Knowledge - Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence 9783110322668, 9783110322279

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Birte Schelling Knowledge - Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence

EPISTEMISCHE STUDIEN Schriften zur Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie Herausgegeben von / Edited by Michael Esfeld • Stephan Hartmann • Albert Newen Band 23 / Volume 23

Birte Schelling

Knowledge - Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence

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Contents Preface 1

2

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The Epistemologist’s Dilemma: A Reasonable Quest for Truth 1.1 Truth-Conducivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Truth-Conducivity and Likelihood . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 Truth-Conducivity - an Amendment . . . . . . . . 1.2 Externalism and Internalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Internalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Externalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 In Defense of Internalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3.1 Arguing against Externalism by Counterexamples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3.2 The Children-and-Animals-Objection . . 1.2.3.3 The Skepticism Objection . . . . . . . . 1.2.3.4 The Externalist Confusion . . . . . . . . 1.3 Against Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 The Relativity of Justification . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 Knowledge without Justification . . . . . . . . . . Coherence and the World Connection 2.1 Coherence and Truth-Conducivity . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 What is Coherence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 The Problem of the World Connection . . . . . . 2.2 The First Attempt: BonJour’s Observation Requirement . 2.2.1 BonJour’s Characterization of Coherence . . . . 2.2.2 The Role of Observation in BonJour’s Coherence Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 BonJour’s Answers to the Three Objections . . . 2.2.4 Two Arguments against BonJour’s Solution . . . 2.3 The Second Attempt: Davidson’s Appeal to Language . 2.3.1 Davidson on Coherence and Truth . . . . . . . . 1

15 16 18 41 44 48 54 62 62 66 69 81 85 86 93

. . . . .

99 100 101 106 110 111

. . . . .

116 123 130 133 134

2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4 3

Meaning and Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Causality and Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 An Epistemological Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Perception, Coherence and Knowledge 165 3.1 The Role of Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 3.1.1 Sensation and Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 3.1.2 Conceptual versus Nonconceptual Content . . . . 181 3.1.2.1 In Defense of Nonconceptuality of Perceptual Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 3.1.2.2 Against Nonconceptuality of Perceptual Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 3.1.3 Triangulation and Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 3.1.4 Perception without Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . 211 3.2 Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence . . . . . . 219 3.2.1 Objective Truth-Conducivity and Genetic Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 3.2.2 Subjective Truth-Conducivity and Epistemic Coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 3.2.2.1 Laurence BonJour: Inferential Coherence 237 3.2.2.2 Keith Lehrer: Coherence in Terms of Meeting Objections . . . . . . . . . . . 239 3.2.2.3 A Two-Level Account of Coherence . . 243 3.2.3 Knowledge as Coherent True Belief . . . . . . . . 246

Bibliography

259

For my teachers Joachim Minnemann, Howard Jackson and Peter Ulrich. Without them, there would have been darkness.

Acknowledgments This book would not have been possible without the support of several people who contributed with ideas, conversations, guidance and care: my sincerest thanks to everybody who helped me throughout the process of writing this thesis. Without them, I would never have been able to reach my goal. I am particularly indebted to my boyfriend Daaje Böhlke-Itzen, whose support, constructive criticism and never wavering faith in my ability to master this project were invaluable to me. Furthermore, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all participants of the Examenskolloquium at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Hamburg for being so supportive and helpful. Our fruitful discussions and their constructive criticism advanced my work on the thesis considerably. Especially I have to thank Arne Spudy and Rickmer Frier for reading parts of this thesis and offering advice for improvement. My thanks also go to Prof. Dr. Ulrich Gähde and Prof. Dr. Rolf W. Puster for supervising this thesis. And last but not least, I want to express my sincere gratitude to my parents for supporting me during my course of studies and during the time I was writing this thesis.

Preface What is knowledge? This question has been around in philosophy since Plato’s days but still philosophers have not found the answer. So this book shall be another attempt to clarify the notion of knowledge. The starting point of any discussion of the concept of knowledge is Plato’s well-known analysis which defines knowledge as “true judgement with an account”.1 Although it is dubious whether Plato himself intended to endorse this definition, almost all contemporary epistemologists agree with “his claim” that knowledge - if it can be analyzed at all - has to be analyzed as true belief + x.2 However, regarding the third condition for knowledge, there is almost no common ground. Plato included the third condition into his characterization of knowledge because of a problem he discusses in more detail in the dialogue Meno3 , namely the problem that true belief alone cannot constitute knowledge, since it lacks stability: “Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful of nothing but good, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not care to remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by a reasoned understanding of causes; [. . .]. But when they are bound, in the first place, they attain to be knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than right opinion, because fastened by a chain."4 1 Plato

(1973) 201c. belief condition has been challenged once by Colin Radford. He presents an example of a student who has been forced to memorize historical dates by his teacher and has repressed the traumatic memory of this mistreatment in school. As a result, when asked about such dates, he always answers correctly although he claims not to believe that his answers are correct. Radford claims that the history student knows the answers although he does not believe them to be correct. Cp. Radford (1966). 3 Cp. Plato (1953) 96e-98c. 4 Op.cit. 98a (my italics). 2 The

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Thus Plato’s reason for requiring knowledge to be more than just true belief is that knowledge should be more stable than mere true belief. So according to Plato we need something more for a belief to count as knowledge than simply its truth.5 Moreover, the “something” which is needed here must be something which counts in favor of the truth of the belief which is backed by it, because otherwise it could not stabilize the belief in question in a way which could make us retain it. We need an additional condition for knowledge because otherwise there would be no distinction between beliefs which are formed and are held because of a connection to their truth and beliefs which we merely happen to have for other reasons. Thus the function of the “account” mentioned by Plato is to guide us toward truth, i.e. the third condition is introduced to provide a link between truth and belief. This difference between true belief and knowledge and the need for a third condition for knowledge discovered by Plato is still acknowledged by almost everyone in epistemology.6 Furthermore, although there has been considerable disagreement about how this difference and with it the third condition should be spelled out, Plato’s central point about the function of the third condition remains widely accepted as well: Its function is to somehow introduce a connection between the first and the second condition, i.e. between a belief and its truth, since such a connection seems to be necessary for a true belief to count as knowledge. To appreciate this agreement, let me first present some quotations from the literature: “What makes [. . .] a belief a case of knowledge? My suggestion is that there is a lawlike connection between the state of affairs Bap and the state of affairs that makes ‘p’ true such that, given Bap, it must be the case that p.”7 “Something more is needed for a person to know that p, to go alongside (1) P is true 5 Since

Plato writes that “in the first place” beliefs fulfilling the additional requirement attain the status of knowledge and that they “in the second place” are stabilized by fulfilling it, stability does not seem to be the requirement itself. Instead the requirement is intended to provide stability, while it is left open which properties of beliefs can serve as providers of stability. 6 It has been disputed by Crispin Sartwell. Cp. Sartwell (1991) and Sartwell (1992). 7 Armstrong (1973) p.166. “Bap” stands for “A believes that p”. Armstrong claims this to hold only for non-inferential knowledge.

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(2) S believes that p. This something more, I think, is not simply an additional fact, but a way that (1) and (2) are linked.”8 “What makes us cognitive beings at all is our capacity for belief, and the goal of our distinctively cognitive endeavours is truth: we want our beliefs to correctly and accurately depict the world. [. . .] The basic role of justification is that of a means to truth, a more directly attainable mediating link between our subjective starting point and our objective goal.”9 “The correct theory of knowledge must provide the correct blend of acceptance and truth in what is accepted, that is, the right match between mind and reality.”10 “The constraint is that true belief counts as knowledge only when it is no accident that the belief is true. This kind of accidentality has to do with the relation between the truth value and the ground of the belief. For a true belief to count as knowledge it has to be true nonaccidentally in the sense that what makes it true either is, or is reflected in the ground on which the belief is based.”11 Thus for a belief to be knowledge, so almost everyone agrees, there has to be some connection between a proposition’s being believed by someone and its truth. To be more specific: In order to count as knowledge that p, the belief that p must at least partly be due to the fact that p is true. This is formulated vaguely on purpose, since here I am trying to capture the common denominator among the widely differing positions on the specific role of the third condition. Now what does it mean for a belief that p to be due to the fact that p is true? Regarding the answer to this question, agreement comes to an end. Many proposals have been offered in order to answer the question in what way the third condition should establish the desired connection between the first and the second condition. Most of the early proposals take the form of a concrete formulation of a third condition which is then defended by an appeal to the function of the third condition and to our linguistic intuitions about the meaning of “S knows that p". But since the debate about the correct analysis of knowledge has 8 Nozick

(1981) p.170. (1985) p.7. 10 Lehrer (1990) p.21. 11 Alston (2005) p.34. 9 BonJour

8

been going on for quite a while by now, more general oppositions have emerged from the question which kind of a link between the first and the second condition is needed for knowledge. The first issue is whether the third condition should be spelled out in terms of epistemic justification.12 This question has been answered affirmatively by many authors, but there are also some prominent denials.13 Among those who give a positive answer to this question, there is further controversy regarding the correct explication of the term “justification” itself, which is most prominently represented in the opposition between foundationalism and coherentism.14 So the second question is whether the notion of justification has to spelled out in a foundationalist or a coherentist manner. Furthermore, there is the idea to explicate the third condition in terms of justification and to supplement it by a fourth condition which states that justification suffices for knowledge only if it is “undefeated”.15 The latter conception is compatible with foundationalism as well as with coherentism, so there is no need for further controversy at this point. Third and last, there is the question whether the link established by the third condition has to be due to factors internal to the subject’s perspective or if it may be constituted by factors external to this perspective as well. This question has inspired a controversy in epistemology which is called the externalism-internalism-debate. This debate is partly conducted independently of the questions regarding justification, although almost all authors who opt for a third condition not spelled out in terms of justification favor an externalist position.16 The chart below illustrates the prominent 12 I

will drop the qualification “epistemic” in the following, since I will not be concerned with any non-epistemic meaning of the term “justification”. 13 Cp. Goldman (1967), Armstrong (1973), Nozick (1981), Foley (2004) and Alston (2005). Goldman and Armstrong offer third conditions which are cast in terms of reliability and causality instead of justification, while Foley explicitly argues against taking justification to be a condition for knowledge without offering an alternative condition. Alston does not explicitly deny that the third condition of knowledge can be spelled out in terms of justification, but argues that there is no such thing as an “objective status or property of beliefs picked out by ‘justified’.” (Alston (2005) p.27.) I take this to imply that the third condition cannot be explicated in terms of justification. 14 An excellent summary of this opposition can be found in BonJour (1998). 15 This conception is due to Keith Lehrer and can be broadly characterized as follows: In order for S’s belief that p to count as knowledge, it has to be the case that there is no true proposition q which is such that were S to believe that q, he would no longer be justified in believing that p. For Lehrer’s original formulation of this idea see Lehrer (1965). He refines and defends this conception in Lehrer & Paxson (1969) and Lehrer (1970). 16 This is not due to any conceptual necessity. Thus deciding against justification as a third condition does not mean committing oneself to externalism.

9

solutions to these three questions regarding the third condition. Since the problems which have to be dealt with in a thorough discussion of these questions quickly become intricate, this chart might be useful for further reference.

My first chapter will be concerned with a discussion of the general questions pertaining to the concept of knowledge. In the first section I will develop a general requirement which properties of beliefs have to meet in order to be considered as possible candidates for featuring in a third condition for knowledge. This requirement is inspired by the intuition lying at the bottom of the above quotations, namely the intuition that the third condition should somehow provide us with a link between the first and the second condition. But, as I will argue, besides providing us with such a link, properties of beliefs featuring in the third condition have to be such that we are able to find out whether our beliefs have those properties, since otherwise we could not find out whether our beliefs constitute knowledge. Now this of course is an internalist requirement. Therefore, to defend this requirement, I will dedicate the second section of the first chapter to a detailed discussion of internalism and externalism. The conclusion of this discussion will be that the third condition has to be spelled out in a way which respects internalist intuitions. Nevertheless, the properties featuring in the third condition have to conform to externalist intuitions to a great extent as well. More specifically, they have to be such that they really provide the link to truth mentioned before, independently of whether we believe them to do this. Thus properties of beliefs which merely conform to the internalist intuition but do not provide such a link objectively will be excluded as well as properties which do provide the link but are such that we cannot find out whether our beliefs possess them. Now, as I will

10

argue in the last part of the first chapter, the classical property of being justified is of the former kind, i.e. it conforms to the internalist intuition, but does not necessarily provide the needed link between belief and truth. Therefore I will reject justification as a third condition for knowledge. Now since the externalist alternatives presented in the chart above do not conform to internalist intuitions, the only way open is to spell out the third condition in terms of one of the alternatives listed under the label ‘justificationist theories” without taking the chosen alternative to constitute an explication of the notion of justification. For reasons which will become clear in the course of the first chapter, I will choose coherentism as the most promising candidate, i.e. I will try to spell out the third condition for knowledge in terms of coherence without taking coherence to be an adequate explication of the notion of justification. So the general task of the second and the third chapter of this book is to develop an account of knowledge which is based on the notion of coherence. Now since there is no such thing as the concept of coherence, a problem which immediately accompanies the task of developing an account of knowledge in terms of coherence is to specify a notion of coherence which is suited to this task. And as the main objection to coherence theories of knowledge in general is that coherence among beliefs does not constitute a reason to assume those beliefs to be true, i.e. that a coherence theory of knowledge does not succeed in providing the desired link between belief and truth, I will consider two conceptions of coherence which are explicitly designed to encompass an answer to this objection, namely the conceptions offered by Laurence BonJour and by Donald Davidson. Thus these conceptions of coherence are the man topic of the second chapter. While BonJour’s conception of coherence is mainly cast in terms of inferential relations between beliefs, Davidson’s conception draws heavily on conceptual relations among beliefs. So the two conceptions considered have a different focus. Nevertheless, they are both intended to yield a notion of coherence which can be of help in showing that coherence among our beliefs gives us a good reason to consider our beliefs true. Now, as I will argue, BonJour does not succeed in showing this regarding his inferential conception of coherence, since he cannot give a satisfactory answer to the skeptic who claims that it is possible that our systems of beliefs are highly inferentially coherent but nevertheless lack a connection to the empirical world and to truth. BonJour himself claims to have such an answer, so I will discuss his arguments for this claim in detail after presenting his conception of coherence in order to show that his answer is deficient.

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The second part of the second chapter will then be concerned with Davidson’s holistic conception of coherence. Davidson’s conception of coherence is different from BonJour’s, since Davidson does not consider coherence to be a contingent property of systems of beliefs but rather claims that coherence is a necessary feature of systems of beliefs. According to him, being a member of a coherent systems of beliefs is a necessary condition for a belief’s having determinate content. Since a belief’s content is identified by its conceptual relations to other beliefs, a belief which is not a member of a coherent system of beliefs would not have determinate content and therefore would not be a genuine belief at all. Davidson offers an argument for this contention which takes into account the way the contents of beliefs and the meanings of sentences which are used to express beliefs are interrelated. Thus Davidson’s conception of coherence is based on his theory of meaning and interpretation. According to him, the development of systems of beliefs is intimately connected to the acquisition of a language in which beliefs can be expressed. Therefore, for a person to develop a system of beliefs, she has to interact with a world her beliefs are about and with other persons she shares this world with. Thus, so Davidson, systems of beliefs cannot be disconnected from the empirical world or from the truth about it. Now while I think that this argument offered by Davidson establishes that his conception of coherence can provide the desired link between beliefs and truth, it fails in one respect: According to him, the connections between a person and the world she inhabits which are necessary for her developing a coherent system of beliefs are primarily causal. But mere causal connections between a person and her environment do not suffice for this person to develop a system of beliefs, since otherwise standing in causal relations to an objective world alone would mean to have beliefs. Davidson himself notes this and therefore claims that to develop systems of beliefs, persons additionally have to be in linguistic communication with other persons. But, as I will argue, this additional condition involves a circle, since in order to communicate with other persons, a person already needs to have beliefs about the world around her. Now this circle can only be avoided if Davidson’s theory of belief acquisition is supplemented by an account of perception which does not conceive of perception as a purely causal relation, but rather as a relation which connects a person to the world in a way which allows for the acquisition of (primitive) beliefs in advance of communicating with other persons.

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So the first part of the third chapter will be dedicated to a discussion of different accounts of perception in order to see whether one of them is suited to solve the problem discovered in Davidson’s conception of coherence. As the discussion will show, this problem can indeed be solved if Davidson’s conception is supplemented by an account of perception which has regained popularity in philosophy and psychology nowadays and which is called the direct realist account of perception. Broadly, direct realists hold that perception links us directly to objects and events in the world, i.e. that what we are aware of in perception are real things and events in the world. And if this is the case, as will become clear in the course of the discussion, then being perceptually related to the world allows for the development of beliefs about the world in advance of communicating with other people. In the second part of the third chapter I will then develop an account of knowledge which is based on a Davidsonian notion of coherence supplemented by a direct realist theory of perception. Now developing such an account faces two problems which are related to each other: First, it has to be shown that coherence in Davidson’s sense fulfills the requirement developed in the first chapter. And second, Davidson’s holistic conception of coherence primarily applies to systems of beliefs as a whole and not to the relation between single beliefs and the system of beliefs they are part of. Thus his conception of coherence is not really suited to be used as an explication of the third condition of knowledge, since coherence considered as a property of systems of beliefs as a whole does not tell us what it means for single beliefs which are members of those systems to cohere with those systems in a way which is sufficient for their being knowledge. Rather, Davidson’s account of coherence has a bearing on the belief condition, since if indeed beliefs have to members of coherent systems of beliefs which are connected to the world, then the mere fact that something is a belief speaks in favor of its truth. Thus on Davidson’s account of coherence, the link between belief and truth is established via the belief condition itself. But, since this does not tell us whether a given belief is knowledge, Davidson’s notion of coherence has to be extended by an additional notion of coherence which concerns this further question. This will as well be the task of the second part of the third chapter, in which I will explore the possibility of supplementing an account of knowledge which comprises a belief condition which implies Davidsonian coherence by a third condition in terms of coherence of single beliefs with the systems of beliefs they are part of. Thus, on my account on knowledge, the connection between belief and truth is secured by a belief’s being a member of a

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coherent system of beliefs in Davidson’s sense. Its status as knowledge on the other hand depends on its specific relations to the other beliefs which are members of the system.

Chapter 1

The Epistemologist’s Dilemma: A Reasonable Quest for Truth Falsehood is easy, truth so difficult. - George Eliot In this chapter I will mainly be concerned with two of the general questions regarding knowledge which were presented in the introduction, i.e. with the opposition between justificationist theories and Anti-justificationist theories as well as with the controversy between externalism and internalism. Thus I will discuss the controversies surrounding the oppositions which can be found in the second and the fourth line of the chart above. The oppositions in the third line will not be considered in detail, since my answer to the question whether the third condition for knowledge has to be spelled out in terms of justification will be negative, thus relieving me of considering the question which of the theories listed on the second line is the right one regarding the notion of justification. Nevertheless, issues related to those theories will surface frequently throughout the discussion, for - as the reader might recall from the preface - I intend to argue that the third condition has to be spelled out in terms of coherence without the detour via the notion of justification. Thus in this chapter, I will proceed as follows: First, I will develop and defend a general requirement which properties of beliefs specified by a third condition for knowledge have to meet. I will then dedicate a section to a detailed discussion of internalism and externalism and their relation to my requirement. In the last section, I will go on to argue that the notion of justification has to be rejected as a necessary condition for knowledge, since it does not meet this requirement. 15

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CHAPTER 1. THE EPISTEMOLOGIST’S DILEMMA: A REASONABLE QUEST FOR TRUTH

1.1

Truth-Conducivity

As we saw, most epistemologists agree that the third condition somehow has to provide a connection between belief and truth. This has often been expressed by saying that the properties of beliefs specified by the third condition have to be truth-conducive. In the literature, the term “truth-conducive” is not only applied to properties of beliefs, but also to a multitude of other entities, such as belief forming processes,1 grounds of beliefs2 , reasons for beliefs3 or justification in general.4 By understanding this expression to apply to properties of beliefs in general, I hope to cover all or at least most of these various uses. Thus saying that a reliable belief forming process is truth-conducive can be expressed by saying that the property of being formed by a reliable belief-forming-process is truth-conducive, saying that grounds on which a belief is based are truthconducive if they are adequate can be expressed by saying that the property of being based on an adequate ground is truth-conducive, saying that a good reason for a belief is truth-conducive can be expressed by saying that the property of being held for good reasons is truth-conducive, saying that justification is truth-conducive can be expressed by saying that the property of being justified is truth-conducive and so on. Furthermore, I take the term “truth-conducive" to apply to properties of beliefs in a broad sense which also covers relational properties, as for example the property of being a belief held by numerous popular philosophers. My formulation is intentionally neutral with regard to the distinction between belief states and propositional contents of beliefs, thus allowing for properties of both to be truth-conducive.5 Thus the notion of truth-conducivity can be characterized as follows:6

1 Kornblith

(1993) p.361. (2005) p.94. 3 Funkhouser (2003) p.183. 4 Audi (1993) p.316. 5 Beliefs are often understood as consisting of a belief state and a propositional content of this state. A belief state is a psychological or mental state, while the propositional contents of those states are propositions which are expressed by sentences “p” which occur in true belief-ascriptions of the form “S believes that p.” For an illuminating presentation of and argument for the distinction between belief states and propositional contents of belief see Brown (1992) p.298. 6 For similar characterizations of truth-conducivity compare BonJour (1985) p.240, Audi (1988) pp.2 and Alston (2005) p.36. 2 Alston

1.1. TRUTH-CONDUCIVITY

17

(TC) A property P of a belief B is truth-conducive iff the likelihood that B is true given that B has P is high.7 A paradigm case of a property of beliefs which is truth-conducive is the property of following deductively from a set of true propositions, since this property not merely increases the likelihood of the truth of beliefs which have it but even guarantees their truth. Thus in this case it is clear that the biconditional is fulfilled: The fact that B follows deductively from true propositions entails that B is true and so given this fact, the likelihood that B is true is increased to 1. An example of a property which is truth-conducive without guaranteeing truth is the property of being a perceptual belief acquired under normal conditions by properly functioning sense organs.8 In most cases, beliefs having this property will be true although here some possibility of error is left: For example, one might mistake a peach for a nectarine, even though the fruit is observed with properly functioning eyesight under normal visual conditions. But nevertheless, the biconditional is fulfilled: If it is the function of the sense organs to provide us with correct information about the environment and if “functioning properly" is taken to imply “exercising a function with success most of the time", then B’s having the property of being a perceptual belief acquired by properly functioning sense organs under normal conditions strongly increases the likelihood that B is true.9 Thus both paradigm cases are covered by (TC).10 One complication re7 (TC)

might be thought to be problematic since it is possible that although the likelihood that B is true given that B has P is high, as say 0.98, the likelihood that B has P given that it is not the case that B has P is even higher, as say 0.99. Now it might be thought that this is a problem, since if the likelihood that B is true given that B does not have property P is higher that its likelihood given that it has P, then not having property P seems to speak stronger in favor of B’s truth than having P. I will discuss this problem in connection with an example of a property which is truth-conducive below. See Footnote 10. 8 I do not mean to beg the question against skepticism regarding perception here. I merely want to give an example of a purportedly truth-conducive property which does not guarantee truth. The skeptical reader who thinks our senses are not to be trusted may therefore substitute his own example of such a property. 9 Again, this is just an example. I do not mean to claim anything substantial regarding the nature of sense perception or organic functions here. Anyone who disagrees with ascribing such a function to the sense organs may again substitute his own example. 10 The second paradigm case can now help to see why the fact that the likelihood that B is true given that it is not the case that B has P can be higher than the likelihood that B is true given that B has P does not constitute a genuine problem for (TC): As we have just seen, the property of being a perceptual belief acquired under normal conditions by properly functioning sense organs is truth-conducive in the sense of (TC). Now even if the majority of beliefs which do not have this property are true and

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CHAPTER 1. THE EPISTEMOLOGIST’S DILEMMA: A REASONABLE QUEST FOR TRUTH

garding (TC) has to be dealt with here. In (TC), the notion of likelihood is employed to characterize truth-conducivity. More specifically, truthconducivity is defined in terms of the likelihood of a proposition’s truth given that this proposition has certain properties or given that it is the propositional content of a belief state which has certain properties. Now since the notion of likelihood is notoriously unclear, (TC) calls to be clarified in this respect. 1.1.1

Truth-Conducivity and Likelihood

First, I choose the term “likelihood” rather than “probability” to characterize truth-conducivity because in epistemology the notion of probability is strongly associated with Bayesian epistemology, i.e. the task of specifying rationality requirements for degrees of belief or probability distributions among the members of sets of beliefs. My reason for not considering Bayesian epistemology in this context is, briefly stated, that I do not think that Bayesian epistemology can be of use in the course of explicating the concept of knowledge, since this would amount to analyzing this concept in terms of rational probability assignments. But since the notion of knowledge is intuitively far more clear than the notion of rationality, the former should not be analyzed by recourse to the latter according to the standards of conceptual analysis. And moreover, in Bayesian epistemology probabilities are equated with (rational) subjective probability assignments. Now as I do not take the likelihood of a belief’s being true given it has certain properties to be a subjective matter, this Bayesian concept of subjective probability cannot be of use in this context.11 To see why what is meant by “likelihood” here cannot be a subjective matter, consider again the example of the property of being a a perceptual belief acquired by properly functioning sense organs under normal conditions. The question whether having this property increases the likelihood of a belief’s truth cannot be settled by an appeal to subjective assignments of probabilif therefore the likelihood that a belief is true given it does not have the property of being a perceptual belief acquired under normal conditions by properly functioning sense organs is even higher than its likelihood of truth given that it does have this property, this does not count against the truth-conducivity of this property. The reason for this is that the beliefs not having the property could be true by virtue of having other properties which are truth-conducive, not by virtue of not having the property of being a perceptual belief acquired under normal conditions by properly functioning sense organs. So the fact that a lot of beliefs which do not have a certain property are true does not tell us anything about the property’s truth-conducivity. 11 For a detailed account of Bayesian epistemology and the notion of probability developed by Bayesians see Talbott (2008).

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ity, because it is a matter of an objective connection between having this property and being true.12 Thus “likelihood” as understood in this context is an objective notion, which is meant to capture the ordinary language meaning of “it is likely that p” rather than any technical use of that phrase. But since I do not want to contend myself with the rather vague ordinary language notion of likelihood, I will shortly review the main objective interpretations of probability to shed some more light on the significance of the notion of likelihood. These main interpretations can be characterized as follows:13 (1) The Classical View: According to the classical Laplacian view, probabilities are distributed equally among possible outcomes of a given situation if there is no evidence favoring one outcome over the other. Examples of the application of this notion of probability are the well-known experiments of tossing a fair die, where the probabilities are simply distributed equally among the possible outcomes of a given toss. This view can be considered an objective view because it is purely mathematical, since all empirical evidence which might influence probability assignments is excluded from consideration qua definition. Thus one might call this kind of probability “a priori probability”. (2) The Logical View: This view can be characterized as the attempt to formulate probability theory as a generalization of deductive logic.14 Therefore this view involves specifying a formal language analogous to the language of first 12 The

point that subjectivist interpretations of probability do not specify a notion of probability which is connected to truth in the way needed here is emphasized by Hájek, who writes: “What an extreme subjectivist, even one who demands regularity, lacks is an analogue of truth, some yardstick for distinguishing the ‘veridical’ probability assignments from the rest [. . .], some way in which probability assignments are answerable to the world.” (Hájek (2008)). Hájek then goes on to specify in which ways subjectivists have tried to amend their accounts in order to tend to this shortcoming. But since almost all of these amendments amount to stating constraints on rational probability assignments which require them to conform to some degree to an objectivist interpretation of probability, I will turn to those interpretations right away without bothering the reader further with the various subjectivist accounts. 13 The classification of objective interpretations of probability presented here follows Hájek (2008). 14 Early proponents of this view include Keynes (1921) and Jeffreys (1939). Its most famous and elaborated formulation is due to Carnap (1950). Fitelson (2005) gives a comprehensive overview on modern views concerning logical probability. An insightful discussion of the role of this conception of probability in epistemology can be found in Alston (2005) pp.104.

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order predicate logic, defining a measure for assigning unconditional probabilities to some special formulas of the language15 as well as a function for assigning conditional probabilities to the other formulas of this language.16 Probabilistic relations between the sentences of the language can then be evaluated analogous to deductive relations between sentences of a language for classical predicate logic. On this account, probabilities are regarded as degrees to which a hypothesis H is confirmed by a piece of evidence E. Although this view shares with the classical account the characteristic that the unconditional probabilities, which are the initial probabilities of some specified formulas of the language, are assigned a priori, it differs from it in that the conditional probabilities are not determined a priori, but assume their values depending on the evidence found in the course of empirical investigation. Nevertheless, the rules according to which probability values are updated to incorporate empirical data remain a priori.17 Thus this view can also be considered an objective view, because the degree to which a given piece of evidence E confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis H is determined by rules which are considered to share the objective status of the inference rules used in deductive logic. Although there is considerable disagreement among the proponents of this view regarding the questions whether such rules exist and which rules are the correct ones, the objective status of the correct rules is not disputed. (3) Frequentism: Frequentism is the view that probabilities can be identified with relative frequencies with which given attributes or events occur in a given reference class. Thus, for example, the probability of a given die to show a six on some toss is identified with the frequency with which it shows a six in a reference class of tosses. Frequency interpretations can be divided in to two kinds: Finite frequentism and infinite 15 Carnap

(1950) defines a measure m which assigns probabilities to what he calls “state descriptions”. These state descriptions can be conceived of as statements which describe all individuals in the domain of discourse as detailed as possible. For a more exhaustive presentation of Carnap’s approach see Hájek (2008). 16 In Carnap’s theory this function is called the confirmation function c, which assigns probabilities to all formulas of the language depending on the unconditional probabilities assigned by m and on additional information gained from observation. 17 An example of such an a priori rule is the classical definition of conditional probability, which reads (with Pr ( p|q) standing for “probability of p given q"): Pr ( p|q) = Pr ( p&q)/Pr (q) for all q with Pr (q) , 0. Carnap’s confirmation function c is based on this definition.

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frequentism. While proponents of the former view identify probabilities with relative frequencies among finite reference classes, proponents of the latter view identify probabilities with limiting relative frequencies among infinite reference classes.18 Limiting relative frequencies of this kind of course cannot be observed but rather have to be extrapolated from observed frequencies among finite sequences of trials. Thus these limiting frequencies are determined by imagining “hypothetical infinite extensions of an actual sequence of trials; probabilities are then what the limiting relative frequencies would be if the sequence were so extended.”19 Finite frequentism obviously is an objective view, since the frequency with which an attribute or event occurs in a reference class is something which is determined empirically. It is possible to argue about this regarding infinite frequentism, since for hypothetical frequencies to be objective, objective principles for extrapolating them from actual frequencies would be needed and it is by no means clear what those should be. (4) The Propensity View: According to the propensity view, probabilities are identified with propensities. Propensities, in turn, are conceived of as dispositions or tendencies of certain types of situations to produce a certain outcome or a certain long-run frequency of par- ticular outcomes. Depending on whether propensities are considered to be dispositions of situations to produce certain singular outcomes or certain frequencies of such outcomes, probabilities are identified with single-case propensities or long-run propensities.20 Thus, for example, the single-case propensity view identifies the probability of a die showing a six on a given toss as the tendency of the throwing setup to yield an outcome in which the die shows a six on a particular toss, while the long-run propensity view identifies this probability with the setup’s tendency to yield such outcomes with some determinate long-run frequency, e.g. 1/6 in the case of a fair die. This view is objective, since propensities are considered to be real properties of objects or situations. 18 Finite

frequentism is held by Venn (1876), while Reichenbach (1948) and von Mises (1957) are proponents of infinite frequentism. 19 Hájek (2008). 20 The original version of the propensity interpretation, which is ambiguous between single-case propensities and long-run propensities is due to Popper (1957) and (1959). Single-case propensity views are advanced by Fetzer (1983) as well as Miller (1994) and (1996). Hacking (1965) and Gillies (2000) advocate long-run propensity views.

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Having briefly presented these interpretations, we have to consider the question if one or more of them are appropriate for clarifying what is meant by “likelihood” in this context. To decide this, another look at (TC) will be helpful. (TC) stated that a property P of beliefs is truth-conducive iff the likelihood that belief B is true given that B has P is high. Now how is this likelihood of B’s truth given that B has P to be understood on the various interpretations of probability? The classical view is silent on the question what probability is, it just states how to compute probabilities if there is no evidence favorable to any possible outcome. Thus the classical view merely tells us how the probability of B’s being true given that B has P is to be computed, which is by the following ratio: number o f true belie f s having P number o f possible belie f s having P Thus on a classical probability view a property’s truth-conducivity would be understood in terms of the ratio of true beliefs among the possible beliefs having that property. The logical view requires some elaboration, since the above portrayed notion of logical probability is defined for sentences of a formal language. Therefore it is questionable whether it can be applied to beliefs, since its application to beliefs presupposes that all beliefs are expressible in a language. But this is not a major problem as long as beliefs are considered to have propositional contents. Given this, it should be possible to express any belief’s content linguistically in principle, although the person holding the belief may not always be able to do this for lack of linguistic resources. So on this view, which is tied to a language, the likelihood of a belief B’s truth given that it has a property P must be understood in terms of the likelihood that B’s propositional content is true given that B has P. More precisely, the likelihood that B is true given it has P is to be interpreted as the conditional probability that proposition p is true given that p is the propositional content of B and that B has property P.21 Frequentism is rather straightforward: On frequentist interpretations, the likelihood that a belief B is true given that it has P is simply identified with the (limiting) relative frequency of true beliefs among the class of beliefs having P. Depending on whether one favors finite or infinite frequentism, the class of beliefs considered as reference class has to be some finite 21 If

the property considered is a property of the propositional content itself, such as the property of following from a set of true propositions, this reduces to the conditional probability that proposition p is true given that p has property P.

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23

sample of beliefs having property P22 or the class of all beliefs having P.23 The application of propensity interpretations to the explication of truthconducivity is more complicated, since propensity interpretations are primarily intended to apply to entities such as specified types of experimental setups or specified sets of physical conditions in general. Gillies, for example, characterizes the two kinds of propensity interpretations thus: “A long-run propensity theory is one in which propensities are associated with repeatable conditions, and are regarded as propensities to produce in a long series of repetitions of these conditions frequencies which are approximately equal to the probabilities. A single-case propensity theory is one in which propensities are regarded as propensities to produce a particular result on a specific occasion."24 So propensities are taken to be dispositions or tendencies of specified sets of physical conditions to generate a certain outcome on a given occasion or to generate such outcomes with a certain long-run frequency. Now it is not easy to see what those specified conditions should be in our case. It would not make much sense to say of properties of beliefs themselves that they have a certain propensity to produce true beliefs, since beliefs are not produced by any of their properties but by psychological processes. But to attribute the propensities to such processes only would exclude all properties from being truth-conducive which are not properties of the processes generating or sustaining beliefs. One could try to attribute the propensities to the beliefs themselves, thus equating the likelihood of a belief’s truth given that it has property P with the tendency of beliefs with property P to be true simpliciter or with their tendency to be true with a certain long-run frequency. For the time being, I will rest with this solution and discuss it in more detail later. Thus the four main objective interpretations of probability yield the following explications of truth-conducivity: 22 This

could for example be the class of beliefs having P held by some finite set of people in some finite time interval. 23 This interpretation is only applicable assuming that this class has infinitely many members. If the class of all beliefs having P is finite for some property P - for example the property of being a belief held by some person located in Hamburg on October 26th 2008 - this characterization collapses into finite frequentism. 24 Gillies (2000) p.822.

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(1) The property P is truth-conducive iff the ratio of true beliefs having P to possible beliefs having P is high. (2) The property P is truth-conducive iff the conditional probability that proposition p is true given that p is the propositional content of B and that B has property P is high. (3a) The property P is truth-conducive iff the relative frequency of true beliefs among a specified finite sample of beliefs having P is high. (3b) The property P is truth-conducive iff the limiting relative frequency of true beliefs among the class of beliefs having P is high.25 (4a) The property P is truth-conducive iff beliefs having P have a strong propensity (tendency) to be true. (4b) The property P is truth-conducive iff beliefs having P have a propensity (tendency) to be true with a high long-run frequency. For two reasons, (1) cannot be what we are looking for here: First, the notion of possible beliefs is hopelessly unclear. At least, being a possible belief requires having a propositional content which can be believed by some being. But here the difficulties begin: For example, is it possible to believe an outright contradiction, i.e. are logical contradictions to be counted among the possible contents of beliefs or not? Furthermore, are there limits to the complexity of a proposition which can be believed by someone, i.e. at which degree of complexity is it no longer possible for us to even grasp a proposition, let alone believe it? And should we really make the cognitive limits of human beings the criterion for possibility of belief? Couldn’t there be beings much more sophisticated than we are, who could grasp propositions of that complexity? As can be seen from these brief remarks, there are severe difficulties with the notion of possible beliefs, so that it does not seem advisable to build the characterization of truth-conducivity on such a notion. And second, even if one could make some sense of this notion, it would still be difficult if not impossible to individuate possible beliefs, since individuating a belief requires more than just specifying its propositional content. Otherwise, Peter’s belief that 2 + 3 = 5 and Paul’s belief that 2 + 3 = 5 would be one and the same belief. 25 Explications

(1), (3a) and (3b) might be objectionable since it is by no means clear that beliefs can be properly individuated and that therefore it might well be that they cannot be counted. I agree with that charge regarding explication (1) and maybe (3b), since (1) explicitly contains the notion of possible beliefs and (3b) might contain it implicitly. For my reasons for the contention that possible beliefs cannot be properly individuated and a proposal on how to individuate actual beliefs see below.

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25

Thus individuating beliefs seems to require at least specifying the person holding the belief in question, which cannot be done regarding possible beliefs which are not actual, since those are not held by any person. Now computing the ratio occurring in (1) requires counting possible beliefs, which presupposes being able to individuate them, and thus (1) just is not applicable here. Note that this individuation problem does not necessarily arise for actual beliefs as well, since an actual belief B can - at least prima facie - be individuated by specifying the set consisting of the person S holding B, the interval time t during which S holds B and the proposition p which is the content of B. Interpretation (2) has the advantage that probabilistic relations among propositions are taken to be quasi-logical relations. Thus on this interpretation the likelihood of a proposition’s truth given it is the propositional content of a belief with some property P stems from quasi-logical connections between the having the property and being true. This is an advantage, since the notion of likelihood needed to capture what is to be expressed by calling a property of beliefs truth-conducive is that the truth-conducivity of a property connects a belief and its truth in a stronger way than just by empirical coincidence. Rather the connection needed should in some way be due to conceptual connections between having the property and being true. On the other hand, the problem with Interpretation (2) in this regard is that the specified quasi-logical connections between propositions can only be assessed given a specified language in which propositional contents of beliefs and descriptions of properties of beliefs are formulated and given a specified confirmation function. And even assuming that it is possible to express all propositional contents of beliefs and descriptions of properties of beliefs in a formal language, the language and the measure respectively the confirmation function must still be chosen.26 Now the dependence of logical probabilities on these choices introduces a considerable element of arbitrariness into the probability assignments. As Hájek puts it regarding the choice of a confirmation function: “The concern here is that any particular setting of λ is arbitrary in a way that compromises Carnap’s claim to be offering a logical notion of probability.”27 26 For the remainder of this section I will discuss this problem in terms of the choice

of the confirmation function. Since the choice of the confirmation function can be considered to be determined by the choice of the measure or vice versa, discussing both choices under the label “choice of the confirmation function” will suffice here. 27 Hájek (2008). λ is a value which characterizes particular confirmation functions.

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CHAPTER 1. THE EPISTEMOLOGIST’S DILEMMA: A REASONABLE QUEST FOR TRUTH

Thus at this point the analogy to deductive logic breaks down, since for “probabilistic logic” there is no universal agreement on the correct rules for assigning conditional probabilities as there is on the correct rules of inference of deductive logic. Thus it is by no means clear in which sense those rules can be considered logical rules with an objective status. Moreover, even if an agreement could somehow be reached regarding the confirmation function, the problem of choosing a language for “probabilistic logic” would still stand in the way of utilizing the notion of logical probability. Again, Hájek describes the problem very clearly: “ [. . .] inductive logic must be sensitive to the meaning of predicates, strongly suggesting that a purely syntactic approach such as Carnap’s is doomed. Scott and Krauss (1966) use model theory in their formulation of logical probability for richer and more realistic languages than Carnap’s. Still, finding a canonical language seems to many a pipe-dream, at least if we want to to analyze the “logical probability” of any argument of real interest - either in science or in everyday life.”28 So the problem with choosing a language concerns the project of explicating the notion of truth-conducivity in terms of likelihood understood as conditional probability in a twofold manner: First, Carnap’s approach only allows the assignment of conditional probabilities to sentences of a finite language, thus ruling out languages which can truly be considered to reflect probability assignments among sentences of ordinary languages. Therefore, the notion of logical probability - at least in the form developed by Carnap - cannot be considered an explication of the ordinary language notion of likelihood which we are after here. And second, assignments of likelihood in the sense needed here can be expected to depend strongly on conceptual connections between properties of beliefs and truth. Now since Carnap’s approach is purely extensional, those conceptual connections would have no bearing on assignments of conditional probabilities, since those probabilities would be assigned on the basis of the number of true respectively false beliefs with property P found in the course of empirical investigation solely. There have been some attempts in epistemology to spell out the notion of logical probability without relying on a formal language but rather on the assumption that there are probabilistic relations between the propositions expressed by the sentences of ordinary language which are as obvious 28 Hájek

(2008).

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and objective as the deductive relations between those propositions.29 But since this assumption can only be established for very simple probabilistic relations, which are very close to deductive relations as for example the relations between the propositions occurring in statistical syllogisms, it is by no means clear that this approach can be generalized to cover all probabilistic relations between propositions.30 Thus, as should be clear from the discussion, Interpretation (2) cannot be the notion of probability needed here either. Frequentism at first seems more promising but unfortunately must also be discarded. This can be seen by considering two problems which concern finite and infinite frequentism respectively but which have a common root. I will first describe the root problem and then discuss it in its specific form for finite and infinite frequentism separately. The root problem is that on frequentist proposals the likelihood of a belief’s truth given it has a certain property is simply identified with the (limiting) relative frequency of true beliefs among the (sample of) beliefs having that property. This notion of probability is therefore purely extensional in the sense that the likelihood of a belief’s truth given that it has a certain property solely depends on the proportion of true beliefs among the (sample of) beliefs having that property, regardless whether the proportion observed is due to an intrinsic connection between the property and truth or if it is due to arbitrary circumstances. So if the likelihood of a belief’s being true given it has some specified property is interpreted according to frequentism, any property of beliefs which is significantly correlated with truth has to be classified as truth-conducive. Conversely, any property which is not significantly correlated with truth is classified as non-truth-conducive. That this is not desirable is most obvious in the case of finite frequentism, which identifies probabilities with relative frequencies among finite reference classes. On this interpretation the truth-conducivity of a property of beliefs would be spelled out in terms of the frequency of true beliefs among a finite sample of beliefs having the property. But these finite frequencies might not reflect the truth-conducivity of a property of beliefs, which can be seen by considering an example: 29 Cp.

Plantinga (1993a) Chapters 8 and 9 and Fumerton (1995) Chapter 7. Fumerton explores the idea of the apriority of probabilistic inference principles, but abandons it at a later stage of his discussion. 30 Plantinga himself recognizes that this is a major problem of his attempt to develop a logical account of probability. (Plantinga (1993a) p.150).

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James suffers from a peculiar neurophysiological condition, which causes him to believe something only if it is true. Then the property of being believed by James should be classified as truth-conducive according to finite frequentism, since no matter which sample of beliefs having this property is chosen, the frequency of true beliefs among the sample is at maximum. Now since “truth-conducivity” is a technical term, which can be defined by stipulation, this example is of course not intended as a counterexample against the explication of truth-conducivity in terms of finite frequentism. Rather, it is intended to draw attention to a vital feature a property should possess if it is to be considered to be truth-conducive in the sense needed for knowledge: Not only should a high percentage of beliefs which have the property be true, but in addition this high percentage of truth should be due to a non-arbitrary connection between having that property and being true. Consider the paradigm cases of truth-conducive properties again: In the case of following deductively from true propositions a belief having this property must be true because the relation of deductive entailment is so defined that a proposition entailed by true propositions cannot be false. Whereas in the case of being a perceptual belief acquired by properly functioning sense organs under normal conditions, such a belief is very likely to be true, since it is the sense organ’s function to provide us with correct information about our environment. Now this feature is lacking in the case of the property of being believed by James, since this property is connected only very contingently with the truth of the beliefs having it. Being believed by James and being true are not connected intrinsically as for example being true and being derivable from true propositions are. Thus in order to be truth-conducive, a property has to be connected to truth in a stronger sense than simply in the sense of being had by a great number of true beliefs in a finite reference class, since such an extensional connection might come about by mere coincidence, in which case having the property does not count toward the truth of a belief in a sense relevant here. Instead the connection between the property and truth should be to some extent conceptual. Now infinite frequentism might at first seem to be better equipped to establish this conceptual connection, since if the limiting frequency of true beliefs among the class of all beliefs having property P is considered, we do not only have to consider the actual beliefs having this property but also the possible ones.31 But now we are faced with the problem of individu31 Of

course, one could identify the class of all beliefs with the set of all actual beliefs, assuming this set to be infinite. But this would leave one with the contingency

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ating possible beliefs once more, which - as I have been arguing above seems to be intractable. This is a general dilemma for frequency interpretations in this context: If the class of beliefs considered as reference class is restricted to actual beliefs, conceptual connections between the property and truth might not be reflected by the frequency of true beliefs in the reference class. Moreover, such a restriction to actual beliefs would exclude properties of beliefs from being truth-conducive if there simply are (and will be) no beliefs having the property in question. But a property’s truth-conducivity should not depend on whether there are in fact beliefs having this property. Consider the following example: Being an omniscient being’s belief is a property which is clearly truth-conducive, since it is truth-guaranteeing. But, for all we know, there are no omniscient beings and therefore there might very well be no actual beliefs having this property. Thus a property’s truthconducivity cannot depend on the percentage of true beliefs among the actual beliefs having it, since it should not depend on the existence of beliefs having that property. On the other hand, any reference class not restricted to actual beliefs qua definition has to contain non-actual, i.e. possible beliefs and therefore renders the frequency interpretation inapplicable. One could try to avoid the dilemma by pointing to the fact that limiting relative frequencies among infinite reference classes can be determined relative to one or more actual sequences of trials which yield certain actual frequencies from which the limiting frequencies can be extrapolated. But this would leave us with the contingency problem again, since the only plausible way to extrapolate from actual frequencies I can think of regarding the problem at hand is by assuming the limiting frequencies to be (approximately) equal to some kind of arithmetic mean of the frequencies of true beliefs actually observed. But this would leave us again with the problems of James and the omniscient being. Thus we have to conclude that frequentist interpretations of probability are unsuited to illuminate the notion of likelihood needed here. So let us see if one of two kinds of propensity interpretations of probability fares any better with regard to the reflection of the desired conceptual connection. If one takes a closer look at (4a), i.e. at the characterization of truthconducivity in terms of single-case propensities, it can be seen that this kind of propensity view is not really suited to our purpose, since it is not clear what it means to say that a single belief has a strong propensity to problem again.

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be true. Particular beliefs are either true or false. If a particular belief is true, it does not have a tendency to be true, it simply is true. On the other hand, if a particular belief is false, it does not make much sense to say that it nevertheless has a strong tendency to be true. Thus the single-case propensity interpretation of probability is not applicable here. In contrast, the long-run version of this interpretation seems to be closer to what is needed for understanding the notion of likelihood featuring in the explication of truth-conducivity. First, the conceptual connections between a belief’s having properties which are truth-conducive and its being true can be captured by this concept of probability, since on this account probabilities are not identified with frequencies but with a tendency of beliefs with certain properties to be true with a high long-run frequency. So on this account, truth-conducivity does not consist in any frequency among actual beliefs. Therefore the problems which arose from the example involving James and the case of omniscience or more precisely the possibility of some truth-conducive property never being instantiated in general can be avoided. Second, the problem of individuating possible beliefs does not arise, since possible beliefs never enter the picture. All we need to talk about are tendencies of beliefs with certain properties to be true with some longrun frequency. Now one does not have to individuate possible beliefs to ascribe such a tendency to them. All that is needed for ascribing them such a tendency is an account of why a given property of those beliefs is significantly correlated with truth. If this correlation is explained, it will be clear that and why not just a high proportion of the observed beliefs which have the property are true but also a high proportion of the non-observed beliefs having the property will be true. But unfortunately, the ascription of such tendencies to beliefs is exactly where the problems with this interpretation begin: What kind of entities are these “tendencies”? Are they to be considered properties of the beliefs? But what kind of properties? Commonly, propensities are understood as dispositional properties of specified sets of physical conditions.32 32 Cp.

Popper (1959) pp.34 and p.67. This view has been criticized for various reasons even applied to physical entities. For example, Alan White writes: “The theory, in Peirce, Popper and Hacking, stems from a frequency theory [. . .]. The new theory equates the probability not with this frequency but with an alleged propensity to produce this frequency. Popper calls it a ‘revised or reformed statistical interpretation’. Even if - which I have denied - the probability of statistical examples could be analyzed or interpreted in terms of a propensity, the theory has no plausibility beyond this field. It is indeed difficult to imagine what propensity of what could explain, much less be identified with, the probability of my living to be 80, of Tennyson’s

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This view is often made plausible by comparing propensities to other dispositional properties such as solubility. Just as a lump of salt has a disposition to dissolve if it is exposed to water, even if it is never in fact so exposed, a throwing setup involving a certain die, a suitable throwing device and a suitable surface has a disposition to produce certain outcomes with certain frequencies, even if the die is never in fact thrown. Thus, it is concluded, propensities can be considered real physical properties, just as solubility or brittleness are real physical properties. But clearly this analogy cannot be applied in our case, since most of the properties we want to classify as truth-conducive are not physical properties, since they are not properties of belief states considered as neurological states of the brain. Most of the properties are either properties of the propositional contents of beliefs or of beliefs considered as mental states. But at least propositions clearly cannot have physical properties. Thus what would be needed would be a non-physical dispositional property of belief states or of propositional contents of beliefs. But this is even more obscure than the original notion of a physical propensity, which has been massively criticized for its obscurity on its own.33 Thus we have to conclude that none of the standard accounts of objective probability yields a notion of likelihood which can be useful regarding the explication of truth-conducivity. But nevertheless, a considerable increase in clarity can be gained from the survey of the different objective notions of probability, since the discussion has brought to light some important features of the concept of truth-conducivity and the notion of likelihood needed for its explication. I will shortly list these features and then embark on the task of developing an understanding of likelihood which does justice to them. (1) For a property of beliefs to be truth-conducive, the connection between a belief’s having it and the belief’s being true must amount to more than just an extensional connection such as the property and truth being simultaneously present in many actual cases. (2) The connection between having a truth-conducive property and being true has to be logical in some sense, although this logical connection must not be as strong as logical entailment. having written such-and-such a poem or of Hyperion’s winning the Derby. Without independent reasons for supposing ‘probability’ to be ambiguous, this narrowness of application is a serious defect in the theory.” White (1972) pp.41. 33 Cp. Sober (1993) pp.63 and Eagle (2004) pp.379.

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(3) The connection between having a truth-conducive property and being true must be assessable without the need to individuate possible beliefs. (4) The notion of truth-conducivity must apply not only to properties of actual beliefs, but also to properties which are never in fact had by any belief. Moreover, it must apply to properties of belief states as well as to properties of propositions. Thus what we need here is a notion of likelihood which is stronger than that proposed by finite frequentism, yet weaker than a strictly logical notion which would require us to specify probability assignments to propositions formulated in a formal language according to a formally defined confirmation function. William Alston discusses the problem of characterizing the notion of objective probability in an epistemologically useful manner in Chapter 5 of his book Against Justification. After discarding logical probability in Carnap’s sense and propensity interpretations for various reasons (some of which are similar to the ones given here), he votes for a frequency interpretation. Since he sees the problems for finite frequentism in this context all to well, he proposes the following: “Here is another point that needs emphasis with respect to the frequency conception of probability that we are proposing to use to develop the idea that an adequate ground of belief is one such that it is PF credible that a belief based on that ground will enjoy a high probability of truth all things considered on the condition of being so based. [. . .] there is still a choice to be made between a “track record” frequency, the frequency with which such beliefs actually based on such grounds are true, and what we might call a “subjunctive” frequency, the frequency with which such beliefs based on such grounds would be true if they were so based. It is not difficult to see that it is the latter we want for epistemology. This can be most easily seen by reflecting that a ground of a certain sort could be an adequate (possible) basis for a belief with a certain kind of content even if such a belief is never in fact based on it. And opting for a de facto, “track record” frequency would freeze out examples like this.”34 Although Alston does not elaborate this point, I take it that his “subjunctive frequency” is different from the frequencies the infinite frequentist 34 Alston

(2005) p.112. The abbreviation “PF” stands for “prima facie”.

1.1. TRUTH-CONDUCIVITY

33

has in mind. Regardless whether Alston intends them to be, they must be different, because calculating infinite frequencies according to the infinite frequentist involves extrapolating from observed frequencies, which cannot be done if there are no beliefs based on some kind of grounds. Now since Alston assumes that his “subjunctive frequency” interpretation can be applied in such cases, the frequencies he intends to talk about have to be different from the frequencies the infinite frequentist talks about. Now, with respect to the truth-conducivity of properties of beliefs, Alston’s proposal can be applied as follows: (TCsub ) A property P of beliefs is truth-conducive iff the frequency with which beliefs would be true if they had P is high. This explication does justice to many of the desired features listed above, since such a “subjunctive frequency interpretation” covers properties of beliefs which are never in fact had by any belief and properties of propositions. Beyond that, it shares the advantage of the propensity interpretation that the need to individuate possible beliefs does not arise, since an account of why a given property is connected to truth in this way suffices to establish that the alleged frequency would be high. Furthermore, it is obviously stronger than an explication utilizing a finite frequentist notion of probability. For example, the property of being an omniscient being’s belief can be classed as truth-conducive according to (TCsub ), since the frequency with which beliefs would be true if they were beliefs of an omniscient being surely is as high as it can be. Thus the “subjunctive frequency interpretation” preserves the advantages of frequency interpretations and of the long-run propensity interpretation without sharing their shortcomings. Moreover, the paradigm examples are covered by (TCsub ) as well. The frequency with which beliefs would be true if their propositional contents followed deductively from true propositions is maximal and the frequency with which beliefs were true if they were perceptual beliefs acquired under normal conditions by properly functioning sense organs surely is considerably high as well. But closer scrutiny of (TCsub ) reveals that this explication is still too weak, since it does not exclude examples of the kind involving James and his peculiar illness. Thus the property of being believed by James is still not excluded by (TCsub ), since the frequency with which beliefs would be true if they were James’ beliefs is still as high as it can be. Nevertheless, the explication in terms of a “subjunctive frequency” is much closer to what we want than the previous explications which were directly based on the

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objective interpretations of probability. Now a look at one ordinary language use of the expression “it is likely that” might provide a further clue about the needed explication. Imagine that someone utters a sentence as: “It is likely that this chair will not collapse if I sit on it.”. Now what does he mean by that? If he was asked why he thinks that the chair is likely to hold his weight, he supposedly would answer something very similar to: “Chairs normally are constructed in such a way that they are able to hold the weight of people. Besides, I cannot see any construction errors and the chair does not look particularly old or decayed.” This answer does not report any observed, extrapolated or “subjunctive” frequency. It might be used to explain observed high frequencies of stable, non-collapsing chairs but it is itself not inferred from or otherwise based on any observed or extrapolated frequency. Instead, it is inferred from the knowledge what a chair is and what chairs are for. Anyone who knows what a chair is and what chairs are for could infer that the chair in question is very likely not to collapse when sat on without having tested actual chairs for their stability or thinking about any frequencies of stable chairs among observed or imagined chairs. Nevertheless, the inference from chairhood to stability does not hold universally, since some particular chairs do collapse due to remote production errors or due to their age. But although the inference is not based on strict logical entailment, it carries a conceptual element in a twofold manner: First, it is warranted a priori in the sense of not having to be based on empirical data and second, it invokes a conceptual relation between the concept of a chair and the concept of stability. Thus there seem to be conceptual relations between some propositions such as the propositions expressed by “This item is a chair.” and “This item will not collapse when sat on.”. Nevertheless, these relations are not deductive relations in the strict sense.35 Let me present another example to illuminate the nature of relations of this kind: It is a notorious problem in biology to find an adequate definition for being alive. There are some criteria which are pretty good, as for example being able to reproduce, but there are always exceptions. Mules are clearly alive, although they are sterile due to their genetic properties. Thus, the ability to reproduce should not count as a necessary condition for being alive in the strict sense. Nevertheless, there seems to be a strong conceptual connection between the concept of being alive and the concept of being able to reproduce. Now due to this connection the statement “If 35 Neither

are they relations of material implication, since such relations have to be without exception as well to hold.

1.1. TRUTH-CONDUCIVITY

35

something is alive, then it is very likely that it is able to reproduce.” is not true because of a contingent high frequency of beings which are able to reproduce among the living beings, but rather it is true because of the conceptual connection between the concept of being alive and the concept of being able to reproduce.36 But as in the case of the concept of a chair and the concept of stability, this connection is not strictly necessary. This can be seen by imagining a possible world in which many living beings do not reproduce anymore but are simply preserved infinitely.37 Another example which does not involve concepts which are characterized in some way or other by a function is the following: “If something is a desert, then it is likely to be dry.” Now since it sometimes does rain in deserts as for example during wet seasons, deserts are not always dry but nevertheless the concept of dryness is strongly associated with our concept of a desert. Now there are many more examples of this kind of connection between propositions in ordinary language. Consider the following statements: (1) If something is a key, it is likely that it opens something. (2) If something is a cup, it is likely that it does not have holes. (3) If something is a piano, it is likely that striking one of its keys produces a sound. (1) is true, since it is part of the concept of a key that keys can be used to open things like doors or drawers. Thus, although some keys might not open anything, since the doors they were made for do not exist anymore or since the keys are deformed, the truth of (1) can be known without testing any actual keys for their utility regarding the opening of things. Rather, to know that (1) is true, it suffices to know what a key is. (2) is true, since it s part of the concept of a cup that it can be used to drink from, which would not be possible if the cup had holes. Thus (2) can be known without checking a sample of cups for holes, although there might be some cups with holes, because they are broken or used as practical joke devices. (3) is true because it is part of the concept of a piano that its keys produce sounds when struck. Thus despite the fact that some pianos might lack this characteristic, since some of their keys are broken, (3) can 36 Again,

a high frequency of beings which are able to reproduce among the living beings might be explained by recourse to this connection, but the statement above does not have to be based on such a frequency. Instead, it can simply be based on the conceptual connection. 37 Such a world is for example imagined by Michel Houellebecq in his novel The Possibility of an Island (Houellebecq (2006)).

