to exchange one’s natural privilege in a society. Once people are unable to make their living, the society is prone to social evils, including violence and other moral hazards (Sen 1981, 1999).

1

John Locke claims that the earth (land) is the property of people in common. However, each people own their body, and when they apply it as labour to nature, then they are entitled property and wealth. He takes a simple example: “when I pick an apple, I own the apple, but when everybody wants to pick the apple, there is a need of rule of the game.”, i.e. institution. Rules of the game do not only cause wealth, but also distribution (Locke 1988; Woldegiorgis 2020a, p. 110; Brubaker 2012).

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Exclusion and the Theory of Justice (Justice as Fairness)

In his theory of justice, John Rawls explains two principles of justice: equity and efficiency. In his first principle, Rawls states that people are entitled to the greatest basic liberties through equally open opportunities. In his second principle of justice, he underscores that all people are empowered to efficiency through a system of natural liberty and liberal equality. The second principle emphasizes the difference principle, which is claimed to be handled through democratic equality (Rawls 1973). According to the principles, inequality should only be accepted if it is “reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage” (Rawls 1999, 53).

2.2 Empirics In the 1980s, there was a zeal about the nexus of peace and development theories (Galtung 1990; Hettne 1983; Sorensen 1985). The main enthusiasm of the theories was to explore the type of development that would facilitate the existence of peaceful economic, social, and political structures (Barnett 2008). Since then, the empirical evidence has shown that the ever-growing economic inequality among individuals has left some groups excluded from the economic benefit, not only in developing but also in developed countries (Stiglitz 2012). This is a concerning situation for a sustainable, cohesive, and peaceful local and global society. Especially when the exclusion is exacerbated by hierarchical social structures and extractive institutions, the risk of political violence may increase and jeopardize social cohesion and international relations (ibid.). Anyanwu (2002) asserts, using the logit model, that level of development, natural resource availability, population size, democracy, and social fractionalisation are significant drivers of civil wars in Africa. Anyanwu also underscores that in the presence of weak institutions or extractive institutions, it is difficult to rectify a property right. Thus, the presence of “lootable” natural resources may be a haven for “loot-seeking” rebels. Obviously, they will clash with “justice-seeking” people. In the meantime, conflicts can break out. However, if there were more inclusive democratic institutions, people would have control over their governments. However, democracy empowers only the majority but not all citizens to make sure looting politicians are accountable (Anyanwu 2002; Collier 2000; Humphreys 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Sambanis (2004, 14) also states that long-lasting inequality begets anger and anguish, which ultimately increase the propensity for radical reforms against incumbent regimes. Similarly, Stewart (2002) underscores that underprivileged groups are likely to seek reparation. Croissant’s (2005) finding is that poverty is a robust root cause of violence, particularly when it is exacerbated by primordial divisions and the social structures are biased. Croissant also underlines that unemployment is also the main reason behind the ample rebel supply. On the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) claim that conflicts are triggered by greed. According to Collier’s greed, war

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is fundamentally an economic phenomenon. Collier (2003) personally claims that the risk of a violent conflict eruption is four times greater in an impoverished country than in an OECD country.

2.3 Conceptual Framework The paper is devoted to showing the nexus of a country’s political fragility situation in relation to social structure, exclusion, and inequality. The following figure is a simple hand summary of the eclectic theories discussed above. The model (see Fig. 1) shows how hierarchical social structures cause extractive institutions, wealth and income inequality, absolute and relative poverty, and ultimately political fragility. The variables have multiple channels of interaction; however, for ease of understanding, the proto-type version is presented. The feedback also shows how the conflict viciously bears further hierarchies, extractive institutions, inequality, poverty, and conflict. However, an important disclaimer is that, in rare circumstances, revolutions or social disobediences may end up with inclusive institutions (Rawls 1973). For example, Tunisia became more democratic after “Arab Spring” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). According to the sociological model of social structure, societies have formal or informal social structures or hierarchies that affect not only social relations but also institutions. For instance, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), before the industrial revolution, few aristocrats who were on the tip of the social hierarchies in Barbados, the capital of the West Indies, had been controlling the economic system, politics, and justice system. In the arrangement, the slaves, who were the majority in society, had no room to get social, economic, or political entitlements. This gave rise to Marxist ideals and radical movements (“positive conflicts”), which ultimately collapsed the extractive systems.

Hierarchical Social Structure

Extractive Institution

Wealth & Income Inequality

Absolute & Relative Poverty

Fragility

Fig. 1 Conceptual model of vicious social hierarchy, economic exclusion, and fragility. Source Compiled by the author based on the corresponding literature reviewed

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Fig. 2 National Gini coefficient in 2018. Source World map of GINI coefficients from World Bank

In the model, hierarchical social structures (classes) are symbolically represented by a pyramid. An extractive institution is represented by an unbalanced scale. Wealth and income inequality are represented by a see-saw. Absolute and relative poverty are epitomized by a half-filled cup. Finally, the conflict is characterized to an axe, which viciously cuts the arrangement as a feedback to exclusion.

3 Definitions, Data Source, and Method of Analysis Just like in welfare economics and social economics, the theories in this paper are mostly in line with normative development approaches.2 After an extensive review of literature and presenting an analytical framework, the paper offers empirical evidence to justify that social structures and inequality are drivers of exclusion and fragility.

3.1 Definition of Variables The Fragile States Index, or simply the fragility index, is a composite index showing the political instability of states. It has been published by the Fund for Peace. The notion was developed a quarter-century ago to evaluate the vulnerability of states to collapse. Twelve conflict risk indicators are grouped into four sub-indices, namely (i) 2

Social economics uses normative human values or value judgments as an applied economic policy instrument. It is intended to change the prevailing “undesirable reality and achieve a desirable end”. “Social justice is a set of normative values which define and specify morally right social structures, relationships, and institutions to improve the wellbeing of people at the bottom of the social pyramid” (Rider 2005).

Suda n SDN

Rwa nda RWA

SWZ, 54.6

Si erra Leone SLE

Sa o Tome a nd Pri nci pe STP

LBR

KEN

South Suda n SSD

Li beria

Central African Republic CAF

Kenya

Botswa na BWA

20

SWZ

Es wa tini

LSO

Les otho

Cote d'Ivoire CIV

Seyche l l es SYC

Moroc co MAR

Camer oon CMR

TCD

Cha d

MDG

Ma da gascar

Congo, Dem. Rep. COD

30

TGO

Togo

MLI

Ma l i

Congo, Rep. COG

TUN

Tuni sia

Moza mb i que MOZ

Comoro s COM

40

Ta nzani a TZA

Ma urita ni a MRT

Cabo Verde CPV

Ugand a UGA

Ma uri tius MUS

Djibo uti DJI

South Afri ca ZAF

MWI

Ma l a wi

DZA

Algeria

50

ZMB

Za mbia

NAM

Na mi bia

Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY

ZWE, 50.3

ZMB, 57.1

Zi mba bwe ZWE

NER

Ni ger

Ethiop ia ETH

Fig. 3 Income Gini index (World Bank estimate). Source Compiled by the author based on the metadata from the World Development Indicators

SEN

Senegal

Ga mbia, The GMB

Gui neaBi s sau GNB

Gui n ea GIN

Ghan a GHA

BEN

Burkina Faso BFA

Buru ndi BDI

Ango la AGO

Benin

10

0

BDI, 38.637.8 BEN,

COG, 48.9 CMR, 46.6COM, 45.3

MOZ, 54

ZAF, 63

LSO, 44.9 MWI, 44.7 RWA, 43.7 SSD, 44.1 GHA, 43.5 MDG, 42.6 TGO, 42.4UGA, 42.7 42.4 COD, 42.1CPV, DJI, 41.6 KEN, 40.8MAR, 39.5 STP, 40.7 TZA, 40.5 SEN, 38.1 GAB, 38 TCD, 37.5 CIV, 37.2 MUS, 36.8NER, 37.3 GMB, 35.9 SLE, 35.7 LBR, 35.3 MLI, 36.1 NGA, 35.1 ETH, 35 GNB, 34.8 SDN, 34.2 MRT, 32.6 SYC, 32.1 TUN, 32.8 EGY, 31.5 GIN, 29.6 DZA, 27.6

BFA, 47.3

AGO, 51.3

CAF, 56.2 BWA, 53.3

NAM, 59.1

Income Gini index (World Bank estimate)

Ni ge ri a NGA

Gab on GAB

60

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cohesion fragility (security apparatus, factionalized elites, and group grievance); (ii) economic fragility (economic decline, uneven economic development, and human flight plus brain drain); (iii) political fragility (state legitimacy, public services, and human rights plus rule of law); and social fragility (demographic pressures, refugees plus internally displaced persons (IDP), and external intervention).3 On the other hand, the Inclusive Development Index (IDI) was introduced by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2017. Dörfel and Schumann (2022) also used the WEF IDI and expanded it to include more countries longitudinally. Moreover, using the same procedure offered by the WEF, Woldegiorgis (2020a) calculated a multidimensional inclusive development index by incorporating more indicators and sub-indices pertinent to Africa (Woldegiorgis 2020a).

3.2 Data Source and Methods of Analysis The empirical analysis is based on secondary sources of data. The panel dataset for the years 1990–2018 has been mainly amassed for 34 African countries from the World Development Indicators and the Fund for Peace databases. Using statistical tests, individual specific fixed effects regression is found to be a suitable. The sample size represents 62% of the African countries, and the sample countries and time period are chosen based on the availability of the CPIA index. Theoretically, the paper is linked to social interaction models. Social interactions models are typically estimated with data on many small groups with their own data typically consist of the outcome and treatment of each individual. Accordingly, following the econometric regression, a sensitivity analysis is presented to check the robustness of the regression.

4 Discussion of Empirical Analysis 4.1 Economic Income Inequality as a Cause of Fragility in Africa The African countries do not have the same poverty and inequality profiles (Fig. 2). The figure shows that Southern Africa is the most economically unequal region in the world. Compared to Eastern Africa, Western Africa is economically more unequal. However, both the Western and Southern African countries are among the most resource endowed regions. Yet, in the Western Africa, both inequality and poverty are more penetrating. However, the absolute poverty situation in Southern Africa is not as bottomless as the income inequality (Fig. 3). 3

Further information about the composite index is available at: https://fragilestatesindex.org/indica tors/ (Accessed 29 December 2021).

M. Mulugeta Woldegiorgis

80 40

60

Fragility index

100

120

372

20

40

60 inclusion index

Fragility

80

100

Linear prediction

Fig. 4 Fragility inclusion nexus. Source Calculated by the author

4.2 Fragility and Inclusion Nexus The following empirical analysis shows the nexus of inclusive development and fragility due to the fact that an inclusive development approach can serve as a policy instrument to redress the fragility of the selected countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Stiglitz 2012; Woldegiorgis 2020a, b; Dörfel and Schumann 2022; Woldegiorgis 2022; United Nations 2016; WEF 2017; UNDP 2018). In Fig. 4, the country fragility index is put on the y-axis, and the inclusive development index is on the x-axis. The scatter plot shows that the fragility of a country is inversely related to its inclusive development index. This means that multidimensional inclusive development is a long-run remedy to improve the fragility of a country. Yet, as the inclusiveness index has remained minimal, the inverse relationship is not that discernible.

4.3 Fragility Social Structure (Gender) Nexus Societies are often stratified into structurally related groups or sets of roles, with different functions and entitlements in society. However, the division of labour and social classes are not always based on ethical standards, nor are they based on efficiency. For instance, in ancient civilizations, women and men did not have the same entitlements. Even now, the gap has not yet been redressed. In this paper, the gender parity index is used as a proxy for the difference in social class (structure) in the

373

40

60

Fragility index 80

100

120

Social Structure, Economic Exclusion, and Fragility …

70

80 Fragility

90 Genderparity

100

110

Linear prediction

Fig. 5 Fragility gender parity nexus. Source Calculated by the author

selected African countries. The gender parity index (GPI), or simply gender parity, or gender index, is a socio-economic catalogue usually used to measure the relative access to education of females and males, and it has been published by UNESCO. The basic index is calculated as the ratio of the number of females to the number of males enrolled in a given stage of education (in the current paper, secondary school). Figure 5 shows that in the selected countries, the gender parity index is inversely correlated with the fragility index. It means that the inclusion of girls in education improves the fragility of countries, given other things constant. This might be due to, inter alia, the positive role of educated women in family planning, democratization, and overall development, which may ultimately improve the fragility of social cohesion (Fig. 6).

4.4 Country Fragility–Unemployment Nexus Unemployment is one of the most pressing issues in the economic exclusion (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Woldegiorgis 2020a). From the above scatterplot, the impressive upshot is that unemployment rate up to 15% has not been causing much fragility to African countries. However, remarkably the scatter plot shows that unemployment rate above 15% has been associated with increasing fragility. Fragility index is the summation of economic, social, political, and cohesion delicateness.4 The countries show not only high fragility index on average (≈91) but also high 4

For further details, see https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/e2/ (Retrieved 23 December 2021).

M. Mulugeta Woldegiorgis

40

60

80

100

120

374

0

10

20

30

Unemp Fragility

Linear prediction

Fig. 6 Fragility unemployment nexus. Source Calculated by the author

standard deviation (≈11.5) in their severity of fragility. Zimbabwe in 2009 accounts the maximum score, but Mauritania was the most political stable country among the selected countries in the year 2014. The statistical figure of Ghana shows the highest inclusion index in the year 2014 among the selected countries. This might be caused by, among others, the relatively stable democracy and attractive social protection programmes. Zimbabwe shows the highest economic inequality in the year 2008 and 2009 (Table 1). Table 2 presents the experimental models. Column (1) presents the baseline regression result in which technology and freedom are statistically significant and improve the fragility of the selected countries. Conversely, climate change significantly exacerbates fragility. The latest three regression models designated under columns (2), (3), and (4) are generated to see the effect of the test variables on fragility. In model (2), technology, freedom score, and inclusion stand against fragility, but climate change aggravates fragility. In model (3), the fragility situation is improved by the level of development, macroeconomic policy and institutional quality, and democracy (freedom). On the contrary, inflation, unemployment, climate change, fertility rate, and income inequality all contribute significantly to a country’s vulnerability. In model 4, the level of development, technology, policy and institutional quality, and inclusive social structure (gender parity) significantly enhance the fragility of the countries. Inflation and climate change, on the other hand, exacerbate the fragility. To this end, the latest three regressions clearly show that inclusive development in general and inclusive social structure in particular significantly improve the fragility of the countries. On the other hand, inequality exacerbates the fragility of countries.

376 443

United Nationsa

Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)

Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)

Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

Freedom Score (political rights and civil liberties)

Labour force participation WDI rate (% of population) WDI

Consumer prices (annual percentage)

CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)

Fertility rate per woman

Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP

Inflation

Technology

Unemployment

CPIA

Freedom

Labour force participation

Climate change

Fertility

Foreign direct investment WDI

Freedom House

World Bank and AfDB

WDI

WDI

WDI

WDI

Natural log of per capita income (LnPCI)

Level of development

Observation

443

443

342

399

442

434

431

443

437

Source Fund for Peace

Proxy

Country fragility index

Variable

Fragility

Table 1 Summary of descriptive statistics Mean

4.612135

5.111084

0.1293063

68.56205

58.10819

57.30588

5.962964

54.04956

7.14575

6.717879

91.31831

Std. Dev

6.536562

0.8312344

0.0945457

11.53131

15.74606

9.62137

5.232906

30.89535

7.375571

0.5846962

11.52471

Min

Max

49.99791

−4.84583

(continued)

7.592

0.5780923

89.05

89

81.52873

29.69

3.141

0.0266114

42.29

24

28.33333

0.32

139.529

63.29251

−8.97474 2.671155

8.097637

114

5.120245

44.5

Social Structure, Economic Exclusion, and Fragility … 375

WDI

Gini index

Gender parity index in secondary school

Income inequality

Social structure 93.94852

41.89545

66b 360

34.37258

Mean

443

Observation

WDI represents the World Development Indicators, and AfDB represents the African Development Bank a United Nations World Population Prospect 2019 b The number of observation of Gini index for the selected countries is minimum because of dearth of data

WDI

Woldegiorgis (2020a)

Inclusive development index

Source

Proxy

Variable

IDI

Table 1 (continued)

8.884041

6.356884

14.78654

Std. Dev

68.042

30.8

11.50866

Min

112.125

57.1

91.22741

Max

376 M. Mulugeta Woldegiorgis

Social Structure, Economic Exclusion, and Fragility …

377

Table 2 Fixed effects regression result Dependent variable: fragility index

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Level of development

−0.498345 (1.821321)

−0.3050034 (2.050939)

−8.58317a (10.71375)

−0.3596222a (1.94395)

Inflation

0.0711461 (0.0458688)

0.0709524 (0.0459621)

0.0905768b (0.2503873)

0.0767354a (0.0468395)

Technology

−0.0424946b (0.0197524)

−0.0438974b (0.0209225)

−0.1186046b (0.067283)

−0.0279507b (0.0210625)

Unemployment

0.0880894 (0.2477246)

0.0869423 (0.2482389)

0.4972041a (0.7242022)

0.0094124 (0.2616333)

CPIA

−0.1272144 (0.085149)

−0.1297869 (0.0862097)

−0.0519244a (0.285069)

−0.0510819b (0.0931515)

Freedom

−0.1390902b (0.0591104)

−0.1390307b (0.059219)

−0.1648771b (0.2209343)

−0.1579082b (0.0671991)

Labour force participation

−0.0031957 (0.2059341)

−0.0009315 (0.2072762)

−0.5087538 (0.5679222)

−0.1298749 (0.2360997)

Climate change

31.56622c (10.40815)

30.97326c (10.81547)

6.350783a (37.9446)

27.64763b (10.72473)

Fertility

1.463073 (1.807329)

1.438 (1.814696)

8.83738a (7.766953)

0.036295 (1.924003)

Foreign direct investment

−0.0043759 (0.0469828)

−0.0052594 (0.0472627)

0.3800894 (0.3759083)

0.05165 (0.0537464)

−0.0150061c (0.0726857)

IDI

0.2118089b (0.2113811)

Income inequality

−0.2733493b (0.1218489)

Social structure Constant

94.8137c (25.07553)

94.33123c (825.22976)

146.254a (128.9215)

47.58b (31.27976)

Within R-Squ

0.1447%

0.1449

0.7130

0.7210

F>0

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.000

a, b, c

indicate 10, 5, 1% significance levels, respectively. Robust standard error in Parenthesis

Together, the regression model offers a notable empirical evidence for the hypotheses in the current study.

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M. Mulugeta Woldegiorgis

4.5 Post-estimation Sensitivity Analysis The modified Wald test is used to check for the presence of group-wise heteroskedasticity in the regression models. It shows that there is negligible heteroskedasticity. Thus, the parentheses under the coefficients (see the regression table) show only standard errors. Is a country-specific fixed effects or random effects estimation or even ordinary least square (OLS) regression an appropriate model? As the Breusch–Pagan test result gives a statistically significant result, the OLS estimator should not be used. Thus, the Hausman test (HT) is used to choose between a fixed effects estimator and a random effects estimator. The HT is statistically significant for the null hypothesis, i.e. “difference in coefficients not systematic.” Therefore, the fixed effects estimation is appropriate as it gives a consistent estimator. Accordingly, the fixed effects model is found to be the suitable regression model. Is there multicollinearity? The correlation matrix shows that there is no high correlation among the variables. Therefore, the model is not suspicious of multicollinearity.

5 Conclusions and Policy Implications Currently, conflicts, civil war and full-fledged warfare are undergoing in various parts of the world. As a result, numerous nations are vulnerable to political tensions. Although economically more developed countries are not exceptions, most of the selected African countries are experiencing a new wave of internal conflicts, especially since 2010. As a result, millions of people have been displaced, among other social evils. Ethnicity and nationalism are claimed to be among the most conflicttriggering factors in the region. This is because they are linked to resource and political power control interests. However, it is not easy to access data on ethnic segregations. That is why only the gender index is used in the analysis to capture the differential in social class and its consequences. Givin its shortcomings, the current paper exclusively brings together social positions and inequality as causes of economic exclusion and fragility. As a case study, the paper uses path dependence analysis and fetches evidences from ancient civilizations. For example, in ancient Egypt, slaves, peasants, craftsmen, merchants, scribes, soldiers, government officials, and monarchs had hierarchies of exclusion. As a result, control and benefit from national wealth were skewed. As the main contribution of this paper, the discourse about social structures may help understand the associated extractive social institutions in modern-day societies. Such extractive institutions and exploitive social structures have a profound impact on the development and peacefulness of societies which is in line with Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Moreover, rising inequality has also been a critical cause of civil disobedience and radical protests. However, the available literature shows a divided perspective on social inclusion and income inequality. In this aspect, the main contribution of

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this paper is that it offers empirical evidence for major drivers of the fragility of countries. It also gives a mental framework to comprehend the main drivers behind the delicacy of the African political landscape and beyond. The paper is timely, when the exclusion of certain segments of society from the benefit causes insecurity both within and outside the selected countries. The statistically significant policy variables suggest that level of development, technological advancement, quality of macroeconomic policy, democratization, inclusive social structures, particularly for women, and inclusive development approach in general are intervention areas to address the fragility of the countries. On the other hand, inflation, unemployment, climate change, higher fertility rates, and income inequality have exacerbated the fragility of the selected countries. Accordingly, the statistical analysis suggests that African policymakers should address the delicate political economy by targeting the policy variables. Finally, it is worthwhile to close discourse with the Immanuel Kant’s famous quote, which says “poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere” and Kofi Annan’s statement “extreme poverty anywhere is a threat to human security everywhere”.

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Security Sector Reform as a Process of Reconciliation, What Went Wrong in Palestine? Nizam F. Salahat

Abstract Security sector reform (SSR) is commonly perceived as a process of reconciliation in transitional and post-conflict situations. This process is envisioned around national consensus, political inclusiveness, and community peace. However, in the Palestinian situation, the reform of the security sector was implemented in response to certain political imperatives, rather than to the needs of the Palestinian populations for an effective and accountable security sector. Unlike in other situations where SSR is usually implemented in a post-conflict context, reform in the Palestinian Territories was undertaken within the rather specific condition of working under Israeli occupation, and it was overshadowed by the severe political division between Palestinians themselves. Moreover, the US-led international reform did not conform with SSR donor standards, which assumably place much value on national ownership, inclusiveness, and neutrality standards. In this respect, the international reform as laid out in the Middle East Roadmap has primarily focused on the technical and operational support for the PA security and on building capacity in the counterterrorism domain. Bearing in mind all these factors and rather special conditions, the author argues that the Palestinian SSR has promoted authoritarianism, has significantly contributed to internal division, and has thus negatively impacted democratization and good governance.

Acronyms SSR PA PLO PLC ICHR

Security sector reform Palestinian Authority Palestinian Liberation Organization Palestinian Legislative Council Palestinian-Independent Commission for Human Rights

N. F. Salahat (B) Al-Istiqlal University, Jericho, Palestine e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_24

383

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SAACB USSC

N. F. Salahat

State Audit for Administrative Control Bureau United States Security Coordinator

1 Introduction Since its inception in mid-1990s, as a part of democratization, state building, and good governance, security sector reform gained additional importance in post-conflict and transitional situations; reforming of security apparatus including rehabilitation of security personnel, insuring civilian democratic control, parliamentary oversight on security forces, and human right respect has become a priority in post-conflict communities, since such procedures conform with democratization and sustainable development (Sedra 2010). What is interesting in security sector reform is that the process is performed on the principles of national consensus, political dialogue, and reconciliation (Gordon 2014). The Palestinian security sector established as an outcome of Oslo agreement between PLO and Israel has suffered lack concrete organizational structure, overlapping, weak chain of command, and lack of legislative framework that organizes their mission and responsibilities (Tartir 2015). Moreover, Palestinian security under late president Yasser Arafat was extremely involved in the political system and subject to factional competencies within the internal game of power (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). To this end, International parties and internal Palestinian revisionist were in favor of performing deep reforms in the security sector upon professional bases, so as to insure a civilian command and oversight framework of the Palestinian security (Bouris 2012). Basically, SSR process was envisioned in the roadmap for peace issued by the Quartet in 2003 and took place by 2005 under the auspices of US and other western countries (Tartir 2015). However, despite the national well and consensus on performing security reforms, the process has resulted as a failure in many aspects and deepened internal division. Moreover, instead of promoting democracy and good governance, security reforms have promoted authoritarian rule inside PA. This article explores the Palestinian SSR process and investigates reasons behind the failure of the process in insuring good governance and civilian oversight.

2 SSR and Reconciliation If reconciliation has to do with consensus, forgiveness, peace, non-violence, tolerance, justice, and equality (Bloomfield and others 2003), then SSR is found in the center of all these values.

Security Sector Reform as a Process of Reconciliation …

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Since its inception by mid-1990s, security sector reform (SSR) gained growing importance as an effective tool for enhancing civilian democratic governance and promoting human rights and justice in post-conflict and transitional situations (Sedra 2010). Despite that SSR has been characterized as a post-cold war tool to maintain western “peace building” efforts in former USSR domains in Europe and Balkan, the process proved to act as a strong social and political mechanism to promote consensus and unity in divided societies all over the world (Sedra 2010). Ideally, SSR evolved to maintain security professionalism and to ensure effectiveness and accountability of security institutions controlled by civilians and operating according to human rights and the rule of law (Gordon 2014). Transformation of security sector upon these bases stipulates wide range of reforms including both structural/operational and institutional aspects. On the structural level, best practices consider in the first rate, the subjection of security apparatus into a civilian governmental body that would practice surveillance and oversight over this apparatus. Structural reforms also involve organizational re-structuring on the level of security providers including mission, responsibilities, leadership, and chain of command for armed forces. Such reforms are usually accompanied by programs for downsizing of armed forces and amicable based actions for disarmament, demobilizations, and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants (DCAF 2015). SSR proved to be a reconciliation-based approach from different perspectives: First of all, SSR is designated and implemented within an inclusive vision about the society and its security institutions. Security sector in itself is defined by including all the state and non-state actors that influence security and justice such as security apparatus, civil administrative and oversight bodies, parliamentarians, and civil society organizations to name a few (OECD DAC 2007). This wide array of actors reflects the inclusiveness of SSR as a process meant to achieve good governance by maintaining the role of civil democratic control on arm forces. Secondly, SSR ideally relies on a shared vision of security that the whole society may adapt and support. On this respect, security policy is regarded as an outcome of public consensus rather than a reflection of mere defense objectives usually defined by military and security staff. On the contrary, security policy, in its best practice, incorporates all security sector actors and society as a whole that may reflect their agreed security vision in a form of a white paper (Gordon 2014). Third, SSR is a vital instrument for peace building specially in post-conflict situations. The main focus of SSR is to maintain rule of law and transitional justice (Gordon 2014; Donais 2009). In this respect, efforts are concentrated on an agreed and a reconciled transition from armed conflict situation into peace, including disarmaments, demobilization, and re-integration of ex-combatants. (Qehaja 2009). Fourth, SSR is a part of democratization, since it establishes for good governance and parliamentary oversight on armed forces. Last, but not least, issues like justice, rule of law, and gender mainstreaming are found as central to SSR (Gordon 2014).

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3 The Context of Reforming Palestinian Security 3.1 Description Very broadly, security sector reform in Palestinian Territories refers to all international and local efforts, taken to rehabilitate Palestinian security apparatus, including training, and capacity building (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). As well, it refers to the efforts taken to put legislations, take decisions, and perform policies relating to the good practices concerning Palestinian security sector including Police and security organizations, PA governance and oversight bodies, and PA justice institutions. In this sense, SSR in Palestine encompasses a wide spectrum of people, institutions, and security providers, as well as unofficial military groups that some of them were dissolved voluntarily and re-integrated in the security forces (Sayigh 2011). In the strict meaning however, the term is used to refer to international aid provided to the Palestinian security organizations including arming, equipping, providing logistic support, training, and consultations (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). There is no definite starting time for SSR in the Palestinian Territories; some related security aid had been provided to the PA since the establishment of Palestinian security since 1994, as part of security reforms; the prevailing literature however considers Palestinian SSR as more recent and is considerably connected with the peace roadmap adopted by the Middle East Quartet in 2003 (Tartir 2015). The account of this dominant view is that the roadmap was the first ever official document adopted by the PA and approved by international community to perform intrinsic reforms in the Palestinian security institutions. In this domain, reforms would include legislative reforms that were to first ever layout the structural foundations of these institutions including their civil–political administration (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). Moreover, the plan was followed by US conveying of the US Security Coordinator (USSC) in 2005 to assist the PA in re-building their security forces. A mission that developed later to an integral consulting team with the participation of other partners like UK and Canada, in addition to the formulation of the EU delegation to assist Palestinian Police, named (EUPOLL COPS) one year later (Sayigh 2011). In addition, different international non-governmental endeavors were undertaken; most salient was the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and other NGOs that were engaged in several SSR and rule of law programs, including human rights, security sector governance, and gender mainstreaming (Sayigh 2011).

