Lex Sportiva [1 ed.] 9783428545407, 9783428145409

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Beiträge zum Sportrecht Band 42

Lex Sportiva Herausgegeben von Klaus Vieweg

Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

KLAUS VIEWEG (Ed.)

Lex Sportiva

Beiträge zum Sportrecht Herausgegeben von Kristian Kühl, Udo Steiner und Klaus Vieweg

Band 42

Lex Sportiva

Edited by Klaus Vieweg

Duncker & Humblot  ·  Berlin

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without the expressed written consent of the publisher © 2015 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin Printing: Meta Systems Publishing & Printservices GmbH, Wustermark Printed in Germany ISSN 1435-7925 ISBN 978-3-428-14540-9 (Print) ISBN 978-3-428-54540-7 (E-Book) ISBN 978-3-428-84540-8 (Print & E-Book) Printed on no aging resistant (non-acid) paper according to ISO 9706

Internet: http://www.duncker-humblot.de

Dedicated to the memory of my wife, Cornelia Maas-Vieweg, who supported the conference in many ways and was the perfect host in the beer garden in Bräuningshof

Preface On June 24th and 25th, 2011, the twelfth Interuniversity Sports Law Conference, which was also the second conference of The Hague Academy for International Sports Law (HISLAC II), took place in Erlangen. The conference was, therefore, particularly noteworthy as, along with “young sports lawyers”, we were also able to attract very renowned experts from the worlds of academia and practice, both from Germany and further afield. This volume is comprised of the lectures delivered in Erlangen and is enriched by several additional papers that keep with its theme. Most of the papers relate to international or transnational topics and demonstrate one of the peculiarities of sports law: the frequent occurrence of similar problems worldwide and the need for unified rules and harmonized practices. The title, “Lex Sportiva”, refers to this. All of the papers delivered at the conference will be published in English. In addition, many lectures that were originally delivered in German will be published in their original form. The sports law team at the Institute for Law and Technology (IRuT) with its connected research centre for German and international sports law provided vital assistance in the editing and translation of the papers and in the necessary preparations for the printing process. For this, I am most thankful. Erlangen, June 2014

Klaus Vieweg

Contents Klaus Vieweg Words of Welcome ...........................................................................................

11 

Janez Kocijančič The Hague International Sports Law Academy ................................................

13 

Klaus Vieweg and Paul Staschik The Lex Sportiva. The Phenomenon and its Meaning in the International Sporting Arena ..................................................................................................

17 

Burkhard Hess The Development of Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport .........

59 

Robert C.R. Siekmann Sports Law, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica. A Reassessment of Content and Terminology......................................................................................................

77 

Franck Latty Transnational Sports Law ................................................................................. 107  Alexandre Miguel Mestre States and the Olympic Movement. The Twin Face of a Legal Subordination: The Portuguese Case ......................................................................................... 121  Andreas Wax Public International Sports Law and the Lex Sportiva ...................................... 145  James A.R. Nafziger Defining the Scope and Structure of International Sports Law: Four Conceptual Issues .......................................................................................................... 161  Andreas Zagklis Lex Sportiva – From Theory to Practice: Lessons to be Learned from the Jurisprudence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and of the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT).................................................................................... 179 

10

Contents

Rudolf Streinz Boundaries upon the Jurisdiction of Federations under EU Law. The Area of Sport is not a Vacuum in which EU Law does not Apply ................................. 189 Jacob Kornbeck The First EU Contribution to the Revision of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC)............................................................................................................ 211 Robert Sieghörtner International Sporting Accidents and the Rome II Regulation .......................... 227 Contributors…………………………………………………………………………

253

Words of Welcome By Klaus Vieweg Dear friends of sports law, I would like to welcome you very heartily to Erlangen on the occasion of the twelfth “Interuniversitäre Sportrechtstagung” which usually takes the form of a conference with participants from various German universities. This year, 2011, is a special year, as we are celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Institute for Law and Technology (IRuT), known in the world of sports law as the Erlangen Institute. For this reason, we are extending our circle of speakers and participants and, in addition, we will continue a tradition which had its starting point in Jakarta last year, where we founded the Hague International Sports Law Academy (HISLAC). Our colleague, Janez Kocijančič, will inform us in detail about the Jakarta Declaration on Lex Sportiva, which came into being on September 22nd 2010. Allow me some words on the history of the Interuniversitäre Tagungen Sportrecht. They were initiated by my colleague Burkhard Hess, who at that time had a chair at Tübingen Law School. The first seminar with students from Tübingen and Basel took place in the legendary Deutsches Olympisches Institut at the “Kleiner Wannsee” in Berlin in the year 2000. I was invited to participate by Burkhard Hess and we had the idea of holding a seminar every year at this marvellous place. The following year, the seminar took place with students and young sports lawyers from three universities (Tübingen, Cologne and Erlangen) in attendance. I remember very well that the three professors (Burkhard Hess, Peter Tettinger, and myself) enjoyed the break from our positions as deans of our faculties immensely. At that time, we developed the idea of bringing doctoral candidates, those who had just received their doctoral title and wellknown experts in the area of sports law together, which led to very fruitful discussions. In the years that followed, Volker Röhricht and Walter Seitz – among others – were very welcome participants. In 2003, we combined the conference with an evaluation of the project “Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules” which was carried out by IRuT and the Asser Institute in The Hague for the European Commission. For this reason, we had quite a number of experts from Germany and abroad who contributed greatly to discussions with the young sports lawyers. The unique atmosphere at the “Kleiner Wannsee” re-

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Klaus Vieweg

grettably came to an end when the Deutscher Sportbund was forced to sell the property. We then decided to change the venue every year, so the conferences which followed were held in Cologne (2004), Heidelberg (2005), Erlangen (2006), Rauischholzhausen near Gießen (2007), Schloss Thurnau (2008), Paderborn (2009) and Oberhaching (2010). To date, we have published the contributions of 67 speakers in four volumes: Spektrum des Sportrechts (2003), Perspektiven des Sportrechts (2005), Prisma des Sportrechts (2006) and Facetten des Sportrechts (2009), and now the next book-baby is on the way: Akzente des Sportrechts. I’m very pleased that our publisher, Dr. Florian Simon, has honoured us with his presence on several occasions and also that he has found his way back to the town of his youth. We intend to publish this year’s contributions in a separate book with the title Lex Sportiva. On this occasion, it is not just the young sports lawyers who will speak, but primarily those sports lawyers who, in Bob Dylan’s words, remain “forever young”. Burkhard Hess – the founder of the seminar – is one of our speakers and he is returning to Erlangen, where he was professor before he took the chair in Tübingen. Others, unfortunately, could not make it due to business or family commitments. Thomas Bach, the vice president of the IOC who is living nearby in Weisendorf, is obliged to attend a conference of the DOSB in Frankfurt, and therefore regrets that he is unable to come to Erlangen. In total, we have colleagues here from 11 countries. The lectures, discussions and handouts, which have been translated by the IRuT assistants, will be in English and German. . Finally, allow me to make some organisational remarks: At 5 p.m., we will meet in order to drive to the Fraunhofer Institute IIS for a technical demonstration of super slow-motion and 3D. The Fraunhofer Institute is well-known as the inventor of mp3 and for its leadership of various technical developments. After the presentation, we will have dinner there and afterwards, we will drive to the village of Bräuningshof – where my wife and I live – to have refreshments in our beer garden.

The Hague International Sports Law Academy By Janez Kocijančič The idea which gave rise to The Hague International Sports Law Academy (HISLAC) has its roots in several meetings between a group of sports lawyers – the most prominent of these being Professors Robert Siekman, Klaus Vieweg, James Nafziger and myself. We had met at several international congresses, conferences and meetings where we discussed various aspects of sports law on both a national and an international level. Based on our discussions and shared criticism of the various problems which we perceived to exist in the area of sports law, we came to the conclusion that the scholarly study of international sports law and its expansion should be elevated onto a higher level. Gradually, we came to the conclusion that we shouldn’t just “go with the flow” and reduce our role in this area to that of mere spectators of recent developments. We therefore decided to establish a new body: the Hague International Sports Law Academy. We chose this name, reasoning that The Hague is the legal capital of the world, and, for this reason, we were of the opinion that our Academy belonged there; in particular, because the famous Asser Institute also has its headquarters in that city. –

It is important that we understand that sport is a very significant phenomenon within modern society. There are several reasons for this:

–

It strengthens several basic human values; e.g. it establishes a strong foundation for sporting ethics such as fair play, and it enhances social cohesion and solidarity. It is of benefit to the well-being of society in general, and I would go so far as to say that it is one of the constituent elements of democracy.

–

It brings people – especially young people – together, regardless of any differences which may exist between them, be they social, religious, political, gender-related or otherwise. Moreover, it assists them in overcoming these differences.

–

It is an increasingly important economic activity. According to the White Book on Sport of the EU Commission, which was published in 2006, sport represents 3.7 % of EU GDP.

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Janez Kocijančič

–

It is an important source of employment: 5.4% of the entire European workforce (i.e. 15 million workers) is employed within the area of sports.

–

It is leading to a gradual narrowing of the division between developed and developing countries, or rather, emerging countries. This boundary is disappearing in sports and, ever more frequently, it is a distinction which belongs in the past; just look at the extraordinary sporting achievements of China and several Caribbean and African countries. Consider the choices of venue for the Summer Olympic Games in 2016 (Brazil) and the next Winter Olympic Games in 2018 (Korea).

Sport is, and should be, subject to the rule of law. In modern times, it has been acknowledged that sports law is as an academic discipline; both nationally and internationally. However, there exist conflicts between (the prevalent) national legal regulation of sport on the one hand, and the global nature of sport on the other. Globally, sport is dominated by huge and powerful international sports organizations, particularly in those sports which are most attractive to the public. In order to deal with the problems which arise from this contradiction, more and more rules and legal practices are emerging which are, in their essence, international. Thus, a new international set of rules, known as the “lex sportiva” is in the process of being formulated. There are, however, many definitions and interpretations of this term. The main theoretical problem with sports law is that of arriving at a specific definition of sport. In order to produce such a definition, we must elaborate on the particular characteristics of sports, i.e. the typical features which, as distinct from other social substructures (like culture or science), give rise to a set of specific sports rules; in other words, those which distinguish, or even provide immunity to the sport, be this immunity complete or partial. These sports rules typically involve many theoretical and practical legal problems. In short, we must examine the matter of why the problems and relationships which exist in this field should be awarded a different (or privileged) legal treatment. Sport is a field which belongs within civil society and should, therefore, enjoy a wide breadth of autonomy, including, for example, the capacity to selfregulate as regards issues of substantial importance. The consequence of this would be the creation of numerous sets of autonomous rules (e.g. rules of the game, organizational rules, etc.). In addition to the principle of specificity, special attention must also be paid to the autonomy of sport (although this principle is less contentious due to the fact that it appears to be more logical. It is therefore widely accepted that state and political authorities should not intervene in the organizational structure of sports).

The Hague International Sports Law Academy

15

The first event organized by HISLAC was the Lex Sportiva International Conference in Jakarta, Indonesia on 22nd September, 2010. There, a special declaration (Declaration on Lex Sportiva) was signed by Prof. Robert Siekman, Prof. Bintan R. Saragih, Prof. Klaus Vieweg, Dr. Janez Kocijančič, Prof. Franck Latty, Prof. James Nafziger, Mr Hinca IP Pandjaitan and Mr Alexandre Miguel Mestre. The conference concerned itself with various aspects of the lex sportiva and paid special attention to the Asian experience gathered in this field. The second significant event involving HISLAC took place in conjunction with the 12th Interuniversity Conference of Sports Law in Erlangen (Germany) on 24th–25th June, 2011, and was organized by the Institut für Recht und Technik (Institute for Law and Technology). The conference had many prominent international speakers, and there were also a large number of distinguished German participants. It was devoted to further academic analysis and discussion of the lex sportiva – both nationally (in Germany) and on an international level. There were many important contributions, including a reassessment of the content of, and the terminology used in, sports law, a discussion of the private and public dimensions of sports law, a submission on the lex olympica (a set of rules regulating the international Olympic movement and Olympic games), a contribution relating to international sports injuries, a presentation on European regulations in the field of sport, and so on. As always, particular heed was paid to the problem of doping. In its short history, with these two events, The Hague International Sports Law Academy began to function and it is, to my knowledge, attracting much scholarly attention. The Academy never intended to form and operate an institution which would run parallel to the several others which already exist in the field of international sports law. Neither do the founders intend to compete with other organizations in the same field. The aim of HISLAC is not to increase competition, nor to add to the number of the events staged; on the contrary, the HISLAC intends to direct its efforts and energy towards improving the quality of scholarship in the area of sports law.

The Lex Sportiva The Phenomenon and its Meaning in the International Sporting Arena By Klaus Vieweg and Paul Staschik Introduction .......................................................................................................

18 

II. Definition and Sources of the Lex Sportiva ......................................................

21 

I.

1.

Definition ..................................................................................................

21 

2.

Sources ......................................................................................................

24 

a)

Rules and Regulations of the Sports Federations ...............................

24 

b)

General and Sport-specific Legal Principles ......................................

25 

III. Lex Mercatoria, Lex Informatica and Lex Technica .........................................

34 

1.

Lex Mercatoria ..........................................................................................

34 

2.

Lex Informatica (Lex Digitalis) .................................................................

35 

3.

Lex Technica .............................................................................................

36 

IV. Lex Sportiva as Autonomous Law? ..................................................................

37 

1.

Original Legislative Autonomy .................................................................

37 

2.

State Provision for an Autonomous Sports Law ........................................

40 

3.

The Applicability of the Lex Sportiva to Athletes .....................................

40 

a)

Corporate Law Variation....................................................................

41 

b)

Contractual Variation .........................................................................

41 

The Limits of Autonomy ...........................................................................

41 

a)

European Law ....................................................................................

42 

b)

National Law ......................................................................................

43 

V. Lex Sportiva and Arbitration ............................................................................

44 

4.

1.

Sports Courts of Arbitration, in Particular the CAS ..................................

45 

2.

Lex Sportiva as a Basis for the Decisions of the CAS? .............................

45 

a)

Inequality between Federation and Athlete ........................................

46 

b)

Lacunae Within the Lex Sportiva .......................................................

48 

c)

Choice of Law Agreement in Relation to the Lex Sportiva................

49 

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Klaus Vieweg and Paul Staschik 3.

Acknowledgement of CAS Decisions by State Legal Orders ....................

50 

4.

The Enforcement of CAS Decisions ..........................................................

55 

5.

Interim Relief ............................................................................................

55 

VI. Lex sportiva and State Courts of Justice ...........................................................

56 

1.

Choice of Law Regarding the Lex Sportiva? .............................................

57 

2.

Observance of the Lex Sportiva in Applying and Interpreting State Law .

57 

VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................

58

I. Introduction The phenomenon of the lex sportiva is an increasingly popular topic of discussion in legal academic articles. What exactly is the magic that lies behind these words? In modern times, for a variety of reasons including commercialisation, professionalisation and increasing media coverage of sports, the area of sport has become ever more conflict-laden.1 These developments have taken place both on national and international levels and the multitude of rules and regulations made by sports federations and the increasing codification by means of (supra)national legislation, as well as the rapidly increasing number of decisions of sport panels of the federations, of courts of arbitration, and of courts of justice provide good examples of this conflict. At the same time, the internationalisation of sport has given rise to a specific set of problems – an area of tension. The diversity of legal mechanisms for conflict solution on both national and international levels and the principle of equal opportunity (as one of the most important principles in the realm of sport) can come into conflict with one another. By virtue of the international nature of sport, it is not the case that just one court has jurisdiction to rule on sports-related disputes: rather, a multitude of courts from various different states can have jurisdiction depending on the facts of the case e.g. the nationality or the domicile of the athlete. The matter of the applicable national substantive law – which is determined in accordance with

___________ 1 Kane, Twenty Years On: An Evaluation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 2006, p. 455. The jurisdiction of the approximately 1,000 federations in Germany is of crucial importance. About 450,000 to 800,000 disputes come before the approximately 800 sports tribunals annually. Of these, 340,000 are football disputes. See Steiner, Autonomie des Sports, in: Tettinger/Vieweg (eds.), Gegenwartsfragen des Sportrechts, 2004, p. 222 (p. 227); Hilpert, BayVBl 1988, 161.

The Lex Sportiva – The Phenomenon and its Meaning

19

the provisions of the relevant national law of conflicts – can vary, even where the same point of law is being considered.2 Consequently, even in cases where similar circumstances are involved (e.g. in doping cases), various different national legal orders can be of application. This can lead – as past experience demonstrates – to varying results, due to the fact that the individual national legal orders employ different benchmarks and thus have a varying impact on sports law. It is also of note that the extent of the autonomy awarded to sports federations, and the level of control regarding sports federation regulations and decisions, can vary between different states (a figure which is in excess of 200 worldwide). Furthermore, it must be considered that many of these states belong to different legal cultures and traditions (the difference between common law and civil law is particularly significant). These circumstances lead to inequality and legal uncertainty when reviewing the decisions of sports federations.3 Thus, the globalisation of sport is accompanied by the risk of a fragmentation of law.4 However, in the area of sport in particular, where the principle of equality of opportunity is of huge importance, this is unacceptable.5 As the legal problems prevalent in the area of sport are the same worldwide, it stands to reason that they should also be treated in the same way. This would necessitate the creation of a unified body of law in the area of sport. The central problem in this regard is whether sport itself can create such a unified body of law autonomously. In this connection, the lex sportiva is increasingly being regarded as a sort of cureall. Many claim that the lex sportiva could prevent an arbitrary nationalisation of cases which are similar the world over in international sport.6 The lex sportiva is sometimes mentioned as a basis for decisions or in legal criticism, even though it is not very clear what decision-makers or commentators really understand by the term lex sportiva. The CAS (Court of Arbitration for Sports) itself has not yet been able to provide a conclusive definition of the ___________ 2 Adolphsen, Eine lex sportiva für den internationalen Sport?, in: Witt et al. (eds.), Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler e.V. 2002, p. 281 (p. 284); Hess, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines autonomen Sportrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des internationalen Spitzensports, in: Juristische Studiengesellschaft Karlsruhe (ed.), Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, 1999, p. 1 (p. 34 et seqq, 39). 3 Schleiter, Globalisierung im Sport – Realisierungswege einer harmonisierten internationalen Sportrechtsordnung, in: Haas et al. (eds.), Schriftenreihe Causa Sport (Volume 2), 2009, p. 45 et seqq. 4 Adolphsen, Vereinbartes Recht am Beispiel der lex sportiva, in: Bumke/Röthel (eds.), Privates Recht, 2012, p. 93 (p. 95 et seq.). Wax, Internationales Sportrecht – Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts, 2009, p. 132 et seqq. 5 See also Wax (fn. 4), p. 135. 6 Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 286).

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term and, in one of its decision7, expressly rejected the application of the lex sportiva, concluding that it is an uncertain concept, the content and scope of which is much too vague. In other decisions8, however, it acknowledged the concept of the lex sportiva and, for instance, accepted that even a penalty imposed by a federation could be based solely on the principles of the lex sportiva.9 This – much criticized – vagueness is due to the fact that several fundamental questions remain unanswered: –

What exactly is the lex sportiva?

–

To which areas does it extend?

–

To whom does the lex sportiva apply?

–

What are the sources of the lex sportiva?

–

Are there any phenomena that are comparable to the lex sportiva?

–

What role does the lex sportiva play in the decisions of courts of arbitration, in those of the CAS in particular?

–

Can decisions based on the lex sportiva be overruled by state or European courts of justice, or are they final and binding?

–

What is the relationship between the lex sportiva and state law? And what is its relationship to European law?

To summarise, one must ask: is the lex sportiva a generally accepted concept, or do various different interpretations of this term exist? Is it really a valid instrument, or just a wish, a hope, a dream, an intangible phenomenon? Can it really be regarded as a cure-all for the solution of all legal problems that arise in sport? These are clearly too many questions to answer within one single paper. Therefore, this paper will focus on the following aspects which must be fulfilled in order to ensure that the lex sportiva meets all expectations.

___________ 7

FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, para 124. FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, para 16; COC & Scott v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, para 14; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (75); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (102 et seq.). Express reference is also made to the lex sportiva in I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 75, in which a general legal principle is acknowledged: namely, that sports federations are generally entitled to communicate with athletes in their official languages, and do not have to use the athlete’s native language. 9 In its decision Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 65 the CAS Panel does not discount the possibility that an established principle of lex sportiva might serve as legal basis to impose a sanction on an athlete or a team. 8

The Lex Sportiva – The Phenomenon and its Meaning

21

First of all, the exact definition and the various sources of the lex sportiva must be clearly established. Even as regards this elementary matter, however, no consensus can be reached, so an overview of current opinion will be provided (see II.). In this context, it is instructive to draw a comparison to the related terms of lex mercatoria, lex informatica and lex technica (III.). The lex sportiva can only contribute to the resolution of the aforementioned problems if the matters relating to its dogmatic classification are clarified (IV.). In this regard, the question of whether the lex sportiva is binding upon the institutions charged with reaching decisions regarding sport-related disputes should also be clarified. In this connection, one must differentiate between arbitration (V.), which is most common in everyday practice, and the state courts (VI.), which, under certain circumstances, could destroy the entire system created by sport.

II. Definition and Sources of the Lex Sportiva 1. Definition It is unclear what exactly is meant by the term lex sportiva.10 It is possible that the term could encompass the entire body of rules and regulations created by sports federations, as well as the arbitral awards delivered by the CAS, or even state sports law. Often, the effects of the lex sportiva are – somewhat prematurely – taken into account and regarded as forming part of its definition. To this end, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between what is meant by the term lex sportiva, on the one hand, and, on the other, its legal consequences.11 Several views on the matter will be set out in order to demonstrate the breadth of opinions under discussion. Due to the difficulty involved in defining the lex sportiva, Allan Erbsen regards the term as being of little use.12 In his opinion, the concept of the lex sportiva can neither describe nor adequately justify the jurisdiction of the CAS. He adverts to the fact that the rules governing sport are not contained in one single body of law; rather, the CAS can have recourse to many different legal ___________ 10

See Foster, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 20 et seq.; id., Lex Sportiva: Transnational Law in Action, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 235 (p. 238 et seqq.); Xiang, Lex Sportiva from Legal Pluralism Perspective, in: The Publication Committee of Festschrift für Professor Dr. Kee-Young YEUN on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday (eds.), New Prospects of Sports Law, 2013, p. 337 et seqq. 11 Similarly, Latty, La lex sportiva: Recherche sur le droit transnational, 2007, p. 37 et seqq. 12 Erbsen, The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 2006, p. 441 (p. 444 et seq.); id., The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 91 (p. 95 et seqq.).

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sources. He refers to the procedure by which the CAS generally applies four different principles13 in order to determine the outcome of a dispute, instead of simply developing one lex sportiva, and describes it as follows: first, if official regulations of the sports federations contain norms that clearly govern the particular case with which the CAS is dealing, it generally applies these regulations without further ado. Secondly, and by way of exception, if express regulations and constitutions of the federations clearly violate principles central to justice and equality, the CAS overrides them. Thirdly, the CAS tries to interpret any applicable federation regulations that are unclear with regard to the basic principles of the law of contract. And fourthly, if federation regulations prove insufficient to solve the problems, the CAS creates customary law in order to fill any lacunae which arise in them. Ken Foster also regards the term lex sportiva as being imprecise14 and refers to four types of rules which are applicable to sport:15 Rules of the game (lex ludica) are the technical rules of a game which are created by the international sports federations, the use of which is unavoidable when playing the game. They are indisputable. The ethical principles of sport are those principles which flow from fairness and decency. These could play a part in court if a federation decision is contested. They must, however, be set out on an individual basis for each different type of sport. The term international sports law encompasses the general legal principles which are of application, but not specific, to sport, such as the fundamental principle of due process, for example, or the right to be heard in court. Often, the lex sportiva is used in this sense, even though these legal principles are not a distinct feature of sport, but rather play an equal role, and are of equal application, in other areas of law. Global sports law relates to those legal principles that are specific to sport and that arise out of the constitutions and regulations of the federations. These principles are characteristic of, and unique to, the sport. James Nafziger views the term lex sportiva as meaning the arbitration decisions of the CAS alone and examines the question as to whether this type of legal order (lex specialis) could be binding on later arbitral awards.16 The devel___________ 13

Erbsen (fn. 12), p. 441 et seq. Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984– 2004, 2006, p. 420 (p. 421); id., Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 123 (p. 125). 15 See Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 35 (p. 38 et seqq.). In the meantime, however, Foster has also acknowledged the existence of the term “lex sportiva”, id. (fn. 10), p. 235 et seqq. 16 Nafziger, ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3 et seqq.; id., Lex Sportiva, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 53 et seqq. 14

The Lex Sportiva – The Phenomenon and its Meaning

23

opment of the lex sportiva, in his opinion, is based on three aims: efficiency of the legal process, predictability of decisions and equal treatment of similar situations. He stresses the advantages of this development but remains critical of the fact that, because of it, proceedings before the CAS will become ever more formal, resulting in some of the advantages typically associated with arbitration proceedings, such as confidentiality, low costs, speedy decisions and flexibility, being lost. The CAS should therefore ensure that any further development of the lex sportiva is cautious. Dimitrios P. Panagiotopoulos regards the lex sportiva as a legal order, which incorporates state-adopted law in the area of sports and the law adopted by the national and international bodies representing organised sport.17 The focus is set on the non-state law, which claims for itself to be applied directly and preferentially within national sports legal orders and which is the par excellence law in sports life. He rejects the idea that the lex sportiva is a part of public international law. He emphasises that the non-state private sports law cannot attain direct legal force, but rather needs to be accepted by the law of the states concerned. This occurs as a result of the state awarding autonomy to the sports federations, particularly in those areas specific to sport. In the so-defined area of autonomy, the lex sportiva is comprised of special rules and regulations which supersede the more general state law in accordance with the maxim of lex specialis derogat legi generali.18 Robert C.R. Siekmann points out that one must distinguish between public and private sports law on a national, regional and international level.19 In his opinion, public sports law encompasses all national, European and intergovernmental rules applicable to sport, whereas private sports law consists of the rules and regulations which the organised sport has set for itself. Contrary to the generally-accepted interpretation of the term, he favours the use of the term lex sportiva as a description for public sports law, and the term lex ludica for private sports law.20 It appears preferable to use a comprehensive definition in order to provide an exhaustive description of the phenomenon of self-regulation in sport. The term lex sportiva should cover the legal regulations enacted by the various participants in the realm of sports themselves in order to achieve a uniform sports law that does not depend on nationality or any other circumstances – this under___________ 17

Panagiotopoulos, Sports Law – Lex Sportiva and Lex Olympica, 2011, p. 105. Panagiotopoulos, ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 7:1–2, 2007, 1 (4); id., ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 5:3, 2004, 316 (321). 19 Siekmann, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 3 (8 et seqq.); id., What is Sports Law? A Reassessment of Content and Terminology, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 359 (p. 375 et seqq.). 20 Siekmann, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 3 (10 et seqq.); id. (fn. 19), p. 359 (p. 378 et seqq.). 18

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standing of the term will also be employed in the following paper. The term lex sportiva will therefore encompass the entire self-imposed non-state rules and regulations of sport, thus the entire body of law enacted by national and international sports federations. Moreover, regard will also be had to the general principles of sports law that can be divined from the arbitral awards of the CAS.21 The term lex sportiva does not encompass national and supranational public sports law. Rather, public sports law is of importance in respect to the extent to which the lex sportiva is recognised by national legal systems. This definition consciously omits any reference to the possible legal functions and consequences of the lex sportiva.

2. Sources Thus it can be seen that the sources of the lex sportiva include the by-laws and regulations of the sports federations, as well as, increasingly, general and sport-specific principles of law developed by the CAS (above all, in dopingrelated disputes).22 The CAS has expressly specified that, in the event of a lacuna in the federation regulations, it can have regard to its earlier jurisprudence in order to reach a decision, even if such jurisprudence does not have binding force.23

a) Rules and Regulations of the Sports Federations Central to the concept of the lex sportiva are the by-laws and regulations of the federations. In principle, every federation can enact its own regulations ___________ 21 Wax also regards the lex sportiva as including the by-laws and regulations of the federations, as well as the arbitral awards of the CAS, Wax (fn. 4), p. 178 et seqq. Likewise, Casini, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 21 (22); id., The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 149 (p. 151 et seq.); Latty (fn. 11), p. 41 et seqq.; Ipsen, Private Normenordnungen als Transnationales Recht?, 2009, p. 136 et seq.; Schleiter, Die lex sportiva – Ein autonomer Begründungsansatz zur internationalen Rechtsharmonisierung im Sport?, in: Vieweg (ed.), Facetten des Sportrechts, 2009, p. 231 (p. 235). Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann, on the other hand, regard the lex sportiva as relating to the general legal principles of sport that extend beyond any particular type of sport and that are elaborated upon by the CAS, id. Selbstregulierung im Privatrecht, 2010, p. 85. 22 See AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II 38 (102 et seq.); Nafziger, WLR Vol. 42 (2006), 861 (876); Kane (fn. 1), p. 455 (p. 466 et seqq); Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 42). 23 D’Arcy v. AOC, CAS 2008/A/1574, para 32; Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/ 1545, para 55; E. v. Diyarbakirspor Kulübü, CAS 2008/A/1447, para 26. See Blackshaw, Sport, Mediation and Arbitration, 2009, p. 179.

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autonomously. Due to the pyramidal organisational structure of associations and federations and the one-place-principle in international sport,24 however, uniform rules are applicable. The national and regional associations and federations are thereby forced to adopt the rules of the international federations. Thus, within each individual type of sport, the same rules are of international application.

b) General and Sport-specific Legal Principles Among the general and sport-specific legal principles developed by the CAS, which are one source of the lex sportiva and whose application is independent of their enshrinement in the rules and regulations of the sports federations, are the following:25 Indisputability of the factual decision of a referee:26

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Only in exceptional cases can referee decisions be disputed, e.g. if it is a case of an arbitrary decision, an erroneous decision due to inadequate or defective technical equipment, or where the referee’s competence to make the decision is questioned.27 The autonomy of associations and federations28 and the precedence of international sports federations.29

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___________ 24

See Vieweg, The Appeal of Sports Law, 2nd edition 2010, p. 4 et seq., available at http://www.irut.de/Forschung/Veroeffentlichungen/OnlineVersionFaszinationSportrecht/Fas zinationSportrechtEnglisch.pdf; id., Normsetzung und -anwendung deutscher und internationaler Verbände, 1990, p. 61 et seqq.; Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, 2003, p. 42 et seq. 25 Nafziger, ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3 (5 et seq.); Kane (fn. 1), p. 455; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 42); Blackshaw (fn. 23), p. 184. 26 SNOC & STF v. ITU, CAS OG 12/10, para 7.1 et seqq.; BOC et al. v. WTF et al., CAS 2012/A/2731, para 104; FSA & Saarinen v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2090, para 7.17; de Lima & BOC v. IAAF, CAS 2004/A/727, para 9 et seq.; Y. v. FIG, CAS 2004/A/704; S. v. IAAF, CAS OG 2000/013, Digest II, 680; M. v. AIBA, CAS OG 1996/006, Digest I, 413; for a general overview, see Vieweg, Tatsachenentscheidungen im Sport – Konzeption und Korrektur, in: Krähe/Vieweg (eds.), Schiedsrichter und Wettkampfrichter im Sport, 2008, p. 53 et seqq.; id., Fairness und Sportregeln – Zur Problematik sog. Tatsachenentscheidungen im Sport, in: Crezelius/Hirte/Vieweg (eds.), Festschrift für Volker Röhricht, 2005, p. 1255 et seqq.; Hilpert, Die Fehlentscheidungen der Fußballschiedsrichter, 2010, passim. 27 See SNOC & STF v. ITU, CAS OG 12/10, para 7.1; BOC et al. v. WTF et al., CAS 2012/A/2731, para 108; FSA & Saarinen v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2090, para 7.17; de Lima & BOC v. IAAF, CAS 2004/A/727, para 9 et seq.; KOC v. ISU, CAS OG 2002/007, Digest III, 611; N. v. IRF, CAS OG 2000/012, Digest II, 674; M. v. AIBA, CAS OG 1996/006, Digest I, 413 (415). 28 Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, para 114; IAAF v. ARAF & Yegorova et al., CAS 2008/A/1718–1724, para 61; Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS

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The principle of fair play (fairness principle):30 The CAS has, for example, ruled that, in order to comply with the rules of fair play, international federations are required to provide a procedure in their rules for an appeal jury – or some equivalent – to hear promptly claims by affected athletes or by other affected parties related to the fact that in a competition the relevant officials have not complied with international federations’ rules and procedures.31

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The principle of legality (hierarchy of norms): According to this principle federation rules must be in conformity with the law and all higher-ranking federation norms, such as the federation bylaws.32

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The principle that federation regulations may not have retrospective effect.33

___________ 2008/A/1583&1584, para 41; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, para 49; AOC, CAS OG 2000/C/267, Digest II, 725 (742); FIN v. FINA, CAS 1996/157, Digest I, 351. For a general overview, see Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 143 et seqq. 29 IFA v. FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2009/A/2071, para 58 et seq.; M. v. IAAF, CAS OG 2000/015, Digest II, 691 (692 et seq.); B v. IJF, CAS 1998/214, Digest II, 308 (316); UCI v. DCU & DIF, CAS 1998/192, Digest II, 205; UCI & CONI, CAS 1994/128, Digest I, 495 (505). See also Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 102. 30 UCI/WADA v. Contador & RFEC, CAS 2011/A/2384&2386, para 356 et seq.; MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., CAS 2009/A/1757, para 31; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, para 16; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (76); COC & Scott v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, para 14; COC v. IIHF, CAS OG 1998/004–5, Digest I, 435 (442); W. v. ACF, CAS 1996/153, Digest I, 335 (341, 348). No participant in the realm of sports should be dealt with in an arbitrary and manifestly unfair manner, Peternell v. SASCOC & SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, para 24. The Karlsruher Erklärung zum Fair Play (Karlsruhe Declaration on Fair Play) of the Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für Sportrecht e.V. – Verein für deutsches und internationales Sportrecht of the 3 March 1998 is instructive in this respect; cf. Fairness-Gebot, Sportregeln und Rechtsnormen, Württembergischer Fußballverband e.V. (ed.), 2004; Vieweg/Staschik, SpuRt 2013, 227 et seqq.; Nafziger, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 3 et seqq.; id., The Principle of Fairness in the Lex Sportiva of CAS Awards and Beyond, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 251 et seqq. 31 SNOC & Abrahamina v. FILA, CAS OG 08/007, para 11 et seqq. In this decision, the CAS expressly stated that the principle of fairness does not only apply on the field of play, but must also be observed off of it. Furthernore, it is not only the athletes who are obliged to observe this principle, but also all other participants in the realm of sports: for instance, sports federations must treat their athlete members fairly. 32 Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 102; Grasshopper v. Lima, CAS 2008/A/ 1705, para 25; COC & Kibunde v. AIBA, OG 00/004, para 11. 33 Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 64; Boxing Australia v. AIBA, CAS 2008/A/1455, para 16; FC Metz v. FC Ferencvarosi, CAS 2006/A/1181, para 8 et seqq.

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Principles relating to the interpretation of the rules and regulations of sports federations:34 The principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat), for example, holds that an interpretation which creates an effective scope of application should be favoured.35 In cases where doubts arise as to the interpretation of the provision, the justifiable understanding of the party who did not draft the by-laws or the regulations should be accepted as the correct interpretation (principle of contra proferentem).36

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The institution of “associational practice” as an expression of applicable customary law within an sports association or federation.37

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The principle of “positive interest” in the law of damages:38 It states that the harmed party should be restored to the position in which he or she would have been had the contract been properly fulfilled.

___________ 34

The rules and regulations must be interpreted objectively, and this interpretation should be carried out on the basis of the literal meaning of the norm. If this is not clear, one should proceed from the internal logic of the provision, its systematic relationship to other provisions and its meaning and objective, which can be be gleaned from the history of the legislation, IFA v. FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, para 20; SV Wilhelmshaven v. Club A. Excursionistas & Club A. River Plate, CAS 2009/A/1810&1811, para 45; TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v. ETTU, CAS 2007/A/1363, para 12; Wigan Athletic FC v. Heart of Midlothian et al., CAS 2007/A/1298–1300, para 50. For instance, the principles of in claris non fit interpretatio or ubi lex voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit are also principles of statutory interpretation, cf. ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, CAS 2006/A/1152, para 15. However, the CAS sometimes also employs other principles of statutory interpretation, cf. Ward v. IOC et al., CAS OG 12/02, para 6.3; RCD Mallorca SAD & A. v. FIFA & UMM Salal SC, CAS 2009/A/1909, para 67. See also CD Nacional v. FK Sutjeska, CAS 2011/A/2563, para 53: “the rules and the statutes of an association have to be interpreted either in accordance with the subjective intentions of the those who make the rules (the socalled ‘Willensprinzip’, i.e. principle of intention), or with the objective meaning that the addressees of the rule would, in good faith, give to that rule (the so-called ‘Vertrauensprinzip’, i.e. principle of confidence or of good faith).” 35 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, CAS 2006/A/1152. 36 NADA v. Y., CAS 2012/A/2997, para 32; Hansen v. FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 15.2; Devyatovskiy v. IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752, para 4.28; AOC & AWU v. FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 15 et seqq.; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/ 1396&1402, para 15; see also Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, para 116 et seqq.; Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 107; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/ 776, para 16. 37 FC Schalke 04 et al. v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1622–1624, para 33. 38 FC Sion v. FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, CAS 2009/A/1880&1881, para 80; Matuzalem et al. v. Shaktar Donetzk et al., CAS 2008/A/1519&1520, para 86; E. v. Diyarbakirspor Kulübü, CAS 2008/A/1447, para 32.

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The principle of good faith, of estoppel and of venire contra factum proprium:39 An instance of estoppel arises when, for example, a statement or admission is made that induces another person to believe something and this results in that person’s reasonable and detrimental reliance on the belief.

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The principle of “aggrievement requirement” which is an essential element in determining the legal interest and the standing of a party to appeal the decision before the CAS:40 Only an aggrieved party who has something at stake, and thus has a concrete interest in challenging a decision of a sports body, may appeal the decision of a sports body before the CAS. The principle of legal effect (res judicata):41

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The binding effect of a ruling has implications only for the parties involved in the proceedings, but not for any uninvolved third parties. Principles regarding the burden of presentation and the burden of proof:42

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Each party must present and prove the facts of the case that are favourable for them in accordance with the principle of party presentation as opposed to the principle of judicial investigation.43 ___________ 39

Peternell v. SASCOC & SAEF, CAS OG 12/01, para 41; Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, para 108; BEF v. FEI, CAS 2010/A/2058, para 20; Club Tofta Itróttarfelag B68 v. R., CAS 2009/A/1956, para 16; Simms v. FINA, CAS OG 2008/002, para 12; Boxing Australia v. AIBA, CAS 2008/A/1455, para 16; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (76). In the case of Al Nasr Sports Club v. F. M., CAS 2010/A/2049, para 11, too, the CAS maintained that, a justified expectation can arise on the part of a player not to be subject to any claims for damages if an association or a federation does not make use of this right over an extended period of time. 40 Sterba v. WADA, CAS OG 12/05, para 7.7; FC Sion v. FIFA, CAS 2009/A/1880, para 29. 41 Mutu v. Chelsea FC, CAS 2008/A/1644, para 23; AFHF v. ANOC & FIH, CAS OG 2008/005, para 23; Maccabi Haifa FC v. Real Racing Club Santander, CAS 2006/A/1029, para 12 et seqq. It is not only the judgments of the CAS that have legal effect, but also any decisions of federation courts, BEF v. FEI, CAS 2010/A/2058, para 15 et seqq. 42 Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, para 91 et seqq.; SV Wilhelmshaven v. Club A. Excursionistas et al., CAS 2009/A/1810&1811, para 18; RCD Mallorca SAD & A. v. FIFA & UMM Salal SC, CAS 2009/A/1909, para 21 et seqq. The CAS also determines which standard of proof is required if this question is not expressly regulated, Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.32; Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, para 153 et seqq.; Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 92; O. v. UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 20; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, para 25. For example, according to established CAS jurisprudence, the standard of proof to be applied in disciplinary cases is that of “comfortable satisfaction”, Al-Birair v. CAF, CAS 2012/A/2699, para 86 et seqq.

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The requirements of interim legal protection: (1) The measure must be useful to protect the applicant from irreparable harm (“irreparable harm” test), (2) the action must not be deprived of any chance of success on the merits (“likelihood of success test”) and (3) the interests of the applicant outweigh the interests of the respondent (“balance of interest” test).44

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In particular, those principles intended to ensure that athletes’ rights are protected (limitation of federation autonomy):45 

The necessity of a clear and unambiguous legal basis for penalties imposed by the federation (nulla poena sine lege; principle of legal certainty):46 For instance, the doping substance found in the athlete’s body must appear on a list of forbidden substances.



In relation to sanctions imposed by federations, the prohibition of any legal measures that have retrospective effect:47

___________ 43

Club Salernitana Calcio 1919 S.p.A. v. Club Atlético River Plate et al., CAS 2009/A/ 1919, para 31. 44 These requirements are now expressly regulated in Art. R37 (5) CAS-Code. Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/1918-O, para 6; Iraqi FA v. FIFA & Qatar FA, CAS 2008/A/1621-O, para 8; Jaramillo & FSV Mainz 05 v. CD Once Caldas & FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1453-O, para 12; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, para 69. 45 Rinaldi v. FINA, CAS 2007/A/1377, para 49. See also Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 141 et seqq.; Erbsen (fn. 12), p. 441 (p. 451). 46 See Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 103; PJU v. IJF, CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.5; Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 30; TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v. ETTU, CAS 2007/A/1363, para 16; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, para 126; USOC v. IOC & IAAF, CAS 2004/A/725, para 20; A. et al. v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/725 para 93; P. v. IOC, CAS OG 2002/001, Digest III, 573 (578); T. v. IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, Digest II, 658 (663); B. v. IJF, CAS 1999/A/230, Digest II, 369; R. v. IOC, CAS OG 1998/002, Digest I, 419 (424); H. v. FINA, CAS 1998/218, Digest II, 325 (326 et seq.). Any imprecise terms in federation regulations are construed against the party that imposed its inclusion (contra preferentem interpretation), Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 107; G. v. FEI, CAS 1991/53, Digest I, 79 (87 et seq.). For an overview of the situation in Germany, see Reichert, Vereins- und Verbandsrecht, 12. edition 2010, mn. 2887 et seq. The principle of legal certainty also applies outside of the realm of federation penalties and holds that federation regulations must be drafted in a clear and unambiguous manner, Telecom Egypt Club v. EFA, CAS 2009/A/1910, para 33. 47 Valverde v. CONI, CAS 2009/A/1879, para 14; A. et al. v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/725, para 73; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (75 et seq.). However, there are exceptions to this principle, Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, para 41.

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Objective criteria for federation sanctions must be set out prior to the commission of an offence. In cases where there is a temporal collision of rules, the principle of tempus regit actum will apply – that is, the rule which was in effect at the time of the relevant act will apply.48 However, in cases where rules are subsequently abated, the principle of favourability (lex mitior) will apply.49 

Minimum procedural standards50 (“fair trial”, procedural fairness51), in particular the right to a fair hearing:52

___________ 48 UCI v. Kolobnev & RCF, CAS 2011/A/2645, para 62; Chepalova v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 11; WADA & FIFA v. CFA et al., CAS 2009/A/1817&1844, para 133; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/2019, para 15; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/ 1918, para 18; WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 16; Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 10; Justin Gatlin v. USADA, CAS 2008/A/1461&1462, para 36. This applies not only to the penalty imposed by the federation, but also to the applicable procedure under the law of the association or federation, WADA v. Thys et al., CAS 2011/A/2435, para 93; Rayo Vallecano de Madrid SAD v. FIFA, CAS 2006/A/1008, para 10. 49 UCI v. Kolobnev & RCF, CAS 2011/A/2645, para 62; Chepalova v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 11; WADA & FIFA v. CFA et al., CAS 2009/A/1817&1844, para 133; Devyatovskiy et al. v. IOC. CAS 2009/A/1752, para 4.27; FK Pobeda et al. v. UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 68 et seq; Iourieva et al. v. IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 8.10; Valverde v. CONI, CAS 2009/A/1879, para 15; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/2019, para 16; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/1918, para 19; WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 16; S. v. UCI & FCI, CAS 2002/A/378, Digest III, 311 (314); V. v. FCS, CAS 2001/A/318, Digest III, 185 (191); A.C. v. FINA, CAS 1996/149, Digest I, 251; UCI & CONI, CAS 1994/128, Digest I, 495 (509). 50 The incorrect designation of a sports federation’s decision cannot lead to the restriction of an athlete’s legal protection, Galatasaray v. FIFA et al., CAS 2004/A/659, para 24. Furthermore, the CAS has, for instance, established rules of evidence in order to determine whether doping violations have taken place, N. et al. FINA, CAS 1998/208, Digest II, 234 (247). In particular, the test procedure for identifying a doping violation must be conducted in such a way that it is is in line with all technological developments and, in addition, it must be ensured that the result is established with the greatest degree of certainty possible, see E. & A. v. IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, key statement 2; B. v. ITU, CAS 1998/222, Digest II, 330 (338). The test must be scientifically reliable, Veerpalu v. ISF, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 94 et seq., 202. The opportunity for the athlete and his representative to attend the B sample “opening and analysis” is a basic right in doping-control proceedings, since it reflects the need for an athlete to be heard before an adverse analytical finding is finally reported, and provides the athlete with the possibility of verifying that the procedures to confirm the initial adverse analytical finding are properly conducted, Chepalova v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 108 et seq.; Wen Tong v. IJF, CAS 2010/A/2161, para 9.7. Any decisions relating to selection for competitions must be transparent and reached in accordance with objective criteria, C. v. JASF, CAS 2000/A/278, Digest II, 534; B. & C. v. AYF, CAS 2000/A/260, Digest II, 527. In general, however, they can only be challenged if selection criteria were infringed, or if the decision was reached in a malicious or an arbitrary manner, Peternell v. SASCOC et al., CAS OG 12/01, para 41; Mewing v. Swimming Australia Limited, CAS 2008/A/1540, para 22. In contrast to this, there is no general legal principle in accordance with which evidence, the procure-

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Regard must be had to the fact that the sanctions imposed by federations are civil and not criminal sanctions. For this reason, the principles of criminal procedure cannot be applied without giving the matter any further consideration.53 Thus, according to the CAS, rules of criminal procedure should be of application only where they are expressions of a fundamental system of values. Even in such cases, exceptions may have to be made in relation to these principles under certain circumstances, due to characteristics specific to the area of sport.54

___________ ment of which is found to have been an infringement of personal rights, has to be excluded imperatively from consideration, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 79 et seqq.; Adamu v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, para 75 et seqq.; Valverde v. CONI, CAS 2009/ A/1879, para 68 et seqq.; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, para 60; IAAF v. USATF & Y., CAS 2004/A/628, para 17. 51 Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 71; ARcycling AG v. UCI, CAS 2004/ A/777, para 56; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (75); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (103). 52 CGF v. EGA, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 29 et seq.; FINA v. CBDA & G., CAS 2007/A/1373, para 26; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, para 126; ARcycling AG v. UCI, CAS 2004/A/777, para 56; A. et al. v. NOC CV, CAS OG 1996/005, Digest I, 397 (399 et seqq.); USA Shooting & Q. v. UIT, CAS 1994/129, Digest I, 187 (202 et seq.). Any procedural defects by a federation court can, for all intents and purposes, be cured by means of a proceeding before CAS in which it hears cases anew (de novo), Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, para 87; Györi ETO v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702, para 122; Bursaspor Kulübü Dernegi v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821, para 85; Asif v. ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 40; Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, para 129; Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 52 et seqq.; Adamu v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, para 46 et seqq.; Namibia FA v. CAF, CAS 2011/A/2654, para 26; D. v. CIO, CAS 2009/A/2018, para 63; FK Siad Most v. Clube Esportivo Bento Gonçalves, CAS 2009/A/1781, para 26; FC Sion v. FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, CAS 2009/A/1880&1881, para 18; FK Pobeda et al. v. UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 88; Anderson et al v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 77 et seqq.; D’Arcy v. AOC, CAS 2008/A/1574, para 32; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, para 43; Aston Villa FC v. B.93 Copenhagen, CAS 2006/A/1177, para 16; D. v. International Dance Sport Federation, CAS 2006/A/1175, para 18; ARcycling AG v. UCI, CAS 2004/A/777, para 56; F. v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/714, para 11; A. et al. v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/725, para 78; D.B. v. FINA, CAS 1998/211, Digest II, 255 (264). This would seem appropriate only if it could be determined that the infringement of the principle of due process had not had any influence on the decision itself, Vieweg/Staschik, SpuRt 2013, 227 (231, 233). To this extent, the following cases, in which the CAS rejected the possibility of curing a procedural error during arbitration, are to be welcomed: CGF v. EGA, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 38 et seqq. and A. et al. v. NOC CV, CAS OG 1996/005, Digest I, 397 (401). 53 I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 99 et seqq.; NADO & KNSB v. W., CAS 2010/ A/2311&2312, para 7.6; Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, para 41. See also Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 67 et seqq. 54 According to the CAS, this applies, for instance, to the principle of nulla poena sine lege, Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, para 42.

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The principle of proportionality55 (particularly the necessity of sanction to be proportionate to the offence): The sanction imposed on an athlete must not be disproportionate to the offence and must always reflect the extent of the athlete’s guilt.56 In doping proceedings, strict liability is applied where an offence has been committed, insofar as this is envisaged by the regulations of the federation, and insofar as it remains possible for the athlete to prove that he is not at fault.57 When assessing the actual penalty, however, regard must be had to the principle of proportionality; so, here, the question of fault plays a part.58 To this end, a minimum penalty is admissible as long as it

___________ 55

Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, para 109; Györi ETO v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702, para 147; WADA v. Jobson et al., CAS 2010/A/2307, para 173 et seqq.; I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 132 et seqq.; IFBB v. IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, para 46; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, para 39 et seqq.; Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, para 45; M. v. ATP Tour Inc., CAS 2007/A/1427, para 20 et seqq.; D. v. International Dance Sport Federation, CAS 2006/A/1175, para 48; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, para 124, 138 et seq.; Knauss v. FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, para 28; S. v. FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 44; H. v. ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, para 50. 56 Armstrong v. WCF, CAS 2012/A/2756, para 8.32; Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.33. In considering such cases, however, the CAS generally proceeds from the assumption that the sports federations should be awarded a margin of discretion in relation to the imposition of sanctions. For this reason a sanction cannot be appealed simply because another sanction appears more appropriate. Rather, the sanction imposed must be clearly and grossly disproportionate, Beşiktaş JK v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2824, para 127; Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, para 113; Armstrong v. WCF, CAS 2012/A/2756, para 8.31; Butt v. ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, para 55 et seqq.; UCI v. Kolobnev & RCF, CAS 2011/A/2645, para 94; I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 132 et seqq.; WADA v. Jobson et al., CAS 2010/A/2307, para 181; IWBF v. UKAD & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.8 et seqq.; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, para 39 et seqq.; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/1918, para 59; WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 48; WADA & FIFA v. CFA et al., CAS 2009/A/1817&1844, para 174. However in one particular decision, which concerned a sanction imposed by a federation (although not a sanction for doping), the CAS ruled that it could change federation sanctions if they were simply “erroneous”, suggesting that they would not have to reach the threshold of clear and gross disproportionateness, Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, para 87. See also Al Eid v. FEI, CAS 2012/A/2807, para 10.1 et seqq.; Sharbatly v. FEI, CAS 2012/A/2808, para 10.2 et seqq.; IAAF v. ARAF et al., CAS 2008/A/1718–1724, para 166. 57 P. v. IHHF, CAS 2005/A/990, para 3; USA Shooting & Q. v. UIT, CAS 1994/129, Digest I, 187 (194). For more on the problematic application of the principle of strict liability, as well as on the principle of proportionality in Germany, cf. Petri, Die Dopingsanktion, 2004, p. 208 et seqq. The CAS regards the principle of strict liability as being compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, Tysse v. NAF & IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2353, para 8.28; WADA v. Jobson et al., CAS 2010/A/2307, para 175; Hansen v. FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 13, 15.6. 58 CAS grants federation organs a broad margin of discretion in their imposition of concrete penalties. This margin is generally found to have been overstepped if the sanction is clearly and grossly disproportionate or irrational, see fn. 56. In this connection, CAS al-

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is reasonable. According to the jurisprudence of the CAS, many federation rules now contain the possibility of reducing the minimum penalty if the athlete’s level of culpability is low.59 

The principle of fault: In principle, in cases where a person is to be held responsible for his or her own actions, it is necessary to prove that he or she acted culpably before imposing a disciplinary sanction.60



The prohibition of discrimination in application of rules (principle of equal treatment;61 but no equality in the event of a legal wrong62).



The standard of proof in doping proceedings: An anti-doping rule violation must be established to the “sufficient satisfaction” of the Panel.63 This standard of proof applies to all disciplinary proceedings.64 This standard is more than the mere “balance of probabil-

___________ lows sports federations to set out in their regulations the criteria that must be observed when imposing a doping penalty, cf. WADA v. Jobson et al., CAS 2010/A/2307, para 131; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, para 51; Knauss v. FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, para 32. If a minimum, mandatory penalty stipulated in the federation by-laws is disproportionate, the question arises as to whether the CAS is permitted to disregard it. The jurisprudence of the CAS is, in this regard, not consistent. In some of its decisions it regards itself as being bound to impose a minimum penalty, see R. v. FISA, CAS 2001/A/330, Digest III, 197 (204 et seq.); NWBA v. IPC, CAS 1995/122, Digest I, 173 (184); see also WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 61. In other decisions, however, the CAS emphasises that it has the authority to revoke mandatory minimum penalties if they are (obviously) disproportionate and if they infringe fundamental rights, I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 132 et seqq.; Puerta v. ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025; S. v. FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 48; Knauss v. FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, para 32; H. v. ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, para 52; B. v. FINA, CAS 2001/A/337, Digest III, 206 (224); B. v. IJF, CAS 1998/214, Digest II, 308 (322); N. v. FEI, CAS 1992/73, Digest I, 153 (157). 59 Cf. S. v. FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 47 et seq. 60 Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, para 133; Armstrong v. WCF, CAS 2012/A/2756, para 8.12; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, para 136. 61 WADA v. Jobson et al., CAS 2010/A/2307, para 130; Rinaldi v. FINA, CAS 2007/A/1377, para 49; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, para 137; N. et al. v. IHHF, CAS 2001/A/357, para 24; COC & Kibunde v. AIBA, OG 00/004, para 12; AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (66). 62 See, for example, Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, para 145; Midtjylland v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.5.3. 63 Pechstein & DESG v. ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912&1913, para 54; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, para 53. 64 Al-Birair v. CAF, CAS 2012/A/2699, para 86 et seqq.; Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, para 135 et seqq.; Diakite v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2433, para 5; Sheykhov v. FILA, CAS 2008/A/1594, para 46 et seqq. This standard of proof applies, for instance, insofar as the matter concerns the proof of arrangements to manipulate games, O. v. UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 20; FK Pobeda et al. v. UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 85. The

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ities”, which would suffice outside of disciplinary proceedings, but less than the criminal (and, to a large extent, civil) standard of proof of “beyond reasonable doubt”.65 The application of the principle of ne bis in idem has been discussed several times by the CAS.66 The CAS has also expressly rejected certain legal principles as being part of the lex sportiva. It has, for example, stated that there is no general rule that the CAS has jurisdiction over all disputes that take place in the field of sport. Thus, if an athlete has no possibility to appeal a decision within his federation, it will not automatically be the case that he will have a right of recourse to the CAS.67 Furthermore, there is no general principle in the lex sportiva that, in order to prevent cheating in sports, would require the mandatory annulment of team results in cases where a member of the team is found to have doped while competing.68

III. Lex Mercatoria, Lex Informatica and Lex Technica Other phenomena linked to the lex sportiva that are also manifestations of transnational law are the lex mercatoria, the lex informatica and the lex technica. In order to better understand the way in which the lex sportiva operates and its effects, and in order to avoid misunderstandings in the use of certain terminology, it is instructive to consider the similarities and differences between these phenomena.

1. Lex Mercatoria The lex mercatoria69 can be understood as encompassing rules in international commerce which originate outside of the national legal orders, in particu___________ sports federations can, however, set out a divergent applicable standard of proof in their by-laws, Köllerer v. ATP et al., CAS 2011/A/2490, para 86. 65 Pistorius v. IAAF, CAS 2008/A/1480, para 39. This lower standard of proof also applies in cases where athletes are required to prove that the doping violation that occurred was not their fault, NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, para 25. 66 WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, para 118; see also Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, para 106; USOC v. IOC, CAS 2011/O/ 2422, para 60. 67 Lynch v. HIS, CAS OG 12/03, para 2.3.4 et seq. 68 Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 126 et seqq. 69 For general information about the lex mercatoria, see Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 65 et seqq.; Zumbansen, RabelsZ 67 (2003), 637; Schroeder, Die lex mercatoria – Rechtsordnungsqualität und demokratische Legitimation, in: Witt et al. (eds.), Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler e.V. 2002, p. 257 et seqq.; Berger, Die Neue Lex Mercatoria

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lar, international commercial customs, customary law, standard contracts (e.g. INCOTERMS) as well as private codifications such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.70 Similarly to the lex sportiva, in scholarly discussions of the lex mercatoria, it is debatable whether it is an autonomous anational legal order (this is generally strongly opposed) and which consequences there might be if it were.71 In recent years it has, for the most part, been clarified that the lex mercatoria may be chosen by the parties as applicable law before a court of arbitration as a private regulation of affairs.72 The basic structures of the lex mercatoria and the lex sportiva are comparable and, thus, discussing the lex mercatoria can give rise to new knowledge and insights about the lex sportiva.73 A substantial difference presents itself, however, in the area of the relationships between the parties involved; as regards the lex sportiva, this relationship is normally asymmetrical, a hierarchial relationship between athlete and federation, whereas the parties involved in the area of the lex mercatoria are generally on a par.74 This distinction can be demonstrated by, for instance, the fact that the lex mercatoria for the most part relies on the general legal principles of private law, whereas, contrary to this, in the development of the lex sportiva, CAS has primarily adapted public law principles.75 However, sporting organisations and athletes can be considered to be on the same level when it comes to top-level athletes. Thus, in one case, CAS expressly declared the lex mercatoria to be of application between football associations and players.76

2. Lex Informatica (Lex Digitalis) It is debatable whether national law is applicable to the internet or whether the internet is regulated by private legal norms (lex informatica).77 In recent ___________ – Ist Transnationales Wirtschaftsrecht kodifizierbar?, in: Bumke/Röthel (eds.), Privates Recht, 2012, p. 119 et seqq. 70 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (756); Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 65 et seqq. 71 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (fn. 21), p. 157 et seqq.; Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 52 et seq. 72 See Kolev, ISLJ 2008/1–2, 57 (61); id., Lex Sportiva And Lex Mercatoria, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 223 (p. 227 et seqq.); Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (fn. 21), p. 157. 73 Elsewise, Foster (fn. 15), p. 35, (p. 50); Chen-Huan Lin, A Survey of the Concept of “Lex Sportiva” from Analytical Legal Philosophy, in: 10th KASEL International Conference on Sport Law in 2012 – A New Trend of Sport Law, 2012, p. 71. 74 Kolev, ISLJ 2008/1–2, 57 (58); Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (758). 75 Casini (fn. 21), p. 149 (p. 158). 76 Kuwait Sporting Club v. Z. & FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1593, para 18. 77 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (fn. 21), p. 175 et seqq.; Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 110 et seqq.

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years, however, the view that national law is also of application to the internet has achieved unanimous support. Private transnational law has developed in a very tentative manner in this area. The only matter of note is the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy (UDRP) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is responsible for the international allocation of domain names.78 UDRP is a method of alternative dispute resolution and deals with disputes regarding domain names (so-called cyber-squatting). It must be contractually accepted by all users of domain names. It is, however, concerned solely with selective regulation in the area of trademark protection, and so, one cannot speak of a complete, autonomous legal order in relation to the internet. Due to this selective regulation, it is next to impossible to put any academic findings in the realm of the lex informatica to good use in the area of the lex sportiva.

3. Lex Technica The lex technical comprises European technical standards, which are initially formulated by private standardisation committees on a European level, but are then adopted by Union legislators in that they are linked to the rebuttable presumption that the product concerned conforms to directives and is therefore capable of being marketed freely.79 Ultimately, it deals with a case of legal outsourcing, because the technical standards developed by private regulatory organisations are linked to statutory provisions. While compliance with these technical standards is voluntary, competitors are virtually compelled to abide by them.80 The lex technica and the lex sportiva are comparable, to the extent that European technical norms are binding on producers, just as the rules of international sports law are binding on athletes. In the area of the lex technica however, this force is exerted explicitly by the legislator, and, for this reason, expertise from this area cannot be put into use in the area of the lex sportiva.

___________ 78

Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (fn. 21), p. 193 et seq.; Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 115 et seqq. Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (758 et seq.); Vieweg, Produkthaftungsrecht, in: Schulte/Schröder (eds.), Handbuch des Technikrechts, 2nd edition 2011, p. 337 (p. 370 et seq.); for a general discussion of this instrument of co-operative regulation of technological matters, Röthel, Europarechtliche Vorgaben für das Technikrecht, in: Schulte/Schröder (eds.), Handbuch des Technikrechts, 2nd edition 2011, p. 201 (p. 217 et seqq.). 80 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (fn. 21), p. 170. 79

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IV. Lex Sportiva as Autonomous Law? The term lex sportiva indicates, on the one hand, the sheer scope and the significance that rules enacted by the sports federations themselves have in practice. On the other hand, however, a question arises as to whether these rules can be denoted as independent (autonomous), in the sense that they are of application without having been granted by the state and independent of state influence – i.e. whether they are in force independently of any other regulations or bodies, or whether they require approval by the individual state’s legal systems (state’s monopoly to approve laws). The consequence of an autonomous, self-regulating legal system would be that the lex sportiva would be enforceable, even in the event that provisions of state law ran contrary to it. In addition, the athletes would be bound directly by the lex sportiva and no further act of implementation or intervention would be necessary.

1. Original Legislative Autonomy The first supporter of a lex sportiva that would have priority over state law was Massimo Severo Giannini who, as early as 1949, put forward the opinion that sport was the only area where the “birth” of an independent, anational legal order was possible.81 Sport, in his view, possessed all three elements needed in order to constitute a legal order: an organisational structure, a personnel structure and a regulation structure.82 Beyond the borders of Italy, this view (institutional model) found further acceptance in the USA, Belgium, France, Switzerland and, to some degree, in Germany.83 The requirement of autonomy is based on the fact that international cases should be assessed in accordance with a uniform body of law and not pursuant to the individual legal systems with their own distinct criteria. However, problems arise in the search for an enduring dogmatic basis for the lex sportiva being placed on the same level as state law, or at least outside of the national hierarchy:

___________ 81

Giannini, Prime osservazioni guiridici sportivi, Riv. Dir. Sport. 1949, 10 (17), cited after Will, Rechtsgrundlagen der Bindung nationaler Verbände an internationale Sportverbandsregeln, in: Reuter (ed.), Einbindung des nationalen Sportrechts in internationale Bezüge, 1987, p. 29 (p. 38 fn. 17). 82 Giannini (fn. 81), 10 (13, 21), cited after Will (fn. 81), p. 29 (p. 39 fn. 17a). 83 For a thorough overview of the prevailing opinions in other states, cf. Will (fn. 81), p. 29 (p. 37 et seqq.); Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 50; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 40); Wax (fn. 4), p. 175.

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The authority of international sports federations to enact their own laws autonomously is partly based on the proposition that they are to be regarded as subjects of international law that can thus avoid coming under the jurisdiction of state courts. 84 Their classification as subjects of international law is, however, contentious. While international sports organisations such as the IOC are not international organisations within the meaning of international law,85 they can, under certain circumstances, obtain (derivative) international legal personality as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or as transnational companies.86 International sports federations do classify themselves as NGOs or as transnational companies and, to some extent, they are regarded as such.87 Both NGOs and transnational companies have partial international legal personality when they enter into contracts with states which relate to matters of functional sovereignty. Before large events such as the Olympic Games or the Football World Cup, international sports organisations conclude contracts with states in order to negotiate privileges or immunities, for instance.88 However, it is not an automatic consequence of classification as a subject of international law that the sports organisation concerned achieves the right to enact legislation autonomously.89 This is due to the fact that states may not confer such powers upon sports organisations, because such autonomy would affect private citizens directly and in an adverse manner.90 The removal of the right of resort to state courts imposed by the state would be an inadmissible interference with due process.91 It should also be mentioned that, at present, no state is known to accept that sports organisations have the right to enact law on their own authority.92 In a second approach to its justification, the autonomy of the lex sportiva is derived from its classification as a type of international customary law. In Ger___________ 84 See Oschütz, Sportschiedgsgerichtsbarkeit – Die Schiedsverfahren des Tribunal Arbitral du Sport vor dem Hintergrund des schweizerischen und deutschen Schiedsverfahrensrechts, 2005, p. 352 et seqq. 85 See Wax (fn. 4), p. 153 et seqq. 86 See also Schleiter (fn. 21), p. 231 (p. 242 et seqq.). For an opposing view, see Nolte, Vereinbartes Recht am Beispiel der lex sportiva – Wechselwirkungen zwischen „lex sportiva“ und „lex extra sportiva“, in: Bumke/Röthel (eds.), Privates Recht, 2012, p. 107 (p. 109 et seq.). 87 Foster (fn. 15), p. 35 (p. 47); Panagiotopoulos, Lex Sportiva – Lex Olympica and International Sports Law, in: The 18th IASL Congress – Conference Proceedings, 2012, p. 2 (p. 6). Negative, e.g., Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 6); Pfister, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (eds.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht, 2nd edition 2007, VI 1 para 8. 88 Wax (fn. 4), p. 168 et seq. 89 Schleiter (fn. 21), p. 231 (p. 247). 90 See Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (762 et seq.). 91 See Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (762 et seq.). 92 Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 353.

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many, state recognition of such international customary law could arise from Art. 20 III, 25 of the German Basic Law.93 Frequently, however, the lex sportiva lacks the necessary prerequisite of enduring usage, as amendments are frequently made to the rules and regulations of the sports federations.94 On the other hand, this would be an acceptable basis of justification for the general principles of sports law. Even though the rules and regulations of federations are, at least to some extent, regarded as being customary international law, this does not mean that they would prevail in the event of conflicting state law; insofar as the state retains the right to legislate, it can also impose limits on customary law.95 Thus, due to the lack of a sound dogmatic justification, the international sports federations have no real independent autonomy to legislate, but rather a power to legislate that is derived from the relevant state.96 Only the states have the power to establish new areas of responsibility (“jurisdiction over jurisdiction”; Kompetenzkompetenz); in particular, there is a state monopoly to approve and enforce law. In the courts, too, the concept of a completely autonomous lex sportiva is refuted: in the cases of Bosman97, Meca-Medina and Majcen98 as well as that of MOTOE99, the ECJ made clear that it does not acknowledge a completely autonomous lex sportiva. Moreover, in the Matuzalem case, a judgment of the CAS was overturned for the first time due to reasons of substantive law by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.100 Equally, in Germany, Frankfurt/Main Higher Regional Court (OLG Frankfurt) established that “a lex sportiva which is independent of all state law does not exist”.101 It remains the case that sports federations have no independent power to legislate. The assumption that the lex sportiva is an autonomous anational legal order is misguided.102 It is rather the case that the rules and regulations put in place by the various federations require recognition by the state in order to at___________ 93

Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 331. Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 331. 95 Schleiter (fn. 3), p. 99 et seq. 96 Summerer, Internationales Sportrecht – eine dritte Rechtsordnung, in: Aderhold et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Hans Hanisch, 1994, p. 267 (p. 269 et seqq.); Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 353; Vieweg fn. (24), p. 143 et seqq. 97 EuGH Slg. 1995, I-4921, NJW 1996, 505. 98 EuGH Slg. 2006, I-6991, SpuRt 2006, 195. 99 EuGH Slg. 2008, I-4863, SpuRt 2008, 193. 100 Swiss Federal Court of Justice SpuRt 2012, 109 et seqq.; cf. specifically V.3. 101 OLG Frankfurt SpuRt 2001, 159 (161). 102 See also Pfister (fn. 87), VI 1 para 8; Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 287 et seq.); Wax (fn. 4), p. 175; Kolev, ISLJ 2008/1–2, 57 (62); Latty (fn. 11), p. 423 et seqq., 514, 768; Nolte (fn. 86), p. 107 (p. 116). 94

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tain legal status and force103 and they are subject to elaboration, review and amendment by the state.104

2. State Provision for an Autonomous Sports Law It is, however, the case that the rights of sports federations to regulate themselves as they fit and to enact their own rules and regulations is guaranteed in many states to a certain extent, even if the scope of these rights vary from state to state.105 Thus, the rules and regulations of the sports federations are arguably generally recognised as having legal validity, and sporting bodies are awarded the competence to enact their own rules and regulations (“regulatory power”; Regelungsbefugnis). In Germany, the freedom of each individual association to frame its rules and regulations howsoever it chooses is guaranteed by, for example, Art. 9 of the German Basic Law. Within European Law it is enumerated in Art. 12 I of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, problems continue to arise from the fact that the power to legislate is not guaranteed without limits, and that the scope of this autonomy can vary from state to state (see IV.4.).

3. The Applicability of the Lex Sportiva to Athletes Due to the fact that the lex sportiva is not an autonomous legal order that can be imposed directly upon athletes – such as, for example, state law – the question arises as to how and under which conditions athletes are bound by the federation rules and regulations. The basis of the lex sportiva’s validity can, ultimately, lie only in the voluntary acceptance of the rules and regulations by those who participate in sports.106 This acceptance is justified by means of legal agreements between the participants within the framework of private autonomy.107 Here, there are two possibilities:108

___________ 103

Summerer (fn. 96), p. 267 (p. 269 et seqq.). See Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 159 et seqq. 105 Pfister (fn. 87), VI 1 para 8. 106 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757). 107 Adolphsen, Eine lex sportiva für den internationalen Sport, p. 2, http://www.recht. uni-giessen.de/wps/fb01/dl/det/adolphsen/14109/eine-lex-sportiva-fuer-den-internationalen -sport/ (last accessed on 15.10.2012); see Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 40); critical Chen-Huan Lin (fn. 73), p. 71 (p. 76). 108 See Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (fn. 24), p. 13 et seq.; Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 132. 104

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a) Corporate Law Variation The athlete, as a member of his own sports club, is bound by its rules and regulations. The obligation to follow the uniform international federation rules and regulations is as a result of the anchoring of the provisions of the governing body in the rules and regulations of its subordinate federations and associations (a so-called “chain of rules and regulations”). This “chain” can be formulated in one of two ways: first, the subordinate federations and associations can be obliged to align their rules and regulations with that of the international federation (“obligation to adapt”; Anpassungspflicht). This alignment can, however, lead to delays.109 Therefore, the task is often carried out by so-called “dynamic referrals” (dynamische Verweisungen): the current version of the relevant rules and regulations of the international federation is automatically made to apply within those of the subordinate federations and associations. It is, however, debatable whether such dynamic referrals are permissible because they affect the freedom of association of the subordinate federations and associations.110

b) Contractual Variation The athlete concerned is allowed to participate in a competition only if he – contractually – acknowledges the validity of the rules and regulations of the federation by entering into an “athlete's agreement” or a licence (contract acknowledging rules and regulations; Regelanerkennungsvertrag).111 Even though the athlete is factually obliged to enter into such an agreement, this variant is nonetheless classified as contractual.

4. The Limits of Autonomy As the power of sports federations to enact rules and regulations must be derived from state law, the freedom of the federations to formulate their own lex sportiva is limited in Europe by, both European and state law.

___________ 109

Heermann, ZHR 174 (2010), 250 (251). Heermann, ZHR 174 (2010), 250 et seqq.; Orth/Pommerening, SpuRt 2010, 222 et seqq.; id., SpuRt 2011, 10 et seqq.; Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 72 et seqq.; for an alternative opinion, see Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 71 et seqq. 111 BGHZ 128, 93; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 19 et seqq.) 110

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a) European Law In several cases, the ECJ has reviewed the compatibility of the rules and regulations of the lex sportiva with EU law and has subsequently limited the freedom of sports federations to frame their rules and regulations in a manner which they see fit (Walrave & Koch112; Bosman113; Deliège114; Lehtonen115; Meca-Medina116; MOTOE117; Bernard118).119 EU Law – the fundamental freedoms and, in particular, antitrust law – has direct effect as long as the athletes are carrying out economic activities. The ECJ has rightly rejected the possibility of an exception for sport.120 Therefore, should a conflict arise, EU law takes precedence over the lex sportiva.121 When applying EU Law, however, the ECJ also has regard to the specific characteristics of sport,122 in that it classifies the rules and regulations of sports federations as conforming to EU law if the rules are necessary for the organisation and safeguarding of the peculiarities of the sport in question and comply with the principle of proportionality. EU law imposes particular conditions upon the lex sportiva, the most notable being the requirement that any decisions taken be transparent, that those involved have the opportunity to participate and the requirement that, the federation rules and regulations are objectively necessary and proportionate (justification) in order to safeguard the particular characteristics of sport.123 In the Lisbon Treaty, EU law makes express reference to sport for the first time in Art. ___________ 112

EuGH Slg. 1974, 1405. EuGH Slg. 1995, I-4921, NJW 1996, 505. 114 EuGH Slg. 2000, I-2549, SpuRt 2000, 148. 115 EuGH Slg. 2000, I-2681, SpuRt 2000, 151. 116 EuGH Slg. 2006, I-6991, SpuRt 2006, 195. 117 EuGH Slg. 2008, I-4863, SpuRt 2008, 193. 118 EuGH Slg. 2010, I-2177, NJW 2010, 1733. 119 See Parrish, 37 E.L. Rev. (2012), 716 et seqq.; Latty (fn. 11), p. 697 et seqq.; Weatherhill, ISLJ 2011/1–2, 38 (39 et seq.); id., Is There Such a Thing as EU Sports Law?, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 299 (p. 302 et seqq.); Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (fn. 24), p. 25 et seqq. 120 Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 149 et seqq.; Panagiotopoulos, ISLR/Pandektis Vol. 7:1–2, 2007, 1 (8). See also Siekmann, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 75 et seqq. 121 This is also acknowledged by the CAS, which, at least, reviews whether the actual application of the rules is compatible with EU law, cf. Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., CAS 2008/A/1644, para 18, 44; MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., CAS 2009/A/1757, para 29 et seqq. and Midtjylland v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4. 122 This was expressly stated in the case Bernard, EuGH Slg. 2010, I-2177, NJW 2010, 1733 (1735). 123 Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 152. 113

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165 TFEU and introduces the aim of developing the European dimension of sport, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.124

b) National Law National law also sets boundaries upon the freedom of the federations to frame their own rules and regulations in a manner in which they see fit, although the scope and intensity of review of provisions of the rules and regulations vary from state to state.125 In Germany, the Federal Court of Justice reviews the rules and regulations of sports federations being, as they are, economically or socially powerful associations, particularly on the basis of section 242 of the German Civil Code126 as a yardstick to measure the appropriateness of their content.127 Appropriateness is ascertained by reference to the fundamental rights of the German Basic Law in particular – for example, freedom of profession of the professional athlete and freedom of association – which are to be balanced fairly and justly so as to achieve a practical concordance. In addition to the scrutiny of the content of federation regulations (Inhaltskontrolle), the Federal Court of Justice also scrutinises whether the matters asserted to be fact by the federation are indeed so (Tatsachenkontrolle), and whether the federation has applied the relevant regulations correctly to the facts at hand (Subsumtionskontrolle).128 Moreover, antitrust law also sets boundaries upon the freedom of sports federations to frame their own rules and regulations.129 In Switzerland, on the other hand, the rules and regulations of sports federations are reviewed primarily on the basis of the general personal rights set out ___________ 124 For a detailed account of Art. 165 TFEU, see Parrish, 37 E.L. Rev. (2012), 716 (725 et seqq.). It remains to be seen what effects this will have on the jurisprudence of the ECJ, cf. Weatherhill, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 11 et seqq.; id., Fairness, Openness and the Specific Nature of Sport: Does the Lisbon Treaty Change EU Sports Law?, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, p. 311 et seqq. 125 See Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757). 126 BGHZ 105, 306 (316 et seqq.); 128, 93 et seqq.; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 30 et seqq.). 127 See Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 229 et seqq.; Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 153. In addition, the Federal Court of Justice reviews the rules and regulations of sports federations on the basis of sections 134 and 138 of the German Civil Code, see BGHZ 13, 5 (11); 21, 370 (373); 29, 352 (354); 36, 105 (109). 128 See Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 279 et seq.; id., JZ 1984, 167 et seqq. 129 Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 27 et seqq.); Hannamann, Kartellverbot und Verhaltenskoordinationen im Sport, 2001, p. 299 et seqq.; the same applies in the USA, where the rules and regulations of federations are reviewed on the basis of antitrust law, Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 285, 298).

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in Art. 28 et seqq. of the Swiss Civil Code (ZGB).130 The freedom of development of personality is framed in terms of the exercise of sport as a general personal right.131 However, in Switzerland, antitrust law also imposes limits upon the freedom of sports federations to frame their own rules and regulations.132 In Austria, the lex sportiva is reviewed in particular on the basis of protective provisions of labour law.133 According to Dimitrios Panagiotopolous the lex sportiva in Greece is restricted by state law in matters pertaining to labour law, of economic activity within sport, protection of the athletes' health, protection of the athletes' personal rights and public safety.134 State legal systems thus specify different limits for the lex sportiva, within which the lex sportiva must confine itself. This can vary from state to state, even though courts – at least German ones – restrain themselves from interfering in matters that are of central importance to sport.

V. Lex Sportiva and Arbitration In order to evaluate the importance of the lex sportiva, its influence on arbitration must be more closely examined because, in general, this is the mechanism which is used to deal with any conflicts arising in the area of sport. One particular milestone in the development of an international sports law was the creation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) by the IOC in 1984.135 Although, due to its connections with the IOC, there was an initial general hesitance to seek a remedy from the CAS in the years directly following its creation,136 it is now recognised by all in the sporting world as a type of “global sports court” 137.

___________ 130 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757). Cf., for example, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 96 et seqq.; WADA v. Jobson et al., CAS 2010/A/2307, para 175. 131 Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 208. 132 UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA / FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, para 328 et seqq. 133 Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 285). 134 Panagiotopoulos, ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 7:1–2, 2007, 1 (4); id., ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 5:3, 2004, 316 (323 et seq.). 135 Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998, 1998, XXIV. 136 Kane (fn. 1), p. 455 (p. 457 et seq.). 137 Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 133; FAZ of 20.5.10, p. 8.

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1. Sports Courts of Arbitration, in Particular the CAS In addition to the international sports court of arbitration CAS, there is an increasing number of national courts of arbitration for the area of national sports. In Germany, for example, the German Institution of Arbitration (DIS) was established at the beginning of 2008. Distinctions must be drawn between “real” courts of arbitration, which are independent of sports federations, and which are approved by state courts, and other courts of arbitration, which cannot supersede the jurisdiction of the state courts. The following remarks confine themselves to the CAS, as it is increasingly viewed as the international sports court of highest instance, and because it has played a major role in the development of a lex sportiva.138 The significant role played by the CAS in relation to the lex sportiva owes much to the fact that its arbitral awards contribute to the development of legal principles specific to sport,139 and to the harmonisation of sports law – for example, sports federations increasingly adjust their regulations in relation to doping in accordance with the jurisprudence of the CAS. The CAS is often mentioned in the rules and regulations of sports federations, in licences and in athlete agreements as the court of arbitration with jurisdiction in the event of conflicts in connection with the sporting event – the Olympic Games, for example140 – in order to exclude state courts (arbitration agreement).141 The athlete is factually obliged to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the CAS, as otherwise, he will not be permitted to compete in sporting events. In order to make recourse to the CAS as effective as possible, special ad hoc court divisions are formed during big sporting events in order to facilitate the reaching of decisions within 24 hours in order to ensure that no delays occur during the competition.142

2. Lex Sportiva as a Basis for the Decisions of the CAS? Above all, the lex sportiva attains its own individual significance in cases where it can, by choice of law, be selected as the sole basis for decisions of the ___________ 138

See Latty (fn. 11), p. 257 et seqq., 357; Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 498. See II.2.b). Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 498. 140 Art. 61 Olympic Charter (2013) and Point 8 of the IOC Entry Form; for more details on the latter, cf. Jakob-Milicia, SpuRt 2013, 236 et seqq. 141 For example Art. 66 et seqq. FIFA Statutes (2013); Art. 15 IAAF Constitution (2013). 142 Like during the Olympic Games pursuant to the CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games; for a more detailed account, cf. Martens/Keidel, SpuRt 2013, 253 et seqq; Netzle, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit an Sportveranstaltungen, in: Torggler (ed.), Rechtsprobleme von Sportveranstaltungen, 2012, p. 67 et seqq. 139

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CAS. In such cases, it is employed in solving the dispute without resorting subsidiary to state law. In principle, there is general agreement that the parties to international arbitration proceedings can choose to have the court of arbitration rule on the dispute on the basis of private legal provisions as opposed to state law.143 The admissibility of agreeing upon the lex sportiva as a basis for decision faces two main lines of criticism (see a) and b)). Regardless of this, the possibility of permitting the choice of the lex sportiva for disputes before courts of arbitration is to be welcomed (see c)).

a) Inequality between Federation and Athlete A material component of the lex sportiva is the rules and regulations of the federations, which means that there is a substantial risk of the protection of the athlete by the lex sportiva being neglected as sports federations can define the rules and regulations in a manner beneficial to themselves. In addition, it is enormously difficult for athletes to react against unfairly framed rules and regulations because of the significant inequality in existence between athletes and federations.144 This objection can, however, be relativized: for one thing, the rules and regulations of the federation, as already discussed, are always embedded in a state legal order, the internationally mandatory provisions of which must be observed; for another, the protection of athletes is guaranteed by the general and sport-specific legal principles stipulated by the CAS (see II.2.b)). To this end, however, the question arises as to whether the CAS can simply apply the provisions of the federation rules and regulations, or if it is rather entitled – or even obliged – to gauge their provisions against higher-ranking sources of law, such as the general sporting law principles of the lex sportiva or mandatory provisions of state and European law – and, if necessary, to reject them.145 A competence to reject norms (Normverwerfungskompetenz) would support the development of a complete, loophole-free lex sportiva.146 While the ___________ 143

Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 324, 362. Pfister (fn. 87), VI 1 para 8. It is doubtless another matter for top-level athletes, who are able to negotiate the terms of their contracts to put them on a stronger footing with the associations and federations. 145 For an example of an affirmative answer, see, e.g., Vieweg/Staschik, SpuRt 2013, 227 (232 et seq.); Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 621 et seqq., 641. The possibility set out in the procedural rules of the CAS for sports federations to request that the CAS reviews the compatibility of federation rules and regulations with higher-ranking law was abolished, with effect from 1 January 2012, cf. Art. R60 CAS-Code (2004 version). 146 The decision of the CAS regarding the validity of the UEFA rule, which forbids the participation of two teams with the same owner in UEFA competitions, is an exemplary 144

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CAS does demand that the provisions of the rules and regulations of sports federations are regularly reviewed on the basis of higher-ranking law,147 it generally tries to show restraint in implementing this and only seldom rejects an unambiguously-worded federation rule on the grounds that there exist higherranking legal principles to the contrary.148 Rather, it generally criticizes dubious rules only in obiter dicta, or limits itself to reviewing whether the concrete application of the rule is compatible with higher-ranking law.149 To this end, it would be a welcome move, if the federations clarified and extended the competence of the CAS to review their rules and regulations. If no review of federation rules and regulations occurs, the arbitral awards of the CAS are liable to be overturned by state courts. Therefore, there is some support for the notion that the CAS is obliged to assess the validity of the regulations agreed upon.150

___________ one in this area, AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 et seqq. In this decision, the CAS conducted a comprehensive review of the compatibility of the UEFA by-laws with Swiss civil and competition law, EU law and general legal principles of the lex sportiva, in particular, the principle of fairness. While conducting the review, it paid particular attention to the principle of proportionality and the objective necessity of the rule. It subsequently determined that the inadmissibility of unsuitable or inappropriate rules was also a part of the lex sportiva. 147 CAS OG 2004/009, para 6.8; COC & Kibunde v. AIBA, CAS OG 00/004, Digest II, 617 (621 et seqq.); see also Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.5; Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 96; UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA / FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, para 328 et seqq.; UCI v. Ullrich & Swiss Olympic, CAS 2010/A/2083, para 34; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, para 123, 173. 148 See Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 143 et seq., 156. In its decision WADA v. Hardy & USADA, for example, the CAS regarded itself as being bound by the minimum penalties set out in the doping regulations of FINA and WADA and stated inter alia that it did not have the power to disregard or completely reformulate federation regulations that were in violation of the principle of proportionality or the prohibition of discrimination in order to correct an unfair result WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 61. In its decision Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., CAS 2008/A/1644, para 18, 44 the CAS stated that, as a rule, it reviews the compatibility of federation regulations with EU law. However, it continued that it would not address the matter in the case at hand, as the legal consequences would remain the same, whether there had been a violation of EU law or not. In the cases MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., CAS 2009/A/1757, para 29 and Midtjylland v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4, CAS did check whether certain matters were compatible with EU law – in particular, the right of free movement for workers – but answers this in the affirmative. However, the CAS disregarded an unambiguously-worded federation rule in I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 132 et seqq. 149 So expressly Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., CAS 2008/A/1644, para 18; RIIS v. UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.38; Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 641 et seq. 150 Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 636, 641 et seq.

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b) Lacunae Within the Lex Sportiva Secondly, it is debatable whether the lex sportiva can be used as the sole basis for deciding an issue in order to facilitate the complete settlement of a dispute or whether, due to its incomplete nature in certain areas, resorting to state law is sometimes unavoidable.151 In particular, the matter of claims for damages by athletes due to unfavourable, erroneous decisions of sports federations and any financial detriment connected with the same (e.g. loss of earnings due to an unlawful doping ban) is not addressed by the lex sportiva.152 For this reason, athletes often file claims for damages with state courts.153 Harry “Butch” Reynolds, for example, was awarded 27 Million US-Dollar from the IAAF at first instance but this award was overturned on appeal.154 In order to develop a complete, all-encompassing lex sportiva, the inclusion of regulations in respect of damages for athletes in federation rules and regulations would be welcome. It is, debatable whether the CAS can develop such damages as a general principle of sports law as long as they are not set out expressly in the rules and regulations of the sports federations.155 After all, the CAS Code stipulates that the CAS has competence to decide disputes in matters of monetary claims (Art. R27, paragraph 2). Adolphsen, for example, considers this to be – in principle – possible. The general and sport-specific legal principles that form part of the lex sportiva could thus play a role in filling the lacunae in this area.156 Even if the lex sportiva cannot provide comprehensive regulation for all matters, it can be chosen as applicable law in a court of arbitration as, in the complex reality of everyday life, a legal system without absolutely any lacunae whatsoever cannot exist. Therefore, the existence of lacunae within a legal order is not detrimental to making a choice of law if it can fulfil its regulatory and standardising functions. This is the case in relation to the lex sportiva.

___________ 151

Pfister (fn. 87), VI 1 para 8. Wax (fn. 4), p. 148. 153 For example, the speed skater, Claudia Pechstein, took legal action for damages against the International Skating Union (ISU) and the German Ice-Skating Alliance (Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft; DESG) at Landgericht Muenchen I (Munich Regional Court I), claiming 3.5 million euro in damages and 400,000 for pain and suffering caused by the two-year ban imposed upon her due to raised blood levels, FAZ of 20.9.13, p. 29. 154 Documentation from the case at Bach, SpuRt 1995, 142. 155 The CAS itself has, to date, viewed the matter with some reservation, see R. v. FIBA, CAS 2000/A/262, Digest II, 377 (387). 156 Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 643 et seqq.; id. (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 290 et seq.). 152

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c) Choice of Law Agreement in Relation to the Lex Sportiva In spite of these two lines of criticism, it has, in recent years, been uniformly acknowledged that the lex sportiva can be chosen instead of state law as a basis for deciding a case before a court of arbitration by means of a choice of law agreement. This is due to the fact that, in light of the restrictions imposed by the ordre public, state law gives precedence to non-state regulations if this is desired by the parties concerned.157 In practice, the lex sportiva has found its way into the arbitration rules of the CAS for the Olympic Games (Art. 17 CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games), for example. There it is stated that “the panel shall rule on the dispute pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate”. Thus, in the relevant proceedings, the CAS should decide the matter without subsidiary recourse to any state legal order and, to that extent, may have recourse to the lex sportiva.158 The procedural provisions, pursuant to which the CAS decides regular proceedings, provide for the application of the rules and regulations of the federation concerned, as well as the “rules of law” chosen by the parties. Furthermore, in the absence of such a choice, the CAS may apply the rules of law that it deems appropriate – such rules could include the lex sportiva, for example.159 In practice, the various panels of the CAS have divergent views on the concept of a lex sportiva that exists without the necessity of recourse to a state legal system.160 At present, the arbitral agreements of the international federations generally stipulate that the rules and regulations of the federation in question should be applied. However, up until now, no express reference to the lex sportiva is made where matters arise that are not regulated in the federation rules and regulations. In such a case, the current practice of the CAS is, in general, to have express recourse to

___________ 157 Wax (fn. 4), p. 184; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 43); Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757); Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 633; id. (fn. 2), p. 281, (p. 288). Rejected by Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 395. 158 Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 282); Martens/Keidel, SpuRt 2013, 253 (255). 159 Article R58 CAS-Code; see Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 356. Recourse to the general legal principles that fall under the lex sportiva would most likely be ruled out if the parties to the arbitration had agreed to the subsidiary application of the law of a particular state legal system in addition to the rules and regulations of the federation. 160 Cf. fn. 7. The following decisions are examples of instances in which the validity of the lex sportiva has been recognized: I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 75; Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 65; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, para 16; COC & Scott v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, para 14; COA & S. v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, Digest III, 17 (28); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (102); B. v. FIBA, CAS 1992/80, Digest I, 297 (302). Likewise Wax (fn. 4), p. 183 et seq.

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state law on a subsidiary basis (usually Swiss law). It is rare that the CAS has recourse solely to the lex sportiva, the exception rather than the rule.161 Thus, the lex sportiva can be agreed upon as a basis for decisions before courts of arbitration. In Germany, for example, this is regulated in section 1051 I ZPO (Civil Code of Procedure), or in Switzerland in Art. 187 IPRG (Federal Code on Private International Law). Thus the application of a uniform law to similar legal disputes in the realm of sports becomes possible, before the CAS at least. Federation decisions, i.e. the application of federation rules and regulations in individual cases, but also the federation rules and regulations themselves, can be reviewed on the basis of the lex sportiva in order to assess their lawfulness. Such choice of law agreement is valid, even though the athlete is factually obliged to agree, because he would otherwise not be permitted to compete.162 This is because, in the prevailing opinion, the virtual compulsion of the athlete to comply is justified by the necessity that disputes in international sport be decided in a uniform manner. This is, however, under the proviso that the court of arbitration must guarantee that the proceedings are fairly conducted and that the rights of the athletes are adequately protected.163

3. Acknowledgement of CAS Decisions by State Legal Orders One should not underestimate how significant it is if, and to what extent, CAS awards based on the lex sportiva are acknowledged by state legal orders, in particular whether the objection that an arbitration agreement has been concluded will be accepted by the state courts.164 In principle, the Swiss Federal

___________ 161

Adolphsen (fn. 4), p. 93 (p. 103). This was, however, otherwise in the decision, FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, para 16, in which the CAS expressly made reference to Art. R58 CAS-Code in support of the application of the lex sportiva. 162 Agreements to arbitrate are, for example, contained in the athlete agreements that must be signed by the athletes in order to participate in the Olympic Games, see above V.1. This instance of de facto coercion was criticised by speed skater Claudia Pechstein in a petition that was signed by many top athletes, cf. FAZ of 22.10.13, p. 27. 163 Swiss Federal Court of Justice SpuRt 2007, 113 (115 et seq.); Latty (fn. 11), p. 536 et seq.; Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281, (p. 293 et seqq.). For comparable questions as to whether an arbitration agreement is valid in cases where the waiver was not voluntary, see Steiner, SchiedsVZ 2013, 15 (17 et seqq.). 164 Soek says: “The lex sportiva … could only find universal recognition if its main aspects did not meet with insurmountable resistance in the respective legal systems.” Id., The Strict Liability Principles and the Human Rights of Athletes in Doping Cases, 2006, p. 165; Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 509.

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Court of Justice has sole competence for reviewing the decisions of the CAS because the CAS has its seat in Lausanne.165 After an initial reticence,166 the Swiss Federal Court of Justice certified that the CAS possesses the necessary independence from the IOC and acknowledged it to be a “real” court of arbitration.167 Consequently, the extent to which CAS decisions can be reviewed is very limited. Under Art. 190 II IPRG, only the following objections are admissible: the court’s composition was contrary to the relevant provisions; the court erroneously declared itself to have jurisdiction to hear the case; the court delivered no ruling regarding individual petitions, or delivered rulings regarding submissions which were not made; the court infringed the principles of equal treatment or of due process; the award was incompatible with the ordre public. Until early 2007, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice had never overruled a decision of the CAS168 and, so, its overruling of the case of the professional tennis player Guillermo Canas caused much controversy.169 The CAS had imposed a 15-month ban – which it regarded as reasonable – on the Argentinan player for a doping offence.170 In spite of a regulation of the ATP which excluded recourse to state courts in relation to CAS decisions, the athlete appealed the ban to the Swiss Federal Court of Justice. The Court of Justice regarded the waiver (based on Art. 192 IPRG) as invalid and, therefore, held that the action was admissible. Unlike contractual partners to an everyday business transaction, the athlete and the federation did not have a “horizontal” relationship, but, rather, a “vertical” one. The athlete could choose only between, on one hand, agreeing to recognise the conditions laid out by the federation and, on the other, refraining from practising his profession. In order to be able to agree to a valid waiver, the athlete would have to have a certain amount of ___________ 165 Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 153. This, however, also applies to decisions of the ad hoc court divisions that sit at the location where the competition takes place. 166 Swiss Federal Court of Justice, Digest I of CAS Awards, 561 (569 et seq.); Casini (fn. 21), p. 149 (p. 153 et seq.). 167 Swiss Federal Court of Justice, BGE 129 II, 271. In Germany Munich Regional Court I (Landgericht München I) acknowledged the CAS as an independent court of arbitration, LG München I, judgment of 20.12.2001 – 7 O 2030/2001 (cited by Adolphsen (fn. 4), p. 93 (p. 100)). As FIFA has since begun to provide financial support to the CAS, one must also ask whether the CAS is truly independent of FIFA and, if not, whether it is a “real” court of arbitration. The CAS regards itself as being sufficiently independent to fulfil all requirements, see UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA / FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, para 252 et seqq., 266 et seqq. Equally, Bern-Mittelland Regional Court sees no reason to raise any doubts about the independence of the CAS from FIFA, CaS 2012, 253 (259 et seq.). 168 Wax (fn. 4), p. 141. 169 Swiss Federal Court of Justice SpuRt 2007, 113. 170 C. v. ATP Tour, CAS 2005/A/951, SpuRt 2006, 161.

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freedom of choice in agreeing to abandon his right of recourse to state courts. However, this proposition could only be true if the athlete were allowed to take part in his chosen sport even if he refused to sign the waiver clause. As, in this context, the concept of freedom of choice within professional sports – apart from a few exceptions – seems rather unrealistic, it is probably the case that, in the realm of sports arbitration, any waiver clause pursuant to Art. 192 IPRG excluding the athlete’s right of recourse to state courts is invalid, and that the lodging of an objection pursuant to Art. 190 (2) IPRG is possible. The court was also of the opinion that the CAS had infringed upon the tennis player's right to due process and so overturned the award of the CAS. Nonetheless, the CAS imposed again a ban of 15 months on Canas, basing the subsequent decision on the opinion of the Swiss Federal Court of Justice, thus confirming its first arbitral award.171 In subsequent cases, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice overruled arbitral awards that had been delivered by the CAS for reasons of procedural law.172 In 2009, the CAS imposed a two-year ban on German ice hockey player Florian Busch, who had refused to take part in a doping test, but later agreed to be tested. The result proved negative.173 The Swiss Federal Court of Justice lifted this ban at the end of 2009 because, as no arbitration agreement had been concluded, the CAS did not have jurisdiction to settle the dispute.174 Busch had never concluded the required athlete's agreement with the German Ice Hockey Federation (DEB), and the registration form for the 2008 World Championship in May granted the CAS jurisdiction only for the duration of the tournament, not in the time preceding it. In 2010, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice held that the CAS had violated the procedural ordre public, and that any arbitral awards that did not take into account the substantive legal force of an earlier decision (objection of res judicata) should be overturned.175 In general, however, apart from errors of procedural law, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice refrains from interfering with the decisions of the CAS and

___________ 171

C. v. ATP Tour, CAS 2005/A/951, SpuRt 2007, 244; an action taken by Cañas against this arbitral award based on a violation of EU antitrust law was dismissed by the European Court of Justice, judgment of 20.06.2013, Rs. C-269/12, cf. CaS 2013, 244 et seq. 172 Cf. also the two decisions of the Swiss Federal Court of Justice of 08.03.2012– 4A_627/2011 and of 03.05.2010 – 4A_456/2009 in which arbitral awards delivered by the CAS were overturned on the grounds that the CAS had not had jurisdiction over the matter. 173 WADA v. DEB & B., CAS 2008/A/1738. 174 Swiss Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 06.11.2009 – 4A_358/2009. 175 Swiss Federal Court of Justice SpuRt 2010, 197 et seq.

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generally recognises them.176 However, the doctrine of ordre public is the ultimate limit. Verdicts of the CAS will only be recognised – and not overruled – by state courts, if they do not violate the doctrine of ordre public (see section 1059 II nr. 2b ZPO, German Civil Code of Procedure; Art. 190 IIe IPRG, Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law).177 A violation of the doctrine of ordre public will be found to have occurred in cases where international mandatory norms are not adhered to. These norms must therefore be complied with by the court of arbitration so that it can properly fulfil its duty to reach enforceable decisions.178 Here, the doctrine of ordre public is not employed for the purpose of scrutinising the content of those provisions of the lex sportiva that have been applied; rather, it is employed in order to review the result of the arbitral award.179 Among the norms that are internationally mandatory are German (section 130 II GWB, German Act Against Restraints of Competition) and European (Artt. 101, 102 Treaty on the European Union) antitrust law and labour law.180 A review on the basis of antitrust law can lead to considerable limitations being placed on the autonomy of the sports federations. Both the application of law by sports federations and the content of the rules and regulations of the federations are assessed using antitrust law as a benchmark.181 In this area, it is unfortunate that courts of arbitration are denied the possibility of referring a preliminary question (Art. 267 AEUV) to the ECJ.182

___________ 176 Cf. the two decisions of the Swiss Federal Court of Justice in the case of FC Sion. In its rulig of 12.01.2011– 4A_392/2010, the court confirmed the arbitral award of the CAS, which inter alia upheld a ban on FC Sion to engage new players, its grounds being that neither the right to a fair hearing nor the ordre public had been violated. In that respect, the Federal Court of Justice emphasised its limited right of review in the area of international arbitration. After FC Sion did engage new players in spite of the ban and was, therefore, excluded by UEFA from the Europa League for the 2011/2012 season, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice dismissed FC Sion’s appeal against a ruling of the CAS, which had confirmed UEFA’s decision, ruling of 16.07.2012 – 4A_134/2012. In the view of the court, FC Sion did not have the requisite interest in the remedy sought, as the Europa League was already concluded. 177 See Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.5; Grunsky, Überprüfung der Sportrechtsprechung durch staatliche Gerichte, in: Württembergischer Fußballverband e.V. (ed.), Sportrechtsprechung, 1995, p. 15 (p. 21 et seq.); Latty (fn. 11), p. 514; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 44). 178 Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 395. An example is provided by WADA v. Jobson et al., CAS 2010/A/2307, para 173 et seqq. 179 Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 44). 180 Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 340. Nafziger, for example, is of the opinion that the lex sportiva is not applicable to cases involving labour or antitrust law, id., ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3. 181 Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 297 et seqq.). See for example UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA / FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, para 328 et seqq. 182 See Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 342.

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In its ruling of March 27th 2012183, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice regarded the limits of the doctrine of the ordre public as having been overstepped and once again overturned a decision of the CAS. In the legal dispute between the footballer, Francelino da Silva Matuzalem, and the world football federation, FIFA, along with FC Shakhtar Donetsk, the CAS184 had ordered Matuzalem to pay 11.9 million euro to his former club. This was based on the fact that the footballer had terminated his contract of employment with FC Shakhtar Donetsk, without first having provided notice and without having good cause to do so. This decision was confirmed by the Swiss Federal Court of Justice.185 As Matuzalem could not pay, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee imposed a fine upon him in August 2010. Furthermore, it threatened Matuzalem with an unlimited professional ban if he did not pay. Matuzalem filed an objection against this professional ban with the CAS, but the court of arbitration found against him. Matuzalem then turned to the Swiss Federal Court of Justice, which found in favour of the footballer. The court regarded the ban as an infringement of fundamental principles of the Swiss legal order (ordre public). It stated that the ban was a clear and serious infringement of Matuzalem’s personal rights, and, consequently, overturned the decision of CAS. To date, this is the only case where the Swiss Federal Court of Justice reversed an award of the CAS for substantive reasons. CAS arbitral awards are particularly at risk of being set aside where – as a matter of exception – another court is responsible for their review. This was demonstrated by the Hondo case. The German professional cyclist Danilo Hondo was given a two-year ban for doping.186 The special legal framework in existence in Switzerland, where Hondo had permanent residence, allowed a decision of the CAS to be reviewed by a regional court (Kantonsgericht) – even though such courts do not actually have jurisdiction to review CAS decisions – as the dispute in question was a purely domestic one. The regional court first overruled the award of the CAS, granting an interlocutory injunction because of doubts as to whether the principle of strict liability was permissible.187 The entire battle against doping appeared to be endangered by this decision. Ultimately, however, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice, as the court of final appeal, rejected Hondo's appeal.188 ___________ 183

Swiss Federal Court of Justice SpuRt 2012, 109 et seqq. Matuzalem et al. v. Shaktar Donetzk et al., CAS 2008/A/1519–1520. 185 Swiss Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 02.06.2010 – 4A_320/2009. 186 H. v. SCF & SO, CAS 2005/A/922&923&926, SpuRt 2006, 70. 187 FAZ of 22.03.2006, p. 34. 188 Swiss Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 10.01.2007 – 4P.148/2006, FAZ of 16.01.2007, p. 30. 184

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4. The Enforcement of CAS Decisions The lex sportiva can only lead to an effective harmonisation of international sports law if the decisions reached by the CAS based on it can actually be enforced. The enforcement of CAS arbitral awards by the sports federations themselves is possible without giving rise to any problems and effective. The awards can be enforced in the form of suspensions and bans, for instance.189 In general, the decisions are in fact enforced by the sports federations – this means that recourse does not need to be had to state courts in order for the the decisions to be enforced. In some exceptional cases, the enforcement of the decision of the CAS may need to be carried out by the state190 – if, for example, a fine has been imposed upon a player, as in the case of Romanian footballer Adrian Mutu upon whom a fine of 17.2 Million Euro was imposed by the CAS for cocaine abuse,191 which was to be paid to his former club, FC Chelsea. In such a case, the arbitral award has to be declared enforceable in the state concerned. However, this can only occur if the award does not violate the ordre public, so that any internationally mandatory norms of the state concerned must be complied with (see V.3.).

5. Interim Relief While jurisdiction for regular legal disputes occurring in the realm of sports can be awarded to the CAS and while this jurisdiction will, in general, be recognised by the state courts, this is debatable in relation to interim relief, which is of particular importance in the field of sport. The CAS is, in principle, also entitled to issue interim injunctions,192 but there exists a parallel jurisdiction with the state courts (in Germany, section 1033 of the Code of Civil Procedure), meaning that the interim relief provided by the courts of arbitration is not exclusive.193 The athlete can, in principle, apply to a state court for relief while his case is being heard by the CAS.194 This can give rise to the aforementioned problems of inequality and legal uncertainty in the international arena, which, in an area as important as that of interim relief, is a serious problem. ___________ 189

Ipsen (fn. 21), p. 148; Panagiotopoulos (fn. 87), p. 2 (p. 6). Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 675. 191 Mutu v. Chelsea FC, CAS 2008/A/1644. This fine was also confirmed by the Swiss Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 10.06.2010 – 4A 458/2009. 192 Art. R37 CAS-Code; see above II.2.b. 193 Wax (fn. 4), p. 144; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 45). 194 Holla, Der Einsatz von Schiedsgerichten im organisierten Sport, 2005, p. 229. 190

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It has not yet been conclusively settled whether this area of parallel jurisdiction of the CAS and the state courts can be eliminated by stating in the CAS arbitration agreement that the CAS has exclusive jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions.195 The IOC has included this stipulation in its conditions of participation for the Olympic Games.196 It remains debatable whether this preclusion of state courts from the area of interim relief is valid. If one considers the athletes’ lack of freedom of choice, the answer is most likely no.197 It is, in any case, a prerequisite that the interim relief granted by the courts of arbitration is framed in such a manner that it will be of maximum effect.198 The Pechstein case sets out the main problems involved in the area of interim relief. In its decision of 25.11.2009, the CAS initially accepted indirect proof of doping to be an adequate basis for the imposition of a ban of several years upon competing in ice speed skating competitions on Claudia Pechstein by the International Skating Union (ISU).199 The Swiss Federal Court of Justice thereupon granted Pechstein's application for interim relief200 and, by means of an interim injunction, permitted her to take part in the qualifying rounds for the Olympic Games. In the main proceedings, however, it rejected the complaint against the decision of the CAS.201 On 28.9.2010, the Swiss Federal Court of Justice finally confirmed the arbitral award of CAS, in that it dismissed a final appeal taken by Pechstein.202

VI. Lex Sportiva and State Courts of Justice Finally, one must ask what role is played by the lex sportiva in proceedings before a state court of justice – if, for example, the athlete does not appear before the CAS but rather (admissibly) goes directly to the state courts. ___________ 195 In respect of Swiss law, Bern-Mittelland Regional Court proceeds from the assumption that the jurisdiction of the state courts in matters of interim relief is absolute, CaS 2012, 79 (81 et seqq.). 196 Point 8 of the Entry-Form: “The CAS shall rule on its jurisdiction and shall have the exclusive power to order provisional and conservatory measures.” Cf. Jakob-Milicia, SpuRt 2013, 236 (238). 197 Wax (fn. 4), p. 147 et seq.; Adolphsen (fn. 24), p. 569 et seqq.; Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 399 et seqq. Steiner, on the other hand, regards the exclusion of state courts from interim reliefs as valid, id., SchiedsVZ 2013, 15 (18). 198 Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 416; Hess (fn. 2), p. 1 (p. 46). 199 Pechstein & DESG v. ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912&1913. 200 Swiss Federal Court of Justice CaS 2009, 368 et seq. 201 Swiss Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 10.02.2010 – 4A_612/2009. 202 Swiss Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 28.09.2010 – 4A_144/2010.

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1. Choice of Law Regarding the Lex Sportiva? Although the parties to arbitration proceedings are granted the freedom to agree to have proceedings decided on the basis of the lex sportiva, before state courts, the only choice which may be made is whether another (state) legal order (but not a private one) may be chosen. Thus, the lex sportiva cannot form the basis of decisions in proceedings being heard before a state court.203 This leads to the aforementioned problem of legal fragmentation, in particular, in the area of interim relief, because, in this area, state courts cannot be superseded by courts of arbitration. In this case, the lex sportiva cannot be of direct help.

2. Observance of the Lex Sportiva in Applying and Interpreting State Law Indirectly, however, the lex sportiva could – at least partly – contribute to the harmonisation of the law to be applied by state courts. As the athletes are bound by the federation rules and regulations (see above, IV.3.), these are applicable to the dealings between sports federations and athletes insofar as they conform to the law of the relevant state. Furthermore, the question arises as to whether the lex sportiva should be used in applying and interpreting unclear legal terms and general clauses of state law.204 In certain areas, this is already common practice: when ski accidents occur, for example, state courts consult the FIS regulations in order to decide whether one of the parties involved was culpably responsible for the accident.205 In the area of bodily injuries in sport, the relevant sporting rules must be observed when ruling on whether the injured party should be granted compensation, or whether the party who caused the injury is liable to be prosecuted.206 Moreover, the lex sportiva has even been known to influence the enactment of state law. A clear example of this is the World Anti-Doping Code, to which many national and international statutes (the UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport, for example) make reference.207

___________ 203

Adolphsen (fn. 2), p. 281 (p. 288); Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757); Wax (fn. 4), p. 185. Oschütz (fn. 84), p. 360; Nolte (fn. 86), p. 107 (p. 113). 205 See Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (fn. 24), p. 48 et seq.; Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (fn. 21), p. 87 et seqq. 206 See Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (fn. 24), p. 52 et seqq.; Nolte (fn. 86), p. 107 (p. 113). The same applies in Taiwanese law, for instance, Chen-Huan Lin (fn. 73), p. 71 (p. 74). 207 Nolte (fn. 86), p. 107 (p. 113 et seqq.). 204

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VII. Conclusion The term lex sportiva, with its variety of different definitions, should describe the phenomenon of self-regulation in the realm of sport. It is therefore advisable to include under this heading the entire breadth of self-enacted, nonstate law that exists in relation to sport. This consists not only of the rules and regulations of national and international sports federations, but also of the general and sport-specific legal principles developed by the CAS. The lex sportiva is not an anational, completely autonomous set of norms, but rather requires recognition by the individual states, so that disputes in sport can be settled on the basis of the lex sportiva alone. The lex sportiva is influenced considerably by national and European law and is particularly dependent upon receiving acceptance from state legal orders. The CAS can reach decisions on the basis of the lex sportiva that are, in general, recognised by state courts, in particular by the Swiss courts, and that can, for the most part, be enforced by the sports federations themselves. Thus, while the lex sportiva can in no way be regarded as a cure-all, it does offer the world of sports the “possibility to self-regulate”208. In this way, it can contribute to the harmonisation of international sports law with the exception of the area of interim relief.

___________ 208

See Vieweg (fn. 24), p. 195.

The Development of Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport By Burkhard Hess* Introduction .......................................................................................................

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II. The Institutional and Legal Framework ............................................................

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I.

The model: lex mercatoria in international commercial arbitration ...........

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2.

Institutional requirements for lex sportiva .................................................

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3.

The shaping of lex sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sports ...........

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III. Lex sportiva at the interface between the commercialization of sport and the protection of the athlete.....................................................................................

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The Mutu Case at the CAS ........................................................................

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The Review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal ...............................................

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The Mutu Case at the European Court of Human Rights ..........................

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IV. Concluding Remarks .........................................................................................

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I. Introduction The development of lex sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) must be considered a success story. Since the CAS was founded in 1984, CAS arbitration tribunals have ruled on more than 1,9001 cases concerning not only core areas of sports law, such as admission of athletes to competitions and sanctions imposed by federations for doping2, but also areas indirectly connect___________ * This paper is an updated version of the lecture held in Erlangen in 2011. It is dedicated to the memory of Cornelia Maas-Vieweg who – together with Klaus Vieweg – inspired and animated the Sportrechtstagungen and made them into unique meetings of scholars, practitioners and students. I would like to thank Franz Kaps, Research Fellow at the MPI Luxembourg, for his support in preparing the updated paper. Alex McCafferty carefully reviewed the English version of the text. 1 Statistics 2012, Table 1, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/437/ 5048/0/stat2012.pdf (last accessed on 26.1.2014). 2 Cf. Art. 13 World Anti-Doping Code, available at http://www.wada-ama.org/Docu ments/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-The-Code/Code_Review/1st_Consultation/

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ed with sports, such as transfer regulations, and compensation (particularly in professional soccer) and athlete liability for breach of contract.3 Stakeholder acceptance of the CAS has increased steadily over the two last decades. This is particularly the case among international sports federations once CAS independence from the IOC was improved.4 This independence has strengthened the standing of the CAS in the international sports world. Its arbitral awards are recognized under the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.5 Furthermore, the New York Convention widely shields sports arbitration from review by state courts6, as arbitral awards are only subject to limited review under Article V of the New York Convention. This situation is reinforced by the reluctance of the Swiss Federal Court of Justice in reviewing and setting aside CAS arbitral awards under Article 190 of the Swiss Federal Law on Private International Law (PILA).7 In Switzerland, the CAS operates in a legal environment where it ___________ WADA_Code_2003_EN.pdf [status 2003]; cf. also Art 67 of the 2013 FIFA-Statutes, FIFA Statutes; Regulations Governing the Application of the Statues Standing Orders of the Congress, available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/ 02/14/97/88/fifastatuten2013_e_neutral.pdf [status July 2013]. 3 Haas, Die Streitbeilegung durch Schiedsgerichte im internationalen Sport, in: Gilles/Pfeiffer (eds.), Neue Tendenzen im Prozessrecht – Deutsche Landesberichte und weitere deutsche Beiträge zum Weltkongress für Prozessrecht in Salvador/Bahia, Brasilien 2007, 2008, p. 9, 25 et seq.; According to Rule 27 of the CAS Procedural Rules (available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4962/5048/0/Code20201320corrections20fi nales20(en).pdf [status 1.3.2013]) the jurisdiction of the CAS extends to all disputes, which … “may involve matters of principle relating to sport or matters of pecuniary or other interests relating to the practice or the development of sport and may include, more generally, any activity or matter related or connected to sport.”; cf. also Adolphsen, Grundfragen und Perspektiven der Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit, SchiedsVZ 2004, 169, 172. 4 In response to the so-called Gundel decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (BGE 119 II 271, 276 ff.), the Paris Agreement of 22 June 1994, transferred the organizational structure of the CAS to the ICAS, a self-standing foundation under Swiss law (see S 1 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sport-Related Disputes [available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/3923/5048/0/code%202010%20(en).pdf]), see S 6 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sport-Related Disputes, Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, 2003, p. 492 et seq.;BG, 27.5.2003, Case BGE 129 III 445, 450 et seq. 5 Treaty of 10 June 1958, BGBl. (Bundesgesetzblatt; Federal Law Gazette) 1961 II 122. A CAS award is formally recognized and enforced in all the member states of the New York Convention, see Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration, German Law Journal 2011, 1317, 1330; Haas, Loslösung des organisierten Sports aus der Umklammerung des staatlichen Rechts, SJZ 2010, 585, 589 et seq. 6 Hess, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines autonomen Sportrechts, in: id./Dressler, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, 1998, p. 41 et seq. 7 Cf. Oschütz, Zur Überprüfung von Schiedssprüchen des TAS/CAS durch das schweizerische Bundesgericht, Oschütz, SpuRt 2007, 177 et seq. Until now, approximately 60 appeals (as opposed to 1,900 CAS arbitration awards) were filed, with only 5 successful.

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is, to a large extent, shielded from the influence and control of state courts. Therefore, the CAS is able to function as the central judicial authority of sports law, providing a comprehensive dispute settlement system for organized sports and operating outside the purview of state courts.8 However, as I will demonstrate, there is still a residual – although limited – review by state courts of CAS awards, which demarks minimum standards of procedural and substantive fairness to be respected in sports dispute resolution. The following article does not primarily address the creation of autonomous sports law by CAS case law. Rather, it explores the extent to which CAS case law defines the contours of lex sportiva and the limited, but still important role of state courts and international tribunals in this development. Lex sportiva is assumed to be an autonomous legal order, operating outside the scope of national legal systems, developing its own independent principles and values. Therefore, it may transgress (and even supersede) the statutes and regulations of national and international sport federations. The fundamental issue is to what extent lex sportiva emanates from the interpretation of those statutes and regulations and becomes a genuine legal system. If the assumption were correct, CAS arbitral tribunals would be empowered to review and, eventually, to dismiss the statues of the sport federations. However, such a hierarchy of lex sportiva will be demonstrated to be an idealized vision which still has not yet become a comprehensive concept. Lex sportiva is evolving: at present, there is a constant interplay between the regulations and statutes of the sports federations and the fundamental values of human rights guaranteed by the legal systems of national states and international law.9 Therefore, there is no clear hierarchy of different norms of sports law, but interplay between the regulations of sports federations and the peremptory norms of the national and international legal orders forming the legal basis of the sports federations and their law-making. However, the present situation should not be considered a disadvantage: the resort to fundamental human rights guarantees that sports law – a system based on undemocratic law___________ 8 Haas, SJZ 106 (2010), 585, 588 et seq. (talking about the “flight into the sports law version of Delaware”) 9 Haas, Internationale Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in: Gilles/Pfeiffer (eds.), Neue Tendenzen im Prozessrecht – Deutsche Landesberichte und weitere deutsche Beiträge zum Weltkongress für Prozessrecht in Salvador/Bahia, Brasilien 2007, p. 9, 51 et seq.; Hess, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines autonomen Sportrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des internationalen Spitzensports, in: id./Dressler (eds.), Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, p. 1, 10 et seq.; Haas, SJZ 2010, 585, 587 et seq.; In the Baumann case the Higher Regional State Court in Frankfurt decided, that lex sportiva is not completly independent from state law, OLG Frankfurt/Main, 18.4.2001, Case 13 U 66/01, SpuRt 2010, 159 161; For an overview in Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, p. 56 et seq.

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making10 – does not diverge too greatly from the fundamental values which underlie the idea of any just and fair legal system. The following article will firstly describe the general model and the legal framework of lex sportiva (II.). Secondly it will analyze lex sportiva in the context of athletes’ fundamental rights (III.). Thirdly, the article will deal with the tension between mandatory arbitration agreements and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (IV.).

II. The Institutional and Legal Framework 1. The model: lex mercatoria in international commercial arbitration When the idea of a “lex sportiva” was initially discussed in the 1980s, its promoters had the perfect model in mind: “lex mercatoria”. Lex mercatoria describes legal rules and priniciples in the area of international commerce developed by arbitral tribunals within the bounds of the New York Convention.11 However, when the concept of an independent court of arbitration for sports was proposed, lex mercatoria was – apart from a few controversial arbitral awards – still tentatively developed.12 At that time, coherent texts of lex mercatoria did not exist. Only from the 1990s onwards did UNCITRAL and Unidroit develop comprehensive principles and rules to be applied comparably to uniform laws13, which has engendered legal certainty and corresponds to the practical needs of merchants and arbitral tribunals when deciding commercial disputes.14 Scholars – euphemistically – describe this development as the “codification” of lex mercatoria. At present, private international law permits an expressed “choice” of such non-governmental regulations – the most prominent examples are Article 3 (1) and Recital 13 of the Rome I Regulation.15 The trend ___________ 10 The lawmaking process in sports law is marked by top-down lawmaking where the international federations impose their statutes and by-laws on all subordinate sport federations worldwide, Hess, in: id./Dressler, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, p. 4 et seq. 11 Hellwege, Lex Mercatoria, in: Basedow/Hopt/Zimmermann (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, Bd. II, 2012, p. 1086 et seq. 12 For a comprehensive critique see Schlosser, Recht der privaten internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2nd ed.1990), paras 192 et seq. 13 Dasser, Mouse or Monster? Some Facts and Figures on lex mercatoria, in: Zimmermann (ed.), Globalisierung und Entstaatlichung des Rechts, 2008, p. 129 et seq. 14 In particular, the rules and regulations, comparable with the Restatements of US law which, for their part, are commented and annotated, see Kronke, Festschrift Kropholler, 2008, p. 39, 52 et seq. 15 Section 1051 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) permits the parties in arbitration to choose a non-state law such as lex mercatoria as the law applicable to the merits, Stein/Jonas/Schlosser, Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 22th ed. 2002, § 1051 ZPO

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of favouring private regulation extends far beyond lex mercatoria to include, for example, the Internet, corporate governance codes in company law, and finance sector self-regulation. However, these examples demonstrate the imminent dangers of over-privatization when state control is too severely reduced.16 There is a fundamental strain between the autonomy of the parties involved and the need for a residual control by state courts to protect and preserve the rights of disadvantaged and weaker parties.

2. Institutional requirements for lex sportiva Lex sportiva and lex mercatoria have a similar judicial framework; both are inextricably linked to arbitration. Traditionally, sport associations provide for internal dispute settlement bodies which decide all disputes within the associations. Initially, these bodies did not sufficiently comply with procedural minimum standards, such as fair trial, judicial independence, etc. During the two last decades, dispute settlement bodies within the sports system have evolved considerably and implemented procedural rules which correspond to minimum standards of procedural fairness. This development is due – in no small part – to the CAS and its case-law: a self-standing institutional framework suitable – and designed – for the development of a lex sportiva. Nevertheless, there are two significant, related differences between lex mercatoria and lex sportiva: party autonomy and consequent possible derogation from national law. International commercial law and lex mercatoria are based on party autonomy – parties usually agree on its application and may easily derogate from national law whereas party autonomy does not play a major role in sports and lex sportiva is mainly based on various sport federation statutes and regulations which are often closely connected to the laws of the country in which the federations are registered and operate. Of course, one can assume that athletes usually join their sports association voluntarily. In addition, they voluntarily sign athlete agreements that entitle them to participate in national and international competitions. In return, these agreements provide all disputes be handled by sports arbitration and declare sports law applicable.17 However, athletes are not free when signing these ___________ para. 1 et seq.; Art. 187 PILA (Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht; Swiss Federal Act on International Private Law) also allows the parties to choose non-state law, Furrer/Girsberger/Müller-Chen/Furrer/Girsberger, Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht, 2nd edn. 2012, PILA 187–189 para. 3 et seq. 16 Köndgen, Privatisierung des Rechts, AcP 206 (2006), p. 477, 506 et seq. 17 Same opinion Röthel, Lex mercatoria, lex sportiva, lex technica, JZ 2007, 755, 758.

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agreements, as they have no alternative but to sign the agreement as presented by the sports federations and/or the organizers of sport competitions.18 There are no competitions outside the organization of professional sports. German courts have designated these agreements as “Unterwerfung” (“submission”).19 However, these submissions evince a tension: athletes, being without real bargaining power, cannot influence the content of agreements. In addition, negotiation of individual agreements concerning sport competitions is generally considered as unfeasible because the principle of equal opportunities in sport prevents departures from the standard norm for an individual athlete.20 Against this background, the agreements of athletes are clearly negotiated differently to contracts between merchants who “submit” their contract to lex mercatoria by mutual consent. This inequality is acknowledged by civil courts, which apply lex sportiva reluctantly in the context of conflict of laws.21 In general, legal disputes between an athlete and a national federation start at the domestic level, as the legal relationship of joining a federation is, naturally, based on domestic law.22 The choice of a foreign law is restricted in purely domestic cases (cf. Art. 3 para 3 and 4 of the Regulation Rome I). Thus, a German athlete and a German sports federation cannot agree that Swiss law will apply to nomination for national competitions. However, they can agree that Swiss law will be applicable for international competitions. Nevertheless, a German court would closely review the content of sporting regulations even in cases where the law of another country was chosen by the parties.23 On the other hand, if one characterizes the agreement as based on the law of associations, then the law of the seat of the ___________ 18

If they do not sign, they will not get permission to participate in the competition. German Federal Court of Justice, 28.11.1994, Case II ZR 11/94, NJW 1995, 583, 584 et seq. 20 Correctly decided by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court 22.3.2007, Case BGE 133 II, 235 (in relation to Art. 192 PILA, p. 243 et seq.); Olympic participants have to sign an arbitration agreement if they want to participate in the Olympic Games, see Adolphsen, SchiedsVZ 2004, 169, 173. 21 Cf. Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, p. 113 et seq. and 628 et seq.; “lex sportiva” is only applied by arbitration tribunals. In German state court proceedings the conflict of law rules allow the parties only to choose state law and not lex sportiva, as the applicable law, Adolphsen, in Adolphsen/Nolte/Lehner/Gerlinger (eds.), Sportrecht in der Praxis, 2012, para. 1085; Pfeiffer, Neues Internationales Vertragsrecht zur Rom IVerordnung, EUZW 2008, 622, 624. 22 See Hess, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines autonomen Sportrechts, in: id./Dressler, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, p. 1, 34 et seq. 23 German Federal Court of Justice, 28.11.1994, Case II ZR 11/94, NJW 1995, 583, 585 et seq. According to this case-law, the court reviews the content of the by-laws of the federation and the effects of the submission of the athlete according to the principles of good faith. 19

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association – German law – will apply. Finally, the parties can agree on the substantive law content – in this case, the relevant regulations will become part of the agreement by reference, but the regulations must yield to any mandatory provisions of the applicable law.24 As a result, the choice of applicable law at the domestic level is more or less excluded – the same applies to lex sportiva (as applicable law). In international settings, the legal situation is slightly different. Parties can choose the applicable law for any contract in connection with international transfers, or when stipulating their participation in international competitions. Consequently, clubs involved in the transfer of professional footballers can choose the “Fédération Internationale de Football Association” (FIFA) Rules and Swiss law. Under the Rome I Regulation, however, this clause will be interpreted as a choice of Swiss law, rather than a choice of the FIFA regulations.25 Therefore, the applicable substantive law will finally determine to what extent sport federation regulations are exempted from mandatory provisions. As a result, from the perspective of the conflict of laws, lex sportiva itself cannot usually be chosen as the applicable law. Alternatively, federation regulations might be subordinated under a liberal legal regime. In this context, Switzerland has become the “Delaware of international sports federations” (U. Haas), as many international federations – the most prominent being the International Olympic Committee – are organized as associations under Swiss law.26 Traditionally, Switzerland adopts a very liberal and generous approach to “international” associations and foundations – some of them benefit from a specific status similar to international organizations – even granting immunity from the Swiss judiciary.27 Additional isolation from review by state courts can be achieved by sending sports-related disputes to arbitration. The most prominent example is the CAS ___________ 24

Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 20.12.2005, Case BGE 132 III 285, 289 et seq (concerning the abbreviation of mandatory limitation periods). 25 This is the prevailing opinion with regard to the application of Art. 3 Rome I Regulation, cf. Palandt/Thorn, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 73th ed. 2014, Article. 3 Rom I-VO para. 4; MünchKomm/Martiny, Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 5th edn. 2010, Art. 3 VO Rom I (2011), para. 50 et seq; detailed overview Rauscher/v. Hein, Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht, 2011, Art. 3 VO Rom I para. 50 et seq. 26 Haas, SJZ 2010, 585, 588 et seq. 27 Federal Act on the Privileges, Immunities and Facilities and the Financial Subsidies granted by Switzerland as a Host State (Swiss Host State Act) of 22 June 2007, by which immunity from the jurisdiction of domestic courts can be accorded, among others, to “international institutions”. The most prominent and problematic example is the The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, mainly sponsored by the American millionaire Bill Gates, see http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/board/ (last retrieved 10 April 2014).

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in Lausanne which directly profits from reduced control by Swiss courts. This is because, when an arbitral award is set aside by the courts at the Swiss seat of the arbitral tribunal (Art. 190 et seq. PILA), or the award is not recognized and enforced by the courts of other states (Art. V New York Convention), Swiss courts are not permitted to review the substance of the award28. The authorization of state courts to review the (correct) application of law by an arbitral tribunal would amount to a révision au fond and is generally not made.29 Furthermore, national arbitration acts and the procedure rules of many arbitration institutions authorize the arbitral tribunal to determine the applicable law if the parties involved have not chosen the applicable law themselves,30 a prominent example being section 1051 of the German Code of Civil Procedure.31 In Switzerland, Article 187 PILA opens up to an arbitral tribunal a similar empowerment in international cases.32 The provisions on the applicable law in international sports arbitration operate in this legal framework by authorizing arbitral tribunals to apply the rules and regulations of sports federations, and, only alternatively, to apply national law.33 Rule R 58 Procedural Rules of the CAS Statute of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sport-Related Disputes reads as follows: “The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiary, to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence, of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sportsrelated body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law that the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision.”