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be known by reflecting on the concept of a piano instead of testing samples of pianos. These examples are intended to show that many ordinary language statements containing the notion of likelihood owe their truth to conceptual connections between the concepts expressed by the predicates occurring in them. Thus given our concepts of a key, a cup and a piano, the statements above cannot be false. Consequently, these kinds of likelihood-statements above can be considered analytic truths. Since there is a never ending debate about the analyticsynthetic-distinction, let me elaborate on this a little in order to explain what I mean by calling these statements analytic truths. Traditionally, an analytic statement is a statement which is true solely because of the meaning of the terms occurring in it. Thus for an analytic statement to change its truth value, the meaning of one of the terms occurring in it has to change. For example, for the truth value of “Bachelors are unmarried” to change from true to false, either the meaning of “bachelor” or the meaning of “unmarried” has to change. So analytic statements cannot change their truth-value due to changes in the empirical world but only due to changes in the meaning of the terms they contain. So when I call a statement analytic I mean that this statement cannot change its truth value without one of the terms occurring in it changing in its meaning. Thus what is meant by saying that (1) is analytic is that for (1) to change its truth value from true to false, either the meaning of “is a key” or of “opens something” has to change.38 The same applies to the examples discussed above. The statements “If something is a chair, then it is very likely not to collapse.” and “If something is alive, then it is very likely to be able to reproduce.” can be considered analytic truths as well. For the first statement to change its truth value either “is a chair” or “collapses” would have to change its meaning and for the second statement to change its truth value either “is alive” or “is able to reproduce” would have to change its meaning. Thus the high frequencies of non-collapsing things among the class of chairs and the high frequency of beings with the ability to reproduce among the class of living beings are not due to empirical contingencies but to conceptual connections. One more word has to be said about “it is likely that” occurring in these statements. In these contexts this expression can be interpreted frequentistically, for example (1) can be taken to mean “The frequency of things which can be used to open something among the keys is high.” But this 38 I

here.

am taking the meanings of “If . . ., then” and “it is likely that” to be constants

1.1. TRUTH-CONDUCIVITY

37

statement has to be analytic as well, since this frequency could only decrease significantly if either “is a key” or “opens something” changes in meaning. Thus one may spell out the notion of likelihood in the style of a frequency interpretation here, but one has to bear in mind that in these cases the reason for the existence of this frequency is not a contingent correlation of two properties, but a semantic connection between two concepts, which may be appealed to in order to explain the corresponding frequencies.39 I will call the notion of likelihood occurring in these statements “conceptual likelihood”. This notion can be spelled out as follows: (CL) Given that q it is conceptually likely that p iff “If q, then it is likely that p.” is an analytic truth. Now this notion of likelihood gives us exactly what we need in order to characterize the notion of truth-conducivity in terms of likelihood. In order to see this, I will first spell out my proposed explication of truthconducivity in terms of conceptual likelihood and then defend it by an appeal to the four main features of truth-conducivity introduced earlier and to the examples discussed. (TCcon ) A property P of beliefs is truth-conducive iff the following statement is analytically true: “If belief B has P, then it is likely that belief B is true.”. As explained above, the notion of likelihood occurring in this statement can be interpreted frequentistically. Thus the statement “If belief B has P, then it is likely that belief B is true.” can be read as equivalent to “The frequency of true beliefs among the beliefs having P is high.” But, since the statement is required to be analytic, this high frequency cannot be due to a contingent correlation between having property P and being true. Instead it must be due to a conceptual connection between a belief’s having the property P and its truth. Thus in order for the truth value of “If belief B has P, then it is likely that belief B is true.” to change from true to false, the meaning of at least one of the terms occurring in the statement must change. 39 Of

course I do not intend to claim that sentences containing“it is likely that” express conceptual likelihood in all ordinary language contexts. For example the statement “Since Peer is a Swede, it is likely that he is a Protestant.” expresses no conceptual connection, but is merely based on an empirical correlation between the property of being a Swede and the property of being a Protestant. The difference can be seen by considering the possibility that most Swedes convert to Catholicism. In this case, the statement would change its truth value but neither the meaning of “is a Swede” nor the meaning of “is a Protestant” would change.

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CHAPTER 1. THE EPISTEMOLOGIST’S DILEMMA: A REASONABLE QUEST FOR TRUTH

Let us reconsider the four features of truth-conducivity which must be incorporated into an explication of truth-conducivity in order to see that this explication is indeed what is needed. First, for a property of beliefs to be truth-conducive, the connection between the property and truth was required to amount to more than just an extensional connection such as being simultaneously present in many actual cases. Now if having a property P makes it conceptually likely that belief B is true, the connection between the property P and truth must be to a great extent conceptual. For if there were only a contingent connection between the property P and truth, the likelihood of B being true on condition of having property P would depend on contingent circumstances and the statement “If belief B has P, then it is likely that belief B is true.” would not be analytically true. Thus (TCcon ) captures the first desired feature. Second, although the connection between a truth-conducive property and truth is required to be in some sense logical or conceptual, this connection must not be as strong as logical entailment. This condition is met as well by properties which fulfill (TCcon ): Although some beliefs having the property P might be false, the frequency of true beliefs among the beliefs having P must be high for conceptual reasons in order for “If belief B has P, then it is likely that belief B is true.” to be analytically true. Third, the notion of truth-conducivity should apply not only to properties of actual beliefs, but also to properties which are in fact never had by any belief. This feature is captured by (TCcon ) as well, since a property’s fulfilling (TCcon ) does not depend on the property’s being ever had by any belief. In order to find out whether “If belief B has P, then it is highly likely that belief B is true.” is analytically true, one only needs to consider the concept of this property. Thus any possible property of beliefs can fulfill (TCcon ), regardless whether the property is ever had by any actual belief. This can be seen by considering again the property of being an omniscient being’s belief. Regardless whether there were, are or will ever be any beliefs which have that property, the statement “If B is an omniscient being’s belief, then it is highly likely that B is true” is analytic, since being omniscient implies having all and only true beliefs. Thus even if no belief ever had and will ever have this property, any belief which had it would thereby be highly likely to be true. And fourth, it has to be possible to find out if a property of beliefs is truthconducive without the need to individuate possible beliefs. Now finding out if a property is truth-conducive in the sense explicated above does not require individuating any beliefs, since in order to find out if property P

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39

is truth-conducive in this sense, one only has to take a look at the concept of the property and does not need to know how many actual or possible beliefs which have the property are true. Next, let us consider the paradigm examples discussed above in order to see if the properties which are intuitively considered to be truth-conducive meet the above explication. The property of following deductively from a set of true propositions clearly fulfills (TCcon ), since “If belief B‘s propositional content follows deductively from a set of true propositions, then it is highly likely that B is true.” cannot change its truth-value from true to false unless the concept of deductive consequence has changed. If a proposition follows deductively from a set of true propositions, it must be true, since this is what “following deductively from” means. This can similarly be shown for the second paradigm property : “If B is a perceptual belief acquired under normal conditions by properly functioning sense organs, then it is highly likely that B is true.” is analytic, too, since for the sense organs to be functioning properly means for them to provide us with correct information about the environment. Thus beliefs having this property must be highly likely to be true because of what it means for the sense organs to be functioning properly. Unlike in the case of following from a set of true propositions, this does not mean that all beliefs arrived at in this manner must be true, since in this case things can still go wrong. Just remember the case of the peach and the nectarine. But if the sense organs really are functioning properly, a high proportion of beliefs arrived at in this way must be true simply because of what it means for the sense organs to function properly. This can also be seen by considering the following scenario: Were we to find out that our sense organs do not provide us with correct information about the environment most of the time, i.e. that most of our perceptual beliefs are false, the statement “If B is a perceptual belief acquired under normal conditions by properly functioning sense organs, then it is highly likely that B is true.” would change its truth value. But in this scenario, the meaning of “to perceive something” would change as well, since it would lose its veritative component. Furthermore, (TCcon ) covers many more properties of beliefs which are commonly considered to be truth-conducive in the literature, as for example being based on sound reasoning, being acquired by an adequate causal process or being acquired by a reliable belief-forming process. Now let us consider the counterexample, which dealt with the property of being believed by James, our poor fellow who suffers from a neurological

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CHAPTER 1. THE EPISTEMOLOGIST’S DILEMMA: A REASONABLE QUEST FOR TRUTH

disease, which precludes him from ever believing something false. Thus all of James’ beliefs are true due to his medical condition. Nevertheless the property of being believed by James intuitively should not count as truth-conducive. Now the property of being James’ belief does not count as truth-conducive according to (TCcon ), since the statement “If B is one of James’ beliefs, then it is likely that B is true”, may be true if James suffers from a neurological condition that makes it impossible for him to believe anything false, but it is certainly not an analytic truth, since none of the terms in the statement does have to change its meaning in order for the statement to change its truth value. All that is required for such a change is that James be cured of his illness. So the property of being believed by James is not covered by (TCcon ) because there is no conceptual connection between this property and being true, but only a contingent, empirical connection which is due to James’ illness. As we have seen, in contrast to the other proposed explications, (TCcon ) accommodates many properties intuitively considered to be truth-condu- cive but excludes the discussed counterexample. Of course this does not show that (TCcon ) is the only possible adequate explication of truth-con- ducivity which can accommodate the desired features of truth-conducivity and the examples. But since I have discussed many alternatives which do not provide such an accommodation, I take the previous discussion to count strongly in favor of (TCcon ). Furthermore, (TCcon ) captures the central requirement for properties of beliefs which are to figure in a third condition for knowledge, namely the requirement that only properties of beliefs which can provide a connection between the first and the second condition of the analysis of the concept of knowledge are to be considered as candidates for featuring in the third condition. (TCcon ) captures this requirement, since any property fulfilling (TCcon ) must be a property which intrinsically connects beliefs having them to being true since (TCcon ) requires the connection between a belief’s having a truth-conducive property and its likelihood to be true to be conceptual. Thus properties of beliefs fulfilling (TCcon ) will provide the link between beliefs and their truth which is required to be established by properties of beliefs which are suited to figure in the third condition. Thus I will conclude that (TCcon ) is on the right track as an explication of truth-conducivity and move on to some qualifications which pertain to the role this notion is to play in connection with the third condition for knowledge.

1.1. TRUTH-CONDUCIVITY

1.1.2

41

Truth-Conducivity - an Amendment

The notion of truth-conducivity we have developed so far is still too weak in one respect. To see why this is so, let us come back for a moment to the role the notion of truth-conducivity was to play regarding the third condition for knowledge: Plato argued for the necessity of a third condition for knowledge on the grounds that simply being true does not suffice for a belief to be knowledge, because there are many true beliefs which are not backed by something stabilizing. Thus true belief does not suffice for knowledge, since in order to know we have to be able to give an “account” for our true beliefs. We need this “account” because otherwise there would be no distinction between a belief that was formed by chance and happens to be true and a belief that was formed because of its truth. In modern terms, Plato’s argument for the necessity of a stabilizing third condition for knowledge can be rephrased as follows: True beliefs can be acquired in many ways and held on many grounds which do not have to do anything with the fact that they are true and therefore simply being the content of a belief does not count in favor of the truth of a proposition. Now the same holds for being a belief which has one or more properties which are truth-conducive: Simply having those properties surely does not lead to the stability of the beliefs which have the properties, i.e. the mere fact that a belief has one or more properties which are truth-conducive does not lead to our retaining the belief. So the role of the third condition is not only to connect our beliefs to truth, but also to do this in such a way that we can be aware of this connection. Thus besides providing a connection between belief and truth, the role of the third condition is to guide us toward truth. As Joe Cruz and John Pollock put it with regard to justification as a third condition for knowledge: “The role of a theory of justification in knowledge is to distinguish between beliefs that are true but only accidentally so, versus beliefs that are true because the believer has some positive reason to think so."40 As a result, we are faced with the problem of construing the third condition for knowledge in a way that takes into consideration its vital link to truth without explicating the condition such that it implies that people almost never know what they believe to know. 40 Cruz

& Pollock (2004) p.135. Since they are explicitly talking about the role of justification regarding knowledge, I assume that what Cruz and Pollock claim here is supposed to hold for any third condition of knowledge, regardless whether it is spelled out in terms of justification.

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Considered more closely then, the third condition should provide a link between truth and belief in a twofold manner: First, whatever is required for a belief to fulfill the third condition must objectively increase the likelihood that the belief in question is true, i.e. the third condition must require the belief in question to have one or more properties which make the belief likely to be true independently of our believing that they do so. Second, whatever is required by the third condition must subjectively increase the likelihood that a belief which fulfills the condition is true, i.e. the third condition must require the belief in question to have one or more properties which we can be aware of. Moreover, we must be able to be aware of the fact that having these properties increases the likelihood of a belief’s being true. In other words: The properties of beliefs required by the third condition must on the one hand be indicative of the truth of the beliefs objectively, i.e. they must somehow be connected to the truth of the beliefs independently of our believing that they are connected to it. On the other hand they have to be indicative of the truth of the beliefs subjectively, i.e. we have to be able to find out if a given belief has these properties and we have to be able to find out that these properties are connected to the truth of the belief. For simplicity of reference, I will label these requirements “objective truth-conducivity” and “subjective truth-conducivity” respectively. Now since (TCcon ) covers only the notion of objective truth-conducivity, the characterization of truth-conducivity needed as a requirement for the third condition has to be expanded by a clause to comprise subjective truth-conducivity as well: (TCC) A property P of a belief B is completely truth-conducive iff (i) The following statement is analytically true: (T)“If belief B has P, then it is likely that belief B is true.”, and (ii) It is cognitively accessible to S whether his belief B has property P.41 41 One

has to be careful here not to cast the notion of cognitive accessibility too broad. For example, what is not to be covered by this notion are cases in which a person does not yet have reasons for a given belief but could discover such reasons by reading a book that is on her shelf at home. In one sense she has cognitive access to reasons for her belief in this situation, because all she has to do to acquire those reasons is to read the book. But surely the mere availability of reasons cannot confer the status of knowledge on her belief. Thus the reasons have to be something she already possesses in the sense that she already has those reasons in the form of beliefs. What is meant by cognitive accessibility is that the person holding the belief can become aware of the properties which confer the status of knowledge on her belief without the aid of anything but her own cognitive resources.

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Conjunct (i) is intended to capture what it means for a property of beliefs to be objectively truth-conducive. Now in what sense is the requirement stated in (i) an objective requirement? It is objective in the sense that it is a mind-independent requirement. When we say that something exists or is the case objectively, we mean that something exists or is the case independently from being thought of or believed to be the case. For example, a lion living in the depths of the African savannah exists independently of ever being observed or imagined by anyone and thus exists objectively. But note that existing or being the case objectively does not imply existing or being the case independently of the existence of minds: The computer in front of me objectively exists, even though it would probably never have existed if there were no minds in the universe. What matters is that the computer does not cease to exist when it is not thought of. Thus requiring properties of beliefs to be objectively truth-conducive amounts to requiring that it be likely that beliefs having them are true independently of our believing that this is the case. That this requirement must be met by the third condition may not be obvious, although the reason for this is quite straightforward: If the properties specified by the third condition lacked objective truth-conducivity, having these properties would not count in favor of the truth of the belief. Thus the function of the third condition, which is to link the first and the second condition would be lost, since beliefs having the property specified by the third condition would not be more likely to be true than beliefs lacking it.42 Let us now turn to conjunct (ii). This conjunct expresses the requirement of subjective truth-conducivity by stating that the third condition should encompass one or more properties which are thus that we can find out whether our beliefs have them. Now why must this requirement be met in order for a belief to count as knowledge? I will answer this question in detail in the next section which deals with the controversy between epistemic externalism and epistemic internalism. This controversy is relevant here, since internalists hold that nothing which is not cognitively accessible to the person having a belief can contribute to the belief’s status as knowledge while externalists deny this claim. Thus in terms of my require42 This

argument rests on the assumption that truth is an objective property in the sense that most beliefs - discounting special cases such as the belief that I believe that I have a headache right now - are true or false independently of our (rationally) believing them to be true or false. This assumption has been challenged by some authors but lacking space for a discussion of the arguments against this assumption, I will not take on that challenge here. The central argument against theories of truth which define truth in terms of rational acceptability or the like is presented in detail in ? pp.424.

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ments, internalism amounts to the claim that in order to contribute to a belief’s status as knowledge, a property of this belief has to be subjectively truth-conducive. Now most internalists and externalists agree on the point that the third condition must somehow ensure objective truth-conducivity. Thus internalism can be seen as placing an additional constraint on beliefs in order for them to be considered knowledge, which is supposed to be reflected by (TCC). Thus conjunct (i) can be considered to express the externalist requirement of truth-conducivity for knowledge, while conjunct (ii) expresses the internalist requirement of truth-conducivity. In the next section, I will deliver a detailed defense of the requirement of subjective truth-conducivity in the course of a discussion of internalism and externalism.

1.2

Externalism and Internalism

Concerning the link between the properties specified by the third condition and truth, we are faced with an important question which has created much controversy among contemporary epistemologists: Do we have to consider the link an internal or an external one? Is knowledge a result of internal processes like for example reasoning or is it a result of external processes like for example causation? Two positions can be characterized with respect to these questions: Internalism and Externalism. In the following paragraphs I will broadly outline these positions, since as I already indicated in the previous section, the discussion centering on them bears a direct connection to my requirements for a third condition for knowledge. This connection can be described as follows: While internalists endorse (ii) as a requirement for properties specified by the third condition,43 externalists endorse (i) and (most of them) explicitly deny the internalist claim that (ii) is necessary. The debate between internalists and externalists can be considered a result of the problem of establishing a link between belief and truth by the third condition for knowledge. Externalist theories have the advantage that they offer a condition which can provide a direct link between beliefs fulfilling it and the truth of those beliefs, since if external factors figure prominently in the third condition, they link the person holding the belief in question and her belief to the external world.44 But externalist theories face the 43 Some

internalists additionally endorse (i). Cp. for example BonJour (1985). that it is nevertheless not guaranteed that beliefs fulfilling these alternative third conditions are true, since even a belief caused by the facts might misrepresent 44 Note

1.2. EXTERNALISM AND INTERNALISM

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danger of falling prey to skepticism, since according to externalist theories, it is possible that we are not able to determine if any of our beliefs fulfill the proposed conditions. Thus it could be difficult or even impossible to find out whether any given belief is linked to the external world by adequate causal connections or whether the belief forming processes which led to its generation were of the generally reliable kind. In general, in many cases we cannot find out if the externalist conditions needed for knowledge obtain, because we cannot just “step out of our minds” to take a look at independent reality. Purely internalist theories on the other hand, have to face the problem of human fallibility. For example, how can they account for the fact that someone who is frequently hallucinating does not know what he perceptually believes (even though some of his perceptual beliefs might be true) if the third condition is purely internal? So both externalist and internalist approaches encounter difficulties in construing the third condition for knowledge in an adequate manner. The difference between the two approaches can be elucidated further by pointing out two different intuitions about knowledge which lie behind externalism and internalism respectively: Externalists consider it very important that beliefs which fulfill the third condition are often true. Therefore they try to cast the third condition in a way which minimizes the possibility of error. Internalists rely on another intuition: They want to ensure that we can in principle find out whether the beliefs we classify as knowledge are true. Therefore they focus on inferential relations, sensations, sense data, or other things which we can be aware of at least on reflection. So their focus is on the reasons or grounds we have for our purported knowledge. Before considering these alternatives in detail, an important difference has to be clarified in order to avoid confusion. The debate about internalism and externalism is not unique to epistemology. There is an analogous dispute in philosophy of mind and language which is concerned with the question whether the fact that our beliefs (and other mental states) have content and that our utterances have meaning is mainly due to internal factors or if external factors are primarily responsible for that. Let me elucidate this by an example: Suppose Oscar believes that water is wet. Then we can ask whether the content of his belief which he can express by uttering the sentence “Water the facts and a belief generated by a generally reliable belief forming process might nevertheless be an instance in which the reliable process failed to produce a true belief, although these cases are so rare that the process can nevertheless still be regarded as reliable.

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is wet.” is mainly determined by factors which are internal to Oscar, such as his other mental states or his brain states or if this content is mainly determined by external factors such as his (previous) causal connections to water or his interactions with people and things during the period in which he learned the language he uses to express his thoughts. The first alternative is called content internalism or semantic internalism. This brand of internalism amount to the claim that the contents of our mental states and the meanings of our utterances are entirely constituted by things which go on “in the head”, i.e. by mental states or brain states.45 Content externalism or semantic externalism on the other hand, is the position that contents and meanings are mainly constituted by things “out there”, for example by the causal history46 or social environment47 of the person having the mental states and uttering sentences to express the content of those mental states or even by the function those mental states had and have in the evolution of mankind.48 The debate about this sense of the externalisminternalism contrast is distinct from the discussion of internalism and externalism in epistemology but nevertheless has a bearing on it, since its outcome partly determines how we have to think about beliefs.49 If it is true that the contents of beliefs are determined primarily by external factors, we could not have beliefs with those contents if these external factors did not obtain. Thus if content externalism is true in one of its versions, the external factors responsible for our belief’s having content have to exist in order for us to have beliefs with these contents. So according to content externalism the mere fact that we have the beliefs we have counts against skepticism regarding the external world. This point is made explicit in Hilary Putnam’s famous argument against skepticism involving brains in vats.50 Thus the question whether the contents of beliefs are constituted mainly by internal or by external factors is by no means irrelevant to epistemology. Nevertheless I will set it aside for the time being, since here I will discuss the internalism-externalism-debate in epistemology which 45 Cp.

Fodor (1981) and Stich (1983). Putnam (1981). 47 Cp. Burge (1979) and Ludlow (1995). 48 Cp. Millikan (1984) and Millikan (2004). 49 Content externalism and semantic externalism are strongly connected, since if we take our utterances to express the contents of our thoughts, what our utterances mean is determined by these contents. Thus if these contents are determined by external factors, so are the meanings of our utterances. Conversely, if we take the contents of our thoughts to be dependent on the meanings of the words we use to express them, and these meanings depend on external factors, so do the contents of our thoughts. 50 Putnam (1981) Chapter 2. 46 Cp.

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centers on the question whether the factors contributing to knowledge are mainly internal or external.51 I will come back to the other forms of externalism and their bearing on epistemology in my discussion of Donald Davidson’s epistemology in the second chapter. One last comment is due before I can turn to the discussion of internalism and externalism in epistemology: There is one sense in which the notion of knowledge undoubtedly is an externalist notion. Since it is universally agreed that one necessary condition for knowledge is truth, this introduces an irreducibly externalist element into the concept of knowledge. Consider for example the following case: Peter believes that it is raining in Sydney right now as a result of being told so on the phone by his friend who lives in Sydney. Granting that believing that p as a result of being told that p by a reliable friend on the phone is sufficient for knowing that p in case that p is true, the answer to the question whether Peter knows that it is raining in Sydney entirely depends on the question whether it is true that it is raining in Sydney right now. But this question can be settled independently of considering any facts about Peter. Thus the truth condition is as externalist as it can be, since the truth value of (most) propositions does not depend on anything which is internal to people.52 Furthermore, there is an additional externalist component to knowledge, namely any component which is added to an analysis of knowledge in order for it to be invulnerable to Gettier cases.53 This component has to be externalist, since it is the point of most Gettier cases that the “victim” is in no position to readily become aware of the “gettierized” circumstances. Thus any requirement excluding these cases has to be such that it will be difficult if not impossible for persons to become aware of their fulfilling the requirement.54 Since many epistemologists cast the third condition in terms of justification, the debate about epistemological internalism and externalism has in most cases been a debate about internalism and externalism regarding justification. But as William Alston notes, this debate does not depend on construing the third condition for knowledge in terms of justification but 51 When

I use the terms “internalism” and “externalism” in the following sections I am referring to the epistemological versions of the positions. 52 There are of course some propositions whose truth value is trivially dependent on things internal to people - as for example propositions about people’s mental states. 53 I use the term “Gettier case” to cover all situations in which any putative analysis of knowledge is fulfilled by a person’s belief but we would nevertheless deny the person knowledge since her arriving at a true belief in this situation is somehow accidental. 54 For a more detailed discussion of the Gettier problem see section 3.2.3.

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can be generalized to a discussion about what he calls “epistemic desiderata”, i.e. about properties of beliefs desirable from an epistemic perspective.55 Now while not every property of beliefs which Alston classifies as an “epistemic desideratum” may be suited for figuring in a third condition for knowledge,56 many of the desiderata he discusses are properties of beliefs offered as a third condition in one or another analysis of knowledge. Thus it is possible to discuss the controversy between externalists and internalists in terms of a third condition of knowledge instead of in terms of justification, which I will do in the following sections.57 I will begin by presenting internalism because externalism is often characterized as a mere denial of internalist restrictions on knowledge. But as many proponents of externalism do not contend themselves with simply rejecting internalism but offer their own accounts of knowledge which cast the third condition in terms of external factors of different kinds, I will present the dominating externalist strategies afterwards. In the third part of this section, I will then defend internalism by arguing against two prominent objections to internalism presented by externalists.

1.2.1

Internalism

Since there are many different kinds of epistemic internalism, I will begin by characterizing epistemic internalism in a way such that almost any internalist can agree. Afterwards I will differentiate different versions of internalism. Broadly formulated, internalists hold the following: (INT) S knows that p only if all factors which contribute to conferring the status of knowledge on the belief that p (apart from truth and whatever condition is needed to exclude Gettier-cases) are factors which are internal to S. 55 Alston

(2005) pp.52. example, he discusses so-called deontological desiderata as holding a belief permissibly or responsibly, which are much too weak to serve as a third condition of knowledge. 57 The controversy about internalism and externalism regarding the third condition has partly been carried on in terms of “warrant”, which is a technical term introduced by Alvin Plantinga to stand for “that, whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” (Plantinga (1993b) p.3). But since this terminus is to some extent bound to Plantinga’s special account of knowledge which makes use of the idea of proper function of cognitive faculties, I will refrain from adopting that terminus. Instead I will continue to call whatever turns true belief into knowledge “the third condition for knowledge”. 56 For

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Now this is of course still obscure in at least two respects: First, it has to be specified what kind of “factors” are suitable to confer the status of knowledge on beliefs and second, it has to be specified what it means for such a factor to be “internal”. I do not intend to answer the first question here, since this question is part of another big debate in epistemology, namely the debate between foundationalists and coherentists and various mixed positions which I will not deal with here. Rather I will specify what it can mean for a knowledge-contributing factor to be internal. There are four readings of “internal” which figure prominently in the literature:58 The first version of internalism is strongly connected with a deontological version of epistemology, according to which in order to count as knowledge, beliefs have to be held responsibly or permissibly. This means that the person who holds the belief has to have fulfilled her epistemic duties with regard to the belief or has to hold the belief “epistemically blamelessly” in order for her belief to be knowledge.59 It can be seen why this conception counts as internalist: Fulfilling one’s epistemic duty, for example by attending to the evidence carefully or by not forming beliefs on the basis of untrustworthy sources is something which is internal to the person holding the belief, since it has to do with her epistemic habits and practices, which are part of her conscious cognitive activities. The second version of internalism has been christened “evidentialism” by its proponents and can be characterized as follows:60 In order to count as knowledge, a belief has to be based on good evidence. This evidence consists in mental states of the person holding the belief, such as further beliefs, perceptions or introspections. Again, it can clearly be seen why this conception is a version of internalism: The evidence a belief has to be based on has the form of a mental state of the person and is therefore internal to the person’s mind. The third version of internalism can be called “inferentialism”, since it is the view that in order to be knowledge, a belief has to be backed inferentially by other beliefs.61 Now again, it is clear why this counts as an 58 I

follow Grundmann (2001) in this division of the internalist positions into four categories. 59 This conception is the traditional version of internalism which can be found in Descartes (2000) and Locke (1955). Among modern authors it is held by Chisholm (1977), Ginet (1975), Pollock (1986) and Steup (1996). 60 Cp. Conee & Feldman (1985). 61 This position is held by BonJour (1985) and Davidson (1983). Of course, proponents of this position do not hold that every true belief which is backed by inferential relations to other beliefs counts as knowledge. One would have to specify the strength and kind of inferential relations which are able to confer the status of knowledge on

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internalist requirement: Inferential relations between the contents of beliefs are relations which are internal to the person holding the belief, since they hold between the contents of mental states of that person. Furthermore, the person holding the beliefs can become aware of these relations just by reflecting on her beliefs. The fourth and last version of internalism is called “access internalism” and can be described as follows: A belief counts as knowledge only if the person holding the belief has potential cognitive access to everything which contributes to conferring the status of knowledge upon the belief.62 Thus, for example, causal connections between beliefs and the world are excluded from the list of features relevant for knowledge by some proponents of access-internalism, since the person having the beliefs can never check if these connections really obtain. This is clearly a version of internalism, since everything which contributes to conferring the status of knowledge on a belief has to be internal to the believer in the sense that it already is the content of a (possibly unconscious) mental state of his and can become the content of a conscious mental state of his. As Roderick Chisholm puts it: “We presuppose, second, that the things we know are justified for us in the following sense: we can know what it is, on any occasion that constitutes our grounds, or reasons, or evidence for thinking that we know. In beginning with what we think we know to be true, or with what, after reflection, we would be willing to count as evident, we are assuming that the truth we are seeking is “already implicit in the mind which seeks it, and needs only to be elicited and brought to clear reflection.””63 The three former versions of internalism can of course be combined with the last version, since one can additionally require the fact that a person has fulfilled her epistemic duties with respect to a given belief, the evidence for a belief and the inferential relations between a belief and other beliefs to be cognitively accessible to the person holding the belief in order for the belief to count as knowledge. a belief. But since this is irrelevant to the discussion of internalism, I will disregard this further complication here. 62 This position is held by BonJour (1985) and Chisholm (1977). 63 Chisholm (1977) p.17. Chisholm quotes Lewis (1929) in the second paragraph of the passage.

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Now I think that only the last version of internalism tends to the issue at question here, since the three former positions are rather answering the first question asked above, i.e. the question what kind of factors can contribute to conferring the status of knowledge on a given belief. Deontologism states that a belief has to be formed in a way which is “epistemically blameless” to count as knowledge, evidentialism says that a belief has to be based on good evidence to count as knowledge and inferentialism says that a belief has to be inferentially related to other beliefs in a way to be specified in order to count as knowledge. But with respect to all these positions, internalism is a merely contingent consequence, since fulfillment of epistemic duties by a person with respect to a belief, being based on good evidence and being inferentially related to other beliefs are internalist requirements only because the properties of the beliefs involved are properties which in normal circumstances can be assessed internally by us. If these properties of beliefs could only be assessed externally, this would not count against the arguments for the requirements. One could for example imagine a world in which people did not possess the conceptual resources to comprehend the notion of an epistemic duty or the concept of evidence or did not have the ability to draw inferences. In these worlds, their beliefs would be knowledge but the requirements would no longer be internalist, since the above arguments for the internalist status of the requirements depend on contingent facts about our cognitive abilities, namely the fact that we normally can access our mental states and the relations between them. Thus only access internalism tends to the question at issue directly, since it does not presuppose any contingent facts about our cognitive abilities but rather states that regardless of what is accessible to us, only factors accessible to us can contribute to conferring the status of knowledge on a belief. Thus epistemic internalism in its accessibility version seems to be motivated by an intuition which is close to the intuition which lies behind requirement (ii) of (TCC): We have to be able to find out if a given belief has properties which count in favor of its truth in order for it to count as knowledge. This intuition rests on the following considerations: If in many cases we could not find out whether our beliefs have the properties which contribute to their status as knowledge, then we would in many cases be unable to find out whether our beliefs constitute knowledge. But this leads to skeptical results regarding those beliefs, since then - while many of our beliefs might be true - we could never find out which ones are and which ones are not. Now, unfortunately, access internalism is the

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version of internalism which is attacked most often by opponents of internalism. I will shortly sketch their major objections against an accessibility requirement in the remaining part of this section. In the next section I will present the externalist alternatives. The last section is then dedicated to a detailed discussion of the externalist objections against access internalism and a defense of the internalist requirement.64 The first kind of argument against internalism is not directly relevant here, since this line of argument is merely directed against one of the above versions of internalism, namely deontologism.65 Now since I have already shown that internalism can be maintained independently of deontologism and that the association between internalism and deontologism is mainly due to the contingent fact that we normally can be aware of whether we have fulfilled our epistemic duties with respect to a given belief, I will not consider these arguments in detail here. The rough idea behind the arguments is that the main motivation for internalism is a commitment to deontologism, which is taken to imply a strong internalist requirement, since it would not make sense to require a fulfillment of epistemic duties the subject does not believe to hold. Since ought implies can, only a fulfillment of epistemic duties we can be aware of counts towards knowledge. Thus internalism follows from deontologism. After this is established, various attacks on deontologism are launched. Now the flaw of these arguments is that they take deontologism to be the sole or main reason for endorsing internalism. While tradition and some modern authors66 may be motivated by deontologism to endorse internalism and may even take deontologism as their sole reason to endorse internalism, there is no necessity to do so. There are at least two prominent authors who do not so much as lose a word on deontologism in their arguments for internalism, namely Donald Davidson and Laurence BonJour, who rather focus upon inferentialism and give arguments for internalism which are independent of deontologism.67 And as internalism can be maintained quite independently of deontologism, since access-internalism implies nothing regarding the factors which are relevant to conferring the status of knowledge upon beliefs. All access internalism states is that these factors have to be ones accessible to the subject having the belief in order for his belief 64 When

I speak of internalism in the following, I mean access internalism. of this kind are put forward by Alston (1989) pp.207, Plantinga (1993a) p.24 and Plantinga (1993b) pp.39. 66 Cp. Ginet (1975), Moser (1985) and Steup (1988). 67 Cp. Davidson (1983) pp.141 and BonJour (1985) Chapter 3 and 4. 65 Arguments

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to be knowledge.68 Now since I am not a proponent of deontologism and since I take it to be shown that internalism is independent of deontologism, I will feel free to disregard arguments against internalism based on the assumption that internalism has to be based on deontologism. But there are arguments against access internalism which are independent of deontologism and which I must therefore discuss at this point. The first main class of arguments against access internalism is motivated by an appeal to the ordinary language uses of “S knows that p.” In ordinary language, we often say things as “ My dog knows that the cat went up that tree.” or “The child knows that his mother will be back soon.” Thus we attribute knowledge of a simple kind to higher animals and young children. These ordinary language uses of “S knows that p” are taken to show that there is at least one sense of this expression in which the attribution of knowledge does not involve an accessability requirement, since putatively, animals and young children do not have cognitive access to everything which contributes to conferring the status of knowledge on their beliefs. This can be seen by for example considering cats and dogs who can be said to know many things about for example their food, their toys etc. Now, it is argued, an internalist would have to require those animals to at least possess the concept of perception in order for us to be able to correctly attribute to them this kind of knowledge. Since what confers the status of knowledge on true perceptual beliefs generally is at least partly the way in which those beliefs are (causally) connected to the world, those animals would have to be able to have cognitive access to this connection. But this would require them to be able to think about perception and to deploy the concept of perception, which they obviously are not. Roughly the same goes for young children who have not yet developed sophisticated concepts as for example the concept of perception. Thus there is a strong semantic reason not to endorse an internalist condition for knowledge. The second class of arguments against internalism consists of arguments which aim at establishing that internalism leads to skepticism by its own standards. There are many versions of this argument. Broadly, it is argued in all versions of the argument that the standards set by internalism are so 68 It

is even possible to argue for access internalism before discussing the question which factors are thus deciding. This would involve narrowing the class of possible relevant factors to those accessible to subjects holding the beliefs in question. This is what I will endeavor to do here. BonJour did the same thing when he converted from coherentism to foundationalism on the grounds that he became convinced that coherentism is incompatible with internalism. Cp. BonJour (1998)

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restrictive that almost no one would know anything at all if those standards would have to be fulfilled in order for our beliefs to be knowledge. I will present and discuss two prominent versions of this argument, since those versions make explicit the concerns which lie behind most externalist objections.69 But at this point, I will postpone the detailed presentation and critical discussion of these arguments against internalism, since these arguments are presented by externalists against the background of their own epistemological positions. Thus I will first survey the main externalist positions to provide this background to the reader. 1.2.2

Externalism

Externalists do not put an accessibility constraint on knowledge. According to them, one can know something even if one is not able to become aware of everything that contributes to a given belief’s being knowledge. Externalism can thus be stated broadly as a denial of the characterization of internalism given above: (EXT) S knows that p even if some factors which contribute to conferring the status of knowledge on the belief that p are factors which are not internal to S. Thus, for example, some externalists maintain that appropriate causal connections between the facts and beliefs about them confer the status of knowledge on the beliefs, regardless whether the person holding the beliefs is or even can be aware of the causal connections or not.70 Another brand of externalism, reliabilism, requires true beliefs to be acquired by a generally reliable belief forming process, as for example perception, in order to be knowledge.71 Another externalist requirement is stated by the “tracking analysis”, which makes knowledge dependent on a belief’s fulfilling certain counterfactual conditions.72 So according to externalism, in 69 These

arguments can be found in Bergmann (2006a), Bergmann (2006b) pp.9 and Goldman (1999) pp.279. 70 The “classical” causal theory of knowledge is found in Goldman (1967). 71 The “classical” reliability theory of knowledge is found in Armstrong (1973). Although most reliabilists are externalists, reliabilism is not strictly bound to externalism. One could add an internalist restriction to the effect that only the reliability of those belief forming processes which we can be aware of is to be counted in deciding whether a belief formed by them is to be considered as knowledge. This position can be found in Stroud (1984). 72 The tracking analysis is maintained by Dretske (1971) and Nozick (1981).

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some cases, factors the person who has the belief is not or even cannot be aware of are necessary for knowledge. In the following I will briefly describe the main externalist theories. The Causal Theory of Knowledge The causal theory of knowledge is one of the early responses to Gettier’s challenge to the traditional analysis of the concept of knowledge in which the traditional justification condition is abandoned and substituted by an externalist requirement. It was first developed by Alvin Goldman.73 One motivation for developing the causal theory of knowledge was that it was hoped that it would be immune to Gettier cases.74 Second, the causal theory was motivated by an appreciation of the fact that many kinds of empirical knowledge involve a causal connection between beliefs and the facts that obtain in the world. Thus on this account the traditional analysis is replaced by: “S knows that p if and only if the fact that p is causally connected in an “appropriate” way with S’s believing p.”75 Goldman then explains the qualifier “appropriate” by offering the following list of appropriate, i.e. knowledge-producing processes: “(1) perception (2) memory (3) a causal chain, exemplifying either pattern 1 or 2, which is correctly reconstructed by inferences, each of which is warranted (background propositions help warrant an inference only if they are true.) (4) combinations of (1), (2), and (3).”76 Thus, for example, the causal theory accounts for the fact that perceptual beliefs, if true, constitute knowledge by reference to item (1). Beliefs based on perceptual beliefs by inferential relations are knowledge if there is a warranted inference from the contents of the perceptual beliefs to the 73 Cp.

Goldman (1967). An information-theoretic version of this theory is held by Dretske (1981). 74 It has been shown that it is not. Goldman himself presented a prominent counterexample to the causal theory featuring fake barns in Goldman (1976) and converted to reliabilism after that. 75 Goldman (1967) p.369. 76 Goldman (1967) pp.369. This list, Goldman remarks, is not closed and allows for the addition of more processes if such processes are to be discovered.

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content of the belief based on them. This deserves explanation, since inferences are normally not considered to be causal processes. But Goldman argues that mixed chains of causal processes and logical connections or inferences can be considered causal chains as well. He offers the following example: “[. . .] the fact p - someone in Smith’s office owning a Ford is logically related to the facts q & r - Jones’s owning a Ford and Jones’s working in Smith’s office. The fact that q & r is, in turn, logically related to the fact q and to the fact r. q causes S’s belief of q and, by inference, his belief of q & r and of p. Similarly, r is a cause of S’s belief of p. Hence, by the above principle, p is a cause of S’s belief of p.”77 Thus what is meant by (3) of the above list is that beliefs can attain the status of knowledge by standing in certain logical relations to perceptual beliefs and beliefs stored in memory. The merits of the causal theory are clearly less numerous than its problems. Its main supposed merit - immunity to Gettier cases - has been revealed as a pipe-dream. One merit it can still be appreciated for is that it is sensitive to the fact that the genesis of a belief can affect its epistemic status. On the other hand, it has the severe flaw that an entirely different story has to be told about non-empirical knowledge as for example knowledge of the truths of mathematics or logic, since here the retraceability to perception or memory is lacking.78 Goldman and Dretske concede this, claiming that their theories are solely intended to be theories of empirical knowledge.79 But although this answer is legitimate, this means that we need two entirely different accounts for empirical and non-empirical knowledge, which is not a very plausible result. The Tracking Analysis A “tracking” account of knowledge is offered by Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick.80 On these accounts, the traditional justification condition is substituted by two externalist conditions.81 Again, the main motivation for 77 Goldman

(1967) p.369. Nozick (1981) p.172. 79 Dretske even restricts his analysis to perceptual knowledge. Cp. Dretske (1981) p.86. 80 Cp. Dretske (1971) and Nozick (1981) pp.173. 81 Nozick’s and Dretske’s versions of the tracking analysis differ. What I will present in the following is Nozick’s version, since this is the one which is most dis78 Cp.

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the development of this alternative account was the hope that it would be immune to Gettier cases.82 A further motivation for the introduction of this account is the following idea: As Gettier cases have shown, beliefs should not count as knowledge if they are accidentally true, i.e. if the facts that the first and the second condition are fulfilled are not connected in any way. Therefore a third condition is needed which links the first two conditions. Now this, Nozick argues, will be the case if the third condition offered ensures that a belief which is knowledge “tracks the truth”.83 Now what is meant by “tracking the truth”? To answer this question, let us take a look at the analysis itself: (TK) S knows that p iff (1) It is true that p (2) S believes that p (3) If p were not true, S would not believe that p. (4) If p were true, S would believe that p and it is not the case that S would believe that not-p.84 Let me elucidate the counterfactual conditions (3) and (4) by an example: In the simple case of S’s perceptual belief that there is a chair in front of S (which is generated by perception of the chair), condition (3) is fulfilled, since if there were no chair in front of S, S would not believe that there is a chair in front of him. Note that cases of hallucination are no counterexamples here. For in case that S’s belief that there is a chair in front of him is caused by hallucination and not by perception, the truth condition is violated.85 This is part of what is meant by “tracking the truth”. Given that condition (1) and (2) are met, condition (3) ensures that the fact that both (1) and (2) are met is no mere accident, but rather is due to a connection between their being met. cussed in the literature. 82 This hope has also been shown to be in vain. Craig (1993) pp.61 presents a Gettier case to which the tracking analysis is vulnerable. 83 Nozick (1981) p.178. 84 Cp. Nozick (1981) pp.172. 85 It is possible to construct Gettier cases which are counterexamples to the tracking analysis from hallucination cases: If S is hallucinating and as a result believes that there is a chair in front of him but accidentally there is indeed a chair in front of him, which nevertheless is not causally responsible for S’s belief, the truth condition is fulfilled as well. Craig’s Gettier case is of this kind, but involves perceptual illusion instead of hallucinations.

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Now condition (4) deserves explanation, since if p is true by (1), why additionally require that S also would believe that p if p were true? What Nozick has in mind here is the following: “According to the suggestion tentatively made above, 4 holds true if not only does he actually truly believe p, but in the “close” worlds where p is true, he also believes it. He believes that p for some distance out in the p neighborhood of the actual world; [. . .].”86 Thus the rough idea behind (4) can be illustrated using our example as follows: In the simple perception case, (4) is met, since under almost any normal circumstances in which there is a chair in front of S, S believes that there is a chair in front of him and does not believe that there is no chair in front of him. Thus (4) provides “tracking” by ensuring that beliefs do count as knowledge only if the circumstances invariantly relevant to their truth are connected to their genesis. Nozick elucidates this further by describing how condition (4) explains why brains in vats do not know what they believe even in case the evil scientists feed them correct information: “The person in the tank does not satisfy the subjunctive condition 4. Imagine as actual a world in which he is in the tank and is stimulated to believe he is, and consider what subjunctives are true in that world. It is not true of him that if he were in the tank he would believe it; for in the close world (or situation) to his own where he is in the tank but they don’t give him the belief that he is (much less instill the belief that he isn’t) he doesn’t believe he is in the tank. Of the person actually in the tank and believing it, it is not true to make the further statement that if he were in the tank he would believe it - so he does not know he is in the tank.”87 Thus the general idea behind (4) is to exclude cases in which a belief is generated in an accidental way which has nothing to do with its truth: Since the scientists could as easily have provided their victim with all kinds of false beliefs instead of the true belief that he is in the tank, this case is excluded by (4). 86 Nozick

(1981) p.176. By his reference to “close” worlds, Nozick is appealing to David Lewis’ possible world semantics. (Cp. Lewis (1973)) For lack of space, I will not explain Lewis’ rather complicated theory here, since Nozick’s basic conception can be understood without a detailed presentation of Lewis’ theory. 87 Nozick (1981) pp.176.

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An obvious merit of the tracking analysis is that it offers a way of linking belief and truth and excluding a great deal of a coincidence from this link. A second merit is that it - as well as the causal analysis - is sensitive to the relevance of the genesis of beliefs to their epistemic status, although in contrast to the causal theory, this is not achieved by introducing a condition which excludes a priori knowledge. A third merit is that the tracking analysis is vulnerable to relatively few Gettier cases, most of which are rather outlandish. Nevertheless - and this is the first shortcoming - some realistic Gettier cases can be presented regarding the tracking analysis.88 Its second and major shortcoming is that while it might be nearly perfect at picking out the extension of the concept of knowledge, it is doubtful whether it picks out the right intension. As the reader might have noticed, it is quite difficult to grasp the meaning of the conditions (3) and (4) as well as to apply the conditions to concrete cases. Thus if the tracking analysis is correct, we would have to conclude that almost no one besides sophisticated philosophers possesses the right concept of knowledge or the right methods of its application. Reliabilism Reliabilism is the most prominent form of externalism nowadays. This may be partly due to the fact that reliabilism - in contrast to the causal theory and the tracking analysis - leaves open the option to retain the justification condition and analyze it in terms of reliability.89 Moreover, third conditions in terms of reliability can be more easily modified if problems with them or Gettier cases arise, since there is a wide variety of possibilities to cast conditions in terms of reliability. Reliabilism was first introduced by David Armstrong90 , again mainly as a reaction to Gettier. Nowadays reliabilism is prominent for various reasons independent of Gettier’s objection to the traditional analysis as well,91 but it is also disputed vehemently by many authors.92 Roughly, reliabilist third conditions can be 88 The

example presented by Craig (1993) is of this kind, since perceptual illusions are quite common. 89 Thus there is knowledge-reliabilism and justification-reliabilism. I will gloss over this distinction here, since the main features of reliabilism are the same in both cases. 90 Cp. Armstrong (1973). 91 Such reasons are for example avoidance of skepticism or the appeal of naturalism in epistemology. Proponents of reliabilism include Swain (1981), Bach (1985), Goldman (1986), Alston (1988) and Greco (1999). 92 Cp. BonJour (1985), Feldman (1985), Foley (1985), Ginet (1985), Lehrer (1990) and Conee & Feldman (1998). An overview of the debate about reliabilism can be

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characterized as follows: (iiiR ) S knows that p only if whatever confers the status of knowledge on the belief that p is reliable.93 Now what does it mean for a knowledge-conferring factor to be reliable? Most reliabilists explain this in terms of a high proportion of true beliefs among the beliefs which are backed by a reliable factor. There are two versions of reliabilism: (a) Process Reliabilism94 (b) Reliable Indicator Theories95 Process reliabilism is the claim that a belief is knowledge only if the process which led to its formation is reliable, i.e. if this process yields a high proportion of true beliefs. Reliable indicator theories state that a belief is knowledge only if the basis or ground of the belief is a reliable indicator that the belief is true. That a basis or ground is a reliable indicator of truth means that the probability of a belief’s truth on condition of being based on that basis or ground is high.96 Reliabilism of both forms shares one merit of the formerly discussed externalist accounts: It can incorporate the relevance of the genesis of beliefs for their epistemic status. But in this respect an important additional merit of reliabilism must be noted: Contrary to the causal theory and the tracking analysis, reliabilism can additionally integrate knowledge-contributing factors which are not connected to the genesis of beliefs. It is also difficult to construct Gettier cases against reliabilism. found in Goldman (2008). 93 Of course, no reliabilist endorses this formulation as a third condition for knowledge, since formulating the third condition in this way would result in a circular analysis. I chose this formulation for the purpose of characterizing reliabilism in a broad way which covers most versions of this position. 94 This variant of reliabilism is maintained by Goldman (1979) and Goldman (1986). 95 Proponents of this variant of reliabilism are Swain (1981) and Alston (1988). 96 This may sound like an internalist requirement, but it does not have to be interpreted like that. A belief can be based on a ground without the person having the belief being aware of this. This is due to the fact that “being based on a ground” is ambiguous regarding genetic and epistemic grounds of beliefs. Thus a belief can be based on a ground in the sense of being generated by it - as for example in the case of a perceptual belief which is genetically based on perception - or it can be based on a ground as a result of being inferred from it - as for example in the case of a belief which is held because it was inferred from other beliefs.

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But reliabilism faces a serious problem.97 This problem is due to the fact that the notion of the reliability of a process is an ambiguous notion, since what can be meant by it is either the reliability of a process type or of a process token. Now what reliabilists have in mind must of course be the reliability of process types, since a process token - being a single item can only be reliable in the sense of yielding a true belief in one case. Thus regarding a process token, its reliability is either maximal or minimal, but this tells us nothing more than that the token yields a true belief or a false belief, i.e. it tells us nothing more than that the truth condition is either fulfilled by the belief or that it is not. Thus, if process-token-reliability would be the criterion, the third condition would be superfluous, since it would be equivalent to the truth condition.98 Thus process-type-reliability has to be the thing which is at stake here. But this kind of reliability faces another objection, called “the problem of generality”.99 This problem can be described as follows: Belief generating processes can be classified by many criteria, some of them granting reliability and some of them not. For example, many perceptual beliefs can be taken to be generated by the process of perception, the process of perception under such-and-such conditions, the process of human perception, the process of perception of humans in the 21st century, the process of perception of humans in China in the year 2008 and so on. Now for many beliefs, the criteria according to which their generating processes are chosen matter with regard to the belief’s epistemic status, since these processes differ regarding their reliability. But since there is no decisive reason to class those processes according to any specific criterion, there is no way to objectively pick out the generating process relevant in case of a given belief. Thus reliabilism is confronted with severe problems as well. After having briefly reviewed the main externalist positions in epistemology, we are now ready to turn to the arguments externalists offer against internalism as well as to the possible internalist replies.

97 In

the following I will describe this problem in the context of process reliabilism only. The problem applies to reliable indicator theories as well, since it stems from the notion of reliability. 98 This is called the “problem of the single case”. For elaboration see Feldman (1985) pp.160. 99 This problem is described in detail by Conee & Feldman (1998). Solutions have been proposed by Heller (1995) and Comesaña (2006). An illuminating discussion of the problem and its possible solutions can be found in Alston (2005) pp.114.

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1.2.3

In Defense of Internalism

In this section, I will try to show that contrary to externalist intuitions, there are good reasons to endorse internalism. To show that, I will first present a strategy for defending internalism which I think is not promising, since it can be answered easily by externalists. I will present it nevertheless, since it has acquired much prominence over the years and is by many internalists taken to refute at least externalism of certain kinds. After that I will deal with the arguments against internalism sketched above in order to show that they are not suited to refute internalism. The remainder of the section will be dedicated to presenting an argument for endorsing a version of internalism which is combined with the requirement of objective truth-conducivity. 1.2.3.1

Arguing against Externalism by Counterexamples

The most prominent defenses of internalism involve the presentation of examples which are designed to show that externalist versions of the third condition run counter to our intuitions and therefore are not adequate. They involve the presentation of cases in which someone has a true belief which fulfills externalist requirements but which we nevertheless would be reluctant to call knowledge.100 In the following I will present two of the most prominent examples of this kind. The first example is due to Keith Lehrer and involves a putative externalist knower named Mr. Truetemp: ”Suppose a person, whom we shall name Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery by an experimental surgeon who invents a small device which is both a very accurate thermometer and a computational device capable of generating thoughts. The device, call it a tempucomp, is implanted in Truetemp’s head so that the very tip of the device, no larger than the head of a pin, sits unnoticed on his scalp and acts as a sensor to transmit information about the temperature to the computational system of his brain. This device, in turn, sends a message to his brain causing him to think of the temperature recorded by the external sensor. Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are correct temperature thoughts. All told, this is a reliable beliefforming process and a properly functioning cognitive faculty. 100 Most

of these examples are directed at reliabilism, since reliabilism is taken to be the most viable form of externalism. But those examples can be modified to speak against the causal analysis and against the tracking analysis as well.

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Now imagine, finally, that he has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted in his brain, is only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively about the temperature, but never checks a thermometer to determine whether these thoughts about the temperature are correct. He accepts them unreflectively, another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and accepts that the temperature is 104 degrees. It is. Does he know that it is? Surely not. He has no idea whether he or his thoughts about the temperature are reliable.”101 So the idea behind Lehrer’s example is that while Mr. Truetemp has a perfectly reliable method for discerning temperatures, we would not be inclined to call his temperature-beliefs knowledge, because he himself does not take his evidence for those beliefs to be reliable. After presenting the example, Lehrer goes on to argue that since we would not consider Mr. Truetemp’s temperature-beliefs to be knowledge, externalist conditions at least have to be modified by inclusion of an internalist requirement to exclude cases as this. Although the example is directed against reliabilism, it can be easily modified to apply to the the causal theory and the tracking analysis as well: Presumably being linked to the temperature by the tempucomp is a way of being causally linked to the facts regarding the temperature in an appropriate manner and presumably the tempucomp, being reliable, would not generate the belief that the temperature is 104 degrees Fahrenheit if this were not true, but the world slightly altered and it would still generate the belief if it were still true but the world slightly altered. So the causal theory and the tracking theory have to class Truetemp’s beliefs regarding the temperature as knowledge as well and therefore imply the same intuitively implausible results as reliabilism. Laurence BonJour presents a similar example in his discussion of externalism. His example involves a clairvoyant named Norman: “Norman, under certain conditions, which usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances 101 Lehrer

(1990) p.187.

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in which it is completely reliable.”102 BonJour then goes on to argue that according to externalist positions, we would be obliged to say that Norman knows that the President is in New York City, although we intuitively would not credit him with such knowledge.103 He further argues that by modifying the example to the effect that Norman has evidence for the reliability of clairvoyance and evidence for his possession of this cognitive power, we can turn intuitions to more favorable results regarding Norman’s belief. The point he wants to make by this is that we are much more inclined to attribute knowledge to Norman if he possesses such evidence than if he does not, although the reliability of his powers does not change. Thus the point behind BonJour’s example is essentially the same as that behind Lehrer’s example: Whether we consider a belief to be knowledge or not does not merely depend on the way in which the belief was acquired but rather on the beliefs about its way of acquisition the subject himself has. Now do these examples really count conclusively in favor of internalism? Unfortunately, they don’t. First, the externalist is always free to accommodate his intuitions to his theory and simply affirm that Mr. Truetemp and Norman do know.104 Thus Lehrer and BonJour might succeed in convincing a sympathetic audience, but what good does this do if their opponent, the externalist, remains unimpressed by the examples and does not concede their point? Now from the perspective of ordinary language philosophy one might argue that if the examples succeed with an audience 102 BonJour

(1985) p.41. BonJour’s example primarily applies to reliabilism, it presents a problem for the causal theory as well, since it can be expanded to include a causal explanation of Norman’s clairvoyant powers. If now the causal theorist were to argue that this is not an appropriate causal connection, he could be charged with immunizing his position against counterexamples by a selective interpretation of the qualification “appropriate”. The tracking analysis also falls prey to this example, since if Norman’s clairvoyant powers indeed are completely reliable, i.e. if they lead to true beliefs in nearly all cases, Norman would not believe that the President is in New York City on the basis of his clairvoyant powers if the President were not there. In addition, he would not believe that the President is not in New York on the basis of his clairvoyant powers if the President were indeed there. 104 A problem of the debate between internalists and externalists is that it is often carried out solely by examples rather than by arguments. Now the problem with merely discussing examples not backed by arguments is that the opponent can always adjust his intuitions to his theory and deny the intuitive force of the examples. This may be more difficult when the intuitions the examples mobilize are close to common sense, but gets easier proportionally to the number of science fiction elements the examples comprise. 103 Although

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of competent speakers of English but not with the externalist, the internalist’s point is proven and the externalist is just stubbornly holding on to his theory in the face of the evidence. But at this point, there is help for the externalist from empirical science. Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan M. Weinberg have conducted a study which shows that our intuitions on the Truetemp example are not stable, but rather are easily influenced by the context in which the example is presented.105 Therefore, in this case, intuitions cannot be decisive. The authors of the study claim the following: “A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.”106 Thus at least in the Truetemp case, intuitions are not a reliable source to decide for or against the claim that he knows. Of course, this remains to be shown for the Norman-case, but I think that results could be similar there, since the structure of the example parallels that of the Truetemp case. Now these results show that in the debate about internalism and externalism, intuitions regarding knowledge cannot serve as a judge. Rather, this dispute has to be settled by arguments, which is what I will try to do in the remainder of this section. First, I will discuss the objections against internalism I described above and second, I will offer an argument for internalism which derives from the idea that knowledge should not be accidentally true belief from the believer’s perspective either. 105 Cp.

Swain et al. (2008). et al. (2008) p.138. I will spare the reader the statistical details here.

106 Swain

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1.2.3.2

The Children-and-Animals-Objection

This objection, which has been already sketched above, can be summarized as follows: In ordinary language contexts we often attribute knowledge to animals or human infants. Now since human infants and especially animals lack the cognitive resources to form beliefs about beliefs or to reflect upon reasons for beliefs, the accessibility requirement the internalist is proposing clearly is too strong, because if accessibility were required for knowledge, these knowledge attributions would have to be incorrect. In this vein, Fred Dretske writes: “There are two ways to think about knowledge. One way is to start, so to speak, at the bottom. With animals. The idea is to isolate knowledge in a pure form, where its essential nature is not obscured by irrelevant details. Cats can see. Dogs know things. Fido remembers where he buried his bone. That is why he is digging near the bush. Kitty knows where the mouse ran. That is why she waits patiently in front of the hole. If animals are not conceptually sophisticated, do not possess language, do not understand what it takes to know, then this merely shows that such talents are not needed to know.”107 Now I will argue that in launching this objection, the internalist’s opponent is relying on at least one of two premises which are much less plausible than the superficial intuitive force of the objection suggests. Both premises concern the ordinary language use of “to know.” The first premise consists in the assumption that any ordinary language use of the expression “to know” aims at expressing the concept of knowledge the epistemologist is after or should be after, while the second premise is that any ordinary language utterance of a sentence which instantiates the schema “S knows that p” aims at expressing the same concept of knowledge. Now the first premise is clearly false, while the second premise seems to me at least dubious. Let me first discuss the assumption that any ordinary language use of the verb “to know” expresses the concept of knowledge epistemologists want to analyze. This assumption is clearly false, since in nearly every introductory textbook on epistemology, there can be found a passage in which two senses of “to know” are distinguished, one of which is then discarded with respect to epistemological purposes. The latter is the sense of “to 107 Dretske

(1991) p.15.

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know” which features in statements as “I know how to drive a car” and “He knows Latin”. It is almost universally agreed that this procedural sense of “to know” is not at issue in the discussions of the analysis of the concept of knowledge, but that these discussions only concern propositional knowledge.108 Thus there clearly is one ordinary language use of “to know” which does not express the same concept as the one epistemologists are interested in. So we can conclude that since there are at least two distinctive senses of “to know”, one of which is not relevant to epistemology, not every ordinary language use of “to know” can count as a counterexample to a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge. That the children and animal cases are counterexamples to internalist analyses remains to be shown by the externalists who appeal to these uses as counterexamples against internalism. The mere pointing to the fact that we use the expression “to know” in a certain way cannot conclusively establish the externalist’s case. Now let us take a look at the second premise the externalist could be using, namely the assumption that every ordinary language utterance of sentences of the form “S knows that p” expresses the same concept of knowledge. What speaks against this assumption is that we sometimes say things as “The guidance system knows that this is the right way” or “The robot knows that there is an obstacle in front of him”. Now these uses of “S knows that p” clearly express a different concept than those uses in which we attribute knowledge to humans. Maybe this results from the fact that in these cases we indeed mean something as “The robot has a reliable method of discriminating obstacles from free spaces” or “The guidance system is causally connected in an appropriate way to the facts about locations” But this does not show that we also mean something like this when we attribute knowledge to humans, since there could be different concepts involved in the two kinds of cases. An indicator for the assumption that the machine cases involve a different concept of knowledge than the cases of knowledge attributions to humans is that we normally do not attribute beliefs to robots and guidance systems, since we do not think that those devices possess mental states like we do.109 So if guidance systems 108 One

can imagine the flood of counterexamples to the truth condition and the belief condition which would emerge if this use of “to know” would have to be accommodated by the analysis of the concept of knowledge. 109 I do not intend to claim anything about the possibility of developing machines which possess artificial intelligence. All that is needed for my argument to go through is the concession that robots and guidance system as we use them today are not intelligent in this way, something I think that everyone who has used such machines can agree on.

