Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's "Other" [Proofs ed.] 2008046665, 0415450551, 0203883756, 9780415450553, 9780203883756

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Proof Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy

This book is the first attempt to examine Japan’s relations with Russia from the perspective of national identity, providing a new interpretation of Japan’s perceptions of Russia and foreign policy. Alexander Bukh focuses on the construction of the Japanese self, using Russia as the other, examining the history of bilateral relations and comparisons between the Russian and Japanese national character. The first part of the book examines the formation of modern Japan’s perceptions of Russia, focusing mainly on the Cold War years. The second part of the book examines how this identity construction has been reflected in Japan’s economic, security and territorial dispute-related policy towards post-Soviet Russia. Providing not only a case study of the Japan–Russia relationship, but also engaging in a critical examination of existing International Relations frameworks for conceptualizing the relationship between national identity and foreign policy, the appeal of the book will not be limited to those interested in Japanese/Russian politics but it will also be of interest to the broader body of students of International Relations.

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Alexander Bukh is an Associate Professor, in the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Science at Tsukuba University, Japan. He holds an LL.M from Tokyo University and a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics.

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Proof Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies / Routledge Series Series Editor: Glenn D. Hook Professor of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield

This series, published by Routledge in association with the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheffield, both makes available original research on a wide range of subjects dealing with Japan and provides introductory overviews of key topics in Japanese Studies. The Internationalization of Japan Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Michael Weiner

Japanese Business Management Restructuring for low growth and globalization Edited by Hasegawa Harukiyo and Glenn D. Hook

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Race and Migration in Imperial Japan Michael Weiner

Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area Pekka Korhonen Greater China and Japan Prospects for an economic partnership? Robert Taylor

The Steel Industry in Japan A comparison with the UK Hasegawa Harukiyo Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan Richard Siddle Japan’s Minorities The illusion of homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner

Japan and Asia Pacific Integration Pacific romances 1968–96 Pekka Korhonen Japan’s Economic Power and Security Japan and North Korea Christopher W. Hughes

Japan’s Contested Constitution Documents and analysis Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson

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Proof The Political Economy of Reproduction in Japan Between nation-state and everyday life Takeda Hiroko

Japanese Education Reform Nakasone’s legacy Christopher P. Hood The Political Economy of Japanese Globalisation Glenn D. Hook and Hasegawa Harukiyo

Grassroots Pacifism in Post-War Japan The rebirth of a nation Mari Yamamoto

Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle

Interfirm Networks in the Japanese Electronics Industry Ralph Paprzycki

Japan and Britain in the Contemporary World Responses to common issues Edited by Hugo Dobson and Glenn D. Hook

Globalisation and Women in the Japanese Workforce Beverley Bishop Contested Governance in Japan Sites and issues Edited by Glenn D. Hook

Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping New pressures, new responses Hugo Dobson

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Japanese Capitalism and Modernity in a Global Era Re-fabricating lifetime employment relations Peter C. D. Matanle Nikkeiren and Japanese Capitalism John Crump Production Networks in Asia and Europe Skill formation and technology transfer in the automobile industry Edited by Rogier Busser and Yuri Sadoi Japan and the G7/8 1975–2002 Hugo Dobson

Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Second edition Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises Yukiko Nishikawa Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs Purnendra Jain Japan and East Asian Monetary Regionalism Towards a proactive leadership role? Shigeko Hayashi Japan’s Relations with China Facing a rising power Lam Peng-Er

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Proof Representing the Other in Modern Japanese Literature A critical approach Edited by Rachael Hutchinson and Mark Williams Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa Miyume Tanji

Japan’s Minorities 2nd Edition The illusion of homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner

Nationalisms in Japan Edited by Naoko Shimazu Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum The search for multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific Takeshi Yuzawa Global Governance and Japan The institutional architecture Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Hugo Dobson

Japan’s Middle East Security Policy International Relations theory and Japanese foreign policy-making Yukiko Miyagi

Japan and Britain at War and Peace Edited by Nobuko Kosuge and Hugo Dobson Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy Russia as Japan’s ‘Other’ Alexander Bukh

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Proof Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy Russia as Japan’s ‘Other’

Alexander Bukh

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First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2009 Alexander Bukh Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Defence procurement and industry policy / edited by Stefan Markowski, Peter Hall, and Robert Wylie. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Armed Forces–Procurement. 2. Defense contracts–Government policy. 3. Defense industries–Government policy. 4. Armed Forces–Procurement– Case studies. 5. Defense contracts–Government policy–Case studies. 6. Defense industries–Government policy–Case studies. I. Markowski, Stefan. II. Hall, Peter, 1948– III. Wylie, Robert, 1947– IV. Title: Defense procurement and industry policy. UC260.D44 2009 355.60 212–dc22 2008046665 ISBN10: 0-415-45055-1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-88375-6 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-45055-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-88375-6 (ebk)

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To my parents

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Acknowledgments

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Exploring Japan’s identity

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1.1 Analytical framework 2

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Constructions of Japan’s “self”

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2.1 Modern Japan and its “others” 000 2.2 Russia in pre-1945 Japan’s identity 000 3

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Japan’s “Soviet Union”, Japan’s “Russia” 3.1 Japan’s “Soviet Union” 3.2 Japan’s “Russia” 000

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Ainu, Russia and Japan’s quest for “Northern Territories”

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4.1 The Islands before the “Northern Territories” 000 4.2 The origins of the dispute 000 4.3 The Ainu and the “Northern Territories” 000 5

Shiba’s original forms of Japan and Russia 5.1 Shiba Ryo-taro-: an introduction 000 5.2 Shiba’s “Russia” 000

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“Newly born Russia” and Japan

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6.1 Post-Communist Russia in Japan’s political identity 6.2 The attenuation of the threat from the North 000

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Contents

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The idea of the Northern Territories

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7.1 Post-Cold War negotiations 000 7.2 Japan’s national interest and the idea of the Northern Territories 000 Conclusion

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Notes Bibliography Index

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Proof Acknowledgments

This book, which is based on my PhD thesis submitted to the London School of Economics in August 2006, would not be possible without the emotional, intellectual and financial support provided by many individuals and institutions. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr Chris R. Hughes for his invaluable guidance throughout my PhD program at the LSE. I am also deeply indebted to Drs Chris W. Hughes and Phil Deans who were kind enough to agree to serve as examiners at my viva for their comments and the suggestion to publish the thesis. I am also grateful to Professor Glenn Hook, the editor of Japan series and two anonymous referees from Routledge who positively evaluated the initial proposal and offered some important suggestions regarding the content and the structure of the book. Professor Umemori Naoyuki, who adopted me into his seminar at Waseda University, not only exposed me to the intellectual depth of Japanese political philosophy but also made me realize the unexplored potential of enka as a medium for building friendships cutting across nationalities, backgrounds and social statuses. Professor Umemori’s graduate students, and particularly Saikawa Takashi, provided me with invaluable comments regarding methodological and empirical aspects of this project. Andrew Gebert was more than generous with his time and patience in assisting me to turn the initially chaotic draft into what I hope is an intelligible and structured book. Special thanks go to Marie-Anne Serleys who, following vary vague instructions from the author, single-handedly designed the cover of this book. I am also thankful to Professors Arai Nobuo, Iwashita Akihiro, Shimotomai Nobuo, Shiokawa Nobuaki, Tanaka Akihiko, Peter Berton, Christopher Coker, Jody Ferguson, Fred Halliday, Ian Nish, Gilbert Rozman, my fellow PhD students at the LSE (especially Matthew Arnold, Padideh Tosti, Amnon Aran, Elisabetta Brighi, Bill Vlcek and Nicola Casarini) and many others for sharing with me their knowledge and experience. Over the years, the Anglo-Jewish Association, Hosei University International Fellowship, COE-GLOPE at Waseda University and the Japan Society for Promotion of Science Post-Doctoral Fellowship provided me with deeply appreciated financial assistance without which this project would not have been possible. The Institute of Oriental Culture at Tokyo University, Hosei

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Acknowledgmentss

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University and Waseda University were kind enough to host me during the various stages of conducting research for this book. Last but not the least, special thanks to my parents and to Sandy for their unconditional support, patience and understanding. Our little Zoya definitely has been neither patient nor particularly understanding, but her smiles and laughter were the most important source of energy that kept me going during the last year of this project, which also coincided with her first year as a fully fledged member of our family. An earlier version of Chapter 5 appeared in The Power of Memory in Modern Japan, edited by Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, published in July 2008 by Global Oriental. An earlier version of Chapter 3 was accepted for publication in The European Journal of International Relations in November 2007 as “Identity, Foreign Policy and the ‘Other’: Japan’s ‘Russia’” and was published in volume 15 issue 2 of the journal. Parts of Chapter 4 appear in an article titled “Ainu and Japan’s Quest for Northern Territories” accepted for publication in a special issue of Alternatives: Global, Local, Political dedicated to indigenous politics, scheduled to be published in April 2009. I am grateful to Global Oriental, to Sage and to Lynne Reiner for granting me permissions to use this material. Following Japanese convention, names of individuals are given with the family name first. When citing publications in English, however, the personal name is followed by the family name. Except for widely known place names such as Tokyo, Osaka and Hokkaido, long vowels in personal and place names are indicated by a macron. Tsukuba, Japan September 14, 2008

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Exploring Japan’s identity

The overall aim of this book is to examine the evolution of the meaning of the Soviet Union and Russia for Japan during the six decades that have passed since the end of World War II. This work further represents a sincere effort to overcome the “model testing” predicament of International Relations (IR) scholarship, in which a theoretical “monologue of instructions” (Kratochwil 2000: 75) precedes the empirical study, which, in turn, is devoted to arguing the usefulness or, alternatively, the fallacious nature, of the theoretical model in question. Theory-free inquiry is obviously impossible. The mere fact that this research focuses on Japan and Russia, and not, say, on relations between Japan’s Niigata Province and the Russian Maritime Province, in itself carries a number of crucial assumptions about the nature of international relations. Propelled by the desire to go beyond theoretical model testing, driven both by the general trend in IR scholarship as well as by the absence of a reflective account of Japan’s relations with Russia, I decided to incorporate the notion of identity into the project. As such, the need for a certain theoretical foundation that would guide but at the same time also limit this inquiry seemed obvious. This study, or my “archive” as some choose to define their ontological and epistemological premises, is located within the post-structural strand of what can be defined as the constructionist or constructivist school of International Relations. As a justification for compromising my initial ambition not to engage in theoretical model testing and to undertake certain self-imposed limitations, I can only state that the choice of this particular analytical framework was not made a priori of the actual empirical work, but only after conducting an extensive survey of primary and secondary sources on Japan’s relations with Russia. An outline of the analytical framework that underlines this case study will be provided in the following section. Importantly, I do not claim exclusive validity or objectivity for this approach. It is my belief, though, that the framework outlined below enables the work to overcome a number of important limitations visible in current scholarship on Japan’s identity and foreign policy, which will also be noted below.

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1.1 Analytical framework Constructivism and Japan’s identity On the whole, post-World War II IR theory has paid little attention to domestic non-material factors such as national identity and culture. As R.B.J. Walker has put it, the study of international relations absorbed the “premises of professionalism and scientific method” which came to dominate American social science in the mid twentieth century, embracing such scientific paradigms as the notion of objective analysis and the dichotomous separation of facts from values (Walker 1984: 191).1 Theory has become increasingly structuralist and, as such, has drifted toward largely unvarying systemic properties of the “international” from which to deduce what were assumed to be uniform national interests of state actors. Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work, Theory of International Politics, written in 1979, became the symbol of this tradition, which assumes states to be rational unitary actors, pursuing accumulation of power, whose actions are governed by the underlying structure of international anarchy. This said, the concept of national identity, which negates the presumed uniformity of nation-states, is not a new phenomenon in the broadly defined study of international relations. This concept, as well as other non-”rational choice” factors, was present in the scholarship in the 1940s and 1960s, and was used by such highly regarded academics such as Hedley Bull, Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas (Clunan 2000: 91). Also, contestations, or rather, modifications of the rationalistic perception of foreign policy, long predated any contestations of the basic paradigms of the utilitarian framework, with a number of scholars arguing for a variety of national role conceptions or emphasizing the importance of individual perceptions, values and attitudes in foreign policy making (for example, Holsti 1970, Hermann 1977 and Wish 1980). Analysis of the cultural factor in foreign policy formation had also begun long before the end of the Cold War, but has modestly focused on studies of particular cultures (for example, Watanabe 1978). However, the most significant challenge to the hegemony of rational structuralism or “economic mode of analysis” (Katzenstein 1996: 15) emerged with the advent of the constructivist school of International Relations in the late 1980s, when the first constructivist theoretical work, World of Our Making by Nicholas Onuf (1989), was published. The main tenets of constructivism were later popularized in the writings of Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1999) and constructivism came to be perceived as the most formidable theoretical challenge to the rational choice orthodoxy. One key reason for the advent of constructivism was the drastic developments in the international arena that took place in late 1980s through 1990s. Theory, particularly problem-solving theory, which aims to provide a general framework for solving puzzles in relations among the nations, cannot exist in a vacuum, detached from the actual dynamics of the world, as its validity depends on its utility

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and technical applicability in explaining world events (Devetak 1996: 150). The end of the Cold War, which meant the end of ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism, as well as the dramatic developments in the international arena (such as for example, the war in former Yugoslavia) that followed, posed significant challenges to the dominance of rational choice, as these events simply could not be explained by the established analytical approaches (Katzenstein 1996a: 3–17). As such, the failure of mainstream IR theory to provide correct predictions and to explain outcomes caused many scholars and policy makers to re-engage with the national, i.e., with the domestic and the non-material sources of foreign policy. In the words of Lapid and Kratochwil, “the global eruption of separatist nationalism set in motion by the abrupt ending of the Cold War has directly and inescapably forced the IR scholarly community to rethink the theoretical status of culture and identity in world affairs” (1996: 4). An important part of the process was to reconsider the relevance of national characteristics to states’ foreign policy. At the same time, the conceptions of identity and culture have themselves gone through drastic revisions. These notions, which were perceived as singular, self-evident and non-problematic, have been subjected to extensive theorizing and the motifs of multiplicity and social construction came to dominate the debate of identity and culture. As such, the conception of identities has become “emergent and constructed, contested and polymorphic, and interactive and process-like” (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996: 6–8). As opposed to the rationalist ontology of mainstream IR, constructivism/ constructionism, or what has been labeled as the “sociological turn” in IR (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998: 675), denies the existence of an objective given reality, within which states operate, but perceives this as socially objectivated knowledge. This is probably the only ontological premise that unites the array of constructivist approaches and it remains rather difficult to provide a comprehensive identification of the claims of constructivism as a unified school (Zehfuss 2002: 2–3). Rather than a consistent theoretical framework, constructivism is probably better understood as a broad theoretical umbrella, which embraces a wide range of at times complementary but more often contradictory ontological and epistemological paradigms about the nature of international relations, the place of identities, ideas and culture in world politics (see for example, Onuf 1989, Kratochwil 1989, Wendt 1992, Lapid and Kratochwil (eds) 1996, Katzenstein (ed.) 1996a, Neumann 1998, Weldes et al. 1999, Wendt 1999, Guzzini and Leander (eds) 2006 and Zehfuss 2002). Theoretical debates are vigorous and the occasional usage of terminology borrowed from the military lexicon (for example, see Campbell [1992] 1998: 207–27) underscores the depth of the theoretical rifts among the followers of rival approaches. The “thin” constructivists, who continue to adhere to positivism and structuralism, perceive identity and culture as another variable that should be incorporated into causal analysis, and conceive their framework as a middle way between post-structuralism and rational choice (for

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example, Adler 1997). They often view the more radical post-structural theorists, who abandon positivism in favor of discourse analysis and deny the validity of the “ideas/material forces” dichotomy (Doty 2000: 138), as followers of an exotic “Parisian” social theory and dismiss their arguments as being based on excessive attention paid to language, esoteric terminology and unscientific methodology (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 34 and Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998: 678). On the other hand, the poststructural constructionists accuse the “thin” constructivists with complete misunderstanding and misrepresentation of post-structuralist epistemology and its main tenets, such as “discourse,” “identity” and “culture.” As a result, they argue, the attempted “domestication” of this epistemology for the needs of mainstream IR scholarship by the “thin” constructivists leads to nothing more than theoretical shallowness and inconsistency (for example, Campbell [1992] 1998: 216–22, Doty 2000 and Zehfuss 2002). While the importance of these debates should not be underestimated, it is far beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in an extensive theoretical argumentation regarding the appropriateness of one theoretical framework over another. As already noted, the analytical framework that guides this study is informed by the post-structuralist strand of constructivism and is closer to discourse analysis than to the conception of culture as an intelligible variable, which can be operationalized as a separate causal factor affecting the preferences of policy makers (Campbell [1992] 1998: 217–18).2 However, instead of simply stating the main premises of this framework, I would like to highlight the possibilities that it holds through a brief engagement with existing constructivist scholarship on Japan. For this purpose the concise review of IR constructivism conducted by Bahar Rumelili (2004), which highlights the main ontological differences between the two strands, seems to be particularly useful.3 In brief, Rumelili argues that the two schools of IR constructivism, which she refers to as liberal constructivism (roughly corresponding to the notion of “thin” constructivism used above) and critical or post-structural constructivism, diverge on one rather fundamental ontological premise: namely, the role of “difference” in the constitution of identity (for a slightly different categorization of constructivist scholarship see Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998: 675–8). Liberal constructivism, which draws mainly from the sociological perspective of symbolic interactionism (for example, Berger and Luckmann[1966] 1980) focuses on social structures, either domestic or international, which, it is argued, are constituted by norms, ideas and collective meanings; it thus seeks to analyze a particular set of policies in terms of the socially constructed identity of the states. Critical constructivism, on the other hand, not only tends to avoid positivist analysis but, influenced by poststructural theory, negates the existence of objective social structures and focuses on notions of difference between the outside and inside of a certain group as central in the construction of meanings and identities (Rumelili 2004: 30–6).

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Arguably, the majority of current IR scholarship that engages the notion of Japan’s identity belongs to the liberal constructivist school and is mainly focused on Japan’s security policy and its sources. In general, it has been driven by one research question: namely, why Japan has been reluctant to use military force since the end of the Pacific War (Katzenstein 1996: 1 and Berger 1998: 193). While exhibiting certain variations in approaches employed to answer this puzzle, the constructivists argued that post-war Japan has developed a uniquely antimilitarist identity of purely domestic origin, which constituted or constrained the national security agenda (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, Katzenstein 1996 and Berger 1996 and 1998). Berger describes this antimilitarist identity as a domestically developed political culture of antimilitarism, while for Katzenstein it is a combination of a number of institutionalized norms, which have shaped or constituted4 the policy makers’ perceptions of international environment and national interests. In other words, Japan’s identity is conceived as a domestically developed social structure, which has existed independently of Japan’s policy but has continuously shaped it. For Berger, it is mainly the “strong antimilitarist sentiments” that emerged domestically in the wake of the World War II defeat (1998: x). Katzenstein, whose analytical framework differs from Berger’s in that it focuses on institutionalized norms as opposed to political culture, nevertheless argues, in a similar fashion, that in the post-war period Japan has embraced an identity of a “merchant nation” or “economic identity,” as opposed to its pre-1945 militarism (1996: 20). Japan’s external security, argues Katzenstein, is largely shaped by the normative context, which is defined by the interaction between the institutionalized social norms expressed by public opinion (1996: 39) and the legal norms (1996: 18) which “condition the definition of interests that inform Japan’s security policy” (1993: 129). These norms, it is argued, have become institutionalized in the media, in the judicial system and in the bureaucracy, and they shape the interests and policy choices of the government (1996: 19). Besides the emphasis on economic strength and the public support for Article Nine of the Constitution, Katzenstein’s analysis emphasizes the norms of peaceful diplomacy, low-key consensus approach in the political decision-making process, the lack of popular respect for the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the reluctance of the public to support resort to military action. These, along with the legal norms embedded in the Constitution, are seen as constituting a stable normative structure of antimilitarism, which, since the end of World War II, has shaped Japan’s security policy (1996: 116–18). This scholarship, claiming to challenge both the universal applicability of rational choice tools of analysis as well as the emphasis on Japan’s particularism in analyzing Japan’s foreign policy (Katzenstein 1996: 11–14), became one of the cornerstones of empirical constructivist scholarship and, arguably, came to define IR scholarship on Japan’s identity. While in recent years Katzenstein and Berger have abandoned their strict adherence to constructivism in favor of analytical eclecticism, the notion of Japan’s antimilitarism continues to serve as an important point of reference in their own and other

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Japan-related IR scholarship (for example, Katzenstein and Okawara 2004, Izumikawa 2005, Togo 2005, Nishi 2006 and Miyashita 2007). I would argue that there are a number of important reservations that limit the usefulness of applying the militarist/antimilitarist dichotomy to the study of Japan’s identity. First, the ontological and epistemological foundations of the argument about Japan’s antimilitarist identity implies the existence of its opposite, namely, a particular militarist identity of pre-1945 Japan (what Berger calls “the prewar cult of Bushido and the Japanese warrior spirit” [1998: 199]) which, following the ontological dichotomy between identity and policy, existed as an independent variable that constituted or shaped Imperial Japan’s foreign policy. However, this kind of argument would be a grave simplification of pre-1945 Japan’s cultural or normative structures. Even the deeply Orientalist account of Japanese national character provided by Ruth Benedict concedes that in pre-1945 Japan, Bushido was a “modern official term which has no deep folk-feeling behind it” (1946: 175). But there is an even more fundamental problem with conceptions of Japanese militarism as a normative or cultural structure. For this either assumes a structural rupture between Japan’s pre-1931 colonialism on the one side and militarist Japan of the 1930s and early 1940s on the other or, alternatively, does not distinguish between the two periods in terms of the ideational structures that informed the policy. Either of these approaches is highly problematic. Japan’s early imperialism cannot be simply reduced to “militarism,” as it was intertwined with the process of Japan’s modernization and Westernization and conducted under the banners, very familiar to the Western reader, of civilization and enlightenment, with strongly liberal ideas occupying a dominant position in the public and policy debates (see, for example, Aydin 2008). The complexity of the discourse surrounding Japan’s pre-1945 identity was further underscored by the fact that, following the defeat, the emergence of newly “peaceful” and “democratic” Japan was seen by many domestic intellectuals not as a departure from traditional values but actually as a return to them (Wada 2002). Thus, any attempt to reduce Japan’s colonialism and imperialism to a culture of militarism either falls into essentialist Orientalism by assuming that Japan’s imperialism is somehow unique or, alternatively, leads to the rather paradoxical conclusion that all colonial powers were governed by a domestic culture of militarism. At the same time, drawing a line between the “militarist” Japan of the 1930s and its earlier colonialism not only presupposes an easily challengeable ideational rupture between these two “Japans” but also raises the question of whether a normative or cultural structure can develop and constitute a state’s policies in such a short period. As such, it seems to contradict the whole conception of identity as a relatively stable and consistent construct which guides the works of both Berger (1998: 20) and Katzenstein (1993: 139–99). More important, though, as will be briefly illustrated below, there have been a number of important aspects of post-war Japan’s domestic public sentiment and policy that not only cannot be contained within the “militarist/

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antimilitarist” dichotomy but also seem to contradict the conception of Japan as a nation that denies the importance of military power per se. There is no doubt that proclamations of peaceful Japan and her peaceful policies have become an integral part of Japan’s post-war political ideology (Hirano 1985: 345). As such, the assertions of Japan’s antimilitarism seem to confirm the validity of this agenda as a manifestation of actually existing normative or political cultural structures. However, a closer examination of governmental policy debates and public sentiments shows that neither can be simply categorized as antimilitarist. In terms of Japan’s security posture, it seems clear that the policies adopted by the Koizumi administration (2001–6) have seriously undermined assertions of deep-rooted cultural norms as the foundation for Japanese antimilitarism. The swift enactment of laws that enabled Japan’s participation in the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and in the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the adoption of various national security-related legislation in the face of strong resistance from the opposition, demonstrates that Japan’s reluctance to resort to force cannot be traced primarily to cultural or normative structures, since such an approach presupposes a relatively stable and static effect of those ideational factors (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 139–99 and Berger 1998: 167). Even more important is to recognize that during the Cold War years Japan’s security discourse and defense posture was far from being as antimilitarist as argued. The delegation of actual warfare to the US through the US–Japan Alliance, with Japan providing bases for US-led struggle against communism,5 did not mean an abolition of security policy per se. In 1970s, the Japanese defense budget became the sixth largest in the world, larger than the budgets of the four Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and Austria combined (Nakamura et al 1982: 156–63). In 1985, after the appreciation of the yen (resulting from the Plaza Accord) Japan’s military budget became the third largest in the world, based on dollar calculations (Hook 1996: 50–6). In spite of having no experience in actual warfare, Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF) has come to be considered as one of the most potent armies in the region and the “most technologically sophisticated non-nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific” (Gow 1993: 57–8). It is true that during the Cold War years Japan has never deployed its military, but at the same time, during this period it never faced an objective or subjectively perceived urgent threat to its national security that could serve as a testing ground for Japan’s antimilitarism (Thayer 1951, Jorden 1957: 279, Wilbur 1957: 312 and Hasegawa 2000b: 300). Incidentally, communist China’s successful development of nuclear weapons in the 1960s, which could have been seen as a direct threat to Japan’s security, was perceived by the Japanese establishment mainly as China’s tool of deterrence against the US and the Soviet Union and not directed at either Japan or South Korea (Kase 2001: 59). This said, however, the most important aspect of Japan’s security discourse that questions the validity of the argument about Japan’s antimilitarism has

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been its attitude towards nuclear weapons. The so-called “nuclear allergy,” or the three anti-nuclear principles that were established in 1967 by the Satocabinet—the political decision not to possess, produce, or introduce nuclear weapons—is argued to be one of the pillars of Japan’s antimilitarism (Katzenstein 1996: 128). The broad structure of the “nuclear allergy,” which no doubt occupies an important place in the domestic public discourse, is rather interesting and deserves an in-depth examination. However, in terms of policy its hollowness is obvious. Asahi Shimbun revealed that in 1970 Nakasone Yasuhiro, at that time Director-General of the Defense Agency, agreed at a meeting with US officials to US nuclear weapons being brought into Japan (Asahi Shimbun 20 December 2000: 4). Kei Wakaizumi (2002), who served as Prime Minister Sato-’s secret envoy to negotiations on the return of Okinawa, mentioned a secret memorandum in which Japan agreed to US deployment of nuclear weapons on Okinawa in case of emergency. Furthermore, over the years, the Japanese government has conducted three secret studies into the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons. One of the studies was commissioned in 1968 by Prime Minister Sato- Eisaku, less than a year after his declaration of the “three non-nuclear principles,” and to a certain extent was conducted in response to China’s successful ascent to the status of a nuclear power (Kase 2001: 56). In all three studies, the nuclear option was rejected, but the argument was based on purely strategic grounds, unrelated to antimilitarism or pacifism (Asahi Shimbun 19 June 2004: 4 and Hughes 2007 also see Ohta 2004). As such, the “nuclear allergy” can hardly be viewed as constituting or constraining the conception of national interests among the ruling elites. To the contrary, based on the above it can be plausibly argued that Japan’s state policies correspond perfectly to the tenets of “defensive realism,” which argues that, generally, states ought to pursue moderate security strategies and policies that communicate restraint (Taliaferro 2000–2001: 129). In terms of Japan’s public opinion, a brief look at public attitudes towards military and defense shows that, in general, they have been shaped by notions which are closer to nationalism than to an abstract pacifism or antimilitarism and, along with the changes in Japan’s nationalism, the public attitudes have undergone a number of significant changes during the post-war decades. Obviously, in the immediate post-war years the understanding that “peace” is to be the common basis for the new Japanese state was shared widely among the majority of social groups, including even the Rightist wing (Wada 2002 and Umemori 2006). This seems to be common-sensical, as opposition to peace would mean the advancement of jingoism or militarism, unthinkable in a Japan that had experienced decisive military defeat and economic devastation only few years earlier. Importantly, however, the main consideration shared by the public was an avoidance of war on Japan’s national territory and not the denunciation of war per se. In other words, the greatest fear of the Japanese was the reoccurrence of the attacks on the Japanese homeland, which were still vividly remembered by the majority of the population (Jorden

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in Borton et al 1957: 284). In this context Oguma’s (2002a) extensive analysis of post-war Japan’s public discourse offers a number of interesting insights. Oguma argues that, in the early 1950s, when Japan was still under the Occupation, the majority of Japanese did not oppose reinstatement of the military as such, rather, they opposed it mainly in the context of the military becoming part of the American forces. The same reason was behind the opposition to overseas deployment of Japan’s military,6 namely, it was not so much a pacifist belief, but more an expression of a lack of desire to get involved in a war conducted by the former enemy. In other words, the situation in which “small and weak” Japan found itself in the early 1950s in the context of her relations with the United States, to a certain extent resembled the colonial setting, hence the opposition to constitutional revision and subsequent rearmament was more of an expression of nationalism directed towards both the United States and the Soviet Union than an expression of pacifism (Oguma 2002a: 454–73). Similarly, the mass anti-US–Japan Alliance movement (anpo to-so-) of 1960, which is often seen as the culmination of Japan’s antimilitarist sentiment, was very much an expression of anger towards the undemocratic way in which Prime Minister Kishi concluded the treaty and was conducted under the slogans of “patriotism” and “nation.” Starting in the mid 1960s, a general “optimism regarding the further continuity of peace in Japan” and a growing lack of interest in foreign affairs spread among the Japanese public, enhanced by government’s policy, which emphasized consumerism and pushed the questions of war and peace into the background of the policy discourse.7 This view, however, was not based on pacifism but founded on the self-centered belief that Japan was unlikely to get involved in a conventional war, that the danger of nuclear was not imminent (Nakamura et al in Sakamoto 1982: 157). At the same time, this self-centered optimism did not entail a rejection of the military and lack of desire to defend the country, if needed. Review of the often-cited public opinion polls reveals that while a desire to actively participate in the defense of Japan has been relatively low, the importance of the military has been acknowledged by a gradually increasing number of respondents. In general, the Japanese public has consistently affirmed that the SDF has played an important role in protecting Japan’s peace. Even the publishers of the dovish Asahi Shimbun, in an overall summary of Japanese public attitudes during the “post-war” years, conceded that the general trend of Japanese attitudes did not favor Japan becoming a military superpower but at the same time consistently agreed to the need for a military. As an example, only 15% in 1970 and 21% in 1988 of those polled stated that there was no need to rely on military power and no need for either the SDF or the American military to protect Japan (Asahi Shimbunsha 1988: 172–86). The public opinion polls conducted annually by the Prime Minister’s Office confirm these findings and they reveal a gradually increasing favorable view of the SDF among the public during the Cold War years (66% in 1967 and 74.3% in 1984) and support for maintaining or increasing defense capabilities (44.4% and 22% respectively in 1969 and

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61.4% and 12.6% in 1984), and only a minority supporting a reduction in defense capabilities (10.8% in 1969 and 11.8% in 1984) (PM Office website). The purpose of this brief survey8 of public and governmental discourse is not to suggest that post-war Japan has been persistently militaristic, as has sometimes been argued in leftist scholarship (for example, Axelbank 1972 and Halliday and McCormack 1973) nor that the recent developments point towards Japan’s transformation into a militaristic power (for example, Agawa, Tamamoto and Nishi 2004).9 In terms of institutions, conceptions of national interest and related policy, there is no doubt that post-war Japan is different from the pre-1945 state. This difference, though, should not be taken for granted, as a number of influential studies have demonstrated various political, institutional and ideational continuities between prewar and post-war Japan (for example, Johnson 1982, Kushner 2002 and to a certain extent Dower 1999). Nor do I seek to reclaim the exclusive validity of structural explanation for Japan’s foreign policy by denying the relevance of various domestic ideational factors. Few of those familiar with Japan’s domestic politics would argue that its foreign policy making is simply a response to structural signals, independent of domestic political processes. There is little doubt that the general perception among the Japanese public is that Japan is a “peaceful nation,” and this has become an integral part of the post-war discourse conducted by numerous Japanese intellectuals from various perspectives (for a conservative critique see Fukuda (1966), for a liberal critique see Sakamoto (ed.) 1982). The actual meaning of “peaceful nation,” however, has not been a stable concept and has meant different things in different societal and temporal loci. Based on the above, it is clear that any attempt to find a consistent normative/cultural antimilitarist structure in post-war Japan is highly problematic and bound to result in reductionism and essentialism. Numerous authors have emphasized different stages in Japan’s post-war era (sengo), with different master paradigms that have dominated the intellectual and the broader public discourses (for example Yoshida 1994, Oguma 2002 and Yasumaru 2004). Hence, I would argue that application of the militarist/antimilitarist dichotomy lacks adequate analytical merit when trying to examine Japan’s post-war identity, as the static portrayal of Japan’s antimilitarism is bound to ignore the dynamics and the complexity of the domestic discourse.10 Another important question for Japan’s identity which is left unanswered in the scholarship examined is the relationship between the domestic ideational structures and the broadly defined “international.” Examples of the dialectic relationship between Japan’s domestic discourse and the international are abundant. The discourse on “the way of the warrior” (bushido), argued to be the embodiment of Japan’s militarist political culture (Berger 1999: 199), was first popularized in Japan by Nitobe Inazo- in his famous Bushido, The Soul of Japan (1899). Originally written in English as a conscious attempt to construct the Japanese equivalent to Western moral codes, the book was aimed at explaining Japan to the West (Pandey 1999: 44). In its structure it does not

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exhibit significant deviations from Western ethics and includes such familiar concepts as the pursuit of justice, courage, benevolence, politeness, sincerity and loyalty. Likewise, Japan’s post-war “Peace Constitution,” which is seen as one of the main manifestations of Japan’s antimilitarism (Katzenstein 1996: 116), was not only drafted by an external actor, the Occupation authorities, but also to a large extent reflected the general spirit of the time, namely the worldwide desire for peace that emerged as the result of the broad tiredness of war following the devastating consequences of World War II (Maruyama 1965: 257–8 and Oguma 2002: 153–74 and 448–9). Here we can also mention Japan’s post-war peace movement’s agenda, which was strongly influenced by the Vietnam War and the global anti-war movement (Oguma 2007). As such, it can be argued, drawing borders between the domestic and the international does more to obscure than to shed light on the origins and structure of Japan’s identity. This brings us to the second strand of constructivist framework of analysis, namely, the “critical constructivism” that shifts the focus of analysis from normative and cultural structures to “difference” or “the other” and its role in the construction of identity, and that abandons the “identity/policy” dichotomy. Broadly speaking, the critical constructivist approach does not perceive identity as a static normative or ideational structure but argues that it is an “ongoing boundary drawing process” in which the cognitive borders of the “self” are defined and redefined in opposition to difference embodied in a multiplicity of “others” (Rumelili 2004: 31–3 also Neumann 1996: 1 and Zehfuss 2001). In this analytical framework, identity is an open-ended process, a multi-leveled discursive construction in which the boundaries of the collective “self” can expand to include its former constitutive “other” (Germany’s post-war integration into Europe is arguably an example) or to shrink by excluding what had earlier been perceived as an extension of the “self” in response to behavioral manifestations that undermine the identity construction. (An example of this would be the recently deepening “otherness” of Russia in the Western discourse, which in early post-Cold War years was perceived as part of the realm of liberal democracy.) This does not mean that all identities are of dynamic nature, based on acquired characteristics such as political or economic structures. Identities can also be exclusive, that is, constructed around certain (subjectively perceived) inherent and unchangeable characteristics such as geographical location, religion and culture (Rumelili 2004: 37).11 However, the forms of identity that are the subject of this book are “always a relation between two human collectives, that is, it always resides in the nexus between the collective self and its others” (Neumann 1998: 399). Hence any normative collective identity category, such as democracy, liberalism, human rights, presuppose an existence of its “logical opposite” and the discursive construction of these identities produce two hierarchically constructed identity categories, such as democracy/autocracy or freedom/oppression (Rumelili 2004: 37). Importantly, this analytical framework renders superfluous the distinction between the domestically developed identities and identities acquired through

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a social interaction in the international arena (Wendt 1999: 74), as it rightly points to the fact that any constitution of identity presupposes an existence of alternative identity, or, in other words, the “self” can know what it is only through what it is not. As opposed to the positivist thread of liberal constructivism which seeks to establish causality between policy and ideational factors, the critical constructivist (or post-positivist) framework does not engage in an ontological differentiation between identity construction and policy. It conceives them as belonging to the same discursive practice in which a particular identity construction makes certain behavioral manifestations possible. As such, when conceiving a research project, the “why” question that typically defines the positivist puzzle is substituted with a “how” question—one which points the analysis in the direction of historicizing meanings, towards uncovering their social productions that open or foreclose certain behavior options (Doty 1993: 297–8). In one of the most radical and innovative works on foreign policy and identity, David Campbell conceptualizes foreign policy as a general political practice of “othering,” a “specific sort of boundary-producing political performance” (Campbell 1992: 69). As such, the conventional foreign policy, the “sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill 2003: 3), is just one of these practices that produce an identity by “framing man in the spatial and temporal organization of the inside and outside, self and other” (Campbell 1992: 69). While Campbell’s work provides important theoretical and empirical insights into the construction of “inside” and “outside,” his nearly exclusive focus on the notion of “danger” seems too narrow to encompass the full variety of identity-related discourses. Relationship between the “self” and the “other” can take a multiplicity of modes or forms; difference vis-à-vis the “other” is not limited to an extreme (i.e., threatening) opposite to the “self” and behavioral manifestations of identity construction do not necessarily entail extreme “othering” depicted by Campbell. In case of the US, for example, it was argued that leader/partner and guardian/children hierarchies determined its Cold War-era identity vis-à-vis other Western allies and developing nations respectively (Milliken 1999.) In the case of the European Union, Rumelili (2004) demonstrates that the “old” Europe identity has been simultaneously constructed vis-à-vis the “new” Europe and the non-European outside. Both modes of the “self” construction are based on different modes of difference and do not involve extreme “othering” on either the cognitive or behavioral levels, where the outside is always seen as the threatening opposite of the “self” and identity is secured through threat-centered security policy. This kind of fluid, negotiated and multi-modality “self/other” nexus is the guiding framework for the present study as it seeks to explore the evolving nature of Japan’s response to the Soviet/Russian difference. The examination of the construction of Japan’s “self” vis-à-vis the USSR/Russia is conducted