3.2 International Framework Roadmap for peace actually was not designated merely to reform and rehabilitate Palestinian security; the plan was first envisioned by former US President George W. Bush, who formulate his vision toward Middle East based on the two-state vision:

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Israel and Palestine who live peacefully. Then, the plan was adopted by the Quartet composed of US, Russia, EU, and UN (Otterman 2005). Roadmap can be summarized as follows: end the violence; halt settlement activity; reform Palestinian institutions; accept Israel’s right to exist; establish a viable, sovereign Palestinian state; and reach a final settlement on all issues by 2005 (The Road Map Draft 2003). In this sense, the plan itself was an outcome of the interaction of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the international political arena, as well, it can be considered as an outcome of the new US approach in the aftermath of September 11th terrorist attacks and their consequence on the US policy toward Middle East, specially after American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Barari 2009; Arnan 2020). For example, one view of the roadmap held that the George W. Bush administration wanted to stabilize the situation in the Palestinian Territories and to create a political framework for the Israeli–Arab conflict as a part of compact terrorism strategy adopted by his administration (Barari 2009). In this sense, reforms of the PA political system and their security sector were envisioned to meet international political imperatives; actually, this is one of the assumptions that is suggested by this study as of a negative impact as it will be shown later (Friedrich and Luethold 2007).

4 PA Establishment and the Founding of Security Sector 4.1 PA Establishment Oslo Agreement, signed between PLO and Israel, in White House lawn in September 1993, is considered as watershed in the Israeli Palestinian conflict: From one hand, the agreement reflected a major shift in the Palestinian position toward acceptance of Israel as a legitimate state, from another, it established a framework for ending of Israeli occupation to the Palestinian Territories through negotiations. Gaza–Jericho protocol agreement of 1994 was a starting point to fulfill Oslo agreement, and subsequently to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, when allowed initially for Palestinian to handover Jericho and Gaza Strip, after an Israeli— first ever—withdrawal from both areas. Around one year later, PLO and Israeli government signed another agreement in Egypt (known as Oslo II). The later agreement was to replace Gaza–Jericho agreement, and to set rules for Palestinian interim self-rule in the occupied areas. In general terms, Oslo I and Oslo II agreements ( Known together as Oslo Accords) were interim agreements, stipulated interim Palestinian self-rule in the promise of reaching a final, and negotiated settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242. The agreements proposed five years to negotiate final status issues, including the status of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements in occupied territories, Palestinian refugees, border, and water (Oslo Accords 1994).

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The features of the interim self-rule stipulated by Oslo II agreement can be summarized as follows: First, establishment of an elected council, an executive and judicial bodies to undertake self-rule necessities including civilian and security affairs; these bodies together would consist of the Palestinian Authority (Oslo Accords 1994). Second, three zone areas were to be created in West Bank; Areas A, B, and C—each with different security and administrative arrangements: In area A, which encompasses 17.2% of the West Bank and contains the main urban populated area, PA would enjoy full civilian and security authority. In area B, which includes 23.8% of West Bank and consists of 227 non-contiguous enclaves, PA would undertake civilian responsibilities under Israeli security control (B’Tselem 2019). In area C, however, which holds 63% of West Bank, a full Israeli military and civil control would be maintained. This area now is home to 150,000 Palestinians and about 400,000 Jewish settlers, including also main roads, military bases, and the bordering passages of Jordan Valley. Three, and in accordance with mentioned zone area regulations, PA would establish and operate their civilian and security control, including establishing and deployment of Palestinian police and security forces. In this regard, the agreement stated that around 30,000 policemen would be recruited and deployed in West Bank and Gaza Strip (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). As provided by the agreement, police and security would undertake internal security which includes: maintaining internal security and public order; protecting the public and all other persons present in the areas, as well as protecting their property, and acting to provide a feeling of security, safety, and stability; and adopting all measures necessary for preventing crime in accordance with the law. As well, the agreement stated other responsibilities of Palestinian police concerning Israeli security, like: “Preventing acts of harassment and retribution; Combating terrorism and violence, and preventing incitement to violence; …” (Oslo Accords 1994). In the structural domain however, and in order for Palestinian security to undertake responsibilities mentioned above, the agreement was provided for establishment of six police and security agencies, that would subject to a central directory, in between them: Public Security, Preventive Security, Intelligence, and Emergency Services and Rescue. In addition, the agreement allowed the establishment of Coastal Police (Oslo Accords 1994). To this end, Oslo II interim agreement resulted to the establishment of PA as an interim self-rule entity, with limited rule, while Israel restored its overall control over land passages, boarders, air space, and areal sphere, of the Palestinian Territories.

4.2 The PA Security Sector and the Need for Reform While Oslo II provided for the establishment of specific security apparatus under Palestinian Police, Palestinian security sector, however, has developed upon different bases; the sector has witnessed rapid increase during President Arafat reign. By 1997, there were more than 14 known security agencies, i.e., double than proposed by the agreement. Increase in PA security was also on the level of personnel; instead of

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30,000 (12,000 for the West Bank and 18,000 for Gaza) proposed by Oslo II, number exceeded the limit to 50,000 by 1999 (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). Recruitment in PA security was upon non-professional bases; recruitment policy lacked defined criteria, while overshadowed by political and factional considerations. On this respect, loyalty to Fatah, the ruling party on PA was the only obvious criteria, besides communal considerations like blood kinship or family relations within the small community of West Bank and Gaza (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). On the structural domain, security organizations lacked a concrete organizational structure; that from one hand, security bodies under President Arafat lacked a central leadership, and a chain of command as well. Without having a command in chief, or an equivalent position, all security forces were submitted to President Arafat himself, as in his capacity as the Higher Commander of Security Forces (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). From a security sector governance view, Palestinian security sector lacked a legal framework that defines their structure, command, mission, and responsibilities. As well, security organizations lacked proper oversight mechanisms and parliamentary control. So far, President Arafat loosely controlled different organizations, with overlapping or paralleled missions. This allowed further competition between security forces and resulted to human rights violations specially from organizations with intelligence functions (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). This situation raised concerns in both international and national levels, for international community as well as for Israel, reforming Palestinian security sector in accordance with Oslo Agreement. For Israel, Palestinian security sector reform is not more than a mean to ensure her own security (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). For Palestinians, however security reform means creating a full-fledged security apparatus able to protect them from Israeli incursions (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). As well, Palestinians expect an effective security capable of enhancing security and imposing order; such demand has become a necessity after Israel has destroyed much of the Palestinian security infrastructure crippling security and police capacity to uphold order in the PA areas. In accordance, civil society organizations, academies, and political activists started to call for reform. The internal pressure would coincide with external pressure after the issuing of the roadmap for peace by 2003 (Bouris 2012).

5 Roadmap and the Exclusion of Arafat Leadership True that security sector reforms in the Palestinian territories reflect internal demands for democracy and transparency in the PA. Yet, those reforms were driven mainly by external factors and definitely were a response to Israel–US political and security ambitions in Palestinian territories. Escalation followed the failure of Camp David summit in 2000, known by Palestinians as Al-Aqsa uprising, heightened security tension. PA different security organizations were identified by Israel as partners

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with militias affiliated to Hamas and Fatah in what Israel called terrorist actions against Israel. Despite Israeli army harshly practiced “iron fist” against PA security and managed to paralyze their role after destroying most of their infrastructure and logistics, Israel continued to categorize Palestinian security forces under President Arafat as hostile and dangerous to Israel’s security (Arnan 2020). Later developments on the Middle East arena, following Gulf War, had led to formulate a new US approach for Middle East peace, primary based on President George W Bush vision of a two-state solution for Israel and Palestinians. Later, George Bush vision was formulated by the “Quartet” in roadmap calling for ending of escalation, dismantling of military groups, normalizing of Palestinian life, and performing political and security reforms in the PA. These steps were to be taken by Palestinian leadership as pre-requests for launching peace negotiations. It is widely agreed that international calls for reform respond to the very Palestinian needs for re-establishing an accountable democracy, and for professionalizing their security agencies under civilian government. From another hand, call for reform has proven to be of political implications in the framework of Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The Israeli right-wing government headed by Ariel Sharon insisted removal of President Arafat and replacing him by a so called moderate leadership that might denote “terrorism” and acquiesce with Israeli requirements in a final settlement (Arnan 2020). Arafat and his veteran cabinet from another were convinced that USdriven reforms were not about democracy, but more about appointing a pro-western government prone to Israeli pressure. Being besieged et al.-mukata’a (headquarter) by Israeli tanks, suffering international and Arab boycott, and facing internal resistance on reform bases, President Arafat accepted roadmap (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). Later steps taken on behalf of reforming PA system according to roadmap had proven that reform, at least for Israel and US, meant to create a new power-shift. First, it was the insistence to appoint an “empowered prime minister,” who was Mahmoud Abbas, the later elected president for PA. Recognizing the step as potential danger against himself, Arafat struggled to undermine his prime minister authority, specially over security, relying on his capacity as a president and as the Higher Command in Chief same time. Facing different obstacles on maintaining law and order in PA territories, turf disputes with Arafat men in the cabinet. Abbas finally receded. Despite that, inventing of a prime minister position resulted to make shift in the PA system, from presidential into quasi-parliamentary system. This had become reality when PLC amended the Basic Law on these bases in 2003 during the reign of the second appointed prime minister Ahmed Qurie. From a point of view of democratization, the step is considered as a turning point, despite it was envisioned basically upon political bases, namely on behalf of replacing Arafat’s leadership by moderate leadership (The Washington Institute 2021). Second attempt to create shift power inside PA in the name of reform was the re-structuring of security forces under civilian government. Driven by International pressure, and as a response to the mounting Palestinian voices from PLC and civil society groups, against what they described as “floated and

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corrupted” security forces, Arafat agreed on a (100-day) plan to reform the security structure. He endorsed reporting three internal security branches: Police, Preventive Security, and Civil Defence under an empowered minister of interior. (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). Meanwhile, Arafat issued a presidential decree to activate the Palestinian National Council which would be responsible for recommending security policies to the president (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). From an outview of democratization, late Arafat reforms are regarded as a turning point toward an accountable security sector. From another angle however, these reforms are pressured by Israel and US, in order to decline Arafat’s power from one side, and to neutralize Palestinian security that was identified as an enemy (Arnan 2020). Israel expressed this position clearly when in May 2003 Ariel Sharon’s government approved the roadmap with 14 reservations including dismantling PA’s security organizations and reform the structures, side by side with dismantling of Hamas and other military groups (The Washington Institute 2021).

6 President Abbas Reforms: From Inclusion to Exclusion 6.1 Inclusion to Reform The election of President Mahmoud Abbas nourished hopes for reviving the moribund peace process. In accordance, the new president headed for establishing a new era in the Palestinian politics upon moderate basis; the new approach would sever the link with the legacy of former President Arafat. For President Abbas, Palestinians should not rely on military power to reach their goals put only through negotiations (Barari 2009; Arnan 2020). Relying on the two-state vision provided by the roadmap; on international support; and on US auspices, Abbas hoped much for achieving a breakthrough. Whereas, launching of peace negotiations was conditional on de-escalation, Abbas headed at integrating Hamas and Islamic Jihad into the Palestinian political system, at the levels of both the PA and the PLO (Barari 2009). On the Palestinian national level, integration of Islamist opposition within PLO is a historic breakthrough toward Palestinian unity. From a point view of President Abbas however, integration of Hamas and Jihad was sought to contribute to peace process, and to Oslo agreement, since it was the PLO, who signed the agreements, and subsequently established the PA. Palestinian internal debate has led to Cairo agreement of 1995 (Barari 2009). Hamas and Jihad announcement of “Tahdi’a;” a connotation refers to calm down escalation with Israel in reciprocity. This would lead to the second PLC elections, in January 2006, with Hamas and Islamic Jihad first time participation, and consequently, to a Hamas decisive victory on polls (Tartir 2015).

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In parallel with the one-year rally to integrate Islamist movements within PA system (Barari 2009). President Abbas was performing deep reforms at the level of the PA constitutional and legal frameworks, and on the level of security sector: complementing on late Arafat institutional reforms, concerning shift in the PA system toward a parliamentary democracy, the PLC legislated a bundle of laws that were to layout the legal foundations of a civil-controlled security sector, including oversight mechanisms. Most prominent of which were as follows: Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces No. 8 of 2005; Law of Public Retirement No. 7 of 2005; and General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005. Laying out of legislative framework was accompanied by structural reforms including merging some security forces under interior minister; dismantling of other forces like Force 17 and Special Forces; retiring long-standing security commanders; and reactivating the National Security Council (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). At this stage, further security reform was taken on the level of adapting national security policy, such as debates on a white paper for security, and discussing reenvisioning security doctrines upon policing basis (Tartir 2015). This twofold strategy, integration of Palestinian system and reforms, actually, was to compile with the Palestinian obligations stipulated in Phase I of Roadmap; as mentioned earlier, these together were sought by President Abbas, to create conditions conductive for initiating peace negotiations (Barari 2009). From an international perspective, Palestinian reforms were generally regarded upon their political ends, specially in terms of reforms contribution to international conflict management approaches in the Middle East led by U.S administration. Upon these political bases, international support and consultancy programs were formulated and, mainly, were the initiation of The United States Security Coordinator (USSC) and the Civil Police reform program EUPOL COPPS. Despite that both programs were ostensibly envisioned upon principles of democratization and state building, actually they were directed upon technical support, and capacity building, or, as framed by Yezid Sayigh, on “train-and-equip approach” (Sayigh 2011). To this end, SSR contribution to democratization, inclusiveness, and good governance appeared to be limited to their impact on the structural reforms or to their contribution to roadmap stipulations.

6.2 The Reforms of Exclusion While President Abbas adopted an approach of reconciliation to unify and to integrate the Palestinian political system, and while he was conducting reforms upon this background, later developments on the Palestinian arena, definitely, the Hamas won of 2006 PLC elections and Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza Strip, has resulted to a fundamental change on this approach. This section addresses these developments and reveals that security sector reform would be resumed upon exclusion of the new elected government. Moreover, it shows how policies of exclusion were stipulated by

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international donors themselves, before they resume their support to the Palestinians (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). Abbas consensus approach, specially his efforts to integrate Hamas and Islamic Jihad, was met by an Israeli skepticism and indifference, since Israeli decided withdrawal from Gaza and from specific areas from West Bank, in August 2005. Despite the election of President Abbas after Arafat, Israeli right-wing prime minister Ariel Sharon continued to pretend that there is no Palestinian partner to Israel. The plan was designated to secure Israeli demands in final settlement negotiation unilaterally without need to negotiate with Palestinians. In accordance, Israel would withdraw from Gaza Strip, and from a tiny passage in north of West Bank, where Israel has less settlements, and less strategic, historic, or vital advantages. The other plow, President Abbas received against his negotiated peace approach, was the election of Hamas in which he himself convinced to participate in the PLC elections of January 2006 (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). The Hamas’s unexpected victory has created tensed atmosphere on both Israel, international, and internal Palestinian levels. On the Israeli level, the Hamas triumph was categorized as “legitimizing of terrorism;” that was in reference to Hamas’s militaristic activities, marked by suicide operation during Al-Aqsa intifada. On her remark on the event, Tzipi Livni, Israeli foreign minister at the time, noted that “elections are not a washing machine,” urging Hamas to recognize Israel’s existence. International community, represented by the Middle East Quartet, asked Hamas to recognize Israel, to approve Oslo agreements, and to renounce violence. The three conditions were raised by international community, as prerequisite to legitimize Hamas government and to continue international funding for the PA. On the PA leadership level however, President Abbas was anxious about the new development as a threat to the peace process, and the whole Oslo track, and to lose international backing to the PA. Such concerns appeared in President Abbas speech to the new elected council when he reminded them of the PLO recognition to UN resolutions 242, 338, and of the Oslo Accords signed by PLO and Israel. As well, he warned any PA government from rejecting the agreements, considering them as “a political reality” to which, in his words, “we remain committed” (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). Befuddled between its historic stance refusing concession on Palestine from one hand, and between political imperatives from another, Hamas government attempted to make balance by offering long-term hudna (ceasefire), and Hamas offer was rejected by the U.S and the EU, who by April 2006, have boycotted Hamas government and halted financial assistant, except for humanitarian aid, that would continue to flow through international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). In addition, banks around the world halt their banking services including loans to the boycotted governments for fear of running afoul of U.S. antiterrorism laws and being cut off from the U.S. banking system. Noteworthy, that in December 2006, George W. Bush administration had signed law Anti-Terrorism Act, which bars aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian government unless; among other things, it acknowledges Israel’s right to exist and adheres to all previous international agreements and understandings (Pettengill and Ahmed 2011).

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Israel, from her side, participated in the international financial boycott of the PA government by withholding the transfer of tax revenues collected by Israeli customs authorities and national insurance institutions. The results of the boycotts were catastrophic on Hamas government. The government who lost access to any kind of financial assistance eventually was not able even to pay wages for its security and civilian employees. Moreover, fiscal cuts had negatively impacted basic sectors like health and education. On the security and rule of law domain however, situation has become worst; state of insecurity and disorder in Palestinian Territories continued under Hamas government. With weak rule of law, disorder on security forces and police, justice system almost had been paralyzed (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018).

6.3 Exclusion Within Unity International US-led embargo to Hamas government has been accompanied by internal escalation between Hamas and Fatah militants specially in Gaza Strip including sporadic clashes and political assassinations. Reasons for this tension, that later would lead to Hamas’s takeover Gaza Strip by June 2007, were internal albeit was being fueled by regional interventions. Hamas, who was entirely out of PA both, sought to stuff thousands of their followers on both security and civilian services sectors. On local basis, Hamas strategy was twofold: First, it would balance their power inside PA against Fatah dominancy and, second, the step would solve unemployment problem among Hamas advocators, in which part of them were dependent on financial and in-kind aids provided by the movement from time to time. Yet, Hamas attempt to control over PA, including security organizations, was identified by its regional implications, since the movement was strategically backed by Iran as part of “resistance axis” including Assad regime of Syria and Hezbollah (Pettengill and Ahmed 2011). On this regard, the attempt raised US and EU concerns upon the future of PA and the Palestinian security sector in particular. On similar background, President Abbas was reluctant about Hamas takeover security organizations. Accordingly, he sought to restore the structure of security forces under his command. He separated the National Security Forces from the Ministry of the Interior and National Security; then he nominated a Chief-of-Staff under him in his capacity as the Higher Command of Security Forces, beside his capacity as a President (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). Moreover, President Abbas joined internal security branches (Civil Police, Preventive Security, and Civil Defence) under a Fatah loyalist commander (Rashid Abu Shbak), who would undermine the role of Hamas Minister of interior (Said Siam) (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). From its side, Hamas government reacted by establishing a special backup Force named as the “Executive Force;” emerged from the corps of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, the military wing of Hamas. As well, Hamas government relied much on the “Executive Force” and other affiliated paramilitary extensions to impose order in Gaza Strip (Barari 2009).

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In sum, competition over security forces, and reforming policies aimed at depriving Hamas government from commanding security, was behind dissolving the unity government and the split of the Palestinian system between competing rivals Fatah and Hamas (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018).

7 After Schism: SSR of Authoritarianism As soon as the short-term internal war in Gaza was over, it actually resulted to divide Palestinian Territories into two entities, one in West Bank led by Fatah and the other in Gaza dominated by Hamas (Pettengill and Ahmed 2011). This section addresses Palestinian SSR within this context, showing that this western led process, has bitterly deepened internal division, contributed negative to reconciliation, and worst still, it enhanced authoritarian rule in both West Bank and Gaza Strip (Tartir 2015).

7.1 Western Reforms and the PA Authoritarian Shift In terms of democratization of the PA system, President Abbas reign has been regarded as pro-democratic in comparison with Arafat model. However, consequences followed Gaza takeover by Hamas reveal that Abbas rule has been shifting toward authoritarianism. True that President Abbas, as shown earlier, has performed important legislative, security, and political reforms that were to formulate a quasipresidential system with strong parliamentary control. As well, Palestinian legislations have secured civilian control over security forces. Despite that, Palestinian political system has demonstrated an authoritarian shift after the political division of 2007 (Sayigh 2011). In general terms, Palestinian arena aftermath Hamas takeover Gaza was marked by internal hostilities and moribund reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah, which was overshadowed by an Israeli occupation, intensive settlement activities in West Bank, and military escalation against Gaza Strip. The Palestinian government in Ramallah installed by President Abbas, and headed by Salam Fayyad, was to represent the PA, as the legal Palestinian rule provided by Oslo Accords. Upon this basis, Palestinian limited rule in West Bank has enjoyed international support, especially after US and EU ended their boycott and resumed their funds to the PA (Sayigh 2011). Practically, international political and financial support was placed as the backbone, in support for Fayyad’s non-violent approach for Palestinian statehood: building institutions, maintaining rule of law, and adhering to the peace negotiations with Israel. However, Abbas–Fayyad amicable approach, and their model of state building, was being faced by an Israeli neglect; considering absence of Palestinian partner for peace, Israel’s rightist government continued to increase settlement

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activities in West Bank and to enhance the apartheid system there, including segregation of Palestinian communities and land confiscation (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). This situation has fueled Palestinian anger and hostility against Israelis. Despite that, President Abbas continued to reject violence and, instead, he proposed legal and popular struggle against Israeli policies (Sayigh 2011). On the contrary however, Hamas rule in Gaza, which was established upon rejection of Israel and upon promoting military and popular resistance, was faced by strict international boycott, and by Israeli–Egyptian blockade as well (Pettengill and Ahmed 2011). In this framework, Hamas de-facto government has to manage daily life of Gaza citizens, specially basic services like health, education, and security as well, a task that was not easy to consider with blockade, high poverty, and lack of resources (Barari 2009). To cope with their rule challenges, Hamas would rely on political sympathy of few Arab and Middle Eastern regimes like Turkey and Qatar, who sought to increase the political influence of Islamic Brotherhood movement in the Middle East in the framework of Arab Spring (Zilber and Al-Omari 2018). From another, Hamas would rely on the Iranian regime to support maintaining their military capabilities against Israel, including rockets and other low tech weaponry, since the former considers Hamas as part of their proxies against Israel and US in the region along with Syrian regime and Hizbullah. From their side, Israel responded by increasing military campaigns against Gaza Strip, including bombardments, incursions, and invasions, that were to inflict heavy causalities in Gaza (Pettengill and Ahmed 2011). These developments in each West Bank and Gaza realms reflect regional and international impact on Palestinian cause on the expense of a Palestinian national will; both Palestinian rivals continued to exchange accusations of political subordination either to Israel and US, either to Iran or its allies. As well, conflicting Palestinian parties, each sought to maintain their own political and security monopoly over the entity under its rule.

7.2 SSR of Authoritarianism Instead of promoting democracy and political consensus inside the Palestinian political system, it is revealed that western-driven SSR process has provided for authoritarianism and promoted police state in both West Bank controlled by PA and Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas: Dissolving of the PLC, and the disruption of the political system since 2005, when latest elections were performed, have contributed to an authoritarian shift in the Palestinian system. Latest attempt to conduct general elections in West Bank and Gaza, in May 2021 as projected, has failed (Sayigh 2011). In both West Bank and Gaza Strip, performance of the security forces has gained mounted criticism on illegal or politically oriented detains, and for other human rights violations committed by security forces. According to authentic reports, violations

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are repeatedly committed by both Hamas and Fatah regimes. Human rights violations appeared to mount after Palestinian division in 2007. For example, the annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner repeatedly reveals tense human rights violations committed by Palestinian Security forces either in Gaza Strip either in West Bank, such violations include illegal arrest, discrimination-based violence, killing, shooting, and torturing. Other authentic human rights reports revealed political bias arrests, restriction of movement, restrictions on freedom of expression, force suppression of peaceful gatherings, and much other violations against individual and collective freedoms (Sayigh 2011). Recent annual reports of the Palestinian-Independent Committee of Human Rights (ICHR) (stands as a state ombudsman) have also revealed such violations repeatedly (ICHR Annual Reports). Another feature of authoritarian rule in West Bank and Gaza is demonstrated by weakening of the PA-independent oversight bodies such as the Independent Commission for Human Rights (PICHR), the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), and the State Audit Administrative Control Bureau (SACB). These independent institutions that are reported to the Palestinian President have nearly become “cosmetic” role; their role is mostly defined of issuing annual reports, which are considered of little oversight impact. Authoritarian shift has affected Palestinian justice as well; beside internal division, limited rule of the PA, that affects the Palestinian justice system, public perception of the Palestinian justice is that it has become politically oriented, namely the accusations to Constitutional Court of being stacked with loyalist to the Palestinian President. In September 2018, the Palestinian Judges Association announced that 14 (out of 27) justices of the Supreme Court had submitted their resignations in protest against legal amendments proposed by the Judiciary Development Committee “undermining the independence of the judiciary” (European Council on Foreign Relations 2019). In July 2019, President Abbas dissolved the High Judicial Council (HJC), claiming it had failed to halt the deterioration of the judiciary, and replacing it with a Transitional High Judicial Council for one year. From another perspective, security forces in different cases do not take in consideration court decisions to release detainees from their prisons.

8 Conclusions Highlighting the Palestinian Security Sector Process from the outview of SSR best practices, and by tracing its different phases since roughly 2003, it is revealed that the process was not carried out accordingly, specially in accordance with national reconciliation and political inclusiveness. Instead of performing reforms upon national shared vision on national security and on security policy, the process is being carried out upon specific political and security views that has to meet with the roadmap stipulations and, as well, with the donors’ agendas in the Middle Eastern politics.

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Instead of building security sector reform process upon political dialogue and inclusiveness, the process was envisioned upon exclusion due to political considerations either for international actors or for internal political opponents. From one hand, security and political reforms proposed by the roadmap ostensibly aimed at creating shift in the Palestinian political system from a presidential to parliamentary democracy, but actually reforms aimed at weakening the authority of late president Arafat, in a time of his besiege by Israeli army. Same token about reforms after Hamas won the general elections in 2006, when their government was a subject to international boycott, and reporting the internal aid including security aids to the office of President Abbas. SSR is a process that best performed in post-conflict situations. The Palestinian context however cannot be regarded as a post-conflict situation since the PA is operating under Israel’s overall control of the Palestinian territories. Such situation deprives Palestinians from possessing the reform process; the absence of national ownership to security sector reform plans and strategies means that national security vision is not formulated upon a national consensus of the Palestinian people. Finally, reforms of exclusion have deepened Palestinian internal division and worked against political reconciliation. This resulted to dissolve Palestinian legislative council and to promote authoritarianism and police states of the ruling regimes in both West Bank and Gaza Strip.

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OECD DAC (2007) Handbook on security system reform (SSR)—supporting security and justice (PDF). OECD DAC, Paris. https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/478/3015/OECD%20DAC%20Hand book%20on%20SSR.pdf Oslo Accords (1994). https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180015/ Otterman S (2005) Middle East: the road map to peace backgrounder, (EST) Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/middle-east-road-map-peace Pettengill J, Ahmed (2011) Regional actors and the Fatah-Hamas unity deal shifting dynamics in the Middle East? Henry Jackson Society. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2 014/documents/d-il/dv/regionalactorsandfathhamasunitydeal/regionalactorsandfathhamasunit ydealen.pdf Qehaja R (2009) The process of demobilization and integration of former Kosovo Liberation Army members—Kosovo’s perspective. Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS), Prishtina. http://qkss.org/web/images/content/Process%20of%20demobilization%20and%20integration% 20of%20former%20KLA%20members.pdf Roadmap Plan Final Draft (2003) https://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/6129B9C832FE59AB85256 D43004D87FA Sayigh Y (2011) Policing the people, building the state: authoritarian transformation in the West Bank and Gaza Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep 12747 Sedra M (2010) Introduction: the future of security sector reform. In: Sedra M (ed) The future of security sector reform. CIGI, Ontario, pp 16–27. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ The%20Future%20of%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf Tartir A (2015) The evolution and reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993–2013. Stab Int J Secur Dev 4(1):Art. 46. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.gi The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2021) The roadmap, the fence, and the prospects for Israeli Palestinian Peace (Part II). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/8854/en Zilber N, Al-Omari (2018) State with no army, army with no state. Evolution of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces 1994–2018 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/state-no-army-army-no-state-evolut ion-palestinian-authority-security-forces-1994

The Spatiality of the Peace Luis Pena

Abstract Peace studies have long ignored social theories about spatiality and have considered space as an abstract container that does not contribute anything to understanding peacebuilding. This article shows how spatiality has been treated in peace studies and how peace has been treated in spatiality studies to discuss possible and fruitful dialogues between the two fields of knowledge.

