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ECKHART: TEXTS AND STUDIES
VOLUME 14
meister eckhart, The latin works «sermones et lectiones super ecclesiastici»
Patricia Irene Impey
PEETERS
MEISTER ECKHART, THE LATIN WORKS SERMONES ET LECTIONES SUPER ECCLESIASTICI
Eckhart: Texts and Studies EDITED BY
MARKUS VINZENT (King’s College, London & Max-Weber-Kolleg, Universität Erfurt)
ADVISORY BOARD
CHRISTINE BÜCHNER (Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften, Universität Hamburg)
MARKUS ENDERS (Theologische Fakultät, Universität Freiburg)
GOTTHARD FUCHS (Kultur-Kirche-Wissenschaft, Bistümer Limburg und Mainz)
FREIMUT LÖSER
(Philosophisch-historische Fakultät, Universität Augsburg)
DIETMAR MIETH (Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Universität Tübingen)
REGINA D. SCHIEWER (Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt)
LORIS STURLESE (Storia della filosofia medievale, Università del Salento)
RUDOLF K. WEIGAND (Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt)
Eckhart: Texts and Studies VOLUME
Meister Eckhart, The Latin Works Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici Sermons and Lectures on Jesus Sirach Introduction, Translation and Commentary
BY
PATRICIA IRENE IMPEY
PEETERS LEUVEN — PARIS — BRISTOL, CT
ISBN ---- eISBN ---- D/// A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. © , Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan , B- Leuven, Belgium
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage or retrieval devices or systems, without prior written permission from the publisher, except the quotation of brief passages for review purposes.
Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Latin Text and English Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sermon – Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lecture – Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sermon – Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lecture – Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concluding Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix – Authorities Quoted in Each Work . . . . . . .
Appendix – Biblical References Ordered According to the Vulgate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bibliography Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secondary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction
T
his book consists of a translation of Meister Eckhart’s Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. (placed opposite the Latin text, taken from the critical Kohlhammer edition), followed by a commentary containing detailed observations on the meaning and significance of the text. Delivered at a Provincial Chapter of the Dominicans, these texts provide an important insight into Eckhart as both Lesemeister and Lebemeister, (a master of the text and a master of life) and, above all as a Dominican who was the epitomy of Dominic’s vision when he founded the Order. This corpus of two Sermons and two Lectures contains what Sturlese has descibed as a ‘form of summa of the philosophical theorems of Eckhart’ for within them we see the key concepts of his thought. But, as important, we see here that for this Meister, philosophy and theology are not to be separated. One example of this can be seen in the way the theory of the transcendentals is used to provide an explanation of the inner life of the Trinity particularly with reference to Being and the One. Just as important as his academic approach, however, is Eckhart’s concern for the integrity of his fellow Dominicans. In this body of work we see that any attempt to separate the academic from the pastor fails to understand the underlying dynamic which informs Eckhart: an area which I believe, requires further study to enable more progress in understanding both the unity of his Latin and German works and the dynamic of faith which undergirds all his work as a Dominican. In this Introduction I explore: – The provenance of the text, its transmission and dating – Work already done on these texts – Medieval exposition and Eckhart’s distinctive style – Eckhart’s sources – Key concepts contained within these works. . L. Sturlese, ‘The Origins of the OPUS TRIPARTITUM ’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion to Meister Eckhart (), .
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The concluding chapter will consider the importance of these texts for Eckhartian scholarship particularly in the English speaking world with the contribution they can make to our understanding of Eckhart’s work and secondly, what the driving force was for him. Considering the various ways in which Eckhart has been understood, as mystic, philosopher, theologian, as I read these texts, I believe we do him a great disservice if we don’t recognise that first and foremost he was a Dominican, trained to the highest degree to teach and preach but all from within the contemplative ethos of the Order which led to the situating of his thought in divinis. Only then will we truly understand the importance of this work for Eckhart scholarship, but also for the human spirit as a whole. The provenance of the text and edition The manuscripts Koch’s critical edition (with Heribert Fischer as translator), in the publication of the critical Kohlhammer edition of , was based on two manuscripts, E and C. E is the well known Cod. Amplonianus, Fol. , from the City library of Erfurt, now hosted at the University of Erfurt. It is dated to the th c. In this manuscript we find: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h)
Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum ( -) Prologus in opus propositionum (-) Expositio Libri Genesis (-) Expositio Libri Exodi (-) Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. (-) Prologus in opus expositionum () Expositio Libri Sapientiae (-) Tabula auctoritatum Libri Sapientiae (-)
C is the famous Cod. Cus. ‘which incorporates the most prominent works of Eckhart’, it ‘is dated to ’. . See LW III ix-x. . M. Vinzent, Meister Eckhart, ‘On the Lord’s Prayer’ (), .
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The manuscript comprises: a) Tabula prologorum (ra-b) b) Tabula auctoritatum Libri Genesis (rb-vb) c) Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum (ra-va) d) Prologus in opus propositionum (vb-ra) e) Expositio Libri Genesis (ra-vb) f) Prologus in Librum parabolarum Genesis (vb-va) g) Tabula Libri parabolarum Genesis (va-ra) h) Liber parabolarum Genesis (rb-vb) i) Tabula Libri Exodi (ra-va) k) Expositio Libri Exodi (va-ra) l) Tabula auctoritatum Libri Sapientiae (rb-rb) m) Prologus in opus expositionum (rb) n) Expositio Libri Sapientiae (rb-ra) o) Articuli condemnati istius doctoris (rb-va) p) Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. (ra-vb) q) Tabula expositionis auctoritatum s. Evangelii secundum Iohannem (rava) r) Expositio Evangelii secundum Iohannem (vb-ra) s) Tractatus super Oratione Dominica (ra-rb) t) Opus sermonum; sermones spurii (ra-v) u) Tabula sermonum secundum initia (ra-va) v) Duae notae: Nihil tam dulce ... non cadit medium. Nihil tam dulce ... ° corpori necessarias (va) w) Conspectus anni liturgici (vb) A Comparison of E and C: a) Tabula prologorum (ra-b) b) Tabula auctoritatum Libri Genesis (rb-vb) a) Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum c) Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum (-) (ra-va) b) Prologus in opus propositionum (-) d) Prologus in opus propositionum (vb-ra) c) Expositio Libri Genesis (-) e) Expositio Libri Genesis (ra-vb) f) Prologus in Librum parabolarum Genesis (vb-va)
d)
e) f) g) h)
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g) Tabula Libri parabolarum Genesis (va-ra) h) Liber parabolarum Genesis (rb-vb) i) Tabula Libri Exodi (ra-va) Expositio Libri Exodi (-) k) Expositio Libri Exodi (va-ra) l) Tabula auctoritatum Libri Sapientiae (rb-rb) m) Prologus in opus expositionum (rb) n) Expositio Libri Sapientiae (rb-ra) o) Articuli condemnati istius doctoris (rb-va) Sermones et Lectiones super p) Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. (ra-vb) Ecclesiastici c. (-) q) Tabula expositionis auctoritatum s. Prologus in opus expositionum () Evangelii secundum Iohannem Expositio Libri Sapientiae (-) (ra-va) Tabula auctoritatum Libri Sapientiae r) Expositio s. Evangelii secundum (-) Iohannem (vb-ra) s) Tractatus super Oratione Dominica (ra-rb) t) Opus sermonum; sermones spurii (ra-v) u) Tabula sermonum secundum initia (ra-va) v) Duae notae: Nihil tam dulce ... non cadit medium. Nihil tam dulce ... ° corpori necessarias (va) w) Conspectus anni liturgici (vb)
In general the outline of the two manuscripts is the same. However, closer observation shows that the earlier, E, has fewer of Eckhart’s works on the Old Testament, (for example, Liber parabolarum Genesis is not included) and none of his New Testament commentaries or sermons which appear only in C. This gives more weight to the importance of these Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. purely by the fact of their inclusion so early in the process of collecting together the works of this Dominican. Of further interest is the positioning of his Prologus in opus expositionum and his Expositio Libri Sapientiae and his Tabula auctoritatem Sapientiae. These are placed after his work on Ecclesiasticus in E, not before as in C. What importance can be attached to this, I am
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not sure but we shall see in the commentary, particularly in the first Lecture, there is interaction between this Lecture and his Expositio Libri Sapientiae with regard to his understanding of time. The Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. , are to be found in the first part of Volume of Joseph Koch’s critical edition of Eckhart’s works: Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke immediately after Eckhart’s Exposition of Exodus and, as noted above, before his Exposition of Wisdom. Begun in , of the volumes of his Latin works are now complete in , as are of the German volumes. While Koch gives a detailed description of the manuscripts, he does not give specific information about the Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. which are to be found in the third part of Eckhart’s Opus tripartitum. This collection of his work was written at different stages of Eckhart’s life, often corrected and revised, and as its name suggests consisted of three parts. In the Prologus generalis Eckhart tells us these consisted of the Opus propositionum, the Opus quaestionum and the Opus expositionum, and then elaborates on what each will contain. Opus propositionum – general and doctrinal propositions, Opus quaestionum – diverse questions with new, short and easy answers, and the one with which we are concerned in this work: Opus expositionum – the exposition or preaching divided into two parts, the first comprises the exegetical commentaries and the second is made up of the Latin sermons.
. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Stuttgart und Berlin: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, . Vol. , part , edited and translated in collaboration with Heribert Fischer, by Josef Koch, Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. , -, -. . Eckhart, Prologus generalis, n. (LW I ,-): Distinguitur igitur secundum hoc opus ipsum totale in tria principaliter. Primum est opus generalium propositionum, secundum opus questionum, m opus expositionum. . Eckhart, Prologus generalis, n. (LW I ,-): Opus uero tertium, scilicet expositionum, in duo diuiditur. Quia enim nonnullas auctoritates utriusque testamenti in sermonibus specialiter diffusius auctor pertractauit et exposuit, placuit ipsi illas seorsum ponere et hoc opus sermonum nominari. Adhuc autem opus expositionum subdiuiditur numero et ordine librorum ueteris et noui testamenti, quorum auctoritates in ipso exponuntur.
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Dating Although Alessandra Beccarisi, in her consideration of these sermons and lectures states that, given the occasion for the two sermons is tied to the dates of the Provincial Chapters of the Dominican Order, they are more easily dateable than the other works in the Opus tripartitum, she still poses a range of eight years from to for their date. Walter Senner believes there is some evidence that this work on Ecclesiasticus is from Eckhart’s first time in Paris as Magister, -, or even earlier, stemming from lectures he would have had to give in the Dominican studia. At the same time, Senner believes, since the text for the Sermons is that for the Feast of the Birth of Mary, they provide evidence of Eckhart’s attendance at Provincial Chapters. Originally Koch thought the two Sermons represented Eckhart’s presence at two different Chapters. The first being shortly after Eckhart’s return from Paris in . Fernand Brunner appears to accept this in his introduction to his work on these texts and it is the position Loris Sturlese also takes in his contribution to A Companion to Meister Eckhart. However, Senner notes that the order for such Chapters which survives, explicitly requires the Provincial to preach two sermons, one on the first and one on the second day of the Chapters. Thus it would seem more likely – and this is confirmed by the content of these Sermons and Lectures – that this material arose from his attendance at a single Chapter with the second introduction to the second Sermon seeming again to indicate a date of , after Eckhart’s first Paris magisterum. Kurt Ruh, however, writing at the end of the twentieth century and taking the second introduction to the second sermon as his lead, believed this sermon was delivered shortly after Eckhart had learnt he had been . A. Beccarisi, ‘Eckhart’s Latin Works’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), . . W. Senner, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Life, Training, Career and Trial’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), -. Sánchez is also of the opinion that the origin of these sermons and lectures probably goes back to before the first Parisian magisterium. A. Quero Sánchez, Sermones y lecciones sobre el capítulo , - del Eclesiastico (), . . L. Sturlese, ‘The Origins of the Opus Tripartitum’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), . . F. Brunner, Sermons et leçons sur l’Ecclésiastique (), . He here refers to the footnote LW I and the footnote on LW II . . W. Senner, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Life, Training, Career and Trial’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), .
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appointed to the Magisterium in Paris by the Congress of Provincial Leaders in Basel, thus before he took up the office and therefore dating it September . At the same time, Ruh acknowledges it was surprising it was not noted in the published text of the Latin works whether the text came from the first or second Magisterium, i.e. September or -. This, he concluded, was probably due to Eckhart’s habit of revising his own work, especially as he brought it together in his Opus tripartitum. Finally, Loris Sturlese considers it more likely that these Sermons and Lectures were given soon after his return from his first appointment as Magister in Paris when he became the first Provincial of the new Dominican Province of Saxonia in . For him the evidence for this lies in the continuity they show with the Quaestiones Parisienses which belong to the first stay in Paris. In particular Sturlese notes a correspondence in thought with these Questions in Eckhart’s understanding of the intellect and God, as well as the relationship between Creator and creature within the doctrine of general perfections and the concept of analogy which he addresses in the second Lecture. Sturlese acknowledges that Eckhart approached the question of the relationship between God and created beings from two different angles in these works, but he understands Eckhart to be expressing the same idea. Sturlese further notes that Eckhart included the Sermons and Lectures in his Opus expositionum, placing them, however, next to his biblical commentaries, rather than, as would seem more appropriate, to his collection of Latin sermons. Although they do not naturally belong with the commentaries, the Sermons and Lectures follow the characteristic pattern of Eckhart’s exegetical works, that of taking a significant verse (auctoritas) from scripture and then focusing on just one or two words in that text. Sturlese sees this placing as significant. Recognising the fundamental unity between Eckhart’s ideas expressed in them and the Parisian Quaestiones, he raises the question of the relationship between the Quaestiones and the Opus tripartitum. It would seem, Sturlese concludes, that the Opus tripartitum as we find it in Codex E (the Prologues, the two versions of the Commentary on Genesis, the Commentary on . K. Ruh, Meister Eckhart, Theologe, Prediger, Mystiker (), -. . Ibid. .
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Exodus and the Commentary on Wisdom) goes back to the early years of the th century. Given Eckhart’s practice of expanding and revising texts it is not possible to establish a precise year for the presentation of these Sermons and Lectures but we can be clear about the context in which they were delivered for, at the end of the second Lecture, we read that these Sermons and Lectures were delivered at a ‘General Chapter of the Order’. However, the evidence points to their being delivered at a meeting of a Provincial Chapter. The General Chapter of the Dominicans used to meet at Pentecost but the reading on which this work is based is that of Ecclesiasticus :-, the reading for the Feast of the Nativity of the Virgin Mary on September th the date on which the Provincial Chapter met. In addition, in the very first lines of the first Sermon, Eckhart specifically mentions this Feast. It is helpful here that Andrés Quero Sánchez, in his introduction, notes that there is other evidence that the term ‘General Chapter’ was also used in the sense of the ‘Provincial Chapter’. Finally, Marco Vannini raises another possibility, in part in the light of the two introductions to the second Sermon, and the university nature of the second Lecture which has no reference to the Virgin Mary, that originally the second Sermon and Lecture were presented first. However, given that the verses they consider are later in the scripture text than those used for the first Sermon and Lecture they were rearranged to give a sequential commentary on these scriptural verses. Work done on this corpus After the critical edition with a German translation had been published, so far, relatively little has been done on this important corpus. In Marco Vannini published a translation in Italian ‘Commento all’Ecclesiastico’. Out of print as a separate work, it has been included in a recently published single volume containing Vannini’s other translations of Eckhart’s Old Testament commentaries. Vannini provides an eighteen . L. Sturlese, ‘The Origins of the Opus tripartitum’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), . . A. Quero Sánchez, Sermones y lecciones (), . . M. Vannini, Meister Eckhart, Commenti all’Antico Testamento (/), . . Ibid.
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page introduction to his translation in which he considers the setting for these two Sermons and Lectures, the difficulty in dating them precisely given Eckhart’s predilection for re-working his texts and Eckhart’s way of choosing single words or phrases to introduce a particular theological or philosophical point. Noting the many and varied influences on Eckhart and the freedom with which Eckhart reads and interprets scripture, Vannini considers ideas held within the texts: Eckhart’s understanding of the meaning held in the single word ego, his understanding of Justice, the just man and detachment, the intellect, the theme of being, the relationship between created being and eternal being and, what he considers Eckhart’s most relevant text on the doctrine of analogy. In Fernand Brunner’s translation and commentary was published posthumously. Following the pattern of this present work, namely that of translation and then a section by section comment, it had not been edited by the time of his death in . This work was undertaken by Alain de Libera. This has been particularly important with regard to the second lecture since the commentary there, particularly paragraphs - appeared in note form only. In his introduction, Brunner notes that Eckhart’s method in his two Sermons was faithful to the contemporary approach whereby ‘the theme is followed by a counter-theme, the Bible itself throwing light on the meaning of the Bible.’ Regarding the Lectures, Brunner notes that Eckhart’s method is: essentially to add on all the arguments that shed light on the thesis being upheld. Philosophical knowledge largely being used when Meister Eckhart judged them right for throwing light on religious and spiritual truths. Philosophy was at the service of the faith. In Andrés Quero Sánchez published his Spanish translation, Sermones y lecciones sobre el capitulo , - del Eclesiástico. Like . Ibid. . Ibid. . . F. Brunner, Sermons et leçons sur l’Ecclésiastique (), : ‘La méthode d’Eckhart dans les deux sermons est fidèle aux usages de son temps. Le thème est suivi d’un contre-thème, la Bible elle-même éclairant le sens de la Bible. Dans les leçons, sa méthode consiste essentiellement à multiplier les raisons éclairant la thèse soutenue; les connaissances philosophiques sont largement utilisées, quand Maître Eckhart les juge aptes à éclairer les vérités de la religion et de la vie spirituelle’. . A. Quero Sánchez, Sermones y lecciones ().
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Vannini before him, Quero Sánchez provides an introductory chapter ahead of Eckhart’s Latin text and the Spanish translation. Much fuller than Vannini’s, this introduction of pages in total provides us with a biography of Eckhart, a consideration of his work as a whole and its various editions, the dating of these texts, and a section on Eckhart’s metaphysics before turning to a more detailed consideration of each of these Sermons and Lectures in turn. Noting that Sturlese had been of the opinion that this body of work of Eckhart contains an immensely valuable summary of Eckhart’s metaphysics, Quero Sánchez sees a very clear internal unity between each of these pieces of work around the purity of the intention of the preacher, and talks of Eckhart’s ‘Ethic of Intention’ particularly in his commentary on the first Lecture. As far as I know the studies mentioned above are the only full works that concentrate entirely on these texts. The only translation into English has been Bernard McGinn’s translation of Eckhart’s work on Ecclesiasticus : in the second Lecture where Eckhart presents his understanding of analogy. This was published in a collection of other selections from Eckhart’s works in . As a consequence these texts have had a particularly limited reception in the English-speaking world. Reference to dating, language and the presentation of these Sermons and Lectures can be found in such books as Ruh’s Meister Eckhart, Theologe, Prediger, Mystiker, already noted and Eberhard Winkler’s Exegetische Methode bei Meister Eckhart. Beccarisi’s chapter on Eckhart’s Latin works in A Companion to Eckhart contains a brief synopsis of their contents, and, as already noted, Sturlese’s chapter in the same book refers to them as he considered the Opus tripartitum. Markus Vinzent in his publication, Meister Eckhart ‘On the Lord’s Prayer’, refers to the discussion concerning the question of generation within the Godhead which is found in the first Sermon; Eckhart’s understanding of prayer found in the first Lecture; the question of sonship which we encounter at the . Ibid. . . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. - (LW II ,-,), trans. by B. McGinn (ed.), Meister Eckhart, Teacher and Preacher (), -. . E. Winkler, Exegetische Methode bei Meister Eckhart (), . . M. Vinzent, Meister Eckhart ‘On the Lord’s Prayer’ (), -; Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-). Extended discussion of this is to be found in M. Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (), -. . M. Vinzent, Meister Eckhart ‘On the Lord’s Prayer’ (), ; Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-).
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beginning of the second Lecture; Eckhart’s understanding of time, as well as the stress Eckhart places on the intention of an act. The part which has aroused most interest and comment has been that part of the second Lecture in which Eckhart’s discussion on analogy is found (Paragraphs -), the only section that had been translated into English, as indicated above. Anastasia Wendlinder pays full consideration to this section as she considers Eckhart’s use of analogy as it relates to the Creator-creature relationship in her work Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart. In addition, Jeremiah Hackett and Jennifer Hart Weed commit a whole chapter in A Companion to this aspect of Eckhart’s thought. They note the contributions of Alain de Libera, and Vladimir Lossky as well as those of Burkhard Mojsisch, Reiner Schürmann, and Frank Tobin. There is also Vinzent’s contribution to work on these Sermons and Lectures, namely his contribution ‘Salus extra ecclesiam? Meister Eckhart’s Institutionenskepsis’ in Dietmar Mieth and Britta Müller-Schauenburg (eds), Mystik, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im Spätmittelalter. Apart from these I am not aware of any other more extensive work either by way of translation or commentary by mid . Medieval exposition and Eckhart’s distinctive style To understand a little more of Eckhart’s style and his use of resources it is important to remember that he was trained through the exacting curriculum of thirteenth century scholasticism in which: • The Bible was recognised as the highest authority and interpreting it correctly was of crucial importance. . Ibid. & ; Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-,). . Ibid. : Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-). . Ibid. ; Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-). . Eckhart, In Eccli. nn. - (LW II ,-,). . A. Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart (), -. . B. Mojsisch, Analogie, Univozität und Einheit (), trans. O.F. Summerell, Meister Eckhart: Analogy, Univocity and Unity (). . R. Schürmann, Wandering Joy (), -. . F. Tobin, Meister Eckhart, Thought and Language (), -. . D. Mieth & B. Müller-Schauenburg (eds), Mystic, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im Spätmittelalter ().
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• Other authorities were the Church Fathers. Some texts such as Augustine’s De trinitate were known first hand by many scholastic theologians and in this body of Eckhart’s work as noted in the introductory chapter, there are many references to early Christian writers. • Reason was a tool used to explain and defend authoritative teaching. The appeal to reason involved, first and foremost, the use of logic, partly prompted by the translation of Aristotle’s logical writings and their reception in the West in the twelfth century. Substantial philosophical accounts of language were also developed in the Middle Ages and were used in theology. As a result, scholastic theologians raised and answered semantic and linguistic questions which they regarded as basic to their work. (Where there was a problem of reconciling the truths of Christianity with the claims of reason which included not only metaphysics and ethics but also the natural sciences, especially physics, astronomy and biology, the teaching of Christianity was held as the highest authority). • The Dominican’s stress was on the intellect rather than that on the will and love as was the case for the Franciscans. For them there was no conflict between philosophy and theology, rather philosophy was a necessary tool for theology, thus we find many references to philosophical works in these Sermons and Lectures, especially those of Aristotle and his Jewish and Arab interpreters, Maimonides, Avicenna and Averroes. Whilst the image of the circle found in The Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers provides Eckhart with a powerful picture of God everywhere and nowhere. Alongside this we need to be aware that the medieval exegete’s approach to scripture was very different from today where the narrative nature of the passage and its Sitz im Leben are given foremost importance. For the medieval interpreters, the Bible was not just a story about God but a story by God, true and written for the well-being of humankind. To understand it the exegete had to read ‘below the surface’ of the text and see it as one extended metaphor, ‘a Great Code, which was mystically referring to a higher truth’. Frequently Old Testament stories and events were understood as a ‘type’, a blueprint for God’s plan of salvation as it . F. van Liere, An Introduction to the Medieval Bible (), .
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would be revealed in Christ. For example, Jonah was read as a prefiguration of Christ – his three days in the belly of the fish prefiguring the three days between Good Friday and Easter Day. More often the terms allegory, mystical sense, spiritual sense, were generally used to denote this deeper meaning. In addition, the text could be read as conveying a simple moral lesson, sometimes called the tropological sense. The moral message of Jonah was that one should not disobey God. In this way, Medieval authors distinguished several spiritual senses in scripture. By the thirteenth century the idea of four senses was common: the literal, the allegorical, what one should believe, the moral, what one should do and the analogical, what one should hope for. Aquinas discussed the senses of scripture in his Summa Theologiae Part I, generally agreeing there were multiple meanings but at the same time arguing that all essential lessons were to be found in the literal meaning. However, this literal sense was extended by him to include some aspects we might understand as allegory. Here the author’s intention came into play, and Thomas distinguished between the human author whom he called the ‘instrumental’ author, and the ‘real’ author, God or the Holy Spirit. For Thomas, God does speak in a mysterious way through Scripture, leaving plenty of room for allegory, but only after he has instructed us through the voice of reason. As a disciple of Thomas, Eckhart builds on him, but it is important to recognise that he also deviates from many of the positions Thomas held. The one thing that becomes apparent as we read these texts is Eckhart’s desire to find the deepest meaning possible in the scriptural texts. Unlike Thomas, and indeed Augustine and the Church Fathers, Eckhart rarely uses the term ‘allegory’. In the prologue to the Liber parabolarum Genesis where he says he wished to search out the profundities of scripture, to go beyond the more obvious meanings of the text and coax out certain things under the ‘shell of the letter’, Eckhart refers to Maimonides’ . Ibid. ; Littera gesta docet, quod credas allegoria; moralia quid agas, quid speres (or quo tendas) anagogia. . Th. Aqu., STh., Part , q. , art. , -. trans. (): Leonina (), . . F. van Liere, An Introduction to the Medieval Bible (), . (Van Liere doesn’t reference this quotation). . Eckhart, In Gen. II, Prol. n. (LW I ,): sub cortice litterae.
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description in his work The Guide of the Perplexed, of the truth of scripture as a golden apple covered with silver filigree with very small holes. Seen from afar without intellectual insight, only the beauty of the silver is perceived. A closer, sharper look reveals the yet more valuable gold underneath. For Maimonides, the external meaning of parables contained some wisdom, useful in many respects, but it was that internal, hidden wisdom that was important where truth is concerned. It was this that drew Eckhart to the use of Maimonides’ term, parabola meaning an allegorical relation or parable and related to the adverb parabolice, which means metaphorically. Julie Casteigt notes that not only does Eckhart cite Maimonides’ description of the two kinds of parable – the first when every word stands for something, the second when the whole parable is the expression of that which it is expressing – but also recounts literally, Maimonides examples of each, namely Jacob’s ladder for the first and Proverbs :- for the second. This occurs both in his second work on Genesis and in his Commentary on John. From this she concludes Maimonides parabola was largely responsible for Eckhart producing his Liber parabolarum Genesis for, following Maimonides, Eckhart saw in the parabola a vehicle which could carry both an ‘underlying’ and an ‘obvious’ meaning between which the truth could be glimpsed. For Eckhart, it communicated a way of thinking that both conceals and reveals. A fresh examination of Maimoinides parabola, Casteigt believes led Eckhart in his second commentary on Genesis to develop the principle of the metaphysics of the ‘act’. The
. Eckhart, In Gen. II, Prol. n. (LW I ,-): Est ergo veritas scripturae ‘sicut malum aureum opertum reti, in quo sunt caelaturae argenti’. . M. Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. S. Pines (), . . Eckhart, In Gen. II, Prol. n. (LW I ,-,): Secundum est, quod parabolarum duplex est genus, sicut docet Rabbi Moyses in prooemio Ducis neutrorum. Unum genus sive modus parabolarum est, quando >quodlibet verbum< aut quasi parabolae >demonstrat aliquid super aliquo separatim. Secundus modus est< quando parabola se tota est >similitudo< et expressio >rei< totius cuius est parabola. Et tunc quidem >multa verba< interponuntur, quae directe non docent super aliquo rei cuius est parabola, >sed sunt posita ad ornatum similitudinis< et parabolae >vel ad profundationem occultationis rei< cuius est parabola, >iuxta quod convenit plano illius similitudinis< et parabolae. . Eckhart cites Proverbs , In Gen. n. (LW I ,). . Eckhart, In Ioh., nn. - (LW III ,-,). . J. Casteigt, ‘Sous l’écorce de la lettre’ (), . In this connection Julie Casteigt talks of a ‘network of texts’.
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parabola provided a hermeneutical principle for interpreting the unity of reality which involves a movement from, an ontology of substance – causes and effects, producers and products – to an ontology of the relationship between the active and the passive where beings are no longer defined by their own nature but by their reciprocal relationship in the acts in which they are involved. Moreover, we find Eckhart saying that he used them so as to encourage those who were more skilled to seek richer explanations of the truths hidden beneath the literal text. Here we see both the teacher and the pastor at work. Another feature of Eckhart’s work is that unlike his predecessors (and contemporary exegetes) who commented on an entire biblical book, Eckhart had little interest in the story, rather he was concerned only with select verses as is evident in this corpus. McGinn describes this approach: He dehistoricizes and decontextualizes the text into sentences, fragments or even individual words that he recombines with other passages in a dense web of inter-textuality through a system of cross-referencing that is one of the main characteristics of his hermeneutics. This for McGinn, fits Eckhart’s ‘principial ’ way of knowing, that is of seeing things from the divine perspective: The ‘now’ (Nü/nunc) of eternity in which all words and expressions are one in the Divine Word. Such multiplicity does not, for Eckhart at least, introduce confusion, because all these meanings come from one and the same source of Divine Truth. As we shall see in the texts we are considering, Eckhart often develops his argument by letting one text recall another, through word association, texts that are frequently taken from different parts of the Bible and . Ibid. : ‘… d’une ontologie des substances – causes et effets, producteurs et produits – à une ontologie des relations entre actif et passif où les étants ne sont plus définis par leur nature propre, mais par leurs rapports réciproques dans les actes auxquels ils participent’. . Eckhart, In Gen. II, n. (LW I ,-): ut peritiores provocentur, ut tam in his, quae pauca tango et breviter, quam in aliis pluribus, quae pertranseo, meliora et uberius inquirant quantum ad divina, naturalia et moralia, latentia sub figura et superficie sensus litteralis. . B. McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (), . . Ibid. .
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so, in their original context, seemingly quite separate and distinct from one another. In Casteigt’s discussion of Eckhart’s understanding of parabola, she reminds us of the etymology of the word. Coming, as it does, from the Greek para-ballein, she points out that we can get the meaning ‘to throw something against another thing’ or ‘to put (things) in parallel’, or ‘to compare’. This is what we see at the very beginning of the first Sermon. In the first five sections of his introduction, Eckhart moves immediately from his Ecclesiasticus’ text through the word ‘odoris’ to Corinthians , recalling the phrase ‘Christi bonus odor sumus’, and continues through Corinthians, Philippians, Galatians, the Gospel of John and Genesis as he lays the groundwork for the content of the Sermon regarding the integrity of the preacher. Eckhart’s sources As we would expect, scripture formed the core of his teaching. References to the Gospels of Matthew and John are to be found in all four documents, the Gospel of Luke in the second Sermon and Lecture but interestingly, the Gospel of Mark not at all. The Roman, Corinthian, Galatian and Philippian correspondence as well as the book of Revelation appear in at least three of the documents whilst from the Hebrew scriptures references to Genesis also appear in three of the documents, Exodus and the prophet Isaiah in all four. In addition, we see that the Wisdom literature, as is evidenced by these texts, played an important part in his work, both in teaching and in preaching. This, as Woods sees, is part of Eckhart’s indebtedness to the Christian Platonism of Alexandria. Pseudo-Dionysius, an anonymous fifth century monk, who developed further a dialectical form of Platonism, exerted some considerable influence on his thinking, an influence which can be seen, amongst other ways, in Eckhart’s use of the negative approach to God. But it would seem to be Plotinus that he draws on most for structure and even sometimes for content although nowhere does he acknowledge Plotinus directly. In looking at these texts we shall find reference to Boethius and the author of the Liber de causis. Augustine played a dominant role in Eckhart’s . J. Casteigt, ‘Sous l’écorce de la lettre’ (), . . See Appendix , . . R. Woods, Meister Eckhart: Master of Mystics (), .
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thought as he did in many of the early Church Fathers. Vinzent notes that (Pseudo-)Chrystostom, in particular the Opus imperfectum from the Patristic period, was a real inspiration for Eckhart. This can be seen in his work On the Lord’s Prayer but more particularly regarding this corpus, in Eckhart’s understanding expressed at the end of the first Sermon of Joseph’s response to Mary, that grace is more important and trustworthy than nature. Another major influence after Augustine, was Aristotle, the most frequently quoted in Eckhart’s work, often referred to simply as ‘the philosopher’. However, as Richard Woods notes, Eckhart is philosophically more Neoplatonic than Aristotelian. Islamic and Jewish authors were also important resources, although as Alessandro Palazzo points out Eckhart was quite selective in those he used. The four who appear to have influenced him the most are the Jewish Maimonides and Avicebron, whose Fons vitae is noted in our text and the Islamic thinkers, Averroes and Avicenna. From the statistical evidence, Palazzo shows that Avicenna was one of Eckhart’s favourite philosophical sources and the most cited of the Islamic authors. Kurt Flasch notes that Avicenna was an important source for the meaning of ‘Being’ in Eckhart. For Avicenna God is the first without genus and without substance, without quality or quantity. There is no ‘where’ for Him, no opposition and no definition. Close attention to all of Eckhart’s references in this work also reveals that, alongside Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and such as Origen, John of Damascus and Bernard who are referred to a couple of times, a number of sources only appear in one of the four documents. Finally, as a . M. Vinzent, ‘Pseudo-Chrysostom’s Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum in Meister Eckhart’ in Studia Patristica (), . . A. Beccarisi, ‘“Der hoehste under den Meistern”: Eckhart e il De anima di Aristotele’ in L. Sturlese (ed.), Studi sulle fonti di Meister Eckhart (), . . R. Woods, Meister Eckhart: Master of Mystics (), -. . A. Palazzo, ‘Eckhart’s Islamic and Jewish Sources: Avicenna, Avicebron and Averroes’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), . . Ibid. ; see also Kurt Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Die Geburt der ‘Deutschen Mystik’ aus dem Geist der arabischen Philosophie (). . K. Flasch, Meister Eckhart, Philosopher of Christianity (), . . See Appendix .
