Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa 3031079647, 9783031079641

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Dennis Masaka   Editor

Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa

Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa

Dennis Masaka Editor

Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa

Editor Dennis Masaka Great Zimbabwe University Masvingo, Zimbabwe

ISBN 978-3-031-07964-1    ISBN 978-3-031-07965-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

Profound credit goes to a number of people and organisations who, in one way or another, have contributed to the success of this book project. First, and foremost, I would like to thank authors who have contributed chapters to this volume that I think will generate further debates on the question of knowledge production in Africa. I would also want to thank the University of the Free State’s Department of Philosophy for offering me a Research Fellowship under whose subsistence this book project was done. Many thanks also go to the team at Springer namely the senior editor in philosophy books, Christopher Coughlin, and project coordinator (books), Kritheka Elango, who have worked immensely to make this book project a success. I also greatly appreciate invaluable support offered by colleagues in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. Great thanks also go to my family for their support. 2022 Masvingo, Zimbabwe

Dennis Masaka

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Contents

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Introduction: The Question of Knowledge Production in Epistemic Liberation Debates in Africa��������������������������������������������    1 Dennis Masaka

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‘Epistemicide’ and Epistemic Emancipation in Africa: Problems and Promises ��������������������������������������������������������������������������    7 Kai Horsthemke

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 Knowledge Production and the Liberation Agenda in Africa�������������   23 Dennis Masaka

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 Decolonisation as Self-Recovery: The Path to Intellectual Independence��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   37 Pascah Mungwini

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Colonial Legacy and Knowledge Production in Africa: Re-echoing the Need for Epistemic Decolonisation������������������������������   49 Kenneth Uyi Abudu

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A Critical Exposition of ‘Alternative’ Site(s) of Knowledge Production in Africa: Decentering the African University������������������   69 Joseph Pardon Hungwe

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African Epistemic Liberation Through Knowledge Democratisation ������������������������������������������������������������������   85 Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda

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How African Logic Can Dissipate the Question of Originality and Knowledge Production in Africa ��������������������������������   99 Emmanuel Ofuasia and Sheriff Olasunkanmi Ibiyemi

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Contents

Africanising Institutional Culture: What Is Possible and Plausible��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  111 Thaddeus Metz

10 Africa’s  Knowledge and the Quest for Epistemic Liberation in a COVID-19 Crisis�����������������������������������������������������������  135 Munamato Chemhuru 11 Religiosity and African Epistemology����������������������������������������������������  149 Jonathan Mzwazi and Sibiziwe Shumba 12 Ukama  Ethic and Covid-19 Pandemic: Countervailing Social Distancing-­Induced Exclusive Individualism in (Southern) African University������������������������������������������������������������  167 Amasa Phillip Ndofirepi and Joseph Pardon Hungwe 13 African  Indigenous Knowledge and the Management of COVID-19 Pandemic��������������������������������������������������������������������������  179 Sibiziwe Shumba, Estere Nyangari, and Molyn Mpofu 14 African  Knowledge Systems: Shona Paremiology in Promoting Morals, Peace and Human Security������������������������������������  201 Silindiwe Zvingowanisei and Francis Machingura 15 A  Yòrùbá Worldview on the Compatibility of Human and Nonhuman Animal Relations (HAR) with Environmental Sustainability��������������  215 Adewale O. Owoseni and Isaac Olufemi Olatoye Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  231

Contributors

Kenneth Uyi Abudu  Ambrose Alli University, Nigeria Munamato  Chemhuru  Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda  Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa Kai Horsthemke  University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany Joseph Pardon Hungwe  University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Sheriff Olasunkanmi Ibiyemi  Federal College of Dental Technology and Therapy, Enugu, Nigeria Francis Machingura  Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Centre for Postgraduate Studies and Faculty of Education, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Dennis Masaka  Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa Thaddeus Metz  University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa Molyn Mpofu  University of Eswatini, Eswatini Pascah Mungwini  University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Jonathan Mzwazi  Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Amasa Phillip Ndofirepi  Sol Plaatje University, South Africa ix

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Estere Nyangari  Hillside Teachers College, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe Emmanuel Ofuasia  National Open University of Nigeria, FCT, Abuja, Nigeria Isaac Olufemi Olatoye  University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Adewale O. Owoseni  University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa Sibiziwe Shumba  Joshua Mqabuko Polytechnic College, Gwanda, Zimbabwe Silindiwe Zvingowanisei  Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Centre for Postgraduate Studies and Faculty of Education, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

Chapter 1

Introduction: The Question of Knowledge Production in Epistemic Liberation Debates in Africa Dennis Masaka

Debates on what needs to be done in order to consummate the yet to be fully attained epistemic liberation in Africa have tended to be varied in terms of what requires critical focus and attention. Decolonisation, transformation and Africanisation have gained traction as possible ways to fight off and overturn the conquest of African peoples’ epistemologies (see Nkrumah 1965: 31; Ramose 2003; Okere et al. 2005; Lamola, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020; Masaka 2021). These debates have generally been more inclined towards promoting the production of African knowledges and ensuring that these knowledges claim a significant share of the formal educational curricula content in Africa. All these efforts claim to proffer viable solutions to overturn an extroverted epistemology (see Hountondji 1990: 7) that has over the years been an albatross on efforts to construct knowledges that have inspiration and roots in African cultures, and in turn diversify knowledges that inform the educational curricula. These efforts are commendable in initiating serious steps to challenge the myth of a ‘universal’ knowledge tradition that is assumed to have the mandate to inform the curricula across much of Africa (Ramose 2016). They are meant to face off what Tariq Ramadan calls the ‘dogmatic mind’ which contentiously ‘states that its truth is the only truth, that its Way is exclusive and that its universal is the only universal, that is because it stipulates – at the same time – that anything that does not partake of that truth, that path and that universal is, at best, absolutely ‘other’ and, at worst, culpably mistaken’ (Ramadan 2010: 22). However, it remains necessary to discuss what these efforts have largely overlooked in the critical agenda to overturn the dominance of the so-called ‘universal’ knowledge and create conditions that assure the production of authentic liberatory knowledges.

D. Masaka (*) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_1

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A point of inquiry that underpins this book is a call to ask critical questions about the very basis of knowledge production in Africa and what needs to be possibly done to genuinely attain the envisioned epistemic liberation. The necessary turn is to invest intellectual energies in interrogating the very foundation of knowledge projects in Africa with the aim of producing knowledges that are shaped and inspired by African peoples’ own lived experiences. In this struggle, it is critical to guard against the enticing lure of what Jennifer Lisa Vest (2009: 3) calls ‘perverse questions’ or ‘perverse’ preoccupations, that is, ‘questions concerned centrally with the rationality, the intellectual capabilities, and the humanity of Africa and her peoples’ as if these can at any point be a subject of doubt. These questions divert the attention of those sympathetic to the production of genuine African epistemologies from dealing with issues of critical importance to them, or what Vest (2009: 4) calls ‘necessary’ debates. Instead, these questions place knowledge producers in Africa in perpetual polemical mode to answer questions not of their creation but posed from elsewhere. As a result, what purports to be genuine African knowledge projects are in fact externally controlled. These diversionary tactics ought to be avoided. In turn, there is need to build robust inquiries fleshed out from African peoples’ lived experiences in order to prepare for the production of veritable African knowledges (Vest 2005: 14). The point is that the preoccupation with answering ‘perverse’ questions simply means that African knowledge projects will remain beholden to extroverted knowledge projects that they are struggling to set free from (Curry 2011a: 140–145). Answering to perverse questions has proven to be a waste of time and a grand distortion to pursuit of genuine African knowledge projects (see Mafeje 1992: 1–3). A true libaratory path needs to sidesptep ‘intellectual preoccupations with European disciplinary prescriptions’ (Vest 2009: 7) and focus on the self-understanding of African peoples (Curry 2011b: 316). It is precisely for this reason that the book takes as its preeminent focus the very question of the foundation of knowledge production in Africa hoping to establish a firm basis from which authentic African knowledges can emerge. The book has three broad sections: In the first section, The question of Epistemic conquest in Africa, the key point of focus is the condition of epistemic domination that African peoples have faced over the years (see Nkrumah 1964: 5; Flikschuh 2014: 3–4; Mungwini 2017) and some suggestions on how it can be overcome. Though perspectives on the nature of the problem at hand may be varied, there is at least some consensus that it is one issue that requires serious scholarly attention if epistemic liberation in Africa is to be attained (Ramose 2003; Makgoba 1998: 58). In chap. 2, Kai Horsthemke critically interrogates the commonly regarded link between epistemicide and epistemic emancipation, noting that they are of utmost concern to African scholars. Horsthemke notes that African peoples have suffered the injustices of epistemicide and it is a matter of importance to them much as are the efforts to overturn it and seek epistemic emancipation. Departing from the commonly held notion of epistemicide, Horsthemke shares a condition under which it could be said to have occurred, that is, when the knowledge targeted for destruction is ‘adequately justified true belief’. In the chapter, Horsthemke also spells out what constitutes ‘alternative knowledges’ noting that it only makes sense when used in reference to practical knowledge and not propositional knowledge. In chap. 3, Dennis Masaka considers how knowledge production in countries in Africa could

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be conceived differently if it is to foreground a genuine quest for liberation more generally. In this chapter, Masaka defends the need to escape from entanglement in the epistemic tradition that has fought relentlessly to suppress African peoples’ struggles for self-understanding, opting instead to invest trust in their culturally embedded methods and frameworks. In chap. 4, Pascah Mungwini focuses on the critical issue of decolonisation of knowledge in Africa, and argues that it should result in African peoples seizing control of their destiny. Mungwini calls this an ‘an act of self-recovery’ which is so critical to the attainment of epistemic liberation in Africa. In chap. 5, Kenneth Uyi Abudu explores the implications of colonial legacy to knowledge production in Africa that have manifested in the coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide. In light of these problems that have been faced by African philosophers, Abudu concludes by noting the importance of interrogating implications of continuing along the path of Eurocentric hegemonic models of knowledge production. In the second section, Broadening the knowledge canon in Africa, the aim is on taking seriously knowledge traditions that have over the years been delegitimised so that they claim a stake in the educational curricula in Africa. This is an issue of concern to African peoples whose knowledges have faced ostracisation up to present times (Okere 2005: 20–22). In chap. 6, Joseph Pardon Hungwe notes that scholarly research on knowledge production in Africa has mainly focused on the need for local knowledge and methodology within a university. In response, Hungwe discusses ‘alternative sites of knowledge production’ as a way of expanding the base for knowledge production in Africa and overcome epistemic injustice. In chap. 7, Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda argues that African epistemic liberation can be attained by opening space for multiple canons of knowledge while chap. 8 by Emmanuel Ofuasia and Sheriff Olasunkanmi Ibiyemi  employ the method of conversational philosophy to establish how logic can establish a basis for authentic knowledge production in Africa. Inspired by Ezumezu logic, Ofuasia and Olasunkanmi show how African indigenous alternative logic systems can serve as foundation for producing authentic African knowledge. In chap. 9, Thaddeus Metz offers an overview of the major forms that Africanisation of institutional culture could take and shows the extent to which South African universities have embraced them over the years. Metz concludes by arguing that a combination of the rationales of redress, civilisation and identity together make a convincing case for a moderate form of Africanising the institutional culture of public universities in South Africa. The main focus of the third section, African knowledges and contemporary challenges, is on how African knowledges could respond to some of the pressing issues of our time such as the COVID-19 pandemic. This and many other pandemics require knowledge traditions including those of African peoples to be always alert to the need to offer remedies that will help in mitigating them (Tangwa and Munung 2020: 4–5). In chap. 10, Munamato Chemhuru considers some philosophical arguments around the perceptions and status of African knowledge in the fight against COVID-19. The intention is to assess the potential of African indigenous knowledge in creating medicines to combat pandemics especially in the face of contestations on its pedigree. In chap. 11, Jonathan Mswazie (may his soul rest in peace) and Sibiziwe Shumba attempt to show the nature and application of African indigenous

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knowledge in real contexts of Africa with a particular focus on Karanga forms of knowledge. In chap. 12, Amasa Philip Ndofirepi and Joseph Pardon Hungwe appeal to Ukama ethic to countervail exclusive individualism induced by the Covid-19 pandemic’s social distancing measure in an African university. In chap. 13, Sibiziwe Shumba, Estere Nyangari and Molyn Mpofu analyse the contribution of African Indigenous Knowledge (AIK) in offering sustainable mechanisms to cope with COVID-19 pandemic. In chap. 14, Silindiwe Zvingowanisei and Francis Machingura focus on paremiology and defend the need for Africans, and the Shona in particular, to embrace their cultural values, personality, identity and self-esteem. In chap. 15, Adewale O.  Owoseni and Isaac O.  Olatoye analyse the compatibility of Yòrùbá understanding of human and nonhuman animal relations (HAR), and environmental sustainability. The purpose is to show the relevance of indigenous worldview to the goal of One Health. Overall, it is hoped that this book will stimulate interest among African scholars to produce knowledges that speak to African peoples’ lived experiences and thus contribute to the agenda of genuine liberation more broadly.

References Curry, T.J. 2011a. On Derelict and Method: The Methodological Crisis of African-American Philosophy’s Study of African-Descended Peoples under an Integrationist Milieu. Radical Philosophy Review 14 (2): 139–164. ———. 2011b. The Derelictical Crisis of African American Philosophy: How African American Philosophy Fails to Contribute to the Study of African-Descended People. Journal of Black Studies 42 (3): 314–333. Flikschuh, K. 2014. The Idea of Philosophical Fieldwork: Global Justice, Moral Ignorance, and Intellectual Attitudes. The Journal of Political Philosophy 22 (1): 1–26. Hountondji, P. 1990. Scientific Dependence in Africa Today. Research in African Literatures 21 (3): 5–15. Lamola, M.J. 2016. The Political Economy of the Philosophical Canon: An Africanist Critique. Philosophia Africana 17 (2): 89–99. Mafeje, A. 1992. In Search of an Alternative: A Collection of Essays on Revolutionary Theory and Politics. Harare: SAPES. Makgoba, M. 1998. South African Universities in Transformation: An Opportunity to Africanise Education. In Black Perspective(s) on Tertiary Institutional Transformation, ed. S.  Seepe, 42–62. Florida: Vivlia Publishers & University of Venda. Masaka, D. 2021. Knowledge, Power, and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa. Social Epistemology 35 (3): 258–269. Mungwini, P. 2017. “African Know Thyself”: Epistemic Injustice and the Quest for Liberative Knowledge. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies  – Multi-, Inter and Transdisciplinarity 12 (2): 5–18. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2020. Decolonization, Development and Knowledge in Africa: Turning Over a New Leaf. London and New York: Routledge. Nkrumah, K. 1964. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonisation. London: Panaf. ———. 1965. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. New  York: International Publishers. Okere, T. 2005. Is there One Science, Western Science? Africa Development XXX (3): 20–34. Okere, T., C.A. Njoku, and R. Devisch. 2005. All Knowledge is First of All Local Knowledge: An Introduction. Africa Development XXX (3): 1–19.

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Ramadan, T. 2010. The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism. London: Penguin Books. Ramose, M.B. 2003. Transforming Education in South Africa: Paradigm Shift or Change? SAJHE/ SATHO 17 (3): 137–143. ———. 2016. Teacher and Student with a Critical Pan-Epistemic Orientation: An Ethical Necessity for Africanising the Educational Curriculum in Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 546–555. Tangwa, G.B., and N.S. Munung. 2020. COVID-19: Africa’s Relation with Epidemics and Some Imperative Ethics Considerations of the Moment. Research Ethics 16 (3-4): 1–11. Vest, J.L. 2005. The Promise of Caribbean Philosophy: How it can Contribute to a ‘New Dialogic’ in Philosophy. Caribbean Studies 33 (2): 3–34. ———. 2009. Perverse and Necessary Dialogues in African Philosophy. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK). New Series 1 (2): 1–23.

Chapter 2

‘Epistemicide’ and Epistemic Emancipation in Africa: Problems and Promises Kai Horsthemke

Knowledge Production in Africa The enormous toll exacted on the African continent over centuries has, amongst many other things, also had ramifications for knowledge production. Following centuries of occidental (or Western-originated) negation and suppression, disparagement, as well as exploitation and appropriation, which also had the enormous psychological impact of internalised inferiority among many Africans, there has in recent decades been a movement towards reclamation, decolonisation, recognition and acknowledgement, validation/legitimisation, and protection of ‘African’ or ‘indigenous’ knowledge (Horsthemke 2021: 16–23). This movement has been characterised by vociferous and rightful anger about both the acts and the omissions, past and present, that have been disadvantaging Africans. It has also drawn on ideas that have become popular in post-colonial theory and decolonisation discourses (De Sousa Santos 2005, 2014), notions like ‘epistemicide’ and epistemic emancipation, which are commonly regarded as intimately linked. The deliberate, systematic destruction of knowledge involves epistemic, cognitive marginalisation and negation, while epistemic emancipation serves as a countervailing measure to the killing of knowledge (systems). Given the extensive, brutal processes and history of colonization, enslavement and general subjugation on the African continent, it should not come as a great surprise that the notions of epistemicide and epistemic emancipation have particular resonance with African scholars and concerned laypersons. In this chapter, I aim to establish some clarity about key concepts. My critical take on some of these ideas should in no way be understood as an endorsement of

K. Horsthemke (*) University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_2

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the evils of colonial conquest and (ongoing) exploitation, oppression, and subjugation. Nor should it be taken as an indication of a failure on my part to sympathise with the struggle of Africans for a dignified and sustainable way of life, for personal and communal space, and for self-determination. The aim of the chapter is to provide especially African educators with theoretical tools for critical reflection and interrogation of their own and others’ preconceptions, assumptions, and epistemic practices and customs.

The Charge of Epistemicide It is rather difficult to determine the originator(s) of the idea in question, epistemicide being defined as “the murder of knowledge” (De Sousa Santos 2014: 92) or “destruction of all alternative knowledges” that involves “the destruction of all social practices and the disqualification of the social agents that operate according to such knowledges” (ibid.: 153). The first authors I have come across to employ this notion are Mogobe Ramose (2004: 1561) and Teboho Lebakeng (20042; see also Lebakeng et al. 2006). The idea of epistemicide has received detailed elaboration in the writings of Boaventura De Sousa Santos: in the name of modern science, many alternative knowledges and sciences have been destroyed, and the social groups that used these systems to support their autonomous paths of development have been humiliated. In short, in the name of science, epistemicide has been committed, and the imperial powers have resorted to it to disarm any resistance of the conquered peoples and social groups. (2005: xviii; see also De Sousa Santos 2014: 209, 238)

In his programmatically titled book Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide (2014: 92), De Sousa Santos describes one of the more pernicious effects of globalization upon developing countries: Unequal exchanges among cultures have always implied the death of knowledge of the subordinated culture, hence the death of the social groups that possessed it. In the most extreme cases, such as that of European expansion, epistemicide was one of the conditions of genocide.

Karen Bennett takes up these ideas (2017: 153): “Epistemicide, as the systematic destruction of rival forms of knowledge, is at its worst nothing less than symbolic genocide”, before explaining, Epistemicide works in a number of ways. Knowledges that are grounded on an ideology that is radically different from the dominant one (as in the case of many of the Third World knowledges that [De Sousa Santos] foregrounds) will by and large be silenced completely. They will be starved of funding, if the hegemonic power controls that aspect (and in the

 “The history of epistemicide in South Africa raises fundamental questions of justice such as the question of epistemological equality of all the existing paradigms of the peoples of South Africa” (Ramose 2004: 156). 2  Lebakeng (2004: 109) refers to epistemicide as “a destruction of African knowledge systems”. 1

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European Union this is increasingly the case); they will remain unpublished, since their very form will be unrecognizable to the editors of the journals and textbooks; and they are unable to be taught in schools and universities, thus ensuring their rapid decline into oblivion. Knowledges that are not so distant as to warrant automatic annihilation, having some historical or cultural overlap with the dominant one, are instead bullied or cajoled into an acceptable shape. This is where the translator comes in. Our job is, essentially, to present the alien knowledge in a form that will enable it to be assimilated into one or another of the ready-made categories existing for the purpose, which means ensuring that it is properly structured, that it makes use of the appropriate terminology and tropes – in short, couching it in the accepted discourse. (Ibid.: 154)

Dennis Masaka (2017: 442n.3) understands “‘epistemicide’ as the partial or near total destruction of one knowledge paradigm by hegemonic cultures with the objective of presenting their own as the dominant one”. He rightfully bemoans the lack of relevance of tertiary educational curricula on the African continent. In particular, the philosophy curricula of African universities tend to pay insufficient attention to the philosophical writings emanating from Africa and dealing with particularly African problems, concerns and priorities. But does a Eurocentric (and/or androcentric) philosophy curriculum necessarily involve epistemicide? It does, or would, insofar as the contributions by African (and/or female) scholars are rejected by way of foregone conclusion either as not being philosophy or as being inferior, as less significant, etc. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s denial that Africa has any history and relevance3 can certainly be considered as a case of epistemicide, as can Immanuel Kant’s racist vilification of “Negroes”.4 The same goes for any denial, tout court, that Africans have any contribution to make to the knowledge canon (Masaka 2018: 286). Challenging and ending epistemicide, as envisaged by Masaka, would involve establishing a “parity of epistemologies”: “no epistemological paradigm is superior to others” (ibid.: 294). Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni concurs with this line of reasoning. Connecting the silencing of African voices with both “epistemicides (killing of indigenous people’s knowledges) and linguicides (killing of indigenous people’s languages)”, he contends that “denial of humanity automatically disqualified one from epistemic virtue” (2018: 3; see also pp. 18–23, 62). Ndlovu-Gatsheni provides several examples. “The knowledgeable African women were simply discredited as witches”, and the “forcible and violent conversion to Christianity … was itself a form of epistemicide” (ibid.: 11): “Christianisation constituted a form of education and an epistemicide simultaneously” (ibid.: 12; see also Lebakeng 2004: 109). ‘Epistemicide’ is a notion that has achieved widespread articulation and, judging from these representative writings, unfortunately also less-than-critical

 “… so verlassen wir hiermit Afrika, um seiner künftig keine Erwähnung mehr zu tun. Denn es hat keine Geschichte.” (Hegel 1992: 129) 4  “Die Menschheit ist in ihrer größten Vollkommenheit in der Rasse der Weißen. Die gelben Indianer haben schon ein geringeres Talent. Die Neger sind weit tiefer, und am tiefsten steht ein Teil der amerikanischen Völkerschaften. […] Die Negers von Afrika haben von der Natur kein Gefühl, welches über das Läppische stiege.” (From “Physical Geography”, in Kant 1900ff: 253) 3

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endorsement. The main problem, it seems, resides with the respective understandings of ‘knowledge’ and ‘epistemology’. Thus, there is a tendency to apply the notion in question in a rather undifferentiated manner to all kinds of beliefs and worldviews  – irrespective of whether they amount to knowledge, or constitute a theory of knowledge. What makes those African women discredited as witches knowledgeable? What knowledge was killed as a result of Christianisation and other forms of colonisation? Does rejection of views that underlie rainmaking and ancestor agency amount to the ‘murder of knowledge systems’? Is the failure to allow flat-earth and geocentric worldviews in geography classrooms a matter of epistemicide? What about the refusal to teach creationism in biology? Or the unwillingness to allow the counsel of active drug dealers and pimps in career guidance sessions? Do indigenous African women have epistemologies?5 In what way, if any, can one make sense of the ideas of “alternative knowledges” and of “parity of epistemologies”? The plausibility of any response to these questions hinges on the respective understanding of ‘knowledge’ and ‘epistemology’. If it is indeed the knowledge (as opposed to the mere belief, unjustified true belief, or justified false belief) of African women that is being negated, this would not only raise concerns about moral or social injustice but also about epistemic injustice: the reasons for rejection would be that the claims in question are being made by African women, and this would be deeply disconcerting. Our two boys were attended to virtually from birth by Agnes Phoshoko, a Pedi woman who had three considerably older children of her own. She would carry each boy in a blanket on her back while she did the housework, which gave them a sense of company, comfort and security – and the steady motion would gently rock them to sleep. When I asked her when she would start carrying our younger son, she replied, “As soon as his spine is strong enough”. She would accommodate our gastronomic preferences with vegetarian and vegan recipes she knew, like steamed amadumbe (African potato), morogo (wild spinach) and umngqusho (also known as samp and beans, a combination of boiled maize kernels and speckled sugar beans). On a Monday, she would often be hoarse and exhausted, having spent the whole of Sunday dancing and singing ecstatically in ZCC (Zion Christian Church) gatherings. So, Agnes is knowledgeable in terms of infant physiology and children’s needs, nutritious and tasty treats and many other things, like the healing properties of certain indigenous plants. On the other hand, her religious beliefs, however intense, and other metaphysical beliefs (for example, regarding ancestor agency, or malevolent beings like the tokoloshe and the mantindane) do not amount to knowledge. Furthermore, I doubt very much whether she has an epistemology. Not many people I know actually have a theory of knowledge. Consider the (fictitious) case of Khoisan Z, living in southern Africa in the mid-­ seventeenth century. Shortly after the arrival of the first white settlers, his adequately justified true belief that all human life is finite and not only of equal value but also  In a 2010 roundtable during the annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society in Francisco, Claudia Ruitenberg poses the question, “how should the field of educational research respond to claims about indigenous African women’s epistemologies?” (Code et al. 2012: 137) 5

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intimately bound up with non-human life and the natural environment is rejected and forcibly changed to a belief system that is premised on a hierarchical social ontology and ethics, which gives some humans dominion over others, and all humans dominion over all other creatures, and which promises some human beings a glorious eternal life after death. This would be epistemicide. Rejection or dismissal of a person’s beliefs or worldview may be unkind, impolite, perhaps even disrespectful, but it amounts to epistemicide only if the beliefs or worldview in question actually amount to knowledge, that is, to adequately justified true belief. The idea of “alternative knowledges” makes sense only with regard to practical knowledge, knowledge-how, or skill-type knowledge. When applied to propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that, it belongs in the same category of claptrap as ‘alternative facts’. What about the notion of “parity of epistemologies”? It is important to be clear about the meaning of ‘epistemology’. In the philosophically relevant sense of ‘theory of knowledge’, an epistemology is neither a set of beliefs, that is, an account of their content, nor a description of how people acquire or come to hold their beliefs. The former simply refers to differing sets of beliefs held by different individuals or prevalent in different communities, while the latter belongs not in philosophy but constitutes the natural terrain of the so-called ‘sociology of knowledge’ (which might be called, more fittingly, the ‘sociology of belief’) and perhaps the psychology of learning. Philosophers, however, use ‘epistemology’ to refer to a normative (as opposed to merely descriptive) field of inquiry. Their concern resides with establishing what ought (not) to be called ‘knowledge’ and with the criteria for doing so. Relevant distinctions are made here between knowledge and belief, between mere belief and well-warranted (or adequately justified) belief, and between true belief and justified true belief. The inquiry here is essentially normative, for example, evaluating beliefs and belief strategies, investigating what beliefs are trustworthy enough to be acted on, how researchers should validate their findings, what forms of argument and what kinds of justification are acceptable, who (if anyone) counts as an epistemic authority, etc. This is, incidentally, not an essentially or exclusively ‘Western’ philosophical understanding of knowledge. It should be noted, for example, that in Yoruba, too, pertinent distinctions are made between gbàgbó (belief; the subjective, private or personal component of knowledge) and mò (knowledge in the sense of ‘knowledge-that’). Barry Hallen and J.O. Sodipo (1997: 81) observe that “gbàgbó that may be verified is gbàgbó that may become mò. Gbàgbó that is not open to verification and must therefore be evaluated on the basis of justification alone (àlàyé, papò, etc.) cannot become mò and consequently its òótó [truth] must remain indeterminate”. A second philosophical use of epistemology is as a normative theory of knowledge. Different epistemologies demonstrably exist within the philosophical tradition. Thus, a distinction is commonly made between foundationalist (e.g., rationalist, empiricist, and positivist) and non-foundationalist (e.g., pragmatist, constructivist, and standpointist) epistemologies. Here, too, the inquiry is normative. As in the first sense elucidated in the previous paragraph, the concern resides with what can (and

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what cannot) meaningfully be called ‘knowledge’. These epistemologies coexist because philosophers still disagree about them, even though they are in agreement that only one position can be right. Within multiculturalist, decolonial and postcolonial discourses, however, “parity of epistemologies” seems to mean something different, namely that all are equally respectable and valid – indeed, that “no epistemological paradigm is superior to others” (Masaka 2018: 294). The implications of such an essentially symmetrical understanding of diverse epistemologies are profoundly disturbing, however, for there would be no way in which ‘Afrocentric epistemology’ could be established as superior to ‘Eurocentric epistemology’, or ‘African egalitarian feminist epistemology’ to ‘white Afrikaner apartheid androcentric epistemology’.

Epistemic Injustice and Cognitive Justice Considerations similar to those articulated in the previous section also pertain to the ideas of epistemic injustice and cognitive justice. The former idea originates with Miranda Fricker (2007), while the latter is associated mainly with the work C. Shiv Visvanathan (1997): Cognitive justice recognises the right of different forms of knowledge to co-exist, but adds that this plurality needs to go beyond tolerance or liberalism to an active recognition of the need for diversity. It demands recognition of knowledges, not only as methods but as ways of life. This presupposes that knowledge is embedded in ecology of knowledges where each knowledge has its place, its claim to a cosmology, its sense as a form of life. In this sense knowledge is not something to be abstracted from a culture as a life form; it is connected to livelihood, a life cycle, a lifestyle; it determines life chances. (Visvanathan 2009; see also Odora Hoppers 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018)

The ideas of cognitive justice, and of a diversity and ecology of knowledges, are also of considerable significance in the work of De Sousa Santos: “There is no global social justice without global cognitive justice” is an oft-repeated mantra (De Sousa Santos et al. 2007: xix; see also De Sousa Santos 2014: 42, 124, 133, 189, 193, 207, 233). Sometimes invoking these notions is plausible, sometimes it is not. De Sousa Santos (2014: 42) emphasises the need for “a more just relationship among different kinds of knowledge”. In other words, “there has to be equity between different ways of knowing and different kinds of knowledge” (ibid.: 237). The notions of cognitive and epistemic justice, and of their absence or violation (cognitive and epistemic injustice), apply only when what is at stake is really knowledge  – and not just knowledge claims, beliefs, impressions, and the like. Unfortunately, De Sousa Santos fails to provide concrete examples of (the violation of) cognitive justice. Fricker’s work proves to be more generative in this regard. In her influential account of epistemic injustice, she distinguishes between two types of epistemic justice, testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Fricker refers to them as hybrid

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virtues (in that they both have an intellectual and an ethical component6) that serve to countervail or prevent epistemic (i.e., respectively, testimonial and hermeneutical) injustice. Although they are experienced (and may be performed) individually, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice constitute not only individual harms: they originate within a social fabric of which the biases and prejudices that enliven and perpetuate them are a characteristic part. Contesting such injustices and harms, according to Fricker, requires “collective social political change” (Fricker 2007: 8). In order to bring about such change, what is required at a testimonial level is “reflexive awareness of the likely presence of prejudice”, and this “anti-prejudicial virtue is the virtue of testimonial justice” (ibid.: 91–92). Testimonial justice, says Fricker, is “both ethical and intellectual in character, at once a virtue of truth and a virtue of justice” (ibid.: 124). Thus, apart from being able to rely on the competence and sincerity of speakers (ibid.: 72), and apart from sensitivity (ibid.) and empathy (ibid.: 79), “hearers need dispositions that lead them reliably to accept truths and to reject falsehoods” (115). Like testimonial justice, hermeneutical justice is a hybrid virtue, says Fricker (174). What it is meant to counteract is hermeneutical injustice  – which occurs when (members of certain) groups or communities lack the hermeneutical tools to make sense of their own social experience (ibid.: 146). “For something to be an injustice, it must be harmful but also wrongful, whether because discriminatory or because otherwise unfair” (ibid.: 151). When there is unequal “hermeneutical participation with respect to some significant areas(s) of social experience, members of the disadvantaged group are hermeneutically marginalised” (ibid.: 153). Let us return to Khoisan Z. When his knowledge claims are rejected by the colonising powers on the mere grounds of the colour of his skin or ethnic origin, of not being ‘one of them’, he suffers testimonial injustice. When he and his family and friends are forced to ‘relocate’ to a less hospitable, less fertile terrain, they suffer hermeneutical injustice – over and above gross social injustice: they simply lack the concept of, and so cannot comprehend, ‘relocation’. They therefore cannot make sense of what is happening to them. Prejudice affects various levels of credibility, and the idea of epistemic (in-)justice in Fricker’s analysis refers to the epistemic situation of women and blacks in a world dominated by men and whites. Testimonial justice appears as an original virtue of both justice and truth. It expresses the idea that the influence of a possible identity prejudice (in this case, against a woman and/or ‘person of colour’) on the part of the (male/white) hearer has been recognised and corrected. Hermeneutical justice manifests itself in the reflective-critical sensitivity of the (male/white) hearer to any reduced understanding (or any failure to comprehend) incurred by the speaker (in this case, a woman and/or ‘person of colour’) because of a gap in the collective hermeneutical resources. In other words, the hearer is aware of the fact that the speaker’s apparent lack of understanding is “a function of a collective

 With reference to De Sousa Santos, these hybrid virtues might be held to have both a cognitive and a social component. 6

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hermeneutical impoverishment, and he adjusts or suspends his credibility judgement accordingly” (ibid.: 7). Surely there is a difference between rejecting someone’s knowledge claims on the mere grounds that she is African (this credibility deficit would be both ethically reprehensible and epistemologically problematic), and rejecting the claims held or expressed by someone who happens to be African, because they are unjustified and/ or false, or because they result from faulty or fallacious reasoning. Nonsense (like rationality) is not geographically, ethnically, culturally, racially, or sexually locatable or specific. By the same token, surely there is a difference between accepting someone’s knowledge-claims on the mere grounds that she is African (this credibility excess would be not only epistemologically problematic but also tokenist), and accepting the claims held or expressed by someone who happens to be African, because they result from clear-headed reasoning, because they are justified and true. Cognitive justice essentially involves the latter – it is ill-served by credibility excess.

Epistemic Emancipation Perhaps the dictum by De Sousa Santos et al. could be extended in the following fashion: ‘There is no social emancipation without epistemic emancipation.’ What, then, is epistemic emancipation? In what follows, I will use this idea because it arguably offers important advantages over both Lebakeng’s (and Masaka’s) notion of “epistemic liberation” (Lebakeng 2004: 112; Masaka 2018: 286; Masaka 2020) and the comprehensive account of epistemic freedom presented by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018: 3): The definitive entry of descendants of the enslaved, displaced, colonised and racialised peoples into the existing academies across the world, proclaiming loudly that they are human beings, their lives matter, and that they were born into valid and legitimate knowledge systems, enabled the resurgence of long-standing struggles for epistemic freedom. Thus(,) epistemic freedom speaks to cognitive justice. Epistemic freedom is fundamentally about the right to think, theorise, interpret the world, develop own methodologies, and write from where one is located and unencumbered by Eurocentrism.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (ibid.: 4) distinguishes epistemic freedom from academic freedom, which speaks to institutional autonomy of universities and rights to express diverse ideas(,) including those critical of authorities and political leaders. Epistemic freedom is much broader and deeper. It speaks to cognitive justice; it draws our attention to the content of what it is that we are free to express and on whose terms. … Epistemic freedom is about democratising ‘knowledge’ from its current rendition in the singular into its plural known as ‘knowledges’. It is also ranged against overrepresentation of Eurocentric thought in knowledge, social theory and education. Epistemic freedom is foundational in the broader decolonisation struggle because it enables the emergence of the necessary critical decolonial consciousness.

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Ndlovu-Gatsheni appears to conflate freedom and liberation. Yet, correctly seen, ‘epistemic freedom’ is the result of liberation and emancipation. It is the product, so to speak, of the processes that are epistemic liberation and emancipation. My preference for ‘emancipation’ over ‘liberation’ can be explained fairly succinctly. Epistemic emancipation arguably captures the crucial act of self-liberation, as opposed to ‘being set free’ by former oppressors, subjugators and exploiters – that is, as opposed to passively and gratefully accepting the purported ‘gift’ of epistemic freedom from the erstwhile knowledge killers. Epistemic emancipation is the act of emancipating oneself “from mental slavery”, as Bob Marley so memorably put it in his Redemption Song. Ndlovu-Gatsheni is correct in emphasising the key liberatory elements of decolonisation and reclamation, but his reference to “valid and legitimate knowledge systems” arguably involves a tautology. A knowledge system cannot be anything but valid and legitimate. It might not be recognised or acknowledged (for all the ethically and epistemically dubious and unjust reasons considered above) but, unlike a belief system, it cannot be invalid or illegitimate. An additional query concerning Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s account is whether epistemic democratisation necessitates a move from (the singular) ‘knowledge’ to (the plural) ‘knowledges’. This is not obvious. Like political democratisation, epistemic democratisation is a matter neither of ‘anything goes’ nor, necessarily, of ‘the more the merrier’. While a multi-party system is certainly preferable to a single- or two-party system, this advantage is lost when the parties are all (or mostly) located on one side of the political spectrum. Analogously, all beliefs or worldviews that parade as ‘knowledges’ ought to be carefully and critically scrutinised. Crackpot theories about the shape and location of our planet and about ‘stolen’ elections, witchcraft accusations and superstition, generally, have marginal, if any, epistemic value. ‘Emancipation’ signals the act or process of freeing oneself from restraint, from moral and social conventional strictures, indeed from slavery  – of course, more often than not this is a collective or communal effort. The content of the kind of emancipation under discussion here is knowledge. So ‘epistemic emancipation’ refers to the act of freeing oneself (whether individually or communally) from the restraint, conventions and strictures imposed from without on one’s knowledge and on one’s capacity and status as a knower. This is frequently coupled with claiming the right to think, conceptualise and philosophise in one’s own language, the right to know on the basis of the conceptual tools and the evidence at one’s disposal, and the right to epistemic independence and autonomy. Nonetheless, knowledge embodies certain conventions of its own, without which it is simply not knowledge. Among these are the features necessary (albeit perhaps not sufficient) for knowledge: belief, truth and adequate justification. ‘Epistemic’ independence and autonomy do not entail an abdication of rationality and epistemic norms and standards. Like moral and political independence and autonomy, epistemic independence and autonomy come not only with certain rights but also with certain obligations or responsibilities, as I will illustrate in the following section.

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Social Epistemology, Rights and Obligations As the foregoing discussion of epistemic injustice, cognitive justice and epistemic emancipation has indicated, there exists frequent confusion of matters of epistemology with matters of social justice. It is easy to commit this error, so I will attempt in this section to demonstrate what is at stake in this confusion and to draw on the tools of a fairly recent addition to the field of academic philosophy, social epistemology. Social epistemology is understood here as concerned with the interpersonal and social practices and norms that influence and guide the search for knowledge, the quest for truth and the avoidance of error. Epistemic emancipation suggests cognitive and intellectual autonomy. Like moral autonomy, this involves rational self-determination, and is (I will argue) best safeguarded by an appeal to individual rights. Apart from providing a basic framework for grounding the need for education and cognitive emancipation, as well as in terms of intellectual property rights, rights language has both a richness in application and a political effectiveness that are generally lacking in advocacy of ‘indigenous knowledge’ and ‘epistemological diversity’ projects. Broadly, and most plausibly, cognitive and epistemic justice refer to the fair and equal distribution of cognitive and epistemic benefits and burdens. They involve due acknowledgement of individuals as knowers (or ‘cognisers’) with corresponding rights and obligations. To illustrate this, I would like to dwell a little on the necessary conditions or essential components of propositional knowledge, or knowledge-­ that. The first component, the so-called subjective condition of knowledge, is belief. The freedom to think and believe what one likes is often claimed as a democratic right. Indeed, having the right to think and believe what one likes is politically and morally significant. Democratic constitutions safeguard differences in opinion and worldview, irrespective of whether these are true or correct. The right to freedom of thought, belief and religion includes the right to change one’s beliefs and religion at any time. The essence of democracy depends on these safeguards and guarantees. Yet, epistemically, this right is considerably narrower. One is free (and one has a right) to believe, epistemically, that for which one has adequate justification – and ideally that which is also true. It would make no sense whatsoever, epistemically, to claim an epistemic right to believe what is not adequately justified and/or what is untrue. Truth is the objective condition of knowledge. The ‘right to truth’ could be understood in at least two ways: the right to pursue truth (and to avoid error), and the right to be told the truth (that is, the right not to be lied to). Like other rights, especially the latter – the right to truthfulness – is not an absolute right: there may be circumstances where it is to one’s own advantage, or for one’s own benefit, not to know or be told ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth’. What about justification? Adequate justification constitutes a bridging condition in propositional knowledge, between belief and truth. An adequately justified belief is one to which a person is rationally entitled, to which that person has a right. Articulated in the normative terms of social epistemology, adequate justification may be defined as

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‘the right to be sure’ (see Horsthemke 2021: 84). An unjustified or insufficiently justified belief, on the other hand, is one that we ought not to hold, on the basis of rational considerations alone. There is a conceptual difference between having a right or (rationally being able) to embrace a belief, if a person so chooses, and having (a duty or an obligation) to embrace a belief, on the basis of rational considerations alone. Honouring our epistemic obligations ultimately comes down to assuming responsibility for the origin of our beliefs. There are two basic epistemic obligations: to pursue truth and to avoid error – although it is undoubtedly the case that the pursuit of truth is often bound up with committing errors. We know from ethical and legal discourse that there is an intimate connection between rights and obligations. If a person has a right, then others have correlative obligations towards that person. But can the same be said to follow from ‘the right to be sure’? If a person has a right to be sure, then who (if anyone) has any obligations? And what would be the content of these obligations? One of the responsibilities of educators is to develop learners’ understanding of the nature of evidence and their capacity to use evidence appropriately. However, we have other obligations, too: practical or prudential obligation, moral obligation, and epistemic obligation. Epistemic obligations are, at least superficially, distinct from other types of obligations. Educators, for example, have professional or practical obligations to do their work properly, and to make their lessons interesting and informative. Educators’ competence would be such an obligation. They also have moral obligations, for example, not to discriminate against certain learners, and to ensure a just and fair approach in the classroom. Educators’ trustworthiness would be such an obligation. Epistemic obligations, on the other hand, appear to be different: they concern a person assuming responsibility for his or her own beliefs, not for the beliefs of others. What is known as the ethics of belief or achieving epistemic excellence involves normative enquiry. It concerns what we have the right to believe, what we are entitled to believe. Another way of framing the ethics of belief is in terms of enquiring what we ought to believe, what we have an obligation to believe. It is worth noting that the different ‘oughts’ – in other words, practical or prudential obligation and epistemic obligation – may not coincide. While we may have a practical obligation not to believe something, we may have an epistemic obligation to do so (that is, on pain of irrationality). For example, a student may have a practical obligation to believe that she will pass the entrance examination (because this will give her valuable self-confidence), but she may have an epistemic obligation not to believe it (given the extraordinarily high failure rate among people taking the exam, and/or that she has not had enough time to prepare) (ibid.: 84, 85). Is taking responsibility for the formation of our beliefs the same as assuming responsibility for the formation of our values? After all, we cannot have values or act in accordance with values if we have no appropriate beliefs. Values, in a sense, are beliefs: beliefs about what is worthwhile or good. People generally do not readily relinquish or abandon what they believe to be true. It would surely be unreasonable to expect someone to change their values just because a new approach or a new

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government instructs them to do so. By the same token, it would be irrational to adhere to values that have been shown to be questionable (ibid.: 86).

‘African Ways of Knowing’: Tokoloshe and Mantindane In 1996, Credo Mutwa7 published Isilwane/The Animal, essentially an account of “the reverence in which animals are held according to African ritual and tradition” (1996: back cover blurb). Among the many fascinating ‘traditional tales’ contained in the book is Mutwa’s account of why the cat is “more than just a pet” (ibid.: 30): “treating a cat properly guarantees that it will protect you against the tokoloshe and the mantindane” (ibid.: 31). He goes on to provide the following account, which is worth quoting in virtual entirety: From the Cape right up to Zaire, there is a fearful creature known as the tokoloshe. It is short, thickset, round-headed and furry, with a round snout and a pair of glowing, bright red eyes. It has pointed ears and a thick, bony ridge extending from above its forehead to the nape of its neck. This creature, short though it is, is extremely aggressive and viciously cruel. It specializes in sexually assaulting women and challenges benighted travellers to stick fights which it triumphantly wins. (Ibid.)

Mutwa writes that in the course of his career as a traditional healer, he has “come across many women who have been sexually molested and even raped by this terrible creature, which moves in the shadowy field where the real and the unreal, the visible and the invisible meet” (ibid.). “As a sanusi,” Mutwa has treated many men who have been beaten and frightened out of their wits by the tokoloshe. However, there are some people, especially white sceptics, who believe that the tokoloshe is nothing more than a figment of African superstition and fertile imagination. (ibid.: 32)

Referring to the fact that he possesses “over fifty years of experience”, Mutwa feels impelled to appeal to these sceptics to think again. The tokoloshe is real – it does exist. I have seen the way it injures men and women who are unfortunate enough to fall into its clutches. When Africans fear the tokoloshe they are not fearing a figment of their imaginations. Instead of being laughed off by sceptics, the tokoloshe deserves investigation. (Ibid.)

“There is another creature,” he reports, which is not unlike the tokoloshe in its love of inflicting bodily harm, and which is also greatly feared. … Like the tokoloshe, the mantindane stands about three-and-a-half feet tall. Unlike the tokoloshe, which is a powerfully built, almost chimpanzee-like creature, it appears extremely frail. It has a large, bald, egg-shaped head which can be as large as a fully grown watermelon, and it has very weak-looking jaws. Its mouth is little more than a slit and the nose is rudimentary, with nostrils like comma-shaped holes. The creature’s eyes are very strange and resemble beans. They are slanted and covered with what looks like thick,

 Mutwa, according to the publicity information on the back cover (1996), is a “well-known wise man of Africa and sanusi (uppermost sangoma) of all sangomas [traditional healers] in southern Africa, [and] respected and well-known by people across the world”. 7

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jet-black plastic or horn. It has a very thin neck, narrow shoulders and long, thin arms, and its hands, although resembling those of a human being, are very thin and long. Its long, thin and bony fingers have more joints than those of a human being. The creature’s two spindly legs end in long, delicate feet. The mantindane is civilized and highly intelligent, and unlike the tokoloshe, which appears stark-naked, it always wears some type of garment that reaches from its neck and covers its limbs completely. The colour of this creature’s skin is a strange greyish white with slight pink overtones. Like the tokoloshe, the mantindane treats human beings who fall into its hands cruelly and with utter contempt. It kidnaps males and females and scoops out flesh from their legs, thighs and even buttocks and upper arms. Unlike the tokoloshe which is solitary, mantindane operate in groups. There can be as many as twenty of these vicious creatures in one group. Sometimes a gang of mantindane will kidnap a person and ill-treat him or her. They will then release the person, only to kidnap them again a few months or even a few years later. (Ibid.)

Mutwa states that he has “met many black men and women throughout Africa who have been kidnapped by these creatures several times, and who bear scars on their bodies that testify to their terrible ordeals at the hands of these strange and fearful beings” (ibid.). “I have personally fallen victim to mantindane,” he reports, “– not once, but three times – and I still carry scars on my body that testify to the truth of what I say” (ibid.). Mutwa’s account is noteworthy, in the present context, for its implicit acknowledgement of the conditions that are generally assumed to have to be in place when we make knowledge claims: belief, truth and appropriate justification (‘experience’, evidence, testimony). Clearly, “many black men and women throughout Africa” believe that the tokoloshe and mantindane are real, that they exist. Equally clearly, beliefs in these creatures might be put to educational use in terms of comparative studies of cultural creativity and myth-making (see Lillejord and Mkabela 2004). Do these beliefs constitute ‘African ways of knowing’, however, and can (and should) they be taught as ‘African knowledge’? Before one can even begin to answer these questions, one ought to be clear about what is involved in judging others’ knowledge claims, especially if these ‘others’ adhere to what would appear to be substantially different epistemological traditions. Am I inflicting ‘epistemic harm’ on someone when I judge her beliefs to be untrue and/or lacking in adequate justification? When I refer to the tokoloshe or mantindane as “a figment of African superstition and fertile imagination,” does this constitute ‘epistemicide’, and ‘epistemic injustice’ towards those who hold the beliefs in question? Evidently, the most desirable way of proceeding would be by trying to understand how those who have certain beliefs could see them as plausible, to grasp the concepts they use. This is a simple albeit essential demonstration of respect.

A Brief Conclusion Having said this, as I have made clear in this essay, ‘knowledge’ is not ambiguous between various concepts of knowledge. What constitutes knowledge does not fluctuate with differences in people’s cognitive abilities or with what their personal and

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cultural backgrounds are. Of course, people do not have the same cognitive resources, abilities and opportunities. They do not all act or operate in the absence of time constraints. Their situations are characterised by different levels of expertise, by different opportunities to access and gather information, by different levels of cognitive ability, maturity and training, and by considerable disparities in time constraints. This insight permits us to talk of different levels of justification, without implying epistemic relativism or relativism about truth. It is not the case that ‘anything goes’, epistemologically. The knowledge in question remains characterised by the pursuit of truth and the avoidance of error. A person’s claims constitute ‘knowledge’ only if they are true. Truth does not vary according to particular individuals, social or ethnic groups, or different cultures. This serves to indicate why it is advisable to be more lenient in some cases than in others, in terms of expected sophistication of justification (and judging its ‘adequacy’), but such leniency does not extend to condoning untruths or falsehoods.

References Bennett, Karen. 2017. Epistemicide! The Tale of a Predatory Discourse. In S.  Cunico and J. Munday (eds.), Translation and Ideology, special issue of The Translator 13(2): 151–169. Code, Lorraine, Denis C.  Phillips, Claudia W.  Ruitenberg, Harvey Siegel, and Lynda Stone. 2012. Epistemological Diversity: A Roundtable. In Education, Culture and Epistemological Diversity: Mapping a Contested Terrain, ed. C.W.  Ruitenberg and D.C.  Phillips, 121–143. Dordrecht: Springer. De Sousa Santos, Boavista. 2005. General Introduction. In Democratising Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon, ed. B. De Sousa Santos, xvii–xxxiii. Verso: London & New York. ———. 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. London & New York: Routledge. De Sousa Santos, Boavista, João Arriscado Nunes, and Maria Paula Meneses. 2007. Introduction: Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and Recognition of Difference. In Another Knowledge Is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies, ed. B. De Sousa Santos, xvix–lxii. London & New York: Verso. Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hallen, Barry, and J.O. Sodipo. 1997. Knowledge, Belief, and Witchcraft: Analytical Experiments in African Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1992. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Horsthemke, Kai. 2021. Indigenous Knowledge – Philosophical and Educational Considerations. Lanham: Lexington Books. Kant, Immanuel. 1900ff. Kants gesammelte Schriften. Publ. by the Royal Prussian Academy of the Sciences (Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften [today Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften]). Vols. 1–29. Berlin: Georg Reimer (later Walter de Gruyter; “Akademie” edition). Lebakeng, Teboho. 2004. Towards a Relevant Higher Education Epistemology. In Towards an African Identity of Higher Education, ed. S. Seepe, 109–119. Pretoria: Vista University and Skotaville Media.

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Lebakeng, Teboho, Manthiba Phalane, and Nase Dalindjebo. 2006. Epistemicide, Institutional Cultures and the Imperative for the Africanisation of Universities in South Africa. AlterNation 13 (1): 70–87. Lillejord, Solveig, and Queeneth Mkabela. 2004. Indigenous and Popular Narratives: The Educational Use of Myths in a Comparative Perspective. South African Journal of Higher Education 18 (3): 257–268. Masaka, Dennis. 2017. Challenging Epistemicide through Transformation and Africanisation of the Philosophy Curriculum in Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4): 441–455. ———. 2018. The Prospects of Ending Epistemicide in Africa: Some Thoughts. Journal of Black Studies 49 (3): 284–301. ———. 2020. Universities in Africa and the Quest for Global Epistemic Justice. In African Higher Education in the 21st Century: Epistemological, Ontological and Ethical Perspectives, ed. E.T. Gwaravanda and A.P. Ndofirepi, 74–89. London & Boston: Brill/Sense. Mutwa, Credo. 1996. Isilwane/The Animal. Cape Town: Struik. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. 2018. Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization. London & New York: Routledge. Odora Hoppers, Catherine. 2009. Education, Culture and Society in a Globalising World: Implications for Comparative and International Education. Compare 39 (5): 601–614. Ramose, Mogobe B. 2004. In Search of an African Philosophy of Education. South African Journal of Higher Education 18 (3): 138–160. Visvanathan, C.  Shiv. 1997. A Carnival for Science: Essays on Science, Technology and Development. London: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. The Search for Cognitive Justice. http://www.india-­seminar.com/2009/597/597_ shiv_visvanathan.htm

Chapter 3

Knowledge Production and the Liberation Agenda in Africa Dennis Masaka

Introduction The agenda for the liberation of African peoples more generally has often been conceived as a yearning waiting for authentic consummation (Ramose 2016: 548). This is despite their attainment of ‘independence’ that has been touted as a departure from patronizing life of conquest and dominance. Yet it has not essentially delivered them from entanglement in hegemonic categories and charted a path to realistic liberation (Mudimbe 1988: 199; Masaka 2021: 263) showing that the claim to independence is one grand deception that ought to be noted and critiqued. With this in mind, the major focus in this chapter is on the problematic question of knowledge production and the envisioned liberation agenda in countries in Africa. I take it as a necessary debate as one ponders what ought to be done in order for African peoples to be the primary points of reference and determinants of their own knowledge  projects. The intention is to place knowledge production at the centre of African peoples’ liberation agenda with concern being on how such an important project ought to be construed if it is to deliver envisioned liberation on epistemic and other fronts. The idea is that a more authentic liberation agenda so conceived ought to be foregrounded by a robust and honest debate on the project of knowledge production by those realistically sympathetic to the liberation agenda of African peoples. At stake here is how such a worthy endeavour could be conceived in order to ensure that it successfully foregrounds veritable liberation for the indigenous people of Africa.

D. Masaka (*) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_3

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While Jennifer Lisa Vest (2005: 6) prefers South-South dialogues as a way of proffering a homogenous position in response to shared historical experiences; which to her is indicative of ‘a shift in focus and method’, I argue that addressing the problematic question of knowledge production is an important and  foundational  issue that not only render such dialogues meaningful but could also provides a more plausible base for the quest for liberation on a more secure foundation. To some extent, I share perspectives with Tommy J.  Curry (2011a, b, see also Vest 2005: 9) that the focus of dominated peoples should be on self-understanding than seeking legitimation from or secure space within the same dominant epistemological order that has historically demeaned their epistemologies and ways of knowing. Drawing from Curry’s (2011a, b) averments, I give explicit attention to the contentious issue of knowledge production as an essential point of departure for thoughts about more realistic liberation of African peoples. I show that this can be made possible if there is an articulate focus on how knowledge production could be geared towards attaining the envisioned liberation of African peoples. It is for this reason that in this chapter, I consider how knowledge production in countries in Africa could be conceived differently if it is to aid their cause for a more authentic liberation that will in turn foreground the quest for self-assertion (Oladipo 1995: 26) and attainment of their liberation goals. This is a departure from calls for the presence of African knowledges in educational curricula in Africa without necessarily paying attention to the ideological and methodological underpinnings of such knowledges. The chapter has three sections. In the first section, I show that knowledge production in countries in Africa has not departed from the problematic entanglement in the dominant epistemology for which it intends to overturn. This is a cause for concern especially in light of efforts to escape entanglement in epistemological categories of hegemonic cultures and chart a liberatory path that I take to be foundational to the liberation of African peoples on other fronts. In the second section, I defend the need for knowledge production that is truly centred on indigenous people of Africa’s respective self-histories and conditions of existence, unmediated by alien knowledge traditions, through veritable ideological and methodological leanings (see Graness 2015: 89–90). In the last section, I discuss the promise of such an ideological and methodological change for countries in Africa in their quests for liberation. The aim is to show the possible benefits of knowledges produced from ideological and methodological standpoints of African cultures.

Entangled Knowledge Production Knowledge production in Africa remains largely a problematic enterprise because of its failure to escape from the very epistemological order it sets out to overturn (see Ramose 2016: 548; Mudimbe 1988: 10). This has hampered efforts to facilitate the liberation of African peoples particularly on the epistemic front. In turn, this has a bearing on the broader efforts to engender liberation more generally as African peoples seek to be the authoritative voices about themselves and their affairs.

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Entangled knowledge production will only succeed in giving deceptive liberation to African peoples because the dominant epistemological order will continue to underpin knowledge production in Africa. Essentially, this means that entangled knowledge production cannot deliver the envisioned liberation of African peoples. With this in mind, in this section, I set out to show that knowledge production in countries in Africa is yet to depart from problematic entanglement in the dominant epistemology for which they intend to overturn. Yet this is an essential prerequisite for the production of knowledge that speaks to terms and frameworks of African cultures. Claims of independence of countries in Africa have been widespread. Essentially this has been construed to mean the physical displacement of purveyors of conquest from their positions of direct control and domination over indigenous African peoples. On its own, this notion of independence has been largely disputed as nominal since control and domination have mutated from overt to covert mode thereby dampening claims of disentanglement from the influence of hegemonic cultures. Kwame Nkrumah aptly advices (1965, x) that ‘a State in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of its own destiny’. This serves to show that ‘political independence’ is not enough to justify celebrations and claims of ‘arrival’ but ought to be construed as one of many steps in African peoples’ quest to assume maximal control of their own affairs. As a result of the realisation of the nominal nature of the independence that countries in Africa often pride themselves with, there has been sustained calls to focus on knowledge production as an essential element of the liberation agenda. But then, there are plausible reasons to show that such a noble cause is likely to be constrained by a number of issues. These issues justifies the depiction of knowledge production as it currently puns out in Africa as preeminently an entangled enterprise requiring a realistic transformative overhaul. I now proceed to discuss these issues. One of the possible reasons why knowledge production in Africa has not broken from the hegemonic epistemological order, for which defenders of epistemic liberation have committed themselves to overturn, could be the desire for legitimation. The idea is to contentiously entrust the quest for epistemic liberation with the same epistemological order that has effectively undermined other epistemologies by construing  them  to be of a lesser order. The lure then will be to fashion knowledge production in Africa along lines of the dominant cultures. This might be viewed as a way of showing the dominant culture that other cultures can produce knowledges that meet its canon. As the argument might go, it is no longer necessary to ascribe a demeaning status to other knowledge formations since they are essentially produced on terms and frameworks of the former. Once the dominated epistemologies find home within the canon of the dominant epistemology, they might feel that the latter has to recognise and accept their efforts. But then the desire for legitimation or to fit into categories of thought of the dominant epistemic traditions  as the principle underpinning knowledge production in Africa is problematic and ought to be rejected. It will only succeed to produce clones of the dominant epistemology and not knowledges that are anchored on terms and frameworks of African peoples and unconstrained by clamour for recognition and acceptance by hegemonic epistemologies. This is not the kind of aim that ought to preoccupy African knowledge producers in their efforts to produce liberatory knowledges. The main focus ought to be

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on building stocks of knowledge that are underpinned by African peoples’ varied life experiences and not clamouring for legitimation. With the above view in mind, it is futile for African knowledge producers to seek, as a point of departure, the ‘expertise’ of knowledge producers from other traditions in order for them to consider their knowledges as legitimate and authentic. This contentious way of producing knowledge in Africa is akin to what Vest (Vest 2005: 14) cautions as ‘perverse preoccupations’, that is, a commitment to prove to the Euro-North American world that African knowledge producers are after all, capable of thought that fit the latter’s notions of thought. It turns out that there is no epistemic tradition that has powers to grant the sought legitimation except by contentiously tilting other knowledges to its preferred epistemological order. This is not the path that genuine knowledge production in Africa that is true to their frameworks and varied existential situations might want to take. A path of genuine liberation demands a sustained focus on African peoples telling varied African stories according to their own respective perspectives. Connected to the clamour for legitimation from the dominant epistemology is a contentious notion of seeking standardisation of knowledge production across geopolitical centres. The idea is that there is one ‘universal’ standard upon which knowledge productions across geopolitical centres ought to conform to. Essentially, such thinking trashes the notion that there are varied knowledges as there are varied cultures and communities that produce them. Focus then is on producing knowledge underpinned by the assumed ‘universal standard’ that guarantees authentic and ‘universal’ knowledge. But then the ‘universal’ has largely been discounted by some scholars as essentially an attempt by mostly Euro-North American world to project their particular knowledge formations and standards as befitting transcultural application and appeal (Taiwo 1998: 5–6; Dussel and Ibarra-Colado 2006: 505; Ramose 2016: 551; Dunford 2017: 389–390). Understood thus, the assumed ‘universal’ standards are misguided efforts to suppress differences of perspectives and methods of producing knowledges arising from varied epistemic traditions of this world. Nevertheless, the lure of standardisation might be one justificatory reason for attempting to launch liberatory knowledge production within the same epistemological order that has historically demeaned other knowledge projects to the periphery of ‘the canon’. But contradictions of such efforts appear pretty obvious. While this may on the face of it appears an innocent project, it in fact is a snaring one. If it is accepted that cultures across the world produce knowledges that are inspired by their varied existential situations and methods, it will not be plausible to think of a standard of knowledge production that speaks to how they conceive the world from their varied vantage points. Any efforts to produce liberatory knowledge that is conditioned by terms and frameworks of the dominant epistemology will not help in the quest for the production of veritable knowledges that are necessary for African cultures’ pursuits for self-assertion and liberation. In this following section, I attempt to defend possible remedies to the problem of entangled knowledge production in Africa.

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Defending Liberatory Knowledge Production In the preceding section, I discussed entangled knowledge production as an encumbering problem for African peoples to attain epistemic liberation and liberation more generally. In this section, the focus is on what needs to be done in order to help the case for the production of knowledges that stand to aid African peoples’ quest to attain the envisioned liberation. In this connection, I seek to defend the need to invest more in understanding what needs to be done in order to ensure that knowledge production in Africa pointedly speaks to their needs and aspirations. In so doing, it is necessary to guard against a stampede to produce knowledge  that are considered liberatory without paying attention to the requisite ideological and methodological base that would underpin such an important task. I will show why this is important as African peoples undertake to attain more sustainable liberation. What could be the prerequisites of successful production of liberatory knowledges for African peoples? I consider this to be an important question that ought to be addressed as a foundational issue in preparation for the production of knowledges that African peoples envision as essential to their liberation. The very foundation of knowledge production in Africa has to be seriously interrogated. It is not an issue to be glossed over in efforts to produce knowledges that are identified with African cultures. And in so doing, it is necessary to establish ideologies and methods that could underpin it. Do the ideologies and methods derive from the indigenous peoples of Africa for which the knowledges produced are meant to be of service? If not, can knowledges thus produced be of purpose to African peoples’ liberation agenda? The answer is in the negative for the reason that colonial ideologies and methods are conceived as primarily extroverted and thus largely unfit for underpinning African peoples’ journey to liberation. A significant focus on the foundations of knowledge production in Africa becomes a subject of intense interest for those involved in knowledge production that would foreground the overall liberation agenda of the indigenous people of Africa. This then places ideology and method at the centre of production of knowledge that energises African people’s quest for epistemic liberation and liberation more generally. The term ‘ideology’ is often conceived as embodying negative connotations especially in connection to how it has at times been understood with reference to relations between the hegemonic cultures and dominated ones. In this connection, the negative sentiments it carries would thus incline one to think that it is something not to be trusted to leverage a serious transformation agenda that would lead to the attainment of envisioned liberation goals of African peoples. When it is conceived as embodying tyrannical and oppressive tendencies against certain segments of human society, ideology is not attractive to those who want to launch serious struggles for liberation. As J. Andrew Kirk (2010: 240) puts it, ‘when judged negatively an ideology is often said to defend and promote the vested interests of a sector of a given population (a privileged class of people), irrespective of the effect its implementation may have on other groups in society’. This is not the sense in which I use the term ‘ideology’ as it serves to create uneven power relations among segments of

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a particular society. As such, it does not accord with an authentic liberation agenda that must underpin knowledge production in Africa, one that takes as its point of departure, the need for the indigenous people of Africa to fashion an ideology that enables them to attain epistemic liberation. It is akin to a colonial ideology that ought to be replaced by a liberatory one. In this connection, an ideology is attractive to those who subscribe to it and does not have the same effects to those who do not. Abiola F. Irele’s (2004: 56) understanding of an ideology is instructive in efforts to map an ideology that could underpin epistemic liberation in Africa wherein: it is a direct response to the actual conditions of life, and has a social function, either as a defensive system of beliefs and ideas which support and justify an established social structure, or as a rational project for the creation of a new order. The latter type of ideology, even when it includes a certain degree of idealism, also implies a reasoned programme of collective action; it becomes the intellectual channel of social life.