1 Introduction This article seeks to put to dialogue peace studies and studies on social spatiality. We are interested in detecting arguments from these two traditions of knowledge to understand the spatiality of peace. There is a long tradition in the social sciences, very little known in peace studies, that deals with social spatiality and problematizes the dialectical relationship between spatial configurations and social dynamics. The maxim of studies of spatiality is that social dynamics (e.g., violence, war, peace, capital accumulation, etc.) are expressed as spatial configurations and that, at the same time, the processes of spatial configuration affect social dynamics. This perspective insists that space cannot be taken as a simple container where important things like politics, conflicts, culture, economy, etc., happen. The long privilege that temporal analysis had in the social sciences over spatial analysis began to weaken at the end of the eighties with works such as those of Michel Foucault. He denounced the impossibility of building a complex perspective of power by excluding places where the specific discourses are institutionalized (Crampton and Elden 2007). Arguments like this led to a Spatial Turn in the social sciences and the interest in geographical differentiation of social processes, the spatiality of modes of production, the daily appropriations of space, and the relations between power and representations of space (Warf and Arias 2008). The Spatial Turn translated into an interest in the conceptual tools elaborated in human geography, anthropology, and economics to understand the social production of space (Giddens 1984; Harvey 1998; L. Pena (B) Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, Friedrich-Schiller University, Jena, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_25

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Massey and Allen 1984). The social sciences and humanities began to discover a rich tradition of empiricist, positivist, structuralist, Marxist, phenomenological, feminist, and post-structuralist arguments for thinking about social spatiality. Until before the local turn, which we will discuss later, in peace studies, these discussions were practically unknown, and today they are still not incorporated to think about peace. The same can be said about the elaborations on the concept of peace in the different epistemologies of space. Dereck Gregory affirms these sciences have not been competent for talking about peace because they have elaborated a few theoretical, conceptual, and methodological elements to study this process. As several authors have stated, the sciences, such as political geography, are competent, eloquent, theoretical, interdisciplinary, committed, and create a compelling and stimulating critique of the cultures and practices of war for nor for dealing with peace (Williams and McConnell 2011; Gregory 2010; Koopman 2010; Megoran 2011). The sciences that study the social space such as political and human geography, urban-regional planning, rural studies, and urbanism have neglected peace because they have been understood as disciplines to tackle the conflicts for promoting the territorialization of the State (Elden 2007; Guattari and Deleuze 2002; Olwig 2018; Serje 2005) or as because the have seen as sciences for making war (Lacoste 1977). Below, we discuss how the issue of peace has been treated in the epistemologies of social space, mainly in human geography. Second, we discuss how spatiality has been addressed in peace studies. Then, we ended with a conceptualization of what it would mean to address the spatiality of peace.

2 Peace in the Epistemologies of Social Space It is worth saying that the history of ignoring peace is not a story of the absence of notions of peace in the epistemologies of space. As Nick Megoran, Fiona McConnell, and Philippa Williams claim, there have been partially explicit theories of peace in political and human geography. For example, in classical geopolitics, Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, and Nicholas Spykman displayed a realist perspective of peace for reflecting on the relationship between space, State, and war. They understood the geopolitical status quo maintained through a fragile balance of power between competing empires. In contemporary terms, it was a negative view of peace in the sense that temporary truces between mutually distrustful states could be achieved through military power and the use of violence as a deterrent. In this view, the analysis of space is meant to provide the correct tools to deploy the coercive power of the State by understanding the geographical aspects of international politics and how military technologies might modify them (Megoran et al. 2016). Megoran, McConnell, and Williams forget to mention that in the so-called positivist-inspired space science and specifically in the theories of space modernization, there is an implicit notion of peace, which could be interpreted as an early version of what was called in the 80 s and 90 s liberal peace. These spatial modernization theories were conceived as post-conflict science and associated peace with economic

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development (Peet and Hartwick 2009; Peña 2001). In its first phase of theorization, spatial modernization understood development as a task of connecting peripheral and backward areas to central ones to benefit them from the diffusion of innovations and the adoption of modern institutions (Peña 2001). From this spatial point of view, modernization was measured with the following variables: (1) the development of transport networks; (2) the expansion of the media; (3) the growth of integrated urban systems; (4) the change of traditional ethics; (5) the emergence of a monetary economy; (6) the development of education; (7) participation in non-parochial forms of organization and activities; (8) proximity and interaction with urban centers; and (9) geographic or spatial mobility (Peet and Hartwick 2009). Of course, the notions of modernization and territorial development became more complex with the elaboration of new models of regional development planning (Hodder et al. 2015; Polèse and Barragán 1998). In Colombia, to provide one example, territorial modernization has appeared in different governments’ peace and pacification projects through infrastructure construction, agrarian reforms, and promoting economic activities (Moncayo 2002) but has become clear in the 2016 Peace Agreement. This accord promises a territorial peace, which is understood as territorial renovation, that is, infrastructural integration, rural reforms, and expansion of State institutions to the modernizations of areas affected by the conflict. In the Marxist epistemologies of space, there is also a notion of peace stemming from its engagement to unveil the relation between war and conflicts and capital accumulation’s spatial logic. From Marxist geography, peace is related to freedom and social justice by transforming class structural limitations (Walicki 1988). It is a perspective of “positive peace” in which it is insisted that peace is not only the absence of war but refers to the existence of the conditions of justice and development required to fulfill the basic needs of the human being. In Galtung’s terms, positive peace must be achieved by peaceful means (García 2000). Marxism admits that there is also the option of revolutionizing even violently the structures that block justice. “In revolutionary situations, someone’s goat is sacrificed, and we must ask whose goat and why,” says David Harvey in Seventeen Contradictions of Capital and the End of Neoliberalism (Harvey 2014, p. 202). Moreover, as Harvey recalls, freedom and subjugation are dialectical pairs, and, consequently, the freedom of one can be the subjugation of another. The demand for peace must, then, be accompanied by social justice and, following the most recent theoretical elaborations of Marxism, also of spatial justice, that is, of the transformation of the spatial structures that promote and reproduce injustices (Soja 2013). The vision of peace within Marxist space epistemologies has two faces: a vision of moral peace and a vision of modern peace. Moral because it conceives peace as the process of reaching a social organization that functions under the normative principle to protect and build a state of justice. And modern, because, without referring to a positive image of humanity, it appeals to progress and confidence that scientifically society will achieve peace by defeating the structural bases of injustice. A broader exposition on the concepts of moral and modern peace is in the next section, where we address the concept of many peaces.

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The phenomenological and existentialist epistemologies of space should also be mentioned because they have developed the categories like place and sense of place relevant to peace studies. These approaches reflect on the meaning of the presence of men on earth, the meaning of their existence, and understands conflict as the mismatch between what man is in capitalist, individualistic, and rationalist societies and what man could be if he were to captive from those chains (Billinge 1977; Gregory 1978; Ley and Samuels 1978; Tuan 1976). According to phenomenological and existentialist epistemologies of space, capitalism produces a type of space and routines that reduce people’s affective, creative, and projective capacities. Such a reduction expresses in the form of an inauthentic experience and relationships that persons establish with people and places (Cresswell 2013; Tuan 1991). These epistemologies of space focus on understanding human experience, awareness, and sense of places by asking questions like what are the significant experiences we have of places? How do we experience the sense of belonging and identification with the place? How do the bonds of affection or rejection towards places arise? How does space become a place, a center of personal or collective significance? What is the meaning of people’s everyday movements in the places? (Cresswell 2013; Ley and Samuels 1978; Peña 2008). The place and sense of place are not only a site, a phenomenal-empirical, sensory experience, but mainly an emotional human experience associated with a space (Tuan 1976). Yi Fu Tuan characterized various senses of place and coined a terminology, already well-known in anthropology and geography, to describe subjects’ multiple symbolic and affective relationships with the places they use and inhabit. He spoke of topophilia (love and affection for a place), topolatry (the reverential feeling of a place), topophobia (feeling of rejection associated with fear, insecurity, uncertainty), and toponegligence (living in a place without feeling rooted in it) (Tuan 2007). As we saw, peace actions and projects have to do with transforming topophobic and toponeglygent senses of place for senses such as topophilia. In the same line of reflection, it is pertinent to mention the work of Edward Relph on the authentic and inauthentic senses of place (Relph 1976). Relph based that categorization on Heidegger’s existentialist concept of authenticity. For the latter, authenticity means recognizing that we are a being for death. Inauthentic life is born from the concealment of our condition of finitude. Thus, an authentic sense of place implies being integrated, belonging to the place as an individual and as a community member, and recognizing that the social and ecological relationships that make up that place are finite (Relph 1976). This authentic experience of places is being undermined by the development of capitalist society that favors and stimulates mobility and weakens the symbolic qualities of places. The geography that builds capitalist society is a geography without places, or more precisely, a geography with inauthentic senses of place. Relph elaborates for the first time the notion of place and placelessness with which he exposes that the notion of location or position is too narrow to address the complexity of the concept of place. The place, according to him, is linked to two other concepts: that of community and that of identity. He says that community and sense of place reinforce each other, so people are their place, and the place is their people (Relph 1976). Both in the communal and

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individual experience of a particular place, there is a narrow feeling of belonging that defines our “roots in places,” it is a feeling of familiarity constituted not only by a detailed knowledge of the place but also by a sense of care and concern for it. Relph conceives these ties as a human need of the first order. Without them, a person loses the reference from which to observe the world and make sense of it (Relph 1976). The placelessness and inauthentic places are the lack of meaningful ties, the feeling of insecurity, and neglect of care of the place. On the contrary, when the subjects’ place bonds are solid and affective, they confer stability to the individual and the group. Hence the fundamental criticism that the existentialist approach address to capitalist society (where mobility, flows, and individualism prevail) is that space is becoming a network of non-places. The civic death or disappearance of the sense of belonging to the place is the product of turning the place into an abstract space and a commodity object in capitalist societies (Delgado 2003; Peet 1998). The whole discussion about the senses of place seems to support the energetic peace concept coined for Wolfgang Dietrich in his transrational peace approach (2006). Nevertheless, he ignores humanistic geography’s arguments and partially mentions the relevance of the affective and symbolic relationship with places in the constitution of energetic peace and the sense of harmony. The existentialist approach of space teaches us about peace is that it should include affective bonds between people and places. Moreover, the ethnic-territorial social movements in Latin America also express the centrality of senses of place in peace when they claim that the construction of peace entails “the defense of territory.” They see the territory as a space of production and life to which they have strong attachments and affections. Besides the implicit notions of peace, some authors have recently established lines of research known as the geography of peace and the spatiality of peace. Firmly based in the spatial turn, they advocate including new categories like space, place, scale, and borders in the peace research to offer a more complex perspective of how the peace takes place (Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel 2016). These perspectives criticize the security regime emanating from the doctrine of the war on terrorism, adopt antimilitarist commitments, and call for an analysis of conflicts that serve to promote solidarity and compassion. Virginie Mamadouh argues that these two values (solidarity and compassion) are found in the explicit demands for building spatial approaches of peace in authors like Peter Kropotkin, Wallace Atwood, Frank Horrabin, Griffith Taylor, John O’Loughlin, Herman van der Wusten, Nurit Kliot, and Stanley Waterman (Mamadouh 2004). In the same line of commitments is Sara Koopman’s work. She has researched the contextuality of peace visions, beyond the assertion that the meanings of peace vary historically and spatially, and had included the diverse visions and practices of peace from women, youth, peasants, indigenous peoples, and black communities (Koopman 2010). This type of analysis is closely related to works that contrast the objectives and practices of liberal peace and “peacebuilding” strategies with the visions, uses, and expectations of peace of people in contexts such as Bosnia (Toal and Dahlman 2011), Liberia (Brottem and Unruh 2009), Cyprus (Akçalı and Antonsich 2009), Burundi (Daley 2013), and Tomor Oriental (Nevins 2003).

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Research on the spatiality of peace has also begun to generate criticism of the notions that circulate in peace studies, such as positive peace, negative peace, peace as the dialectical pair of war, or even the very notion of post-conflict. For example, Scott Kirsch and Colin Flint, in Reconstructing Conflict (2011), argue that rebuilding the state, economy, culture, and society after the war is a powerful notion that invokes an idea from reshaping new landscapes to reshaping national identities. The term reconstruction assumes the existence of a clear intellectual delimitation between war and peace that, in reality, is more complex. Reconstruction is exposed in peace studies as synonymous with “post-conflict society,” but in fact, war and even genocide itself have been presented as reconstruction processes (Kirsch and Flint 2011). Megoran has also criticized how the conception of negative and positive peace and structural violence was adopted by denouncing that they have been treated as black boxes that do not differentiate who is more vulnerable, where and how the damages produced materially and discursively are naturalized. On the contrary, he advocates studying the specific relationships in which oppression-domination, conflict-postconflict are articulated at particular times and geographical spaces (Megoran 2011). It is a call for mapping where there is negative peace or positive peace in a particular context and by different subjects. In geographies for peace, identity and discourse are also critically examined. Identity has been analyzed as a source for the political and territorial projects of social movements and communities searching for peace. It has been shown that identity is not fixed but strategic since social actors do not present themselves in the same way and use different terms (for example, human rights, environmental crisis, human security, victims, survivors, etc.) depending on who their interlocutor is or their interest in the context of local peacebuilding (Graham and Nash 2006; Kirsch and Flint 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2011). Identity has also been understood as imposed, as a discursive artifact that has fostered conflict and war. People like Ulloa (2005, 2008), Bocarejo (2015), Asher and Ojeda (2009), Ojeda (2013), Oslender (1998, 2004), Osorio (2009), Hoffman (2000), and Escobar (2010b) have shown the discourse about the specific places and groups (backward area, underdevelopment, isolated zones, and disintegrated areas) have served to support a series of violent interventions in the communities to favor the capital accumulation. They call for a counter identity politics so that new meanings about peace and development emerge. In this regard, Arturo Escobar calls for supporting social mobilization in favor of peace from the perspective of the ecology of knowledge and the ecology of difference. It implies being sensitive to the constructions and practices of peace, forgiveness, reconciliation, negotiation, love, and reparation found in the social movements (Escobar 2010a).

3 The Treatment of Social Space in Peace Research Critical studies on peace have gradually recognized the relevance of space, place, and territory in peacebuilding processes. The most direct antecedents of taking

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space into account can be found in the local turn in peacebuilding that began to be introduced since the mid-90 s to criticize the liberal peacebuilding approaches that were the standard with the end of the Cold War and the Berlin wall fall (Hughes et al. 2015; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015; Paffenholz 2015). The liberal approach to peacebuilding began to be applied under the unreported but widely accepted conflict management premise that promoting liberalization creates stable and lasting peace conditions. In the political sphere, liberalization means democratization, or the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for fundamental civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, and conscience. In the economic sphere, liberalization means commodification or movement toward a market-oriented economic model, which included measures aimed at minimizing government intrusion into the economy and maximizing the freedom of private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their respective economic interests (Paris 2010; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Several analyses revealed that the application of liberal peace has been the means to implant neoliberalism in post-conflict societies and did not generate the necessary changes for a stable peace (Graef 2015a, b; Wolff 2015). In this context appeared a series of post-liberal approaches to peace. The hybrid peace approach, for example, analyzes the unstable and contradictory convergence of actors of various scales in the composition of peacebuilding. These actors can be neoliberal international institutions to individuals and groups with non-Western values. They argued that peace is not a top-button process but takes place in a hybrid manner (Mac Ginty 2010; Richmond and Mitchell 2011). The hybridization of peace has highlighted the importance of local peacebuilding processes and the critical role of civil society, communities, and actors on the ground for peacebuilding. This emphasis has fostered the idea that peace is a bottom-up, networked process in which the greatest resource for long-term peacekeeping is always rooted in the local population and their culture (Lederach 2005). That has translated into the principle that citizens are no longer recipients of peace strategies and that peacebuilding is a process based on citizens’ visions and needs. From this, premise comes Lederach’s idea that peace is a process of reconstructing a relational space destroyed by war and violent conflict that consists of searching or strengthening the relational framework, which he calls social space. That translates into the idea of locating the group or person with sufficient capacity to intertwine peaceful social relations (Lederach 2005). Lederach uses spatial metaphors to refer to peacebuilding and to detail his concept of moral imagination. He argues that peace is based on understanding and feeling the landscape of prolonged violence and knowing why that landscape or geography of violence poses such entrenched challenges to constructive change. Lederach argues that the moral imagination arises from settling our feet well in the geographies and realities that produce destructive relationships, to understand what legacies they transmit and what will be necessary to break their violent patterns (Lederach 2005).

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In Lederach’s perspective, space is the sociological space and not the multirelational space of critical social theory.1 For him, the space is a network of relationships between people, and it does not speak so much of the network of relationships between human beings and nature that give life to senses of place, landscapes, spatial configurations, and territorialities. He understands that peacebuilding is rebuilding a network of relationships to overcome an order he calls the geography of violence, and the social geography of apathy, the social geography of distance. He also defines violence and war as the collapse of the social network and the destruction or weakening of the center that supports a relational space set in physical geography, but which is above all about networks of human beings (Lederach 2005). In this way, he states that “contrary to anarchy, the construction of peace emanates from social energy to create relationships. The social spaces that Lederach has in mind are the family and the community. He admits that” even geographic locations could provide a sense of identity and have a centrifugal/centripetal capacity of the social space (Lederach 2005). In Lederach’s definition of moral imagination, sustainable peacebuilding focuses on the quality and nature of relationships between people. He mentions that the key to constructive social change lies in what creates social fabrics, relationships, and relational spaces”, understanding the latter as the fabric of a human community, in a given geography composed of people, their lives, their activities, their organizational modalities, and even the patterns of conflict. He argues that this space-centered (sociological) approach consists of knowing who is at the center of relationships or who could become the center to rebuild the social space destroyed by violent conflict. That makes him conclude that seeing and locating the change in a physical and social geography entails an attentive observation to detect what is present but is not always immediately visible: the network of social relations.” Considering the arguments expressed in the previous section about the sense of place and the work that we have developed with the ethnic-territorial social movements in Colombia and Argentina, it is possible to understand that at the center of a social network could be not only people. For example, for the indigenous people, the territory, a river, a ritual site, a forest, etc., is the referent to which start to rebuilding networks of relations broken for the conflict. In Lederach’s vision of moral imagination, the eurocentric man-nature dualism and a reduction of place as a physical container are still present. The problem with Lederach’s arguments is how the reparation is conceived. In his view, reparation has as its object and vehicle people and 1

There is enormous literature that has built a relational and critical notion of social space to show that social space is composed of society-nature relations, the spatial logics of modes of production, and the appropriations and daily and existential constructions of space-time. In addition to Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre 1991), Milton Santos (Santos 2002), David Harvey (Harvey 1997), it is key to mention authors such as (a) Thrift, Nigel (2008). Non-representational theory: Space, politics, affect. Routledge; (b) Whatmore, Sarah (2002). Hybrid Geographies: Natures Cultures Spaces. SAGE. (c) Massey, Doreen (2005). For space. Sage; (d) Porto-Gonçalves, Carlos Walter (2009). Territorialities and struggle for territory in Latin America: geography of social movements in Latin America. Ediciones IVIC; (e) Werlen, Benno (1993). Society action and space: an alternative human geography. Routledge.

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the social network (what he calls social space), while for the social movements, reparation entails harmonizing relations to the territory and environment. Other authors have come to the same conclusion as Lederach that people should not be regarded as model recipients and repositories of peace, but that lasting peace is based on the knowledge and practices that communities and individuals have built to confront war and conflict (Druckman et al. 1997; Fetherston 2000). The United Nations in the early 2000s also adopted this principle when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that the UN’s approach would emphasize developing local capacity for conflict resolution (Chesterman 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). This perspective has started to be known as the local turn in peacebuilding. Although the sense of the local here is far from that exposed in existentialist approaches, this local turn opened the peace studies to themes never addressed, such as local visions and practices of peace. In this last field of research, Wolfgang Dietrich, from the School of Peace Studies at the University of Innsbruck, has been the pioneer. He did a historical and philosophical reconstruction of peace visions and created the Many Peaces or the Transracional peace approach (Dietrich 2012, 2014; Dietrich and Sützl 2006). His fundamental argument is that diverse visions, layers, and rationalities of peace are conflicting present. He mentions four dimensions or visions of peace: energetic, moral, modern, and postmodern. We describe them briefly to consider later how they can dialogue with the epistemologies of space. ● Energetic peace refers to the sense of harmony between body and cosmos. It is manifested in rituals and representations about how the cosmos is organized and how the body should be adjusted harmoniously to resonate with it. Energetic peace refers to images of how the microcosm of the human body and mind is integrated with the universe and attunement to the universe and other living things. In the consonance or dissonance between the microcosm and the universe, harmony or lack thereof arises. The art of energetic peace lies in interpreting the signs of universal harmony and acting accordingly. For this purpose, it is essential to know, care and use the vehicle that allows this adventure: the self. There are many terms for it, for example, soul, a¯ tman; buddhists talk about Vajra, the diamond; the sufis call it the essence. In energetic peace, introspection is the primary virtue. For this purpose, societies create rituals. This peace begins within the self and spreads from there as a harmonious vibration in society, nature, and the universe (Dietrich 2012, pp. 53–63). Moral peace. It refers initially and partially to social norms and comes from the idea of peace as the fulfillment of a contract between people that serves to live in tranquility. In more complex terms, it is an awareness of the value of energetic peace that has become the norm because of a threat or a crisis. Moral peace is instituted in norms that are a tool for the government but then become a reason for the existence of government. The rule recalls situations in which people felt threatened and helpless but requires a discourse of authority to oblige the people to respect the norm for fear that the traumatic event will recur. Moral peace must have a theme to be narrable, so it appears in variations of peace and security, peace and justice, or peace and truth.

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Through these combinations, moral peace becomes narrable. The setting of the norm claims that peace is the future salvation from such misfortunes and promises the achievement of peace only by following the authority and rules. For these narratives to become effective, they need an additional discursive element: dualism or a basic pattern of good vs. evil like insecurity vs. security, injustice vs. justice, fallacy vs. truth. Moral peace works on the matrix of fear, salvation, and the future. If those overriding fears are institutionalized, if moral teachings are built from them and used as a means of government, then an image of peace develops not only moral but also phobic. Fear-driven societies yearn for peace but at the same time act in a way that is very dangerous to others. They create tension because they try to become something different from what they are. They do not accept their being, deny it and exalt something different as an ideal to be achieved. There is a fundamental tension between what one is and one’s goal. The goal is in contradiction with what one is and leads to tensions. That is why moral persons and moral communities have a high propensity to conflict (Dietrich 2012, pp. 112–115). Modern Peace: refers to visions and practices that understand the world and society as a manipulable and rationally adaptable machine to fulfill a specific goal. For some thinkers of modernity, the goal of the social machine must be security (Hobbes) for others social harmony (Rousseau), for others truth (Kant), and for others justice (Marx). The prevailing view is that society has autonomous functioning laws that can be scientifically studied and rationally manipulated. Modern visions of peace do not explicitly use the image of an immediate driving God of the world and instead replace him with the existence of natural laws or various notions about human nature. Natural laws are scientifically calculable and predictable, although they are not totally separate from the spirituality of the Christian tradition. The primary basis of modern concepts of peace also rests on moral visions. The difference is that scientists have now replaced priests as experts in interpreting the fundamental laws of the world. The new experts claim to be able to interpret the world as a machine, predict its movements, and maintain the ability to manipulate properties reasonably so that a more peaceful world can emerge (Dietrich 2012, pp. 145–160). Postmodern Peace: there are multiple, imperfect, small, every day, and nonspectacular ways of opposing the universal culture of violence. The postmodern peace refers to the practices and visions of peace that partially seek to turn different aspects of modern visions of peace upside down, understanding that this transformation is a complex and multiple process that does not necessarily attempt its replacement but the possibility of convergence that allows us to think that peace is plural. Postmodern peace is a small peace that unifies the duality of cooperation and conflict. It is relational, local, contextual, vernacular, and everything except universalist. This type of peace does not attend to concepts based on a single truth, and neither do promise salvation. These are peaces that have to be constantly invented. The postmodern peaces are not for lethargic minds. They are peaces that always want to be lived, practiced, and gained. Groups and individuals who constantly create new struggles for peace, progress, development, justice, and security lose their appeal because they recognize the deceptive character of their promises of salvation and the emptiness of their intellectual traps. The practices and visions of postmodern peace question the

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ought to be and seek instead strip it of its power. It dismantles the binarisms of modern peace that have become a potent, mundane, and global threat. The postmodern peace covers the soil with the remnants of modern binarism and thus fertilizes the growth of many new peaces (Dietrich 2012, pp. 206–209). The transrational peace perspective sheds light on conflicts and peace disputes. It gives elements to characterize tensions in the construction and implementation of peace policies by exposing the differences between energetic peace, moral peace, modern peace, and postmodern peaces. The “discovery” of the many peaces already expresses in itself a conviction that visions and practices of peace are situated, differentiated and multiscale notions, basic principles of the spatial thinking (Peña 2011). Moreover, it is also an invitation for scholars of social spatiality to ask themselves about the conflicting and contradictory spatialization of the various rationalities of peace. An interesting contribution of Dietrich’s work is his methodology of elicitive conflict mapping (Echavarria 2014; Dietrich 2015), which at first glance would seem to be a recognition of the issues of space, place, environment, and scale in peacebuilding. However, it turns out to be a tool where conflict and peace are centered on the individual and where the term mapping becomes a pure metaphor. When he talks about mapping, he refers to a tool to create a mental map of a person’s conflicts. Thus, in the elicitive mapping of conflicts, there is no interest in observing the spatiality of a conflict, nor the spatiality of social networks that seek to resolve it, nor the association between senses of place with conflicts and practice-visions of peace, much less the relationship between daily space–time appropriations with conflicts and different forms of peace.