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inductively in the following chapters. The relevance of these findings for conceptions of Japan’s identity and broader theoretical implications are outlined in the concluding chapter. Locales of identity construction Identification of representative texts is of vital importance for the analysis and subsequent conclusions and hence needs to be addressed properly. Scholarly works, which circulate almost exclusively within the esoteric realms of academia, can prove a fascinating object of inquiry into the intellectual history of a particular nation or particular period. However, unless one practices extreme structuralism, which conceives of any text as exhibiting the structure of the broader societal discourse, scholarly works are not necessarily representative of ideas and notions that can be dubbed as national identity, as academic trends do not necessarily overlap with societal trends.12 In the context of Japan’s “social stock of knowledge” (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1980: 39) and its role in that country’s relations with its neighbors, the question of Japan’s historical memory is one of, if not the dominant, components of national discourses. As such, it has been receiving a growing amount of both scholarly and media attention. Particularly, the narratives on Japan’s imperial and colonial history as they appear in the history textbooks used in schools have been subject to intense scrutiny, as often they are seen as representative of general societal trends and have often been the focus of domestic debates and disputes between Japan and its neighbors, who view such textbooks as both embodying and reproducing Japanese historical memory (for example, McCormack 2000, Nelson 2002, Rozman 2002, Brooke 2005, Saaler 2005 and Takahashi 2005). However, as I have argued elsewhere (Bukh 2006: 99–123), this conception of history textbooks as central in the construction of national identity is not applicable to Japan’s relations with Russia. Namely, the narratives in the most widely used textbooks on Russia and bilateral relations, including those on contemporary issues, have been very limited both in terms of space and even more in terms of providing certain normative depictions of bilateral history. At the same time the USSR, which during the Cold War years consistently topped the list of most-hated nations in public opinion polls, can hardly be regarded as an irrelevant “other.” Hence, we can argue that knowledge of the Soviet Union/ Russia has been consistently produced and reproduced, but the process has been occurring in other locales, outside of the history textbooks. I have therefore chosen to omit school textbooks from the present study and focus instead on other widely circulated texts. In one of the most detailed works on Japan’s views of the Soviet Union, Gilbert Rozman (1988 and 1992) divided Japanese thinking about the Soviet Union into five schools of thought along the lines of their ideological preferences and the analytic tools used to examine the Soviet Union and bilateral relations. The approach taken here differs, as it seeks to examine the variety of perceptions as forming a discourse

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and thus assumes a certain relationship between the various texts. Hence, some of the texts examined by Rozman are omitted, while other texts relevant to the broader discourse are added. The analysis undertaken in the following chapters focuses on political manifestos, writings and speeches by prominent politicians and public intellectuals, popular books and journals, as well as the scholarly works of mainstream academics, often appearing in the media as authoritative commentators on Russia. Most of authors of the works on Russian socio-cultural identity examined in the second part of Chapter 3 belong to the conservative mainstream; many have had close relationships with the government. In informal conversations with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) officials involved in Russia-related policy making, a number of these authors have been portrayed as authoritative specialists with “accurate” knowledge of Soviet Union/Russia and the history of relations with Japan (Interviews 1 November 2004, Moscow, and 18 June 2005 and 28 March 2006, Tokyo). Some of these authors have testified before various Diet committees related to Japan’s USSR/Russia policy and represented Japan in bilateral fora. A number of these scholars have also been regular members of the Council on National Security Problems (Anzen hosho- mondai kenkyu-kai or Anpo-ken for short), a non-official policy group which, until the death of its leader, Suetsugu Ichiro, in 2001, was the most influential non-governmental body in Soviet and Russia-related policy making (Rozman 1992: 34). Chapter 5 is devoted to the writings of the popular author of historical fiction and essays, Shiba Ryo-taro-. The role of poets, writers and artists in the construction of national identity, as producers of national narratives, has been an integral part of the general discussion of nationalism (Kaiser 2001 quoted in Ozkirimili 2005: 180). As Edward Said argued persuasively in his celebrated Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1994), literature plays an important role in the formation and reproduction of the identity discourse. Notably, “literature” has never existed outside of the political, but always been related to other kinds of discourse, some of which were used to define national identity and engaged in the process of writing the “nation” against other nations and forms of imagined communities (Hadfield 1994: 1 also Brennan 1990: 49 and Pollack 1992: 1). Shiba, the “people’s writer” (Keene 2004: 87 and Matsumoto 1996: 14), has been undoubtedly one of the most widely read authors of the past three decades and, what is more important, one of the dominant figures in the discourse on Japanese identity. Thus far his writings have been largely neglected by the English-language scholarship on Japan’s identity and I hope that this book will constitute a first step in bridging this gap. There are, nevertheless, important locales of identity production and reproduction which are not examined in this book, with its principal focus on textual analysis. The visual media and cyberspace are not examined, in spite of the growing importance of these locales in terms of information provision in general, and hence as locales of identity construction. The Russo–Japanese War has been the subject of a number of films, among them Meiji Tenno- to

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Nichiro Daisenso- (The Emperor Meiji and The Great Japan-Russia War, released in 1957) and 303 Kochi (The 303 Hill, released in 1980) which engage in patriotic depictions of Japan’s victorious war effort. In 2000, Nanohana no Oki (The Open Sea of Rape Blossoms), one of Shiba’s most popular novels related to the history of Japan’s relations with the Russian Empire during the Edo period, was turned into a popular drama broadcast on the public Nihon Ho-so- Kyo-kai (NHK) channel. The focus of the visual media is not limited to the pre-1945 bilateral relations. For example, in 2004 NHK released a TV film titled Bo-kyo- (Nostalgia, or Longing for Home) depicting a story of courageous friendship between a Japanese and a Romanian officer in a post-World War II Soviet labor camp.13 Furthermore, the harsh labor and living conditions of the Japanese PoWs and the hardships of the Japanese deportees from Manchuria (hikiagesha) can also be experienced vicariously through paintings, pictures and other artifacts at the small museum named Heiwa Kinen Shiryokan (“Praying for Peace” Resource Center) under the patronage the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of Communications. Without doubt it can be argued that these visual images have contributed to the construction of the negative image of Russia in Japan. While visual media are for the most part excluded from the analysis, it is my hope that the analysis of Shiba’s notion of “Russia” will at least partially compensate for this gap.

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Proof 2

Constructions of Japan’s “self”

It is often argued that the dominant analytical frameworks employed in the studies of International Relations, because they have their roots in Western experience, do not reflect the experience of other geographical areas and regions. There is no doubt that the “self/other” analysis which anthropomorphizes the nation-state is firmly rooted within the Western conception of the person (Neumann 1996). Below, however, I argue for the applicability of the “self/other” framework to the study of Japan’s identity through a review of existent scholarship. As such, here I also introduce the main arguments regarding modern Japan’s construction of the “self” that are particularly pertinent to the present study. For the purposes of this study, Stefan Tanaka’s Japan’s Orient (1993) and Oguma Eiji’s A Geneaology of “Japanese” Self-images (2002a), originally published in Japanese in 1995 as Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen (The Origins of the Myth of “Homogenous Nation”) are probably the most relevant accounts of modern Japan’s identity construction. Both explore the discourse on the origins of Japan during the formative years of Japan as a modern state, analyzing the constitution of the Japanese “self” through a discourse on Orient (Tanaka 1993) and the homogeneous/ pure national construction of Japan (Oguma 2002a). The second part of this chapter provides a brief overview of the main Japanese discourses on Russia and the Soviet Union prior to the end of the war in Asia-Pacific.

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Modern Japan and its “others” The Japanese Empire Tanaka’s work explores the creation of the “Orient” as a project aimed at establishing the place of modernizing Japan vis-à-vis two “others”: the West and Asia. Tanaka notes that a simple adoption of the Western Enlightenment model would have meant a denial of Japan’s past and would have doomed Japan to a “perpetual state of inferiority” as a barbarian nation, standing at the periphery of civilization (Tanaka 1993: 266–7). Hence, the creation of Oriental (Chinese) history (to-yo-shi) as a discipline, which evolved from an engagement by Japanese historians with the Western discourse on the Orient

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(ibid. 1993: 70), was part of the project to find an alternative conception of the universal. This project was part of Japan’s struggle to maintain, or recreate, political and cultural independence; it thus sought to rescue Japan from the category of the backward Orient and create a unique place for it in the universal history of humankind. Tanaka shows how, in Japanese historiography, the Orient became the Origin, the cultural past of Japan from which it developed and grew. Japan was constructed as a nation that emerged from the Orient, inheriting all the positive aspects of Asian culture, but went on to develop and gain a degree of cultural and historical autonomy comparable to that of the West. This creation of Japan’s own “Orient” in turn enabled the creation of Japan’s own history of development into a modern nation; as such it has provided a world vision, a new totality, a variant of the Western model of universal history, through which Japan could favorably position itself relative to both Asia and the West. While this new view of history altered the Western model, Tanaka argues, it was conducted with tools and methods of modern positivist science, professing objectivity and universality. As a result of the new universality created by Oriental historiography, Japan became spatially unified with Asia but, at the same time, temporally unified with the West, in that both have achieved modernity. The other regions of Asia were relegated to the status of “incomplete variations of Japan” whose options were either to follow “historical development” as defined and demonstrated by Japan or resist the flow of universal history (ibid. 1993: 103–4). This construction of the Orient and attempt to transcend the East/West dichotomy provided legitimacy to Japan’s claims for equality with the West. However, Tanaka notes, the need for the consolidation of Japan as a nation, resulting from the sense of societal disintegration attributed to Western cultural influence during the Taisho- Period (1911–25), and the continuing preponderance within the international hierarchy of the West over Japan, gave birth to the discourse on Japan’s cultural uniqueness (ibid. 1993: 181). This was achieved through the creation of Japan’s unique history of assimilation and transformation of many pasts, Asian and Western alike (ibid. 1993: 268–74). Japan came to epitomize all that the West was not. As opposed to the individualism, self-interest, greed, conflict, competition and imperialism of the West, Japan’s essence was characterized by cohesion, cooperation and loyalty—positive values, as were found in the antiquity of the Orient (ibid. 1993: 184). Oguma Eiji’s (2002a) work provides an excellent analysis of the dynamics of the homogeneity discourse in Japan from the period of expansionism and imperialism (1868–1945) through the post-war years. His detailed work aims to deconstruct the contemporary dominant self-perception that the Japanese nation has always consisted of members who share “a single, pure origin and a common culture and heritage” (Oguma 2002a: xxx). Oguma analyzes the works of historians, anthropologists and folklore scholars as well as journal articles to trace the changes in the dominant discourse from the prewar model, which argued the essentially heterogeneous nature of the Japanese nation, to the post-war homogenous theory. Oguma provides an interesting

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Constructions of Japan’s “self”

insight into the various theories of “Japan” as placed on a homogenous/ heterogeneous axis, and offers perhaps the most comprehensive critical analysis of the Japanese national identity discourse. For the purposes of the present study, the role of the “other” in the construction of the discourse and its relationship with the political are of particular interest. As Oguma illustrates, the homogeneity discourse has evolved vis-à-vis numerous “others” that were included within or excluded from “Japan” in response to the political realities and exigencies of each period in Japan’s modern history. Oguma’s work shows that the homogeneity discourse has constructed the “Japanese” vis-à-vis the Ainu, Ryukyuans (Okinawans), Taiwanese and Koreans, alternately incorporating them through the “mixed Japanese nation” theory, or excluding them through the “pure Japanese” one. At the same time, as in the construction of Japan’s Orient, the “West” played an important role as the “other” while at the same time providing the modes of knowledge by which the origins of the Japanese “nation” were established. According to Oguma, the homogenous theory originated in the 1870s as a nationalistic “revolt” against the originally Western perception of the Japanese as a mixed nation consisting of conquering people, aboriginals and other minorities. It was thus an attempt to end the Western monopoly on defining the Japanese and their roots (Oguma 2002a: 3–15). And yet, both of the currents of the discourse (mixed versus homogenous) were developed using the Western scientific methodologies of anthropology, archeology and eugenics in constructing modern nationalism and were influenced by the European conceptions of a nation, universalism, European Romanticism and the American “melting pot.” Oguma depicts the numerous changes in both of the theories and the variations within them, but in general it can be said that the “mixed nation” theory became dominant after the annexation of Korea as responding to the realities of the multi-racial empire, and was utilized to justify aggression, assimilation policies and conscription of Koreans and Taiwanese into the Imperial Army (ibid. 2002a: 291), although, after Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War and the subsequent loss of the colonies and their residents as subjects of the Japanese state the homogenous nation theory rose to prominence. In the post-war revolt against the past, “mixed nation” theory was seen as symbolizing the Empire and, like other ideological discourses, was inverted. As the continued presence of Korean, Taiwanese and other minorities on mainland Japan was seen as the result of the imperial expansion, the general tendency was to help them to “return” to their respective homelands rather than reformulate Japan as a multi-ethnic nation. In this environment, Oguma argues, the “peace-loving homogeneous state” discourse emerged as a dichotomous opposition to the “militaristic multi-national empire” and came to dominate the public and academic debates of both the Left and the Right (ibid. 2002a: 298–310). Oguma concludes that, while the two branches of the discourse differ in form, their function has equally been to exclude the “other”—by turning the “other” into a “defective Japanese,” in the case of the mixed nation theory,

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and by excluding minorities from the nation in case of the pure nation theory (ibid. 2002a: 323–5). Post-war Japan While both Oguma and Tanaka focus mainly on Japan’s prewar identity, in terms of Japan’s post-war conceptions of the “self,” the discourse broadly known as nihonjinron has gained a central position in the societal debates on Japan’s identity. Nihonron (theory of Japan), nihonjinron (theory of the Japanese) or nihonbunkaron (theory of Japanese culture) signifies a voluminous body of academic and semi-academic inquiry into the social, cultural and historical traits of the Japanese society and nation. While this represents a highly diverse body of work, the unifying thread is a consistent commitment to the idea of Japanese uniqueness—whether the sources of this are located in history, biology, climate, diet or orthography. Between 1946 and 1978 alone, approximately 700 related titles were published, when the genre reached its peak of popularity (Nomura Research Institute survey cited in Dale 1986: 15 and Befu 2001: 7). The structure of the discourse has not been consistent and has evolved through a number of stages, each differing significantly in its narration of Japan’s national essence. While the scholars differ in their periodization of nihonjinron, Aoki Tamotsu (1999) provides probably the most detailed analysis of the evolution of the discourse (see also Anno 2000 for a different approach). Aoki divides the post-war nihonjinron discourse into four stages. The first period, from the defeat in 1945 through the mid 1950s, is dominated by reflections on Japanese militarism and characterized by a “negative uniqueness,” ascribed to Japanese society by progressive sociologists driven by the mission to democratize Japan (Aoki 1999: 56–67). From around 1955 until the early 1960s, as life in Japan began to stabilize and recover from the post-war chaos, the discourse is dominated by historical relativism, which attempted to be objective by comparing Japanese culture and identity with the West. In spite of the attempt at objectivity and a nonprescriptive nature, the theories tended to include Japan and the West in the same category, implying that Japan belonged culturally, as well as economically and politically, to the Western camp (ibid. 1999: 68–84). This period, Aoki argues, served as a transitional period, preparing the way for a change from a “negative uniqueness” to the third period of “positive uniqueness” that extended for over 20 years from the mid 1960s until the early 1980s, resulting in mass production of (positive) nihonjinron towards the end. Economic prosperity and political stability, argues Aoki, produced new demand for “culture and identity” in Japanese society and the various positive nihonjinron responded to these demands by providing affirmation of Japanese uniqueness and the superiority of the Japanese socio-economic model. The last period, which, according to Aoki, is defined by internationalization (kokusaika) and draws on both negative and positive branches of nihonjinron, started in 1984 and, according to Aoki, continues to the present (1999: 134–64).

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The state of contemporary discourse on Japan’s identity will be examined in the last chapter, but for now we should note that it is the third period is Aoki’s schema which, due to its immense popularity and its dominance in the mainstream discourse, has become the main focus of scholars (Anno 2000: 347–8, Igarashi 2000: 75 and Befu 2001: 105–22). The structure of the positive nihonjinron, its origins and role in Japanese society have been subjected to a number of critical investigations (for example, Dale 1986, Befu 1987 and 2001, Minami 1994, Clammer 2001 and Kowner 2002). The most thorough critique is provided probably by Peter Dale in his The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (1986). Dale’s work shows the continuity between the contemporary construction and pre-1945 discourse by tracing the sources of the contemporary nihonjinron to the pre-war conservative ideologies of Nishida Kitaro, Watsuji Tetsuro and others. At the same time, like Oguma and Tanaka, he argues that, in spite of claims for uniquely Japanese modes of knowledge, many of the basic conceptual tenets of nihnojinron have their origins in Western theories developed by Fichte, de Tocqueville, Hegel, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and others (Dale 1986: 218–22). As argued by Dale, there are three major assumptions which unite the discourse: 1) the social and cultural homogeneity of the Japanese racial entity and its historical continuity, 2) the radical difference of the Japanese from other peoples and 3) the nationalistic hostility to any mode of analysis that might be seen as derived from non-Japanese sources (ibid. 1986: Introduction). Dale also notes that the geo-ecological differences are considered to play a very important role in the cultural formation. The “violent forms” of Western culture are in many ways a function of the “West” being a continent, dominated by desert or pasture, where nature is poor and dominated by man and the climate is temperate and regular. On the other hand, “peaceful and harmonious” Japan is an island that is covered by forest and paddies, where nature is “rich” and “prevails over man.” In racial terms, the West is assumed to be a “miscegenation of races,” while in Japan “blood purity” of “one race” prevails. All these factors are perceived as determining the economic mode, where the primordial archetype in the West is nomadic-pastoral, with an animal flesh-based diet and a slave-based economy. In contrast, “Japan” is originally a “settled agricultural” society, has a vegetarian diet and its labor is not based on exploitation of others but on communal cooperation (ibid. 1986: 41–2). The Western social structure is usually characterized in terms of individualism, horizontal structure of relations among individuals, and egalitarianism; it is urban-cosmopolitan, contract-based, and dominated by notions of the “private,” “guilt,” rights and independence. Dale identifies the Western sociocultural mode typically depicted in nihonjinron as masculine, bellicose, monotheistic, unstable, intolerant and materialistic. In contrast, Japanese society is narrated as communal, vertical and hierarchical; it is rural-exclusive and dominated by notions such as groupism, contextualism, “kintract” (combination of kinship and contract), “public,” “shame,” “duties” and

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“dependence.” The socio-cultural mode of Japanese society is feminine, peaceful, polytheistic, stable, tolerant and spiritual. While the intellectual basis of Western culture is logical, rational, objective, rigid-principled and “talkative,” in Japan it is characterized by ambivalence, emotions, subjectiveness, situational logic and silence (ibid. 1986: 44–6). While the works examined here do not specifically engage foreign policy, they contain a number of insights particularly pertinent for the present study. In methodological terms it enables us to transcend the “domestic/international” boundary when analyzing the origins and structure of the identity discourses and to examine the national identity construction as a dialectical process between the array of domestic discourses and the broadly defined “international.” In terms of Japan’s identity, the “self/other” nexus as applied to its identity shows certain continuity in modern Japan’s “self” construction. The omnipresence of the West as a mirror image against which Japanese exceptional distinctiveness could be measured (Harootunian and Najita 1988: 711) and the dominance of Western modes of knowledge in the construction of this identity can be observed throughout Japan’s modern history. Importantly, the consistent presence of the “West” in Japan’s identity construction vis-à-vis its Asian “others,” as shown in the works of Tanaka and Oguma, points toward the need to pay attention to a “Japan/West” nexus when examining Japan’s relations with Russia, which is the main purpose of this book. The relevance of the “West” in the way Japan has historically related to Russia is noted in the next section, but is consistently present throughout the remaining chapters.

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Russia in pre-1945 Japan’s identity

Notwithstanding the importance of Russia in modern Japan’s external relations, its role in the construction of Japan’s identity has remained largely unexplored. As the main focus of this study is Japan’s relations with the USSR/Russia in the post-war period, this section is limited to a brief and simplified outline of the dynamics of modern Japan’s discourse on Russia. There are two main points to be made here. One is that Russia, belonging exclusively to neither the “West” nor the “East” category, has always occupied a special place within the array of modern Japan’s “others.” The second is that Japan’s construction of the “self” vis-à-vis Russia has been largely determined by the transformations in Japan’s identity generated within the “Japan/West” nexus. In other words, the narrative on Russia within the Japanese domestic discourse has been continuously shaped by the dynamics of identity construction vis-à-vis the West. The “threat from the North” (hoppo- no kyo-i), which is considered to be the traditional Japanese view of Russia (for example, Shimizu 1992), has its origins in the second half of eighteenth century. However, the initial notion of threat, which emerged mainly from information derived from contemporary Dutch documents, was perceived not as a military threat to Japan per se, but

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in terms of the expansion of Russian influence leading to the loss of Japanese influence over Ainu lands (northern parts of today’s Hokkaido and some of the Kurile islands) which, at that time, were not incorporated into territories under the control of the Edo (Tokyo) shogunate (bakufu). More important, however, is that the potential Russian expansion of influence was seen as propelled by enlightened and amicable policies which could result in the Ainu themselves desiring to come under the control of the Russian Empire (Akisuki 1987). Russia was thus perceived as an enlightened Western power that could endanger Edo Japan’s control over the Northern Territories through the introduction of its superior civilization. At roughly the same time two other debates on Russia emerged. One, emphasizing the military threat, was reinforced by the strongly exaggerated warning about Russian expansionist plans, brought to Japan by the Hungarian adventurer Benyowsky in 1771 (Togawa 1993: 34), and gained further legitimacy as the result of violent clashes between Russian explorers and the Japanese on the Kurile Islands in the early 1800s. At the same time, the amicable and cooperative relations established between the Russian navy officers and Japanese merchants facilitated the resolution of these conflicts and gave birth to the conception of Russia as a neighbor with whom relations based on trust were possible and desirable (Wada 1999: 4–6). The incorporation of various Enlightenment paradigms and related European modes of thinking into the Japanese domestic discourse in mid nineteenth century, presented a dilemma for Japanese intellectuals engaged in defining Japan’s position vis-à-vis Russia. As already noted, starting in this period the “West” became the main “other” in relation to which Japan’s intellectuals and policy makers not only measured the level of Japanese technological development but also contributed to a construction of modernizing Japan’s identity. China, which for centuries had been Tokugawa Japan’s principal “other,” was reinvented as Japan’s “Orient” (Tanaka 1993). However, Russia did not fit into these clear-cut categories of alterity vis-à-vis which modernizing Japan could constitute the national “self.” On the one hand, Russia, with its formidable military might, political face largely indistinguishable from other white Europeans and partially European geography, was an integral member of the Western Powers (rekkyo-) which became the most important standardsetting entity in Japan’s pursuit of modernity and equal status. On the other hand and at the same time, however, Western thinking never fully conceived of Russia as part of the European “self” but tended to perceive it as the feared and the backward “other,” the barbarian of the East (Neumann 1998: 65–112). The undetermined position of Russia within the clear-cut categories of East and West thus posed a dilemma for Japanese intellectuals. The lack of clarity about how to classify Japan’s northern neighbor through the new prisms is most obvious in the writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), one of the leading thinkers of the Japanese Enlightenment and one of the first to visit Europe and the United States in the 1860s. In his impressions and observations of Europe, Russia is depicted as part of Europe not only in terms of military power but also when describing the various social institutions, such as public

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housing for the poor and state-run libraries. At the same time, Russia is often singled out as different from the “West” mainly in terms of political and judicial systems (Fukuzawa [1867] 2003). This ambiguous place of Russia within the Western/European multilayered construction of cognitive borders enabled two possible constructions of modern Japan’s identity vis-à-vis Russia. Some Japanese intellectuals who had an extensive exposure to Russian political and religious thought and firsthand experience of Russia were able to draw parallels between Japan and Russia in terms of their relationship with the “West.” One of these was a convert to Russian Orthodox Christianity, Konishi Masutaro- (1862–1940). As a student of theology and Russian literature, Konishi spent six years in Russia (1887–93) and during his stay befriended the famous writer Lev (Leo) Tolstoy, to whom he introduced the Chinese philosophy of Confucius, Lao-tse and others. After his return to Japan, Konishi led an active public life and worked as a translator of Russian literature, an educator and public intellectual, introducing Russian thought to the Japanese public and criticizing the excessive attention paid to the Western European thought dominant among his contemporaries. In his recollections of Russia, Konishi depicts the Russians as friendly and hospitable people and, while critical of the tsarist despotism, provides a generally positive evaluation of Russia’s social and cultural institutions. When discussing Japan’s modernization, Konishi, like Fukuzawa, located both Russia and Japan as nations with immature civilizations, juxtaposed with the West, and downplayed the possibility of Russia serving as a teacher for Japan. At the same time, however, he argued that Russia should be seen as a friend, a companion on the road to modernity where both nations could share their experience and learn from each other (Konishi [1896] 1988 and Oota 2007: 123–6). This construction, which located both Japan and Russia in opposition to the West, was not reflected in the dominant discourse of Meiji era which, driven by the paradigms of progress and modernity, employed the similarity between the two nations in terms of their economic inferiority relative to Western European countries as well as a strong focus on the military dimension to construct Japan’s relative proximity to the West through the juxtaposition of Japan with Russia (Nakamura 1985: 60–2). Early attempts at this portrayal of Russia as a polar opposite of Japan can also be found in the writings of Fukuzawa. While locating both nations within the realm of semicivilized nations, Fukuzawa nevertheless asserted Japan’s relative technological and intellectual superiority; he thus created a hierarchy between Japan and Russia, locating Japan in closer proximity to the West (Fukuzawa [1867] 2003a: 137–8). This brief instance, however minor a place it occupies in the writings of Fukuzawa, can be seen as a starting point for the discourse in which the ambiguous place of Russia in Western thought was used to construct Japan’s belonging to the realm of normalcy and civilization. This construction of Japan relative to Russia became most visible during the years of the Russo–Japanese War (1904–5). In the rest of the world the

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war was seen as the first victory of a yellow race over a white Western empire. It had an important impact on the anti-colonial movement and has been celebrated by Afro-American, African and Asian intellectuals as dealing a deadly blow to the myth of white man’s invincibility and superiority (Gallicchio 2000: 32–4 and Aydin 2007: 71–89). However, within the Japanese domestic discourse both before and during the war, Japan came to represent the civilized world embarking on the historical mission of fighting the barbarian Russia, with this fighting conducted in the name of civilization, peace and humanity. Ironically, in the Japanese discourse it was Russia that came to be depicted as oriental and “half-yellow.” On the other side, Japan, which aspired to equal status with the European powers, was depicted as a Western nation having a “white heart” under its yellow skin or, at times, as even belonging to the white race (Oguma 2002: 143–55 and Shimazu 2005: 365–9). There is no doubt that this narrative had a strong propaganda element aimed at mobilizing Western governments and publics to the Japanese side in the conflict, and to counter the conception of the war in racial or religious terms, as a war against white Christendom (Matsumura 1982). At the same time, it cannot be reduced to mere rhetoric, because many of the leading Japanese intellectuals of the day did see the Russo–Japanese conflict in terms of the struggle of the civilized versus the uncivilized, and of liberal freedom and progress versus their enemies (for example, see Han 2007). Over the next three decades, as Japan’s imperialism expanded and eventually culminated in the vision of Great Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (daito-a kyo-eiken), the discourse on Russia went through a number of transformations. The perception of the Russo–Japanese War as a war of races, which was dominant in the non-Western world and accepted by a large part of the Western elites, was embraced by some Japanese intellectuals already in the immediate aftermath of the war. Initially, this perception of the war and related concepts of Asianism (or Pan-Asianism) met with resistance from the Japanese elite, who feared the revival of the “yellow peril” discourse in the West (Aydin 2007: 89–90). However, the escalating tensions in Japan’s relations with Europe and the United States, which clearly had strong racial elements, and the reconceptualization of Japan’s place in Asia led to the reemergence and gradual ascent to dominance of the racial perception of the war. Namely, the Russo–Japanese War came to be narrated as a victory of the superior Japanese spirit over the expansionist Russian national essence and, simultaneously, as a victory of “colored people” over the white race (Honda 1933, Ogura 1939: 21, Sonda and Hara 1942: 72–3). In terms of the broader discourse on Russia, the Bolshevik revolution, combined with the growing exposure of Japanese intellectuals to Russian literature and art, resulted in a number of important changes and fragmentation of the discourse. While for the Left-leaning intellectuals Russia became the symbol of progressive revolution, the ruling elites came to perceive the threat from Russia not only in military but also in ideological terms (Wada 1999: 8–9). Even after Japan finally withdrew from the Russian Far East in 1922 (and

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from Northern Sakhalin in 1925), following its participation in the Entente intervention, and after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet government in 1925, bilateral relations did not improve significantly. It was not only the fear of communism among the Japanese elites that accounted for these tensions, but also clashes of interests that followed the establishment of the pro-Soviet Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924 and the birth of Manchukuo in 1932. After the “China incident” in 1937, by which Japan launched a fully fledged war in China, bilateral relations with the USSR grew even more tense, with two major border clashes in 1938 and 1939 (the Changkufeng/Lake Khasan and Nomonhan/Khalhin-Gol incidents). While Japan and the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact in April 1941, the Japanese military considered the “northward advance” option, namely occupation of the Soviet Far East, virtually up till the last moment before making the decision to attack Pearl Harbor and “advance south” into Southeast Asia. Even after Japan opted for the former, parts of Soviet Asia were included in some of the Japanese schemes of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Shillony 1981: 141 and Berton 1985: 340), pointing to Japan’s sustained geo-political interest in the Soviet Far East. As a result of the persistent potential for military confrontation between Japan and the Soviet Union during the years of the Asia-Pacific War (1937–45), Japan’s military, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other semi-official agencies of Japan’s colonialism, such as the Manchurian Railway Company (manshutetsudo-), accumulated a significant amount of empirical research on their northern neighbor. It seems that this was based mainly on publicly available data and academic works of Japanese, Soviet and Western scholars and included accounts of the various aspects of Soviet society, industry, military, economy and politics (for example, see Yamauchi 1937, Yamamoto 1939, Naikaku jo-ho-bu 1940 and Gaimusho- Cho-sabu 1941).1 Interestingly, as the Japanese plan for the new order in Asia envisioned a hierarchical regional construct, led and dominated by Japan, the Soviet policy towards ethnic minorities, namely (nominal) support for self-determination through autonomy and promotion of the indigenous languages and culture of the various peoples of the Soviet Union, drew significant attention from the governmentaffiliated institutions, as it was seen as one of the most dangerous aspects of the Soviet Union because it could enhance the spread of communism (sekka) in China and within the other territories of the Japanese Empire (Cho-sen So-to-kufu Keimukyo-ku 1930: 65–98). As such, the notion of “enlightened threat” from Russia that existed in Tokugawa Japan re-emerged more than a century later, in a form of superior imperial management. Despite of the dominant perception of a military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union, the narration of Soviet “otherness” in the domestic discourse was not, however, monolithic. Its ambiguity was captured by New York Times journalist Otto D. Tolischus’ (1945) post-war review of Japan’s wartime debates in which the section on the Soviet Union was titled as “The Mysterious Russia.” Namely, on one side the “traditional” Western

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paradigms of Russia as an immature nation, lacking civilization and possessing an extreme character—traced to a combination of natural factors such as climate and geographical location and historical developments such as the Mongolian Yoke and belated exposure to Western civilization—defined the aspects of the discourse. These paradigms, were not, however, applied evenly to the contemporary Soviet Union. On the other side, in the narrative generated by the Japanese military and the political Right, communism was intertwined with the uncultured, jingoistic and unrestrained Russian national character. These texts provided a detailed depiction of Russia’s expansionist history and called on the Japanese people to fully comprehend the seriousness of the Soviet threat, validated through this historico-cultural prism, and to enhance their national defense capability (for example, Oouchi 1937 and Naitoet al. 1942). Other writers, equally worried about the communist threat but having a more romantic perception of the Russian national character, saw communism and the Soviet system as opposed to traditional Russian characteristics. These writers argued that the triumph of communism in Russia led to the erosion of such traditional positive characteristics as emotionality, generosity and somewhat childish recklessness, while they argued equally the dangers of communism (for example, Takeo 1941). At the same time, however, a less alarmist narrative posited successful Soviet industrialization as proof that national identity is not a static entity but susceptible to fundamental change. Arguably, it was not only admiration for the Russian resistance to the German invasion by “martial Japan” (Shillony 1981: 156) that supported this view, but a number of broader characteristics of the wartime domestic discourse. First, in spite of the prevalence of appeals to the superior nature of the traditional Japanese spirit and nationalism, the construction of the Japanese “self” in the 1930s and early 1940s narrated the Japanese Empire as modern, revolutionary (in terms of its rebellion against the West) and scientific (for example, Shillony 1981 and Kushner 2002 and 2006) in a way not entirely dissimilar to the Marxist-Leninist construction of the Soviet “self.” This similarity between Japan and Soviet Russia was manifested in one of the main texts that defined wartime Japan’s identity, when the political philosopher Kosaka Masaaki located Russia together with Japan and Germany as creators of new foundations of world history (in Fujita (ed.) 1943: 125). Furthermore, Japan’s Pan-Asianist discourse, some strands of which were informed by Marxism-Leninism (Mark 2006: 464), was constructed in direct opposition to European colonialism and broader Western political liberalism, individualism and utilitarianism on the one side, while positioning Japan as self-proclaimed leader of Asia on the other. Reflecting the traditionally ambiguous position of Russia in the East/West dichotomy, Russia/the USSR was occasionally mentioned as a Caucasian “oppressor” of “peoples” or as part of the Western imperialism (for example, Ogura 1939: 21 and Sonda and Hara 1942: 19–26), and communism as an ultimate form of materialism was mentioned as an integral part of Western ideology in Shinmin no michi (The

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Way of the Subject), one of the key ideological documents of wartime Japan (in Sonda and Hara 1942: 52–5). However, in general, Russia/the USSR was ignored in the historico-cultural narrative of the New Order, which constructed Japan through the West and Asia (for example, see Fujita (ed.) 1943). The somewhat undetermined position of Russia enabled an easy shift in narrative from conceptions of Russia as a racially white European power to an Asian one when it suited the interests of the ruling elites (in Shillony 1981: 156). Also relevant is the domestic discourse on the “nation” (minzoku), in which the conception of the nation as a dynamic and not historically static entity was one of the dominant positions (Doak 2007: 245–50), this enabling a conception of Russian national identity as susceptible to change. These discursive conditions, it can be argued, led to the emergence of a narrative not dissimilar to that of Konishi Masutaro- examined earlier, which located Russia in certain proximity to Japan and observed positive dynamics in the Russian national character. In this context particularly interesting are the impressions of the Soviet Union written by Maruyama Masao ([1941] 1942),2 a correspondent for Asahi Shimbun who was stationed in Moscow (1932–47) and traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union. Sobueto Tsu-shin (Correspondence from the Soviet Union) was first published in 1941 and proved to be quite popular, as over the next two years it went through four reprints. In the first chapter, devoted to an analysis of Russian national characteristics, Russia is portrayed as being traditionally inferior to the West in terms of “material culture” (busshitsu bunka). This inferiority is explained by the traditionally agrarian nature of the society, the two centuries of the Mongolian yoke (1223–1480) and the essentially Asian nature of Russian mentality, which resulted in a “natural laziness” and stunted the development of practical sense. Hence, noted Maruyama, Soviet industrialization plans were at first seen by outside observers as a reflection of this aspect of the Russian mentality, one characterized by daydreaming and lack of realism. Maruyama depicts in detail other negative aspects of the Russian national character, such as easy change from one extreme to another, carelessness and discrimination against ethnic minorities. He observes that these national characteristics emerged from centuries of societal development and thus could not be changed overnight. At the same time, however, he notes that it is a mistake to consider them absolute or fixed. Reflecting on te Soviet industrial successes, Maruyama argues that, as a result of the “trend of the times” (toki no nagare) and objective changes in living conditions, as well as the strong determination of political leaders to transform these national characteristics, they could be gradually changed and developed. In Maruyama’s view, the industrial development achieved by the Soviet Union could be seen as evidence of transformation from the traditional Russian national identity into a more advanced “Soviet man” identity. Maruyama concludes his observations by stating that, unlike the Europeans, Russian national identity had not yet reached its final form (ibid. [1941] 1942: 1–29). As will be shown in the next chapter, this type of narrative, which argued for a certain relationship between

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Russian socio-cultural characteristics and the economic and the political aspects of the Soviet Union, continued to exist in the fragmented discursive field of the immediate post-war years. However, along with the entrenchment of the Cold War and Japan’s place in it, it quickly disappeared, to resurface only in the 1970s, though in a radically different form.

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Japan’s “Soviet Union,” Japan’s “Russia”

It is often argued that contemporary Japanese perceptions of the USSR/ Russia are a product of centuries-long historical animosity compounded with more recent memories of Soviet actions in the summer of 1945, namely, the Soviets’ treacherous revocation of the neutrality treaty, the occupation of Japanese territory and the prolonged detention of Japanese PoWs taken in Manchuria in the final phase of the war (in Japan usually referred to as the “Siberian internment” (siberia yokuryu-)) (for example, Mendel 1961: 200, Morley 1962: 51, Hitchcock 1971: 280–1, Falkenheim 1977–78: 604 and Ogawa 1987: 158). The territorial dispute, which continues to play central role in bilateral relations, will be examined in the next chapter. It will show that the dispute and related perceptions and affective valuation of the dispute among Japanese decision makers and the broader public emerged only after a decade had passed since the actual events transpired.1 In terms of more general perceptions of the Soviet Union, there is no doubt that Japan’s conservative elite, left largely intact by the Occupation authorities, continued to harbor a strong suspicion of/antipathy toward communism from the pre-1945 years. On the whole, however, the public discourse on the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war years was rather heterogeneous, in spite of the steadily escalating anti-communist censorship exercised by the US Occupation authorities. Domestic publications on the Soviet Union during the years of Occupation can be divided roughly into two groups: articles and books by Japanese writers, and translations of texts written by foreigners, mainly American and British writers. The latter, like, for example, the recollections of the Soviet Union written by the former US Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith (1950), provided generally negative depictions of the Soviet Union and communism in general. Writings by Japanese journalists and writers can in turn be divided into those by reporters who visited the Soviet Union “from the front door” (i.e., made officially sanctioned visits) and those by former PoWs, who had seen only the “toilet” of the USSR, in the apt phrase of one of the returnees from the Siberian internment (Tantoku 1949). However, the memoirs of the returnees were divided sharply between those with predominantly negative recollections of their experience and those who praised the Soviet social and political systems (Fujimoto 2002).