It is the latter sense of the term ‘ideology’ that applies to this work and which ought to underpin the African peoples’ liberation agenda. Africa knowledge producers ought to construct knowledges in ‘a new order’ that takes as foundational, the need to produce knowledges that disentangle African peoples from the burden of epistemological order that does not speak to their terms and lived experiences. The idea is that the thinking behind knowledge production in Africa must be inspired by the thoughts and purposes of users of these knowledges. This will enable it to be more useful to them than is currently the situation where much of what is purported to be African knowledges are constructed on non-indigenous epistemological orders and terms. Connected to the need for ideological changes that are necessary for more veritable knowledge production in Africa, is the imperative for methodological considerations. One important clarification in this endeavour is that there is not one method of producing knowledge as friends of standardisation in the arena of knowledge production might want to claim. The temptation however, seems stronger to produce knowledge according to the prescribed methods emanating from other knowledge traditions. But then, different cultures do have their own methods of producing knowledge in line with their own lived experiences. In this light, what may be considered informal sites of knowledge production like the home environments, the community or society for example, ought to be taken seriously as important platforms that contribute to a particular cultural group’s stock of knowledge. The methods of producing knowledge thus ought to be such that they appeal to respective cultures’ internal modes of knowledge production. Attempts to legislate a particular culture’s method of producing knowledge to underpin knowledge production in other cultures will only serve to produce knowledges that are less significant to cultures they are meant to serve (see Graness 2015: 80). Not even attempting to ‘transform’ methods of producing knowledge picked from other geopolitical centres to suit peculiarities of some African cultures may work in pursuit of genuine epistemic liberation and liberation more generally. It may just produce ‘perverse’ knowledges that are not steeped in the social and existential milieus for which they are supposed to serve. Curry (2011a, b) cautions against Africana philosophy’s

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tendency to show the inadequacies of European philosophy and its attempts to seek to transform it from a philosophic tradition known for its aversion and demeaning perceptions of other ways of thinking to one that is accommodative. When this is taken as the guiding principle of Africana philosophy, Curry (2011a: 143) notes that ‘African-American philosophy functions primarily as academic racial therapy’ aimed at changing the bad side of hegemonic cultures ‘rather than advancing the self-understanding of African/a peoples’. This clamour to transform a hegemonic philosophy or epistemology so that it becomes, as assumed, accommodative of other ways of thinking cannot help in efforts to develop authentic African-American philosophy per se. I find Curry’s (2011a, b) repudiation of African-American philosophy largely relevant to African peoples’ arduous journey to produce truly liberatory knowledges. It is simply a deceptive endeavour that will essentially misdirect the epistemic liberation agenda for countries in Africa whereby it remains essentially entangled in the same epistemological order they seek to escape from. The clarion call for African-American philosophy to focus on self-understanding of its own history is a necessary step as it battles to attain envisioned epistemic liberation. African peoples can learn lessons from the mistakes of Africa-American philosophy that Curry (2011a, b) highlights as they seek to produce knowledges that would underpin their liberation agenda. More specifically, Curry (2011a, b) shows the futility of underpinning knowledge production on terms and frameworks of other epistemic traditions if countries in Africa are to attain the envisioned liberation especially on epistemic fronts. Focus on knowledge production that speaks to ideologies and terms of African cultures is necessary in order to enhance self-understanding of their histories and thought systems. But then this important step presupposes a fundamental problem that it seeks to correct in a robust way, that is, the problem of denials of various capacities of African peoples by some peoples and cultures from the Euro-North American world. Such an issue may not elude attention along the way as one seeks to produce knowledge committed to self-understanding. Vest (2005, 2009) has no kind words for global South thinkers who pay unnecessary attention to problematic claims peddled by some hegemonic cultures pertaining to assumed pathological inabilities and deficiencies of African peoples and those from global South regions more generally. These ‘perverse preoccupations’ are said to prevent global South peoples from producing knowledges centred on their own histories and conditions of existence and underpinned by their respective ideologies and methods. As Vest (2005: 14, 2009: 3) notes, much time and effort are lost by global South peoples in trying to answer dubious questions and agendas set by peoples from hegemonic cultures; debates that may preclude and at times distort pursuit of African self-­ histories and thought systems. It is akin to allowing hegemonic cultures to shape debates about African self-histories and thought systems. In this light, the useful thing to do is to ignore these dubious questions and claims and instead pursue ‘necessary and fruitful debates’ (Vest, 2009: 3). However, Vest’s (2009: 2) claim that dialogues in African philosophy ought to start with certain ‘necessary assumptions’ about Africans’ abilities is apt to raise some critical questions that are likely to implicate her in the same perversity she is

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trying reject. As Vest (2009: 2) argues, ‘dialogues in African philosophy should begin with certain necessary assumptions: we must assume it exists, that it is possible, that it is valuable, that it is important. We must believe that being African does not invalidate a philosophy, deligitimize it or even raise suspicions about its authenticity’. The operational word that is worth highlighting in Vest’s (2009: 2) claim is ‘assumptions’ of abilities that ought to foreground dialogues within African Philosophy. It would appear that making such assumptions is to steep oneself in perverse preoccupations that Vest (2005, 2009) has vehemently set out to reject. The reason is that the existence of African philosophy ought not to be a subject of debate and need not at all to be treated as an ‘assumption’ or its development or evolvement to proceed from certain ‘necessary assumptions’. To proceed from ‘assumptions’ in evolving and developing African thought is simply to accede to the problematic narrative that treats questions of its existence as requiring debate and verification. This is likely to put African philosophy’s existence from time immemorial in serious doubt; an issue Africans ought not to expend intellectual energies on as Vest (2005: 2) rightly claims. Perhaps, we need not anchor knowledge production in Africa on ‘assumptions’ of African philosophy’s existence but on a fact beyond dispute that it has always existed. Nevertheless, one might argue that it is not proper to ignore questions that continue to be raised pertaining to Africans’ abilities as one seeks to produce knowledges that are underpinned on ideologies and methods emerging from African cultures. The reason is that doing so might help especially in attaining more enduring epistemic liberation especially given that the narrative of African inabilities to produce knowledges from their own sources might have a fair share of adherents. I have in mind reactions to questions about the inabilities of Africans to devise knowledges from their terms and frameworks. Though attempts at disproving such claims might appear to be a worst of intellectual energy and time, it is necessary given that there could be some people within the global South that take such claims of African inabilities as points of fact. As a result, it is necessary to reject such prejudicial narratives while at the same time expending significant and serious energies on what Vest (2009: 14) calls ‘necessary debates’. And for this reason, one might argue that there is need to engage these perverse questions without necessarily considering them as the overarching preoccupation of engagements in African philosophy. With this in mind, Vest (2009: 4), argues that we need to focus on ‘necessary debates’ that ‘privilege Africa and African issues relevant to African intellectual goals and concerns. Necessary debates are defined by the intellectual goals of African philosophers: they are pivotal to lively and engaging discourse, they are vital for Africans- African thinkers, African educational programs and African creative expression’. Curry (2011a, b) shares a similar perspective where he implores African-­ American philosophy to be committed to the self-understanding of black thought and history than to seek to transform hegemonic philosophy so that it becomes more accommodative of other systems of thought. Such a change of focus is commendable if countries in Africa are to attain the epistemic liberation that has eluded them since the beginning of colonial conquest. Nevertheless, there is need to be more

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explicit about critical steps that are necessary for the attainment of the envisioned epistemic liberation, that is, the basis upon which liberatory knowledges in Africa are to be anchored. I think that this is an issue that has not been given more attention especially in debates about knowledge production in Africa. Yet, it is an important one in preparing for the production of knowledges of a kind that speak to terms and frameworks of their producers and users. It will not help to embark on a programme to produce knowledges that are purportedly considered African when they are essentially underpinned by ideologies and methods of other epistemic traditions and thus of marginal value to their own conditions of existence. A stampede to produce such knowledges will not aid African peoples’ escape from the epistemic entanglement that still essentially subsists in much of the knowledges that are currently viewed as ‘African’. There is need to abandon deceptive liberatory knowledge projects and seek to seriously rethink what needs to be done in order to initiate veritable knowledge projects that place at their centre the quest for realistic liberation. It is for this reason that I argue that attention ought to be committed at crafting ideologies and methods steeped in the conditions of existence of African peoples that will in turn underpin knowledge production disposed to attain more meaningful liberation of African peoples. In these projects, focus has to change from prioritising answering to ‘perverse questions’ to seeking to rethink strategies necessary to produce knowledges that are identifiable to African peoples in terms of focus, ideological and methodological orientations. Pandering to agenda-setting antics of hegemonic cultures through confining debates of African knowledge projects to answering questions posed from elsewhere will only succeed in producing entangled knowledges that are less useful to the liberation agenda of African peoples.

Prospects of a New Epistemology In the previous section, I discussed what needs to be done in order for knowledges that are to be called ‘African’ to answer to the circumstances of African peoples. In this connection, I noted the need to change the ideologies and methods that underpin knowledge production in Africa so that they derive from authentic lived experiences of respective African peoples. The reason behind the call for ideological and methodological changes is that pursuit of production of authentic African knowledges cannot to be outsourced to ideologies and methods of other epistemic traditions for doing so only gives rise to deceptive ‘African’ knowledges of less significance to their varied lived experiences. These ideological and methodological changes are fundamental prerequisites to the production of liberatory knowledges. In this section, I discuss the promise of such changes in the overall scheme of knowledge production in Africa. The aim is to demonstrate the possibility of different outcomes for African peoples from ones produced by what can essentially be called dubious African knowledges that currently constitute much of the content of the educational curricula in some countries in Africa. To demonstrate the promise of a new epistemology for African peoples, it is necessary to briefly rehearse the

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deficiencies of epistemologies underpinned by ideologies and methods from other epistemic traditions yet defended in some quarters as good for purpose for African peoples mainly on account of playing to the standardisation narrative. It has been shown that knowledges are tied to circumstances from which they arise. The assumption is that in the different spaces of this universe, varied circumstances unfold so are questions that require answers through the production of requisite knowledges. This definitely calls attention to the fact that the birth of knowledges is initially a localized process though with time such knoweledges may be transmitted and adapted to spheres outside their original spaces of origin. Theophilus Okere (2005: 1) has clearly shown that ‘at its roots, knowledge production is context bound’. While I agree that knowledge so conceived could to be adapted to other circumstances for use, I feel that on balance of scale it is more useful to the context from which it emerges than to alien spaces. This gains traction when one realises that, barring circumstances of conquest, ideologies and methods underpinning knowledge production in any particular space and culture emerge from it. As a result, such knowledges may not be so useful and worthwhile outside their places of birth compared to those produced using ideologies and methods of respective cultures. There lies the problems with much of knowledges consumed in Africa. Their largely outward-looking nature may not produce useful results for African peoples especially given that the ideologies and methods underpinning their production reflect the existential situations from which they originally emerge. The reason is that the circumstances of African peoples just like of any other peoples require knowledges steeped in their own ideologies, methods and conditions of existence. One such explicit failure of ‘exported knowledges’ often cited are their failure to spur the development of countries in Africa in ways that speak to their varied needs and circumstances (Nabudere 2006; Metz 2009; Oppong 2013; Ugwuanyi 2013). The drive in this direction has been to produce knowledges that are geared for purpose most notably to push the agenda of self-understanding and finding solutions to emerging problems of the day. Knowledge has never been innocent of context and purpose such that talk of transcultural knowledge appear farfetched and unattainable if not simply to hoodwink those unfortunate to be its users from outside spaces of its origin, ideological and methodological order. Essentially, the knowledge paradigm from the Euro-North American world that currently predominates official educational curricula in countries in Africa is designed for purpose which upon analysis may be found not to resonate with the varied directions countries in Africa and cultures within them may want to take going forward. For reason of being essentially underpinned on ideological and methodological inclinations of cultures from which they emerge, it has been found to be largely deficient. It has not been able to fully answer to the aspirations and existential challenges and issues of major concerns to African peoples. In light of this, what could be the promise of new epistemologies underpinned by ideologies and methods of different African cultures going into the future? New epistemologies ought to directly confront the problems facing respective African peoples ranging from problematic independence to issues of development that would realistically improve conditions of existence of African peoples. This

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must be done in robust ways that really show the transformational change that the emergence of truly African knowledges as the preeminent paradigm that will underpin governance and development in countries in Africa. In so doing, such knowledges ought to distinguish themselves from those steeped in Euro-North American epistemological order, that currently predominate the curricula in some countries in Africa, in terms of their practical impact on African peoples, their aspirations and challenges. Such epistemologies will expose the myth of ‘universal’ knowledge that has over time been peddled by friends of standardisation of knowledge production. This is basically meant to show the problems of taking an epistemology of a particular segment of humanity as fit enough to apply to other cultures across the world. New knowledges emerging from African cultural communities ought not to be encumbered by the claim of a ‘universal knowledge’ to prop up a particular epistemic tradition so that it masquerades as transcultural one. This can be extended to other aspects so central to countries in Africa such as governance models. A critical question that new epistemologies could address is the issue of tenuous political independence of African peoples that I consider to be a critical accessory to more sustainable liberation more generally. These epistemologies have a potential to expose the myth of independence of countries in Africa on the political front. New epistemologies are more likely to lead to calls for evolvement and production of African governance models. They could do so by ensuring that governance models in use in Africa largely emerge from peculiar circumstances of respective African peoples as opposed to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ kind of democracy model implied in the Euro-North American liberal democracy tradition recommended for countries in Africa. African consensual democracy may not be spared either as it also seems to embody the ‘one-size-fits-all’ notion as if Africa is a homogenous continent. This calls attention to the need for countries in Africa to devise their own governance models that pointedly speak to their respective and varied circumstances. Rejection of the standardisation narrative and embracing a transformational turn to enhancing self-understanding of African peoples is not a choice but a necessity, one that will underpin the tortuous journey to sustainable liberation envisioned by African peoples. New epistemologies will give promise to this necessary liberatory turn. But then, one might argue that producing knowledges relative to particular cultures does not bode well with a typical contemporary African country that is multicultural such that it will have a plethora of epistemologies corresponding to different cultural groups within it. As a result, an interlocutor might inquire whose particular epistemology ought to underpin say a democracy or developmental model for a typical country in Africa seized with the imperative for realistic liberation without some epistemologies shutting out others. While this interlocutor raises a pertinent issue, what appears lost to her or him is that such cultures may on face of it be seized with essentially similar circumstances of existence and histories such that part of what their culturally subjective knowledges seek is to emerge from shared histories of being under conquest as well as the consequent development conundrum. This can effectively be done by producing knowledges anchored on ideologies and methods deriving from respective African cultures and their respective conditions of existence.

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Concluding Remarks Because new epistemologies will be steeped in the ideologies and methods of African peoples, they are bound to be more useful in understanding and finding remedies to their circumstances of existence. They will not be constrained by the logics of entanglement that direct knowledge production along the lines of other epistemic traditions as what is predominantly the case in Africa currently. This is a breakthrough that knowledge production requires if it is to steer countries in Africa to epistemic liberation and liberation more generally in the desired directions. My focus on the accessories to knowledge production in Africa stems from the view that if it is underpinned on ideologies and methods of the same epistemic traditions that it seeks to overturn and create conditions for veritable liberation, then such an envisioned outcome might not be realistically realised. For this reason, it is necessary to critically rethink what will underpin these new knowledges so that what is produced reflects the thinking and lived experiences of African cultures, that is, their self-­ histories and thought systems. With this in mind, my main focus in this chapter has been to look into the bases of the production of knowledges termed ‘African’ and argue that this is an important issue that needs to be given significant attention if countries in Africa are to attain authentic epistemic liberation that can foreground liberation in other facets of their lives. The reason why there has to be a critical focus on ideological and methodological underpinnings of knowledge production in Africa is because I take knowledge as a foundational prerequisite to the liberation of the global South cultures. As a result, a transformational turn is required in order to underpin knowledge production on ideologies and methods of African peoples. This is a departure from a call for transformation that is oblivious of problematic and unhelpful knowledge production in Africa that is mediated by ideologies and methods of other epistemic traditions. While this might appear to be a daunting task, it is a trajectory worth taking seriously if African peoples are to create sure bases for liberation more broadly. What I have sought to do in this chapter is to show the importance of paying transformative attention to the bases of knowledge production in Africa because this will significantly determine whether the envisioned liberation will be a reality or a mere fluke. To this effect, I have argued that liberation on epistemic fronts is attainable if ideologies and methods underpinning knowledge production in Africa emerge from African cultures.

References Curry, T.J. 2011a. On Derelict and Method: The Methodological Crisis of African-American Philosophy’s Study of African-Descended Peoples under an Integrationist Milieu. Radical Philosophy Review 14 (2): 139–164. ———. 2011b. The Derelictical Crisis of African American Philosophy: How African American Philosophy Fails to Contribute to the Study of African-Descended People. Journal of Black Studies 42 (3): 314–333.

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Dunford, R. 2017. Toward a decolonial global ethics. Journal of Global Ethics 13 (3): 380–397. Dussel, E., and E. Ibarra-Colado. 2006. Globalization, Organization and the Ethics of Liberation. Organization 13 (4): 489–508. Graness, A. 2015. Questions of Canon formation in Philosophy: The History of Philosophy in Africa. Phronimon 16 (2): 78–96. Irele, F.A. 2004. Négritude: Literature and Ideology. In The African Philosophy Reader: A Text with Readings, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 38–62. London: Routledge. Kirk, J.A. 2010. God Is on Our Side: The Anatomy of an Ideology. Transformation 27 (4): 239–247. Masaka, D. 2021. Knowledge, Power, and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa. Social Epistemology 35 (3): 258–269. Metz, T. 2009. Higher Education, Knowledge for Its Own Sake, and an African Moral Theory. Studies in Philosophy and Education 28: 517–536. Mudimbe, V.Y. 1988. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Nabudere, D.W. 2006. Towards an Afrokology of Knowledge Production and African Regeneration. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies-Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity 1: 1. 7–32. Nkrumah, K. 1965. Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. New  York: International Publishers. Okere, T. 2005. Is There One Science, Western Science? African Development VXXX (3): 20–34. Oladipo, O. 1995. Reason, Identity, and the African Quest: The Problems of Self-Definition in African Philosophy. Africa Today 42 (3): 26–38. Oppong, S. 2013. Indigenizing Knowledge for Development: Epistemological and Pedagogical Approaches. Africanus 43 (2): 34–50. Ramose, M.B. 2016. Teacher and Student with a Critical Pan-Epistemic Orientation: An Ethical Necessity for Africanising the Educational Curriculum in Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 546–555. Taiwo, O. 1998. Exorcising Hegel’s Ghost: Africa’s Challenge to Philosophy. African Studies Quarterly 1 (4): 3–16. Ugwuanyi, L. 2013. Towards an Educational Philosophy for the Human Sciences in Africa. St Augustine Papers 14 (2): 43–68. Vest, J.L. 2005. The Promise of Caribbean Philosophy: How It Can Contribute to a ‘New Dialogic’ in Philosophy. Caribbean Studies 33 (2): 3–34. ———. 2009. Perverse and Necessary Dialogues in African Philosophy. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK) 1 (2): 1–23.

Chapter 4

Decolonisation as Self-Recovery: The Path to Intellectual Independence Pascah Mungwini

Introduction The call to decolonise knowledge in the sense of the imperative to reconfigure the epistemic landscape and thus restore meaning and identity to those who have suffered years of exclusion, marginalisation and pervasive alienating experience, is at its core a project in self-recovery. It is a call to assume responsibility for the urgent task of corrective intervention to ensure that the particularity of our experiences shall not again be smothered or fall victim to a hegemonic universalism. From the viewpoint of those who have suffered systematic neglect, decolonisation of knowledge is an attempt to reverse the alienating experiences that continue to define the education system. The education system through which official knowledge is distributed literally compels African peoples to dispense with who they are and to put on a new set of lenses in terms of the language and the conceptual structures with which to make sense of their world. At many levels, the African encounter with formalised education remains an alienating experience. At every turn, we are confronted by knowledge produced about ourselves and our culture following paradigms and conceptual structures or categories of understanding that are foreign and which in most cases distort or misrepresent African thoughts and ideas. Left unchallenged and with time, such distortions will concretise into ‘new truths’ about ourselves - a situation which will call for the most erudite of Africans with penetrating knowledge and insight of their culture to correct the misrepresentations. Wiredu (1996:138) is not exaggerating when he writes: It is not uncommon to find highly educated Africans proudly holding forth on, for instance, the glories of African traditional religion in an internalized conceptual idiom of a metropolitan origin which distorts indigenous thought structures out of all recognition. P. Mungwini (*) University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_4

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This malady, which he identifies within the context of philosophy and religion, is an issue which applies to many other domains of knowledge in Africa. Several years after independence our education system cannot continue as an enabler of alienation by perpetuating such levels of mental colonisation. True liberation demands that we take a closer look at the epistemic terrain in Africa including the politics of knowledge thereof. It requires that we reflect on what this means in terms of the interventions that can be instituted going forward. There is an urgent need to find a solution to the violence of exclusion and erasure, which not only continues to define the epistemic landscape, but threatens to decimate, indirectly through appropriation, even that which remains of the indigenous knowledges. The indigenous expert continues to be a victim of exclusion and is denied epistemic credibility and whatever knowledge he/she holds, is tapped into by others who then transform it and proceed to claim authorship and the attendant financial benefits for its application. Equally worrisome is that, to a large extent, universities in Africa continue to serve as instruments and workshops of the ideology of universalism. This essay is divided into three sections. The first section is an attempt to situate calls for the decolonisation of knowledge within the broader context of Africa’s journey to authentic liberation. We relate the current efforts to those of Africa’s own first crop of political leaders at independence who articulated political visions and philosophical blueprints for the reconstruction of Africa. Decolonisation of knowledge should be seen within this historical initiative to wrestle control over our destiny as a people. The quest for authentic liberation, which is, to build anew from our own resources and according to our design is an initiative that continues to inspire the unfinished humanistic project of decolonisation in Africa including the decolonisation of knowledge. Our point of departure is that the history of struggle in Africa is an important resource pivotal to our understanding of the politics of knowledge production in Africa and for providing insights into some of the historical projects undertaken and how they fared. In the second section entitled ‘What’s in a name?’ attention is drawn to the question of what it means to name an institute or a knowledge production centre as “An African centre for … [this or that]” and specifically what this naming signifies for the politics of knowledge production, interpretation and application in the context of decolonisation. Our suspicion is that on too many occasions the name ‘African centre of this and that’ is used for its political correctness and therefore deployed as another convenient moniker to serve as the seal of approval on knowledge activities that fail to speak to the problems and concerns arising out of the African continent and the needs of its peoples. We argue that there is good reason, in the interest of decolonisation, to confront this form of deception in the academy in order to address the challenge of ethically sanctioned ignorance as far as knowledge about Africa is concerned. Commitment to Africa indicated by the choice of nomenclature must translate into an equal commitment to accord voice to the African and with it the path to intellectual independence. The name African as a label to an institute or knowledge centre must be more than just a signifier to an academic centre located on and whose activities are carried out on African soil. In the context of the history and politics of knowledge, it must serve as a clear statement of intent with regards to intellectual independence. The last section on

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knowledge as emancipation addresses the question of how to negotiate the orthodoxy of knowledge imposed on us by the powerful and at the same time deal with our own need for self-definition. We submit that the aphorism ‘knowledge is power’ is yet to be celebrated for what it implies by the peoples of Africa. Emancipative struggles and counter-hegemonic strategies subsumed under the name “epistemologies of the global South” must continue to be strengthened. Our position is that perspectives about the world are varied and so are the epistemologies that inform them. The universalisation of a single tradition of knowledge no matter how successful overlooks the fecundity of knowledge and its expression, it impoverishes humanity by suppressing alternative epistemologies. For us in Africa the need for a critical and emancipative knowledge project cannot be overemphasised.

Reclaiming the Initiative Once decolonisation is taken as both corrective and a critique of the skewed narrative of the history of human civilisation including the nature and bases of knowledge which continue to sponsor a hegemonic relationship in almost all significant aspects of our dealings in this world, it becomes apparent that Africa should, out of necessity, assume responsibility for the task of reshaping the epistemic landscape. The correlative duty is to expand not only the scope of our attention beyond the narrow Eurocentric tradition of knowledge but more importantly, to learn to appreciate the intellectual resources inherent on the continent through a re-orientation of our own philosophical thinking. For those of us familiar with African philosophy, Serequeberhan (2009:47) emphasises the desire “to learn from and critically study the concrete practices of various African liberation movements and struggles.” The significance of this can be extended to other areas. In other words, the process of reconstruction that Africa needs to champion must look back to history as much as it looks to the future. Our contemplation of what the future ought to be has to be informed by our past struggles and the nature of the problems we seek to tackle. This history of struggle, as Ki-Zerbo (1981:23) reminds us, is “a source in which we should not only see and recognise our own reflection, but from which we should also drink and renew our strength, so as to forge ahead in the caravan of human progress.” Our forebears carved the path and ours is to consummate the revolution. The history and experiences of Africa should necessarily be positioned as the fountain from which we can draw intellectual resources and inspiration including the stamina to transform our situation and our engagement with the rest of the world. Like the story of philosophy, scholarship in general cannot progress without revisiting the ideas from those who have theorised about Africa before, assessing their insights, improving and building upon those insights capable of making a difference in the present. There is so much that could be enumerated in terms of the mistakes in the history of liberation movements that led Africa to independence. However, one thing that should be lauded about Africa’s first crop leaders is their solid articulation of the vision for a new Africa drawing its resources from within the specific

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history and experiences of the continent. Take the example of Nyerere. It is apparent that in advancing his philosophy of Ujamaa and self-reliance and armed with what Shivji (2014: 138) calls his own “pragmatic political wisdom,” Nyerere was clear on what this drive for change meant for the African at the level of both ideas and practice. For him, the journey to authentic liberation “involve[d] building on the foundation of our past, and building also to our design” (Nyerere, 1968:2). This in essence is what we can call seizing back the initiative. There is an unambiguous commitment to build with the cultural resources available from within Africa itself, and above all to build according to Africa’s own design. To this day, intellectual engagements on what it is that Africa must do to rid itself of multifarious challenges that afflict so many aspects of its life including the academy, testify to this need to wrestle back control and thus ‘build to our design.’ As we look at contemporary Africa therefore, it is not difficult to agree that Nyerere had within his ideas and vision a crucial philosophical theory of reconstruction, an idea whose currency to the present circumstances cannot be easily dismissed except only by those whose prejudices against most things African has become second nature. Of course, there is always the other side. Among the various reasons to explain the predicament of our continent, one cannot leave out our own complicity as a people, and in particular that of our leaders across Africa (ironic to call them ‘our’ since some of them literally elect themselves into office, but perhaps it is a problem of the specific system of democracy adopted as became apparent recently in the long-touted citadel of democracy). Given the myriad of excuses often put forward by Africa’s leaders including disregard for human welfare, there seems to be an unwillingness if not inability among them to take up the task of building from our own resources and in accordance with the concerns of our own people. How one would wish for the day when the essence of the indigenous African democratic and social justice principle ‘Ishe vanhu’ literally translated ‘there is no kingship without the people’ will be consummated. But of course, some of these elected frauds have the blessing of their masters whom they sheepishly continue to serve and grovel to in this unrelenting neo-colonial haemorrhaging of the continent. For the African intellectual the restoration of Africa is a battle to be fought on many fronts chief among which is the intellectual initiative to drive whatever change that is required on the principle of ideas that can promote social justice and restore dignity to the indigenous peoples of Africa. In terms of knowledge, this entails moving away from ‘the dependent orientation of our theoretic efforts’ in order to render Africa, in the words of Hountondji (2002:140), “a new space of theoretical production, seeing to it that sub-Saharan Africa, today marginal in relation to Europe and the West in exchange of ideas, becomes fully autonomous, a centre in its turn, or its own centre.” Elsewhere (Mungwini 2016, 2019), we have characterised this as an unfinished humanistic project of decolonisation driven not only by the need to reaffirm our universal right to reason (Ramose, 1999), but by a much broader universalistic ethos to reshape relations within the world to a point where knowledge can no longer be deployed as an instrument in the service of domination, but as a means through which to reclaim the universality of our oneness as humanity. Decolonisation of knowledge and its corollary recentering of Africa, advocates a particular mode of understanding that seek to reposition the

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continent. It calls on Africans to change course from being recipients of solutions made elsewhere and to begin to theorise their own reality. It is this which constitutes the focus of our attention in the section below.

What’s in a Name? In the aftermath of the ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ movement, several issues revolving around questions of decolonisation and what it entails for the academy and many other aspects of existence have been raised. Crucial questions concerning the academy have ranged from those about the nature of the universities themselves, to demands for lasting changes to the canon, staffing and transformation, the nature of professional associations and their mandate, the composition of their membership and even leadership, to questions about the significance of names, and what they stand for among many other crucial issues. Within the discipline of philosophy, questions regarding the teaching of philosophy itself and its failure to transform in order to respond to questions of historical justice in South Africa came to the fore. The history of philosophy in South Africa is a tainted one because of its close relationship to the colonial politics of exclusion and systematic marginalisation of the indigenous peoples. This is an issue which has been the subject of numerous essays. More (2004) traces the historical roots of the problem and the same issue is revisited by Dladla (2017) and more recently by Matolino (2020) to mention just a few. In this section, our focus is the practice of naming and the questions that have arisen as a result of the calls for the decolonisation of knowledge. Critical questions have been raised regarding what it means to name an institute or any research or knowledge production centre as ‘An African centre for … this or that’ and what this implies for knowledge generation in the context of decolonisation. It is true that the name Africa itself has a problematic history of its own in that it is regarded as a foreign imposition and therefore not one conferred by the indigenous peoples of Africa themselves. While that is indeed a legitimate concern it is not the main issue at this point. We take it that the name is now accepted as designating not just a geographical landmass, but a people with a shared history and identity. Oftentimes the purpose of naming is to identify, to distinguish, and to classify our objects of experience although in particular circumstances naming assumes added significance where the name serves to celebrate, to evoke memory, or to pronounce commitment to a desired cause. For example, there is a distinct message evoked when a university prides itself as being ‘an African University’ which goes over and above the mere fact of being a university located in Africa. By emphasising its being ‘an African University’ the university is pronouncing commitment to a distinct academic mission, a set of principles and grounding values which places what it means to be African at the centre of its intellectual mandate. It is also at the same time an unequivocal statement of commitment to something fundamental, that is, the African cause. Here, Africa is more than a mere reference to the geographical location where the institution is located because subsumed under that name ‘African’

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is a particular historical consciousness and memory that is alive and orients the philosophical thinking of those who pride themselves in that identity. From a philosophical point of view, and in particular from the perspective of those who continue to struggle against oppression and domination, the need for self-definition is still a major issue. In that vein, ethnic labels for example in philosophy such as Asian, Latin American, and African, have a much deeper meaning over and above the mere designation of the geographical place in which the activity of philosophising is undertaken. In these names lie a particular history which in part proposes the key priority questions that define the discourse of philosophy in that region and giving to that particular tradition of philosophy its distinct timbre, methodological orientation, preoccupation, and mission. We use this reference to ethnic labels in philosophy as ingress to reflect on the deployment of the name ‘African’ as a prefix on the names of so many research centres on the continent and its significance to questions of decolonisation and self-recovery. In drawing attention to this issue our hope is to stimulate and possibly sustain a healthy dose of scepticism which can act as that silent irritating voice and reminder to those involved on what it means to call their centre of knowledge production and dissemination ‘an African centre of…’ There is an assumption which follows from invoking the name ‘African’ especially within the context of the decolonisation of knowledge, and it revolves around a commitment to liberate the continent and its modes of knowledge production from the debilitating hold of foreign ideologies. It is a commitment to rewrite and re-right the situation of Africa by addressing issues that help to put an end to the travesties of the colonial era where knowledge from Africa and knowledge by Africans found little or no space in the academy. And where it did, much of it suffered conceptual misrepresentations that distorted much of the indigenous knowledge out of recognition. At the occasion of the opening of the Institute of African Studies, Nkrumah is quoted as having stated that one of its important mission was to study the history, culture and institutions, languages and arts of Ghana and of Africa in new African centred ways- in entire freedom from the propositions and presuppositions of the colonial epoch, and from the distortions of those…who continue to make European studies of Africa the bases of this new assessment1 [For him the institute should] conceive its function as being to study Africa, in the widest possible sense- Africa in all its complexity and diversity, and its underlying unity….This is essentially an Institute of African Studies, not of Ghana Studies, nor of West African Studies. (Allman, 2013:183)

The italics in the first sentence are our own but those around the name Africa in subsequent sentences are original. We employ the italics to draw attention to key principles that continue to elude the academy and which are in part responsible for triggering the ‘Rhodes must fall’ and decolonisation protests that rocked South Africa in recent years. Nkrumah’s pan-African vision even on matters of knowledge production in the above quotation is worth highlighting. The need to study Africa and everything about it in ‘new African centred ways’ with a sense of freedom from  Kwame Nkrumah, The African genius: Speech Delivered by Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah at the Opening of the Institute of African Studies, 25 October 1963, cited in the article by Allman, 2013, p. 183. 1

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foreign impositions and presuppositions is critical. It is only in this way that the African genius would find its expression and with it the path to intellectual independence. More than just being a signifier to an academic centre located on and whose activities happen to be carried out on African soil, the use of the name African must signify a distinct intention at the level of both ideas and theory in terms of recentering Africa. The name ought to serve as a solid statement of declaration against ‘theoretical extraversion’ and a willingness to put an end to the “feverish importation of paradigms, problematics, and perspectives and the search for legitimation and respectability from the intellectual establishments of the North” (see Zeleza, 2002: 21). On the same breadth, it is an expression of the commitment to create autonomous spaces of theoretical production within Africa with the ultimate goal of yielding, through this undertaking, ‘autonomous bodies of thought’ inspired by ‘original sets of questions’ arising out of the concern to be ourselves (Hountondji, 2002a). Our position is that by invoking the label ‘African’ one is also committing to a specific set of important ontological, epistemological, and ethical considerations in the manner the academic project will unfold and within a context which requires the moral and intellectual awareness of what it means to live in an unjust world. It hardly needs argument that the intellectual project in Africa is part of the broader emancipative drive and it must be defined by vigilance and determination at many levels of decision-making including in the academy. Decolonisation as self-­ recovery aims “to demarginalize Africa, and to place it firmly at the centre of its own history in a world that is henceforth plural; a world whose unity cannot be the result of annexation, or some kind of hegemonic integration, but of periodic re-­ negotiation” (Hountondji, 2002: 141). The challenge which therefore extends to all centres of knowledge production with the label ‘African’ including universities, revolves around their complicity in the continued production of ‘ethically sanctioned ignorance’ about Africa where parochial universalism continues to reign on the epistemic field. It is a question about whether the name ‘African’ is being used for its political correctness and thus deployed as another convenient moniker to serve as the seal of approval on knowledge activities that are only African in their location but do not speak to the problematics and concerns arising out of the continent and its situation. This is a question concerning the practice of deception in the academy and its long-term consequences on the continent. Reflecting on the story of the Institute of African Studies in Ghana, and its inception alongside the Encyclopaedia Africana project  - two momentous academic projects which Nkrumah took personal interest in and considered pivotal to the transformation of the politics of knowledge production in Africa which unfortunately suffered the same political fate as their patron – Allman (2013) regrets this as one serious opportunity to exert a seismic shift in the balance of power in knowledge production that was lost. To this day, there is yet to be established a strong continent-based alternative to the hegemony of the western academy in the manner Nkrumah envisaged. Nevertheless, as Allman (2013:203) urges, we shall be served well “to remember that there was a moment, less than fifty years ago, when African Studies seemed poised to escape this neo-colonial fate” implying the excessive influence of externally generated models on African scholarship. These historical precedents today

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should serve as inspiration to the idea that a continent-based alternative to the hegemony of western epistemology is possible. The imperative to re-imagine [and] to reinvent the production, interpretation and circulation of knowledge about Africa is what decolonisation of knowledge is all about. But of course, while emphasis on Africa is essential, the demand for decolonisation is not synonymous with blind particularism and neither does it advocate theoretical or epistemic fundamentalism. Returning finally to the question of naming, it is to be expected therefore, that where institutes are set up to champion the production of knowledge in Africa, their existence and indeed what they do, must come as close as possible to what they convey through the names they pride themselves in. Names have historical significance and that too should never be lost to everyone who chooses to preface any knowledge production centre with the signifier ‘African.’ Our point is that as much as possible the knowledge production must be, in the words of Allman (2013:183), “Africa-­ centred, Africa based, and globally engaged.” There is a debt to be paid to the people and the place where the institutions are located. The seductive lure of universalism must continue to be confronted as a matter of principle if indeed there is going to be meaning to the distinctive nomenclature that we invoke as part of the process of locating our intellectual activities within the different cultural spaces and in giving force to such activities.

Knowledge as Emancipation The aphorism that knowledge is power is yet to be celebrated for what it implies for many indigenous peoples across the world. The quest for epistemic liberation is driven by the desire to witness that day when the world can finally preside over and thus celebrate a requiem to mark the end of an era of epistemic hegemony. Until that moment the emancipative struggles, that is, the different counter-hegemonic struggles which have come to be subsumed under the name “epistemologies of the global South” must continue to be strengthened. The symbiotic relationship between politics and knowledge continues to be the reason why the so-called periphery remains mired in all kinds of problems. The centre, backed by the strength of its weapons has maintained a stranglehold on the canon and what counts as official knowledge. Even research priorities follow a pattern that reveal not only the dominant perspective on what counts as knowledge but also a systematic neglect of alternative forms of knowledge even as they form part of the world’s living cultures. Although nominal changes have since been witnessed over the years, the massive investment on research into so-called cash crops (Hountondji, 2006) produced mostly for export which dates back to the colonial era, at the expense of those crops which meet the basic food requirements of the people, testifies to the synergy between knowledge and capitalist interests. Here one can easily see how the politics of knowledge is itself inseparable from the politics of production and profit. The question of how to liberate the potential of the poor to create better lives for themselves cannot be answered outside the politics of knowledge because of the link between poverty and

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the dominant economic system of this world. This is what Dussel (2013:xv) alludes to when he argues: “We are confronted by the overwhelming yet contradictory reality of a ‘world system’…which has globalised its reach to the most distant corner of the planet at the same time that it has paradoxically excluded a majority of humanity.” This speaks directly to the point being made by Yunus (1999: 205) that “poverty is not created by the poor. It is created by the structures of society and the policies pursued by society. Change the structures and you will see that the poor change their own lives.” The poor and everything about their lives are caught up in a system that sustains itself by taking from the poor. This is made possible through the politics of knowledge. In being compelled to listen to the voice of the foreign expert and in making use of knowledge grounded in so-called ‘universal’ paradigms and theoretical structures to address their local problems, the peoples lose their voice and with it their intellectual initiative. Indeed as Weiler (2006:70) points out, the apparent openness of the international knowledge system … obscure[s] the fact that there are extreme global disparities in the distribution of both knowledge production and consumption…intellectual tasks, such as setting theoretical agendas and methodological standards, are the prerogative of a relatively small number of societies and institutions that play a disproportionately important role in the system – societies and institutions which are, almost without exception, located in the economically privileged regions of the world.

So the inevitable question is  - what then does this mean for Africa? How do we negotiate this orthodoxy of knowledge imposed on us by the powerful and at the same time deal with our own need for self-definition? Several answers can be proffered, but among them, one cannot ignore the imperative this imposes on the African intellectual to look closely at the local knowledges, to work to capitalise on their efficacy by appropriating and also adapting from what has been gained through our interaction with the international world. This is what Nkrumah’s idea of knowledge production in Africa alluded to above would have implied. In this way, we may be able to meet the major challenge which is to make knowledge African in the sense of being able to generate knowledge that speaks to the exigencies of existence, identity and social justice while contributing to the creation of a new ecology of knowledge. The hegemony of the ideology of universalism has to be supplanted and its hold challenged through the strengthening of the perspective of knowledge as emancipation. It is incumbent upon the African intellectual to be conscious and thus remain alert to the force of an intellectual constraint that we have called elsewhere the tyranny of habit, that is, the seemingly innocent but harmful practice of taking for granted a particular tradition of knowledge, its provenance, and canon as sacrosanct (Mungwini, 2021:116). Although it may sound like an oxymoron, there is in existence the ever-present threat of what we described as “intellectual slave holders”’ (Mungwini, 2020: 8), that is, those who have sought to subordinate others to their own thinking and to suppress the growth of alternative voices. What is required is therefore an increase in the numbers of what one may call revolutionary intellectuals - those intellectuals firmly rooted in their place and with an unwavering commitment to their society including the practical and theoretical goals of decolonisation. These are the class of intellectuals Nkrumah saw as integral in directing society’s thinking and philosophy towards the emancipation that is needed.

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A return to history would bear testimony to the fact that revolutions are often triggered by the conviction that the life we are living is not what it should be, and to reclaim our lives change is therefore desirable. If revolutions are an attempt by people to get their lives back then the intellectual revolution in Africa shares a similar drive. The project of decolonising knowledge is an act of intellectual resistance which entails ultimately arriving at ways to overcome epistemic domination. For the African intellectual the critical emancipatory role of the various ‘African centres of this or that’- which are engaged in knowledge production  - must be revisited to reignite the spirit to study Africa ‘in new African centred ways’ in entire freedom from the propositions and presuppositions of the colonial epoch. The prevalence of what Zeleza (2007: 2) calls the “inordinate influence of externally generated models on African scholarship” must remain a critical point of focus because it is this which has proven deleterious to most initiatives to liberate knowledge production and interpretation in Africa. Equally significant, is that the slogan that the hegemonic ‘canon must fall’ should translate into tangible action whose impact should be seen in the transformation of the curriculum itself. Cognisant of the violence of exclusion and erasure, the project of decolonising knowledge must show, within its emancipative thrust, a distinct commitment to reorient contemporary scholarship’s relationship to ideas inherent on the continent and our own priority questions as a people. Ultimately, although intellectual work in and of itself is an activity of the mind, the outcome of that mental labour must always have a practical bearing in terms of improving human welfare in this world we live together.

Conclusion The path to intellectual independence and self-determination in Africa has a history from which contemporary intellectuals should draw crucial insights. The same quest by our forebears to reject impositions, reinvent, and reimagine the study and production of knowledge about Africa carries the same urgency as it did before in part because we have taken too long to appreciate the intellectual trajectory that they had carefully defined for the continent. To this end, calls for decolonising knowledge are in and of themselves an integral component of the African journey to self-­ recovery. Ultimately, this emancipatory drive should have, within its telos, a reconfiguration of the epistemic terrain in Africa. Knowledge production about Africa that is, knowledge which is ‘Africa based, Africa centred, and at the same time globally engaged’ will put us back on the path to authentic liberation.

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References Allman, J. 2013. Kwame Nkrumah, African Studies, and the Politics of Knowledge Production in the Black Star of Africa. The International Journal of African Historical Studies 46 (2): 181–203. Dladla, N. 2017. Racism and the Marginality of African Philosophy in South Africa. Phronimon 18: 204–231. Dussel, E. 2013. Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion (trans. E. Mendieta et.al.). Durham: Duke University Press. Hountondji, P.J. 2002. The Struggle for Meaning: Reflections on Philosophy, Culture, and Democracy (trans. J. Conteh-Morgan). Ohio University/Centre for International Studies. Hountondji, J.P. 2002a. Producing Knowledge in Africa Today. In Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings, ed. P. Coetzee and A. Roux, 501–507. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hountondji, P. 2006. Global Knowledges: Imbalances and Current Tasks. In Knowledge Power and Dissent. Critical Perspectives on Higher Education and Research in Knowledge Society, ed. G. Neave, 41–60. UNESCO Publishing. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000148591 Accessed 16 April 2021. Ki-Zerbo, J. 1981. General Introduction. In UNESCO General History of Africa Volume 1, ed. J. Ki-Zerbo, 1–23. UNESCO/University of California Press. Matolino, B. 2020. Philosophers’ Debt to Their Students: The South African Case. Transformation in Higher Education 5 (87): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.4102/the.v5i0.87. More, P. 2004. Philosophy in South Africa Under and After Apartheid. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 149–160. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Mungwini, P. 2016. The Question of Recentring Africa: Thoughts and Issues from the Global South. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 523–536. ———. 2019. The Quest for epistemic Liberation: What Can be Done to be True to Both Philosophy and to Humanity? Journal of World Philosophies 4: 70–77. ———. 2020. Struggles for Self-Liberation in African Philosophy. Phronimon 21: 1–12. ———. 2021. Decolonisation Debates in African Higher Education. In African Higher Education in the 21st Century: Some Philosophical Dimensions, ed. A. Ndofirepi and E.T. Gwaravanda, 106–121. Leiden: Brill. Nyerere, J.K. 1968. Freedom and Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ramose, M.B. 1999. African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Serequeberhan, T. 2009. African Philosophy as the Practice of Resistance. Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 4 (9): 44–52. Shivji, I.G. 2014. Utu, Usawa, Uhuru: Building Blocks of Nyerere’s Political Philosophy. In Ubuntu: Curating the Archive, ed. L.  Praeg and S.  Magadla, 137–149. Pietermaritzburg: UKZN Press. Weiler, H. N. (2006). Challenging the Orthodoxies of Knowledge: Epistemological, Structural and Political Implications for Higher Education. In G. Neave (Ed.), Knowledge Power and Dissent. Critical Perspectives on Higher Education and Research in Knowledge Society, 61–87. UNESCO Publishing., https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000148591. Accessed 16 April 2021. Wiredu, K. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Yunus, M. 1999. Banker to the Poor: Micro-lending and the Battle Against World Poverty. New York: Public Affairs. Zeleza, T.P. 2002. The Politics of Historical and Social Science Research in Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies 28 (1): 9–23. ———. 2007. The Study of Africa Vol.2: Global and Transnational Engagements. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Chapter 5

Colonial Legacy and Knowledge Production in Africa: Re-echoing the Need for Epistemic Decolonisation Kenneth Uyi Abudu

Introduction Presently, African philosophers have been thinking and rethinking the legacies left behind by colonialism, which reflects in the imperialistic structures present in our systems of government, modes of dressing, types of education, forms of knowledge production, economy, and other spheres of life one can think of. Africa, thus, is still grappling with the contours of colonial matrix of power. According to Anibal Quijano, the colonial matrix of power has four basic interrelated domains, and they are as follows: “control of economy; control of authority, control of gender and sexuality; and, control of subjectivity and knowledge” (2007, 169). One cannot overemphasize that the interrelated domains of colonial matrix of power as outlined by Quijano is present in today’s Africa, which is why I intend to examine the implication of this colonial matrix of power for knowledge production in Africa. According to Santos et al., the “denial of diversity is a constitutive and persistent feature of colonialism. While the political dimension of colonial intervention has been widely criticized, the burden of colonial epistemic monoculture is sometimes accepted as a symbol of development and modernity” (2007: xxxiii). In essence, there is an inextricable link between colonial legacy and knowledge production in Africa, such that Africa today is grappling with the superimposition of Eurocentric epistemological order above our indigenous knowledge systems. One reason that is fundamental to the discourse of entrenching Eurocentric forms of knowledge production in Africa is that the continent has been described as a savagery one which is filled with intellectual darkness, and also lacks self-consciousness. By ascribing all negative things to Africa, it has been argued by some radical Eurocentric philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists that Africans are not capable of rationality and cannot be ascribed an authentic theory of knowledge production. This K. U. Abudu (*) Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_5

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erroneous and ethnocentric idea led to colonialism. The implication of colonial legacy for knowledge production in Africa is stated by Pauline Hountondji who argues that: It is about the way that pre-colonial knowledge has been set aside, marginalized, deprived of its internal dynamism and power of self- regeneration and self-criticism, prevented from absorbing, assimilating and freely developing contributions from outside for its own benefit. It is about the way that pre-colonial knowledge has been reduced to silent, dumb juxtaposition with imported forms of knowledge which in the long term assures its decline and death (1990: 7).

Evidently, with the advent of colonialism, indigenous knowledge production in Africa was replaced with Eurocentric models; also, there grew a disturbing trend which suggests that knowledge production in Africa, especially with reference to the pre-colonial one, is inferior on the basis that it does not model Eurocentric (scientific) canon. My primary concern in this chapter is to examine the implications of colonial legacy for knowledge production in Africa: one is coloniality of knowledge, and the other, epistemicide. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, coloniality of knowledge is defined as “a complex process of deployment of global imperial technologies of subjectivation taking the form of translating and re-writing other cultures, other knowledge and other ways of being, and presuming commensurability through Western rationality” (2013: 33). Epistemicide, according to Nyamnjoh, means “the decimation or near complete killing and replacement of endogenous epistemologies with the epistemological paradigm of the conqueror” (2012: 129). In respect to coloniality of knowledge in African context, knowledge production is being eroded by Eurocentric models. This is evident in, for instance, the language of instruction and curriculums in most African universities, where Eurocentric topics are taught, leaving the African space behind. For epistemicide, African epistemic tradition is regarded as a subaltern one which cannot be measured with the knowledge production applicable in Euro-American philosophy. Thus, while knowledge production in Africa has been replaced with Eurocentric models, these dominant Eurocentric models are considered as determinants of what counts as knowledge within and across spaces. In the light of the above, I begin this chapter by examining the Eurocentric canon in knowledge production, a trend which gave rise to epistemological hegemony. In particular, I argue in this section that the hegemony of Eurocentric canon in African indigenous knowledge system is a by-product of the modern period of Euro-North American philosophy, a period which saw the enthronement of science above other forms of knowledge production. In what follows, I examine the twin implications of colonial legacy for knowledge production in Africa: the question of coloniality of knowledge, and epistemicide and the subalternisation of African epistemic tradition, which has led to a new epistemological order in Africa, such that most Africans live with the erroneous idea that their indigenous forms of knowledge production are inferior when compared to the scientific models obtainable in the Western world. Having this point in mind, I then proceed in the next section to argue that knowledge cannot be produced outside of a particular social context. In this way, factors such

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as linguistic schemes, human nature, socio-cultural habits, customs and traditions of a particular people are important in institutionalising and legitimating what counts as knowledge. All this is followed by an examination of the roles ‘epistemology of resistance’ plays in the attempt by an African philosopher to reecho the need for epistemic decolonisation.

 urocentric Canon in Knowledge Production E and Epistemological Hegemony The assumption that knowledge is based on a subject/object relation suddenly made the rest of the world an extended object of European knowledge. Thus, European sense of the totality of knowledge and its totalitarian effect was devastating for the dignity and humanness of people in the rest of the planet. It was like everything that existed before Greece was stopped in their time and overcome by the new time, the time of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment (Mignolo and Walsh 2018: 200). Mignolo and Walsh’s excerpt already provides us with an insight regarding what is to be done in this section: to examine the roles of the Enlightenment period in perpetuating the argument that Eurocentric paradigm in knowledge production is superior to other forms of knowledge. Thus, this section examines the Eurocentric canon in knowledge production and how it has perpetuated epistemological hegemony in the history of philosophy. According to Mbembe, “a Eurocentric canon is a canon that attributes truth to Western way of knowledge production. It is a canon that disregards other knowledge” (Mbembe 2015: 9). He continues: “The problem – because there is a problem indeed – with this tradition is that it has become hegemonic” (2015: 9). Epistemological hegemony means a concern for the dominance of one view of Western knowledge production and making all other forms subservient. The historical development of epistemology as one of the major branches of philosophy is saturated with several theories of knowledge which philosophers have advanced, arguing that these theories cut across time and space. In particular, the period which saw unison among philosophers in the attempt to universalise the Eurocentric mode of knowledge production was the modern period of philosophy. In the words of Bertrand Russell, “the period of history which is commonly called “modern” has a mental outlook which differs from that of the medieval period in many ways. Of these, two are the most important: the diminishing authority of the Church and the increasing authority of science” (1945: 525). In fact, “almost everything that distinguishes the modern world from earlier centuries is attributable to science, which achieved its most spectacular triumphs in the seventeenth century” (Russell 1945: 525). According to Ukpokolo, the modern period of philosophy was an era marked by the prioritization of a single, fixed, universal, and grand totalizing framework of reference that is foundational and reliable in terms of accessing and appraising truth, reality, language, etc. This manifested in the various fields of

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human endeavour and philosophers of that era were concerned with determining its contents and framework (Ukpokolo 2019: 203). By way of retrospect, knowledge production during the medieval period was regarded as a transcendental enterprise which did not go outside God’s essence. However, during the modern period, coupled with the idea of Enlightenment, there was an elevation of scientific form of knowledge production above the theological and papal metaphysical authorities that characterised the medieval period. Thus, philosophers had two major quests regarding knowledge production during the modern period: first was their resolve “not to accept any belief unless they could convince themselves of it on their own” (Lawhead 2002: 202). The second, according to Ukpokolo, was to find the best way for establishing knowledge and truth. The two most significant methods from the modernist agenda were rationalism and empiricism. While the rationalists believe that knowledge is founded on innate principles in the mind, empiricists believe that knowledge is founded on posteriori (empirical) principles based on experience (Ukpokolo 2019: 196). René Descartes and John Locke were prominent rationalist and empiricist respectively, and by the combination of Cartesian methodic doubt with Lockean empiricism, the modern scientists advocated a Baconian scientific knowledge gained by using reasoning and carefully measured observations to test explanations against evidence. Knowledge production, therefore, was against the divine, transcendental, constant and absolute sources of the preceding era. This led to the rise and prominence of modern science, and the basis of Eurocentric canon in knowledge production. As a consequence, Eurocentric canon in knowledge production was mystified and adjudged as sui generis which could not be challenged nor replaced. Science “attributes truth only to the Western way of knowledge production. It is a canon that disregards other knowledge traditions” (Mbembe 2015: 9). The Eurocentric canon which according to Mbembe, is hegemonic, became evident in the attempt to universalise science as the model which transcends other forms of knowledge, especially the knowledge production peculiar to non-Western traditions. Lending credence to the argument that Eurocentric canon in knowledge production has its trajectory in the affirmation of science above other forms of knowledge, as fashionable during the modern period of philosophy, Santos says that: The epistemological privilege granted to modern science from the seventeenth century onwards, which made possible the technological revolutions that consolidated Western supremacy, was also instrumental in suppressing other, non-scientific forms of knowledges and, at the same time, the subaltern social groups whose social practices were informed by such knowledges (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 183).

Evidently, the privilege granted to modern science suggests that other forms of knowledge production are inferior, and if they are to be considered authentic, they must conform to the standards of science. This idea, according to modern philosophers, should be universalized so as to have a uniform mode of knowledge production. In particular, since the European Renaissance period, agents of Euro-American modernity such as philosophers, colonialists and anthropologists have been entrenching the argument that the Eurocentric canon in knowledge production

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ought to be universalized. This was done via expansionists’ frameworks such as Christianity and colonialism. As a consequence, colonialism was inscribed over the African continent and other regions of the non-Western world thanks to a combination of Western knowledge and imperial power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 33). Shizha lends credence to Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s submission by stating that: Eurocentric knowledge was embedded in the myth of knowledge universalism. Western scientific knowledge, produced, universalized and exported to non-Western societies, was viewed as a vehicle for social change. It was regarded as a benchmark by which the production of non-Western civilisation was measured and knowledge defined and authenticated. This is how the myth on which Western ideas and thought are constructed and reframed as “global knowledge” (2006: 24).

What can be deduced from the above excerpts is that with the enthronement of science, other forms of knowledge production were considered inferior. This position went unchallenged and perpetrated the Eurocentric hegemony in knowledge production. The implication of this is that modern science was therefore been used as an instrument to legitimize knowledge production across cultures, and by extension, marginalize local/indigenous knowledge production. According to Semali and Kincheloe (1999), modern science was used to produce “universal hostilities”, “define civilization” and “determine reality” (1999:64). With science as the determinant of what counts as knowledge, modernity and Enlightenment held sway. In particular, Jary and Jary are of the opinion that “in one of its senses, ‘modernity’ is seen as it identifies with a belief in rationality and triumph of truth and science” (1999: 392). Both modernity and Enlightenment perpetuated the hegemonic view that science is the ultimate paradigm of rationality. In particular, the adherents of Enlightenment used science as an instrument in promoting the radical Eurocentric view that scientific knowledge is objective and rational, and it is the factor responsible for social progress. Here, there came a distinction between “modern” and “traditional”, “Global North” and “Global South”. This distinction lies mainly in the adoption of science as the ultimate vehicle of social change. The Euro-American societies were tagged “modern” while the non-­Western societies were tagged “irrational”, “native”, or “primitive”. The consequence of legitimating and institutionalising the Eurocentric canon in knowledge production as it reflects in (modern) science was the deligitimisation of indigenous and social realities of a group of people, especially the African peoples. Or as Shizha puts it: “the misrecognition of the Other’s reality was hegemonic and imperialistic as it operated to characterize indigenous knowledge as inadequate and inferior” (2006: 25). Giddens further describes the implication of imposing Eurocentric canon in knowledge production over other indigenous ones by asserting that it means “disembedding… ‘the lifting out’ of social relations from the social context of interaction…” (1990: 21). In other words, the Eurocentric canon in knowledge production promoted a kind of linear and hierarchical form of knowledge which dismisses the cultural and historical assumptions of non-Western peoples. With this point in mind, my next point of discourse will examine coloniality of knowledge in Africa as one of the legacies of colonialism, and by extension, one of the implications of the Eurocentric hegemonic canon in knowledge production.

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Coloniality of Knowledge in Africa As argued in the preceding section, the hegemony inherent in Eurocentric canon in epistemology as fashionable during the modern period of philosophy has implications for knowledge production and authentication in Africa. The obvious reason for this is that “knowledge production in Africa is deeply ensnared within the colonial matrix of power and reproduces Western ideational domination on the African continent” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 52). Thus, coloniality of knowledge within African context has to do with the “epistemological questions of how colonial modernity interfered with African modes of knowing, social meaning-making, imagining, seeing and knowledge production, and their replacement with Eurocentric epistemologies that assumed the character of objective, scientific, neutral, universal and only truthful knowledges” (Escobar 2007: 133). The implication of imposing Eurocentric paradigm on the colonized which reflects in coloniality of knowledge is aptly captured by Quijano as follows: The Eurocentric perspective of knowledge operates as a mirror that distorts what it reflects, as we can see in Latin American historical experience.... Consequently, when we look in our Eurocentric mirror, the image that we see is not just composite, but also necessarily partial and distorted. Here the tragedy is that we have all been led, knowingly or not, wanting it or not, to see and accept that image as our own and as belonging to us alone. In this way, we continue being what we are not. And as a result we can never identify our true problems, much less resolve them, except in a partial and distorted way (2000: 556).

While Quijano’s excerpt captures coloniality of knowledge in Latin America, it is not out of place to state that a similar phenomenon is applicable in Africa – Africa being a formerly colonised continent. This position will be further understood if we consider Tlostanova’s conception of coloniality of knowledge. To him, coloniality of knowledge is characterized by a modern syndrome in which all models of cognition and thinking, seeing and interpreting the world and people, subject-object relations, and disciplinary divisions are entirely dependent on the norms and rules created and imposed by Western modernity since the sixteenth century and offered to humanity as universal, delocalize (2015: 39). It is important here to distinguish between colonialism and coloniality so as to avoid using both terms interchangeably. Colonialism is seen as a policy of control by one people over a certain geographical location, while coloniality simply refers to the legacy of colonialism. The difference would be clearer if we consider the position of Maldonado-Torres who states that: Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations (2007: 243).

What can be deduced from Maldonado-Toress distinction between colonialism and coloniality is that coloniality can help to debunk the problem of colonial domination

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from a vantage point of a variety of ‘colonial situations’ that include cultural, political, sexual, spiritual, epistemic and economic oppression of subordinate racialized/ ethnic groups by dominant racialized/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations (Grosfoguel 2007: 220). Consequently, the idea of coloniality cannot be understood in isolation of one of the problems of modernity, that is, the division of the world into North and South and/or West and non-West. Thus, “the representation of the global North as the ‘ideal’ that the rest of the world has to imitate corresponds with the marginalisation of knowledge paradigms from other geopolitical centres” (Masaka 2017: 70). Since the Enlightenment/Renaissance period, Eurocentric knowledges and imperial power have together, the inscription of coloniality all over Africa. The implication of colonial legacy for knowledge production in Africa which is evident in coloniality of knowledge is that it has positioned African indigenous knowledge production as a subjugated one which seeks validation from the standards inherent in the Eurocentric canon. As a consequence, indigenous knowledge production in Africa was “simultaneously ejected from the identity-providing social contexts and confined to an alternative cultural world that was in confrontation and conflict with their respective definitions of reality” (Shizha 2006: 25). Coloniality of knowledge in Africa can be further understood in terms of what is obtainable in most African universities, where Western ideas are being taught at the detriment of African ideas. Ndlovu-Gatsheni resonates this idea accordingly as he argued that in an African university, what should form the basis of knowledge production should be African indigenous knowledge systems. In fact, any knowledge produced in an African university should be able to serve the needs of the indigenous people and at the same time contribute to global knowledge. However, in this century, there has been an enormous challenge of implementing a cultural transformation which will decentralize Eurocentric forms of knowledge production in Africa and by extension, it has become difficult for Africans to imagine alternatives, including re-rooting the inherited university in African spaces (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 198). In a similar vein, Emeagwali and Sefa Dei argued that in postcolonial Africa, academic culture has been distorted by the Western ethnocentric logic and paradigms of rationality; rather than “acknowledging the multiple, collaborative, and accumulative dimensions of knowledge, we see attempts to dismiss, devalue, or negate indigenous knowledge as being not worthy of scholarly engagement” (2014: ix). In Africa today, university education reflects colonial legacy and this has continued to define what counts as knowledge, as knowledge production in Africa today shows that Western science is given primacy above other forms of (indigenous) knowledge. In furtherance to this, Eurocentric constructs are still evident and dominant in most African schools’ curricula. In fact, Ngugi wa Thiongo, a foremost postcolonial writer, criticizes knowledge production in postcolonial Africa by stating that: Education, far from giving people the confidence in their ability and capacity to overcome obstacles or to become masters of the laws governing external nature as human beings, tends to make them feel their inadequacies, their weakness, and their incapacities in the face

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Our corporate social existence in Africa reflects the dominance of the definition of us given by the Europeans. This is also evident in the binary of oppositions in our description of things and events. For instance, we tend to ascribe words like ‘scientific”, “modern”, “civilised”, and so on, to things that of Western origin, while we ascribe words such as “native”, “primitive”, “crude”, “traditional”, “indigenous”, “emotion-laden”, and so on, to things that are of African origin. Even with reference to colour specifications, white in Africa is used to represent purity while black symbolizes evil. This idea has been legitimised to the point that we hardly see anything wrong with it. Hence, coloniality of knowledge is seen, according to Masaka, as a form of “mental colonisation”, and it “engenders the worst form of alienation” (2017: 74). In particular, this idea explains why most Africans have neglected indigenous knowledge system in education as it relates to the sub-Saharan Africa. Politicians, Academics, policy makers and administrators have to a considerable extent developed a mind which sees indigenous knowledge production in Africa as inferior, especially when pitched side by side with that of Western forms of knowledge production. This has continued to deepen the crises being witnessed in the aspects of education and development in Africa (Shizha 2013: 4). The hegemony inherent in the Eurocentric canon in knowledge production suggests that Eurocentric canon knowledge production is capable of “providing answers to the challenges and aspirations of other geopolitical centres even when their experiences are different (Grosfoguel 2013: 74). This is why Masaka is of the opinion that “the logic of Eurocentric modernity is to reject the thesis that a knowledge paradigm primarily answers to the existential situation obtaining in a given geopolitical centre” (2017: 75). The second implication of colonial legacy for knowledge production which reflects in epistemicide will be our next point of discourse. This is necessitated by the fact that Eurocentric canon in knowledge production did not only end in our knowledge system being colonized, but also the destruction of African indigenous knowledge system.

 pistemicide and the Subalternisation of African E Epistemic Tradition W.E.B. Du Bois in his The Souls of Black Folks (1903), states that in the twentieth century, humanity has been divided into a colour line, as most discourses on human races are often discussed from the distinction between white and black. Borrowing a leaf from Du Bois, Ndlovu-Gatsheni reiterates that the division of humanity in the twenty-first century is based on “epistemic line”. According to him: The ‘epistemic line’ cascades from the ‘colour line’ because denial of humanity automatically disqualified one from epistemic virtue. Epistemic line is sustained by what Boaventura

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de Sousa Santos (2007) termed ‘abyssal thinking’ – an imperial reason that reduced some human beings to a sub-human category with no know- ledge. This means that the epistemic line is simultaneously the ontological line (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018: 17).