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and robots do not have beliefs, but we nevertheless attribute knowledge to them, the sense in which we do this cannot be the same sense in which we attribute knowledge to humans, since almost everyone agrees that for cases of human knowledge belief is a necessary condition. Now the externalist can react in two ways to this counter-objection. First, he can claim that in the machine cases we use the expression “to know” figuratively or metaphorically, while in the cases of animals and young children we do not, for in these cases we are not reluctant to ascribe beliefs. And second, he can grant that the machine cases may involve a different concept of knowledge but deny that the children and animal cases do, since again, we do attribute beliefs in those cases. The second approach does not seem to be a preferable option for externalists, for many of them want to model the third condition for knowledge on exactly the features exhibited by the machine examples: having reliable methods of discrimination,110 being appropriately connected to the facts111 or having reliable methods of acquiring information.112 But if the concept of knowledge involved in these cases is different from the concept employed in human cases, it would not be a wise approach to model the third condition for human knowledge on machine cases on the grounds that we attribute knowledge to animals and young children. Of course, the externalist can still maintain that an appropriate account of knowledge must accommodate mental states of young children and higher animals and must therefore include an externalist condition instead of an internalist one. But this condition then first had better be one which is not modelled on robots, guidance systems and thermometers and second, it would be preferable if such a condition includes young children and animals as borderline cases, not as paradigms. The reason for this is that we attribute knowledge in the human knowledge sense first and foremost to adult humans and only in a derivative, weaker way to young children and animals. This may be due to the fact that it is much easier to acquire empirical evidence for the claim that an adult human knows something than to acquire empirical evidence for the like claim regarding a human infant or an animal.113 Thus even if my counter-objection does not refute the exter110 Cp.

Goldman (1986). Armstrong (1973). Armstrong even calls his theory the “thermometer model of knowledge”. 112 Cp. Dretske (1981). 113 It can even be argued - as Donald Davidson does - that we should not attribute beliefs or knowledge to animals on the grounds that there can be no empirical evidence at all for their having mental states with a determinate content, since they do 111 Cp.

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nalist’s argument regarding infants and animals, it at least speaks against some prominent externalist versions of the third condition which model knowledge on abilities which machines share with us. Rather, I think that the machine cases can more plausibly be accommodated to the procedural use of “to know” discussed above, since this use does not necessarily imply belief. Moreover, the statements “The robot knows how to discriminate obstacles from free spaces” and “The guidance system knows how to find the right destination” sound quite more natural than their “knows that”-counterparts. Thus it may be speculated that the machine use of “to know” rather derives from the concept behind the sense of “to know” not relevant to epistemologists. Now does the externalist fare better on the figurative-use-approach? I do not think so, because here the same problem occurs: According to this approach the cited prominent externalist models of knowledge would be based on a figurative use of “to know” as well. But why should a figurative use of an expression be decisive regarding the analysis of the concept expressed by it? Again, the externalist can claim that his model is based on animals and children instead of machines. But then the internalist can again ask why those cases should count as the paradigms for human knowledge. Again, the necessity of their accommodation can be granted by the internalist, thus conceding the need for a less restrictive condition to the externalist, but that the accommodation of children and animals as borderline cases requires a strictly externalist condition cannot be shown by this argument. 1.2.3.3

The Skepticism Objection

The second objection to internalism has the general form of many objections which have been raised against a manifold of epistemological positions. These objections amount to the claim that an epistemological position is deficient in some respect and that because of this deficiency it invites skepticism. Now regarding internalism, this objection is raised in the following specific form: Since the internalist requires that anything which contributes to a belief’s status as knowledge has to be cognitively accessible to the person holding the belief, the internalist’s requirement for a belief’s fulfilling the third condition is way too strong. If we take a closer look at it, almost no belief fulfills this requirement and therefore not possess the ability to speak and understand language. Cp. Davidson (1975) and Davidson (1997a).

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endorsing internalism amounts to endorsing skepticism. Now this objection has been raised in two forms which I will consider separately in the following paragraphs. Michael Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism The first version of the skepticism objection is due to Michael Bergmann and features a regress argument as its central ingredient.114 Bergmann’s argument runs as follows:115 “As the title of this paper suggests, the objection is in the form of a dilemma: (I). An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject’s actual or potential awareness of something a necessary condition for the justification of any belief held by that subject. (II). This required awareness is either conceptual awareness (of a particular kind to be described later) or it is not. (III). If it is conceptual awareness (of the relevant kind), then internalism falls victim to regress problems. (IV). If it is not, then internalism is subject to a prominent objection to externalism. (V). If internalism is subject either to the regress problems mentioned in (III) or to the prominent objection to externalism mentioned in (IV), then we should not endorse internalism. (VI). Therefore, we should not endorse internalism.”116 Now premises (I) and (II) are unproblematic, since (I) is indeed what many internalists hold and (II) is a tautology. I will simply accept premise (V), since the objection against externalism Bergmann mentions is one which is launched - rightfully, I think - against externalism by many internalists. Bergmann calls this objection, which he claims is raised against externalism by BonJour (1985), Moser (1985), Lehrer (1990) and Fumerton (1995), the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” and describes it thus: If as the externalist maintains - the person holding a belief herself does not have to be able to conceive of anything which confers justification upon 114 Cp.

Bergmann (2006a) pp.137 and Bergmann (2006b) pp.13. I will focus on the original version of the argument in Bergmann (2006a) here. 115 Bergmann’s argument is cast in terms of justification, but I take him to intend it to apply to other internalist third conditions for knowledge as well, since he claims that his argument applies to all versions of internalism. 116 Bergmann (2006a) p.14.

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her belief as conferring justification upon her belief, then from her perspective it is a mere accident that her belief is true. Thus on an externalist account her justification does not give her any reason to believe her belief to be true and so, externalist justification does not suffice to really be justified in believing something. Now this is indeed one of the main objections launched against externalism.117 I myself will offer an argument against externalism which is closely related to this objection in the end of my defense of internalism. Thus I will simply accept premise (V). Now Bergmann’s argument for the dilemma posed by (III) and (IV) runs like this: He first distinguishes three kinds of awareness, which he calls “conceptual1 awareness”, “conceptual2 awareness” and “nonconceptual awareness”. He then argues that if the internalist requires conceptual1 awareness, he falls prey to a regress which implies skepticism, while if he requires conceptual2 awareness or nonconceptual awareness, he is subject to the Subject’s Perspective Objection. In the following my concern will be with the first horn of Bergmann’s dilemma, i.e. his premise (III), since this is the premise I will attack. I am not sure whether premise (IV) is true. But I will grant it to Bergmann without elaborate argument, since the conception of internalism I prefer includes a recourse to conceptual1 awareness. Now Bergmann defines the three different kinds of awareness by first distinguishing between conceptual awareness and nonconceptual awareness: “Conceptual awareness of X is awareness of X that involves the application of a concept to X. Nonconceptual awareness, by contrast, doesn’t involve the application of any concepts. Cows and dogs presumably experience pain of some sort. And presumably these animals are aware of such experiences. Yet although they are aware of these experiences, it seems likely that they do not apply any concepts to them. Humans too can be nonconceptually aware of experiences they undergo. The difference is that we are also able to be conceptually aware of those experiences (by applying concepts to them) whereas dogs and cows presumably aren’t able to be conceptually aware of their experiences.”118 Then he distinguishes conceptual1 awareness and conceptual2 awareness: “In light of this understanding of conceptual awareness, we can distinguish two species of it corresponding to two kinds of 117 Of

course, the examples offered by BonJour and Lehrer which were discussed above are intended to mobilize intuitions which are due to similar considerations. 118 Bergmann (2006a) p.142.

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conceptual awareness requirements for a belief’s justification. One kind of conceptual awareness requirement is satisfied by S’s belief B only if S conceives of the relevant object of awareness as contributing to B’s justification (or as indicating B’s truth or as being relevant in some way to the appropriateness of holding B). I will call this sort of requirement a “conceptual1 awareness requirement” and the awareness it involves “conceptual1 awareness”. This is the sort of conceptual awareness that is the focus of premise (III). All other conceptual awareness is conceptual2 awareness. It too involves the application of a concept but it doesn’t involve application of the sort of concept associated with conceptual1 awareness.”119 So the kind of conceptual awareness which is relevant to (III) is conceptual1 awareness. Thus premise (III) becomes: (III’) If it is conceptual1 awareness, then internalism falls victim to regress problems. Bergmann characterizes the kind of internalism which endorses conceptual1 awareness as a necessary requirement for knowledge as follows: “I4: S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B and (ii) S is aware of X in such a way that S justifiedly believes that X is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B.”120 Concerning I4, he then goes on to present the classical regress argument regarding justification which in his version runs as follows: If in order to be justified to believe B, it is necessary to justifiedly believe that X is is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B, then to be justified in believing B, one needs a further justified belief B1 about the relevance of X to the to the appropriateness of holding B. But having justification for this further belief B1 requires that one believe justifiedly that some further X1 is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B1 . Call this belief B2 and continue the regress. Thus, Bergmann concludes, requiring conceptual1 awareness leads to a regress which in turn leads to skepticism, since no one can have infinitely many increasingly complex beliefs about X1 - X∞ being relevant to the appropriateness of holding the Bn . 119 Op.

cit.

120 Bergmann

(2006a) p.143. In a footnote, Bergmann adds: “Or that X is evidence for B or that X is a truth-indicator for B or that X contributes in some way to B’s justification. I will often suppress these sorts of alternatives but they should be assumed.”

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One obvious objection to Bergmann’s argument so far is that I4 is clearly too strong, since sane internalists do not require beliefs which support other beliefs to be actual beliefs. Rather they only require potential beliefs. Bergmann answers this objection by offering an alternative internalist requirement: “I5: S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B and (ii) S is able on reflection alone to be aware of X in such a way that S justifiedly believes that X is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B.”121 He then goes on to argue that this reformulation of the internalist position does not succeed in avoiding the regress, since regarding any belief B, S must be able on reflection alone to justifiedly believe that infinitely many increasingly complex X’s are in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. He comments: “But, as was noted above, one needn’t go very far in the series before one comes to a proposition that no human is able to grasp let alone justifiedly believe. So although the potential awareness option avoids requiring the actual possession of an infinite number of justified beliefs, it is stuck with requiring the ability to justifiedly hold beliefs of ever-increasing complexity. Like I4, therefore, I5 too has skeptical implications that give us a reason to reject it.”122 Now I think that there is a severe problem with Bergmann’s argument for (III). This problem results from the fact that in constructing his argument, Bergmann seems to be guided by a foundationalist perspective, more precisely by the foundationalist assumption that justification has to be linear in the sense that in order to be justified to believe that p, one has to have a justification for p which consists in a justified belief that q, which in turn has to be justified by a further justified belief that r. The additional foundationalist requirement is then that p, q and r be distinct. This linear conception of justification has been challenged by coherentists for decades.123 121 Bergmann 122 Op.

(2006a) p.144.

cit. for example BonJour (1985) and Lehrer (1990). Since he himself quotes BonJour, which shows that he must be aware of these challenges, I suppose Bergmann does not regard coherentism as a viable theory and therefore does not consider it in his argument. 123 Cp.

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And if their challenges to linear conceptions of justification are successful, Bergmann’s argument does not hold against all kinds of internalism, since it does not hold against a coherentist version of internalism. Now the problem with Bergmann’s argument concerns his formulation of the internalist positions I4 and I5. There is no need for the internalist to require that S believe justifiedly that X is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B. This requirement can easily be given up by adopting a coherence theory of justification. From a coherentist perspective, a large set of beliefs, no matter how unjustified every member of the set is considered by itself, can nevertheless taken together constitute justification for another belief. Consider the following example: A physicist has a hypothesis for which he is accumulating evidence using different measuring devices. He does not have any evidence for his reliability assumptions regarding each measuring device and therefore he is not justified in his beliefs regarding the relevance of his observations of the indications of the various measuring devices to his hypothesis. For all he knows, each of the devices could be defective. Nevertheless, all his measurements confirm that his hypothesis is true. Now I think that the physicist is justified in believing that his hypothesis is true simply because he has the following (large but finite) set of beliefs: (1) Measurement (1) showed that p and this concurs with my hypothesis. (2) Measurement (2) showed that q and this concurs with my hypothesis. .. . (N) Measurement (n) showed that n and this concurs with my hypothesis. The reason for this is simple: Although regarding each device, the physicist is not justified in believing that it is working correctly, the fact that all his measurements fit together perfectly to support his hypothesis justifies him in believing that his hypothesis is true and in believing that the measuring devices are working properly. Thus none of the beliefs (1) (N) has to be justified by recourse to a belief of the form “Belief B is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding that (1), (2), . . . (N)” in order for his belief in his hypothesis to be justified. Rather, what justifies the beliefs (1) - (N) as a whole - though not necessarily taken singly - is just the further belief that those beliefs fit perfectly with each other as well as with the physicist’s hypothesis. And this further belief that those beliefs fit with each other simply is justified by beliefs about the inferential relations these beliefs bear to each other. But recourse to these further

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beliefs still does not result in a regress, since these beliefs, although they are metabeliefs about beliefs, do not have to be infinite in number, since their number simply depends on the number of original beliefs about the measuring devices and the number of relevant inferential relations holding between those beliefs and the hypothesis. Now Bergmann’s argument does not primarily rely on the implausibility of the assumption that we have infinitely many beliefs but rather on the implausibility of assuming that the further beliefs needed would have to be increasingly complex: “[. . .] in addition to the mental state regress (either actual or potential), there is also a complexity regress. And it is the latter that I’ve relied on in my objections to the above doxastic versions of the conceptual1 awareness requirement. It is because the doxastic versions of the conceptual1 awareness requirement imply that a belief is justified only if one is able to hold justified beliefs of ever-increasing complexity that they are so implausible.”124 So does the coherentist version of internalism face the complexity regress? I do not think so, since - as can be seen from the example - there is no “ever-increasing complexity” in the further beliefs needed, since on a nonlinear conception of justification, the further beliefs do not form a “chain” of beliefs in which every further belief is a (more complex) belief about the justification of a former belief. Instead, the further beliefs are beliefs about the reciprocal support beliefs lend to each other, i.e. they are beliefs of the form “Belief (1), belief (2), . . ., belief (N-1) are relevant to the appropriateness of holding belief (N), since belief (N) fits with beliefs (1), (2), . . ., (N-1).” Note that the further beliefs needed for coherentist justification can now be generated by simply exchanging for example the positions of belief (1) and belief (N) to yield: “Belief (N), belief (2), . . ., belief (N-1) are relevant to the appropriateness of holding belief (1), since belief (1) fits with beliefs (N), (2), . . ., (N-1).” So there is no need for having further more complex beliefs in order to be justified on the coherentist account either, since all further beliefs needed have the same degree of complexity. Now since the term “skepticism” surfaces in Bergmann’s argument, one might worry at this stage that the regress cannot be stopped on a coherentist account of internalism as well. For - one might argue - how can the physicist be sure that his beliefs are true if all he can cite to justify his 124 Bergmann

(2006a) p.144.

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beliefs is their internal coherence? This indeed is a vital question to be answered by the internalist as well as by the coherentist. But it is not a question lack of an answer to which has to bother the internalist coherentist regarding Bergmann’s argument. For all Bergmann argues is that internalism leads to “skeptical” results since it implies the regress described by him and this regress has as a consequence that in order to have any justified belief, we would have to have infinitely many increasingly complex beliefs and that therefore we could not know anything on an internalist account. But this conclusion, as I hope to have shown, is not warranted if we are talking about a coherentist version of internalism, since the coherentist takes justification to be a reciprocal relation between beliefs instead of a linear one and therefore he does not face the regress. I take it that this efficiently blocks Bergmann’s regress argument at least for internalist coherentism and therefore refutes (III). But one last brief comment is necessary here, since Bergmann himself mentions my way out: “One could try to save the internalist from these problems by dropping one or more of the assumptions I’ve made along the way. For example, one might suggest that mere belief, not justified belief, is required for conceptual1 awareness. But if the internalist has the intuition that merely having a justification contrib˝ that the subject must also have some sort of utor isn’t enough U conceptual1 awareness of that contributor (which includes believ˝ it seems highly doubtful ing that it is a justification contributor) U that the internalist will be impressed by the mere belief (no matter how unjustified or insane) that the thing of which she is aware is a justification contributor.”125 Now regarding my example, this reaction is a case of begging the question, since my example shows that a set of unjustified beliefs can constitute justification for another belief. So even if there may be (foundationalist) internalists not impressed by mere beliefs, coherentists are impressed by them. Alvin Goldman’s Exposure Another argument for the contention that internalism sets standards so restrictive that knowledge is almost unattainable by these standards is offered by Alvin Goldman in his paper Internalism Exposed.126 Goldman 125 Bergmann 126 Cp.

(2006a) p.145. Goldman (1999).

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begins his paper by describing how internalism can be motivated by deontologism but then refrains from arguing against internalism by arguing against deontologism as other authors have already done this.127 Instead, he sets out for a direct criticism of the accessibility constraint which is intended to apply to all versions of internalism, regardless whether they are based on deontologism or not. Goldman proceeds through his criticism by offering many versions of the accessibility constraint, highlighting problems which purportedly imply skepticism regarding each version. I will not discuss all constraints Goldman discusses in his paper, since some of them are clearly too strong and therefore implausible. Rather I will focus on two moderate accessibility constraints Goldman attacks which are still maintained among contemporary internalists. The first of these is: “KJint +ret The only facts that qualify as justifiers of an agent’s believing p at time t are facts that the agent can readily know, at t, to obtain or not to obtain, by introspection and/or memory retrieval.”128 Now Goldman argues that this constraint has local skeptical results, since it excludes many beliefs we normally count as knowledge, because it faces the “problem of forgotten evidence”.129 He illustrates this problem by offering the following example: “Last year, Sally read a story about the health benefits of broccoli in the “Science” section of the New York Times. She then justifiably formed a belief in broccoli’s beneficial effects. She still retains this belief but no longer recalls her original evidential source (and has never encountered either corroborating or undermining sources). Nonetheless, her broccoli-belief is still justified, and, if true, qualifies as knowledge.”130 Goldman offers an escape route for the internalist from this example by suggesting that the internalist might reply that Sally nevertheless does have evidence for her belief since she might have the background belief that most of what she remembers was acquired in an epistemically proper manner. But I agree with Goldman that this background belief does 127 For

example Alston (1989) discusses such an argument. Goldman (1999) p.279. 129 Op. cit. p.280. For more on this problem, Goldman refers the reader to Harman (1986), Senor (1993) and Audi (1995). 130 Op. cit. p.280. 128 Cp.

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not suffice to credit Sally with knowledge regarding her broccoli-belief. Rather, I think that the internalist should reply that this problem can easily be dealt with by arguing that KJint +ret excludes Sally’s broccoli-belief for the right reason, namely for the reason that it is not knowledge. That the broccoli-belief should not be counted as knowledge and that an eventual background belief of the kind Goldman proposes does not suffice in this case, can be seen by considering the following extension of Goldman’s example: Sally, after having forgotten about her evidence, tells her best friend, who hates broccoli, that she nevertheless should eat it more often, since it is healthy. Now her friend - who naturally does not want to believe this readily - asks her how she knows this. Now in the forgotten evidence case, the best answer Sally can give is: “Oh, I just know it. I do not have any specific reason for it, but I believe it and I generally form my beliefs in an epistemically proper manner.” But would this lead her friend to credit her with broccoli-knowledge? I do not think so. Thus I do not think that someone who has forgotten all her evidence for a belief can still be said to have knowledge regarding that belief.131 Either she has to have at least some evidence for her belief or she simply does not know. If there really is no way for Sally to retrieve any evidence for her broccoli-belief from her cognitive resources, she does not have broccoli-knowledge and I do not think that she herself or someone who knows that she does not have evidence would claim that she has such knowledge. Thus I think that cases of forgotten evidence combined with KJint +ret lead to skepticism only in the mild sense that beliefs for which one does not have any evidence are beliefs we should be skeptical about. One last comment about the Sally case: Goldman argues that the problem of forgotten evidence leads to skepticism since “a large sector of what is ordinarily counted as knowledge are beliefs for which people have forgotten their original evidence.”132 This might be true, but nevertheless does not exclude this sector of beliefs from being knowledge on internalist accounts. No internalist ever required that people must have access to the original evidence for their beliefs. What is required is only that they must have access to some evidence which sufficiently backs their beliefs. And this should be the case for almost any belief we count as knowledge. 131 It may be the case that we often credit people with knowledge although they have

forgotten their evidence. But I suspect that most of these cases are cases in which the person crediting the forgetful person with knowledge does not know that the other person does not have evidence and therefore simply assumes the contrary. 132 Goldman (1999) p.281.

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But Goldman has more pressing problems in store for internalism. After criticizing KJint +ret on the grounds of the problem of forgotten evidence, he points to the fact that KJint +ret does not incorporate logical and probabilistic relations between beliefs as justifiers, since those relations are not conscious mental states or stored mental states.133 To avoid this complication, Goldman offers the internalist the following alternative constraint: “KJint +ret +COMP The only facts that qualify as justifiers of an agent’s believing p at time t are facts that the agent can readily know within a suitable doxastic decision interval via introspection, memory retrieval and/or COMP.”134 Now Goldman argues that this internalist constraint leads to problems as well. Thus, according to him, first it excludes “the most naive and uneducated persons on the street”135 from having knowledge and second, it cannot be rationalized by an appeal to deontologism. I will not discuss the second point here, since I have already made it clear that internalism can but does not have to be based on deontologism. Goldman’s first attack on KJint +ret +COMP roughly runs as follows: Since very “naive and uneducated persons” do not have the required computational abilities to access the inferential relations between their beliefs which are relevant to knowledge, most of their beliefs will not count as knowledge according to the internalist, which implies skeptical results regarding those person’s beliefs. But since we normally credit those persons with knowledge regarding many things despite their lack of inferential abilities, this is unacceptable.136 To support his claim, Goldman cites psychological studies which show that people’s abilities in drawing certain probabilistic inferences are often very weak.137 Now while these results may be accurate, I do not see 133 This

seems problematic, since presumably at least some inferential relations between beliefs are exactly the kind of justifiers internalists have in mind. But what Goldman forgets here is that the obtaining of inferential relations between beliefs can itself become the content of a belief, if the subject having the beliefs reflects on them. Thus the modification of the condition to include computational operations might not be necessary. 134 Cp. Goldman (1999) p.285. COMP stands for a chosen set of computational operations. Goldman includes the doxastic decision interval in order to allow for the time it takes to compute logical and probabilistic relations of complex kinds. 135 Goldman (1999) p.285. 136 This basically is a variant of the objection based on knowledge attributions to young children and animals. Nevertheless, it cannot be dealt with in the same way as that objection, since Goldman explicitly addresses adult human knowledge. 137 He cites the following sources: Tversky & Kahnemann (1982) and Tversky & Kahnemann (1983).

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why they should support Goldman’s argument. What he needs to show is that people’s abilities to draw the inferences they actually need to draw in order to know the things we take them to know are insufficient. But I think this cannot be shown, since it is not true. Even uneducated and naive people normally do not lack the ability to draw basic deductive inferences, i.e. to use basic deductive rules as modus ponens or the disjunctive syllogism. Neither do they lack the ability to generalize inductively from past experiences to present situations or to roughly estimate probabilities if situations they are familiar with are involved.138 What can be granted is that the more complex the beliefs involved become, the less accurate the inferential abilities of people may be. But the sort of knowledge we grant to ordinary people or even “most naive and uneducated people” normally does not require complex inferences from complex premises. And even in complex cases, simple inferences often suffice for knowledge. For example, why do we grant √ someone who is far from being a mathematician the knowledge that 7921 = 89? Surely not because we assume that he is able to calculate this in his head. But no internalist would require him to be able do this. For the internalist, it suffices if he is able to use a calculator and infer inductively from seeing the numbers on the screen that 89 is the right result. Of course he needs the additional (accessible) beliefs that a calculator can be used to compute numbers and that the calculator he is using and his vision work properly. But these are beliefs that even “naive and uneducated people” usually have and would cite readily if their belief about the correctness of the result would be called into question. This shows that basic reasoning powers and the ability to discern the inferential relevance of certain beliefs to others are not beyond simple people’s ken even if they lack the ability to use truth-tables139 or complex methods for computing probabilities. Moreover, if Goldman were right, his objection could be launched against his own brand of externalism, namely process reliabilism: If the reliabilist wants to classify simple people’s beliefs as knowledge, he needs to classify the processes leading to the formation of those beliefs as reliable. But if people’s abilities are indeed as limited as Goldman claims, then deductive or probabilistic inference by simple human beings is not a reliable belief forming process, since it does not yield true beliefs in many cases. 138 It is true that people’s inferential abilities rapidly become more limited if abstract

questions and abstract situations are involved. (Cp. Wason (1968) and Oaksford & Chater (1994)) But as these studies also show, people’s inferential abilities massively improve if concrete situations they are familiar with are involved. 139 Cp. Goldman (1999) pp.285.

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Now the reliabilist could reply by claiming that despite first appearances these processes are reliable, since what counts in assessing their reliability is their correct application. But the problem here is that if Goldman is right then people do not apply those methods correctly. So why should correct application be the criterion for assessing the reliability of the processes that lead to the formation of people’s beliefs? Now Goldman would perhaps try to argue that most people do not use these methods at all to arrive at their beliefs, but rather use methods as perception, memory retrieval etc. But this will not do even for the externalist. If simple methods of inference as for example inferring from past experiences of the connection between a dark sky and rain to a high probability of rain in the next few minutes given the look of the sky140 are to be excluded from the class of reliable processes, then it is the reliabilist who cannot escape skepticism. Thus I conclude that Goldman’s objections to internalism do not refute internalism as well. 1.2.3.4

The Externalist Confusion

I will conclude my defense of internalism by offering an argument for internalism - and thereby for my requirement (ii) of (TCC) - which rests on the disclosure of a fundamental confusion regarding the role of the third condition for knowledge which lies at the heart of externalist reasoning. As I indicated above, the argument will draw on considerations similar to those which back the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” presented by Bergmann. As we have seen, externalists usually argue as follows against internalism and in favor of their own accounts: In addition to excluding many cases classified as knowledge in ordinary language, the accessibility requirement imposed by internalists cuts us off from the world and truth, thereby leading to skeptical results. In contrast to this, externalist accounts provide us with a perfect way of seeing why we may assume that we are connected to the world and truth via beliefs fulfilling the third condition for knowledge and therefore we should prefer an externalist account of the third condition. But, as I will argue, externalism in fact does not provide the needed link between our beliefs and the world respectively truth at all but instead rests on a confusion concerning this link. If we take one more closer look at the conditions for knowledge, we note 140 These

kinds of inferences do not have to occur consciously. All the internalist requires is that the person thus inferring be able to access her inferences on reflection.

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that, trivially, the truth of a belief which is to be counted as knowledge is guaranteed by the truth condition. So the purpose of the third condition cannot be to ensure that most of the beliefs we classify as knowledge are true. If we are right in classifying them as knowledge it is guaranteed that they are true for semantic reasons. Therefore there is no danger of a false belief slipping through as knowledge according to the analysis of the concept of knowledge. So the motivation for introducing the third condition was not only the conviction that we need beliefs which are true for the right reasons rather than beliefs which are true by mere accident, but also to ensure that we can find out whether a given belief is knowledge. But this purpose cannot be fulfilled if we construe the third condition in a manner which makes us unable to find out whether the belief in question has the properties specified by this condition. Now this of course does not speak against externalism per se, since the externalist does not have to formulate the third condition in terms of properties which are not accessible to us, since externalism is nothing but a denial of internalism. Thus all the externalist claims is that the properties specified by the third condition do not have to be accessible to us and not that they must be unaccessible to us. So externalism as characterized above does not imply anything regarding the positive formulation of the third condition for knowledge, but leaves the externalist with three alternatives regarding this positive formulation of the third condition: First, the externalist can spell out this condition in terms of properties which indeed are unaccessible to us. Second, he can spell it out in terms of properties which are accessible to us but claim that this accessibility is merely a contingent feature of these properties. And third, he can refrain from giving a positive formulation of the third condition at all. Now I included the third alternative just for completeness, since a variant of externalism which comprises this alternative does tell us little we do not already know about the concept of knowledge. So the interesting variants of externalism are the first and the second alternative. Now, as I will argue, externalism of the first kind leads to skepticism and therefore deprives itself of the man motivation for introducing externalism in the first place, while externalism of the second kind does not have much of a quarrel with internalism. To see that versions of externalism which specify a third condition in terms of properties of beliefs which are unaccessible to us lead to skepticism, we have to consider a variant of the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” with regard to such third conditions. A typical externalist third condition of this kind has the following form:

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(iiiE ) S’s knows that p only if S’s belief that p has property X. where property X is such that S cannot find out whether his belief that p has property X. But now if S is not able to to do this, S is not able to find out whether his belief constitutes knowledge, since to do this would require him to become aware of the fact that his belief fulfills all three conditions for knowledge. Thus if S cannot find out whether his belief fulfills the third condition, he lacks a reason to suppose that his belief is knowledge. Of course, he can acquire reasons for the truth of his belief which are independent of his belief’s fulfilling the third condition. But the reasons he might have for this are irrelevant regarding the question whether his belief is knowledge here, since to have reasons for this, S needs reasons for his belief’s fulfilling the third condition as well. Thus while S might have reasons to assume that his belief is true, he must lack reasons for the stronger assumption that his belief constitutes knowledge. So this variant of externalism yields skeptical results. Now if the externalist wants to avoid skeptical consequences, he can of course revert to externalism of the second kind, i.e. he can claim that the properties specified by his positive formulation of the third condition are such that we can in many cases find out whether our beliefs possess them. An externalist of this kind would claim that his position does not imply skeptical results, since, contingently, the properties specified by his third condition are accessible to us in most cases. Nevertheless, he will claim, externalism is still true, since in some cases, the properties specified might not be accessible and therefore the internalist requirement is not strictly necessary.141 Now while I cannot refute this variant of externalism, I do not think that it is a variant of externalism which contradicts the internalist intuition. For to avoid skeptical results, the proponent of this version of externalism has to require the properties specified by the third condition to be accessible to us in many cases, which again is an internalist requirement, even though it is a weakened one. Let me elucidate this using an externalist theory which is very popular nowadays, namely process reliabilism, as an example. The third condition endorsed by process reliabilists amounts to something like: (iiiRP ) S knows that p only if S’s belief that p is generated by a generally reliable belief forming process. Now if a proponent of (iiiRP ) denies that we have to be able to become aware of the reliability of our belief forming processes, he faces skeptical 141 Cases

like this might be the human infant cases discussed above.

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results, since if we cannot find out that our belief forming processes are reliable, we must lack reasons to suppose that our belief are generated reliably and therefore we must lack reasons for supposing that our belief fulfill the reliabilist condition. Let me illustrate this: Suppose that S’s belief that p is generated by perception under normal conditions using properly functioning sense organs. Now surely this is a reliable way to acquire beliefs. But if from S’s perspective it is impossible to find out whether his belief is so generated and if this is a reliable belief forming process, he has no reason to suppose his belief to be knowledge. Now of course to avoid skeptical results, the reliabilist can additionally claim that the belief forming processes not only have to be reliable but additionally have to be such that in many cases we are able to become aware of their reliability. Thus for example the reliabilist can argue that in the case of perception we are able to find out that our beliefs are generated by perception under normal conditions using properly functioning sense organs and that this way of forming beliefs is generally reliable. But this is just to concede that the reliabilist condition has to fulfill a weakened internalist requirement. So I conclude that if the externalist wants to avoid skepticism, he either has to refrain from specifying a third condition for knowledge completely or he can specify a third condition which features properties of beliefs which are accessible to us in general, even though they may not be accessible in all cases. After these considerations it might seem incomprehensible why someone might have come up with externalist conditions which specify properties which are generally not accessible to us in the first place, as for example the conditions endorsed by the causal analysis or the tracking analysis. So I will conclude this section with a possible explanation of that. The debate about the third condition was started as a consequence of Gettier’s objection to the traditional analysis of the concept of knowledge, which as Gettier’s examples showed, leaves open the possibility that we have beliefs which meet the third condition but rest on a false assumption and therefore are true by accident. So my explanation for the confusion externalists are prone to is that they have forgotten the original purpose of the third condition by concentrating too much on the Gettier debate. They have been focusing on developing an analysis of knowledge which cannot be refuted by Gettier-style counterexamples and the best candidates for such an analysis are of course analyses in which a belief’s fulfilling the third condition (nearly) guarantees the truth of the belief in an exter-

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nalist manner, for then any evidence one might have for a belief is quite irrelevant to its fulfilling the third condition.

1.3

Against Justification

After the discussion of the requirements for a third condition for knowledge in general, we have now reached a stage where the question about specific properties which can be included into a third condition can be tackled. In this section I will therefore deal with the first opposition in the overview above, i.e. with the question whether the third condition should be cast in terms of justification or if it should not. One major problem in the debate about the notion of justification is the massive divergence of intuitions on that topic. As a result of this divergence, one can even be tempted to doubt whether the respective opponents are talking about the same subject. William Alston, for example, has come to the conclusion that even if there were no further reasons for discarding the notion of justification as a third condition, the nature and strength of the disagreement on the question what justification is could be taken to be reason enough to discard this notion altogether: “[. . .] we are confronted with a wildly chaotic picture of an enormous plurality of incompatible views as to what it is for a belief to be justified and as to what further conditions are required for a belief’s having that status. One could be pardoned for taking this alone as a sufficient reason for abandoning the search for the true account of epistemic justification. If so many brilliant philosophers disagree so radically as to what it is and what it takes to have it, why should we suppose that there is an objective property of beliefs picked out by ‘justified’?”142 Alston does not contend himself with this diagnosis, but offers some independent reasons for his conviction that the search for a core of the notion of justification has to be abandoned. Since his concern is not with justification as a third condition for knowledge but rather with justification as the core notion of epistemic rationality, his reasons are not directly relevant to my project and I will therefore not present them here. Instead, I will argue that even if it is assumed that there is a property which is picked out by the ordinary language use of “justified”, this property is not suited to figure in the third condition for knowledge. 142 Alston

(2005) p.21.

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More specifically, I will offer an argument for the claim that the ordinary language notion of justification does not fulfill requirement (i) of (TCC) and therefore fails as a property to be implemented into a third condition for knowledge. The argument is intended to show that justification does not meet this requirement, since which beliefs count as justified depends on the historical circumstances in which they are had. Now since - as I will argue - the question whether a given belief is in fact justified cannot be settled independently of the question whether it counts as justified in the historical context in which it is had, the property of being justified cannot be a necessary condition for knowledge. Thus my argument against including justification as a third condition into the analysis of knowledge rests on the observation that the notion of justification as it is found in ordinary language contains a certain historical relativity which the concept of knowledge does not. Therefore, I will argue, it cannot serve as a necessary condition for knowledge since the historical relativity would carry over to the concept of knowledge.143 1.3.1

The Relativity of Justification

Consider the following example: Anne, who lives in the middle ages, believes that the plant hepatica can be used to cure liver diseases. Her reasons for believing this are that by careful observation one can learn the uses of a plant from some aspect of its form or place of growing144 and that the leaves of hepatica look like the human liver because they have three lobes. From this she concludes that this plant must be helpful for treating liver diseases. Now regarding the information which is available to her in her time, she has good reasons for her belief, since the doctrine she bases her belief on was a commonly held medical belief. Let us further assume that she has reflected thoroughly on her belief, has contemplated 143 Note

that my argument is intended to hold with respect to the ordinary language notion of justification only. I do not presume it to cover technical uses of the term. My reason for not discussing such technical uses of “justification” is that if this term is used merely as a technical term which characterizes a property of beliefs needed for spelling out the third condition of knowledge and which is not intended to capture the ordinary language meaning of this term, one could (and should) drop the term and spell out the third condition for knowledge directly in terms of this technical notion to avoid confusion and counterexamples directed at the ordinary language notion of justification, since then one has already departed with justification in the traditional sense. 144 This doctrine, which is called “the doctrine of signature” was widely held in medieval medicine. It derived from the belief that God has marked everything he has created with a sign. This sign was taken to be an indicator of every item’s true purpose as intended by God.

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all available information in search for something which can be used as evidence against the truth of her belief etc. Then Anne has to be considered justified in her belief about the medicinal effects of hepatica. But nevertheless we today would not credit her with the knowledge that hepatica can be used to cure liver diseases, although this is true.145 The criterion of being justified which I use here is one I take to be part of the ordinary language notion of justification: We regard persons as justified in beliefs if they have formed them in an epistemically responsible manner. So I think that our ordinary language notion of justification is wedded to deontologism, which I briefly described in the section on internalism. Therefore I tend to regard an explication of the ordinary language notion of justification in terms of epistemic duties and resposibilities to be more adequate than the ones offered by authors trying to establish justification as a third condition of knowledge, requiring justification to be objectively truth-conducive. A similar view is advocated by Richard Foley, who writes: “If it is stipulated that the properties that make a belief justified must also be properties that turn true belief into a good candidate for knowledge, an account of justified belief can be regarded as adequate only if it contributes to a successful account of knowledge. The theory of justified belief is thus divorced from everyday assessments of the rationality and justifiedness of opinions, which tend to focus on whether individuals have been responsible in forming their opinions rather than on whether they have satisfied the prerequisites of knowledge.”146 Now the above example illuminates a difference between justified belief and knowledge: While if someone is justified in his his beliefs partly depends on the information available and widely accepted as true in the time he or she lives in, if someone knows something does not depend on that. If for example, some contemporary physician believed that a cure for a liver disease can be achieved by administering hepatica for the same reasons as 145 Today we know that hepatica can indeed be useful in treating liver diseases, since

its leaves and blossoms contain diuretics (substances which elevate the rate of bodily urine excretion) which in modern medicine are used to treat liver diseases, too, even though they are no longer extracted from plants but produced synthetically. As the reader might have noticed, my example resembles Gettier cases, since it is a mere accident that Anne’s belief about the beneficial effects of hepatica on the liver is true. But in contrast to Gettier’s examples which are merely intended to show that the three traditional conditions taken together are not sufficient for knowledge, my example is intended to show that this is due to a defect in the justification condition. 146 Foley (2004) p.64.

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Anne, we would not consider him justified in his belief, since there is a lot more and different medical information available and widely accepted today. Because of that we can be sure that a contemporary physician holding this belief for the same reasons as Anne cannot have fulfilled his epistemic duties at all. For Anne, no better reasons are available, so she has the best reasons she can have for her beliefs. But for the contemporary physician, lots of better reasons are available and - especially considering that he is a physician - we think that these reasons should be known to him. Thus whether someone is justified in his beliefs partly depends on the information which is available to him at the time he lives in. So it is possible that someone who believed that p for reasons r1 , . . . rn back in the year 1250 was justified in believing that p while he would not be justified anymore in believing that p on the grounds that r1 , . . . rn would he be transferred to our century and exposed to the level of information established today. Now this relativity does not hold for knowledge since we would not be inclined to say that Anne knew that hepatica can be used to cure liver diseases, but would not know it anymore were she transferred to our time. Instead we would deny her knowledge in her own time as well. To clarify the point of my argument further, a distinction has to be made between legitimate ascriptions of knowledge and knowledge as well as between legitimate ascriptions of justified belief and justified belief: The crucial point of my example is not that people in the middle ages would have ascribed justification to Anne, while we do not. People in the middle ages would have ascribed knowledge to Anne as well. The point to be noted is that even we consider Anne’s belief justified if we consider her in her own time while we do not consider it justified if we consider her in our time, although or more precisely because her reasons for her belief do not change. Thus whether a given belief is justified depends on the intellectual and informational standards of the time in which it is had. This means that the conditions under which a given belief is justified in a time are pretty much the same as the conditions under which an ascription of justification to the person holding that belief in the same time is legitimate. But this does not hold for knowledge. We cannot legitimately ascribe knowledge to Anne even in her own time, while people in her own time can, even though this ascription is probably false. Thus if someone knows something seems to be independent of the intellectual and informational standards of his or her time, i.e. the conditions under which a given belief is knowledge seem to be different from the conditions under which

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an ascription of knowledge is legitimate. Of course, which ascriptions of knowledge are legitimate depends on the intellectual and informational standards of the time in which the ascription is made as well, but legitimate ascriptions of knowledge can be false, while legitimate ascriptions of justification cannot be false. Thus there is a historical relativity in the notion of justification which is not part of the concept of knowledge. Now one could think that the difference between the notion of knowledge and the notion of justification can be easily explained by pointing to the fact that a necessary condition for knowledge is truth while beliefs do not have to be true to be justified. Thus since a belief’s truth value does not change with time, there can be no historical relativity of knowledge. But this does not solve the problem at hand, because the truth of a belief is independent of its justification. In the example above, the truth condition is fulfilled, thus meeting this condition does not preclude the relativity which is brought into the concept of knowledge by including justification as a third condition. The reason for denying Anne knowledge is not that her belief is false, but that her reasons for her belief are not connected to the truth of her belief in the right way. In other words: Whether a belief is justified depends on historical circumstances while whether it is knowledge does not. Now since whether a belief is true does not depend on historical circumstances either, the culprit has to be the justification condition. Now there is a possible objection to my argument which has to be considered. In his book Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against a position which he calls epistemic relativism. This position amounts to the claim that “facts about what belief is justified by a given item of evidence can vary from community to community.”147 Thus epistemic relativism is the view that what counts as justification for a given belief can vary with the community the believer lives in, since different communities may have different standards as to what kind of evidence can be considered justifying evidence. This is not exactly the position I argued for, since my claim is weaker than epistemic relativism. I merely claim that the level of information may vary depending on the time a community lives in and therefore what counts as justification for a given belief may vary with time even though the basic standards of rationality may remain the same over time. Nevertheless, one might think that Boghossian’s argument holds against my conclusion that justification is historically relative as well as against epistemic relativism. 147 Boghossian

(2006) p.59.

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Let us therefore take a look at his argument against epistemic relativism: A crucial concept which Boghossian uses in his argument is that of an epistemic system. By “epistemic system” he means “a set of general normative propositions - epistemic principles - which specify under which conditions a particular type of belief is justified.”148 To characterize what he means by “epistemic principles” he gives the following example of an epistemic principle which is endorsed by common sense as well as by modern science: “(Observation) For any observational proposition p, if it visually seems to S that p and circumstantial conditions D obtain, then S is prima facie justified in believing p.”149 His argument then runs as follows: If according to the epistemic relativist, particular judgments about what counts as justification for a given belief are only true relative to particular epistemic systems and never in general, this would have to hold for the general epistemic principles as well, since they are merely generalizations of the particular judgments. For example, (Observation) is just a generalized version of particular judgments as “If it visually seems to Galileo that there are mountains on the moon, then Galileo is justified in believing that there are mountains on the moon.”150 Therefore if the latter is true relative to a particular epistemic system only, then so is the former. Thus, so Boghossian argues, if epistemic relativism is true, there would be no reason to accept any particular epistemic system, since as epistemic relativists, we would have to assume that all epistemic systems which contain unrelativized epistemic principles must consist of false propositions. If they on the other hand contained relativized principles they would be of no use to us in deciding what beliefs we should consider justified since they cannot tell us which epistemic system we should choose in order to evaluate our beliefs. So epistemic relativism either tells us to evaluate our beliefs according to principles we believe to be false or it tells us not to evaluate our beliefs at all. Boghossian’s conclusion from this is that there must be objective standards according to which epistemic systems can be evaluated and according to which it can be decided if one epistemic system is more rational than another. Now why can Boghossian’s argument be regarded as speaking against my point as well? One could for example argue as follows: If there are objective standards for evaluating epistemic systems and if those objective 148 Op.

cit. p.85. cit. 150 Op. cit. 149 Op.

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standards can be known to us, then we should only regard beliefs as justified which are justified according to an epistemic system which conforms to those standards. Thus there is a sense of “is justified” which does not contain the alleged historical relativity and therefore can be used as a third condition in an analysis of the concept of knowledge. My answer to this line of argument is this: I completely agree with Boghossian that there are objective standards against which epistemic systems can be evaluated and compared and that we can find out which standards those are. After all, my own formulation of the requirement of truth-conducivity presupposes both claims. For if there were no such standards, requirement (i) of (TCC) could not be fulfilled, because there would not be properties of beliefs which increase the likelihood of their being true independently of our belief that they do so. And if we did not have cognitive access to those objective standards, requirement (ii) of (TCC) could not be fulfilled. Nevertheless the ordinary language notion of justification cannot be used to spell out those standards and therefore to spell out the concept of knowledge, since this notion is much too weak. This can be easily seen by examining the one objective standard of rationality which will be most easily agreed on and observing that one does not have to fulfill it in order to be credited with justification in the ordinary language sense. The standard I am talking about is consistency. Thus a belief which is contradicted by another belief which is part of the same system of beliefs cannot be considered knowledge. This holds for both beliefs, even if the system of beliefs contains good reasons for both of them and one of them is true. Nevertheless it is possible that both contradicting beliefs are justified as D.C. Makinson has shown in his paper The Paradox Of The Preface by presenting the following example:151 Someone writes a book and even though he has good evidence for each claim he makes in his book, he modestly includes in the preface a passage to the effect that he is certain that his book contains at least one claim which is mistaken, since a competent critic has told him so. Unfortunately, the critic did not inform him which of his claims is false, since - as he maliciously told him - he “wanted him to find out for himself”. Now our author could be reproached for holding inconsistent beliefs since he believes each claim he makes in his book (let me call them p1 , p2 . . . pn ) and he additionally believes that at least one of the claims p1 , p2 . . . pn is false, because he knows that this specific critic is almost never wrong in his assessment of claims regarding his area of expertise and that - malicious as he might be - he would never lie to a 151 Makinson

(1965). The “critic-modification” of the example is mine.

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fellow scientist. So since the set {p1 , p2 . . . pn , ¬( p1 ∧ p2 ∧ . . . ∧ pn )} is inconsistent, the author has inconsistent beliefs. But, Makinson claims, that does not prevent his beliefs from being justified. He has good reasons for each of his beliefs and even if he knows that they cannot all be true, he is nevertheless justified in holding each of them because he does not know which of his claims is false and consequently cannot restore consistency by rejecting one of his claims. Thus one of the most basic epistemic principles - namely the principle of not having contradictory beliefs - can be violated by beliefs we nevertheless would call justified. Furthermore, I do not think that we would grant the author knowledge with respect to his claims as long as he has not found the false claim and removed it from his system of beliefs. So the condition which has to be met by a true belief in order to qualify as knowledge has to be stronger than justification in the ordinary language sense. So Boghossian’s argument may hold against epistemic relativism, but does not hold against my argument regarding the ordinary language notion of justification, since being justified in this sense does not require a belief to fulfill the basic objective standards of rationality Boghossian is trying to establish. That the ordinary language notion of justification does not fulfill requirement (i) of (TCC) can further be seen by inserting this notion into the explication of this requirement and checking for analyticity: (TCJ ) If belief B is justified, then it is likely that B is true. Now it can be easily seen that this statement is not analytic: If what it means to be justified in ordinary language mainly has to do with having formed one’s beliefs responsibly, then being justified in holding a given belief does not imply that this belief is therefore likely to be true, since the informational basis on which one has formed the belief may have been completely misleading as it was the case in the example involving Anne and her medical belief. My conclusion from these results is that the project of developing a third condition for knowledge which features the ordinary language notion of justification as its central concept has to be abandoned. Therefore the task for epistemology must be to develop a concept of knowledge which does not rely on this notion of justification but instead includes a third condition which meets (TCC).152 152 Of

course, one could simply name the property featuring in this condition “justification” without claiming it to be an explication of the ordinary language notion of

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It is my contention that the best available candidates for such an analysis are those relying on the notion of coherence in spelling out the third condition. But to make this view plausible, I have to show that the alternatives, namely foundationalism and the defeasibility theory cannot be developed to yield third conditions which are not cast in terms of justification and which fulfill my requirements of truth-conducivity. This task I will tackle in the following section of this chapter. 1.3.2

Knowledge without Justification

Now that the property of being justified has been excluded as a candidate for featuring in a third condition of knowledge, we are left with the question which property could be chosen to replace it. Since almost all anti-justificationist accounts are versions of externalism, these can be excluded as well, since - as has been shown in the last part of the section on internalism and externalism - they do not fulfill requirement (ii) of (TCC). Thus it seems as if neither of the alternatives in the overview presented in the beginning of this chapter can be used in developing an account of knowledge. But the result is not as desperate as it might seem: If one of the notions which figure in justificationist theories can be spelled out as the third condition of knowledge without taking this to constitute an explication of the notion of justification, but just as a theory of what is needed in addition for a true belief to count as knowledge, then these accounts can still be of use in the search for the adequate notion of knowledge. Now the main accounts of justification comprised foundationalism, coherentism and the defeasibility theory. So in the following I will survey those accounts in order to find out if either of them can be used in spelling out the third condition of knowledge without the detour via the notion of justification. Of course, what has to be considered here are only the internalist variants of the three alternatives, since externalist variants fall prey to by the general argument against externalism offered above. Thus let us first consider internalist foundationalism. Now internalist foundationalism cannot yield an adequate explication of the third condition, since internalist foundationalism indeed is vulnerable to Bergmann’s dilemma. Bergmann himself points to the fact that the dilemma he introduces has been presented earlier by Wilfrid Sellars in his famous attack on justification. But - as I already said above - I will refrain from this in order to avoid confusion resulting from a conflation of this notion with the many different other notions which are discussed in the literature.

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the “myth of the given”153 and by Laurence BonJour154 in the course of his critique of internalist foundationalism.155 Since the dilemma is stated far more clearly and in direct relation to internalist foundationalism by BonJour, I will restrict myself to a discussion of BonJour’s version of the dilemma here. BonJour dedicates a whole chapter of his book “The Structure of Empirical Knowledge” to the presentation of the dilemma which presents itself to the internalist foundationalist, applying it to three classical versions of internalist foundationalism, namely the positions of Moritz Schlick,156 Anthony Quinton157 and C.I. Lewis.158 I will not discuss the specific variants of BonJour’s argument he offers pertaining to the three accounts respectively, but rather concentrate on the general argument behind the specific applications in order to show that this argument indeed severely threatens internalist foundationalism. BonJour’s starting point for his argument is a variant of Bergmann’s dilemma pertaining especially to foundationalism. Thus BonJour starts from the following alternatives the foundationalist faces: He either has to claim that these basic beliefs are warranted by reference to something which is external to the cognitive perspective of the person having the basic beliefs, i.e. he has to endorse externalist foundationalism, or he has to claim that the “basic beliefs” he assumes to provide the epistemological basis for systems of beliefs are warranted by something which is internal to the cognitive perspective of the person holding the beliefs while nevertheless not being a belief itself, i.e. he has to endorse internalist foundationalism. Now, BonJour argues, externalism is not a plausible option for the foundationalist, since externalism is not a plausible option at all. In arguing for this, he draws on the examples involving clairvoyance discussed above as well as on the “Subject’s Perspective Objection”. Since I have already discussed BonJour’s anti-externalist examples and the reasons for not considering it striking against externalism as well as the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” and the reasons why I think that employed as a part of the above argument it is striking against externalism, I will skip this part of 153 Sellars

(1963) pp.131. (1985) Chapter 4. 155 A further similar argument is presented by Donald Davidson in Davidson (1982a) and Davidson (1983). I will discuss Davidson’s version of the anti-foundationalist argument in connection with a detailed presentation of Davidson’s epistemological position in chapter 2. 156 Schlick (1959). 157 Quinton (1973a) and (1973b). 158 Lewis (1929) and (1946). 154 BonJour

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BonJour’s argument here and turn to his argument pertaining to the internalist option at once. According to BonJour, the internalist foundationalist encounters a second dilemma which he describes as follows: “[. . .] if there is no justification, basic beliefs are rendered epistemically arbitrary, thereby fatally impugning the very claim of foundationalism to constitute a theory of epistemic justification; while a justification which appeals to further premises of some sorts threatens to begin anew the regress of justification which it is the whole point of foundationalism to avoid.”159 Thus the internalist foundationalist is caught between the following alternatives: Either he appeals to something which is internal but unjustified to justify basic beliefs, which is clearly not a very desirable option. Or he appeals to something which is itself justified, in which case it is difficult to see how this something can be justified without being a further belief, in which case the foundationalist faces the classical epistemological regress problem. Foundationalists have traditionally tried to avoid this problem by appealing to something which is in some way “given”, i.e. of which we are in some way “immediately aware” as for example immediate experience, sense data and the like. Now BonJour’s goal is to show that no appeal to such a “given” can save the internalist foundationalist from the above dilemma, since if the “given” is not itself something which has positive epistemic status, it cannot confer positive epistemic status on any belief. If on the other hand, it has positive epistemic status, the question surfaces whence this status derives and the regress problem resurfaces. BonJour writes: “Givenness can provide a genuine solution to the regress problem only if it is possible to construe the immediate experience or direct apprehension through which the given content is appropriated in such a way as not to involve a further act of judgement or propositional acceptance (which would at once raise anew the demand for justification), while retaining the capacity of such an experience to justify a basic belief. My thesis is that this cannot 159 BonJour

(1985) p.58. BonJour casts his discussion in terms of justification, but I take it that his argument applies to other variants of internalist foundationalist formulations of the third condition, as for example conditions in terms of having foundational evidence for one’s beliefs or one’s beliefs being grounded in something foundational as well, since the problem BonJour describes is of a general structure.

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be done, that these demands conflict so as to make it impossible in principle to satisfy them both.”160 The idea behind this is the following: If some cognitive entity can confer positive epistemic status on beliefs, it must have positive epistemic status itself, since otherwise it could not confer this status upon beliefs. But if it must have positive epistemic status itself, this positive epistemic status must somehow be grounded. Now either it is grounded in something else (in which case the regress threatens) or it is grounded in itself, i.e it is somehow self-certifying. BonJour then argues that it is not possible for any cognitive entity to be self-certifying while at the same time lending epistemic support to basic beliefs: “The basic idea of givenness, after all, is to distinguish two aspects of ordinary cognitive states, their capacity to justify other cognitive states and their own need for justification, and then to try to find a kind of state which possesses only the former aspect and not the latter - a state of immediate apprehension or intuition. But [. . .] it is clear on reflection that it is one and the same feature of a cognitive state, namely its assertive or at least representational content, which both enables it to confer justification on other states and also creates the need for it to be itself justified - thus making it impossible in principle to separate these two aspects.”161 So BonJour’s argument runs as follows: If a cognitive state has propositional or representational content, it cannot be self-certifying, since having such content implies the need to be grounded in something else with propositional or representational content, while if a cognitive state does not have such content, it may not stand in need of being thus grounded itself, but neither can it ground other cognitive states which have such content. Now at this stage an obvious objection to BonJour’s argument presents itself: If I believe that I have a headache right now, this belief clearly is selfcertifying, because its existence guarantees that it is true.162 Thus there 160 BonJour

(1985) pp.64. In a later paper, BonJour revokes this argument and concludes that if one construes the given as a “built-in awareness of perceptual content [. . .] the given is not after all a myth!” (BonJour (1998) p.134. 161 BonJour (1985) p.78. 162 Of course, I may be mistaken regarding the existence of physical causes of my headache, since my headache might not have such causes but instead it might be due to psychological aberrations on my part. But I cannot mistakenly take myself to have a headache.

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seems to be a class of cognitive states with representational content which are self-certifying, namely purely introspective beliefs about one’s own mental states. But now, while this objection might speak against the strict thesis that there cannot be self-certifying cognitive states, it still does not refute BonJour’s claim that there cannot be self-certifying cognitive states which can confer positive epistemic status upon other cognitive states in any way which can save the foundationalist from the dilemma. For it is universally agreed that neither reference to purely introspective beliefs nor reference to truths of formal logic can get foundationalism off the ground as a serious theory of knowledge. What the foundationalist needs are selfcertifying cognitive states which nevertheless have empirical content. And such states, I agree with BonJour, are not to be had, since if a cognitive state has propositional or representational content which concerns anything beyond one’s own mental states, then it stands in need of epistemic support which can neither be derived from itself nor from any entity which itself does not have such content. But if this is the case, then internalist foundationalism indeed falls prey to the regress problem. Now if indeed foundationalism faces these problems if combined with internalism, I take this to be a very strong reason not to endorse foundationalism as a starting point for explicating the third condition for knowledge without recourse to the notion of justification. Thus I will turn my attention to coherentism in the following. But before I can do this, some comments about the defeasibility theory are due. As I already remarked above, this theory is combinable with foundationalism as well as with coherentism. Thus it should not be taken as an exclusive alternative to the foundationalism-coherentism divide, but rather as an extension of either a foundationalist or coherentist account. The inventor of this theory, Keith Lehrer, opted for coherentism. And since I do not see a way to salvage internalist foundationalism from Bergmann’s dilemma by introducing the defeasibility theory, I will simply take this theory to be best spelled out as a more specific variant of coherentism.163 Thus I will in the following chapter explore the fruitfulness of the notion of coherence as an explication of the third condition of knowledge. Now the main problem for the coherentist is that he has to defend the claim that coherence fulfills requirement (i) of (TCC), i.e. the claim that the following statement is analytic: (TCC ) If belief B coheres with a system of beliefs, then B is likely to be true. 163 For

a way to integrate this theory into a coherentist account of the third condition for knowledge see chapter 3.

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But since the notion of coherence is notoriously unclear, I first have to elaborate on this notion before I can argue for the claim that coherence fulfills both requirements of truth-conducivity. Thus the clarification of the notion of coherence by recourse to two existing accounts of coherence is the task of the next chapter. In the last chapter I will then try to show that coherence, understood in a certain way, indeed does fulfill the two requirements of truth-conducivity.

Chapter 2

Coherence and the World Connection Consistency, madam, is the first of Christian duties. - Charlotte Brontë In this chapter I will discuss the prospects for developing an account of knowledge in terms of coherence, bearing in mind the requirements for properties of beliefs featuring in the third condition. Now while very few authors have denied the claim that the property of being a member of a coherent system of beliefs fulfills requirement (ii) of (TCC), many authors have challenged the claim that it fulfills requirement (i). The reasons for this are manifold, but one central theme keeps surfacing: Since it seems to follow from almost all explications of what it means for a system of beliefs to be coherent that coherence is a purely internal property of systems of beliefs, i.e. a property which does not depend very much on the relations of the beliefs in the system to the external world, but rather on their relations to each other, the fact that a system of beliefs is coherent does not necessarily count toward the truth of its members. Thus while the property of being a member of a coherent system of beliefs may be weakly truth-conducive in the sense that a belief which has this property is likely to be true given the truth of the majority of the beliefs which constitute the system the belief is a member of, there seems to be no reason to assume that this property is also truth-conducive in the sense specified by the first conjunct of (TCC). The reason for this is that the majority of the beliefs which constitute the system might be false as well, in which case a belief’s coherence with that system does not count toward its truth. Thus the claim that coherence fulfills (TCC) is in need of defense, which is what I will do in the third chapter, since in order to offer such a defense, one first has to clarify what it means for a system of beliefs to be coherent. Now there is general agreement that the coherence of a system of beliefs has to do with the way the beliefs which are part of the system are re99

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lated to each other. But since the proponents of coherence theories of knowledge differ regarding the conditions such a structure has to meet in order for the system to be called coherent, there is no “universal” notion of coherence which could be our topic here. Therefore I will discuss two notions of coherence which seem to me the most promising candidates for featuring in an account of knowledge. These two notions are the ones presented by Laurence BonJour and Donald Davidson. But before I can discuss these two notions of coherence in detail, there are two tasks to be dealt with: First, I have to sketch the general idea behind the notion of coherence, and second, I have to present the objections against the claim that coherence is truth-conducive in the sense of (TCC) in detail. The first section of this chapter is concerned with these tasks. The following two sections will then be dedicated to an extended consideration of BonJour’s and Davidson’s notions of coherence.1

2.1

Coherence and Truth-Conducivity

In this first section I will present a broad notion of coherence on which almost everyone agrees when asked what coherence amounts to. In the second part of this section I will then present three standard objections to the attempt to spell out the third condition of knowledge in terms of coherence, which in different ways pertain to the claim that the coherence of beliefs with other beliefs is a property of beliefs which is objectively truth-conducive.2 1 There

is a third conception of coherence which is explicitly intended to feature in an account of knowledge, namely the one developed by Lehrer (1990). But since Lehrer’s notion of coherence rather concerns the coherence of single beliefs with systems of beliefs than the coherence of systems of beliefs considered as a whole, which is what is primarily to be discussed in this chapter, I will not consider his conception of coherence here, but defer this consideration to chapter 3. 2 There is one objection against this claim which I will not discuss in this context. The objection I am talking about has been put forward against purely probabilistic notions of coherence by Olsson (2001) and draws on a formal argument to the effect that coherence, understood probabilistically, does not have to increase likelihood of truth. I will disregard this argument, since the notion of coherence I aim to develop here is not a probabilistic notion. For my reasons for disregarding purely probabilistic notions of coherence as an alternative to the conceptions of coherence considered, see chapter 3.