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Furthermore, many texts written by professional reporters stationed in the Soviet Union during and after World War II showed high esteem for various aspects of the Soviet Union and the national character. Maruyama Masao’s ([1941] 1942) popular book mentioned in the previous chapter was reprinted with some modifications which provided a generally positive depiction of Soviet industrial progress and the emergence of the Soviet Union from World War II as a victorious global power (Maruyama 1948). Other texts also expressed unconditional admiration for the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, often tracing it to the superior nature of the Russian national character (for example, Mainichi Shimbunsha 1946: 25–42 and Hatanaka 1947: 229–30). They also provided a positive evaluation of Soviet industrial, economic, social and cultural progress, harmonious relations between various ethnicities and lack of racial discrimination, often favorably comparing the Soviet Union with Japan (for example Kiyokawa 1946, Mainichi Shimbunsha 1946, Hatanaka 1947, Watanabe 1947 and 1948, Maeshiba 1949). Other Japanese intellectuals which did take into account the negative recollections of the ex-PoWs criticized the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system and its oppressive mechanisms. However, memories of Japan’s own not-so-distant history of domestic totalitarianism, combined with romantic perceptions of the “Russian soul” (drawn largely from Russian literature widely read by Japanese intellectuals) at times manifested in comparisons between the Russian and the Japanese national characters and simultaneous juxtaposition of good-hearted people with the oppressive system (for example, Kiga 1953). A review of public opinion polls from this period also provides a number interesting insights into Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia. In September 1951, days before the San Francisco Peace Conference, a public opinion poll of Japanese attitudes towards various nations showed the public attitude towards Russians divided almost equally, with aggregate positive scores of 64 points2 versus 68 negative points (compared with 10 and 219 for Chinese and 296 and 3 for Americans, respectively.) The overall evaluation of Russian national character was negative, but not overwhelmingly so: positive 116/negative 253 (compare with 448/36 for the most highly respected Americans, and 27/403 for the most despised Koreans.) At the same time, the evaluation of Russian culture was more positive (60 positive to 79 negative), placing the views of Russian culture between the negative Asia (Korea 3 to 198, China 12 to 170) and the positive West (US 268 to 3 and England 248 to 1 in Wilbur 1957: 309–12). In a different set of polls conducted a year later, when asked to compare Japan with different nations only 5% of the respondents singled out the Soviet Union as “more advanced” than Japan. This number is quite low compared to the 81% that chose the US as more advanced than Japan. The favorable nature of Japanese perceptions of the US can be explained by the greater direct contact with that country compared to the very limited access to information among the Japanese and the Soviet people, foor exposure to information about the Soviet Union was very limited. Bearing in mind this

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limited exposure, the 5% received by the Soviet Union should not be considered as negligible when compared with evaluations of other nations besides the US, such as Switzerland (2%), Germany (6%), France (7%) and only few votes for other “Western” nations such as Canada, Norway, Denmark and Holland. It is also interesting to note that, in the target group of young city dwellers aged 16 to 19 and 20 to 24, the Soviet Union was positively evaluated as more advanced than Japan by a substantial 12% and 10% respectively.3 In terms of which country the respondents wanted to visit, the US again proved to be overwhelmingly popular, with 48%. However, the Soviet Union got 3% of votes (5% among men and 1% among women)—the same as Switzerland, Germany and China, and more than currently popular destinations such as Italy, Hawaii and Europe in general. In terms of which aspects these countries were considered more advanced than Japan, the USSR received 51% of votes for science (as compared to 62% for the US and 48% for the UK) and 13% and 5% for “culture” and “spirit” respectively, getting the same percentage as the US. In terms of economic development, the USSR got 14%, more than the US and the UK (11% each) (So-rifu 1953: 35–9). Furthermore, in spite of massive domestic anti-communist propaganda and the almost three years of war that was happening in neighboring Korea, very few Japanese expressed fear of the Soviet Union or of communism in general. For example, in an opinion poll conducted among business leaders, high government officials, labor union leaders and scholars in May 1954, just over a year after the end of the Korean War, only 3% of respondents expressed fear of communism or Communist aggression (Wilbur 1957: 312). The findings of these polls are particularly interesting in light of the fact that from the early days of the post-war era the government engaged in anticommunist propaganda, including dispatching MoFA officials to various parts of the country to deliver lectures on international affairs (Kushner 2002: 378–80). Furthermore, in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, the American authorities conducted a comprehensive suppression of publications that were perceived as pro-communist. In June 1950, the publication of the Communist Party newspaper Akahata was suspended and in July a total of 561 publications seen as pro-communist were banned. Also, faithfully following the Occupation authorities’ directives, other newspapers and news agencies engaged in a thorough purge of suspected communists and their “bed-fellows,” resulting in a total of 700 workers losing their jobs, including 104 and 119 respectively at the major newspaper Asahi Shimbun and the public radio NHK (Japanese Newspaper and Publishers Association 1951: 15). The diversity of public feelings towards the Soviet Union in the first postwar decade can also be seen in the writings of American “Japan watchers,” who seemed to worry ceaselessly about the spread of pro-Soviet sentiment among Japanese citizens. On one hand, they noted that the Japanese lacked direct exposure to the “evils” of Soviet occupation. On the other, they were worried that the memories of American occupation, combined with the continuous presence of American military bases, nuclear testing in the Pacific,

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and the American pressure on Japan to rearm, could bring about widespread positive sentiment towards Russia, encouraged by the Japanese Communist Party and its “subsidiaries,” the latter probably referring to anti-nuclear and peace movements (Langer in Borton et al 1957: 62–7). Bearing in mind these public opinion poll findings and the heterogeneous nature of the public discourse in the early post-war years, we can argue that the overwhelmingly negative perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia that emerged from the mid 1950s onwards were not a product of direct experience or of historical memories, but were fostered by a complex interaction of domestic and international political dynamics on the political or socio-cultural dimensions.

3.1 Japan’s “Soviet Union” There is no doubt that the sweeping educational, economic and political reforms conducted by the Occupation authorities, combined with the severe suppression of pro-communist publications and public figures from 1949 onwards, played a pivotal role in shaping the subsequent domestic discourse in many areas, and especially on the Soviet Union and communism (see Japanese Newspaper and Publishers Association 1951 and Takemae 2002). However, in spite of the importance of the Occupation in shaping post-war Japan’s domestic discourse, the political otherness of the Soviet Union was fully consolidated only after Japan regained its independence in 1951, within the domestic political rivalry between the ruling conservatives and the Leftist opposition. The conservative construction of Japan’s political identity and its contestation by the socialists and progressive intellectuals continued to dominate the domestic political discourse throughout the Cold War years and it is within this context that the political otherness of the Soviet Union and communism in general was reproduced.

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From the Left: peace, democracy, unarmed neutrality After regaining independence, the ruling conservative elites, while correcting some of what they perceived as the mistakes of the Occupation (such as, for example, re-establishing state control over the school curriculum), continued the project of constructing a “free and democratic” Japan that had been initiated by the American Occupation authorities (for example, see Prime Minister Yoshida’s speech in the Diet, 12 October 1951 at TD). As the conservative camp brought together a variety of members with different backgrounds and agendas, the Soviet “other” came to serve a range of different, sometimes contradictory purposes in the narration of Japan’s imperial past. But whichever aspect of the Soviet “other” was emphasized, it remained the consistent foil against which Japan’s political normalcy was constructed and defined. For some, the “authoritarian” Soviet Union, “lacking freedom of speech” and governed by “state nationalism,” presented an opportunity to draw

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comparisons between Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union and thus emphasize the break post-war Japan had made with the past. This narrative emphasized the normalcy of “free” and “democratic” Japan by juxtaposing it with its own “abnormal” past, mirrored in the “authoritarian,” “unthinkable” and “nationalistic” present in the Soviet Union (Nakasone 1954: 1–38). For other conservatives, many of whom had been members of the pre-1945 establishment, positively framed memories of Japan’s imperial past constituted an integral part of their conception of post-war Japan’s identity. The communist Soviet Union (as well as communist China) presented an opportunity to rescue Japan’s imperial history from the negative narrative of the left, which was engaged in fierce critique of Japan’s recent history of authoritarianism, militarism and imperialism. This “othering” of the Soviet Union came to manifest itself most vividly in the struggle over school history textbooks, compiled mainly by Leftist historians. During the first post-war ideological battle over education, which took place in the mid 1950s, the ruling Conservative Party’s Special Committee on Textbooks Problem argued for the urgent need to revise history textbooks and history education in general. It was claimed that the currently used “red” textbooks took a worshipful attitude toward the Soviet Union and communist China and presented to young students a view of history that was alien to Japan (Minshuto- 1955). The biggest challenge faced by the conservative establishment in its struggle over public support was over the definition of the dominant signifiers of postwar Japan, such as “peace,” “democracy” and “liberty.” This struggle was particularly fierce in the context of Japan’s military alliance with the United States, denounced by the Left but considered as one of the main pillars of Japan’s foreign policy by the conservative mainstream. Importantly, during the first two post-war decades there was a broad-based popular opposition in Japan to the military alliance. Although marginal in today’s politics, the noncommunist Left (mainly the Socialist Party and a significant number of Leftleaning but unaffiliated public intellectuals), played a crucial role in shaping domestic public discourse during the Cold War years, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, when Japan’s politics were basically defined by a two-party system, centered on the conservative and the socialist blocs. After the political realignment of 1955, Japan’s Socialist Party (JSP) became the largest opposition party4 and its critique of the military alliance with the US resonated well with the broader anti-war sentiment. While public opinion experienced a number of fluctuations, in 1953, for example, just two years after the conclusion of the US–Japan Security Treaty, by a slight margin, respondents chose the unarmed neutrality championed by the Left over the alliance with the US that the conservative mainstream was pursuing (cited in Mendel [1961] 1971: 43). Ideologically and politically, Japan’s Left has been consistently fragmented and even today a significant number of historians of Japanese political thought work to sort out the numerous theoretical debates about capitalism, revolution and interpretations of socialism that predate the Asia Pacific War and consistently weakened Japanese opposition. Despite this ideological

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fragmentation, however, it can be said that, for most of the non-communist Left, the Soviet Union never appeared to be an extension of the “self.”5 Rather, the Left participated in its own way in the construction of Japan’s identity, in which the Soviet Union was consistently “other.” The changes sought by the Japanese Left were to be achieved through peaceful and democratic revolution, as opposed to the violent, antidemocratic Russian revolution that led to the creation of the USSR. From the early post-war days, “peace,” “independence” and “democracy” were the main slogans of a strongly nationalistic left (Cole et al. 1966, Stockwin 1968 and Oguma 2002). Within this Leftist discourse, these goals could be achieved only through the advent of domestic socialism on the one hand, and, in terms of foreign policy, through abolition of the US–Japan military alliance and the institution of permanent unarmed neutrality. Needless to say, the principal “other” in this discourse was “American imperialism” and most of the rhetoric, narrating Japan as still occupied and subordinated, was directed at the United States (Stockwin 1968: 1–20 and Oguma 2002: 447–98). Hence it is not surprising that many of the leftist intellectuals who visited the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s returned with rather rosy reports regarding Soviet society and politics, the state of freedom and democracy, and of technological progress (for example, see Japan Science Council 1956). However, in spite of a certain admiration of the Soviet Union, the strongly nationalistic but progressive discourse which emphasized an independent role for Japan did not envisage either an alliance with the USSR or an embrace of communist ideology.6 For example, Nanbara Shigeru, the one time president of Tokyo University and a leading advocate of the unarmed neutrality thesis, gave a generally positive report on his visit to the USSR in 1955, but nevertheless concluded by arguing for an independent road for Japan. Neither the American paths nor the Soviet nor the Chinese paths, argued Nanbara, should serve as a model for Japan. Japan needed to regain full independence and to “walk our own path” in order to achieve genuine democracy, that is, respect of all human beings and freedom (Nanbara 1955: 68–73). The Socialist Party platform that emerged from a compromise that produced the merger of the Left and Right socialist parties in 1954–55 reflected the strong suspicion of communism among some of the dominant members of the newly formed Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as well as the rivalry with the pro-Soviet Japanese Communist Party (JCP) over the progressive vote. Thus, the JSP argued for Japan’s neutrality, emphasizing independence from both the capitalist and the communist camps (Stockwin 1968: 71–97). In general, the socialists, while criticizing American military policies in Japan and Asia, did not necessarily oppose Western-style liberal democracy and argued the liberation and development of the individual to be their main goal (Seki 1955). Hence the socialists engaged in a fierce critique not only of Japan’s ruling elites and the United States but also of the Japanese communists and “international communism,” along with Soviet “totalitarianism” and

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“imperialism.” Alongside capitalism, the “international communism” that emerged as the result of the Russian Revolution was presented as a deformed form of Marxism, devoid of humanism, that destructively divided the socialist and labor movements and thwarted the triumph of socialism in many countries. Communism was argued to be just another form of imperialism, which subdues the individual to the “group” and has no respect for democracy or freedom. The socialist platform argued that socialism can “breathe” only in a free society and, implicitly rejecting the revolutionary model of the ultra Left, proclaimed that socialism is to be achieved through democratic means. In turn, the advent of socialism was argued to be the only way to achieve true democracy (Seki 1955 and JSP 1955: 11–26). In terms of Japan’s place in the Cold War rivalry, the progressives warned that the alliance with the US would bring eventual destruction to Japan and hence argued for the urgent need to adopt a neutral stance and to abolish the security treaty with the US. In this vision, Japan’s security would be guaranteed through a “Locarno style” collective security pact that would include the US, Japan, the USSR and China, or by a “UN army” to be stationed in Japan (Sakamoto 1959). Throughout the Cold War, the relationship between the socialists and the Soviet Union experienced a number of changes. After the most anti-Soviet “Nishio fraction” left the JSP during the 1960 “anti-US Japan Alliance struggle” (anpo to-so-), the relationship between the JSP and the Soviet Union gradually improved. From the mid 1960s onwards, the socialists actively engaged in “opposition diplomacy” with the USSR and established a rather close relationship with the Soviet leadership.7 The platform of the Socialist Party, outlined in a text titled “A Japanese Path to Socialism” (Nihon ni okeru shakaishugi e no michi) published in 1964, and its official interpretation by the party’s ideologues five years later, differed greatly from the 1955 platform in its depiction of the Soviet Union (Nihon Shakaito- Seisaku Shingikai 1965: 1–42 and Katsumata et al 1969), although, the socialist vision of alternative identity for Japan continuously navigated between praising the Soviet Union for its social, political and technological achievements and, at the same time, establishing a distinctive socialist identity for a truly independent Japan, to be achieved through democratic and peaceful means. In 1960s, the references to Soviet imperialism disappeared and the socialists defended and praised the great achievements of world socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Citations from Lenin were abundant as the inevitability of the socialist revolution in Japan was argued; the Soviet Union came to represent the motherland of socialism, praised for its significant achievements in terms of ending the exploitation of the workers and peasants, realizing equality of income distribution and successfully confronting imperialism and militarism. There were, however, two factors that constrained this positive socialist appraisal of the Soviet Union. One was the territorial dispute which by the 1960s had become a central issue in domestic debates on Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union, and in which the socialists’ conception of the disputed

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islands, as Japan’s inherent territory, did not differ from that adopted by the government. The second factor that prompted the socialists to establish a certain distance between themselves and the Soviet Union was the centrality of “peace,” “independence” and “democracy” in their conception of Japan’s post-war identity. These notions came to dominate the progressive discourse, mainly in the context of opposition to Japan’s military alliance with the United States and American imperialism. However, Soviet-style “dictatorship of the proletariat,” combined with active participation in the arms race with the US and related nuclear tests and, most importantly, the kind of interventionist foreign policy that manifested itself the Soviet-led military suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, could not be contained within the strongly nationalistic socialist discourse that evolved around the notions of peace and independence. The parallels between the Dubcˇ ek-led Czechoslovak Communist Party arguing the need to build “socialism with a human face” and its brutal suppression by the Warsaw Pact forces on the one side, and the JSP vision of a uniquely Japanese form of socialism and the country’s continuing dependence with the US on the other, were too obvious to ignore. The JSP’s relations with the Soviet Union worsened, and both the 1968 party communiqué and the 1969 commentary on the socialist platform by the ideological committee of the party criticized the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as the border clashes between USSR and Chinese forces, as incidents that damaged the image and the dignity of socialism. The JSP asserted that sovereignty and the right to self-determination should be respected and that solidarity of socialist nations should be built on mutual respect for these values. The 1969 commentary tried to soften the critique of the Czechoslovakia incident by relativizing it through depictions of suppression of freedom in capitalist societies and stressing the necessity of defending socialism. At the same time, however, it explicitly argued that the invasion was illegal and violated the socialist spirit of international solidarity. The commentary also emphasized a uniquely Japanese path to the creation of a free socialist society, one that would respect the basic human rights of the people in the process of establishing socialism (Nihon Shakaito- Seisaku Shingikai 1990: 512 and Katsumata et al 1969 112–19). The 1969 commentary continued to deepen the vision of constructing a uniquely Japanese path to socialism and argued that, while the experience of previous revolutions (such as in Russia and China) is important, these should be understood within the conditions peculiar to each country. In contrast with the violent nature of these revolutions, it was argued that democracy and peace are the necessary conditions for achievement both of socialist revolution in Japan and of genuine independence (Katsumata et al 1969: 100–1 and 122–26). In must also be noted that during the late 1960s and 1970s the laudatory commentaries on the Soviet achievements and social and political life in the Soviet Union gradually became more and more abstract. As Japan’s own economic progress generated living standards that far surpassed those visible to visitors to the Soviet Union, the early positive eye-witness accounts of

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Soviet life (for example, Matsumoto (1966) gave way to vaguer praise of the achievements of Soviet socialism, similar to those that appeared in “A Japanese Path to Socialism.” The early 1980s saw further alienation from the Soviet Union within the progressive discourse. Compared to the decade-earlier response to the Soviet-led suppression of Prague Spring, the socialists’ critique of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was much more explicit. In 1980, while equally criticizing the boycott of the Moscow Olympics as an attempt to politicize amateur sport, the JSP issued a strong condemnation of the invasion and argued that it contradicted principles of peace and the basic norms of the UN Charter. Simultaneously trying to utilize the incident to promote the vision of unarmed neutrality, the party communiqué argued that the invasion proved the danger of military alliances and reiterated the need for the pursuit of non-aligned neutrality (Nihon shakaito- seisaku shingikai 1990: 1224). Throughout the first half of 1980s the socialists, along with non-affiliated progressive intellectuals, continued their effort to reconstruct the vision of unarmed neutrality in opposition to conservative attempts to enhance Japan’s security capacities to counter the perceived Soviet threat. They deployed a number of arguments to this effect. They downplayed the Soviet threat to Japan; they argued the futility of Japan’s defense and military alliance with the US in case of Soviet invasion; and they continuously criticized US global imperial ambitions, Japan’s role in them and the encirclement of the Soviet Union. Importantly, these arguments did not negate the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy or its domestic totalitarianism, but sought principally to relativize it in the context of American imperialism and jingoism (for example, Ishibashi 1980). To conclude this examination of the socialist discourse we can argue that, in spite of having a fundamentally different conception of the Soviet Union from that which dominated the conservative discourse, neither the Soviet Union nor the communist ideology were narrated as a political model for Japan, but were continuously present as one of the “others” in a discourse which evolved around the notions of independence, peace and distinctively Japanese socialism. In 1986, just as the Soviet Union was taking its first steps on the reformist path of perestroika under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the “New Declaration of Japan’s Socialist Party” supplanted “A Japanese Path to Socialism” as the party’s new platform. In this new platform, “revolution” and references to class struggle disappeared and the party reinvented itself as the party of the Japanese people, not representing a particular class in its pursuit of social and economic reforms. As such, this restructuring of Japan’s socialist vision located it further away from Soviet-style communism and drew it closer to Western European democratic socialism.

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From the Right: peace, democracy, alliance In contrast to the Leftist paradigm of “neutrality,” the conservative discourse consistently emphasized the necessity of the alliance with the US, arguing that

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“neutrality” was not a realistic option in the context of the global Cold War. The alliance was presented as the only realistic way not only to preserve stability in the region but also to pursue Japan’s post-war values of peace and freedom (Kosaka 1963.) While the Left argued that Japan’s interests and sovereignty were being subordinated to the US, in the conservative discourse the alliance was portrayed as integral to Japan’s post-war identity as free and democratic. There is a certain irony in this conflation of the military alliance with Japan’s freedom and democracy, because in parallel to this discourse the conservatives argued the need to revise the Japanese constitution, which was written and imposed on Japan by the American Occupation authorities, by stressing the alien nature of some of its key elements (especially the war-renouncing Article 9). Thus, the conservative discourse linked Japan’s domestic peace with the alliance with the US, while simultaneously arguing the alien nature of the constitution, imposed on Japan by this very same “other.” Nevertheless, the preservation of domestic peace and democracy, with its “respect for personal freedom and human rights,” became an integral and inseparable part of Japan’s path of “peace and prosperity” within the camp of “free nations.” The security treaty was presented as the guarantee for this membership and, by default, as the basis for domestic peace and democracy. As such, the Leftist vision of a neutral Japan, which, according to conservatives, was a pretext for joining the “anti-democratic” communist camp, was argued to inevitably lead to the collapse of democracy in Japan and Japan’s “isolation” in Asia (for example, Prime Minister Kishi’s Speech at the National Press Club, 21 June 1957 at TD also LDP 1966: 3–15). Under the aegis of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from the mid 1960s on, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union experienced an approximately decade-long period of gradual warming that culminated in the 1973 Tanaka–Brezhnev summit. While remaining only a minor portion of Japan’s total foreign trade (2–3% of the total volume), in absolute terms bilateral trade quadrupled between 1970 and 1980, mainly as the result of Japan’s import of raw materials from Siberia, and Soviet purchases of Japanese machinery and steel (Ogawa 1987). No doubt Japan’s search for new markets for its rapidly expanding economy and the growth of the Soviet economy were among the main immediate factors that contributed to the gradual improvement of bilateral relations and the rather impressive expansion of economic ties. Closer economic ties were also facilitated by political developments such as the heightening tensions between the USSR and China and the subsequent rising interest in Japan among Soviet policy makers; the Nixon shocks and the oil shocks of the early 1970s and, of course, the broader Cold War détente of the 1970s also facilitated closer economic ties (Hitchcock 1971, Ogawa 1987 and Hara 1998: 113–48). Reflecting this positive turn in bilateral relations, the conservative discourse on foreign policy started to exhibit a more conciliatory stance towards the Soviet Union and argued for closer ties with the USSR despite the differences in political systems and ideologies (Jiyu-minshuto- Seimu Cho-sakai 1968: 33–4).

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The decade-long spell of relatively good bilateral relations started to cool down in the second half of the 1970s, again due to a nexus of bilateral, regional and global developments. Among these we can count the 1976 Soviet MiG defection incident in which a MiG-25 operated by Lieutenant Victor Belenko unexpectedly landed at Hokkaido’s Hakodate airport; the inclusion of the controversial anti-hegemony clause in the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978; and the subsequent upgrading of Soviet military facilities and deployment of troops on the disputed islands as part of the broader growth in the Soviet strategic military build-up in the Far East, which resulted in a “small scale arms race” (Panov 2007: 14) between the Soviet Union on one side and Japan’s SDF and US forces on the other, in the area of Hokkaido and the South Kuriles. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended the détente and Japan’s participation in the US-led sanctions against the Soviet Union brought a further deterioration in bilateral relations, which, by 1980, had entered a “glacial period” (Hara 1998: 149–50 and Hasegawa 1998: 161–70). Tensions peaked in the early 1980s and are manifested in the first explicit reference to the USSR as a potential enemy in Japan’s Defense White Paper for 1980 and the depiction of Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” (fuchin ku-bo) by Prime Minister Nakasone in an interview with the Washington Post in 1983 (cited in Pyle 1987: 266). At the initiative of Nakasone, during the 1983 summit of the G-7, the Western powers declared that the “security of the seven is inseparable” (cited in Miyoshi 1985: 250), further entrenching the identification of Japan’s security with that of the West. No doubt these developments, along with other defense-related initiatives undertaken by Japan’s successive cabinets from 1976 onwards, represented a significant change in Japan’s security discourse and a certain departure from the low-defense posture and economic focus of the Yoshida doctrine (Nishihara 1983/84 and Pyle 1987). However, in terms of the political “otherness” of the Soviet Union in the conservative discourse, these changes should be viewed as deepening sense of the threatening otherness of the Soviet Union and the expansion of this sentiment from party level to the state level, but not as a drastic change in the construction of Japan’s political identity. In other words, the positive developments in bilateral relations during the 1960s and early 1970s as part of the broader “snow melting” détente did not involve a drastic reconfiguration of the Soviet and communist otherness that was a consistent element of the conservative discourse (for example, see Prime Minister Tanaka at Plenary Session, House of Representatives, 30 October 1972 at NDL). Clearly, the lack of progress in the territorial dispute and related frictions over fishery rights, as well as official alarmism regarding Japan’s growing economic and military power, all contributed to the perpetuation of suspicion towards the Soviet Union. Until the late 1970s, however, the Soviet Union per se and Japan’s relations with its northern neighbor occupied a surprisingly minor place in the conservative discourse, and the sense of the Soviet and communist otherness was determined by the rivalry with domestic progressives over

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Japan’s political identity. The degree to which, for conservatives, Japanese progressives represented the “other” can be seen, for example, in the LDP policy vision for the 1970s, which devoted a mere four pages to Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union as opposed to three chapters arguing the benefits of representative democracy and the necessity of the military alliance with the US as an implicit critique of the socialist notions of peaceful revolution and unarmed neutrality (Jiyu-minshuto- Seimu Cho-sakai 1969). As such, it was mainly within the conservative construction of Japan’s peace, democracy and independence, and the competition of these with their progressive enunciations, that Soviet “otherness” was produced and reproduced. While viewing the de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union and the consequent reforms as representing a kind of “normalization” of the Soviet state (for example, Wada 1966,) the structure of the conservative discourse on Japan’s politics, economy and, most importantly, national security, was defined by a simultaneous opposition to the “dictatorial” and “unrealistic” ideology of Japan’s Left and to what were narrated as the global revolutionary designs of international communism (for example, see Jiminto- anzenhosho- cho-sakai 1966 and Jiyu-minshuto- seimu cho-sakai 1969: 1–24). This production of Japan’s political identity, which merged Japan’s membership in the Western camp and the US– Japan military alliance with domestic peace and democracy, perpetuated the political and threatening otherness of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology. Hence it is not surprising that, in the early 1980s, conservative publications presented the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and other incidents such as the downing of the Korean Airlines civilian aircraft in 1983 as evidence of the aggressive, dictatorial and lying nature of the Soviet Union and communism in general. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan figured as a proof of the Soviet conspiracy for world dominance, as an event in which the Soviet Union had shown its real face, raising concerns that Japan might be the next target, with a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido being but a matter of time (for example, Gekkan jiyu-minshu 1980: 52–63). However, the discourse continued to evolve along the already established paradigms, simultaneously narrating these events as evidence of the childish, irresponsible and unrealistic nature of the unarmed neutrality ideology championed by the socialists, and reproducing the identity of peaceful, free and democratic Japan as opposed to the Leftist “other” which encompassed the USSR, communism and the domestic Left (for example, Koyama 1983). To summarize, the political otherness of the Soviet Union, while obviously a product of the Cold War ideological rivalry, was most sharply defined and elaborated in the context of the domestic struggle between the conservative and the progressive visions over the nature of Japan’s post-war identity and competing definitions of peace, democracy and independence. For its part, the progressive discourse did not essentially identify with the Soviet position as an extension of “self” but rather, attempted to relativize the Soviet threat within the context of Japan’s relations with the US. Hence, it did not present a radical counter-discourse to the conservative construction of Japan facing the

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international and domestic threat of communism; it sought, rather, to ameliorate the sense of threat by focusing on the US imperialism as the principal “other” against which Japan’s identity should be constructed. On the other hand, the conservative construction of Japan’s identity continuously evolved in simultaneous opposition to the twinned “others” of the domestic left, with which it existed in a complex symbiosis or parliamentary ritual and political symbolism, and an expansionist international communism. The most important development that occurred in the conservative discourse in the late 1970s was the emergence of a socio-cultural narrative on Russia, in parallel with the political “othering” of the Soviet Union, engaged in a construction of Japan’s national identity through incessant examination and analysis of Russia’s “inherent national characteristics.” The structure of this construct will be examined in the following section.

3.2 Japan’s “Russia” The origins of the discourse The post-war socio-cultural discourse on Russian national character branched out from the conservative narrative on the Soviet Union and started to take shape in the late 1970s. It is difficult to identify the exact moment of the emergence of this construction, but it seems to have crystallized through the publication of certain quasi-academic texts on Russian national identity by established scholars-cum-public intellectuals, among them Tokyo Foreign Languages University Professor Shimizu Hayao’s Nihonjin wa naze soren ga kirai ka (Why do the Japanese hate the Soviet Union? first published in 1979) and Hokkaido University Professor Kimura Hiroshi’s Soren to roshiajin (The Soviet Union and the Russians, published in 1980). Also, it is important to note that this discourse was built on foundations established by earlier firsthand accounts of the social and cultural aspects of life in the Soviet Union, such as the popular Dare mo kakanakatta soren (The Soviet Union that nobody wrote about, first published in 1971), written by Suzuki Toshiko, the wife of a Japanese businessman stationed in Moscow in late 1960s. The socio-cultural construction of Japan and Russia emerged from a nexus of short- and long-term trends in Japan’s discourse on the national “self.” To a certain extent it reflected the Cold War borders between the “self” and the “other.” As mentioned, moves towards political rapprochement and negotiations in 1973 failed to bring any meaningful progress towards the conclusion of a peace treaty and bilateral relations started to deteriorate in the second half of the 1970s as part of the broad collapse of the détente. Despite its Cold War sources, though, the discourse on Russian national character was not simply a Japanese iteration of the “evil empire.” Rather, it has emerged in close relation with other debates peculiar to Japanese context. The narrative on Russian national character examined below was firmly located within the broader nihonjiron construction of Japan’s socio-cultural

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identity. This body of popular analysis, which argued Japan’s uniqueness in terms of certain historical and even racial essences, was embraced by the conservative mainstream and became an integral part of the political discourse. Prime Minister Oohira’s (1978–80) declaration of the coming of the age of culture in the Diet Policy Speech made on 25 January, 1979 (at TD) and the establishment of a “Study Group on the Age of Culture,” headed by one of the main nihonjinron authors Yamamoto Shichihei (best known for his Japanese and the Jews written under the pen name of Isaiah Bendasan), can be seen as the first official post-war declaration of Japan as not only an economic superpower, but also a nation of unique culture. The report produced by the group, like other nihonjinron texts of that time, did not engage purely in a cultural debate. It attempted to establish a dialectical relationship between culture and economics, implying that Japan’s post-war economic success expressed an underlying cultural uniqueness (Bunka no jidai kenkyuguroopu 1980). As such, in a rather ironic fashion, capitalism, which during the years of the Pacific War was narrated as a negative and corrupting system which had led to the erosion of the initially positive American values and was juxtaposed with Japanese spiritual and cultural superiority (Shillony in White et al. 1990: 194–5), became an integral part of the same cultural superiority after Japan’s ascent to the status of second largest economy in the Western camp. It is worth noting that both Nihonjin to yudayajin (The Japanese and the Jews), one of the first key texts of modern nihonjinron written by Bendasan/ Yamamoto in 1970, and the above-noted Dare mo kakanakatta soren (Soviet Union that nobody wrote about) written by Suzuki in 1971, probably the first popular book that engaged not only in political but also in social and cultural critique of the Soviet Union, both received the prestigious Ohya So-i’chi Prize for non-fiction writing in 1971. This decision of the selection committee may be read as the early signs of the emergence of the assertion of superior cultural uniqueness manifested in economic success that would be a key aspect of nihonjinron views that would shape the socio-cultural discourse on Russia as it re-emerged. The ideology of nihonjinron constituted an integral part of a broader effort on the part of Japan’s elites to (re)integrate Japan into the realm of “civilized” nations and simultaneously to (re)establish a unique place for Japan’s cultural identity. This cultural construction that started to develop in late 1970s was built on the conceptions of Russian national character established by the pre-1945 discourse and certain passages seem to be taken directly from texts by Oouchi (1937) and Maruyama [1941] 1942) mentioned in Chapter 2.8 At the same time, the various blocks of these narratives were reassembled and transformed to create a hierarchical construction of the Japanese “self” and the Russian “other.” As this construction branched out from the conservative political “othering” of the Soviet Union it continued to rely on the same dichotomies of democratic/authoritarian and peaceful/ jingoistic. Importantly though, the political construct was not replaced by the socio-cultural one, but both continued to coexist in a mutually reinforcing

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relationship within the broader context of Cold War, where political and cultural discourses merged in the process of border demarcation between the realms of normalcy and pathology (Campbell 1992). As already argued in the previous chapter, the search for Japan’s identity as both unique and embodying the Western norms had been on the agenda of domestic elites since the early days of Japan’s modernization. Despite various ups and downs in the Western discourse, Japan has consistently been one of the principal “others” against which the Western collective identity was constructed. Following the defeat in the Pacific War, cognitive structures that traced Japan’s militarism to peculiar cultural traits were adopted by many domestic intellectuals, following the broader pattern of domestic incorporation or modification of Western images of Japan (Harootunian and Myoshi 1993: 7). Furthermore, despite being a consistent geo-political location firmly within the capitalist camp of the Cold War rivalry, Japan was never entirely absolved from cultural “othering” within the post-war Western discourse. Threatening conceptions of Japanese culture9 continued to resurface in the Western representations of Japan. Such negative representations further reinforced the twinned needs to assert Japan’s adherence to the standards of universal (read Western) normalcy on the one hand, while reconstructing Japan’s socio-cultural uniqueness on the other. Hence, while the broad nihonjinron discourse emphasized Japan’s uniqueness, the discourse on Russia recreated Japan as an integral part of the universal realm of normalcy. The structure of the socio-cultural hierarchy that emerged in 1970s can be read as a reconstruction of the prewar narrative on Russia, founded in Western “traditional” discourse on Russia. At the same time, the similarity between elements of the present discourse and the wartime Anglo-American narration of Japan’s cultural and psychological pathologies which, to a certain extent, was embraced by domestic intellectuals in the postwar period, is rather striking. It can be argued, therefore, that the sociocultural construction also projected onto Russia the negative traits attributed to Japan, by this absolving the latter from the pathological otherness. It must be noted that the texts examined below, while mostly the work of scholars, were not confined in their readership or impact to the self-contained realm of Japanese academia. As such, these texts fall somewhat outside those typically considered in researches of Japanese political thought. However, it can be argued that these texts represent a broader discourse which, while probably lacking the depth and sophistication of politico-philosophical scholarship (dominantly Leftist in the post-war years), has been shared by the policy-making elites and has been the one most readily available to the general public. The majority of the works analyzed here were published as quasiacademic books directed at a broad readership by prominent scholars who, even today, occupy key positions in Japan’s academic institutions and disseminate their knowledge of Russia through general-readership journals, newspapers and through providing Russia-related advice to the LDP. Incidentally, the construction examined below also appeared in a slightly

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simplified form in the collection of general public-oriented lectures on the Soviet Union conducted in Japan by Tamba Minoru (1984), at that time a Minister of Japan’s embassy in Moscow and later one of the key players in Japan’s Russia policy. Russia’s immutable national identity In general, the socio-cultural discourse on Russia as it re-emerged in the late 1970s narrates Russia as the negative opposite of the universal “self.” Russia’s difference is not framed in the language of ideological confrontation, but in cultural and civilizational terms, drawing on the language and paradigms used in both the positive and the negative nihonjinron. In this process, the inherent jingoism, barbarism and savageness which have been attributed by the Western discourse to both Russia and Japan are transferred as inherently and uniquely Russian characteristics, in this way “rescuing” Japan from the realm of the barbarian “otherness.” For example, in this construct, the uniquely Russian deep-rooted tradition of inordinate respect of force is seen as one of the dominant sources of Soviet (and later, Russian) foreign policy (Shimizu [1979] 1992: 277–83, also Kimura 2000: 127 and Sato- 2005: 82–3). Following the epistemology of nihonjinron, “struggle” is portrayed as the basic norm and physical might as the supreme value in Russian mentality as derived from the climate and the natural conditions. In turn, this mentality produced the norms of respect and obedience to a strong leader as the only way to maintain order (Kimura 1980: 35–7). A “long tradition of Russian xenophobia” is a product of Russia’s unique geopolitical position and is presented as the source of the Soviet mistrust of alliance and reliance on self-help. The geo-political location, combined with MarxismLeninism, it is argued, has also led to the emergence of a “siege mentality” and generated the recurrence of Russian traditional “suspicions, hostility and distrust of foreign nations” in Soviet and Russian foreign policies (Morimoto 1980: 12, Tamba 1984: 8 and Kimura 2000: 41). The main historical factors that have shaped Russian national character are typically seen as the cultural influence of the Byzantine Empire and the political and administrative influence of Mongolian rule. Both of these factors have encouraged the emergence of strong autocracy and the submissiveness of the people, and of a complete absence of individualism and rationalism (Morimoto 1980: 12–13, Kimura 1980: 46–55, Ito- 1987: 136–42, Kimura 1995: 13–15 and Hirooka 2000: iv–vii). The socio-cultural narrative on Russia not only resulted in the Western modes of “othering,” but also projected onto Russia the particular negative characteristics attributed to Japan by the post-war domestic and Western narrations of Japanese culture. Through this, the discourse not only rescued Japan’s culture from the negative “otherness” but also located Japan within the realm of the universal culture. For example, the still influential The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), written by American anthropologist Ruth Benedict, is arguably one of, if not the most representative texts of the

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contemporary negative discourse on Japan’s cultural uniqueness. For Benedict, the chrysanthemum represents such positive cultural qualities as aesthetics, politeness, adaptability and hospitability; while the sword represents such negative aspects of the Japanese psyche as militarism, rigidity and conservatism. In a strikingly similar fashion, “Russia,” as narrated by the Japanese socio-cultural discourse, also suffers from a split personality, with the two contradictory characters defined as the “plains character” and the “forest character.” The former embodies such negative characteristics as extremism, hedonism and the desire for freedom from any authority. On the other hand, the “forest character” represents silence, abstinence and mysticism (for example, Shimizu ([1979] 1992: 240, Tanihata and Shimizu 1980 and Morimoto 1989: 22). Elsewhere this split personality is presented as a combination of a European identity, which stands for virtue, respect and freedom, and the Asian one, which stands for a primitive, animalistic and fanatical Russia. This psychological imbalance is seen as a main cause of a consistent Russian insecurity regarding self and the outside world, which in turn leads to violent mood swings from docile submission to extreme violence (Kimura 1980: 56–7). Another key aspect of the negative nihonjinron shared by both its Western and Japanese followers is an unquestioning respect of power, seen as a key feature of Japan’s identity. Along with the hierarchical structure of Japanese society and the hierarchical construction of the world, with Japan at the top, this was identified as a key characteristic of Japanese culture not only by Benedict (1946) but also by one of the most celebrated of Japan’s post-war critical intellectuals, Maruyama Masao (1914–96). Maruyama, who engaged in an extensive critique of Japan’s prewar nationalism and fascism, traced the origins of these ills to “particular social organization, political structure and cultural patterns” of Japanese society (Maruyama 1963: 136). Out of his desire for Japan to achieve authentic modernity, Maruyama engaged in an extensive research aimed at exposing and clarifying the body of primordial attitudes and values which he claimed were rooted in Japanese minds and which hamper the development of a “truly universal spirit” of ethical individualism and genuine democracy (Bellah 2003: 140–9 and Hiraishi 2003: 241–2). In his depiction of the historical background for the emergence of Japanese ultra-nationalism, Maruyama wrote:

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Consequently, when the premises of the national hierarchy were transferred horizontally into the international sphere, international problems were reduced to a single alternative: conquer or be conquered. In the absence of any higher normative standards with which to gauge international relations, power politics is bound to be the rule and yesterday’s timid defensiveness will become today’s unrestrained expansionism. Naturally, a psychological complex of fear and arrogance holds sway here as a primitive attitude towards the unknown. (Maruyama 1963: 140, emphasis added)

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In the socio-cultural construction of Russia, these characteristics also feature as an integral part of Russia’s national character. Russia’s vast territory and the struggle with nature and the climate are argued to be the cause of Russian obsession with all things big and the yearning for greatness and might, as well as a worshipful respect of strength and power (Kimura 1980: 68–76 and Morimoto 1980: 190). Territorial expansionism, which in the case of Japan was argued by Maruyama to be a result of Japan’s projection of domestic hierarchy to the international, is likewise seen as an integral part of Russian national character. Russian “traditional expansionism” is traced to the obsession with the idea of establishing buffer zones, the only way of providing security after Russian “emergence” from the forests into the steppes (Tamba 1984: 99–100 and Ito1987: 36). Ironically, Russian inherent backwardness becomes an integral part of the discourse even in terms of military strength; Russia’s inferior military abilities are reflected in the qualitative weakness of the army, consistently poorly managed and underequipped. Russian/Soviet victories in numerous wars are attributed solely to the “tenacity and excellent field-craft” of the peasantsoldiers and to overwhelming quantitative superiority (Ito- 1987: 136–9). It is also interesting to note the role of history in the discourse. Basically, “history” is mobilized to prove its own irrelevance. Historical transformations are presented as flowing over the surface of the national essence without bringing any substantial changes and hence, basically as irrelevant. Russian national characteristics are unchanged by changes in ruling ideology, be this tsarism, communism or perestroika, and will remain unchanged into the future (Kimura 1993: 75–6 and Hakamada 1996: 19–20). There is no differentiation between Soviet and Russian leaders (for example, Suetsugu Ichiro in Sapio, 26 November 1997: 10–13) or between the Soviet citizens and Russian people (Kimura 2000a: 122–57); they are all represented as the same and historically consistent “other.” Explicitly emphasizing the deep historical continuities, the texts often go back and forth between contemporary Russia and the period of the Russo– Japanese War to adumbrate the immutable nature of the Russian national character and of Japan’s civilizational superiority. The narrative often shifts from tsarist Russia to the Soviet era, from the Russo–Japanese War to the Brezhnev-era Soviet Union. For example, one of the text points out the fact that Russian PoWs during the Russo–Japanese War were impressed by Japan’s higher levels to the degree that they realized that they were the actual barbarians as compared to Japanese. The irrelevance of historical changes to national characteristics is emphasized through a description of a similar situation in contemporary Soviet Russia. A visit to the USSR in 1967 is described as a similar “culture shock,” but of the completely opposite nature. While noting that the cultural level of the small intelligentsia class was higher than that of the Japanese, the text argues that most of the Russian people turned out to be ignorant and leading a “natural” life, reflective of their primordial anarchical character (shizenjin) (Hakamada 2000: 21–4 and Yamazaki and Sekikawa 2004: 54).