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Dominican, Eckhart could not avoid being influenced by both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Albert’s influence can be seen in Eckhart’s understanding of the importance of philosophy as well as that of the Arab thinkers. As with all his sources however, Eckhart did not just adopt their thoughts but has often transformed them, as he sought to express what in many ways he thought was inexpressible. This is particularly clear in this corpus in relation to Aquinas with regards Eckhart’s understanding of the priority of the intellect in the first Sermon and, in the second Lecture in the discussion about analogy. Eckhart reshapes and condenses what he finds in tradition to create something essentially new from what is materially old, without negating or ignoring the essence of his sources. In one respect, however, as Beccarisi points out, Eckhart differed from both Albert and Thomas in his whole approach. They had set up a clear division between subject and method, between theology and philosophy, whereas for Eckhart it was very possible and helpful to use philosophy to express belief since for him wisdom and religion belonged together. Key concepts in the Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. As I noted at the very beginning of the Introduction, Sturlese describes this collection of sermons and lectures as ‘a form of summa of the philosophical theorems of Eckhart’. We might also add that the main tenets of his theology revolving around the basic premise that, ‘God became man that man might become God’, can be found in this corpus. Here I shall simply note the tenets briefly so that we may be aware of them as they arise in the Sermons and Lectures. . A. de Libera, La mystique rhénane (), : ‘Eckhart est véritablement l’héritier de la tradition ouverte par Albert le Grand’. . L. Sturlese, ‘Eckhart as Preacher, Administrator, and Master of the Sentences. From Erfurt to Paris and Back: -. The Origins of the OPUS TRIPARTITUM ’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), -. . A. de Libera, La mystique rhénane (), , Eckhart’s talk of a ‘spark’ in the soul, , the identification of the Intellect and of the One in God. . M. Vinzent, Meister Eckhart ‘On the Lord’s Prayer’ (), . . A. Beccarisi, ‘Eckhart’s Latin Works’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), . . L. Sturlese, ‘The Origins of the OPUS TRIPARTITUM ’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), .
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Esse est Deus: In the first Sermon we meet the familiar Eckhartian understanding of God, the ‘unmixed purity of the divine essence’, Esse est Deus, ‘being is God’, which Ruh notes runs ‘like a red thread’ through Eckhart’s commentaries. This key idea Palazzo, following Flasch, believes goes back to Avicenna’s understanding of God as ‘Necessary Existent’. God is above distinction and we also hear again echoes of Eckhart’s Parisian Questions, ‘deus est intellectus’, God exists because he knows. Knowing is prior to Being. The Creator-creature relationship and the ‘in divinis’ perspective from which he viewed it, lies at the heart of both Eckhart’s Latin and Vernacular works. Within these Sermons and Lectures we find his distinctive way of expressing that relationship, not (in a contrastive way), as from creature to Creator, from outside in, but as C.F. Kelley was insistent in his work Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge, from the perspective of ‘in divinis’, that is from the perspective of the Godhead, for the Godhead is the dynamic source of all that is, and to which all return. This, Kelley understands is the doctrine of ‘unrestricted knowledge’ and for Kelley this was ‘the essential doctrine which determines all aspects of Eckhart’s teaching’. Sadly, as Tauler, a student of Eckhart was to say in one of his sermons: He (Eckhart) spoke in terms of eternity and you (regrettably) understood in terms of time’. For Kelley, studying Eckhart is not primarily to study the ‘early fourteenth century teacher’, but to meditate on the formless light of transcendent knowledge with which the intellect is coincident and in which this innermost contemplative metaphysics always takes its stand. Here it is important, I believe, to understand that for Eckhart, as Kelley acknowledges, this understanding of ‘Divine Knowledge’ comes directly from the ‘Word’, the ‘Word’ as in scripture itself, as well as meaning the . K. Ruh, Meister Eckhart, Theologe, Prediger, Mystiker (), . . A. Palazzo, ‘Eckhart’s Islamic and Jewish Sources: Avicenna, Avicebron and Averroes’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), -. . C.F. Kelley, Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge (), . . Ibid. . . Ibid. .
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person of Christ as in the prologue to John’s Gospel. In approaching these Sermons and Lectures it is important to note that it is pure metaphysics with which we are dealing here, or at least the intention of such. Anything less, arising as it does from reflections on our experiences of the world, would for Eckhart overvalue the rational, temporal aspect of the intellect and limit understanding. Instead, ‘truly unlimited possibilities of insight are opened up’. It was from this perspective within the principial order of God that Eckhart understood the ‘birth of the Word’ in the soul. We enter this area of metaphysics almost immediately in the first Sermon when, in his consideration of the text in hand, juxtaposing it with other texts and understanding Christ to be the key to both the texts and their message, we meet here his ‘Principial’ understanding of the Godhead as he moves from considering the preacher to considering the fullness of Being in God. Creatures are nothing in themselves, all life receives that life from and within the Godhead. Much of the early part of this sermon is, accordingly, concerned with the question of this relationship. God as Principle: Almost immedirately the first Lecture presents us with Eckhart’s understanding of God as principle. Eckhart declares God ‘who works all things in all’ … ‘He himself is ‘the principle and the end’ at note , and in note that He is the originator of every ‘single work whose end and purpose is God.’ The dynamic of the Godhead and the twofold emanation of the Trinity and Creation: In the twofold emanation of the Trinity and Creation we see the influence of Neoplatonism in his presentation of the movement of exitus/reditus and the ‘Birth of the Word in the soul’. The traditional idea of emanation Eckhart develops into a twofold emanation, first in the persons of the Trinity and second in the creation of all things, together with a twofold return consisting of the birth of the Word in the soul, and then the ‘breaking through’ of the soul into the divine ground. . Ibid. . . Ibid. . . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): … deus, ‘qui operator omnis in omnibus’ … ipse est ‘principium et finis’. . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): … quod omnis et solius illius operis, cuius finis et intentio sincera est deus.
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The power to generate: The question of essence, substance and the power to generate has been found in the newly discovered second Parisian Question, and appears in this work with generation provocatively being extended beyond the inner-divine generation to that of creatures. In consideration of this we meet also his familiar illustrations of ‘Justice’ and the ‘just man’. Mutual Indwelling: Using the picture presented in the second half of the verse under consideration in the first Lecture, flores mei fructus, Eckhart develops the concept of the mutual in-being of everything, not only is the ‘least in the greatest’ but the ‘greatest is in the least’. This presents us with a further aspect of Eckhart’s metaphysics which develops Neoplatonism further and even turns it on its head: in God both maximum and minimum coincide or cohere together; it is not only about the least moving back into the greatest, but also the greatest being in the least, the exitus/reditus scheme no longer stands alone, but needs to be complemented by its reverse, the reditus/exitus. Using Plotinus’ image of the circle, referenced in The Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers to elucidate this, Eckhart shifts from a Neoplatonic ontological hierarchy of being to that of a mutual indwelling. We have here his understanding of an essential causality on the part of the divine rather than that of an efficient and final causality as in Aristotle. The Eternal Now: Eckhart’s concept of the ‘Eternal Now’ builds on the previous idea of a circular dynamic. It appears in the first Lecture. Since there is no temporal dimension in God, says Eckhart, God is always giving ‘birth’, there is only the present in God, the ‘now’ of eternity. And, alongside this, we see an aspect of Eckhart rarely noted, that of the contemplative, in his assertion that true knowledge and understanding comes only from within. Analogy: in the second Lecture Eckhart takes four verses of Ecclesiasticus as his framework and it is in this work that we find Eckhart’s major thinking on analogy. One of the major questions is whether he is arguing against Thomas Aquinas or rather developing Aquinas’ thought, as Wendlinker suggests. In presenting it he returns to his principle understanding that esse is God, the totality of being is in God, outside of God there is nothing. We note also that for Eckhart negation is not . Biblia Sacra Vulgata (), Eccli. :, , , .
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a valuable didactic tool. In addition, we are presented again with an understanding of son-ship in which Eckhart looked to express the dynamic identification of the creature with the Creator. Such an identification misunderstood, was to cause trouble at his trial. In quantum: throughout these texts, with the exception of the second Sermon, we find Eckhart using the reduplicative principle, in quantum, ‘In so far as’. As Denys Turner points out, this term was not unique to Eckhart. Thomas Aquinas had used it to show the consistency of the various statements of faith the believer is required to make about the unity of the two natures in the one person of Christ. But for Eckhart it is an important principle that runs through his work. In his Defense he makes it clear it is one of the three technical points that are important for understanding his whole work. Other Recurring Themes and Texts: In both the first Sermon and the second Lecture we find the example of ‘Justice’ and the ‘just man’. Woven into his arguments in this corpus also are some very familiar scriptural references of his, namely, ‘the manna in the wilderness’, ‘Mary and Martha’, Luke :-; ‘In the beginning was the Word’, John :; ‘Ego sum qui sum’, from Exodus :; Philips’ assertion ‘it is enough for us’ in John :, followed by the picture of the eagle in Ezekiel : and from Philippians :: ‘for me to live is Christ’. References to the church fathers, various masters, Christian and others, also abound. Some other characteristics observable in this corpus: Amongst these are Eckhart’s use of dialectic, his technique of drawing out the implications of a verse word by word, his emphasis through the doubling or repetition of words or parts of words such as alterius, alterum, alteri in the fourth paragraph of Sermon , as well as word or picture association which can be somewhat puzzling at times. We see how much Eckhart wove exegesis into preaching in these two sermons as he did in most of his Latin sermons. In addition, we can perhaps note his opposition to some of the practices of the rising mercantile economy of the late Middle Ages, as . D. Turner, The Darkness of God (), . . Eckhart, Processus contra mag. Eckhardum, nn. - (LW V ,-): Ad evidentiam igitur praemissorum tria notanda sunt. Primum est quod li ‘in quantum’, reduplicatio scilicet, excludit omne aliud, omne alienum etiam secundum rationem a termino. Licet enim in deo sit idem esse et intelligere, dicimus tamen deum non esse malum, quamvis dicamus eum intelligere malum. Et quamvis in deo patre idem sit essentia et paternitas, non tamen generat in quantum essentia, sed in quantum pater, quamvis essentia sit radix generationis.
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well, most probably to the decadence and corruption of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, in his references to the false practices of ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ in both sermons. Thus, in these Sermons and Lectures, we find the major themes of Eckhart’s thought as well as his use of metaphysical terms and arguments to express them. But I believe it is of the utmost importance that we remember their setting in a Dominican Provincial Chapter, and recognise, that over against all considerations of Eckhart’s method and style, the major thrust of the first Sermon is about the integrity of the Preacher, with the implicit return to this theme at the end of the second Lecture and the intervening considerations of relationship with the divine as from within the Godhead. In doing so we have the work not only of a Magister, but, as I shall argue in the concluding chapter, primarily that of a Prior whose main task in the Order of Preachers on the one hand was to equip his brethren for the active side of their lives – the task of drawing others on the journey of faith, and on the other, as a contemplative, to experience for themselves and so be able to express to and for others, as far as it is possible, that intimate relationship with God which he believed to be the source of the Dominican mission. Translation As well as the text of this corpus, all other translations of Eckhart’s Latin works in this thesis are mine. My approach has been to keep close to a literal translation of Eckhart’s Latin in order to attempt to convey something of the man himself as well as his thought. The translators of all other authorities are acknowledged in the footnotes.
Latin Text and English Translation Sermon
Sermon
‘Ego quasi vitis fructificavi suavitatem odoris’ Eccli. :[]
‘I am like a vine bearing fruit with a delightful perfume’, Eccli. :[]
99 Verba ista primo tractanda sunt in forma praedicationis, specialiter de beata virgine Maria, secundo exponenda per modum lectionis. Quantum ad primum ait: Ego quasi vitis fructificavi suavitatem odoris. Odorem notitiae suae manifestat per nos in omni loco, quia Christi bonus odor sumus, Cor.
99 First these words will be expounded fully in the form of a sermon specifically about the Blessed Virgin Mary, secondly, they will be explained in the form of a lecture. Concerning the first, she said: ‘I am like a vine bearing fruit with a delightful perfume.’ ‘The perfume of his knowledge makes itself known through us in every place, because we are the good perfume of Christ’, [] Cor. :[].
99 Verba secundo assumpta convenienter valde tam vocaliter quam realiter respondent verbis primo propositis. Apostolus enim, »praedicator veritatis«, notans praedicationis actum, praedicantis officium, concludit quid sit praedicatori necessarium, dicens: ‘Christi bonus odor sumus’. Et sunt tria: vitae puritas, intentionis sinceritas, opinionis aut famae odoriferae suavitas. Intentionis sinceritas: ut Christum intendat, nihil extra ipsum, secundum illud Cor. : ‘nos praedicamus Christum crucifixum’. Opinionis suavitas: ‘bonus odor’. Bernardus in Epistula: ‘splendor est operis odor opinionis’. Vitae puritas: ‘sumus’. »Vivere enim viventibus est esse«. Sed li esse – ‘sumus’ – quanto communius, quanto abstractius, tanto purius vitam, quod li vivere, significat.
99 Secondly, the words chosen corespond well, both in the words used and in [their] meaning, with the words [i.e. verse] first proposed. For the apostle, ‘a preacher of truth’, observing the work of preaching, the office of preacher, sums up what is essential for the preacher, saying: ‘we are the good perfume of Christ’: and there are three things: purity of life, sincerity of intention, aromatic sweetness of reputation or renown. On the sincerity of intention: that he has only Christ in mind, nothing other than him, according to [] Cor. :[]: ‘We preach Christ crucified.’ The sweetness of reputation [is meant by] ‘a good perfume’. Bernard in [his] letter [writes]: ‘The splendour of a work is the fragrance of reputation’. The purity of life [is meant by] ‘we are’. ‘For indeed, for living beings, to live is to be’. But the [verb] to be – ‘we are’ –
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[indicates that] the more common, [and] the more abstract being is understood the more purely it indicates life, namely simply ‘to live’. 99 Et hoc est quod in ipso themate dicitur: ‘ego quasi vitis fructificavi suavitatem odoris. Ego’: vitae puritas – li ‘ego’ enim meram quod est puram substantiam significat – ut possit dicere: ‘mihi vivere Christus est’, Phil. . Christus siquidem etiam secundum hominem »ex purissimis virginis sanguinibus« est formatus, ut ait Damascenus.
99 And this is what is said by the text itself: ‘I am like a vine bearing sweet smelling fruit. I ’: [meaning] purity of life – ‘I ’, indeed, signifies pure and undefiled substance – so that it is possible to say: ‘For me to live is Christ’, Phil. :[]. Since Christ is indeed fashioned in human flesh ‘by the blood of the most pure virgin’ as the Damascene says.
99 ‘Quasi vitis’. Li quasi relationem similitudinis significat. Relationi autem suum esse est non suum esse; sibi esse est non sibi, sed alterius, ad alterum et alteri esse. Sic praedicator verbi dei, quod est ‘dei virtus et dei sapientia’, non debet sibi esse aut vivere, sed Christo quem praedicat, secundum illud Gal. : ‘vivo ego, iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus’. ‘Ego, iam non ego’, et hoc est: ego quasi vel quasi vitis, id est Christus, quasi Christus, Ioh. : ‘ego sum vitis vera’. Christus vitis, praedicator ‘quasi vitis’. Et quia eius est operari cuius est esse, praedicatoris Christi doctrina non debet quidquam intendere praeter Christum, ut possit dicere illud Ioh. : ‘mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui misit me’. Hoc est ergo secundum, quod in praedicatore requiritur, intentionis sinceritas: ‘quasi vitis’.
99 ‘Like a vine’. The like signifies a relation of similarity. However, in a relation, being oneself is being not oneself; [in a relation] to be for oneself is to be not for oneself, but of another, towards the other and for the other. In the same way, the preacher of the word of God which is ‘the power of God and the wisdom of God’ [ Cor. :], ought not to exist or live for himself but for Christ [see Cor. :] whom he preaches, according to that [verse] Gal. :[]: ‘I live, yet not I, in truth Christ lives in me’. ‘I, yet not I’, and this means: like me or like a vine, it is Christ, like Christ, John :[]: ‘I am the true vine’. Christ [is] the vine, the preacher is ‘like a vine’. And because the work belongs to the one who is, the teaching of Christ’s preacher should not focus on anything else than Christ, so that he can say with John :[]: ‘My teaching is not mine, but his who sent me’. This is therefore, secondly, what is required from the preacher, sincerity of purpose: ‘like a vine’.
99 Sequitur tertium, scilicet opinionis odoriferae suavitas: ‘fructificavi suavitatem odoris’, ut de ipso possit dici illud Gen. : ‘ecce odor filii mei sicut odor agri pleni, cui benedixit deus’.
99 Thirdly follows, namely the sweetness of a perfumed reputation: ‘Bearing fruit with a sweet perfume’, so that it is possible that [the verse] in Gen. :[] is said of oneself: ‘See, the perfume of my son is like
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Sed ‘ad hoc’, carissimi, ‘quis tam idoneus?’ Certe nullus, nisi per illum, ‘qui idoneos nos fecit ministros novi testamenti, non littera, sed spiritu’, Cor. ‘Non littera’, inquit, ‘sed spiritu’. Ipsum ergo spiritum pro his impetrandis invocemus et dicamus: »veni, sancte spiritus« etc.
the perfume of the open country which God has blessed’. But, ‘regarding this’ my beloved, ‘who is capable’ [ Cor. :]? Certainly no one, except through him ‘who makes us worthy ministers of the New Testament, not by the letter but by the Spirit’, [] Cor. :[]: ‘Not by the letter’, he said, ‘but by the Spirit’. Therefore, we will call upon the Spirit himself that these things might be acomplished and we will say: ‘come Holy Spirit, come’ etc.
99 ‘Ego quasi vitis’ etc. Videmus quod isti, qui pro sua utilitate et lucro transeuntes ad hospitia sua vocant et invitant, solent allicere et promittere commoditates, quas sciunt affectare et amare viatores et eos qui laboraverunt, secundum illud Matth. : ‘venite ad me omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis, et ego reficiam vos’. Unde tales commendant stabulum, pabulum, vinum, cenaculum et huiusmodi et promittunt bonum forum. Isa. : ‘omnes sitientes venite ad aquas’ et: ‘emite absque ulla commutatione vinum et lac’. Secundum istum modum hodie divina sapientia pro sua bonitate nos invitat in epistula dicens: ‘transite ad me omnes’. Promittit in principio tria quae omnes amare solent, non plura, non pauciora nec alia. Sunt autem ista: amati puritas, plenitudo sive copiositas, tertium est ipsius suavitas: puritas sine alterius cuiuslibet commixtione, contra illud Isa. : ‘vinum tuum mixtum est aqua’; plenitudo sine qualibet defectione; suavitas sine cuiuslibet alius motione. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘ego quasi vitis fructificavi suavitatem odoris’. In pronomine puritas: ‘ego’, in relatione similitudinis fecunditas, in qua relucet plenitudo sive copiositas: ‘quasi vitis’; in odore fructus suavitas: ‘fructificavi suavitatem odoris’.
99 ‘I am like a vine’ etc. We see there are those, who for their own benefit and gain, call and invite the travellers to stay with them, they are accustomed to offer and promise accommodation which they know travellers and labourers desire and love, according to Matth. :[]: ‘Come to me all who labour and are weary, and I will refresh you’. Such men therefore recommend an inn, food, wine, a lodging and, in this way, they promise a good place. Isa. :[]: ‘All who are thirsty come to the water’ and ‘buy wine and milk without any cost’. Following the same way today divine wisdom invites us out of her goodness, saying in the epistle: ‘Come over to me everyone’. She promises in the beginning three things which everyone is accustomed to love, not more, not less, not anything else. These things are thus, purity of [that which] is loved, fullness or abundance, the third is its sweetness: purity without mixture of anything else, in reply to Isa. :[]: ‘Your wine is mixed with water’; a fullness without any shortcoming; a sweetness without any other sensation. And this is what is said here: ‘I am like a vine bearing fruit with a sweet perfume’. In the case of the pronoun ‘I ’, purity, in the relation of similarity fruitfulness, in which
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fullness or abundance is mirrored: ‘Like a vine’; by the sweet fragrance of the fruit: ‘Bearing fruit with a sweet perfume’. 99 ‘Ego quasi vitis’ etc. Verba ista scribuntur de sapientia dei increata, leguntur autem hodie in epistula de matre dei intemerata, per quam et in qua ipsa dei sapientia misericorditer est incarnata. Et secundum hoc sermo erit bipartitus: primo enim exponemus verba praemissa de sapientia increata de qua scribuntur, secundo de matre dei intemerata de qua hodie leguntur.
99 ‘I am like a vine’ etc. Such words are written about the uncreated wisdom of God, but they are being read today in the epistle about the unstained Mother of God, through whom and in whom the wisdom of God herself is mercifully incarnate. And accordingly, this sermon will be in two parts: namely, first we will explain the aforementioned words written about the uncreated wisdom, second [we will expound the words] about the unstained mother of God about whom they were read today.
99 Primo igitur modo sapientia dei notat sui puritatem dicens ‘ego’. Li ‘ego’ enim meram et puram substantiam significat, et hoc est primum quod in amato quaeritur. Quamvis enim omnis potentia animae unicum aliquod purum obiectum formale habeat, hoc tamen potissime convenit voluntati et amori, tum quia »voluntas« et amor »est ipsius finis«, qui semper unicus est, tum quia amor ex sui proprietate unitivus est. Amor ergo et voluntas ipsum amatum in se ipso et per se ipsum solum et purum sine omni alio respiciunt, quin immo omne alienum, omne aliud despiciunt. Iustus enim per essentiam, inquantum huiusmodi amat solam iustitiam et odit omne non iustum, secundum illud Iob : ‘posuisti me contrarium tibi, et factus sum mihimet ipsi gravis’; Matth. : ‘qui non est mecum, contra me est’; ‘nemo potest duobus dominis servire’, Matth. . Adhuc sic purum amat amatum, ut nec eius principia essentialia respiciat. Verbi gratia: amans ostii apertionem nihil prorsus curat utrum sit clavis lignea vel aurea, dummodo apte aperiat, ut ait Augustinus IV De doctrina
99 Therefore, according to the first way, the wisdom of God signifies her own purity saying ‘I ’. Indeed, the ‘I ’ signifies unadulterated and pure substance, and this is the first thing which is being sought in the beloved. For although every power of the soul has only one pure formal object, nevertheless this applies chiefly to the will and to love, because, first, ‘the will’ and love ‘is itself the end’, which is always unique, and, second, because love by its own peculiar nature is unifying. Therefore, love and the will respect the beloved himself in himself and for himself, unique and pure, without [regard for] any other, in fact, on the contrary, they despise everything that is alien, everything that is other. For the just man [is so] by essence, insofar as by nature he loves only justice and hates everything that is not just, according to that [verse in] Job :[]: ‘You have set me against you and I have become a burden even to myself’; [and] Matth. :[]: ‘Whoever is not with me is against me’; [and] ‘no one is able to serve two masters’, Matth. :[]. Thus he loves
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christiana. Tob. propter quod angelus Tobiam reprehendit dicens: ‘genus quaeris mercennarii?’ Hinc est quod nec efficiens nec finem amati aspicit amor, sed tantum formam puram et pure, Sap. : ‘amator factus sum formae illius’. Hinc est iterum quod »spiritus sanctus est amor patris in filium«, qui est emanatio formalis praeter efficiens et finem, secundum illud: ‘emanatio est dei sincera’, Sap. .
his pure beloved in such a way, with the result that he does not even have any regard for her essential principles. For example, one who loves to open a door, does not care at all whether the key is made from wood or gold, provided it unlocks properly, as Augustine says in Book of his Christian Doctrine. In Tob. :[], on account of which, the angel rebuked Tobias saying ‘Why do you inquire about the tribe of a hired worker? Hence it is that love neither beholds the cause or end of the beloved, but solely the pure and unadulterated form, Wisd. :[]: ‘I fell in love with her form’. Hence, again, ‘the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father for the Son’, which is a formal emanation beyond cause and end according to the following: ‘She is a pure emanation of God’, Wisd. :[].
99 Secus de intellectu et notitia. Haec enim rem accipiunt ex suis et in suis principiis, et secundum hoc exponitur uno modo istud Ioh. : ‘in principio erat verbum’. Verbum enim ad notitiam et intellectum pertinet. Propter quod Philippus ait: ‘domine, ostende nobis patrem’, id est principium sine principio, ‘et sufficit nobis’, Ioh. . Intellectus enim est in figura ‘aquila’ illa ‘grandis’, Ez. , ‘longo membrorum ductu’, quae ‘venit ad Libanum et tulit medullam cedri’, id est principia rei, et ‘summitatem frondium eius avulsit’, rationes rerum scilicet in summitate causarum originalium sive primordialium, priusquam in res ipsas prodeant, »in solis puris nudis intellectibus« latentes, apprehendit. Sub hac autem puritate substantiae significat li ‘ego’, et hoc est primum quod in amato requiritur, scilicet puritas sine omni permixtione, quae proprie sapientiae divinae congruit. Unde in V l. Fontis vitae auctor de deo excelso et
99 It is different with regard to intellect and knowledge. For they receive being out of and in their own principle, and accordingly this is expounded in a single way in John :[]: ‘In the principle was the word’. Because the word belongs to knowledge and the intellect. Because of which Philip says: ‘Lord, show us the Father’, that is the principle without principle, ‘and it is enough for us’, John [:]. For the intellect is figuratively in that powerful eagle, Ez. [:-], ‘with broadly stretched wings’ which ‘comes to Lebanon and carries off the best part of the cedar’, that is the principles of the thing, and ‘it plucks off the top of its foliage’, namely the reasons of things in the summit of their original or primordial causes, before they should spring forth in the causes themselves, seized hidden ‘in the pure, naked intellect alone’. However, the ‘I’ is addressed within this purity of substance, and this is what is first required in the
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sancto loquens dicit »quod est substantia constituens essentiam omnium formarum«, »sapientia perfecta, lumen purissimum«. Prov. : ‘primi et purissimi fructus eius’.
beloved, purity without any mixture of course, which corresponds appropriately with divine wisdom. Therefore, in book V of the Fountain of Life the author speaks of the high and holy God saying: ‘that he is the substance which constitutes the essence of all forms’, ‘perfect wisdom, most pure light’. Prov. :[]: ‘The first and purest [are] his fruit’.
99 Relucet autem ista puritas excellens ex quinque. Primo, quia est substantia se tota stans in se ipsa tota et »in quolibet sui«, nulli innixa, nulli permixta. Propter quod redit super se »reditione completa«. Secundo relucet, quia li ‘ego’ dicit substantiam sine omni accidente, quin immo accidens in ipsa et per ipsam transit in substantiam. Ratio est, quia omnium accidentium in subiecto est idem esse cum ipso esse subiecti. In primo autem esse est ipsa substantia; ergo omne accidens in deo transit in substantiam. Sed quia sola relatio non habet esse in subiecto nec a subiecto, sed potius ab obiecto et a suo opposito, non transit in substantiam. Et sic manent in divinis tantum duo praedicamenta, scilicet substantia et relatio. Tertio relucet ex hoc, quia li ‘ego’ non significat substantiam hanc aut illam, sed substantiam meram simpliciter. Quarto quia nec substantiam significat, quae sit in genere substantiae, sed quid altius et per consequens purius, includens perfectiones omnium generum. Quinto, quia substantiae ut sic, quam li ‘ego’ significat, non est capax hic mundus nec dignus, sed solus intellectus; nec hic inquantum natura sive ens naturae, sed inquantum altius quid natura. Propter quod philosophus dicit quod »anima est locus specierum«, quae sunt rationes rerum, »non tota, sed intellectus«. Augustinus etiam ex Platone
99 This excellent purity, however, shines out for five reasons. First because it is the substance standing totally in its own totality and ‘in whatever is hers’, supported by nothing, mixed with nothing. Because of which it returns upon itself ‘in a perfect return’. Secondly it shines out because the ‘I ’ expresses substance without any accidents, whereas, on the contrary, an accident moves in itself and through itself into substance. The reason being that every accident in a subject is identical with the very being of the subject. In the Principle, moreover, being is substance itself; therefore, every accident in God moves into substance. But because the relation alone does not have [its] being in the subject, nor from the subject but rather from the object and from its own opposite, it does not move into substance. And thus, only two categories remain in the divine, namely substance and relation. Thirdly, it shines out from the following [argument], because the ‘I ’ does not signify this or that substance, but simply pure substance. Fourthly because it does not signify a substance which belongs to the genus of substance, but that which is higher and as a result purer, including the perfections of all offspring. Fifthly, because this world is neither capable nor worthy of such a substance which the ‘I ’ signifies, but only the intellect; neither is this one insofar as
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dicit quod sapientia et veritas non sunt in hoc mundo, sed in mundo altiori, scilicet mundo intellectuali. Hoc de primo inter tria.
[being] nature or being of nature, but insofar as something loftier than nature. Because of which, the philosopher says that ‘the soul is not the place of species’, which are the reasons of things, ‘but the intellect’. Likewise, Augustine, based on Plato, says that wisdom and truth do not exist in this world, but in a higher world, namely the world of the intellect. This [completes] the first of the three topics.
99 Secundum est amati plenitudo sive copiositas, super quam attestatur ipsius fecunditas. Quam notat li ‘quasi, quasi vitis’, relatio scilicet ad vitem et similitudo. Ubi notandum quod, cum in deo, ut iam supra dictum est, sint tantum duo praedicamenta, substantia et relatio, substantia in ratione substantiae non est sui diffusiva, tum quia ad intra respicit, ad se ipsam est, non ad aliud, tum quia secundum se et per se esse respicit, quod est unum semper in divinis. Propter quod optime dicunt sancti et doctores quod in divinis essentia non generat. Dicunt etiam doctores communiter quod potentia generandi non est essentia absolute, sed essentia cum relatione. Quid autem principalius, nodosa quaestio est.
99 Second it is by the fullness or abundance of the beloved that it bears witness to its fruitfulness. The words ‘like, like a vine’ denote the relation to the vine and the likeness. Where it will be noted that, as in God, already stated above, there are but two such categories, substance and relation, substance, which according to the notion of substance is not pouring itself out, then because it looks back within [itself], it is [directed] towards itself, not towards another; moreover, because it looks to be according to itself and through itself, it is always one in the Godhead. Because of which, the saints and doctors rightly say that in the Godhead the essence does not generate. The doctors unanimously say also that the power to generate is not the absolute essence, but essence with relation. Which, however, [of the two principles] is more principal [than the other] is a knotty question.
99 Oportet igitur necessario quod relatio sit, ratione cuius est fecunditas et diffusio in divinis. Et hoc est quod Boethius dicit: »essentia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem«. Propter quod signanter dicitur Ioh. secundum aliam expositionem: ‘in principio erat verbum’; pater enim non dicit verbum nec generat filium, inquantum essentia sive substantia, sed inquantum principium. Unde solet
99 Therefore it is inevitable that the relation exists, the reason of it being fruitfulness and pouring out within the Godhead. And this is what Boethius says: ‘essence contains oneness, the relation multiplies into the Trinity’. Because of which it is said in John :[] more clearly according to another interpretation: ‘In the beginning was the word’; because the Father does neither say the Word nor does
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exponi: ‘in principio’, id est in patre, ‘erat verbum’. Principium autem, sicut et li primum, relationem importat ordinis et originis. In De causis enim dicitur: »primum est dives per se«. »Primum« ait, non primus, quia ratione relationis sive ordinis habet deus diffusionem sive fecunditatem tam in divinis quam in creaturis, Iac. : ‘dat omnibus affluenter’, id est omnia; et apostolus Cor. : ‘operatur omnia in omnibus’. Prima enim causa necessario dat omnibus omnia; aut enim omnibus aut nulli, omnia vel nihil, secundum illud Rom. : ‘vocat ea quae non sunt, tamquam ea quae sunt’, sicut super eodem notavi diffuse. Propter quod ‘disponit omnia suaviter’.
he generate the Son, insofar as he is essence or substance, but insofar as [he is] the principle. From which is to be explained ‘in the beginning’, meaning in the Father, ‘was the word’. The principle, however, as also the first, implies a relation of order and origin. In the De causis, indeed it is said: ‘A first is rich in itself’. ‘A First’, is said, not the first, because God has diffusion or fruitfulness because of relation or order, as much in the Godhead as in creatures, [as] James :[b writes]: ‘He gives generously to all’, that is all things; and the apostle [Paul] in Cor. :[]: ‘He works all things in all’. The first cause gives all things to all by necessity; either to all or to nobody, everything or nothing, according to what is said in Romans :[]: ‘He calls into being things which are not, just as those who are’, as I have observed extensively on these words. Because of which ‘he arranges everything delightfully’.
99 Et hoc est tertium principale, scilicet amati suavitas: ‘suavitatem odoris’. Suave est quod sua vi trahit, et hoc est tertia amati proprietas, quod videlicet ipsum solum et sui solius vi trahat. Iustum enim inquantum iustum nihil prorsus trahit nisi iustitia, et trahit ipsum iustitia et omne iustum, sicut videmus quod oculum sive visum nihil movet vel trahit nisi color et coloratum; omne aliud est ipsi per accidens omnino, puta quod sit homo, lignum vel lapis. Nunc autem sic est quod solum supremum sive altissimum sua vi trahit; omnia quae subsunt trahunt in vi superioris, sicut diffuse patet in tractatu De natura superioris. Sapientia vero increata, de qua est sermo, ‘in altissimis’ habitat, Eccli. . Ex quo patet quod ipsi sola est quae sua vi trahit, et sic habet et spirat ‘suavitatem odoris’. Et hoc est quod hic
99 And this is the third main point, namely the sweetness of the beloved: ‘the sweet smelling perfume’. What is sweet attracts through its own power, and this is the third character of the beloved, that clearly it itself alone attracts and solely by its own power. Absolutely nothing if not justice attracts the just [man] insofar as he is just, and justice attracts him [i.e. the just man] and all just [men], in the same way we see that nothing moves nor attracts the eye or sight except colour or things coloured; everything else is by itself completely accidental, for example, what a man is, what wood is, what stone is. Now, however, it is thus that alone the supreme or highest attracts by his own power; everything below attracts by the power of the superior, just as it is thoroughly explained in the tract On the nature of the
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dicitur ex ore sapientiae: ‘ego quasi vitis fructificavi suavitatem odoris’. Haec de prima parte sermonis.
superior. Indeed, uncreated wisdom, which [our] sermon is about dwells ‘in the highest place’ Eccl. [:/:]. From which it is clear, that it is in itself alone that it attracts by its own power and thus it has and breathes a ‘sweet smelling perfume’. And this is what is said from the mouth of wisdom: ‘I am like a vine bearing sweet smelling fruit.’ This [completes] the first part of the sermon.
99 Exponendo autem verba praemissa de matre sapientiae incarnatae in ipsis notantur tria. Extollitur enim virgo beata a tribus, vitae sanctitate et puritate: ‘ego’; secundo a prolis fecunditate: ‘quasi vitis fructificavi ’; tertio a famae et opinionis odoriferae suavitate: ‘suavitatem odoris ’. De primo Anselmus: decebat nimirum, »ut ea puritate virgo illa niteret qua maior sub deo nequit intelligi«. Cant. : ‘tota pulchra es, amica mea, et macula non est in te’; Apoc. : ‘mulier amicta sole, et luna sub pedibus eius’. Prosequere, ut libet.