___________ 28

Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, 2012, § 17.04, p. 382. Swiss Federal Supreme Court; 10.6.2010, Case 4A_458/2009, Adrian Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Limited, Tribunal fédéral, 4A_458/2009, 10 June 2010, ASA Bulletin 2010, 520, 530, para. 4.4.1. 30 According to Art. 21 ICC-Rules, the arbitral tribunal may apply the rules of law it deems to be appropriate, cf. Schütze/Reiner/Jahnel, Institutionelle Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 2nd edn. 2011, Art. 17 para. 6. 31 Stein/Jonas/Schlosser, § 1051 ZPO, para. 1 et seq. 32 The provision reads: “(1) The court of arbitration shall rule on the matter in dispute in accordance with the law chosen by the parties to proceedings. If no choice of law has been made, the court shall decide the matter in accordance with the law with which the matter in dispute has the closest connection. (2) The parties to proceedings may grant the court of arbitration the power to decide the matter in accordance with equity [Billigkeit].” 33 Article 17 of the CAS ad-hoc Rules for the Olympic Games reads: “The Panel shall rule on the dispute pursuant to the Olympic Charta, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate.” 29

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This provision demonstrates that a complete separation of the CAS from state law is not envisaged. In practice, however, the relationship between sports regulations and applicable state law is more complicated, as the regulations of federations are usually formulated in such a detailed manner that any additional reference to state law seems unnecessary. Furthermore, in applying these regulations, CAS arbitration panels have developed independent principles of lex sportiva which, as a level of regulation, are situated between the regulations of the sports federations and the respective state law.34 Occasionally, CAS arbitration panels have avoided any determination of the applicable law. In the Cañas case, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, for its part, annulled a CAS award as the arbitral tribunal had not sufficiently respected applicable state law which the athlete had invoked.35 In this case, however, the Federal Tribunal did not review how the CAS panel had determined the applicable law but simply endorsed the athlete’s complaint that his arguments based on the law of Delaware had not been considered (Gehörsrüge).36 The arbitral panel reconvened again, found its decision compatible with the law of Delaware, and upheld the award.37

3. The shaping of lex sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sports Most readers of this article will not require a comprehensive description of the principles of lex sportiva.38 Therefore, I will confine myself to a few general remarks before demonstrating the dangers of a systematic approach based on the so-called “necessities of sports” as the guiding principle of sports law. I would like to illustrate this issue by CAS case-law in the dispute between the football player Adrian Mutu and his former English club Chelsea London. When one discusses the structure of the general principles of lex sportiva, two different categories must be distinguished. First, there are “general principles specific to sports”, such as the principle of equal conditions for athletes in ___________ 34 In this respect it is interesting to note that the CAS arbitration panels are very reluctant to permit sports federations to file amicus curiae briefs, see CAS 2008/A/1639 RCD Mallorca v. FA & Newcastle United, award of 24 April 2009. 35 Swiss Federal Court, 22.3.2007, Case BGE 133 III, 235, 247 et seq. Cañas v. ATP Tour. 36 Oschütz, SpuRt 2007, 177 et seq.; Cañas unsuccessfully applied to the European Commission to trigger proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, ECJ, 20.6.2013, Case C-269/12 P Cañas ./. Commission, nyr. 37 Oschütz, SpuRt 2007, 177, 179. 38 Cf. Casini, German Law Journal 2011, 1317, 1327 et seq.

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competition39, or the principle of fairness in sports (fair play)40 The nonjusticiability of decisions made by referees also belongs to this category.41 Another, much-discussed example is the “strict liability” principle with regard to doping offenses.42 Furthermore, rules relating to the “nationality” of athletes in sports can differ from the provisions of national law.43 Even an “autonomous” interpretation of sports rules and regulations is recognized.44 This set of principles forms a core area of lex sportiva, in which the necessities of sport, which require a fair and equal framework for competitions, entail specific content of the applicable law and its underlying principles. However, a second set of general principles applicable to the legal framework of sports regulations is not only found in sports law, but is also part of the respective national legal systems. These principles often have constitutional underpinnings. Pertinent examples are the principle of non-retroactivity (with regard to doping offences),45 the necessity that the regulations of a sports feder-

___________ 39 Adolphsen, SchiedsVZ 2004, 169, 170; Haas, Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und EMRK, SchiedsVZ 2009, 73, 80 et seq.; Haas/Haug/Reschke (eds.) Handbuch des Sportrechts, 2012, Band 1 B Kap. 2, para. 1 et seq. 40 Casini, German Law Journal 2011, 1317, 1330; The CAS has also developed and refined the concept of “fairness” in sports, CAS, 18.12.2003, Case 2002/O/373, COC & Beckie Scott ./. IOC, para. 14; For unsportsmanlike behavior, cf. Haas/Haug/Reschke (eds.) Handbuch des Sportrechts, Band 2 Kap. 17, para. 1 et seq. 41 Haas, Die Streitbeilegung durch Schiedsgerichte im internationalen Sport, in: Gilles/Pfeiffer (eds.), Neue Tendenzen im Prozessrecht – Deutsche Landesberichte und weitere deutsche Beiträge zum Weltkongress für Prozessrecht in Salvador/Bahia, Brasilien 2007, p. 9, 64 et seqq.; Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sport Law?, 2011, p. 123, 128 et seq.; see also Arbitrage Chambre ad hoc du TAS (J.O. Atlanta), 1.8.1996, Case JO 96/006 M. ./. AIBA, para. 4 et seq.; Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney), 30.9.2000, Case OG 00/013 Bernardo Segura ./. IAAF, para. 17. 42 Art. 2.1 World Anti-Doping Code [status 2003]; CAS, 23.5.1995, Case 94/129, USA Shooting & Q ./.UIT, para. 16; Casini, German Law Journal 2011, 1317, 1330; The CAS has developed and refined the concept of “strict liability”, CAS, 18.12.2003, Case 2002/O/373, COC & Beckie Scott ./. IOC, para. 14. 43 With regard to the permission of football players to play for a national team, see Art. 7 and 8 Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes in FIFA Statutes, in FIFA Statutes; Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes Standing Order of the Congress [status July 2013]. 44 Latty, La lex sportiva, Recherche sur le droit transnational, 2007, p. 308 et seq.; Casini, German Law Journal 2011, 1317, 1334. 45 CAS, 14.8.2000, Case 2000/A/284, Sullivan ./. The Judo Federation of Australia Inc., the Judo Federation of Australia Inc. Appeal Tribunal and Raguz, para. 28 ; CAS, 23.5.1995, Case 94/129, USA Shooting & Q ./. UIT, para. 22; Foster, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva. What is Sport Law?, p. 123, 143.

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ation imposing penalties and sanctions must be clear and unambiguous46, and the prohibition of excessive measures.47 These principles must be accommodated with the necessities of the sports world. There still remains the question of whether and to what extent the rules and regulations of sports federations can override state law and deviate from mandatory principles. However, one might also ask to which extent general legal guarantees may override (unfair and uneven) regulations and sanctions of the sports federations. From the perspective of Swiss law (which is pertinent to the CAS48), the answer is found in Articles 190 and 191 PILA.49 According to these Articles, the Federal Tribunal reviews and sets aside an arbitral award when fundamental principles enshrined in the public policy-exception have not been respected. This reference includes substantive and procedural principles, such as the priniciple of proportionality, the protection of the personality of private persons, the right to be heard, the equality of the parties50, and the impartiality of the arbitrators. These principles are, of course, not specific to sports but implement the general rule of law and procedural fairness.51 However, the application and observance of general principles of law by CAS arbitral panels demonstrates that lex sportiva is unfolding as a legal system based on fundamental guarantees of justice. Or, in other words: lex sportiva will only be recognized as a self-standing legal system when it respects and implements fundamental principles and values. Finally, the unfolding of lex sportiva as a comprehensive system also entails repercussions for the autonomy of federations: when elaborat___________ 46 CAS, 23.5.1995, Case 94/129, USA Shooting & Q ./. UIT, para. 28 et seq. ; Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Nagano), 12.2.1998, Case OG 98/002, R ./. IOC, para. 26 et seq.; Foster, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sport Law?, p. 123, 143; Haas/Martens, Sportrecht – Eine Einführung in die Praxis, 2011, p. 101. 47 Hilpert, das Fußballstrafrecht des Deutschen Fußball-Bundes (DFB), 2009, p. 98 et seq.; In view of athletes “personality rights” a doping suspension has to take into account the particular circumstances of the case, CAS, 28.1.2002, Case 2001/A/345, M. ./. Swiss Cycling, para. 47, see also CAS, 9.7.2001, Case 2001/A/317, A. ./. FILA, para. 28 et seq.; the doping sanction against an athlete must be proportional and reflect the fault, cf. CAS, 9.7.2001, Case 2001/A/317, A. / FILA, para. 50 et seq.; CAS, 22.4.1996, Case 95/141, C. / FINA, para. 15 et seq.; CAS, 17.3.1999, Case 98/214, B. ./. FIJ, para. 21; with regard to the proportionality of sport rules, CAS, 23.4.1997, Case 96/157, FIN ./: FINA, para. 22. 48 As the CAS has its seat in Switzerland, arbitration panels acting under its auspices are considered as Swiss arbitrations. 49 Dasser, International Arbitration and Setting Aside Proceedings in Switzerland – An Updated Statistical Analysis, ASA Bulletin 2010, 82, 84 et seq.; Furrer/Girsberger/MüllerChen/Girsberger, Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht, PILA 190–192, paras 3 et seq. 50 These procedural guarantees are expressly mentioned in Article 190 (2) lit d) PILA. 51 Otherwise there remains the risk that awards are set aside by the Swiss Federal Court applying these principles under Art. 190, 191 PILA.

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ing on and applying higher-ranking principles, CAS arbitral panels may not only review, but also possibly overrule, specific decisions of federation bodies and also incidentally dismiss regulations of sports federations.52 Such a development can be deduced from recent CAS case law. 53

III. Lex sportiva at the interface between the commercialization of sport and the protection of the athlete 1. The Mutu Case at the CAS Fundamental tensions exist between the diverging interests – or legal positions – of clubs, federations, athletes and other stakeholders, although all of them benefit from the economic wealth of sports.54 Numerous CAS decisions in the field of professional football demonstrate that growing commercialization in sport triggers considerable conflicts. 55 A prominent example of this conflict was the dispute between Adrian Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd.56, concerning the famous Romanian football player who moved from FC Parma to Chelsea Football Club in 2003 for a € 22.5 million transfer sum. On 11 October 2004, Mutu tested positive for cocaine. On 28 October 2004, Chelsea dismissed Mutu without notice. The English Football Association and FIFA imposed a seven months ban. Mutu left England and, after the suspension had passed, signed a new contract with Ital-

___________ 52 Consequently, the CAS indirectly influences the law-making power of sports federations; see Casini, German Law Journal 2011, 1317, 1327 et seq. With CAS’s informal practice to adhere to its own case law, CAS decisions strongly influence the future of sport legislation, Casini, German Law Journal 2011, 1317, 1331; According to Foster the CAS has the task to set the standards of the sports federations and to monitor them, Foster, in: Lex Sportiva: What is Sport Law?, Siekmann/Soek (eds.), p. 123, 144. 53 There is meanwhile a tendency to review the rules concerning their compliance with the higher ranking-standards of lex sportiva, cf. CAS, 20.7.2005, Case 2005/A/847, Hans Knauss./.FIS, para. 32 et seq.; for more on this topic Haas, Die Streitbeilegung durch Schiedsgerichte im internationalen Sport, in: Gilles/Pfeiffer (eds.), Neue Tendenzen im Prozessrecht – Deutsche Landesberichte und weitere deutsche Beiträge zum Weltkongress für Prozessrecht in Salvador/Bahia, Brasilien 2007, p. 9, 62 et seq. 54 Hess, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines autonomen Sportrechts, in: id./Dressler, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, p. 9 et seq. 55 Most of the arbitral awards of the CAS have been rendered in the area of football (146 awards), see Case law Documents, available at http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/ sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/Forms/PerSport.aspx (last accessed on 21.11.2013). 56 CAS, 31.7.2009, Case 2008/A/1644, Mutu ./. Chelsea Football Club Ltd.

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ian club AS Livorno Calcio, but was immediately transferred to Juventus Turin.57 Chelsea sought compensation from Mutu in 2005. The Football Association Premier League Appeals Committee decided that Mutu, by taking cocaine, had committed a breach of contract without just cause and that Chelsea was eligible to claim compensation. In August 2007 Chelsea filed an application with the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) for an award of compensation, seeking damages to be determined on various factors “including the wasted costs of acquiring the Player (£13,814,000), the cost of replacing the Player (£22,661,641), the unearned portion of signing bonus (£44,000) and other benefits received by the Player from the Club (£3,128,566.03), the substantial legal costs that the Club has been forced to incur (£391,049.03) and the unquantifiable cost in playing terms and in terms of the Club’s commercial brand values”, but “at least equivalent to the replacement cost of £22,661,641”. On 7 May 2008, the DRC ordered Mutu to pay € 17,173,990 in compensation to Chelsea for breach of contract. This amount included € 16,500,000 for the unamortized portion of the transfer fee paid to Parma, € 307,340 for the unamortized portion of the sign-on fee (received by Mutu), and € 366,650 for the unamortized portion of the fee to the Agent. The DRC did not take into account damages for amounts already paid by the club to Mutu (consideration for services rendered) or the remaining value of the employment contract (€ 10,858,500). The damages were the highest ever levied by FIFA.58 Mutu lodged an appeal with the CAS, but on 31 July 2009 the arbitration panel court dismissed the appeal and ordered Mutu to pay Chelsea the amount plus interest of 5% per annum. In addition, Mutu had to pay the costs of arbitration for both parties, including CHF 50,000 to Chelsea. It was beyond question that a breach of contract had occurred;59 the issue at stake was the right of the English club to claim damages for a breach of contract. Mutu’s obligation to compensate all damages incurred by the breach of contract was expressly set out in Article 22 of the 2001 FIFA Transfer-

___________ 57

As Juventus Turin had already signed the allowed number of players from non-EU countries and AS Livorno had not exhausted its contingent AS Livorno had to act as a “middleman”. 58 The procedural history is documented at Wikipedia, entry: “Adrian Mutu”, visited on May 4th, 2014. 59 Two violations of the contract of the player were undisputed: the taking of cocaine and the conclusion of a new contract with Juventus Turin (outside of the transfer regime of FIFA).

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Regulations.60 Pursuant to this provision, the damage is assessed according to the “law of the country concerned”, to the “specificity of sports” and by socalled “objective criteria”, which include the amount of remuneration, the term of the contract and the acquisition costs. 61 The CAS arbitration panel based the obligation of Mutu to compensate all damages of Chelsea, especially the transfer sum paid by Chelsea to the former club, on Article 22 of the 2001 FIFA Transfer-Regulations and especially on the criterion of “specificity of sport”. The panel held: 62 “With reference to this specificity of sport, then, the Panel notes that, in this respect, it has to take into consideration the specific nature and needs of sport when assessing the circumstances of the dispute at stake, so to arrive to a solution which takes into account not only the interests of the players in the clubs, but, more broadly, those of the whole football community (…). In this context, the Panel finds that the specificity of sport does not allow a reduction of the compensation as determined by the DRC: much to the contrary, the breach of the Player caused substantial damages to the club, that, on top of the wasted acquisition costs, also lost the sporting benefit of the Player’s services.” 63

As the case concerned the transfer of a player between two European clubs, the arbitration panel also examined whether an obligation of the player to pay damages of more than 17 million Euro would constitute an infringement of EU law. However, the panel held that the athlete was not discriminated against by the 2001 FIFA Transfer-Regulations as English law would oblige him to compensate Chelsea by the same amount.64 Furthermore, the panel did not see any violation of Article 45 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Referring to the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, the panel held that Mutu had not been free to change his employer. When engaging with a different club, Mutu had breached the terms of his employment contract with Chelsea. In addition, the panel held that the right to freedom of movement within ___________ 60

tions. 61

Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, hereafter FIFA Transfer-Regula-

Commentary on the Regulation for the Transfer of Players, Art. 17 para. 1. CAS, 31.7.2009, Case 2008/A/1644, Mutu ./. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., para. 139. 63 According to the legislative history of Art. 17 of the FIFA 2012 TransferRegulations, the successor provision of Art. 22 of the FIFA 2001 Transfer-Regulations, the aim of the “specificity of sport” is to create a fair balance between the interest of the clubs to maintain a contractual stability and the interest of the players on free movement of workers, CAS, 30.1.2008, Case 2007/A/1298, Wigan Athletic FC ./. Heart of Midlothian, Case 2007/A/1299, Heart of Midlothian ./. Webster & Wigan Athletic FC and Case 2007/A/1300, Webster ./. Heart of Midlothian, para. 67; CAS, 26.5.2008, Case 2007/A/1358, FC Pyunik Yerevan ./. L., AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA, para. 40. 64 The arbitration panel did not address the relevant issue of whether the mere amount of the compensation awarded was compatible with the principle of proportionality, Spindler, in Adolphsen/Nolte/Lehner/Gerlinger [eds.], Sportrecht in der Praxis, para. 1819 et seq. 62

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the European Union was not applicable, as Mutu was not an EU citizen.65 Eventually, the arbitration panel ordered Adrian Mutu to pay the € 17,173,990 as compensation to Chelsea.

2. The Review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal Mutu immediately appealed the arbitral award at the Swiss Federal Tribunal and requested the CAS award to be set aside under Articles 190 and 191 PILA. The appeal was mainly based on the argument that the award was incompatible with EU law. The Federal Tribunal came to the conclusion that Art. 45 TFEU had not been infringed, “…puisque (…) le footballeur, nonobstant le licenciement immédiat, a trouvé un nouvel employeur en Italie …”66 With regard to damages, the Federal Tribunal did not see any infringement of the athlete’s right to freedom of profession nor any “spoliation” (expropriation) of the athlete.67 Looking at the Mutu case, one cannot avoid a sense of unease. Although there is no doubt that Mutu, by taking cocaine, had infringed his obligations to Chelsea, the English club was able to terminate the contract immediately and to obtain compensation which amounted to the full profits (and investment) related to the player’s recruitment on the European transfer market. According to the award, the damages awarded to Chelsea were intended to deter other players from infringing their contractual obligations. Yet the arbitration panel transformed the damages awarded into an untechnical kind of contractual penalty (similar to punitive damages). In addition, the arbitral tribunal did not find any obligation on Chelsea’s side to reduce the damages incurred. Adrian Mutu’s legal status was weakened considerably as he was not protected by European Union law, particularly Article 45 TFEU. According to the ___________ 65

seq.

CAS, 31.7.2009, case 2008/A/1644, Mutu ./. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., para. 3 et

66 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 10.7.2010, Case 4A_458/2009, Adrian Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Limited, Tribunal fédéral, lère Cour de droit civil, 4A_458/2009, 10 June 2010, ASA Bulletin 2010, 520, 533, para. 4.4.3.1; This statement is contrary to the decision of the ECJ in Olympique Lyonnais ./. Olivier Bernard und Newcastle UFC, Case C-325/08. 67 Swiss Federal Court, 10.7.2010, Case 4A_458/2009 Adrian Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Limited, Tribunal fédéral, lère Cour de droit civil, 4A_458/2009, 10 June 2010, ASA Bulletin 2010, 520, 533, para. 4.4.7 et seq. The award was recognized under the 1958 New York Convention, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, 13.2.2012, Case 10-24028-CIV-MORENO, Chelsea Football Club Limited v. Adrian Mutu.

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ECJ in Olymique Lyonnais ./. Olivier Bernard, Newcastle United68 Article 45 TFEU shields athletes against unproportional damage.69 However, being a Romanian citizen, the transitorial provisions of the Accession Agreement between the EU and Romania precluded Mutu from the application of Article 45 TFEU.70 Nevertheless, the general principle of proportionality was not sufficiently addressed; neither by the arbitration panel nor by the Federal Tribunal. The arbitration panel avoided any application of the principle by referring to the “specificities of sport”. The Federal Tribunal simply declared that the award would not expropriate the player. The Mutu decision shows an institutional weakness of the control of sports law with regard to the application of EU law: Although CAS decisions are often based on the application of EU law, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, when considering the legality of awards under Article 190 PILA, is not permitted to refer questions to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) under Article 267 TFEU71 as Switzerland is not a member of the European Union. As a consequence, CJEU intervention in sports disputes is largely excluded although the disputes concern the application of EU law within the European Union. From the perspective of EU law this situation must be considered as unsatisfactory. Interestingly, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has recently changed its case law: in Matuzalem, the Federal Tribunal was confronted with a CAS award in the context of enforcement: the footballer Matuzalem had been ordered by an arbitral award of the CAS to pay a huge amount of compensation to his club. As Matuzalem was unable to pay, a CAS arbitration panel went on to order a sanction under Article 64 (4) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code which would have excluded Matuzalem for life from exercising his professional activities.72 The Swiss Federal Court relied on the public policy exception of Article 190 PILA and set aside the award. The court held: “The threat of an unlimited occupational ban based on Art. 64 (4) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code constitutes an obvious and grave encroachment in the Appellant’s privacy rights and disregards the fundamental limits of legal commitments as embodied

___________ 68 CJEU, 16.3.2010, Case C-325/08, Olymique Lyonnais SASP ./. Olivier Bernard, Newcastle United. 69 CJEU, 16.3.2010, Case C-325/08, Olymique Lyonnais SASP ./. Olivier Bernard, Newcastle United, para 44 et seq. 70 Article 38 of the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part did not grant Mutu the right of free movement within the EU, CAS, 31.7.2009, Case 2008/A/1644, Mutu ./. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., para. 131. 71 In Ecco Swiss, the CJEU urged the courts of the EU member states to refer issue of EU law to the Court of Justice in annulment and recognition proceedings, see Hess, Europäisches Prozessrecht und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, JZ 2014 (forthcoming). 72 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 21.3.2012, Case 4A_558/2011, p. 3 et seq.

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in Article 27 (2) of the Swiss Civil Code. Should payment fail to take place, the award under appeal would lead not only to the Appellant [Matuzalem] being subjected to his previous employer’s arbitrariness but also to an encroachment in his economic freedom of such gravity that the foundations of his economic existence are jeopardized without any possible justification by some prevailing interest of the world football federation or its members. In view of the penalty it entails, the CAS arbitral award of June 29, 2011 contains an obvious and grave violation of privacy and is contrary to public policy (Article 190 (2) (e) PILA).”73

This new case law is to be welcomed. It clearly limits the power of international sport federations to enforce arbitral awards and doping sanctions. Usually, sport federations do not need the support of state authorities to enforce their decisions (including the decisions of sports arbitral tribunals): as all federations and clubs are bound by the statutes of the international federation, they must implement the respective decision. If a club retains a banned player, it will be immediately excluded from competitions. Against this background, the Federal Tribunal plays a unique role when exercising a residual control of CAS arbitral awards: it is the only competent state court outside the world of sports providing residual control that the fundamental rights of the athletes will be respected in international sports arbitration proceedings. Therefore, the Federal Tribunal is the “court of last resort” for athletes involved in sports arbitration. It also has the function of being a guardian for the development of lex sportiva. However, the role of the Federal Tribunal is limited by the standards of review of Article 190 PILA.

3. The Mutu Case at the European Court of Human Rights The judgment of the Federal Court may not be the final word: in 2010 Mutu filed a complaint against Switzerland at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).74 Although the ECtHR has not yet decided the case, several complaints concerning sports arbitration are expected to be decided at the end of 2014. It remains to be seen whether the ECtHR will accept or correct the practice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal with regard to the review of arbitration awards given by the CAS. However, from ECtHR case law, one assumption can be made: The ECtHR applies the fundamental freedoms of the European Convention on Human Rights, especially Article 6, closely (and directly) to arbitration and alternative dispute resolution if the parties are not free to choose between litigation in state courts and arbitration. In this situation, arbitration fully replaces adjudication in state courts and must, therefore, totally respect the pro___________ 73 74

Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 213.2012, Case 4A_558/2011, para. 4.3.5 ECtHR, 19.7.2010, Pending Case 40575/10, Adrian Mutu ./. la Suisse.

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cedural guarantees of the Convention. Yet, this circumstance is present when athletes sign arbitration clauses in sports matters: they must sign the agreement in order to qualify and to be nominated for competition.75 Consequently, the ECtHR will certainly closely review the Federal Tribunal case law with regard to the control of CAS sports related arbitration, as the Member States of the European Convention on Human Rights have an obligation to protect individuals against infringements of their conventional rights, even in cases where the infringements are committed by third parties, including other private parties (such as sports federations).

IV. Concluding Remarks As demonstrated above, the last word on the detachment of lex sportiva from control and review by national and international judicial authorities has not been uttered. However, the development of international sports law has been impressive and – all in all – CAS case law has set up the contours of a distinct legal system. Nevertheless, finding the right balance between the protection of athletes’ rights and the interests of sport federations in a highly commercialized environment is an on-going need. Thus, this debate is not expected to end. However, lex sportiva may positively influence this development when arbitral tribunals evolve it in a balanced way which takes into account all interests involved the substantive rights of the individuals and the necessities of sport as an operating system.

___________ 75 See supra at footnote: Athletes actually have no choice but to sign a CAS arbitration clause if they want to participate at e.g. the Olympic Games; see Art. 3 of the Athlete Agreement for the German Olympic Team at the XXII Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014 (Athletenvereinbarung für die Deutsche Olympiamannschaft bei den XXII: Olympischen Winterspielen Sotschi 2014 in conjunction with Art. 61 Olympic Charter [status 9.9.2013] and Art. 13 World Anti-Doping Code [status 2003]); Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, p. 492; cf. Besson, ASA Bulletin 2006, 395, 397 et seq.

Sports Law, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica A Reassessment of Content and Terminology* By Robert C.R. Siekmann Introduction .......................................................................................................

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II. Does such a Thing as “Sports Law” Exist? .......................................................

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III. What is “Sports Law”? ......................................................................................

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Lex Sportiva ..............................................................................................

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Global Sports Law .....................................................................................

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Transnational Sports Law ..........................................................................

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Lex Ludica.................................................................................................

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Public International Sports Law ................................................................

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European Sports Law.................................................................................

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Summary ...................................................................................................

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IV. A Reassessment of Content and Terminology ..................................................

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Terminology ..............................................................................................

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V. Concluding Observations: The Hard Core of Sports Law ................................. 101

I. Introduction What is “sports law”? – This is a question often asked by students, academics, lawyers and lay persons. Anyone who attempts to formulate an answer often searches in vain for a compelling response which demonstrates some modicum of understanding of what “sports law” is. Perhaps the difficulty in articulating a response is, in part, a result of the uncertainty related to the information which is being sought. Is the question intended to focus attention on the content ___________ *

Previously published in 3–4 The International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) 2011, 3 et seqq. (“What is Sports Law? A Reassessment of Content and Terminology”). For this publication, some editorial modifications have been made.

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of the practice of “sports law”? In other words, which substantive areas of practice fall under the rubric of “sports law”? Or is the role of the sports lawyer intended as the principal focus? In this regard, perhaps the object of the question is to uncover information concerning the services provided by a lawyer in this field. Finally, perhaps the inquirer seeks an answer to a more fundamental consideration: does such a thing as “sports law” exist?1 To put this another way: can sports law be considered as an independent substantive area of the law and does it enjoy recognition as such? If so, why? This is actually the primary question that requires answering, because the answer to this question is not unchallenged. Once that question has been answered, the matter of what sports law is can then be addressed. This will be structured as follows: does sports law (a sports law, sports law as an area of law) exist? (see II.), what does sports law consist of? (see III.), a reassessment of content and terminology (see IV.), and what is the “hard core” of sports law? (see V.). The reassessment mentioned before includes my own vision of the subject matter and some of the issues of which sports law consists, partly in the light of a presentation of all existing, previous positions and views in this regard.

II. Does such a Thing as “Sports Law” Exist? Beloff says that the question of whether a “lex sportiva” – which he apparently uses literally in the sense of “sports law”2 – exists is a persistently recurring theme. The matter of whether a cohesive set of rules exists, or whether sports law is nothing more than a mosaic which is arbitrarily constructed from a diversity of generally accepted and separate areas of law – the law of obligations, torts, intellectual property, administrative law – is the subject of continuing debate. The issue is not purely academic (a qualification which cynics are inclined to use in relation to an issue which is regarded as being of no practical importance). Proponents of the first argument (sports law does exist) supposedly advocate this particular view partly out of a wish to enhance the status of the subject3, which does not necessarily mean that advocates of the latter argument (sports law does not exist) can be said to be motivated in any way by a wish to lower that status. In any case, those who advocate the existence of “sports law” choose Latin terminology in order to lend the subject a semblance of classical antiquity, sometimes using the alternative term “lex ludica”4, even ___________ 1 2 3 4

Cf. Davis, What Is Sports Law?, Marquette Sports Law Review 2001, vol. 11, 211. See also below under III.1. By way of oratio pro domo. Cf. also below at III.4.

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though this is a rather unfortunate choice, since it might come across as faintly ludicrous if incorrectly translated (“playful” or “playful law”). The question of whether “sports law” exists is not of enormous importance, but that does not mean that it is unimportant according to Beloff.5 Mitten and Opie remark that the academic study of the law regulating sport is relatively new. In effect, they say, there is no consensus as to whether “sports law” is an independent area of the law or merely the application of general legislation which would be more suitably labelled as “sport and the law” amongst scholars and academics who regularly examine the rapidly-growing body of rules and case law that governs the sports industry. The debate revolves around the question of whether the area displays the unique and coherent characteristics of a separate collection of rules, or whether principles from more established legal disciplines merely appear to be finding particular or special application.6 Davis has outlined a possible assessment framework to assist in answering this question in relation to the subject of “sport and the law”. However, before outlining the framework and criteria, he comments that there are, roughly speaking, three views or positions. The traditional view is that “sports law” does not exist: no separately identifiable body of law exists that can be designated as sports law and the possibility that such a corpus of law will ever develop is extremely remote; according to this interpretation, “sports law” is nothing more and nothing other than an amalgamation of elements from different substantive areas of law that are relevant in the context of sport; the term “sports law” is, then, incorrectly chosen, since sport as an activity is governed by the legal system as a whole;7 The moderate position contends that “sports law” has the capacity to develop into an independent area of law; in 2001, when Davis’ article was published, proponents of this view identified developments that would appear to point in that direction; they drew attention to the de facto unique character of certain issues in sport that require specialised analysis and the application of the law to sport, which is, in some cases, unique; and: Finally it is contended that sports law is a separate area of the law. Supporters of this view highlight the increase in legislation and case law specific to sport as being a sign of this. Commentators argue that those who view sports ___________ 5

Beloff, Is there a Lex Sportiva?, International Sports Law Review 2005, 49. Mitten/Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications For The Development Of International, Comparative, And National Law And Global Dispute Resolution, Marquette University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper no. 10–31, June 2010, p. 3 et seq., especially fn. 6 at p. 4. 7 The classical representative of this position is the eminence grise of sports law in England, Grayson, Sport and the Law, 2nd edition 1994, p. XXXVII. A recent publication in this tradition is, for example, Donnellan, Sport and the Law: A Concise Guide, 2010. 6

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law as a mere amalgamation of various other substantive areas of law ignore the present-day reality that very few substantive areas of the law fit into separate categories that are distinct from and independent of other substantive areas of the law; overlaps exist not only within sports law, but within other areas of law as well; the inter-disciplinary nature of sports law has, in any event, not helped the case for establishing the existence of a separate legal discipline; the supporters of this view also argue that the unwillingness to recognising sports law as a specific and separate body of law appears to reflect the inclination of some intellectuals not to take sport seriously. In this regard, they emphasise the tendency to marginalise the academic study of sports rather than to treat it in the same way any other type of business. The debate regarding the existence of sports law as an independent field of law is not extraordinary, given that questions about the legitimacy of new fields of law are not uncommon. Similar controversy accompanied the emergence of “computer law”, for example. Such diverse areas of the law as employment law, health law and environmental law met with similar doubts until they became generally accepted as specific fields of law. The process of acknowledging a new area of the law is slow because it is connected with a fundamental process of change in society. Inherent in this process of change is the development of new behavioural patterns and forms of cooperation that require acceptance. The matter of whether a particular field of law ought to be recognised as such is not an exact science. The process of identifying, designating and naming areas of the law is a complicated matter and is, to a certain extent, often arbitrary; there is no official recognition procedure. It is a process whereby legal practitioners and academics determine that the law is increasingly being applied to a new area of society. According to Davis8, the answer to the question of whether sports law is recognised as an independent area of the law may ultimately depend upon the perceptions of those practising, teaching and conducting academic research into that sports law. Which factors or criteria can be applied in order to determine whether an independent legal area exists? Davis’ assessment framework contains no fewer than eleven factors. While these factors are a guide, their meticulous application need not necessarily provide a definitive answer to the question of whether an independent sports law discipline exists. The factors are: 1.

Law from other disciplines is applied by courts to a specific context in a unique manner.

___________ 8

Davis (fn. 1), 211–214.

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2.

There are factual peculiarities within a specific context that produce problems which require specialised analysis. 3. Issues involving the proposed discipline’s subject matter must arise in multiple existing common law or statutory areas. 4. Within the proposed discipline, the elements of its subject matter must connect, interact or interrelate. 5. Decisions within the proposed discipline conflict with decisions in other areas of the law and decisions regarding a matter within the proposed discipline have an impact on other matters within the discipline. 6. The proposed discipline must significantly affect the nation’s (or the world’s) business, economy, culture or society. 7. Interventionist legislation develops in order to regulate specific relationships. 8. Legal casebooks that focus on the proposed discipline are published. 9. Law journals and other publications develop that are specifically devoted to publishing writings that fall within the parameters of the proposed field. 10. The proposed field is accepted by law schools. 11. The proposed field is recognised by legal associations, such as bar associations, as a separately identifiable substantive area of the law. Davis himself has not applied this assessment framework explicitly and systematically to sports. Nevertheless, if we apply the above criteria, which are not always clearly formulated, to “sport and the law” as it exists in 2011, there is no doubt that we can conclude that an independent area of the law exists which is fully deserving of the name “sports law”. This is probably most systematically expressed in the term “sport specificity” that has been developed in the context of European law. This term indicates the extent to which the European Court of Justice, in particular, has recognised exceptions to regular law, because in some cases, the rules of organised sport cannot be dispensed of without rendering it impossible to conduct sports competitions in a correct and proper fashion. A now-classic example, which arose in the Lehtonen case9, is the recognition of only two periods of time in a competitive season during which professional footballers can move from one club to another (in the summer, after the end of the season, and during the socalled winter break).10 As such, this rule is contrary to the freedom of movement of workers in the European Union, but without this rule, there would be a risk that falsification of competition would occur because, for example, a club that is in danger of relegation could suddenly be bolstered by a last-minute injection of funds by external backers and would thereby be enabled to buy new ___________ 9 Case C-176/96 – Lehtonen v. Fédération Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basketball, (2000) ECR I-2681. 10 So-called “transfer windows”.

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players – an advantage which may not be available to their competitors at that time. This would compromise the existence of a fair and uniform competition for all participants. It is clear that the particular characteristics of sports organisations deserve special attention, which can lead to exceptions if these characteristics are inevitable. The stipulations set out under factors 1 and 2 are consequently fulfilled. Conflicts (see factor 5) are not always settled in favour of the sports regulation, however. A good example is the 6+5 rule adopted by FIFA. The rule implies that only 5 foreign players may be selected per team in any match; the other players must be domestic players. This rule discriminates on the basis of nationality and, therefore, cannot be applied within the European Union. Such a rule is, however, not indispensable in order to guarantee a strong national team, for example. Talented young or experienced domestic players can also improve their skills abroad. The Dutch national team is a good example of a team comprising many international players who ply their trade in the best foreign leagues, which is of immense benefit to the standard of the national team. The special nature of sport is also expressed by means of the application of factor 7. There are many countries in the world with a general, national sports act. Such countries are generally considered as belonging under the heading of interventionists. The so-called Football Act (Voetbalwet), aimed at combating undesirable behaviour by supporters and other acts of vandalism, is an example of the special regulatory provisions which exist in the Netherlands. Similarly, the international community often makes its voice heard: anti-doping conventions have been accepted by the Council of Europe and UNESCO, for example. There is also broad conformity with the other factors, which are partly of a practical legal nature, rather than a substantive one, such as the publication of legal casebooks, specialised journals, academic teaching and research, as well as the existence of specialised associations, at many places around the world (see factors 8 to 11).11 ___________ 11 Mitten/Opie (fn. 6), p. 3, especially fn. 3 comment that, in spite of the fact that almost all areas of the law – individually and in combination – regulate competition (including such broad and important areas such as competition law, the law of obligations, intellectual property law and employment law), relatively few academics teach sports law or are scholars of sports law. According to the AALS (The Association of American Law Schools) Directory of Law Teachers 2009–2010, there are only 120 professors teaching sports law, while more than 340 specialise in competition law, 1800 in constitutional law and 360 in employment law. These three fields of law are the main areas of public law regulating sport in the United States, which leads to the conclusion that there is scope for a greater focus on sport in these fields of law. See the website of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre (www.sportslaw.nl under “The Centre”) for a global listing of International and National Sports Law Associations, Sports Law Centres and Sports Law Journals.

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There is also sufficient institutional connection – or interrelationship – in organised sports (cf. factor 4). Globally, organised sport is structured in a pyramid shape, with the international federations responsible for each sport, such as FIFA for football and the IOC for Olympic sports, at the top. There is a “world court” for sport, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which is located in Switzerland, and a World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), in which the international community is also officially a stakeholder. This leaves factor 3, the second part of factor 5 and factor 6. Matters that are sports-related occur in many different fields of law. Sports law has an inter-disciplinary character, which would support the existence of an independent field of law (factor 3). It is evident that the internal decisions of sports organisations sometimes impact on another matter within the field of law of which the rules of organised sport form an inextricable part. If, for example, FIFA were to repeal its agents’ rules, there would be automatic repercussions on the rules relating to player transfers as a whole (factor 5, second part). Finally, it goes without saying that, nowadays, sports, and hence sports law, are of considerable economic, cultural and social importance at a national as well as international level. In England, professional football is labelled an “industry”, reflecting the fact that football has become a marketable product and a business sector in its own right. Thanks to commercialisation and the sale of TV rights, huge sums of money now pass hands in professional sport.12 Events such as the Olympic Games and the Football World Cup are watched by billions of people around the world (factor 6). In summary, there is, on the one hand, sufficient phenomenological and legal inter-relationship, and on the other, sufficient external distinctness, to justify deeming “sports law” to be an independent, substantive area of the law.

III. What is “Sports Law”? The proposition that “sports law” exists would, therefore, appear to be a wholly justifiable position to take in 2011, at least if one adheres to the assessment framework provided by Davis. The following question may now be asked: what is sports law, what are the elements of sports law, and what can it be deemed to cover?

___________ 12 Real Madrid, for example, tops the 2010 world ranking list of clubs in terms of annual turnover with more than 438 million euro. In 2010, the total turnover of all professional clubs exceeded four billion euro for the first time (according to data from accountancy firm Deloitte, as published in NRC Handelsblad on 11.02.2011).

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First, however, an observation with regard, in particular, to the nature of sports law should be made. Beloff says that a distinction can be made between “horizontal law” – a body of rules which applies across the full range of relevant human activity – and “vertical law”, which is a body of rules driven by a single human activity. The law of torts and competition law fall into the first category. As in the case of aviation law and banking law, a substantial part of sports law falls into the latter category.13 Focused research of legal scholarship reveals that the following distinctions are expressly made, or the following terminology explicitly used, to designate sports law or sections of it: lex sportiva, global sports law, transnational sports law, lex ludica, public international sports law (“the law of nations of sport”) and European sports law. These categories will be discussed below one by one. It is notable that the term “lex sportiva” occurs repeatedly in many contexts, as though it were a benchmark in this regard. It should be noted that all the authors are, of course, adherents to the position that sports law does exist as an independent substantive area of the law.

1. Lex Sportiva Nafziger comments that, in practice, the arbitral decisions and opinions of the CAS provide guidance in subsequent cases, strongly influence subsequent awards, and often function as precedent. By reinforcing and helping to elaborate on the established rules and principles of international sports law, the growing number of CAS awards is gradually forming a source of that body of law. This source is referred to as “lex sportiva”. He adds that the concept of a lex sportiva is normally limited to the case law of the CAS.14 Foster points out that the CAS itself has recognised the existence of a precedent effect in accordance with its own earlier arbitral awards.15, 16 ___________ 13

Beloff (fn. 5), 52. Nafziger, Lex Sportiva, 1–2 ISLJ 2004, 3; also published under the title “Lex Sportiva and CAS” in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 2006, p. 409. See also Nafziger, International Sports Law, 2nd edition 2004, p. 48. 15 Devyatovski v. IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752. 16 Foster, Lex Sportiva: Transnational Law in Action, 3–4 ISLJ 2010, 20 et seq.; paper presented during the Lex Sportiva Conference at Pelita Harapan Universitas (UPH), on 22.09.2010 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The conference was organised in collaboration with the Indonesia Lex Sportiva Instituta and with the support of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Olympic Committee, the T.M.C. Asser Instituut and the Indonesian football league. 14

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Casini says that the number of arbitral decisions made by the CAS has increased to the point where a set of principles and rules has developed which relate to sport in particular: this “judge-made law” has been given the name “lex sportiva”. This name, which calls to mind well-known designations such as “lex mercatoria” or “lex electronica”, has been readily adopted and its meaning has been extended over time, in order to refer more generally to the transnational law produced by sports organisations.17 Foster comments that, in 2005, the CAS was not sure whether a “lex sportiva” existed at all. The CAS said that it was not prepared to take refuge in such uncertain concepts as that of a “lex sportiva”, as had been advocated by various authors. The exact content and the boundaries of the concept were still far too vague and uncertain to allow it to be used to determine the specific rights and obligations of sports associations towards athletes18. There had been no further references to a “lex sportiva” by the CAS in its published decisions since this statement until the recent arbitral case of Anderson et al v IOC19 which appeared to signal an acceptance of the existence of such a concept.20 Erbsen comments that the CAS has developed a fascinating body of case law that, unfortunately, has acquired a misleading name which obscures its nuances. An increasingly popular interpretation of the history of the CAS in the first two decades of its existence suggested that the CAS had created an entirely new body of international sports law called “lex sportiva”. Commentators have not reached an agreement as to what is meant by “lex sportiva”, but many share the belief that it exists. The term’s inscrutability increases its allure, combining the legitimising cachet of Latin with the malleability of obscure concepts such as “lex” and “sport”. Erbsen goes on to say that the concept of a “lex sportiva” cannot meaningfully describe or explain the jurisprudence of the CAS. When it was first used, the term evoked visions of a new, emerging form of sports regulation that probably helped the CAS to gain recognition and establish itself as a respected and authoritative tribunal. The term has outlived its usefulness, however. Lex sportiva has become a collective term that encompasses many different types of law-making and unites a diverse collection of variables under an ___________ 17 Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva: The Court of Arbitration for Sport “Der Ernährer”, Draft paper for the Max Planck Institute International Conference on “Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Law-Makers”, Heidelberg, 14./15.06.2010, p. 3 (the most recent version appeared as IILJ International Law and Justice Working Paper 2010/5 under the title “The Making of a Lex Sportiva: The Court of Arbitration for Sport ‘The Provider’”, see http://www.iilj.org/publications/2010-5.Casini.asp; see for the final version 12 German Law Journal 1317–1340 (2011), available at http://www.german lawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1363. 18 FIFA v. WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 and 986. 19 Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545. 20 Foster (fn. 16), 20.

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over-simplified heading. Descriptive and normative scholarship in relation to the CAS would benefit from a more subtle interpretation of how the CAS has adapted general legal principles to the circumstances surrounding individual disputes involving athletes and sports officials. According to Erbsen, the idea that the resolution of international sports disputes through arbitration is creating a “lex sportiva” had gained increasing resonance over the previous decade. The term “lex sportiva”, which was only coined in 199021, now appears in the CAS’ official descriptions of itself, in the case law of the CAS, in articles by academic specialists in the field of sports law and by academics who study general international law, in textbooks, in lectures, speeches and presentations given by sports officials, and informally at academic conferences and gatherings of experts in this field. There is, nonetheless, considerable disagreement as to the sources of law and the forms of reasoning that are encompassed by “lex sportiva”, with Erbsen referring in particular to Foster (see below) and Nafziger (see above). In his view, the increasing use of “lex sportiva” as an amorphous euphemism for legal innovations affecting international sport gives rise to problems.22

2. Global Sports Law Foster wonders whether a definable concept called “international sports law” exists and proposes that a distinction be made between “international sports law” and “global sports law”. International sports law can be applied by national courts. Global sports law, on the other hand, implies a claim to immunity from national law. Foster states that some authors have used the concept of “lex sportiva” in a superficial manner in order to describe the globalisation of sports law. He argues that “lex sportiva” should be equated with global sports law. To define “lex sportiva” as global sports law is to opine that “lex sportiva” is a label for permanent self-regulation by international sports federations. It is a demand that national legal systems and international sports law not intervene, and, thus, it opposes the regulation of international sport by public law. Foster further explains his opinion that it is necessary to distinguish between the con___________ 21

McLaren says that the term “lex sportiva” was coined by the acting Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, Matthieu Reeb, at the time of the publication of the first Digest with awards of the CAS in the period 1986–1998. See McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World’s Sports Disputes, Valparaiso University Law Review 2001, 379, fn. 11. In the introduction to the Digest of CAS Awards II 1998–2000, p. XXX, Reeb writes that the Digest of CAS Awards 1986– 1998 recorded the creation of a lex sportiva by means of the arbitral awards granted by the CAS. 22 Erbsen, The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 2006, p. 441, 443 et seq.

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cepts of international and global sports law as follows: international law deals with the relations between states, and can therefore be described as the principles of international public law that are applicable to sport. Global sports law, by contrast, can be defined provisionally as a transnational autonomous legal order created by the global private institutions that govern international sport. Its main characteristics are: first, that it is a contractual legal order and, secondly, that this legal order is not governed by national legal systems. It could therefore be described as a legal order “without a state”. It is a sui generis set of principles that have developed from transnational legal norms based on the rules of international sports federations and the interpretation of those rules. This is a separate legal order that, from a global perspective, is autonomous. It implies that international sports federations cannot be regulated by national courts and governments. They can only be regulated by their own internal institutions or by external institutions which they themselves have created or mandated for that purpose. Foster considers the fundamental distinction between international and global sports law to be crucially important. He has noted that, in recent times, various authors have argued that international sports law is distinct and, in doing so, have described it as “lex sportiva”. This usage confuses and merges international sports law with global sports law, which is contrary to his own definitions.23 Foster comments further that one of the claims made for the work of the CAS is that it is developing a “lex sportiva”. The jurisprudence of the CAS is a body of “international sports law”, it is argued. It involves more than the application of international law or of general legal principles to the resolution of sports disputes. A distinct jurisprudence is emerging, it is claimed; a unique set of universal legal principles that is used by the CAS in adjudicating cases. According to Foster, the concept “lex sportiva” is an imprecise term covering several different concepts. It can be helpful to distinguish different usages. The “lex sportiva” is little more than the proper interpretation and application of the regulations of sports organisations – a lex specialis that is applicable to the governance of international sport because its source exists in the constitutional order created by sports federations to administer sport. In a wider sense, the “lex sportiva” can be extended to those general principles that can be derived from the diverse practice of sports federations and the rules and regulations by which they govern themselves. This is a restricted, but specific use of the concept “lex sportiva”. Foster says that it corresponds roughly to his own definition of a global sports law, which he equates with “lex sportiva”. This concept has several important elements: it is essentially a transnational autonomous private legal order. This legal order consists of the regulatory and constitutional order ___________ 23 Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, Entertainment Law, vol. 2, no. 1, Spring 2003, 1 et seq., 8.

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established by international sports federations. It was created by, and has its origin in, the private global institutions that govern sport and consists of the customs and practices of international sporting federations. Global sports law is a private system of governance with its own global forum, the CAS.24 Casini says that sporting rules are genuine “global law”, because they are spread across the entire world, they encompass both international and national levels, and they directly affect private actors. Hence, the global dimension of sport is, in the first place, normative. A “global sports law” has emerged which consists of the whole body of norms and standards that have been set out and are implemented by sports organisations. Global sports law encompasses the rules that have been set out by central sports institutions such as the IOC, international sports federations and WADA, and by national sports associations such as national Olympic Committees and national anti-doping organisations. Global sports law, therefore, is highly heterogeneous. Casini uses the term “lex sportiva” in the broad meaning of “global sports law”. So the term “global sports law” includes all the definitions that academics have so far provided to describe the principles and rules of sports organisations.25

3. Transnational Sports Law Latty analyses the self-regulation of transnational sport, taking the concept of “transnational law” as his starting point: law made by private parties, without the intervention of states, which extends across their borders, and which is intended to regulate activities in the community concerned. This analysis shows that the “lex sportiva” is constructed from the legal systems of the international sports federations which are, to a certain extent, centralised by the legal order of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), assisted by the activities of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). The “lex sportiva” is comparable to the “lex mercatoria” and the canon law of the global Catholic Church. They constitute global, extranationally applicable rules. Latty assesses the degree of autonomy of the “lex sportiva”. Largely freed from national rules and only embodied in a decentral-

___________ 24

Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984– 2004, 2006, p. 420–421. 25 Casini (fn. 17), p. 2–4.

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ised international legal order, the “lex sportiva” is nonetheless substantially restricted by European law.26

4. Lex Ludica According to Foster, the rules of the game (“sporting law”) can be distinguished as an independent set of norms and standards, separate from the concept of “lex sportiva”. He proposes to call these principles “lex ludica”. They encompass two types of rules that are unique because of the context of sport in which they occur and are applied. One type covers the actual rules of the game and their application, or enforcement, by referees and other match officials. The second type is what can be termed the “sporting spirit” and covers the ethical standards that should be respected by sportspeople. So, the concept of “lex ludica” includes both the official rules of the game and the principle of fair play in sport. They are principles of “internal” sports law and governance.27

5. Public International Sports Law Wax points out that public international sports law, a central component of international sports law, has so far received little attention. Defined in a positive manner, public international sports law can be considered to include all norms of international public law that are applicable to legal issues concerning sport, and according to which the subjects of international public law allow themselves to be directly or indirectly governed. Defined in a negative manner, public international sports law includes all norms that are not connected with the rules and regulations of national and international sports organisations, EU sports law or national sports law. Public international sports law relates in particular to the following four areas: the struggle against apartheid and other forms of discrimination in sport, peacekeeping during the Olympic Games and preventing and combating violence in connection with sporting events (matches), the prevention of and fight against doping in sport and the question of recognising a “right to sport” as a human right. These four areas can, in turn, be subdivided into two categories: the struggle against apartheid (against racism in general) and other forms of discrimination, the question of the recognition of a “right to sport” as a human right as well as the prevention of and fight ___________ 26

Latty, Transnational Sports Law, 1–2 ISLJ 2011, 34 et seqq. See also Latty, La lex sportiva – Recherche sur le droit transnational, Études de Droit International, vol. 3, Leiden-Boston 2007. 27 Foster (fn. 24), p. 421.

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against doping in sport involving the actual practice of sport – in these cases, it is possible to refer to a public international sports law “in the strict sense” of the term. Peacekeeping during the Olympic Games and preventing and combating violence in connection with sporting events (matches) by contrast do not pertain to the practice of sport as such, but are directly related to them (in a spatial sense). This category involves public international sports law “in the broader sense”. Public international sports law is a key component of international sports law. At a time when sport is becoming increasingly “juridified”, public international sports law is the appropriate means of correction for which the internationalisation of sport currently has a need. On the one hand, the statutes and regulations of the international sports organisations find their “doubles partner” in public international sports law for the regulation of international sport. On the other, public international sports law is the most suitable instrument for regulating international sport in precisely these areas (and hence for achieving its goals) which, depending on the nature of the issue, manage to evade the powers of the sports organisations, argues Wax.28

6. European Sports Law Does such a thing as European (EU) sports law exist? Weatherill says that the simple answer to this question is “yes”, but that simple answers tend to be misleading, and that this is the case here, too. There is such a thing as EU sports law in the sense that, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, sport has been expressly recognised as an area in which the European Union has authority to intervene. However, this observation can be misleading in two quite different senses. First, it ignores the fact that, while December 2009 was certainly a notable milestone in the shaping of EU sports law, the relevant newly introduced Treaty provisions are in fact cautiously drafted and limited in their scope. They emphatically do not elevate the EU to the position of “sports regulator” in Europe, so it would be inadvisable to get too excited about them. Secondly, setting the focus solely on the Treaty reforms of 2009 fails to acknowledge that the EU has already exerted an influence on sports governance in Europe for some 35 years. Beginning with its famous judgment in Walrave and Koch in 1974, the European Court of Justice has subjected sport to the requirements of what was then Community (EC) law and is ___________ 28 Wax, Public International Sports Law – A “Forgotten” Discipline?, 3–4 ISLJ 2010, 25, 28; see also Wax, Internationales Sportrecht – Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts, Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht, vol. 90, Berlin 2009.

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now EU law, in so far as it constitutes an economic activity. So, while sport was not brought within the explicit scope of the EU Treaties until December 2009, and although it went unmentioned in the Treaty, it was nonetheless required to comply with EU rules and regulations in so far as it constituted an economic activity well before that date. That meant, primarily, that sporting practices were to be tested using as a yardstick the prohibitions in the Treaty on practices which are contrary to fair competition, which obstruct inter-State trade or which discriminate on the basis of nationality. Thus, an EU sports law has developed as a result of the steady accretion of case law where sporting rules exerted an economic effect and interfered with the fulfilment of the EU’s mission. The EU did not stipulate how sport should be organised, but it did rule out choices that contravened the Treaty. The core of EU sports law is, therefore, an established pattern, with sporting practices being examined to determine whether they comply with the commercial law of the EU, and most clearly in relation to freedom of movement and competition law. When making this assessment, the special characteristics of sport have always been taken into account, and since 2009, that has been explicitly acknowledged in the Lisbon Treaty. However, EU law is anything but broad in scope. There is very little legislation at EU level that pertains directly to sport, and its “negative” effect – the Treaty prohibitions – is primarily focused on practices which are anti-competitive or which obstruct interState trade. The EU has little to do with determining property rights, contract law or crime. So, while there is such a thing as European, or EU, sports law, and while it is of practical and intellectual interest, it is quite different from and far less systematic and comprehensive than one would expect of sports law at national level.29 7. Summary A further analysis of the above overview of the various opinions as to what “sports law” is reveals the following picture: The first thing to note is that the concept of a “lex sportiva” evidently plays a crucial role. It is also the oldest term in the debate. However, there are various interpretations of it by various authors: Nafziger adheres to the “classical” view that the concept of a “lex sportiva” is restricted to the “judge-made law” of the CAS. Erbsen, incidentally, is of the opinion that the term is an unfortunate choice. He also observes that there are various meanings attached to “lex sportiva” which does nothing to aid clarity being achieved in relation to it. ___________ 29

Weatherill, Is There Such a Thing as European Sports Law? Global Sports Law and Taxation Reports (GSLTR) 2010/1, 1 et seqq.; also Wax, 1–2 ISLJ 2011, 38 et seqq. See also Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers, The Hague 2007.

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Foster has introduced the concept of a “global sports law”, suggesting that the concept of a “lex sportiva” be equated with it. Latty talks of a “transnational sports law” in this connection. Both understand the term to mean essentially the same thing: namely, the rules and institutions of the international sports organisations and the accompanying jurisprudence, or case law. Their interpretation of the concept “lex sportiva” is, therefore, broader than that employed by Nafziger, as it covers more than just the jurisprudence of the CAS. In addition, Foster uses the term “lex ludica” to refer chiefly to the rules of the game themselves. Wax has emphasised the importance of assigning public international sports law its own place within international sports law. Finally, European (EU) sports law can be distinguished as a regional public variant (Weatherill).

IV. A Reassessment of Content and Terminology It is evident from the above that the debate in legal scholarship concerning what “sports law” is has, so far, taken place in a manner that is hardly conducive to creating clarity. There is still no cohesive vision that systematically compares and assigns a place to all possible elements and aspects. The purpose of this contribution to the debate is, therefore, to introduce structure in terms of content and terminology so as to engender a reassessment of all elements which will dispel the existing lack of clarity regarding the subject matter.

1. Content First and foremost, it may be assumed that “sports law” (or “a” or “the” sports law, if one wishes) does exist as a separately identifiable field, and hence substantive area of, the law. The concept “sports law” is nevertheless made up of the elements “sport” and “law”. It is “the law of sport”. The first question is therefore: what do we understand by “sport” in this connection? This is followed by the question of what we understand by “law” in this context. What is “sport”? – In order to answer this question there is no need to further examine existing definitions of the concept of “sport” and the choice between them. In this connection, we can limit ourselves to referring functionally to one of the factors in the assessment framework of whether sports law exists: namely, that the various aspects of the subject matter in question connect, interact or interrelate (factor 4). The existence of such a connection, interaction or inter-relationship is most clearly evident in the institutional structure of organ-

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ised sport. Organised sport is transnational by nature. National associations for each sport are affiliated with regional, continental and international, global sports federations. This produces a pyramid structure of federations, with an international federation in charge. If one takes football in the Netherlands as an example, the Dutch football association, the KNVB, regionally UEFA and globally FIFA are in charge. Organisationally and administratively, the sports world spans national borders. In addition to national championships, there are also European and world championships in each sport. Alongside this, there exists an Olympic movement and there are the Olympic Games, which unite all Olympic sports, with the IOC at the head. Both nationally and internationally, organised sport constitutes an independent social sector. “Sports law” therefore pertains above all to the law that applies to organised sport represented in the structure as outlined. This can be both amateur and professional sport. It encompasses competitive sport in which championships can be contested and won at all levels of the pyramid. This means that recreational sports or leisure sports that are not practised competitively or in any organised sense will not initially be studied in the context of sports law, however important they may be from a social perspective. That is not to rule out in advance the study of this type of practice of sport, which may also include physical education at school. However, there is little sense in conducting an academic debate about the precise definition of the concept of sport in this regard. The boundaries are fluid. There is also a grey area between what constitutes “sport” and what is simply a “game”. A response must, naturally, also be formulated where an issue of law arises in relation to what constitutes a “game”. A person who goes out jogging on the road in an independent capacity is only required to observe the rules of the road, and is not subject to any sporting rules. The essence of sport, and hence of sports law, is, however, to be found in the sport that is encompassed by the most suitable response to the question in factor 4 of the assessment framework30. This brings us to the question of what “law” is in relation to “sport”. In principle it can be stated that in the widest sense, all “law” that pertains to “sport” – as the latter concept is explained further above – constitutes “sports law” and is “sports law”. This includes not only all rules and regulations that have been drawn up by organised sport itself, but also all other law that has been accepted by national states and the international community in order to regulate “sport”. This is supplemented by the combined jurisprudence of courts or other lawadministering bodies of organised sport itself, as well as that of “ordinary” courts31, both national and international. If we label the law of sport itself as the ___________ 30 31

Supra II. Civil courts as well as criminal courts.

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“private” part of sports law then it seems obvious that all other law should be designated “public”. Naturally, the private, or autonomous part, has a public base: it concerns the application of general public law, in the context of the law of associations in particular, to the specific social sector known as sport, or it is law that has, at least by definition, been created in the public context. Sports organisations, too, cannot disengage themselves from the regular jurisdictions of which they are a part. If one were to bring together all existing law within a single framework containing the various areas of the law, and were then to introduce sport into this framework, a picture (configuration) would emerge comprising a great many blind spots of varying severity. These are all those areas that are not covered by “sports law”, or areas where the law has not been applied to sport. The International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court in The Hague, for example, have never yet had any involvement in sport, nor is it really conceivable that they should, although, of course, nothing should be ruled out in advance.32 Sports law, therefore, relates solely to a single, specific social sector. Although the public part of sports law is of an incidental nature and the private part, structural, we should begin with a further explanation of what can be considered to belong to the public part, as this part concerns the environment of sport, how it is placed within a broader social framework, and is, by definition, of a higher legal order. The rules and regulations which sport has set itself are intended to legislate the sector from within and, therefore, constitute the private core or essence of sports law. The public part can be divided into national and international sports law. The clearest example of national sports law in a public sense is the national sports law which exists in some fifty countries. There are also countries that have included a provision on sports law in their constitution.33 These are laws of general application that are intended to define the position of sport in society and, hence, to regulate the relationship between government and sport (“sport governance”). It is customary to distinguish between interventionist and non-interventionist countries.34 The Netherlands belongs to the latter group and, therefore, has no provision in its constitution, let alone a sports law. Within Europe, it is the southern countries such as France, Portugal, Italy and Spain where governments have traditionally had more involvement ___________ 32 Cf. as an example of a “casus belli” – in its new meaning of legal proceedings on war – an event such as the border conflict which El Salvador and Honduras waged with one another in the 1960s following a series of football matches which escalated out of control (casus belli in the traditional sense); see Kapuściński, The Soccer War (Wojna futbolowa), 1978. 33 See Soek, Sport in National Sports Laws and Constitutions: Definition, Ratio Legis and Objectives, 3–4 ISLJ 2006, 28–31 and 33–35. 34 Chaker, Good governance in sport – a European survey, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 2004, p. 9–11.

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with sport. Countries where sport is still in its infancy in terms of organisation and/or where sports law is still in the first stage of development attach great importance to having a sports law. Indonesia and China are just two examples in this regard.35 Apart from national, general sports laws, there are also examples of special legislation aimed at a particular field. A well-known example is the Dutch law that specifically targets football hooliganism, also commonly referred to as the Football Act, and which has been drafted along the same lines as its English counterpart.36 There are also special anti-doping laws in Europe and elsewhere.37 One example of national sports legislation that caused much commotion is that of the legislation which criminalised participation in acts of ambush marketing (the “Bavaria girls”) during the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa. In addition to public national sports law, there also exists public international sports law. The revival of the ekecheiria, the longest lasting truce in history and, hence, international law from the earliest times (in the field of sport), has seen the United Nations engage in international peacekeeping during the Olympic Games of the modern era through a series of resolutions which, since 1993, have consistently been passed with a view to preserving the “Olympic Peace” at the forthcoming Olympic Games.38 Between 1968 and 1993, standard resolutions against apartheid in sport were adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 1977 saw the adoption in New York of the International Declaration against Apartheid in Sports, followed by a corresponding UN Convention in 1985. The UN Security Council imposed a sports boycott against ___________ 35 See Law no. 3 of 2006 of the Republic of Indonesia concerning National Sports System. In China, the 1995 Sports Law is currently being reviewed. See Nafziger/Wei, China’s Sports Law, The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. XLVI, 1998, no. 3, 453–483. 36 See Coenen, At Last, a Football Law in the Netherlands?, 3–4 ISLJ 2009, 59–61 and 64–65; Pearson/James, The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders in the Fight against Racism and Violence at Sports Events, in: Gardiner/Parrish/Siekmann (eds.), EU, Sport, Law and Policy: Regulation, Re-regulation and Representation, The Hague 2009, p. 535–554. 37 See Koch, A Comparative Legal Analysis of Anti-Doping Activities – General Framework and Criminal Law Aspects, in: Vieweg/Siekmann (eds.), Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules – Pilot Study for the European Commission, Beiträge zum Sportrecht, vol. 27, Berlin 2007, p. 95–158 (Part II.B: Public Law). 38 Wax, Internationales Sportrecht – Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts, Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht vol. 90, Berlin 2009. Jacobs, Tourism, sports and other forms of leisure from the point of view of international law, General report on the twenty-fourth A.A.A. Congress, Nicosia, 22 to 27 May 1972, Annuaire de l’A.A.A./Yearbook of the A.A.A. 1972/73 vol. 42/43, La Haye/ The Hague 1975, p. 52, says that the Games of Greek antiquity were an early example of the influence of sport on the development of international law, and that these Games can therefore be seen as one of the first steps towards the creation of true international law between ethnically related, but completely autonomous, city states.

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South Africa due to its implementation of the apartheid regime. The global UNESCO Convention of 2005 aims to combat doping in sport. At a regional level, the Council of Europe adopted an anti-football hooliganism convention as early as 1985, followed by an anti-doping convention in 1989.39 In addition, the sports provision in article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty is another recent example of “public regional sports law” which can, incidentally, be classified under European (EU) sports law.40 At EU level, too, sports boycotts have been imposed in the past, an example being the boycott of Nigeria.41 Finally, reference is made in this connection to the international Nairobi Treaty on the protection of the Olympic Symbol of the five rings (1981). The rules and regulations which sport has set itself (the private, autonomous, non-governmental part of sports law) can be divided first into Olympic law and then into the law of the national, regional and international organisations for each sport. The law of the Olympic Movement (Lex Olympica) is laid down in the Olympic Charter and all other documents associated with it.42 The law of the sports organisations can be divided into the rules of the game (in football: Laws of the Game), which are applied uniformly around the world, on the one hand, and constitutions, rules and regulations pertaining to administrative (institutional) and thematic aspects of the sport concerned, on the other. Competition regulations can also be included in this category.43 Many rules have a transnational character, meaning that they are must be applied up to national level, or ___________ 39

For more on the activities of the Council of Europe in the field of sport, see Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Council of Europe and Sport: Basic Documents, The Hague 2007. Regarding the combating of football hooliganism in the European Union, see Siekmann/Gardiner/Soek/Olfers/Mojet, Football Hooliganism with an EU Dimension: Towards an International Legal Framework, Final Report AGIS Programme 2003, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague 2004; see also Mojet/Siekmann, Legal Aspects of Combating Football Hooliganism in Europe, in: Gardiner/Parrish/Siekmann (eds.), EU, Sport, Law and Policy: Regulation, Re-regulation and Representation, The Hague 2009, p. 499–533. 40 See Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The European Union and Sport: Legal and Policy Documents, The Hague 2005; regarding the “sports article” in the Lisbon Treaty: Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy, Study for the European Parliament, commissioned to the T.M.C. Asser Instituut and Edge Hill University and Loughborough Universities, September 2010. For a comparison of types of “continental sports law” see Nafziger, A Comparison of the European and North American Models of Sports Organisation, 3–4 ISLJ 2008, 100–108; see also Weatherill, Resisting the Presuures of “Americanization”: The Influence of European Comminity Law on the “European Sport Model”, in: Greenfield/Osborn (eds.), Law and Sport in Contemporary Society, London 2000, p. 155 et seq.; also included in Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers, The Hague 2007, p. 155–176. 41 See Siekmann, The Sports Boycott of Nigeria: Sports, Politics and Human Rights, 1–2 ISLJ 2008, 121–124. 42 See Mestre, The Law of the Olympic Games,The Hague 2009. 43 See Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Basic Documents of International Sports Organisations, The Hague/Boston/London 1998.

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ought to be converted into a corresponding set of national rules and regulations. A good example in the anti-doping field is the WADA Code, which, to a certain extent, can also be characterised as “semi-public” because national governments are officially involved in administering the WADA, and because the Code has effectively been legitimised by the UNESCO Convention against doping in sport.44 The doping rules of the Netherlands Institute of Sports Jurisprudence (Nederlandse Instituut Sportrechtspraak) is an almost entirely faithful copy of the WADA Code. Thus, the WADA Code must be largely or fully complied with in the application of the doping rules of the Netherlands Institute of Sports Jurisprudence. In the past, each national sports association and international sports federation had its own doping rules. This was the case until 2004, when harmonisation was achieved by means of the WADA Code.45 Further well-known examples in the field of football are the rules regarding the status and transfer of professional footballers and regarding players’ agents, which will soon be abolished.46 At a regional level, reference can be made to, for example,the safety and security regulations of UEFA, the European football federation, which regulations are of particular importance in combating football hooliganism. In sport, the role fulfilled by criminal law and “ordinary” courts in civil disputes in regular society is assigned to disciplinary bodies and forms of arbitration at the various levels for each sport.47 In this system, the Court of Arbitration for Sport performs the general function of “International Court for Sports”, while also acting as the appeal court in doping cases.48 Football has its own important international body for resolving disputes in transfer matters: FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber.49 ___________ 44 See Casini, Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), International Organizations Law Review 6 (2009), 421–446; see in general David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code – A Fight for the Spirit of Sport, Cambridge 2008. 45 Siekmann/Soek/Bellani (eds.), Doping Rules of International Sport Organisations, The Hague 1999. See also Soek, Sport Rules and Regulations, in: Vieweg/Siekmann (eds.), Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules – Pilot Study for the European Commission, Beiträge zum Sportrecht, vol. 27, Berlin, p. 159–560 ). 46 See Siekmann/Parrish/Martins/Soek (eds.), Players’ Agents Worldwide: Legal Aspects, The Hague 2007. 47 See Siekmann/Soek, Arbitral and Disciplinary Rules of International Sports Organisations, The Hague 2001; see also Blackshaw, Sport, Mediation and Arbitration, The Hague 2009. 48 Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, The Hague 2006. 49 See de Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, The Hague 2009.

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2. Terminology “Sports law” can, therefore, be said to consist of public and private national, regional and international (in the sense of universal, global) sports law. Strictly speaking, the term “lex sportiva” could be used to cover the concept of sports law in its entirety, since “lex sportiva” literally means “sports law” and, as such, is a neutral designation. The “exotic” nature of the Latin term means it could also be regarded as being ideally suited to its designation, since it lends it a very distinctive and exclusive character (cf. lex mercatoria). The term purportedly underlines that sports law is something distinct, a separately identifiable field, and hence, substantive area of, the law. However, several objections may be raised against the use of “lex sportiva” in this general, broad meaning. For example, that this innovation goes too far, leading as it does to further terminological confusion which is in no one’s interest. From a purely academic perspective, this may be correct: after all, every researcher is entitled to develop his own new conceptual framework as well as what he considers to be appropriate terminology in that regard, provided he gives his reasons for doing so. In this case, however, it would not be very practical to act in this way. Firstly: sports law, or sections of it, is not taught at university level anywhere under the name “lex sportiva”.50 In literature, moreover, one finds agreement as to at least one thing; namely that “lex sportiva”, while it may not pertain exclusively to the jurisprudence of the highest judicial body in sport, the CAS (Nafziger), nevertheless encompasses nothing more than the autonomous rules of organised sport itself and the associated jurisprudence (private sports law) (Foster, Latty). It is important not to disrupt a conceptual framework that has already developed, and about which, as in this case, consensus exists to a certain extent, in order to advance with one’s own brand of reasoning. A pragmatic approach is preferable here. In a non-public law context, “lex sportiva” is “global sports law” (Foster), or – even better – “transnational sports law” (Latty), since it is not limited solely to the global level nor to the international and regional levels. Lex sportiva can – to continue the Latin terminological thread – indeed be said to consist of lex sportiva internationalis (universalis), regionalis and nationalis. However, thanks to the transnational, cross-border, or even supranational character, if one will, of the private part of sports law, this part of sports law constitutes de facto a single, continuous body of law. Anyone referring in a general sense to international sports law is, implicitly, also referring to its national variant. Unlike international public law, private sports law knows no boundaries. There is nothing comparable to the sovereignty of national states in the sports world. While sport may be organised along national lines, the boundaries be___________ 50

The Lex Sportiva Institute in Jakarta, Indonesia, is the only one of its kind. It was founded several years ago and is a private initiative of a law firm that is not officially connected with any university.

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tween the associations are, in effect, nothing more than dotted lines (by comparison, national boundaries are rather more comparable to solid lines). The clearest example of this is provided by the rules of the game for each sport. The rules of football, as adopted and expounded by FIFA, are the same all over the world, making it unique in this sense. As law consists not just of legislation, but also of jurisprudence, or case law (“judge-made law”), I prefer the broad meaning of “lex sportiva” to a strict usage of the term (CAS). Law, however, is not just formal, written law, but also practices or customs from which customary law may have arisen. This is rarely addressed, if at all, in the “sports law debate”. This source of law can, however, also operate in the private sector. An interesting example of the question as to whether customary law exists is provided by the rules of football. It is customary – i.e. it is seen as a moral duty (fair play) – for a player with the ball to hit the ball out of the play if an opponent is lying injured on the ground and unable to play on. It is then customary – i.e. the opponent has the sporting duty – not to give the ball to one of his own players from the throw-in, but to return it to the other team that had kicked the ball out of play. The party awarded the throw-in derives that right from the fact that the other team had knocked the ball out of play, constituting an infringement: the ball should remain in play, otherwise it is not possible to play football. This unwritten rule may well be “soft law” rather than customary duty and law, since the referee does not have the power to enforce this unwritten rule of fair play. Or can he claim this power by innovatively invoking the principle of “improper behaviour” (formerly ungentlemanly conduct, now unsporting behaviour) which is explicitly provided for by the laws of the game51? After all, the custom of giving the ball back is based on a gentlemen’s agreement. But how, then, should the game be restarted? Perhaps by having the throw-in taken by the other team? The laws of the game make no provision for this. By awarding a direct free kick to the other team? That is not possible, since the ball would not be validly returned into play. The player taking the throw-in could be given an official caution (yellow card), if one were to reason along these lines. Or is the offence deemed to have taken place at the moment the teammate receives the ball, so that a free kick would be possible? If this were the case, then who should be shown a yellow card? The player taking the throw-in, or the player receiving the ball from the throw-in, or both? It is very rare for a throw-in to be taken “mistakenly” or “incorrectly” – even in professional football. When this does happen, it is greeted by loud disapproval from opponents and spectators alike.52 The custom of hitting the ball out of play ___________ 51 See Law 12 Rules of the International Football Association Board (Fouls and Misconduct). 52 The most famous example of the ball not being returned to the other team occurred on 13.02.1999 during the FA Cup tie between Arsenal and Sheffield United, when Nwankwo Kanu, making his debut for Arsenal, mistakenly took a ball from a teammate

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when an opponent is injured is coming under pressure nowadays, however, because it is increasingly assumed that in professional football, it is the referee’s duty to stop play. This is, of course, correct, but only in cases of serious injuries. There is, therefore, a tendency to play on when an opponent is lying injured on the pitch. Might he just be feigning injury, for example, in order to break up the opponent’s rhythm? Professional footballers do not throw the ball straight to an opposing player, anyway, but to a teammate who then kicks the ball as far as possible towards the opponent’s goal or another safe area, so as not to incur any disadvantage from the custom. The rules, or laws, of the game are, nonetheless, distinguished as a separately identifiable category of sports law (Foster). However, I consider “lex ludica” – a similarly “exotic” term, due to its evidently Latin roots – to be a subspecies of the “lex sportiva” rather than a type of sports law alongside it. The direct inter-relationship is best illustrated by the example of the footballer who is ordered to leave the field of play after being given a red card by the referee, and who can, subsequently, be given a one- or two-match ban as a disciplinary measure. The fact that rules of the game which are not assessed by any “ordinary” court as such are most autonomous in practice may be a particular feature of those rules, but that does not justify them being considered an entirely independent category, or even being excluded from the purview of sports law. In my opinion, “sports law” in the broader sense consists of more than “lex sportiva” and the subspecies “lex ludica”. It should also be seen as encompassing the public part (national, regional and international). There is no generally accepted, specific terminology in use for this part and its sub-parts. The Dutch term “sportvolkenrecht” (Wax) is the only suggestion which has been made so far, but, when translated into the lingua franca of international sport (i.e. English) it is rendered quite unusable in a terminological sense: “public international sports law”, “the law of nations of sport”? Nor should we forget the national variant (“public national sports law” or “national public sports law”?). On the other hand, “European sports law” (Weatherill) has become a standard term. We know that this does not refer to the private regional variant of “lex sportiva”. Nevertheless, in order to produce a comprehensive nomenclature for the entire field of “sports law”, one might want to consider the following solution in an attempt to unravel the terminological knot. Admittedly, it is a theoretical, purely academic solution that runs contrary to what is generally understood by the terms “lex sportiva” (the law of sport) and “lex ludica” (the rules, or laws, ___________ that was intended for the opponent and crossed it for Marc Overmars to score the winning goal. Arsenal manager Arsène Wenger subsequently offered to have the match re-played. The match was, indeed, replayed, and Arsenal won again, 2-1.

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of the game). “Lex sportiva” would stand for public sports law (the “law” that governments set on sport), which can be divided into “lex sportiva nationalis” and “lex sportiva internationalis” (or “regionalis”, such as European (EU) sports law), and “lex ludica” which would then designate sporting rules and the rules, or laws, of the game (the “law” that sport sets for itself), which might also be divided inter alia into “lex ludica nationalis”, “internationalis” (or “regionalis”), with the laws of the game belonging qualitate qua to the “lex ludica internationalis”. This solution would be based on the idea that we have only two “termini technici” in sports law: “lex sportiva” and “lex ludica” (along with “Lex Olympica”, of course, as the designation for the law relating to an international series of competitive events). The advantage of using the neologisms “lex sportiva” and “lex ludica” in this sense is that they are commonly-used, international technical terms which, as Latinisms, do not require translation into various national languages. As such, they are even more suitable than the umbrella label “sports law”, which is derived from English. Finally, why use the term “lex sportiva” for the public part and the term “lex ludica” for the private part? Could they not just as easily be used in a different manner, i.e. the other way round? The reason is that, in terms of their literal meanings, “lex ludica” is closer to sport as a game (and that is, after all, the basis of sport as it is practised, the “hard core” constituted by the rules, or laws, of the game) and “lex sportiva” as a more general, more neutral term is by definition further-distanced from this designation, and lends itself more readily to association with “government”. The sharp “bright line” definition and designation of an area of the law could, incidentally, also be added as an additional (X) factor to Davis’ assessment framework. If this X factor is then applied to the present area, “sports law”, then the outcome is not entirely positive, as is evident from the above.

V. Concluding Observations: The Hard Core of Sports Law In Davis’ assessment framework, which I took as my reference point in order to determine whether such a thing as “sports law” exists, and to which the answer was “yes”, it is evidently factors 1, 2, 5 and 7 (the unique application of law from other disciplines to sport; the specific, and, from a legal viewpoint, problematical, context of sport; the conflicting nature of the rules of sport with other areas of the law; the interventionist legislation existing in the area of sport which would also, therefore, include conventions enacted by way of international legislation) that chiefly determine the response to this question. They can be considered as the “hard core” of the assessment framework. These are all factors or criteria that determine the distinctive nature of an area of law relative to the legal environment of other areas of the law. They are, therefore, not only

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relevant in determining whether or not sports and law make up “sports law”; in other words, whether sports law exists. It can, however, also be argued that these factors determine where the “hard core” of the content of sports law is to be found. The core question as to why sports law exists, as to why sports law is sui generis, also constitutes the core matter of what sports law is, i.e. what makes it special. Of course, all sports law – as described above in IV.1. and furnished with its own terminology in IV.2. – is, by definition, special, since it pertains to all law that is related to sport. But that should not be a reason in itself to practice sports law as an intellectually interesting, academic discipline. I am not, therefore, concerned here with this sports law “in the broader sense”. What interests me is the dynamism that occurs when sporting rules are tested against the general norms of regular society, and the – actual or optimal – outcome. How do the rules by which the subculture of organised sport regulates itself fit into the legal framework of the rest of society? From the perspective that has been outlined above, the emphasis is placed on the study of “judge-made law”. As the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is both the ultimate and the key body in this regard globally, it is understandable that Nafziger is keen to use the term “lex sportiva” for the jurisprudence of the CAS alone. Sporting rules are applied and interpreted by the CAS in the light of regular, general social legislation and regulations. This can be illustrated by the following example: according to the disciplinary law of UEFA, the European football federation, clubs are responsible for the conduct of their supporters. In the “football hooliganism” case of Feyenoord Rotterdam versus UEFA53, the CAS confirmed this rule, even in cases where the club is not to blame for the misconduct of its fans. UEFA’s rule and the arbitral award granted by the CAS which confirms the rule are clearly incompatible with the fundamental principle under the rule of law and criminal procedure of “no punishment without guilt”. In his doctoral thesis on sports law54, Soek successfully defended the position that disciplinary procedural law in relation to doping offences must be regarded as pseudo-criminal law and the praesumptio innocentiae set forth in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is applicable to doping-related disciplinary law. He concludes that, consequently, the application of the principle of “strict liability” with its presumption of “automatic” liability is contrary to this.55 In this case, the CAS upholds a sporting rule in spite of all the objections raised (the club had done everything in its power and could not reasonably ___________ 53

Feyenoord Rotterdam v. UEFA, CAS 2007/A/1217. Soek, The Strict Liability Principle and the Human Rights of Athletes in Doping Cases, The Hague 2006. 55 For a detailed elaboration on this issue in relation to the Feyenoord/UEFA case, see Mojet/Siekmann, Legal Aspects of Combating Transnational Football Hooliganism in Europe, in: Gardiner/Parrish/Siekmann (eds.), EU, Sport, Law and Policy, The Hague 2009, p. 530–531. 54

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have been expected to prevent this misconduct; the so-called supporters were not members of the club, or even of the official supporters club, and, moreover, the European match at which they caused a disturbance took place abroad in France). It is, however, uncertain whether this sporting rule would stand the test of criticism before a state court. The CAS produces “judge-made law” of private origin and thereby contributes to the development and refinement of sports law. The CAS is usually regarded as an independent body, although in actual fact it is closely affiliated with international organised sport, and the IOC, in particular. As far as I am aware, incidentally, the jurisprudence of the CAS has not yet resulted in the “export” of specific legal doctrines or principles to other sectors and areas of the law for the purpose of their enrichment. European sports law is largely based on the “judge-made law” of the European Court of Justice. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice stretches from the “landmark cases” Walrave via Bosman and Meca-Medina56 to the most recent Bernard case57 regarding compensation for clubs providing training to players in professional football. This has led to the development of a body of case law based on the underlying principle of respect for the autonomy of sports associations and their rules, provided that these rules and decisions are sustainable in the light of the particular characteristics of the sport, and hence the granting of exceptions to EU law is justifiable.58 The question of so-called “sport specificity” was also addressed in the Bernard case. In this regard, the European Court of Justice accepted that, in principle, compensation for providing training to talented young footballers is necessary in order to maintain the profession, although such a mechanism is actually in conflict with the freedom of movement of workers, or rather, the freedom of workers to change employer. Weatherill59 questions the judgment. The prospect of receiving compensation for providing training might equally well encourage universities or supermarkets to recruit new talent and to train young employees. Why is football any different, and ought this be permitted in this sector? ___________ 56

Case C-36/74 – Walrave and Koch (1974) ECR I-1405; Case C-415/93 – Bosman (1995) ECR I-4921; Case C-519/04 – Meca-Medina and Majcen (2006) ECR I-6991. 57 Case C-325/08 – Bernard (2010) ECR I-2177. 58 See Parrish/Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in European Union Law, The Hague 2008. It should be noted that in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice regarding “sports betting” (nine cases from Zenatti (1999) to Carmen Media (2010)), it is not sport specificity, but rather national lottery legislation and policy that is tested against EU law; see Siekmann, Sports Betting in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, 1–2 ISLJ 2011, 97 et seqq. and also in: Anderson/Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds), Sports Betting: Law and Policy, The Hague 2012 59 Weatherill, The Olivier Bernard Case: How, if at All, to Fix Compensation for Training Young Players?, 1–2 ISLJ 2010, 3–6.

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The European Court of Justice does not always endorse existing sporting rules and decisions. It sets the limits upon what is permissible and what is impermissible. The clearest example of a rejection of sporting rules was, of course, the well-known Bosman case which led to the abolition of the transfer system and the nationality clauses in professional football in Europe. This ruling caused nothing short of a revolution in professional football, as it meant that footballers were free to move on after the expiry of their contract without their “former” club being entitled to any fee from their “new” club. The judgment held that this was also the case regardless of their nationality, insofar as they moved as an EU citizen within the EU. Many open questions have been clarified by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in cases where sporting rules have been held up to the light. The European Commission has also made a contribution in the form of its decision-making in this regard, particularly in relation to competition law with regard to the collective sale of TV rights. Nevertheless, numerous questions as to whether a particular sporting rule is indeed compatible with EU law remain unanswered. A recent example may serve to illustrate this: in recent years, the European Commission has received a raft of complaints from individual sportsmen and women about discrimination on the basis of nationality when competing in events in another EU Member State. In this context, the question as to whether one may take part in national championships in other EU countries is, of course, explosive. Is the scope of the ban on discrimination so wide that it also allows one to “hack into” sporting events that were traditionally reserved for citizens of the country in question? It is a question that has disturbed the peace of mind of the sporting world, although there are countries (in Scandinavia, for example) where this is already possible. Anyone required to provide answers to these types of question finds that they must also respond to the preliminary, non-legal demand for the facts. Sports lawyers are required to know a great deal about how sport is structured and how it works. Although he need not have smelled the proverbial odour of the locker room for himself, it is nonetheless considered an advantage when applying for a job within the sector. Aspects that are evidently relevant in this case are, for example, the question of the relationship between the national championships and qualification for European and World Championships or the Olympic Games. This is important, since in order to be allowed to compete at this level, the athlete must hold a national passport for the country he or she is representing. If an athlete from another country “blocks” his or her progress during the national championships that grant direct qualification in the particular sport in question, this would constitute a falsification of competition. This can occur if a fellow countryman has not met a better foreign competitor and thereby wins the national championships. Swimming is a non-contact sport, so no problems arise there. One swims in order to register one’s own time in one’s own lane. Judo, however, is a

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“combat sport” in which participants eliminate each other in a series of knockout rounds. If a competitor finds himself in the half of the draw with the better foreign competitor, then he will not reach the final. Tennis and badminton are also examples of sports with eliminating or knock-out rounds, as is boxing. The conclusion must be that it is easier to justify a ban on participation in “qualifying” national championships by non-national competitors in such sports, thereby possibly enabling an exception to EU law to be made.60 In summary, it can be concluded that: (1) sports law exists, (2) it has a public and a private part, (3) it is proposed to name the public part “lex sportiva” and the private part “lex ludica”, and (4) the “hard core” of sports law is chiefly “judge-made law” emanating from the European Court of Justice as the public judge, or court (regional), and from the Court of Arbitration for Sport as the private court (global).

___________ 60

See Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, Commissioned by the European Commission to the T.M.C. Asser Instituut and Edge Hill and Leiden Universities, December 2010.

Transnational Sports Law By Franck Latty* I.

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 107 

II. The Existence of Sports Law ............................................................................ 107  III. Transnational Sports Law ................................................................................. 109  1.

The Wide Conception: Jessup’s Transnational Law .................................. 110 

2.

The Hybrid Conception: Transnational Law as the Law Governing Mixed Relations......................................................................................... 113 

3.

The Private Conception: Transnational Law as a Form of Global Sectoral Self-Regulation .......................................................................................... 117 

IV. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 120

I. Introduction Certain legal expressions are common in everyday usage, both in doctrine and in practice, as though their meaning were obvious, despite the conceptual vagueness that continues to surround them. The notion of “transnational sports law” undoubtedly falls into this category. In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that, regardless of the meaning given to the expression, the addition of the adjective “transnational” has conceptual virtues that provide sports law with a pertinent analytical framework.

II. The Existence of Sports Law It remains necessary, however, to confirm the existence of “sports law”, a phenomenon which is not recognised by a certain school of thought. E. Grayson, for instance, has emphatically rejected its existence: ___________ * Previously published in 1–2 The International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) 2011, pp. 34–38 (“Transnational Sports Law”). For this publication, some editorial modifications have been made.

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“No subject exists which jurisprudentially can be called sports law. As a soundbite headline, shorthand description, it has no juridical foundation; for common law and equity create no concept of law exclusively relating to sport. Each area of law applicable to sport does not differ from how it is found in any social or jurisprudential category […].” 1

Rejecting the idea of sports law, these authors entitle their discipline “Sports and the Law”, which consists of an analysis of the manner in which the law – namely state law (e.g. employment law, contract law, criminal law, etc.) – applies to the sporting domain. At best, some of these authors recognise that the particularities of sport give rise to an independent offshoot of state law.2 This restrictive doctrinal approach can be criticised for at least two reasons: First of all, it is only of relevance for certain countries – generally common law jurisdictions – which have not adopted legislation in the sporting domain. However, other states – often civil law jurisdictions – have legislated for this area. This is the case in France, which, since the second half of the 20th century, has developed an increasingly dense body of legislation that is now grouped together in a sporting code3 which covers numerous aspects of sporting activities. The code essentially allocates responsibilities to government, regional authorities, associations, companies, federations, the National Olympic Committee, etc. in terms of the organisation of sporting activities and specifies the rights and obligations of the various parties involved (athletes, trainers), as well as the organisation of the anti-doping effort; it also regulates the practice of sporting activities (sports facilities, insurance, hygiene and safety, etc.) and includes other measures relating to the funding of sport. French law even operates a form of nationalisation of the national federations by means of a system of public service delegation: although the federations retain association status under private law, their decisions are regarded as administrative decisions and come under the competence of an administrative judge. Undoubtedly, therefore, there exists within French sports a type of law of state origin, to which the sporting standards of the federations apply, thus invalidating the theory of “Sports and the Law”. Secondly, the “Sports and the Law” theory is state-centred, ignoring the law produced by sporting bodies, whether they are international (in particular, the ___________ 1 E. Grayson, Sport and the Law, 2nd edition, London, Butterworths, 1994, p. xxxvii. See also the presentation in favour of sports law given by authors: S. Gardiner/ J. O´Leary/R. Welch/S. Boyes/U. Naidoo, Sports Law, London/Sydney, Cavendish, 1998, pp. 71 and 72; R. Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 6 et seq. 2 T. Davis, What is Sports Law, Marquette Sports Law Review, vol. 11, 2000–2001, pp. 211 et seq. 3 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071318& dateTexte=20120928.

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international federations and the International Olympic Committee) or national in scope. However, it is these bodies which, even before the states, organise the countless aspects of sporting competition (rules of play, technical rules, qualification of athletes, anti-doping rules, in some cases the status and contracts of athletes, etc.). The view that these standards cannot claim to have the quality of legal rules is a highly restrictive conception of the law which is well out of step with the realities on the ground. The “Sports and the Law” theory has its roots in the state positivism that necessarily links the law to the state, the sole entity capable of imposing compliance by means of physical constraint.4 However, pluralist theories have demonstrated that neither power nor law are linked to the state in essence, but that they manifest themselves in any organised social group, whether it be pre-, infra-, supra- or para-state.5 From this perspective, it becomes clear that sporting bodies do, indeed, produce legal rules – a fact which in no way prejudices the degree of autonomy they have with regard to the law emanating from the states.

III. Transnational Sports Law Once the existence of sports law, resulting both from public (state or even, by extension, inter-state) and private sources (the rules of sporting bodies), has been confirmed, it is then necessary to analyse what the adjective “transnational” adds to or takes away from the concept. An e contrario approach would permit the exclusion of sports law of national scope from the concept. If the idea of transnationality involves transcending a defined national territory, both the state rules applicable to sport and the rules of the national sporting bodies must be set aside. It should, however, be noted that the rules of the national federations are often a mere transposition of the rules laid down by the international federations. Transnational sports law can also be distinguished from international sports law,6 as the concept of international law (interpreted as international public law) originally referred to the law applicable to inter-state relations. With the diversification of international society, international law now involves more varied subjects (intergovernmental organisations and private bodies, to a certain ___________ 4

See the writings of Kant, Hegel, Carré de Malberg, Kelsen etc. See in particular S. Romano, L’ordre juridique, 2nd edition, Paris, Dalloz, 2002, particularly p. 81; M. Virally, La pensée juridique, Paris, LGDJ, 1960, chapter XV on the pluralism of legal orders. 6 Contra, see J.A. Nafziger, International Sports Law, 2nd edition, Transnational Publ. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 2004, p. 376, for whom the conception of international sports law is close to that which set out in the first part of this paper. 5

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extent) and generally governs the status of or relations between these bodies. International law still intervenes only infrequently in the field of sport, so that, logically, the sporting bodies are not characterised as subjects of international law – with the possible exception of the International Olympic Committee, which has succeeded in obtaining quite unique status, not dissimilar to that of the International Committee of the Red Cross.7 As the a contrario approach proves insufficient in providing a sufficiently precise definition of the concept of transnational sports law, a positive definition becomes inevitable. If we depart from the sporting domain for a moment, it appears that the notion of transnational law, which is very common in legal literature and even in practice, is characterised by an ambiguity which, far from constituting an obstacle to its application to the field of sport, on the contrary, helps to highlight the diversity of the legal phenomenon that is sports law. Three meanings can be drawn from this: a wide meaning, based on Jessup’s theory, covering any rule with external scope (I); a hybrid meaning, characterising the legal relations between public and private entities (II); and a strictly private meaning, referring to the sectoral rules produced by self-regulated private global parties (III). While the last of these is the most meaningful from a conceptual point of view, the fact remains that the first two help to illustrate the varied dimensions of sports law.

1. The Wide Conception: Jessup’s Transnational Law The spread of the expression “transnational law” within legal circles owes a great deal to the book of the same name published in 1956 by the renowned American lawyer, Philip Jessup, who went on to become a judge in the International Court of Justice during the 1960s. Mindful of going beyond the traditional distinctions between internal law and international law, and between public and private law, Jessup proposes the grouping together under a single description of all rules with an extra-national dimension: “I shall use, instead of ‘international law’, the term ‘transnational law’ to include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”8

___________ 7 F. Latty, Le Comité international olympique et le droit international, CEDIN, Perspectives internationales n° 21, Paris, Montchrestien, 2001, xix + p. 235. 8 Ph.C. Jessup, Transnational Law, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956, p. 2.

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Apart from the rules of public international law and the national rules of private international law, the concept also encompasses internal law with international scope – public and private (civil or criminal) – and the principles applied to legal relations forged directly between private bodies. Defined in this way, transnational law embraces all legal rules that exceed the framework of a single national legal order, independently of their origin. Through this emphasis of the existence of standards that were little known at the time, such as the law of international organisations or the general principles resulting from arbitration case law, Jessup raised the issue of the traditional boundaries of international law, which is a success still palpable today in terms of the theory of transnational law. Applied to sports law, Jessup’s transnational law would make it possible to group all standards into a single set “which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers” in the area of sport. The private rules of the international federations and the International Olympic Committee would thus sit alongside the small number of rules which stem from the international legal order, such as the 2005 UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport, the conventions of the Council of Europe against doping and violence in stadiums, and the texts imposing a sporting embargo on certain nations (United Nations Convention against Apartheid in Sport of 10 December 1985, Resolution 757 (1992) of the Security Council imposing an embargo on Yugoslavia). To this list can be added the numerous soft law texts adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, UNESCO and other international bodies9. Finally, the state rules likely to be applied to transnational sporting relations, for instance, the Swiss law on associations – the IOC and most international federations have their headquarters in Switzerland – would also come under transnational sports law. Nonetheless, Jessup’s theory is not intended to be merely descriptive, as his proposal consists of suggesting that any judge (national or international, public or private) faced with a dispute transcending state borders should be able to choose the rule of transnational law for the resolution of the dispute which they regard as being most commensurate with reason and justice.10 From this perspective, Jessup’s theory has been as successful as had been anticipated, due to the fact that each judge is an organ of an established legal order, meaning that he or she does not have the latitude to import external standards at will. It will ___________ 9 On international sports law, see infra A. Wax, Public international Sports Law – A “Forgotten” Discipline?, International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) 2010, pp. 25 et seq. and F. Latty, La lex sportiva – Recherche sur le droit transnational, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, pp. 652 et seq. 10 See Ph.C. Jessup, op. cit. (fn. 8), pp. 106 et seq.

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now be examined, however, whether this could be otherwise in relation to sport specifically. There is no doubt that, if a sport-related dispute is being heard by a judge at a state court – which is becoming a rarer phenomenon, due to the fact that recourse to the CAS is becoming more frequent –, that court would give precedence to its national law and take the applicable international law into account only if its constitution acknowledged its value,11 while the laws of another state would be implemented if the mechanisms of private international law referred to it.12 Similarly, the court would apply the laws of international sporting bodies if authorised by national law to do so via an explicit reference,13 or by means of contractual mechanisms. However, under no circumstances would a state judge be authorised to draw on a patchwork of transnational rules potentially concerning the situation in dispute. It is for this reason that the French Conseil d’Etat traditionally considers the rules of the international federations to be devoid of legal effect in French law, unless they have been transposed by the national federations.14 At the level of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, this is more of a grey area, as the CAS’s arbitration rules leave its arbitrators considerable room for manoeuvre. Within the framework of the appeals process, in addition to the “applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties” and, secondary to “the law of the country in which the federation, association or sportsrelated body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled”, the CAS may apply “rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems appropriate”.15 In practice, it can be observed that the divisions of the CAS sometimes have differing interpretations of these provisions on the applicable law. While all divisions in the first instance apply the rules of the sporting bodies concerned, some make abundant reference to state law, sometimes making the ___________ 11 In France, Art. 55 of the Constitution envisages that international treaties have a value superior to the law. 12 See E. Loquin, Sport et droit international privé, Lamy Droit du sport, nos. 186–95. 13 The French law of 1975 (amended on several occasions since 1984) thus envisaged that the sports federations were responsible for ensuring “compliance with the technical and ethical rules of their disciplines laid down by the international federations, the International Olympic Committee and the French National Olympic and Sports Committee”. 14 See, for example, the Conseil d’Etat’s advisory opinion dated 20 November 2003, in: Revue juridique et économique du sport, no. 72, September 2004, p. 65: “The international sports federations are subject to the legislation of the state where each of them has its headquarters and the regulations which they lay down do not apply within France’s internal law.” 15 Art. R58 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration: “In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision.”

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sporting rules secondary to this,16 while others spontaneously free the sporting standards from any national legal order.17 Moreover, at the level of the relevant ad hoc division at the Olympic Games, “The Panel shall rule on the dispute pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate”18. The divisions of the CAS, therefore, enjoy a degree of freedom of choice in terms of the rules to be applied, which appears to correspond to Jessup’s recommendations. The theory of transnational law is therefore implemented, at least to a certain extent, at the level of the CAS, not only in its descriptive aspects (diversity of the rules applicable to transnational sporting relations), but also in its operational aspects (application of the most relevant rules by the judge).

2. The Hybrid Conception: Transnational Law as the Law Governing Mixed Relations The adjective “transnational” is commonly used in a specific sense to qualify relations between a state and a foreign private entity, especially in the context of investment law. The practice of state contracts (a petrol concession contract, for instance) gives rise to “hybrid”19 or “asymmetrical”20 relations between the state and a foreign private company. The term “transnational” takes into account the atypical nature of these legal relations in which contractual equality and state sovereignty are opposed, in many cases without being wholly reduced to either national or international law. These contracts generally include an arbitration clause, stipulating a tribunal which will adjudicate on any disputes which occur between the parties. This is commonly referred to as “transnational arbitration” ___________ 16 See, for example, CAS 94/126, N. / FEI, 9 December 1998, § 3; CAS 98/208, N., J., Y., W. / FINA, 22 December 1998, § 9. 17 See, for example, CAS 92/80, B. / F.I.B.A., 25 March 1993, § 10; CAS 2003/A/507, Strahija / FINA, 9 February 2004, § 6.1. See F. Latty, La lex sportiva – Recherche sur le droit transnational, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 547 et seq. (distinction made between the “statist” approach and the “transnationalist” approach within CAS case law). 18 Art. 17 of the Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games (Vancouver 2010). The arbitration rules for other major international competitions (FIFA World Cup, UEFA European Championship, Commonwealth Games) set out similar provisions (see, for example, Art. 18 of the arbitration rules for the final phase of the FIFA World Cup 2010). 19 Z. Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, BYIL, 2003, p. 153. 20 Th. Wälde, The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration, in: Ph. Kahn/Th. Wälde, New aspects of International Investment Law, Hague Academy of International Law, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 94.

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or “mixed arbitration”. Much has been written about the law which can be applied to disputes of this type by transnational tribunals: the law of the contracting state? International public law? Other rules? In view of certain decisions reached in disputes of this type, where general principles belonging to no identified legal order have been applied,21 some authors have posited the idea of transnational law being specifically tailored to these mixed relations.22 Since the 1980s, however, the debate has lost its momentum and interest due to the exponential development of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between states. With the majority of disputes relating to investments now being raised on the basis of one of these BITs (even in the absence of contractual relations between the investor and the state), the transnational courts of arbitration are almost always called upon to settle disputes by applying international (public) law.23 In the first place, transnational sports law, interpreted in this way, could offer a characterisation of the standards adopted by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). This body, which is responsible for the World Anti-Doping Code and associated International Standards, is formed jointly by representatives of the public authorities and representatives of the Olympic movement.24 Formally at least, the standards which it produces are acts of private law, since the agency has foundation status under Swiss law, in spite of the fact that its premises are located in Montreal. However, the notion that the agency’s mixed composition affects the law which it produces – transnational law in the hybrid sense of the term – is not beyond the bounds of reason. The World Anti-Doping Code and the International Standards do not, however, possess any intrinsic legal force. They have an effect only insofar as the sporting bodies transpose their content into their own anti-doping regulations, while the states have adopted the UNESCO convention against doping, the main objective of which is to recognise the Code. However, it is precisely because of the fact that the ___________ 21

Most notably, the judgment National Iranian Oil Company c. Sapphire, 15.03.1963, ILR, vol. 35, p. 136. 22 J.-F. Lalive, Un récent arbitrage suisse entre un organisme d’Etat et une société privée étrangère (A recent Swiss arbitration case between a state body and a foreign private company), Annuaire suisse de droit international, 1962, pp. 273–302, which refers to an “autonomous transnational law for state contracts”. Cf. also J.-F. Lalive, Contracts Between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, ICLQ 1964, p. 1008; Ch. Leben, La théorie du contrat d’Etat et l’évolution du droit international des investissements, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 2003, t. 302, pp. 316 et seq. 23 See our chronicle, “Arbitrage transnational et droit international général”, published in the Annuaire français de droit international from 2008. 24 See Art. 6 of the WADA Statutes and R. Pound, The World Anti-Doping Agency: an Experiment in International Law, International Sports Law Review, July 2002, no. 2, pp. 53-59.

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WADA’s global anti-doping programme is the product of co-regulation within the agency that it can obtain the consent of both the sporting bodies and the public authorities. Secondly, and de lege ferenda, the practice of state contracts referred to above could effectively be found to apply at major international competitions (the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup, for example). The legal framework developed for the staging of these events does not guarantee full legal security to the sporting institutions, which are only contractually bound to the host city (for the Olympic Games), or to the chosen federation (in the case of the FIFA World Cup). However, the holding of such events in a particular country involves commitments on the part of that country, if only to provide entry at its borders to athletes from all over the world. The states supply plenty of very precise guarantees, which are appended to the bid and then to the organisation contract25, but in the event of a state defaulting, the sporting body runs the risk of only being able to count on its own resources to remind the state of its commitments. In practice, certain “hiccups” occur every now and then, such as the attempt by the Chinese authorities, on the eve of the opening of the Beijing Games, to limit accredited journalists’ access to websites deemed by it to be “subversive”26, a problem eventually resolved via discreet “Olympic diplomacy”27. Similarly, in the build-up to the 1976 Montreal Games, the Canadian authorities refused to let Taiwanese athletes enter their territory, as their country was not recognised by Canada.28 Consequently, the international sporting bodies might seek to secure their legal relationship with the host state by entering into a “state contract” similar to those concluded by foreign private companies with the destination states for ___________ 25

As regards the requirements of the IOC on the subject, see F. Latty, La lex sportiva – Recherche sur le droit transnational, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 584 et seq. The state guarantees demanded by FIFA are not included in any public FIFA regulation. However, on reading the bid evaluation reports for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, which include a paragraph headed “Legal and Government Guarantees”, one can identify the nature of FIFA’s requirements in this area. They concern access to the state’s territory for the competitors and persons affiliated to FIFA, security during the event (and the exclusion of any liability of FIFA in this regard), currency exchange, FIFA’s commercial rights, the use of national anthems and flags, telecommunications and the importing of the equipment required for the event’s organisation. These guarantees are also required to include total tax exemption for FIFA and its affiliates. 26 Essentially, websites belonging to human rights defence bodies or those in favour of a free Tibet. 27 “Internet: sous la pression, Pékin assouplit sa position” (Internet: under pressure, Beijing softens its stance), Le Monde, 3–4 August 2008. 28 See the report written by J.-L. Chappelet within the framework of the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (Council of Europe), The Autonomy of Sport in Europe, Strasbourg, 01.12.2008, EPAS (2008), pp. 14–15.

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their investments. Subject to international law (so as to avoid national law, which the contracting state has the power to amend to its advantage), such agreements strengthen the position of the private body, which is placed on equal footing with the sovereign state. The presence of arbitration clauses, pursuant to which any dispute is submitted to transnational arbitration, also possesses dissuasive virtues which might suffice to prevent disputes between the body and the state hosting the event. A proposal of this type was formulated during the 1980s by the authors of a study on the improvement of the IOC’s legal status, which it itself had commissioned29, but it failed to get past the Olympic drawing-board stage, and subsequent changes to international investment law mean that its revival would not be worthwhile. Finally, it must be acknowledged that the development of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) is likely to offer protection to international sporting bodies whose international events must be held on the territory of sovereign states. These treaties generally contain provisions whereby the state parties guarantee the investor parties equal, fair and non-discriminatory treatment (national treatment and/or treatment of the most favoured nation), together with full and complete protection and security. Some contain a clause calling on the state parties to respect the commitments made vis-à-vis investors, while the freedom of payments and money transfers relating to the investments is guaranteed. These treaties offer the investors direct lines of recourse against the state, usually before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or pursuant to the arbitration regulations of the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law). It is also worth noting that Brazil, which is due to host the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Rio Olympic Games in 2016, concluded a BIT in 1994 with Switzerland, the “home country” of both the FIFA and the IOC.30 Due to Brazil’s failure to ratify the treaty, it has not yet entered into force, but there is nothing to prevent this case being used as a basis for reasoning. If a state, by its behaviour, were to present an obstacle to the successful staging of the World Cup or the Olympic Games, or more prosaically, if it failed, for example, to ful___________ 29 B. Simm/Ch. Vedder, Suggestions for Improving the Legal Position of the IOC as Regards to its Relationship with States and Intergovernmental Bodies, 1985, study not published but referred to in: F. Latty, La lex sportiva – Recherche sur le droit transnational, op. cit (fn. 9)., pp. 598–599. Cf. also the debate on the sedentarisation of the OG, launched at the time as the boycotts, when several proposals were formulated. Some of these involved the conclusion of contracts between the IOC and the states, covering the status of the permanent Olympic site, and governed by international law (see F.C. Rich, The Legal Regime for a Permanent Olympic Site” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 15, 1982, pp. 1–53). 30 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Federative Republic of Brazil concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Brasilia, 11.11.1994.

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fil the guarantees provided in terms of freedom of transfer of capital, could FIFA or the IOC not invoke its international liability on the basis of a BIT which was in force? The crucial – and novel – legal issue would be to determine whether the sporting competition could be regarded as an investment, as transnational case law fluctuates on this definition.31 After all, it must be acknowledged that the construction of the infrastructure required to stage the Olympic Games or the World Cup involves investment made not by the IOC or FIFA, but by local partners not protected by the BIT. Having said that, it is also of note that the Switzerland/Brazil BIT includes international property rights and expertise in its definition of the investment,32 which would facilitate the inclusion of international competition within the scope of the treaty. Once the a priori surmountable obstacle of the existence of an investment has been overcome, it would remain to be verified that the state concerned had indeed breached its international obligations arising from the treaty. At the end of the process, the system would enable the body to obtain compensation for any damage incurred33, although it is doubtful whether the CIO or FIFA would wish to “jurisdictionalise” their generally peaceful relations with the states. The corrective, or even simply dissuasive, virtues of this mechanism, which is highly (overly?) favourable to investors, should, however, not be ignored.

3. The Private Conception: Transnational Law as a Form of Global Sectoral Self-Regulation We will now deal with the final manner in which transnational sports law can be conceived, and in terms of the overall analysis of sports law, it should be noted that it is the most useful of the three. Once again, it is in the economic sphere that this specific conception of transnational law has been developed, in order to refer to the self-regulation of international economic players. Observation of the contractual practices of private operators from international commerce and analysis of commercial arbitration case law in this field have led certain authors to propose the theory of a ___________ 31 See M. Sornarajah, The Definition of Foreign Investment, in: A.H. Qureshi/X. Gao (eds.), International Economic Law: Critical Concepts in Law, New York, Routledge, 2011, vol. 4, pp. 153–163; K. Yannaca-Small, Definition of “Investment”: an Open-ended Search for a Balanced Approach, in: id. (ed.), Arbitration under international investment agreements: a guide to the key issues, New York, Oxford UP, pp. 243–269. 32 Art. 1 § 2, of the Switzerland-Brazil BIT of 1994. 33 Compétition sportive et droit international des investissements. Quelques élucubrations juridiques à l’approche de la Coupe du monde de football au Brésil et des Jeux olympiques de Rio de Janeiro, VIe Anuário Brasileiro de Direito Internacional, 2011, pp. 149–169.

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new lex mercatoria34 or New Law Merchant35 – in reference to the lex mercatoria of the Middle Ages, developed by market traders as a remedy for the legal insecurity arising from the multiplicity of feudal laws. The repeated use of standard contracts for commercial uses and the formulation by the arbitrators of general principles of law fuel this new lex mercatoria, which, for part of the doctrine, could even be used in relation to state contracts.36 The existence of a “lex mercatoria legal order”, concurrent with the legal orders of the states, has even been propounded, taking the institutionalist theory of the Italian lawyer Santi Romano37 as a basis, an idea which has been written about extensively.38 The debate concerning the lex mercatoria, the existence of which is still disputed,39 has had the advantage of promoting the idea that legal communities depending on transnational solidarity are likely to self-regulate outside of the framework of state law. Moreover, the phenomenon is not limited to the economic field, as an examination of the religious domain shows. The Catholic Church, the most institutionalised body within the three main monotheist religions, is a grouping of a transnational community of followers who are subject to the canon law produced by the Church. Similar to the lex mercatoria, canon law is, therefore, a manifestation of the legal phenomenon characterised as “transnational law”: a law produced by private parties without the intervention of the states – and beyond their borders – and intended to govern activities within the community concerned. Several transnational legal orders can be said to exist: commercial, religious … and sporting. In effect, the law produced by the international sporting bodies (International Olympic Committee, international federations, continental federations, etc.) ___________ 34 B. Goldman, Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria, Archives de philosophie du droit, 1964, vol. IX, pp. 177–192; id., The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law – The Lex Mercatoria, in: J.D.M. Lew (ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, pp. 113–125. 35 C. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, Current Law and Social Problems, University of Toronto, 1961, pp. 129 et seq.; id., The New Sources of the Law of International Trade, International Social Science Journal, vol. XV, p. 2. 36 See supra III.2. 37 S. Romano, L’ordre juridique, op. cit. (fn. 5). 38 See Ph. Kahn, Droit international économique, droit international du développement, lex mercatoria: concept juridique unique ou pluralité des ordres juridiques, in: Etudes offertes à B. Goldman, Paris, Litec, 1982, pp. 97–107; E. Loquin, L’application des règles nationales dans l’arbitrage commercial international, in: L’apport de la jurisprudence arbitrale, publication C.C.I., no. 440/1, 1986, pp. 67–122. 39 See K. Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, Tul. L.R. 1989, pp. 613–628; M. Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: the First Twenty-Five Years, in: M. Bros/I. Browlie (eds.), Liber Amicorum for Lord Wilberforce, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 149– 183; V.L.D. Wilkinson, The New Lex Mercatoria: Reality or Academic Fantasy?”, J. Int’l Arb., June 1995, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 103–117.

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constitutes a legal phenomenon similar to the lex mercatoria or to religious laws, insofar as these bodies – which are private entities – produce globally, or at least extra-nationally-applied, rules, designed to govern the system of sporting competition. Thus, the neologism “lex sportiva” is increasingly used as a direct reference to the lex mercatoria, either to indicate the set of transnational sporting rules,40 or in a more limited sense, referring only to the case law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.41 As in the case of the arbitrators of international commerce, the CAS has formulated a whole series of legal principles, directly inspired by internal laws or deduced from the necessities of the sporting competition.42 Applied to the Olympic Movement as a whole, these principles combine with the Olympic Charter and the World Anti-Doping Code to ensure the unity of the transnational sporting legal order. Considerably more institutionalised than the lex mercatoria (through the Olympic Movement), the lex sportiva constitutes a particularly clear manifestation of “transnational law”. The lex mercatoria theory’s sole aim is not to describe the “internal coherence”43 specific to the community of economic operators. It encompasses an “external” dimension which requires the verification of its “survival” when it comes up against state or inter-state standards. This question of the degree of autonomy of transnational standards is precisely the same one which is endlessly posed on the subject of sporting standards. In this regard, the theory of transnational law offers a framework that makes it possible to understand this question in terms of relations between legal orders, or “relations between systems”, as Kelsen would say.44 Santi Romano, who has defended a pluralist conception of the law, as distinct from Kelsen’s monism, has very specifically set out the various relationships likely to be forged between legal orders: a relationship in which one order is the presupposition of another; a relationship in which several orders which are independent of each other depend on one another; relevance granted unilaterally by one order to another from which it is independent; a relation of succession between several orders.45 ___________ 40 See, for example, E. Loquin, Sport et droit international privé, op. cit. (fn. 12), nos. 186–90. 41 See, for example, J.A. Nafziger, Lex Sportiva, International Sports Law Journal 2004, pp. 3–8. 42 See F. Latty, La lex sportiva – Recherche sur le droit transnational, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 301 et seq. 43 Ph. Kahn, Droit international économique, droit international du développement, lex mercatoria: concept juridique unique ou pluralité des ordres juridiques, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 100. 44 H. Kelsen, Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1926-IV, vol. 14, pp. 227 et seq. 45 S. Romano, L’ordre juridique, op. cit. (fn. 5), pp. 107 et seq.

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Due to the difficulty of confirming in a few lines the degree of autonomy of the lex sportiva in relation to the legal orders likely to restrict its effectiveness46, only a few main “trends” concerning the relationship between the transnational sporting legal order and the national, international and European Union legal orders will be mentioned. Insofar as the international sporting bodies have internal legal statutes, they are, by nature, subject to the legal order of their headquarters. This being so, the liberalism of Western democracies permits the self-regulation of the associations, as long as they do not come up against the public order of the states concerned. Even in this last scenario, with regard to the multiplicity of sovereignties, the transnational standard deprived of effects in a given territory is likely to continue to be applied in the rest of the world. What is more, the increasingly widespread recognition of the CAS by sporting bodies is having the mechanical effect of dispensing with the state judge, and often, even of dispensing with the application of the states’ laws. The recognition by the states of the World AntiDoping Code through the 2005 UNESCO Convention against doping is also helping to ensure that the sporting bodies’ anti-doping standards are applied, without the states’ laws presenting an obstacle any longer. The issue of doping aside, inter-state solidarity is too weak in the sporting field for the international legal order to be able to channel, or even just effectively rival, the lex sportiva. At European Union level, on the other hand, the autonomy of the lex sportiva is likely to be affected as soon as its standards have an economic scope, which is increasingly the case as a result of the commodification and professionalization of sport since the Samaranch era. This is because the integration of twenty-seven states into a single legal order has effectively permitted the transnational standard to be countered. The loss of autonomy is only limited, however, by the recognition of sport’s peculiarities by European Union law.47

IV. Conclusion The concept of transnational sports law therefore offers a suitable theoretical framework for the analysis of the system of relations forged between the sporting legal order and the “public” legal orders – the sole obstacles to the unlimited development of the lex sportiva. ___________ 46 For a more in-depth examination of this question, see F. Latty, La lex sportiva – Recherche sur le droit transnational, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 415 et seq. 47 See S. Weatherill, Fairness, Openness and the Specific Nature of Sport: Does the Lisbon Treaty Change EU Sports Law?, International Sports Law Journal 2010, pp. 311– 325.

States and the Olympic Movement The Twin Face of a Legal Subordination: The Portuguese Case By Alexandre Miguel Mestre I.

“Olympic Law” in the Olympic Games of the Antiquity .................................. 121 

II. “Olympic Law” in the Olympic Games of the Modern Era: From an Early Paucity of Rules to the Olympic Charter........................................................... 123  III. The Subordination of State Law to the “Lex Olympica”................................... 128  1.

The States’ Acceptance of the Primacy of the Lex Olympica .................... 128 

2.

The Incorporation or Assimilation of the Lex Olympica under State Law: The Portuguese Case ................................................................................. 131 

IV. The Subordination of the Olympic Movement to State Law: The Portuguese Case................................................................................................................... 137  V. Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 142

I. “Olympic Law” in the Olympic Games of the Antiquity The Olympic Games of Antiquity, the origins of which go back to 776 BC, were organised and played out in the Sanctuary of Olympia in Greece, and were governed by a very strict set of rules. Heracles is credited with having created the rules of the Olympic Games of Antiquity; the first aim of these was to ensure equality of opportunity between all competing athletes. The “canons” or “Fundamental Laws of Olympia” were broken down into three categories: “Olympic Laws”, “Olympic Regulations”, and “Competition Rules”. The “Olympic Laws”, which were at the apex of the hierarchy of rules, were engraved on bronze tablets, and were deposited at the permanent seat of the Olympic Senate, the Buleuterion. Immediately beneath these, in hierarchical terms, were the “Olympic Regulations”. These contained rules governing the specific application of the “Olympic Laws”. Finally, there were detailed rules governing the organisation and execution of each trial or competition, each of which was specific to its field. These “Fundamental Laws of Olympia” represented the birth of one type of “Olympic law”.

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All athletes were required to comply strictly with the obligatory equal preliminary training regime in Olympia, both individually and together. This took place for six weeks before the beginning of the Games, when all the athletes trained together. Even the athletes’ diets had to be identical. All athletes submitted to the verdict of the referees, the hellanodikes, an expression which – in Greek – means “judges of the Greeks”. These arbiters had a period of ten months in which to prepare themselves thoroughly for the event. They did this by studying the applicable rules which, as Herodotus tells us, had been inherited from Egyptian sages. As well as this technical preparation, there was also spiritual preparation.1 During the first phase of the Olympic Games, these hellanodikes were chosen from among the rich families of Elis, but from 580 BC onwards they were chosen by drawing lots. One hellanodike was selected from each city. The guiding principle in the definition of offences and their corresponding penalties was the criterion, referred to above, of “equality of opportunity”. The penalties, which were ranked in order of the severity of the offending conduct, were of four distinct kinds: political, economic, sporting and corporal. The logic behind them was, essentially, that there should be severe penalties for anyone who treated victory as being more important than abiding by the rules. The institution known as Ekecheiria provides another example of the importance placed on abiding by rules and on the symbol of unity (referred to above) in the Olympic Games of Antiquity. This was introduced in 776 BC, and was a concept which was equivalent to an armistice (abstaining from the use of arms) rather than, as is sometimes asserted, peace, although it did convey a desire for peace and cessation of hostilities, and so, in practice, amounted to a proclamation of peace. This truce consisted of a formal proclamation of the inviolability of the regions in which the religious festivals and sporting competitions took place. As applied to the Olympic Games, it sought to ensure the safety of those who participated in them: athletes, officials and spectators.2 This truce was, in fact, always respected, because anyone who violated it was “severely punished”3, thus helping to reinforce the idea that the Games succeeded in enforcing strict compliance with principles and rules. ___________ 1

p. 7. 2

Various authors, Tudo sobre Jogos Olímpicos, Atenas 1896 – Pequim 2008, 2007,

Pescante, La Trêve Olympique, in: Sport Europe, Revue Officielle des COE, n. 62, Year XIII, 2002, 38. 3 Various authors, Tudo sobre Jogos Olímpicos, Atenas 1896 – Pequim 2008, 2007, p. 6.

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As time progressed over tens of centuries and 300 sessions of Olympic Games, the Olympic Games of Antiquity were, without a doubt, not only an unparalleled sporting and educational event, but also a model of the primacy of Law, of the need for competitions and settled societies to have structure governed by principles and rules enacted by organised bodies in the name of Justice. The Olympic Games of Antiquity were abolished by an Edict of Ambrosio, Bishop of Milan in 393, but, fortunately, this was not enough to extinguish their great legacy.

II. “Olympic Law” in the Olympic Games of the Modern Era: From an Early Paucity of Rules to the Olympic Charter Rather surprisingly, in the entire rich heritage of the Games, which were successfully revived by Pierre de Coubertin, there was no “Olympic law”. Indeed, the founder of the Olympic Games of the modern era was actually opposed to a proliferation of rules, and, on this point, held as follows: “The more regulations we adopt, the more we are fettered. Let us allow the Olympic organisations some flexibility.”4 As regards the controversial issue of amateurism, Pierre de Coubertin even called attention to the fact that most countries had introduced “complicated legislation, full of compromises and contradictions” 5. This explains why the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was not created until 1908, and why, for 14 years, that body operated with very little by way of regulation and internal organisation, and with only a scant framework of rules for dealing with important issues such as organising and staging the Games. The legal scholar who, without a doubt, contributed most, to both the study and practical application of “Olympic law”, Kéba Mbaye6, stated that “those who run the Olympics have always wished to free themselves from the political influence of states, but have never managed to find an effective legal frame___________ 4 Berlioux, The International Olympic Committee, in: Report of the Tenth Session of the IOA at Olympia, 1970, p. 2. 5 Quoted by Marivoet, Ética do Desporto – Princípios, Práticas e Conflitos – Análise Sociológica do caso Português durante o Estado Democrático do Século XX. Doctoral Thesis, May 2007, copy provided by the author, p. 44. 6 Mbaye, La nature juridique du CIO, in: Collomb (ed.), Sport, droit et relations internacionales, 1988, p. 69.

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work that would allow them to clearly differentiate between the formulae employed by the IOC and the legal reality by which it was governed”. In 1924, the term “Charter” was used for the first time, although its force was diluted in other texts. Drawn up at the Paris Congress in 1914, and approved in 1921 after the 1920 Antwerp Games, the “Charter of the Olympic Games” was included as a sub-heading of the “Statutes of the IOC” in 1924. The term was then dropped for more than 20 years, only reappearing in the “Olympic Rules” that were in force from 1946 to 1955, again as a sub-heading. There was never really any logical coherence to be found in the way the Olympic rules were drawn up, and the constant modifications that ensued in the aftermath of their drafting gave rise to much academic criticism. Angel Ivanov7 drew attention to the vague and confused nature of the successive alterations, which often brought rules into being that were mutually incompatible, and also gave rise to difficulties as regards numbering; this criticism was echoed by comments on the rather imprecise, ambiguous and vague character of the Olympic Charter made by J. F. Brisson8 and by Fernando Xarepe Silveiro9, in Portugal. Christoph Vedder10 makes similar points with respect to legislation, referring to the fact that, for a considerable period of time, this took the form of discursive texts which lacked clarity and consistency, a matter which was aggravated by the fact that the alterations were confined to incidental technical issues that were unrelated to the overall structural content. Cazorla Prieto11 points out problems regarding structure, the lack of legal content in some of the rules, and certain lacunae that created many problems in relation to interpretation. This leads to the conclusion that the Olympic Charter amounted to a real legal conglomeration, a criticism, which helps us to understand why Bruno Simma12 emphasises the “very complicated” character of the Olympic Charter. ___________ 7 Ivanov, On the Olympic Charter of the International Olympic Committee, in: Solakov (ed.), Topical problems of the International Olympic Movement, 1982, p. 75. 8 Brisson, L’enjeu olympique, 1981, p. 135. 9 Silveiro, O Empréstimo Internacional de Futebolistas Profissionais, in: Rei/Silveiro/ Graça, Estudos de Direito Desportivo, 2002, p. 118. 10 Vedder, The International Olympic Committee: An Advanced Non-Governmental Organization and the International Law, German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 27, 1984, p. 253–258. 11 Prieto, Derecho del Deporte, 1991, p. 109. 12 Simma, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 2006, p. 22.

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Concurring with the criticisms of these authors, let us address the issue of the systematisation or organisation of the rules. We can see at a glance that the IOC needed to try different models before arriving at the current formulation for the codification of the Olympic Charter. For example, in 1967 the so-called “Olympic Rules” were contained in four separate documents: (1.) Fundamental Principles, IOC, NOC, Olympic Games, Olympic Protocol; (2.) Code of Eligibility; (3.) General Information; and (4.) Information for cities that wish to host the Olympic Games. Then, just nine years later in 1976, the same “Olympic Rules” appeared in a new format: (1.) Rules; (2.) Bye-laws; (3.) Instructions (which included the conditions applying to candidate cities to organise the Olympic Games); (4.) Regional Games; and (5.) Olympic Awards. In 1978, in the document that was finally entitled Olympic Charter, the legal framework was set out in a single text, which was organised as follows: (1.) Rules; (2.) Bye-laws; (3.) Instructions; (4.) Organisation of the Olympic Games; (5.) Committees of the IOC; and (6.) Olympic Rewards. Thus, the Olympic Charter emerged as the principal “locus”13 of the IOC rules. Despite this unifying logic, the Olympic Charter still had texts annexed to it in 1982, such as “Standard constitution of a NOC”, “List of members belonging to, or who have belonged, to the IOC since it was founded” and “Standard contract for purchase of television rights to the Games”. The completion and simplification of the Olympic Charter was, indeed, a slow and gradual process. The version of the Olympic Charter currently in force was approved on July 8, 2011, and henceforth all references made to the Lex maxima of Olympism will be in relation to this version.14 The form and purpose of the Olympic Charter are immediately apparent in its introduction: “[The] Olympic Charter is the codification of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, Rules and Bye-laws adopted by the IOC. It governs the organisation, action and operation of the Olympic Movement and sets forth the conditions for the celebration of the Olympic Games.” From the introduction, and on reading the entire text of the Olympic Charter, it is apparent that the legislator’s intent is to create a kind of “scripture” or codex of Olympism by means of a fine normative filter and a methodical structuring of the organisation of the Olympic Movement.15

___________ 13

Latty, La lex sportiva: Recherche sur le droit transnacional, 2007, p. 169. The translation is, thus, a free translation. 15 Karaquillo, Le droit du sport, 2nd edition, 1997, p. 8. 14

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In the author’s view, it is increasingly the case that legislators act with a mind to the practical consequences of the legislation they enact. Thus, the laws that they enact are increasingly focused on the requirements of those who have the job of interpreting and applying the Olympic Charter, as can be surmised from the three-pronged approach which is currently employed: In addition to the Fundamental Principles, which can be viewed as an ideological declaration or a teleological interpretation of the Olympic Charter (in the sense of guidelines for those who consider themselves part of the Olympic Movement), the text of the Olympic Charter includes a body of legislation composed of 61 Rules, to which are added 27 Bye-laws, which function as glosses on, and annotations of, those Rules which the legislator thinks likely to pose the main difficulties of interpretation or which appear to be more concise. In the introduction, the scope of the Olympic Charter is also set forth, by referring to the three main purposes which, in essence, the Olympic Charter aims to serve: “a) The Olympic Charter, as a basic instrument of a constitutional nature, sets forth and recalls the Fundamental Principles and essential values of Olympism. b) The Olympic Charter also serves as statutes for the International Olympic Committee. c) In addition, the Olympic Charter defines the main reciprocal rights and obligations of the three main constituents of the Olympic Movement, namely the International Olympic Committee, the International Federations and the National Olympic Committees, as well as the Organising Committees for the Olympic Games, all of which are required to comply with the Olympic Charter.”

Upon reading and interpreting these three purposes, we begin to detect parallels between the Olympic Charter and the regulatory instruments with which we are more familiar. Aim a) permits us to come to the conclusion that the Olympic Charter is similar to a constitution in its conception because it is the basic fundamental document of the Olympic Movement, the raison d’être of which is to act as a governing framework for the other rules (Lex superior, Lex maxima or “fundamental rule”), which, in a complex and complete form, assumes a transcendent authority over the universe of sport that is subject to it. We may also identify other similarities with a constitution: (1) The Olympic Charter is of a foundational or constitutive character; (2) the Olympic Charter establishes a set of principles and fundamental values which govern a particular type of organisation; in this case, the organisation of sport worldwide; (3) the Olympic Charter aims to give a stable and durable quality to the governing regime by making amendments to the Olympic Charter an exceptional occurrence that would require a qualified majority of two-thirds; and (4) the Olympic Charter combines a programmatic discourse with imperative rules.