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The scientific nature of the identity discourse Despite their orientations toward a general readership, the texts examined here have been consistently framed as positivist and scientific. An appeal to objective and scientific methods has been considered a prerequisite for participation in contemporary Japan’s discourses on history, culture or politics. Today, this determination to present the arguments in objective and scientific terms can be observed even in ultra-nationalistic comic books of the (in) famous Kobayashi Yoshinori and others, as they attempt to provide a “truly objective” view of Japan’s imperial and contemporary history by using carefully selected and presented, ostensibly factual descriptions, dates and details of historical figures. One of the Japanese heroes in the recently published nationalistic comic book on Japan’s history of relations with Korea10 is depicted as desperately calling on the Korean people to approach the history of Korea’s relations with Japan according to objective historical facts and not to be swayed by emotion. As might be expected, the conclusion reached by such “objective analysis” that follows is that Japan’s annexation of Korea was carried out in accordance with the will of the Korean people and that it is in fact the Koreans who have continuously discriminated against the egalitarian and altruistic Japanese. As with these attempts to construct Japan’s identity through “objective” reinterpretation of its imperial past, the narrative on Russia is also undertaken as a scientific inquiry, denying the validity of subjective value judgment and personal feelings, and presenting the narrative as a factual description of the cultural realities of the Soviet Union (Ito- 1987: 144) or as a contribution to a “comprehensive understanding of the Soviet Union” (Kimura 1980: 26– 9). Importantly, the authors often admit the limited applicability of the “national” or “cultural” lenses in analyzing state behavior. Kimura (1980 and 1995) notes that the political culture model has its limitations and is only one in an array of analytical models that can and should be applied to the studies of Soviet/Russian politics and foreign relations. At the same time, however, he also notes that it is probably the most effective framework to explain contemporary Russia’s inability to establish real democracy, and the resulting “mix” of pluralism and authoritarianism. Ito- (1987) likewise acknowledges the validity of criticism directed at an overemphasis on the historical continuity of Russia’s foreign policy, as well as the dangers of essentialism. However, stressing the general limitations of the social sciences to “prove” things, he presents the national identity lens as the best available analytical framework for interpreting the dry facts regarding Russian/Soviet policies. In similar fashion, Hakamada (1985) stresses the inherent subjectivity of social analysis generally, emphasizing the culturally relative basis of its key analytical paradigms (such as the notion of totalitarian society). However, rather than seek a generally applicable interpretative approach, he argues for an original Japanese approach to the Soviet Union, based on the uniquely Japanese cultural and social psychology. This, he argues, reveals certain aspects of

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the Soviet society that are invisible to Western scholars. At the same time, Hakamada warns about the biased nature of many of the Western sources and appeals to the need to “correct” it, implying the ultimate objectivity of the Japanese lens. Reservations expressed by such writers regarding the universal applicability of the identity lens in explaining a state’s behavior, do not, however, undermine the validity of the identity discourse. Rather, admitting the explanatory limitations of such an approach serves to enhance the legitimacy of the “objective” depiction of national identity traits; any questioning of the accuracy of the argument is deflected away from the descriptions of essential national characteristics and limited to assert explanations of state behavior. Summary This chapter has examined the construction of Japan’s identity vis-à-vis the USSR/Russia during the Cold War years. I have argued that the construction proceeded along two dimensions, which had different socio-temporal origins. Importantly, however, because of their location on the opposite sides of the inclusive/exclusive binary (Rumelili 2004), these identities have existed continuously in an inherent tension, concealed by the prevalence of Cold War borders which were produced and reproduced through a synergy of the cultural and the political. Namely, the political identity that created a democratic and capitalist Japan belonged to the category of inclusive identity, in which the difference is based on acquired characteristics. As such, it contained a potential for the mobility of the Soviet Union out of the realm of total and threatening “otherness,” contingent of course, on the manifestation of political change in the Soviet Union and its acceptance by Japan as a genuine change in the Soviet conception of the “self.” On the other hand, the sociocultural identity, with its emphasis on the fixed and immutable nature of Russia’s national identity, belonged to the exclusive type of identities, which are constructed around inherent characteristics. As such, it implied the irreversibility of the hierarchical construction of the Japanese “self” and the Russian “other” regardless of any political, economic or social changes that may take place in the latter. This tension came to manifest itself in Japan’s relations with post-communist Russia and will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7.

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Ainu, Russia and Japan’s quest for “Northern Territories”

The territorial dispute between Japan and Russia revolves around the islands of Etorofu (Itrup in Russian), Kunashiri (Kunashir), Shikotan and the Habomai archipelago, which, combined, came to be referred to in Japan as the “Northern Territories” (NTs). The islands are located in close proximity to and east of Hokkaido, the northernmost of the main four islands that constitute the Japanese archipelago. The total territory of the islands is about five thousand square kilometers; since September 1945 the Soviet Union (and from 1992 onwards Russia) has exercised de facto control over the islands. While the islands are often referred to as being part of the Kurile archipelago, the question of whether they are an integral part of the Kurile chain (as well as whether “Kuriles” is identical with the Japanese name “Chishima”), which stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula to Hokkaido, is one of the fundamental issues of the dispute. Namely, the Japanese side argues that the two southernmost islands of Shikotan and the Habomais constitute an integral part of Hokkaido, while Etorofu and Kunashiri are referred to as the Southern Kuriles (Minami Chishima) to distinguish them from the “Kuriles,” the rights to which Japan renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. On the other hand, the Soviet/Russian side claims all the islands to be part of the Kuriles and refers to Etorofu and Kunashiri as an integral part of the Great Kuriles (Bol’shaia Kuril’skaia griada), and to Shikotan and the Habomais as the Lesser Kuriles (Malaia Kuril’skaia griada). This discrepancy between the two conceptions and its relevance to the dispute will be explained later in the chapter. As a result of the centrality of the issue in bilateral relations and the continuous discord in Soviet/Russian and Japanese dominant narratives on the history of the islands, there exists a vast amount of related academic literature in both Japanese and English and, to a lesser degree, in Russian. Combined, it contains a comprehensive and probably exhaustive analysis of the early explorations of the islands by Japanese and Russians, the history of the Japanese and the Soviet possession of the islands and the half century (1955 till the present day) of bilateral attempts to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to the dispute. In terms of English-language scholarship, John J. Stephan’s The Kuril Islands (1974), Peter Berton’s white paper titled “The

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Japanese–Russian Territorial Dilemma: Historical Background, Disputes, Issues, Questions, Solution Scenarios” (1992) and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations (1998 and 1998a) stand out in their objective and comprehensive analyses and their extensive coverage of primary and secondary material in the Japanese, Russian and English languages. One must also mention Kimie Hara’s Japanese–Soviet/ Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace (1998), which provides a concise and informative analysis of the post-war bilateral attempts to negotiate a peace treaty, as well as some important findings about the origins of the dispute. The purpose of this chapter is not to contest the historical facts or the arguments presented in the above-mentioned scholarship. As the main interest of the present study is the construction of Japan’s national identity, the central issue that this chapter seeks to explore is the question of how the islands came to be narrated within the dominant discourse as inherent Japanese territory (nihon no koyu- no ryo-do) in spite of the rather recent history of Japan’s colonization of the islands along with other Ainu territories. The contestation of this dominant conception of the islands by the Ainu groups in Japan is occasionally mentioned in the existing scholarship (for example, Berton 1992). However, in general the question of the Ainu, who constitute one of the smallest ethnic minorities in today’s Japan, has been largely ignored by the existing scholarship, which tends to focus on state-level relations.1 In this context the lack of interest in the Ainu is quite understandable; since the early days of the colonization of their territories by both Russia and Japan, they have played no significant role in the process that determined their lives. However, the Ainu “other” played an important role in the construction of Japan’s identity and, since the early days of Japan’s exposure to Russia, the two “others” (Russia and Ainu) had a close relationship in Japan’s cognition of the “self.” Hence, after a brief introduction that outlines the place of the disputed islands in the Japanese conception of their territory in the prewar and immediate post-war years, this chapter turns to examine the discourse on the Ainu place within Japan’s modern history, which emerged in the 1970s, and the challenge it posed to the dominant narrative on the NTs. As will be argued below, the question of the Ainu and the subsequent contestation of the notion of “inherent territory” as applied to the NTs emerged within the broader struggle over the definition of Japan’s national identity between the conservative and the progressive narratives. The next chapter examines the Russia-related writings of one of the most popular contemporary narrators of Japan’s identity, Shiba Ryo-taro-. It demonstrates that through a historico-cultural construction of Japan and Russia the contestation of the “inherent territory” narrative was suppressed, and submerged the Ainu subjectivity within Japan’s national identity. Through a narrative on the Russian “other,” which belongs to the same discursive formation examined in the previous chapter, it is argued that this construction re-legitimized Japan’s possession over the islands.

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4.1 The islands before the “Northern Territories” It is true that, as the Japanese official historical narrative states, the disputed islands were never administered by either tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union prior to 1945. None of the three bilateral border demarcation treaties (1855, 1875 and 1905) that modified and defined Japan’s border with its northern neighbor ever placed the NTs under Russian jurisdiction. However, importantly, prior to 1868 the islands did not constitute part of historical Japan either. For centuries they were part of lands inhabited by Ainu, along with what today is known as Hokkaido (Northern Japan) and Sakhalin (Russian territory).2 In the second half of the nineteenth century the islands, along with Hokkaido-, were incorporated into Japan proper as part of modernizing Japan’s northward expansion, and over the following decades they were subjected to centrally organized colonization and “pioneering” (kaitaku). The process of colonization and its disastrous effects on the indigenous population have been outlined in detail in excellent works by scholars such as Emori Susumu (1987) Richard Siddle (1996) and Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1998 and 2000). Early accounts of foreign travelers and otter hunters in Hokkaido and the Kuriles are also very illustrative of the miserable conditions of the Ainu during the process of colonization, as all note the fear that the Ainu exhibited towards the Japanese and the cruel treatment they were subjected to (for example, Bird 1880 and Snow 1910). As one of the Meiji-era Japanese surveys of the islands shows, in 1872 there were around seventy Ainu living on the two biggest of the currently disputed islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, and Ainu constituted one third of all of the population of the Kuriles/Chishima (Sasamori [1893] 1988). In 1884 Shikotan, initially uninhabited, was populated through a forced transfer of the indigenous population of the northernmost Kurile island of Shumushu (Shumshu in Russian), as the Meiji government did not trust the russified Ainu to reside at the northern gate of Empire’s northern frontier. Since the signing of the first bilateral border demarcation, the Treaty of Shimoda (1855), which designated the islands as part of Japan’s territory, through the years of subsequent colonization and up until the Soviet occupation, the NTs (and after 1875 the whole Kurile chain), was among the most marginal and least developed parts of the Japanese Empire. It is true that the Kuriles were administered by Japan as part of Hokkaido and, at the time of Japan’s surrender to the Allies in summer 1945, they were treated differently from the neighboring Sakhalin (Karafuto in Japanese). Southern Sakhalin, ceded to Japan by tsarist Russia through the Portsmouth Peace Treaty (1905), was, until its occupation by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1945, under a separate administration (Karafuto-cho-). Thus, in purely legal terms, as of August 1945 the currently disputed islands were recognized as part of Japan proper (naichi), as opposed to Southern Sakhalin, which was under a colonial administration. However, in cognitive terms, the claim that the Kuriles “were

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never considered a colonial possession” (Stephan 1974: 96), like Taiwan or Korea, is open to contestation. This is due to the ambiguous place that the “pioneering” and “development” of the Ainu territories in general occupied within the pre-1945 broader conception of Japan’s colonial expansion among the Japanese. Ishikawa Takuboku, a famous Japanese poet who lived and traveled widely around Hokkaido in 1907–8, explicitly called Hokkaido a “colony” (shokuminchi) because of the lack of morals and traditions that would form a basis for a communal culture among its residents (cited in Umemori 2006a: 12). However, the place of Hokkaido’s development in the broader colonial discourse has been more ambiguous, reflecting the numerous contradictions contained within the basic ideological paradigms of the Empire, such as, for example, the conception of the Japanese nation (see Oguma 2002). It must be noted that, unlike the European Empires, Japan did not have either official colonies or one agency in charge of their administration, like, for example, the British Colonial Office. Taiwan, Korea and other colonial possessions were administered by separate agencies, such as the Taiwan Governor-General or the Cho-sen (Korea) Governor-General, with different legislation applied in each respective territory. At the same time, references to Japan’s archipelago often included South Sakhalin and Taiwan as integral parts of it (for example, Monbusho- 1942: 1), reflecting the ambiguity of Japan’s colonial project. Hokkaido and the adjacent islands were also administered by a separate agency between 1871 and 1882. The Kaitakushi is literally translated as a Department of Pioneering, but foreign contemporaries, who were freer to call things by their name, referred to the agency as a Colonization Department (Watson 1874: 133). Incidentally, the Japanese colonizers in Manchuria in the 1930s were also known as “pioneers” (kaitaku imin). R.G. Watson, Her Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires in early Meiji Japan, perceptively noted this ambiguity of Hokkaido’s place within modernizing Japan. Watson, in his recollection of the journey to Hokkaido, notes that, while constituting one of the main Japanese islands, Hokkaido is placed “on a different footing” than the rest of mainland Japan and is considered rather as a “colonial possession” (Watson 1874: 133). From 1882 onwards, Hokkaido was administered as part of the mainland and, unlike other colonies acquired later, fell under the jurisdiction of Japan’s first constitution enacted in 1889. However, the ambiguity of Hokkaido’s place within Japan was reproduced by enactment of a special law aimed at protecting the “former natives” (kyudojin),introduced in 1899 and abolished only a century later. As such, through the introduction of a separate legislation for the native inhabitants of Hokkaido, not unlike the separate legislation enacted for later colonial possessions, the semi-colonial status of Hokkaido was sustained, in spite of the abolition of the colonial administration. It is also interesting to examine the perceptions of Hokkaido’s colonization by Goto- Shinpei (1857–1929), one of the key bureaucrats in Japan’s colonial

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machinery, who served at a number of high-level positions, including as the civilian governor of Taiwan and as president of the South Manchurian Railway Company. In his treatise on Japan’s expansion and discussions of Japan’s colonial policy on Taiwan he makes an interesting reference to the development of Hokkaido. In discussing Taiwan, Goto- briefly reflects on what he calls as the “Hokkaido enterprise.” The development of Hokkaido is classified as a peaceful economic and cultural integration, an “internal colonization” (naichi shokuminsei) as opposed to another possible form of new territorial acquisition, that of a military expansion. Nevertheless, Gotolocates the development of Hokkaido within the general project of Japan’s colonial expansion by singling it out as Japan’s only experience of administering “new territory” (shinryo-do) prior to the acquisition of Taiwan. Furthermore, Goto- argues that the administration of Hokkaido could have provided valuable lessons for subsequent colonial projects, if only the policy makers and practitioners of Hokkaido “pioneering,” would have thought about the broader meaning of their experience (Goto- [1914] 1944: 44–5 and 1915: 16–17). In light of this positioning of Hokkaido’s colonization, it is not surprising that one of the leading prewar and post-war specialists on Ainu and an active member of the “Northern Territories” irredentist movement, Takakura Shin’ichiro-, argued it to be an integral part of the broader modern development of the Japanese (Yamato) race, as one of the first steps of the “pioneering” project, which included Manchuria, Korea and South Pacific islands (Takakura 1942: 171). This cognitive positioning of Hokkaido within the broad colonial enterprise also led Takakura to the Korean Peninsula in 1939, in order to observe some aspects of cultural policy implemented by the colonial government, such as management of historical sites and museums, in order to draw lessons for similar policies for Hokkaido (ibid. 1942: 259). This process of learning also worked in the other direction; the assimilation policies applied to Ainu were utilized as a source of information for the GovernorGeneral of Korea in developing the strategy for Korea’s Japanization (Siddle 1996: 145). This contextualization of the acquisition of Ainu lands within the broader project of colonial expansion is not surprising. While Japan’s colonization of Hokkaido was largely based on the American model of “pioneering” Indian lands, the general process of colonization through state-organized dispatch of “pioneers” was rather similar in its rationale and implementation both in Hokkaido and later in Taiwan, Manchuria and Korea (Oguma 1998: 55). We must also add that the conception of the Hokkaido project as peaceful, as argued by Goto-, is based solely on the fact that there was no large-scale resistance by the indigenous population, who, as noted with certain amazement by early European travelers, could bravely face a bear but were possessed with incredible fear when dealing with the Japanese (for example, see Bird [1880] 1997). As a critical inquiry into Japan’s “development” of Ainu lands reveals, the development of Hokkaido did not differ greatly from other colonial projects in its aggressive nature and complete disregard of the wishes and lifestyle of the indigenous population by the

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policy makers and colonizers, all of which brought disastrous consequences for the indigenous population (for details see Emori 1987, Siddle 1996 and Morris-Suzuki 1998 and 2000). At the same time, the Kuriles, which constituted the most remote part of Ainu lands as seen from the metropolis, continued to be somewhat an exotic part of the Empire that even those familiar with Hokkaido never traveled to. In the first few decades of Japan’s “pioneering” of Ainu lands, the islands were sparsely populated and the majority of the population engaged in seasonal fishing, leaving the islands almost deserted during the winter (Landor [1893] 1970: 131 also see the population figures in Sasamori [1893] 1988: 150–1). It was only in the 1930s that the population of the islands reached 15,000 (Kuroiwa 2006: 249)—slightly less than the size of the Japanese population expelled by the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1940s. Writing in the late 1930s, Hokkaido-born writer Terashima Masashi notes that Chishima remain Japan’s “stepchild,” a “world of mystery” for the majority of the Japanese, and a “virgin land” as compared to the “cultured” and “civilized” Hokkaido, sometimes not even making an appearance on the maps of the Empire and ignored in school textbooks (Terashima 1939: 1–8). This is not completely true, as, for example, an elementary school geography textbook does make a reference to Chishima (Monbusho- 1942: 136). However, Terashima’s frustration is rather understandable, as the textbook devotes only a nine-line paragraph to the archipelago (as opposed to fifteen pages for the rest of Hokkaido administrative zone and nine pages devoted to Sakhalin) and, while stipulating its importance for national security, does not even mention the names of the main islands. As can be seen from an account of Terashima’s contemporary, a wealthy businessman from Osaka, Akimori Tsunetaro-, who traveled to the islands in 1935, while the population of the islands had grown significantly over the years,3 in general they remained sparsely populated and the practice of migration from the islands during the winter period continued well into the 1930s (and, according to the above-mentioned geography textbook, into the 1940s as well). For Akimori, Chishima constituted one of the most remote and unfamiliar territories administered by Japan, comparable to the Micronesian Islands, which were placed under Japan’s trusteeship after Germany’s defeat in World War I (Akimori 1936: Introduction). One gets a similar impression from the recollections of a journey to Chishima by Shimomura Kainan (real name Shimomura Hiroshi), a former bureaucrat, member of the House of Peers, a prominent journalist who also served as a President of the national broadcasting service (the NHK) between 1943 and 1945, and briefly as Minister of Interior in 1945. Shimomura traveled to the islands in July 1941 and published his recollections two months later in one of the major contemporary general-read journals, Kaizo- (Shimomura 1941, also see Shimomura 1942). The fact that the article, which carries nothing more than tourist-like impressions, appeared in one of the major journals, of itself points to the remoteness and exotic nature of Chishima. However, there are two additional aspects of the article which underline this place of Chishima in

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the broadly shared imagery of their homeland by the Japanese. First, Shimomura juxtaposes Chishima with Japan proper (naichi) by this locating Chishima in the realm of colonial possessions. Second, as the names of the islands appear with furigana,4 we can conclude that a large part of the Japanese public was not familiar with these names. In the immediate post-war years, the Soviet occupation of the islands played a rather marginal role in the domestic political and public debates. Later, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a think-tank affiliated to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), traced this “temporary resignation” on behalf of the Japanese people to the general post-war confusion and frustration, and to the fact that there was a (Japanese) military presence on the islands at the time of Japan’s capitulation, which obscured people’s understanding of the territorial issue in the immediate post-war years (JIIA 1963: 49). However, in light of the above-depicted remoteness of the islands in the Japanese imagery of their homeland, as well as the ambiguity regarding the place of the broader “pioneering” of Ainu lands within Japan’s colonial enterprise, the relative lack of interest in the loss of the islands is not surprising. In immediate post-war political debates the Chishima archipelago was often mentioned along with other colonies, such as Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan, as a “lost land,” “developed” by Japan since Meiji and now taken away as a result of the defeat in the Asia-Pacific War (for example, MP Tamura Hideyoshi, House of Representatives, Main Session 28 November 1945, Akita Mitsukazu, House of Lords, Main Session 15 December 1945 and Baron Naito- Masamitsu, House of Lords, Second Petitions Commission 31 August 1946 at NDL). An appeal for the return of Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu islands made before the House of Representatives, Foreign Relations Committee on 6 October 1947 by Hando- Ko-taro-, an MP from Hokkaido, met with little interest from the other committee members. One of the few responses to Hando-’s emotional speech, which appealed to historical facts related to Japan’s possession of the islands, went so far as to state that it did not matter who held the territorial right, as long the Japanese could have access to the islands’ natural resources (Wada Toshiaki MP, House of Representatives, Foreign Relations Committee 6 October 1947 at NDL). Based on a previously unknown confidential MoFA pamphlet from 1946, drafted as part of Japan’s preparations for the peace settlement with the Allies, Hara (1998: 24–33) noted that at this early stage the government’s goal was the return of the two smaller islands of Habomai and Shikotan. A book for young readers titled The Story of the Soviet Union (Soren no hanashi), published by the MoFA in 1949, shows that even three years later the government did not have a clearly formulated position regarding Japan’s territories occupied by the Soviet Union. In the book, the Soviet participation in the war against Japan and the following occupation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles are described as natural results of the Yalta agreement, the legality and relevance of which to Japan is not questioned. This unquestioning acceptance of the Soviet participation in the war could be attributed to fear

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of, or actual exercise of, censorship by the Occupation authorities. The accompanying map of the Soviet Union shows Sakhalin, Southern and Northern Kuriles as “newly acquired territories (including territories whose status is yet to be decided).” Most important is that there is no distinction whatsoever made among these territories (MoFA 1949: 100–1). Incidentally, a map that appears in a pamphlet on the Soviet Union published by the influential Mainichi Shimbun a year after Japan’s surrender shows all the Kuriles/ Chishima and Sakhalin as Soviet territory, without any reservations that could suggest the disputed nature of these territorial possessions (Mainichi Shimbunsha 1946: 26–7). Demands for the return of Soviet-occupied territory started to gain prominence in the broader domestic political discourse as the Cold War began to take shape in 1948, when, as the result of growing disagreements between the wartime allies regarding the terms for restoring Japan’s independence, the possibility of a peace treaty that would exclude the Soviet Union (tandoku ko-wa) appeared more and more realistic. However, the exact scope of the territorial demand and its construction as a national mission took on its present contours much later. The process started during the first bilateral attempt to conclude a peace treaty during the 1955/56 negotiations and materialized in its present form in the late 1960s, when a semi-official agency, Hoppo-ryo-do mondai taisaku kyo-kai (The Northern Territories Problem Countermeasures Association), was established to oversee and support the various activities related to the territories.

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4.2 The origins of the dispute

Over the years, both the Soviet/Russian and the Japanese sides have continuously appealed to early writings on the “discovery” of the Kuriles in their search for historical backing for their respective claims to the islands. The origins and intensity of the dispute, however, are better understood not in terms of competing historical narratives, but rather in its political nature, deriving from a nexus of domestic and international factors (Togawa 1993: 19). In general, the origins of the dispute can be divided roughly into two stages. It seems that the Soviet leaders entertained the possibility of gaining territorial concessions from Japan as early as 1940, when the Soviet and the Japanese governments were negotiating a conclusion of a bilateral Neutrality Pact (Shimotomai 2006: 75). The most visible roots of the post-war dispute, though, can be traced to the February 1945 Yalta summit of Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. During this meeting of the Big Three, it was agreed that the Soviet Union would get the rights to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles (without specifying the exact scope of the Kurile chain) in exchange for the Red Army’s participation in the war against Japan. Incidentally, the original justification for the claim to the Kuriles, given by Stalin a year earlier, was purely strategic and neither legal nor historical; he argued that the islands were needed in order to protect the Soviet “outlets in

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the Pacific” (Beloff 1953 cited in Berton 1992). Six years later, Japan renounced its right to the Kuriles and to Sakhalin in article 2 (c) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on 8 September 1951. However, the fact that the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty and, more importantly, that the treaty, like the Yalta Agreement, did not stipulate the scope of the “Kuriles,” provided an opportunity for a wide range of interpretations, utilized later by the Japanese government. Japan’s current official interpretation of the treaty consists of two main elements which, according to the Japanese mainstream discourse, provide the legal basis for the demand for the return of four islands. First, it argues that the two islands of Kunashiri and Etrofu belong to the South Kurile (Minami Chishima) islands. Second, it states that the “Kurile islands” do not include the Habomai archipelago and Shikotan, which, as argued by the Japanese government, have historically been part of Hokkaido. Hence, according to the official interpretation of the Peace Treaty, neither of the two pairs, namely Kunashiri and Etorofu, and Habomai and Shikotan, is included in the “Kuriles” stipulated by article 2 (c). However, it seems that right up to the first round of bilateral negotiations (1955–56) neither the Japanese government nor public had a clear understanding of which former Japanese territories occupied by the USSR could and should be returned. The statement made by Nishimura Kumao, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Treaties Bureau, when questioned at the Diet one month after the conclusion of the treaty, is the best-known example of the lack of consistency in Japan’s governmental position (for example, Clark 2005). When asked about the scope of the “Kuriles” renounced by Japan in the Peace Treaty, Nishimura admitted that the South Kurile islands were among the relinquished territories. In terms of public opinion, the MoFA website states that since the expulsion of the Japanese residents from the “Northern Territories” and their unilateral incorporation by the Soviet government (1947–48), the “return of the Northern Territories has been the ardent wish of the people of Japan, and a deep-rooted movement among the general public for the return of the islands has developed nation-wide.” No doubt that this sentiment has prevailed among the deported residents, many of whom have settled on Hokkaido, and the residents of Nemuro, a port city on Hokkaido, located in close proximity to the islands, whose economy has been in mutually dependent relationship with the islands. A movement for the return of the islands had started already in 1945, when Ando- Norisuke, the major of Nemuro, submitted his first petition to the American army stationed on Hokkaido, demanding the transfer of the islands from Soviet to American occupation. The grass-roots movement grew over the next few years, supported by Hokkaido politicians and by former residents, many of whom settled on Hokkaido after their forced expulsion in 1947–48 (Kuroiwa 2007). However, while the current governmental position presents these organizations as the origin of the current irredentist movement, there are two important aspects that underscore

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the difference between the later “national mission” for the recovery of Northern Territories and these early groups. First, the variety of these groups of expelled residents lacked unity in terms of the scope of the territory that they were seeking to recover, and the argument was unified only in the late 1950s, under the patronage of the government (Kuroiwa 2007: 65). Second, the petitions submitted to the American Occupation Authorities, and other texts such as the Hokkaido Assembly resolutions, contained some expressions of sentimental longing for the lost homeland and employed historical justifications for their claim but were far from the nationalism which later would come to dominate the irredentist discourse. In these early days, the rationale was dominantly economic, arguing the vital importance of the islands as a source of protein for Japan (Kobayashi (ed.) 1950 also see Kuroiwa 2007). The cognition of the territorial issue among the non-Hokkaido Japanese is even more complicated. An official from the Home Ministry who visited Hokkaido in 1946, in response to one of the petitions submitted by the local irredentist movement, was quite surprised to discover the existence of “those islands” in the waters outside Nemuro, which, apparently for military reasons, did not appear on his map of Hokkaido (cited in Kuroiwa 2007: 56). In light of the almost negligible significance the islands occupied in the pre-1945 selfimagery of the Japanese homeland, it is not surprising that well into the 1950s the interest of the broader Japanese public in the islands was rather low and the perception of the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union was not uniform and was, at times, contradictory. For example, a poll conducted by a Soren Kenkyu- (Soviet Studies) journal in early 1953 asked a dozen or so diplomats and scholars with USSR-related expertise to speculate about the possible changes in bilateral relations in case of Stalin’s death. In light of the present-day centrality of the territorial dispute to bilateral relations, one would expect it to be one of the main themes in the guiding questions posed to the respondents. However, none of those touched on the territorial issue (Soren Kenkyu- 1953: 2–15). A similar exercise conducted a year later, following the death of Stalin, asked specifically “what should be Japan’s demands from the Kremlin?” Among the respondents it included not only scholars and analysts but also members of the Diet and bureaucrats. Interestingly, while the demand for repatriation of the Japanese PoWs detained in the Soviet Union was mentioned by the majority of the respondents, fewer than one in five stated the demand for the return of the disputed territory. Also noteworthy is the fact that the definition of the “territories” by those who listed it as one of the desired demands varied from “Chishima” and “Chishima archipelago” to “Chishima and Karafuto (Sakhalin)” to “South Karafuto and Chishima archipelago” to “Habomai and Shikotan”5 (Soren Kenkyu1954: 2–16). Bearing in mind that these are responses from mainstream experts (most of whom took a generally critical stance vis-à-vis the USSR), it is obvious that the understanding of the territorial issue and the actual scope of the territory to be demanded back was rather vague even among those Japanese with expertise in bilateral relations.