99 However, in expounding these words which have already been advanced about the Mother of wisdom incarnate, three things are noted in them. Namely [that] the Blessed Virgin has been praised for three things, for a life of holiness and purity: ‘I ’; second for fruitfulness of the offspring: ‘like a fruitful vine’; third for the sweet fragrance of reputation and esteem: sweet smelling. About the first Anselm: without doubt it was appropriate ‘that the virgin by her purity shines so that one cannot conceive of a greater under God’. Cant. :[]: ‘You are total beauty, my friend, and there is no blemish in you’; Rev. :[]: ‘A woman clothed with the sun, and under her feet the moon.’ Follow this up as it pleases you.
99 De secundo, scilicet fecunditate, Augustinus in quodam sermone »Legimus Moysen«: »divina potentia operante credentis viscera fecundantur«. »Qui terra, mari caeloque non capitur, intra unius corpusculi membra suscipitur; de creatura creator omnium procreatus« »nascitur«. Primum, scilicet puritas, respondet virginitati; secundum, scilicet fecunditas, maternitati. Beda in Homilia: o quam pium spectaculum, virgo et mater.
99 On the second, fruitfulness of course, Augustine in a certain sermon [said]: ‘We read about Moses’: ‘the heart of the believer is made fruitful by the work of the divine power’. ‘The one whom earth, sea and sky cannot capture has been received into one organ of the human body; by a creature the creator of all is begotten’, ‘is born’. The first, namely purity, corresponds with virginity; the second, namely fruitfulness, with motherhood. Bede in a homily [says]: O what a holy wonder, virgin and mother!
99 De tertio, scilicet famae et opinionis odoriferae suavitate, Chrysostomus super
99 Regarding the third, namely the sweet fragrance of reputation and esteem,
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Matthaeum, super illo: ‘inventa est in utero habens’ scilicet: »inaestimabilis laus Mariae. Magis credebat Ioseph eius castitati quam utero eius, plus gratiae quam naturae«. »Possibilius credebat mulierem sine viro posse concipere quam Mariam posse peccare«. Eccli. : ‘quasi myrrha electa dedi suavitatem odoris’. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘ego quasi vitis fructificavi suavitatem odoris’. Cuius odoris et fructus suavitatis participes nos faciat ipse ‘fructus benedictus’ cum patre et spiritu sancto in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
Chrysostom said in On Matthew on that [verse]: ‘She was found to have [a child] in her womb’ [Matth. :], ‘praise of Mary beyond all praise. Joseph believed more in her chastity than her womb, more in grace than in nature’. ‘He believed in the possibility that his wife is able to conceive without a husband more than that Mary is able to sin’. Eccl. :[]: ‘I gave the sweetness of perfume as though it were finely chosen myrrh’. And this is what is being said here: ‘I am like a vine bearing sweet smelling fruit.’ So may the fragrance and sweetness of the fruit itself make us partakers of ‘the blessed fruit’ with the Father and the Holy Spirit for ever and ever. Amen.
Lecture
Lecture
‘Ego quasi vitis fructificavi suavitatem odoris’ Eccli. :[]
‘I am like a vine bearing fruit with a delightful perfume’ Eccli. :[]
99 Dubium videtur in verbis praemissis: primo quia, ut dictum est supra, suave est quod sua vi trahit; hoc autem est solius primi moventis et finis ultimi. Constat autem quod fructus est finis floris et gustus olfactus. Rursus flos servit fructui, non e converso, et flos spirat in fructum, non e converso. Quid est ergo quod hic dicitur: ‘fructificavi suavitatem odoris’, cum odor non trahat sua vi, sed potius vi ipsius fructus, ad quem ordinatur sicut olfactus ad gustum
99 [There] seems to be something uncertain in the preceding words: first that as is said above, what is sweet attracts by its own power; this, however, is [true] only of the prime mover and ultimate end. However, it is well known that fruit is the end of the flower and taste of smell. Again, the flower serves the fruit, not the reverse, and the flower manifests the fruit and not the reverse. Which, then, is what is said here: ‘bearing fruit with a delightful perfume’, since a perfume does not attract by its own power but rather by the power of its own fruit, to which it is related as smell is to taste.
99 Advertendum ergo quod hoc est proprietas et condicio divinorum, quo distinguuntur et discernuntur a non divinis, quod divina habent fructum in flore. Alias
99 Therefore, it will be noted that this is the special character and nature of the Godhead, by which it is distinguished and separated from [what] is not divine, that
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enim nequaquam essent divina. Et hoc est quod sequitur ‘Flores mei fructus’. Ratio est, quia deus, ‘qui operatur omnia in omnibus’, Cor. , et Isa. : ‘omnia opera nostra operatus es nobis, domine’, ipse est ‘principium et finis’, Apoc. et c. , ‘primus et novissimus’, Isa. . Ipse ergo flos ut principium, fructus ut finis.
the Godhead has the fruit in the flower. That is to say, the others are by no means divine. And this is [what is expressed in] what follows: ‘My flowers [are] fruits’. The reason is because God, ‘who works all things in all’, [] Cor. :[] and Isa. :[]; ‘all our work you have done for us, Lord’, He himself is ‘the principle and the end’, Apoc. and chapter ‘the first and the last’, Isa. :[, also :]. Consequently, He himself is the flower as the principle and the fruit as the end.
99 Hinc est primo quod omnis et solius illius operis, cuius finis et intentio sincera est deus illud opus operatur deus et est eius principium, et sic est divinum, utpote operatum a deo. Hinc est secundo quod in Psalmo dicitur: ‘oratio mea in sinu meo convertetur’, sicut super eodem Psalmo notavi diffuse. Factus enim finis, hoc ipso et solo fit et est principium. Sic igitur simul et eodem floret et fructificat, flos est et fructus, et flos est fructus. Et secundum hoc punctatur littera sic: ‘flores mei fructus’ in recto, et sequitur sub alio puncto: ‘honoris et honestatis’, de quo iam infra dicetur.
99 From this it follows, first that every single work whose end and true purpose is God, God performs that work and He is the originator of it and thus it is divine in as much as [it is] a work by God. Second, this is what is said in the Psalm [:], ‘My prayer will return to my heart’ as I have written extensively on the same Psalm. That is to say, becoming the goal, by this itself and only [this] it becomes and is of the principle. So, therefore, at the same time and in the same way, He flowers and bears fruit, He is the flower and the fruit, and the flower is the fruit. And following this, the text is punctuated as follows: ‘my flowers [are] fruit’, correctly, and followed by another full stop: ‘honour and integrity’, about which something will be said below.
99 Rursus tertio in divinis »quodlibet est in quolibet« et maximum in minimo, et sic fructus in flore. Ratio, quia »deus«, ut ait sapiens, »est sphaera« intellectualis »infinita, cuius centrum est ubique cum circumferentia«, et »cuius tot sunt circumferentiae, quot puncta«, ut in eodem libro scribitur. In cuius figura Exodi dicitur de manna divino: ‘nec qui minus paraverat, repperit minus’, et Luc. : ‘Maria optimam partem elegit’, quia optimum et totum est in parte, fructus in flore. Sic deus
99 Again, third, in the Godhead ‘everything is in everything’ and the greatest is in the least and so the fruit is in the flower. This is because ‘God’ as the wise man says, ‘is an intellectual ‘sphere’, ‘infinite, whose centre is everywhere with the circumference’, and ‘of which there are as many circumferences as there are points’, as it is written in the same book. According to which image, it is said of the divine manna in Exodus :[]; ‘No one who had collected less had too little’, and [in] Luke :[];
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totus in qualibet creatura, in una sicut in omnibus. Igitur opus dei et divinum inquantum huiusmodi fructificat in flore et in florem et odoris suavitatem.
‘Mary has chosen the best part’, because the best is also the whole in a part, the fruit in the flower. So, God [is] totally in whatever creature, in one as in all. Therefore, the work of God insofar as it is divine, in this way bears fruit in the flower and according to the flower and the sweetness of perfume.
99 Hinc est quarto quod omne opus dei semper novum est, Sap. : ‘in se permanens innovat omnia’; Apoc. : ‘ecce nova facio omnia’, sicut diffusius notavi super Sap. . Rursus quinto est illud Gen. : ‘in principio creavit deus caelum et terram’. ‘Creavit’: finis et fructus in praeterito; ‘in principio’: flos est et novum. Hinc est sexto quod, ubi deus operator in se ipso, si opus dici debeat, semper filium genuit et gignit, semper natus est, semper nascitur: flos est fructus, flos in fructu, fructus in flore.
99 This is the fourth, that every work of God is always new, Wisd. :[]; ‘Remaining in herself she renews all things’; Rev. :[]; ‘Behold, I make all things new’, as I have noted extensively on [that verse] in Wisdom. Again, fifth is that [verse] in Gen. :[]; ‘In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth’. ‘Created’ [means] the end and the fruit in the past tense; ‘in the beginning’ [means that] it is the flower and [it is] new. This is the sixth that when God is working in Himself, if one might call it work, He has generated and always generates the Son, [who is] always born, always being born: the flower is the fruit, the flower in the fruit, the fruit in the flower.
99 Hinc est septimo illud Ioh. : ‘in principio erat verbum’. Verbum, fructus, erat in principio, id est in flore. Fructus igitur in flore et flos est in divinis. Notandum ergo quod virtuoso fructus est ipsum operaari virtuose, non operatum esse. Virtus siquidem et bonum in actu consistit. Propter quod operatum esse nequaquam esset fructus virtutis, nisi operatum esse esset operari, frustuc flos.
99 This is the seventh [point], John :[]; ‘In the beginning was the Word’. The Word, the fruit was in the beginning, that is in the flower. Therefore, the fruit is in the flower and the flower is in the Godhead. Therefore note, that to the virtuous man the fruit is that he himself acts virtuously, not that he has acted virtuously. Accordingly, virtue and the good consist in being practised. Because of this the fruit of virtue should in no way be what has been done unless what has been done should be in the process of being done, the fruit, the flower.
99 Hinc est octavo quod Matt. dicitur: ‘beati qui persectionem patiuntur’; non ait: ‘passi sunt’, sicut ibidem super Matthaeum
99 This is the eighth [point] what is said in Matth. :[]; Blessed are those who suffer persecution’; he did not say ‘have
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diffusius notavi. Patet hoc in divinis sic esse. In ipso enim deo pater filium non genuisset, nisi genuisse esset generare. Unde Origenes super Ieremiam ex persona filii in divinis ait: ‘ante omnes colles generat me dominus’, »non: ‘generavit’, sicut quidam male legunt« – verba sunt Origenis – Prov. . Unde nostra translatio habet ‘parturiebar’, Sap. . Ratio est, quia in deo et per consequens in divinis, ut divina sunt, non est praeteritum quippiam nec futurum nec in re nec in apprehensione. Cuius ratio etiam est, quia praeteritum et futurum non cadunt nec lucent in esse. Propter quod Matth. dicitur: ‘nescio vos’. Ubi Augustinus dicit quod hoc solum novit deus quod invenit et lucet in regulis aeternis incommutabilis veritatis. Sic enim et in nobis: nihil scimus specie hominis, nisi quod lucet et est in ipsa specie. Unde nec Petrum hominem videmus in specie Martini, sed solum Martinum. Praeteritum igitur et futurum, quia non lucent nec cadunt sub esse, non sciuntur in esse aut per esse, cum ibi non sint; et haec est proprietas non entium, ut nesciendo sciantur. Hoc enim solum de ipsis vere scitur quod non sciuntur. Sic enim sunt praeterita et futura quod non sunt. Hoc enim est praeteritum esse: non esse. Quia ergo praeteritum et futurum et huiusmodi privativa esse cadunt ab ente et extra esse, cadunt consequenter a luce veritatis et cognoscibilitatis et similiter ab uno et bono. Sicut igitur hoc solo sunt quod non sunt, sic eo solo sciuntur quod nesciuntur. Et hoc est quod intendimus, scilicet quod deus pater nequaquam filium genuisset, nisi genuisse esset generare. Cuius exemplum: virtuosus et divinus, utpote deiformis et deo conformis, beatus est et ipsi sapit pati, non passum esse. Nam passum esse non est, sed praeteritum est.
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suffered’, as I have written extensively there on the Matthew [passage]. It is clear this is the way to be in the Godhead. Indeed, in God himself, the Father has not generated the Son, unless ‘to have generated’ should be ‘to generate’. Therefore, Origen [in his] On Jeremiah says [as] from the person of the Son in the Godhead: ‘The Lord creates me before all the mountains’, ‘not “has created”, as some wrongly read’ – the words are Origen’s – Prov. :[], from which he is able [to give] us the translation ‘was being born’, Wisd. :[]. This is because in God and, as a logical consequence, in the Godhead, as they are divine, there is no past nor future, neither in fact nor in understanding. Furthermore, the reason for this is because past and future neither end nor shed light on being. Because of that it is said in Matt. :[]; ‘I do not know you’. So, Augustine says that God alone knows what he invented and is visible in the eternal rule of unchangeable truth. Indeed [it is] so also with us: we know nothing of the form of man unless it is apparent and is in us in the form itself. From this we do not see Peter the man in the form of Martin, but only Martin. Therefore, the past and the future, because they are not apparent nor fall under being, are not known in being or through being, in that they are not there; and this is the special character of non-beings, that they should be known by not knowing. Indeed, by this alone it is known of truth itself that it is not known. Indeed, in such a way past and future are not anything. For this is [what it means] to be past: not to be. Therefore, because the past and the future and negative [states] of this kind fall from being and [are] outside being, as a result they fall from the light of truth and the ability to understand and similarly from the
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One and the Good. Therefore, in the same way, by this alone they are what they are not, in the same way, for that reason, they are only known because they are not known. And this is what we are meaning, namely that God the Father by no means had given birth to the Son, unless to have given birth should be [understood as] to procreate. An example of which [is]: A virtuous and divine [man], inasmuch as he is godlike and agrees with God, is blessed and understands within himself that he is suffering, not [that] he has suffered. For to have suffered does not exist but is past. 99 Hinc est nono quod Macrobius in Saturnalibus dicit: »rerum honestarum in ipsis pretium est«, id est fructus in flore virtus in operari aut pati. Augustinus etiam IX De trinitate c. docet »conceptum verbum et natum« esse idem in spiritualibus, ut sint idem flos et fructus. Conceptio enim verbi, quae fit amore adhaerente et inhaerente rei, quam audimus vel videmus aut quomodolibet cogitamus aut cognoscimus, est ipsa proles mentis sive verbum natum; sicut, ut prius, fructus in flore, proles in conceptione, verbum conceptum verbum natum. Cum vero quod auditur, videtur et cogitatur displicet, tunc mens non haeret nec adhaeret cognito, viso vel audito. Propter quod non concipit nec fecundatur nec fetum habet nec prolem per consequens, quia conceptio ipsa est proles. Unde opus tale non habet rationem boni nec meriti, nec ipsius est hereditas. Non enim haeret nec adhaeret; non est ergo heres, tum quia non haeret, tum quia per consequens non concipit nec est proles sive filius. Quod si non filius, nec heres, Gal. .
99 Here is the ninth [point] what Macrobius says in the Saturnales: ‘The value of honest things is in themselves’, that is the fruit in the flower, virtue [is] to labour or to suffer. Augustine [in] book IX On The Trinity, chapter , also teaches: ‘The word conceived and born’ to be the same in spiritual things, as the flower and the fruit should be the same. For the conception of the Word which takes place through love by clinging to and by being inherent in a thing which we hear or see, just as we think or we know, is itself the offspring of the intellect or the Word [that is] born; just as earlier [I said] the fruit [is] born. When, however, what is heard, seen or thought displeases then the intellect neither clings to nor hangs on to [what is] known, seen or heard. Because of that, it [the intellect] does not conceive, neither [is it] fruitful, neither does it have offspring or descendants as a result, because the conception itself is offspring. It follows such a work does not have the knowledge of the good, nor of [what is] worthy, nor is it its inheritance. Indeed, it is not adhering nor hanging on; therefore, it is not the heir, besides because it does not adhere,
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then as a result it does not conceive, there is neither offspring or son. Because if no son, no heir, Gal. :[]. 99 Hinc est decimo quod Psalmista ait: ‘mihi adhaerere deo bonum est’. Adhaerens enim deo adhaerendo concipit deum, concipit bonum, florescit et in ipso flore conceptionis fructus est et perfectus est. Et hoc est aperte quod Augustinus dicit XI De trinitate c. , quod species visibilis in visu vel oculo proles concepta a visibili est ipsa visio.
99 Tenth, here is what the Psalmist says: ‘It is good for me to cling to God’ [Ps. :]. For in clinging to God who clings, he conceives God, he conceives goodness, he blossoms and, in the flower itself is the fruit of conception and it is perfect. And this is plainly what Augustine says in On the Trinity, book XI, chapter [n. ], that the species of what is visible by sight or by the offspring conceived by the eye from what is visible, is the vision itself.
99 Hinc est undecimo quod actus exterior, utpote aliud a conceptu sive conceptione et extra conceptionem, nihil prorsus adicit nec fructus potest dici, cum non sit in flore nec in conceptione, nihil, inquam, adicit quantum ad esse bonum morale et divinum. Propter quod meritum non consistit in numero, magnitudine seu duratione actuum, sed in sola intentione conceptionis actus, quae fit amore sive caritate operantis. Et hoc est duodecimo quod dicitur Isa. : ‘flos de radice eius ascendet’, id est Iesse, quod est incendium amoris, caritas scilicet. Et sequitur: ‘requiescet super eum’, scilicet florem, ‘spiritus domini’. Ecce quiescit deus in ipso flore, in ipsa conceptione concipitur et perficitur fructus, nihil extra exspectans.
99 This is the eleventh, that the external act, inasmuch as [it is] another thing by conception or by the act of conceiving, even outside of conception, adds absolutely nothing, nor can it be called a fruit, seeing that it should not be in in the flower nor in the conception, I say it adds nothing so far as [it] concerns being morally good and divine. Because of this, merit does not consist in number, magnitude or duration of acts, but only in the intention of the act of conception which occurs by the love, or affection of the one who performs the act. And this is twelfth what is said in Isa. :[]; ‘A flower will arise from his root’, that is Jesse, which is the fire of desire, love of course, and it follows: ‘it will rest upon him’, namely the flower, ‘the spirit of the Lord’. Look, God rests in the flower itself, in the very conception the fruit is conceived and perfected, anticipating nothing extra.
99 Adhuc est tertio decimo quod dicitur Gen. : ‘requievit’ deus ‘ab omni opere quod patrarat’. Non ait solum ‘in opere’, sed ‘ab opere’, quia ipsum operari fructus est deo et divinis. Quiescere facit ipsum operari, et ab ipso quies datur et tribuitur.
99 Now the thirteenth [point is] what is said in Gen. [:]; God ‘rested from all the work that he had accomplished’. It does not just say ‘in the work’ but ‘from the work’, because the work itself [is] fruit to God and the Godhead. To rest [in] itself
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Virtuoso et divino ipsi operari virtuose vita est et vivere est, Phil. : ‘mihi vivere Christus est’, et Rom. : ‘iustus ex fide vivit’. Certe plus quam vivere est iusto iuste agere, tum quia vitam potius contemnit quam iustitiam deserat – Eccli. : ‘pro iustitia agonizare pro anima tua et usque ad mortem certa pro iustitia’ – tum quia iustus ut sic ex se toto et per essentiam habet iuste agere. Quies igitur et fructus est in opere aut potius ‘ab opere’, ut ait littera, et ab ipso operari accipit quietem, fructum boni in flore et a flore et a nullo prorsus exteriori et alieno ab ipso flore. Sed numquid iustus semper iuste operatur, cum iustitia et vita iusti sit operari? Utique. Nam et hoc est quod dicimus iustitiam fructum et perfectum et consummatum esse in conceptione in mente. Quae conceptio est ante et praeter operari exterius. Intus igitur etiam in dormiente vigilat iustitia, Cant. : ‘ego dormio, et cor meum vigilat’. Propter quod signanter dicitur: ‘iustus ex fide vivit’. Augustinus docet quod in abdito mentis potentiae animae semper sunt in actibus suis.
accomplishes work, and from itself rest is given and imparted. To the virtuous and to the divine, the work itself is a virtuous life and it is to live, Phil. :[]; ‘to me to live is Christ’, and Rom. [:]; ‘the just man lives by faith’. Certainly, to the just man to act with justice is more important than to live, because he despises life more than he might abandon justice. Eccli. :[]; ‘Fight for justice as for your soul and all the way to certain death for justice’ – because then the just man from his whole self and by his essence lives justly. Therefore, rest and fruit are in the work or rather ‘from the work’, as it says literally, and from the work itself he [the just] receives rest, fruit of the good in the flower and from the flower and nothing from anything external and foreign to the flower itself. But is it possible the just man acts justly, since justice and the life of a just man should be in the work? Certainly. For this is what we are saying justice [is] the fruit [and] is perfect and brought to perfection in [its] conception in the intellect. Any concept exists prior to and in addition to any external work. Therefore, within the inner [man], even while asleep, justice is vigilant – Cant. :[]; ‘I sleep and my heart keeps watch’. Because of that, it is said clearly: ‘the just man lives out of faith’. Augustine teaches that in the hidden intellect the powers of the soul are always in their actions.
99 Hinc est quarto decimo quod omnis scientia, non sistens nec quiescens nec fructum habens aut quaerens et inveniens in ipso scire, non est liberalis nec sui gratia, sed est mechanica sive adultera, quaerens fructum extra et praeter scire. Talis non habet scientiam et sapientiam sponsam, sed concubinam, non liberam, sed ancillam. Non est amator formae ipsius quae est scire
99 This is the fourteenth [point] that all knowledge, neither standing still nor resting nor bearing fruit, thinking or searching and discovering to know within itself, is not free nor [does] itself any kindness, but is mechanical or adulterous, seeking fruit outside and apart from knowledge. Such a one does not have knowledge and wisdom [as a] bride, but [as a] mistress, not free but
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/et sapere, sed est adulter sapientiae, amator formae illius, quod per ipsam sapientiam quaerit extra et praeter ipsam et extra sapere. Propter quod talis, etsi possit dici sapiens, non tamen potest nec meretur dici philosophus, id est amator sapientiae, sed potius amator divitiarum, honorum, commoditatum aut huiusmodi, propter quae sapientiam quaerit. Opus tale et eius operarius mercennarius est, servus est, non filius, et opus ipsius mortuum, non proprie meritorium nec divinum, sicut notavi super illo: ‘si filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi estis’, Ioh. :[].
a maidservant. He is not a lover of the form itself which is to know and to understand, but is an adulterer of wisdom, a lover of that form which through wisdom herself seeks outside and beyond herself and to be wise outside [of wisdom]. Because of that, even if it should be possible to call [him] wise, nevertheless it [should] not be possible nor [does he] deserve to be called a philosopher, that is a lover of wisdom but rather a lover of riches, of honours or advantages or [such] of this kind, because of that he seeks wisdom. Such a work of his is a hired labourer’s work, he is a slave, not a son, and his work is dead, not particularly deserving of merit nor divine, as I have observed above about that [verse], ‘If the Son shall set you free, you are free indeed, John :[].
99 Patet igitur ex praemissis omnibus quod divinorum proprie est, ut in ipsis idem sit flos et fructus. Secus autem in omni opere quod et in quo creatura inquantum huiusmodi operatur, cuius ipsa est principium et finis intentus. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘flores mei fructus’. Thomas tamen in I II q. a. exponens verba praemissa dicit: »nihil prohibet fructus alicuius esse alium fructum, sicut finis« unius ordinis habet super se alium finem communiorem. Quapropter »nostra opera, inquantum sunt effectus spiritus sancti operantis in nobis, habent rationem fructus« in vita gratiae »in quantum vero ordinantur ad finem vitae aeternae, sic habent rationem florum«.
99 Therefore it is clear from [what has] gone before that it is characteristic of the Godhead, that in it the flower and the fruit should be the same. But it is otherwise in every work which and in which the creature operated insofar as [it is such a creature] who is itself the beginning and the awaited end. And this is what is said here: ‘my flowers [are] fruits’. Thomas, however, in [his Summa Theologia Pars] I II q. a , explaining the previous words says: ‘Nothing prevents a fruit bearing another fruit, even as the end’ of one order has above itself another more general end. On which account ‘our works insofar as they are brought about by the Holy Spirit working in us, have the meaning of [being] fruit ‘in the life of grace’, ‘insofar as they are truly ordered towards the end of eternal life, thus they hold the meaning of [being] flowers’.
99 ‘Ego quasi vitis’. Notandum quod tota perfectio secundorum est assimilatio superiorum. Propter quod Clemens
99 ‘I am like a vine’. Note that the complete perfection of secondary [things] is to make [them] like the superior [things].
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philosophus, ut ait Dionysius, dicebat quod superiora sunt exemplaria inferiorum et idealiter se habentia ad ipsa inferiora. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur in persona viri sancti: ‘ego quasi vitis’, id est similis viti quae est Christus. Quod autem dicitur: ‘flores mei fructus’, li ‘fructus’ accipitur in recto in prosecutione superius dicta, potest tamen et accipi in obliquo, ut sit sensus: ‘flores mei’ flores sunt ‘fructus’ illius, qui fructus est ‘honoris et honestatis’. Distinguuntur autem honor et honestas, eo quod »honor est exterior exhibitio reverentiae in signum virtutis«. Unde dependet honor ab alio quodam extra. Propter quod dicit philosophus I Ethicorum quod honor magis est in honorante quam in honorato; non, sicut multi male intelligunt, quasi honorare sit magis et maior honor honoranti quam honorato. Hoc enim falsum est et contra intentionem philosophi. Sed vult dicere quod honor, cum sit exhibitio reverentiae exterior, dependet ab alio et ab extra. Et propter hoc et ex hoc probat philosophus non esse felicitatem sive summum bonum hominis in honore, quia honor dependet ab alio extra nos, summum autem bonum hominis non est dependens ab extra nec requirit alium vel aliud ab extra. ‘Honestatis’: honestas sive honestum est virtus et omne bonum divinum quod sua vi trahit, non vi alterius, non habens finem extra se ipsum nec principium. Praeponit autem ‘honoris’ et subiungit ‘honestatis’, quia honestas, utpote intra, latet, honor autem sive exhibitio reverentiae patet, et ex honore impenso alicui innotescit apud omnes honestas et divinum aliquod esse in ipso honorato.
Because of that the philosopher Clement, as Dionysius says, was saying that [the things] above are prototypes of inferior [things] and consider themselves the eternal prototype for inferior [things]. And this is what is said here regarding a holy person: ‘I am like a vine’, that is like the vine which is Christ. However, what is said [is]: ‘the flowers of my fruit’, ‘fruit’ is understood as virtue following the above saying, nevertheless it is possible even to understand [it] differently so that the sense might be: ‘my flowers’ flowers are ‘fruit’ of that one, which fruit is of ‘reputation and integrity’. However, reputation and integrity are to be distinguished [from one another], in that ‘reputation is an external display of respect in denoting the character of reputation’. From which [we see] reputation depends on something other [which is] outside. Because of that the philosopher says [in Part] [of] Ethics that [there is] more honour in honouring than in being honoured; not as many wrongly understand, as it were [that] to be honoured might be great and the greater honour [is] being honoured rather than to honour. This is to be mistaken and against the intention of philosophy. But, in fact he wanted to say that honour while it might be an external display of respect will be derived from another and from outside. And because of this and from this, the philosopher demonstrates happiness or the highest good of man does not consist in reputation, because reputation is derived from another outside of us, on the contrary, the highest good of man is not derived from outside nor does it need this or that from outside. ‘Reputation’: or integrity is a virtue and the whole divine good which attracts by its own power, not by the power of another, not having its end or principle outside of
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itself. Moreover, it puts honour first and subdues integrity because integrity, as [it is] within, lies hidden, honour, however is open to a display of respect, and from excessive honour it becomes known among everyone [that] integrity and something godlike [is] to be [found] in the honoured [one] himself.
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‘Spiritus meus super mel dulcis, ubi supra’ Eccli. :
‘My spirit is sweeter than honey’ Eccli. :
99 ‘Spiritus eius ornavit caelos’, Iob . ‘Spiritus eius’. Cuius? ‘Eius’, patris et domini caeli et terrae, Matth. : ‘confiteor tibi, pater, domine caeli et terrae’; Psalmus: ‘initio tu, domine, terram fundasti, et opera manuum tuarum sunt caeli’. ‘Ornavit caelos’. Quos caelos? Praedicatores praedicantes gloriam dei et intendentes, Psalmus: ‘caeli enarrant gloriam dei’. “Hi sunt caeli”, sicut in quadam Prosa cantatur, “in quibus, Christe, habitas, in quorum verbis tonas, fulguras signis, roras gratia”. Isa. : ‘rorate, caeli, desuper’. Quia igitur spiritus patris ornat caelos, ipsum spiritum pro gratia impetranda invocemus.
99 ‘His spirit has adorned the heavens’, Job :[]. ‘His spirit’. Whose? ‘His’ the Father and Lord of the heavens and the earth. Matt. :[] ‘I acknowledge you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth’; Psalm [:]: ‘In the beginning you, O Lord, established the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands’. ‘He adorned the heavens’. What heavens? [They are] preachers preaching the glory of God and directing [attention to Him] as the Psalm :[] points out: ‘the heavens are proclaiming the glory of God’. ‘These are the heavens’, as it is celebrated in a certain Prose, ‘in which, O Christ, you dwell, in words of which you thunder, you flash in signs, you pour out kindness.’ Isa. :[]: ‘Let dew fall. O heavens, from above.’ Therefore, because the spirit of the Father adorns the heavens, we should call upon the spirit himself requesting his grace.
‘Spiritus meus super mel dulcis’.
‘My spirit is sweeter than honey’.
99 Carissimi, in principiis sollemnibus theologorum mos est iste: unus ex magistris primis antiquioribus quaestionem proponit,
99 Beloved, in accordance with the traditional beginning of theologians it is the custom that: one of the time-honoured
. Vulgate text.
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et unus ex novissimis respondet. Certe iam pridem quidam ex veteranis veteris legis quaestionem proposuit quid esset dulcius melle, Iud. : ‘quid dulcius melle?’ Nunc ergo huic quaestioni respondet unus magister novissimus qui hodie incipit, hodie nascitur, Psalmus: ‘dominus dixit ad me: filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te’, dicens: ‘spiritus meus super mel dulcis’.
masters puts forward a question, and one of the young [ones] answers. Now, in all events, some time ago one of the veterans of the old law put forward a question what might be sweeter than honey, Judges :[]: ‘what is sweeter than honey?’ Therefore, today one very new master who begins today, is born today, answers this question, Psalm [: says]: ‘the Lord says to me: you are my son, today I have begotten you’, saying: my spirit is sweeter than honey’.
99 Carissimi, inter emptores et venditores haec est condicio contraria hinc et inde quod venditor merces suas et venalia solet commendare, ut emptores alliciat, emptor vero e converso venalia solet vituperare, ut levius emat, Prov. : ‘malum est, malum est, dicit omnis emptor, et cum recesserit, gloriatur’. Et notandum est quod bis ait: ‘malum est ’. Primo quidem, quia nunquam malum est unicum. Cadens enim a bono cadit per consequens ab esse et ab uno quod cum illo convertitur. Malum etiam ex sui natura in aliud malum trahit, secundum illud Psalmi: ‘abyssus abyssum invocat’. »Mox enim suo pondere ad aliud trahit«, ut ait Gregorius; est enim peccatum plerumque poena peccati. Et ipsa culpa poena est, ut docet Augustinus super Psalmo . Est autem et alia ratio magis ad propositum, quare bis dicat: ‘malum est, malum est’. Solent enim emptores frequenter plures defectus allegare rei venalis, non contenti uno. Verbi gratia: emptor equi allegat quod equus sit nimis antiquus vel nimis iuvenis ad labores, item quod habeat tibias claudas aut visum debilem et huiusmodi. Venditor autem venale suum e converso commendat. Secundum hoc ergo divina sapientia ad suum venale omnes invitans: ‘transite’,
99 Beloved, there is an incompatible situation between these buyers and sellers here since the seller is accustomed to recommend his goods for sale so that he might attract buyers, the buyer, however, on the contrary, is accustomed to find fault with [the goods] for sale, so that he might buy [them] cheaply, Proverbs :[] ‘it is bad, it is bad, every buyer says, while he will have gone away boasting’. And note that he says twice ‘it is bad’. Certainly first, because at no time is evil uncommon. For, falling from the good he falls, as a result, from being and from the one which is interchangeable with it. Furthermore, evil because of its own nature influences evil in another according to that Psalm [:]: ‘deep calls to deep’. ‘Namely, next, it attracts by its own influence’, as Gregory says; for sin is frequently the penalty of sin. And guilt itself is the punishment, as Augustine teaches about Psalm . There is, however, also another more important reason for the practice, why he says twice: ‘it is bad, it is bad’. For buyers, not content with one, are frequently in the habit of alleging the many defects of a thing for sale. For example: the buyer of a horse might allege that the horse might be too old or too young to work, similarly that it
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inquit, ‘ad me omnes’. Condiciones suas nobiles commendat dicens: ‘spiritus meus super mel dulcis’. Notandum autem quod invitans emptores ait: ‘transite ad me omnes’. Augustinus docet non esse quippiam quod omnes velint, praeterquam esse beatum sive habere deum. Et est ratio: finis enim omnium est solum ultimus finis, qui est deus, beatitudo, summum bonum. Ait ergo: ‘transite ad me omnes’. Sic Matth. : ‘venite ad me omnes’; Rom. : ‘vocat ea quae non sunt tamquam ea quae sunt’.
might have a lame shin or weak sight and [things] of this sort. The seller, on the other hand, recommends his sale by the reverse [argument]. Following this, therefore, divine wisdom inviting everyone to her sale says: ‘come over to me, everyone’. She recommends her superior terms saying: ‘my spirit is sweeter than honey’. Note moreover, that inviting buyers she says: ‘come over to me, everyone’. Augustine teaches there is nothing anyone wants except to be happy or to have God. And the reason is: namely the end of all things is alone the ultimate end, which is God, supreme happiness, the highest good. Therefore, she says: ‘come over to me everyone’. Thus, in Matthew :[]; ‘everyone come to me’; Romans :[]; ‘he calls into existence the things that do not exist’.
99 Sunt autem quinque in quibus divina sapientia venale suum commendat. Primum est naturae impermixta puritas: ‘spiritus’. Secundum est universalis boni fontalis proprietas: ‘meus’. Tertium praesidentiae incomprehensa sublimitas: ‘super’. Quartum respectu aliarum rerum venalium perfectionis incomparabilitas: ‘super mel ’. Quintum dulcoris ipsius amplectenda suavitas: ‘dulcis’.