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Aim b) provides that the Olympic Charter, as the document governing the internal organisation of the IOC, constitutes or encompasses the Statutes of the IOC.16 Finally – aim c) – due to the fact that the Olympic Charter defines the rights and obligations of the main constituents of the Olympic Movement, it resembles a contract. In relation to its content, the Olympic Charter is a composite legal text in which general principles sit side by side with more technical rules. These include coercive rules along with simple standards of behaviour. The Olympic Charter also combines rules typical of public law – such as those relating to the exclusive competence to represent a country – with rules typical of relations between private parties, an example of which is the concept of “ownership” of the Olympic Games. The Olympic Charter contains executive, legislative and judicial powers. Insofar as executive powers are concerned, the procedure employed in order to choose a city to host the Games is the most noteworthy. The following is the full text of the third Bye-law of Rule 33 of the Olympic Charter, entitled “Election of the host city”: “1. The election of any host city is the prerogative of the Session. 2. The IOC Executive Board determines the procedure to be followed until the election by the Session takes place. Save in exceptional circumstances, such election takes place seven years before the celebration of the Olympic Games. 3. The National Government of the country of any applicant city must submit to the IOC a legally binding instrument by which the said government undertakes and guarantees that the country and its public authorities will comply with and respect the Olympic Charter. 4. The election of the host city takes place in a country having no candidate city for the organisation of the Olympic Games concerned.”

Insofar as legislative powers are concerned, it is instructive to examine the power to amend the text of the Olympic Charter itself, as set out in Rule 18 (3.), under the heading “The Session”: “The quorum required for a Session is half the total membership of the IOC plus one. Decisions of the Session are taken by a majority of the votes cast; however, a majori-

___________ 16

According to Carvalho, “[the] IOC therefore has its legal basis in the provisions of the Olympic charter, a sort of basic law or statute of the organisation (...) the most important document for the Olympic movement”. See Carvalho, O contributo das organizações nacionais e internacionais na promoção da ética desportiva e do fair-play. A importância da educação para a ética – o Olimpismo, in: Carvalho/Brazão de Carvalho/Silva, O Desporto e o Direito, prevenir, disciplinar, punir, 2001, p. 31 and 22.

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ty of two-thirds of the votes cast is required for any amendment of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, or of the Olympic Charter.

Finally, the Olympic Charter contains judicial powers, as is clearly demonstrated by Rule 59, under the heading “Measures and Sanctions”, which confers powers on IOC bodies – the Session and the Executive Board – and on the Disciplinary Commission, to which the Executive Board may delegate powers, to punish violations “of the Olympic Charter, the World Anti-Doping Code or any other regulation, as the case may be”.

III. The Subordination of State Law to the “Lex Olympica” 1. The States’ Acceptance of the Primacy of the Lex Olympica According to Paulo Otero, “[one] sign of the ‘destatification’ of the law is the existence of ‘specific or special legal regimes’ originating with” nongovernmental organisational structures, international and independent of the state, such as canon law, “which articulates a separate legal regime for the Catholic Church, or sports law, originating with various organisations such as the IOC”17 (emphasis added by author). A similar suggestion comes from Jónatas E. M. Machado, for whom “sporting institutions such as IOC, FIFA and UEFA are a source of authentic legal regimes, which detract from states’ jurisdiction”18. As far as Olympism is concerned, there is no doubt that state law has, in recent times, been submitting to the Lex olympica. The fundamental question is why the Olympic Charter, “in the eyes of” the IOC, as well as of the whole Olympic Movement, amounts to a fully-fledged international treaty, when, in reality, it is not one. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the IOC was not founded by an international convention, and that its members are not representatives of governments.19 ___________ 17

Otero, Lições de Introdução ao Estudo do Direito, Iº vol., 2.º tomo, 1999, p. 28–30. Machado, Direito Internacional – Do Paradigma Clássico ao Pós-11 de Setembro, 2003, p. 202. 19 Nonetheless, a court in the region of Piedmont, by a judgment of 22.01.2004 on the role and actions of TOROC (the OGOC for the Turin Games in 2006), called the Olympic Charter a document in the nature of an international treaty. This judgment concerns the private legal status of TOROC, which resulted in the abandonment of proceedings that the European Commission had brought against Italy in 2003, when it had classified the TOROC as a public law entity and had allegedly infringed Article 11 of Directive (EC) 50/92, during the construction of bobsleigh and ski slopes. See Bertone/Degiorgis, Il libro nero delle olimpiadi di Torino 2006, 2004, p. 303. 18

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While it may be suggested that, if the Olympic Charter lays claim to and attains a universal legal nature, this is not a consequence of its legal nature, but arises, rather, by virtue of a moral authority; an extra-legal element – that is, the social, economic and sporting magnitude of the Olympic Games. This is exactly where the basis for the external authority of the Olympic Charter lies: in the affiliation of, or voluntary recognition by, those who submit to it. These are comprised of a diverse community of individuals, groups and organisations of all kinds: states, NOCs, International Federations (IFs) and others. It is only by taking this context into account that one can understand why a court in California took the precaution of expressly enforcing state law against the Olympic Charter in 1984, or help to justify the fact that Turkey – an example which, as far as the author is aware, is unique – incorporates the entire Olympic Charter in its national legal system by means of its “Law on the Olympics”. The same may be said of the formal submission of states to the primacy of “Olympic law” and the ius stipulandi of (i.e. their legal subservience to) the IOC when they apply to organise the Olympic Games. Under the heading “Election of the host city”, Rule 33 (3.) of the Olympic Charter stipulates: “The National Government of the country of any applicant city must submit to the IOC a legally binding instrument by which the said government undertakes and guarantees that the country and its public authorities will comply with and respect the Olympic Charter.”

Thus, the Olympic Charter requires that the government of the country in which the candidate host city is located accepts the Olympic Charter rules formally and unilaterally without any reciprocal commitment – that is, it must accept the Olympic Charter as valid and applicable within its territory. We could say that this is a type of submission to the ius stipulandi of the IOC by which the government in question expressly acknowledges and respects the autonomy of “Olympic law” and – effectively and impliedly – “delegates” government sporting functions to the IOC, without having involvement in the IOC, or, indeed, any relationship with it at all, other than one of subordination (it is certainly not one of equals). If one considers the genesis of what is now Rule 33 (3.) of the Olympic Charter, one may note that the legislator’s aim was, effectively, to compel states to subject themselves to the primacy of “Olympic law” over national state legislation. Pierre de Coubertin clearly signalled as much to the USA, which was a candidate for the Games of 1924 and 1928, so that they would not

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confuse the IOC with Congress, and even Adolf Hitler was forced to submit to this primacy when the Games were held in Berlin in 1936.20 One may even conclude, in concurrence with Alexandra Pessanha21, that states cede independence and sovereignty: “[The] International Olympic Committee and its Olympic Charter constitute the highest expression of an aspiration on the part of the sports movement to independence from the state. In a general way, the provisions of that charter are based on the idea of sovereignty of the Olympic Movement and of international sport, to which idea the international sporting federations are also attached, being inspired and constituted on an identical basis.” It is within this context that Dimitrios P. Panagiotopoulos22 identifies the existence of a sui generis legal order, of which IFs are part, and which prevails over other legal orders. Consequently, one can hardly avoid questioning whether this type of concession, or – more specifically – such unilateral acts of submission by states to the primacy of the Olympic Charter, do, in fact, have legal effects. In other words: What is the legal value of the commitment of a state to comply with the Olympic Charter – an issue which is not devoid of complexity – in the first place? Once the organisation of the Games has been awarded to a particular city, the state of which the host city is part may no longer intervene, as it is not in any way a party to the “host city contract”, nor does it establish any new legal relationship with the IOC. This being so, it is a priori difficult not to yield to the temptation to regard this submission as a political gesture rather than a legal act, and to consider that it is, at the most, debatable whether there is any binding aspect to this submission.

___________ 20

In a very recent work, Hilton relates that the (then) President of the IOC, Balet Latour, warned the German OGOC that the Olympic rules should be respected, even if they were contrary to recent orders approved in Germany. Similarly, the logic impressed on Hitler by the IOC was as follows: “If you do not agree with our rules, do not organise the Games. You must understand that it is we who adopt the rules and not you.” Hilton even argues that the Summer and Winter Olympic Games held in Germany during Hitler’s period as Chancellor (1933–1945) were the only examples of Hitler submitting to the orders of others. See Hilton, Hitler’s Olympics: The 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, 2008, p. 16–17. 21 Pessanha, As federações desportivas. Contributo para o estudo do ordenamento jurídico desportivo, 2002, p. 32. 22 Panagiotopoulos, Lex sportiva: Sport Institutions and Rules of Law, in: International Sports Law Review Pandektis, vol. 5:3, 2004, p. 325.

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Fernando Xarepe Silveiro23 throws open the debate on this issue, illustrating it as follows: “[I]n the documents submitted by Paris and Albertville as candidates for the organisation of the 1992 Olympic Games, it was emphasised that the President of the Republic had made a declaration giving assurances that, while the Games were in progress, Olympic law would be the only applicable law, which, in practice, meant that, in the event of any conflict, it would prevail over French law. Although the legal validity of such a written pronouncement may be questioned, the very fact that it was made testifies to the real power that sport wields, and how much states and their representatives are ready to sacrifice.” (emphasis added by author)

According to the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Tests case24, acts of this kind are legally effective. This judgment recognised that unilateral declarations made by governments fall into the category of acts capable of creating legal obligations, and that, once the maker of the declaration has publicly expressed a willingness to carry out the terms of the declaration, it must then act accordingly, even though this was expressed outside of the context of international negotiations. Another argument which must not be overlooked is that the recognition by states of the IOC and the requirement to comply with the Olympic Charter arise from an international practice which has its roots in customary law.25

2. The Incorporation or Assimilation of the Lex Olympica under State Law: The Portuguese Case (a) The Portuguese State recognised in its fundamental laws the “prerogatives and powers” of the Olympic Committee of Portugal which arise from the Olympic Charter. If there were any doubts regarding the position of the Portuguese State in relation to the provisions of the Olympic Charter, they were assuaged in 1990 when the Portuguese Government made express reference to the Olympic Charta in no. 1 of Article 28 of the Basic Law of the Sports System26, in its ac___________ 23

Silveiro, O Empréstimo Internacional de Futebolistas Profissionais, Estudos de Direito Desportivo, 2002, p. 116. 24 Judgment of 20.12.1974, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 267, § 43. 25 This recognition through custom also extends to “parties” (other than states) involved, including the Holy See. Margarit recalls that Pope Paul VI referred to the IOC as the highest authority best qualified for dialogue in sport, and so recognised it as an interlocutor. See Margarit, Las relaciones entre la Santa Sede y el Comité Olímpico Internacional, Bachelor’s Degree Thesis directed by Prof. Dr. D. Vicente Prieto, Università Pontifica della Santa Croce – Faculty of Canon Law, 2001, p. 35. 26 Law no. 1/90 of 13th January.

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knowledgment of the mandatory impact of the OC on the POC in the following manner: “The Portuguese Olympic Committee is granted the prerogatives and powers that arise from the International Olympic Charter, i.e. the power to organise the Portuguese team in the Olympic Games and the power to authorise the holding of sports events for Olympic purposes.” (emphasis added by author)

This official legal recognition by the Portuguese State of the submission of the POC to the Olympic Charter was retained in subsequent Portuguese basic sports legislation: specifically, in no. 1 of Article 25 of the 2004 Basic Law of Sport27, and in no. 1 of Article 12 of the current 2007 Basic Law of Physical Activity and Sport28, in the following terms: “The Olympic Committee of Portugal is a non-profit association with a legal personality which is governed by its bylaws and regulations in accordance with the law and the principles and rules in the International Olympic Charter.” (emphasis added by author)

In this regard, the position adopted by one Portuguese court in 2007 is noteworthy to the extent that, notwithstanding the legal provisions referred to above, the Olympic Charter binds the Portuguese Olympic Committee but not the Portuguese State, as it is not part of the Portuguese legal system in accordance with, and for the purposes of, Article 8 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.29 ___________ 27

Law no. 30/2004 of 21st July Law no. 5/2007 of 16th January. 29 Cf. the judgment of the Lisbon Court of Appeal of 29th November 2007, Comité Olímpico de Portugal v. Fórum Olímpico de Portugal: “The fact is, however, that although the International Olympic Charter is binding on the claimant (cf. Article 25 of the Basic Law of Sport), it does not bind the Portuguese State, as, contrary to the position adopted by the claimant, it is not an integral part of the Portuguese legal system, in accordance with and for the purposes of Article 8, no. 1 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, and cannot, therefore, be the legal basis of the claims made by the claimant, as we shall seek to demonstrate. (…) Accordingly, given the positions adopted by the constitutional law experts cited, it is more than evident that the International Olympic Charter cannot be considered to be general or common international law. The International Olympic Charter cannot even be considered to be an integral part of the Portuguese legal system, pursuant to the provisions of the other sections of Art. 8 of the Constitution (which have not been invoked by the appellant), because (i) it is not an international convention properly ratified or approved by the Portuguese State; (ii) it is not a series of legal provisions issued by the proper organs of the international organisations of which Portugal is a member, and (iii) it is not a case of provisions of treaties that govern the European Union, or of legal provisions enacted by its institutions, in the exercise of their corresponding powers. The appellant’s assertion that the International Olympic Charter is an integral part of the Portuguese legal system is, therefore, baseless. Accordingly, in instances where Article 25, no. 1 of the Basic Law of Sport provides that the appellant’s activity must comply, inter alia, with the provisions of the International Olympic Charter, this does not mean that the Portuguese State is bound by the said provisions (as there would be no constitutional basis for this).” 28

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(b) The Portuguese State altered rules regarding protocol by means of an official circular because of a change in the conduct of the International Olympic Committee. On 20th August 1947, the Directorate General of Sport, the supreme body in the structure of the public administration of sports, issued the following circular: “As the International Committee has removed the salute known as the Olympic salute from its ceremonial protocols – which salute had been adopted as the Portuguese form of salute used by sportsmen and women before any competition – His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State of National Education has agreed that the said salute should cease to be used in Portugal, as it has lost its previous significance, and that sportsmen and women shall, henceforth, stand to attention when saluting official entities or the public. This is the matter that I am required to duly inform you of.” (emphasis added by author)

(c) The Portuguese State enacted legislative provisions with the intention of protecting the “rights to Olympic properties” enshrined in the Olympic Charter. The legal protection of the so-called “Olympic properties” is set out in in Rules 7 to 14 of the Olympic Charter. The “properties” referred to are the Olympic symbol, the Olympic flag, the Olympic motto, the Olympic anthem, identifications (including, but not limited to, “Olympic Games” and “Games of the Olympiad”), designations, emblems, the Olympic flame and torch. This is provided by no. 4 of Rule 7, which adds: “All rights with regard to any Olympic Property and all rights regarding the use thereof are vested solely in the IOC.”

This legal protection is one of the major concerns of the Olympic Movement and dates back to the birth of the Lex olympica. This explains why, as early as 13th December 1949, the Directorate General of Physical Education, Sport and School Health made legal provision for this matter: “His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State of National Education issued the following order on the 7th of December this year: Recognition of the exclusive right of the Portuguese Olympic Committee to use the Olympic motto, creed and emblem.”

In 1958, the Government enacted legislation in relation to these matters in response to the wishes of the IOC in the form of Decree no. 41 784 of 6th August 1958 of the Directorate General for Physical Education, Sport and School Health: “The International Olympic Committee wishes to see a convention adopted in all countries which support the Olympic Ideal by limiting the use of the Olympic motto, anthem and emblems to the National Olympic Committees.”

Two decades later, the Government sought to improve the legislation already passed and, it should be noted, did so. Once again, this was on the basis of the

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wishes of the IOC and, therefore, of the POC. In order to do this, it produced a draft law which was attached to the official letter sent by the Head of the Cabinet of Secretary of State for Youth and Sport to the Director General of Sport, dated 26th June 1979. The said official letter contained an express statement of the reasons for this legislative initiative: “Draft Decree In order to comply with the wishes of the International Olympic Committee, which are justified, i.e. that a convention be established which grants exclusivity in the use of the Olympic motto, creed and emblems to the national Olympic committees in all countries that support the Olympic Ideal, the Portuguese Olympic Committee has been granted the exclusive rights with regard to the Olympic motto, creed and emblem by an order of the Ministry of National Education dated 7th December 1949, published in the Government Gazette, 2nd Series, on the 17th of the said month that year. The said entitlement was subsequently included in the text of Decree no. 41.784, of 6th August 1958 (…).” (emphasis added by author)

Only in 1982 was new legislation introduced, i.e. Decree-Law no. 1/82, of 4th January, which is still in force, and which introduced the rules intended to protect the Olympic symbols. The first sentence of the first paragraph of the preamble to this Decree-Law clearly reflects that the impulse for this item of legislation came from the IOC: “The International Olympic Committee and the Portuguese Olympic Committee have, for many years, sought to introduce measures that prohibit the generalised use of the Olympic symbols in order to prevent them being degraded by indiscriminate use and to reserve them for activities strictly related to the Olympic movement. This desire was reflected among us in an order of the then Minister for National Education dated 7th December 1949, and subsequently by Decree-Law no. 41 784, of 6th August 1958, which asserted the exclusive right of the Portuguese Olympic Committee to use the Olympic symbols in Portugal. However a need to define the content of the said right in greater detail and to penalise violations thereof has been identified. Neither of these aspects are dealt with in the said Decree-Law. This Decree-Law seeks to implement this objective in order to contribute to the prestige of the Olympic movement by preventing uses of its symbols that distort its message of human fraternity. Accordingly, uses which violate the said exclusive right are prohibited and penalties are introduced in order to render the said prohibition effective.” (emphasis added by author)

In this regard, it should be noted that the Portuguese basic laws of sport, which are laws of a fundamental nature (i.e. they must be passed by at least 2 out of 3 of the deputies in office), have also asserted the rights and obligations of the POC regarding these matters, and have required ordinary legislation that develops the principles enshrined in these basic laws.

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Thus, Article 28 (2) and (3) of the 1990 Basic Law of the Sports System provided as follows: “2. Only the Portuguese Olympic Committee shall be entitled to use the Olympic symbols in Portugal. 3. Special regulations shall ensure the protection of the rights referred to in the preceding provisions, and shall define the specific state aid to be granted in this context, and the way in which the various private and public sector organisations active in the area of sport shall interact within the ambit of preparation for and participation in the Olympic Games.”

Article 25 (4) and (5) of the 2004 Basic Law of Sport retained these provisions in practically identical terms. Finally, in 2007, the Basic Law of Physical Activity and Sport – which is the basic law currently in force – provides in Article 12 (4): “In accordance with the law, only the Olympic Committee of Portugal is entitled to use the Olympic symbols in Portugal.”

(d) The Portuguese State legislated with regard to doping, in accordance with the provisions of the International Olympic Charter regarding doping in sport. In 1997, a decree-law was passed, which has since been repealed, i.e. Decree-Law no. 183/97, of 26th July, regarding the “fight against doping in sport”. The preamble of this decree-law is yet another example of the way in which the Portuguese legislature has felt the need to approve new legislation as a result of advances in the Lex olympica: “Six years after the publication of Decree-Law no. 105/90, of 23rd March, it has become necessary to introduce legislation regarding the fight against doping in sport because recent international developments in this area. An example of this is: The International Olympic Charter of Doping in Sport (…) The purpose of this legislation is to tailor the Portuguese legislation so that it meets current international recommendations by providing the Portuguese sports system with more effective legal tools in the fight against and prevention of doping in sport.” (emphasis added by author)

It is an interesting exercise to consider some of the provisions of this decreelaw in order to understand the way in which the Portuguese legislature refers to public and private international sports law, which, in the latter case, is legislated for by the IOC:

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“Article 2 Definitions For the purposes of this Decree-Law: a) Doping is the administration to sportspersons, or the use by them, of pharmacological classes of substances, or methods that appear in the lists approved by the proper national and international sports organisations (…) The lists referred to in this article shall be organised in accordance with the lists created within the ambit of international conventions relating to doping in sport of which the IOC is, or becomes, a member, or, in the absence thereof, in accordance with the most restrictive lists established by the International Olympic Committee, or by the corresponding international federations.” (emphasis added by author)

Also of interest is the chain of legal subordination which was created when the Portuguese Government introduced legislation that requires Portuguese sports federations to bring their anti-doping regulations into line with the directives of the IOC: “Article 9 Federation regulations 1. The sports federations shall adapt their anti-doping control regulations, which establish the rules governing the said control within the ambit of the respective sports, so as to comply with: (…) c) the rules and guidelines issued annually by the International Olympic Committee, and by the corresponding international sports federations.” (emphasis added by author)

Finally, the influence of the IOC with regard to government requirements in the area of penalties and sanctions is also emphasised: “3. In imposing penalties on sportspersons and other parties involved in sports, the sports federations shall take all mitigating and aggravating circumstances into consideration, in accordance with the recommendations of the International Olympic Committee, or the corresponding international federations.” (emphasis added by author)

(e) The Portuguese State defined its sports policy in legislative terms, according to the “Olympic cycles”. The Olympic cycle is referred to in various items of legislation. In no. 3 of Article 3 of the Basic Law of the Sports System, the “Integrated Sports Development Programme” coincides with the “Olympic cycle”, i.e. the said programme remains in force for a four-year period, which is based on the period of the Olympiad (four years).

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Article 50 of the Legal Framework Governing Sports Federations – DecreeLaw no. 248-B/2008 of 31st December – fixes the duration of terms of office of members of the decision-making bodies of sports federations with public utility status at four years so that the term of office coincides with the Olympic cycle. Even the legislation in the Azores and Madeira Autonomous Regions makes the same provision. In the Azores, it is stipulated in paragraph d) of no. 2 of Article 47 Regional Legislative Decree no.14/2005/A – which introduced the legal framework governing the provision of support to the sports associations movement – that one of the powers of the Azores Council for High Performance Competition is “to give its opinion regarding the sports deemed to be a priority for each Olympic cycle”. Article 52, no. 1 of the decree provides that “the priority sports in terms of investment in the search for excellence shall be determined for each Olympic cycle by means of a resolution of the Regional Government upon consultation with the CAAC”. Regional Legislative Decree no. 4/2007/M, of 15.02.2007, which introduced the foundations of the sports system of the Madeira Autonomous Region, and introduced the first amendment to Regional Legislative Decree no. 12/2005/M – a decree which approves the legal framework governing the grant of financial subsidies to associations in the Region – commences in items 6 and 12 of the preamble by referring to “the selection [from Madeira] which has been capable of being present at all Olympic Games held since Seoul (1988),” and to “the revolution that has occurred within the Olympic movement in terms of the participation of professional sportspersons”. This explains the approach adopted in no. 1 of Article 14 entitled “Planning”: “[The] regional government shall approve a strategic sports development plan for each Olympic cycle.” Finally, Article 59 provides that “[the] sports atlas shall be prepared and published by the public sports administration at the end of each Olympic cycle”.

IV. The Subordination of the Olympic Movement to State Law: The Portuguese Case Once again, Portuguese legislation provides an example which, in this case, demonstrates that there is a subordination which is the opposite of that which we have already considered. Indeed, states such as Portugal frequently use legislative and administrative instruments as a source of “Olympic law” and, in this way, limit or control the activity of the Olympic movement. (a) The Portuguese State acted by decree to place the POC under its “superintendence”. The year in which the POC is officially considered to have been created is 1909. In spite of this, and perhaps because of the fact that many considered the

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POC to be merely transitory and merely a committee that existed for each Olympic Games, ten years later in 1919, Portugal decided to “create” the POC by means of a decree30, and to make it subject to supervision by the state: “As each country has a fundamental need to take close care of the physical education of its population, in view of the fact that this is an essential aspect of a perfect civilisation; whereas the athletics event, the “Olympic Games”, is the most important international sporting event and one of the most important manifestations of the vitality of nations; whereas a systematic neglect of matters related to physical education has placed us in a state of delay which must be remedied urgently by recourse to new methods, to which the State cannot be indifferent; whereas is it urgent to create a sports organisation which is under the supervision of the State which guides the evolution of national sport effectively in order to augment and generalise physical culture, while also preparing teams representing Portugal, as selected via public competitions, for the International Olympic Games (…).” (emphasis added by author)

(b) The Portuguese State, by means of legislation, granted the POC a legal personality for the purposes of granting it the power to carry out expropriations. As the POC did not, at that time, have a legal personality, the Portuguese State granted it a legal personality ope legis31 in 1925, in order to involve the POC in expropriations: “Article 1 In addition to the expropriations referred to in Article 2 of the law of 26th July 1912, expropriations for the purposes of education, physical culture and practical involvement in sport, and also for the establishment of sports associations, the construction, improvement and extension of playing fields, stadiums, swimming pools and any other constructions for the purpose of the physical development of the Portuguese population, are deemed to be urgent and to involve public utility. The land expropriated shall revert to the ownership and possession of the former proprietors if the organisations for which they were expropriated are dissolved or cease to exist. Article 2 The Portuguese Olympic Committee is granted the power to carry out expropriations for the purposes referred to in the second part of the preceding article.

___________ 30

Cf. Decree of 14th August 1919 of the Ministry of Public Education, General Directorate of Higher Education, General Inspectorate of School Health. 31 Law no. 1.728 of 5th January 1925.

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Article 3 The Government is authorised to cede any properties belonging to the State to sports clubs or associations that are recognised and designated by the Portuguese Olympic Committee, free of charge and temporarily, for the purposes referred to in Article 1. (…) Article 4 Declarations of public utility made at the request of the Portuguese Olympic Committee, which is hereby granted a legal personality for that purpose, shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of § 2 of Article 5 of the Law of 26th July 1912.” (emphasis added by author)

(c) The Portuguese State appointed members of the public to the POC by decree. In 1925, the Portuguese State exerted its legislative influence by selecting the members of the POC32: “I have decided, on the basis of a proposal made by the Minister of Public Education, to appoint the following members of the general public to be members of the Portuguese Olympic Committee, the objectives and resources of which will be fixed in a draft law to be submitted to Parliament in due course.”

Similarly, in 193733, a list of the members of the POC was published in a decree, together with the following statement of reasons: “In light of the international importance of the Olympic Games, and the Government attention that these events merit as a manifestation of sports activity in the context of national education; in light of the advisability of giving the Portuguese Olympic Committee the official recognition that will increase its status, both in the international organisation of which it is part, and in Portugal, and the identical previous conduct of the state in relation to the said committee, the Government of the Portuguese Republic, acting through the Minister of National Education, orders as follows: 1. That the Portuguese Olympic Committee, which is charged with the organisation of the Portuguese participation in the games of the 12th Modern Olympiad, be comprised of (…).”

In turn, organisational legislation from 1943 made the continued official recognition of the POC by the Government subject to the submission of a list of its members: ___________ 32

Cf. Decree of 14th August 1919 of the Ministry of Public Education, General Directorate of Higher Education, General Inspectorate of School Health. 33 Decree of the Secretary General of the Ministry of National Education of 21st April 1937.

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“Article 9 In order to continue to enjoy the official recognition granted to it by the statutory instrument dated 21st April 1937, the Portuguese Olympic Committee shall submit a list of its members to the Ministry of National Education for its approval. (…).”

(d) The State entrusted the POC with the responsibilities for Olympic preparation by means of legislation. It is important, once again, to refer to the basic laws of Portuguese sport in order to draw attention to the level of importance that the Portuguese State has attached to the matter of preparation for the Olympic Games by making this the primary function of the POC. 34 Article 28, no. 1 of the Basic Law of the Sports System stipulates: “The Portuguese Olympic Committee is granted the prerogatives and powers that arise from the International Olympic Charter, i.e. the power to organise the Portuguese national representation at the Olympic Games and the power to authorise the holding of sports events for Olympic purposes.”

No. 2 of Article 28 of the Basic Law of Sport, in turn, provides as follows: “The Olympic Committee of Portugal has the exclusive right to form, organise and manage the Portuguese delegation to the Olympic Games and in the multisport competitions sponsored by the International Olympic Committee by collaborating in the preparation and promotion thereof, and in the practice of the sports involved in the said competitions.”

Finally, it is stated in Article 12 of the Basic Law of Physical Activities and Sport, which is entitled “The Olympic Committee of Portugal”, in similar words: “2. The Olympic Committee of Portugal has the exclusive right to form, organise and manage the Portuguese team at the Olympic Games and in the other sports competitions organised under the auspices of the International Olympic Committee, by collaborating in the preparation thereof, and by promoting active involvement in the sports represented at such events.”

This constant recognition by the Government of the POC’s role in the preparations for the Olympic Games, together with the recognition and stimulus by the public administration of the “autonomy of sports organisations in the development and operationalization of their missions”, were at the root of an important step that was taken in 2005, by means of which the POC became “(…) solely responsible for the direction and management of the Olympic Preparation Programme”. This step was possible only because the Portuguese State considered it to be useful and necessary. It took the form of a programme contract between the Portuguese Sports Institute and the POC. ___________ 34

Cf. Article 28, no. 2 of Law no. 30/2004 of 21st July.

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It should not, however, be assumed that this step put an end to legislative intervention by the Government in the area of Olympic preparation.35 The following are some examples of such intervention: –

Decree-Law no. 272/2009, of 1st October, “established the specific measures necessary to support the development of high performance sport”.

–

By Order no. 10124/2010, of 9th June, the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport approved the “standard form contract to be signed by highperformance sportspersons”, which permitted the POC to include “other clauses” in the said form “provided that the said clauses alter neither the letter or the spirit of the standard form clauses”.

–

In the exercise of the powers granted by the decree referred to in DecreeLaw no. 272/2009, Statutory Instrument no. 325/2010, of 16th June was issued, which “defined the general criteria to be applied in order to classify certain sports competitions as ‘high-level competitions’ in order to include the high performance sportspersons who take part therein in level C”. In this regard, it should be noted that the Government made a distinction in Articles 1 and 2 between the provisions applicable to sports included in the Olympic Programme and the provisions applicable to those that are not.

–

By Order no. 13543/2010 of the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport, of 17th August, the Government entrusted the POC with direct management of the financial aid to be granted to the Portuguese Yachting Federation as a consequence of circumstances that did not involve the POC. The Portuguese Yachting Federation, due to the suspension of its sports public utility status by government decision, was unable to sign a programme contract with the POC. The solution settled upon by the Government in order to ensure that “preparations were not interrupted” was to instruct the POC “on the basis of the sum reserved for the Portuguese Yachting Federation with regard to the London 2012 Olympic project to support its activities, to manage the said financial aid directly in order to pay the grants directly to those coaches who train the sportspersons involved in the London 2012 Olympic Project”, and also to “ensure the operationalization of the pre-

___________ 35 In addition to the contractual tasks entrusted to the Portuguese Sports Institute, i. e. in the area of supervision of compliance by the POC with the provisions, there is one clause in the contract that clearly demonstrates that the Government never wanted to lose control of the situation. In this context, reference should be made to clause 11, which is entitled “Amendment of the Contract”, pursuant to which: “This programme contract may be amended or revised by agreement between the parties, on approval by the member of Government responsible for sport” (emphasis added by author). Order no. 2045/2009 of 5th January 2009 of the Under Secretary of State for Youth and Sport makes it clear that the government area responsible for sport had considered the report on Peking 2008, and that this had led it to decide on the signing of an interim programme contract, inter alia.

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paratory activities, competition and the inclusion of the sportspersons, coaches, managers and other sports persons involved”. In light of the text of item 3 of the order – “inform the Olympic Committee of Portugal” – and the fact that the order makes no reference to any understanding or prior agreement with the POC, and even from the level of contention that was apparent, it appears that this was a case of the imposition of unilateral administrative regulations by the Government which went far beyond what had previously been agreed, and which required the POC to have additional prerogatives within the ambit of its superintendence, direction and management of the Olympic preparations programme. This presumption may, of course, be mistaken due to a lack of information or misunderstanding. (e) By law, the State gave the POC responsibilities in the area of the “registration” of Olympic athletes. The only Portuguese basic law of sport which made no provision regarding the awarding of responsibilities in the area of the registration of Olympic athletes to the POC was the Basic Law of the Sports System. The Basic Law of Sport and the Basic Law of Physical Activity and Sport made such provision in no. 3 of Article 28 and in no. 3 of Article 12, respectively, in the following terms: “The Olympic Committee of Portugal shall keep an up-to-date record of Portuguese Olympic athletes.”

(f) In the law and in an order, the State acknowledged the “public interest” of a transnational event organised by the POC in order to provide the POC with financial aid. By Order no. 1601/2008 (dated 15th January) of the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport, the Portuguese Government recognised the “public interest” of the holding by the POC of the 2nd Lusophone Games in Portugal. It did so pursuant to no. 1 of Article 46 of the Basic Law of Physical Activity and Sport, which is entitled “Financial aid”, and thus enabled the POC “(…) to benefit from aid or financial subsidies provided by the State (…).”

V. Conclusions Several conclusions can be drawn from this. First, that the regulation of Olympism in general, and of the Olympic Games in particular, as set out in “Olympic law”, is a paradigmatic case of legal pluralism, in which various legal systems co-exist and seek to cohabit, i.e. the law of a state, on the one hand, and the Lex olympica, on the other.

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The major challenge lies not only in the need for mutual respect between the two systems, but, above all, in the finding of solutions that facilitate the easing of inevitable friction. These solutions should make it possible for systems that are frequently divergent to operate simultaneously in the same international and supranational context, and in the same country. This should be for the good of the Olympic Movement. This cohabitation has only been possible so far because, on the one hand, states have frequently waived their primacy in favour of the Lex olympica. They have even agreed to be subordinated to it and have incorporated it in their own state law. On the other hand, it has been made possible by the fact that the primacy of the Lex olympica is not a fully developed reality, given the limits imposed by state law. This is true at both national and supranational level and Portuguese law is a good example of this. There are therefore two sides to the subordination that exists between state law and the Lex olympica. It can, however, be concluded that one of these two legal systems does prevail: i.e. the subordination of state law to the Lex olympica. The fact is that the main concessions have been made by states, which have conceded much of their own autonomy in order to allow for the autonomy of sports organisations in their self-regulation. These are the main components of the Olympic Movement, the International Olympic Committee, the International Sports Federations and the National Olympic Committees. It is also noteworthy that these concessions have not always had a legal basis. While recourse has sometimes been had to the derogatory mechanisms provided by law, the truth is that states have generally consented to a “destatification” of the Olympic legal framework contrary to the pure logic of the hierarchy of legal provisions. Only thus was it possible to create an environment in which the Lex olympica could be excluded, or exempted, from the application or, as the case may be, primacy of state law.

Public International Sports Law and the Lex Sportiva By Andreas Wax I.

The “Dilemma” within International Sports Law.............................................. 145 

II. Methods of Solving this “Dilemma” ................................................................. 146  1.

Lex Sportiva Internationalis ...................................................................... 147  a)

Is Sports Law a Legal System in and of Itself? .................................. 147 

b)

The Validity of Lex Sportiva Internationalis through the Choice of Applicable Law? ................................................................................ 148  aa) Lex Sportiva as “an Individual Branch of Private Law (Sonderprivatrecht) Influenced by International Law” ............... 148  bb) Lex Sportiva as a free Choice of Law by the Parties to Arbitration Proceedings ......................................................................... 150  cc) Lex Sportiva as a free Choice of Law by the Parties before State Courts ................................................................................ 150 

2.

Public International Sports Law ................................................................ 151  a)

Definition of Public International Sports Law ................................... 151 

b)

The Scope of Public International Sports Law ................................... 151 

c)

The Prevention and Combating of Doping in Sports.......................... 152  aa) Findings Relating to Public International Sports Law ................ 152  bb) Assessment ................................................................................. 153 

d)

Public international Sports Law as a Solution to the “Dilemma”? ..... 155  aa) Harmonization of the Conflict of Laws Regulations .................. 155  bb) Harmonization of Criminal Law Regulations ............................. 156 

III. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 160

I. The “Dilemma” within International Sports Law Decisions made by sporting organisations and their courts are not always compatible with decisions made by state courts. This is partly due to the fact that procedures employed by the courts of sporting organisations on the one

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hand, and the rules of the state and the EU pertaining to identical international sporting conflicts on the other, are not always in harmony. This “dilemma”1 is intensified because, in most cases, it is uncertain which national legal order should have competence for settling the conflict in question. In addition, under the law of conflicts, there are often various divergent “qualification options” (Qualifikationsoptionen) and connecting factors (Anknüpfungsmöglichkeiten) for one single legal matter.2 Due to the many divergent legal systems worldwide, with their conflicting laws and varying competences, it is often the case that the courts of these legal systems can and do arrive at decisions which are at variance with one another, even though the facts of the cases on which they rule are similar.3 It is a typical feature of international private law that, in cases that cross national boundaries, different legal systems have jurisdiction for similar cases, depending on the rules of the law of conflicts. In (international) sports, such disparities are, however, unacceptable, as one of the most fundamental principles in the area of sport is that of equality.4 If the equality is to be achieved, not only must the rules of the game be the same worldwide, but the legal rules that apply to an individual case must also be identical.5

II. Methods of Solving this “Dilemma” The jurisdiction of national courts in the area of international sports law conflicts cannot be completely excluded, at least not in those proceedings which involve injunctive relief.6 Thus, if the aforementioned “dilemma” is to be resolved, the sole remaining option is to apply the same law consistently to comparable cases.7 A lex sportiva internationalis is one possible way of achieving this solution. The solution could also be found in public international sports law.

___________ 1

Adolphsen, SchiedsVZ (Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren) 2004, 169, 170. Petri, Dopingsanktion (2004), p. 313; Wax, Internationales Sportrecht (2009), p. 132. 3 Hess, in: Digel/Dickhuth (eds.), Doping im Sport (2002), p. 98, 103; Krieger, Vereinsstrafen im deutschen, englischen, französischen und schweizerischen Recht (2003), p. 173; Tyrolt, Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit und zwingendes staatliches Recht (2007), p. 39. 4 Ronellenfitsch, DAR (Deutsches Autorecht) 1995, 241. 5 Waldbröl, FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) 14.11.2005, p. 29; Weller, JuS (Juristische Schulung) 2006, 497, 498 et seq. 6 Wax (fn. 2), p. 143 et seqq. 7 Cf. Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen (2003), p. 50. 2

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1. Lex Sportiva Internationalis a) Is Sports Law a Legal System in and of Itself? Against the background of Article R58 CAS-Code, Article 17 CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games,8 as well as Article 18 CAS-Arbitration Rules for the FIFA World Cup 2006 Final Round, it is often debated as to whether or not international sports has its own applicable body of law, i.e. a lex sportiva internationalis, which is ranked above national state law.9 In 1977, Luc Silance stated that “the law of the State, whether national or Community, gives way before the law of sport in its own domain.”10 If the imposition of a law which is “the same for everyone” were the ultimate goal, the existence of such a primacy in application for international sports law would be ideal, as, in that case, the same legal rules would be applied consistently in cases concerning international sport law. As early as 1949, Massimo Severo Giannini advocated the idea that sport provides the only possibility for the “birth” of an individual legal system.11 The idea that sports, via regulation by international sports organisations independent of national law, had achieved a distinct rule of law spread beyond Italy.12 In spite of all of this, the assumption that lex sportiva internationalis could have its own “anational” legal system is misguided:13 The law of sports organisations is a type of privately enacted associations law. In order for its development, the relevant state must confer legal force upon the norms and regulations enacted by the organi___________ 8

Hess, in: Hess/Dressler (eds.), Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports (1999), p. 1, 43. Adolphsen (fn. 7), p. 51. 10 Silance, Olympic Review 1977, p. 618, 628. 11 Giannini, RDES (Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport) 1949, 10, 17. 12 Nafziger, AJIL (American Journal of International Law) 1992, 489 et seqq.; Rich, JILP (Journal of International Law and Politics), vol. 15, 1982, 1, 34; Bondoux, Olympic Review 1978, 494, 497; Simon, RFCJ (Revue française de théorie, de philosophie et de culture juridique) 2011, p. 97 et seqq.; Maisonneuve, RRJ (Revue de la Recherche Juridique) 2005, 1563, 1566 et seqq.; Jacquier, Règles Autonomes des Organisations Sportives (2004), p. 190 et seq.; Simma, Festschrift Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998), 573, 580; Tröger/Vedder, in: Reuter (ed.), Einbindung des nationalen Sportrechts in internationale Bezüge (1987), p. 1, 14 et seq. 13 Pfister, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (eds.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht (2007), p. 511 margin no. 8; Adolphsen (fn. 7), p. 60; Summerer, Internationales Sportrecht vor dem staatlichen Richter (1990), p. 177; Reuter, DZWir (Deutsche Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Insolvenzrecht) 1996, 1; Will, in: Reuter (ed.), Einbindung des nationalen Sportrechts in internationale Bezüge (1987), p. 29, 38 et seq.; Oschütz, Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), p. 353; Hochtritt, Internationale Sportschiedssprüche vor deutschen Gerichten (2007), p. 77; OLG Frankfurt, judgment of 18.04.2001 (Dieter Baumann), SpuRt (Zeitschrift für Sport und Recht) 2001, 159, 161. 9

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sations.14 These norms, which are enacted by sports organisations, do not constitute primary legislation; the required rules and by-laws must always have a basis in state law.15

b) The Validity of Lex Sportiva Internationalis through the Choice of Applicable Law? aa) Lex Sportiva as “an Individual Branch of Private Law (Sonderprivatrecht) Influenced by International Law” Nevertheless, the discussion surrounding the existence of a lex sportiva internationalis is justifiable. The possibility of applying the lex sportiva in place of state law has, after all, not been ruled out.16 Such an “individual branch of private law” (“Sonderprivatrecht”)17 (“influenced by international law”18) would be comprised of the by-laws and policies of international sports organisations developed from the (standardized) contracts that sport organisations conclude with athletes and associations, the case law developed by the CAS19 and the “grundlegende Rechtsprinzipien als Gemeingüter aller nationalen Rechtsordnungen” (“fundamental legal principles which are common to all national legal orders”) and “spezielle Rechtssätze der sportiven Gemeinschaft” (“dictates of justice central to the sporting community”),20 21 defined by Hess as the “core” of the lex sportiva.22 The “dictates of justice central to the sporting community” include, for example, the ideal of “clean sports”, the prohibition of racial discrimination23 and the principle of “fair play”.24 The matter of whether such unclear legal terms can be applicable in the area of conflict resolution remains debatable. For example, when one hears the term “fair play”, one interprets it as relating to the ___________ 14

F. Kirchhof, Private Rechtsetzung (1987), p. 133, 343. Vieweg, Normsetzung und -anwendung (1990), p. 135 et seqq.; Summerer, Festschrift Hanisch (1994), p. 267, 276; Hess (fn. 8), p. 1, 40 et seq.; Krieger (fn. 3), p. 218. 16 Cf. Adolphsen, Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 2002, pp. 281, 288; Krieger (fn. 3), p. 222. 17 Westermann, Festschrift Rittner (1991), p. 771 et seqq. 18 Hess (fn. 8), p. 1, 46. 19 Kane, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport (2006), p. 455, 476. 20 Cf. CAS, Award of 15.12.2002 (NOC/IOC), CAS 2002/A/372. 21 Krieger (fn. 3), p. 219 et seqq.; Haas, CaS (Causa Sport) 2007, 271, 272. 22 Hess (fn. 8), p. 1, 42. 23 Hess (fn. 8), p. 1, 42. 24 Krieger (fn. 3), p. 219. 15

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athlete’s relationship with his fellow athletes – in contest and conflict, in competition and in the heat of the moment.25 This is a predominantly ethical matter which is both valuable and worthwhile in the area of sports; however, due to the fact that it is so unclear in law, it can only have limited use. This flaw is not specific to the lex sportiva. In other areas of law, the term “fairness” is also used more and more frequently as a legal term,26 despite the fact that the matter of what exactly “fairness” is remains to be clarified. Such uncertainty must, however, be tolerated, as these terms serve only as guiding principles in ascertaining the special rules and privileges applicable to sports. As is the case with all specific law, laws and rules which are applicable to sports are also affected by moral values. The “basic legal principles” (of the lex sportiva) include the principal of nulla poena sine lege, the right to a fair hearing,27 the principle of proportionality and the principle of equal treatment.28 These principles of law are common to the majority of national legal systems.29 This is a concession to the international nature of sports, as well as to cases of legal disputes where it is necessary for worldwide decision-making to be harmonious.30 As the “dictates of justice central to the sporting community” as well as the “basic legal principles” are nowadays usually included in the statutes and by-laws of international sports organisations,31 they cannot be interpreted as individual components of the lex sportiva. The only components of the lex sportiva are the statutes, bylaws and contracts of sports organisations, as well as the rulings by the CAS.32

___________ 25

Kircher, Fair Play (1927), p. 24, 25. Cf. Tettinger, in: Scheffen (ed.), Sport, Recht und Ethik (1998), p. 33, 35; Vieweg, Festschrift Röhricht (2005), p. 1255, 1266 et seqq. 27 Hess (fn. 8), p. 1, 42; Reeb, Olympic Review 1998, N° 19, p. 67 et seq.; CAS, Award of 23.05.1995 (USA Shooting & Quigley/UIT), CAS 94/129, CAS Awards I 1986–1998, p. 187, 202 et seqq.; CAS, Award of 15.01.1992 (G./FEI), CAS 91/53, CAS Awards I 1986–1998, p. 79. 28 CAS, Award of 18.09.2000 (COC & Jesus Kibunde/AIBA), CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 004, CAS Awards II 1998–2000, pp. 617, 621; for a general overview, see Soek, The strict liability principle and the human rights of the athlete in doping cases (2006), passim. 29 Krieger (fn. 3), p. 220. 30 Cf. CAS, Award of 20.08.1999 (AEK Athen und SK SlaviaPrag/UEFA), CAS 98/200, CAS Awards II 1998–2000, p. 38, 101 et seq. 31 Wax (fn. 2), p. 180, 99 et seqq. 32 Nafziger, AJIL 1992, 489, 508. 26

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bb) Lex Sportiva as a free Choice of Law by the Parties to Arbitration Proceedings It is already possible for parties to proceedings before the CAS to agree to choose the lex sportiva as a basis upon which to settle their dispute and, internationally, this is regarded as admissible.33 If this were the usual practice in arbitration proceedings in the CAS (or in other sport arbitration courts), it would, in future, lead to a uniform law being applied to similar cases. The basis for this claim is provided in Article R45, R58 CAS-Code, Article 17 CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games and Article 18 CAS-Arbitration Rules for the FIFA World Cup 2006 Final Round.

cc) Lex Sportiva as a free Choice of Law by the Parties before State Courts It is generally accepted that the parties to arbitration proceedings can choose to employ the lex sportiva as a basis for settling the dispute. However, the prevailing opinion does not accept the possibility of choosing a legal system which is not a national one in proceedings which take place before state courts. Private autonomous legal rules cannot be the legal basis for decisions reached by a state court.34 Just as the lex mercatoria cannot be agreed upon as the applicable law in proceedings before state courts,35 it is also not possible to employ the lex sportiva as a basis for decision-making in proceedings where state courts have jurisdiction.36 The aforementioned “dilemma” cannot, therefore, be remedied by an agreement between the parties to the application of a (standardized) lex sportiva. The only option in this case is the application of the legal norms of different national legal orders which could lead to divergent verdicts despite similar facts.

___________ 33

Hess (fn. 8), p. 1, 43; Haas, CaS 2007, 271; Krieger (fn. 3), p. 223; Hochtritt (fn. 13), p. 78; Röthel, JZ (JuristenZeitung) 2007, 755, 757; Tyrolt (fn. 3), p. 30; for a general account, see also Solomon, RIW (Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft) 1997, 981, 982. 34 Solomon, RIW 1997, 981, 982; Spickhoff, RabelsZ (The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law) 1992, 116, 133; v. Hoffmann, Festschrift Kegel (1987), p. 215, 232; Lorenz, IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht) 1987, 269, 272; Adolphsen (fn. 16), p. 281, 288. 35 Stein, Lex mercatoria (1995), p. 246 et seq.; Spickhoff, RabelsZ 1992, 116, 133; Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 756. 36 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 757; Hochtritt (fn. 13), p. 77.

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2. Public International Sports Law Public international sports law could potentially lead to the elimination of the difference in treatment between cases with similar facts. Just as the WADC harmonised anti-doping regulations, and just as the application of the lex sportiva could achieve uniformly applicable law for sports arbitration courts, it is possible that the “forgotten discipline” of public international sports law37 could lead to the harmonisation of that national law which is applied to sports.38 Before further discussion of this matter, the matter of public international sports law will be elaborated upon briefly.

a) Definition of Public International Sports Law Defined in a positive manner, public international sports law includes all international norms of public law that apply to legal issues concerning sports, and according to which the subjects of public international law allow themselves to be governed. Defined in a negative manner, public international sports law encompasses all of the norms of sports law that are not associated with one of the categories of federal state law applicable to sports law, European laws concerning sports or national sports law. Public international sports law encompasses only those norms that directly relate to sport (public international law on sports), regardless of whether in this connection sport also serves as a means of regulating (other) issues.39

b) The Scope of Public International Sports Law Public international law applies to sports under the following four headings:40 the struggle against apartheid and other forms of prejudice and discrimination in sports, peacekeeping during the Olympic Games and the prevention of football hooliganism and combat of spectator violence in sports, the prevention and combat of doping in sports, and the matter of the recognition of the “right to sports” as a human right. The topic of the prevention and combat of doping in sports through public international sports law – one which is always topical – is outlined below. ___________ 37 However, see also: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Basic Documents of International Sports Organisations (1999), XI: “Specific public international law (in the sense of the law of nations) with regard to (…) sports.” 38 For a comprehensive account, see Wax (fn. 2), p. 290 et seqq. 39 Wax (fn. 2), p. 188. 40 For a detailed account, see Wax (fn. 2), p. 197 et seqq.

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c) The Prevention and Combaing of Doping in Sports aa) Findings Relating to Public International Sports Law Subsequent to the Council of Europe’s fight against doping, which began in the early 1960s,41 and which involved a series of non-binding resolutions and recommendations, a decisive step in terms of public international sports law was taken in 1989, when the first intergovernmental agreement against doping was adopted in the form of the Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention. The Convention was expanded in 2004 by means of a supplementary protocol,42 which is the first binding international agreement recognising the authority of WADA.43 The United Nations’ initial foray into solving the doping problem occurred in May 1968 and involved the ECOSOC.44 UNESCO’s International Charter of Physical Education and Sport of 1978 warned athletes of the dangers of doping. In November 1995, the General Assembly encouraged its member states to cooperate with the Olympic movement in the fight against doping.45 In November 2003,46 an appeal was made to member states to accelerate the drafting process for an anti-doping convention on a global level. This request was in compliance with the requirements of the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport of 05.03.2003. In this declaration, the states supporting the WADC made a commitment to create an intergovernmental agreement to strengthen the WADC. This commitment ultimately took the form of the International Convention against Doping in Sport initiated by the UNESCO. The Convention entered into force on 01.02.2007. As of 14.11.2011, it had been ratified by 163 countries. The main precept contained in the Convention is that doping can be combated effectively only by means of international co-operation and the gradual harmonization of anti-doping standards and practices of governmental authorities and private sports organisations. Signatories agree to adopt appropriate measures to combat doping in sports in accordance with the principles of the WADC. Even in this connection, one can discern the connection between the Convention and the WADA, or alternatively the WADC. Article 4 of the Con___________ 41

Cf. Houlihan, AE (Annuaire Europeen) 2000, 39, 40. Vieweg/Siekmann, Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules, p. 35 et seqq. 43 Wax, ISLJ (International Sports Law Journal) 2010/3–4, 25, 27. 44 ECOSOC Res. 1968/1925(XLIV) 23.05.1968 (Doping). 45 GA Res. 50/13 07.11.1995 (The Olympic Ideal). 46 GA Res. 58/5 03.11.2003 (Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace). 42

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vention deals with the relationship of the Convention to the WADC: accordingly, the WADC, the International Standard for Laboratories and the International Standard for Testing are added as appendices to, but not as actual components of, the Convention. They will not become public international law as a result of their incorporation into the Convention, and thus do not result in any obligations under international law for the signatory states. It is another matter in relation to the (WADA) Annexes to the Convention, such as the Prohibited List and the Standards for Granting Therapeutic Use Exemptions, which, pursuant to Article 4 para. 3, form part of the Convention. The appending and referencing of these documents may give the impression that, in the event of its amending these statutes, WADA, a private organisation, is empowered to create public international law. However, Article 34 of the Convention indicates that this is not the case, prescribing a special procedure for the amendment of the Annexes to the Convention.47 Generally speaking, the Convention (primarily) undertakes to achieve the eradication of doping by implementing preventive measures.48 There is no provision in the Convention which permits the imposition of sanctions against individuals who commit doping offences, apart from an express reference to the WADC in Article 4 para. 2.49

bb) Assessment In the context of public international sports law, it should be noted that the fight against doping initially (in 1968) involved various resolutions and recommendations which were not binding (soft law) between states. Regional forms of public international sports law in this area first became visible when the Council of Europe Convention was adopted in 1989. The law reached global level only in 2007, when the International Convention against Doping in Sport came into effect. Moreover, active state commitment to any specific convention based on public international sports law did not occur until the latter anti-doping convention came into force.50 Both of these anti-doping conventions demonstrate that, in contrast to private sports organisations which use both preventive and enforcement measures to combat doping, the international community is, for the most part, confined to preventive regulations.51 In general, both conventions pursue the same objectives: measures aimed at eradicating doping in sports. The primary goal of the ___________ 47

Cf. UNESCO ED-2005/CONV-DOP Rapp. 1, 14.01.2005, p. 4. Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 27. 49 Wax (fn. 2), p. 277 et seqq. 50 Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 28. 51 Cf. Haug, Doping – Dilemma des Leistungssports (2006), p. 215 et seq. 48

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conventions is to make the same anti-doping regulations available both to states and to international sports organisations. This corresponds to the assumption that, in principle, the prevention of, and the fight against doping can only be efficient and fair if the same rules apply to all parties involved. This goal can be achieved inter alia by improving the mutual co-operation between signatory states, and that between states and sports organisations, as well as by adopting uniform standards in order to fight doping. A legal framework, which would provide governments with the means to combat doping actively, should be provided for this harmonisation. These steps involve tasks (such as restricting the availability of prohibited substances) that can only be performed by states. State activity is essential for any effective curtailment of doping in sports52 since the anti-doping measures engaged in by sports organisations generally do not have sufficient scope.53 In general, both conventions reveal that the doping problem can only be effectively combatted if prevention and enforcement are co-ordinated worldwide. It is unlikely that preventive measures alone will deter those athletes who are prepared to dope from resorting to banned substances or methods. An effective combination of anti-doping prevention and enforcement can, however, only succeed if the international community and privately-organised sports act in tandem with one another.54 The partnership principle is thus the basis of both conventions. A weakness of both conventions is the fact that they impose (only) the general obligation to take steps to prevent and fight against doping without stipulating any concrete measures. This is, however, not specific to anti-doping conventions and offers countries a certain amount of flexibility. However, this also means that there is no guarantee that all signatory states will act in the same manner. At the very least, though, the International Convention is a clear sign that the international community is taking its responsibility seriously in the fight against doping. If sport is characterised by its universality, its greatest scourge – doping – must, ultimately, be fought universally. As far as private sports organisations are concerned, this has been happening for some years under the direction of the WADC. The (global) international community now has the means available to fulfil its self-proclaimed responsibility. There is still no answer to the question concerning the extent to which public international sports law is in fact the appropriate means of alleviating, or even eliminating, the problem of doping in sports, but the will tackle issues concerning the prevention of and the fight against doping collectively is certainly evident.55 ___________ 52

Cf. Simeoni, FAZ 29.03.2005, p. 32. Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 28. 54 For a general account, see Graf Vitzthum, Der Staat der Staatengemeinschaft, p. 12. 55 Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 28. 53

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d) Public International Sports Law as a Solution to the “Dilemma”? As was demonstrated above, a lex sportiva can mitigate the aforementioned “dilemma” to a certain extent, but it cannot completely solve it. It has been suggested that public international sports law could eventually completely solve the problem of the unequal treatment of similar sports issues, in that it could possibly bring with it the harmonization of applicable national law applied to sports. There are two conceivable basic approaches. The first approach would be the worldwide unification of codes regulating the conflict of laws that effect sports. This would lead to the same results for similar cases.56 As a second approach, it is worth considering whether or not the criminal law relating to sports (in certain areas) should also be harmonized.57

aa) Harmonization of the Conflict of Laws Regulations The “dilemma” of international sports law could be solved via a public international law convention on the harmonization of national conflict of law regulations that apply to international sports law disputes. It should be noted here that it is not legally possible to achieve a public international law convention in which the states oblige themselves to enact regulations which would exclude the review by state courts of decisions made by sport organisation courts. This would not be consistent with the globally-accepted principle of access to justice. A convention that would harmonize specific conflict of laws regulations in international sports law conflicts would, ideally, include an exact regulation of the matters that should be harmonized. One example of this is a review of the laws which apply in the case of the doping ban. The sole connection is the seat of the sports organisation involved in the conflict.58 This leads to the same results for the same cases. As the laws applicable in the jurisdiction where the sport organisation has its headquarters would always be based on the same association sanction, it is difficult to imagine that there would be divergent decisions in similar cases. Any such convention would be compatible with the autonomy of sports, as it is accepted that measures taken by sports organisations today are already capable of being reviewed to a certain extent by state courts.59

___________ 56

Cf. Latty, ISLJ 2011/1–2, 34, 38. Wax (fn. 2), p. 290 et seq. 58 For more detail on finding an “ideal connection” (“ideale Verknüpfung”), see Gamilllscheg, in: BDGV (Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht), Issue 3 (1959), p. 29, 43. 59 Wax (fn. 2), p. 293. 57

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Any such harmonization of conflict of law regulations could prove unpopular, as it would encroach upon and undermine the cultural diversity of the various national legal systems, as well as various national conflict of laws regulations.60 Although such a theory is potentially justifiable, it is, in this instance, easily refutable. In individual cases, there is no room for the cultural and national differences which exist in international sports law, as one of the main principles of sport is that of egalitarianism and, thus, one of the main features of sport is its internationality.61 Ultimately, it is debatable whether or not such a harmonization of laws is feasible. In order for it to be successful, there would need to be a worldwide understanding that such a move was necessary as well as a willingness on the parts of the states involved to achieve a successful harmonization of the laws. The acknowledgement and pursuit of a general understanding that, in international sports law, one should act in a way which is legally harmonious, is the goal of the international community, the most recent example of which is provided by the International Convention Against Doping in Sport. Admittedly, this agreement does not include any concrete suggestion that the international community is pursuing harmonization in the area of conflict of laws; however, this convention includes the obligation to fight effectively against doping in the way that the WADC intended. This clearly shows the potential and desire that exists for such a step to be taken, as the sanctions for doping anchored in the WADC can only be fully effective if there is no risk that courts will not apply the law in a united manner due to divergent national law. An international convention that harmonizes the state conflict of laws regulations would by and large alleviate the aforementioned “dilemma” in international sport law.62

bb) Harmonization of Criminal Law Regulations It is debatable whether or not legal provisions concerning substantive law in the area of sports (in specific areas) can also be harmonized in order to alleviate the aforementioned “dilemma”. This can be examined by considering the example of the fight against doping in sports. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport did not choose to take this path. The WADC was merely added as part of the Appendices. As opposed to the Annexes to the Convention which form part of it, the WADC is not a part of the convention. ___________ 60 Schack, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht (2006), p. 97, margin no. 215; Gamillscheg, in: BDGV, Issue 3 (1959), p. 29, 30; Adolphsen (fn. 7), p. 257. 61 Cf. Silance, Olympic Review 1971, p. 586, 593. 62 Wax (fn. 2), p. 294 et seq.

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For this reason, the sanctions against those convicted of doping are not harmonized under state law. The harmonization of national private law failed due to the norms’ lack of sport specificity.63 For this reason, it is debatable whether or not it is legally possible to harmonize criminal law via public international law. Punishments handed down by sports organisations or via sport groups must be confirmed by national law. This is done in order to produce an accord between bans determined by sports organisations and “punishments” from the state. There is a tendency in the area of private sports for sports organisations to align their sanctions with those of the national law in doping cases. This can be observed in Article 4, para. 4 of the European Council Convention Against Doping or in Article 4 para. 1 of the International Convention Against Doping in Sport. A further interesting element in this case is the demand contained in Article 22.2 WADC, which stipulates that “all other governmental involvement with antidoping will be brought into harmony with the Code”. A (non-justifiable) intervention in the autonomy of sporting organisations does not prevent harmonisation. A national criminal law regulating doping sanctions would not be a direct intervention in organised sports. It would “merely” have the effect of indirectly preventing the athlete from participating in sporting events.64 The autonomy of sports organisations would be violated only if the state were to infringe upon sports organisations’ self-regulatory authority. This would mean that the rights of self-regulation within the sporting organisation would no longer be guaranteed.65 This would make it possible, via harmonization by means of public international sports law, to waive (or modify) criminal law norms that sanction those who are convicted of doping the world over.66 A ne bis in idem in opposition to the prohibition of double jeopardy as regards the sanctions imposed by associations and the state would not occur here.67 Culpability arising out of doping cannot be ruled out. In order to explore this in more detail, one can take a look at German law, which states that acts performed at one’s own risk which can result in injury to one’s person, or

___________ 63

Cf. Vedder, GYIL (German Yearbook of International Law) 1984, 233, 256. Cf. Hilpert, Sportrecht und Sportrechtsprechung im In- und Ausland (2007), p. 323, margin no. 5. 65 Vieweg/Röthel, ZHR (Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht) 2002, 6, 15. 66 See similarly Cherkeh, Betrug (§ 263 StGB), verübt durch Doping im Sport (2000), p. 242. 67 For the German law (Art. 103 para. 3 GG [German Basic Law]) cf. Fahl or Reschke (concurring), Sportverbandsgerichtsbarkeit und Doppelbestrafungsverbot, SpuRt 2001, 181 et seqq.; Heger, SpuRt 2007, 153. 64

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which put oneself at risk of harm cannot penalised.68 This paradigm could, however, still be overcome by basing the punishment of the athlete who doped upon the premise that, by using forbidden substances, he committed fraud and is thus culpable.69 There are, however, further difficulties here arising from the diverging configurations of association proceedings and state criminal trials, as well as the line of argument used as regards the question of guilt in the case of the athlete who doped.70 The criminal law of most states works on the basis of the principle of presumption of innocence. In this instance, sports associations have differing lines of argument,71 including the principle of strict liability, the assumption of guilt with exonerating evidence72 and prima facie evidence. Because prima facie evidence in sports court proceedings is admissible73 and not excluded from state criminal proceedings, at least in accordance with a middleEuropean legal interpretation74, it is quite possible that prima facie evidence can be a “bridge” for the purpose of aligning the two proceedings. The resulting harmonization effect between the penalties imposed by the association and the criminal sanctions imposed upon those convicted of doping could lead to the same evidence guidelines being employed in both association and criminal doping proceedings. In order to achieve this, not only would states the world over need to accept it, but there would also have to be a corresponding concession from the sporting world. It would be a clear signal to the sporting world that it should renounce the strict liability principle, as well as the assumption of guilt. Up until now, no such move has been made within the private sporting world. In order for doping to be successfully defeated, states and sports organisations need to work hand-in-hand with one another. This would also be a clearer ex___________ 68

Summerer, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (eds.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht (2007), p. 200, margin no. 246; Hilpert (fn. 64), p. 321, margin no. 5; see also BGH, judgment of 14.02.1984, BGHSt 32, 265 et seqq. 69 Digel, in: Digel/Dickhuth (eds.), Doping im Sport (2002), p. 1, 3; Nolte, Sport und Recht (2004), p. 224; Lüer, Dopingstrafen im Sport und der Grundsatz “ne bis in idem” (2006), p. 112; Hilpert (fn. 64), p. 321 et seq., margin no. 5; Schimke, Sportrecht (1996), p. 202; Wax (fn. 2), p. 300. 70 Cf. Eufe, Die Unschuldsvermutung im Dopingverfahren (2005), p. 36. 71 See Hilpert (fn. 64), p. 313 et seqq., margin no. 3. 72 Hilpert (fn. 64), p. 313 et seq., margin no. 3. 73 Walker, in: Vieweg (ed.), Doping – Realität und Recht (1998), pp. 135, 143 et seqq.; Steiner, in: Röhricht/Vieweg (eds.), Doping-Forum (2000), p. 125, 135 et seq., Hochtritt (fn. 13), p. 164; Hilpert (fn. 64), p. 315 et seq., margin no. 3. According to Hilpert § 8 no. 3 a) German Football Federation Legal and Procedural Regulations (DFB-Rechts- und Verfahrensordnung) could serve as a “model”. 74 For a basic account, see Müller, Anscheinsbeweis im Strafprozeß am Beispiel der Feststellung von Kausalität und von Dispositionsprädikaten (1998); Eufe, Unschuldsvermutung (2005), p. 59 et seqq., p. 61.

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pression of the corresponding convention. It would require not only that states make concessions, but also that the sports world be more receptive to state concerns, in which the principles of national law would take over.75 In order to achieve complete harmonization of decision-making between state doping sanctions and doping bans imposed by sport organisations, the state criminal law concerned must “conform” to the anti-doping provisions of the sporting world. This means that identical sanctions should be imposed for the same conduct, depending on which possibilities are available: if a sport association bans an athlete for two years for doping, the state must also ban him or her (worldwide) for two years. In this case, it is clear that a sentence of imprisonment (without parole) imposed by the state would satisfy this requirement. However, a prison sentence should most certainly not become an automatic criminal consequence in doping cases. It would, however, be conceivable that the state (monetary or probationary) penalty in doping cases would also result in a ban from said profession. This would prevent the person convicted of doping from practicing his or her profession and would (for the time being) enforce the ban handed down by the sports organisation. In this instance, harmonization of decision-making would only be achieved if the employment ban (with or without probation or parole) were exactly the same as the ban imposed by the sports association for doping. The length of the (state) ban on participation in sport would have to correspond to the length of the ban imposed by the organisation. In order for this to be achieved, state regulations that conform to the provisions made by sports organisations would have to be put in place worldwide.76 This would most likely be difficult to achieve: The WADC includes a flexible system for the imposition of sanctions in doping cases so that it can react appropriately to the specific facts of individual cases. In all cases, the same issues must be decided in the same manner. It would be legally acceptable to insert a comparable catalogue of sanctions into state criminal law through public international sports law worldwide. However, these regulations would need to conform to the constitutions of the individual states.77 A complete harmonization of state sanctions, achieved by means of employment bans and the doping bans handed down by the sports organisations, would not be accomplished, because each case must be decided individually. Furthermore, there would be no obligation upon the judge to impose the same sanctions as those handed down ___________ 75

Nolte (fn. 69), p. 19. Wax (fn. 2), p. 305. 77 Cf. the legal position in Germany: Hilpert (fn. 64), p. 319, margin no. 4: “A general penalty of two years for the first offence and, in the case of repeated offences, bans (…) satisfy (…) the requirements of the principle of proportionality and are compatible with Art. 12 para. 1 GG.” 76

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by the sports organisation. This means that the length of the sanctions could still vary. It would be a requirement of harmonisation that “fixed” levels of penalisation be imposed in criminal proceedings. This would not allow association proceedings to deviate by either lowering or raising the penalty. However, such regulations would not be compatible with judicial independence. Here, it can be seen that a criminal sanction for athletes who have doped is legally acceptable, as is the case de lege lata in Italy. It is, however, impossible for criminal regulations to be harmonized in such a way that sanctions imposed by the state and by sports organisations will always be the same worldwide. A conclusive solution to the “dilemma” in international sports law cannot be achieved by the harmonisation of criminal proceedings worldwide.78

III. Conclusion The “dilemma” in international sports law can be mitigated by employing a lex sportiva internationalis. It cannot, however, be solved. The ideal solution to this problem can, rather, be found in the worldwide harmonization of the relevant conflict of laws regulations. In the process of achieving this harmonization, public international sports law can be regarded as a pacemaker.

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Wax (fn. 2), p. 308.

Defining the Scope and Structure of International Sports Law: Four Conceptual Issues By James A.R. Nafziger I.

The Problem ...................................................................................................... 161 

II. The Conceptual Issues ...................................................................................... 163  1.

Professional Orientations toward either International or Domestic Law ... 164 

2.

The Public-private Law Distinction ........................................................... 166 

3.

The Definition of the Lex Sportiva ............................................................ 168 

4.

The Applicability of Fairness as a Core Principle ..................................... 171  a)

The Definitional Issue ........................................................................ 171 

b)

The Analysis of Fairness in three Contexts ........................................ 173 

c)

CAS Jurisprudence ............................................................................. 175 

III. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 177

I. The Problem There is general agreement that the term “international sports law” refers to a process involving a distinctive body of rules, principles, procedures, and practice to govern important consequences of sports activity that transcends national boundaries. Beyond this broad definition, however, the scope and structure of international sports law is uncertain, thereby limiting its authority and legitimacy. What this means at the international level of authority is that we do not always know what is law and what is not, or at least we may find it difficult to distinguish law, with all of its rigor, from non-legal norms, best practices, ethics, and simple rules of sports etiquette, with all of their flexibility. This kind of problem besets most if not all young regimes, not just international sports law, but the sports law community would be remiss if it failed to address the underlying issues. It might seem that we could overcome this problem by defining and labeling the pertinent law and legal institutions more precisely. To do so, our collective wisdom would be essential. After all, our ability to accurately describe our observations, whether of concrete objects or social phenomena such as legal

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norms, often depends on more than individual impressions. One is reminded of the story about a group of blind persons who are finding it difficult to identify an elephant merely by touching it, each of them describing a different part of the animal. A lack of agreement on definitions and labeling does not seem to be the real problem, however. To be sure, we need to distinguish what is so-called hard law, such as prohibitions on match-fixing, and what is soft law, such as the ethics of good sportsmanship and the principle of international cooperation. But simply defining the terms “hard law” and “soft law” more precisely would not seem to be very helpful. Similarly, we cannot resolve the tensions between international and national authority over sports merely by refining the terminology and rules that express their complicated relationship. After all, international sports law is an authoritative process, not a taxonomy of rules. Trying to reach a more functional consensus on the scope and structure of international sports law therefore raises deep and rather difficult issues – not just nominal or verbal ones, but conceptual ones.1 Four of these conceptual issues are particularly troublesome: professional orientations among sports lawyers toward either international or domestic law, but not always both; the public-private law distinction; the jurisprudential scope of a Lex sportiva; and the applicability of a core principle of fairness. There is a fifth set of important conceptual issues that this commentary will not discuss in detail, namely, those related to the European Union’s complex relationships with national authorities, international sports bodies, and, ultimately, athletes and other individual stakeholders in sports. Although the EU is certainly a source of important developments in international sports law – indeed, some of the most important developments – it nevertheless remains only a regional rather than global mechanism. As such, EU law has its own internal conceptual issues that, we must remember, are not necessarily experienced elsewhere. Perhaps the most obvious of these issues is how, precisely, to define the specificity of sport – the so-called sporting exception – which within the EU is framed in terms of the distinctive exigencies of economic integration. We might even speak of EU-type specificity. Elsewhere, however, sports law typically is not as driven by economic requirements as on the continent of Walrave, Bosman, and Meca-Medina.2 This means that at the global level the scope of ___________ 1 The issues are fundamentally ones of “conceptual semantics – the language of thought – [as] distinct from language itself.” STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT 4 (2007). “The theory of conceptual semantics [proposes] that word senses are mentally represented as expressions in a richer and more abstract language of thought.” Id. at 150. 2 Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, Case 36/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1405, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association v. Bosman, Case C415/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-4921, and Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Comm’n, Case C-519/04,

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the concept of specificity may be quite different from the sense of the term within the EU.3 Moreover, the meaning of EU-type specificity is still evolving. Thus, although the term clearly raises conceptual issues of great interest, they are ones that as yet cannot be resolved at the global level, given the continuing evolution of the concept within the EU and, ultimately, its mandatory economic requirements. It seems advisable, then, to avoid this kind of confusion in a study of conceptual issues that are not simply regional and are susceptible to actual resolution at the global level. The present commentary seeks mostly to identify and discuss the four conceptual issues without attempting to resolve them definitively. That should be the next step in seeking to achieve a consensus on the scope and structure of international sports law. Nevertheless, this commentary will offer several observations that may help us take this next step.

II. The Conceptual Issues Perhaps the best place to begin is by clarifying what should no longer be a conceptual issue – namely, whether the term “law and sports” or simply “sports law” best describes our common inquiry.4 It should be clear that the more ambitious term “sports law” is entirely justified. The regime governing international competition has certainly evolved well beyond the “law and sports” stage when the applicable law was merely or mostly external. Today, the acceptance of a limited specificity of sport and the emergence of distinctive rules, institutions, and processes clearly confirm that sports law – indeed, the process of international sports law – is a discipline unto its own. Although it is still young, ___________ [2006] E.C.R. I-6991, formed the foundation of a line of European Court of Justice opinions that have confirmed the EU’s regulatory power over sport and have thereby attempted to define the bounds of sports specificity. See generally RICHARD PARRISH & SAMULI MIETTINEN, THE SPORTING EXCEPTION IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2008). 3 See, e.g., Richard H. McLaren, Is Sport Losing Its Integrity?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 551, 558 n.22 (2011) (calling into question the global relevance of economic considerations in the context of cheating by athletes, citing Meca-Medina & Majcen, supra note 2, and quoting Richard Pound, former Vice-President of the International Olympic Committee and first President of the World Anti-Doping Agency, to the effect that a right to work as a professional athlete does not entail a right to cheat by the use of performanceenhancing agents). 4 For a concise summary of the debate just as “[t]he case for the recognition of a field of ‘sports law’ [was] beginning to gain empirical credibility,” and as theoretical analysis was developing in the literature, see Richard Parrish, The Birth of European Union Sports Law, 2 ENT. L., Summer 2003, at 20, 21–23. See also SIMON GARDINER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 97, 99 (2d ed. 2001) (concluding that the notion that a separate discipline of sports law does not exist “is symptomatic of a narrow outlook.” Id. at 99). See also text at notes 30–32.

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the discipline is surprisingly mature, with both primary and secondary rules. We shall return later to these points as we examine each of the four conceptual issues.

1. Professional Orientations toward either International or Domestic Law It is obvious that international sports law straddles both international law and topics of national or domestic law such as antitrust or competition law, employment law, labor law, tort law, criminal law, and civil rights law. As a result, some sports lawyers and scholars are more grounded in international law and others in domestic law. Consequently, individual orientations toward either international or domestic law contribute to the confusion about the scope and structure of the discipline. It then becomes essentially a problem of legal ordering between the two spheres of authority. Although this distinction can be exaggerated, professional orientations can make a difference in defining the proper legal ordering. For example, international lawyers are more apt to assume that international rules, standards, and procedures, often established by custom or general practice, should always be supreme. This is, of course, highly questionable as a general rule, at least in many domestic legal systems. International lawyers may also discount the actual impact that international sports law has on national regulation of employment relations, broadcasting rights, intellectual property rights, doping and so on. Moreover, they may be impatient about or even overlook important variations in national constitutional protections and mandatory laws and procedures that may call into question the uniformity of such rules of international sports law as strict liability in doping cases. Sometimes the wish for greater uniformity of rules and authority around the world may be the parent of the thought that such uniformity actually exists in practice. On the other hand, domestic lawyers tend to think of international law mostly, if not entirely, in simplistic terms of relations between nation-states. They may therefore fail to understand the breadth of international legal personality and consequently fail to appreciate the unusual and powerful status of the Olympic Movement, led by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), as an unusual nongovernmental arrangement with limited legal personality,5 much ___________ 5 See, e.g., MICHAEL BELOFF, TIM KERR, AND MARIE DEMETRIOU, SPORTS LAW 5, 257 (1999). Accord, Ken Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, 2 ENT. L., Spring 2003, at 1, 13 (“The classic definition of international legal personality has been the capacity to enter into legal obligations at the international level and to enter into relations with other international persons such as nation states.”); David J. Ettinger, The Legal Status of the Interna-

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like the International Committee of the Red Cross in that respect. It should be clear that the constituent and affiliated organizations of the Olympic Movement – particularly the IOC, international sports federations, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) – are not just loosely associated with each other under private agreements. Instead, these organizations, even though they are essentially nongovernmental, form an integrated subject of public international law that is recognized as such by nationstates. This point is crucial to an understanding of the scope and structure of international sports law. Thus, for example, “[t]he IOC increasingly acts [as] a global legislator in international sport, setting common standards.”6 In the words of a national court: “[A] court should be wary of applying a state statute to alter the content of the Olympic Games. The Olympic Games are organized and conducted under the terms of an international agreement – the Olympic Charter. We are extremely hesitant to undertake the application of one state’s statute to alter an event that is staged with competitors from the entire world under the terms of that agreement.”7

Also, CAS awards have been repeatedly recognized and enforced by states, not only under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards,8 but also by virtue of the status of CAS itself as a legal actor within the framework of international sports law.9 We should recall, too, that the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established by a mix of nongovernmental organizations and – it is too often forgotten – national governments. Moreover, UNESCO’s International Convention Against Doping in Sport,10 with over 150 States Parties, establishes WADA as an advisory organi___________ tional Olympic Committee, 4 PACE YRBK. INT’L L. 97, 109 (1992) (“it is clear the IOC has international legal status and acts as an international person”). See also Christoph Vedder, The International Olympic Committee: An Advanced Non-Governmental Organization and the International Law, 27 GERMAN YRBK INT’L L. 233, 257–58 (1984) (questioning whether the IOC has international legal personality but, even as early as 1984, noting that “public international law has become more decentralized” so that “the recognition of the IOC [by states] could be understood as an implied delegation.” 6 Ken Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in IAN S. BLACKSHAW, ROBERT C.R. SIEKMANN & JAN WILLEM SOEK, THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984–2004, at 420, 438 (2006). 7 Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1984). 8 Done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. 9 See, e.g., E.T. Gilson, Exploring the CAS, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 503, 504 (2006). Also, the legal personality of CAS has been recognized, for example, by the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations, Europ. T.S. No. 124 (1986). 10 Paris, October 19, 2005.

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zation11 and obligates the parties to adopt appropriate measures consistent with the principles of WADA’s World Anti-Doping Code.12 As a hybrid of governmental and nongovernmental commitments, WADA therefore should not be classified as a strictly private organization. Unfortunately, the reality that the core nongovernmental organizations within the world of sports form a subject of public international law with limited international legal personality is too often obscured by the obvious (but misleading) fact that these organizations are, after all, nongovernmental. Too often, form thereby triumphs over function.

2. The Public-private Law Distinction A second conceptual source of confusion is the public-private law distinction – so essential in the civil code tradition of law but so incidental or even blurred in the common law tradition. Unlike the civil code tradition, with its elaborate organization of substantive law, the common law tradition is fundamentally process-oriented, not substance-oriented. Of course, such contrasts between the two western legal traditions are not as important as they used to be. Today the two traditions are gradually converging in numerous respects. Even so, it is still easier for common lawyers to understand that everyday practices and dispute resolution that we may call “private” can easily ripen into public law without any legislative or executive intervention. For example, the concept of stare decisis ensures that court decisions in civil cases will shape future decisions in the public sector. When Philip Jessup, over a half-century ago, coined the term “transnational law” to describe a normative process of decision-making that blends private and public elements, it soon became essentially another name for public international law in the United States, although a formal distinction between “international” and “transnational” law is certainly understood. Here again, the public-private distinction seems rather fuzzy in a common law system. Moreover, in the context of sport, even civil code systems have “undergone extremely interesting developments in recent decades”13 that have blurred the sharp dichotomy between public and private law. ___________ 11

Id. art. 29. Id. arts. 3, 4. Article 4(3) provides that the Code, which appears as Appendix 1 to the Convention, is an “integral part of this Convention.” 13 Andreas Wax, Public International Sports Law: A “Forgotten” Discipline?, INT’L SPORTS L.J. 2010/3–4, at 25 (defining a limited scope of public international sports law). For an expansive commentary by the same author on international sports law, see ANDREAS WAX, INTERNATIONALES SPORTRECHT UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES SPORTVÖLKERRECHTS (2009). 12

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If, however, we maintain the public-private distinction so as to envisage two separate legal orders in international sports, the question becomes, how do the two orders relate to each other exactly? At this point, we must confront such rubrics as “global sports law,” “private international sports law,” “private international law of sports,” and “legal pluralism in sports” – each of which is used to describe a different range of private legal ordering. It is all very confusing – and unnecessarily so. We should readily reject two of these rubrics – “private international sports law” and “private international law of sports” – neither of which seems to be limited to the issues of jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement of foreign judgments that define private international law in the normal sense of the term. That is a simple semantic solution to terminological confusion. But the remaining rubrics – “global sports law” and “legal pluralism in sports” – do not suffer from the same sort of nominal confusion and therefore should not be rejected as semantically mistaken. Instead, these two rubrics exemplify the conceptual issues concerning the relationship between the kinds of legal ordering that the rubrics imply and the established framework of international sports law. Here is one possible resolution of the conceptual issue: If some sort of private legal order in international sports is to be maintained, rather than conceptualizing it vaguely as autonomous as if it were beyond legal review, we simply need to integrate it effectively into the established process of international sport law, with all of its safeguards for the specificity of sport; the authority and legitimacy of sports organizations; and the recognition of the rules of the game, ethical norms of sport and decisions in the field of play that constitute the Lex ludica.14 In philosophical terms, it may be time to make use of Occam’s razor of simplicity by cutting out the unnecessary complexity of different legal orders. What seems to make good sense is a blend of so-called private and public

___________ 14 In Ken Foster’s (see supra note 6, at 421) definition: “A further set of principles and rules … are what can be termed the sporting law, or rules of the game. I propose to call these principles ‘Lex ludica.’ These encompass two types of rules that are distinctive and unique because of the context of sport in which they occur and are applied. One covers the actual rules of the game and their enforcement by match officials. The approach here by the Court of Arbitration for Sport has been to treat these rules as sacrosanct and immune from legal intervention. The second type is what can be termed the “sporting spirit” and covers those ethical principles of sport that should be followed by sports persons. The concept ‘Lex ludica’ thus includes both the formal rules and the equitable principles of sport. They are arguably immune from legal intervention because they are an ‘internal law’ of sport – a private governance that is respected by national courts, and as such is best applied by a specialized forum or system of arbitration by experts.”

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authority that clearly articulates their symbiotic relationship, more or less in line with Philip Jessup’s concept of transnational law.15 Taking into account these first two conceptual issues, an interesting question is the status of the Olympic Charter and the law generated by Olympic practice under it – the so-called Lex olympica.16 Once again, professional orientations and the distinction between public and private law seem to be important. As we have seen, international lawyers (and common lawyers in the United States but perhaps not as much in the British Commonwealth countries) generally conclude that the Lex olympica is paramount in defining the process of international sports law itself whereas domestic lawyers (and civil code lawyers but perhaps not as much in Greece) may be inclined to view the concept as a description of an essentially autonomous body of private law.

3. The Definition of the Lex Sportiva A third conceptual issue involves the crucial but elusive term Lex sportiva. There is general agreement that it refers to an emerging body of law which transcends the rules of the game, the ethical norms of sport, and decisions in the field of play, otherwise known collectively as the Lex ludica. Indeed, international sports law, as articulated primarily by the awards of CAS and other arbitral tribunals, supplies a noninterference rule to help protect the Lex ludica. But what exactly is the scope of the Lex sportiva? Even CAS awards are ambiguous on that point. There is some agreement, however, that the term refers to a body of sports law that is roughly analogous to the Lex mercatoria or law merchant in international commercial practice and commercial arbitration.17 These two bodies of law have numerous similarities of origin in customary practices and of development by arbitral tribunals. To be sure, they also have numerous differences, insofar as the Lex sportiva is the product of arbitral awards and, by now, a distinctive development.18 ___________ 15 See McLaren, supra note 3, at 553 (“The coming challenge is to knit the approach of both sets of authority together without taking away the control of sport by sport officials and their accompanying federations.”). 16 See generally Alexandre Miguel Mestre, The Law of the Olympic Games (2009). 17 The text that follows draws on the author’s earlier commentary. See James A.R. Nafziger, The Principle of Fairness in the Lex Sportiva of CAS Awards and Beyond, INT’L SPORTS L.J., 2010/3–4, at 3. 18 See generally Boris Kolev, Lex Sportiva and Lex Mercatoria, INT’L SPORTS L.J. 2008/1–2, at 57 (noting similarities and differences between the ancient tradition and authority of the Lex mercatoria and the recent development of a Lex sportiva, in their respective origins and developments); Ulrich Haas, Die Vereinbarung von “Rechtsregeln” in Berufungs-Schiedsverfahren vor dem Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAUSA SPORT,

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The scope of the Lex sportiva has been variously defined, sometimes expansively to embrace most if not all of international sports law and sometimes narrowly to describe a contractually based, private legal order based on the socalled autonomy of sports federations from national legal systems.19 Ordinarily, however, the term is limited to its original definition as a body of rules and principles derived from awards made by CAS, primarily, and other recognized tribunals. These include, for example, principles derived from rulings by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center on the domain names of sports teams.20 Although such awards and other pronouncements do not constitute precedent in the sense of the common law – they are, after all, Lex specialis – they do provide guidance for future cases21 under national and international law and gain additional traction in national legal systems whenever they become final and binding decisions under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.22 In these ways, such tribunals and CAS generate the Lex sportiva that helps shape international sports law. The emerging Lex sportiva does not address all issues presented for arbitration, however. For example, issues of Lex ludica involving rules of the game, ethical norms and field-of-play decisions are not susceptible to formal arbitration under international sports law. The Lex sportiva also does not address such other issues as the arbitrability of a dispute, the validity of an arbitration agreement, and judicial relief from arbitral awards. Instead, these issues are subject to the applicable rules of a particular arbitral tribunal and the positive law – in the instance of CAS, the Lex arbitrii of Swiss law. Also, arbitral pro___________ 3/2007, at 271, 272; LUC SILANCE, LES SPORTS ET LE DROIT 86, 87 (1998) (noting a difference in the reception of the term between Latin-based (Romance) languages and other languages and considering the term in the context of a transnational juridical order). One CAS award confusingly associated the Lex mercatoria with the Lex ludica rather than the Lex sportiva. AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), CAS 98/200, at 158. 19 See, e.g., FRANCK LATTY, LA LEX SPORTIVA: RECHERCHE SUR LE DROIT TRANSNATIONAL (2007) (drawing upon Judge Philip Jessup’s concept of transnational law that blends private and public processes and rules); Dimitrios Panagiotopoulos, Theoretical Foundation of Sports Law, in SPORTS LAW (LEX SPORTIVA) IN THE WORLD 19, 22, 39 (2004); Dimitrios Panagiotopoulos, Lex Sportiva: Sport Institutions and Rules of Law, in SPORTS LAW: IMPLEMENTATION AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES 33 (2005); James Nafziger, Lex Sportiva, INT’L SPORTS L.J., 2004/1–2, at 3. 20 See, e.g., Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Lee, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2007-0896 (2007). 21 See Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n v. U.S.A. Track & Field and Jerome Young, CAS 2004/A/628 (June 28, 2004) (making it clear that although CAS awards do not form a stare decisis, CAS panels must try to come to the same conclusion on matters of law as previous panels). 22 Done June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.

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nouncements on the civil rights of athletes or on labor, anti-trust (competition), and other regulatory law generally fall outside the scope of the Lex sportiva, as do any awards that are deemed to violate national constitutions, mandatory domestic law, or public policy (ordre public).23 But even if we can agree on the jurisprudential sources of the Lex sportiva – largely CAS – we may still ask, so what? Is the term significant or is it only specious? If it is significant, what kinds of questions does it help answer? Two thoughtful but divergent commentaries on the Lex sportiva raised these questions. One of the commentaries equated the Lex sportiva with “global sports law,”24 which it defined as a “transnational autonomous private order ... constituted by the legislative and constitutional order created by international sporting federations.”25 The other commentary defined the Lex sportiva as a “novel body of international sports law”26 created by CAS, but then observed that it is little more than “an umbrella label that encompasses several discrete methodologies of lawmaking distilling a medley of variables into an oversimplified motto.”27 What is most interesting and important about these two very different commentaries is that they both approached the conceptual issue of determining the nature of the Lex sportiva by deconstructing CAS jurisprudence. Then, after exposing the diverse roles of CAS, both commentaries concluded that if we carefully identify the multiplicity of distinct tasks and functions that CAS performs, the law that it generates may take on real meaning and distinction. Thus, according to the first of the commentaries,28 CAS may operate variously to preserve the autonomy of private sports bodies and thereby defer to the Lex ludica, to serve as an ombudsman, to conduct a final review of a dispute, to act as a supreme court within the Olympic Movement, or simply to arbitrate a dispute on the basis of fairness and justice. The other commentary29 similarly focuses on ___________ 23 On the inherent tension in resolving sports-related disputes between internationalism and nationalism and the need for “final and binding decisions having global recognition and effect,” see Matthew J. Mitten & Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development of International, Comparative Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269, 284–85 (2010). 24 Foster, supra note 6, at 421. In an earlier commentary, however, Professor Foster warned that the Lex sportiva was “a dangerous smoke screen justifying self-regulation by international sporting federations and the danger is that their customs and practices will be accepted as legitimate.” Foster, supra note 5, at 17. 25 Id. 26 Allen Erbsen, The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in BLACKSHAW ET AL., supra note 6, at 441. 27 Id. 28 Foster, supra note 6, at 440. 29 Erbsen, supra note 26, at 442.

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four modes of legal analysis reflected in CAS awards, depending on the nature of a particular issue of interpreting language in an authoritative text. CAS, then, is indeed capable of creating “a unique body of law known as Lex sportiva,”30 not merely a contextually specific application of general law although the application by CAS of general law is essential, too. Claiming that the Lex sportiva is distinctive and functional is really not at all like claiming, for example, that any commercial and tort law applied to potato merchants forms a Lex tuber.31 Instead, the Lex sportiva is distinctive – for example, its strict liability rules in doping cases, its deference to the Lex ludica and the specificity of sport, its application of the Olympic Charter and practice, its provision for party autonomy to select mediation procedures, its acknowledgement of sport-specific definitions of nationality, its metaphor of fair play drawn from the Lex ludica, and so on. Although much of the emerging law is still Lex ferenda – that is, law still in the process of formation and acceptance – it is evolving steadily, as is the larger process of international sports law itself.32

4. The Applicability of Fairness as a Core Principle a) The Definitional Issue A core principle, perhaps the core principle, to inform the Lex sportiva and the larger body of international sports law is fairness. But what exactly is “fairness”? That question highlights our fourth and final conceptual issue – essentially a jurisprudential issue – about the scope of international sports law. We can all agree on an essential principle of the Lex ludica: that “fair play” in competition requires athletes, coaches, and referees to comply fully with the rules of the game and ethical norms on the playing field. Beyond that, however, definitions of the principle of fairness as applied to sports have been disappointing. For example, the federal, provincial and territorial sports ministers of Canada issued a lengthy and elaborate declaration entitled “Expectations for Fairness in ___________ 30 2009 Annual Survey: Recent Developments in Sports Law, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 497, 541 (2010). For a retrospective on CAS by a leading expert, see Richard H. McLaren, Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: A Look in the RearView Mirror, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 305 (2010); see also Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World’s Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379 (2001). 31 Erbsen, supra note 26, at 445 (making that comparison, albeit facetiously). 32 This overview of CAS and the Lex sportiva draws from more extensive discussion in JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 40–43, 48–61 (2d ed. 2004). The definitive work on CAS is BLACKSHAW ET AL., supra note 6. The ensuing discussion about the fourth conceptual issue, involving the core principle of fairness, is drawn but modified from Nafziger, supra note 17.

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Sport” that is essentially meaningless because of its failure to come to grips with the term “fairness.”33 The declaration’s inability to do so may have been simply an oversight or perhaps a semantic problem within the single legal system of Canada, but, as we shall see at the international level, the principle raises serious conceptual issues. On a purely semantic level, if we attempt to develop a meaningful principle of fairness as a core principle of the Lex sportiva and international sports law as a whole, we can generally rely on standard definitions. According to a leading legal dictionary, the word “fair” has “the qualities of impartiality and honesty; free from prejudice, favoritism, and self-interest; just; equitable; even-handed; and equal, as between conflicting interests.”34 We might add two additional elements: acting in good faith and what we can call “coherence,” embracing the values of consistency and uniformity. For further guidance, we can turn to public international law. A leading commentary on fairness in public international law emphasizes the substantive aspect of distributive justice and the procedural aspect of right process.35 This distinction between substantive and procedural fairness is important. Turning first to procedural fairness, a CAS award made it clear that “the principle of procedural fairness is surely among the unwritten principles of sports law to be complied with by international federations.”36 As a matter of due process or natural justice, we can identify two basic rules: the rule against bias and the right to a fair hearing. In turn, the right to a fair hearing can be seen to involve seven requirements: prior notice of a decision, consultation and written representation, adequate notice of applicable sanctions, an oral hearing, a right to call and cross-examine witnesses, an opportunity for legal representation, and a reasoned decision.37 ___________ 33 Federal-Provincial-Territorial Sports Ministers, Declaration: Expectations for Fairness in Sport, August 10, 2001 (Canada). 34 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (8th ed. 2004). For an excellent commentary on the concept of fairness, particularly in its relationship to field-of-play decisions, see Klaus Vieweg, Fairness und Sportregeln – Zur Problematik sog. Tatsachenentscheidungen im Sport, in G. CREZELIUS, H. HIRTE, & K. VIEWEG (HRSG.), FESTSCHRIFT FÜR VOLKER RÖHRICHT ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAG: GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, RECHNUNGSLEGUNG, SPORTRECHT 1255–75 (2005), partly translated and reprinted as Klaus Vieweg, Fairness and Sports Rules [and] Regulations – A Contribution to the Problem of “Field of Play” Decisions, in SPORTS LAW IMPLEMENTATION AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES 207 (Dimitrios Panagiotopoulos ed. 2005) (noting that “the ‘fairness’ argument has become one of the most popular, most decisive forms of argumentation,” id. at 215, and that “[t]he volume of sports law literature on fairness and fair play is immense.” Id. at 217). 35 See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 7 (1995). 36 AEK Athens, supra note 18, at 158. 37 See Ian Blackshaw, The Rules of Natural Justice: What Are They and Why Are They Important in Sports Disciplinary Cases?, INT’L SPORTS L.J., 2009/1–2, at 134.

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Defining substantive fairness, in the sense of distributive justice, is more difficult. Of course, in some statutory contexts such as that of labor and employment law governing claims of unfair dismissal, the principle of fairness is well elaborated in its application to sports within national legal systems.38 But at the international level, at least, the exact meaning of substantive “fairness” is unclear. The applicability of substantive fairness is, however, an important issue, and it is ultimately a conceptual issue. For example, should athletes with disabilities be allowed to use prosthetic devices and other equipment to equalize their opportunities in international competition besides the Paralympics and such special competition? Should equal opportunities for women athletes trump religious barriers to such equality in the Middle East and elsewhere? In exceptional circumstances, should domestic courts adjudicate the fairness of actions against athletes as a matter of equity to soften the rigidity of legal prescriptions such as strict liability for doping? Should CAS make decisions on the basis of substantive fairness? The answers to these important questions are not simply semantic; that is, the answers to the questions cannot be resolved simply by terminological refinement and consensus. Instead, they raise fundamental conceptual – often cultural and jurisprudential – issues of discrimination, the role of national courts, the role of arbitral tribunals, and so on. Moreover, many issues of fairness cannot be pigeon-holed as either “procedural” or “substantive”, particularly those involving organizational and institutional structures. Often issues are both procedural and substantive, such as in the resolution of disputes arising out of claims of discrimination. In order to address such issues, given the primitive status of thinking about questions of substantive fairness in international sports law, we shall have to rely primarily on the better-developed elements that have been employed mostly to ensure procedural fairness, such as impartiality, equity, good faith, and coherence in the sense of consistency and uniformity.

b) The Analysis of Fairness in three Contexts Despite the obvious indeterminacy of the principle of fairness, it is worthwhile to consider its applicability in three contexts of international sports law: first, organizational and institutional structures; second, the eligibility of athletes and the conduct of competition; and third, dispute resolution. These three

___________ 38

See, e.g., GARDINER, supra note 4, at 580.

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contexts roughly correspond, respectively, to the time framework before competition, during competition, and after competition.39 Sometimes a determination of the appropriate context for applying the principle of fairness will in itself be significant. For example, the Lisbon Treaty of 200940 specifies the role of the European Union (EU) in sports for the first time in an EU treaty. Article 165 requires the EU to “contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function … by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions”41 and in other ways. It is unclear, however, whether this explicit mandate of fairness applies only to the field of play – that is, to actual competition, as a literal reading of the phrase might suggest. If so, then the EU mandate of fairness would largely lie beyond the competence of courts and other legal authority except to review issues involving governmental enforcement of the mandate. Or does the mandate apply more broadly to matters beyond the field of play that impinge on sports competition but do not occur there – for example, to the organizational structure of the sports industry in ensuring a fair distribution of revenue, financial solidarity and stability, an acceptable nationality profile of clubs, and a general and competitive balance among sports clubs?42 This is a likely but not obvious interpretation of Article 165. In any event, if the European Court of Justice and other EU authority expect to apply Article 165 properly, they will first need to agree on its scope. That, however, will require considerable deliberation and consensus about the relationships between the Lisbon Treaty and the specificity of sport, just as the specificity of sport has already has been addressed by the European Court of Justice in the context of economic integration. ___________ 39

at 5. 40

For examples and a discussion of these three contexts, see Nafziger, supra note 17,

Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, 500 O.J. (C306). 41 Id. art. 165 (emphasis added). 42 See Stephen Weatherill, Fairness, Openness and the Specific Nature of Sport: Does the Lisbon Treaty Change EU Sports Law? (paper on file with author); Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (2010) (mandating, for example, a “break-even requirement on financial fair play,” according to which a club’s relevant expenses must align with its “relevant income” within stipulated margins in order to accomplish several purposes such as to better ensure that clubs are in a position to settle their liabilities with players and that they generally benefit football on a basis of fairness to other football clubs). See also European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Dep’t B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, LISBON TREATY AND EU SPORTS POLICY STUDY, Sept. 6, 2010, at 37 (observing that Article 165 may discourage nationality discrimination in amateur sport).

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c) CAS Jurisprudence The gold standard in resolving sports-related disputes on the basis of fairness has been established by CAS. Indeed, the greatest value of the tribunal so far has been one of ensuring fairness, at least in the more or less procedural sense of even-handedness, impartiality, acting in good faith, and coherence in the sense of consistency and uniformity. In promoting procedural fairness, CAS awards have scrutinized procedures of internal appeals bodies within international sports federations.43 CAS panels have criticized media interviews by such bodies44 and have insisted that international sports federations provide for an appeals jury or some equivalent to review decisions involving issues of compliance with their rules.45 One award emphasized the importance of de novo review by CAS so as to give an athlete a full hearing and supersede any previous procedural defects in the tribunal of a sports organization. Such defects thereby “fade to the periphery”46 of a CAS proceeding. CAS has taken pains to avoid bias in dispute resolution. For example, in remitting issues for further fact-finding and other determinations by sports bodies, CAS has insisted that the required process must be undertaken by new decision-making panels and tribunals.47 CAS panels have also demonstrated their commitment to coherence as an element of fairness by turning to the tribunal’s prior awards for guidance. CAS has been at its best when, for example, it has taken fully into account its past awards and those of national tribunals to evaluate the fairness, on a comparative basis of equality, of a proposed sanction against an athlete.48 In blending procedural and substantive fairness, CAS has relied not only on black-letter rules, but also on equitable principles such as the Lex mitior. Accordingly, if newly applied sanctions against an athlete such as under the ___________ 43

DeBruin v. Federation Internationale de Natation (FINA), CAS 98/211. Id. § 11. 45 See, e.g., SNOC v. FILA, CAS, Ad Hoc Div. OG 08/007 (Aug. 23, 2008). 46 DeBruin, supra note 43, at 8. 47 See, e.g., Michael v. Australian Canoeing, CAS 08/A/1549 (June 4, 2008). 48 See, e.g., Anderson v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545 (upholding an appeal against an annulment of the results of women’s relay teams in the 2000 Olympics. CAS ruled that the IOC’s decision did not follow precedent, especially USOC v. IAAF & IOC, CAS 2004/A/725. The IOC decision also failed to rely on any express IOC or IAAF rule that clearly allowed the IOC to annul the results of women’s relay teams if one team member was found to have committed a doping offense). See also IAAF v. USA Track & Field & Young, CAS 2004/A/628 (“In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent, or stare decisis. However, a CAS Panel will obviously try, if the evidence permits, to come to the same conclusion on matters of law as a previous CAS Panel”); cf. Brunemann, supra note 43 (comparing a swimmer’s negligent ingestion of a banned substance to the negligence of other athletes). 44

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WADA Code are less severe than those in effect at the time of an offense, the new sanctions must be applied.49 In the interest of fairness and in its role as a sort of supreme arbitral tribunal within the Olympic Movement,50 CAS has disregarded the stature of particular institutions, including the IOC. The Anderson case,51 just noted, is one example. Another important example is USOC v. IAAF & IOC.52 At issue in that case was Rule 45 of the Olympic Charter. It prohibited athletes who had been suspended from sanctioned competition for more than six months because of an anti-doping violation from participating in the next Olympic Games following the expiration of their suspension. After Rule 45 came into effect in July 2008, it served to disqualify a number of top athletes from competing in the 2012 Olympics. On behalf of one of these athletes, the United States Olympic Committee challenged the new rule as invalid and unenforceable. In USOC v. IOC, a CAS panel concluded that Rule 45 was a disciplinary sanction rather than a pure condition of eligibility to compete in the Olympic Games within the IOC’s competence to establish. As such, the new rule did not comply with the sanctions provided by the World Anti-Doping Code, which had been incorporated by Rule 44 into the Olympic Charter. Article 23.2.2 of the Code bars its signatories (including the IOC) from introducing additional provisions of their own that change the periods of eligibility as a result of the Code’s sanctions. Rule 45 was therefore invalid and unenforceable. Also, as the CAS panel carefully explained, if the IOC wishes to exclude athletes who have been sanctioned for doping from the Olympic Games, it could propose an amendment to the World Anti-Doping Code to that effect. Such an amendment would avoid a ne bis in idem issue (prohibition against double jeopardy), as the ineligibility would be part of a single, Code-based sanction subject to the principle of proportionality. Perhaps the record of CAS for applying the core principle of fairness, at least in a procedural or mixed procedural substantive sense of the term, confirms the ___________ 49 See United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Brunemann, Am. Arb. Ass’n/N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77-190-E-00447-08 JENF (Jan. 26, 2009) (noting that “this doctrine is well-established in Lex sportiva through many cases arising in several different sports,” and citing numerous previous decisions applying the Lex mitior). The principle of the Lex mitior is an interesting variation on the fairness principle, also observed by CAS awards, of tempus regit actum. According to that principle, any determination of what constitutes a sanctionable rule violation and what sanctions may be imposed must be done in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the allegedly sanctionable conduct, and new rules and regulations do not apply retrospectively to facts that occurred before their entry into force. See Anderson v. I.O.C., CAS 2008/A/1545, at 10. 50 See supra text accompanying note 29. 51 Supra note 48. 52 CAS 2011/0/2422.

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famous dictum of an English court that sports-oriented bodies, including CAS, are “far better fitted to judge than the courts”53 and the observation of a French scholar that legal disputes in sports are best settled “within the family of sports.”54 What remains to be done is for sports lawyers to work together and with others on the applicability of the core principle, particularly in its substantive sense. Despite the growth of the Lex sportiva, however, the gradual accretion of CAS awards does not ensure consistency, an essential element of fairness, within the larger framework of international sports law. An issue of fairness can sometimes remain even after a CAS award that is based on the principle. For example, although CAS panels generally have been careful to follow precedent in making decisions about reallocating Olympic medals after a medal winner has had to forfeit a medal, the IOC has not always followed CAS precedent. In 2009 the IOC decided not to re-award a gold medal to silver medalist Katrina Thanou of Greece that the sprinter Marion Jones had won at the 2000 Games in Sydney but had forfeited when she confessed to having been doped during her victorious race. The IOC’s decision not to re-award the medal to Thanou was based on her own disqualification, not from the 2000 Games in Sydney but from the 2004 Games in Athens. This rationale did not follow the CAS precedent, as a matter of fairness, of denying the award of a forfeited medal to only those athletes who had also tested positive for doping in the same Games.55

III. Conclusion The globalization of sports has been nurtured by the modern Olympic Movement, facilitated by communications technology, fueled by high-profile professional athletes and commercial interests, and challenged by difficult problems such as the doping of athletes. It is small wonder that the development of international sports law has been handicapped by unresolved conceptual issues. This study has focused on four conceptual issues: the professional orientation of sports lawyers toward either international or domestic law but not al___________ 53

[1978] 3 A11 E.R. 211. B. Foucher, “La Conciliation comme Mode de Règlement des Conflits Sportifs en Droit Français”, paper presented at the Court of Arbitration for Sport Symposium on Mediation, Lausanne, Switzerland, Nov. 4, 2000. The author is indebted to Ian Blackshaw for this reference. 55 See A., B., C., D., & E. v. IOC., CAS 2002/A/389, 390, 391, 392, & 393, and COC & Scott v. IOC, CAS 2002/A/372. On the reallocation of the medals initially claimed by Marion Jones, see Lynn Zinser, Jones’s Gold in 100 Meters Won’t Go to Greek Sprinter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2009, at B17. 54

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ways both, the public-private law distinction, the definition of the Lex sportiva, and the applicability of fairness as a core principle of the law. These issues demand thoughtful analysis and, eventually, as much global consensus on how to resolve them as our fragmented world will allow. Meanwhile, international sports law, still in its youth, is growing along discernible lines of authority and dispute resolution. Of particular importance is the emerging jurisprudence of institutions within the Olympic Movement, including that of international sports federations and the Lex sportiva formed by the awards of CAS and other tribunals. A major challenge for everyone interested in the progressive development and eventual codification of international sports law is to address the conceptual issues56 that inhibit its development.

___________ 56 For example, in his commentary on the concept of fairness, particularly as it relates to field-of-play decisions, Klaus Vieweg notes its “conceptual lack of clarity.” Vieweg in Panagiotopoulos ed., supra note 34 at 219 (English translation). He concludes his commentary by observing that, despite the “need for swift and final decisions” on the playing field, “[f]airness should be accorded precedence.” Id. at 224.

Lex Sportiva – From Theory to Practice: Lessons to be Learned from the Jurisprudence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and of the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT) By Andreas Zagklis I.

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 179 

II. Lex Sportiva and CAS Jurisprudence ............................................................... 180  III. Ex Aequo et Bono and BAT Jurisprudence ...................................................... 184  1.

The Absence of “Applicable Regulations” ................................................ 184 

2.

Creation of General Principles Governing Basketball Contracts? ............. 185 

IV. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 188

I. Introduction The term “Lex sportiva” has been the subject of numerous academic debates. Its content, nature and application are constantly approached through different prisms: a jurisdictional approach, a national approach, a liberal approach, a formalistic approach etc. It is, however, commonly accepted that the Lex sportiva is constantly being interpreted and implemented and evolved through the jurisprudence of sports tribunals, in particular the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). International sports associations have chosen CAS as the ultimate appeals body for – among other reasons – the flexibility that an arbitral panel with its seat in Switzerland enjoys in selecting the rules applicable to the merits of the case. A CAS panel can, in essence, resolve a dispute by simply applying the regulations enacted by the federation which issued the appealed decision and, as a subsidiary, by virtue of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (CAS Code), the law of the federation’s seat (see below II.). Institutional arbitration in sports has been so well-received that international federations are now tempted to create their own independent arbitration tribunals and comply with the requirements under Swiss law of “true arbitration” as

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set out in the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal1. Within this framework, the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) created the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT)2 in 2006. The BAT is an arbitral tribunal which has its legal seat in Geneva, and is designed primarily to resolve contractual basketball-related disputes between players, clubs and agents. The present article will focus on the possible contribution which could be made by the jurisprudence of BAT to the doctrine of the Lex sportiva. At the centre of this analysis are the rules applicable to the merits of the claims in the vast majority of BAT arbitrations, namely ex aequo et bono, coupled with the principle of publication of BAT awards (see below III.).

II. Lex Sportiva and CAS Jurisprudence Whether praising or undermining the Lex sportiva’s role in the theory of sports law, the majority of legal scholars admit that the Lex sportiva is – at least – associated with the jurisprudence of CAS. The awards and advisory opinions of CAS have been received as either a source of the Lex sportiva3 or as a “common law of interpretation” of regulatory documents which relate to sports4. This admission implies nothing else than that the Lex sportiva is a product of the private autonomy which the sports organisations wish to promote not only at regulatory level, but also at the level of dispute resolution: CAS is the private judge created by the Olympic Movement for the resolution of disputes which arise between members of the Olympic Movement and to apply the rules enacted by the same. The legal situation is, however, much simpler on the procedural level than it is on the level of substantive law. On the one hand, arbitration is an internationally recognized method of dispute resolution, and thus, states recognize and enforce arbitral awards as though they were court decisions, subject to limited control.5 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the regulations enacted by ___________ 1 Decision of 15.03.1993 in the matter of Elmar Gundel, ATF (frz. Arrets [principaux] du Tribunal Fédéral) 119 II 271; Decision of 27.05.2003 in the matter of Larissa Lazutina and Olga Danilova, ATF 129 III 445. 2 The tribunal’s name was FIBA Arbitral Tribunal initially. In order to underline its independence, FIBA decided to rename the tribunal during its 19th World Congress (04.-06.09.2010, Istanbul). The name change came into effect on 01.04.2011. 3 J. Nafziger, Lex Sportiva, ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3. 4 A. Erbsen, The substance and illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Blackshaw I./Siekmann R./Soek J. (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2006, p. 441-442. 5 Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, concluded in New York on 10.06.1958.

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sports organisations are of a secondary nature in comparison to state laws. It has frequently been highlighted in legal theory that the authority of sports associations to enact regulations, to “create law”, stems from the provisions of the state law under which they are organised. This has given rise to opinions which support the restriction of international federations’ legislative competence to purely technical sporting matters and the intervention of international public organisations in relation to all other matters affecting the rights of athletes.6 Considering the inevitable reality that (a) sports regulations must be set aside when they come into conflict with fundamental principles of state law and (b) state interventionism in popular sports is an accepted part of the political agenda in many countries, sports associations have managed to avoid the majority of such conflicts, not only by taking them out of the hands of the state judge, but also by submitting them to a tribunal with an express assignment: to apply both sports regulations and national law (and to examine the issues in that order) for the resolution of a dispute where the default choice of law is that of the federation’s seat. Swiss arbitration law and the CAS Code offer this option: Article 187 paragraph 1 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA) provides that “the arbitral tribunal shall rule according to the law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law with which the action is most closely connected”. Furthermore, by agreeing to refer a dispute to CAS, the parties submit themselves to the conflict of law rules contained in the CAS Code7. Article R58 of the CAS Code provides, with respect to appeals disputes, that “the Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision.” The practical result of such cumulative wording (“according to the applicable regulations and the rules of law”) is that in CAS appeals proceedings, sports regulations and the law of the federation’s seat are applied in parallel.8 This means that the international sports organisations that created CAS ensure that their regulations will be applied by a CAS panel “in any case”9 and not possibly ___________ 6 D. Panagiotopoulos, Lex sportiva and international legitimacy governing: protection of professional players, US-China Law Review, vol. 8-II, p. 135-136. 7 CAS 2006/A/1061, CAS 2006/A/1141, CAS 2007/A/1267, CAS 2008/A/1639. 8 A. Rigozzi, L’arbitrage international en matiere de sport, Basel 2005, p. 607. 9 A.M. Steingruber, Sports arbitration: determination of the applicable regulations and the rules of law and their interpretation, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 58.

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neglected by a state judge who uses the law applicable in his forum as the point of departure in his decision-making process. The benefit is obvious: this procedure produces a sports-specific approach without preventing the arbitrator from submitting the sports regulations to the test of legitimacy, either under the law applicable at the seat of the federation (i.e. the law under which the federation functions and is empowered to create rules for its members)10 or, in some cases, the law chosen by the parties11. The chances of reaching a legally sound result, but one which is absurd in a sporting context, are therefore limited, while uniform interpretation and application of the federation’s rules is guaranteed by referring to the same state law in the vast majority of cases, the law of its seat. Given that the International Olympic Committee and most of the International Federations have their seat in Switzerland, Swiss law usually also applies to the substance of a dispute. Furthermore, the increasing quality and detailed drafting of sports regulations has had an impact on the way CAS panels apply article R58, particularly in doping and football cases. It is not uncommon today for parties to base their submissions solely on regulations, without making reference to the applicable state law, because the panel can reach a conclusion and resolve the dispute by applying regulations only. Although a state tribunal could, theoretically, also apply the same procedure, it is difficult to imagine a state judge expressly stating in a decision (as many CAS Panels have done) that the regulations of federation X shall apply “primarily”12 while the law of country Y shall apply “complementarily”13, “subsidiarily”14 or “to the extent necessary for the resolu___________ 10 Ex multis CAS 2008/A/1519–1520 (FC Shakhtar Donetsk v/ Matuzalem Francelino da Silva & Real Zaragoza SAD & FIFA; Matuzalem Francelino da Silva & Real Zaragoza SAD v/ FC Shakhtar Donetsk & FIFA), where the Panel interpreted article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, while also considering the principles of Swiss law (law of FIFA’s seat): “taking into due consideration all of the above, in line with the rationale and the spirit of Art. 17 para. 1 FIFA Regulations and having regard to the specificity of sport and to the applicability, subsidiarily, of Swiss law and in particular of Art. 99 para. 3 and 42 para. 2 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, according to which if the exact amount of damages cannot be established, the judge shall assess them in his discretion, having regard to the ordinary course of events and the measures taken by the damaged party to limit the damages, the Panel comes to the conclusion …” 11 Ex multis CAS 2008/A/1644 (Mutu v/ Chelsea), p. 23-27, where the employment contract included a choice of law provision in favour of English law. The Panel concluded that the dispute had to be determined on the basis of English law and FIFA Regulations. 12 Article 62.2 of the FIFA Statutes: “The provisions of the CAS Code of SportsRelated Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.” 13 CAS 2006/A/1177, CAS 2007/A/1219, CAS 2008/A/1521, CAS 2009/A/1912 & 1913, CAS 2010/A/2172. 14 CAS 2007/A/1370–1376 (FIFA & WADA v/ STJDF, CBF, Dodô) where the Panel concluded that “the present case must be adjudicated on its merits applying primarily FIFA rules, complementarily the WADA Code and, subsidiarily, CBF rules and Brazilian law.

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tion of the dispute”15. One understands that, although CAS panels do not second-guess the supremacy of state law, they begin (and sometimes conclude16) their legal reasoning with the applicable sports regulations. The above analysis demonstrates that CAS is in a much better position than an ordinary court to interpret and create the Lex sportiva, not only because of the sport-specific qualification and experience of its panels, but also because, in resolving a sports dispute, it first seeks to apply the sports regulations, and usually interprets them – if such interpretation is required – on the basis of the applicable law at the federation’s seat. This practice has allowed CAS to consistently apply principles characteristic of sports law (e.g. strict liability in doping offences17), establish others through its own jurisprudence (e.g. the field-ofplay-rule doctrine18) or even intend to detect a long-standing practice in sports that could receive recognition as a customary rule19 over a long period of time. For this reason, the definition of the Lex sportiva, as accurately and rather courageously presented by Ken Foster20, underlines the role of sports tribunals: “a private autonomous legal order established by contract between international sporting federations and those subjects to their sporting jurisdiction and which then emerges from the statutes and regulations of federations as interpreted by institutions of alternative dispute resolution” (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that Foster avoids naming the CAS, but rather refers to institutional arbitration, implying that the required consistent body of jurisprudence can be delivered only by permanent sports tribunals. One is, however, immediately faced with the next question: what happens if the federation has chosen to leave certain issues unregulated and has entrusted the resolution of these issues to a sports arbitral tribunal which in principle decides ex aequo et bono? ___________ Additionally, Swiss law might also be applied in connection with the interpretation and application of FIFA rules.” 15 CAS 2009/A/1974, CAS 2008/A/1988. 16 A. Erbsen, op. cit. (fn. 4), going one step further in his analysis of the “four distinct types of law” developed by CAS: “First, when CAS concludes, that an authoritative text – such as a contract, federation bylaw, or antidoping code – contains provisions that clearly answer a contested question, CAS will almost always apply the text without any normative analysis of whether the textual rule is sound.” 17 World Anti-Doping Code, comment to Article 2.1.1. Regarding other principles, see comments to Articles 3.1, 3.2.4, 4.2.2. 18 CAS 2010/A/2090 summarising the CAS jurisprudence on this issue. 19 CAS 2008/A/1545 where the CAS panel reviewed in detail (and rejected) IOC’s argument that there exists a general principle of Lex sportiva, according to which a team must be disqualified when one of its members commits an anti-doping rule violation during a competition. 20 K. Foster, Transnational law in action, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 21.

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III. Ex Aequo et Bono and BAT Jurisprudence 1. The Absence of “Applicable Regulations” Unlike FIFA, which has enacted rules governing the employment relationship between clubs and players, FIBA has refrained from passing similar regulations. The call for contractual stability and pacta sunt servanda, however, has been equally strong in both team sports, and FIBA received clear messages from the international basketball community that there was a need for an international forum to resolve basketball disputes in a fair, quick and inexpensive way. In order to serve this purpose, the creation of the Geneva-based BAT in 2006 brought about a series of – presumably uniquely combined – features21: (a) voluntary system (true arbitration), (b) BAT does not decide disputes where FIBA is a party, (c) single judge appointed by the BAT president on a rotation basis from a closed group of arbitrators, (d) hearing only upon request, (e) computeraided proceedings, (f) publication of awards.22 Despite these procedural characteristics, there can be no fast and costefficient arbitration if the judge has no direct access to, or knowledge of, the law applicable to the merits. The solution found for the FIFA/CAS dispute resolution system (i.e. Article R58 of CAS Code above referring to federation regulations and Article 62 para.2 of the FIFA Statutes referring to FIFA rules “primarily” and Swiss law “additionally”) is of no use here. As mentioned earlier, although both FIFA and FIBA have an interest in monitoring the conclusion and termination of professional player contracts in their sport – because a player’s contractual status is linked to his right to transfer internationally – only FIFA has decided to intervene vertically in these contractual relationships by means of its Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA RSTP). For example, Article 18 para. 4 of the FIFA RSTP provides that “the validity of a contract may not be subject to a successful medical examination and/or the grant of a work permit”. The FIBA Internal Regulations (FIBA IR) on the other hand only marginally23 refer to possible terms24 of player contracts. So where will the BAT arbitrator find guidance to resolve a dispute? Again, Swiss arbitration law provides a solution. ___________ 21 D.-R. Martens, Basketball Arbitral Tribunal: an innovative system for resolving disputes in sport (only in sport?), ISLJ 2011/1–2, 54-57. 22 www.fiba.com/bat. 23 Article 3–6, establishing a 4-year maximum duration of player contracts. 24 Appendix 3 to Book 3 of the FIBA IR merely lists “suggested main points to be covered in a contract between a club and a player”.

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Article 187 para.2 of the PILA reads as follows: “The parties may authorize the arbitral tribunal to rule ex aequo.” In turn, Article 15 para.1 of the BAT Arbitration Rules, reads: “Unless the parties have agreed otherwise the Arbitrator shall decide the dispute ex aequo et bono, applying general considerations of justice and fairness without reference to any particular national or international law.” It follows that, when the parties submit their dispute to BAT and do not make an express choice of national law that BAT must apply, the BAT arbitrator receives a mandate to decide ex aequo et bono, i.e. general principles of justice and fairness. The reference to “general principles of justice” is not entirely a nouveauté in the world of sports arbitration: the CAS arbitration rules for the Olympic Games provide25 that – the somewhat related notion of – “general principles of law” shall be applied by CAS alongside the provisions of the Olympic Charter and respective regulations.26 The main difference between CAS and BAT, however, is that the BAT arbitrator can decide the case without making reference to any particular national or international law. And, given the wording of article 15 para. 1 of the BAT Rules, and the absence of FIBA regulations on the employment of players, the BAT arbitrator can decide the case without making reference to any particular national or international regulations either.

2. Creation of General Principles Governing Basketball Contracts? In practice, the jurisprudence of the BAT demonstrates that, in most cases, the arbitrators use the employment contract(s) as point of departure and seek to evaluate the parties’ behaviour on the basis of what they have agreed. This is not a self-evident practice. When resolving contractual disputes under a particular national law, the validity of contracts can be subject to mandatory law provisions which one of the parties, usually the foreign player or coach, ignores. A typical example is the Greek Sports Law Act which considers a coach-club contract null and void if it has not been submitted to, and ratified by, the competent local tax authorities.27 If Greek law were to apply to the following dispute a foreign coach, whose contract appears to have been normally executed as if it were valid and who is dismissed without notice after six months, cannot demand compensation, but only the salary to which he is entitled for work done on the basis of unjust enrichment provisions. ___________ 25

Article 17. M. Beloff, Is there a Lex Sportiva?, ISLR 2005, vol. 5/3, 49-67. 27 Article 31 para. 6 of Law 2725/1999, as currently valid. 26

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The BAT arbitrator who decides ex aequo et bono is not, however, obliged to apply such provisions (which sometimes lead to unfair results), but rather focus on the agreement of the parties. An example of this is the numerous awards that have dealt with the issue of whether a player failed a medical examination or concealed a pre-existing medical condition, as most basketball player contracts are signed with a condition precedent that the player will pass the club’s medical test after his arrival on the club’s premises. As regards contractual terms, the application of which could be seen as contrary to principles of fairness, the BAT has decided in several cases to intervene and impose a solution which is fair in view of the circumstances of the case. For this reason, when, for instance, calculating the compensation payable to a player as a result of unjust termination by the club of a multiple-year contract, BAT arbitrators tend to take into account the contract signed by the player following the termination. In order to avoid “unjust enrichment”, amounts received under a new contract are deducted and the compensation is adjusted accordingly.28 Similarly, for matters not regulated in a contract, e. g. whether interest is payable as a result of late payment, the BAT has consistently held that “although the [agreement] does not regulate interest for late payments, it is a generally recognized principle embodied in most legal systems, which is underpinned by motives of equity, that late payments give rise to interest – in order that the creditor be placed in the financial position she/he would have been in had payments been made on time. Consequently and despite the [agreement] not specifying an interest rate, it is normal and fair that interest is due on the late payments.”29 The interest rate fixed by BAT in such cases is 5 % per annum. It is evident that applying the contract to the circumstances of the case and then examining the result under general principles of fairness is, to a very large extent, an individualised exercise, from which one cannot easily draw conclusions of broader value. At this point, another specific characteristic of the BAT procedure influences the possibly wider impact of BAT awards. Article 16 para. 4 of the BAT Rules provides that the “awards are not confidential unless ordered otherwise by the Arbitrator.” BAT has applied this rule in such a way that more than 90 % of the BAT awards are publicly accessible on the official FIBA website, which receives hundreds of “hits” on a daily basis. This parameter, coupled with the customary practice of many basketball agents to use the same template contract for all their players, which on many ___________ 28 29

BAT 0014/08 confirmed by CAS 2009/A/1846. Ex multis BAT 0054/09 (p. 23) confirmed by CAS 2010/A/2035.

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occasions does not differ from contracts of other agents, makes the finding of a BAT arbitrator in an individual case interesting for a circle of persons much wider than the parties involved in the arbitration. Therefore, although the BAT arbitrator enjoys certain discretion when applying ex aequo et bono principles, the quest for consistency sometimes increases the level of difficulty of his task. Stare decisis, a requirement actually foreign to the notion of arbitration, is very often a desideratum in sports arbitration30, which explains why institutional tribunals like CAS31 and BAT publish their awards. So far, BAT has met all expectations, considering the impressive number (50032) of cases it has deliberated on since the first request for arbitration was filed in spring of 2007. The confidence placed in the BAT arbitrators’ findings is also demonstrated by another statistical figure: in less than 1 % of arbitrations the parties insisted on the application of national law. More importantly, the gradual creation of a corpus of consistent jurisprudence is manifested in the parties’ submissions: several claimants now adapt their requests for relief to the standing jurisprudence of BAT (e. g. by claiming the difference between the contract breached by the club and the player’s new contract33 or by claiming compensation for salaries of future seasons only up to 50 %34) or refer to the interest rate of 5 % per annum as “the BAT interest rate”. Following these few examples of legal questions arising in similar disputes35, one can validly argue that the awards of BAT have an impact on dayto-day commercial basketball dealings, and vice versa. Contractual terms very often have a decisive role in the determination of the BAT arbitrator; but it is not unfounded to suggest that contracts will be (if not already are) drafted with reference to the jurisprudence of BAT.

___________ 30 CAS 2004/A/628, p. 10: “In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent, or stare decisis. However, a CAS Panel will obviously try, if the evidence permits, to come to the same conclusion on matters of law as a previous CAS Panel. Whether that is considered a matter of comity, or an attempt to build a coherent corpus of law, matters not.” See CAS 2008/A/1545 with further references to CAS jurisprudence on stare decisis. 31 M. Reeb, Digest of CAS awards I (1986–1998), p. XXIII. 32 Status as of 31.12.2013. 33 BAT 0158/11 following the example of cases BAT 0043/09, BAT 0127/10. 34 BAT 0127/10 following the example of case BAT 0014/08 (cf. supra fn. 28). 35 Among other matters, BAT jurisprudence has consistently dealt with the issue of late payment penalties (BAT 0036/09), multiple contracts between the same parties (BAT 0067/09), termination of contract due to non-payment (BAT 0155/11) etc.

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IV. Conclusion The development of institutional sports arbitration is now in its next phase: during its almost 30 years of operation, CAS has issued awards that now form part of the Lex sportiva. This success story motivates the creation of new institutions which are sport-specific and tailor-made to the needs of the respective sport. The BAT is using the CAS experience and the arbitration-friendly provisions of Swiss law to offer a service which complies with the objectives of the international federation: members of the basketball family are essentially left to self-regulate their relationships and FIBA simply asks them to honour what they have agreed. At the same time, BAT seems to meet the needs of the stakeholders who frequently use it: fair and swift resolution of disputes around the world, from Venezuela and Spain to Syria and China. The application of ex aequo et bono principles in basketball contractual disputes inevitably focuses on the individual characteristics of each case. On a second level, it may contribute to the development of a consistent approach to issues which repeatedly come before BAT. Of course, legal analysis cannot go as far as alleging that BAT arbitrators “create law”. Also, it is very early to assess whether BAT awards can be a source of the Lex sportiva of not. Some may be, others may not. In any event, the evolution of consistent jurisprudence and the publication of the awards greatly assist in achieving – as far as this is possible – predictability. Such predictability may, in principle, seem incompatible with the very nature of ex aequo et bono,36 but one cannot deny that the high degree of similarity in basketball contractual disputes and the small number of BAT arbitrators dealing with them can lead to harmonised and widely acceptable legal conclusions. And isn’t that part of a tribunal’s mission?

___________ 36 F. Oschütz, Institutional arbitration in Sport, in: N. Korchia/C. Pettiti (eds.), Sport et Garanties Fondamentales, Paris 2001, p. 516.

Boundaries upon the Jurisdiction of Federations under EU Law The Area of Sport is not a Vacuum in which EU Law does not Apply By Rudolf Streinz I.

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 190

II. Basic Principles ................................................................................................. 192 1.

Provisions of European Union Law which Relate to Sport........................ 192 a)

The Principle of Conferred Powers .................................................... 192

b)

References to Sport in EU Law .......................................................... 193

c)

The Impact of the Fundamental Freedoms ......................................... 194 aa) Sport as an Economic Activity ................................................... 194 bb) Participation in Sport as Social Advantage ................................. 195

d)

Provisions of Antitrust Law ............................................................... 196

2.

Obligation of Private-law Federations ....................................................... 197

3.

Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental Rights ...................................... 197

III. Overview of the Decisions of the ECJ .............................................................. 198 1.

Rules Relating to Foreign Players (Walrave and Koch, Bosman, Kolpak, Simutenkov, Kahveci) ............................................................................... 199

2.

Transfer Compensation – Training Compensation (Bosman, Bernard) ..... 200

3.

Resulting Problem: Terms of Contracts (Compromise EU-Commission/ FIFA/UEFA – Webster) ............................................................................ 201

4.