With the obvious ‘epistemic line’ there is a distinction between Eurocentric and Afrocentric epistemology; or epistemology of the global North and that of global South, as it became one of the projects of radical Eurocentric philosophers to provincialise Europe and deprovincialise Africa from an epistemological standpoint. This gave rise to epistemicide and the subalternisation of African epistemic tradition. Epistemicide here is used to mean the deliberate “attempt at destroying or silencing one group’s knowledge paradigm by another group has been one of the defining features of the relationship between the hegemonic culture and the dominated culture. Since the dominated culture’s epistemology is silenced and replaced with that of the dominant culture (Hountondji 1990, 7; Taiwo 1993: 895–898), the dominated culture becomes dependent on the hegemonic culture’s epistemological paradigm (see Busia 1964: 20). The loss of their right as legitimate producers of knowledge through epistemicide may lead to doubts about their humanity (Taiwo 1993: 898). Santos conveys his understanding of epistemicide by stating that epistemicide simply means the murder of knowledge and also asymmetric exchanges between two cultures in terms of knowledge production. Epistemicide, therefore, “was one of the conditions of genocide” in most extreme cases (2014: 93). It is important to state here, the reason why epistemicide and the subalternisation of African epistemic tradition were prevalent. The reason is due to the fact that Africa and Africans are sometimes considered as a continent and people without history; or as Grosfoguel captures it: We went from the sixteenth century characterisation of ‘people without writing’ to eighteenth and nineteenth century characterisation of ‘people without history,’ to the twentieth century characterisation of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of ‘people without democracy’ (2007: 214).

The implication of Grosfoguel’s assertion for the epistemicide against African indigenous knowledge system stems from the fact that the simple denial of humanity to Africans suggests the denial of an authentic epistemic tradition to them. In other words, if at all Africans have indigenous knowledge systems, it will be subservient to that of the Europeans. The idea of modernity and Enlightenment spread across the world through colonialism and imperialism, with the Eurocentric paradigm in knowledge production being used as the paradigm to judge the rationality or irrationality of a people’s epistemic tradition. There came a danger posed to African indigenous knowledge, and as a consequence, Eurocentric domination in knowledge production in knowledge production was pitched against African indigenous knowledge system, and this has remained uncontested, and by extension, it has stereotyped African indigenous knowledge as an altered epistemology, or what Santos refers to as ‘this side of the line’ (western epistemology) and the realm of ‘the other side of the line’ (non-­ Western epistemology) (Santos 2014). In other words, the dethronement of African indigenous epistemology and the imposition of an alien (Western) hegemonic

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epistemology leave Africans with no choice other than to accept the alien epistemology as their own form of knowledge, further entrenching epistemicide against African indigenous epistemology. The implication of colonial legacy for knowledge production which reflects in epistemicide against African epistemology cannot be discussed in isolation of what Santos refers to as “cognitive injustice” which reflects in an abysmal epistemology. Abysmal epistemology here is used to mean the ethnocentric idea that Western paradigm in knowledge production with emphasis on science is conceived as superior to other forms of knowledge. In the opinion of Fataar and Subreenduth (2015), Santos’ idea of “cognitive injustice” promotes abysmal epistemology which fails to recognise three salient facts: (1) different ways of knowing; (2) the relevance of such knowing within particular socio-­ cultural and political educational contexts; and (3) how the failure of formal education to include the different ways of knowing within school and university-based knowledge systems create epistemological inequity, imbalance and conflict within educational and societal structures (2015: 107).

Consequently, “cognitive injustice” does not only promote epistemicide against indigenous African epistemologies, but also fails to recognise the principle of incommensurability which is inherent in the ecology of knowledge. Further building on Santos’ idea of “cognitive injustice”, it is evident that the period of modernity which perpetuated colonialism inspired the Eurocentric epistemology to become a universal epistemology, and this saw other socio-cultural and/or indigenous (African) epistemology supplanted or obliterated totally. Santos projects the global dominance of Western epistemological orientation as that which created an epistemic line between global South and global North by asserting that Western thought is now an abysmal thinking. It is made up of apparent and unseen characteristics, with the latter serving as the foundation for the former. The invisible distinctions are formed by radical lines that split social reality into two realms: the realm of “this side of the line” (Western epistemology) and the realm of “the other side of the line” (non-Western epistemology (Santos 2014: 1). According to Ipadeola, in their attempt to establish a new epistemological order in Africa, the colonialists took their Western education with them. The only real means of acquiring information was thought to be Western-style of education and training. In the new epistemological order, people who had a Western education were granted certain privileges that were denied to those who did not (Ipadeola 2017: 145–146). What is evident in Ipadeola’s submission is that the colonial masters did not just impose on Africans, a new epistemological order at first instance. However, this was done the moment it became clear to them that injustice (epistemicide) has been done to African indigenous epistemology. Consequent upon this, a binary relation of epistemology surfaced: between an epistemology that is considered superior and another one which is considered inferior. African mode of knowing was replaced by Western modes of knowing and other cultural expressions. One cannot fail here to mention the negative effect of epistemicide against African indigenous epistemology for education. This is in consonance with

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Ipadeola’s earlier argument that the colonialism brought a distinction between Western education and indigenous education. While this was fashionable in the years that subsequently followed the post-independent era, it is worthwhile to state here that till date, this trend has continued with little or no effort being put in place to checkmate it. Copious examples can be cited here: for instance, let us take a look at most curriculums in African school; it is obvious that most topics being taught reflect the dominance of Eurocentric paradigm above that of Africans. Hopper illustrates this position by stating that: Subject contents are dumped onto children without any efforts to ensure that they first understand the subject in relation to their lived reality, a reality in which what is to be acquired via the school may only be a small part. In tertiary institutions, the intensity becomes more alarming. All the disciplines crucial to national development such as science, law, sociology and political science are not anchored in, or linked to any culture but the western one. Where African culture is brought up (often only in passing), it is presented as devoid of any epistemological content (2001: 75).

Hopper’s characterization here suggests that prominence is hardly given to African epistemologies in the attempt to showcase that it has roles to play in re-representing African educational system in a manner that makes African epistemology an all-­ inclusive one. In other words, what is the essence of education in Africa when such education only reflects the reality of the Western cultures to the detriment of African indigenous cultures? This resonates with the point that epistemicide as construed is not limited to the epistemic framework of Africa, as it extends to African educational system as well. The above argument makes the discourse on global in/justice tenable. In particular, the epistemicide inherent in the Eurocentric paradigm in knowledge production has made some thinkers argue that “global justice” remains an illusion, as long as there is an epistemic line between global North and global South. For instance, Masaka is of the opinion that “the hegemonic relations between the epistemic paradigm of the global North and that of the global South, it would appear challenging to think of ‘global justice’” (2017: 75). This suggests that ‘global justice’ ought to be an all-encompassing concept which promotes diversity in not only the economy (capitalism) and politics (democracy) of all geographical zones in the world, but must also cover the epistemologies of the dominated peoples. Hence, Masaka further states that: “in my view, justice at the global level can only subsist if there is acceptance and respect for the diversity of the peoples of this world, their knowledge paradigms and the geopolitical centres that they reside in” (Masaka 2017: 75).

 nowledge Production as a Social Practice K and Context-Dependent Can knowledge production be validated across time and space by mere conformity to the Eurocentric canon as espoused during the modern/Renaissance period of philosophy? What role, if any, do social contexts, linguistic schemes, and the history of

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a people play in knowledge production? The attempt to answer to these questions forms the bulwark of this section. Here, I argue that knowledge production does not need to conform to the Eurocentric hegemonic models before it can be validated. This is so as there are relativistic factors that determine what count as knowledge in the process of knowledge production. Knowledge production, going by the Euro-scientific paradigm, suggests epistemic ethnocentrism, and the attempt to universalize the dominant group’s theory of knowledge production does not only falls flat in the face of logic, but also leads to the superimposition of an alien form of life above another. The reason for this is that knowledge production is tied to conceptual, material, social and theoretical factors within a socio-cultural milieu. In Yoruba traditional thought, for instance, the people do not only reckon with the Eurocentric/scientific models in the process of knowledge production. This is why Olufemi Taiwo posits that the Ifa corpus is one of the methods by which the Yoruba people of Southwestern Nigeria produce knowledge. He states unequivocally that: “considered as a system of knowledge, the Ifa corpus not only had its complement of specialized personnel; it also had, in many communities, spaces exclusively reserved for its dissemination to those who sought to acquire the knowledge it contained” (Taiwo 1993: 893). Lending credence to Taiwo’s assertion, de Sousa Santos et al. assert that: Conceptions of knowledge, of what it means to know, of what counts as knowledge, and how that knowledge is produced are as diverse as the cosmologies and normative frameworks alluded above. All social practices involve knowledge. The production of knowledge is, in itself, a social practice… (Santos et al. 2008: xxi).

The above excerpt can be further understood if we consider what de Sousa Santos calls “the principle of the incompleteness of knowledge.” By this principle, de Sousa Santos means the “precondition for epistemological dialogues and debates among different knowledges. What each knowledge contributes to such a dialogue is the way in which it leads a certain practice to overcome certain ignorance” (Santos 2014: 189). Evidently, knowledge production, be it scientific or unscientific, Western or non-Western, is geared towards tackling ignorance in a particular context, and this cannot be done in isolation of what a particular society holds to be true or false in their epistemic conceptual framework. Knowledge production, therefore, reflects as much as possible, the existential situations of a group of people. Hence, it is a difficult to universalize the Eurocentric canon in knowledge production, and denying of a group’s ability to produce knowledge is superfluous. By extension, denying a group’s ability to develop their own knowledge is denying their membership in the genus of rational beings. Such arguments appear to be advantageous to the conquering group when seen in the context of the dominant group’s plan to conquer the opposing group. They are, nevertheless reality that knowledge paradigms exist (Masaka 2018: 288). What is evident from Masaka’s submission is that knowledge production is often determined by the “existential situations” of a particular group of people. In other words, there are some factors that determine what count as knowledge, as against the Eurocentric hegemony that was legitimised during the Enlightenment period. By way of necessity, it is important to mention and briefly

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explain some factors that determine knowledge production as a social practice, and by extension, context-dependent. In fact, one can argue that the science that was popular during the Enlightenment period was made to attend to the existential situations of Western cultures, which makes it possible for one to refer it as an ethnoscience, since it was only peculiar to the Westerners, and other geographical locations in the world had their own science peculiar to them. Thus, the argument that knowledge is a social practice and context-dependent is a valid one, as one form of knowledge cannot be said to be universal, since it cannot reflect the existential situations of the people all over the world. According to Okere et al., knowledge production is not limited to one paradigm. This means that the revered science as we have it today is only one of the many forms of knowledge developed by man to tackle his existential predicaments. Thus, we can have forms of knowledge such as mythology, mysticism, ontological knowledge, perceptual knowledge, etc., depending on the existential exigency of that particular geographical location. Okere et al., sum this position up thus: Knowledge has a many-sided face that ought to be gathered in for a richer integral development of its thrust. Re-stating that all knowledge is basically local knowledge undermines the Reformist Modernity’s pretense at monolithic knowledge trajectories for mankind. This pretense moreover tended to universalize science, which was in origin local, historically determined, contingent ethnoscience. It tended to suffocate the voice, vision, and unique perspectives and contributions of the great variety of other and genuine knowledge systems and epistemologies from the many cultures of the world (2005: 4–5).

Evidently, all knowledge, science included, are all local, and there are viable knowledge forms outside what is obtainable in the Eurocentric world. It is therefore against the principle of the ecology of knowledge to prioritise one form of knowledge above other forms for the reason that it is outside one’s conceptual framework. The importance of discussing knowledge production as a social practice and context-dependent is to dehegemonise the erroneous idea that the Eurocentric epistemic paradigm as it reflects in science is the ultimate paradigm of rationality and epistemic authority. As a consequence, this does not imply that all forms of knowledge are equal, but that factors peculiar to a people’s conceptual scheme are what determine what counts as knowledge. The reason for this is that “since no knowledge or practice in isolation provides reliable guidance, and for an edifying, socially responsible, rather than technical, application of science, fully aware that the consequences of scientific actions tend to be less scientific than the actions themselves” (Santos 2014: 127). This why scholars such as Mbembe has called for ‘epistemic diversity’ which according to him, is “a process that does not necessarily abandon the notion of universal knowledge for humanity, but which embraces it via a horizontal strategy of openness to dialogue among many epistemic traditions” (Mbembe 2016: 37). The argument that knowledge production cannot be devoid of social practices might be frowned at on the basis that it encourages relativism and using the famous phrase of Paul Feyerabend: “anything goes.” It is important to state here that it is not the case, as knowledge production as a social practice and context-dependent only suggests that knowledge systems all over the world can exist side by side, and one

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will not be considered as superior and the other inferior. To further understand this, Visvanathan listed some salient requirements which will obliterate any form of hegemony or dominance of a form of knowledge over other. According to him: 1 . Each knowledge system if it is to be democratic must realise it is iatrogenic in some context. 2. Each knowledge system must realise that in moments of dominance it may destroy life-giving alternatives available in the other. Each paradigm must sustain the otherness of other knowledge systems. 3. No knowledge system may ‘museumify’ the other. No knowledge system should be overtly deskilling. 4. Each knowledge system must practice cognitive indifference to itself in some consciously chosen domains. 5. All major technical projects legitimised through dominant knowledge forms must be subject to referendum and recall (Visvanathan 2007: 215).

These requirements, therefore, makes the discourse on indigenous epistemologies possible. For instance, through these requirements, we can have African epistemology, Indian epistemology, Aboriginal epistemology, and so on, and by extension, privilege will not be granted to Eurocentric canon in knowledge production.

 rom Critique to (Re) construction: Re-echoing the Need F for Epistemic Decolonisation The concept of epistemic decolonisation, no doubt, is not new to African philosophers. For instance, Wa Thiongo (1986) has  at many point in time promoted the project of decolonisation in African philosophy. While decolonisation differs in how both thinkers conceptualized it, it is important to note that their conceptions of decolonisation is geared towards rescuing Africans from the shackles of colonialism, and by extension, coloniality. However, my attempt here is not to examine decolonisation from the perspectives of Fanon and Wa Thiongo, but to simply re-­ echo the need for epistemic decolonisation in contemporary Africa. Epistemic decolonisation, according to Mignolo, is, in the first place, a constant set of processes in which the means is the end; and second, the steady set of process understood as epistemic decolonisation is not oriented toward “the deconstruction of Western metaphysics” but, rather, both to uncovering the illusions of modernity, progress, and development by revealing its darker side, coloniality (Mignolo 2003: 456). In Africa, Mbembe is of the opinion that epistemic decolonisation has two sides: one is a constant critique of the dominant Eurocentric canons in knowledge production, and two, the development of alternative models; in particular, the second side “is where a lot remains to be done” (Mbembe 2015: 18). Once cannot overemphasize that a lot has to be done by African philosophers because presently, decolonisation has specific relevance to Africa, as this continent finds itself in a post-colonial era, but its mode of knowledge production and university curricula still reflect the hold of colonial power over us.

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While this is the case, my argument in this section stems from Mbembe’s position on epistemic decolonisation, that is, I will offer an epistemic framework that will be used in critiquing the Eurocentric canons in knowledge production as fashionable in contemporary Africa, then move on to offer an alternative model. My framework for critiquing the aftermath of colonial legacy on knowledge production in Africa which reflects in coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide is Jose Medina’s epistemology of resistance. And in (re) constructing an alternative model, I rely on the need to Africanise epistemology in contemporary Africa. One thing that is evident in the discourse of coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide as they both relate to African context is oppression in terms of epistemic relations. Put differently, both coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide are geared towards oppressing Africans and suppressing their indigenous epistemologies. While this is the case even as we have in Africa today, some salient questions are begging for answers: How can African philosophers ensure the dehegemonisation of the Eurocentric canons in knowledge production as it relates to Africa? What should be an African response to coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide? In what way is the African philosopher supposed to conduct his/her business in a manner that will resist the consequences of colonialism on knowledge production in Africa? To answer these questions, the epistemology of resistance comes handy. In particular, epistemology of resistance “is about rejecting the assumption that the modern West is the central root of Africa’s consciousness and cultural heritage. It is about rejecting the notion that Africa is merely an extension of the West” (Mbembe 2015: 16). The fact that both coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide reflects epistemic oppression cannot be overstated. This is why Medina developed an epistemology which can be used in tackling the negative effects of epistemic oppression on a particular group of people. In the opinion of Medina, “the epistemology of resistance I will develop has both an analytic and a normative side: it tries to elucidate the epistemic aspects of oppression, but it also tries to offer a way out of the epistemic injustices that accompany oppression” (Medina 2013: 3). He further states that the epistemology of resistance has to do with using “our epistemic resources and abilities to undermine and change oppressive normative structures and the complacent cognitive-affective functioning that sustain those structures” (2013: 3). Evidently, coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide has come to stay in the African epistemological paradigm, which no doubt, will keep entrenching the argument that Africans cannot think for themselves as long as they tend to value Eurocentric canons in knowledge production to the detriment of African indigenous epistemologies. However, the pertinent question here remains: should African philosophers continue to fold their hands and watch the Eurocentric canons in knowledge production override that of the Afrocentric paradigms? Here, it is important for African philosophers to keep engaging themselves in the rudiments of epistemology of resistance in the attempt to rejecting the Eurocentric canons in knowledge production that has disparaged African indigenous knowledge system. Thus, it is the argument here that resistance should be used as a virtue in critiquing Eurocentric canons in knowledge production as it relates to Africa. With this done, there will be a type

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of epistemology that will be African-centred. According to Sefa Dei, an African-­ centred approach to epistemology will ensure an important and pragmatic space for African peoples to interpret and critically reflect upon their upon their own experiences on their own terms, and through the lens of their worldviews and understandings, rather than being forced to understand their world through a Eurocentric lens (Dei 2012: 114). Thus, an African-centred epistemology does not imply that Africans should not learn from others (Europeans), but the “insistence on Africans [to] think, speak, and do things for themselves in the first place. This does not imply unwillingness to learn from others but a refusal to be hegemonised by others, irrespective of color or race.…” (Mafeje 2000: 71). The task before African philosophers, therefore, is to pursue a: knowledge production that can renovate African culture, defend the African people’s dignity and civilisational achievements and contribute afresh to a new global agenda that can push us out of the crisis of modernity as promoted by European Enlightenment. Such knowledge must be relevant to the current needs of the masses, which they can use to bring about a social transformation out of their present plight. [As] there cannot be no such a thing as the advancement of science for its own sake. Those who pursue “science for its own sake” find that their knowledge is used for purposes, which they may never have intended it for (Nabudere 2006: 7).

The notion of an African-centred epistemology, therefore, suggests two salient positions: first is that Africans have abandoned their indigenous knowledge system, and secondly, it also reminds Africans that the position they are in now is not an irredeemable one. In postcolonial Africa, an African-centred epistemology has been explored by philosophers, politicians and other policy makers to reaffirm the African epistemic identity. For instance, Makoba while proposing “Africanisation” as an African-centred epistemology in the twenty-first century, argued that it is an all-­ inclusive concept which seeks to incorporate and reassert a new sense of belonging on the part of Africans In other words, “Africanisation” promotes inculsion and rejects exclusion, and also, it is regarded as a process and a way of life for Africans which encourages the incorporation and integration of other cultures into African visions (1997: 199). However, this should not be done in a way that encourages the inferiorisation of African indigenous epistemologies. Above all, the essence of having an African-centred or Africanising epistemology is to ensure that Eurocentric canons in knowledge production does not erode that of Africans since it takes into cognizance a form of life that is distinct from an African form of life. This will not only promote an epistemology that is indigenously African, but will also sustain in all ways, African cultural identity.

Concluding Remarks In this chapter, I have argued that postcolonial African societies are still grappling with the colonial matrix of power which reflects in how knowledge is being produced and sustained. In particular, I argued  that this colonial matrix of power in

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knowledge production reflects in coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide. The former has a nexus with mental colonisation in the sense that Africans tend to value Eurocentric paradigms in knowledge production to the detriment of their indigenous epistemology. The latter (epistemicide) is an extreme form of the former (coloniality of knowledge). I demonstrated in this chapter that both coloniality of knowledge and epistemicide are epiphenomenal of the epistemological hegemony  fashionable during the Enlightenment period which saw  the superiority of science above other forms of knowledge. Thus, there was a project of epistemic expansionism via modernity and colonialism which extended to Africa. It is also one of my central arguments in this chapter that knowledge production cannot be discussed in isolation of social contexts. In this sense, factors such as language, human nature, socio-cultural values, and customs and habits are important in legitimizing what counts as knowledge. This generally rejects the universalism that characterizes the argument of the Enlightenment philosophers that science is the ultimate paradigm of rationality and epistemic authority. Having said all this, it is the position of this chapter that African philosophers should at all-time keep resisting and rejecting the Eurocentric canons in knowledge production which seeks to replace the African paradigms. By implication, Africans can “accommodate new entrants in the partnership, taking cautious strides against an inversion or invasion of what is relevant to Africa in the era of globalization” (Ndofirepi 2014: 157). It does not just end at rejecting Eurocentric paradigms which seek to obliterate African epistemological paradigms but that it also behooves on African philosophers to keep promoting an African-centred or an Africanised epistemology which will not only decolonise the African mindscape, but will also dehegemonise the ethnocentric idea that Eurocentric canons in knowledge production are superior to that of Africans.

References Busia, K.A. 1964. Purposeful Education for Africa. The Hague, Paris: Mouton. ———. 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. De Sousa Santos, B. 2007. Beyond abyssal thinking: From global lines to ecologies of knowledges. Review xxx (1): 45–89. ———. 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide. London/New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. ———. 2008. Introduction: Opening up the Canon of Knowledge and the Recognition of Difference. In Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies, ed. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, xx–xxvii. New York: Verso Books. Dei, S.J.G. 2012. Indigenous Anti-colonial Knowledge as ‘Heritage Knowledge’ for Promoting Black/African Education in Diasporic Contexts. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1 (1): 102–119. Emeagwali, G., and S.G.J.  Dei. 2014. African Indigenous Knowledge and the Disciplines. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Escobar, A. 2007. Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American Modernity/Coloniality Research Program. Cultural Studies 21 (2/3): 197–210.

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Fataar, A., and S. Subreenduth. 2015. The Search for Ecologies of Knowledge in the Encounter with African Epistemicide in South African Education. UNISA: South African Journal of Education 29 (2): 106–121. Giddens, A. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Grosfoguel, R. 2007. The Epistemic De-colonial Turn: Beyond Political Economy Paradigms. Cultural Studies 21 (2–3): 211–223. ———. 2013. The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities: Epistemic Racism/Sexism and the Four Genocides/Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century. Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 11 (1): 73–90. Hoppers, C.O. 2001. Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Academic Institutions in South Africa. Perspectives in Education 19 (1): 73–85. Hountondji, P. 1990. Scientific Dependence in Africa Today. Research in African Literatures 21 (3): 5–15. Ipadeola, A.P. 2017. The Imperative of Epistemic Decolonisation in Contemporary Africa. In Themes, Issues and Problems in African Philosophy, ed. Isaac E. Ukpokolo, 145–160. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lawhead, W.F. 2002. The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Mafeje, A. 2000. Africanity: A Combative Ontology. CODESRIA Bulletin 1 & 4: b66–b71. Makgoba, M.W. 1997. Mokoko: The Makgoba Affair. A Reflection on Transformation. Florida: Vivlia. Maldonado-Torres, N. 2007. On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept. Cultural Studies 21 (2–3): 240–270. Masaka, D. 2017. ‘Global Justice’ and the Suppressed Epistemologies of the Indigenous People of Africa. Philosophical Papers 46 (1): 59–84. ———. 2018. The Prospects of Ending Epistemicide in Africa: Some Thoughts. Journal of Black Studies 49 (3): 284–301. Mbembe, A. 2015. Decolonising Knowledge and the Question of the Archive. Lecture delivered at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research. Retrieved from http://wiser.wits.ac.za/ sites/default/files/private/Achille%20Mbembe%20-­ ———. 2016. Decolonizing the University: New Directions. Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 15 (1): 29–45. Medina, J. 2013. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppresion, Epistemic Injustice and Resistant Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mignolo, W. 2003. The Darker Side of Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality and Colonization. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. Mignolo, W.D., and C.E.  Walsh. 2018. On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, and Praxis. Durham/London: Duke University Press. Nabudere, W.D. 2006. Towards an Afrikology of Knowledge Production and African Regeneration. International Journal of African Renaissance 1 (1): 7–32. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2003. Empire, Global Coloniality, and African Subjectivity. New  York/ Oxford: Berghahn. ———. 2013. Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization. Senegal: CORDESRIA. ———. 2018. The Dynamics of Epistemological Decolonisation in the 21st Century: Towards Epistemic Freedom. Strategic Review for Southern Africa 40 (1): 16–45. Ndofirepi, A.P. 2014. Africanisation of Epistemology in 21st Century University in Africa. In Remapping Africa in the Global Space: Propositions for Change, ed. Edward Shizha, 151–165. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2012. Education in Africa ‘Potted Plants in Greenhouses’: A Critical Reflection on the Resilience of Colonial. Journal of Asian and African Studies 47: 129–154. Okere, T., C.A. Njoku, and R. Devisch. 2005. All Knowledge is First of All Local Knowledge: An Introduction. Africa Development 30 (3): 1–19.

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Quijano, A. 2000. Coloniality of Power, Eurocentricism, and Latin America. Nepatla: Views from the South 1 (3). ———. 2007. Coloniality of and Modernity/Rationality. Cultural Studies 21 (2/3): 168–178. Russell, B. 1945. The History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Semali, L.M., and J.L.  Kincheloe. 1999. What is Indigenous Knowledge and Why Should We Study It? In What is Indigenous Knowledge? Voices from the Academy, ed. L.M. Semali and J.L. Kincheloe, 53–57. New York: The Falmer Press. Shizha, E. 2006. Legitimizing Indigenous Knowledge in Zimbabwe: A Theoretical Analysis of Postcolonial School Knowledge and its Colonial Legacy. Youth and Children Studies 2: 20–35. ———. 2013. Reclaiming Our Indigenous Voices: The Problem with Postcolonial sub-Saharan African School Curriculum. Journal of Indigenous Social Development 2 (1): 1–18. Taiwo, O. 1993. Colonialism and Its Aftermath: The Crisis of Knowledge Production. On Postcolonial Discourse: A Special Issue 16 (4): 891–908. Tlostanova, M. 2015. Can the Post-Soviet Think? On Coloniality of Knowledge, External Imperial and Double Colonial Difference. Intersections. EEJSP 1 (2): 38–58. Ukpokolo, I.E. 2019. Enriching the Knowledge of the Other Through an Epistemology of Intercourse. In Handbook of African Philosophy of Difference, ed. Elvis Imafidon, 193–204. New York: Springer. Visvanathan, S. 2007. “Between Cosmology and System: The Heuristics of a Dissenting Imagination.” Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies, 182-217. B. Santos, B. (ed.), London: Verso Books. Wa Thiongo, N. 1986. Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. Portsmouth: Heinemann.

Chapter 6

A Critical Exposition of ‘Alternative’ Site(s) of Knowledge Production in Africa: Decentering the African University Joseph Pardon Hungwe

Introduction This chapter seeks to do two things: Firstly, it decenters the university as site of knowledge production in Africa. The objective of decentering the university is premised on the understanding that universities’ monopolization of knowledge production perpetuates epistemic injustice in Africa. It is succinctly noted that the university is the dominant knowledge production institution, while hardly any knowledge is produced outside the university (Cloete et al. 2015).The university’s dominance and monopolization of knowledge production in Africa tend to further entrench epistemic marginalization of African knowledge traditions. Epistemic injustice is conceptualized as the practices and tendencies of illegitimization, marginalization and trivialization of local knowledge production and sites (Ndlovu 2015). The consequence of epistemic injustice is the importation and deployment of Western-centric knowledge in the African society. Secondly, the chapter seeks to highlight alternative sites of knowledge production in Africa, which should be legitimated by both local and global knowledge traditions in order to terminate epistemic injustice. There is an exclusion of the ‘othered’ knowledge in the ‘othered’ sites of knowledge production. Disenfranchisement of knowledge is done through disenfranchisement of the othered sites of knowledge production, thereby, discounting other knowledge systems (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019). While there is abundant scholarly research on knowledge production at African universities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020; Murove 2018; Akena 2012; Nyamnjoh 2012), there is a paucity of conceptual exploration of other sites of knowledge production in Africa. There is a perception that the university is the exclusive site of the production of legitimate and relevant knowledge in Africa (Cloete et al. 2015). Consequently, other sites of knowledge production are marginalized. Ironically, the universities in J. P. Hungwe (*) University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_6

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Africa are perceived to be Western implants that produce and disseminate knowledge that is highly oriented towards a Western worldview (Cross and Ndofirepi 2016). It is also the case that because of its colonial baggage, the current model of university in Africa is not designed to harness, accommodate and produce contextual knowledge that responds adequately to social, political and economic challenges. Moreover, the imperative for contextualized knowledge production draws justification from the realization that the bulk of knowledge produced and disseminated in African universities is Western-centric (Mbembe 2016) While the demand for contextual knowledge production serves a noble cause (Masaka 2018), there is a need to identify and expose other sites of knowledge production in Africa. In this chapter, a site of knowledge production refers to a designated and communally recognized place where knowledge producing processes takes place. A site of knowledge production is important because it regulates and assigns people, practices, validation processes, values and norms of knowledge production. Ultimately, a site of knowledge production influences the form or type of knowledge produced. Moreover, the practices, beliefs and worldviews that underscore knowledge production are important because in the end, knowledge production determines how society responds to immediate challenges. From the above paragraph, it is evident that there is need to decenter the university as a site of knowledge production. Decentering does not imply a trivialization of the university, but rather recognition of other sites of knowledge production in Africa. From the onset of this chapter, it is important that I point out that I do not seek here to defend the thesis of pluriversity as outlined by eminent scholars like Achille Mbembe and Walter Mignolo (Mbembe 2016). In my thinking, a call for pluriversity is a demand for more versions of universities, a situation that may imply a multiplication or replication of rigidly formalized institutions that do not take into account contextualities. In any case, both university and pluriversity are terms laden with a power matrix that is associated with cultural dominance, formalization, institutionalization and/or systematization. Rather, the primary concern in this chapter is exploring ‘other’ sites of knowledge production in Africa. This chapter therefore curates the sites that produce valid and contextually relevant knowledge in Africa. The central argument in this chapter is that in Africa, decentering the university as a site of knowledge production should entail the harnessing and legitimating of knowledge produced outside the Western institutionalized and formalized settings of knowledge production in Africa. Decentering the university as site of knowledge production in Africa is essential for two reasons; firstly, universities in Africa have generally retained the Western-centric orientation; thereby perpetuating epistemic injustice against African indigenous epistemic traditions. Perhaps it is for this first reason that there has been resurgence in the decolonization discourse in African education (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019; Sebola and Mogoboya 2020). Secondly, in the African university, the infrastructure, technological facilities and expertise necessary for knowledge production are noted to be comparatively underdeveloped, thereby negatively affecting the quality of knowledge (Kumalo 2018). For Murove (2018), “in a globalised and multicultural world, when knowledge is produced from multiple sites and from within multiple ethnicities, authentic knowledge production

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is both multicultural and multi-ethnic”. In this respect, the process of knowledge production is highly influenced by the site in which it occurs. However, Murove (2018), like many other scholars, does not identify the sites of knowledge production. Therefore, the primary research questions in this chapter are: What are the conceptual assumptions that undergird knowledge production? Besides the university, are there alternative sites of knowledge production in Africa? In pursuance of these research questions, there are four sections in this chapter. The first section is an exposition of conceptual underpinnings in knowledge production. In the second section, I pay attention to theorization about a university as a site of knowledge production. The third section analyses the context in which the African university endeavors to produce knowledge. The final section, which comprises four subsections, curates sites of knowledge production in Africa. In accounting for the knowledge sites, I draw mostly upon the Zimbabwean and southern African context, because I am familiar with this context. However, it is my conviction that the sites of knowledge noted in this chapter are equally common across Africa. The following section discusses knowledge production as theoretical framework.

 nowledge, Knowledge Production and Epistemic Injustice: K Some Conceptual Perspectives As noted in the introductory section, the primary focus of this chapter is to outline some alternative knowledge sites to the university in Africa. In this respect, I adopt knowledge production as a theoretical framework. In this section, I discuss knowledge production firstly as a process and secondly as a factor that can be employed to either perpetuate or terminate epistemic injustice. From a theoretical perspective, knowledge production entails the process of creation, innovation and research regarding knowledge. Before delving into knowledge production, the first part of this section discusses the concept of knowledge. Primarily, knowledge is essential because it is used to respond to challenges that confront humanity. Fundamentally, knowledge emanates from social contexts. It is noted that “knowledge production should link to the experiential world of indigenous communities, whereby social and cultural context play an academically indispensable role in the formation of discourses” (Murove 2018:162). Appreciating that knowledge is a product of the immediate context can mediate between universalism and relativism in discourses on epistemology. In its varied meanings, knowledge can refer to information, experiences, encounters, facts, awareness and data, among other things. These referents and descriptors of knowledge point to the observation that knowledge is a highly contestable term. For the conceptual purposes in this chapter, I categorize knowledge into two subsets, namely academic and social. Firstly, academic knowledge refers to systematized, institutionalized and formalized knowledge that is produced, packaged and

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deployed by formal institutions to the society at large. For instance, university faculties are supposed to produce and disseminate academic knowledge within and among academic communities and society at large. The assumption is that the knowledge transferred to society is relevant and adequate to resolve challenges. In such transfer, a university graduate is presumed to have acquired relevant knowledge that is of value to humanity and the environment. Therefore, society holds university graduates in high esteem – they are the knowledgeable ones. For instance, among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, a university graduate is colloquially referred to as munhu akadya mabhuku, (person who has consumed books).The presumption is that legitimate and relevant knowledge is found in books. I concur with the observation that “there has been a tendency to treat the university learning experience as the one that truly deserves to be considered as an education, even contrasting it with knowledge acquired in technical/vocational institutions labeled as training” (Assie-­ Lumumba 2006:11).A graduate is presumed to possess abundant and unquestionable relevant knowledge because society considers him or her to be an exceptional consumer of books. There is an impression in society that outside the book, there is no knowledge. On the other hand, social knowledge refers to information, facts and communicable values that are acquired in society. This description of knowledge intimates that every member of society is in possession of social knowledge. You do not need to enroll in a formal institution to acquire social knowledge; rather, membership of a specific society guarantees that a member attains this kind of knowledge. In the traditional context of Africa, elders are the agents of social knowledge. Every society derives knowledge from its past and present experience. However, the hierarchical social structure in Africa entails that elders are ‘ordained’ as the custodians of wisdom and knowledge that they would have acquired through life experiences. Besides the hierarchical social structure as agent of knowledge, there are numerous agents of social knowledge such as newspapers, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, radio and the other people considered as knowledgeable. Nevertheless, there is a need to be cautious of the consumption and dissemination of social knowledge because it is also mixed up with hearsay and unverified information. Currently, the Covid-19 vaccination resistant in Africa can be associated with the social knowledge in which false information is peddled. It is important to state that there is an interrelationship between academic and social knowledge. For instance, social knowledge can be gathered, verified and modeled into academic knowledge. A case in point is research work in which social knowledge is gathered and ‘processed’ by persons affiliated to universities. However, because of the prestige associated with universities, academic knowledge, which in any case is supposedly derived from society, is regarded as superior to social knowledge. This section exposes “the danger of limiting definitions of knowledge to those areas of study that are represented by departments and faculties or the various branches of research and specialization within them” (Winberg 2006:160). Both social and academic knowledge should be accorded values in so far as they enable responses to the challenges faced by society.

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Accordingly, all knowledge, whether social or academic, is derived from the society. It is aptly stated that “all knowledge is cultural or context specific. So there is plurality of knowledge system formations” (Murove 2018:161).Knowledge should be relevant in response to the local and global political, economic and social challenges. It does however, not mean that if knowledge is not responsive to global needs, then it ceases to be knowledge. In other words, knowledge does not only serve the instrumental purposes but it also espouses values and ideas. The ideas expressed by individuals should be understood within the social context of those individuals. For this reason, ordinary life experiences are significant for formulating local knowledge that is critical to mutually harmonious coexistence with fellow human beings and the environment (Ndlovu 2015; Akena 2012: 601). So far this section has shown that knowledge production is closely related to the conceptualization of knowledge in a society. Nevertheless, adding production as a superlative to knowledge has its own complexities, as will be demonstrated in this section. Knowledge production suggests that an individual in society is in the process of knowing and knowledge is an ever-pursued object. The examination of the relationship between individual and society in knowledge production means that we should study society and the individual to uncover the deeper meanings embedded and represented by the knowledge produced (Akena 2012). On the basis that knowledge is derived from a social context, it can be claimed that knowledge production is viewed from different perspectives. For example, there is a school of thought that focuses on the legitimacy of knowledge. In this respect, “knowledge producers, politics, class affiliation and group identity symbiotically influence one another in a complex manner, creating a hybrid knowledge that is a product of such interaction” (Akena 2012:600).Authentic knowledge production takes into account people’s life experiences. Additionally, knowledge production is a function of social processes and structures because knowledge producers are related to the project of the community and to the challenges that society encounters (Akena 2012). Ultimately, knowledge production is about the creation of new knowledge on a phenomenon; it involves innovativeness. More importantly for this chapter, knowledge production is about recognition, validation and legitimization. Therefore, the pursuance of epistemic fairness should encompass the basic question: How does knowledge production occur outside institutionalized settings such as university?

 heorizing About the University as a Site T of Knowledge Production When we theorize about the university as a site of knowledge production, several questions come to mind: What is the ‘appropriate’ site of knowledge production? Who validates or certifies genuine knowledge? Is the university the only site where legitimate knowledge can be produced? How is knowledge production extended to non-university sites as an endeavor to end epistemic injustice?

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The above questions are important because, despite the centrality of epistemic injustice debates in Africa (Ally and August 2018), there is little focus on the importance of sites of knowledge production. The truth is that there is an interrogated assumption that universities have the exclusive duty of knowledge production (Cloete et al. 2015; Simukungwe 2019). Such an argument is advanced despite the observation thatthe universities in Africa are currently Western-centric in terms of their orientation and curriculum perspectives (Mbembe 2016; Ally and August 2018). For Waghid and Manthalu (2019), the African university is in principle Eurocentric in most respects. Yet paradoxically, while university education has become a valued good, the university in Africa has stubbornly remained an outpost of Western worldviews. Ideally, a university is supposed to be a powerful symbol of national identity, national aspiration and collective national history through its knowledge production perspectives. Both the state and society assign the university a dominant mandate and role to produce and disseminate knowledge that is relevant and adequate in addressing contextual challenges. Such contextual challenges may have local, regional, national and even international dimensions and outlooks. Assigning the knowledge production mandate to a university is premised on assumptions that the university possesses the required facilities for knowledge production, such as qualified lectures, talented students, the requisite technological infrastructure, and the capacity to collaborate with other national and international universities. In this instance, “universities were/are assumed to be the only sites where knowledge was produced. From these sites, knowledge was then understood to be transferred to other sites” (Winberg 2006:163). As a site of knowledge production, a university produces multiple versions or subdivisions of knowledge. In this respect, Horsthmeke (2008) suggests that there are three variants of knowledge, namely factual knowledge; practical knowledge; and knowledge of persons, places or things (knowledge by acquaintance).For instance, in Zimbabwe, ruzivo (Shona) and ulwazi (Ndebele) are all-encompassing terms that refer to acquired experiences, encountered facts, accumulated information and historical memory. On the other hand, kudzidza (Shona) and ukufunda (Ndebele) are terms that predominantly refer to knowledge that a person acquires through attending institutions of education such as universities. The paradox is that one may have ruzivo or ulwazi without necessarily being educated or learned. Because institutionalized knowledge tends to have market value, any knowledge that is acquired outside institutions is regarded as anecdotal, irrelevant and superstition. In fact, knowledge thatis extra-university is invalidated. Subsequently, epistemic injustice is not only entrenched by the content of what is taught, but by the validation of universities as the apex of knowledge sites in Africa (Alemu 2018). Perhaps, it is for this reason that there is a mushrooming of universities with the attendant massification of universities. Theorization about universities as sites of knowledge production draws from the triple purposes of the university, which is to teach research and practice community engagement. A university is assumed to possess adequate qualifications to be a suitable site for knowledge production because of three reasons: Firstly, a university is

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a site that is supposedly endowed with the infrastructure, capacities and skills necessary for knowledge production. Infrastructure includes physical infrastructure, like lecture rooms, laboratories, libraries and sports and recreational facilities. Secondly, university staff members responsible for lecturing and research are assumed to be experts in knowledge production. Note that the usual practice is that universities recruit lecturing and research staff and students based on their potential to participate actively in the knowledge production discourse, which will ultimately benefit both the university and the broader society. In other words, academic merit is assumed to play an important role in knowledge production. The allocation of both students and staff to disciplines is designed to maximize knowledge production. Academic disciplines and faculties are therefore categories of knowledge production, institutionalization, validation and packaging, and the transmission of knowledge. Thirdly, the university has structured time management, performance indicators, targets, quality control and measurements of knowledge production. Nevertheless, in the context of Africa, the criteria and validation of knowledge production have come under the scholarly scrutiny mainly because of decolonisation discourse. In view of the points made in the previous paragraph, universities can be described as idealized sites of the production of formal knowledge. In this respect, I concur with the observation that “we commonly view formal education as sites in which knowledge is produced and transmitted to learners from teachers, academic literature and other materials” (Alemu, 2018). Therefore, the knowledge production that the society often associates with innovations, creation and discoveries is assumed to emanate from universities. Alemu (2018) makes the following claim: A university is a higher learning institution that brings men and women to a high level of intellectual development in the arts and science, and in the traditional professional disciplines, promotes high-level research. It also signifies a community of persons engaged in study and research. A university is a source of universal knowledge and highly skilled human power for professions (Alemu 2018:211).

While the above citation aptly points to the conceptualization of a university as a critical site of knowledge production, the implicit assumption is that alternative sites of knowledge production are marginalized, specifically in the context of Africa. On a continent where knowledge from a university is accessed by a tiny minority, it is problematic to marginalize alternative knowledge sites. At this juncture in this chapter, a cursory look at the notion of pluriversity cannot be avoided. As I indicated earlier in the introductory section of this chapter, I do not concur with the notion of pluriversity. For conceptual purposes, pluriversity is described as a decolonial perspective that seeks to interrogate the ‘self-proclaimed universality’ of Western epistemologies, and to acknowledge the existence and validity of many different ways of knowing the world (Mignolo 2018). In summative terms, pluriversity seeks to terminate epistemic injustice by conferring alternative sites as ‘other’ universities. A lucid articulation on pluriversity is offered by Mbembe (2016): By pluriversity, many understand a process of knowledge production that is open to epistemic diversity. It is a process that does not necessarily abandon the notion of universal

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J. P. Hungwe knowledge for humanity, but which embraces it via a horizontal strategy of openness, to dialogue among different epistemic traditions. To decolonize a university is therefore to reform it with the aim of creating a less provincial and more critical cosmopolitan pluriversalism, a task that involves the radical reformation of ways of thinking and transcendence of our disciplinary divisions (Mbembe 2016:37).

The primary focus of this chapter is not the domain of pluriversity because the multiplicity of universities may still neglect the alternative sites of knowledge production in Africa. Rather, authentic knowledge production should harness the ‘othered’ knowledge sites with their discounted knowledges. The following section focuses on the contextualities that characterize knowledge production in the African universities. In doing so, I seek to outline that knowledge production is a culturally and contextually determined endeavor.

 ontextual Setting: Production or Replication of Knowledge C in African Universities To appreciate the contextual setting of knowledge production in African universities fully, the first part of this section briefly outlines the historical pattern of knowledge production in Africa. Whether pre-colonial knowledge production was formal or informal and institutional or non-institutional is often debated. The words formal and institutional tend to be laden with power, systems and cultural connotations. To illustrate this point, one may ask: What are the criteria for qualifying a knowledge system as formal or informal and institutional or non-institutional? This debate is not the primary focus of this section. It suffices to point out that there were teaching and learning, which imply that some knowledge production did occurring pre-­ colonial Africa. It is pointed out that “learning in pre-colonial Africa was embedded in the cultural settings of the time without having formally established institutions that deal with production and dissemination of knowledge” (Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck 2013:36).Note that the first two students to graduate from a European-­ style university in sub-Saharan Africa received their degrees in 1879, while in South Africa, the first university was established in 1829 (Assie-Lumumba 2006).This historical analysis points to the fact that knowledge production did not begin in the era of colonialism. Rather, traditional authorities produced knowledge to meet the challenges and needs of Africans. To this end, “knowledge was for building African civilizations, transferring cultural identity, maintaining a coherent way of life in the continent, establishing a source of local autonomy, formation of social elites and institutionalization of culture” (ibid). Moreover, local institutions of learning were devoted to religion, philosophy, morality and medicine. Colonialism indisputably disrupted the knowledge production model in Africa. There was sustained colonial marginalization of African knowledge traditions in the colonial era. The informalization of African knowledge sites, and the centering of the Western-centric- university as the mono-site of the production of ‘verifiable and genuine’ knowledge, occurred simultaneously.

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In Africa, the Western values, norms and worldviews are dominant in the knowledge production in universities. Murove (2018:161) states that “previously, knowledge systems of the colonizing powers imposed themselves on the colonized as the only legitimate knowledge to the exclusion of the knowledge systems of the colonized”. Additionally, “the triumphalism of Western-centered modernity negated the legitimacy of ‘other’ knowledge outside the Western purview of seeing, imagining and knowing” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019).In an attempt to rectify a flawed knowledge production in Africa, there should be a recognition, validation or canonization of non-institutionalized or alternative knowledge production, a contestation between knowledge with market value and knowledge without market value (De Sousa-­ Santos 2014). The production of knowledge by the African university is continuously compromised by the colonial legacy. In succinct terms, “the basic problem is that educational structures inherited from colonialism are based on cultural values different from those existing in most of the African indigenous societies” (Hassan and Seleti 2013). Consequently, the patterns and values that underlie knowledge production in Africa draw from the Western scope. Post-colonial Africa regarded university education institutions as apparatuses for creating an African identity within colonial institutions (Nampala et al. 2017). This counters the universalizing model. According to Kumalo (2018), some African universities are producing ‘Natives of Nowhere’. Kumalo coined the term Natives of Nowhere to depict an education system that literally vandalizes the African identity to the extent that Africans who graduate from such a system fail to identify themselves with their African origins, or assimilate white middleclass worldviews. Since knowledge production is essentially a process of generating new ideas, most ideas generated in African universities are equally Western-oriented. The failure to address the Western dominance in knowledge production implies that Africa will continue to import epistemic theories, praxis and practices from the Western world. Besides, it is problematic to presuppose that “there is a singular system of modern knowledge which pervades the mental universe and supposedly provides answers for every human problem across the globe” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020:366). To reverse Western dominance in universities, it is argued that “in Africa, there should be an autonomous, self-reliant tradition of research and knowledge that addresses problems and issues that are directly or indirectly posed by Africans” (Hountondji 2009:121).The Western-centric model of knowledge production, which is currently under sustained criticism by some scholars, (Ndlovu 2015; de Sousa-­ Santos 2014) gives university education a dominant role in the production of knowledge. There is an apparent dissatisfaction with the model and practices of the current university. It is argued that “the current Eurocentric, mono-cultural, colonialist and male-centered university struggles to accommodate social and epistemic diversity” (Guilherme and Dietz 2017:18) A Euro-American model of knowledge production devalues African creativity, agency and value systems (Nyamnjoh 2012). In African universities, the production of knowledge is associated with white male, heterosexual; middleclass Europeans who impose their intellectual premises on subordinate groups (Thapar-Bjorket and Farahani 2019:215). It is evident that the current model of knowledge production in African universities does not fully serve the

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needs of Africans. A knowledge that is a by-product of a flawed arrangement does a disservice to the members of society who expectantly look upon universities to be not only innovative, but also to proffer relevant solutions to their immediate challenges. Despite the above-mentioned defects in the knowledge production scope, it is ironic that there is significant numerical growth in university student enrollments (Ramchander and Naude 2018). However, even though student enrollments rise annually, it is also true that Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, has the least university enrollments in comparison to other continents. Numerous factors contribute to the low enrollment uptake in Africa, including the prohibitive costs of tuition, boarding and transport. In addition there are still relatively few universities in comparison to the number of students who seek to be enrolled, reduced government subsidies for public universities and the general infrastructural underdevelopment of most African universities (Lee and Sehoole 2015). Accordingly, these factors simply mean that the African university is not accessible for many students. For instance, in the case of South Africa, government ordered some public universities to reduce their annual student intake (Makanda 2021). Furthermore, there is also “a growing concern that the European university is drawn to academic capitalism that produce commercial knowledge and pragmatic job training rather than knowledge for its own sake” (Kamola 2014:604).When these factors are considered, it also becomes necessary to identify and expose alternative sites of knowledge production in Africa. The purpose of identifying such sites of knowledge is underscored by the need to harness local values and knowledge to be deployed to respond to immediate and contextual challenges. Moreover, it is problematic to entrench the perception that in Africa, the university is the only knowledge production institution and that hardly any knowledge is produced outside the university (Cloete et al. 2015). There are three interlocking points in the above sections of this chapter that I wish to emphasize here. Firstly, the current model of the African university is incapacitated and highly compromised, and therefore it does notproduce knowledge that reclaims, restores and affirms the African identity.As noted, knowledge production by the African university is predominantly Western-oriented. The second point is a consequence of the first. The African university as institution hasremained detached or isolated from the society within which it operates (Van Schalkwyk 2015). Additionally, the African university is accused of being a Westernimplant because it does not fully take into account the cultural milieu in which it is located. The curriculum,norms, values, iconography and institutional culture of the African university have remained Westernimports. For instance, research as bedrock of knowledge production is conducted using Western methodologies, theoretical frameworks, analyses and, above all, Western languages as the media of research. In other words, Eurocentrism has remained the canon of knowledge production in the African university. Thirdly, knowledge production is commodified by established institutions such as universities and other research centers, making it inaccessible to the majority of ordinary Africans. This chapter has mentioned the prohibitive costs or tuition, accommodation and transport, which are factors that compromise access to university education in Africa. In view of these perspectives, it has become

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apparent that it is important to identify and recognize alternative sites of knowledge production in Africa.

 n Exposition of Alternative Sites of Knowledge Production A in Africa The above sections show that a knowledge production system in which the university is the dominant site of knowledge production in Africa ultimately obstructs the quest for recognition of local knowledge traditions in Africa. Therefore, the primary purpose of this section is to expose and outline some alternative sites of knowledge production. In so doing, the sites that this section alludes to are meant to complement rather than compete with the university. Though the university remains an important institution, it should not be regarded as the sole site of knowledge production in Africa. Below are some identified sites of knowledge production whose knowledge should be recognized and harnessed for the benefit of Africa and beyond.

Sites of Medical Knowledge Production The production and dissemination of medical knowledge in the traditional African setup is a result of both empirical and metaphysical domains. The metaphysical, that is often referred to as vadzimu or amadlozi, (spiritual ancestors) inform the chosen medical practitioner. The medical practitioner in turn uses such medical knowledge to treat and cure patients from his or her village and beyond. The metaphysical domain enables the healer to offer not only pharmaceutical prescriptions through herbs, but also psychosocial and psychological counseling. Medical practictioners are expected to attend and treat the patient on the physical, social and psychological levels. In this respect, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020:371) observes that, “it is gratifying that in response to the Covid-19 pandemic countries such as Ghana, Madagascar and others have put their scientists to work on endogenous mitigation strategies”. In Zimbabwe, traditional medical steaming organics such as zumbani, kupfungaidzira s/ukufutha/ (chiShona and isiNdebele, respectively are used to mitigate against Covid-19 virus. Knowledge ideally assists in the solving of problems and challenges as well the prediction of the probability of recurrence of pandemics. There are circumcision classes in most parts of Africa for the purpose of chinamwari (rites of passage). Pluriversity should not be a narrative of return. An African herbalist or traditional healer is a site of medical knowledge production. In addition there are African women who have valid knowledge of gynecological practices (nyamukuta) and who use this knowledge successfully. This African traditional healer has the required knowledge of diagnosing, prescribing medical intervention and monitoring the patient.

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Sites of Social Knowledge Production The argument that social gatherings are sites of knowledge production proceeds from the fundamental premise that the notion of community is central to the African worldview. Communality is expressed in and through attending and participating in social gatherings such as funerals, weddings, religious ceremonies and many other community events. These are all sites of knowledge production, dissemination and consumption. Social gatherings are not mono-purpose convergence events, but are rather multidimensional. At such gatherings, knowledge in praxis are expressed through rituals, conduct and proceedings that are often led by those with vested authority. Moreover, knowledge is theorized through ‘informal’ sharing, dialogues and conversations that occur at such gatherings.

 ites of Art, Music, Sports and Recreational S Knowledge Production Creative art skills such as sculpting, drama, music and sports are passed on from one generation to the next via informal platforms such as homes and arts centers. Art centers are handled by experienced experts from whom students and upcoming artists can learn. In most cases, there is no written or systemized curriculum that the expert uses apart from his or her accumulated experiences. As experts teach and impart knowledge they have acquired over many years, there is a limited threat of employing and imparting imported knowledge (as in the case of universities). On the contrary, knowledgeable experts impart their knowledge through open discussion, dialogue and debate. By its very nature, art requires critical thinking and analytical and reflective skills. Artists (musicians, sculptors, etc.) are expected to apply interpretative skills to produce a piece of art that is relevant, educational and informative to the audience.

Sites of Vocational Knowledge Production The concept of vocational training colleges has been part of Africa since the pre-­ colonial era. Iron smelting, rock-painting, weaving, carpentry, hunting, fishing and pottery are some of the skills acquired at vocational training centers. It was the duty of elders to train the young and equip them with skills that could enhance both individual and communal life. As skills were highly gendered, there were colleges that trained girls to cook, wash and do other household chores. Women were trained to be efficient housekeepers. On the other hand, the men (boys) were trained in all the skills required to be responsible family and community members. Environmental

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ethics were taught to every member of society as they were all responsible for their immediate environment.

Padare/Indaba These are social spaces that guarantee freedom of thought and expression in Africa. The padare concept, which is similar to the Western bon-fire, is a social setup in which men gather to sit around a fire, usually in the evening. As stories are a central feature of African culture, educational information is shared among the participants. It is instructive to note that since the padare concept is composed of peers, critical thinking is accommodated. In this respect, the accommodation of critical thinking at padare enables men to challenge culturally inherited practices that perpetuate gender, tribal, racial or religious prejudices. Moreover, the debates that occur at padare are not limited to issues in the locality, but include regional, national and international issues. Nevertheless, the underside of the padare concept as knowledge production site is that peers do not challenge one another adequately. However, the padare/indaba concept needs to be reconceptualized so that the views of women and youth are accommodated and valued.

Market Areas Most African economies are informalized through self-employing creativities such as vending, small-scale mining and subsistence farming that tend to employ many people. It is important to realize that before the establishment of institutionalized agricultural colleges, for example, African people had developed agricultural systems that were productive and suitable to different types of soil and climates. For example, agricultural systems such as chitemene and pfumvudza(intwasa), which are practiced in Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively, have been deployed and monitored by people without formal agricultural qualifications. Entrepreneurship skills tend to be acquired in practical by non-formalised settings. In most instances, knowledge production in ‘non-formalized’ knowledge production sites are regarded as anecdotal primarily because that knowledge is usually transmitted orally.

African Sagacity In this section, I borrow from Odera Oruka’s philosophical sagacity as an analytical framework to advance the argument that such elders as sages constitute a site of knowledge in Africa. Sage philosophers occupy themselves with the problems and challenges that confront the immediate environment and context. It is aptly written

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that a “sage is an opinion leader, frequently consulted by people because he or she is versed in the wisdom and traditions of his people, and is wise within the conventional and historical confines of his or her culture. A sage is a custodian of the traditions of his or her people” (Ekwealo 2012:206). If knowledge is described as acquired through experiences, repeated behaviors and practices, then there are elders who possess sage knowledge in hierarchical societies such as those we encounter in Africa. Proverbs based on critical and logical thinking espouse wisdom and knowledge. Age is celebrated in Africa on the assumption that people acquire knowledge and wisdom as the time passes. Among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, the notion of vakuru or umkhulu is revered on the assumption of accumulated wisdom. The vakuru or umkhulu offers guidance and knowledge drawn from accumulated experience.

Conclusion The recognition and appreciation of sites of knowledge production in Africa (other than the university) are vital for the termination of epistemic injustice against the alternative sites of knowledge production in Africa, and coloniality of knowledge that has engulfed African universities Towards this end, this chapter has interrogated the assumption that ‘genuine’ knowledge is researched, refined, produced and disseminated from the formal settings of a university. Such an assumption is justified based on the perception that a university is capacitated to produce knowledge as it has the necessary expertise, infrastructure, methodologies and discipline to achieve authentic knowledge. In so doing, the notion of the university as the sole producer of knowledge inadvertently excludes or ‘others’ the alternative knowledges that are produced at the alternative sites; therefore, the main contribution of this chapter is the curation of sites of knowledge production in Africa. The very process of knowledge production should encompass the institutional and non-­ institutional, formal and informal sites of knowledge production.

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Sebola, M., and M.J. Mogoboya. 2020. Re-imagining Africanisation of Sustainable Epistemologies and Pedagogies in (South) African Higher Education: A Conceptual Intervention. South African Journal of Higher Education 34 (6): 237–254. Simukungwe, M. 2019. Universities as Sites for Advancing Education for Decolonisation. In Education for Decoloniality and Decolonisation in Africa, ed. C.H. Manthalu and Y. Waghid. Cham: Palgrave macmillan. Thapa-Bjorkert, S., and F.  Farahani. 2019. Epistemic Modalities of Racialised Knowledge Production in Swedish Academy. Ethnic and Racial Studies 42 (16): 214–232. Van Schalkwyk, F. 2015. University Engagement as Interconnectedness: Indicators and Insights. In Knowledge Production and Contradictory Functions in African Higher Education, ed. N. Cloete, P. Maasen, and T. Bailey, 203–232. African Minds: Cape Town. Waghid, Y., and C.H.  Mantalu. 2019. Decoloniality as Democratic Change Within Higher Education. In Education for Decoloniality and Decolonization in Africa, ed. C.H. Manthalu and Y. Waghid. Cham: Palgrave macmillan. Winberg, C. 2006. Undisciplining Knowledge Production: Development-Driven Higher Education in South Africa. Higher Education 51: 159–172. Woldegiorgis, E.T., and M. Doevenspeck. 2013. The Changing Role of Higher Education in Africa: A Historical Reflection. Higher Education Studies. 6 (3): 35–46.

Chapter 7

African Epistemic Liberation Through Knowledge Democratisation Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda

Introduction For Africa to contribute meaningfully to global epistemology, it is important to self-­ reflect and achieve self-understanding so as to overcome two weaknesses that have weighed down epistemic efforts. Self-reflection enables Africa to make an objective evaluation of its position in terms of knowledge production while taking into account its epistemic strengths and weaknesses. Self-understanding provides Africa the opportunity to see itself not in foreign lenses but using home grown perspectives. The first weakness involves inheriting a colonial epistemology that has historically and systematically marginalised, silenced, stereotyped, dislocated and decentred African indigenous ways of knowing. The second weakness is seen in the use of foreign languages to express African indigenous epistemological concepts. Such tendencies are enslaving rather than liberating. For Africa to attain epistemic liberation, it has to democratise both local and global epistemic spaces. Such liberation will enable dialogue, comparison and improvement of epistemic efforts. While much has been written about liberating African epistemology, in terms of global justice (Masaka 2017; Mungwini 2017) curriculum transformation (Masaka 2018) Africanisation (Chemhuru 2016; Metz 2016; Gwaravanda 2019) decolonisation (Higgs 2010; Heleta 2016) this chapter attempts to go beyond previous contributions and make a novel intervention by focusing on a three-pronged approach to epistemic liberation that involves a combination of refuting western assumptions about African epistemology, exploring African culture as foundation and source of epistemic thinking and exchange with global epistemologies for enrichment.

E. T. Gwaravanda (*) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_7

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Addressing these three aspects in African epistemology opens space for flexible and liberated African epistemology. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a critique to western positivist epistemology to argue for a liberating African relational epistemology. The second section critically analyses the use of hegemonic tendencies in the use of African epistemologies so as to attain democratic cultural epistemology. The third section argues for an African epistemology that draws from the local while addressing global concerns as marks of both epistemic liberation and democratisation.

 ritique of Western Epistemology as Necessary C for the Liberation of African Epistemology This section critically analyses western epistemology’s hegemonic tendencies to side-line indigenous African epistemology by showing that reasons for African knowledge de-marginalisation are both unreasonable and unfair. The unreasonableness is evidenced by fallacies committed in attempts to judge African knowledge. Western positivist epistemology is based on fallacious thinking because it identifies positivism with knowledge yet a species cannot be identical with its genus. What this means is that positivist epistemology is just part of knowledge without exhausting all its dimensions. Unfairness is seen in the undemocratic representation of knowledge whereby the west purports to be the sole representative of knowledge while other alternative forms of knowledge are relegated to either mere opinions or ignorance. Such judgement is arrived at not out of weighing evidence but out of prejudice. It is important to define decolonisation in the context of African knowledge systems. Wiredu (1998:17) defines decolonisation as divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past. For Wiredu, the word ‘undue’ is significant since it may be both unreasonable and impractical to reject everything of colonial past. Colonialism is not only a political imposition, but a cultural one as well. Epistemological decolonisation is necessarily a conceptual enterprise; it is not a critique of doctrine but of fundamental conceptualisation. Epistemology becomes a critical examination of the conceptual framework upon which the thought of a culture is erected. From the perspective of decolonisation, Eurocentric epistemology should be critically examined in the context of colonisation because the epistemic images given to Africa by the West were meant to facilitate colonisation not only of the African continent in the sense of physical space but of the African mind as well. The colonisation of the mind has the most serious and far reaching consequences. For Africa to succeed in the decolonisation of knowledge project, it is important to examine the arguments that are advanced by western epistemologists in dismissing African ways of knowing.

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Pannikar (1979:9) sees the dismissal of non-western knowledge systems as one big mistake that has several dimensions. Pannikar’s view has important implications for the construction of liberated African epistemology. Pannikar (1979:9) warns against Eurocentric mistakes as follows: to cross the boundaries of one’s culture without realizing that the other person may have a radically different approach to reality today is no longer admissible. If still consciously done, it would be philosophically naive, politically outrageous and religiously sinful.