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What is Coherence?

Coherence theories of knowledge first emerged as a reaction to the negative results the traditional theory of knowledge - namely foundationalism in either its rationalist or empiricist garb - yielded regarding the classical regress problem. This problem has been known in epistemology as “Agrippa’s trilemma” or as the “Münchhausen-Trilemma”.3 The problem derives from the principle that to count as knowledge, a belief has to be sufficiently grounded. If one now thinks about how a belief can come to be sufficiently grounded, one encounters a trilemma of the following form: “Here one faces a mere choice between: 1. an infinite regress, which appears as a result of the necessity to continue the search for reasons further back infinitely, which is not practically feasible and therefore cannot yield a certain foundation, 2. a logical circle in deduction, which arises by resorting to propositions which already appeared as requiring to be grounded in the course of reasoning, and which does not lead to a certain foundation either; and finally: 3. a termination of the procedure at a certain point, which appears to be feasible in principle, but which would involve an arbitrary suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.”4 Now, since the first alternative is clearly not a viable way to ground beliefs,5 the divide between foundationalists and coherentists concerns the second and the third alternative. Foundationalists try to find a way of terminating the regress by finding foundations which do not themselves have to be grounded in further beliefs, while coherentists opt for the circle and offer arguments supporting the claim that the circle they have in mind is not a vicious one. Historically, the development of the coherence theory of knowledge started with the writings of Otto Neurath,6 who characterizes the coherence view 3 This name derives from Hans Albert, who discusses the trilemma and the possible

ways out of it in detail in Albert (1991) Chapter 2. 4 Albert (1991) p.15; my translation. 5 Although Klein (1999) has argued that it has to be considered as such a way as well. 6 An anticipation of it can be found in Charles S. Peirce, who writes in 1860: “Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust

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on knowledge using a metaphor which has acquired much fame over the years: “There is no way of taking conclusively established pure protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences. No tabula rasa exists. We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials. Only the metaphysical elements can be allowed to vanish without trace. Vague linguist conglomerations remain in one way or another as components of the ship.”7 Thus, as Neurath’s metaphor suggests, what characterizes a coherence theory of knowledge is first and foremost its denial of the existence of a certain foundation for our beliefs. Instead, all of our beliefs are open to question and can be revised if the necessity for such a revision arises. Moreover, there are no strict rules according to which such a revision has to take place in any specific part of our systems of beliefs. In this spirit Quine and Ullian write: “Often in assessing beliefs we do best to assess several in combination. A very accomplished mechanic might be able to tell us something about an automobile’s engine by examining its parts one by one, each in complete isolation from the others, but it would surely serve his purpose better to see the engine as a whole with all the parts functioning together. So with what we believe. It is in the light of the full body of our beliefs that candidates gain acceptance or rejection; any independent merits of a candidate tend to be less decisive.”8 So here the positive sense of coherence shifts into focus: While the openness to revision which pertains to all of our beliefs is merely a negative characterization of coherence theories of knowledge, which is results from its proponents’ opposition to traditional foundationalism, the positive characterization has to do with the coherentist’s answer regarding the above trilemma: For the coherentist, knowledge results from the interrelations between the various members of our systems of beliefs. Neurath, rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.” (Peirce (1958) pp.40). 7 Neurath (1959) p.201. 8 Quine & Ullian (1970) p.8.

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in his early development of the coherence view, characterized coherence mainly in terms of logical consistency, i.e. on his account, what it means for a system of beliefs to be coherent is that it has to be free of formal contradictions. But of course, coherence cannot be equated with mere logical consistency. This can be seen by considering the following sets of propositions: (1) {Anne has a brother; 2+3=5; Whales are mammals} (2) {Anne has a brother; Anne has two siblings; Anne’s mother has three children} Now while of course both sets of propositions are logically consistent, set (2) is clearly more coherent, since there are interconnections between the propositions, while the propositions which are part of set (1) are independent of each other. So coherence does not seem to be a matter of consistency alone, but rather it seems to be a matter of the connections between propositions as well.9 Thus most modern authors characterize coherence not as mere consistency but rather as a matter of how well systems of beliefs “fit together”. For example Laurence BonJour writes: “Intuitively, coherence is a matter of how well a body of beliefs ‘hangs together’: how well its component beliefs fit together, agree or dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured system of beliefs, rather than either a helterskelter collection or a set of conflicting subsystems.”10 Thus the coherence of a system of beliefs mainly results from interconnections between the beliefs which are part of the system. Now, regarding the nature of the connections which contribute to the coherence of the system, there are many kinds of interrelations which can thus contribute, most of which are inferential in nature. Thus, of course, deductive implications between beliefs count as contributing to coherence. Furthermore, probabilistic and explanatory relations among beliefs are to be counted toward the coherence of systems of beliefs. Moreover, there are conceptual connections between beliefs, which massively contribute to the coherence of 9 Most

authors do not even consider strict consistency to be a necessary condition for coherence of systems of beliefs as a result of the observation that it can be rational to hold inconsistent beliefs in some situations. To see this, compare the example of the “paradox of the preface” which was presented in chapter 1. 10 BonJour (1985) p.93.

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systems of beliefs.11 From this, it can be seen that the coherentist’s way out of the above trilemma of course is not intended to involve a circle in the strict sense. The idea behind a coherence theory of knowledge is not that our beliefs are warranted by being inferable from themselves (via some intermediate steps), which - as Albert remarks - would clearly be an unacceptable solution to the regress problem. Rather, the idea behind coherentism is that our beliefs provide each other with mutual support by fitting together in the some of the ways indicated above. Thus a belief is to be counted as knowledge if it is supported strongly by a multitude of deductive, probabilistic, explanatory and conceptual relations to other beliefs which are part of a (coherent) system of beliefs. At this stage it becomes apparent that there are two accounts of coherence which are needed: An account of what it means for systems of beliefs to be coherent and an account of what it means for single beliefs to cohere with a (already coherent) system of beliefs. Of course, since in both cases coherence will be a result of the interconnections among beliefs, these two accounts must be related to each other. In this chapter, I will only deal with the first question, i.e. with the question what it means for a system of beliefs to be coherent. The second question, i.e. the question what it means for single beliefs to cohere with a system of beliefs I will postpone to the next chapter, whose last part is concerned with developing a notion of knowledge based on an account of coherence. Now before we can embark on the discussion of the specific accounts of coherence, two important points have to be clarified. The first one concerns the question between which entities the relation of coherence holds and the second one pertains to a theory which is akin to the coherence theory of knowledge but by no means identical to it, namely the coherence theory of truth. The question about the entities between which the relation of coherence holds can be answered rather easily. Since what we are after here is a notion of coherence which is suited to be implemented into an account of knowledge, the needed notion of coherence has to apply first and foremost to beliefs. Furthermore, the main factor to be considered in explaining what it means for a system of beliefs to be coherent will be the propositional contents of the beliefs which are part of the system, not the beliefs considered as mental states or brain states. But note that an important 11 I

mention conceptual connections separately here although it might be possible to spell them out in the form of and therefore reduce them to deductive relations. The reason for this is that one of the accounts of coherence I will discuss in the following, namely the account of Donald Davidson, heavily draws on conceptual connections between beliefs for the development of the notion of coherence.

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restriction has to be kept in mind here: Coherence may not be a relation which can be considered a property of sets of propositions independently of the question of whether these propositions are contents of beliefs. Maybe the fact that some propositions are contents of beliefs rather than others pertains to the coherence of a set of propositions considered. I explicitly mention this here, since both authors whose accounts of coherence I will consider in detail in the following emphasize the fact that when they are talking about the coherence of systems of beliefs they do mean real systems of beliefs and not mere abstract sets of propositions. The reason why they emphasize this will become clearer in the course of the discussion of BonJour’s and Davidson’s accounts of coherence. Regarding the second point mentioned above, I have to clarify the relation between a coherence theory of knowledge and a coherence theory of truth. To see the difference between those to types of theories, I will briefly sketch the idea behind a coherence theory of truth as it was maintained by its classical proponents as Francis H. Bradley12 and Brand Blanshard.13 Broadly, holding a coherence theory of truth amounts to claiming that what it means for a proposition to be true is to be a member of a coherent set of propositions.14 As it was the case regarding proponents of the coherence theory of knowledge, proponents of the coherence theory of truth differ regarding the exact nature of the coherence relation involved. Some early coherence theorists took coherence to be identical to simple consistency. But this can easily be shown to be implausible, since two sets of propositions can be both consistent considered separately but inconsistent with each other. Now both sets taken by itself would have to be considered as having only true members if coherence were nothing else but consistency. So later coherentists modified this version of the theory.15 Thus the difference between a coherence theory of truth and a coherence theory of knowledge is that while the coherence theory of truth comprises the claim that the concept of truth can be spelled out in terms of coherence, the coherence theory of knowledge is silent regarding the concept of truth, since it only comprises the claim that coherence among beliefs can be an indicator for the truth of beliefs without thereby implying anything 12 Cp.

Bradley (1914). Blanshard (1939). 14 Most proponents of coherence theories of truth as well as the proponents of coherence theories of knowledge consider only sets of real beliefs as candidates for the kind of coherence they have in mind. Cp. Young (2008). 15 For example, Blanshard requires the members of a coherent set of propositions to mutually entail each other. 13 Cp.

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specific about the concept of truth.16 Now it is only the latter coherence theory I wish to defend here. Regarding the coherence theory of truth, I do not know whether it can be maintained in any plausible form. I tend to think that it cannot, since there are many objections to coherence theories of truth, some of which seem to me quite decisive. But as I do not intend to defend a coherence theory of truth, but rather merely aim at explicating the third condition for knowledge in terms of coherence, I will not present those objections here, since they are of no consequence to my position.17 Nevertheless, there are some objections to coherence theories of knowledge which parallel the objections against coherence theories of truth and which primarily pertain to the claim that coherence considered as a property of beliefs is objectively truth-conducive. Now since these objections are - in contrast to the versions of the objections directed at coherence theories of truth - extremely relevant to my project here, I will dedicate the following section to their presentation. After that, I will present the conceptions of coherence presented by BonJour and Davidson, who both claim to be able to escape these objections. 2.1.2

The Problem of the World Connection

Anyone who offers an account of knowledge in terms of coherence has to give an answer to three standard objections which have been brought forward against coherence theories of knowledge and coherence theories of justification many times in the literature. The basic idea behind the standard objections is that since coherence is a completely internal property of systems of beliefs which stems from the interrelations between the members of the system solely, belonging to a coherent system of beliefs is not sufficient for being connected to the world in an adequate way and therefore for being connected to truth in an adequate way. So a belief’s being a member of a coherent system is not a sufficient reason to suppose that the belief is likely to be true. At least in the case of empirical knowl16 There is a consequence of maintaining a coherence theory of truth which pertains

to a coherence theory of knowledge: If truth were nothing but coherence, the connection between coherence spelled out as a third condition for knowledge and the truth condition would be clear as crystal: The connection would consist in identity between truth and coherence and therefore no belief which is a part of a coherent system of beliefs could be false. Thus if truth were identical to coherence, the third condition would turn out to be redundant after all. But, since I do not think that there is any real prospect for the coherence theory of truth, I will not pursue this line of thought further here. 17 For a presentation of the objections against coherence theories of truth see ? pp.390.

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edge there has to be some further link between our beliefs and the world in order for our beliefs about the world to be true. This is a severe difficulty for any coherence theory of knowledge, since coherence among our beliefs does not immediately guarantee a link between our beliefs and the world and therefore possibly does not satisfy the requirement of objective truth-conducivity regarding empirical beliefs. Thus proponents of coherence theories have to explain how this link is to be established in order to be able to give an answer to the skeptic. Now the three objections all draw on this basic idea in different ways. The first objection has been termed the “alternative systems objection” and was first presented by Moritz Schlick in the following passage: “If one is to take coherence seriously as a general criterion of truth, then one must consider arbitrary fairy stories to be as true as historical report, or as statements in a textbook of chemistry, provided the story is constructed in such a way no contradiction ever arises. I can depict by help of fantasy a grotesque world full of bizarre adventures: the coherence philosopher must believe in the truth of my account provided only I take care of the mutual compatibility of my statements, and also take the precaution of avoiding any collision with the usual description of the world, by placing the scene of my story on a distant star, where no observation is possible. Indeed, strictly speaking, I don’t even require this precaution; I can just as well demand that the others have to adapt themselves to my description; and not the other way round. They cannot then object that, say, this happening runs counter to the observations, for according to the coherence theory there is no question of observations, but only of compatibility of statements.”18 So as can be seen by considering fictional stories, fairy tales and legends, different sets of propositions can be very coherent and yet be incompatible with each other. Thus coherence cannot be a criterion of truth, since coherence alone does not allow one to choose between alternative systems of beliefs which are equally coherent but nevertheless are incompatible, so that they cannot all consist of true beliefs. This objection closely parallels the above sketched objection against coherence theories of truth whose sole criterion of coherence is logical consistency. But it can easily be amended to pertain to coherence theories of knowledge which require co18 Schlick

(1959) p.215.

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herence to amount to more than mere consistency as well, since at least fictional stories often are very coherent in a richer sense than in the sense of being merely logically consistent. Nevertheless, many fictional stories contradict many things we believe about the real world. But if this is the case, so the objection goes, then mere coherence cannot serve as a criterion of truth, which is what the coherence theory of knowledge requires it to be. So in addition to not being identifiable with truth, coherence cannot even be a criterion on which to decide which of the many alternative systems of beliefs contains most true beliefs. Thus if there are two or more competing systems of beliefs which are equally coherent, there is no way to decide which system should be adopted. Now since we can always construct many different systems which are equally coherent, coherence cannot be used as a basis on which to decide among those systems. The second objection, which is already indicated in the last passage of the quotation from Schlick above, has been called the “input problem” or the “isolation objection”. It is presented very clearly by BonJour in the following passage: “Coherence is purely a matter of the internal relations between the components of the belief system; it depends in no way on any sort of relation between the system of beliefs and anything external to that system. Hence if, as a coherence theory claims, coherence is the sole basis for empirical justification, it follows that a system of empirical beliefs might be adequately justified, indeed might constitute empirical knowledge, in spite of being utterly out of contact with the world that it purports to describe. Nothing about any requirement of coherence dictates that a coherent system of beliefs need receive any sort of input from the world or be in any way causally influenced by the world.”19 So the isolation objection amounts to the following problem: If coherence is a purely internal property of systems of beliefs, since it solely results from interconnections between the members of systems of beliefs, then even a highly coherent system of beliefs may be completely unconnected to the empirical world. Thus requiring that a belief be a member of a highly coherent system of beliefs in order to count as knowledge does not ensure that what is considered to be knowledge is in any way connected to the empirical world. Therefore being coherent does not ensure that a system of beliefs gets any input from the empirical world and thus con19 BonJour

(1985) p.108.

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tains empirical knowledge. But note that this objection does not state a problem which is unique to coherence theories of empirical knowledge.20 A problem of the same kind arises for many versions of internalist foundationalism, since as long as the foundationalist does not provide a basis for empirical beliefs which can ensure that those beliefs are properly connected to the world they are about, he faces the objection that our beliefs may be based on this foundation and yet may not have to do anything with the world as well. Objections of this kind against traditional foundationalist theories of knowledge are for example brought forward in the form of skeptical hypotheses involving evil demons. Thus the problem raised by the isolation objection can be more genuinely described as a problem for internalism than as a problem for coherentism. But since I have already discussed my reasons for rejecting internalist foundationalism, I will discuss this problem only with regard to internalist coherentism here. The point of the third and last objection is similar to the one made by the alternative systems objection but is more general, since it does not involve reference to multiple coherent systems of beliefs but rather states the worry behind the former objection without this detour. Thus this objection is directly aimed at the claim that the property of being a member of a highly coherent system of beliefs is truth-conducive. This objection is called the “problem of the truth-connection”21 and runs like this: Although a system of beliefs may be very coherent, it is possible that it does not contain any truths or at least more falsehoods than truths. Thus coherence is not a feature which provides the desired connection between a belief and its truth, since that a belief is a member of a coherent system of beliefs obviously does not provide a good reason to assume that the belief is true. Some authors further add that the only way to establish the connection between coherence and truth needed is to adopt a coherence theory of truth alongside the coherence theory of knowledge. But first, as I indicated above - I do not think that a coherence theory of truth is tenable. And second, I do not think that simply equating truth with coherence would lead to a satisfactory account of knowledge, since this would mean to equate the first and the third condition, leaving us with knowledge as mere true belief again. Thus I will try to find a different way out of this problem. Now since these objections all dispute in different ways the claim that co20 Cp.

Kvanvig (2008). labeling is due to Keith Lehrer. Cp. Lehrer (1983) and Lehrer (1990) Chapter 8. BonJour (1985) simply calls this objection “the problem of truth”. 21 This

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herence can provide the vital connection between belief and truth - the first and the third objection in terms of truth directly and the second in terms of input from the world which is necessary to arrive at empirically true beliefs - a theory of knowledge which aims to cast the third condition for knowledge in terms of coherence has to provide an answer to these objections. Therefore I will in the following discuss two accounts of coherence which comprise such answers.

2.2

The First Attempt: BonJour’s Observation Requirement

One possible solution to the problem of the lacking connection to truth which is spelled out by the objections has been proposed by Laurence BonJour. In his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge22 he dedicates a whole chapter to the task of finding a solution to the problem of establishing a link between our systems of beliefs and the world.23 In the following two chapters, he tries to answer the three objections on the basis of his reflections in this chapter. But before I embark on discussing his proposed solution to the three objections presented above and the concern about truth-conducivity lying behind all three of them, I have to present BonJour’s account of coherence in general.24 One point has to be mentioned before I can present BonJour’s theory: BonJour advocates a coherence theory of epistemic justification in order to integrate this theory into an account of knowledge. Now since I rejected the idea of spelling out the third condition for knowledge in terms of epistemic justification in chapter 1, proposing instead to explicate this condition in terms of coherence without the detour via the notion of justification, one might wonder if BonJour’s coherence theory is relevant to my project regarding the concept of knowledge. But since the application of his arguments regarding the objections against coherence as a condition for knowledge does not in any way depend on an explication of the third condition in terms of epistemic justification, his arguments - if they 22 In

the following abbreviated as TSEK. (1985) Chapter 6. 24 He develops his coherence theory of knowledge in various works, as for example BonJour (1969), BonJour (1976) and BonJour (1985). Since the account he gives in BonJour (1985) is the newest and most discussed version of his coherence theory, I will mainly discuss this account, although I will in some parts draw on BonJour (1976), too. 23 BonJour

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are useful in a defense of coherence against the objections at all - can be applied in a defense of a coherence theory of knowledge which does not utilize the notion of justification as well. 2.2.1

BonJour’s Characterization of Coherence

For BonJour, coherence of systems of beliefs is primarily a matter of the inferential relations holding between the beliefs which are members of the system. But, on his account, not all inferential relations count equally toward the coherence of systems of beliefs. Rather, he characterizes coherence as a function of the following main properties of system of beliefs. “(1) A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically consistent. (2) A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic consistency.25 (3) The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in proportion to the number and strength of such connections. (4) The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to each other by inferential connections. (5) The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system.”26 Thus, on BonJour’s account coherence is a result of one necessary condition, i.e. logical consistency,27 as well as two positive and two negative constraints. The first positive constraint is probabilistic consistency, i.e. the absence of probability assignments to contents of beliefs which are incompatible according to the axioms of probability theory. BonJour does not take complete absence of such assignments to be a further necessary 25 What

is meant by “probabilistic consistency” here is that there is no conflict in the probability assignments to the propositions which are the contents of the beliefs in the system. Thus for example ascribing “It will rain the whole day tomorrow” a probability of 0.3 while assigning “The sun will shine the whole day tomorrow” a probability of 0.9 would constitute such a conflict. 26 BonJour (1985) pp.95. 27 BonJour notes that requiring strict consistency as a necessary condition might be too strong a condition, but leaves this condition to be refined later. Cp. BonJour (1985) Chapter 5 note 7.

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condition for coherence but only correlates the degree of coherence positively with the degree of probabilistic consistency, i.e. less probabilistic inconsistency makes for a higher degree of coherence. The second positive factor which contributes to coherence are the inferential relations between the beliefs which are part of the system, i.e. the positive deductive, probabilistic, explanatory28 etc. relations between the beliefs which are members of the system. So this constraint comprises the rough idea of coherence developed in the preceding section. And last, BonJour supplements his account of coherence by two negative constraints which state what factors diminish the coherence of a system of beliefs. First, systems of beliefs which form very unified structures with inferential relations being distributed equally among the members of the system throughout all the system are to be counted as more coherent than systems which are divided into subsystems which are not interconnected inferentially. An example of such a less coherent system would be the system of beliefs of a physicist who nevertheless is a very religious person and therefore has a system of beliefs which is divided into a system of scientific and a system of religious beliefs, which do not bear many relations to each other.29 Constraint (5), the second negative constraint, requires some elaboration: First, by an anomaly BonJour means a “fact or event, especially one involving some sort of recurring pattern, which is claimed to obtain by one or more of the beliefs in the system of beliefs, but which is incapable of being explained (or would have been incapable of being predicted) by appeal to the other beliefs in the system.”30 Thus the coherence of systems of beliefs is decreased if the system of beliefs comprises beliefs which lack inferential connections to other beliefs in the sense that the beliefs in question cannot become the content of an explanandum sentence in an explanation which features contents of other beliefs in the system as explanans premises. An example for such an anomaly (in a system of beliefs which in other respects strongly resembles a system of beliefs of a modern scientist) would be the belief that in a certain room, melons frequently pop into existence from out of nowhere. Now why does BonJour require that such anomalies should be absent from coherent systems of beliefs? He states his reasons as follows: 28 BonJour

places major emphasis on the role of explanatory relations. I will come back to this in the discussion of condition (5). 29 Of course I do not mean to imply that it is impossible for physicists to be religious without having such divided systems of beliefs. 30 BonJour (1985)p.99.

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“The distinctive significance of anomalies lies [. . .] in the fact that they undermine the claim of the allegedly basic explanatory principle to be genuinely basic, and thus threaten the overall coherence of the system in a much more serious way.”31 Thus, according to BonJour the existence of anomalies is to be counted against the coherence of systems of beliefs, since their existence threatens the structure of the system as a whole instead of merely weakening the inferential interconnectedness of the system. The reason for this is that unexplained anomalies are potential falsifiers regarding the basic explanatory principles contained in the system, as for example the assumption of the existence of causal relations among events in the world in the case of the melons.32 So BonJour’s account of coherence heavily relies on the classical idea of systems of beliefs being inferentially interconnected and makes coherence a function of those interconnections or lack thereof, placing a certain emphasis on explanatory relations. But such a notion of coherence is immediately vulnerable to the three objections presented above, since so far, nothing which contributes to the coherence of system’s of beliefs positively or negatively on BonJour’s account, precludes either disconnection from truth or disconnection from the empirical world. Thus someone who has a system of beliefs which meets all five conditions advanced by BonJour could still have beliefs which are largely false or completely cut off from the way things really are in the world. Now before I can present the answers BonJour gives to the problem of truth-conducivity on the basis of his inferentialist account of coherence, I have to present one further particular feature of his account, which he introduces after having presented his five conditions for coherence, since his arguments regarding the isolation objection partly draw on this feature. BonJour calls the further element he introduces into his account of coherence the “Doxastic Presumption”. He primarily introduces this element to prevent his coherence theory from falling prey to objections pertaining to requirement (ii) of (TCC) rather than to the ones pertaining to requirement (i). Now since the main concern regarding coherence theories of knowledge is whether they meet the latter requirement, I will merely sketch his 31 Op.

cit.

32 Of course, BonJour does not employ the term “basic” in the way a foundationalist

would here. All he means to say by calling the principles he has in mind “basic explanatory principles” is that these principles are inferentially connected to a great multitude of beliefs, especially by explanatory relations, such that giving them up would mean to deprive many beliefs of their inferential anchoring in the system.

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considerations which concern the former requirement and lead to the introduction of the Doxastic Presumption, since there is one aspect of this presumption which is important regarding BonJour’s answer to the objections. The problem which BonJour wants to address in introducing the Doxastic Presumption concerns the metabeliefs someone must have in order to have a cognitive grasp of his system of beliefs as a whole and its coherence. Now since those metabeliefs are beliefs about which beliefs are part of the system of beliefs, the problem can be stated as follows: “[. . .] it is beyond any doubt viciously circular to claim that the metabeliefs which constitute the believer’s grasp of his system of beliefs are themselves justified by virtue of their coherence with the system - even if the nonlinear view of justification articulated earlier is accepted in its entirety. How can my metabelief B2 that I have a certain other belief B1 be justified for me by an appeal to the fact that B2 coheres with my total system of beliefs if my very grasp of that system depends on the justification of B2 and other similar beliefs?”33 Now BonJour’s idea regarding an answer to this question is the following: On a coherentist account of knowledge, the justification of particular beliefs is a sole matter of their coherence with the system of beliefs they are part of. Thus on such an account, raising the question of justification regarding any particular belief presupposes that this belief is part of such a system of beliefs, because otherwise the question would be unintelligible. But, BonJour goes on to argue, we have to assume that this presupposed system of beliefs is approximately the system the person having the belief which is to be justified on the basis of this system takes herself to have. The claim here is not that one cannot mistakenly hold oneself to believe something which in fact one does not.34 What is claimed is that the whole point of asking for the justification of a belief would be lost if it could not be assumed that we roughly have the beliefs we believe ourselves to have, for if we did not have those beliefs, the question whether and how those beliefs are justified would not have any meaning. BonJour goes on to clarify the status of the Doxastic Presumption: “[. . .] the Doxastic Presumption [. . .] is [. . .] a characterization of something which is, from the standpoint of a coherence theory, a 33 BonJour

(1985) p.102. this can be the case can be easily seen by considering examples of selfdeception or repression. 34 That

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basic and unavoidable feature of cognitive practice. Epistemic reflection, [. . .] begins from a (perhaps tacit) representation of myself as having (approximately) such and such a specific system of beliefs: only relative to such a representation can questions of justification be meaningfully raised and answered. This representation is presumably a product of something like ordinary introspection [. . .], but whereas most introspective beliefs can be justified by appeal to coherence, [. . .] the metabeliefs which constitute this representation cannot be thus justified in general for the reasons already considered. The issue of their justification can be raised and answered in particular, relatively confined cases which are for some reason specially problematic. But apart from such cases, such metabeliefs must be presumed to be correct in order for the process of justification even to get started.”35 Thus the Doxastic Presumption does not figure as a premise in the justification of beliefs but rather serves as the frame which has to be taken for granted in order to ask whether any of our beliefs are justified. Now, BonJour goes on, assuming the Doxastic Presumption to hold is not to beg the question against the skeptic who claims that we might be largely mistaken regarding our beliefs about the beliefs we hold. Such an unusual skeptic, BonJour concedes, cannot be refuted from the perspective of his coherence theory of knowledge. If we do not hold approximately the beliefs we take ourselves to hold, the coherence theory of knowledge in BonJour’s version is doomed. But, BonJour goes on, if this is the sole form of skepticism which is successful against his theory, “this would be a significant epistemological result, even if not quite the one which would be ideally desirable.”36 So in the next sections I will - in the context of the discussion of BonJour’s proposed solution to the problem posed by the three objections - discuss other, more usual forms of skepticism, i.e. skeptical doubts pertaining to the link between coherence in BonJour’s sense and empirical truth, to see whether BonJour’s theory fares better when faced with such common forms of skepticism. 35 BonJour

(1985) pp. 104. (1985) p.106. In a later paper, BonJour revises his assessment of this particular from of skepticism and portrays it as the central problem for internalist coherentism. Cp. BonJour (1998). p.129 36 BonJour

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The Role of Observation in BonJour’s Coherence Theory

BonJour’s answer to the three objections presented above has the following structure: He first introduces a principle which is designed to deal with the isolation objection and then goes on to argue that if this principle succeeds with respect to this objection, then the two other objections can be met by an appeal to this principle and the notion of coherence as well. The principle BonJour advocates is a certain metaprinciple which he calls the “Observation Requirement”. On his account, any proponent of a coherence theory of knowledge who wants to escape skeptical objections regarding empirical knowledge has to bear in mind the special contribution beliefs acquired by observation make to the coherence of the system. In this section, I will first sketch the account of the role of observation BonJour gives in Chapter 6 of TSEK. After that, I will present his “Observation Requirement” and his answers to the three objections portrayed above, which all rely on the introduction of this requirement into the theory. Any coherentist account of knowledge has to deal with the task of clarifying the role of observational beliefs. While on foundationalist accounts, the special epistemic status of observational or perceptual beliefs is often incorporated by considering them to be foundational in the sense of having a prima facie initial credibility or reliability,37 this option is not open to the coherentist. Thus there are only two alternatives to the coherentist regarding observational beliefs: Either he claims that observational beliefs do not have any special epistemic status, but have to be evaluated according to criteria of coherence as any other kind of beliefs, or he tries to show that evaluating them according to criteria of coherence alone leads to an attribution of a special epistemic status. While many coherentists have embraced the first alternative, BonJour votes for the second option. In developing his account of coherentist observation, he begins with a distinction of two senses in which a belief can have noninferential character. According to him, a belief can have noninferential character in the sense that it was arrived at by some other process than inference from other beliefs, i.e. it can have a noninferential origin. On the other hand, a belief may have noninferential character in the sense of not being justified or 37 This,

of course, does not mean that observational beliefs have to be considered to be immune from revision. Moderate foundationalists, as for example William Alston merely hold that these beliefs have a prima facie reliable status which may be overthrown if there is evidence against the truth of any of those beliefs. Cp. Alston (2002).

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warranted by inferential relations to other beliefs, but by some relation to something which is not itself a belief.38 Now, BonJour claims that all the coherentist has to dispute is that observational beliefs have noninferential character in the second sense. But to dispute this does not commit one to denying that observations play a special role for systems of beliefs as an instance of independent check. All that must be denied is that beliefs based on observation lack the need to be justified by recourse to coherence with the rest of the system. But this does not mean that the coherentist cannot appeal to the noninferential origin of those beliefs in the course of their coherentist justification. So BonJour’s general idea on how to integrate observational beliefs into a system of beliefs without assigning them a special epistemic status which is somehow due to their relation to something other than a belief is the following: If one takes into account the fact that observational beliefs are cognitively spontaneous, i.e. that they originate without being inferred from other beliefs and if it can be made plausible that this origin has a bearing on the likelihood of truth of those beliefs, then observational beliefs could be justified coherentistically by an appeal to metabeliefs concerning the class of beliefs with such an origin. The crucial idea behind this conception of the justification of observational beliefs within a coherent system of beliefs is the following: Beliefs can support other beliefs in two different ways. Support of the one kind derives from inferential relations a belief bears to the content of another belief, while the other kind of support is lent to other beliefs without being inferentially related to their content. The latter kind of support rather derives from establishing a link between some property of the belief (which does not have to be directly connected to its content) and the truth of the belief.39 Thus for example, one can know of a certain theorem that it is true without even understanding it, i.e. without being aware of its content, if one knows that the theorem is frequently used in a respectable book on quantum mechanics and that a good physicist can prove it. Gen38 This

is the way in which foundationalists claim basic beliefs to be justified. Alston for example characterizes the justification of basic beliefs thus: “[. . .] where what justifies a belief includes the believer’s having certain other beliefs, [. . .] we may speak of indirectly (mediately) justified beliefs. And, where what justifies a belief does not include any such component, we may speak of directly (immediately) justified beliefs.” (Alston (1976) p.166.) 39 Roderick Firth introduces the locution “warrant-increasing property” to characterize such properties: “Thus we may say that the coherence theory of justification maintains that, if P is a warrant-increasing property of S, then either (1) P is an inferential property, or (2) P is a warrant-increasing property only because the statement “If S has the property P then S is true” has an inferential warrant-increasing property.” (Firth (1964) p.550).

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erally, inferential support of this kind can be spelled out in an argument of the following form: (P1) Beliefs which have property P are very likely to be true. (P2) This belief has property P. (K) Therefore, this belief is very likely to be true. In this case, the beliefs which support the belief in question are not directly inferentially related to the content of this belief. Their contents may stand in a certain indirect relation to the content of the belief, because the fact that the belief has the property P is in most cases due to its content. For example, the fact that a theorem is used in a respectable book on quantum mechanics can be due to the proposition expressed by the theorem, which is presumably a useful truth of physics. So the supporting beliefs are only indirectly related to its content. But nevertheless the support they provide is in one sense independent of this content, since the argument above supports the belief without reference to its content. Now BonJour’s idea of how to integrate observational beliefs into his theory in a way compatible with the coherentist tenet that no belief can be justified except by being inferred from other beliefs in the system is to justify them by using an argument which instantiates the above sketched form, substituting “is a cognitively spontaneous belief of kind K acquired under circumstances C” for the property P. Thus he shows that observational beliefs can in principle be justified inferentially using metabeliefs which first establish a general connection between the property of being a cognitively spontaneous belief acquired under appropriate circumstances and being true, and second concern the kind of belief the belief in question is and the circumstances of its origin. Having established this possibility of justifying observational beliefs in a coherentist manner, two things remain to be done in order to show that observational beliefs can be assigned a special epistemic status by an appeal to coherence only: First, it has to be shown how the premises of the argument used to justify observational beliefs, i.e. the metabeliefs, can themselves be justified by an appeal to coherence. The reason for this is straightforward: If the premises cannot be justified by an appeal to coherence, they either remain unjustified, in which case the argument carries no support regarding observational beliefs, or they have to be considered justified by something else than inferential relations to other beliefs in the system and the problem which arose concerning the inferential justification of observational beliefs reappears

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at the level of the metabeliefs. And second, it has to be at least made plausible that having a coherent system of beliefs requires one to have the relevant metabeliefs, especially the general metabelief about the high likelihood of truth of cognitively spontaneous beliefs acquired under certain circumstances. This is important, because otherwise systems of beliefs in which observational beliefs are attributed a special epistemic status could be less coherent than systems of beliefs which attribute them no such status and the isolation objection would be threatening immediately. For completeness, I will offer a brief sketch of BonJour’s treatment of the first task ín the following. My presentation of this treatment will be brief, since the question how the premises are justified in detail is not directly relevant to the answers BonJour gives to the objections, which are what I primarily need to discuss. The remainder of this section will then be dedicated to BonJour’s treatment of the second task, i.e. to his Observation Requirement. Now to see how BonJour argues in favor of the justifiability of the premises of the argument for the truth of a given observational belief, it can be helpful to take a look at his own formulation of the premises first. Acccording to him, the argument indicated above runs as follows: “(1) I have a cognitively spontaneous belief that P which is of kind K. (2) Conditions C obtain. (3) Cognitively spontaneous beliefs of kind K in conditions C are very likely to be true. Therefore my belief that P is very likely to be true.”40 Since he discusses the premises in reverse order, I will do so as well. According to BonJour, the coherentist justification of premise (3) does not pose much of a problem, because specific instances of premise (3) containing specifications regarding the kind of belief and the kind of circumstances involved, can be considered psychological laws which “might be justified in a variety of familiar ways: by ordinary enumerative induction from actual instances, by other sorts of inductive and theoretical reasoning, and by inference from more general laws.”41 Thus the justification of these premises is not a problem on a coherentist account. The only thing which has to be kept in mind is that the premise has to be justified using only propositions which are themselves contents of beliefs contained in 40 BonJour 41 BonJour

(1985) p.123. (1985) p.125.

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the system of beliefs which contain the cognitively spontaneous beliefs in question. The justification of premise (2), which is just a conjunction consisting of beliefs about the existence of various conditions at the moment of acquisition of the cognitively spontaneous belief in question, is not very problematic either, since most of those propositions will be either contents of observational beliefs themselves or contents of introspective beliefs. But those beliefs can be justified by arguments similar to the one offered for the original observational belief.42 Furthermore, BonJour argues, in many cases the premise may primarily consist of or be completely substitutable by a ceteris paribus clause which can be justified by a simple appeal to the lack of evidence for the absence of conditions C. Now, according to BonJour, premise (1) is the most problematic regarding its coherentist justification, since the coherentist cannot simply claim, as the foundationalist could, that this premise is self-justifying, since this would amount to admitting at least one category of beliefs which are basic in the sense of not being justified by an appeal to their inferential relations to other beliefs. But, so BonJour argues, there is another solution regarding the justification of claims about the existence of beliefs of a certain kind in a system of beliefs which is open to the coherentist. The coherentist can appeal to the fact “that the raising of an issue of empirical justification presupposes the existence of some specifiable system of empirical beliefs [. . .]; the primary justificatory issue is whether or not, under this presumption that I do indeed hold approximately the system of beliefs which I believe myself to hold, those beliefs are justified.”43 , i.e. he can appeal to the Doxastic Presumption. Now if the Doxastic Presumption can be assumed to hold, premise (1) is warranted. The reason for this is that if the Doxastic Presumption holds, it can also be assumed - at least with a good enough likelihood - that the cognitively spontaneous beliefs we take ourselves to have will be a part of our systems of beliefs. Thus, on BonJour’s account of coherentist justification, it is possible to justify all three premises by an appeal to beliefs contained in the system of beliefs to which the cognitively spontaneous beliefs in question belongs.44 42 This

does not have to lead to a regress, since the belief that the original belief exists and the beliefs that the appropriate conditions for its production exist can be taken to support each other mutually. 43 BonJour (1985) p.103. 44 As noted above, this is just a rough sketch of BonJour’s account of the justification of the premises which I included for completeness. I do not assume this sketch to be as convincing as BonJour’s own elaborate account.

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What BonJour has shown by his considerations regarding observational beliefs presented in the last section is that there is a way in which observational beliefs can be justified in a manner compatible with a coherentist account of justification in his sense, i.e. an account which only allows inferential relations to other beliefs as a source of justification. But this merely establishes the possibility of integrating observational beliefs into a system of beliefs on a coherentist account. What is not established is that observational beliefs will or even must be integrated into systems of beliefs if these systems are to be coherent. Thus at least the isolation objection is still with us, since the mere possibility of allowing observational input into a system of beliefs does not guarantee that there really will be such input. One can imagine someone who simply rejects all kinds of cognitively spontaneous beliefs as delusions and therefore never even tries to justify those beliefs using the above argument, since he does not believe that any instance of premise (1) or premise (3) is true. So far, nothing in BonJour’s five conditions for the coherence of systems of beliefs prevents such a person’s system of beliefs from being counted as highly coherent. So to ensure that observational beliefs have to be integrated into systems of beliefs on a coherentist account, BonJour has to show more. He recognizes this when he writes: “Thus, as a straightforward consequence of the idea that epistemic justification must be truth-conducive, a coherence theory of empirical justification must require that in order for the beliefs of a cognitive system to be even candidates for empirical justification, that system must contain laws attributing a high degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of cognitively spontaneous beliefs [. . .].”45 Now this demand on systems of beliefs to contain such laws is in a nutshell what BonJour calls the “Observation Requirement”. In order to ensure that what is taken to count as knowledge on a coherentist account genuinely has empirical content, one has to require that systems of beliefs contain enough metabeliefs according to which cognitively spontaneous beliefs of certain kinds have a high degree of reliability, in order to make sure that enough observational beliefs will be integrated into the system and can be justified by an appeal to the metabeliefs. Thus, BonJour argues, any coherence theory of empirical knowledge has to contain the Observation Requirement as a “regulative principle” which requires 45 BonJour

(1985) p.141.

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that cognitively spontaneous beliefs of certain sorts occurring under certain circumstances have to be classed as prima facie reliable and therefore have to be incorporated into the system on most occasions. Two points about the Observation Requirement have to be clarified before I can embark on the presentation of how its integration into BonJour’s coherence theory allows him to deal with the three objections presented above: First, according to BonJour, the Observation Requirement is an a priori principle about systems of beliefs. It is a priori because it has the form of a conditional which states “that a cognitive system must attribute reliability to some members of the general class of cognitively spontaneous beliefs, to the extent indicated, if it is to contain empirical knowledge.”46 Therefore the requirement does not state anything about the de facto reliability of any class of cognitively spontaneous beliefs but simply states that if a system of beliefs is to be counted as containing empirical knowledge, it must satisfy the requirement. Second, which classes of cognitively spontaneous beliefs are classified as reliable in a given system of beliefs is an empirical question which has to be determined by an appeal to other beliefs in the system, i.e. by an appeal to coherence. This means that it is possible that there is a clash between coherence and the observation requirement in some cases, i.e. that for some systems of beliefs it is not possible to fulfill both in the long run, since there are frequent collisions between a wide range of cognitively spontaneous beliefs and the rest of the beliefs in the system, which lead to the rejection of most of the metabeliefs concerning the reliability of the cognitively spontaneous beliefs. Thus introducing the Observation Requirement into a coherence theory of knowledge does not preclude the possibility that there is in fact no empirical knowledge. Furthermore, BonJour argues, establishing the Observation Requirement as a metaprinciple does not violate the coherentist tenet that there is no source of justification apart from inferential relations of beliefs to other beliefs. The Observation Requirement thus does not attribute any special epistemic status to any specific class of beliefs, observational or other, since the epistemic status of different kinds of cognitively spontaneous beliefs is evaluated within concrete systems of beliefs according to criteria of coherence solely.

46 BonJour

(1985) p.142.

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BonJour’s Answers to the Three Objections

Having established the Observation Requirement, BonJour formulates his answers to the above presented standard objections to coherence theories of knowledge relying on that principle. To answer the alternative systems objection, he draws on a distinction between the coherence of a system of beliefs at a given moment of time and the coherence of a system of beliefs in the long run. According to him, regarding the coherence of systems of beliefs at a given moment of time, the objection is trivially valid. At a given moment of time, there may be many systems of beliefs which are equally coherent and the members of which are consequently equally justified. But, he goes on to argue, if one considers the coherence of systems of beliefs in the long run and takes into account the Observation Requirement, the picture changes significantly: “The basic rationale for the original version of the objection was that alternative coherent systems could, at least in principle, be construed arbitrarily. But such an arbitrary constructed system will not in general satisfy the Observation Requirement; and if one should be so constructed as to initially satisfy that requirement, there is no reason to think that it would remain coherent as (putative) observations accumulate, even if it were coherent in the beginning.”47 So the argument is that even if it might be possible to invent many equally coherent alternative systems of beliefs in order to formulate the alternative systems objection for systems of beliefs existing at a given moment of time, these systems would not remain equally coherent if they would develop over time while continuing to satisfy the Observation Requirement. Rather they would either develop in a way which would lead to significant differences in coherence, so that a decision between them would be possible on the basis of coherence alone or many of them would in the long run cease to meet the Observation Requirement, which would mean that a decision between them would be possible on these grounds. So with the Observation Requirement, the alternative systems objection is a valid possibility only if one does not take into account the fact that real systems of beliefs develop over time. And thus BonJour is able to conclude: “Instead of the claim that there will always be indefinitely many equally coherent and incompatible cognitive systems, we have 47 BonJour

(1985) p.144.

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now the claim that there might possibly be two (or, an even more questionable possibility, more than two) such systems between which a coherence theory could not decide [. . .]. This is a very weak objection, if indeed it is still an objection at all.”48 Now let us turn to the isolation objection. BonJour claims that “the Observation Requirement effectively guarantees that a cognitive system which satisfies it will receive at least apparent input from the world and hence that empirical justification will not depend merely on the internal relations of a static belief system; it thus provides a basic answer to [the isolation objection].”49 The crucial phrase in this quotation is obviously “apparent input”. The objection was that a system of beliefs can be perfectly coherent without being connected to the world the beliefs contained in it are about, since it lacks empirical input altogether. Now does the guarantee of apparent input really solve this problem? To be sure, the Observation Requirement guarantees that enough cognitively spontaneous beliefs are integrated into the system, but since the reliability of certain classes of cognitively spontaneous beliefs is evaluated according to criteria internal to the system, only input which is reliable according to the standards internal to the system is allowed into the system. This leaves open the possibility that the cognitively spontaneous beliefs admitted into the system do not constitute real input from the world but rather only what is taken to be input according to the standards of the system. But, as BonJour argues, at least at the level of the system itself, there must be an argument available for the claim that the beliefs admitted do constitute real input from the world, since there must be an argument available which justifies the standards of the system regarding the reliability of certain classes of cognitively spontaneous beliefs. Now since such arguments will be typically in terms of causal relations between objects and events in the world and the genesis of the cognitively spontaneous beliefs, at least according to the standards of the system the cognitively spontaneous beliefs have to count as genuine input from the world. But this of course does not settle the question whether they really constitute such input, since the correctness of the internal standards of the system may of course be questioned. Now, according to BonJour, the question whether the claim that the cognitively spontaneous beliefs admitted into a given system of beliefs constitute genuine input from the world is true is 48 BonJour 49 BonJour

(1985) p.146. (1985) p.142.

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“merely a specific case of the general issue, [. . .] of whether coherentist justification is truth-conducive.”50 Therefore he postpones the discussion of this problem to a stage after the discussion of the third objection, which is what I will do here as well. So how does BonJour deal with the third objection, i.e. the problem of the truth connection? Regarding his treatment of this objection, it is important that BonJour holds a correspondence theory of truth, which he spells out thus: “[. . .] the correspondence theory of truth holds that a belief or statement is true if it corresponds to or agrees with the appropriate independent reality.”51 So for him, truth broadly amounts to an agreement between a proposition and the way the world is. He clearly sees but explicitly denies the possibility of arguing for the truth-conducivity of justification understood in coherentist terms by adhering to a coherence theory of truth, since first, he considers such a theory of truth to be untenable and second, he rightly considers it a petitio principii to ensure the truth-conducivity of justification in terms of coherence by making what is true depend on what is coherentistically justified in an ideal way or in the long run. Thus what he has to show is that beliefs which are members of a system of beliefs which remains highly coherent over a long period of time or which develops to be coherent over a long period of time are therefore likely to be in agreement with the world. And this is where the Observation Requirement comes in: BonJour argues that it is extremely unlikely that a system of beliefs which does meet the Observation Requirement remains coherent or develops to be coherent over a long period of time if it does not mainly agree with reality. More specifically, he aims to give what he calls a “metajustificatory argument” for the following thesis which he calls (MJ): “A system of beliefs which (a) remains coherent (and stable) over the long run and (b) continues to satisfy the Observation Requirement is likely, to a degree which is proportional to the degree of coherence (and stability) and the longness of the run, to correspond closely to independent reality.”52 50 BonJour

(1985) p.140. (1985) p.159. He characterizes this formulation of the correspondence theory as a “first approximation” but does not give a more specific formulation later. 52 BonJour (1985) p.171. His argument heavily relies on the notion of explanation, which may be seen as dubious for itself. But for lack of space I will not press this 51 BonJour

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BonJour’s argument runs like this: The fact that a system of beliefs remains stable and coherent while continuing to satisfy the Observation Requirement calls for an explanation. Now if it can be shown that the best explanation for this fact is that the members of the system of beliefs are mainly in agreement with reality, we can conclude that a system of beliefs’ staying coherent over a long period of time combined with its fulfilling the Observation Requirement leads to agreement with reality. Now how does BonJour intend to show that agreement with reality is the best explanation for the fact that a system of beliefs which fulfills the Observation Requirement remains stable and coherent over a long period of time? He answers as follows: “What needs to be shown is that the explanatory hypothesis in question, which I will refer to as the correspondence hypothesis, is more likely to be true relative to the conditions indicated than is any alternative explanation. The underlying claim is that a system of beliefs for which the correspondence hypothesis was false would be unlikely to remain coherent (and continue to satisfy the Observation Requirement) unless it were revised in the direction of greater correspondence with reality - thereby destroying the stability of the original system and gradually leading to a new and stable system for which the correspondence hypothesis is true.”53 Thus the idea behind his argument is to show that the assumption that a system of beliefs agrees with reality is the best explanation for its remaining coherent and stable while continuing to satisfy the Observation Requirement54 in the sense of being the explanation which is most likely to be true given the evidence that the system of beliefs remains coherent and stable.55 BonJour’s metajustificatory argument involves two premises, one stating that the fact that a system of beliefs remains coherent and stable over a long period of time needs an explanation and one stating that the correspondence hypothesis is the best explanation for that fact. The first premise, BonJour argues, can easily be seen to be warranted, since if the point here but simply assume that the notion of explanation can be explicated in a way that is appropriate. 53 BonJour (1985) p.172. 54 I will drop the qualification “while continuing to satisfy the Observation Requirement” in the remainder of this section, taking it to be tacitly understood by the reader. 55 It can be assumed that BonJour intends “the best explanation” to mean the same thing as “the explanation which is most likely to be true given the evidence” as he often uses these two locutions interchangeably.

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cognitively spontaneous beliefs which are members of the system were generated randomly without any reason to explain why those specific beliefs are generated, then it would be extremely unlikely that the system would remain coherent and stable over a long period of time. The second premise is more problematic, since to show that this premise is true, it has to be shown that all alternative explanations for the coherence and stability of the system of beliefs are less likely to be true than the correspondence hypothesis. To show this, BonJour separates the alternative explanations into two classes, one containing explanations involving worlds roughly like the one we believe ourselves to reside in, i.e. worlds in which physical objects and processes exist in space and time, are connected by causal relations to us and to each other etc., and the other containing explanations involving worlds in which skeptical hypotheses are true, as for example a Cartesian-Demon-World. I will not discuss BonJour’s arguments regarding the normal-world-hypotheses, since - as I will argue in detail in the next section - I think that BonJour’s argument regarding the skeptical hypotheses does not show that assuming the truth of our beliefs provides the best explanation for the coherence and stability of our systems of beliefs. And if his argument regarding the skeptical alternatives fails, it is of no consequence whether his arguments concerning the normal-world alternatives are successful in establishing that his conception of coherence can meet the problem of the truth connection, since those arguments can establish this only on the assumption that the world roughly is as we believe it to be. But this assumption can be challenged by the proponent of the above objections to coherence by the invention of a skeptical hypothesis. So if BonJour does not have a good answer to the objections put in terms of skeptical hypotheses, he does not succeed in answering the problem of the truth connection. Now his argument against the claim that skeptical hypotheses can provide an equally good or even better explanation for the coherence and stability of our systems of beliefs is a probabilistic one, which he first presents with regard to the “explanatory” hypothesis that the beliefs which are the members of the system are produced by chance. Although this hypothesis can be ruled out because of the extreme improbability that production of beliefs by pure chance would lead to systems of beliefs which remain coherent and stable over long periods of time, it can be modified to yield another hypothesis which makes it extremely likely that systems of beliefs the members of which are produced by chance remain coherent and stable:

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“My cognitively spontaneous beliefs are produced purely by chance; and chance, quite fortuitously, produces in fact only observational beliefs which will fit into my coherent system of beliefs and not disturb its stability.”56 As can be seen, this hypothesis entails that the system of beliefs will remain coherent and stable and thus a fortiori renders this very likely. Now why can’t this hypothesis be considered a better explanation for the coherence and stability of our systems of beliefs than the correspondence hypothesis? BonJour argues this way: Even if a hypothesis makes it very likely that a system of beliefs will remain stable and coherent, it will nevertheless not be a good explanation if its initial likelihood is very low. BonJour calls this initial likelihood of a hypothesis its antecedent or a priori likelihood. Now what he means by this is that many propositions do have a likelihood independently of being related to other propositions. The classical example are tautologies or contradictions, which have an a priori likelihood of one respectively zero. But now propositions can have such an a priori likelihood even if they are not logical truths or falsehoods, as for example in the case of conjunctions whose conjuncts are relevant to each other’s likelihood. Consider for example the proposition that Mary is a virgin and that Mary is pregnant. Since this conjunction might be true in some extraordinary circumstances, it is not a contradiction. But nevertheless the likelihood that this conjunction is true is very low on a priori grounds, since given that the first conjunct is true, it is unlikely that the second is true and vice versa.57 Now, BonJour argues, as in the case of the conjunction concerning Mary, the initial likelihood of the above hypothesis is indeed very low, since it is a conjunction of two propositions which are very unlikely relative to each other. Thus it is very unlikely that they are both true and therefore that their conjunction is true. According to BonJour, the same applies to skeptical hypotheses which are not ruled out by the fact that they do not explain stable and coherent systems of beliefs very well. He demonstrates this with respect to 56 BonJour

(1985) p.182.

57 It might be objected that this is not an a priori likelihood, since it is only given our

background knowledge about female physiology and procreation that this conjunction is very unlikely to be true. Thus it could be the case that his argument already fails at this point. But I am not sure whether his considerations regarding a priori likelihood are defective in this respect, since one might argue that one does not need to have empirical knowledge to judge this conjunction to be very unlikely, but that instead all one needs to know to consider it unlikely that someone is both a virgin and pregnant is what “being a virgin” and “being pregnant” means. Thus I will disregard this objection.

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the Cartesian-Demon-hypothesis. To genuinely explain the coherence and stability of a system of beliefs, this hypothesis must be modified slightly, too, since the unqualified hypothesis that a demon is causing the cognitively spontaneous beliefs which are members of the system at will would not explain why the beliefs thus caused form and continue to form a stable and coherent system. To be genuinely threatening to BonJour’s account, this hypothesis would have to be formulated like this: There is an allpowerful demon, who “has certain specific desires, purposes and so on, in virtue of which he will single-mindedly continue to produce in me, even in the long run, coherence-conducive observations.”58 But this hypothesis, BonJour argues, is as initially unlikely as the modified chance hypothesis, since as in this former case, its conjuncts make each other extremely unlikely. So it can be assumed that the correspondence hypothesis really is the best explanation for the fact that a system of beliefs remains coherent and stable. After having drawn this conclusion, BonJour concludes his book as well, unfortunately without providing the reader with any further comment regarding the answer to the isolation objection, which he postponed earlier. Therefore one can only speculate about how he intended to solve this problem by an appeal to his above argument. My supposition as to how he would argue is the following: If skeptical hypotheses can be ruled out on the grounds of being worse explanations than the correspondence hypothesis, assuming that our systems of beliefs are coherent and stable, we can safely assume that the world is at least basically as we believe it to be. Thus there really are physical objects and processes in space and time, these objects and processes interact causally with each other and with us etc. Now if this is the case, our cognitively spontaneous beliefs will at least most of the time be caused by those objects and processes. And if furthermore the Observation Requirement is fulfilled for our systems of beliefs, true beliefs about these independent objects and processes will be integrated into our systems of beliefs and this will either lead to the destabilization of those systems or to a loss of coherence if the systems do not agree with reality in large parts. And so the Observation Requirement in combination with a coherence theory of knowledge of the kind BonJour proposes will ensure that systems of beliefs which mostly contain beliefs which are justified according to BonJour’s account will receive input from the world. 58 BonJour

(1985) p.183.

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2.2.4

Two Arguments against BonJour’s Solution

In this last section I will criticize BonJour’s account in two respects. First, I do not think that his probabilistic argument works for the CartesianDemon-hypothesis and second, even if it worked for that hypothesis, showing that this hypothesis cannot be a better explanation than the correspondence hypothesis does not show that there could not be any skeptical hypothesis which is a better explanation for the coherence and stability of a system of beliefs than the correspondence hypothesis. About the first point: In his presentation of the argument, BonJour simply claims that the two conjuncts of the Cartesian-Demon-hypothesis make each other very unlikely, i.e. that this hypothesis can be treated in a way analogous to the treatment of the modified chance hypothesis: “Just as the relation of tension or probabilistic incompatibility that holds between the simple chance hypothesis and the fact of the long-run coherence (and stability) of my system of beliefs is internalized by the elaborated chance hypothesis, so also the analogous relation of incompatibility which was just argued to exist between simple demon hypotheses and the existence of such a system is internalized by elaborated demon hypotheses, with the result that an elaborated demon hypothesis of the sort just indicated is very unlikely, on purely a priori grounds, to be true.”59 Now I do not see the analogy here: Why should it be so unlikely that an all-powerful demon has the desire to produce beliefs which coherently fit into a system of beliefs or that he has other desires which make the production of such beliefs desirable as a means? To be sure, not knowing anything else about the demon, the likelihood that he has such desires is equally high as the likelihood that he does not have such desires. But this does not establish that it is unlikely that he has such desires. To establish that, one would have to argue that the simple fact that he is a demon who has the power to cause beliefs at will makes it unlikely that he has those desires. And I do not see how this could be done in a plausible way. So the analogy between the modified chance hypothesis and the CartesianDemon-hypothesis does not really hold. While in the case of the modified chance hypothesis it is the notion of chance itself which is responsible for the tension between the conjuncts, the notion of an all-powerful demon does not lead to such a tension. The notion of the production of something 59 BonJour

(1985) p.184.

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by chance carries with it an implication of genuine randomness, i.e. of equiprobability of all possible outcomes of a given situation. Thus if the cognitively spontaneous beliefs are genuinely produced at random, the probability of the production of one specific set of beliefs is equal to that of any other set being produced. So if there are more sets which do not fit coherently into the system of beliefs than there are sets which do fit coherently into the system, the probability that genuine chance will in the long run produce a set which coheres with the system of beliefs is indeed very low. Thus in the case of the modified chance hypothesis, the tension between the conjuncts really exists. But in the case of the elaborated demon hypothesis, this tension simply does not arise, because the notion of the production of beliefs by an allpowerful demon does not carry the implication of randomness. That he has the power to produce beliefs at random if he likes to does not establish that he will have the desire to do so, nor does it establish that it is probable that he will have such a desire. One still might argue that since we do not know anything about the demon, for all we know, he might produce beliefs at random and that therefore the production of one set of beliefs is as likely as the production of any other. But that would collapse the elaborate demon hypothesis into the simple demon hypothesis. And moreover, since a demon or at least the Cartesian version of a demon is by definition a conscious being with intentions, the likelihood that he genuinely acts randomly is much lower than the likelihood that he has some definite and relatively stable motives and desires according to which he acts. Thus the likelihood that he produces the beliefs in a systematic way according to some pattern is much higher than the likelihood that he simply produces them at random. So in the case of the demon hypothesis, there is no internal incompatibility between the conjuncts and thus it cannot be ruled out as an explanation. A second point against BonJour’s argument is that even if the demon hypothesis could be ruled out by an appeal to internal improbability, this would not show that any skeptical hypothesis can be thus ruled out. Judging from BonJour’s comments about skeptical hypotheses in general, if he were faced with this objection, he would probably reply that simple skeptical hypotheses can always be ruled out, since they would explain any evidence equally well and therefore lack sufficient explanatory force. Therefore they always would have to be modified in the above manner, which would always lead to a tension as in the case of the modified chance hypothesis. But I do not see that this must be the case, since I can think

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of at least one example of a skeptical hypothesis which could not be ruled out this way, namely the brains-in-vats-hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that we are brains in vats, which are not connected to the empirical world but to electrodes which are manipulated by scientists who cause us to have all kinds of cognitively spontaneous beliefs, which nevertheless have nothing to do with the way the world is. Maybe this hypothesis would have to be modified as well, if it is to genuinely be an alternative explanation. But first, since this hypothesis does not rely on the assumption of dubious entities as demons, it is by this alone more likely than the demon hypothesis. And second, in the case of scientists, about whose desires we know significantly more than about those of all-powerful demons, it is even more likely that they will cause beliefs according to systematic patterns rather than at random. They may not want their victims to notice that they are experimented with, since that would destroy their experiment or they may want to test their victims’s reactions in a systematic manner and so on. Thus in this case, there is even less tension between the conjuncts of the hypothesis and the hypothesis becomes even more initially credible. So I assume that it is sufficiently established that BonJour’s argument does not show what it is intended to show and that therefore he does not succeed answering the problem of the truth connection. Now since his solution of the input problem depended on his success in this regard, that solution can be considered to be insufficient as well. So establishing the Observation Requirement may be an adequate answer to the alternative systems objection, but it is not an adequate answer to the other two objections. So I end this section by concluding that BonJour’s account of coherence does not meet the requirement of truth-conducivity and that therefore it is not suited to serve as a notion of coherence which can be of help in spelling out the third condition for knowledge. Nevertheless, I will come back to BonJour’s account in the next chapter, since even if this notion cannot be the notion of coherence of whole systems of beliefs needed here, it can still be of help in spelling out what it means for a single belief to be knowledge.