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In terms of the general public, even on the eve of the first round of bilateral negotiations in 1955, over 50% of the respondents to a related public opinion poll stated that Japan should have no special demands vis-à-vis the Soviet Union when negotiating the peace treaty. A few months later, in November 1955, 40% of the respondents had no particular opinion when confronted with the question of whether Japan should demand the return of all the four islands or compromise on only two (Asahi Shimbun polls cited in Mendel [1961] 1971: 203–9). Bearing in mind that the latter poll was conducted after the first round of negotiations, widely covered in the domestic press, it is safe to say that even at this point the Japanese public had no particular interest in or clear understanding of the dispute. This brings us to the second stage in the formation of the territorial dispute, namely, the bilateral negotiations that took place in 1955–56 and, while failing to bring a permanent peace settlement, resulted in a joint communiqué and a restoration of diplomatic relations. Prior to and after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese government was concerned mainly with the return of only the two smaller islands, Shikotan and the Habomais (for example, interview with Prime Minister Yoshida, Yomiuri Shimbun 5 October 1955 in Tomaru (ed). 1993: 5, see also Berton 1992 and Hara 1998: 24–32). Hence it is not surprising that, as described in a number of studies of the 1955–56 negotiations, Japan’s initial territorial threshold for concluding a peace treaty in June 1955 was limited to those two islands. In general, this demand was acceptable to the Soviet side and the two parties were close to the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, due to domestic intra-conservative rivalry and subsequent pressure from the United States not to compromise and to accept only the two islands—aimed at preventing bilateral rapprochement—Japan’s territorial demand evolved into its present form, namely a demand for the return of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais. This demand, presented as the minimal condition for the conclusion of a peace treaty, was rejected by the Soviet side. Eventually the 1955–56 negotiations resulted in a restoration of diplomatic relations, but put off to the future the resolution of the territorial dispute (for detailed discussion see Matsumoto 1956, Hellman 1969, Berton 1992, Hasegawa 1998, Hara 1998, Wada 1999 and Iwashita 2005). Incidentally, Japan’s strongly nationalistic socialists (who became the largest opposition party after the 1955 merger), driven by the rivalry with the ruling conservatives, supported the demand for the return of all four islands. During this time the domestic media engaged in extensive coverage of the negotiations, in general strongly supportive of the government’s inflexible position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It can be argued that it was during this period that broader public cognition of the territorial dispute emerged (Sekai 1956). Notably, the conception of the four islands as “inherent Japanese territory” appeared initially in the discourse of the irredentist movement among the expelled residents, which started to take shape on Hokkaido as early as 1945. However, the formation of the government/LDP endorsed quest for the return

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of the “inherent territory” as a national mission occurred between 1955 and the early 1970s (Iwashita 2005: 201–5). It must be noted that the officially endorsed conception of the dispute has been based on rather shaky historical and legal grounds, questioned not only by Soviet/Russian specialists but also by a number of Japanese and American scholars who have often expressed doubt about Japan’s ability to regain the title to all the four islands if the dispute is submitted to international arbitration (for example see, Takano 1962, Ginsburg 1991 cited in Berton 1992, Garthoff 1995: 21 and Hasegawa 1998: 133). The rather recent nature of the distinction between South and North Kuriles and the argument about Habomai and Shikotan being an integral part of Hokkaido can be found in pre-1945 official and private publications. As can be seen from the maps produced by the local government and individual explorers and travelers, only the Habomai archipelago was treated as an integral part of Hokkaido, while the other three islands, including Shikotan,6 were seen as an integral part of Chishima7 (for example, see the maps in Sasamori [1893] 1988, Hokkaido Cho- 1927 and 1934, in Akimori 1936 and Terashima 1939: 9, also Berton 1992). Ironically, it seems that at least in 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida was not sure about whether Habomai and Shikotan were part of Chishima archipelago or an extension of Hokkaido. In an unofficial discussion with prefectural governors a year before San Francisco, he noted that, as a result of the peace treaty, Japan could expect the return of Chishima’s (sic), Habomai and Shikotan (chishima no habomai, shikotan), contradicting his later argument that the Habomais are an integral part of Hokkaido (as reported in Yomiuri Shimbun 10 May 1950 and Mainichi Shimbun 9 March 1951 in Tomaru (ed). 1993: 5–9). Furthermore, in pre-1945 official documents and travel memoirs alike, the distinction between Southern and Northern (and, occasionally Central) Chishima, was made solely on the grounds of different topography, climate and transport from Hokkaido (Oono (ed). 1940: 1, Hokkaido Cho- 1934: 1–53, Akimori 1936: 42 and Terashima 1939: 47). Otherwise the whole archipelago was seen as one administrative unit. No doubt these issues would be of utmost importance if, against all predictions made by pundits, both sides would decide to involve a third party and entrust, for example, the International Court of Justice, to rule on the dispute. However, as this study’s main interest lies in the question of Japan’s identity, the most pertinent questions are the role of the territorial dispute in the two identity constructions described in the previous chapter and the place of the Ainu in the dominant narrative that legitimizes Japan’s demand for the islands. Starting from mid 1950s, the territorial dispute became the central issue in Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union, and subsequently with Russia. In the socialist discourse that evolved in opposition to the conservative construction of Japan’s political identity, the NTs played an important role in the narrative on unarmed neutrality. After the 1955–56 failure of the government to solve the territorial dispute, the socialist argument converged with the governmental conception of the dispute in arguing that Habomai and Shikotan constitute an integral part of Hokkaido and are not part of the Kuriles

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stipulated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. At the same time they criticized the government’s interpretation of the Peace Treaty and argued that, according to the treaty, the conservative government had ceded the Kuriles, which included the other two islands, and also South Sakhalin, which rightfully belong to Japan. However, the socialist narrative did not see the territorial dispute as a bilateral problem but presented it as part of the general problem of Japan’s place in the Cold War rivalry, which could be solved only through a comprehensive revision of Japan’s policy and establishment of “permanent friendship” with the Soviet Union. Thus, the socialist position stated that Habomai, Shikotan, Chishima and South Karafuto (Sakhalin) should be returned to Japan along with the US-occupied Okinawa and Ogasawara (Bonin) islands, which could be achieved only as a result of departure from “one sided” (ippento-) foreign policy of “dependence” (ju-zoku) pursued by the government. In other words, the solution of the territorial dispute with the USSR was narrated as an integral part of abolition of the military alliance with the US and adoption of neutrality that would bring true autonomy and independence (jishudokuritsu) to Japan (Goto- 1967 and Nihon Shakaito- Chu-oHonbu 1987: 329–32). In 1969, when the return of Okinawa was basically agreed by the Sato- government, the JSP changed its position regarding the comprehensive approach and argued that, in legal and historical terms, the NTs and Okinawa were problems of completely “different dimensions” (betsu no jigen no mondai), as the US trusteeship over Okinawa resulted solely from a unilateral decision of the American government, while the Northern Territories problem had its origins in wartime agreements between the Allies and the actions of the Japanese government during San Francisco and the 1955– 56 negotiations. At the same time, the socialists continued to argue that the problem could be solved only through abolition of the security alliance with the US and complete stabilization of relations with the USSR, to be achieved through conclusion of a peace treaty and subsequent revision of the status of Habomai and Shikotan as the first stage in the solution of the dispute (Tatebayashi 1969 and Nihon Shakaito- 1969). As such, the socialists and sympathetic progressives followed their strongly nationalistic program by supporting the demand for the return of the islands. At the same time, they argued that this could be accomplished only as part of a broader revision of Japan’s foreign policy that would include the abolition of the military alliance with the US (Takano 1962: 247–50 also Hara 2000: 245–8). Interestingly though, while the territorial dispute was an integral part of the socialist discourse on unarmed neutrality, in the conservative construct of Japan’s political identity, initially, the NTs problem was not part of the “othering” discourse on the Soviet Union but featured as a problem purely bilateral in nature. There is no doubt that the existence of the dispute and the illegality of the Soviet occupation of the islands, as argued by the government, enhanced the negative sentiment and suspicion towards the Soviet Union. However, in general, the discourse on the “inherent territory” subscribed to the developmental paradigm introduced to the political arena by the irredentist movement,

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which legitimized Japan’s rights to the islands based on legal treaties between Japan and Russia, and at the same time argued that the islands had been “developed” by Japan. As such, the conservative discourse located the justification for Japan’s possession not in Japan’s political identity but in universal principles of international law and objective history (for example, Jiyu-minshuto- Seimu Cho-sakai 1968: 62–4). It was only during the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the expansion of the conservative synergy of political and socio-cultural otherness of the USSR/Russia, that the territorial dispute became its symbolic manifestation. It appeared as an empirical evidence both for the benefits of liberal capitalism over socialism and the preferable nature of the United States over the Soviet Union (for example, Kosaka [1977] 1996: 134–8 and Nakayama 1981), and for the socio-cultural otherness of the consistently expansionist and paranoid Russia (for example, Tamba 1984: 200–1 and Kimura 1987: 136). The question of the Ainu as the original inhabitants of the islands and as subjects of Japan’s colonialism was concealed in this historical narrative, which referred to the Ainu as “Japanese Ainu” and claimed a history of peaceful commerce, conducted under Japanese rule and extending for two centuries prior to the legal acquisition of the islands under the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 (for example, Yoshida 1962: 22–36, Jiyu-minshuto- seimu cho-sakai 1968: 62–4 and Hoppo-ryo-do mondai taisaku kyo-kai 1974: 12–15). Notably, the socialists subscribed to this perception of the history of Japan’s possession of the islands, arguing that they were originally Japanese territory, acquired through peaceful and legal means and not through aggression (for example, Nihon Shakaito1969), and by this means enhanced the construction of “inherent territory.” Unsurprisingly, the structure of the discourse on the Soviet side, which also claimed the islands to be an “inherent Russian territory,” demonstrates a striking symmetry to the Japanese one. Within the Soviet narrative, the Japanese were accused of exploiting the Ainu and blamed for their extinction, while the early Russian missions to the Kuriles were described as peaceful and based on equal trade (for example, Arutyunov 1965). Although, for obvious reasons, the officially endorsed narrative faced no contestations from inside the Soviet Union, the Japanese narrative and its basic notion of “inherent territory” were confronted with a challenge that emerged from the Ainu community. The following section examines this challenge, which emerged within the context of the domestics struggle between the conservative and progressive discourses and was eventually suppressed through a historico-cultural construction of the Japanese “self” and the Russian “other” which reproduced and reinforced that examined in the previous chapter, and restabilized the notion of “inherent territory.”

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4.3 The Ainu and the “Northern Territories” The Ainu in Japan’s identity Before the contemporary discourse on the Ainu can be examined, it must first be placed within the broader context of the place of the Ainu “other” in

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Japan’s identity. When the geo-political interests of pre-modern Tokugawa Japan and the Russian Empire first collided in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Ainu were at the center of the dispute. For the Japanese ruling class, a hierarchical view of the “self” that contrasted Japan against both the Ainu and the Russian “others” played a central role in conceptualizing the Russian threat and developing policies to counter it. Namely, the Russian expansion of influence over the native residents in border areas was seen as the expansion of a civilized people, a procession of superior culture conducted through enlightenment and amicable policies. These factors were seen by parts of the Japanese elite as holding the dangerous possibility that the Ainu would voluntarily embrace the rule of the Russian empire (Akitsuki 1987). Thus, the directives issued by the Edo (Tokyo) shogunate following the Ainu revolt of 1789 instructed the Matsumae clan, which acted as an intermediary between Edo and the Ainu, to promote the education of the natives as a means of stemming the spread of Russian influence (Takakura 1960: 51). In other words, in a simplified hierarchical construction of self and these two others, Russia and Japan occupied a relatively equal status in terms of their cultural values, while the Ainu, seen as potential subjects of education, and that by either Russia or Japan, were placed on a distinctly lower rung of the cultural hierarchy. It is important to note that, in this cosmology, the Ainu, while being perceived as inferior in cultural terms (Siddle 1996: 28–42) and potential subjects for education, were located in the same temporal space as the wajin (Japanese). This is because the modern notions of “advanced” and “backward,” which imply a temporal hierarchy, did not exist in the minds of eighteenth-century Japanese thinkers (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 9). This construction would undergo radical changes after Japan’s internalization of the Western modes of “othering” implied in the modernizing narratives of civilization and barbarism. During the initial stages of Japan’s socialization into “imperialist international society” (Suzuki 2005) in the second half of the nineteenth century, Hokkaido and adjacent islands inhabited by the Ainu were incorporated into Japan proper, to become the “Northern Gate of the Empire.” The Meiji government embarked on a mission of colonization of the territories and education of the natives, largely based on the American experience of “developing” Indian lands (Siddle 1996: 55–6). The modes of engagement between Japan and its first colonial subjects followed closely the cognitive patterns of European colonialism in terms of the conception of the relationship of the “self” and the natives (dojin). However, as Japan was still struggling to overcome unequal treatment at the hands of the “civilized” nations of the West, the Japanese conception of the Ainu allowed for mobility from the inferior realm of the barbarian to the realm of the civilized, but only on the condition of their acceptance of modernity, represented by Japan—although, similarly to Colombus’s encounter with the Indians, the possibility of acceptance of the Ainu, with their culture, as equal human beings (Todorov 1982: 42) was denied by Japanese intellectuals and policy makers, just as Japan’s own

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equality was denied by the dichotomous notions of civilized/barbarian, dominant in the Western discourse. It must be noted that, over the course of its expansionist period (1868– 1945), as Japan moved to acquire new colonies beyond the Ainu lands and the Ryukyus (Okinawa), the discourse on that country’s ethnic structure underwent a number of significant changes, with views fluctuating between assertions of ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity (Oguma 2002). Likewise, the degree of ethnic difference or similarity between the Ainu and the mainland Japanese (wajin) was a subject of continuous academic debate among the late nineteenth-century anthropologists (Oguma 1995: 73–86). While some anthropologists argued for different ethnic origins, others contested this by presenting what they claimed were traces of the customs, religion (Shinto) and language of ancient Japan in contemporary Ainu customs and languages (Umehara 1982: 254). In cultural terms, however, Ainu backwardness was assumed, as was the need to “civilize” the Ainu through education. In other words, the ideas of historical progress and Enlightenment imported from the West during the nineteenth century resulted in reinterpretation of the Ainu difference in terms of time rather than in space (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 9–34). As Johannes Fabian (1983) has argued, the conception of the “other’s” difference in terms of time and the denial of coevality between the “self” and the “other” and the existence of a dialectical relationship between the object and the subject (what Fabian calls “allochronism”) emerged within the particular discursive context of the formation of Western anthropology. Fabian notes the inherently political nature of time, as, through a particular construction of “otherness,” it has been an integral part of the array of political practices that produced and reproduced the hierarchical relationship between the West and its “others.” This mode of relation to the “other” was embraced by the Japanese elites, along with other political practices of the West, and projected onto the Ainu. Ainu society, which earlier had been conceived as inferior and different but existing in the same temporal space, came to be seen within the modernizing cosmology of civilization as representing Japan’s own backward past. While earlier the education of the Ainu had been seen simply as a strategic tool for preventing the spread of Russian influence, now adaptation of the customs of “civilized” Japan became the main condition for achieving the status of a fully equal human being. Forced assimilation of the Ainu into the new and modern Japanese nation was an integral part of what would later become the “family” of the Emperor’s subjects, and was one of the pillars of Japan’s early colonization policies (Hashimoto 1987: 27). The continual expropriation of the land, the destruction of traditional ways of living and the introduction of diseases such as tuberculosis, to which the natives lacked immunity, as well as the introduction of alcohol, together had an almost genocidal impact on the population, reducing its numbers greatly and making the Ainu a minority in their own land (Emori 1987: 124–5).8

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As we have seen above, following Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War and unconditional surrender to the Allies, the issue of the colonization of the Ainu did not surface during the years when the territorial dispute was taking shape. The scope of Japan’s colonialism and imperialism was, in effect, determined by the Cairo Communiqué (1943) and by the Potsdam Declaration (1945), which stipulated the conditions for Japan’s surrender. Neither statement included Hokkaido among the territories Japan took by violence and greed. In this way, the colonization of Ainu lands generally was not problematized by the Allies, and in the first post-war decades the Ainu were largely excluded from the narrative on Japan’s past and present. School textbooks, in their brief references to Meiji-era northward expansion, maintained the modernizing paradigm and ignored the disastrous effects of Japan’s expansion on the Ainu (Nishino 2007: 5). Other scholarly and popular texts related to the Northern Territories noted briefly that the territories were acquired peacefully and, over the years, developed by Japan, focusing on the dispute solely in terms of a bilateral issue between Japan and Russia (for example, see Taoka et al. 1962). It must be noted that this tendency does not necessary reflect the often-argued failure or refusal of Japan to face the more problematic aspects of its history. It is, rather, consistent with the broader international consensus regarding the place of indigenous peoples within independent nations or within an international system of sovereign nationstates. As reflected in one of the principal early conventions regarding indigenous peoples, the International Labour Organization’s convention No. 107 (ILO 107, on “Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries”), signed in 1957, assimilation and integration were seen as the best way to protect the well-being of indigenous peoples.9 Furthermore, while, after Japan’s defeat, a number of members of the Ainu community called for a thorough revision of the history of their colonization by the Japanese (wajin), the leadership of the Ainu community did not share these aspirations for a distinct identity. There is certain anecdotal evidence that, in 1947, General Joseph M. Swing, commander of the 11th Airborne Division in charge of the American occupation of Hokkaido, summoned the Ainu elders and suggested autonomy or even independence for the Ainu. The elders, however, rejected the idea, explaining that the Ainu do not constitute a distinct ethnicity different from other Japanese (Masuko 1989). As this real or imaginary incident illustrates, the leaders of the Ainu community were not interested in national determination. The limited activities of the Ainu Association (Ainu kyo-kai) were not directed at establishing a distinct Ainu identity in post-war Japan, but continued the prewar strategy of trying to achieve deeper Ainu assimilation into Japanese society in face of continuing social discrimination (Siddle 1996: 151–61). As such, the representatives of the Ainu community themselves contributed to the continuance of the prewar modernizing narrative with regard to Japan’s northward expansion.

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The Ainu challenge The narrative that involved a re-evaluation of Ainu culture and the portrayal of the Ainu as victims of Japan’s colonization began to appear in academic and public debates in the early 1970s. While in the 1950s and 1960s Ainurelated issues were debated almost exclusively in anthropological and historical academic journals, in the following two decades the issue became strongly politicized. During this time, along with the appearance of numerous books, films and TV programs related in one way or another to the Ainu, the issue came to be intensely debated in general-interest journals such as Sekai, Chu-oKo-ron and Asahi Journal. This sudden politicization and the visibility of the Ainu issue in public debates has been seen as aby-product of the discourse on the suffering of “Asia” that emerged in Japan during the Vietnam War. It has been argued that the anti-war sentiment and expressions of solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia brought not only memories of Japan’s own victimization of Asia but also the discovery of an “internal” Asia consisting of Ainu and Korean residents (Oguma 2007: 208–11). No doubt the growing politicization of the Ainu movement and various acts of sometimes violent protest conducted in the name of Ainu liberation further contributed to attracting public attention (Siddle 1996: 162–70). Further, the shift in the international discourse on the indigenous people should not be ignored. For example, in 1970 the United Nations’ Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities recommended a study of discrimination against indigenous peoples, straying from the earlier modernizing paradigm (Keal 2003: 117). However, a different and revealing light can be shed on the structure of the debate on the place of the Ainu by examining it in the context of the broader domestic struggle between the conservative and the progressive camps over the nature of Japan’s national identity. The critical re-evaluation of Ainu history and culture by Japanese progressive intellectuals in the 1970s constituted a discursive intervention into the rising conservative nihonjiron narrative on Japan’s ethnic and cultural homogeneity and the unquestioning positive evaluation of economic progress generally and Japan’s development specifically. In other words, by focusing on the Ainu, the progressive critique constituted an attempt to counter two homogenizing identity discourses championed by the conservatives: the domestic construction of Japan as a homogenous nation and the more general discourse of liberal capitalism. Within the critical agenda, the “liberation” of the Ainu came to be represented as an integral part of the broader liberation of Asian and “Third World” peoples (Hanazaki 1977: 62). However, the liberation of the Ainu was seen not as goal in itself but as an integral part of the search for an alternative future not dominated by economic development, as an escape from the path dictated by the norms of the market economy. The “liberation” of the Ainu from the atrocities and degradation visited on them by modernity was

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argued to be the only means of “overcoming” the dead end of modernization in order to “open a door” to the future (Hanazaki 1977: 63). The critical discourse engaged in a radical reinterpretation of Japan’s “development” of Hokkaido and its “enlightenment” of the indigenous population. The history of the Ainu after the advent of modernization and colonization came to be represented as a tragedy counterpoised to the triumphant modernizing discourse. Generally, following the paradigms established by the decolonization process, the Japanese (wajin) came to be portrayed as invaders who paid no respect to the customs and habits of the indigenous population and who forced on them their own “modern” value system (Ogawa 1974: 37 and Matsui 1972: 256–9). The critical narrative was not restricted to criticizing the history of Japan’s conquest of Ainu lands, but engaged in detailed depictions of continuing acts of discrimination against the Ainu and the persistent structure of “aggression” and “exploitation,” in this way undermining the conservative construction of Japan as a homogenous nation (for example, Ogawa 1974: 36–7 and Hanazaki 1977: 61). In its attempt to undermine the two homogenizing discourses of the conservative nihonjinron, the narrative went beyond simple critique of Japan’s history and contemporary societal discrimination against the Ainu. Importantly, it relocated Ainu difference from the temporal difference back to a spatial one, and presented the Ainu “other,” unspoiled by modernity, as coexisting with contemporary modern Japan. In the words of one writer, “the Ainu live in the present and together with them lives the Ainu culture” (Ehara 1980: 63). This construction was enhanced through visual images of Ainu leading a “traditional” way of life that appeared in a number of publications (for example, Kitahara 1983: 1) and extensive narration of Ainu culture and customs not as a matter of the past but as a contemporary reality (for example, Fujimura 1982). The coeval but at the same time archaic society of Ainu served as an antithesis to the modern world, a space in which the world of the gods, the world of humans and the world of nature existed in mutual harmony, a space narrated as a source of inspiration for overcoming the “pathology” of modern society (Hanazaki 1977: 62). In its critique of Japan’s modernity, the narrative contrasted the quiet life of the Ainu village (kotan) with “featureless” modern buildings and mourned the gradual disappearance of the culturally “pure” Ainu and “inherent” Ainu culture and customs (Ogawa 1974: 36). As such, through embracing the coevality of the Ainu with the Japanese, the progressive narrative seemingly overcame the hierarchy embedded in the temporal construction of the difference. However, it is doubtful whether this constituted an admittance of a dialectical relationship between the subject and the object and actual engagement with the “time of the ‘other’,” as argued by Fabian (1983: 153). Basically, the elevation of the Ainu to the category of the pure and innocent “native” denied the existence of Ainu modernity, lived by the members of the community since their forceful incorporation into modern Japan. As such, more than an engagement with

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the time of the “other,” this celebration of the native, unspoiled by modernity, resembles more the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European literature of the “noble savage,” which also engaged in reversion of the existing hierarchy between the “self” and the “other” but did not grant subjectivity to the “native.” Just like the writings of earlier, but also more recent, European thinkers, who saw in the “native” representatives of the lost Eden or the golden age of human society (Liebersohn 1994: 746) or the “innocence” lost by the modern society driven by Enlightenment paradigms (Walker 1984: 7), the Ainu culture was objectified to represent the simplicity, harmony with the nature and purity lost in modern Japan’s society. This attempt to relocate the Ainu “other” back to the realm of spatial and ethnic difference led to a counter-attack from the proponents of the (conservative) nihonjinron discourse. They countered this attempt to destabilize the construction of a homogenous Japan by arguing that, ethnically and culturally, the Ainu are an integral part of the Japanese race. This counter-narrative sought to conceal the recent history of conquest, resistance and discrimination relative to the Ainu by shifting the focus of the debate away from modern history and toward the pre-historical Jo-mon period (c. 10,000 BC to 300 BC), and at the same time asserting the same ethnic origins for both the Japanese and the Ainu. A special section in the popular Chu-o- Ko-ron journal’s March 1982 issue, titled “A new view on nihonjinron,” is most illustrative of the attempt to absorb the Ainu “other” into the Japanese “self” by shifting the focus from modern to ancient time frames. The special section included articles written by authoritative academics from a variety of related disciplines, all of which in one way or another denied the ethnic difference ascribed to the Ainu by the progressive narrative. One article argued that the history and origins of the Ainu should be viewed in a broader time frame reaching back to the prehistoric period. Hence, through providing a broad historical analysis of the Ainu and the Japanese (Yamato) people, it was argued that both peoples have cognate cultural and ethnic origins and share a common history dating back prior to the annexation of Hokkaido. The article concluded by stating that the nineteenth-century annexation of Hokkaido should be seen not as a conquest but as an act of reunification of the nation (Takahashi 1982: 295–8). An anthropological review of the origins of the Ainu argued that the Ainu are of mongoloid origin and in their physical constitution are very similar to the Japanese (Hanihara 1982). While the argument was presented very cautiously and was careful to avoid making any explicit statements regarding the relationship between the two groups, the implication that the Ainu and the Japanese are of the same ethnic origin is rather obvious. The special section also included an article written by Umehara Takeshi, one of Japan’s leading scholars of Japanese philosophy and the first Director-General of the government-affiliated International Research Center for Japanese Studies. In his contribution, Umehara argued simply that any imputation of ethnic difference between the Japanese and the Ainu is a recent and mistaken invention.

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Through a lengthy linguistic analysis stressing the similarity of the two languages, Umehara attempted to refute this “recent myth,” and, like the other contributors, argued for the sameness of origin of both Ainu and Japanese (Umehara 1982). This attempt to incorporate the Ainu within the ethnic construction of the Japanese and to obscure the history of conquest and discrimination was criticized both as false and pseudo-scientific (Hagino 1983) and as a new form of exploitation of the Ainu for the purposes of conservative neo-nationalism (shin kokkashugi) that sought to deny any Japanese responsibility for the miseries brought on the Ainu by nineteenth-century colonialism (Hanazaki 1986: 103–5). However, in spite of the questionable nature of the scientific basis for the conservative narrative and its rather obvious motive of concealing the recent history of subjugation of the Ainu, the cultural construction of the Ainu which emerged from this narrative strikingly resembled that advocated by the critical discourse. Basically, since “culture” and “tradition” attained an near absolutely positive value in the nihonjinron discourse and the Ainu came to represent the “original” Japanese culture, they were elevated from the inferior position of backward people to the status of superior carriers of the “foundation of Japanese culture” which has been continuously present within Japanese thought and religion (Umehara 1984: 38) and whose “blood flows in the veins of the majority of Japanese today” (Umehara [1982] 1985: 7 also Shiba [1992] 1997: 9–12). Hence the narrative of the Ainu culture as one of animist people living in harmony with nature, which emerged from the conservative writings, has in its structure been almost identical to that propagated by the progressives. However, rather than juxtaposing Ainu and Japanese cultures, it has presented the Ainu as an integral part of Japan’s ancient culture, the sameness emphasized through juxtaposing both cultures with the most dominant “other” in the construction of modern Japan’s identity, namely the Christian West (Umehara 1984: 38–51). This elevation of the Ainu to the status of “original Japanese” and the carriers of the inherent Japanese culture within the meta-discourse of nihonjinron, which argued for Japanese cultural uniqueness as the source of Japan’s successful modernization, resulted in a rather paradoxical inversion of the hierarchy between the Ainu and the Japanese in cultural terms. However, unlike the progressive construction that engaged in a critique of the modernizing paradigm and positioned the Ainu outside of the borders of modernity, here it remained contained within the meta-narrative of civilization and progress. As such, since the nihonjinron discourse tried to explain and affirm Japan’s post-war economic success through cultural characteristics, Japan’s rapid post-war development came to be attributed occasionally to the “hunting spirit” of the Ainu, as opposed to the agricultural character of the Japanese (Umehara [1982] 1985: 10). In other words, Ainu culture, perceived as the opposite of progress and modernity from the early years of colonization well into the 1970s, was reconstructed as the source of Japan’s development

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and progress in a discourse that narrated economic development in terms of culture and tradition. For the purposes of the present study, the most important result of this paradoxical relocation of the Ainu to the temporally coeval and hierarchically superior realm—a relocation that emerged from both the conservative and the progressive narratives—was that it enabled Ainu participation in the public discourse not as an inferior “native” but as an equal or even superior subject. Thus, the Ainu voice which criticized Japan’s colonization and argued for distinct Ainu identity, which existed among certain members of the Ainu community from the early post-war years (Masuko 1989), started to appear in the mainstream discourse. In general, the members of the Ainu community who appeared in public debates became an integral part of the progressive discourse in arguing for a distinct ethnic identity and against discrimination and subjugation. The “indigenous voice” as manifested in the writings and speeches of public figures of Ainu origin such as Sho-ji Yu-ki, Chikappu Mieko, Narita Tokuhei, Kayano Shigeru and others clearly subscribed to the progressive view of the history of Japan’s northward expansion and located the Ainu “self” in opposition to the colonizing Japanese. They argued that the history of Japan’s northward expansion was a history of colonialism, betrayal of trust, aggression and subjugation. Echoing but also reversing the paradigms of Japan’s colonial discourse in its structure and terminology, the Ainu narrative came to bear a striking resemblance to the Chinese and Korean depictions of Japanese imperialism. In a sense, the discourse repeated the pre-1945 conception of the “development” of Hokkaido as the first step in Japan’s expansion, but at the same time turned this construction on its head. The history of Japan’s “aggression” and “exploitation” of the Ainu was presented as an integral part of “modern Japan’s colonization and discrimination,” with detailed depictions of “forced assimilation,” “prohibition of the usage of Ainu language and imposition of the Japanese language,” “loss of land,” “forced migration” and “loss of traditional culture” (Narita 1981: 97). Predating the emergence of the infamous “comfort women” controversy in the context of Japan’s colonialism and imperialism in Asia by almost two decades, the Ainu public figures argued that Ainu women were used as “comfort women” by the Japanese invaders, who were the actual “barbarians” (Narita 1973: 331). Here, “Northern Territories” and Japanese critical views of the Soviet Union became an important aspect in the process of defining Ainu identity in opposition to Japan, as victim of Japanese “barbarianism.” Japanese mainstream critique of the Soviet oppression of ethnic minorities and suppression of their rights through imposition of the Russian language and culture was revised to question Japan’s own policies of assimilation and suppression of the Ainu culture (Yu-ki 1997: 72–3). While the Japanese mainstream condemned the Soviet Union for “stealing” the territories from Japan, the Ainu historical narrative opposed this conception by arguing that it was Japan that was the aggressor that initially stole the territory from the Ainu (in Yu-ki 1997: 58 and

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Yamamoto (ed). 1992: 12). Thus a number of, Ainu activists argued that the “Northern Territories” are neither Soviet nor Japanese, but are an integral part of historical Ainu territory. While the mainstream irredentist discourse argued that Japan was a victim of Soviet aggression, in the Ainu narrative the conception of the islands as Japan’s “inherent territory” was argued to be a memorial of Japanese aggression against the Ainu. Criticizing this mainstream conception, the Ainu activists argued that, until the end of the war, the Kurile islands and Sakhalin were nothing more than a colony, an “outside territory” (gaichi) (Narita 1973: 330). Stating that the Ainu have never rented or sold Hokkaido nor the Kurile islands to the Japanese, the indigenous voice and a number of nonAinu (wajin) intellectuals continuously criticized the Japanese movement for the return of the Northern Territories which perceives it as Japanese “inherent land” and completely ignores that, before the invasion of the Japanese, it was the land of the Ainu (for example, Narita 1973: 329 and 1981: 96–7, Kayano 1980, 1986: 110 and 1997: 5–6, Yamamoto (ed). 1992, Nomura 1993 and Yu-ki 1997: 57–96). The 1884 forced relocation of the Shumushu Ainu to the island of Shikotan, now an integral part of the “Northern Territories,” became an important part of the historical narrative on Ainu victimhood and in the critique of the mainstream irredentist movement. Namely, the tragedy of the Shumushu Ainu, who, at the time of their forced relocation to Shikotan, were deeply russified in terms of culture, language and religion, became an integral part of the suffering of the Ainu at the hands of the Japanese and one of the historical incidents in the construction of the counter-discourse on “Northern Territories” (for example, Kaiho 1974, Yamamoto (ed). 1992: 88, Hirayama 2005: 96–8). However limited in scope, the issue of the Ainu became part of the domestic political and public discourse on the Northern Territories. Many of Japan’s Left-leaning historians in charge of compiling school history textbooks came to share the Ainu perception of the dispute and consistently refused to insert the reference to Northern Territories as “inherent Japanese territory” in school history textbooks (Ienaga 1993: 63–6). From early 1980s, the progressive daily Asahi Shimbun carried multiple articles and opinion pieces that questioned the notion of the Northern Territories as Japan’s “inherent territory,” calling for the need to recognize their historical belonging to the Ainu and to address the question of Ainu rights vis-à-vis the disputed islands. On the eve of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevarnadze’s visit to Japan in 1988, it reported a call issued by a group of Ainu activists called “Ainu National Congress” (ainu minzoku kaigi), demanding of the government that it include Ainu representatives in the bilateral talks (Asahi Shimbun, 1988: 10). In September 1991 one of the leading Ainu activists, Chikappu Mieko, was among the members of the group that visited the disputed islands as part of a tour organized by a Japanese NGO named “Peace Boat.” Besides engaging in talks with local residents not as a Japanese but as an Ainu, a representative of the “original owners” of the islands, Chikappu criticized the

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hypocrisy underlying the Japanese irredentist movement and the conception of the islands as Japan’s “inherent territory” (in Yamamoto (ed). 1992: 140–6). After being elected to the Diet in 1994, an Ainu activist, Kayano Shigeru, continuously argued that the Northern Territories had been Ainu territory and that now two strong states, Russia and Japan, were debating the future of the islands “above the heads” of the “original owners” (for example, at House of Councilors, Cabinet Committee 24 November 1994 and Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories 2 December 1997). Obviously, the appropriation of the irredentist cause, as well as the vision of an Ainu state on the Northern Territories, entertained by parts of the Ainu community, as well as the presentation of Ainu as culturally and ethnically distinct from the Japanese in this counter-discourse had significant implications for Japan’s quest for the return of the Northern Territories. Besides questioning the validity of the mainstream historical narrative it also undermined the conception of the irredentist cause as a “national mission” and the argument which, among other reasons, traced Japan’s preoccupation with the return of the islands to a “unique Japanese concept of national territory” in which “natural, racial, linguistic and cultural boundaries must coincide with political and administrative borders” (Kimura 1980: 709, emphasis added). The Ainu and the broader progressive struggle against discrimination finally culminated in the abolition, in 1997, of the law that had, for almost a hundred years, designated the Ainu as “former natives”(kyu- dojin) and the enactment in 1997 of the Act for the Promotion of Ainu Culture, the Dissemination of Knowledge and Education regarding Ainu Traditions. Formally, this new law interrupted the discourse on Japanese ethnic homogeneity and officially elevated the Ainu from the realm of inferior barbarians to the status of an equal ethnic entity. At the same time, a report published by the Expert Group, on which the law was based, following the above-discussed nihonjinron construction, framed the Ainu identity within the broader realm of Japanese identity and territory by stipulating their status simply as indigenous people and glossed over “the history of invasion, colonization and forced assimilation”(Siddle 2002: 408). However, the Ainu challenge to Japan’s dominant narrative of the “Northern Territories” was already submerged in the broad historical narrative on Japan and Russia, which was reinterpreted in cultural terms and popularized in Shiba Ryo-taro-’s writings, which are examined in the following chapter.

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Shiba’s original forms of Japan and Russia1

This chapter analyses the narrative on the “original forms” of Japan and Russia in the writings of one of the most popular contemporary writers of historical novels and cultural essayists, Shiba Ryo-taro- (1923–96). As will be argued below, his writings not only contributed to deepening and popularizing the hierarchical construction of Japan and Russia (examined in Chapter 3) but also engaged in submersion of the Ainu challenge to the quest for “inherent territory.” Furthermore, the reason for the focus on Shiba is not only his popularity but also the fact that he served as a human link between the debates on Russia and the Ainu. Namely, Shiba was one of the seven members of the Council of Experts established by the government in 1994 to help draft the new legislation aimed at promoting Ainu culture (Siddle 2002: 408). As such, Shiba was one of the people directly involved in revision of the “former natives” law. In spite of the continuing popularity of Shiba’s historical novels and essays, there is a dearth of academic literature in English on his work. Hence, before turning to Shiba’s writings on Russia, the next few pages will briefly introduce him and his role in the construction of Japan’s identity.

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5.1 Shiba Ryo-taro-: an introduction Shiba Ryo-taro-, born in Osaka in 1923 as Fukuda Tei’ichi, majored in Mongolian studies at the Osaka University of Foreign Languages and served in an Imperial Army tank division in Manchuria during the last two years of World War II (1944–45). After the war he worked for several years as a newspaper reporter, while also writing fiction. After receiving the prestigious Naoki Prize in literature for his novel Fukuro no shiro (Owl’s Castle) in 1961, he retired from his job at the Sankei Shimbun newspaper and became a full-time novelist. For the rest of his life, Shiba devoted himself to writing historical novels and became perhaps the most widely read Japanese writer of the historical novel genre and historico-cultural essays. He wrote on a wide range of subjects but, in one way or another, all of his works related to Japan’s national past or present. Even when he wrote about foreign lands and peoples, Shiba’s actual narrative, it has been said, was about Japan (Sekikawa and Funabiki 2006:

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110). As such, Shiba’s corpus constitutes probably one of the most illustrative cases in the construction of the Japanese national “self” through the “other.” Today, more than ten years after Shiba’s death in 1996, his works, including historical novels, essays, travel writings and conversations, continue to enjoy a wide readership in Japan. As of 2005, the six hundred titles which carry Shiba’s name as their author have sold over 180 million copies (Sekikawa 2005). Shiba’s essays have been published (and republished) in the most popular magazines and two of his historical novels, one related to the Russo– Japanese War and the other to the Meiji Restoration, are currently all-time bestsellers.2 In 1999 the former, titled Saka no ue no kumo (The Cloud on Top of the Hill), was chosen by the readers of the popular magazine Bungei Shunju- as the most valuable book, among all books written in the twentieth century, to be left for the future and was chosen by the “representative intellectuals” as the best work of history on Japan (in Yamazaki and Sekikawa (2004: 61). It is also often argued that Shiba’s books have become one of the main sources of historical knowledge for the Japanese people, for lack of better alternatives (Ozaki in NHK 1998: 17 and Koizumi 1996). Ironically, this happened in disregard of Shiba’s own and others’ occasional calls to consider his works as literary fiction (Matsumoto 1996: 22–36). As one of the few critical accounts of Shiba’s historical narrative has argued, there has been no other writer in contemporary Japan who exercised such a tremendous influence on the formation of the “historical consciousness” (rekishi ninishiki) of the Japanese people (Nakamura 1997: 2). The numerous admirers have bestowed on Shiba the title of the “leader of civilization” (Sekikawa [2000] 2003: 64) and his ideas and perceptions of Japan’s history have been juxtaposed with those of the celebrated Maruyama Masao, briefly introduced in the previous chapter, as two intellectual “giants” of Japan’s post-war period. While both were criticized for being dominated by modernist and enlightenment thinking, as both shared a rather positive understanding of Meiji period (Nakajima 1998: 11–13), Shiba has been portrayed as the “rescuer” of Japanese history from the negative and critical view of Maruyama (Ishihara and Nasu 2002). While at times commentators have conceded that some historical facts might have been omitted or changed, Shiba’s narrative has been generally perceived as untainted by ideological considerations but shaped purely by aesthetics (Nakamura 1986: 289 and Matsumoto 1996: 37–9 also Keene 2004: 89).3 As such, Shiba’s views and interpretations of Japan’s history and “original form” (kuni no katachi or genkei—discussed in detail below) are often mobilized to provide legitimacy for certain normative arguments in political debate. His writings have been the ultimate point of reference in numerous public discussions related to Japan’s national destiny and his influence cuts across political affiliations (for example, the Left-leaning and critical Tokyo University professor Kang Sang Jung citing Shiba in his testimony in front of the House of Representatives, Constitution Investigative Committee, 22 March 2001 in NDL). Shiba’s historical and cultural writings have become a source

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of inspiration to many politicians and important public figures and were cited in Diet policy speeches by at least two prime ministers, Koizumi Jun’ichiro- and Obuchi Keizo-. Both cited Shiba in their general policy speeches in the context of arguing for a particular vision of Japan’s past, present and future (House of Representatives, 19 January 1999 and 26 March 2003 in NDL). A collection of obituaries written on the occasion of Shiba’s death features a significant number of prominent politicians who praise Shiba as the “master” who understood how to apply lessons from the past to present dilemmas and describe his writings as the source of historical knowledge (Hashimoto 1996: 105–6 and Koizumi 1996: 114–15). In the context of Japan’s relations with Russia, Shiba’s writings were cited by Hata Tsutomu (prime minister April–June 1994), who visited the Soviet Union in 1986 in his capacity as Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources, as his guide to Russia’s “national conditions” (kokujo-) and to the history of Russo–Japanese relations (Hata 1996). Shiba’s works are also often cited in parliamentary debates related to Japan’s relations with Russia (for example, Sasahara Junichi, at the House of Councillors, Foreign Relations Committee, 4 November 1993 and Akamatsu Masao, House of Representatives, Security Committee, 17 April 1998 in NDL). It must be noted, however, that in spite of this popularity among domestic devotees of national history, Shiba’s writings cannot be simply classified as conservative in the conventional meaning of the term in the Japanese context. Obviously, his often-cited “critique of ideology” was directed at the Marxist ideology that dominated the Japanese intellectual world in the 1950s and 1960s (Tanizawa 1996: 14). However, unlike the mainstream conservatives who often attempted to whitewash or ignore the pre-1945 years, Shiba’s views on the period in Japan’s history between the Russo–Japanese War and the defeat in the Asia-Pacific War were highly negative and critical (Ishihara and Nasu 2002 and Tsurumi 2001: 66–8). In light of the above, without attempting to establish a positivist connection between Shiba’s writings and Japan’s political agendas, it can be argued that his views of history have continuously influenced the broad public as well as the political elites since the 1960s. Surprisingly, in spite of the centrality of Shiba’s writings in the narration of Japan’s identity, his works have so far been largely denied the attention of international scholarship.4 Probably the length of his novels (The Cloud on Top of the Hill consists of eight volumes) and the absence of English translations have contributed to this academic lacuna. At the same time, the search for the sophisticated and exotic, and the rigid interdisciplinary border delimitations that leave literature beyond the reach of political and historical inquiry, have probably played an important role in keeping Shiba and his works in the waiting room of scholarly studies on Japan’s identity.