In the context of dismissing African knowledge claims, Pannikar’s argument amounts to philosophical, political and religious dimensions. I will focus on the implications of philosophical naivety. If Eurocentric thinkers were serious about studying other forms of knowing, then they should have used evidence based approaches rather than armchair views. The naivety that is used to judge non-­ western forms of knowing tends to contradict philosophical principles of sound reasoning and fair analysis. This background makes a decolonial critique necessary in the study of African epistemology. Apart from failure to recognise the radically different approach to knowledge, the negation of rationality among indigenous Africans is the basis of rejection of African epistemology by the West. Zea (1998:36) acknowledges that, the rationality and the very humanity of the people of the conquered world were put on trial and judged by the jury of its conquerors. While Zea (1998) focuses on all conquered regions of the world, his study pointedly speaks to the circumstances of Africa, which is the focus of this chapter. The judgement to dismiss other forms of knowing was made, not on the basis of reasoned research and evidence, but merely on prejudice. The prejudice involved skin colour, geographical region and political positioning. These factors are clearly non-epistemic issues yet they have far reaching impact on the marginalisation of African indigenous forms of knowing. Logically, it is fallacious procedure to draw epistemic conclusions from non-epistemic issues such as judging one to be ignorant on the basis of skin colour. Paradoxically, Africans are not considered to be in a position to present their own epistemic credentials. This means that the ‘evidence’ used was based on opinion rather than objective facts. This line of thought contradicts the rigour that is often sought for in the construction of knowledge. As a result, there is no uniform epistemological platform but a one sided analysis of the conquered by the conqueror and this indicates epistemic injustice. Although claims to objectivity are made by the Eurocentric thinkers, they use ethnic and racialised identity to judge the epistemic status of the indigenous people of Africa. This shows inconsistency in the claims of Eurocentric thinkers. Furthermore, colonialism created and developed a hierarchy of knowledge and knowers for the purpose of colonizing administratively and even epistemically. An alternative to the above imperial epistemology, such as African epistemology, requires the toppling of the cultural hierarchy that colonialism enforced. The hierarchy of knowledge is another form of bias that negates knowledge democracy since one culture already claims some higher ground before there can be any meaningful dialogue. Alcoff (2007:80) notes that, the epistemic effects of colonization are the most damaging, far-reaching and least understood. The damaging effect is seen in

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the destruction of mind-sets, denial of one’s own cultural ways of knowing and validation of knowledge. This means that Africans rely on foreign epistemological paradigms to understand their own experience of knowledge. The epistemic effects of colonialism are said to be far-reaching because they displace one’s epistemological paradigm to the extent of disregarding one’s indigenous forms of knowledge thereby making the colonised think like the Eurocentric epistemologists. This means that one makes use of foreign epistemic lenses to validate knowledge claims and it is difficult to apply foreign epistemic lenses to daily experience. For example, as an undergraduate philosophy student, I was taught that the individual or the subject is considered as a knower. This is contrary to the African cultural experience where knowledge is communal and relational. This contradiction was difficult to reconcile until I began to understand that the Western and African perspectives are two radically opposed systems of knowledge. The epistemic effects of colonialism are least understood because of the brain washing victimization created by Eurocentric epistemology among Africans. As a result, individuals may fail to think outside the epistemological images created by colonizers. The task of decolonisation is to come up with an anti-colonial epistemic resistance (Alcoff 2007:80). One way of epistemic resistance is the construction of forms of knowledge based on an African epistemological paradigm so as to dislodge the false claims of positivist epistemology. To correct the said problems, Mignolo (2000) maintains that subaltern reason must aim to rethink and reconceptualise the stories that have been told and the conceptualization that has been in place to divide the world between Christians and pagans, civilized and barbarians, modern and premodern and developed and undeveloped regions and people. This kind of dualistic thinking also divides the world into knowers and the ignorant. By implication, African knowledge systems that have been historically and epistemically trivialised and are the victims of prejudice. As such, the task of subaltern reason is to deconstruct and reconstruct the proper image of the conquered people and regions. It is interesting to note that generalizations were drawn from mere geographic regions to serious epistemological consequences of the people of the concerned regions. The logical incoherence of drawing epistemic conclusions from geographical factors cannot be allowed to prevail. The process of correcting the ills of colonialism on African indigenous knowledge systems is incomplete without addressing the myth of the postcolonial world. Grosfoguel (2011:13) argues that one of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrators amounted to the decolonisation of the world resulting in the myth of the postcolonial world. The fact of the matter is that the formerly colonized are living under Western European exploitation and domination including epistemological domination. The domination which occupies intellectual space and mind-sets is more dangerous compared to economic or political domination. The decolonisation critique is significant for this study because it challenges colonial assumptions that have been used to side-­ line African knowledge systems. Grosfoguel (2011:13) makes an important distinction between colonization and coloniality. For Grosfoguel, colonization allows us to think of the continuity of

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other forms of domination after colonial administration. Coloniality addresses present forms of situations in racist culture and the ideological strategies used by Western Europe. It involves rethinking the modern colonial world from the colonial difference point of view. Thinking from a colonial difference point of view allows us to modify important assumptions of our paradigms. Grosfoguel’s line of thought gives room to rebut the false assumptions of Eurocentric thinking and validate and legitimise African knowledge systems. Having examined the undemocratic nature of colonial epistemology on African indigenous epistemology, it is now important to focus on the ways in which African indigenous epistemology has been construed as to allow epistemic liberation through democratisation.

Liberation Through Exploring African Cultural Epistemology This section critically reflects on epistemic practices within the African continent in the past three decades. There is evidence of three trends among African scholars. The first trend attempts to draw on epistemic similarities across the African continent to argue for African epistemology that applies across several cultures. The second trend, which is less common, picks up regional or sub-regional epistemological cultural traits as the source and foundation of epistemology. The last approach provides an in-depth study of linguistic or cultural epistemic concepts from a particular position such as Akan, Yoruba, Ibgo, Shona and Zulu. I argue that that genuine epistemic liberation is found in the last approach since it provides diversity and respect for distinct cultural and linguistic groupings across the African continent. For Africa to democratise its knowledge base and liberate epistemology, it is necessary to overcome the problems of unanimism, provide equal representation of indigenous languages and remove linguistic and cultural hierarchies. Turning to the problem of unanimism, the claim that African cultures share similarities is one path that has been inherited from colonial thinking without much criticism. This kind of thinking tends to block epistemic diversity across distinct cultural groupings. From an epistemic point of view, Africa is talked as if its parts are interchangeable and this blocks epistemological diversity. Although one must concede that generalisations sometimes have to be made, neither the standards of language nor the need to summarise and be brief can be used to defend the sweeping generalizations about Africa (Palmberg 2001:198). Similarly, the study of African epistemology must follow the route of diversity and difference rather than unanimism. Within the Southern African region and the continent, for example, Ubuntu epistemology (Ramose 2005) has been dominant with other cultural groupings attempting to find equivalent notions from their cultural settings. While it can be argued that picking epistemic traits from the over 2000 African linguistic groupings may prove to be both impossible and improbable, this sweeping statement kills rather than promotes epistemic democracy and diversity. To argue for reliance on foreign epistemological thinking because African epistemic sources are too many would

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perpetrate epistemic hegemony without addressing the problems created by colonialism. This approach fails to emancipate African knowledge systems since there is focus on the similarities rather than differences. While similarities are important in understanding African epistemology, the trend seems to perpetrate colonial mentality where concepts were lumped up together as a result of failure to appreciate and understand Africa indigenous conceptions of knowledge. It is important to acknowledge efforts to pick up traits in African epistemology on the basis of regional concepts or cultural perspectives. Such an approach is more liberating given that it departs from the colonial approach that sees similarities rather than differences. A good example of a regional approach is ubuntu epistemology (Ramose 2005) that shows African epistemology as characterised by an insistence on the interconnectedness of the world, the unity of the knower and the world, and the relatedness of the knower within a community. This process includes the emergence of the speaking and knowing human being. Thus -ntu stands for the epistemological side of being. This is the wider horizon, in which the inter-­subjective aspects of ubuntu have to be seen. Mutual recognition and respect in the different inter-subjective relations are parts of the process of unfolding of the universe, which encompasses everything, in the speaking and knowing of human beings. This process in itself leads to the forms of inter-subjective relations that have been mentioned above. Ramose (2005:109) underlines the oneness and the whole-ness of this ongoing process. The affirmation of interconnectedness, as well as the consequent denial of the ontological autonomy of objects or things and of the human observer, leads to a participatory epistemology. According to Ramose (2005:104), ―Motho ke motho ka botho is a Sotho proverb found in all indigenous languages of Africa. It means to be human is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and on that basis, establish humane relations among them. In this context, the transition is from the ‘Cartesian I’ to the African ‘we’. A quick objection that is often levelled against communalistic knowledge is that knowledge eclipses the individual within the community. However, communalistic thought does not necessarily eclipse the individual for two reasons. First, thinking is done by the individual and when thoughts are judged as significant by others, they qualify as knowledge and secondly, individual points of view are acknowledged in the assessment of knowledge. To care for one another therefore implies caring for knowledge concerns as well. Without epistemic care, the interdependence between human beings and knowledge would be undermined (Ramose 2005:109). The recognition of others in knowledge production becomes important since there is a shift from a sub-regional to a cultural focus for the purpose of grater emancipation as shown in the paragraphs that follow. Epistemic hegemony created by the west against the African epistemological paradigm historically affected the scope of African epistemology. Following the epistemic hierarchy created by the west, post-colonial Africans passed on this hegemony among themselves resulting in some cultures being considered as representing African epistemology while other African cultures were side-lined creating a scenario of dominant and less dominant cultures. In Zimbabwe for example, Shona and Ndebele cultures were dominant epistemically while other cultures such as

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Tonga, Shangani, Venda, Ndau etc were considered less representative. The aim of this section is argue for equality of culturally based epistemology for the purpose of liberation. The linguistic struggle for African epistemology lies in the language paradox. African epistemology struggles to liberate itself from all sorts of colonial dominations yet it expresses itself in the language of the coloniser. In Zimbabwean universities, the medium of instruction is English yet the language lacks expressions that are important for African philosophical concepts. The main concepts of African epistemology are thought of and expressed in English. The main reason of using English is that it is seen as the most accommodative when the audiences’ mother tongues are varied. In Zimbabwe, mother tongues consist of the following languages: Chewa, Chibarwe, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, sign language, Sotho, Tonga, Tswana, Venda and Xhosa (Constitution of Zimbabwe, Section 6). Surely it seems difficult at face value, to teach African Epistemology in Zimbabwe in any one of the above languages since no communication will take place. However, the paradox is that; by using English as the language of instruction, the expression of African concepts becomes vague and ambiguous. As a result, Shona and Ndebele notions of epistemology are incorporated into Ubuntu epistemology, for example, while other cultures were thought to be represented by the dominating cultures. From a democratic point of view, there is little respect and there is imposition of epistemological views in the name of similarity among African cultures. A more emancipatory approach, which still has a lot of potential, is the specific cultural approach in African epistemology. For Matsumoto (1996: 16) culture is “... the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people, communicated from one generation to the next.” The word “set” is important because it gives the totality of factors that define culture. Hofstede (2011) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. Hofstede’s point emphasizes on the mindset effect of culture. According to Chitando (2016) people make culture and culture makes people. In the context of knowledge, it can be argued that culture shapes knowledge and individuals within a culture rely on culture for description, validation and evaluation of knowledge. It is difficult to talk about liberation of knowledge outside the context of culture. Instead of picking up similarities from a continental or sub-regional level, this approach focuses on a specific culture to draw epistemological concepts. Examples of this approach include the Akan concept of truth (Wiredu 1998); Yoruba epistemology (Oke 1995) Shona epistemology (Gwaravanda and Masaka 2008) Ibgo epistemology (Udefi 2014) and Oromo epistemology (Wake 2018). Such approaches pick up unique features that each specific culture contributes about the nature, scope, validity and evaluation of knowledge. Each of the epistemic issue brings important aspects when approached from a cultural perspective and this is emancipatory in terms of bringing diversity and democratisation of knowledge. I believe the little that has been studied by African epistemologists so far constitutes a tip of the iceberg and more needs to be done to bring more issues to the forefront. African

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epistemologists should exploit the richness that lies in indigenous conceptions of knowledge thereby refuting colonial claims as well as liberating knowledge systems from the yokes of generalisations. This approach avoids generalisations while promoting an in-depth understanding of particular issues within the broad spectrum of African epistemology. The specific cultural approach sees the need to ground African epistemology on an authentic foundation that stands independently of Eurocentric thinking. This view maintains that African epistemology should develop its own methodology, content and form so that it warrants the adjective “African”. It is a reflective and critical effort to rethink the indigenised African epistemic situation beyond the confines of Eurocentric concepts and categories (Gwaravanda and Ndofirepi 2020). Going beyond the confines of Eurocentric epistemic thinking entails an interrogation of the African condition and identity as the basis of epistemic arguments. African epistemology should not mirror Eurocentric epistemology and it should develop its own path by using concepts, theories, categories and principles that are grounded in African cultural experience and thought. African epistemology ought to reflect on African experience, articulate African worldviews and accommodate African culture without necessarily implying either fragmentation or ethnocentric thinking. It must be pointed out rejecting epistemic universalism in favour of epistemic particularism does not mean that the particularist is a cultural relativist. A particularist could in some way be a pluralist. Having shown that African epistemology has to explore indigenous concepts of knowledge further, such efforts should not blind African epistemology from engagement with other traditions from outside Africa in the form of pluriversal engagements as shown in the next section.

 iberation Through Exchange with Global L Epistemic Traditions Having shown the need to study African indigenous epistemological concepts for the purpose of knowledge democratisation, it will be argued in this section that epistemic liberation also entails dialogue with other epistemic traditions from across the globe. In order to avoid a ‘two wrongs do not make a right fallacy’, it is important for African epistemology to exchange with all other epistemic traditions and exchange dialogue for a genuine self-enriching exercise. In this section, my aim is to show that non-African epistemic traditions from different historical backgrounds share important similarities, specifically, with regard to the epistemic importance of community, the role of partiality in epistemic thinking, and the heightened respect accorded to elders. I believe that each epistemic tradition can be enriched by learning from the strengths of the other and by reflecting on the parts of the tradition that are still epistemically defensible and feasible in today’s world. Liberation of African epistemic space does not entail isolating ourselves from the rest of the world, neither does it mean that we should adopt inferior standards.

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African epistemology can be internationally competitive and uniquely African at the same time. We can promote our own uniqueness whilst learning from other cultures. Liberating epistemology in Africa would be truly meaningful if Africans realize the importance of that which belongs to the Continent as they utilize non-African knowledge systems. Africanised epistemology has its foundations in African experiences, concerns and aspirations. In order to meet the demands for global competitiveness, African epistemology ought to embrace a pluriversal outlook. The idea of pluriversality provides epistemic liberation at a global level and African epistemology can achieve full emancipation through pluriversal engagements. The notion of pluriversality springs from the works Mignolo (2018a), Dussel (2012) and Alcoff (2007) and these scholars borrow from Pannikar’s (1979) concept of pluritopic hermeneutics. While these scholars write in the context of Latin American liberation epistemology, the background and context informing their study share similarities with the African condition. The epistemology of the pluriverse cannot be obtained without the ontology of the pluriverse (Mignolo 2018a: ix). Epistemology investigates the principles of knowledge and hermeneutics investigates the principles of interpretation. Going beyond Mignolo’s views, pluriversality also consists of a logic and ethics to make it a complete philosophical perspective. Logic examines the principles of reasoning while ethics focuses on the principles of right and wrong. The aim of pluriversality is the restoration of gnoseology that fuels the march towards emancipation. This emancipation is made possible by treating different knowledge traditions with respect. Pluriversality begins by interrogating claims to universality. Pluriversality calls universality into question when searching for meaning. The tendency of Western universality is to claim a superior position for itself. Pluriversality is emancipatory because it sees beyond claims to superiority and senses the world as multiple. Pluriversality names the principles and assumptions upon which pluriverses of meaning are constructed. As a universal project, pluriversality is aimed not at changing the world (ontology) but changing the beliefs and understanding of the world (epistemology) which could lead to changing all praxis of living the world. Pluriversality counters the assumption that the world is a unified totality and adopts the view that the world is an interconnected diversity. The notion of interconnected diversity is important for this chapter because it serves both as a critique to western universalism and a platform for genuine engagement for African epistemology. The idea of diversity frees one to think about the epistemic pluriversity of the world rather than epistemological universality. The world cannot have a single knower but it has multiple knowers. Stripped of its pretended universality, Western cosmology would be one of many cosmologies and no longer the true one that subsumes and regulates all others. Ontologically, pluriversality entails the recognition of multiple conceptions of reality (Harding 2018). This multiplicity does not mean ontological relativism but the bringing of multiple views of conceiving reality on the table for the purpose of overcoming the narrowness and pretence of universalism. If there are competing perspectives of understanding reality, there is a possibility of tapping the best from different conceptions thereby coming up with the richest understanding of reality. Pluriversality recognises the existence of multiple ways of conceiving reality. While

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Western views provide atomistic conceptions of reality, the Global South defends relational perspectives of reality. Pluriversality sees no contradiction in thinking of reality as both atomistic and relational. However, pluriversality sees problems in endorsing one form of conceiving reality at the expense of the other possible models. Competing models of understanding reality should be brought at the table and these should dialogue and learn from each other. Escobar (2018) argues for the decolonisation of the Western scientific tradition and its underlying ontologies and epistemologies. Harding (2018) revisits her long-standing efforts to make feminist standpoint theory an integral part of scientific endeavors; then she elaborates on her second scholarly contribution to this field—the recognition of different, non-­ European scientific traditions and their importance for creating a better, more just, and more inclusive successor science. This is based on the recognition of multiple ontologies in the understanding of reality. A conception of ontology leads to an understanding of knowledge as shown in the next section. If we grant that there are multiple ways of postulating reality, then it follows logically that there are multiple ways of knowing reality. These multiple ways should not be understood as a form of relativism but as a form of diversity. Feminist epistemology, for example, demonstrates how male domination shapes conceptions of knowledge and considers how knowledge would look like if male bias is eliminated. Similarly, African epistemology argues that knowledge has been packaged by the colonisers as universal, objective, neutral and transcultural and reflects how knowledge can be understood outside the parameters set by the colonisers to come up with a relational or ‘we’ epistemology. The goal of such projects are clearly not to relativise knowledge but to remove all obstacles that hinder attempts to obtain the truth. If a pluriverse is not a world of independent units (as is the case with cultural relativism) but a world entangled through and by the colonial matrix of power, then a way of thinking and understanding that dwells in the interstices of the entanglement, at its borders, is needed. So the point is not to study the borders while still dwelling in a territorial epistemology you are comfortable with. Such an approach would imply that you accept that there is a pluriverse someplace out there, but that you observe it from someplace else, somewhere outside the pluriverse (Mignolo 2018b). Connell (2018) identifies the problem of epistemic violence caused by the global economy of knowledge. She explains how other knowledges were, and continue to be, marginalized by colonialism and imperialism—and she offers ways out of this marginalization based on feminist theory. Connell introduces the idea of Mosaic epistemology as a dimension of pluriversality. Like the Biblical Moses leading the Israelites out of the bondage of Israel, Mosaic epistemology is an attempt to emancipate knowledge from the domination and characterisation brought by universalism. Ethically pluriversality entails inclusivity, fairness and respect for multiple knowledge systems. Within pluriversal thinking, there is no room for bias, unfair dismissal of alternative knowledge claims and racist judgements about knowledge. Ziai (2018) elaborates a critique of knowledge understood in its traditional way and argues for free cooperation, based on the recognition that most social problems are specific and local in nature and thus cannot be solved with recipes obtained from

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foreign concepts. Burchardt (2018) argues that an approach to knowledge that focuses narrowly on rational action cannot capture all the irrational, emotional, and group-oriented actions that characterize all our lives, particularly in the realm of knowledge. To move beyond this analytical dead end, Burchardt (2018) rereads the writings of Baruch Spinoza and Norbert Elias, both of whom have proposed systematic ways to take emotions and irrational behaviour into analytical accounts of knowledge. These powerful critiques enable a broader understanding of knowledge based on broad principles of knowledge. Relying on the principle of excluded middle, Western universalism had claimed that knowledge exits within two alternatives. It exists as either knowledge or its opposite, namely ignorance. There is no middle ground between the two. Universalism relies on the principle of excluded middle which states that there is no intersection between the truth and falsity of a proposition. When applied to the context of epistemic liberation, the principle of excluded middle amounts to the view that there is no middle ground between knowledge and ignorance, either there is knowledge or ignorance without the possibility of a combination of the two since knowledge and ignorance are mutually exclusive. While I may not debate the problems surrounding the logical principle of excluded middle, I argue that the principle is assumed in universalism. Universalism presents an absolutist account of knowledge that relegates all other forms of knowledge to ignorance. The dichotomy between knowledge and ignorance as presented by universalism is both inadequate and false. It is inadequate in the sense that it presents a disjunction that leaves out a third category of opinion that lies between knowledge and ignorance. It is false because it gives a one-sided approach to knowledge, the Western view, while excluding other forms of knowledge. I argue that knowledge is not something static but it is dynamic. The dynamism of knowledge is shaped by evidence and truth. The flawed logic of universalism has resulted in problematic conceptions of objectivity and neutrality of knowledge to the extent of excluding all forms of knowledge in the Global South and these conceptions are narrow and reductionist. Beyond the faulty logic, pluriversality embraces multiple conceptions of logic and truth that offer a rich understanding of systems of knowledge. The affirmation and growth of the cultural alterity of postcolonial communities (peoples), which subsumes within itself the best elements of Modernity, should not develop a cultural style that tends towards an undifferentiated or empty universal cultural identity, an abstract universality, but rather a trans-modern pluriversality (with many elements similar: European, Islamic, Vedic, Taoist, Buddhist, Latin American, African, etc.), one which is pluricultural, and engaged in a critical intercultural dialogue (Dussel 2012:50). Intercultural dialogue is important for this study because it opens up possibility of mutual respect of knowledge from both the Western and the African paradigms. This gives a better position that attempts to overcome the narrowness of assumed universality. According to Dussel (2012:55), abstract universality ought to be converted to an analogical pluriversal similarity, which is not the equivocal incommunicability or the identical univocity, but the concrete pluriversality of the analogical similarity with the inevitable distinction of each cultural tradition. Dussel’s notion of pluriversality is therefore inclusive in

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scope more than it denounces Western universalism. Pluriversal similarity becomes the product of deconstruction of knowledge forms. This gives an open and flexible approach that provides room for alternative viewpoints for the purpose of enriching knowledge.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that African epistemic liberation entails freedom from three related epistemic dimensions, namely; myths created by western epistemology, cultural hegemonic epistemology and false universalism. Western epistemology creates a lot of myths and fallacies about the nature and scope of African ways of knowing as reflected in the writings of early anthropologists. The task to rebut and refute the myths and fallacies is a continuous exercise that helps to liberate African epistemology. The chapter has also shown that the traits of colonial thinking such excessive use of inductive generalisations and the use of colonial languages, to some extent, in post-colonial African epistemology. Liberation entails freeing African knowledge systems from such ills. It has been argued in the chapter that while internalist approaches are necessary, they are insufficient if they fail to engage in global epistemic issues. The chapter has argued for engagement with other epistemic traditions in the context of fruitful exchange and mutual enrichment within a pluriversal context. Considered jointly, liberation from these three aspects facilitates an African epistemology that is democratic to both the local and the global epistemic space. Such an epistemology is rooted in the African ways of knowing while at the same time addressing global issues of knowledge. Through such an epistemology, Africa will be free from contradictions and dilemmas created by inheriting a colonial epistemology and applying it to the contemporary situation.

References Alcoff, L. 2007. Mignolo’s epistemology of coloniality. Continental Review 7 (3): 79–101. Burchardt, H. 2018. How Spinoza and Elias Help to Decenter Our Understanding of Development: A Methodical Reserach Proposal on the Pluriverse. In Constructing the Pluriverse: The Geopolitics of Knowledge, 219–239. London: Duke University Press. Chemhuru, M. 2016. Pursuing the Agenda of Africanising Philosophy in Africa: Some Possibilities. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 418–428. Chitando, E. 2016. ‘Going Backwards in Order to go Forward’ Culture, Identity and Development. Masvingo: Great Zimbabwe University. Connell, R. 2018. Meeting at the Edge of Fear: Theory on a World Scale. In Constructing the Pluriverse: The Geopolitics of Knowledge, 19–38. London: Duke University Press. Dussel, E. 2012. Transmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Liberation. Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1 (3): 28–59.

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Escobar, A. 2018. Transition Discourses and the Politics of Relationality. In Constructing the Pluriverse: The Geopolitics of Knowledge, 63–89. London: Duke University Press. Grosfoguel, R. 2011. Decolonising Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity. Decolonial Thinking and Global Coloniality. 1 (1): 1–36. Gwaravanda, E.T. 2019. An Epistemological Critique of the African University Education System. In Education Systems Around the World, 1–23. London: IntechOpen. Gwaravanda, E.T., and D.  Masaka. 2008. Epistemological Implications of Selected Shona Proverbs. Cape Town: CASAS. Gwaravanda, E.T., and A.  Ndofirepi. 2020. Eurocentric Pitfalls in the Practice of African Philosophy: Reflections on African Universities. Phronimon 21: 1–21. Harding, S. 2018. One Planet, Many Sciences. In Constructing the Pluriverse: The Geopolitics of Knowledge, 39–62. London: Duke University Press. Heleta, S. 2016. Decolonisation of Higher Education: Dismantling Epistemic Violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa. Transformation in Higher Education 1 (1): 1–8. Higgs, P. 2010. Towards an indigenous African epistemology of community in Education Research. Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences 2: 2414–2421. Hofstede, G. 2011. Dimensioning Culture: Hofstede Model in Context. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture 2 (1). https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-­0919.1014. Masaka, D. 2017. ‘Global Justice’ and the Suppressed Epistemologies. Philosophical Papers 46 (1): 59–84. ———. 2018. Reconciling the Indigenisation Narrative and the Eurocentric Education Curriculum in Zimbabwe. In Power in Contemporary Zimbabwe, ed. E. Masitera and F. Sibanda, 31–43. London: Routledge. Matsumoto, D. 1996. Culture and Psychology. Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole. Metz, T. 2016. Teaching African Philosophy alongside Western Philosophy: Some Advice about Topics and Texts. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 490–500. Mignolo, D. 2000. Local Histories, Global Designs: Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mignolo, W. 2018a. Foreword on Pluriversality and Multiplicity. In Constructing the Pluriverse: The Geopolitics of Knowledge, ix–xvi. London: Duke University Press. ———. 2018b. On Pluriversality and Multipolar World: Decoloniality after Decolonisation, Dewesternisation after the Cold War. In Constructing the Pluriverse: The Geopolitics of Knowledge, 90–118. London: Duke University Press. Mungwini, P. 2017. African Know Thyself: Epistemic Injustice and the Quest for Liberative Knowledge. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 12 (2): 5–18. Oke, M. 1995. Towards an African (Yoruba) Perspective on Empirical Knowledge: A Critique of Hallen and Sodipo. International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2): 1–15. Palmberg, M. 2001. A Continent Without Culture. In Same and Other: Negotiating African Identity. In Cultural Production, ed. M. Palmberg, 197–209. Stochholm: Nordiska Afrikainstutet. Pannikar, R. 1979. Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. New York: Paulist Press. Ramose, M. 2005. African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Udefi, A. 2014. The Rationale for an African Epistemology: A Critical Examination of the Igbo Views on Knowledge, Belief, and Justification. Canadian Social Science 10 (3): 108–117. Wake, J. 2018. Theorising Namummaa: Oromo Relational Philosophy. African Journal of History and Culture 10 (7): 77–97. Wiredu, K. 1998. The concept of truth in the Akan language. In Philosophy in Africa, Trends and Perspectives, ed. P.O. Bodunrin. Ife: University of Ife Press. Zea, L. 1998. Identity: A Latin American Philosophical Problem. The Philosophical Forum 20 (1&2): 33–42. Ziai, A. 2018. Internationalisation and Speaking for Others: What Struggling Against Neoliberal Globalisation Taught Me About Epistemology. In Constructing the Pluriverse: The Geopolitics of Knowledge, 117–136. London: Duke University Press.

Chapter 8

How African Logic Can Dissipate the Question of Originality and Knowledge Production in Africa Emmanuel Ofuasia and  Sheriff Olasunkanmi Ibiyemi

Introduction Some decades ago, Paul Feyerabend (1992, 11) announced: Scientific education…simplifies ‘science’ by simplifying its participants: first, a domain of research is defined. The domain is separated from the rest of history (physics, for example, is separated from metaphysics and from theology) and given a ‘logic’ of its own. A thorough training in such a ‘logic’ then conditions those working in the domain; it makes their actions more uniform and it freezes large parts of the historical process as well” (Emphasis ours).

We begin with Feyerabend for reasons not unconnected to logic as mediator for thought, theory and method in any field of research. Feyerabend is apt when he cedes that logic makes those working in a specific research domain to trudge in tandem but also reject or cast as subaltern, those whose researches do not conform to ‘that logic.’ Feyerabend’s striking articulation extends and speaks to the condition of knowledge production and reproduction on the African continent and why the inferiorisation of African episteme continues to mount (Ofuasia 2021). Under this condition, African episteme will first, be assessed from the purview of Western methodology before it is ‘adopted’ if it conforms or rejected if it does not. The undergirding paradigm, that is subtle and implied for assessment is logic. And whatever fails to conform to the logic of the global north is inferior and in most instances, dismissed out rightly (Falola 2018, 893). The implication which is therefore not far-fetched is epistemic marginalization or to be candid, epistemicide (Santos 2016).

E. Ofuasia (*) National Open University of Nigeria, FCT, Abuja, Nigeria S. O. Ibiyemi Federal College of Dental Technology and Therapy, Enugu, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_8

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Bonaventura de Sousa Santos defines epistemicide as “the murder of knowledge. The loss of epistemic confidence that currently afflicts modern science has facilitated the identification of the scope and gravity of the epistemicides perpetrated by the hegemonic Eurocentric modernity” (Santos 2016: 135). Clearly, this is the state of indigenous knowledge systems in Africa and similar cultures of the global south, hundreds of years after their first encounter with the global north. This point is properly captured by Cisneros A. Cesar Puebla (2013: 396) thus: “the only way of knowing was to eliminate, subordinate and/or oppress our differences from the Other…the narrative of modernity needs the notion of “primitives” to create the spatial colonial difference and define the identities of supposed superior and inferior human beings.” These narratives are underscored with the racial considerations of Africans as peoples that are nearly without logic and critical faculty by top-notched Western cerebrals such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1975), Immanuel Kant (1978), David Hume (1985), Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1995). By invoking the method of conversational philosophy,1 we aim to set the proper intellectual tone for originality in contemporary African scholarship through emphasis on African logic. So, in the next part of this chapter, we begin with a rehashing of the contemporary inferiorisation of African episteme by Jurgen Hengelbrock (2002) and Heinz Kimmerle (2002). Realising that their inferiorisation is not disconnected from the ideology of Eurocentrism and the superiorisation or absolutisation of Euro-American episteme in the writings of scholars such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Thomas Jefferson, Lucien Levy-­ Bruhl, this section shows how power and knowledge rub off to cause epistemic marginalisation, with Africa constantly on the intellectual defensive. We rehash the place of logic as an underlying factor in these ‘epistemic confrontations.’ In the second part of this chapter, an Igbo Africa-inspired logic system developed by Jonathan Chimakonam (2019) is tersely unpacked and used to illustrate how originality, differentiation and authenticity can greet African knowledge systems to not only mediate thought, theory and method in Africa but in non-African climes as well. The third part is the conclusion.

 Conversationalism is an emerging methodology for studying African realities and beyond. It is a system that commands criticality, analysis and rigour for the sake of opening new vistas to knowledge (Chimakonam 2015). It involves a context where two conversants enter into an intellectual exchange via what is called the principle of arumaristics. It is a principle that takes cognisance of a thesis and anti-thesis but without any hope of reaching a synthesis. The aim of the exercise is for the two individuals or opposing camps to engage critically in order to improve the quality of their individual theses. So, as one of the disputants makes a claim the other tries to counter, thereby forcing the one to revise and resubmit for the discussion to continue. During this engagement, synthesis is an anathema and that point which the engagement can no longer continue is the benoke point. 1

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 Trajectory of the Inferiorisation of Knowledge Production A in Africa In the twenty-first century, the age of sophistication, exposure and technological advancement and breakthroughs, on almost every front, one would have thought that the cerebral stamina of the ‘man of colour’ (Fanon 2008) would have reached a level to command respect, enough to shore the epistemic gap. Unfortunately, this is not to be. Rather than recognition and dignity, the entire effort of Africa’s knowledge production has been recently dubbed as transliteration and plagiarism of Western thought systems. This is the deduction from two Western intercultural scholars  – Jurgen Hengelbrock (2002) and Heinz Kimmerle (2002). So what is about their arguments that command deep thought? Jurgen Hengelbrock who is a German intercultural philosopher files that when he visited Africa for the first time, he was aghast to find African intellectuals displaying their European standing rather than standing to the true African heritage (Hengelbrock 2002). Alongside Kimmerle, Hengelbrock comes to the conclusion that there is nothing substantially new via their researches since these are nothing but mere rehashing of what Western intellect has exhausted overtime (Ozumba 2015, 181). These points were the primary focus of their 2002 debate titled: “The Stranger between Oppression and Superiority.” In his words, Hengelbrock (2002) hints that: Indeed, arriving in Africa for the first time you feel a disappointment or even a certain shock. You are looking for African culture and you don’t find anything but western life style in its worst form, and on the other hand terrible poverty and social disintegration. Speaking with African intellectuals you notice their European education and formation.

The implication is the dearth in creativity and originality on the part of African scholarship (Chimakonam 2019, 163). From this orient, it seems clear that there will necessarily be the need to show why this is not the case. Hengelbrock’s displeasure leads him to validate: “indeed, you must go very far in order to find the genuine Africa, far not only in a geographical sense but first of all in a mental one” (Hengelbrock 2002). Kimmerle (2002) adds to the findings or observations of Hengelbrock by insisting that what is called African thought system passes as no more than folk wisdom at best and uncharitable ersatz of Western ideas at worst. Of course, the suggestions of these scholars have found African scholars such as Godfrey Ozumba (2015) and Innocent Asouzu (2007) riposting. Ozumba, reacting to Kimmerle and Hengelbrock insists: “I beg to disagree that what the immense population of African philosophers do amount to copying Western episteme” (Ozumba 2015, 182). He furthers: “To say that Africans merely copy or transliterate, or translate or repackage Western philosophy into African containers is to accuse African philosophers of plagiarism and this opens up another scandal on another stolen legacy. This counter accusation will be the most uncharitable way of redressing the first “Stolen Legacy” Saga” (Ozumba 2015, 181). On his part, Innocent Asouzu rejoinds that it is incorrect for Kimmerle and Hengelbrock to announce that African ideas are mere imitations of Western thoughts.

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He sees a form of protectionism over the superiorisation of reason of one culture over others. Asouzu (2007, 32) elucidates: “This protectionist type of reasoning is a remnant of our natural instinct of self-preservation in the course of which we seek to be considered as special types of human beings, along with our cultural heritages.” Much as some African scholars have tried to defend this outlook, this study is convinced that efforts at defending are not enough. There ought to be a yard stick or paradigm through which one can show that creativity, that originality, which will make a thought distinct and characteristic of Asia, Africa, and Euro-America. Whereas we strongly believe this can be attained via logic, it is also fundamental to point that “The humanities must search for Africa in Africa and not elsewhere” (Falola 2007, 31). On this note, an Afro-inspired logic from within is crucial to the attainment of this paramount aim. Any non-African logic system that is entreated for mediating African episteme, will merely reinforce the plagiarist charge and compromise the originality question. Furthermore, the charge that nothing original has or can ever surface from Africa and the entire global south is steeped in the ideology of Eurocentrism. Kimmerle (2002) and Hengelbrock (2002) are merely reiterating, albeit in less subtle terms, the derogatory comments of prominent Western scholars concerning the African intellect. For instance, several decades before the pronouncements of Kimmerle and Hengelbrock, the French anthropologist Lucien Levy-Brul (1995, 43) had found that traditional Africans are “primitive people who had no idea of natural explanation. As people whose dreams are real experiences lacking the mental wherewithal to distinguish between subject and object, good and bad, moral and immoral. Primitive, barbaric, irrational, uncivilised and most importantly people without capacity for critical and rational thinking- qualities that is natural to doing philosophy.” David Hume, in spite of his brilliance still maintains that other races are naturally inferior to Europeans (Popkin 1978, 215). In an essay entitled “Of National Characters,” he validates: “I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised notion of that complexion; nor even any individual eminent in action or speculation… (Hume 1985, 319). Similarly, the German philosophy Georg Friedrich Hegel (1975, 177) will be remembered for his assertion that the African is “an example of animal in all his savagery and lawlessness.” In a related development, another great German scholar, Immanuel Kant believes that Europeans are the epitome of rationality and sound mind whereas “the so-called sub-human, primitive, and characterological inferiority of the American Indian, the African, and the Asian is biologically and metaphysically inherited archetype” (Kant 1978, 124–5). Likewise, the erstwhile president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson (1787, 192) announces: “I advance it therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind.” From the foregoing it is clear that the case of Kimmerle and Hengelbrock is nothing but old wine in new jar, a way of committing the old sins in new ways. However, it needs to be stated that these utterances have made African knowledge production

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subaltern, with Africans themselves condemning their ritual archives and intellectual heritage. We say this on four grounds. First, the third and perhaps fourth generation of African scholars have abandoned the conversational and system building nature of African philosophy for the invitation and even imposition of Western ideas over African themes. Second, the spirit of scholarship among the first generation scholars of African philosophy who conversed, engaged and criticized one another is vegetative among the present crop of African scholars. Third, the tendency in some African tertiary institutions where it is rife, the understanding that it is impossible for non-Africans to do original African philosophy poses as another militating factor that has stalked the conversational and system building character of philosophy. Finally, the “I did it first mentality” which is synonymous with some of the first and second generation of African scholars has left so much ideas as foundations for systems that have failed to be erected. For instance, Sophie Oluwole (2014), who speaks of “Binary Complementarity” for the first time in a 2014 book publication, fails to mention, acknowledge, engage or converse with Innocent Asouzu who has been brainstorming and publishing copiously on the subject decades hitherto. Incidentally, such a mentality is now replete among the third and fourth generation of African scholars, and this dangerous trend needs to be reversed earnestly. The urgency to reverse this unenviable trend is pertinent due to the connection between power and knowledge. We say this from the finding that “Power shapes knowledge, which is obviously not neutral and free of context” (Falola 2018, 928). Toyin Falola (2018, 896) furthers: “In a Western-derived knowledge system, the epistemic identities of our scholars and the ecology of African universities can extend and reproduce the externally derived knowledge systems. That external knowledge cannot be separated from external power, for it shapes who sells a centre, and who turns particularism into universalism.” He goes on to infer correctly: “In that Western power and control of knowledge, African scholarship becomes consigned to the margins. They exist in footnotes as gatherers of data and as intellectual subjects needed to supply information about African objects.” For African scholarship and episteme to not be consigned to the margins, it is therefore appropriate to disclose or unearth that underlying novelty that makes it unique. Attaining this novelty, we maintain, can only be settled via logic. However, concerning with Ezumezu logic as an African logic that can make African ideas original, the section that follows will briefly describe the essential character of this logic system before disclosing how it can assist with the originality question in knowledge production in Africa.

The Main Thrust of Ezumezu Logic Ezumezu logic is developed by the African philosopher, Jonathan Chimakonam (2019). It is an Africa-inspired three-valued system that seeks to provide a foothold for original thinking in Africa yet applicable in other climes as well. Whereas we concede that some readers may shudder at the mere mention of African logic since

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logic is a universal, it is important to note that there is a difference between being universal and being absolute. All logic systems are supposed to be universal. By this, we mean that they must be pliable in other climes. However, no logic system is absolute, beyond question to serve as paradigm for assessing other systems. It is on this note that Chimakonam (2019, 47) admits that “My conception of African logic is in terms of logic relativity rather than logic relativism. Logic relativity further allows us to contrast African logic with say Western logic. Both may be relative and universalisable but their application of rules of reasoning may have some nuances.” The absolutisation of classical bivalent logic and its universal appeal, on the one hand, with the understanding of the tension between power and knowledge as discussed in the preceding section, it is clear that African logic will be consigned to the margins. Realizing this possible inference, Campbell Shittu Momoh (2000, 197) insists that “even though it is possible to use existing formal logics and rules of inference to evaluate discourse, reason and thoughts in African cultures and world-­ views the authentic African logic in artificial language is yet to be developed. African professional philosophers have this gauntlet to pick up.” Momoh (2000, 175) is also convinced on the need to distinguish natural logic from formal logic – “It is obvious that a discussion of the logic question in African philosophy must consider two senses – natural logic and artificial logic.” Concerning natural logic, he explains that it “involves clarity of expression, the avoidance of fallacies, vagueness, ambiguity and contradiction in natural language” (Momoh 2000, 174). The implication of this assertion is that logic “in natural language is an attribute of any competent individual. Logic as artificial language is an attribute only of a trained logician” (Momoh 2000, 176). Hence, to maintain that traditional Africans have no idea of logic or cannot be logical is lacking in substance. Artificial logic, on the other hand, for Momoh (2000) is where the real challenge lies. This, for him is the task of contemporary African philosophers. Specifically, the artificial aspect of logic “underscores the formal skill of a trained logician. Logic in artificial language is the setting up of constants, variables, sentence connectives, deductions and transformation rules for deriving the formal validity of arguments. Even in this sense of logic, Momoh argues that African philosophy can be logical” (Chimakonam 2020: 124). In spite of the rancour that erupted concerning the possibility of providing an Africa-inspired logic, Chimakonam forays into his Igbo-­ African culture to ferment a logic system that is pliable for Africa and in places non-African too (Ofuasia 2019). The result is Ezumezu logic. Ezumezu logic, as codified by Chimakonam is a three-valued logic that emphasizes complementarity over contradiction, conjunction over disjunction. The word, Ezumezu, itself is an Igbo word that means accretion (Ofuasia 2021). It is an accretion “of three values namely; truth (ezu), falsity (izu) and ezumezu with small letter ‘e’ (complemented). A system of logic is trivalent if it has three values. This is opposed to bivalence in which a system of logic boasts of two [sic] values namely: truth and falsity” (Chimakonam 2019, 96). This logic, according to its codifier is “…a prototype of African logic which studies values, meanings and understanding of logical language. Nothing is treated without content. It is both an art and science which studies the logical relationship among realities expressed in terms of

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propositions and symbols. Ezumezu, therefore, is a logical framework that can be used to explain and analyse experiences in African world-view” (Chimakonam 2019, 96). In a system where complementarity is prioritised over contradiction, it is clear that the traditional laws of thought will not do. To this effect, Chimakonam (2019) adds three supplementary laws of thought to be able to cope with the inadequacies of the traditional laws. These are: Njikoka, Nmekoko, and Onana-etiti (Chimakonam 2019, 96). Hence, “the total numbers of laws of thought that undergird Chimakonam’s system are six” (Ofuasia 2019, 2). The outlook that contradiction is an obstruction to knowledge but which classical bivalent logic upholds in high regard has been corroborated by Alfred North Whitehead. For him, “In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a defeat: but in the evolution of real knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards a victory. This is one great reason for the utmost toleration of variety of opinion” (Whitehead 1948, 186). He furthers: “We are told by logicians that a proposition must be either true or false and that there is no middle term. But in practice, we may know that a proposition expresses an important truth, but that it is subject to limitations and qualifications which at present remain undiscovered” (Whitehead 1948, 182). The emphasis on these laws of thought and the use of classical bivalent or two-valued logic has contributed to one of the chief reasons why African episteme has been grossly misunderstood and distorted by ethnographic and anthropological scholars such as Lucien-Levy Bruhl and Placid Tempels who tried as much to circumvent original African idea of reality for Western interpretation. Ezumezu’s supplementary laws are able to overcome the problems that the classical laws of thought encounter. It is however crucial to realise that these laws are not opposed to the classical laws but are derived from them to strengthen their lapses. In this guise, Chimakonam (2019, 96) expounds further: These supplementary laws like the ones I formulated for African logic are not strictly opposed to the three traditional (Aristotelian) laws such that may make systems in different logic traditions irreconcilable. What the additional laws warrant are nuances to the legal parameters that make statements in each tradition consistent or inconsistent, contradictory or non-contradictory, universal or absolute.

It is therefore valid to infer that Ezumezu recognises the traditional laws of thought. One of the supplementary laws njikoka states that “A is true if and only if A is true wedge-implies A and B is true. Here, the variable A is said to be true only in the company of another or other variables, not in isolation” (Chimakonam 2019, 139). For Nmekoka: “‘C’ is or equals a complement of ‘T’ and ‘F.’ This ‘C’ is the third truth value called ezumezu or nwa-izugbe. Whereas Njikoka hints at individual identities within the group, Nmekoka lays emphasis on group power or identity through the convergence of individual elements” (Ofuasia 2019, 75). The third supplementary law, Onana-etiti, uses a conjunction in the place of where Aristotle’s law of excluded middle admits a disjunction. “This” according to Emmanuel Ofuasia (2019, 75) “is one of the most striking features of Ezumezu which allows it applicability and relevance in process metaphysics and Yorùbá ontology.” Onana-etiti

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states that “A could be both true and false or if a thing is equal to itself, it can be unequal to or different from itself depending on context” (Chimakonam 2019, 140). The logic, aside the supplementary laws of thought added to the traditional laws, is reinforced by two prominent theses: ontological and logical. Whereas the ontological thesis upholds the view that realities can both be independent units but also competent to forming a status quo of interdependent relationships, the logical thesis, on the other hand, upholds the outlook that values can only be ascribed to judgments not on the basis of facts but via context. (Chimakonam 2019: 141–2). It is from this leaning that one can understand the role of CdV  – Context-dependent Variable in Ezumezu logic. What this hints at is that context is very crucial for ascribing values of truth and falsity to propositions. What is true in context A may not be so for context B. On this note, one is reminded of Gottlob Frege’s (1960, xxii) conviction: “Never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition.” Chimakonam however goes beyond Frege. Where Frege talks about contexts in the appearance of propositions, Chimakonam talks about contexts, where the proposition is uttered. In Ezumezu logic, two inferential modes are central and need to be discussed. These are Arumaristic and Ohakaristic. Specifically, “the inference from premises to conclusion in Ezumezu logic is either from the peripheries to the centre (arumaruka) or from the centre to the peripheries (ohakarasi).” (Chimakonam 2019, 116). In Ezumezu logic, arumaristic reasoning suggests how the supplementary law of nmekoka brings two variables, say ‘T’ and ‘F’ so their distinct identity may be strengthened in the collective or centre. Afterward, the law of onana-etiti is invoked to validate the conjunction at the centre such that the truth-value of each proposition or variable accounts for the truth value of the group. In the case of ohakaristic reasoning, the supplementary law of njikoka brings two variables, say ‘T’ and ‘F’ into a logical relationship so each can strengthen the collective. Then, onana-etiti makes it possible for the truth of the individual to be accounted for by the collective.2 With the main thrust of his logic thus exposed, Chimakonam (2019) is convinced that it is able to ground African theories such as Afro-communitarianism; Ibuayidanda philosophy; Consolationism; Ubuntu. As a way of testing the validity of the logic, Emmanuel Ofuasia (2019) has carried the justification of Chimakonam further by applying it to Yorùbá ontology and process-relational philosophy. On these showings, the aspects of thoughts in these traditions of thought that may have been branded as contradiction and vague have been able to receive better comprehension and exposition. Perhaps the principal problem of hitherto ways of assessing indigenous African episteme has been the undue accentuation and uncritical acceptance of classical bivalent logic as the absolute and universal system valid for all climes and seasons. When original African episteme is assessed from this alternative logic system, it becomes clear that the originality question of knowledge production in Africa can be dissipated almost effortlessly. It however needs to be

 I do not boast to have been able to provide the full details of Ezumezu Logic here. I recommend readers to Jonathan Chimakonam’s (2019) text for further readings. 2

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disclosed that the unfair impact and implications of classical logic to understanding some theories is not peculiar to Africa. There are some Western epistemes that are not dominant and copiously understood because they do not conform to the classical bivalent undergirding. In mind is Whitehead’s (1978, v) “Philosophy of Organism.” For instance, while reacting to how attempts to comprehend Whitehead’s ideas, two popular analytic scholars, William Quine and Donald Davidson, who are deeply steeped in the tenets of classical bivalent logic, encountered intellectual gridlocks which are divorceable from logic. While he was being lectured by Whitehead, Quine would later complain: “Whitehead lectured on Science and the Modern World and on Cosmologies Ancient and Modern. I responded little, even after accustoming myself to his accent. What he said had little evident bearing on the problems that I recognized. His lecture hours were mercifully short and his speech exasperatingly slow. My notes were crowded with doodles…But I retained a vivid sense of being in the presence of the great” (see Hahn and Schlipp 1986). Perhaps Quine is considerate with words Davidson is more effusive finding: “the “unreadable” Whitehead basically…a fraud as a teacher and philosopher: Truth or even serious arguments was basically irrelevant” (see Hahn 1999, 13–4). If we imagine for a moment that Whitehead is not English but an African, there is no debate concerning how his ideas would not command any serious intellectual respect. Here, is a clear demonstration, not only how logic upholds thought, theory and method but how power also shapes knowledge as well. In the section that follows, we turn to constructive ways regarding how this logic system, though briefly unpacked here, can dispel the originality question by providing the proper framework upon which African ideas can thrive and avoid the dub of transliteration and ‘copycatism.’

 frican Logic, the “Logic Criterion” and the Originality A Challenge Posed to African Episteme It is important to begin the process of authentic epistemic construction and production in Africa, by taking into serious cognizance, “the wreckage of slave trade and colonialism” (Falola 2018, 277). In spite of this historical truth, it is however more pertinent to understand that there are “three general ways to respond to the undeniable Western presence: to accept it without question; to reject it completely; and to blend traditional practices with foreign practices” (Falola 2018, 8). On this note, “Africa cannot isolate itself from the rest of the world. Neither can it refuse to draw lessons and ideas from other peoples, cultures, and civilizations. Borrowing should, however, be adaptive, creative, and discriminating” (Falola 2018, 277). If Toyin Falola’s position is admitted as cardinal, then it is important to add the “logic criterion” for African philosophy in order to put to rest, the originality question of

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African episteme. The “Logic criterion” for African episteme, according to Chimakonam (2019, 35) is read thus: Any discourse that treats African or non-African issues whether produced by an African or non-African versed in African cultural and intellectual life but is capable of universal application can qualify as African philosophy insofar as it is produced with African cultural-­ inspired methods grounded in the logic of African ontology or the instrument of logic tradition in Africa which is arumaristic in structure.

The ways through which an idea can be deemed as original and authentic to Africa is that it must be underscored by the arumaristic inferential and a logic that is Africa-inspired. This is the central character of an African logic invoked to mediate thought, theory and method which in turn, will vitiate the claims of the German intercultural scholars whose views were considered in the early portions of this chapter. Hence, to dissipate the originality question via logic, the following steps are recognised: 1. The need to learn from other traditions other than Africa; 2. The need to not denigrate indigenous African episteme in the process of learning from traditions other than Africa; and 3. African logic (Ezumezu in this context) must be the logic that mediates thought, theory and method for the discourse in question. Once these three theses are met, then the charge of transliteration and ‘copycatism’ will be eroded. In a nutshell, the task is to “first toot out Western background logic and planting African logic as its replacement to drive the new hybrid curriculum. The second is assembling relevant foreign contents from diverse cultures and combining them with relevant local content for a formidable system…the logical framework that undergirds it would be African, and this is what would make such a curriculum African. Every borrowed idea is re-shaped and restructured to suit African needs with the tool of African logic” (Chimakonam 2019, 185). To show this can be attained, further illustration is crucial. From Fig. 8.1, what we have been saying so far may be easily gleaned. Let us imagine that the plan is to provide a curriculum that will reveal African originality and creativity, the first step is to admit all the relevant foreign episteme that we can

Useful Non-African E me

Relevant Africainspired Backgr d Logic

Useful African Ep me

Original and Creative African Episteme Fig. 8.1  An illustration of how to birth an original African knowledge system

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have. By relevant, we admit that there are some non-indigenous episteme that cannot assist the drive toward originality. These are to be expunged. This is also true for the case of African indigenous content. Aspects that no longer serve the present age will be discarded for the inclusion of those that are relevant for the present climes. The aggregate of these extractions from both African and non-African epistemic contents will be assessed from an Africa-inspired logic system. This, logic system may be perplexing for the non-African or even the African that is not grounded in it. It is therefore a matter of first disclosing from the outset, the relevant Africa-inspired logic that the chapter is employing for the sake of those who may not be familiar. It is when a step of this calibre is undertaken that the originality question which has greeted contemporary African scholarship will be cast aside.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that there is a connection between knowledge and power, wherein the one who is powerful controls what will be deemed knowledgeable or not. More so, the charges of ‘copycatism’ and transliteration of Western ideas as African ideas by Hengelbrock and Kimmerle can only be dismissed provided that there is a background Africa-inspired logic, such as Chimakonam’s (2019) Ezumezu logic. From the exploration made thus far, it is valid to deduce that logic is imperative for originality and uniqueness of a thought system. The idea that Africans do not have the capacity to produce original ideas nor creative ones will be found invalid on arrival since the background logic that engulfs the episteme will be foreign to those who are not grounded in this logic. Hence, the whole character of this chapter is to show that logic is a powerful tool for shaping and characterising the geography and originality of knowledge. For authentic or original knowledge production to be realised for Africa, the emphasis on Africa-inspired background logic is not negotiable. It is precisely this task that the entirety of this study has been devoted.

References Asouzu, Innocent. 2007. Ibuaru: The Heavy Burden of Philosophy Beyond African Philosophy. Münster: Litverlag. Chimakonam, Jonathan O. 2015. Transforming the African Philosophical Place through Conversations: An Inquiry into the Global Expansion of Thought (GET). South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 462–479. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. ———., ed. 2020. Logic and African Philosophy: Seminal Essays on African Systems of Thought. Wilmington, Delaware: Vernon Press. Falola, Toyin. 2007. Nationalising Africa, Culturalising the West, and Reformulating the Humanities in Africa. In Rethinking Humanities in Africa, ed. S.  Akinrinde, D.  Ogungbile Fashina, and J. Famakinwa. Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press.

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———. 2018. The Falola Reader on African Culture, Nationalism, Development and Epistemologies. Texas: Pan-African University Press. Fanon, Frantz. 2008. Black Skin White Masks (trans: Markmann, Charles L.). London: Pluto Press. Feyerabend, Paul. 1992. Against Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frege, Gottlob. 1960. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-mathematical Inquiry into the Concept of Number (trans: Austin, J.L.). New York: Harper Torch Books. Hahn, Lewis E., ed. 1999. The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Library of Living Philosophers XXVII). Chicago: Open Court. Hahn, Lewis E., and Paul A. Schlipp, eds. 1986. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine (Library of Living Philosophers). Chicago: Open Court. Hegel, Georg W.F. 1975. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (trans: Nisbet, H.B.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hengelbrock, Jurgen. 2002. You Cannot Free Yourself from Hegel: An Encounter with Heinz Kimmerle. In The Stranger Between Oppression and Superiority: Close Encounter with Heinz Kimmerle. Intercultural Communication. www.galerie-­inter.de/kimmerle. Retrieved 21 Feb 2021. Hume, David. 1985. Of National Characters. In Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. E. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Jefferson, Thomas. 1787. Notes on the State of Virginia. Reprinted in 1965. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1978. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (trans: Gregora, M.J., & Dowdell, V.L.). Southern Illinois: University Press. Kimmerle, Heinz. 2002. Response to Jurgen Hengelbrock. In The Stranger Between Oppression and Superiority: Close Encounter with Heinz Kimmerle. Intercultural Communication. www. galerie-­inter.de/kimmerle. Retrieved 21 Feb 2021. Levy-Bruhl, Lucien. 1995. How Natives Think. In African Philosophy: Selected Readings, ed. A. Mosley. New York: Prentice Hall. Momoh, Campbell S. 2000. The “Logic” Question of African Philosophy. In The Substance of African Philosophy, ed. C.S. Mommoh, 175–192. Auchi: APP Publications. Ofuasia, E. 2019. Unveiling Ezumezu Logic as a Framework for Process Ontology and Yorùbá Ontology. Filosofia Theoretica 8 (2): 63–84. Ofuasia, Emmanuel. 2021. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies: A Review. International of Journal of African Renaissance Studies. https://doi.org/10.108 0/18186874.2021.1889926. Oluwole, S. 2014. Socrates and òr ú nmil à: Two patron satins of classical philosophy. Lagos: Ark Publishers. Ozumba, Godfrey. 2015. The transliteration question in African philosophy. In Atuolu omalu: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 171–185. Lanham: University Press of America. Popkin, R. 1978. Hume’s Racism. The Philosophical Forum 9 (2&3): 213–218. Puebla, Cisneros A.C. 2013. The Onward Journey. In Indigenous Pathways into Social Research: Voices of a New Generation, ed. D.M. Mertens, F. Cram, and B. Chilisa. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press. Santos, Bonaventura S. 2016. Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. London: Routledge. Whitehead, Alfred N. 1948. Science and the Modern World. New York: Pelican. ———. 1978. In Process and Reality, ed. David R. Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: The Free Press.

Chapter 9

Africanising Institutional Culture: What Is Possible and Plausible Thaddeus Metz

Introduction One central facet of the ideal of transformation in South African higher education institutions (HEIs), at least for many self-described adherents to that idea, is Africanisation. Africanisation, in part, involves admitting African and other black students into academic programmes and hiring non-white staff as academics and managers. However, I do not investigate such practices, since they have received more critical analysis, and are by and large less contested, than the other major part of Africanisation that I explore. It concerns not which people are included in HEIs, but which norms are accepted. In this chapter, I expound and evaluate arguments for the view that HEIs in South Africa and societies with similar backgrounds  have been and still are under a moral obligation to Africanise their institutional culture. There is as yet in the literature no comprehensive discussion of whether, why and how to Africanise norms in higher education, that is, no thorough account of the different forms it could take, the competing rationales for them, and their strengths and weaknesses. Such a critical and philosophical analysis, in the light of a wide array of written works, is what I aim to provide in this chapter. I end up distinguishing stronger and weaker versions of Africanisation with regard to institutional culture, and maintain that there is good reason to think that a moderate version should have been adopted by South African HEIs and should still be. I begin by describing what those who explicitly advocate ‘Africanisation’ with regard to academic norms have by and large have meant by that term (section “What Africanisation Is, or Rather Could Have Been”), focusing principally on writings by those based in South Africa, including Catherine Odora Hoppers, Malegapuru William Makgoba, Gessler Muxe Nkondo, Mogobe B. Ramose, Sipho Seepe and T. Metz (*) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_9

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Lesiba Joe Teffo  (from the first generation of post-apartheid black academics). Next, I analytically distinguish and critically evaluate five fundamental rationales that these and other thinkers have proffered for such Africanisation (section “Exploring the Rationales for Africanisation”). In catchwords, these defences of Africanisation appeal to: relativism, democracy, redress, civilisation and identity. I point out that the sort of Africanisation that might be appropriate for South Africa and other post-independence African countries differs radically, depending on which of the above rationales is accepted. For example, relativism entails that anything Western or more generally non-local is out of place here, whereas the logic of compensatory justice entails that Africanisation should proceed only until such time as reparation is effected, after which it would no longer be justified. I also provide a critical discussion of the major rationales, investigating which ones are most plausible, and concluding that some arguments for a moderate sort of Africanisation merit serious consideration and probably acceptance. Specifically, considerations of redress, civilisation and identity together make a strong philosophical case for much more Africanisation of institutional culture than there has been up to now in South Africa, and they probably have implications for related epistemological and pedagogical struggles elsewhere in the world, particularly in the Global South.1 I conclude by summarising the findings and by raising some practical implications of the most promising rationales for making academic norms substantially African (section “Conclusion: How to Africanise”), noting that the issue of how best to deal with prima facie impediments to Africanisation, such as academic freedom, merit thorough discussion in another forum.

What Africanisation Is, or Rather Could Have Been In this section, I explain in some detail what I mean by ‘Africanisation’, as it, much like its companion term ‘transformation’, has been used in a variety of ways in South Africa. One major reason for thoroughly exploring the sense of the term is to obtain clarity about what precisely is at stake in debates about Africanising institutional culture, but another is to dispatch along the way objections to it that are based on an implausible understanding of what it involves.

 For discussion of how higher education should avoid, and respond to, oppression of aboriginal peoples in New Zealand and the Americas, see, e.g., Andreotti et al. (2011); de Oliveira Andreotti (2012). In this chapter, I focus on issues of Africanisation in particular, paying close attention to what self-described ‘Africanists’ say about it. Such is plausibly required to give the concept of Africanisation its due, particularly given how large the literature on it is and how distinct the experiences and perspectives of sub-Saharans are likely to be. 1

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Two Misconstruals of ‘Africanisation’ There are more than a few who would immediately reject Africanisation of institutional culture as an ideal, not on grounds of liberalism, the usual suspect, but rather because it allegedly suggests essentialism. For some, to use labels such as ‘African’, ‘sub-Saharan’ and the like implies a fixed and distinct nature (see, for example, Parker 2003; Horsthemke and Enslin 2005). According to this perspective, when one calls something ‘African’, one is presuming that it is unique to, and exhaustive of, that part of the world, whereas it invariably not only can be found outside it, but also will not be found everywhere in it. And beyond the descriptive error, proponents of this line of thinking usually have a normative concern in the background, that in calling something ‘African’ one is cramping the ability of those who live in Africa to choose their own ways of life. I have routinely encountered these concerns from social scientists in southern Africa, but I submit that my colleagues are the ones who are misusing language, not those who speak of things ‘African’. When English-speakers use geographical terms to characterise a property, they usually do not mean to posit something fixed and distinct. The combination of markets, science and Constitutionalism is, throughout the world, routinely called ‘Western’, although one will find it in Japan and Australasia, and will fail to find it in the Amazon jungle. Baseball is ‘American’, though the Cubans are well known for playing it, and many Americans prefer to play and watch football, basketball or even ice hockey. Maple trees and syrup are ‘Canadian’, but you will find plenty in Vermont and none, I presume, in the northernmost parts of Canada near the Arctic. These and myriad other examples suggest that geographical terms are aptly used when they pick out a feature that is salient in the given region, that is common there in a way it tends not to be elsewhere. Hence to call something ‘African’ or ‘sub-­ Saharan’ implies neither that it is to be found only below the Sahara desert, nor that it is everywhere in that locale. Again, these terms signify merely that something is particularly frequent or noticeable there, not necessarily something that is single or static (cf. Suttner 2010: 523–28). Or at least that is the way I elect to use them. Hence, to speak of ‘Africanisation’ does not commit me to looking for features that make such a transformation utterly distinct from Western, Chinese or any other cultural processes. Instead, it means pointing out features characteristic of indigenous black peoples below the Sahara desert and of contemporary ways of life that are or could be informed by their worldviews and practices. Africanisation might not be appropriate or justified, but not, I maintain, because it is essentially essentialist, even if a few of its self-described adherents appear to be (such as, it appears, Teffo 2000). Here is another reason for rejecting Africanisation that can be dismissed for being grounded on a misconstrual of what it involves. Some might suggest that Africanisation is not to be taken seriously because it would require taking on all salient facets of sub-Saharan education or culture more generally, which would undercut any plausible understanding of a university’s mission in a constitutional

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democracy. For example, it does appear that much of traditional African education was gendered, meaning that the content of what one could learn was determined by one’s biological sex (Adeyinka and Ndwapi 2002: 19; Adeyemi and Adeyinka 2003: 432). Since a sexist approach to education has no place in contemporary South African society, Africanisation is to be rejected straightaway, so this sort of objection goes.2 However, virtually no self-described proponent of ‘Africanisation’ believes that it would require patently unjust or otherwise undesirable features of sub-Saharan ways of life to be taken on board. Instead, implicit in the discussion is usually the presumption that only the (particularly) attractive features of African norms should be adopted. There are of course some Africanists who have romantic understandings of what pre-colonial life was like and contend that anything undesirable was an importation from other cultures and so is not really African. The bad breath of ideology wafts from such people’s mouths. However, one need not buy into the ‘Myth of Merrie Africa’ in order to make prima facie sense of Africanisation; one can grant that there have been both good and bad salient features of indigenous African ways of life, and then maintain that what is meant by ‘Africanisation’ is a process of transforming universities so that more of the good ones are exhibited.