99 There are, however, five things according to which divine wisdom recommends her sale. First is the unmixed purity of nature: ‘spirit’; second is the special character of the source of the universal good: ‘my’. Third, the inconceivable loftiness of its oversight: ‘over’; fourth, respect for the incomparability of the perfection of other goods for sale: ‘more than honey’. Fifth, embracing the attractiveness of its own sweetness: ‘sweet’.
99 Quantum ergo ad primum ait: ‘spiritus’. In quo notatur divinae essentiae impermixta puritas, Ioh. : ‘spiritus est deus’, et distinguatur sic ad praesens: ‘spiritus deus est’. Exodi : ‘qui est misit me ad vos’. ‘Hoc nomen mihi est in aeternum’, et distinguatur sic: ‘hoc nomen est’ et sequitur: ‘mihi in aeternum’. Phil. : ‘nomen’ quod ‘est’ ‘super omne nomen’, quia esse sive ‘qui est’ secundum Damascenum est primum inter omnia nomina dei. Punctetur ergo sic littera:
99 Therefore, as for the first, she said: ‘spirit’. In which it is noted the unmixed purity of the divine essence, John :[]; ‘God is spirit’, so, for the present it is to be distinguished from: ‘the spirit is God’. Exod. :[]; ‘[He] who is sent me to you’. ‘This is my name for ever’, and it might be divided as follows: ‘this is my name’ and ‘mine for eternity’ follows. Phil. :[]; ‘the name’ that is ‘above every name’, because being or ‘he who is’ according to the Damascene is first among all the names of
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‘donavit illi nomen quod est’ sive esse aut ‘qui est’, quod, inquam esse, est ‘super omne nomen’, utpote primum et per consequens supremum super omne nomen. De hoc plene notavi super illo Phil. : ‘donavit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen’. Hoc de primo, quod est divinae naturae impermixta puritas: ‘spiritus’.
God. Therefore, the text is punctuated thus: ‘He has given him the name that is’ whether to be or ‘who is’, regarding which, I say: to be, is ‘above every name’, namely the first and as a result the greatest [name] above every name. I have written extensively about this regarding Phil. :[]; he gave him the name which is above every name’. This [is what I say] about the first [point], which is the unmixed purity of the divine nature: ‘spirit’.
99 Sequitur ‘meus’. In quo notatur universalis boni fontalis proprietas. ‘Spiritus’, inquit, ‘meus’. Certe, si ‘spiritus est deus’, »ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia«, Rom. , patet quod spiritus est fontalis ratio universalis boni, et haec sua proprietas et sibi proprium. Ait ergo: ‘meus’. Ioh. : ‘omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil’. ‘Omnia per ipsum’: ecce fontalitas originalis. ‘Sine ipso nihil’: ecce proprietas singularis. ‘Spiritus’, inquit, ‘meus’. Agg. : ‘spiritus meus erit in medio vestri’; Is. : ‘effundam spiritum meum super semen tuum’, ‘et germinabunt quasi salices iuxta praeterfluentes aquas’. ‘Super semen tuum’.
99 ‘My’ follows. In which the special character of the source of universal good is noted. ‘Spirit’, it says, ‘my’. Certainly, if ‘God is spirit’, ‘from whom all things, through whom all things, in whom all things [are]’, Romans :[], it is clear, that the spirit is the original cause of the universal good, and this is its own quality and its characteristic. Therefore, it says: ‘my’. John :[]; ‘All things are made through him, and without him nothing is made’. ‘All things through him’: See, the original source. ‘Without him nothing [is made]’: see the unique quality. ‘Spirit’, it says, ‘my ’. Haggai :[];’my spirit will be in your midst’; Isaiah :[-]; I will pour out my spirit upon your seed’, ‘and they shall sprout forth like willows by flowing streams’. ‘Over your seed’.
99 Et hoc est tertium principale, dei scilicet sive spiritus incomparabilis sublimitas: ‘super mel ’. Cant. : ‘mel et lac sub lingua eius’. ‘Sub’ ait, non ‘supra’, sed ‘sub lingua eius’. Ait ergo: ‘spiritus meus super mel ’. Et hoc de tertio.
99 And this is the third principle, namely, the incomparable loftiness of God or the Spirit: ‘more than honey’. Cant. :[]; honey and milk under his tongue’. It says, not ‘over’ but ‘under his tongue ’. Therefore, it says: ‘my spirit over honey ’. And this is the third point.
99 Sequitur ‘dulcis’, dulcedinis divinae sapientiae ineffabilis suavitas, quod erat quartum, Sap. : ‘o quam bonus et suavis est, domine, spiritus tuus’; Cant. : ‘fructus
99 ‘Sweet’ follows, concerning sweetness, the indescribable sweetness of divine wisdom, that was the fourth, Sap. :[]; ‘O how good and sweet is your spirit,
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illius dulcis gutturi meo’. Dulcis, inquam, sed ‘super mel dulcis’, quia ‘initium dulcoris est fructus eius’, Eccli. .
Lord’; Cant. :[]; ‘his fruit [is] sweet to my taste’. Sweet, I say, but ‘sweeter than honey ’, because ‘the beginning of sweetness is its fruit’, Eccli. :[].
99 Et hoc est quintum principale, scilicet dulcoris ipsius amplectenda incomparabilis suavitas. Ubi notandum quod ait: ‘initium dulcoris’; initium siquidem rei cuiuslibet est ratio ipsius. Ratio siquidem rei prior est et praestantior ipsa re, utpote principium et causa illius, Ioh. : ‘in principio erat verbum’ – Graecus habet logos, quod est ratio – et sic ratio semper est prior ipsa re, in re ipsa lucens, non comprehensa, sed comprehendens rem ipsam, Ioh. : ‘lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt’. ‘Lux’, inquam, ratio rei dicitur; res sunt ‘tenebrae’ ipsae. Universaliter enim ratio rei, utpote principium et causa superior, ‘lux’ est; res autem ipsa, utpote causata et inferior, ‘tenebrae’ est. Nihil enim habet inferius ut sic perfectionis aut lucis ex se, sed totum et se toto habet a suo principio causali superiori. Inferius enim ut sic se toto est passivum, nudum et informe; superius e converso »per se dives« est et influens et forma lucens. In Psalmo dicitur: ‘quam magna multitudo dulcedinis tuae, domine, quam abscondisti’. ‘Dulcedinis’: dulcedo dei est ratio dulcedinis, quia ‘deus erat verbum’, id est ratio, ut sapientia ait. ‘Abscondisti’, quia res omnis in sua ratione absconditur et latet. Ignis enim in ratione sua non est ignis nec dicitur ignis, sic ergo nec nomen nec naturam habet ignis et sic absconditur in sua causa. Hoc est ergo quod dicitur: ‘spiritus meus’ etc. Et sic solvitur problema Iudicum: ‘quid dulcius melle?’
99 And this is the fifth principle, namely, the charm of her incomparable sweetness will encircle [her]. Where it will be noted that it says: the beginning of sweetness’; in that the beginning of a thing whatever is reason itself. Accordingly, reason is prior to a thing and surpasses the thing itself, inasmuch as [it is] the beginning and cause of that [thing], John :[]; ‘In the beginning was the word’ – Greek has logos which is reason – and thus reason is always prior to the thing itself, shining in the thing itself, not being comprehended, but comprehending the thing itself, John :[]; ‘the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not comprehended it’. ‘Light’ I say, is said to be the reason of a thing; things are ‘darkness’ themselves. For generally, inasmuch as the reason of a thing is the principle and highest cause, it is ‘light’; the thing itself, however, insofar as it is caused and inferior, is ‘darkness’. For nothing below has perfection or light from itself but has everything even its whole self from its own principle in the superior cause. For in such a way [what is] below is itself totally passive, bare, and formless; by contrast [what is] above is “rich in itself” and flowing and shining in form. In the Psalm [:] it is said: ‘How great the multitude of your sweetness, Lord, which you have hidden’. ‘Of sweetness’: the sweetness of God is the ground of the sweetness, because ‘God was the word’, that is the reason as wisdom says. ‘You have hidden’ because everything is concealed and hidden in its ground. For a fire in its ground is not a fire
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nor is it called a fire, therefore a fire has neither the name nor the character of fire, thus it is hidden in its own origin. This, therefore, is what is said [here]: ‘my spirit ’ etc. And thus the riddle of Judges is solved: ‘what is sweeter than honey?’ [Judges :]. 99 ‘Spiritus meus’ etc. Expositis supra his verbis de sapientia dei patris nunc exponenda restant de matre ipsius verbi, quod virtus et sapientia dei patris, Cor. Et secundum hoc notantur hic tria. Primum est omnis carnalis corruptionis immunitas: ‘spiritus’, Gal. : ‘spiritus’ concupiscit ‘adversus carnem’. Secundum est divinae prolis admiranda fecunditas: ‘spiritus meus’, Luc. : ‘spiritus sanctus superveniet in te’, ‘et quod nascetur ex te sanctum, vocabitur filius dei’. Tertium est in succurrendo miseris, quin immo omnibus, dulcedo et pietas: ‘super mel dulcis’. De his tribus simul Luc. : ‘ave, gratia plena, dominus tecum’. ‘Ave’, sine vae carnalis corruptionis quoad primum. ‘Dominus tecum’ quantum ad fecunditatem generationis, quod erat secundum. ‘Gratia plena’ quantum ad tertium, quod erat pietas miserationis et subventionis
99 ‘My Spirit’ etc. Having explained above these words about the wisdom of God the Father now an explanation remains concerning the mother of the word herself, which is the power and wisdom of God the Father, [] Cor. [:]. And following this, three things are noted. First is the freedom of everyone from the corruption of the flesh: ‘spirit’, Gal. :[]: [what] the ‘spirit’ desires [is] in ‘opposition to the flesh’. Second is the wonderful fruitfulness of the divine offspring: ‘my spirit’, Luke :[]; ‘the Holy Spirit will come upon you’, ‘and [the one] who will be born from you in fulfilment [of scripture] shall be called the Son of God’. The third is in helping the poor, in fact on the contrary, everyone, sweetness and goodness: ‘sweeter than honey’. At the same time, Luke :[], [says] about these three: ‘Hail, [one] full of grace, the Lord [is] with you’. ‘Hail’, without the pain of the corruption of the flesh refers to the first [point]. ‘The Lord [is] with you’ so far as the fruitfulness of procreating [is concerned], that was the second. ‘Full of grace’ as far as concerns the third, that was the tenderness of compassion and of help.
99 Est ergo virgo quantum ad primum, mater quantum ad secundum, Eccli. : ‘flores mei fructus’: flos virgo, fructus mater. Beda in Homilia ‘Loquente Iesu’: »o admiranda puella quae salvo virginitatis pudore suum genuit genitorem«. Rursus de his duobus simul et de tertio Beda, ubi supra: »o benedicta mater, quae inferni
99 Therefore, as for the first she is a virgin, as to the second she is a mother, Eccli. :[] ‘my flowers are fruit’: flower the virgin, fruit the mother. Bede in [his) Homily ‘Jesus Speaking’: ‘O wonderful maiden who by preserving the honour of her virginity has given birth to her creator’. Again, concerning these two [properties]
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vastatorem, caeli reparatorem, nostrum salvatorem, mundi redemptorem«, »angelorum laetitiam, hominum vitam, caelorum gloriam, sanctorum coronam, paradisi lucernam«, »beatitudinem omnium« genuit. Et hoc quantum ad tertium. Sequitur: »mater et virgo peperit« quantum ad secundum et primum. Hieronymus in Sermone de assumptione tractans istud: ‘ave, gratia plena’ ait: »talibus decebat virginem oppignerari muneribus, ut esset gratia plena, quae caelis dedit gloriam, terris deum pacemque refudit, fidem gentibus, finem vitiis, vitae ordinem, moribus disciplinam«. Item Hieronymus: »bene gratia plena, quia ceteris per partes, Mariae vero se totam infudit gratiae plenitudo«. »Vere gratia plena, per quam largo sancti spiritus imbre superfusa est omnis creatura«. Et notandum quod convenienter valde, sicut pater dicendo verbum producit et creaturas, sic virgo beata gignendo filium omnem superfudit gratia creaturam. Cuius gratiae nos participes faciat deus, cuius ‘spiritus super mel dulcis’.
and the third Bede, [says] more in the above [mentioned homily]: ‘O blessed mother, [who gave birth] to the destroyer of Hell, the renewer of the heavens, our saviour, the redeemer of the world’, ‘joy of the angels, the life of men, the glory of the heavens, the crown of saints, the light of paradise’, ‘the blessedness of everyone’ she has given birth. And this concerns the third [property]. It follows: ‘mother and virgin have given birth’ as the second and the first [properties]. Jerome in [his] sermon on the Assumption discussing this [greeting]: ‘greetings, full of grace’ says: ‘it was fitting such a tribute should be pledged to the Virgin as she was full of grace, who gave glory to the heavens, she has restored God and peace to the earth, faith to the Gentiles, an end to sin, order to life, discipline to morals’. Jerome also said: ‘truly full of grace, because others share [in it], however, in Mary herself fullness of grace has been poured into her whole self ’. ‘Truly full of grace, through whom the rain of the Holy Spirit has been lavishly poured over every creature’. And note that very suitably, speaking brings forth the word and creatures so the Blessed Virgin in giving birth to the Son has poured grace over every creature. Of which grace may God make us partakers, whose ‘Spirit is sweeter than honey’.
Lecture
Lecture
‘Hereditas mea super mel et favum’ Eccli. :
‘My inheritance is superior to honey and the honeycomb’ Eccli. :
99 Nota: hereditas solius heredis est. Heres autem filius, Gal. : ‘si filius, et heres’. Filius enim haeret, et hereditas ipsi adhaeret, Ioh. : ‘filius manet’ in domo ‘in aeternum’. Oportet ergo ad hoc, ut simus
99 Observe, the inheritance belongs only to the heir. The heir, however, [is] the son. Gal. :[] ‘if [he is] son, then also heir’. For the son inherits and the inheritance adheres to him. John :[] ‘the son remains’
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heredes regni caelorum, quod simus filii dei. Et hoc est maius donum dei, inter omnia praecipuum, quod nobis ‘dedit potestatem filios dei fieri’ spiritualiter. Unde etiam »in rebus per tempus ortis illa summa gratia est quod homo in unitate personae coniunctus est deo«, ut ait Augustinus XIII De trinitate c. . Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘hereditas mea super mel et favum’ [Eccli. :], id est ius possidendi hereditatem, quod est filiatio, ‘super mel et favum’ [Eccli. :], ut per mel et favum intelligatur res sive ens et eius ratio, quae duo respiciunt: intellectum ratio, voluntatem ens extra. Est ergo sensus: ‘hereditas mea’, ut quis sit filius, est et praemium [Eccli. :]. Omni enim intellectus contemplatione et omni incendio voluntatis et amoris, secundum illud Is. : ‘propter Sion non tacebo et propter Ierusalem non quiescam, donec egrediatur ut splendor iustus eius’. Cuius prosecutionem notavi super Isa. c. .
in the house ‘in eternity’. It is right, therefore, according to this, that we should be heirs of the kingdom of heaven, because we should be sons of God. And this is the greater gift of God, the most extraordinary of all, that he ‘has given’ to us ‘the power to become sons of God’ spiritually. Therefore, Augustine says in Book XIII of De trinitate c. , [n. ]: ‘Among things created in time that is the highest grace, that man is united with God in oneness of person’. And this is what is said here: ‘My inheritance is superior to honey and honeycomb’ [Eccli. :], that is, the right of possessing the inheritance, which is son-ship, ‘superior than honey and honeycomb’ [Eccli. :]; by ‘honey’ and ‘honeycomb’ should be understood the thing or being and its reason, of which one considers two aspects: reason the intellect, [and] the will outside of being. Therefore, the meaning is: ‘my inheritance’ that one should be the son, is also the reward [Eccli. :] for all contemplation of the intellect and to all passion of the will and of love according to that [verse in] Isaiah :[]: ‘On account of Sion I will not be silent, on account of Jerusalem I will not rest until her just magnificence should come forth’, about which I have written in detail concerning chapter :[] of Isaiah.
‘Qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’ etc. Eccli. :
‘They who eat me will still be hungry’ etc. Eccli. :
99 Notandum quod esuries et sitis proprie est desiderium, appetitus et potentia naturalis ad actum. Unde omne desiderium, appetitus et potentia, quae sunt ad aliquod
99 Note that hunger and thirst are properly desire, a longing and a natural ability to act. As a result, because all desire, longing and ability, are about some other
. I am deviating from the critical edition here as the editor’s addition of ‘mel et favum’ is incorrect. The ‘praemium’ here refers to what has just been said before, the ratio, intellect, is the heritage, the son and this is the ‘praemium’, which here is a noun. The punctuation is also changed so that the second emendment of the editors: ‘superior est’ is not needed.
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finitum, non semper esuriunt nec semper sitiunt; sed adepto termino edunt et bibunt et nequaquam amodo sitiunt et esuriunt. Sic enim adepta perfecte forma ignis finem habet calor formam consequens. Iuxta quod Ioh. dicitur: ‘petite, ut gaudium vestrum plenum sit’. In his autem, quorum terminus est infinitus, e converso se habet. Talia enim semper edunt et semper esuriunt, et ardentius esuriunt et avidius quo plus edunt. Verbi gratia: materia prima infinita est ad omnes formas generabiles infinitas. Propter quod, licet nunquam sit sine forma et sic semper edat, semper tamen aliam et aliam formam appetit et esurit, quia nullam invenit in qua sint omnes. Propter quod Rabbi Moyses l. III c. ipsam materiam dicit a Salomone Prov. describi sub metaphora mulieris adulterae quae virum habet et semper alterum appetit. Item videmus quod pars quaelibet orbis caelestis, quia potentiam habet et per consequens sitim et desiderium ad quodlibet et omne ubi, propter hoc semper est ubi alicubi et semper appetit et sitit omnia. Et haec est una causa vera motus perpetui illius corporis per naturam. E converso levia corpora et gravia, quia sunt ad unum terminum sursum vel deorsum, propter hoc illo adepto edunt, quiescunt, non sitiunt amplius proprie loquendo. Propter quod amodo non moventur, non quaerunt nec sitiunt amplius nec esuriunt.
end, one is not always hungry or thirsty; on the contrary, they eat and drink and from then onwards they are no longer hungry or thirsty. Indeed, in such a way the goal of fire gaining perfect form, has heat as a logical consequence. Just as it says in John :[]: ‘Ask that your joy may be full’. However, in those things whose end is infinite, the opposite holds. For in those one is always eating and always hungry and passionately and greedily hunger the more one eats. For example: prime matter is infinite in relation to all the forms infinitely generated. On account of which it is never allowed to be without form and thus it always eats, yet always it seeks another and another form and is hungry because it finds none in which all [forms] might exist. On account of which Rabbi Moses l. III [of the Dux neutrorum], c. says that this matter itself is described by Solomon in Proverbs under the metaphor of an adulterous woman who has a husband and always desires another. Likewise, we see that any part of the heavenly sphere, because it has power and, as a result the thirst and the desire [to be] anywhere and everywhere, is thus always somewhere and always desires and thirsts to be in every [place]. And this is one true cause of perpetual motion of that body by nature. Conversely, the light and heavy bodies, because they exist for the one end, up or down, eating until full, they rest, they are not thirsty to speak more specifically. On account of which from now on they are not moved, they are not searching, neither are they thirsty or hungry any more.
99 Deus autem cum sit veritas et bonitas infinita et esse infinitum, omnia, quae sunt, quae vera sunt, quae bona sunt, ipsum edunt et ipsum esuriunt: edunt, quia sunt,
99 But since God is infinite truth and goodness and infinite being, all things that are, that are true, that are good, eat him and for him they hunger. They eat, because
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quia vera sunt, quia bona sunt; esuriunt, quia ipse infinitus est, Iob : ‘omnes eum vident, unusquisque intuetur procul’; Psalmus: ‘a summo caelo egressio eius’, ‘nec est qui se abscondat a calore eius’. Et Damascenus in principio libri sui dicit: »non dereliquit nos deus in omnimoda ignorantia sui: omnibus enim cognitio essendi deum naturaliter inserta est«. Sic ergo in verbis praemissis sui ipsius infinitatem entitatis, veritatis et bonitatis nobis dei sapientia insinuat dicens: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’. Sic enim tertio videmus in omni quanto quod quidem semper quantum est et divisum sive distinctum et nihilominus, quia quantum, semper sitit divisionem et semper bibit et edit divisionem; semper enim aliquod divisum est.
they are, because they are true, because they are good; they hunger because he himself is infinite. Job :[]: ‘All men look at him, and each [one] sees him from a distance’; Psalm [:]: ‘His going out is from the highest heaven’, ‘neither is there [anyone] who can hide from his heat’. The Damascene in the beginning of his book says: ‘Our God has not left us in total ignorance of him: for knowledge of the being of God is naturally planted in all men’. Therefore, in such a way in accordance with the previous words, God’s wisdom makes known to us the infinity of his being, of truth and of goodness saying: ‘They who eat me, shall still hunger ’ [Eccli. :]. That is to say, thirdly accordingly we see in everything how much, insofar as indeed it always exists as quantity and is separated or distinct and likewise because it is quantitative, it is always thirsty for division, it always drinks and eats the division; that is to say it is always divided to some degree.
99 Secundo notandum quod illud quod sititur, esuritur, quaeritur et appetitur ab omnibus est esse, tam in natura quam in arte. Ad hoc enim et propter hoc laborat ars et natura quod effectus sit et esse habeat. Sine esse enim non plus valet totum universum quam musca, nec plus sol quam carbo, nec sapientia plus quam ignorantia. Et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna VIII Metaphysicae c. : »id quod desiderat omnis res est esse et perfectio esse, inquantum est esse«. »Illud igitur quod vere desideratur est esse«. Nullum autem ex entibus est esse, nec in ipso est radix esse. Augustinus I Confessionum: »an quisquam se faciendi erit artifex? Aut ulla vena trahitur aliunde de qua esse« »currat in nos, praeterquam quod tu facis«, »quia summe esse« es? Ratio est, quia omne
99 Secondly, note that which is thirsted for, hungered for, sought and desired by all, is being, as much in nature as in knowledge. To this end and on account of this, knowledge, and nature works insofar as it brings about and might have existence. For without being the whole universe is no more valuable than a fly, nor the sun more than coal, nor wisdom more than ignorance. And this is what Avicenna says in Metaphysics :: ‘That which all things desire is being and the perfection of being insofar as it is being’. ‘Therefore, that which is truly desired is being’. Moreover, none of those who exist are being, unless there is in them the root of being. In Confessions Augustine [says]: ‘Can anyone be the maker of his own creation? Or [is there] any other
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commune multis aut omnibus non potest habere aliquod ex multis aut ex omnibus quod sit radix et vena illorum omnium. Iam enim esset radix et principium sui ipsius, nec esset principium superius principiatis, sed ex aequo se haberet cum illis.
channel from which being can be drawn?’ ‘Other than what you cause to flow in us’? ‘Because you are the highest being’? The reason is because everything common to many or to all is not able to have anything from the many or from all which might be the root and the source of them all. That is to say, now it would be the root and principle of itself, it would not be the highest principle of principles but would be on the same level as those [others].
99 Patet igitur quod omne ens et de numero entium non habet ex se, sed ab alio superiori esse quod sitit, esurit et appetit. Propter quod in ipso non figitur nec haeret nec inchoatur esse; nec permanet absente, etiam per intellectum, ipso superiori. Propter hoc semper sitit praesentiam sui superioris, et potius et proprius accipit continue esse quam habeat fixum aut etiam inchoatum ipsum esse. Sic ergo sitit et appetit esse omne ens, utpote in se et ex se nudum, sicut materia formam »et turpe bonum«. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘qui edunt me ’, – qui sum esse Exodi : ‘ego sum qui sum’; ‘qui est misit me’ – ‘adhuc esuriunt’, utpote in se nuda et potentia ad esse, quae potentia appetitus est et sitis ipsius esse.
99 It is clear therefore that every being, and with regard to a number of beings, does not have that for which it thirsts, hungers and desires from itself, but from another superior being. On account of which no being is fixed to itself or adheres in or begun by [itself], neither does it remain, when it is absent, even through the intellect, from its superior. For this reason, it is always thirsty for the presence of its superior, and more importantly and characteristically it receives being continuously rather than having it fixed or being begun with it. So, every being thirsts and hungers to be, inasmuch as it is in itself and bare from itself, just as matter [relates to] form and ‘the shameful to the good’. And this is what is said here: they who eat me – me who am being, Exodus :[]: ‘I am who I am’; ‘He who is has sent me’ – will still be hungry, insofar as they are in themselves also bare of the power to be, which is the power of hunger and of thirst of them.
99 Exemplum autem manifestum et ratio dictorum est in luce et calore in medio. Calor enim et forma ignis quam consequitur habet radicem in medio, quod est aer, propter convenientiam et identitatem materiae hinc inde. Propter quod aere calefacto iam habet radicem et figitur ipsa forma ignis et inchoatur quasi ignis. Secus de lumine, cum sit
99 Yet a manifest example and account of what has been said is given by light and heat in a medium. For heat and the form of fire which follows has a root in the medium that is air because of the coming together and identity of the matter from that cause. On account of which hot air already has the root and is itself fixed in the
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qualitas activa consequens formam solis aut orbis aut caeli, quod cum elementis nullam habet materiae convenientiam. Propter quod forma solis et sua qualitas formam consequens, lumen scilicet, non mittit radicem nec aliquo modo inchoatur in ipso medio. Hinc est quod abscedente sole manet calor iam radicatus et utcumque inchoatus in aere; secus de lumine quod subito abscedit et deserit aerem, utpote non habens radicem nec in minimo formae, quam consequitur, nisi in sola siti, appetitu scilicet. Sitiendo igitur accipit esse. Propter quod semper edit et esurit, quia esuriendo accipit esse quo est et quod edit. Secus de omni alio quod non sitit esse ipsum et causam, sed tale esse. Hoc enim sitiendo et appetendo non acciperet esse, sed hoc esse, nec per ipsum tale esset ens, sed ens hoc. Ait ergo significanter: ‘qui edunt me’, solum scilicet, qui sum esse et causa esse, ‘adhuc esuriunt ’.
form of fire and has just begun to be like fire. It is different with regard to light, in that it is an active quality following the form of the sun, the sphere of heaven, where no material comes together. Because of this the form of the sun and its character that follows the form, namely light, does not send out a ray nor anything by way of being started in the medium itself. Hence it is that the heat that is departing the sun remains already rooted and in one way or another established in the air; the light which suddenly leaves and departs from the air is different, inasmuch as it does not have a root nor the slightest form which it follows, unless solely in thirst and alike in appetite. Therefore, by being thirsty it receives being. For this reason, it is always eating and it is hungry because in being hungry it receives being which is and which it eats. It is otherwise with every other one which does not thirst for being itself and the cause [of being], but for being something specific. For in being thirsty and longing for this it does not receive being, but this [particular] being, nor by being itself this specific one, is it being, but is this specific one. Hence, he points this out by having said: they who eat me, that is to say I alone who am being and the cause of being, will still be hungry.
99 Tertio exponitur ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt ’ per id quod deus est principium et finis, flos et fructus, sicut supra expositum est. Quarto notandum: ex eisdem, ut ait philosophus, sumus et nutrimur. Sumus autem per esse; igitur, inquantum sumus et inquantum ens, esse nutrimur et pascimur. Et sic omne ens edit deum, utpote esse; sitit autem omne ens ipsum esse, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur in quarto sensu: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt ’.
99 A third explanation for they who eat me will still be hungry [is] through the fact that God is the beginning and the end, flower and fruit, just as has been explained above. Fourth note: From the same things, as the philosopher says, we are and and we are nourished. Yet we are through being; therefore, inasmuch as we are and inasmuch as we are being, we are nourished and fed by being. And thus, every being eats God, inasmuch as he is being; every being,
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however, thirsts for being itself, as is said above. And this is what is said here in the fourth point: They that eat me shall still be hungry. 99 Quinto notandum quod causae aliae praeter primam causam, quae deus est, non sunt causa ipsius esse rerum nec entis, inquantum est ens, sed potius causa fieri. Propter quod completo et perfecto ipso effectu suo amplius non influunt super ipsum effectum suum. Propter quod effectus talium causarum bibunt quidem et edunt causas suas, sed ipsas non sitiunt, non quaerunt nec appetunt. Exempli causa: domus bibit et edit formam artis domificatoris sibi impressam ab artifice; sed ipsa adepta amodo non quaerit nec sitit ipsam artem nec artificem. In natura etiam videmus quod animalia fetus suos nutriunt et fovent materna sollicitudine, et e converso ipsi fetus matres sitiunt et ad ipsas recurrunt; sed postquam ad statum (perfectum) perducti fuerint, non plus parentes et proles hinc inde se respiciunt quam alia animalia eiusdem speciei. Causa vero prima, quae deus est, non minus influit effectum conservando in esse quam influat aut influxerit in ipso fieri; et e converso effectus, quamvis completus, non minus dependet a causa prima in suo esse quam in suo fieri. Propter quod ipsam causam primam omnis effectus edit et esurit. Propter quod optime dictum est in persona primae causae: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt ’.
99 Fifth, note that other causes besides the First Cause which is God, are not the cause of the being itself of things or of being, inasmuch as it is being, but rather as the cause of becoming. Because of which by the completion and perfection in the effect itself they no longer have any influence over the effect itself. On account of which the effects of such causes drink and eat their causes but they do not thirst for nor search for, nor seek, nor desire them. For example, a building drinks and eats the form of the skills of the builder of a house impressed on it by the craftsman; but from this moment on having received it, it does not search, neither is it thirsty for the skill, nor for the craftsman. Likewise, in nature we see that animals feed and cherish their offspring and maintain a maternal concern [for them], and on the other hand the young themselves thirst for and run back to [their] mothers; but after they have reached maturity, parents and offspring henceforth no longer from this time consider each other differently than others of the same species. In truth, the First Cause which is God has no less influence on the effect by preserving it in being than it might have or might have had in the very making [of it]; and by the opposite, the effect although complete, will be no less dependent on the First Cause for its existence than with regard to its becoming. On account of which, every effect eats and hungers for the First Cause itself. On account of which, it is well said in the person of the First Cause: they who eat me will still be hungry.
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99 Adhuc autem sexto sciendum quod omnis causa secundaria producit effectum a se quidem, sed non in se. Propter quod effectus talem causam bibit quidem, sed non sitit proprie. Causa vero prima omnem effectum producit ex se et in se. Ratio est, quia extra primam causam nihil est; quod enim extra causam primam, deum scilicet, est, extra esse est, quia deus est esse. Propter quod utrumque praemissorum, scilicet quod omne creatum est ab ipso et in ipso, [et] ex se et in se, deo, bene dictum est: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’. Redde singula singulis. Augustinus IV Confessionum c. sic ait: fecit deus omnia. »Non fecit atque abiit, sed ex illo in illo sunt«.
99 However, sixth, certainly you should know that every secondary cause produces an effect from itself, but not in itself. On account of which the effect indeed drinks of such a cause but is not particularly thirsty. The First Cause, however, produces every effect from itself and in itself. The reason is that outside the First Cause there is nothing; that is to say, anything that is outside the First Cause, God of course, is outside being because God is being. On account of both premises, that all that is created is from him and in him, [and] out of him and in him, God, it is well said: ‘they who eat me, will still be hungry’. Thus, Augustine in Confessions IV chapter says: God has made all things. ‘He did not make them and go away but the ones from him are in him’.
99 Rursus septimo sciendum quod causa prima, deus, in hoc differt ab omnibus, quae sunt post, quod prima causa agit in omnibus aliis et operatur in illis. Adhuc autem eius actio est prior natura actionibus omnium secundorum et per consequens ultima; finis enim ultimus semper respondet primae actioni. Rursus tertio formae, per quas agunt secunda agentia, id, quod sunt formae et actus, a deo sunt, qui est primus actus formalis. Adhuc autem ipsae formae, quibus agunt secunda, non possunt moveri ad agendum nisi a deo, utpote a primo motore, sicut, verbi gratia, forma(e) ignis et caloris non possunt calefacere nisi motae a motore caeli. Propter quod effectus agentia secunda bibunt quidem, sed sitiunt proprie causam primam in illis. Virtus enim eius (respectu) agentis mediati est immediatior, intimior, prima et ultima respectu omnium. Propter quod ipsa sititur, esuritur, intenditur et appetitur ab omnibus. Bibitur quidem, quia in illis; sititur nihilominus, quia extra illa,
99 Again, seventh, one has to know that the First Cause, God, in this is different from all things that are after [it] because the First Cause acts in all others and works in them. Moreover, besides, his action is prior in nature to the actions of all secondary [causes] and as a consequence the ultimate; for the ultimate end always corresponds with the first action. Again, third, the forms through which the secondary [causes] work as agents, because they are forms and have been brought forth, are from God who is the first formal act. But still the forms themselves, by which secondary [causes] act, are not able to be moved to act except by God, namely by the first Mover, just as, for example, the forms of fire and of heat cannot be warmed unless by the mover of the heaven. On account of which, indeed, the secondary agents drink the effects, but they are thirsty particularly for the First Cause in them. For its power with respect to a middle
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utpote non comprehensa ab illis, Ioh. : ‘lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt’. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt; qui bibunt me’ etc.
agent is more immediate, more intimate, by the first and last regard for all things. Because of which, it is thirsted after, hungered, strained after and desired by everything. Indeed, it is drunk, because [it is] in them; nonetheless it is thirsted after because [it is] outside them, inasmuch as it is not grasped by them, John :[]: ‘the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not grasp it’. And this is what is said here: ‘they who eat me, will still be hungry; they who drink me’ etc.
99 Praeterea octavo sciendum: secundum philosophum differt sensus et intellectus, quia sensus ex frequenter et magna operari fit infirmior et impotentior ad agendum, intellectus vero e converso quanto pluries et altiora intelligit, tanto fit potentior ad actum. Propter quod visus quidem semper in actu bibit quidem et edit sensibile, non autem semper sitit, quia »excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensum«. Intelligibile autem non sic; sed vigorat intellectum tanto amplius, quanto fuerit sublimius, et ob hoc ab ipso intellectu editur et esuritur. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus unus ex XXIV: »deus est amor qui plus habitus plus placet«. Augustinus in libro De sententiis Prosperi: crescit semper perfecta caritas, usu fit maior et largitate ditior. Ait ergo »primus intellectus et intelligibile primum«, deus, sub specie et forma sapientiae ad intellectum pertinentis: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’.