4 Toward the Spatiality of Peace To close, it is worth mentioning that the local turn, the recognition of hybridization, and the diversity of the rationalities of peace are progress toward understanding the spatiality of peace. However, it is necessary to overcome a “sociological vision of social space.” As we have seen, understands social space as a network of social relations (a community, a family, a social movement, a company) assumes that “the rest”—the place, the territory, the landscapes, the scale, nature—are realities external to social dynamics. Here, we have vindicated the idea that peace is a political, cultural, economic, psychological, and social process but that these are spatial processes. This also implies affirming that spatial processes are political, cultural, economic, psychological, and social processes. In peace research, the space still appears as a canvas on which diverse practices-visions of peace develop. Persists the idea that space belongs to the realm of geometry or physics and not to the social sciences. However, the idea that space is not a passive thing in the constitution of society is now dominant in the social sciences. The different epistemologies of space (Marxist, existentialist, phenomenological, structuring, feminist, post-structuralist, and decolonial) have shown that conflicts are also based on the different practices,

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forms, and conceptions of space, a premise that has not been incorporated in the theorization or practice of research on many peaces. The local turn in peacebuilding, the moral imagination, hybrid peace, and the many peaces are positions about what peace is made of that have rightly defended the diversity of peace practices and visions by highlighting the innovations of peace of individuals and communities. These perspectives of peace mainly defend a bottomup approach, which is a significant advance in recognizing the diversity of knowledge of peace. In other words, the idea of peace as a diverse, differentiated, and complex process has the purpose of transforming the exercise of peacebuilding by altering the hierarchy and articulation of the actors involved in the processes of conflict transformation, conflicts that, however, are understood as social and individual conflicts, but not as socio-spatial conflicts. The prevalence of a sociological perspective of social space in peace research has as a corollary that peacebuilding forgets what and how the spatiality should be transformed to construct peace. It means that it is not only a question of recognizing that there are various rationalities and hybridizations of peace, but that it is necessary to investigate the positions on how and in what dimensions the spatiality of war or conflict must be transformed in order to build a lasting peace. The approaches mentioned here treat peace as a contentious process but do not delve into the controversy of the actors over what, how much, and how the spatial order must change to achieve peace. They do not delve into what Bladimir Rodríguez calls conflicts for socially necessary spaces for social life and conflicts for a community’s living space (Rodríguez 2017). In that sense, following Rodríguez’s argument, they contribute little to knowing the people and activities that occupy the lands, who own them, who control the territories, and the destination of the resources integrated into the geographical space. On the side of studies on social spatiality have emerged the spatialization of peace and the geographies of peace as a line of research seeking to problematize the relationship between space, conflict, and peace. These works have shown that the construction of peace is differentiated (in ethnic, gender and territorial terms), produced by actions that have intersecting scales from the global to the local and expressed in the disputes to define borders. Difference, scale, and border are essential categories for the development of any spatial reflection, however, they are not all the categories necessary to understand how the spatiality of peace is constructed. Based on the work carried out with three ethnic-territorial organizations in Colombia (the Black Communities, the Peasant Reserve Zones, and the Nasa People) and in Patagonia with the Mapuche, we have discovered that for these groups, peace means recovering the collective functions of the territory. This notion of peace involves categories of spatial analysis absent in reflections on the spatialization of peace and geographies of peace such as landscape, model of nature, senses of place, and territorial project. Indeed, the concept of peace as reparation for the collective functions of the territory implies that peace is spatial because it translates into:

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a. transform the economic landscape imposed through violence and create an economic landscape that expresses economic and food sovereignty. Transform, for example, the landscape of extractivism and monoculture by the landscape of diversified production. b. transform the relationships between humans and nature. Ethnic territorial movements have shown that war and military interventions in their living spaces have been made to exploit resources from a utilitarian and predatory perspective of nature. Peace then implies changing the model of appropriation of nature that put in the center the respect for biodiversity and based on the sustainability of life. c. transform the daily appropriations of the places created by war. War and violence have created a geography of fear and interdictions to everyday mobility. Peace would therefore be expressed in creating new senses of place not based on fear, on new appropriations of space and time where there is time for enjoyment and encounter. Faced with the atomized time of mechanical activities and for the benefit of the owner of a plantation, a mining company, a factory, of being a domestic employee, proposed by the capitalist economy, the communities oppose the idea of activities with duration and meaning for the community and with a sense of autonomy for the person. d. transform of the existing territorial order and create a new one. The definition of peace as the restitution of the collective functions of the territory translates into a territorial project, that is, the purpose of materializing justice and economic and cultural autonomy through the new territorial framework. The territorial project politicizes the issues of land, autonomy, visions of development, the territorial form of the state, the economic project, planning and spatial ordering, the relations between different ethnic groups, and organizational strategies to vindicate territorial demands. Among the ethnic territorial social movements, the territory implies the representation of how far the community extends, what space the community has used and appropriated, and how far it reaches or should reach its domain. It is an issue that has to do with the memory of belonging to a place and the social representation of border along with the definition of landmarks of the space appropriated by the community, the classificatory categories of space, etc. All these elements derive in a critique of existing borders and a political agenda consisting of redrawing them as a critical element of reparation.

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Bargaining Over What We Were All in Together: Citizenship and Belongingness in the 2017 Qatar-Gulf Crisis Elmehdi Lahmamed

Abstract The Gulf crisis occurred in June 2017, representing an exceptional opportunity to explore the new emerging state-society through the lenses of citizenship and belongingness. This study explored recent legal developments, the official narrative, and social media activity to advance the sociopolitical understanding of the concepts of both citizenship and belongingness by exploring Qatar within the context of this crisis. It shows that the crisis threatened the state’s stability and social fabric, resulting in a significant surge in the sense of belonging among people living in Qatar, a less guarded environment around citizenship, and a greater potential for overcoming long inherent patterns based on maintaining the state autonomy from the societal base. However, it raises the state’s urgency to address citizenship rights for the most disadvantaged, including children and non-Qatari spouses of Qatari women, and other longtime residents petitioning for citizenship based on cultural and familial ties to the land. Keywords Qatar · Gulf · Citizenship · Belongingness · Crisis · 2017

1 Introduction The six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Since the GCC’s founding in 1981, it has long been a strong interest for global social and economic policy, but equally, an area of complicated political parameters. A short historical overview reveals large and persistent discrepancies between the countries, which increased further with the outbreak of the Arab uprising, leading to the March 20141 withdrawal of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain ambassadors E. Lahmamed (B) Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] 1 Gumuchian and Abedine, “Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain withdraw envoys from Qatar”, March 05, (2014), Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/05/world/meast/gulf-qatar-ambassadors/ index.html.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_26

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and severing diplomatic ties with Qatar over support for opposition groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. This, however, is a mere diplomatic dispute compared to the critical crisis that unfolded in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar, imposing an air, sea, and land blockade, accusing the country of supporting terrorism and promoting regional instability, and collectively announcing a list of “urgent demands”2 to be met before lifting the blockade. These demands included shutting down the state-owned Aljazeera media network and reducing ties with Iran—ties that Qatar denies having. There has existed an “existential crisis” in Qatar since its independence in 1971, serving as the most serious rupture in the Gulf region since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 19903 “with major economic, social, and political impacts on the Arab Gulf nation.”4 In addition to the fast-paced, misinformation campaigns, the crisis represented a serious concern that the blockading countries were not only threatening the social fabric among Khaleejis (people of the Arabian peninsula), but could serve as a catalyst to take military action against the country5 though this has been disputed by many Gulf expert and scholars.6 However, the blockade appeared not to have succeeded in isolating Qatar, with some arguing that “Qatari leaders instead strengthened their links with other countries, succeeded in finding new supply lines, and were able to maintain their sovereignty.”7 Another aspect of the blockade was the ability to study citizenship and sense of belonging within Qatar’s unprecedented crisis with its neighbor countries; it has embarked on a remarkable journey to cope with the new situation associated not only with challenging regional tensions, but also an internal pressure to bring its own house in order. In this context, citizenship and belonging represent “momentum concepts” to better understand the tension-in-house resulting from conjunctive historical conditions. In contrast to the avalanche of scholarly literature on the subject in the west,8 citizenship is only rarely regarded as an important component of the sustainability 2

The list of 13 demands issued by Saudi Arabia and can be accessed at: Patrick Wintour, “Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia”, June 23, (2017), Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-issues-qatarwith-13-demands-to-end-blockade. 3 Ulrichsen, Qatar, and the Gulf crisis (2020), p. 2. 4 Barakat, Milton and Elkahlout (2020). The impact of the Gulf crisis on Qatar’s humanitarian sector. Disasters 4, p. 63. 5 Experts argue that there was an attempt of regime change in Doha; this strains the traditional rentier arrangements and relies on the ideological assumption that the fragility of traditional ties with state leadership will serve ease their goal. 6 See Andreas Krieg (ed.), Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis (2019). 7 Chaker, “La Crise Du Golfe De 2017: Un an Après” Politique Etrangère 3, (2018), p. 219; Kristian Ulrichsen, “How Qatar Weathered the Gulf Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-06-11/how-qatar-weathered-gulf-crisis. 8 Lister, “Inclusive Citizenship: Realizing the Potential,” Citizenship Studies 11.1 (2007), p. 49.

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of rentier states like Qatar. Since loyalty is acquired through the very process of distribution and redistribution of a large amount of wealth, UAE Rulers distribute wealth to citizens in a way that silences resistance and calls for political reform,9 and the state makes every effort to create a special kind of citizens and citizenry that are “pro-market,” “pro-globalization,” and “patriotic,”10 mostly through education, business, and entrepreneurship. The society functions by distinguishing citizens from foreigners, pressuring the citizens to adopt certain policies and culture through social engineering. This article raises the question of citizenship and belongingness at the heart of transformations during this crisis. I pay close attention to certain demonstrations of citizenship and belongingness on both the political and personal levels in Qatar’s state and society. I contend that the turbulent political climate brought by the 2017 crisis resulted in a less restrictive environment around citizenship, which can be seen in public dialogues and media, drawing attention to the situation of longtime residents and the official narrative. In determining ways forward to address the question of citizenship and belongingness in Qatar post-blockade, I draw upon a general assumption that citizenship is a key domain to study Qatar’s social and political transformations. Second, I contend that the blockade of June 2017 had a significant impact on the debate around the citizenship-related issues in Qatar. Third, I argue that given the pressure posed by practices of neighboring countries against Qatar that led to an escalation of tension and harm to national peace, stability, and threats to the country’s interests, there is, in reaction to that, a new society-driven sense of common belonging to the state, mostly from less-privileged people in Qatar, including children of Qatari women with foreign husbands as well as longtime residing nationals. The turbulent political climate brought by the crisis resulted in a less restrictive environment around citizenship, which can be observed in public dialogues, and media drawing little attention to the situation of long residing non-nationals. It has also resulted in a slight change in the ways state and citizens perceiving migrants, and to some extent, speeding up the reform of policies addressed to them. The combination of citizenship and belongingness in the present study is no coincidence, as citizenship alone is insufficient to provide a sense of the culture as a whole. Scholarship on citizenship has indicated that a long residence period gives a rationale for even more demands for inclusion and legal recognition.11 In Qatar, citizenship as a legal status is restricted to a minority of people, whereas a generation of people has been living in the country for decades, and they are likely to develop a sense of belonging, in the absence of any legal framework to acknowledge their citizenship rights. Thus, it is imperative not to consider citizenship a social, economic, 9

Babar, “The Cost of Belonging: Citizenship Construction in the State of Qatar,” The Middle East Journal 68.3 (2014), p. 120. 10 See Calvert W. Jones, “Bedouins into Bourgeois” in her study conducted in Ras Al Khaimah, UAE. Jones, Bedouins into Bourgeois (2017). 11 Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, Citizenship policies for an age of migration (2002), pp. 1–3.

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and to some extent political engagement and privilege supported by the legal status that determines who is the citizen and who is not, but imperatively consider “the status of belonging” as it is a basic human need, and it can be interpreted in different ways.12 This article is divided into three phases, each of which contains an introduction and a conclusion. Phase one questions the context in which the crisis of June 2017 has been developed and pays close attention to the manner citizenship has been initiated historically and legally in Qatar to ensure citizens loyalty, based on a rentier theory. The second phase calls into question the surge of an ever-expressive citizenship and integration demands in Qatar in the context of the crisis and provides an analysis based on selected speeches, laws, and Twitter observations. The last phase relies on relevant statistical data to look at the prospective development of citizenship and belongingness in Qatar post-blockade under a new domestic, regional, and international environment.

2 A Divided Gulf: Citizenship and Belongingness in Context For the rulers of Qatar to secure their established borders, they considered the separation of populations along with the new national territories as an essential element of building their new emerging statehood. Zahra Babar argues, “It was imperative not only to delineate and control landmasses but also to conclusively determine who would be the permanent, settled population of each state.”13 Assuring the loyalty for the state has been the aim of such processes, and it has been illustrated in the subsequent rise of a single narrative regarding the heritage of the state and the disproportionate constitution of a single national identity despite the cultural and social diversity that characterized Qatari society in the past.14 Qatar has been a remarkably stable regime. The very politics of belongings can explain the stability of the Qatari regime to the state and the strict manners in which the state pursues social engineering through exclusion and marginalization. Belonging, namely through citizenship, is limited solely to those who can claim historical and territorial associations of their male parent since the pre-independence era. Citizenship is passed chiefly via the male parent and his associated ancestral bloodline. Until fairly recently, most female GCC citizens could not pass citizenship to their offspring if they married a foreigner.7 In this sense, “citizenship can only be considered to be

12

Bennett, Doing belonging: a sociological study of belonging in place as the outcome of social practices (2012), p. 26. 13 Babar, “Enduring ‘contested’ citizenship in the Gulf Cooperation Council” (2018), pp. 115–116. 14 Several studies can be found on the issue of state-sponsored identity, see for instance: Al-Janahi, National Identity Formation in Modern Qatar: New Perspective (2014).

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a gift that has been given to small, selective groups of those who inhabit the Arabian Peninsula, based on “jus sanguinis.””15 However, the regime’s stability has come into question by the increasing strain of the Arab Spring in 2011, despite the relatively modest action-oriented movement that took place in the wealthiest countries of the Gulf. In questioning, if the absence of revolution in the states of the Gulf during 2011 vindicates the argument that an oil or gas-rich government could “buy” political loyalty by transferring vast sums of rent-derived material wealth to citizens, Jessie Moritz16 found that in Qatar, where street protests did not occur in 2011, political mobilization is rare, except for some few moves in Twitter. He stated that there are at least three preventive mechanisms by the state against political mobilization, all directly or indirectly associated to rentierism; the threat of repression by the state, the perception that reform would be unsuccessful (lack of opportunity); and material benefits (rent-based co-optation). Thus understood, the citizenship and loyalty of the citizens being invested and reinvested during the time of crisis and instability are frequent in the Gulf region and Qatar.17 Kinninmont highlighted that citizenship stripping becomes a strategic tool to curtail pressures for political change in the region.18 Citizenship, in this sense, is an instant and strategic tool used by the state to assure the loyalty of the individuals and the durability of the system. It is used for both marginalization and discrimination against the potential threats to the system on the one hand and the inclusive and more inclusive instrument used to welcome and promote the participation of certain people in the system on the other. In this sense, it is a gift given or ripped from a very small, selected, and honored groups. The June 2017 crisis is a critical, exceptional, and to some extent, clear case in that it further highlights the significant mutations of citizenship and politics of inclusion during the time of crisis. However, the roots of such crises go back to an early track that Qatar chose in terms of foreign policy—building strong relations with a significant player in the Middle East, the USA, which possesses the world’s biggest military base in the region. Additionally, Qatar has widely worked on supporting the emerging power in the Arab world, particularly during what so-called the Arab Spring, positioned itself as a soft power, particularly through investing in Aljazeera— a well-known and significant impact state-owned media network. Among many strategies that Qatar has implemented to contain the crisis, its impacts internally were to address “the availability of fresh food, the sudden drop in the value of the stock market, and worries over the ambitious plans for the upcoming FIFA Football World Cup in 2022.”19 The strategy associated with increasing national 15

Babar, “Enduring ‘contested’ citizenship in the Gulf Cooperation Council” (2018), p. 125. Jessie, Oil and societal quiescence: Rethinking causal mechanisms in rentier state theory In The Politics of Rentier States in the Gulf (2019), p. 42. 17 See for instance, the case of Al Ghufran clan (a branch of Al-Murrah tribe) at: HRW, Qatar: Families Arbitrarily Stripped of Citizenship (2019). Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/news/ 2019/05/12/qatar-families-arbitrarily-stripped-citizenship. 18 Kinninmont, Citizenship in the Gulf (2013), p. 52. 19 Miller, Managing Regional Conflict: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Embargo of Qatar, 10.2 (2019), p. 37. 16

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belonging and social inclusions appeared to be an ever-increasing contribution of the bottom of society in the social and political sphere, in a way that flows down-top, perhaps for the first time in the country’s modern history. It is particular in a rentier state in the sense that the very social segments revealed an unprecedented sense of belonging in residents and emphasize relatively active processes of citizenship among citizens along with a capacity to defend their sovereignty and independence, demand rights, but also criticize some realities on the ground. It is essential to point out here that Gulf scholars have already identified that the concept of citizenship and political belonging/participation as defined and practiced by liberal democracies is problematic when it comes to the monarchies of the Gulf. The reductionist approach saying that there is no real citizenship, no political citizenship, and possibly no politics in this part of the world reveals an ethnocentric and western-oriented conception about these societies. Such approaches have long been criticized in Euro-American academia, particularly in subaltern and postcolonial studies. Georges Balandier, for instance, in his critical anthropology, has emphasized the dynamicity of what Claud Levi Strauss often called “cold societies” (sociétés froides).20 For Balandier, the social mutations and transformations, the order and disorder occur permanently and in a different form within the context of these societies under “colonial status” (situation coloniale). It is only through opening politics into ethnography and history that one could construct an internal and profound understanding based on what Balandier referred to as “dynamic sociology for modernity.” In this regard, Zahra Babar stated, “Being a citizen has political meaning to the people who reside in the Gulf, to those who have access to categories of residency, to those who are excluded from these categories of residency altogether, and to those who design and police it.” It is when shifting the approach from the “institution of citizenship” toward performative “acts of citizenship” that both the collective and individual action can be understood in their very distinct social–historical context. It is impossible to understand human conduct while ignoring its intentions, and it is impossible to understand human intentions while ignoring the settings in which they make sense.21 Accordingly, manifestations around citizenship and belongingness to the nation occurred during and after the June 2017 crisis are required when applied into Qatar taking into consideration not only what may be called a “citizenship in action/in context” but also the symbolic patterns that citizenship and belongingness undertake, as it is not necessarily related to legal political participatory rights dominant in the experiences and the scholarships of liberal democracies. The chapter reflected on the emerging of Qatar as an active actor in the region, examined the surge in citizenship and belongingness in the context of the crisis in Qatar, and finally emphasized the particularity of the ever-increasing manifestation for a less restrictive citizenry and belongingness and a more politically expressive citizenry that integrate wider segments of the society. 20 21

Balandier, Sens et puissance: Les dynamique sociales (1986), pp. 13–16. Czarniawska, Narrative in Social Science Research (2004), p. 4.

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3 Manifesting a New Emerging Citizenry and Belongingness The research builds on an assumption that citizenship and belongingness have been a critical part of the state-society building in the GCC and is ideologically and politically used to reinforce the state legitimacy through excluding or including new groups or individuals. In examining the June 2017 crisis, however, a less restrictive environment seems to appear around citizenship and discussion regarding belongingness to the society along with an ever-increasing trend of political demand regarding the belong to the state. In addressing these manifestations, I draw on institutional and individual changes that occurred after June 2017 in Qatar. For the institutional aspect, I concentrate on legal changes, particularly new legislation changes, in addition to a discourse analysis of the highest official speech addressed to the nation after June 2017. As for individual aspect, I rely on the Twitter platform where users actively show ever-increasing, expressive, and demanding claims for citizenship along with a sense of belonging, particularly among Qatari women with foreign husband and their relatives, as well as paper holders, “Al-bid¯un,” and to some extent, long-term residing people.22 Twitter can be a reliable source to collect raw data,as the world’s largest microblogging social media site, being also the most used social media in the relatively small Peninsula of Qatar with a population of 2.7 million, of whom less than 10% are nationals. Besides, people in Qatar rely on Twitter to express their thoughts due to the absence of an effective civil society.23 In the official narrative of the government communication of Qatar,24 the crisis began on April 20, 2017, with a series of thirteen opinion pieces critical of Qatar appearing in the American media. The Emir attended the Riyadh Summit and committed to working with the USA and GCC members to combat extremist ideology and cut terrorist funding. Four days later, the website of the Qatar news agency was hacked, and a false statement about the Emir was published. On June 5, 2017, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt imposed their blockade on Qatar. Several diplomatic and economic moves have taken place, later on, to defend what Qatar and its Emir referred to as a matter of sovereignty. As documented in the official narrative, the blockade demonstrated a series of escalations from blockading countries in different fields. First, in the financial and banking industry, Qatar Central Bank launched investigations of the manipulation of 22

Al-bid¯un, short for bid¯un Jinsiyya, literally means “without nationality” in Arabic and often means “people without paper” or “paperless people.” The term refers to those claim entitlement to the Qatari nationality based on historical long settlement in the country, and of their affiliation to other state, while the state considers them as “illegal resident” cannot prove their legal residency status. 23 For more details on the restriction posed on civil society in Qatar, see: Nura muhamad a ¯ lmuh.sn, . mah.mud naˇgyb a¯ lmah.mud, ucmar hišh¯am a¯ lšhih¯aby, a¯ lta¯ bit w¯almutah.awil a¯ lhlyˇg bayna a¯ lšhiq¯aq ¯ ¯ a¯ lmuˇgtamcy wa tar¯abut. a¯ lm¯al w¯a sult.a (2014). 24 GCC Crisis, Government Communication Office. Retrieved from: https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/ focus/gcc-crisis/.

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its currencies, securities, and derivatives markets by blockading countries. Second, for human rights, the Qatari UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) worked toward redressing the victims of the blockade and documented violations by the blockading countries against the citizens and residents, in terms of media (the spread of false information, the piracy of media property rights of beIN sports media network, and the ban of other Qatari channels), and the freedom of rituals and religious rites practice (particularly the prohibition of performing Hajj and Umrah), as well as other rights for education and business. And finally, in the aviation sector, four Emirati fighter aircraft violated Qatar airspace. In arguing that the main political dynamics in Qatar, as with the neighboring Gulf countries, are planned by the states themselves, being a rentier state, they act as a strategic response to the oil dependency.25 That is to say that the state as a superior apparatus determines the fundamental principles of citizenship and belongingness of its people, legally, politically, and economically. The official speech is a good way to examine and track the changes and transformation in how the authority perceives citizenship and belongingness after the June 2017 crisis, namely the statements made by the higher official speakers in the state—Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani and the Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Lolwah Al Khater. The discourse is mainly relevant in determining the exclusionary and inclusionary manner that provides criteria of who belongs or does not in the context of the crisis under examination. It is also essential as it reflects the official way of representing the nation to the entire world. However, a discourse analysis “is a scholarly analysis only when it is based on more or less explicit concepts, methods, or theories.”26 But first and foremost, it has to be a critical analysis that goes beyond a summary of what the speakers said and critically tackles the structure, strategies, and manner in which the speeches are formulated. After the crisis first hit in Qatar, highly representative figures such as the Emir of the state and the minister of foreign affairs (Mohammed bin Abdulrahman AlThani) reflected directly or indirectly on issues that concern their citizens and people, praising their unity against the blockade. However, we focus primarily on the critical period from June 5, 2017, when the blockade occurred and the countries closed their borders and airspace, till May 30, 2019, when Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa AlThani, the prime minister of Qatar, attended a Saudi summit on regional security in Mecca. This event is particularly important as it is the first time a senior Qatari official visits Saudi Arabia since the blockade occurs, which appears to be a sign of de-escalation of the situation. If not, an agreement on the situation remains as it is. During this period, one important speech to reflect on and analyze is that made by the Emir on July 21, 2017, almost a month after the blockade. This speech was the first to be addressed to the “distinguished citizens” and those “who live in the good land of Qatar”—unifying both under the term “Qatari people.” The Emir praised what he called the spirit of solidarity, harmony, and defiance “that prevailed and frustrated the hopes of those who banked on the opposite side because of their ignorance of the 25 26

Babar, “Enduring ‘contested’ citizenship in the Gulf Cooperation Council” (2018), p. 116. Van Dijk, “Editorial: Analysing discourse analysis,” Discourse & Society 8.1 (1997), pp. 5–6.

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nature of our society and our people.” Using the term “society” here refers potentially to those living in the country (the residents), while “our people” means the Qatari nationals. A very significant word such as “homeland” and “home” was repeated four times, reflecting the integrity of the state for those living in its land. There is a significant clear tendency throughout the speech toward addressing different segments of the society and not only the country’s citizens, which is quite different from the speeches and remarks made just a year before the crisis.27 It is hardly surprising, as residents took the lead in defending the country by showing different sorts of support for the country, but this goes beyond simply praising their contribution in a difficult time. The scale of the crisis led the Emir to describe it as a matter of “sovereignty and independence.” It is a high-security concern, which amounted to an integrated approach to mobilize the whole society to self-defend the state. The crisis challenged a long-lasting issue of inclusion “in terms of categorizing which groups of inhabitants have the legal right to belong to and participate in the state, or exclusion in terms of those who are denied belonging and participation.”28 It is what described by the Emir’s speech as the “true moral test where the society has achieved great success,” and “the seriousness of the campaign against the country” that reveals what it appears to be a new form of enhancing the belonging, and therefore, securing the nation. Similarly, scholars have addressed mainly the manifestations of citizenship and belongingness after the blockade occurred in Qatar. Tweets using the hashtag #ourtribeisqatar (our tribe is Qatar) appeared after the blockade to express the rally around their leader and defend the state against accusations of the blockading country. Notably, the tweets do not only come from Qatari nationals but also different residents in the country. Residents appear to be outspoken on the blockade as well, benefiting from a more tolerant public sphere. Nurgul Oruc29 demonstrates how Twitter users expressed national unity and solidarity through displays of strength, resilience, loyalty, and pride, concentrating on Emir Tamim Al-Thani as the leader while denouncing social and cultural divisions. With Twitter being a widely used social media in Qatar and the neighboring countries, many users must share their ideas, passions, and demands. The hashtags represent a manner in which people collectively express their collaborative support to a given issue or case. Concerning the blockade in Qatar, several hashtags appeared extensively during the days following the blockade, expressing demands for citizenship. The latter is given in Table 1. The hashtags represent an ever-increasing demand spreading from specific Qatari society segments, namely children of Qatari women married to foreign husbands

27

See for instance, the speeches and remarks made in 2016 and prior years. Available at the Qatari Amiri Diwan website: Amiri Diwan, Speeches and remarks. Retrieved from https://diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/spe eches-and-remarks. 28 Babar, “Enduring ‘contested’ citizenship in the Gulf Cooperation Council” (2018), p. 117. 29 Oruc, Hashtag Unity in the Midst of the Blockade of Qatar (2018).

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Table 1 Popular hashtag from Twitter express different forms of demands for citizenship in Qatar The hashtag in Arabic

Translation Paper holders deserve (the nationality) Naturalization of children of Qatari women (with foreign husbands)

Qatari paperless Children of Qatari women are among us The son of a female Qatari citizen is a Qatari

and a group of “Al-bid¯un.” However, other active groups living in Qatar for several generations (known as “Mawalid”) appear to be less involved in Twitter. Despite the slight improvements in the law first issued in 1961, article 2 of the 2005 act signifies a marginal improvement over prior laws, “as it allows for the children of a Qatari woman to apply for naturalization”30 ; however, it does require a princely decree, which takes a non-determined process by which one might apply to the Emir for naturalization. Besides, article 44 of the convention in Qatar issued on December 2008 grants permanent residence to children of Qatari mothers and provides them with free education, medical treatment, and employment, but only in the case that the non-national husband has died or has left the wife and the country permanently.31 Although such demands had been raised several years before the blockade, especially during the bidding for World Cup 2022,32 this campaign’s size and momentum after the 2017 crisis seem to be bigger and represent unprecedented courage to speak for rights. Several tweets addressed and directly mentioned high authorities and figures in the state, namely the Emir, Amiri Diwan, and Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. According to Mitchell, “the politicization of the online public sphere in the region does not represent a fundamental change in the region’s diplomacy,”33 but also a new battleground for old regional rivalries. However, addressing the state’s 30

Babar, “The Cost of Belonging: Citizenship Construction in the State of Qatar,” The Middle East Journal, 68.3 (2014), p. 412. 31 Waas, The situation of stateless persons in the Middle East and North Africa, UNHCR (2010), p. 19. 32 A blog dedicated to the Al-bid¯ un in Qatar has been created since 2010. The blog publishes article defining this group of people, their situation, and shares different viewpoints about them, See: Al-bid¯un f¯ı Qat.ar. Retrieved from https://bedoonqatar.wordpress.com/. 33 Mitchell, “#Blockade: Social Media and the Gulf Diplomatic Crisis,” Review of Middle East Studies 53.2 (2019), p. 200.

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official high figures and symbols, and perhaps, in a more demanding and pressing manner than ever, is not a frequent move among local Twitter users. Remarkably, the “Tamim Al Majd” portrait that means “Tamim the Glorious” became a famous icon of unity and patriotism. The portrait was first designed by a young Qatari artist and can be seen everywhere in the public sphere, including several public entities, semi-public, and private. They demonstrate their solidarity with Qatar by installing the mural/portrait at their entrances and headquarters. The mural can also be seen in t-shirt, cars, and different interfaces.