Africanising People v Africanising Place I noted above that by ‘Africanisation’ I am not fundamentally interested in the racial and ethnic composition of students and staff. As is well known, Africanisation, and transformation more broadly, had for about two decades largely been reduced to the admissions, hirings and promotions of black people. One plausible explanation of why this reduction occurred had been government’s drive for public accountability and university councils’ and managers’ interest in demonstrating their performance (Lange 2013). It is easy to measure the percentage of Africans in a classroom or workplace, and hence to demand that quotas are filled and to demonstrate that they have been. It is, in contrast, much more difficult to quantify, and hence publicise in sound bites or tick off in a brief performance review meeting, the Africanisation of institutional culture that I explore in this chapter. From now on, by ‘Africanisation’ I mean only the latter consideration, regarding the way things could be done in an HEI, and not who does them.3  For similar objections, but different sorts of responses to them, see Makgoba (1998: 51); Seepe (1998: 63–4). 3  Hence by ‘Africanisation’ I mean precisely the opposite of what Prah (2004) does. By the way, I of course recognise that if some kind of Africanisation of norms were appropriate, then promoting it would probably require some substantial presence of African people. However, it also (nearly) goes without saying that merely hiring African people would be unlikely to ensure Africanisation with regard to norms. Both points are by now banalities in Africanist analyses of higher education. 2

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Content In spelling out what it would mean to Africanise a university’s institutional culture, in the following I distinguish between content, extent and implementation. I first indicate different functionings in a university that could be Africanised, then discuss the degree to which they could be, and finally the manner in which they could be. After distinguishing these three facets of Africanisation, I round out the section by articulating stronger and weaker versions of it. With respect to content, there are five central dimensions by which a university, which I take to be a representative HEI, could Africanise its functionings: curriculum, research, language, aesthetics and governance. I use the phrase ‘institutional culture’ to refer to all five elements.4 With respect to curriculum, are students being taught characteristically African perspectives and approaches as well as texts written by Africans? Is a music department teaching indigenous forms? Is a philosophy department instructing sub-­ Saharan thinkers? Is a sociology department addressing African societies? Is a history department exploring unknowns about the past below the Sahara? One might suspect that such questions are appropriate only for the humanities and social sciences, but it is worth considering what Africanisation could realistically mean in the contexts of the hard sciences and maths (on this, consider Seepe 2000). One prima facie attractive ‘African’ approach to maths might be not to do it in the abstract and in an isolated classroom, but rather in the context of, say, designing something that would benefit a village or township.5 Local readers will know that such pedagogical approaches had not been frequent, even if there are now more of them since the 2015/16 student protests. The well-known ‘racism report’, commissioned by South Africa’s Minister of Education and composed by Crain Soudien and several leading figures in higher education policy, briefly addresses the Africanisation of curricula and is bleak about progress that had been made on this score (2008: 91–4, 117). In an overview of the report disseminated to the public, Soudien and his cohorts remark that ‘the transformation of what is taught and learnt in institutions constitutes one of the most difficult challenges this sector is facing’ (2009). The report’s authors find, as did many other black scholars ten years prior (for just one example, see Jansen 1998: 109, 110–1), much instruction to be decontextualised as well as not directly engaged with African perspectives. Anecdotally, while it is clear to me that departments such as history, sociology and development studies routinely focused on sub-Saharan concerns, I doubt that many other disciplines systematically did until recently. Certainly in my field of

 For a thoughtful sociological analysis of the way the phrase ‘institutional culture’ gets used in South Africa, see Higgins (2007). 5  I lack the space to defend the ‘Africanness’ of such an approach, but refer the reader to Adeyinka and Ndwapi (2002) and Adeyemi and Adeyinka (2003), who discuss the salient communal and utilitarian dimensions of traditional African education. 4

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philosophy, African ideas  and sources had been eclipsed by the presentation of Anglo-American and Continental perspectives in most major departments. And, for all I can tell, it was not unique in that respect. To what extent have lecturers in psychology seriously explored collective conceptions of the self and relational perceptions of the world, more prominent in Africa than in the West? How often have lecturers in political theory engaged with sub-Saharan conceptions of democracy (on which see below)? What percentage of classtime have lecturers in journalism devoted to addressing obligations that an ubuntu ethic might entail for reporters or a publishing firm? Having been a part of South African academe for more than 20 years, I submit that rough answers to such questions are clear.6 Note that Africanisation need not imply that such perspectives are correct, should be presented as such or should be the only ones critically discussed; in the first instance it simply calls for not ignoring them, which they largely had been prior to the FeesMustFall movements. Turning to research, the issue is of course to what extent African theoretical perspectives are studied, used and advanced and African issues are addressed. Questions paralleling those about the curriculum can be posed about research. One may reasonably surmise that Africanised scholarship had fared worse than that of teaching; after all, if instructors were generally not extending themselves to learn about and teach African approaches and issues, then they surely were doing so even less when it comes to what they publish. There have been many conferences, centres and chairs established since the transition to democracy devoted to issues of race, identity, justice and the like, which Soudien overviews (2011: 23–7); however, based on his familiarity with the research landscape in South African universities, he concludes, ‘South African contributions, I suggest, are dominated by ideas of modernism and modernity. They have difficulty in working with knowledge forms and knowledge claims which fall outside the particular modernist imagination’ (Soudien 2011: 17; see also Suttner 2010: 525–6). I submit that even modernist approaches could have been much more systematically applied to African contexts in revealing ways. For instance, one finds no thorough attempt to empirically ascertain what kernels of truth there might be in traditional medicine. Scientists in South Africa have a terrific opportunity to sift through indigenous peoples’ knowledge of herbs and plants in search of those that are demonstrably efficacious (a point made by Vilakazi 1998: 73). Of course some of this work is being done, but not in earnest, and often enough it is being done by Big Pharma. For another respect in which traditional medicine begs for empirical study, consider what economists might learn from the fact that typical traditional healers do not demand payment from patients unless the latter are happy with the service they have been provided (Leonard 2009). A third possible locus of Africanisation in an HEI such as a university is its mediums of communication, especially the languages that are spoken and written. The

 Which is not to say that systematic empirical enquiry into what is being taught and how would not be worthwhile. 6

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more that students learn in an indigenous sub-Saharan language, and the more that university affairs are conducted in it, the more African the university’s institutional culture, in one major respect. It is well known that an overwhelming majority of instruction at universities has been conducted in English or, until recently, Afrikaans. Writing in 2001, the Council on Higher Education noted, Of the 21 universities, 16 use English as the language of tuition. In the other five institutions, English-medium tuition is steadily and often rapidly increasing alongside, and perhaps at the expense of, Afrikaans-medium tuition . . . Of the universities that returned the questionnaire on which the survey was based, hardly any can be said to be promoting the use of any African language as a Language of Tuition (2001: 4).7

Since then, the use of English has increased substantially, including at the University of Johannesburg (formerly the Rand Afrikaans University) and, to somewhat lesser degrees, at the Universities of Pretoria and of Stellenbosch. And since then nothing notable has happened with regard to use of African languages, save for the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s policy of requiring all undergraduates to have learned some Zulu by the time they graduate and some very sporadic efforts at Rhodes University and the University of Limpopo (on which see Beukes 2015). A fourth important dimension of Africanising institutional culture could concern aesthetic issues, by which I roughly mean those designed to touch the senses in ways that are expected to please others, to prompt reflection on their part or to express oneself (and often all three). Which kinds of music are played at university events? Which cultures inform the university’s symbols it displays in its advertising or its academic gowns? What sort of entertainment is there in a university’s residences? Where have the rituals at a graduation ceremony come from? What kinds of food are served? What kinds of clothes may be expected to be worn? In a fairly notorious newspaper op-ed (Makgoba 2005), the long-time Vice-Chancellor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal discussed these facets in blunt terms: It should therefore become common sense that the white male soon learns to speak, write and spell in an African language; that he, like Johnny Clegg, learns to dance and sing like Ladysmith Black Mambazo. He should learn kwaito, dance like Lebo, dress like Madiba, enjoy eating ‘smiley and walkies’ and attend ‘lekgotla’ and socialise at our taverns.

To the extent that non-Africans participated in these ways of life––or indeed even Africans themselves did!––in a university setting, there would be a greater dimension of Africanisation of institutional culture. While one occasionally encounters African colours and shapes in a university’s symbols and indigenous songs or at least rhythms from university choirs, that is about all that readily comes to mind. The manners of dress at both formal and informal events, the types of food and drink largely sold in student centres and offered at events, the kinds of background music played at graduations and award ceremonies, and the architecture in which one is housed on campus have been little different from what I encountered when at a variety of academic institutions in the United States.  See also Ministry of Education (2002: 7).

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A fifth facet of academic life that admits of Africanisation is the way that decisions are made and enforced. Who decides how a given department, faculty and university as a whole is run, how are the decisions made, and how are refusals to carry them out handled? Are there salient decision-making processes in the sub-­ Saharan tradition that are attractive and should inform university practice? What sort of boundaries does a university have with respect to its neighbourhood, and how are they secured? Consider, for example, that African political philosophers have argued that pre-­ colonial sub-Saharan societies tended to make decisions consequent to some kind of consensus, either among all affected adults or a group of elders, and that the search for unanimity is worth undertaking in contemporary political settings (Wiredu 1996: 172–90; Ramose 1999: 135–52; Teffo 2004). More familiar, because of the influence of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is a characteristically sub-Saharan approach to conflict resolution, in which the aim is to reconcile offenders (such as, say, those who have plagiarised)  and victims (and those who identify with them), and not in the first instance to deter prospective offenders from misbehaving or to seek retribution in the form of an ‘eye for an eye’. Might an Africanised management be one that consults widely or at least with a group of elected senior academics or university representatives more generally, rather than decides unilaterally? Perhaps the idea of an Institutional Forum started out with such an aim, but the evidence is that it has not been realised (on which see Soudien et al. 2008: 108–9). Could an Africanised Senate be one that seeks unanimous agreement, or at least some kind of supermajority on key issues? Should a university’s approach to student infraction typically involve a kind of sub-Saharan restorative justice, with productive burdens imposed, as opposed to penalties such as deregistration, fines or expulsion? Unlike other facets of Africanising institutional culture, I am not aware of the extent to which any university in South Africa has tried out these approaches or any others grounded on salient African norms. As is often remarked, the phrase ‘institutional culture’ is vague. I submit that it is well understood as picking out all five of the elements of curriculum, research, language, aesthetics and governance. For the sake of this chapter, a university’s institutional culture counts as more Africanised, the more these five elements are imbued with (desirable) features salient in the sub-Saharan tradition.

Extent So far I have spelled out Africanising institutional culture as it concerns the content of what is or could be done at a university. Another issue is how much it should take place. According to some, radical views, there ought only to be Africanisation in South Africa’s universities. Relatively few theorists of Africanisation have favoured

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that sort of approach.8 Usually the suggestion is that Africanisation should proceed alongside other cultural approaches in a dialogue of mutual enrichment. However, there remains the issue of whether African norms should be the dominant ones, and, if so, to what extent.

Implementation More controversial is the issue of how the Africanisation of institutional culture ought to be promoted. Here, one can distinguish between, on the one hand, the normative force that university leaders and members generally ascribe to Africanisation, and, on the other, the coercive force that should back it up. In terms of normative force, managers, staff and students might think of Africanisation as: permissible, something that may morally be done but that need not be; praiseworthy, something that should morally be done and that, while not wrong not to do, would be ideal to do; or required, something that must morally be done and that would be wrong not to do. Most self-described adherents to Africanisation would favour the spread of the latter two approaches. Indeed, more than a few favour the view that Africanisation is an ethical necessity and would be delighted to see universities express the same. Now, just because something is a moral requirement (or believed to be) does not necessarily mean it should be an enforceable requirement. That is, even if one supposes, for the sake of argument at this point, that academics and administrative staff have an ethical obligation to Africanise institutional culture, more argument would be needed to demonstrate that they should be forced to live up to that obligation. It might be, after all, that academics and other staff have a ‘right to do wrong’, as it is known in Anglo-American political philosophy; even if they would be wrong not to Africanise voluntarily, it could be that senior managers would also be wrong, and perhaps even wrong to a greater degree, to make them Africanise by withdrawing privileges, issuing threats and imposing penalties in response to failure to do so. Hence, a separate issue with regard to the implementation of Africanisation is which mechanisms should be used to foster it. Here, it is useful to distinguish between policies that would merely permit Africanisation, that is, would not interfere with its realisation by members of a university; those that would encourage it, say, by seeking to come to an agreement about its promotion or by offering incentives; and those that would require it on pain of some kind of sanction. Resolving this issue raises tricky matters regarding institutional autonomy and academic freedom, which I only briefly discuss in the conclusion of this chapter.

 But see Lebakeng et  al. (2006: 77), who do advocate ‘jettisoning’ Western perspectives and Murove and Mazibuko who compare Eurocentric standpoints to HIV, a virus that must be eradicated (2008: 104–5), and to a ghost that must be exorcised (2008: 108). Cf. van Wyk and Higgs (2004: 201). 8

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Strong, Moderate and Weak Versions of Africanisation In the light of the above analysis, it is useful to think of the Africanisation of institutional culture along a spectrum of possible manifestations. At one extreme would be a strong or robust form according to which academic norms at South African HEIs should be only African, they should be African along all the dimensions of curriculum, research, language, aesthetics and governance, they should be considered morally required, and ministers and managers should back them up with force. The prospect of this sort tends to terrify white folks (especially ‘liberals’). At the other extreme would be a weak form of Africanisation according to which it would be deemed permissible and hence permitted, but would not be encouraged by the powers that be. Africanisation with regard to curriculum, research, language, aesthetics and governance would be left to the haphazard and voluntary inclinations of particular individuals, managers and institutions. This pretty much described South Africa until FeesMustFall, which had gravely disappointed many black folks (and even liberals!) In between these two poles would be a moderate form of Africanisation. Here, academic and administrative staff would deem it morally ideal or required to Africanise on their own, with line managers facilitating negotiations about, and providing praise, incentives and inspiration for, innovative and promising realisations of it on their part. Universities would reflect carefully and systematically on how they might Africanise along all the dimensions of curriculum, research, language, aesthetics and governance, while minimising costs to other important values, including the need to pay attention to cultural norms springing from, say, Europe and Asia. The moderate form has some intuitive appeal to me and I presume to most readers. However, my major aim in this chapter is to critically explore what good arguments there are for Africanising institutional culture and for which sort. In the end, I conclude that the most promising rationales are ones that entail a moderate form of Africanisation, one that would nonetheless mean substantial change for South African HEIs.

Exploring the Rationales for Africanisation Based on my familiarity with largely South African discussions of Africanisation in higher education, I distinguish five logically distinct reasons that have been given in favour of it and that are relevant to discussion of institutional culture. Recall from the introduction that I capture them under the following headings: relativism, democracy, redress, civilisation and identity. My aim in this section is to specify these different rationales, bring out their implications and explore their plausibility or lack thereof. The five rationales progress in a developmental order, from what I consider to be the least promising to the most.

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Relativism Those who defend Africanisation on the ground that it is a source of ‘valid knowledges’ and similar phrasings often veer into relativist conceptions of truth and justification according to which a proposition is true or a policy is justified if and only if it is socially accepted. Relativism, or constructivism, at the core is the view that what makes something valid is that it is believed to be by a given society. And since beliefs and practices differ from society to society, there is nothing universally valid, or at least nothing that is interesting or controversial. Instead, knowledge and culture generally is appropriate relative to the context in which it originated and continues to be accepted, making African claims true in African societies, so the argument goes. Such a position is suggested by the following: People need to accept that there is no one unique truth which is fixed and found, but rather a diversity of valid, and even conflicting, versions of a world in the making (Venter 1997: 62). Africanisation . . . holds that different foundations exist for the construction of pyramids of knowledge. It holds further that communication is possible between the various pyramids. It disclaims the view that any pyramid of knowledge is by its very nature eminently superior to all the others (Ramose 1998: vi). (T)he assumptions which constructed Western thought, literature and traditions are not universal but are derived from special and discreet Western experiences prescribed by special historical levels of economic and industrial development. Implicit in this perspective is that standards are not universal but contextual (Lebakeng et al. 2006: 74).

In addition, the widely used phrase ‘indigenous knowledge systems’ (my emphasis) seems to imply that what is local is always already true and justified, as does being suspicious about ‘hierarchies of knowledge’ (e.g., Odora Hoppers 2001: 81) and positing ‘equally legitimate locations of human imagination’ (Odora Hoppers 2000: 9).9 As is widely appreciated by epistemologists and other philosophers, but not yet sufficiently recognised by others, most of those who advance relativist conceptions of knowledge contradict themselves in doing so. The above authors are advancing controversial views that they know their readers might not already accept. They therefore are supposing that their thesis that there are equally valid competing perspectives is not itself merely relatively true and instead is a claim that is universally or objectively true, true regardless of whether a particular interlocutor or community recognises it or not.10 Is it not a ‘fixed and found truth’ that there are a ‘diversity of valid, and even conflicting, versions of a world in the making’? Is it not to argue from an ‘eminently superior’ standpoint that ‘disclaims the view that any pyramid

 For additional apparent flirtations with relativism, see Higgs (2006); Nabudere (2006: 20); Murove and Mazibuko (2008: 110). 10  In the South African context, this inconsistency has been noted by Horsthemke (2004: 584) and by Horsthemke and Enslin (2008: 214–5). 9

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of knowledge is by its very nature eminently superior to all the others’? Is it not to appeal to a universal standard when making the claim that ‘standards are not universal but contextual’? If the answers to these questions are ‘yes’, as they implicitly are, then the content of the doctrine of relativism (or whatever doctrine is being expressed) is implied to be false in the very process of advancing it. For most epistemologists, this sort of contradiction or self-refutation is the kiss of death.11 Even if one were willing to bite the bullet and maintain that relativist claims about knowledge can be justified merely relativistically, there would be the additional serious problem of specifying the relevant community’s beliefs relative to which propositions are true. As Africanists themselves repeatedly point out, a large majority of the academic community in South Africa does not hold Africanist tenets. The logic of relativism therefore entails that any proposition in favour of Africanisation is false in relation to that community! Third, and finally, suppose for the sake of argument that Afro-relativists were able to find a way to show that the academic community is not the relevant one that determines which beliefs are true, and that it is instead the broader society that counts. Even so, such a relativist approach to knowledge would give majorities a ‘dictatorship’ about what counts as legitimate knowledge or appropriate culture more generally. Relativism logically implies that minorities are necessarily incorrect in a given context. So, even if from a global point of view there were no way to choose between Western and African epistemologies and cultures, when in an African context the Western or otherwise non-local would have to be considered false and something to be excluded from a university’s institutional culture. This direct implication of relativism is not often appreciated by those who advance it, and does not easily square with routine judgements that some Western perspectives, say, pertaining to physics and chemistry should be taught in South African institutions. If one believes that it is possible for majorities to be mistaken and for locals to learn something from foreigners, that is, if one welcomes fallibilism about knowledge claims, then one must reject relativism, on pain of incoherence. These three objections lead me to conclude that some other basis for Africanising institutional culture should be sought out. Below I argue that there are some epistemic considerations that provide good reason to Africanise a typical South African university. However, those factors involve neither the claim that contextuality determines validity, nor that one can always already know that propositions and practices arising out of a sub-Saharan context are true, justified, valid or the like to a degree equal to those of any other context.

 But for a thoughtful intellectual from South Africa willing to tolerate this sort of contradiction, see Cilliers (2005). Note, by the way, that if the answers to the above questions are ‘no’, then there is no point in having published these works and no reason for someone who does not already accept their views to do so, for they are, ex hypothesi, true merely relative to a given, local context. Hence, another sort of contradiction would be involved in having published them. 11

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Democracy Whereas a relativist approach to culture is roughly the view that what a majority believes about it makes it true and hence to be promoted, a democratic approach is, in contrast, the view that the culture to be promoted is what a majority prefers. Even if majorities do not construct validity as per the relativist, they could still be entitled to determine which objective and universal truths about what exists and how to act are to be transmitted and sought out. Along these lines, one finds the following suggestion: The largest experience in South Africa is the African experience, i.e., the experience of the African people, who form the overwhelming majority of the population of the society. Therefore, it is right and proper that this African experience should be the source of ideas and concepts . . . (Vilakazi 1998: 79).12

The appeal to democratic values in support of Africanising South African universities has not been systematically spelled out, so far as I can tell from the literature. On the one hand, advocates of this rationale could have in mind certain formal, representative procedures. Perhaps they would say that since a majority of the population has voted for the African National Congress in presidential elections, and since the President has chosen a Minister of Higher Education and Training who prefers Africanisation, Africanisation is justified. On the other hand, they might have a more informal, direct sense of how the majority should determine university norms. Maybe what a majority of South Africans want (or would say they want if asked) with respect to academic institutions is what should determine their nature, apart from the views of those whom they have elected. Either way, collective self-­ governance arguably demands infusing South African universities with African norms. Upon reflection, this argument is readily seen to be a poor justification for Africanisation, in the sense of failing to give enough support to what Africanists themselves typically want when it comes to institutional culture.13 Consider that appeal to democratic will supports Africanisation only so long as the majority’s preferences (or those of whom they have elected) favour Africanisation. Majorities, however, can change their minds. For one, it is not obvious that most of those in South Africa in fact favour Africanisation, or would if they had to choose between it, on the one hand, and socio-economic development and jobs for their children, on the other. From what I can tell, the poor and African majority above all sees tertiary education as a ticket to freedom from poverty, and would be delighted if their children learned English well enough to participate in the global economy and bring home the bacon.

 For closely related views, see Makgoba (1998: 46, 51, 2005); Seepe (1998: 64, 65, 68); Dowling and Seepe (2003: 44–5); Makgoba and Seepe (2004: 30, 41); Prah (2004: 103). 13  For additional criticisms of an appeal to majority will to ground knowledge production, see Metz (2009a: 523, 528, 529–33). 12

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Of course, many friends of Africanisation maintain that development can truly take place only in conjunction with mining sub-Saharan perspectives. Here, they often point to the fact that what has made, say, Anglo-American universities strong is that they have drawn on the cultures in their territories. Perhaps something similar would be true of South African universities; maybe they will foster socio-economic improvement only when their institutional cultures are informed by African cultures. But maybe not. It might be that the sort of knowledge produced by Western universities is a function of a certain individualist culture exhibiting a distinct kind of rationalism, viz., one that is competitive, unconventional and literate and that prizes instrumental efficiency and analytic experimentation, which has not been nearly as present in indigenous sub-Saharan settings.14 In any event, the deep point is that an appeal to democratic will holds Africanisation hostage to the contingencies of what majorities want or choose. Suppose that a majority of South Africans did not prefer Africanisation. Imagine, say, that colonisation cut so deep that all they wanted were Anglo-Americanisation en route to economic growth. Surely, Africanists would be inclined to think that the majority should change its mind. That judgement implicitly shows (again, as it did in the context of relativism above) that Africanists are ultimately committed to there being a mind-independent reason in favour of Africanisation, one that majorities should come to appreciate, even if they do not already. The next three rationales for Africanisation that I explore below are more objective in this respect. Instead of appealing to what majorities believe or prefer to try to ground Africanisation, the following arguments invoke considerations that majorities ought to take into account, supposing they do not yet.

Redress One influential argument for Africanisation appeals to ideals of liberation, emancipation, independence, freedom and similar concepts. The idea is that Africanisation is a proper response not so much to contemporary South African society’s beliefs or preferences, but rather more to its history of apartheid, colonialism and related forms of oppression of Africans and black peoples generally. Such oppression was effected not only materially, in terms of, say, the dispossession of land, and politically, with respect to lack of opportunities to vote, hold office and otherwise participate in governance, but also culturally. ‘The colonial and apartheid orders were not simply political and military conquests and systems of governance, but knowledge projects’ (Suttner 2010: 515–16). That is, characteristic African worldviews and ways of life were denigrated and excluded from consideration in many South African universities, part of a process of ‘spiritual genocide’ (Vilakazi 1998: 76),

 On which see sociological discussion of ‘rationalisation’ in the work of Max Weber and the ‘uncoupling of the system from the lifeworld’ in that of Jürgen Habermas. 14

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‘cultural violence’ (Odora Hoppers 2000: 5), ‘symbolic castration’ (Odora Hoppers 2001: 74) and ‘epistemicide’ (Ramose 2004: 156; Lebakeng et al. 2006: 70).15 The present rationale for Africanisation is that promoting it in the context of a university’s institutional culture is necessary to counteract epistemic injustice. Africanisation could serve this function in two distinct ways. First, Africanisation might compensate for harm that has already been done. Africanisation could serve a reparative measure, correcting for epistemological and related oppression done in the twentieth century. Second, though, it might serve as a defensive measure, analogous to the way that an innocent person would fight back against an aggressor. Supposing that teachers and researchers in South African HEIs are continuing to bad mouth African cultures, or, more often, conversationally imply that African cultures are inherently inferior, Africanisation would be a way of protecting Africans from racism, arrogance and related harms. It is worth considering whether Africanisation in South African universities would truly serve the function of paying back those wronged during the apartheid era or before then. On the face of it, only descendants of those wronged, and not those who been wronged in the past, would be the ones to receive the recognition of African perspectives. In addition, it would be a relatively small handful of descendants getting something, namely, those lucky few able to attend an Africanised university. Some other form of epistemic compensation, effected outside of the academy and its expensive books and journals, and directed toward the African public much more generally, instead appears appropriate when it comes to those who were directly wronged by, say, not having been allowed to attend university at all during apartheid. Suppose, for the sake of argument, however, that the university is at least one apt setting in which to adopt and explore sub-Saharan ways of life for purposes of compensation for historical epistemic injustice. Or suppose that a concern to prevent racism in the present, as opposed to compensate those wrongfully harmed in the past, is the relevant basis for Africanisation in South African HEIs. Even so, the logic of the present argument cannot support the kind of Africanisation of institutional culture that most Africanists believe is appropriate. Conceiving of Africanisation strictly in defensive and restitutive terms entails that it would no longer be justified if and when there were no longer such needs. Suppose that Africanisation proceeded for two or three decades or however long it would take to effect compensation, and also imagine that after that time there were also no longer any systematic attacks of the sort requiring a prophylactic. Then, Africanisation would stop being justified, by the present rationale. However, most adherents to Africanisation believe that it should be continued indefinitely, or at least for a much longer time than would likely be needed to end imperial dispositions on the part of South African academics and to make up for damage done. Hence, an additional rationale for Africanisation that would support longer-term

 See also Makgoba (1998: 46–7, 51–2, 58); Nkondo (1998: 33–4); Seepe (1998: 64); Vilakazi (1998: 76); Goduka (2000: 80); Odora Hoppers (2000); Teffo (2000: 106); Lebakeng (2004). 15

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approaches is needed, and is what the last two arguments under discussion promise to provide.

Civilisation A fourth major argument for Africanising the institutional cultures of South African universities appeals to what has been associated with talk of an ‘African renaissance’. The basic idea is that sub-Saharan ways of life should be mined with the aims of revitalising African civilisation and thereby making a contribution to humanity’s progress. What do indigenous peoples know about the uses of certain plants and other aspects of the environment? What beliefs about the workings of nature do they have that are true and justified? How do they characteristically perceive reality, and how might such perceptions inform more theoretical pursuits? What useful skills do they have to build upon and share? What kinds of local painting, sculpture, dance, music, literature and the like would those in other parts of the world appreciate, and what new styles and genres might grow out of sub-Saharan soil? What values have traditional Africans tended to live by or extol that are insufficiently acknowledged elsewhere? What myths, stories and proverbs might be revealing of the human condition or exhibit wisdom and so merit spread on this continent and others? In short, ‘Africanisation seeks to provide a basis for originality and uniqueness that can contribute meaningfully to global knowledge and civilisation’ (Makgoba 1998: 48).16 Unlike a relativist approach to culture, the present argument for Africanisation does not a priori suppose that Africans have equal amounts of knowledge to share when it comes to any given domain such as, say, mathematics or the workings of nature at a small-scale level. Instead, the current rationale urges those in universities to work to empirically establish what sub-Saharan culture has in the domains of the good (values), the true (enquiry) and the beautiful (the arts) that would be of interest to those currently living below the Sahara desert and to those living beyond it. In principle, such a search could come up empty handed in a particular area. That might sound pessimistic, but it is a direct implication of the claim commonly made by Africanists themselves that those in the South African academic community, including many of the Africans among it, lack knowledge about African perspectives! After all, if we are ignorant of them, then we are in no position to pronounce on their merit or lack thereof. That is something to investigate over time. However, since it is reasonable to suppose that any long-standing and widespread tradition has a substantial amount of insight and interesting expression, it is well worth an academic’s time and other resources to explore the African one. That is the compelling argument for multiculturalism, and academics in South Africa have

 See also Ramose (1998: iv); Vilakazi (1998: 69–80); Goduka (2000: 80); Odora Hoppers (2000: 6–7); Teffo (2000). 16

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strong reason to mine the sub-Saharan intellectual tradition in particular, since they have the most ease of access to it and since, in comparison to many other civilisations, this one is grossly under-explored. Note how the logic of the argument from civilisation also differs from that of the argument from redress. Even if academics were no longer actively suppressing African perspectives, and even if compensation for past suppression had been completely effected, the present rationale could continue to justify Africanisation as a way to enrich local culture and to develop Africa’s opportunity to contribute to the civilising process of the human race. To use some philosophical jargon, whereas the argument from redress is ‘non-ideal’, contending that Africanisation is justified merely in response to wrongdoing, the present rationale is ‘ideal’, maintaining that even in the (hypothetical) absence of any wrongdoing, Africanisation would still be justified as a way to promote something of value. In the latter context, one often encounters mention of Africa having a gift that it has yet to present to the world, a view expressed by the South African intellectual Steve Biko (1971: 51). The civilisational argument is strong, and in my view does provide some good reason to Africanise. However, it also has limitations with regard to scope, by which I mean that it fails on its own to justify the range of Africanisation that is typically sought out. Specifically, the present argument provides strong reason for academics to conduct research into sub-Saharan perspectives, to disseminate their findings and to teach them in the classroom. It naturally explains why curricula content and research agendas should be substantially Africanised. However, it is weak when it comes to the other three potential dimensions of Africanising institutional culture. First, in terms of language, while it is of course true that coming to grips with a particular African culture would be best facilitated by an intimate knowledge of its language, it does not follow that this language would need to be spoken on campus from day to day. I accept that teaching in an African language might well help to convey subtleties and more generally enrich the subject matter, but that presumes that South African students themselves have an intimate awareness of African languages, which is often not the case. Furthermore, to best understand Africa, it is not necessarily true that a given African language would include all of the most useful mental tools. It could be that routinely appealing to the words, and the concepts associated with them, that are found in English would (sometimes? often?) be an ideal way to come to grips with a given sub-Saharan object. Consider, for example, scientific analysis of a plant’s medicinal properties that have been appreciated by herbal healers, or an analytic treatment of a moral principle associated with an indigenous proverb.17 Finally, even if using an African language were alone ideal when it comes to teaching and research, there would still, on grounds of civilisation, apparently be little reason, say, to greet people in the vernacular or to strive for the point at which one could realistically conduct a committee meeting in an indigenous language.  To be a bit cheeky, I note that Africanists have invariably published in English. Is part of that because they have found English to be particularly useful when discussing the case for Africanisation? 17

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Second, when it comes to governance, the present considerations do not appear to recommend Africanisation. Insofar as characteristically sub-Saharan modes of decision-making and responding to infraction should be approached by academics on grounds of enhancing and disseminating African civilisation, they should merely be objects of intellectual engagement, not ones of immediate practice. One might reply that a university could be an experimental site where African approaches are tested out. Perhaps. But they could just as well be tested out in other environments, where academics could study the results more objectively. Third, with respect to aesthetics, there appears to be little reason for a university to take on African artistic themes if the ‘principle to be adopted is this: the unique African pattern of development into modernity should base itself, first and foremost, on the utilization of the resources provided by her civilization’ (Vilakazi 1998: 71). Would it not be puffery to suggest that when a university adopts, say, a coat of arms inspired by local indigenous themes (abjuring any Latin phrases) it is thereby ‘developing into modernity’ or showing that Africa can ‘make a meaningful contribution to universal human progress’ (Ramose 1998: iv)? Some readers would be willing to say, ‘It in fact would be doing so, even if in a small way’. However, below I provide what I think is a more compelling reason for a South African university to feature African food, music, symbols, art and the like, one that is not so grand as helping to develop and spread African civilisation.

Identity The fifth and last major rationale for Africanisation that has been salient in the literature can be summed up by saying that Africanisation is necessary to fulfil ‘the right to be an African’, in the South African philosopher Mogobe Ramose’s pithy phrase (1998: vii).18 This phrasing  might seem to imply essentialism about what counts as ‘African’, but it need not. As per above, what is meant by ‘African’ and cognate terms is reasonably understood in terms of properties that are recurrently (not exhaustively, not exclusively) encountered below the Sahara desert. The ability to take on and express an African identity includes three central elements. First, it involves self-understanding on the part of those reared in sub-­Saharan cultures and environments. This means not merely correcting incorrect beliefs about Africa, but also imparting true ones that are not yet held because of a lack of information. Now, to understand who one is means obtaining a firm grasp of one’s society, which has shaped one and will continue to do so. One must therefore become familiar with the values, norms, cultures and institutions of the community in which one lives. In addition, understanding one’s society means knowing how it arose, for

 For similar considerations, see Makgoba (1998: 49, 52); Vilakazi (1998: 85–7); Goduka (2000: 80); Odora Hoppers (2000: 7); Seepe (2000: 134); Teffo (2000); Makgoba and Seepe (2004: 23–7). 18

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to know who is one means knowing how one has arrived at the present and also, in the light of that, what possibilities there are for the future. These considerations in themselves provide good reason to Africanise the curriculum, and to do so with up to date and accurate research. In one of the first major books on Africanising the university to appear, Joseph Ki-Zerbo remarks that ‘Africanization of the curriculum is no more than conformity with the injunction, “know thyself”’ (1973: 26). This consideration would apply not merely to those students fortunate enough to attend classes, but also, ideally, to people more generally, supposing academics took the time to disseminate their findings in ways accessible to the public. There is some overlap, here, with the previous, civilisational argument, but there are important differences. The emphasis on cultivating identity is inward, directed toward Africans themselves, whereas a key part of the argument from civilisation involves an outward orientation of contributing to the world’s order of higher achievements. In addition, a prescription for higher education institutions to enable people to become Africans does not involve merely the discovery and transmission of knowledge. Ki-Zerbo points out that Africanisation of the curriculum would serve a function beyond a cognitive one, namely, it would help when it comes to the emotional side of developing an African identity. He says that it ‘is the first pre-­ requisite for overcoming complexes and attaining self-development’ (1973: 26). I presume that by ‘complexes’ Ki-Zerbo means negative emotions such as shame and self-hatred for being an African, as well as an absence of positive emotions such as pride and self-esteem with respect to that. To truly exhibit an African identity requires feeling good about what is good about oneself and hence about one’s society, history and future, as well as feeling confident to move forward to achieve one’s goals. There is probably a third core element of displaying an African identity beyond the cognitive and the emotive, namely, the active. To be an African means not just exhibiting certain states of mind, but also making certain decisions consequent to them. In this context, one sometimes finds the word ‘authentic’ invoked (for example, Teffo 2000), with the suggestion that for Africans to truly be themselves means making choices based on characteristically sub-Saharan values and norms and in the accurate awareness of local history and society. In the absence of such choices, the personality lacks integrity or wholeness, and is instead incoherent and fragmented. Values and norms must be acted upon in order for one to become a real (African) person. If South African universities had a duty to enable residents to choose to be Africans, then a much larger scope of Africanisation would be defended relative to what the previous two arguments were able to underwrite. Recall that the redress argument entails that no Africanisation would be called for upon the end of racism and the achievement of compensation for epistemic injustice. However, it is plausible to suggest that public institutions such as universities in South Africa would continue to have strong reason to enable people to become Africans, indeed, so long as they continue to be set in an African environment. In addition, remember that the civilisation argument could not easily justify the Africanisation of language,

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aesthetics and governance at a university. However, considerations of identity easily do so; the more characteristically African ways of life that a university adopts, the more opportunity for students and staff and those influenced by them to exhibit an African identity. Notice that the present argument is ‘ideal’ in the above sense that it does not essentially involve the claim that Africanisation is apt in response to wrongdoing. Instead, the heart of the claim is that, given a largely African context, public institutions have some substantial obligation to enable people to become Africans. However, there are a variety of elements that are not African in the South African context. It is not only Africans who have a claim on South African universities to help them realise themselves; those from other cultural backgrounds living here do, too (cf. Suttner 2010: 518). And so while it would make sense for South African institutions to Africanise, the logic of the present argument does not entail that they should do that alone. They should also assist people to become Afrikaners, people of Indian descent and people of mixed heritage, if they should indeed enable people to become Africans.

Conclusion: How to Africanise It is time to sum up what has been established, and to make some brief suggestions about the way forward. In the expository section above, I distinguished five dimensions along which Africanisation of institutional culture could take place, namely, curriculum, research, language, aesthetics and governance. I also pointed out that a South African HEI could exclusively Africanise or do so alongside other enculturation policies. And I further noted that the moral force ascribed to Africanisation could range from permissible, praiseworthy and required, and that, with respect to the use of coercion, managers could permit, encourage or mandate it. What has the evaluative section shown with regard to these different possible forms of Africanisation? Recall that I found the arguments from relativism and democracy to be weak; majorities do not have deep epistemic or moral authority, at least when it comes to the knowledge that a university ought to seek out and the culture more generally it ought to adopt. Much more convincing, I contended, were the arguments from redress, civilisation and identity. It is plausible to think that the proper functions of a publicly funded university include: preventing racism and helping to make up for ‘epistemicide’, mining (South) African cultural heritage with an eye to revitalising and sharing  African civilisation, and providing the conditions that would enable people living in South Africa to adopt an African identity. Even if one doubts that these are ends that would justify the creation of a university in the first place, they are at least ‘attendant’ final ends that a university should adopt, upon having been created for other good reasons (cf. Metz 2009b: 181). Supposing these are indeed proper aims for a South African HEI, it follows that Africanisation should proceed along all five dimensions of institutional culture;

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there is strong reason to Africanise the curriculum, research, language, aesthetics and governance. Of course, to say that there is strong reason does not imply that it is the only reason or even that it is the strongest reason; further argument would be needed to establish something like that. However, at this stage it is reasonable to conclude that a university in South Africa ought to seek to Africanise as much as it can while paying due regard to other important and competing values. With regard to the extent to which enculturation ought to be African, the answer is clearly that it should not solely be. The arguments in favour of Africanisation do not justify such a strong form of it, at least given the current diversity of South African society. The redress and civilisation arguments, however, do entail that, at least for a number of decades, Africanisation should receive the lion’s share of attention. Finally, with regard to implementation, one should conclude that Africanisation of institutional culture is a moral requirement, at least given the redress argument and probably the identity argument. I find it a bit harder to say that universities are morally required to develop African civilisation, although I naturally believe that it would be desirable for them to do so. Now, if Africanisation is indeed a moral requirement, may deans, DVCs and ministers require it? That difficult question is left unanswered by the analysis in this chapter. To conclude, as I have, that academics and administrators ought to Africanise does not settle the issue of whether they should be forced to do so if they do not on their own. Africanists often suggest that the reasons non-Africans will not Africanise is that they are racist and arrogant, but that is not the most common reason in my experience of white colleagues in South Africa. Insecurity and fear are more salient. In any event, the difficult question about the extent to which academic freedom and institutional autonomy are consistent with Africanisation19 and about how to make trade-offs among them where they are not20 must wait for another occasion.21

References Adeyemi, M.B., and A.A.  Adeyinka. 2003. The Principles and Content of African Traditional Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 35 (4): 425–440.  See Metz (2011: 50–5) for some prima facie reason to be hopeful about their compatibility.  For those who clearly favour substantially sacrificing other, ‘liberal’ values for the sake of Africanisation, see Murove and Mazibuko (2008). 21  An earlier version of this chapter initially appeared in Being at Home: Race, Institutional Culture and Transformation at South African Higher Education Institutions, edited by S. Matthews and P. Tabensky. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2015, 242–72. It is reprinted here with the kind permission of the UKZN Press. Although quite a bit more literature has appeared in the wake of the 2015/16 student protests, I submit that the main arguments given for Africanisation (or for what is now often called ‘decolonisation’) will fit within the framework (of relativism, democracy, redress, civilisation, and identity) discussed here. 19 20

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Chapter 10

Africa’s Knowledge and the Quest for Epistemic Liberation in a COVID-19 Crisis Munamato Chemhuru

Introduction The crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic has posed serious challenges not only to public health-care systems (See, Cordeiro-Rodrigues and Ewuoso 2021: 5), but also to global knowledge production, particularly the African knowledge paradigm. Africa’s capacity for knowledge production has somewhat been revisited and put to test in the ensuing search for knowledge solutions to COVID-19. Interestingly, for reasons mostly to do with colonialism and coloniality (See Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2021), African knowledge and in particular indigenous knowledge of African medicines has continued to lag behind other global knowledge paradigms. Although Horsthemke is writing in the pre-COVID-19 era, he sees “the denigration, suppression, and exploitation of traditional knowledge systems during and after colonialism” (Horsthemke 2017: 585) in Africa. These perceptions have also contributed to the neglect, suppression and negativity about African knowledge in the crisis caused by COVID-19. Yet, in this crisis we have witnessed COVID-19 vaccines as some of the fastest developed vaccines after the mumps vaccine which was previously considered the fastest ever developed vaccine as it took four years to be developed and approved for use (Akpan 2020). However, COVID-19 was a game-changer for vaccine development as it only took less than a year for most of the Western countries to quickly develop, approve and roll out its vaccines. Nevertheless, African indigenous knowledge in the same time of COVID-19 continues to be mostly facing the challenge of being labelled as ‘unproven’ medicines. These contradictions have a M. Chemhuru (*) Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_10

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bearing on the status, and continued neglect and somewhat suppression of African knowledge which is largely lacking in the response to the COVID-19 crisis. Hence my quest for the need for the epistemic liberation of African knowledge. In this chapter, I mainly argue why African indigenous knowledge is in need of epistemic freedom (See Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018) so that it could also contribute to, and add on to the “pluriversity and ecologies of knowledge” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020: 4) in the world. This question of epistemic freedom of African knowledge arises because of some doubts that are commonly expressed about African knowledge in terms of its authenticity and its possible contribution to current problems and global epistemology broadly. According to Horsthemke, “a question that remains largely unaddressed is whether the ideas of indigenous knowledge, science, and technology make any sense” (Horsthemke 2017: 585). While I will address this question in the affirmative, I also grapple with the problem of how the denial of African epistemology and indigenous knowledge in times of a pandemic like COVID-19 might disempower them. For example, Masaka thinks that “indigenous people of Africa ought to take control of the production and nurturing of some of the knowledge that they will consume in the future if they are to attain the liberation that they seek” (Masaka 2021: 1). This view, for Masaka, is important because there is a very close connection between knowledge and power (Masaka 2021: 1) such that the denial of knowledge to a people is as good as epistemic conquest through disempowering them. Ndlovu-Gatsheni also makes the observation that “today Africa is saddled with knowledge that serves to disempower rather than empower individuals and society” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020: 35). I therefore provide a nest of reasons to show how the denial of African indigenous knowledge in times of a pandemic like COVID-19 might also contribute to epistemic conquest and disempowering of the indigenous African people and argue why African indigenous knowledge ought to be taken seriously especially during times of a pandemic like COVID-19. I show that even prior to European modernity, colonialism and coloniality (See, Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni 2020), African indigenous communities appealed to indigenous knowledge in advancing the well-being of their societies and their worldviews. So, the search for remedies, medicines or vaccines for COVID-19 through African indigenous medicine could be part of the appeal to their traditional knowledge. Such an appeal “could effectively enable them to produce power that yields epistemic liberation that they envision” (Masaka 2021: 1). Epistemic liberation, especially in the area of medicine is important considering the weaponisation and commercialisation that usually goes with medicines. It is a fact that COVID-19 is still a new disease that is posing new epistemic and epidemiological challenges to both academics and epidemiologists alike. Excitingly, the search for possible vaccines for it is proving to be a success story worldwide. This is despite some of the challenges associated with distributive patterns between the rich and poor countries, and the scepticism that some may have regarding the vaccines themselves. At the time of writing this chapter, there is a substantial number of COVID-19 vaccines that have so far been developed and are already in use in

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different countries across the world. However, in this breakthrough, African indigenous knowledge is largely lacking, ignored or silenced due to continued epistemic arrogance, epistemic universalism and epistemic colonisation by the dominant Western knowledge producers or through what Ndlovu-Gatsheni sees as “epistemic and ideological trickery” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020: 1). African indigenous knowledge is thus, mostly ignored and denied because it is constructed “outside the confines of the epistemological order of the dominant culture” (Masaka 2021: 2). It is therefore worth noting that most of the vaccines developed so far were developed in countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, America, Russia, China and India, and intriguingly with the exception of Africa. It is even worse because most African indigenous medicines have been quickly dismissed as ‘unapproved medicines’. Yet among the different vaccine candidates developed so far, there equally continue to be a lot of scepticism and politics concerning their efficacy and possible side effects among other issues. Although I may not have the scientific expertise to venture into the area of African indigenous medicine in particular, I will philosophically consider some of the epistemic attitudes, insinuations and conclusions that have been characteristic of African indigenous knowledge and medicine in the COVID-19 crisis. Helen Lauer sums up similar epistemic perspectives as follows: “The self-promotional rhetoric generated by Western scientific cartels sustains the pretence that Africans require foreign technical wherewithal and initiative to meet their development goals” (Lauer 2017: 606). This explains why African knowledge about indigenous medicines is quickly dismissed as ‘unapproved’. However knowledge produced in the West, i.e., Western medicine is enthusiastically acceptable at the expense of African indigenous knowledge and medicines. I will therefore analyse this kind of an argument from hypocrisy in order to deal with “the historic enmity which polarises African and non-African knowledge traditions, reinforcing myths which retard the synthesis of scientific advances in postcolonial societies” (Lauer 2017: 506) such as Africa. Yet knowledge should be taken as culturally specific (Emeagwali and Shizha 2016: 7), in terms of how it ought to be produced and ultimately utilised. The chapter divides into three sections. In the first section, I consider the catastrophic situation that is created by the advent of COVID-19 since the end of 2019, and argue why it is necessary to approach it as an emergence. In the second section, I analyse the irony in the Western epistemic paradigm with regards to the newly discovered vaccines for COVID-19. In this section, I question the sincerity of denying African indigenous knowledge on the basis of it being ‘unapproved’ yet knowledge from the West, i.e., the newly discovered vaccines are quickly embraced despite them not having stood the test of time. In the third section, I then highlight some of the African indigenous knowledge approaches that have so far been denied epistemic legitimacy. I give reasons and argue why there is need for epistemic liberation in Africa.

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The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Medical Emergency The novel coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) was first discovered towards the end of 2019 in Wuhan, a province of China before quickly spreading to other parts of the world from early 2020. According to Luís Cordeiro_Rodrigues and Cornelius Ewuoso, “COVID-19 first detected towards the end of 2019 was an unknown disease to humanity so far, albeit it is part of the family of already known virus, the RNA viruses, such as SARS and MERS” (Cordeiro-Rodrigues and Ewuoso 2021: 5). In addition, because COVID-19 seems to be much more contagious and deadlier than other previously known respiratory diseases such as SARS of 2003, it quickly spread across the whole world in the first part of 2020, and was declared a pandemic by the World health Organisation by March 2020 (See WHO 2020). The reason why it was declared a pandemic (as implied by its nomenclature) was its potential, and eventually an actuality to spread and affect the whole world. From its Greek etymology, the word ‘pandemic’ comes from two terms, pan meaning ‘all’ and demos referring to ‘people.’ (See, Honigsbaum 2009). In view of this etymological understanding, Honigsbaum notes that a pandemic “is commonly taken to refer to a widespread epidemic or contagious disease throughout the whole of a country or one or more continents at the same time” (Honigsbaum 2009). Although there have been many pandemics recorded in human history such as Spanish Flu, SARS, H7N2, Ebola, Zika (See, Honigsbaum 2009), especially in recent years, except for the 1918–1919 Spanish Flu, other previous pandemics have not been as devastating as COVID-19. This is why I make reference to it as a medical emergence because of the way and extent to which it has impacted on human health, healthcare systems and world economies. With regards to its impact on healthcare systems, the COVID-19 pandemic could be described as a catastrophe. It is a catastrophe because when it started affecting the world, there was no specific epistemic, medical or emergence response plan that was in place for it. However, disaster planning and preparation remains an ethical matter that is mandatory (Zack 2009: 59). Nevertheless, it is difficult to have proper disaster preparedness for diseases like flues and respiratory diseases like COVID-19 which always mutate, prompting challenging to vaccine development, coupled with limited medical infrastructure for such unforeseen challenges. For example, at the pick of any of its waves, “the number of infected people tends to out-strip available resources like personnel, ventilators, ICU beds, protective gear, and physicians’ time” (Cordeiro-Rodrigues and Ewuoso 2021: 5). These effects are even corroborated by the number of statistics of morbidity and mortality from the pandemic so far. For example, by the end of June 2021, is has infected nearly 200 million people and claimed almost 4 million people worldwide (John Hopkins University 2021). These statistics have culminated in new epistemic challenges that human beings, particularly medical professionals have never imagined before. Some of these challenges include, but are not limited to the lack of medical infrastructure, the allocation of medical resources (See Cordeiro-Rodrigues and Ewuoso 2021: 5), knowledge about the handling of COVID-19 patients, and those that would have died, etc. In

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addition to these effects on healthcare systems, there are also a multiple of other normative and economic implications which COVID-19 has had, and continues to have on humanity and on world economies respectively. This situation is even made worse by the fact that, so far, not much knowledge exists about the pandemic since it is new and hence no cure has been found for it so far. Besides, it seems scientifically not possible that a cure can be found in the near future because COVID-19 is a viral disease. Until now scientists are almost in agreement that no viral diseases can be medically treated except to prevent them through vaccines which have just started to be rolled out throughout the world, or at least through some other means of containing the detrimental effects of the viral diseases like the way HIV/AIDS has so far been managed through antiretroviral therapy. Nevertheless, while there seem to be some hope in the number of vaccine candidates that have so far been developed and already in use in different countries, there also seem to be new epistemic challenges posed by the virus mutations that are being reported from time to time in different countries. These viral mutations present challenges of potentially rendering knowledge so far developed about how to contain it redundant. Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has literally brought the whole world to a standstill since early 2020. Although some countries have now been able to loosen some lockdown restrictions on some social activities, businesses, educational activities, work, travel and leisure among others, it is not yet clear whether, how and when the ‘new normal’ will really come to an end so that human beings can actually return to normal live without some restrictions, social distance requirements and wearing of masks. It seems that humanity is still in the midst of a crisis and because no real solution has so far been found. In addition, “since any pandemic will occur in different waves, over a period of months” (Zack 2009: 63), similarly the COVID-19 pandemic continues to affect the world through different waves in different countries and regions. As a result, this is forcing some countries to revert back to lockdowns and implement different forms of restrictions and other approaches to curtail it. This explains why Tangwa and Munung look at Africa COVID-19 and Africa’s relation to epidemics and come to the conclusion that COVID-19 “has affected individuals, different countries and regions of the world equally in some senses and differently in other senses” (Tangwa and Munung 2020: 1). This is why people have attempted to appeal to their indigenous medical wisdom differently in order to respond to that emergence. Instead, human beings ought to be aware of their indigenous and home-grown knowledge and approaches in order to respond to, and solve practical problems that they face.

The Irony in Western Knowledge Because of the emergence situation that is presented by COVID-19, the quest for new knowledge production becomes central. However, there appear to be some salient epistemic battles in that quest, especially between the Western and the

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African knowledge epistemic frontiers which I am mainly focussed on here. I consider how the Western knowledge paradigm tries to exclude, or at least control other epistemic traditions, and in particular, the African epistemic tradition in the quest for new knowledge in a time of crisis. Yet, paradoxically, Western knowledge might also face the same sceptical scrutiny that the African knowledge paradigm is facing. Although these epistemic struggles have a long history which I cannot exhaust in this chapter, I will mainly focus on how they can be understood within the COVID-19 crisis and why epistemic freedom ought to be a fundamental virtue in such a crisis. The main problem with Western knowledge is the claim for universality and the disrespect for other non-Western knowledge paradigms. While such Western knowledge claims universality, it also falls short especially within the context of COVID-19 because it has not also managed to provide a permanent solution to it. In the various responses to COVID-19, even if vaccines have so far been developed by different players and most have been approved for use mainly by the World Health Organisation based on their purported efficacy and safety, still they have not yet stood the test of time such that we can consider them with certainty to be safe. Alfred Jules Ayer’s principles of verification which he used in determining the meaningfulness of propositions might perhaps help us to appreciate my argument around whether new knowledge about vaccines developed so far can withstand the test of whether they are safe or not in the long run. Ayer’s criterion is mostly used in the verification of propositions in terms of whether they can be accepted as either meaningful or not (Ayer 1935) by making a distinction between strong verifiability vis-à-vis weak verifiability and practical verifiability vis-à-vis verifiability in principle. Interestingly Ayer settles for weak verifiability and verifiability in principle as the most appropriate ways to arrive at meaningful propositions. This is almost a similar approach used in making conclusions about whether new knowledge about vaccines so far developed could be verified as safe or not. So far, such conclusions about the safety of vaccines developed so far are based on some kind of weaker form of verification and verification in principle as we lack practical and strong verification criterion for determining their safety because we are not yet in the future. For example, with reference to the strong and weak form of verification, Ayer argues that “a proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is verifiable in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable” (Ayer 1935: 6). Similarly, it is not possible to be conclusive about the new knowledge of vaccines developed so far because it is probable for experience to render such vaccines so far developed unsafe, i.e. over time. At the same time, we lack the actual or practical means of putting ourselves as human beings in the future where we could then judge the eventualities of any of the vaccines developed so far. This is why they have been accepted in principle, and not in practice. Accordingly, Ayer argues that “propositions about matters of fact, which we could not verify even if we chose; simply because we lack the practical means of placing ourselves in the situation where the relevant observations could be made” (Ayer 1935: 6). In this regard, we therefore accept the safety of vaccines in principle, and not in practice because we lack practical means to verify our future. Overall,

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from these observations, it is apparent that there is still a lot of ongoing experimentation, trial and error in the fight against COVID-19 such that the appeal to African indigenous knowledge might be taken as other experimental efforts aimed at coming up with either knew knowledge, vaccines or possibly cure for COVID-19. Interestingly, with reference to the use of African indigenous medicines, a statement by the World Health Organisation on the 4th of May 2020 states that: WHO recognizes that traditional, complementary and alternative medicine has many benefits and Africa has a long history of traditional medicine and practitioners that play an important role in providing care to populations. Medicinal plants such as Artemisia annua are being considered as possible treatments for COVID-19 and should be tested for efficacy and adverse side effects. Africans deserve to use medicines tested to the same standards as people in the rest of the world. Even if therapies are derived from traditional practice and natural, establishing their efficacy and safety through rigorous clinical trials is critical (WHO 2020).

From this statement, it is interesting to note that the WHO prefers to acknowledge the existence, role and importance of indigenous African knowledge about traditional medicines. However, what is fascinating is the attempt to then make such African traditional and indigenous knowledge to conform to what are then considered as the ‘universal’ standards of knowledge. Accordingly one can take Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni’s view that, “Eurocentric epistemology actively worked and continues to work as the primary and active enabler of the planetary European hegemony” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020: 2). Yet such purported ‘universal’ standards are just Euro-­ American standards of knowledge. This approach could thus, be looked at as the universalist fallacy in Western approaches to knowledge because by being traditional and indigenous to African society, such medicine ought to be tried and tested within that indigenous context using similar indigenous frameworks for evaluating such knowledge. This view resonates with Emeagwali and Shizha’s observation that “scientific knowledge, in whatever form, definition and cultural context it may exist, is found in all societies. Each society has its own way of categorising and labelling types of knowledge” (Emeagwali and Shizha 2016: 6). Understood this way, therefore, African indigenous knowledge of medicine deserves some form of epistemic respect and freedom rather than looking at it using what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2021) sees as the “colonial cognitive” perspective. The suggestion in the WHO statement that such medicines need to be tested for efficacy and safety does not suggest that such tests are to be done by Africans themselves using their own indigenous knowledge. Rather, it gives the impression that African traditional knowledge should undergo tests and verification using other non-African or Western tools in order for it to be authenticated as proper for use. Yet the status of African traditional knowledge and medicine could just be taken as the status of knowledge about current vaccines in use across the world. This is because African traditional knowledge of medicines has actually been tested in terms of efficacy and safety by its own traditional practitioners within their own context just like vaccines that have been developed in different epistemic contexts such as in China, Russia, India, America and Britain. According to Emeagwali and Shizha, “African indigenous science is embedded within the larger body of knowledge

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constructs that constitute African indigenous knowledge systems” (Emeagwali and Shizha 2016: 6). Similarly, the denial of African indigenous medicines is a good as the denial of African knowledge at large. Thus, one could therefore be justified in taking Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s argument that “the Eurocentric perspective urges Africa to imitate and emulate Europe and North America in the search for liberation and development” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020: 4). By implication, the statement by the WHO for the need for African indigenous medicines to be tested, it is meant that such medicine ought to match the Euro-American standards. In the context of the pandemic, the problem with the Western approaches to knowledge is the attempt to universalise epistemic knowledge around vaccines and medicines, a view that is incompatible with not only African knowledge, but with other non-Western knowledge paradigms. At the same time, what is fascinating is that so far, despite Africa’s wealth of indigenous medicines, most of which were being appealed to as possible ‘cures’ for COVID-19, the African continent has so far not developed a vaccine in that respect. It is even worse when mostly African indigenous attempts at traditional medicine are quickly labelled as ‘unapproved’ medicines. One then wonders whether it might be really the lack of technological advancements or some other political problems that are characteristic to Africa in its quest for epistemic liberation.

 ppeal to African Indigenous Knowledge and the Quest A for Epistemic Liberation Having highlighted the severity with which COVID-19 has so far impacted across the world, as well as the irony in Western knowledge shown by its claims for universality above, I now proceed to show why indigenous African communities ought to  appeal to indigenous knowledge  and methods. This is despite the fact that these  have come to be known as ‘unproven’ methods and medicines in the fight against the disease. I give some reasons why African communities might be justified in the use of such indigenous knowledge, methods and medicines. I appeal to some philosophical arguments why indigenous and mostly poor sub-Saharan African communities appeal to African indigenous knowledge and medicines not only during times of a pandemic, but as a way of life. In the end, I argue why the epistemic freedom of such indigenous African approaches to medicine is a necessity for the health and development of the African people. The effects of COVID-19 such as its high morbidity and mortality have somewhat put humanity in desperate situations than never before. Especially in African communities, in the search for what could perhaps help them either to prevent contracting COVID-19, to lessen its symptoms and effects, or to possibly treat it, a lot of people have appealed to some alternative medicines from their indigenous knowledge and cultural heritage. For example, in the midst of the first wave in April 2020, the president of Madagascar attracted a lot of international attention and criticism

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when he officially launched a herbal medicine that is prepared from the Artemisia plant, COVID-19 Organics (CVO). This indigenous medicine is alleged to reduce and eliminate symptoms of COVID-19 (Tangwa and Munung 2020: 4) as well as other flue-related ailments. From the international attention, particularly the criticism and scorn that eventually followed not only on the use of Artemisia, but other African indigenous medicines and remedies, one can easily see the lack of readiness to accept African indigenous medicine and African knowledge. Yet, somehow, “the greatest number of deaths from the epidemic have been recorded in countries with the most advanced healthcare systems” (Tangwa and Munung 2020: 2), such that epidemiologists ad scientists ought to be more focussed on finding out whether this is a result of use of indigenous knowledge and medicines in Africa. However, Horsthemke makes an important observation that “indigenous knowledge, African ways of knowing, etc. have been rejected, ignored, undervalued or colonised – that is, exploited for Western (Northern) ends and purposes” (Horsthemke 2021: 38). The lack of respect and denigration of African indigenous medicines is fascinating because the appeal to indigenous science broadly is not something new as such. Emeagwali and Shizha note that “Africa’s indigenous ways of knowing and knowledge did not begin with the coming of Western knowledge systems and neither should their future depend exclusively on Western and other worldviews” (Emeagwali and Shizha 2016: 7). Similarly, African indigenous science has always been an important aspect of African epistemology, and it includes its ethno-­ medicine, ethnobiology, ethno-zoology and ethno-psychiatry (Horsthemke 2017: 588). It is these indigenous scientific approaches that African indigenous knowledge finds its footing in, and appeals to, in approaching medical knowledge from an indigenous perspective. Whether these approaches are successful or not with regards to COVID-19, that is an argument that could be pursued elsewhere. However, one could justify the quest for epistemic liberation of African knowledge and the appeal to African indigenous medicine using a number of reasons, some of which I spell out below. It is a fact that most sub-Saharan African communities are so poor to the extent that they have always been appealing to, and continue to appeal to African indigenous knowledge and medicines in times of illness and other pandemics which have been part of African history (Tangwa and Munung 2020: 1). Such communities cannot afford what are seen as ‘modern’ or rather non-African healthcare facilities and medicines which are far more expensive than indigenous medicines. For example, even if hospitals and clinics are available in some of these countries, they do not have the adequate personnel such as physicians, leaving people with no option than to seek indigenous medical practitioners and their indigenous herbal medicines which are easily and freely available. In 2013, the World Health organisation reported that “the ratio of traditional health practitioners to population in Africa is 1: 500, whereas the ratio of medical doctors to population is 1: 40 000” (WHO 2013: 2). It is even worse when it comes to facilities such as ventilators which are very useful in the management of people who are seriously affected by COVID-19. For this reason, it is clear that poor African communities have no option when it comes to healthcare and medicine, than to seek what is easily, available in the form

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of indigenous methods of managing illness like COVID-19 through indigenous medicines. Otherwise discouraging and denying them the use of their indigenous knowledge and medicines is as good as denying them epistemic freedom. Related to the above view, another reason to think seriously about African indigenous knowledge as opposed to Western knowledge in time of a crisis like COVID-19 is the emphasis on commercialisation and patent protection of knowledge in the Western world. This is opposed to African indigenous and largely communitarian approaches to medicine that are mainly informed by unhu/ubuntu. According to such a view, the individual can only say that “I know because we know. Or, a knower is a knower because of other knowers” (Horsthemke 2021: 38). This communitarian and largely humane view of knowledge contrasts with the individualistic and capitalistic conceptions of knowledge and medicine in the Western tradition. In the Western epistemic tradition for example, Ian Barker observes the following: “…huge swathes of medical research rely on commercialisation and related patent protection in order to thrive. In the United Kingdom, the government seems keen to encourage entrepreneurial universities; I would argue that medical research has become too skewed in favour of commercial enterprise” (Barker 2015: 2841). As a result, little attention is put on ethical consideration and what the ultimate purpose of medicine ought to be. However, this is in contrast to approaches in indigenous medicine in Africa where traditional knowledge about medicine is orally and socially handed down from generation to generation freely as implicit from Horsthemke’s (2021: 38) view above. In contrast, one of the major tools of epistemic colonisation throughout the world and particularly in Africa has been the commercialisation of knowledge, (Western knowledge to be precise) on the indigenous people, at the expense of their home-grown and practical knowledge paradigms. Similarly, the commercialisation of medical knowledge of vaccines while denigrating indigenous African knowledge and medicine in a time of a pandemic like COVID-19 is deliberate and contrary to epistemic freedom in Africa. In addition, since COVID-19 is a medical emergence that has caught the whole world unprepared for it, the appeal to traditional indigenous medicines is at least a better alternative to the highly commercialised Western medicines. Thus, it would be worth taking Tangwa and Munung’s view that “Africa’s eagerness in the midst of this pandemic is to seek alternative healthcare approaches that are different from those of the industrialised world systems, which is often trapped in the unholy marriage between medicine and the capitalist open market” (Tangwa and Munung 2020: 5). What this also means is that, vaccine development specifically in the Western epistemic world is big-business. Vaccine research is no longer only about the quest for saving human lives only, but also about who will eventually control the ownership and/ patents and ultimately income from the developed vaccine. Taken from another angle, one might therefore argue that the regulation and control of African indigenous knowledge of medicine could also be understood as part of the agenda of coloniality in post-colonial Africa by the Western world. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni sees it, coloniality involves “the expansion of racist logics which enabled inimical processes of enslavement, racial capitalism, colonial domination, heteronormative patriarchal domination and their perpetuation into the present” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni

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2020: 4). So, discouraging and denying the use of African indigenous medicines and remedies becomes part of the agenda of coloniality and where African communities ought to continue to be second order in terms of knowledge production so that they also continue to rely on Western knowledge. The Western world’s lack of willingness to accept, develop and use African indigenous medicines is so far clear. This reluctance is evident in lack of support for research and development of African indigenous medicines despite the promise of such medicines. For example, although the Madagascar COVID-19 Organics showed a lot of promise, prompting South Africa and the World Health Organisation to express readiness to support the carrying out further scientific research, “the apparent hesitancy by pharmaceutical and funding agencies to support scientific research and clinical testing of herbal medicines, compared to the enthusiasm to fund hydroxychloroquine trials, is a further indication that Africa’s research priorities will continue to be side-lined in global priorities for drug and vaccine development” (Tangwa and Munung 2020: 5). Although Africa might lack the capacity for setting up clinical trials (at least in the Western sense) for its indigenous medicines; that may not be taken to mean that such indigenous medicines are not effective. The problem that African indigenous knowledge faces is that of epistemic colonisation where the West is not only reluctant to support African indigenous knowledge, but that it also seeks to suppress and even dismantle it. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “colonilaity of knowledge is useful in enabling us to understand how endogenous and indigenous knowledges have been pushed to what are now understood as ‘the barbarian margins of society’” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2020: 35). According to this view, African indigenous knowledge is construed as peripheral and primitive in order to dislocate it from the purported ‘universal’ canons of knowledge. It is not that such knowledge is peripheral, but that it is a strategy to just relegate marginalise and exploit African knowledge. This is why Horsthemke observes that, “indigenous science or ethno-science has traditionally and historically been victimised, marginalised, or exploited for the sake of colonialist promotion of occidental science” (Horsthemke 2017: 588). It is therefore not surprising that within the crisis of COVID-19, African indigenous knowledge has been doubted, suppressed and denigrated before it was put to serious test. Overall, it must be emphasised that African indigenous medicines are a product of African epistemology, or part of the African epistemic tradition. So, to appeal to African indigenous knowledge is to also appeal to African epistemology. Just as any tradition appeals to its own epistemic tradition in coming up with knowledge that can help it in solving problems that society faces. Even in its 2013 report, the World Health Organisation gives a definition of indigenous medicines that is based on this understanding of traditional knowledge. According to WHO, “the sum total of the knowledge, skill and practices based on the theories, beliefs and experiences indigenous to different cultures, whether explicable or not, used in the maintenance of health as well as in the prevention, diagnosis, improvement or treatment of physical and mental illness” (WHO 2013: 1). From this view, it therefore follows that traditional or indigenous knowledge is specific to a certain locality or situation. In other

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words, such knowledge is local and situated within a given context (See Horsthemke 2017: 588). However, the above view should not be understood to mean that African local or indigenous knowledge should not conform to the objectivity standards of knowledge. Although the universalist approach to knowledge has somewhat been monopolised by Western epistemic colonisers who think that Western approaches are the universal standards, there should be a way in which all knowledge could objectively conform to certain universal standards which are not necessarily Euro-American standards. Of course there is a worry commonly expressed about “indigenous knowledge discourse tending towards an implicit or explicit endorsement of relativism (both about knowledge and about truth)” (Horsthemke 2021: 39). However, this should not be a problem because all knowledges have localness, despite sharing objectivity (Horsthemke 2017: 589). Accordingly, the localness and objectivity of African indigenous knowledge ought to be respected so that African epistemology can also contribute to its own as well as to global epistemic discourse.