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Shiba’s “history” and “original form” A much more famous and internationally acclaimed master of the historical novel, Lev (Leo) Nikolayevich Tolstoy, denied the possibility of scientifically

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rational inquiry into history and the ability of individuals to fully understand the course of historical events (Berlin 1999: 16–20). For his part, Shiba firmly believed that historical inquiry, provided it is not tainted by any ideological biases, can achieve the goal of retrieving objective truth. He persistently criticized the use of various ideological “tools” in understanding Japanese history and promoted what he called a “digging-by-hand” (tebori) method of historical inquiry. By this he meant an objective inquiry into history as it was, unaffected by any preconceived notions. He explicitly rejected the validity of such subjective and value-laden terms as “justice,” preferring objective “realism,” or search for objective facts, emphasizing the centrality of empirical inquiry and denying validity to any kind of preconceptions or prejudice (Nakajima 1998: 19 and Sekikawa [2000] 2003: 14–15). For Shiba, “ideology” was an anathema, which he equated with alcohol, as it provided nothing more than illusions to those who indulge in it (Shiba 1976: 111–13). Ideology has been seen by Shiba as the source of illusions not only in historical inquiry, but also in politics. In terms of actual application of this theory to Japan’s history, he argued that, after its surprisingly decisive victory in the Russo– Japanese War (1904–5), the Japanese state abandoned the political realism that had its roots in Edo-period Japan’s political culture and gained momentum in early years of the Meiji period (1868–1912). The replacement of this realism with dogmatic ideology was seen by Shiba as the main reason for the disastrous adventures of Japanese militarism and the subsequent defeat in the Pacific War (Shiba 1995: 9–10.) Ironically, not unlike Maruyama, who also engaged in an extensive critique of Japan’s historical development, Shiba, the “rescuer” of Japanese history, idealized the “West,” mainly for what he believed to be its adherence to realism. In contrast to the Japanese, Shiba once noted, the Europeans have had realism implanted in them since ancient Greece, the “original form” of the West. This realism, Shiba believed, has been one of the main reasons behind Western success (Shiba 1995: 60). Shiba has never provided a clear definition of the term “original form” (genkei), which he uses quite often in his writings as applied to national culture. It is possible that it emerged, consciously or unconsciously, in opposition to the influential critique of Japan’s cultural substrate (koso-) as developed by Maruyama. As can be derived from Shiba’s numerous speeches and essays on the topic, the “original form” stands for a certain set of national characteristics that were acquired at the time of the initial “nation formation” (kokka keisei). In line with the general tenets of cultural determinism, Shiba argued that this original form continuously shapes and influences the social, political and economic aspects of the nation throughout its subsequent history (for example, Shiba 1998b and 1999a). As such, this notion of “original form” is almost identical to what Maruyama defined as Japan’s cultural substrate of its history, the body of attitudes and values firmly rooted in Japanese society that have persistently influenced its development. However, unlike the critical Maruyama, who perceived the era of war, fascism and militarism as a logical continuation of Japan’s cultural history,

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Shiba saw this same period as a deviation from the normalcy of Japan’s “original form.” Shiba admired the scientific method and objectivity that he observed in Edo and Meiji Japan, and contrasted these periods favourably with the “egocentric” Showa era, during which the Japanese became, as he put it, too “Germanised” (Shiba 1992: 20–1), meaning emotional and irrational. In his laudatory appraisal of the Meiji Restoration, Shiba argued that, unlike the French or the Russian revolutions, which each benefited a specific class, it created a thoroughly egalitarian society through a process in which all previously existing classes underwent a painful process of readjustment. All this happened in order to create a modern nation state and to prevent Japan from becoming the colony of the West (Shiba 2003: 84–95). This process, however, was undermined by the dogmatism of the Showa era and led to the humiliating defeat in the Pacific War. Notwithstanding his admiration of the West, Shiba dedicated himself principally to the study of Japan’s history and culture. He was fascinated with what he saw as the unique and consistent way of Japan’s history, which has never been governed by any ideology, be it Buddhism, Confucianism or Marxism.5 According to Shiba, all these dogmatic ideologies came from outside of Japan and never managed to penetrate deeply into the core of society, instead remaining only on the surface in the form of philosophical inquiry or “writings” (shomotsu) (Shiba 2003: 9–20). For Shiba, the “original form” of Japan has always been governed by political realism (meaning non-ideological assessment of national interests and state power) and most of his works have been dedicated to uncovering this cultural thread. Obviously, Shiba’s approach to historical inquiry is rather tautological, as it attempts to engage in an objective uncovering of Japan’s history and its “original form” while remaining firmly rooted in assumptions of the existence of this “national realism,” which for Shiba is the essence of Japan’s identity. Within Japan’s domestic discourse, however, the objectivity of Shiba’s historical inquiry has rarely been challenged. Generally, and in line with Shiba’s own self-conception, he has been seen as an impartial observer of Japan’s history (Shiba 1999a). Shiba’s writings on Russia have met with similarly flattering comments, as a search for truth without any ideological or emotional biases, characterized by “political realism” (Numano in Shiba 1999: 8–9).6 We must add that this perception of Shiba’s writings is widely shared by the general audience as well (for example, Tsurumi 2001: 69). Anecdotal evidence of this is provided by the comments on Shiba’s writings on Russia on the Japanese website of Amazon.com and Yahoo! Japan; virtually all the commentators approach his works as a “proper” historical narrative.

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5.2 Shiba’s “Russia” In light of Shiba’s positive appraisal of Japanese history prior to the Russo– Japanese War, the progressive critique of Japan’s colonization of Ainu lands

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posed an obvious challenge to his conception of Japan’s “original form.” This section examines Shiba’s writings on Russia and argues that this challenge was addressed in an engagement of a historico-cultural construction of Russia and Japan. The following analysis draws mainly but not exclusively on the collection of essays, Roshia ni tsuite – hoppo- no genkei (On Russia – The Original Form of the North) (Shiba 2002), originally published in 1986 and awarded the prestigious Yomiuri Prize for Literature the following year. This collection, as Shiba himself states in the Introduction, is the crystallization of his views on Russia developed over the years, while writing The Cloud on Top of the Hill and The Open Sea of Rape Blossoms, both of which deal with the history of Japan’s relations with Russia.7 As will be shown below, Shiba’s writings belong to same discursive formation on Russia and Japan as the works examined in Chapter 3, and participate in the creation of a hierarchical binary between the two nations. Like the identity discourse examined in the previous chapter, Shiba’s narrative “rescues” Japan from the shadows of its negative history and provides reassurance to the domestic audience regarding the essentially peaceful and superior nature of the Japanese “original form.” However, as the narrative specifically focuses on Russia’s eastward expansion, here this construction of Japan’s “original form” is achieved not only through a juxtaposition of Japan and Russia, but also through a suppression of the Ainu counter-narrative discussed above. Like Hakamada, who stresses the culturally relative basis of social inquiry and a uniquely Japanese understanding of Russia that complements the Western view (Hakamada 1985: 321–2), Shiba also emphasizes the difference in perceptions of Russia as seen from Europe and from Asia, where he locates the Japanese perceptions. He does not contradict the European view but believes that both views complement each other and, combined, should provide a complete picture, constituting the whole body of truth (Shiba 1999a: 54). Ironically, in spite of this claim for a uniquely Japanese view of Russia, Shiba’s narrative, like that examined in the previous chapter, follows faithfully the paradigms established by the Western construction of “self” in opposition to the Russian “other.” Overall, the construction of the narrative is rather simple. Most of the book is a series of descriptions of the Russian conquest of Siberia, Russian exploitation of the local population and resources, and Russian attempts to establish trade relations with Japan. He also makes some reference to the suffering that the Russians endured under the “Mongol Yoke” (1237–1480), and even more under their own rulers. These descriptions are occasionally interrupted with what Shiba calls “digressions” (yodan), sometimes of considerable length. These interventions provide snapshots of Edo-period (1603–1867) Japan in order to draw comparisons between events in Russian history and the state of affairs in Japan during the parallel period. By using this technique, Shiba shrewdly exploits his position as an amateur rather than a “professional historian” (Shiba 1995: 77 also Sekikawa [2000] 2003: 20) to provide the reader with contrasting comparisons of the Japanese “self” and the

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Russian “other.” It has been argued that these digressions are the only places in Shiba’s writings where he engages in overt historico-cultural analysis (Shimauchi 2002: 228), allowing the rest of the text to remain within the putative realm of objective history. However, the argument provided in these digressions has an intimate relationship with the rest of the text, and hence both threads of his narrative should be examined as an integrated whole. The “snapshots” of Edo Japan presented in these digressions are consistently positive in normative terms.8 At first reading they seem to present random thoughts rather out of place in the overall narrative. However, these passages intervene into a story of conquests, greed and oppression that characterizes the Russian history of eastward expansion. The indirect comparison of the two nations’ navies is illustrative of this strategy. Shiba discusses the colonial chartered Russo–American Company (1799–1867) and, in a very detailed fashion, describes the non-professional nature of the sailors and the cruel conditions under which they worked on the commercial ships of the Company that operated in the Pacific (Shiba [1986] 2002: 114–19). This depiction is preceded by a digression regarding the Japanese merchant fleet of the same period that is mostly devoted to describing the positive role it played in the economy of Edo Japan (ibid. [1986] 2002: 100–2). In a similar fashion, another “idle talk” section depicts the needle and lacquer-ware trade between the Ainu and the Edo-period Japanese (wajin). Seemingly out of place, this passage intervenes into the story of conquests that characterized Russian relations with the natives of Siberia and the Kurile islands in the eighteenth century, and provides a striking contrast by emphasizing the peaceful nature of Japan’s historical interactions with the Ainu (ibid. [1986] 2002: 74). Shiba was not the first Japanese writer to narrate a violent history of Russia’s eastward expansion and interactions with the Kurile Ainu, as contrasted with the amicable relations between the Ainu and Japanese merchants (for example, see Takakura 1960 and Yoshida 1962). However there are two major characteristics that distinguish Shiba’s narrative from earlier historical accounts that were written to justify Japan’s claim to the Northern Territories. The first is that Shiba was probably the first public intellectual to narrate it in terms of the “original forms” of the Japanese and Russian nations, in this way subscribing to and reproducing the socio-cultural hierarchy established by the identity discourse examined in Chapter 3. The second is the shift of focus to the Russian conquest of Siberia and the relatively little attention paid to the Northern Territories as such. In terms of the “original form” of Russia derived from this historical analysis, again, jingoism and expansionism are presented as the most salient and persistent national characteristics. Time is frozen in Shiba’s account, as the continuous dominance of the “original form” over historical changes is affirmed by drawing parallels between the USSR and tsarist Russia, arguing for the consistently expansionist nature of the nation (Shiba [1986] 2002: 10– 11). Likewise, the narrative argues for the consistent dominance of the belief among Russia’s rulers (here Stalin, Lenin and Ivan the Terrible find

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themselves bundled together) in the supreme value of military power and the view that any domestic or international problem can be resolved through military force (ibid. [1986] 2002: 54 and 199). In his search for the sources of Russia’s “original form,” Shiba locates the source of this national character in the Mongolian influence on the formation of the Russian state and nation in the sixteenth century (ibid. [1986] 2002: 22). Ironically, Shiba, who makes claims to originally Asian/Japanese perceptions of Russia, meticulously repeats the socio-medical discourse of differentiation, the normal/pathological dichotomy that has constituted one of the main modes of constructing difference in the modern Western discourse on the “self” and the “other” (Campbell 1992: 92–101). Russia is depicted as exhibiting a pathological deviation from normalcy. Hence the “abnormal fear” of foreign invasion, the “pathological suspicion” of other states and the “lust for conquest and an abnormal belief” in military force are assigned by Shiba as the “cultural genetics” engraved in the Russian character by the rule of the Mongolian Kipchak Khans and the protracted Russian submission to this rule (Shiba [1986] 2002: 25–6, emphasis added). Here it is hard to avoid mentioning Marx and Engels—whose ideology Shiba, along with other Japanese cultural determinists, loathed, vigorously denying its applicability to Japan (in Shiba 1998c: 44). The fathers of communism shared with Shiba the perception of Russia as an economically and socially backward “barbarous power.” The construction of Russia’s national character in Shiba’s narrative closely recapitulates this construction, right down to doubts about the Russian ability to depart from the barbaric state and to become a civilized nation through internalizing the “universal values” of civilization. Unlike Russia’s ruthless and cynical expansionism, militarism and pathological fear of invasion, Japan’s “original form,” which, according to Shiba, has survived to the present day, is a somewhat childish “pacifism.” In support of this argument, Shiba draws parallels between Edo Japan, which had no heavy arms and required all foreign ships to submit their stocks of gunpowder to the authorities upon entering port, and contemporary Japan’s negative attitude towards nuclear weapons (Shiba [1986] 2002: 160). However, the main thrust of the narrative is to unearth Japan’s original rationalism. Shiba portrays Edo Japan as an exquisite and sophisticated “maritime civilization” in which the gap between the poor and the rich was much smaller than in neighboring China, in India or other Asian countries (ibid. [1986] 2002: 44– 6). The mercantilist economy of the Edo period is praised not only as an advanced economic system but also as one that fostered the development of objective and advanced scientific thinking. The superior nature of this society, based on a mercantilist economy, is further emphasized by descriptions of the societal ability to evaluate events and knowledge, not only on the basis of subjective perception but also through comparative analysis (ibid. [1986] 2002: 84). Japan’s pre-modern economy is portrayed by Shiba as basically functioning through a market mechanism with a complex distribution network that enabled commodities from various parts of Japan to circulate

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throughout the country, predicated on an impressively high literacy rate. Furthermore, faithfully following the paradigms of the liberal discourse, Shiba locates the origins of Edo Japan’s humanism, rationalism and rejection of religious authority in this economic system. This depiction of Japan’s “original form” contradicts the conception of Japan’s history that appears in Shiba’s other writings, where he suggests that these Enlightenment-associated values were introduced to Japan during the Meiji Restoration (for example, Shiba and Inoue 2004: 44). His approach, however, forces him into this contradiction. Seemingly unable to go beyond the cognitive paradigms of the rational “self” and the irrational “other” established by the Western discourse, he transposes this distinction to premodern Japan and Russia, thus creating a static socio-cultural hierarchy, unchangeable by the passage of time. Notably, the “West” is continuously present in the narrative, not only as the silent supplier of the tools for the construction of the hierarchy, but also as the explicit yardstick for measuring the level of civilization. For example, Shiba notes that at the time when Europe was experiencing the “blossoming” of the Renaissance, in Russia the Mongols were destroying the urban culture. According to Shiba, even if the ideas of the Renaissance had reached Russia, it would have been impossible for the Russians to adopt such a “mature system of thought” (Shiba [1986] 2002: 24– 5). Russia’s system of serfdom is described as having a fundamentally more cruel nature than its European equivalent. Russia’s pre-revolutionary sociopolitical structure, consisting only of the tsar and the serfs, is depicted as far more simplistic than the “complex” Western one (ibid. [1986] 2002: 31–4). Russia’s “youthfulness” as a nation is perceived to be one of the reasons for its ferocious roughness and is contrasted with “old nations,” such as France, where, notes Shiba, the original barbarian spirit tends to be diluted (ibid. [1986] 2002: 12). For the same reason, the relative “oldness” of Japan as a nation is emphasized in the depictions of Edo-period civilization appearing throughout the book. The process of Russia’s modernisation/Westernisation that started in the eighteenth century is positively evaluated and Shiba respectfully notes the Europeanization of high culture. Here, however, he employs a strategy that mirrors the one he uses to acknowledge the negative aspects of Japan’s recent history while preserving his sense of its “original form.” While, in the case of Japan, responsibility for the years of Japan’s imperialism is placed solely on the military (Sekikawa [2000] 2003: 16–18), Russia’s “upwards mobility” as a nation is denied by confining “any modernization” only to a small, enlightened minority. Hence Shiba is quick to remind the reader that the process of Russia’s modernization involved only the aristocracy, while 90% of the population continued to carry the “original form” of the “barbarian nomads” (Shiba [1986] 2002: 162–71). In contrast, Japan as a nation is regularly allocated a place within the Western course of development and modernization. For example, Shiba stresses that while Russia languished under the Mongolian Yoke, both Japan and the West underwent important socio-cultural developments that “prepared” them for

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modernity (ibid. [1986] 2002: 22 and Shiba 1998c: 56–8). As such, while both nations are presented as static and unsusceptible to change, Japan’s “time” is equated with that of the West, while Russia’s is rendered as inherently lagging behind. Shiba occasionally adumbrates Russian and Japanese similarities for the purpose of bringing hierarchical differences into sharper focus. He notes, for example, that in the sixteenth century both Japan and Russia underwent the processes of national unification. Furthermore, cannon were deployed and new strategies to defeat horse-mounted warriors were adopted almost simultaneously in both countries: by the Russians in their campaign against the Siberian Khan and in Japan by Oda Nobunaga (Shiba [1986] 2002: 49 and 57). However, these similarities are utilized to emphasize the difference in the development of the two nations’ respective “original forms.” While in Russia “national unification” gave birth to the brutal dictatorship of Ivan the Terrible, in Japan unification gave rise to the “exquisite and sophisticated” Edo period mentioned earlier (ibid. [1986] 2002: 49). Two centuries later, Russia was still heavily influenced by the barbarian style of the nomads, while late Edo-period Japan had already embraced the modern principles of commerce (ibid. [1986] 2002: 138–9). As noted, Shiba’s writings on Russia contain scant reference to the Ainu. In a book devoted to Hokkaido, however, he reproduces the conservative nihonjinron construction by describing the Ainu as the “civilizational ancestors” of the Japanese. Here he argues that the Ainu are indisputably Japanese, descendants of people who “stubbornly” continued to preserve the pre-historical Jo-mon lifestyle despite the advent of Yayoi civilization (circa 300 BC–250 AD) and all that transpired in the following centuries (Shiba [1992] 1997: 145). Throughout the book Shiba emphasizes the ethnic and cultural continuity between the Ainu and modern Japanese and, as expected, repeats the argument that the conquest of the Ainu lands has not been a “blood stained struggle” between a conquering and indigenous people but little more than a brotherly competition between different lifestyles (ibid. [1992] 1997: 65). Shiba’s writings on Russia focus mainly on the Russian conquest of the Siberian mainland and barely touch on the question of the Ainu, even when discussing Russian contacts with Japan in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which directly involved the native people of Hokkaido and the Kurile islands.9 Obviously, this omission of the Ainu from the narrative functions to locate them within the political and cultural borders of Japan, suppressing any challenge that distinct Ainu identity might present to Japan’s territorial irredentism. Interestingly, though, while the Ainu are virtually omitted from the narrative, the natives of Siberia figure prominently, as Shiba engages in extensive depiction of similarities between them and the Japanese. In these depictions, arguably, the narrative constructs a certain trans-Asian identity for Japan, which complements the narration of the Western-like rational “original form” of Japan. In what can be seen as a replication of the construction of Japan as both modern and Asian (Tanaka 1993), the text

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creates a certain cultural and racial affinity between the Japanese and the Mongolian peoples of Siberia through an explicit admiration for their “magnificent culture,” followed by an extensive depiction of similarity between them and the Japanese, as can be seen in religious rites and physical features (Shiba [1986] 2002: 23–49 and 180 and Shiba 1999a: 56). In spite of locating the roots of Russia’s violent and expansionist “original form” in the “cultural genes” left by the Mongols elsewhere in the text, Shiba continues to deepen the identification of the Japanese “self” with the Mongols. This is done, for example, by stressing that the facial features of the Japanese are similar to those of the Kipchak Khanate aristocracy—the former conquerors and rulers of Russia. He goes even further and observes that even the rulers of modern Russia look like the Asian “us,” as seen in examples of Stalin (who was, ironically, Caucasian, in the original meaning of the word) and the Russian prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin (1992–98) (Shiba 2003: 58). The relevance of and the explicitly political nature of this “Asian identity” to the discourse on the Northern Territories becomes clear in the concluding part of On Russia, where Shiba for the first time touches on the territorial dispute between Japan and its northern neighbor. Here Shiba locates the Northern Territories together with the Mongolian Plateau (here referring to Mongolia) which, according to Shiba, were seized by the Soviet Union from Japan and China respectively, as the result of the Yalta Conference. As is well known, the February 1945 meeting of the Big Three, among other stipulations regarding the post-World War II world order, confirmed the independent status of the Mongolian People’s Republic (Outer Mongolia) and allocated the rights to the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. However, it was probably China’s official support for Japan’s position on the Northern Territories from the mid 1960s through the 1980s that played an important role in this creation of common victimhood under the aegis of Asian identity. Both China and Japan are presented as victims of contemporary Russian expansionism, and Shiba argues the need of the Japanese to understand the NTs dispute within this broader context (Shiba [1986] 2002: 243–7). Arguably, by appealing to Japan’s Asian identity, the narrative reinforces the suppression of the Ainu challenge and enhances the legitimacy of Japan’s quest by locating it within a broader context of Asian (China, Japan and the peoples of Siberia) victimhood vis-à-vis Russia. Today’s domestic mainstream narrative on the history of the native people of the Northern Territories and their interactions with Japan and Russia follows faithfully the path established by the early writings and given mature expression in Shiba’s writings. As part of this consistent containment of Ainu within the realm of Japan’s identity, the mainstream publications related to the dispute continue to reproduce the narrative of Japan’s colonization of Ainu lands as a process of a “daring and challenging development of inherent territory” (for example, Koizumi (ed.) 2003: 35 also Nemuro City Office 2003). Just as in Shiba’s writings, the Edo-period Japanese (wajin) and the Ainu are portrayed as having peaceful trade relations (Koizumi (ed.) 2003:

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68–73). The trade evolved into “living together” with the Ainu (Hoppo-ryo-do mondai taisaku kyo-kai 2002: 7) and “development policies,” which resulted in the “rise of living standards of the Ainu” (Koizumi (ed.) 2003: 84–5). This is contrasted with the Russian expeditions to the Kuriles, which “suppressed the resistance of the Ainu” and “exploited” them, starting from the beginning of the eighteenth century (ibid. 2003: 76–8). Once, in a talk regarding his views on Russia, Shiba explicitly stated that because he did not adhere to any ideology, he did not have any prejudice or preconceptions related to Russia (Shiba 1999a: 96). Shiba’s explicit efforts to adhere to objective “realism” and impartiality are quite visible in the narrative examined here. He shows, for example, understanding of the imagined patriotic feelings Soviet teenagers must have when they see the map of Siberian conquests (Shiba [1986] 2002: 71–2). He also expresses admiration of certain Russian individuals, for example, one of the early Russian naval explorers of the Far East, Ivan Kruzenshtern (ibid. [1986] 2002: 133). After a very negative description of the sailors of Russo–American Company, he attempts to avoid generalizations by concluding that this perception cannot be applied to the Russian navy in general (ibid. [1986] 2002: 119). Shiba also positively evaluates the Russian policy of “enlightenment” towards the ethnic minorities in Siberia, conducted through building schools in the newly acquired territories. This in one rare occasion on which Russia is juxtaposed with China, Japan and Asia as a superior and an enlightened nation (ibid. [1986] 2002: 231–2). Along with impartiality, though, Shiba believed in the importance of comparison and relativity when discussing historical events (Shiba 1999a: 96–8). In his pursuit of establishing a relative place for Japan’s history within universal modernity, he broadly followed the paradigms established by the early twentieth-century narrators of Japanese identity, in which the Western practices of hierarchical construction of the “self” were employed to create Japan as a nation both modern and Asian. As such, Shiba’s narrative is firmly located within the socio-cultural paradigms established by the nihonjinron discourse; it reaffirms Japan’s belonging to the Western realm of normalcy and universalism, and at the same time affirms its positively unique and perpetually unchanging “original form,” in the process overriding the contestations of this construction. Shiba described his novels as written from a “bird’s eye view.” While the focus is typically on particular individuals, the perspective taken is as from the “roof of a high building” in order to capture the broader picture (Shiba 1964 cited in Matsumoto 1996: 97–8)—the historical and social settings of the “original form.” Seen from the “roof” of Japan’s “original form,” the Ainu people disappear from the history of Japan’s relations with Russia and are absorbed into the structures of Japan’s national identity. In turn, this absorption of Ainu subjectivity and the simultaneous creation of a hierarchy between Japan and Russia acts as a reinforcement of the discourse on the Northern Territories as Japan’s “inherent territory.”

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“Newly born Russia” and Japan

6.1 Post-communist Russia in Japan’s political identity The early years The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and other related transformations did not bring a successful resolution of the territorial dispute that continues to figure centrally in Japan’s relations with its northern neighbor. Furthermore, the rejection of communism and the embracing of a market economy and democracy by Russia’s new leadership did not lead to incorporation of Russia into the realm of Japan’s political “self.” Rather, Russia’s difference was reconfigured and the “self/other” nexus was restructured in such a way that it reconfirmed Japan’s identity as a capitalist democracy. The process and the manifestations of this transformation of the “self/other” nexus will be explored in this chapter. Certain transformations in the political discourse had already started to take place during the last years of the Soviet Union. Compared with other members of the Western camp, the Japanese response to the Soviet “new thinking” was slow and cautious (Shimotomai 1995 and Hasegawa 2007: 61), as the Japanese agenda vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was largely determined by the territorial dispute. This said, however, some important changes in the Japanese discourse on the Soviet Union can be recognized from the late 1980s (Ferguson 2007: 203). To a certain extent, these changes constituted a reflection on Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s broader reforms and the gradual dissipation of the Cold War conflict, but more important, they emerged in response to Japan-related initiatives undertaken by the new leadership, which culminated in Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo in April 1991 (Kimura 1991). Gorbachev’s request for financial aid remained largely unanswered (Nimmo 1994: 98–101) and the Japanese public, unlike their counterparts in other major Western nations, remained generally skeptical about the changes taking place in the Soviet Union (for example, see public opinion polls in Berton 1992a). The domestic political discourse, however, started to shift gradually from ultimate otherness towards narrating temporal difference between Japan and the Soviet Union. Namely, the Soviet Union was reconstructed as a nation

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that was in the early stages of implementing the universal values of democracy, personal freedom and the rule of law. In this process Japan’s political “self” was reaffirmed as a mature representative of these values, and hence as a provider of guidance and assistance to the Soviet Union (for example Prime Minister Kaifu’s speech at Karuizawa LDP seminar, 28 July 1991 at TD). As a manifestation of this shift in identity discourse, the Japanese position, which from the early 1980s tied economic aid to progress on the territorial issue, began to show a gradual softening but this did not lead to drastic policy reassessments. It was the August 1991 coup attempt which convinced the Japanese leadership of the importance of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union; in its wake, Japan finally announced a program of limited economic aid to the Soviet Union (Hasegawa 2000a: 169). The Soviet Union, however, ceased to exist as a state only six months after Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo and less than four months after Japan announced the financial aid package. The evolution of the identity discourse thus continued vis-à-vis newly independent Russia, which inherited from the Soviet Union the legal and political relations with Japan, the policy of military build-up in the Far East and, most importantly, the territorial dispute. The reconfiguration of the “self/other” nexus was rather slow, as it worked against the Cold War symbiosis of the political and the socio-cultural, the pervasiveness of which received a further boost from the lack of visible progress in the territorial dispute as well as the domestic instability in Russia, often perceived in Japan as manifestations of Russia’s national character (for example, see Ochiai 1992). Other incidents, such as the revelations of Russian nuclear waste dumping into the Sea of Japan, were also seen as confirmations of the prevalence of national character as the decisive factor in determining Russia’s policies (for example, Nakanishi 1993: 169). As Tsuyoshi Hasegawa noted, “in the minds of many Japanese, the Soviet Union was merely replaced by Russia and there were no fundamental changes in the problems that existed between the two countries” (Hasegawa 2007: 62 also see Shimotomai 1995: 122–3 and Ferguson 2008: 74–6). Thus, in spite of Russia’s acceptance of the “common language” of freedom, democracy and market economy (Tamba 2000: 29–38) and repetitious proclamations from the Russian leadership that the new Russia was fundamentally different from the Soviet Union, sharing with Japan important “humanistic values” (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 25), the process of reconfiguration of the “self/other” nexus was impeded by the dominance of a sociocultural construct that downplayed the possibility of genuine Russian transformation. Hence, while the 1992 LDP policy manifesto announced the “collapse of the Cold War structure” and the emergence of a new international order and new threats (LDP 1992: 3), the political establishment, particularly the defense community, continued to view changes in Russia with great suspicion, often criticizing the Americans and Europeans as being overly optimistic in their enthusiasm about the changes taking place (for example, Vice-Minister of Defense Miyahara at House of Representatives,

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National Security Committee, 14 April 1992 at NDL). This skepticism was also evident in the Japanese policy makers’ persistent reluctance to provide large-scale economic assistance to Russia, justified by arguments that economic aid cannot change the Russian character (for example, Yomiuri Shimbun, 1992). Yeltsin’s cancellation of what was to be his first visit to Japan as the President of independent Russia gave a further boost to the validity of the socio-cultural construct. In early September 1992, at virtually the last moment, Yeltsin abruptly announced the postponement of his visit, explaining this move to Russia’s domestic audience as a reaction to “Japan’s intransigence on the territorial issue” (Nimmo 1994: 149), as evidenced by Japanese insistence on including the reference to the territorial dispute in the G-7 statement at the Munich Summit few months before the scheduled visit. The cancellation of the visit was extensively covered by the Japanese press and many commentators presented it as a confirmation of the continuing relevance of national character for analysis of Russia. Unlike the American “Russophobic pessimists” who often tended to resort to a quasi-religious discourse to explain Russia’s abnormality (Foglesong 2007: 197), the Japanese narrative was drawn from and reproduced the socio-cultural discourse on the “original forms” (genkei) of both nations. Yeltsin’s attitude and manners were portrayed as a manifestation of essentially Russian characteristics which are neither Western nor Eastern. Again, Russia’s paradoxical, traitorous, cunning and calculating character was contrasted with Japanese consistency and integrity. Incompatible with both Western ethics and Eastern logic, Yeltsin’s sudden cancellation of his visit to Japan was argued to be an absurd paradox, explicable only in the context of Russian national character (for example, Nakanishi 1993: 172–3). Underscoring the omnipresence of this construct, even the progressive Asahi Shimbun, whose interpretation of current events rarely converges with the positions of either the governmental or the more Right-leaning press, featured an editorial that interpreted the situation in Russia in socio-cultural terms and downplayed the importance of the collapse of the Soviet Union in shaping Russia’s foreign policy. Drawing examples from Russia’s history it portrayed an unchanging Russian national mentality of a people under siege, dominated by general insecurity and fear of being invaded, as the key to understanding Russia’s policies (Asahi Shimbun 1993: 1–2). The consistent prevalence of this construct, however, cannot be understood solely within the context of bilateral relations. As was the case in other periods, Japanese discourse on Russia was also very much a reflection of evolving relations with the West, (read: with the US). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a decade of trade frictions, together with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, led to the re-emergence of a discourse on Japan’s otherness, somewhat reminiscent of the “yellow peril” discourse of the first half of the twentieth century that presented Japan as the emerging enemy of the West. Its structure, which drew on the “traditional” racial and cultural stereotypes to narrate Japan’s threatening “otherness” was captured perfectly in the title of a New

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York Times article surveying the literature: “The Land of the Rising Threat” (McDowell 1990). The instability of Japan’s position within the West was further enhanced by the undermined relevance of the US–Japan Security Treaty, which had posited the Soviet Union as the prime potential enemy. In light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and relatively close relations between Russia and its former Western foes, the legitimacy of the security treaty came into question as the alliance lost its “presumed enemy.” This decline in the alliance’s legitimacy, combined with worries about the “rise of China” and the US–China “strategic partnership” of the early 1990s, led to an acute sense of insecurity in Japan about the future of its partnership with the US, as suggested in the title of Alliance Adrift (Do-mei hyo-ryu- [1997]), published by one of Japan’s leading journalists, Funabashi Yo-’ichi. Thus, in a rather paradoxical fashion, the socio-cultural construction of Japan through Russia, the emergence of which was facilitated by the Cold War, was now preserved as the result of the collapse of the Cold War structure. Through narration of Russia’s difference, it responded to the instability in Japan’s location within the West and reinforced the construction of Japan as an integral part of the universal realm of normalcy and at the same time as a unique nation. It was not until October 1993 that Yeltsin’s visit materialized, and this only after Japan, succumbing to pressure from the US and other G-7 members, pledged US$1.8 billion in aid to Russia as part of the G-7 package and demonstrated a willingness to take a less rigid position on the territorial dispute (Meyer 1993: 965). In the summit with Japan’s Prime Minister Hosokawa, Yeltsin stressed Russia’s desire to develop its relations with Japan on the basis of “law and justice.” These two concepts have since been adopted by the Japanese policy discourse and become the main keywords in discussions of bilateral relations, particularly in the context of the territorial dispute. In the bilateral Tokyo Declaration, Yeltsin committed himself to the resolution of the territorial issue and pledged to honor all bilateral agreements concluded by the Soviet Union. He refused, however, to make a specific reference to the Joint Declaration of 1956, in which the Soviet Union promised to transfer two islands to Japan after the conclusion of a permanent peace treaty. Importantly, however, during his visit Yeltsin did publicly apologize for the Soviet internment of the Japanese PoWs in the aftermath of World War II. This apology was welcomed by the Japanese establishment as a sign of a significant change in Russia’s attitude toward Japan (Hasegawa 2000a:184–6). It is around this time that the socio-cultural construct started its retreat from the general discourse on Russia, operating mainly in the realm of the territorial dispute. At the same time, the conception of Russia as a new country started to gain prominence in mainstream debates. Gradually, Russia came to be referred to as “newly born Russia” (shinsei roshia), to underline discontinuity with both the Soviet Union and historical “Russia” (for example, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hata Tsutomu at House of Representatives, 14 October 1993 at NDL). This distinction was also emphasized in a speech

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by Prime Minister Miyazawa when, in discussing Japan’s relations with Russia, he contrasted the “expansionist” Stalinist policies of the Soviet Union with the “new Russia,” a country on its way to becoming a “true member” of international society (speech on occasion of elections to the House of Representatives, 10 July 1993 at TD). A similar distinction between Russia and the Soviet Union can be witnessed in the speeches of Suzuki Muneo, a Diet Member from Hokkaido, who, until he was brought down by the corruption scandal in 2002, was one of key post-Cold War actors in Japan’s policy vis-à-vis Russia. While Suzuki had earlier adopted a rather uncompromising stance toward Russia, this began to change from around late 1993. He became one of the main champions of “new Russia,” stressing the need to differentiate between the “nyet (no) saying” USSR and the “new” Russia which had embarked on the process of democratization and transition to a market economy (for example, at House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 October 1993 and 28 November 1994 at NDL). Principally as a result of political instability in both countries, there was little movement in bilateral relations between Yeltsin’s visit in 1993 and 1996. In Russia, the nationalistic mood was on the rise and Yeltsin’s popularity and his political power were significantly undermined, with the majority of the parliamentary seats occupied by the opposition consisting of communists and nationalists after the 1995 elections. In Japan, in 1994, a coalition government of the two rivals, the Socialist Party and the LDP, was formed, headed by the Socialist Murayama Tomiichi. Lack of unity meant that little progress in foreign policy was achieved during the two years of the Murayama cabinet.

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In January 1996, the LDP’s new Secretary General, Hashimoto Ryu-taro-, became Japan’s Prime Minister, and it was during the premiership of Hashimoto that the notion of “new Russia” came to be reflected in Japan’s policy. A month after the June 1997 G-8 meeting at which Russia was admitted membership in the elite club of industrialized nations, Hashimoto made an unprecedented policy speech at the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai doyukai) in which he paid particular attention to Japan–Russia relations. The speech introduced new concepts that signaled the most significant change to date in Japan’s conception of Russia and became Japan’s “basic philosophy” in its relations with the northern neighbor (Tamba Minoru cited in Sato- and Komaki 2003: 100). In his speech, Hashimoto underscored his admiration for the “historical mission” of transition to market economy and democracy that Russia had embarked on. He proclaimed that, in spite of the various “legacies of the past” (principally the territorial dispute), it was clear that a new Russia was being born. Most importantly, the speech announced the introduction of the “multilayered approach,” developed by MoFA’s Russia specialists, by stating that Japan was going to build her relations with Russia based on the three principles of

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“trust, mutual benefit and long-term perspective.” While stressing that the return of the four islands remained a national goal, this speech manifested a certain isolation of the territorial dispute from other areas of bilateral relations. It recognized the need to create an appropriate atmosphere for the solution of the territorial issues through enhanced bilateral cooperation (Hashimoto, 24 July 1997 at TD). As mentioned, this drastic shift in Japan’s political relations with Russia did not signify the complete disappearance of the socio-cultural construction. As the next chapter will show, the Japanese discourse on the territorial dispute has been continuously determined by the symbiosis of the political and the socio-cultural. However, in the general political debates on Russia, the sociocultural construction withdrew to the Right-leaning fringes of the domestic discourse. Many of the authoritative commentators on Russia whose works were examined in the previous chapter, together with the more nationalist elements of the press, continued to reproduce this construction in their coverage of Russia’s current events. For example, Putin’s dealing with the Kursk submarine accident in 20001 was interpreted as a deviation from the proper behavior of a leader of a normal democratic country such as Japan or the US (Arai 2000: 109). More recently, the growing tendency towards authoritarianism under Putin has been presented by some commentators as a reversal of the process of acceptance of the “universally shared values” and as a simultaneous return to the Soviet system and the re-emergence of the Russian national character (for example, Tamba 2007, also Hakamada 2007). The general policy debates, however, from around 1997 onwards, came to be oriented towards “new Russia.” To some extent, the sources of this fundamental shift in Japan’s conception of bilateral relations are found in the concrete actions taken by the Russian government that stabilized the notion of a new Russia, driven not by ideology but by political “realism” (Nishimura 1996). Dispatches of high-level officials to Tokyo and numerous confirmations of the importance of Japan in Russia’s economic and broader foreign policy outlook, and Russia’s support for Japan’s membership in the UN Security Council (Sarkisov 2000), worked to confirm Russia’s new identity and its new relationship with Japan. At the same time, this transformation of Japan’s relations with Russia was in a mutually reinforcing relationship with other significant transformations in Japan’s political identity. On the domestic level, the discourse on Japan’s political identity underwent a process of gradual convergence towards acceptance of Japan as more deeply integrated part of the Western realm of capitalist democracy. This domestic “end of history,” to borrow the phrase made famous by Francis Fukuyama, started with a thorough reform of the Socialist (or, more precisely, the Socialist Democratic) Party’s platform in 1994, following the formation of a coalition government of the SDP, LDP and the small New Party Sakigake, under the premiership of Socialist Murayama Tomi’ichi. This involved such drastic changes as the acceptance of the US–Japan Alliance and admission of the

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constitutionality of the SDF. The relationship between this process and the emergence of “new Russia” in Japan’s political discourse had already been underscored by Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, who headed the coalition for a few weeks before resigning and handing over the reins to Murayama. In a press conference, Hata argued that for Yeltsin, an ex-member of the Soviet Communist Party, to be introducing market reforms in Russia was proof that the domestic ideological battles, led by the Socialist Party, were anachronistic and were no longer significant to contemporary politics (greetings to the Sixty-sixth Meeting of the Japan Newspapers Association on 15 June 1994 at TD). The same idea was conveyed in Murayama’s inauguration speech a month later, in which he stressed that the end of the Cold War ideological confrontation on the international level meant the end of domestic ideological struggles and the emergence of cross-party “realistic” policy debate (Inauguration Speech, 18 July 1994 at TD). The homogenization of the political identity discourse was furthered by the Socialists’ defeat in the 1996 general elections and their subsequent marginalization within domestic politics. The eventual emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 1998 as the main alternative to the LDP further consolidated Japan’s new homogenous political identity, with little fundamental ideological difference between the ruling and the opposition parties. The domestic discourse shifted further away from grand debates over the notions of democracy, economy and independence, toward more particular debates about the structure of Japan’s political system and the desired role for Japan in the post-Cold War order, taking the basic foundations of the liberal democratic order for granted (for example, see Ozawa 1994). This domestic homogenization of the political discourse went hand in hand with the process of reconfirmation of the validity and solidness of Japan’s membership in the West after a decade of trade frictions and a period of doubts and insecurity regarding the future of the US–Japan Alliance. The trade disputes were resolved and in 1996 the US–China “strategic partnership” suffered a serious setback as a result of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The US–Japan Declaration on Security Cooperation in 1996 and the revised Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation that were published in 1997 and ratified by the Diet two years later presented the new role of the alliance as the regional “stabilizer,” providing stability to the Asia-Pacific region and contributing to regional peace and prosperity. The notion of a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993), which, arguably, has become one of the dominant paradigms in American foreign policy discourse, presented Japan as one of world’s major civilizations but outside of the main challengers to the West—the Chinese and the Islamic civilizational spheres. Thus, in the second half of the 1990s the relevance of the alliance and the stability of Japan’s relations with the West/the US were re-established, now constructed vis-à-vis new threats. As will be argued below, the perception of military threat from Russia did not disappear completely from the security discourse, and its attenuation was very much a result of bilateral

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confidence-building measures as well as the emergence of new security threats. However, the relative stability of Japan’s identity as part of the realm of liberal democracy, achieved on both the domestic and international levels, and the shift towards different “others,” such as China and North Korea, in turn enabled a shift towards closer ties with Russia. This discursive intersection, in Japan’s identity construction of its membership in the West, with the “Japan/ Russia” nexus can be witnessed in the simultaneous appearance of two major research projects initiated by one of Japan’s main think-tanks on Japanese international relations, the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), in 1997/98. The first project, on “engaging Russia in Asia-Pacific,” headed by Japan’s former ambassador to Russia, Watanabe Ko-ji, issued a report that “welcomed” the “new Russia” to the Asia-Pacific; here Russia was presented not as a threatening “other” but as a country with an important and positive role to play in the region (Watanabe 1999: 12–14 and Akino 1999). The second project was devoted to the US–Japan Alliance. Headed by Nishihara Masashi, the President of the National Defense Academy, it constituted an integral part of the “reinvention” of the alliance, as it provided for a variety of new roles the alliance could and should play in the region in the wake of the dissolution of the foe it had been established to counter (Nishihara (ed.) 2000). Importantly, there were also changes in Russia’s relations with the West in the second half of the 1990s which facilitated the emergence of closer relations between Russia and Japan. Of particular importance was the decision, formally adopted in 1997, to expand NATO eastward, despite Russia’s objections and in contradiction of earlier promises given. This decision dealt an irreversible blow to the idea of the “common European home” introduced a decade earlier by Gorbachev as part of his “new thinking.” As such, it signaled the beginning of the end of Russia’s short-lived close identification with the West and resulted in a “turn to the East” in search of closer relations with the Asia-Pacific region in general (Singh 1999 and Rangsimaporn 2006). Thus, in a rather paradoxical fashion, Japan’s acceptance of Russia as a new nation, sharing basic values, was facilitated both by the consolidation of Japan’s identity as a member of the West and, simultaneously, by a further distancing of Russia from the West.