Photo 1 Citizens and residents wrote messages and signed the “Tamim” portrait expressing their loyalty to the Emir. Grand Hyatt Hotel, Doha, Qatar

Photo 2 Widespread portrait sticker among car owners includes the phrase “Tamim the Glorious”

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As many would argue, such manifestations demonstrate that the Qatari society became more supportive of free speech. Before the blockade, a survey on “Media Use in the Middle East”34 conducted by Professor Justin D. Martin found that few Qataris felt comfortable speaking about politics (1 in 4), thought people should be free to criticize governments online (1 in 5), or felt the Internet is safe to say what one thinks about politics (1 in 8). In August–September 2018, most interviewees said they felt comfortable discussing politics and about half said people should be able to criticize governments online (48% in 2018, up from 19% the year before).35 Another important perspective is to look at Qatar’s post-blockade desire to embrace a new sort of citizenship and belongingness from a legal standpoint. The institution of citizenship represents the intersection of identity and the law and is the locus of constitutionally based articulations of membership in the state. “It is understood as a legal status providing privileges of social membership in a political community and, in the process, producing dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.”36 Thus, a look into the legal change is imperative in locating Qatar’s strategic response to enhance a new sense of belonging. Since the blockade occurred, we have seen that Qatar state policies, with some slight legal changes, play a tremendous role in shaping sociological realities related to the status of its citizens and people living in the country. The state issued statements in favor of workers living in Qatar, most notably passing two laws that strike at the heart of the sponsorship system (Kafala)—a long criticized labor system that all GCC countries use with slight differences among them. Qatar has abolished restrictions on migrant workers changing their jobs without a no-objection certificate from their employer and initiated a monthly minimum wage for some of the most vulnerable members of society. Amnesty International and other migrant worker organizations have indeed welcomed this positive reform development. However, there was a call on Qatar to implement more reforms in this regard. Additionally, Qatar has announced on January 16, 2020, that “most migrant workers previously prevented from leaving the country without their employer’s permission, including domestic workers, will no longer need an exit permit.”37 Despite the new legal announcement has a potentially positive impact on increasing the labor mobility freedom, even described by the Human Rights Watch as “an important step forward.”38 Still, there is much more to do to end the systematic abuse of migrant workers, especially those who are in exploitative situations. 34

Northwestern University in Qatar, Media Use in the Middle East 2018. Retrieved from http:// www.mideastmedia.org/survey/2018/. 35 Martin, “The Blockade of Qatar has made Qataris more supportive of free speech,” Washington Post, 8 April, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/ 02/11/why-are-qataris-now-more-supportive-of-free-speech/. 36 Molavi, “Stateless citizenship: The Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel,” Studies in Critical Social Sciences (2014), p. 4. 37 “Qatar: End of Abusive Exit Permits for Most Migrant Workers,” Human Rights Watch, January 20, 2020. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/20/qatar-end-abusive-exit-permitsmost-migrant-workers. 38 Ibid.

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Nevertheless, another significant law catching attention regionally and globally is Qatar’s new law for permanent residency addressed to specific non-citizens. This move, as many would argue, “is an indication that the Qatari leadership is using this crisis to its advantage.”39 The law allows children and spouses of Qatari women married to non-Qataris other long residing segments in the country to acquire permanent residence status, provided however, under four strict conditions.40 The law is the first in the GCC to bestow non-citizens with the economic benefits akin to those under full citizenship—including free education, free health care, and preferential hiring. The action is symbolically significant and will make some expatriates in Qatar feel like they now have a more substantial stake in the future of the country,41 which could give an incentive to more stability in the country, rather than just a temporary residency that must be renewed as per the contract with their employers. After the crisis hit, the confluence of all previous laws and legislation is an important foundation on Qatar’s response to the unfolded siege. It is necessary to understand how this serves the country as a strategic response to the crisis and the rise of such social demands, particularly in the present challenging period. Through their citizenship laws, the GCC states, including Qatar, have tried to ensure complete control over who has access to full citizenship.42 Not only that, the state has always been keen not to foment any sense of belonging except among a blessed minority of its citizens. Most migrant workers, which constitute a large part of the country’s social and economic dynamic, have always been excluded at different levels. Just as with other GCC countries, in Qatar, it can be seen how the state promoted the social exclusion of the overwhelming majority of the society, looking at how they can monitor possible interactions with the citizen population in public spaces. In looking at how the GCC states emphasize a specific physical and performative through dress, language, and consumption behavior, Abdulkarim Khaled argues that these practices are crystallized around concepts of exceptions and exclusions and its pivotal aspects for immediate identification the Khaleejis.43 Citizenship as a legal status, referring to the legal person being free to act according to the law and having the right to claim the law’s protection,44 is yet to be achieved in the context of Qatar. However, having these slight improvements in the legal phase implemented may play a pivotal role in establishing better social and economic 39

Mitchell, “Why did Qatar just change its residency laws?” Washington Post, February 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/09/whydid-qatar-just-change-its-residency-laws/. 40 Law No. 10 of 2018 on Permanent Residency. Qatar. 41 Shahine and Syeed, Game-Changing Qatar Law to Grant Expats Permanent Residency (August 3, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.fa-mag.com/news/game-changing-qatar-law-to-grant-expatspermanent-residency-33991.html. 42 Babar, “Enduring ‘contested’ citizenship in the Gulf Cooperation Council” (2018), p. 122. 43 Abdulkarim, “Crystallizing a Discourse of “Khalijiness”: Exclusion and Citizenship in the Arab Gulf States,” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal (15 May 2017). 44 Leydet, “Citizenship,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Zalta (ed.), Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/citizenship/.

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stability for those living in Qatar. Recent research conducted by Nabil Khattab and others aimed at examining the experiences of highly skilled migrant women working in Qatar found that “for the immigrant Arab and Asian women, their preferences would be for long term or perhaps even permanent settlement but within the current context of migration and nationality law in Qatar which does not allow for ease of access to citizenship, they are reconciled to the fact that they will eventually have to move on.”45 The study also suggests that Western, Asian, and Arab highly skilled women were found to be less attached to Qatar and lacked the feeling of belonging due to the current migration policies in Qatar that discourage long-term settlement in the country. As a result, expatriates refrain from developing any sense of belonging; however, Asian and Arab women may feel culturally closer to Qatar, perhaps due to religious and linguistic connections, which contribute to a stronger attachment to Qatar’s religious and linguistic connections.46 Meaning, for broad segments of Asians and Arabs in particular, there is a high potential of increasing belonging in their real life due to the present legal advancement. In studying different manifestations in the post-blockade era in Qatar, it is imperative, within the context of the crisis, to touch upon the surge in citizenship politicization in the way it relates to supporting democracy. In a study conducted and published in 2018, the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI)47 asked Qatari citizens about the importance of living in a democratic country; the same question was also asked before the blockade in another survey. To answer the question, importance was rated based on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the least important. The results of the survey “Qatar Against the blockade” indicate that 67% of Qataris believe in the importance of living in a democratic country by rating it 10 out of 10, which is twice the percentage of Qataris who believed in the importance of democracy in the survey conducted before the blockade (34%). Unsurprisingly, despite the strain of the Arab uprising in 2011 and being one of the region’s autocratic regimes, Qatar has not been extensively involved in citizenship stripping but has relied on other means to ensure social order. The emirate has retained the same approach, mainly relying on diplomatic support for several Arab external opposition movements and carefully invested in a high-risk yet useful strategy based on distancing itself from the neighboring Gulf monarchies and their predominantly anti-Arab spring, counter-revolutionary stances, which makes it a trustworthy regional mediator and broker. At the domestic level, the country does not seem to be undergoing a much-needed change in how it represents the minority of its citizens. The people have access to the top leadership, namely the Emir and his father. Accordingly, “they don’t need to

45 Khattab et al. “Gender and mobility: Qatar’s highly skilled female migrants in context.” Migration and Development 9.3 (2020), pp. 369–389. 46 Ibid. 47 Social and Economic Survey Research Institute, “Executive report: Qatar against the blockade” (December 2017).

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appoint a representative for the time being to deliver their demands,”48 as literally pointed by the minister of foreign affairs. Will Kymlicka has perfectly distinguished three kinds of demands in terms of citizenship: multicultural rights, special representation rights, and self-government rights.49 The first two rights related to the needs associated with immigrant and disadvantaged groups seem most pressing and immediate in the present time. However, the state cannot ensure being perfectly responsive to its own people’s demands, mainly due to the very diversified and demanding segments of vast and constant mainstream of migrants from all over the world that shape and determine the country as we know it today. To this extent, having analyzed a selected sort of official discourse, social media content, and legal developments after the June 2017 crisis, I found that the Qatari administration shows a very progressive strategy in response to the crisis. Throughout the 2017 crisis, there has been genuine support for Qatar along with an increasing online expressive campaign toward access to citizenship from the very segments of society, what considered an adopted home for many of them, in parallel with policies and discourse expanding access to citizenship and belonging to previously excluded categories of residents. It is certainly possible that the official discourse and digital content can be analyzed more sophisticatedly. However, it is only possible due to the research limitation to focus on every selected forms. Further more, the only way to assure a better result in the analysis will remain by doing more analysis.50 Interestingly enough, a different model of citizenship is developing. In addition to the predominantly known definition of liberal, nationalist, and post-nationalist models that stress the universal approach of citizenship, the concept of ethnonationalist citizenship first appeared in Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, refereeing to a specific doctrine that emphasizes nation or ethnic group.51 The latter has always helped determine the historical practice of citizenship in Qatar. The country has pushed further toward more inclusive citizenship and tolerating a broader sort of speech and activities. These positive developments notwithstanding, unless it is accompanied by even more freedom of speech and development of a strong political and civil society, retrogression might occur depending on the evolving regional security variables on the ground.

48

Speeches and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 05, 2017. Retrieved from https:// mofa.gov.qa/en/speeches/speeches-of-deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs/spe eches/45-chatham-house---the-crisis-in-the-gulf-qatar-responds. 49 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (1995), pp. 176–187. 50 Van Dijk, “Editorial: Analysing discourse analysis.” Discourse & Society 8.1 (1997), pp. 5–6. 51 Shafir and Peled, Being Israeli: The dynamics of multiple citizenship (2002), p. 6.

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4 Moving Forward? Crafting Citizenship and Belongingness for an Ever-Challenging Future Upon exploring the genuine significance of the crisis in Qatar and GCC, this section looks at the possible development of citizenship and belonging among people living in Qatar within the new regional conditions imposed by the crisis. It proceeds from the available data on the crisis and relevant indicators from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. It relies on the rentier state theory to further investigate the possible impacts and existing challenges concerning citizenry. To some extent, belongingness in Qatar shows the dire necessity of adopting a society-sponsored citizenship and belongingness against the prevailing model of state-sponsored citizenship. Ulrichsen indicates that since the domestic policies are enacted by Emir Tamim, he is likely to prioritize domestic policies. However, this strategic option is associated with less investment in foreign affairs and meaningless dependency on the longadopted diplomacy and economic investments to buy international influence. It was indeed imperative at a particular stage for the emerging country of Qatar, under the father of Emir Hamad Bin Jasim, to spend more in this regard. Expansion globally and regionally made Qatar act as a strategic response to the regional threats, particularly the break from Saudi-centered policies. Being a rentier state, the country has to engage heavily in buying international loyalty, especially with the hosting of the 2022 World Cup, which has placed Qatar in the limelight of the international scene. Since naming Qatar the host for the mega-sportive event, the country promised to invest largely not only in infrastructures but also human rights, sparing no effort to better improve the conditions of large inflows of skilled, mid-skilled, but most importantly, low-skilled workers in the country, the most vulnerable segments among all these groups. “The State of Qatar sits at the juncture of a major hub of global migration, and the story it has to tell about how a state negotiates the management of international migration, and national citizenship is an important one.”52 The inclusion, participation, and betterment of various segments living in the country became highly indicative of internal advancement in the country, but equally important, in commercializing a good image of the country at the international stage (Table 2). An overview of some relevant indicators generated from the BT index reveals a relatively stable pattern in terms of political indicators, including the separation of powers and political participation. The sustainability remains relatively stable, while the economic performance and status indicate a slight decrease, which may be explained by the 2017 crisis that hit hard the private sector in particular over other sectors, resulting in affecting companies headquartered in other parts of the GCC blockading countries. Interestingly, the political and social integration, as well as democracy status, has notably increased. The latter is not oft-seen in an autocratic regime located in the GCC, especially after the retrogression of the so-called the Arab Spring. Comparing the UAE and Saudi Arabia, for instance, using the three indicators from the same 52

Babar, “The Cost of Belonging: Citizenship Construction in the State of Qatar,” p. 406.

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Table 2 Selected social, economic, and political indicators about Qatar during the years between 2016 and 2020 Indicator

Units

2016

2018

2020

Separation of powers

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

2.00

2.00

2.00

Political and social integration

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

2.67

2.67

3.00

Sustainability

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

7.00

7.50

7.00

Civil society participation

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

4.00

3.00

3.00

Credibility

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

6.00

6.00

7.00

Freedom of expression

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

5.00

4.00

4.00

Political participation

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

2.75

2.25

2.25

Economic performance

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

10.00

9.00

9.00

Regional cooperation

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

8.00

8.00

8.00

Economy status

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

8.18

8.04

7.89

Democracy status

Score, 1 = lowest, 10 = highest

3.83

3.73

3.90

Source Bertelsmann Transformation Index Data—2020

index demonstrates, on the contrary, a slight decrease during the same period. The slight decline in civil society participation can be explained by two factors: the very small and restricted space given to the civil society on the one hand and the BTI’s variables and criteria used to gather the relevant data to this indicator on the other. Nevertheless, the data on regional cooperation and credibility does not seem very rigorous considering some facts. Qatar, ever since the blockade imposed by its neighbors, embarked on what appears to be a solo journey toward local production and diversified cooperation, relying on new emerging players in the area, namely Turkey and Iran, while reducing, if not boycotting the level of cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt—Qatar’s major old allies. Regardless of the BTI’s concept of democracy, that, as described in the index website, “goes well beyond other definitions of democracy, which are limited primarily to basic civil rights and the conduct of free elections”53 and, perhaps, does not include some important elements to describe the democracy as it is perceived and practiced in Qatar and the whole MENA region, highlighting the decrease in economic status accompanied with the relative increase in social and political indicators reveals what appears to be a new tendency toward more social and political liberalism in Qatar. This may be explained by high investment into alleviating the impact of the 2017 crisis on the Qatari economy and the financial and economic burdens brought about by the heavy investment in the 2022 FIFA World Cup infrastructure. Since the successful bid to host the World Cup 2022, Qatar has promised to invest billions to build and expand its world-class infrastructure, including a rail and road network

53

See the methodology of BTI project as described in their website, at: Methodology—BTI Project. Retrieved from https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html.

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and additional hotel rooms, apartments, and facilities.54 The budgeted expenditure of 2020 only is estimated at QAR 210.5 billion, up by 1.9% compared with the previous year, which is the highest in Qatar’s past five fiscal years.55 At an early stage of the significant arrangement to host the 2022 event, the increased economic return is yet to be seen. The country relies on the mega-event, not as an economic gain, but much more as a long-lasting legacy, to showcase Qatar’s unique identity and convey a positive image to the world.56 These objectives are intrinsically linked to Qatar’s long-term national strategy of 2030. Building on the rentier state theory as proposed by Hazem Beblawi is very beneficial in further explaining this point. Qatar represents a rentier state par excellence, “Only a small fraction of the population is involved in the generation of oil revenues, the rest being engaged in the use of the oil wealth.” Part of the rent goes to a high employment rate of citizens in the public sector. According to Qatar’s planning and statistics authority (Ministry of Development, Planning, and Statistics previously), over 75% of the Qatari labor force is employed in the government sector.57 The rent also goes to other benefits, such as free education, continued education, water, electricity, health care, including sponsored specialized medical treatments overseas, land grants, housing, concessional lends, and retirement. In health care, for instance, according to Alpen Capital’s GCC Healthcare industry report of 2016, the health spending in Qatar is to double reaching US$8.8 billion by 2020, it outperformed other GCC countries in terms of growth and per capita spending, but yet Qatar has not been able to keep pace with their rapidly growing population, resulting in a fall in the availability of beds per capita.58 In a similar vein, Qatar spends billions on establishing a world-class education and higher education system that range from national education provider to a wide range of western schools and campuses, as part of a strategy to enable a knowledge-based economy, and to integrate the Qatari citizens for various benefits to study domestically and overseas. In this sense, as per the rentier state theory, citizenship is an ultimate source of economic benefit. A country such as Qatar, with high financial allocation alone, can maintain legitimacy and, thus, stability through the very nature of the relation between the state and its citizens, which is based on the constant generation and 54

More details on Qatar investment can be seen at: Hukoomi—Qatar E-Government. FIFA World Cup 2022. Retrieved from https://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/topics/Tourism Sports and Recreation/fifaworldcup2022. 55 Ministry of Finance. 2020 Budget State of Qatar. Retrieved from https://www.mof.gov.qa/en/ Documents/2020StateBudgetInfographs.pdf. 56 Official narrative regarding Qatar aims from organizing such event can be seen at the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy (SC) website. The latter is the core entity responsible for implementation of host operations for the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 at: https://www.qatar2 022.qa/en. 57 Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, Labor Force Sample Survey 2018 (2019). Retrieved from: https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%20Releases/Social/LaborForce/2018/statis tical_analysis_labor_force_2018_En.pdf. 58 Alpen Capital, GCC Healthcare Industry (Rep.) (2016). Retrieved from http://www.alpencapi tal.com/downloads/GCC_Healthcare_Industry_Report_February_2016.pdf.

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distribution of rent. However, it is essential to emphasize with Michael Herb that this rent is subject to inflation and economic fluctuations. While the citizens consider their economic benefits not just the result of the rent allocation alone, but first and foremost, as a direct benefit from holding citizenship itself, hence, under this hybrid relation, citizens’ loyalty cannot permanently be ensured. It could instead put the whole system at stake. Citizenship may be considered a crucial tool in Qatari rent benefit’s management and distribution. “Qatari nationality law currently draws distinctions between different tiers of citizenship, so that those members who are original or native Qataris are entitled to more rights of citizenship than are those who acquire citizenship through naturalization.”59 This distinction in terms of benefits distribution based on being “pure Qatari” or “a Qatari through naturalization” can be seen more clearly and directly in public tenders awards, land grants, participation in elections, and nominations in the legislative body, in the same way, that it can be witnessed indirectly in prioritization in providing restricted services and distinguished appointment; however, those benefits are not stated clearly in law60 or negotiated publicly. They are somewhat agreed internally in the very societal harmony as per a symbolic consensus-building process. Despite Qatar being no exception in distinguishing between born citizens and naturalized citizens, Qatar may be a special case as a rentier state, in that the attempts to balance between social and economic needs of its citizens while ensuring sustainability, requires very complex societal agreements and gratifications. Likewise, it also requires a good deal of economic resources, which are certainly difficult to sustain in the long term. Looking at the ever-challenging forthcoming period, based on the conditions left by the blockade, and the current unprecedented circumstances imposed by the pandemic of COVID-19, one cannot but forecast more heavy pressure on the economic rents, accompanied with the additional limitation imposed particularly against the less-privileged segments of citizens. The latter will force to maintain a high level of government spending and may push further economic demands to make a more political sense, especially given the increasing interest in local and regional politics after the blockade, that will “undoubtedly affect the sociopolitical development in the State of Qatar” according to the survey conducted by SESRI. In addition to the side continued discussions in social media, “Majales,”61 institutes, research 59

Babar, The Cost of Belonging: Citizenship Construction in the State of Qatar, The Middle East Journal 68.3 (2014), p. 414. 60 The Qatar citizenship law 38 for the year 2015 article 4, 5, 12, 16 states clearly a distinction between Qatari and Qatari through naturalization. For instance: article 16 states “Naturalized Qataris shall not be equated with Qatari nationals in terms of the right to work in public positions or work in general until five (5) years after the date of naturalization. Naturalized Qataris shall not be entitled to participate in elections or nominations or be appointed in any legislative body”. 61 “Majlis” from the Arabic verb “Jalasa” means “to sit.” Refer historically to a council in which the male tribe members discuss issues of concerns, solve problems, and make decisions. Majlis refer to whatis known in west as the guest hall, meeting room or front parlor. It is a relatively big room where guests, usually male, are received and entertained. It is mandatory for a Khaleeji

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Fig. 1 Qataris’ interest in local and regional politics before and after the blockade. Source Social and Economic Survey Research Institute, “Executive report: Qatar Against the Blockade,” December 2017, 10

centers, and new emerging social and cultural clubs,all of which, form the operational foundation that the country leverages to create a knowledge society (Fig. 1). Furthermore, despite provisions within the constitution and slight progress in the first-ever long-awaited elections to the Shura Council,62 Qatar, for many legal and political experts, needs to strengthen and promote democracy and public participation. Qatar’s attempt to restrict citizenship as an exclusive field is hardly surprising given the booming and hybrid demography due to the tremendous flows of labor migrants. However, with political stability ensured in this manner, the impact of such a pattern is concentrated mainly on the high economic spending and goes beyond to futuristic impact on domestic market innovation, competitiveness, and attractiveness among foreign investors. Previous research revealed that “economic freedom and political stability have a positive and statistically robust impact on economic growth.”63 Thus, it seems that the state of Qatar ensuring regime stability through economic freedom requires less state guarding citizenship, though that poses a challenge under the present rentier setup. In Qatar, political, ideological, and, to large extent, economic power is heavily concentrated among the Al-Thani ruling family. It can be a tool for tyranny and oppression, in the same manner that it can be a tool to facilitate a swift shift toward democratic transition and societal openness, and it is important to understand that the decisions of private investors depend on factors that are partly under the control of

(Arab Gulf) and certainly Qatari typical house to have a private Majlis, placed directly in the very entrance of the house, and decorated in a specific manner. 62 The ruling Emir Tamim recently approved an electoral law that allows the nationals to run and elect 30 of the council’s seats while he appoints the remaining 15 members. 63 Bashir and Xu, “Impact of Political Freedom, Economic Freedom and Political Stability on Economic Growth,” Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 5.22 (2014), pp. 59–67.

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the government.64 Given the conditions, perhaps, the blockade against Qatar’s opportunities created, the Al-Thani ruling elite, namely the Emir, appears to be gaining more outstanding popular support than ever. The special historical reinforces societal cohesion and incentivizes people to proactively rallying around the leadership, making the very favorable conditions to facilitate the Qatari leadership taking a bold political decision to promote intercultural, inclusive, and diverse citizenship, enhance belongingness among various societal segments, and devote more consideration to overcoming different types of systematic practices of exclusion and ethnic discrimination. Qatar has ended a long historical pro-Saudi policy, which started in 1995,65 escalated during the Arab spring, and peaked by the present discussed June 2017 blockade. Qatar for instance was of something unprecedented in the modern history of the Gulf States, when Hamad bin Jassim (the Father) stepped down and passed the power to his son, Tamim bin Hamad—the current Emir of Qatar in June 2012. It is no surprise then that the ruling elite in Qatar are willing to take even further progressive decisions at the level of democratizing the state-society relation, while it sustains and strengthens the country’s security. Now, with Qatar positioning itself at the very heart of a relatively independent pathway, there appears that the small wealthier peninsula cannot but push toward more domestic reform. This is for the sake of legitimacy and credibility to the state’s international strategic choices, particularly those related to promoting the democratic transition in countries of the regions after the “Arab spring” and engagement in supporting transition states through its overt combination of diplomacy and investment,66 while also fostering the state security and continuing to project soft power in a regional neighborhood of high-risk forces with different agendas.

5 Conclusion The June 2017 crisis marked a shift in the GCC region. Qatar began what appears to be a new pathway at the international and regional levels, but even more importantly, at the domestic level. Citizenship and belongingness are at the heart of this new pathway. The research began by exploring the historical state-society formation and the material and symbolic development of a protected citizenship field and discussing how it is used to exclude or include groups or individuals depending on the state aims. This is clearly mirrored in the legal framework that offers citizenship rights for

64

Ali and Isse, “Political Freedom and the Stability of Economic Policy,” CATO Journal 24.3 (2004), p. 252. 65 “Qatar suspected Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain of playing a role in a 1996 countercoup attempt.” See Hammond, Qatar’s leadership transition: Like father, like son (February 11, 2014). Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf. 66 Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, p. 176.

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a minority of people, ensuring the flow of economic rents to them, and maintaining their loyalty. Furthermore, the research demonstrates that in the face of the threats brought by the blockade and the blockading countries, Qatar has seen an unprecedented societydriven manifestation from not only the citizens, but also less-privileged segments of the society, and aims at demonstrating what appears to be a common belonging to the state and public support toward the leadership. As such, the state, including its official narrative, has backed these manifestations. Drawing upon relevant scholarship, related Twitter content, and discourse analysis of the most important speech of the Emir, this article indicates that the new regional setup leads to a less restrictive environment around citizenship domestically and a greater state orientation toward reinforcing belonging. This has been illustrated in initiating new laws and labor policies intended to protect workers and promote social stability. While Qatar persists in a status of tensions at the regional and international levels today, the country must cope with significant political, social, and demographic challenges, particularly under the increasing limelight from hosting the upcoming FIFA World Cup 2022. Additionally, issues of food and water security, along with terrorism, affect the whole region. However, at a broader level, the crisis represents a concern for many countries of the region, including Arab countries such as Kuwait, Sudan, Morocco, and Somalia,67 which chose not to join the effort of blockading countries. It is equally important that the crisis represents a concern for western international actors as “the state formation processes of the smaller Gulf monarchies, and in particular, their historical relationships with Britain and other foreign powers, are crucial to understanding the political institutions that developed—especially those that fit with the neo-patriarchy and liberalized autocracy arguments.”68 Therefore, the quest for scenarios and future developments of the crisis in Qatar and the MENA region is unforeseeable, mainly without significant attention to the external factor.69 Perhaps more heavily, the crisis relates to external factors associated with the international relations and agenda of major players in the region, particularly the USA. At the crossroads of the long-existing model of “state-driven citizenship” and the emerging “society-driven citizenship” is that fact that Qatar, as a rentier state, continues to maintain a high structural level of autonomy from the social base, consisting of a large part of resident, which is still considered foreign in the presence of an exclusionary citizenship legal framework. Therefore, a strict and protected “national” public sphere remains under the pressure of a long-standing generation, who came originally to meet the state’s ambitious development aspirations, and 67

See for more, Almoustafa and Abdelrazig, “Another Way: Morocco, Sudan and Somalia React to the Intra-Gulf Crisis,” Siyasat Arabiya 27 (2017). 68 Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (2013), p. 229. 69 Scholarship has long been discussed the significant impact of the “external factor” on democratic transitions. For instance, Azmi Bishara and other researchers at The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies lead an important project dedicated only to this issue; see: Bishara, “Remarks on External Factors in Democratic Transition,” Siyasat Arabiya 38 (2019), pp. 7–26.

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most of them are culturally close to the native population. They developed a sense of belonging and nationalism. Missing the chance to legally integrate such people that are not “visitors” or even “residents” by no means threatens the human social fabric in Qatar and the national cultural heritage. Even more importantly, it may affect overall economic sustainability, as the substantial amount of rent generated externally from hydrocarbons cannot be ensured, particularly with the anticipated further global economic deterioration resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and the decreasing oil and gas prices.