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The Second Attempt: Davidson’s Appeal to Language

The second account of coherence I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. Davidson’s coherence theory of knowledge is explicitly presented in the article A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.60 But since he presents vital prerequisites for and explanations of his theory in various other articles, I will draw on these articles as well in this section. Now Davidson’s coherence theory of knowledge takes another form than BonJour’s, since Davidson develops the notion of coherence from the notion of belief and the contention that systems of beliefs are structured holistically. Thus Davidson does not develop a notion of coherence first and then shows that a belief’s cohering with a system of beliefs constitutes a good reason for supposing that this belief is true as BonJour did. Instead he develops a notion of belief which implies that beliefs have to members of coherent systems of beliefs and that therefore they have to be likely to be true qua being beliefs. So the notion of coherence Davidson develops is not a candidate for figuring in the third condition of knowledge directly. Rather, his notion of belief implies that all beliefs which are had by real persons must have the property of being a member of a coherent system of beliefs. Moreover, Davidson claims that this property is a property which is truth-conducive. Now if this is true, the requirement of truth-conducivity can be dropped as a requirement for the third condition of knowledge, since then every belief has to be a member of a coherent system of beliefs just because it is a real belief. Thus on Davidson’s account, being a belief itself is a property which is truth-conducive, so that this requirement is fulfilled by the second condition for knowledge alone. So if Davidson’s arguments regarding beliefs are on the right track, the role of the third condition of knowledge is quite different from the role it was assumed to play in the preceding discussion. For if Davidson is right, then the truth condition and the belief condition are intrinsically linked, so there is no need for third condition to establish a link between those two conditions. Nevertheless, a third condition for knowledge is needed even if Davidson is right regarding belief and coherence. For even if beliefs have to be members of coherent systems of beliefs and therefore are likely to be true just because they are beliefs, this does not show that any belief - provided it really is true - is knowledge as well. This cannot be the case, since then we would be back to the claim that knowledge is nothing but 60 Cp.

by CTK.

Davidson (1983). In the following I will abbreviate reference to this article

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true belief.61 So even if it follows from Davidson’s account of coherence that the requirement of truth-conducivity is met by the property of being a belief which is a member of a coherent system of beliefs, this does not tell us which additional condition beliefs have to meet to rightfully count as knowledge. In the remainder of this chapter I will present Davidson’s account of coherence and his arguments for the claim that beliefs are likely to be true just because they are beliefs as well as a major objection to this claim. The next chapter will then be dedicated to the presentation of a way to escape this objection and to the development of an account of knowledge which is based on Davidson’s account of coherence and encompasses a third condition which is cast in terms of a notion of coherence which can be considered an extension of Davidson’s notion of coherence.

2.3.1

Davidson on Coherence and Truth

Donald Davidson’s coherence theory of knowledge differs from other coherence theories of knowledge since Davidson tries to explain what it means for our beliefs to cohere with each other by an appeal to a theory of meaning and interpretation. Thus the relation between beliefs and meaning is central to his notion of coherence. Unlike most proponents of a coherence theory of knowledge, Davidson does not merely advocate a coherence theory of justification which is to be implemented into an account of knowledge but also claims to maintain a coherence theory of truth. This has to be clarified further because Davidson does not want - as the proponents of the coherence theories of truth presented earlier did - to develop a coherence theory of truth as an alternative to correspondence theories of truth.62 His project is not to define truth in terms of coherence, since he holds that the notion of truth - be61 Davidson

himself explicitly denies that the relation of his account of coherence to the concept of knowledge is intended to be understood in this way. Cp. Davidson (1983) p.153. 62 In Davidson (1983), he affirms the central tenet of correspondence theories of truth that a belief is true if and only if it corresponds to reality. Later, in Davidson (1988a), he explicitly argues against correspondence theories of truth using his famous “slingshot argument”, which is designed to show that if there is anything sentences or beliefs can correspond to, it must be reality as a whole. This argument was first introduced in Davidson (1967) pp.18, where he uses it in order to argue against a theory of meaning which takes the basic units of meaning to be single words. For more on this argument see ? pp.133 and LePore & Ludwig (2005) pp.49. Nevertheless, he does not advocate a classical coherence theory of truth in these later essays either, but merely claims that coherence has to be considered a criterion for truth.

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ing “beautifully transparent compared to belief and coherence”63 - can be considered an undefined primitive. So Davidson does not advocate an antirealistic or epistemic theory of truth according to which beliefs are true if they are justifiable or rationally acceptable under ideal epistemic conditions. He rather rejects such theories of truth on the grounds that they either rely on the introduction of a dualism between conceptual schemes and reality - a dualism which Davidson considers unintelligible64 - or imply some form of skepticism. Thus in Davidson (1988a), he writes: “Subjective [i.e. antirealistic] theories [of truth] are skeptical in the way idealism or many versions of empiricism are skeptical; they are skeptical not because they make reality unknowable, but because they reduce reality to so much less than we believe there is. Objective [i.e. realistic] theories, on the other hand, seem to throw in doubt not only our knowledge of what is “evidencetranscendent”, but all of the rest of what we think to know, for such theories deny that there is any link between beliefs and truth.”65 Thus Davidson neither wants to maintain a coherence theory of truth in the classical sense, i.e. a theory according to which truth is identified with coherence, nor does he want to maintain a classical correspondence theory of truth, i.e. a theory according to which truth is defined in terms of beliefs (or sentences) agreeing with an independent reality. Nevertheless, in Davidson (1983), Davidson retains the notion of correspondence because according to him this notion is essential not for defining truth but for explaining how true beliefs are related to reality. But he criticizes the proponents of traditional correspondence theories of truth for combining their theories of truth with the idea of a confrontation between reality and beliefs as a test for truth. He considers the idea of a direct confrontation of our beliefs with reality absurd, since such a confrontation would require us to be able to adopt a point of view beyond our cognitive faculties. Later, in Davidson (1988a) he criticizes himself for arguing in this way against a correspondence theory of truth, since the correspondence theorist can “simply reply that his position is untouched; he always maintained that truth was independent of our beliefs or our abilities to learn the truth.”66 He then goes on to argue against the correspondence 63 Davidson

(1983) p.139. Davidson (1988a) pp.186. For his reasons for rejecting a dualism between conceptual schemes and reality see Davidson (1974b). 65 Davidson (1988a) p.178. 66 Davidson (1988a) p.183. 64 Cp.

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theory of truth in another vein: “The real objection to correspondence theories of truth is [. . .] that there is nothing for true sentences to correspond to.”67 In the following, I will not comment further on Davidson’s views on truth which are rather complicated. The reason for this is that Davidson’s views on truth are not directly relevant to the issue at hand, as long as one bears in mind that he does not maintain an antirealistic theory of truth which makes truth relative to what we believe but only claims that there cannot be any criterion for the truth of our beliefs which is independent from our beliefs. We can only confront beliefs about reality with other beliefs about reality and therefore a check for coherence among our beliefs seems to be the only criterion we have for deciding if a given belief is true. Thus Davidson’s coherence theory of truth is a theory of truth in the sense that he considers coherence among beliefs to be an indicator for the truth of the cohering beliefs, i.e. coherence among beliefs is taken to yield correspondence of the cohering beliefs with reality in the sense of linking these beliefs to reality. So here we have Davidson’s account of the role of coherence regarding knowledge in a nutshell: On his account, coherence among beliefs is to be taken as a criterion for the truth of beliefs. What remains to be explained is how coherence among beliefs can be spelled out in order to see why coherence is suited to serve as such a criterion. To explain this we have to take a closer look at Davidson’s account of coherence. According to him, the central problem in epistemology is to clarify the relation between beliefs and truth. By dealing to a great extent with beliefs, epistemology is confronted with the difference between what we believe to be true and what is true. Thus explaining what entitles us to assume that some or most of our beliefs are true is a main objective of epistemology. Now Davidson’s explanation on this point is quite straightforward: If a given belief is part of a coherent system of beliefs, we may assume that it is very likely to be true. Thus coherence of a system of beliefs does not guarantee that all beliefs contained in it are true, but it can guarantee that most of them are. So Davidson’s central epistemological claim regarding coherence is exactly what is at stake here, i.e. the claim that coherence is truth-conducive. As the above considerations show, Davidson takes coherence to be a property of systems of beliefs. On his account, one condition for a system of beliefs to be coherent is that it is mainly consistent, although he is aware that complete consistency cannot be required. But beyond this he does not explicitly state any more conditions a system of beliefs has to fulfill 67 Op.cit.

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in order to be coherent. Thus in contrast to BonJour, Davidson does not spell out the notion of coherence in terms of conditions which systems of beliefs have to meet to be considered coherent. It will become clearer in the following why he does not do this. Briefly stated, this peculiarity of his account of coherence can be explained by reference to the role coherence of systems of beliefs plays in his epistemology: As will become clearer in the following discussion, Davidson takes coherence of systems of beliefs to be a necessary condition for the existence of systems of beliefs in the first place. Therefore, on his account, developing conditions which systems of beliefs have to meet in order to be considered coherent does not make much sense, since if being coherent is a necessary condition for being a system of beliefs, then systems of beliefs have to be coherent on a priori grounds. Thus instead of stating conditions which systems of beliefs have to meet in order to be considered coherent Davidson characterizes his notion of coherence further by stating a condition any epistemology has to fulfill in order to count as a coherence theory of knowledge: On his account of coherence, the only entities which can contribute to the coherence of a system of beliefs are the beliefs contained in it. He writes: “What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.”68 By invoking this condition he rejects any epistemological theory which allows something beyond our systems of beliefs to contribute to the our belief’s status of knowledge as externalist theories of knowledge or internalist versions of foundationalism which try to base beliefs on experiences, sense data and the like do. Now this is a strong internalist claim which needs to be discussed. But before I can embark on this discussion in the second part of this section, I must survey a different aspect of Davidson’s philosophy, namely his theory of meaning and interpretation. This is necessary since his coherence theory of knowledge is based on his theories of meaning and interpretation. Therefore I first have to present those theories in order to provide the reader with the basis needed to understand Davidson’s conception of coherence and his arguments for the claim that coherence, thus understood, is truth-conducive. 68 Davidson

(1983) p.141.

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Meaning and Interpretation

Two crucial concepts in Davidson’s account of coherence are the concepts of meaning and interpretation. His whole idea of a coherence theory which can escape the skeptical objection against the truth-conducivity of coherence which BonJour failed to answer in an adequate manner centers around his understanding of language and meaning. His central claim is thus that the connection between belief and truth is established through meaning. He argues for this claim by characterizing the relation between meaning and knowledge drawing on Quine’s theories of meaning and translation. Furthermore, he presents some arguments which are meant to show that epistemology can be saved from skeptical objections by combining it with a theory of meaning and interpretation. Davidson’s theory of meaning is based on a methodology he calls “radical interpretation” and which is based on Quine’s method of “radical translation”.69 Davidson builds his theory of interpretation and the epistemology resulting from it on the foundations Quine laid out, but as we will see, his theory deviates from Quine’s in several important respects. Thus Davidson develops his theory of meaning in the context of a critical examination of Quine’s theory of meaning. Quine explains the meaning of sentences by reference to non-linguistic entities and holds that the meaning of sentences is grounded in patterns of sensory stimulation. He thus claims that the meaning of observation sentences is constituted by the patterns of sensory stimulations which cause a speaker to assent to such a sentence or to withhold his assent to that sentence. The meaning of theoretical sentences which cannot be linked directly to patterns of sensory stimulation then results from the meaning of observation sentences through conditioned association. Quine gives the following example for this in The Nature of Natural Knowledge: Consider the sentence “Every dog is an animal.” According to Quine, the meaning of this sentence is learned by learning to assent to the expression “dog” as well as to the expression “animal” whenever a dog is present. Now since these two expressions come to be associated with each other by this conditioning, the speaker will assent to the general statement which links the two expressions as well.70 Thus on Quine’s account, the link between meaning and knowledge is established by taking the patterns of 69 Quine

develops his account of radical translation in Quine (1960) pp.26. For a detailed account of the concept of radical interpretation and its relation to radical translation as introduced by Quine see Davidson (1973). 70 Cp. Quine (1975) p.76.

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sensory stimulations which are constitutional for meaning to justify assent to a given sentence. Therefore these patterns of sensory stimulations are counted as a source of justification for the belief expressed by the sentence assented to. Davidson mainly follows Quine in this conception of meaning except for rejecting Quine’s distinction between the constitution of the meaning of observation sentences and the meaning of theoretical or general sentences and his claim regarding the justification of observational beliefs. On his account, neither is the meaning of observation sentences based on sensory input, nor are perceptual beliefs justified by their relation to this input. He agrees with Quine insofar that sensory input is causally responsible for the genesis of perceptual beliefs, but he disputes Quine’s claim that therefore sensory inputs can account for the justification of perceptual beliefs they are causally responsible for. Davidson’s prima facie reason for rejecting this view is that it can easily lead to skepticism since considered from the perspective of the person who has the perceptual beliefs, the patterns of sensory stimulations responsible for their genesis may as well be the result of something else than causal connections to the world.71 So since he rejects the idea of a foundation of knowledge in sensory input, Davidson has to provide an alternative to back his own conception of the relation between meaning and knowledge in a way which is not vulnerable to skeptical objections in this manner. Now how does he conceive of an adequate link between our beliefs and the world which entitles us to assume that many of our beliefs indeed constitute knowledge? Davidson’s argument for his afore mentioned claim that, given a system of beliefs is coherent, we may assume that most of the beliefs contained in this system are true is intended to show that a correct understanding of the propositional attitudes people have leads to the conclusion that most of their beliefs must be true. This argument rests on Davidson’s conception of meaning and on his conception of “radical interpretation”, which is inseparable from his account of meaning. The method of radical interpretation, as was mentioned before, owes much to Quine’s method of radical translation. Therefore I will at his point shortly sketch the main idea behind this method. Quine’s conception of “radical translation” is developed in the second chapter of Word and Object. Quine starts from the situation of a field linguist, who does not yet know anything about the language he is sup71 I

will discuss Davidson’s reasons for rejecting Quine’s conception in this respect in detail later.

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posed to study. Thus ignorant, the best the field linguist can do to get started is to note which sentences a speaker of the studied language utters in certain situations. So the linguist for example notes that the speaker utters “Gavagai!” when a rabbit scurries by. Thus the linguist starts from the assumption that which sentences are uttered is somehow correlated to the conditions under which they are uttered. He then tests this assumption regarding particular sentences by querying the speaker for assent or dissent to the noted sentences under varying conditions. So for example the linguist can find out that the speaker assents to “Gavagai!” every time a rabbit is present and dissents from it when there is no rabbit in sight. Furthermore he can test whether the speaker assents to “Gavagai!” in more deviant situations, as for example when he is presented with a rabbit facsimile or when he only sees an ear of a rabbit who is hiding behind a bush. Now when he has tested a sufficient variety of situations, the linguist formulates a translation hypothesis which assigns “There is a rabbit” to “Gavagai!” as a translation. If the linguist has gathered enough hypotheses of this kind, he can begin to try to find out which words in the language of the speaker correspond to the logical connectives in his own language by connecting simple sentences which he has already translated with the purported logical connectives in the language of the speaker and presenting the speaker with these connected sentences to test whether he assents or dissents from them. Thus the linguist can for example test the speaker’s reactions when the speaker is confronted with a conjunction consisting of two already translated simple sentences in order to find out whether the speaker assents when both conjuncts are satisfied. If this is the case, the hypothesis that the connecting particle constitutes the equivalent of conjunction is confirmed, if it is not, it is falsified. Now in this context Quine introduces a methodological principle which calls the “principle of charity”. This principle states that the linguist should favor translations which preserve consistency among the utterances of the speaker and which are compatible with the observed behavior of the speaker as far as possible. But, Quine maintains, even if the linguist complies with this principle and correlates the utterances of the speaker with his own observations of the speaker’s surroundings in developing a translation manual for the language of the speaker, there will be many alternative manuals consistent with the speaker’s utterances. Thus for example, instead of translating “Gavagai!” by “There is a rabbit” the linguist could have translated this utterance by “There is a part of a rabbit”, “Rabbithood is instantiated here” or “There’s an episode in the history of a rabbit” without encountering in-

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consistencies. From these considerations, Quine then develops his famous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, i.e. the thesis that given any language, it is always possible to construct many different adequate translation manuals for translating it into another language. Thus the evidence the linguist has in form of the behavior of the speaker does not uniquely determine which manual is correct but only yields a range of different manuals which can serve equally good in translating the speaker’s utterances into the language of the linguist. According to Quine, this is not an empirical problem which results from the fact that the linguist has a limited amount of data about the language he is studying. Rather it is a logical problem, since one can always construct an alternative manual from one adequate manual simply by systematically exchanging translations of one expression by another translation in a way which preserves consistency among the translations. Thus for example, the linguist could replace the translation of “Gavagai!” with “There is a part of a rabbit” in his translation manual without violating the principle of charity or disregarding any data he has about the linguistic behavior of the speaker. Now Davidson’s account of radical interpretation draws on Quine’s account of radical translation in major respects but also differs from it regarding some important aspects. His idea behind the method of radical interpretation is the following: The practice of a radical interpreter, i.e. an interpreter who does not yet know anything about the meaning of the sentences a speaker utters, is best described as developing a Tarski-style theory of truth for the language of the speaker. Thus the radical interpreter proceeds roughly as Quine’s field linguist: He observes the situations in which a speaker of the language assents or dissents from sentences, correlating these sentences with the common features of the situations in order to develop interpretatory hypotheses which take the form of Tarskian truth biconditionals as for example: (TG) “Gavagai” is true if and only if there is a rabbit. In describing the approach of the radical interpreter, Davidson starts with the idea of a mutual interdependence of meaning and belief. The meaning of a sentence and consequently the belief which is expressed by an utterance of that sentence results partly from observable states of affairs in the world which cause the expressed belief and partly from the conceptual and inferential relations the sentence bears to other sentences. Now since these relations themselves are represented as beliefs in a system of beliefs, the meaning of a sentence uttered by a speaker depends on the role

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the belief which is expressed by the sentence plays in the speaker’s system of beliefs. On the other hand, since single beliefs can only be identified linguistically by using sentences which are taken to express them, which beliefs someone has is partly determined by the meaning of the sentences he uses to express the beliefs. Similarly, what someone means by the sentences he utters is partly determined by the beliefs he takes those sentences to express. So the meaning a sentence has when assented to by the speaker depends on the beliefs the speaker has and vice versa. Thus if the radical interpreter neither knows which beliefs the speaker holds nor what his utterances mean, he cannot find out anything about either. At this point Davidson draws on Quine’s ideas in proposing the following: In order to find out what the speaker’s utterances mean, the interpreter has to start with the sentences to which the person assents, correlating those sentences to the circumstances under which they are assented to. Now according to Davidson’s method of interpretation this correlation has to be essentially guided by the principle which Quine introduced under the name of the “principle of charity”. The reason for this is that without applying this principle, the interpreter could not correlate the speaker’s utterances with the circumstances in any systematic way and interpretation would be impossible. Departing from Quine, Davidson adapts this principle to state that the interpreter has to assume that what the speaker says agrees with what the interpreter himself believes as far as possible. Thus if the interpreter observes that the speaker regularly assents to some sentence under certain conditions, he has to assume that these conditions are the truth conditions of the sentence in the language of the speaker. Furthermore, in contrast to Quine, who only requires translations to be charitable in the sense that they have to be in accord with the standards of logical consistency and the observed behavior of the speaker, Davidson extends this principle to sentences whose interpretation is not directly determined by the conditions under which they are assented to by requiring that these sentences also must be largely interpreted as being consistent with each other and with the sentences whose truth conditions are taken to be directly determined by the circumstances. Now, Davidson argues, the result of applying this principle is that most of the sentences uttered by the speaker are taken to be true by the interpreter. So the necessity to apply the principle of charity in the course of interpretation leads to the conclusion that the beliefs we attribute to others when we interpret their utterances must be largely true. Now how is this conclusion related to Davidson’s account of co-

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herence? The answer is quite simple: If in interpreting the utterances of others we cannot refrain from attributing to them systems of beliefs which are largely consistent and in accord with what we ourselves believe, then in order to attribute beliefs to others at all we have to attribute to them systems of beliefs which are largely coherent. At this point I have to say a little more about Davidson’s notion of coherence, since it might not be evident why the attribution of a largely consistent system of beliefs which agrees in large parts with the interpreter’s system of beliefs amounts to the attribution of largely coherent system of beliefs. For Davidson, coherence of a system of beliefs is a result of two main factors: First, as I already mentioned above, to be coherent a system of beliefs has to be largely consistent. And second, the coherence of a system of beliefs is mainly a result of the logical and conceptual connections between the beliefs contained in the system. Let me elucidate this by an example Davidson himself offers: “Entertaining any proposition, whatever one’s attitude toward the proposition may be, entails believing many other propositions. If you wonder whether you are seeing a black snake, you must have an idea of what a snake is. You must believe such things as: a snake is an animal, it has no feet, it moves with sinuous movement, it is smaller that a mountain. If it is a black snake, then it is a snake and it is black. If it is black, it is not green. Since you wonder what you are seeing, you must know what seeing is: that it requires the use of the eyes, that you can see something without touching it, and so on. I do not wish to give the impression that there is a fixed list of things you must believe in order to wonder whether you are seeing a black snake. The size of the list is very large, if not infinite, but membership in the list is indefinite. What is clear is that without many of the sort of beliefs I have mentioned, you cannot entertain the proposition that you are seeing a black snake; you cannot believe or disbelieve that proposition, wish it were false, ask whether it is true, or demand that someone make it false.”72 Thus, on Davidson’s account, coherence among beliefs is a result of the holistic connections among beliefs, which mainly are due to logical and conceptual relations between the beliefs which are members of the system. Now this holistic notion of coherence might seem to be quite differ72 Davidson

(1995) pp.10.

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ent from the notion of inferential coherence we find in BonJour, since at first, it might seem to imply nothing about inferential support which some beliefs lend to other beliefs. But if we take a closer look at it, this notion of coherence is not so different from the inferential notion of coherence BonJour proposes after all. Let us reconsider the example: If in order to believe that I see a black snake, I have to believe that snakes are animals without legs. Now, of course the latter belief is inferentially related to the former belief: If I believe that I see a a snake and at the same time believe that I see an animal without legs, the former and the latter belief of course support each other inferentially, since the latter belief deductively follows from the former and the former belief is suported inductively by the latter, since seeing an animal without legs makes it likely that one is seeing a snake. Thus the main difference between Davidson’s and BonJour’s account of coherence is not that they specify different relations which count in favor of coherence, but that BonJour does not consider coherence an intrinsic property of systems of beliefs and therefore focuses on the inferential aspect of these relations rather than on the logical and conceptual aspect as Davidson does.73 Thus from Davidson’s perspective, BonJour’s question whether coherence of a system of beliefs constitutes a reason for taking the beliefs contained in the system to be likely to be true is answered quite trivially: If a belief is a member of a system of real beliefs, then it must be a member of a coherent system of beliefs in the sense that it has to bear inferential relations to many other beliefs in the system. Otherwise it could not be a belief. Now if standing in numerous inferential relations to other beliefs in the system constitutes a reason for taking a belief to be likely to be true, then beliefs are likely to be true just because they are beliefs. But of course at this stage Davidson has not shown that being a belief which is a member of a coherent system of beliefs counts in favor of the truth of a belief, since he has not shown that standing in logical and inferential relations to other beliefs makes it necessary that a belief is likely to be true. Let me elucidate this with recourse to Davidson’s conception of radical interpretation: Although the preceding considerations show that by applying the principle of charity the interpreter must come to the conclusion that most sentences uttered by the speaker - and therefore most of his beliefs which are expressed by the sentences - are true by the interpreter’s standards, the possibility that the speaker’s beliefs are 73 Of

course, BonJour specifies more factors which contribute to the coherence of systems of beliefs than Davidson does. For example, he considers unexplained anomalies contained in the system as factors which diminish the coherence of the system.

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mostly false remains because the interpreter is as fallible as the speaker. Thus it could simply be the case that speaker and interpreter share the very same false beliefs. In this case the interpreter’s positive assessment of the speaker’s beliefs would just be a result of the interpreter’s deficient standards. Thus so far, while Davidson has shown that the systems of beliefs we attribute to others on the basis of an interpretation of their utterances have to be largely coherent, an argument for the assumption that coherence in this sense makes it likely that the beliefs we thus attribute are largely true is still missing. In CTK, Davidson tries to give such an argument by introducing the idea of an omniscient interpreter who is endowed with complete knowledge about the world and the possible and actual causes of the speaker’s assent to any sentence and then arguing that this interpreter must also find the speaker to be largely right in his beliefs if he uses the principle of charity. But since Davidson himself acknowledges in a later article that this solution to the problem is not very convincing,74 I will not present and criticize it at length here. Instead I will sketch the alternative solution he proposes in later papers. Davidson’s argument for the claim that even a fallible interpreter has to find a speaker to be largely right in his beliefs is based on two methodological principles, which express two aspects of the principle of charity and which he characterizes as follows: “The first [principle] concerns the pattern of beliefs an interpreter finds it possible intelligibly to attribute to an agent. [ . . . ] Quite generally he must favor interpretations that make the speaker a subscriber to his own, the interpreter’s, standards of consistency and rationality, though of course there are times when inconsistency at some point is the best way to accommodate the data.”75 “The second methodological principle deals not with consistency but with the causal connections between the agent and the world. These are of two sorts, depending on the direction of the causality: action reveals the effects of an agent’s thoughts on the world outside him, while sensation mediates the effects of the world on the agent’s beliefs. The principle simply says that these causal connections must be respected in interpretation.”76 74 Davidson

(1993) pp.43. (1993) p.44. 76 Davidson (1993) p.45. 75 Davidson

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The remainder of this paragraph will be dedicated to Davidson’s arguments concerning the first principle. The discussion of the second principle - which is supposed to resolve the problem of the possibility that both interpreter and speaker share the same false beliefs - will be postponed to the next part of this section which deals with the role of causality in Davidson’s epistemology, since in order to see which role the second principle plays in establishing that most of our beliefs must be true, we first need a more detailed description of the role of the first principle in attributing beliefs to others in interpretation. Now why does going by the first principle lead the interpreter to an interpretation which attributes mostly true beliefs to the speaker and - even more important - why should it be necessary for an an interpreter use this principle? Davidson’s answer to the second question is straightforward: If the interpreter - omniscient or fallible - does not attribute a large degree of consistency to the speaker’s utterances, interpretation becomes impossible, since the more inconsistencies are attributed to the speaker, the less intelligible his utterances - and thereby his beliefs - become to the interpreter. Thus successful interpretation depends on the speaker’s being largely consistent in his utterances. Moreover, so Davidson, which proposition is expressed by an utterance of the speaker depends on the logical and conceptual relations the belief expressed by the utterance bears to the other beliefs of the speaker. According to Davidson,“propositions are identified by the position they occupy among other propositions”.77 Assuming that this holds for beliefs as well, his argument can be summed up as follows: Since beliefs can only be identified by reference to their relations to other beliefs, a large degree of consistency of one’s system of beliefs is a necessary condition for having determinate beliefs. In this spirit he writes: “[. . .] unless one’s beliefs are roughly consistent with each other, there is no identifying the contents of beliefs. A degree of rationality or consistency is therefore a condition for having beliefs.”78 Thus if the interpreter is to assume that the speaker has determinate beliefs at all, then he also has to assume that these beliefs are largely consistent. But consistency alone does not make for truth. So why does the application of the first methodological principle lead the interpreter to the conclusion that most of the speaker’s beliefs have to be true? Davidson’s 77 Davidson 78

(1993) p.44. Davidson (1997a) p.124.

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answer to this question runs as follows: Besides attributing consistency, the interpreter has to assume that the speaker’s system of beliefs contains many beliefs shared by himself, because without this assumption he lacks the resources to attribute any belief - true or false - to the speaker. The reason for this is again that beliefs are identified by their relations to other beliefs: “[. . .] a belief is identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is this pattern that determines the subject matter of the belief, what the belief is about. Before some object in or aspect of the world can become part of the subject matter of a belief (true or false) there must be endless true beliefs about the subject matter. False beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter; to undermine, therefore, the validity of a description of the belief as being about that subject. And so, in turn, false beliefs undermine the claim that a connected belief is false.”79 So the attribution of any belief to the speaker requires the interpreter to assume that the speaker’s system of belief contains many beliefs which are shared, i.e. held true by the interpreter himself, since otherwise the interpreter would not be able to take any utterance of the speaker to express a determinate belief. This point can be illustrated by the following example: If an interpreter wants to interpret an utterance of “The book is on the table” as expressing a belief that there is a book on the table (which is true or false), he has to assume that the speaker believes that books and tables are physical objects, that a book has a weight which can be supported by a table etc. If he would not attribute these beliefs which are true by his own standards to the speaker, he could not interpret the speaker’s utterance as expressing any determinate belief. Thus a basic agreement between speaker and interpreter about which propositions are true and which are false is necessary in order for interpretation, i.e. ascription of beliefs by the interpreter, to succeed. Given that, it becomes clearer why the above principle leads the interpreter to an interpretation according to which many of the beliefs in the system of the beliefs of the speaker must be true. As Davidson puts it: “[. . .] widespread agreement is the only possible background against which disputes and mistakes can be interpreted. Making sense of the utterances and behaviour of others, even their most aberrant behaviour, requires us to find a great deal of reason and truth in 79 Davidson

(1975) p.168.

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them. To see too much unreason on the part of others is simply to undermine our ability to understand what it is they are so unreasonable about. If the vast amount of agreement on plain matters that is assumed in communication escapes notice, it’s because the shared truths are too many and too dull to bear mentioning."80 But this account of interpretation of course still faces the objection indicated above if it shall be taken to imply that the beliefs we attribute to others must be largely true: Why can’t interpreter and speaker - even if they are in agreement with each other at large - be both wrong about the world? Now this question cannot be answered by an appeal to the first methodological principle alone anymore. To answer it in a satisfying way, we have to take a closer look at the second principle and thus at the role of causal connections between systems of beliefs and the world in Davidson’s epistemology. 2.3.3

Causality and Meaning

According to the second methodological principle quoted above, the interpreter is required to take into account causal connections between the speaker’s beliefs and the world in his interpretation of the speaker’s utterances. Now what does it mean for the interpreter to take into account the causal connections between his interpretee’s beliefs and the world and how does requiring this help to solve the above problem? To answer the first question, we have to reconsider the method of radical interpretation. The basic idea behind radical interpretation is the observation that there is an inseparable link between meaning and belief which must be taken into account if a given speaker is to be interpreted. Since an interpreter can know what a speaker believes from his utterances only if he knows what the speaker means by his words and since he can know what the speaker means by his words only if he knows which beliefs the speaker wants to express by his utterances, at least one of the two - meaning or belief - has to be known to the interpreter in order for interpretation to succeed. Therefore, it seems, an interpreter who knows neither the meanings of a speaker’s words nor his beliefs must fail to understand the speaker’s utterances. Now a theory of interpretation may not assume that either is known to the interpreter, since the only access we have to the beliefs of others and what they mean by their words is through an interpretation of their utterances. Thus a theory of interpretation has to explain 80 Davidson

(1974a) p.153.

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how interpretation can be achieved without having prior access to either belief or meaning. On Davidson’s account, the radical interpreter has to start “from scratch” since he neither knows what the speaker means by his words, nor does he know what the speaker believes. Thus he has to start with what can be observed, i.e. sentences held true respectively assented to by the speaker under certain observable conditions.81 So the interpreter has to take into account the twofold causal relations mentioned in the second methodological principle because otherwise there would be no way for him to break into the circle of the speaker’s meanings and the speaker’s beliefs. But if he can observe that a given sentence is regularly assented to under certain conditions, this is evidence for the interpretative hypothesis that these conditions are the truth conditions of the sentence in the language of the speaker and the circle is broken. The causal connections between beliefs (expressed by sentences assented to) and the world are essential here because it is assumed that at least considering the most primitive sentences, the presence of the conditions under which the sentence is regularly assented to causes the speaker to assent to the sentence and therefore these conditions can be taken as truth conditions for the sentence in the speaker’s language. Thus considering the conditions which cause a speaker to assent to a given sentence is an essential part of interpretation which in the first place enables the interpreter to apply the first methodological principle. Davidson’s own example for this concurrence of the consideration of causal connections and the application of the principle of charity runs as follows: “If someone is regularly prompted by owls attended to in good light to hold the sentence “There’s a fowl” true, then, other things being in accord with this interpretation, the best interpretation is that the speaker uses the word “fowl” to refer to owls. Such direct conditionings of words to objects must lie at the basis of correct interpretation; and if this is so, correct interpretation makes a speaker believe a lot of true things about what exists.”82 At this point it can be seen that Davidson’s account of interpretation is indebted to Quine in many ways. On his account of radical translation, Quine took prompted assent to be the starting point from which utterances 81 Davidson assumes that it can be observed whether a speaker assents to a sentence

even if his language is unknown to the interpreter. Cp. Davidson (1975) pp.161. 82 Davidson (1993) p.45

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can be translated and explained the capacity to learn a language as a result of causality and conditioned association.83 But Davidson deviates from Quine in an important respect regarding the role of causality. According to him, the causal connections between beliefs and the world are important for a theory of interpretation and have to be taken into account by an interpreter in order to be able to apply the principle of charity. But unlike Quine, Davidson does not think that the existence of causal connections between a belief and the world counts in any way towards the belief’s status as knowledge. In the following I will discuss Davidson’s reasons for disagreeing with Quine on this part and the consequences he draws from this disagreement regarding his coherence theory of knowledge. But before embarking on this discussion I have to answer the second question raised at the beginning of this section: How does taking into account the causal connections between the speaker’s beliefs and the world solve the problem posed by the fallibility of both the speaker and the interpreter? To give an answer to this question, we have to consider the role of causality in Davidson’s theory of meaning. Basically, the answer to the question why speaker and interpreter cannot both be wrong runs as follows: Since the meaning of the (most primitive) sentences we use to express our beliefs is (partly) fixed by what normally causes us to hold them true (i.e. to acquire a belief), these sentences necessarily must be about the things we think they are about. This is not to say that we may not on occasion take a sentence to be true which is false in the situation in question or that we may not have some false beliefs. But it means that it is not possible for the majority of our beliefs to be false, because otherwise the sentences we use to express those beliefs would simply lose their meanings. So on Davidson’s account, the process of acquiring a language and the causal history of our beliefs are essential to the meaning of the sentences we use to express our beliefs. For him, learning a language and developing a system of beliefs are processes which cannot be separated. So while Davidson vehemently rejects epistemic externalism, he explicitly endorses semantic externalism and content externalism. Now Davidson’s basic conception of the development of meaning and belief - which he calls “triangulation” - is something which involves both causal connections between persons and the world and interaction between persons. In developing this conception of triangulation, Davidson again relies on a foundation laid out by Quine, namely his naturalized epis83 Cp.

Quine (1960) pp. 29.

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temology.84 Quine’s project was to naturalize epistemology in the sense of replacing the normative question under which conditions a beliefs qualifies as knowledge by a descriptive account of the way knowledge is acquired. Now Davidson does not think that this project is entirely on the right track, but draws on some of the insights Quine reached in pursuing this project. While rejecting Quine’s claim that a description of the acquisition of knowledge is all there is to epistemology, Davidson adopts the view that the way the conditions for having knowledge, namely possessing a language and a system of beliefs, are developed must be taken into account in justifying the claim that we can indeed have knowledge. In a nutshell, Davidson’s conception of triangulation runs as follows: Both learning a language and developing a system of beliefs require that there be at least two people who interact with each other and with a shared environment. Otherwise, the development of meaning and belief is not possible for the following reasons: Having beliefs requires having the concept of belief which in turn requires being aware of the possibility of being wrong in what one believes and of the possibility of correction. Thus in order to have a belief one has to have some concept of objectivity, i.e. one has to be aware that there are standards of objectivity which are independent of one’s own beliefs and against which those beliefs can be checked regarding their correctness. Now, Davidson argues, this concept of objectivity can only be developed in communication: “The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. [. . .] This follows at once if we suppose that language is essential to thought and we agree with Wittgenstein that there cannot be a private language. The central argument against private languages is that, unless a language is shared, there is no way to distinguish between using the language correctly and using it incorrectly; only communication with another can supply an objective check. If only communication can provide a check on the correct use of words, only communication can supply a standard of objectivity in other domains, [. . .].”85 Thus the existence of a shared language and of communication is a necessary condition for developing beliefs and therefore for the development of knowledge. Now taking into account this role of language and communication, it can be clarified in what manner Davidson takes causal connec84 Cp.

Quine (1969). (1991) pp.209.

85 Davidson

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tions between people and the world to be essential to the development of language and beliefs: The meaning of the most basic sentences is fixed by what causes them to be true. This in itself merely explains how meanings of utterances and contents of beliefs are fixed but does not us permit to conclude anything about the world around us. Thus causal connections between us and the world and sensory stimuli which are a part of these causal connections are necessary for developing language and beliefs, but a shared environment and communicative interaction between people are necessary to determine the “objective” causes of those beliefs and the objective criteria of application for the words and sentences used to express those beliefs. The difference between Quine’s naturalized epistemology and Davidson’s conception of triangulation is obvious: While Quine takes sensory stimulations to be a direct source of justification for the beliefs caused by them, Davidson merely recognizes their genetic role in the development of language, beliefs and of objective criteria by which to check beliefs regarding their possible status as knowledge. Thus if we take into account the role of causal connections, it becomes clearer why speaker and interpreter cannot both be systematically deluded in their beliefs about the world, even though they are fallible regarding every single belief. If the meaning of the sentences they use to express their beliefs is to a large part determined by the common causes of the beliefs which are expressed by the sentences, in most cases when these sentences are used to express beliefs, the beliefs expressed have to be true, since they are caused by exactly the things they are about. As Davidson puts it: “What an omniscient interpreter knows a fallible interpreter gets right enough if he understands a speaker, and this is just the complicated causal truth that makes us the believers we are, and fixes the contents of our beliefs. The agent has only to reflect on what a belief is to appreciate that most of his basic beliefs are true, and among his beliefs, those most securely held and that cohere with the main body of his beliefs are the most apt to be true. The question ‘how do I know my beliefs are generally true?’ thus answers itself, simply because beliefs are by nature generally true. Rephrased or expanded the question becomes, ‘How can I tell whether my beliefs, which are by their nature generally true, are generally true?”’86 So at this stage we are ready to offer a rough sketch of Davidson’s coher86 Davidson

(1983) p.153.

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ence theory of knowledge: According to him, what it means for a system of beliefs to be coherent is first that this system of beliefs is largely consistent and that the beliefs which are part of the system are related by a multitude of logical and conceptual connections. This first condition must be met by systems of beliefs on a priori grounds, since a “system of beliefs” which were not largely consistent and interconnected by many logical and conceptual relations could not be described as consisting of beliefs with determinate propositional contents. But a “belief” without a determinate propositional content cannot intelligibly said to be a belief at all. Thus it follows from the notion what a belief is that systems of beliefs have to be coherent in the sense of being largely consistent and interconnected by many logical and conceptual relations. But now our belief’s being coherent in this sense of course does not imply anything regarding their status as knowledge, since in order for a belief to count as knowledge, first and foremost it has to be true. Now regarding the truth of our beliefs, Davidson resorts to content externalism.87 His argument in this regard runs as follows: If we take into account the necessary genetic conditions for developing beliefs with determinate contents in the first place, i.e. being causally connected to the world and being in communication with others, then it is easy to see why coherence among our beliefs in the above sense can be a conclusive reason to suppose that many of those beliefs are true: If in the case of the most primitive beliefs as for example simple perceptual beliefs, what normally causes those beliefs determines their contents, then it is not possible for those beliefs to be largely false, since their content is determined by the very same things which in most cases make them true. Now of course this merely holds for the most simple beliefs which directly concern our surroundings and not for more abstract general beliefs. But nevertheless if now we take into account the holism of the mental, i.e. the fact that the contents of the more abstract beliefs are largely constituted by logical and conceptual interrelations among beliefs, these other beliefs cannot be largely false as well, if the general coherence of systems of beliefs is assumed. Thus simple perceptual beliefs and beliefs about one’s own mental states constitute the “genetic foundation” of our systems of beliefs, since the empirical content of our beliefs derives from those beliefs. Nevertheless, so Davidson, the simple beliefs which constitute the genetic foundation of our systems of beliefs cannot be taken 87 A

detailed discussion of Davidson’s version of content externalism in relation to other versions of this brand of externalism (especially Putnam’s and Burge’s version) can be found in Davidson (1990).

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to constitute an epistemic foundation in the sense of being the fundamental epistemic basis on which all other beliefs rest, since what counts regarding the epistemic status of any belief is not its genesis but rather its logical and conceptual interconnections with other beliefs. In the next section I will discuss Davidson’s reasons for this contention as well as present a major problem for Davidson’s account of knowledge which stems from his treatment of the genetic foundation of systems of beliefs. I do not think that this problem is as fatal to his coherence theory of knowledge as the problems encountered with regard to BonJour’s coherence theory. Nevertheless I think that the problem calls for a modification of Davidson’s coherence theory of knowledge regarding the role of the genetic foundation.

2.3.4

An Epistemological Dilemma

Despite his emphasis on the role causal connections between beliefs and the world play in his theory of meaning and interpretation, Davidson vehemently rejects the claim that the existence of causal connections between beliefs and the world can in any way contribute to the justification of beliefs thus connected to the world. Neither, Davidson claims, can these connections confer the status of knowledge on a belief in any other externalist way.88 According to him, nothing external to a person’s system of beliefs can in any way confer the status of knowledge on a belief contained in this system. Now why is Davidson convinced of this and how does he argue for this? The only attempts to tie our systems of beliefs to a foundation external to these systems which Davidson takes seriously are approaches which contain an appeal to the senses and try to ground knowledge in perception, perceptual experiences, sensation, sense data or something similar. In the following paragraphs I will refer to all these entities as “sensations” since in CTK Davidson mostly talks of sensations. In some other articles he recantates the arguments directed against sensations as a foundation of knowledge with respect to perceptions, sense data etc. Thus I take his arguments to be directed against any position which takes evidence arrived at by the senses to be foundational. In general, Davidson acknowledges the relevance of sensations, percep88 He

thus turns against externalist theories of knowledge which aim for a substitution of the justification condition by an externalist condition which appeals to causality, reliability or the like in order to explicate the notion of knowledge.

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tual experiences and the like for knowledge since he, too, thinks that sensations, perceptual experiences etc. establish an important link between beliefs and the world - as should be clear from his integration of causal connections into his theory of meaning and interpretation. But according to him sensations, perceptual experiences etc. do not contribute in any special epistemic way to a belief’s status as knowledge. To support this claim, Davidson offers two major arguments. I will present and discuss these arguments in the remainder of this section. In a nutshell, the first argument runs as follows: Sensations cannot play a special (justifying) role in epistemology, since the mere existence of causal connections between the world and our sense organs does not constitute a reason for the belief that beliefs generated by the senses are true in most cases. Thus, according to Davidson, even if causal connections between the world and our beliefs are established via sensations and therefore sensations do play a major role in learning a language and developing a system of beliefs and in this regard are important to his own theory, beliefs derived from sensations do not deserve any special treatment in epistemology. He employs this argument many times in arguing against epistemological theories which try to base knowledge on experiences or beliefs derived from the senses as for example in the following passage: “It should be obvious that no appeal to perception can clear up the question what constitutes a person’s ultimate source of evidence. For if we take perception to consist in a sensation caused by an event in the world (or in the body of the perceiver), the fact of causality cannot be given apart from the sensation, and the sensation cannot serve as evidence unless it causes a belief. But how does one know that the belief was caused by a sensation? Only further beliefs can help.”89 Now these further beliefs cannot be themselves beliefs directly caused by sensations, since these beliefs have to be beliefs about the reliability of the senses, the existence and nature of causal connections between the world and beliefs arrived at via the senses, the conditions under which the senses can be trusted etc. Thus perceptual beliefs are in need of justification as much as other beliefs are in order to be counted as knowledge and therefore cannot be the foundation of knowledge. In other words, the causal relations between our beliefs and the world which are established via the senses cannot be counted as reasons for any 89 Davidson

(1982a) p.164.

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belief, since first, the mere existence of a sensation or perceptual experience does not constitute a reason to believe that the sensation or perceptual experience is really caused by the things and events in the world the belief derived from the sensation or perceptual experience is about. And second, in situations in which we have reasons to believe that a given sensation or perceptual experience is really caused by the things and events in the world the belief derived from it is about, it is not the sensation or perceptual experience which supports the belief but the beliefs about the sensation. Thus the mere existence of causal connections between a belief, a sensation and the world cannot turn the belief into knowledge. What is required for a belief to count as knowledge is that we be aware of the causal connections in the sense of having good reasons to believe that they exist.90 Besides the above argument, Davidson offers a second, related but different argument for his claim that sensations cannot serve as reasons and thus neither as a foundation for knowledge: Nothing which is not structured propositionally can be considered a reason for any belief, because in order to be related inferentially, entities have to have propositional structure. Now Davidson assumes that sensations are not structured propositionally and therefore cannot count as reasons for any belief. He writes: “The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes.”91 Thus, according to Davidson, sensations cannot in any way serve as evidence for our beliefs since there can be no inferential relations between mental states like sensations which have no propositional content and mental states like beliefs which have such content. Of course there are inferential relations between beliefs which are about sensations, perceptual experiences etc. and other beliefs. But these cannot contribute to knowledge in a way which is different from or more important than the way all kinds of inferential relations between beliefs contribute to knowledge, namely by increasing the coherence of the system of beliefs in which they obtain. In CTK Davidson mentions three ways in which a theory which takes sensations to be foundational can cast the relation between sensations and 90 This

argument does not only apply to epistemological theories which try to base knowledge on sensations but to any theory which tries to base knowledge on something which is external to systems of beliefs, i.e. which is not a belief itself. In this respect, Davidson’s argument can also serve as an argument for the conviction that coherence theories of knowledge are wedded to internalism. 91 Davidson (1983) p.143.

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beliefs: The first option, which he traces back to Hume, is to identify certain sensations with certain beliefs. This option he rejects quickly on the grounds that beliefs of this kind (a) could not be used to justify beliefs about the world and (b) do not exist anyway. The second option involves an appeal to the infallibility of introspective beliefs, which then are taken to constitute the basis of systems of beliefs. Davidson criticizes this approach for being unclear with respect to the connection between sensations and introspective beliefs and the way sensations are taken to justify introspective beliefs. According to him, introspective beliefs are not justified by sensations. Rather they do not need to be justified by an appeal to something external to the system of beliefs they are part of, since their very existence implies their truth. And moreover, even if they were in need of external justification, they could not serve as a basis for knowledge since they do not imply anything about the world. The third option is to assume that some beliefs are justified “directly” by sensations. This means that sensations are taken to justify beliefs about the world without the necessity to appeal to beliefs about sensations for justification. Davidson criticizes this position for violating the principle that nothing which is external to a system of beliefs can count as justification for beliefs contained in the system: According to this principle, a belief which is based on a sensation can only be justified if the person who has the belief also believes that he or she has the sensation on which the belief is based. But in this case the former belief is not justified by the sensation but by the latter belief. Thus, however one casts the relation between sensations and beliefs, sensations cannot contribute to the coherence of systems of beliefs, since sensations do not have propositional content and therefore do not bear inferential relations to beliefs, not even to perceptual beliefs. Assuming that Davidson is right in claiming that the relation between sensations and beliefs cannot be inferential, the question arises what other relations obtain between sensations and beliefs, since it clearly makes sense in some way to say that perceptual beliefs are “based on” sensations. Davidson’s answer to this question reads as follows: “What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or the ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified.”92 92 Davidson

(1983) p.143.

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In this passage it can be seen how the two arguments against the view that sensations can be the foundation of knowledge are related: Since sensations are mental states which do not have propositional content, there are no inferential relations between sensations and beliefs. Instead, there are causal relations between sensations and beliefs, but these causal relations cannot be relied on to epistemically support beliefs which are caused by sensations, since a causal explanation for the existence of a belief does not tell us if or why the belief is true. Therefore it is of no use for epistemology to employ sensations or similar mental states as mediators between beliefs and the world, since they can only serve as mediators in a causal chain, never as mediators between mere belief and knowledge. As Davidson puts it: “No doubt meaning and knowledge depend on experience and experience ultimately on sensation. But this is the ‘depend’ of causality, not of evidence or justification.”93 Thus the arguments against epistemological theories which rely on entities and relations external to systems of beliefs as a foundation for knowledge show why Davidson is convinced that nothing can contribute to knowledge except relations between beliefs. The central premise which he uses in both arguments is that nothing but reasons can confer the status of knowledge upon any belief. Now sensations cannot function as reasons since they do not have propositional content, while causal connections between beliefs and the world cannot function as reasons except qua beliefs about these connections. Therefore neither sensations nor causal connections can in any way contribute directly to knowledge. Nevertheless, as could be seen above, Davidson acknowledges that the existence of causal connections and the existence of something like sensations is a necessary condition for the existence of knowledge, since it is their existence which ensures the connection between systems of beliefs and the world. Thus knowledge seems to be a result of both causal relations between beliefs and their causes in the world and inferential relations between beliefs. So every epistemological theory has to explain how causal relations on the one hand and inferential relations on the other hand contribute to knowledge, since any epistemological theory which only deals with one kind of these relations seems to be doomed to fail for the following reasons: If knowledge is explained by an appeal to causal relations only, as for example in Dretske’s and Goldman’s externalist the93 Davidson

(1983) p.146.

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ories of knowledge, epistemology is reduced to a biological or psychological theory which fails to do justice to the role of reasons in epistemology. Moreover to cast knowledge in this manner invites skeptical objections at once, since we can never step outside our systems of beliefs to check if the causal relations necessary for knowledge do really obtain. But if, on the other hand, knowledge is explained solely by an appeal to inferential relations, epistemology becomes a kind of epistemic logic which cannot explain why and how our beliefs are connected to the world and therefore falls prey to major skeptical objections, too. Davidson’s solution to this dilemma is his integration of causal connections via his theory of meaning and interpretation. Although causal connections cannot directly contribute to knowledge by serving as reasons for beliefs, they contribute to knowledge by playing a major role in the development of language and belief. Since the contents of our beliefs and the meaning of the sentences we use to express those beliefs are partly determined by the causal history of our beliefs and our linguistic capabilities, it is not possible that our systems of beliefs are not in any way connected to the world. Thus although causal connections and causal mediators as sensations cannot be counted as reasons for our beliefs and in this sense are irrelevant to knowledge, they are extremely relevant for understanding how it is genetically possible for us to have knowledge and for arguing in favor of the anti-skeptical claim that a good part of our beliefs can count as knowledge. But even though this solution does not face the above dilemma between reducing epistemology to a biological or psychological theory or reducing it to some kind of epistemic logic, i.e. even though it does not face the dilemma between giving “a false answer to the skeptic, and no answer”94 - it faces a different problem, which I will describe after briefly reconsidering Davidson’s conception of triangulation. According to Davidson, the content of our beliefs and the meaning of the sentences we use to express our beliefs are determined partly by the causal history of our beliefs and partly by the inferential relations which obtain between our beliefs and between the sentences we use to express them. Regarding the first part of the constitution of content, the causal history of our beliefs involves causal mediation by sensations which thus are only relevant to the generation of beliefs causally and cannot contribute to the positive epistemic status of the beliefs they cause in any special manner. Now even if this part of Davidson’s theory is correct, he does not explain in detail how the part of the determination of content and meaning due to 94 Davidson

(1983) p.146.

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causality and the part of the determination of content and meaning due to inferential relations are connected. But Davidson’s conception of triangulation gives a hint as to how he wants to cast the connection: An interpreter who wants to find out which beliefs a speaker wants to express by the sentences he utters has to start with the observed conditions under which similar sentences are assented to by the speaker. If the conditions under which similar sentences are assented to can be classed as bearing certain similarities to each other by the interpreter, these similarities shared by the conditions can be identified as the cause(s) of the beliefs expressed by the sentences assented to by the speaker. In doing this, the interpreter follows the second methodological principle, i.e. he is taking into account the causal relations he takes to hold between the speaker and the world as they hold between himself and the world. Thus having determined the meaning of the most basic sentences of the speaker’s language which are most immediately tied to specific things in the world, the interpreter can then work his way up to the meaning of the more abstract sentences. He does this by going by his own standards of logic and inference which he takes to hold for the inferential relations between the beliefs and sentences of the speaker as well. So here the interpreter uses the first methodological principle. Now Davidson claims that the causal connections between us and the world can account for content of belief and meaning of sentences uttered only if the causes of our beliefs in the world can be identified as causes of those beliefs and this is possible only if they can be located in a shared objective space. He illustrates this using the following example involving the interpretation of a child’s responses to a cause in the world: “Involved in our picture there are now not two but three similarity patterns. The child finds tables similar; we find tables similar; and we find the child’s responses in the presence of tables similar. It now makes sense for us to call the responses of the child responses to tables. Given these three patterns of response we can assign a location to the stimuli that elicit the child’s responses. The relevant stimuli are the objects we naturally find similar (tables) which are correlated with responses of the child we find similar. It is a form of triangulation: one line goes from the child in the direction of the table, one line goes from us in the direction of the table, and the third line goes between us and the child. Where the lines from child to table and us to table converge, the ‘stimulus’ is located. Given our view of child and world, we can pick

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out ‘the’ cause of the child’s responses. It is the common cause of our response and the child’s response.”95 According to Davidson only common causes in this sense can determine contents of beliefs and meanings of sentences uttered, since without common causes, i.e. causes which can be identified by at least two speakers in interpretation or communication, there would be no awareness of the possibility of error and therefore no belief. Thus only causes which are determined by triangulation can be causes of belief because otherwise they would not be causes of belief but only causes of something nonpropositional as sensations or the like. The reason for this is the following: Since only communication and triangulation allow for the development of concepts, only communication and triangulation allow for awareness of the possibility of error and of the notion of a shared objective world. Concepts are “detached" from the causes of beliefs to which they apply in the sense that one can be in error as to the correct application of a concept to something in the world. Thus only the possession of concepts allows us to have beliefs, if having a belief requires to be aware of the possibility that the belief can be false. Just being caused to have a sensation by something does not make for having a belief about this something, since being caused to have a sensation does not imply being caused to have a belief. Thus only creatures who have concepts can develop beliefs with propositional content and utter meaningful sentences. Therefore even if causal relations are necessary for developing beliefs and language, they are not sufficient, since the inferential relations between beliefs and sentences which are necessary for them to have determinate content can only be established via concepts which in turn can only be developed in communication. Davidson writes: “[. . .] the kind of triangulation I have described, while not sufficient to establish that a creature has a concept of a particular object or kind of object, is necessary if there is to be any answer at all to the question what its concepts are concepts of. If we consider a single creature by itself, its responses, no matter how complex, cannot show that it is reacting to, or thinking about, events a certain distance away rather than, say, on its skin.”96 Now the problem with Davidson’s solution of the above described problem by an appeal to triangulation concerns the notion of the determination 95 Davidson 96 Davidson

(1992) p.119. (1992) p.119.

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of common causes by correlating similar stimuli on the part the interpreter to similar responses on the part of the interpreted person. Davidson claims that the interpreter can determine the common causes of his beliefs and the interpreted person’s beliefs by observing the conditions under which the interpreted person assents to certain sentences. Similar sentences assented to under similar conditions are thus taken to express beliefs about these conditions which are similar to the interpreter’s beliefs about the conditions. But determining common causes, beliefs and meanings in this way requires that at least the interpreter, if not both the interpreter and the interpreted person, already posses concepts. Without having concepts, the interpreter can class neither the conditions observed nor the responses observed as similar. To do so, he needs criteria of similarity which can only be provided by conceptual resources he already possesses. Thus Davidson’s theory cannot account for the development of concepts which are necessary for the development of beliefs and knowledge. Furthermore, to correlate similar responses with similar conditions observed, the interpreter has to presuppose that the interpreted person reacts to the same conditions he reacts to. Therefore he has to presuppose that the interpreted person roughly perceives and classes the surroundings as he does. But if - as Davidson himself holds - causal connections between a person and the world alone do not suffice to fix contents of belief and meaning, in order to perceive and class the surroundings in any way, the interpreted person already has to possess concepts, too. Thus the triangulation necessary to develop concepts can only take place if the communicating persons already possess those very concepts. So, taking a closer look at it, Davidson’s theory seems to be threatened by circularity. This circularity is a result of his attempt to escape from the above described dilemma and shows that this attempt is not really successful for the following reason: The causal relations between our beliefs and the world alone do not suffice for the determination of the content of our beliefs, since although it might be correct to say that things and events in the world cause us to have beliefs considered as mental states, they cannot cause those beliefs to have a determinate content. The reason for this is that the causal relations between us and the world cannot be responsible for our having concepts. Things and events in the world can cause us to have sensations, but they cannot cause us to have concepts, since to develop concepts one has to abstract from sensations and class them according to criteria of similarity.97 Correspondingly, the causal relations between us 97 I

do not want to imply that this abstraction has to be a conscious process or that

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and the world cannot be responsible for the inferential relations obtaining between our beliefs which are due to the conceptual relations among them and for our awareness of them. Thus to account for our having concepts and for our awareness of the inferential relations obtaining between our beliefs, Davidson appeals to communication and triangulation. But since this appeal leads into a circle, Davidson does not succeed in escaping the dilemma sketched at the beginning of this section: Although skeptical objections may be harder to formulate with regard to his account, the question how causal connections between us and the world and inferential relations between our beliefs can jointly account for our having knowledge remains unanswered. But nevertheless I think that Davidson’s conception of the development of belief and knowledge is roughly on the right track, because the threatening circle can be avoided by reconsidering the role of sensation and perception. Thus in the next chapter I will offer an account of the role of perception regarding a coherence theory of knowledge which can be of help in resolving the problem of circularity in Davidson’s theory.

we have to be aware of this process. All I want to claim is that the development of concepts cannot be the sole result of causal connections between us and the world.

Chapter 3

Perception, Coherence and Knowledge It takes two to speak truth - one to speak and another to hear. - Henry David Thoreau In this last chapter I will try to develop a conception of coherence which is suitable to be integrated into an account of knowledge. This conception of coherence can be considered a modified version of Davidson’s conception. My first modification of his conception will be the integration of an account of perception. Davidson himself does not include an account of perception into his account of coherence because he does not believe that perception should play a special role in epistemology. He regards perception as a mere causal mediator between our beliefs and the world they are about, thus endorsing a causal theory of perception.1 He writes: “It should be obvious that no appeal to perception can clear up the question what constitutes a person’s ultimate source of evidence. For if we take perception to consist in a sensation caused by an event in the world (or in the body of the perceiver), the fact of causality cannot be given apart from the sensation and the sensation cannot serve as evidence unless it causes a belief.”2 Thus, according to Davidson, even if causal processes which lead to the acquisition of beliefs do play a major role in learning a language and providing mental states with content and in this regard are important to his theory, perceptions and perceptual beliefs do not deserve any spe1 Cp.

Føllesdal (1999) pp.724. In his reply to Følledal’s critique in Davidson (1999), Davidson claims not to maintain a “simple causal theory of perception” (Davidson (1999) pp.731), but unfortunately does not explain how this claim fits with the various claims about perception which can be found in his earlier articles. Neither does he elaborate on the question how a more complex causal theory of perception could come to terms with the problems for his account. 2 Davidson (1982a) p.164. 165

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cial treatment in epistemology. His disregard for perception as an epistemologically important notion stems from three related convictions: First, Davidson holds that any kind of empiricist foundationalism which assigns perceptions or perceptual beliefs a special epistemic status and tries to base large parts of our knowledge on them must be wrong, since such a theory has to presuppose that perceptual beliefs are in some way immediately justified by sense data, sensations or similar entities. Second, he thinks that introducing perceptions as epistemic mediators into epistemology puts one on the road to conceptual relativism which he regards as unintelligible.3 And third, he claims that nothing which is not structured propositionally can contribute to the coherence of a system of beliefs. Regarding the first claim, I absolutely agree with Davidson, while I have certain doubts about his second and third claim, which will become clearer in the course of the first part of this chapter. Thus I will argue that perception does deserve a special treatment in epistemology. What it does not deserve is to be considered the epistemic foundation for our beliefs, in the sense that perceptual beliefs have to be the basic reasons for most of our other (empirical) beliefs and that our (empirical) beliefs have to be retraceable to perceptions in order to count as knowledge. But perception in general does deserve an epistemological consideration as a major and not merely causal contributor to the genesis of coherent systems of beliefs in Davidson’s sense. Thus the leading idea behind my modification of Davidson’s coherence theory of knowledge is to develop an account of knowledge according to which our systems of beliefs have a genetic but not merely causal foundation in perception. Perception is essential for developing a coherent system of beliefs in Davidson’s sense, since the awareness of the world which is provided by perception is needed in order to explain the possibility of the process of triangulation. The special epistemic status of beliefs which constitute knowledge on the other hand is conferred on them not by being epistemically based on perceptions, but exclusively by the inferential and conceptual relations they bear to other beliefs. But, as I will argue, since the development of conceptual resources which are characterized by these relations crucially depends on perception, perception cannot be epistemologically irrelevant. Thus the first part of this chapter is dedicated to the development of an account of perception which can be implemented into Davidson’s account 3 Cp.