Coaching Licenses (Heylens) .................................................................... 202

5.

Player’s Agents (Piau) ............................................................................... 202

6.

Selection Criteria for Athletic Competitions (Deliège).............................. 203

7.

Transfer Periods (Lehtonen) ...................................................................... 203

8.

Doping Suspensions (Meca-Medina)......................................................... 204

IV. Obligations under EU Law and under the Autonomy of the Association.......... 205 1.

Statutory Basis in EU Law ........................................................................ 205

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Sporting Rules and Legal Rules................................................................. 205 

3.

Practical Concordance between Fundamental Freedoms and European Antitrust Law and the Fundamental Rights of the European Union .......... 207 

4.

In Particular: The Case of Meca-Medina ................................................... 207 

V. Legal Protection of Athletes under EU Law ..................................................... 208  VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 208  VII. Theses ............................................................................................................... 209

I. Introduction Although legal obligations are tiresome for those bound by them, they are also necessary. Any lawyer or legal scholar who adverts to legal standards which set boundaries upon the arbitrary design of relationships is, accordingly, admired, and this is often clearly expressed. The field of politics, for instance, has provided us with prime examples which are now of purely historical value; for instance, the reaction to two judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG), namely the “Television Judgment” 1 and the “Eastern Treaties Decision”2. With regard to sports, Article 1, nos. 9 and 12 of the international competition rules of the International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation, FIBT (Fédération ___________ 1

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer: “Dat ham wir uns so nich vorjestellt” (“That’s not what we envisaged”). See Wesel, Der Gang nach Karlsruhe, 2004, p. 76 et seq. The cabinet adopted a resolution in which the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 12, 205) was declared to be “wrong”. See Adenauer’s speech before the German Parliament on 08.03.1961 in BT-Sten. Ber. (stenographic reports of the Bundestag) vol. 48, p. 8308 et seq.: “Sobald wir im Besitz des Urteils waren und unsere besonderen Sachverständigen sich durchgearbeitet hatten, ist das Kabinett zu einer Sitzung zusammengetreten, um zu diesem Urteil und diesem Fernsehstreit Stellung zu nehmen. Die Beschlüsse, die das Kabinett gefaßt hat, sind einstimmig gefaßt worden. Das Kabinett war sich darin einig, daß das Urteil falsch ist ... Aber ... das Urteil des BVerfG muß den Gesetzen entsprechend beachtet werden.” (“As soon as we got our hands on the judgment and our own experts had waded through it, a meeting of the cabinet was held in order to formulate an opinion on the judgment and the TV row. The resolutions adopted by the cabinet were unanimous. The cabinet was in agreement that the judgment was incorrect … But … the legislator must take account of the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court.”) See also bulletin of the Press- and Information Department of the German Government, no. 4, 09.03.1961, p. 425. 2 There is no verified proof that a politican belonging to one of the parties in government (a coalition consisting of the SPD and FDP parties was in power at that time) commented that the eastern policy was not going to be destroyed by “eight assholes from Karlsruhe” (translated by the author), even though the quote has been linked to a specific person. Only seven judges from the second division (zweiter Senat) were involved in reaching the judgment on the Basic Treaty (BVerfGE 36,1), due to bias on the part of one of the judges.

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Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing), are especially concise. Along with public criticism and subsequent inappropriate remarks regarding decisions reached or measures implemented, these provisions classify any episode of “legal hairsplitting” as “unsporting” and “inappropriate”, and stipulate that such hairsplitting must not occur. Any intervention under civil or criminal law is prohibited “for sporting reasons”.3 The by-laws of FIFA do not permit any of the federations or clubs (or their members) associated with FIFA to have recourse to courts of law in cases where a dispute arises with FIFA itself, or with other federations, clubs or their members; instead, they may only institute proceedings in the federation’s courts. Recourse to courts of law is, however, permitted in the event that all federation remedies have been exhausted, as recourse to courts of law under these circumstances cannot be seen as a violation of the relevant provisions.4 The former General Secretary of the UEFA, Gerhard Aigner, responded to the Bosman judgment of the ECJ with the words: “lawyers are increasingly barging into the world of football and creating havoc!”5 When the European Commission objected to excessive transfer fees after the abolition of transfer compensation, which had been payable after the expiry of the contractual term, the former Vice President of the German Football Association (DFB), Franz Beckenbauer, commented that the European Commission was nothing more than a “band of losers” and full of “wimps”.6 For a long time, sports associations also thought that they could ignore or circumvent legal provisions. In the case of “Walrave and Koch”7, the International Cycling Union’s (UCI) reaction to the judgment of the ECJ was to threaten that it would cancel all so-called motor-paced races from the world championships programme,8 which they would, in principle, have been at liberty to do. With regard to some of the privileges which large sports event organisers, such as IOC or FIFA have in many areas – e.g. tax, about which a completely separate article could be written – and the general incomprehension of the fact that private parties can successfully defend themselves against unjustified mo-

___________ 3

Cf. Hannamann, Kartellverbot und Verhaltenskoordinationen im Sport, 2001, p. 37. Cf. Streinz, Die Freizügigkeit des Athleten, in: Scherrer/Del Fabro (eds.), Freizügigkeit im Europäischen Sport, 2002, p. 99 (114). 5 dpa press release of 27.02.1997. 6 Cf. Streinz, EG-Grundfreiheiten und Verbandsautonomie, SpuRt 2000, 221 (221). 7 ECJ, Case C-556/07 Commission v. France [2009] OJ C102/8 ECR 1974, 1405. 8 There have been no world championships for motor-paced racing since 1994. The UCI justified this by saying that there were too few national teams to warrant organising such an event. 4

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nopolies9 in state courts, this attitude was, perhaps, not reasonable, but, to a certain extent, understandable. Since the – admittedly – revolutionary judgment in the Bosman case10, it has, however, become clear that European law also applies to sports.11 This gives rise to questions, however, as to the extent to which legal provisions are binding, and the extent of the autonomy of associations and federations in organizing their competitions and the “sports rules” which apply to them.

II. Basic Principles 1. Provisions of European Union Law which Relate to Sport a) The Principle of Conferred Powers Unlike its member states, the European Union possesses only those competences which have been transferred to it by its member states. This principle of conferred powers was not only confirmed, but also emphasised by the Lisbon Treaty.12 The EU does not have a “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” (i.e. the power to decide where the borders of EU authority end), which was emphasised by the Federal Constitutional Court in its Lisbon judgment.13 Nevertheless, EU law covers a broad variety of matters, which means that there are hardly any areas remaining to which it does not apply.

___________ 9 For a more detailed account of the controversy between FIFA and Ferrero on the occasion of the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, cf. Hamacher, Exklusive Marketingrechte für Sportgroßveranstaltungen und ihre Grenzen am Beispiel von Kennzeichenschutz, SpuRt 2005, 55 (56 et seqq.). 10 ECJ, Judgment of 15.12.1995, C-415/93 (Union royale belge des societés de football association ASBL inter alia/Jean-Marc Bosman), ECR 1995, I-4921. For a more detailed account, see Streinz, EG-Freizügigkeit für Sportler, in: Studiengesellschaft für Wirtschaft und Recht (ed.), Sport und Recht, 2005, p. 71 (74 et seq.). 11 For a general account, see, for example, Streinz, Die Auswirkungen des EG-Rechts auf den Sport, SpuRt 1998, 1 et seqq., 45 et seqq., 89 et seqq.; Summerer, Sport und Europarecht, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (eds.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht, 2nd edition 2007, p. 595. For a detailed account of freedom of movement in relation to athletes, see, for example, Hess, Vom Konflikt zur Konkordanz – Das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht und der Sport, dargestellt am Beispiel der Freizügigkeit der Sportler, in: Vieweg (ed.), Prisma des Sportrechts, 2006, p. 1 (1 et seqq.). 12 Art. 5 para. 1 und 2 TEU. Cf. Art. 4 para. 1 TEU. 13 Cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 (392 et seq.).

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b) References to Sport in EU Law For a long time, neither the foundation treaties of the European Community and the European Union nor their amendments contained the term “sport”. Nevertheless, EU law (or, in some cases, EC law) had a substantial impact on sport, which can, for instance, be seen in the ECJ judgments of Walrave and Koch or Bosman. This led to an attempt to directly anchor the characteristics of sport in EU law, preferably by means of area derogations (so-called Bereichsausnahmen). As a first step, and in reaction to the Bosman judgment, the Declaration on Sport was annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam.14 The “social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity15 and bringing people together” is emphasized by the Declaration. The Declaration also calls upon the bodies of the European Union to consult sports federations in relation to important questions dealing with sport, and to consider the particular characteristics of amateur sports. Unlike a protocol, the Declaration is not regarded as primary law, but can be used as an aid to interpretation. It had been planned that sports would become part of primary law in the EU for the first time via the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.16 After the failure of that treaty, the relevant provisions were included in the Lisbon Treaty. Pursuant to Article 165 (1) sub-paragraph 2 TFEU, the EU is to contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, taking account of the specific nature of sport, which is founded on structures based on voluntary activity, and its social and educational function. The EU action is to be aimed inter alia at developing the European dimension in sport by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions, and cooperation between the organisations responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of athletes, especially of young athletes (Article 165 (2) last en-dash TFEU). In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with ordinary legislative procedure, and, after consultation with the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, adopts incentive measures which should not involve any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the member states; the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, adopts (non-binding17) recommendations (Article 165 (4) TFEU). ___________ 14

Declaration 29, OJ.EU 1997 C 340/136. Protocols form part of the Treaties, Art. 51 TEU. For an account of the functions of declarations, cf. Kokott in: Streinz, EUV/AEUV-Kommentar, 2nd edition 2011, Art. 51 TEU, margin no. 6; Schmalenbach, in: Calliess/Ruffert, EUV/AEUV-Kommentar, 4th edition 2011, Art. 51, margin no. 5. 16 Cf. Streinz (fn. 10), p. 72. 17 Art. 288 para. 5 TFEU. 15

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Thus, the competences of the EU are expressly limited to contribution (see also Article 6 lit. e TFEU) and the undertaking of any measures of harmonisation is precluded. This is not an area derogation which could “protect” sport from EU law.18 According to the declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam and affirmed by the reference to the “specific nature of sport” and the promotion of cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, however, the characteristics set out must be taken into account when the EU adopts new measures.19

c) The Impact of the Fundamental Freedoms This issue becomes relevant in situations where the concerns of sports associations – which are, in principle, protected by the freedom of associations in accordance with European fundamental rights –20 are to be taken into account due to the possibility that the European fundamental freedoms may have an impact on them. The fundamental rights and freedoms of the internal market, especially the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU), and the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU), also affect sport due to its economic nature. Moreover, they are of relevance to amateur sport.

aa) Sport as an Economic Activity The impact of the fundamental freedoms on sport became visible for the first time in the Walrave and Koch case. This case came before the ECJ, and was a seminal case as regards the impact of EU law on sport.21 The ECJ held that sporting activities fell under the scope of EC (now EU) law. The only exception arose in cases where the reasons for a provision were based solely on sport and ___________ 18 Cf. Streinz (fn. 4), p. 105 for more on the futile attempts to justify a derogation as set out in Art. 45 para. 4 and Art. 51 para. 1 TFEU, which would be determined under EU law (cf. ECJ, judgment of 24.05.2011, C-54/08 [Commission/Germany – “Notaries”]), EuZW 2011, 468 with commentary by Fuchs and Streinz, Jus 2011, 851). 19 Following the same principle, but with consequences which are too wide-ranging, see Brost, Die „Besonderheit des Sports“ im neuen Artikel 165 des Lissabonner Vertrages, SpuRt 2010, 178 (180 et seq.) and Persch, Sportförderung in Europa: Der neue Art. 165 AEUV, NJW 2010, 1917 (1917). Having been enshrined within the Treaty as an “aid to interpretation”, certain aspects specific to sport may be taken into consideration by the ECJ. However, they do not constitute exemptions from general EU law. See also Weatherill, EU Sports Law: The effect of the Lisbon Treaty, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, no. 3/2011. 20 See II.3 infra. 21 For more detail, see Streinz (fn. 10), p. 73 et seq.

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were not related to economic activities. One example provided by the ECJ was the composition of national teams.22 This distinction is fundamental, but not at all as easy to make as it may seem at first glance. The example of the national teams was, for instance, called into question, as, in this area, too, money may be a relevant factor, making it impossible to exclude the possibility that economic activity is taking place.23 This may be true in the case of bonuses awarded upon joining the team, and when the team wins, but it does not change the fact that the provision itself has a specific sporting aim; i.e. to ensure competition between the teams of different nationalities.24 Similar reasons also justify the restrictions on participation in the Olympic Games.25 The distinction between an economic and a sporting motive was also the problem at the heart of the Meca-Medina case.26 The rules of sporting federations which have sporting motives, such as doping restrictions and the bans imposed when athletes are found guilty of doping, can interfere with athletes’ freedom to choose an occupation and freedom of competition.27

bb) Participation in Sport as Social Advantage The impact of EU law is, however, not restricted to the area of economics. It has long been debated whether or not the central prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality in EC, or, as the case may be, EU law28 requires that European fundamental rights entitle citizens of the European Union to participate in sporting events which take place in a member state other than their own home state, and which are purely amateur, on an equal standing with residents of the member state in which the competition is taking place. If this were the case, all “nationality clauses” would be inadmissible.29 The ECJ has not yet addressed this issue, but the judicial committee of the German Basketball Federa___________ 22

ECJ (fn. 7), no. 4/10. Cf. Fikentscher, Nationalmannschaften als Teil des Wirtschaftslebens – rechtstatsächliche Anmerkungen zur europarechtlichen Privilegierung von Nationalmannschaften, in: FS W. Fikentscher, 1998, p. 635 (641 et seqq.); Thöny, Keine Zukunft für Nationalmannschaften?, SpuRt 1999, 177 (180 et seq.); Thöny, Sind Nationalmannschaften noch zu retten?, JBl. 1998, 627 (635 et seqq.). 24 Cf. Streinz (fn. 10), p. 80 et seq. 25 Cf. Streinz (fn. 4), p. 121 et seqq. 26 See III.8, IV.4 infra. 27 Schroeder, Sportrecht und europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, SpuRt 2006, 1 (2). 28 Art. 7 TEEC, Art. 12 TEC, now Art. 18 TFEU. 29 Cf. Schroeder, Sport und europäische Integration 1989, p. 44 et seqq.; Seymer, Ausländerklauseln im organisierten Freizeitsport, 2006, p. 108 et seqq. and 130 et seqq. For an opposing point of view, cf. Klose, Die Rolle des Sports bei der Europäischen Einigung. Zum Problem der Ausländersperrklauseln, 1989, p. 86. 23

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tion (Deutscher Basketball-Bund) recently annulled a nationality clause in its by-laws.30 “Social advantages” are also of relevance in EU law. European citizenship, as well as the “fundamental status” of nationals of member states, can be dealt with under this heading.31 These social advantages are connected to the European fundamental freedoms.

d) Provisions of Antitrust Law Another important issue for sports associations in addition to fundamental rights is European antitrust law. These associations occupy market-dominating positions due to the “Ein-Platz-Prinzip” (“single-place principle”)32, and are thus the focus of provisions prohibiting unlawful agreements (Article 101 FTEU) and the abuse of dominant positions (Article 102 FTEU).33 Arguments involving the right of freedom of movement are linked to those which relate to antitrust law and must be taken into account when considering the specific conditions which apply to team sports.

___________ 30 German Basketball Federation (DBB) Legal Affairs Committee, Decision 03/2009 of 24.03.2010, SpuRt 2010, 215; Decision 01/10 of 20.07.2010. 31 Cf. Streinz, Zum Recht der Unionsbürger auf Gleichbehandlung im Amateursport, SpuRt 2010, 231 (232 et seqq.); Engelbrecht, Discrimination against EU Nationals in Amateur Sport, ISLJ 2010, 105. Engelbrecht, Nochmals: Diskriminierung von Unionsbürgern im Amateursport, SpuRt 2011, 96 where he provides a translation of the reply of the European Commission to a question he himself had posed. Furthermore, he examines the consequences which this reply could have for questions posed by other member states. For an account of the distinctions drawn between various national championships in individual sports and the records set during these championships, cf. ibid, p. 97, no. 4. For additional information on the competence of arbitration courts to refer questions to the ECJ (ibid, p. 98, no. 7) see Streinz/Herrmann, (Original-)Referendarexamensklausur – Europarecht. Ausländerklauseln im Sport – Sammy Kefir will auch spielen, JuS 2008, 903 (904 et seq.). 32 Cf. Hannamann (fn. 3), p. 54 et seqq. 33 Cf. Weiß, Transfersysteme und Ausländerklauseln unter dem Licht des EG-Kartellrechts, SpuRt 1998, 97 (97 et seqq.), Heermann, Sport und europäisches Kartellrecht, SpuRt 2003 (89 et seqq.); Schroeder (fn. 27), SpuRt 2006, 2 et seqq. For a discussion of the possible abuse of dominant positions by sports associations, cf. ECJ, C-49/07 – Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE), ECR 2008, I-4863 = Causa Sport 2008, 264.

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2. Obligation of Private-law Federations Although the main question involved in the case of Walrave and Koch had already been settled, the sports associations involved in the Bosman case still believed that they were not bound by EU law, since they were not actually parties to the founding contracts. The explosive nature of the case was, at any rate, underestimated, possibly because of the Commission’s pledge that compliance with the so-called “3+2 rule”34 was sufficient in order to comply with European Union law. The ECJ, however, proceeded to make it clear that such unlawful pledges are of little value.35 Moreover, in confirming its own jurisprudence regarding the third-party effect of the fundamental freedoms, the ECJ also emphasized that the collective regulations of sports associations, at least, must comply with the principle of non-discrimination, and with the prohibition of any restriction of the fundamental freedoms.36 Sports federations performed a necessary counter-manoeuvre and were granted leave to appeal on the grounds – which were specifically tailored to apply to measures taken by states – that such restrictive measures were justified.37 This is an element of the essential counterbalancing which is necessary in response to the effects of the fundamental freedoms. A further element is the fundamental rights of the European Union, which can be invoked by the sports federations.

3. Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental Rights The fundamental freedoms of the Single European Market and European citizenship – unlike the “conventional freedoms”, freedom of movement, which emanates from European citizenship, is expressly referred to as such by the ECJ –38 are, despite certain similarities, to be distinguished from the fundamental rights of the EU.39 When considering the regulations of sports federations in ___________ 34

Cf. Summerer (fn. 11), p. 603 et seq. ECJ (fn. 10), no. 136, for an account of the “self-commitment” of the Commission, see V, infra. 36 ECJ (fn. 10), no. 84. For an account of the controversial extension of these principles to the area of individual agreements, cf. ECJ, judgment of 06.06.2000, Angonese/Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano, ECR 2000, I-4139, no. 36 and Streinz, JuS 2000, 1111 et seqq. 37 ECJ (fn. 10), no. 85 et seq. For dogmatic problems cf. Streinz (fn. 4), p. 110, with further references. 38 ECJ, judgment of 11.07.2002, C-224/98 – D’Hoop/Office national de l’emploi, ECR 2002, I-6191, no. 29; judgment of 02.10.2003, C-148/02 – Garcia Avello –, Slg. 2003, I-11613, no. 24 to Art. 18 TEC, now Art. 21 TFEU. 39 Cf. Streinz, Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, in: Merten/Papier, Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa, Vol. VI/1: Europäische Grundrechte I, 2010, § 151, margin no. 11 et seqq., with further references. 35

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relation to EU law and sports, it is significant that, on the one hand, the fundamental rights are limited by the fundamental freedoms, and that, on the other, they also restrict the fundamental freedoms.40 The autonomy of the sports associations, which is protected by EU law, is, to this extent, relevant to the law of sports associations.41 This was merely implied in the Bosman judgment, but became obvious in the ECJ judgments in the cases of Deliège and Lehtonen42. The autonomy of associations derives from the freedom of associations which was first declared to be a general legal principle (Art. 6 (3) TEU) based on Article 11 on the European Convention on Human Rights and the constitutional traditions common to the member states. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, the principle of freedom of associations set out in Article 12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union43 enjoys an equal ranking with the Treaties (TEU and TFEU) because of Article 6 (1) TEU. Article 11 ECHR has functioned as a source of legal principles. It will, however, become a source of law upon the scheduled accession of the EU to the ECHR (Article 6 (2) TEU). At that point, measures taken by the EU itself will also be subject to the direct supervision of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, if this proves necessary.

III. Overview of the Decisions of the ECJ The amount of jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, which is classified as a “Court of Justice” in the terminology of the Lisbon Treaty,44 is already vast, as is the amount of academic legal discourse on the subject of these decisions; in particular, on the Bosman case. In addition, judgments are also delivered by the General Court (as the European Court of First Instance became known after the Lisbon Treaty came into force).45 To this extent, the case of ___________ 40

Cf. ibid., margin no. 23 et seqq. for more on these interrelationships. Cf. Gramlich, Grundfreiheiten contra Grundrechte im Gemeinschaftsrecht?, DÖV 1996, 801 (810 et seq.); Streinz, EG-Grundfreiheiten und Verbandsautonomie, SpuRt 2000, 221 (225 et seqq.); Streinz, Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH nach dem BosmanUrteil. Spielräume für Verbände zwischen Freizügigkeit und Kartellrecht und Verbandsautonomie, in: Tettinger (ed.), Sport im Schnittfeld von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Recht, 2001, p. 27 (44 et seqq.). 42 See III.7, infra. 43 Original version (2000) in OJ.EU 2000 C 364/1, amended version (2007) in ABl. 2007 C 303/1 and in OJ.EU 2010 C 83/02. 44 Art. 19 para. 1 subpara. 1, 1st sentence TEU. The abbreviated designation for this court is to remain “ECJ”. 45 Re-naming the court was necessary, as it can function as a court of second instance to certain specialized courts. The abbreviation for the name of the court remains “GC” – the court’s designation as “General Court” shows the range of its competence. 41

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Meca-Medina is particularly remarkable, as the General Court and the Court of Justice had different basic approaches to the case. While only a short overview of other decisions will be provided, this case deserves special attention. Furthermore, the judgments of Deliège and Lehtonen are of great significance in the area of the autonomous jurisdiction of federations under EU law.

1. Rules Relating to Foreign Players (Walrave and Koch, Bosman, Kolpak, Simutenkov, Kahveci) As early as the case of Walrave and Koch, the ECJ emphasised that rules relating to foreign players on grounds of nationality are prohibited under EU law if these are not motivated by sporting reasons. This was affirmed and defined more precisely in the case of Bosman, where the ECJ dealt with concrete attempts by the associations to justify rules relating to foreign players, and finally rejected them.46 Thus, all doubts as to justification of a possible “6+5” plan, introduced by Joseph Blatter47, were also clarified.48 In this manner, EU law forbids any discrimination as regards, for instance, working conditions. Therefore, the argument that restrictions were imposed for reasons relating to the appearance of the starting line-up, and not for reasons of employment, is beside the point.49 Any arguments which relate to fans’ identification with teams and support for national teams have been rebutted, meaning that the ECJ would need to change its jurisprudence completely if the “6+5” model were to endure.50 The prohibition of discrimination is not limited to EU citizens and citizens of states which form part of the EEA or the European Economic Area (i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) who must be treated on a par with EU citizens: it also encompasses individuals who are awarded rights by virtue of corresponding association agreements between the EC (or rather, the EU) and third-party countries. Although such agreements do not grant a right of access to the EU’s employment market; however, if an individual achieves access to ___________ 46

ECJ (fn. 10), no. 116 et seqq. Resolution of the FIFA Congress of 29./30.05.2008 in Sydney. 48 Cf. Battis/Ingold/Kuhnert, Zur Vereinbarkeit der „6+5“-Spielregel der FIFA mit dem Unionsrecht, EuR 2010, 3 (10 et seqq.). For a legal opinion, cf. Causa Sport 2009, 187. 49 Cf. Streinz, Bosman und kein Ende? – Die geplante „6+5“-Regel der FIFA im Lichte des Europarechts, in: FS Steiner, 2009, p. 855 (864 et seqq.); Streinz, „6+5“-Regel oder Homegrown-Regel – was ist mit dem EG-Recht vereinbar?, SpuRt 2009, 224 (225 et seqq.). 50 For alternatives that are compatible with EU law, cf. Conzelmann, Modelle für eine Förderung der inländischen Nachwuchssportler zur Stärkung der Nationalmannschaften, 2008, although he regards regulations that are partly discriminatory as being admissible (cf. ibid, p. 63 et seqq.). 47

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the employment market in a lawful manner, he or she is then entitled to equal treatment. The ECJ initially decided this in relation to Slovakia (which was not a member state of the EU at that time) in the case of Kolpak,51 and later in relation to Russia in the case of Simutenkov52 and Turkey in the case of Kahveci53. Due to the Cotonou agreement, many states within Africa, the Carribean and the Pacific are also affected.54

2. Transfer Compensation – Training Compensation (Bosman, Bernard) In the Bosman case, the ECJ, basing its arguments on the right to freedom of movement for workers, objected to the transfer fees stipulated in the football federations’ by-laws, stating that they constituted an unjustified obstacle to mobility.55 The ECJ acknowledged only the aim of supporting the recruitment and training of young players as being legitimate.56 The recently decided case of Bernard57 dealt with a regulation contained in the by-laws of the French Football Association, pursuant to which so-called “Espoir”-players, employed as trainees between the ages of 16 to 22 within the scope of a time-limited contract, had to conclude their first contracts as professional players with the association which had trained them, if the association in question so wished. Furthermore, the consequences of a player’s refusal to comply with the association’s demand were discussed. Following the Advocate General’s submissions,58 the ECJ decided that, in examining whether or not a regulation which restricts freedom of movement can be eligible to achieve a particular aim, and whether or not it exceeds those requirements necessary in order for it to be real___________ 51

ECJ, judgment of 08.05.2003, C 438/00 (Deutscher Handballbund/Maros Kolpak), ECR 2003, I-4135 = SpuRt 2003, 153 with commentary by Weiß. Cf. Holzke, Die Gleichstellung drittstaatsangehöriger Berufssportler nach der „Kolpak’-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, SpuRt 2004, 1 (1 et seqq.). 52 ECJ, judgment of 12.04.2005, C-265/03 (Igor Simutenkov/Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Espanola de Fútbol), ECR 2005, I-2579 = SpuRt 2005, 155, with commentary by Streinz. 53 ECJ, judgment of 25.07.2008, C-152/08 (Nihat Kahaveci), ECR 2008, I-6291 = SpuRt 2009, 61. 54 Cf. Brecht, Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit im Cotonou-Abkommen. Analysiert am Beispiel des Sports, 2009, p. 51 et seqq., 82 et seqq., 85 et seqq., 127 (“Theses” 10, 11, 13, 14, 15); Streinz/Herrmann (fn. 31), 903 (903 et seqq.). 55 ECJ (fn. 10), no. 92 et seqq. 56 ECJ (fn. 10), no. 106. 57 ECJ, judgment of 16.03.2010, C-325/08 (Olympique Lyonnnais/J. Bernard, Newcstle UFC), SpuRt 2010, 110. 58 AG Eleanor Sharpston, opinion of 16.07.2009, no. 30 and 47.

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ised, the “specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function” must be taken into account in accordance with Art. 165 para. 1, subpara. 1 TFEU.59 It is, however, doubtful whether restrictions posited by the ECJ, which were to be imposed upon the costs of training which had actually accrued for the individual player,60 are in fact appropriate.61

3. Resulting Problem: Terms of Contracts (Compromise EU-Commission/FIFA/UEFA – Webster) One of the consequences of the Bosman judgment was that, in cases where players were particularly talented, associations were interested in achieving the longest contractual terms possible and players were, of course, happy to let their club pay them large salaries. Another consequence was that exorbitantly high sums were often demanded for a premature transfer out of the contract, or were even stipulated during the initial contractual negotiations. This caused problems in relation to national employment law, as well as in relation to EU law, which were solved by means of a compromise between the EC Commission and FIFA and UEFA, the response to which has been varied.62 Measures which require the associations to undertake to place restrictions upon the amount of compensation and to forgo the imposition of sporting sanctions after the contract has been in existence for three years, both of which are stipulated in Article 17 FIFA regulations63, are problematic – see the case of Webster64, decided by the CAS – and result in the “creative” drafting of contracts65.

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ECJ (fn. 57), no. 40. ECJ (fn. 57), no. 50. 61 For an account of the provisions contained in the FIFA regulations, cf. Streinz (fn. 4), p. 112 et seq.; Streinz, Der Fall Bosman und die Folgen, ZEuP 2005, 341 (353); Groß, Eine unendliche Geschichte: Transferregelungen im lizenzierten Fußballsport – Zugleich ein Plädoyer für einen beitragsfinanzierten Solidarfonds, 2004, p. 437 et seqq. 62 Cf. Streinz (fn. 4), p. 114 et seq.; Streinz (fn. 61), ZEuP 2005, 349 et seqq. 63 FIFA regulations concerning status and transfer of players, SpuRt 2002, 148. Cf. Fritz/Düll, Zu den neuen FIFA-Transferregelungen, SpuRt 2002, 144 (144 et seqq.). 64 CAS, judgment of 30.01.2008, SpuRt 2008, 114. 65 Cf. Breucker/Thumm/Wüterich, Der Fall Webster – Konsequenzen für Lizenzspieler in Deutschland, SpuRt 2008, 102 (105); Menke/Räker, Webster und Sylva – Arbeitsrechtliche Antworten auf „privilegierten Vertragsbruch“ im (Lizenz-)Fußball, SpuRt 2009, 45 (48 et seqq.). 60

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4. Coaching Licenses (Heylens) There are also regulations in EU law which concern the mutual recognition of coaching licenses. In the case of Heylens, the ECJ decided that, based on Article 48 TEEC (now Article 45 TFEU), the refusal to acknowledge the parity of a qualification acquired in another member state with a qualification acquired in that state must be examined with regard to its compliance with EC Law (now: EU Law). Moreover, the persons concerned must be informed of the reasons for this refusal.66 The ECJ also declared the requirement of reciprocity of ski instructor qualifications in Italy to be clearly contrary to the law of the European Union.67 Despite the primary law obligations and the more extensive secondary legislation, the achievement of a Single European Market is impeded by the professional interests of domestic physical education instructors, companies and federations who wish to retain a type of “partitioning” which is contrary to EU Law.68

5. Player’s Agents (Piau) The restrictions upon the activity of players’ agents69 established by federation law also concern an economic and transnational activity. Consequently, they fall under the purview of EU Law.70 In the case of Piau, the claimant opposed a decision of the Commission, in which the Commission held that the new FIFA regulations were consistent with European antitrust law.71 In spite of ___________ 66 ECJ, judgment of 15.10.1987, Case 222/86 (Unectef/Heylens), ECR 1987, 4097 no. 17. 67 ECJ, judgment of 16.05.2002, C-142/01 (Kommission/Italien), ECR 2002, I-04541 = SpuRt 2002, 237 with commentary by Streinz. Cf. Streinz/Herrmann/Kraus, (Schneeball-) Schlacht um die Diplomanerkennung – Die Vereinbarkeit französischer Berufsausübungsregelungen im Alpinsport mit dem Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, SpuRt 2005, 5 (5 et seqq.). 68 Cf. Streinz, Die Freizügigkeit für Sportlehrer im Binnenmarkt, in: FS Röhricht, 2005, p. 1239 (1239 et seqq., with further references). Occasionally, domestic courts acknowledge that EU law takes precedence over the law of EU member states, cf. Cour d’Appel de Grenoble, judgment of 22.04.2004, SpuRt 2005, 25 with commentary by Kraus. 69 Cf. Stopper/Holzhäuser, Juristische Fallstricke im Recht der Spielervermittler, SpuRt 2011, 13 (15 et seq., with further references). 70 Cf. Vetter, Das FIFA-Spielervermittler-Reglement im Spannungsverhältnis zum europäischen Kartellrecht, SpuRt 2005, 233 (233 et seqq., with further references); Scherrer, Die Spielervermittlerregelung des Weltfussballverbandes FIFA, in: Scherrer (ed.), Sportlervermittlung und Sportmanagement, 2nd edition 2003, p. 95 (95 et seqq.). 71 Cf. Muresan, Anmerkungen zum Urteil des EuG und zum Beschluss des EuGH i.S. Piau/Europäische Kommission, Causa Sport 2006, 243 (243 et seq., with further references).

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the Commission’s opinion, the GC confirmed that Article 82 TEC (now 102 TFEU), in this case, was indeed applicable, because, as long as they are pursuing economic interests, the federations and FIFA are regarded as associations of undertakings (within the meaning of competition law), which act on behalf of the clubs. The clubs were to be regarded as the actual buyers of the services of the players’ agents. Due to clubs’ obligations arising out of the players’ agents regulations, FIFA can be regarded as holding a dominant position on the market. With regard to the exemptions set out in Article 81 para. 3 TEC (now Article 101 para. 3 TFEU), this position was, however, not an abuse of law.72 For this reason, the ECJ rejected the appeals which had been lodged by means of a decision.73

6. Selection Criteria for Athletic Competitions (Deliège) In the case of Deliège, the ECJ expressly considered the autonomy of associations. The decision mentions that it “naturally” falls to the bodies concerned, such as organisers of tournaments, sports federations or professional athletes’ associations, to lay down appropriate rules, and to make their selections in accordance with them. Since the national associations were regarded by the ECJ as possessing the necessary knowledge and experience, it allows them a certain margin of appreciation which also applies to their organizational structure.74

7. Transfer Periods (Lehtonen) The judgment of the ECJ in the case of Lehtonen follows the same line. The court took the autonomy of federations in relation to athletic competitions into account, acknowledging the setting of deadlines for the transfer of players – obviously an obstacle to mobility – as a convenient measure in order to ensure the regularity of sporting competitions. However, it also – justifiably – demanded that the regulations be appropriate and inherently consistent75. The lat___________ 72

GC, judgment of 26.01.2005, T-193/02 (Piau/Kommission), ECR 2005, II-209 no. 112 et seqq. = SpuRt 2005, 102. 73 ECJ, judgment of 23.06.2006, C-171/05 P, ECR 2006 (not published in the official collection). Extensive commentary with an analysis of the legal situation Muresan (fn. 71), Causa Sport 2006, 252 et seqq. 74 ECJ, judgment of 11.04.2000, C-51/96 and C-191/97 (Deliège/Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées, ECR 2000, I-2549, no. 67 et seq. = SpuRt 2000, 148. 75 ECJ, judgment of 13.04.2000, C-176/96 (Jyri Lehtonen u.a./Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL, ECR 2000, I-2681, no. 51 et seqq., SpuRt 2000, 151. Cf. Streinz (fn. 40), 33 et seqq., 47 et seqq., with further references ; Vieweg, The legal autonomy of sport organisations and restrictions of European Law, in : Caiger/Gardiner (eds.),

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ter requirement was developed by the ECJ as a general test criterion in cases in which the institution imposing the restrictions – be it the state or a monopolistic sports association – is conceded a broad margin of appreciation; particularly with regard to healthcare76, gambling77 (which relates to sport in a special manner) and sport itself: the measures imposed must be “consistent”.78

8. Doping Suspensions (Meca-Medina) Finally, it must be mentioned that doping suspensions imposed by sports associations have come to the forefront of EU Law. This was unavoidable, as a doping suspension with international effect inevitably interferes with occupational freedom, and is thus a grave obstacle to the athlete’s mobility.79 As a result of the divergent assessments of GC and the ECJ80 in the case of MecaMedina, however, it became obvious that the matter of the limits which exist upon the jurisdiction of federations is particularly significant.81

___________ Professional Sports in the European Union: Regulation and Reregulation, 2001, p. 83 (88); Steiner, Richterliche Grundrechtsverantwortung in Europa, in: FS Maurer, 2001, p. 1006 (1011 et seqq.). 76 For a particularly unambiguous judgment, cf. ECJ, judgment of 10.03.2009, C169/07 (Hartlauer), ECR 2009, I-1721. 77 Cf. ECJ, judgment of 08.09.2010, C-46/08 (Carmen Media), NVwZ 2010, 1422, where the German monopoly on gambling was declared to be in violation of EU law because it was not “consistent” with the goal of prevention of addiction. For a general overview of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on gambling: Streinz/Kruis, Unionsrechtliche Vorgaben und mitgliedstaatliche Gestaltungsspielräume im Bereich des Glücksspielrechts, NJW 2010, 3745 (3745 et seqq.). 78 For more on this principle of consistency (which must be differentiated from the consistency principle that applies to the organs of the European Union (Art. 7 TFEU), cf. Streinz, Die Rolle des EuGH im Prozess der Europäischen Integration. Anmerkungen zu gegenläufigen Tendenzen in der neueren Rechtsprechung, AöR 135 (2010), 1 (21 et seqq.). 79 Cf. Streinz (fn. 4), p. 124 et seqq. 80 GC, judgment of 30.09.2004, T-313/02 (Meca-Medina und Majcen/Kommission), ECR 2004, II-3291 = SpuRt 2005, 20 with commentary by W. Schroeder; ECJ judgment of 18.07.2006, C-519/04 P (Meca-Medina and Majcen/Kommission), ECR 2006, I-6991 = SpuRt 2006, 195 with commentary by Orth. 81 See IV.4, infra.

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IV. Obligations under EU law and under the Autonomy of the Association 1. Statutory Basis in EU Law It is no longer disputed that, as an economic activity, sports fall within the scope of EU law. It is also acknowledged that, as is generally the case, the rules which exist in this area and which can restrict the fundamental freedoms must be justifiable. Finally, it is also acknowledged that there exists autonomous regulation of sports. This must be considered when evaluating the autonomy of associations, protected under EU law, i.e. by the fundamental freedoms and the fundamental rights of the EU. This does not mean that sports can invent its “own law” (which has, in some cases, occurred on the pitch), leading to the creation of a legal vacuum. Instead, a clear divide must be found between rules which, as “pure sports rules”, should be excluded from review by a court outside of the federation’s jurisdiction, and the areas in which sport and the behaviour of its federations are subject to a “general” jurisdiction. In this area, as in all other areas of law, a “practical concordance” between the conflicting rights must be reached. Here, it is the practical concordance between the fundamental freedoms and antitrust law on the one hand, and the fundamental right of the autonomy of the association on the other.

2. Sporting Rules and Legal Rules The GC attempted to solve the case of Meca-Medina by drawing a distinction between “sporting rules” which are “purely sporting in nature” and do not, therefore, follow any economic aim, and “legal rules”, i.e. the provisions of EU law. The court ruled that anti-doping rules were “purely of sporting interest”, which excluded them from the scope of EU law.82 This was met with justified criticism,83 and this part of the judgment was thus – correctly – set aside by the ECJ, which ruled that the GC had “erred in its judgment”.84 Criticism of this judgment85 was – correctly – countered.86 The case of Meca-Medina demon___________ 82

GC (fn. 80), no. 44 et seqq. Cf. the commentary of Schroeder, SpuRt 2005, 23 (23 et seq.); Heermann, Anmerkung zu EuG, judgment of 11.10.2004 – T-313/02 – Meca-Medina und Majcen, GPR 2005, 118; Heermann, Causa Sport 2006, 348; Orth, Causa Sport 2004, 194 (194 et seqq.), see also Blackshaw, ISLJ 2005, 51 who takes an opposing view and believes the judgment to be correct. 84 ECJ (fn. 80), no. 34. 85 Cf. Infantino, Meca-Medina: Ein Schritt zurück für das europäische Sportmodell und die Spezifität des Sports?, SpuRt 2007, 12 (12 et seqq.). 83

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strates two things: first, that the tension between the self-regulation of sports acknowledged by domestic law and by EU law and its boundaries is, indeed, the “central element” of sporting law.87 And secondly, that the distinction drawn by Max Krummer between “sporting rules” and “legal rules” in sports88 must be questioned, and possibly evaluated differently with respect to its effectiveness and its consequences.89 Ultimately, the decisive matter is if – and to what extent – sports and games should be justiciable under the jurisdiction of the federation on the one hand, and under domestic or EU jurisdiction on the other.90 With regard to the “if”, it may be stated that the rules of the game, at least (for instance, the determination of the number of players in a football, handball, basketball or hockey team), cannot be infringed upon by EU law on the grounds that they are “disproportionally” small, and thus constitute an obstacle to the freedom of workers – irrespective of the fact that such a determination also has “economic” effects.91 To this extent, the example of national teams has already demonstrated that economic effects alone cannot be decisive.92 This also concerns the question of the verifiability of “factual decisions” on the pitch – decisions which are, in general, reached by the association. At best, an examination of the federation’s jurisdiction can be reviewed for arbitrariness by domestic courts. It is a different matter again in cases where licensing standards or bans affect the freedom of workers under German constitutional law93 and, moreover, free___________ 86 Cf. Pfister, Meca-Medina, kein Schritt zurück!, SpuRt 2007, 58 (58 et seq.); for a similar view, see also Orth, Anmerkung, SpuRt 2006, 198. 87 See Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht, (accessible at online version http://www.irut. de/Forschung/Veroeffentlichungen/OnlineVersionFaszinationSportrecht/FaszinationSport recht.pdf), p. 46. 88 Kummer, Spielregel und Rechtsregel, in: Merz (ed.), Abhandlungen zum Schweizerischen Recht, 1973, p. 44 et seqq., 77 et seqq, with further references. For a more detailed account of this distinction, cf. Pfister, Autonomie des Sports, sport-typisches Verhalten und staatliches Recht, in: FS W. Lorenz 1991, p. 171 (174 et seqq.). 89 For a critical account, cf. Hess, in: Hess/Dressler (eds.), Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, 1999, p. 19 et seqq. For necessary distinctions, see also Vieweg, Fairness und Sportregeln – Zur Problematik sog. Tatsachenentscheidungen im Sport, in: FS Röhricht, 2005, p. 1255 (1260 et seqq.). 90 Cf. Kaiser, Sport- und Spielregeln als materielles Nichtrecht? Zur Frage der Justiziabilität von Sport und Spiel, SpuRt 2009, 6 (9 et seqq.). 91 Streinz (fn. 10), p. 84. See also Weatherill, Anti-doping revisited – the demise of the rule of “purely sporting interest”?, ECLR 2006, 645 (652); Stein, Das Weißbuch der EUKommission zum Sport. Bestandsaufnahme zur Anwendung des Wettbewerbsrechts auf Sportregeln, SpuRt 2008, 46 (48): “purely sporting rules”. 92 Cf. II.1.c)aa), supra. 93 For an account of the state of affairs as regards constitutional law, see Nolte, Staatliche Verantwortung im Bereich Sport, 2004, p. 254 et seqq.

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dom of movement under EU law. Due to their effects, they fall under the headings of fundamental freedoms and antitrust law.94

3. Practical Concordance between Fundamental Freedoms and European Antitrust Law and the Fundamental Rights of the European Union In this area, which falls under the purview of EU law, it is necessary – as in any other situation of conflict – to find “practical concordance” between the conflicting positions of the fundamental freedoms and European antitrust law on the one hand and, on the other, the freedom of associations, as protected by the European fundamental rights. Here, the grounds for the restrictions of fundamental rights, and for exceptions to the prohibition of cartels, can be used as starting points, all the while taking the specific nature of sports into account. Any justification must prove that it follows a legitimate aim; that it fulfils the principle of proportionality, and that it is consistent. The process of the justification of a restriction upon one of the fundamental freedoms, or of the provisions of antitrust law, should, therefore, run parallel, at least with regard to the result.95

4. In Particular: The Case of Meca-Medina On the basis of these criteria, the ECJ reached the correct decision in the case of Meca-Medina. European antitrust law was applied as a result of the interference with the protected rights. This would also apply to the fundamental freedom of the movement of persons. As a consequence, the examination of the activity took into account its justification under EU law and considered the specific nature of sport. Ultimately, its proportionality was confirmed. The significance of this judgment lies in its unequivocal finding that the classification of a regulation as one of “purely sporting character” does not automatically lead to this provision being excluded from the scope of applicability of EU law. A broader and binding standardisation of the lawfulness of sporting rules under EU law would – for reasons of legal certainty – be desirable. However, this standardisation would be subject to certain limitations, particularly in the sense of legal certainty, i.e. in order to prevent the misleading impression that “con-

___________ 94 95

For greater detail, see Streinz (fn. 4), p. 124 et seqq., with further references. See also Weatherill (fn. 91), ECLR 2006, p. 645 et seqq.

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sent” has been granted.96 In analyzing the jurisprudence of the ECJ, however, legal scholarship can, at least, be of assistance in providing clarification.

V. Legal Protection of Athletes under EU Law An athlete affected by actions taken by federations has several remedies open to him in the context of a review of the federation’s decisions (including the jurisdiction of the federation): within the context of antitrust law, an athlete can, pursuant to Article 263 para. 4 TFEU, file a suit with the ECJ against decisions of the Commission which do not go far enough to intervene in situations where an action taken by an association is in violation of competition law (Meca-Medina). If the Commission remains completely inactive, proceedings for failure (Article 265 para. 3 TFEU) could, as an exception, be permissible – this is analogous to the competitor’s lawsuit.97 In the context of the fundamental freedoms, legal protection is available before the domestic courts, which includes the possibility of a referral to the ECJ (Article 267 TFEU). If a domestic court of final instance “arbitrarily” fails to make this obligatory referral (Article 267, para. 3 TFEU), a demand can be made that the case is referred to the ECJ by lodging a constitutional complaint grounded on a violation of a principle of natural justice (Article 103 para. 1 German Constitution).98 The case of Bosman demonstrates that, in spite of claims to the contrary by the Commission, federations are not safeguarded against this.99

VI. Conclusion As is the case with any other occupation, professional sports require legal regulation in order to protect the athlete and to ensure fair competition. European law has contributed substantially to this objective, and continues to do so. Sport is not an area to which EU law does not apply. However, the “sporting” truth is not to be uncovered in the courtroom, but rather on the pitch.

___________ 96

For reasons which demonstrate this, see Stein (fn. 91), SpuRt 2008, 47 et seqq. For more detail on the competitor’s lawsuit, cf. Pechstein, EU-Prozessrecht, 4th edition 2011, margin no. 632 et seqq. 98 Cf. Streinz, Europarecht, 8th edition 2008, margin no. 709 et seqq. 99 ECJ (fn. 10), no. 102. 97

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VII. Theses 1.

EU law includes professional sports as an economic activity. Therefore, any discrimination against professional athletes is prohibited by the fundamental freedoms of the Single European Market (in particular, free movement of workers and freedom of services). The fundamental freedoms also serve to prevent discrimination (e.g. “nationality clauses”) and as limitations (e.g. against bans on transfers) on any obstacles to mobility between the member states of the EU (for instance obstacles to transfers). Citizens of third-party countries do not have a right to direct access to the employment market; they are, nonetheless, entitled to equal treatment under the corresponding association agreements if they do gain access to the employment market legitimately.

2.

Furthermore, every citizen of the European Union engaging in amateur sports has the right not to be discriminated against.

3.

Sports federations are also bound by the fundamental freedoms (thirdparty-effect)

4.

Sports associations, as associations of undertaking, come within the purview of EU law, and are also subject to antitrust law provisions.

5.

Regulations that follow “purely sporting” aims are exempted from these provisions only if they are “purely rules of the game” (for instance rules which relate to the number of players). If this is not the case, they may still constitute justified exceptions. For example, provisions which relate to the selection of national teams. It is a different matter in relation to regulations which penalise certain doping violations: even though such regulations are intended to maintain fairness in the game, they constitute a substantial interference with the athletes’ freedom of occupation and their fundamental freedoms. Thus, it was with good reason that the ECJ corrected the General Court’s approach in the case of Meca-Medina.

6.

Following the annexing of the Declaration on Sport to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), sports was referred to as part of binding primary law for the first time in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007; entered into force on 1 December 2009) (Article 165 TFEU). The EU thereby gained a limited competence to support sports (no harmonization of legal or administration provisions is permitted). Article 165 TFEU does not establish an area derogation from the requirements of the fundamental freedoms, or from those of European antitrust law. It does, however, provide a point of reference and orientation when considering the “specific nature” of sports.

7.

In order to justify the restriction of actions, sporting federations can refer to the adjusted limitations upon the fundamental freedoms (“ordre public”). The restriction of actions must follow a legitimate aim, fulfil constitutional principles and the principle of proportionality and be “coherent”.

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8.

Athletes must be properly protected from actions taken by the federations which are capable of restricting their occupational freedom and their fundamental freedoms. EU law is used as a yardstick to assess whether such measures constitute obstacles to mobility. This constitutes a limitation of the federation’s jurisdiction.

9.

A practical concordance is to be sought between the requirements of the fundamental freedoms and European antitrust law, and freedom of association, which is also protected under EU law. The ECJ has provided points of reference for this in the judgments of Deliège and Lehtonen, and confirmed this approach in the case of Bernard.

10. Professional sports need to be made subject to legal regulation in order to protect the athletes and to ensure that competition is fair. European law contributes significantly to this. Sports cannot be a legal vacuum in which European law does not apply. Nevertheless, the “sporting” truth must be found on the pitch, and not in the courtroom.

The First EU Contribution to the Revision of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC)* By Jacob Kornbeck I.

Introduction: Background and Motives ............................................................. 211

II. The EU Contribution: Process and Procedures ................................................. 214 1.

WADA Process and Procedures ................................................................ 214

2.

EU Process and Procedures ....................................................................... 215

III. Structure and Content of the EU Contribution .................................................. 216 1.

Structure .................................................................................................... 216

2.

Emerging Data Privacy Principles – Point 1 of the EU Contribution ........ 217

3.

Use of the ADAMS Database – Point 2 of the EU Contribution ............... 219

4.

Registered Testing Pools (RTPs) and Whereabouts – Point 3 of the EU Contribution............................................................................................... 220

5.

Involvement of Governments – Point 4 of the EU Contribution................ 221

6.

Public Disclosure – Point 5 of the EU Contribution .................................. 223

IV. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 223 1.

The EU Contribution as a Compromise ..................................................... 223

2.

The EU Contribution as an Opportunity .................................................... 224

3.

The EU Contribution as an Achievement .................................................. 226

I. Introduction: Background and Motives When the Danish Minister of Sports, Uffe Elbæk, sent a text entitled “EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code” to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) on 14.03.2012,1 it was far more than a merely ___________ * Special thanks go to my colleague Jörg Huperz and trainees Samy Julien Hamama and Carolin Schwegler for their support, advice and criticism in the process of drafting this contribution. The translation was provided by the European Commission’s in-house translation service, the Directorate-General for Translation (DGT). Some editing has been car-

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symbolic gesture. By the time the first consultation phase for the revision of the codes had been completed on the following day (see the following figure for a summary of the various phases), WADA had received contributions, expressions of opinion and suggestions, from both recognised WADA Stakeholders (i.e. sports associations and governments represented on the WADA Foundation Board), and other organizations and individuals. It was, however, the first time that the 27 EU Member States had submitted joint proposals on the new World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) which will come into force on 01.01.2015. The fact that the governments of the EU Member States and of the Council of Europe pay almost 50% of the total amount of contributions from governments throughout the world will, it is hoped, lend the EU contribution as much weight as the fact that all the proposals it contains are based on existing secondary EU legislation. Given that WADA is likely to be concerned to avoid administrative complaints and legal conflicts in Europe, this is certainly an important argument. However, this initiative is definitely an historical landmark too, as it is the first time that the EU has managed to formulate a joint position; the EU Council responsible for sports issues2 adopted the contribution and authorised the Danish EU Presidency, on behalf of the EU in its entirety, to pass it on to WADA officially. The driving forces here were the Council and, in particular, the Danish EU Presidency. However, when the EU contribution was being drafted, the Commission had a special advisory role (especially in the initial phase), as the Council Working Party on Sport had decided to confine the EU ontribution exclusively to WADC provisions covered by applicable secondary EU legislation3 (not least for the purposes of cooperating with the Council of Europe, whose anti-doping body had also prepared a contribution for the WADC revision). Although the EU contribution was thus deliberately confined to applicable EU law, namely the acquis communautaire – which, in light of the discussions between Europe and WADA since 2008 on the issue of data protection, certainly makes sense – the Council potentially has a much wider role if a consen___________ ried out by M. Boland (LL.B., LL.M.). This text is strictly personal and does not express the opinion of the European Commission. 1 Council approves EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20120314b_en.htm (accessed: 29.11.2012). 2 Education, Youth, Culture and Sport (EYCS), cf. summary: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/policies/council-configurations?lang=en (accessed: 29.11.2012). 3 Cf. EU Expert Group “Anti-Doping”: Report from the 1st meeting (19 October 2011), p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b24/xg-ad-201110-final-rpt.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012).

Timetable for the WADA consultation and revision process

Source: WADA website http://wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/The-Code/ Code-Review/ (accessed: 29.11.12).

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sus can be found on issues which do not relate to the acquis. The Commission is also the EU observer in the Council of Europe’s anti-doping bodies and cooperates politically, albeit on a non-binding basis, with the Member States’ governments on the issue of doping. It takes account of anti-doping in exchanges with sports bodies throughout the EU and also conducts an ongoing dialogue with WADA. Finally, at EU level, a priority area of policy on “prevention” is being built up. This covers amateur sport and fitness and will involve new options for EU support at political level and, if applicable, will include a future financial instrument (a section on sport as an integral part of a future EU educational programme “Erasmus 4 All”).4

II. The EU Contribution: Process and Procedures 1. WADA Process and Procedures In 2012–13, not only the WADC itself but also the associated international standards on the Prohibited List (“List”), Testing (IST), Laboratories (ISL), Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs) (ISTUE) and the International Standard consultation phases and three International Standards consultation phases. In the initial First Code Consultation Phase (01.01.–15.03.2012), the hearing covered the 2009 Code and the contributors’ own proposals. The Second Code Consultation Phase (01.06.–15.10.2012) covered the draft 2015 Code published online by WADA on 01.06.2012. A similar procedure has been adopted for the IS Consultation Phases, the first phase of which (01.06.–15.10.2012) covers only current standards, whereas the second (01.12.2012–28.02.2013) will be based on the drafts to be released by WADA on 01.12.2012. In light of the above, the EU contribution is clearly intended to provide input as early as possible within the consultation procedure in order to gain maximum impact. This timely approach also allows comments to be made in the subsequent phases, where necessary, on EU comments or proposals submitted previously. The entire initiative is therefore to be seen not only in terms of (sports) law, but also in terms of legal policy.

___________ 4 EU Council adopts Conclusions on doping in recreational sport, http://ec.europa.eu/ sport/news/20120515-eu-council-adoptsconclusions_en.htm (accessed: 29.11.2012).

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2. EU Process and Procedures In its Decision of May 2011,5 the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Work Plan for Sport and created six EU Expert Groups, all of which have clearly defined tasks and deliverables. Unlike the informal Working Groups previously moderated by the Commission, they do not have the discretion to tackle new issues. On the other hand, they have increased legitimacy and, potentially, also a new kind of influence. The number of Expert Groups and their tasks and deadlines are set out in Annex II. A measure, “prepare draft EU comments on the revision of the WADA Code”, for which an Expert Group has been set up, is laid down under the heading “integrity of sport, in particular the fight against doping and match-fixing and promotion of good governance”. Its tasks and deadline are “preliminary draft EU comments by early 2012 and related follow-up”6. On 19.10.2011, the Expert Group on Anti-Doping held their first meeting and decided how they would go about drafting the EU contribution.7 They decided on an exclusively acquis-based format (and hence against a more wideranging political EU contribution). A series of observers were allowed to participate in the group.8 On 25.01.2012, the Commission published a legislative instrument for a regulation on data protection. If this is adopted, it will replace Directive 95/46/EC and will contain amendments which may be important for current anti-doping practice.9 On 08.02.2012, the Expert Group on Anti-Doping

___________ 5 Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on a European Union Work Plan for Sport for 2011–2014 (EU Work Plan for Sport 2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ /LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:162:0001:0005:EN:PDF (accessed: 29.11.2012). 6 EU Work Plan for Sport 2011, ibid., Annex I, p. 4. 7 See EU Expert Group on “Anti-Doping”: Report from the 1st meeting (19 October 2011), p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b24/xg-ad-201110-final-rpt.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012). 8 As indicated in the minutes from the meeting of 19 October 2011, the following organizations had by then applied for observer status: Council of Europe (Secretariat), European Olympic Committees (EOC), European Elite Athletes’ As-sociation (EEAA) (EU Athletes), Professional Players’ Association (PPA), European Health and Fitness Association (EHFA), World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), Government of Norway. At the third meeting they were joined by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11, 25.1.2012 – see press release and documentation: “Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of the data protection rules”, 25.01.2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en. htm (accessed: 29.11.2012).

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adopted a draft EU contribution at their second meeting10. This in turn was adopted by the Council on 08.03.201211 and forwarded to WADA by the Presidency on 14 March 2012. When the Council adopted its conclusions on doping in recreational sport on 11.05.2012, it also extended the Expert Group’s mandate so that it could continue its work until the end of 2013 (the 2015 Code is due to be adopted in Johannesburg in November 2013).12

III. Structure and Content of the EU Contribution 1. Structure The EU contribution is a written contribution on the WADC revision adopted by the Council of the European Union.13 The document contains the text to be sent to WADA as Annex I, which (unlike the Council text itself) is not available in German. The EU contribution addresses five selected aspects of the current 2009 Code, identifies specific problems and calls upon WADA to make specific changes to the 2015 Code: – –

emerging data-privacy principles (lack of specific guidance in the Code); use of ADAMS (use of the ADAMS [Anti-Doping Administration and Management System] database and compatibility with the data protection legislation of the EU and of its Member States); RTPs and whereabouts (composition, size and application of the important registered testing pools [RTPs] of top athletes in connection with the rules on the obligation to register [“Whereabouts”]); involvement of governments (involvement and the role of governments); public disclosure (forwarding of personal information).

– – –

___________ 10

EU Expert Group on “Anti-Doping”: Report from the 2nd meeting (8 February 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b24/xg-ad-20120208-final-rpt.pdf_(accessed: 29.11.2012). 11 Council approves EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20120314b_en.htm (accessed: 29.11.2012). 12 EU Council adopts Conclusions on doping in recreational sport, http://ec.europa.eu/ sport/news/20120515-eu-council-adoptsconclusions_en.htm (accessed: 29.11.2012). 13 EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code = I/A-ITEM-NOTE: Participation of the European Union in revising the World Anti-Doping Code, Brussels, 23 February 2012 (28.02), 6846/12, SPORT 14 DOPAGE 5 SAN 40 JAI 109 DATAPROTECT 26, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st06/st06846.en12.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012).

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Each point is broken down as follows: –

WADA references (Which provisions in the Code or in the international standards are affected by this proposal?); EU references (To which provisions of EU law does the proposal refer?); EU concerns (legal and political concerns of the EU); Solution proposed (What amendments to the relevant WADA provisions would the EU like to propose?).

– – –

2. Emerging Data Privacy Principles – Point 1 of the EU Contribution Under the law of the EU and its Member States, the processing of personal data is subject to strict principles with regard to consent, purpose and (in the absence of the two previously mentioned criteria) legal basis. A high level of protection, combined with a strict purpose limitation, is a fundamental legal principle, as it is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter Article 8(2)). The emerging data-privacy principles in Code Article 14.5 (Doping Control Information Clearing House) do not meet these standards.14 Article 14.5 does not place any clear restrictions on the principles governing such data processing, and the expression “clearing house” appears to suggest more of a “switchboard” function, although the recipient organizations mentioned (IOC, IPC, national and international associations, national Olympic committees, etc.) are globally organised bodies, which means that a comprehensive exchange of data should be expected on that basis. Particularly in light of these provisions, which may jeopardise data protection, the vague reference to “emerging dataprivacy principles” is unsatisfactory, in both legal and legal-policy terms. The EU contribution identifies the potential impact on the IST (4.3, 4.5, 15.2) and the ISPPPI (4.2, on the primacy of national law) and the reservations it voices are supported by the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter Article 8.2), and the applicable secondary legislation in the form of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (especially Directive Article 25(1)–(2)). ___________ 14

“WADA shall act as a central clearing house for Doping Control Testing data and results for International-Level Athletes and national-level Athletes who have been included in their National Anti-Doping Organization’s Registered Testing Pool. […] each AntiDoping Organization shall report all In-Competition and Out-of-Competition tests on such Athletes to the WADA clearinghouse as soon as possible after such tests have been conducted. This information will be made accessible to the Athlete, the Athlete’s National Federation, National Olympic Committee or National Paralympic Committee, National Anti-Doping Organization, International Federation, and the International Olympic Committee or International Paralympic Committee. […] To enable it to serve as a clearing house for Doping Control Testing data, WADA has developed a database management tool, ADAMS, that reflects emerging data privacy principles.” (Code 2009, Article 14.5).

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In this respect, the EU refers to current political debates, trade union policy initiatives and administrative complaints and legal cases in the EU Member States, and to opinions from the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the ISPPPI from 200815 and 2009.16 Furthermore, reference is made to the comment in the second opinion to the effect that there is no justification for assessing the ISPPPI, given its de facto involvement in numerous WADA standards – irrespective of the theoretically non-binding nature of the ADAMS Arrangement.17 The EU therefore cannot support the compulsory use of ADAMS. The EU also takes the view that the role of WADA as a clearing house is not defined precisely enough, and that the wording of Article 14.5 itself is too vague. This infringes the principle of legal certainty in EU law.18 Article 14.6, too, appears to allow national law to apply at the same time as the respective WADA provision,19 which would cause considerable problems in the event of a regulatory conflict, and for this reason, the EU specifically acknowledges that the current ISPPPI Article 4 does comply with the legal certainty principle. All that needs to be done here, therefore, is to extend existing sound WADA practice to all WADA provisions. This point in the EU contribution ends with a proposal for pragmatic improvements, adding the following to Article 14.6: ___________ 15

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2008): opinion 3/2008 on the draft for an international data protection standard for the World Anti-Doping Code, adopted on 1 August 2008, 1576-00-00-08/EN, WP 156, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/ docs/wpdocs/2008/wp156_en.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012). 16 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2009): second opinion 4/2009 on the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information, on related provisions of the WADA Code and other privacy issues in the context of the fight against doping in sport by WADA and (national) antidoping organizations, adopted on 6 April 2009, 0746/09/EN, WP 162, http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp162_en.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012). 17 “The Working Party cannot confine its remarks only to the Privacy Standard. As the Privacy Standard contains numerous references to the WADA Code and ADAMS data base (see 2.2) it is necessary to examine it in the broader context of its application. That is why, after having recalled the main features of the system developed by WADA (point 2), the opinion refers in more detail to the following matters: whereabouts (3.1.), unintegrated remarks from the first opinion (3.2.), grounds for processing (3.3.), the transfer of data to the ADAMS database in Canada and to other countries outside the EU (3.4.), retention periods (3.5.) and sanctions (3.6.).” (Opinion 4/2009, p. 3). 18 Cf. Case C-2/08, Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Agenzia delle Entrate v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl, ECJ (Second Chamber), judgment of 3 September 2009. See p. 6 of the EU contribution, with references. 19 “Each Anti-Doping Organization shall ensure that it complies with applicable data protection and privacy laws with respect to their handling of such information, as well as the International Standard for the protection of privacy that WADA shall adopt to ensure Athletes and non-athletes are fully informed of and, where necessary, agree to the handling of their personal information in connection with anti-doping activities arising under the Code.” (Code 2009, Article 14.5).

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“Anti-Doping Organizations shall only process Personal Information where necessary and appropriate to conduct their anti-doping activities under the Code (such as those identified in Articles 2, 4.4, 5–8, 10–16 and 18–20) and International Standards, or where otherwise required by applicable law, regulation or compulsory legal process, provided such processing does not conflict with applicable privacy and data 20 protection laws.”

As the proposed improvement is intended to specify general reservations with regard to basic and data protection law in no uncertain terms this first point in the EU contribution has particular priority and accounts for the largest portion of the text; namely three-and-a-half of a total of ten-and-a-half pages. The shorter legal and political assessment in the subsequent four points are also to be seen in this light, although the amendments called for in those points are no less comprehensive for all that.

3. Use of the ADAMS Database – Point 2 of the EU Contribution Although the Code itself demonstrably contains no explicit obligation on WADA stakeholders and governments to use the ADAMS database, it has, nevertheless, not escaped the EU’s notice that Articles 4.4 (Therapeutic Use), 14.3 (Athlete Whereabouts Information), 14.5 (Doping Control Information Clearinghouse) and 15.2 (Out-of-Competition Testing) are couched in highly prescriptive terms. The EU also notes that corresponding provisions are to be found in the IST Standards, sections 14.3, 14.5, 15.2 and ISPPPI, section 4.2 (primacy of national law). The EU would like to support unrestricted use of the ADAMS database, but cannot do so as things stand, not least in light of the two comments by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the ISPPPI from 200821 and 200922. The comments in the Codes (“All provisions of the Code are mandatory in substance”23), combined with the fact that nowhere near all of the Member States currently use ADAMS,24 show that the use of ADAMS is, at present, controversial. ___________ 20

EU contribution (fn. 13), p. 7. Opinion 3/2008 (fn. 15). 22 Second opinion 4/2009 (fn. 16). 23 Code 2009, p. 16. 24 A survey shows that only ten Member States used ADAMS without restriction in 2010, whilst a further six had approved restricted use, and six were in the process of introducing (not further defined) use. In five Member States, however, ADAMS was not used at all. See T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The implementation of the WADA Code in the European Union, Report commissioned by the Flemish Minister responsible for Sport in view of the Belgian Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2010, The Hague 21

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The EU therefore sets out the problems arising in connection with Charter Article 8 and Directive 95/46/EC (data protection), and also asks whether the consent obtained for the use of ADAMS meets all the requirements laid down by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party for all sectors of society for consent of data subjects.25 Finally, it states that data transfers are permissible only within deliberately strict limits laid down in Articles 25–26 of Directive 95/46/EC. In conclusion, the EU refers to the amendments proposed under the previous point (Emerging data privacy principles), taking the view that they can also solve the problems with ADAMS.

4. Registered Testing Pools (RTPs) and Whereabouts – Point 3 of the EU Contribution The aim and status of the ADAMS provisions have already been examined in detail under points 1 and 2, but will now be considered under point 3 with regard to Code Articles 5.1.1 (Obligation of the Anti-Doping Organizations [ADOs] to have Registered Testing Pools [RTPs]) and 14.3 (Obligation of the ADOs to share relevant information with other organizations), which are not necessarily compatible with Article 8 of the Charter and Directive 95/46/EC (data protection). The EU acknowledges combating doping as a legitimate aim in principle, but the means used must be proportionate. The interests which have to be weighed against each other are not very different from those which have already been established and acknowledged with regard to the freedom of movement for professional athletes, and have to comply with specific standards (based on what is already a substantial body of case-law and the Commission’s administrative practice): in combating doping, the means selected must be “lawful, necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.26 The

___________ 2010, pp. 13 et seq.; http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/9202010_100013rapport%20 Asserstudie%20(Engels).pdf (accessed: 11.12.2012). 25 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2011): opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, adopted on 13 July 2011, 01197/11/EN, WP187, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2011/wp187_en.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012). 26 See, for example, the Commission Staff working document: Sport and Free Movement, Accompanying document to the Commission Communication: Developing the European Dimension in Sport, 18.01.2011, SEC(2011) 66, p. 3, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/ documents/swd_en.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012).

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RTPs of some Member States are disproportionate to the size of the population, as the Asser Instituut study27, demonstrated emphatically. In conclusion, the EU proposes two possible solutions to WADA: first, that a reference to the principle of proportionality, compatible with IST, be added to Article 5.1.1 and Article 14.3, or that the principle of proportionality be explained and laid down in the course of setting out what is expected of IFs and NADOs with regard to RTPs; and, secondly, that the proposal made under point 1–2 is reiterated.

5. Involvement of Governments – Point 4 of the EU Contribution Although sports organizations and governments have different roles and obligations under the WADA Code, the fact that the Code creates the impression that the expectations of governments referred to above are binding commitments poses legal-policy problems. As governments have “only” entered into commitments under the UNESCO Convention, and as this Convention to a large extent leaves it up to them to decide which instruments they need to achieve the Convention’s aims, there appears little point, given the sociological reality, in actually binding athletes to the social structures of sports with the associated forms of communication and loyalties (“governing bodies”, “the authorities of sports”, “officials of …”). As is the case with the problems with data protection mentioned above (points 1–3), a possible response to the EU’s comments might be to provide that existing law remain unaffected by any political commitments under rules which are issued by an NGO. Here, of course, it is self-evident that the governments’ legal position would remain unaffected, but such a blinkered legal interpretation would probably very largely ignore the sociological reality. The EU therefore takes the view that a newly-worded article on this point would be desirable in the 2015 Code. Specifically, Article 22 of the Code and section 4.2 (primacy of national law) of the ISPPPI should be mentioned, and, with regard to EU law, reference should once more be made to Article 8 of the Charter and Directive 95/46/EC in its entirety. One section of the introduction to the Code (which is therefore not an integral part of the actual provisions) is also seen as problematic. This part of the text claims to confer upon the Code a special status outside national legal systems, whereby not only private disciplinary bodies and arbitration courts, but also State courts are called upon to dispense with the application or consideration of customary provisions and general principles of law. Although such a provision would certainly not hold water before the Member States’ ___________ 27

Study of the T. M. C. Asser Instituut (fn. 25), pp. 29–30.

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courts – German courts have already ruled that they are competent to hear complaints concerning the manner in which rules on the obligation to register one’s “whereabouts”28 are applied – it should be of concern, particularly in the light of the sociological realities which often prevail in sport, that the introduction to the Code, of all things, contains a section liable to give athletes the impression that there are binding legal restrictions on their human rights, basic rights and, if applicable, rights as employees.29 The EU and the governments of the Member States have a duty of care vis-à-vis their citizens under current EUwide and national data protection legislation.30 In light of the above, the EU has submitted two proposed solutions, or rather, improvements. First, it proposes an addition to the last sentence of Article 22,31 emphasising that national law is applicable (which, in the case of the Member States of the EU, includes EU law, where relevant). Secondly, it proposes that the above-mentioned section on the non-applicability of national law or principles of national law in the introduction to the Code be deleted. ___________ 28

This impression is confirmed by two German judgments on the question of the obligation to register (LG Hamburg, judgment of 29.5.2009, ref.: 324 O 1002/08) and the publication of results on the internet (OLG Karlsruhe, judgment of 30.01.2009, ref.: 14 U 131/08). In both cases, the complaint was dismissed as unfounded, but the court deemed itself competent. 29 “These sport-specific rules and procedures aimed at enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonized way are distinct in nature from and are, therefore, not intended to be subject to or limited by any national requirements and legal standards applicable to criminal proceedings or employment matters. When reviewing the facts and the law of a given case, all courts, arbitral hearing panels and other adjudicating bodies should be aware and respect the distinct nature of the anti-doping rules in the Code and the fact that those rules represent the consensus of a broad spectrum of stakeholders around the world with an interest in fair sport.” (2009 Code, p. 18). 30 I. Spiecker gen. Döhmann and M. Eisenbarth even call upon the EU institutions to take action: “Purely in its own interest, the ECJ should therefore take active measures to discharge the duty of care for data protection assigned to it in the Treaty. It would reap twofold benefits: first, its reputation as a ‘guardian of privacy’ would enhance the image and status of its judges, who are not infrequently accused of being economic liberals, and secondly it would spare itself – and hence the EU – pressure on legal policy comparable with that relating to retention of data. The ECJ would thus make a considerable contribution to the intended aim of political unification: the emphasis on its role as a court safeguarding basic rights is an important new aspect, derived from the Lisbon Treaty, in addition to its overall responsibility for the internal market.” (I. Spiecker gen. Döhmann/M. Eisenbarth, Kommt das „Volkszählungsurteil“ nun durch den EuGH? – Der Europäische Datenschutz nach Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon, JZ 2011, pp. 169 et seqq., see in particular p. 177). 31 It relates to the following text: “Each government’s commitment to the Code will be evidenced by its signing the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport of March 3, 2003, and by ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the UNESCO Convention. The following Articles set forth the expectations of the Signatories.” This text introduces Article 22 which is followed by detailed provisions in Article 22.1 to 22.6.

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Although no official EU response to the first WADA draft is available, it is interesting to note that the WADA team has, up to now, kept the said section in the introduction.

6. Public Disclosure – Point 5 of the EU Contribution In accordance with Article 14.2.1, information about any athlete who has committed a violation is always expected to be disclosed to the public,32 although there are restrictions on this obligation under Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.2. A public disclosure obligation must give rise to misgivings, if only because it is intended to apply on mere suspicion. Article 14.2.1 even allows the identity of athletes to be disclosed if they only appear to have committed a violation (“who is asserted by an Anti-Doping Organization to have committed an anti-doping rule violation”). In view of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the EU deems this to be a concern and therefore suggests inserting a reference to the ISPPPI, together with detailed comments on the application of this provision and of national law.33

IV. Conclusion 1. The EU Contribution as a Compromise The EU contribution will certainly divide opinion: for some, the requirements laid down with regard to suitable protection of the individual rights of European athletes will appear to be unsatisfactory, whereas for others, these very limited proposals, which are consistently based on applicable EU law, will represent a (potential or actual) blow to the autonomy of sports organizations and the effectiveness of the fight against doping (where the keyword is “deterrent”). It must, however, be borne in mind that the text adopted by the Council is a compromise: some Member States would certainly have been prepared to ___________ 32 “The identity of any Athlete or other Person who is asserted by an Anti-Doping Organization to have committed an anti-doping rule violation, may be publicly disclosed by the Anti-Doping Organization with results management responsibility only after notice has been provided to the Athlete or other Person in accordance with Articles 7.2, 7.3 or 7.4, and to the applicable Anti-Doping Organizations in accordance with Article 14.1.2.” 33 “The EU suggests that a reference be made to the International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information within which detailed guidance is provided on such disclosures, this with the understanding of compliance with applicable national law.”

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support more stringent requirements but no consensus could have been reached on a text that went any further.

2. The EU Contribution as an Opportunity The EU Member States’ decision to join forces to submit specific proposals and requirements to WADA in this way is, of course, primarily attributable to the national and European constraints which arise from the incompatibility of some WADA provisions, standards and expectations with EU law and national law. Quite apart from the specific and explicit legal standards, we should not underestimate the importance of the universal values which underpin the democratic, legal and social order that we have built up, and which raise the question: how far can a democracy afford to waive normal standards in the legitimate interests of sports policy? With regard to data protection, the dissonance between aspiration and reality appears to have become a problem: the lack of an explicit legal basis has been identified as an issue in, for example, an expert opinion written by a legal scholar in an expert opinion commissioned by an athletes’ trade union34, and in a joint opinion35 drafted by two provincial data protection authorities. The situation is, admittedly, problematic, but is not necessarily hopeless, as both contributions come to the conclusion that the fight against doping is important and legitimate and should be continued as long as a legal basis, which does not exist at present, is created. The fact that the draft Code 2015, published by WADA on 01.06.2012, expects all States to introduce anti-doping laws36 will ___________ 34 Legal opinion of P. Wedde, Datenschutzrechtliche Bewertung der Melde- und Kontrollpflichten im Rahmen von Anti-Dopingprogrammen, die die von SP.IN [Spielerinitiative Basketball; note from the author] vertretenen Athleten betreffen, 05.09.2011, 156 pages, http://www.spinbb.net/uploads/media/Wedde_-_Gutachten_fu__r_SP.IN_per_5.9.2011.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012). 35 Positionspapier des Landesbeauftragten für den Datenschutz Rheinland-Pfalz (LfD Rh.Pf.) und des Unabhängigen Landeszentrums für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein (ULD): Datenschutz und Dopingbekämpfung, Mainz und Kiel, 26.07.2011, https://www. datenschutzzentrum.de/allgemein/20110726-positionspapier-dopingbekaempfung.html (accessed: 29.11.2012). 36 Article 22.2 (Involvement of Governments) states: “Each government shall put in place a proper legal basis for cooperation and sharing of information with Anti-Doping Organizations and sharing of data among Anti-Doping Organizations as provided in the Code.” Article 22.5 even stipulates that this is to be fulfilled retrospectively: “A government should meet the expectations of Article 22.3 no later than January 1, 2016. The expectations of the other sections of this Article should have been met by January 1, 2010.” As Article 22.2 states that a sufficient legal basis is expected to materialise, the deadline of 1 January 2010 appears to apply. As in the 2009 Code, sanctions apply to governments that fail to comply with the expectations under Article. 22.6, but these are not obligatory: “Fail-

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certainly prompt detailed discussions (not only in Germany), although it cannot yet be said whether this expectation will still be in the 2015 Code once it is ready for adoption in November 2013 in Johannesburg. It is quite clear that all doping bans have evolved over time and, therefore, exhibit internal inconsistencies and contradictions, not least with regard to how they are justified.37 Such a system might well be thought to be particularly susceptible to challenges, both legal and political, by athletes. The successes and failures of the worldwide fight against doping in the framework defined by WADA will largely be determined by the way in which the 2015 Code is framed. With regard to data protection, much depends on how far athletes’ consent must be taken as the touchstone. A PhD thesis in law on this subject38 (it appears to be the first in the German-speaking community and is an impressively prompt reaction to the conflict which ensued after 200839) came to the conclusion that the current conflicts of standards could be overcome if the question of consent could be resolved.40 The question of the legal basis for antidoping rules will probably be raised repeatedly.41 However, the timing of the WADC revision can be seen as a positive, as, in principle, it at least offers the possibility of building a better anti-doping system: the best way to support the system is surely to be found in designing it in such a way that it is not permanently exposed to legitimate legal and political attacks. ___________ ure by a government to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the UNESCO Convention by January 1, 2010, or to comply with the UNESCO Convention thereafter may result in ineligibility to bid for Events as provided in Articles 20.1.8 (International Olympic Committee), 20.3.10 (International Federation), and 20.6.6 (Major Event Organizations) and may result in additional consequences, e.g., forfeiture of offices and positions within WADA; ineligibility or non-admission of any candidature to hold any International Event in a country, cancellation of International Events; symbolic consequences and other consequences pursuant to the Olympic Charter.”, see World Anti-Doping Code, Draft Version 1.0, 2015, http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-The-Code/ Code_Review/Code%20Review%202015/Code-Draft-1.0/WADA-Code-2015-Draft-1.0EN.pdf (accessed: 29.11.2012). 37 See J. Kornbeck, Wozu Dopingbekämpfung in „dürftiger Zeit“?, in: J. Buschmann/M. Lämmer/K. Petry (eds.), Internationale Aspekte und Perspektiven des Sports, Prof. Dr. Walter Tokarski zum 65. Geburtstag, Sankt Augustin 2011, pp. 131–150. 38 L. Mortsiefer, Datenschutz im Anti-Doping-Kampf: Grundlagen und Spannungsfelder, Remscheid 2010. 39 Also completed in 2010: J. Niewalda, Dopingkontrollen im Konflikt mit allgemeinem Persönlichkeitsrecht und Datenschutz, Berlin 2011. 40 L. Mortsiefer (fn. 38), p. 250. 41 “In this context, the legislator is urgently called upon to lay down the normative framework for an effective combating of doping in sport by creating rules which comply with data protection requirements and which uphold the rights of athletes in a suitable manner which complies with the Constitution. If specific legal bases are created which comply with the Constitution, the collection, processing and use of data on athletes can certainly be legitimised.” (P. Wedde [fn. 34], pp. 151 et seq.)

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3. The EU Contribution as an Achievement The fact that the Member States of the EU actually managed (given their often very different values, aims, interpretations and practices) to adopt this EU contribution jointly, and to forward it to WADA on behalf of all the Member States, deserves credit, insofar as the consensus underlying it is based on serious misgivings felt by all the Member States on the five points mentioned above. As each of the five points contains specific references to the law of the EU and its Member States, this contribution should ideally have a claim to a special place among all of the contributions received.

International Sporting Accidents and the Rome II Regulation By Robert Sieghörtner I.

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 228  1.

Examples of Sporting Accidents from the Field of Comparative Law ...... 229 

2.

The Rome II Regulation ............................................................................ 231 

II. The Place of Damage Principle ......................................................................... 232  1.

General ...................................................................................................... 232 

2.

Localisation of the Place of Damage ......................................................... 233 

III. The Awarding of Priority to the Common Place of Habitual Residence (Art. 4 Para. 2 Rome II Regulation).............................................................................. 235  IV. The “Closer Link” Éxception (Art. 4 Para. 3 Rome II Regulation) ................... 238  1.

Introduction ............................................................................................... 238 

2.

Connection to a Relationship with a Club or Society ................................ 239 

3.

Points of Connection which Hinge on Contracts ....................................... 240 

4.

Sporting Accidents within the Family ....................................................... 241 

V. Behavioural and Game Rules in Sport .............................................................. 242  1.

General ...................................................................................................... 242 

2.

The Legal Nature of Behavioural Regulations and Game Rules Concerning the Practice of Sports ........................................................................... 243  a)

Norms laid down by the Legislator .................................................... 243 

b)

Regulations put in Place by Federations ............................................ 243  aa) Customary Practice? ................................................................... 243  bb) “Lex Sportiva”, “Lex Ludica” .................................................... 244 

3.

The Meaning of the Lex Ludica within the Law of Conflicts .................... 245  a)

Place of Accident as Applicable Law (Art. 4 Para. 1 Rome II Regulation) ................................................................................................. 245 

b)

A Law Other than Place of Accident Law is the Applicable Law (Artt. 4 Para. 2, 3, 17 Rome II Regulation) ........................................ 246  aa) Normative Bases ......................................................................... 246 

228

Robert Sieghörtner bb) Local Security and Behavioural Rules ........................................ 247  cc) Adherence to the Sporting Rules of the Place where the Accident Occurs ................................................................................. 249  dd) The Relationship between Sporting Rules at the Place where the Accident Occurs and the Applicable Law ............................. 250  ee) Negotiability of Observing the Sporting Rules of the Place where the Accident Occurs? ....................................................... 251 

VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 252

I. Introduction The most well-known recent case of an international sporting accident (in the sense of a sporting accident with a connection to a foreign jurisdiction) in the German press is probably the skiing accident of the former prime minister of Thuringia (Thüringen), Dieter Althaus. In that case, Dieter Althaus – a German citizen, usually resident in Germany – was skiing in Austria and collided with a Slovakian citizen, whose usual residence was in the USA. These details are of relevance to the final finding of liability as, in the context of comparative law, the framing and arrangement of claims in sporting accidents1 can vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction in which they are asserted. These differences do not generally arise in relation to game rules, as these are – for the most part – uniform on the international level although their interpretation can vary enormously from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.2 Rather, matters arise such as who is capable of being found liable under the law of torts – e.g. in cases involving minors – illegality, culpability and contributory negligence, the possibility of being awarded immaterial damages (and the amount of the same) as well as the expiry of claims.3 The differences between the various jurisdictions will now be clarified with the help of examples from the area of comparative law.

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The present article will focus on the liability of athletes towards fellow athletes; the liability of e.g. the organiser of a sports event towards spectators will not be addressed, nor will issue of international jurisdiction. For further reading on this topic, see e.g. Pfeiffer, zfs (Zeitschrift für Schadensrecht) 2010, 542 et seqq. 2 Cf. for an example of a contribution to the discussion of the interpretation of the FISrules, especially rule 5, see Heermann/Götze NJW (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift) 2003, 3253 and Pichler NJW 2004, 643. 3 Spellenberg, CaS (Causa Sport) 2009, 99.

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1. Examples of Sporting Accidents from the Field of Comparative Law A well-known peculiarity of the law relating to liability in the area of sporting accidents is the adaptation of the German law of tort’s application to martial arts and combative sports, to sporting competitions which carry a material risk of injury and, in general, in relation to dangerous sporting activities.4 This concerns, for example, football, handball, wrestling, judo, ice hockey, car racing, and (under certain circumstances) group hikes in the mountains which carry a certain level of risk.5 Where claims for damages arise in such cases, recourse is generally had to § 242 BGB (German Civil Code) which allows the courts to consider whether the assertion of such claims is in bad faith. As a general result, athletes who accidentally inflict injury on other athletes will only be held accountable if the boundary relating to the expected level of hardship inflicted – and thus the threshold between “fair” and “unfair” – is overstepped.6 The solution to this problem in other jurisdictions is, for the most part, the same.7 In the US, however, there is a tendency to hold the party who has incurred injury in a contact sport responsible only for conduct which is either grossly negligent (reckless) or intentional.8 Thus, it is clear that in other jurisdictions, there exists a far-reaching limitation of liability. One peculiarity which pertains to the French law relating to liability is that, pursuant to Art. 1385 C.c., a club can ex-

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For a recent rulings in this regard, see BGHZ 154, 316 ff. = NJW 2003, 2018 et seq.; OLG München NJOZ (Neue Juristische Online-Zeitschrift) 2009, 2268; KG, SpuRt (Sport und Recht) 2008, 76 et seqq.; for an extensive account of the topic, see Heermann, JZ (JuristenZeitung) 2008, 1001 et seq.; Schimikowski, r+s (recht und schaden) 2008, 189 et seq.; Burger, SpuRt 2007, 192 et seq.; Behrens/Rühle, NJW 2007, 2079 et seqq.; Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (online version http://www.irut.de/Forschung/Veroeffentlichungen/ OnlineVersionFaszinationSportrecht/FaszinationSportrecht.pdf – retrieved on 23.02.2011), p. 52 et seq. 5 Cf. OLG Karlsruhe NJW 1978, 705; Palandt/Sprau, § 823, margin no. 217; the initial distinction between combative sports and so-called parallel sports was overcome many years ago, cf. Vieweg (fn. 4), p. 53, margin no. 242. 6 Vieweg (fn. 4), p. 52 et seq. with further reference. 7 Fleischer, VersR (VersicherungsRecht) 1999, 785, 786; for various approaches to the solution of this matter under French law see Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99 et seq. and Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 788, each with further references; for an overview of the English case law cf. Condon v. Basi [1985] 2 All ER 453; Smoldon v. Whitworth [1997] ELR 249; Caldwell v. Maguire and Fitzgerald [2001] EWCA 1054; für Australien Rootes v Shelton [1968] ALR 33. 8 Jaworski v. Kiernan 696 A. 2d 332 (Conn. 1997); Lenti v. Jacobson; Super. Ct. Conn., Jud. Dist. of New Haven CV095029998S, 2009 Conn. Super. – retrievable at http://www.hackneypublications.com/sla/archive/000972.php (retrieved on 24.2.2011); for an extensive account, see Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 788.

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clude liability for a player whom it employs, though only in cases where it acted unintentionally.9 A further example which arises under German law, and which will be included because of its topicality is “relief from liability” (Haftungsvergünstigung). This legal concept reduces liability for transgressions committed by particular “related persons” so that it corresponds with the degree of culpability diligentia quam in suis. This relates primarily to § 1359 BGB and § 4 LPartG (Civil Partnership Act), respectively, insofar as sporting accidents occur between spouses or registered partners; and § 1664 BGB insofar as sporting accidents occur between parents (as the parties incurring injury) and their children (as the injured parties).10 Such limitations of liability are largely unknown in other legal orders.11 However, in its decision of 24.03.200912, the German Federal Court of Justice clarified and curtailed the scope of the application of § 1359 BGB to sporting accidents between spouses. The facts of the case concerned a German married couple who were water-skiing at Lake Garda, Italy. The husband was steering the boat and, in doing so, seriously injured his wife. In its ruling on the matter of liability, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH; Federal Court of Justice) did not have recourse to § 1359 BGB, in spite of the fact that German law was of application in this case. The headnote chosen by the editorial board of the NJW13 (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift; German legal journal) – which states that “where a leisure sport is exercised jointly” by a married couple, and where one party is thereby injured, § 1359 BGB is not of application – goes too far. The BGH considered the specific facts of this case and argued that the accident which had occurred was similar to a road traffic accident14, as it was caused by a motor-propelled vehicle, the operation of which required a license, and which was capable of causing an amount of damage comparable to that which would ___________ 9 Cf. Cass. JCP 2000 II 10295 with commentary by Billiau; 2002 II 10026 with commentary by Billiau; RTDciv. 2005, 143 with commentary by Jourdain; for an extensive discussion of the impact on sports see Mouly, JCP 2005 I 134. 10 In individual cases § 708 BGB can also come to the fore if several athletes form a company under civil law (BGB-Gesellschaft). This, however, is a rare occurence; cf. OLG München, SpuRt 1997, 100 on joint climbs: these are classified as joint undertakings if there is no economic object; they will only be classified as companies if the purpose is to be furthered by monetary contributions; Burger, SpuRt 2007, 192, 193 with further reference: in cases of alpine venture relations under company law are generally excluded. 11 For a comparative law account, see Hausmaninger, Festschrift Baltl, 1978, p. 283 et seqq. 12 BGH, NJW 2009, 1875; on this Figgener, NZV (Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht) 2009, 382; Lemcke, r+s 2009, 257. 13 BGH, NJW 2009, 1875. 14 In such cases § 1359 BGB does not apply according to BGHZ 53, 352; 61, 101; 63, 51.

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be caused by a car,. It went on to say that, in relation to the body of water concerned, there existed regulations which were sufficiently detailed in nature (Italian Ministerial Order No. 550 of 20.07.1994) which were aimed at ensuring the safety of water-skiers and uninvolved third parties, and which did not allow the employment of an individual standard of care. Thus, the decisive factors in the case were the (general) danger and the water-tightness of existing regulations relating to the exercise of sport. Similarly, in the event of a skiing accident, one can reach ones decision in a similar way due to the FIS-rules which are of application in such cases. However, the ruling leaves a margin of appreciation with regard to the decision as to whether § 1359 BGB should be applied in relation to, for instance, badminton games in domestic gardens. The final example from the area of comparative law relates to accidents which occur while skiing, and a peculiarity of French law which must be observed in such cases. Art. 1384 para. 1 C.c. envisages liability independent of culpability in the case of objects which are in the custody of their “possessor”. There exists no similar provision in any other jurisdiction.15 This strict liability is also taken as a basis by the French courts16 when one skier injures another with the object (i.e. the ski).

2. The Rome II Regulation In Germany, the matter of how liability is attributed (i.e. in accordance with the law relating to liability of which jurisdiction) in relation to sporting accidents is decided is now regulated by the Rome II Regulation which has harmonized the law of conflicts in the area of non-contractual obligations within the EU – with the exception of Denmark (see Art. 1 para. 4 Rome II Regulation). It covers claims arising from the law of torts (unerlaubte Handlungen). It must be observed at this point however that in the area of family law, there are certain exceptional restrictions, in that the limitations of liability set out in §§ 1359, 1664 BGB, and § 4 LPartG are not subject to qualification by the law of tort, but rather are regulated as follows: in the case of § 1359 BGB, pursuant to Art. 14 EGBGB (Introductory Law to the Civil Code)17; in the case of § 1664 BGB, Art. 17 Hague Convention on Protection of Children; and in the case of § 4 LPartG, pursuant to Art. 17b EGBGB. In accordance with Art. 32 Rome II Regulation, the Regulation is applicable to sporting accidents which occur after ___________ 15

Kadner Graziano, Europäisches Internationales Deliktsrecht (2003), p. 129, 131. Cour d’appel de Colmar JCP 1993 IV, 1711; but cf. also Cour d’appel de Paris Gaz. Pal. 1986, 1 somm. 41: no liability is incurred by the person in whose possession the object is if the collision ensues with the body of the other skier. 17 NK-BGB/Andrae, Art. 14 EGBGB, margin no. 67. 16

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11.1.2009, making it a so-called loi uniforme. It therefore covers tortious claims arising out of sporting accidents, irrespective of whether the parties concerned are classified as belonging to the EU in terms of their citizenship or their domicile, and also irrespective of whether the accident took place within the borders of the EU or elsewhere. This much is clear from Art. 3 Rome II Regulation, which states that the law stipulated to be applicable by the Regulation is to be applied, even if it is not the law of a member state; for example, skiing accidents which occur in the USA, Canada or Russia would also be covered by the Regulation.18 There are no special regulations contained within the Rome II Regulation for sporting accidents, which means that the general rules applying to tortious claims with a foreign dimension are of application.19

II. The Place of Damage Principle 1. General In holding with the long-established “place of damage” principle (Tatortgrundsatz) of Art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation, which is also set out in Art. 40 para. 1 EGBGB, the Regulation refers the courts to the law of the state in which the damage has occurred, irrespective of which state the occurrence giving rise to the damage – or the indirect consequences of the damage – took place. This means of referral to the so-called lex loci delicti commissi was already possible under the German law of conflicts.20 It is justified in principle, and also in practice, by the principle of protection of the common good – which is the idea upon which this connecting factor is based, and which also applies to sporting accidents. According to this principle, one must behave in a manner which is in conformity with the legal order of the place where the accident occurred.21 Furthermore, it fulfills the requirement for simple and clear provision of legal solutions in relation to legal transactions.22

___________ 18 These cases are of some relevance in court. For more information on the law which was previously in force, cf. e.g. LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20: skiing accident in Canada. 19 For the previous law cf. Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 175. 20 For an account of the law which was previously in force, cf. e.g. LG Hildesheim, VersR 1994, 615 – skiing accident in Switzerland; LG Köln, NJW 1973, 953 – motor-boat accident in Italy. 21 Kegel/Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (9th edition 2004), § 18 IV 1 a. 22 For more on road traffic accidents, see BGHZ 87, 95 (97); 119, 137 (140); similarly, BGH, VersR 1977, 56; BGHZ 90, 294 (298).

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2. Localisation of the Place of Damage It is usually quite simple to establish where the accident occurred, as it usually involves a Platzdelikt (i.e. a tort which occurs in a particular place). If the accident occurs in a state in which the civil law (or rather law of torts) differs depending on the territory in which one finds oneself, i.e. in which there are different laws governing tortious acts depending on the federal state, territory or similar – for example, the USA, Canada, Australia – then, pursuant to Art. 25 Rome II Regulation, each territory is awarded the status of a state.23 Accidents occurring between athletes which fall into the category of Distanzdelikt (“distance tort”), i.e. tortious acts where the party inflicting damage performs the relevant action at a place (so-called “place of action”, Handlungsort) which is in a different state to the place where the legallyprotected interest directly affected by the action is situated (so-called “place where the damage occurs”, Erfolgsort) are of little relevance24 and there is very little case law in relation to such accidents. There exist only examples which have been fabricated for textbooks, the most well-known of which is a case that one could describe as the “runaway ski”. In this example, an unsecured ski is dropped by a skier on an Austrian ski-slope and injures a second skier who is skiing in Italian territory.25 Another example is the firing of shots whose range extends beyond the state border in the sport of target shooting.26 The solution to such cases is, in any case, provided by Art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation. The applicable law is that which is applicable in the place where the damage occurs, i.e. the place where the “runaway” ski caused the damage, or, in the second example, the place where the shot injured the victim. It is a more difficult matter if the “place of the accident” (Unfallort) cannot be determined; for example, two skiers collide in the area where three countries border each other (Austria-Italy-Slovenia). In retrospect, it is impossible to clarify where (i.e. in the territory of which state) the collision occurred. The Rome II Regulation does not contain any provisions which would regulate such difficulties in the investigation of accidents and, furthermore, does not contain any assisting “connecting factor” (Anknüpfungspunkt). If, in an individual case, the connection (Anknüpfung) to the common habitual residence set out in Art. 4 ___________ 23

For an account of the law previously in force, cf. v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 10 – commentary on LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20: skiing accident in the Canadian territory Alberta. 24 This is, naturally, otherwise – as far as the liability of the manufacturer is concerned – in cases where sporting accidents occur due to defective sporting equipment; here, the rules of international product liability play an important role, cf. Art. 5 Rom II-regulation. 25 Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 175. 26 Pfister, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (eds.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht, Part 6, margin no. 97, fn. 305: “textbook example”.

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para. 2 Rome II Regulation is of no assistance, recourse must be had to the general principles employed by the law of conflicts in the event that the courts are unable to determine the relevant “connecting factor”.27 Nevertheless, there has been no discussion of the possibility of creating an international tortious “connecting factor” which could be applied in the event that it was not possible to determine the location of the accident. This problem is, in any case, not likely to arise very often. There are few limits to the possibilities open to the courts. One possibility would be to decide on a probable location of the accident.28 Another alternative would be to have recourse to the legal order (of the state involved) which is most favourable for the injured party. The “favourability principle” (Günstigkeitsprinzip) which, in former times, was popular in relation to tortious conflicts of law would provide one argument in support of this view. Another possibility – which also falls under the heading of favourability, but which is dubious as there would exist no connection between the injuring party and the legal order chosen – is to choose the legal order of the area of habitual residence of the injured party. Finally, as a “final aid”, there remains the application of the lex fori.29 Similarly, the Rome II Regulation leaves unresolved difficulties which arise in cases where an accident occurs outside of any state’s borders. In this case, too, it is easy to think of examples; an accident between two boats participating in a sailing regatta on the high seas, or divers involved in an accident on the high seas. There has been much discussion by the courts and in legal commentary of the set of problems which arises from torts which occur in an area situated beyond territorial sovereignty, and in relation to which the “place of accident” rule cannot be of application, most frequently in relation to sea- and aircraft.30 To this extent, the original draft of the Rome II Regulation31 drawn up by the European Commission envisaged having recourse to the law of the flag of the ship, or of the state in which the aircraft was registered in relation to torts occurring on such ships, or in such aircraft.32 This, however, would not have been of much direct help in the cases enumerated above. Nevertheless, in the case of the divers, one might decide upon the flag of the ship used by both of the divers, but also (in the event that this solution does not lead to the determi___________ 27

For more, cf. Kegel/Schurig (fn. 21), § 15 V 1. Cf. Kegel/Schurig (fn. 21), § 15 V 1 a, although this section deals with cases of uncertain nationality or habitual residence. 29 Cf. Kegel/Schurig (fn. 21), § 15 V 1 a, although this section deals with uncertainty in contracts of inheritance. 30 Cf. e.g. RGZ 138, 243 (246); OLG Hamburg, VersR 1975, 761, 762. 31 Of 22.07.2003 COM (2003) 427 final = IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privatund Verfahrensrechts) 2005, 174. 32 For an extensive account, see Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 4 Rom II Regulation, margin no. 33 et seq. 28

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nation of a “common state”), one might determine the relevant state to be the state from which the ship left for the diving trip. In the case of the regatta accident, as in the case of all collisions between ships on the high sea, if both ships are – legitimately – flying the same flag, then the law of this state should be decisive.33 This ultimately corresponds to the legal concepts upon which Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation is based. In cases where the colliding sea craft are flying different flags, the courts have (up until now) generally applied the “favourability principle” in such a way that the flag of either ship could be decisive, depending on which proved most favourable to the injured party.34 Others35 favour the view that the flag of the ship which causes the damage should be conclusive, because it would be unfair to the perpetrator of the damage to make him subject to the law of the injured party’s state; a state to which he has no connection. In my opinion, if the ships were taking part in the same regatta, it would be a better option to move away from the law of the flag altogether and to view the starting point of the regatta, or the headquarters of the organizer as being decisive of the matter, having regard to the demonstrably closer link to Art. 4 para. 3 Rome II Regulation.

III. The Awarding of Priority to the Common Place of Habitual Residence (Art. 4 Para. 2 Rome II Regulation) In the cases which have come before the German courts, it is very often the case that the parties involved in a sporting accident which took place abroad have a common place of habitual residence, i.e. Germany.36 In such cases, it was already common practice under the pre-existing law of conflicts to apply the law of the place of common habitual residence (see Art. 40 para. 2 EGBGB). The reasons for these so-called lex domicilii communis also apply to sporting accidents. The level of care that a person applies to their behavior and actions in everyday life is usually related to the law in place in their usual environment37; the way in which the parties to the accident steer their behaviour, therefore, is determined by the law of their common habitual residence.38 The ___________ 33

Kegel/Schurig (fn. 21), § 18 IV 1 f. RGZ 138, 243 (246); OLG Hamburg, VersR 1975, 761, 762. 35 Kegel/Schurig (fn. 21), § 18 IV 1 f. 36 OLG Hamm, NJW-RR 2001, 1537 (skiing accident in Italy); OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 1990, 111; 1997, 193 (both skiing accidents in Austria); OLG Brandenburg, NJWRR 2006, 1458 (skiing accident in Italy); LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20 (skiing accident in Canada); LG Bonn, NJW 2005, 1873 (skiing accident in Austria). 37 Cf. Schönberger, Tatortprinzip und Auflockerung (1990), p. 160; also cf. Rohe, Zu den Geltungsgründen des Deliktsstatuts (1994), p. 227 et seq. 38 Cf. Deville, IPRax 1997, 409 (410); similarly, W. Lorenz, DAR 1983, 273 (277): parties have adjusted to the continuing applicability (Fortwirkung) of this legal system. 34

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law of one’s own habitual residence is the law that one knows best.39 Primarily the injured party – but ultimately both sides – must live with the consequences of the accident in the country of their common habitual residence, and must also put in action any steps necessary to deal with and regulate the damage there.40 The applicability of the lex domicilii communis may be expected to correspond to the expectations and wishes of the parties involved.41 De lege ferenda, however, it may be necessary to query whether the place of habitual residence is a sensible criterion to employ in arriving at a connecting factor, as, in some cases, it cannot be easily ascertained and the connection can, therefore, be quite uncertain.42 Habitual residence is usually indicated by the finding that a person has lived and integrated themselves socially in an area over a long period of time and is based solely on the actual situation which points to place of residence as the central point of the individual’s life (“actual centre of a person’s existence”).43 Within the purview of the Rome II Regulation, however, it must be recalled that the definition of this term is intended to develop independently of the Regulation and is to be clarified further by the ECJ. The aforementioned criticism focuses (legitimately) on the fact that, in the area of professional sports, the hiring of foreign players by clubs – most notably by football clubs – is a common occurrence.44 The possible configurations of facts in such cases are manifold. For instance, one possible example is a player who is on loan to a club for only one season, or a player who moves permanently to a foreign club but whose family remains in Germany, thus leading to his decision to “commute” between his family and his club. In debates as to the dogmatics of habitual residence, it has already been established that such situations are common. Thus, courts may refer to jurisprudence and scholarly articles which deal with soldiers stationed abroad45 and students who are studying abroad46; obviously all the while having regard to the differences between ___________ 39

Cf. Beitzke, Rec. 1965 II, 63 (81); also cf. Looschelders, VersR 1999, 1316 (1320). Cf. Deville, IPRax 1997, 409 (410); Hohloch, JuS 1980, 18 (23); id., JR 1985, 372 (373); Zimmer, JZ 1993, 396 (399); W. Lorenz, DAR 1983, 273 (277); Dörner, JR 1994, 6 (7); Junker, RIW 1998, 741 (748). 41 Trutmann, Das internationale Privatrecht der Deliktsobligationen (1973), p. 98; Gonzenbach, Die akzessorische Anknüpfung (1989), p. 74 et seq.; Looschelders, VersR 1999, 1316 (1320), however this relates to accidents involving fellow passengers. 42 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 101. 43 BT-Drs 16/6308, 226 – on the FamFG; for the jurisprudence in the area of the law of conflicts, cf. BGHZ 78, 293, 295; BGH, NJW 1993, 2047, 2048; 1975, 1068. 44 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 101 speaks of “professional nomads”. 45 OLG Zweibrücken, NJW-RR 1999, 948; AG Landstuhl, FamRZ (Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht) 2003, 1300. 46 OLG Frankfurt, FamRZ 2009, 796; OLG Hamm, FamRZ 2002, 54; Palandt/Thorn, Art. 5 EGBGB, margin no. 10. 40

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such cases. In this regard, the peculiarity of the “barracking” of soldiers can lead to the justification of a divergent appraisal of such cases. In any case, the jurisprudence and articles relating to these cases make clear that the engagement of a player for only one season does not justify the determination of a new habitual residence.47 The constellation of cases involving workers who regularly commute to their family is equally well established. In such cases, the existence of a multiple habitual residence is – correctly – denied48, and the case decided on its own individual facts.49 Conversely, it is not possible to have recourse to the more specific reference to habitual residence contained in Art. 23 para. 2 Rome II Regulation. Pursuant to this provision, the habitual residence of a natural person acting within the boundaries of his professional activities is the place of central administration of those activities. This does not actually relate to individuals in gainful employment, but rather to self-employed individuals.50 This can be adduced from the schedules to the Rome II Regulation, where “independent, freelance or commercial”51 activity is mentioned, and from the reference to the place of central administration.52 In any case, the provision is of no further help to contract players. In addition to the unclear definitions and wording, it is often pointed out that the consequences of the special regulations contained in Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation frequently do not apply to sporting accidents. One good example is that of a German footballer who has contracted to play in England for two years and who intends to bring his family there, too.53 If, during his first game (against a German team), he injures an opposing footballer whose habitual residence is in Germany, Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation is no longer of application, as, pursuant to the regulations which relate to the determination of habitual residence, the party incurring the damage obtained a new habitual residence in England immediately upon arrival. The new habitual relevance is based on ___________ 47

Cf. AG Landstuhl, FamRZ 2003, 1300: soldiers have no habitual residence if their date of return is already fixed; similarly, OLG Frankfurt, FamRZ 2009, 796 in the case of a short-term residence abroad for the purpose of study; in a case before Hamm Higher Regional Court, this was assessed in a different manner; the case involved a residence abroad for a four year (!) course of studies, OLG Hamm, FamRZ 2002, 54. 48 E.g. Bamberger/Roth/Lorenz, Art. 5 EGBGB, margin no. 13; von Bar/Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht I (2nd edition 2003), § 7, margin no. 24; for an alternative view, see e.g. Erman/Hohloch, Art. 5 EGBGB, margin no. 55; Soergel/Kegel, Art. 5 EGBGB, margin no. 49. 49 For an extensive account, see Spickhoff, IPRax 1995, 185, 187 et seq. 50 Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 23 Rom II-VO, margin no. 20. 51 COM (2003) 427 final, p. 30. 52 Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 23 Rom II-VO, margin no. 20. 53 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 102.

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the relevance of his pre-existing intention to remain in England for a prolonged period of time. The case can, however, be argued in another way, in that the ties to the footballer’s old home do not yet seem to be fully dissolved. Similarly, if the reasons for the so-called lex domicilii communis54 are examined, it is difficult to arrive at a clear conclusion. The party incurring the damage has not yet had time to adjust his behavioural standards to standards which are acceptable in the new environment in which he finds himself. On the other hand, it cannot, without further evidence, be simply assumed that the expectations and wishes of the parties involved are that the case be dealt with in Germany, and that German regulations be decisive in assessing the level of damages to be awarded, etc. It would seem to be worth considering whether the traditional doctrine relating to habitual residence could be modified in such a way that a certain length of time (three months, for example) must have elapsed before the new place of residence could be recognized as habitual residence. As this proposition has not received any recognition as a general rule, however, there remain uncertainties attached to the question of what exactly the relevant connecting factor for habitual residence is. If more than two people are involved in a sporting accident – in relation to the injured parties, for example, a collision of multiple skiers on a ski slope which was caused by one individual skier – then the accident must be broken down into the various pairs involved (party incurring injury and respective injured party) and the applicability of Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation to each pair must be examined.55

IV. The “Closer Link” Exception (Art. 4 Para. 3 Rome II Regulation) 1. Introduction Art. 4 para. 3 s 1 Rome II Regulation sets out that, if, from the total sum of facts, it can be concluded that the tortious act has a conspicuously closer connection to a state other than those enumerated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of this other state is to be applied. Pursuant to Art. 4 para. 3 s 2 Rome II Regulation, a conspicuously closer connection with another state could arise from a pre-existing legal relationship between the parties – such as a contract – which is more closely connected to the tortious act. There are numerous conceivable ___________ 54

For an extensive account, see above at III. Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 4 Rom II-VO, margin no. 42; E. Lorenz, VersR 1993, 308; Kropholler, RabelsZ (The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Privat Law) 33 (1969), 601 (630 fn. 99); Looschelders, VersR 1999, 1316 (1322). 55

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sets of facts within the realm of sporting accidents to which these special regulations may be applied.

2. Connection to a Relationship with a Club or Society The application of Art. 4 para. 3 Rome II Regulation is often discussed in relation to certain types of cases, for example, a German ski club runs a skiing course in Switzerland and, during the course, one of the club members injures himself.56 Often, Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation will already have taken precedence over the “place of accident” principle, as the parties involved will usually also have their habitual residence in Germany. If this is not the case, then it will probably be the case that if those involved are members of one, common club, the rules and regulations of the club will be more relevant than the place where the accident occurred. This is demonstrated by the following example: a skiing organization registered in Kufstein (Austria) has members who live on both sides of the German-Austrian border; the club goes on a club trip to Switzerland. While there, a club member who lives in Germany injures a club member who lives in Austria. Here, the relationship between the parties is solidified by their membership of a common organization. However, the situation becomes even more complicated in the event that two club members living in Germany are involved in the accident. Should the rules and regulations of the Austrian club be of application here (Art. 4 para. 3 Rome II Regulation)? Or should the case be decided by means of application of German law (Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation). In my opinion, the latter option appears to be more relevant to the facts of the case. As with the club cases outlined above, one also encounters cases in which a group of athletes are regarded as forming a company.57 As against this, I would prefer not to regard the common starting point of a group of athletes on a sports excursion as being decisive of the matter without taking further evidence into account, and certainly not as a general rule.58 I will illustrate this with an example; a group of skiers resident in Germany and Austria, respectively, who have no further connection with each other, set out from Kufstein on a bus journey to Switzerland in order to go skiing there. Once there, a member of the group who lives in Germany collides with another who is resident in Austria. It appears to me that the starting point of the journey, which is otherwise not officially “organized”, is not less arbitrary than the place ___________ 56 Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 175 on Art. 40 (2) no. 1 EGBGB. 57 Cf. Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 4 Rom II-VO, margin no. 165. 58 However, see also Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 175.

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of accident, but rather quite clearly more haphazard, which would suggest to me that the case should remain to be decided by the lex loci (Art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation).

3. Points of Connection which Hinge on Contracts Art. 5 para. 3 sentence 2 of the Rome II Regulation deals with contracts between the parties involved in a tortious action; in the context of the examples discussed above, these parties would be the athlete incurring injury, and the injured athlete. It will hardly ever be the case that a contract will exist between these two parties; however, Art. 5 para. 3 sentence 2 Rome II Regulation is designed to provide a general example (Regelbeispiel) (“insbesondere”; in particular). A “manifestly closer connection” (within the meaning of Art. 4 para. 3 sentence 1 Rome II Regulation) can thus be deduced from a contractual relationship which does not exist between the parties to the tort themselves; one example mentioned in legal academic discourse is that of two participants in a skiing course, who both have contracts with the organizer of the course.59 One of the prerequisites for a connection of the tortious claims to a contract is that both contracts are subject to the same law. The matter of which law this is is decided by the Rome I Regulation. In accordance with the Regulation, a law which has been selected by the parties prior to the incident (“choice of law”) will have precedence (Art. 3 Rome I Regulation). If no choice of law has occurred, the habitual residence of the course organizer will be decisive, Artt. 4 para. 1 d, 19 Rome I Regulation. This will often be the place where the accident actually occurred. If this is not the case, it would make sense to favour the law upon which the ski-course contract is based over the lex loci delicti. In cases where footballers are injured during games, Spellenberg60 has posed a question as to whether the law of the tortious action (Deliktsstatut) should be linked to the law of the contracts which are concluded between the clubs and which form the legal bases of the football games in question. It is probable that such a contract exists in relation to most international friendly games.61 Ultimately, however, Spellenberg62 rejects the idea of achieving redress by having recourse to the law of the contract instead of the law of the place where the ___________ 59

Cf. Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 175; Pfister (fn. 26), Part 6, margin no. 91 – however, an exception to this would probably be any claims made against the ski school itself. 60 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 102. 61 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 102: it is a different matter where games take place as part of an international competition. 62 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 103.

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game was played, and, in the same way, in cases involving of competitive games, rejects the idea of resorting to the law of the registered office of the international federation concerned. In both cases he is correct, as the reference to torts in sports law is not narrow enough. In the case of contracts between clubs, it must be added that the players have no influence in this area and, furthermore, are possibly not even aware of the existence of the contracts. Any possible choice of law (Art. 3 Rome I Regulation) will be made without consultation with the players. Art. 4 para. 3 Rome II Regulation does not provide a basis for a connection hinging on a contract either.

4. Sporting Accidents within the Family It has long been debated whether torts which occur between members of a family should be dealt with under the relevant area of family law, rather than in accordance with the place of accident principle.63 Generally, the common habitual residence (Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation) will direct away from the place where the accident occurred to the legal system which defines the relationship under family law. One example of this is the case which relates to a German couple who were water-skiing on Lake Garda. This case was decided by the Federal Court of Justice64, and has already been mentioned above. In this case, too, the common habitual residence of the married couple demonstrated the necessity of applying German law. In most cases, the question as to whether a connection to family law (in accordance with Art. 4 para. 2 sentence 1 Rome II Regulation) exists will not even be posed. In the following example, however, the question does arise. It concerns a married couple: both are German citizens but live in France. On a joint holiday to Switzerland, they have an accident. The accident is caused by the husband’s brief inattentiveness, but has severe consequences for the wife. Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation would require French law to be applied in this case. As German law is the law which applies to the marriage (Ehewirkungsstatut), however, Art. 14 para. 1 No. 1 EGBGB would require that German law be applied. In my view, Art. 4 para. 3 sentence 1 Rome II Regulation should not be employed in order to facilitate the second option (Ehewirkungsstatut) to regulate the tortious claims arising out of the skiing accident. By means of an accessorial connection, the common citizenship of the couple could penetrate – through the “back door” of Art. 4 para. 3 Rome II Regulation in connection with Art. 14 para. 1No. 1 EGBGB – the Deliktsstatut, to a certain extent. The provision is more suited to lasting rela___________ 63 Cf. e.g. Wandt, VersR 1990, 1301 (1309); W. Lorenz, JZ 1985, 443 (444); Hohloch, Das Deliktsstatut (1984), p. 210 et seq. 64 BGH, NJW 2009, 1875.

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tionships – such as relationships under family law –, not to singular occurrences such as accidents, even if there exists in close connection to the accident a lasting relationship under family law.65

V. Behavioural and Game Rules in Sport 1. General One of the peculiarities of sport is that it is, to a large extent, characterized by extra-legal behavioural rules (provisions regulating games and competitions) which are, for the most part, set out by the relevant sporting organisations within the scope of their own autonomy. A further peculiarity of sport is that such extra-legal behavioural norms not only exist, but the submission of international sport to unified games rules demonstrates a high rate of international harmonization.66 This is certainly an advantage in the solving of questions of liability in international sporting accidents. The high rate of harmonization also helps to surmount the hurdle of the diversity which exists among the individual laws of liability67 and is caused by the nationality of state-imposed law due to the imposition of unified behavioural standards. Of course, the density of the regulations, as well as the extent of the internationalization of sporting regulations from sport to sport, is very diverse. Combative sports, such as football, ice hockey and boxing by their very nature contain a high level of regulatory density; equally, they contain – conditional upon international competitions – a high level of international harmonization. This is not the case with regard to parallel sports, such as skiing, cycling and golf. Insofar as the sport is a competitive one, the body of regulations will usually be relatively dense.68 If, on the other hand, it is performed only as a hobby during a person’s free time, there is usually not such a large, dense body of regulations. In the area of skiing, for example, there are the ten FIS rules. However, in mountaineering, there is no additional fixed body of regulations.69 Thus, the relevant national courts have the opportunity not only to interpret existing rules ___________ 65 For an extensive account of this line of argument, see Sieghörtner, Internationales Straßenverkehrsunfallrecht (2002), p. 392 et seq., although this deals with road traffic accidents – regarding the awarding of specific privileges under family law, e.g. § 1359 BGB, the family law statute remains applicable, see above at I. 2. 66 Cf. Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 17 Rom II-VO, margin no. 30: rules of conduct for leisure and sport (generally on federation level (Verbandsebene) are more harmonized internationally than the rules of the road. 67 For more on this topic, cf. above at I. 1. 68 Cf. e.g. the ISAF Racing Rules of Sailing for sailing regattas. 69 Burger, SpuRt 2007, 192, 194.

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and regulations differently, but to “fill in” any gaps in the regulations in a way which best suits their jurisdiction, meaning that these gaps are often “filled” differently from state to state.70 International harmonization by the imposition of federation rules can, therefore, be limited at this stage.

2. The Legal Nature of Behavioural Regulations and Game Rules Concerning the Practice of Sports a) Norms laid down by the Legislator While behavioural standards enacted by federations have the fore in the area of sport, it must be noted that this area is also subject to state-imposed law, which aims at guaranteeing the safety of the athletes and all involved in the sport. One example of this is the Italian Ministerial Order No. 550 of 20.7.1994, which regulates waterskiing on inland bodies of water, and which became relevant in the aforementioned judgment of the Federal Court of Justice.71 Such legal norms must, of course, be adverted to, and would take precedence over regulations put in place by federations.72

b) Regulations put in Place by Federations The matter of whether bodies of regulations imposed by sporting federations within the area of their autonomy are really to be regarded as purely extra-legal, or whether they can be awarded the quality of legal norm, has long been discussed.

aa) Customary Practice? The FIS rules are generally accepted as a type of customary law.73 However, no detailed debate as to the requirements for defining a certain practice as customary law is to be found in the relevant jurisprudence.74 Customary law requires that a practice has been employed for a prolonged period of time and in a ___________ 70

On issues of interpretation and the filling in of gaps in the FIS-rules, see above fn. 2. BGH, NJW 2009, 1875. 72 Cf. OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 1997, 193. 73 OLG Hamm, NJW-RR 01, 1537; OLG Brandenburg, NJW-RR 2006, 1458; Dambeck, DAR 1993, 132; Pichler, ZVR 1991, 353, 355 on the most important rules of conduct in practice. 74 For an extensive account, see Pichler, ZVR 1991, 353, 355. 71

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uniform way, and that those affected by it regard the practice as legally binding, as opposed to optional and non-binding. In addition, there should be sufficient precision attached to the practice so that concrete legal consequences may be imposed as a result of non-compliance.75 In actual fact, it is just as seldom the case that the rules specific to a type of sport are absolutely binding as it is that technical rules and bodies of regulations are.76 Even the FIS rules are not regarded as settled customary law.77 The prolonged use necessary for this is often impossible to prove, or can be proved only with great difficulty.78 The assertion that a corresponding legal obligation exists, and that legal consequences can arise from these rules seems doubtful to me. In addition, classification as customary law would not serve the interests of the FIS, as the rules could no longer be amended if this were the case.79 The option should, however, remain open to the FIS due to the sport-related knowledge which it has gathered.

bb) “Lex Sportiva”, “Lex Ludica” The term lex sportiva comprises the bodies of regulations enacted by international sporting federations.80 The term draws on the terminus of the lex mercatoria. This refers to the creation of rules in international trade; in particular, in common standard-form contracts, trade clauses and other customs of trade.81 As regards the rules which relate to the practice of sport, it would probably be more appropriate to refer to the “lex ludica”. In a world in which networks between people and businesses continue to flourish across the globe (“globalization”), the development of such international customs and practices – be they in the area of commercial traffic, sport, or elsewhere – is a natural and a correct progression, and it is tempting to characterize these customs and prac___________ 75

Larenz/Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts (9th edition 2004), § 3, margin no. 31 et seq., with further references. 76 Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 787; however, as far as European technical rules are concerned, the “new conception” referral technique should be mentioned, for an extensive account, see Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 759 et seqq., with further references; cf. e.g. also Münchener Kommentar/Wagner, § 823, margin no. 550, with further references: “the rules of play of sports associations are not binding law”. 77 OGH, ZVR 83, 15; Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253, 3254. 78 Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253, 3254. 79 Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253, 3254. 80 Schleiter, in: Vieweg (ed.), Facetten des Sportrechts, p. 231, 235; Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 757; cf. also Oschütz, Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 2005, p. 351 et seq.; Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, 2003, p. 628 et seqq. 81 Cf. e.g. Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 757.

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tices as legal norms and a form of “anational law”, thereby guaranteeing that they will be regarded as binding before courts of law. The persons affected would thus be guaranteed the return of the legal certainty which has been lost as a result of globalization. However, the prevailing opinion in scholarly articles rejects the proposition that the customs and practices known collectively as the lex mercatoria could be viewed as legally-binding norms. Rather, it has its roots in the positive law recognition of freedom of contract and private autonomy.82 The same is true of the lex sportiva. Schleiter83 in particular provided convincing and detailed proof that the lex sportiva cannot be regarded as an independent arrangement of norms. The international sporting federations (also) have no autonomy to legislate which could be regarded as justified by international law.84 This, of course, does not mean that their regulations are meaningless for participants in the sport which they regulate, nor can they be seen as meaningless for the courts. It does, however, mean that athletes and the courts are not expected to comply with these regulations in the same way that they are with statutes in a material sense. The relevance awarded by the law of conflicts to international bodies of regulations relating to sport in the event of an accident will be considered below.

3. The Meaning of the Lex Ludica within the Law of Conflicts The matter of what role the lex ludica should have in relation to international sporting accidents should be dealt with on two distinct levels. It must first be ascertained whether the applicable liability law is that of the place of the accident, or of another legal system.

a) Place of Accident as Applicable Law (Art. 4 Para. 1 Rome II Regulation) If the claims for compensation between the athletes are to be determined in accordance with the law of the place of the accident – which corresponds to the basic rule in Art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation – then the legal situation must be assessed in accordance with the generally recognized principles of the law of conflicts, just as the courts of any legal system would do.85 If there are fixed ___________ 82

Cf. inter alia Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 756, with further references. Schleiter (fn. 80), p. 231, 236 et seq.; Cf. also Oschütz (fn. 80), p. 351 et seq.; Adolphsen (fn. 80), p. 628 et seqq. 84 For an extensive account, see Schleiter (fn. 80), p. 231, 237 et seq. 85 E.g. Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (2006), p. 212 et seq. 83

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behavioural norms set out by the legislator in the state in which the accident occurred – such as, for example, the Italian Ministerial Order No. 550 of 20.7.1994, which regulates the operation of water skis on inland bodies of water – then these legal norms must, naturally, be adhered to. If, and insofar as there are no such legal rules, the courts can use the lex ludica as a basis for assessing the standards of behavior and care which must be adhered to in the practice of sport. Thus, German courts assess skiing accidents by reference to the FIS rules, even if the accidents are purely domestic and have no foreign element.86 The Austrian courts also employ the FIS rules in their decisions on skiing cases, even where there is no foreign element.87 As such behavioural sporting rules set out by federations do not have legal character, their employment by the courts is not justified by reference to any absolute binding effect. From a German perspective, a prerequisite for the observance of the rules is, in fact, that the rules can be legally acknowledged as such88, and that they are sufficiently established and widespread among athletes, that compliance with them guarantees the necessary coordination of behavior.89 Thus, it is decisive that there is a general belief that the relevant groups will abide by the rules.90

b) A Law Other than Place of Accident Law is the Applicable Law (Artt. 4 Para. 2, 3, 17 Rome II Regulation) aa) Normative Bases Art. 4 para. 2 and 3 Rome II Regulation offer the normative starting point in arriving at another liability law. This so-called loosening-up of the place of accident principle brings with it the problem of which sport-related behavioural and safety norms (in accordance with the lex loci accidentium) will continue to be relevant in cases in which the applicable law is that of a different legal system. In cases involving sporting accidents, where the connecting factor is the common habitual residence (in accordance with Art. 4 para. 2 Rome II Regulation), or, for example, an existing regulation imposed by a club (Art. 4 para. 3 ___________ 86 E.g. BGHZ 58, 40, 43 et seq.; BGH, NJW 1987, 1947, 1949; OLG München, SpuRt 1994, 35, 36; NJW-RR 2002, 1542, 1543. 87 OGH, ZVR 1983, 15, 16; OLG Innsbruck, VersR 1987, 294 with annotations by Klee; the same has also been assumed by LG Hildesheim, VersR 1994, 615 for Switzerland, although this is not expressly stated and, as a result, is probably correct. 88 Cf. Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 273; Eser, JZ 1978, 368, 372. 89 Cf. e.g. BGHZ 58, 40, 43 et seq.; BGH, NJW 87, 1947, 1949; OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 90, 111; OLG München, NJW-RR 2002, 1542, 1543; Münchener Kommentar/Wagner, § 823, margin no. 555. 90 Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253 et seq.

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Rome II Regulation), Art. 17 Rome II Regulation is of application.91 Pursuant to this provision, when assessing the liable party’s behaviour, regard must be had to the safety and behavioural rules which were applicable at the time of the event which gave rise to the claim and in the place in which it occurred, insofar as this is actually possible, and insofar as it is reasonable to do so. The notion that regard should be had to the usual behavioural norms applicable in the place in which the accident occurred was acknowledged even before the enactment of the Rome II Regulation.92 The wording of Art. 17 Rome II Regulation is, however, partially flawed and, ultimately, incomplete. For example, it is acknowledged that the provision applies equally to the injured party so that, in the assessment of contributory negligence in particular, the norm is of equal application.93

bb) Local Security and Behavioural Rules If Art. 17 Rome II Regulation applies to safety and behavioural rules, then the rules encompassed by the lex ludica can also be subsumed under this heading without further ado. It is actually of little consequence whether the rules are public or private law in nature, or whether they display the character of legal norms.94 To this extent, the formulation “in force” employed in Art. 17 Rome II Regulation is a somewhat unfortunate choice, as it can be used to refer to legal norms. The actual act of compliance is decisive and sufficient.95 The crucial aspect in deciding whether or not the lex ludica is to be observed, therefore, is not its stipulation by federations, nor is it the sport-specific expert knowledge possessed by these federations, but rather the compliance with its provisions by the athletes, and the routine which develops in their observance of these rules. To this extent, it is probably more accurate to speak of a “usus ludicus”. The same values which are of relevance in German substantive law are decisive. Even in ___________ 91

Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 17 Rom II-VO, margin no. 19. OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 1990, 111; for road traffic accidents cf. e.g. BGHZ 87, 95, 97; 90, 294, 298; 93, 214, 217 et seq.; 119, 137, 140; Hohloch, NZV 1988, 161, 164 et seq.; id., JuS 1980, 18, 23; Rothoeft/Rohe, NJW 1993, 974; Pfeiffer, NJW 1997, 1207 1215. 93 Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 17 Rom II-VO, margin no. 25, with further references. 94 v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 11; Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 58 – in margin no 176, he correctly states that it is significant that the FIS-rules are displayed on the ski slopes in Alpine countries. 95 Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 58; Seetzen, VersR 1970, 1, 3. 92

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that case, the extra-legal behavioural rules which are to be observed in sport attain a “legal relevance” in relation to the athletes, arising from their “abidance by these rules and their recognition of the behavioural system circumscribed therein as a binding arrangement of their reciprocal relationships in the area of ‘sport’.”96 In addition to this element of acknowledgement, however, there is also another type of element intended to protect the athlete; the sporting rule which is of relevance in each individual case must have the (at the very least subsidiary) aim of emphasizing the relevance of a certain type of behavior under the relevant liability law.97 Thus, it may not solely serve the aim of, for example, guaranteeing that the principle of equality is observed in competitions.98 There are some gradations which differentiate the individual provisions from one other, even within the bodies of regulations themselves. Thus, within golfing99, the binding rules of golf are distinguished from golfing etiquette. Failure to observe the latter, which is usually supplemented by special “ground rules”, is generally not punishable.100 However, even here, distinctions can be made and etiquette cannot be sweepingly rejected as being irrelevant to the decision as to who is liable. For instance, the etiquette-based instruction that one should play briskly101 should rarely give rise to problems in the area of liability law. However, the etiquette-based instruction to call “fore” as loudly as possible if another player could be injured by the golf ball could be regarded in a different manner. If there is a lex ludica available within a problematic area of sport, the actual harmonization which occurs naturally minimizes the scope of the application of Art. 17 Rome II Regulation. The sporting regulations which apply at the place where the accident occurs, and those of the applicable law, are, in this case, one and the same. However, it must once more be emphasized that the interpretation of the lex ludica in the states in question can differ.102 In this case, the prevailing interpretation of the relevant provision in the state in which the accident occurred should be given precedence (through Art. 17 Rome II Regulation, if

___________ 96

For an extensive account, see Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 270, with further references; cf. also Münchener Kommentar/Wagner, § 823, margin no. 555: FIS-rules are sufficiently well-known and common enough for their observance to guarantee a proper coordination of conduct. 97 Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 270. 98 Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 270. 99 It can be quite dangerous, for an extensive account, see Zuck, MDR 1990, 971 et seq.: “dangerous sport”. 100 Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 790. 101 Cf. Zuck, MDR 1990, 971. 102 See above at I.