References Primary sources Government Communication Office, GCC Crisis (2017–2020). Available online at: https://www. gco.gov.qa/en/focus/gcc-crisis/ Stiftung B (2020) Bertelsmann transformation index. Available online at: https://bti-project.org/en

Secondary sources Abdulkarim AK (2017) Crystallizing a discourse of “Khalijiness”: exclusion and citizenship in the Arab Gulf States. College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania Aleinikoff TA, Klusmeyer DB (2002) Citizenship policies for an age of migration. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. Ali A, Isse H (2004) Political freedom and the stability of economic policy. CATO J 24(3) Al-Janahi BM (2014) National identity formation in modern Qatar: new perspective. Qatar university: Thesis for Degree of Master of Arts Almoustafa H, Abdelrazig A (2017) Another way: Morocco, Sudan and Somalia react to the intragulf crisis. Siyasat Arabiya 27:44–55 Babar Z (2014) The cost of belonging: citizenship construction in the State of Qatar. The Middle East J 68(3) Babar Z (2018) Enduring ‘contested’ citizenship in the Gulf cooperation council. In: Nils A, Butenschøn, Roel M (eds) The Middle East in transition: the centrality of citizenship. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham Balandier G (1986) Sens et puissance: Les dynamique sociales. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Barakat S, Milton S, Elkahlout G (2020) The impact of the Gulf crisis on Qatar’s humanitarian sector. Disasters 4 Bashir MF, Xu C (2014) Impact of political freedom, economic freedom and political stability on economic growth. J Econ Sustain Develop 5(22) Bishara A (2019) Remarks on external factors in democratic transition. Siyasat Arabiya 38 Chaker R (2018) La Crise Du Golfe De 2017: Un an Après. Politique Etrangère 3:77–87 Czarniawska B (2004) Narrative in social science research. Sage Publications, London Davidson C (2013) After the Sheikhs: the coming collapse of the gulf monarchies. Oxford University Press, Oxford van Dijk TA (1997) Editorial: analysing discourse analysis. Discourse & Society 8.1

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Bennett JM (2012) Doing belonging: a sociological study of belonging in place as the outcome of social practices. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. The University of Manchester—School of Social Sciences Gumuchian M-L, Abedine S (2014) Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain withdraw envoys from Qatar. 05 March 2014. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/05/world/meast/gulf-qatar-ambass adors/index.html Hammond A (2014) Qatar’s leadership transition: like father, like son (11 Feb 2014). Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf Herb M (1999) All in the family: absolutism, revolution, and democracy in the Middle Eastern monarchies. State University of New York Press, New York Jessie M (2019) Oil and societal quiescence: Rethinking causal mechanisms in rentier state theory. In: The politics of rentier states in the Gulf. The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) Jill C (1995) Oil and politics in the Gulf: rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Jones CW (2017) Bedouins into Bourgeois: remaking citizens for globalization. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Khattab N et al (2020) Gender and mobility: Qatar’s highly skilled female migrants in context. Migr Develop 9(3) Kinninmont J (2013) Citizenship in the Gulf. In: Echagüe A (2013) The Gulf States and the Arab uprisings. FRIDE and the Gulf Research Center, Madrid Krieg A (2019) Divided Gulf: the anatomy of a crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, an imprint of Spinger Nature, Singapore Kymlicka W (1995) Multicultural citizenship. Oxford University Press, Oxford Leydet D (2017) Citizenship. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford, Fall Lister R (2007) Inclusive citizenship: realizing the potential. Citizenship Stud 11(1) Miller R (2019) Managing regional conflict: the Gulf cooperation council and the embargo of Qatar. Glob Policy 10(2) Mitchell (2019) #Blockade: social media and the gulf diplomatic crisis. Rev Middle East Stud 53(2) Molavi CM (2014) Stateless citizenship: the Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel. In: Fasenfest D (ed) Studies in critical social sciences. Haymarket Books, Chicago Nura muh.amad a¯ lmuh.sn (2014) mah.mud naˇgyb a¯ lmah.mud, ucmar hišh¯am a¯ lšhih¯aby; a¯ lta¯ bit ¯ w¯almutah.awil a¯ lhlyˇg bayna a¯ lšhiq¯aq a¯ lmuˇgtamcy wa tar¯abut. a¯ lm¯al w¯a sult.a. Beirut: Muntada ¯ c a¯ lma a¯ rif Oruc N (2018) Hashtag unity in the midst of the blockade of Qatar. Master’s Thesis, Qatar University Shafir G, Peled Y (2002) Being Israeli: the dynamics of multiple citizenship. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Shahine A, Syeed N (2017) Game-changing Qatar law to grant expats permanent residency. Retrieved from https://www.fa-mag.com/news/game-changing-qatar-law-to-grant-expatspermanent-residency-33991.html Ulrichsen K (2014) Qatar and the Arab spring. Hurst & Company, London Ulrichsen K (2019) How Qatar weathered the gulf crisis. Foreign Affairs, 14 Aug 2019. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-06-11/how-qatar-wea thered-gulf-crisis Ulrichsen K (2020) Qatar and the Gulf crisis. C Hurst & Co., London Van Waas L (2010) The situation of stateless persons in the Middle East and North Africa. UNHCR Wintour P (2017) Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia. 23 June 2017. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabiaissues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade

Regional Geopolitical Conflict and the Fragile State: Foreign Influence and Lebanon’s Sovereignty Zinat Hassan

Abstract This paper examines the geopolitical conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon between the period 2005 and 2011. The study is based on indepth studies of the literature on the geopolitical conflict in the region and the ongoing conflict in Lebanon, in addition to other literature related to the subject of the study. The study draws its information from relevant and authoritative books, academic articles and Web sites. It aims to explore the reasons behind the geopolitical conflict between the two regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia and provides an analytical framework for this conflict. It examines the real reasons that tempt Iran and Saudi Arabia to interfere in Lebanese political affairs. The result of this study showed that the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon is for regional power, making use of Lebanon a fragile state. This paper is divided into five sections in addition to the introduction, conclusion and references. Keywords Lebanon · Geopolitics · Foreign interference · Sovereignty · Sectarianization · Political and identity mobilization

1 Introduction Lebanon is based on sectarian pluralism due to the state’s recognition of 18 different religious sects, including 12 Christians, five Muslims and one Jew (UNDERSTANDING LEBANESE CONFESSIONALISM 2007). Lebanon is a country of “consensual democracy” due to its political system that relies on sharing power according to the demographic weight of the diverse societies (Roeder et al. 2005). The Emirate of Mount Lebanon was a nucleus that was under the Ottoman control until 1920 when the state of Greater Lebanon was established by the French mandate, and after that, Lebanon gained its independence in 1943. In Lebanon, the first three presidential positions are distributed on a sectarian basis: The Presidency of the Republic for the Maronites, the Presidency of the Parliament for the Shiites and Z. Hassan (B) Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_27

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the Presidency of the Council of Ministers for the Sunnis (T.ar¯abuls¯i 2012, p.111). Likewise, jobs in the first category are distributed on sectarian basis (T.ar¯abuls¯i 2012). In 1990, according to the Taif Agreement that put an end to the civil war (1975–1990), the constitution was amended, so that the number of parliament members became 128 divided equally between Muslims and Christians, after the number of Christian seats was greater before that. In this way, the powers of the Christian President of the Republic were amended and greater powers were given to the “Council of Ministers as a whole” (T.ar¯abuls¯i 2012). Consociational democracy is a political process in which the decision-making power remains in the hands of the leaders of ethnic or sectarian groups within their societies with great independence while making decisions at the national level largely unanimously (Lijphart, 1969). Leaders in this type of power use their veto power to prevent any group from controlling others (Lijphart, 1969). Moreover, consociational democracy is a government by an elite cartel designed to transform a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy (Lijphart, 1969). This may appear to be an appropriate model for divided societies where political parties represent political, religious and social subcultures. In the case of Lebanon, the multiple sects are the subcultures (Cammett 2019). Nevertheless, challenges to democratic consensus in Lebanon arise due to the tendency to distribute institutions of power along societal lines, thus reinforcing divisions on the basis of sectarian identity. Horowitz (1990) suggests that integrative institutions force politicians to request the support of members of other societies to gain and retain power. This approach is useful for explaining how existing institutions in Lebanon build incentives to gain support outside of their religious communities. The reality of Lebanese politics is more complex than the literature depicted on the influence of regional states on Lebanon. This country is a political regional bridge used by regional powers to achieve these powers’ own gains and settle scores. Lebanon’s history indicates that this country attracts foreign and regional powers due to several factors, the most important of which is Lebanon’s multi-faceted identity and the geopolitical position of Lebanon. The regional and foreign powers have participated in the Lebanese domestic politics with the aim of influencing the political course in a manner that suits the interests of these major powers. Civil wars, crises and political deadlocks seem intractable at the heart of the disputed regional order over its dominance by regional powers, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia. According to Salloukh (2013), “Lebanon was the second site of the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical confrontation.” Lebanon is at the center of the regional system and is therefore constantly exposed to the influence of these regional tensions (Salloukh 2013). In other words, there is no doubt that the dynamics of regional power struggles have perpetuated local crises in Lebanon. It seems clear that Lebanon is one of the most important wings of the Iranian-Saudi regional conflicts, making its territories one of the most important arenas for competition between these two regional powers. The confrontational strategies adopted by Iran or Saudi Arabia as regional adversaries lead to reactions that lead to the outbreak of indirect conflicts. These regional confrontations translate into local conflicts and political crises on the territories of

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others. This can be inferred from the ever-changing political dynamics in Lebanon, especially in the aftermath of 2005 and the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. In addition to the complexity of the situation, Lebanon is affected to varying degrees by the regional power struggle, as a result of the conflict of local political interests in Lebanon with the geopolitical interests of the dominant regional powers. Moreover, the impact of the regional geopolitical conflict on Lebanon often puts this country in political deadlocks that are difficult to get out of without regional or external interference. This is indeed what the historical events since the establishment of the modern state of Lebanon indicate, that settlements to Lebanese political crises do not occur without external and regional interference. Thus, from the regional scene, it appears that Saudi Arabia is accusing Iran of playing an extremely destructive role in Lebanon. While the Iranian viewpoint justifies its behavior in Lebanon as a defensive response to the Israeli military threats and the military bases established by the United States in neighboring countries (Cammack & Dunne 2018).

2 Analytical Framework: The Saudi-Iranian Struggle Analyzing the political and security instability of Lebanon requires returning mainly to examine the nature of the Iranian-Saudi conflict, and thus building a deeper understanding of the Lebanese situation. There are many debates in academic and political circles about the interpretation of this regional conflict. The most important of these discussions takes place around three schools of thought in the social sciences: The primordial, instrumental and constructivist. The primordial interpretation assumes that the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a religious conflict that reflects an ancient and deep-rooted hatred that is difficult to solve (Geertz 1963). However, this approach does not provide an explanation about the relevance of the conflict to identity. To better explain the rise of ethnic divisions and the politicization of ethnic and religious identities such as those that revolve around Iran and Saudi Arabia, one can rely on Varshney’s approach, which provides a constructive and instrumentalist approach (Varshney 2009). Although the validity of the ethno-ethnic conflict cannot be denied, the primordial, instrumental and constructivist approaches cannot be ignored, and they are all old approaches that are not upgraded according to modern contexts. In looking at the issue of religious identity in the modern conflict, sectarianism and political mobilization are the best thing that can be relied upon to map out the new policies in the Middle East (Hashemi & Postel 2017). To transcend the understanding of sectarian identity from a monochromatic framework, a multi-layered model can be adopted that works on four dimensions: Religious, sub-national, national and transnational (Hashemi & Postel 2017). An examination of the concept of sectarianism for identities in all of their forms can provide a better understanding of sectarian identity (Hashemi & Postel 2017).

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Therefore, it cannot be completely dropped on the reality of the Iranian-Saudi conflict as a result of the change in Middle Eastern policies that altered the fall of Iraq in 2003. The Middle East is witnessing convulsion, regional turmoil and internal conflict, as the Middle East is not only defined by trade relations and diplomatic interaction, but also by power relations and military capacity (Cammack & Dunne 2018). Sectarianization and political mobilization map the new policies of the Middle East (Hashemi & Postel 2017). Therefore, the new Middle East cannot be defined solely through Arab or national identity, but rather its character is determined by Shiite neighborhoods and Sunni reactions to them (Nasr 2004). The Middle East also became known by how Iran’s geopolitics are formed and revived in the region (Elias 2019). Indeed, the regional conflict is a geopolitical confrontation (Salloukh 2013). Building supranational alliances with dynamics and linking them to the internal conflicts of modern nation states make alliances develop to gradually turn into a geopolitical actor (Hassan 2018). Against this discussion background, it is possible to understand cross-border alliances, how they are built and their implications for the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. The best explanation for penetrating the sovereignty of fragile states is Malcolm Kerr when he called it the Arab Cold War between the revolutionary nationalist camp with socialist tendencies and the conservative monarchy regime, Iraq and Jordan, centered around the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which adopted a non-military confrontation (Kerr 1981). Instead, the internal political systems of the weak state were employed in the confrontation between the two revolutionary nationalist camps and the conservative monarchies (Kerr 1981). Attempts to explain the escalation of these regional conflicts center mostly in the context of the geostrategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the imbalance of power. According to Malcolm Kerr’s study, this geopolitical conflict was called the “new cold war” due to the similarities that are many with the first Arab Cold War, but with the inclusion of a non-Arab actor and the employment of sectarianism in the struggle to achieve the self-goals of regional powers (Gause III 2014). Likewise, through the rediscovery of the Arab Cold War, in the 1950s and 1960s, the IranianSaudi confrontation, with the highlighting of the Arab dimension, is described as a “new Arab cold war” (Valbjørn & Bank 2011).

3 Regional Interference in Fragile State: The Case of Lebanon The characteristic of a fragile state may be the best way to describe Lebanon (Palanch 2016). Regional powers intervene in the affairs of weak or fragile states in order to protect their interests. Hence, foreign and regional powers are selective in their intervention based on their interests and priorities and according to specific calculations of the gains and costs necessary to achieve them, for themselves and for their allies and the losses incurred by their opponents. The regional conflict is taking a new trend,

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due to the replacement of international and regional conflicts with internal conflicts, as they are exploited in order to penetrate local political societies and economic and security entities, especially in fragile states such as Lebanon (Abdulkader 2017). This country constitutes an internal platform for regional conflicts in a system based on institutional sectarianism, where the regional balance of power and the interventions of regional sponsors (Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria) or external (the United States and Russia) determine decisions mainly on the Lebanese political scene (Palanch 2016). Iran and Saudi Arabia, as major actors in the region, are not confronting militarily, but are competing for influence in the domestic political systems of weak states in the region (Gause III 2014). In fact, this conflict is a struggle to manage the domestic politics of weak or fragile states, as is the case in Lebanon. The military and political power of the parties to civil conflicts and the contribution of external parties to this force are more important than the military balance of power between the regional powers (Kerr 1981). In the Cold War, weak regimes like Lebanon face difficulty in controlling their societies, and local players seek behind regional alliances against their local opponents, which gives non-international players a prominent role in the internal crisis, and this applies to Lebanon (Gause III 2014). Saudi Arabia and Iran are playing a game of balance of power and using sectarianism in this game, but both of them crossed the line of sectarianism in the pursuit of regional alliances (Gause III 2014). Despite the importance of sectarian manipulation by regional powers in the power balance game, the weakness of some Arab countries and the role of weak political regimes in some countries in the region in opening the battlefields by proxy in favor of the regional powers cannot be ignored (Gause III 2014). In fact, the weakness and failure of the state, which are evident in Lebanon, make it difficult to rebuild a political system in this country. In order to better understand how Lebanon reached this situation, it is necessary to return to the moment of the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the moment of changing the balance of power in the Middle East. This fall led to the increasing fears of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia about the expansion of Iranian influence in the region (Kabalan 2015). Saudi Arabia’s response to the Iraq crisis was mainly driven by concerns about the balance of regional powers because it believes that Iran will use its position of influence in Iraq to strengthen the position of regional hegemony precisely in the wake of the American withdrawal (Kabalan 2015). In other words, if the roles between regional powers were to be reversed, Lebanon would be severely affected as it is an arena for the Saudi-Iranian conflict. Saudi Arabia has an ally, Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the Future Movement. Iran has Hezbollah as an armed ally. Consequently, any regional military development will have a real impact on the Lebanese scene. In this context, the invasion of Iraq was a turning point in the formation of geographical policies, and that Lebanon is the second site of the geopolitical confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Salloukh 2013). Moreover, the escalation of regional conflicts provokes local conflicts, until the continuous regional rivalries are being formed as armed conflicts, political deadlocks or crises on the territories of failed or fragile states. Iran and Saudi Arabia are not competing for influence in the region by directly confronting each other. Instead, they use fragile

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states as negotiating and pressure cards to exercise influence (Gause III 2014). This applies to the Lebanese case. Examining the roots of the conflict in Lebanon since the civil wars of 1860, 1958 and 1975 (Kisirwoni 1980), and the political crises in 2005 with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Cammett 2019), it has been proven that these violent events or political stalemate were caused by or by regional or foreign powers (Salloukh 2013). It can also be concluded that each sect Lebanon derives its support, legitimacy and authority in power from foreign protectors. In other words, foreign interference is not new in Lebanese political life (Kisirwoni 1980). Rather, it started from the Ottoman period and the French mandate, up to the period of Syrian tutelage over Lebanon (Harris 2021)) and the Taif Agreement in 1989 that ended the civil war (Roeder et al. 2005). Indeed, since the past two decades, Lebanon has witnessed violent events and foreign and regional interference, as Iran and Saudi Arabia have become the main regional protectors of the Lebanese sects (Salloukh 2013).

4 Saudi-Irani Geopolitical Struggle in Lebanon Lebanon is considered the most important country in the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Gause III 2014). The regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has exacerbated the polarization among the Lebanese who are allied with these two rival regional powers (Khatib 2014).

4.1 Saudi Intervention in Lebanon The political and security perspective of regional challenges, in addition to the geostrategic dimension, contributes to shaping Saudi Arabia’s strategy to intervene in Lebanese domestic politics. This, in turn, indicates that Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Lebanon must be understood from the perspective of the changing relations between the Kingdom and Iran as a competing regional actor. The balance of power in the region and its preservation makes Saudi Arabia pay attention to the appropriate strategic dimension that places Saudi Arabia firmly in the regional confrontation, specifically Iran. Accordingly, one can understand the regional intervention in Lebanon to play the role of proxy in the regional confrontation between the two powers Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi relationship with Lebanon goes back to the year 1952, after the first visit of Lebanese President Camille Chamoun to Saudi Arabia, which was struggling with the Arab ideology led by Gamal Abdel Nasser (2019). Saudi Arabia then chose to support the Lebanese right, with its Christian majority, against the left-wing Muslim majority who support Arab nationalism and to confront the Westernization of Lebanon. At that time, Saudi Arabia offered its financial and military support to

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the Christian forces in the face of its Arab opponents, the opposition to the Arab revolutionary movements in Lebanon. The Saudi intervention in Lebanon is due to several factors, the most important of which are religious, political and ideological ties. In addition to that, the relations of many Lebanese businessmen, especially the relationship between the Hariri family and political and businessmen in Saudi Arabia (Harris 2021). All these factors strengthened the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to become important factors in the dynamics of Saudi intervention in this country. In short, religious ties, identity politics, strong businessman relations and geopolitical dynamics are important factors in Saudi Arabia’s right to interfere in Lebanese domestic politics. Saudi Arabia interferes in Lebanese internal affairs through its Sunni allies (Zneid 2018). Saudi Arabia became the patron of the Sunni community, following the Taif Agreement in 1990. At that time, it was clear that Saudi Arabia was rebuilding its presence in Lebanon under the pretext of reconstruction while dedicating itself as a direct guardian of a Sunni sect that was fighting for its presence in Lebanon, especially in the face of the Syrian regime that occupied Lebanon for more than three decades (Arabi post 2019). Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was appointed Prime Minister, with the support of Saudi Arabia, to establish an understanding with the Syrian regime, the de facto ruler of Lebanon (Arabi post 2019). This is how Lebanon was ruled by the formula: Syria-Saudi Arabia. The first was based on taking over the security and political files, while Hariri left foreign diplomacy and the economy with Saudi funding.

4.2 The Assassination of Hariri in 2005 It sparked the Saudi-Iranian conflict on Lebanese soil. The Iranian-Saudi conflict on the Lebanese soil intensified once again after Hezbollah participated in the Syrian war with the support of Iran (Palanch, 2014). Lebanon bears the repercussions of destabilizing regional balances after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, in addition to the shock resulting from the assassination of Hariri, which was followed by the withdrawal of Syria and Lebanon’s entry into a new cycle of political and security turmoil. Thus, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri made Lebanon an arena for conflict between the interests of these powers (Bahout 2016). In addition, Saudi Arabia abandoned its policy of supporting the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon, and the Saudis decided to support the United States and France in pushing the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1559 (Dawisha 1984, 229). In the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the allies in Lebanon continued without change. “There are unique relations between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia,” said Fouad Siniora, prime minister of the March 14 government that was elected in the spring of 2005 (Thompson, 2002, p. 74). At the moment, after the collapse of the March 14 Alliance and the fall of Saad Hariri’s government in 2011 and the presidential vacuum for more than two years that led to the election of Hezbollah’s Asian ally in Lebanon, President Michel Aoun, it

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seems that Saudi influence has significantly diminished from the Lebanese political scene and they have not been able to diminish its influence. The Iranian in Lebanon. In light of the rise of Iranian influence in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia has acted as a regional power competing with Iran since 2005 to counter the rise and influence of Iran in Lebanon and Syrian alliance. In this context, Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in Lebanese domestic politics by employing pre-existing ties between the kingdom, the Lebanese Sunni community and the Hariri family to oppose the rise of the Shiite Crescent. Thus, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia changed from a traditional friendly policy toward Lebanon to a progressive confrontational policy to confront the Iranian rise in Lebanon and the region, especially between 2003 and 2005. However, the Saudi intervention in Lebanon failed to prevent the rise of Iranian influence in this country. Saudi Arabia’s failure to isolate Syria from Lebanon between 2005 and 2008, as well as its failure to expel Syria from the Iranian camp, led to allowing the Axis of Resistance coalition, namely Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, to consolidate its influence in Lebanon. Moreover, the decay of the Cedar Revolution after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri also diminished the prospects for establishing stronger Saudi influence in Lebanon at the expense of Syria and Iran. This trend culminated in the armed confrontation in May 2008 between the March 8 and 14 forces in Beirut and the surrounding areas.

4.3 Iranian Intervention in Lebanon There is no doubt that Iran is the second decisive actor in Lebanon. Iranian interference in Lebanon is not a new phenomenon, as we look at the links between the Lebanese Shiite community and the Iranian Shiites going back to the sixteenth century, where frequent contacts and cultural intersections arose between the two sects (Salamey & Othman 2011). Nevertheless, the strong alliances between the Lebanese Shiites and their Iranian counterparts were strengthened after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Salamey & Othman 2011). To create this alliance, Iran found common intersections, the most important of which was the export of the Islamic Revolution regionally and the creation of a common ideology, which is the fight against the Israeli enemy, internal mobilization and the politicization of the Lebanese Shiite community in the midst of the Lebanese civil war. This convergence led to the creation of Hezbollah, which over the following decades became one of Tehran’s strategic assets in the region, serving Iranian foreign and domestic policy. Cross-border alliances between the Lebanese Shiite community and Iran have intensified since 1982. The ideological affinity of the Shiite group and its adherence to Khomeini’s teachings contributed to the increase in ties between the two parties. The close relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is clear through its logistical, financial, military and economic support. Iran’s intervention in Lebanon since the 1980s has mainly focused on supporting and assisting Hezbollah to preserve its existence and power. Hezbollah is considered an Iranian party in Lebanon, and since

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its inception, all the party leaders have pledged allegiance to the Wali al-Faqih, as legitimate proxies of Iran in Lebanon (Rasanah 2016). One of the Hezbollah’s real goals is to create a foothold for Iran to intervene whenever it wants to implement its geostrategic plans in Lebanon. The relations between Iran and Hezbollah are special according to a sectarian and religious approach. Coordination between Hezbollah and Iran is highest on critical issues, internally and externally (Rasanah 2016). The privileged relationships allow both parties to speak on behalf of the other on their positions on issues, to direct unified policies and to form influential alliances. Iran speaks on behalf of Hezbollah in regional and international affairs and supports it, and on the other hand, the party operates under Iranian orders, resulting in a politically fragmented, sectarian conflict infiltrated by Iran (Rasanah 2016). Moreover, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005 gave Iran a greater opportunity to increase its direct influence in the country. Consequently, the Syrian withdrawal was a decisive turning point in Iran’s relationship with Lebanon when Iran found itself in the Lebanese arena to defend Hezbollah against any attempts to disarm the group or restrict the resistance and thus may be a potential threat to Iran’s influence in the region. Iran would like to present itself as a regional alternative to Lebanon’s Western allies, particularly the United States and its regional allies led by Saudi Arabia. This was evidenced by Iran’s offer to provide financial and military aid to Lebanon, as well as strengthening the Axis of Resistance, which includes Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is clear that Iranian influence has escalated, and currently, Iran’s influence has become strong in Lebanon in conjunction with the political rise of friendly governments dominated by Hezbollah in cooperation with its internal allies, especially the Free Patriotic Movement led by Gebran Bassil. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Iran will be able to overcome sectarian political divisions in Lebanon and pull this country away from the other regional geopolitics toward Iran, especially in the presence of the rival regional camp, specifically Saudi Arabia, which rejects Iran’s policies in Lebanon and the region. This will serve Iran Policy against Israel.

4.4 Israeli War This war sparked the geopolitical war that reached its climax in Lebanon in the wake of the July 2006 war, accusing Hezbollah of seizing the country’s decision on peace and war (Gause III 2014). The 2006 war intensified the rivalry between the so-called Axis of Resistance that encompassed Iran, Hezbollah and Syria on the one hand and the moderate axis led by United States and its ally Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the geostrategic war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has revived in Lebanon the ideological debate about the ideological relationship between Iran and Hezbollah (Fuller 2007). For example, Hezbollah wanted from behind the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers in 2006, which caused the Israeli aggression on Lebanon during the same year, to reduce pressure on Iran regarding its nuclear program. The whole

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world has turned to follow what is happening to Lebanon. It was an attempt to deliver a message that Iran could take the war from the Iran and Gulf region to Israel and Lebanon (Rasanah 2016). Saudi Arabia showed renewed activity during this period: The Saudis actually began to escalate their role in Lebanon in August 2006 for 26 days, on the one hand, and this activity translated into renewed support for the government and renewed economic assistance to the country (Gambill 2010). The 2006 war revived Saudi efforts to support the Lebanese government and the March 14 forces and contained the role and influence of Iran and Syria in Lebanon, through Hezbollah and its local pro-Syrian allies (Abukhalil 1990, p.7). Therefore, Saudi Arabia was utterly firm in its condemnation of Hezbollah, declaring: “It is necessary to distinguish between legitimate resistance [to the occupation] and the irresponsible adventure adopted by certain elements within the state” (Abukhalil 1990, p.7). The Saudis tried to stop the rise of Iran and resistance axis, but its attempt has failed (Gambill 2010). Together with a strong grip by Damascus and Iran, through its local ally, Hezbollah, over Lebanon’s political destiny by controlling the opposition forces and confronting the regional Saudi and their allies in Lebanon (Gambill 2010). Saudi Arabia’s attempts were clear in its intervention in Lebanon with the aim of undermining Hezbollah’s legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of its Syrian and Iranian sponsors, yet it was never able to undermine Iran’s regional role in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s military operations showed the Saudis that the Iranians and their local ally had become a quasi-army—and certainly a very powerful force to be reckoned with when, for example, the seizure of the capital, Beirut, in May 2008. Riyadh was extremely dissatisfied with the Iranian rise in Lebanon, expressing its condemnation of Hezbollah, saying: “Iran’s support for the coup that took place in Lebanon and its support will have an impact on its relations with all Arab countries” (Khazen, 2001). From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, the potential rise of a Shiite Crescent that includes Iran and Lebanon may represent a terrifying scenario, especially if coupled with the progress of the Iranian nuclear program (Barzegar, 2008). Nevertheless, the alleged involvement of Hezbollah, which started the assassination of Rafik Hariri, made the Special Tribunal for Lebanon at the heart of the Lebanese political scene once again, leading to the immediate intervention of regional powers to mediate in this case, and they regained the roles they had installed themselves as mediators of influence in Lebanon (Blanford, 2010). To discuss the implications of the indictments for the International Tribunal for Lebanon in November, the Iranian, Syrian and Saudi ambassadors met in Beirut, a move also aimed at recognizing that Tehran wants to be part of any agreement reached on the issue (2010). Relations between internal allies, Syria and Iran, have been strained over the issue of protests in Bahrain. It is understood that Saudi Arabia, which has invested heavily politically and militarily in stopping the protests in Bahrain, if the criticism continues, will directly affect bilateral relations and was not satisfied with the Iranian protection campaign in favor of the Bahraini Shiites (Berti, 2017).