99 Furthermore, eighth, it should be understood: according to the Philosopher, the senses and the intellect differ, because the senses from repeated and extensive use become weaker and less capable of acting, however the intellect on the contrary the more often and the deeper it understands, becomes more able to act. On account of which, sight to be sure always in the case of the act indeed drinks and eats that which is accessible to the senses, but it is not always thirsty, because ‘the excellence of what is accessible to the senses corrupts the sense’. So, however, it is not with intelligence; but in fact, the intellect gains so much more strength, the more it is elevated, and on account of this the intellect eats and hungers from itself. And this is what one of the twenty-four philosophers says: ‘God is love, the more it is, the more it might please.’ Augustine in the book The Sentences of Prosper [says] perfect love always increases, becoming greater in use and richer through abundance. Thus, ‘the first Intellect and the first able to understand’, God, under the appearance and form of wisdom relating to the intellect, said: ‘they who eat me, will still be hungry’.
99 Rursus nono advertendum quod distinguuntur haec tria: »univocum,
99 Again ninth, notice that these three are to be distinguished: ‘the univocal, the
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aequivocum et analogum. Nam aequivoca dividuntur per diversas res significatas, univoca vero per diversas rei differentias, analoga« vero non distinguuntur per res, sed nec per rerum differentias, sed »per modos« unius eiusdemque rei simpliciter. Verbi gratia: sanitas una eademque, quae est in animali, ipsa est, non alia, in diaeta et urina, ita quod sanitatis, ut sanitas, nihil prorsus est in diaeta et urina. non plus quam in lapide, sed hoc solo dicitur urina sana, quia significat illam sanitatem eandem numero quae est in animali, sicut circulus vinum, qui nihil vini in se habet. Ens autem sive esse et omnis perfectio, maxime generalis, puta esse, unum, verum, bonum, lux, iustitia et huiusmodi, dicuntur de deo et creaturis analogice. Ex quo sequitur quod bonitas et iustitia et similia bonitatem suam habent totaliter ab aliquo extra, ad quod analogantur, deus scilicet. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de ipso esse quidem I Confessionum circa medium, quod nulla »vena trahitur aliunde a qua esse« sit, praeterquam a deo, qui est summum et »summe esse«, ut dictum est supra in secunda expositione. De iustitia vero dicit idem Augustinus l. III Confessionum: iustitia »ubique et semper«, »non alibi alia nec alias aliter, secundum quam iusti« sunt »omnes laudati ore dei«. De luce autem, vita et veritate frequenter idem dicit, ut patet super illo Ioh. : ‘lux vera illuminat omnem hominem’.
equivocal and the analogous. For equivocals are divided by the different things that are signified, the univocals, however, by the diverse differences of a thing, the analogous’, however, are neither distinguished according to the thing nor in fact by the differences of things but by ‘the modes’ of one and the same simple thing. For example: the one and the same health that is in an animal, is the very same [and] non other, be it in the diet or urine, thus there is absolutely no more of health, as health, in the diet and urine than in a stone, but this is said about healthy urine alone because it signifies that health, the same in number which is in an animal, just as a wreath [signifies] wine, but has nothing of wine in it. Moreover, being or to be and every perfection, especially general [ones], for example, being oneness, truth, goodness, light, justice and such like, are said of God and creatures analogically. From which it follows that goodness and justice and the like have their goodness completely from something analogous, namely God. And this is what Augustine says about being itself around the middle of book I of Confessions, that no ‘vein is drawn from elsewhere by which existence might be’ except from God who is the greatest and ‘highest being’ as was said above in the second explanation. Indeed, in the first chapter of the third book of Confessions the same Augustine says about justice: justice [is] ‘everywhere and always [exists]?’ ‘not another [thing] elsewhere nor otherwise in another time, according to which all the just are praised by the mouth of God’. Moreover, he frequently says the same about light, life and truth, as is well known concerning that [verse in] John :[] ‘The true light gives light to every man’.
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99 Colligatur et formetur breviter sic ratio: analogata nihil in se habent positive radicatum formae secundum quam analogantur. Sed omne ens creatum analogatur deo in esse, veritate et bonitate. Igitur omne ens creatum habet a deo et in deo, non in se ipso ente creato, esse, vivere, sapere positive et radicaliter. Et sic semper edit, ut productum est et creatum, semper tamen esurit, quia semper ex se non est, sed ab alio. Notandum etiam quod hanc naturam analogiae quidam male intelligentes et improbantes erraverunt usque hodie. Nos autem secundum veritatem analogiae intelligendo, sicut ex primo Libro propositionum declaratur, dicamus quod ad significandum hanc veritatem analogiae rerum omnium ad ipsum deum dictum est optime: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’. Edunt, quia sunt, esuriunt, quia ab alio sunt.
99 Thus the reasoning can be briefly summed up and formulated as follows: analogous things have nothing in themselves of the agreed form according to which they are analogically rooted. But every created being is analogical to God in being, truth and goodness. Therefore, every created being positively and radically has from God and in God, not in itself as a created being, being, life, [and] wisdom. And thus it always eats as [one] that has been produced and created, yet it is always hungry because it is always from another, not from itself. Note also that up to today some who wrongly understand and reject this nature of analogy go astray. However, according to the understanding of the truth of analogy, as [it] is declared according to the first Book of Propositions, we say that to signify this truth of analogy of all things to God himself it is best said: They who eat me, will still be hungry. They eat, because they are, they shall be hungry because they are from another.
99 Rursus etiam decimo potest verbum praemissum sic exponi: deus est rebus omnibus intimus, utpote esse, et sic ipsum edit omne ens; est et extimus, quia super omnia et sic extra omnia. Ipsum igitur edunt omnia, quia intimus, esuriunt, quia extimus; edunt, quia intus totus, esuriunt, quia extra totus. Sic anima tota in manu et tota extra. Hoc est igitur quod dicitur: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’.
99 Likewise again tenth, it is possible to explain the passage set before us thus: God is intimate to all things as being, and thus every being eats him; and he is outside because he is above all things and so outside all things. Therefore, all things eat him because he is intimate, they are hungry because he is outside; they eat because he is totally within, they hunger because he is totally outside. Thus the whole soul is in the hand and the whole [soul is] outside. Thus this is what is said: ‘they who eat me, will still be hungry’.
99 Rursus undecimo notandum quod edere nunquam sapit apud nos sine esurie nec bibere sine siti. Unde quantum decrescit fami et siti, tantum per omnia decrescit
99 Again eleventh, note that to eat without hunger has no taste for us at any time, nor to drink without thirst. From which the more hunger and thirst decrease
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sapori seu delectationi quae est in edendo et bibendo. Augustinus VIII Confessionum circa principium ait: »edendi et bibendi voluptas nulla est, nisi praecedat esuriendi et sitiendi molestia«. Hinc est quod ebriosi, ut sitim acuant, salsa comedunt. »Ubique maius gaudium molestia maiore praeceditur«. Tullius in Vl De Tusculanis quaestionibus sic ait: »quis non videt omnia desideriis condiri? G. Marius in fuga cum aquam turbidam et cadaveribus inquinatam bibisset, negavit unquam se bibisse iucundius«, quia »videlicet nunquam sic sitiens biberat«. Et infra post multa similia dicit quod fame et siti »epulae condiuntur«. Sic quidem in corporalibus se habet, in divinis autem et spiritualibus secus agitur. Ratio est ad praesens una, quia primus actus universaliter primo facit distare a contrario sive opposito, privatione scilicet. Propter quod forma substantialis est perfectior omni alio formali, et materia prima ipsam solam per sui ipsius materiae essentiam appetit et esurit, eo quod ipsa forma sola facit distare a nihilo. Hinc est secundo quod talem formam recipit sine medio, sine murmure, sine motu et tempore, in instanti, et fit unum simpliciter ex ipsa materia et tali forma.
the more in all respects the taste or pleasure which is in eating and drinking [decreases]. Augustine near the beginning of the Eighth Book of Confessions said: ‘There is no pleasure in eating and drinking unless the discomfort of hunger and thirst precede [them]’. Hence it is that a drunk wets [his] thirst eating salted things. ‘Wherever there is greater joy greater trouble precedes it’. Tullius in Book of De Tusculanae Quaestiones thus said: ‘Who doesn’t see all things flavoured by desire? When G. Marius in flight drank muddy water polluted with dead bodies he denied [that] at any time he had drunk [anything] so pleasant because clearly he had never been so thirsty when he drank.’ And later after many similar examples he says that hunger and thirst ‘flavour the banquet’. Indeed, this is the way it is with bodily [things], but in divine and spiritual [things] it is otherwise. One reason for now is because the first act universally first creates a distance from [its] contrary or opposite, that is to say by deprivation. On account of which the substantial form is more perfect than any other formal [thing] and prime matter itself solely through its own material substance alone desires and hungers [for it], consequently that form alone separates itself from nothing. This is a second [reason] that it receives such a form without a medium, without a whisper, without motion and time, in an instant, and becomes simply one out of matter itself and of such a form.
99 In bibitione igitur corporali in principio maxime sapit bibere, avidius bibitur et dulcius, quia ipse potus primo et in sui principio quo sumitur facit plus distare a siti contraria et molesta. Sequens autem bibitio iam non facit distare a tanta et tota siti nec a siti simpliciter, sed a minori
99 Therefore, with regard to the body drinking the greatest taste [is] in the first drink, it is drunk more greedily and sweetly because the drink itself in the first [moment] and in its own principle which it assumes makes more distance from thirst which is the opposite and annoying. While
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iam siti et minus contraria et minus gravante, et sic semper deinceps, quousque sitis exstinguatur; et quod ex tunc amplius est, a malo est, malum est et fastidium. In spiritualibus autem et divinis ex utraque parte secus se habet. Primo quidem, quia omnis actus primo facit distare a contrario et amaro. Nihil enim ibi prius aut posterius, et propter hoc omnis et quilibet est primus. Processu ergo non recedit a primo, sed accedit ad primum, et sic novissimus est primus. Ratio est, quia procedendo fini fit vicinius; finis autem in divinis est ipsum principium, Apoc. et ultimo: ‘ego’ ‘principium et finis’. Accessu igitur ad finem semper manet coniunctum cum suo principio, si tamen deus et divinum pure est quod editur et bibitur. Si vero aliud quodcumque, quantumlibet magnum vel modicum, iam secus est, secundum illud Ioh. : ‘modicum, et iam non videbitis me’.
the following drink already does not make a difference from such and a total thirst, nor from simple thirst, but from a smaller and less contrary and less severe [thirst], and thus always successively until the thirst is quenched; and anything which [comes] from then onwards is from evil, is evil and is disgusting. But in spiritual and divine [things] it is different with regards to both sides. First because every act first causes a separation from [its] bitter opposite. That is to say nothing there [is] first or last and on account of this every and anything is first. Therefore, progress does not go back from the First but draws near to the First and thus the Last is the First. The reason is because by going forward the end comes nearer; but the end in the Godhead is itself the beginning. Rev. :[] and at the end: ‘I’ [am] ‘the beginning and the end’. Therefore, an approach towards the end always remains joined with its own beginning, if God and divinity is purely that which is eaten and drunk. However, if [it is] anything else, no matter however great or small, it is already contrary to what is expected according to that [verse] in John :[]: ‘In a little while, and even now you will not see me’.
99 Sic ergo in corporalibus edere tandem facit fastidire; in divinis autem ut sic edere facit esurire, et quanto plus et purius edunt, tanto plus et purius esuriunt, et currit pari passu edere esurire. Consequenter autem et per accidens secundario tollitur et excluditur omne fastidium, secundum illud: ‘non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius’, Sap. , si tamen ‘nihil inquinatum’, id est non divinum, ‘incurrat’, Sap. . Porro si quid aliud praeter deum incurrat et intercurrat, secus est. Iam enim procul dubio necesse est, ut incidat amaritudo, labor, poena et
99 Thus, therefore, in bodily [things] eating ultimately brings about disgust; but in divine [things it is] as follows to eat creates hunger, and according to the more and purer [things] they eat, so much greater and purer do they hunger, and it causes to eat and to be hungry to be endured equally. Moreover, consequently and by accident second, every loathing is taken away and excluded according to that [text]: ‘her conversation has no bitterness’, Wisdom :[], if only ‘nothing [that is] defiled’ that is non divine, should enter (her)’, Wisdom
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fastidium, quia ut sic deus non editur. Cuius enim operis finis est quippiam praeter deum, huius operis deus non est principium, quia deus idem, finis et principium. Opus autem divinum non est, cuius deus principium non est. In cuius figura et exemplo dicitur Ioh. : ‘pater in me manens, ipse facit opera’.
:[]. Again, if something other than God should enter and even intervene it is different. For already it is much inferior [and] from a distance inevitable [and] uncertain that bitterness, labour, punishment and disgust should occur because God is thus not eaten. For any work [whose] goal is something other than God, God is not the beginning of this work, because the same God is the end and the beginning. Moreover, a work of which God is not the beginning is not divine. According to which image it is said in John :[]: ‘The Father who remains in me does the work himself’.
99 Ex praemissis patet quod ‘qui edunt’ deum, ‘adhuc esuriunt’, patet etiam quod non propter hoc esuriunt, quia non fastidiunt, ut communiter exponitur, sed e converso ideo non fastidiunt, quia esuriunt et quia esurire est ipsum edere. Qui ergo edit, edendo esurit, quia esuriem edit, et quantum edit, tantum esurit. Nihil in his maius et minus, prius aut posterius. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’. Edendo enim esurit et esuriendo edit et esurire sive esuriem esurit
99 From what has gone before it is well known that ‘those who eat’ God, will still be hungry. Now it is well known that they will still be hungry, not because they are disdainful, as is commonly explained, but because of the opposite, they are not disdainful because they are hungry and because to be hungry is the same as to eat. Whoever, therefore, eats by eating is hungry because he eats hunger and as much as he eats so much he is hungry. [There is] no great and small and no prior and posterior in these. And this is what is said here: they who eat me will still be hungry. That is to say, by eating he is hungry and being hungry he eats and he is hungry to be hungry or for hunger.
99 Thomas tamen aliter exponit et dupliciter et bene I II q. a. . Bernardus in Epistula de caritate secundum illud Psalmi: ‘concupivit anima mea desiderare’, sic ait: »non potuit satiari desiderio, qui non nisi desiderare concupivit; fames enim animae desiderium est. Sic vere amans deum anima amore non satiatur, quia deus amor est, quem qui amat, amorem amat. Amare autem amorem circulum facit, ut nullus sit
99 Thomas, however, explains [it] in another way twice and well in Summa I-II, q. , a.. Bernard in his Epistle on Charity [talking] about that verse of the Psalm [:]: ‘my soul passionately desires to desire’, he said thus: ‘Only the one who has longed to desire has not been able to have been satisfied by desire; for the hunger of the soul is desire. Thus the soul truly loving God is not sated by love, because God
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finis amoris«; et infra: »in desideriis exardescit. Quae etsi dentur ad plenitudinem, nunquam tamen ad satietatem«. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’. Exemplum posset poni, si dicatur aliquis currere propter currere. Hic enim semper edit cursum, currit enim. Tamen semper esurit cursum, quia currit propter currere et cursum amat propter cursum, et sic idem propter se ipsum quod amat amat, amorem propter se ipsum amorem. Augustinus IX De trinitate c. , magis autem l. XV c. tractat illud Psalmi: ‘laetetur cor quaerentium dominum’, et iterum: ‘quaerite faciem eius semper’, et ibi exponit quod hic dicitur: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’.
whom he loves is love, he loves love. Moreover, to love love makes a circle so that there might be no end of love’; and further along: ‘He is inflamed with desires. Even if they have been granted in fullness yet at no time to satiety’. And this is what is said here: they who eat me will still be hungry. An example might be if it is said about anyone who [loves] to run for the sake of running. For this one always truly eats the race he runs. Still he is always hungry for running because he runs on account of running and he loves running [for the sake of] running, and thus it is the same with the one who loves love, he loves love for love’s own sake. Augustine [in] De trinitate IX [] also to a greater extent [in] book XV c. treats that Psalm [:-]: ‘Let the heart of those who seek the Lord rejoice’, and again ‘seek his face always’, and and there he explains what is said here: ‘they who eat me will still be hungry’.
99 Adhuc autem ultimo notandum quod sitis, esuries vel desiderium sive appetitus dupliciter accipiuntur: »uno modo secundum quod important appetitum rei non habitae: alio modo secundum quod important exclusionem fastidii«. Cavendum est ergo, ne putetur hoc ultimum, scilicet exclusio fastidii, esse principale et per prius. Sic enim multi accipiunt et secundum hoc grosse exponunt quod hic dicitur: ‘qui edunt me, adhuc esuriunt’, quasi sine fastidio edant. Hoc enim parum esset dare divinae sapientiae, deo scilicet, maxime de se ipso loquenti et se ipsum docenti et sui excellentiam commendanti. Praeterea, negatione nihil vere docetur, et negatio nihil ponit et in ipsa affirmatione figitur et firmatur, nihil in se ipsa habens perfectionis. Propter quod in ipso deo nullum prorsus locum habet negatio; est enim ‘qui est’ et ‘unus est’, quod
99 But [there is] still a last point [to be made], thirst or hunger or desire or appetite are taken in two ways: ‘In one way insofar as it causes the appetite for a thing not possessed; in another way according to which it brings about the exclusion of disgust’. Therefore, beware, it should not be supposed that this last, namely the exclusion of disgust, to be the principle and first [meaning]. For thus many take [it] and according to this they roughly explain what is said here: they who eat me will still be hungry, as if they eat without loathing. For this would be to give too little to divine Wisdom, that is to say God, especially speaking of his very self, teaching about his very self and commending his excellence. Besides, nothing is really taught by negation and negation posits nothing and in itself is affirmed and fixated by self-affirmation,
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est negatio negationis. Non ergo accipienda est esuries.
having nothing of perfection in its very self. For this reason, negation has absolutely no place in God himself; for he is ‘who is’ and ‘he is one’ which is the negation of negation. Therefore, hunger will not be admitted in the divine, as it is the exclusion of disgust.
99 Rursus cum esuries est et dicitur »appetitus rei non habitae«, id quod est esuries sive appetitus non est, videlicet formaliter, id quod est ex eo quod non est habitum; hoc enim sola negatio est sive privatio et est materiale. Sed id quod est esuries formaliter est appetitus affirmatus, radix et causa quam consequitur exclusio fastidii, et ut sic est aliquid rei habitae et res ipsa aliqualiter positive. Exemplum evidens et verum est de privatione, quae est unum ex principiis tribus rerum naturalium. Melius est igitur verba praemissa exponere, ut supra exposita sunt. Nam illae expositiones fundantur omnes et singulae super aliqua excellentia divinorum, puta dei infinitate, simplicitate, puritate, prioritate et huiusmodi, et docent creaturarum infirmitatem respectu dei aut potius in se ipsis nulleitatem.
99 Again, when hunger exists and is called ‘the desire of something not possessed’, that which is hunger or desire, is not, clearly [formally], because one has what is from something that is not; that is to say this is only a negation or a deprivation and is material. But that which is formally hunger is an affirmed appetite, the root and cause of which follows with the exclusion of satiety, and, as such, it is something possessed and a thing itself in some way positive. It is a visible and true example with regard to privation, which is one of the three principles of natural things. Therefore, it is better to explain the aforementioned words as defined above. For those explanations are based, each and everyone, on some perfection of the Godhead, for example God’s infinity, simplicity, purity, priority, and the like, and they teach the weakness of creatures with regard to God or rather, the nothingness of creatures in themselves.
‘Qui operantur in me, non peccabunt’ Eccli. :
‘Whoever works according in me will not sin’ Eccli. :
99 Nota: primo meritum: ‘operantur in me’; secundo praemium: ‘non peccabunt’. Sed quid est quod praemium ponitur negative: ‘non peccabunt’? Praemium enim negativum nullum est. Notandum ergo quod meritum universaliter est in actione, praemium in passione, id est receptione, supplicium autem in privatione et dolore. Meritum in actione et ideo in voluntate, per
99 Note: first the service: ‘they who work in me’; second the reward: ‘they will not sin’. But what kind of reward is it that is put into the negative: they will not sin? For a reward is not a negative [thing]. Observe therefore, whatever value is universally in the action, the reward [is] in suffering, that is in the reception, moreover, of punishment in the midst of deprivation and
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quam sumus domini actuum nostrorum, praemium in passione et (ideo in) intellectu: intelligere enim quoddam pati est, supplicium in privatione et ideo poena in afflictione. Omnis enim privatio casus est ab esse et per consequens a bono et consequenter a gaudio, laetitia delectante. Casus autem ab his est in opposita praemissorum, puta in nihilum contra ens, in malum contra bonum, in dolorem contra gaudium mentis, in tristitiam sive afflictionem contra laetitiam exteriorem.
sorrow. The service is in the action and therefore in the will, through which we are the masters of our actions, the reward [is] in suffering and therefore in the intellect: for to understand is to suffer something, suffering in deprivation and therefore the punishment [is] in the pain. For all deprivation [is] a fall from being and as a consequence from the good and subsequently from joy, joy being a source of delight. While the fall from these is in the opposite of the premises, believe in nothingness over against being, in evil against the good, in sorrow against joy of the intellect, in sadness or suffering against external joy.
99 His praemissis dicendum est ad quaestionem: bene praemium negative ponitur. Primo nam hoc ipso, quod negative ponitur ‘non peccabunt’, minus dicit et plus significat, et in hoc significatur praemii incomprehensibilitas. Minus enim dicimus de divinis quam intendimus, secundum illud: ‘oculus non vidit’ etc. Secundo dicendum quod prima et simplicia proprie negationibus innotescunt. Euclides: »punctus est, cuius pars non est«. Ratio ad praesens huius est, quia principium in unoquoque extra genus illud est (et non pertinet ad genus illud) nisi fortasse per quandam reductionem. Punctus non est quantus nec unum numerus. Tertio, quia »in divinis« »affirmationes sunt incompactae«. Quarto, quia praemium illud est ineffabile. Quinto quia, ut praemissum est, minus dicit et plus significat li ‘non peccabunt’, et sic praemium stabit in affirmato quod significare intendit, non in negato. Sicut, verbi gratia, unum transcendens in voce quidem negatio est, sed in significato, cum sit negatio negationis, est mera affirmatio, secundum illud: ‘sum qui sum’, Exodi . Et notandum quod iste
99 To these (words) which will have been said before about the question: it is good that the reward is expressed negatively. For first by this [statement] which is put negatively ‘they shall not sin’, it says less and signifies more, and in this the incomprehensibility of the reward is shown. For we say less about God than we intend according to that (saying) ‘the eye does not see’ etc. Second it will be said that the first and pure/unmixed characteristic is known by negation. Euclides (said) ‘a point is (something) of which there is no part’. The reason according to this present (thinking) is because the one and the same principle is outside that category and does not relate to that category except perhaps through a return. A point is not an amount nor one a number. Third, because ‘in the divinity’ the assertions do not hold. Fourth because that reward is indescribable. Fifth, because as it says before, ‘they shall not sin’ says little and means more and thus the reward will rest in the positive that it intends to signify, not in the negative. Just as, for example, the transcendent one in expression is
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modus aptissimus est loquendi de divinis, ubi vel minus dicitur et plus significatur, ut in proposito: ‘non esurient’, vel per negationes negationis, ut cum dicitur: ‘deus unus est’.
certainly a negative but in meaning, in that it might be the negation of negation, is pure affirmation according to that (verse) in Exodus :[]: ‘I am who I am’. And note that that is the most appropriate way of speaking about the divine, where actually less is said and more is meant as in the text: ‘they will not be hungry’, or through the negation of negation as when it is said: ‘God is one’.
99 ‘Operantur in me’. Nota: duplex est sensus. Primo ‘in me’, id est secundum me. Ubi advertendum quod in arte omne quod fit secundum artem rectum est et bonum est, quod autem e converso contra artem est, hoc ipso obliquum est, malum est et peccatum est et distortum. Similiter et in natura et in moribus: omne quod fit et est ad finem sive ad regulam et ordinem in finem, hoc ipso et per hoc ipsum bonum est; e converso quod fit contra vel praeter regulam seu finem in natura, arte et moribus, hoc ipso et hoc solo peccatum est et vitium. Propter quod iurisperitus dicit: «qui peccat, non peccat legis auctoritate«. Sensus est: quicumque facit quod lex iubet, non peccat: peccat autem omnis qui facit contra legem. Et Augustinus dicit quod »virtute nemo male utitur«; et iterum: habe caritatem »et fac quod vis«. ‘Caritas’ enim et virtus universaliter semper ad bonum est et ‘finis praecepti est’. Deus autem, utpote esse primum et simplicissimum, mensura est et regula omnium quae sunt quocumque modo essendi, ex X Metaphysicae. Igitur omne quod fit secundum deum bonum est; quod autem secus, peccatum est hoc ipso et solo hoc ipso. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: ‘qui operantur in me’, id est secundum me, ‘non peccabunt’, Exodi : ‘inspice et fac secundum exemplar quod tibi monstratum est in monte’. Omne ergo, quod secundum
99 [Whoever] works in me. Note the sense is twofold. First in me, that is according to me. Whereby it shall be noted that in every human activity everything which happens according to that activity is right and is good, but on the other hand, anything which is against the activity is in itself hostile, it is evil, it is a sin and a distortion. Similarly, both in nature and in behaviour everything which is done and [which] is [done] according to the goal or to the basic principle and manner with regard to its goal, by this very [reason] and because of [it] is good; conversely, that which is done otherwise than, or even contrary, to the basic principle or goal according to its nature, character and customs, this in itself and this alone is a sin and a crime. On account of which the lawyer says: ‘anyone who sins does not sin with the authority of the law’. The understanding is whoever does what the law commands does not sin; but everyone who acts against the law sins. And Augustine says that ‘no one wrongly uses virtue’; and again, have love ‘and do as you wish’. For ‘love’ and generally virtue is always about the good and ‘and is the goal of teaching’. While God, inasmuch as [he is] the principle and simplest being, is the measure and standard of all things which are whatever [their] mode of existence
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exemplar, quod deus est, vivimus, operamur et sumus, totum rectum est, meritorium et perfectum; quod autem secus, peccatum est.
according to Book X of Metaphysics. Therefore, everything that is done following God is good; but what [happens] contrary to what is right by this and by this alone is sin. And this is what is said here: whoever works in me, that is according to me, they will not sin. Exodus :[]: ‘Look and do according to the example that was revealed to you on the mountain’. Therefore, everything [we do] that is according to the pattern that God is, we live, we work and we are, is totally right, good and perfect; but that which is contrary to what is right is sin.
99 Secundo modo accipitur li ‘in me’, sicut sonat et subtilius, et est sensus: quod omnis et solus ille operatur bonum et non peccat, qui est in deo. Omne enim quod boni sumus, quod bonum operamur et quod bene vivimus, utique in deo sumus. E converso omne, quod extra deum sumus, operamur et vivimus, peccamus: extra deum sumus, in diabolo sumus – si tamen aliquid in malo esse posset, quod altioris quaestionis est et requiratur in Opere quaestionum, ubi de malo agitur – et hoc est quod Origenes super illo ‘inventa est coniuratio’, Ier. , inducens illud Ioh. : ‘qui facit peccatum, ex diabolo est’, sic dicit: »totiens ex diabolo nascimur, quotiens peccamus. Infelix ille qui semper a diabolo generatur. Ille vero felix est qui semper a deo nascitur; non enim dicam semel iustum ex deo natum, sed per singula virtutis opera semper ex deo nascitur«. Augustinus De agone christiano circa principium ait: »quando dictum est diabolo: ‘terram manducabis’, dictum est et peccatori: ‘terra es et in terram ibis’, Gen. . Datus est ergo in cibum diaboli peccator. Non simus ‘terra’, si nolumus manducari a serpente«. Ioh. peccatoribus dictum est: ‘vos ex patre diabolo estis’.
99 Second, the expression ‘in me’ is only understood just as it sounds and literally and the meaning is: that the one who is in God, and only that one, works good and does not sin. That is to say that all the good that we are, that the good that we work, insofar as we live rightly we are assuredly in God. Conversely, insofar as we are outside God, by everything we do and live we sin: we are outside of God, we are in the devil – yet whether anyone might be in evil, that is a profound question and should be sought in the Work of Questions where [things] concerning evil is considered – and this is what Origen [says] about that [verse] in Jeremiah :[] ‘he discovered a conspiracy’, introducing that [one of] John : ‘whoever commits a sin is of the devil’, thus it says ‘as often as we sin we are born of the devil that number of times. Wretched is the one who is always born of the devil. Truly he is happy who is always born of God; indeed, I should not say the just [man] is born of God once but he is always being born of God through every work of virtue’. Augustine says around the beginning of the Christian Struggle ‘when it is said to the devil: “you shall eat dust”, it was also said to
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the sinner: “you are dust and to dust you shall return”. Genesis :[,]. Therefore, the sinner has been given for food to the devil. We should not be “dust” if we are unwilling to be eaten by the serpent’. [In] John :[] It is said to the sinner: ‘you are from your father the devil’. 99 Magna certe fiducia et securitas omni virtuoso quod in deo est, in deo vivit et operatur, Psalmus: ‘in deo faciemus virtutem’; Ioh. : ‘opera eius’ ‘in deo sunt facta’; et Ioh. : ‘qui manet in eo, non peccat’; et iterum: ‘qui manet in caritate, in deo manet’. Secundum hoc exponi potest illud Matth. : ‘bonum opus operata est in me’, ut sit sensus: ipsa ‘in me’ est operata bonum opus, quia sanctus et est et operatur in deo omne, quod est et quod operatur.
99 Certainly [it is a matter of] great confidence and security to every virtuous man who is in God, in God he lives and works, Psalm [:] ‘In God we shall practice virtue’; John :[] ‘his works’ ‘have been done in God’; and John :[] ‘the one who remains in him does not sin’; and again ‘whoever remains in love remains in God’. According to this it is possible to explain that [verse in] Matthew :[]: ‘a good work has been performed ‘in me’, so that the meaning should be: in me’ a good work itself is worked, because it is both holy and has been worked in God by everything that is and that is worked.
99 Praemissorum ratio et exemplum manifesta sunt, si loco dei ponamus ‘esse’ et ‘iustitia’. Certum est enim quod omne quod quis est eo est quod in esse est et esse in ipso est, Ioh. : ‘in deo manet, et deus in eo’. Quod autem extra esse est, nihil est, Ioh. : ‘sine ipso factum est nihil’, et Psalmus: ‘ad nihilum deductus est in conspectu eius malignus’. Rursus: omne, quod iusti sumus et quod iusta operamur, sumus utique et operamur, inquantum sumus in iustitia et iustitia in nobis est. E converso omne, quod praeter iustitiam est et extra iustitiam, nec iustum est nec iuste operamur. Iustitia enim sola iusti sumus et iuste operamur, secundum illud philosophi: »virtus bonum facit habentem et opus eius reddit bonum«. Et hoc est quod salvator manifestissima et verissima parabola ait, Ioh. : ‘ego sum
99 The reasoning and example of the previous [argument] are clear if in place of God we should put ‘being’ and ‘justice’. For it is certain that the totality which any one is in himself is what is in being and being is in himself. John :[] ’he abides in God, and God in him’. But whatever is outside being is nothing, John :[] ‘without him nothing is made’, and Psalm [:]; ‘the evildoer is brought to nothing in his sight’. Again: insofar as in everything we are just and insofar as we perform just [works] we are undoubtedly [just] and we work [justly], insofar as we are in justice and justice is in us. On the other hand, everything which is contrary to justice and outside justice, is neither just nor a just work. That is to say we are just and we work justly only in justice, according to that philosopher: ‘Virtue creates a good man and his work delivers goodness’.
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vitis vera’; et infra: ‘manete in me, et ego in vobis’, et iterum: ‘qui manet in me et ego in eo, hic fert fructum multum, quia sine me nihil potestis facere’. Hoc est ergo quod hic dicitur quantum ad secundum sensum iuxta ipsa verba litterae subtiliter accipiendo: ‘qui operantur in me, non peccabunt’. Omne enim, quod iustus est et quod iuste operatur, in deo est; omne quod extra, iustus non est nec iuste operatur, sed peccat, Ioh. : ‘qui est ex deo, non peccat’. Sequitur:
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And this is what the Saviour says in a very clear and true parable, John :[] ‘I am the true vine’; and later: ‘Remain in me and I in you’, and again ‘whoever remains in me and I in him, (this) one bears much fruit, because without me you can do nothing’. This, therefore, is what is said so far as the second meaning is concerned according to the words of the text themselves, subtly understood: ‘whoever works in me shall not sin’. For everyone who is just and who works justly is in God; everyone who is outside [God] is not just nor works justly, but sins, John :[] ‘he who is from God does not sin’. It follows:
‘Qui elucidant me, vitam aeternam habebunt’ Eccli. :
‘Whoever reveals me shall have eternal life’ Eccli. :
99 Notandum quod elucidare est extra luci dare, id est manifestare, Eph. : ‘omne quod manifestatur lumen est’. Sed nota quod ait elucidare. Oportet ergo, ut ‘qui elucidant’, prius intus luceant. Propter quod primis doctoribus dictum est Matth. : ‘vos estis lux mundi’. ‘Estis’ inquit. Esse verum et intimum est, et »vivere viventibus est esse«. Debet ergo qui docet sive elucidat intus lucere vivendo, Ioh. : ‘vita erat lux hominum’, et iterum: ‘quod factum est in ipso vita erat’. Et hoc est elucidare, scilicet lucem, quae intus vita lucet et est, extra luci dare.
99 Note that to enlighten is to give more light, that is to make clearer, Eph. :[]: ‘Everything which is made visible is light’. But note that it says, ‘to enlighten’. Therefore, it is necessary that those who give light should first shine within. On account of which it is said by the first doctors, Matth. :[]; ‘You are the light of the world’. He said ‘you are’. Being is true and innermost and ‘to the living to live is to be’. Therefore, whoever teaches or enlightens must shine within to give light to the living, John :[] ‘the life was the light of men’ and again ‘what was created in him was life’. And this is to explain, the light of course, which shines within a life and is to give light outside.
99 Notandum etiam in exemplo quod fetus prius in utero concipitur et formatur, vivit, animal est et homo, sed nondum luci datur et latet. In nativitate vero, dum nascitur ex utero, datur luci et manifestatur per id quod factum est extra. Quod tamen factum extra iam intus vita erat, sed latens.