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necessary).103 The same is true if the lex ludica contains loopholes. Otherwise, the possibility of applying Art. 17 Rome II Regulation remains in areas where there is no lex ludica (i.e. where no internationally-harmonised sporting rules exist).

cc) Adherence to the Sporting Rules of the Place where the Accident Occurs Pursuant to Art. 17 Rome II Regulation, the local safety and behavioural rules are to be “adhered to”. This choice of words is relevant from a dogmatic point of view, as the provision does not read “applies” or “are to be applied”. Thus, Art. 17 Rome II Regulation is not a “rule of conflict” (Kollisionsnorm) in the narrow sense of the term104, as, for instance, Art. 4 Rome II Regulation is. An old difference of opinion thus appears to have been clarified. The behavioural rules of the place where the accident occurred are not to be applied (by means of a special connecting factor) as legal norms.105 This would also give rise to problems in relation to the lex ludica, as it – as has already been mentioned – does not possess legal character. Art. 17 Rome II Regulation makes clear that the regulator does not regard the dogmatic method of special treatment as being a special connection (Sonderanknüpfung) to provisions relating to behaviour in the area of the law of conflicts, but rather searches on a substantive level; i.e. on the side of the legal consequences of conflict norms, possibly due to the date theory. According to this theory, which is generally regarded as the dogmatic basis of special treatment, the local behavioural rules, for example, lex ludica, are to be complied with, being regarded as facts existing at the place where the accident occurred (“local data” or “Sachverhaltselemente”106).107 In this way, sporting behavioural rules can be observed at the place where the accident occurs, solely due to the fact that they are seen as customary practice, without forcing the courts to address their legal character.

___________ 103

On the EGBGB and with regard to FIS-Rules cf. Staudinger/von Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, margin no. 176. 104 Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 17 Rom II-VO, margin no. 2, with further references; Leible/Lehmann, RIW 07, 721, 725. 105 Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 17 Rom II-VO, margin no. 2. 106 COM (2003) 427 final p. 28. 107 In my opinion, it is, however, more convincing if it is classified as a subset of substitution, cf. Münchener Kommentar/Sonnenberger, Introduction IPR, margin no. 608 et seq.

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dd) The Relationship between Sporting Rules at the Place where the Accident Occurs and the Applicable Law If there is no existing lex ludica in the problematic sport, but it is rather the case that the sporting rules in force at the place where the accident occurred – or their interpretation – diverge from the applicable law, then one must consider the relationship which exists between these rules. Art. 17 Rome II Regulation does not assist in suppressing the rules imposed by the applicable law in favour of the general application of the rules of the place where the accident occurs. This is as a result of the dictum of the “proper observance”.108 Thus, in the case of a road traffic accident, it is broadly acknowledged that in order to apply behavioural norms and safety provisions (such as the obligation to wear a seatbelt) which are not strictly territorial, and which diverge from the law of the place where the accident occurred, there is room for manoeuvre if (but only if) the provision is a lex domicilii communis and the parties to the accident (i.e. injured party and party incurring injury) were both in the same vehicle when the accident occurred.109 The rules in relation to the practice of sport generally suggest that there is no tie to the place where the sport is practiced – as is, for example, the case with road traffic signs – meaning that there is absolutely no possibility of applying those sporting rules which are usual in the state of common habitual residence. Furthermore, situations can occur in relation to sporting accidents which can be evaluated as being on a level with accidents which involve a passenger (Mitfahrerunfall). In legal academic articles, tobogganing and boating are two sports which are often mentioned in this category.110 In my opinion, however, there is no reason to confine the category by imposing the requirement of a common piece of sports equipment (as a parallel to a common motorised vehicle). The decisive matter in permitting recourse to the behavioural and safety norms usual in the place of common habitual residence in relation to an accident which involves a passenger is the existence of a corresponding mutual trust between the occupants of the vehicle in the application of these norms.111 The same would seem to apply to the practice of sports, even where, for example, a German sports club trains in a foreign training camp.112 If ___________ 108 However, this does not amount to a favourability principle (Günstigkeitsprinzip), which operates in such a way that the rules which favour the victim would, in general, be treated as decisive, Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 17 Rom II-VO, margin no. 26. 109 For an extensive account, see Sieghörtner (fn. 65), p. 443 et seq., with further references. 110 v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 10. 111 For an extensive account, see Sieghörtner (fn. 65), p. 443 et seq., with further references. 112 For a similar constellation, cf. Münchener Kommentar/Junker, Art. 17 Rom II-VO, margin no. 30.

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the athletes in this case keep to themselves while training, it appears selfevident that they will all be playing “under a bell jar” in accordance with the same rules (if these differ at all from the rules in use locally) as they would do at home. To assert anything else would make little sense, as the players are training for their games at home. The matter of the relationship between the sporting rules at the place where the accident occurs and the applicable law can, therefore, only be assessed “appropriately” if one takes the circumstances of the individual case into account.

ee) Negotiability of Observing the Sporting Rules of the Place where the Accident Occurs? One judgment of Traunstein Regional Court (Landgericht Traunstein)113 has given legal scholars the chance to elaborate on the matter of whether the observance of sporting rules which apply in the place where the accident occurs – regulated in Art. 17 Rome II Regulation – can be subject to negotiation by the parties. The facts of the case concerned a skiing accident in Canada between two German citizens who had travelled there together. Accordingly, the Regional Court applied German liability law in compliance with the principle of the lex domicilii communis. In relation to the question of culpability, however, it held that it did not need to determine the matter of whether the behavioural norms in existence in Canada deviate from the FIS rules. The court held that, according to the principle of party autonomy, it was open to the parties to declare that behavioural norms which deviated from the FIS rules were not to be observed, which they had in fact done in the proceedings. The court endeavoured to provide a dogmatic justification in the form of an “a maiore ad minus” argument, as under the provisions of the international conflict of tort laws, one may depart from the law of the place of accident if one selects another forum – nowadays, this is more precisely codified in Art. 14 Rome II Regulation. Ultimately, this result is doubtlessly the correct one. However, as has been conclusively proven by Hein114, the dogmatic route chosen by the Regional Court is not viable. As has already been elaborated upon, the observance of local behavioural rules is not a matter for the law of conflicts; therefore, a choice of law (see Art. 14 Rome II Regulation) is not an option. The matter is rather one of material law: thus the matter of whether the parties to a tortious relationship of obligation (deliktsrechtliches Schuldverhältnis) can be permitted to deviate from statute by means of private agreement is a question of material law. ___________ 113 114

LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20. v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 11 et seq.

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The German law of torts allows an agreement between the parties that they will proceed as though the FIS rules had applied, with no further requirements.

VI. Conclusion On the whole, the Rome II Regulation provides an appropriate framework within which justice can be done to the problems which arise from sporting accident with a foreign element, even if it does not contain provisions which are specifically tailored to sporting accidents. It also provides sufficient room to allow for the necessary observance of the lex ludica.

Contributors Burkhard Hess, Professor, Founding and Executive Director of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law, Luxembourg Janez Kocijančič, President of the Slovenian National Olympic Committee, Founding Member of HISLAC, Ljubljana/Slovenia Jacob Kornbeck, Administrator in the European Commission, DirectorateGeneral Education and Culture, Sport Unit, Brussels/Belgium Franck Latty, Professor, University of Clermont-Ferrand 1 (currently: University of Paris 13), France Alexandre Miguel Mestre, Secretary of State for Sports and Youth (currently: Attorney at Law, Lisbon/Portugal James A.R. Nafziger, Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law, Founding Member of HISLAC, Willamette (Oregon)/USA Robert Sieghörtner, Notary, Honorary Professor, University of ErlangenNuremberg, Erlangen/Germany Robert C.R. Siekmann, Professor, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Founding Member of HISLAC, Rotterdam/The Netherlands Paul Staschik, Research Assistant, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen/Germany Rudolf Streinz, Professor, University of Munich, Germany Klaus Vieweg, Professor, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Founding Member of HISLAC, Erlangen/Germany Andreas Wax, Attorney-at-Law, Stuttgart/Germany Andreas Zagklis, Attorney at Law (Greece), Associate at Martens Lawyers, Munich/Germany.

KLAUS VIEWEG (Hrsg.)

Lex Sportiva

Beiträge zum Sportrecht Herausgegeben von Kristian Kühl, Udo Steiner und Klaus Vieweg

Band 42

Lex Sportiva

Herausgegeben von Klaus Vieweg

Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

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In Erinnerung an meine Frau, Cornelia Maas-Vieweg, die diese Tagung in vielfältiger Weise unterstützt hat, nicht zuletzt als perfekte Gastgeberin im Biergarten in Bräuningshof

Vorwort Am 24./25. Juni 2011 fand in Erlangen die zwölfte Interuniversitäre Tagung Sportrecht statt, die zugleich die zweite Konferenz der Haager Akademie für Internationales Sportrecht (The Hague Academy for International Sports Law – HISLAC II) war. Hieraus resultiert die Besonderheit, dass nicht nur „junge Sportrechtler“, sondern auch renommierte in- und ausländische Experten aus Wissenschaft und Praxis als Referenten gewonnen werden konnten. Der vorliegende Band umfasst die in Erlangen gehaltenen Vorträge und wird durch einige Beiträge bereichert, die sich thematisch einfügen. Die meisten Beiträge haben einen inter- oder transnationalen Bezug und nehmen damit eine Eigenart des Sportrechts auf, die darin besteht, dass sich weltweit häufig ähnliche Probleme stellen und ein erhebliches Bedürfnis nach einheitlichen Regelungen und einer harmonisierten Praxis besteht. Der Titel „Lex Sportiva“ greift dies auf. Alle Beiträge sind in englischer Sprache veröffentlicht. Zusätzlich sind zahlreiche Beiträge in ihrer deutschen Originalfassung abgedruckt. Bei der redaktionellen Bearbeitung, den Übersetzungen und der Druckvorbereitung hat mich das Sportrechtsteam des Instituts für Recht und Technik mit der angeschlossenen Forschungsstelle für deutsches und internationales Sportrecht tatkräftig unterstützt. Ihm gebührt mein herzlicher Dank. Erlangen, im Juni 2014

Klaus Vieweg

Inhaltsverzeichnis Klaus Vieweg Begrüßung .........................................................................................................

11

Janez Kocijanþiþ Die Hague International Sports Law Academy .................................................

13

Klaus Vieweg und Paul Staschik Lex Sportiva. Phänomen und Bedeutung in der internationalen Sportwelt .......

17

Robert C.R. Siekmann Sportrecht, Lex Sportiva und Lex Ludica. Eine Neubewertung von Inhalt und Terminologie .....................................................................................................

59

Andreas Wax Sportvölkerrecht und Lex Sportiva ...................................................................

91

Andreas Zagklis Lex Sportiva – von der Theorie zur Praxis: Was man von der Rechtsprechung des Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) und des Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT) lernen kann ............................................................................................ 109 Rudolf Streinz Europarechtliche Grenzen der Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit. Sport ist kein europarechtsfreier Raum .............................................................................................. 121 Jacob Kornbeck Der erste EU-Beitrag zur Revision des World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) .... 143 Robert Sieghörtner Internationale Sportunfälle und Rom-II-Verordnung ........................................ 161 Autorenverzeichnis…………………………………………………………………. 185

Begrüßung Von Klaus Vieweg Liebe Freunde des Sportrechts, aus Anlass der 12. Interuniversitären Tagung Sportrecht möchte ich Sie ganz herzlich hier in Erlangen willkommen heißen. Üblicherweise finden die Interuniversitären Tagungen Sportrecht in der Weise statt, dass die Teilnehmer von verschiedenen deutschen Universitäten kommen. Dieses Jahr, 2011, ist ein besonderes Jahr, weil wir den 20. Geburtstag des Instituts für Recht und Technik (IRuT) feiern, das in der Welt des Sportrechts als das „Erlangen Institute“ bekannt ist. Deshalb erweitern wir den Kreis der Referenten und Teilnehmer und setzen zugleich eine Tradition fort, die im letzten Jahr in Djakarta begonnen hat, wo wir die Hague International Sports Law Academy (HISLAC) gegründet haben. Unser Kollege Janez Kocijanþiþ wird uns im Detail über die Djakarta Declaration on Lex Sportiva informieren, die am 22. September 2010 verabschiedet worden ist. Erlauben Sie mir einige Worte zur Historie der Interuniversitären Tagungen Sportrecht. Gegründet wurden sie von meinem Kollegen Burkhard Hess, der zu der Zeit einen Lehrstuhl an der Juristischen Fakultät in Tübingen innehatte. Das erste Seminar fand mit Studenten aus Tübingen und Basel im Jahre 2000 im legendären Deutschen Olympischen Institut am Kleinen Wannsee in Berlin statt. Burkhard Hess hatte mich als Teilnehmer eingeladen und wir hatten die Idee, an diesem wunderbaren Ort in jedem Jahr ein Seminar zu veranstalten. Im Folgejahr fand das Seminar mit Studenten und jungen Sportrechtlern von drei Universitäten (Tübingen, Köln und Erlangen) statt. Ich erinnere mich sehr gut daran, dass die drei Professoren (Burkhard Hess, Peter Tettinger und ich selbst) seinerzeit Dekane unserer Fakultäten waren und die Auszeit von diesen Positionen sehr genossen haben. Damals entwickelten wir die Idee, Doktoranden, „Frischpromovierte“ und renommierte Experten des Sportrechts zusammenzubringen, um fruchtbare Diskussionen zu ermöglichen. So waren in den Folgejahren u. a. Volker Röhricht und Walter Seitz sehr willkommene Teilnehmer. 2003 haben wir die Tagung mit einer Evaluation des Projekts „Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules“, das vom IRuT und dem Asser Institut in Den Haag für die Europäische Kommission durchgeführt wurde, kombiniert. Deshalb nahmen an der Tagung eine ganze Reihe von Experten

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Klaus Vieweg

aus Deutschland und dem Ausland teil, die großartige Beiträge in den Diskussionen mit den jungen Sportrechtlern lieferten. Die einmalige Tagungsatmosphäre am Kleinen Wannsee endete leider, als der Deutsche Sportbund sein Anwesen verkaufen musste. Wir entschieden uns dann, den Veranstaltungsort jedes Jahr zu wechseln. So fanden unsere weiteren Tagungen in Köln (2004), Heidelberg (2005), Erlangen (2006), Rauischholzhausen bei Gießen (2007), Schloss Thurnau (2008), Paderborn (2009) und Oberhaching (2010) statt. Bis jetzt haben wir die Vorträge von 67 Referenten in vier Tagungsbänden veröffentlicht: Spektrum des Sportrechts (2003), Perspektiven des Sportrechts (2005), Prisma des Sportrechts (2006) und Facetten des Sportrechts (2009). Das nächste Buch „Akzente des Sportrechts“ wird in Kürze erscheinen. Ich freue mich sehr darüber, dass unser Verleger, Dr. Florian Simon, uns des Öfteren die Ehre seiner Anwesenheit gegeben hat und dass er nun auch den Weg nach Erlangen – der Stadt seiner Jugend – gefunden hat. Die Beiträge der diesjährigen Tagung sollen in einem gesonderten Band mit dem Titel „Lex Sportiva“ erscheinen. Referieren werden nicht nur die jungen Sportrechtler, sondern in erster Linie die Sportrechtler, die – in den Worten von Bob Dylan – „forever young“ geblieben sind. So ist Burkhard Hess – der Gründer der Veranstaltung – einer unserer Referenten und er ist wieder einmal in Erlangen, wo er als Professor tätig war, bevor er den Tübinger Lehrstuhl übernahm. Leider konnten – aus verschiedenen Gründen – nicht alle Eingeladenen kommen. So ist Thomas Bach, der in der Nähe in Weisendorf lebende Vizepräsident des IOC, verhindert, nach Erlangen zu kommen, weil er als Präsident des DOSB an einer Konferenz in Frankfurt teilnehmen muss. Erfreulich ist, dass wir Teilnehmer aus 11 Ländern hier haben. Die Vorträge und Diskussionen werden in Englisch und Deutsch sein. Dasselbe gilt für die Handouts, die von den Mitarbeitern des IRuT übersetzt worden sind. Erlauben Sie mir abschließend einige organisatorische Hinweise: Um 17 Uhr treffen wir uns, um zum Fraunhofer Institut für Integrierte Schaltungen (IIS) zu fahren. Dort sehen wir eine Demonstration von Superzeitlupen und von 3DProjektionen. Das Fraunhofer Institut ist berühmt als Erfinder von MP3 und seine Führungsrolle bei verschiedenen technischen Entwicklungen. Nach dieser Präsentation werden wir dort zu Abend essen und anschließend nach Bräuningshof zu meiner Frau und mir in unseren häuslichen Biergarten fahren.

Die Hague International Sports Law Academy Von Janez Kocijanþiþ Die Idee, die Anlass zur Etablierung der Hague International Sports Academy (HISLAC) gab, wurzelt in mehreren Treffen einer Gruppe von Sportrechtlern – es sei mir erlaubt, die bekanntesten unter ihnen zu nennen: Prof. Dr. Robert Siekman, Prof. Dr. Klaus Vieweg, Prof. Dr. James Nafziger und meine Wenigkeit – auf internationalen Kongressen, Konferenzen und Sitzungen, auf denen wir verschiedenste Aspekte des Sportrechts auf nationaler wie internationaler Ebene diskutierten. Die Entscheidung, die wissenschaftliche Erforschung des internationalen Sportrechts und dessen Ausbreitung auf eine höhere Ebene zu heben, ist das Resultat vieler Diskussionen und gemeinsam geteilter Kritikpunkte. Schritt für Schritt gelangten wir zu der Erkenntnis, nicht nur „mit dem Strom schwimmen“ und unsere Rolle in der aktuellen Entwicklung nicht auf die eines Zuschauers beschränken zu dürfen. Stattdessen beschlossen wir die Gründung einer neuen Institution: der Hague International Sports Law Academy. Die Namengebung liegt darin begründet, dass Den Haag die Welthauptstadt des Rechts ist und unsere Vereinigung somit dorthin gehört, zumal insbesondere auch das berühmte Asser Institut in derselben Stadt angesiedelt ist. Wir müssen begreifen, dass der Sport ein äußerst bedeutsames Phänomen der modernen Gesellschaft darstellt. Dafür sind mehrere Gründe anzuführen: –

Er bestärkt einige menschliche Grundwerte; er begründet ein starkes Fundament für sportethische Werte und fördert den sozialen Zusammenhalt und die Solidarität. Er begünstigt das gesellschaftliche Wohlbefinden insgesamt – ich würde sogar sagen, dass er eines der konstitutiven Elemente der Demokratie ist.

–

Er bringt Menschen – insbesondere junge Menschen – zusammen, ungeachtet sozialer, religiöser, politischer, geschlechtsspezifischer oder anderer Unterschiede. Darüber hinaus hilft er ihnen, diese Unterschiede zu überwinden.

–

Er ist ein an Wichtigkeit zunehmender Wirtschaftsfaktor. In der Europäischen Union (so das Weißbuch Sport der EU-Kommission, Stand: 2006) macht Sport 3,7% des BIPs aus.

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Janez Kocijanþiþ

–

Er ist ein bedeutender Arbeitgeber: 5,4% aller europäischen Arbeitnehmer (d. h. 15 Millionen) sind im Bereich des Sports beschäftigt.

–

Er verringert allmählich die Kluft zwischen Industrie- und Entwicklungsbeziehungsweise Schwellenländern. Diese Grenze schwindet im Sport und gehört immer mehr der Vergangenheit an. Schauen Sie sich die außerordentlichen sportlichen Leistungen Chinas und einiger karibischer und afrikanischer Länder an. Auch die Wahl der zukünftigen Organisatoren Olympischer Spiele geht in diese Richtung: Die Olympischen Sommerspiele 2016 finden in Rio de Janeiro (Brasilien) statt, die nächsten Olympischen Winterspiele 2018 in Pyeongchang (Korea).

Sport ist dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip unterworfen und sollte dies auch sein. Das Sportrecht ist heute als wissenschaftliche Disziplin sowohl national als auch international anerkannt. Allerdings bestehen Widersprüche zwischen der (überwiegend) nationalen Regelungskompetenz im Bereich des Sports auf der einen und der globalen Natur des Sports auf der anderen Seite, die insbesondere im attraktiven, publikumswirksamen Breitensport von gigantischen und mächtigen internationalen Sportorganisationen dominiert wird. Um der Probleme Herr zu werden, die sich aus diesem Widerspruch ergeben, bilden sich immer mehr Regeln und Rechtsgrundsätze heraus, die in ihrem Kern international sind. In diesem Zusammenhang ist ein neues internationales Regelwerk im Entstehen, die „Lex sportiva“ – ein Begriff, für den es allerdings viele Definitionen und Interpretationen gibt. Das grundlegende theoretische Problem des Sportrechts besteht darin, den Begriff Sport zu definieren. Um zu einer solchen Definition zu kommen, müssen wir die besonderen Charakteristika des Sports betrachten, d. h. die typischen Merkmale, die – im Unterschied zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Substrukturen (wie der Kultur oder Wissenschaft) – sportspezifische Regeln hervorbringen, die also, mit anderen Worten, speziell für den Sport gelten oder sogar dessen totale oder partielle Immunität begründen und eine Vielzahl theoretischer und praktischer Rechtsprobleme mit sich bringen. Kurzum: Wir müssen der Frage nachgehen, welche Gründe für eine unterschiedliche (privilegierte) rechtliche Behandlung sportbezogener Probleme und Beziehungen bestehen. Sport ist ein Teil der zivilen Gesellschaft und sollte daher in weitem Umfang Autonomie genießen. Im Rahmen dieser Autonomie sollte es möglich sein, Fragen von grundlegender Bedeutung selbst zu regeln und als Folge daraus auch zahlreiche eigene, sportspezifische Regeln (z. B. Spielregeln, organisatorische Regeln, etc.) aufzustellen. Zusätzlich zum Prinzip der Spezifität muss auch der Autonomie des Sports besondere Beachtung geschenkt werden. Dieses Prinzip ist allerdings weniger

Die Hague Sports Law Academy

15

umstritten, was darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass es logischer erscheint und daher weitgehend akzeptiert ist, dass staatliche und politische Autoritäten nicht in die organisatorische Struktur des Sports eingreifen sollten. Die erste von der HISLAC organsierte Veranstaltung war die Lex Sportiva International Conference in Jakarta, Indonesien, am 22. September 2010. Dort unterzeichneten Prof. Dr. Robert Siekman, Prof. Dr. Bintan R. Saragih, Prof. Dr. Klaus Vieweg, Dr. Janez Kocijanþiþ, Prof. Dr. Franck Latty, Prof. Dr. James Nafziger, Hinca IP Pandjaitan und Alexandre Miguel Mestre eine besondere Erklärung (Erklärung zur Lex Sportiva). Im Rahmen der Konferenz wurden mannigfaltige Aspekte der Lex sportiva diskutiert. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit galt den asiatischen Erfahrungen in diesem Bereich. Die zweite bedeutsame Veranstaltung der HISLAC fand gemeinsam mit der 12. Interuniversitären Tagung Sportrecht am 24. und 25. Juni 2011in Erlangen statt und wurde vom Institut für Recht und Technik organisiert. Anlässlich der Tagung referierten viele Sportrechtsexperten aus dem Ausland, es nahmen aber auch zahlreiche angesehene deutsche Sportrechtler teil. Das Thema der Tagung war die weitere wissenschaftliche Analyse und Diskussion der Lex sportiva sowohl auf nationaler (deutscher) als auch auf internationaler Ebene. Es gab viele wichtige Beiträge z. B. zu Inhalt und Terminologie des Sportrechts, zu seiner privaten und öffentlichen Dimension, zur Lex olympica (ein auf die internationale Olympische Bewegung und die Olympischen Spiele bezogenes Regelwerk), zu internationalen Sportunfällen, zu europäischen Rechtsvorschriften im Bereich des Sports etc. Daneben galt wie immer der Dopingproblematik besondere Beachtung. Mit diesen ersten beiden Veranstaltungen nahm die erst seit kurzem bestehende Hague International Sports Law Academy ihre Arbeit auf und hat meines Wisens bereits viel (wissenschaftliche) Beachtung gefunden. Die Akademie hatte nie die Absicht, eine Institution zu gründen und zu betreiben, die zu den vielen anderen, die bereits im Bereich des internationalen Sportrechts existieren, parallel agiert. Auch wollen ihre Gründer in keiner Weise mit anderen Organisationen in diesem Bereich konkurrieren. Das Ziel der HISLAC ist es nicht, den Wettbewerb anzufachen oder die Quantität der Veranstaltungen zu erhöhen, sondern sie konzentriert ihre Bemühungen und ihre Energie darauf, die Qualität der Wissenschaft im Bereich des Sportrechts zu verbessern.

Lex Sportiva Phänomen und Bedeutung in der internationalen Sportwelt Von Klaus Vieweg und Paul Staschik Einleitung ..........................................................................................................

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II. Definition und Quellen der lex sportiva ............................................................

21

I.

1.

Definition ..................................................................................................

21

Quellen ......................................................................................................

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a)

Verbandssatzungen und -regelwerke..................................................

25

b)

Allgemeine und sportspezifische Rechtsgrundsätze ...........................

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III. Lex mercatoria, lex informatica und lex technica .............................................

34

2.

1.

Lex mercatoria ...........................................................................................

34

2.

Lex informatica (lex digitalis) ...................................................................

35

3.

Lex technica ..............................................................................................

36

IV. Lex sportiva als autonomes Recht? ...................................................................

36

1.

Originäre Rechtsetzungsautonomie ...........................................................

37

2.

Staatliche Gewährleistung eines autonomen Sportrechts...........................

39

3.

Geltung der lex sportiva gegenüber den Athleten ......................................

40

a)

Korporationsrechtliche Variante ........................................................

40

b) 4.

Rechtsgeschäftliche Variante .............................................................

41

Grenzen der Autonomie.............................................................................

41

a)

Europäisches Recht ............................................................................

41

b)

Nationales Recht ................................................................................

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V. Lex sportiva und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit ...........................................................

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1.

Sportschiedsgerichte, insbes. der CAS ......................................................

44

2.

Lex sportiva als Entscheidungsgrundlage für den CAS? ...........................

45

a)

45

Ungleichgewicht zwischen Verband und Sportler .............................

b)

Lückenhaftigkeit der lex sportiva .......................................................

47

c)

Rechtswahlvereinbarung bzgl. der lex sportiva ..................................

48

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Klaus Vieweg und Paul Staschik 3.

Anerkennung der Entscheidungen des CAS durch die nationalen Rechtsordnungen ..................................................................................................

49

4.

Durchsetzung der CAS-Entscheidungen....................................................

54

5.

Einstweiliger Rechtsschutz ........................................................................

54

VI. Lex sportiva und nationale Gerichte .................................................................

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1.

Rechtswahl der lex sportiva? .....................................................................

56

2.

Berücksichtigung bei Anwendung und Auslegung des staatlichen Rechts

56

VII. Zusammenfassung.............................................................................................

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I. Einleitung In der juristischen Literatur ist immer häufiger von der lex sportiva die Rede. Was genau macht aber die Magie aus, die sich hinter diesen Wörtern verbirgt? – Der Bereich des Sports ist in der Neuzeit aus verschiedenen Gründen zunehmend konfliktträchtiger geworden. Hierzu sind unter anderem die Kommerzialisierung und die Professionalisierung des Sports sowie die wachsende Medienberichterstattung zu zählen.1 Diese Entwicklungen finden sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf internationaler Ebene statt. Ausdruck der Konfliktträchtigkeit sind unter anderem die Vielzahl an Regeln und Regelwerken, die von nationalen und internationalen Sportverbänden aufgestellt werden, die zunehmende Kodifizierung durch (über-)staatliche Gesetzgebung sowie die sprunghaft wachsende Zahl an Entscheidungen von Sportverbandsgerichten, Schiedsgerichten, staatlichen Gerichten und des EuGH. Dabei hat die Internationalisierung des Sports eine spezielle Problematik – ein Spannungsfeld – hervorgerufen: Die Vielgestaltigkeit der rechtlichen Konfliktlösungsmechanismen auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene einerseits und die Chancengleichheit als eines der wichtigsten Sportprinzipien andererseits können miteinander in Konflikt geraten. Aufgrund der internationalen Natur des Sports sind nicht nur die Gerichte eines Staates für Entscheidungen sportbezogener Streitigkeiten zuständig. Vielmehr können, abhängig von den Umständen des Einzelfalls – z. B. Nationalität oder Wohnsitz des Sportlers – Gerichte unterschiedlicher Staaten zu ___________ 1 Kane, Twenty Years On: An Evaluation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 2006, S. 455. Die Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit der ca. 1.000 Sportverbände in Deutschland hat immense Bedeutung. Etwa 450.000 bis 850.000 Streitverfahren werden jährlich vor den ca. 800 Sportgerichten anhängig gemacht. Davon entfallen allein 340.000 auf den Fußball. Vgl. Steiner, Autonomie des Sports, in: Tettinger/Vieweg (Hrsg.), Gegenwartsfragen des Sportrechts, 2004, S. 222 (S. 227); Hilpert, BayVBl 1988, 161.

Lex Sportiva – Phänomen und Bedeutung

19

ständig sein. Das anwendbare nationale Sachrecht, welches in Übereinstimmung mit den relevanten nationalen Kollisionsregeln bestimmt wird, kann – selbst wenn ein- und dieselbe Rechtsfrage geprüft wird – dabei variieren.2 Folge hiervon ist, dass auf vergleichbare Sachverhalte (bspw. in Dopingfällen) verschiedene nationale Rechtsordnungen Anwendung finden. Wie sich in der Vergangenheit bereits gezeigt hat, kann die Tatsache, dass die einzelnen nationalen Rechtsordnungen divergierende Maßstäbe anlegen und infolgedessen unterschiedlichen Einfluss auf das Sportrecht haben, zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen führen. Von Bedeutung ist zudem, dass sich das Maß der den Sportverbänden gewährten Autonomie und die Kontrolldichte bezüglich der Sportverbandsregeln und -entscheidungen in den einzelnen Staaten – weltweit mehr als 200 – unterscheidet. Darüber hinaus muss beachtet werden, dass viele dieser Staaten zu unterschiedlichen Rechtskulturen und -traditionen gehören. Besonderer Bedeutung kommt dabei der Unterscheidung zwischen Common law und Civil law zu. Diese Umstände führen zu Ungleichheit und Rechtsunsicherheit bei der Überprüfung von Entscheidungen der Sportverbände.3 Die Globalisierung des Sports birgt so die Gefahr einer Rechtszersplitterung.4 Aber gerade für den Sport, in dem der Grundsatz der Chancengleichheit herausragende Bedeutung besitzt, ist dies nicht hinnehmbar.5 Da die rechtlichen Probleme in diesem Bereich weltweit Großteils die gleichen sind, sollten sie auch gleich behandelt werden. Bedingung dafür ist, dass für den gesamten Sport ein einheitliches Recht gilt. Dies führt zu der zentralen Frage, ob der Sport selbst ein einheitliches Sportrecht autonom erschaffen kann. In diesem Zusammenhang wird zunehmend auf die lex sportiva als Allheilmittel verwiesen. Durch die lex sportiva soll eine als zufällig empfundene Nationalisierung international gleicher Sachverhalte im internationalen Sport verhindert werden.6 Die lex sportiva wird mitunter als Grundlage für Entscheidungen genannt oder in rechtlichen Ausführungen erwähnt, obwohl unklar bleibt, was die Ent___________ 2

Adolphsen, Eine lex sportiva für den internationalen Sport?, in: Witt u.a. (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler e.V. 2002, S. 281 (S. 284); Hess, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines autonomen Sportrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des internationalen Spitzensports, in: Juristische Studiengesellschaft Karlsruhe (Hrsg.), Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, 1999, S. 1 (S. 34 ff., 39). 3 Schleiter, Globalisierung im Sport – Realisierungswege einer harmonisierten internationalen Sportrechtsordnung, in: Haas u.a. (Hrsg.), Schriftenreihe Causa Sport (Band 2), 2009, S. 45 ff. 4 Adolphsen, Vereinbartes Recht am Beispiel der lex sportiva, in: Bumke/Röthel (Hrsg.), Privates Recht, 2012, S. 93 (S. 95 f.). Wax, Internationales Sportrecht – Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts, 2009, S. 132 ff. 5 Vgl. auch Wax (Fn. 4), S. 135. 6 Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 286).

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Klaus Vieweg und Paul Staschik

scheidungsträger oder das Schrifttum tatsächlich unter lex sportiva verstehen. Auch der CAS (Court of Abritration for Sports) selbst hat in dieser Frage noch keine einheitliche Linie gefunden und in einer Entscheidung7 die Anwendung einer lex sportiva mit der Begründung ausdrücklich abgelehnt, es handele sich um ein unsicheres Konzept, dessen Inhalt und Reichweite derzeit noch zu vage seien. In anderen Entscheidungen8 hat er das Konzept der lex sportiva hingegen anerkannt und bspw. angenommen, dass sogar eine Verbandsstrafe allein auf Grundsätze der lex sportiva gestützt werden könne.9 Die kritisierte Vagheit beruht darauf, dass mehrere grundlegende Fragen nicht beantwortet sind: –

Was genau ist die lex sportiva?

–

Welche Bereiche deckt sie ab?

–

Auf wen findet die lex sportiva Anwendung?

–

Welche Quellen hat die lex sportiva?

–

Gibt es mit der lex sportiva vergleichbare Phänomene?

–

Welche Rolle spielt die lex sportiva in den Entscheidungen der Schiedsgerichte, insbesondere des CAS?

–

Können Entscheidungen, die auf der lex sportiva basieren, von staatlichen oder europäischen Gerichten aufgehoben werden oder sind sie endgültig und bindend?

–

Wie ist das Verhältnis zwischen der lex sportiva und staatlichem sowie europäischem Recht?

Zusammenfassend ist zu fragen: Ist die lex sportiva ein allgemein anerkanntes Konzept oder existieren unterschiedliche Interpretationen dieses Begriffs? Ist sie wirklich ein brauchbares Instrument oder lediglich ein Wunsch, eine Hoffnung, ein Phantom, ein Traum? Ist sie wirklich ein Allheilmittel, dass sämtliche im Sport auftretenden rechtlichen Probleme lösen kann? Diese Fragen lassen sich in ihrer Vielfalt im Rahmen dieses Beitrags kaum beantworten. Deswegen sollen hier nur einige Voraussetzungen behandelt wer___________ 7

FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, Rn. 124. FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, Rn. 16; COC & Scott v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, Rn. 14; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (75); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (102 f.). Ausdrücklich Bezug genommen wird auf die lex sportiva auch in I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, Rn. 75, wonach als allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz anerkannt sei, dass Sportverbände grundsätzlich in ihren offiziellen Sprachen kommunizieren könnten und nicht die Sprache des Athleten verwenden müssten. 9 In seiner Entscheidung Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, Rn. 65 hat der CAS explizit nicht ausgeschlossen, dass anerkannte Prinzipen der lex sportiva eine Rechtsgrundlage für Sanktionen gegen Athleten und Vereine darstellen könnten. 8

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21

den, die gegeben sein müssen, wenn die lex sportiva die mit ihr verbundenen Erwartungen erfüllen soll. Zunächst muss Klarheit darüber geschaffen werden, wie die lex sportiva im Einzelnen zu definieren ist und welche Quellen sie hat. Bereits über diese elementaren Fragen besteht aber keine Einigkeit, so dass ein Überblick über den Meinungsstand hilfreich ist (dazu II.). In diesem Zusammenhang bietet es sich an, einen Vergleich mit den verwandten Begriffen lex mercatoria, lex informatica und lex technica zu ziehen (III.). Die lex sportiva kann nur dann zur Lösung des dargestellten Problems beitragen, wenn ihre dogmatische Einordnung geklärt ist (IV.) und die Frage beantwortet wird, ob sie für die über Sportstreitigkeiten entscheidenden Institutionen verbindliche Geltung beanspruchen kann. Hierbei ist zu unterscheiden zwischen der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (V.), die in der Praxis im Vordergrund steht, und den staatlichen Gerichten (VI.), die unter Umständen das ganze vom Sport geschaffene System zum Einsturz bringen können.

II. Definition und Quellen der lex sportiva 1. Definition Unklarheit herrscht bereits darüber, was eigentlich unter dem Begriff lex sportiva zu verstehen ist.10 Die lex sportiva könnte sowohl das gesamte von den Sportverbänden geschaffene Regelwerk als auch die Schiedssprüche des CAS oder sogar das staatliche Sportrecht umfassen. Häufig werden dabei die Wirkungen der lex sportiva verfrüht mit einbezogen und als Teil der Definition verstanden. Zwischen dem Begriff selbst und der rechtlichen Wirkung der lex sportiva ist jedoch sauber zu trennen.11 Exemplarisch werden im Folgenden einige Auffassungen referiert, um das Spektrum der Diskussion aufzuzeigen. Allan Erbsen hält den Ausdruck lex sportiva aufgrund der Begriffsschwierigkeiten insgesamt für verfehlt.12 Nach seiner Ansicht kann das Konzept der lex sportiva die Rechtsprechung des CAS weder ausreichend beschreiben noch ___________ 10 Vgl. Foster, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 20 f.; ders., Lex Sportiva: Transnational Law in Action, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 235 (S. 238 ff.); Xiang, Lex Sportiva from Legal Pluralism Perspective, in: The Publication Committee of Festschrift für Professor Dr. Kee-Young YEUN on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday (eds.), New Prospects of Sports Law, 2013, S. 337 ff. 11 Ebenso Latty, La lex sportiva: Recherche sur le droit transnational, 2007, S. 37 ff. 12 Erbsen, The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 2006, S. 441 (S. 444 f.); ders., The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 91 (S. 95 ff.).

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rechtfertigen. Zudem gebe es nicht nur ein Recht oder Regelwerk, das den Sport regele, sondern mehrere verschiedene Rechtsquellen, auf die der CAS zurückgreifen könne. Anstatt eine, wie auch immer geartete, lex sportiva zu entwickeln, berücksichtige der CAS vielmehr vier unterschiedliche Prinzipien, um eine Streitigkeit zu entscheiden.13 Erstens wende er im Regelfall ohne Weiteres die offiziellen Regelwerke an, sofern diese Normen enthielten, die den zu entscheidenden Sachverhalt eindeutig regelten. Zweitens setze sich der CAS ganz ausnahmsweise über eindeutige Verbandssatzungen und -regelwerke hinweg, wenn diese gegen Kernvorstellungen von Gerechtigkeit und Gleichbehandlung verstießen. Drittens versuche der CAS, einschlägige, aber unklare Verbandsregelungen anhand der Grundprinzipien des Vertragsrechts auszulegen. Und viertens schaffe der CAS Gewohnheitsrecht, um Lücken in den Verbandsregelungen zu schließen, wenn diese den Sachverhalt nicht befriedigend zu lösen vermögen. Ken Foster hält den Begriff lex sportiva ebenfalls für unpräzise14 und differenziert zwischen vier Arten von Regeln, die auf den Sport anwendbar sind:15 Spielregeln (lex ludica: rules of the game) seien die technischen Regeln des Spiels, die von den internationalen Sportverbänden geschaffen würden und für die Ausübung des Sports unverzichtbar seien. Diese seien unanfechtbar. Die ethischen Prinzipien des Sports (ethical principles of sport) seien Ausfluss der Fairness und des Anstands. Diese könnten vor Gericht eine Rolle spielen, wenn eine Verbandsentscheidung angefochten werde. Sie seien für jede Sportart aber spezifisch zu bestimmen. Unter das internationale Sportrecht (international sports law) seien die allgemeinen Rechtsprinzipien zu fassen, die auch auf den Sport anwendbar, aber gerade nicht sportspezifisch seien, z. B. der Grundsatz des fairen Verfahrens oder der Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör. Häufig werde der Begriff lex sportiva in diesem Sinne verwendet. Unter globalem Sportrecht (global sports law) seien die sportspezifischen Rechtsprinzipien zu verstehen, die sich aus den Verbandssatzungen und -regelwerken ergäben und gerade für den Sport charakteristisch und einzigartig seien. James Nafziger fasst unter lex sportiva allein die Schiedsentscheidungen des CAS und geht der Frage nach, ob diese als Präzedenzfälle eine Art Rechtsord___________ 13

Erbsen (Fn. 12), S. 441 f. Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984– 2004, 2006, S. 420 (S. 421); ders., Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 123 (S. 125). 15 Vgl. Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 35 (S. 38 ff.). Inzwischen erkennt aber wohl auch Foster den Begriff lex sportiva an, ders. (Fn. 10), S. 235 ff. 14

Lex Sportiva – Phänomen und Bedeutung

23

nung (lex specialis) bilden, die für spätere Schiedssprüche verbindlich ist.16 Die Entwicklung der lex sportiva verfolgt seiner Ansicht nach drei Ziele: die Effizienz des Rechtswegs, die Vorhersehbarkeit der Entscheidungen sowie die Gleichbehandlung vergleichbarer Situationen. Er streicht die Vorteile dieser Entwicklung heraus, betrachtet aber kritisch, dass das Verfahren vor dem CAS dadurch immer formeller werde, so dass einige Vorzüge des Schiedsgerichtsverfahrens wie Vertraulichkeit, geringe Kosten, schnelle Entscheidungen und Flexibilität verloren gingen. Der CAS solle deswegen die lex sportiva nur behutsam weiterentwickeln. Dimitrios P. Panagiotopoulos versteht unter lex sportiva eine Rechtsordnung, die sowohl das staatliche Recht im Bereich des Sports als auch das nichtstaatliche, von den nationalen und internationalen Sportverbänden geschaffene Recht umfasst.17 Der Schwerpunkt liege dabei auf dem nichtstaatlichen Recht, das für sich beanspruche, innerhalb der nationalen Sportrechtsordnungen unmittelbar und vorrangig angewendet zu werden und das im Bereich des Sports das Recht schlechthin darstelle. Er verneint einen völkerrechtlichen Charakter der lex sportiva und betont, dass das nichtstaatliche, private Recht nicht automatisch und unmittelbar Geltung beanspruche, sondern von staatlichem Recht anerkennt werden müsse. Dies geschehe durch Einräumung von Autonomie für die Sportverbände, insbes. in Bereichen, die spezifische Fragen des Sports beträfen. Soweit diese Autonomie reiche, enthalte die lex sportiva spezielle Regeln, die das allgemeine staatliche Recht nach dem Grundsatz lex specialis derogat legi generali verdrängten.18 Robert C.R. Siekmann weist darauf hin, dass jeweils auf nationaler, regionaler und internationaler Ebene zwischen öffentlichem Sportrecht und privatem Sportrecht unterschieden werden müsse.19 Das öffentliche Sportrecht umfasse alle staatlichen, unionsrechtlichen und zwischenstaatlichen Regeln, die auf den Sport Anwendung fänden, wohingegen das private Sportrecht die selbstgesetzten Regeln des organisierten Sports erfasse. Im Gegensatz zu dem allgemein angenommenen Begriffsverständnis möchte er den Begriff lex sportiva als Beschreibung für das öffentliche Sportrecht und den Begriff lex ludica für das private Sportrecht verwenden.20 ___________ 16 Nafziger, ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3 ff.; ders., Lex Sportiva, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 53 ff. 17 Panagiotopoulos, Sports Law – Lex Sportiva and Lex Olympica, 2011, S. 105. 18 Panagiotopoulos, ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 7: 1–2, 2007, 1 (4); ders., ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 5: 3, 2004, 316 (321). 19 Siekmann, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 3 (8 ff.); ders., What is Sports Law? A Reassessment of Content and Terminology, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 359 (S. 375 ff.). 20 Siekmann, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 3 (10 ff.); ders. (Fn. 19), S. 359 (S. 378 ff.).

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Vorzugswürdig erscheint ein umfassendes Begriffsverständnis, mit dem das Phänomen der Selbstregulierung im Sport vollständig erfasst wird. Es geht um die rechtlichen Regeln, die die beteiligten Akteure des Sports selbst aufstellen, um unabhängig von der Nationalität und sonstigen Umständen weltweit ein einheitliches, von den Staaten gelöstes Sportrecht zu schaffen – dieses Begriffsverständnis wird auch den folgenden Ausführungen zugrunde gelegt. Unter dem Begriff lex sportiva werden deshalb zum einen die gesamten selbstgesetzten, nichtstaatlichen Normen des Sports verstanden, also die von den nationalen und internationalen Sportverbänden geschaffenen Regeln in ihrer Gesamtheit. Zum anderen werden die sich aus den Schiedssprüchen des CAS ergebenden allgemeinen Sportrechtsprinzipien einbezogen.21 Das staatliche und zwischenstaatliche Sportrecht bleibt ausgeklammert, hat jedoch Bedeutung für die Frage, inwiefern die lex sportiva von den staatlichen Rechtsordnungen anerkannt wird. Mit dieser Begriffsbestimmung wird bewusst noch keine Aussage darüber getroffen, ob und ggf. welche rechtlichen Funktionen und Wirkungen der lex sportiva zukommen.

2. Quellen Quellen der lex sportiva bilden somit sowohl die Verbandssatzungen und -regelwerke als auch zunehmend die vom CAS (vor allem in Dopingstreitigkeiten) herausgearbeiteten allgemeinen und sportspezifischen Rechtsprinzipien.22 Der CAS hat ausdrücklich festgestellt, dass er bei einer Lücke in den Verbandsregelwerken zur Entscheidungsfindung auf seine eigene frühere Rechtsprechung zurückgreift, auch wenn dieser keine rechtliche Bindungswirkung zukommt.23 ___________ 21 Auch Wax versteht unter lex sportiva sowohl die Verbandssatzungen und -regelungen als auch die Schiedssprüche des CAS, Wax (Fn. 4), S. 178 ff. Ebenso Casini, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 21 (22); ders., The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 149 (S. 151 f.); Latty (Fn. 11), S. 41 ff.; Ipsen, Private Normenordnungen als Transnationales Recht?, 2009, S. 136 f.; Schleiter, Die lex sportiva – Ein autonomer Begründungsansatz zur internationalen Rechtsharmonisierung im Sport?, in: Vieweg (Hrsg.), Facetten des Sportrechts, 2009, S. 231 (S. 235). Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann verstehen unter lex sportiva hingegen allein die allgemeinen, sportartübergreifenden Rechtsgrundsätze des Sports, die durch den CAS herausgearbeitet werden, dies., Selbsregulierung im Privatrecht, 2010, S. 85. 22 Vgl. AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (102 f.); Nafziger, WLR Vol. 42 (2006), 861 (876); Kane (Fn. 1), S. 455 (S. 466 ff.); Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 42). 23 D’Arcy v. AOC, CAS 2008/A/1574, Rn. 33; Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/ 1545, Rn. 55; E. v. Diyarbakirspor Kulübü, CAS 2008/A/1447, Rn. 26. Vgl. Blackshaw, Sport, Mediation and Arbitration, 2009, S. 179.

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a) Verbandssatzungen und -regelwerke Im Mittelpunkt der lex sportiva stehen die Satzungen und Regelwerke der Sportverbände. Grundsätzlich kann zwar jeder Verband autonom sein eigenes Regelwerk erlassen, im internationalen Sport gelten aber aufgrund des pyramidenförmigen Verbandsaufbaus und des Ein-Platz-Prinzips24 einheitliche Regeln. Die nationalen und regionalen Verbände sind dadurch gezwungen, die Regeln der internationalen Verbände zu übernehmen. Somit kommen innerhalb einer Sportart international grundsätzlich die gleichen Regeln zur Anwendung.

b) Allgemeine und sportspezifische Rechtsgrundsätze Zu den vom CAS herausgearbeiteten allgemeinen und sportspezifischen Rechtsgrundsätzen, aus denen sich die lex sportiva speist und die unabhängig von einer Verankerung in den Sportverbandsregelungen Geltung beanspruchen, zählen unter anderem:25 Unanfechtbarkeit der Tatsachenentscheidungen eines Schiedsrichters:26

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Schiedsrichterentscheidungen können nur ganz ausnahmsweise angefochten werden, etwa wenn es um willkürliche Entscheidungen, Fehlentscheidungen wegen mangelhaften technischen Geräts oder um die Entscheidungszuständigkeit geht.27

___________ 24

Vgl. Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht, 2. Aufl. 2010, S. 4 f., abrufbar unter http:// www.irut.de/Forschung/Veroeffentlichungen/OnlineVersionFaszinationSportrecht/Faszina tionSportrecht.pdf; ders. Normsetzung und -anwendung deutscher und internationaler Verbände, 1990, S. 61 ff.; Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, 2003, S. 42 f. 25 Vgl. auch Nafziger, ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3 (5 f.); Kane (Fn. 1), S. 455; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 42); Blackshaw (Fn. 23), S. 184. 26 SNOC & STF v. ITU, CAS OG 12/10, Rn. 7.1 ff.; BOC u.a. v. WTF u.a., CAS 2012/ A/2731, Rn. 104; FSA & Saarinen v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2090, Rn. 7.17; de Lima & BOC v. IAAF, CAS 2004/A/727, Rn. 9 f.; Y. v. FIG, CAS 2004/A/704; S. v. IAAF, CAS OG 2000/013, Digest II, 680; M. v. AIBA, CAS OG 1996/006, Digest I, 413; vgl. zum Ganzen Vieweg, Tatsachenentscheidungen im Sport – Konzeption und Korrektur, in: Krähe/Vieweg (Hrsg.), Schiedsrichter und Wettkampfrichter im Sport, 2008, S. 53 ff.; ders., Fairness und Sportregeln – Zur Problematik sog. Tatsachenentscheidungen im Sport, in: Crezelius/Hirte/Vieweg (Hrsg.), Festschrift für Volker Röhricht, 2005, S. 1255 ff.; Hilpert, Die Fehlentscheidungen der Fußballschiedsrichter, 2010, passim. 27 Vgl. SNOC & STF v. ITU, CAS OG 12/10, Rn. 7.1; BOC u.a. v. WTF u.a., CAS 2012/A/2731, Rn. 108; FSA & Saarinen v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2090, Rn. 7.17; de Lima & BOC v. IAAF, CAS 2004/A/727, Rn. 9 f.; KOC v. ISU, CAS OG 2002/007, Digest III, 611; N. v. IRF, CAS OG 2000/012, Digest II, 674; M. v. AIBA, CAS OG 1996/006, Digest I, 413 (415).

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Autonomie der Verbände28 und Vorrangstellung der internationalen Sportverbände.29

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Grundsatz des „fair play“ (Fairness-Prinzip):30 Der CAS hat bspw. entschieden, dass es der Grundsatz des „fair play“ gebietet, dass internationale Sportverbände in ihrem Regelwerk ein Beschwerdeverfahren für sofortige Reklamationen von Athleten und sonst betroffenen Parteien bezüglich der fehlerhaften Regelanwendung durch Offizielle vorsehen müssen.31

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Prinzip der Gesetzmäßigkeit (Normhierarchie): Dieses besagt, dass Verbandsregeln mit höherrangigen Gesetzes- und Verbandsnormen, etwa der Satzung, vereinbar sein müssen.32

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Grundsatz, dass Verbandsregeln keine rückwirkende Wirkung haben dürfen.33

___________ 28

Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, Rn. 114; IAAF v. ARAF & Yegorova u.a., CAS 2008/A/1718–1724, Rn. 61; Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, Rn. 41; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, Rn. 49; AOC, CAS OG 2000/C/267, Digest II, 725 (742); FIN v. FINA, CAS 1996/157, Digest I, 351. Vgl. Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 143 ff. 29 IFA v. FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, Rn. 58 f.; M. v. IAAF, CAS OG 2000/015, Digest II, 691 (692 ff.); B. v. IJF, CAS 1998/214, Digest II, 308 (316); UCI v. DCU & DIF, CAS 1998/192, Digest II, 205; UCI & CONI, CAS 1994/128, Digest I, 495 (505). Vgl. auch Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, Rn. 102. 30 UCI/WADA v. Contador & RFEC, CAS 2011/A/2384&2386, Rn. 356 f.; MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., CAS 2009/A/1757, Rn. 31; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, Rn. 16; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (76); COC & Scott v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, Rn. 14; COC v. IIHF, CAS OG 1998/004–5, Digest I, 435 (442); W. v. ACF, CAS 1996/153, Digest I, 335 (341, 348). Kein Sportakteur soll in willkürlicher und offensichtlich unfairer Art und Weise behandelt werden, Peternell v. SASCOC & SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, Rn. 24. Instruktiv ist die Karlsruher Erklärung zum Fair Play des Konstanzer Arbeitskreises für Sportrecht e.V. – Verein für deutsches und internationales Sportrecht vom 3. März 1998; vgl. auch den Band Fairness-Gebot, Sportregeln und Rechtsnormen, Württembergischer Fußballverband e.V. (Hrsg.), 2004; Vieweg/Staschik, SpuRt 2013, 227 ff.; Nafziger, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 3 ff.; ders., The Principle of Fairness in the Lex Sportiva of CAS Awards and Beyond, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 251 ff. 31 SNOC & Abrahamina v. FILA, CAS OG 08/007, Rn. 11 ff. In dieser Entscheidung stellt der CAS ausdrücklich klar, dass das Fairness-Prinzip nicht nur auf dem Spielfeld, sondern auch außerhalb Geltung beansprucht und nicht nur von den Athleten, sondern auch von den sonstigen Sportakteuren, etwa von den Sportverbänden gegenüber den Athleten, zu beachten ist. 32 Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, Rn. 102; Grasshopper v. Lima, CAS 2008/A/ 1705, Rn. 25; COC & Kibunde v. AIBA, CAS OG 00/004, Rn. 11. 33 Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 64; Boxing Australia v. AIBA, CAS 2008/A/1455, Rn. 16; FC Metz v. FC Ferencvarosi, CAS 2006/A/1181, Rn. 8 ff.

Lex Sportiva – Phänomen und Bedeutung

27

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Institut der Vereinsübung als Ausdruck innerhalb eines Sportverbands oder -vereins geltenden Gewohnheitsrechts.34

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Grundsatz des „positiven Interesses“ im Schadensersatzrecht:35 Danach ist die geschädigte Partei so zu stellen, wie sie stünde, wenn der Vertrag ordnungsgemäß erfüllt worden wäre.

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Grundsätze von „Treu und Glauben“, der Rechtsverwirkung und des venire contra factum proprium:36 Eine Verwirkung kann bspw. eintreten, wenn eine Partei eine Aussage trifft, auf die sich die andere vernünftigerweise verlassen darf. Grundsätze für die Auslegung der Regelwerke der Sportverbände:37

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Der Grundsatz der Effektivität (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) besagt etwa, dass die Auslegung vorzuziehen ist, die der Regel einen effektiven Anwendungsbereich verschafft.38 Bei Zweifeln hinsichtlich der Auslegung der Bestimmung ist das berechtigte Verständnis der Partei zugrunde zu le___________ 34

FC Schalke 04 u.a. v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1622–1624, Rn. 33. FC Sion v. FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, CAS 2009/A/1880&1881, Rn. 80; Matuzalem u.a. v. Shaktar Donetzk u.a., CAS 2008/A/1519&1520, Rn. 86; E. v. Diyarbakirspor Kulübü, CAS 2008/A/1447, Rn. 32. 36 Peternell v. SASCOC & SAEF, CAS OG 12/01, Rn. 41; Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, Rn. 108; BEF v. FEI, CAS 2010/A/2058, Rn. 18; Club Tofta Itróttarfelag B68 v. R., CAS 2009/A/1956, Rn. 16; Simms v. FINA, CAS OG 2008/002, Rn. 12; Boxing Australia v. AIBA, CAS 2008/A/1455, Rn. 16; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (76). Auch im Fall Al Nasr Sports Club v. F. M., CAS 2010/A/2049, Rn. 11 stellt der CAS darauf ab, dass beim Spieler ein berechtigtes Vertrauen entstehen kann, nicht wegen Schadensersatz in Anspruch genommen zu werden, wenn der Verein dieses Recht über einen längeren Zeitraum nicht ausübt. 37 Die Auslegung der Regelwerke ist objektiv vorzunehmen und hat dabei vom Wortlaut auszugehen. Ist dieser nicht eindeutig ist auf die interne Logik der Bestimmung, die systematische Beziehung zu anderen Bestimmungen und den Sinn und Zweck der Regel, der in der Entstehungsgeschichte zum Ausdruck kommt, abzustellen, IFA v. FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, Rn. 20; SV Wilhelmshaven v. Club A. Excursionistas & Club A. River Plate, CAS 2009/A/1810&1811, Rn. 45; TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v. ETTU, CAS 2007/A/1363, Rn. 12; Wigan Athletic FC v. Heart of Midlothian u.a., CAS 2007/A/1298–1300, Rn. 50. Zu den Auslegungsgrundsätzen zählen daneben bspw. in claris non fit interpretatio oder ubi lex voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, vgl. ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, CAS 2006/A/1152, Rn. 15. Z. T. werden vom CAS aber auch andere Auslegungsgrundsätze herangezogen, vgl. Ward v. IOC u.a., CAS OG 12/02, Rn. 6.3; RCD Mallorca SAD & A. v. FIFA & UMM Salal SC, CAS 2009/A/1909, Rn. 67. Vgl. auch CD Nacional v. FK Sutjeska, CAS 2011/A/2563, Rn. 53: Die Satzungen und Regelwerke einer Vereinigung müssen entweder anhand des subjektiven Willens der normsetzenden Vereinigung (sog. „Willensprinzip“) oder anhand der objektiven Bedeutung, die der Adressat der Regel beimisst (sog. „Vertrauensprinzip“), ausgelegt werden. 38 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, CAS 2006/A/1152. 35

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gen, die die Satzung oder das Regelwerk nicht gestellt hat (Prinzip des contra proferentem).39 –

Erfordernis einer Beschwer als Voraussetzung für die Aktivlegitimation:40 Eine Partei kann nach diesem Grundsatz nur dann gegen eine Verbandsentscheidung vorgehen, wenn sie durch diese beschwert ist und ein konkretes Interesse an ihrer Aufhebung hat.

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Grundsatz der Rechtskraft (res judicata):41 Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidung entsteht dabei allein zwischen den Parteien, nicht jedoch im Verhältnis zu Dritten.

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Grundsätze der Darlegungs- und Beweislast:42 Jede Partei muss die ihr günstigen Tatsachen darlegen und beweisen. Somit gilt der Beibringungs- und nicht der Untersuchungsgrundsatz.43

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Voraussetzungen der Gewährung vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes: (1) Dem Antragsteller muss ein erheblicher Nachteil drohen, (2) das Rechtsschutzbegehren darf nicht offensichtlich aussichtslos erscheinen und (3) die Interessen des Antragstellers müssen die Interessen des Antragsgegners überwiegen.44

___________ 39 NADA v. Y., CAS 2012/A/2997, Rn. 32; Hansen v. FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, Rn. 15.2; Devyatovskiy v. IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752, Rn. 4.28; AOC & AWU v. FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, Rn. 15 ff.; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, Rn. 15; vgl. auch Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, Rn. 116 ff.; Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, Rn. 107; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, Rn. 42. 40 Sterba v. WADA, CAS OG 12/05, Rn. 7.7; FC Sion v. FIFA, CAS 2009/A/1880, Rn. 29. 41 Mutu v. Chelsea FC, CAS 2008/A/1644, Rn. 23; AFHF v. ANOC & FIH, CAS OG 2008/005, Rn. 23; Maccabi Haifa FC v. Real Racing Club Santander, CAS 2006/A/1029, Rn. 12 ff. Rechtskraft kommt dabei nicht nur CAS-Schiedssprüchen, sondern auch den Entscheidungen der Verbandsgerichte zu, BEF v. FEI, CAS 2010/A/2058, Rn. 15 ff. 42 Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, Rn. 91 ff.; SV Wilhelmshaven v. Club A. Excursionistas u.a., CAS 2009/A/1810&1811, Rn. 18; RCD Mallorca SAD & A. v. FIFA & UMM Salal SC, CAS 2009/A/1909, Rn. 21 ff. Der CAS legt auch fest, welches Beweismaß erforderlich ist, wenn dies nicht ausdrücklich in den Verbandsregeln geregelt ist, Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, Rn. 8.32; Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, Rn. 153 ff.; Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 92; O. v. UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, Rn. 20; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, Rn. 25. So ist z. B. das Beweismaß in Disziplinarverfahren nach der gefestigten CAS-Rechtsprechung „ausreichend zufriedenstellende Wahrscheinlichkeit“ („comfortable satisfaction“), Al-Birair v. CAF, CAS 2012/A/2699, Rn. 86 ff. 43 Club Salernitana Calcio 1919 S.p.A. v. Club Atlético River Plate u.a., CAS 2009/A/1919, Rn. 31. 44 Diese Voraussetzungen sind jetzt ausdrücklich in Art. R37 Abs. 5 CAS-Code geregelt. Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/1918-O, Rn. 6; Iraqi FA v. FIFA & Qatar FA,

Lex Sportiva – Phänomen und Bedeutung

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29

insbes. Grundsätze zum Schutz der Rechte der Sportler (unter Einschränkung der Verbandsautonomie):45 x

Erfordernis einer klaren und eindeutigen Rechtsgrundlage für Verbandsstrafen (nulla poena sine lege; Prinzip der Rechtssicherheit):46 Die positiv getestete Dopingsubstanz muss bspw. auf der Liste der verbotenen Mittel stehen.

x

Geltung des Rückwirkungsverbots für Verbandsstrafen:47 Notwendig ist eine vorherige Festlegung von objektiven Kriterien für Verbandsstrafen. Im Fall der zeitlichen Kollision von Regeln gilt der Grundsatz tempus regit actum, d. h. es gilt die Regel, die zur Zeit der fraglichen Handlung in Kraft war.48 Jedoch kommt bei zwischenzeitlichen Regelmilderungen das Günstigkeitsprinzip (lex mitior)49 zur Anwendung.

___________ CAS 2008/A/1621-O, Rn. 8; Jaramillo & FSV Mainz 05 v. CD Once Caldas & FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1453-O, Rn. 12; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/ 1396&1402, Rn. 69. 45 Rinaldi v. FINA, CAS 2007/A/1377, Rn. 49. Vgl. auch Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 141 ff.; Erbsen (Fn. 12), S. 441 (S. 451). 46 Vgl. Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, Rn. 103; PJU v. IJF, CAS 2009/A/1823, Rn. 9.5; Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, Rn. 30; TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v. ETTU, CAS 2007/A/1363, Rn. 16; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, Rn. 126; USOC v. IOC & IAAF, CAS 2004/A/725, Rn. 20; A. u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/725, Rn. 93; P. v. IOC, CAS OG 2002/001, Digest III, 573 (578); T. v. IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, Digest II, 658 (663); B. v. IJF, CAS 1999/A/230, Digest II, 369; R. v. IOC, CAS OG 1998/002, Digest I, 419 (424); H. v. FINA, CAS 1998/218, Digest II, 325 (326 f.). Ungenauigkeiten in Verbandsregeln gehen dabei zu Lasten des Normgebers (Auslegung contra preferentem), Liao Hui v. IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, Rn. 107; G. v. FEI, CAS 1991/53, Digest I, 79 (87 ff.). Vgl. für Deutschland Reichert, Vereins- und Verbandsrecht, 12. Aufl. 2010, Rn. 2887 f. Der Grundsatz der Rechtssicherheit gilt auch außerhalb des Bereichs von Verbandsstrafen und besagt, dass Verbandsregeln klar und verständlich verfasst sein sollen, Telecom Egypt Club v. EFA, CAS 2009/A/1910, Rn. 33. 47 Valverde v. CONI, CAS 2009/A/1879, Rn. 14; A. u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/725 Rn. 73; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (75 f.). Das Rückwirkungsverbot gilt aber nicht ausnahmslos, Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, Rn. 43. 48 UCI v. Kolobnev & RCF, CAS 2011/A/2645, Rn. 62; Chepalova v. FIS, CAS 2010/ A/2041, Rn. 69; Y. v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, Rn. 11; WADA & FIFA v. CFA u.a., CAS 2009/A/1817&1844, Rn. 133; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/2019, Rn. 15; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/1918, Rn. 18; WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, Rn. 16; Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, Rn. 10; Gatlin v. USADA, CAS 2008/A/1461&1462, Rn. 36. Dies gilt nicht nur für die Verbandsstrafe selbst, sondern auch für das anwendbare verfahrensrechtliche Prozedere, WADA v. Thys u.a., CAS 2011/A/2435, Rn. 93; Rayo Vallecano de Madrid SAD v. FIFA, CAS 2006/A/1008, Rn. 10. 49 UCI v. Kolobnev & RCF, CAS 2011/A/2645, Rn. 62; Chepalova v. FIS, CAS 2010/ A/2041, Rn. 69; Y. v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, Rn. 11; WADA & FIFA v. CFA u.a., CAS

30

Klaus Vieweg und Paul Staschik x

Mindeststandards bzgl. des Verfahrens50 („faires Verfahren“; prozessuale Fairness51), insbes. der Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör:52

___________ 2009/A/1817&1844, Rn. 133; Devyatovskiy u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752, Rn. 4.27; FK Pobeda u.a. v. UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, Rn. 68 ff.; Iourieva u.a. v. IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, Rn. 8.10; Valverde v. CONI, CAS 2009/A/1879, Rn. 15; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/2019, Rn. 16; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/1918, Rn. 19; WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, Rn. 16; S. v. UCI & FCI, CAS 2002/A/378, Digest III, 311 (314); V. v. FCS, CAS 2001/A/318, Digest III, 185 (191); A.C. v. FINA, CAS 1996/149, Digest I, 251; UCI & CONI, CAS 1994/128, Digest I, 495 (509). 50 Die Falschbezeichnung einer Entscheidung eines Sportverbands darf nicht dazu führen, dass der Rechtsschutz gegen diese beschränkt wird, Galatasaray v. FIFA u.a., CAS 2004/A/659, Rn. 24. Des Weiteren hat der CAS bspw. Beweisregeln zur Feststellung von Dopingverstößen festgelegt, N. u.a. v. FINA, CAS 1998/208, Digest II, 234 (247). Die Testprozedur zur Feststellung von Dopingverstößen muss so ausgestaltet sein, dass das Verfahren dem aktuellen Stand der Technik entspricht und das Ergebnis mit dem größtmöglichen Maß an Sicherheit ermittelt wird, vgl. E. & A. v. IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, Leitsatz 2; B. v. ITU, CAS 1998/222, Digest II 330 (338). Das Testverfahren muss wissenschaftlich verlässlich sein, Veerpalu v. ISF, CAS 2011/A/2566, Rn. 94 ff., 202. Die Gelegenheit für den Athleten oder seines Vertreters bei der Öffnung und Analyse der B-Probe anwesend zu sein, ist ein grundlegendes Recht des Dopingverfahrens. Denn es gibt dem Athleten das Recht vor der Meldung des positiven Dopingbefunds angehört zu werden und die Gelegenheit zu überprüfen, ob das Verfahren zur Bestätigung des ursprünglichen Dopingbefunds ordnungsgemäß durchgeführt wurde, Y. v. FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, Rn. 108 ff.; Wen Tong v. IJF, CAS 2010/A/2161, Rn. 9.7. Auswahlentscheidungen für Wettkämpfe müssen transparent und anhand objektiver Kriterien getroffen werden, C. v. JASF, CAS 2000/A/278, Digest II, 534; B. & C. v. AYF, CAS 2000/A/260, Digest II, 527. Sie können grundsätzlich nur angegriffen werden, wenn gegen Auswahlkriterien verstoßen wurde oder die Entscheidung bösgläubig oder willkürlich getroffen wurden, Peternell v. SASCOC u.a., CAS OG 12/01, Rn. 41; Mewing v. Swimming Australia Limited, CAS 2008/A/1540, Rn. 22. Hingegen existiert kein allgemeines Rechtsprinzip nach dem Beweismittel, die unter Verletzung persönlicher Rechte erhoben wurden, stets unverwertbar sind, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 79 ff.; Adamu v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, Rn. 75 ff.; Valverde v. CONI, CAS 2009/A/1879, Rn. 68 ff.; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, Rn. 60; IAAF v. USATF & Y., CAS 2004/A/628, Rn. 17. 51 Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 71; ARcycling AG v. UCI, CAS 2004/ A/777, Rn. 56; GFA v. UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, Digest III, 68 (75); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (103). 52 CGF v. EGA, CAS 2010/A/2275, Rn. 29 f.; FINA v. CBDA & G., CAS 2007/A/ 1373, Rn. 26; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, Rn. 126; ARcycling AG v. UCI, CAS 2004/A/777, Rn. 56; A. u.a. v. NOC CV, CAS OG 1996/005, Digest I, 397 (399 ff.); USA Shooting & Q. v. UIT, CAS 1994/129, Digest I, 187 (202 f.). Verfahrensverstöße durch ein Verbandsgericht werden aber durch das Verfahren vor dem CAS, der die Streitigkeit vollständig erneut prüft (de novo), praktisch geheilt, Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, Rn. 87; Györi ETO v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702, Rn. 122; Bursaspor Kulübü Dernegi v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821, Rn. 85; Asif v. ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, Rn. 40; Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, Rn. 129; Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 52 ff.; Adamu v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, Rn. 46 ff.; Namibia FA v. CAF, CAS 2011/A/2654, Rn. 26; D. v. CIO, CAS 2009/A/2018, Rn. 63; FK

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31

Zu berücksichtigen ist, dass es sich bei den Verbandssanktionen um zivilrechtliche und nicht um strafrechtliche Sanktionen handelt, so dass strafprozessuale Grundsätze nicht unbesehen Anwendung finden.53 Vielmehr sind strafprozessuale Verfahrensmaxime nur anwendbar, wenn sie Ausdruck eines fundamentalen Wertesystems sind. Selbst dann sind unter Umständen aufgrund sportspezifischer Besonderheiten Ausnahmen von diesen Grundsätzen zu machen.54 x

Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz55 (insbes. das Erfordernis schuldangemessener Sanktionen): Die dem Athleten auferlegte Strafe darf nicht außer Verhältnis zur Schwere des Vergehens stehen und muss immer das Ausmaß der begangenen Schuld widerspiegeln.56 In Dopingverfahren gilt bei der Frage, ob

___________ Siad Most v. Clube Esportivo Bento Gonçalves, CAS 2009/A/1781, Rn. 26; FC Sion v. FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, CAS 2009/A/1880&1881, Rn. 18; FK Pobeda u.a. v. UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, Rn. 88; Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, Rn. 77 ff.; D’Arcy v. AOC, CAS 2008/A/1574, Rn. 32; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, Rn. 43; Aston Villa FC v. B.93 Copenhagen, CAS 2006/A/1177, Rn. 16; D. v. International Dance Sport Federation, CAS 2006/A/1175, Rn. 18; ARcycling AG v. UCI, CAS 2004/A/777, Rn. 56; F v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/714, Rn. 11; A. u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/725, Rn. 78; D.B. v. FINA, CAS 1998/211, Digest II, 255 (264). Dies erscheint nur dann sachgerecht, wenn ausgeschlossen werden kann, dass die Verletzung des rechtlichen Gehörs Einfluss auf das Ergebnis der Entscheidung hat, Vieweg/Staschik, SpuRt 2013, 227 (231, 233). Positiv zu bewerten sind insoweit die Entscheidungen CGF v. EGA, CAS 2010/A/2275, Rn. 38 ff. und A. u.a. v. NOC CV, CAS OG 1996/005, Digest I, 397 (401) in denen der CAS eine Heilung des Verfahrensfehlers durch das schiedsgerichtliche Verfahren verneinte. 53 I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, Rn. 99 ff.; NADO & KNSB v. W., CAS 2010/A/ 2311&2312, Rn. 7.6; Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, Rn. 41. Vgl. auch Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 67 ff. 54 Dies gelte etwa für den Grundsatz nulla poena sine lege, Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/1583&1584, Rn. 42. 55 Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, Rn. 109; Györi ETO v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702, Rn. 147; WADA v. Jobson u.a., CAS 2010/A/2307, Rn. 173 ff.; I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, Rn. 132 ff.; IFBB v. IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, Rn. 46; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, Rn. 39 ff.; Benfica v. UEFA & FC Porto, CAS 2008/A/ 1583&1584, Rn. 45; M. v. ATP Tour Inc., CAS 2007/A/1427, Rn. 20 ff.; D. v. International Dance Sport Federation, CAS 2006/A/1175, Rn. 48; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, Rn. 124, 138 f.; Knauss v. FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, Rn. 28; S. v. FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, Rn. 44; H. v. ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, Rn. 50. 56 Armstrong v. WCF, CAS 2012/A/2756, Rn. 8.32; Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, Rn. 8.33. Dabei geht der CAS aber grds. davon aus, dass den Sportverbänden bei der Verhängung der Sanktionen ein Ermessensspielraum zusteht. Deswegen kann die Sanktion nicht bereits dann angefochten werden, wenn eine andere Strafe angemessener erscheint, sondern erst wenn sie offensichtlich und grob unverhältnismäßig ist, Beúiktaú JK v. UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2824, Rn. 127; Mu-yen Chu & CTOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2913, Rn. 113; Armstrong v. WCF, CAS 2012/A/2756, Rn. 8.31; Butt v. ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, Rn. 55 ff.; UCI v. Kolobnev & RCF, CAS 2011/A/2645, Rn. 94; I. v.

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ein Dopingvergehen vorliegt, der Grundsatz der „strict liability“, sofern er satzungsmäßig vorgesehen ist und es dem Athleten möglich bleibt, sein mangelndes Verschulden nachzuweisen.57 Bei Bemessung der konkreten Strafe ist jedoch der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit zu beachten, so dass hier die Verschuldensfrage eine Rolle spielt;58 dabei ist eine Mindeststrafe zulässig, sofern sie angemessen ist. Aufgrund der CASSpruchpraxis sehen inzwischen viele Verbandsregelwerke eine Möglichkeit vor, die Mindeststrafe zu reduzieren, wenn den Athleten nur ein geringes Verschulden trifft.59 ___________ FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, Rn. 132 ff.; WADA v. Jobson u.a., CAS 2010/A/2307, Rn. 181; IWBF v. UKAD & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, Rn. 11.8 ff.; WADA & FIFA v. CFA u.a., CAS 2009/A/1817&1844, Rn. 174; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, Rn. 39 ff.; Wawrzyniak v. HFF, CAS 2009/A/1918, Rn. 59; WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, Rn. 48. In einer Entscheidung die zwar eine Verbandsstrafe aber keine Dopingsanktion betrifft hat der CAS hingegen weitergehend entschieden, dass er die Verbandsstrafe nicht erst ändern kann, wenn sie offensichtlich und grob unverhältnismäßig, sondern bereits wenn sie schlicht „fehlerhaft“ ist, Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, Rn. 87. Vgl. auch Al Eid v. FEI, CAS 2012/A/2807, Rn. 10.1 ff.; Sharbatly v. FEI, CAS 2012/A/2808, Rn. 10.2 ff.; IAAF v. ARAF u.a., CAS 2008/A/1718–1724, Rn. 166. 57 P. v. IHHF, CAS 2005/A/990, Rn. 3; USA Shooting & Q. v. UIT, CAS 1994/129, Digest I, 187 (194). Vgl. zur problematischen Anwendung des Strict liability-Grundsatzes sowie zum Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz in Deutschland Petri, Die Dopingsanktion, 2004, S. 208 ff. Der CAS hält den Strict liability-Grundsatz für mit Grundrechten und der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention vereinbar, Tysse v. NAF & IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2353, Rn. 8.28; WADA v. Jobson u.a., CAS 2010/A/2307, Rn. 175; Hansen v. FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, Rn. 13, 15.6. 58 Der CAS gesteht den Verbandsorganen bei Verhängung der konkreten Strafe einen weiten Beurteilungsspielraum zu, der erst dann überschritten ist, wenn die Strafe evident und grob unverhältnismäßig oder willkürlich ist, s.o. Fn. 56. Dabei spricht der CAS den Sportverbänden das Recht zu, in ihren Regelwerken diejenigen Umstände festzulegen, die bei der Bemessung einer Dopingsanktion zu berücksichtigen oder unberücksichtigt zu lassen sind, vgl. WADA v. Jobson u.a., CAS 2010/A/2307, Rn. 131; NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, Rn. 51; Knauss v. FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, Rn. 32. Ist eine in den Verbandssatzungen zwingend vorgeschriebene Mindeststrafe unverhältnismäßig, stellt sich die Frage, ob der CAS diese außer Acht lassen darf. Die Spruchpraxis des CAS ist hier uneinheitlich. In einigen Entscheidungen sieht er sich an Verbandsregeln die eine Mindeststrafe vorsehen gebunden, vgl. R. v. FISA, CAS 2001/A/330, Digest III, 197 (204 f.); NWBA v. IPC, CAS 1995/122, Digest I, 173 (184); vgl. auch WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, Rn. 61. In anderen Entscheidungen hingegen betont der CAS, dass er die Autorität besitzt zwingende Mindeststrafen aufzuheben, wenn sie (offensichtlich) unverhältnismäßig sind und Grundrechte verletzen, I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, Rn. 132 ff., Puerta v. ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025; S. v. FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, Rn. 48; Knauss v. FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, Rn. 32; H. v. ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, Rn. 53; B. v. FINA, CAS 2001/A/337, Digest III, 206 (224); B. v. IJF, CAS 1998/214, Digest II, 308 (322); N. v. FEI, CAS 1992/73, Digest I, 153 (157). 59 Vgl. S. v. FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, Rn. 47 f.

Lex Sportiva – Phänomen und Bedeutung x

33

Schuldprinzip: Soll eine Person für ihr Verhalten verantwortlich gemacht werden, erfordert eine Verbandsstrafe grundsätzlich ein schuldhaftes Handeln.60

x

Diskriminierungsverbot bei der Regelanwendung (Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz;61 aber keine Gleichheit im Unrecht62).

x

Beweismaß in Dopingstreitigkeiten: Der Dopingverstoß muss für das entscheidende Gericht mit „ausreichend zufriedenstellender“ Wahrscheinlichkeit feststehen.63 Dieses Beweismaß gilt für alle Disziplinarverfahren.64 Es erfordert mehr als eine bloße „hinreichende Wahrscheinlichkeit“, welche außerhalb von Disziplinarverfahren genügt,65 jedoch weniger als die im Strafprozess und weitgehend auch im Zivilprozess erforderliche Überzeugung, die „vernünftigen Zweifeln Schweigen gebietet“.

Diskutiert wird die Anwendung des Grundsatzes ne bis in idem.66 Der CAS hat die Annahme bestimmter Rechtsgrundsätze auch ausdrücklich abgelehnt. So hat er klargestellt, dass es keinen allgemeinen Grundsatz gibt, der besagt, dass der CAS für alle Streitigkeiten im Sport zuständig ist. Ein Athlet, dem innerhalb des Verbands keine Anfechtungsmöglichkeit zusteht, kann daher nicht automatisch den CAS direkt anrufen.67 Darüber hinaus gibt es kein Prinzip der ___________ 60 Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, Rn. 133; Armstrong v. WCF, CAS 2012/A/2756, Rn. 8.12; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, Rn. 136. 61 WADA v. Jobson u.a., CAS 2010/A/2307, Rn. 130; Rinaldi v. FINA, CAS 2007/A/ 1377, Rn. 49; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, Rn. 137; N. u.a. v. IHHF, CAS 2001/A/357, Rn. 24; COC & Kibunde v. AIBA, CAS OG 00/004, Rn. 12; AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (66). 62 Vgl. z. B. Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, Rn. 145; Midtjylland v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, Rn. 7.5.3. 63 Pechstein & DESG v. ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912&1913, Rn. 54; WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, Rn. 53. 64 Al-Birair v. CAF, CAS 2012/A/2699, Rn. 86 ff.; Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, Rn. 135 ff.; Diakite v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2433, Rn. 5; Sheykhov v. FILA, CAS 2008/A/1594, Rn. 46 ff. Dieses Beweismaß gilt auch soweit es um den Nachweis von manipulativen Spielabsprachen geht, O. v. UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, Rn. 20; FK Pobeda u.a. v. UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, Rn. 85. Jedoch können die Sportverbände das anwendbare Beweismaß in ihren Satzungen abweichend festlegen, Köllerer v. ATP u.a., CAS 2011/A/2490, Rn. 86. 65 Pistorius v. IAAF, CAS 2008/A/1480, Rn. 39. Dieses geminderte Beweismaß gilt auch für den Nachweis des Athleten, dass der Dopingverstoß unverschuldet erfolgte, NADO v. N., CAS 2009/A/2012, Rn. 25. 66 WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396&1402, Rn. 118; vgl. auch Murofushi & JOC v. IOC, CAS 2012/A/2912, Rn. 106; USOC v. IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, Rn. 60. 67 Lynch v. HIS, CAS OG 12/03, Rn. 2.3.4 f.

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lex sportiva, dem zufolge das Ergebnis einer Mannschaft zwingend zu annullieren ist, um den Sport vor Betrügern zu schützen, wenn ein Mannschaftsmitglied gedopt hat.68

III. Lex mercatoria, lex informatica und lex technica Mit der lex sportiva verwandte Phänomene, die ebenfalls Erscheinungsformen des transnationalen Rechts umschreiben, sind die lex mercatoria, die lex informtica und die lex technica. Zum besseren Verständnis der Wirkungsweise und der Geltung der lex sportiva und um Missverständnissen bei der Verwendung der Begrifflichkeiten vorzubeugen, bietet es sich an, Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede in den Blick zu nehmen.

1. Lex mercatoria Unter dem Begriff lex mercatoria69 versteht man die Regeln des internationalen Handels, die außerhalb der nationalen Rechtsordnungen entstehen, insbes. internationale Handelsbräuche, Gewohnheitsrecht, Standardverträge (z. B. INCOTERMS) sowie Privatkodifikationen wie die UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.70 Im Rahmen der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion zur lex mercatoria ist wie bei der lex sportiva umstritten, ob diese eine autonome, anationale Rechtsordnung darstellt – was überwiegend strikt abgelehnt wird – und welche Folgen dies hätte.71 Weitgehend geklärt ist inzwischen, dass die lex mercatoria als private Normenordnung vor einem Schiedsgericht von den Parteien als anwendbares Recht gewählt werden kann.72 Die Grundstrukturen der lex mercatoria und der lex sportiva sind vergleichbar, so dass aus der Diskussion um die lex mercatoria Erkenntnisse auch für die ___________ 68

Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, Rn. 126 ff. Grundlegend zur lex mercatoria Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 65 ff.; Zumbansen, RabelsZ 67 (2003), 637; Schroeder, Die lex mercatoria – Rechtsordnungsqualität und demokratische Legitimation, in: Witt u.a. (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler e.V. 2002, S. 257 ff.; Berger, Die Neue Lex Mercatoria – Ist Transnationales Wirtschaftsrecht kodifizierbar?, in: Bumke/Röthel (Hrsg.), Privates Recht, 2012, S. 119 ff. 70 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (756); Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 65 ff. 71 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (Fn. 21), S. 156 ff.; Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 52 f. 72 Vgl. Kolev, ISLJ 2008/1–2, 57 (61); ders., Lex Sportiva And Lex Mercatoria, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 223 (S. 227 ff.); BuckHeeb/Dieckmann (Fn. 21), S. 157. 69

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lex sportiva gewonnen werden können.73 Ein bedeutender Unterschied liegt aber darin, dass sich das Verhältnis der Parteien bei der lex sportiva in der Regel asymmetrisch als Beziehung der Über- und Unterordnung zwischen Verband und Athlet darstellt, wohingegen die Parteien bei der lex mercatoria grundsätzlich gleichberechtigt auf einer Ebene stehen.74 Dieser Unterschied zeigt sich bspw. darin, dass sich die lex mercatoria überwiegend an allgemeine Rechtsprinzipien des Privatrechts anlehnt, wohingegen der CAS in Entwicklung der lex sportiva vor allem öffentlich-rechtliche Rechtsprinzipien adaptiert.75 Jedoch können auch Sportorganisationen und Athleten durchaus auf einer Stufe stehen, sofern es sich um Spitzensportler handelt. So hat der CAS in einem Fall die lex mercatoria zwischen Fußballvereinen und -spielern ausdrücklich für anwendbar erklärt.76

2. Lex informatica (lex digitalis) Diskutiert wird, ob staatliches Recht auf das Internet anwendbar ist oder ob eine Regulierung des Internets nicht vielmehr privaten Rechtsnormen – einer lex informatica – vorbehalten bleibt.77 Einhellig wird aber inzwischen anerkannt, dass staatliches Recht auch für das Internet Geltung beansprucht. Privates transnationales Recht hat sich in diesem Bereich nur sehr zurückhaltend herausgebildet. Nennenswert ist allein die Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy (UDRP) der Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), welche für die internationale Vergabe von Domainnamen zuständig ist.78 Die UDRP ist ein Verfahren der alternativen Streitschlichtung und beschäftigt sich mit Streitigkeiten um Domainnamen (sog. Cybersquatting). Sie muss von allen Nutzern von Domainnamen vertraglich akzeptiert werden. Dabei handelt sich jedoch nur um eine punktuelle Regelung zum Markenrechtsschutz, so dass nicht von einer abgeschlossenen, autonomen Rechtsordnung hinsichtlich des Internets gesprochen werden kann. Aufgrund des punktuellen Charakters können die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse im Bereich der lex informatica für die lex sportiva kaum fruchtbar gemacht werden.

___________ 73 Anders Foster (Fn. 15), S. 35 (S. 50); Chen-Huan Lin, A Survey of the Concept of “Lex Sportiva” from Analytical Legal Philosophy, in: 10th KASEL International Conference on Sport Law in 2012 – A New Trend of Sport Law, 2012, S. 71. 74 Kolev, ISLJ 2008/1–2, 57 (58); Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (758). 75 Casini (Fn. 21), S. 149 (S. 158). 76 Kuwait Sporting Club v. Z. & FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1593, Rn. 18. 77 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (Fn. 21), S. 175 ff.; Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 110 ff. 78 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (Fn. 21), S. 193 f.; Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 115 ff.

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3. Lex technica Mit dem Begriff lex technica werden europäische Techniknormen umschrieben, die zwar im Ausgangspunkt von privaten Normungsgremien auf europäischer Ebene formuliert, dann aber vom Unionsgesetzgeber aufgegriffen werden, indem an ihre Einhaltung die widerlegliche Vermutung geknüpft wird, dass das betreffende Produkt richtlinienkonform und damit freiverkehrsfähig ist.79 Letztlich handelt es sich um einen Fall des legal outsourcing, da an die von den privaten Normungsorganisationen aufgestellten Techniknormen gesetzlich angeknüpft wird. Zwar ist die Einhaltung dieser Techniknormen freiwillig, faktisch besteht aber ein Zwang für die Wettbewerber, die Normen zu befolgen.80 Die lex technica und die lex sportiva sind zwar insofern vergleichbar, als die europäischen Techniknormen für die Hersteller faktisch ebenso zwingend sind wie die Regeln des internationalen Sports für einen Athleten. Dieser Zwang wird bei der lex technica aber explizit durch den Gesetzgeber vermittelt. Erkenntnisse aus diesem Bereich sind somit nicht für die lex sportiva verwertbar.

IV. Lex sportiva als autonomes Recht? Der Begriff lex sportiva weist einerseits auf den enormen Umfang und die überragende Praxisbedeutung hin, die von den selbstgesetzten Regeln der Sportverbände ausgeht. Darüber hinaus ist mit ihm die Frage verbunden, ob diese Regeln als eigenständig (autonom) in dem Sinne zu qualifizieren sind, dass sie selbstständig und unabhängig von staatlicher Gewährung und staatlichem Einfluss Geltung beanspruchen können – ob sie also aus eigenem Anspruch Geltung beanspruchen oder der Anerkennung durch die einzelnen staatlichen Rechtsordnungen bedürfen (staatliches Rechtsanerkennungsmonopol). Folge eines autonomen, selbstregulierenden Rechtssystems wäre, dass sich die lex sportiva gegenüber entgegenstehendem nationalem Recht durchsetzte. Zudem wären die Sportler unmittelbar an die lex sportiva gebunden, ohne dass ein weiterer Umsetzungs- und Vermittlungsakt erforderlich wäre.

___________ 79 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (758 f.); Vieweg, Produkthaftungsrecht, in: Schulte/Schröder (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Technikrechts, 2. Aufl. 2011, S. 337 (S. 370 f.); vgl. allgemein zu diesem Instrument kooperativer Techniksteuerung Röthel, Europarechtliche Vorgaben für das Technikrecht, in: Schulte/Schröder (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Technikrechts, 2. Aufl. 2011, S. 201 (S. 217 ff.). 80 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (Fn. 21), S. 170.

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1. Originäre Rechtsetzungsautonomie Erster Befürworter einer anationalen, dem staatlichen Recht vorgehenden lex sportiva war Massimo Severo Giannini, der bereits 1949 die Ansicht vertrat, dass der Sport der einzig mögliche Fall der „Geburt“ einer eigenständigen, anationalen Rechtsordnung sei81 und dass der Sport alle drei Elemente aufweise, die eine Rechtsordnung konstituierten: ein Organisationsgefüge, ein Personengefüge und ein Normengefüge.82 Über Italien hinweg fand diese als Institutionenlehre bezeichnete Auffassung Verbreitung in den USA, in Belgien, Frankreich, der Schweiz und ansatzweise in Deutschland.83 Die Notwendigkeit einer Autonomie wird u. a. damit begründet, dass internationale Sachverhalte nach einheitlichem Recht beurteilt werden sollten und nicht nach den einzelnen nationalen Rechtsordnungen mit ihren unterschiedlichen Maßstäben. Probleme bereitet jedoch die Suche nach einer haltbaren dogmatischen Begründung für die These, dass die lex sportiva auf gleicher Stufe mit staatlichem Recht oder zumindest außerhalb der staatlichen Hierarchie steht. Die autonome Rechtsetzungsbefugnis der internationalen Sportverbände wird teilweise darauf gestützt, dass diese als Völkerrechtssubjekte einzustufen seien84 und sich so der staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit entziehen könnten. Die Einordnung als Völkerrechtssubjekte ist allerdings umstritten. Internationale Sportorganisationen wie das IOC sind zwar keine internationalen Organisationen im Sinne des Völkerrechts,85 ihnen kann aber unter Umständen eine (gekorene) Völkerrechtssubjektivität als Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) oder als transnationale Unternehmen zugesprochen werden.86 Die internationalen Sportfachverbände bezeichnen sich selbst als NGOs oder als transnationale Unternehmen und werden zum Teil auch als solche angesehen.87 Sowohl NGOs ___________ 81

Giannini, Riv. Dir. Sport. 1949, 10 (17), zit. nach Will, Rechtsgrundlagen der Bindung nationaler Verbände an internationale Sportverbandsregeln, in: Reuter (Hrsg.), Einbindung des nationalen Sportrechts in internationale Bezüge, 1987, S. 29 (S. 38 Fn. 17). 82 Giannini, Riv. Dir. Sport. 1949, 10 (13, 21), zit. nach Will (Fn. 81), S. 29 (S. 39 Fn. 17a). 83 Vgl. grundlegend zu den in anderen Staaten vertretenen Auffassungen, Will (Fn. 81), S. 29 (S. 37 ff.); Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 50; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 40); Wax (Fn. 4), S. 175. 84 Vgl. Oschütz, Sportschiedgsgerichtsbarkeit – Die Schiedsverfahren des Tribunal Arbitral du Sport vor dem Hintergrund des schweizerischen und deutschen Schiedsverfahrensrechts, 2005, S. 352 ff. 85 Vgl. Wax (Fn. 4), S. 153 ff. 86 Vgl. auch Schleiter (Fn. 21), S. 231 (S. 242 ff.). Ablehnend Nolte, Vereinbartes Recht am Beispiel der lex sportiva – Wechselwirkungen zwischen „lex sportiva“ und „lex extra sportiva“, in: Bumke/Röthel (Hrsg.), Privates Recht, 2012, S. 107 (S. 109 f.). 87 Foster (Fn. 15), S. 35 (S. 47); Panagiotopoulos, Lex Sportiva – Lex Olympica and International Sports Law, in: The 18th IASL Congress – Conference Proceedings, 2012, S. 2 (S. 6). Ablehnend hingegen z. B. Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 6); Pfister, in:

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als auch transnationale Unternehmen besitzen partielle Völkerrechtssubjektivität, wenn sie vertragliche Beziehungen mit Staaten eingehen, die Angelegenheiten „funktioneller Staatlichkeit“ betreffen. Gerade vor sportlichen Großereignissen, wie den Olympischen Spielen oder der Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft, schließen internationale Sportorganisationen mit Staaten Verträge, etwa um Privilegien oder Immunitäten auszuhandeln.88 Aus der Einordnung als Völkerrechtssubjekt folgt jedoch keinesfalls automatisch eine Rechtsetzungsautonomie der betreffenden Sportorganisationen.89 Den Staaten wäre es nämlich gar nicht möglich, entsprechende Befugnisse auf die Sportorganisationen zu übertragen, da eine solche Autonomie unmittelbar zu Lasten Privater ginge und diese unzulässig benachteiligt würden.90 Ein von Staats wegen angeordneter Entzug des staatlichen Rechtswegs wäre eine unzulässige Verwehrung von Rechtsschutz.91 Auch ist kein Staat bekannt, der die Setzung originären Rechts durch Sportorganisationen akzeptiert.92 In einem zweiten Begründungsansatz wird versucht, den autonomen Charakter der lex sportiva über eine Einordnung als völkerrechtliches Gewohnheitsrecht herzuleiten mit der Begründung, die staatliche Anerkennung des Völkergewohnheitsrechts sei in Deutschland über Art. 20 Abs. 3, 25 GG gewährleistet.93 Für eine Etablierung als Völkergewohnheitsrechts fehlt es häufig aber an der erforderlichen langwährenden Übung, da sich die Satzungen der Verbände oft ändern.94 Für die allgemeinen Sportrechtsgrundsätze könnte sie hingegen im Einzelfall bejaht werden. Selbst wenn es sich bei den Verbandsregeln zum Teil um Völkergewohnheitsrecht handeln sollte, führt dies jedoch nicht dazu, dass es sich gegenüber widerstreitendem staatlichem Recht durchsetzen würde, denn soweit die Rechtsetzungsautonomie beim Staat verbleibt, kann er auch Gewohnheitsrecht einschränken.95 Mangels tragfähiger dogmatischer Begründung kommt den internationalen Sportverbänden also keine eigene, selbstständige Rechtsetzungsautonomie zu,

___________ Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (Hrsg.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht, 2. Aufl. 2007, VI 1 Rn. 8. 88 Wax (Fn. 4), S. 168 f. 89 Schleiter (Fn. 21), S. 231 (S. 247). 90 Vgl. Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (762 f.). 91 Vgl. Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (762 f.). 92 Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 353. 93 Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 331. 94 Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 331. 95 Schleiter (Fn. 3), S. 99 f.

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sondern nur eine von dem jeweiligen Staat abgeleitete Normsetzungsbefugnis.96 Allein die Staaten haben die kollisionsrechtliche Kompetenzkompetenz, insbes. das Rechtsanerkennungsmonopol und die Geltungsverschaffungskompetenz. Auch in der gerichtlichen Praxis wird eine vollständige Autonomie der lex sportiva abgelehnt: in den Rechtssachen Bosman,97 Meca-Medina und Majcen98 sowie MOTOE99 hat der EuGH klargestellt, dass er keine vollständig autonome lex sportiva anerkennt. Zudem wurde im Fall Matuzalem erstmalig vom Schweizer Bundesgericht ein Urteil des CAS aus materiell-rechtlichen Gründen aufgehoben.100 Ebenso hat in Deutschland das OLG Frankfurt/Main festgestellt: „Eine von jedem staatlichen Recht unabhängige lex sportiva gibt es nicht.“101 Es bleibt festzuhalten, dass die Sportverbände keine originäre Rechtsetzungsbefugnis haben. Die Annahme, die lex sportiva sei eine originäre, anationale Rechtsordnung, ist verfehlt.102 Die Verbandsnormen bedürfen als privates Regelwerk vielmehr staatlicher Anerkennung, um Rechtsqualität und -geltung zu erlangen.103 Sie unterliegen dabei der staatlichen Konkretisierung, Kontrolle und Korrektur.104

2. Staatliche Gewährleistung eines autonomen Sportrechts Die Verbands- und Normsetzungsautonomie der Sportverbände wird in vielen Staaten in gewissem, wenn auch unterschiedlichem Umfang gewährleistet. Somit wird die Geltung der Verbandssatzungen und -regelwerke von den staatlichen Rechtsordnungen wohl in der Regel anerkannt.105 Dem Sport wird vom Staat eine Regelungsbefugnis zuerkannt, so dass er seine eigenen Regeln aufstellen und diese auch durchsetzen kann. In Deutschland wird die Satzungsautonomie bspw. verfassungsrechtlich in Art. 9 Abs. 1 GG verbürgt. Europarechtlich wird sie durch Art. 12 Abs. 1 Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen ___________ 96 Summerer, Internationales Sportrecht – eine dritte Rechtsordnung, in: Aderhold u.a. (Hrsg.), Festschrift für Hans Hanisch, 1994, S. 267 (S. 269 ff.); Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 353; Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 143 ff. 97 EuGH Slg. 1995, I-4921, NJW 1996, 505. 98 EuGH Slg. 2006, I-6991, SpuRt 2006, 195. 99 EuGH Slg. 2008, I-4863, SpuRt 2008, 193. 100 Schweizer Bundesgericht SpuRt 2012, 109 ff.; vgl. im Einzelnen V.3. 101 OLG Frankfurt SpuRt 2001, 159 (161). 102 Vgl. auch Pfister (Fn. 87), VI 1 Rn. 8; Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 287 f.); Wax (Fn. 4), S. 175; Kolev, ISLJ 2008/1–2, 57 (62); Latty (Fn. 11), S. 423 ff., 514, 768; Nolte (Fn. 86), S. 107 (S. 116). 103 Summerer (Fn. 96), S. 267 (S. 269 ff.). 104 Vgl. Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 159 ff. 105 Pfister (Fn. 87), VI 1 Rn. 8.

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Union gesichert. Problematisch bleibt aber, dass die Rechtsetzungsautonomie nicht grenzenlos gewährleistet wird und dass der Umfang der gewährten Autonomie von Staat zu Staat variieren kann (dazu IV.4.).

3. Geltung der lex sportiva gegenüber den Athleten Da die lex sportiva keine autonome Rechtsordnung darstellt, die – wie etwa staatliches Recht – unmittelbar Anwendung auf die Athleten findet, stellt sich die Frage, wie und unter welchen Voraussetzungen die Athleten an die Verbandsregelwerke gebunden sind. Der Geltungsgrund der lex sportiva kann letztlich allein in der freiwilligen Selbstbindung der am Sport beteiligten Akteure liegen,106 welche durch rechtsgeschäftliche Vereinbarungen der Beteiligten im Rahmen der Privatautonomie begründet wird.107 Hierfür bestehen zwei Möglichkeiten:108

a) Korporationsrechtliche Variante Der Athlet ist als Mitglied seines Vereins an dessen Satzung gebunden. Die Bindung an die einheitlichen, internationalen Verbandsregeln erfolgt durch eine lückenlose Verankerung der Bestimmungen des Dachverbands in den Satzungen der nachgeordneten Verbände und Vereine (sog. Satzungskette). Eine solche Satzungskette kann auf zwei Arten hergestellt werden: Zum einen können die nachgeordneten Verbände und Vereine verpflichtet sein, ihre Satzung jeweils an die Satzung des internationalen Verbandes anzupassen (Anpassungspflicht). Bei der Angleichung der nachgeordneten Satzungen kann es zu zeitlichen Verzögerungen kommen.109 Aus diesem Grund werden zum anderen dynamische Verweisungen festgelegt, denen zufolge die jeweils aktuelle Fassung der Satzung des internationalen Verbands automatisch in den nachgeordneten Verbänden und Vereinen gelten soll. Ob solche dynamischen Verweisungen zulässig sind, ist fraglich, da durch sie die Vereinsautonomie der nachgeordneten Verbände und Vereine tangiert wird.110 ___________ 106

Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757). Adolphsen, Eine lex sportiva für den internationalen Sport, S. 2, http://www. recht.uni-giessen.de/wps/fb01/dl/det/adolphsen/14109/eine-lex-sportiva-fuer-den-interna tionalen-sport/ (zuletzt abgerufen am 15.10.2012); vgl. Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 40); kritisch Chen-Huan Lin (Fn. 73), S. 71 (S. 76). 108 Vgl. Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (Fn. 24), S. 13 f.; Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 132. 109 Heermann, ZHR 174 (2010), 250 (251). 110 Heermann, ZHR 174 (2010), 250 ff.; Orth/Pommerening, SpuRt 2010, 222 ff.; dies., SpuRt 2011, 10 ff.; Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 72 ff; differenzierend Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 71 ff. 107

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b) Rechtsgeschäftliche Variante Der Athlet wird nur zu einem Wettkampf zugelassen, wenn er die geltenden Verbandsregeln im Rahmen einer Athletenvereinbarung oder Lizenz vertraglich anerkennt (Regelanerkennungsvertrag).111 Auch wenn der Sportler faktisch zum Abschluss einer solchen Athletenvereinbarung gezwungen ist, handelt es sich dabei um eine vertragliche Unterwerfung.

4. Grenzen der Autonomie Da die Normsetzungsbefugnis der Sportverbände von staatlichem Recht abgeleitet werden muss, sind der Autonomie der Sportverbände, eine eigene lex sportiva zu schaffen, in Europa sowohl durch europäisches als auch durch nationales Recht Grenzen gesetzt.

a) Europäisches Recht Der EuGH hat in mehreren Fällen die Vereinbarkeit von Regelungen der lex sportiva mit Unionsrecht geprüft und dabei die Satzungsautonomie der Sportverbände eingeschränkt (Walrave & Koch112; Bosman113; Deliège114; Lehtonen115; Meca-Medina116; MOTOE117; Bernard118).119 Auf die Regeln der Sportverbände ist das Unionsrecht – die Grundfreiheiten und insbes. das Kartellrecht – direkt anwendbar, sofern die Athleten eine wirtschaftliche Aktivität ausüben. Eine Bereichsausnahme für den Sport lehnt der EuGH zu Recht ab.120 Das europäische Recht setzt sich also im Konfliktfall ge___________ 111

BGHZ 128, 93; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 19 ff.). EuGH Slg. 1974, 1405. 113 EuGH Slg. 1995, I-4921, NJW 1996, 505. 114 EuGH Slg. 2000, I-2549, SpuRt 2000, 148. 115 EuGH Slg. 2000, I-2681, SpuRt 2000, 151. 116 EuGH Slg. 2006, I-6991, SpuRt 2006, 195. 117 EuGH Slg. 2008, I-4863, SpuRt 2008, 193. 118 EuGH Slg. 2010, I-2177, NJW 2010, 1733. 119 Vgl. Parrish, 37 E.L. Rev. (2012), 716 ff.; Latty (Fn. 11), S. 697 ff.; Weatherhill, ISLJ 2011/1–2, 38 (39 f.); ders., Is There Such a Thing as EU Sports Law?, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 299 (S. 302 ff.); Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (Fn. 24), S. 25 ff. 120 Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 149 ff.; Panagiotopoulos, ISLR/Pandektis Vol. 7:1–2, 2007, 1 (8). Vgl. auch Siekmann, ISLJ 2011/3–4, 75 ff. 112

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gen die lex sportiva durch.121 Bei der Anwendung des Unionsrechts berücksichtigt der EuGH aber auch die Besonderheiten des Sports,122 indem er Sportverbandsregeln als europarechtskonform einordnet, wenn die Regeln für die Organisation des Sports und die Sicherung seiner Eigenheiten notwendig sind und der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit eingehalten wird. Voraussetzungen, die das europäische Recht an die lex sportiva stellt, sind insbes. Transparenz der Entscheidungen, Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten der Betroffenen sowie objektive Notwendigkeit und Verhältnismäßigkeit (Rechtfertigung) der Verbandsregeln zur Sicherung der Besonderheiten des Sports.123 Mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon nimmt das Unionsrecht in Art. 165 AEUV zum ersten Mal ausdrücklich Bezug auf den Sport und führt als Ziel die Entwicklung der europäischen Dimension des Sports an. Zu berücksichtigten sind die besonderen Merkmale des Sports, seine auf freiwilligem Engagement basierenden Strukturen sowie seine soziale und pädagogische Funktion.124

b) Nationales Recht Auch nationales Recht setzt der Satzungsautonomie, also der Befugnis der Sportverbände, eigene Regelwerke zu schaffen, Grenzen. Der Umfang und die Kontrolldichte der Prüfung solcher Regelwerke fallen allerdings von Staat zu Staat unterschiedlich aus.125 In Deutschland prüft der BGH Sportverbandsnormen als das private Regelwerk wirtschaftlich oder sozial mächtiger Vereine insbes. am (auch grundrechtsgeprägten) Maßstab des § 242 BGB126 auf Angemessenheit ihres Inhalts (Inhaltskontrolle).127 Die Angemessenheit wird insbes. anhand der Grundrechte ___________ 121 Dies erkennt auch der CAS an und prüft zumindest, ob die konkrete Regelanwendung mit Unionsrecht vereinbar ist, vgl. Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., CAS 2008/A/1644, Rn. 18, 44; MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., CAS 2009/A/1757, Rn. 29 ff. und Midtjylland v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, Rn. 7.4. 122 So ausdrücklich in der Rechtssache Bernard, EuGH Slg. 2010, I-2177, NJW 2010, 1733 (1735). 123 Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 152. 124 Ausführlich zu Art. 165 AEUV Parrish, 37 E.L. Rev. (2012), 716 (725 ff.). Welche Auswirkungen dies auf die Rechtsprechung des EuGH hat, ist noch nicht abzusehen, vgl. Weatherhill, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 11 ff.; ders., Fairness, Openness and the Specific Nature of Sport: Does the Lisbon Treaty Change EU Sports Law?, in: Siekmann/Soek (eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, 2012, S. 311 ff. 125 Vgl. Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757). 126 BGHZ 105, 306 (316 ff.); 128, 93 ff.; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 30 ff.). 127 Vgl. Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 229 ff.; Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 153. Daneben zieht die Rechtsprechung §§ 134, 138 BGB als Prüfungsmaßstab heran, vgl. BGHZ 13, 5 (11); 21, 370 (373); 29, 352 (354); 36, 105 (109).

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bestimmt, etwa der Berufsfreiheit des Sportlers und der Verbandsautonomie, die im Sinne der praktischen Konkordanz in einen gerechten Ausgleich zu bringen sind. Neben dieser Inhaltskontrolle der Verbandsregeln überprüft der BGH im Rahmen der konkreten Normanwendung zudem, ob das Verbandsorgan bei seiner Entscheidung von einer richtigen Tatsachenbasis ausgeht (Tatsachenkontrolle) und ob es den Sachverhalt richtig unter die maßgebliche Verbandsnorm subsumiert (Subsumtionskontrolle).128 Darüber hinaus setzt auch das Kartellrecht der Satzungsautonomie Grenzen.129 In der Schweiz hingegen wird Sportverbandsrecht schwerpunktmäßig am allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht gem. Art. 28 ff. ZGB geprüft.130 Vom allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht wird dort unter anderem die Entfaltungsfreiheit im Rahmen der Sportausübung erfasst.131 Aber auch das Kartellrecht setzt in der Schweiz der Freiheit der Sportverbände, ihre eigenen Regeln zu setzen, Grenzen.132 In Österreich wiederum wird die lex sportiva vor allem an arbeitsrechtlichen Schutzvorschriften gemessen.133 In Griechenland wird die lex sportiva nach Ansicht von Dimitrios Panagiotopolous insbes. in arbeitsrechtlichen Bereichen, bei Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Betätigung im Sport, des Gesundheitsschutzes der Athleten, des Schutzes der Persönlichkeit sowie der öffentlichen Sicherheit durch staatliches Recht begrenzt.134 Der lex sportiva wird durch die staatlichen Rechtsordnungen somit ein Rahmen vorgeben, innerhalb dessen sie sich bewegen muss. Dieser kann von Staat zu Staat abweichen, auch wenn sich die Gerichte zumindest in Deutschland mit Eingriffen in den Kernbereich des Sports zurückhalten.

V. Lex sportiva und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit Um die Bedeutung der lex sportiva bewerten zu können, muss ihr Einfluss auf die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit genauer untersucht werden, da über diesen Mechanismus sportrechtliche Streitigkeiten in einer Vielzahl von Fällen gelöst ___________ 128

Vgl. Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 279 f.; ders., JZ 1984, 167 ff. Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 27 ff.); Hannamann, Kartellverbot und Verhaltenskoordinationen im Sport, 2001, S. 299 ff.; Gleiches gilt für die USA, wo die Verbandsregelwerke anhand des Kartellrechts überprüft werden, Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 285, 298). 130 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757). Vgl. etwa Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 96 ff.; WADA v. Jobson u.a., CAS 2010/A/2307, Rn. 175. 131 Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 208. 132 UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA / FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, Rn. 328 ff. 133 Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 285). 134 Panagiotopoulos, ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 7:1–2, 2007, 1 (4); ders., ISLR/Pandektis, Vol. 5:3, 2004, 316 (323 f.). 129

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werden. Ein herausragender Eckpunkt in der Entwicklung des internationalen Sportrechts stellt die Gründung des Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) durch das IOC im Jahr 1984 dar.135 Auch wenn aufgrund seiner Verbindung zum IOC zunächst generelle Zurückhaltung dahingehend bestand, Rechtsschutz beim CAS zu suchen,136 wird er in der Sportwelt inzwischen von allen Beteiligten als eine Art „Weltsportgerichtshof“ anerkannt.137

1. Sportschiedsgerichte, insbes. der CAS Neben dem internationalen Sportschiedsgericht CAS entstehen auch zunehmend nationale Schiedsgerichte für den Bereich des nationalen Sports, in Deutschland zum Beispiel die Anfang 2008 eingerichtete Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (DIS). Zu unterscheiden ist zwischen „echten“ Schiedsgerichten, die unabhängig von den Sportverbänden sowie überparteilich sind und daher von den staatlichen Gerichten anerkannt werden, und sonstigen Schiedsgerichten, die die staatliche Gerichtsbarkeit nicht verdrängen können. Die Ausführungen beschränken sich im Folgenden auf den CAS, da er zunehmend als oberstes internationales Sportgericht angesehen wird und bei der Entwicklung einer lex sportiva eine herausragende Rolle spielt.138 Der CAS ist für die lex sportiva deswegen so bedeutsam, weil seine Schiedssprüche zur Herausbildung sportspezifischer Rechtsprinzipien und zur Harmonisierung des Sportrechts beitragen.139 Die Sportverbände orientieren sich bspw. zunehmend an der Rechtsprechung des CAS, wenn sie ihre Dopingregeln anpassen. Der CAS ist häufig in den Satzungen der Sportverbände und in den Athletenvereinbarungen – etwa bei den Olympischen Spielen140 – sowie in den Lizenzen als zuständiges Schiedsgericht unter Ausschluss staatlicher Gerichte für Streitigkeiten im Zusammenhang mit dem sportlichen Wettbewerb vorgesehen (Schiedsvereinbarung).141 Der Athlet ist de facto dazu gezwungen, sich der Zuständigkeit des CAS zu unterwerfen, da er sonst nicht zum sportlichen Wettbewerb zugelassen wird. Um den Rechtsschutz vor dem CAS möglichst effektiv auszugestalten, werden während großer Sportereignisse spezielle Ad-hoc___________ 135 Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998, 1998, XXIV. 136 Kane (Fn. 1), S. 455 (S. 457 f.). 137 Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 133; FAZ v. 20.5.10, S. 8. 138 Vgl. Latty (Fn. 11), S. 257 ff., 357; Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 498. 139 Siehe II.2.b). Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 498. 140 Art. 61 Olympic Charter (2013) sowie Punkt 8 der Entry-Form des IOC; vgl. zu letzterem Jakob-Milicia, SpuRt 2013, 236 ff. 141 Zum Beispiel Art. 66 ff. FIFA Statutes (2013); Art. 15 IAAF Constitution (2013).

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Kammern gebildet, um Entscheidungen innerhalb von 24 Stunden treffen und Verzögerungen bei den Wettbewerben vermeiden zu können.142

2. Lex sportiva als Entscheidungsgrundlage für den CAS? Der lex sportiva kommt vor allem dann eigenständige Bedeutung zu, wenn sie durch Rechtswahl als alleinige Grundlage für Entscheidungen des CAS vereinbart werden kann, so dass diese ohne subsidiären Rückgriff auf staatliches Recht getroffen werden können. Grundsätzlich besteht heute Einigkeit, dass die Parteien eines internationalen Schiedsverfahrens statt staatlichen Rechts private Rechtsregeln als Entscheidungsgrundlage wählen können.143 Die Zulässigkeit der Vereinbarung der lex sportiva sieht sich insbes. zwei Kritikpunkten ausgesetzt (dazu a) und b)). Dessen ungeachtet ist die Möglichkeit, die lex sportiva vor Schiedsgerichten als anwendbares Recht zu wählen, zu bejahen (dazu c)).

a) Ungleichgewicht zwischen Verband und Sportler Wesentlicher Bestandteil der lex sportiva sind die von den Verbänden aufgestellten Regelwerke. Damit besteht die Gefahr, dass der Schutz der Sportler vernachlässigt wird. Denn die Sportverbände können für sich vorteilhafte Regelungen selbst festlegen und die Sportler sich wegen des zwischen ihnen und den Sportverbänden bestehenden erheblichen Machtgefälles nur schwer dagegen wehren.144 Dieser Einwand kann aber relativiert werden, da zum einen die Verbandssatzungen, wie dargestellt, stets in eine nationale Rechtsordnung eingebettet sind und deren international zwingende Vorgaben beachten müssen. Zum anderen wird der Schutz der Athleten durch die vom CAS aufgestellten allgemeinen und sportspezifischen Rechtsprinzipien gewährt (dazu II.2.b)). Hier stellt sich allerdings die Frage, ob der CAS die Satzungsbestimmungen der Verbände lediglich anwenden oder diese an übergeordnetem Recht – etwa den allgemeinen Sportrechtsprinzipien der lex sportiva oder den zwingenden Bestimmungen des nationalen und europäischen Rechts – messen und ggf. ___________ 142 So während den Olympischen Spielen nach den CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games; vgl. dazu ausführlich Martens/Keidel, SpuRt 2013, 253 ff.; Netzle, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit an Sportveranstaltungen, in: Torggler (Hrsg.), Rechtsprobleme von Sportveranstaltungen, 2012, S. 67 ff. 143 Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 324, 362. 144 Pfister (Fn. 87), VI 1 Rn. 8. Etwas anderes gilt sicherlich für Spitzensportler, die im Einzelnen entsprechende Vereinbarungen aushandeln können.

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verwerfen kann bzw. sogar muss.145 Eine Normverwerfungskompetenz würde die Ausbildung einer lückenlosen lex sportiva vorantreiben.146 Zwar beansprucht der CAS regelmäßig das Recht, Verbandssatzungen an höherrangigem Recht zu prüfen,147 hält sich bei der praktischen Umsetzung aber weitgehend zurück und verwirft nur in seltenen Fällen eine eindeutige Verbandsregel aufgrund entgegenstehender höherrangiger Rechtsprinzipien.148 Vielmehr rügt er grundsätzlich fragwürdige Regeln nur in obiter dicta bzw. beschränkt sich in der Regel darauf, die konkrete Normanwendung auf ihre Vereinbarkeit mit höherrangigem Recht zu prüfen.149 Insoweit wäre es wünschenswert, wenn die Verbände die Zuständigkeit des CAS zur Überprüfung ihrer Verbandsregeln klarstellend regeln würden. Erfolgt keine Überprüfung von Verbandssatzungen ___________ 145

Befürwortend z. B. Vieweg/Staschik, SpuRt 2013, 227 (232 f.); Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 621 ff., 641. Zum 1. 1. 2012 wurde die in den Verfahrensvorschriften des CAS vorgesehene Möglichkeit der Sportverbände, ein Gutachten des CAS hinsichtlich der Vereinbarkeit der Verbandsregeln mit höherrangigem Recht anzufordern, abgeschafft, vgl. Art. R60 CAS-Code a.F. (2004). 146 Als vorbildlich hervorgehoben werden kann in diesem Zusammenhang die Entscheidung des CAS über die Gültigkeit der UEFA-Regel, das nicht zwei Vereine mit demselben Eigentümer an Wettbewerben der UEFA teilnehmen dürfen, AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 ff. Der CAS prüft in diesem Schiedsspruch umfassend die Vereinbarkeit der UEFA-Statuten mit dem Schweizer Zivilund Kartellrecht, dem europäischen Recht und den allgemeinen Rechtsprinzipien der lex sportiva, insbesondere dem Fairness-Prinzip. Im Rahmen der Prüfung des europäischen Kartellrechts schenkt er dabei der Prüfung der Verhältnismäßigkeit und der objektiven Erforderlichkeit der UEFA-Regel besonderes Augenmerk und stellt fest, dass das Verbot unangemessener Regeln auch Teil der lex sportiva ist. 147 CAS OG 04/009, Rn. 6.8; COC & Kibunde v. AIBA, CAS OG 00/004, Digest II, 617 (621 ff.); vgl. auch Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, Rn. 8.5; Fusimalohi v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, Rn. 96; UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA / FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, Rn. 328 ff.; UCI v. Ullrich & Swiss Olympic, CAS 2010/A/2083, Rn. 34; FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976&986, Rn. 123, 173. 148 Vgl. Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 143 f., 156. In seiner Entscheidung WADA v. Hardy & USADA sieht sich der CAS bspw. an eine in den Dopingregularien der FINA und WADA vorgesehene Mindeststrafe gebunden und stellt unter anderem darauf ab, dass es außerhalb seiner Prüfungskompetenz liege, die Verbandsregularien wegen Verstoßes gegen den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz oder das Diskriminierungsverbot zu missachten sowie die anwendbaren Regeln komplett umzuschreiben, um ein unfaires Ergebnis zu berichtigen, WADA v. Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, Rn. 61. In seiner Entscheidung Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., CAS 2008/A/1644, Rn. 18, 44 weist der CAS zwar darauf hin, dass er grundsätzlich die Vereinbarkeit von Verbandsregeln mit Unionsrecht prüfe, diese jedoch im konkreten Fall offen lassen könne, da sich auch bei einem Verstoß gegen Unionsrecht die gleiche Rechtsfolge ergäbe. In den Fällen MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., CAS 2009/A/1757, Rn. 29 und Midtjylland v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, Rn. 7.4 prüft er eine Vereinbarkeit mit Unionsrecht, insbes. der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit, bejaht diese aber. Eine eindeutige Verbandsregelung außer Acht lässt der CAS hingegen in I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, Rn. 132 ff. 149 So ausdrücklich Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Ltd., CAS 2008/A/1644, Rn. 18; RIIS v. UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, Rn. 8.38; Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 641 f.

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an höherrangigem Recht, droht den Schiedssprüchen vor nationalen Gerichten die Aufhebung. Deswegen wird teilweise auch vertreten, dass der CAS dazu verpflichtet sei, die Wirksamkeit des vereinbarten Reglements zu beurteilen.150

b) Lückenhaftigkeit der lex sportiva Fraglich ist darüber hinaus, ob überhaupt allein auf Grundlage der lex sportiva immer eine vollumfängliche Streitbeilegung möglich ist oder ob diese in gewissen Bereichen nicht so lückenhaft ist, dass ein Rückgriff auf staatliches Recht unumgänglich wird.151 So wird insbes. die Frage nach Schadensersatzansprüchen von Athleten gegen einen Sportverband aufgrund einer ungünstigen, fehlerhaften Sportverbandsentscheidung und der hiermit verbundenen finanziellen Einbuße (etwa Einnahmeausfälle wegen einer rechtswidrigen Dopingsperre) von der lex sportiva nicht beantwortet.152 Sportler klagen Schadensersatz deswegen auch stets vor staatlichen Gerichten ein.153 Harry „Butch“ Reynolds hatte bspw. vor einem amerikanischen Gericht von der IAAF zunächst 37,5 Mio. US-Dollar erstritten, unterlag dann jedoch in zweiter Instanz vollständig.154 Für die Entwicklung einer umfassenden lex sportiva wäre die Aufnahme von Schadensersatzregelungen zugunsten der Athleten in den Verbandsregelwerken wünschenswert. Fraglich ist, ob der CAS entsprechende Schadensersatzansprüche als allgemeines Prinzip des Sportrechts entwickeln kann, solange dies nicht geschehen ist.155 Immerhin sieht der CAS-Code in Art. R27 Abs. 2 eine grundsätzliche Zuständigkeit des CAS für Streitigkeiten um Vermögensansprüche vor. Adolphsen bspw. erachtet dies für grundsätzlich denkbar. Den allgemeinen und sportspezifischen Rechtsprinzipien der lex sportiva kommt so eine Lückenfüllungsfunktion zu.156 Selbst wenn die lex sportiva nicht alle Fragen umfassend regelt, kann sie als anwendbares Recht vor einem Schiedsgericht gewählt werden, da es ein absolut ___________ 150

Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 636, 641 f. Pfister (Fn. 87), VI 1 Rn. 8. 152 Wax (Fn. 4), S. 148. 153 Die Eisschnellläuferin Claudia Pechstein verklagt z. B. den Eislauf-Weltverband ISU und die Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft DESG vor dem LG München I auf 3,5 Mio. Euro Schadensersatz und 400.000 Euro Schmerzensgeld wegen der gegen sie aufgrund erhöhter Blutwerte verhängten Zweijahressperre, FAZ v. 20.9.13, S. 29. 154 Dokumentation des Falls bei Bach, SpuRt 1995, 142. 155 Der CAS selbst betrachtet die Angelegenheit bisher zurückhaltend, vgl. R. v. FIBA, CAS 2000/A/262, Digest II, 377 (387). 156 Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 643 ff.; ders. (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 290 f.). 151

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lückenloses Rechtssystem in der komplexen Lebenswirklichkeit gar nicht geben kann. Die Lückenhaftigkeit einer Rechtsordnung schadet daher ihrer Rechtswahl nicht, wenn sie ihre Ordnungs- und Vereinheitlichungsfunktion dennoch erfüllen kann. Dies ist für die lex sportiva zu bejahen.

c) Rechtswahlvereinbarung bzgl. der lex sportiva Trotz der beiden Kritikpunkte wird inzwischen durchweg anerkannt, dass die lex sportiva durch eine Rechtswahlvereinbarung vor Schiedsgerichten statt staatlichen Rechts gewählt werden kann,157 denn das staatliche Recht gewährt – unter dem Vorbehalt des ordre public – nichtstaatlichen Regelungen den Vorzug, wenn dies von den Parteien gewünscht ist. Die lex sportiva hat in der Praxis bspw. in die Schiedsregeln des CAS für die Olympischen Spiele (Art. 17 CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games) Eingang gefunden. Dort heißt es, dass die Ad-hoc-Kammern die Streitigkeit unter Anwendung der Olympischen Charter, der einschlägigen Verbandsregeln, allgemeiner Rechtsprinzipien und solcher Rechtsregeln, deren Anwendung ihnen geeignet erscheinen, entscheiden. Der CAS soll in diesen Verfahren also vollkommen ohne subsidiären Rückgriff auf eine staatliche Rechtsordnung entscheiden und kann insoweit auf die lex sportiva zurückgreifen.158 In den für gewöhnliche Verfahren geltenden Verfahrensvorschriften des CAS ist die Anwendung des einschlägigen Verbandsrechts vorgesehen und die Wahl von Rechtsregeln anstelle staatlichen Rechts ist explizit zugelassen. Dabei kann der CAS wiederum sogar ohne ausdrückliche Rechtswahl die Rechtsregeln anwenden, die ihm geeignet erscheinen – also etwa die lex sportiva.159 Dem Konzept einer lex sportiva, das ohne jeglichen Rückgriff auf eine nationale Rechtsordnung auskommt, stehen die verschiedenen Panels des CAS in der Praxis aber unterschiedlich gegenüber.160 Gegenwärtig sehen die Schiedsvereinbarungen der internationalen Sportver___________ 157 Wax (Fn. 4), S. 184; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 43); Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757); Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 288); ders. (Fn. 24), S. 633. Ablehnend Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 395. 158 Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 282); Martens/Keidel, SpuRt 2013, 253 (255). 159 Art. R58 CAS-Code; vgl. Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 356. Ein Rückgriff auf die allgemeinen Rechtsprinzipien der lex sportiva scheidet allerdings wohl aus, wenn sich die Schiedsparteien auf die subsidiäre Anwendung eines staatlichen Rechts neben den Verbandsregeln verständigen. 160 Vgl. oben bei Fn. 7. Die lex sportiva wird bspw. anerkannt in den Entscheidungen I. v. FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, Rn. 75; Anderson u.a. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, Rn. 65; FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, Rn. 16; COC & Scott v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, Rn. 14; COA & S. v. IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, Digest III, 17 (28); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 1998/200, Digest II, 38 (102); B. v. FIBA, CAS 1992/80, Digest I, 297 (302). Ebenso Wax (Fn. 4), S. 183 f.