Davidson (1988b) p.46. Davidson’s reasons for rejecting conceptual relativism as unintelligible can be found in Davidson (1974b).

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of coherence to save it from the charge of circularity. In the second part of this chapter I will then develop an account of knowledge which fulfills both requirements of truth-conducivity. This account will be developed by first showing that if one takes into account that as Davidson has shown, beliefs have to members of coherent systems of beliefs in order to have determinate content, it becomes clear that the belief condition alone fulfills requirement (i) of (TCC). But, this still leaves open the question which additional condition a belief must fulfill to count as knowledge, since if cohering with the system of beliefs it is a part of is a necessary condition for a belief’s having determinate content, then any belief coheres with the system it is a part of in this sense. Thus if coherence in Davidson’s sense would be taken as a third condition for knowledge it would seem that any true belief constitutes knowledge. But this is clearly implausible. Thus I will explore the possibility of extending my account of knowledge by a third condition in terms of coherence in a different sense than Davidson’s in the second part of this chapter.

3.1

The Role of Perception

At this stage we have to take another look at two central points in Davidson’s account of the coherence of our systems of beliefs: First, we have to consider his argument for the claim that sensations or perceptions cannot be an epistemologically relevant foundation of beliefs, since they do not have propositional content but merely function as causal mediators in the genesis of (perceptual) beliefs. And second, we have to take a look at the process of triangulation, which was supposed to be a necessary condition for our developing concepts and for our belief’s having definite contents. I will discuss the former argument in relation to the current debate about the contents of perception in the first and second paragraph of this section while the notion of triangulation is discussed in the third paragraph. Therefore the aim of the first three paragraphs of this section is to develop an account of perception which can be implemented into Davidson’s account of the coherence of systems of beliefs in a way which renders this account no longer vulnerable to the charge of being circular. In the last paragraph, I will show that this implementation of an account of perception as an epistemic intermediary between the world and our beliefs about it does not constitute a relapse into empiricist foundationalism, which I reject for the same reasons as Davidson does.

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3.1.1

Sensation and Perception4

Davidson’s argument for the claim that sensations cannot provide a foundation for our systems of beliefs makes use of the core premise that sensations do not have propositional contents and that therefore they cannot feature as reasons for beliefs. Rather, they serve as pure causal intermediaries in the genesis of perceptual beliefs. Now the claim that sensations do not have propositional content seems quite plausible. This can be seen by considering ordinary language claims about sensations. Normally we do not say that we sense or feel that something is the case but rather that we sense or feel something. Consider the following examples: To say “I sense that there is a pain in my stomach.” would be weird. Rather we say things like “My stomach hurts”. Analogously we normally do not say things like “I sense/feel that it is cold.” but rather things like “I am cold”. These examples suggest that there are no propositional contents involved in sensation. Rather sensations seem to be “immediate” in the sense that they do not involve any representations of the things sensed or felt. And this “immediate” relation indeed seems to be a purely causal relation. Thus I think that Davidson is right when he classes sensations as mere causal intermediaries between the mental states of a person and the environment of this person which have no special epistemic impact. But what about perception? Perception first does not share the kind of phenomenological immediacy which is characteristic for sensation. When we perceive something, we normally perceive it as something which is independent of our perceiving it. This is of course not to say that the things perceived always are independent of us in all respects. What I want to emphasize here is merely the appearance of mind-independence of perceived objects.5 Thus the relation in which we stand to the causes of perceptual experiences seems to be “less direct” than the relation in which we stand 4 The

distinction between mere sensation and perception is not that easy to draw with respect to human experience, since most cases of human consciousness involve both. Furthermore, the distinction seems to be vague in the sense that there are clear cases of mere sensation as for example the sensation of pain and clear cases of perception as for example visual experiences of distinct objects, but that there are also cases in between, which are not easy or even impossible to class as for example olfactory experiences or experiences of taste. Thus what I will have to say about sensation and perception and the distinction between them is intended to apply only to the clear cases. Whether it holds for the intermediate unclear cases remains to discuss, which I will not do here, since it is of no consequence to my arguments as long as those hold for the clear cases. 5 For a detailed discussion of this appearance of mind-independence in the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences see Smith (2002) and Siegel (2006).

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to the causes of sensations in the sense that while in sensation we do not experience the cause of the sensation independently of the sensation,6 in perception we do. Thus in perception we are aware of the cause of the perceptual experience as something which is independent of our minds but nevertheless in some way responsible for our being in a certain mental state, more specifically for our having a certain perceptual experience. John Searle puts this as follows: “Thus, for example, if I see [a] yellow station wagon, I have a certain visual experience. But the Intentional content of the visual experience, which requires that there be a yellow station wagon in front of me in order that it be satisfied, also requires that the fact that there is a yellow station wagon in font of me must be the cause of that very visual experience. Thus, the Intentional content of the visual experience requires as part of the conditions of satisfaction that the visual experience be caused by the rest of its conditions of satisfaction, that is, by the state of affairs perceived.”7 Thus perception in contrast to sensation presents its objects or contents as mind-independent objects or events in a mind-independent world, which are responsible for our having the experience we have. Second, it makes perfect sense to say things like: “I see that the door is closed.” or “I hear that there is a car approaching.” Thus in the case of perception there is no such clear evidence for the non-propositionality of its contents as in the case of sensation. Thus maybe Davidson jumps to conclusions when he claims that perceptions do not have propositional content and therefore cannot be considered reasons for beliefs. There is a large debate going on in the literature regarding the contents of perception which for its extent and complexity cannot be considered in detail here. Therefore I will just survey the main arguments in favor and against the claim that perceptions have propositional contents. But before I can turn to this survey, some preliminaries pertaining to perception have to be offered. 6 Of

course we do in many cases of sensation know what the cause of the sensation is, but mere sensations do not give us information about their source or their cause. This further information is provided by additional background knowledge and perceptual information. 7 Searle (1983) p.48. I disagree with Searle regarding the cause of the visual experience, because I do not think that states of affairs or facts can cause anything, since states of affairs and facts are abstract entities which cannot feature in causal relations. Rather I would be inclined to say that the station wagon itself is (part of) the cause of the visual experience. But besides this, I think Searle puts the point quite nicely: If we have a perceptual experience we experience the objects and events perceived as mind-independent causes of our experiences.

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First, there seems to be a difference between the role of concepts regarding perceptions and their role regarding beliefs. While it is relatively clear that it is impossible to have beliefs without having concepts, this is not so clear regarding perceptual experiences. This can be seen by considering an example due to Norman Malcolm, which Davidson himself discusses.8 The example runs as follows: When we see a dog running after a cat, which then climbs up a tree in order to escape the dog, but the dog takes the cat to have run up another tree at whose foot he then remains barking, it is tempting to explain the dog’s behavior by ascribing to him the false belief that the cat went up that tree. We say, so Malcolm, that the dog thinks that the cat went up that tree, thereby attributing to the dog the belief that the cat is up that tree. Thus, Malcolm argues, if we did not attribute some belief of this kind to the dog, his behavior would be inexplicable. So, he concludes, we have to rest with the contention that at least higher animals have beliefs. Now Davidson argues against Malcolm along the following lines: Contrary to first intuitions, it is not so clear that the dog believes that the cat ran up the tree, precisely because it is not clear if he possesses the concept of a cat and the concept of a tree. This can be seen by considering the following example: Mr. Smith, a bank director, comes home and his dog runs up the driveway to greet him. Now it would seem natural to say that the dog believes that his master is home. But would it not be odd to say that the dog believes that Mr. Smith is home or even that the bank director is home? Surely we would not ascribe the latter belief to the dog. Now the point Davidson wants to make by invoking this example is the following: While the dog of course perceives and remembers his master, i.e. has perceptual experiences involving his master, he does not have beliefs about his master, Mr. Smith or the bank-director. This is because the dog lacks the concepts of being someone’s master or of being a bank director. Thus he perceives his master, but not the bank director. All the dog knows is his master, not something about his master. So a first difference between perceptual experiences and beliefs is that while the former merely comprise an awareness of the object perceived, the latter always comprise conceptual classifications of the object perceived. Now, before I embark on a detailed discussion of perception, two preliminary clarifications regarding the following discussion are due: First, when I will engage in the discussion of perception and its role in the genesis of 8 For

the presentation of the original example see Malcolm (1991) p.457. Davidson’s discussion of the example can be found in Davidson (1975) p.163 and Davidson (1982b) pp.97.

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our systems of beliefs in the following paragraphs, I will leave aside nearly all issues regarding the physiological or neurological explanation of perception. The reason for my disregarding those matters is that they are quite irrelevant to the question which is at issue here, namely the question what role must be assigned to perceptual experiences in order to escape the circle in Davidson’s account of the coherence of systems of beliefs. To answer this question the only thing needed is a philosophical account of perceptual experiences and their relation to the things they are experiences of, not an empirical explanation of the underlying physiological and neurological processes which mediate the relation between perceptual experiences and the perceived entities on a causal level. Shortly, the question is whether perceptions can be of help in escaping the circle in Davidson’s account of the development of systems of beliefs and if they can, how this is achieved. But the answer to this question is independent of the answer to the question what must be the case physiologically in order for perceptual experiences to be as they are, since perceptual experiences conceived of as mental states connecting people to their environment could be realized differently from the way they are in fact realized in humans and yet play the very same role in the genesis of our systems of beliefs. This point is made by Davidson himself regarding the causal relations between us and the environment which are a necessary condition for our beliefs having determinate contents, when he writes: “It is an empirical accident that our ears, eyes, taste buds, and tactile and olfactory organs play an intermediate role in the formation of beliefs about the world. The causal connections between thought and objects and events in the world could have been established in entirely different ways without this making any philosophically significant difference to the contents or veridicality of perceptual belief.”9 Second, in my discussion of perception I will simply take a stance regarding a part of the philosophical discussion of perception without arguing for this in detail. The part of the discussion I have in mind here is the one centering on the question whether perception provides us with “direct” or “indirect” access to the world.10 More specifically, the debate is about the question whether perception gives us “direct” awareness of objects and 9 Davidson

(1988b) p.45. debate is not new to philosophy but dates back to a scholastic debate between two factions, the “perceptionists” and the “representationists”. A detailed account of this debate can be found in Coffey (1917) pp.4. 10 This

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events in the world11 or rather only provides us with “indirect” representations of it such as “sense-data”,12 “qualia”13 or “intentional objects”.14 Instead of going into the details of this discussion, I will simply assume that some version of direct realism has to be correct after presenting some brief considerations which speak in favor of direct realism. My reason for this is the following: If Davidson’s contention that we cannot have beliefs 11 This

conception of perception has been termed “direct realism” or “naive realism” and has been abandoned for a long time as a result of the conviction that what is perceived in perception cannot be the world as it really is, since there are perceptual illusions and hallucinations. But it has been resurrected recently as a result of puzzling and counterintuitive consequences of the alternative views by many authors, including Gram (1983), Searle (1983), Kelley (1986) Alston (1990), (1998) and (1999), Putnam (1994) and Smith (2002). A variant of direct realism is a view called “disjunctivism”, which was developed as a reaction to the problems direct realism faces regarding the explanation of the possibility of perceptual illusions and hallucinations. Broadly, this view can be characterized as the claim that in genuine perception we have direct access to the objects or events perceived while if we experience an illusion or a hallucination, the objects or events presented by the perceptual experience are mental entities. This view can be found in McDowell (1994) and Dancy (1995). I will not discuss this variant of direct realism here, since I do not think that cases of illusion and hallucination do pose a major problem for direct realism. Of course I do not mean to imply that disjunctivism has to be false on these grounds. For my reasons for not taking illusions and hallucinations to be a major problem for direct realism, see below. 12 The sense-data theory of perception has been very popular in the philosophy of mind. Roughly, it states that when we perceive something, we are not directly aware of objects and events in the world, but rather of “sense-data” which are somehow generated by the relation between the perceiver and the environment and which actually have the properties which are presented to the perceiver as properties of objects and events in the environment. This theory has been advocated by many authors as Broad (1925), Price (1932) and more recently Robinson (1994), Garcia-Carpintero (2001) and O’Shaughnessy (2003). 13 The term “qualia” was introduced in the 20th century to denote the qualities of the phenomenal aspects of our experiences, i.e. the way things look, feel or sound to us. This is merely a broad characterization, since different authors assign different meanings to the term. Not all authors who advocate the view that there are things like “qualia” take them to be representations which somehow function as intermediaries between the objective world and our experiences, but some - as for example Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995) and (2000) - do. An overview on theories of qualia can be found in Tye (2008). 14 The expression “intentionality” and the idea of “intentional objects” date back to Franz Brentano. According to him, “every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself.”(Brentano (1995) p.88.) Thus regarding perception, the theory of intentional objects states that what we are aware of in a perceptual experience are not ordinary physical objects but rather mental “intentional” objects which are representations of the physical objects. This theory is held among others by Anscombe (1965), Armstrong (1968), Pitcher (1970), Peacocke (1983) and Lycan (1996). The

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with determinate contents if we do not have lots of true beliefs about the world around us and about the minds of other people is correct, then we have to have some access to the world as it really is, for otherwise we would not be able to form true beliefs about it except by extraordinary metaphysical luck. Now, of course, assuming that perception must somehow contribute to our ability to form true beliefs about the world alone does not decide the case in favor of direct realism, since the proponents of the “indirect awareness” views do not dispute that perception provides us with access to the world as it really is - they merely claim that it does this via an awareness which is not an awareness of the world itself but rather an awareness of mind-dependent entities which are some kind of representations of things and events in the world.15 Now my main reason for assuming that direct realism is correct in the course of my discussion is that only direct realism can provide us with an account of perception which is suitable to solve the problem of circularity in Davidson’s account of the coherence of systems of beliefs. The reason for this is that according to Davidson’s version of content externalism, the contents of our “most basic thoughts” are determined by “what has typically caused similar thoughts.”16 Regarding this, Davidson then argues that to identify the “typical” causes of our thoughts we need to resort to linguistic communication, since “in addition to being a cause of those thoughts, what makes the particular aspect of the cause of the [language] learner’s responses the aspect that gives them the content they have is the fact that this aspect of the cause is shared by the teacher and the learner. Without such sharing, there would be no grounds for selecting one cause rather than another as the content-fixing cause.”17 Now this line of argument is what leads into the circle described above, for if linguistic communication has to take place in order to fix the contheory is compatible with either the “sense-data-view” or the “qualia-view”, since intentional objects can just be identified with sense-data or qualia. Some authors even combine this view with direct realism, identifying the “intentional objects” with real objects in the world. For such views see Searle (1983) and Huemer (2001). 15 In accordance with the literature, I will call the “indirect awareness” views “indirect realism”. A third alternative which has been maintained regarding perception is a position called “phenomenalism” or “idealism” which amounts to the claim that perception does not give us access to real objects and events in the world at all but instead merely shows us a realm of purely mental objects. This position has been classically maintained by Berkeley (1996). But since it is almost universally agreed among contemporary philosophers that this view must be false, I will disregard it here. 16 Davidson (1990) p.201. 17 Davidson (1990) p.203.

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tent of even our “most basic thoughts”, then we would need to be able to communicate before we can have thoughts with determinate content. But, as I have argued above, linguistic communication presupposes thought, since to communicate linguistically is to express thoughts. Now my proposed way of escaping this circle is to supplement Davidson’s account of triangulation with an account of perception according to which perception can provide us with the needed shared environment without its possibility depending on a preexisting capacity of propositional thought or language. But now if Davidson is right in claiming that what determines the contents of our thoughts are the shared causes of our thoughts, then in order for perception to play the assigned role in resolving the circle, it has to provide us with direct access to those shared causes. The reason for this is the following: When Davidson is talking about shared causes he cannot merely be talking about common causes, which we do not have to be aware of as common causes. Rather the causes have to be shared in the sense that the triangulating creatures have to be aware of those causes as the causes of their own and the other creature’s reactions.18 This is a major point of Davidson’s version of content externalism: Development of thoughts with determinate contents is essentially a social process. He writes: “Without other people with whom to share responses to a mutual environment, there is no answer to the question what it is in the world to which we are responding. The reason has to do with the ambiguity of the concept of cause. It is essential to resolve these ambiguities, since it is, in the simplest cases, what causes a belief that gives it its content. In the present case, the cause is doubly indeterminate: with respect to width, and with respect to distance. The first ambiguity concerns how much of the total cause of a belief is relevant to content. The brief answer is that it is the part or aspect of the total cause that typically causes relevantly similar responses. What makes the responses relevantly similar in turn is the fact that others find those responses similar; once more it is the social sharing of reactions that makes the objectivity of content available.”19 Now this vital social aspect of the genesis of thought content would be lost 18 Of

course this does not mean that the triangulating creatures need to have the concept of a cause in order to be thus aware of those causes. All they need to be aware of is that there is something in the shared environment which they themselves and the other creatures react to in a similar way. 19 Davidson (1997a) pp.129.

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if the shared causes were not causes which the triangulating creatures are aware of. Thus if the triangulating creatures were not consciously aware of those causes, the content of their beliefs could not be determined by them. Now this is the reason why indirect realist accounts of perception cannot be of help in resolving the circle in Davidson’s account of the genesis of content by triangulation: All perceiving creatures are aware of on indirect realist accounts of perception are representations of things and events in the world. But such representations can never be shared. Thus on an indirect realist account, while there can be common causes of beliefs, we cannot be aware of those causes but merely of the representations caused by them. But those representations we are aware of, as for example sense data or qualia, are not shared by others but are private mental entities. So on indirect realist accounts of perception, perception cannot be of use in resolving Davidson’s circle, since on such an account, perception cannot provide us with shared causes of belief which we are aware of and therefore can play no vital part in the determination of the contents of our thoughts in triangulation. Thus I conclude that only a direct realist account of perception can solve the problem posed by Davidson’s account of triangulation. So I will merely offer some short considerations in favor of direct realism in order to show that this position has at least some plausibility independently of being needed in resolving the circle in Davidson’s account. There are two points which speak in favor of direct realism which I will present in the following. The first simply is the phenomenology of perception: When we perceive something, we do not - as we do for example when we look at a picture - perceive it as a representation of something else but rather as this something itself. Thus the phenomenology of perception speaks for direct realism, not for indirect realism. This point is made rather strongly by Searle: “If, for example, I see a yellow station wagon in front of me, the experience I have is directly of the object. It doesn’t just “represent” the object, it provides direct access to it. The experience has a kind of directness, immediacy and involuntariness which is not shared by a belief I might have about the object in its absence. It seems therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations, [. . .]. Rather, because of the special features of perceptual experiences I propose to call them “presentations”. The visual experience I will say does not just represent the state of affairs perceived; rather, when satisfied, it gives us direct access

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to it and in that sense it is a presentation of that state of affairs.”20 Thus the fact that it seems to us as if we are connected directly to objects and events in the environment through perceptual experiences speaks in favor of direct realism. But since taking the phenomenology of perception at face value might just be a case of a naive realist fallacy, I will add one more substantial consideration in favor of direct realism. Indirect realists agree with direct realists insofar as they claim that the representations which function as intermediaries between the world and our perceptual experiences provide us with access to the objective world. Now either mediation by those representations is the only way in which we can have perceptual access to the world or it is not and we have another form of perceptual access to the world, which is independent of those representations. The latter claim is absurd, since representations were introduced as an explanation for the possibility of perceptual access to the world in the first place. Now if there were other forms of perceptual access to the world which do not stand in need of explanation by a recourse to representations, the introduction of representations as an explanation for perceptual access to the world would obviously be unnecessary. Thus we have to conclude that perceptual experiences mediated by representations are our only way to gain access to the world. But if this is the case and perceptual access is always mediated by representations which - as we know - can misrepresent the world, then we can never find out whether our perceptual experiences represent the world correctly. Thus indirect realism seems to reduce to the claim that there is an objective world and that our perceptual experiences somehow represent this world but that otherwise we cannot know anything about this world. The reason for this is that if our perceptual experiences are our only source of access to the world then we cannot compare the representations provided by perception with the world as it really is. Thus given that indirect realism is true, we lack a criterion to tell illusions from perceptual experiences which show us the world as it is.21 Here it does not help to argue that science provides us with independent access to the world as it really is and therefore allows us to distinguish illusions from 20 Searle

(1983) pp.45. I will adopt the term “presentation” in the following. is a curious result in itself, given that the need for an explanation for the possibility of perceptual illusions and hallucinations was and still is one of the main reasons for introducing indirect realism in the first place. But if we lack a criterion to tell illusions and hallucinations from veridical perceptual experiences, then how can we be sure that illusions and hallucinations exist and demand an explanation for their possibility? For a detailed presentation and discussion of the arguments for indirect realism which take the possibility of illusion and hallucination as their starting point see Crane (2008). 21 This

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veridical perceptual experiences. For in scientific reasoning and theory we have to presuppose that the world largely is as our senses present it to us because otherwise, we would have no starting point for scientific reasoning and theory. Thus we have to presuppose the existence of the things we perceive as we perceive them in order to be able to proceed with scientific research which enables us to find out further facts about those things and our perceptual relations to them. Consider for example scientific research on color perception: While it may be true that we perceive objects as being colored because they absorb specific spectra of light, it is still determined by our perception if a given thing can be said to have some definite color. This is how scientific research led to the discovery of the absorption of certain spectra of light by objects as the ground of their appearing colored to us in the first place: Different things which share the quality of appearing colored in perception were compared regarding the spectra of light they absorb to find out that whenever something has a specific color it absorbs a specific spectrum of light. Thus scientific research about our perceptual faculties is of no help in solving the problem described above, since science has to presuppose direct realism in order to get started in the first place, because otherwise science itself would have no criterion for distinguishing between veridical and nonveridical perceptual experiences. As the psychologists Claire F. Michaels and Claudia Carello put it aptly in a discussion of the arguments against direct realism which draw on the possibility of illusions and hallucinations: “For the scientist, the choice between realism and idealism is an easy one: realism. Most scientists assume that what they are studying is real and objective. They are realists. [. . .] Thus, the psychologist as scientist must be a realist. Nevertheless, perceptual theorists have tended to argue that the perceiver is not directly acquainted with the environment as such, but with a surrogate for that environment. The latter position, of course, means that psychologists do sometimes adopt idealist attitudes. [. . .] If it is correct to assert that psychology should be a science and that science demands realism, it follows that psychology should demand realism. This does not mean that psychologists should ignore the phenomena which seem to demand idealism but rather that realism should only be abandoned if a thorough attempt at it fails.”22 22 Michaels

& Carello (1981) p.87. The authors use the term “idealism” to cover indirect realism as well as genuine idealism. That the “thorough attempt” at direct realism does not fail in consideration of illusions and hallucinations and in consid-

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Thus scientific research has to presuppose realism in order to find explanations for the “phenomena which seem to demand idealism”, in this case the existence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations. The reason for this is that scientific research cannot provide the access to the world needed here without relying on the access provided by perception. Rather it has to rely on this access and the general reliability of perception, using this as a starting point to explain its unreliability in special cases as in the cases of perceptual illusions and hallucinations. So I will in the following assume that some form of direct realism is true, i.e. that what we aware of in perception are the objects and events in the world themselves and not mind-dependent representations of them.23 Now the crucial question at issue here is in what way we are aware of the world in perception, i.e. whether the awareness of the world we have in perception is structured in a way similar to beliefs we have about the world or if it is somehow structured differently. This question is important since for perceptions to be able to play the circle-resolving role which they need to play in order for Davidson’s conception of triangulation to be a sufficient explanation of our beliefs’ having determinate content, their contents have to be such that their having content does not presuppose that the perceiver already possesses concepts, i.e. their contents have to be nonconceptual. On the other hand, their contents have to be such that the perceiver gets access to the world as a structured entity by having perceptual experiences, i.e. the perceiver has to experience the world as consisting of mind-independent objects and events with mind-independent properties. Otherwise perception could not account for the criteria of similarity which have to be accessible to animals and humans in order for them to be able to triangulate. But before I can turn to the discussion of this question, I have to clarify some terminology regarding perception. The reason for the necessity of the clarification is that there is an ambiguity in our ordinary notion of perception. Thus the ordinary language expression “perception” can refer either to the perceptual experience or to the perceived entity as it is perceived or to the process of perceiving something, which involves a relation between the perceiver and the pereration of other shortcomings of perception as for example the necessary time-lag in perceiving objects is shown by an insightful discussion of various kinds of arguments starting from a premise which states a shortcoming of perceptual access to the world as it really is and arguing to indirect realism as a conclusion in LeMorvan (2004). 23 I will not decide on the issue whether the correct variant of direct realism is naive realism, intentionalism as it is held by Searle (1983) or disjunctivism as McDowell (1994) holds it, since which of these alternatives is correct does not matter regarding my purposes here.

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ceived entity. To avoid being unclear as a result of this ambiguity, I will in advance distinguish between various elements contributing to perception. I will use the term “perception” to refer to the relation between the perceiver and the cause of the perceptual experience which according to direct realism is also the entity perceived. Thus in my terminology, perception has no content at all, since it is a relation between a perceiving creature and something perceived. What has content is the perceptual experience, which is a mental state of the perceiver caused by something24 in the environment of the perceiver.25 So it is the content of the perceptual experience with regard to which the question of its propositionality arises.26 The question does not arise with regard to perceptual beliefs which are formed as a result of undergoing perceptual experiences, since being beliefs, these clearly have propositional contents. Now one has to distinguish between the cause of the perceptual experience and the content of the perceptual experience. This distinction is necessary, since one could easily think that cause and content of the perceptual experience are identical, since what is experienced in the perceptual experience is - in a sense to be specified the very same thing which causes the perceptual experience. But a consideration of two examples will show that this is not true in a strict sense: The first example is perception of colors: When we perceive objects we always perceive them as colored although color as we perceive it is not an intrinsic property of the objects but a relational property which objects have in relation to perceivers with visual faculties resembling our own.27 Thus while in the perceptual experience something colored is experienced, the cause of the perceptual experience is not colored. It might have objective, intrinsic properties which account for our experience of color when 24 I

intentionally keep the specification of the cause of the perceptual experience vague here, since I do not have to commit myself to a definite answer to the ontological question whether it is objects or events or facts which cause perceptual experiences to make the points about perception I want to make. All I need to assume is that it is something which exists or happens independently of being perceived. 25 This characterization of the perceptual experience merely specifies a necessary condition for being a perceptual experience, since there are many mental states which are caused by something in the environment of the person being in these states but which are nevertheless not perceptual experiences, as for example sensations. 26 In the following, I will often use the expression “perceptual content” as an abbreviation for the rather cumbersome term “the content of perceptual experiences”. 27 This claim is controversial. There are some authors who claim that color is an intrinsic, non-relational property of objects which supervenes on their physical properties or that colors have “hidden essences”, which are properties of colored objects and which can be discovered by science. The first position can be found in Hacker (1987) and Campbell (1993), while the second view is held by Armstrong (1969), Tye (2000) and McLaughlin (2003).

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facing the object, but the cause of this experience is not colored itself.28 The second - even more striking and less controversial - example are the afore mentioned perceptual illusions: For example, a stick which is put into a glass of water looks bent to the perceiver although it is not. So in this case, at least a part of the cause of the perceptual experience is different from the corresponding part of the content of the experience the stick which is a part of the cause of the experience is straight, while the content of the experience shows the stick as bent - we express this more naturally by saying that the stick looks bent to us although it is not really bent. Thus in the case of optical illusions there is a clear sense in which cause and content of the perceptual experience differ, which shows that cause and content of the perceptual experience should not be identified. Thus there are three different elements to be considered in thinking about perception: The perceptual experience, the cause of the perceptual experience and the content of the perceptual experience. Now presupposing direct realism, the relation between the perceptual experience and its cause is relatively clear: The experience is caused by objects and events in the world which exist independently of being perceived and this causal process is mediated by physiological and neurological processes involving the sense organs. But what is the relation between the cause of the perceptual experience and the content of the perceptual experience? We already know two things about the relation between the cause of the perceptual experience and the content of the perceptual experience: Although direct realism states that what we perceive are real objects and events “out there”, cause and content cannot be identical. Furthermore, according to direct realism the content of the perceptual experience is not a representation of the cause of the perceptual experience but rather has to be a direct presentation of this cause. Thus it seems as if cause and content of perceptual experiences have to be the same thing but nevertheless have to differ. What we have encountered here is an old puzzle about perception, which is very clearly stated by William James: “Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities; and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former [. . .] has assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome. Representative theories put a mental ‘representation’, ‘image’ or ‘content’ into the gap, as a sort of interme28 For

an elaborate argument for this see Pollock & Oved (2005) pp.329.

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diary. Commonsense theorists left the gap untouched, declaring our mind able to clear it by a selftranscending leap. Transcendental theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory act.”29 The puzzle we have encountered thus can be described as follows: The content of the experience cannot be identical to its cause, since in some respects it differs from its cause. On the other hand, the cause of the perceptual experience has to be identical to the perceived entity, since according to direct realism the perceived entities are the real objects and events in the world which are the causes of the perceptual experience. Now to solve this puzzle we have to take a closer look at the notion of the content of the perceptual experience. Having for the above reasons decided to adopt a direct realist stance about perception, I will in the following discussion of the question how we have to think about perceptual content only consider content as it can be plausibly understood from a direct realist perspective. 3.1.2

Conceptual versus Nonconceptual Content

The debate about whether perceptual content has to be conceived of as propositional or nonpropositional has been framed in a different terminology in the literature. Therefore I have to clarify some terminology at this point. In the literature, the controversy I want to talk about here has not been framed in terms of the propositionality of perceptual content but rather in terms of its conceptuality. I take the debate about the conceptuality of perceptual content to address the same problem I want to address here, since to be in a mental state with propositional content requires to be in a mental state with conceptual content. The reason for this is that whatever propositions may be - to grasp them involves grasping concepts. Thus if perceptual content is nonconceptual, it cannot be propositional and if it is propositional, it cannot be nonconceptual.30 Thus what needs to be shown in order to give an account of perceptual experiences which can be of help in avoiding Davidson’s circle is that the proponents of the claim 29 James

(1912) p.28. is possible that perceptual content is conceptual while being nonpropositional. McDowell seems to maintain something like this about perceptual content when he defends the claim that perceptual content is composed of “demonstrative concepts” which he conceives of as concepts which constitutively contain indexicals as for example the concept of “that shade of red”. A more detailed discussion of McDowell’s position will be given in the section on the arguments for nonconceptual content below. 30 It

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that the contents of perceptual experiences are nonconceptual are right. Therefore I will in the remainder of this section present the arguments for and against this claim, arguing that although these arguments do neither conclusively establish that perceptual content is conceptual nor that it is not, the arguments against the nonconceptuality of perceptual content discussed rest on an indirect realist premise which is unacceptable from the perspective of direct realism. I will start with a presentation and discussion of the arguments in favor of nonconceptual content and then move on to the arguments against it. 3.1.2.1

In Defense of Nonconceptuality of Perceptual Content

The main arguments for the nonconceptuality of perceptual content all involve contrasting perceptual contents with contents which are clearly conceptual as for example contents of beliefs. This contrast is then used in an attempt to show that perceptual content does not have certain features which are taken to be essential for the conceptuality of the content of beliefs or other propositional attitudes. The first argument I will discuss is presented by Tim Crane.31 Crane starts from a consideration of a famous kind of perceptual illusion, the “waterfall-illusion”, which in modern psychology is also called the “motion after-effect”.32 This illusion can be described as follows: When one stands in front of a waterfall, looking constantly at the water moving downward for some time and then turns one’s gaze toward an unmoving surface, this surface seems to be moving upward. But this appearance of motion upward is of course an illusion.33 Now Crane argues that in watching the waterfall illusion one has a perceptual experience with contradictory content, since one observes a stationary surface which nevertheless looks as if it were moving. But “although the stationary object does appear to move, it does not appear to move relative 31 Cp.

Crane (1988). illusion was first discovered by Aristotle: “And also when persons turn away from looking at objects in motion, e.g. rivers, and especially those which flow very rapidly, they find that the visual stimulations still present themselves, for the things really at rest are then seen moving: [. . .]” (Aristotle (1955) 469b.) 33 The illusion is explained by recourse to a phenomenon called “neural adaptation”. When one looks at constant downward motion, the neurons coding movement in this direction reduce their responses with time. Thus when one afterward looks away from the motion to a stationary surface, this surface seems to be moving in the opposite direction, since the neurons coding downward motion reduce their activity by the constant stimulation, tilting the balance in favor of upward movement. A detailed explanation of the motion after-effect can be found in Mather et al. (1998). 32 The

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to the background of the scene. That is, there is a clear sense in which it also does appear to stay still [. . .]. There is a distinct appearance of lack of motion as well as motion.”34 Crane concludes from this that the contents of perceptual experiences cannot be conceptual, since it is not possible to be in a mental state with contradictory conceptual content. It would therefore not make sense to say that the content of the perceptual experience in the case of the waterfall illusion is the proposition that the surface is moving and is not moving at the same time, since no one can entertain such a content. This seems plausible if one considers the paradigm case of mental states with conceptual contents, i.e. beliefs. While it is possible to have an experience of a surface which seems to be moving and not moving at the same time (as the waterfall illusion shows), it is not possible to believe that the surface really is moving and is not moving at the same time, since this is an outright contradiction.35 Crane’s argument has been challenged by D.H. Mellor on the grounds that there can be no clear sense in which the content of the perceptual experience in the case of the waterfall illusion can be said to be contradictory if it is not conceptual. Mellor argues as follows: If the content of the perceptual experience were not conceptual, what then would the contradiction be? It cannot be that the experience has a content of the form Fa & ¬Fa, since this would mean that its content is conceptual. Thus describing the content of the perceptual experience as contradictory either implies that it is conceptual after all or involves an unintelligible notion of a contradiction. Furthermore, it remains unclear “how, without containing the concept F, the experience can include believing that a looks to be both F and not-F, which it evidently does”.36 Thus examples of illusions which seem to convey something contradictory may speak in favor of nonconceptual content but only if one uses the term “contradiction” in a sense which is rather obscure, since if the contents of perceptual experiences are nonconceptual, they cannot be said to be contradictory in the sense in which a proposition and its negation can be said to be contradictory. This can be further illustrated by reflect34 Crane

(1988) p.142. course we all may have some contradictory beliefs without noticing this. But this does not change the fact that it seems to be impossible to consciously believe an outright contradiction of the form p ∧ ¬p. 36 Mellor (1988) p.147. This already hints at one of the arguments against the nonconceptuality of perceptual content. This argument starts from the premise that perceptual experiences somehow have to give rise to perceptual beliefs, which cannot be explained if perceptual experiences do not share the content of the corresponding perceptual beliefs. I will discuss this argument in the next paragraph. 35 Of

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ing on a related difference between the contents of perceptual experiences and the contents of beliefs: While contents of beliefs can be true or false, the contents of perceptual experiences can only be accurate or misleading, i.e. they do not have truth values. So if one understands “contradiction” to mean “necessary falsehood”, perceptual contents would have to have truth values, which they do not. So although Crane’s argument misfires at showing what it was designed to show, considering it from this perspective brings us to a difference between perceptual content and contents of beliefs which speaks for the nonconceptuality of perceptual content after all. Since the contents of perceptual experiences differ from the contents of beliefs because they do not have a truth value, it seems that Crane simply makes a mistake in describing the illusory experiences as contradictory. Rather he should have described them as conveying something contradictory, which results in the belief that the surface looks as if it were moving and not moving at the same time. Put this way, the argument of course does not establish conclusively that perceptual content is nonconceptual, but merely suggests this via the additional claim that the contents of perceptual experiences do not have a truth value. The second argument for the nonconceptuality of perceptual content is offered by Gareth Evans.37 In his famous book The Varieties of Reference he argues that perceptual content cannot be conceptual, since it is too fine-grained to be captured conceptually. He illustrates this by the example of perceiving different shades of color and then asks: “Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many color concepts as there are shades of color that we can sensibly discriminate?”38 Thus if we perceive objects which are colored in different shades of the same color, we may have some differentiating concepts as for example the concept of ruby and the concept of scarlet, but we do not have different concepts for all the different shades of red we can discriminate perceptually. So the fine differentiations which are present to us in perceptual experiences cannot be grasped conceptually, but nevertheless the differences are present in perception.39 Therefore the ability to differentiate things perceptually can at least not solely be due to our conceptual resources and the contents of perceptual experiences cannot solely owe their structure to conceptual differentiations. 37 Cp.

Evans (1982) pp.227. (1982) p.229. 39 Peacocke (1992), Tye (1995) and Luntley (2003) offer similar arguments regarding perception of music. 38 Evans

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Evans’ argument has been subject to much discussion in the literature. For lack of space I cannot go into all the details of this discussion, thus I will only sketch the main line of criticism launched against his argument. This criticism draws on the idea that the fine-grained nature of perceptual content is a problem for the contention that perceptual content is structured conceptually only if one limits conceptual structure to something supposedly too general. Thus, for example John McDowell argues against Evans as follows: “But why should we accept that a person’s ability to embrace colour within her conceptual thinking is restricted to concepts expressible by words like “red” or “green” and phrases like “burned sienna”? It is possible to acquire the concept of a shade of colour, and most of us have done so. So why not say that one is thereby equipped to embrace shades of colour within one’s conceptual thinking with the very same determinateness with which they are presented in one’s visual experience, so that one’s concepts can capture colour no less sharply than one’s experience presents them? In the throes of an experience of the kind that putatively transcends one’s conceptual powers - an experience that ex hypothesi affords a suitable sample - one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly as fine-grained as the experience, by uttering a phrase like “that shade”, in which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the sample.”40 So the idea behind McDowell’s criticism is the following: If by the finegrained nature of perceptual experience we are led to believe that we lack the conceptual resources to grasp conceptually what is presented in experience, this is a result of our being mistaken regarding the nature of concepts. More specifically, we mistake concepts for something which is completely general in nature. If we, so McDowell goes on to argue, adopt a more liberal attitude toward concepts, identifying the possession of a concept with no more than “a recognitional capacity”,41 there can be “demonstrative concepts” as the concept of “that shade”. So when we perceptually discriminate two properties as for example two different shades of color, we do so by virtue of deploying two different demonstrative concepts which pick out the particular shades of color discriminated. Thus McDowell argues that what is at work in human perception are concep40 McDowell 41 McDowell

(1994) pp.56. Brewer (1999) pp.170 argues along the same lines. (1994) p.57.

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tual capacities as well, but that these capacities involve concepts which have a much more determinate content than the concepts exercised in the case of beliefs. So for McDowell the fine-grained nature of perceptual experiences does not constitute a reason for the claim that its contents are nonconceptual, but only for the claim that the concepts involved in the content of perceptual experience are of a more determinate kind than the ones involved in belief and other propositional attitudes. There have been various answers to McDowell’s position and his notion of demonstrative concepts by proponents of nonconceptualism. The most prominent response is that demonstrative concepts as McDowell conceives of them would violate an essential constraint on the possession of a concept which is called the “re-identification condition”. This condition amounts to something like this: In order to possess a certain concept C, we must be able to re-identify different things falling under C as falling under that concept.42 Sean Kelly for example argues against McDowell that “demonstrative concepts” do not meet this condition, since there are many cases in which normal human subjects can discriminate different shades of color perceptually without being able to re-identify those shades as the shades experienced before after the presentation of the shades has been interrupted even for a very short period. Kelly gives the following example: Imagine someone is in a store shopping for paint to paint her kitchen. After deciding on a particular shade of beige displayed on a color-chart, she drops the chart, thereby losing sight of the selected shade. Now after recovering the chart from the floor it will be very difficult for the normal perceiver to re-identify the selected shade without judging from its location on the chart.43 Thus, Kelly argues, McDowell’s “demonstrative concepts” fail to satisfy the re-identification condition and therefore cannot be properly called concepts. Furthermore, it is argued, if we possess demonstrative concepts at all, we must have experiences in advance of acquiring these concepts, since in order to explain the recognitional capacities associated with or constitutive of the demonstrative concepts we need to take recourse to our having experiences of the objects possessing the properties expressed by the demonstrative concepts. Without having those experiences we could not acquire the recognitional capacities and without those capacities we could not be said to possess demonstrative concepts. Thus the content of the 42 Chuard

(2006) differentiates four different readings of this condition and gives a detailed account of its role in the arguments against conceptualist theories of perceptual content. 43 Kelly (2001) p.411.

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experiences has to be independent of the concepts even if having experiences with certain contents might lead to our developing certain kinds of demonstrative concepts.44 But even if the arguments against assuming demonstrative concepts are quite convincing, the possibility to resort to such concepts shows that the argument from the fine-grainedness of the content of perceptual experiences does not establish conclusively that perceptual content has to be nonconceptual either. Nevertheless, what must be noted is that the introduction of demonstrative concepts as such is no argument in favor of the conceptuality of perceptual content, it is just a defense of this position against the objection to conceptualism drawing on the fine-grainedness of perceptual experiences. In order to show that the content of perceptual experiences really is conceptual, the conceptualist needs to offer an independent argument which shows that having perceptual experiences in some way requires the perceiver to have demonstrative concepts, not only that having perceptual experiences of the kind we have is compatible with our having those concepts and deploying them in experience.45 The third argument for the nonconceptuality of perceptual content comprises a premise similar to the a premise of the first argument against epistemic internalism which was discussed in chapter 1: Animals and small children can be clearly said to perceive their environment and must be said to do so because otherwise it would be quite difficult to explain their behavior in any natural way. For example if we would not take a cat who is running after a mouse to perceive the mouse roughly as we do, i.e. as a small furry animal scurrying away from the cat in a certain direction, we would lack the resources to explain the cat’s behavior.46 So if animals and infants do not possess concepts, but if on the other hand it is obvious that they perceive their environment roughly as we do, then perceptual content has to be nonconceptual, since otherwise conceptless creatures could not have perceptual experiences with roughly the same content our experiences have.47 Now it is of course possible to deny that the percep44 Heck

(2000) presents an argument of this sort. will discuss such an argument in my discussion of the arguments against the nonconceptuality of perceptual content below. The argument aims at showing that for perceptual experiences to play the role they have to play regarding the justification of perceptual beliefs, their contents have to be conceptual. 46 Of course, this is not to say that the cat does not perceive more details about the mouse than we do, as for example the distinctive smell of the mouse. All that needs to be assumed here is that the cat’s experiences have to resemble our own in large parts if our explanation of the cat’s behavior is to be correct. 47 Arguments of this kind can be found in Evans (1982) p.124, Dretske (1995) 45 I

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tual experiences of animals (and maybe also perceptual experiences of infants) have contents which are like the contents of perceptual experiences of adult humans. Instead, one could claim that animal experiences and their contents are very different from our experiences, since animals lack the conceptual resources to experience the world as an objective, mindindependent reality as we do. For example McDowell argues along these lines, drawing heavily on a Kantian conception of experience: “[. . .] the objective world is only present to a self-conscious subject, a subject who can ascribe experiences to herself; it is only in the context of a subject’s ability to ascribe experiences to herself that experiences can constitute awareness of the world. [. . .] It is the spontaneity of the understanding, the power of conceptual thinking that brings both the world and the self into view. Creatures without conceptual capacities lack self-consciousness and - this is part of the same package - experience of objective reality.”48 The point which McDowell wants to make here is that animals (he does not say anything about human infants) cannot perceive the world as objective and mind-independent as we do, since animals lack a concept of objectivity and therefore remain bound to an immediate acquaintance with their environment, which - for them - is not shaped as a mind-independent realm of objects and events but rather as a “succession of problems and opportunities.”49 Now - counterintuitive as McDowell’s claim might seem - it is of course not possible to prove it wrong empirically since it cannot be tested by observing animals. Neither is the fact that we find it difficult to explain animal behavior without resorting to descriptions of their environment and descriptions of the animal’s behavior which presuppose that they perceive the environment roughly like we do a conclusive reason for rejecting McDowell’s claim. It is not conclusive since faced with this objection, McDowell might employ a further Kantian strategy and claim that when giving explanations for an animal’s behavior in terms of experiences which resemble our own, we are talking in an “as if” manner which is acceptable as a heuristic device but which may not be taken as literal speech. pp.107 and Peacocke (2001a) pp.260 and (2001b) pp.613. Peacocke, who has not always been a proponent of strict nonconceptualism himself, judges these arguments to be the strongest in favor of nonconceptualism regarding perceptual content. 48 McDowell (1994) p.114. 49 McDowell (1994) p.116.

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But besides pointing to the difficulties in explaining animal behavior without taking recourse to their purported perceptual experiences which resemble ours, there is another way one can respond to McDowell’s claim which has been pursued by Christopher Peacocke. Peacocke does not try to refute McDowell’s claim directly, but rather challenges his claim by showing that we do not have to credit a creature with concepts in order to credit it with perceptual awareness of the objective world. To show this, Peacocke distinguishes two senses in which a creature can be said to be aware of an objective world. First, a creature can be aware of an objective world without it also being aware of the objectivity of this world. Thus while it may be true that animals do not possess the concept of objectivity, they can be aware of the same objects in the world creatures who do possess concepts are aware of - the only thing they lack is awareness of the objectivity of these objects, which indeed requires the concept of objectivity and therefore is only available to creatures with a conceptual background. To put the matter more distinctly: While animals can only be aware of objective things in the world, we can also be aware of the fact that these things are objective.50 While animals lack the resources to ask themselves whether the objects they are presented with really are the way they are presented to them, they do not lack the resources to perceive the objects as being at a distance, being distinct from them and having distinct properties.51 Peacocke puts this as follows: “I conjecture that this distinction, in point of grasp of objectivity, between the minimal requirements for having states with nonconceptual contents, and what is involved in conceptual content, is a deeper reason why perceptual content cannot be explained in 50 But

note that this awareness is not due to perceptual experiences alone. Our perceptual experiences present us with objects in the world which are independent of our perceiving them, but they do not present us with the fact that those objects and their properties are part of an objective world. If they did this, perceptual illusions would have to be impossible, since then either in the case of an illusion the presentation of objectivity would have to be absent or we would not be able to find out that what is presented is in some way illusory. Thus while perceptual experiences present us with an objective world consisting of objects independent of our perceiving them, it does not present us with the objectivity of this world. The fact that we are presented with an objective world is only accessible to creatures with conceptual resources, as facts (or propositions) in general are. This difference is explained in an illuminating way in a critique of Searle’s account of perception according to which we perceive states of affairs by Ulrich (1997) p.259. 51 This probably does not hold for lower animals which do not have a central nervous system, but Peacocke’s argument does not need to hold for those animals for his point to be established by it. It suffices if it holds for higher animals, since we would not credit many of them with conceptual resources either.

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terms of conceptual content. The most primitive aspects of representational content in perception, which our subjective experience shares with the mere animals, do not involve the grasp of objectivity required for conceptual content. This is one of the reasons that trying to treat all perceptual content as conceptual involves an overascription. We should always distinguish between content that is objective, and content which is not only objective, but which is also conceived of as objective.”52 Now although I do disagree with Peacocke regarding the representational character of perceptual content, the point he makes here can be made as well if perceptual content is not taken to be representational in character but rather as presentational in character in Searle’s sense. It can even be made more convincingly, since the difference between conceptual content and nonconceptual content can be illuminated by recourse to the difference between a representation and a presentation: While animals share the presentations of objects and events in the world which are the content of our perceptual experiences, they do not share the representations of them we have in the form of beliefs about the world. Thus in order to be presented with mind-independent objects and events in the world, a creature does not need to possess concepts. Concepts are only needed to form representations of objects and events, i.e. perceptual beliefs about them, since the latter indeed requires applying the concept of objectivity. At this point I need to say something more about the difference between the - presumedly nonconceptual - content of perceptual experiences and the conceptual content of perceptual beliefs. This difference is reflected in the two different uses of expressions regarding perception in ordinary language I alluded to in the beginning of the discussion about the difference between sensation and perception. While it is weird to say things like: “I sense (or feel) that there is heat on my skin.” it is not at all weird to say “I see that the carpet is brown.” In the first case, the only natural way of saying what shall be said is “I feel heat.”. The reason for the weirdness of the first formulation is that one cannot sense of feel facts or propositions, i.e. one cannot feel or sense that something is the case. But in the second case, besides the propositional construction, a construction involving a direct reference to the perceived object also seems natural. So for example instead of saying “I see that the carpet is brown” one could as well say: “I see a brown carpet”. Now my conjecture is that these two alternative formulations express the content of perceptual beliefs and of perceptual 52 Peacocke

(2001a) p.264.

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experiences respectively: While the content of the perceptual belief is the proposition that the carpet is brown, the content of the perceptual experience is just the brown carpet as it is presented by the experience. Now - to return to the problem of perception spelled out above - how is it possible that real objects and events are presented to us and to animals in perceptual experiences? For example regarding visual perception, the explanation is quite simple on a direct realist account which takes perceptual contents to be nonconceptual: The real objects in the world reflect light, which in turn travels through the air and strikes the retina, thereby producing a retinal image, which is in turn processed by the brain, the result of this processing being our visual experience of the object. I hope that the reader will excuse the oversimplification in my description of the physiological process of vision. I allow myself to oversimplify, since the concrete details of the physiological process underlying visual perception are irrelevant to the point I want to make here. This point is that if perception is seen as a direct relation between the perceiver and the perceived objects in the world, not as a relation between the perceiver and mental representations of those objects, there is nothing mysterious about this relation anymore. The objects which are the contents of perceptual experiences in the way they are presented are at the same time part of the causes of the perceptual experiences. The possibility of difference between the object as part of the cause and the object as part of the content can then be accounted for by simply acknowledging the part the specific perceptual apparatus of the perceiver and the surrounding environmental conditions play in the causal process producing the perceptual experience.53 Of course, this account of perception presupposes the existence of objects and events as we perceive them. But if Davidson’s claim that our beliefs could not have determinate contents if we did not stand in causal contact with the world and the objects and events which are part of it is correct, this presupposition can be justified by an appeal to the fact that our beliefs have determinate contents. Thus on this account of perception the relation between perceived objects conceived of as the content of perceptual experiences and conceived of as part of the cause of the perceptual experience is not a particularly problematic relation: First, if the contents of perceptual experiences are real objects in space and time presented in certain ways, this accounts for the 53 Thus,

illusions as the waterfall illusion can be accounted for by considering the perceptual apparatus of human beings, while illusions like a mirage can be explained by recourse to the specific environmental conditions.

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nonconceptuality of perceptual content, because real objects and events do not assume a conceptual structure just by being presented in a certain perceiver-relative way. We can form perceptual beliefs with conceptual content about those objects and events but the objects themselves are not structured conceptually, which is why perceptual content cannot be conceptual. Moreover, if conceptualism were true, perceptual experiences could not be caused by the objects which are the content either, since concepts - as well as propositions, states of affairs or facts - cannot cause anything. Thus on my account the relation between cause and content of perceptual experiences can be described as follows: Real objects and events in the world in combination with the processes which take place in the perceptual apparatus of the perceiver cause perceptual experiences, but those objects, events and processes do not cause the content of the perceptual experience, since the content is the object itself presented in a certain way. They cause the perceptual experience and they cause the perceptual experience to have the special content it has, but they do not cause the content itself. The way of presentation is contributed by the circumstances and the particular perceptual system involved. Thus which features of the object are presented in the experience depends on the position the perceiver has in relation to the objects, the environmental conditions under which the perception takes place and on the special perceptual faculties the perceiver is equipped with. Thus for example, while the location of objects in a dark room is not presented to us, since we lack perceptual equipment to determine location in the dark, location of objects in the dark is presented to bats via ultrasound. So the mode in which objects and events are presented in perception partly depends on the sensory equipment of the perceiver which is why those objects and events may be presented in a misleading way sometimes. Furthermore, the difference between human perception and animal perception can be explained without taking recourse to a difference in perceptual content, which is conceptual in case of humans and nonconceptual or even nonexistent in the case of animals. The difference between animal and human perception rather is constituted by a difference in the role perceptual experiences play in the mental life of creatures which do not possess concepts and creatures which do possess them. While for the former creatures, perceptual experiences are the only way of access to the objective world, for the latter creatures it is not. This further explains why animals are far more prone to illusions and perceptual errors than we are:

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The sole access to reality animals have consists in presentations of objects and events, which can be misleading. Consider for example a cat running after a laser-pointer light, mistaking it for a material object. The cat sees the same thing as we do, namely a moving colored entity. What the cat fails to notice is that this moving entity is just a spot of light. Thus we, in contrast to animals, are able to use our conceptual resources as an independent way of access to the world. Now by calling this an independent way I of course do not want to imply that we could in principle have concepts without having perceptual experiences. It may well be that having perceptual experiences is necessary for developing a grasp of concepts. All I want to claim is that once the concepts are in place, conceptual thinking is a way of access to the world which is independent of particular perceptual experiences. Otherwise we could not notice that some perceptual experiences are illusory. If for example, we had no concepts of equality of length which is independent of any perceptual experience of long things, we would not be able to expose the famous Müller-Lyer-Illusion as an illusion. But being equipped with such an independent concept, we can just measure the lengths of the two lines with a ruler to conclude that they are of the same length although they do not appear to be. So the discussion of the arguments for the nonconceptuality of perceptual content already yielded some insight into the account of perception which is to be defended here. But before I can elaborate on this account I have to present and discuss the arguments offered by proponents of conceptualism in favor of their view. This is what I will do in the remainder of this section. 3.1.2.2

Against Nonconceptuality of Perceptual Content

My discussion of the arguments against the nonconceptuality of perceptual content serves the major aim to show that they all rest on an indirect realist premise which I claimed has to be rejected if Davidson’s account of coherence is to be rescued from the threat of circularity. The first argument for the contention that perceptual content has to be conceptual rests on the following question about the role of perceptual experiences in belief acquisition: What is the relation between the contents of perceptual experiences and the contents of perceptual beliefs? If the contents of perceptual experiences are nonconceptual, they cannot be identical to the contents of the corresponding perceptual beliefs. Thus the nonconceptualist has to explain the connection between perceptual experiences

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and perceptual beliefs without recourse to identity of content. Now on my account the answer to this question is quite straightforward: While perceptual experiences present the perceiver with objects and events in the world in a certain way and therefore have as their content precisely these objects and events in the way they are presented, perceptual beliefs have as their content propositions about those objects and events which do not figure the objects and events themselves as constituents, but rather conceptual representations of them.54 Now the question conceptualists challenge the nonconceptualist with is puzzling only from an indirect realist perspective, since the most plausible solution the indirect realist can provide for the problem of the transition from perceptual experiences to perceptual beliefs is identity of content and difference of form. Thus a wide-held position among indirect realists regarding this transition is that perceptual experiences in humans are nothing but acquisitions of beliefs or - more plausibly considering our ability to refrain from forming beliefs in the face of illusions - dispositions to acquire beliefs. But this fails to explain the common elements in human and animal perception. If human perceptual experiences simply are acquisitions of beliefs or dispositions to acquire beliefs, the common elements in human and animal perception remain inexplicable, since perceptual experiences of animals cannot be acquisitions of beliefs or dispositions to acquire beliefs. Thus if human perceptual experiences are nothing more than acquisitions of beliefs or dispositions to acquire beliefs, human perception and animal perception are utterly distinct. Human perception is explained as a relation between two kinds of representations and animal perception is not explained at all. The second argument for the conceptuality of perceptual content is derived from an epistemological premise and concerns the justification of perceptual beliefs. More specifically, it is argued that if perceptual content is nonconceptual, perceptual experiences cannot account for the justification of perceptual beliefs, since there is no way to infer perceptual beliefs from perceptual experiences or to put it more moderately, perceptual experiences cannot confer prima facie justification upon perceptual beliefs. The general point is that nonconceptualism cannot explain the justificatory role of perceptual experiences regarding perceptual beliefs. This argument is 54 Note

that what I claim here runs counter to an account of propositions which was developed by Russell (1905), according to which real objects can be constituents of propositions. I will not discuss this account of propositions here, since doing this would take a chapter of its own. Rather, I simply take a Fregean stance against Russell.

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endorsed by McDowell when he writes: “Having things appear to one in a certain way is already a mode of actual operation of conceptual capacities. [. . .] In the context of that claim, it takes work to ensure that the capacities are recognizable as genuinely conceptual capacities - that the invocation of the conceptual is not mere word-play. What is needed is that the very same capacities can also be exploited in active judgements. And what secures this identification, between capacities that are operative in appearances and capacities that are operative in judgements, is the way in which appearances are rationally linked into spontaneity at large: the way appearances can constitute reasons for judgements about objective reality - indeed do constitute reasons for judgements in suitable circumstances [. . .].”55 Now this argument obviously rests on an indirect realist premise, since it presupposes that perceptual experiences are structured propositionally and therefore can be considered reasons for perceptual beliefs. But this cannot be the case if perceptual experiences are direct presentations of objects and events in the world. Since objects and events in the world do not have propositional structure, they cannot serve as reasons for beliefs. Thus this argument is not a problem for a direct realist version of nonconceptualism. Rather offering such an argument against this version of nonconceptualism would be begging the question against direct realism, since the direct realist can of course not maintain that perceptual experiences justify beliefs. The reason he cannot do this are similar to Davidson’s reasons for excluding perceptions from the class of epistemic justifiers, they just have to be put differently: Davidson claims that perceptions cannot justify beliefs, since they are mere causal intermediaries between the world and our beliefs about the world. Now the direct realist has to subscribe to a similar claim: Since the contents of perceptual experiences are real objects and events presented in a certain way, of course perceptual content cannot justify propositional content. Thus the direct realist has to explain the relation between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs as a non-justificatory relation. The question of justification of perceptual beliefs by perceptual experiences arises only on indirect realist premises, more specifically on the premise that the relation between the contents of perceptual experiences and the contents of perceptual beliefs is a relation between two kinds of representations. 55 McDowell

(1994) p.62.

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The third main argument for conceptualism is more complicated, since it rests on a distinction between perceptual experiences considered as mental states and their contents. Drawing on this distinction, it is argued that the arguments for nonconceptualism at best establish that perceptual experiences considered as mental states may be concept-independent, but not that their contents are concept-independent.56 Thus the claim is that if one distinguishes between the nonconceptuality of perceptual experiences considered as mental states and the nonconceptuality of the contents of perceptual experiences, it can be seen that while the arguments for nonconceptualism support the claim that being in certain perceptual states may not require possession of concepts, they do not support the conclusion that a perceptual state’s having content does not require the person who has that perceptual state to possess concepts. Since I agree with Peacocke in judging the argument from the continuity between animal and human perception to be the strongest of the arguments in favor of nonconceptualism, I will present an argument of the above kind directed at this argument here. The version of the argument is due to Jeff Speaks.57 He puts the above described arguments in terms of “nonconceptual content in the relative sense” and “nonconceptual content in the absolute sense” by which he means state-nonconceptuality and contentnonconceptuality respectively. He writes: “It seems to me that this argument [the argument from the continuity between animal and human perception, B.S.], while intuitively appealing, contains a non sequitur. Suppose we grant though we will find reason to doubt this later - that animals do not possess concepts, and that our perceptions may share representational properties with the perceptions of animals. It does not follow from these two claims that there is a special kind of content, (absolute) nonconceptual content, which the perceptions of lower animals (and, by the concluding argument, those of human beings as well) have.”58 Thus what Speaks wants to argue is that the argument from the continuity between animal and human perception merely establishes that being in perceptual states does not require having concepts, not that the contents of those states themselves have to be nonconceptual. So while it might be 56 This

position is argued for in Byrne (2005), Speaks (2005) and Crowther (2006). Speaks (2005). 58 Speaks (2005) p.366. 57 Cp.