99 Yet again observe for example that a foetus is first conceived and formed in the womb, it lives, it is an animal and a human being, but light is not yet given and it lies hidden. However, at birth as long as it is born from the uterus it is given to the light and revealed through it insofar as it is fashioned
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Hinc est quod astrorum iudices, horam conceptionis ignorantes, horam nativitatis, qua infans datur et exponitur luci et stellarum aspectui, inspiciunt. ‘Vos’, inquit, ‘estis lux mundi’, et sequitur: ‘luceat lux vestra coram hominibus’. Sic etiam verbum omne prius formatur intus in anima quam producatur et manifestetur per loquelam extra. Unde apostolus Timotheo scribit: ‘praedica verbum’. ‘Praedica’ quasi praedic, id est prius intus dic; vel ‘praedica’, id est prodic vel produc extra, ut ‘luceat coram hominibus’.
outside. Yet, whatever happened outside was already a life inside, but hidden. Hence it is that they who observe the stars, not knowing the hour of conception determine the hour of birth by which the infant is given birth and exposed to the light and to the appearance of a planet. ‘You’, it is said, ‘are the light of the world’, and it follows ‘let your light shine before men’. Likewise, in such a way [it is with] every word first formed within the soul which is revealed and made known through speech outside. Wherefore the apostle Timothy writes: ‘preach the word’. ‘Preach’, as it were, say beforehand, that is say [it] first within; or ‘preach’ that is come forth or reveal outside, so that ‘it shines before men’.
99 Rursus tertio notandum quod ait elucidare, extra luci dare, quasi intus non luceat, sed lateat, quousque extra fiat et pateat. Propter quod signanter dictum est: ‘vos estis lux mundi’. Lux enim intus esse est: ‘vos’, inquit, ‘estis lux’. Lux intus vivere est, Ioh. : ‘vita erat lux hominum’, id est lux hominum et in homine vivere est, et »vivere viventibus est esse«. Rursus lux et vita sive vivere in esse sunt ipsum esse et unum esse, sicut patet ex De causis. Sic ergo lucere et vivere latent in esse et sub esse, tamquam abscondita a natura et proprietate lucendi, donec producantur et extra fiant et sic luceant, secundum illud Iob : ‘profunda fluviorum’ ‘produxit in lucem’. Sic enim albedo in se non est alba nec dealbat, sed est id quo dealbatur. In esse est quidem albedo, sed dealbare in esse absconditur, extra vero facta dealbat. Unde quod iam factum est in ipso albedo erat et vita erat, si albedo et alba viverent, secundum illud iam supra: ‘quod factum
99 Again, third it should be noted that it says to enlighten, to give light outside, as if it should not shine within, but should lie hidden until it might take place outside and be visible. On account of which it has been said clearly: ‘you are the light of the world’. That is to say the light is to be within: it says ‘you’, ‘you are the light’. The light is to live within, John :[] ‘the light was the life of men’, that he is the light of men and is to live in a man, and ‘to live is to be alive for the living’. Again, light and life or to live in being are being itself and being alone, just as is well known from De causis. Therefore, in such a way, to shine and to live hidden in being and within being as if concealed from birth and the quality of light, until they are revealed and take place outside and thus should shine, according to that [verse] in Job :[]: ‘the depths of the rivers’ ‘he brought forth into the light’. That is to say, in such a way, whiteness in itself is not white neither does it whiten but is that
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est in ipso vita erat’; et iterum: ‘lux in tenebris lucet’, extra scilicet.
which is whitened. Certainly, whiteness is in being but the whiteness is hidden in being, however it makes things white outside. Because from that, what has been already done was whiteness in itself and it was life, if whiteness and white shall exist, according to that which has already [been said] above: ‘that which has come into being in him was life’ [John :-]; and again: ‘the light shines in the darkness’ [John :], outside of course.
Expliciunt Sermones facti ad fratres praedicatores in capitulo generali.
The Sermons given to the brother preachers in the General Chapter.
Sermon – Commentary Paragraph
F
ollowing the quotation from Ecclesiasticus , Eckhart begins this sermon saying: First these words will be fully expounded in the form of a sermon specifically about the Blessed Virgin Mary, secondly, they will be explained in the form of a lecture.
He speaks of both a ‘sermon’ and a ‘lecture’, and proceeds in that order. This order was probably determined by the structure of the day at this Chapter, but it clearly shows that in the form we have the texts here, they are a conscious redaction to which this introduction belongs. Even though both ‘sermon’ and ‘lecture’ are given in the singular, the in forma and per modum might mean that this redactional note could have also included the ‘second sermon’ and ‘lecture’. Yet, as both these latter ones deal with Eccli. :, the note here might be restricted to the first Sermon and first Lecture only. In this case, however, the question arises, why Eckhart does not indicate in his opening the full set of Sermons and Lectures here? There is also the possibility that, as we have it here in the context of the third part of the Opus Tripartitum, the order may not only be derived from the way the Provincial Chapter was organised, but also that for Eckhart, both personally and as a Dominican, preaching preceded lecturing in importance as well as chronologically. In the Scriptures, the core verse of Eccli. : refer to Wisdom – hence my translation of ait by ‘she said’ – as we can see already from the opening verses of chapter of Ecclesiasticus: : Wisdom speaks her own praises, in the midst of her people she glories in herself. : I came forth from the mouth of the Most High. . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-). . On some attempts to answer the question see the introduction. . The Jerusalem Bible (), Eccli. :., .
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According to Scripture, Wisdom is personified and acts as a speaking subject, one that can praise herself ‘in the midst of the people’, while at the same time, she is seen as being spoken by God himself, as the one that has come from the mouth of the Most High. In using this verse, Eckhart transfers what Scripture says of Wisdom to the Virgin Mary. As we have seen from the Introduction, following the scholastic school of thought in which Eckhart was trained and the influence of the Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides, to whom he refers quite often, Eckhart constantly saw the possibility of each word in Scripture pointing parabolically to something else. For this he also has the authority of Jerome behind him, as Jerome wrote: There are basically only two senses of scripture recognised everywhere in the ancient tradition: the one which consists in the history or the letter; the other which is more generally named spiritual or allegorical or mystical. It is these two levels of meaning that Eckhart is following here: the literal and the figurative one, departing from the usual designation of this figurative meaning as ‘allegory’ preferring instead, Maimonides’ term parabola as noted in my Introduction. Another factor at work in Eckhart’s time which would influence his interpretation was the prevalent understanding of another Pauline term, ‘mysterium’, that saw the future as hidden in God and at the same time revealed to human beings as realised in Christ. As a result, what in the Hebrew Scriptures on the surface referred to Wisdom, could be understood, on another level, to refer to the Virgin Mary. Eckhart then makes a second move in his use of the text. Picking up on the word ‘perfume’ he juxtaposes it with a quotation from Cor. :: The perfume of his knowledge makes itself known through us in every place because we are the good perfume of Christ. This practice of combining texts that come from different parts of the Scriptures is not unique to Eckhart. Both patristic and medieval exegesis . H. de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, Vol. II (), ; Jerome, Ep. , ch. XII (I, ). . An understanding gained from such passages as Cor. and Gal. according to Robert Louis Wilken in his introduction to H. de Lubac’s Medieval Exegesis, Vol. I: The Four Senses of Scripture (). . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): ‘Odorem notitiae suae manifestat per nos in omni loco, quia Christi bonus odor sumus’, [] Cor. :[].
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show the same practice, but Eckhart often does so in a unique and original way as we shall see in the course of this Sermon. Consequently, Tobin prefers to speak of his ‘attitude’ to, rather than a ‘theory’ of, interpretation. Paragraph These words of St. Paul (his address as ‘a preacher of truth’ seems to derive from the Dominican liturgy), Eckhart understands to correspond very well with the text of his sermon from Ecclesiasticus, not merely by the fact some of the same words occur in both, but in meaning as well. Translated literally, he says, according to Sánchez: Secondly, the words chosen correspond well both linguistically and in meaning with the words first proposed. I would venture to suggest that for us it would best translate into English as I have done: Secondly the words chosen correspond well both in the words used and in [their] meaning with the words [i.e. verse] first proposed. By the ‘words chosen’ Eckhart is referring to this quotation from Corinthians, the context of which is Paul’s desire to proclaim the good news of Christ despite all hardships. By seeing a close correspondence between the two verses in the terms they use, specifically in the use of the words ‘good’ and ‘perfume’, as well as in their meaning we see Eckhart, at the very beginning of this sermon, following that pattern of interpretation we noted in Paragraph , that Christ is the key to all that had gone before him. It is through the New Testament that the Old Testament, the Hebrew scritures, in this case the verse from Ecclesiasticus, is understood. For Eckhart, the Corinthian quotation gives . F. Tobin, Meister Eckhart: Thought and Language (), . . See LW II ad loc. . A. Quero Sánchez, Maestro Eckhart: Sermones et Lecciones (), : ‘Las palabras consideradas en segundo término se corresponden muy adecuadamente con las referidas en primer lugar, tanto en lo que respecta a su forma lingüística como a su contenido’. . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): Verba secundo assumpta convenienter valde tam vocaliter quam realiter respondent verbis primo propositis.
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expression to the reality of which he is speaking in the following sentence, namely that ‘the work of preaching’ or ‘the office of preacher’ is one ‘of truth’. Of the correspondence between the two verses, Eckhart particularly highlights the second part of Corinthians: ‘We are the good perfume of Christ’ and from it concludes there are three things necessary for the preacher: . Purity of life . Sincerity of intention . Aromatic sweetness of reputation and fame Returning to his quotation from Ecclesiasticus: ‘I am like a vine bearing fruit with a delightful perfume’, he parallels: . Purity of life with ‘we are’ or ‘to be’ . Sincerity of intention with ‘he only has Christ in mind’ (‘like a vine’ – Christ being the vine) . Sweetness of reputation with a ‘delightful perfume’ and proceeds to consider them in the order of ,,. First, he notes that by ‘sincerity of intention’ is meant that the preacher only has Christ in mind. This may indicate that the corruption within the church noted in the introduction, was very much to the forefront for him, responsible as he was as Prior, for those gathered before him. The link with the vine in the verse from Ecclesiasticus follows instinctively from Jesus’ words ‘I am the vine’ in John’s Gospel. Second, and linked with this in his mind, is the question of reputation. The integrity of the preacher is seen in the reputation that follows and Eckhart notes that Bernard picks up on the word ‘fragrance’ in speaking of this. Here we see that, like many medieval theologians, Eckhart was quite eclectic in his thinking but possibly not always so careful in his references. Koch in his footnotes says he finds no such reference in Bernard’s letters but there are echoes of it in Hugo of St. Victor’s De arca noe morali III (c. IIseq, PL , ). In the same footnote . John :. . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,), footnote : Sicut flos per speciem fulget et per odorem demulcet, ita bonum opus per exemplum quidem fulget … per odorem autem demulcet, quando absentibus et longe positis per opinionem bonae famae innotescit … fructus boni operis est virtus occulta rectae intentionis.
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Koch also raises the possibility that Eckhart may well have had in mind a letter written to Bernard by Archbishop Hildebertus Turonensis which speaks of the ‘scent of oil’ that wells up, streams out, from mention of Bernard’s name, and which continues to speak of a reputation that comes from his very being, not from external study; a reputation that restores hope in the church. That may well be, however, in his sermons on the Song of Songs, in Sermon entitled ‘On the Breasts of the Bride and the Bridegroom’, Bernard says of the Bridegroom: Not merely do you refresh those present with the milk of inward sweetness, you also spray the pleasing perfume of good repute over the absent ones… Again, in Sermon , Bernard speaks of St. Paul being ‘Christ’s incense to God in every place’ and further on of one who sought to relieve the needs of others whether those be the need of a bed, of food, he says: What a sweet perfume that man must have radiated throughout the earth by works such as these. Every action bore its own aroma. Further on Bernard speaks of Samuel’s reputation being ‘diffused abroad like a perfume’ and because of this: All Israel from Dan to Beersheba came to know that Samuel was accredited as a prophet of the Lord. and finally, having spoken of Joseph, Moses and David, continuing the same metaphor Bernard says: All these persons possessed the best ointments and even today diffuse their perfumes through all the churches … Since their purpose was to be of help to everybody they evinced a great . Ibid. HILDEBERTUS TURONENSIS archiepiscopus, Epistula ad Bernardum (scripta circa annum ), inter cuius Epistulas CXXII n. , PL , : Talis est odor olei effusi nominis tui, talia iam tuorum praemia meritorum … In hac enim vita quaedam merces virtutis est conspicuum et immortale testimonium … Huius splendor non minuitur invidia, non exterioribus studiis adiuvatur. Quaeque bonorum existimatio, sicut falsis delationibus auferri non potest, ita nec adulatoriis favoribus acquiri … Sane de celeberrima opinione tua spes in sinu ecclesiae reposita est. . Bernard of Clairvaux on the Song of Songs , translated by Kilian Walsh OCSO (Kentucky, ), . . Ibid. . . Ibid. .
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humility before all in all that they did, they were beloved by God and men, their good odour a perfume in the memory. And later: And you too, if you will permit us your companions to share in the gift you have received from above, if you are at all times courteous, friendly, agreeable, gentle, humble, you will find men everywhere bearing witness to the perfumed influence you radiate. For Eckhart also such a reputaion comes about through the person one is and how one acts, it cannot be gained by flattery or destroyed by false accusations. Third and finally, very simply Eckhart states, that by ‘purity of life’, ‘we are’ is indicated for ‘to live is to be’. He continues: But [the verb] to be – ‘we are’ – (indicates that) the more common (and) the more abstract being is understood, the more purely it indicates life, namely simply to ‘live’. This is a seemingly simple sentence but one which contains a summary of Eckhart’s metaphysics and arises from the depths of his faith. Again, and again within this particular corpus, as indeed throughout his works, both Latin and German, for Eckhart being is intimately related to God. In his Commentary on Exodus, referring to God’s answer to Moses ego sum qui sum, a response which had been used since Augustine to establish the doctrine of God as being, he says: The term ‘I’ (is) the pronoun of the first person. A distinguishing pronoun signifies pure substance – pure, I say, without any accident, without anything foreign, the substance without quality, without this or that (form), without this or that. These (things), moreover belong to God and to him alone, who is above accident, above species, above genus. . Ibid. . In Sermon Bernard speaks of a fragrance that emanates from the King’s rooms but doesn’t link it so specifically to reputation as he does in Sermon . . Eckhart, In Eccl. n. (LW II ,-): Sed li esse – ‘sumus’ – quanto communius, quanto abstractius, tanto purius vitam, quod li vivere, significat. . Eckhart, In Ex. n. (LW II ,-): Li ego pronomen est primae personae. Discretivum pronomen meram substantiam significat; meram, inquam, sine omni accidente, sine omni alieno, substantiam sine qualitate, sine forma hac aut illa, sine hoc aut illo. Haec autem deo et ipsi soli congruunt, qui est super accidens, super speciem, super genus.
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Purity of life occurs through the fact we exist and we exist because God is in us (we are). We are, not through each of us ‘being’ and possessing specificities according to our individual characteristics, but ‘we are’, insofar as for us ‘to live is Christ’ (Phil. :). For Eckhart, the phrase ‘in Christ’ did not simply mean ‘agreement with’ or ‘of one mind’, but being essentially rooted in God. ‘We are’ expresses pure being (esse absolute or esse ipsum) which should not be confused with a being’s particular nature (esse hoc aut hoc) or (esse huius et huius). By juxtaposing this text from Ecclesiasticus with that from Corinthians, around the words ‘sweet perfume’ and ‘aromatic sweetness’ Eckhart moves our understanding on further when we see he looks below the surface of the Pauline text and again understands it to refer to our very being rather than our being a part of a victory march as Paul might have intended it to signify. For Paul, we are ‘the good perfume of Christ’ insofar as Christ presents us, brings us, offers us to the Father. Paul seems to have in his mind the picture of a triumphal procession marking a victory in Roman times when the triumphant leader would bring with him prisoners and any booty taken. Often incense would be burnt to mark the event which gives Paul the picture of God’s triumphal procession making its way around the world following the victory of Christ over sin and death, with folk like himself who are in the procession wafting the smell of victory, the knowledge of Christ, amongst people all around them. This picture of a victory procession marks an external relationship whereas that of the vine signifies something internal, something producing from within itself. For Eckhart ‘aromatic sweetness’ is an expression of ‘being’ even if it does have to do with reputation and fame, as we shall see in the following paragraphs. Paragraph Eckhart now returns to his original quotation: ‘I am like a vine bearing fruit with a delightful perfume’ and continues to draw parallels between the words of both texts. This time, taking them in their original order, he continues his thinking focusing first on ‘purity of life’. Beginning . T. Wright, Paul for Everyone, Corinthians (), ; W. Barclay, The Daily Study Bible, The Letters to the Corinthians (), -.
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with the parallel he had drawn previously between ‘purity of life’ and ‘we are’ he now moves from first person plural (sumus) back to the first person, singular, ‘I’ (ego). The short, almost staccato sentence which follows, forms the basis of his entire theological programme: “‘I’, indeed, signifies pure and undefiled substance”. The ‘I’, to him signifies ‘being on one’s own’ – a possible translation of meram which means ‘pure, unmixed, unadulterated’. However, this ‘I’ seems to be taken with regards to the quotation in Scripture where the ‘I’ on the one side, quite literally, stands next to a longer explanation, indicated by the quasi vitis … Hence, the ‘I’ per se being pure, unmixed and standing alone, is seen as a rich, fruitful and well scented vine. In the next sentence, it becomes clear that this combination between purity and richness is being extended to the relation between Paul and Christ or human beings and the Divine. Very carefully, Eckhart adds this sentence with Christ being the subject – so he is the ‘I’, while at the same time, he speaks of ‘me’, meaning Paul (or the soul or human being). ‘I’, therefore, is both, Paul and Christ, Christ living in ‘me’ – and the enormous tension arises how these two ‘I’s can be a ‘stand-alone’, a ‘pure’ nature? It becomes clear that precisely in this two-folded oneness of the ‘I’ we find both, purity and life, hence the combination of a ‘purity of life’. For Eckhart, the being of creatures (‘esse’) belongs to God, resides in God. Being is from God alone, and (He) himself alone is Being: ‘I am who I am’, and ‘He who is sent me’ (Ex. :). Moreover, if there should be anything outside him or not in him, he would not be Being and consequently not God. Hence John says again, ‘All things have been made through him’ (Jn. :). Creatures receive being as a loan or a gift from God. All that they are, including the perfections which they have, actually belong to God. In themselves they are nothing. Outside of God there is nothing but only nothingness. . Eckhart, Latin Sermon IV, n. (LW IV ,-,): Esse autem a solo deo est, et ipse solus est esse: ‘ego sum qui sum’ et ‘qui est, misit me’. Si autem extra ipsum aut non in ipso esset aliquid, ipse non esset esse nec deus per consequens. Hinc Ioh. :[] iterum dicitur: ‘omnia per ipsum facta sunt’. . Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,): Úzer gote enist niht dan niht aleine.
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Here we note the contrast with Thomas Aquinas. For Thomas ‘being’ designated a sensible substance, it is created and falls under the experience of the senses. Whatever a creature possesses is his own albeit it might be acquired gradually. Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form but nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore, no creature can be like to God. This difference between Eckhart’s and Thomas’ perspective when speaking of ‘being’ is important. Eckhart understood ‘being’ as being within God, in the Godhead, in divinis, rather than seeing it as Thomas did, as an external element that approaches God but is never within God. In his Commentary on John, considering the text ‘In the beginning was the Word’ down to ‘There was a man sent from God’, Eckhart states: … note, first, that naturally and in general, also in the divinity (the Godhead) which this discussion is about, yes, as true in natural and artificial (things), that what is produced or proceeds from anything, first exists in it. So, through the Logos theology of creation, Eckhart held, we can argue there is something in us, in our mind or conscious being, which participates in the very nature of the Godhead itself. Intimately related to this understanding and its relevance for this passage of his commentary is his use of the concept imago. He distinguished between the uncreated and the created image; the uncreated image being Christ, the exclusive imago Dei and human beings as created ad imaginem Dei. Eckhart understood that our essence, being an image as indicated in the Genesis narrative, participates in, or shares the nature of that which it is an image of, namely God himself. Tobin describes this as an ‘uncovering of the . Th. Aqu., STh. vol. (), I, q. , a. , n. , ; Leonina (), : PRAETEREA, similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma. Sed nihil convenit cum Deo in forma: nullius enim rei essentia est ipsum esse, nisi solius Dei. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse similis Deo. Further discussion can be found in R. Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (), , looking at Pr. , ‘Mulier, venit hora…’ . John :-. . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): … notandum primo quod naturaliter et generaliter, tam in divinis de quibus hic est sermo, quam etiam in naturalibus et artificialibus, sic se habet quod productum sive procedens ab aliquo prius est in illo.
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divine nature already existing by nature in individual human beings’ recalling Eckhart’s German sermon blîbet in mir: When that man lays bare and uncovers the divine image that God created in him naturally, God’s image becomes evident in him. This brings us back to our text. Insofar as we have our existence in God, as the Son exists in God, says Eckhart, we can truly say: ‘to me to live is Christ’. This is further substantiated in his mind by the incarnation which was of particular importance in his thinking and his experience. Jesus, in whom God was made flesh, Eckhart understands to be the goal of union with God. Here again we see the pattern of backing an argument by linking it with further texts from scripture and from the Fathers, in this case John of Damascus. Paragraph Eckhart now picks up on the next two words of his text, like a vine, (quasi vitis), to speak about the second, of the two qualities he has said are vital for the preacher: sincerity of intention. ‘Like a vine’ he parallels with ‘sincerity of intention’ or we might say, ‘integrity of purpose’ – that he, the preacher, only has Christ in mind, quoting Corinthians :. The subject of their preaching is nothing other than the crucified Christ with all that means for humankind. As a vine can only produce the fruits of its kind so a preacher who is true to his calling as a preacher, can only preach Christ. ‘Like’, Eckhart says, expresses a relation of similarity. What Eckhart understands by a ‘relation of similarity’ is made clearer when we look at his German sermon, Quasi stella matutina in medio nebulae… on Sirach :-. There he talks of quasi (like) which he says the children at school call a Beiworte, an adverb, and argues that since . F. Tobin, Meister Eckhart, Thought and Language (), ; Eckhart, Pr. (DW II ,-,): Swenne der mensche entbloezet und entdecket daz götlîche bilde, daz got in im natiurlich geschaffen hât, so wirt gotes bilde in im offenbaere. . De fide orthodoxa III c. , PG , B, sec. vers. Burgundionis Pisani (ed. E.M. Buytaert c. , ). . Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,-): Ich meine daz wörtelîn ‘quasi’, daz heizet ‘als’, daz heizent diu kint in der schuole ein bîwort.
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God called himself a Word, we should be an ad-verb to the Word. Like the planet Venus, which in contrast to all the other planets is always equally near the sun, so those who seek to know God should be: … always present to God, always with Him and equally near him, and raised above all earthly things. He should be an adverb to the Word. But it is in another German sermon Quasi vas auri solidum ornatum omni lapide pretioso on Sirach :, that Eckhart explains more fully how he understands ‘similarity’. Once again behind his thinking here is the belief that human beings are made in the image of God. Every vessel, he says, has two properties: it takes and it contains but there is a difference between spiritual and material vessels. With material vessels, the contents are inside the vessel, there is no way the vessel can be inside the contents nor can vessel and content be identical. Whereas with spiritual vessels: Whatever is received in that is in the vessel and the vessel in it, and it is the vessel itself. Whatever the spiritual vessel receives, is its own nature. God’s nature is to give Himself to every virtuous soul, and the soul’s nature is to receive God …There, the soul bears God’s image and is like God. Eckhart acknowledges two things can be similar, for example two eggs, without being the image of one another, but one thing cannot be the image of another without similarity existing between them. Thus ‘similarity’ for Eckhart expresses the relationship that exists between God and man as a result of man being in ‘the image of God’. It refers therefore not only to the present but recalls the origins of those being compared and points forward to the future. For Eckhart ‘similarity’ is not a static . The Latin expression is ad verbum. For Eckhart, no noun was adequate for God because nouns are static, only verbs which imply energy really represent him. . B. McGinn (ed.), Eckhart: Teacher & Preacher (), ; Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,,): iemermê gote gegenwertic und iemermê bî und glîch nâhe und erhaben über alliu irdischiu dinc und bî dem worte sîn ein bîwort. . Genesis :; et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam… . M.O’C. Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart (), ; Eckhart, Pr. b (DW I ,-,): Allez, daz dar în enpfangen wirt, daz ist in dem vazze und das vaz in im und ist daz vaz selbe. Allez, daz daz geistlich vaz enpfaehet, daz ist sîn natûre. Gotes natûre ist daz, daz er sich gibet einer ieglîchen guoten sêle, und der sêle natûre ist daz, daz si got enpfaehet; … Dâ treget diu sêle daz götlîche bilde und ist gote glîch.
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concept, rather it is constantly on the move. He reminds his hearers this has implications for the way they live. It implies a way of being that looks towards another and not to oneself. A way of being that is ‘being in relationship’, a relationship in which the ‘I’ in terms of the ego no longer dominates, is no longer the focus of life. For the preacher, it is Christ who is ‘the other’: However, in a relation, being oneself is being not oneself; (in a relation) being for oneself is being not for oneself, but of another, towards the other and for the other. Being in a relationship always means there is an ‘other’ to consider, this is so in human relationships, and for Eckhart this should be particularly true of those who seek God. Picking up on Paul’s words ‘I, yet not I, in truth Christ lives in me’ (ego, iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus), he reminds his hearers of Paul’s sense of being himself and yet there is more as his experience is also that of Christ living in him. Preachers must be prepared for a whole new way of thinking of themselves and of God. Preaching requires a special relation with Christ. A relation which stems from an awareness that, like Christ, our very being (esse) is, in essence, God’s being. Thus, the sole focus of preaching should be Christ who is described (in Corinthians :) as ‘… the power of God and the wisdom of God’. As preachers, they are to be ‘like Christ’, to be ‘in Christ’ who described himself as the ‘true vine’. This is true and insofar as they are, they can say as Christ himself said ‘My teaching is not mine, but of his who sent me’. In this lies their integrity, their sincerity of purpose. In this Paragraph, particularly the Latin that follows quasi vitis, speaking of being one self is being not oneself, suum esse est non suum followed by sibi esse est non sibi, and again in the following phrase sed alterius, ad alterum, et alteri esse, we see how Eckhart used repetition and alliteration to emphasise what he wanted to say. For him words were . Eckhart, Pr. : Justi autem in perpetuum vivet… (Wisdom :): M. O’C. Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works (), : ‘God’s being is my life. If my life is God’s being, then God’s essence must be my essence and God’s self-identity (Wesenheit) my identity, neither more nor less’. Interestingly, E. Colledge & B. McGinn, Essential Sermons (), Sermon , , translate ‘Wesen/ Wesenheit’ as ‘is-ness’ whilst Walshe translates it as ‘self-identity’; (DW I ,-): Waz ist leben? Gotes wesen ist mîn leben. Ist mîn leben gotes wesen, sô muoz daz gotes sîn mîn sîn und gotes isticheit mîn isticheit, noch minner noch mêr. . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): Relationi autem suum esse est non suum esse; sibi esse est non sibi, sed alterius, ad alterum et alteri esse.
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important vehicles for conveying the truth and yet limited vehicles for, as he understood it, ‘Truth’ in its totality can never be fully expressed. Granted this, he devised a number of ways in Latin as in German, in which to try and communicate at least some aspects of this truth which is God. Paragraph Third and finally, Eckhart considers the phrase, ‘bearing fruit with a sweet perfume’ and the third aspect of the work of a preacher he mentioned in Paragraph : the ‘sweet smelling reputation’. This aspect he likened to the bearing of sweet smelling fruit in the verse from Ecclesiasticus. He reminds us of Isaac’s words when Jacob came seeking his blessing instead of his brother Esau. Isaac spoke of the smell of the open country on the clothes Jacob was wearing, a smell which bears the blessing of God, a smell which is natural and God-given, not the result of any effort on the part of human beings. The bearing of this blessing, Eckhart sees as almost an impossibility for the human preacher and, picking up on Paul in Corinthians without directly acknowledging the text ( Cor. :b), he asks ‘who is capable of this?’ With Paul, again, he answers that it is only possible through the one who ‘makes us worthy ministers’, Christ himself through the Spirit. Such an understanding of ministry Eckhart sees as fulfilling the New Testament vision. As the repetition of non littera, sed spirito emphasises, the preacher is not subjugated to the literal text, but is to be guided by Christ’s spirit in reading and interpreting this text. Only such a spiritual interpretation makes the text speak and be heard, or scent and be smelled and, based on the Spirit’s blessing, makes the preacher an attractive communicator of an accessible and God-given message, giving him ‘a perfumed reputation’. Once again in this paragraph we see Eckhart’s creativity with language, in this case Latin, coming in to play in the way he uses the words to communicate scent, smell, perfume (odoriferae suavitas, fructificavi suavitatem odoris), that indefinable ‘something’ which delights and attracts us. Here that means the attraction of a good preacher who is wholly rooted in God. All this, Eckhart reminds his hearers, is only accomplished with the help of the Spirit and so the prayer of preachers is ‘come Holy Spirit, come’.
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Paragraph Eckhart continues his thinking about the question of reputation and of fruitfulness in this paragraph and we get a strong hint of the background against which Eckhart felt he was working, namely the well-known corruption in the church at that time. He points out to those present that there are those who seek to develop their own reputation, making all sorts of promises, saying things they know those around them want to hear. Divine wisdom, he says, also does this! She starts with where people are, with what they are looking for, or think they are looking for, but she moves them on to that experience of God which is both wholly fulfilling, and which has the effect of attracting others. This invitation consists of three things: purity of what it loves, fullness or abundance and its goodness. Nothing more, nothing less, says Eckhart. He notes that Isaiah : talks of watered-down wine. Here what is on offer is a relationship that is not watered down by conflicting desires for popularity or any other tangible gain in this world. His non plura, non pauciora, nec alia emphasises this. This is the invitation the preacher himself is to respond to. ‘I am like a vine’, the preacher’s reputation rests solely on his relationship with God. If he is truly to have a ‘sweet smelling reputation’ then his whole being must be rooted in God and God alone. This, he says, is what the text he has taken for his sermon from Ecclesiastes also says, and he concludes this part by repeating what he has said in the first paragraphs: in Ecclesiastes :: Purity of what it loves like Purity in the pronoun ‘I’, parallels ‘like a vine’; fullness and abundance like fruitfulness, parallels ‘bearing fruit, and goodness, the delightful fragrance, delightful perfume’. All are the consequences of our being in God, God being in us, esse ipsum. For Eckhart, as we have noted already, the phrase ‘in Christ’ and similar ones did not simply mean ‘agreement with’ or ‘of one mind with’, but being essentially rooted in him, in God. Paragraph Eckhart appears to view what he has said up to this point as an introduction to the text of this first sermon. He notes that the introductory . A theme that recurs in the second lecture: In Eccli. n. (LW II ,). A discussion of words that are equivocal – here ‘hunger’ and ‘thirst’ to designate knowledge and apprehension, can be found in Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, vol. (), .
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words of his text ‘I am like a vine’ were originally written about the ‘uncreated wisdom of God’ although in the present context he is applying them to the ‘unstained Mother of God’. As a result, he states, the structure of the sermon will have two parts: Part One, Paragraphs -, will explain these words as they are written about the uncreated wisdom of God and Part Two, Paragraphs -, will relate them to the Virgin Mary. Paragraph Part Eckhart now moves to consider in greater depth, each of the three qualities he has outlined in the introduction as important for the preacher to consider; purity of life, integrity of purpose and the sweetness of reputation. Looking at the first of these, purity of life, Eckhart returns to what for him was one of the main themes of his preaching whether in his vernacular sermons or, as here, in his Latin work, namely the purity of the divine wisdom, divine nature. He repeats the statement he has already made in paragraph three, that the ‘I’ in the verse under consideration – ‘I am like a vine’, ‘… signifies unadulterated and pure substance’, and in doing so immediately draws us from considering the person of the preacher to the purity or fullness of being in God. Such a difference in perspective can cause the contemporary reader, unaccustomed to the linguistic manoeuvres of medieval scholastic theology and of Eckhart in particular, to feel quite bewildered and unsure of the path they are following. Oliver Davies captures this in the following quotation and indicates that understanding these linguistic and conceptual strategies is vital if we are to keep up with Eckhart’s thought. Eckhart’s ontology is a metaphysical journey, which begins with the ordinary created being of the creature and ends – through strategies of linguistic and conceptual subversion – in the ‘hidden depths of the Godhead’. . He claimed there were four things he generally spoke about when preaching: the purity of the divine nature being one of them. Pr. (DW II ,-,): ‘Swenne ich predige, sô pflige ich ze sprechenne von abegescheidenheit und daz der mensche ledic werde sîn selbes und aller dinge. Ze dem andern mâle, daz, man wider îngebildet werde in daz einvaltige guot, daz got ist. Ze dem dritten mâle, daz man gedenke der grôzen edelkeit, die got an die sêle hât geleget, daz der mensche dâ mite kome in ein wunder ze gote. Ze dem vierden mâle von götlicher natûre lûterkeit – waz klârheit an götlîcher natûre sî, daz ist unsprechelich. Got ist ein wort, ein ungesprochen wort. . O. Davies, Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian (), .
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Being was a central and complex concept in medieval scholastic thought and Eckhart was to use it in a way that could be both unsettling and enlightening. Medieval philosophy was built on Aristotle’s frequently used concepts of substance and accidents. The substance of a thing containing its essential properties, those things that made it what it was, whilst its accidents were those things which were nonessential. A substance could lose its accidents without being changed into a different substance. To clarify this the example of a clothes horse has often been used. The clothes horse itself being the ‘substance’ and the clothes placed on it, the ‘accidents’. Their addition to the clothes horse or their being taken away make no essential difference to the clothes horse itself, but only to its appearance. Thus Eckhart, considering the purity of divine wisdom can talk of ‘unadulterated and pure substance’. The question as to how Eckhart understands divine substance, divine being, is an important one in the context of these sermons and lectures since at their core is the relationship between the preacher and God. In the first of his Parisian Questions concerning being and knowing in God, written during his first period as magister in Paris, Eckhart first gives reasons, known to those listening from Thomas Aquinas, as to why being and knowing are the same in God. We read: … all are based on this, that God is the first and simple (being); for something cannot be the first being if it is not simple. Eckhart continues, saying that he is now using an argument which he has used elsewhere that esse in its all-embracing fullness in God is the basis for knowing, thus far agreeing with Aquinas. Beginning from the perspective of man he states: … although (the terms) ‘man’ and ‘rational’ are convertible, nevertheless, it is not because he is rational that he is a man, but rather because he is a man he is rational. . Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n. (LW V ,-): … omnes fundantur in hoc quod deus est primum et simplex; non enim potest aliquid esse primum si non sit simplex. . Th. Aqu., STh. vol. (), I, q. , a. , : ‘God understands Himself through Himself’; Leonina (), : … quod Deus se per seipsum intelligit. . Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n (LW V ,-): … licet ‘homo’ et ‘rationale’ convertantur, non tamen quia rationale, ideo homo, sed magis quia homo, ideo rationalis.