Conclusion One can see that COVID-19 has largely exposed Africa. It is clear that African knowledge paradigms face some form of epistemic colonisation such that African knowledge producers, especially indigenous knowledge producers ought to have the task to decolonise and liberate it from what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020): 2) sees as the “European game”, which mainly revolves around Eurocentric epistemology’s universalist claim. Even in terms of medical research, such a European game is evident because, despite the medical emergence that the world finds itself in due to COVID-19, African indigenous knowledge claims and approaches to medicine have lately been quickly dismissed as unscientific and unapproved. All this is done in order to force Africa to continue to accept the view that Euro-American epistemology is the salvation to human liberation and development. Thus, the project of epistemic liberation is far from over in Africa considering the continued suppression of African indigenous knowledge as I have tried to show here. Of course, my argument should not be taken to imply that all African knowledge claims constitute knowledge. Acknowledgements  This research was fully funded by the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung/ Foundation.

References Akpan, N. 2020. Why a Coronavirus Vaccine Could Take Way Longer than a Year. National Geographic: Science. Downloaded from: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/why-­coronavirus-­vaccine-­could-­take-­way-­longer-­than-­a-­year#close. Date Retrieved: 15 June 2021.

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Ayer, A.J. 1935. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Penguin Books. Barker, I.A. 2015. Has the Commercialisation of Medical Research Gone Too Far? International Journal of Research in Medical Sciences. 3 (16): 2841–2843. Cordeiro-Rodrigues, L., and C. Ewuoso. 2021. A Relational Approach to Rationing in a Time of a Pandemic. The Journal of Value Inquiry.: 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-­020-­09782-­x. Emeagwali, G., and E.  Shizha. 2016. Interconnecting History, African Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Science. In African Indigenous Knowledge and the Sciences. Journeys into the Past and Present, ed. Gloria Emeagwali and Edward Shizha, 3–11. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Honigsbaum, M. 2009. Historical Keyword: Pandemic. The Lancet. 373 (9679): 1939. Horsthemke, K. 2017. Indigenous (African) Knowledge Systems, Science, and Technology. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy, ed. Adeshina Afolayan and Toyin Falola, 585–603. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2021. Epistemological Issues in African Higher Education. In African Highre Education in the 21st Century: Epistemological and Ethical Perspectives, ed. Ephraim T. Gwaravanda and Amsa P. Ndofirepi, 38–56. Brill.: Leiden. John Hopkins University. 2021. John Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Centre. Downloaded from: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/. Date Downloaded: 30 June 2021. Lauer, H. 2017. African Philosophy and the Challenge of Science and Technology. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy, ed. Adeshina Afolayan and Toyin Falola, 606–620. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Masaka, D. 2021. Knowledge, Power, and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa. Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy.: 1–12. https://doi.org/10.108 0/02691728.2021.1882607. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2018. Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization. New York: Routledge. ———. 2020. Decolonisation, Development and Knowledge in Africa: Turning Over a New Leaf. New York: Routledge. ———. 2021. The Epistemic Revolution for Epistemic Freedom in Africa. Africa Knows Bock Post. Retrieved from: https://www.africaknows.eu/the-­epistemic-­revolution-­for-­epistemic-­ freedom-­in-­africa/. Date Downloaded: 30 June 2021. Tangwa, G.B., and N.C. Munung. 2020. COVID-19: Africa’s Relation with Epidemics and Some Imperative Ethics Considerations of the Moment. Research Ethics. 16 (3–4): 1–11. WHO. 2013. Traditional Medicine: Report by the Secretariat. Downloaded from: https://apps. who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB134/B134_24-­en.pdf. Retrieved: 11 March 2021. ———. 2020. WHO Supports Scientifically Proven Traditional Medicine. Downloaded from: https://www.afro.who.int/news/who-­supports-­scientifically-­proven-­traditional-­ medicine?gclid=Cj0KCQiAs5eCBhCBARIsAEhk4r5aYXh-­W 5vJqdbAWGQime-­ SdD0uX11W8deSp73aFrSzliTQ6sfLdw0aAlb-­EALw_wcB. Retrieved 8 March 2021. Zack, N. 2009. The Ethics of Disaster Planning: Preparation vs Response. Philosophy of Management. 8 (2): 55–66.

Chapter 11

Religiosity and African Epistemology Jonathan Mzwazi and Sibiziwe Shumba

Introduction Throughout the world there is an increasing appreciation of indigenous knowledge systems as a resource in national development efforts but sadly few African academics have realized the value of indigenous knowledge IK). Crossman’s studies (2004) have revealed that most African academics view cultural knowledge negatively. Consequently, university pedagogies and instructional techniques lack grounding in authentic African world-views or paradigms. Warren (1991) defines indigenous knowledge as the local knowledge that is unique to a given culture or society, whereas Flavier et al. (1995) view it as the information base for a society which facilitates communication and decision–making. These two definitions provide a useful lens for understanding the importance of indigenous knowledge as both a critical platform and data base information for decision making. Recent literature has identified critical functions of IK in the survival and sustenance of traditional institutions and technologies. The World Bank Report (2010) provides useful insights into the critical functions of indigenous knowledge. Some key ones are as follows: First, IK constitutes a basic component of a country’s knowledge systems as it encompasses the skills, experiences and the insights of people, to sustain and improve their livelihood. More so, IK has been a major source to global knowledge due to its intimate understanding of the local environment. The medical and veterinary sciences have benefited immensely from the contributions of IK. Together with this, IK constitutes a significant aspect of the lives of poor people. Hence, survival for the poor is dependent upon specific skills and knowledge. In view of this IK has

J. Mzwazi Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe S. Shumba (*) Joshua Mqabuko Polytechnic College, Gwanda, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_11

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been identified as underlying survival strategies in respect of animal husbandry and veterinary science, management of natural resources, preventive medicine, community development and poverty alleviation (World Bank 1997). Similarly, the World Bank Report (2010) pointed out the following advantages of IK. First, IK provides the basis for problem-solving strategies for local communities especially the poor. It also improves understanding of local conditions and provide a productive context for activities designed to help the poor. The sharing of IK can help cross-cultural understanding and promote the cultural dimension of development. In addition to that, understanding IK can increase responsiveness to clients. Last, integrating IK into assistance programs of the World Bank and its partners can effectively reduce poverty. Other researchers have underscored the role of IK in sustaining the ecological environment (Nakashima and Roue 2002). Nakashima and Roue’s studies have revealed the following benefits to ecological preservation and balancing. They posited that IK constitutes the mainstay of food production and health care in developing countries. It even guides the decisions of small-scale farmers who represent 70–90% of agricultural producers and more than 60% of the population. It is estimated that more than 80% of the population fulfill their primary health needs through the use of traditional medicines. On the African continent, Igweala (2003) has identified useful functions of IK in the economic, social and curriculum sectors. These include the fact that IK is a community and community biased research. It is a source of healing in the context of unhealthy imbalances, trivialization and neglect as inflicted by Eurocentric education governance. Economically, IK has proved its viability and strength in the informal sectors. Many of the agents and agencies associated with the informal sector or second economy tap into the accumulated skills and expertise of indigenous knowledge systems, and in the business realm, IK African business. The methods are people-centred, placing people above the product. Similarly, other writers have proposed the adoption of IK to resolve the African crisis (Bell 1986; Nnoli 1998). According to these two writers, IK should be regarded as a driving force in socio-economic transformation and development of Africa. Bell (1986) asserts that cultural traditions and practices constitute a crucial role in mediating the material relations, the social processes and institutional interventions. In the same vein, research studies on the utilization of IK among artists and migrant workers in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively, have reported on the motivational aspects of cultural knowledge.  Kaya  & Seleti  2013 and Lalonde 1991 have reported on positive functions of indigenous knowledge systems in mobilizing, defending and inspiring African communities towards self-­ preservation and defense in challenging environments. Whereas the literature reviewed above has been useful in providing insights into IK as a major resource for sustainable practice and community development, there has been very little study in respect of the anatomy or essence of IK in African contexts. Most classification schemes on forms of human knowledge have largely been conducted in respect of

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Western knowledge systems (Hirst 1965; Marimba Ani 1994). Hirst (1965)’s classification of human knowledge appears to be a justification of the liberal academic curriculum in secondary schools whereas Ani’s (1994) analysis of western-oriented knowledge system seems to have been motivated by the desire to explain the hegemonic cultural and political tendencies among western-oriented education systems. Against this backdrop, this chapter seeks to unravel the essence or foundational principles underpinning indigenous knowledge systems of the African people. The Karanga sub-ethnic group of the Shona people of Zimbabwe was used as an example. Why? All this was done to highlight some insights from the AIK of the Karanga people as a representation of some African religiosity and epistemology. The study was also limited to the Karanga group in Mberengwa district of the Midlands Province in Zimbabwe for these other important reasons. First, the Karanga people are a sub-ethnic group of the Shona people who constitute about 80% of the population in Zimbabwe. The Karanga share common cultural beliefs and values with the other sub-Saharan ethnic groups. Second, the Karanga people of Mberengwa district are unique in terms of their cultural diversity and continuance in traditional practices despite the ascendancy of Christian religious practices in the public domain (Mswazie and Shumba 2008). Mberengwa district is also unique in the sense that it is an intersection or a melting pot of different cultural traditions, the dominant ones being Shona and Ndebele cultures. However, due to the proliferation of mining communities such as the Buchwa Iron Mining Company, Inyala Chrome Mine, Sandawana Emerald Mine and Vanguard Asbestos Mine, a significant population from other minority ethnic groups now constitute the Mberengwa cultural milieu which may provide useful sources for studying living traditions. Third, and more importantly, one of the writers is privileged to have been raised by a traditional leader whose court sessions and deliberations provided useful insights into the practical utilization and dynamics of indigenous knowledge. More importantly, the writers have been privileged as both teacher educators and university lecturers, to have gained some meaningful insights into traditional modes of knowledge production and utilization. This chapter initially examines the amazing marvels and inspiring technological achievements flowing from ancient African cultures or civilizations as expressions of indigenous intellectual heritages. These intellectual heritages are articulated in unparalleled achievements in the sciences, mathematics and philosophy or seba but more concretely, the existing edifices and monuments such as the Great Pyramid of Cheops in Egypt and Great Zimbabwe-the stone city in Zimbabwe. The second section examines modes and repositories of Karanga, a subgroup of the Shona ethnic group in Mberengwa district. These modes and realms represent key aspects of Karanga indigenous institutions that seem to be the mainstay of Karanga cultural in the context of mainstream Western-derived knowledge systems. The section below examines some of the legacy of indigenous intellectual resources in the broad African context and for which Karanga culture is also part of the cultural mosaic.

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I ntellectual Legacies and Marvels of African Cultures or Civilizations African civilizations as epitomes of African cultures have made immense contributions to humanity but these contributions have not been properly acknowledged in mainstream academic discourses. The research literature seems to suggest that only a very small group of African scholars is aware of the contributions and influence of African cultures to humanity. Biblical evidence indicates that Egypt was not only the granary of the ancient world during trying times (Genesis 42: 1–2), but was also the nursery of great religious founders such as Moses (Exodus 2: 10) and Christ (Matthew 2: 13–14). More significantly, prominent Greek philosophers ventured to Africa to study. The list of Greek visitors who were tutored by priest-scholars of Africa is quite impressive. It includes among others Plato, the father of Western philosophy; Aristotle, the mentor of Alexander the Great, Pythagoras the mathematician; Democritus, the Greek philosopher who developed the atomist theory of matter (Moktar 1990; Asante and Abarry 1996). According to Asante and Abarry (1996), both Thales, the first Greek philosopher and Isocrates recorded in their annals that they came to Egypt to learn philosophy and medicine respectively. Research studies by Diop (1974); Asante and Abarry (1996); Karenga (1996); Obenga (1996) Gyekye (1996) and Runoka (2010) among others have begun to throw light on significant contributions of African cultures’ contributions to humanity. As Diop observed, “African-Egyptian civilization is the distant mother of Western cultures and sciences, most ideas we call foreign or European are often nothing but mixed up, reversed, modified, elaborated images of the creations of our African ancestors”. Archeological and scientific studies have reported that ancient African civilizations to the north, south, east and west outshone Europe in the fields of medicine, chemistry, physics, agriculture, geometry, philosophy, religious administration, record keeping, architecture and engineering and technology (Davidson 1978; Nadoury 1990; Moktar 1990; Horton 1996). Below is a brief summary of some of the achievements of ancient Afro-Dravidian civilizations gleaned from the literature.

 orth and North East African Civilizations N (Nilotic Civilizations) Egypto-Meroeitic /Nubian civilizations excelled in the following fields. First, it excelled in medical science. For instance, the mummification of bodies and surgery in ancient represents the highest forms of chemistry and anatomy studies. Equally remarkable is the fact that Hippocrates (460–377 BC), father of medicine, was given access to the medical library of Imhotep at Memphis. In Astronomy, the Egyptians developed and invented the 365-day calendar, charted the skies, and invented water clocks. Moreover, in building and architecture, the Great Giza Pyramid which is 238 m long and 138 m high symbolized the height of technological inventions.

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In addition to this, there is precision building and the utilization of mathematical concepts of geometry, as illustrated in stone cities like Engaruka (Tanzania), Great Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe) and Mapungubwe (South Africa). Furthermore, there is an aspect of writing and paper technology. There is actually high culture of writing, literature, art and design. This developed writing systems-hieroglyphic and meroitic. This also invented the alphabet which was borrowed later by the Greeks (Nadoury 1990: 109–116). Along with this, there is developed iron working. Meroe was regarded as the “Birmingham” of ancient Africa. In line with political organization, the Meroitic political system chose leaders through an election. Four women became Pharaohs. There is also agriculture, engineering and technology. There is also the invention of the sakya, a wheel which can lift water three to eight meters with much less labour and time, and the Nilometer, a device used to gauge the extent of Nile floods and for forecasting crop harvests for tax purposes. Together with this, there is spinning and weaving. Cultivation of cotton led to the invention of looms and workshops. Through industry and manufacturing, they invented large quantities of artisan objects used in metal work. In carpentry and jewellery, for example, they developed the pull saw and glassmaking. In the area of civil engineering and international transport, there was a construction of the 80 km canal from the Nile to the Red Sea, construction of the Nile barges and the construction of the 13 km oldest known paved road constitute great feats of human ingenuity. On religions and moral conceptions, there was a development of a coherent view of the world-ecocentrism, manifesting itself in the myths, rituals, language and works of wisdom namely proverbs, idioms and riddles.

East Coastal Civilization A number of achievements were made by the East Coastal Civilization. First, it established and built stone cities with an international outlook. Prominent ones include Mogadishu, Malindi, Mombasa, Kilwa and Sofala. In 1498, Vasco da Gama came upon busy ports, splendid towns, rich traders, experienced pilots and seamen. At Malindi, ibn Majid-an Arab pilot guided the Portuguese to India. Ordinary citizens were engaged in many crafts, fisherman, fruit-growers, shipbuilders, masons and metal works, and Kilwa was the chief centre of the gold and ivory trade. There was also urban town planning and sewage management as well as articulation of the dharma and ahimsa concepts.

Great Zimbabwe Civilization This is renowned for stone architecture, gold production, ivory trade, crop and cattle production. The Great Enclosure wall is only second to the Great Pyramid in terms of majesty. Extensive trading networks made Great Zimbabwe one of the biggest

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trade centers in the medieval period. As a political center, the population was believed to have reached 18,000 inhabitants and this makes it one of the largest cities of its day (//manuampin-com.Great Zimbabwe. A history almost forgotten. Retrieved 6 May 2018).

Harrapan/Indus Valley Civilization According to Runoko Rashid, very few people know that “…more than a thousand years before the foundations of Greece and Rome, proud and industrious black people known as Dravidians erected a civilization with major cities spread along the course of the Indus valley.” (Rashid 2008). Remarkable achievements were made by the Dravidian civilizations. For instance, planned cities comprising a citadel for the aristocracy and a lower town for the common people as well as houses provided with paved baths were made. More so, there is also elaborate drainage systems and bathrooms with flushing toilets, and strict enforcement of municipal laws ensuring cleanliness. The brief summary above clearly indicates that indigenous societies had the intellectual capacities and resources to develop stable socio-economic and political systems that would foster enabling environments for sustained development over extended periods of time. The building of the Great Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe, a world heritage site, is believed to have taken place from the 11th to the fourteenth century, a clear indication of socio-economic stability and effective intergenerational communication. More importantly, indigenous civilizations invented learning systems that were capable of sustaining durable eco-centric principles and practices. Indigenous people worldwide had also the wisdom and foresight to develop psycho-social strategies for managing and controlling human greed which has, in contemporary times, left humanity on the brink of self-destruction. In view of this, this study seeks to analyze conceptually and practically African epistemologies which have been sustained to serve the Africans against the onslaught and hegemony of globalization forces of contemporary times. Some of the insights were also drawn from the Karanga, a sub-ethnic group of the Shona people as a representation of some African religiosity and epistemology.

Realms of Indigenous African Epistemologies In order to bring out some insight from the African religiosity and epistemology seven realms and modes of African indigenous knowledge are examined. These are namely (1) cultural/religiosity; (2) rituals and ceremonies; (3) ethnic/kinship; (4) magic; (5) ethics; (6) practical wisdom, and (7) taboos. Navigating and penetrating these realms empowers and equips one to communicate meaningfully in a familiar diction. The following sections examine each category in greater detail.

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 frican Cultural Thought and Religiosity: The Superglue A and Ideological Core of African Thought and Practice The word African thought and religiosity literal means the way of life of the black people as contrasted to white people. Conceptually, it refers to an African paradigm or world-view of interpreting phenomena. Practically, it denotes actions which are consistent with African orthodox or religious tenets called Chivanhu by the Karanga. Chivanhu as a way of life of the Karanga can be contrasted with Chirungu, meaning way of the whites or Europeans. Chivanhu permeates every aspect of the traditionalists in terms of explaining and interpreting natural and social phenomena such as disasters or unexpected fortune. At the centre of this world view is the belief in the existence of a supernatural world populated by both benevolent and malevolent spiritual forces. These beliefs seem to endure tribulations and other cataclysmic events. As reported by other researchers, the triple challenges of colonialism and racism could not suppress or eradicate religiosity or the sacred lore of the Karanga. In the same vein, Afro-centric scholars have traced the source to survival of African communities in the diaspora and on the African continent to the utilization of core principles and values embedded in the sacred lore (Karenga 2009; Wiredu 1992). Religiosity or the sacred lore manifests itself in African cosmological views, ethics, economic production and social interactions. For both Mbiti (1996) religiosity permeates every aspect of African people’s mindset across all aspects of human endeavor. Religious or sacred principles and values are embedded in all dimensions of social life - in undistorted African wisdom philosophies, world views, principles, ideas and experiences of the African people. The Karanga culture constitutes part of the African cultural mosaic. Hence, the liberation war in Zimbabwe was shrouded in religious rituals and symbolism (Ranger 1991). Below are some of the expressions and manifestations of Karanga religiosity which coincides with those of Africans on the continent and those in the Diaspora. The following ideas, concepts and principles, gleaned from the literature, are regarded as having been influential in sustaining and inspiring black peoples’ struggles for justice and survival under slavery and colonialism. First, there is Nguzo Saba (the seven principles). Nguzo saba principles articulate African Americans’ struggle for freedom, rebuilding community and contribution to a new history of mankind (Karenga 1996:543). There is also Quilombismo. This is an African Brazilian’s web of associations, brotherhoods, clubs samba schools, secretive societies and military communities that facilitated the defense and protection of their economic, social and political organizations. Quilombist struggles still exist throughout the Americas (Nascimento 1996:511). There is also the concept of Chimurenga which deals with cultural mobilization and resistance to foreign hegemony. This is Zimbabwean people’s socio-cultural struggles against colonial and racial domination. Maat (Universal justice and truth) is another aspect. Maat is the underlying current that connects all things in an intricately woven network. It signifies universal order, honesty, fairness, righteousness, patience, and cool-headedness. It echoes the Lord’s Prayer and the Muslim sharia or submission to the will of God

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(https://egypt.idolhands.com/maat/intro.html; http://www.msu.ed/ghoshss/maat. htm). There is also personhood (onipa; ubuntu; utu; unhu;). According to Wiredu (1992:104), personhood is not an automatic quality of the individual, it is something to be achieved, the higher the achievement, the higher the credit. Furthermore, there is Eco-centrism, which is an ecological philosophy used to denote a nature-centred as compared to human-centred values (www.answers.com/ topic/ecocentrism). Eco-centric ethics assert that earth not humanity is the centre of life. Humanity is just another subservient part of the earth. Dharma (moral duty), denotes that a person is morally obliged to receive or give assistance to members of the kinship and ethnic groups. Ahimsa (interdependencies among animate and inanimate things), means that humans communicate and live-in harmony with nature, communities regard certain animals, forests, pools and forests as sacred that should not be abused or misused. To sum up, African cultural thought and religiosity as a mode of knowledge and cultural innovation among the Karanga is articulated and expressed in the concept of African indigenous knowledge. This type of knowledge as both philosophy and practical guideline, has provided the African communities in Africa with psycho-social anchorage for coping with the vagaries of human existence. The next section examines another critical knowledge domain in the African world.

 frican Rituals and Ceremonies: Repositories A of Psycho-­Social Cathartic, Cleansing, Restorative and Renewal Knowledge The term African ritual and ceremonies literally means the numerous rituals that are conducted by the Africans to purge or cleanse the land, groups of people or individuals of their misfortunes. Among the Karanga this is called zvikaranga. Death, suicide, murder, unemployment, chronic illness and outbreaks of diseases are some of misfortunes which prompt the African people to seek the assistance of a diviner to pin point the exact nature and appropriate ritual to remedy the situation. The regularity and frequencies of ritual ceremonies among the Karanga, for example, normally increase in times of socio-economic turbulence in the community and is indicative of the precarious existence of the most households in Mberengwa. The ritual ceremonies are expensive in terms of material resources required, expenses to be paid to religious specialists in terms of consultations and the like. Despite the cost, poor people sink into debt in order to fulfill ritual requirements. Sacred rituals constitute the most profound knowledge domain in African communities. Malinowski in Frazier (1975) identifies the sacred rituals as the repositories of the most critical knowledge upon which the survival of the ethnic group depends. The custodians and dispensers of ritual knowledge among the Karanga are, as in the ancient days, cultic priests (mbonga), prophets (vauki) and spirit mediums (masvikiro) Kaarsholm 1991; Ranger 1991). Today in Mberengwa, these cult leaders

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continue to dispense their invaluable knowledge to a captive market of comprised of politicians, corporate managers, senior civil servants soccer clubs and players (Zvomuya 2011) in Mail and Guardian 14–20 October. Their expert knowledge is regarded as indispensable in planning, organizing and cleansing of communities with different misfortunes (Chavunduka and Ranger in Kaarsholm 1991). The following are some of the key functions of cultic professionals and ritual experts. First, there is preservation of the natural environment by preserving ecological behavior as well as political control by being involved in the election of the chiefs. There is also mobilizing, leading, organizing or supporting resistance movements. More so, there is exercising, legitimizing control over new religious groups and movements such as healing cults and witchcraft eradication movements.

 inship/Ethnic Relations: Repositories K of Interactive Knowledge African kinship/ethnic relations are shown in ethnicity; kinship; totems; marriage and age-sets. Social interactions among the Africans are intimately regulated by relationships. Knowledge of one’s relationship is crucial in defining one’s behavior, roles and obligations to other members of the community and outsiders within African religiosity and epistemology. This is called ukama by the Karanga. In line with this, knowledge of one’s relationship is critical among the Karanga in two subtly ways. First, the language register one uses is determined by the relationship one has with the other person. Therefore, good behavior is defined in terms of use of an appropriate language register. Second, the greeting and respect system among the Karanga, for example, operates on intimate knowledge of relational hierarchies in the community. Normally, young people greet their elders first and ask for their health. However, if a younger person’s relationship is located in the kinship system to the status of a “fathers”, then the elderly person is the one who should greet first the younger person. These writers enjoy such a status in their kin group and it took them a long time to appreciate this kind of honor. Furthermore, ethnic identities and kinship ideologies constitute another critical knowledge domain. Ethnicity provides important guidelines for navigating inter-and intra-personal relations in traditional societies. Positive functions of ethnic and kinship ideologies include a number of aspects. First, there is the provision of a basis for the organization against domination. There is also a provision of a historicity necessary for understanding inter-­ group relation as well as a basis for adaptation to the uncertainty and insecurity caused by the rapid changes and proving security to their members. Along with this, there is mobilization of populations in promoting community development in rural areas of Africa e.g., Harambee projects in Kenya, and pressurizing and demanding justice for their members (Guy and Thabane 1991; Mhlaba 1991; Nnoli 1998, Mustapha 1998).

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Critical Reflection on Ethnic Knowledge Whilst ethnic knowledge provided psycho-social support in pre-and post-colonial society, it has also proved an albatross around the development of the modern state in Africa. Ethnic knowledge has given birth to corruption in the form of nepotism and regionalism. The media is awash with cases where managers in parastatals and public institutions have promoted and employed their relatives in influential positions. The emergence of entrepreneurs is strongly linked to ethnic relations. Similarly, the tentacles of ethnic fueled have pervaded academic institutions whereby the promotion system is based on ethnic ideologies and associations. Cases of students being awarded degree certificates have been widely reported in the media. Similarly dubious promotions have been made to undeserving people on the basis of ethnic relations. In summary, ethnic and kinship relations among the Africans constitute a social compass which provides guidelines for meaningful social communication and appropriate behavioral and social relationships. Karanga children, for example, brought up in urban areas are often regarded as uncouth because they lack this knowledge. Similarly, outsiders usually cannot make headway because they often lack an intricate social knowledge and understanding of ukama. In the broader social context, understanding the nature of ethnic knowledge would be essential in breaking inter-ethnic barriers, forging intergroup unity and relations and in mobilizing national development efforts.

 agical Knowledge: The Bedrock of Social Power, Control M and Domination This type of knowledge is exercised in medical science, sorcery, witchcraft, divination and exorcism. Magical knowledge is of paramount significance in African epistemology. The term gona in Shona refers to a powerful enabler or charm. In African belief, it refers to both benevolent and malevolent magic formulas used by traditional medical practitioners in healing or harming other people. Among the Africans, medical practitioners are loathed and loved at the same time. They are loathed because once you become their client, they will not let go a client who consults them or because they may abuse their charms to bewitch people they envy. However, they are also loved because they are experts in diagnosing, curing and warding off evil spirits. More importantly, they are consulted in all cases related to misfortunes in the family and community. Magical knowledge is the least understood domain in African as well as Karanga culture. Witchcraft as well as magical beliefs and practices constitute one of the most influential and enduring aspects of Karanga culture, hence the need to be vigilant by keeping strategic stocks of protective charms to ward off malevolent forces. However, Gmelch’s (1997) studies have revealed widespread use of magical practices in sport worldwide. In American Baseball League, Gmelch identified three types of magical practices namely, rituals, taboos and

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fetishes, an indication that the human psyche is enthralled by the occult. In the same vein, the existence of secret societies to which even some world leaders belong, is an indicator that the occult has a firm grip on the human mind. There are a number of positive functions of magical knowledge identified in the literature which coincide with those of the Karanga. For instance, witchcraft practices in the form of threats, curses and poisons curb unbridled ambition and arrogance, enforce social conformity, settles scores, and provide grounds for terminating relations. Witchcraft accusations act as safety valves for accumulated social frustrations. Magical practices provide assurances in sports, love, health and promotional prospects at work (Guy and Thabane 1991).

Critical Reflection on Magical Knowledge The wide spread beliefs and practices have held most African societies to ransom in several respects. First, beliefs in practice have been exploited by lazy workers to intimidate their superiors. Conversely, underperforming managers have shielded their incompetence by exploiting these practices to intimidate and threaten. In sport, some African teams have performed badly in competitions because of their over dependence on magical powers. In this regard, one North African team performed badly in the soccer world cup because they trusted in the coterie of magicians they had assembled. To conclude, medical practitioners among the Africans like the Karanga, are believed to possess mystic powers and magical knowledge which enable them to deal with both physical and spiritual ailments. In view of this, the majority of villagers seek their services at critical times in their lives. The prevalence and influence of magic beliefs and practices in Karanga cosmology makes a compelling case for the inclusion of socio-cultural and psycho-social research an imperative in post-colonial African countries.

 frican Local Wisdom: The Intersection of Evaluative, A Problem-Solving and Experiential Knowledge African local wisdom connotes practical wisdom rather than individual genius or intelligence. This type of wisdom is found in oratures, fables, folktales; drama, music, poetry and proverbs. Among the Karanga this type of wisdom is called ungwaru. In Karanga folklore, wisdom is articulated in the actions of kamba, the tortoise which is always slow to act but is always effective in resolving knotty problems in the community. In Karanga folklore, individual genius is symbolized by the actions of the hare which is always depicted as crafty, cunning, manipulative and shrewd. Individual genius is less valued than wisdom because the Karanga believe that it contributes little to social stability and sustainable relationships. In this

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regard, the Karanga regard the acquisition of wisdom as the ultimate goal of a learned or civilized person. Practical wisdom or problem-solving knowledge among the Karanga community, as in other African cultures is largely caught than taught (Fafunwa 1974). It is largely articulated and contested in proverbial sayings and legal contests at the dare (indigenous courts or assemblies). Symbolically expressed in Shona folklore kamba (The tortoise) and gava (The wily fox), wisdom knowledge is largely acquired through experience, imitations and observations. Wisdom is also inferred or acquired from legends, folktales, riddles, competitive games and play. Fafunwa (1974:20–49) has unveiled key principles that underpin the acquisition of practical wisdom and they include some of the following. First, there is character development through cooperative effort among members of the child’s immediate family and members of the extended family participate. There is the development of intellectual training through proverbs, riddles and tongue twisters. There is a development of respect for elders which is a respect for those in is expressed through language registers and the greeting system. More so, there is development of physical skills: through playful exercise, imitative play and physical games, the African child developed physical, intellectual and social qualities.

Critical Reflection on Local Wisdom Local wisdom as praxeology can be equated to utilitarian or Mode 2 knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994). Mode 2 knowledge is applied within local contexts and constitute one of the pillars of indigenous knowledge systems. Without mastering this knowledge, one cannot relate and navigate indigenous communities meaningfully. Many urbanites are often a subject of derisions by their rural counterparts because often when they retire or are dismissed from work, they do not have the resources to sustain them. Whereas, urbanites look very prosperous and successful, most times they beg their relatives to assist them when employment has ended. Local wisdom is undoubtedly, one of the key resources in marginalized societies. In summary, the Africans of Mberengwa value and prioritize the acquisition of practical wisdom or problem-solving knowledge over and above substantive or propositional knowledge. Wisdom is the trademark of a cultured or civilized person. In view of this, many highly degreed persons who do not display wisdom in their decision-making or lifestyles are despised and not taken seriously in the community. For instance, a university professor who does not possess substantial property in the community is regarded as a rombe (vagrant) despite his/her intellectual prowess). The next section looks at the content of instruction delivery systems in African communities.

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 acred Oaths/Vows/Initiation Rites: The Cornerstone S of Instructional Delivery System The sacred oaths relate to promises and pledges sworn under-oath and are conducted at secret sites or in initiation schools. These are called mhiko among the Karanga. Violating sworn oaths invite curses and initiates rarely breach them throughout their lives. Serious educational content i.e., life-coping knowledge and skills are imparted in initiation schools by means of secret oaths, vows and ritual ceremonies. Initiation methodologies among the Karanga of Mberengwa as among other African groups entail, ritual ceremonies, secret oaths and sacred rites that invite curses and misfortunes for those who breach them. They are at the centre of important professions such as mentorships and apprenticeships to master craftsmen such as traditional medical practice and metalwork. Trainees spend long periods away from the public, in most cases not less than 5 years for some professions like medicine and divination, learning from their mentors. Initiates or trainees are subjected to strict discipline and rigorous training. Initiation methods are exclusively utilized in critical phases of life such as puberty and in readiness or anticipation of a marital life. Another instructional delivery approach is based on the concept of socialization. Socialization methodologies and delivery systems among the Karanga, for example, focus and emphasize the acquisition of appropriate social knowledge and skills on-site whereby the young assimilate moral values and attitudes are acquired through participation and engagement in social activities. Through observation, imitation and listening, children and young adults acquire the norms and moral values of their community. The duty for socializing the young belongs to the whole community and age is a significant factor in delivering the instruction. Senior age groups to those below them up to the level of family households where senior siblings assume the role of tutors in the absence of parents. In summary, the Africans have devised methods for delivering instruction and imparting life coping skills and knowledge. The more serious educational knowledge and skills are shrouded in secret vows and oaths, whereas public domain is delivered through participation, observation, simulation and prescription.

Ethical Knowledge: The Yardstick of African Virtues Within African epistemology, humaneness is acquired through various communal prescriptions and ethical codes. In the context of social relations, concepts of blood kinship take precedence over friendship. Perhaps this is the root of the practice of African nepotism. A Karanga proverb has this to say on relations: “ Chawawana idya nehama, mutorwa une hangamwa”, meaning literally, “Whatever you get, eat with your relatives, an outsider easily forgets ”. In this regard, the totemic system is a major tool for measuring and determining social distance. Similarly, the African concepts of brotherhood, sisterhood, manhood, womanhood, fatherhood and

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motherhood are utilized as guidelines for building community solidarity and acceptable behavior. For instance, a brotherhood and sisterhood in Karanga relate not only to your siblings but members of the community and extended family who occupy the same position in the social hierarchy, the climate of love, patience and tolerance that should exist among peace-loving families and communities as it should be among siblings, cousins and nieces. Similarly, fatherhood and motherhood relate to the ideal of responsible adults. In this case, ethical knowledge called unhu in Karanga language, constitutes the ethical and moral framework for developing and accessing respected persons in the Karanga community. Similarly, African concepts of justice and fair-play constitute the other building blocks of the ethical system. For example, the Karanga justice system stipulates that a thief should repay twice what has been stolen. A murderer is not sentenced to death but should repay and replace the life he/ she has lost. Human life should be respected at all times. To this end, members of the family or kin group should restrain their members from committing murder because in the Karanga justice system makes members of the kin group accountable for their members misdeeds. In environmental affairs certain specified trees, plants and animals cannot be exploited without authorization. Violating rules invites religious sanctions. The ethical codes and prescriptions were intended to sustain and maintain order and stability in African communities. Despite the growing secularization of African communities due to western influences, these ethical beliefs and practices remain prevalent and influential in Africa. Honesty, respect, humility and modesty still remain the guiding ethical principles of African communities.

 aboo Knowledge: The Socio-Ecological T Regulatory Mechanisms In line with African epistemology, taboos refer to those entities that are out of bounds to humans or those actions that are considered ritually polluting. Most of the taboos are at the intersection of nature and humanity. Joseph Osei (https://jsd-afrca. com>. Accessed 27 Sept 2018) has this to say on African taboos: “The taboo system was the main source of bonding in all human relations and transactions in traditional societies”. Similarly, Cassier (2005:106), views the taboo system as the cornerstone of the whole social order. Taboos apply and influence all aspects of human endeavor. Osei (2006) identifies the following functions of taboos in African societies of which Karanga is a part. There is a moral and ethical code of ethics. In this case, taboos serve as a point of reference in determining law-breakers and in the adjudication of ensuing cases at the traditional court. There is also an aspect of rational/scientific explanations. Taboos constitute rational solutions to problematic issues. They represent valuable scientific or rational explanations relevant for improving social life. Based on the collective experiences and wisdom of wise elders, taboos constitute rational and practical guidelines in social life. Below are some of the taboos and their scientific bases.

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First, there is incest taboos. In this case wise elders knew that incest is responsible for hemophilia and other debilitating birth defects as the gene pool within the family is corrupted by in-breeding. The environmental taboos regulate the ethical use of the environment in view of its resources and sustainable development. Preventive medicine taboos are intended to promote and protect human health. For example, no sex in the bush is intended to prevent rape or promiscuity, whilst the taboo that forbids talking while eating is intended to prevent choking. Together with this there are economic taboos. These were designed and developed to manage productive and distributive systems. They include among others, the following aspects namely the cutting down of certain fruit and timber trees; changing of farm boundaries; stealing; as well as farming in wetlands and destroying sacred forests. Birth control taboos were developed to ensure that humans did not overpopulate the carrying capacities of their local areas resulting in conflicts over scarce resources. Among the key family planning taboos are the following: sex with a teenager before puberty is taboo. This taboo is intended to preempt and prevent teenage pregnancies. It is taboo to have sex with a woman during her menstrual period and after child birth: The scientific explanation for this taboo has to do with preventing infections and allowing women to recuperate physically and emotionally from the stresses of child –birth. Personal safety taboos were designed to prevent acts such as murder and committing suicide. Committing murder and suicide constitute very serious offences in all African societies. In view of this, stiff ritual punishment befalls upon any member and his/her community who engages in these offences. To conclude, the African epistemologies can be classified into several categories as highlighted above. However, those pertinent to socio-political interaction are namely (1) cultural knowledge; (2) ethnic knowledge; (3) local wisdom. These three constitute the main cultural constructs, frames and filters through which innovative projects are either approved and validated or resisted and rejected. epistemology has evolved. They are deeply entrenched and have evolved over countless generations. A deep understanding of these African epistemologies is a prerequisite for effective mobilization of indigenous communities in development efforts.

Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter sought to unpack the nature and application of African indigenous knowledge in real contexts of Africa. It set to analyze conceptually and practically African epistemologies which have been sustained to serve the Africans against the onslaught and hegemony of globalization forces of contemporary times. It actually sought to unravel the essence or foundational principles underpinning indigenous knowledge systems of the African people. To achieve that the chapter initially examined the amazing marvels and inspiring technological achievements flowing from ancient African cultures or civilizations as expressions of indigenous intellectual heritages. These intellectual heritages are articulated in unparalleled

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achievements in the sciences, mathematics and philosophy. The second section then chronicled modes and repositories of Karanga, a subgroup of the Shona ethnic group in Mberengwa district as a representation of some African religiosity and epistemology. The chapter revealed that the African indigenous knowledge is complex and expressed through various modes and dynamics of social settings which outsiders may not appreciate and understand. Against a background of indigenizing discourses of the education system in post-colonial African countries, this chapter recommends a systematic study and classification of indigenous forms of knowledge. This would constitute a critical step in documenting accurately knowledge forms that will resonate with diverse ethnic groups and which would as a result, enhance inter-cultural communication and national development efforts. It is hoped that scholars and African countries seized by this concept of indigenization of their education systems will utilize taxonomies of African knowledge forms as a platform for gaining deeper understanding and insights into the local knowledges of indigenous communities.

References Ani, M. 1994. Yurugu: An African Centred Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior. New Jersey: Africa World Press. Asante, M.F., and A.  Abarry, eds. 1996. African Intellectual Heritage. Book of Sources. Philadelphia: Temple University.  Cassirer, E. 2005. Sembolik Formlar Felsefes 2. Mtik Dusunme , (M.Korkturk, Trans) Ankara Turkey . Hece) Crossman, P. 2004. Perceptions of Africanisation or Endogenisation at Africa Universities: Issues and Recommendations. In Volume II. Knowledge and Society, ed. P.T. Zeleza and A. Olukoshi, 319–340. Universities in Twenty-First Century. Davidson, B. 1978. Discovering Africa’s Past. London: Longman. Diop, C.A. 1974. The Origin and Histories of the Black World. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Fafunwa, B. 1974. History of Education in Nigeria. London: George Allen &Unwin Ltd. Flavier, J.M., L.J. Slikkeerveer, and D. Brokensa. 1995. The Regional Program for the Promotion of Indigenous Knowledge in Asia. In The Cultural Dimension of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems, ed. J.M.  Warren, Brokensa Slikkeerveer, and D.  London: Intermediate Technology Publicans. Frazier, A. 1975. Critical Thought and Religion. In Issues in Religion, ed. A. Frazier. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Gibbons, M., C. Limoges, H. Nowotny, K. Schartzmannm, P. Scott, and M. Trow. 1994. The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage. Gorjestani, Nicholas, M. 2010. Indigenous  Knowledge for Development: Opportunities and Challenges. https://documents.worldbank.org. Retrieved 20 October 2020. Gmelch G. 1997. Baseball Magic. https://meissinger.com>gmel. Retrieved 20 October 2020 Guy, J., and M. Thabane. 1991. Basotho Miners, Oral History and Workers’ Strategies. Harare: Baobab Books. Gyekye, K. 1996. The Idea of African Philosophy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hirst, P.H.  1965.  “Liberal  Education and    and the Nature of Knowledge”, in the book Philosophical Analysis and Education. Routledge

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Horton, B.A. 1996. Africa as the Nursery of Science and Literature. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.http://egypt.idolhands.com/maat/intro.html. Retrieved 20 November 2021. http://www.msu.ed/ghoshss/maat.htm. Retrieved 20 November  2021. Kaarsholm, P. 1991. Cultural Struggle and Development in Southern Africa. Harare: Baobab Books. Kaya , O.H  and Seleti, Y.N. 2013. “African Indigenous Knowledge  Systems and Relevance in Higher Education  in South Africa” in The  International  Education Journal: Comparative Perspectives, 2013, 12(1), 30-44m ISSN 1443-1475. Accessed at www.iejcomparative.org. Karenga, M. 2009. “Names, and notions of Black Studies: Issues of roots, range and relevance”, in Journal of Black Studies. Sept. 2009 VOl.40 no.1. Sage Publications Mbiti, J. 1996. The Study of African Religions and Philosophy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mhlaba, L. 1991. Local Cultures and Development in Zimbabwe. Harare: Baobab Books. Moktar, G., ed. 1990. General History of Africa. Ancient Civilization of Africa. California: Currey Ltd. Mustapha, A.R. 1998. Identity Boundaries, Ethnicity and National Intergration in Nigeria. Nadoury, R. 1990. The East African Coast and Its Role in Maritime Trade. In General History of Africa. Ancient Civilization of Africa, ed. G. Moktar. California: Currey Ltd. Nakashima, D., and M. Roue. 2002. Indigenous Knowledge Peoples, and Sustainable Practice. In Social and Economic Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, ed. P. Timmerman, vol. 5, 314–324. Chichester: Wiley. Nnoli, O. 1998. Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: A Comparative Analysis. Nottingham: Codestria. Obenga, T. 1996. Genetic Linguistic Connections of Ancient Egypt and the Rest of Africa. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Osei, J. 2006. “The Value of African Taboos for Biodiversity and and Sustainable Development”, in Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa. https://jsd-afrca.com. Retrieved 20 November 2020. Ranger, T. 1991. Religion and Witchcraft in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Harare: Baobab Books. Rashid, R. 2008. The African Presence in India - The Patriotic Vanguard. http://www.cwo.com/lucumi/runoko... Retrieved 20 November 2020. Subbarao, K.  1997.  Poverty Reduction and the  World Bank.  https://elibrary.worldbank.org>.. Retrieved 21 November 2021. Warren, D.M. 1991. Using Indigenous Knowledge in Agricultural Development. World Bank Discussion Paper No 127. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Wiredu, K. 1992.  “The Moral Foundations of an African Culture,” in K.  Wiredu & K.  Gyekye (Eds). Person and Community . Ghanaian Philosophical Studies.  Volume 1, pp193-206. Washington D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Zvomuya, P. 2011. African Culture Uncensored. https://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-23-african-culture-uncensored/. Retrieved 21 November 2021.

Chapter 12

Ukama Ethic and Covid-19 Pandemic: Countervailing Social Distancing-Induced Exclusive Individualism in (Southern) African University Amasa Phillip Ndofirepi and Joseph Pardon Hungwe

Introduction The Covid-19 pandemic has socially disrupted the practices, values and orientations towards teaching and learning in the African university and higher education in general across the globe. It is also the case that the social impact and corresponding response towards a pandemic such as Covid-19 tend to differ from one cultural context to the other. In other words, in their response, universities are culturally influenced by predominant immediate values and norms. In this view, universities are supposed to draw upon the local ethics and knowledge traditions to respond to the social disruptiveness of the Covid-19 pandemic to teaching and learning. It is within the scope of drawing upon local ethics and knowledge traditions, that we situate Ukama as a possible counteractive response to the exclusive individualism that may be instituted through social distancing, a preventative measure against Covid-19 pandemic. In Covid-19 pandemic spectrum, social distancing has become a regular and daily lexicon as one of the preventative measures. It refers to the establishment and maintenance of safe distance that ensures reduced chances of transmission of the Covid-19 virus. Subsequently, social distancing has greatly affected contact teaching and learning. In this introductory section, it should be stated that social distancing is vitally important for the protection of human life. Essentially, social distancing is a preventative measure that slows down the spread of the Covid-19 virus. We do not seek to make generalised assumptions about the African university. So in this chapter cognisance is given to the fact that diverse universities within Africa

A. P. Ndofirepi Sol Plaatje University, Kimberley, South Africa J. P. Hungwe (*) University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_12

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are informed by their colonial formations or legacies. Universities that exist in former British-colonies such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Zambia and others are modelled differently from Francophone African Universities in terms of institutional arrangement, curricula make-up and content. To avoid generalisation, we draw upon and make a case study of our experiences of studying and working in universities in southern Africa. Deploying a case study approach enables this study to appropriate the experiences from universities in southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia to other African countries. In any case, the legacies of colonialism and apartheid are common factors that shape the universities across the African continent. In this respect, we concur with the assertion that “the conception of the African university implies the agency, autonomy and responsibility to identify from within the needs of the African societies and make the universities work toward the solution of the societal problems” (Assie-­ Lumumba 2011: 16). There are two interrelated reasons that persuade us towards the assimilation of Ukama ethic as militating practice against the Covid-19 pandemic-induced exclusive individualism. Firstly, while the Covid-19 pandemic poses a crisis moment for social practices and values that underlie teaching and learning in the southern, and by extension the African university, it equally provides an opportune moment for African university to integrate local ethic traditions, a paradigm referred to as Africanisation within the decolonisation of African higher education discourse. While limited conceptual attention is focussed on Africanisation in this chapter, it is unavoidable that it is mentioned because it prefigures the domain of ukama ethic. Accordingly, Africanisation involves “a renewed focuses on Africa and reclamation of what had been taken away from Africa” (Naidoo 2016:1). Henceforth, the imperative to incorporate Ukama ethic is pursued within the vein harnessing the local ethic to the Covid-19 pandemic to militate against exclusive individualism that may be induced by social distancing. Secondly, universities, aim to produce graduates who can work, interact socially with people who may be from different cultural, national, racial, or religious backgrounds and worldviews than their own. In this respect, it is aptly observed that “education needs to be underpinned by teaching and learning strategies that create well-educated, socially conscious citizens equipped with the knowledge, skills and attributes for a rapidly changing era” (Motala and Menon 2020: 91). Nevertheless, while other universities across the world may not find the individuation embedded in social distancing as problematic, we argue that the social distancing-induced exclusive individualism affronts the communally-­ orientated context in which the African university is located. In this vein, we concur with the assertion that “the individualistic Western value system in education is alien to African communal customs” (Kayira 2015: 107). Individuation arises when consideration is given to the fact that in social distancing students are confined to their respective homes and residency as places for study as per the recommendation of universities. Exclusive individualism occurs when students become self-centred that they do not care for the needs of others. Some insinuations for exclusive individualism are such as; ‘I want to get my degree, get a good job for myself and get good salary and a better life standard’. To counter exclusive individualism in the

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African university, we argue for the appropriation of the Ukama ethic in reshaping collaborative teaching and learning. Accordingly, the question that guides this chapter is: Given the Covid-19 pandemic’s social distancing, what can the Ukama ethic as a decolonial precept contribute to collaborative teaching and learning to counter exclusive individualism in the (southern) African university?

In pursuit of this central question, the chapter is divided into four interlocking sections. In the first section, we give a brief overview of the Covid-19 pandemic. The main purpose of this section is to outline that Covid-19 is not just a medical but a social crisis that has disrupted and reconfigured the African and university. The second section discusses decolonisation as a conceptual framework, rationale and objectives of the chapter. In the third section, we unpack the ukama ethic by drawing upon the centrality of relatedness. Finally, the fourth section integrates ukama into re-imagined collaborative teaching and learning in ways that militate against the Covid-19 pandemic-induced exclusive individualism. Ultimately, we establish the fact that Ukama which is expressed through care, concerns, empathy and solidarity is necessary for social distancing in the African university.

 ovid-19 Pandemic’s Social Reconfiguration of the (Southern) C African University The Covid-19 pandemic has fundamentally changed and reconfigured social norms, values, worldviews and beliefs. Succinctly, “the virus is making us re-evaluate our lives, our values, our ways of being, how we have (not) been present to one another, and how we must take a deep look at all our relationships with each other, with societal institutions and with the Earth” (Junket 2020:117).Perhaps, there is no other sector that the Covid-19 pandemic has posed more disruptions than the African university. Consequently, this has necessitated a need to re-evaluate, rethink the expression of social values in African university. In compliance with social distancing measures of the Covid-19 pandemic, by March 2020, over 1, 5 billion students in 165 countries had had their learning and studying disrupted as universities and other educational facilities were shut down thereby, suspending contact learning (WHO 2020; De Souz et  al. 2020). In place of contact learning, online learning facilitated through digital technological devices was adopted in universities. The Covid-19 pandemic-enforced migration to online learning draws impetus from social distancing as a cardinal preventative measure against the Covid-19 pandemic. In some universities, the misconceptions about social distancing as Covid-19 preventative recommendation caused an increase in instances of social discrimination in universities. Cases of xenophobia, racism, tribalism and gender discrimination have been noted to be on the increase in universities as a result of Covid-19 pandemic. For instance, Chinese international students have been explicitly discriminated against in their host countries of study (Wang 2020). These socially

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discriminatory practices are foregrounded on political rhetoric which stereotypes the Covid-19 virus as a Chinese or Kung-fu virus (ibid). Besides social discriminatory practices, social distancing preventative recommendation has negatively affected student international and regional mobility to access university education (Unicef 2020). Social distancing which is sometimes interchangeably referred to as social isolation (Motala and Menon 2020) entails that students and lecturers do not socially intermingle, thereby, reconfiguring teaching and learning. In place of contact teaching and learning, online or remote learning has gained momentum. Le Grange (2020:5) states that “online learning is a subset of distance education that embraces a wide range of information technology applications in designing courses with access to content for “just in time learning”. Nevertheless, under the Covid-19 pandemic, online teaching and learning are slightly different from the ‘ordinary’ distance education that was offered by a few universities in the pre-­ Covid-­19 pandemic era in Africa such as University of South Africa (UNISA). The difference is that students are not permitted to study in the focus group; they cannot have contact study where they can engage openly and debate in close physical proximity. Since the Covid-19 virus spread fast when people are sitting and talking to each other closely (WHO 2020), the requirements for online teaching and learning as a consequence of social distancing became more apparent. For instance, poor internet services, frequent electricity outages, poor technological infrastructure and limited Information and Technology are some of the impediments to online teaching and learning in the African university (Dube 2020). Furthermore, Le Grange (2020) postulates that the Covid-19 pandemic requires a complete migration from contact to online teaching and learning, a situation that demands that both students and lecturers are competent to use technological gadgets devices. However, the Covid-19 pandemic is said to have exposed the digital divide that characterises the African society. This digital divide is manifested by the fact that the African university could not manage full migration to online teaching and learning because the majority of students cannot afford the technological gadgets, data bundles required for proper online learning and teaching. We acknowledge that digital technology for online learning is meant to facilitate physical and social distancing. Nevertheless, our focus in this chapter is on the primacy of ethical imperatives that should undergird teaching and learning that militate against exclusive individualism in the African university. Henceforth, the following subsection outlines the theoretical orientation in the chapter.

Theoretical Scope: Decolonial Turn This chapter is theoretically informed by the decolonial imperatives of integrating local knowledge traditions, ethics and epistemologies as underpinnings of decolonisation of the African higher education. As we noted in the first section, decolonisation is not the primary focus of this chapter. But, since we locate our argument in the discourse on decolonisation, we will give a brief synopsis. Primarily, decolonisation

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entails the “central recognition of the culture and humanity of local people to drive the idea of what it is to be human as well as the character of knowledge generation” (Canham 2018: 321). Ostensibly, decolonisation seeks to undo or eliminate the Western colonial residual values and norms which dominate the African higher education’s curriculum. Moreover, decolonisation is characterised in terms of restoration of Africanisation (Naidoo 2016), indigeneity (Akena 2012), and epistemic justice (Fricker 2007, 2008). One important aspect of decolonisation of higher education is integrating local knowledge and ethics within the mainstream education. In this respect, we appropriate the ukama ethic into African university with the primary aim of countervailing exclusive individualism that is occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic social distancing. Specifically for universities in southern Africa, there is an observation that “the current pandemic has added a new layer of complexity and uncertainty to an already volatile and contested higher education sector evidenced by protests on fees, decolonisation and affordability among other concerns” (Motala and Menon 2020:97). It is our intellectual consideration that the Covid-19 pandemic is a crisis that presents the African university an opportune moment to integrate or as it were, inject local ethics and traditions into the university. In summative terms, the African university should play a pivotal role in the generation and appropriation of ideas and ethics drawn from the local African context (Sebola and Mogoboya 2020). However, we do not seek to suggest that the African university has a monopoly over the production and dissemination of knowledge traditions and ethics, thereby assuming the sole role of distributing knowledge to society. Rather, we argue that there are valuable ethical and epistemic practices within the society from which the African university may benefit. It is in this vein that we are advance Ukama as an ethic that can militate against institutionalized individualism that is foreshadowed by the social distancing as a preventative measure against the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. We thus aver that the entry of the overly emphasised social distancing defies the ukama ethic in university teaching and learning, which, from time immemorial, has profited from a culture of closeness and affection, and symbiosis with others as well as the virtues of harmony, equality, solidarity, cooperation, mutual profit and reciprocity in a boundless web. We thus conclude that the effects of social distancing will impact severely on the much-­ cherished university graduate attributes that embody the public/social good values.

 npacking the Ukama Ethic for the (Southern) U African University The particular concern in this section is to outline Ukama with the objective that such an outline will occasion the conceptual appropriation of Ukama into the African university. The primary aim of appropriating ukama is to militate against the exclusive individualism that arises as a result of Covid-19 pandemic-social

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distancing. The Ukama ethic is grounded on the primacy of relatedness among the Shona people of Zimbabwe (Murove 2014; Ndofirepi and Shanyanana-Amaambo 2015). Ukama regulates all forms of blood relatedness. It is fundamentally founded on solidarity, communion and, and shared commonality among relatives. It therefore, serves as a social bond and induces some level of a collective response to common relatives’ needs. Centrally, because communal social relations are extremely important in most African cultural set-ups, Ukama underlines mutual human relations, coexistence, cooperation, solidarity and working towards mutual gain (Ndofirepi 2013). Furthermore, “this collective template centres around respect based on age, rank, self-control and the balancing of individual rights with group demands responsibility which requires working hard with others, in favour of their security, reciprocity through which generous acts are returned” (Ndofirepi 2013:112). Ukama complements Ubuntu as a broad notion that promotes communality (Murove 2014; Mhaka 2010). Accordingly, Ukama is about common concern whichis concretely expressed through the material, emotional and social support. For instance, in the traditional society, relatives and neighbours used to come together and assist one another in tilling or harvesting crops, a practice referred to as humwe paukama or colloquially referred to as pachedu (togetherness as relations).The humwe notion captures the interconnectedness found among relatives and neighbourhood community as it engages in in periodic collective activities. In rural areas, collective activities may include joint agricultural farming activities like ploughing, weeding or harvesting agricultural produce. In some cases, humwe is used to construct community infrastructure such as water collection points” (Mudokwani and Mukute 2019). So ukama facilitate co-operative practices that ultimately result in collective solutions to challenges. Tenets such as expression of care, love, compassion and tolerance in a time of pandemic can be drawn from ukama. To adequately appreciate Ukama as a possible conceptual militant against exclusive individualism in social distancing in African university, it is critical that we delineate the theoretical operatives in ukama. The stem root of ukama is hama which means a relative. A relative can be a cousin, auntie, grandfather, grandmother and so forth. In Ukama there is a bonding that demands obligations and commitments. However, there are two forms of hama (relative) espoused in the ukama ethic. There is hama yepedyo (close relative) and hama yekure (distant relative). The close relative refers to a lineage of blood relations which is closely traceable and identifiable such as cousins, uncles and aunties. On the other hand, a distant relative is a relation whose connectivity is located in distant history or some commonalities such as totem. In its pejorative connotations, kure would imply being afar/ apart or geographically separated. It is notable that Ukama has an inherent characteristic of extension or elasticity. It can be extended to include social categories such as race, ethnicity and other forms of social categorization. Therefore, this ethic can be accommodated and applied within the socially diverse African university’s student and staff social composition. For this reason, Ukama is embracive as noted by its emphasis on common humanity. The aphorism which states that munhu wese ihama yangu (everyone is my relative) denote the ideals of common humanity. The

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practical implication of considering someone as one’s relative is that you accord him/her respect and not stigmatize those who are infected by the Covid-19 virus. Ukama ethic influences the social life of the Shona people, within the spectrum of other southern African ethic such as Ubuntu. However, Ukama is not just confined to traditional practices. But it is valued in contemporary African cultural setup where relations are given high premium. Ukama is underscored by the cohesion that is characteristic of a traditional African family. A family is here understood from its broad perspective that is from the nucleus family of father and mother then extended to uncles, cousins, aunties, grandfather and grandmother. The idea of extension which is constituted in extended family implies that relatedness under Ukama is not closed, fixed, or rigid. On the contrary, Ukama can be established through interactive social practices such as inter-marriages, totems and mutual co-existence. This theoretical exploration of Ukama brings out two important points in relation to the central argument. Firstly, there is need to appropriate Ukama in the Covid-19 pandemic in African higher education. Given the emphasis on social distancing, the forms of teaching and learning should be informed by a collectivist approach such as Ukama. Secondly, as discussed in the preceding section, despite the disruptiveness of the Covid-19 pandemic, the African university has an opportune moment to integrate local ethic within its curricula as part of its effort to achieve the objectives of decolonisation. In cognisance of these two reasons, next section sketches out collaborative teaching and learning which is undergirded by ukama ethic. The purpose of such collaborative teaching and learning is to militate against exclusive individualism that emanates from social distancing under Covid-19 pandemic restrictive measures.

 he Ukama Reconfigured Collaborative Teaching T and Learning: Countering Institutional Individualism This section begins by stating two observations. Firstly, we consider social distancing from two viewpoints, the medical and social. From the medical viewpoint, social distancing is highly beneficial as it can drastically reduce the chances of contracting the Covid-19 virus. However, on the social viewpoint, social distancing is impersonal, reconfigures social interactions, disrupts ordinary lives and fertilises stereotypes along with race, nationalities and other forms of social discrimination within the African university as noted in the second section of the chapter. Ideally, social distance is valued from a medical perspective. If viewed and valued from this perspective, then social stigma against other social groups as outlined in the preceding section will be combated. Secondly, we are aware that ukama as a communal orientation, may contradict individual autonomy, critical thinking and other forms of individual values. Furthermore, we take cognisance of the fact that ukama as a traditional ethic has inherent flaws such as hierarchism, unquestionable loyalty to parents and other forms of authority. Despite these inherent flaws, the ukama ethic

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is aligned to other prescriptive principles that counter social discrimination. In this chapter, we deploy ukama ethic to neutralise social distancing from its social viewpoint which may entrench exclusive individualism in the African university. Ukama ethic is therefore, an ordering of the society where the sickly and infected members are cared with compassion. So ukama can inform the practice of ethics of care in African university. Collaborative teaching and learning in African universities areabout access to higher education. Collaborative learning and teaching is “an educational approach that involves groups of learners and lecturers working together to solve a problem, complete a task or create a product” (Laal and Laal 2011:491). Collaborative teaching and learning facilitate lecturers and students to apply critical and analytical skills to respond and resolve a challenge as well as research activities that promote innovativeness. From a conceptual perspective, collaborative teaching and learning denote tenets such as cooperation, support networking, communal approach to education. For Nnene and Ene (2014), collaborative learning “enhances maturity, experience and social communication in an academic environment while discouraging repetition, passivity and individuality”. As we have stated, the Covid-19 pandemic has reshaped the social norms and values that underlie all social practices including those in the African university. To this end, it is a logical consequence that we interrogate collaborative teaching and learning that has been disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic in the African university. The important question to pursue here is; what are the philosophical views that underpin collaborative teaching and learning which can countervail excessive individualism of Covid-19 pandemic social distancing in the African university.? Collaborative teaching and learning are not teacher/lecturer-centred rather it centers all the participants in the teaching and learning process. One of the main goals is to produce graduates who are concerned with the issues that affect their community, region, nation and the international community. To this end, collaborative teaching and learning should be the hallmark of an education system especially the African university. This approach aligns with the ukama ethic in particular and the African communalism in general. It encompasses concepts such as belonging, companionship, fellowship and communal learning and all these concepts offer some sense of security. Collaborative learning and teaching is constituted by four interweaving advantages. Firstly, in this method, an individual should be made aware that he or she has valuable ideas and therefore, should contribute to the common intellectual pursuit towards a common solution. In this respect, this method empowers a student to actualise their potential. In ukama, sharing of knowledge and the idea of learning together whereby students assist each other is indispensable, hence the saying, chawawana idya ne hama (share with your fellow relative the proceedings of your efforts) is aligned to collaborative learning and teaching. In the Akan culture of Ghana, this aphorism is captured as tikoronkoagyina (one head does not go into council), this saying advocates ideals of consultation, peer-reviewing and constructive suggestions and feedback, conferring and deliberative. To highlight this point, it is important to state that community orientation is designed towards meeting both individual and collective goals.