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true that humans and animals share certain perceptual states, the content of those states is different in humans and animals, since humans possess concepts and therefore the contents of their perceptual experiences can still be structured conceptually, even if they are perceptual experiences of the same objects and events as the experiences of animals. Thus to have perceptual experiences of those objects and events does not require possessing concepts while having perceptual experiences with the specific kind of content human perceptual experiences have does require this. One possible response to this line of argument is to claim that it is impossible to distinguish between state-types which require the possession of concepts and state-types which do not require this without relying on the difference between conceptual and nonconceptual content, since this difference is the only criterion available by which one can distinguish between the two different kinds of state-types. If this is true, then statenonconceptualism would rest on content-nonconceptualism and establishing the former by the argument from the continuity between human and animal perception would mean to establish the latter.59 But I think there is an even easier way to respond to Speaks’ argument: To me it looks as if the argument simply does not establish anything regarding the conceptuality or nonconceptuality of perceptual content. This can be seen clearly from a direct realist perspective: For the direct realist, the contents of perceptual experiences consist in objects and events presented in a certain way which depends on the perceptual faculties of the perceiver and the circumstances under which the perceptual experience takes place. Now of course, from this it does not follow that there can be no differences between the content of human perceptual experiences and the content of animal perceptual experiences, since the perceptual faculties of humans and animals differ (even to a great extent in some cases.) But from the direct realist perspective, this difference cannot be explained by claiming that the content of animal perceptual experiences is structured nonconceptually while the content of human perceptual experiences is structured conceptually, because what is the content of - animal and human - perceptual experiences are just the objects and events which are presented in different ways in the experiences. Now since - as I have been already arguing above - these objects and events themselves are not structured conceptually, neither the content of animal perceptual experiences nor the content of human perceptual experiences can be structured conceptually. What almost certainly differs regarding human and animal perceptual ex59 This

point is made by Bermúdez (2007) pp.66.

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periences is the way in which objects and events are presented. So indeed the contents of human and animal perceptual experiences are different, but this difference consists solely in a difference in the way of presentation of objects and events. Now this difference between the two kinds of content does not seem to be due to the fact that humans possess concepts while animals do not. More probably, the difference is simply due to the differences in the perceptual faculties of humans and animals. This can further be seen by considering humans with deficiencies in perceptual faculties: The contents of the perceptual experiences of a blind person will differ greatly from the contents of the perceptual experiences of a person with normal eyesight. They will differ not only because the blind person lacks visual experiences, but also because the experiences the blind person has due to the other sense modalities in most cases are enhanced compared to those had by someone with normal eyesight. But these differences in content are not due to differences in conceptual resources. Of course there will be differences in the conceptual resources of the two persons, since for example the blind person will probably lack color concepts. But these differences in conceptual resources have to be explained by recourse to the differences in perceptual experiences, not the other way round. Rather, the blind person’s perceptual experiences differ from the normal person’s experiences, since there is a difference in perceptual faculties which leads to a difference in the way of presentation of objects and events in perceptual experiences. Thus the argument from continuity between animal and human perception supports more than just a “state-conclusion”. The only thing which can be established by pointing to the difference between perceptual states and their contents is that there can be some differences between the content of human and animal perceptual experiences. But this is something no nonconceptualist relying on the argument from continuity between animal and human perception has to deny. All the nonconceptualist claims is that the conceptualist fails to provide an explanation why it is sometimes correct to say that a human person and an animal perceive the same thing, since the conceptualist has to maintain that what humans perceive is structured conceptually, while what animals perceive is not. Thus, on the conceptualist account what humans perceive and what animals perceive cannot be the same thing. On a direct realist account of nonconceptualism on the other hand, it is perfectly clear what it means that humans and animals perceive the same thing, since on this account the contents of both animal and human per-

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ceptual experiences are real objects and events. Thus for example if a dog and his master both perceive a stick, which the master throws for his dog to fetch, they perceive the same thing in the sense that they both perceive the stick, which therefore features in the content of their experiences. Of course they will perceive the stick in different ways, the dog being able to follow the movement of the stick hurtling through the air much more accurately than the man and the man being able to feel the texture of the stick much more accurately by touching it with his hands than the dog could by touching it with its paws. But nevertheless they both perceive the stick rather than - as a conceptualist like McDowell would have to say - the man perceives a stick while the dog perceives an “opportunity to run after”. Thus we have to conclude that none of the main arguments against nonconceptualism is conclusive if we allow for the possibility of maintaining a direct realist version of nonconceptualism which encompasses the claim that the contents of perceptual experiences are objects and events in the objective world presented in a certain way. So in the following section I will assume that a nonconceptualist version of direct realism can be maintained in discussing the question whether Davidson’s account of coherence can profit from being supplemented with such a version of nonconceptualism in order to avoid the circle which threatens regarding the development of concepts in the process of triangulation. 3.1.3

Triangulation and Perception

To see which role perception has to play in the development of concepts and the genesis of systems of beliefs, we first have to briefly reconsider Davidson’s account of the process of triangulation as a necessary condition for this genesis. The following passage should bring to mind this account quite clearly again: “[. . .] each of two people is reacting differentially to sensory stimuli streaming in from a certain direction. Projecting the incoming lines outward, the common cause is at their intersection. If the two people now note each other’s reactions (in the case of language, verbal reactions), each can correlate these observed reactions with his or her stimuli from the world. A common cause has been determined. The triangle which gives content to thought and speech is complete.”60 60 Davidson

(1991) p.213.

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So on Davidson’s account, what determines the contents of perceptual beliefs is the part of the cause of those beliefs which is publicly accessible, i.e. the objects or events in the world which on a direct realist account of perception are the contents of perceptual experiences. But the fact the we thus stand in causal relations to the world alone does not account for our acquiring concepts of these objects and events, since a dog is caused to react to (some) objects and events in a similar way as a human, but does not acquire concepts despite that. So the process of triangulation Davidson describes cannot wholly account for the development of concepts and beliefs. He acknowledges that himself, when he writes that the process of triangulation is merely a necessary condition for the acquisition of concepts.61 It is a necessary condition for this development, since it provides the triangulating creatures with a criterion to check their reactions to the environment and therefore allows them to discriminate appropriate from inappropriate reactions, thus enabling them to distinguish themselves from an environment which is objective in the sense of being distinct from them. But this does not mean that triangulation provides the creatures with a conceptual grasp of their environment. Rather this merely means that the process of triangulation provides the creatures with a conscious distance to the world they inhabit which is a necessary condition for the development of concepts. Now what is needed in addition to the process of triangulation to account for the development of concepts and beliefs? If we consider Davidson’s answer to this question, the circularity in his account becomes rather obvious. He writes: “Without one creature to observe another, the triangulation that locates the relevant objects in a public space could not take place. I do not mean by this that one creature observing another provides either creature with the concept of objectivity; the presence of two or more creatures interacting with each other and with a common environment is at best a necessary condition for such a concept. Only communication can provide the concept, for to have the concept of objectivity, the concepts of objects and events that occupy a shared world, of objects and events whose properties and existence is independent of our thought, requires that we are aware of the fact that we share thoughts and a world with others.”62 61 Cp.

Davidson (1997a) p.128. (1990) p.202 (my italics).

62 Davidson

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According to Davidson, only creatures who are capable of interpreting the speech of other creatures can be aware of the latter fact, since languageless creatures do not have propositional attitudes and therefore cannot be aware of any fact.63 Thus it seems as if on Davidson’s account, in order to develop the concept of objectivity, a creature must already have mastered a language. But this means that in order to develop the concept of objectivity, we already must have beliefs, since what could it mean to say that some being communicates linguistically, i.e. utters and understands sentences, but does not grasp the thoughts or beliefs expressed by these utterances?64 Therefore Davidson’s account of the development of concepts and of beliefs with determinate content is either circular or incomplete: Either the process of triangulation has to be backed by linguistic communication to lead to the development of concepts and beliefs, in which case the account is circular, since in this case, the triangulating creatures would need to have concepts and beliefs in advance of acquiring them. Or triangulation suffices for the development of beliefs without being backed by linguistic communication, in which case the account is incomplete, since it does not explain how the process of triangulation alone can account for the fact that conceptual resources are developed.65 Thus Davidson’s theory cannot account for a pre-conceptual conscious access to an objective world, which is necessary for the process of triangulation to take place without the triangulating creatures already possessing concepts. Neither can his theory of triangulation account for our acquiring concepts and the ability to think propositionally. Of course these two problems are related. Nevertheless, I will deal with them separately in the following in order to show how both of them can be solved by recourse to an adequate theory of perception. The core idea to the solution of both problems is this: If the process of triangulation is to be responsible for our developing concepts, the triangulating creatures must have a form of conscious access to the objects and events in the world which is independent of their already having triangulated and which is independent of their having a language. It is only by recourse to such a form of access to the world 63 Cp.

Davidson (1975) p.170, Davidson (1982b) p.101 and Davidson (1997a) p.130. 64 Davidson himself acknowledges the dependence of the ability to speak on having thoughts and beliefs: “The dependence of speaking on thinking is evident, for to speak is to express thoughts.”(Davidson (1975) p.154). 65 Davidson rejects the latter alternative and explicitly endorses the former: “Until a base line has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point in saying one’s own thoughts or words have a propositional content.”(Davidson (1991) p.213).

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that the possibility of acquiring a language and of developing thoughts and beliefs with determinate contents can be explained. Now if perceptual experiences can provide this previous access, the problem of circularity would be solved. I will consider this possible solution in two steps: First, I will try to show that having perceptual experiences is a necessary condition for the process of triangulation to take place and second, I will try to explain the role of perceptual experiences in the process of triangulation. Now the first problem with Davidson’s account can be traced back to his causal theory of perception or, more specifically, to the fact that Davidson fails to distinguish properly between sensations, which do not have any content at all but rather connect the creature which has the sensation to its environment “immediately” via causal connections and perceptual experiences, which have content and therefore put the perceiving creature at a distance from its environment of which the creature is - however dim aware in having the perceptual experience.66 This lack of distinction becomes obvious if we reconsider Davidson’s views on the role of perception in the process of triangulation: For him, perceptual experiences feature as a mere causal factor in this process, i.e. the triangulating creatures are caused to react to the world by their perceptual experiences which in turn are caused by objects and events in the environment of the creatures. Thus, in the case of animals, causal chains are all there is to the process of triangulation. Now while this might be true for cases of triangulation which are based on reactions which are “wired in” as Davidson himself describes it using the example of a swarm of fish,67 it cannot be true for cases of triangulation which involve learned reactions as Davidson describes it by reference to higher animals a few lines later in the same article: “A learned reaction can be observed in certain monkeys which make three distinguishable sounds depending on whether they see a snake, an eagle, or a lion approaching; the other monkeys, perhaps without seeing the threat themselves, react to the warning sounds in ways appropriate to the different dangers, by climbing trees, running, or hiding.”68 The reason why processes of triangulation like this cannot be a sole matter of causal chains is that the kind of learned reactions involved here require 66 For

a criticism of Davidson’s conception on the same lines see McDowell (1994) p.145. 67 Davidson (1997a) p.128. 68 Op. cit.

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that the reacting creatures have some kind of conscious access to the objective world prior to triangulation. Thus for this kind of triangulation to be possible, mere sensations do not suffice. And this means that it cannot be true that the conscious access to the world these creatures have is itself constituted in the process of triangulation. On the contrary, this access has to be already present in order for the creatures to be able to triangulate, since without some kind of previous conscious access to the world, the creatures would not be able to recognize each other as distinct living beings and their mutual reactions as reactions to distinct features of an external environment. But a mere causal theory of perception cannot account for this previous conscious access to an external world and therefore it cannot account for the possibility of cases of triangulation which involve learned rather than “wired in” reactions. The problem here is that a creature’s standing in causal relations to the environment alone does not have to lead to the creature’s having conscious access to this environment. Thus on a purely causal account of perception even the possibility of two creatures triangulating remains a mystery. This point is also made by Dagfinn Føllesdal, who writes with respect to Davidson’s account of perception: “Generally, I feel unease when adherents of causal theories of perception or of reference speak as if causality can individuate objects.”69 What Føllesdal wants to stress here is that a causal theory of perception fails to explain how perception succeeds in providing the perceiving creature with conscious access to an objective world consisting of distinct objects, events and creatures. Føllesdal explains this further: “Reification is a process which is fundamental for our theories and at the same time depends upon them. It is in my opinion also crucial to language learning and communication. When we try to understand another person, we have to make assumptions concerning which objects he perceives and which properties he takes them to have, and thereby concerning his theories and the structure of what he perceives, his expectations, or his noema, to speak with Husserl.”70 Thus Føllesdal’s objection as well as mine is that a causal theory of perception must fail to distinguish between mere causal relations between a 69 Føllesdal 70 Føllesdal

(1999) p.724. (1999) p.725.

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creature and the world and - as Føllesdal calls them - “intentional” relations between a creature and its environment, which involves the creature’s being aware of its environment as something which is distinct from itself. Now Davidson replies to this objection as follows: “Føllesdal is certainly right that no simple causal theory of perception can explain our concepts of objects, events and their properties. We are built to discriminate objects, to keep track of them, expect them to emerge from their holes or from behind trees, and in some cases to feed or eat us. But these finely tuned abilities are not the same as thinking of things as objects and events. This demands the apparatus of propositional thoughts with truth conditions and the awareness of possible error. [. . .] Perception is propositional: when we look or feel or hear we believe. What we are caused by our senses to believe is often true, which in the simplest cases it could not fail to be, since the content of our simplest beliefs is necessarily fixed by the history of past perceivings.”71 But this is no satisfying answer to Føllesdal’s concern, but rather begs the question against it by affirming that human perceptual experiences can give humans the access to the world needed, since human perceptual experiences are structured propositionally. It furthermore again hints to the circle in Davidson’s account of triangulation, since the process of triangulation was offered as a step on the way to the development of conceptual resources and propositional attitudes, not as a process which can only take place as a result of already having them. This brings me to the second problem of Davidson’s account, which can be spelled out by considering another lack of distinctions: Besides failing to distinguish between the role of sensations and perceptual experiences by assigning them both a merely causal role, Davidson does not distinguish properly between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs:72 71 Davidson

(1999) p.732. Thus when Davidson speaks of animals seeing, hearing and smelling things in the passages quoted previously, this must be seeing, hearing and smelling in a different sense than human seeing, hearing and smelling. In another essay he offers similar remarks: “[. . .] the abilities to speak, perceive and think develop together, gradually. We perceive the world through language, that is, through having language.” (Davidson (1997b) p.141.) 72 In an answer to a critique from McDowell (1998) pertaining to Davidson’s treatment of perception, Davidson himself acknowledges this problem: “I have the problem, which I think a form of externalism at least partly solves, of explaining how external features of the world cause us, through the medium of the senses, to form largely correct beliefs. This is a debate I look forward to pursuing on future occasions.” (Davidson (1998) p.321.) Unfortunately, Davidson did not elaborate further

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“Many of my simple perceptions of what is going on in the world are not based on further evidence, my perceptual beliefs are simply caused directly by the events and objects around me.”73 But this cannot be completely true. While it might be true that perceptual experiences considered as mental states are caused directly by objects and events around the perceiver, this cannot be true for perceptual beliefs. This can be seen by first considering the fact that perceptual experiences do not automatically give rise to perceptual beliefs. Rather, which beliefs are formed as a result of a given perceptual experience is at least in some cases influenced by background knowledge of the perceiver. And second this much I have to concede to conceptualism - the contents of the perceptual beliefs which are formed on the basis of perceptual experiences not only depend on the causes of the perceptual experiences, the perceptual faculties and the environment of the perceiver, but on his background assumptions and conceptual resources as well. The reason for this is that - as Davidson himself claims - the contents of our perceptual beliefs are partly determined by the relations of the concepts which are parts of these contents to other concepts and by the inferential relations which hold between perceptual beliefs and other beliefs. Thus someone from a technologically unsophisticated society might believe that he sees some blocks of stone where people from our technologically advanced society - as a result of undergoing a perceptual experience with the same content - believe that they see a nuclear power plant.74 So of course what is believed as a result of having certain perceptual experiences cannot be a question of the causal relations between the perceiver and the perceived environment alone. At least some conceptual element has to enter the process of the formation of perceptual beliefs, which therefore cannot be a sole matter of causality. Furthermore, this process cannot be a purely causal process, since it is possible to withhold the transition from experience to belief in the face of an experience. Again, illusions are a good example: When faced with the waterfall illusion or the Müller-Lyer-illusion we refrain from believing what we see, if we have the right background beliefs. Thus our conceptual background partly determines which perceptual beliefs are formed as a result of perceptual experiences.75 Perceptual experiences carry with them a disposition to believe that what is seen really is as it is seen, but on this point in his later writings. 73 Davidson (1991) p.205. 74 For similar examples involving children see Schantz (1990) pp.143. 75 Maybe this is a part of the explanation why the claim that human perceptual experiences in contrast to animal perceptual experiences have conceptual content seems

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this disposition to form perceptual beliefs only leads to the formation of a belief if there are no background beliefs which prevent the formation of certain perceptual beliefs. Considering this, the difference between perceptual experiences of conceptless creatures and perceptual experiences of creatures which possess concepts can be stated rather easily: While the former creatures do not form perceptual beliefs as a result of undergoing certain perceptual experiences, the latter creatures (under normal circumstances) do form such beliefs on the basis of their perceptual experiences. Now of course, the possession of such beliefs makes for a great difference between the mental lives of conceptless creatures and creatures who have concepts, since the ability to form beliefs opens up a possibility of access to the world which is epistemically independent of the access to the world via perception. Thus while conceptless creatures have to take what is presented to them at face value, beings who possess conceptual resources can use these resources to question the objectivity of what is presented to them. Davidson acknowledges this difference when he writes: “Animals show by their behavior that they are making fine distinctions, and many of the things they discriminate we do too. They recognize individual people and other animals, distinguish among various sorts of animal, find their way back to places they have been before, and can learn all sorts of tricks. So it is important to reflect on why none of this shows they have propositional attitudes; beliefs, desires, doubts, intentions, and the rest. Dumb beasts see and hear and smell all sorts of things, but they do not perceive that anything is the case. Some non-human animals can learn a great deal, but they do not learn that something is true.”76 Now Davidson’s reason for denying animals the ability to perceive that something is the case is quite straightforward: Animals do not speak and therefore, so Davidson argues, we lack sufficient evidence to attribute to them mental states with propositional content.77 Now I completely agree with him regarding the claim that we cannot justify the attribution of mental states with propositional content to animals on the basis of the obserso compelling: We, as a result of having a background of concepts and beliefs in which these concepts figure, are able to refrain from believing what we see in a way in which animals are not. We can use our background beliefs as a source of access to the world which is independent of particular perceptual experiences and thereby realize that certain perceptual experiences cannot be veridical, as for example when we measure the Müller-Lyer-lines using our concept of sameness of length and a ruler. 76 Davidson (2001) p.136. 77 Cp. for example Davidson (1982a) pp.101 and Davidson (1997a) pp.127.

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vation of their behavior. But I do not think that this claim also constitutes a conclusive reason to deny animals the ability to perceive objects and events in the world in contrast to the ability to merely discriminate them using sensory resources. On the contrary, I think that we have to attribute the ability to perceive to (higher) animals if we want to understand how it is possible for humans to develop conceptual resources and systems of beliefs. The reason for this again is that the process of triangulation requires the triangulating creatures to have some form of conscious access to the objective world which first precedes and then goes along with the process of triangulation. So at his point, the relation between the two problems in Davidson’s account of triangulation becomes clear: Without a form of conscious access to the world which is independent of the process of triangulation, neither can this process take place in the form Davidson describes it, nor can it play a constitutive role in the development of thought and language. But Davidson’s causal theory of perception cannot explain how this form of conscious access is possible for two reasons: First, his theory does not contain a proper distinction between sensations and perceptual experiences. And second, it does not explain how the acquisition of language and thought is possible on the basis of triangulation since it does not contain a proper distinction between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs. This can further be seen by considering Davidson’s description of the acquisition of language: “[. . .] the learner is rewarded, whether deliberately or not, when the learner makes sounds or otherwise responds in ways the teacher finds appropriate in situations the teacher classes together. The learner is subsequently caused to make similar sounds by situations the learner instinctively classes together. [. . .] Success at the first level is achieved to the extent that the learner responds with sounds the teacher finds similar to situations the teacher finds similar. The teacher is responding to two things: the external situation and the responses of the learner. The learner responds to two things: the external situation and the responses of the teacher. All these relations are causal. Thus the essential triangle is formed which makes communication about shared objects and events possible. But it is also this triangle that determines the content of the learner’s words and thoughts when these become complex enough to deserve the term. The role of the teacher in determining the content of the learner’s thought is not just the

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‘determine’ of causality. For in addition to being a cause of those thoughts, what makes the particular aspect of the cause of the learner’s response the aspect that gives them the content they have is the fact that this aspect of the cause is shared by the teacher and the learner.”78 Now it can be clearly seen from this passage that Davidson’s account of language learning lacks the above distinctions. First, the fact that the learner and the teacher possess the needed criteria of similarity cannot be a result of the process of triangulation itself, since teacher and learner need to possess them in advance for the process to start in the first place. Now it can be argued that the teacher must possess a language in advance and uses it as a source for the criteria of similarity. But what about the learner? Davidson resorts to an appeal to instinct here. But if it is instinct which provides the learner with the needed criteria, we would have to conclude that many of the basic distinctions we make between objects and situations in the world are connate to us. But this conclusion contradicts Davidson’s claim that the basic distinctions animals and humans make are developed in interaction, since it is interaction which provides them with access to a world which is independent of them. Thus if the process of triangulation is to be relevant to the development of the concept of such a world, the creatures triangulating or learning a language have to have a form of access to the world which precedes triangulation and which can provide them with the needed criteria of similarity. To be sure, if the creatures have these criteria, triangulation still plays a vital role on the way to the development of conceptual resources and of systems of beliefs, since - on this I agree with Davidson - triangulation is the only way to check if the objects and events picked out by those criteria really are similar. Without the interaction in the process of triangulation there would indeed be no way to tell if the things reacted to really are there or if they are mere imaginations. As Davidson puts it: “If we consider a single creature by itself, its responses, no matter how complex, cannot show that it is reacting to, or thinking about, events a certain distance away rather than, say, on its skin. The solipsist’s world can be any size; which is to say, from the solipsist’s point of view it has no size, it is not a world.”79 78 Davidson 79 Davidson

(1990) p.203 (my italics). (1992) p.119.

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Thus a non-triangulating creature may react to objects and events in the world, but it will never be able to develop concepts of those objects and events or acquire a language which can be used to refer to these objects and events and express beliefs about them, since it will not be able to develop a notion of objectivity. So what can be gained the process of triangulation is the insight that what is perceived and reacted to is a common cause and that therefore it is something which is objective in the sense of being independent of the triangulating creatures. But this does not mean that creatures who do not gain this insight in the process of triangulation are not conscious of those causes as objects and events distinct from them in advance of triangulation. What they lack without triangulation is not conscious access to the objective world, but a criterion on which to decide whether what they have access to or what is presented to them as distinct from them really is objective. Thus Davidson is right when he writes that the situation of triangulation “creates the space needed for error.”80 But this space can only be developed by creatures who already have perceptual access to the world without the need to triangulate first. So what should have become clear by now is that and how an account of perception like the one developed above can solve Davidson’s first problem, i.e. the problem how triangulation based on learned reactions is possible in the first place: If perception gives us (and higher animals without language) conscious access to the objective world, the criteria of similarity necessary for the identification of common causes by classing objects in the world as similar as well as classing the responses of other beliefs to these objects as similar can be provided by perceptual experiences. It is the similarity of those experiences of which we (and animals) are aware which allows us (and animals) to class their contents as similar. Or to put it differently: In perceptual experiences objects and events as well as the behavior of other creatures are presented to us as similar which is the reason why we class them together as similar. The presentations of objects and events which are the contents of perceptual experiences can thus serve as a basis for triangulation and communication. The needed “shared world” is already present in perceptual experiences since these present objects, events and other living beings.81 Hence perceptual experiences 80 Davidson

(2001) p.143. himself hints at something like this in some essays as for example in this passage: “[. . .] we group together the causes of someone’s responses, verbal and otherwise, because we find the responses similar. What makes the relevant similarities? The answer again is obvious; it is we, because of the way we are constructed (evolution had something to do with this), who find these responses easy and natural 81 Davidson

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close the gap between causality and the possibility of triangulation which involves learned reactions in Davidson’s account by providing us with the needed conscious access to a shared objective world. The common causes can thus be located without recourse to already existing linguistic capacities, since our perceptual faculties are similar and therefore our perceptual experiences are similar.82 Now, regarding Davidson’s second problem, i.e. the question which role the process of triangulation plays in the acquisition of concepts and beliefs, I concur with him in holding that only human triangulation suffices for the development of concepts and beliefs. But what explains the difference between human triangulation and animal triangulation cannot be that humans possess a language while animals do not. Now the reason for this difference probably cannot be found out by philosophical investigation, but rather has to be found out by empirical science which deals with the differences in brain structure and/or genetic makeup of humans and higher animals. But regardless of the precise reason for this difference, if we are talking about animals endowed with the right organic resources for the development of thought and language, the process of triangulation can account for the development of thought and language if it is supplemented by the above theory of perception, since perceptual experiences provide us with access to the world in the form of content which consists of presentations of objects and events in the world. Thus what determines common causes becomes clearer: The common causes are those objects and events presented to us in perceptual experiences. These objects and events are as I have been arguing above - part of the causes of the perceptual experiences. Now if the perceptual faculties of the triangulating creatures are sufficiently similar, the perceptual experiences caused by the objects and events and their reactions to the perceptual experiences will be sufficiently similar as well. So perceptual experiences conceived of as mental states to class together. If we did not, we would have no reason to claim that others were responding to the same objects and events (i.e. causes) that we are. [. . .] This clearly is true of animals; and of course it becomes more obvious the more like us the animal is.”(Davidson (1990) p.202) But I fail to see how a view as the one proposed above is reconcilable with his claims that perceptions serve as mere causal intermediaries and that linguistic communication is a necessary condition for the development of the concept of objectivity and of beliefs with propositional contents. 82 Davidson sees the necessity of similarity of the faculties of the triangulating creatures as well: “It is clear that for triangulation to work, the creatures involved must be very much alike. They must class together the same distal stimuli among them each other’s reactions to those stimuli. In the end it is just this double sharing of propensities that gives meaning to the idea of classing things together. (Davidson (2001) p.143).

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caused by objects and events in the environment of the perceiver which at the same time have those objects and events as their contents can account for the development of the criteria of similarity needed to triangulate. If on the contrary perception is conceived of as being a purely causal relation, it indeed seems as if prior possession of a language is necessary in order for the process of triangulation to lead to the development of beliefs with conceptual content. The reason for this is that causal relations between a creature and its environment cannot account for the formation of propositional attitudes. As we have seen in the consideration of perceptual illusions, the same experience can lead to the formation of different beliefs depending on the background beliefs and the richness of the conceptual resources the person forming the belief possesses. So causal relations alone cannot account for the formation of particular beliefs. Now to make the transition from perceptual experiences to perceptual beliefs, interaction with other living beings is essential - so far I agree with Davidson. But this interaction has to be backed by an access to the world the interacting creatures have independently of their interaction. Otherwise they could not interact with each other, since for both, the other is at first nothing more than a part of the external world. Thus for example, the child which learns a language by interacting with its mother and father and other individuals has to be able to pick them out as other living beings in advance of learning the language. At this point it becomes obvious why the contents of perceptual experience must be nonconceptual in order for them to play the role they play in the acquisition of thought and language: If the contents of perceptual experiences were structured conceptually, the circle in Davidson’s account would reappear on the level of perception, since then having perceptual experiences would require having concepts and the process of triangulation could not be a necessary condition for our developing concepts. But as we have seen in the preceding section, we can safely assume that perceptual contents are nonconceptual. Thus I take it that supplementing Davidson’s account of coherence by a direct realist nonconceptualist account of perception solves the problem of circularity. 3.1.4

Perception without Empiricism

Now that it has been established that perceptual experiences - conceived of as having as their contents presentations of objects and events in the external world - can account for the possibility of triangulation and therefore

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for the possibility of our developing concepts and beliefs with determinate contents, one question remains open: Isn’t this solution to the problem of circularity in Davidson’s approach a relapse into empiricist foundationalism? Therefore this paragraph is dedicated to an explanation why the recourse to perceptions in order to solve the problem of circularity does not have to constitute such a relapse. Briefly summarized, this explanation will look like this: Something can be called the basis of a set of beliefs in two senses. The first sense is the sense of empiricist foundationalism: For something to be the foundation or the basis of a set of beliefs in this sense means for it to be the basic ground of the validity or justification of the beliefs which are parts of this set. In most cases the basis of a set of beliefs in this sense is taken to stand in no need of validation or justification itself, but rather counts as “immediately justified”.83 I will call a basis or foundation in this sense an epistemic basis or foundation in the following. The second sense in which something can be said to be the basis or the foundation of a set of beliefs is that something can be the ground of the existence or the origin of the beliefs which are parts of the set. I will term a basis or foundation in this sense the genetic basis or foundation in the discussion to come. Now I will argue that if we take perceptions and perceptual experiences to be the genetic basis of our systems of beliefs without taking them to be its epistemic basis, perceptions and perceptual experiences can be epistemologically appreciated as important genetic contributors to the coherence of our systems of beliefs without this appreciation constituting a relapse into empiricist foundationalism. Now to see why this is so, we first have to reconsider Davidson’s main two arguments against variants of epistemology which take sensations, perceptual experiences, perceptions or perceptual beliefs to be the basis of our systems of beliefs. These arguments, which he offers in various of his essays pertain to two different variants of an epistemology of this kind. The first argument, which he prominently offers in Davidson (1983) is directed against a position according to which perceptual beliefs are “immediately justified” by their relations to perceptual experiences. He writes: “Suppose we say that sensations themselves, verbalized or not, justify certain beliefs that go beyond what is given in sensation. So, under certain conditions, having the sensation of seeing a green light flashing may justify the belief that a green light is flashing. The problem is to see how the sensation justifies the 83 Cp.

Alston (1976) p.165.

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belief. Of course if someone has the sensation of seeing a green light flashing, it is likely, under certain circumstances, that a green light is flashing. We can say this, since we know of his sensation, but he can’t say it, since we are supposing he is justified without having to depend on believing he has the sensation. Suppose he believed he didn’t have the sensation. Would the sensation still justify him in the belief in an objective flashing green light?”84 The problem here is that it remains unclear how the relation to a perceptual experience or a perceptual experience itself can justify a perceptual belief without the detour via the belief that one has this perceptual experience, in which case it seems to be this belief rather than the experience which justifies the perceptual belief. Now it is clear that this argument is primarily directed against positions which take perceptual experiences to be the epistemic basis of systems of beliefs, since to claim that perceptual experiences justify perceptual beliefs is just to claim that they constitute the epistemic basis of perceptual beliefs. So is the position that perceptual experiences are the genetic basis of systems of beliefs also vulnerable to this argument? I do not think that it is, because a position which encompasses the claim that perceptual experiences merely are the genetic basis for perceptual beliefs is of course not vulnerable to the objection that it cannot explain how perceptual experiences can justify perceptual beliefs, since to claim that perceptual experiences are the genetic basis for perceptual beliefs does not commit one to the claim that the relation between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs is in any way justificatory. One can of course maintain both claims, as many proponents of reliabilism do. But for obvious reasons, I do not want to defend both claims. Rather, I agree with Davidson regarding the internalist point he makes in the last part of the above quotation: A mere genetic relation between something and a belief cannot be a justificatory relation. So Davidson’s first argument is not a problem for my position. So let us turn to Davidson’s second argument, which he offers with regard to Quine’s epistemological position and his theory of meaning.85 To un84 Davidson

(1983) p.142. Davidson casts this argument in terms of sensations, but regarding the example he gives, I take him to mean it to apply to perceptual experiences as well. 85 As we have seen in the second chapter, Davidson draws heavily on Quine’s conception of meaning in developing his own theory of interpretation. Thus for example his method of radical interpretation on which he bases his argument for the claim that most of our beliefs must be true is developed from a modification of Quine’s method of radical translation. But - as the following discussion will show - regarding

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derstand this argument, we have to shortly review Quine’s position regarding epistemology and theory of meaning. Quine proposes to “naturalize” epistemology, i.e. he rejects the traditional idea that it is possible to evaluate the epistemic status of beliefs without taking into account the origin of those beliefs. According to him, all efforts to supply our systems of beliefs with an epistemic basis which is independent of their genetic basis have to fail. He writes: “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input - certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology: namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one’s theory of nature transcends any available evidence. [. . .] But a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology.”86 So Quine proposes to abandon the traditional epistemological approach in favor of the investigation of belief forming processes by psychology conceived of as a part of natural science. As we have seen in chapter 2, on Quine’s account the connection between epistemology and theory of meaning is due to the connection between the patterns of sensory stimulation which are constitutive of meaning and at the same time constitute the justifying evidence for holding perceptual beliefs. Thus Quine maintains that there is no real difference between the genetic and the epistemic basis of our systems of beliefs, since the central tenet of his naturalized epistemology is the claim that the genetic basis of beliefs, i.e. the sensory the question what links our beliefs to the world, i.e. what gives them their content and what gives meaning to utterances expressing those beliefs, Quine and Davidson differ. 86 Quine (1969) pp.82. This view has been heavily criticized on the grounds that Quine’s approach to epistemology simply constitutes a change of topic. (Cp. Kim (1988) p.390) This line of criticism is by now widely accepted and as a result, Quine’s approach has been abandoned by most epistemologists. A lone proponent of this view remains Kornblith (1994) and (1999b).

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stimulations which lead to their formation, has to be identified with their epistemic basis. Now Davidson agrees with this in one respect: He, too, maintains that there is no basis of our systems of beliefs apart from their genetic basis. But instead of identifying this genetic basis with the epistemic basis of our beliefs, Davidson simply denies that our systems of beliefs have an epistemic basis: “Introducing intermediate steps or entities into the causal chain [between the world and our beliefs, B.S.], like sensations or observations, serves only to make the epistemological problem more obvious. For if the intermediaries are merely causes, they don’t justify the beliefs they cause, while if they deliver information, they may be lying. The moral is obvious. Since we can’t swear intermediaries to truthfulness, we should allow no intermediaries between our beliefs and their objects in the world. Of course there are causal intermediaries. What we must guard against are epistemic intermediaries.”87 And later: “Take Quine’s proposal that whatever there is to the meaning (information value) of an observation sentence is determined by the patterns of sensory stimulation that would cause a speaker to assent or to dissent from that sentence. [. . .] Quine’s proposal, like other forms of verificationism, makes for skepticism. For clearly a person’s sensory stimulations could be just as they are and yet the world outside be very different.”88 Thus Davidson’s objection to Quine’s position is the following: While it is true that meaning and belief are genetically based on causal relations between our mental states and the world which the contents of those mental states are about, these causal relations do not - as Quine thinks - have epistemic impact. To be sure, they have metaepistemic impact, since we have to invoke them to reply to the skeptic when he challenges the general presumption of truth regarding our beliefs. But nevertheless they cannot figure in any way in the process of justifying particular beliefs. This is why Davidson rejects epistemic externalism: Causal relations between a particular belief and the environment of the person having this belief can 87 Davidson 88 Davidson

(1983) p.144. (1983) p.145.

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never constitute reasons for this belief, since the person having this belief can never know - with regard to particular beliefs - whether the purported causal relations really exist of if she has fallen prey to illusion or hallucination. Thus, epistemic externalism as well as Quine’s naturalism lead to skepticism. This can be seen, Davidson argues elsewhere, by considering an ironic consequence of Quine’s approach:89 If one assumes, as Quine does, that the sole information we have about the external world is given to us by the “cues” we have in form of sensory stimulations, one introduces a dualism between the subjective and the objective which inescapably leads to skeptical consequences. With respect to Quine’s specific position, this can be seen by considering the fact that the evidence we have for our beliefs in the form of sensory stimulations and which shall secure our access to the objective world cannot secure this access. The reason for this is that this evidence is radically subjective in the sense that it is private and thus cannot link our beliefs to the objective world they are about. Now - to come back to the point of this section - why is this controversy between Davidson and Quine relevant to the question whether allowing perceptual experiences as a genetic basis for systems of beliefs constitutes a relapse into foundationalist empiricism? It is, since Davidson accuses Quine of retaining foundationalist empiricism by invoking sensory stimulations as something which has epistemic impact on our systems of beliefs. More specifically, he accuses Quine of remaining committed to an empiricist position, since he grounds meaning, belief and knowledge in patterns of sensory stimulations and not in the causes of beliefs in the world. Now does this accusation also apply to a position which takes perceptual experiences to be the genetic basis of our systems of beliefs, which moreover has epistemic impact due to the fact that these experiences do not merely play a causal role in the genesis of the content of our beliefs but rather are partly constitutive of meaning and content? Does such an account fall prey to skepticism as well as Quine’s? Now I do not think so for the following reason: First, as was shown above, taking perceptual experiences to be an intermediary between our systems of beliefs and the world these beliefs are about does not commit one to taking perceptual experiences to be the epistemic basis of our systems of beliefs. And second, the role of perceptual experiences on my account is different from the role of sensory stimulations on Quine’s account. If we remember that on a direct realist account of perception like the one proposed above the contents of perceptual experiences are not represen89 Cp.

Davidson (1988b) pp.42.

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tational but rather are presentations of objects and events in the external world, the main difference between this account and Quine’s account becomes obvious. On Quine’s account the sensory stimulations which are taken to be constitutive of the meaning of observation sentences and by association of the meaning of universal sentences as well, are cast as something subjective and private. Of course, the causes of the sensory stimulations are taken to be objective, but since it is not the causes of the sensory stimulations which are constitutive of content and meaning but rather the sensory stimulations themselves, content and meaning are grounded in something private and subjective on Quine’s account, which leads Davidson to criticize Quine’s account for implying skeptical consequences. Now if we take another look at the account of perception proposed above, it can be seen that this account does not lead to skepticism in the way Quine’s does, since what is constitutive of content and meaning on this account are not representations of objects and events in the world but rather direct presentations of those objects and events. Thus perceptual experiences in the direct realist sense connect the perceiving beings directly to the world, since on this account there are no epistemic intermediaries in the form of representations. Thus on this account, as on Davidson’s, private sensory stimulations and sensations are taken to be mere causal intermediaries, while the entities which function as epistemic intermediaries, i.e. perceptual experiences, are not subjective, since they are presentations of objective entities in the external world. So regarding perceptual experiences, it cannot be argued that they “could be just as they are and yet the world outside be very different.” If the world outside were very different, then perceptual experiences would be very different as well. But - it could be argued - isn’t there still a problem, since as we have seen perceptual experiences can be misleading? Doesn’t this alone imply skeptical consequences, since although the contents of perceptual experiences are presentations of objects and events and therefore cannot be misleading on the whole, we can never know whether a particular perceptual experience is misleading and therefore perceptual experiences cannot be “sworn to truthfulness” either? Now this further worry can be dispelled by a consideration similar to Davidson’s own considerations regarding beliefs: Of course no single perceptual experience can be “sworn to truthfulness” insofar as we can never compare its contents with the way objects and events are independently of being perceived. Thus, regarding any perceptual experience, it is possible that it is misleading. But this first does not mean

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that perceptual experiences as a whole can be misleading (as they cannot be on a direct realist account of perception) and second, it is possible to find out whether a given perceptual experience is misleading without comparing it to perception-independent objects and events, since one can compare perceptual experiences with each other. So for example, it is possible to find out that a visual experience which presents a stick in water as bent is misleading by touching the stick and discovering that it is not presented as bent to touch. Now this alone does not tell one whether the stick is really bent, but it might for example lead one to take the stick out of the water and to compare the original visual experience with the further visual experience one undergoes then, which does not present the stick as bent anymore. Of course, this comparison which counts in favor of the stick’s being not bent still does not establish conclusively that it is not bent. But this is not a problem, since perceptual experiences are not required to be infallible in order to be the genetic basis of our systems of beliefs. The sole purpose they have to serve as such a basis is to connect us to the external world in general. So Davidson’s two main arguments against assigning perceptual experiences a special role in epistemology are only valid regarding perceptual experiences as an epistemic basis. Neither of his arguments is effective against a position which takes perceptual experiences to be a genetic basis. On the contrary, he himself must assume that they form (a part of) the genetic basis of our systems of beliefs if his externalist argument against skepticism is to be valid. But of course a major difference between my account and Davidson’s account remains: In Davidson’s conception perceptual experiences either figure as mere causal intermediaries or are - in the case of humans - considered to be identical with perceptual beliefs. He himself is not very clear regarding this topic. When he speaks of perception, it is always human perception, which he regards as being structured propositionally, when on the other hand he speaks of the connection to the world we share with animals, he always speaks of “discrimination”, leaving open whether and in which cases this “discrimination” is a conscious process and in which cases it is not. But, as I take myself to have shown, the mere ability to discriminate does not suffice to explain the possibility of the development of contentful thoughts and beliefs. As I have argued, introducing perceptual experiences into Davidsons’s account as the genetic basis of our systems of beliefs solves this explanatory deficiency while - as I take the preceding discussion to have shown - avoiding the skeptical consequences threatening empiricist foundationalism.

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Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence

In this section I come back to the questions discussed in the first chapter, now with respect to the notion of coherence as it is developed by Davidson. So in these last paragraphs, I will try to show that this notion of coherence is suited to be integrated into an analysis of the concept of knowledge. Thus, briefly, I will propose the following account of knowledge in the last section of this chapter: If a belief is true and strongly coheres with the rest of the beliefs in the system it is a member of, it can be considered knowledge. But to argue for this, I first have to show that the account of coherence developed by Davidson does satisfy the two requirements of truth-conducivity established in the first chapter. So in the first part of this section, I will argue that on Davidson’s account of coherence, requirement (i) of (TCC) is fulfilled merely by taking beliefs to be members of real systems of beliefs had by real persons. Thus, on a Davidsonian account of knowledge, the belief-condition alone ensures that requirement (i) of (TCC) is met. In the following section I will then consider the question if coherence as a third condition meets requirement (ii) of (TCC), of course in order to argue that it does. In the last section I will then develop an account of knowledge which features Davidsonian coherence as a third condition. 3.2.1

Objective Truth-Conducivity and Genetic Foundations

The aim of this section is to show that coherence in Davidson’s sense satisfies requirement (i) of (TCC). With regard to coherence this requirement can be spelled out as follows: (OTCc ) The statement “If belief B is a member of a coherent set of beliefs then it is likely that B is true” is analytically true. So what has to be shown in this section is that indeed the statement “If belief B is a member of a coherent set of beliefs then it is likely that B is true.” is analytically true with respect to Davidson’s notion of coherence. Now on my modified account of Davidson’s conception of coherence what is meant by being a member of coherent set of beliefs is that a belief must be part of a system of real beliefs had by a real person who is perceptually connected to her environment and other people and that the belief must bear a multitude of inferential and conceptual relations to other beliefs. Now, according to Davidson, being a member of such a system of beliefs is what constitutes being a belief :

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“[. . .] belief is central to all kinds of thought. If someone is glad that, or notices that, or remembers that, or knows that, the gun is loaded, then he must believe that the gun is loaded. Even to wonder whether the gun is loaded or to speculate on the possibility that the gun is loaded, requires the belief, for example, that a gun is a weapon, that it is a more or less enduring object and so on. There are good reasons for not insisting on a particular list of beliefs that are needed if a creature is to wonder whether a gun is loaded. Nevertheless, it is necessary that there be endless interlocked beliefs. The system of such beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space.”90 What Davidson wants to show by invoking this example is that our beliefs have their contents only in virtue of standing in conceptual and inferential relations to other beliefs.91 To have a belief with the determinate content that the gun is loaded requires having the concept of a gun, the concept of being loaded and having these concepts in turn requires having a multitude of other concepts, such as the concept of a physical object, the concept of a weapon etc. But having those concepts in turn requires having a multitude of beliefs in which those concepts figure as constituents, since “a concept, like that of mouse or chair, cannot remain the same concept no matter what beliefs it features in.”92 Now why does this constitute a reason for assuming that beliefs which have the property of being a member of a coherent set of beliefs are likely to be true? Davidson argues like this: Having beliefs with determinate content does not only require having a multitude of other conceptually and inferentially related beliefs, but moreover requires that a great number of them be true: “We can, however, take it as given that most beliefs are correct. The reason for this is that a belief is identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is this pattern that determines the subject matter of the belief, what the belief is about. Before some object in, or aspect of, the world can become part of the subject matter of a belief (true or false) there must be endless true beliefs about the subject matter. False beliefs tend to undermine the identification 90 Davidson

(1975) pp.156. the paragraphs to come, I will often speak of inferential and conceptual relations among beliefs. I distinguish between those two kinds of relations, since it is not completely clear whether all conceptual relations between beliefs - as for example the relations between the beliefs involved in the example above - can be directly converted into deductive or inductive relations between the beliefs. 92 Davidson (1990) p.195. 91 In

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of the subject matter; to undermine, therefore, the validity of a description of the belief as being about that subject.”93 Davidson’s argument can thus be reconstructed as follows: (P1) Being a belief with determinate content requires being a member of a system of beliefs which are interrelated conceptually and inferentially, i.e. requires being a member of a largely coherent system of beliefs. (P2) Most of the beliefs which are members of a coherent system of beliefs must be true. (C) Therefore, any belief with determinate content is likely to be true. So since it follows from the notion of belief that beliefs must be members of coherent systems of beliefs, it follows from the notion of belief that any belief which is had by a real person is likely to be true qua being a belief. The following line of argument for this claim cannot be found in Davidson’s essays explicitly in the way I reconstruct it, since in Davidson’s writings, the relation between the arguments for the first and the second premise of the above argument is not very transparent. In his early writings, as in the passage quoted above, it seems as if he takes it to follow from the holistic nature of beliefs alone that both premises have to be true. In later writings, he additionally argues for the second premise by recourse to the claim that our beliefs can only have determinate content if many of our beliefs are regularly caused by objects and events in an environment shared with other creatures with whom we communicate about this environment. Davidson never explicitly clarifies the relation between those two arguments. In my reconstruction, I will cast this relation as follows: While the argument from the holistic nature of beliefs shows that a belief cannot have any content if it is not a member of a coherent system of beliefs, it does not show that it cannot be the case that our beliefs do not have empirical content. To ensure the latter, the argument from the holistic nature of beliefs has to be supplemented by the argument from triangulation as a necessary condition for our developing systems of beliefs. That the first premise of the above argument is established by the argument from holism can be seen easily, since it can be granted that one cannot for example have the belief that the gun before one is loaded if one does not have beliefs of the kind “A gun is a weapon” and “A gun is a physical object” etc. To say that someone has the former belief without also having the latter ones simply is unintelligible. 93 Davidson

(1975) p.168.

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But what about the second premise? To see that this premise can also be granted, it cannot suffice simply to point to the multitude of inferential and conceptual relations among beliefs. The quotation from Davidson above suggests that he takes this to suffice, but it can be seen that it does not by considering the following point, which Davidson introduces in later writings:94 In order to have a (true or false) belief with determinate content, one must also have lots of further beliefs about the “subject matter” of that belief, since the “subject matter”, i.e. what the belief is about, is determined to a great extent by other beliefs one has about this “subject matter”. In terms of Davidson’s example: To believe that the gun is loaded requires that one also believes that guns are weapons, that guns are physical objects etc. because otherwise the belief that the gun is loaded would in no clear sense be a belief about a gun and therefore would not have determinate content. Thus being a part of a coherent system of beliefs is necessary for being a belief with determinate content. But it is not sufficient if the system of beliefs is not conceived of as a system of beliefs had by a real person which stands in perceptual relations to an external world and in interactive relations with other living beings. For if the latter conditions are not assumed to hold, it might be the case that the belief in question is part of a system of beliefs which has no connection to an external world. Thus the belief might have determinate content in the sense that it is a part of a system of beliefs which are interrelated through a large number of inferential and conceptual relations such that every “belief” is assigned its position in this framework of interrelations and thereby has its content in relation to the contents of the other beliefs, but it is still possible that it does not have determinate content in the sense of having empirical content. Thus at this point the familiar isolation objection, which we already encountered in the discussion of BonJour’s account of coherence resurfaces. The skeptic regarding the objective truth-conducivity of coherence can at this point challenge Davidson’s argument from the holistic nature of belief by inventing a skeptical hypothesis like an evil demon or a brains in vats scenario. He can then claim that believers who are trapped in such a world might have beliefs with determinate content in the holistic sense, since all that is required for content in this sense is the internal coherence of systems of beliefs, which in the case of lack of empirical content reduces to large logical and conceptual consistency.95 Thus all 94 Cp.

for example Davidson (1991), Davidson (1997a) and Davidson (2001). “conceptual consistency” I mean that there are no material inconsistencies among the propositions which are the contents of beliefs as for example among the 95 By

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that can be inferred from the holistic nature of beliefs is that beliefs have to stand in inferential and conceptual relations to other beliefs in order to have determinate content in the sense of having content which is different from but inferentially related to the contents of other beliefs. But this is just a formal notion of “determinate content”. What is additionally required for our beliefs to have determinate empirical content is that our beliefs stand in certain relations to the external world and in this sense are beliefs about this external world. Without this connection, our beliefs would merely have determinate content in the sense in which formulae of a formal language have determinate content, i.e. they would have certain formal structures which distinguish one formula from others, such that their contents are defined by the interrelations between those structures. Davidson himself concedes that the argument from holism does not establish that our beliefs have contents which concern the empirical world: “So far, however, I have done little to show that skepticism is untenable or unintelligible. For even if you were to agree that to have a thought, any thought at all, one must have many true beliefs, it does not follow that any of these beliefs directly concern the nature of the world around us. I have suggested that if, for example, you have a thought that you are seeing a snake, then you must believe many true things about snakes: you must know what a snake is like. But such truths are general, and general truths like these do not imply that any snakes exist, but only that if there were a snake, it would be without legs or arms, etc. So I have not shown why it is absurd to doubt that the external world in which we all believe actually exists.”96 But note that despite this shortcoming the argument from holism already establishes a great deal against the skeptic: The skeptic can now no longer maintain that it is possible for the majority of our beliefs to be false, for if our systems of beliefs indeed lack empirical content, it does not make sense to claim that the beliefs contained in them are false, since in this case the beliefs are in no clear sense beliefs about an external world. So skeptics who invent evil demons and the like should better not claim that it is possible that the majority of our beliefs could be false, since this claim lacks intelligibility. For if our beliefs do not have empirical content it does not make sense to claim that any of them is false, since in this case the notions of empirical truth and falsity are simply not applicable to our beliefs. proposition that Peter is a bachelor and the proposition that Peter is married. 96 Davidson (1995) p.17.

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To say that someone falsely believes that the gun before him is loaded is to attribute to him a multitude of beliefs with empirical content, namely the belief that the thing he believes to see in front of him is a gun, furthermore that it is weapon, a physical object etc. If the skeptic is right, there may be no guns, no weapons, no physical objects etc. But if this indeed is the case, then one cannot conclude that our beliefs about guns, weapons etc. are false. This is the point Hilary Putnam wants to make in his famous discussion of the brains in vats scenario. If this scenario indeed were the case, he argues, our beliefs would still be true, but they would not be beliefs about guns, weapons etc. but rather they would be beliefs about the schemes and doings of the neuroscientists tending to our brains.97 Davidson rejects this conclusion on the grounds that from this it would follow that we do not know what we believe or think.98 A third solution could be that our beliefs would be true in the sense in which axioms or meaning postulates are true, i.e. that they would be analytically true, since what gives them their content simply are the internal logical and conceptual relations they bear to each other. Thus, if the skeptic’s hypothesis were true, our beliefs either lack empirical content completely or they would still be true in some sense, but not in the sense we take them to be, i.e. they would not be empirically true. But neither would they be empirically false, since they would lack content concerning an empirical world. So the argument from holism encompasses an answer to the problem of the truth connection discussed in the second chapter, since it can be shown by an appeal to the holistic nature of beliefs that this problem is reducible to the input problem: If one considers systems of “beliefs” apart from their connection to the empirical world, it indeed cannot be shown that beliefs which are parts of those systems have empirical content. But neither can it be shown that those beliefs are false, since if a system of beliefs does not contain beliefs about the empirical world, the criterion of truth regarding those beliefs can no longer be how things are in the empirical world. Thus the skeptical claim that it is possible that a system of beliefs is very coherent but nevertheless contains mostly false beliefs is ambiguous. Either it means that the beliefs in the system might lack empirical content and that therefore they are not empirically true or it means that the system of beliefs lacks logical and conceptual consistency and therefore must contain many falsehoods. Now the latter statement first is refuted by the argument from holism and second is clearly not what the skeptic wants to 97 Cp. 98 Cp.

Putnam (1981) Chapter 1. Davidson (1988c) p.61 and Davidson (1990) p.197.

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claim, since the internal coherence of our systems of beliefs is explicitly conceded. But if what is meant is the former, the problem of the truth connection reduces to the input problem. So if he wants to put his objection in an intelligible way, the skeptic either has to claim that it is possible that our beliefs lack empirical content altogether or he has to concede that our beliefs have empirical content and that therefore the majority of them must be empirically true. In the latter case, the only option for him is to claim instead that we still cannot find out which of our beliefs are true and therefore we still do not have knowledge. The remainder of this section will concern Davidson’s answer to the first skeptical possibility, while the following section will deal with the second skeptical concern, which does not pertain to requirement (i) of (TCC) but rather to requirement (ii). To exclude the first skeptical possibility, Davidson needs the additional externalist premise his account of coherence comprises. The skeptic who entertains the possibility that our beliefs might lack empirical content, he could argue, forgets the second condition for our beliefs’ having the contents they have, namely the condition that to have beliefs with such contents, these beliefs must be caused by objects and events in a world which the creatures having the beliefs must share with other creatures in communication. Since I have already presented Davidson’s argument for the necessity of our standing in causal relations to a world shared with others in triangulation in detail, I will only sketch this argument with respect to the skeptical claim here. Davidson himself does not explicitly offer this argument in the context of answering the skeptical challenge posed above. Rather he offers it in various essays to show that being a speaker of a language in the sense of being an interpreter of the utterances of others is a necessary condition for having determinate thoughts.99 As it should have become clear from what I have been arguing in the preceding sections, I do not think that his argument establishes that. But what I think is established by it is that in order to have beliefs or thoughts with determinate content, we must indeed share an external world to which we are connected perceptually with others and interact with them in this world. Now the core idea of Davidson’s argument is the following: A creature can only have beliefs if it stands in regular causal relations to the world, i.e. if similar situations in the world regularly cause similar reactions of the 99 Cp.

for example Davidson (1990) pp.202, Davidson (1997a) pp.129 and Davidson (2001) pp.143. Davidson offers this argument not only with respect to beliefs but with respect to propositional thought in general. But since in this context beliefs are the relevant kind of propositional attitudes, I will reconstruct the argument in terms of belief.

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creature. In addition, to develop beliefs with propositional contents, the creature has to be able to observe other creatures reacting to the environment in a similar way itself does. This latter condition is necessary, since if causal relations between a creature and its environment would suffice for the development of beliefs, we would have to conclude that jellyfish and sunflowers have beliefs as well.100 Davidson puts this as follows: “It should now be clear what insures that our view of the world is, in its plainest features, largely correct. The reason is that the stimuli that cause our most basic verbal responses also determine what those verbal responses mean, and the content of the beliefs that accompany them. [. . .] Of course many beliefs are given content by their relations to further beliefs, or are caused by misleading sensations; any particular set of beliefs about the world around us may be false. What cannot be the case is that our general picture of the world and our place in it is mistaken, for it is this picture which informs the rest of our beliefs and makes them intelligible, whether they be true or false.”101 In this passage it can be clearly seen how the argument from holism and the argument from triangulation work together: While the holistic nature of beliefs accounts for the truth of the majority of beliefs, the causal relations between us and the world which we share with others account for our belief’s having empirical content by giving content to the beliefs which correspond to “our most basic verbal responses”. Of course, Davidson does not want to imply that the beliefs expressed by those responses are “basic” in the sense of foundationalism. Rather, he means that they are genetically basic, i.e. that they are the basis of the existence of our systems of beliefs. Thus these beliefs are basic in the sense that without them, we would not have beliefs with empirical content - which, if we take a closer look at it, would mean that we would not have any beliefs at all. The reason for this is that something which does not have empirical content - true or false - cannot be said to be a belief, since it is not a belief about anything. Of course, we can construct formal systems which have content in the weak sense of consisting of different formulae with different structures by abstracting from our real systems of beliefs, thereby depriving them of their empirical content and merely considering their logical structure. But it is not possible for any creature to develop a system of beliefs to abstract 100 Cp.

Davidson (1991) p.209 and Davidson (1995) p.8. (1991) pp.213.

101 Davidson

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from without input from an empirical world. Thus input from the empirical world is a necessary condition for developing a system of beliefs in the first place. Now clearly this does not mean that all of our beliefs have to result from such input and therefore have to be true. On the contrary, once the genetically basic beliefs are in place, we are free to question them, generalize from them and ask us with respect to any of them whether it is true.102 But to arrive at a coherent system of beliefs which is needed as the general frame for all those activities, we have to rely on perceptual input from an external world and on our interactions with other creatures in this world. Thus if we have the systems of beliefs we have, then our beliefs must have empirical content. Their having empirical content is what enables us to ask skeptical questions in the first place, i.e. to ask ourselves if it is possible that the contents of our beliefs are false. So the skeptic who worries about the empirical content of our beliefs presupposes the answer to his own challenge: While it certainly is true that some of our beliefs are empirically false, it cannot be the case that our beliefs lack empirical content, since beliefs without empirical content would not be beliefs. So what remains of the skeptical challenge is the claim concerning our ability to find out which of our beliefs are false. But - as I already hinted above this is not a question concerning requirement (i) of (TCC) but rather one which concerns requirement (ii) of (TCC), i.e the question whether coherence among our beliefs can be a reason for us to regard some beliefs as more likely to be true than others. Thus according to Davidson, any belief which is a member of a system of beliefs of a human being carries with it a presumption of truth, since it is guaranteed by the holistic nature of belief and the necessary conditions for the genesis of systems of beliefs that the majority of our beliefs must be true. If we consider more closely what a belief is and which conditions do have to be fulfilled in order for our having beliefs, we see that it is impossible that most of our beliefs - and especially the most strongly embedded beliefs - are false. So Davidson construes a transcendental argument of the following form: It is a necessary condition for our having beliefs with determinate content that we receive input from the objective world and interact with others with whom we share this world. Thus, since we have beliefs with determinate propositional contents, we have to receive input from an objective world we share with others. And if this is the case, then 102 This

is the reason why those “basic” beliefs cannot be epistemically basic: Since any of those beliefs can be questioned and doubted, those beliefs stand in need of being reasoned for as well as other beliefs and therefore cannot serve as an epistemic basis.