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4.5 The Syrian War The Syrian war cannot be isolated from the sectarian tensions in Lebanon and the regional conflict on its soil. Syria war in 2011 exacerbated the division between political forces, including those supporting the Syrian regime, especially Hezbollah and its allies, and others strongly opposing, especially the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri. The Syrian issue occupies a large place in Lebanese political life, as Hezbollah intervened in 2012 on the side of the Syrian army to confront the opposition under the pretext of protecting Shiite villages in Syria. Among the repercussions of this conflict is that Lebanon is used as a transit corridor for weapons and recruitment of fighters, in addition to transforming some Lebanese regions, especially in the north, into a safe haven for those fleeing the regime or opponents of it. Hezbollah’s overt intervention in 2012 alongside the regime forces in Syria caused great controversy and political tension. Syria serves Iran’s broad strategy in the region, as it represents the vital link between Tehran and Hezbollah. Iran believes in defending the arms transit corridors for the party on the one hand, and confronting the Arab regional axis led by Saudi Arabia, which aims to contain the growing geopolitical power of Iran on the other hand (Rasanah 2016). Hezbollah supported the Syrian regime militarily, with Iranian encouragement, to protect Damascus, which is the main strategic bridge linking Iran and Hezbollah. On the other hand, many Lebanese Islamist groups support the Syrian opposition, which is the archenemy of Hezbollah. Iran maintained the land bridge linking it to Hezbollah and expanded its influence over the land of the Levant (Cammett 2019). Iran supplies weapons to Hezbollah via the Syrian land bridge, to be its strongest ally in the internal political equation, and thus a pressure card on the Lebanese political system to respond to Iranian interests (Rasanah 2016). Iran is primarily concerned with preserving Syria’s prominent role in the axis of defiance, as well as preserving its main goal, which is securing its regional deterrent power. Hence, the collapse of Damascus was not something that could be tolerated, as it negatively affected Iran and its allies in the region (Cammett 2019). This includes securing supplies to Hezbollah in Lebanon (Cammett 2019). The sharp internal political divisions over Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria are fueling security concerns and sectarian tensions in Lebanon (Khatib 2014).

5 the Internal Factors Attracting the Regional Conflict in Lebanon There are many internal factors that facilitate and change foreign and regional interference in Lebanon, the most important of which are political system and sectarian identity.

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5.1 Fragile State Political and security instability allows the outside to invest in the internal division, and foreign and regional interests have priority, because they exploit the weakness and disintegration of the Lebanese interior, so external and regional powers deal with Lebanese parties and not with the state, because it is the weaker party (Arab Center, 2020). Investing in Lebanese crises is a justification for the existence of political forces, all of which depend on the outside and become hostages to it in order to continue, and therefore, these parties will not accept the cancellation of their justification (Arab Center, 2020). One of the most important reasons for the intervention is primarily due to the fragmentation of Lebanese societies as a result of the sectarian division, making this country a fertile ground for internal discord and an attractive target for foreign political investment under the pretext of settling Lebanese disputes. Most of the foreign interventions in Lebanon were to achieve direct or indirect control over the Lebanese political decision or to settle scores between foreign powers on Lebanese soil (Kisirwoni 1980). Moreover, the absence of a defensive strategy in Lebanon and the singling out of Hezbollah alone in resisting any Israeli attacks, in addition to Hezbollah’s playing a regional role since 2011, places Lebanon as a battleground for regional and international confrontation (Arab Center, 2020). The proliferation of weapons in the hands of some Lebanese causes great security chaos that threatens national security. The proliferation of weapons often causes security disturbances and chaos, the most dangerous of which is the use of weapons inside Lebanon. Hezbollah directed the use of its weapons internally, and this was clearly demonstrated during the events of May 7, 2008, when the Lebanese capital, Beirut, was occupied by Hezbollah militants (Bahout 2016). This makes Lebanon a failed state that cannot impose its control over all Lebanese groups.

5.2 Failure to Provide Social Services for Sectarian Groups It is not possible to separate politics and economics in Lebanon, nor can economic development be separated from external and regional interference. The real problem relates to the fact that the absence of a real civil state in Lebanon to rebuild the political, economic and social system hinders facing foreign and regional interference (Arab Center, 2020). The failure of the Lebanese system to provide basic social safety nets plays a fundamental role in consolidating sectarianism and facilitating the foreign and regional interference. The absence of the state’s role in providing basic services to citizens has made sectarian religious institutions replace the state in providing social services. Sectarian actors, including clerics, politicians and parties, control social welfare institutions to pave the way for them to conduct sectarian practices that

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dominate social and political life. Consequently, these sectarian components dominate their sectarian group by presenting themselves as protectors and guarantors of societal well-being. In other words, they provide the grassroots community with social services and help them access the benefits provided by informal institutions, either directly or through indirect mediation (Cammett 2019). The economic system reflects the domestic and external balances of power. Sectarian quotas, which are the economic translation of the system for distributing power, share between sects (Arab Center, 2020). Likewise, loans and development aid are a translation of the manipulation of external and regional powers into the economy of Lebanon in accordance with the interests of regional powers (Arab Center, 2020). All sectarian educational institutions in Lebanon received financial support from foreign countries (Al-Koumi, 2020).

6 the Repercussions of the Regional Intervention in Lebanon When the Middle East region traverses a delicate circumstance, this will have repercussions for Lebanon. Lebanon’s stability does not come from within, but rather from foreign and regional powers, not for a noble goal, but rather to serve their interests (Zneid 2018).

6.1 Erosion of Lebanese Sovereignty The sovereignty of the sectarian dimension is a fundamental dilemma that presents an opportunity for regional and foreign interventions. The problem is not that Lebanon is composed of Sunni, Shiite, Druze and Christian sects. Rather, the unfortunate calamity occurs when its components and its political body are politicized, as the regional powers master this process well in Lebanon. The sects’ recourse to foreign powers becomes an indispensable necessity that leads to the Lebanese regime’s inability to resist foreign interference (Arab Center, 2020). Sectarianism and crossborder alliances serve as internal political and religious platforms that facilitate the penetration of Lebanese sovereignty by foreign powers. The dominant regional powers act as an ideological umbrella to undermine the sovereignty of the fragile state, taking advantage of sectarian overlap with political files (Hassan 2018). This penetration can be seen through the visits of representatives of foreign countries to the heads of sectarian political parties, ignoring all aspects of Lebanese sovereignty. That means that the fragility of Lebanon, afflicted by the ongoing internal sectarian conflicts, facilitates the investment of regional powers in the deteriorating political reality by strengthening one side over the other. In this way, the geopolitical game is being implemented in Lebanon through the local arms of

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Iran and Saudi Arabia, as Hezbollah’s control in Lebanon has been strengthened by Iran and confronted domestically by the Sunni Saudi Arabia by strengthening local Sunni proxies. This dynamic takes us to a crucial issue, which is the violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and its penetration by foreign powers, so that Lebanon lives in a crisis of political dispossession, accompanied by the erosion of its geographical borders due to political loyalties that cross national borders starting from the individual and ending with political groups. Therefore, the Lebanese state appears weak and more exhausted to the extent of obliterating its sovereignty and integrating it into the struggle for regional power balances. Lebanon appears to be in a dynamic positioning that is driven by foreign and regional interference, using cross-border alliances to manipulate internal disputes. This is what makes Lebanon lose its full sovereignty over the country. In Lebanon, the Saudi and Iranian governments have developed close relationships with various parties, primarily through the provision of financial and diplomatic support but sometimes with direct military assistance as well, to influence the course of conflicts and advance their respective interests (Fanack 2021). As a result, the state’s authority is undermined, its concept of the state is distorted, and Lebanon’s sovereignty is subject to foreign interference. The cross-border alliances were as essential factor to make Lebanon as a stronghold of extremist militants (Samaha 2015). A large segment of the Lebanese considered that Hezbollah had a greater role in invoking the ISIS threat by participating in the fighting in Syria, which led to more bombings and assassinations in Lebanon, which contributed greatly to the Lebanese government’s involvement in battles with extremist parties (Samaha 2015). It is said that had it not been for Hezbollah’s participation in the fighting in Syria, we would not have seen ISIS in Lebanon (Samaha 2015). While others believed that Hezbollah protected Lebanon from Extremist, namely ISIS (Counter Extremist Project 2021).

6.2 Political Deadlock and Fragmentation In most cases, regional interventions prevent the formation of the government while awaiting the green light or the secret word to break the formation knot (Ya libnan 2018), and thus, the crisis of government formation in Lebanon is not only an internal crisis but is most often the result of regional and international interventions and pressure on this country using transnational alliances (Yalibnan 2018). For example, the Christian-Christian representation was problematic in the formation of the government in 2018, which is nothing but an expression of a regional and international desire to put in place a two-way Christian equation that includes the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (Arab News, 2018). At that time, a political mix under the auspices of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia re-aligned the Lebanese Forces, the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party, to form a tripartite political alliance in the face of Hezbollah’s political alliances (Arab

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News, 2018). Iran’s intervention in Lebanon is causing political fragmentation as a result of Hezbollah’s control of the state’s political, economic and perhaps military joints, with Iranian support (Rasanah 2016). Hezbollah has become dominant in political decision-making in Lebanon, especially after it obtained the blocking third in the government. Against this background, Iranian influence became stronger and expanded in Lebanon, taking advantage of the weakness of the Lebanese state and the lack of authority over its territory. The regional powers support and establish institutions with a sectarian dimension in Lebanon that resulted in what is called “sectarian fighting,” the entry into civil wars similar to the Lebanese civil wars in 1975, the fragmentation of society and the exhaustion of the state’s powers. The sectarian fighting in Lebanon is in favor of a sectarian faction that seeks to tighten its control over the political and economic equation in the country to implement the agenda of the regional countries that support it. The internal political forces in Lebanon are competing to acquire ministerial portfolios to achieve balance between groups or to prevail over another. Nevertheless, an attempt by a particular party to seize power fails in Lebanon due to the political parties’ association with strategic regional allies. Governments can only be formed and decisive decisions taken on the basis of a Lebanese-regional equation instead of the Lebanese-Lebanese equation. Recently, a new feature has entered into the formation of governments in Lebanon, which is the “time feature.” The use of the time period is a new Lebanese maneuver that allows regional and international interventions to take a greater margin of time to make changes to the portfolios and distribute them in line with their regional self-interests. Only then will the regional powers release their decision to launch the formation of governments in Lebanon and remove obstacles to their functions. It is clear that regional interference in forming Lebanese governments is political manipulation to increase internal pressure in forming them to serve the interests of regional powers. It seems that the internal conflict supported by the regional powers has failed to achieve their goals so far, and the victory of the Lebanese Forces is limited to their steadfastness in their positions, the thwarting of the proposals of the other and the preservation of civil peace. Lebanon today suffers from a crisis of political deadlock that seems long and complicated. There may be no possibility of resolving the dispute before regional disputes are resolved.

6.3 Obliterating the National Identity Lebanon is an ideal case for understanding how identity and regional and external support fuel tension as society in this country is divided into different sects. The sectarian political and economic system is strongly based on an ideology supported by regional and external forces that lead to the national identity. Identity is not deeply rooted in society but rather an evolving component of politics, which is constantly being shaped and reconstructed (Petrikkos 2018). Against a backdrop of continuing tensions in Lebanon, ostensibly on sectarian lines, the

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country’s stability is at risk, as are competing sectarian entities at risk. As a result of this crisis situation, the sects demand protection from foreign powers and thus the realization of the self-interests of these sectarian entities at the expense of the national interest (Cammett 2019). Thus, sectarianism in Lebanon is fueled by internal and external regional accounts and misguided identity politics. Religious sectarianism has a dimension that transcends the national sectarian boundaries, which is represented by cross-border religious solidarity and solidarity. This indicates the interrelation between the cross-border sectarian dimension and religious identity. In this sense, the transboundary public sphere connects different national environments. For a more synergistic concept of national and transnational solidarity, nationalism and calls for transnational solidarity are often rooted in national agendas (Zisser 2009). For example, the synergy of the Sunni Muslims in Saudi Arabia with the Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, and likewise the sympathy of the Shiite Muslims in Iran with the Shiite Muslims in Lebanon. No one doubts that Hezbollah’s loyalty to Iran is preceded by its loyalty to the Lebanese state. The sectarian, societal and political divide is a conduit for external interference that prevents the Lebanese people from uniting in a unified state. The division over identity, interests and the future has failed to reach a Lebanese societal unity (Arab Center, 2020).

6.4 Preventing Political Change Scenarios of dismantling any uprising or revolution in Lebanon, distorting it from its course and integrating it into the cycle of international regional conflict in the region are always present. The Lebanese revolution was lost in the corridors of regional and international conflicts raging in the Middle East. Day after day, regional interference increases, and the greater the popular mobilization in Lebanese fields, the higher the level of this external interference, and the stances of regional players appear (Alritnawi 2019). Iran described the 2019 revolution as riots led by “riots” led by the United States, Israel and some countries in the region with reference to Saudi Arabia (Al-Rintawi 2019). On the other hand, the National Security Adviser in Israel stated that the popular revolution in Lebanon is a historic opportunity that Israel should not waste to achieve tactical and strategic goals to influence the course of events in Lebanon (Al-Rintawi 2019). Iran is interested in preserving Hezbollah’s power and weapons in Lebanon. This is why Iran fears any popular revolution that might have potential repercussions that lead to a change in the Lebanese political system. In return, Saudi Arabia urges its local allies to ensure the results of the uprising according to its desires. The movement was represented by the Saudi intervention in the communication movement that it conducted with agents and allies, and the funds were paid in semi-publicized ways, and inflammatory media coverage (AlRintawi 2019). Regional countries are pushing any Lebanese uprising or revolution in directions that serve their divergent agendas, making Lebanon fight a proxy war.

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In fact, they are not interested in the aims and motives of the uprising. Rather, what it is interested in is that none of the regional powers fall under the domination of the opposite camp. What matters most to regional powers is that the enemy’s allies do not achieve a knockout victory at the expense of their allies in Lebanon.

6.5 Political Economy and Financial Crises Lebanon’s exposure to the regional conflict, in addition to the politics of local powers, constituted an obstacle to obtaining loans and development aid, whether from foreign countries or some regional powers (Arab Center, 2020). Since the summer of 2019, Lebanon has witnessed an accelerating economic collapse due to the deteriorating economic situation and the decline in foreign reserves. It put in place an economic recovery plan and sought help from the International Monetary Fund. After 17 sessions, negotiations between the parties were suspended (Alquds 2020). The international community requires Lebanon to undertake necessary reforms in order to obtain international financing to get it out of the cycle of economic collapse, including $ 11 billion pledged in 2018 during an international conference sponsored by France (Alquds 2020). In the case of Lebanon, regional and foreign interference occurs due to the types of institutions and sectarian practices that contribute to the preservation and strengthening of sectarian identities that require influential power brokers to enhance their development and foreign protectors to strengthen and perpetuate them. Lebanon needs foreign capital to face the economic and financial crisis it is currently going through, as well as deep reforms in terms of financial and economic policies, institutions and governance structures (Khishin 2020). Lebanon relies on a development approach backed by regional powers that are manipulating it to reshape the regional economic geography. The financial and development assistance provided by regional powers is for the benefit of the sect and its subordinate regions, which ultimately led to the division of the country into isolated political and sectarian cantons, as happened during the civil war. This aid prevents the breaking of barriers between Lebanese regions or sects and thus creates a culture of clientelism in providing public services, political influence and artificial borders between Muslim, Christian and Druze regions. Thus, if the aim of the aid that is flowing from some regional powers is a noble goal, then it is directed toward the members of a specific sect and not the other. Moreover, it prevents the balanced development of regions, culturally, socially and economically, which increases divisions along sectarian lines. The financial crisis is a rare opportunity to strike the party and disarm it, if Israel took advantage of it and pressured the donor community to stipulate disarming Hezbollah, in return for Lebanon’s access to aid and soft loans. Thus, it is said that there is no way out of the economic impasse without removing the cover from Hezbollah (Alritnawi 2019).

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7 Conclusion Sectarian conflicts in Lebanon are not concerned with issues of religious belief or the pursuit of sectarian homogeneity. Rather, they are related to national integration, exclusion and a means of accessing the state’s resources and institutions. In addition, Lebanon is a key agent in settling conflicts between regional powers by proxy, and it is a fundamental pillar that helps shift the regional balance of power in favor of one of them. This pushes regional powers to compete for power and influence over Lebanon. Although the regional and international players in Lebanon are constantly changing, interference in Lebanese political affairs by these forces is one of the constant political features in Lebanon. Lebanon was and still is an alternative battleground for regional and international parties to settle scores. It is clear that Lebanon plays a prominent role in the regional powers’ battle through its local arena. External factors affect the political course of Lebanon, as long as the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia reflects negatively on Lebanon. This also makes it possible to believe that reaching political settlements between these two regional powers may have a positive impact on Lebanon. The rapprochement between the two regional powers could revitalize political life by overcoming the political deadlock. However, this political rapprochement between the two regional powers will not mean the end of the conflict over regional issues, leading to persistent fears of destabilizing political, social, economic and security life in Lebanon.

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Interfaith Dialogue: A Path to Reconciliation Mohammed Abu-Nimer

1 Introduction The need for dialogical discourses and skills is widely needed around the globe. Building, institutional, group, and individual awareness and capacities to dialogically engage with those who are different from ourselves is a crucial element in conflict prevention and crisis intervention. Dialogue deals with misperceptions and negative assumptions that fuel negative attitudes and justify exclusion and discrimination. Perceptions and misperception constitute a major factor in generating violent conflicts and sustaining their dynamics of suspicion, distrust, fear, hopelessness, and helplessness. Such feelings and perceptions exist in a range of different scales and intensities in many violent and nonviolent conflicts. Despite the popular assumption held by many people in which only societies deeply divided and torn by violent conflicts are subject to such dynamics. However, deep-rooted racist and xenophobic antagonistic attitudes and sentiments against foreign refugees, especially Muslims in certain European and North American settings, are part of the daily public discourse. Building dialogical capacities through teaching and training is an essential component of building peace and restoring social fabric in deeply divided societies and post violent conflict processes. It is also needed as a preventive measure and a possible tool to contribute to social change in uncovering and confronting different forms of structural violence in the Northern hemisphere context. This article explores principles, tensions, and paradoxes and challenges in conducting capacity building interventions while focusing on interfaith and interethnic dialogue in particularly in a conflict setting.

M. Abu-Nimer (B) American University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 I. M. AlDajani and M. Leiner (eds.), Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08713-4_28

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2 What Is Dialogue and Why? Since the end of the cold war in the late 1980s, ethnic and religious identities return to occupy the centre stage of the world politics. Often identity is described as set of layers of awareness that the person accumulates over her/her life journey. These layers of conscious vary in their priorities, sharpness, and focus (gender, religious, political ideology, race, ethnicity, etc.) Nevertheless, over time, humans have used identity politics to incite and sustain conflicts1 ; once a conflict is in place, many peacebuilding tools are brought in place by either third parties to ease the tension and help find a resolution. In such context, dialogue is one of discourses and tools utilized by third party to build peace. Enhancing institutional, group, and individual awareness and capacities on how dialogue can serve as a crucial element in conflict resolutions and prevention. Fundamentally, dialogue process is about building a container or a space for individuals and groups to critically examine their current and past perceptions and judgments of themselves and others. Dialogue also deals with misperceptions and negative assumptions that fuel negative attitudes and justify exclusion and discrimination. Indepth, dialogue can unveil the fear from the other and grantee a safe space to delve into difficult and painful issues in the relationship with the other. Such a process can gradually help in confronting fears of trusting the other and believing in the possibilities to find mutual ground and overcome animosities that are necessary to build and sustain peace. “My learning journey of dialogue has a special value for me; I felt safe to delve deeper into difficult issues of stereotyping and deal with my misperceptions through dialogue principles and techniques”.2 Such statement is what a dialogue facilitator hopes to happen with courageous participants in dialogue encounters. For an individual to admit her/his level of fears, ignorance, and misperceptions, one should have truly experienced a powerful encounter, one so powerful that it made him/her re-examine deep-seated assumptions and misperceptions of the other side and his/herself. The encounter is a platform that allows participants to look at themselves through the other. A dialogical encounter is contrary to what many people think or describe, and it is not meeting the other. It is meeting oneself and confronting his/her own negative images and biases of the other. In the encounter, we need the other to show us what we think and feel. The other becomes the mirror in which we examine our own feelings and ask risky questions that otherwise, we will not ask if we are not forced to meet the other in a trusting environment. Moreover, a dialogical encounter pushes the participant to meet his/her own fears from those whom he/she thinks they are similar or different. Such a meeting is painful where the person uncovers feelings and attitudes that were carried overtime 1

See Kwame Anthony Appiah; The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity, New York: W. W. Norton, 2018. 2 An Iraqi participant providing feedback to the group after his five days dialogue training (December, 2019).

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and were preventing acceptance of the other, or even sometimes justifying the use of violence. For example, in a dialogue setting, when two Iraqi participants from different faith groups encounter, they will have to confront each other questions, fears, and perceptions about causes of their homeland conflicts: why Iraq is a wartorn country? Why can’t we embrace our nation’s diversity? Why did we not know much about each other faith and ethnicity? A dialogical encounter contains certain dynamics that facilitate a painful process of self-discovery, which has been prohibited or blocked (intentionally or unintentionally) by social agencies. The blocking of such a process is certainly done intentionally by most socialization agencies. A society with all its agencies has conspired against its members to prohibit and prevent everyone, especially children, from dialogically meeting the other. The above two Iraqi Kurdish and Arab or Shia and Sunni are victims of this social, political, and educational structures that deprived them from meeting each other in a safe space to deepen their understanding of each other from an early age. Thus, the skills of posing self-critical questions regarding the other (enemy, different religions, or cultures) are often lacking. In fact, it can be highly dangerous to publically speak about the perspective of the other faith groups or their truth, especially when there is an on-going conflict with such groups. Being accused of betrayal or treason is just one of the potential consequences that a daring person can face from his/her own community (or even family). For example, if an Azeri citizen speaks about the Armenian perspective on the Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent clashes, it can cost him/her his own career if not citizenship. But what is the role of religious agencies in facilitating a culture of encounter? What are the challenges that obstruct genuine dialogical encounters?

3 Faith and Dialogical Encounters Most, if not all, religions claim certain exclusive truths. The membership in each faith has requirements, duties, and privileges. The degree of critical self-examination varies between and even within members of the same faith group. Nevertheless, currently there are theological interpretations that have been constructed, especially throughout the last century, in a way that allows for the possibility of dialogical encounters with other faiths. However, such hermeneutics is neither necessarily mainstreamed nor dominant in most faith groups. On the contrary, those who believe and promote interfaith and/or intra-faith dialogue often find themselves on the defensive in the margins of their own faith group. They face many challenges from within.3 The engagement in a dialogical encounter process requires that the follower accept certain assumptions, of which some might contradict his/her own faith group’s theological interpretations. The conditions for an effective dialogical encounter include six key elements briefly discussed in the following section.

3

See Michelle Gerrard and Mohammed Abu-Nimer: Making Peace with Faith. 2018.

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First, it is critical to have trust in other faith group members. Trust is necessary to build a relationship based on honesty and transparency. In conflict areas, especially in contexts in which religious identities have been manipulated by the various sides to justify violence in the name of protecting one’s own faith groups, it becomes highly challenging to take the risk of trusting members of the other faith. In a context like Israeli Palestinian conflict, misperceptions and stereotypes are deeply ingrained in the collective mind and psyche of the three Abrahamic groups. Thus during the early stage of the first encounter, participants often admit to the following negative images: “Muslims cannot be trusted, they always side with each other in situations of violence; that is what their faith tells them. Don’t you know about their brotherhood pact?!” “Jews will always stick together no matter what you do with them”. “Christians only buy from each other. They cannot be trusted”. Such statements are not exclusive to this region; for example, in Sri Lanka, Buddhist, Muslim, Hinds, and Christian participants exchange such views when they met for the first time. The second dialogical encounter principle is rooted in the notion that we are all here in the encounter for the purpose of learning about each other. Within most faith groups, learning about other religions is done through one’s own clergy and religious agencies. In fact, there are whole systems or structures within faith groups that have evolved to specialize in teaching children and adults about the other faith groups and their religions. In Islam, for example, Da’awa (spreading the word of Allah), which consists of comparing Islamic teaching to the teachings of other faith groups, is very central in persuading the individual to adopt the path of Islam. Similarly, the Evangelical missionary tradition has a practice that compares the protestant teachings to Catholic teachings, or other faiths like Judaism, Buddhism, etc.4 Even faith groups that do not adopt conversion as part of their belief systems, the religious institutions provide their followers with answers to the question of who other faith groups are and why “ours” is better or the best path. Thus, adopting the principle of being able to learn from others about one’s own faith or others’ faith(s) is a highly challenging practice. The dialogical encounter participant finds himself/herself facing the following dilemmas: how do I deal with the information that was given to me about the other faith groups by my religious authorities? Who is right and who is wrong when the information is contradictory? Who has deceived me? Once the religious participant adopts the principle of learning through the encounter, the pressure of defending one’s own story as was told by the rabbi, imam, priest, or Buddhist monk is relieved. The participants begin exploring the possibilities of new sources of information about their own faiths and other faith groups. The third dialogue principle is that the dialogical encounter has to take place through proper communication channels and a venue that allows the religious and cultural meanings and codes to be interpreted accurately. This means that Muslim participants have to listen fully and be able to articulate clearly their own perceptions 4

See article by Omar Rashid and Dudley. in David Augsburger and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Muslim-Christian Conversations for Peace. Fuller Theological Seminary and Salam Institute, August 2006.

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of their Islamic spiritual and religious identity. In most cases, participants arrive at the encounter with a default communication system that is based on inter- and intra-religious defensive and offensive strategies of interaction. In the encounter when a Christian participant describes his perception of Islam and Muslims, on many occasions, the Muslim participants immediately assume the role of the traditional teacher who needs to “set the record straight” and make sure that the other speaker knows the “correct version of Islam”. This dynamic repeats itself when the Muslim describe Christianity or Judaism. Due to the negative historical collective memory and current interreligious conflict dynamics, the need to defend is deeply installed in the followers mind. Thus, open communication is rarely deployed or utilized in the encounter. Facilitators are certainly needed, at least in the initial encounters to ensure that the old and default negative communication patterns are broken and at least partially replaced with newly and jointly agreed upon communication methods. The new form of interreligious listening allows the Jewish participant to verify if the message stated by the Muslim indeed meant what she/he understood. This verification process takes place through the encounter by posing questions such as: when you said … did you mean to this…? Or this is what I understood from your message… is this what you meant to say? Although such statements or open questions seem simple yet, they are very effective tools to prevent the person from blindly using his/her own religious framework to understand and communicate with the other. Symmetry is another principle that ensures the effectiveness of the dialogical encounter. In outside reality, individuals or members of a faith group are rarely in asymmetric relationship with each other. The fact that they belong to different ethnic or national groups has placed them in asymmetrical power relations. For example, the Sri Lankan Muslim clergy, as members of a minority in a Buddhist dominant majority state, will always feel underrepresented and less influential than their counterparts, the Buddhist clergy. Similarly, a member of the Christian clergy in the Egyptian context will experience the same feeling of asymmetrical relations when he/she is in the presence of a member of the Muslim clergy from al Azhar who belongs to the dominant Muslim majority. Such asymmetrical ties are reflected in daily social and cultural encounters. However, the dialogical encounter is based on the assumption that all members of the group are equal and have the same rights for expression and action. No priority is given to a member of the dominant faith group in society; on the contrary, often facilitators compensate for the external asymmetrical relations by empowering the faith minority groups throughout the encounter. For example, one such way of empowerment would be providing the minority faith group with their own independent and safe space to practice their own rituals and develop their own separate path for engagement with the dominant faith group.5 Symmetry is crucial for the dialogical encounter to affect issues of justice and grievances. Faith groups will not feel comfortable if the encounter design reproduces the outside reality within the encounter and gives privileges to the dominant 5

See Helmes (1990).