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Secondly, one must not or cannot consider one’s intellectual point as ultimate or beyond criticism but expect to be evaluated by others (Gyekye 1987). Thirdly and closely related to the foregoing point is the fact that one should be prepared to dispose of one’s position in the face of another person’s better ideas or arguments or in the event of one’s ideas or arguments being judged unacceptable or implausible by others (Gyekye 1987). If a relative persists in doing actions that are contradictory to family unity, then there is a ceremonial process called kucheka ukama (excommunication) the offending relative. In other words, excommunication is in essence a format of socially distancing from a person because of one’s misdemeanours that demote familial communion. One of the downside of the Western approach to education is that it is primarily inclined towards exclusive individualism. Murove (2014) aptly describes this point by illustrating that in the Western perspective of education, learners resolve, for instance, a mathematical problem together in a class set up but are examined individually. On the other hand, communalism espouses values of solidarity, social interaction and engaged dialogue. So collaborative teaching and learning is aimed at producing graduates who are concerned with both individual and communal good. Having outlined collaborative teaching and learning from the interplay between individualism and communal orientation,we enumerate four scenarios to implement this. Firstly, lecturers can initiate debates on the ukama derivate of pachedu/ sisonke (solidarity) in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic. Under the framework of ukama, technological platforms such as Whatsapp groups could be used to facilitate communion among students as they shareshare anxieties, frustrations, insecurities and fears in the face of Covid-19 pandemic. The idea is to create a ‘common pool of misery’ out of which common solutions are found. This is in line with the Ukama dictum which states that musi wenhamotinochemanapaukama (we resolve our challenges as relatives). Secondly, since most universities in Africa are not like to manage fully implement online education, thereby, managing to migrate to blended learning, students may still physically congregate at the campus. In any case, there are some academic courses such as experimental and laboratory sciences that are not feasible to pursue via online services. On the campus, students who are infected, those coughing or sneezing are highly likely to be discriminated against. As we already stated in this chapter, xenophobic and racist tendencies as a stigma for Covid-19 will be/ are on the increase on the African university. The African university can draw upon the tenet of chawana hama hachisekwi (you do not make fun of your relative’s misfortunes). Thirdly, given the development of Covid-19 vaccines, the image of African universities as a globally competitive institution in knowledge production is dented. Because currently, all the vaccines are developed and imported from outside the African university, the imperative of and the sustainability of local/ indigenous knowledge production is under strain. In our view, the African university’s limited epistemic contribution towards the Covid-19 vaccine and possible cure is because of limited scientific research collaboration among universities in Africa. The Covid-19 pandemic has made is evidential that scientific collaboration in the form of research, conferencing and internationalisation is essential in Africa. Most universities in

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Africa prefer to undertake research collaboration with universities ‘overseas’. We are not by any means suggesting that it is incorrect to collaborate with universities outside the African continent, however, we find it amiss for the African university to minimise contact with itself. In this regard, drawing upon the ukama ethic, cooperation is highly demanded in the Covid-19 pandemic. Relatives (hama) are obligated to come together and contribute towards a common family challenge. As we have alluded to in this chapter, ukama ethic is premised on close-knit units of family, extended family, clans, totem-union, inter-marriage and other forms of extensions and denotations. All these unions demand practical obligations and commitments. For instance, if universities in southern Africa can work closely from an ukama ethic (kubatana) then a collection of local resources, local ‘brains’, and local enthusiasm can address local challenges. As an illustration, even though the first Covid-19 virus cases spread from people who were coming from Europe, the southern African countries resorted to fortify and close land borders. Yet the African university as the intellectual pool was not explicit to advise governments on the possible social impact of such a step. The southern African region could easily have collectively closed both land and airports to travellers from outside the region. This in turn would have prevented social and economic disruptions as is the case under lockdown. Despite social distancing, an African university with ukama ethic in its collaborative teaching and learning discourages a fragmented approach to a common problem. Finally, the ukama ethic is tended towards militating against exclusive individualism that arises from social distancing in the Covid-19 pandemic. Exclusive individualism exist both institutional and individual level. At an institutional level, the above paragraph has pointed out that the fragmented or paucity of cooperation in research among African universities could be the underside of the pursuit towards a common approach to the Covid-19 pandemic and other social, economic and political challenges in Africa. On the other hand, exclusive individualism at a person (student) level may arise from isolated individuals. One of the implicit good of contact education in which students and staff congregate at a university is that orientations towards cooperation, solidarity and sense of belonging to a community are developed through social interactions. On the other hand, social distancing that underlies virtual provisioning of education may lead to the development of individuals that are detached to the others. It is important to state we are not advocating for priority of communalism over individualism as the goal of educational institutions. However, there is an imperative for universities to produce graduates who can live and work in socially diverse context as the world moves towards increased interconnectedness. Ukama appropriates the connectedness at human level. Students should not just see each other as fellow competitors in a meritocracy-oriented education system. With ukama notion of relatedness, students consider education as a collaborative enterprise, and educational institutions as spaces for developing orientations towards collective approach to common problems. In this respect, the orientaion to the larger social group encourages respect and obedience (Ndofirepi & Shanyanana-Amaambo 2015) It is for that reason that in many African countries, educational institutions have been used as places to foster common national and

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global citizenship. In response to exclusive individualism, the ukama ethic as an antidote, states that chara chimwe hachitswanyi inda(you cannot resolve challenges alone). Ukama can become inherently linked with digital spaces through encouraging both social and academic connectivity social media. Social media should be used as platforms for students to develop relatedness. For example, there are Whatsapp groups for student classes upon which students engage with each other in social other than academic matters. Moreover, the current model whereby students ‘just’ receive printed and audio material from the lecture may further entrench exclusive individualism. Depending on the affordability and availability of data bundles, online teaching and learning can alternate between lecture to student and student to student format. In a continent where a lecturer is a symbol of authority and hierarchy, students may not be free to express themselves in terms of their insecurities and frustration of studying ‘alone’ through online mode dueto Covid-19 pandemic social distancing. On the other hand, there two demerits associated with collaborative teaching and learning. Firstly, this method operates on the assumption of goodwill, honesty and cooperation. It assumes that the participants in this education approach are more persuaded by the common rather than selfish agenda. Secondly, Ukama ethic as a cultural derivative from the Shona people may incur resistance in a continent that is characterised by ethnicity, racism, tribalism Nevertheless, ukama can still contribute towards countervailing exclusive individualism induced by social distancing in the (southern) African university.

Conclusion The Covid-19 pandemic has provided an opportune moment for the appropriation of Ukama notion. Our particular concern in this chapter is the conceptual appropriation of Ukama into the Covid-19 pandemic-induced ‘new normal.In this chapter, we have argued for a conceptualization of social distance which is undergirded by the ukama ethic to militate against exclusive individualism. Exclusive individualism as a consequence may lead to the production of graduates who cannot develop concerns towards their community, local and global. Graduates are supposed to be people-orientated towards addressing common challenges that humanity encounters.

References Assie-Lumumba, N.T. 2011. Higher education as an African public sphere and the university as a site of resistance and claim ownership for the national project. Africa Development 36 (2): 175–206. Akena, F.A. 2012. Critical Analysis of Production of Western knowledge and Its Implications for Indigenous Knowledge and Decolonization. Journal of Black Studies 43 (6): 599–619. Canham, H. 2018. Theorising Community Rage for Decolonial Action. South Africa Journal of Psychology 48 (3): 319–330.

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De Souz, G.H.S., W.S.  Jardam, G.L.  Junior, Y.B.  Marques, N.C.  Lima, and R.S.  Ramos. 2020. Brazilian Students’ Expectations Regarding Distance Learning and Remote Classes During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice 20 (4): 65–80. Dube, B. 2020. Rural Online Learning in the Context of COVID-19 in South Africa: Evoking an Inclusive Education Approach. REMIE Multidisciplinary Journal of Educational Research 10 (2): 136–160. Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2008. Forum on Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Theoria 61: 69–71. Gyekye, K. 1987. The Unexamined Life: Philosophy and the African Experience. In An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Ghana, 7 May 1987. Accra: Ghana University Press. Junket, Y.A. 2020. On Covid-19, U.S Uprisings and Black Lives. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 36 (2): 117–129. Kayira, J. 2015. (Re) Creating Space for uMunthu: Postcolonial Theory Environmental Education in Southern Africa. Environmental Education Research 21 (1): 106–128. Laal, M. and M. Laal. 2011. “Collaborative Learning” What is it? Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences (31): 491–495. Le Grange, L. 2020. Could the COVID-19 Pandemic Accelerate the Uberfication of the University? South African Journal of Higher Education 34 (4): 1–10. Mhaka, V. 2010. Becoming a Christ for your neighbor: Exploring Lutheran notion of neighborliness in light of Ukama and Ubuntu in the Zimbabwe Lutheran Church. Unpublished Masters in Theology (Theology and Development). University of KwaZulu-Natal Motala, S., and K. Menon. 2020. In Search of the ‘New Normal’: Reflections on Teaching and Learning During the Covid-19  in a South African University. Southern African Review of Education 26 (1): 80–99. Mudokwani, K., and M. Mukute. 2019. Exploring Group Solidarity for Insights into Qualities of T-learning. Sustainability 11 (6825): 1–11. Murove, M.F. 2014. Ubuntu. Diogenese. 59(3–4): 36–47. Naidoo, M. 2016. Overcoming Alienation in Africanising Theological Education. HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies 72 (1): 1–8. Ndofirepi, A., and R.N.  Shanyanana-Amaambo. 2015. Rethinking Ukama in the Context of ‘Philosophy for Children. Africa: Research Papers in Education. Ndofirepi, A. P. 2013. Quality education in Africa: Introducing Philosophy fr children to promote open-mindedness. Africa Education Review 9(1): S26–S40. Nnene, B., and F.  Ene. 2014. Collaborative Approach in Teaching and Learning English as a Second language. JELTAN: Journal of the English Language Teachers’ Association of Nigeria 4: 113–122. Sebola, M., and M.J. Mogoboya. 2020. Re-imagining Africanisation of Sustainable epistemologies and Pedagogies in (South) African Higher Education: A Conceptual Intervention. South African Journal of Higher Education 34 (6): 237–254. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (2020). Responding to Covid-19: UNICEF Annual Report 2020. UNICEF. unicef.org/media/100946/file/UNICEF%20Report%2020.pdf Wang, T. 2020. The Covid-19 Crisis and Cross-Cultural Experiences of China’s International Students: A Possible Generation of Glocalised Citizens? ECNU Review of Education 00 (0): 1–6. World Health Organisation (2020). Social Stigma associated with COVID-19. WHO 24th February 2020. https://www.who.int/publicatins/on/item/a-guide-to-preventing-and-addressing-socialstigma-associated-with-covid-19?

Chapter 13

African Indigenous Knowledge and the Management of COVID-19 Pandemic Sibiziwe Shumba, Estere Nyangari, and Molyn Mpofu

Introduction This chapter is premised on issues of various developments on the global, continental and local scenes. Some literature has been written on Indigenous Knowledge (IK), with a lot being on the other issues and pandemics other than COVID-19 pandemic. The recent published works by Mawere and Mubaya (2015) and Taurayi et al. (2019) contributed much to the subject of IK in general, but this study seeks to focus on the management of COVID-19 pandemic through the use of African Indigenous Knowledge (AIK). Most Africans believe in their IK, which is part of the African heritage, and this dates back to the pre-colonial era when it was developed in order to address various survival challenges including pandemics. IK is defined as the local knowledge that is unique to a given culture (Warren 1991), and it is the information base which facilitates communication and decision-making for societies (Flavier et al. 1995). It has been a major source of global knowledge. On the other hand, AIK denotes a home-grown coping mechanism guided by African cosmological survival strategies (Mawere 2015). AIK is contextual, orally transmitted, and has survived the test of time (Dube and Munsaka 2018). It is a dynamic form of knowledge, which changes contextually to suit different needs. However, as Mapara (2009) says, European colonizers sought to destroy, denigrate or marginalize AIK and replace it with Western views and approaches, in line with their goals of imperialism. This has affected attitudes towards AIK up to today, in the COVID-19 S. Shumba (*) Joshua Mqabuko Polytechnic College, Gwanda, Zimbabwe E. Nyangari Hillside Teachers College, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe M. Mpofu University of Eswatini, Kwaluseni, Eswatini © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_13

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pandemic era. To make matters worse, AIK has been perpetually wrapped by Westerners in their ideas, but this has not invalidated it or effectively taken it out of the hearts of indigenous Africans (Dube and Munsaka 2018:150). It has also proved to be the drivers of development in most African local communities. Although the significance of AIK has been recognized by Africans themselves and international organizations, such as the United Nations and World Bank, its role in Risk Reduction has to date not received the attention it deserves in Africa, Zimbabwe included (Maferethlane 2012). The knowledge has not been recognized in the global scheme of vaccine politics at the global level. Africans themselves although they are aware of the contribution of IK to manage pandemics, they are influenced by the Western education systems, which is the basis of their educational knowledge. It is therefore necessary to explore AIK as sustainable COVID-19 coping strategies in Africa. Hence, the main aim of this chapter is to critique the contribution of AIK as sustainable intervention coping mechanism of COVID-19 pandemic. In actual fact, the chapter reiterates the need for knowledge production using requisite terms and frameworks to the broader scheme of epistemic liberation in Africa with regard to COVID-19 pandemic management. The first part of the chapter focuses on the background of AIK and the pandemics as well as a historical background of COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. The next section outlines a brief methodology. The next segment then brings to the fore the various forms of AIK used in the management of COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. Zimbabwe has been used as an example in the chapter discussion because these African indigenous remedies are not necessarily defined by geography. They are practiced across Africa and elsewhere. The next section discusses the status of AIK COVID-19 remedies in the global scheme of vaccines, followed by the chronicling of opportunities of AIK in managing COVID-19 pandemic. This is then followed by a segment which outlines the challenges of AIK in managing COVID-19 pandemic. The next section explores strategies for improving the management of COVID-19 pandemic through AIK. The last section then concludes the chapter.

Background to African Indigenous Knowledge and Pandemics African Indigenous Knowledge (AIK) has been of great value in managing adversities and pandemics in indigenous communities from time immemorial. The indigenous people have been using their indigenous knowledge and practices to find solutions to the challenges brought by the pandemics. As they have done for centuries, their communities continue to adapt to change while maintaining their cultures. Degawan (2020) postulates that indigenous people are no strangers to diseases and throughout generations indigenous people have established responses and coping mechanisms grounded in traditional knowledge, customs, and practices to different circumstances affecting their communities. The main purpose of doing that was to guarantee that the community survives.

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Globally, risk reduction strategies have been adopted to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. Proponents of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKSs) argue that IK serves disaster risks and all people globally have certain capacities of indigenous knowledge from the past which have been proven to be sustainable and effective in reducing and managing disasters (Dube and Munsaka 2018). Internationally, disasters affect different nations, with severe socio-economic consequences, thereby affecting sustainable development (SD) (Allardice 2013), and the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Regionally, Degawan (2020) asserts that Olawale Olaopa of the Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University in Dammam, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has explored and examined the role of traditions and practices in influencing community and individual perceptions of health and illness, prevention, cure, and management of COVID-19 pandemic. The main conclusion was that indigenous knowledge can benefit the community and might even reduce the impact of the pandemic. This will be especially true if the indigenous knowledge is used synergistically with scientific understanding and undertaken in an environmentally aware manner. Olaopa cited by Degawan (2020) also says that indigenous knowledge continues to be a fundamental aspect of social culture and inheritance, communicated and transferred verbally from one generation to the next, which has for countless generations played a vital role in the life of the community. It has a potent effect on the socio-economic and political situations in which the community lives as well as affecting the spiritual lives of people. Pandemics have a significant effect upon Africa where these have increased over the past, such as Ebola, showing poor pandemic management. According to Wanda (2020), during the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, it was a compass of epidemiological knowledge drawn from indigenous knowledge among the ordinary people, that performed a vital part in controlling the epidemic in 2015. The above author goes on to point out that in his book, anthropologist Paul Richards, describes in detail how the use of indigenous knowledge among ordinary people helped to eradicate risks of infection, that resulted in a rapid drop in mid-2015 in the number of contagions. More importantly, Richards notes that in areas like rural Liberia, where communities had experienced earlier viral hemorrhagic outbreaks similar to Ebola, for example Lasser fever, most Africans survived because of the indigenous knowledge they had used during past epidemics. In addition to this, a Swedish scholar, Mats Utas, who has studied how communities in three countries mostly affected by Ebola; Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leoneall of whom had the weakest health systems in the world – has also concluded that these communities overcame the epidemic through the use of indigenous knowledge (Wanda 2020). Mats Utas then pointed out that those communities are likely to fare better than others as the corona virus pandemic spreads across Africa. This means that African indigenous knowledge played a vital role in controlling the pandemics. Africa has been said to be in high risk for COVID-19 pandemic (Lone Shabir Ahmad and Ahmad 2020), with low capacity to manage the emergency. Therefore, urgent attention, support and action are required to fight and control the further spread of the ongoing pandemic. Several government strategic measures, which include complete lockdowns, travel bans, closing schools, companies and

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offices, ban on large gatherings (religious, sports, social events), systemic quarantines, increased testing capacity and strict infection control measures, have been and are being implemented in Africa to control the spread of the pandemic (Lone Shabir Ahmad and Ahmad 2020). Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has low vaccine manufacturing capacity (Folayan 2021). The indigenous mitigation strategies besides government restrictions, have been implemented in Africa, which are based on past experiences. Along with this, there is some control in the continent compared to other parts of the world (Lone Shabir Ahmad and Ahmad 2020). The swift actions against the pandemics imposed by the governments and the IK use approach, have been effective so far. Indigenous peoples’ lifestyles are a source of their resilience. They are seeking their own solutions to this pandemic, taking action based on traditional knowledge and practices such as voluntary isolation, and other preventative measures in their own languages (https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/14/04/2021, 13:28). Research findings show that the IK approaches and application in managing COVID-19 pandemic are not uniform across the African continent. Use of indigenous medicine, social distancing, (where possible), high hygiene and sanitization whenever possible are practiced in rural and urban communities through the use of IK. Social distancing through lockdowns were the major strategies applied to flatten the COVD-19 pandemic curve. Although the pandemic is ravaging the world, African countries are in a different situation compared to others like China and India. Therefore, Africans ‘…are in the same storm, but in different boats…’.(Buffin 2020; Letzing 2020). Africa is using its own unique ways and strengths to successfully manage the pandemic (Dandara et al. 2020). A large proportion of the African population (nearly 80%) including Zimbabwe, uses traditional herbal medicine for its immediate needs (Dandara et al. 2020). This shows that herbal medicine has a bright future in Africa and globally. In other countries, there has been recent debates, for instance, the Madagascar herbal preparation, Artemisia afra, which is used to alleviate respiratory disease symptoms, some of which are shared with COVID-19 (Dandara et al. 2020 DU Toit and van der Kooy 2019; Mahomoodally 2013) in Africa. Hence, taking this background into consideration, assessment of the contribution of AIK as sustainable intervention coping mechanism of COVID-19 pandemic and its effectiveness is worthy conducting.

Historical Background of COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa According to Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation −94 Report, the first human case of the COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus, subsequently called SARS-CoV-2, were first reported by officials in Wuhan City, China, in December 2019. Whilst some of the earliest known cases had a link to a wholesale food market in Wuhan, some of the cases did not have a link to that, but to a lab in Wuhan city. The above report further points out that environmental samples taken

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from the wholesale food market tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, further proposing that the market in Wuhan City was the source of this epidemic. Since the disease had advanced to become a global pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus pandemic a public health emergency of international concern on January 30, 2020 and a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Africa has not been spared by this pandemic. The first case in Africa was confirmed in Egypt on 14 February 2020. Dzinamarira et al. (2020) point out that the first COVID-19 pandemic case in Zimbabwe was reported on 21 March 2020, in the resort town of Victoria Falls. By 31 March 2020, seven more people had tested positive with one reported death. These scholars even indicate that there was a steady increase in the number of cases in the months of April to July 2020. More so, they even postulate that there has been an uneven spread of the virus in Zimbabwe and Harare, Bulawayo, and Matabeleland South provinces were at one time the COVID-19 pandemic hotspots in the country. In 2020, a number of lockdown measures were declared by the African governments including Zimbabwe, to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the year 2021 started with a cloud of gloom and uncertain future with latest lockdown measures being declared. In Zimbabwe, announcing the stiff lockdown measures on television the Vice President and health minister Constantine Chiwenga, declared that the country had seen a “surge in COVID-19 cases during the festive seasons”, with cases almost doubling in the previous two months. Currently, vaccination programs are under way world-­ wide to control the effects of the virus. All African states so far are depending on imported vaccines particularly from China, with none manufactured in the region. In the foregoing section, we have sketched the background of indigenous knowledge and the COVID-19 pandemic, that should provide the base and direction of this research. Hence, it is very clear that we are dealing with a phenomenon that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the world is continuously threatened with the pandemic which has affected about 205 million people with 4,34 million deaths globally according to the 12 August 2021 WHO statistics. A senior African correspondent, Anne (October 2020), and John Wilkins University says COVID-19 fatality figures in Africa have been less than elsewhere. The pandemic has disrupted life with a huge impact on the economic and educational areas particularly in African rural areas. Human survival has been endangered. This has compromised the SDGs particularly goal number 3 to do with issues of good health and human well-being in Africa, which goes hand in glove with goal number 1 on eradicating poverty and 4 on quality education. Agenda 2030, has been compromised, and the mutation of COVID-19 has worsened the situation. Vaccines have now been rolled out to curb the pandemic. However, there are conspiracy theories concerning them resulting in hesitancy among many Africans. Given such a background the main objectives of the chapter were to examine the forms of AIK, which can be adopted to manage the COVID-19 pandemic in the African continent and Zimbabwe in particular. The chapter also sought to explore the status of AIK remedies in the scheme of vaccines globally and their opportunities in the management of COVID-19 as home grown solutions to protect human

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life. More so, it intended to assess the challenges of the AIK in managing the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. All this enables coming up with a knowledge production, which helps the people of Africa to tell their own story free of alien narratives, terms and frameworks.

Research Methodology In this chapter we used a qualitative research method, based on an interpretive paradigm. Cohen (1994) postulate that interpretive approaches to research have the purpose of understanding the world of human experience. This suggests that reality is socially constructed as propounded by Mertens (2010). Creswell (2010) asserts that the interpretive researcher relies on the participants’ views of the situation under study and takes cognizance of the impact on the research of their own experiences. We used qualitative methods to adequately describe and interpret a situation in relation to how AIK was used in the management of COVID-19 pandemic in Africa with special reference to Zimbabwe. For the research design we used a case study design so that we would get an in-­ depth analysis of a single setting of the populace within Zimbabwe as suggested by Moorhead and Griffin (1995).. Participants were given a voice to articulate their experiences and their interpretation of the situation. Such an approach created space for the participants to speak for themselves, thereby providing thick descriptions of their lived experiences, their thoughts and feelings with regard to how the AIKs were implemented to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe. According Moorhead and Griffin (1995), case study design has the advantage of permitting the researcher to probe a situation in detail. Thus, it actually facilitated the discovery of unexpected relationships yielding a wealth of descriptive and explanatory information. However, we would like to note that a case study design had some limitations. For instance, according to Moorhead and Griffin (1995), the data generated through a case study design cannot be readily generated to other situations because the data is closely tied to the situation studied. More so, the data may again be biased towards the researcher’s closeness to the situation. Above all, case study research tends to be very time consuming. Hence, when applying the case study design in the research study we had to take such constraints into consideration. Purposive sampling was used to select the participants of the study. At this juncture we would like to point out that although Zimbabwe has a number of ethnic tribes like the Shona, Ndebele, Kalanga, Venda, Sotho, Tonga and many others, we have just selected only the Shona and the Ndebele people to be part of the research sample. The method was useful in making sure that we included people who fit the requirements of the study. In Zimbabwe, a sample of one hundred (100) participants from both rural and urban areas was chosen. For research instruments, online open-­ ended questionnaires were sent to the selected ninety (90) participants. Using such an instrument increased the response rate. In actual fact, the low cost and overall convenience of online surveys brought a high response. The respondents were also able to answer questions on their own schedule at a pace they chose.

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Telephone interviews were used to interview ten participants from Zimbabwe. This instrument assisted us to uncover rich descriptive data on the personal experiences of the participants and they remained focused on the topic under discussion. The interview results were tape recorded. The other advantage of using interviews was that we were able to interview the participants in their mother language. This created a free environment which allowed the participants to reveal their inner most feelings and experience in line with the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on their respective religions. Literature review was used to gather data from other African states. Having outlined the research methodology, the next section examines the discussion of findings in line with the forms of AIK used to manage COVID-19 pandemic.

 orms of AIK Used in the Management F of COVID-19 Pandemic This section examines the use of AIK by the Zimbabweans people to manage COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. It shall be shown that the AIK plays a paramount role in the management of COVID-19 pandemic despite being denigrated, marginalized and put to the periphery. On the question of the nature of the AIK used to manage the COVID-19 in Zimbabwe, the online open-ended questionnaires and majority of telephone interviews responses revealed that most Zimbabweans who make use of AIK to manage COVID-19 employ methods of boiling, soaking, burning, chewing, pounding and steaming. In this case, African indigenous herbs are used by people as fresh, dried, in the form of a powder, leaf, bark or root. Since the COVID-19 symptoms are similar to those of other common cold and respiratory diseases, the commonly used measures to manage such diseases are used to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. All this is in line with Itai Rusike, the director of Zimbabwe’s community working group on health, quoted by Matiashe (2021), who posited that people consult traditional healers and use home remedies for general illness especially the country dwellers who are far from medical health facilities. Preference of indigenous herbal treatment as alternatives to WHO guidelines was supported and authorized by Governments, such as Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Tanzania during the early stages of the pandemic in 2020. While Zimbabwe authorized Zumbani for packaging, Madagascan president authorized the Artemisia afra beverage as tea (which was said to be efficacious for malaria), and the late Tanzanian President Magufuli authorized the use of the Madagascan herbal tea. (Matiashe 2021). The Tanzanian government attributed reduction in the infection rate to the use of indigenous herbs and religious prayer, with President Magufuli and the health ministry advising people to use local herbs like ginger and lemon to treat covid-19 (Mpota 2020). What we found in Zimbabwe concurs with what was happening in Nigeria. For instance, the Nigerian Federal University in Jigawa research team, collaborated with traditional medical practitioners, and the Vice-­Chancellor tasked them to produce home grown solutions to COVID-19 by identifying and extracting

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those medicinal plants with a ‘record history’ of being used to treat fever, protracted cough and acute pneumonia, (Mavhunga 2020). Hence, they started Clinical trials of plant based COVID-19 medicine from May and June 2020. They even evaluated the toxicity of the medicines on experimental animals and to be followed by volunteers. Thus, the traditional medicines for COVID-19 need to be given such space in Africa. However, this backing by governments has been criticized by physicians who say it could hamper vaccination efforts. Dr. Nyika Mahachi of Zimbabwe, president of Zimbabwe college of public health physicians pronounced that ‘we cannot take chances with traditional medicine that is not proven’ to show their skepticism’.

Steaming From the telephone interview and online open-ended questionnaire responses, we noted that steaming called kufukira in Shona or ukufutha in Ndebele is part of the AIK used in Zimbabwe and other countries. For instance, Interviewee C, from Matabeleland South in Zimbabwe, (I interviewed 9 February 2021) said, Hot water is used when steaming is done. This is done using herbs like fever tree leaves/ zumbani /umsuzwane or a mixture of different herbs to remove body impurities. To be more effective, this steaming water is mixed with Eucorub/Vicks and Tsunami ointment. Steaming causes one to sneeze and spit out the various blockages in the body system and ‘open the breathing tract’.

Tsunami is also popularly used in Zambia for flu and COVID-19 ailments. Hence, from the above point we noted that steaming, which is part of the AIK since time immemorial, is important in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic in African countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia. When steaming, fever tree leaves or a mixture of different herbs are made use of to remove body infections. Steaming is a common indigenous practice and has a huge impact in preventing and managing respiratory and body weakness problems in Africa. It is now recommended in most societies to ‘steam out’ COVID-19 even by African diasporans in other continents. If it is considered for the COVID -19 therapy it can yield great results. What we found in Zimbabwe is similar to what happens in Tanzania, where a concoction from leaves of trees including neem, mango orange and African onion is boiled and used for this kujifukiza in Swahili (Mpota 2020).

Fever Tree Leaves (Lippia Javanica) In addition to this, online open-ended questionnaire and telephone interviews responses revealed that the use of Fever Tree Leaves (zumbani /umsuzwane) is very popular in addressing COVID-19 in Zimbabwe. It is an anti-oxidant (Bhebhe 2021), referred to as a magical shrub in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabweans use this locally available shrub to manage ailments of flu, colds, coughs, fever and for blood

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cleansing. One of the Shona interviewees from Mashonaland West Interviewee B (Interviewed 10 February 2021) said; We apply zumbani in various forms and ways, depending with the situation and environment. This ranges from steaming with it, drinking it as tea, bathing with it or spraying premises or indoors with it. We also apply it in the form of leaves or powder, fresh or dried mostly after soaking it in boiled water. At times we mix zumbani with other herbs to increase its efficacy.

The above view was also supported by one of the Ndebele Interviewees from Matabeleland North region, Interviewee D (Interviewed 14 February 2021) who said; The Umsuzwane is very effective and relieves fever and colds. It also quickly reverses respiratory problems which are linked to COVID- 19 pandemic. Just like modern medicine, this can be done over a short period of time or for a long period, depending on one’s immune system and health conditions.

Therefore, the Fever Tree Leaves plays a significant role in managing the COVID -19 pandemic. What we noted in Zimbabwe is also in line with what was found by Agency (2021:1) where it is written, Even as the world is bracing for vaccination drives to combat COVID-19, many people in Southern African country of Zimbabwe have latched their hopes on zumbani- a woody shrub- to keep the pandemic at bay.

Although the Zimbabweans regard Fever Tree Leaves as having magical powers with regard to COVID-19 pandemic, its healing properties stand unproven. Therefore, Zumbani is quite effective in preventing coronavirus, but in terms of treating the disease this has not yet been proven. Figure 13.1 below is a picture of the Fever Tree Leaves.

Fig. 13.1  Fever Tree Leaves/Umsuzwane /Zumbani. (Source: Bhebhe (2021))

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Snuff Communities in Zimbabwe also use snuff to cope with COVID-19. From the majority of the telephone interviews and online open-ended questionnaire responses, we observed that the African snuff (Bute/Fodya) in Shona and Igwayi in Ndebele, is also used to manage COVID- 19 in Zimbabwe. Respondents in both urban and rural areas use it to ‘sneeze out dirty and mucus’ and anything that blocks the lungs, nose or breathing tract. One of the Shona interviewees from Midlands region in Zimbabwe, Interviewee G (Interviewed 21 February 2021) said that African snuff is commendable to use if one has COVID-19 disease, since it ‘makes the sick person’s organs exercise’ even if he/she is weak through sneezing. This is locally made and available even in various southern region countries shops.

Ginger and Garlic Ginger and garlic are used in African local communities to manage colds, flu, sore throat, chest congestions, fever and other COVID-19 related complications including headaches. Moreover, from the online open-ended questionnaires and telephone interview responses, one of the Ndebele interviewees from Matabeleland South region in Zimbabwe, Interviewee H (Interviewed 3 March 2021) said, Here in Matabeleland South region, we also make use of garlic and ginger to manage COVID-19 pandemic. Garlic and ginger can be crushed and mixed or cooked with food, chewed, boiled or put in tea. They are also mixed with other herbs and boiled and are then taken as tea or used for steaming. These are readily available in shops and in some gardens.

Ginger in Zimbabwe is produced in Nyanga in Manicaland. Therefore, from the above assertion it can be concluded that garlic and ginger are vital in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic. Garlic and ginger used in Zimbabwe.

Herbs In addition to this, from the telephone interviews and online open-ended questionnaires responses, we discovered that various herbs which are multi-purpose are used to manage COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe. The respondents asserted that this is done by herbalists/ medicine men / traditional healers called N’anga (Shona) or Inyanga (Ndebele) or any one with the knowledge. If one has COVID-19 symptoms, the herbs are supposed to be taken daily. Respondents also pointed out that the intake of herbs is not a once off thing, but at times continuous or intermittent as a preventive measure. One of the Ndebele respondents, from Matabeleland North, Interviewee E (Interviewed 15 February 2021) said,

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Leaves of different trees, including fruit trees like mango, lemon, lemon grass, avocado and gwava are mixed and used to manage COVID -19 related ailments. These are made into a concoction and are inhaled, drunk, or put in food. Some are used for steaming.

However, some respondents asserted that some of these herbs and tree leaves are toxic, and their toxicity cannot be determined since they are not scientifically tested. As a result, they do not apply them continuously. What we discovered in Matabeleland North is in line with what was found by Maunganidze, (2016), who pointed out that most people and patients in Zimbabwe still use traditional herbs as supplements. What we found in Zimbabwe is similar to what happens in Tanzania. Mpota, (2020) posits that this herbal treatment has become widely practiced in Tanzania where tree leaves from neem, orange, mango trees and African onion leaves are boiled and taken. One of the key informants from Mashonaland Central region, Interviewee F(Interviewed 24 February 2021), expressed that ‘traditional herbs and healing are interwoven’ in their community. Even before the introduction of modern medicine in Africa, ailments and diseases were treated by herbal doctors with medicines from their natural local environment (UNESCO 2020). These are prepared using animal parts, herbs, water, alcohol, roots, leaves and bark of trees. Herbalists provide these herbs as home remedies to boost immunity. COVID-19 symptoms are similar to those of other common cold diseases. Therefore, commonly used indigenous measures are used to address the pandemic. We also found out that in Zimbabwe, indigenous remedies like leaves from fever tree, resurrection shrub, gwava among others have been ‘exported’ overseas to manage COVID-19. A key informant in Harare urban said he made huge profits from sending indigenous tree leaves, dried or in powder form, to Zimbabweans in America and the UK.

Social Distancing and Isolation By nature of their settlements, homesteads in most African countries particularly in country side are socially distanced and isolated. The strategy of isolation in traditional communities has been revived to address COVID- 19 pandemic in Africa. Most telephone interview and online open-ended questionnaire responses in Zimbabwe revealed that the current strategy of social distancing and isolation is rooted in AIK. Hence, the communities are generally socially distanced from the way they are settled especially in rural areas where they are sparsely populated and each homestead is ‘on its own’. They easily avoid crowded places and gatherings of huge crowds. They greet each other from a distance with no ‘hugging’. As a result, a Ndebele Interviewee from Matabeleland South region, Interviewee A (Interviewed 27 February 2021) said masking rarely applies to them since they do not come into close contact with outsiders except family members they stay with.

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Cleansing The cleansing concoction is famous in Africa during pandemics (Tengatenga et al. 2021). In this case cleansing is titled kugeza/kusukwa in Shona or mchape in Nyanja. Body system and spiritual cleansing (internally and externally), is part of African treatment and healing. The belief is that complete healing is wholistic, both internal and external, exhibiting the natural, supernatural and spiritual. It was mentioned by the Shona and Ndebele online open-ended questionnaire and telephone interview respondents as another AIK system used to fight COVID-19 pandemic. The process of cleansing depends on the person, nature of COVID-19 symptom/ ailment and environment. The process of cleansing is done in various ways. First, there is the burning of herbs/ smoking called kupwititidza (Shona) or ukuthunqisela (Ndebele), in houses or when the person is covered in a thick blanket. There is also the inhaling of herbs/medicine – in the form of powder or cigarette. More so, there is body washing with herbs so-called kushamba muviri (Shona) or ukugeza umzimba (Ndebele). Smearing, herbs on certain body parts or the whole body is also done as a method of cleansing. This is named kuzora in Shona or ukugcoba in Ndebele. The other way is to lacerate blood veins slightly, entitled kutemera nyora in Shona or ukucaba in Ndebele, and apply the medical powder ‘into the blood veins. This makes the herbs go directly into the blood stream just like modern injections and fight the pandemic fast and purifies the blood system if there are impurities. Tummy system cleansing through diarrhoea or vomiting termed kubudisa/kurutsisa in Shona or ukuhudisa in Ndebele is also done. Herbs like murumanyama in Shona or isihaqa in Ndebele, are used to make one have a running tummy or vomit any impurities, including blockages in the system. There is also drinking of certain herbs to clean the system. In Zimbabwe such herbs include Moringa to boost the immune system, busika (found only in Manjolo, Binga) for detoxification, khalimela which is mixed with hot water for flu and coughs. Cleansing was believed to address colds or body weakness or fevers one might have, including those caused by ‘spiritual forces.” This shows the holistic nature of AIK in managing COVID-19. In all these, different specialists such as diviners, healers and prophets including ordinary people are engaged as consultants. Respondents said rituals in some cases are done to invoke or revoke spiritual intervention or curse respectively.

Sanitization The telephone interviews and online open-ended questionnaire responses showed that the Shona and Ndebele people use AIK of sanitization to cope with COVID-19. These include washing of hands using modern or natural detergents like ashes called dota in Shona or umlotha in Ndebele. Aloevera termed gavakava in Shona or

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ihlaba in Ndebele, is another multi-purpose herb which communities use for flies and blisters. They practice hygiene/cleanliness through disinfecting premises and houses by spraying /sanitising using herbs or cow dung in rural areas. Hence, during and after funerals at any time, they spray where corpses lay in state, houses, and mourners wash hands with water mixed with herbs to sanitise them as they come from the grave yard. Such sanitization helps in fighting the infection and spread of COVID-19 pandemic in different regions of Zimbabwe, which is part of AIK. The AIK of involving only a few people in taking care of and carrying/burying someone who dies from an infectious disease like COVID-19 is practiced by the Shona and Ndebele people in these regions. They use protective clothing and special herbs to avoid contracting the disease. This practice curbs the spreading of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Use of Wood Ashes Furthermore, the telephone interviews and online open-ended questionnaire respondents from Matabeleland North and Mashonaland East in Zimbabwe also pointed out that ashes, termed dota in Shona or umlotha in Ndebele, are anti-bacterial. They are used for stomach aches and acidity, brushing teeth, washing and disinfecting utensils and premises. Because of this, local communities in these regions use ashes to manage COVID-19 pandemic as a sanitiser, which is locally and readily available in every homestead, mostly in rural areas where modern sanitizers are not easily reachable and affordable.

Other AIK Strategies to Manage COVID- 19 From the telephone interviews and online questionnaires responses, we noted that the Zimbabweans manage COVID-19 pandemic in many other ways. For instance, the Shona and Ndebele people keep the patient warm through fire called mwoto in Shona or umlilo in Ndebele, and sun basking termed kudziya mushana in Shona or ukuwothamela ilanga in Ndebele. They even drink warm water and take warmth generating herbs. They even eat fruits that boost the immunity system, especially those found in virgin forests, mostly those with vitamin C, which fight against colds /flu, a symptom of COVID-19 pandemic. Most of the fruits have other minerals like calcium and iron which are important in boosting the immunity. These include the Marula fruit (sclerocarya / mapfura), sour plum (Ximenia caffra/Nhengeni) and Monkey orange (Strychnos spinosa / Matamba). They also eat Ziziphus (jujube / Masawu) and Smelly berry finger leaf (Vitez mombassae /Tsubvu), which enhances physical strength although the seeds can be toxic. Thus, from the findings, we noted that African communities in Zimbabwe have vast African knowledge systems which they use to address the COVID-19

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pandemic. Informants indicated that there is a hybrid of treatment where various herbs/medicines and approaches are used to prevent and treat its symptoms, and they said these herbs are effective. All this was confirmed by the less figures of ailments, spreading and deaths associated with COVID-19 pandemic. In such periods of movement restrictions and bans, people benefit from AIK and medicines in their local areas. Developing, documenting and giving space to the knowledge in COVID-19 discourses can go a long way in managing the pandemic treatments and vaccines.

 he Status of AIK COVID-19 Remedies in the Global Scheme T of COVID-19 Vaccines It important to note that although AIK medicines play such a paramount role in line with COVID-19 pandemic as indicated in the foregoing section, globally and even regionally they are not recognized as important. The major reasons are that they are not scientifically proven. Hence, there is skepticism about the remedies, and they are not given space but peripherised, where they are presented. African medical doctors such as Dr. Nyika Mahachi from Zimbabwe even lamented the Government’s approval of the fever tree leaves and indigenous medicine for COVID-19, saying it is an unwelcome development’ (Mavhunga 2020) and the people cannot take chances with it. Yet globally people and medical personnel are prepared to take chances with vaccines manufactured in Western and Eastern countries. Their main concern seems to be the hampering of vaccination in Africa using imported vaccines and not people’s health. WHO also gave a warning against using Madagascan indigenous tea and other African indigenous herbs. As a result, the global scheme of COVID-19 vaccines has relegated them as unreliable and ‘dangerous’ to people. Hence, all vaccines used in Africa are developed and manufactured outside Africa, and there is lack of transparency and criteria for vaccines to be included in COVAX, contributing to suspicion (www.socialscienceinaction.org). Not even one vaccine so far is from Africa despite its vast knowledge which can be tapped locally and benefit people. Yet findings show how much Africans and non-Africans are relying on the indigenous remedies yielding positive results. Also, statistics show low cases of COVID-19 in Africa up to date compared to other continents. This could be attributed to the contribution of indigenous African medicines. Their dismissal is exacerbated by the poor packaging and unclear documented dosages. Also, the colonial mentality and Western yardstick of knowledge that failed to liberate African knowledge has left this vital community-­ based knowledge out of consideration. There is no following of the landmark 1997 Global Knowledge Conference in Toronto, which emphasized the urgent need to learn, preserve and exchange indigenous knowledge. The COVID vaccines are shrouded in various conspiracy theories globally, hence hesitancy in taking the vaccines in Africa. Of concern is forced and mandatory

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vaccination thereby creating fear, distrust and conspirational ideas. Concerns are related to vaccine safety, side effects and effectiveness, and their rejection is due to misinformation (Ullah et al. 2021) which is exaggerated, such as that they make one magnetic. There are also multiple issues to do with vaccine ingredients, the rushed trials and use of MNRA based technologies (www.socialscienceinaction.org). These have dominated the social media. Most Africans believe natural remedies and alternative medicines are safer than vaccines. The common conspiracy includes a plan to depopulate the planet by preventing procreation (Cassata 2021), especially Africa through vaccination by Bill Gates, concern about collusion serving the interests of national governments and external actors in the ‘corona business’, where big pharmaceutical companies are believed to have created the virus to profit from the vaccine supply, influencing vaccine perceptions of vaccines delivery and safety. There is a claim that the virus and the vaccine are part of a plan to depopulate Africa by the Westerners to gain full control of African resources (Dr Mphahlele, Virologist, SA 2021 www.samrc.ac.za) making Africans to fear the vaccines and rely on herbs. However, all these theories and concerns are without basis. Viruses have no borders. Also, the fear and hesitancy can be attributed to lack of knowledge, religious beliefs and misinformation.

Opportunities of AIK in Managing COVID-19 Pandemic The AIK has a number of opportunities in managing COVID-19 pandemic. From the telephone interviews and online open-ended questionnaires we discovered that AIK plays a key role in coping with the pandemic of COVID-19 in African local communities. Given the ‘new normal’ where people’s movement is restricted and social distancing is vital, locally based and home-grown strategies embedded in AIK become important. In agreement with Folayan (2021), the African region needs to do self-­ introspection and devote resources for the design, discovery and deployment of vaccines and diagnostic tests to meet current and future needs. Infrastructure and capacity building is crucial in Africa. There is need to work with various organizations that promote development and innovation in vaccines in Africa, so that the continent can have their own medicines for pandemics. Matiashe (2021) notes that in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, people from Zimbabwe to Tanzania turned to indigenous home remedies to manage the mysterious disease. A senior African correspondent, Anne (October 2020), and John Wilkins University says COVID-19 fatality figures in Africa have been less than elsewhere. Folayan (2021) argued that the African Sub-Sharan region’s low vaccine manufacturing capacity can be addressed through different organizations which include some below. For instance, African states can join The Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers’ Network of 2010, in which only South Africa is the only member from Sub –Saharan Africa (Folayan 2021). The network is intended to increase production of high-­ quality vaccines. Hence, African COVID medicines can be improved qualitatively.

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More so, The African Vaccine Manufacturing Initiative of 2010 intended to promote sustainable human vaccines manufacturing capacity in Africa has the potential to be used for COVID-19 response using African indigenous herbs and therapies. IK is the mainstay of health care in developing countries, where the majority use traditional medicine for primary health needs. More so, in line with Wekesa (2020), we noted that Africans in various provinces of Zimbabwe are producing lots of knowledge daily on COVID-19 pandemic in their informal and formal system, in both rural and urban set ups. These are affordable, readily available and environmentally friendly. Hence, COVID-19 pandemic can be highly mitigated using these community-based remedies, given the travel restrictions which do not give people opportunities to travel far for treatment and fragile health care systems in African states. The fact that traditional healers in Zimbabwe are applying AIK to offer mitigatory measures for COVID- 19 pandemic, is an indication that from an African perspective, the problem is less that of knowledge production and is more of the gathering, packaging and dissemination of the knowledge and its recognition scientifically in the global circles. More so, the other opportunity of AIK in African countries like Zimbabwe and Madagascar lies in the fact that African herbal medicine such as Artemisia afra and the associated expertise in Africa warrant consideration in managing COVID-19 pandemic. Herbal medicines are the backbone of poorly resourced health care systems. These can be powered by AIKs to give them a competitive edge. In addition to this, there is need to explore innovative solutions and exchanges of promising practice than to be skeptical, bringing in the experience of global and regional initiatives. The Nilotic civilizations in North and East Africa excelled in medical Science during ancient times, such as the Egyptians and mummifications and surgery of bodies. This African knowledge cannot be ignored. Global conspiracies have to be put aside to save human lives and achieve the SDGs. Key priorities should be human life protection and access to appropriate health and care. The AIK has to be deepened through vertical strategies. In this case, in line with Wekesa (2020), the other opportunity is in the fact that understanding the domestic /community situations and dynamics is important, finding out what is African in the current pandemic. In actual fact, African knowledge in Zimbabwe, through horizontal strategies (trans-regionalism) though unique has global connections with other knowledges from the worldly regions (Wekesa 2020). As such it can become universal knowledge. Home grown solutions to combat COVID in Africa are necessary.

Challenges of AIKS in Managing COVID-19 Pandemic Although AIK has a number of opportunities as mentioned in the above section, it has also a number of challenges in Africa when managing COVID-19 pandemic. First, knowledge divide is the greatest challenge. What passes as legitimate knowledge on COVID-19 pandemic is knowledge disseminated on the internet, which

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suggests that knowledge is less African and more Western (Wekesa 2020), since AIK is not found on the internet but is intangible. Again, this is because the African digital divide problem can be understood also as a knowledge divide. Together with this, in line with what was observed by Mawere (2015), when writing about sub-­ Saharan Africa, we noted that in Zimbabwe for example, while the so-called indigenous communities have always found value in their own local forms of knowledge, the colonial administration and its associates considered indigenous knowledge as unscientific, illogical, anti-development and /ungodly. Thus, colonial administrators and their associates denigrated the AIK in Zimbabwe and Africa in general. However, the status and importance of indigenous knowledge has changed in the wake of the landmark 1997 Global Knowledge Conference in Toronto, which emphasized the urgent need to learn, preserve and exchange indigenous knowledge. Furthermore, we noted that local knowledge in Africa is dismissed and put to the periphery as inferior knowingly or unknowingly, by both Africans themselves and foreigners. Respondents confirmed that the indigenous knowledge is dismissed even in the mass media, and medical experts urged extreme caution of the dangers of using them despite their positive results on COVID-19 affected people. They call their authorization an ‘unwelcome development’ (Mavhunga 2020) and urged governments to stick to WHO guidelines. However, the medicine is older than Science. As such we noted that in Zimbabwe the effects of colonization have denigrated African medicine and promoted Western medicine, with school texts reinforcing this at the detriment of AIK. Physicians, hence criticized it as it could hamper vaccination efforts. Despite most African governments hailing traditional medicines as a success, skepticism still exists among many (Mpota 2020). Another major challenge of AIK is lack of clinical studies to suggest that they ‘cure’ COVID-19 pandemic (Agency 2021) or other diseases. It is important to note that although Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Cameron and Tanzania have made their claims known about their efforts to mitigate the toll of COVID-19 pandemic on human health, these indigenous remedies have been demeaned in the broader scheme of vaccine politics at global level as well. The reason has been that such remedies have not been scientifically tested and thus unreliable. Further to this, there are gaps regarding to their toxicity and dosages. Also, there could be absence of testing in most African communities and undiagnosed cases are likely to be many. Therefore, they are sidelined and not considered seriously. This idea is also supported by Mohamedbhai (2013) who pointed out that there is still reticence in the use of IKS, which is considered anecdotal and not scientific, in the development process. In addition to this, using AIK like zumbani in Zimbabwe has a challenge that while there are many others who believe in the magical healing powers of it, herbal medicine experts say its anti-COVID-19 properties stand unproven. For instance, some scholars point out that zumbani is not a coronavirus cure. It is actually a relief agent, especially when one is using it in the process of steaming; one inhales it just for relief. The virus in the body cannot be cured. Along with this, loss of transmission of AIK in general to succeeding generations is a challenge in Africa. Indigenous peoples’ ways of learning, storing and

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transmitting knowledge contributed to its decimation, since those with the knowledge often ring-fence their expertise or die without transmitting it to next generations (Maunganidze 2016). In line with this, is the lack of research and marketing of AIK. They are mostly found in rural areas where there is limited access to clean packaging or organized markets. The unlabeled sometimes unclean packages of indigenous foods, fruits and herbs are a challenge in the promotion of these as health products since health is related to hygiene. The other challenge affecting the management of COVID-19 pandemic through AIK lies in the fact that the IK is always passed by word of mouth from one generation to another. There is very limited documentation if any. We noted that a majority of the bearers of IK are from the older generation and they now find it difficult to communicate their beliefs and practices to the scientifically educated younger generation. As a result of that, once the older generation passes on the knowledge also disappears. Above all, in line with Mohamedbhai (2013), we also observed that the other challenge of AIK in managing COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe lies in the fact that there is a real danger that AIK in Africa is being wiped out as result of the rapid changes occurring from imported economic, cultural and political development models through globalization. As a result, so far there is no COVID-19 vaccine developed from Africa, which is recognized by WHO despite its vast knowledge and management of the pandemic. Vaccines from other continents are coming to Africa.

 trategies for Improving the Management of COVID-19 S Pandemic Through AIK In light of what has been outlined in the preceding sections, a number of strategies should be adopted to improve the management of COVID-19 pandemic through the use of AIK in Africa and other continents. To use Mohamedbhai (2013)‘s standpoint, we also assert that it is crucial that without delay IK in Africa be protected, documented, studied, modified if essential and then widely propagated to encourage management of COVID-9 pandemic and development as well. Africa has to act united and coordinate at continental level and scale up manufacturing capacities through resource pooling and sharing, bridging financial gaps in companies involved in providing COVID-19 related solutions. Various scientific, technological and industrial solutions are needed to effectively identify and treat patience and researchers and governments have to address those gaps of protecting, treating and curing the disease. Moreover, the Ministry of Health and Child care should address the information gaps regarding the AIK medicine, herbs dosages and toxicity, instead of putting it to the periphery, suspiciously regarding them. For instance, this should be done in line with Fever Tree Leaves /Umsuzwane/Zumbani, the Madagascar resurrection shrub

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and many others. They need to invest in laboratories locally to investigate their medicinal value which can as well promote the management of COVID-19 pandemic through AIK. The knowledge should be consulted in generating COVID-19 vaccines from Africa. More so, the preservation of AIK and the environment and propagation of herbs / trees has to be promoted by local communities and nations as sustainable sources of the medicine and knowledge. AIK stakeholders need also to be trained to be hygienic in their packaging, storage and marketing of the IK products, which result in their efficacy of the management of the COVID-19 and other diseases. Furthermore, they should be given opportunities to try whenever there is an emergency disease just like modern scientists (Mavhunga 2020) as aired by Tribert Chishanyu the President of Zimbabwe Traditional Practitioners Association. This is because they are already treating COVID-19 related symptoms. Above all, some work on AIK, for example on traditional healers and the use of medicinal plants, has been carried out in African universities, but it seems disparate. Therefore, as such for AIK to be truly effectual an all-inclusive and multi-­disciplinary approach is highly called for, with community involvement prioritized to ensure adherence, hence benefits. Collective action including AIK is needed to achieve positive outcomes in containing COVID-19. This can actually be achieved by ensuring that the AIK has been entrenched in all university teaching, research and outreach activities. This can be attained by creating medical institutional centers that are dedicated to AIK as well.

Conclusion All in all, this chapter has shown that AIK has been playing and is still playing a paramount role in Africa in line with prevention and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic. AIK has a lot of opportunities to be raised from the position it is currently in. We noted that Zimbabweans like other Africans in various African countries, are producing lots of indigenous knowledge on COVID-19 pandemic in their informal and formal systems, in both rural and urban spaces. These are affordable, readily available and environmentally friendly. However, it has a lot of challenges especially in line with the fact that local knowledge is dismissed and put to the periphery as inferior by both foreigners and Africans themselves. One major challenge of AIK is lack of clinical studies to suggest that they ‘cure’ COVID-19 pandemic or other diseases. Further to this, there are gaps regarding to their toxicity. Hence, without delay IK in Africa should be documented, studied and modified if essential and then widely propagated to encourage management of COVID-19 and development as well. For AIK to be truly effectual an all-inclusive and multi-­disciplinary approach is highly called for. In actual fact, the chapter reiterates the need for knowledge production using requisite terms and frameworks to the broader scheme of epistemic liberation in Africa with regard to COVID-19 pandemic management.

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References Agency Anadolu. Zimbabweans Hopeful to Beat COVID-19 with Zumbani Plant. Harare Health. Feb 2021. Bhebhe Michael 2021. The Zimbabwe Zumbani Story. Bulawayo 24 News 03 February 2021. Retrieved 21 February 2021. Buffin, J. 2020. In the same Storm Maybe but not in the Same Boat-Who Will Pay the Recovery from COVID-19? https://www.uclan.ac.uk./research/explore/groups/assets/in-the-same-stormmaybe-jez-buffin.PDF. Retrieved 8 December 2021. Cassata, Cathy. 2021 June, 22. Doctors Debunk 9 Popular COVID-19 Vaccine Myths and Conspiracy Theories. Retrieved 8 Dec 2021. Cohen, Lewis. 1994. Manion Lawrence Research Methods in Education. 4th ed. London: Routledge. Conspiracy Theories on COVID-19 Vaccines Can be as Deadly as Virus Itself. SAMRC. Coronavirus disease. 2019. (COVID-19) Situation Report-94. Accessed at https://www.who. int>situation-reports>2 on 7 Feb 2021. Creswell, John. 2010. W.  Qualitative Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. London: Sage. Dandara, Collet, Dzobo, Kevin, & Chirikure, Shadrech. (2020 July, 10). COVID-19 Pandemic and Africa: From the Situation in Zimbabwe to a Case for Precision Herbal Medicine. Omics. Journal of integrated Biology. Degawan, Minnie. 2020 June. Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine. Kasiyanna: Turning to Indigenous Knowledge During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Dube, Ernest, and Edson Munsaka. 2018. The Contribution of Indigenous Knowledge to Disaster Risk Reduction Activities in Zimbabwe: A big Call to Practitioners. Jamba: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies 10 (1). https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v10i1.493. Du Toit, A. & Van der Kooy, F. 2019. Artemisia Afra, a controversial herbal remedy or a treasure trove of new drugs? J. Ethnopharmacol 244, 112–127. Dzinamarira, Tafadzwa, Solomon Mukwenha, Rouzeh Eghtessadi, Diego F.  Cuadros, Gibson Mhlanga, and Godfree Masuka. 2020. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Response in Zimbabwe: A Call for Urgent Scale- Up of Testing to Meet National Capacity in Clinical Infectious Diseases ciaa1301. In Covid-19 and Innovation in Africa -A Thought Leadership Series. University of Witwatersrand, African centre for the study of the United States. African Portal. https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciaa1301. Flavier, J., M. Slikkeerveer, L.J. Brokensa, and D. 1995. The Regional Program for the Promotion of Indigenous Knowledge in Asia. In The Cultural Dimension of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems, ed. J.M.  Warren and D.  Slikkeerveer Brokensa. London: Intermediate Technology Publicans. Folayan, Morenike Oluwatoyin. 2021. Covid-19 Preparedness: Capacity to Manufacture Vaccines, Therapeutics and Diagnostics in Sub-Saharan Africa. Global and Health 24: 2021. Interviewee A. (Interviewed 27 Feb 2021). Interviewee B. (Interviewed 10 Feb 2021). Interviewee C. (Interviewed 9 Feb 2021). Interviewee D. (Interviewed 14 Feb 2021). Interviewee E. (Interviewed 15 Feb 2021). Interviewee F. (Interviewed 24 Feb 2021). Interviewee G. (Interviewed 21 Feb 2021). Interviewee H. (Interviewed 3 March 2021). Leitzing, J. 2020. What Does COVID-19 Still have in Store for Africa? https://www.weforum. org/agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-what-does-covid-19-­still-have-in-store-for-Africa. Retrieved June 28 2021 Lone Shabir Ahmad, H., and Aijaz Ahmad. 2020. COVID-19 Pandemic – An African Perspective. Emerging Microbes & Infections. Vol. 9(1). UK: Taylor & Francis.

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Chapter 14

African Knowledge Systems: Shona Paremiology in Promoting Morals, Peace and Human Security Silindiwe Zvingowanisei and Francis Machingura

Introduction Africans just like other ancient societies have had their unique knowledge systems that ensured peace and security in their societies. The Shona are one of the African tribes that has deep belief in their proverbs (tsumo). Africa is marked by flashes of insecurity, attacks, ethnic rancor, cultural frictions, racism, tribalism, terrorism, interalia, Africa is blessed with a rich culture which can be utilized to address the above mentioned challenges bedeviling society. African societies have unique knowledge systems that can be panacea to the social ills. Proverbs (tsumo) have remarkable characteristics that can positively influence individuals and their societies (Hrisztova-Gotthardt and Varga 2015). This chapter highlights that Africans, the Shona in particular have their own conceptions of reality, knowledge and truth. We call upon the African people to liberate their conceptions of reality, knowledge and truth from the slavery and dominance of the European/Western epistemological paradigm. The chapter interrogates the role of Shona proverbs (tsumo) in fostering peace, morals and security in Africa. We are guided by the following research question: What is the role of indigenous knowledge (proverbs) in promoting peace, morals and security among the Shona? This will be achieved through an analysis of the Shona conception of moral values, peace and human security and the proverbs which promote the same. The paper uses the qualitative research approach and the phenomenological method in a bid to see reality from the believers’ point of view. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the description of the Shona, definition of key terms, and the background of IKS and proverbs S. Zvingowanisei . F. Machingura (*) Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Centre for Postgraduate Studies and Faculty of Education, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_14

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(paremiology). The second section discusses the Shona worldview and philosophy. The third section analyses Shona proverbs on moral values, peace and human security and then the conclusion.

The Shona The Shona are found in Zimbabwe, a land-locked country between South Africa to the South, Botswana to the West, Zambia to the North and Mozambique to the East (Taringa 2008). Mozambique is, however, also home to some Shona people who have been living there even before the exodus of Zimbabweans into neighbouring countries. 67% of the population lives in the rural areas. There are two major ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, that is, the Shona and the Ndebele. The Shona tribe constitutes about 77% of the population with 17% Ndebele while Whites, Asians and others constitute the remaining 6% (Taringa 2008). The Shona is the largest indigenous language group. Thus, the Shona form the majority group of the indigenous population of Zimbabwe. The Shona rarely use the term Shona in reference to themselves. Rather they tend to refer to themselves by the name of the particular Shona-speaking group to which they belong (Bucher 1980). African scholarship on the Shona are, however, of the view that this perspective is mainly propagated by Western thinkers who seek to understand Shona people according to their different dialects so that they can conquer them as a divided people. Thus, while such dialects do exist, the Shona themselves do not identify with them. The term generally refers to dialects. These dialects are Karanga, Manyika, Ndau, Korekore and Zezuru. The Karanga are found in the south-west, the Ndau and Manyika in the east, the Korekore in the north and the Zezuru in the centre (Taringa 2008). So, when we speak of the Shona, we imply all those who speak dialects of Shona in Zimbabwe.

Defining African Knowledge Systems The desire to know is said to be innate in every human being (Kanu et al. 2020). It is this innate desire that engenders the type of knowledge that is said to be contemporaneous with a particular person or group of people. It is in this respect that we can talk of African Indigenous Knowledge (AIK) as the knowledge system that is hinged on the way of life and worldviews of the Africans (Kanu et al. 2020). Africans have got some unique experiences and, thus, they can lay hold to a particular system of knowledge. Admittedly, African Knowledge Systems (AKS) are not homogenous. However, generally, African Knowledge is knowledge that is said to be African, that is, deriving from Africa or focusing on Africa. The concept of AKS is broad and varied. It covers a large spectrum of disciplines resulting in definitions varying according to its wide-ranging use. Thus, the term African Knowledge Systems is in itself a contested concept (Mapara 2009; Mawere 2010; Muyambo

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2017). The concept of African Knowledge Systems has often been associated in the Western context hence the primitive, wild and natural concepts (Muyambo 2017). This definition draws our attention to the colonial prejudiced idea that African knowledge system is a matter of trials and errors western while science is characterized by experimentation. The Western representations reflect little appreciation or understanding of the African proverbs and African people. Given such contestations surrounding African knowledge, the chapter concurs with Mapara (2009) who defines AKS as a body of knowledge or bodies of knowledge of the African people and are linked to a particular geographical area whereby its inhabitants have relied and survived on that body of knowledge for a long time. The fact that AKS are unique to specific communities explains our rationale for focusing on the Shona. The Shona people valued AKS and the centrality of Proverbs in inculcating moral values to the youth. AKS is also known as: • • • •

Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS); Local Knowledge (LK); Traditional Knowledge (TK); Indigenous Technical Knowledge (ITK).

The terms are used interchangeably. The use of the word “systems” is significant because it foregrounds the holistic nature of African Knowledge. In essence, AKS is more than an ordinary science because it entails interalia, matters relating to: • • • •

Peace and Security; Governance; Environmental Management; and Spiritualism.

African knowledge is the local knowledge embedded in a community and its broader cultural traditions such as community practices, beliefs, institutions, relationships, rituals, norms, values, morals, proverbs, idioms, taboos, a system of building peace and providing security. These characteristics make it unique to a particular culture and society hence defining the identity of the community. The values represent the skills and innovations of a particular group of people as well as the collective wisdom and resourcefulness of the community. These multifarious attributes of AK are a rich and invaluable resource for the promotion of morals, peace and security.

The Visibility of AKS The influence of AKS is witnessed in the various facets of life amongst the Shona. The AKS have varying facets such as medicine, agriculture, security, botany, zoology, craft skills and linguistics (Mapara 2009). In the case of medicine, indigenes developed traditional ways of healing and containing diseases. The resilience of IKS in the field of medicine gave birth to the formal recognition of traditional healers and/or alternative medical practitioners and traditional herbs by the Zimbabwean

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government since independence in 1980. The Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA) was formed as a body that formally recognised medical practitioners and traditional herbs (Mapara 2009). In the Zimbabwean context, AKS have also been widely used by the indigenes in the field of peace building and human security. Since African communities are informed by AKS, researching on AKS leads to the important rediscovery of our cultural values or indigenous ways of life. Evidence is awash that most African people rely on AKS for their survival especially in the fields of agriculture, health, education, peace-building and human security. Chirimuuta and Mapolisa (2011) posit that, the dominant model of development in most African countries has been guided by knowledge generated in laboratories, research stations and universities. Their research anchored the indigenous knowledge systems as an integral part of food security and promotion and utilization of local production systems. The local survival strategies had (and still have) the capacity to renew themselves through the innovativeness of the people in their unique ecologies as well as through their interaction with other social systems, and ultimately contribute to the realization of food security in Zimbabwe. They argue that the pool of knowledge and expertise on food security, in the traditional Zimbabwean context, was driven and given impetus by the way of life of the local people. The indigenous Zimbabwean local knowledge for food security is part of a plethora of time-tested survival strategies which took cognizance and depended on symbiotic relationship between food security and locally available resources. According to Chirimuuta and Mapolisa (2011), the colonial system set up a scene for the establishment of an economic system where Zimbabweans, like most African states, occupied a second class partner status. This relationship inhibited most African nations from advancing their own science and technology and thus allowing Europeans, through their control of African economies, a chance to widen the technological and industrial gap between Africa and Europe. This contact brought the loss of confidence and faith in the local food varieties, African medicines and food security systems as well as the African wisdom in general and, thus, resulted in them looking down upon African scientific food security strategies. The indigenous people had their own scientific mechanisms of ensuring a reliable supply or source of food throughout the years. They give examples of time-tested strategies such as extending the shelf lives of different types of seasonal and perishable foods and the use of storage facilities that are strategically designed to promote and safeguard food security.

Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Proverbs (Paremiology) The Shona people of Zimbabwe have traditional ways of fostering moral values, peace and human security dating back to pre-colonial times. Among the Shona, the elders are regarded as sources of wisdom and their spoken words are often spiced up with deep thoughtful statements such as proverbs (tsumo), idioms (madimikira) and other figures of speech. According to Speake and Simpson (2015), a proverb is a

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traditional saying which offers advice and presents moral decadence in a short pithy manner. The profuse use of proverbs, arguably, is bound to restore some order to society. Proverbs have a subtle but powerful means of making people think and see life differently as part of vision and action (Clifford 1999). Shona proverbs are very useful because they are used in judging, counselling, healing crisis management, soothing, warning and encouraging people to live peaceful lives. The Shona know fully well that kind and rude statements have the power to create peace or war respectively. The Shona Indigenous Knowledge System has proverbs (tsumo) for almost every situation and every aspect of life. There are words and proverbs spoken to the bereaved, for good conduct in children, for hard work and encouragement, for a choice of, or moral justification of war or peace to the warring party, for security of life and protection of territories, in marriage, for praise, at birth, death, interalia. The Shona believe so much in the values and richness of proverbs and the elders have used them profusely in both pre and post-colonial times. At the dare (gathering place for men), Shona men garnish their statements with well-seasoned proverbs. While speaking, they conveniently employ proverbs that are relevant to the topic being discussed to strike their point home. The use of proverbs has been very useful in the training of children in many Shona traditions. The Shona are aware that early use of proverbs on children helps them to grow with deep respect for life, unity, hard work and inculcates quality moral values in them. The use of tsumo in bringing up children has helped to address social ills such as juvenile delinquency. Mamser (2007): ix) takes a proverb as a mastery art as well as short saying, that expresses a general truth about life; gives advice, make an observation, or present a teaching in a succinct and memorable way. The Shona also use other important expressions of speech which are difficult to distinguish from proverbs such as: (a) Simile (fananidzo) which draws comparison between two things such as Akareba sefuriramudenga (He is as tall as a giraffe); akashinga seshumba (she is as brave as a lion); (b) Metaphor (dimikira) which is used to express something in order to strike home a point such as inyoka (she is a snake), ane moyo wedombo (she has a heart of stone). (c) Hyperbole (gudzamukanwa) which is the use of exaggerated words to strike home one’s point such as akasviba setsito (she is as black as soot), arikumhanya kupfuura mhepo (she is running faster than the wind); (d) Ideophone (nyaudzosingwi) which are words that evoke an idea in sound often a vivid impression of certain sensations or sensory perceptions such as dhiii (a sound produced when something has fallen), vhuu (used when something or someone has arrived); (e) Idiom (dimikira) which is a group of words established by usage as having a meaning not deducible from those of the individual words such as, uraya shiri mbiri nedombo rimwe (kill two birds with one stone), kubaiwa kumusana (stabbed in the back) (https://www.caeexamstips.com).

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In Shona society, numerous proverbs and idiomatic expressions are meant for different occasions. Replete with deep wise sayings, proverbs are sometimes very hard for a layman to comprehend. Elders who use tsumo think before uttering them as they can hold hurtful words or deep meanings depending on the occasion. A detailed study of Shona proverbs proves that they are powerful tools which can positively change human behaviour. Proverbs stimulates moral values among the youths, peace in the society and respect for human life and property. Among the Shona, some proverbs have left the old and young alike ruminating as some of them are difficult to comprehend. Mieder gives a comprehensive overview of what paremiology means in Proverbs: A Handbook, Mieder (2004:125) writes, Any interest in proverb whatsoever leads quite naturally to the question of what makes proverbs “click” that is, what differentiates these short texts from normal utterances or such subgenres as proverbial expressions, proverbial comparisons, twin formulas, and wellerisms. When inquiring about definition, origin, history, dissemination, language, structure, meaning, use and function of such phraseological units or phraseologies, one enters the realm of proverb scholarship or paremiology as it is called in Greek technical term.”

In a study which focuses on proverbs in Zimbabwe advertisements, Liveson Tatira (2001) explores the ways in which proverbs and other witty sayings have been “liberated” and disseminated in Zimbabwe through the mass media. Analyzing the continuous presence of proverbs in advertisements in Zimbabwe, he avers that the use of proverbs adds authenticity to advertisements as proverbs are considered to be truths coming out of real life experience and texted by past generations. Furthermore, they are advices to be accepted without questioning. The Constitution of Zimbabwe urges Zimbabweans to preserve their heritage. The aim of The National Arts, Culture and Heritage Policy of Zimbabwe is to promote and support the safeguarding of Zimbabwe’s cultural and natural heritage. One of the Policy objectives is to promote heritage conservation and awareness of such items artifacts, archives, monuments and historic sites, as well as intangible heritage including oral tradition, indigenous knowledge and folklore (unesco.org 2021).

In his foreword to the Policy, the Minister of Rural Development, Promotion and Preservation of National Culture and Heritage (Hon. A. Ncube (MP)) said, The National Arts, Culture and Heritage Policy is consistent with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and aspirations of the people. It also strives to be consistent with the African Union Charter for Cultural Renaissance and aspiration number 5 of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 among other International Conventions, Protocols and Agreements that the Zimbabwe government is party to (unesco.org 2021).

The minister urged all stakeholders including all government ministries, all state institutions, organisations, churches, civil society, associations and public and private agencies to embrace this policy for safeguarding and upholding values, practices and strategies that promote cohesion, mutual social accountability and responsibility that our African Ubuntu/Unhu philosophy articulates, for the common good of the entire Zimbabwean society (unesco.org 2021). The Secretary in the same Ministry, Mr. S. Magosvongwe, noted that the Policy seeks to inculcate and reinforce the concept of Unhu/Ubuntu especially its

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embodied virtues of interalia mutual respect, mutual social responsibility, mutual assistance, mutual trust, mutual social accountability, hardwork, integrity, unselfishness and sharing. Ubuntu/Unhu collectively urges every Zimbabwean to safeguard and uphold the significance of each and every human being and for all Zimbabweans of all walks of life to consider each other as social beings, in addition to taking care of their environment and natural heritage and further to develop a positive selfesteem so that Zimbabwe can intrinsically re-invent itself. In the process, the Policy will cause the radiation of Zimbabwean ideals and values from home, through to schools, local communities and larger arms of government and private institutions (unesco.org 2021).

 he Shona World-View, Proverbs T and Unhu/Ubuntu Philosophy Every society has a philosophy and world view that guides them. Proverbs are part of that philosophy. Proverbs are linked to the spiritual realm. The Shona believe in the existence of different types of spirits arranged in hierarchical order with God (Mwari) at the apex, followed by ancestral spirits (vadzimu) and then other spirits such as alien spirits interalia (Bourdillon 1976). While some non-African anthropological studies such as Bourdillon (1976) claim that the Shona put more importance on vadzimu than on God. African phenomenological studies posit that this position is somehow not true. Vadzimu are believed to be concerned with the daily lives of the Shona, for example, the Shona look to their midzimu (plural of mudzimu) for help, protection and support. The midzimu are spirits of the dead but they are believed to be still alive and active. Mbiti (1969) calls them the living-dead. When a person dies, he is not thought of as being detached from the family just because they are believed to be members of the family. There are proverbs in that respect. There is belief in life after death. However, one must have lived a morally upright life in order to become a mudzimu. Social deviants such as witches cannot become ancestral spirits (Bourdillon 1976). Ancestral spirits are concerned about the welfare, peace, security and prosperity of their own children. Whereas Mwari is consulted and concerned about serious national issues such as drought and war; ancestral spirits are consulted on personal issues like protection on journeys, bad luck and agricultural production. Generally, their role is to protect the living children from evil spirits and physical enemies such as witches (Bourdillon 1976). Midzimu also believed to ensure fertility of the land and success in socio-economic endeavors hence acts as guardians of their immediate descendants. Ancestral spirits look into descendants’ health and welfare by providing goodies such as bumper harvest, wives, husbands, children and all that is desirable. Midzimu are believed to be benevolent when they protect, bless and prosper the living (Gelfand). Proverbs are there to confirm the benevolence of the ancestral spirits. The Shona proverbs are linked to the moral virtues expected of the Shona people.

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Morality is the driving force that characterizes the socialization of the Shona people. The concept of Ubuntu is an alternative to individualistic and utilitarian philosophies that dominate in the West. It is a Zulu/Xhosa word, with parallels in many other African languages, which is most directly, translated into English as “humanness”. In Shona, it is Unhu. Its sense, however, is best conveyed by the Shona expression munhu munhu ngevanhu/nevanhu or umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu in Nguni which means a person is a person through other people. Another expression is “I am a person through other people”, my humanity is tied to yours. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, explained it this way: One of the sayings in our country is ubuntu – the essence of being human. Ubuntu speaks particularly about the fact that you cannot exist as a human being in isolation. It speaks about our interconnectedness. We think of ourselves far too frequently as just individuals, separated from one another, whereas you are connected and what you do affects the whole world. When you do well, it spreads out; it is for the whole of humanity (clintonfoundation. org 2012).

Ubuntu can perhaps be best understood as a social philosophy based on principles of care and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness that express the fundamental interconnectedness of human existence (Bolden 2014). It has been described as a philosophy of people and is perhaps best known as a guiding concept of the African Renaissance, spearheaded by post-colonial and post-­ apartheid leaders in South Africa such as Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu and Thabo Mbeki in which Africans are urged to re-engage with African values (Bolden 2014). According to Metz (2019), the word ubuntu is from some Southern African languages and it literally means humanness. To have ubuntu is to be a person who is living a genuinely human way of life, whereas to lack ubuntu is to be missing human excellence. For Africans, one’s basic aim in life should be to exhibit ubuntu, which is done by prizing communal relationships with other people (Metz 2019). Murove (2012) posits that there can be no genuinely global ethic until non-Africans take African heritage seriously. For many years African ethics has been marginalized in the mainstream ethical discourses. A discussion on the ethics or philosophy of Ubuntu is usually suspected by Western scholars for being another way of African scholars advancing their own hidden agendas against the values or philosophies they received from the Western world. Whilst Ubuntu has originated with African societies since time immemorial, there is a tendency among Western scholarship to trivialize this truism (Murove 2012). In his book African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Ramose (1999) argues that Ubuntu is at the root of African philosophy and being. According to him, Ubuntu is a wellspring that flows within African existence and epistemology in which the two aspects ubu and ntu constitute a wholeness and oneness. For the Shona people, Ancestors expect the living to maintain peace and tranquility in the family. If the living people fail to respect the social, economic, political and religious order, for example, committing incest, the ancestors punish them by withdrawing their protection thereby causing diseases, illnesses, misfortunes (munyama) and barrenness in people, animals and the land. Ancestral spirits are believed to withdraw their

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protection against evil spirits, witchcraft and sorcery. Proverbs and idioms are then used to communicate that message. The Shona people believe that a witch cannot succeed to bewitch someone unless she first gets permission from the victim’s ancestors (Bourdillon 1976). When the ancestors give a witch permission to bewitch their children, this is a Shona idiom called kuvhura musuwo (opening the door). Through sacrifices (bira) done for ancestors, therefore, the ancestors expect the living to maintain or restore the relationship with them and to be reconciled with all the family members. Not only are ancestors loved, but they are feared too because of their ability to cause sickness or other misfortunes if the living violates taboos, for instance, murder or rape (Bourdillon 1976). The fear of angering Mwari, the Supreme God and Midzimu (ancestral spirits) make the Shona wary of their actions. Most Shona moral teachings come through the words and statements they make, for example, folktales, parables, proverbs, idioms and metaphors. The Shona believe in profuse use of proverbs (tsumo) to correct people and shape their communities. The use of proverbs has worked for them for years. Lamentably, this vital aspect of Shona culture has been adversely affected by modernity, civilization, globalization, urbanization, westernization, colonization and migration (rural-urban included) among other challenges.

 hona Proverbs (Tsumo) on Moral Values, Peace S and Human Security The Shona proverbs address holistic aspect of human life. There are proverbs (tsumo) that deliberately focus on moral values, peace and human security among other issues. According to Hartman (2009), moral conduct is always conduct towards persons, but also in connection with other kinds of values and counter values. Moral values presuppose other goods as well as specific qualities expected of them. This resonates well with Ugwueze (2011)‘s observation that African culture is still useful today and demonstrates how we can use it to bring Africa back on its feet. Culture and morality are goods that define security, unity, peace and development of every people. Human security is multi-sectoral in nature because it involves the understanding of other forms of insecurities or threats such as economy, health, environment, person, community and politics. Essentially, seven elements are associated with human security, that is, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Human security is necessary for national, regional and global stability. In the same vein, people should look within and utilize what they already have in their cultural norms and values, as a way of tackling all round insecurity, as well as providing human security for the people. Martin and Owen (2013) postulate that for many people the idea of human security may be hazy. On the same note, Freks and Coldewijk (2006) argues that, human security is about everyday realities of violent conflict and poverty, humanitarian crisis, epidemic diseases, threat, injustice and inequality.

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Shona people have clear concepts of virtues and vices of personality. Thus, they have a definite idea of what constitutes correct behaviour in their society and of its importance (Gelfand 1973). Good relations between one person and another, between the physical world and the spiritual world are bound to suffer if one should commit an antisocial act. The Shona have different types of sanctions or taboos which are designed to ensure proper behaviour. Everyone must be very careful to avoid suspicion of anti-social attitudes being attributed to them. In Shona society, everyone is concerned with social justice, fairness, obligation and responsibility. Every member of society is regarded as important. Every person counts and has their place and respect accorded to them as a person (munhu). No one is left out. All vices are seen as threats to human security while virtues are regarded as promoting social intercourse, respect and unity. All vices are condemned as anti-social. Every member of the community is expected to exude good moral behaviour. Proverbs are evoked to cofirm such expectations. There is a uniform system of punishment for bad behaviour or misdemeanour or moral misbehaviour through the local courts (dare), for example, a man can be charged with despoiling an unmarried girl or committing adultery or engaging in any disrespectful behaviour. A person who exhibits good behaviour (tsika) towards others, is liked by people because of hunhu/ubuntu. Hunhu is close to personality or character which is derived from hunhu is derived from the parents, tribal practices and inherited from the distant past through proverbs, riddles, metaphors, idioms, hyperboles, similes, ideophones and other expressions. In particular, Shona proverbs are so powerful that they stimulate imagination and images in the minds of the listener, persons saying them and that includes readers.

Shona Proverbs and Morality Shona proverbs promote moral values. One such proverb is Chakaona/Chawana hama hachisekwi (what another person experienced should not be a source of laughter). One must not derive joy at the adverse experiences of other people because one day one can find oneself in the same negative experience. Another proverb is Kupa kuturika (giving is investing) which means when one gives, one can expect good thing in return. Those who are stingy cannot expect to receive. A similar proverb is kandiro kanoenda kunobva kamwe (a small plate goes where another came from). The Shona also encourage hospitality to visitors or strangers through proverbs such as mombe inopfuura haipedzi uswa (a passing cow does not finish the grass) and Muenzi haapedzi dura (a visitor does not finish the granary). Both proverbs mean that a visitor or stranger is only a passerby and cannot eat up all your food supplies when paying a visit. The proverbs promote generosity and goodwill among the generality of Africans and the Shona people in particular. Among the Shona, a good person does not go out divulging secrets to the public. This belief is expressed in tsumo such as nhumbu mukadzi mukuru hairevi chayadya (a womb is a seasoned woman, which does not expose what has been eaten) and

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mukadzi muuya haafukuri hapwa (a good wife does not expose her armpits). Ndomene haichemedzi (self-made problems should not make one cry) means one should not cry after creating trouble for oneself or creating problems for other or the community. The problem encourages good contact for every member of society. As a result, Shona children are taught obedience through proverbs such as Mwana asingateereri anodya chedemo, chebanga haachidye (a disobedient child eats what has been cut by an axe and not what has been cut by a knife). We find almost similar proverbs in the Old Testament (Proverbs 6:23, 12:1, 13:1, 19:18, 22:15, 23:13–15, 29:17). The practical meaning is that when someone is disobedient, he/she will only eat what can be seen in public and not what is hidden in secret. Other proverbs which foster moral values are Ashamba haanokorerwi sadza (a person who has washed his/her hands does not have food dished to him (her)) meaning a cultured person gets some favours and social help; and Mapudzi anowira kusina hari (squashes fall to people without pots) meaning fortune favours people without resources or wisdom.

Shona Proverbs on Peace and Unity Besides proverbs which promote moral values, the Shona also have those which foster peace and unity. Kugara kunzwana (living together calls for peaceful co-­ existence) and Murombo munhu (a poor person is also a human being). The two proverbs call for harmony and peaceful co-existence amongst members of the community. In the administration of justice, leaders are not expected to use violence or force or to intimidate disputants/offenders evidenced by proverbs such as Mhosva haitongwi nepfumo (a case is not settled by a spear). Dare harivengi munhu, rinovenga mhosva translated as (the court does not hate a person but the crime). The two proverbs emphasise on fairness and justice when settling disputes or disagreements. Chara chimwe hachitswathe nyi inda (One fingernail cannot kill lice) calling for unity, respect and collegiality. Unity is power and strength, even in times of trouble as illustrated in proverbs. Makudo akavengana pakudya, papfumvu anorwirana (Baboons fight over food but collaborate when facing danger). Hukama haugezwe setsvina translated as a relationship cannot be gotten rid of just like dirt. The proverb promotes peace and unity. The practical meaning is that a person cannot easily discard his/her relative because of the deep social and spiritual bond between them. Another proverb is Afirwa haatariswi kumeso (one who is bereaved is not looked at in the face). The practical meaning is that when someone is in sorrow, there is need for sympathy from close people. Actions and words made under stress or sorrow are not to be taken seriously. Mwana asingachemi anofira mumbereko (a child who does not cry dies in the cradle) means one should voice one’s complaints or problems. Two more proverbs which foster peace and unity are Utsva hwerurimi hahuna marapiro (aburn on the tongue cannot be treated) and Hapana mhou inokumira mhuru isiri yayo (no cow mows for a calf which is not its own). The two proverbs indicate that, some problems have no solution and that everyone knows his own kith and kin respectively.

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Shona Proverbs on Human Security Shona proverbs promote human security. One example is Musha mukadzi (a home is a wife) which means a home cannot be a home without a woman/wife. A woman is associated with the stability of the family. Another example is Chirere chigokurerawo (look after it, it will look after you) which means parents should take care of their children; in turn their children will realise and appreciate taking care of them in old age. In Shona culture, no one, not even the chief is permitted to trample on other’s interests. This is evidenced in proverbs such as Garwe haridyi chebamba, charo chinozaneronga (a crocodile does not raid for food; its food comes to it through the water or through set strategy). Kamoto kamberevere kanopisa matanda mberi (a low intensity fire left to burn for long could burn the logs) also promotes human security. Its practical meaning is that a seemingly minor irregularity could have significantly unfavourable consequences if left unchecked. The Shona believe that every contribution from members counts and the proverb Atswinya arwa (One who has pinched has fought) demonstrate this. Participation of every member is applauded amongst the Shona people through proverbs. And some proverbs are meant to warn people against misdemeanour in society. Rambakuudzwa akaonekwa nembonje pahuma (He who will not be told was found with a bruise on the forehead) means someone who does not listen to wise counsel will find himself in trouble. In Shona custom, a man who inherits a wife inherits her children as well. The proverb counsels people or members of the family to stand in for the needy especially children after the passing on of one family parents or guardians. This practice is found in proverbs such as Akweva sanzu akweva nemashizha aro (One who has pulled a branch along has pulled along its leaves). It encourages support to children born out of wedlock. The practical meaning of Chiripamuchena chiripamutenure (What is on a poor man is on a slope and not secure) is that because of his bad luck, a poor man is ever in want. Panodya ishe veranda vanodyawo (When the chief eats, the subjects eat as well) and Unaki hwemukadzi huri pamwana (The beauty of a wife lies in the child) also fall under the category of proverbs which promote human security which implies that the office of the chief benefits his people. The latter means that a good wife is one who bears children and is able to teach them good morals. Having stated the value of proverbs in fostering moral values, peace and human security among the Shona, these invaluable and traditional values should not be looked down upon but be appreciated and revitalized once more. Because of the value of paremiology in the contemporary world characterized by different forms of crises, the chapter recommends that African societies, the Shona in particular revisit their traditional values that are morally constructive to reformation of character and promotion of peace and security. Proverbs are used in peace building, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict transformation in African societies.

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Conclusion The chapter analysed paremiology and has highlighted the need for Africans, the Shona in particular to embrace their cultural values, personality, identity and self-­ esteem. The moral rottenness is blamed on the practical neglect of constructive cultural values of the people. African people should liberate their conceptions of reality, knowledge and truth from the slavery and dominance of the European/ Western epistemological paradigm. Africans must value their vital beliefs and practices such as proverbs for the promotion of moral values, integrity, self-respect, peace and human security.

References Bolden, R. 2014. “Ubuntu” in Encyclopaedia of Action Research. London: SAGE Publications. Bourdillon, M.F.C. 1976. The Shona Peoples: An Ethnography of the Contemporary Shona with Special Reference to their Religion. Gweru: Mambo Press. Bucher, H. 1980. Spirits and Power: An Analysis of Shona Cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chirimuuta, C., and T. Mapolisa. 2011. Centring the Peripherised Sytems: Zimbabwean Indigenous Knowledge Systems for Food Security. Zimbabwe International Journal of Open and Distance Learning 1 (2) International Research Conference Revised Edition. Clifford, R.J. 1999. Proverbs: A Commentary. U.S.A: Westminster John Knox press. Freks, G., and B.K.  Coldewijk. 2006. Human Security and International Security. Wageningen Academic Publishers. Gelfand, M. 1973. The Genuine Shona. Gweru: Mambo Press. Hartman, N. 2009. Moral Values. USA: Transaction publishers. Hrisztova-Gotthardt, H., and M.A. Varga. 2015. Introduction to Paremiology: A Comprehensive Guide to Proverbs. De Gruyyer. Kanu, I. A. et al. 2020. African Indigenous Knowledge and Peacebuilding. https://www.acjol.org/ index.php/jassd/article/view/1557/1539. Accessed 10 Jan 2021. Mamser, M.H. 2007. The facts on file dictionary of proverbs. New York: Facts on file, Inc. Mapara, J. 2009. Indigenous Knowledge Systems in Zimbabwe. Juxtaposing Post-Colonial Theory Journal of Pan African Studies. 3 (1): 139–155. Martin, M., and T. Owen. 2013. Routledge Handbook of Human Security. Routledge. Mawere, M. 2010. Indigenous knowledge systems (IKSs) Potential for Establishing a Moral, Virtuous Society: Lessons in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 12 (7): 209–221. Mbiti, J.S. 1969. African Religion and Philosophy. London: Heineman. Metz, T. 2019. The African Ethic of Ubuntu-1000- Word Philosophy. An Introductory Anthology. https://www.1000wordphilosophy.com. Mieder, W. 2004. Proverbs: A Handbook. Greenwood publishers. Murove, M. F. 2012. Ubuntu. SAGE Journals. https://www.journals.sagepub.com>abs. Accessed 16 Aug 2021. Muyambo, T. 2017. Indigenous Knowledge Systems: A Haven for Sustainable Economic Growth in Zimbabwe. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies 10 (3): 172–186.

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Ramose, M. 1999. African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Speake, J., and J.A.  Simpson. 2015. The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs. U.K.  Oxford University Press. Taringa, N. 2008. A Critical Comparative Analysis of Shona and Christian Attitudes to Nature: Phenomenological Soundings. Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of Zimbabwe. Tatira, Liveson. 2001. Proverbs in Zimbabwean Advertisements. Journal of Folklore Research 38 (3): 229–241. Ugwueze, U.L. 2011. African Culture, Identity and Aesthetics: The Igbo example. USA: Authorhouse.

Chapter 15

A Yòrùbá Worldview on the Compatibility of Human and Nonhuman Animal Relations (HAR) with Environmental Sustainability Adewale O. Owoseni and Isaac Olufemi Olatoye

Introduction Indigenous Yòrùbá worldview of human and nonhuman animal relations (HAR) is quite insightful for interdependent environmental wellbeing. In this discourse, the imperative of Yòrùbá worldview of human and nonhuman animal (hereafter, referred to as animal) relations for environmental sustainability would be emphasised. This is mainly to suggest that while the motive of Yòrùbá worldview seems not to be the same as that of Animal Liberation (Singer 1975; Sagoff 2011), the common standpoint about the moderation of human attitudes and ‘cultured’ practices toward animals is similarly shared. The extent to which indigenous Yòrùbá worldview could be discerned for the fruition of the agenda of One Health that is oneness or compatibility of human, animal and environmental health is the rationale of this discourse. The vision of SDGs 3, 11, 14 and 15 (#Envision2030 n.d) reiterates the necessity of One Health initiative that centers on the sustenance of human, animal and environmental health. This presupposes the inextricable link between One Health and environmental sustainability based on the wellbeing of humans, non-humans and environment as a whole. In other words, the agenda of One Health to synergize health care research and boost public health for the future through uniting human, animal and environmental studies to wrangle zoonotic and infectious diseases (One Health Initiative n.d) is synonymous to sustaining the environment. One Health initiative has been a subject of concern for physicians, anthropologists, veterinarians, and sociologists, which include renowned scholars like Laura A. O. Owoseni (*) University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa I. O. Olatoye University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8_15

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Kahn, Thomas Monath, Bruce Kaplan, and Jack Woodall among many others. Philosophical discourse on One Health could be differently derived. This is subject to the current of thoughts about the incompatibility of animal and environmental health with human health. Philosophers like Baird Callicot, Peter Singer, Tom Regan among others seem to implicitly suggest that the extent of moral, ontological, and epistemological consideration of status ascribed to human, animal and the environment is a crucial factor that cannot be ignored in making the case for a common ground of One Health. This is in terms of the same value attributed to human and non-human entities as subjects. In other words, the course of mitigating zoonotic or infectious diseases, from a holistic conception of health or wellbeing seem to be anchored on the importance attached to the patterns of relations that occur among considerable subjects of values that include humans, non-humans and the environment. HAR remain an example of such manifest pattern of relations through food, pet/ companionship, experimentation, games and so on. In this connection, human and animal relations is also implicated in terms of the status of subjects of values. The realization of this is foregrounded by the incompatible (unequal) value of health accorded to the subjects involved. In lieu of the foregoing, this chapter attempts to engage an indigenous African worldview of HAR, in terms of the compatible value of human health with those of animal and the environment at large. With specific emphasis on indigenous Yòrùbá worldview, it inquires whether the challenge of incompatibility impressed in Western philosophical discourse of animal liberation and environmentalism is sustained in the case of oneness of health. This chapter submits that Yòrùbá notion of HAR is compatible with sustainable environmentalism for engendering the agenda of One Health, and is forged on animistic and weak anthropocentric motives that are distinct from the rationale of animal liberation. This submission is at variance with the global context of discourse on animal liberation and environmentalism that suggests the incompatibility of animal rights (independent autonomy, natural freedom of animals) with holistic environmental wellbeing. Importantly, advancing such argument presupposes the decolonial shift that accrues from the contestation of dominant/extant knowledge spaces in lieu of the agenda of One Health and holistic environment. As such, proceeding from a brief outlook on the contestation of this knowledge scape is essential prior to expounding the philosophical issues on this and the contribution of Yòrùbá notion of HAR.

Knowledge Space, One Health and Environmentalism From the angle of most ex-colonial societies (Quayson 2000), the lingering effects of colonial heritage cannot be underestimated. The manifestation of such lingering effects reflect in erstwhile inherited socio-political and economic institutions as well as the infrastructures of ordering derived from the era of empire building that hitherto erode, and in some cases expanded pre-established forms of ordering

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livelihood in the ex-colonial societies. The alteration of such pre-established forms of ordering livelihood erupt clashes of identities, decenters culture and personality among others, which inadvertently triggered ideologies and literature of resistance that culminated into post-colonial thoughts, ushering in decolonial efforts from diverse contexts; Asian, African, Caribbean and other geo-cultural loci within the Global South (Chinweizu 1975; Barber 1995; Gikandi 2001; Adesanmi 2006). Subsequently, proliferation of ecosystem/environment of reasoning is engendered, resulting into contestation of knowledge spaces of production. Within the precinct of African philosophical curricula (post 1960), the emergence of alternative schools of thought besides the universalist/modernist orientation of thought (that assumes the absolute standpoint of what qualifies as philosophical or otherwise) have contested predominant Western positionalities regarding the authenticity of African forms of knowing, identity, and personality as well as notion of social progress or development (Lauer 2003; Sweet 2014; Chimakonam 2015; Mosima 2016). While expounding further on the veracity of the alternative theorization of African systems of knowing and so on is not the central concern here, emphasizing that this same foundation underscores (African) reflection on the debate of environmentalism is notably important. Godfrey Tangwa (2004), Richard Peterson (2004), and Murove (2004) have contributed in this regard and similarly share the opinion that in African context, the environment is founded on the interdependent agency of human, nonhuman and other natural entities that constitute the environment. The foregoing opinion presupposes a holistic view of the environment or ecosystem as an integrated phenomenon. This seems to align with the crucibles of One Health agenda (which is oneness of health for human, animals and the environment). While One Health agenda is prominently pursued for the sake of ecosystem or environmental wellbeing, which remains a laudable effort, contribution from African context of understanding that proffers a similar sense of oneness of wellbeing is yet to be factored. In order to attempt a thorough inquiry of this preceding assertion, it is essential to engage priorly the existing philosophical contestation of the extent of the compatibility of human and nonhuman animal agency with (broad) environmentalism that informs the One Health agenda. Also, in order to avoid a category mistake of assuming that diverse African cultures or traditions of knowing are mainly homogenous in belief or thought, the discourse would subsequently refer to Yoruba worldview on the polemics.

 hilosophical Issues on Animal Liberation P and Environmentalism In this section, the popular currents of argument about the incompatibility of animal rights with environmentalism would be considered. Animal rights remain one of the philosophical positions within the framework of Animal Liberation. Baird Callicot’s

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work titled “Animal Liberation: Triangular Affairs” argues for the incompatibility of animal right philosophy with environmentalism for the reason that animal rights prohibit population control of sentient animals by means of hunting for instance while environmental ethics permit it. This argument aligns with the opinion of Mark Sagoff (2011) that “environmentalist cannot be animal liberationists. Animal liberationists cannot be environmentalists…moral obligations to nature cannot be enlightened – one cannot even take the first step to the rights of animals.” Basically, Callicot (1989) suggests that the goal of animal rights is to advance autonomy and wellbeing for animals at the expense of human or ecosystem values. Such worldview underrates the value of environmental wellbeing and is considered incompatible with it. In similar terms, Gary Varner (2003: 100) asserts that the factors of human control of species’ population and demands of ecological diversity are the basis for the incompatibility of environmentalism with animal rights philosophy. In Varner’s view, animal rights prioritises moral right of animals to be preserved even when the benefit, happiness, or wellbeing of the society or ecosystem is at stake. On the other hand, environmentalism favors the accomplishment of moral monism that is the collective moral value of environmental sustenance. Varner critically engages the impression of the advocates of animal rights about Peter Singer’s 1975 seminal work (namely Animal Liberation) as the foundation of this incompatibility. It is argued that while animal rights philosophy expresses incompatibility with environmentalism, Singer’s adoption of the broad sense of moral rights seems compatible with environmentalism. Varner clarifies this through the distinction between what is called Obligatory Management Species like mammals and ungulates and Permissive Management Species like elves, mourning doves, birds among others. The former are species that do not overshoot their carrying capacity in the habitat in ways that degrade the entire habitat for future generations, other species, or their own sake while the latter does otherwise. Furthermore, Varner emphasises that Singer’s notion of moral right does not outrightly ascribe autonomy to animals in terms of deterring human activities involving animals such as in factory farming and other endeavors. Put simply, Varner suggests that Singer seems to prioritise the expedient need of humans to enhance the obliteration of all forms of suffering, harm and other impediments undermining the considerable moral status of animals. In Varner’s opinion, therapeutic hunting for instance would align with Singer’s position. Therapeutic hunting is hunting motivated or designed to secure the aggregate welfare of the target species’ health and its ecosystem, or both. Perhaps, strategy such as therapeutic hunting constitute the intent of the legal protection of endangered animal species (wild fauna, inclusive of flora) by Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES 2018), which remains a part of UN and EU global agenda for sustainable ecosystem. From a different angle, Tom Regan in the Case for Animal Rights engages the position that moral rights are limited to the preservation and dignity of individual entities over species or ecosystem, and thus is incompatible with holistic environmentalism. In Regan’s (1994;  2003a,  b,  c: 117) view, this claim attempts to de-­ emphasise the claim of animal rights arbitrarily on the ground of moral rights, and amounts to shallow environmentalism. Regan defended the thesis of moral rights by

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emphasizing that the basic features of moral rights is respect that is the virtue of not harming ‘others’ around us in the environment and avoiding undue intervention in other’s competent capacity of choice or survival. Regan suggests that the perspective about human persons and certain classes of animals such as mammals and birds (with the exception of plants and insects) as subjects-of-a-life within the world justifies the sameness of moral right. However, this perspective is problematic due to the differentials of the levels of subjectivity, awareness of quality of life of human and such animals. In other words, the difference in the moral agency of human and nonhuman animals seems to complicate the notion of subjects-of-a-life. According to Regan (2003b, c : 121), animals and human beings as subjects-of-­ a-life means: We are all the same because we are all in the world. We are all the same because we are all aware of the world. We are all the same because what happens to us matters to us. What happens to us matters because it makes a difference to the quality and duration of our life. There is no superior or inferior, no higher or lower.

Regan suggests that undue human activities such as sporting, subjection of animals to industrial or commercial agriculture purposes, eating of meat and so on should be jettisoned. It is also emphasised that as humans, we ought to ensure un-paternalistic obligation of mitigating actions that affect the quality of animals’ life since they are also subjects-of-a-life. In Regan’s view, this is called compensatory justice. Fundamentally, Regan (2003a, b, c: 117) sustains a position contrary to the expressed view about the incompatibility of animal rights with environmentalism, as opined by Callicot. This is advanced through the counter-argument that moral rights view prioritises the expediency of restricting human freedom to exploit or destroy the natural world. This view is not flawless. The insistence on human persons as moral agents that have obligation to desist from commercial agriculture, poaching and destruction of natural habitats that involves animals, without no moral obligation expected from animals who are also supposed to possess moral sameness seems questionable. Again, the justification of the argument about moral sameness of humans and animals demands further clarification. Put simply, the suggestion of Regan’s subjects-­of-a-life argument seems not sufficient enough to address the issue of incompatibility of animal rights with environmentalism. However, other philosophical reflections exist on the matter. In this connection, post-structuralist and post-­ anthropocentric thinkers like Jacques Derrida (2008), Gary Steiner (2005), Cary Wolfe (2009), Rod Boddice among others attempt to deconstruct such preceding thoughts, which is described as anthropocentric and moral conception of animals. Explicating the intricacies of post-anthropocentric thoughts on the matter is beyond the scope here. To a large extent, it could be stated that the foregoing philosophical debates spur critical engagement and response, especially from climes besides those of the West. On the basis of this, it is also essential to interrogate nonwestern indigenous cultural views on the subject matter. Specifically, attempting the interrogation of indigenous

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African cultural views on such matter reiterate the relevance of decolonising the ‘universal’ assumptions of thoughts and ideology circulated from mainstream Western philosophies that espouse skepticism about the authenticity of African mode of knowing. Indeed, there is a common place understanding that most African mode of knowing are encapsulated in lived oral tradition and practices, a situation that predispose African worldviews to the sanction and authority of presumed ‘universal’ frameworks of Western philosophies. It is therefore apposite at this point to briefly make a case for the justification of lived oral tradition/practices as the framework of most indigenous African worldviews on timely issues before exemplifying the particular context of indigenous Yòrùbá worldview of HAR and its implication for the pursuit of One Health. This is granted on the shared understanding that the Yòrùbá worldview of HAR is encapsulated in lived oral tradition and practices, which suggests an alternative (epistemological) mode of knowing/understanding to extant Western worldviews or philosophies.

Oral Tradition and the ‘Sanction’ of Authenticity Philosophical debates concerning the viability of oral traditions/orature as a reliable source of a peoples’ worldview or knowledge scape remain contested by the acclaimed tradition of literacy or writing that is often elevated in Western enclaves of thought production as the genuine mode of transition of intellectual and communicative contents (Gunner 2004; Ricard 2004). This disparage labelling of oral tradition subsists despite the acknowledgement of the Socratic dialectical method of inquiry, that is often believed to be the initiating drive of the Hellenic-Roman philosophical thoughts, which later culminated into Western philosophy for the most part. African philosophical worldviews that subsequently emerged (not chronologically from Hellenic-Roman foundations) from the hermeneutical base of communal beliefs, myths, folktales, beliefs, sayings, relational attitudes and so on are equally treated with similar aspersion casted on the dialectical nature of its oral traditions. In other words, there seems to be a ‘boundless’ suspicion about African oral traditions that are encapsulated through various cultural forms such as myth, belief, sayings, proverbs among others. Disruption of meaning, loss of content, shrinking memories, imprecision of accounts, lack of evidential support, and more are often recounted as the challenge of oral tradition. These factors spurred sceptical outlooks about its justification as a source and resource of collective knowledge about phenomena, place, persons and communities as the case may be – that is the ‘sanctioning’ of its authentic account or representation of a people’s way of life, ethos, beliefs, and social order. However, one remains wont to engage the grounds of these claims from the literal sense of the science of knowing issued by the continuum of oral tradition that remains sustained to date. Literally, if science as a derived conception or notion from the Latin root word ‘scientia’ implies broadly ‘to know’; one becomes curious about the justification for the sceptical assertions levied against myth, beliefs, or folklores as forms of

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knowing. More so, within the scientific enterprise, the phase of hypothesizing remains conjectural, demanding the probity of commensurate findings with the conjectured hypothesis that could be false or true, given the dependent variables. Pro  – oral tradition scholars like Francis Nyamnjoh et  al. (2021), Oyekan Owomoyela, Innocent Onyewuenyi, Wole Soyinka among others suggest in light of the preceding statement that while the conjecture cum variable-based form of knowing does not qualify less as a science; the inner logic of oral traditional contents like myth, proverbs or popular sayings are also transmutable nodes of knowledge tracts. It is emphasised that they are derived from corresponding observation of the past as point of references for ever changing presence and ‘unknown’ future state of human condition and existence. Apparently, for this ilk of scholars, myth, proverbs, beliefs, and folklores in their various cultural dimensions constitute methodologies or approaches for retrieving the archives of knowing about reality or phenomena within indigenous societies (Falola 2017). Furthermore, to what extent is the exoneration of writing traditions legitimately defensible when it is considered that it can be agreeably fraught with deliberate misrepresentation, intentions of ‘under-writing’ or ‘over-writing’ as the case may be. However, it seems not difficult to understand that making a case for or against any of the two forms of tradition would lead to endless speculative exercise. It is rationally considerable to admit that either oral or written traditions are varying formats or representations of thoughts, communicative contents or knowledge-­ scape of particular people or domains within certain context, which would indubitably be faced with the continual charge of authenticity. Subsequently, for the sake of exemplifying Yoruba worldview or thought of HAR and its implication for One Health/environmental sustainability, the following discourse would embrace the tenets of lived oral tradition and practices for its inherent cognate contents of myth, taboo beliefs, popular sayings, relational attitude and totemic symbols (among others) on the subject matter.

Yòrùbá Conception of Health, Environment and HAR In Yòrùbá conception, Ilérá could be approximated as the state of wellbeing or good health, in the absence of ailérá (sickness/affliction), aìsàn (illness) and àrùn (diseases). The notion of Ilérá as conveyed in Yòrùbá conception suggests the physical and metaphysical coherence of being that is life and existence. This coherence is in terms of normal and appropriate bodily function of Nnkan abęęmi – life subjects. Nnkan abęęmi includes human person, the environment and its constituent. The human person as Nnkan abęęmi in Yòrùbá conception is confirmed to be in the state of Ilérá when the certainty of idęrá (rested mind and body) is guaranteed. Idęrá, also known as “ìbalę okàn atí ara” implies psycho-social and bodily balance that yields àlááfià (peace, tranquility, balance or wellness). In this context, the notion of health in Yòrùbá worldview (Erinosho 1978; Erinosho & Ayonrinde 1978: 401–410; Jegede 1996: 74–75; Jegede 1999: 1–18; Jegede 2002: 322–335) entails physical

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and metaphysical wellbeing of the life subjects. In light of this worldview, the wellbeing of life subjects culminates into the totality of health. This seems to align with the opinion of Alex Nading (2013: 60–78) about ‘production of life’. The equivalence of ‘production of life’ as health forms the basis for the ongoing dynamics and entanglement of human and animals’ relationship with the environment in Nading’s understanding. This gives credence to Yòrùbá notion of health as the totality of human, nonhuman and environmental wellbeing. As Nading (2013: 62) suggests, health as life, is the ongoing dynamics of material and symbolic relationship among humans, other life forms, and their environments. However, in Yòrùbá belief, life subjects are also believed to be potential agents/totems of extra-terrestrial forces that include the ancestors, deities, spirit among others (Leroy et al 2002: 132–134). This belief is indicated in the ontology of reality and existence that expounds the interdependent state of being or existence of human and non-human life forms. Given this, the notion of health implies the physical and metaphysical elements of balanced existence. In this sense, balanced existence means the dialectical manifestation of functional and mal-functional being that is good and bad state of health, which is subject to the potential effect of the extra-terrestrial forces. Kola Abimbola (2005) aptly captures this through his notion of existential and functional hierarchy of being in Yòrùbá thought. Abimbola notes that extra-terrestrial forces inseminate the Yòrùbá cosmos or environment with positive and negative consequences. According to him, following the Ifà sacred text and corpus of knowledge system of the Yòrùbá people, a pantheon of 600 + 1 supernatural beings or powers abound in the spherical cosmos, aligned from left to right hemispheres. The 400 primordial powers on the right side are the Òrìsà (divinities) that are capable of benevolence. The Yòrùbá pray and offer sacrifices to them to earn or attain their desires while the 200 primordial powers on the left hand side are the Ajogun (warrior, who wage war against both humans and Òrìsà) that are believed to be irredeemably malevolent. These malevolent forces are believed in Yòrùbá cosmology to be presided by eight primal Lords called Ikú (Death), Àrùn (Disease), Ófǫ (Loss), Ęgba (Paralysis), Ǫràn (Big Trouble/Calamity), Ęwòn (Imprisonment) and Ęsę (Affliction). Abimbola substantiates this in Yòrùbá belief by making allusion to Ogúndá poem (the ninth book) in Ifà literary corpus thus:

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Ifà -is-the-master-of-today. Ifà -is-the-master-of-tomorrow. Ifà -is-the-master-of-the-day-after-tomorrow-as-well. Òrúnmìlà is-the-master-of-all-the-four-days-(of-the-week)-established-here-on-earth-by-thedivinities. Those were the names of the diviners from the divination practice who performed Ifà Divination for Òrúnmìlà; On the day that all the malevolent supernatural powers. Were repeatedly haunting his household. Death, Disease, Loss, Paralysis, Affliction. Were all glancing at Òrúnmìlà. They were saying that One day, we will succeed in killing him. Òrúnmìlà then set down his divination instrument to consult his Ori.

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Ogúndá Meji was divined. He was advised to offer sacrifice. He offered the sacrifice. After he had completed this sacrifice. His Ori provided protective shielding for him. Death could no longer kill him. Nor could Disease afflict him (Abimbola 2005).

Furthermore, Yòrùbá myths corroborate the interdependency of life subjects and extra-terrestrial forces in the course of existence  (Yoruba Myth of Creation n.d). Specifically, there is need to hint that contentions exist on whether there is a unanimous Yòrùbá worldview on interdependency of being. The idea of conceiving good health as coherent or interdependent being of life subjects with the extra-terrestrial forces is impressed in Yòrùbá mythologies and Ifá corpus. Regarding the idea of interdependency of being as the signifier of a complete state of health (good health), the Yòrùbá are wont to express that ‘ìrǫrùn ígí ní ìrǫrùn ęyę’ which means ‘the wellness of the tree is the wellness of the bird.’ This expression conveys a common ground of wellbeing among life subjects that is the trees and birds in Yòrùbá worldview. It should be noted that such expressions like many other expressions have extended meanings. This means that these expressions can also be used by the Yòrùbá as metaphors for events beyond the literal interpretation for wellbeing. This shift of literal to metaphorical meanings is also implied in Yòrùbá belief of HAR.  Importantly, speaking of the link between Yòrùbá stance of HAR and the phenomenon of health requires consideration of Yòrùbá beliefs and sayings regarding HAR. Ajibade Olusola (2006) has interrogated the Yòrùbá perception of animals on the basic criteria of taxonomy, taboo and mythical representations as well as symbolic interactions of human with animals. Conceptions about human and animal health or wellbeing remain an integral aspect of such approach, as depicted in some common Yòrùbá sayings about the interaction of humans with animals. This is conveyed in some of the following Yòrùbá sayings: Èyàn o tii ri’bi sun, aja n hanrun – where human wellbeing is at stake, the animal’s wellbeing is secondary. Béwúrẹ́ bá ‘lè kú, ko kú, miì lè kómí èèyàn, kí n tún kómí ẹran – tending/caring for fellow humans is more important than that of a goat, even at the point of death. Akéyinje kòmọ̀pé ìdí n ro ádìe – A person who consumes egg care less about the pain of the hen. Mo májá lęyìn, o jan an nígi, emí naa lo jan an nígi – if you beat my dog which follows me with a rod, I am the one you have beaten with the rod ( Olusola 2006: 165).

The sense, in which these sayings suggests Yòrùbá conception of human and animal health would be clarified as the discourse progresses. The view that HAR is moderated through beliefs held about relational practices and attitudes deployed through superstitions, sacrifice and rituals involving animals is also sustained in Yòrùbá

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belief. The instances of vulture (igún) and yellow palm bird (ęyę ęgà) as totemic symbols associated with the state of human and environmental wellbeing suffice in this direction. In the case of yellow palm bird, falling a tree where it perches is believed to cause environmental disasters or doom for such community where this occurs. The same is applicable in the case of the vulture, whose presence is considered vital for the acceptance of sacrifices or rituals conducted in order to avert undesirable state of affairs in terms of human and environmental wellbeing. In this connection, the Yòrùbá renders plea to certain birds like the vulture and the decorous yellow palm bird among others that are considered to be sacred, in the manner below; Bá ò rí gúnnugún, a ò lè ṣẹbọ, bá ò rákàlà, a ò ṣorò – without the presence of the vulture, sacrifices and rituals are unacceptable (Abimbola 1975). Odídẹrẹ́ ẹyẹ òkun. Àlùkò ẹyẹ ọ̀sà. Bí o bá joun gbé, kí o má johùn gbé – Odidere, bird of the sea, aluko, bird of the ocean, heed our voices and accept our plea (Kolajo 2014).

Also, Yòrùbá belief of sacredness about these birds is entrenched through taboo injunction to incite sensitive adherence and accord with the dictates of the divinities, associated with such animals. An apt example here is the Yòrùbá belief that; a kì í jẹ igún, a kì í pagún, a kì í figún b’ọrí – the vulture is not to be killed, eaten, or used as remedy for human destiny. This kind of belief is embraced to allay the undesirable vent of the Ajogun that could fraught environmental and human wellbeing through outbreak of pestilence, paralysis, drought, famine, diseases, death, and so on (Owoseni 2017: 12–20). In this sense, the Yòrùbá believe that undue or frivolous turning of the soil or land by a child would spur the anger of Omo Onile (the earth/ farm goddess) to lead to the death of the erring child’s mother. This is often conveyed in the Yòrùbá taboo injunction that; Ọmọdé kò gbọdọ̀ fi igi fa ilà sílẹ̀, bí èèrà bá kó sójú ìlà náà, ìyá ọmọ náà yóò kú – a child must not use stick to draw lines on the ground, if ants enter any of the lines, the child’s mother would die.

At this juncture, it is important to state that while it may be arguable that most of the Yòrùbá relational attitudes, beliefs or sayings of HAR are driven by superstition, its import for the utility of moral regulation of human interaction with the environment and its constituents is undeniable. Importantly, the question to engage in lieu of the foregoing is; what is the implication of Yòrùbá conception of HAR for One Health.

Implications for One Health The essence of the foregoing exposition of Yòrùbá worldview of HAR encapsulated in sayings, beliefs, and relational attitudes could be discerned for the consideration of health on three fronts accordingly: (i) The primacy of human wellbeing over animals.

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(ii) Extension of wellbeing to animals by virtue of identity with/respect for human wellbeing. (iii) Environmental based belief of wellbeing. Sayings such as “eyan…hanrun” and “béwúrẹ́ bá ‘lè kú, ko kú” suggest the case of (i), based on human exceptional motivation of health or wellbeing over animals’ wellbeing. In this context, a speciesistic motivation for care or health is presupposed with priority granted to human species over nonhuman species. In the case of (ii), the impression that Yòrùbá worldview of animal wellbeing is associated or attached to the recognition of human wellbeing is derived. This indicates the cultural psychological predisposition that shapes human and animal interaction based on respect for fellow humans in Yòrùbá context. This corroborates the relevance of Gail Melson’s (2002: 347–352) attachment thesis that explains how the idea of dignity is conferred on animals by virtue of being a pet, domestic or companion appendage of human persons or individuals. In this connection, the Yòrùbá expressions that “a ki mo alaja…pa” and “akeyinje komope…adie” become meaningful for the attribution of wellbeing to animals on the basis of respect or recognition of the wellbeing of the custodian of the animals. This is probably sustained in Yòrùbá worldview for reasons beyond wellbeing to social order in terms of enhancing peaceful coexistence and togetherness (àlááfià). On the third front (iii), environmental based belief through the imperative of taboos like Ọmọdé kò gbọdọ̀...kú and moral traditions that are deployed through superstition about animals such as vulture (igún) and yellow palm bird (ęyę ǫgà) are sustained to emphasise the vitality of environmental holism. In this context, environmental holism implies the idea of interactive environment where all the constituting parts function for the sustenance of the whole. Yòrùbá myth about the formation of the whole environment by virtue of the primordial agency of proto-­ human (Obàtálá), animals (cock, snail), water, sand and so on aptly captures this. Furthermore, the dialectical manifestations of the malevolent and benevolent nature of the divinities as well as the instance of the intercessory roles of the vulture as in “odidere eye okun…gbe” renders the potency of extra-terrestrial forces to ‘make or mar’ the state of being or wellbeing essential in the Yòrùbá cosmos. Thus, the hint about taboos such as “a ki je igun…bori” could be conceived as a conservative injunction that emphasises the necessity of averting the extinction of rare species through cautious or revered interaction with such animals (that is animism). This is advanced especially for the sake of enhancing cosmic balance or environmental wellbeing physically and metaphysically. Metaphysically, this is sustained through animistic dispositions toward such animals that could be considered as vital forces (to use Placid Tempel’s coinage) that are believed to have the capacity to disrupt or enhance environmental wellbeing. The foregoing impression necessitates the need to raise the fundamental question of; what is the underscoring motivation of HAR in Yòrùbá worldview and to what extent is it compatible to the contemporary pursuit of One Health?

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 nderscoring Principles of HAR and Compatibility with One U Health in Yòrùbá Conception In the preceding section, the idea that animism underscores the nature of environmental based beliefs that are fashioned through cautious interaction of humans with certain animal species has been suggested. Animism in a broad sense, is attributed to the spiritual effects of animals, trees, stones and other entities conceived as totems of extra-terrestrial beings or forces  (Chidester 2005: 78–81; Halverson 1998: 59–67). Particular emphasis in this discourse is on Yòrùbá beliefs about animal agents that traverse the terrestrial to extra-terrestrial realms and its implication for the conservative attitude of humans toward such animals in order to engender human and environmental wellbeing (ilérá & àlááfià). Besides animism, weak anthropocentrism also underscores HAR in Yòrùbá worldview, in lieu of the goal or concern for wellbeing or health. Weak anthropocentrism is the philosophical stance that expounds the consistency of human values with environmental values at large. This is to speak about the enhancement of human values as the medium or means for attaining environmental or ecosystem integrity (Norton 1984: 131–148; Mendenhall 2009: 35–41) that is the idea of ‘live and let live’ over deep anthropocentrism that exclusively prioritises human values at the expense of ecosystem or environmental sustenance. The Yòrùbá myth of the existential agency of human and animals in the course of environmental wellbeing as well as sayings like “a ki mo alaja…pa” aptly conveys the underlying principle of weak anthropocentrism. While sayings such as “béwúrẹ́ bá ‘lè kú, ko kú…ẹran” and “eyan o tiribi…hanrun” exudes speciesistic motivation, it is arguable that it suggests the rationale of deep anthropocentricism. This is mainly because the emphasis here is about the primacy of human wellbeing over animal wellbeing. It is important to note that while it could be sustained that weak anthropocentrism seeks consistency of human values with environmental values, it grants primacy to human values considerably for the attainment of flourishing environmental values. Another vital concern to address in the context of the discourse is the concern of how Yòrùbá notion of HAR seems compatible with environmental sustainability. Addressing this concern is not an easy one due to the contemporary challenges that confront the agenda of One health and environmental wellbeing such as global warming, outbreak of diseases such as monkey pox, EBVD, HIV/AIDS, and COVID among so many more that demand socio-economic as well as techno-scientific solutions. One plausible way to address this is to state that engendering the value of health or wellbeing from an indigenous context would foster eco-friendly attitudinal dispositions through the impetus of conservative and cautionary beliefs (taboos, sayings and superstitious relational attitudes) to complement the fruition of socio-­ economic and techno-scientific approaches. More so, the scientific dimension of traditional use of herbal medicine for specific human and animal diseases treatment could also be appropriately incorporated to bolster such complementary efforts. Importantly, the point stressed here is the use of eco-friendly traditional medicine approach, through which several plants are preserved and maintained for attainment

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of One Health and ecological sustainability. This is a common practice in indigenous Yòrùbá society  (Borokini & Lawal 2014: 20–33; Soewu 2008: 421–427; Erinoso & Aworinde 2012: 1352–1362). Given the preceding hint, it is important to note that the interest here is not to entertain the zeal of uncritical cultural traditionalism. Rather, emphasis is placed on the need to incorporate the positive rudiment of indigenous values derived from belief and practices of the people without ruling out worthwhile contemporary approaches to attain a sustainable environment that is conservation of the environment and biodiversity. In other words, it is expedient to embark on a synthesis of the positive strands of indigenous values and modernity for the attainment of environmental sustainability as long as supposed indigenous societies are also impacted by social change. Put simply, seeking a comprehensive approach towards environmental sustainability by also incorporating the progressive values encapsulated within the rudiments of beliefs, attitudes and habits that enhance the interdependence of wellbeing/ health for human, animals and environment is a way forward. Regarding the Yòrùbá stance of HAR and compatibility with environmental sustainability, interdependency of wellbeing is premised on the principle of understanding that the environment is shared and not for humans’ wellbeing exclusively. This suggests that the moderation of the networks of interaction in terms of interdependent environmental wellbeing and One Health follows from this. While initiating a comparative analysis of this perspective with the discourse on animal liberation and environmentalism as impressed in Western philosophical circle is not the intention here; the point stressed in this discourse is that in Yòrùbá worldview, the essential conception of the subjectivity of animals in terms of moral rights seems not obvious, and the network of beliefs and relational attitudes regarding the status of human, animal and environmental wellbeing is fundamentally interdependent. In lieu of the foregoing, there is the suspicion that the problems associated with Yòrùbá conception of HAR in terms of compatibility with the pursuit of environmental sustainability and One Health spans from: the epistemological question of intentionality or certainty of meaning in terms of literal and metaphorical interpretations; the inflexibility of moral dogmas devised for moderating HAR in its conservative mode as well as; the complexity of equating the existential state of wellbeing or health with physiological, socio-physical and psychological state of health. These aforementioned problems demand further critical engagement beyond this discourse.

Conclusion This chapter attempted an inquiry into the compatibility of Yòrùbá worldview of HAR with environmental sustainability in order to explicate the relevance of indigenous worldview to the goal of One Health. It argues that health, which is ilérá in Yòrùbá worldview is a phenomenon that implies the wellbeing of human,

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nonhuman and environmental lifeforms. In this direction, the discourse centers on human and animal relations (HAR) and asserts the compatibility of HAR with environmental sustainability in Yòrùbá worldview. It proffers brief insight into some philosophical issues surrounding the debate of animal liberation and environmentalism from Western philosophical circle, and grants an exposition of Yòrùbá worldview of HAR through beliefs, sayings and relational attitudes. It submits that the positive rudiment of indigenous values of HAR in Yòrùbá worldview should be complemented with techno-scientific and socio-economic initiatives in the pursuit of One Health. Finally, it recommends that further philosophical engagement should be deployed to engage the problems associated with Yòrùbá conception of HAR, in lieu of the attainment of environmental sustainability.

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Index

A Academic knowledge, 71, 72 African epistemologies, 58, 59, 62, 85–94, 96, 122, 136, 143, 145, 146, 149–164 African indigenous knowledge, 50, 55–57, 63, 88, 135–137, 141–146, 154, 156, 163, 164, 179–197, 202 Africanisation, 64, 85, 111–131, 168, 171 African knowledge, 19, 24, 28, 31, 33, 69, 76, 86, 87, 102, 135–137, 140–146, 164, 192, 194, 202, 203 African knowledge producers, 25, 26, 146 African knowledge systems, 8, 86, 88–90, 96, 100, 108, 191, 202–203 African logic, 99–109 African universities, 9, 41, 50, 55, 69–82, 103, 116, 122–126, 128–130, 167–177, 197 Animal liberation, 215–220, 227, 228 C Canons, 9, 25, 26, 41, 44–46, 50–56, 59, 60, 62–65, 78, 145 Civilizations, 39, 53, 76, 107, 112, 120, 126–131, 151–154, 163, 194, 209 Cognitive marginalisation, 7 Colonialism, 49, 50, 53, 54, 57–59, 62, 63, 65, 76, 77, 86–88, 90, 94, 107, 124, 135, 136, 155, 168 Coloniality, 54, 55, 62, 88, 89, 135, 136, 144, 145 Coloniality of knowledge, 50, 53–56, 63, 65, 82 Colonial legacy, 49–65, 77

Colonization, 7, 87, 88, 195, 209 Conversational philosophy, 100 Coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19), 135–146, 179–197 Curricula, 9, 31–33, 46, 55, 62, 74, 78, 80, 115, 116, 118, 120, 127, 129–131, 168, 171, 173, 217 Curriculum, 85, 108, 150, 151 D Decentering, 69–82 Decolonization, 7, 14, 15, 37–46, 62, 70, 75, 85, 86, 88, 94, 168–171, 173 Democracy, 16, 33, 40, 57, 59, 87, 89, 112, 114, 116, 120, 123–124, 130 Democratisation, 15, 85–96 E Emancipation, 14–16, 39, 44–46, 90, 93, 124 Entangled knowledge production, 24–27 Epistemic decolonisation, 49–65 Epistemic emancipation, 7–20 Epistemicides, 7–20, 50, 56–59, 63, 65, 99, 100, 125, 130 Epistemic injustice, 10, 12–14, 16, 19, 63, 69–75, 82, 87, 125 Epistemic liberation, 14, 15, 25, 27–31, 34, 44, 85–96, 135–146, 180, 197 Epistemologies, 8–12, 16–18, 24–26, 29, 31–34, 39, 44, 50, 51, 54, 57–59, 61–65, 71, 85–94, 96, 136, 141, 146, 151, 154, 157, 161–164, 170, 208

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Masaka (ed.), Knowledge Production and the Search for Epistemic Liberation in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07965-8

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232 Eurocentric, 9, 12, 14, 39, 49–65, 74, 77, 86–89, 92, 100, 141, 142, 146, 150 Ezumezu logic, 103–107, 109 H Hegemony, 43–45, 50–54, 56, 60, 62, 65, 90, 141, 154, 155, 163 Hermeneutical injustice, 13 Human, 10, 11, 14, 19, 27, 39, 40, 46, 51, 52, 55–57, 65, 73, 75, 77, 90, 100, 102, 121, 126–128, 138–140, 144, 146, 150, 151, 153–156, 159, 162, 163, 167, 171, 172, 176, 182–184, 194, 195, 202, 206–209, 211, 215–228 Human security, 201–213 I Identity, 13, 37, 41, 42, 45, 64, 73, 74, 76–78, 87, 92, 95, 100, 103, 105, 106, 112, 116, 120, 128–131, 157, 203, 213, 217, 225 Ideologies, 8, 27–34, 38, 42, 45, 100, 102, 114, 157, 158, 217, 220 Independence, 15, 23, 25, 32, 33, 38, 39, 124, 204 Indigenous knowledge, 16, 38, 42, 49, 50, 53, 55–57, 64, 100, 121, 135, 136, 141–146, 149–151, 160, 163, 175, 179–181, 183, 192, 195, 197, 201, 203–207 Individualism, 167–177 Institutional culture, 78, 111–115, 117–120, 122–127, 130, 131 Intellectual independence, 37–46 Intercultural, 95, 101, 108 Isolation, 55, 58, 60, 61, 65, 105, 106, 170, 182, 189, 208 K Knowledge production, 7, 8, 23–34, 38, 41–46, 49–65, 69–82, 85, 90, 99–109, 123, 135, 139, 145, 151, 175, 180, 184, 194, 197 Knowledges, 7–16, 19, 20, 24–34, 37–46, 49–62, 64, 65, 69–82, 85–96, 100, 103–105, 107, 109, 116, 121, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 135–146, 149–151, 156–164, 167, 168, 170, 171, 174, 179–182, 188, 192–197, 201–213, 216–217, 220–222

Index L Languages, 9, 15, 16, 37, 42, 50, 51, 65, 78, 85, 89–91, 96, 104, 113, 115–118, 120, 127, 129–131, 153, 157, 160, 162, 182, 185, 202, 206, 208 Legitimation, 24–26, 43 Liberation, 15, 38–40, 46, 85–96, 124, 136, 142, 146, 155 Liberatory knowledges, 25–31 Logics, 34, 55, 56, 60, 93, 95, 99, 100, 102–109, 112, 122, 125, 127, 130, 144, 221 M Medicines, 76, 116, 135–137, 141–146, 150, 152, 161, 163, 182, 186–190, 192–197, 203, 204, 226 Methods, 12, 24, 26–34, 52, 60, 99, 100, 107, 108, 142, 144, 150, 161, 174, 177, 184, 185, 190, 201, 220 Morals, 10, 15–17, 43, 102, 111, 119, 127, 130, 131, 153, 156, 161, 162, 201–213, 216, 218, 219, 224, 225, 227 N Naming, 38, 41, 44 Nonhuman, 215–228 O One health, 215–217, 220, 221, 224–228 Originality, 99–103, 106–109, 126 P Pandemics, 79, 135, 136, 138–139, 142–144, 167–177, 179–197 Peace, 201–213, 221 Pluriversality, 93–95 Pluriversity, 70, 75, 76, 79, 93, 136 Proverbs, 82, 90, 126, 127, 153, 159–161, 201–213, 220, 221 R Recentering, 40, 43 Redress, 112, 120, 124–127, 129–131 Relativism, 20, 61, 71, 93, 94, 104, 112, 120–122, 124, 130, 131, 146 Religiosity, 149–164

Index Rights, 12, 14–18, 40, 57, 92, 93, 119, 123, 128, 172, 216–219, 222, 227 S Self-recovery, 37–46 Shona, 72, 74, 82, 89–91, 151, 154, 158, 160, 164, 172, 173, 177, 184, 186–188, 190, 191, 201–213 Social distancing, 167–174, 176, 177, 182, 189, 193 Social knowledge, 72, 80, 158, 161 Standardisation, 26, 32 T Testimonial injustice, 13 Tokoloshe, 10, 18, 19 Transformation, 27, 34, 41, 43, 46, 55, 64, 85, 104, 111–115, 131, 150, 212 U Ubuntu, 89–91, 106, 116, 144, 156, 172, 173, 206–210

233 Ukama, 157, 158, 167–177 Universities, 9, 14, 38, 41, 43, 55, 62, 69–80, 82, 91, 113–120, 122–126, 128–131, 138, 144, 149, 151, 160, 167–171, 175, 176, 181, 183, 185, 193, 197, 204 V Vaccines, 135–142, 144, 145, 175, 180, 182, 183, 192–197 W Western epistemology, 44, 57, 58, 75, 86–89, 96 Western world, 50, 77, 144, 145, 208 Z Zimbabwe, 72, 74, 79, 81, 82, 90, 91, 150, 151, 153–155, 168, 172, 180, 182–197, 202, 204, 206, 207