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skepticism in the global sense must be false. So on Davidson’s account, the objective truth-conducivity of coherence is established by the fact that coherence is considered as a relation which holds among beliefs. Thus on his account, the statement “If belief B is a member of a coherent set of beliefs then it is likely that B is true” is indeed analytic, since the mere fact that something is a belief, which must be a member of a coherent system of beliefs in order to be a belief, counts in favor of its truth. More precisely, Davidson claims that it follows from the concept of belief that most beliefs must be true: If being a belief implies being a member of a largely coherent system of beliefs and if being a largely coherent system of beliefs requires consisting of mostly true beliefs, then what it means to be a belief ensures that beliefs are likely to be true. So on Davidson’s account requirement (i) of (TCC) is met by the belief-condition alone, since the genetic conditions for the development of a coherent system of beliefs ensure that this requirement is satisfied. Thus considering the possibility that our beliefs are largely mistaken on the epistemic level results from neglect of the genetic conditions for the development of systems of beliefs, which have to be fulfilled if the beliefs contained in it are to have determinate contents and this means: if they deserve to be called beliefs. If coherence is taken to be a relation among beliefs, the worries about the objective truth-conducivity of coherence which surface in the form of the alternative systems objection, the isolation objection and the problem of the truth connection can be dispelled. If one takes into account the genetic conditions for the development of systems of beliefs as well as the holistic nature of beliefs, those worries can be seen to apply to coherence as a relation among propositions which are considered independently of their being contents of beliefs, but not to coherence as a relation among propositional contents of beliefs. Davidson himself strongly emphasizes this difference with regard to the debate about coherence theories among the early logical positivists of the Vienna Circle: “[. . .] coherence theories have always been bedeviled by failure to distinguish between coherence theories of truth and coherence theories of knowledge. This is natural enough, since if knowledge, which is of the true, demands nothing but coherence of belief, how can truth require more than a set of coherent propositions? Thus one is invited to dismiss the difference between coherence of beliefs and coherence of sentences (or statements or propositions) as tests of knowledge and truth. [. . .] Since standard objections to coherence theories of knowledge parallel standard

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objections to coherence theories of truth, it is not immediately apparent why it is so important to distinguish between them. But of course beliefs are not historically or causally arbitrary; even if our reasons for our beliefs are always other beliefs, the causes sometimes lie elsewhere.”103 So the persuasive force of the classical objections against coherence theories of knowledge seems to rest on the possibility of constructing sets of propositions which cohere in the same way as the propositional contents of our beliefs do and yet are not contents of real beliefs. This can be seen by again considering the alternative systems objection. Of course we can construct sets of propositions which are strongly connected conceptually and inferentially as can be seen by considering works of fiction. But considered more closely, these “possible systems of beliefs” are not real alternatives to our systems of beliefs. Adopted as systems of beliefs, they would soon become highly incoherent, since there is perceptual input from an empirical world, which would soon lead to the development of a large number of contradictory beliefs. This is the point BonJour wants to stress in his defense of coherence against the three standard objections. If we really tried to substitute such an “alternative” system for our real systems of beliefs, we would not need much of a “long run” for it to become massively incoherent. Nevertheless, the observation requirement BonJour introduces to ensure that our systems of beliefs are supplied with empirical input is not needed on Davidson’s account, since on his account it is necessary that our systems of beliefs receive such input on order for them to exist in the first place. So on his account, there is no need to require us to follow a “regulative principle” which demands the integration of observational beliefs into our systems of beliefs, since it is guaranteed that we follow such a principle because otherwise we could not develop systems of beliefs at all. Moreover, since input from an empirical world can be seen to be a necessary condition for the genesis of systems of beliefs on Davidson’s account, he does not need an argument which takes recourse to the notion of explanation and the correspondence theory of truth in order to establish that many of our beliefs must result from input from an empirical world as BonJour did. On his account, the mere fact that our beliefs exist in the form of coherent systems of beliefs guarantees that at least the genetically basic beliefs result from input from the empirical world and our interactions with others in this world and that therefore most of our beliefs must have empirical content qua being inferentially related to 103 Davidson

(1982a) p.169.

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those genetically basic beliefs and to each other. Thus the only skeptical challenge Davidson’s account of coherence is vulnerable to is the claim that while we might know that most of our beliefs must be true, we can never know which ones are true and which ones are false and that therefore coherence does not yield knowledge, since it fails to fulfill requirement (ii) of (TCC). So I will discuss this further skeptical challenge in the next section. 3.2.2

Subjective Truth-Conducivity and Epistemic Coherence

What remains after establishing the objective truth-conducivity of coherence in Davidson’s sense is the skeptical challenge hinted at in the course of the preceding section. The skeptic might still argue like this: Well, so it may have been established that systems of beliefs have to contain a large number of true beliefs about the world. But this still does not bring us much further toward knowledge, since this does not enable us to distinguish beliefs which are true from those which are not. For all we know, every single belief still may be false, although it might not be possible that most of them are false. Now a skeptic who argues along these lines does not challenge the claim that coherence fulfills requirement (i) of (TCC), but rather that coherence meets the internalist requirement (ii). With respect to coherence, this requirement can be spelled out as: (STCc ) It is cognitively accessible to S whether his belief B coheres with his system of beliefs. Now at this point we have to distinguish between two things: The overall coherence of systems of beliefs and the coherence of a single belief with such a coherent system. The first property, i.e. the overall coherence of the system is of course accessible to the person who has the system of beliefs, since if the person who has the beliefs were not aware of the fact that these beliefs form a largely coherent system, the person would not be aware of the contents of her own beliefs, since according to Davidson the relations between the beliefs to a great extent determine their contents.104 Thus Davidson’s notion of coherence fulfills requirement (ii). 104 Of

course, no one is aware of all inferential and conceptual relations between his or her beliefs. Moreover, probably no one can become aware of the more complex inferential relations holding between his or her beliefs. But nevertheless, we have to be able to become aware of the simple inferential and conceptual relations such as the ones hinted to in Davidson’s examples, which should suffice in order to be aware of the fact that our systems of beliefs are largely coherent.

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But - as should have become clear at this stage - to be aware both of the fact that one’s system of beliefs is coherent as well as of the fact that this implies a presumption of truth regarding any belief in the system does not suffice to give one reasons to assume that any of the beliefs contained in the system constitute knowledge, much less to give one a reason to believe that a particular belief rather than another constitutes knowledge. So here the skeptic can challenge the claim that coherence is a property which is suited to figure in a third condition for knowledge in a different way: He cannot directly challenge the claim that we can access the fact that a given belief coheres with the rest of the beliefs which are part of the system in Davidson’s sense. But he can deny that being aware of this fact can give us any reason to believe that this belief constitutes knowledge. Thus the objection is that while we might be aware of the fact that the overall coherence of our systems of beliefs constitutes a reason for assuming that most of our beliefs must be true, this does not give us a reason to consider any of our beliefs knowledge. The reason for this is that a belief’s cohering with the system of beliefs it is a part of in Davidson’s sense does not constitute a reason to suppose that this belief is knowledge. So although coherence of our systems of beliefs might give us a reason to suppose we have some knowledge, with respect to particular beliefs we cannot find out whether these constitute knowledge. Thus while it is conceded by the skeptic that the property of cohering with a system of beliefs meets both requirements of truth-conducivity, it is denied that fulfilling the requirements suffices for our having knowledge, since we can never know which of our beliefs sufficiently cohere with our other beliefs to constitute knowledge. The reason for this is that while the fact that a belief is a part of a coherent system of beliefs might imply that it is likely to be true, this is certainly not enough to consider the belief knowledge. Otherwise we would have to consider any true belief of ours knowledge, which is clearly unacceptable. Thus regarding the question whether a particular belief constitutes knowledge the crucial property is the coherence of single beliefs with the system. At this stage, two questions arise: First, what does it mean for a single belief to cohere with a system of beliefs in a way sufficient for the belief’s being knowledge and second, does the property of cohering in such a way fulfill requirement (ii) of (TCC), i.e. can we become aware of the fact that single beliefs cohere with our systems of beliefs by recourse to our own cognitive resources only? So at this point, we need a notion of coherence which can not only tell us that many of our beliefs must be true, but which can additionally tell us which of our beliefs sufficiently cohere with our

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systems of beliefs to be considered knowledge. Davidson himself notes that his account of coherence does not supply a criterion for deciding this: “We cannot, alas, draw the picturesque and pleasant conclusion that all true beliefs constitute knowledge. For though all of a believer’s beliefs are to some extent justified for him, some may not be justified enough, or in the right way, to constitute knowledge. The general presumption in favor of the truth of belief serves to rescue us from a standard form of skepticism by showing why it is impossible for all of our beliefs to be false together. This leaves almost untouched the task of specifying the conditions of knowledge. I have not been concerned with the canons of evidential support (if such there be), but to show that all that counts as evidence or justification for a belief must come from the same totality of belief to which it belongs.”105 Thus coherence in Davidson’s sense leaves us partly dissatisfied when it comes to knowledge. What Davidson has shown is that we must have knowledge beyond knowledge about the contents of our own minds, since without this further knowledge there would not even be such contents. Moreover, he has shown that large parts of what we believe about the world around us must constitute knowledge. But what he has not shown is how we can tell whether particular beliefs of ours constitute knowledge. In this respect coherence in Davidson’s sense fails. This is of course due to the fact that Davidson’s holistic notion of coherence primarily applies to systems of beliefs as a whole, not to the relation between single beliefs which are part of the system and (parts of) the rest of the system. Thus Davidson’s account of coherence has to be extended to apply to the latter relation as well. In short, the question becomes what the expression “belief B coheres with S’s system of beliefs” can mean beyond coherence in the global sense of being a member of a coherent system of beliefs had by a real person. What is needed here is a notion of coherence which can be applied to the relation between a single belief and the system of beliefs it is a member of in a way which additionally tells us something interesting about the conditions under which a single belief can count as knowledge. But note that this further notion of coherence merely has to fulfill requirement (ii) of (TCC), since on Davidson’s account requirement (i) of (TCC) is already met by the belief condition. So what we need here is a notion of coherence which is capable of being a criterion for knowledge regarding 105 Davidson

(1983) p.153.

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single beliefs in addition to Davidson’s notion of coherence which is an indicator of truth regarding beliefs in general. Now there are notions of coherence in the literature which are compatible with Davidson’s notion and which therefore can be used to extend his conception to cover this last question as well. First, there are various probabilistic accounts of coherence which define coherence quantitatively in terms of relations of probabilistic among sets of propositions. The idea of a definition of coherence in terms of mutual probabilistic support dates back to C.I.Lewis, who was the first to give voice to this idea in terms of “congruence”: “A set of statements, or a set of supposed facts asserted, will be said to be congruent, if and only if they are so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of the set can be assumed as given premises.”106 So the general idea behind probabilistic accounts of coherence is that the coherence of a set of propositions is defined as a function of the strength with which the members of the set support each other in purely probabilistic terms. Such a function is called a “measure of coherence”. Now there is a multitude of ways to define such a measure, on the one hand depending on which relations of support are taken into account in defining the measure and on the other hand depending on how the measure is to be computed.107 But since - as I will argue - these ways of spelling out coherence do not seem to be suited to our present purposes for a number of reasons, I will spare the reader the details of these definitions, referring him to the detailed discussion of the different measures which can be found in Meijs (2005).108 Now there are three major reasons which speak against using a probabilistic measure of coherence in spelling out the relations between systems of beliefs and single members of these systems: First, the existing measures of coherence deal first and foremost with coherence as a property of sets of propositions and not with coherence as a relation between a single proposition and a set of propositions. Of course, the latter notion could be defined on the basis of the former notion, but 106 Lewis

(1946) p.338. Lewis calls the notion he has in mind “congruence” rather than “coherence” to avoid conflation of his account with idealist coherence theories of truth which were popular at his time. 107 One can for example consider only the relations of the whole set considered as a conjunction to any member of the set or one can consider the relations between the single members and/or the relations between subsets of the set as well. 108 Meijs (2005) pp.16.

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since this has not been attempted yet, we would not be much better off than we are with Davidson’s account by relying on such a measure. Second, it has been argued quite convincingly by Mark Siebel “that no probabilistic measure will ever be able to adequately capture coherence.”109 Siebel claims this on the following grounds: First, there are counterexamples to the specific definitions of coherence in terms of probability which can be generalized to apply to all purely probabilistic notions of coherence. And second, probabilistic accounts of coherence are unable to incorporate the importance of explanatory relations in evaluating the coherence of sets of propositions. Thus Siebel concludes that “probability might be one of the aspects which are crucial to coherence, but coherence is a notion too rich to be captured by nothing but probabilistic terms.”110 And third, which might be the problem at the core of the latter difficulty for probabilistic measures of coherence pointed out by Siebel, it is unclear to what extent we use probabilistic reasoning in assessing the coherence of single beliefs with the rest of our systems of beliefs. Thus when it comes to assessing everyday knowledge attributions, a purely probabilistic account of coherence will most likely not be of help. Moreover, it can be doubted whether these accounts of coherence meet the requirement (ii) of (TCC), since the majority of people presumably is unable to assess probabilistic relations of the complex kind required by the measures of coherence. Some mathematicians and philosophers may be able to do this, but most “normal” people most likely won’t be. So a probabilistic notion of coherence does not seem to be the right way to spell out coherence if requirement (ii) of (TCC) is to be fulfilled. Thus what we need is an account of coherence which explicitly deals with the relation between single propositions and sets of propositions in a way which does not preclude “normal” people from assessing the coherence of one of their beliefs with the rest of their beliefs. Two major accounts of coherence which fulfill these conditions remain, namely the one offered by Laurence BonJour, which has already been discussed in the second chapter and the one Keith Lehrer advances in his Theory of Knowledge. But before I can sketch the idea behind an extension of Davidson’s global notion of coherence by these local notions, I have to address a position regarding knowledge which has become rather popular in epistemology in recent times, namely epistemic contextualism. Broadly characterized, contextualists hold that whether someone knows something at least partly 109 Siebel 110 Siebel

(2005) p.335. (2005) p.358.

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depends on contextual factors. More specifically, epistemic contextualism focuses on ascriptions of knowledge and their truth conditions. Thus epistemic contextualism can be characterized as the claim that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions are influenced by the context in which the ascription is uttered, rather than set by a fixed meaning of “S knows that p” alone.111 According to contextualists, the standards which must be met by a given belief to count as knowledge may vary with the situation in which knowledge is ascribed and with the standards of the person ascribing it.112 So for example whether we credit someone with the knowledge that Columbus discovered America on October 12, 1492, i.e. which truth conditions the sentence “S knows that Columbus discovered America on October 12, 1492” has partly depends on whether it is uttered in the context of a TV-show, in which the candidate S has just given the right answer to the question about the date of the discovery of America, in the context of a history exam, in which student S has written down the right answer or in the context of a historical research paper in which the historian S defends this claim against a challenging claim of a colleague.113 In the first case, an inspired guess based on some memory fragments might suffice to credit the TV-show candidate with knowledge, in the second case we require the student to at least be able to quote his source (a teacher or a textbook) in order to grant him knowledge, while in the last case, we require the historian to have available a detailed defense of the claim regarding the date which comprises at least equally good evidence as the challenger’s in order to call the belief knowledge. Now the reason for introducing contextualism at this late stage of this book is that contextualist intuitions can be captured by an account of knowledge in terms of extended Davidsonian coherence rather well without thereby sliding into a position which holds that there is no such thing as “the” concept of knowledge but rather merely many different uses of the locution “S knows that p”. The idea is to retain a core notion of knowledge in the form of three necessary conditions, while at the same time allowing the strength and quality of the relations between a belief and the system of beliefs it is a part of to vary with the contextual factors surrounding utterances of statements ascribing knowledge. Thus a coherentist account of knowledge along these lines does not have to require one and the same kind and strength of relations between a belief and the system of beliefs it is a part 111 An

overview of various contextualist positions is given by Rysiew (2008). view is advanced by DeRose (1992) and Cohen (1999). 113 This example is due to Castañeda (1980) p.217. 112 This

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of to be applicable to every attribution of knowledge, but rather will be sensitive to context-specific variations in the standards of coherence required for knowledge. Nevertheless, the strong intuition that in some way we mean the same thing when we attribute knowledge to schoolchildren who give a right answer as well as to university professors who discover something new can be retained if knowledge is spelled out in terms of coherence: Schoolchildren as well as university professors have to truly believe something in order to know it. But while in the case of schoolchildren coherence between the true belief that p and the rest of their systems of beliefs might only be required for knowledge in the sense that they believe that p for the reason that their teacher told them that p is the case, in the case of university professors we will require much stronger and qualitatively different relations of coherence between a belief pertaining to their area of expertise and the rest of their systems of beliefs. Consider another example: To attribute knowledge that he suffers from a very rare disease to John, a medical layman, it will suffice that he believes that a physician he has known to be trustworthy in his diagnoses for years told him that he suffers from this disease. In contrast, we would not credit another physician called in to double-check his colleague’s diagnosis with the knowledge that John suffers from this disease if he merely takes his colleague’s diagnosis for granted, even if he as well has known his colleague to be very trustworthy regarding his diagnoses. Thus different contexts call for different standards of coherence for the attribution of knowledge, which I think can be spelled out as different standards of coherence in terms of different strength and different quality of the relations between the particular beliefs and systems of beliefs involved. Thus contextualism is compatible with a coherence theory of knowledge of the kind I wish to defend as a result of keeping open the degree of strength and the kind of relations required to hold between a belief and the system of beliefs it is a part of in order for it to count as knowledge. The reason for this is that keeping open those factors allows for an adaptation of the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions to the contexts of attribution. So while if we credit a person with knowing that Columbus discovered America on October 12, 1492 in a TV-show, it might suffice for the attribution to be true if her belief coheres with the rest of her beliefs in the minimal sense ensured by being a belief, we require stronger and qualitatively different relations between this belief and the system it is a part of in the context of an exam. Here we would for example at least require the person examined to remember that that she read that Columbus discovered America on October 12, 1492

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in a history textbook which is generally accepted as a reliable source or to remember that the teacher told her so and believe that this teacher is a source which is generally reliable. In the context of a historical research paper, we would require even stronger and again qualitatively different relations between the historian’s belief and his system of beliefs, as for example that the historian has checked all available historical data on the subject and is able to fit his claim into a broader perspective on the historical period which is accepted by (at least a part) of his fellow researchers. Now there is one more reason for my introducing contextualism at this stage: The following two proposals on how to extend Davidson’s account of coherence in order to apply to the relation between particular beliefs and systems of beliefs will both gain great plausibility from being adaptable to context. I will show this regarding the two alternative proposals after sketching them briefly in the remainder of this section.114 3.2.2.1

Laurence BonJour: Inferential Coherence

BonJour, as we already know, bases his account of coherence primarily on various kinds of inferential relations between beliefs. For him, coherence between a belief and the system of beliefs it is a part of is a result of the various inferential interconnections the belief has to the other beliefs in the system as well as of the coherence of the system as a whole. Now since we already possess a notion of the coherence of a system of beliefs as a whole which, as we have seen, deals far better with the problem of the objective truth-conducivity of coherence than BonJour’s, I will only consider BonJour’s conception of the coherence of single beliefs with the system of beliefs they are part of and not his conception of the coherence of systems of beliefs as a whole. Regarding the coherence of a single belief with a system of beliefs, BonJour introduces the classical notion of inferential coherence: What counts toward the coherence of a particular belief with a system of beliefs are simply all kinds of inferential relations, i.e. deductive, inductive and explanatory relations the belief in question bears to the rest of the beliefs in the system, as well as the strength of these relations in the latter two cases. Thus BonJour claims that the coherence of a particular belief with the rest of the system can be evaluated by considering all kinds of reasons the person holding the belief might have for 114 Of

course, I cannot spell out in detail how such an extension of Davidson’s account of coherence by either one of those additional notions could be given in these last paragraphs. But I hope to embark on that enterprise in the future.

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this belief in the form of other beliefs which are parts of her system of beliefs and the degree of support those reasons lend to the belief in question - provided that the person herself regards those beliefs as reasons for this belief.115 Thus, according to BonJour, all inferential relations the person herself can appreciate as lending support to her belief are to be taken into account in evaluating the coherence of a particular belief with her system of beliefs. So, if an account of coherence between single beliefs and the system of beliefs they are part of shall be spelled our in BonJour’s style, what is needed is an account of which inferential relations support a belief with what strength and a specification of the strength of support which is required in order to count a belief as knowledge based on its coherence with the system of beliefs it is a part of. BonJour himself remarks this, regrettingly adding that it might be quite a lot of work to develop such an account.116 Unfortunately, such an account is still lacking.117 But I do not see why it should be impossible to give such an account in the future. Thus BonJour’s notion of inferential coherence is a possible answer to what it means for a particular belief to cohere with a system of beliefs in a way which leads to the belief’s qualifying as knowledge. In addition, his account is open to a contextualist amendment, since different contexts could require different kinds and different strengths of inferential relations to hold between a belief and the system it is a part of in order for the belief to qualify as knowledge. And still more important, different contexts might require the person holding the belief to be aware of inferential relations of different kinds and strengths in order for a particular belief of hers to qualify as knowledge. So someone participating in a TV-show might not be required to be able to give any reasons for his true belief besides “I think I read this somewhere” or “I learned this in school, I think” in order for us to say that he knows that Columbus discovered America on October 12, 1492. These reasons would of course not suffice in the context of an exam or regarding a claim made in an research paper, since in those latter cases, we would require better reasons in the sense of more and stronger inferential relations to more beliefs in the system. Additionally, we would require that the person holding the belief could in principle spell out her reasons for the belief. Thus amending a BonJourian extension of Davidson’s account of coherence to contextualist intuitions 115 Cp.

BonJour (1985) p.92. (1985) pp.93. 117 Regarding the probabilistic relations between beliefs such accounts have been given in the form of the above mentioned measures of coherence. 116 BonJour

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regarding knowledge could even help to reconcile internalist and externalist intuitions regarding knowledge to some extent, since by varying the quality and strength of inferential relations required for knowledge with context, a coherence theory of knowledge can account for our different attributions of knowledge in a variety of cases which at first seem quite different and which have been in the focus of internalist and externalist accounts of knowledge respectively. While externalists emphasize cases in which lower standards of coherence are required,118 internalists emphasize cases in which very high standards of coherence are required.119 Thus a coherence theory of knowledge like the one proposed, which secures objective truth-conducivity by explicating the notion of coherence as a property of systems of beliefs as a whole and comprises a third condition for knowledge in terms of inferential relations between particular beliefs and the systems of beliefs they are part of seems to be able to cover both kinds of cases emphasized by externalists and internalists respectively. 3.2.2.2

Keith Lehrer: Coherence in Terms of Meeting Objections

Now let me come to the second way to spell out coherence between particular beliefs and the systems of beliefs they are parts of. The idea for this second fleshing out of Davidson’s notion of coherence derives from Keith Lehrer’s account of coherence, which he develops in his book Theory of Knowledge. In the chapter which explicitly deals with his coherence theory of knowledge, he characterizes coherence as a relation between a single belief and a set of further beliefs as follows: “p coheres with the evaluation system of S at t if and only if it is more reasonable for S to accept p than to accept any objection to it on the basis of the evaluation system of S.”120 Now, to spell out the general idea behind this characterization of coherence, we need to know what Lehrer means by the “evaluation system” of a person and by the idea that the acceptance of a proposition is more reasonable for someone than the acceptance of any objection to this proposition. I will only briefly comment on Lehrer’s notion of an evaluation 118 This

can for example be seen by reconsidering Goldman’s “problem of forgotten evidence”, which was discussed in section 1.2.3. 119 BonJour’s own case of Norman the clairvoyant which was discussed in chapter 1 is a prime example of this. 120 Lehrer (1990) p.129. Clearly this account of coherence in terms of being able to counter objections developed by Lehrer draws upon his earlier idea of developing a fourth condition for knowledge in terms of excluding defeaters.

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system and elaborate some more on what he understands to be reasonable acceptance in the face of objections, since it is this second notion which is relevant regarding the characterization of coherence between a single belief and the system of beliefs it is a part of needed here. On Lehrer’s account what counts toward the status of a belief as knowledge is not its coherence with the whole system of beliefs a person holds, but rather its coherence with a special part of this system, the “evaluation system”. To characterize this part, Lehrer first distinguishes between belief and acceptance in this way: While many beliefs are held for a variety of reasons, including irrational ones such as wishful thinking, only those beliefs held for a specific purpose count as accepted. Now in epistemic contexts, the relevant purpose is attaining truth and avoiding error. Therefore, in epistemic contexts, Lehrer counts as an acceptance that p only a belief that p which is held for the purpose of attaining truth and avoiding error. Of course, on Lehrer’s account, beliefs count as acceptances independently of whether this purpose is attained. Thus the evaluation system of S consists solely of the beliefs which S holds for the purpose of attaining truth and avoiding error and does not comprise beliefs held for other purposes.121 Now I come to the second notion to be explained with respect to Lehrer’s definition of coherence. Lehrer leaves as undefined the notion of it being more reasonable to accept a proposition rather than another at this stage. He later clarifies this notion in terms of trustworthiness of acceptance, preference and reasoning, but since these clarifications only serve the purpose of ensuring the objective truth-conducivity of coherence on Lehrer’s account I will leave them aside here.122 Instead I will concentrate on his definition of an objection, which is central for my purposes here, since 121 Lehrer

supplements the acceptance system of a person with a “preference system” and a “reasoning system” in order to yield the “evaluation system”. But since the evaluation system will not play a big role in what is to come I will spare the reader the details of his definitions of those further systems. 122 Lehrer’s elaborations on the role of one’s own trustworthiness regarding one’s faculties and beliefs reached by their exercise fits perfectly with Davidson’s account of the coherence of systems of beliefs as a whole, since Lehrer argues that the reason why we may suppose that most of our beliefs are true is that we must suppose that we ourselves are trustworthy regarding our faculties and beliefs, since “my trustworthiness is a consequence of how I learn from experience and learn from others, how I evaluate experience and how I evaluate others.” (Lehrer (1990) p.140) Thus Lehrer argues for the objective truth-conducivity of coherence by an appeal to the genesis of our beliefs in our interaction with the world and others as well. Nevertheless, his arguments in this respect are not as convincing as Davidson’s are, since they lack an appeal to the holistic character of beliefs which is at the heart of the compelling force of Davidson’s arguments.

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Lehrer’s idea amounts to defining the coherence of single beliefs with a system of beliefs in terms of the ability of the person holding the beliefs to defend her belief against objections on the basis of her evaluation system alone. Now Lehrer defines an objection as follows: “o is an objection to p for S on system X at t, if and only if it is less reasonable for S to accept that p on the assumption that o is true than on the assumption that o is false on the basis of the system X at t.”123 Furthermore, he defines what it means for S to be able to answer an objection: “An objection o to p is answered for S on X at t if and only if o is an objection to p for S at t and it is more reasonable for S to accept that p than to accept that o on X at t.”124 Thus, on Lehrer’s account, a belief coheres with the evaluation system of a person if and only if any objection, i.e. any proposition acceptance of which would make it less reasonable for the person to accept her original belief on the basis of her evaluation system can be reasonably rejected on the basis of the person’s evaluation system.125 More specifically, Lehrer proposes the following: To evaluate the coherence of a given belief with the evaluation system of a person, this person must enter a situation called “the justification game”, in which she is confronted with various objections regarding her belief by a critic. Now if the person wins every round of this game, i.e. if she is able to counter any objection by drawing on her evaluation system, then the belief in question coheres with this system. So, for example, a round in the “justification game” can take the following form: “Claimant: I see a zebra. Critic: You are asleep and dreaming that you see a zebra. Claimant: It is more reasonable for me to accept that I see a zebra than that I am asleep and dreaming that I see a zebra. (I can tell that I am awake and not asleep and dreaming now. My experience 123 Lehrer

(1990) p.131.

124 Op.cit. 125 At

this point it becomes very clear that this account of coherence is based on Lehrer’s original idea of knowledge as undefeated true belief: A belief coheres with the evaluation system of a person only if acceptance of any potential defeater for the belief would be less reasonable than accepting the original belief.

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does not feel at all like a dream and I have a distinct memory of what preceded my present experience, leaving my hotel, taking the cab to the zoo, buying a ticket, all of which is trustworthy information that I am now at the zoo looking at a zebra and not asleep and dreaming.)”126 The claimant wins this round of the game, since he can show by an appeal to his evaluation system alone that it is more reasonable for him to accept that he sees a zebra than to accept that he is asleep and dreaming of seeing a zebra. Of course, the claimant has not conclusively refuted the critic’s claim that he is sleeping and dreaming of seeing a zebra by showing this. But, as Lehrer writes “the claimant’s replies are [. . .] adequate replies for the purposes of exhibiting personal justification, for showing what justifies him on the basis of his evaluation system.”127 Thus since on the level of coherence of particular beliefs with systems of beliefs, coherence alone does not have to imply likelihood of truth, but rather merely has to imply likelihood of truth given an evaluation system. But at this stage this does not constitute a vulnerability to skepticism anymore, since if coherence in this sense is spelled out against a background of a system of beliefs which is coherent in Davidson’s sense, then coherence of a single belief with this system in Lehrer’s sense suffices to count this belief as knowledge. Now how can Lehrer’s conception of coherence in terms of the ability to meet objections on the basis of an evaluation system be of help in spelling out the notion of coherence of a particular belief with a system of beliefs? The idea is the following: The more objections the person holding a belief with respect to which the objections are raised can counter on the basis of her system of beliefs, the stronger this belief coheres with her system of beliefs.128 This account fits even better with contextualist intuitions than BonJour’s account, since it can be amended to comprise a restriction specifying which kind of objections must be answered in order for the belief in question to count as knowledge. And which kind of objections in turn must be countered for a belief to be considered knowledge may vary with context. Thus for example, in the TV-show case, what must be countered 126 Lehrer

(1990) p.133. (1990) p.134. 128 Thus, Lehrer’s way of defining coherence of a single belief with a system of beliefs has an advantage over BonJour’s way, since on Lehrer’s account degrees of coherence can be specified without the need to compare the strength of various inferential relations in quantitative terms, since on this account to evaluate coherence one simply has to consider objections answered, which will be a task much easier to perform than the task of developing a complex quantitative theory of inferential relations. 127 Lehrer

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in order for the candidate’s belief to qualify as knowledge are objections by the quizmaster which are intended to unsettle the candidate such as: “How can you be so sure that this is the right answer? Couldn’t it be answer B as well?” Now if the candidate is just guessing inspiredly, he might answer: “Yes, it could, but I think that I learned answer A in school, and therefore on my system of beliefs, it is more reasonable for me to believe that answer A is the right answer than to believe that answer B is the right answer.” In this case, there would be no reason for us to deny the candidate knowledge if he cannot indicate his sources more specifically. In the case of the high school student, a legitimate objection could be: “But the teacher mentioned a different date last week.” Now if the student cannot counter this objection, he does not know that Columbus discovered America on October 12, 1492. If on the other hand, he can reply “But I read that it was this date in the textbook just yesterday and I trust the textbook more than the teacher”, the objection is countered and we credit the student with knowledge. Considering the historian, even stronger objections are allowed than in the student case: The historian must counter objections like “But only a few of your colleagues believe that this date is the correct one.” When faced with such an objection which remains uncountered, we do not credit the historian with knowledge. But if he can counter this by for example replying: “My colleagues are wrong, since they are not aware of this new piece of historical evidence, which supports my claim and contradicts theirs” and providing further evidence for the authenticity of his evidence, he can be considered to know that Columbus discovered America on October 12, 1492. Thus, depending on the context in which knowledge is attributed, the class of objections which must be countered by the person holding the belief varies. So Keith Lehrer’s account of coherence is compatible with contextualist views as well. 3.2.2.3

A Two-Level Account of Coherence

As we have seen, BonJour’s and Lehrer’s accounts of coherence of single beliefs with systems of beliefs both are possible candidates for extending Davidson’s account of coherence in a way which meets requirement (ii) of (TCC). On BonJour’s account this requirement is met, since what is to be taken into account in evaluating the coherence of a given belief with the system of beliefs are only those inferential relations between the belief and further beliefs which are part of the system, the person holding the belief would consider in giving reasons for her belief. On Lehrer’s

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account the requirement is met, since what is taken into account in evaluating coherence is whether the person can counter certain objections on the basis of her system of beliefs, which she can do only if she is aware that it is more reasonable for her to retain her belief on the basis of her system than to accept the objection. Thus on both accounts the requirement that the coherence of the belief that p with S’s system of beliefs has to be cognitively accessible to S in order for S to have knowledge that p is fulfilled. Moreover, both accounts have the advantage of being compatible with epistemic contextualism, since both accounts allow for a variation of the degree of coherence which is required for knowledge in a given context. Thus we may conclude that both accounts of the coherence of single beliefs with a system of beliefs can be used to extend Davidson’s account of coherence of systems of beliefs as a whole in order to yield a coherence theory of knowledge which provides an answer to the question how we can tell whether one of our beliefs constitutes knowledge. I will not decide on the answer to the question which account provides the better way to extend Davidson’s account here but leave this question as a topic for further research. Thus the general idea behind the conception of knowledge which will be presented in the next section is the following: The account will classically encompass a truth condition and a belief condition. The belief condition included will be taken to imply that beliefs are members of Davidsoncoherent systems of beliefs. The third condition will then be spelled out in terms of coherence in either BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense and include a reference to context. So requirement (i) of (TCC) is fulfilled by the belief condition while the belief condition as well as the third condition meet requirement (ii). One objection to the proposal to extend Davidson’s account of coherence by one of the notions of coherence presented in this section has to be mentioned here: One might wonder whether it could be the case that Davidson’s notion of coherence which is primarily based on conceptual relations between beliefs and the conceptions of coherence developed by BonJour and Lehrer which are based on inferential relations between beliefs and the ability to answer objections on the basis of a system of beliefs respectively are incompatible. If this were the case, an account of knowledge resulting from combining a belief condition which implies that a belief must be a member of a system of beliefs which is Davidson-coherent and additionally requires it to cohere with this system in BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense would be inconsistent. So what needs to be shown here is that Bon-

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Jour’s conception of coherence as well as Lehrer’s are compatible with Davidson’s conception. The following consideration shows that this is the case: If a belief’s cohering with the system of beliefs it is a member of in Davidson’s sense is a necessary condition for its having determinate content, then there cannot be beliefs which do not cohere with the systems of beliefs they are members of in this sense. Thus it is impossible that a belief coheres with the system of beliefs it is a member of in BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense but does not cohere with it in Davidson’s sense, since there is no room for incompatibility in this respect. So what remains is the question whether it is possible for a belief to cohere with the system of beliefs it is a member of in Davidson’s sense but fails to cohere with it in BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense. Now this of course is possible, since the reason for introducing these additional conceptions of coherence was that coherence in Davidson’s sense alone does not suffice for a belief’s being knowledge. So of course there are beliefs which cohere with the system of beliefs they are part of in Davidson’s sense but do not cohere with it in BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense, either because they are not sufficiently inferentially connected to the the other beliefs in the system or because there is an objection to them which cannot be countered on the basis of the system of beliefs they are part of. But this cannot result in an inconsistency in a concept of knowledge which comprises both notions of coherence, since if a belief is a member of a Davidson-coherent system of beliefs but nevertheless does not cohere with this system of beliefs in BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense, this simply means that the belief is not knowledge although it is likely to be true. Thus the fact that it is possible that beliefs cohere with the system of beliefs they are part of in Davidsons’s sense while they do not cohere with it in the sense required by a third condition in terms of coherence as understood by BonJour or coherence as understood by Lehrer simply means that those beliefs do not constitute knowledge although they are likely to be true. An example for a belief which coheres with the system of beliefs it is a part of in Davidson’s sense but does not cohere with it in Lehrer’s sense would be Peter’s belief that Paul will visit him tomorrow, which is due to Peter’s telling Paul that he will do so. Now this belief coheres with Peter’s system of belief perfectly as far as Davidsonian coherence is concerned. But Peter additionally knows that Paul is notoriously forgetful. So his belief that Paul will visit him tomorrow does not cohere with his system of beliefs in Lehrer’s sense, since there is an objection to his belief which cannot be countered n the basis of his system of beliefs, namely

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the objection that Paul will forget that he promised to visit Peter. Thus of course there can be beliefs which cohere with the system of beliefs they are part of in Davidson’s sense but which do not cohere with those system in BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense. But this does not mean that Davidson’s notion of coherence is incompatible with BonJour’s or Lehrer’s notion. It merely means that while all beliefs must cohere with the systems of beliefs they are part of in Davidson’s sense, there are some beliefs which do not cohere with those systems in BonJour’s or Lehrer’s sense. But this is just the desired result, since the point in introducing the further notions of coherence was to develop an account of knowledge which does not imply that all true beliefs are knowledge. So in the last section of this chapter, I will present my account of knowledge and defend it against one last objection. 3.2.3

Knowledge as Coherent True Belief

Now that a notion of coherence which is suitable to figure in an account of knowledge has been identified and clarified, it is time to introduce this notion into an explicit account of knowledge. Of course, since they have seldom been questioned as conditions for knowledge, I will include into my account a truth condition and a belief condition, bearing in mind that the latter has been shown to imply coherence of systems of beliefs in Davidson’s sense. I will supplement these necessary ingredients with a third condition in terms of coherence of particular beliefs with systems of beliefs in the style of BonJour or Lehrer. Moreover I will explicitly include a reference to context in order to account for different standards for knowledge attributions in different contexts. Thus my proposed partial analysis of the concept of knowledge is the following: (K) S knows that p in context K only if (i) It is true that p. (ii) S believes that p. (iii) p coheres with S’s system of beliefs to an extent appropriate to context K. Now regarding this partial analysis, one point will immediately strike the reader’s eye as requiring clarification. This point is that the form of analysis of course raises the question about possible (Gettier-style or other)

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counterexamples. The contextualist element which is included in my partial analysis will of course not suffice to exclude Gettier-examples, which can be seen by considering Russell’s example involving a stopped station clock which nevertheless at the time someone is looking at it accidentally indicates the right time.129 I do not see how this case can be excluded by any analysis by introducing a contextualist element: Surely, in this context the belief that the time the clock indicates is the correct time will fulfill all of the above conditions for knowledge while still falling short of being knowledge. Thus for example, we would credit her belief with a large number of inferential relations to her other beliefs and we would not require her to be able to conclusively refute the objection that the clock might have stopped. Thus the partial analysis I offer seems to be vulnerable to at least some Gettier examples.130 I hope to dispel the worry about the possibility of counterexamples to some degree by refraining from claiming that the conditions in my analysis are more than necessary conditions. It might well be that a fourth condition in terms of undefeatedness in a stronger sense than the one exploited by Lehrer in his conception of coherence or in terms of nonaccidentality is called for to deal with all Gettier-style counterexamples. My project was not to offer an analysis of the concept of knowledge which is immune to Gettier-style counterexamples but only to show that and why coherence is the best candidate for a property of beliefs which fulfills the requirement of truth-conducivity. Nevertheless I will say a few concluding words about the Gettier problem in this last section. The fact that almost 50 years of thinking about the Gettier problem done by a great number of highly capable epistemologists has lead to nothing but failure in this respect alone might license the conclusion that the Gettier problem simply is irresolvable. But I will not contend myself with this easy way of dismissal of the issue. Instead I will discuss an argument for the contention that the Gettier problem cannot be resolved while holding on to the traditional project of analyzing the notion of knowledge in order to show that this argument does not establish its conclusion. Arguments for the conclusion that the project of analyzing the concept of knowledge should be given up as a result of encountering the Gettier difficulty began to surface shortly after Gettier’s paper was published. These early arguments rested on a rejection of the idea of conceptual analysis tout court 129 Cp.

Russell (1948) pp.170. a discussion of the possibility of excluding Gettier examples by endorsing contextualism which results in a negative verdict regarding this project, see Brogaard (2004). 130 For

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which was inspired by Wittgenstein’s idea that ordinary language terms are characterized by “family resemblances” rather than by a conceptual core which could be analyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. So for example Saunders and Champawat concluded the following only a year after Gettier’s paper was published: “[. . .] we would suggest that it is a mistake to believe that there is some essence of knowledge, some set of conditions which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge. It is our opinion that ten instances of knowledge share at most a family resemblance.”131 Now while there may be ordinary language notions which cannot be characterized by necessary and sufficient conditions since they lack a conceptual core, I do not take the Gettier problem to establish this in the case of the concept of knowledge. To show that the concept of knowledge lacks analyzability in this manner one would have to show that there are two or more different uses of the expression “S knows that p” which only bear “family resemblances” to each other. Noting that some analysis of “the” concept of knowledge - or even many of them - can be refuted by counterexamples of a certain style does not establish this.132 Instead I will argue that Gettier cases present a general problem to analyses of knowledge which try to accommodate our intuition that a belief’s fulfilling the third condition should not imply its truth but at most an increased likelihood of its truth.133 To see why it seems impossible to develop an analysis of the concept of knowledge which accommodates the intuition that the truth condition and the third condition should be logically independent and is immune to Gettier-style counterexamples let us reconsider briefly the various attempts at formulating such an analysis. Since almost all epistemologists endorse the truth condition and the belief condition for knowledge, the common reaction to Gettier’s challenge 131 Saunders

& Champawat (1964) p.9. For a more recent criticism in this spirit see: Craig (1993) Chapter 1. 132 For a more elaborate criticism of the Wittgensteinian “solution” of the Gettier problem see Lycan (2006) pp.157. 133 Similar arguments have been presented by Craig (1990) pp.45 and pp.69 and Zagzebski (1994). As a consequence, Craig opts for a pragmatic contextualist approach which takes into account that everyday ascriptions of knowledge - while all requiring some value of probability of truth bestowed on beliefs by fulfilling the third condition - differ with regard to the strength of these probability requirements depending on the situation (Craig (1990) pp.98). Zagzebski reacts by denying that every analysis of knowledge including a third condition which implies truth has to run counter to our intuitions and offers her own analysis in this spirit. (Zagzebski (1999) pp.103.)

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has been to have a closer look at the third condition: Any analysis which requires the property of beliefs specified by the third condition to be a property whose being had by a belief does not imply the belief’s truth introduces an element of fallibility and therefore the possibility of epistemic luck. This can be seen by considering Gettier cases which involve a valid inference from a false premise which is nevertheless backed by lots of true reasons or evidence. In such cases, although all three conditions of many analyses are met, we are nevertheless reluctant to classify the belief in question as knowledge. The reason for this is that the person’s arriving at a true belief is merely a matter of luck, since valid inferences from false premises can lead to false conclusions as well as to true ones. So as long as the property specified by the third condition falls short of implying truth, there will always be a logical gap between having that property and being true. And as long as this logical gap exists, one can always construct Gettier cases using the following “recipe” offered by Linda Zagzebski: “[. . .] we can construct Gettier cases by using the following procedure: start with a a case of justified (or warranted) false belief. Make the element of justification (or warrant) strong enough for knowledge, but make the belief false. The falsity of the belief will not be due to any systematically describable element in the situation, for if it were, such a feature could be used in the analysis of the components of knowledge other than true belief and then truth would be entailed by the other components of knowledge, contrary to the hypothesis. The falsity of the beliefs is therefore due to some element of luck. Now emend the case by adding another element of luck, only this time an element which makes the belief true after all. The situation might be described as one element of luck counteracting another. We now have a case in which the belief is justified (warranted) in a sense strong enough for knowledge, the belief is true, but it is not knowledge.”134 Now of course this recipe can as well be used considering analyses which contain a third condition which is not cast in terms of justification or warrant but in terms of different concepts which nevertheless do not imply the truth of the belief, as for example in terms of coherence. Note that adding a fourth condition which does not imply truth does not seem to help to avoid Gettier cases either, since if the chosen fourth condition does not 134 Zagzebski

(1994) p.69.

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imply truth, one can construct examples following the above “recipe” with respect to the fourth condition as well, since the logical gap remains.135 Therefore third or fourth conditions involving only properties the having of which does not imply the belief’s truth cannot exclude Gettier cases.136 As Elke Brendel aptly puts it regarding internalist third conditions which do not imply truth: “Therefore, a pure internalist theory of knowledge in which the justification is solely based on justifying grounds that are accessible to the epistemic subject and in which consequently the justification need not guarantee the truth of a belief, does not satisfy the third condition of an adequate analysis of knowledge, i.e., it does not provide a solution to the Gettier problem.”137 Most internalist epistemologists dealing with the analysis of knowledge have acknowledged this point by now and reacted by adding to their analyses a fourth condition to the effect that in order to count as knowledge, a belief has to be “degettierized”.138 But including such a condition seems rather ad hoc, since it simply amounts to excluding certain types of counterexamples in a way which does not have anything to do with the concept to be analyzed. Rather, this strategy amounts to something like adding an “and my analysis is not vulnerable to Gettier cases by definition”-clause to the analysis. It is less clear that the above argument applies to all externalist third conditions as well, but as all prominent externalist analyses as the causal analysis, the tracking analysis and reliabilist analyses have been shown to be either vulnerable to Gettier examples or to be too strong, I will take it that casting the third condition in a strictly externalist manner does not provide a solution to the Gettier problem while leading to a satisfactory analysis either.139 135 This

can be seen by considering Keith Lehrer’s defeasibility condition. If the requirement that S’s justification must be undefeated does not imply the truth of the original belief, Gettier cases - although of a more complex kind - are still possible. 136 There are even some Gettier cases which suggest that analyses which contain a third condition which implies truth cannot exclude Gettier cases completely. One example is the famous barn facsimile case which was developed by Goldman (1976), who attributes it to Carl Ginet. But note that some authors have rejected those cases, claiming that they are not real Gettier cases but constitute cases of knowledge after all. (Cp. Lycan (2006) pp.157). 137 Brendel (1999) p.297. 138 Cp. Steup (2008). 139 Alvin Plantinga has argued that externalist theories of a certain kind are not vulnerable to Gettier problems (Cp. Plantinga (1993b) pp.36), but this claim is convinc-

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Now does it follow from these results that the concept of knowledge is unanalyzable? This depends on what is meant by the claim that a given concept is unanalyzable. Unanalyzability claims have been presented regarding many concepts, but not many of them have been motivated by an appeal to the fact that all proposed analyses have been shown to be vulnerable to a certain type of counterexamples. Rather, unanalyzability claims are often based on one of the following reasons: First, it can be claimed that a given concept is unanalyzable since it is one of our most basic concepts.140 In this case the reasoning usually runs as follows: Since we have to start with conceptual analysis at some point, there have to be concepts which are not to be analyzed in terms of other concepts. These concepts are the basic concepts which other concepts are reducible to. Now if a concept persistently resists analysis, it might well be that it is such a basic concept, which cannot be explained in terms of other concepts. But this is clearly not the case regarding the concept of knowledge, since almost everyone agrees that the concept of knowledge has as its components at least the truth condition and the belief condition. Thus it cannot be a basic concept, since we can give at least two necessary conditions in terms of which the concept of knowledge is analyzable. What is problematic considering the possibility of Gettier cases is not finding necessary conditions for knowledge but finding necessary conditions which jointly are sufficient. Thus the problem of finding an adequate analysis of the concept of knowledge which is not vulnerable to Gettier cases does not seem to result from the unanalyzability of the concept of knowledge in this first sense. Second, a concept can be said to be unanalyzable in the sense that it is vague. A concept is said to be vague if there are clear cases of its application and clear cases to which it does not apply, but if there is also a range of cases in which it is unclear whether the concept applies. Moreover the boundaries between the clear and the unclear cases themselves are vague, i.e. it is not possible to draw a distinct line at some point between the clear cases and the unclear ones. Thus it might be that a concept comprises a kind of vagueness no analysis of the concept can capture. The classical example of the concept of a heap is such a case.141 But the concept of ingly refuted by Zagzebski (1994) pp.66. 140 Timothy Williamson takes this line of argument regarding the concept of knowledge but argues for this independently of Gettier’s challenge. (Cp. Williamson (2000) pp.33). 141 Vagueness does not per se constitute a reason for taking a concept to be unanalyzable. There still might be an analysis whose right hand side comprises exactly the

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knowledge does not seem to be vague, since the problem with the concept of knowledge is not that there are clear cases of knowledge and cases in which we are not sure whether to apply the concept. More important, even if the concept of knowledge were vague to some extent, Gettier cases do not result from vagueness. The problem in these cases is not that we are uncertain whether to apply the concept. On the contrary, we are quite sure that the concept does not apply in these cases. So the problem here is that we are sure that the concept does not apply while our analyses do apply in these cases. Thus the Gettier problem does not seem to result from vagueness of the concept of knowledge and therefore this cannot be the sense in which is it can be said to be unanalyzable either. Third, as has been already discussed above, a concept may resist analysis on the grounds that there is no “conceptual core” of the concept, but merely various different uses of the same expression which do not express the same concept but rather are connected by “family resemblances”. Thus in these cases, “the concept” resists analysis, since there is no unique concept which is expressed by all uses of a certain expression. But this does not seem to be true in the case of the concept of knowledge either, since first, the concept expressed by “S knows that p” has a conceptual core in the form of two necessary conditions, namely the truth condition and the belief condition.142 And second, as William Lycan argues convincingly, the expression “to know” does not exhibit a family resemblance structure. According to Lycan, an expression can exhibit a family resemblance structure in two senses: On the one hand, it can exhibit a “paradigm structure”, i.e. its use can be determined by a list of features, which are possessed by a “paradigm case” of the expression’s application. So the expression is correctly applied to something if this something exhibits enough of the features on the list. But, Lycan argues, the expression “S knows that p” is not structured like that: “‘Know’ does not have the Paradigm structure. I suppose there is a paradigm for inferential empirical knowledge. [. . .] If S has overwhelming amounts of evidence for believing that p, has not the slightest reason to doubt that p, and is not gettiered or beset by same kind of vagueness as its left hand side. Thus for example the concept of a foal is vague, since it is not clear exactly how old a horse has to be in order not to count as a foal anymore. But since the concept of a young horse shares the same vagueness, the former concept can be analyzed in terms of the latter. 142 Of course, there are related uses of the verb “to know”, as for example when this verb is used in sentences as “Peter knows Paul.” or “Paul knows how to swim.”. But those related uses are not intended to be covered by the analysis of the concept of propositional knowledge by any author tending to this project (Cp. Section 1.2.3).

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fluke in any way at all, then (barring global skepticism) S surely knows that p. But suppose S meets the first of those two conditions but not the third, i.e., S is a classic Gettier victim. Then (as before) S does not pretty-much-know that p; S is not a good though imperfect example of a knower. S simply and flatly does not know. It is not that S fails to have ‘enough’ of the paradigm features of knowing. It is that S is gettiered and so disqualified, period.”143 On the other hand, an expression can exhibit a family resemblance structure in the sense that it has a “criss-crossing” structure.144 This structure is similar to the paradigm structure in the sense that expressions exhibiting this structure are also characterized by a list of features which determines their correct use. But in this case, the features on the list may be mutually incompatible, so that there is no single paradigm of the expression’s application but rather merely various different correct applications which partly overlap. Now Lycan argues that the expression “S knows that p” does not exhibit this structure as well: “But ‘know’ does not have the Criss-Crossing structure either, for the same reason as before. It is not that poor gettiered S fails to have ‘enough’ of the family features; it is that S is disqualified. Also, there is no very visible ‘family’ composed of people who have one or two or three of the traits: believing that p, its being true that p, having evidence that p, not being gettiered. Rather, there is more of an epistemological hierarchy: believing that p, believing truly that p, justifiedly and truly believing that p, epistemically-justifiedly and truly believing that p, epistemically-justifiedly and truly believing that p and not being gettiered (though one wonders where on this scale to put epistemicallyjustifiedly and falsely believing that p, and it is not obvious whether justifiably and truly but not epistemically-justifiedly believing that p but not being gettiered should be ranked higher or lower than epistemically-justifiedly believing that p and being gettiered).”145 So the expression “S knows that p” does not exhibit a family resemblance 143 Lycan

(2006) pp.158. borrows that term from Wittgenstein himself and remarks that Wittgenstein seems to have had in mind this structure rather than the paradigm structure when describing his conception of family resemblances, although his examples, as the expression “game”, more often are examples of expressions with a paradigm structure. 145 Lycan (2006) p.159. 144 Lycan

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structure on either interpretation of Wittgenstein’s conception and thus, this does not seem to be the sense in which the concept of knowledge is unanalyzable either. Fourth, what is meant by the claim that a given concept is unanalyzable can simply be that no analysis without counterexamples can be found. Now this indeed seems to be the case for the concept of knowledge until today, since it seems that to exclude Gettier cases an analysis of the concept of knowledge must contain a third or fourth condition which implies truth, in which case the analysis is not intuitively adequate because it is too strong. Now does this show that the concept of knowledge is doomed to fall under the verdict of unanalyzability in any interesting sense? I do not think so for two reasons: First, there are analyses of the concept which cover all cases except Gettier cases. I hope my own analysis belongs to this class if it is taken as a complete analysis. And second, we know exactly what the problem with Gettier cases is: They all involve an element of epistemic luck in the sense that all gettiered persons are such that they have arrived at a true belief which might easily have been false in the same situation although it fulfills the third condition, i.e. all beliefs of Gettier victims are to some extent accidentally true. As a result of this structural feature of Gettier cases, which as we have seen even offers the possibility of specifying a “recipe” for constructing such cases regarding any analysis which does not include a third (or fourth) condition which does not imply truth, some authors have proposed to cast the third condition in terms of nonaccidentality.146 So let us take a further look at conditions of this kind. First, I am convinced that it will not do to simply replace the third condition with a nonaccidentality condition, since this would run counter to the internalist intuition that in most cases the person having knowledge must have cognitive access to the factors that contribute to her belief’s being knowledge. So a nonaccidentality condition can at best serve as a supplementing fourth condition, for which the internalist requirement does not have to hold, since it is merely included to deal with Gettier cases. Now since we would not require people to be aware of the fact that they are not gettiered in order to credit them with knowledge but rather only require them not to be gettiered, a fourth condition intended to take care of Gettier examples does not seem to have to meet internalist standards. So it seems to me that the strategy to supplement the analysis of knowledge with a fourth condition in terms of nonaccidentality does not have to lead to an analysis which is too strong. The reason for this is that it can 146 Cp.

for example Ryan (1996) and Howard-Snyder et al. (2003).

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provide the desired result of excluding Gettier cases without closing he logical gap between the truth condition and the third condition. Now how could such a condition look like? What I have in mind is something as (iv) It is not by accident that conditions (i) - (iii) are fulfilled by S’s belief that p simultaneously.147 Now I do not think that adding such a condition to the partial analysis offered above would yield an analysis which is too strong, since (iv) says nothing about the reasons why the conditions (i) - (iii) are fulfilled simultaneously. Most important, it does not require them to be fulfilled simultaneously for logical or conceptual reasons. At the same time, I cannot think of any Gettier case which is not excluded by (iv). So here we seem to have a condition which is able to save analyses of the concept of knowledge from falling prey to Gettier cases. But there are some major objections against conditions in terms of nonaccidentality. These objections at least partly parallel the objections against “degettierizing” conditions. Linda Zagzebski pregnantly formulates these objections like this:148 “Since Gettier cases are those in which accidentality or luck is involved, it has often been suggested that knowledge is nonaccidental true belief. This definition [. . .] is vague as well as negative and it has little practical import. [. . .] Like the definition justified true belief that is not a Gettier case it is ad hoc.”149 In this passage, three major points are made against conditions in terms of nonaccidentality:150 First, they introduce an element of vagueness into the analysans, which is not part of the concept of knowledge itself. Second, they introduce a negative element into the analysans. And third, they are ad hoc, since their introduction is inspired by the desire to rid oneself of 147 Of

course, this condition implies that the other three conditions are fulfilled. But it does not imply that there is any relation of implication between the belief’s fulfilling (i) and it’s fulfilling (ii) and (iii). 148 She formulates the objections with respect to analyses in which the third condition is replaced by a nonaccidentality condition. But all but the practical-impactobjection do not hinge on this particularity but apply to nonaccidentality conditions which are offered as a supplement as well. 149 Zagzebski (1999) p.103. 150 I will ignore the complaint about practical import, since what Zagzebski means by this is that definitions in terms of nonaccidentality do not get us further toward the goal of finding out which of our beliefs are knowledge. Thus I take this objection to apply to analyses in which the third condition is replaced by a nonaccidentality condition only.

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Gettier-style counterexamples only. Now since I think that the second and the third objection can be countered easily, I will discuss them first. Zagzebski considers the negativity of nonaccidentality conditions an undesirable feature since she considers it a general requirement for proper definitions that they should not be negative: “The idea is that a definition is supposed to tell us something we didn’t already know. We want a definition because of a failure to grasp the concept to be defined. A circular definition does not do that since it uses the concept to be defined in the definiens, not does one that uses other concepts as much in need of definition as the definiendum. Negative definitions fail in a more subtle way. They tell us what something is not, not what it is.”151 Now I think that if this is true at all, it is true only for definitions which are completely negative, i.e. which contain only negative conditions, but not for definitions which contain a mixture of negative and positive conditions. Consider the following well-known paradigm of a definition: S is a bachelor if and only if (i) S is a man. (ii) S is not married. (iii) S is above majority age. Now if Zagzebski is right in claiming that definitions should not contain negative conditions, then this paradigm case of a definition would be excluded from being a proper definition. So while it may be true that definitions should not be cast in terms of negative conditions only, mixed definitions obviously can be informative and even capture the meaning of the term defined completely. As can be seen by considering the bachelor example, saying what something is not at least in some cases can tell us a great deal about what something is. So I think it is safe to conclude that the negativity objection does not count against nonaccidentality conditions. So let us come to the objection that nonaccidentality conditions are invented ad hoc, since their only purpose is to exclude Gettier cases. Now although it is true that nonaccidentality conditions are inspired by Gettier cases, I do not see why this speaks against their introduction. After all, isn’t it part of the point of the method of counterexamples to show us 151 Zagzebski

(1999) p.98.

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where our original analyses went wrong? If, after an analysis of a concept has been shown to fall prey to a counterexample, the new proposed analyses were not allowed to be designed to exclude the counterexamples to the previous one to some extent, the method of counterexamples would have to be considered an exclusively negative method which cannot yield positive results in the sense of a better understanding of the concepts analyzed. Thus I think that presenting counterexamples does not merely serve the purpose of showing us that our original analysis was wrong, but also can lead us to a better understanding of the reasons why it was wrong. And if, as in the case of the concept of knowledge, we even have a whole class of counterexamples whose structure can be characterized independently of the various specific situations presented, i.e. which shows us exactly what the problem with the previous analyses was, then why shouldn’t we design an additional condition which excludes exactly those undesired cases if this is possible? So I do not really see why such a strategy should be ad hoc. To be sure, adding a clause like “and Gettier cases are excluded” is ad hoc, since such a clause does not specify a condition in terms of concepts but simply is a ceteris paribus clause. But this is only a problem of formulation, not a problem on the conceptual level. If the problem with Gettier cases - as most authors agree - really is accidentality, then why not exclude it to yield a satisfactory analysis of the concept of knowledge? That adding a condition which excludes a class of counterexamples by characterizing them in conceptual terms, as for example in terms of nonaccidentality, can be a legitimate move can moreover be seen by considering the attempt to exclude Gettier cases by endorsing the defeasibility theory, i.e. by adding a condition to the effect that S’s justification must be undefeated. For this strategy aimed at excluding Gettier cases by characterizing them conceptually and formulating a fourth condition in terms of the characterizing concepts as well. Since at the time of the development of this theory, it was still thought that the problem with Gettier cases is that a “gettiered” person’s belief must rest upon at least one false premise, it was tried to exclude beliefs justified by false premises. Thus if a strategy which proceeds from the structure of the counterexamples which were used to refute the original analysis in developing a new one is illegitimate since it is ad hoc, the defeasibility theory should have to be excluded as well. So I take it that the ad hoc objection does not discredit nonaccidentality conditions as well. Now the first objection, i.e. the vagueness objection is the most vital one, although I do not think that the problem addressed by it is the vague-

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ness of nonaccidentality conditions but rather their obscurity. The notion of nonaccidentality which is contained in the proposed condition is not vague, since the problem with this notion is not that it has fuzzy borders of application. Rather, this notion is highly obscure, since it is not at all clear what it means that the simultaneous holding of two or more conditions is no accident. So this really is a valid objection against nonaccidentality conditions, since the standards of conceptual analysis demand not to analyze a concept in terms of concepts which are less clear than the analysandum. So, as it stands, the concept of nonaccidentality severely stands in need of clarification before it can be used in spelling out a fourth condition for knowledge. But of course the obscurity objection does not show that the concept of nonaccidentality is helplessly obscure, i.e. that it is not possible to clarify the notion of nonaccidentality to an extent sufficient to match the clarity of the concept of knowledge. So the obscurity objection is valid as long as such a clarification is still lacking, but it can be overcome in a straightforward way by offering a clarified notion of nonaccidentality and spelling out a fourth condition of knowledge in terms of this clarified notion.152 So, contrary to many prophecies of doom regarding the project of analyzing the concept of knowledge which have been brought forth over the years, there still seems to be hope for this project after all. As I hope to have shown in this book, neither is the search for a third condition which respects internalist as well as externalist intuitions in vain, nor does the resilient nature of the notion of justification prevent us from finding out what knowledge is. And as this last section showed, the Gettier problem seems not to be insurmountable as well. It may take some time and a lot of work to finally arrive at a satisfying solution to this problem, but I hope that my concluding remarks will inspire some of the readers to set out on this quest.

152 A

great deal of work in this direction has already been done by Howard-Snyder et al. (2003).

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