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bände in der Regel vor, dass das jeweilige Verbandsrecht Anwendung findet. Jedoch wird für die dort nicht geregelten Fragen bisher jedenfalls nicht ausdrücklich auf die lex sportiva verwiesen. Der CAS wendet dann derzeit subsidiär grundsätzlich explizit nationales Recht – in der Regel Schweizer Recht – an, wohingegen der alleinige Rückgriff auf die lex sportiva die Ausnahme bildet.161 Die lex sportiva kann demzufolge vor Schiedsgerichten als anwendbares Statut vereinbart werden, bspw. in Deutschland nach § 1051 Abs. 1 ZPO oder in der Schweiz nach Art. 187 IPRG. Dadurch wird die Möglichkeit eröffnet, dass zumindest vor dem CAS international auf vergleichbare Sportrechtsstreitigkeiten einheitliches Recht Anwendung findet. Verbandsentscheidungen, also die Anwendung der Verbandsregelungen im Einzelfall, aber auch die Verbandsregelungen selbst, werden dann anhand der lex sportiva auf ihre Rechtmäßigkeit überprüft. Eine solche Rechtswahlvereinbarung ist wirksam, obwohl der Sportler faktisch zu ihrem Abschluss gezwungen ist, da er sonst vom internationalen Sportverband nicht zum Wettbewerb zugelassen wird.162 Der faktische Zwang ist nämlich nach überwiegender Auffassung durch das Erfordernis einer einheitlichen Streitentscheidung im internationalen Sport gerechtfertigt, solange das Schiedsgericht ein faires Verfahren und effektiven Schutz der Rechte der Sportler gewährleistet.163

3. Anerkennung der Entscheidungen des CAS durch die nationalen Rechtsordnungen Nicht zu unterschätzende Bedeutung kommt der Frage zu, inwiefern die auf Grundlage der lex sportiva getroffenen Schiedssprüche des CAS von staatlichen Rechtsordnungen anerkannt werden, insbes. ob von den staatlichen Gerichten die Einrede des Schiedsvertrags akzeptiert wird.164 In der Regel ist allein das ___________ 161 Adolphsen (Fn. 4), S. 93 (S. 103). Anders jedoch in seiner Entscheidung FCP v. FIRS, CAS 2004/A/776, Rn. 16, in der der CAS die Anwendung der lex sportiva ausdrücklich auf Art. R58 CAS-Code stützt. 162 Eine Schiedsgerichtsvereinbarung enthält etwa die Athletenvereinbarung, die von Sportlern unterzeichnet werden muss, um an Olympischen Spielen teilnehmen zu können, s.o. V.1. Dieser faktische Zwang zum Abschluss einer Schiedsvereinbarung wird in einer Petition von der Eisschnellläuferin Claudia Pechstein kritisiert, die von mehreren Spitzensportlern unterstützt wird, vgl. FAZ v. 22.10.13, S. 27. 163 Schweizer Bundesgericht SpuRt 2007, 113 (115 f.); Latty (Fn. 11), S. 536 f.; Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 293 ff.). Siehe zur vergleichbaren Frage, ob die Schiedsgerichtsvereinbarung mangels Freiwilligkeit des Verzichts auf staatlichen Rechtsschutz unwirksam ist Steiner, SchiedsVZ 2013, 15 (17 ff.). 164 Soek schreibt: „The lex sportiva … could only find universal recognition if its main aspects did not meet with insurmountable resistance in the respective legal systems.“

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Schweizer Bundesgericht für die Überprüfung von CAS-Entscheidungen zuständig, da der CAS seinen Sitz in Lausanne hat.165 Nach anfänglicher Zurückhaltung166 hat das Schweizer Bundesgericht dem CAS inzwischen die notwendige Unabhängigkeit vom IOC bescheinigt und ihn als „echtes“ Schiedsgericht anerkannt.167 Dies hat zur Folge, dass der Prüfungsumfang hinsichtlich CAS-Entscheidungen sehr beschränkt ist. Gem. Art. 190 Abs. 2 IPRG sind allein folgende Rügen zulässig: vorschriftswidrige Bestellung bzw. Zusammensetzung des Schiedsgerichts; fehlerhafte Zuständigkeitserklärung des Schiedsgerichts; kein Entscheid über einzelne Rechtsbegehren oder Entscheid über nicht unterbreitete Streitpunkte; Verletzung der Grundsätze der Gleichbehandlung der Parteien oder des rechtlichen Gehörs; Unvereinbarkeit mit dem ordre public. Bis zum Frühjahr 2007 hatte das Schweizer Bundesgericht auch keinen Schiedsspruch des CAS aufgehoben.168 Dies änderte sich mit dem Fall des Tennisspielers Cañas, bei dem das Bundesgericht zum ersten Mal eine Entscheidung des CAS verwarf.169 Der CAS hatte wegen eines Dopingvergehens des argentinischen Tennisprofis Guillermo Cañas eine Dopingstrafe von 15 Monaten als angemessen erachtet.170 Trotz eines im Reglement der ATP vorgesehenen Ausschlusses staatlicher Rechtsbehelfe gegen Schiedssprüche des CAS rief der Sportler das Schweizer Bundesgericht an. Dieses erachtete die auf Art. 192 IPRG gestützte Verzichtserklärung bei Sportschiedsverfahren als unwirksam und hielt die Klage daher für zulässig. Anders als Vertragspartner im gewöhnlichen Geschäftsleben stünden sich Sportler und Verband nicht horizontal gegenüber, sondern es bestehe ein Machtgefälle. Der Sportler habe allein die Wahl zwischen der Anerkennung der verbandsrechtlich vorgegebenen Bedin___________ Ders., The Strict Liability Principles and the Human Rights of Athletes in Doping Cases, 2006, S. 165; Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 509. 165 Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 153. Dies gilt aber auch für Entscheidungen der Ad-hocKammern, die ihren Sitz am jeweiligen Wettkampfort haben. 166 Schweizer Bundesgericht, Digest I of CAS Awards, 561 (569 f.); Casini (Fn. 21), S. 149 (S. 153 f.). 167 Schweizer Bundesgericht, BGE 129 II, 271. In Deutschland hat das LG München I den CAS als unabhängiges Schiedsgericht anerkannt, LG München I, Urteil v. 20.12.2001 – 7 O 2030/2001 (zitiert nach Adolphsen (Fn. 4), S. 93 (S. 100)). Da auch die FIFA den CAS finanziell unterstützt, stellt sich die parallele Frage, ob der CAS von der FIFA abhängig und deswegen kein „echtes“ Schiedsgericht ist. Der CAS selbst sieht die notwendige Unabhängigkeit als gegeben an, vgl. UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA / FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, Rn. 252 ff., 266 ff. Ebenso sieht das Regionalgericht Bern-Mittelland, CaS 2012, 253 (259 f.), keinen Grund die Unabhängigkeit des CAS von der FIFA in Frage zu stellen. 168 Wax (Fn. 4), S. 141. 169 Schweizer Bundesgericht SpuRt 2007, 113. 170 C. v. ATP Tour, CAS 2005/A/951, SpuRt 2006, 161.

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gungen einerseits und dem Verzicht auf die Ausübung seines Berufs andererseits. Die Vereinbarung eines wirksamen Anfechtungsverzichts setze jedoch eine gewisse Entscheidungsfreiheit des Sportlers voraus. Nur wenn dieser auch ohne Unterzeichnung der Schiedsklausel am Sportbetrieb teilnehmen dürfe, könne von einer freiwilligen Zustimmung zum Ausschluss der Anfechtung gesprochen werden. Da eine solche Situation der Freiwilligkeit im Profisport jedoch – abgesehen von Ausnahmen – realitätsfern erscheint, dürfte – die Auffassung des Bundesgerichts zugrunde gelegt – künftig fast jeder Anfechtungsverzicht gemäß Art. 192 IPRG im Bereich der Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit unzulässig und eine Anfechtung bei Vorliegen eines Grundes nach Art. 190 Abs. 2 IPRG möglich sein. Da das Gericht weiterhin der Auffassung war, dass der CAS das rechtliche Gehör des Tennisspielers verletzt habe, hob es den Schiedsspruch des CAS auf. Auch unter Zugrundelegung der Auffassung des Schweizer Bundesgerichts verhängte der CAS aber in seiner Folgeentscheidung eine Sperre von 15 Monaten gegen Cañas und bestätigte damit seinen ersten Schiedsspruch.171 In weiteren Fällen kassierte das Schweizer Bundesgericht Schiedssprüche des CAS aus verfahrensrechtlichen Gründen:172 2009 war der deutsche Eishockey-Spieler Florian Busch zunächst vom CAS für zwei Jahre gesperrt worden, weil er im März 2008 eine Dopingprobe verweigert, dann aber verspätet – mit negativem Resultat – nachgeholt hatte.173 Das Schweizer Bundesgericht hob diese Sperre Ende 2009 auf, da der CAS mangels Schiedsgerichtsvereinbarung nicht zuständig sei.174 Busch habe nie die notwendige Athletenvereinbarung beim Deutschen Eishockey-Bund (DEB) unterschrieben und das Anmeldeformular für die Weltmeisterschaft 2008 im Mai begründe nur eine Zuständigkeit des CAS für die Dauer des Turniers, nicht aber im Vorfeld. 2010 entschied das Schweizer Bundesgericht, dass der CAS den verfahrensrechtlichen ordre public verletze und sein Schiedsspruch daher aufzuheben sei, wenn er die materielle Rechtskraft einer früheren Entscheidung unbeachtet lasse (Einwand des res iudicata).175

___________ 171 C. v. ATP Tour, CAS 2005/A/951, SpuRt 2007, 244; ein Vorgehen Cañas gegen diesen Schiedsspruch auf europarechtlicher Basis wegen Verstoßes gegen EUWettbewerbsrecht wurde vom EuGH, Urteil v. 20.06.2013, Rs. C-269/12 zurückgewiesen, vgl. CaS 2013, 244 f. 172 Vgl. auch die beiden Entscheidungen des Schweizer Bundesgerichts vom 08.03.2012 – 4A_627/2011 und vom 03.05.2010 – 4A_456/2009 in denen Schiedssprüche des CAS aufgrund fehlender Zuständigkeit des Schiedsgerichts aufgehoben wurden. 173 WADA v. DEB & B., CAS 2008/A/1738. 174 Schweizer Bundesgericht, Entscheid vom 06.11.2009 – 4A_358/2009. 175 Schweizer Bundesgericht SpuRt 2010, 197 f.

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Insgesamt hält sich das Schweizer Bundesgericht außerhalb verfahrensrechtlicher Fehler jedoch erkennbar zurück und erkennt Entscheidungen des CAS in aller Regel an.176 Als absolute Grenze ist allerdings der Ordre-public-Vorbehalt anzusehen. Schiedssprüche werden durch staatliche Gerichte nur dann anerkannt, wenn sie nicht gegen den Grundsatz des ordre public (§ 1059 Abs. 2 Nr. 2b ZPO, Art. 190 Abs. 2e IPRG) verstoßen.177 Ein Verstoß liegt vor, wenn international zwingende Normen nicht beachtet wurden. Diese müssen also auch vom Schiedsgericht berücksichtigt werden, damit es der Aufgabe, vollstreckungsfähige Entscheidungen zu treffen, gerecht werden kann.178 Die Ordre-publicKontrolle ist aber keine Inhaltskontrolle der angewandten lex sportiva, sondern allein eine Ergebniskontrolle des Schiedsspruchs.179 Zu den international zwingenden Normen zählen etwa das deutsche (§ 130 Abs. 2 GWB) und das europäische Kartellrecht (Artt. 101, 102 AEUV) sowie das Arbeitsrecht.180 Vor allem die kartellrechtliche Nachprüfung kann die Sportautonomie erheblich beschneiden. Sowohl die Anwendung im Einzelfall durch die Sportverbände als auch der Inhalt der Verbandsregeln werden am Maßstab des Kartellrechts beurteilt.181 Gerade in diesem Bereich erscheint es wünschenswert, dass Schiedsgerichte eine Vorlagefrage nach Art. 267 AEUV an den EuGH richten dürfen.182 ___________ 176 Vgl. zuletzt die beiden Entscheidungen des Schweizer Bundesgerichts in der Causa „FC Sion“: In seiner Entscheidung vom 12.01.2011 – 4A_392/2010, bestätigte das Schweizer Bundesgericht einen Schiedsspruch des CAS, der u.a. ein Verbot für den FC Sion neue Spieler zu verpflichten aufrechterhielt, mit der Begründung, dass weder der Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör noch der ordre public verletzt sei. Das Bundesgericht betonte dabei seine eingeschränkte Prüfungsbefugnis im Bereich der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. Nachdem der FC Sion trotz des Verbots neue Spieler verpflichtet hatte und deswegen von der UEFA für die Saison 2011/2012 von der Europa League ausgeschlossen wurde, verwarf das Schweizer Bundesgericht eine Beschwerde des FC Sion gegen einen Schiedsspruch des CAS, der diesen Ausschluss bestätigt hatte, Entscheid vom 16.07.2012 – 4A_134/2012. Nach Ansicht des Schweizer Bundesgerichts fehlte dem FC Sion das erforderliche Rechtsschutzinteresse an der Aufhebung des Ausschlusses von der Europa League, da der Wettbewerb zwischenzeitlich beendet war. 177 Vgl. Savic v. PITOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, Rn. 8.5; Grunsky, Überprüfung der Sportrechtsprechung durch staatliche Gerichte, in: Württembergischer Fußballverband e.V. (Hrsg.), Sportrechtsprechung, 1995, S. 15 (S. 21 f.); Latty (Fn. 11), S. 514; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 44). 178 Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 395. Vorbildhaft insoweit WADA v. Jobson u.a., CAS 2010/A/2307, Rn. 173 ff. 179 Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 44). 180 Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 340. Nafziger ist z. B. der Ansicht, dass die lex sportiva auf Fälle, die Arbeits- oder Kartellrecht tangieren, keine Anwendung findet, ders., ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3. 181 Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 297 ff.). Vgl. z. B. UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA/FC Sion, CAS 2011/O/2574, Rn. 328 ff. 182 Vgl. Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 342.

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Das Schweizer Bundesgericht hat die Grenze des ordre public in seinem Urteil vom 27. März 2012183 überschritten gesehen und in einem weiteren Fall eine CAS-Entscheidung aufgehoben. In dem Rechtsstreit zwischen dem Fußballspieler Francelino da Silva Matuzalem und dem Weltfußballverband FIFA sowie FC Shakhtar Donetsk hatte der CAS184 Matuzalem verpflichtet, 11,9 Mio. Euro an seinen früheren Verein FC Shakhtar Donetsk zu zahlen, da er dort seinen Arbeitsvertrag fristlos und ohne wichtigen Grund aufgelöst hatte. Diese Entscheidung des CAS wurde vom Schweizer Bundesgericht bestätigt.185 Da Matuzalem aber nicht zahlen konnte, verurteilte ihn die FIFA-Disziplinarkommission im August 2010 zu einer Geldbuße und drohte für den Fall der Nichtbezahlung ein unbegrenztes Berufsverbot an. Nachdem Matuzlem dieses Berufsverbot vor dem CAS angefochten hatte, dort aber gescheitert war, verhalf das Schweizer Bundesgericht der Beschwerde des Fußballers zum Erfolg. Das Gericht sah in dem Berufsverbot einen Verstoß gegen fundamentale Grundsätze der Schweizer Rechtsordnung (ordre public), namentlich einen offensichtlichen und schwerwiegenden Eingriff in das Persönlichkeitsrecht, und kassierte in der Folge die Entscheidung des CAS. Dies ist bisher der einzige Fall, in dem das Schweizer Bundesgericht eine Entscheidung des CAS aus materiell-rechtlichen Gründen aufhob. Eine gesteigerte Gefahr der Aufhebung von Entscheidungen des CAS besteht, wenn ausnahmsweise ein anderes Gericht für die Überprüfung des Schiedsspruchs zuständig ist, wie der Fall Hondo zeigt. Der deutsche Radprofi Danilo Hondo wurde vom CAS wegen Dopings mit einer zweijährigen Sperre belegt.186 Die Gesetzeslage in der Schweiz, wo Hondo seinen ständigen Wohnsitz hatte, erlaubte es dem eigentlich für die Revision von CAS-Entscheidungen unzuständigen örtlichen Kantonsgericht, den Schiedsspruch des Sportgerichts zu überprüfen, da es sich um eine rein nationale Auseinandersetzung handelte. Das Kantonsgericht hob die Entscheidung des CAS zunächst im Wege einer einstweiligen Verfügung auf, da es Zweifel an der Zulässigkeit des Strictliability-Grundsatzes hatte.187 Durch diese Entscheidung schien die gesamte Dopingbekämpfung gefährdet. Schließlich hat aber das Schweizer Bundesgericht Hondos Einspruch in letzter Instanz abgelehnt.188

___________ 183

Schweizer Bundesgericht SpuRt 2012, 109 ff. Matuzalem u.a. v. Shaktar Donetzk u.a., CAS 2008/A/1519–1520. 185 Schweizer Bundesgericht, Entscheid v. 02.06.2010 – 4A_320/2009. 186 H. v. SCF & SO, CAS 2005/A/922&923&926, SpuRt 2006, 70. 187 FAZ v. 22.03.2006, S. 34. 188 Schweizer Bundesgericht, Entscheid vom 10.01.2007 – 4P.148/2006; FAZ v. 16.01.2007, S. 30. 184

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4. Durchsetzung der CAS-Entscheidungen Die lex sportiva führt nur dann zu einer effektiven Vereinheitlichung des internationalen Sportrechts, wenn die auf ihrer Grundlage getroffenen Entscheidungen des CAS auch durchgesetzt werden können. Unproblematisch möglich und effektiv ist eine Durchsetzung der CASEntscheidungen durch die Sportverbände selbst, bspw. in Form von Startverboten und Sperren.189 Dies ist auch der Regelfall, so dass staatliche Vollstreckungshilfe nicht beansprucht werden muss. Sollte ausnahmsweise ein Bedarf an staatlicher Vollstreckung eines Schiedsspruchs bestehen190 – etwa wenn ein Spieler zu einer Geldstrafe verurteilt wird, wie z. B. der rumänische Fußballspieler Adrian Mutu, der wegen KokainMissbrauchs vom CAS zur Zahlung einer Geldstrafe in Höhe von 17,2 Mio. € an seinen früheren Verein FC Chelsea verurteilt wurde –,191 muss dieser zunächst im jeweiligen Staat für vollstreckbar erklärt werden. Dies erfolgt allerdings nur dann, wenn kein Verstoß gegen den ordre public vorliegt. Hiefür müssen die international zwingenden Normen des jeweiligen Staates eingehalten werden (dazu V.3.).

5. Einstweiliger Rechtsschutz Während für Sportrechtsstreitigkeiten in der Hauptsache also eine ausschließliche Zuständigkeit des CAS vorgesehen werden kann und diese von staatlichen Gerichten in aller Regel auch anerkannt wird, ist dies für den einstweiligen Rechtsschutz, dem gerade im Sport immense Bedeutung zukommt, umstritten. Grundsätzlich ist der CAS zwar auch zum Erlass einstweiliger Verfügungen berechtigt.192 Es besteht aber eine parallele Zuständigkeit der staatlichen Gerichte (in Deutschland § 1033 ZPO), so dass der durch Schiedsgerichte gewährte vorläufige Rechtsschutz kein exklusiver ist.193 Der Athlet kann grds. also auch während eines laufenden Verfahrens vor dem CAS vorläufigen Rechtsschutz vor einem staatlichen Gericht begehren.194 Dies führt gerade im wichtigen Bereich des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes zur beschriebenen Problematik der Ungleichheit und Rechtsunsicherheit im internationalen Bereich. ___________ 189

Ipsen (Fn. 21), S. 148; Panagiotopoulos (Fn. 87), S. 2 (S. 6). Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 675. 191 Mutu v. Chelsea FCL, CAS 2008/A/1644. Diese Geldstrafe wurde auch vom Schweizer Bundesgericht bestätigt, Entscheid v. 10.06.2010 – 4A 458/2009. 192 Art. R37 CAS-Code; dazu II.2.b). 193 Wax (Fn. 4), S. 144; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 45). 194 Holla, Der Einsatz von Schiedsgerichten im organisierten Sport, 2005, S. 229. 190

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Nicht abschließend geklärt ist, ob diese parallele Zuständigkeit von Schiedsgericht und staatlichem Gericht dadurch ausgeschlossen werden kann, dass in der Schiedsvereinbarung der CAS für einstweilige Verfügungen als ausschließlich zuständig erklärt wird.195 Das IOC sieht dies in den Teilnahmebedingungen für die Olympischen Spiele vor.196 Bis heute ist umstritten, ob ein solcher Ausschluss staatlicher Gerichte für den vorläufigen Rechtsschutz überhaupt wirksam ist. Aufgrund der fehlenden Freiwilligkeit seitens der Sportler ist dies mit guten Gründen zu bezweifeln.197 Voraussetzung ist aber jedenfalls, dass der schiedsgerichtliche einstweilige Rechtsschutz möglichst effektiv ausgestaltet ist.198 Die Causa Pechstein verdeutlicht die Problematik des einstweiligen Rechtsschutzes. Der CAS akzeptierte mit Schiedsspruch vom 25.11.2009 erstmals einen nur indirekten Doping-Nachweis als Grundlage für eine mehrjährige Wettkampfsperre der Eisschnellläuferin Claudia Pechstein durch die Internationale Eislaufunion (ISU).199 Das Schweizer Bundesgericht gab daraufhin einem Eilantrag Pechsteins statt200 und erlaubte ihr per einstweiliger Verfügung, an der Qualifikation für die Olympischen Spiele teilzunehmen. Letztlich hat es aber im Hauptverfahren die Beschwerde gegen die Entscheidung des CAS am 10.02.2010 abgewiesen.201 Am 28.9.2010 hat dann das Schweizer Bundesgericht endgültig den CAS-Schiedsspruch bestätigt, indem es die Revision von Pechstein abwies.202

VI. Lex sportiva und nationale Gerichte Abschließend stellt sich die Frage nach der Rolle der lex sportiva bei einem Verfahren vor staatlichen Gerichten, bspw. wenn ein Sportler zulässigerweise nicht den CAS, sondern direkt nationale Gerichte anruft. ___________ 195 Für das Schweizer Recht nimmt das Regionalgericht Bern-Mittelland CaS 2012, 79 (81 ff.) an, dass die Zuständigkeit der staatlichen Gerichte für den einstweiligen Rechtsschutz unabdingbar ist. 196 § 8 der Entry-Form: „The CAS shall rule on its jurisdiction and shall have the exclusive power to order provisional and conservatory measures.“ Vgl. Jakob-Milicia, SpuRt 2013, 236 (238). 197 Wax (Fn. 4), S. 147 f.; Adolphsen (Fn. 24), S. 569 ff.; Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 399 ff. Steiner hält hingegen den Verzicht auf staatlichen Eilrechtsschutz für wirksam, ders., SchiedsVZ 2013, 15 (18). 198 Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 416; Hess (Fn. 2), S. 1 (S. 46). 199 Pechstein & DESG v. ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912&1913. 200 Schweizer Bundesgericht CaS 2009, 368 f. 201 Schweizer Bundesgericht, Entscheid vom 10.02.2010 – 4A_612/2009. 202 Schweizer Bundesgericht, Entscheid vom 28.09.2010 – 4A_144/2010.

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1. Rechtswahl der lex sportiva? Während eine parteiautonome Rechtswahl der lex sportiva in Schiedsverfahren als zulässig erachtet wird, ist vor staatlichen Gerichten allein die Wahl einer anderen staatlichen, nicht aber einer privaten Rechtsordnung möglich. Somit kann die lex sportiva nicht als Entscheidungsgrundlage in Verfahren der staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit gewählt werden.203 Dies führt insbes. im einstweiligen Rechtsschutz zum geschilderten Problem der Rechtszersplitterung, da in diesem Bereich die staatlichen Gerichte nicht durch Schiedsgerichte verdrängt werden können. Hier kann auch die lex sportiva nicht unmittelbar weiterhelfen.

2. Berücksichtigung bei Anwendung und Auslegung des staatlichen Rechts Mittelbar könnte die lex sportiva aber auch zu einer – zumindest teilweisen – Harmonisierung des anwendbaren Rechts vor staatlichen Gerichten beitragen, denn die Verbandsregeln sind zwischen den Sportverbänden und den Sportlern aufgrund der satzungsmäßigen oder vertraglichen Bindung der Sportler an diese (s.o. IV.3.) trotzdem im Rahmen des jeweiligen staatlichen Rechts und innerhalb dessen Grenzen anwendbar. Darüber hinaus stellt sich die Frage, ob die lex sportiva bei der Anwendung und Auslegung unbestimmter Rechtsbegriffe und Generalklauseln des staatlichen Rechts zu berücksichtigen ist.204 In bestimmten Bereichen ist dies bereits Praxis: Bei Ski-Unfällen werden bspw. von nationalen Gerichten die FIS-Regeln bei der Frage herangezogen, ob ein Beteiligter den Unfall schuldhaft verursacht hat.205 Im gesamten Bereich der Körperverletzungen im Sport sind die jeweiligen Sportregeln zu beachten, wenn es um die Frage geht, ob dem Verletzten Schadensersatzansprüche zustehen oder ob der Verletzer sich strafbar gemacht hat.206 Die lex sportiva hat darüber hinaus sogar Einfluss auf den Erlass staatlichen Rechts. Deutlich wird dies am Beispiel des World-Anti-Doping-Codes, auf den staatliche Normen und völkerrechtliche Abkommen – etwa das UNESCO-Übereinkommen zur Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Doping im Sport – Bezug nehmen.207 ___________ 203

Adolphsen (Fn. 2), S. 281 (S. 288); Röthel, JZ 2007, 755 (757); Wax (Fn. 4), S. 185. Oschütz (Fn. 84), S. 360; Nolte (Fn. 86), S. 107 (S. 113). 205 Vgl. Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (Fn. 24), S. 48 f.; Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (Fn. 21), S. 87 ff. 206 Vgl. Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (Fn. 24), S. 52 ff.; Nolte (Fn. 86), S. 107 (S. 113). Das Gleiche gilt bspw. für das taiwanesische Recht, Chen-Huan Lin (Fn. 73), S. 71 (S. 74). 207 Nolte (Fn. 86), S. 107 (S. 113 ff.) 204

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VII. Zusammenfassung Mit dem – unterschiedlich verstandenen – Begriff lex sportiva sollte das Phänomen der Selbstregulierung im Sport umfassend beschrieben werden. Es empfiehlt sich deshalb, das gesamte selbstgesetzte, nichtstaatliche Recht des internationalen Sports zu erfassen. Dieses besteht aus den nationalen und internationalen Sportverbandsregeln sowie aus den vom CAS entwickelten allgemeinen und sportspezifischen Rechtsgrundsätzen. Die lex sportiva hat keinen anationalen, vollständig autonomen Rechtscharakter. Vielmehr bedarf sie grundsätzlich staatlicher Anerkennung, damit auf deren Grundlage Streitigkeiten im Sport entschieden werden können. Die lex sportiva wird dabei erheblich von staatlichem und europäischem Recht beeinflusst und ist von deren Akzeptanz abhängig. Der CAS kann Entscheidungen auf Grundlage der lex sportiva treffen. Diese werden von den staatlichen, insbes. von den Schweizer Gerichten in aller Regel anerkannt und können meist durch die Sportverbände selbst durchgesetzt werden. Somit ist die lex sportiva zwar keineswegs ein Allheilmittel, sie bietet aber eine „Chance zur Selbstregulierung“208. Auf diesem Weg kann sie einen Beitrag zur Harmonisierung des internationalen Sportrechts leisten. Ausgenommen ist allerdings der Bereich des einstweiligen Rechtsschutzes.

___________ 208

Vgl. Vieweg (Fn. 24), S. 195.

Sportrecht, Lex Sportiva und Lex Ludica Eine Neubewertung von Inhalt und Terminologie* Von Robert C.R. Siekmann Einleitung ..........................................................................................................

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II. Existiert so etwas wie „Sportrecht“? .................................................................

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Transnationales Sportrecht ........................................................................

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IV. Eine Neubewertung von Inhalt und Terminologie ............................................

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Terminologie .............................................................................................

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V. Abschließende Betrachtung: Der harte Kern des Sportrechts............................

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I. Einleitung Was ist „Sportrecht“? – Diese Frage wird häufig von Studenten, Wissenschaftlern, Rechtsanwälten und Laien gestellt. Wer versucht, darauf zu antworten, sucht oft vergebens nach einer Antwort, die ein Minimum an Verständnis dafür vermittelt, was „Sportrecht“ ist. Die Schwierigkeit, eine Antwort zu geben, rührt vielleicht daher, dass nicht klar ist, wonach genau gefragt wird. Zielt die Frage auf den praktischen Inhalt des „Sportrechts“ ab? Mit anderen Worten: ___________ *

Bereits in englischer Fassung unter dem Titel „What is Sports Law? A Reassessment of Content and Terminology“ veröffentlicht in The International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) 2011/3–4, 3 ff.

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Welche substantiellen Bereiche der Praxis fallen unter die Rubrik „Sportrecht“? Oder geht die Frage eher in die Richtung der Rolle des Sportrechtsanwalts? – In diesem Fall wird eventuell nach Informationen gefragt, die die Dienstleistungen eines Anwalts betreffen, der in diesem Bereich tätig ist. Schließlich könnte es dem Fragenden auch um die eher grundsätzliche Überlegung gehen, ob so etwas wie „Sportrecht“ überhaupt existiert.1 Anders gefragt: Kann Sportrecht als ein eigenständiger Bereich des materiellen Rechts angesehen werden und ist es als solcher auch anerkannt? Wenn ja, warum? Dies ist im Grunde die Frage, die zuerst beantwortet werden muss, da die Antwort nicht unumstritten ist. Ist diese Frage einmal beantwortet, ist im Anschluss zu fragen, was Sportrecht ist. Diese Untersuchung gliedert sich in folgende Teile: Existiert Sportrecht (ein Sportrecht, Sportrecht als ein Bereich des materiellen Rechts)? (dazu II.). Woraus setzt sich Sportrecht zusammen? (dazu III.). Eine Neubewertung des Inhalts und der Terminologie (dazu IV.) und die Frage „Was ist der harte Kern des Sportrechts?“ (dazu V.) schließen sich an. In Abschnitt IV. stelle ich meine eigene Auffassung der Thematik dar und erläutere einige der Fragen, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Sportrecht zu klären sind. Dies erfolgt unter Berücksichtigung aller dazu vertretenen Positionen und Meinungen.

II. Existiert so etwas wie „Sportrecht“? Beloff zufolge ist die Frage nach der Existenz einer „Lex sportiva“ – der Begriff wird von ihm offenbar wörtlich im Sinne von „Sportrecht“ verwendet2 – ein ständig wiederkehrendes Thema. Es ist eine fortdauernde Debatte, ob es ein einheitliches Regelwerk gibt oder ob Sportrecht nichts weiter ist als ein Mosaik, das beliebig aus einer Vielzahl verschiedener, allgemein anerkannter, separater Rechtsgebiete – Schuldrecht, Deliktsrecht, Urheberrecht, Verwaltungsrecht – zusammengesetzt ist. Diese Frage ist nicht nur rein akademischer Natur (ein Stempel, den Zyniker gerne Streitfragen aufdrücken, die angeblich ohne praktische Bedeutung sind). Vertreter der erstgenannten Ansicht (Sportrecht existiert) befürworten diese spezielle Sicht teilweise wohl aufgrund des Wunsches, die Thematik3 zu stärken, was nicht notwendigerweise bedeutet, dass Vertretern der entgegengesetzten Auffassung (Sportrecht existiert nicht) unterstellt werden kann, die Thematik in irgendeiner Weise schmälern zu wollen. Jedenfalls entschieden sich diejenigen, die von der Existenz eines „Sport___________ 1 2 3

Vgl. Davis, What is Sports Law?, Marquette Sports Law Review 2001, Band 11, 211. Siehe unten III.1. Lex sportiva. Im Sinne von oratio pro domo.

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rechts“ ausgehen, für die lateinische Bezeichnung „Lex sportiva“, um dem Sportrecht die Aura einer klassischen Disziplin zu verleihen. Manchmal wird als alternativer Begriff „Lex ludica“4 verwendet, obwohl dies eine eher unglückliche Wahl darstellt, denn er kann leicht falsch übersetzt werden und zu abstrusen Begriffen wie „spielerisches“ oder „verspieltes Recht“ führen. Die Frage, ob „Sportrecht“ existiert, ist nicht von überragender Bedeutung, sie ist aber Beloff zufolge auch nicht unwichtig.5 Mitten und Opie merken an, dass die wissenschaftliche Forschung im Bereich des den Sport regulierenden Rechts verhältnismäßig jung ist. Ihnen zufolge besteht zwischen Experten und Akademikern, die die schnell wachsenden Regelwerke und das Richterrecht, das den Bereich des Sports regelt, untersuchen, keine Einigkeit darüber, ob „Sportrecht“ ein eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet ist oder ob es sich lediglich um die Anwendung allgemeiner Rechtsvorschriften in einem Bereich handelt, der sinnvoller als „Sport und Recht“ zu bezeichnen wäre. Die Debatte dreht sich um die Frage, ob dieser Bereich die besonderen und einheitlichen Eigenschaften eines eigenständigen Regelwerks aufweist oder ob Grundsätze bereits etablierter Rechtsbereiche hier nur besondere oder spezielle Anwendung finden.6 Davis hat einen Bewertungskatalog entwickelt, der helfen kann, diese Frage bezüglich „Sport und Recht“ zu beantworten. Bevor er diesen Katalog und die darin enthaltenen Kriterien erläutert, unterscheidet er jedoch drei unterschiedliche Sichtweisen des Sportrechts: Die traditionelle Ansicht besagt, dass „Sportrecht“ nicht existiert: Es gibt keinen eigens identifizierbaren Rechtskörper, der als Sportrecht bezeichnet werden kann, und die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass sich solche Vorschriften jemals entwickeln, ist sehr gering; nach dieser Ansicht ist „Sportrecht“ nicht mehr und nichts anderes als eine Ansammlung von Regeln aus verschiedenen Rechtsgebieten, die im Zusammenhang mit Sport bedeutsam sind; der Begriff „Sportrecht“ ist nach dieser Auffassung falsch gewählt, da Sport als Aktivität von der Rechtsordnung als ganzer geregelt wird.7 Nach einer vermittelnden Auffassung hat das „Sportrecht“ durchaus das Potenzial, sich zu einem eigenständigen Rechtsgebiet zu entwickeln; im Jahr ___________ 4

Vgl. ebenso unten III.4. Lex ludica. Beloff, Is there a Lex Sportiva?, ISLR 2005, 49. 6 Mitten/Opie, „Sports Law“: Implications For The Development Of International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, Marquette University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper Nr. 10–31, 2010, S. 3 f., insb. Fn. 6 auf S. 4. 7 Der klassische Vertreter dieser Auffassung ist der eminence grise (langjähriger Vertreter) des Sportrechts in England, Grayson, Sport and the Law, 2. Aufl., London 1994, S. XXXVII. Eine neuere Veröffentlichung in dieser Tradition ist zum Beispiel Donnellan, Sport and the Law: A Concise Guide, Dublin 2010. 5

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2001, als der Aufsatz von Davis veröffentlicht wurde, stellten Vertreter dieser Ansicht Entwicklungen fest, die in diese Richtung zu zeigen schienen; sie wiesen vor allem auf den de facto einzigartigen Charakter verschiedener Belange im Sport hin, die eine spezialisierte Untersuchung und eine sportspezifische Anwendung von Rechtsvorschriften erfordern. Schließlich gibt es die Auffassung, dass das „Sportrecht“ als eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet zu betrachten ist. Vertreter dieser Ansicht werten die steigende Zahl an Gesetzen und Fällen, die sich speziell mit dem Sport befassen, als Beweis dafür. Es wird argumentiert, dass diejenigen, die Sportrecht lediglich als Vermischung von diversen anderen materiellen Rechtsgebieten ansehen, die Realität verkennen, dass sich nur sehr wenige materielle Rechtsgebiete in gesonderte Kategorien aufteilen lassen, die voneinander getrennt und von anderen materiellen Rechtsgebieten unabhängig sind. Überschneidungen gibt es nicht nur im Sportrecht, sondern auch in anderen Rechtsgebieten. Der interdisziplinäre Charakter des Sportrechts hat auf jeden Fall nicht dazu beigetragen, die Grundlage für die Etablierung einer eigenständigen Rechtsdisziplin zu schaffen. Die Vertreter dieser Meinung argumentieren weiter, dass die Ablehnung, Sportrecht als einen eigenen Rechtskörper anzusehen, die Haltung einiger Intellektueller widerspiegelt, den Sport an sich nicht ernst zu nehmen. So fördern sie die Tendenz, die akademische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Sport an den Rand zu drängen, statt ihr den gleichen Stellenwert einzuräumen wie anderen Forschungsbereichen. Die Diskussion darüber, ob Sportrecht als eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet besteht, ist nicht ungewöhnlich, da Fragen in Bezug auf die Legitimität neuer Rechtsgebiete nicht unüblich sind. Ein ähnlicher Meinungsstreit begleitete zum Beispiel die Entstehung des „Computerrechts“. Auch im Blick auf das Arbeitsrecht, das Gesundheitsrecht und das Umweltrecht gab es ähnliche Zweifel, bevor diese Bereiche als eigenständige Rechtsgebiete allgemein anerkannt wurden. Der Prozess der Anerkennung eines neuen Rechtsgebiets schreitet nur langsam voran, weil er mit einem tiefgreifenden gesellschaftlichen Veränderungsprozess einhergeht. Dieser Veränderungsprozess ist mit der Entwicklung neuer Verhaltensmuster und Kooperationsformen verbunden, die akzeptiert werden müssen. Ob ein einzelnes Rechtsgebiet als solches anzuerkennen ist, ist keine spezifische Wissenschaft. Das Verfahren, Rechtsgebiete zu identifizieren, zu bestimmen und zu benennen, ist eine komplizierte Angelegenheit und erfolgt, in gewissem Maße, oft willkürlich; ein offizielles Anerkennungsverfahren gibt es nicht. Es ist ein Prozess, in dem Rechtspraktiker und Wissenschaftler feststellen, dass das betreffende Recht zunehmend auf einen neuen Gesellschaftsbereich angewandt wird.

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Laut Davis8 dürfte die Antwort auf die Frage, ob Sportrecht als eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet anerkannt ist, letztlich von der Sichtweise derjenigen abhängen, die im Bereich des Sportrechts praktizieren, lehren und wissenschaftliche Forschung betreiben. Anhand welcher Kriterien lässt sich nun prüfen, ob ein eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet existiert? Davis’ Bewertungskatalog enthält nicht weniger als elf Kriterien, die zwar als eine Art Leitfaden dienen können, jedoch auch bei sorgfältiger Anwendung nicht zu einer endgültigen Antwort auf die Frage führen, ob es ein eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet Sportrecht gibt. Die Kriterien sind: 1. Das Recht anderer Rechtsgebiete wird von Gerichten speziell auf einen spezifischen Sachverhalt angewendet. 2. In einem spezifischen Kontext gibt es Sachverhalte, aus denen sich Fragen ergeben, die einer spezialisierten Analyse bedürfen. 3. Probleme im Zusammenhang mit Bereichen des zu prüfenden Rechtsgebiets müssen Gegenstand mehrerer Gerichtsentscheidungen oder formeller/materieller Gesetze geworden sein. 4. Innerhalb des zu prüfenden Rechtsgebiets müssen die einzelnen Bereiche zusammenhängen, interagieren oder miteinander verknüpft sein. 5. Entscheidungen in dem zu prüfenden Rechtsgebiet stehen im Widerspruch zu Entscheidungen in anderen Rechtsgebieten und Entscheidungen bezüglich einer speziellen Problematik innerhalb des zu prüfenden Rechtsgebiets haben Auswirkungen auf andere Fälle innerhalb dieses Bereichs. 6. Das zu prüfende Rechtsgebiet muss erhebliche wirtschaftliche, kulturelle oder gesellschaftliche Auswirkungen auf nationaler (oder internationaler) Ebene haben. 7. Es entwickelt sich eine eingreifende Gesetzgebung, um bestimmte Beziehungen in diesem Bereich zu regulieren. 8. Es existieren Veröffentlichungen juristischer Fall- und Lehrbücher, die das zu prüfende Rechtsgebiet zum Inhalt haben. 9. Es entstehen juristische Fachzeitschriften und andere Publikationen, die sich vor allem der Veröffentlichung von Schriften im Bereich des zu prüfenden Rechtsgebiets widmen. 10. Das zu prüfende Rechtsgebiet wird von juristischen Fakultäten anerkannt. 11. Das zu prüfende Rechtsgebiet wird als ein eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet durch juristische Vereinigungen, wie beispielsweise Rechtsanwaltskammern, anerkannt. ___________ 8

Davis (Fn. 1), 211–214.

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Davis selbst hat diesen Bewertungskatalog nicht ausdrücklich und systematisch auf den Bereich des Sports angewandt. Nichtsdestotrotz kann bei Anwendung der o. g. Kriterien, die nicht immer klar formuliert sind, auf den Bereich „Sport und Recht“ (so wie er sich im Jahre 2011 darstellt) ohne Zweifel auf die Existenz eines eigenständigen Rechtsgebiets geschlossen werden, das den Namen „Sportrecht“ verdient. Am deutlichsten zeigt sich dies wahrscheinlich an dem Begriff „Spezifität des Sports“, der im Rahmen des Europarechts entwickelt wurde. Dieser Begriff beschreibt den Umfang, in dem insbesondere der Europäische Gerichtshof Ausnahmen zum regulären Recht anerkannt hat, weil in einigen Fällen auf Sportregeln nicht verzichtet werden kann, wenn ein ordnungs- und sachgemäßen Ablauf sportlicher Wettkämpfe gewährleistet bleiben soll. Ein mittlerweile klassisches Beispiel in diesem Zusammenhang ist der Fall Lehtonen9. Hier wurde entschieden, dass professionelle Fußballspieler nur innerhalb von zwei festgelegten Zeitfenstern während einer Wettkampfsaison von einem Verein zum anderen wechseln können (im Sommer nach dem Ende der Saison und während der sog. Winterpause).10 Die Regelung als solche steht im Widerspruch zu der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Ohne diese Regel bestünde jedoch das Risiko einer Wettbewerbsverzerrung, da beispielsweise ein relegationsgefährdeter Verein in letzter Sekunde finanzielle Unterstützung durch externe Geldgeber erhalten und daraufhin neue Spieler einstellen könnte – ein Vorteil, den andere Wettbewerber sich zu dieser Zeit möglicherweise nicht verschaffen könnten. Ein fairer und gleicher Wettbewerb für alle Teilnehmer wäre damit nicht mehr gewährleistet. Die Besonderheiten des Sports bedürfen also einer speziellen Aufmerksamkeit und können – soweit erforderlich – Ausnahmeregelungen begründen. Die Bedingungen, die in den Kriterien 1 und 2 ausgeführt sind, werden somit erfüllt. Allerdings werden Konflikte (siehe Kriterium 5) nicht immer im Sinne der Sportregelung gelöst. Ein treffendes Beispiel hierfür ist die von der FIFA eingeführte 6+5-Regel. Diese Regelung besagt, dass für jedes Spiel pro Mannschaft lediglich 5 ausländische Spieler ausgewählt werden dürfen, die restlichen Spieler müssen inländische Fußballspieler sein. Diese Regelung stellt eine Diskriminierung auf Grund der Staatsangehörigkeit dar und kann daher innerhalb der Europäischen Union nicht angewendet werden. Eine solche Regel ist auch nicht unverzichtbar, um eine starke Nationalmannschaft zu gewährleisten. Junge talentierte oder erfahrene inländische Spieler können sich auch im Ausland verbessern. Die niederländische Nationalmannschaft ist ein gutes Beispiel für ein Team, das aus vielen internationalen Spielern besteht, die in den besten ausländischen Ligen spielen und wovon der Standard der Nationalmannschaft immens profitiert. Das ___________ 9

EuGH, Urt. v. 13.04.2000, Rs. C-176/96, Slg. 2000, I-2681 – Lehtonen. Sog. Transferperiode.

10

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besondere Wesen des Sports zeigt sich auch anhand von Kriterium 7. Es gibt weltweit zahlreiche Länder, die ein allgemeines Sportgesetz erlassen haben. Diese Länder zählen allgemein zu den Befürwortern eingreifender Gesetzgebung. Das sog. Fußballgesetz (Voetbalwet), mit dem unerwünschtes Verhalten von Fans und andere Arten von Vandalismus bekämpft werden sollen, ist ein Beispiel aus den Niederlanden für eine spezielle, regulierende Bestimmung. Auf ähnliche Weise verschafft auch die internationale Gemeinschaft ihrer Stimme oft Gehör: So wurden beispielsweise vom Europarat und von der UNESCO Anti-Doping-Konventionen verabschiedet. Auch die anderen Kriterien, die teilweise eher praktischer als materiellrechtlicher Natur sind – die Veröffentlichung juristischer Fallbücher und spezialisierter Zeitschriften, das Bestehen wissenschaftlicher Lehre und Forschung ebenso wie besonderer juristischer Vereinigungen an vielen Orten weltweit – werden weitgehend erfüllt (siehe Kriterien 8–11).11 Außerdem gibt es auch hinreichende institutionelle Verbindungen und wechselseitige Beziehungen im organisierten Sport (vgl. Kriterium 4). Weltweit ist der organisierte Sport pyramidenförmig aufgebaut, mit den internationalen Verbänden für jeden Sport, wie der FIFA im Fußball und dem IOC für den Olympischen Sport, an der Spitze. Es gibt einen Internationalen Sportgerichtshof, den Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), mit Sitz in der Schweiz und eine Welt-Anti-Doping-Agentur, die World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), in der die internationale Gemeinschaft ein offizieller Akteur ist. Damit bleiben noch Kriterium 3, der zweite Teil von Kriterium 5 und Kriterium 6. Sportbezogene Belange treten in vielen verschiedenen Rechtsbereichen auf. Sportrecht hat interdisziplinären Charakter und dies spricht für das Bestehen eines unabhängigen Rechtsgebiets (Kriterium 3). Es ist offensichtlich, dass interne Entscheidungen von Sportorganisationen manchmal Auswirkungen auf andere Angelegenheiten in diesem Rechtsgebiet haben, die untrennbar mit den Regeln des organisierten Sports in Zusammenhang stehen. Würde die FIFA zum Beispiel ih___________ 11 Mitten/Opie (Fn. 6), S. 3, insb. Fn. 3 bemerken, dass trotz der Tatsache, dass fast alle Rechtsgebiete – alleine oder in Verbindung – den Wettbewerb regeln (einschließlich umfassende und wichtige Rechtsgebiete wie das Wettbewerbsrecht, das Schuldrecht, das Urheberrecht und das Arbeitsrecht) verhältnismäßig wenig Wissenschaftler Sportrecht unterrichten oder Gelehrte des Sportrechts sind. Dem AALS (The Association of American Law Schools)-Verzeichnis der Jura-Professoren 2009–2010 zufolge gibt es nur 120 Professoren, die Sportrecht unterrichten, während mehr als 340 auf das Wettbewerbsrecht, 1800 auf das Verfassungsrecht und 360 auf das Arbeitsrecht spezialisiert sind. Diese drei Rechtsgebiete sind die drei Hauptgebiete des öffentlichen Rechts, die den Sport in den Vereinigten Staaten regeln, was zu dem Schluss führt, dass es in diesen Bereichen Raum für eine vermehrte Fokussierung auf den Sport gibt. Vgl. die Internetseite des ASSER International Sports Law Centre (www.sportslaw.nl unter „The Centre“) mit einer weltweiten, umfassenden Auflistung der Internationalen und Nationalen Sportrechtsvereinigungen, Sportrechtszentren und Sportrechtszeitschriften.

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re Regeln für Spielervermittler außer Kraft setzen, hätte dies automatisch Auswirkungen auf alle Regeln, die den Transfer von Spielern betreffen (Kriterium 5, zweiter Teil). Zuletzt versteht es sich von selbst, dass der Sport und daher auch das Sportrecht heutzutage sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf internationaler Ebene erhebliche wirtschaftliche, kulturelle und gesellschaftliche Bedeutung haben. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Fußball ein vermarktbares Produkt in einem eigenständigen wirtschaftlichen Bereich geworden ist, wird Fußball in England als Wirtschaftszweig bezeichnet. Durch die Kommerzialisierung des Sports und den Verkauf von Fernsehrechten geht es im professionellen Sport um gewaltige Geldsummen.12 Großereignisse wie die Olympischen Spiele und die Fußballweltmeisterschaft werden von Milliarden von Menschen auf der ganzen Welt mitverfolgt (Kriterium 6). Zusammengefasst gibt es auf der einen Seite eine ausreichende tatsächliche und rechtliche Wechselbeziehung und auf der anderen Seite eine ausreichende äußerliche Unterscheidbarkeit, um Sportrecht als eigenständiges, materielles Rechtsgebiet anzusehen.

III. Was ist „Sportrecht“? Die Annahme, dass es Sportrecht gibt, ist somit im Jahre 2011 eine durchaus vertretbare Ansicht, zumindest wenn man sich an den Bewertungskatalog von Davis hält. Nun kann die Folgefrage gestellt werden: Was ist Sportrecht, was sind die Bestandteile des Sportrechts, welche Bereiche sollen umfasst sein? Zunächst soll jedoch besonders die rechtliche Natur des Sportrechts untersucht werden. Nach Beloff kann zwischen dem „horizontalen Recht“ – rechtlichen Regeln, die auf die ganze Bandbreite menschlicher Tätigkeiten Anwendung finden – und dem „vertikalen Recht“ – rechtlichen Regeln, die sich auf eine einzelne Aktivität beziehen – unterschieden werden. Schadensersatz- oder Wettbewerbsrecht fallen in die erste Kategorie. Ebenso wie Luftfahrtrecht und Bankrecht fällt auch der wesentliche Teil des Sportrechts in die zweite Kategorie.13 Spezielle rechtswissenschaftliche Forschungen zeigen, dass folgende Unterscheidungen gemacht werden oder folgende Terminologie explizit verwendet ___________ 12 Real Madrid z. B. führt die weltweite Rangliste von Vereinen im Bereich des jährlichen Umsatzes für das Jahr 2010 mit mehr als 438 Millionen Euro an. 2010 überschritt der gesamte Umsatz von allen professionellen Vereinen zum ersten Mal vier Milliarden Euro (laut der Daten von Deloitte, veröffentlicht im NRC Handelsblatt am 11.02.2011). 13 Beloff (Fn. 5), 52.

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wird, um Sportrecht oder seine Teilbereiche zu benennen: Lex sportiva, globales Sportrecht, transnationales Sportrecht, Lex ludica, Sportvölkerrecht („das Recht der Sportnationen“) und europäisches Sportrecht. Diese Kategorien werden im Folgenden einzeln behandelt. Auffallend ist, dass der Begriff „Lex sportiva“ wie eine Art Bezugspunkt immer wieder in verschiedenen Zusammenhängen verwendet wird. Alle diese Autoren sind selbstverständlich der Ansicht, dass Sportrecht als eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet existiert.

1. Lex sportiva Laut Nafziger bieten die schiedsgerichtlichen Entscheidungen und Ansichten des CAS in der Praxis Orientierung für spätere Fälle, beeinflussen stark spätere Schiedssprüche und fungieren häufig als Präzedenzfälle. Die wachsende Zahl an CAS-Schiedssprüchen forme allmählich eine Rechtsquelle in diesem Bereich, indem sie anerkannte Regeln und Prinzipien des internationalen Sportrechts festige und helfe, diese weiter auszuarbeiten. Diese Rechtsquelle werde als „Lex sportiva“ bezeichnet. Das Konzept der Lex sportiva sei normalerweise auf die Rechtsprechung des CAS begrenzt.14 Foster weist darauf hin, dass der CAS selbst die Existenz einer Präzedenzwirkung seiner früheren Schiedssprüche anerkannt hat.15, 16 Casini merkt an, dass die Anzahl der Schiedsentscheidungen des CAS soweit gestiegen ist, dass sich eine Reihe von Grundsätzen und Regeln entwickelt hat, die sich besonders auf den Sport beziehen: Dieses „Richterrecht“ werde „Lex sportiva“ genannt. Dieser Terminus, der an bekannte Bezeichnungen wie „Lex mercatoria“ oder „Lex electronica“ erinnere, sei bereitwillig angenommen worden und seine Bedeutung habe sich im Laufe der Zeit ganz allgemein auf das grenzüberschreitende Recht der Sportorganisationen erweitert.17 ___________ 14 Nafziger, Lex Sportiva, ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3 ff.; auch veröffentlicht unter ders., Lex Sportiva and CAS, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, Den Haag 2006, S. 409; ebenso ders., International Sports Law, New York 2004, S. 48. 15 Vadim Devyatovskiy v. IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752. 16 Foster, Lex Sportiva: Transnational Law in Action, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 20 f.; präsentiert während der Lex-Sportiva-Konferenz an der Pelita-Harapan-Universität (UPH) am 22.09.2010 in Jakarta, Indonesien, organisiert in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Indonesischen Lex-Sportiva-Institut und mit der Unterstützung des Indonesischen Außenministeriums, des Nationalen Olympischen Komitees, des T.M.C. Asser Instituts und der Indonesischen Fußballliga. 17 Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva: The Court of Arbitration for Sport „Der Ernährer“, Konzeptpapier für die Internationale Konferenz des Max Planck Instituts über „International Judicial Institutions as Law-Makers“, Heidelberg, 14./15.06.2010, S. 3 (die aktuellste Version erschien im IILJ International Law and Justice Working Paper 2010/5 un-

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Foster bemerkt in diesem Zusammenhang, dass der CAS 2005 nicht sicher gewesen sei, ob eine „Lex sportiva“ überhaupt existiere. Der CAS sei nicht bereit gewesen, sich in einen nicht anerkannten Begriff wie „Lex sportiva“ zu flüchten, wie er von verschiedenen Autoren vertreten wurde. Der genaue Inhalt und die Reichweite des Begriffs seien noch zu wage und ungenau, um ihn dazu zu verwenden, die speziellen Rechte und Pflichten von Sportverbänden gegenüber Athleten festzulegen.18 Seit dieser Stellungnahme habe es in den veröffentlichten Entscheidungen des CAS keinen weiteren Verweis auf eine „Lex sportiva“ gegeben – bis zu dem aktuellen schiedsgerichtlichen Fall Anderson et al. v. IOC19, der die Anerkennung einer solchen Begrifflichkeit zu signalisieren scheine.20 Laut Erbsen hat der CAS einen beeindruckenden Korpus an Rechtsprechung entwickelt, der unglücklicherweise eine irreführende, die Eigenheiten dieses Rechts verdeckende Bezeichnung gefunden hat. Eine immer beliebtere Interpretation der Entwicklung des CAS in den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten seines Bestehens lege nahe, dass der CAS einen völlig neuen Rechtskörper des internationalen Sportrechts geschaffen habe, der als „Lex sportiva“ bezeichnet werde. Autoren in diesem Bereich seien noch nicht zu einer Übereinstimmung gekommen, was „Lex sportiva“ eigentlich bedeute, aber viele seien davon überzeugt, dass es existiere. Die Unbestimmtheit dieses Terminus erhöhe seine Faszination, da das seriöse Ansehen der lateinischen Sprache mit der Formbarkeit unklarer Begriffe wie „Lex“ und „Sport“ verbunden werde. Erbsen ist weiter der Ansicht, der Begriff „Lex sportiva“ könne die Rechtsprechung des CAS nicht sinnvoll beschreiben oder erklären. Als die Bezeichnung erstmals verwendet wurde, habe sie die Vision einer neu entstehenden Form von Sportregelungen heraufbeschworen, was dem CAS wahrscheinlich geholfen habe, Anerkennung zu erlangen und sich als respektierte und maßgebende Instanz zu etablieren. Der Begriff habe seine Nützlichkeit jedoch überlebt. Lex sportiva sei zu einem Sammelbegriff geworden, der viele verschiedene Formen der Rechtsetzung umfasse und eine Vielzahl an Varianten unter einer vereinfachten Überschrift vereine. Beschreibende und normative Studien über den CAS würden von einer subtileren Interpretation profitieren, wie der CAS allgemeingültige Rechtsprinzipien den Umständen von Auseinandersetzungen angepasst hat, an denen Sportler und Sportfunktionäre beteiligt waren. Erbsen zufolge hatte die ___________ ter dem Titel „The Making of a Lex Sportiva: The Court of Arbitration for Sport ,The Provider‘“, siehe http://www.iilj.org/publications/2010-5.Casini.asp; die endgültige Version 12 German Law Journal 1317–1340 (2011) ist abrufbar unter http://www.germanlaw journal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1363. 18 FIFA v. WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 und 986. 19 Anderson et al. v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545. 20 Foster (Fn. 16), 20.

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Idee, dass die Lösung internationaler Sportstreitigkeiten durch Schiedsgerichte eine „Lex sportiva“ schaffe, im vorangegangenen Jahrzehnt zunehmend Zuspruch gefunden. Der Begriff „Lex sportiva“, der erst 1990 entstanden sei21, erscheine nun in den offiziellen Beschreibungen des CAS über seine Tätigkeit, in der Rechtsprechung des CAS, in Aufsätzen wissenschaftlicher Koryphäen im Bereich des Sportrechts und von Wissenschaftlern, die sich allgemein mit internationalem Recht befassen, in Fachbüchern, in Lehrveranstaltungen, Vorträgen und Präsentationen von Sportfunktionären und informell auf wissenschaftlichen Tagungen und Treffen von Experten in diesem Bereich. Nach Erbsen, der insbesondere Bezug nimmt auf Foster (siehe unten) und Nafziger (siehe oben), herrscht nichtsdestotrotz erhebliche Uneinigkeit bezüglich der Rechtsquellen und der Argumentationsformen, die von „Lex sportiva“ umfasst werden. Seiner Ansicht nach bringt die zunehmende Verwendung des Begriffs „Lex sportiva“ als formloser Euphemismus für rechtliche Neuerungen im internationalen Sport Probleme mit sich.22

2. Globales Sportrecht Foster fragt sich, ob es einen definierbaren Begriff „internationales Sportrecht“ gibt und schlägt vor, zwischen „internationalem Sportrecht“ und „globalem Sportrecht“ zu unterscheiden. Internationales Sportrecht könne von nationalen Gerichten angewendet werden. Globales Sportrecht beinhalte dagegen einen Anspruch auf Immunität gegenüber nationalem Recht. Foster behauptet, dass einige Autoren den Terminus „Lex sportiva“ auf oberflächliche Weise benutzt hätten, um die Globalisierung des Sportrechts zu beschreiben. Er argumentiert, dass „Lex sportiva“ mit globalem Sportrecht gleichgestellt werden solle. „Lex sportiva“ als globales Sportrecht zu definieren bedeute, „Lex sportiva“ als Bezeichnung für die dauernde Selbstregulierung durch die internationalen Sportverbände zu verstehen. Nationale Rechtsordnungen und internationales Sportrecht dürften somit nicht intervenieren und internationaler Sport dürfe nicht durch öffentliches Recht reguliert werden. Foster erklärt weiter, dass es notwendig sei, zwischen den Begriffen internationales und globales ___________ 21 Laut McLaren wurde der Begriff „Lex Sportiva“ von dem amtierenden Generalsekretär des CAS, Matthieu Reeb, zur Zeit der Veröffentlichung des ersten Digests mit Schiedsentscheidungen des CAS in der Zeit von 1986–1998 geprägt. Vgl. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World´s Sports Disputes, Valparaiso University Law Review (2001), 379, Fn. 11; in der Einleitung zum Digest der CAS-Schiedsentscheidungen II 1998–2000, S. XXX, schrieb Reeb, dass die Digests der CAS-Schiedsentscheidungen 1986–1998 die Schaffung von Lex Sportiva durch die Schiedsentscheidungen des CAS erfassten. 22 Erbsen, The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, Den Haag 2006, S. 441 (443 f.).

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Sportrecht wie folgt zu unterscheiden. Internationales Recht betreffe die Beziehungen zwischen Staaten und deshalb seien unter internationalem Sportrecht die allgemeinen, völkerrechtlichen Rechtsprinzipien zu verstehen, die auf den Sport anwendbar seien. Im Gegensatz dazu könne globales Sportrecht vorläufig als grenzüberschreitende, autonome Rechtsordnung definiert werden, die von globalen privaten Institutionen zur Regelung des internationalen Sports geschaffen worden sei. Seine charakteristische Eigenschaft sei zum einen, dass es eine vertragliche Rechtsordnung sei, und zum anderen, dass diese Rechtsordnung nicht von nationalen Rechtsordnungen geregelt werde. Deshalb könne das globale Sportrecht auch als Rechtsordnung „ohne Staat“ beschrieben werden. Es sei eine Prinzipienordnung sui generis, die sich aus transnationalen Rechtsnormen entwickelt habe, basierend auf den Regeln der internationalen Sportverbände und der Auslegung dieser Regeln. Es sei eine eigenständige Rechtsordnung, die aus globaler Sicht unabhängig sei. Dies bedeute, dass internationale Sportverbände nicht von nationalen Gerichten und Regierungen reguliert werden könnten. Regulierungen seien nur durch eigene interne Instanzen oder durch externe Einrichtungen möglich, die eigens zu diesem Zweck eingerichtet oder beauftragt worden seien. Foster hält die grundlegende Unterscheidung zwischen internationalem und globalem Sportrecht für äußerst wichtig. Er hat festgestellt, dass in jüngster Zeit viele Autoren die Andersartigkeit des internationalen Sportrechts begründet und dabei den Begriff „Lex sportiva“ verwendet haben. Diese Verwendung des Begriffs verwirre und vermische internationales Sportrecht mit globalem Sportrecht, im Widerspruch zu seinen eigenen Definitionen.23 Foster bemerkt weiter, dass eine der Forderungen, die an die Arbeit des CAS gestellt würden, die Entwicklung einer „Lex sportiva“ sei. So werde argumentiert, die Rechtsprechung des CAS sei ein Korpus des „internationalen Sportrechts“. Dies beinhalte weit mehr als die Anwendung von internationalem Recht oder allgemeiner Rechtsprinzipien zur Lösung von Sportstreitigkeiten. Es werde behauptet, dass eine eindeutige Jurisprudenz entstehe, eine einmalige Reihe universeller Rechtsprinzipien, die vom CAS in seinen Entscheidungen angewandt würden. Foster zufolge ist der Begriff „Lex sportiva“ eine ungenaue Bezeichnung, die mehrere verschiedene Konzepte umfasst. Es könne hilfreich sein, die verschiedenen Verwendungen voneinander abzugrenzen. „Lex sportiva“ sei kaum mehr als die richtige Interpretation und Anwendung der Satzungen und Regelwerke von Sportorganisationen – eine Lex specialis, die für die Kontrolle des internationalen Sports anwendbar sei, weil sie ihre Quelle in der verfassungsmäßigen Ordnung habe, die von den Sportverbänden geschaffen worden sei, um Sport zu regeln. In einem weiteren Sinne könne „Lex sportiva“ auf die allgemeingültigen Prinzipien ausgeweitet werden, die von der vielfälti___________ 23

Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, Entertainment Law 2003/2, 1 (2, 8).

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gen Praxis der Sportverbände und den Satzungen und Regelwerken, mit denen diese sich selbst kontrollierten, abgeleitet werden könnten. Dies sei eine begrenzte, aber spezifische Verwendung des Begriffs „Lex sportiva“. Foster ist der Ansicht, dass dieses Begriffsverständnis ungefähr mit seiner eigenen Definition des globalen Sportrechts übereinstimmt, das er mit „Lex sportiva“ gleichsetzt. Dieser Terminus beinhalte verschiedene wichtige Elemente. Es sei im Wesentlichen eine grenzüberschreitende, autonome Privatrechtsordnung. Diese Rechtsordnung bestehe aus der regulierenden satzungsgemäßen Ordnung, die durch die internationalen Sportverbände etabliert worden sei. Sie sei von den privaten, globalen Institutionen geschaffen worden, die den Sport regelten, und habe auch ihren Ursprung darin. Sie bestehe aus den Gewohnheiten und der Praxis der internationalen Sportverbände. Globales Sportrecht sei ein privates System der Steuerung, mit seinem eigenen globalen Gericht, dem CAS.24 Casini ist der Meinung, dass Sportregeln echtes „globales Recht“ seien, weil sie über die ganze Welt verbreitet seien, sowohl internationale als auch nationale Ebenen umfassten und private Akteure unmittelbar beeinflussten. Deshalb sei die globale Dimension des Sports an erster Stelle normativ. Es habe sich ein „globales Sportrecht“ entwickelt, das aus der Gesamtheit der Normen und Standards bestehe, die von den Sportorganisationen gesetzt und durchgesetzt würden. Globales Sportrecht umfasse die Regeln, die von zentralen Sportinstitutionen wie dem IOC, den internationalen Sportverbänden und der WADA sowie von nationalen Sportvereinigungen wie den nationalen Olympischen Komitees und nationalen Anti-Doping-Organisationen erlassen würden. Deshalb sei globales Sportrecht in höchstem Maße heterogen. Casini verwendet den Begriff „Lex sportiva“ in der weitgehenden Bedeutung von „globalem Sportrecht“. So vereine der Begriff „globales Sportrecht“ alle Definitionen, die Wissenschaftler bisher entwickelt hätten, um das Prinzip und die Regeln von Sportorganisationen zu beschreiben.25

3. Transnationales Sportrecht Latty analysiert die Selbstregulierung des transnationalen Sports, indem er den Begriff „transnationales Recht“ als Ausgangspunkt nimmt: Recht, geschaffen von privaten Organisationen ohne staatliche Eingriffe, das grenzüberschreitend wirkt und die Intention hat, Aktivitäten in dem betreffenden Bereich zu re___________ 24

Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence, in: Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984– 2004, Den Haag 2006, S. 420–421. 25 Casini (Fn. 17), S. 2–4.

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geln. Diese Analyse zeige, dass „Lex sportiva“ aus den Rechtssystemen der internationalen Sportverbände bestehe, die bis zu einem gewissen Grad von der Rechtsordnung des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees (International Olympic Committee, IOC) vereinheitlicht würden, unterstützt durch das Internationale Sportschiedsgericht (Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS) und die Welt-Anti-Doping-Agentur (World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA). „Lex sportiva“ sei vergleichbar mit der „Lex mercatoria“ und dem Kanonischen Recht der Katholischen Kirche. Sie stellten globale, supranational anwendbare Regeln dar. Latty bewertet den Grad der Autonomie der „Lex sportiva“ folgendermaßen: Obwohl die „Lex sportiva“ weitgehend von nationalen Regeln befreit sei und nur aus einer dezentralisierten, internationalen Rechtsordnung bestehe, sei sie dennoch wesentlich durch das Europäische Recht beschränkt.26

4. Lex ludica Nach Foster können die sog. Spielregeln („sporting law“) als ein eigenständiger Korpus aus Regeln und Standards von der „Lex sportiva“ abgegrenzt werden. Er schlägt vor, diese Prinzipien „Lex ludica“ zu nennen. Es handele sich um zwei Arten von Regeln, die wegen des Sportzusammenhangs, in dem sie aufträten und gälten, einzigartig seien. Zu der einen Art zählten die eigentlichen Regeln des Spiels und ihre Anwendung oder Durchsetzung durch Schiedsrichter oder andere Offizielle. Die zweite Art sei das, was „Sportsgeist“ genannt werden könne. Dazu zählten die ethischen Standards, die von Sportlern und Sportlerinnen eingehalten werden sollten. Der Begriff „Lex ludica“ beziehe sich somit sowohl auf die offiziellen Spielregeln als auch auf das Prinzip der Fairness im Sport. Es handle sich um Grundsätze des Sportrechts im engeren Sinne und der Good Governance im Sport.27

5. Sportvölkerrecht Wax weist darauf hin, dass das Sportvölkerrecht, ein zentraler Teil des internationalen Sportrechts, bisher wenig Aufmerksamkeit erhalten habe. Positiv definiert könne Sportvölkerrecht als Gesamtheit aller Normen des internationalen öffentlichen Rechts verstanden werden, die auf rechtliche Belange des Sports anwendbar seien und denen sich die Subjekte des internationalen öffentlichen Rechts selbst unterwürfen, um sich direkt oder indirekt zu regulieren. Negativ ___________ 26

Latty, Transnational Sports Law, ISLJ 2011/1–2, 34 ff.; siehe auch ders., La lex sportiva – Reserche sur le droit transnational, Etudes de Droit International, Band 3, Leiden-Boston 2007. 27 Foster (Fn. 24), S. 421.

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definiert bestehe Sportvölkerrecht aus all den Normen, die nicht mit den Regeln und Vorschriften der nationalen und internationalen Sportorganisationen, dem europäischen Sportrecht oder dem nationalen Sportrecht verknüpft seien. Sportvölkerrecht beziehe sich insbesondere auf die folgenden vier Bereiche: Kampf gegen die Apartheid und andere Formen der Diskriminierung im Sport, Friedenssicherung während der Olympischen Spiele sowie Prävention von und Kampf gegen Gewalt im Zusammenhang mit Sportveranstaltungen (Spielen), Vorbeugung und Bekämpfung von Doping im Sport und die Frage der Anerkennung eines „Rechts auf Sport“ als Menschenrecht. Diese vier Bereiche könnten wiederum unterteilt werden in zwei Kategorien: Kampf gegen die Apartheid (gegen Rassismus im Allgemeinen) und andere Formen der Diskriminierung, die Frage der Anerkennung eines „Rechts auf Sport“ als ein Menschenrecht sowie die Vorbeugung und Bekämpfung von Doping im Sport bei der tatsächlichen Ausübung von Sport – in diesen Fällen sei es möglich, auf ein Sportvölkerrecht „im engeren Sinne“ Bezug zu nehmen. Im Gegensatz dazu betreffe die Friedenssicherung während der Olympischen Spiele und die Vorbeugung und Bekämpfung von Gewalt im Zusammenhang mit Sportveranstaltungen (Spielen) als solche nicht die Ausübung von Sport, sei aber direkt mit ihr verbunden (im räumlichen Sinne). Diese Kategorie sei mit Sportvölkerrecht „im weiteren Sinn“ verknüpft. Sportvölkerrecht sei eine Schlüsselkomponente des internationalen Sportrechts. In Zeiten, in denen Sport zusehends „verrechtlicht“ werde, sei Sportvölkerrecht ein angemessenes Mittel zur Korrektur, die die Internationalisierung des Sportrechts im Moment brauche. Auf der einen Seite fänden die Gesetze und Regeln der internationalen Sportorganisationen ihre „Doppelpartner“ im Sportvölkerrecht für die Regulierung des internationalen Sports. Auf der anderen Seite sei das Sportvölkerrecht das geeignete Instrument, um den internationalen Sport in genau den Bereichen zu regulieren (und somit auch seine Ziele zu erreichen), die sich – abhängig von der Art der Angelegenheit – dem Einfluss der Sportorganisationen entzögen, so Wax.28

6. Europäisches Sportrecht Existiert so etwas wie ein Europäisches (EU) Sportrecht? Weatherill ist der Meinung, dass die einfache Antwort auf diese Frage „ja“ ist, dass aber die ein ___________ 28 Wax, Public International Sports Law – A „Forgotten“ Discipline?, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25 (28); siehe auch Wax, Internationales Sportrecht – Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts, Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht, Band 90, Berlin 2009.

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fachen Antworten oft missverstanden werden und dass dies hier der Fall ist. Es gibt wohl ein EU-Sportrecht in dem Sinne, dass Sport nach Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon am 1. Dezember 2009 ausdrücklich der Kompetenz der Europäischen Union unterliegt. Dies kann jedoch auf zwei verschiedene Arten irreführend sein. Erstens lässt es die Tatsache unberücksichtigt, dass – wobei Dezember 2009 sicherlich ein bemerkenswerter Meilenstein in der Ausgestaltung eines europäischen Sportrechts war – die entsprechenden, neu eingeführten Vertragsbestimmungen eigentlich zurückhaltend formuliert und in ihrem Anwendungsbereich beschränkt sind. Sie erheben die EU ausdrücklich nicht in die Position eines „Sportregulators“ in Europa, weshalb man nicht zu begeistert von diesen Vorschriften sein sollte. Zweitens übersieht eine Fokussierung einzig auf die Vertragsreformen von 2009, dass die EU schon seit etwa 35 Jahren den Sport in Europa beeinflusst. Angefangen mit seinem berühmten Urteil im Fall Walrave und Koch im Jahre 1974, hat der EuGH den Sport den Anforderungen des damaligen Gemeinschaftsrechts (EG) und heutigen EU-Rechts unterworfen, sofern er eine wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit darstellt. Obwohl also der Sport bis Dezember 2009 nicht explizit in den Anwendungsbereich des EUVertrags fiel, musste er – wenn er auch in den Verträgen nicht erwähnt wurde – schon vor diesem Datum den Bestimmungen des Vertrages entsprechen, wenn er eine wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit darstellte. Dies bedeutete hauptsächlich, dass sportliche Tätigkeiten an den Vorschriften des Vertrages überprüft wurden, die den unlauteren Wettbewerb, den gemeinsamen Markt und die Diskriminierung auf Grund der Staatsangehörigkeit betreffen. So entwickelte sich ein europäisches Sportrecht als Ergebnis der stetig zunehmenden Rechtsprechung in den Bereichen, in denen Sportregeln einen wirtschaftlichen Effekt mit sich brachten und sich störend auf den Auftrag der EU auswirkten. Die EU schrieb nicht vor, wie der Sport zu organisieren sei, aber sie verdrängte die Wahlmöglichkeiten, die den Verträgen zuwiderliefen. Der Kern des europäischen Sportrechts ist demzufolge ein bewährtes Raster, anhand dessen sportliche Aktivitäten überprüft werden, um ihre Vereinbarkeit mit dem Europäischen Wirtschaftsrecht und vor allem im Zusammenhang mit der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit und dem Wettbewerbsrecht festzustellen. Bei dieser Überprüfung wurden die spezifischen Besonderheiten des Sports stets berücksichtigt und seit 2009 sind sie im Lissabon-Vertrag ausdrücklich anerkannt. Allerdings hat das Europäische Recht alles andere als einen breiten Anwendungsbereich. Auf europäischer Ebene gibt es sehr wenig Gesetzgebung, die den Sport direkt betrifft und ihr „negativer“ Effekt – die vertraglichen Verbote – sind in erster Linie auf Tätigkeiten gerichtet, die wettbewerbswidrig sind oder den zwischenstaatlichen Handel hemmen. Die EU hat wenig mit der Festlegung von Eigentumsrechten, mit Vertragsrecht oder Strafrecht zu tun. Es gibt also ein Europäisches oder EU-Sportrecht, das sowohl von praktischem als auch von theoretischem Interesse ist, aber es unterscheidet sich stark von dem,

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was man auf nationaler Ebene von Sportrecht erwarten würde und es ist weit weniger systematisch und umfangreich.29

7. Zusammenfassung Eine genauere Analyse des oben dargestellten Überblicks über die verschiedenen Meinungen, was „Sportrecht“ ist, ergibt folgendes Bild: Erstens ist festzuhalten, dass der Begriff „Lex sportiva“ offensichtlich eine ausschlaggebende Rolle spielt. Er ist auch der älteste Begriff in der Debatte. Er wird jedoch von verschiedenen Autoren unterschiedlich ausgelegt. Nafziger hält an der „klassischen“ Ansicht fest, nach der die „Lex sportiva“ auf das „Richterrecht“ des CAS beschränkt ist. Erbsen ist der Meinung, dass der Ausdruck unglücklich gewählt ist. Er stellt zudem fest, dass dem Begriff „Lex sportiva“ verschiedene Bedeutungen anhaften, was nicht gerade für Klarheit in diesem Bereich sorgt. Foster hat den Begriff „Globales Sportrecht“ mit dem Vorschlag eingeführt, dieses mit dem Begriff „Lex sportiva“ gleichzusetzen. Latty spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einem „transnationalen Sportrecht“. Beide verstehen darunter im Wesentlichen das Gleiche, nämlich die Regeln und Einrichtungen der internationalen Sportorganisationen und die begleitende Rechtsprechung oder die Präzedenzfälle. Ihre Auffassung von „Lex sportiva“ ist daher weiter als die von Nafziger, da sie mehr als nur die Rechtsprechung des CAS beinhaltet. Zusätzlich benutzt Foster den Begriff „Lex ludica“, wenn hauptsächlich die konkreten Spielregeln gemeint sind. Wax betont, dass dem Sportvölkerrecht sein eigener Platz innerhalb des internationalen Sportrechts zuzuweisen ist. Schließlich kann Europäisches (EU-)Sportrecht als eine regionale öffentlichrechtliche Variante abgegrenzt werden (Weatherill).

IV. Eine Neubewertung von Inhalt und Terminologie Aus dem bisher Gesagten wird deutlich, dass die Debatte in der Literatur über die Frage, was „Sportrecht“ ist, nicht dazu beigetragen hat, Klarheit zu schaffen. Es gibt noch keine kohärente Ansicht, die alle möglichen Elemente und Aspekte systematisch vergleicht und positioniert. Zweck dieses Beitrags ist deshalb, Struktur in den Inhalt und in die Terminologie zu bringen, um durch ___________ 29

Weatherill, Is There Such a Thing as European Sports Law?, Global Sports Law and Taxation Reports (GSLTR) 2010/1, 1 ff.; ders., ISLJ 2011/1–2, 38 ff.; Siehe ebenso: ders., European Sports Law: Collected Papers, Den Haag 2007.

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eine Neubewertung aller Faktoren vorhandene Mängel an Klarheit auszuräumen.

1. Inhalt In erster Linie sollte davon ausgegangen werden, dass „Sportrecht“ (oder „ein“ oder „das“ Sportrecht, wenn man so möchte) als ein eigenständiges Rechtsgebiet und damit als materielles Recht existiert. Der Begriff „Sportrecht“ setzt sich gleichwohl aus den Elementen „Sport“ und „Recht“ zusammen. Es ist „das Recht des Sports“. Die erste Frage ist daher: Was verstehen wir hierbei unter „Sport“? Darauf folgt die Frage, wie „Recht“ in diesem Zusammenhang aufzufassen ist. Was ist „Sport“? – Um diese Frage zu beantworten, besteht keine Notwendigkeit, bereits bestehende Definitionen des Begriffs „Sport“ und die Wahlmöglichkeit zwischen ihnen zu untersuchen. Wir können uns in diesem Zusammenhang darauf beschränken, funktional auf einen der Faktoren des Bewertungskatalogs, ob Sportrecht existiert, Bezug zu nehmen: und zwar auf Faktor 4, nach dem die vielfältigen Aspekte des zu prüfenden Rechtsgebietes zusammenhängen, interagieren oder miteinander verknüpft sein müssen. Die Existenz eines solchen Zusammenhangs, eines solchen Wechselspiels oder einer solchen Verknüpfung wird in der institutionellen Struktur des organisierten Sports offensichtlich. Organisierter Sport ist von Natur aus grenzüberschreitend. Nationale Vereine für jede Sportart stehen in Beziehung zu regionalen, kontinentalen und internationalen, globalen Sportverbänden. Dies führt zu einer Pyramidenstruktur mit einem internationalen Verband an der Spitze. Nimmt man den Fußball als Beispiel, gibt es in den Niederlanden den nationalen Fußballverband KNVB, auf europäischer Ebene ist die UEFA und global die FIFA verantwortlich. Organisatorisch und verwaltungstechnisch überschreitet die Welt des Sports nationale Grenzen. Zusätzlich zu nationalen Meisterschaften werden europäische und Weltmeisterschaften in jeder Sportart veranstaltet. Daneben gibt es eine Olympische Bewegung und Olympische Spiele, die alle Olympischen Sportarten vereinen, mit dem IOC an der Spitze. Sowohl national als auch international bildet der organisierte Sport einen unabhängigen sozialen Sektor. „Sportrecht“ bezieht sich deshalb insbesondere auf das Recht, das für den organisierten Sport in der oben dargestellten Struktur gilt. Dies kann sowohl Amateur- als auch Profisport sein. Er umfasst auf allen Ebenen der Pyramide Wettkampfsport, in dem Meisterschaften bestritten und gewonnen werden können. Dies bedeutet, dass der der Erholung dienende Sport oder Freizeitsport, der nicht wettbewerbsmäßig oder in irgendeiner organisierten Weise praktiziert wird, gleich wie wichtig er aus sozialer Sicht auch sein mag, im Zusammenhang mit Sportrecht zunächst nicht untersucht wird. Damit

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soll die Untersuchung dieser Art der Sportausübung, zu der auch der Sportunterricht in der Schule gehört, nicht von vornherein ausgeschlossen werden, doch es ist wenig sinnvoll, in diesem Zusammenhang eine akademische Diskussion über die genaue Definition des Begriffs Sport zu führen. Die Grenzen sind fließend. Es gibt außerdem eine Grauzone zwischen dem, was „Sport“ ausmacht und dem, was lediglich ein „Spiel“ ist. Eine Antwort muss selbstverständlich dann formuliert werden, wenn ein Rechtsproblem auch im Zusammenhang mit einem „Spiel“ auftaucht. Eine Person, die selbstständig auf der Straße joggen geht, muss lediglich die Straßenverkehrsregeln beachten und unterliegt keinen Sportregeln. Das Wesen des Sports und somit des Sportrechts ist jedoch in dem Sport zu finden, der den Anforderungen von Faktor 4 des Beurteilungskatalogs30 am besten entspricht. Dies führt uns zu der Frage, was „Recht“ im Verhältnis zum „Sport“ ist. Im Prinzip kann festgehalten werden, dass im weitesten Sinne das gesamte „Recht“, das zum „Sport“ gehört, wie er oben erläutert wurde, „Sportrecht“ ausmacht und „Sportrecht“ ist. So beinhaltet dieses Recht nicht nur alle Satzungen und Regelwerke, die vom organisierten Sport selbst aufgestellt werden, sondern auch das gesamte übrige Recht, das von den Nationalstaaten und der internationalen Gemeinschaft anerkannt wurde, um den „Sport“ zu regulieren. Dieses wird sowohl durch die gemeinsame Rechtsprechung der Gerichte oder anderer rechtsanwendender Organe des organisierten Sports selbst als auch durch die Rechtsprechung der „ordentlichen Gerichte“31, sowohl national als auch international, ergänzt. Wenn wir das selbstgesetzte Recht des Sports als „privaten“ Teil des Sportrechts bezeichnen, dann erscheint es selbstverständlich, alle anderen Bereiche des Rechts als „öffentlich“ anzusehen. Selbstverständlich hat der privatrechtliche oder selbstgesetzte Teil eine öffentlichrechtliche Grundlage: Er betrifft die Anwendung von allgemeinem öffentlichen Recht, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit dem Vereinsrecht, auf den speziellen gesellschaftlichen Bereich des Sports, oder es ist Recht, das, zumindest seiner Definition zufolge, in einem öffentlichen Zusammenhang geschaffen wurde. Auch Sportorganisationen können sich nicht von der regulären Rechtsprechung freimachen, der sie unterliegen. Würde man das gesamte existierende Recht in einem einzigen Rahmen zusammenfügen, der die verschiedenen Gebiete des Rechts enthielte, und dann den Sport in diesen Rahmen einfügen, so entstünde ein Bild mit sehr vielen freien Flecken unterschiedlicher Ausprägung. Dies wären all jene Bereiche, die nicht von „Sportrecht“ umfasst werden oder in denen das Recht nicht auf den Sport angewendet wird. Der Internationale Gerichtshof und der Internationale Strafgerichtshof in Den Haag zum Beispiel waren weder jemals irgendwie in den Sportbereich verwickelt, noch ist es ___________ 30 31

Siehe oben II. Zivilgerichte ebenso wie Strafgerichte.

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wirklich denkbar, dass es jemals dazu kommt, obwohl natürlich nichts von vornherein ausgeschlossen werden sollte.32 Sportrecht bezieht sich also ausschließlich auf einen einzigen, spezifischen gesellschaftlichen Bereich. Obwohl der öffentlich-rechtliche Bereich des Sportrechts nebensächlicher Natur und der privatrechtliche Teil der wesentliche ist, sollten wir zu Beginn genauer klären, was als zum öffentlich-rechtlichen Teil gehörend betrachtet werden kann, da dieser mit dem Umfeld des Sports zusammenhängt, wie er innerhalb eines breiteren gesellschaftlichen Rahmens platziert und auf einer höheren rechtlichen Ebene anzusiedeln ist. Die Satzungen und Regelwerke, die sich der Sport selbst gesetzt hat, sind dazu bestimmt, den Sektor aus sich selbst heraus zu steuern und stellen deshalb den privaten Kern oder das Wesen des Sportrechts dar. Der öffentlich-rechtliche Teil kann in nationales und internationales Sportrecht unterteilt werden. Nationale Sportgesetze, die in etwa 50 Ländern eingeführt wurden, sind das beste Beispiel für nationales, öffentliches Recht. Es gibt auch Länder, die eine Bestimmung über Sportrecht in ihre Verfassung aufgenommen haben.33 Dies sind generell anwendbare Gesetze, die dazu bestimmt sind, die Position des Sports in der Gesellschaft zu definieren und somit die Beziehung zwischen Regierung und Sport zu regulieren („Sportkontrolle“). Es ist üblich, zwischen interventionistischen und nicht-interventionistischen Ländern zu unterscheiden.34 Die Niederlande gehören zur zweiten Gruppe und haben deshalb keine Bestimmung in ihrer Verfassung, geschweige denn ein Sportgesetz. In Europa sind es die südlichen Länder wie Frankreich, Portugal, Italien und Spanien, deren Regierungen sich traditionell mehr mit dem Sport beschäftigen. Länder, in denen der Sport hinsichtlich seiner Organisation noch in den Kinderschuhen steckt und/oder in denen Sportrecht noch nicht weit entwickelt ist, finden es sehr wichtig, ein Sportgesetz zu haben. Indonesien und China sind nur zwei Beispiele dafür.35 Abgesehen von allgemeinen nationalen Sportgesetzen gibt es auch Beispiele spezieller Gesetzgebung für ein besonderes Gebiet. Bekannt in diesem Zusammenhang ist das niederländische Gesetz, das speziell auf Fußball-Hooliganismus abzielt, allgemein ___________ 32 Vergleiche als Beispiel eines „casus belli“– in der neuen Bedeutung von rechtlichen Verfahren in Bezug auf Krieg – den Grenzkonflikt, den El Salvador und Honduras in den 1960er Jahren gegeneinander führten, nachdem eine Reihe von Fußballspielen außer Kontrolle gerieten (casus belli im traditionellen Sinne); vgl. KapuĞciĔski, The Soccer War (Wojna futbolowa), 1978. 33 Siehe Soek, Sport in National Sports Laws and Constitutions: Definition, Ratio Legis and Objectives, ISLJ 2006/3–4, 28–31 und 33–35. 34 Chaker, Good governance in sport – a European survey, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasburg 2004, S. 9–11. 35 Vgl. Gesetz Nr. 3 aus dem Jahr 2006 der Republik von Indonesien, das das nationale Sportsystem betrifft. In China ist das Sportgesetz von 1995 kürzlich überprüft worden. Siehe Nafziger/Wei, China’s Sports Law, The American Journal of Comparative Law1998, Band XLVI, Nr. 3, 453–483.

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auch Fußball-Gesetz genannt, und das nach dem Vorbild seines englischen Gegenstücks entworfen wurde.36 Außerdem gibt es in Europa und anderswo spezielle Anti-Doping-Gesetze.37 Ein Beispiel nationaler Sportgesetzgebung, die für viel Unruhe sorgte, ist die Gesetzgebung, die die Teilnahme am Ambush Marketing (z. B. die sog. „Bavaria girls“) während der Fußballweltmeisterschaft 2010 in Südafrika kriminalisierte. Neben dem öffentlichen nationalen Sportrecht gibt es auch ein öffentliches internationales Sportrecht. Die Wiedererweckung der ekecheiria– die am längsten dauernde Waffenruhe in der Geschichte und somit internationales Recht der ersten Stunde (im Bereich des Sports) – verpflichtete die Vereinten Nationen zur internationalen Friedenssicherung während der Olympischen Spiele der Moderne durch eine Reihe von Beschlüssen, die seit 1993 verabschiedet wurden, um den „Olympischen Frieden“ und die bevorstehenden Olympischen Spiele zu schützen.38 Zwischen 1968 und 1993 wurden Standardbeschlüsse gegen die Apartheid im Sport von der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen verabschiedet. 1977 wurde die Internationale Erklärung gegen Apartheid im Sport in New York verabschiedet, gefolgt von einem entsprechenden UNAbkommen 1985. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat verhängte aufgrund der Apartheid einen Sportboykott gegen Südafrika. Das weltweite UNESCO-Abkommen aus dem Jahre 2005 hat den Kampf gegen Doping im Sport zum Ziel. Auf regionaler Ebene verabschiedete der Europarat schon 1985 ein Abkommen gegen Fußball-Hooliganismus, gefolgt von einem Anti-Doping-Abkommen 1989.39 Die ___________ 36 Vgl. Coenen, At Last, a Football Law in the Netherlands?, ISLJ 2009/3–4, 59–61 und 64–65; Pearson/James, The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders in the Fight against Racism and Violence at Sports Events, in: Gardiner/Parrish/Siekmann (Hrsg.), EU, Sport, Law and Policy: Regulation, Re-regulation and Representation, Den Haag 2009, S. 535–554. 37 Siehe Koch, A Comparative Legal Analysis of Anti-Doping Activities – General Framework and Criminal Law Aspects, in: Vieweg/Siekmann (Hrsg.), Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules – Pilot Study for the European Commission, Beiträge zum Sportrecht, Band 27, Berlin 2007, S. 95–158 (Part II.B: Public Law). 38 Wax, Internationales Sportrecht – Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts, Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht Band 90, Berlin 2009; Jacobs, Tourism, sports and other forms of leisure from the point of view of international law, General report on the twenty-fourth A.A.A. Congress, Nicosia, 22 to 27 May 1972, Annuaire de l’A.A.A./Yearbook of the A.A.A. 1972/73 Band 42/43, La Haye/Den Haag 1975, S. 52, ist der Meinung, dass die Spiele der griechischen Antike ein frühes Beispiel für den Einfluss des Sports auf die Entwicklung des internationalen Rechts waren und dass diese Spiele deshalb als einer der ersten Schritte in Richtung der Schaffung von wahrem internationalem Recht zwischen ethisch verflochtenen, aber völlig autonomen Staaten gesehen werden können. 39 Zu den Aktivitäten des Europarates im Bereich des Sports siehe Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), The Council of Europe and Sport: Basic Documents, Den Haag 2007. In Bezug auf die Bekämpfung von Fußball-Hooliganismus in der Europäischen Union, siehe Siekmann/Gardiner/Soek/Olfers/Mojet, Football Hooliganism with an EU Dimension:

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Sportvorschrift des Artikel 165 des Lissabonner Vertrags ist ein weiteres aktuelles Beispiel für „öffentliches regionales Sportrecht“, das im Übrigen als europäisches (EU-)Sportrecht klassifiziert werden kann.40 Auch auf EU-Ebene wurden in der Vergangenheit Sport-Boykotts verhängt, z. B. gegen Nigeria.41 Schließlich ist in diesem Zusammenhang auf den internationalen NairobiVertrag zum Schutz des Olympischen Symbols der fünf Ringe (1981) hinzuweisen. Die Satzungen und Regelwerke, die der Sport sich selbst gesetzt hat (der private, autonome und nicht-staatliche Teil des Sportrechts) kann zunächst in Olympisches Recht und dann in das Recht der nationalen, regionalen und internationalen Organisationen für jede Sportart unterteilt werden. Das Recht der Olympischen Bewegung (Lex olympica) ist in der Olympischen Charta und allen damit verbundenen Dokumenten niedergelegt.42 Das Recht der Sportorganisationen kann folgendermaßen unterteilt werden: einerseits Spielregeln (im Fußball: „Laws of the Game“), die weltweit einheitlich gelten, und andererseits Satzungen und Ordnungen, die Verwaltungs- (institutionelle) und thematische Aspekte des Sports betreffen. Wettkampfregeln können ebenso in diese Kategorie eingeordnet werden.43 Viele Regeln haben transnationalen Charakter, was bedeutet, dass sie obligatorisch bis auf nationale Ebene anwendbar sind oder in entsprechende nationale Regeln und Vorschriften umgesetzt werden sollten. Ein gutes Beispiel im Bereich Anti-Doping ist der WADA-Code, der bis zu einem gewissen Grad auch als „halb-öffentlich-rechtlich“ charakterisiert werden kann, weil nationale Regierungen an der Verwaltung der WADA offiziell beteiligt sind und der Code durch das UNESCO-Abkommen gegen Doping im Sport ___________ Towards an International Legal Framework, Final Report AGIS Programme 2003, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Den Haag 2004; ebenso Mojet/Siekmann, Legal Aspects of Combating Football Hooliganism in Europe, in: Gardiner/Parrish/Siekmann (Hrsg.), EU, Sport, Law and Policy: Regulation, Re-regulation and Representation, Den Haag 2009, S. 499–533. 40 Siehe Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), The European Union and Sport: Legal and Policy Documents, Den Haag 2005; vgl. insbesondere in Bezug auf den „Sportartikel“ im Vertrag von Lissabon: Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy, Study for the European Parliament, beauftragt von T.M.C. Asser Instituut und der Edge Hill University und den Loughborough Universities, September 2010. Für einen Vergleich zwischen den Arten des „Kontinentalen Sportrechts“ siehe: Nafziger, A Comparison of the European and North American Models of Sports Organisation, ISLJ 2008/3–4, 100–108; siehe ebenso Weatherill, Resisting the Pressures of „Americanization“: The Influence of European Community Law on the „European Sport Model“, in: Greenfield/Osborn (Hrsg.), Law and Sport in Contemporary Society, London 2000, S. 155 f.; ebenso enthalten in Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers, Den Haag 2007, S. 155–176. 41 Siehe dazu Siekmann, The Sports Boycott of Nigeria: Sports, Politics and Human Rights, ISLJ 2008/1–2, 121–124. 42 Vgl. Mestre, The Law of the Olympic Games, Den Haag 2009. 43 Vgl. Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), Basic Documents of International Sports Organisations, Den Haag/Boston/London 1998.

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erfolgreich legitimiert wurde.44 Die Dopingregeln des Niederländischen Instituts für Sportrechtsprechung (Nederlandse Instituut Sportrechtspraak) sind eine nahezu identische Kopie des WADA-Codes. Somit muss der WADA-Code bei der Anwendung der Anti-Dopingregeln des Niederländischen Instituts für Sportrechtsprechung größtenteils oder vollkommen eingehalten werden. In der Vergangenheit verfügte jeder nationale Sportverband und jeder internationale Sportverband über eigene Dopingregeln, bis 2004 mit dem WADA-Code eine Harmonisierung der Regelungen erreicht wurde.45 Weitere bekannte Beispiele im Bereich des Fußballs sind die Regeln hinsichtlich des Status und Transfers von Profifußballern und bezüglich der Spielervermittler, die bald abgeschafft werden.46 Auf regionaler Ebene kann beispielsweise auf das Sicherheitsreglement der UEFA, des europäischen Fußballverbands, hingewiesen werden, dessen Regelungen für die Bekämpfung des Fußballhooliganismus von besonderer Wichtigkeit sind. Im Sport wird die Rolle, die die ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit in der normalen Gesellschaft bezüglich Strafverfahren und Zivilrechtssachen erfüllt, für jede Sportart Disziplinargremien und Schiedsgerichten auf den verschiedenen Ebenen übertragen.47 In diesem System erfüllt der Internationale Sportschiedsgerichtshof (Court of Arbitration for Sports, CAS) die allgemeine Funktion eines „internationalen Gerichts für Sport“, während er gleichzeitig auch als Rechtsmittelinstanz für Dopingfälle fungiert.48 Der Fußball hat sein eigenes bedeutendes internationales Gremium zur Lösung von Konflikten in Transfersachen: die Kammer zur Beilegung von Streitigkeiten der FIFA (Dispute Resolution Chamber, DRC).49

___________ 44

Siehe Casini, Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), International Organizations Law Review 2009/6, 421–446; vgl. allgemein David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code – A Fight for the Spirit of Sport, Cambridge 2008. 45 Siekmann/Soek/Bellani (Hrsg.), Doping Rules of International Sport Organisations, Den Haag 1999. Siehe ebenfalls Soek, Sport Rules and Regulations, in: Vieweg/Siekmann (Hrsg.), Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules – Pilot Study for the European Commission, Beiträge zum Sportrecht, Band 27, Berlin, S. 159–560. 46 Vgl. Siekmann/Parrish/Martins/Soek (Hrsg.), Players’ Agents Worldwide: Legal Aspects, Den Haag 2007. 47 Siehe Siekmann/Soek, Arbitral and Disciplinary Rules of International Sports Organisations, Den Haag 2001; siehe auch: Blackshaw, Sport, Mediation and Arbitration, Den Haag 2009. 48 Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, Den Haag 2006. 49 Siehe de Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber; Den Haag 2009.

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2. Terminologie „Sportrecht“ kann daher als privates und öffentliches nationales, regionales und internationales (im Sinne von universelles, globales) Sportrecht verstanden werden. Streng genommen könnte der Begriff „Lex sportiva“ verwendet werden, um Sportrecht in seiner Gesamtheit zu erfassen, da „Lex sportiva“ wörtlich „Sportrecht“ bedeutet und somit eine neutrale Bezeichnung ist. Der „exotische“ Charakter des lateinischen Begriffs ist auch insofern passend, als er dem Sportrecht einen unverwechselbaren und sehr exklusiven Charakter verleiht (vgl. Lex mercatoria). Der Begriff unterstreicht, dass Sportrecht etwas Eigenständiges ist, ein separat identifizierbarer Bereich, und daher materielles Recht darstellt. Gegen die Verwendung von „Lex sportiva“ in diesem allgemeinen, weiten Sinn könnten jedoch einige Einwände erhoben werden. Beispielsweise spricht dagegen, dass diese Entwicklung zu weit geht und – wie man sehen kann – zu terminologischer Verwirrung führt, an der niemand ein Interesse haben kann. Aus einer rein akademischen Perspektive mag dies stimmen: Letzten Endes bleibt es jedem Wissenschaftler überlassen, einen eigenen, neuen konzeptionellen Rahmen sowie eine Terminologie zu entwickeln, die er als passend in dieser Hinsicht erachtet, vorausgesetzt, er begründet diese. In diesem Fall jedoch wäre es nicht besonders sachdienlich, so vorzugehen. Erstens wird Sportrecht – oder werden Teile davon – an keiner Universität unter dem Namen „Lex sportiva“ gelehrt.50 Darüber hinaus herrscht in der Literatur zumindest bezüglich einer Sache Übereinstimmung: Wenn sich „Lex sportiva“ auch nicht auf die Rechtsprechung der höchsten Sportgerichtsbarkeit (CAS) beschränkt (Nafziger), umfasst der Begriff doch nicht mehr als die autonom gesetzten Regeln des organisierten Sports selbst und die damit verbundene Rechtsprechung (Foster, Latty). Es ist wichtig, einen konzeptionellen Rahmen, der sich bereits entwickelt hat und über den, wie in diesem Fall, zumindest bis zu einem bestimmten Punkt Konsens besteht, nicht zu sprengen, nur um die eigene Meinung voranzutreiben. Hier ist ein pragmatisches Vorgehen vorzuziehen. In einem nicht öffentlich-rechtlichen Kontext ist „Lex sportiva“ „globales Sportrecht“ (Foster) oder – besser noch – „transnationales Sportrecht (Latty), da sich „Lex sportiva“ nicht auf die globale und auch nicht auf die internationale oder regionale Ebene beschränkt. Über Lex sportiva kann in der Tat gesagt werden, dass es – um auf die lateinische Terminologie zurückzukommen – aus Lex sportiva internationalis (universalis), regionalis und nationalis besteht. Durch den transnationalen, grenzüberschreitenden oder, wenn man so will, sogar supranationalen Charakter des privatrechtlichen Sportrechts ergibt sich aber de facto ein eigenständiges, einheitliches Recht. Jeder, der sich in einem allgemeinen ___________ 50

Das Lex-Sportiva-Institut in Jakarta, Indonesien, ist das einzige seiner Art. Es wurde vor einigen Jahren gegründet und ist eine private Initiative einer Kanzlei, die offiziell mit keiner Universität verbunden ist.

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Sinn auf das internationale Sportrecht bezieht, bezieht sich implizit auch auf seine nationale Variante. Anders als das öffentliche Völkerrecht kennt das private Sportrecht keine Grenzen. Es gibt nichts Vergleichbares zu der Souveränität von Staaten in der Welt des Sports. Während Sport zwar innerhalb nationaler Linien organisiert ist, sind die Grenzen zwischen den Vereinen faktisch nichts anderes als gepunktete Linien (im Vergleich dazu sind nationalstaatliche Grenzen eher mit einer durchgezogenen Linie vergleichbar). Das deutlichste Beispiel hierfür sind die Spielregeln einer jeden Sportart. Die Fußballregeln der FIFA sind weltweit die gleichen, was sie in diesem Sinne einzigartig macht. Da Recht nicht nur aus Gesetzen, sondern auch aus Rechtsprechung oder Case Law (Richterrecht) besteht, bevorzuge ich die Verwendung des Begriffs „Lex sportiva“ in einem weiten Sinne gegenüber einem engen Sinne (CAS). Recht besteht jedoch nicht nur aus formellem, geschriebenem Recht, sondern auch aus Übung oder Gewohnheiten, woraus sich Gewohnheitsrecht bilden kann. In der „Sportrechtsdebatte“ wird dies jedoch, wenn überhaupt, nur sehr selten angesprochen. Diese Rechtsquelle gibt es aber auch im Privatrecht. Ein interessantes Beispiel im Zusammenhang mit der Frage, ob Gewohnheitsrecht besteht, liefern die Fußballregeln. Es ist üblich – d. h. eine moralische Pflicht (Fair Play) –, dass ein ballführender Spieler den Ball ins Aus spielt, wenn ein Gegner verletzt am Boden liegt und nicht weiterspielen kann. Es ist dann üblich – d. h. der Gegner hat die sportliche Pflicht –, den Ball beim Einwurf nicht einem der eigenen Spieler zuzuwerfen, sondern ihn der anderen Mannschaft zu überlassen, die den Ball ins Aus gespielt hat. Das Team, dem der Einwurf zugesprochen wurde, leitet dieses Recht zum Einwurf daraus ab, dass die andere Mannschaft den Ball aus dem Spiel geschossen hat, was einen Regelverstoß darstellt: Der Ball muss im Spiel bleiben, andernfalls wäre ein Fußballspiel nicht möglich. Diese ungeschriebene Regel ist wohl eher „weiches“ Recht als eine gewohnheitsrechtliche Pflicht oder ein gewohnheitsrechtliches Recht, da der Schiedsrichter keine Macht hat, diese ungeschriebene Regel des Fair Play durchzusetzen. Oder kann er dies etwa doch, indem er sich erfindungsreich auf „unangebrachtes Verhalten“ (früher: „ungentlemanly conduct“/heute: unsportliches Verhalten) beruft, das ausdrücklich von den Spielregeln51 hierfür vorgesehen ist? Letzten Endes basiert die Gewohnheit, den Ball zurückzugeben, auf einem Gentlemen’s Agreement. Aber wie soll das Spiel dann wieder beginnen? Vielleicht indem die andere Mannschaft den Einwurf ausführt? Die Spielregeln enthalten keine entsprechende Regelung. Indem der anderen Mannschaft ein Freistoß zugesprochen wird? Da der Ball so nicht wieder ins Spiel gebracht wird, ist dies nicht möglich. Der einwerfende Spieler könnte auch offiziell verwarnt werden (Gelbe Karte), wenn man so argumentieren möchte. Oder erfolgt der Regelverstoß erst in dem Moment, in dem der Mitspieler den Ball erhält ___________ 51

Vgl. Regel 12 der Fußballregeln der FIFA (Fouls und unsportliches Betragen).

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und dadurch ein Freistoß möglich wäre? Wenn dem so wäre, wem müsste dann die Gelbe Karte gezeigt werden? Dem Spieler, der den Einwurf vornimmt oder dem Spieler, der den Ball annimmt oder beiden? Es kommt – gerade im Profifußball – sehr selten vor, dass ein Einwurf „versehentlich“ oder „inkorrekt“ ausgeführt wird. Kommt dies doch einmal vor, so wird dies von lauten Unmutsbeurkundungen des Gegners und der Zuschauer begleitet.52 Die übliche Verhaltensweise, den Ball ins Aus zu spielen, wenn ein Gegenspieler verletzt ist, gerät jedoch heutzutage unter Druck, da zunehmend davon ausgegangen wird, dass es im professionellen Fußball Aufgabe des Schiedsrichters ist, das Spiel zu unterbrechen. Dies ist natürlich korrekt, aber nur in Fällen schwerer Verletzungen. Deshalb wird heute tendenziell weitergespielt, wenn ein Gegner verletzt auf dem Spielfeld liegt. Täuscht er lediglich eine Verletzung vor, um beispielsweise den Gegner aus dem Rhythmus zu bringen? Ohnehin werfen Profifußballer den Ball nicht direkt einem Gegenspieler hin, sondern einem Mitspieler, der dann den Ball so weit wie möglich in Richtung des gegnerischen Tors oder eines anderen sicheren Bereichs schießt, um keine Nachteile aus der Gewohnheitsspielregel zu erleiden. Die Regeln oder Gesetze des Spiels sind als ein eigenständiger Teil des Sportrechts unterscheidbar (Foster). Dennoch halte ich die „Lex ludica“ – wegen seines offensichtlich lateinischen Ursprungs ein ähnlich „exotischer“ Begriff – eher für eine Untergruppe der „Lex sportiva“ als für eine Form des Sportrechts auf gleicher Ebene mit der „Lex sportiva“. Dass beide in direktem Bezug zueinander stehen, lässt sich am besten am Beispiel eines Fußballspielers illustrieren, der das Spielfeld verlassen muss, nachdem ihm der Schiedsrichter die Rote Karte gezeigt hat, und gegen den anschließend eine Sperre für ein oder zwei Spiele als Disziplinarmaßnahme verhängt werden kann. Der Umstand, dass Spielregeln, die von den ordentlichen Gerichten als solche nicht überprüft werden, praktisch autonom sind, mag zwar ein Charakteristikum dieser Regeln sein, er rechtfertigt es aber nicht, diese Spielregeln als völlig unabhängige Kategorie zu betrachten oder sie gar vom Sportrecht auszunehmen. Meiner Meinung nach besteht „Sportrecht“ im weiten Sinne aus mehr als der „Lex sportiva“ und der Untergruppe „Lex ludica“. Es sollte auch den öffentlich-rechtlichen Teil (national, regional und international) umfassen. Für diesen Teil und seine Untergruppen gibt es keinen allgemein akzeptierten, speziellen ___________ 52 Das wohl berühmteste Beispiel für einen nicht an das andere Team zurückgegebenen Ball ereignete sich am 13.02.1999 während der FA-Cup-Begegnung zwischen Arsenal und Sheffield United, bei der Nwankwo Kanu, der sein Debüt für Arsenal spielte, versehentlich den Ball seines Teamkollegen annahm, der für den Gegner bestimmt war und diesen an Marc Overmars abspielte, der so das Siegtor schoss. Der Manager von Arsenal, Arsène Wenger, bot anschließend an, das Spiel zu wiederholen. Auch diese Wiederholung gewann Arsenal mit 2:1.

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Begriff. Bisher wurde nur der niederländische Begriff „sportvolkenrecht“ (Wax) vorgeschlagen, aber überträgt man diesen Begriff in die lingua franca des internationalen Sports (d. h. ins Englische), so ist die Übersetzung terminologisch eher unbrauchbar: „public international sports law“, „the law of nations of sport“? Auch die nationale Variante („public national sports law“ oder „national public sports law“?) sollte man nicht vergessen. Andererseits ist „European sports law“ (Weatherill) zu einem Standardbegriff geworden. Wir wissen, dass dieser sich nicht auf die privat-rechtliche regionale Variante des Sportrechts bezieht. Um eine umfassende Nomenklatur für das gesamte Gebiet des Sportrechts zu schaffen, sollte man nichtsdestotrotz in einem Versuch, den terminologischen Knoten zu durchschlagen, folgende Lösung in Betracht ziehen. Zugegebenermaßen ist es eine theoretische und rein akademische Lösung, die dem entgegensteht, was generell unter den Begriffen „Lex sportiva“ (Recht des Sports) und „Lex ludica“ (Regeln und Gesetze des Spiels) verstanden wird. „Lex sportiva“ würde für das öffentliche Sportrecht (staatlich gesetztes Recht, das den Sport betrifft) stehen, das in „Lex sportiva nationalis“ und „Lex sportiva internationalis“ (oder „regionalis“, wie das Sportrecht der Europäischen Union) unterteilt werden kann. „Lex ludica“ stünde dagegen für Sportreglements und Spielregeln (Recht, das sich der Sport selbst setzt). Möglich wäre auch hier die Unterteilung in „Lex ludica nationalis“, „internationalis“ (oder „regionalis“), wobei die Spielregeln zur „Lex ludica internationalis“ gehören würden. Diese Lösung würde auf der Vorstellung basieren, dass wir nur zwei „termini technici“ im Sportrecht zur Verfügung hätten: „Lex sportiva“ und „Lex ludica“ (natürlich abgesehen von „Lex olympica“ – die Bezeichnung für das Recht, das sich auf eine internationale Reihe von Wettbewerben bezieht). Die Neologismen „Lex sportiva“ und „Lex ludica“ in diesem Sinn zu verwenden, hat den Vorteil, dass sie allgemein gebräuchliche internationale Termini technici sind, die als Latinismen keiner Übersetzung in die verschiedenen Sprachen bedürfen. Als solche sind sie sogar noch geeigneter als der aus dem Englischen stammende Oberbegriff „sports law“. Schließlich: Warum soll „Lex sportiva“ für den öffentlich-rechtlichen und „Lex ludica“ für den privatrechtlichen Teil verwendet werden? Könnte man sie nicht ebenso einfach auf andere Weise, z. B. andersherum, verwenden? Der Grund ist, dass von der wörtlichen Bedeutung her „Lex ludica“ dem Sport als Spiel näher steht (und das ist letztendlich die Grundlage des Sports, wie er betrieben wird, der „harte Kern“ bestehend aus Spielregeln), während „Lex sportiva“ als eher allgemeiner, neutralerer Begriff diesen engen Bezug nicht hat und sich stärker für die Assoziation mit „Regierung“ anbietet. Die klare, eindeutige Definition und Bezeichnung eines Rechtsgebietes könnte im Übrigen als zusätzliches Kriterium in Davis’ Bewertungskatalog aufgenommen werden. Würde der fragliche Bereich, das „Sportrecht“, anhand

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dieses Kriteriums geprüft, so wäre – wie oben ausgeführt – das Resultat nicht ganz so eindeutig.

V. Abschließende Betrachtung: Der harte Kern des Sportrechts In Davis’ Bewertungskatalog, den ich als Orientierungspunkt genommen habe, um der Frage nachzugehen, ob so etwas wie „Sportrecht“ existiert (die Antwort lautete: „ja“), sind es offensichtlich hauptsächlich die Faktoren 1, 2, 5 und 7, die die Antwort auf diese Frage bestimmen: das Recht anderer Rechtsgebiete wird von Gerichten speziell auf einen spezifischen Sachverhalt angewendet (1); in einem spezifischen Kontext gibt es Sachverhalte, aus denen sich Fragen ergeben, die einer spezialisierten Analyse bedürfen (2); Entscheidungen in dem zu prüfenden Rechtsgebiet stehen im Widerspruch zu Entscheidungen in anderen Rechtsgebieten und Entscheidungen bezüglich einer speziellen Problematik innerhalb des zu prüfenden Rechtsgebiets haben Auswirkungen auf andere Fälle innerhalb dieses Bereichs (5); es entwickelt sich eingreifende Gesetzgebung, um bestimmte Beziehungen in diesem Bereich zu regulieren (7). Diese Kriterien können als der harte Kern des Bewertungskatalogs betrachtet werden. Sie alle bestimmen, inwiefern sich ein Rechtsgebiet bezogen auf die rechtliche Umgebung anderer Rechtsgebiete unterscheidet. Deshalb sind sie nicht nur für die Entscheidung relevant, ob aus Sport und Recht „Sportrecht“ wird oder nicht, mit anderen Worten, ob Sportrecht existiert. Es lässt sich vielmehr zudem vertreten, dass diese Kriterien bestimmen, wo der inhaltliche „harte Kern“ des Sportrechts zu finden ist. Die zentrale Frage, warum Sportrecht existiert, warum Sportrecht eine Rechtsmaterie eigener Art ist, führt mitten hinein in den Kern dessen, was Sportrecht ist, d. h. was Sportrecht besonders macht. Natürlich ist das Sportrecht insgesamt – wie unter IV.1. beschrieben und in IV.2. mit eigener Terminologie ausgestattet – schon von der Definition her speziell, weil es alles Recht betrifft, das auf Sport bezogen ist. Aber das an sich sollte kein Grund sein, Sportrecht als eine intellektuell ansprechende, akademische Disziplin auszuüben. Ich befasse mich daher hier nicht mit dem Sportrecht „im weiteren Sinne“. Für mich ist vor allem die Dynamik von Interesse, die entsteht, wenn Sportregeln an den allgemeinen gesellschaftlichen Normen gemessen werden, und das – tatsächliche oder optimale – Ergebnis. Wie fügen sich die selbstgesetzten Regeln der Subkultur Sport in den rechtlichen Rahmen der übrigen Gesellschaft ein? Aus der oben beschriebenen Perspektive betrachtet, liegt der Fokus auf der Untersuchung des „Richterrechts“. Da hier der internationale Sportgerichtshof (CAS) weltweit sowohl die letzte als auch die Hauptinstanz ist, ist es verständlich, dass Nafziger den Begriff „Lex sportiva“ allein auf die Rechtsprechung des CAS beziehen möchte.

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Sportregeln werden vom CAS im Sinne einer regulären, allgemein für die Gesellschaft geltenden Gesetzgebung und Regulierung angewandt und interpretiert. Das kann mit Hilfe des folgenden Beispiels illustriert werden: Nach den Disziplinarregeln der UEFA, des europäischen Fußballverbandes, sind die Clubs für das Verhalten ihrer Fans verantwortlich. Im dem Fall „Fußballhooligans“ von Feyenoord Rotterdam gegen die UEFA53 bestätigte der CAS diese Regel, selbst in den Fällen, in denen dem Club kein Verschulden am Fehlverhalten seiner Fans zur Last gelegt werden kann. Die Regel der UEFA und der vom CAS erlassene Schiedsspruch, der diese Regel bestätigt, sind eindeutig nicht mit dem fundamentalen Rechtsstaatsprinzip und dem strafprozessrechtlichen Grundsatz „keine Strafe ohne Schuld“ vereinbar. In seiner sportrechtlichen Dissertation54 verteidigt Soek erfolgreich die Position, dass die Vorschriften über Disziplinarverfahren im Zusammenhang mit Dopingverstößen als Psedo-Strafrecht angesehen werden müssen und dass die praesumptio innocentiae, also die Unschuldsvermutung, des Artikel 6 EMRK auf dopingbezogene Disziplinarverfahren anwendbar ist. Folglich kommt er zu dem Schluss, dass die Anwendung des Prinzips der „strict liability“ (verschuldensunabhängigen Haftung) mit der dahinterstehenden „automatischen“ Verantwortlichkeit dem entgegensteht.55 Im erwähnten Fall hält der CAS trotz aller geäußerten Bedenken an einer Sportregel fest (der Club hatte alles in seiner Macht Stehende getan und von ihm konnte nicht ernsthaft erwartet werden, dieses Fehlverhalten zu verhindern; die sog. Fans waren weder Mitglieder des Clubs noch Mitglieder des offiziellen Fanclubs; außerdem fand das europäische Spiel, bei dem es zu den Krawalle kam im Ausland, in Frankreich, statt). Es ist jedoch ungewiss, ob diese Sportregel der kritischen Überprüfung vor einem staatlichen Gericht standhalten würde. Der CAS produziert „Richterrecht“ privaten Ursprungs und trägt damit zur Entwicklung und Verfeinerung des Sportrechts bei. Der CAS wird gewöhnlich als unabhängige Institution betrachtet, obwohl er tatsächlich eng mit dem internationalen, organisierten Sport verbunden ist, insbesondere mit dem IOC. Soweit ich weiß, hat die Rechtsprechung des CAS bisher nicht zum „Export“ spezifischer Rechtslehren oder -prinzipien in andere Sektoren und Rechtsgebiete zu ihrer Bereicherung geführt.

___________ 53

Feyenoord Rotterdam v. UEFA, CAS 2007/A/1217. Soek, The Strict Liability Principle and the Human Rights of Athletes in Doping Cases, Den Haag 2006. 55 Für eine detaillierte Ausführung dieses Aspektes in Bezug auf den Feyenoord/UEFAFall vgl. Mojet/Siekmann, Legal Aspects of Combating Transnational Football Hooliganism in Europe, in: Gardiner/Parrish/Siekmann (Hrsg.), EU, Sport, Law and Policy, Den Haag 2009, S. 530–531. 54

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Das Europäische Sportrecht basiert größtenteils auf dem „Richterrecht“ des Europäischen Gerichtshofs. Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs reicht von den bahnbrechenden Fällen Walrave, Bosman und MecaMedina56 bis zum jüngsten Fall Bernard57, der die Entschädigung von Vereinen für die Ausbildung professioneller Fußballspieler betraf. So hat sich eine Spruchpraxis entwickelt, der das Prinzip der Anerkennung der Autonomie von Sportverbänden und ihrer Regeln zugrunde liegt, vorausgesetzt, diese Regeln und Entscheidungen sind im Lichte der speziellen Charakteristika der jeweiligen Sportart erforderlich und können somit eine Ausnahme vom EU-Recht rechtfertigen.58 Die Frage der sog. Sportspezifität wurde auch im Fall Bernard behandelt. In diesem Zusammenhang akzeptierte der Europäische Gerichtshof grundsätzlich, dass eine Entschädigung für die Ausbildung talentierter junger Fußballspieler notwendig ist, um den Beruf zu erhalten, wenngleich derartige Vorschriften eigentlich der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit oder vielmehr der Freiheit der Arbeitnehmer, den Arbeitgeber zu wechseln, entgegenstehen. Weatherill59 stellt dieses Urteil in Frage. Die Aussicht, eine Entschädigung dafür zu erhalten, dass eine Ausbildung ermöglicht wird, könnte ebenso Universitäten und Supermärkte ermuntern, neue Talente zu rekrutieren und junge Arbeitnehmer auszubilden. Warum ist das im Fußball etwas anderes und warum sollte das in diesem Bereich gestattet sein? Der Europäische Gerichtshof billigt jedoch nicht immer existierende Sportregeln und Entscheidungen. Er setzt die Grenzen und legt fest, was gestattet ist und was nicht. Das deutlichste Beispiel für die Beanstandung einer Sportregel war natürlich der bekannte Bosman-Fall, der zur Abschaffung des Transfersystems und der Staatsangehörigkeitsklauseln im Profifußball in Europa geführt hat. Dieses Urteil löste nichts Geringeres als eine Revolution im Profifußball aus, denn es besagte, dass sich Fußballspieler nach Ablauf ihres Vertrags frei bewegen konnten, ohne dass ihr „alter“ Verein berechtigt war, vom „neuen“ Verein eine Ablöse zu verlangen. Dem Urteil zufolge galt dies auch unabhän___________ 56 EuGH, Urt. v. 12.12.1974, Rs. C-36/74, Slg. 1974, I-1405 – Walrave und Koch; EuGH, Urt. v. 15.12.1995, Rs. C-415/93, Slg. 1995, I-4921 – Bosman; EuGH, Urt. v. 18.07.2006, Rs. C-519/04, Slg. 2006, I-6991 – Meca-Medina und Majcen. 57 EuGH, Urt. v. 16.3.2010, Rs. C-325/08, Slg. 2010, I-2177 – Bernard. 58 Siehe Parrish/Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in European Union Law, Den Haag 2008. Beachte: In der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshof im Bezug auf „Sportwetten“ (neun Fälle, von Zenatti (1999) bis zu Carmen Media (2001)) ist es nicht die Sportspezifität, sondern eher die nationale Lotteriegesetzgebung, die am Maßstab des EURechts überprüft wird; siehe Siekmann, Sports Betting in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, ISLJ 2011/1–2, 97 ff. und zudem in: Anderson/Blackshaw/ Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), Sports Betting: Law and Policy, Den Haag 2012. 59 Weatherill, The Olivier Bernard Case: How, if at All, to Fix Compensation for Training Young Players?, ISLJ 2010/1–2, 3–6.

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gig von ihrer Nationalität, sofern sie sich als EU-Bürger innerhalb der EU bewegten. Viele offene Fragen wurden durch die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs in Fällen geklärt, in denen Sportregeln kritisch durchleuchtet wurden. Auch die Europäische Kommission hat mit ihrer Entscheidungspraxis in diesen Fragen einen Beitrag geleistet, hier insbesondere im Wettbewerbsrecht mit Hinblick auf die Zentralvermarktung von Fernsehrechten. Nichtsdestotrotz bleiben zahlreiche Fragen zur tatsächlichen Vereinbarkeit bestimmter Sportregeln mit dem EU-Recht unbeantwortet. Ein aktuelles Beispiel kann zur Verdeutlichung dienen: In den letzten Jahren erreichte die Europäische Kommission eine Flut von Beschwerden einzelner Sportler und Sportlerinnen wegen Diskriminierung auf Grund der Staatsangehörigkeit bei Wettkämpfen in anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Die Frage, ob jemand an nationalen Meisterschaften in anderen EU-Staaten teilnehmen kann, ist in diesem Zusammenhang natürlich brisant. Ist der Anwendungsbereich des Diskriminierungsverbots so weit gefasst, dass er es auch erlaubt, Zugang zu Sportveranstaltungen zu erhalten, die traditionellerweise für Staatsbürger des betreffenden Landes reserviert sind? Das ist eine Frage, die den Seelenfrieden der Sportwelt gestört hat, obwohl es Länder gibt (Skandinavien), in denen dies bereits möglich ist. Bei der Beantwortung solcher Fragen sind immer auch die größeren, über rechtliche Fragen hinausgehenden Zusammenhänge zu berücksichtigen. Sportrechtsanwälte sollten sehr viel über die Strukturen des Sports und seine Funktionsweise wissen. Auch wenn man nicht den sprichwörtlichen Duft der Umkleidekabine selbst gerochen haben muss, ist dies bei einer Bewerbung in diesem Sektor durchaus von Vorteil. Ein offensichtlich relevanter Aspekt ist im erwähnten Fall z. B. die Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen einer nationalen Meisterschaft und der Qualifizierung für eine europäische oder Weltmeisterschaft oder für die Olympischen Spiele. Das ist wichtig, da die Athleten im Besitz eines nationalen Passes des Landes sein müssen, das er oder sie repräsentiert, um auf dieser Ebene antreten zu dürfen. Verhindert ein Athlet aus einem anderen Land das Weiterkommen eines einheimischen Athleten während einer nationalen Meisterschaft, die sie oder ihn in der bestimmten Sportart direkt qualifiziert, läge damit eine Wettbewerbsverfälschung vor. Dieser Fall kann eintreten, wenn ein Einheimischer nicht auf einen besseren ausländischen Konkurrenten trifft und damit die nationale Meisterschaft gewinnt. Das Schwimmen ist eine Sportart ohne Körperkontakt, daher werden solche Probleme hier nicht bestehen. Jemand schwimmt und bestimmt damit seine eigene Zeit in seiner eigenen Bahn. Judo ist jedoch eine Kampfsportart, in der die Teilnehmer sich gegenseitig durch eine Reihe von Knock-out-Runden eliminieren. Trifft man im Kampf auf halber Strecke auf einen besseren ausländischen Gegner, wird man das Finale nicht erreichen. Tennis und Badminton sind weitere Beispiele für Sportarten mit Ausscheide- und Knock-out-Runden, ebenso wie Boxen. Die Schlussfolgerung muss sein, dass

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es in solchen Sportarten einfacher ist, bei „qualifizierenden“ nationalen Meisterschaften ein Teilnahmeverbot für ausländische Wettstreiter zu rechtfertigen und dadurch möglicherweise eine Ausnahme zum EU-Recht zu erlauben.60 Zusammenfassend ist festzuhalten, dass (1) Sportrecht existiert, (2) es einen öffentlich-rechtlichen und einen privatrechtlichen Teil beinhaltet, (3) vorgeschlagen wird, den öffentlich-rechtlichen Teil „Lex sportiva“ und den privatrechtlichen Teil „Lex ludica“ zu nennen und (4) der „harte Kern“ des Sportrechts hauptsächlich aus dem „Richterrecht“ des Europäischen Gerichtshofs als öffentlichem Richter oder öffentlichem Gericht (regional) und des Internationalen Sportgerichthofs (CAS) als privatem Gericht (global) besteht.

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Siehe Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, Commissioned by the European Commission to the T.M.C. Asser Instituut and Edge Hill and Leiden Universities, Dezember 2010.

Sportvölkerrecht und Lex Sportiva Von Andreas Wax „Dilemma“ des internationalen Sportrechts ......................................................

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II. Ansätze zur Lösung des „Dilemmas“ ................................................................

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I.

1.

2.

Lex sportiva internationalis .......................................................................

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a)

Existenz einer eigenen Sportrechtsordnung? ......................................

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b)

Geltung einer Lex sportiva internationalis durch Rechtswahlvereinbarung?...............................................................................................

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aa) Lex sportiva als Sonderprivatrecht internationaler Prägung .......

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bb) Parteiautonome Rechtswahl der Lex sportiva vor Schiedsgerichten .........................................................................................

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cc) Parteiautonome Rechtswahl der Lex sportiva vor staatlichen Gerichten ....................................................................................

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Sportvölkerrecht ........................................................................................

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a)

Definition des Sportvölkerrechts ........................................................

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b)

Die Betätigungsfelder des Sportvölkerrechts .....................................

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c)

Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Doping im Sport.......................

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aa) Völkerrechtlicher Befund ...........................................................

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bb) Bewertung ..................................................................................

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d)

Sportvölkerrecht als Lösung zur Behebung des „Dilemmas“? ........... 101 aa) Harmonisierung kollisionsrechtlicher Vorschriften .................... 101 bb) Harmonisierung strafrechtlicher Vorschriften ............................ 103

III. Fazit .................................................................................................................. 107

I. „Dilemma“ des internationalen Sportrechts Die Entscheidungen der Sportorganisationen bzw. Sportverbandsgerichte stehen mit denen staatlicher Gerichte aufgrund der Anwendung von einerseits sportverbandlichen und andererseits staatlichen bzw. unionsrechtlichen Regelungen auf ein und denselben internationalen Sportsachverhalt bisweilen nicht

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in Einklang. Dieses „Dilemma“1 verstärkt sich im internationalen Sport noch dadurch, dass sich bei Anrufung staatlicher Gerichte stets die Frage nach dem anwendbaren staatlichen Privatrecht stellt und das internationale Privatrecht im internationalen Sport neben verschiedenen Qualifikationsoptionen mehrere Anknüpfungsmöglichkeiten für ein und dieselbe Rechtsfrage vorsieht.2 Für vergleichbare Fälle gelangen daher aufgrund nicht deckungsgleicher nationaler kollisionsrechtlicher Systeme verschiedene nationale Rechtsordnungen zur Anwendung, was zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen führen kann und auch führt.3 Zwar ist es Typik des internationalen Privatrechts, dass bei grenzüberschreitenden Sachverhalten je nach vermittelndem Kollisionsrecht unterschiedliche nationale Rechtsordnungen für vergleichbare Sachverhalte zur Anwendung gelangen. Im (internationalen) Sport sind solche „Ungleichheiten“ aber nicht hinnehmbar, da ein Wesensmerkmal des Sports das Gleichheitsprinzip ist.4 Zur Verwirklichung des Gleichheitsprinzips müssen nicht nur die Spielregeln weltweit gleich sein, sondern auch die Rechtsregeln, die auf Sportsachverhalte Anwendung finden.5

II. Ansätze zur Lösung des „Dilemmas“ Die staatliche Gerichtsbarkeit kann in international-sportrechtlichen Streitigkeiten nicht gänzlich ausgeschlossen werden, zumindest nicht in Verfahren des einstweiligen Rechtsschutzes.6 Daher verbleibt zur Behebung des beschriebenen „Dilemmas“ nur die Möglichkeit, für vergleichbare Sachverhalte stets dasselbe Recht zur Anwendung gelangen zu lassen.7 Lösungswege könnten hier in einer lex sportiva internationalis, aber auch im Sportvölkerrecht liegen.