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Japan’s identity and new Russia Importantly, this reconfiguration of Japan’s relations with Russia should not be viewed as an abrupt replacement of the ultimate difference of the Soviet Union with acceptance of Russia as part of the capitalist democratic “self,” but within the above-mentioned process of reconfiguration of Soviet otherness. While the collapse of the Soviet Union was perceived as an affirmation of the supreme value of “freedom and democracy” (Edamura 1997: 31–4), “newly born” Russia confirmed Japan’s identity as a leading representative of these values with an obligation to provide guidance and assistance to Russia

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in its quest to become a “normal country” (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 54). Russia’s difference and the related hierarchy in the identity construction did not disappear, but rather, as a culmination of the process that started in the late 1980s, were relocated to the temporal realm and continued to secure Japan’s identity as a mature capitalist democracy, working towards bringing stability and prosperity to Russia as well as to other “immature” regions of the world (for example, Prime Minister Hashimoto, policy speech at CSIS, 24 September 1996 at TD). The continuous presence of this construct can also be seen in a general outline of Japan’s foreign policy, which underscored Japan’s role as a promoter and supporter of political and economic reforms in Russia designed to help Russia to become a “constructive member of the international community” (MoFA 2001: 7–9). Nevertheless, from the second half of 1990s, Japan’s relations with Russia grew more complex and more diversified. Arguably, it is precisely in this nexus of Japan’s relations with “newly born” Russia, and particularly since the separation of the territorial dispute from other areas of bilateral relations, that Japan’s identity as an economic power has been produced and reproduced. Importantly, “economic identity” here does not mean the prevalence of the economic over the military, so much as the dominance of the economic dimension in Japan’s identity as a capitalist democracy. In other words, while the need to support political and economic reform in Russia was recognized in Japan in ways that did not differ greatly from Western Europe or Northern America (for example, see Sato- and Komaki 2003: 56), the actual manifestations of this identity have been limited almost exclusively to the economic and technological realms. The circumstances of Japan’s support for Russia’s admittance to the elite G-7 club are illustrative of these changes and of the continuity in the “self/other” nexus. In 1997, succumbing to pressure from the US, Japan reluctantly supported Russia’s integration into the G-7 (Dobson 2004: 112–13), which from the 1998 Birmingham summit onwards officially became the G-8. Japan, however, was strongly opposed to Russia’s full integration into all of the economic structures of the G-7, which would at least nominally assume equality in terms of the economies of the two nations. In a press conference held after the summit, Prime Minister Hashimoto emphasized that debates on critical economic issues would continue to be held within the G-7 framework (24 June 1997 at www.kantei.go.jp). His statement can be read as an assertion of Japan’s superior economic standing over and hierarchical distinction from the “new Russia.” In November 1997, Russia was admitted to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), largely as a result of Japan’s active support for Russian membership (Hashimoto 2000: 32). This exercise of leadership was mainly due to Japanese policy makers’ desire to show their genuine commitment to the “multilayer approach,” as well as enthusiasm for and faith in Yeltsin’s desire and ability to resolve the territorial dispute generated by the Krasnoyarsk summit held earlier the same month (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 129–32). At the same time, we should also bear in mind that, unlike the elite

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club of the G-7, APEC consists of such economically diverse nations as Papua New Guinea, Thailand, the US, Japan, China etc. Membership in APEC does not assume economic equality among its members and thus, unlike the case of the G-7, Japan’s active support of Russia’s admission not only did not undermine the hierarchy but served to reconfirm Japan’s role as a major economic power. The slowness of Japan’s response to the political changes that had been taking place in Russia is often noted by academics and journalists alike. Importantly, however, after the groundbreaking re-evaluation of bilateral relations, Japan’s engagement with Russia has been fundamentally different from that of other Western nations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, other Western governments, their quasi-official affiliate bodies, as well as a virtual army of non-governmental organizations, have been engaged in building democratic institutions in Russia. These governmental and private actors have attempted to facilitate Russia’s transition to “normalcy” through involvement in such diverse areas as politics, economy, education, academia, religion and human rights (Mendelson and Glenn 2000 and Foglesong 2007: 196–218). In contrast, Japan’s engagement in Russia’s “normalization,” on both the governmental and non-governmental levels, has been focused mainly in the fields of economy and technology. It was not Japan’s political institutions, but rather the experience of post-war economic reconstruction and development, that appeared as a potentially useful model for Russia’s reforms (for example, Prime Minister Obuchi’s speech, 22 October 1998 at TD). Importantly, unlike other Western nations’ engagement with Russia, there has been a certain convergence in identity discourse that emerged both from the Japanese and the Russian elites. This has manifested itself in the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements, such as the Hashimoto–Yeltsin Plan (1997), Japan–Russia Action Plan (2003) and other documents and policy statements that established Japan’s position as an investor, supporter of economic reforms and provider of technological know-how. As such, in spite of the deadlock in the negotiations over the peace treaty and the related territorial dispute, and occasional incidents such as the shooting of a Japanese fisherman near the disputed islands by the Russian border guards in August 2006, bilateral relations have progressed rather smoothly and have not exhibited the kinds of conflict and tension frequently seen in Russia’s relations with Europe and the US. In spite of the various ups in downs in Japan’s assistance policy and its inability to deliver all that has been promised (Moltz 2001), over the years Japan has provided a significant amount of direct and indirect financial aid for such projects as housing for retired soldiers, dismantling of Russian nuclear submarines, and medical equipment and supplies for hospitals. Japan also provided low-interest loans (US$1.175 billion as of the year 2000) aimed at accelerating Russia’s economic reform, funds channeled through Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), one of Japan’s main development assistance-related institutions (MoFA website.) In 2004, loans and investment

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insurance extended to Russia accounted for over 40% of JBIC overall activities in Europe and in 2006, reflecting the growth of bilateral economic activities, reached 60% (JBIC 2005: 18 and JBIC 2007: 22). Japan has also been one of the main contributors to the IMF loans extended to Russia, committing US$6 billion out of the overall US$19.8 billion provided by the IMF between 1993 and 1999 (Yoshida 1999: 232). Japanese business engagement with Russia has been growing rapidly, reflecting Russia’s transition to the creation of a “normal” (i.e., suitable) investment environment and steady economic growth boosted by the sharp rise in oil prices. While Japanese businesses have been active in Russia since the early 1990s, bilateral trade started to pick up only in 2003, reflecting the economic recovery in both countries and Russia’s introduction of numerous legal reforms such as in customs duty and tax administration, as well as measures to protect foreign investment (Ivanov 2005: 10, see also Imoto 2003: 6–7). In 2004, Japanese cumulative investment in Russia totaled US$1.9 billion and direct investment was at US$1.35 billion, making Japan the sixthlargest investor in Russia (Bury 2004: 12). In a survey conducted by Keidanren among Japanese executives in 2004, 80% replied positively to the question whether they had an interest in doing business with Russia (cited in Anzai Kunio, interview with Tokyo Foundation, 29 March 2005, www.tkfd. or.jp). During the Soviet era, Japan’s trade relations with Russia were mostly limited to the import of natural resources and the export of machinery. Today, Japan’s economic presence in Russia is diverse and includes auto manufacturers, major banks, computer makers, large trading houses, insurance companies, food manufacturers and construction companies. Reflecting the growth in the interest of Japanese business elites in Russia, the number of corporate members in Moscow’s Japan business club more than doubled from 65 to 137 between 2003 and 2006 (Shiratori 2006: 149). In 2006, bilateral trade reached a record level of US$137.2 billion, and Russia climbed to 20th place in the list of Japan’s trading partners, above other BRIC members such as India (28th) and Brazil (29th) (Hattori 2006: 40). Japan’s most significant economic interest in Russia has probably been in the area of energy. The need to diversify its sources of oil has been constant in Japanese policy debates since the oil shocks of the 1970s. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the low prices of crude oil downgraded the importance of the energy issue within the policy agenda. The ongoing war in Iraq since 2003 and growing competition with China, India and other nations for energy resources once more made overcoming Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil one of the most important issues on the government agenda (Toichi Tsutomu, Head of the Institute of Energy Economics www.fpcj.jp/j/mres/ briefingreport/bfr_203.html). In the policy debates on the diversification of suppliers of energy resources, Russia has been designated as the most important potential alternative supplier of oil and natural gas (for example, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2004: 165 and Togo and Kayama in Ivanov 2005a). Furthermore, energy has become increasingly tied to the issue

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of national security (Defence Agency 2005). In this sense, Russia, which not so long ago had been Japan’s ultimate “other,” has come to be discussed as a contributor to Japan’s (energy) security (for example, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Hiranuma, at House of Representatives, Committee on Economy and Industry, 30 May 2003 and Toichi Tsutomu at Economy and Trade Commission, House of Representatives, 2 August 2002). Unlike other major capitalist democracies, however, neither the Japanese government nor Japan’s non-governmental organizations have felt the need to engage in the socio-political or politicized realms of Russian society. The activities of the “Japan Centers,” whose status and raison d’être are otherwise comparable to that of the British Council, for example, are symbolic of Japan’s engagement with Russia. Established in 1994 and currently operating in seven major cities in Russia, the centers engage solely in the provision of Japanese language classes and technical training for Russian specialists expected to become the “pillars of the future Russian economy,” as well as business consulting to both Russian and Japanese entrepreneurs (MoFA 2006: 4). The activities of the “Japan–Russia Youth Exchange Center” (Nihon Roshia seinen ko-ryu- senta), established in 1999 and run by MoFA, as well as the non-governmental “Japan–Russia” Association (Nichiro kyo-kai), have also been rather limited in scope, and it seems that Russia’s impressive economic growth is the central motivation for the Japanese youth who choose to participate in the exchange projects (see Uchida 2006: 63–5). The engagement of the non-governmental actors and individuals has also been generally limited to economic activities and material assistance. Japanese non-governmental organizations, such as those affiliated with the colossal Nippon Foundation2 and other, smaller organizations, have been active mainly in providing humanitarian assistance such as medical treatment support for victims of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident and other humanitarian emergencies (www.smhf.or.jp/outline/outline04.html and http:// web-japan.org/links/society). In terms of individual interactions, the number of Japanese passport holders who entered Russia reached its peak in 2006, with 97,000 visitors, but in 2007 dropped to 83,000, while the number of Russian visitors to Japan remained around 60,000 per year. In spite of growth in bilateral tourism as compared to the Soviet era, each country occupies a relatively low place in the other’s list of tourist destinations. As one of Japan’s leading Russia specialists noted, the actual interaction between the two peoples takes place mainly among specialists and academics (Shimotomai in Matsuda, Shimotomai, Takagaki and Yoshida 2005). Admittedly, there has been a certain presence of Japanese religious organizations in Russia. However, the religious missions of the apocalyptic Aum Shinrikyo sect, banned in 1995 after it carried out lethal sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo underground, as well as the continuous presence of the Buddhist So-ka Gakkai, which has about 250 members in Russia and whose activities focus mainly on organizing art exhibitions and concerts between Japan and Russia (interview with Eto- Ko-saku, 27 June 2008), can be seen neither as

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representing Japan’s mainstream discourse nor as manifestations of Japan’s identity. Furthermore, the scope of activities of these two groups is rather limited if compared with the three hundred Western church groups that already had representatives in the former Soviet Union by 1993 (in Foglesong 2007: 209). All this does not mean that what has been widely perceived in the West as the “regression of democracy” under Putin (Foglesong 2007: 220–1) has been completely ignored in Japan. The domestic media has engaged in extensive coverage of Russia’s war in Chechnya, the gradual tightening of media control in Russia and other highly politicized incidents, such as the suspected murder of former KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko in London or the murder of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Such evidence of the regression of democracy in Russia, however, has not been directly reflected in the “self/other” nexus. When the Second Chechen War started in August 1999, unlike other Western nations, which engaged in an extensive critique of human rights violations, Japan’s official stance remained largely neutral, arguing that the war was an essentially domestic matter (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 281). Japan did not have its version of the “Open Letter” signed by more than a hundred prominent “Euro-Atlantic” intellectuals, in which they expressed their worries about Russia’s “breaking away from the core democratic values” (www.newamericancentury.org/russia-20040928.htm). Neither there were calls to boycott the 2006 G-8 summit hosted by Russia, such as were issued by the American Republicans, and there were no calls from the mainstream press to the Japanese leadership to denounce Putin’s undemocratic policies. None of the Japanese think-tanks close to the political establishment issued anything similar to the 2006 report of the Council of Foreign Relations bearing the rather self-explanatory title Russia’s Wrong Direction (www.cfr.org/publication/9997/). The absence of Japan from the Carnegie Endowment for Peace’s treatise on the recent history of the West’s engagement with Russia (Trenin 2007) is rather symbolic of the distance between Japan and other members of the West in terms of engagement with Russia. Admittedly, Japan was represented as one of the core members of liberal democracy in the Engaging with Russia report (Lyne, Talbott and Watanabe 2006), authored by non-governmental representatives of the US, the UK and Japan and produced by the Trilateral Commission. However, while the Introduction states that “all three coauthors devoted significant parts of their working lives to studying and dealing with the Soviet Union and Russia” (ibid.: 5,) the Japanese representative stands out in the relative brevity of his experience of Russia. Roderic Lyne and Strobe Talbott, who represent the UK and the US respectively, both have in-depth knowledge of Russia and the Russian language and extensive experience in “engaging Russia.” In contrast, Watanabe Ko-ji, Japan’s former ambassador to Russia, whose earlier post as MoFA Deputy Minister in charge of economic affairs and later appointment as a special adviser to Keidanren perhaps typify Japan’s engagement, served in

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Russia for only three years, and, as he himself admits in the preface to the Japanese edition, has very limited knowledge of Russia’s affairs. Russia’s “resource diplomacy,” and particularly the forceful takeover of the oil and gas development project Sakhalin-II by Russia’s state-owned Gazprom, which resulted in a halving of the shares held by Japan’s Mitsui and Mitsubishi, was probably the only manifestation of Russia’s “non-democratic” identity to spur serious doubts about that country’s “normalcy” (for example, see Shiobara 2005, Kawato 2006, Hitachi 2007 and Sakaguchi 2007). Russia’s continuous expression of interest in Japan’s participation in the development of Russian energy resources, however, as well as the reassurance of a stable supply of gas to Japan from the Sakhalin-II project, seem to have stabilized Japan’s attitude toward Russia. It is true that, unlike the 2003 report, Japan’s new long-term energy strategy plan published by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in May 2006 does not contain any specific references to the Russian Far East as a potential alternative supplier of Japan’s energy (Shiratori 2006: 150). Recent developments, however, point toward further growth of bilateral relations in the area of energy. In February 2007, JBIC announced its ongoing support for Sakhalin-II, despite the Gazprom takeover. More recently, in March 2008, the Japanese government concluded an accord with Russia’s state-owned oil company, Rosneft, aimed at boosting the construction of the Japan-bound East Siberian oil pipeline. Further, during the visit of Prime Minister Fukuda to Russia in April 2008 the leaders of the two countries agreed on joint exploration of oil fields in Eastern Siberia. It would thus seem that, for the time being at least, the convergence of interests will remain stable and will not be a source of pressure for the reconfiguration of respective identities.

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6.2 The attenuation of the threat from the North The changes in the conception of Russia as a military threat deserve special attention, as generally security policy has been traditionally one of the main interest areas of both mainstream and critical IR scholarship alike, and also because this has been one of the main areas of convergence of the political and the socio-cultural constructions. This section examines the process of the gradual receding of the threat perception following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In general, it shows that the transformation in the security discourse has paralleled the emergence and stabilization of the notion of “new Russia” in the broader political discourse. Furthermore, it argues that the attenuation of the threat perception has been facilitated by the fundamental shift in Japan’s security agenda towards China and North Korea, but also achieved through ongoing confidence-building measures between the two militaries. In other words, it shows that the nature of actual interactions with the “other” can play an important role in the conception of its “otherness.” As early as 1992, Hiroyuki Kishino, a diplomat on assignment to the influential International Institute for Global Peace run by former Prime

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Minister Nakasone, noted in his assessment of Russia that the new Russia had ceased to be a military threat to Japan. Kishino presented three main reasons for this argument: the disappearance of communism as state ideology, the disintegration of the Soviet “inner empire” and the end of its expansionist policy (Kishino 1992: 2–3). This optimism was not immediately shared by the entire defense community. Like the general discourse on Russia, changes in the threat perception were gradual and developed slowly as compared, for example, with the US, whose military conducted joint military exercises with the former enemy as early as 1994. More even than the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was the broader transformation in Japan’s security discourse to respond to challenges from North Korea, China, and, later, “global terrorism,” that contributed to the decline in the threat perception. Most important of all, however, was perhaps, the bilateral “defense dialogue” conducted with Russia from 1996 onwards. As already noted, in the early 1990s Japan’s security community continued to view the Soviet Union and then Russia with strong suspicion, despite the many significant changes taking place. In general, the position of the security establishment was ambiguous, reflecting the depth of the socio-cultural construction, which denied the possibility of change in Russia’s threatening “otherness.” At the same time, however, it was impossible to ignore the dramatic changes that were taking place in Russia and in Russia’s relations with other members of the West. Japan’s security community thus continued to underscore the potential danger, even as it noted the positive changes in Russia’s military posture. While the political discourse on the Soviet Union had already started to change towards the end of the 1980s, the security debates remained essentially unchanged well until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The depth of the defense establishment’s mistrust of the Soviet Union can be witnessed in the 1991 edition of the Defense of Japan White Paper published by the Defense Agency. Around this time the Soviet Union was not only undergoing a severe economic and political crisis but also implemented a drastic reduction in Soviet troop strengths in the Far East, including those stationed on the disputed islands. The section of the report on the Soviet Union did evaluate positively the various domestic and international factors that suggested that it would be difficult for the USSR to engage in an act of aggression. However, it also noted that the military situation surrounding Japan remained unchanged, as the Soviet ground, naval and air forces in the Far East had actually been reinforced and modernized and were highly active in the area. The White Paper downplayed the importance of troop reductions by arguing that it was a mere strategic reposition, and actually signified the reorganization, modernization and rationalization of the Soviet military. The overview of the Soviet forces emphasized that the military force deployed in the Far East was larger than required for purely defensive purposes, by this obviously implying the possibility of aggressive intent on the part of the USSR (Defense Agency 1991: 44–6). A similar report written in 1992, immediately after the

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collapse of the Soviet Union, also expressed uncertainty about Russian defense policy and the future of its army, emphasizing both the military capability and the fluidity of the domestic political situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Defence Agency 1992: 16–21). The report also emphasized the difference between Europe and the Far East in terms of the Russian military posture, specifically noting that the quality of the Russian military build-up in the Far Eastern region went beyond what would be considered purely defensive capabilities. It concluded by stating the need to “follow closely the developments” in Russian politics and the military buildup (Defence Agency 1992: 50–61). The consistent suspicion directed at Russia can be seen in a statement made to the Diet Inquiry Commission on International Issues (17 December 1992) by the influential “Mister Defense Agency” (misuta bo-eicho-), Defense Advisor Seki Nishihiro. In his evaluation of the Russian military posture, he noted domestic chaos, meaning that the likelihood of Russian military aggression in Europe was minimal. At the same time he was critical of American and Western European optimism, noting that in spite of all the foreign aid, Russia was not going to change overnight. In an even more blunt fashion, Miyahara Asahiko, the Parliamentary ViceMinister of Defense, noted that it is “impossible” for the threat from Russia to decrease drastically, as Russia was the direct successor of the Soviet Union and heir to its policies (House of Representatives, National Security Committee, 14 April 1992 at NDL). Thus, despite the end of the Cold War, the Japanese security discourse continued to view Russia with strong suspicion. Until 1994, the Russian build-up in the Far East continued to be the top priority on the first page of the analysis section of annual Defense White Papers. Only since 1994 has the first page been allocated to the “military developments on the Korean Peninsula” (Nakano 2005: 42–3), as Russia’s military posture has increasingly come to be discussed mainly in the context of threats from China and North Korea (for example, Mii 1998: 76–7). The reference to China and North Korea as military threats in the National Defense Program Guidelines for Financial Year 2005 and After, published in December 2004, was the culmination of a process that had started a decade earlier. What has become known as the “North Korean nuclear crisis” started in 1993, with North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to International Atomic Energy Agency demands for special inspections of its suspected nuclear sites. As the result, North Korea’s nuclear program came to be perceived as a “grave threat” to Japan’s security (Hughes 1999: 88–9). This threat perception has been further aggravated by North Korea’s 1998 test firing of a ballistic missile that passed through Japanese air space and a number of intrusions by North Korean spy ships into Japan’s territorial waters. Since 2002 the issue of Japanese civilians kidnapped by North Korea has dominated the domestic discourse on North Korea and this, together with the North Korean nuclear program, the existence of which was confirmed by a nuclear test carried out in October 2006, has firmly placed North Korea at the top of Japan’s security agenda. As

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already noted, the “China threat” gradually emerged (or re-emerged) in the early 1990s, as Japan’s China watchers became increasingly concerned about the steep rises in military expenditure that accompanied China’s rapid economic growth, combined with a lack of Chinese transparency. The emerging threat perception was further aggravated by Chinese nuclear tests conducted between 1994 and 1996, despite pleas from Japan,and the large-scale military exercises China conducted in the Taiwan Strait on the eve of Taiwan’s presidential elections in 1996 (Drifte 2003: 43–8). Over the years, the growing rivalry between Japan and China over leadership in Asia, issues related to history and its recounting and, most importantly, the territorial dispute in the East China Sea, have deepened the conflict (Curtin 2005). However, despite the emergence of these new threatening “others” evidenced by the allocation of the first pages of the annual Defense White Paper to “developments on the Korean Peninsula,” as well as a significant reduction in Russia’s military presence on the disputed islands, the “Russian threat” was still vividly present in the security discourse until 1997. For example, in the parliamentary debates, Russia’s military might, combined with its domestic political uncertainty, was often cited as a factor contributing to instability in the Asia-Pacific region (for example, Usui Hideo, House of Representatives, National Security Committee, 23 February 1996 at NDL). In 1995 Tamba Minoru, at that time Deputy Foreign Minister and later Japan’s ambassador to Russia, explicitly stated in discussions with US officials that Russia still constituted a military threat to Japan’s security (Ferguson 2008: 80). The need to continue watching Russia and follow its policies was stressed time and again. In particular, it was Russia’s strong military, strong nationalism and the lack of predictability about its future political course that were argued as the main factors behind this ongoing need for “Russia watching” (for example, MP Machimura at House of Councilors, Sub-committee on Asia Pacific, Committee on Foreign Relations, 10 April 1996 at NDL.) The discourse started to show significant changes in 1996, the year of the above-mentioned Taiwan crisis. China’s missile tests over the Taiwan Strait and the subsequent deployment of the US navy at this point clearly overshadowed Russia’s importance in Japan’s security agenda. At the same time, however, in 1996 and in the following year there were important developments in security-related bilateral relations between Japan and Russia. These included confirmation of Russian troop reductions on the disputed islands during Russian Foreign Minister Primakov’s visit to Tokyo in November 1996, a visit to Russia by Usui Hideo, head of Japan’s Defense Agency (a post at the time equivalent to Minister of Defense) and a reciprocal visit by Russia’s Defense Minister Igor Rodionov to Tokyo the following year, during which he announced that Russia regarded neither Japan nor the US–Japan Alliance as a security threat (Sarkisov 2000: 219–21). This security dialogue was institutionalized two years later, during Head of Defense Agency Norota Ho-sei’s visit to Moscow in 1999 and reaffirmed in the Action Plan signed by Koizumi and Putin in 2003.

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Importantly, the defense dialogue was not simply a rhetorical exercise but has been implemented at the various levels of the military establishments. Between 1996 and 1998 there were two visits to Russia by the Head of Japan’s Defense Agency and one by the Chief of Staff. In 1996, Japan’s Air SelfDefense Forces’ pilots were invited to train in Russia, learning to fly one of Russia’s most advanced fighter jets and, as such, getting access to Russia’s most advanced military technology (Ferguson 2008: 86). Furthermore, in 1996 Japanese navy (MSDF) vessels participated in the tri-centennial celebration of the birth of the Russian navy, a visit reciprocated by the visit of a Russian destroyer to Japan the following year. The two navies also conducted two joint exercises in 1998 and 1999. These exercises were deeply symbolic, as they were the first time that the Japanese navy had conducted exercises with a foreign navy other than that of the US (Izuyama, Hyo-do- and Matsuura 2001: 17). Since 1998 these exchanges have continued at a steady pace. They have included visits by the Russian Chief of General Staff, commander of the Russian Pacific fleet; reciprocal visits by the Head of Defense Agency, Chairman of the Joint Staff council; goodwill visits by Russian and Japanese naval vessels; participation in bilateral search and rescue exercises; and defense research exchanges (NIDS 2000: 254–5). In Japan’s security community, these developments have been interpreted as positive and important steps in the normalization of bilateral relations (for example, Ogawa et al. 1999: 30–5 also Head of Defense Agency Kawara Tsutomu at House of Representatives, National Defense Committee, 13 April 2000 at NDL). Furthermore, since 2003, mutual visits have been implemented between military personnel from Ground SDF of the Northern Military District (the one that faces Russia and “traditionally” the most suspicious of Russian intentions)3 and its counterparts from the Russian Far Eastern Military District officers. In 2004, an unprecedented visit by the Head of the Northern Military District to the Russian Far East and a meeting with his counterpart took place. This can be seen as a further maturation in the security dialogue which has gradually progressed from symbolic visits by top officials and navy vessels to now include commanders of the units that would be in direct confrontation in the event of a military clash. The dialogue between the two militaries continues to progress steadily up till the present (Defense White Paper 2007: 365–6 at www.moda.go.jp) and even such an incident as the Russian border patrol shooting and killing of a Japanese fisherman in August 2006 was not enough to bring about a drastic change in the low level of Japan’s immediate threat perception vis-à-vis Russia (see Ministry of Defence 2007: 64–74). Furthermore, these symbolic confidence-building measures were accompanied by troop reductions that further accelerated the “fading away” of the “threat from the North” (Kawakami 1998: 43). By 1997 the Russian military presence on the islands had been reduced to 3,500 troops (Valliant 1999: 159). The Russian military build-up in the Far Eastern mainland has also undergone significant reductions. By 2001, the ground forces had been reduced by over 30%, the navy by 50% and the air force by 60% as compared to 1992

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levels (Kan 2001). Japanese troops in the Northern Military District are also scheduled for significant reduction as part of the new defense doctrine introduced in the National Defense Program Guidelines for Financial Year 2005 and After and the Mid-Term Defense Program. In general, the new defense doctrine emphasizes the low probability of a direct invasion of Japan and stresses the emergence of new acute threats to Japan’s security, namely terror, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the stationing of ballistic missiles in the region. In geographical terms, the defense priorities have been shifted from “defending the North” to the remote (and rich in natural resources) islands in Southwestern Japan, where the interests of Japan and China clash. The reduction of troops facing Russia is to include a one-third reduction of tanks and artillery, and reduction of the 11th brigade (7,200 troops) stationed on Hokkaido to the size of a brigade (2,000 to 4,000 troops) (Asahi Shimbun 2004: 4). To summarize, the emergence of new threats in the second half of the 1990s led to a significant transformation in Japan’s security discourse on Russia, which was entrenched by the bilateral confidence-building measures that accompanied the shift in Japan’s relations with “newly born” Russia. The global “war on terror,” cooperation between Japan and Russia in North Korea-related issues and the institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis have all led to a certain convergence of the security agendas of both nations and contributed to further attenuation of the Russian threat perception in Japan’s security debates. However, despite this significant improvement in bilateral relations, the mistrust of Russia and anxiety regarding its future policies, (re)produced by the socio-cultural construct and the related deadlock in the territorial dispute, continues to lurk in the background as an unspoken subtext of the security discourse. The evidence is rather anecdotal but it points toward the continuous presence of a certain mistrust of Russia among the members of the defense community. In an article published in a Right-leaning journal, Head of Cabinet Secretariat National Security Desk Sassa Atsuyuki argued that one of the main reasons for Japan’s aid to the Russian Far East is to create sympathy toward Japan among the residents of the area and soldiers serving there, in case the Russian government should decide to attack Japan with missiles (Sassa 1999). However, while this statement can be interpreted as an attempt at humor, similar kinds of worry about the unpredictability of Russia’s policy have been present in other statements and publications by members of the security community. For example, there have been also occasional references to Russian “traditional” paranoia and its fear of being besieged (for example, Kawai Katsuyuki at House of Representatives, Committee on US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 24 May 1999). Yeltsin’s sudden resignation was met with an expression of worries by many defense analysts about the generally unpredictable nature of Russia’s policy (Ogawa et al 1999: 35). Elsewhere, it has been pointed out that, in the future, Russia’s recovery of economic strength will result in its re-emergence as a “great

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power” on a par with China (Soiya Yoshihide, testimony in front of House of Councilors, Committee on International Affairs, 7 March 2001 at NDL). In 2002, in what seems to be a repetition of the earlier debates on Russia, Moriya Takemasa, Head of the Defense Bureau, Defense Agency, provided a rather ambiguous evaluation of Russia in a testimony in front of the Diet. While positively noting the significant military reduction as compared to the Cold War years, Moriya emphasized the large scale of the Russian military in the Far East and its nuclear capability. He further noted that the Defense Agency has a “significant interest” in the developments related to the Russian military in the Far East (House of Councilors, Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories, 18 March 2002 at NDL). In 2003 one of analytical papers published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), affiliated with the Defense Ministry, examined possible scenarios for longterm changes in the Russian military stance in the Far East, even mentioning the possibility of a Russian confrontation with the US (and by implication also with Japan) in the Far East arising from conflicting interests in the region (Mii 2003). A more recent report on Japan’s Asia diplomacy in the twentyfirst century, published by the Institute for International Policy Studies, described both Russia and China as having “vestiges” (zanshi) of the Cold War and stated that the idea that the security environment in Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different from Europe remains the governmental vision of the region (Hoshiyama 2007: 11). We can thus plausibly argue that mistrust of Russia’s military intentions, while significantly ameliorated as the result of bilateral measures and changes in the regional and global security environment, has not disappeared, but continues to reside on the fringes of a security discourse that is generally oriented towards new threats and different “others.”