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For man, knowing follows from being. He first exists then he knows. This is so because, unlike God’s existence, man’s existence is not perfect and thus does not contain within it everything including understanding and every kind of activity. However, in using this approach we find Eckhart is preparing the ground for what is to come, namely to state the difference between a categorical or creaturely view of being and rationality and the view of divinity. God’s being, he acknowledges, is both excellent and perfect since he is … the primary actuality and the perfection of all things, bringing all acts to completion, so that if it were removed everything would be reduced to nothing. So God does everything through his being, both interiorly in the Godhead and exteriorly in creatures, in each, however, in its own way. With this differentiation that ‘each’ is done by God ‘in its own way’, he concludes in line with Thomas: Thus in God being itself is his act of knowing, for he acts and knows through his being. God knows because he is. He is because he knows. The interchangeability of both provides Eckhart with the basis for making the startling statement in the Questions that he is now convinced that Thomas’ order needs to be reversed. God is because he knows. Scripture forms the first basis of his argument. In John : he points out that the evangelist did not say ‘in the beginning was being’ but ‘in the beginning was the Word’ and a ‘word’ Eckhart understands to be completely related to the intellect. The fact those initial words were subsequently followed by the words ‘Through him all things came into being’, Eckhart then interprets to mean that being primarily referred to the nature of something creatable. In other words, ‘being’ is a term restricted to creatures on the principle that being is caused. Thus, God who is the cause of all things that are should be referred to first as understanding or knowing and only secondly as being. This conclusion is . Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n. (LW V ,-): … et sic in deo ipsum esse est ipsum , quia ipso esse operator et intelligit. . Eckhart makes further reference to God as knowing/reason in the second sermon, n. (LW II ,-). Also in his In Gen. I, n. (LW I ,-): Sed natura dei est intellectus, et sibi esse est intelligere. ‘God’s nature is intellect and for him existence is understanding’.
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based on the principle that something cannot be formally both a cause and the effect which the cause brings about. God is an intellect and understanding, and his understanding is itself the ground of his being. By this Eckhart does not mean to deny God’s being. That is why he concludes this first Question by allowing the attribution to God of the purity of being, puritas essendi: Thus, I say, God pre-contains everything in purity, fullness and perfection more abundantly and extensively because he is the ground and cause of all things. And this is what he intended to say when he declared ‘I am who I am’. We saw in Paragraph , that Eckhart understands the words spoken to Moses, Ego sum qui sum, because of the reduplication of the verb ‘to be’ to indicate that God is the hidden being of being, the purity of being, the root and cause of all things. It is this ‘I’, this ‘unadulterated and pure substance’, this being which is sought in that which is loved. Eckhart continues that, although every faculty of the soul has only one pure formal object, this particularly applies to will and love, because the will is always unique and because love, by its own nature, is always unifying. And so they will seek only that from which love has its being, understood presumably as esse, being itself, God. In his second lecture on Ecclesiasticus Eckhart states: However, since God is infinite truth and goodness and infinite being, all that is, that is true, that is good, eat him and hunger for him: . Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n. (LW V ,-): … deus est intellectus et intelligere et est ipsum intelligere fundamentum ipsius esse. . Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n. (LW V ,-): Dico enim quod deus omnia praehabet in puritate, plenitudine, perfectione, amplius et latius, existens radix et causa omnium. Et hoc voluit dicere, cum dixit: ‘ego sum qui sum’. . Eckhart elaborates this a little more in Sermo VI, n. (LW IV ,-): Per hoc quod deus nominator caritas in abstracto, primo probatur dei omnimoda et purissima simplicitas, …; that the fact God is called love shows him to be entirely and wholly pure. Secondly, he says, the reason God is called love over against wisdom, beauty and the like is: … quia amor est uniens, diffusivus. … because love is (both) unifying and diffusive. Sermo VI, n. (LW IV ,). . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): Deus autem cum sit veritas et bonitas infinita et esse infinitum, omnia, quae sunt, quae vera sunt, quae bona sunt, ipsum edunt et ipsum esuriunt.
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thus It is evident, therefore, that every being and (the same can be said) concerning the category of beings, does not have from itself, but from another superior being that for which it thirsts, hungers and desires. For Eckhart, the being we are given never becomes our own; it always remains the being of God. Being is, so to speak, always on loan to us, it is always our becoming. As ‘becoming’, however, it is something that is always being sought. Underlying this is Augustine’s understanding of the whole creation having an infinite desire for its infinite goal, God, expressed in the well-known phrase of his: ‘… you have made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in You’. To illustrate this Eckhart uses his familiar example of the ‘just man’. The just man is just, not because he has acted justly, but because he is just in his very essence. The example of which he was to say in a later vernacular sermon: whoever understands the difference between Justice and the just man understands everything I say. Explaining the text Iustitia enim perpetua est et immortalis (Wisdom :), he notes there is an essential difference between the relationship of material qualities to their subject and that of spiritual qualities and their subject. Material qualities cease to exist when their subjects do, as they have the same esse. Spiritual qualities, however, are not limited by the creatures that receive them. Justice exists prior to the just man and it is more correct to say the just man is in justice rather than the other way round. . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): Patet igitur quod omne ens et de numero entium non habet ex se, sed ab alio superiori esse quod sitit, esurit et appetit. . S. Houedard, Commentaries on Meister Eckhart’s Sermons (), -, notes that for Ibn ‘Arabi – ‘this possibility is the eternal, immutable truth that we are always in eternity in the mind of God’. . H. Chadwick, St. Augustine, Confessions (), ; CChr.SL XXVII () I, ,-: … quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. There are also echoes in Plotinus’ Enneads, vol. VII, trans A.H. Armstrong, L (), VI, ,-: iusta ut sic totem suum esse accipit ab ipsa iustitia, ita ut iustitia vere sit parens et pater iusti et iustus ut sic vere sit proles genita et filius iustitias … . B. McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism (), . Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,-): Swer underscheit verstât von gerehticheit und von gerehtem, der verstiât allez, daz ich sage. . Eckhart, In Sap. n. (LW II ,-): Sciendum enim quod omnino aliter et opposito modo de accidentibus corporalibus, puta albedine, sapore et huismodi, et alter de perfectionibus spiritualibus.
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Thus, God is entirely just, good, loving and so on, while we are only so inasmuch as we are seeking justice, goodness, and love in him. The man who is truly just is just to the core of his being and so can only seek justice. All else is insignificant. Drawing on the Aristotelian division of secondary causes that we see in the world; the material and formal causes which are the internal causes of anything, the efficient (the maker) and the final causes (the purpose for which something is made), Eckhart says, we are not concerned with the material from which a key is made, but only that it accomplishes that for which it is made, its inbuilt finis. In the same way, the lover draws on the very nature of the beloved, his or her most pure form, that which made it what it is ‘beyond cause and end’, ‘a pure emanation from God’. So too, he continues, regarding the wisdom of God, love only beholds the ‘pure form’ of the beloved, quoting Wisdom :, Amator factus sum formae illius, ‘I fell in love with her form’. From this he concludes that the Holy Spirit is ‘the love of the Father in the Son, a formal emanation beyond cause and effect’, and, quoting part of Wisdom :, emanatio est dei sincera – she is ‘a pure emanation from God’. Here he seems to agree with Aquinas in the light of questions whether ‘Love’ can be the proper name for the Holy Spirit, that the name Love in God is to be taken essentially and personally: … so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, ‘love’ and ‘to love’ are said of the essence … but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and vice versa, so that by ‘love’ is understood the ‘love proceeding’, and by ‘to love’ is understood ‘the spiration of the love proceeding’, in that sense ‘love’ is the name of the person… . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Constat enim primo quod iustus ut sic est in ipsa iustitia. Quomodo enim iustus esset, si extra iustitiam esset, divisus a iustitia foris staret? Adhuc autem secundo: iustus praeest in ipsa iustitia. How could he be just if he were outside justice … He pre-exists in justice itself. . Tobin points out, this view can also be found in Eckhart’s vernacular sermons e.g. Pr. : ‘Everything works in being; nothing can work above its being. Fire can only work in wood. God works above being in the open where he can move. He works in non-being,’ F. Tobin, Meister Eckhart, Thought and Language (), and ; Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,-): Ein ieglich dinc würket in wesene, kein dinc enmac würken über sîn wesen. Daz viur enmac niht würken dan in dem holze. Got würket über wesene in der wîte, dâ er sich geregen mac, er würket in unwesene. . In Sap. :, full text: emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotenti Dei sincera. . Trans. Th. Aqu., STh. vol. (), I, q. , a. , ; Leonina (), : … inquantum in amore vel dilectione non importatur nisi habitudo amantis ad rem amatam, amor et diligere essentialiter
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Paragraph Eckhart continues noting in this paragraph that intellect and knowledge are not at the same level as divine wisdom. While divine wisdom is signified by the personal pronoun ‘I’ which implies the highest purity which has no principles except itself, its own nature, free from any contamination or mixture, intellect and knowledge still draw on something, live out of something, even if this ‘something’ is called ‘their own principle’, namely God’s Word. Only this Word, the Father, ‘is the principle without principle’, God’s wisdom. Hence, he says, Philip asks in John’s Gospel that Jesus would show them the Father. Eckhart gives this request extensive treatment in his commentary on John. Since unity is attributed to the Father, he argues that Philip in making his request is asking to be united with the Father. ‘Man, however, has been created to the image of God’s whole nature, and thus not to (what is) similar, but to the One’. As a result, he is only satisfied by returning to the idea of the One from which he came forth. Thus, we have Philip’s following assertion ‘it is enough for us’ (John :). Following this Eckhart, as in his commentary on John :, uses the picture of the eagle in Ezekiel to describe the intellect. Intellect and knowledge can be compared with ‘that powerful eagle’. Such an eagle, in order to gain the best part of the cedar, which Eckhart identifies with ‘the principles of the thing’, needs to pluck it ‘off the top’ of the foliage of ‘the finest of cedar’ from Lebanon. As he states, it is, as if the intellect has to grasp ‘the reasons of things themselves in the summit of their original or primordial causes’, thus the intellect ‘apprehends’ that principial knowledge which is being itself. dicuntur … Inquantum vero his vocabulis utimur ad exprimendam habitudinem eius rei quae procedit per modum amoris, ad suum principium, et e converso; ita quod per amorem intelligatur amor procedens, et per diligere intelligatur spirare amorem procedentem: sic Amor est nomen personae… . Eckhart, In Ioh. nn. - (LW III ,-,). . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Homo autem creatus est ad imaginem totius substantiae dei, et sic non ad simile, sed ad unum. ‘Deus autem unus est’… . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): ‘Aquila grandis magnarum alarum, longo membrorum ductu, plena plumis et varietate, venit ad Lebanum et tulit medullam cedri…’ If, as many believe, Eckhart began his Opus Tripartitum while in Paris, and this sermon is delivered on his return from Paris, we can perhaps see in these few lines of the sermon the abbreviation of his recently completed extensive treatment of Philip’s request in the fourth gospel. . C.F. Kelly, Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge (), : The intellective soul is the informing principle of the body and when considered more especially under its vital aspect it is the form of individual experience specifically determining the human condition.
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In contrast to this active apprehension, which is a drawing out of the first principles, the ‘I’ or ‘divine wisdom’ is addressed as this ‘purity of substance’. Based on the Jewish philosopher, Avicebron’s Fountain of Life (Fons vitae), Eckhart understands this substance as the one that ‘constitutes the essence of all forms’, it is ‘perfect wisdom, most pure light’ (Prov. :). The original passage, Palazzo points out, referred to the universal form which Avicebron understood as substance constituting the essence of all forms. Eckhart instead applies it here in this sermon to the divine wisdom referred to in the biblical verse to which he is referring. So Eckhart distinguishes the faculties of the soul from the ground or ‘isness’ of the soul. The faculties of the soul such as intellect and knowledge do operate, but they differ from the purity of essence, as ‘they receive something out of and in their own principle’. This brings him back to the theme of this section ‘Purity’ and specifically to his understanding both from metaphysics and scripture, that God ‘is the essence which constitutes the essence of all forms’. Also, to another reference in Proverbs to fruit, by which it would seem he intends to indicate that those who are receptive to wisdom (Divine Knowledge), participate in that purity which, in his introduction he has talked in terms of sincerity of purpose, that all important requirement of the preacher. It is useful here to remember, as Oliver Davies reminds us, that it was from Aquinas that Eckhart took the term ‘purity’ to refer to essence and in the following five points we can begin to see how essence and purity may be synonymous. Paragraph At this point we meet a characteristic of teachers from the scholastic period, namely that of numbering the points that need to be made in . A. Palazzo, ‘Eckhart’s Islamic and Jewish Sources: Avicenna, Avicebron and Averroes’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), : Palazzo sees this as an example of Eckhart’s approach to such texts whereby he creatively transforms their original meaning and thereby neglects their original doctrinal content. Unlike both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas who sought to understand such doctrines in their original metaphysical context and grasp their implications. . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): Unde in V I. Fontis vitae auctor de deo excelso et sancto loquens dicit >quod est substantia constituens essentiam omnium formarumalbus solam quidem qualitatem significatsimul tempore, natura et intellectuprimum est dives per sePrimum< ait, non primus, quia ratione relationis sive ordinis habet deus diffusionem sive fecunditatem tam in divinis quam in creaturis, …
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Father (who would be the masculine subject), but the principle, God as essence and relation, because of relation, is pouring himself out and is fruitful. Such fruitfulness, however, is not limited to the Trinity, but refers as well to all creatures. Eckhart then turns to scripture to support this idea: James :b: ‘He gives generously to all’ and Paul in Cor. :: ‘He works all things in all’ make it clear that the divine principle is not restricting itself to the Trinity. Eckhart understands these verses to be saying that insofar as God is principle, he cannot but pour himself out to everything. ‘The first cause gives all things to all by necessity.’ He takes this further in his sermon on Romans : where, commenting on the words Ex ipso, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia, he argues that Paul wanted to say not only is God (as principle) present in all but all are in God. Ex ipso signifying God’s efficient causality by which things gain existence and by implication their separateness from him, per ipsum, indicating that God is the form of all things, that is they receive ‘what they are’ from God as well, and in ipso indicating that God is the goal of all things. This presence of God, as Keenan points out, is not conceived as an ontological presence but an epistemological presence of relatedness: God’s pre-eternal, undivided and unthematic knowledge that is causative of creaturely being is met by humanity’s dependence on God’s gift of esse. This presence is not principally a matter of being in-substance, but of being-towards: the ontological aspects of the presence descend from the epistemological, which are its precondition. Again, Eckhart understands John : (‘All that came to be had life in him’) to be saying that all life exists only in God. Thus Paul can say in Romans :: ‘He calls into being things which are not, just as those who are’. We have here a new order of reality constituted through a relationship with God as principle. In a metaphysical sense, there is a relational progression from the Principle. As Eckhart understands it, God is principle of all actual and possible being and thus all actual and possible being is, not substantially but principially (tamquam in principio), . Eckhart, Sermo IV, n. (LW IV ,-): Vult ergo dicere apostolus et docere quod omnia sunt a deo, deus in omnibus et omnia in ipso. . O.J. Keenan, Theological Epistemology in Eckhart’s First Parisian Question (), . . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Solus deus, utpote finis ultimus et movens primum, vivit et vita est.
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God. Thus, he says the first cause (God) necessarily gives ‘all things to all or, in fact, to everybody or nobody.’ Eckhart expresses this in another way in his Commentary on John where he uses the example of an image, something which has no existence in itself but derives its being directly from that whose reflection it is. An image, insofar as it is an image, receives nothing of its own from the subject in which it is, but receives its whole being from the object of which it is an image. In his German Sermon Nolite Timere he uses the metaphor of a mirror to illustrate this. I take a bowl of water, place a mirror in it and set it under the sun’s orb. The sun then casts its brightness out of its disc and out of its core, but still the sun is not diminished. The reflection in the mirror of the sun is like a sun within the sun, and yet the mirror is what it is. So it is with God. God is in the soul with his nature, His being, and with his Godhead, and yet He is not the soul. The reflection in the soul of God is God and yet the soul is what she is. In other words, in God there is no other, thus in extending this understanding of fruitfulness to all creatures, Eckhart is not adding more persons to the Trinity or to the Godhead! It was a lack of understanding of this in quantum principle that appears to have been one of the factors in his trial as, without it, such statements as that in Pr. ‘God’s being is my life; since my life is God’s being, God’s essence is my essence’, could fuel the fears that he was guilty of the ‘Heresy of the Free Spirit’, a heresy which had been increasing during Eckhart’s life time. . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Imago enim, in quantum imago est, nihil sui accipit a subiecto in quo est, sed totum suum esse accipit ab obiecto, cuius est imago. . Eckhart, Sermon , M.O’C. Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works (), : Eckhart, Pr. , n. (DW IV ,): Ich nime ein becke mit wazzer und lege einen spiegel dar în und setze ez under daz rat der sunnen: sô wirfet diu sunne ûz irn liehten schîn ûz dem rade und ûz dem bodem der sunnen und envergât doch niht. Daz widerspil des spiegels in der sunnen daz ist in der sunnen sunne. Und er ist doch daz er ist. Alsô ist ez umbe got. Got ist in der sêle mit sîner natûre und mit sînem wesene und mit sîner gotheit. Und er enist doch niht diu sêle. Daz widerspil der sêle daz ist in gote got. Und si ist doch daz si ist. . B. McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (), ; Eckhart, Pr. b (DW I ,): Hie ist gotes grunt mîn grunt und mîn grunt gotes grunt. . The Heresy of the Free Spirit was considered to include two heresies namely those of antinomism and pantheism, both of which were regarded to have been implied in Marguerite Porete’s book Mirror of Simple Souls.
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Thus we see that Eckhart goes beyond Thomas Aquinas who, as we have indicated, although maintaining the essential character of divine generation, had allowed for a middle position, namely the power as the principle, distinct from the Begetter through which the Begetter generated and also communicated and channelled divine power to the Son. Whereas in the Father this essential principle was active power to generate, in the Son it was only the passive power to be generated. There is still a lot of work to be done on how Eckhart conceived the creation of creatures. Suffice it to say at this point that it would seem, we are witnessing here the influence of the Platonic tradition on his thinking as his emphasis is on esse as the formal cause of creatures. The first cause necessarily gives all things to all … According to what is said in Romans :[]. He calls into being those which are not. And again: Being itself is the cause of all things which are beings, just as whiteness itself is the cause of all things that are white. But God is being itself … and will be the cause of all things which are beings. Thus, in Paragraph , Eckhart seeks to solve the ‘knotty question’ with which he ended Paragraph : ‘Which however is more principle?’, absolute essence or essence with relation? For Eckhart, we see this is a false question, a false dichotomy. As he sees it, it is divine essence with relation which is the principle of all being that God brings forth as Father, the Son and, at the same time therefore, and, as the same principle, all creatures. So we can say all fruitfulness resides in the divinity and, . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): Prima enim causa necessario dat omnibus omnia … secundum illud Rom. :[]: ‘vocat ea quae non sunt, tamquam ea quae sunt’ … . Eckhart, In Ex. n. (LW II ,-): Ipsum esse causa omnium est quae sunt entia, sicut albedo ipsa causa est omnium quae sunt alba. Sed deus est esse ipsum … erit causa omnium aliorum quae sunt entia. . V. Losky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (), , states it as follows: ‘The only characteristic of the hypostases which we can state to be exclusively proper to each, and which is never found in the others, by notion of their consubstantiality, is thus a relation of origin. Nevertheless, this relation must be understood in an apophatic sense. It is above all a negation showing that the Father is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit; that the Son is neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit; that the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. Otherwise to regard it would be to submit the Trinity to a category of Aristotelian logic, that of relation.’
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through what we might call the first part of what has been described as a ‘metaphysics of flow’, in going out from itself creates and is fruitful. This fruit, in the context of the sermon, we presume as being understood to be in the life of the preacher. A theme taken up again in the following lecture with the picture of a fruit being contained within a flower. It is worth noting here that Vinzent points out that a similar discussion of paternity and generation also arises in the ‘new’ Parisian Questions of Codex Vaticanus Latinus . In the first, the author is addressing the problem of whether God is omnipotent in an absolute or restricted sense. The answer is the same as Eckhart’s in his Commentary on Exodus. In both it is asserted that God is omnipotent in an absolute sense since being is the principle of every divine action. Again, in the second of these Questions the topic of power and paternity is addressed and again the same solution that we encounter here in Eckhart, is given, this time by reference to John of Damascus. It is God’s nature in his essence and as principle with regard to relation, that is the principle of generation, not fatherhood or paternity, thus even more clearly distancing Eckhart from Thomas. Further parallels both in content and order between the other Questions and Eckhart’s work here and in his Commentary on Exodus provide a strong argument, Vinzent believes, for assigning these Questions, whose Eckhartian authorship had previously been disputed, to Eckhart himself. Paragraph Finally, from this consideration of fruitfulness Eckhart proceeds to his third point, that of the ‘sweetness of the beloved’. First, he plays with the word ‘suavitas’ talking of the ‘sweetness of the beloved’ and the ‘sweet smelling perfume’. The perfume is sweet, he continues ‘because it draws through its own power’. For Eckhart, this third quality also comes from the very being of God. And to emphasise this he again refers to the topics of justice and colour. Justice is the drawing power for the just . The term ‘metaphysics of Flow’ was first applied to the thought of Albert the Great by Alain de Libera, Albert le Grand et la Philosophie (), ch. . . M. Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (), -. . Eckhart’s authorship was disputed by Grabman after being influenced by August Pelzer. Markus Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attributes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian Questions of Meister Eckhart’ (), .
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man, and as justice is the acting subject equated with being in contrast to accident, so it is with sweetness. Both, justice and sweetness are not powers in their own right, however, … alone the supreme or highest attracts by his own power; everything below attracts by the power of the superior… It is uncreated wisdom, the wisdom of the superior that ‘has and breathes’ the ‘sweet smelling perfume’. Unfortunately, the tract On the nature of the superior to which Eckhart refers is not extant, yet, as Koch points out in his footnote, Nicholas of Cusa notes in the margins of his manuscript the principle: solum supremum trahit omnia: ‘Only the superior draws all things’. Continuing the same line of thought, Eckhart now refers to Eccli. :: The Almighty is One, all powerful creator, mighty King and exceedingly to be feared, sitting on the throne and ruling. And Eccli. :: I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before all. Both texts he believed, indicated that uncreated wisdom, which, he says the sermon is about, dwells in the highest place; the context of these verses indicating the highest place as God himself. The first, in particular, referring to what Eckhart understood as the omnipotent One. In Eckhart’s ontology, it is the property of the superior alone to attract by its own power, hence it is this uncreated wisdom that says, ‘I am like a vine bearing sweet smelling fruit’ which brings him to the concluding remark that this finishes ‘the first part of the sermon’. Although Eckhart does not say so explicitly here, we see from the opening paragraphs of the sermon that by the ‘sweetness’ that the fruit gives off from its very being, he understands the third virtue he looks for in a preacher, namely integrity. Integrity or ‘sweet’ reputation stems . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): solum supremum sive altissimum sua vi trahit; omnia quae subsunt trahunt in vi superioris… . Vulgata: Unus est Altissimus creator omnipotens rex potens et metuendus nimis sedens super thronum illius et dominans… . Vulgata: ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi primogenita ante omnem creaturam.
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from the very nature of a person who is rooted in God, but it is not the preacher who breathes and is the attraction, it is God himself who calls for and also gives the power to attract. Given that this homily was the opening address of the new provincial master to his leading monks and nuns in the Saxonia Province, it is also a pastoral programme that must have been meant as a relief and a cautioning. Integrity and reputation do not stem from the preachers in the first instance, but from God and his uncreated wisdom. Eckhart will pick up this theme of sweetness in both his First Lecture and his Second Sermon. In the Lecture, he notes that the perfume does not come about by its own power but from the power of the fruit to which it is related as smell is to taste; this he sees as characteristic of the Godhead. Whilst in the Second Sermon, taking as his text Eccli. : (‘My spirit is sweeter than honey’), he talks of the ‘indescribable sweetness of divine wisdom’. A ‘sweetness’ which, when talking of the Virgin Mary at the end of this Sermon he aligns with the grace of God. So we have his consideration of the three points he wished to make from his text with reference to the uncreated wisdom of God; purity, fruitfulness and sweetness, that is, integrity, all of which Eckhart understood to be important indeed, vital for the preacher, each having their origin and very existence not in the preacher, but in God. Paragraph Finally, we come to what Eckhart had said in Paragraph seven would be part two of the sermon, where he would relate the verse under consideration to the Virgin Mary whose feast day it was. Here he considers the applicability of the three qualities of purity, fruitfulness and integrity to the Virgin. She has been praised, he notes, regarding the first, purity, for a life of holiness and purity, equating her with the subject ‘I’; for the second, for her fruitful offspring and thirdly, for the attractiveness of a flattering reputation. With regard to the first, her purity, he calls on Anselm of Canterbury who in parallel to his proof of God’s existence here speaks of Mary . Eckhart, In Eccli. Sermo II, n. (LW II ,): Spiritus meus super mel dulcis. . Eckhart, In Eccli. Sermo II, n. (LW II ,): dulcedinis divinae sapientiae ineffabilis…
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as the one of whom ‘one cannot conceive of a greater under God’. And Eckhart adds to this ontological praise which fits the feast of the day for which the sermon was given, the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, that Mary was conceived without original sin, highlighted by the verse taken from the Song of Songs :: ‘You are wholly beautiful, my love, and there is no blemish in you’ and supported by another, this time from Revelation :: ‘A woman clothed with the sun and under her feet the moon’. As we read the final note in this paragraph – ‘Follow this up as it pleases you’ – it seems the sermon has been edited by its author when it was placed in the collection of the Opus expositionum of the Opus tripartitum. In addition, it shows that Eckhart understood this collection not simply as a treasure to borrow from or a systematic collection for discussion, but also as a guidebook from which to develop one’s own interpretations. Paragraph For the second quality, fruitfulness, Eckhart refers to Augustine’s comment on Moses that the heart of the believer is made fruitful by God. So too, he concludes, in the same way the Virgin Mary was made fruitful by the divine power. This fruitfulness which he has immediately equated with motherhood is also mentioned in Augustine, the fact that God who cannot be captured by anybody has been created and begotten by a creature. More explicitly as here, Eckhart will hardly talk about the birth of the Son through creatures, but he states the paradox quite clearly: ‘by a creature the creator of all is created’. Mary is made fruitful, a mother, by God himself. Through her the divine takes on human flesh. So, he recaps – virginity corresponds to purity. That virginity and motherhood cannot be separated, he underlines with his quotation from Bede, according to which Mary is praised as ‘virgin and mother’, a strong reminder
. St Anselm of Canterbury, De conceptu virginali et peccatu originali, ed. Fr.S. Schmitt, Opera omnia, vol. II (; ; ), c. .-, . . Vulgata, Cant. :: … tota pulchra es amica nea et macula non est in te… and Rev: :: … et signum magnum paruit in caelo mulier amicta sole et luna sub pedibus eius et in capite eius corona stellarum duodecim… . Augustine, Sermo supposititius, (In Natali domini III) n. , PL , . Incipit: Legimus et fideliter retinemus.
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of what we read in Eckhart’s second vernacular homily, Intravit Jesus in quoddam castellum: Our Lord Jesus went up into a citadel and was received by a virgin who was a wife. Paragraph In conclusion, considering the third quality, that of reputation, Eckhart refers to Chrysostom’s comments on Joseph and his trust in Mary. A trust that enabled him to believe more in the fact she had conceived without a husband than that she had sinned. It also means, comments Eckhart, that Joseph believed more in grace than in nature. Such was her reputation so far as he was concerned. Eckhart concludes with a further quotation from Eccli. :: ‘I gave the sweetness of perfume as though it were finely chosen myrrh’ and says this is what is being said in this sermon about the Virgin Mary through the verse: ‘I am like a vine bearing sweet smelling fruit’. Finally, as was his custom, Eckhart finishes the sermon with a doxological prayer that through her fruit – Christ – we shall all be participants, blessed fruit, with the Father and the Holy Spirit.
. See Lectionarium Ord. Fratr. Praed. (Cod. Archetypes Liturgiae dominicanae, Romae, Arch. gen. O.P. Cod. XIV, L. , f. v) In vigilia Assumptionis b. M. v. in lectione secunda Homiliae venerabilis BEDAE presbyteri: O veneranda domina electa et praeclara, quae mater est et virgo esse non desinit. Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,-): unser here Jêsus Kristus der gienc üf in ein bürgelin und wart enfangen von einer juncvrouwen, diu ein wîp was. . John Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, homily , PG , -, . . Vulgata: quasi murra electa dedi suavitatem odoris.
Lecture – Commentary
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t the beginning of the first sermon Eckhart stated he would be looking at the quotation from Ecclesiasticus: ‘I am like a vine bearing fruit with a delightful perfume’, Eccli. :[], first in the Sermon and then in a Lecture. Consequently, in this Lecture we see him continuing to develop his argument that creation arises ‘in the principle’, in the very being of the Godhead in which there is neither future nor past and within whom lies the integrity of the preacher. He considers again what he regards as the origin and source of those qualities of integrity and fruitfulness he explored in the preceding Sermon. There he related them directly to the life of a preacher, here reference is simply made to the question of ‘integrity’ and ‘reputation’ in Paragraph and later to ‘integrity and reputation’ in Paragraph . Eckhart assumes his hearers, members of the Chapter of the Order of Preachers, understand that what he is talking about relates specifically to them in their calling and work, not only as preachers but also as leaders in their order. Paragraphs & Although Eckhart heads this lecture with the same quotation from Eccli. : as the Sermon, after the initial opening, he focuses on the second half of that verse: et flores mei fructus honoris et honestatis and specifically on those first three words: flores mei fructus. He begins by questioning the order of things contained within that first line. The basic assumption that follows from these words could be that it is the perfume that attracts and so it is in the perfume that the power lies. This assumption may be made because earlier in the Sermon in Paragraph , it is said what is sweet attracts by its own power. However, Eckhart refers his hearers back to what he has said at the end of that first Sermon where he stated that, although what is sweet attracts by its own power, in reality only the
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prime mover, God, can be said to attract by his own power. The question is, how can this be explained by a more detailed examination of this verse? First, he looks at the verse literally as it stands. On the natural level, he says, it is clear that the fruit develops from the flower and, in that sense it can be said that the flower serves the fruit, not the reverse. Working backwards, he points out that the perfume draws its power, its scent from the fruit which again, has its origin in the flower. From this example in nature Eckhart moves, as is his wont to another level of reading the text. This, he now says, is how we are to understand the Godhead. The Godhead contains within it all that is, just as the flower in nature contains within it the fruit of its species. So, Wisdom can say, as he concluded in paragraph , ‘My fruits are flowers’, for all is contained within the Godhead. This, Eckhart continues, is what distinguishes the Godhead from all else. The characteristic of divinity is to contain within it all that is. Eckhart shows scripture bears witness to this by quoting specifically from Corinthians :, where Paul is referring to the variety of ways people can serve the church. Each receives this ministry from God. ‘It is the same God who activates all of them (ways of serving) in everyone’. Following this, picking up on Isaiah : ‘All that we have done you have done for us’, the book of Revelation : and :: ‘(I am the Alpha and the Omega) I am the first and the last’, and finally Isaiah :, where he simply quotes ‘the first and the last’, although the fuller verse: Who has performed and done this, calling the generations from the beginning? I, the Lord, am first, and will be with the last. . Eckhart, In Sap. n. (LW II ,): Eckhart takes the concept of sweetness as that which God gives to all, He ‘disponit omnia suaviter’ and says, n. (LW II ,-): Sciendum igitur quod actio dei, et ipsius solius, in creaturis est suavis: ‘Know, therefore, that the action of God, and of him alone, in creatures is sweetness.’ . Other references to this verse with a similar force of meaning can be found: In Gen. I, n. (LW I ,-): In principio autem omnis res virescit et florescit, in fine vero quiescit, sicut notavi diffuse super illo: ‘flores mei fructus’; In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Hoc autem dei et solius dei est et divinorum per consequens, in quantum divina sunt. Unde in ipsis flos et fructus idem, Eccli. : ‘flores mei fructus’. . NRSV (); Vulgata: … idem vero Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus. . Vulgata: Isa. :: … omnia enim opera nostra operates es nobis Domini. . Ibid. Rev. :: Ego sum et principium et finis; Rev. :: Ego sum et primus et novissimus principium et finis. . Ibid. Isa. :: quis haec operatus est et fecit vocans generationes ab exordio ego Dominus primus et novissimus ego sum. It is interesting to observe at this stage that in both the Isaiah and
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would have been even more to the point in his argument. Even so Eckhart can conclude that we can say decisively with the authority of scripture, that God, as the principle of all things, is the flower while the fruit is contained within him as the outworking of his power. In the following paragraphs, Eckhart gives a series of twelve points in which he relates this understanding of being, his metaphysics, to work. An application which Quero Sánchez describes as an ethics of intention according to which the goodness or value of an act would be defined solely by the fact that the intention behind the action or work was good regardless of the value or usefulness of the action itself. Sánchez usefully reminds us that in Latin fructus, as well as meaning fruit, can mean ‘gain’, ‘profit’, ‘benefit’, ‘advantage’, ‘pleasure’ or ‘delight’. These alternative meanings will help throw light on Eckhart’s interpretation of this verse further on in this lecture. Paragraph First, Eckhart says, it must follow that God is the originator and producer of any work that has him as both its end and true purpose and thus any such work is divine. Later in his Second Lecture he comes at this from the other direction by saying; That is to say God is not the beginning of any work whose end is something other than God because the same God is the end and the beginning. Moreover, a work of which God is not the beginning is not a divine work. Revelation passages noted here, the word for last is novissimus. From the adjective novus-a-um meaning ‘new’. In the superlative form used here, it also acquired the meaning of ‘last’ in the sense of the ‘latest’. With this we have the sense that there is an ongoing movement in the life and creativity of God and which might well have been in the background of Eckhart’s mind as he goes on to use Wisdom : ‘Remaining in herself she renews all things’, and Rev. : ‘Behold I am making all things new’. . A. Quero Sánchez, Sermones y lecciones (), : ‘La lección argumenta entonces en favor de una ética de la intención, para la que la bondad de un acto o de la obra llevada a cabo por el mismo se definiría únicamente por la “belleza moral” del acto u obra (la flor), esto es, por el hecho de que la intención que guía la acción u obra sea buena, independientemente del valor de utilidad de la acción u obra (el fructus, que en latín significa, como es sabido, tanto “fruto” como “ganancia”, “beneficio”, “provecho”, “placer”, “deleite”).’ . Eckhart, In Eccli. n. (LW II ,-): Cuius enim operis finis est quippiam praeter deum, huis operis deus non est principium, quia deus idem, finis et principium. Opus autem divinum non est, cuius deus principium non est.