___________ 1

Begrifflichkeit nach Adolphsen, SchiedsVZ 2004, 169, 170. Petri, Die Dopingsanktion (2004), S. 313; Wax, Internationales Sportrecht (2009), S. 132. 3 Hess, in: Digel/Dickhuth (Hrsg.), Doping im Sport (2002), S. 98, 103; Krieger, Vereinsstrafen im deutschen, englischen, französischen und schweizerischen Recht (2003), S. 173; Tyrolt, Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit und zwingendes staatliches Recht (2007), S. 39. 4 Ronellenfitsch, DAR 1995, 241. 5 Waldbröl, FAZ v. 14.11.2005, S. 29; Weller, JuS 2006, 497, 498 f. 6 Wax (Fn. 2), S. 143 ff. 7 Vgl. Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen (2003), S. 50. 2

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1. Lex sportiva internationalis a) Existenz einer eigenen Sportrechtsordnung? Auch in Anbetracht von Art. R58 S. 1 Hs. 3 CAS-Code, Art. 17 CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games8 bzw. Art. 18 CAS Arbitration Rules for the FIFA World Cup 2006 Final Round wird diskutiert, ob dem internationalen Sport nicht ein eigenes Recht zur Verfügung steht: eine Lex sportiva internationalis, die „oberhalb der Ebene nationalen staatlichen Rechts einzuordnen“9 ist. Bereits 1977 äußerte Luc Silance, dass „the law of the State, whether national or Community, gives way before the law of sport in its own domain“.10 Aus Sicht eines Verlangens nach einem „gleichen Recht für alle“ wäre ein solcher Anwendungsvorrang ideal, da auf international-sportrechtliche Sachverhalte dann stets dieselben Rechtsregeln Anwendung fänden. Dass der Sport der einzige mögliche Fall der „Geburt“ einer eigenständigen Rechtsordnung sei, wurde von Massimo Severo Giannini bereits 1949 vertreten.11 Über Italien hinaus verbreitete sich die Ansicht, dass der Sport durch die Regelungen der internationalen Sportorganisationen eine vom staatlichen Recht unabhängige, originäre Rechtsordnung geschaffen habe.12 Dennoch ist die Annahme, eine Lex sportiva internationalis könne eine eigene, anationale Rechtsordnung darstellen, verfehlt:13 Das Recht der Sportorganisationen ist privat gesetztes Vereinsrecht. Zur Entfaltung bedarf es stets der rechtlichen Verbindlichkeit eines staatlichen Geltungsbefehls.14 Beim Erlass von Regelungen durch Sportorgani___________ 8

Hess, in: Hess/Dressler (Hrsg.), Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports (1999), S. 1, 43. Adolphsen (Fn. 7), S. 51. 10 Silance, Olympic Review 1977, S. 618, 628. 11 Giannini, RDES (Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport) 1949, 10, 17. 12 Nafziger, AJIL (American Journal of International Law) 1992, 489 ff.; Rich, JILP (Journal of International Law and Politics), Vol. 15, 1982, 1, 34; Bondoux, Olympic Review 1978, 494, 497; Simon, RFCJ (Revue française de théorie, de philosophie et de culture juridique) 2011, 97 ff.; Maisonneuve, RRJ (Revue de la Recherche Juridique) 2005, 1563, 1566 ff.; Jacquier, Règles Autonomes des Organisations Sportives (2004), S. 190 f.; Simma, FS Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998), 573, 580; Tröger/Vedder, in: Reuter (Hrsg.), Einbindung des nationalen Sportrechts in internationale Bezüge (1987), S. 1, 14 f. 13 Pfister, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (Hrsg.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht (2007), S. 511, Rn. 8; Adolphsen (Fn. 7), S. 60; Summerer, Internationales Sportrecht vor dem staatlichen Richter (1990), S. 177; Reuter, DZWir 1996, 1; Will, in: Reuter (Hrsg.), Einbindung des nationalen Sportrechts in internationale Bezüge (1987), S. 29, 38 f.; Oschütz, Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), S. 353; Hochtritt, Internationale Sportschiedssprüche vor deutschen Gerichten (2007), S. 77; OLG Frankfurt, Urt. v. 18.04.2001 (Dieter Baumann), SpuRt 2001, 159, 161. 14 F. Kirchhof, Private Rechtsetzung (1987), S. 133, 343. 9

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sationen handelt es sich nicht um originäre Rechtsetzung; die entsprechenden Regelwerke bedürfen ausnahmslos der Verankerung im staatlichen Recht.15

b) Geltung einer Lex sportiva internationalis durch Rechtswahlvereinbarung? aa) Lex sportiva als Sonderprivatrecht internationaler Prägung Dennoch hat die Diskussion um die Existenz einer Lex sportiva internationalis ihre Berechtigung. Es ist nämlich nicht ausgeschlossen, anstelle eines staatlichen Rechts die Geltung einer Lex sportiva zu vereinbaren.16 Ein solches „Sonderprivatrecht“17 („mit internationaler Prägung“18) soll sich neben den Satzungen und Regelwerken der internationalen Sportorganisationen aus den (standardisierten) Verträgen, welche die Sportorganisationen mit Sportlern und Vereinen schließen, aus dem durch den CAS entwickelten (Schieds-) Richterrecht19 sowie – von Hess als „Kern“ einer Lex sportiva bezeichnet20 – aus „grundlegenden Rechtsprinzipien als Gemeingüter[n] aller nationalen Rechtsordnungen“ und „spezielle[n] Rechtssätze[n] der sportiven Gemeinschaft“21 zusammensetzen.22 Die „Rechtssätze der sportiven Gemeinschaft“ umfassen z. B. das Gebot eines „sauberen Sports“, das Verbot rassischer Diskriminierung23 und den Grundsatz des „fair play“.24 Fraglich bleibt, inwieweit derart unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe einer Streitlösung zugänglich sein können. So versteht man beispielsweise unter „fair play“ die „Beziehung zum Nächsten (…) in Konkurrenz und Kampf, im Wettbewerb und im Affekt.“25 Hierbei handelt es sich um vorwiegend ethische Motive, die für den Sport zwar wertvoll, aufgrund ihrer Unbe___________ 15 Vieweg, Normsetzung und -anwendung deutscher und internationaler Verbände (1990), S. 135 ff.; Summerer, FS Hanisch (1994), S. 267, 276; Hess (Fn. 8), S. 1, 40 f.; Krieger (Fn. 3), S. 218. 16 Vgl. Adolphsen, Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 2002, S. 281, 288; Krieger (Fn. 3), S. 222. 17 Westermann, FS Rittner (1991), S. 771 ff. 18 Hess (Fn. 8), S. 1, 46. 19 Kane, in Blackshaw/Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport (2006), S. 455, 476. 20 Hess (Fn. 8), S. 1, 42. 21 Vgl. CAS, Award v. 15.12.2002 (NOC/IOC), CAS 2002/A/372. 22 Krieger (Fn. 3), S. 219 ff.; Haas, CaS 2007, 271, 272. 23 Hess (Fn. 8), S. 1, 42. 24 Krieger (Fn. 3), S. 219. 25 Kircher, Fair Play (1927), S. 24, 25.

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stimmtheit im Recht aber nur eingeschränkt brauchbar sind. Dieses Manko ist aber kein Spezifikum einer Lex sportiva. Auch das sonstige Recht verwendet die dem „fair play“ synonyme „Fairness“ zunehmend als Rechtsbegriff,26 ohne dass bislang geklärt ist, was hierunter konkret zu verstehen ist. Derartige Unbestimmtheiten sind jedoch hinzunehmen, da sie lediglich als „Leitbild“ eines Sonderrechts des Sports dienen. Wie alles spezifische Recht ist auch das auf den Sport anwendbare Recht von Wertvorstellungen geprägt. „Grundlegende Rechtsprinzipien“ (einer Lex sportiva) sind u. a. das Prinzip des nulla poena sine lege, der Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör27 sowie das Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip und der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz.28 Diese Rechtsgrundsätze sind den allermeisten nationalen Rechtsordnungen gemein,29 was der Internationalität des Sports bzw. seinen Rechtsstreitigkeiten entgegenkommt30 und einem weltweiten Entscheidungseinklang förderlich ist. Da die „Rechtssätze der sportiven Gemeinschaft“ bzw. die genannten „grundlegenden Rechtsprinzipien“ heute regelmäßig in den Satzungen und Regelwerken der internationalen Sportorganisationen enthalten sind,31 sind sie allerdings keine eigenen Bestandteile einer Lex sportiva. Elemente einer Lex sportiva sind daher allein diese Satzungen und Regelwerke, die erwähnten Verträge sowie die Schiedssprüche des CAS.32

bb) Parteiautonome Rechtswahl der Lex sportiva vor Schiedsgerichten Die parteiautonome Inanspruchnahme einer Lex sportiva wird vom CAS bereits praktiziert und in schiedsgerichtlichen Verfahren international als allge-

___________ 26 Vgl. Tettinger, in: Scheffen (Hrsg.), Sport, Recht und Ethik (1998), S. 33, 35; Vieweg, FS Röhricht (2005), S. 1255, 1266 ff. 27 Hess (Fn. 8), S. 1, 42; Reeb, Olympic Review 1998, N° 19, S. 67 f.; CAS, Award v. 23.05.1995 (USA Shooting & Quigley/UIT), CAS 94/129, CAS Awards I 1986–1998, S. 187, 202 ff.; CAS, Award v. 15.01.1992 (G./FEI), CAS 91/53, CAS Awards I 1986– 1998, S. 79. 28 CAS, Award v. 18.09.2000 (COC & Jesus Kibunde/AIBA), CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 004, CAS Awards II 1998–2000, S. 617, 621; vgl. allgemein Soek, The strict liability principle and the human rights of the athlete in doping cases (2006), passim. 29 Krieger (Fn. 3), S. 220. 30 Vgl. auch CAS, Award v. 20.08.1999 (AEK Athen und SK SlaviaPrag/UEFA), CAS 98/200, CAS Awards II 1998–2000, S. 38, 101 f. 31 Wax (Fn. 2), S. 180, 99 ff. 32 Nafziger, AJIL 1992, 489, 508.

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mein zulässig erachtet.33 Würde dies in Schiedsverfahren vor dem CAS (oder anderen Sportschiedsgerichten) gängige Praxis, hätte dies zur Folge, dass (zumindest) dort künftig einheitliches Recht auf vergleichbare Sachverhalte Anwendung fände. Die Grundlage hierfür ist mit Art. R45, R58 CAS-Code bzw. Art. 17 CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games und Art. 18 CAS Arbitration Rules for the FIFA World Cup 2006 Final Round bereitet.

cc) Parteiautonome Rechtswahl der Lex sportiva vor staatlichen Gerichten Zwar wird eine parteiautonome Rechtswahl der Lex sportiva in Schiedsverfahren allgemein als zulässig erachtet. Allerdings verneint die herrschende Auffassung die Wahl einer anderen als einer staatlichen Rechtsordnung vor staatlichen Gerichten. Privatautonome Rechtsregeln können nicht Rechtsgrundlage für die Entscheidung eines staatlichen Gerichts sein.34 Ebenso wie die Lex mercatoria nicht als anwendbares Recht vor staatlichen Gerichten vereinbart werden kann,35 ist es nicht möglich, eine Lex sportiva als Entscheidungsgrundlage in Verfahren der staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit zu wählen.36 Das beschriebene „Dilemma“ kann vor staatlichen Gerichten somit nicht durch die parteiautonome Vereinbarung einer (vereinheitlichten) Lex sportiva behoben werden. Hier bleibt es bei der Anwendung verschiedener staatlicher Rechtsordnungen, die zu verschiedenen Ergebnissen bei vergleichbaren Sachverhalten führen können.

2. Sportvölkerrecht Eine vollständige Beseitigung der Ungleichbehandlung vergleichbarer Sportsachverhalte könnte das Sportvölkerrecht erreichen. So wie der WADC die Anti-Doping-Bestimmungen der Sportorganisationen vereinheitlicht hat bzw. eine Lex sportiva für einheitlich anwendbares Recht vor Sportschiedsge-

___________ 33

Hess (Fn. 8), S. 1, 43; Haas, CaS 2007, 271; Krieger (Fn. 3), S. 223; Hochtritt (Fn. 13), S. 78; Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 757; Tyrolt (Fn. 3), S. 30; allg. auch Solomon, RIW 1997, 981, 982. 34 Solomon, RIW 1997, 981, 982; Spickhoff, RabelsZ 1992, 116, 133; v. Hoffmann, FS Kegel (1987), S. 215, 232; Lorenz, IPRax 1987, 269, 272; Adolphsen (Fn. 16), S. 281, 288. 35 Stein, Lex mercatoria (1995), S. 246 f.; Spickhoff, RabelsZ 1992, 116, 133; Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 756. 36 Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 757; Hochtritt (Fn. 13), S. 77.

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richten sorgen kann, könnte möglicherweise das bislang wenig beachtete37 Sportvölkerrecht – die „vergessene Disziplin“ des internationalen Sportrechts – zur Harmonisierung des auf den Sport anwendbaren staatlichen Rechts führen.38 Bevor hierauf eingegangen wird, erfolgt zunächst eine knappe Darstellung, worum es sich beim Sportvölkerrecht handelt.

a) Definition des Sportvölkerrechts Positiv definiert umfasst das Sportvölkerrecht alle internationalen öffentlichrechtlichen Normen, die auf Rechtsfragen des Sports Anwendung finden und von denen sich die Völkerrechtssubjekte bei ihrem sportbezogenen Handeln unmittelbar oder mittelbar leiten lassen. Negativ definiert umfasst das Sportvölkerrecht alle Normen des Sportrechts, die weder einer der landesrechtlichen Kategorien des internationalen Sportrechts noch dem europäischen Sportrecht oder dem nationalen Sportrecht angehören. Das Sportvölkerrecht umfasst nur diejenigen Normen, die den Sport unmittelbar betreffen (Völkerrecht im Sport), unabhängig davon, ob der Sport hierbei auch als Mittel zur Regelung (anderer) Sachverhalte dient.39

b) Die Betätigungsfelder des Sportvölkerrechts Das Völkerrecht widmet sich dem Sport in folgenden vier Bereichen:40 der Bekämpfung von Apartheid und sonstiger Diskriminierung im Sport, der Friedenssicherung bei Olympischen Spielen und der Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Gewalt beim Sport, der Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Doping im Sport sowie der Frage der Anerkennung eines „Rechts auf Sport“ als Menschenrecht. Zur Veranschaulichung sei vorliegend das stets aktuelle Thema der völkerrechtlichen Dopingbekämpfung skizziert.

___________ 37 Siehe allerdings Siekmann/Soek (Hrsg.), Basic Documents of International Sports Organisations (1999), S. XI: „Specific public international law (in the sense of the law of nations) with regard to (…) sports.“ 38 Umfassend Wax (Fn. 2), S. 290 ff. 39 Wax (Fn. 2), S. 188. 40 Hierzu ausführlich Wax (Fn. 2), S. 197 ff.

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c) Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Doping im Sport aa) Völkerrechtlicher Befund Nachdem der Europarat seit den frühen 1960er Jahren die Bekämpfung des Dopings durch rechtlich unverbindliche Resolutionen und Empfehlungen betrieben hatte,41 erfolgte aus sportvölkerrechtlicher Sicht im Jahr 1989 ein entscheidender Einschnitt in der internationalen Dopingbekämpfung, indem mit dem Übereinkommen gegen Doping die erste zwischenstaatliche Anti-DopingKonvention verabschiedet wurde. Erweitert wurde dieses Übereinkommen im Jahr 2004 durch ein Zusatzprotokoll,42 das die erste verbindliche völkerrechtliche Vereinbarung darstellt, mit der die Kompetenz der WADA anerkannt wird.43 Eine erste Auseinandersetzung der Vereinten Nationen mit dem Doping erfolgte durch den ECOSOC im Mai 1968.44 Die UNESCO betreffend äußerte die Internationale Charta für Leibeserziehung und Sport aus dem Jahr 1978, Sportler vor den Gefahren des Dopings zu schützen. Die Generalversammlung regte hinsichtlich der Dopingbekämpfung im November 1995 die Zusammenarbeit ihrer Mitgliedstaaten mit der Olympischen Bewegung an.45 Im November 200346 wurden die Mitgliedstaaten dazu aufgefordert, die Erarbeitung eines Anti-Doping-Übereinkommens auf universeller Ebene zu beschleunigen. Dieser Aufruf entsprach den Forderungen der Kopenhagener Erklärung zum AntiDoping im Sport vom 05.03.2003. Hier verpflichteten sich die Anhängerstaaten des WADC, ein zwischenstaatliches Übereinkommen zur Stärkung des WADC zu schaffen. Diese Verpflichtung nahm durch das von der UNESCO auf den Weg gebrachte Internationale Übereinkommen gegen Doping im Sport Gestalt an. In Kraft trat das Übereinkommen, dem bis zum 14.11.2011 163 Staaten beigetreten sind, am 01.02.2007. Grundgedanke des Übereinkommens ist, dass Doping nur durch die internationale Zusammenarbeit und die stufenweise Harmonisierung der Dopingbekämpfungsstandards von staatlichen Behörden und privaten Sportorganisationen wirksam bekämpft werden kann. Die Vertragsparteien verpflichten sich, geeignete Maßnahmen zur Dopingbekämpfung zu ergreifen, die den Grundsät___________ 41

Vgl. Houlihan, AE (Annuaire Europeen) 2000, 39, 40. Vieweg/Siekmann, Legal Comparison and the Harmonisation of Doping Rules, S. 35 ff. 43 Wax, ISLJ (International Sports Law Journal) 2010/3–4, 25, 27. 44 ECOSOC Res. 1968/1925(XLIV) v. 23.05.1968 (Doping). 45 GA Res. 50/13 v. 07.11.1995 (The Olympic Ideal). 46 GA Res. 58/5 v. 03.11.2003 (Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace). 42

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zen des WADC entsprechen. Bereits hieran sieht man das Zusammenspiel zwischen dem Übereinkommen und der WADA beziehungsweise dem WADC. So befasst sich Art. 4 des Übereinkommens mit seinem Verhältnis zum WADC: Der WADC, der Internationale Standard für Labors und der Internationale Standard für Kontrollen sind dem Übereinkommen als Anhänge beigefügt, aber keine Bestandteile des Übereinkommens. Sie werden also nicht durch Aufnahme in das Übereinkommen zu Völkerrecht, aus ihnen erwachsen für die Vertragsstaaten keine völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen. Anders als für die Anhänge verhält es sich mit der von der WADA erlassenen Verbotsliste und den Standards für die Erteilung von Ausnahmegenehmigungen zur therapeutischen Anwendung, die gemäß Art. 4 Abs. 3 als Anlagen des Übereinkommens Bestandteile desselben sind. Aufgrund dieser Verweisungstechnik könnte man annehmen, dass im Fall der Änderung dieser Statuten die WADA als private Organisation zur Erzeugung von Völkerrecht ermächtigt sei. Dass dem nicht so ist, belegt allerdings Art. 34 des Übereinkommens, der ein besonderes Änderungsverfahren für die Anlagen des Übereinkommens vorsieht.47 Insgesamt nimmt das Übereinkommen die Bekämpfung des Dopings (primär) durch präventive Maßnahmen in Angriff.48 Die Verhängung von Sanktionen gegenüber Dopingsündern ist im Übereinkommen nicht geregelt, abgesehen von der ausdrücklichen Verweisung auf den WADC in Art. 4 Abs. 2.49

bb) Bewertung Unter sportvölkerrechtlichen Gesichtspunkten ist hinsichtlich der Dopingbekämpfung zuerst festzustellen, dass die Auseinandersetzung der Staatenwelt zunächst allein durch diverse rechtlich unverbindliche Resolutionen und Empfehlungen (soft law) erfolgte. Sportvölkerrecht kann in diesem Bereich in regionaler Ausprägung erst mit dem Europaratsübereinkommen im Jahr 1989, auf universeller Ebene gar erst im Jahr 2007 mit dem Internationalen Übereinkommen gegen Doping im Sport verzeichnet werden. Im Übrigen fand bislang kein (spezifisch) sportvölkerrechtliches Übereinkommen eine solch rege Beteiligung der Staaten wie das Letztere.50 Beide Anti-Doping-Übereinkommen zeigen, dass sich die Staatengemeinschaft im Gegensatz zu den privaten Sportorganisationen, die Doping präventiv und repressiv bekämpfen, zumeist auf Regelungen zur Prävention beschränkt.51 ___________ 47

Vgl. UNESCO ED-2005/CONV-DOP Rapp. 1, 14.01.2005, S. 4. Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 27. 49 Wax (Fn. 2), S. 277 ff. 50 Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 28. 51 Vgl. Haug, Doping – Dilemma des Leistungssports (2006), S. 215 f. 48

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Generell verfolgen beide Übereinkommen das gleiche Ziel: Maßnahmen zur Ausmerzung von Doping im Sport zu treffen. Hierfür ist primäres Ziel, Staaten und internationalen Sportorganisationen dieselben Anti-Doping-Regeln zu geben. Dies entspricht der These, dass die Dopingverhinderung und -bekämpfung grundsätzlich nur wirksam und gerecht sein kann, wenn gleiche Regeln für alle Beteiligten gelten. Unter anderem soll dieses Ziel dadurch erreicht werden, dass die Kooperation der Vertragsstaaten untereinander und die Zusammenarbeit der Staaten mit den Sportorganisationen verbessert sowie einheitliche Standards zur Dopingbekämpfung geschaffen werden. Zu deren Harmonisierung soll ein rechtlicher Rahmen bereitgestellt werden, innerhalb dessen die Regierungen im Wege der Gesetzgebung oder durch administrative oder politische Maßnahmen aktiv werden können, um Doping zu bekämpfen. Hierbei gibt es eben Aufgaben, die nur von staatlicher Seite wahrgenommen werden können, wie z. B. die Beschränkung der Erhältlichkeit von verbotenen Substanzen. Auch ist staatliche Aktivität unabdingbar, um Doping im Breitensport wirkungsvoll zu begegnen,52 da die Anti-Doping-Maßnahmen der Sportorganisationen in diesen Bereich regelmäßig nicht hineinreichen.53 Insgesamt lässt sich beiden Übereinkommen entnehmen, dass dem Doping nur wirksam begegnet werden kann, wenn Prävention und Repression weltweit aufeinander abgestimmt werden. Allein präventive Maßnahmen werden den dopingwilligen Sportler kaum davon abhalten, zu verbotenen Substanzen zu greifen. Das wirkungsvolle Zusammenspiel präventiver und repressiver AntiDoping-Maßnahmen kann aber erst gelingen, wenn Staatengemeinschaft und privat organisierter Sport gemeinsam agieren.54 Dieses partnerschaftliche Prinzip liegt beiden Übereinkommen zu Grunde. Zu bemängeln ist, dass beide Übereinkommen teilweise (nur) die generelle Verpflichtung enthalten, Maßnahmen zur Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Doping zu unternehmen, ohne konkrete Maßnahmen zu nennen. Dies ist jedoch kein Spezifikum der AntiDoping-Übereinkommen und bietet den einzelnen Staaten auch eine gewisse Flexibilität, sorgt auf der anderen Seite aber dafür, dass nicht gewährleistet ist, dass alle Vertragsstaaten in gleicher Weise zur Zielerreichung tätig werden. Zumindest ist das Internationale Übereinkommen aber ein deutliches Zeichen der Verantwortung der Staatengemeinschaft in ihrem weltweiten Kampf gegen Doping. Wenn der Sport durch seine Universalität gekennzeichnet ist, muss auch seine größte Geißel – Doping – universell bekämpft werden. Auf Seiten der privaten Sportorganisation geschieht dies seit einigen Jahren durch den WADC. Nun hat auch die (universelle) Staatengemeinschaft ein Mittel an der Hand, um ihrer selbst propagierten Verantwortung nachzukommen. Heute kann ___________ 52

Vgl. Simeoni, FAZ v. 29.03.2005, S. 32. Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 28. 54 Allgemein Graf Vitzthum, Der Staat der Staatengemeinschaft, S. 12. 53

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freilich nicht beantwortet werden, inwiefern das Sportvölkerrecht de facto dazu taugt, das Dopingproblem im Sport zu mildern oder gar zu beseitigen. Der Wille, der Dopingverhinderung und -bekämpfung gemeinsam gerecht zu werden, ist aber deutlich sichtbar.55

d) Sportvölkerrecht als Lösung zur Behebung des „Dilemmas“? Wie dargestellt, kann eine Lex sportiva das beschriebene „Dilemma“ erheblich lindern, nicht aber vollständig beseitigen. Angedeutet wurde, dass eine totale Beseitigung der Ungleichbehandlung vergleichbarer Sportsachverhalte durch das Sportvölkerrecht – mittels einer Harmonisierung des auf den Sport anwendbaren staatlichen Rechts – erfolgen könnte. Hier sind zwei Ansätze denkbar: Zum einen könnten die verschiedenen (den Sport betreffenden) staatlichen Kollisionsrechte weltweit vereinheitlicht werden, was für vergleichbare internationale Sportsachverhalte bei entsprechender Anknüpfung letztlich die Anwendung des jeweils selben staatlichen Sachrechts zur Folge hätte.56 Zum anderen erscheint es (weitergehend) überlegenswert, ob nicht auch das auf den Sport anwendbare staatliche Strafrecht (in gewissen Bereichen) harmonisiert werden könnte.57

aa) Harmonisierung kollisionsrechtlicher Vorschriften Das „Dilemma“ des internationalen Sportrechts könnte beseitigt werden, indem durch ein völkerrechtliches Übereinkommen eine weltweite Harmonisierung derjenigen nationalen kollisionsrechtlichen Vorschriften, die auf international-sportrechtliche Streitigkeiten Anwendung finden, vorgenommen würde. Hierbei sei bemerkt, dass es rechtlich nicht möglich ist, ein völkerrechtliches Übereinkommen zu schaffen, mit dem sich die Staaten verpflichten, Regelungen zu erlassen, die einen generellen Ausschluss der Überprüfbarkeit sportgerichtlicher Entscheidungen durch die staatliche Gerichtsbarkeit vorsehen. Dies wäre mit dem weltweit anerkannten Justizgewährungsanspruch nicht vereinbar. Ein Übereinkommen, das die Vereinheitlichung (bestimmter) kollisionsrechtlicher Vorschriften im Bereich international-sportrechtlicher Streitigkeiten zum Gegenstand hätte, müsste idealiter zunächst eine exakte Regelung der konkret zu harmonisierenden Materien – z. B. das auf die Überprüfung von Dopingsperren anwendbare Recht – vorsehen. Als exklusives Anknüpfungsmoment ___________ 55

Wax, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 25, 28. Vgl. auch Latty, ISLJ 2011/1–2, 34, 38. 57 Wax (Fn. 2), S. 290 f. 56

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böte sich hier (allein) der Sitz der jeweils im Streit befindlichen Sportorganisation an.58 Dies würde dazu führen, dass für vergleichbare Sachverhalte aufgrund einer stets identischen Anknüpfung jeweils das Sachrecht zur Anwendung käme, das am Sitz der Sportorganisation gilt, was zumindest innerhalb einer Sportart zu einheitlichen und gerechten Ergebnissen führen würde. Da auf dem am Sitz der Sportorganisation geltenden Recht auch stets die entsprechende Verbandssanktion begründet wäre, wären divergierende Entscheidungen von Sport- und staatlicher Gerichtsbarkeit für vergleichbare Sachverhalte nur sehr schwer vorstellbar. Mit der Autonomie des Sports wäre ein solches Übereinkommen vereinbar, da anerkannt ist, dass Maßnahmen der Sportorganisationen ohnehin und bereits heute durch die staatliche Gerichtsbarkeit eingeschränkt überprüfbar sind.59 Eine solche Harmonisierung kollisionsrechtlicher Vorschriften könnte allein deshalb unerwünscht sein, weil sie die kulturelle Diversität, der die unterschiedlichen nationalen Rechtsordnungen erwachsen, über Gebühr einschränken würde.60 So berechtigt eine solche These generell sein mag, so deutlich kann ihr im konkreten Fall entgegnet werden, dass für kulturelle und nationale Verschiedenheiten im internationalen Sport(-recht) gerade kein Platz ist, da ein Wesensmerkmal des Sports das Gleichheitsprinzip ist und der Sport gerade und vor allem auch durch seine Universalität gekennzeichnet ist.61 Letztlich ist fraglich, ob eine derartige Rechtsvereinheitlichung realisierbar wäre. Dies erfordert eine weltweite Verständigung über die Notwendigkeit, in diesem Bereich rechtsharmonisierend tätig zu werden, sowie die Bereitschaft, dies auch zu tun. Eine allgemeine Verständigung darüber, im Bereich des internationalen Sportrechts rechtsvereinheitlichend zu agieren, ist – wie beschrieben – Bekenntnis und Bestreben der Staatengemeinschaft, wie nicht zuletzt das Internationale Übereinkommen gegen Doping im Sport zeigt. Zwar enthält dieses keinen konkreten Hinweis darauf, dass die Staatenwelt eine Harmonisierung im Bereich des Kollisionsrechts anstrebt. Andererseits beinhaltet die mit dem Übereinkommen übernommene Verpflichtung, Doping wirkungsvoll und im Sinne des WADC zu bekämpfen, durchaus Potential und Anreiz für ein derartiges Vorhaben, da den im WADC verankerten Dopingsanktionen nur dann volle Wirksamkeit zukommen kann, wenn nicht zu befürchten ist, dass sie von staatlichen Gerichten aufgrund der Anwendung verschiedener staatlicher Privatrechte nicht einheitlich beurteilt werden. ___________ 58 Zur Auffindung einer „idealen Anknüpfung“ siehe generell Gamillscheg, in: BDGV, Heft 3 (1959), S. 29, 43. 59 Wax (Fn. 2), S. 293. 60 Schack, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht (2006), S. 97, Rn. 215; Gamillscheg, in: BDGV, Heft 3 (1959), S. 29, 30; siehe auch Adolphsen (Fn. 7), S. 257. 61 Vgl. Silance, Olympic Review 1971, S. 586, 593.

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Insgesamt würde ein internationales Übereinkommen, das eine Harmonisierung der staatlichen Kollisionsrechte im Bereich international-sportrechtlicher Streitigkeiten zum Gegenstand hätte, das beschriebene „Dilemma“ des internationalen Sportrechts beseitigen, da dann innerhalb derselben Sportart vor staatlichen Gerichten stets dasselbe Sachrecht Anwendung fände.62

bb) Harmonisierung strafrechtlicher Vorschriften Fraglich ist, ob zur Behebung des beschriebenen „Dilemmas“ auch das auf den Sport anwendbare materielle Recht (in speziellen Bereichen) harmonisiert werden könnte. Dies soll wiederum am Beispiel der Dopingbekämpfung untersucht werden. Einen solchen Weg hat das Internationale Übereinkommen nicht gewählt; der WADC wurde dem Übereinkommen „lediglich“ als Anhang beigefügt. Im Gegensatz zu den Anlagen des Übereinkommens stellt er ausdrücklich keinen Bestandteil desselben dar, womit die Sanktionen gegenüber Dopingsündern keine Harmonisierung das staatliche Recht betreffend erfahren haben. Eine Harmonisierung der staatlichen Privatrechte, deren Generalklauseln zur Überprüfung der verbandsrechtlichen Sanktionen herangezogen werden, wäre aufgrund der mangelnden Sporttypizität dieser Normen zum Scheitern verurteilt.63 Daher ist fraglich, ob es rechtstechnisch möglich wäre, strafrechtliche Vorschriften mittels des Völkerrechts dahingehend zu vereinheitlichen, dass die im sportverband(sgericht)lichen Verfahren ausgesprochenen Dopingstrafen vom staatlichen Recht (stets) „bestätigt“ würden, um einen Entscheidungseinklang zwischen der Sperre durch die Sportorganisation und einer „Strafe“ durch den Staat herzustellen. Tendenzen für eine generelle „Anpassung“ des staatlichen Rechts an die Sanktionsmaßnahmen des privaten Sports in Dopingfällen sind durchaus zu erkennen, wie ein Blick auf Art. 4 Abs. 4 des Europaratsübereinkommens gegen Doping oder auf Art. 4. Abs. 1 S. 1, 2 des Internationalen Übereinkommens gegen Doping im Sport zeigt. Von Interesse ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Forderung in Art. 22.2 WADC, dass „all other governmental involvement with anti-doping will be brought into harmony with the Code.“ Ein (nicht gerechtfertigter) Eingriff in die Sportautonomie verhindert eine solche Harmonisierung nicht. Eine staatliche strafrechtliche Vorschrift, die Dopingsünder sanktioniert, würde keinen unmittelbaren Eingriff in den Sportbetrieb darstellen, sondern den Sportler „lediglich“ mittelbar an der Teilnahme am ___________ 62 63

Wax (Fn. 2), S. 294 f. Vgl. Vedder, GYIL 1984, 233, 256.

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Sportgeschehen hindern.64 Die Autonomie des Sports wäre aber erst verletzt, wenn der Staat in den Wesensgehalt der Selbstregulierungsbefugnisse des Sports eingreifen würde.65 Somit ist es grundsätzlich möglich, dass, harmonisiert durch das Sportvölkerrecht, weltweit einheitliche strafrechtliche Normen erlassen (oder modifiziert) würden, die Dopingsünder sanktionieren.66 Ein dem ne bis in idem entgegenstehendes Doppelbestrafungsverbot im Verhältnis von Verbandssanktion und staatlicher Strafe bestünde hierbei nicht.67 Eine Strafbarkeit wegen Dopingkonsums könnte aber ausgeschlossen sein – hierzu genügt der Blick auf das deutsche Recht –, weil die eigenverantwortliche Selbstschädigung bzw. -gefährdung nicht strafbewehrt ist.68 Doch auch dieses Paradigma könnte überwunden werden, wenn eine Bestrafung des gedopten Sportlers damit begründet würde, dass er sich durch die Verwendung verbotener Substanzen wegen Betrugs strafbar macht.69 Schwierigkeiten zeigen sich hierbei aber aufgrund unterschiedlicher Ausgestaltungen im Verbandsverfahren und staatlichen Strafverfahren hinsichtlich der Frage der Schuld des gedopten Sportlers sowie in der hierfür zu Grunde liegenden Beweisführung.70 Während das staatliche Strafrecht – soweit ersichtlich weltweit – hier vom Grundsatz der Unschuldsvermutung ausgeht, enthält das sportverbandsrechtliche Verfahren verschiedene Wege der Beweisführung,71 namentlich das Prinzip der strict liability, die Verschuldensvermutung mit Entlastungsbeweis72 und den Anscheinsbeweis. Da der Anscheinsbeweis im Sportgerichtsverfahren grundsätzlich möglich73 und, zumindest nach mitteleuropäi___________ 64 Vgl. auch Hilpert, Sportrecht und Sportrechtsprechung im In- und Ausland (2007), S. 323, Rn. 5. 65 Vieweg/Röthel, ZHR 2002, 6, 15. 66 In diesem Sinne auch Cherkeh, Betrug (§ 263 StGB), verübt durch Doping im Sport (2000), S. 242. 67 So für das deutsche Recht (Art. 103 Abs. 3 GG) Fahl bzw. (zust.) Reschke, SpuRt 2001, 181 ff.; Heger, SpuRt 2007, 153. 68 Summerer, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (Hrsg.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht (2007), S. 200, Rn. 246; Hilpert (Fn. 64), S. 321, Rn. 5; siehe auch BGH, Urt. v. 14.02.1984, BGHSt 32, 265 ff. 69 Digel, in: Digel/Dickhuth (Hrsg.), Doping im Sport (2002), S. 1, 3; Nolte, Sport und Recht (2004), S. 224; Lüer, Dopingstrafen im Sport und der Grundsatz „Ne bis in idem“ (2006), S. 112; Hilpert (Fn. 64), S. 321 f., Rn. 5; Schimke, Sportrecht (1996), S. 202; Wax (Fn. 2), S. 300. 70 Vgl. Eufe, Die Unschuldsvermutung im Dopingverfahren (2005), S. 36. 71 Hierzu statt vieler Hilpert (Fn. 64), S. 313 ff., Rn. 3. 72 Hilpert (Fn. 64), S. 313 f., Rn. 3. 73 Walker, in: Vieweg (Hrsg.), Doping – Realität und Recht (1998), S. 135, 143 ff.; Steiner, in: Röhricht/Vieweg (Hrsg.), Doping-Forum (2000), S.125, 135 f.; Hochtritt (Fn. 13), S. 164; Hilpert (Fn. 64), S. 315 f., Rn. 3. Als „vorbildhaftes“ Beispiel möge hier § 8 Nr. 3 a) DFB-Rechts- und Verfahrensordnung dienen.

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schem Rechtsverständnis, im staatlichen Strafverfahren nicht ausgeschlossen ist,74 könnte und müsste „Brücke“ für eine Angleichung der Verfahren und hieraus resultierender Harmonisierungseffekte zwischen verbandsrechtlicher und strafrechtlicher Sanktionierung von Dopingsündern die generelle Einführung des Anscheinsbeweises im Sportverbandsverfahren sein. Dies könnte dazu führen, Dopingsünder im Verbandsverfahren und im staatlichen Strafverfahren nach den gleichen Beweisgrundsätzen zu behandeln. Zur Verwirklichung bedürfte es nicht nur weltweiter Anerkennung seitens der Staaten, sondern auch eines entsprechenden Entgegenkommens durch die Sportwelt. Ein deutliches Signal, das Strict-liability-Prinzip bzw. die Verschuldensvermutung aufzugeben, wurde vom privat organisierten Sport – soweit ersichtlich – aber noch nicht gesetzt. Doping kann jedoch nur dann wirksam bekämpft werden, wenn Staat und Sport Hand in Hand zusammenarbeiten, was auch deutlicher Ausdruck der entsprechenden Übereinkommen ist. Hierzu bedarf es aber nicht nur eines Entgegenkommens der Staaten, sondern auch einer Öffnung des Sports für staatliche Belange, indem dieser Grundsätze des staatlichen Rechts übernimmt.75 Um einen Entscheidungseinklang von staatlicher Dopingsanktion und Dopingsperre durch die zuständige Sportorganisation zu erreichen, müsste das betreffende staatliche Strafrecht den Anti-Doping-Bestimmungen des Sports schließlich derart „entsprechen“, dass für gleiche Verhaltensweisen sowohl im Verbandsverfahren als auch im Strafverfahren hinsichtlich der Höhe des Strafmaßes identische Sanktionen verhängt würden: Wenn der gedopte Sportler von Verbands wegen beispielsweise für zwei Jahre gesperrt wird, müsste der Staat ihn eben (weltweit) auch für zwei Jahre „aus dem Verkehr ziehen.“ Hierbei ist klar, dass die staatliche Freiheitsstrafe (ohne Aussetzung zur Bewährung) den mit einer Dopingsperre verfolgten Zielen zwar entsprechen würde, unter rechtsstaatlichen Gesichtspunkten aber keinesfalls (automatische) strafrechtliche Folge bei Dopingverstößen sein dürfte. Denkbar wäre vielmehr, dass zur staatlichen (Geld- oder Bewährungs-)Strafe bei Dopingfällen ein Berufsverbot hinzutritt, das den gedopten Sportler für den der Dopingsperre entsprechenden Zeitraum an der Berufsausübung hindern und somit (mittelbar) vom Sportbetrieb ausschließen würde. Ein Entscheidungseinklang zwischen Verbandsverfahren und staatlichem Verfahren wäre aber immer nur dann gegeben, wenn, wie bemerkt, am Ende die Höhe der Dopingsperre und des die gesamte Sportart umfassenden Berufsverbots (ohne Bewährung) identisch wären. Voraussetzung wäre also, dass die Dauer des (staatlicherseits) ausgesprochenen Berufsverbots ___________ 74

Grundlegend Müller, Anscheinsbeweis im Strafprozeß am Beispiel der Feststellung von Kausalität und von Dispositionsprädikaten (1998); Eufe, Unschuldsvermutung (2005), S. 59 ff., S. 61. 75 Nolte (Fn. 69), S. 19.

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der Dauer der Dopingsperre entspräche. Hierzu müssten (weltweit) staatliche Regelungen geschaffen werden, die hinsichtlich „Dopingtatbestand“ und Rechtsfolge den Bestimmungen der Sportorganisationen entsprechen würden.76 Dies erscheint nur schwer möglich: Der WADC beinhaltet ein flexibles System der Sanktionshöhen bei Dopingvergehen, um angemessen auf die Besonderheiten des Einzelfalls zu reagieren. Hierbei ist dennoch stets gewährleistet, dass gleiche Sachverhalte gleich beurteilt werden. Rechtlich zulässig wäre es zwar, einen vergleichbaren und in den Sanktionshöhen entsprechenden Regelkatalog mittels des Sportvölkerrechts (weltweit) in das staatliche Strafrecht einzuführen, wenn derartige Regelungen mit den Verfassungen der jeweiligen Staaten konform gingen.77 Zu einer Totalharmonisierung zwischen staatlicher Sanktion in Form eines Berufsverbots und einer Dopingsperre durch die Sportorganisation könnte dies aufgrund der rechtsstaatlich gebotenen Flexibilität einer je nach Einzelfall unterschiedlichen Sanktionshöhe aber dennoch nicht führen, da ob der Unabhängigkeit der beiden Verfahren – eine Bindung des Strafrichters durch das (vorhergehende) verbandsrechtliche Urteil kann nicht bestehen – und hieraus resultierender möglicher unterschiedlicher Bewertungen der Sanktionshöhe durch mögliche Milderungs- oder Strafschärfungsgründe eine Übereinstimmung der verhängten Sanktionen zwar im Regelfall vorstellbar, in keinem Fall jedoch zwingend wäre. Voraussetzung für einen Gleichklang wären „fixe“ Sanktionshöhen im staatlichen Strafprozess, die keine vom Verbandsverfahren abweichende Strafmilderung oder -erhöhung zuließen. Derartige Regelungen wären mit der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit allerdings nicht vereinbar. Somit ist festzuhalten, dass eine strafrechtliche Sanktionierung gedopter Sportler zwar – de lege lata ist dies beispielsweise in Italien der Fall – durchaus rechtlich zulässig ist. Nicht möglich ist es aber, eine Harmonisierung strafrechtlicher Vorschriften dergestalt zu erreichen, dass sich – im Sinne eines Entscheidungseinklangs – staatliche Dopingsanktion und Sperre durch die Sportorganisation (weltweit) stets entsprechen würden. Eine Totalbeseitigung des „Dilemmas“ des internationalen Sportrechts kann hierdurch nicht erreicht werden.78

___________ 76

Wax (Fn. 2), S. 305. Vgl. zur Rechtslage in Deutschland Hilpert (Fn. 64), S. 319, Rn. 4: „Zwei Jahre Regelstrafe beim ersten Verstoß und Sperren auf Dauer im Wiederholungsfall (…) genügen (…) dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz und sind mit Art. 12 I GG vereinbar.“ 78 Wax (Fn. 2), S. 308. 77

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III. Fazit Das beschriebene „Dilemma“ des internationalen Sportrechts kann durch eine Lex sportiva internationalis zwar gelindert, nicht aber beseitigt werden. Der „Königsweg“ zur Problembeseitigung kann vielmehr in der weltweiten Harmonisierung entsprechender kollisionsrechtlicher Vorschriften gesehen werden. Hierzu kann das Sportvölkerrecht tauglicher Taktgeber sein.

Lex Sportiva – von der Theorie zur Praxis: Was man von der Rechtsprechung des Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) und des Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT) lernen kann Von Andreas Zagklis I.

Einleitung .......................................................................................................... 109

II. Lex sportiva und die Rechtsprechung des CAS ................................................ 110 III. Ex aequo et bono und die BAT-Rechtsprechung .............................................. 114 1.

Das Fehlen „anwendbarer Regeln“ ............................................................ 114

2.

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IV. Fazit .................................................................................................................. 119

I. Einleitung Das Konstrukt der „Lex sportiva“ war und ist Gegenstand zahlreicher akademischer Diskussionen. Seit jeher nähert man sich seinem Inhalt, seiner Natur und seiner Anwendung über verschiedene Ansätze: einen rechtswissenschaftlichen, einen nationalen, einen liberalen, einen formalistischen Ansatz etc. Übereinstimmend erkennen alle diese Ansätze jedoch die fortwährende Interpretation, Implementierung und Entwicklung der Lex sportiva durch die Rechtsprechung, insbesondere die des Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), an. Internationale Sportverbände haben den CAS als Letztentscheidungsinstanz gewählt, nicht zuletzt aufgrund der Flexibilität, die das Schiedsgericht mit Sitz in der Schweiz hinsichtlich der Wahl des im konkreten Fall anzuwendenden materiellen Rechts genießt. Zur Schlichtung eines Streits kann der CAS schlicht die Regeln anwenden, die der Sportverband erlassen hat, dessen Entscheidung angefochten wird. Subsidiär kann gemäß dem Code of Sports-related Arbitration (CAS-Code) das Recht am Sitz des Verbands zur Anwendung gelangen (siehe unten II.). Die positive Resonanz auf die institutionelle Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit im Sport hat dazu geführt, dass internationale Sportverbände versucht sind, eigene unabhängige Schiedsgerichte zu schaffen, die den Erfordernissen einer „echten

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Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit“ („true arbitration“) nach Schweizer Recht entsprechen, wie sie in der Rechtsprechung des Schweizer Bundesgerichts1 hervorgehoben wird . In diesem Rahmen schuf der internationale Basketballverband (FIBA) im Jahre 2006 das Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT)2, ein Schiedsgericht mit satzungsgemäßem Sitz in Genf, dessen vorrangige Aufgabe darin besteht, basketballbezogene Vertragsstreitigkeiten zwischen Spielern, Vereinen und Agenten zu entscheiden. Im Folgenden geht es um die Frage, welchen Beitrag die Rechtsprechung des BAT zur Doktrin der Lex sportiva zu leisten vermag. Das Hauptaugenmerk liegt auf dem in der großen Mehrzahl der BAT-Schiedsverfahren anwendbaren materiellen Recht, nämlich ex aequo et bono, in Verbindung mit dem Prinzip der Veröffentlichung von BAT-Schiedssprüchen (siehe unten III.).

II. Lex sportiva und die Rechtsprechung des CAS Unabhängig davon, ob die Rolle der Lex sportiva in der Sportrechtstheorie anerkannt oder kritisch gesehen wird, steht für die Mehrheit der Rechtswissenschaftler außer Frage, dass die Lex sportiva – zumindest – eng mit der Rechtsprechung des CAS verknüpft ist. Die Schiedssprüche und Stellungnahmen des CAS wurden entweder als eine Quelle der Lex sportiva3 oder als „common law“ für die Interpretation von sportrechtlichen Dokumenten4 angesehen. Dies impliziert nichts anderes, als dass die Lex sportiva ein Produkt der Privatautonomie darstellt, das Sportorganisationen nicht nur auf regulatorischer, sondern auch auf der Ebene der Streitbeilegung fördern möchten. Der CAS ist der von der Olympischen Bewegung geschaffene private Richter, der die Aufgabe hat, zwischen den Mitgliedern der Olympischen Bewegung auftretende Streitigkeiten zu entscheiden und die von ihnen selbst erlassenen Regeln anzuwenden. Die rechtliche Situation ist jedoch auf prozessualer Ebene um ein Vielfaches einfacher als auf der Ebene des materiellen Rechts. Auf der einen Seite ist die ___________ 1 Entscheidung vom 15.03.1993 in der Sache Elmar Gundel, ATF (frz. Arrets [principaux] du Tribunal Fédéral) 119 II 271; Entscheidung von 27.05.2003 in der Sache Larissa Lazutina und Olga Danilova, ATF 129 III 445. 2 Der ursprüngliche Name des Tribunals war FIBA Arbitral Tribunal. Um dessen Unabhängigkeit zu unterstreichen, entschied die FIBA während ihres 19. Weltkongresses (04.–06.09.2010 in Istanbul), das Schiedsgericht umzubenennen. Die Namensänderung trat zum 01.04.2011 in Kraft. 3 J. Nafziger, Lex Sportiva, ISLJ 2004/1–2, 3. 4 A. Erbsen, The substance and illusion of Lex Sportiva, in: Blackshaw I./Siekmann R./Soek J. (Hrsg.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, TMC Asser Press, Den Haag 2006, S. 441–442.

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Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit eine international anerkannte Streitbeilegungsmethode, so dass Staaten Schiedssprüche – vorbehaltlich einer begrenzten Kontrolle – wie Gerichtsentscheidungen anerkennen und durchsetzen.5 Auf der anderen Seite ist nicht zu leugnen, dass die von Organisationen erlassenen Regelwerke im Vergleich zum nationalen Recht nur zweitrangig sind. In der Rechtstheorie wurde häufig hervorgehoben, dass die Kompetenz von Sportorganisationen, Regelwerke zu erlassen – und somit „Recht zu erschaffen“ – aus nationalen Rechtsvorschriften stammt, nach denen die Organisationen errichtet wurden. Teilweise wird daher vertreten, die legislative Kompetenz internationaler Sportverbände auf rein technische Sportangelegenheiten zu beschränken, während in allen anderen, die Rechte der Athleten betreffenden Angelegenheiten zwischenstaatliche Organisationen („international public organisations“) zuständig sein sollen.6 Angesichts der Tatsache, dass (a) Sport-Regelwerke ungültig sind, wenn sie mit grundlegenden Prinzipien des nationalen Rechts kollidieren und (b) staatliche Interventionen im populären Sport anerkannter Bestandteil der politischen Agenda vieler Staaten sind, konnten Sportverbände einen Großteil solcher Konflikte vermeiden, indem sie diese nicht nur aus den Händen staatlicher Richter nahmen, sondern sie zudem einem Tribunal mit einer ausdrücklichen Anweisung übertrugen: Dieses soll sowohl Sport-Regelwerke als auch nationales Recht (in eben dieser Reihenfolge) auf die Streitbeilegung anwenden, wobei im Falle fehlender abweichender Parteivereinbarung das Recht am Sitz des Verbands anzuwenden ist. Das Schweizer Schiedsrecht und der CAS-Code eröffnen diese Möglichkeit. Artikel 187 Abs. 1 des Schweizer Bundesgesetzes über das Internationale Privatrecht (PILA) sieht vor, dass „[d]as Schiedsgericht […] nach dem von den Parteien gewählten Recht oder, bei Fehlen einer Rechtswahl, nach dem Recht, mit dem die Streitsache am engsten verbunden ist, [entscheidet].“ Zudem unterwerfen sich die Parteien selbst den kollisionsrechtlichen Regelungen des CAS-Codes7, indem sie sich darauf einigen, den Streit dem CAS zu übergeben. Artikel R 58 des CAS-Codes schreibt für Berufungsstreitigkeiten vor, dass das Panel den Streit im Einklang mit den anwendbaren Regelwerken und den Rechtsgrundsätzen des von den Parteien gewählten Rechts oder, bei Fehlen einer solchen Rechtswahl, im Einklang mit dem Recht des Landes, in dem der nationale oder internationale Verband oder die Sportinstitution, die die angefochtene Entscheidung getroffen haben, ihren Sitz hat oder im Einklang mit den ___________ 5

Vgl. das New Yorker Übereinkommen über die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer Schiedsgerichtsprüche vom 10.06.1958. 6 D. Panagiotopoulos, Lex sportiva and international legitimacy governing: protection of professional players, US-China Law Review, Bd. 8-II, S. 135–136. 7 CAS 2006/A/1061, CAS 2006/A/1141, CAS 2007/A/1267, CAS 2008/A/1639.

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Rechtsgrundsätzen, deren Anwendung das Panel für angemessen hält. Im letztgenannten Fall hat das Panel seine Entscheidung zu begründen. Die praktische Folge einer solch kumulativen Formulierung (im Einklang mit den anwendbaren Regelwerken und den Rechtsgrundsätzen) ist, dass SportRegelwerke und das Recht am Sitz der Vereinigung in CAS-Berufungsverfahren parallel angewandt werden.8 Auf diese Weise stellen die internationalen Sportorganisationen, die den CAS erschaffen haben, sicher, dass ihre Regelwerke „in jedem Fall“9 vom CAS angewandt und nicht etwa von einem staatlichen Richter abgelehnt werden, der als Ansatzpunkt in seiner Urteilsfindung das Recht seines Forums anwendet. Der Vorteil ist offensichtlich: Es handelt sich um einen sportspezifischen Ansatz, bei dem der Schiedsrichter nicht daran gehindert wird, die Sport-Regelwerke einem Legitimitätstest zu unterziehen – entweder gemäß dem anwendbaren Recht am Sitz der Vereinigung (das Recht, unter dem die Vereinigung existiert und Regeln für ihre Mitglieder aufstellen kann)10 oder, in einigen wenigen Fällen, gemäß dem von den Parteien gewählten Recht11. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines rechtlich stimmigen, aber in sportlicher Hinsicht absurden Urteils ist daher begrenzt, wohingegen die einheitliche Interpretation und Anwendung der Regeln des Sportverbands durch die in den meisten Fällen gegebene Bezugnahme auf das gleiche nationale Recht, das Recht am Sitz des Verbands, garantiert ist. Da sowohl das Internationale Olympische Komitee als auch die meisten internationalen Fachsportverbände ihren Sitz in der Schweiz haben, findet in der Regel Schweizer Recht auch auf den materiellen Teil des Streits Anwendung. Darüber hinaus haben die zunehmende Qualität und die detailliert verfassten Sport-Regelwerke die Art und Weise beeinflusst, in der CAS-Panels Artikel ___________ 8

A. Rigozzi, L’arbitrage international en matiere de sport, Basel 2005, S. 607. A.M. Steingruber, Sports arbitration: determination of the applicable regulations and the rules of law and their interpretation, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 58. 10 Ex multis: CAS 2008/A/1519–1520 (FC Shakhtar Donetsk v/ Matuzalem Francelino da Silva & Real Zaragoza SAD & FIFA; Matuzalem Francelino da Silva & Real Zaragoza SAD v/ FC Shakhtar Donetsk & FIFA), in dem das Panel Artikel 17 des FIFA-Reglements bezüglich Status und Transfer von Spielern auch unter Berücksichtigung von Prinzipien des Schweizer Rechts (Recht des Sitzes der FIFA) interpretierte: „Nach reichlicher Betrachtung aller oben genannten Punkte, in Übereinstimmung mit Sinn und Zweck von Art. 17 Abs. 1 des FIFA-Reglements und unter Berücksichtigung der Spezifität des Sports und der subsidiären Anwendung des Schweizer Rechts und im Besonderen der Art. 99 Abs. 3 und 42 Abs. 2 des Schweizerischen Obligationenrechts, denen zufolge bei Unmöglichkeit der Bestimmung eines genauen Schadensersatzbetrags der Richter den Betrag nach billigem Ermessen festlegt, unter Berücksichtigung des ordnungsgemäßen Ablaufs der Dinge und der von der verletzten Partei zur Schadensminderung ergriffenen Maßnahmen, kommt das Panel zu folgender Entscheidung […].“ 11 Ex multis: CAS 2008/A/1644 (Mutu v/ Chelsea), S. 23–27, in dem der Arbeitsvertrag eine Rechtswahlklausel zugunsten des englischen Rechts enthielt. Der CAS folgerte, dass der Streit auf Grundlage englischen Rechts und des FIFA-Reglements zu entscheiden war. 9

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R 58 anwenden, und zwar insbesondere in Doping- und Fußballfällen. Es ist heutzutage nicht ungewöhnlich, dass die Parteien ihren Vortrag allein auf die Sport-Regelwerke ohne Bezug zum anwendbaren nationalen Recht stützen, weil das Panel auch durch die alleinige Anwendung der anwendbaren Regelwerke zu einer Entscheidung und zur Lösung des Streits gelangen kann. Obwohl ein staatliches Gericht theoretisch dieselbe Praxis an den Tag legen könnte, ist es schwer vorstellbar, dass ein staatlicher Richter in seiner Entscheidung ausdrücklich angibt (wie es viele CAS-Panels getan haben), dass die Regelwerke des Sportverbands X „vorrangig“12 anzuwenden sind, das nationale Recht des Landes Y dagegen „ergänzend“13, „subsidiär“14 oder „in dem Umfang, wie für die Beilegung des Streits nötig“15. Man erkennt also, dass CAS-Panels – wenngleich sie die Überlegenheit des staatlichen Rechts nicht anzweifeln – ihre rechtliche Argumentation mit den anwendbaren Sport-Regelwerken beginnen (und manchmal auch abschließen16). Die bisherigen Ausführungen zeigen, dass der CAS besser als ein normales staatliches Gericht in der Lage ist, die Lex sportiva zu interpretieren und zu entwickeln. Dies nicht nur wegen der sportspezifischen Qualifikation und Erfahrung seiner Panels, sondern auch, weil er bei der Entscheidung von Streitigkeiten im Sport bemüht ist, zuerst die Sport-Regelwerke anzuwenden und diese – sofern erforderlich – in der Regel auf Grundlage des am Sitz der Vereinigung gültigen Rechts interpretiert. Diese Praxis erlaubte es dem CAS, charakteristische Prinzipien des Sportrechts stetig und über einen langen Zeitraum hinweg anzuwenden (z. B. die verschuldensunabhängige Haftung [„strict liablitity“] in Dopingfällen17), durch seine eigene Rechtsprechung andere Prinzipien zu etab___________ 12

Artikel 62.2 der FIFA-Statuten: „Die Vorschriften des CAS-Codes für sportbezogene Schiedsgerichtsverfahren finden auf das Verfahren Anwendung. Der CAS wendet vorrangig die verschiedenen Regeln der FIFA und, ergänzend, Schweizer Recht an.“ 13 CAS 2006/A/1177, CAS 2007/A/1219, CAS 2008/A/1521, CAS 2009/A/1912 & 1913, CAS 2010/A/2172. 14 CAS 2007/A/1370–1376 (FIFA & WADA v/ STJDF, CBF, Dodô), in denen das Panel beschloss, dass „der gegenwärtige Fall in seiner Begründetheit unter vorrangiger Anwendung der FIBA-Regeln, ergänzender Anwendung des WADA-Codes und subsidiärer Anwendung der CBF-Regeln und des Brasilianischen Rechts zu entscheiden ist. Zusätzlich könnte auch Schweizer Recht hinsichtlich der Interpretation und Anwendung der FIFARegeln anwendbar sein.“ 15 CAS 2009/A/1974, CAS 2008/A/1988. 16 A. Erbsen (Fn. 4), der in seiner Analyse der vom CAS entwickelten „vier verschiedenen Arten des Rechts“ einen Schritt weiter geht: „Erstens, wenn der CAS feststellt, dass ein autoritativer Text – wie ein Vertrag, eine Verbandssatzung oder ein Anti-Doping Code – eine Regelung enthält, die die strittige Frage eindeutig beantwortet, wird der CAS nahezu immer diesen Text anwenden, ohne eine normative Analyse dahingehend anzustellen, ob die textliche Regel vernünftig ist.“ 17 World-Anti-Doping-Code, Kommentar zu Artikel 2.1.1. Hinsichtlich anderer Prinzipien siehe die Kommentare zu den Artikeln 3.1., 3.2.4., 4.2.2.

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lieren (z. B. die Field-of-play-Doktrin18) oder sogar langjährige Praktiken im Sport aufzuspüren, die auf lange Sicht als gewohnheitsrechtliche Regel Anerkennung finden könnten19. So unterstreicht Ken Foster20 die Rolle der Sportschiedsgerichte in seiner recht mutigen und genauen Definition der Lex sportiva. Diese beschreibt er als „eine privatautonome rechtliche Ordnung, die durch Vertrag zwischen den internationalen Sportverbänden und den ihrer (Sport-)Jurisdiktion Unterworfenen begründet wird und die dann aus den von Institutionen der alternativen Streitbeilegung interpretierten Satzungen und Regelwerken entsteht“ (Hervorhebung hinzugefügt). Bemerkenswert ist, dass Foster es vermeidet, den CAS namentlich zu nennen und stattdessen auf die institutionalisierte Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit verweist und damit davon ausgeht, dass die erforderliche Rechtssicherheit nur durch die von den ständigen Sportschiedsgerichten getroffenen Entscheidungen („body of jurisprudence“) geschaffen werden kann. Sogleich stellt sich jedoch die nächste Frage: Was passiert, wenn der Sportverband beschlossen hat, bestimmte Fragestellungen nicht zu regeln und deren Lösung einem Sportschiedsgericht überlässt, das grundsätzlich ex aequo et bono entscheidet?

III. Ex aequo et bono und die BAT-Rechtsprechung 1. Das Fehlen „anwendbarer Regeln“ Im Unterschied zur FIFA, die Regeln über das Arbeitsverhältnis zwischen Vereinen und Spielern erlassen hat, hat es die FIBA unterlassen, entsprechende Regeln zu formulieren. Der Ruf nach vertraglicher Stabilität und dem Prinzip pacta sunt servanda war jedoch gleichermaßen stark in beiden Mannschaftssportarten, weshalb der FIBA von der internationalen Basketballgemeinschaft unmissverständlich zu verstehen gegeben wurde, dass ein internationales Forum zur Beilegung von Basketballstreitigkeiten im Wege eines fairen, schnellen und günstigen Verfahrens geschaffen werden müsse. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, wurde im Jahre 2006 das BAT mit Sitz in Genf geschaffen, das folgende – wohl auf einzigartige Weise vereinte – Charakteris___________ 18

CAS 2010/A/2090, die CAS-Rechtsprechung zu diesem Punkt zusammenfassend. CAS 2008/A/1545, in dem das CAS-Panel ausführlich die Argumentation des IOCs zur Existenz eines generellen Prinzips der Lex sportiva, dem zufolge eine Mannschaft disqualifiziert werden müsse, sollte ein Mitglied während eines Wettbewerbs gegen die AntiDoping-Regeln verstoßen, überprüft (letztlich verwirft). 20 K. Foster, Transnational law in action, ISLJ 2010/3–4, 21. 19

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tika aufweist:21 (a) ein freiwilliges System (echte Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit), (b) das BAT entscheidet nicht über Streitigkeiten, an denen die FIBA als Partei beteiligt ist, (c) ein vom BAT-Präsidenten aus einer geschlossenen Gruppe von Schiedsrichtern auf Rotationsbasis ernannter Einzelrichter, (d) mündliche Verhandlung nur auf Antrag, (e) computergestützte Verfahren, (f) Publikation von Schiedssprüchen.22 Trotz dieser prozessualen Charakteristika kann es keine schnelle und kosteneffiziente Streitbeilegung geben, wenn der Richter keinen direkten Zugang zum bzw. Wissen über das anzuwendende Recht hat. Die für das FIFA/CASStreitbeilegungssystem gefundene Lösung (der oben erwähnte Artikel R58 CAS-Code verweist auf die Regeln des Verbands und Artikel 62 Abs. 2 FIFAStatut verweist auf „vorrangige“ FIFA-Regeln und „zusätzliches“ Schweizer Recht) ist hier unbrauchbar. Wie bereits erwähnt, hat sich nur die FIFA dazu entschieden, über ihre Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFARSTP) vertikal in die vertraglichen Beziehungen von Berufsspielern einzugreifen. Die FIBA ist diesen Weg nicht gegangen, obwohl sowohl die FIFA als auch die FIBA Interesse an der Überwachung des Vertragsabschlusses und der Vertragsbeendigung haben, weil der Vertragsstatus eines Spielers an sein Recht geknüpft ist, international zu wechseln. Beispielsweise heißt es in Artikel 18 Abs. 4 FIFA-RSTP, dass die Gültigkeit des Vertrags nicht von einer erfolgreichen ärztlichen Untersuchung und/oder der Bewilligung einer Aufenthaltsgenehmigung abhängen soll. Die FIBA Internal Regulations (FIBA-IR) nehmen hingegen nur am Rande23 Bezug auf mögliche Bedingungen24 in Spielerverträgen. Woran wird sich der BAT-Schiedsrichter also bei der Streitbeilegung orientieren? Abermals hält das Schweizer Schiedsrecht eine Lösung bereit. Artikel 187 Abs. 2 PILA besagt: „Die Parteien können das Schiedsgericht ermächtigen, nach Billigkeit [also ex aequo et bono] zu entscheiden.“ Im Gegensatz dazu sagt Artikel 15 Abs. 1 der BAT-Schiedsregeln, dass „der Schiedsrichter – vorbehaltlich einer anderen Vereinbarung der Parteien – den Streit ex aequo et bono unter Anwendung allgemeiner Gerechtigkeits- und Fairnesserwägungen entscheiden soll, ohne auf ein bestimmtes nationales oder das internationale Recht Bezug zu nehmen.“ ___________ 21

D.-R. Martens, Basketball Arbitral Tribunal: an innovative system for resolving disputes in sport (only in sport?), ISLJ 2011/1–2, 54–57. 22 www.fiba.com/bat. 23 Artikel 3–6, die eine maximale Laufzeit der Spielerverträge von vier Jahren festlegen. 24 Anhang 3 zu Buch 3 der FIBA-IR zählt lediglich „vorgeschlagene Hauptpunkte, die von einem Vertrag zwischen dem Verein und dem Spieler abgedeckt sein sollten“ auf.

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Daraus folgt, dass im Falle der Übergabe des Streits an das BAT ohne explizite Wahl des vom BAT anzuwendenden nationalen Rechts der Schiedsrichter automatisch das Mandat erhält, den Fall ex aequo et bono zu entscheiden, also nach allgemeinen Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit und Fairness. Der Rückgriff auf „allgemeine Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit“ ist in der Welt der Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit nichts völlig Neues: Die CAS-Schiedsregeln25 für die Olympischen Spiele schreiben vor, dass „allgemeine Rechtsprinzipien“ – ein verwandter Begriff – vom CAS gemeinsam mit den Vorschriften der Olympischen Charta und entsprechenden Regeln angewendet werden sollen.26 Der Hauptunterschied zwischen dem CAS und dem BAT ist jedoch, dass der Schiedsrichter des BAT den Fall ohne Bezugnahme auf irgendein bestimmtes nationales oder internationales Recht entscheiden kann. Nach dem Wortlaut des Artikels 15 Abs. 1 BAT-Regeln und angesichts des Fehlens von FIBA-Regeln über Arbeitsverhältnisse von Spielern kann er auch ohne Bezugnahme auf irgendwelche speziellen nationalen oder internationalen Regeln entscheiden.

2. Schaffung allgemeiner Grundsätze zur Regelung von Basketballverträgen? In der Rechtsprechung des BAT zeigt sich, dass die Schiedsrichter in den meisten Fällen den Arbeitsvertrag bzw. die Arbeitsverträge als Ausgangspunkt nutzen und das Verhalten der Parteien auf der Basis des von ihnen Vereinbarten beurteilen. Dies ist keine selbstverständliche Praxis. Bei der Beilegung von Vertragsstreitigkeiten nach einem bestimmten nationalen Recht bemisst sich die Gültigkeit der Verträge am Maßstab zwingender rechtlicher Vorschriften, die von einer Partei – in der Regel der ausländische Spieler oder Trainer – ignoriert werden. Ein typisches Beispiel ist das griechische Sportgesetz, das einen Vertrag zwischen Trainer und Verein für null und nichtig erachtet, wenn er nicht den zuständigen lokalen Finanzbehörden vorgelegt und von diesen ratifiziert wurde.27 Fände griechisches Recht auf den Streit Anwendung, hätte der ausländische Trainer, der seinen Vertrag – in der Annahme, dieser sei wirksam – ordnungsgemäß ausgeführt hat und nach sechs Monaten plötzlich entlassen wird, daher keinen Anspruch auf Schadenersatz, sondern nur auf Bezahlung der erbrachten Leistung nach den Vorschriften der ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung.

___________ 25

Artikel 17. M. Beloff, Is there a Lex Sportiva?, ISLR 2005, Bd. 5/3, 49–67. 27 Artikel 31 Abs. 6 des Gesetzes 2725/1999 in der heute gültigen Fassung. 26

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Der BAT-Schiedsrichter, der ex aequo et bono entscheidet, ist jedoch nicht verpflichtet, derartige Regelungen anzuwenden (die manchmal zu ungerechten Ergebnissen führen). Vielmehr hat er hauptsächlich die Parteivereinbarungen heranzuziehen. In diesem Zusammenhang befassten sich zahlreiche Entscheidungen mit dem Problem, dass ein Spieler eine medizinische Untersuchung nicht bestanden oder einen bereits bestehenden Körperschaden verschwiegen hatte, da die meisten Basketballspielerverträge unter der Bedingung geschlossen werden, dass der Spieler eine medizinische Untersuchung besteht, die nach seiner Ankunft in den Vereinsräumlichkeiten stattfindet. In Bezug auf Vertragsklauseln, deren Anwendung als ein Verstoß gegen das Fairnessprinzip gesehen werden könnte, hat das BAT in mehreren Fällen entschieden, zu intervenieren und eine Lösung anzuordnen, die im Hinblick auf die Umstände des Einzelfalls fair ist. Aus diesem Grund neigen beispielsweise die BAT-Schiedsrichter bei der Berechnung des Schadensersatzanspruchs eines Spielers wegen ungerechtfertigter Beendigung eines Mehrjahresvertrags durch den Verein dazu, einen Vertrag, den der Spieler nach der Beendigung unterzeichnet hat, zu berücksichtigen. Um eine „ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung“ zu verhindern, wird das Entgelt des neuen Vertrags in Ansatz gebracht und der Schadensersatz entsprechend angepasst.28 In ähnlicher Weise entschied das BAT bei nicht vertraglich geregelten Angelegenheiten, z. B. in der Frage, ob Zinsen als Folge verspäteter Zahlung geschuldet sind, regelmäßig, dass „obwohl die [Vereinbarung] keine Regelung zu Zinsen bei verspäteter Zahlung enthält, es doch ein in den meisten Rechtssystemen allgemein anerkannter Grundsatz ist, der von Gerechtigkeitserwägungen untermauert wird, dass verspätete Zahlung zu Zinsen führt – mit dem Zweck, dass der Gläubiger in die finanzielle Situation versetzt wird, in der er/sie sich befände, wäre die Zahlung rechtzeitig erfolgt. Folglich und ungeachtet dessen, dass die [Vereinbarung] keinen Zinssatz bestimmt, ist es üblich und gerecht, dass Zinsen als Folge verspäteter Zahlung entstehen.“29 Der Zinssatz, der in solchen Fällen vom BAT festgesetzt wird, beträgt 5 % pro Jahr. Es ist offenkundig, dass die Anwendung des Vertrags auf die Umstände des Einzelfalls und die anschließende Überprüfung des Ergebnisses anhand allgemeiner Grundsätze der Fairness ein in hohem Maße individualisierender Vorgang ist, aus dem sich nicht ohne Weiteres Schlüsse für einen breiteren Anwendungsbereich ziehen lassen. Doch hier kommt eine weitere Besonderheit des BAT-Verfahrens zum Tragen, die sich auf die möglicherweise größere Reichweite von BAT-Entscheidungen auswirkt. Artikel 16 Abs. 4 der BATRegeln bestimmt, dass „Entscheidungen nicht vertraulich sind, es sei denn, der ___________ 28 29

BAT 0014/08, bestätigt durch CAS 2009/A/1846. Ex multis: BAT 0054/09 (S. 23), bestätigt durch CAS 2010/A/2035.

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Schiedsrichter entscheidet anderweitig.“ Die Handhabung dieser Regel durch das BAT erfolgt in der Weise, dass nahezu alle BAT-Entscheidungen öffentlich auf der offiziellen Internetseite der FIBA verfügbar sind, die täglich mehrere hundert Mal aufgerufen wird. Dieser Umstand in Verbindung mit der üblichen Praxis vieler Basketballagenten, den gleichen Mustervertrag, der sich in vielen Fällen nicht von den Verträgen anderer Agenten unterscheidet, für alle ihrer Spieler zu verwenden, macht das Urteil eines BAT-Schiedsrichters in einem einzelnen Fall für einen größeren Kreis von Personen interessant, der weit über die am Verfahren Beteiligten hinausgeht. Obwohl der BAT-Schiedsrichter bei der Anwendung von Ex-aequo-et-bonoGrundsätzen über einen gewissen Ermessensspielraum verfügt, erhöht das Streben nach Konsistenz manchmal den Schwierigkeitsgrad seiner Aufgabe. Stare decisis, ein Konzept, das der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit an sich fremd ist, ist in der Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit häufig ein Anliegen30 – was wiederum erklärt, weshalb institutionalisierte Schiedsgerichte wie der CAS 31 und das BAT ihre Entscheidungen veröffentlichen. Zieht man die beeindruckende Anzahl an Fällen (mehr als 50032) in Betracht, die seit dem ersten Antrag auf Einleitung eines Schiedsgerichtsverfahrens im Frühjahr 2007 anhängig geworden sind, so hat das BAT bisher alle Erwartungen erfüllt. Das Vertrauen in die Urteile eines BAT-Schiedsrichters zeigt auch eine andere Statistik: In weniger als 1 % der Verfahren bestanden die Parteien auf der Anwendung nationalen Rechts. Noch wichtiger ist die Tatsache, dass das allmähliche Entstehen einer konsistenten Rechtsprechung sich in den Parteivorträgen manifestiert: Etliche Kläger passen ihre Anträge mittlerweile an die ständige Rechtsprechung des BAT an (z. B. durch die Forderung der Differenz zwischen dem durch den Verein gebrochenen und dem neuen Vertrag des Spielers33 oder durch die Forderung von Schadensersatz für Gehälter zukünftiger Saisons nur in Höhe von bis zu 50 %34) oder sie beziehen sich auf den Zinssatz von 5 % pro Jahr als „BAT-Zinssatz“. ___________ 30

CAS 2004/A/628, S. 10: „In der CAS-Rechtsprechung gibt es kein Prinzip bindender Präzedenzien oder stare decisis. Nichtsdestotrotz wird ein CAS-Panel offensichtlich versuchen, wenn die Beweise es erlauben, hinsichtlich der Rechtsfragen zum gleichen Schluss zu gelangen wie ein vorheriges CAS-Panel. Ob das als Sache der Höflichkeit oder als Versuch der Schaffung einer einheitlichen ‚Rechtsordnung‘ (‚corpus of law‘) anzusehen ist, spielt keine Rolle.“ Siehe CAS 2008/A/1545 m. w. N. zur CAS-Rechtsprechung bzgl. stare decisis. 31 M. Reeb, Digest of CAS awards I (1986–1998), S. XXIII. 32 Zum 31.12.2013. 33 BAT 0158/11, dem Beispiel der Fälle BAT 0043/09, BAT 0127/10 folgend. 34 BAT 0127/10, dem Beispiel des Falls BAT 0014/08 (vgl. oben Fn. 28) folgend.

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Anhand dieser wenigen Beispiele für Rechtsfragen, die sich in ähnlichen Streitfällen35 ergeben, kann man berechtigterweise davon sprechen, dass die Entscheidungen des BAT die tagtäglichen Geschäfte im kommerziellen Basketball beeinflussen und umgekehrt. Vertragliche Bestimmungen sind sehr oft ausschlaggebend für die Entscheidung des BAT-Schiedsrichters; es ist jedoch durchaus anzunehmen, dass Verträge zukünftig (wenn nicht sogar jetzt schon) unter Berücksichtigung der BAT-Rechtsprechung entworfen werden.

IV. Fazit Die Entwicklung institutionalisierter Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit geht aktuell in die nächste Phase: Während seiner fast 30-jährigen Tätigkeit hat der CAS Entscheidungen gefällt, die heute Teil der Lex sportiva sind. Diese Erfolgsgeschichte motiviert zur Schaffung neuer Institutionen, die sportspezifisch und auf die Bedürfnisse der jeweiligen Sportart zugeschnitten sind. Das BAT nutzt die Erfahrungen des CAS und die schiedsrechtsfreundlichen Vorschriften des Schweizer Rechts, um eine Leistung anzubieten, die mit den Zielen des internationalen Verbands übereinstimmt: Den Mitgliedern der Basketballfamilie bleibt es im Wesentlichen selbst überlassen, ihre Beziehungen zu regeln und die FIBA hält sie schlicht dazu an, das anzuerkennen, was sie selbst vereinbart haben. Gleichzeitig scheint das BAT den Bedürfnissen der Stakeholder Rechnung zu tragen: faire und zügige Entscheidung von Streitigkeiten weltweit, von Venezuela und Spanien bis Syrien und China. Die Anwendung von Ex-aequo-et-bono-Grundsätzen bei Vertragsstreitigkeiten im Basketball konzentriert sich zwangsläufig auf die individuellen Besonderheiten jedes einzelnen Falles. In einem zweiten Schritt kann sie dazu beitragen, dass sich eine konsistente Herangehensweise an Probleme entwickelt, die wiederholt vor dem BAT verhandelt werden. Selbstverständlich ginge die rechtliche Betrachtung zu weit mit der Behauptung, die BAT-Schiedsrichter schüfen Recht. Auch ist es verfrüht, abzuschätzen zu wollen, ob BATEntscheidungen eine Quelle der Lex sportiva sein können oder nicht. Einige mögen dazu geeignet sein, andere nicht. Jedenfalls aber fördern die Entwicklung einer konsistenten Rechtsprechung und die Veröffentlichung von Entscheidungen die Vorhersehbarkeit – soweit es diese geben kann – in ganz erheblichem Maße. Eine solche Vorhersehbarkeit

___________ 35

Die BAT-Rechtsprechung befasste sich u. a. ständig mit Fragen zu Strafen bei Zahlungsverzug (BAT 0036/09), Mehrfachverträgen zwischen denselben Parteien (BAT 0067/09), der Vertragskündigung aufgrund Nichtzahlung (BAT 0155/11) etc.

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mag als unvereinbar mit der Natur von ex aequo et bono erscheinen,36 doch es ist nicht zu leugnen, dass die große Ähnlichkeit basketballbezogener Vertragsstreitigkeiten und die geringe Zahl von BAT-Schiedsrichtern, die sich mit ihnen befassen, zu harmonisierten und weithin akzeptierten rechtlichen Schlussfolgerungen führen können. Und ist nicht genau dies die Aufgabe eines Schiedsgerichts?

___________ 36 F. Oschütz, Institutional arbitration in Sport, in: Korchia N./Pettiti C. (Hrsg.), Sports et Garanties Fondamentales, Paris 2001, S. 516.

Europarechtliche Grenzen der Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit Sport ist kein europarechtsfreier Raum Von Rudolf Streinz I.

Einleitung .......................................................................................................... 122

II. Grundlagen........................................................................................................ 124 1.

Unionsrechtliche Vorgaben für den Sport ................................................. 124 a) b) c)

d)

Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung ....................................... Erwähnung des Sports im Unionsrecht .............................................. Auswirkungen der Grundfreiheiten .................................................... aa) Sport als wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit .............................................. bb) Teilnahme am Sport als soziale Vergünstigung .......................... Vorgaben des Kartellrechts ................................................................

124 124 126 126 127 127

2.

Bindung privatrechtlicher Verbände .......................................................... 128

3.

Grundfreiheiten und Grundrechte .............................................................. 129

III. Übersicht über die Rechtsprechung des EuGH ................................................. 130 1.

Ausländerklauseln (Walrave und Koch, Bosman, Kolpak, Simutenkov, Kahveci) .................................................................................................... 130

2.

Transferentschädigung – Ausbildungsentschädigung (Bosman, Bernard). 131

3.

Folgeproblem: Vertragslaufzeiten (Kompromiss EU-Kommission/FIFA/ UEFA – Webster) ...................................................................................... 132

4.

Trainerlizenzen (Heylens) ......................................................................... 133

5.

Spielervermittler (Piau) ............................................................................. 134

6.

Auswahlkriterien für Sportwettkämpfe (Deliège) ...................................... 134

7.

Wechselperioden (Lehtonen) ..................................................................... 135

8.

Dopingsperren (Meca-Medina).................................................................. 135

IV. Bindung an das Unionsrecht und Verbandsautonomie ...................................... 136 1.

Unionsrechtliche Grundlagen .................................................................... 136

2.

Sportregeln und Rechtsregeln .................................................................... 136

3.

Praktische Konkordanz zwischen Grundfreiheiten und EU-Kartellrecht und Unionsgrundrechten............................................................................ 138

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Rudolf Streinz 4.

Insbesondere: Der Fall Meca-Medina........................................................ 138

V. Unionsrechtlicher Rechtsschutz des Sportlers................................................... 139 VI. Fazit .................................................................................................................. 139 VII. Thesen ............................................................................................................... 140

I. Einleitung Rechtliche Bindungen sind genauso notwendig wie für die daran gebundenen Akteure oft lästig. Entsprechend beliebt ist der Jurist, der auf rechtliche Vorgaben hinweist, die der willkürlichen Gestaltung der Verhältnisse Grenzen setzen. Manchmal wird dies auch deutlich zum Ausdruck gebracht. Aus dem Bereich der Politik seien hier nur als mittlerweile historische Fälle die Reaktionen auf die Urteile des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) im ersten Fernsehurteil1 sowie zu den Ostverträgen2 genannt. Hinsichtlich des Sports ist besonders prägnant § 1 Nr. 9 und Nr. 12 der früheren Internationalen Wettkampfordnung des Bob- und Schlittenverbandes FIBT, wonach neben öffentlicher Kritik und nachträglichen unangebrachten Äußerungen über eine getroffene Entscheidung oder Maßnahme auch „juristische Haarspaltereien“ „unsportlich“ und unangebracht sind und zu unterbleiben haben und ein ziviles oder strafrechtliches Einschreiten „aus sportlichen Gründen untersagt“ ist.3 Die Statuten der FIFA schließen für die an sie gebundenen Verbände, Vereine und deren Mitglieder bei Streitigkeiten mit der FIFA, mit anderen Verbänden, Vereinen

___________ 1

Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer: „Dat ham wir uns so nich vorjestellt“. Vgl. Wesel, Der Gang nach Karlsruhe, 2004, S. 76 ff. Das Kabinett fasste einen Beschluss, in dem das Urteil des BVerfG (BVerfGE 12, 205) als „falsch“ bezeichnet wurde. Vgl. dazu Adenauers Ausführungen vor dem Bundestag am 08.03.1961 in: BT-Sten. Ber. Bd. 48, S. 8308 f.: „Sobald wir im Besitz des Urteils waren und unsere besonderen Sachverständigen sich durchgearbeitet hatten, ist das Kabinett zu einer Sitzung zusammengetreten, um zu diesem Urteil und diesem Fernsehstreit Stellung zu nehmen. Die Beschlüsse, die das Kabinett gefaßt hat, sind einstimmig gefaßt worden. Das Kabinett war sich darin einig, daß das Urteil falsch ist ... Aber ... das Urteil des BVerfG muß den Gesetzen entsprechend beachtet werden.“ Vgl. auch Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der BReg. Nr. 47 v. 09.03.1961, S. 425. 2 Für das kolportierte Zitat eines Politikers der Regierungsparteien (damals SPD/FDPKoalition), man lasse sich die Ostpolitik nicht von den „acht Arschlöchern in Karlsruhe kaputt machen“ gibt es allerdings keine verifizierte Belegstelle, wenngleich die Ausdrucksweise mit einer bestimmten Person in Zusammenhang gebracht wird. Am Urteil zum Grundlagenvertrag (BVerfGE 36,1) wirkten wegen der Befangenheit eines Richters nur sieben Mitglieder des Zweiten Senats mit. 3 Vgl. dazu Hannamann, Kartellverbot und Verhaltenskoordinationen im Sport, 2001, S. 37.

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oder deren Mitgliedern die Anrufung ordentlicher Gerichte aus und verweisen alleine auf die Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit. Immerhin wird die Beschreitung des Rechtswegs nach Ausschöpfung sämtlicher Rechtsmittel der Sportgerichtsbarkeit nicht sanktioniert, da darin keine Verletzung dieser Vorschriften liegen könne.4 Auf das Bosman-Urteil reagierte der damalige Generalsekretär der UEFA, Gerhard Aigner, mit den Worten: „Die Juristen finden zusehends den Weg in den Fußball und hauen alles um!“.5 Die Einwände der Kommission gegen überhöhte Ablösesummen nach dem Wegfall der Transferentschädigungen nach Ablauf der Vertragszeit soll der damalige Vizepräsident des DFB, Franz Beckenbauer, dahingehend kommentiert haben, dass es sich bei der EUKommission um eine „Ansammlung gescheiterter Existenzen“ und um „Nieten“ handle.6 Lange Zeit glaubten manche Sportverbände auch, rechtliche Vorgaben ignorieren oder zumindest umgehen zu können. So reagierte der Weltradsportverband UCI auf das Urteil des EuGH im Fall Walrave und Koch7 mit der Drohung, die betroffenen sog. Steher-Rennen aus dem WM-Programm zu nehmen, 8 was ihm an sich natürlich freisteht. Angesichts mancher Sonderrechte, die sich sportliche Großveranstalter wie das IOC und die FIFA z. B. im steuerlichen Bereich einräumen lassen – dies wäre aber ein eigenes Thema – und des Unverständnisses dafür, dass sich Private gegen ungerechtfertigte Monopolisierungen vor staatlichen Gerichten mit Erfolg wehren können,9 war diese Haltung zwar nicht verständlich, aber in gewisser Hinsicht erklärbar. Seit dem insoweit in der Tat revolutionären Bosman-Urteil10 ist aber klar, dass Sport kein europarechtsfreier Raum ist.11 Es stellt sich aber die Frage, inwieweit die ___________ 4 Vgl. dazu Streinz, Die Freizügigkeit des Athleten, in: Scherrer/Del Fabro (Hrsg.), Freizügigkeit im Europäischen Sport, 2002, S. 99 (114). 5 dpa Meldung v. 27.02.1997. 6 Vgl. Streinz, EG-Grundfreiheiten und Verbandsautonomie, SpuRt 2000, 221 (221). 7 EuGH, Urt. v. 12.12.1974, Rs. 36/74 (Walrave und Koch/UCI u.a.), Slg. 1974, 1405. 8 Seit 1994 gibt es keine Weltmeisterschaften der Steherrennen mehr, was von der UCI damit begründet wurde, dass dafür zu wenige Nationalmannschaften zur Verfügung stünden. 9 Vgl. zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen der FIFA und Ferrero anlässlich der FußballWM 2006 in Deutschland Hamacher, Exklusive Marketingrechte für Sportgroßveranstaltungen und ihre Grenzen am Beispiel von Kennzeichenschutz, SpuRt 2005, 55 (56 ff.). 10 EuGH, Urt. v. 15.12.1995, Rs. C-415/93 (Union royale belge des societés de football association ASBL u.a./Jean-Marc Bosman), Slg. 1995, I-4921. Näher dazu Streinz, EGFreizügigkeit für Sportler, in: Studiengesellschaft für Wirtschaft und Recht (Hrsg.), Sport und Recht, 2005, S. 71 (74 f.). 11 Vgl. dazu allgemein z. B. Streinz, Die Auswirkungen des EG-Rechts auf den Sport, SpuRt 1998, 1 ff., 45 ff. 89 ff.; Summerer, Sport und Europarecht, in: Fritzweiler/ Pfister/Summerer (Hrsg.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht, 2. Aufl. 2007, S. 595. Speziell zur Freizügigkeit der Sportler z. B. Hess, Vom Konflikt zur Konkordanz – Das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht und der Sport, dargestellt am Beispiel der Freizügigkeit der Sportler, in: Vieweg (Hrsg.), Prisma des Sportrechts, 2006, S. 1 (1 ff.).

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allgemeine Rechtsordnung zwingende Vorgaben stellt und wie weit die Autonomie der Verbände für die Gestaltung der von ihnen veranstalteten Wettbewerbe durch „Sportregeln“ reicht.

II. Grundlagen 1. Unionsrechtliche Vorgaben für den Sport a) Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung Die Europäische Union verfügt anders als ein Staat nur über Kompetenzen, die ihr die Mitgliedstaaten übertragen haben. Dieses Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung wurde im Vertrag von Lissabon nicht nur bestätigt, sondern besonders betont.12 Die Union hat keine „Kompetenz-Kompetenz“, was vom BVerfG im Lissabon-Urteil hervorgehoben wurde.13 Gleichwohl erfasst das Unionsrecht weite Materien, so dass sich kaum mehr „unionsrechtsfeste“ Bereiche feststellen lassen.

b) Erwähnung des Sports im Unionsrecht In den Gründungsverträgen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften bzw. der Europäischen Union und ihren Änderungen kam der Begriff „Sport“ lange Zeit überhaupt nicht vor. Gleichwohl wirkte sich das Gemeinschafts- bzw. Unionsrecht, wie die Fälle Walrave und Koch, Bosman und weitere Urteile des EuGH zeigten, erheblich auf den Sport aus. Dies führte zu Bestrebungen, die Besonderheiten des Sports im Unionsrecht selbst, am besten durch eine sog. Bereichsausnahme, zu verankern. Ein erster Schritt dazu war – auch als Reaktion auf das Bosman-Urteil – die Erklärung zum Sport, die dem Vertrag von Amsterdam vom 02.10.1997 beigefügt wurde.14 Darin wird „die gesellschaftliche Bedeutung des Sports, insbesondere die Rolle, die dem Sport bei der Identitätsfindung15 und der Begegnung von Menschen zukommt“, unterstrichen und an die Gremien der Europäischen Union appelliert, bei wichtigen, den Sport betreffenden Fragen die Sportverbände anzuhören, und die Besonderheiten des ___________ 12

Art. 5 Abs. 1 und 2 EUV. Vgl. z. B. auch Art. 4 Abs. 1 EUV. Vgl. BVerfGE 123, 267 (392 f.). 14 Erklärung Nr. 29, ABl.EG 1997 Nr. C 340/136. 15 Protokolle sind Bestandteile der Verträge, Art. 51 EUV. Zur Funktion von Erklärungen vgl. Kokott, in: Streinz, EUV/AEUV-Kommentar, 2. Aufl. 2012, Art. 51 EUV Rn. 6; Schmalenbach, in: Calliess/Ruffert, EUV/AEUV-Kommentar, 4. Aufl. 2011, Art. 51 EUV, Rn. 5. 13

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125

Amateursports besonders zu berücksichtigen. Diese Erklärung hat – anders als ein Protokoll – keine primärrechtliche Qualität, kann aber als Auslegungshilfe herangezogen werden. In das Primärrecht selbst sollte der Sport erstmals durch den Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa kommen.16 Nach dessen Scheitern wurden die betreffenden Bestimmungen inhaltlich in den Vertrag von Lissabon übernommen. Gemäß Art. 165 Abs. 1 UAbs. 2 AEUV trägt die Union zur Förderung der europäischen Dimension des Sports bei und berücksichtigt dabei dessen besondere Merkmale, dessen auf freiwilligem Engagement basierende Strukturen sowie dessen soziale und pädagogische Funktion. Die Tätigkeit der Union hat u. a. als Ziel die „Entwicklung der europäischen Dimension des Sports durch Förderung der Fairness und der Offenheit von Sportwettkämpfen und der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den für den Sport verantwortlichen Organisationen sowie durch den Schutz der körperlichen und seelischen Unversehrtheit der Sportler, insbesondere der jüngeren Sportler“ (Art. 165 Abs. 2, letzter Spiegelstrich AEUV). Als Beitrag zur Verwirklichung dieses Ziels erlassen das Europäische Parlament und der Rat gemäß dem ordentlichen Gesetzgebungsverfahren und nach Anhörung des Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses und des Ausschusses der Regionen Fördermaßnahmen unter Ausschluss jeglicher Harmonisierung der Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten und erlässt der Rat auf Vorschlag der Kommission (nicht verbindliche17) Empfehlungen (Art. 165 Abs. 3 AEUV). Die Kompetenz der Union ist somit ausdrücklich auf einen Beitrag limitiert (vgl. auch Art. 6 lit. e AEUV) und schließt Harmonisierungsmaßnahmen aus. Eine Bereichsausnahme, die den Sport vor Auswirkungen des Unionsrechts „schützen“ würde, liegt darin nicht.18 Allerdings sind bei Maßnahmen der Union gemäß der Erklärung zum Vertrag von Amsterdam, bekräftigt durch die Erwähnung der „besonderen Merkmale“ und der Zusammenarbeit mit den Sportorganisationen in Art 165 AEUV, die genannten Besonderheiten des Sports zu berücksichtigen.19 ___________ 16

Vgl. dazu Streinz (Fn. 10), S. 72. Art. 288 Abs. 5 AEUV. 18 Vgl. zu den vergeblichen Versuchen, eine unionsrechtlich zu bestimmende (vgl. dazu zuletzt EuGH, Urt. v. 24.05.2011 Rs. C-54/08 (Kommission/Deutschland – „Notare“), EuZW 2011, 468 m. Anm. Fuchs und Streinz, JuS 2011, 851) Bereichsausnahme, wie sie in Art. 45 Abs. 4 und Art. 51 Abs. 1 AEUV festgelegt ist, zu begründen, Streinz (Fn. 4), S. 105. 19 Vom Grundsatz her ebenso, in den Folgerungen aber wohl zu weitgehend Brost, Die „Besonderheit des Sports“ im neuen Artikel 165 des Lissabonner Vertrages, SpuRt 2010, 178 (180 ff.), und Persch, Sportförderung in Europa: Der neue Art. 165 AEUV, NJW 2010, 1917 (1917). Als jetzt vertraglich fixierte „Auslegungshilfe“ für den EuGH sind sportspezifische Gesichtspunkte qualifiziert zu berücksichtigen, begründen aber keine Ausnahmen vom allgemeinen Unionsrecht. Vgl. auch Weatherill, EU Sports Law: The effect of the Lisbon Treaty, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 3/2011. 17

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c) Auswirkungen der Grundfreiheiten Dies ist von Bedeutung, wenn Belange der Sportverbände, die prinzipiell durch die Vereinigungsfreiheit auch über europäische Grundrechte geschützt sind,20 gegenüber den Auswirkungen der Grundfreiheiten berücksichtigt werden sollen. Die Grundfreiheiten des Binnenmarktes, insbesondere die Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmer (Art. 45 AEUV) und die Dienstleistungsfreiheit (Art. 56 AEUV), betreffen auch den Sport als wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit. Darüber hinaus sind sie aber auch für den reinen Amateursport von Bedeutung.

aa) Sport als wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit Die Auswirkungen der Grundfreiheiten auf den Sport zeigten sich erstmals im Fall Walrave und Koch. Dieses Urteil des EuGH war grundlegend für den Einfluss des Unionsrechts auf den Sport.21 Der EuGH stellte fest, dass sportliche Betätigungen, soweit sie einen Teil des Wirtschaftslebens ausmachen, dem Gemeinschaftsrecht (jetzt Unionsrecht) unterfallen. Eine Ausnahme bestehe allein insoweit, als Hintergrund einer Regelung rein sportliche Gründe seien, die als solche nicht mit wirtschaftlicher Betätigung zu tun hätten. Als Beispiel wurde die Aufstellung von Nationalmannschaften genannt.22 Diese Unterscheidung ist grundlegend, aber keineswegs so eindeutig zu treffen, wie es auf den ersten Blick erscheint. So wurde das Beispiel der Nationalmannschaften mit der Begründung angezweifelt, auch hier gehe es um Geld und damit um eine wirtschaftliche Betätigung.23 Dies trifft zwar, wie die gezahlten Antritts- und Siegprämien zeigen, zu, ändert aber nichts daran, dass die Regelung selbst einen spezifisch sportlichen Zweck verfolgt, nämlich Wettkämpfe zwischen den Mannschaften verschiedener Staatsnationalität zu gewährleisten.24 Entsprechende Motive rechtfertigen auch die Einsatzbeschränkungen bei Olympischen Spielen.25 Die Abgrenzung zwischen wirtschaftlichem und sportlichem Hintergrund war auch ein entscheidendes Problem im Fall Meca-Medina.26 Denn ___________ 20

Siehe dazu unten II.3. Näher dazu Streinz (Fn. 10), S. 73 f. 22 EuGH (Fn. 7), Rn. 4/10. 23 Vgl. Fikentscher, Nationalmannschaften als Teil des Wirtschaftslebens – rechtstatsächliche Anmerkungen zur europarechtlichen Privilegierung von Nationalmannschaften, in: FS W. Fikentscher, 1998, S. 635 (641 ff.); Thöny, Keine Zukunft für Nationalmannschaften?, SpuRt 1999, 177 (180 f.); ders., Sind Nationalmannschaften noch zu retten?, JBl. 1998, 627 (635 ff.). 24 Vgl. dazu Streinz (Fn. 10), S. 80 f. 25 Vgl. dazu Streinz (Fn. 4), S. 121 ff. 26 Siehe dazu unten III.8, IV.4. 21

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auch sportlich motivierte Regeln der Sportverbände wie Dopingregeln und darauf gestützte Sperren können in die Berufs- und Wettbewerbsfreiheit eingreifen.27

bb) Teilnahme am Sport als soziale Vergünstigung Der Einfluss des Unionsrechts beschränkt sich aber nicht auf den wirtschaftlichen Bereich. Seit langem wird die Frage diskutiert, ob nicht das gemeinschafts- bzw. unionsrechtlich zentrale Verbot der Diskriminierung aufgrund der Staatsangehörigkeit28 fordert, dass durch die Grundfreiheiten des Unionsrechts berechtigte Unionsbürger gleichberechtigt mit Inländern am reinen Amateursport teilnehmen dürfen, mit der Folge, dass entsprechende Ausländerklauseln unzulässig sind.29 Der EuGH wurde mit dieser Frage noch nicht befasst. Der Rechtsausschuss des Deutschen Basketball-Bundes hat jüngst eine entsprechende Klausel für nichtig erklärt.30 Unionsrechtliche Ansatzpunkte sind die mit den Grundfreiheiten verbundenen „sozialen Vergünstigungen“ sowie die Unionsbürgerschaft als „grundlegender Status“ der Angehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten.31

d) Vorgaben des Kartellrechts Neben den Grundfreiheiten ist auch das EU-Kartellrecht von Bedeutung, da die Sportverbände wegen des sog. Ein-Platz-Prinzips32 eine marktbeherrschen___________ 27

Schroeder, Sportrecht und europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, SpuRt 2006, 1 (2). Art. 7 EWGV, Art. 12 EGV, jetzt Art. 18 AEUV. 29 Vgl. dazu Schroeder, Sport und europäische Integration 1989, S. 44 ff.; Seymer, Ausländerklauseln im organisierten Freizeitsport, 2006, S. 108 ff. u. 130 ff. Ablehnend Klose, Die Rolle des Sports bei der Europäischen Einigung. Zum Problem der Ausländersperrklauseln, 1989, S. 86. 30 Deutscher Basketball-Bund (DBB), Rechtsausschuss, Beschluss 03/2009 v. 24.03. 2010, SpuRt 2010, 215; Beschluss 01/10 v. 20.07.2010. 31 Vgl. dazu Streinz, Zum Recht der Unionsbürger auf Gleichbehandlung im Amateursport, SpuRt 2010, 231 (232 ff.); Engelbrecht, Discrimination against EU Nationals in Amateur Sport, ISLJ 2010, 105. Engelbrecht, Nochmals: Diskriminierung von Unionsbürgern im Amateursport, SpuRt 2011, 96, gibt dort die von ihm übersetzte Antwort der EUKommission auf eine von ihm selbst gestellte Anfrage wieder und zieht daraus und aus der Antwort der Kommission auf Anfragen aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten entsprechende Schlussfolgerungen. Vgl. insbesondere die Differenzierung hinsichtlich nationaler Meisterschaften in Einzelsportarten und entsprechender Rekorde (ebd., S. 97 Nr. 4). Zur Frage der Vorlageberechtigung von Schiedsgerichten (ebd., S. 98, Nr. 7) siehe Streinz/Herrmann, JuS 2008, 903 (904 f.). 32 Vgl. dazu Hannamann (Fn. 3), S. 54 ff. 28

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de Stellung haben und daher neben dem Verbot unzulässiger Kartelle (Art. 101 AEUV) dem Verbot, ihre marktbeherrschende Stellung zu missbrauchen (Art. 102 AEUV), unterliegen.33 Argumente der Freizügigkeitsrechte und des Kartellrechts sind miteinander verknüpft und unter Berücksichtigung der spezifischen Bedingungen des Mannschaftssports zu würdigen.

2. Bindung privatrechtlicher Verbände Obwohl die Grundfrage im Urteil Walrave und Koch bereits geklärt war, glaubten die beteiligten Sportverbände wohl noch im Fall Bosman, das Unionsrecht ginge sie, da nicht Vertragspartei, nichts an. Jedenfalls wurde die Brisanz des Falles offensichtlich unterschätzt, vielleicht auch im Vertrauen auf die Zusicherung der Kommission, bei Einhaltung der sog. „3+2 Regel“34 sei dem Unionsrecht Genüge getan. Der EuGH hat nicht nur deutlich gemacht, dass solche rechtswidrigen Zusicherungen einen begrenzten Wert haben,35 sondern durch Bestätigung seiner Rechtsprechung zur Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten klargestellt, dass jedenfalls Kollektivregeln der Sportverbände sich nicht nur am Diskriminierungsverbot, sondern auch am Beschränkungsverbot der Grundfreiheiten messen lassen müssen.36 Im notwendigen Gegenzug wurde den Sportverbänden die Berufung auf an sich auf staatliche Maßnahmen zugeschnittene Rechtfertigungsgründe für Beschränkungsmaßnahmen konzediert.37 Dies ist ein Element des notwendigen Gegengewichts zu den Auswirkungen der Grundfreiheiten. Ein weiteres sind die Unionsgrundrechte, auf die sich auch die Sportverbände berufen können.

___________ 33

Vgl. dazu Weiß, Transfersysteme und Ausländerklauseln unter dem Licht des EGKartellrechts, SpuRt 1998, 97 (97 ff.); Heermann, Sport und europäisches Kartellrecht, SpuRt 2003 (89 ff.); Schroeder (Fn. 27), SpuRt 2006, 2 ff. Zum potenziellen Missbrauch einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung durch Sportverbände vgl. EuGH, Rs. C-49/07 – Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE), Slg. 2008, I-4863 = Causa Sport 2008, 264. 34 Vgl. dazu Summerer (Fn. 11), S. 603 f. 35 EuGH (Fn. 10), Rn. 136, Zur Selbstbindung allein der Kommission siehe unten V. 36 EuGH (Fn. 10), Rn. 84. Zur strittigen Erstreckung auf Individualvereinbarungen vgl. EuGH, Urt. v. 06.06.2000, Angonese/Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano, Slg. 2000, I-4139, Rn. 36 und dazu Streinz, JuS 2000, 1111 ff. 37 EuGH (Fn. 10), Rn. 85 f. Zur dogmatischen Problematik vgl. Streinz (Fn. 4), S. 110 m. w. N.

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3. Grundfreiheiten und Grundrechte Die Grundfreiheiten des Binnenmarktes und der Unionsbürgerschaft – das daraus fließende Freizügigkeitsrecht wird neben den „herkömmlichen“ Grundfreiheiten vom EuGH ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet38 – sind ungeachtet bestehender Parallelen wegen der unterschiedlichen Zielrichtung von den Unionsgrundrechten zu unterscheiden.39 Für die Berücksichtigung der Regelungen der Sportverbände im Verhältnis EU-Recht und Sport ist bedeutsam, dass die Grundrechte zwar durch die Grundfreiheiten beschränkt werden, aber auch Schranken der Grundfreiheiten darstellen.40 Als Recht der Sportverbände ist insoweit deren unionsrechtlich geschützte Verbandsautonomie relevant.41 Dies wurde im Bosman-Urteil nur angedeutet, vom EuGH in den Urteilen Deliège und Lehtonen42 aber deutlich gemacht. Die Verbandsautonomie folgt aus der Vereinigungsfreiheit, die im Unionsrecht bereits bislang als allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz (Art. 6 Abs. 3 EUV), gestützt auf Art. 11 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und die gemeinsamen Verfassungsüberlieferungen der Mitgliedstaaten, verankert war und seit Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon am 01.12.2009 in Art. 12 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union43 wegen deren Einbeziehung durch Art. 6 Abs. 1 EUV rechtsverbindlich mit dem gleichen Rang wie die Verträge (EUV und AEUV) gilt. Art. 11 EMRK fungiert bislang als Rechtserkenntnisquelle. Mit dem in Art. 6 Abs. 2 EUV vorgesehenen Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur EMRK wird er Rechtsquelle mit der Folge, dass auch Maßnahmen der Union selbst gegebenenfalls der unmittelbaren Kontrolle durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte in Straßburg unterliegen.

___________ 38 EuGH, Urt. v. 11.07.2002, Rs. C-224/98 – D’Hoop/Office national de l’emploi, Slg. 2002, I-6191, Rn. 29 ; Urt. v. 02.10.2003, Rs. C-148/02 – Garcia Avello –, Slg. 2003, I-11613, Rn. 24 zu Art. 18 EGV, jetzt Art. 21 AEUV. 39 Vgl. dazu Streinz, Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, in: Merten/Papier, Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa, Bd. VI/1: Europäische Grundrechte I, 2010, § 151, Rn. 11 ff. m. w. N. 40 Vgl. zu diesen Wechselbeziehungen ebd, Rn. 23 ff. 41 Vgl. dazu Gramlich, Grundfreiheiten contra Grundrechte im Gemeinschaftsrecht?, DÖV 1996, 801 (810 f.); Streinz, EG-Grundfreiheiten und Verbandsautonomie, SpuRt 2000, 221 (225 ff.); ders., Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH nach dem Bosman-Urteil. Spielräume für Verbände zwischen Freizügigkeit und Kartellrecht und Verbandsautonomie, in: Tettinger (Hrsg.), Sport im Schnittfeld von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Recht, 2001, S. 27 (44 ff.). 42 Siehe dazu unten III.7. 43 Ursprüngliche Fassung von 2000 in ABl.EG 2000 Nr. C 364/1, geänderte Fassung von 2007 in ABl.EU 2007 Nr. C 303/1 und in ABl.EU 2010 Nr. C 83/2.

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III. Übersicht über die Rechtsprechung des EuGH Die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union, in der Terminologie nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon des „Gerichtshofs“ als Teil desselben,44 ist bereits umfangreich, die Literatur dazu, insbesondere zum Fall Bosman, ebenso. Hinzu kommen Urteile des Gerichts erster Instanz, in der Terminologie nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon des „Gerichts“ (englisch: „General Court“).45 Besonders bemerkenswert ist insoweit der Fall Meca-Medina, da hier EuGH und EuG zu gegensätzlichen Ansätzen kamen. Während über andere grundlegende Urteile nur ein knapper Überblick gegeben werden kann, soll diesem Fall daher besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet werden. Für die unionsrechtlich eröffneten Bereiche eigenständiger Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit sind ferner die Urteile Deliège und Lehtonen grundlegend.

1. Ausländerklauseln (Walrave und Koch, Bosman, Kolpak, Simutenkov, Kahveci) Bereits im Fall Walrave und Koch machte der EuGH deutlich, dass abgesehen von „sportlich“ bedingten Ausnahmen wie Nationalmannschaften Ausländerklauseln als Diskriminierungen aufgrund der Staatsangehörigkeit im Anwendungsbereich des Unionsrechts unzulässig sind. Dies wurde im Fall Bosman bekräftigt und dahingehend präzisiert, dass auf die konkreten Rechtfertigungsversuche der Verbände eingegangen wurde und diese widerlegt wurden.46 Damit wurden auch die Fragen, die zur Rechtfertigung des „6+5“-Plans von Joseph Blatter47 gestellt wurden,48 bereits beantwortet. So verbietet das Unionsrecht z. B. jede Diskriminierung in den „Arbeitsbedingungen“, so dass das Argument, den Vereinen würden nicht hinsichtlich der Anstellung, sondern lediglich hinsichtlich des Einsatzes in der Startformation Beschränkungen auferlegt,

___________ 44

Art. 19 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1 S. 1 EUV. Für diesen Gerichtshof soll weiterhin die Abkürzungsbezeichnung EuGH verwendet werden. 45 Die Neubenennung war erforderlich, da das Gericht gegenüber den Fachgerichten auch als zweite Instanz fungieren kann. Auch für das Gericht wird weiterhin die Bezeichnung EuG verwendet. Die englische Bezeichnung „General Court“ macht die Kompetenzbreite des Gerichts deutlich. 46 EuGH (Fn. 10), Rn. 116 ff. 47 Resolution des FIFA-Kongresses v. 29./30.05.2008 in Sydney. 48 Vgl. Battis/Ingold/Kuhnert, Zur Vereinbarkeit der „6+5“-Spielregel der FIFA mit dem Unionsrecht, EuR 2010, 3 (10 ff.). Vgl. zu diesem Rechtsgutachten Causa Sport 2009, 187.

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an der Sache vorbeigeht.49 Auch die Argumente der Identifizierung der Anhänger mit den Mannschaften und der Förderung der Nationalmannschaften wurden bereits entkräftet, so dass der EuGH seine Rechtsprechung grundlegend ändern müsste, sollte das „6+5“-Modell Bestand haben.50 Das Diskriminierungsverbot beschränkt sich nicht auf Unionsbürger und die gleichgestellten Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten des Europäischen Wirtschaftsraums (EWR), namentlich Island, Liechtenstein und Norwegen. Es erfasst auch die Berechtigten aus entsprechenden Assoziierungsabkommen der EG bzw. jetzt der EU mit Drittstaaten. Solche Abkommen gewähren zwar kein Zugangsrecht zum Arbeitsmarkt der EU. Ist ein solcher Zugang aber rechtmäßig gewährt worden, besteht im Folgenden ein Anspruch auf Gleichbehandlung. Der EuGH hat dies zunächst im Fall Kolpak hinsichtlich der damals noch nicht der EU angehörenden Slowakei,51 dann im Fall Simutenkov hinsichtlich Russland52 und zuletzt im Fall Kahveci hinsichtlich der Türkei53 entschieden. Davon betroffen sind über das Cotonou-Abkommen zahlreiche Staaten Afrikas, der Karibik und des Pazifiks.54

2. Transferentschädigung – Ausbildungsentschädigung (Bosman, Bernard) Im Bosman-Urteil beanstandete der EuGH auf der Basis der Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmer als Beschränkungsverbot auch die nach Ablauf der Vertragszeit durch die Statuten der Fußballverbände geforderten Ablösesummen als un___________ 49

Vgl. dazu Streinz, Bosman und kein Ende? – Die geplante „6+5“-Regel der FIFA im Lichte des Europarechts, in: FS Steiner, 2009, S. 855 (864 ff.); ders., „6+5“-Regel oder Homegrown-Regel – was ist mit dem EG-Recht vereinbar?, SpuRt 2009, 224 (225 ff.). 50 Zu unionsrechtskonformen Alternativen vgl. Conzelmann, Modelle für eine Förderung der inländischen Nachwuchssportler zur Stärkung der Nationalmannschaften, 2008, der allerdings teilweise offen diskriminierende Regelungen für zulässig hält (vgl. ebd., S. 63 ff.). 51 EuGH, Urt. v. 08.05.2003, Rs. 438/00 (Deutscher Handballbund/Maros Kolpak), Slg. 2003, I-4135 = SpuRt 2003, 153 m. Anm. Weiß. Vgl. dazu Holzke, Die Gleichstellung drittstaatsangehöriger Berufssportler nach der „Kolpak“-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, SpuRt 2004, 1 (1 ff.). 52 EuGH, Urt. v. 12.04.2005, Rs. C-265/03 (Igor Simutenkov/Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Española de Fútbol), Slg. 2005, I-2579 = SpuRt 2005, 155 m. Anm. Streinz. 53 EuGH, Beschluss v. 25.07.2008, Rs. C-152/08 (Nihat Kahaveci), Slg. 2008, I-6291 = SpuRt 2009, 61. 54 Vgl. dazu Brecht, Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit im Cotonou-Abkommen. Analysiert am Beispiel des Sports, 2009, S. 51 ff., 82 ff., 85 ff., 127 (Thesen 10, 11, 13, 14, 15); Streinz/ Herrmann, (Original-)Referendarexamensklausur – Europarecht. Ausländerklauseln im Sport – Sammy Kefir will auch spielen, JuS 2008, 903 (903 ff.).

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gerechtfertigtes Mobilitätshindernis.55 Der EuGH hat allein den Zweck, die Anwerbung und die Ausbildung junger Spieler zu fördern, als legitim anerkannt.56 Im jüngst entschiedenen Fall Bernard57 ging es um die Regelung des französischen Fußballverbands, dass ein sog. „Espoir“-Spieler, der im Alter von 16 bis 22 Jahren im Rahmen eines befristeten Vertrags als Auszubildender beschäftigt war, im Anschluss daran auf Verlangen des betreffenden Vereins seinen ersten Vertrag als Berufsspieler mit diesem abschließen muss, sowie um die Frage, was die Folgen einer Verweigerung seien. Der EuGH hat im Anschluss an die Schlussanträge der Generalanwältin58 entschieden, dass bei der Prüfung, ob eine das Recht auf Freizügigkeit beschränkende Regelung geeignet ist, die Verwirklichung dieses Zwecks zu gewährleisten und nicht über das hinausgeht, was zu seiner Erreichung erforderlich ist, „die Besonderheiten des Sports im Allgemeinen und des Fußballs im Besonderen sowie ihre soziale und erzieherische Funktion zu berücksichtigen“ sind, und dabei ausdrücklich auf Art. 165 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1 AEUV verwiesen.59 Ob die vom EuGH postulierte Beschränkung auf die tatsächlich angefallenen Ausbildungskosten für den konkreten Spieler60 allerdings sachgerecht ist, kann bezweifelt werden.61

3. Folgeproblem: Vertragslaufzeiten (Kompromiss EU-Kommission/FIFA/UEFA – Webster) Eine Folge des Bosman-Urteils war, dass die Vereine bei besonders guten Spielern an möglichst langen Vertragszeiten orientiert waren, die sich diese auch entsprechend honorieren ließen, und dass gegebenenfalls zum Teil exorbitant hohe Summen für ein vorzeitiges „Herauskaufen“ aus dem Vertrag gefordert bzw. von vorneherein festgelegt wurden. Auch dies warf neben nationalen arbeitsrechtlichen unionsrechtliche Probleme auf, die durch einen – unterschiedlich beurteilten – Kompromiss zwischen der EG-Kommission und den Verbänden FIFA und UEFA beigelegt wurden.62 Die Beschränkung der Höhe ___________ 55

EuGH (Fn. 10), Rn. 92 ff. EuGH (Fn. 10), Rn. 106. 57 EuGH, Urt. v. 16.03.2010, Rs. C-325/08 (Olympique Lyonnais/J. Bernard, Newcastle UFC), SpuRt 2010, 110. 58 GA Eleanor Sharpston SchlA v. 16.07.2009, Nr. 30 und 47. 59 EuGH (Fn. 57), Rn. 40 60 EuGH (Fn. 57), Rn. 50. 61 Vgl. zu den Bestimmungen des FIFA-Reglements Streinz (Fn. 4), S. 112 f.; Streinz, Der Fall Bosman und die Folgen, ZEuP 2005, 341 (353); Groß, Eine unendliche Geschichte: Transferregelungen im lizenzierten Fußballsport – Zugleich ein Plädoyer für einen beitragsfinanzierten Solidarfonds, 2004, S. 437 ff. 62 Vgl. dazu Streinz (Fn. 4), S. 114 f.; ders. (Fn. 61), ZEuP 2005, 349 ff. 56

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der Entschädigung und der Verzicht auf sportliche Sanktionen nach drei Jahren Vertragslaufzeit, die Art. 17 FIFA-Reglement63 vorsieht, sind – wie der vom CAS entschiedene Fall Webster64 zeigt – problematisch und führen bei den Vereinen zu kreativer Vertragsgestaltung65.

4. Trainerlizenzen (Heylens) Unionsrechtliche Vorgaben bestehen auch hinsichtlich der gegenseitigen Anerkennung von Trainerlizenzen. Im Fall Heylens hat der EuGH entschieden, dass im Lichte des Art. 48 EWGV (jetzt Art. 45 AEUV) die Versagung der Anerkennung der Gleichwertigkeit einer in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat erworbenen Qualifikation gerichtlich auf ihre Rechtmäßigkeit im Hinblick auf das Gemeinschaftsrecht (jetzt Unionsrecht) überprüft werden müsse und dass der Betroffene von den Gründen für die Versagung Kenntnis erlangen müsse.66 Das in Italien vorgesehene Gegenseitigkeitserfordernis bei Skilehrerdiplomen hat der EuGH als „offensichtlich“ unionsrechtswidrig beanstandet.67 Trotz der primärrechtlichen Vorgaben und weitgehender sekundärrechtlicher Regelungen stehen der Realisierung des Binnenmarktes auch und gerade in diesem Bereich berufsständische Interessen der heimischen Sportlehrer, Unternehmen und Verbände entgegen, die unionsrechtswidrige Abschottungen aufrechterhalten wollen.68

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FIFA-Reglement bezüglich Status und Transfer von Spielern, SpuRt 2002, 148. Vgl. dazu Fritz/Düll, Zu den neuen FIFA-Transferregelungen, SpuRt 2002, 144 (144 ff.). 64 CAS, Urt. v. 30.01.2008, SpuRt 2008, 114. 65 Vgl. dazu Breucker/Thumm/Wüterich, Der Fall Webster – Konsequenzen für Lizenzspieler in Deutschland, SpuRt 2008, 102 (105); Menke/Räker, Webster und Sylva – Arbeitsrechtliche Antworten auf „privilegierten Vertragsbruch“ im (Lizenz-)Fußball, SpuRt 2009, 45 (48 ff.). 66 EuGH, Urt. v. 15.10.1987, Rs. 222/86 (Unectef/Heylens), Slg. 1987, 4097 Rn. 17. 67 EuGH. Urt. v. 16.05.2002, Rs. C-142/01 (Kommission/Italien), Slg. 2002, I-04541 = SpuRt 2002, 237 m. Anm. Streinz. Vgl. auch Streinz/Herrmann/Kraus, (Schneeball-) Schlacht um die Diplomanerkennung – Die Vereinbarkeit französischer Berufsausübungsregelungen im Alpinsport mit dem Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, SpuRt 2005, 5 (5 ff.). 68 Vgl. dazu Streinz, Die Freizügigkeit für Sportlehrer im Binnenmarkt, in: FS Röhricht, 2005, S. 1239 (1239 ff.) m. w. N. Gelegentlich erkennen aber nationale Gerichte den Anwendungsvorrang des Unionsrechts, vgl. Cour d’Appel de Grenoble, Urt. v. 22.04.2004, SpuRt 2005, 25 m. Anm. Kraus.

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5. Spielervermittler (Piau) Auch die Beschränkungen, die das Verbandsrecht gegenüber der Tätigkeit von Spielervermittlern errichtet,69 betreffen eine wirtschaftliche und grenzüberschreitende Tätigkeit. Sie geraten daher ins Visier des Unionsrechts.70 Im Fall Piau wandte sich der Kläger gegen eine Entscheidung (jetzt Beschluss) der EUKommission, mit der diese das nach Beanstandungen der Kommission geänderte FIFA-Reglement für mit dem EU-Kartellrecht vereinbar ansah.71 Entgegen der Ansicht der Kommission bejahte das EuG die Anwendbarkeit des Art. 82 EGV (jetzt Art. 102 AEUV), da die Verbände und die FIFA, soweit sie wirtschaftliche Interessen verfolgten, Unternehmensvereinigungen im Sinne des Wettbewerbsrechts seien, die für die Clubs handelten. Die Clubs selbst seien aber hinsichtlich der Spielervermittler Dienstleistungsempfänger. Wegen der Verbindlichkeit des FIFA-Spielervermittlungsregiments für die Clubs liege auch eine marktbeherrschende Stellung vor, die jedoch im Hinblick auf die Freistellungsgründe des Art. 81 Abs. 3 EGV (jetzt Art. 101 Abs. 3 AEUV) nicht missbräuchlich ausgenutzt worden sei.72 Der EuGH wies das dagegen eingelegte Rechtsmittel durch Beschluss zurück.73

6. Auswahlkriterien für Sportwettkämpfe (Deliège) Im Fall Deliège berücksichtigte der EuGH ausdrücklich die Verbandsautonomie, indem er von der „natürlichen Aufgabe“ der betroffenen Stellen, der Veranstalter von Turnieren, der Sportverbände oder auch der Vereinigung von Berufssportlern sprach, geeignete Regeln aufzustellen und in Anwendung dieser Regeln eine Auswahl der zugelassenen Teilnehmer zu treffen. Da die nationalen Verbände die dafür erforderlichen Kenntnisse und Erfahrungen hätten,

___________ 69

Vgl. dazu Stopper/Holzhäuser, Juristische Fallstricke im Recht der Spielervermittler, SpuRt 2011, 13 (15 f.) m. w. N. 70 Vgl. dazu Vetter, Das FIFA-Spielervermittler-Reglement im Spannungsverhältnis zum europäischen Kartellrecht, SpuRt 2005, 233 (233 ff.) m. w. N.; Scherrer, Die Spielervermittlerregelung des Weltfussballverbandes FIFA, in: Scherrer (Hrsg.), Sportlervermittlung und Sportmanagement, 2. Aufl. 2003, S. 95 (95 ff.). 71 Vgl. dazu Muresan, Anmerkungen zum Urteil des EuGEI und zum Beschluss des EuGH i. S. Piau/Europäische Kommission, Causa Sport 2006, 243 (243 f.) m. w. N. 72 EuG, Urt. v. 26.01.2005, Rs. T-193/02 (Piau/Kommission), Slg. 2005, II-209 Rn. 112 ff. = SpuRt 2005, 102. 73 EuGH, Beschluss v. 23.06.2006, Rs. C-171/05 P (nicht in der amtlichen Sammlung veröffentlicht). Eingehende Anmerkung mit eigener Analyse der Rechtslage von Muresan (Fn. 71), Causa Sport 2006, 252 ff.

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erkennt ihnen der EuGH ein Ermessen zu, das auch für den Aufbau der Organisationsstruktur gilt.74

7. Wechselperioden (Lehtonen) Auf der gleichen Linie liegt das Urteil des EuGH im Fall Lehtonen. Der Gerichtshof trug hier der Eigengesetzlichkeit von Sportwettkämpfen dadurch Rechnung, dass er die Festsetzung von Fristen für Spielertransfers – ein offensichtliches Mobilitätshindernis – als geeignetes Mittel zur Sicherstellung eines geordneten Ablaufs sportlicher Wettkämpfe anerkannte. Er forderte aber zu Recht, dass die Regelungen verhältnismäßig und vor allem in sich stimmig sein müssen.75 Letzteres wurde vom EuGH zu einem allgemeinen Prüfkriterium in Bereichen entwickelt, in denen der die Grundfreiheiten beschränkenden Einrichtung – sei es der Staat, sei es, wie im Sport, ein Verband mit Monopolstellung – ein relativ weites Ermessen konzediert wird, nämlich der Gesundheitsvorsorge76, dem – speziell auch den Sport betreffenden – Glücksspiel77 und eben dem Sport selbst: Die getroffenen Maßnahmen müssen „kohärent“ sein.78

8. Dopingsperren (Meca-Medina) Schließlich gerieten auch die von den Sportverbänden verhängten Dopingsperren ins Blickfeld des Unionsrechts. Dies war geradezu zwangsläufig, da ei___________ 74

EuGH, Urt. v. 11.04.2000, verb. Rs. C-51/96 und C-191/97 (Deliège/Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées), Slg. 2000, I-2549, Rn. 67 f. = SpuRt 2000, 148. 75 EuGH, Urt. v. 13.04.2000, Rs. C-176/96 (Jyri Lehtonen u.a./Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL, Slg. 2000, I-2681, Rn. 51 ff. = SpuRt 2000, 151. Vgl. dazu Streinz, in : Tettinger (Fn. 41), S. 33 ff., 47 ff. m. w. N.; Vieweg, The legal autonomy of sport organisations and restrictions of European Law, in : Caiger/Gardiner (Hrsg.), Professional Sports in the European Union : Regulation and Reregulation, 2001, S. 83 (88); Steiner, Richterliche Grundrechtsverantwortung in Europa, in : FS Maurer, 2001, S. 1006 (1011 ff.). 76 Besonders deutlich EuGH, Urt. v. 10.03.2009, Rs. C-169/07 (Hartlauer), Slg. 2009, I-1721 . 77 Vgl. z. B. EuGH, Urt. v. 08.09.2010, Rs. C-46/08 (Carmen Media), NVwZ 2010, 1422, in dem das deutsche Glücksspielmonopol mangels „Kohärenz“ der Bekämpfung der Spielsucht angesichts des von dem vorlegenden Gericht vorgetragenen Sachverhalts für unionsrechtswidrig erklärt wurde. Vgl. dazu und generell zur Glücksspielrechtsprechung des EuGH Streinz/Kruis, Unionsrechtliche Vorgaben und mitgliedstaatliche Gestaltungsspielräume im Bereich des Glücksspielrechts, NJW 2010, 3745 (3745 ff.). 78 Vgl. zu diesem Kohärenzprinzip, das vom für die Unionsorgane geltenden Kohärenzprinzip (vgl. Art. 7 AEUV) unterschieden werden muss, Streinz, Die Rolle des EuGH im Prozess der Europäischen Integration. Anmerkungen zu gegenläufigen Tendenzen in der neueren Rechtsprechung, AöR 135 (2010), 1 (21 ff.).

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ne international wirkende Dopingsperre die Berufsfreiheit und damit auch die Mobilität des Athleten in besonders gravierender Weise beeinträchtigt.79 Im Fall Meca-Medina wurde durch die unterschiedlichen Ansätze und Wertungen von EuG und EuGH80 aber deutlich, dass sich hier die Frage nach den Grenzen der Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit in besonderer Weise stellt.81

IV. Bindung an das Unionsrecht und Verbandsautonomie 1. Unionsrechtliche Grundlagen Dass der Sport als wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit in den Anwendungsbereich des Unionsrechts fällt, wird heute nicht mehr bestritten. Ebenfalls anerkannt ist, dass es wie generell auch in diesem Bereich gerechtfertigte Regeln geben muss, die die Grundfreiheiten beschränken. Anerkannt ist schließlich auch, dass es „Eigengesetzlichkeiten“ des Sports gibt, die bei der Bewertung der unionsrechtlich ebenso wie die Grundfreiheiten als Unionsgrundrecht geschützten Verbandsautonomie zu berücksichtigen sind. Das heißt nicht, dass der Sport sich „eigene Gesetze“ – die hat das Sportgeschehen auf dem Platz – dahingehend geben darf, dass er zum rechtsfreien Raum wird. Vielmehr ist die Trennlinie zu finden zwischen den Regeln, die als „reine Sportregeln“ von der gerichtlichen Nachprüfung außerhalb der Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit ausgenommen werden sollen, und den Bereichen, in denen auch der Sport und das Gebaren seiner Verbände der „allgemeinen“ Gerichtsbarkeit unterliegen. In diesem Bereich ist wie in allen Rechtsgebieten die „praktische Konkordanz“ zwischen konfligierenden Rechten, hier den Grundfreiheiten und dem Kartellrecht einerseits, dem Grundrecht der Verbandsautonomie andererseits, zu suchen.