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faith groups. For example, in the Philippines, during an interfaith encounter between Christians and Muslims, the location and venue of the meeting were often decided or determined by the Christian groups and their agencies who organized the encounter. The site in many cases was a Church or related property. A number of Muslim participants expressed frustration and demanded to change the venue or to at least have a meeting within Muslim territories. The language of the encounter is another manifestation of the asymmetric relationship, when Arabic speaking participants in an Arab-European encounter were told that they could not speak their own language and no was translation available, English was utilized as a common language for the encounter. Providing such participants with the opportunity and space to feel equal to their counterparts is essential in nurturing the dignity and respect in the dialogical encounter. Unfortunately, many European-Muslim encounters suffer from this limitation since the European culture of communication and interaction is dominant and is frequently considered the “proper” way to conduct the encounter. Conversely, participants from Muslim societies are expected to adjust and abide by the rules of the dominant majority. Obviously, the dialogical encounter cannot entirely escape the asymmetric interreligious relations in the outside reality. As stated by Abu-Nimer and Lazarus in capturing the asymmetric relationships in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict and its implication on the encounter: The “toll” of the conflict is not equally distributed among the participants, nor is it only psychological. Israelis and Palestinians live in a reality of asymmetric power relations, in which most Israelis are born with access to rights, resources, and opportunities that are denied or severely curtailed for most Palestinians. Many Palestinian participants struggle during encounters with what they experience as over-psychologizing the relationship, or blurring the differences between Israeli life in a society enforcing an occupation and Palestinian life tinder occupation. Psychosocial approaches encourage participants to articulate and recognize their separate and unequal social realities. Such recognition is an essential step for participants on both sides to understand each other’s distinct, but equally real and equally human, fears and needs, the different ways in which both groups perpetuate the dynamics of conflict, and the different ways in which people on each side pay “the price of no peace. (Abu-Nimer and Lazarus, 2007).6

However, the organizers of the encounter can be intentional in shifting the dynamics and constructing an environment that allows the minority faith groups to feel more empowered and the dominant majority to experience a dynamic of genuine equality. When the participant from the dominant faith group experiences and accepts the possibility for equal and symmetrical relations, their theological framework changes in a way to allow them to hold on to the newly constructed view of the other. One such example occurred when Sunni Muslim participants from a dominant faith group in a second dialogical encounter in Pakistan began articulating Qura’nic and hadith 6

See Abu-Nimer, Mohammed and Ned Lazarus. “The Peacebuilder’s Paradox and the Dynamics of Dialogue: Psychosocial Approaches to Israeli/Palestinian Peacebuilding”. In: Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots Peacebuilding between Palestinians and Israelis. J. Kuriansky (Ed.) Greenwood Press, 2007.

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sayings to support their newly constructed view of the Shia and other minority groups who attended a dialogical encounter. Organizers of interfaith encounters have the opportunity to construct and design their dialogical encounters with a great deal of symmetrical conditions within each encounter’s design and process. A decision to do so will affect their choices regarding the type of participants they select, venue and location of the encounter, the language to be utilized, food to be served, games to be played, projects to be initiated, etc. The fact that many religious institutions avoid such symmetry in encounters often reflects the level of commitment to genuine dialogical encounters versus symbolic or ritualistic encounters that replicate the dominant subordinate interreligious dynamics existing in reality. The fourth principle for dialogical encounters is related to the ability of the participants to take risks through the interreligious dialogue. Taking risk is an important step for each participant in the dialogical encounter. If the participant does not take any risk in the interaction with other faith groups, he/she is not able to learn beyond his/her comfort zone. Educational and learning theories have already empirically established the principle that the zone of learning expands when the learner dares to ask questions and takes a risk in pursuing new information from other sources. Thus for a Muslim participant to learn more about Christianity in a dialogical encounter, he/she needs to dare to ask about the theological grounding of the Holy Trinity and being able to compare and contrast with the his/her own Islamic theological interpretations. Similarly, the Christian needs to ask daring questions about the notion of Jihad in Islam and be able to listen to the Muslim participants in articulating the spiritual and religious meaning of Jihad in his/her own faith. In dialogical encounters, taking risks is not only related to raising challenging theological questions or critically examining your own faith interpretation and narrative, but it can extend to posing questions about the religious identity and its boundaries as it is manifested in reality. For example, a European Christian participant in a dialogical encounter with Muslim and Jewish Europeans can explore ways in which the European Christian institutions culture has benefited his/her life in comparison to other religious minorities in the European context. Exploring these privileges related to religious identity can be risky for such participants. The realization that as a Christian in a European, context you do not have to worry about the legitimacy or accessibility to your rituals might lead to a new awareness or need for action. In many encounters that do not encourage risk-taking through the process of the dialogue, Participants tend to remain in their comfort zone and recycle the same information and knowledge or awareness that they have had prior to the encounter. A genuine dialogical encounter will not only be focused on ritualistic presentation of the faith groups but goes beyond that. It allows participants to pose questions that otherwise are not possible to rise in day-to-day life or interreligious interaction. The fifth principle for dialogical encounter is the ability to engage with the other and with one’s own faith group members and discuss difficult theological and nontheological issues. In many encounters, participants and organizers intentionally or unintentionally avoid dealing with difficult issues because of their fear to experience discomfort and pain. Also, others argue that it is better to focus on commonalities and

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avoid differences. Avoiding difficult issues reduces the possibilities of building a deep and sustained trustful relationship. If such an approach is adopted and participants remain on the surface or in the polite stages of interaction, their relationship will also be temporary or will not build enough resilience to withstand the political or security crisis. In fact, many dialogue groups have collapsed once violence escalated within or between their groups due to the lack of trust and lack of commitment.7 Tackling the hard issues means that the dialoguers in the interreligious encounters have allowed themselves to venture into the disputed areas that in the past had generated and will continue to generate distrust and suspicion between the members faith groups. For example, in Muslim and European dialogue groups issues such as historical crusade campaigns, colonialism, Palestinian issues, and Islamophobia are examples of challenging themes that have to be addressed in order to reach a level of trust and sense of honesty in the discussion. On a theological level, issues such as: (a) recognition of the Holy Trinity as a fundamental difference between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity; (b) recognition of Islam as a faith or religion by the Christian and Jewish religious institutions; (c) the concept of jihad in Islam; (d) sexual orientations in all religions; (e) gender roles; etc. are issues that need to be raised and explored. When the encounter deliberately avoids these controversial issues and focuses on the interreligious commonalities such as peace, forgiveness, justice, prayers, fasting, or charity, the dialogue space becomes less risky, less vulnerable, and more comfortable for its members to maintain their negative perceptions of the others too. Obviously, delving into the difficult issues needs to be done gradual and professional. In addition, it needs to be built on the phase of exploring interpersonal and intercultural commonalities. However, the process should not stop there with these commonalities. Critical thinking and critical self-reflection emerge from the dialogical encounter that confronts the differences and controversial issues. The respect for diversity deepens when members of different faith groups realize that there are inherent contradictions and differences that the dialogue cannot bridge and those ought to be accepted and respected as part of the relationship. The above principles of interreligious encounters are obviously applicable to other forms of encounters, too. Also this is not an exhaustive list of principles that can enhance interreligious encounters; however, they are central in shaping the process, design, and outcome of the dialogue. Having explored the principles for interreligious dialogical encounters, we can move on towards dialogical encounter paradoxes more in-depth examining theory versus real-life encounters when a group of participants meets in a dialogue circle that focuses on the limitations of interreligious dialogue from an institutional perspective.

7

See research findings on Israeli-Palestinian dialogue groups after wars and Palestinian uprisings (Abu-Nimer 2004; Abu-Nimer and Lazarus 2007).

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4 Managing Dialogue Paradoxes8 As mentioned above, there is an asymmetric power relation among participants in the dialogue due to their different realities, narratives, and histories with the conflict. As a result, they arrive at the dialogue with different motivations, which in part produce three primary areas of tension and paradoxes for the dialogue’s facilitators, convenors, and donors.9

5 Talking Versus Acting Most participants from the minority groups or those who have less access to sources of political, social, or other forms of power, tend to join dialogue groups mainly for changing systems and structures of deprivation. Thus, the success and failure of dialogical encounters for them are measured by the willingness of the remaining participants to act in solidarity for such change. Thus, the interreligious encounter is limited in its effect or success when it remains on the abstract level and participants are not able to commit to any sort of joint or unilateral action. Such a process or dynamic is often cited as a limitation of many interreligious dialogue or encounters, “these are talking shop encounters” is a statement repeated by many critics. To walk the talk is an expectation that is often shared by participants in the initial interreligious dialogue encounter. Members of the different faith groups join the encounter because they are frustrated from their reality and the type of relationship their community has with the other faith groups. Thus, they want to change. However, they soon realize that other members differ in their capacity, willingness, and awareness of what they can do and what needs to done. Thus, the interreligious encounter becomes a platform for exploring what can be done together and separately to respond to the challenges facing the faith groups. The paradox is sharpened further with the dialogue principle of learning and the need for action. As stated above, learning and understanding the other and oneself is based on a safe space for learning and a non-judgemental environment of selfexamination. For those who seek immediate and even short terms action, this process often seems too slow and unfair. Facilitators keep repeating action cannot be a precondition for dialogue. The exclusive or overemphasis of emphasis on action produces pressure on those who are not ready to act and need a safe space to question, analyse, and reflect on the history and current reality of the relationship and system. 8

See William (1999). Examples and evidence to support the analysis presented in the following section is based on the author’s engagement with KAICIID’s interreligious encounter programs between 2013 and 2019, in four main regions: Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria, Myanmar, and the Arab region. Also other examples are derived from series of interfaith training conducted within the Interreligious Fellowship program which have trained over 250 fellows from the five major faith groups (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism).

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When facilitating process, it is crucial not to be pulled away by the pressure of the African American participants call for immediate justice and action and leaving behind the white Anglo Saxon participants who are yet to see their role in maintaining the racial privileges system in United States society or not able yet to deal with the social price of publically challenging such system. A similar pattern can take place in a dialogue setting among Tamil, Muslims, and Sinhalese to meet in Sri Lanka. The pressure for action from those in the group who motivated by immediate need for change need versus those who are interested in the process of learning and self-examination needs to be balanced by the facilitators. Obviously, the orientation and the dialogue facilitators’ views on the conflict and relationship can have serious implications on how this tension between these two forms of intervention (action versus talk). Serving the needs and expectations of the two groups is the ethical duty of the Facilitator. Thus, reflective and self-examination type of questions should and ought to be used to the members who advocate for immediate or short-term actions. Such participants tend to have the misperception that they do not need to learn more about others because they have been treated with injustice. This notion blocks the dialogical process from moving forward and can convert the dialogue into an advocacy setting. The challenge of dealing with pressure of action-oriented process is also reflected in the identification and assessment of the type of effective and acceptable actions to all members of the dialogue group. For example, is making a presentation about the conflict and injustice to colleagues at work or friends, or family effective enough in comparison to committing to join a protest group every Friday in front of the government. For instance, who determines what is the acceptable range of actions to be jointly adopted by the members of the group? Is leaving the choice for action to each participant effective enough? Addressing these questions is the responsibility of the dialogue facilitator but not necessarily determining the outcome. A common paradox within interreligious encounters is the dynamics or interplay between members of the minority and majority faith groups. Minority groups often join an encounter in order to change the dominant political, social, and cultural structures, which impose certain limitations on their religious rights and aspirations. On the other hand, members of the dominant faith group often join an encounter to learn about other faith; discover commonalities; in many cases, partially relieve themselves from the burden of guilt of being labelled as members of the dominant (oppressive or privileged) group.10 This tension between Muslims and Christians in the European context is reflected by the demand of the Muslim minority groups asking and advocating for the encounter outcome to be policy-oriented, namely to change European states’ regulations regarding the production of halal meat; circumcision; religious education; etc. Conversely, at the starting point of the encounter, dominant faith majority members (Christians or secular participants) do not necessarily see this as an obstacle that urgently needs to be changed.

10

See Hurtado on Intergroup dialogue …; See Abu-Nimer (1999) Encounter between Arabs and Jews In Israel.

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Regardless of the nature of the action that has been agreed upon by the members within the encounter, it is essential that such action is jointly designed and implemented by the various faith groups. The joint action produced by the interreligious encounter is the glue that binds the interfaith group together and advances the chances to create sustained dialogue. There are many conditions that determine or shape the nature of the joint action which the interreligious encounter group produces, some of these include: power symmetry dynamics between the faith groups; the duration of the encounter (short or long term engagement); the availability of a professional third party facilitator for the encounter; the degree of threat and obstacle generated by the context of the encounter (low level of violence versus high level of religiously motivated violence); engagement or non-engagement of the policymakers in the process.

6 Individual Versus Collective Paradox Northern social systems (especially European and North American societies) have emphasized a set of values that support strong individualistic forms of social and cultural identities, in which members of society seek to frame their interests and aspirations in a unique individual narration and often resist attempts to structure such individual framing collectively. In a conflict dynamics setting, members of the dominant majority often refuse to see themselves as members of a collective group that benefits form an oppressive or discriminatory system. For example, white South Africans or Americans who benefited from the racial system in place would deny their collective privileges. They attribute their success to personal motivation, values or stamina, etc. In interreligious and intercultural dialogue, the various components of the design (process, content, outputs and outcomes, and follow up or sustainability) can be shaped to reflect the interveners and convenors perceptions of the relationship between the individual or collective frameworks. When the design is focused on individual framing, then the dynamics and outputs and measures of success become individualized and participants’ responses are expected to reflect that. For example, the facilitators’ questions or initiatives proposed or funded for follow up tend to be more focused on increasing the awareness of individuals in the community. However if the focus is on the collective aspect of the identity, the facilitators’ questions and initiative proposed would target the structural arrangements that suppress the collective rights of the deprived groups. In the conflict dynamics setting, confronting the collective arrangements that sustain racial, patriarchal, or xenophobic systems become the target of the intervention. An Arab Muslim participant in an interfaith dialogue group, a member of the dominant majority in his/her countries finds it difficult to even discuss the collective rights of Christian or other non-Arab ethnicities. It is often argued that they are individual citizens and they can pursue their rights and concerns as a citizen and there is no need for them to be collectively organized to pursue their collective rights

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(linguistic, cultural, or religious). As a result of this individualistic dialogue approach or framing, the Israeli Jewish participants become uncomfortable when Arab Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, express their desire to pursue their collective national, religious, or cultural rights in Israel. Israeli Jewish participants insist in response that as individual citizens, the Arabs in Israel can achieve what they want. The tension between the individual and collective framing of the dialogue design is not only reflected in the type of topics and ways in which the outcomes of the dialogue are measured, but it is also in the ways participants are encouraged to express their views. For example, facilitators who want to emphasize the individualization approach will insist on using the term “I”, and discourage participants from using the terms “we”. Hence, a Muslim European participant in a dialogue setting with Christians on European societies’ reactions to religious and cultural differences is discourage form saying “we the Muslims” and instead encourage to say: “I am Mustafa faced problems in my city because I am Muslim”. In a similar dynamics, a Tamil Hindu in Sri Lanka is challenged by the Sinhalese Buddhist participants to use personal and individual terminology as a citizen and not a member of a discriminatedagainst ethnic or religious group. The paradox is manifested when facilitators are framing the dialogue from an exclusively collective approach, especially when the design (topics, language, outcomes, follow up, etc.) are mainly expressed through group identity.11 Delegitimizing the individual expressions of grievances, values, interests become an obstacle for the dialogue. Participants who belong to the same group are pressured to line up behind a single national, ethnic, or religious narrative, without much consideration or space for the individual variation within such group identity. The risk of “reductionism of identities” in the dialogue exchange is a serious block that can face facilitators and convenors. For example, when the variations in the identity of 1.7 billion Muslims are reduced to one single narrative presented in the interfaith dialogue setting as the “truth” or the only story that exists in the Muslim communities. Similarly, when Israeli Jewish participants in a dialogue group insist that there is only one collective story about the Israeli Palestinian history. In such approach, individualized experiences are ignored or buried within the larger collective identity expressions. The diversity within the minority and majority narratives is suppressed in favour of articulating a unified front to justify the collective group claims in the dialogue dynamics. Obviously, a balance between the collective and individual approaches is a necessary measure that convenors and facilitators have to apply or adopt. Nevertheless, the challenge remains in sorting out the appropriate resource allocations (timing, funds, content, questions, evaluation, etc.) in the actual dialogue that can serve a healthy balance between collective and individual framing of the relationships. Regardless, it is safe to conclude that without the dialogue experience is not complete without integrating individual and collective framing of issues in the process.

11

See Halabi (2004) in discussion of the dynamics of dialogue between Arabs and Jews in Israel.

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7 Content Versus Process A third paradox or tension in the design of dialogue relates to the choice of the convenor and facilitator, a design that relays mainly on the use of content or process throughout the interactions.12 The challenges associated with overemphasizing process or content in implementing dialogue is also connected to asymmetric power relations, but it also reflect the assumptions of the convenors and the facilitators about learning and change. For those who assume that change of attitudes and behaviours is mainly through additional external information and knowledge, their dialogue intervention mainly revolve around the introduction of facts, data, exemplars of success, etc. However, those who assume that change of attitudes and behaviours is initiated and carried out through individual and collective experiences, their dialogue intervention mainly revolves around the participants own experiences and knowledge without using any external learning stimulus. The heavy reliance on the external content as a source of learning and interaction among the interfaith dialogue in many cases means overemphasis on the textual interpretations, historical documents, or input from religious clergy. Similarly contentoriented interracial dialogue in an academic setting often relies on the data supplied by the convenor or facilitators on race relations. The overuse of content deprives the participants from a deeper exploration of their mutual and own experiences and knowledge of the issue. In addition, it detracts from the focus on relationship building and might develop certain reliance on external sources of information rather than developing participants’ own ways of pursuing such information. However, one of the positive and functional aspects of introducing external content into the dialogue interaction, especially in deep-rooted and protracted conflict setting, is providing the participants who often have major distrust of the other group/s with an opportunity to learn new information from an outside source, which they might not accept it from the members of the other groups. For example, data on the level of discrimination and prejudice against Muslims in European settings can be easily rejected from members of the dominant majority if shared by one of the French Muslim participants; however, when it is presented by a credible academic European source, it might allow a less defensive interaction among the participants. In addition, the injection of content in the dialogue interaction can be highly useful when the tension and level of antagonistic relationships are high. In such cases, focusing on shared technical content can be a useful way to gradually build trust among the participants form the different groups. For example, when Bosnian and Serbian participants rejected any suggestion to discuss their past history and possibility for reconciliation, the external content topic of effective teaching methods of social studies became a safe subject to jointly discuss among them. Similarly when Sri Lankan Sinhalese and Tamil participants found, it is difficult and unsafe to discuss the consequences of the 2007–2010 war; they agreed to focus their dialogue on the challenges of rebuilding their livelihood in the region. Thus, content can be a functional tool for dialogue participants and facilitators to use 12

See more on the importance of process-oriented dialogue Bohm (1996).

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when the dialogue over individual and collective experiences becomes too painful or reach a deadlock. In Muslim Christian interreligious dialogue learning about the correct interpretation of the various scriptural texts on peace, nonviolence and war are important to gain new knowledge; however, gaining such knowledge alone does not necessarily guarantee or lead to a shift or transformation of attitudes and behaviours towards the others in the dialogue group. Process-oriented dialogue heavily focuses on the experience and perceptions of the participants setting in the circle of the dialogue. Their personal and collective views, emotions, and values are the source of learning from and about the others in the group. Facilitators and convenors of are a type of design assume that the participants have the knowledge and capacity to learn and process their interaction to gain a deeper understanding and awareness of the conflict. The outcome of such interaction often produces a stronger bond of relationships among the participants and often strong commitment to act for change beyond the dialogue group setting.13 “How does the conflict affect you personally?” “Tell us your story with the conflict?” “What prevent you from acting for peaceful change in your community?” are few examples of the type of questions that might stimulate process-oriented conversation as opposed to what do you think of the lecture or report or study that has been shared? Similar to dealing with the above two other dimensions of “talk versus action” and Individual versus Collective”, the relevant and appropriate balance between content and process in the dialogical design remains a challenging decision to be made by the convenors and facilitators based on many factors. However, it is clear that there are certain disadvantages and even risks of exclusively relying on one of them in the entire design, especially in a deeply rooted conflict setting in which the resistance and obstacles for dialogical interactions are higher than other settings. For example, in a ninety minutes dialogue session, for American undergraduate students to discuss black and white relations and their own experiences in a dialogue process, design might be far more challenging than watching a film or reading and article and conducting a dialogue around that content. Obviously, there are many factors that affect such a decision or selection by the facilitator, such as: the purpose of the dialogue session; number of dialogue sessions available to the participants; and age and personal experience or the background of the participants. Utilizing content in dialogue should be aimed to mainly explore the individual and collective experiences and attitudes of the participants. Its scope and frequency are determined by the above factors. However, unfortunately, certain convenors, and facilitators use external content in a way that prevents systematic and deeper challenges of participants’ positions and attitudes towards the conflict structures and each other’s. Fear of dealing with emotional expressions of the individual and collective experiences often dissuade them from delving into the process domain question and stay with the use of external content to maintain a certain level of dialogical interaction. However, it should be noted that one can still be using content to simulate a dialogical exchange in a process-oriented design, for example, showing a film on slavery

13

See Abu-Nimer and Lazarus (2007), Halabi (2004).

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for an interracial dialogue group can be a powerful instrument to encourage participants to step out of their comfort zone and take risk by stating their own feelings and experiences with the system of white privileges in US context. To accomplish such a task, facilitators are convenors need to have the awareness and commitment to such dialogue design and go beyond the model of external content can generate new cognitive knowledge and lead to attitudinal and behavioural change. Similar dynamics have been observed in Muslim Christian and Muslim Jewish dialogue meetings, overreliance on data on Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, which used as the centre for the dialogue design. Participants learning about their own societies’ extent and scope of Islamophobia and anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination is not sufficient to change their attitudes or behaviours without a space for the process to clarify their own ways of sustaining such structures. This process requires its own design and mechanics of intervention. Above is only a limited and brief exploration of the three areas of tension or paradoxes in the dialogue design and its implications to Interreligious and intercultural dialogue. Obviously, there are many other factors that affect the decision of the convenors and facilitators in dealing with the above tensions, such as: ideology of the convenors and donors; level of awareness of the conflict dynamics and its power relations among the interveners; availability of resources; nature of the conflict or topics of the dialogue; and the background of the participants; etc. Nevertheless, the degrees of balance between these paradoxes have serious implications on the participants and their willingness to engage with each other during and after the dialogue experience. In fact, the outcome of this balance affects the image and credibility of the field of interethnic, intercultural and interreligious dialogue in general and in conflict areas in particular. For example, adopting a dialogue model that uses content for individual awareness exclusively (content-talk-individual level) produces the impression that dialogue is another tool for silencing members of the minority from articulating their own collective experience and to avoid any meaningful change I of the system.

8 Obstacles in Institutionalizing Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogical Encounters As stated above, research and practice of dialogue and encounters have identified many principles and conditions for effective encounters. There is no shortage of theoretical frameworks or guidelines to articulate the process and dynamics of a positive encounter.14 Despite this reality, the field of interreligious dialogue (IRD) is still in its infancy as a professional field. There are internal and external factors that

14

See Bohm (1996), Schoem and Hurtado (2001), Christopher H. (2015) Grundmann Interreligious Dialogue; David R. Smock. (2001) Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding; Mohammed Abu-Nimer. (2012) Dialogue, Conflict Resolution and Change: Arab–Jewish Encounters in Israel.

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affect the development of this field as an effective form of interreligious interaction. The following are a few of the central factors:

9 Religious Agencies Lack Institutional Commitment to Interreligious Encounters There is no doubt that in the past two decades, there has been a significant increase in the interest and willingness of policymakers and religious actors and agencies to engage in dialogue.15 Nevertheless, these engagements remain either on the symbolic level of or serve as “lip service” to appease policymakers who are pursuing the engagement of religious agencies to counter violent extremism. In most conflict areas, especially in the southern hemisphere, government and security agencies have included the engagement with religious authorities as part of their strategies to counter-terrorism and violent extremism. Thus, religious agencies have to respond to the pressure of the governed agencies to show that they are moderate or open enough to accommodate a certain level of religious diversity. Thus, muftis and patriarchs are invited by government agencies and intergovernmental organizations to participate in and even initiate programs with a focus on dialogue, tolerance, and religious freedom.16 Despite this fast growth in the number of meetings and projects for religious freedom, interreligious dialogue, and religious pluralism and diversity, the formal and traditional religious authorities and their institutions have not made a clear institutional shift in their structure to ensure that IRD and the culture of religious encounter is an integral part of their theological and operational structures. Indeed there are designated individuals in the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian religious institutions; however, these individuals and their centres or departments rarely have the necessary human or financial resources to further the significance of interreligious encounters institutionally. For example, compare how much such institutions spend on missionary work or internal theological education versus how much is being spent on interreligious encounters. Most religious institutions have compartmentalized their IRD work or have designated one individual whose mission is to persuade the various religious associations in his faith group to adopt IRD as a priority or plan of action. Regardless of whether IRD is confined into a small unit in the religious authority structure or designated to one person, it remains marginalized in comparison to the priorities of religious institutions as a whole. Thus, when such individuals are removed or simply die of old age, it takes a long period of time to select another person or to resume the IRD 15

See David Little (2007) Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution; Mohammed Abu-Nimer and MichelleGerrad (2018) Making Peace with Faith; etc. 16 Recently US government convened its second annual Ministerial meeting focusing on religious freedom and religious pluralism with over 100 government represented and approximately 1000 civil society and FBOs groups. In addition, most European Union countries have appointed a special envoy for religious freedom. These specialized ambassadors for religious freedom are spreading the message that dialogue encounter is also an effective tool to expand the space for religious freedom.

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engagement in these institutions. Sustained institutional IRD is still missing in most religious authority structures.

10 Conclusion In human history, societies and people have struggled to construct social systems that facilitate peaceful encounters. Nevertheless, there have always been a voice and a trace of knowledge and experience that pointed human beings towards dialogue and peaceful encounters with the other. Such thread is also manifested in every faith group. Religions share common values of peace, mercy, love, and respect for human dignity. Unfortunately, the implementation and transmission of these values into sustainable structures to regulate people’s lives have been extremely limited, especially in wider social systems. Most, if not all, children are deprived of the possibilities to live in dialogical cooperative systems; instead, they are well trained in a competitive culture. A strong culture of dialogical encounter is an effective social and psychological immunization tool that any society or agency can use to equip its members with skills to prevent religious-based violence, to enhance its capacity to resolve its conflicts peacefully constructively. A society that has integrated culture of dialogical encounters within its system grants its members safe spaces to explore creative ways to respect diversity and view such diversity as a source of strength as opposed to the source of disunity and fragmentation. This chapter articulated basic principles that can be integrated into the interreligious encounter to maximize its impact in transforming misperception and distrust in other faith into a more dialogical relationship. It also explored ways to identify the consequences and implications for dealing with three major paradoxes that every dialogue design has to address, especially in an interreligious and interethnic conflict setting. Considering all factors in the context of the interethnic and interreligious dialogue is a crucial step that can help convenors and facilitators construct a relevant and appropriate balance between content and process; action and talk; individual and collective. This analysis of such factors is a necessary step prior to any dialogue design especially to avoid the stigma that dialogue field has become another tool used by policymakers and religious agencies to justify inaction on structural issues. A clear example of this is the recent application of dialogue designs to the field of counter violent extremism (CVE). In many instances where the engagement between religious agencies and policymakers is well established, the context is limited to either countering violent extremism and/or preventing violent extremism. These approaches bring with them several challenges that extend beyond the issue of the potential loss of legitimacy for religious leaders and agencies within their own communities. They risk damaging the ability to build trust among certain groups within the encounter because of the potential reinforcement that both the CVE and PVE narratives have on Islamophobia and thus foster an approach of “defensive

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Islam” particularly for Muslim countries or institutions that develop programs and projects aimed to join policymakers and religious agencies. These approaches also remain locked in securitization, which makes it difficult to detach programs and projects from terrorism, fundamentally preventing the ability to develop a meaningful dialogical encounter.17 Another contextual factor that affects the balance between these paradoxes in interreligious dialogue is the fact that in many parts of the world, the majority of the religious institutions are under the political authority or are governed by laws and regulations. In conflict areas, the engagement of policymakers with religious institutions and actors is often negative and manipulative. Politicians engage religion to gain wider electoral support, and policymakers appeal to religious authority to support certain policies and assist them in disseminating them to the grassroots and their communities. Such manipulation of religious leaders affects their credibility and capacity to preach positive and genuine messages in the society. Thus, it weakens their ability to call for an encounter with the other faith groups or their capacity to call for joint action with other faith groups to advance justice and equality.

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See Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2017) “Alternative Approaches to Transforming Violence Extremism: the Case of Islamic Peace and Interreligious Peacebuilding” In the Berghof Handbook Nov. 2017.

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