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Divinity is not something to be achieved but to be ‘realised’ as the outworking of God himself. This understanding is also to be found in his Commentary on John where, commenting on the phrase ‘In the beginning was the Word’ he writes: Morally we are taught that the principle of all our intention and action ought to be God because ‘in the beginning was the Word and God was the Word ’. Again, [if] you wish to know concerning your every action, interior or exterior, whether it might be divine or not, and whether God himself is working in you and [that] through him it is accomplished: Look whether the goal of your intention is God. If that should be so, the action is Divine, because its beginning and end [are] the very same: God. As we shall see in Paragraph , the understanding expressed here, that if an action has God as its focus or aim, then, that action is divine, since God is also the instigator of all good actions. This leads him to the radical conclusion that the external act adds nothing to the quality of the work. Here as Quero Sánchez points out, we see the relationship between Eckhart’s ‘ethic of intention’ and his metaphysics. Second, Eckhart quotes from Psalm :: ‘My prayer will be returned to my bosom’ a verse on which, he says, he has written extensively. Sadly, however, such a work remains amongst those not yet recovered and, as Sánchez remarks, there is even a question as to whether it was ever published. However, we find a reference to the same phrase from the Psalm in his Commentary on John. Commenting on John :, on the phrase et fructus maneat, ‘fruit that will last’, Eckhart says our intention should not be on producing fruit of this world that does us no good, but on fruit that is of eternal worth, fruit that the Father works within us, fruit that thirdly he understands Jesus as saying, remains the Father’s. . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-,): Moraliter docemur quod principium omnis nostrae intentionis et actionis debet esse deus, quia in principium erat verbum, et deus erat verbum. Iterum, vis scire de omni actione tua interior et exterior, utrum sit divina vel non, et utrum deus ipsam operetur in te, et per ipsum sit facta: vide si finis intentionis tuae est deus. Quod si sit, actio est divina, quia principium et finis idem: deus. . A. Quero Sánchez, Sermones y lecciones (), . . Vulgata, Ps. :: … oratio mea ad sinum meum revertetur. . A. Quero Sánchez, Sermones y lecciones (), . . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-,): Secundo notandum quod ait: et fructus vester maneat. Quod tripliciter potest intelligi: primo vult dicere quod intentio nostra sit ferre fructum non temporalem, sed aeternalem, supra sexto: ‘operamini non cibum qui perit, sed qui permanet in vitam
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Thus, he underlines the fact that, in his understanding, insofar as the word convertetur, ‘returned’, implies a returning to the place from which it went out, so God is the end of a work because he is also the originator of it. As the originator, the principle, he is both flower and fruit at one and the same time and so one can say, the flower is also the fruit. Eckhart continues that he would like the text which he has now extended to ‘I am like a vine bearing flowers which are fruit with a delightful perfume’ to read ‘my flowers are fruit’ standing alone with a full stop, followed by ‘honour and integrity’. The latter, he states, he intends to pick up later. It is interesting to note at this stage, that already, right at the beginning of the previous sermon in paragraphs and , Eckhart had linked honour and integrity with the phrase ‘like a vine’ (quasi vitis). Paragraph Eckhart now proceeds to the third point in support of his argument: that in the Godhead ‘everything is in everything’, in it, all is contained that ever is. He then makes the more surprising statement that, not only is this true but also the reverse – the Godhead is in everything, ‘the greatest is in the least’ – there is mutual in-being. He develops this argument of the mutual in-being of everything by pushing the boundaries of language and contrasting ‘the greatest’ and ‘the least’. In doing this a tension becomes apparent. He does not stress that the least is in the greatest, as if everything (including all things created) are contained ‘in the Godhead’, which he certainly must have regarded as ‘the greatest’, but only states the opposite, that ‘the greatest (is) in the least’. This means that not only is ‘everything in everything’ and ‘everything’ ‘in the Godhead’, but apparently more important to Eckhart is that the Godhead is ‘in the least’. This startling statement he illustrates using, again, the image of fruit and flower. This time, fruit apparently stands for ‘the greatest’ and the flower for ‘the least’, as he sees ‘the fruit (being contained) ... in the aeternam’. Secundo vult dicere quod fructum afferamus actuum, non exteriorum, qui nos bonos non faciunt, sed actuum interiorum quos pater in nobis manens facit et operatur, supra quarto decimo, ubi hoc exposuimus. Tertio vult dicere et animare nos, ut libentius fructum afferamus eo quod fructus manet noster et nobis, secundum illud Psalmi: ‘oratio mea in sinu meo convertetur’.
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flower’. The astonishing element of this comparison is, of course, the same as the relationship between ‘the greatest’ and ‘the least’, namely that the former is contained in the latter, whereas one would normally assume that the flower transforms into a fruit. Eckhart here plays with the importance and size of the fruit that derives from the small flower, and its nascent state which is contained in it. In expanding this idea, we shall see that he draws on a philosophical example that would have been familiar to his contemporaries, namely that both maximum and minimum coincide (cohere) in the divine, infinite Oneness, in God. Both maximum and minimum take the mind beyond the measurable created domain of simply more or less, thus implying that God’s reality lies beyond any familiar understanding in which the principle of contradiction holds. At one level this line of thinking can be traced back to Anaxagoras, as Aristotle shows in Book one of his Physica considering the question of Being. Eckhart is here referring to the common opinion of physicists, namely that, nothing comes into being from not-being. … this is the reason why they use the phrase ‘all things come together’ and the coming into being of such and such a kind of thing is reduced to change of quality, while some spoke of combination and separation … The one, they reasoned, must have already existed in the other; for since everything that comes into being must arise from what is … So, they assert that everything has been mixed in everything, because they saw everything arising out of everything. Here we have the notion that ‘everything is in everything’ just as Eckhart stated. The question of being, we see here is a question of origin, what proceeds from what, what is contained in what. However, as we continue to read, we see that Eckhart is developing this line of argument to lead to what can seem to be a rather startling conclusion, but one which underlines what he has already stated, that not only is the least in the . Aristotle, The Physics, trans. P.H. Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford, L (), , iv, : … the dogma common to all the Physicists, that ‘nothing can come out of nothing’. This made him delare that originally ‘all things existed together’ … whereas the same dogma made the others attribute genesis to transforming combination and separation. Further Anaxagoras argued from the genesis of unlikes from each other that they were already in each other; for since whatever comes to be must arise either out of what exists or out of what does not exist, and since the latter is universally impossible, it remained that all things arose out of what existed, and so must be there already, only in particles so minute as to escape our senses.
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Godhead, but the Godhead is in the least. Eckhart believes the understanding of God he has put forward through the image of the fruit and flower is possible because, as he now says: God … is an intellectual ‘sphere’, ‘infinite, whose centre is everywhere together with the circumference’, and ‘of which there are as many circumferences as there are points’ … This image of the circle, its centre and its circumference would have been familiar to Eckhart’s hearers. It was first developed by the third century Greek philosopher, Plotinus, generally regarded as the founder of Neoplatonism. Working nearly six hundred years after Plato, Plotinus felt the need to reinterpret Plato for his contemporaries. In line with Plato, a basic first principle of Plotinus’ metaphysics was ‘the One’ which he understood as both ‘self-caused’ and the cause, and therefore, the origin of everything else in the universe. In his discussion on ‘Free Will and the Will of the One’ in The Enneads, Plotinus restates the theme of this work, namely that ‘the Supreme is everywhere and yet nowhere’. He continues; For if he is nowhere, he has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere; so that the ‘everywhere’ and ‘in every way’ are himself; he is not in that everywhere, but is this himself and gives the others their being there with him in the everywhere. Thus first, stating the obvious that if God is nowhere, then he cannot ‘happen’ to be anywhere. Nowhere means ‘no-where’, ‘no place’, he continues, the same is true of ‘everywhere’: if God is ‘everywhere’, He is that ‘everywhere’, as well as being the giver of being to the rest of creation in the everywhere. For Plotinus, there was no better way of helping his readers understand this than to use the picture of a circle. Just as a circle therefore, which touches the centre all round in a circle, would be agreed to have its power from the centre and to have in a way the centre’s form, in that the radii in the circle coming together to one centre make their terminal point at the . Eckhart, In Eccl. n. (LW II ,-): Ratio, quia >deusest sphaera< intellectualis >infinita, cuius centrum est ubique cum circumferentiaecuius tot sunt circumferentiae, quot puncta< … . Plotinus, Enn., VI ., trans A.H. Armstrong, L (), .
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centre like that to which they are carried and from which they, so to speak, grow out, though the centre is greater than is proportionate to these lines and their terminal points, the points of the lines themselves – and the terminal points are like that centre, but only a dim image of that which has power to produce them in having power also to produce the lines; and what that centre is like is revealed through the lines. The centre of a circle, Plotinus asserted, determines the existence of the circle that surrounds it. The centre is the spot where the point of a compass rests and from which the circle is then drawn and through which any diameter drawn across that circle will pass. Thus, this picture of a circle, with its centre, its radii and its circumference was a useful one in attempting to speak of God, creation and the relation of the one to the other. Following Plotinus, the circle was used widely as an illustration from early in the Middle Ages. We find it in the second of the twenty-four sentences in the medieval text The Book of the Twenty Four Philosophers. There we read: GOD IS AN INFINITE SPHERE WHOSE CENTRE IS EVERYWHERE AND HIS CIRCUMFERENCE (L: INDEED) NOWHERE
This definition is given as a way of imagining that the continuum (L: centre) is the very first cause in its own life. Namely the end (L: circle) of its extension lies above the ‘where’, terminating outside. Therefore, its centre is everywhere and has no common dimension. Asked for the circumference of its sphere, he states that it is elevated into infinity, as what is without dimension, was like the creator, is (L: also) the beginning and so (L: its) the end is nowhere. From which the proposition is clear. . Ibid. VI ., . . This text is attributed to philosophers at a fictional gathering attempting to answer the question What is God? (Quid Deus?). Its origin and authorship is still debated. During the Middle Ages, it was attributed by some to Aristotle, by others to Hermes Trismegistos or quoted anonymously. Today some believe it might belong to the lost work De philosophis by Aristotle, whilst Françoise Hudry puts Marius Victorinus forward as its author. Markus Vinzent does not agree with this last possibility rather, he believes that the definitions and commentary come from two different sources, see http://markusvinzent.blogspot.de///liber-xxiv-philosophorum-bookof-.html ( Feb. ). . Ibid. Liber viginti quattor philosophorum, II, DEUS EST SPHAERA INFINITA CUIUS CENTRUM EST UBIQUE, CIRCUMFERENTIA (L add.: VERO) NUSQUAM. Haec definitio data est per modum imaginandi ut continuum (L: centrum) ipsam primam causam in vita sua. Terminus
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It is this work Eckhart now draws on. First, slightly misquoting this second sentence, Eckhart says: ‘God is an infinite sphere whose centre is everywhere together with the circumference.’ Straight away, in this sentence we begin to sense a shift. As already indicated above, with Plotinus, the understanding of God in the text could be posited in terms of ontological dependence, now following what Eckhart has said about the relationship of the ‘fruit’ and the ‘flower’, we see that Eckhart is speaking more of a relationship of mutuality and participation. If the Godhead or first principle is placed in the ‘above’, in the transcendent, in contrast to that which is created, then that which exists in space and time is undermined. Whereas for Eckhart, as Vinzent points out, space and time are contained within the first principle of Godhead, they are the ‘make-up’ of the first principle itself. ‘They are the intimacy from which spatiality, locations, or greatness, hours and years derive’, thus undermining the concept of transcendence. Thus it is from this perspective that Eckhart adds: ‘of which there are as many circumferences as there are points’ quoting from the th sentence in the same book (Deus est sphaera cuius tot sunt circumferentiae quot puncta). He feels free, it seems, to do this, despite the fact the explanation given in that book was in line with traditional Platonism. Namely that time and space were seen as creating a framework within which the cosmos and all that lives within it are contained, and by which they are determined. This shift from an ontological hierarchy of being to that of a mutual indwelling, mutual participation, along with the third sentence from The Book, now helps to explain Eckhart’s next set of references in this
(L: circulus) quidem suae extensionis est supra ubi et extra terminans. Propter hoc ubique est centrum eius, nullam habens in communia dimensionem. Cum quaerit circumferentiam suae sphaericitatis, elevatam in infinitum dicet, quia quicquid est sine dimensione sicut creatoris (L: creans) fuit (L add.: et) initium est et sic (L add.: eius) terminus nusquam. Sic patet propositum. . M. Vinzent, ‘Eckhart on Space and Time’ in J. Vinzent & C.M. Wojtulewicz (eds.) Performing Bodies (), . . http://markusvinzent.blogspot.de///liber-xxiv-philosophorum-book-of-.html ( Feb. ), Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum, XVIII: This definition follows … because with him being totally without dimension, even without infinite dimension, the extreme (L: extension) did not exist in the sphere of his essence. Therefore, there is no centre point in the extreme (L: point), unless the circumference (L add.: of the circle) would be even further exterior.; Ista sequitur … quia cum sit totus sine dimensione, et etiam dimensionis infinitae, non erit in sphaera suae essentia extremum (L: extentio). Igitur (L: Ergo) non est in extremo punctus (in extremo punctus; L: punctum) quin exterius sit (L add.: circuli) circumferentia.
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paragraph: the manna collected in the wilderness and Jesus’ words in the Gospel according to Luke: ‘Mary has chosen the better part.’ First the manna: in the third sentence of The Book we read: ‘God is totally in whatever belongs to him’ (Deus est totus in quolibet sui), with the following definition: This definition is given in consideration of the essence of the Godhead in its simplicity. As nothing else should exist to resist it, it is itself once and everywhere total (L: given) being, and similarly above and outside the ‘where’, and it is neither drawn away by any defect of virtue which would be a defect in itself, nor is it limited (L: also such other) by virtue of a dominating alien. Since nothing, given this understanding of the Godhead, exists outside of the Godhead, it’s essence is wholly within each part of all that has existence. Thus Eckhart says in this text, quia optimum et totum est in parte. As Vinzent points out, Kurt Flasch, in his work on The Book of the Twenty Four Philosophers, shows that when such a limitless sphere has no particular centre then every locus, every moment becomes central and equally important. So, Eckhart can turn ‘totality, entirety and optimality into partiality and individuality’. By doing this with the statement quia optimum et totum est in parte we see he is undermining a monadic understanding of the first principle as given in the first of the sentences in The Book: ‘God is a Monad (L: the sole) that brings forth a Monad by reflecting in (L: outside) himself a flame.’ In its place we find Eckhart presenting a relational and more dynamic view of the world and its creatures, whereby the whole, the ‘totality’, is found in its parts. Eckhart then proceeds to show how this helps to explain the reference in Exodus to the collecting of the manna in the wilderness. He sees . Ibid. III, DEUS EST TOTUS IN QUOLIBET SUI. Haec definitio data est secundum considerationem essentiae divinitatis in sua simplicitate. Cum non sit aliquid ipsi resistens, ipsa simul ubique tota (L: data) ens, et etiam similiter super et extra ubique non distrahitur defectu virtutis alicuius in ipsa deficientis, nec stat terminata (L: etiam aliter sic) virtute alieni dominantis. . Ibid. I, (DEUS EST MONAS (L: MONOS) MONADEM GIGNENS IN (L: EX) SE UNUM REFLECTENS ARDOREM. . M. Vinzent, ‘Eckhart on Space and Time’ in J. Vinzent & C.M. Wojtulewicz (eds.), Performing Bodies (), .
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in this text a practical, in contrast to an intellectual, working out of this understanding – that no matter how little or how much was collected it was always sufficient for the needs of the one collecting. This is a recurring theme in many of his writings, for example in his Expositio libri Genesis and in his Sermons, we find him referring to this statement from the Book of the Twenty Four Philosophers. It is in chapter of his Commentary on Exodus however, that we find a fuller explanation. There he considers the matter from several different angles, the third of which is significant for us: Third, because in God there is no giving of more or less. In fact, more correctly those who in themselves have more and less, in him, and through him, as in the One, are made and receive one being. And this is what is clearly said here: the one who had gathered more, did not have too much, neither did [the one] who [gathered] less [have] less. For anyone who in himself is seen [as] more or less is created in God and is one, because [what] is divided in the inferior is always one in the superior, also because everything that is in the One and one in itself, is certainly one. Thus, the just man, loving God in all things, should be with God who in himself exists whole and complete in the smallest [thing] as in the greatest … For there is no great and small in God nor in the One … Next, combining the second, third and eighteenth of the sentences in The Book of the Twenty Four Philosophers, Eckhart concludes: … And this is what is said in the Book of the Twenty Four Philosophers: ‘God is an intellectual, infinite sphere of which there are as many circumferences as [centre] points and whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere’ and whose ‘whole is in his smallest [part]’. . Eckhart, In Gen. I, n (LW I ,-). . Eckhart, Sermo XLV, n. (LW IV ,-,) and Sermo LIV, n. (LW IV ,). . Eckhart, In Ex. n. (LW II ,-,-,): Tertio, quia in deo non est dare plus aut minus. Quin immo quae in se ipsis habent plus et minus, in ipso, utpote in uno, et per ipsum fiunt et accipiunt esse unum. Et hoc est quod hic signanter dicitur: qui plus collegerat, non habuit amplius, nec qui minus, minus. Quod enim in se videtur amplius aut minus, in deo fit et est unum, tum quia divisa inferius semper sunt unum superius, tum quia omne, quod est in uno et unum in ipso, utique unum est. … Et hoc est quod in Libro XXIV philosophorum dicitur: >deus est sphaera< intellectualis >infinita, cuius tot sunt circumferentiae, quot punctacuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquamtotus est in sui minimocorruptio unius est generatio alteriusadipiscendo nasciturex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omniaHomo nobilis est ille unigenitus filius dei, quem pater eternaliter genuit.< Vicesimussecundus articulus: >Pater generat me suum filium et eundem filium. Quicquid deus operatur, hoc est unum; propter hoc generat ipse me suum filium sine omni distinctione.< . This line of thought can be found in Eckhart’s De oratione Dominica. There he follows John :: ‘He gave Us power to become sons of God’ with Romans :, ‘If (we are) sons, then heirs’; n. (LW V ,-,): Secundo, ut sciamus quia dedit nobis ‘potestatem filios dei fieri’. Tertio, consequenter, quod ‘si filii, et heredes’. M. Vinzent, Meister Eckhart, On the Lord’s Prayer (), . At -, Vinzent notes that in Eckhart’s vernacular Homily , Eckhart goes a step further and reduces Paul’s plural ‘sons’ to the singular ‘Son’. . Vulgata, John :: Servus autem non manet in domo in aeternum filius manet in aeternum.
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To consider human beings as sons of God did not pose a problem for theology. The understanding that Christ was born in the heart of believers at baptism had deep roots in both Eastern and Western traditions. A closer reading of the verses in Galatians that precede the verse : which Eckhart uses here, makes the point that ‘sonship’ is gained through adoption: But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, so that those who were under the law, might be redeemed, moreover, because he is the Son, that they might receive adoption as children. When we turn to Eckhart’s Latin Commentary on John :-, we see that this was indeed at least initially, how Eckhart understood ‘sonship’. As many as receieved him he gave the power of becoming sons of God; to those who believe in his name, who were born not of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. The first point he makes is that: … the first of the fruits of the incarnation of Christ, the Son of God, is that man might become through the grace of adoption what [Christ] himself is by nature. Again, in his comments on John : (‘the Word became flesh and dwelt among us’) we read: First fruit of the incarnate word, is the son of God by nature while we are sons of God through adoption. Such passages are important for countering the accusations laid against him at his trial regarding his understanding of ‘Sonship’. For Eckhart, it is the language of adoption that gives the best expression to the intimacy of this relationship. . Vulgata, Gal. :-: at ubi venit plenitudo temporis misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere factun: sub lege ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus quoniam autem estis filii. . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Primo, quod fructus incarnationis Christi, filii dei, primus est quod homo sit per gratiam adoptionis quod ipse est per naturam. . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Secundo notandum quod, sicut supra dictum est, primus fructus incarnationis verbi, quod est fililus dei naturaliter, est ut nos simus filii dei per adoptionem.
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However, with the words ‘greatest gift God can bestow’ he seems to be going further in this passage. He does not appear to stay with the usual understanding of adoption, but instead stretches it beyond its ordinary meaning. This stretching Wendlinder describes as ‘dynamic analogy’: Subtly directed by the master metaphor of indistinction, the doctrine that through Christ believers become the adopted heirs of God passes from traditional formula to dynamic analogy. Traditionally, she reminds us, the understanding that believers became by adoption what Jesus was by nature, preserved the sense of a Thomistic analogy. The uniqueness of Jesus as both human and divine was similar, but remained always different from the being of any other person. For Eckhart however, this understanding was not enough for it still meant Jesus’ unique status as both fully human and divine was kept distinct. With this distinction, the understanding of a real difference between the divine and the human did not enable the expression of intimacy he wanted to convey. For him adoption meant that Jesus is made flesh in the believer so that a profound transformation of the believer takes place. Commenting further on John : (‘the Word became flesh and dwelt among us’) he says: It would not be enough for me that ‘the Word became flesh’ on behalf of man in Christ, as one distinct from me unless he [was made flesh] in me personally so that I also might be the son of God. Again: For ‘The Word was made flesh’ in Christ, outside of us, insofar as he himself is outside of us, he does not make us perfect, but afterwards, through this [fact] that ‘he dwelt in us’, he gives us a name and perfects us so that ‘we are called sons of God and [that is what] we are, Jn. ’ … for it is imagining falsely as though by one son or image, Christ should be the Son of God and by another [a different one] that the just man and god-like [man] should be the Son of God for he says: ‘we are being transformed into the same image’. . A. Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart (), . . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-,): Parum enim mihi esset verbum caro factum pro homine in Christo, supposito illo a me distincto, nisi et in me personaliter, ut et ego essem filius dei. . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): Verbum enim caro factum in Christo, extra nos, hoc ipso quod extra nos non facit nos perfectos, sed postquam et per hoc quod habitavit in nobis, nos
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By such statements, Eckhart would seem to be removing any distinction between the divine and the human hence the questions raised at his trial. Such a controversial approach is even clearer in some of his German sermons, as Wendlinder points out. She cites Predigt in particular. There Eckhart boldly states; The Father begets His Son unceasingly, and furthermore, I say He begets me as His Son and the same Son. Again, in his vernacular sermon Homily , commenting on the phrase ‘Father of lights’ in James :, we see Eckhart moving from the plural ‘sons’ to the singular ‘son’: When the Father bears His Son in me, I am the same Son and not another: true, we are different in humanity, but there I am the same Son and none other. ‘Being sons, we are heirs’ [Rom. :]. He who understands the truth knows well that the word ‘father’ connotes pure generation and the having of sons. Therefore, in this we are sons and are the same Son. For Wendlinder much depends on Eckhart’s understanding of ‘image’. For, she continues, in God Eckhart sees image as an expression of identity rather than likeness, therefore ‘the Son’s imaging of the Father indicates indistinction with regard to divine existence’. It is this relationship between image and indistinction that has profound soteriological implications for humans. A closer reading of John’s Gospel shows Eckhart developing the idea of adoption showing that as the Word images the Father so too do believers, and as a result they become deified heirs. Such seems to be the gist of what Eckhart is saying in this part of the lecture. Very briefly acknowledging Jesus’ words in John :: The slave does not have a permament place in the household; the son has a place forever. denominat et nos perficit, ‘ut filii dei nominemur et simus’, Ioh. ; also n. (,-): Non enim est imaginandum falso quasi alio filio sive imagine Christus sit filius dei, et alio quodam homo iustus et deiformis sit filius dei. Ait enim: ‘transformamur in eandem imaginem’. . A. Wendlinder, Speaking of God (), . . M.O’C. Walshe, The Complete Mystical Works (), ; Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,-): Der vater gebirt sînen sun âne underlâz, und ich spriche mêr: er gebirt mich sînen sun und den selben sun. . Ibid. ; Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,-,): Dâ der vater sînen sun in mir gebirt, dâ bin ich der selbe sun und niht ein ander; wir sîn wol ein ander an menscheit, aber dâ bin ich der selbe sun und niht ein ander. ‘Dâ wir süne sîn, dâ sîn wir rehte erben’. . A Wendlinder, Speaking of God (), .
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Eckhart draws the conclusion that we: should be heirs of the kingdom of heaven because we should be sons of God. and this is the greater gift of God, the most extraordinary of all, that to us he ‘has given to us the power to become sons of God’ spiritually. Once again, he calls on Augustine to support him and referring to De trinitate Eckhart continues: Among things born in time that is the highest grace, that man in the unity of the person is united with God. As Vinzent says in his work on Eckhart’s commentary On the Lord’s Prayer, for Eckhart, Father and Son are ‘characters of the Godhead in its two modes’. God is always both, Father and Son. Consequently, he can say: The Son, according to Eckhart, is not an entity in the Godhead that can be differentiated from God’s powerful, effective, ontological potentiality in his creaures. Because of divine oneness, it has to be the very same Son in His creatures. With sonship comes inheritance and this is superior than honey and the honeycomb. By ‘honey’ and ‘honeycomb’, says Eckhart, is to be understood the ‘thing or being’ and its reason under which heading are contained ‘the intellect’, and the ‘will’. Thus, he understands ‘sonship’ to be superior to all ‘contemplation of the intellect’ and all ‘passion of the will and love’. ‘Sonship’ is a gift, not something to be achieved by work, will power or mental energy. In conclusion, he recalls Isaiah :; On account of Sion I will not be silent, on account of Jerusalem I will not rest until her true magnificence should come forth, which he says, he has written on in detail elsewhere. Amongst his Latin texts we find this verse quoted in his Expositio libri Sapientiae as well as Commentary on John. In the former he uses the text as part of his commentary on verse in chapter : ‘All good things come to me together . E. Hill, St Augustine: The Trinity (), XIII, c. , n. , ; Augustine, De trin., Pars XVI,, Libri XIII, c. , n. (CChr.SL L ,-): In rebus enim per tempus ortis illa summa gratia est quod homo in unitatem personae coniunctus est deo. . M. Vinzent, Meister Eckhart, On the Lord’s Prayer (), . . Ibid. .
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with her’. There he argues that any perfect good comes from ‘the act of giving birth’. Thus he continues: For justice is begotten or brought forth in the just person from the unbegotten justice, the son, the father’s splendour. Whilst in the latter, reflecting on the word ‘Father’ he states: … the principles of being and knowing are the same. Thus things hold themselves in truth just as they hold themselves in reality. Behind each of these we can see Eckhart’s desire to express the dynamic identification of the creature with the Creator and as such laid himself open to misinterpretation. Paragraph Eckhart now moves on in what may be considered the main part of this Lecture to consider Ecclesiasticus :: ‘They who eat me, still hunger.’ A passage McGinn believes is: Perhaps the most powerful text Eckhart ever wrote on the way in which all things both “eat” God insofar as their being depends utterly on him and yet will always “hunger for him” because they can never exhaust his immeasurable existence. Underlying this text are echoes of Augustine from his Confessions: ‘… you have made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you’. Words which speak of the infinite desire of creation for its infinite origin. Eckhart begins by considering the concept of desire. Insofar as desire is about passionate longing and the natural ability to act in accord with this longing, it can be described, he says, as ‘hunger’ and ‘thirst’. Desire, however, has a particular focus and so can only be satisfied insofar as that end is achieved. Such an end, he continues, is achievable in finite things such as fire. The logical goal, we might say purpose, of fire, is heat . Eckhart, In Sap. n. (LW II ,-): Sic ergo cum uno quolibet bono perfecto veniunt omnia pariter, a partu. Gignitur enim sive paritur iustitia in iusto ab ingenita iustitia, filius, splendor patris. . Eckhart, In Ioh. n. (LW III ,-): … eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi. Sic res se habent in veritate, sicut se habent in entitate. . B. McGinn, Eckhart, Teacher and Preacher (), . . H. Chadwick, Augustine, Confessions (), , , ; Augustine, Conf., ch. , n. (CChr.SL XXVII ,-): … quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.
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and in this way the goal of the fire is achieved and desire, insofar as we can attribute this concept to fire, is fulfilled. But, he continues, this is not the case with those things whose ‘end is infinite’. There the opposite is true, indeed the more they ‘eat’ the more they ‘hunger’. To support this, he first cites the example of prime matter. Infinite in relation to all forms it is constantly seeking another form since there is no final form encompassing all forms. Hence, he says, Maimonides uses Solomon’s picture of an adulterous woman in Proverbs to describe this endless hunger; she is never satisfied. Again, using the picture of a sphere which we met in Paragraph of the first lecture in this series, the ‘heavenly sphere’, Eckhart says, having the power and thus the thirst to be ‘anywhere and everywhere’ means always being thirsty, always desiring in contrast with other bodies which, existing for a particular end, for a particular purpose, are able to be satisfied. Paragraph In the same way, Eckhart continues, humankind ‘hungers and thirsts’ after God. It does so since God is infinite truth, goodness and being: all beings are hungry for existence, they desire to continue to ‘be’ and the qualities of truth and goodness likewise they always seek. They ‘thirst’ for more of ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’. That the source of this ‘hunger’ and ‘thirst’ is God is substantiated by scripture – Job : and Psalm : – and made explicit in John of Damascus. Explicit, because God, says John, doesn’t leave us in ignorance, but through his action of self disclosure within, gives us an awareness of the infiniteness of his being, truth and goodness as well as of our separateness which is also the source of our longing and ‘hunger’. Paragraph Eckhart now moves on to his second point regarding this verse: ‘They who eat me, still hunger’. Here Eckhart focuses in on ‘being’ which he sees as being sought as much in nature as in knowledge. In one of his more poetic moods, using evocative picture language, he asserts that without being, there is basically nothing. In support of his argument he first considers Avicenna’s understanding that what everything desires is . John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, c. (PG , ) (ed. E.M. Buytaert c. ,).
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being. Palazza has observed that Eckhart’s understanding of metaphysics which saw in creatures two principles, the quod est, that is the essence which is their own, and the quo est, which is the existence they derive from God and through which they come to exist is due in large part to Avicenna’s Metaphysics. Hence the hunger for existence, because as Eckhart continues in our text, ‘no one in himself is the root of (his own) existence’. To confirm this Eckhart follows his argument with a reference to Augustine and Augustine’s question: … can anyone become the cause of his own making? Or is there any channel through which being and life can be drawn into us other than what you make us, Lord? In you it is not one thing to be and another to live: the supreme degree of being and the supreme degree of life are one and the same thing. You are being in a supreme degree and are immutable. Augustine, he says, likewise recognises that the source of life has to come from outside all that exists. Although there might be a common denominator amongst created things it is insufficient for it to be the source of all things, the highest principle of existence. Likewise, in Predigt with the text James :, Eckhart states: All creatures have no being, for their being consists in the presence of God. All creatures have nothing more without God than a midge would have without God – just the same, neither more nor less. Paragraph Thus, Eckhart continues, we see that every being does not possess being itself. Rather being comes from another superior being, and therefore there is a continual thirst and hunger for the presence of that superior being. This is the argument in his Liber parabolarum Genesis where, . A. Palazzo, ‘Eckhart’s Islamic and Jewish Sources’ in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion (), . . H. Chadwick, Augustine, Confessions (), Book , ch. n. , ; Augustine, Conf., ch. , n. (CChr.SL XXVII ,-): An quisquam se faciendi erit artifex? Aut ulla uena trahitur aliunde, qua esse et uiuere currat in nos, praeterquam quod tu facis nos, domine, cui esse et uiuere non aliud atque aliud, quia summe esse ac summe uiuere id ipsum est? Summus enim es et non mutaris… . Eckhart, Pr. (DW I ,-.-): Alle crêatûren hânt kein wesen, wan ir wesen swebet an der gegenwerticheit gotes. … Alle crêatûren hânt niht mê âne got, dan ein mücke haete âne got, rehte glîch noch minner noch mê.
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refering to this lecture in his comments on that first verse: ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth’, he uses the example of heat, fire and light, and concludes that ‘what is passive always thirsts for what is active even when drinking it’. Again, in his Commentary on Exodus Eckhart refers to the treatise ‘on the Nature of the Superior’ where, he says, the argument is briefly thus: For the superior is always prior and as a consequence ‘rich in itself’. While the inferior, insofar as [it is] inferior, is needy, naked, and begging: and everything which without interruption exists and which has [anything], exists and has [it] from its superior. Thus first, being as such is not a fixed or static possession to be gained once and for all. Rather it is received continuously as a dynamic possession from another ‘superior being’. Second, as a result, there is the continual hunger and thirst and desire for the presence of this ‘superior’ one. This happens, Eckhart says, in the same way that matter desires form and ‘the shameful (desires) the good’ – a passing reference to Aristotle’s Physics: So that if [to borrow their own metaphors] we are to regard matter as the female desiring the male or the foul desiring the fair, the desire must be attributed not to the foulness itself, as such, but to a subject that is foul or female incidentally. Finally, with a brief reference to a favourite and key text for him, Exodus : (‘I am who I am’) he concludes that this is the thrust of the text of this lecture ‘they who eat me’ – God, being itself, ‘will still be hungry’. Paragraph Eckhart follows what he has just been saying by looking at the natural world. Heat and any resultant fire has a root in the medium which is air. Thus, warmed air remains in relation to both fire and the sun. With light . Eckhart, In Gen. II, n. (LW I ,-): Hinc est quarto quod passivum semper sitit et bibendo semper sitit suum activum, Eccli. : ‘qui bibunt me, adhuc sitiunt’ sicut ibidem latius exposui. . B. McGinn, Eckhart, Teacher & Preacher (), ; McGinn states this is part of the Work of Propositions which has not survived. . Eckhart, In Ex. n. (LW II ,-): Semper enim superius prius est et per consequens >dives per seabnegatio non facit scire aliquid de veritate rei, a qua fit abnegatio