2. Sportregeln und Rechtsregeln Den Fall Meca-Medina versuchte das EuG durch die Unterscheidung zwischen „Sportregeln“, die wegen ihrer „rein sportlichen Natur“ keinen wirtschaftlichen Zweck verfolgen, und den „Rechtsregeln“, d. h. den Vorgaben des Unionsrechts zu lösen, indem es den Anti-Doping-Regeln „rein sportliche ___________ 79

Vgl. Streinz (Fn. 4), S. 124 ff. EuG, Urt. v. 30.09.2004, Rs. T-313/02 (Meca-Medina und Majcen/Kommission), Slg. 2004, II-3291 = SpuRt 2005, 20 m. Anm. Schroeder; EuGH, Urt. v. 18.07.2006, Rs. C-519/04 P (Meca-Medina und Majcen/Kommission), Slg. 2006, I-6991 = SpuRt 2006, 195 m. Anm. Orth. 81 Siehe dazu unten IV.4. 80

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Zwecke“ zumaß und sie vom Anwendungsbereich des Unionsrechts ausnahm.82 Dies stieß auf berechtigte Kritik83 und der EuGH hat daher zu Recht diesen Teil des Urteils als „rechtsfehlerhaft“ aufgehoben.84 Der wiederum daran geübten Kritik85 wurde zutreffend entgegengetreten.86 Der Fall zeigt zum einen, dass das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen der staatlich bzw. unionsrechtlich anerkannten Selbstregulierung des Sports und deren Grenzen wohl das „zentrale Element“ des Sportrechts ist,87 zum anderen, dass die auf Max Kummer zurückgehende Unterscheidung zwischen „Spielregeln“ und „Rechtsregeln“ im Sport88 hinsichtlich ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit und ihrer Konsequenzen hinterfragt und gegebenenfalls differenziert werden muss.89 Letztlich entscheidend ist die Frage, ob und inwieweit Sport und Spiel durch die Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit und durch die staatliche bzw. unionale Gerichtsbarkeit justiziabel sein sollen.90 Hinsichtlich des „Ob“ lässt sich festhalten, dass jedenfalls Spielregeln wie z. B. die Festlegung der Anzahl der Spieler einer Mannschaft im Fußball, Handball, Basketball oder Eishockey nicht unionsrechtlich mit der Begründung angegriffen werden können, sie sei „unverhältnismäßig“ klein und behindere damit die Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmer, ungeachtet dessen, dass sich auch solche Festlegungen „wirtschaftlich“ auswirken.91 Insoweit hat aber bereits das Beispiel der Nationalmannschaften gezeigt, dass die wirtschaftliche Auswirkung allein ___________ 82

EuG (Fn. 80), Rn. 44 ff. Vgl. z. B. die Anmerkung von Schroeder, SpuRt 2005, 23 (23 f.); Heermann, Anmerkung zu EuG, Urt. v. 11.10.2004 – Rs. T-313/02 – Meca-Medina und Majcen, GPR 2005, 118; ders., Causa Sport 2006, 348; Orth, Causa Sport 2004, 194 (194 ff.). Zustimmend dagegen Blackshaw, ISLJ 2005, 51. 84 EuGH (Fn. 80), Rn. 33. 85 Vgl. Infantino, Meca-Medina: Ein Schritt zurück für das europäische Sportmodell und die Spezifität des Sports?, SpuRt 2007, 12 (12 ff.). 86 Vgl. insbes. Pfister, Meca-Medina, kein Schritt zurück!, SpuRt 2007, 58 (58 f.); zustimmend auch z. B. Orth, Anmerkung, SpuRt 2006, 198. 87 So Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht, abrufbar unter http://www.irut.de/Forschung/Ver oeffentlichungen/OnlineVersionFaszinationSportrecht/FaszinationSportrecht.pdf, S. 46. 88 Kummer, Spielregel und Rechtsregel, in: Merz (Hrsg.), Abhandlungen zum Schweizerischen Recht, 1973, S. 44 ff., 77 ff. m. w. N. Vgl. zu dieser Unterscheidung Pfister, Autonomie des Sports, sport-typisches Verhalten und staatliches Recht, in: FS W. Lorenz 1991, S. 171 (174 ff.). 89 Kritisch Hess, in: Hess/Dressler, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Sports, 1999, S. 19 ff. Vgl. zu nötigen Differenzierungen auch Vieweg, Fairness und Sportregeln – Zur Problematik sog. Tatsachenentscheidungen im Sport, in: FS Röhricht, 2005, S. 1255 (1260 ff.). 90 Zutreffend M. Kaiser, Sport- und Spielregeln als materielles Nichtrecht? Zur Frage der Justiziabilität von Sport und Spiel, SpuRt 2009, 6 (9 ff.). 91 Streinz (Fn. 10), S. 84. Ebenso Weatherill, Anti-doping revisited – the demise of the rule of „purely sporting interest“?, ECLR 2006, 645 (652); Stein, Das Weißbuch der EUKommission zum Sport. Bestandsaufnahme zur Anwendung des Wettbewerbsrechts auf Sportregeln, SpuRt 2008, 46 (48): „reine Spielregeln“. 83

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nicht entscheidend sein kann.92 Dies betrifft auch die Frage der Nachprüfbarkeit von „Tatsachenentscheidungen“ auf dem Platz, die grundsätzlich der Entscheidung der jeweiligen Verbände überlassen bleiben soll, wobei die Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit allenfalls einer Willkürkontrolle durch staatliche Gerichte unterliegt. Anders verhält es sich dagegen mit Lizenzierungsregeln und Sperren, die verfassungsrechtlich die Berufsfreiheit93 und unionsrechtlich darüber hinaus die Freizügigkeit betreffen. Diese unterfallen wegen ihrer Auswirkungen tatbestandlich den Grundfreiheiten und dem Kartellrecht der Union.94

3. Praktische Konkordanz zwischen Grundfreiheiten und EU-Kartellrecht und Unionsgrundrechten In diesem, tatbestandlich dem Unionsrecht unterfallenden Bereich, ist zwischen den gegenläufigen Positionen der Grundfreiheiten und des Kartellrechts einerseits und der Verbandsautonomie als geschütztem Unionsgrundrecht andererseits wie bei allen Konfliktsituationen eine „praktische Konkordanz“ zu suchen. Ansatzpunkt dafür sind Rechtfertigungsgründe für die Beschränkung der Grundfreiheiten und für Ausnahmen vom Kartellverbot unter Berücksichtigung der spezifischen Besonderheiten des Sports. Die Rechtfertigung muss dabei plausibel den legitimen Zweck, die Verhältnismäßigkeit und die Kohärenz der Maßnahme dartun können. Dabei sollte die Rechtfertigung in den Bereichen Grundfreiheiten und Kartellrecht jedenfalls im Ergebnis parallel laufen.95

4. Insbesondere: Der Fall Meca-Medina Anhand dieser Kriterien hat der EuGH den Fall Meca-Medina zutreffend entschieden. Angesichts der Beeinträchtigung der geschützten Rechte wurde der Anwendungsbereich des EU-Kartellrechts als eröffnet angesehen – Gleiches würde hinsichtlich der Grundfreiheiten des Personenverkehrs zutreffen. Folge davon war, dass die Maßnahme auf ihre Rechtfertigung am Maßstab des Unionsrechts unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten des Sports geprüft wurde. Im Ergebnis wurde ihre Verhältnismäßigkeit bejaht. Die grundlegende Bedeutung des Urteils liegt in der unmissverständlichen Feststellung, dass die ___________ 92

Vgl. o. II.1.c)aa). Vgl. zum Verfassungsrecht Nolte, Staatliche Verantwortung im Bereich Sport, 2004, S. 254 ff. 94 Näher dazu Streinz (Fn. 4), S. 124 ff. m. w. N. 95 Ebenso Weatherill (Fn. 91), ECLR 2006, S. 645 ff. 93

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Einstufung einer Regelung als „rein sportlichen Charakters“ allein nicht dazu führt, sie vom Geltungsbereich des Unionsrechts auszunehmen. Eine weitergehende verbindliche Typisierung der unionsrechtlichen Rechtmäßigkeit von „Sportregeln“ wäre zwar im Sinne der Rechtssicherheit wünschenswert, ihr sind allerdings eben im Sinne der Rechtssicherheit, um den irreführenden Eindruck von „Genehmigungen“ zu vermeiden, Grenzen gesetzt.96 Die Wissenschaft kann durch Analyse der Rechtsprechung des EuGH aber immerhin einen Beitrag zur Klärung leisten.

V. Unionsrechtlicher Rechtsschutz des Sportlers Für den von Maßnahmen der Verbände betroffenen Sportler bestehen im Rahmen der Nachprüfung von Entscheidungen der Verbände einschließlich der Verbandsgerichte folgende Rechtsschutzmöglichkeiten: Im Rahmen des Kartellrechts können Direktklagen zum EuGH gemäß Art. 263 Abs. 4 AEUV gegen Beschlüsse der Kommission, die ein Einschreiten gegen ein als kartellrechtswidrig angesehenes Verhalten eines Verbandes ablehnt (Fall MecaMedina), erhoben werden. Bei gänzlichem Untätigkeitbleiben der Kommission müsste analog zur positiven Konkurrentenklage zur Eröffnung effektiven Rechtsschutzes ausnahmsweise die Untätigkeitsklage (Art. 265 Abs. 3 AEUV) zulässig sein.97 Im Rahmen der Grundfreiheiten besteht Rechtsschutz vor nationalen Gerichten mit der Anregung einer Vorlage an den EuGH (Art. 267 AEUV), die bei „willkürlichem“ Unterlassen durch ein dazu unionsrechtlich verpflichtetes letztinstanzliches Gericht (Art. 267 Abs. 3 AEUV) mit der Verfassungsbeschwerde wegen Entzug des gesetzlichen Richters (Art. 101 Abs. 1 S. 2 GG) erzwungen werden kann.98 Der Fall Bosman hat gezeigt, dass die Verbände dagegen auch durch gegenteilige Zusicherungen der EU-Kommission nicht abgesichert sind.99

VI. Fazit Berufssport bedarf wie jede Berufstätigkeit der Verrechtlichung zum Schutz des Sportlers, aber auch zum Schutz eines fairen Wettbewerbs. Das Europarecht trägt dazu wesentlich bei. Sport ist kein europarechtsfreier Raum. Die ___________ 96

Zutreffend Stein (Fn. 91), SpuRt 2008, 47 ff. Vgl. zur Konkurrentenklage Pechstein, EU-Prozessrecht, 4. Aufl. 2011, Rn. 632 ff. 98 Vgl. dazu Streinz, Europarecht, 9. Aufl. 2012, Rn. 709 ff. 99 EuGH (Fn. 10), Rn. 102. 97

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„sportliche“ Wahrheit ist aber immer noch auf dem Platz und nicht im Gerichtssaal zu suchen.

VII. Thesen 1. Das Unionsrecht erfasst den Berufssport als wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit. Für Berufssportler finden daher die Grundfreiheiten des Binnenmarktes (insbesondere Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmer und Dienstleistungsfreiheit) Anwendung als Diskriminierungsverbote (z. B. gegen Ausländerklauseln) und als Beschränkungsverbote (z. B. gegen Transferhindernisse) gegenüber allen Mobilitätshindernissen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten. Für Angehörige von Drittstaaten besteht im Rahmen entsprechender Assoziierungsabkommen zwar kein Zugangsrecht zum Arbeitsmarkt, aber nach erfolgter rechtmäßiger Zulassung ein Anspruch auf Gleichbehandlung. 2. Darüber hinaus besteht auch im reinen Amateursport für Unionsbürger ein Anspruch auf Nichtdiskriminierung. 3. Verpflichtungsadressaten sind insoweit auch die Sportverbände (Drittwirkung). 4. Die Sportverbände unterliegen als „Unternehmensvereinigungen“ im Sinne des Unionsrechts auch dem Kartellrecht. 5. Regelungen, die „rein sportliche“ Zwecke verfolgen, sind von diesen Vorgaben des Unionsrechts nur als „reine Spielregeln“ (z. B. Anzahl der Spieler) ausgenommen. Im Übrigen können sie gerechtfertigte Ausnahmen darstellen. Dazu gehören z. B. die Bestimmungen über Nationalmannschaften. Differenziert sind dagegen Regeln über die Sanktionierung von Dopingverstößen zu sehen, die zwar der sportlichen Fairness dienen, aber auch erhebliche Eingriffe in die Berufsfreiheit und die Grundfreiheiten der Athleten darstellen. Der EuGH hat daher im Fall Meca-Medina den Ansatz des EuG zu Recht korrigiert. 6. Nach der Erklärung zum Sport des Vertrags von Amsterdam (1997) erwähnt der Vertrag von Lissabon (2007; in Kraft seit 01.12.2009) erstmals den Sport im verbindlichen Primärrecht (Art. 165 AEUV). Die Union erhält dabei eine limitierte Förderkompetenz (keine Harmonisierung der Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften). Art. 165 AEUV begründet keine Bereichsausnahme gegenüber den Vorgaben der EU-Grundfreiheiten und des EUKartellrechts, liefert aber einen Anhalts- und Orientierungspunkt für die Berücksichtigung der „besonderen Merkmale“ des Sports. 7. Die Sportverbände können sich zur Rechtfertigung von Beschränkungsmaßnahmen auf die angepassten Schranken der Grundfreiheiten („öffentliche Ordnung“) berufen. Die Beschränkungsmaßnahmen müssen ein legitimes Ziel verfolgen, rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen sowie dem Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit genügen und „kohärent“ sein.

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8. Die Athleten müssen gegenüber die Berufsfreiheit und die Grundfreiheiten beschränkenden Maßnahmen der Sportverbände einen angemessenen Rechtsschutz erhalten. Als Mobilitätshindernisse stehen solche Maßnahmen auf dem Prüfstand des Unionsrechts. Dies setzt der Verbandsgerichtsbarkeit Grenzen. 9. Zwischen den Vorgaben der Grundfreiheiten und des Kartellrechts und der ebenfalls unionsrechtlich geschützten Verbandsautonomie ist die Herstellung praktischer Konkordanz anzustreben. Der EuGH hat dafür in den Urteilen Deliège und Lehtonen Anhaltspunkte gegeben und dies im Fall Bernard bestätigt. 10. Berufssport bedarf wie jede Berufstätigkeit der Verrechtlichung zum Schutz des Sportlers, aber auch zum Schutz eines fairen Wettbewerbs. Das Europarecht trägt dazu wesentlich bei. Sport ist kein europarechtsfreier Raum. Die „sportliche“ Wahrheit ist aber immer noch auf dem Platz und nicht im Gerichtssaal zu suchen.

Der erste EU-Beitrag zur Revision des World Anti-Doping Code (WADC)* Von Jacob Kornbeck Einleitung: Hintergrund und Beweggründe....................................................... 144

I.

II. Der EU-Beitrag: Prozess und Verfahren ........................................................... 146 1.

Prozess und Verfahren seitens der WADA ................................................ 146

2.

Prozess und Verfahren seitens der EU ....................................................... 147

III. Struktur und Inhalt des EU-Beitrags ................................................................. 148 1.

Struktur ...................................................................................................... 148

2.

Heranwachsende Prinzipien des Datenschutzes („emerging data privacy principles“) – Punkt 1 des EU-Beitrags ..................................................... 149

3.

Anwendung der ADAMS-Datenbank („use of ADAMS“) – Punkt 2 des EU-Beitrags ............................................................................................... 152

4.

Registered Testing Pools (RTPs) und Meldepflichtregelung („Whereabouts“) – Punkt 3 des EU-Beitrags .......................................................... 153

5.

Beteiligung von Regierungen („involvement of governments“) – Punkt 4 des EU-Beitrags ........................................................................................ 154

6.

Zur-Verfügung-Stellung personenbezogener Informationen („public disclosure“) – Punkt 5 des EU-Beitrags ......................................................... 156

IV. Fazit .................................................................................................................. 156 1.

Der EU-Beitrag als Kompromisstext ......................................................... 156

2.

Der EU-Beitrag als Chance ....................................................................... 157

3.

Der EU-Beitrag als Leistung ..................................................................... 159

___________ *

Mein besonderer Dank gilt meinem Kollegen Jörg Huperz sowie den Praktikanten Samy Julien Hamama und Carolin Schwegler für ihre Unterstützung, Ratschläge und Kritik bei der Erarbeitung dieses Beitrags. Der Text gibt lediglich die persönlichen Ansichten des Autors wieder und entspricht nicht zwingend der Meinung der Europäischen Kommission.

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I. Einleitung: Hintergrund und Beweggründe Als am 14.03.2012 der dänische Sportminister Uffe Elbæk einen Text mit dem Titel „EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code“ an die Welt Anti-Doping Agentur (WADA) übersandte,1 war dies weitaus mehr als eine nur symbolische Geste. Als am darauffolgenden Tag die erste Konsultationsphase zur Revision des Codes abgeschlossen wurde (Übersicht der verschiedenen Phasen s. folgende Abbildung), waren der WADA Beiträge, Meinungsäußerungen und Anregungen sowohl von anerkannten WADA Stakeholders (d. h. im WADA-Stiftungsrat vertretenen Sportverbänden und Regierungen), von anderen Organisationen als auch von natürlichen Personen zugegangen. Es war jedoch das erste Mal, dass die 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten gemeinsame Vorstellungen zum neuen, am 01.01.2015 in Kraft tretenden World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) unterbreitet haben. Die Tatsache, dass die Regierungen der EU-/Europaratsländer gemeinsam fast 50% der von den Regierungen weltweit zu erbringenden Beiträge zahlen, wird hoffentlich dem EUBeitrag ebenso viel Nachdruck verleihen wie die Tatsache, dass sämtliche im EU-Beitrag enthaltenen Anregungen sich auf geltendes EU-Sekundärrecht beziehen. Da auch der WADA daran gelegen sein dürfte, Verwaltungsklagen und Rechtsstreite in Europa zu vermeiden, ist dies sicher ein wichtiges Argument. Diese Initiative ist jedoch ohne Zweifel auch von historischer Bedeutung, da es erstmalig gelang, eine gemeinsame Position zu formulieren. Der Text des EU-Beitrags wurde zuvor vom Rat der Europäischen Union in seiner für Sportfragen zuständigen Formation2 mit der Maßgabe verabschiedet, den dänischen EU-Vorsitz dazu zu ermächtigen, ihn offiziell im Namen der gesamten EU der WADA weiterzuleiten. Treibende Kraft waren dabei der Rat und insbesondere der dänische EU-Vorsitz. Bei der Erarbeitung des EU-Beitrags kam der Kommission aber (besonders in der Frühphase) eine besondere, beratende Rolle zu, zumal die Ratsarbeitsgruppe „Sport“ (nicht zuletzt im Sinne guter Kooperation mit dem Europarat, dessen Anti-Doping-Gremien ebenfalls einen Beitrag zur WADC-Revision vorbereitet haben) beschlossen hatte, den EU-Beitrag ausschließlich auf Bestimmungen des WADC zu begrenzen, die vom anwendbaren EU-Sekundärrecht umfasst sind.3 ___________ 1

Council approves EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20120314b_en.htm (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 2 Education, Youth, Culture and Sport (EYCS) = Bildung, Jugend, Kultur und Sport; vgl. Übersicht: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/council-configurations?lang=de (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 3 Vgl. EU Expert Group „Anti-Doping“: Report from the 1st meeting (19. Oktober 2011), S. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b24/xg-ad-201110-final-rpt.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012).

Verlauf des Konsultations- und Revisionsverfahrens der WADA

Quelle: WADA-Webseite http://wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/The-Code/ Code-Review/ (Zugriff: 29.11.12).

Der erste EU-Beitrag zur Revision des WADC 145

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Obwohl also der EU-Beitrag bewusst auf das anwendbare EU-Recht im Sinne des sog. EU-Besitzstandes (acquis communautaire) begrenzt wurde – was vor dem Hintergrund der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Europa und der WADA seit dem Jahr 2008 zum Thema Datenschutz sicher sinnvoll ist –, kommt dem Rat potentiell eine weitaus breitere Rolle zu, sofern für nicht acquis-bezogene Fragen ein Konsens gefunden werden kann. Die Kommission fungiert auch als EU-Beobachter in den Anti-Doping-Gremien des Europarats. Ebenfalls kooperiert sie politisch, wenn auch unverbindlich, mit den Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten zum Thema Doping, berücksichtigt das Thema AntiDoping im EU-weiten strukturierten Dialog mit den Sportorganisationen und führt ebenfalls einen laufenden Dialog mit der WADA. Schließlich wird auf EU-Ebene ein Schwerpunkt „Prävention“ mit Blick auf Amateur- und Fitnesssport aufgebaut, was sowohl auf politischer Ebene als auch ggf. in einem künftigen finanziellen Instrument (ein Kapitel Sport als Bestandteil eines künftigen EU-Bildungsprogramms „Erasmus 4 All“) neue EU-Fördermöglichkeiten mit sich bringt.4

II. Der EU-Beitrag: Prozess und Verfahren 1. Prozess und Verfahren seitens der WADA In 2012–13 werden nicht nur der WADC selbst, sondern auch die ihm zugehörigen Internationalen Standards zu Verbotsliste („List“), Tests (IST), Labors (ISL), Medizinische Ausnahmegenehmigungen (Therapeutic Use Exemptions) (TUEs) (ISTUE) sowie Datenschutz (ISPPPI)5 aufgrund einer Reihe öffentlicher Anhörungen revidiert. Das Konsultationsverfahren der WADA verläuft wie in dem Zeitplan aufgeführt, indem zum Code drei und zu den International Standards zwei Konsultationsphasen abgehalten werden. In der ersten First Code Consultation Phase (01.01.–15.03.2012) bezog sich die Anhörung auf den Code 2009 sowie auf die eigenen Vorstellungen der Beitragenden. Die Second Code Consultation Phase (01.06.–15.10.2012) hat den am 01.06.2012 von der WADA online veröffentlichten Entwurf des Codes 2015 zum Gegenstand. Ähnlich verhält es sich bei den IS Consultation Phases, deren erste Phase ___________ 4

EU Council adopts Conclusions on doping in recreational sport, http://ec.europa. eu/sport/news/20120515-eu-council-adoptsconclusions_en.htm (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 5 International Standard on Prohibited List („List“), International Standard on Testing (IST), International Standard on Laboratories (ISL), International Standard on Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs) (ISTUE), International Standard on the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information (ISPPPI), vgl. http://wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/ Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/International-Standards/ (Zugriff: 29.11.2012).

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(01.06.–15.10.2012) lediglich die aktuellen Standards zum Gegenstand hat, die zweite (01.12.2012–28.02.2013) dahingegen die von der WADA am 01.12.2012 freizugebenden Entwürfe als Grundlage haben wird. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird deutlich, dass der EU-Beitrag den Zweck verfolgt, möglichst früh im Konsultationsverfahren anzusetzen, um somit einen möglichst großen und wirkungsvollen Effekt zu erzielen. Darüber hinaus erlaubt diese frühzeitige Vorgehensweise, in den jeweils danach folgenden Phasen bei Bedarf Anmerkungen zu den vorher übermittelten EU-Anmerkungen bzw. EU-Vorschlägen abzugeben. Die gesamte Initiative ist deshalb nicht nur (sport)rechtlich, sondern auch rechtspolitisch zu bewerten.

2. Prozess und Verfahren seitens der EU Mit Beschluss vom Mai 20116 hat der Rat der Europäischen Union den EUArbeitsplan zum Sport verabschiedet und sechs EU-Expertengruppen ins Leben gerufen, die alle klar definierte Aufgaben und Ziele („deliverables“) haben. Anders als im Falle der bislang von der Kommission moderierten, informellen Arbeitsgruppen liegt es nicht in ihrem Ermessen, neue Themen aufzunehmen. Dafür haben sie eine gesteigerte Legitimität und potentiell auch einen neuartigen Einfluss. Die Zahl der Arbeitsgruppen sowie ihre Aufgaben und Abgabefristen gehen aus Anhang II hervor. Im thematischen Bereich „Integrität des Sports, insbesondere Bekämpfung von Doping und Spielabsprachen und Förderung von Good Governance“ wird eine Maßnahme „Ausarbeitung eines Entwurfs von Bemerkungen der EU zur Überarbeitung des Anti-Doping-Codes der WADA“ festgesetzt, zu deren Verwirklichung eine Expertengruppe „AntiDoping“ ins Leben gerufen wurde. Als Zielvorgaben und Fristen gelten: „Vorläufiger Entwurf von Bemerkungen der EU bis Anfang 2012 und entsprechendes Follow-up“7. Am 19.10.2011 hielt die Expertengruppe „Anti-Doping“ ihre erste Sitzung und beschloss ihre Arbeitsweise im Hinblick auf die Erarbeitung des Entwurfs zum EU-Beitrag.8 Dabei entschied sie sich für ein ausschließlich acquisbasiertes Format (und somit gegen einen weitergehenden politischen EU___________ 6

Entschließung des Rates und der im Rat vereinigten Vertreter der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten zu einem Arbeitsplan der Europäischen Union für den Sport 2011–2014 (EU Arbeitsplan für den Sport 2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ .do?uri=OJ:C:2011:162:0001:0005:de:PDF (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 7 EU Arbeitsplan für den Sport 2011, a.a.O., Anhang I, S. 4. 8 Vgl. EU Expert Group „Anti-Doping“: Report from the 1st meeting (19.10.2011), S. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b24/xg-ad-201110-final-rpt.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11. 2012).

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Beitrag). Eine Reihe von Beobachtern wurde zur Teilnahme an der Expertengruppe zugelassen.9 Am 25.01.2012 veröffentlichte die Kommission eine Gesetzesvorlage hinsichtlich einer Datenschutz-Verordnung. Diese wird, sofern sie verabschiedet wird, die Richtlinie 95/46/EG ersetzen und Änderungen beinhalten, welche für die aktuelle Anti-Doping-Praxis von Bedeutung sein könnten.10 Am 08.02.2012 verabschiedete die EU-Expertengruppe „Anti-Doping“ in ihrer zweiten Sitzung den Entwurf zum EU-Beitrag.11 Dieser wiederum wurde am 08.03.2012 vom Rat verabschiedet12 und am 14.03.2012 vom Vorsitz an die WADA übermittelt. Als der Rat am 11.05.2012 Schlussfolgerungen zum Doping im Breitensport verabschiedet hat, verlängerte er dabei ebenfalls das Mandat der Expertengruppe, damit diese ihre Arbeit bis Ende 2013 fortführen kann (der Code 2015 soll im November 2013 in Johannesburg verabschiedet werden).13

III. Struktur und Inhalt des EU-Beitrags 1. Struktur Der EU-Beitrag ist ein vom Rat der Europäischen Union verabschiedeter, schriftlicher Beitrag zur WADC-Revision.14 Das verabschiedete Dokument be___________ 9 Wie aus dem Protokoll der Sitzung vom 19.10.2011 hervorgeht, lagen bereits von den folgenden Organisationen Anträge auf Beobachterstatus vor: Council of Europe (Secretariat), European Olympic Committees (EOC), European Elite Athletes’ Association (EEAA) (EU Athletes), Professional Players’ Association (PPA), European Health and Fitness Association (EHFA), World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), Government of Norway; ab der dritten Sitzung: International Olympic Committee (IOC). 10 Vorschlag für Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und zum freien Datenverkehr (Datenschutz-Grundverordnung), KOM(2012) 11, 25.01.2012 – vgl. Pressemitteilung und Dokumentation: „Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of the data protection rules“, 25.01.2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/ 120125_en.htm (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 11 EU Expert Group „Anti-Doping“: Report from the 2nd meeting (8. Februar 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b24/xg-ad-20120208-final-rpt.pdf (Zugriff: 29. 11.2012). 12 Council approves EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20120314b_en.htm (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 13 EU Council adopts Conclusions on doping in recreational sport, http://ec.europa. eu/sport/news/20120515-eu-council-adoptsconclusions_en.htm (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 14 EU contribution to the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code = I/A-PUNKTVERMERK: Beteiligung der Europäischen Union an der Überarbeitung des Welt-AntiDoping-Kodex, Brüssel, den 23. Februar 2012 (28.02.), 6846/12, SPORT 14 DOPAGE 5 SAN 40 JAI 109 DATAPROTECT 26, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/12/ st06/st06846.de12.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012).

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inhaltet den an die WADA zu sendenden Text als Anhang I, der (anders als der Ratstext selbst) nicht in deutscher Sprache vorliegt. Der EU-Beitrag setzt sich mit fünf ausgewählten Aspekten des aktuellen Code 2009 auseinander, identifiziert konkrete Problempunkte und fordert die WADA dazu auf, im Hinblick auf den Code 2015 konkrete Änderungen vorzunehmen: –

emerging data privacy principles (Unbestimmtheit eines im Code gebrauchten Leitbegriffs);

–

use of ADAMS (Anwendung der ADAMS [Anti-Doping Administration and Management System]-Datenbank und Vereinbarkeit mit dem Datenschutzrecht der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten);

–

RTPs and whereabouts (Zusammensetzung, Größe und Anwendung der in Verbindung mit der Regelung zur Meldepflicht [„Whereabouts“] wichtigen Registered Testing Pools [RTPs] von Elite-Athleten);

–

involvement of governments (Beteiligung und Rolle von Regierungen);

–

public disclosure (Weiterleitung personenbezogener Informationen).

Eine einheitliche Struktur findet sich in jedem thematischen Punkt wieder: –

WADA references (Welche Bestimmungen im Code bzw. in den Internationalen Standards sind von diesem Vorschlag betroffen?);

–

EU references (Auf welche EU-rechtlichen Bestimmungen bezieht sich der Vorschlag?);

–

EU concerns (Bedenken der EU: sowohl rechtlicher als auch politischer Art);

–

Solution proposed (Welche Änderungen in den einschlägigen WADABestimmungen möchte die EU anregen?).

2. Heranwachsende Prinzipien des Datenschutzes („emerging data privacy principles“) – Punkt 1 des EU-Beitrags Nach dem Recht der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten unterliegt die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten strengen Grundsätzen im Hinblick auf Einwilligung, Zweckbindung bzw. (in Abwesenheit der beiden zuvor genannten Merkmale) gesetzlicher Verankerung. Der Anspruch eines hohen Datenschutzstandards in Verbindung mit einer strengen Zweckbindung genießt aufgrund der Verankerung in der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union Grundrechtsstatus (Art. 8 Abs. 2 der Charta). Diesen Ansprüchen kann der Begriff

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„Emerging data privacy principles“ in Art. 14.5 (Doping Control Information Clearinghouse) des Codes nicht entsprechen.15 Den Grundsätzen dieser Datenverarbeitung werden durch Art. 14.5 keine eindeutigen Grenzen gesetzt, wobei der Begriff „clearing house“ eher eine Schaltzentralen-Funktion nahezulegen scheint, obwohl die genannten Empfänger-Organisationen (IOC, IPC, nationale und internationale Fachverbände, NOKs, etc.) weltweit organisiert sind, so dass ein umfassender Datenaustausch auf dieser Grundlage erwartet werden kann. Gerade vor dem Hintergrund dieser potentiell den Datenschutz gefährdenden Bestimmungen erscheint der unbestimmte Verweis auf „heranwachsende Prinzipien des Datenschutzes“ weder rechtlich noch rechtspolitisch ausreichend. Der EU-Beitrag identifiziert dabei potentielle Auswirkungen im IST (4.3, 4.5, 15.2) sowie im ISPPPI (4.2, zum Vorrang des nationalen Rechts), wobei die Bedenken sowohl auf die Grundrechtscharta (Art. 8 Abs. 2 der Charta) als auch auf das anwendbare Sekundärrecht in Gestalt der Datenschutz-Richtlinie 95/46/EG (insbes. Art. 25.1–2 der Richtlinie) gestützt werden. Die EU verweist dabei auf aktuelle politische Debatten, gewerkschaftspolitische Initiativen sowie Verwaltungsklagen und Rechtssachen in den EUMitgliedstaaten sowie auf zwei Stellungnahmen der Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe zum ISPPPI aus den Jahren 200816 bzw. 200917. Außerdem wird auf die Anmerkung in der zweiten Stellungnahme verwiesen, der zufolge eine Würdigung des ISPPPI aufgrund ihrer De-facto-Einbindung in zahlreiche WADA___________ 15 „WADA shall act as a central clearinghouse for Doping Control Testing data and results for International-Level Athletes and national-level Athletes who have been included in their National Anti-Doping Organization’s Registered Testing Pool. […] Each AntiDoping Organization shall report all In-Competition and Out-of-Competition tests on such Athletes to the WADA clearinghouse as soon as possible after such tests have been conducted. This information will be made accessible to the Athlete, the Athlete’s National Federation, National Olympic Committee or National Paralympic Committee, National Anti-Doping Organization, International Federation, and the International Olympic Committee or International Paralympic Committee. […] To enable it to serve as a clearinghouse for Doping Control Testing data, WADA has developed a database management tool, ADAMS, that reflects emerging data privacy principles.“ (Code 2009, Art. 14.5). 16 Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe (2008): Stellungnahme 3/2008 zum Entwurf eines internationalen Datenschutzstandards zum Welt Anti-Doping Code, Annahme am 1. August 2008, 1576-00-00-08/DE, WP 156, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wp docs/2008/wp156_de.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 17 Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe (2009): Zweite Stellungnahme 4/2009 zum Internationalen Standard der Welt Anti-Doping Agentur (WADA) zum Schutz der Privatsphäre und personenbezogener Informationen, zu entsprechenden Vorschriften des WADA-Codes und zu anderen Datenschutzfragen im Bereich des Kampfes gegen Doping im Sport durch die WADA und durch (nationale) Anti-Doping-Organisationen, Annahme am 6. April 2009, 0746/09/DE, WP 162, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009 /wp162_de.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012).

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Standards – ungeachtet der theoretisch unverbindlichen Natur des ADAMSArrangements – nicht vertretbar ist.18 Eine obligatorische ADAMS-Anwendung kann demnach von der EU nicht unterstützt werden. Ferner findet die EU die Rolle der WADA als „clearing house“ unzureichend definiert und sieht Art. 14.5 überhaupt als zu unbestimmt formuliert, was gegen den Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz des EU-Rechts („legal certainty“) verstößt.19 Ebenso erscheint Art. 14.6 dazu geeignet, gleichzeitig sowohl das nationale Recht als auch die jeweilige WADA-Bestimmung gelten zu lassen,20 was bei einem etwaigen Normenkonflikt erhebliche Probleme mit sich bringen würde, wobei die EU ausdrücklich anerkennt, dass der aktuelle Art. 4 ISPPPI dem gewünschten Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz entspricht. Demnach gilt es hier also lediglich, die bestehende gute WADA-Praxis auf die Gesamtheit der WADABestimmungen auszuweiten. Im Sinne pragmatischer Verbesserungen schließt deshalb dieser Punkt des EU-Beitrags mit dem Vorschlag ab, Art. 14.6 wie folgt zu ergänzen: „Anti-Doping Organizations shall only process Personal Information where necessary and appropriate to conduct their Anti-Doping Activities under the Code (such as those identified in Articles 2, 4.4, 5–8, 10–16 and 18–20) and International Standards, or where otherwise required by applicable law, regulation or compulsory legal process, provided such processing does not conflict with applicable privacy and data protection laws.“21

Da die vorgeschlagene Verbesserung darauf abzielt, allgemeine grund- und datenschutzrechtliche Vorbehalte unmissverständlich festzuhalten, hat dieser erste Punkt des EU-Beitrags besondere Priorität und beansprucht mit dreiein___________ 18

„Die Arbeitsgruppe kann ihre Anmerkungen nicht ausschließlich auf den Datenschutzstandard beschränken. Da dieser zahlreiche Verweise auf den WADA-Code und die ADAMS-Datenbank (siehe 2.2.) enthält, ist es wichtig, ihn in seinem breiteren Anwendungsbereich zu untersuchen. Deshalb geht die Stellungnahme detaillierter auf die folgenden Punkte ein, nachdem sie die grundlegenden Merkmale des von der WADA entwickelten Systems (Punkt 2) aufgezeigt hat: Aufenthaltsort und Erreichbarkeit (3.1.), unberücksichtigt gebliebene Anmerkungen aus der ersten Stellungnahme (3.2.), Rechtsgrundlagen für die Verarbeitung (3.3.), der Datentransfer zu der ADAMS-Datenbank in Kanada und in andere Staaten außerhalb der EU (3.4.), Zeitraum für die Speicherung der Daten (3.5.) und Sanktionen (3.6.).“ (Stellungnahme 4/2009, S. 3). 19 Vgl. Rs. C-2/08, Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Agenzia delle Entrate v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl, EuGH 2. Kammer, Urteil vom 03.09.2009. Vgl. S. 6 des EU-Beitrags mit Literaturhinweisen. 20 „Each Anti-Doping Organization shall ensure that it complies with applicable data protection and privacy laws with respect to their handling of such information, as well as the International Standard for the protection of privacy that WADA shall adopt to ensure Athletes and non-athletes are fully informed of and, where necessary, agree to the handling of their personal information in connection with anti-doping activities arising under the Code.“ (Code 2009, Art. 14.5). 21 EU-Beitrag (Fn. 14), S. 7.

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halb von insgesamt zehneinhalb Seiten auch den größten Anteil des Textes. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist auch die kürzere rechtliche sowie politische Würdigung in den darauffolgenden vier Punkten zu verstehen, wobei die monierten Änderungen dafür nicht weniger umfassend ausfallen.

3. Anwendung der ADAMS-Datenbank („use of ADAMS“) – Punkt 2 des EU-Beitrags Obwohl sich nachweislich keine ausdrückliche Verpflichtung der WADA Stakeholders und Regierungen zur Anwendung der ADAMS-Datenbank aus dem Code selbst ergibt, hat die EU dennoch bemerkt, dass in Art. 4.4 (Therapeutic Use), 14.3 (Athlete Whereabouts Information), 14.5 (Doping Control Information Clearinghouse) sowie 15.2 (Out-of-Competition Testing) stark präskriptive Formulierungen enthalten sind. Die EU merkt ebenfalls an, dass entsprechende Bestimmungen in den Standards IST, Abs. 14.3, 14.5, 15.2 sowie ISPPPI, Abs. 4.2 (primacy of national law) vorzufinden sind. Die EU möchte vorzugsweise die Anwendung der ADAMS-Datenbank uneingeschränkt unterstützen, jedoch ist dies unter den aktuellen Umständen nicht möglich, nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund der beiden Stellungnahmen der Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe zum ISPPPI aus den Jahren 200822 bzw. 200923. Aus den Randkommentaren des Codes („All provisions of the Code are mandatory in substance“24) in Verbindung mit der Tatsache, dass bei weitem nicht alle Mitgliedstaaten ADAMS aktuell nutzen25, ergibt sich, dass die ADAMS-Anwendung gegenwärtig kontrovers eingeschätzt wird. Die EU stellt deshalb die im Zusammenhang mit Charta-Artikel 8 sowie mit der Richtlinie 95/46/EG (Datenschutz) auftretenden Probleme dar und fragt ferner, ob die zur ADAMS-Anwendung eingeholte Einwilligung den von der Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe für alle gesellschaftlichen Bereiche festgelegten ___________ 22

Stellungnahme 3/2008 (Fn. 16). Zweite Stellungnahme 4/2009 (Fn 17). 24 Code 2009, S. 16. 25 Aus einer Untersuchung ergibt sich, dass im Jahr 2010 lediglich 10 Mitgliedstaaten eine unbegrenzte ADAMS-Anwendung praktizierten, während weitere sechs eine begrenzte Anwendung zugelassen hatten und sechs an der Einführung einer (nicht weiter definierten) Anwendung arbeiteten. Dagegen fand in fünf Mitgliedstaaten gar keine ADAMSAnwendung statt. Vgl. hierzu T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The implementation of the WADA Code in the European Union, Report commissioned by the Flemish Minister responsible for Sport in view of the Belgian Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2010, Den Haag 2010, S. 13 f.; http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/9202010_100013 rapport%20Asserstudie%20%28Engels%29.pdf (Zugriff: 11.12.2012). 23

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Grundsätzen zur Einwilligung von Datensubjekten entspricht.26 Schließlich stellt sie fest, dass Datentransfers lediglich innerhalb der bewusst eng gehaltenen, in Art. 25–26 der Richtlinie 95/46/EG bestimmten Grenzen zulässig sind. Als Ergebnis schließt die EU mit einem Verweis auf die von ihr unter dem vorherigen Punkt (Heranwachsende Prinzipien des Datenschutzes) angeregten Änderungen ab, so dass die zur ADAMS-Problematik identifizierten Herausforderungen ihrer Position nach ebenfalls durch diese Änderungen behoben werden könnten.

4. Registered Testing Pools (RTPs) und Meldepflichtregelung („Whereabouts“) – Punkt 3 des EU-Beitrags Zielsetzung und Status der ADAMS-Bestimmungen wurden bereits unter Punkt 1–2 ausführlich behandelt. Sie werden jedoch ebenfalls unter Punkt 3 unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Code-Artikel 5.1.1 (Verpflichtung der Anti-DopingOrganisationen [ADOs], Registered Testing Pools [RTPs] zu unterhalten) sowie 14.3 (Verpflichtung der ADOs, relevante Informationen mit anderen Organisationen zu teilen), die mit Charta-Artikel 8 sowie mit der Richtlinie 95/46/EG (Datenschutz) nicht ohne Weiteres vereinbar sind, behandelt. Der Kampf gegen Doping wird von der EU zwar grundsätzlich als legitimes Ziel anerkannt, die hierfür eingesetzten Mittel müssen jedoch verhältnismäßig sein. Die dabei vorzunehmende Interessenabwägung unterscheidet sich nicht wesentlich von derjenigen, die zur Freizügigkeit von Berufssportlern bereits etabliert und anerkannt ist und (aufgrund einer schon umfassenden Rechtsprechung und Verwaltungspraxis der Kommission) festgelegten Maßstäben zu entsprechen hat: Auch im Kampf gegen Doping müssen die gewählten Mittel „rechtmäßig, notwendig und dem verfolgten legitimen Zweck angemessen“ sein.27 Dabei sind die RTPs einiger Mitgliedstaaten disproportional zur Bevölkerungsgröße, was nicht zuletzt in der Studie des Asser Instituuts eindrucksvoll belegt wurde.28

___________ 26 Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe (2011): Stellungnahme 15/2011 zur Definition von Einwilligung, angenommen am 13. Juli 2011, 01197/11/DE, WP187, http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2011/wp18 7_de.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 27 Vgl. z. B. das Arbeitsdokument der Dienststellen der Kommission: Sport und Freizügigkeit, Begleitdokument zur Mitteilung der Kommission: Entwicklung der europäischen Dimension des Sports, 18.01.2011, SEK(2011) 66, S. 3, http://ec.europa.eu/sport/docu ments/swd_de.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 28 Studie des T. M. C. Asser Instituut (Fn. 25), S. 29–30.

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Als Ergebnis dieser Ausführungen unterbreitet die EU der WADA zwei Lösungsvorschläge. Zum einen wird angeregt, Art. 5.1.1 sowie 14.3 um einen IST-kompatiblen Verweis auf das Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip zu ergänzen bzw. alternativ dazu das Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip im Rahmen der Festlegung der RTP-bezogenen Erwartungen an IFs und NADOs zu erläutern und festzuschreiben. Zum anderen wird der unter Punkt 1–2 unterbreitete Vorschlag wiederholt.

5. Beteiligung von Regierungen („involvement of governments“) – Punkt 4 des EU-Beitrags Obwohl Sportorganisationen und Regierungen jeweils unterschiedliche Rollen und Verpflichtungen im Sinne des WADA-Codes haben, erscheint es unter rechtspolitischen Gesichtspunkten problematisch, durch die angesprochenen Erwartungen an Regierungen im WADA-Code den Eindruck verbindlicher Verpflichtungen zu erwecken. Da Regierungen „nur“ im Rahmen der UNESCO-Konvention Verpflichtungen eingegangen sind und diese Konvention ihnen weitestgehend die Wahl der zur Umsetzung der Ziele der Konvention erforderlichen Instrumente überlässt, erscheint vor dem Hintergrund der soziologischen Realität eine tatsächliche Sozialisierung von Athleten innerhalb sporteigener Strukturen mit dazu gehörenden Kommunikationsformen und Loyalitäten (Stichworte: „governing bodies“ bzw. „the authorities of sport“ bzw. „officials of …“) wenig hilfreich. Ebenso wie bei den bereits geschilderten Datenschutzproblemen (Punkt 1–3) können die Anmerkungen der EU dahingehend berücksichtigt werden, dass das geltende Recht von etwaigen politischen Verpflichtungen im Rahmen eines von einer NGO erlassenen Regelwerks unberührt bleibt. Zwar gilt auch hier selbstredend, dass die Rechtstellung der Regierungen unberührt bleibt, jedoch geht eine derart rechtsdogmatische Auslegung an der soziologischen Realität wahrscheinlich weitgehend vorbei. Deshalb ist die EU der Ansicht, dass ein, in diesem Punkt weitgehend neu formulierter, Code 2015 wünschenswert wäre. Konkret sind hier Art. 22 des Codes sowie ISPPPI, Abs. 4.2 (primacy of national law) zu nennen, wobei unter dem Gesichtspunkt des EU-Rechts nochmals auf Art. 8 der Charta sowie die Richtlinie 95/46/EG in ihrer Gesamtheit Bezug genommen wird. Ebenso wird ein Abschnitt der Einleitung des Codes (und somit kein Bestandteil der eigentlichen Bestimmungen) als problematisch angesehen. Dieser Textteil verspricht den Bestimmungen des Codes eine Sonderstellung außerhalb der staatlichen Rechtsordnung, der zufolge nicht nur private Disziplinarorgane und Schiedsgerichte, sondern auch staatliche Gerichte dazu aufgerufen sind, von einer Anwendung bzw. Berücksichtigung der üblichen Bestimmungen und generellen Rechtsgrundsätze abzusehen. Obwohl eine

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solche Bestimmung vor staatlichen Gerichten der Mitgliedstaaten sicher nicht tragfähig ist – zur Annahme von Klagen über die Anwendung der Meldepflichtregelung haben sich bereits deutsche Gerichte als grundsätzlich zuständig angesehen29 – muss es gerade im Lichte der im Sport oft vorherrschenden soziologischen Realitäten als bedenklich angesehen werden, dass ausgerechnet in der Einleitung des Codes ein Passus vorzufinden ist, der durchaus dazu geeignet wäre, bei Athleten den Eindruck entstehen zu lassen, sie seien rechtlich verbindlich in ihren Menschenrechten, Grundrechten und ggf. auch Arbeitnehmerrechten beschränkt.30 Dabei haben die EU und die Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten vor dem Hintergrund des geltenden EU-weiten und nationalen Datenschutzrechts gegenüber ihren Bürgern eine Fürsorgepflicht.31 Vor diesem Hintergrund unterbreitet die EU zwei Lösungs- bzw. Verbesserungsvorschläge. Erstens wird angeregt, dem letzten Satz des Art. 2232 einen Zusatz zur Unterstreichung der Anwendung des nationalen Rechts (was bei Mitgliedstaaten der EU ggf. auch das EU-Recht miteinschließt) anzuhängen. Zweitens regt die EU die ersatzlose Streichung des o. g. Passus zur Nichtan___________ 29 Bestätigt wird dieser Eindruck durch zwei deutsche Urteile zum Thema Meldepflichten (LG Hamburg, Urteil vom 29.05.2009, Az. 324 O 1002/08) sowie zur Veröffentlichung von Ergebnissen im Internet (OLG Karlsruhe, Urteil vom 30.01.2009, Az. 14 U 131/08). In beiden Fällen wurde die Klage als unbegründet abgelehnt; wobei sich das Gericht als zuständig erachtete. 30 „These sport-specific rules and procedures aimed at enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonized way are distinct in nature from and are, therefore, not intended to be subject to or limited by any national requirements and legal standards applicable to criminal proceedings or employment matters. When reviewing the facts and the law of a given case, all courts, arbitral hearing panels and other adjudicating bodies should be aware and respect the distinct nature of the anti-doping rules in the Code and the fact that those rules represent the consensus of a broad spectrum of stakeholders around the world with an interest in fair sport.“ (Code 2009, S. 18). 31 I. Spiecker gen. Döhmann und M. Eisenbarth rufen die EU-Institutionen sogar zum Aktivismus auf: „Schon aus purem Eigeninteresse sollte der EuGH somit in der Folge seine durch den Vertrag zuerkannte Fürsorgefunktion für den Datenschutz aktiv wahrnehmen. Er erntete doppelt: Zum einen würde der Ruf als ‚Datenschützer‘ positiv auf das Image und die Geltung der nicht selten als wirtschaftsliberal bezichtigten Richter ausstrahlen, zum anderen ersparten sie sich – und damit der EU – der Vorratsdatenspeicherung vergleichbare rechtspolitische Drucksituationen. Der EuGH würde damit der angestrebten politischen Verunionierung einen erheblichen Vorschub leisten: Die Betonung als Grundrechtsgericht neben seiner Federführung im Binnenmarkt ist eine wichtige neue Aufgabe, die sich aus dem Vertrag von Lissabon ergibt.“ (I. Spiecker gen. Döhmann/M. Eisenbarth, Kommt das „Volkszählungsurteil“ nun durch den EuGH? – Der Europäische Datenschutz nach Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon, JZ 2011, 169 ff. [177]). 32 Es dreht sich um folgenden Text: „Each government’s commitment to the Code will be evidenced by its signing the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport of March 3, 2003, and by ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the UNESCO Convention. The following Articles set forth the expectations of the Signatories.“ Dieser Text leitet den Art. 22 ein, ihm folgen detaillierte Bestimmungen in Art. 22.1–22.6.

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wendung staatlichen Rechts bzw. staatlicher Rechtsgrundsätze in der CodeEinleitung an. Obwohl eine offizielle EU-Reaktion auf den ersten WADA-Entwurf noch nicht vorliegt, ist es dennoch von Interesse anzumerken, dass der genannte Passus in der Einleitung vom WADA-Team bislang beibehalten wurde.

6. Zur-Verfügung-Stellung personenbezogener Informationen („public disclosure“) – Punkt 5 des EU-Beitrags Nach Art. 14.2.1 wird eine Zur-Verfügung-Stellung personenbezogener Informationen auffällig gewordener Athleten grundsätzlich erwartet,33 obgleich sich Einschränkungen dieser Pflicht aus Art. 14.1 sowie Art. 14.2.2 ergeben. Eine Verpflichtung zur Zur-Verfügung-Stellung muss allein schon deshalb Bedenken erwecken, weil sie bereits bei einem bloßem Verdacht bestehen soll. Art. 14.2.1 erlaubt schon die Übermittlung der Identität von Athleten, wenn sie lediglich aufgefallen sind („who is asserted by an Anti-Doping Organization to have committed an anti-doping rule violation“). Dies erachtet die EU angesichts der Datenschutz-Richtlinie 95/46/EG als bedenklich und regt deshalb das Einfügen eines Verweises auf den ISPPPI zusammen mit ausführlichen Kommentaren zur Anwendung dieser Bestimmung sowie zur Anwendung nationalen Rechts an.34

IV. Fazit 1. Der EU-Beitrag als Kompromisstext An dem EU-Beitrag werden sich ganz bestimmt die Geister scheiden: Den einen werden die gestellten Forderungen im Hinblick auf einen angemessenen Schutz der individuellen Rechte europäischer Athleten unzureichend erscheinen, den anderen dagegen werden schon diese sehr begrenzten und stets auf anwendbares EU-Recht zurückzuführenden Monierungen einen (potentiellen oder aktuellen) Anschlag auf die Autonomie sportlicher Einrichtungen bzw. auf ___________ 33 „The identity of any Athlete or other Person who is asserted by an Anti-Doping Organization to have committed an anti-doping rule violation, may be publicly disclosed by the Anti-Doping Organization with results management responsibility only after notice has been provided to the Athlete or other Person in accordance with Articles 7.2, 7.3 or 7.4, and to the applicable Anti-Doping Organizations in accordance with Article 14.1.2.“ 34 „The EU suggests that a reference be made to the International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information within which detailed guidance is provided on such disclosures, this with the understanding of compliance with applicable national law.“

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die Effizienz des Kampfes gegen Doping (Stichwort: Abschreckung) darstellen. Dabei muss jedoch bedacht werden, dass der vom Rat verabschiedete Text einen Kompromiss darstellt: Sicher wären einige Mitgliedstaaten dazu bereit gewesen, noch weitergehende Forderungen zu unterstützen, jedoch wäre ein solcher Text nicht konsensfähig gewesen. 2. Der EU-Beitrag als Chance Die Entscheidung der EU-Mitgliedstaaten, sich in der hier vorgestellten Art und Weise geschlossen mit konkreten Vorschlägen und Forderungen an die WADA zu wenden, ist natürlich zunächst auf nationale und europäische Handlungszwänge, die sich aus der Unvereinbarkeit bestimmter WADAVorschriften, WADA-Standards und WADA-Erwartungen mit EU-Recht und nationalem Recht ergeben, zurückzuführen. Neben konkreten, expliziten Rechtsnormen spielen dabei allgemeine Wertvorstellungen unseres demokratisch und rechts- und sozialstaatlich aufgebauten Gemeinwesens ebenfalls eine nicht zu unterschätzende Rolle, frei nach dem Motto: Wie viel sportpolitisch legitimierte Abstriche von den üblicherweise geltenden Normen verträgt ein demokratischer Rechtsstaat? Beim Thema Datenschutz scheint die Dissonanz zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit problematisch geworden zu sein, indem das Fehlen einer expliziten Rechtsgrundlage beispielsweise von einem Rechtswissenschaftler in einem von einer Athletengewerkschaft bestellten Gutachten35 ebenso wie durch zwei Landesdatenschutzbehörden in einer gemeinsamen Stellungnahme36 thematisiert wurde. Diesen Beiträgen zufolge ist die Lage zwar problematisch, aber keineswegs ausweglos, da beide zu dem Schluss kommen, dass der Kampf gegen Doping wichtig und auch legitim ist und fortgesetzt werden sollte, sofern die aktuell fehlende Rechtsgrundlage geschaffen wird. Dass in dem von der WADA am 01.06.2012 veröffentlichten Entwurf eines Code 2015 erwartet wird, dass alle Staaten Anti-Doping-Gesetze37 einführen, wird bestimmt zu aus___________ 35

Rechtsgutachten von P. Wedde, Datenschutzrechtliche Bewertung der Melde- und Kontrollpflichten im Rahmen von Anti-Dopingprogrammen, die die von SP.IN [Spielerinitiative Basketball; Anm. d. Verf.] vertretenen Athleten betreffen, 05.09.2011, 156 Seiten http://www.spinbb.net/uploads/media/Wedde_-_Gutachten_fu__r_SP.IN_per_5.9.2011.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 36 Positionspapier des Landesbeauftragten für den Datenschutz Rheinland-Pfalz (LfD Rh.Pf.) und des Unabhängigen Landeszentrums für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein (ULD): Datenschutz und Dopingbekämpfung, Mainz und Kiel, 26.07.2011, https:// www.datenschutzzentrum.de/allgemein/20110726-positionspapier-dopingbekaempfung.html (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 37 In Art. 22.2 (Involvement of Governments) heißt es: „Each government shall put in place a proper legal basis for cooperation and sharing of information with Anti-Doping

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führlichen Diskussionen (nicht zuletzt in Deutschland) anregen, obschon gegenwärtig nicht einzuschätzen ist, ob diese Erwartung auch im fertigen, im November 2013 in Johannesburg zu verabschiedenden Code 2015 beibehalten sein wird. Nicht zu übersehen ist dabei die Tatsache, dass die Gesamtheit der Dopingverbote historisch-organisch gewachsen ist und deshalb durchaus innere Unstimmigkeiten und Widersprüche aufweist, nicht zuletzt, was die Begründungen der Verbote selbst betrifft.38 Es darf wohl vermutet werden, dass ein solches System in besonderem Maße riskiert, von Athleten herausgefordert zu werden, sei es mit rechtlichen oder auch mit politischen Mitteln. Die Erfolge und Misserfolge des im von der WADA definierten Rahmen weltweit durchgeführten Kampfes gegen Doping wird in nicht unwesentlichem Maße davon abhängen, wie der Code 2015 ausgestaltet wird. Zum Thema Datenschutz hängt vieles davon ab, inwieweit die Einwilligung der Sportler zum Prüfstein werden muss oder nicht. Eine rechtswissenschaftliche Dissertation zum Thema39 (sie scheint die erste im deutschen Sprachraum zu sein und stellte eine beeindruckend zügige Reaktion auf den ab 2008 einsetzenden Konflikt dar40) kam zu dem Ergebnis, dass die aktuellen Normenkonflikte überwindbar seien, sofern die Frage der Einwilligung gelöst werden könne.41 Die Frage der Rechtsgrund___________ Organizations and sharing of data among Anti-Doping Organizations as provided in the Code.“ Die Erfüllung dieser Erwartung wird nach Art. 22.5 sogar rückwirkend erwartet: „A government should meet the expectations of Article 22.3 no later than January 1, 2016. The expectations of the other sections of this Article should have been met by January 1, 2010.“ Da die Erwartung einer ausreichenden Rechtsgrundlage in Art. 22.2 genannt ist, scheint die Frist 01.01.2010 zu gelten. Wie auch schon im Code 2009 sind bei Nichtbefolgen der Erwartungen Sanktionen gegen Staaten nach Art. 22.6 vorgesehen, jedoch nicht verpflichtend: „Failure by a government to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the UNESCO Convention by January 1, 2010, or to comply with the UNESCO Convention thereafter may result in ineligibility to bid for Events as provided in Articles 20.1.8 (International Olympic Committee), 20.3.10 (International Federation), and 20.6.6 (Major Event Organizations) and may result in additional consequences, e.g., forfeiture of offices and positions within WADA; ineligibility or non-admission of any candidature to hold any International Event in a country, cancellation of International Events; symbolic consequences and other consequences pursuant to the Olympic Charter.“, vgl. World AntiDoping Code, Draft Version 1.0, 2015, http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_An ti-Doping_Program/ WADP-The-Code/Code_Review/Code%20Review%202015/CodeDraft-1.0/WADA-Code-2015-Draft-1.0-EN.pdf (Zugriff: 29.11.2012). 38 Vgl. J. Kornbeck, Wozu Dopingbekämpfung in „dürftiger Zeit?“, in: J. Buschmann/M. Lämmer/K. Petry (Hrsg.), Internationale Aspekte und Perspektiven des Sports, Prof. Dr. Walter Tokarski zum 65. Geburtstag, Sankt Augustin 2011, S. 131–150. 39 L. Mortsiefer, Datenschutz im Anti-Doping-Kampf: Grundlagen und Spannungsfelder, Remscheid 2010. 40 Ebenfalls 2010 abgeschlossen: J. Niewalda, Dopingkontrollen im Konflikt mit allgemeinem Persönlichkeitsrecht und Datenschutz, Berlin 2011. 41 L. Mortsiefer, Datenschutz (Fn. 39), S. 250.

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lage für Anti-Doping-Regelungen wird sich wohl daher vermehrt stellen.42 Der Zeitpunkt der Revision des WADC kann jedoch als günstig angesehen werden, da damit zumindest im Prinzip die Möglichkeit geboten wird, ein besseres Anti-Doping-System aufzubauen: Die beste Unterstützung des Systems besteht sicherlich darin, es derart zu gestalten, dass es nicht permanent rechtlich sowie politisch legitimen Angriffen ausgesetzt ist.

3. Der EU-Beitrag als Leistung Dass es den Mitgliedstaaten der EU (bei oft sehr unterschiedlichen Werten, Zielsetzungen, Auslegungen und Praktiken) tatsächlich gelungen ist, diesen EU-Beitrag gemeinsam zu verabschieden und der WADA im Namen aller Mitgliedstaaten zukommen zu lassen, verdient insofern Beachtung, als der diesen Beitrag tragende Konsens auf schwerwiegende, von allen Mitgliedstaaten geteilten Bedenken zu den fünf zuvor genannten Punkten zurückzuführen ist. Da darüber hinaus jeder der fünf Punkte konkrete Verweise auf das Recht der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten enthält, sollte dieser Beitrag idealerweise unter den insgesamt eingegangenen Beiträgen einen besonderen Platz beanspruchen dürfen.

___________ 42 „Vor diesem Hintergrund ist der Gesetzgeber dringend aufgefordert, den normativen Rahmen für den sinnvollen Kampf gegen unzulässiges Doping im Sport durch die Schaffung von Regelungen zu setzen, die datenschutzkonform sind und die Rechte der Athleten angemessen und verfassungskonform wahren. Wenn er spezifische verfassungskonforme Rechtsgrundlagen schafft, kann hierdurch die Erhebung, Verarbeitung und Nutzung von Athletendaten legitimiert werden.“ (P. Wedde [Fn. 35], S. 151 f.)

Internationale Sportunfälle und Rom-II-Verordnung Von Robert Sieghörtner I.

Einleitung .......................................................................................................... 162 1.

Rechtsvergleichende Beispiele zu Sportunfällen ....................................... 162

2.

Die Rom-II-Verordnung ............................................................................ 165

II. Der Unfallortgrundsatz ..................................................................................... 166 1.

Allgemeines ............................................................................................... 166

2.

Die Lokalisierung des Unfallorts ............................................................... 166

III. Der Vorrang des gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts (Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung) .................................................................. 168 IV. Die Ausnahme der engeren Verbindung (Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung) .. 171 1.

Allgemeines ............................................................................................... 171

2.

Die Anknüpfung an ein Vereins- oder Gesellschaftsverhältnis ................. 172

3.

Die vertragsakzessorische Anknüpfung ..................................................... 173

4.

Sportunfälle innerhalb der Familie ............................................................ 174

V. Verhaltens- und Spielregeln des Sports............................................................. 175 1.

Allgemeines ............................................................................................... 175

2.

Rechtsnatur der Verhaltens- und Spielregeln des Sports ........................... 176 a)

Vom Gesetzgeber festgelegte Normen ............................................... 176

b)

Von Verbänden gesetzte Regeln ........................................................ 176 aa) Gewohnheitsrecht? ..................................................................... 176 bb) „Lex sportiva“, „Lex ludica“ ...................................................... 177

3.

Kollisionsrechtliche Bedeutung der lex ludica .......................................... 178 178

a)

Unfallortsrecht als Deliktsstatut (Art. 4 Abs. 1 Rom-II-Verordnung)

b)

Anderes Recht als Unfallsortsrecht ist Deliktsstatut (Artt. 4 Abs. 2, 3, 17 Rom-II-Verordnung) ................................................................. 179 aa) Normative Grundlagen ............................................................... 179 bb) Örtliche Sicherheits- und Verhaltensregeln ................................ 180 cc) „Berücksichtigung“ der Sportregeln am Unfallort ...................... 181

162

Robert Sieghörtner dd) Verhältnis der Sportregeln am Unfallort zu denen des Deliktsstatuts .......................................................................................... 182 ee) Abdingbarkeit der Berücksichtigung der Sportregeln am Unfallort? .............................................................................................. 183

VI. Schlussbemerkung ............................................................................................ 184

I. Einleitung Der wohl prominenteste Fall eines internationalen Sportunfalls, hier verstanden im Sinne eines Sportunfalls mit Auslandsberührung, aus den letzten Jahren war in der deutschen Presse wohl der Skiunfall des ehemaligen thüringischen Ministerpräsidenten Dieter Althaus. Beim Skifahren in Österreich war Dieter Althaus – ein deutscher Staatsangehöriger mit gewöhnlichem Aufenthalt in Deutschland – mit einer slowakischen Staatsangehörigen kollidiert, die ihren gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt in den USA hatte. Dies ist für das konkrete Haftungsergebnis relevant, weil aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht die Ausgestaltung der Ansprüche aus Sportunfällen1 durchaus unterschiedlich ausfallen kann. Dabei sind nicht so sehr die Spielregeln betroffen, denn sie sind weitgehend internationalisiert – allerdings kann auch deren Interpretation durchaus von Staat zu Staat variieren.2 Es geht vielmehr vor allem um Fragen der Deliktsfähigkeit – etwa bei Kindern und Jugendlichen –, der Rechtswidrigkeit, des Verschuldens wie auch des Mitverschuldens, der Möglichkeit und des Umfangs von immateriellem Schadensersatz sowie der Verjährung.3 Einige rechtsvergleichende Beispiele mögen die Unterschiede in den nationalen Rechtsordnungen verdeutlichen.

1. Rechtsvergleichende Beispiele zu Sportunfällen Bekannt ist als Besonderheit des sportunfallbezogenen Haftungsrechts die Modifizierung der Anwendung des deutschen Deliktsrechts, wie sie sich bei Kampfsportarten, bei Wettkämpfen mit erheblichem Gefahrenpotenzial und allgemein bei gemeinsam betriebenen gefährlichen sportlichen Tätigkeiten her___________ 1

Der vorliegende Beitrag soll sich auf die Haftung von Sportlern gegenüber „Mitsportlern“ konzentrieren; außen vor bleibt also z. B. die Haftung von Sportveranstaltern gegenüber Zuschauern wie auch die Haftung der Vereine für die Handlungen ihrer Sportler; außen vor bleiben auch Fragen der Internationalen Zuständigkeit, vgl. dazu z. B. Pfeiffer, zfs 2010, 542 ff. 2 Vgl. beispielhaft die Diskussion zur Auslegung der FIS-Regeln, insb. Regel 5, zwischen Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253, und Pichler, NJW 2004, 643. 3 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99.

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ausgebildet hat.4 Dies betrifft z. B. Fußball, Boxen, Handball, Ringen, Judo, Eishockey, Autorennen, aber u. U. auch gemeinsame waghalsige Touren im Gebirge.5 Durchgesetzt hat sich dabei ein Rückgriff auf § 242 BGB unter dem Aspekt der Treuwidrigkeit der Geltendmachung von Schadensersatzansprüchen derart, dass Sportler untereinander im Ergebnis nur dann für Verletzungen einzustehen haben, wenn die gebotene Härte und damit die Grenze zur Unfairness überschritten wird.6 Ausländische Rechtsordnungen kommen hier weitgehend zu gleichförmigen Lösungen.7 Etwas anders aber ist die Regelung z. B. im USamerikanischen Recht. Hier gibt es eine Tendenz, dass der Verletzer bei Kontaktsportarten nur für ein grob fahrlässiges oder vorsätzliches Fehlverhalten (“reckless or intentional conduct“) einzustehen habe.8 Rechtsvergleichend besteht insoweit also eine weiterreichende Haftungseinschränkung. Im französischen Recht kommt als haftungsrechtliche Besonderheit hinzu, dass die Haftung des Vereins für seine angestellten Spieler aus Art. 1384 C.c. deren Eigenhaftung, jedenfalls wenn sie nicht vorsätzlich gehandelt haben, sogar ausschließt.9 Als weiteres Beispiel seien hier wegen der Aktualität der Problematik aus dem deutschen Recht die Haftungsvergünstigungen genannt, die für bestimmte, nahestehende Personen die Haftung auf Verstöße gegen den Verschuldensgrad der diligentia quam in suis reduzieren. Dies betrifft vor allem § 1359 BGB bzw. § 4 LPartG, soweit es um Sportunfälle zwischen Ehegatten bzw. eingetragene ___________ 4 Aus jüngerer Zeit dazu BGHZ 154, 316 ff. = NJW 2003, 2018 ff; OLG München NJOZ 2009, 2268; KG, SpuRt 2008, 76 ff.; ausf. Heermann, JZ 2008, 1001 ff.; Schimikowski, r+s 2008, 189 f.; Burger, SpuRt 2007, 192 ff.; Behrens/Rühle, NJW 2007, 2079 ff.; Vieweg, Faszination Sportrecht (Online-Publikation, abrufbar unter http://www. irut.de/Forschung/Veroeffentlichungen/OnlineVersionFaszinationSportrecht/Faszination Sportrecht.pdf – abgerufen am 23.02.2011), S. 52 f. 5 Vgl. OLG Karlsruhe, NJW 1978, 705; Palandt/Sprau, § 823 Rn. 217; die ursprüngliche Grenzlinie zwischen den Kampfsportarten und den sog. Parallelsportarten ist insoweit längst überschritten, vgl. Vieweg (Fn. 4), S. 53, Fn. 242. 6 Vieweg (Fn. 4), S. 52 f. m. w. N. 7 Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 786; zu den Lösungsansätzen für diese Problematik im französischen Recht Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99 f., und Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 788 jeweils m. w. N.; zum englischen Recht vgl. Condon v. Basi [1985] 2 All ER 453; Smoldon v. Whitworth [1997] ELR 249; Caldwell v. Maguire and Fitzgerald [2001] EWCA 1054; für Australien Rootes v Shelton [1968] ALR 33. 8 Jaworski v. Kiernan 696 A. 2d 332 (Conn. 1997); Lenti v. Jacobson; Super. Ct. Conn., Jud. Dist. of New Haven CV095029998S, 2009 Conn. Super. – abrufbar unter http://www.hackneypublications.com/sla/archive/000972.php (abgerufen am 24.02.2011); ausf. Fleischer, VersR 99, 785, 788. 9 Vgl. Cass. JCP 2000 II 10295 m. Anm. Billiau; 2002 II 10026 m. Anm. Billiau; RTDciv. 2005, 143 m. Anm. Jourdain; ausf. zu den Auswirkungen im Sport Mouly, JCP 2005 I 134.

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Lebenspartner geht, und § 1664 BGB, soweit Sportunfälle zwischen Eltern – als Schädigern – und ihren Kindern – als Geschädigten – im Raum stehen.10 Derartige Haftungsbeschränkungen sind anderen Rechtsordnungen weitgehend unbekannt.11 Der BGH hat allerdings in seiner Entscheidung vom 24.03.200912 die Reichweite des § 1359 BGB bei einem Sportunfall zwischen Ehegatten verdeutlicht und eingeschränkt. Bei dem zugrunde liegenden Sachverhalt waren deutsche Eheleute zum Wasserskifahren auf dem Gardasee. Der Ehemann steuerte das Boot und verletzte dabei seine Frau schwer. Der BGH wandte hier § 1359 BGB trotz Geltung deutschen Rechts für die Haftungsfrage nicht an. Der insoweit von der Redaktion der NJW13 gewählte Leitsatz, dass „bei der gemeinsamen Ausübung von Freizeitsport“ zwischen Ehegatten, bei der einer von ihnen gesundheitlich zu Schaden kommt, § 1359 BGB keine Anwendung finde, geht indes zu weit. Der BGH argumentierte fallspezifisch damit, dass es sich wie bei einem Straßenverkehrsunfall14 um einen Unfall mit einem motorgetriebenen Fahrzeug von vergleichbarer Gefährlichkeit, dessen Betrieb eine Lizenz erforderte, handelte, sowie damit, dass für das fragliche Gewässer hinreichend detaillierte Regelungen (italienischer Ministerialerlass Nr. 550 vom 20.07.1994) bestünden, die den Schutz der Wasserskiläufer und unbeteiligter Dritter bezweckten und keinen Raum für einen individuellen Sorgfaltsmaßstab ließen. Entscheidend waren also die (Allgemein-)Gefährlichkeit und die Dichte bestehender Regelungen für die Sportausübung. Bei einem Skiunfall mag man also durchaus in gleichem Sinne entscheiden, insbesondere wegen der dort zu berücksichtigenden FIS-Regeln. Die Entscheidung lässt aber ohne Weiteres Spielraum, beim Federballspiel im heimischen Garten § 1359 BGB anzuwenden. Das letzte rechtsvergleichende Beispiel betrifft Unfälle beim Skifahren und eine dort zu beachtende Spezifität des französischen Rechts. Art. 1384 Abs. 1 C.c. sieht für Sachen, welche der Halter in seiner Obhut hat, eine vom Verschulden unabhängige Haftung vor, die anderen Rechtsordnungen in dieser Weise nicht bekannt ist.15 Diese strenge Haftung legt die französische Recht___________ 10 In Einzelfällen kann auch § 708 BGB ins Blickfeld rücken, wenn Sportler eine BGBGesellschaft bilden, was aber eher selten sein wird; vgl. OLG München, SpuRt 1997, 100 für gemeinsame Klettertour: gemeinschaftliche Unternehmungen, die keinen wirtschaftlichen Zweck verfolgen, nur dann Gesellschaften, wenn dieser Zweck durch vermögenswerte Leistungen gefördert werden soll; Burger, SpuRt 2007, 192, 193 m. w. N.: bei alpiner Betätigung gesellschaftsrechtliche Beziehung regelmäßig ausgeschlossen. 11 Siehe rechtsvergleichend Hausmaninger, FS Baltl (1978), S. 283 ff. 12 BGH, NJW 2009, 1875; dazu Figgener, NZV 2009, 382; Lemcke, r+s 2009, 257. 13 BGH, NJW 2009, 1875. 14 Dort findet § 1359 BGB gemäß BGHZ 53, 352; 61, 101; 63, 51 keine Anwendung. 15 Kadner Graziano, Europäisches Internationales Deliktsrecht (2003), S. 129, 131.

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sprechung16 auch zugrunde, wenn ein Skifahrer durch die Sache „Ski“ eines anderen Skifahrers verletzt wird.

2. Die Rom-II-Verordnung Die kollisionsrechtliche Frage nach dem anwendbaren Haftungsrecht bei internationalen Sportunfällen beantwortet aus deutscher Sicht nun die Rom-IIVerordnung, welche das IPR der außervertraglichen Schuldverhältnisse im Bereich der EU – mit Ausnahme Dänemarks (vgl. Art. 1 Abs. 4 Rom-IIVerordnung) – vereinheitlicht. Sie erfasst Ansprüche aus unerlaubten Handlungen. Zu beachten ist insoweit allerdings, dass familienrechtliche Sonderfragen wie die beschriebenen Haftungsbeschränkungen der §§ 1359, 1664 BGB, 4 LPartG nicht deliktsrechtlich qualifiziert, sondern eigenständig angeknüpft werden – soweit keine (anderen) vorrangigen Staatsverträge greifen, also in den Fällen des § 1359 BGB nach Art. 14 EGBGB,17 des § 1664 BGB nach Art. 17 KSÜ und des § 4 LPartG nach Art. 17b EGBGB. In zeitlicher Hinsicht ist die Rom-II-Verordnung anwendbar auf Sportunfälle, die sich ab dem 11.01.2009 ereignen, Art. 32 Rom-II-Verordnung. Sie ist dabei sog. loi uniforme. Sie umfasst daher die deliktischen Ansprüche aus Sportunfällen unabhängig davon, ob die Beteiligten etwa ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit nach oder ihrem gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt nach der EU zuzuordnen sind, und auch unabhängig davon, ob sich der Sportunfall auf dem Gebiet der EU oder anderswo ereignet hat. Das wird deutlich aus Art. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung, dem zufolge das nach der Verordnung bezeichnete Recht auch dann anzuwenden ist, wenn es nicht das Recht eines Mitgliedstaats ist. Beispielsweise werden also auch solche Skiunfälle erfasst, die sich in den USA, Kanada oder Russland ereignen.18 Sonderregeln für Sportunfälle enthält die Rom-II-Verordnung nicht, so dass die allgemein für Ansprüche aus unerlaubten Handlungen geltenden Kollisionsregeln anzuwenden sind.19

___________ 16

Cour d’appel de Colmar JCP 1993 IV, 1711; vgl. aber auch Cour d’appel de Paris Gaz. Pal. 1986, 1 somm. 41: keine Sachhalterhaftung, wenn der Zusammenprall mit dem Körper des anderen Skifahrers erfolgt. 17 NK-BGB/Andrae, Art. 14 EGBGB, Rn. 67. 18 Diese sind durchaus in der Rspr. relevant, vgl. zum alten Recht z. B. LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20: Skiunfall in Kanada. 19 Vgl. zum alten Recht Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 175.

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II. Der Unfallortgrundsatz 1. Allgemeines Art. 4 Abs. 1 Rom-II-Verordnung hält als Grundsatz an dem im Internationalen Deliktsrecht seit langem tradierten und auch in Art. 40 Abs. 1 EGBGB verankerten Tatortgrundsatz fest. Verwiesen wird auf das Recht des Staates, in dem der Schaden eintritt, unabhängig davon, in welchem Staat das schadensbegründende Ereignis eingetreten ist oder indirekte Schadensfolgen entstanden sind. Diese Verweisung auf die sog. Lex loci delicti commissi war im deutschen IPR schon vorher auch für Sportunfälle anerkannt.20 Sie ist grundsätzlich auch sachlich berechtigt, denn auch bei Sportunfällen greift der dieser Anknüpfung zugrunde liegende Verkehrsschutzgedanke, dem zufolge jeder sein Verhalten so einzurichten hat, wie es der Rechtsordnung des Tatorts entspricht.21 Sie erfüllt außerdem das Bedürfnis des Rechtsverkehrs nach einfacher und klarer Rechtszuweisung.22

2. Die Lokalisierung des Unfallorts Bei Sportunfällen lässt sich der Unfallort in aller Regel problemlos feststellen, da es sich um sog. Platzdelikte handelt. Ereignet sich der Unfall in einem Staat, dessen Zivilrecht – hier genauer: Deliktsrecht – territorial gespalten ist, in dem also nach Bundesstaat, Territorium o. Ä. unterschiedliche Deliktsrechte gelten – Beispiele sind die USA, Kanada, Australien –, so gilt gemäß Art. 25 Rom-II-Verordnungjede Gebietseinheit als Staat.23 Unfälle zwischen Sportlern als Distanzdelikte, also als unerlaubte Handlungen, bei denen der Ort, an dem der Schädiger die Handlung vornimmt (sog. Handlungsort), und der Ort, an dem das unmittelbar betroffenen Rechtsgut (Körper bzw. Gesundheit des anderen Sportlers) verletzt wird (sog. Erfolgsort), in verschiedenen Staaten liegen, haben praktisch keine Relevanz,24 Rechtsprechung dazu ist nicht ersichtlich. Es finden sich nur durch die Literatur kon___________ 20 Vgl. zum alten Recht z. B. LG Hildesheim, VersR 1994, 615 – Skiunfall in der Schweiz; LG Köln, NJW 1973, 953 – Motorbootunfall in Italien. 21 Kegel/Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (9. Aufl. 2004), § 18 IV 1 a. 22 So zu Straßenverkehrsunfällen BGHZ 87, 95 (97); 119, 137 (140); ähnlich BGH, VersR 1977, 56; BGHZ 90, 294 (298). 23 Vgl. zum alten Recht v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 10 – Anm zu LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20: Skiunfall in der kanadischen Provinz Alberta. 24 Anders natürlich bei Sportunfällen aufgrund fehlerhaften Sportmaterials, soweit es um die Haftung des Herstellers geht – hier spielen die Regeln der internationalen Produkthaftung eine Rolle, vgl. Art. 5 Rom-II-Verordnung.

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struierte Beispielsfälle, und zwar vor allem die Konstellation, die man als den „entlaufenen Ski“ bezeichnen könnte. Hier löst sich ein nicht gesicherter Ski auf einer österreichischen Skipiste und verletzt einen Skifahrer auf italienischem Staatsgebiet.25 Als weiteres Beispiel dienen Schüsse über die Grenze hinweg beim Sportschützen.26 Die Lösung solcher Fälle wird durch Art. 4 Abs. 1 Rom-II-Verordnung ohnehin vorgegeben. Es gilt das Recht des Erfolgsorts, also des Orts, an dem der entlaufene Ski den Schaden anrichtet bzw. der Schuss das Opfer trifft. Schwieriger wird es, wenn der Unfallort überhaupt nicht feststellbar ist, wenn also beispielsweise zwei Skifahrer im Drei-Länder-Eck ÖsterreichItalien-Slowenien zusammenstoßen. Im Nachhinein lässt sich nicht mehr klären, auf welchem Staatsgebiet die Kollision stattgefunden hat. Die Rom-IIVerordnung schweigt zu solchen Ermittlungsschwierigkeiten und sieht keine Hilfsanknüpfung vor. Versagt im jeweiligen Einzelfall auch Art. 4 Abs. 2 RomII-Verordnung (Anknüpfung an den gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt), so ist auf allgemeine Grundsätze des IPR im Falle der Nichtfeststellbarkeit des maßgeblichen Anknüpfungsmerkmals abzustellen.27 Allerdings findet eine Diskussion über eine internationaldeliktsrechtliche Hilfsanknüpfung bei Nichtermittelbarkeit des Tatorts bislang nicht statt. Dieses Problem dürfte auch eher selten auftreten. Der juristischen Phantasie sind kaum Grenzen gesetzt. Möglich wäre ein Abstellen auf den wahrscheinlichen Unfallort.28 Eine Alternative wäre das Abstellen auf die Rechtsordnung desjenigen in Frage kommenden Unfallstaates, die dem Verletzten am günstigsten ist. Dafür spräche das früher im Internationalen Deliktsrecht bedeutsame Günstigkeitsprinzip. Weiter käme in Frage – ebenfalls unter dem Aspekt der Günstigkeit, aber bedenklich wegen des fehlenden Kontakts des Schädigers zu dieser Rechtsordnung – das Recht des gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts des Geschädigten. Schließlich bliebe noch die Anwendung der Lex fori als „letzte Hilfe“.29 In ähnlicher Weise lässt die Rom-II-Verordnung Schwierigkeiten ungelöst, die daraus resultieren, dass sich der Unfallort außerhalb jeglichen Staatsgebiets ereignete. Auch hierfür sind ohne Weiteres Beispiele denkbar, etwa ein Unfall zwischen den an einer Hochsee-Segelregatta teilnehmenden Booten odervon Sporttauchern auf hoher See. Zur Problematik der Delikte auf hoheitsfreiem ___________ 25

Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 175. Pfister, in: Fritzweiler/Pfister/Summerer (Hrsg.), Praxishandbuch Sportrecht, 6.Teil, Rn. 97, Fn. 305: „Lehrbuchfall“. 27 Vgl. dazu Kegel/Schurig (Fn. 21), § 15 V 1. 28 Vgl. Kegel/Schurig (Fn. 21), § 15 V 1 a, allerdings bezogen auf unklare Staatsangehörigkeit oder gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt. 29 Vgl. Kegel/Schurig (Fn. 21), § 15 V 1 a, allerdings bezogen auf den unklaren Abschlussort eines Testaments bzw. Erbvertrags. 26

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Gebiet, bei der die Tatortregel ebenfalls leer läuft, gibt es in Rechtsprechung und Literatur eine umfassende Diskussion, allerdings am häufigsten mit Bezug auf See- und Luftfahrzeuge.30 Der ursprüngliche Kommissionsentwurf zur Rom-II-Verordnung31 sah für Delikte auf solchen Schiffen bzw. in solchen Luftfahrzeugen den Rückgriff auf das Recht der Flagge des Schiffes bzw. den Registrierungsstaat des Luftfahrzeugs bzw.vor.32 Das hätte in den o. g. Fällen aber auch nicht unmittelbar weitergeholfen. Allerdings wäre bei den Sporttauchern an die Flagge des gemeinsam genutzten Schiffes zu denken, ebenso könnte aber, falls es sich nicht dabei ohnehin um denselben Staat handelt, auch der Ort in Frage kommen, von dem aus sie mit diesem Schiff zur Tauchfahrt aufgebrochen sind. Im Falle des Regattaunfalls ist, wie auch sonst bei Schiffszusammenstößen auf hoher See, dann, wenn beide Schiffe dieselbe Flagge – mit Recht – führen, auf diese abzustellen.33 Dies entspricht letztlich dem Rechtsgedanken des Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung. Führen die kollidierenden Seefahrzeuge unterschiedliche Flaggen, so wurde von der Rechtsprechung bisher das Günstigkeitsprinzip derart angewandt, dass zugunsten des Geschädigten entweder die Flagge des verletzten Schiffes oder die des Täterschiffes maßgebend war.34 Andere35 wollen nur die Flagge des Täterschiffes entscheiden lassen, da es für den Täter unbillig sei, ihn nach dem Recht des Verletzten, zu dem er keinen Bezug hat, „zu packen“. Haben die Schiffe an derselben Regatta teilgenommen, liegt es m. E. unter dem Gesichtspunkt der offensichtlich engeren Verbindung gemäß Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung allerdings näher, vom Flaggenrecht insgesamt abzugehen und auf den Ort des Ausgangspunkts der Regatta bzw. den Ort des Veranstalters abzustellen.

III. Der Vorrang des gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts (Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung) In der deutschen Rechtsprechung kommt es ausgesprochen häufig vor, dass die Beteiligten eines im Ausland geschehenen Sportunfalls einen gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt, nämlich in Deutschland, haben.36 Dann hat sich ___________ 30

Vgl. z. B. RGZ 138, 243 (246); OLG Hamburg, VersR 1975, 761, 762. Kommissionsentwurf zur Rom-II-Verordnung v. 22.07.2003 KOM (2003) 427 endg = IPRax 2005, 174. 32 Vgl. ausf. MüKo/Junker, Art. 4 Rom-II-Verordnung, Rn. 33 ff. 33 Kegel/Schurig (Fn. 21), § 18 IV 1 f. 34 RGZ 138, 243 (246); OLG Hamburg, VersR 1975, 761, 762. 35 Kegel/Schurig (Fn. 21), § 18 IV 1 f. 36 OLG Hamm, NJW-RR 2001, 1537 (Skiunfall in Italien); OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 1990, 111; 97, 193 (jeweils Skiunfall in Österreich); OLG Brandenburg, NJW-RR 2006, 31

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schon nach bisherigem IPR das Recht dieses gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts durchgesetzt (vgl. Art. 40 Abs. 2 EGBGB). Die Gründe für diese sog. Lex domicilii communis tragen auch bei Sportunfällen. Das Maß an Sorgfalt, das eine Person ihrem Verhalten und Handeln im alltäglichen Leben zugrunde legt, orientiert sich am Recht ihrer gewohnten Umwelt37; die Verhaltenssteuerung richtet sich also nach dem Recht des gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts.38 Man kennt das Domizilrecht am besten.39 Vor allem der Geschädigte, letztlich aber beide Seiten müssen im Domizilstaat mit den Unfallfolgen leben und dort die Schadensregulierung betreiben.40 Die Geltung der Lex domicilii communis dürfte auch den Parteierwartungen entsprechen.41 De lege ferenda wird allerdings in Frage gestellt, ob der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt insofern ein sinnvolles Anknüpfungskriterium darstellt, als er in manchen Fällen nicht einfach festgestellt werden könne und dadurch die Anknüpfung sehr unsicher werde.42 Der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt bestimmt sich herkömmlicherweise über eine auf längere Dauer angelegte soziale Eingliederung und ist allein von der tatsächlichen – ggf. vom Willen unabhängigen – Situation gekennzeichnet, die den Aufenthaltsort als Mittelpunkt der Lebensführung (tatsächlicher Daseinsmittelpunkt) ausweist.43 Im Rahmen der Rom-II-Verordnung muss allerdings beachtet werden, dass der Begriff verordnungsautonom zu entwickeln und in seinen Randbereichen letztlich vom EuGH zu konkretisieren ist. Die erwähnte Kritik hebt mit Recht darauf ab, dass im Bereich des professionellen Sports die Verpflichtung auswärtiger Spieler durch Vereine – augenfällig vor allem bei Fußballvereinen – ein häufiges Phänomen ist.44 Die möglichen Fallgestaltungen sind hier tatsächlich vielfältig. Zu denken wäre etwa daran, dass ein Spieler von vornherein nur für eine Saison gewissermaßen „ausgelie___________ 1458 (Skiunfall in Italien); LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20 (Skiunfall in Kanada); LG Bonn, NJW 2005, 1873 (Skiunfall in Österreich). 37 Vgl. Schönberger, Tatortprinzip und Auflockerung (1990), S. 160; vgl. auch Rohe, Zu den Geltungsgründen des Deliktsstatuts (1994), S. 227 f. 38 Vgl. Deville, IPRax 1997, 409 (410); ähnlich W. Lorenz, DAR 1983, 273 (277): Beteiligte haben sich auf Fortgeltung dieser Rechtsordnung eingestellt. 39 Vgl. Beitzke, Rec. 1965 II, 63 (81); vgl. auch Looschelders, VersR 1999, 1316 (1320). 40 Vgl. Deville, IPRax 1997, 409 (410); Hohloch, JuS 1980, 18 (23); ders., JR 1985, 372 (373); Zimmer, JZ 1993, 396 (399); W. Lorenz, DAR 1983, 273 (277); Dörner, JR 1994, 6 (7); Junker, RIW 1998, 741 (748). 41 Trutmann, Das internationale Privatrecht der Deliktsobligationen (1973), S. 98; Gonzenbach, Die akzessorische Anknüpfung (1989), S. 74 f.; Looschelders, VersR 1999, 1316 (1320), allerdings nur für den Mitfahrerunfall. 42 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 101. 43 BT-Drs 16/6308, 226 – zum FamFG; vgl. zur Rechtsprechung aus dem Internationalen Privatrecht BGHZ 78, 293, 295; BGH, NJW 1993, 2047, 2048; 1975, 1068. 44 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 101 spricht von „beruflichen Nomaden“.

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hen“ wird, oder daran, dass er sich zwar bei einem ausländischen Verein dauerhaft verpflichtet, seine Familie aber in Deutschland bleibt und er zwischen ihr und seinem Verein „pendelt“. Ähnliche Probleme sind indes in der dogmatischen Diskussion zum gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt bereits bekannt. So kann beim saisonbefristet verpflichteten Fußballspieler auf die Judikatur und Literatur zu im Ausland stationierten Soldaten45 und zu im Ausland Studierenden46 Rückgriff genommen werden. Zu berücksichtigen sind natürlich die Unterschiede. So kann die Besonderheit der Kasernierung bei Soldaten eine andere Würdigung rechtfertigen. Jedenfalls legen diese Rechtsprechung und Literatur nahe, dass bei der Verpflichtung nur für eine Saison kein neuer gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt begründet wird.47 Die Konstellation regelmäßig zu ihren Familien pendelnder Arbeitnehmer ist ebenfalls bekannt. Ein mehrfacher gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt wird hier mit Recht abgelehnt48 und auf den Schwerpunkt im Einzelfall abgestellt.49 Nicht möglich ist dagegen der Rückgriff auf die Konkretisierung des gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts in Art. 23 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung. Danach ist der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt einer natürlichen Person, die im Rahmen der Ausübung ihrer beruflichen Tätigkeit handelt, der Ort ihrer Hauptniederlassung. Aus den Materialien zur Rom-II-Verordnung, in denen von „selbständige, freiberufliche oder gewerbliche Tätigkeit“50 die Rede ist, und aus dem Bezug auf die Niederlassung51 ergibt sich, dass hier nicht auf eine unselbstständige berufliche Tätigkeit einer natürlichen Person Bezug genommen wird.52 Die Bestimmung hilft also jedenfalls bei Vertragsspielern nicht weiter. Neben der begrifflichen Unschärfe wird der Sonderregelung des Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung entgegengehalten, dass ihre Ergebnisse bei Sportunfällen häufig nicht passen. Angeführt wird das Beispiel eines deutschen Fußballspielers, der soeben für zwei Jahre nach England engagiert ist und beabsich___________ 45

OLG Zweibrücken, NJW-RR 1999, 948; AG Landstuhl, FamRZ 2003, 1300. OLG Frankfurt, FamRZ 2009, 796; OLG Hamm, FamRZ 2002, 54; Palandt/Thorn, Art. 5 EGBGB, Rn. 10. 47 Vgl. AG Landstuhl, FamRZ 2003, 1300: kein gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt bei Soldaten, wenn Rückkehrzeitpunkt schon feststeht; ebenso OLG Frankfurt, FamRZ 2009, 796 bei vorübergehendem Auslandsstudium; anders OLG Hamm, FamRZ 2002, 54 bei Auslandsaufenthalt für vierjähriges (!) Studium. 48 So z. B. Bamberger/Roth-Lorenz, Art. 5 EGBGB, Rn. 13; von Bar/Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht Bd. I (2. Aufl. 2003), § 7 Rn. 24; a. A. z. B. Erman/Hohloch, Art. 5 EGBGB, Rn. 55; Soergel/Kegel, Art. 5 EGBGB, Rn. 49. 49 Ausf. Spickhoff, IPRax 1995, 185, 187 f. 50 KOM (2003) 427 endg. S. 30. 51 MüKo/Junker, Art. 23 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 20. 52 MüKo/Junker, Art. 23 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 20. 46

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tigt, seine Familie auf die Insel nachzuholen.53 Verletzt er bereits bei seinem ersten Spiel in England gegen eine deutsche Mannschaft einen Gegenspieler, der seinen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt in Deutschland hat, so ist Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung nicht (mehr) anzuwenden, da der Schädiger nach den insoweit anerkannten Regeln zur Bestimmung des gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts diesen sofort in England erlangt hat. Dies ergibt sich aus der Relevanz seiner bereits gefassten Absicht zum dauerhaften Verbleib. Über diesen Fall lässt sich tatsächlich trefflich streiten, da die Beziehungen zur alten Heimat noch nicht völlig gelöst erscheinen. Sieht man auf die Gründe für die sog. Lex domicilii communis,54 so ergibt sich ebenfalls kein klares Bild. Der Schädiger wird seine Verhaltensstandards hier tatsächlich noch nicht an die neue Umwelt angepasst haben. Andererseits ist aber auch nicht mehr ohne Weiteres davon auszugehen, dass die Parteierwartungen hier noch auf eine Abwicklung des Schadensfalls in Deutschland und nach dortigen Regeln gerichtet sind. Es schiene eine Überlegung wert, ob hier nicht doch die hergebrachte Dogmatik zum gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt derart zu modifizieren wäre, dass eine gewisse Zeitspanne, etwa 3 Monate, vergangen sein muss, bevor der neue Aufenthalt zum gewöhnlichen erstarkt. Da dies aber keine Anerkennung als generelle Regel finden wird, bleiben Unsicherheiten, die dem Anknüpfungsmerkmal des gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts nun einmal immanent sind. Sind an einem Sportunfall mehr als zwei Personen beteiligt – man denke z. B. an mehrere Geschädigte bei einer von einem Tourengänger auf einer Skipiste verursachte Karambolage mehrerer Skifahrer –, so muss das Unfallgeschehen in Zweierbeziehungen aufgelöst und die Anwendbarkeit des Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung auf die jeweilige Zweier-Relation geprüft werden.55

IV. Die Ausnahme der engeren Verbindung (Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung) 1. Allgemeines Art. 4 Abs. 3 S 1 Rom-II-Verordnung sieht vor, dass dann, wenn sich aus der Gesamtheit der Umstände ergibt, dass die unerlaubte Handlung eine offensichtlich engere Verbindung mit einem anderen als dem in den Absätzen 1 oder 2 bezeichneten Staat aufweist, das Recht dieses anderen Staates anzuwenden ist. Nach Art. 4 Abs. 3 S 2 Rom-II-Verordnung könnte sich eine offensichtlich en___________ 53

Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 102. Ausf. oben unter III. 55 MüKo/Junker, Art. 4 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 42; E. Lorenz, VersR 1993, 308; Kropholler, RabelsZ 33 (1969), 601 (630, Fn. 99); Looschelders, VersR 1999, 1316 (1322). 54

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gere Verbindung mit einem anderen Staat insbesondere aus einem bereits bestehenden Rechtsverhältnis zwischen den Parteien – wie einem Vertrag – ergeben, das mit der betreffenden unerlaubten Handlung in enger Verbindung steht. Die denkbaren Anwendungsfälle für diese Sonderregelungen bei Sportunfällen sind vielfältig.

2. Die Anknüpfung an ein Vereins- oder Gesellschaftsverhältnis Diskutiert wird die Anwendung des Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung z. B. für den Fall, dass ein Skiklub aus Deutschland einen Skikurs in der Schweiz veranstaltet56 und sich die Vereinsmitglieder dabei verletzen. Regelmäßig wird dabei indes schon Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung die Tatortregel durchbrechen, weil die Mitglieder in Deutschland auch ihren gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt haben werden. Ist dies nicht der Fall, so erscheint dann, wenn die Mitglieder in einem gemeinsamen Verein organisiert sind, das Vereinsstatut tatsächlich sachnäher als der Tatort. Das zeigt etwa folgendes Beispiel: Diesseits und jenseits der deutsch-österreichischen Grenze wohnhafte Personen sind in einem Skiverein organisiert, der in Kufstein (Österreich) im Vereinsregister eingetragen ist. Der Verein unternimmt eine Vereinsfahrt in die Schweiz, bei der ein in Deutschland lebendes Mitglied ein in Österreich wohnhaftes verletzt. Hier hat sich die Beziehung der Mitglieder durch die gemeinsame Organisation verfestigt. Die Lage wird aber sofort wieder unübersichtlicher, wenn bei ansonsten gleichem Sachverhalt zwei in Deutschland lebende Vereinsmitglieder die Unfallbeteiligten sind. Soll hier auch das österreichische Vereinsstatut gelten (Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung) oder soll es beim deutschen Aufenthaltsrecht bleiben (Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung)? Letzteres erscheint m. E. sachnäher. So wie die dargestellten Vereinsfälle wird man auch Konstellationen behandeln, in denen eine Gruppe von Sportlern im Rechtssinne als Gesellschaft zu qualifizieren ist.57 Dagegen ist m. E. der gemeinsame Ausgangsort einer sportlich motivierten Gruppe nicht ohne Weiteres und jedenfalls nicht grundsätzlich als entscheidend anzusehen.58 Auch hierzu ein Beispiel: In Deutschland bzw. Österreich ansässige Skifahrer, die ansonsten nichts miteinander zu tun haben, brechen von Kufstein aus zu einer Busfahrt in die Schweiz auf, um dort Ski zu fahren. Dort kollidiert ein in Deutschland lebendes Mitglied der Gruppe mit einem anderen, in ___________ 56

Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 175 zu Art. 40 Abs 2 Nr 1 EGBGB. Vgl. MüKo/Junker, Art. 4 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 165. 58 Vgl. aber Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 175. 57

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Österreich wohnhaften. Der Reiseausgangspunkt einer solchen, ansonsten nicht organisierten Sportlergruppe scheint hier nicht weniger zufällig als der Unfallort, sondern eher deutlich zufälliger, so dass es bei der Lex loci (Art. 4 Abs. 1 Rom-II-Verordnung) verbleiben sollte.

3. Die vertragsakzessorische Anknüpfung Art. 4 Abs. 3 S 2 Rom-II-Verordnung spricht von einem Vertrag zwischen den Parteien der unerlaubten Handlung, im vorliegenden Kontext also zwischen dem schädigenden und dem verletzten Sportler. Dies wird kaum je gegeben sein. Art. 4 Abs. 3 S 2 Rom-II-Verordnung ist allerdings nur als Regelbeispiel konstruiert („insbesondere“). Eine offensichtlich engere Verbindung i. S. d. Art. 4 Abs. 3 S 1 Rom-II-Verordnung kann mithin auch aus einem Vertragsverhältnis hergeleitet werden, das nicht zwischen den Deliktsbeteiligten selbst besteht. Als Beispiel werden in der Literatur Unfälle im Rahmen eines Skikurses genannt,59 also zwischen Skifahrern, die an demselben Kurs teilnehmen und mit dessen Organisator jeweils einen entsprechenden Vertrag haben. Für eine vertragsakzessorische Anknüpfung der deliktischen Ansprüche muss dabei zunächst vorausgesetzt werden, dass beide Verträge demselben Recht unterliegen. Welches Recht dies ist, entscheidet die Rom-I-VO. Danach ist eine etwaige Rechtswahl vorrangig (Art. 3 Rom-I-VO). Andernfalls entscheidet der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt des Kursveranstalters, Artt. 4 Abs. 1 d, 19 Rom-I-VO. Dieser wird häufig ohnehin mit dem Ort, an dem sich der Sportunfall ereignet hat, übereinstimmen. Ist dies nicht der Fall, erscheint es tatsächlich wegen des Sachbezugs sinnvoll, auf das Recht des Skikursvertrags Rückgriff zu nehmen und die Lex loci delicti zurücktreten zu lassen. Spellenberg 60 hat für den Bereich des Fußballs die Frage aufgeworfen, ob bei Verletzungen von Fußballspielern das Deliktsstatut an das Statut des Vertrags angekoppelt werden sollte, der zwischen den Vereinen geschlossen wurde und die rechtliche Grundlage des fraglichen Fußballspiels bildet. Jedenfalls bei einem internationalen Freundschaftsspiel dürfte es einen solchen Vertrag zwischen den Vereinen geben.61 Im Ergebnis lehnt Spellenberg62 aber einen solchen Rekurs auf das Vertragsstatut an Stelle des Spielortrechts ebenso ab wie einen Rückgriff auf das Recht am Sitz des betreffenden internationalen Ver___________ 59 Vgl. Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 175; Pfister (Fn. 26), Rn. 91 – allerdings wohl jeweils für die Ansprüche gegen die Skischule selbst. 60 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 102. 61 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 102: anders bei Spielen im Rahmen eines internationalen Wettbewerbs. 62 Spellenberg, CaS 2009, 99, 103.

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bands im Falle eines Wettbewerbsspiels. Beidem ist zuzustimmen, denn der Bezug zu sportrechtlichen Delikten ist nicht eng genug. Beim Vertrag zwischen den Vereinen kommt hinzu, dass der Spieler auf diesen keinen Einfluss hat und ihn möglicherweise auch gar nicht kennt. Eine etwaige Rechtswahl (Art. 3 Rom-I-VO) wird ggf. ohne ihn getroffen. Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung kann hier also keine vertragsakzessorische Anknüpfung begründen.

4. Sportunfälle innerhalb der Familie Es ist seit langem umstritten, ob Delikte, die innerhalb der Familie begangen werden, akzessorisch dem jeweiligen familienrechtlichen Statut unterstellt werden sollten und insbesondere nicht der Tatortregel.63 Meist wird aber schon der gemeinsame gewöhnliche Aufenthalt (Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung) vom Tatort weg- und auf die Rechtsordnung, die auch das familienrechtliche Verhältnis bestimmt, verweisen. Als Beispiel mag der bereits oben erwähnte vom BGH64 entschiedene Wasserskiunfall deutscher Eheleute auf dem Gardasee dienen. Auch dort zeigte bereits der gemeinsame gewöhnliche Aufenthalt der Eheleute die Anwendung deutschen Rechts an. In den allermeisten Fällen wird sich daher die Frage einer familienrechtsakzessorischen Anknüpfung nach Art. 4 Abs. 3 S 1 Rom-II-Verordnung im Ergebnis nicht stellen. In folgender Konstellation wäre dies indes anders: Eheleute mit deutscher Staatsangehörigkeit leben in Frankreich. Im Rahmen eines gemeinsamen Skiurlaubs in der Schweiz verunfallen sie durch eine leichte Nachlässigkeit des Mannes mit schwerwiegenden Folgen für die Frau. Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-II-Verordnung würde hier französisches Recht zur Anwendung bringen. Als Ehewirkungsstatut wäre aber nach Art. 14 Abs. 1 Nr 1 EGBGB wegen der gemeinsamen deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit deutsches Recht berufen. Hinsichtlich der deliktischen Ansprüche aus dem Skiunfall sollte diesem m. E. aber nicht über Art. 4 Abs. 3 S 1 Rom-II-Verordnung zum Durchbruch verholfen werden. Die gemeinsame Staatsangehörigkeit würde durch eine akzessorische Anknüpfung gewissermaßen durch die Hintertür des Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung i. V. m. Art. 14 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 EGBGB wieder ins Deliktsstatut eindringen. Sie passt eher für Dauerbeziehungen wie familienrechtliche Verhältnisse, nicht aber für singuläre Ereignisse wie Unfälle, auch wenn daneben ein familienrechtliches Dauerverhältnis besteht.65 ___________ 63 Vgl. z. B. Wandt, VersR 1990, 1301 (1309); W. Lorenz, JZ 1985, 443 (444); Hohloch, Das Deliktsstatut (1984), S. 210 f. 64 BGH, NJW 2009, 1875. 65 Ausf. zu dieser Argumentation – allerdings bezogen auf Straßenverkehrsunfälle – Sieghörtner, Internationales Straßenverkehrsunfallrecht (2002), S. 392 f.; hinsichtlich spe-

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V. Verhaltens- und Spielregeln des Sports 1. Allgemeines Es gehört zu den Besonderheiten des Sports, dass er in weitem Ausmaß durch außergesetzliche Verhaltensregeln – Spiel- und Wettkampfbestimmungen – geprägt ist, welche vor allem von den einschlägigen Verbänden im Rahmen ihrer Verbandsautonomie festgelegt werden. Es gehört weiterhin zu den Besonderheiten des Sports, dass solche außergesetzlichen Verhaltensnormen nicht nur bestehen, sondern auch einen hohen internationalen Harmonisierungsgrad aufweisen,66 um das internationale Sportgeschehen einheitlichen Spielregeln zu unterwerfen. Das ist für die Beantwortung der Haftungsfrage bei internationalen Sportunfällen natürlich ein Vorteil, hilft der hohe Harmonisierungsgrad doch, die durch die Nationalität des staatlich gesetzten Rechts bedingte Unterschiedlichkeit der einzelnen Haftungsrechte67 im Wege vereinheitlichter Verhaltensstandards zu überwinden. Regelungsdichte wie auch Internationalisierungsgrad des Regelwerks sind von Sportart zu Sportart allerdings sehr verschieden. Kampfsportarten, etwa Fußball, Eishockey oder Boxen, weisen naturgemäß eine sehr hohe Regelungsdichte auf, ebenso – bedingt durch internationale Wettbewerbe – einen hohen internationalen Harmonisierungsgrad. Anders sieht es bei sog. Parallelsportarten, etwa Skilaufen, Radfahren oder Golf, aus. Soweit sie wettkampfbezogen ausgeübt werden, ist das Regelwerk noch relativ dicht.68 Werden sie hingegen nur freizeitmäßig ausgeübt, fehlt meist ein dichtes Regelwerk. Im Bereich des Skisports gibt es zumindest noch die 10 FIS-Regeln. Beim sonstigen Bergsport fehlt z. B. allerdings ein festes Regelwerk.69 Damit haben die jeweiligen nationalen Gerichte nicht nur die Möglichkeit, die bestehenden Regeln unterschiedlich auszulegen, sondern es können auch die Lücken im Regelwerk von Staat zu Staat anders gefüllt werden.70 Die internationale Harmonisierung durch Verbandsregeln findet also spätestens hier eine Grenze.

___________ zifisch familienrechtlicher Haftungsprivilegierungen, z. B. § 1359 BGB, bleibt es aber beim familienrechtlichen Statut, siehe oben unter I. 2. 66 Vgl. MüKo/Junker, Art. 17 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 30: Verkehrsregeln bei Freizeit- und Sportaktivitäten (meist auf Verbandsebene) international noch stärker vereinheitlicht als im Straßenverkehr. 67 Vgl. dazu bereits oben unter I. 1. 68 Vgl. z. B. für Segelregatten die ISAF Racing Rules of Sailing. 69 Burger, SpuRt 2007, 192, 194. 70 Vgl. beispielhaft für die Interpretations- und Ausfüllungsprobleme bei den FISRegeln oben Fn. 2.

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2. Rechtsnatur der Verhaltens- und Spielregeln des Sports a) Vom Gesetzgeber festgelegte Normen Auch wenn im Bereich des Sports von Verbänden festgelegte Verhaltensstandards im Vordergrund stehen, darf nicht vergessen werden, dass es auch hier staatlich gesetztes Recht gibt, das vor allem die Sicherheit der Ausübenden gewährleisten will. Als Beispiel sei hier der im o. g. BGH-Urteil71 relevant gewordene italienische Ministerialerlass Nr. 550 vom 20.07.1994 erwähnt, der das Betreiben von Wasserski auf Binnengewässern regelt. Derartige Rechtsnormen sind selbstverständlich als solche beachtlich und würden verbandsgesetzten Regeln ggf. vorgehen.72

b) Von Verbänden gesetzte Regeln Es wird seit längerem diskutiert, ob die von den Sportverbänden im Rahmen ihrer Verbandsautonomie aufgestellten Regelwerke wirklich nur als außergesetzliche zu qualifizieren sind oder ob ihnen nicht doch Rechtsnormqualität zugeschrieben werden kann.

aa) Gewohnheitsrecht? Für die FIS-Regeln ist vielfach angenommen worden, es handele sich bei ihnen um Gewohnheitsrecht.73 Eine nähere Auseinandersetzung mit den Erfordernissen für Gewohnheitsrecht findet aber, soweit ersichtlich, in der Rechtsprechung nicht statt.74 Gewohnheitsrecht setzt voraus: eine längere und gleichmäßige Übung, die Überzeugung der Beteiligten, dass die Übung nicht beliebig und unverbindlich, sondern als rechtlich verbindlich geboten ist, sowie genügende Bestimmtheit, so dass konkrete Rechtsfolgen abgeleitet werden können.75 Tatsächlich wird man den Eigenregeln einer Sportart ebenso wenig eine absolute Bindungswirkung zuerkennen können wie den technischen Regeln und ___________ 71

BGH, NJW 2009, 1875. Vgl. OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 1997, 193. 73 OLG Hamm, NJW-RR 2001, 1537; OLG Brandenburg, NJW-RR 2006, 1458; Dambeck, DAR 1993, 132; Pichler, ZVR 1991, 353, 355 für die praktisch bedeutsamsten Verhaltensregeln. 74 Ausf. insoweit aber Pichler, ZVR 1991, 353, 355. 75 Larenz/Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts (9. Aufl. 2004), § 3 Rn. 31 f. m. w. N. 72

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Regelwerken.76 Auch die FIS-Regeln sind kein Gewohnheitsrecht.77 Die hierfür notwendige langandauernde Übung ist oftmals nicht oder nur schwer feststellbar.78 Auch die Überzeugung, dass eine entsprechende rechtliche Bindung besteht und rechtliche Folgen daraus entstehen, scheint m. E. fraglich. Eine Qualifizierung als Gewohnheitsrecht wäre auch nicht interessengerecht, denn die FIS selbst könnte es nicht mehr ändern.79 Dies sollte der FIS jedoch wegen des dort gebündelten sportfachlichen Wissens aber möglich bleiben.

bb) „Lex sportiva“, „Lex ludica“ Unter dem Begriff der Lex sportiva werden die selbstgesetzten Regelwerke des internationalen Sports verstanden.80 Gemeint sind damit vor allem Verbandsregelwerke. Der Begriff knüpft an den terminus „Lex mercatoria“ an. Dieser bezeichnet die Regelbildung im internationalen Handelsverkehr, wie sie vor allem in dort üblichen Standardverträgen, Handelsklauseln und sonstigen Handelsbräuchen zum Ausdruck kommt.81 Im Hinblick auf die Regeln der Sportausübung ließe sich wohl besser von „Lex ludica“ reden. In einer sich immer weiter vernetzenden („globalisierenden“) Welt ist die Herausbildung solcher internationaler Usancen – sei es im Handelsverkehr, sei es im Sport oder anderswo – folgerichtig und es mag verlockend erscheinen, ihnen Rechtsnormqualität als „anationales Recht“ und damit Bindungswirkung für die Gerichte zuzugestehen. Den betroffenen Verkehrsteilnehmern würde damit durch die Globalisierung verloren gegangene Rechtssicherheit wiedergegeben. Bereits der Lex mercatoria verweigert die h. M. aber grundsätzlich den Status rechtlich bindender Normen. Ihre Geltung hat ihre Grundlage vielmehr in der positivrechtlichen Anerkennung von Vertragsfreiheit und Privatautonomie.82 Ähnliches gilt auch für die Lex sportiva. Insbesondere Schleiter83 hat überzeugend und ausführlich nachgewiesen, dass es sich hier nicht um ein selbstständiges ___________ 76 Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 787; allerdings besteht bei den europäischen Techniknormen die Verweisungstechnik der „Neuen Konzeption“, dazu ausf. Röthel, JZ 755, 759 ff. m. w. N.; vgl. z. B. auch MüKo/Wagner, § 823, Rn. 550 m. w. N.: „Spielregeln der Sportverbände sind kein bindendes Recht“. 77 OGH, ZVR 1983, 15; Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253, 3254. 78 Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253, 3254. 79 Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253, 3254. 80 Schleiter, in: Vieweg (Hrsg.), Facetten des Sportrechts, S. 231, 235; Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 757; vgl. auch Oschütz, Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit, S. 351 ff.; Adolphsen, Internationale Dopingstrafen, S. 628 ff. 81 Vgl. z. B. Röthel, JZ 2007, 755, 757. 82 Vgl. statt vieler Röthel, JZ 07, 755, 756 m. w. N. 83 Schleiter (Fn. 80), S. 231, 236 ff.; vgl. auch Oschütz (Fn. 80), S. 351 ff.; Adolphsen (Fn. 80), S. 628 ff.

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Normengefüge handeln kann. (Auch) den internationalen Sportverbänden fehlt nämlich eine völkerrechtlich begründbare Rechtsetzungsautonomie.84 Das heißt natürlich nicht, dass deren Regelwerke für die Sportteilnehmer und die Gerichte bedeutungslos wären. Sie sind ihnen nur nicht als Gesetzen im materiellen Sinn unterworfen. Welche Relevanz die internationalen Regelwerke zur Sportausübung bei Unfällen kollisionsrechtlich haben, soll im Folgenden untersucht werden.

3. Kollisionsrechtliche Bedeutung der Lex ludica Für die Frage, welche Rolle der Lex ludica bei internationalen Sportunfällen zukommt, ist danach zu unterscheiden, ob das anwendbare Haftungsrecht gemäß den oben dargestellten Anknüpfungsregeln das Recht des Unfallorts ist oder ob eine andere Rechtsordnung maßgeblich ist.

a) Unfallortsrecht als Deliktsstatut (Art. 4 Abs. 1 Rom-II-Verordnung) Richten sich die Haftungsansprüche zwischen den Sportlern nach dem Recht des Unfallorts, was der Grundregel in Art. 4 Abs. 1 Rom-II-Verordnung entspricht, so ist die Rechtslage nach allgemeinen internationalprivatrechtlichen Grundsätzen so zu beurteilen, wie sie die Gerichte jener Rechtsordnung beurteilen würden.85 Gelten im Unfallstaat vom Gesetzgeber festgelegte Verhaltensnormen – als Beispiel kann hier wiederum der italienische Ministerialerlass Nr. 550 vom 20.07.1994 dienen, der das Betreiben von Wasserski auf Binnengewässern regelt –, so sind diese Rechtsnormen selbstverständlich beachtlich. Wenn und soweit keine solche gesetzlich normierten Regeln bestehen, können die Gerichte die Lex ludica zur Beurteilung der beim Sport einzuhaltenden Verhaltens- und Sorgfaltsstandards zugrunde legen. So beurteilen deutsche Gerichte, auch bei rein inländischen Fällen, Skiunfälle nach den FIS-Regeln.86 Ebenso handelt die österreichische Rechtsprechung, auch wenn der Fall keine Auslandsberührung aufweist.87 Da solche von Verbänden gesetzten, sportlichen Verhaltensregeln – wie dargelegt – keinen Rechtsnormcharakter aufweisen, ___________ 84

Ausf. Schleiter (Fn. 80), S. 231, 237 ff. So z. B. Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (2006), S. 212 f. 86 So z. B. BGHZ 58, 40, 43 f.; BGH, NJW 1987, 1947, 1949; OLG München, SpuRt 1994, 35, 36; NJW-RR 2002, 1542, 1543. 87 OGH, ZVR 1983, 15, 16; OLG Innsbruck, VersR 1987, 294 m. Anm. Klee; dasselbe nimmt LG Hildesheim, VersR 1994, 615 – ohne dies explizit ausdrücken und im Ergebnis sicherlich mit Recht – für die Schweiz an. 85

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werden sie von den Gerichten nicht aufgrund einer absoluten Bindungswirkung den Entscheidungen zugrunde gelegt. Voraussetzung für ihre Berücksichtigung ist aus Sicht des deutschen Rechts vielmehr, dass sie rechtlich anerkannt werden können88 und dass sie bei den Sportlern hinreichend bekannt und verbreitet sind, so dass ihre Befolgung die gebotene Verhaltenskoordination zu gewährleisten vermag.89 Entscheidend ist also letztlich das Vertrauen der fraglichen Verkehrskreise auf die Einhaltung der Regeln, die Verkehrstypizität.90

b) Anderes Recht als Unfallsortsrecht ist Deliktsstatut (Artt. 4 Abs. 2, 3, 17 Rom-II-Verordnung) aa) Normative Grundlagen Art. 4 Abs. 2 und 3 Rom-II-Verordnung bieten den normativen Ansatzpunkt, um zu einem anderen Haftungsrecht zu gelangen. Diese sog. Auflockerung des Tatortgrundsatzes bringt das Problem mit sich, welche sportbezogenen Verhaltens- und Sicherheitsnormen weiter nach der Lex loci accidentium in den Fällen beurteilt werden, in denen Deliktsstatut eine davon abweichende Rechtsordnung ist. Gerade dann, wenn beim Sportunfall Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-IIVerordnung an den gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt oder Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-II-Verordnung z. B. an ein bestehendes Vereinsstatut anknüpft, kommt Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung zum Zuge.91 Gemäß dieser Vorschrift sind faktisch und soweit angemessen bei der Beurteilung des Verhaltens der Person, deren Haftung geltend gemacht wird, die Sicherheits- und Verhaltensregeln zu berücksichtigen, die an dem Ort und zu dem Zeitpunkt des haftungsbegründenden Ereignisses in Kraft sind. Der Gedanke, dass die verkehrsrechtlichen Verhaltensnormen des Handlungsorts zu berücksichtigen sind, war auch schon vor der Rom-II-Verordnung anerkannt.92 Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung ist allerdings z. T. vom Wortlaut her etwas missglückt und letztlich auch unvollständig. So ist beispielsweise anerkannt, dass er gleichermaßen auch für den Geschädigten ___________ 88 Vgl. zu der hier gebotenen „Mißstandskontrolle“ Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 273; Eser, JZ 1978, 368, 372. 89 Vgl. z. B. BGHZ 58, 40, 43 f.; BGH, NJW 1987, 1947, 1949; OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 1990, 111; OLG München NJW-RR 2002, 1542, 1543; MüKo/Wagner, § 823, Rn. 555. 90 Heermann/Götze, NJW 2003, 3253 f. 91 MüKo/Junker, Art. 17 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 19. 92 OLG Düsseldorf, VersR 1990, 111; vgl. zu Straßenverkehrsunfällen z. B. BGHZ 87, 95, 97; 90, 294, 298; 93, 214, 217 f.; 119, 137, 140; Hohloch, NZV 1988, 161, 164 f.; ders., JuS 1980, 18, 23; Rothoeft/Rohe, NJW 1993, 974; Pfeiffer, NJW 1997, 1207 1215.

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gilt, so dass insbesondere bei der Beurteilung von Mitverschulden die Norm entsprechende Geltung beansprucht.93

bb) Örtliche Sicherheits- und Verhaltensregeln Wenn Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung auf Sicherheits- und Verhaltensregeln abstellt, so können hierunter ohne Weiteres auch die Regeln der Lex ludica subsumiert werden. Es ist nämlich unerheblich, ob die Regeln öffentlich- oder privatrechtlicher Natur sind und ob sie die Qualität von Rechtsnormen aufweisen.94 Insoweit ist die Formulierung „in Kraft“ in Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung etwas unglücklich gewählt, da sie auf Rechtsnormen hinweisen könnte. Entscheidend und genügend ist die tatsächliche Übung.95 Ausschlaggebend für die Beachtlichkeit der Lex ludica ist also nicht ihre Festlegung durch die Verbände und den dahinterstehenden sportspezifischen Sachverstand, sondern die Berücksichtigung durch die Sportler und die sich dadurch herausbildende Übung. Insofern ließe sich also eher von einem „usus ludicus“ sprechen. Es handelt sich um dieselbe Wertung, wie sie auch im deutschen Sachrecht entscheidend ist. Auch dort gewinnen die außergesetzlichen Verhaltensregeln des Sports gegenüber den Sportlern insoweit „rechtliche Relevanz, wie diese sich ihnen unterstellen und die darin umschriebene Verhaltensordnung damit als verbindliche Ausgestaltung ihrer wechselseitigen Beziehungen im Lebensbereich „Sport“ anerkennen.“96 Neben dieses Anerkennungselement tritt allerdings noch eine Art Schutzzweckelement. Die im jeweiligen Fall relevante Sportregel muss – zumindest auch – darauf gerichtet sein, die haftungsrechtliche Relevanz eines Verhaltens festzulegen.97 Sie darf also z. B. nicht nur der Wahrung der Chancengleichheit im Wettbewerb dienen.98 Zum Teil gibt es bei den Regelwerken selbst Abstufungen, die die Bedeutung der einzelnen Bestimmungen ausdifferenzieren. So unterscheidet der Golfsport99 neben den verbindlichen Golfregeln die grundsätzlich nicht sanktionsbewehrten Etikette, ___________ 93

MüKo/Junker, Art. 17 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 25 m. w. N. v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 11; Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 58 – Er erklärt daher mit Recht in Rn. 176 auch für bedeutsam, dass die FIS-Regeln auf den Skipisten der Alpenländer aushängen. 95 Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 58; Seetzen, VersR 1970, 1, 3. 96 Ausf. Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 270 m. w. N.; vgl. z. B. auch MüKo/Wagner, § 823, Rn. 555: FIS-Regeln hinlänglich bekannt und verbreitet, so dass ihre Befolgung die gebotene Verhaltenskoordination zu gewährleisten vermag. 97 Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 270. 98 Looschelders, JR 2000, 265, 270. 99 Dieser kann durchaus gefährlich sein, ausf. Zuck, MDR 1990, 971 f.: „gefährliche Sportart“. 94

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welche noch durch spezielle Platzregeln ergänzt werden.100 Aber auch insoweit sind Differenzierungen geboten und die Etikette können nicht pauschal als haftungsirrelevant angesehen werden. So wird der Etikette, zügig zu spielen,101 wohl kaum haftungsrechtliche Relevanz zuzuschreiben sein. Anders kann aber die Etikette zu beurteilen sein, sofort mehrmals so laut wie möglich „Fore“ zu rufen, wenn jemand durch den Golfball gefährdet sein könnte. Ist im fraglichen Sportbereich eine entsprechende Lex ludica vorhanden, so verkleinert die dadurch gegebene Harmonisierung freilich von vornherein und erheblich den Anwendungsbereich des Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung, denn die Sportregeln am Tatort und die des Deliktsstatuts werden dadurch dieselben. Allerdings ist nochmals zu betonen, dass die Interpretation der Lex ludica in den betreffenden Staaten divergieren kann.102 Dann ist ggf. über Art. 17 Rom-IIVerordnung der am Tatort herrschenden Auslegung der Vorzug zu geben.103 Entsprechendes muss gelten, wenn die Lex ludica Lücken aufweist. Im Übrigen bleibt Raum für Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung vor allem dort, wo es keine Lex ludica, also keine international harmonisierten Sportregeln gibt.

cc) „Berücksichtigung“ der Sportregeln am Unfallort Nach Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung sind die örtlichen Sicherheits- und Verhaltensregeln zu „berücksichtigen“. Diese Wortwahl ist in dogmatischer Hinsicht relevant, denn es heißt nicht „gelten“ oder „sind anzuwenden“. Art. 17 Rom-IIVerordnung ist eben keine Kollisionsnorm im engeren Sinn104 wie etwa Art. 4 Rom-II-Verordnung. Damit scheint ein alter Meinungsstreit geklärt. Die Verhaltensregeln am Tatort sind nicht im Wege einer Sonderanknüpfung als Rechtsnormen anzuwenden.105 Diese wäre bei der Lex ludica auch und gerade problematisch, da sie, wie dargelegt, keinen Rechtsnormcharakter aufweist. Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung legt nahe, dass der Verordnungsgeber die dogmatische Methode der Sonderbehandlung nicht in einer Sonderanknüpfung der Verhaltensvorschriften auf kollisionsrechtlicher Ebene sieht, sondern sie auf der Sachrechtsebene, d. h. auf der Rechtsfolgenseite der Kollisionsnormen, etwa aufgrund der Datum-Theorie sucht. Nach dieser von der h. M. als dogmatische ___________ 100

Fleischer, VersR 1999, 785, 790. Vgl. dazu Zuck, MDR 1990, 971. 102 Siehe oben unter I. 103 Vgl. zum EGBGB und betreffend die FIS-Regeln Staudinger/v. Hoffmann, Art. 40 EGBGB, Rn. 176. 104 MüKo/Junker, Art. 17 Rom-II-VO Rn. 2 m. w. N.; Leible/Lehmann, RIW 2007, 721, 725. 105 MüKo/Junker, Art. 17 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 2. 101

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Grundlage der Sonderbehandlung angesehenen Theorie sind die örtlichen Verhaltensregeln, also z. B. die Lex ludica, als am Unfallort faktische Gegebenheiten („local data“ bzw. „Sachverhaltselemente“106) zu beachten.107 Damit sind sportliche Verhaltensregeln am Unfallort berücksichtigungsfähig allein aufgrund der faktisch angewandten Übung, ohne dass ihnen der Charakter von Rechtsnormen zukommen muss.

dd) Verhältnis der Sportregeln am Unfallort zu denen des Deliktsstatuts Vor allem wenn für den fraglichen Sportbereich keine Lex ludica besteht, sondern die Sportregeln – oder deren Auslegung – am Unfallort von denen des Deliktsstatuts abweichen, stellt sich das Problem des Verhältnisses dieser Regeln zueinander. Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung verhilft keineswegs den Regeln am Unfallort zur generellen Anwendbarkeit unter Verdrängung derer des Deliktsstatuts. Dies ergibt sich aus dem Diktum der „angemessenen Berücksichtigung“.108 So ist es beim Straßenverkehrsunfall weitgehend anerkannt, dass für eine Anwendung vom Tatortrecht abweichender, nicht streng territorialer Verhaltensnormen und Sicherheitsvorschriften (z. B. Gurtanlegepflicht) dann, aber auch nur dann, Raum ist, wenn es sich um solche der Lex domicilii communis handelt und ein Mitfahrerunfall vorliegt, also Schädiger und Geschädigter im selben Fahrzeug unterwegs sind.109 Die Regeln zur Sportausübung weisen in aller Regel keine Bindung an den Ausübungsort auf, wie es z. B. bei Straßenverkehrsschildern der Fall ist, so dass hier durchaus Raum für eine Anwendung der Sportregeln, die im gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthaltsstaat gepflegt werden, besteht. Außerdem können bei Sportunfällen Situationen gegeben sein, die wertungsmäßig einem Mitfahrerunfall gleichstellbar erscheinen. In der Literatur werden insoweit gemeinsame Schlitten- oder Bootsfahrten genannt.110 Meines Erachtens besteht aber kein Grund, hier eine Einschränkung auf ein gemeinsames Sportgerät (in Parallele zum gemeinsamen Kfz) vorzunehmen. Entscheidend für den Rückgriff auf die Verhaltens- und ___________ 106 Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über das auf außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht („Rom II“), KOM (2003) 427 endg S. 28. 107 Überzeugender dürfte m. E. allerdings die Einordnung als Unterfall der Substitution sein, vgl. MüKo/Sonnenberger, Einl. IPR, Rn. 608 f. 108 Dahinter verbirgt sich allerdings kein Günstigkeitsprinzip derart, dass die für das Opfer günstigeren Regeln generell entscheidend wären, MüKo/Junker, Art. 17 Rom-IIVO, Rn. 26. 109 Ausf. Sieghörtner (Fn. 65), S. 443 f. m. w. N. 110 v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 10.

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Sicherheitsnormen des gemeinsamen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts beim Mitfahrerunfall ist das gegenseitige Vertrauen der Insassen in deren Geltung.111 Entsprechendes ließe sich bei der Sportausübung z. B. auch dann annehmen, wenn sich ein deutscher Sportverein in ein ausländisches Trainingscamp begibt.112 Bleiben die Sportler in dieser Situation beim Training unter sich, so erscheint es selbstverständlich, dass sie gleichsam unter einer Käseglocke nach denselben Regeln spielen (falls diese sich überhaupt von den örtlichen unterscheiden), wie sie es auch zu Hause tun würden. Anderes wäre auch wenig sinnvoll, da sie ja gerade für zu Hause trainieren. Die Frage des Verhältnisses der Sportregeln am Unfallort zu denen des Deliktsstatuts lässt sich „angemessen“ also nur je nach den Umständen des Einzelfalles beurteilen.

ee) Abdingbarkeit der Berücksichtigung der Sportregeln am Unfallort? Ein Urteil des LG Traunstein113 hat der Literatur Anlass zur Erörterung der Frage gegeben, ob die heute in Art. 17 Rom-II-Verordnung geregelte Berücksichtigung der am Unfallort maßgebenden Sportausübungsregeln der Abdingbarkeit durch die Parteien unterliegt. Der Entscheidung lag ein Skiunfall in Kanada zwischen zwei Deutschen zugrunde, die gemeinsam dorthin gereist waren. Das LG wandte entsprechend dem Grundsatz der Lex domicilii communis deutsches Haftungsrecht an. Bei der Schuldfrage meinte es aber, dahinstehen lassen zu können, ob in Kanada von den FIS-Regeln abweichende Verhaltensnormen bestünden. Nach dem Grundsatz der Parteiautonomie stünde es den Parteien frei, von den FIS-Regeln abweichende Verhaltensnormen für unbeachtlich zu erklären, was sie in casu im Prozess getan hatten. Das Gericht bemühte zur dogmatischen Begründung einen Erst-recht-Schluss, da nach dem Internationalen Deliktskollisionsrecht auch vom Tatortrecht durch Rechtswahl abgewichen werden kann – so ist es heute auch in Art. 14 Rom-II-Verordnung näher kodifiziert. Dies ist zwar im Ergebnis sicherlich richtig. Der vom LG gewählte dogmatische Weg ist, wie von Hein114 ausführlich nachgewiesen hat, allerdings nicht gangbar. Die Berücksichtigung der örtlichen Verhaltensregeln beruht, wie oben bereits dargelegt, nicht auf einer kollisionsrechtlichen Entscheidung, eine kolli___________ 111

Ausf. Sieghörtner (Fn. 65), S. 443 f. m. w. N. Vgl. zu einer ähnlichen Konstellation MüKo/Junker Art. 17 Rom-II-VO, Rn. 30. 113 LG Traunstein, SpuRt 2002, 20. 114 v. Hein, SpuRt 2005, 9, 11 f. 112

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sionsrechtliche Rechtswahl (vgl. dazu Art. 14 Rom-II-Verordnung) scheidet also aus. Es handelt sich vielmehr um eine Frage der Anwendung des Sachrechts, so dass es auch eine Frage des Sachrechts ist, ob die Parteien des deliktsrechtlichen Schuldverhältnisses dieses durch Parteivereinbarung abweichend vom Gesetz regeln können. Das deutsche Deliktsrecht lässt eine Vereinbarung der Parteien, sich so stellen zu wollen, als hätten die FIS-Regeln am Tatort gegolten, ohne Weiteres zu.

VI. Schlussbemerkung Die Rom-II-Verordnung bietet insgesamt einen angemessenen Rahmen, um der kollisionsrechtlichen Problematik von Sportunfällen gerecht zu werden, auch wenn sie keine speziell auf Sportunfälle zugeschnittenen Kollisionsregeln enthält. Sie bietet auch ausreichend Raum zur notwendigen Berücksichtigung der Lex ludica.

Autorenverzeichnis Janez Kocijanþiþ, Präsident des slovenischen Nationalen Olympischen Komitees, Gründungsmitglied von HISLAC, Ljubljana/Slowenien Jacob Kornbeck, Administrator (Policy Officer) in der Europäischen Kommission, Generaldirektion Bildung und Kultur, Referat Sport, Brüssel/Belgien Robert Sieghörtner, Notar, Honorarprofessor, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen/Deutschland Robert C.R. Siekmann, Professor, Erasmus Universität Rotterdam, Gründungsmitglied von HISLAC, Rotterdam/Niederlande Paul Staschik, wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen/Deutschland Rudolf Streinz, Deutschland

Professor,

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität

München/

Klaus Vieweg, Professor, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Gründungsmitglied von HISLAC, Erlangen/Deutschland Andreas Wax, Rechtsanwalt, Stuttgart/Deutschland Andreas Zagklis, Rechtsanwalt in Griechenland, Associate bei Martens Rechtsanwälte, München/Deutschland