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The idea of the Northern Territories

7.1 Post-Cold War negotiations Notwithstanding the important transformations that have occurred on the bilateral, regional and international levels since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as of September 2008, the prospects for a breakthrough in the territorial dispute seem as distant as they were at the height of the Cold War. This chapter first outlines the post-war history of bilateral negotiations and shows that, over the years, there have been only very limited changes in the Japanese discourse on the Northern Territories. I next examine the current role of the dispute in the construction of Japan’s identity, which, arguably, contributes to the perpetuation of that country’s elite’s reluctance to consider a territorial compromise, and thus to a perpetuation of the dispute. As opposed to the almost three decades of Soviet-era denial of even the existence of a dispute, Russia’s explicit acknowledgment of the dispute and of the basic need to reach a solution has led to multiple negotiations and proposals toward a possible resolution. Many of the details of these remained unavailable to the public until the 2002 “Suzuki Muneo affair” led to the airing of a clearer picture of the bilateral negotiations and the two countries’ respective positions. Suzuki, a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Member of Diet from Hokkaido’s Nemuro, a city of about 30,000 and the one closest to the disputed islands, served as the head of the Hokkaido and Okinawa Development Agency during the second Hashimoto cabinet (November 1996 to July 1998) and as a Vice Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Obuchi cabinets (July 1998 to April 2000). Over the years, Suzuki was able to acquire very considerable influence within MoFA, particularly regarding Japan’s policy towards Russia. Suzuki’s rivalry with the newly appointed Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko (the first Koizumi cabinet, 2001) led to a number of widely publicized scandals. After a series of revelations in the press, presumably leaked by his opponents within MoFA (Honda 2002: 217), Suzuki was forced to resign from the LDP. In 2002 he was arrested on corruption charges related to a construction project that was part of Japan’s humanitarian assistance program to the Russian residents of the disputed islands. Under intensive media scrutiny, it was revealed that from the second half of the 1990s,

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Japanese policy toward Russia had been largely dominated by the trio of Suzuki and two other MoFA bureaucrats: Sato- Masaru (nicknamed the Japanese Rasputin), at that time Senior Analyst in the International Information Bureau and To-go- Katsuhiko, former head of the Eurasia Bureau and Japan’s Ambassador to the Netherlands. The scandal resulted in an extensive shuffling of personnel, numerous dismissals of MoFA bureaucrats affiliated with Suzuki, a number of arrests and attempts to reform MoFA’s structure and the relations of MoFA bureaucrats with politicians (Asahi Shimbun 2002: 13). Most important for present purposes, however, the power struggle within MoFA led to the extensive leaking of information and exposure of the previously unpublicized dynamics of the post-Cold War negotiations over the territorial dispute. Arguably, the most striking feature of this process as it was revealed was that, while Russia’s position evolved from a rigid denial of the existence of a territorial dispute to a basic agreement to transfer at least part of the disputed territory to Japan, Japan’s position remained largely unchanged in its demand for the return of all of the four islands. No doubt, the decoupling of the territorial dispute from other bilateral issues1 in itself constituted a change in Japan’s position. Furthermore, unlike the earlier simple demand for immediate return of all the four islands, the post-Cold War era saw Japan propose various scenarios for their return. Notwithstanding these changes, however, the basic demand for the return of all four islands remained intact throughout the post-Cold War years. As far back as October 1991, Japan’s Foreign Minister Nakayama carried with him on his official visit to Moscow a secret proposal symbolic of Japan’s emerging recognition of the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union. Unlike the earlier demands for the “return of four islands at once” (yonto- ikkatsu henkan), this proposal offered Japan’s flexibility in terms of the timing and modality of the return of the islands, in exchange for immediate Soviet recognition of Japan’s sovereignty over the Northern Territories (Satoand Komaki 2003: 22–3). This change in Japan’s stance on the return of the islands was confirmed a few months later, during the January 1992 meeting between Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio and Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister of the newly independent Russia (Hasegawa 1995: 109). Russia’s response came in the form of a secret proposal carried to Tokyo by Kozyrev during his March 1992 visit. While Gorbachev’s concession during his April 1991 visit to Tokyo had been limited to acceptance of the four islands as objects of future negotiations, the proposal brought by Kozyrev envisaged the conclusion of a peace treaty, accompanied by the transfer of the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan in accordance with the 1956 Declaration. It also included plans for continued negotiations regarding the status of the remaining two islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu. This change in Russia’s position constituted not only a radical departure from three decades of outright Soviet denial of the existence of any territorial dispute, but also a concrete plan for the resolution of the dispute and, most important of all, complete normalization of bilateral relations. During this period, the US

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administration pushed Japan to find a solution for the territorial dispute as part of its broader policy of integrating Russia into a US-led “new world order” (Asahi Shimbun 2002: 4, also Sato- and Komaki 2003: 27–8 and To-go2007: 167–8). However, despite this ground-breaking shift in Russia’s position, as well as the American pressure, the Japanese side failed to respond to this initiative and momentum for resolution of the dispute was lost as bilateral relations started to cool from the latter half of 1992. Yeltsin’s abrupt cancellation of his visit to Tokyo, mentioned in the previous chapter, was the culmination of this process. During and in the aftermath of Yeltsin’s visit to Tokyo in October 1993, a number of new ideas were introduced as guiding principles in the bilateral search for a resolution of the territorial problem. The Tokyo Declaration, agreed to by Russian President Yeltsin and Japan’s Prime Minister Hosokawa during this visit, is still regarded in Japan as the basic framework for any resolution of the dispute regarding sovereignty over the four islands, in which the two sides agreed to work towards a resolution based on “historical and legal facts,” “bilateral agreements” and the “principles of law and justice.” In 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto introduced the policy of a “multilayered approach” based on the three principles of “trust, mutual benefit and long-term perspective” to replace the earlier policy of “expanded equilibrium” vis-à-vis Russia. He also proposed to find a way past “a winner/loser dichotomy” in the search to resolve the territorial issue. The strong personal bond that gradually developed between Hashimoto and Yeltsin facilitated the drafting during the November 1997 Krasnoyarsk summit of an optimistic declaration which stated both parties’ intentions to solve the territorial dispute and to conclude a bilateral peace treaty by the year 2000. This optimistic plan, introduced unexpectedly by Yeltsin during the summit, did not include any detailed guidelines for achieving its goals. Japan’s concrete proposals for the solution of the dispute and conclusion of a treaty were presented during Yeltsin’s reciprocal visit to Japan in April 1998. During what came to be known as the Kawana summit, Hashimoto presented Yeltsin with a detailed proposal based on scenarios developed by MoFA’s Russia specialists. The proposal suggested approaching the territorial problem and the conclusion of a peace treaty not as a dispute but rather as a border delineation issue; the proposed clarified border between Japan and Russia would be drawn between the islands of Etorofu (Iturup) and Uruppu (Urup), locating all of the disputed islands within Japan’s territory. The plan also envisaged a separate bilateral agreement to determine the actual timing and the modalities of the transfer of the islands, and assured Japan’s recognition of the legality of Russia’s administrative control during this transitional period (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 172–97). While the Japanese negotiators presented this scenario to their Russian counterparts as a significant compromise in Japan’s position, the concessions contained in this proposal, namely the abolition of the demand for immediate return of the islands and the softening of the language in which the territorial

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issue was described, were largely symbolic and did not constitute a significant departure from Japan’s earlier demands. It was, in essence, little more than a repetition of the 1991–92 Nakayama/Watanabe proposal noted earlier. Incidentally, neither of the other two scenarios developed by MoFA on the eve of the summit (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 154–67) envisaged any changes in the scope of the actual territory to be transferred to Japan. Russia’s rejection of the Kawana proposal, in the form of a counterproposal for the conclusion of an interim peace treaty and continuous negotiations regarding the status of the islands, was conveyed to Japan five months later, when Obuchi Keizo- (who had replaced Hashimoto as Japan’s Prime Minister) visited Moscow in November 1998. The brief written response given to Obuchi by Yeltsin during their five-minute meeting stated that while Russia hoped to continue negotiations regarding the status of the islands, the Kawana proposal did not constitute a compromise in Japan’s position, was counter to the principle of a “mutually acceptable solution” and would be acceptable neither to the Russian public nor the Duma (Russia’s lower house of parliament) (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 250–1). After Russia’s rejection of the border delineation scenario, the territorial dispute as well as bilateral relations in general disappeared from the priority lists of both Moscow and Tokyo, as both societies underwent major political changes. In Russia, the deterioration of Yeltsin’s health and sharp drop in his domestic popularity undermined his ability, and perhaps desire, to pursue negotiations with Japan and to entertain territorial concessions which could inflict further damage to his shrinking legitimacy. On 31 December 1999 Yeltsin suddenly resigned and designated the previously little-known Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as Acting President. In March 2000, Putin was elected as Russia’s second President. Meanwhile, in Japan, Mori Yoshiro replaced Obuchi as Japan’s Prime Minister after the latter’s sudden collapse in April 2000. Arguably, it was during the short-lived Mori premiership (April 2000 to April 2001) that Japan and Russia came closest to reaching a breakthrough in the territorial impasse. The March 2001 Irkutsk summit between Mori and Putin, held two and a half years after Obuchi’s visit to Moscow, did not lead to any concrete plans, partly because Mori’s resignation from the premiership was already considered a fait accompli, but it did generate a momentum for further negotiations. On the eve of the summit, Putin came out with an unprecedented statement that was in effect the first explicit acknowledgment in forty years by a Soviet/Russian leader of the validity of the 1956 bilateral declaration stipulating the transfer of the two islands of Shikotan and Habomai. (In 1960, after revision and renewal of the US–Japan Security Treaty, the Soviet Union had refused to carry out transfer of the islands, citing a change in circumstances.) Russia was now openly showing its readiness to honor the agreement and to transfer the two islands to Japan, along with conclusion of the peace treaty. On the Japanese side, the dominance of the pragmatic Suzuki–To-go-–Sato- trio in shaping Japan’s Russia policy, spurred by Mori’s pressing need to produce certain achievements in foreign policy to counter the

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sharp decline in his domestic popularity (brought on by a number of gaffes and mishandling of the Ehime Maru incident),2 led to a proposal for “simultaneous parallel negotiations” (do-ji heiko- kyo-gi), or the “two wheels theory” (kuruma no ryo-rinron). Neither this momentum nor the presence of the “two wheels theory” in Japan’s policy was long lived, however, due to the eruption of Suzuki Muneo affair in December 2001. The series of scandals triggered by the power struggle for control of MoFA, waged between Suzuki Muneo and the eccentric Tanaka Makiko (appointed Foreign Minister April 2001–January 2002 by Koizumi as an expression of gratitude for her earlier support in his quest for premiership), brought an end to the behind-the-scenes negotiations and virtually paralyzed Japan’s Russia policy, as many of the key actors, including the members of the “Suzuki trio,” were purged from their positions. Negotiations on the status of the islands and toward the conclusion of a peace treaty entered a “dormant season”; Japan’s position relapsed into that of the Cold War era—the simple demand for the return of the four islands (Sato- 2003: 263 and Iwashita 2005a: 10–14). During and in the aftermath of this period of “confusion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (NIDS 2003: 245) the “simultaneous parallel negotiations” line pursued by the trio was often presented in the Japanese press as a de facto acceptance of two (smaller) islands and thus a betrayal of the national cause (for example, Saito- 2002: 8–93). Some observers have therefore interpreted the Suzuki affair as a struggle between hardliners and more flexible elements within MoFA. The exact details of the negotiations are still unclear, but it seems that the scandal and the related information leaks had more to do with factional power struggles within MoFA than with ideological rivalry regarding Japan’s Russia policy. The “simultaneous parallel negotiations” plan apparently envisaged the conclusion of a peace treaty, along with a transfer of the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan, but also a simultaneous continuation of negotiations regarding the status of the other two islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 286–335 also, Sato- 2005a: 65 and To-go- 2007). If this was indeed the case, the scenario developed by the trio never meant giving up all the claims to the other two islands and, while drawing strong criticism from such powerful figures as Suetsugu Ichiro (for example, see Suetsugu 2000), the most influential private individual in Japan’s Russia policy, in general did not deviate from the initial aim of achieving the return of all the four islands. In the wake of the Suzuki affair there were other, perhaps symbolic, changes in the domestic discourse. Wada Haruki, a Left-leaning historian and professor emeritus of Tokyo University who portrayed the territorial dispute as the historical clash of two imperial expansionisms over Ainu land (Wada 1999) and who, since the 1980s, has criticized the foundations of the mainstream discourse on Northern Territories as historically inconsistent, was invited in 2002 to speak on Japan–Russia relations in front of the Diet Commission on Okinawa and the Northern Territories. In his statement, he repeated his interpretation of the history of the dispute and defended the “gradual

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solution” pursued by the Suzuki trio as a pragmatic approach that did not contradict the basic conception of all the four islands as Japanese territory (11 July 2002 at NDL). Japan’s delegation to the bilateral Council of Wise Men3 included no members affiliated with the hard-line Council on National Security Problems (headed by Suetsugu Ichiro until his death in 2001), whose presence has previously been dominant in similar government-sponsored bilateral forums. Instead, Shimotomai Nobuo, a professor of International Relations at Hosei University who has taken a rather moderate stance on the territorial issue, was Japan’s only Russia specialist present. These developments were no doubt more symbolic than constituting a real change in position. In 2005, the rationale of the “four islands at once” stance was challenged in a widely publicized book written by one of Japan’s leading scholars on Russia, Iwashita Akihiro. The following year, in 2006, the book received the prestigious 2006 Osaragi Jiro- prize for criticism. In contrast with earlier critiques of the mainstream discourse, which questioned the soundness of its historical or legal foundations, Iwashita (2005a) challenged the very basis of the unbending demand for the return of all the four islands by questioning its consistency with Japan’s national interest. Through examining the recent successful resolution of Russia’s territorial dispute with China, achieved on the basis of equal division of the disputed territory and which substantively facilitated further deepening of bilateral relations, Iwashita argued the need for Japan to take a compromise position in order to achieve a breakthrough in the territorial impasse. Besides the historical inconsistency in the mainstream narrative, argued Iwashita, the persistent rigid demand for all four islands did not serve Japan’s present national interests and in fact only perpetuated the dispute. It seems that the argument, perhaps because of its specific reference to Japan’s national interest, found resonance in Japanese political circles. In December 2006, Foreign Minister Aso- publicly mentioned the possibility of an equal division of the disputed territory during Diet interpolations, possibly reflecting the impact of Iwashita’s argument. However, similarly to an earlier sensational remark by LDP Secretary-General Nonaka Hiromu, who stated publicly in 2000 that the territorial dispute should not preclude the conclusion of a peace treaty with Moscow, Aso-’s statement met with a fierce critique from the conservative press and from within MoFA, and was quickly eliminated from the political discourse. Aso- himself was quick to state that he had been referring to just to one of existing ideas and not expressing a change in Japan’s official position (Sankei Shimbun 15 December 2006 at sankei.co.jp). His successor, Machimura Nobutaka, categorically dismissed the idea of a territorial compromise, stating that the equal division of the territory is unthinkable, and the governmental position remained the demand for the return of “four islands at once” (Sankei Shimbun 30 August 2007 at sankei.co.jp). Tamba Minoru, one of former key actors in Japan’s Russia policy and a onetime ambassador to Russia (1999–2002), who currently often comments on bilateral relations in the domestic press, rejected the possibility of a territorial

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compromise on similar grounds, arguing that such a proposal was based on irrational assumptions and undermined Japan’s national interest and the “basic principles of the Japanese state” (nihon kokka no genrigensoku) (Tamba 2007: 240 also see Watanabe 1999a: 72 for a similar argument). In this way, the idea of territorial compromise surfaced briefly but was quickly eliminated from the domestic discourse as damaging the “basic principles” of Japan. Incidentally, Japan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), despite its continuous efforts to establish its differences from the ruling LDP, shares the demand for Russia’s recognition of Japan’s sovereignty over all the four islands (for example, see Hatoyama 2006). To summarize, during the post-Cold War years, Russia’s position evolved rapidly from the Soviet-era denial of the existence of any territorial dispute, to Gorbachev’s reluctant admittance of the existence of the dispute, toward willingness to return two islands to Japan and to engage in negotiations regarding the status of the other two. On the other hand, any changes in the Japanese policy discourse have been largely cosmetic; plans expressing flexibility regarding the timing and modalities of the return of the islands were forwarded, but the underlying demand for the return of all of the four islands remained unchanged. In the meantime Russia, perhaps frustrated by Japan’s inflexibility and fortified by its newly acquired economic prowess, withdrew to a much more rigid position. In November 2004 Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov stated in an interview on Russian television that Russia was prepared to honor the 1956 Declaration. The next day, this statement was reiterated by Putin (in Ferguson 2008: 114). This, however, was the last public statement by Russia’s government that implied readiness to return parts of the disputed territory as part of a permanent peace settlement. During a press conference conducted on 31 January 2006 Putin mentioned the Yalta Agreement (1945), the Potsdam Declaration (1945) and the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1952) as the principal legal documents to be referenced in determining the status of the disputed territories. The mentioning of the Yalta Agreement, which allocated the Kuriles to the Soviet Union and whose validity Japan denies, and the contrasting failure to reference the 1956 Joint Declaration, have been widely interpreted in Japan as an attempt to justify Russian possession of the islands and as a hardening of the Russian position (Asahi Shimbun 2006: 2). In August the same year, further evidence of this hardening was seen in the Russian government’s announcement of a US$630 million plan to develop the entire Kurile, chain including the disputed islands. The actual implementation of this plan and its place in bilateral relations remain undetermined, but it seems that final resolution of the territorial dispute is further than ever from realization.

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Northern Territories and Japan’s national interest Despite the fact that “national interest,” the “basic principles of Japan” and even “rationality” were the dominant concepts in the dismissal of the

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territorial compromise and have been an integral part of the irredentist discourse, these notions are rarely subjected to examination or interrogation. Here I wish to argue that neither economic nor strategic interests can be seen as the driving force behind the rigidity of Japan’s position. As for strategic considerations, Kimura Hiroshi is generally correct in arguing that, should Japan regain control over the islands, it could, as a sovereign state, legitimately choose to station its own or US troops there (Kimura 2006: 38). Such a scenario, however, seems to be more theoretical than grounded in realistic possibilities. Nor does it generally feature in the debates on the Northern Territories. Rather, in the dominant discourse, strategic or other real politik interests tend to be excluded or even juxtaposed with Japan’s “core principles,” loyalty to and protection of which are given as the main motives in the quest for the return of the islands (for example, Watanabe 1999a: 72). Moreover, it is hard to imagine that anybody in the Japanese policy-making community seriously believes that Russia would ever agree to any settlement that would allow for the stationing of Japanese or US troops or military facilities on the islands following their transfer to Japanese jurisdiction. Furthermore, as perception of the “China threat” continues to grow within Japan’s defense and political establishment, it can be argued that a territorial compromise facilitating complete normalization of Japan’s relations with Russia would better serve Japan’s strategic interests than the current policy, which, as even the champions of the irredentist cause concede (for example, Hakamada 2006), is unlikely to bring any tangible results in the foreseeable future. In terms of economic interests, the minimal-scale economic benefits to be gained by the return of the islands were confirmed to the author by one of Japan’s leading academic experts on Russia, Ueno Toshihiko, who criticized Japan’s rigidity and noted that in strictly economic terms it is cheaper for Japanese business to purchase the marine products originating in the seas surrounding the islands from Russia than it is to engage directly in fishing and seaweed harvesting (Interview, 27 June 2003). From the other side of the political spectrum, the secondary positioning of economic benefits within the irredentist agenda was confirmed by one of the leading activists and associates of the late Suetsugu Ichiro, who explained to the author that “we aspire for the return of the islands because we are Japanese. We do not expect to gain any material benefits from it” (Interview with Fukiura Tadamasa, General Director of Tokyo Foundation, 14 December 2005, see also Watanabe 1999a: 72). Importantly, however, the inflexible quest for “inherent territory” not only falls short in terms of advancing Japan’s general economic interests but, in some ways conflicts with the interests of the Japanese residents whose livelihood is directly affected by the dispute. It is worth noting that the initial rationale of the early irredentist movement was economic, in ways similar to Japan’s other ongoing territorial disputes: Takeshima/Dokto with South Korea and Senkaku/ Diaoyu with China and Taiwan, which also have their roots in the Cold War context of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan (Hara 2001). Economic motives, specifically the fisheries in adjacent waters, were central to the

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original irredentist movement that arose among the expelled residents and Hokkaido dwellers whose livelihood was intrinsically dependent on the “Northern Territories.” This economic importance of the islands was stressed repeatedly in the petitions submitted to the American Occupation authorities between 1945 and 1948 urging the transfer of the islands from Soviet to American control, as well as in the 1950 Hokkaido Assembly resolution, in which the islands were argued to be a vitally important source of protein for the nation (Kobayashi (ed.) 1950 also see Kuroiwa 2007). Ando- Ishisuke, the mayor of Nemuro, dubbed the father of the irredentist movement (for example, www. hoppou-d.or.jp/05_undou/01_undou-si.html and Kamisaka 2005: 115–38) and who was the initiator of these petitions, himself owned a farm and was involved in running a crab cannery on Shikotan Island (Kuroiwa 2007: 55). The economic aspect of the Northern Territories dispute did not disappear from the discourse following its appropriation by the state and its gradual transformation into a national mission during the 1950s and 1960s. The fishing rights of Japanese vessels in the waters surrounding the disputed islands as well as in the broader Northwest Pacific have been an integral part of Japan’s agenda vis-à-vis the Soviet Union/Russia since the conclusion of the SovietJapanese Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention in 1956. Furthermore, “poaching” by Japanese fishing boats in the waters surrounding the islands and the Soviet/Russian seizure of many of these boats, accompanied by numerous arrests, confiscations and, on occasion, deaths of Japanese fishermen, have been a source of continuous tensions in bilateral relations (for example, Nakagawa 1981). In the case of Japan’s other territorial disputes with neighboring states, rationally understood economic interests have consistently played an important role in shaping Japan’s policy discourse and have prevailed over a more effective “nationalist” agenda (for example, see Ferguson 2004 and Koo 2005). In contrast, the appropriation of the Northern Territories issue by the central government and its subsequent “nationalization” have not only resulted in its gradual shift away from its pragmatic origins but actually brought policy into tension with the economic agenda of the residents of Nemuro, whose fishing industry is most deeply impacted by the dispute. This tension was already visible in 1959, when Japan’s Fishery Association urged the government to give up the territorial claims in order to secure better fishery terms with the Soviet Union (cited in Morley 1962: 53). An article dedicated to the problems faced by the Nemuro fishermen, published in Chu-o- Ko-ron in 1963, argued that the nationalist sentiment over the lost territory was far superseded among local fishermen by concerns about making a living and breaking out from their current miserable conditions. One of those interviewed argued that it did not matter who came (to rule over their land), as they did not trust anybody anyway; the only thing that did matter was the bettering of their living conditions (Natsubori 1963). This discrepancy between the central government’s agenda and local people’s livelihoods, which was obscured within the global bipolar rivalry during the Cold War, has in recent years surfaced in

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the form of frustration among Nemuro residents with the government’s rigid position and the continuous impasse. As can be seen from the opinion polls on the Northern Territories dispute conducted among Hokkaido residents, the Japanese government’s position of insisting on the simultaneous return of all of the islands is not supported, as lacking in realism and merit, by a significant percentage of Nemuro residents (see Iwashita 2005a and 2006). The re-election of Suzuki Muneo to the Diet in September 2005 also underlines the dominance of pragmatic interest over nationalist sentiment among the Nemuro electorate. As already noted, at the height of the scandal Suzuki was widely portrayed as the “traitor” in the media and reported even to have denied Japan’s need for the islands.4 At the same time, as one of the key figures in Japan’s Russia policy, over the years he has brought considerable economic benefits to his constituency. Most importantly, Suzuki played a leading role in promoting and securing a local-level fishery agreement between Nemuro and Russian Sakhalin district in 1998, opening the way for a limited legal fishing by Japanese boats in the waters around the disputed islands (Honda 2002: 216). Most recently, this dissatisfaction with the government’s position was given explicit voice by Nemuro’s mayor, Fujiwara Hiroshi, in a statement made at the local municipal assembly. The statement, which later appeared in the form of an opinion piece in Asahi Shimbun, emphasized the need to reconsider the “four islands at once” position in order to achieve a breakthrough in the current stalemate (Fujiwara 2006). The importance of this critique originating in Nemuro is all the greater because the city has a deep symbolic significance for the irredentist movement: Nemuro was not only the economic “mother” city of the four islands in the pre-1945 period and the place where many of the original residents of the islands found refuge after their forced expulsion, it was also the center of the grass-roots movement for the return of Soviet-seized islands and is generally perceived as the birthplace of the current irredentist movement. Fujiwara’s statement, however, was dismissed by Japan’s Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, Koike Yuriko, as merely “a view of an individual” in a statement that reconfirmed Japan’s adherence to the four islands demand (cited in Kimura 2006: 30). This growing estrangement of the irredentist discourse from its economic origins can be also witnessed in the various government-sponsored publications designed to “enlighten” the Japanese public about the issue. Here, the natural resources of the islands, which were initially perceived in purely economic terms, are transformed into pastoral depictions of the flora and fauna of the lost homeland, and the term “resources” (shigen) is replaced by the idyllic “nature” (shizen) (for example, see Hoppo-ryo-do Mondai Taisaku Kyo-kai 2003: 4–5).

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Northern Territories and public opinion If Japan’s economic and strategic interests actually favor compromise on the territorial issues, is it possible that domestic public opinion and pressure

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groups are an explanatory factor in Japan’s continuing pursuit of the complete and immediate return of “inherent territory”? The activities of the organizations of former residents of the disputed islands have been mainly restricted to Hokkaido and their lobbying activities focus more on expanding Japanese governmental support to the expelled residents and less on gaining the return of the islands. Furthermore, the grass-roots activities conducted by the former residents have an increasingly low profile and impact. A number of reasons may account for this. As of 2002, the number of first-generation expellees (people with actual experience of living on the four islands) has decreased from the original 17,000 to 8,600 (Asahi Shimbun 2002: 29). Many of the expellees and their descendants have given up hope (or even the desire) of returning to the islands; their main goal has become to visit ancestral graves, the possibility of which was already restored in 1991 during Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency. Furthermore, a large number of the second- and third-generation descendants of former residents show little interest in the activities and the irredentist mission, as their lives are established on the “mainland” on Hokkaido and other parts of Japan (Nakamura 2000: 96–7). Personal visits by the author to the former residents’ organizations on Hokkaido and interviews with activists conducted in July and August 2003 provided confirmation that the number of activists and their activities are on the decline. Professor Arai Nobuo of Hokkaido University, who has worked closely with the grass-roots organizations, expressed the view that the movement is sustained from above and that, without extensive support from the state, it faces extinction (Interview conducted on 2 July 2003). Most of the interviewed activists from irredentist organizations expressed their concern that the younger generation is not interested in the Northern Territories issue and voiced the possibility that the movement might die with them. Even those descendants of former residents who do engage in some kind of activism have lived their lives since birth on Hokkaido and few have concrete plans to move to the islands, should Japan regain control (Interviews conducted in Sapporo and Nemuro 2–7 July 2003, see also similar argument in Nakamura 2000: 98–9). On the national level, public support for the rigid position taken by the government has been steadily declining. In a public opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in September and October 1998 a majority of the respondents (35%) favored “first two islands” solution over the “four islands at once” (28%). Furthermore, an overwhelming majority (56%) chose “economic cooperation” as the most important issue in bilateral relations, when only 33% argued the priority of the territorial issue (Asahi Shimbun 31 October 1998: 6 also see Asahi So-ken Report 1998). A similar poll conducted two years later by the more center-leaning Nihon Keizai Shimbun has confirmed this trend, as 34% of those polled favored the “two islands” solution over insistence on the “four islands” (32.1%). Importantly, 26% of those polled, when replying to the same question, suggested that the territorial dispute should not be made a priority in bilateral relations (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 21 September 2000). Even a poll on bilateral relations conducted by the

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conservative Yomiuri Shimbun in early September 2006, at the height of bilateral tensions and extensive media coverage surrounding the Russian coastguard’s killing of a Japanese “poacher” in the waters near the disputed islands three weeks earlier, did not show an overwhelming public support for the “four islands at once” position. While this stance managed to get the majority of responses (39.5%), other, less rigid options combined accounted for 45.2% of the votes (Yomiuri Shimbun 8 October 2006: 12). Furthermore, despite continuing government efforts to keep it alive, interest in the territorial issue and in Japan’s relations with Russia in general seems to be on the decline. It is true that, over the decades of activities, the “return movement” has managed to collect seven million signatures nationwide demanding the return of the islands. This, however, would seem to be the full extent of most people’s participation in this issue (Nakamura 2000: 101–2). For example, in a public opinion poll regarding various parties’ platforms, conducted in August 2005, only 16% of those polled singled out the solution of the “Northern Territories problem” as a priority issue for Japanese diplomacy as compared to “solving North Korea’s nuclear weapons and abductees issues” (55%), “improving relations with China, Korea and other neighboring countries” (50%) and “engaging in global environmental issues” (27%) (www.nikkei-r.co.jp/phone/results/popup/y200508b.html.) In general opinion polls on Japan’s foreign relations conducted annually by the Cabinet Office, the popularity of Russia continues to be quite low as compared with the US and even China (www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html). In 2003, for example, only 20% of those polled expressed affinity (shitashimi) towards Russia. At the same time, however, monthly Jiji Press surveys show that the percentage of Japanese who choose Russia among the hated nations (kirai na kuni) has been continuously decreasing, and in 2005 (January– August) it averaged 19.5%, as compared with an average of 39.7% for the second half of the 1990s (in Central Research Services at www.crs.or.jp/57512. htm). Russia still occupies third place among the most hated countries after North Korea and China, and is followed by South Korea and the United States (sic!).5 At the same time, however, in terms of the importance of various countries and regions to Japan, the same polls locate Russia fairly low. Responding to a question on which country/region is important to Japan, Russia (8.7% in November 2006) is located somewhere between the Middle East (6.4%) and Europe (11%) and far lower than the generally liked (and also fifth most hated) US (60%), but also the largely disliked China (65.9%) (Jiji Tsu-shinsha 2006: 11). These figures show that the lack of progress in the territorial dispute does not seem to have strongly affected public feelings toward Russia: the Cold War antipathy toward the Soviet Union that lasted well into the 1990s seems to be giving way to indifference and lack of interest. In general, public opinion has been consistently unfavorable and has become increasingly indifferent and passive towards Russia. At the same time, however, it has been increasingly in favor of finding a pragmatic solution to the territorial dispute when confronted directly with this issue.

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Thus, we can plausibly conclude that the production and reproduction of the Northern Territories issue in Japan’s political and public discourses has been occurring independently of and possibly even counter to economic and strategic interests; at the same time, this policy can hardly be interpreted as a manifestation of a strong public sentiment. Recently even the most vocal critics of territorial compromise have tended to implicitly agree with Iwashita and admit that the chances of Russia submitting to the “four islands” demand are almost non-existent. But where Iwashita calls for reconsideration of the “four islands” thesis, these critics do not see the lack of likely progress as a failure of the irredentist movement. Quite the opposite, they often call on the Japanese people to prepare for a hundred-years-long “historic” struggle for the Northern Territories (Hakamada 2006), which can be seen as a further reproduction of the discourse and entrenchment of the policy. This obviously begs the question of what accounts for the importance of the Northern Territories and what is their concrete meaning to the national interest, which the irredentist movement purports to serve.

7.2 Japan’s national interest and the idea of the Northern Territories Northern Territories and Japan’s history debate

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To a certain extent, this continuous and largely unwavering reproduction of Japan’s policy regarding the Northern Territories can be attributed to the fact that, as shown in the previous chapter, the territorial dispute has become somewhat detached from the broader dynamics of the Japan/Russia nexus.6 At the same time, however, the role of the idea of the Northern Territories and its importance should be understood in the context of its relationship to other discursive formations, which are located beyond the scope of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia. In this final section, I will examine those discourses and their relationship with Northern Territoriesrelated policy. One of the discourses, perpetuating a sense of the importance of the Northern Territories, is the ongoing debate about Japan’s colonial and imperial past. The origins of the current debate over Japan’s modern history, epitomized in the struggle over history textbooks, can be traced to the reforms of the American Occupation. Their initial democratic orientation, followed by the 1948 “reverse course” shift toward and emphasis on political and economic stability, led to the emergence of two domestic hegemonies with conflicting ideologies, the progressive academic and the conservative bureaucratic and political (Caiger 1966: 19–198 and Orr 2001: 72–3). The clash of competing historical narratives can already be seen in the mid 1950s, when a number of conservative parliamentarians launched a fierce critique of secondary school history textbooks for their excessively negative depiction of Japan’s past and focus on the atrocities committed by Imperial Japan. Since the 1980s, the debate became internationalized after the Chinese media picked

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up domestic news about the Japanese Ministry of Education’s censorsing of a history textbook passage related to Japan’s invasion of China in 1937. Since then, the debate about Japan’s history has revolved around such issues as Japanese colonial rule in Korea, the Nanking massacre, “comfort women” and the actions of Japan’s military during the battle for Okinawa. While the progressive camp has persistently argued the need for stronger remorse over the past (Ienaga 1993/4), the conservatives have sought to overcome what the they called “red” (meaning communist) (Minshuto- 1955: 24–7) or, more recently, a “masochistic” (jigyaku) view of history (for example, Fujioka 2000) and instead present Japan as liberator of Asia and victim of Western aggression. To the present day, “history” continues to occupy a central place not only in domestic political struggles but also in Japan’s relations with its neighbors, mainly China and the two Koreas (for detailed discussions see Pyle 1983, Rose 1998, Rozman 2002, Nozaki 2005 and Saaler 2005). Interestingly, however, one aspect of Japan’s history, which seems to be shared by both camps, is the notion of Japanese victimhood. Namely, while the progressives and the conservatives engage in fierce contestation of each other’s narratives regarding the circumstances leading up to the Asia-Pacific War, the conduct of the Japanese military during that conflict and other historical issues, the conception of Japan as victim of its own military (in case of the progressives) or Western imperialism and racism (in case of the conservatives) are shared by both sides of the discourse and epitomized in the centrality which the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki tend to occupy in Japan’s historical memory (see for example, Orr 2001 and Bukh 2007). As such, arguably, the depictions of Soviet traitorous aggression, seizure of Japan’s “inherent territory” and expulsion of the residents, all integral elements of the Northern Territories narrative, are of a piece with Japan’s victimhood and facilitate its production. Importantly, however, the domestic history debate has been not only about Japan’s atrocities in colonized or occupied lands but also about the relationship between the people/nation and the state. Thus, while numerous authors have argued the need for deeper understanding of the general complicity of the Japanese people in the war (for example, Sakai and Omori 1995: 118–19), the historical narrative as it appears in the textbooks has juxtaposed the nation and the state through extensive depictions of the suffering of Japanese people during the years of Japan’s militarism (Bukh 2007). Within this conception of Japan’s past, the nation (and more specifically, the problematic but the often-cited term “the people”) came to be seen as a source of opposition to state interests, whereas the state came to represent the negative past of imperialism, authoritarianism and barbarism (for extensive discussion, see Gayle 2001). On the other hand, the conservative critique, which has existed since the early 1950s but emerged with new vigor in the 1990s, not only seeks to relativize or “whitewash” Japan’s past atrocities but also presents a historical narrative in which the nation and the state constitute a monolithic and organic entity (for example, see Fujioka 1999).

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Located within the context of this struggle over the relationship between the nation and the state, the importance of the Northern Territories for “postwar disposition” (sengo shori), often argued by the irredentist movement (for example, Suetsugu cited in Kakuyama 2008: 50), is one whose significance goes beyond simply the recovery of lost territory. Namely, if we consider the prevalence of tension between the “people” and the “state” in Japan’s historical memory as one of the dominant characteristics of the “post-war” sensibility, the continuous and unchanging presence of the “Northern Territories” narrative can be seen stabilizing the discourse on Japan’s modern history by uniting the “people” and the “state” under the aegis of common victimhood. This merger of the people and the state can be seen in the majority of Northern Territories-related publications. The narrative of the “people,” the personal stories of former residents portraying the peaceful life before the Soviet invasion, the miseries and suffering of the occupation and expulsion, as well as subsequent stories of the grass-roots irredentist movement, are intertwined with the history of state-level agreements and negotiations regarding the status of the islands and government initiatives aimed at achieving the return of the islands (for example, Koizumi (ed.) 2003, Hoppo-ryo-do Mondai Taisaku Kyo-kai 2003 and Kamisaka 2005). Thus, the continuous presence of the idea of the Northern Territories in Japan’s discourse on its modern history bridges the two conflicting visions of the relationship between the people and the state in Japan’s past.

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Northern Territories and Japan’s particularism

The importance of the Northern Territories and related policies also lies in their role as a locale where Japan’s uniqueness in reproduced, this against the background of Japan’s ongoing “normalization.” Specifically, “normalization” refers not only to the gradual wearing away of Japanese reluctance to participate in international military affairs, but also to the general process of erosion of those forms of particularism that have been constantly produced in the nexus of Japan’s relations with the West, mentioned in Chapter 4. Since the early days of Meiji, the discursive construction of Japan’s sociocultural identity has been an integral part of Japan’s relations with the Western “other.” It is within this context that the socio-cultural construction of Japan through Russia emerged in the late 1970s as an integral part of broader nihonjinron (theory of Japaneseness) discourse which (re)created the unique socio-cultural traits of the Japanese nation vis-à-vis the West and also, through “Russia,” confirmed Japan’s position within the universal by arguing Russia’s deviation from the universal norms of normalcy. As already noted, the nihonjinron construction was an integral part of the broader political discourse and developed and thrived at the time of Japan’s ascent to the status of economic superpower and trade frictions with the US and European countries, when Japan’s mode of economic development was seen as a threatening (or promising) alternative to Western-style capitalism. As such, the domestic

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construction of national particularism and the Western discourse on Japan’s uniqueness, either in its praising forms or in the alarmist literature on the Japanese threat, existed in a symbiotic relationship which perpetuated this construction of Japan’s identity. By the mid 1990s, however, the putative “Asian model” headed by Japan imploded, along with the collapse of Japan’s economic “miracle” (Dower 2000: 526). This was followed by a shift toward political Islam and “rising” China (and more recently, Russia) as the dominant “others” in the Western discourse. Along the way, not only the notion of Japan’s unique developmental model but also the debates about the challenge Japan could present to American hegemony (Johnson 1992), “Pax Nipponica” (Vogel 1986) or the unique role of Japan as a “civilian power” (Maull 1990/91) have all but disappeared from the Western political discourse. This gradual fading away of Japan’s otherness in the West, already mentioned in the previous chapter, has been paralleled by the entrenchment of the domestic debate about Japan’s “normalization,” popularized in the early 1990s by Ozawa Ichiro- in his Blueprint for New Japan (1994,) published in Japan a year earlier as Nihon kaizo- no keiaku (A plan for Japan’s restructuring). In this book, Ozawa, former chief secretary of the LDP and even today one of the most influential Japanese politicians, argued that key Japanese political, legal and social institutions are defunct and prevent Japan from becoming a responsible member of the international community. While Ozawa, one of the key actors in creating a hiatus in LDP rule through his 1993 defection to form the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseito-), has himself remained in opposition for most of the fifteen years since issuing this call, the process of Japan’s normalization has taken root in mainstream political discourse and related policies (Kitaoka 2000: 10). Importantly, “normal” or “normalizing” Japan has been construed in opposition not only to Japan’s “unique pacifism” but also to other socio-cultural features ascribed to Japan by nihonjinron, such as Japan’s collectivism, supra-linguistic communication abilities etc. This process of Japan’s “normalization” has been accompanied by simultaneous attempts to supplement this lost Japan’s uniqueness by promoting such notional virtues as “beautiful Japan” (Abe 2006) or Japan as the embodiment of a shared philosophy of harmony or “peaceful coexistence” (kyo-sei no shiso-) with other Asian people (Keizai do-yu-kai 2005). Such attempts to reframe Japanese uniqueness, however, did not take root, not only because of their excessive vagueness (the former) or obvious historical fallacy (the latter), but also because they did not receive any confirmation either from Japan’s neighbors or, even more important, from the West. Here I would argue that this erosion of the main “self/other” nexus in which modern Japan’s identity has been constructed has had the effect of elevating the importance of Russia in the production of Japanese particularism by the mainstream discourse. Before proceeding further to examine the role of the Northern Territories in this process, it is important to note the

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subtle, but nevertheless pertinent, changes that have occurred in the sociocultural discourse on Russia. Namely, parallel to the ongoing creation of Japan as an integral member in the realm of universal normalcy, the “otherness” of both Japan and Russia within the Western cultural discourse came to be used to construct a positively unique Japan, located, like Russia, outside of the West, but, unlike Russia, culturally superior to the West. In other words, the socio-cultural discourse on Russia gradually became a reproducer of Japan’s uniqueness as opposed to both Russia and the West. Here, the negative traits ascribed to Japan by the Western and domestic discourses of “unique negativity” are either marginalized or relativized as a “lesser evil” in comparison with the far greater negativity of Russia. Alternatively, certain elements of sameness are used to highlight the essential differences between Russia and Japan, both of which are outside of the Western sphere, the consistent yardstick for measuring normality. In this case, Russian distance from Western norms is used to emphasize Japan’s uniquely superior position of being outside of, yet, in crucial ways, “more Western than the West.” Both nations are, for example, narrated as sharing certain cultural similarities: spirituality, predominance of communal interests over the individual, maintenance of uniformity and harmony within the community as ultimate values etc. (for example, Sankei Shimbun 1993 and Okazaki and Morimoto 1993). Both Japan and Russia are also ascribed similar uniqueness in their developmental paths, which fall somewhere between those of Europe and Asia (Kawato 1995: 227–9). In the context of human rights and democracy, in direct opposition to the more general “normalization” discourse, Russia and Japan are also brought together as representing communalism, as being different and unable to fully adopt the Western models of civil society, democracy and capitalism (Hakamada 1996: 55). Such distinctly Japanese concepts such as honne tatemae (real intentions and outside appearance), nemawashi (informal consultations before a decision is reached) and dashin (sounding out a person) are also discovered in Russia and create a certain sense of similarity (for example, Morimoto 1989: 36–8 and Kawato 1995: 4–5). These similarities, however, are used to support the difference between the cultural essences of the two nations. In juxtaposing Japan with the West, Benedict (1946) argued that the Japanese belong to a “shame culture” while Western societies share a “guilt culture.” In the modern socio-cultural narrative of Russia, this dichotomy is restructured. Here Japanese culture is confirmed as unique but sharing a similar status with the West as both are juxtaposed with a third, and inferior, cultural category: the “fear culture” of Russia (Hakamada 1996: 121–5). Elsewhere, the three categories of the West, Japan and Russia are transformed into a categorization of contract, trust and low-trust societies. The US, representing the West, is described as a contract society where all laws must be strictly enforced if the social order is to be preserved. Japan, in comparison, is a trust society in which legal provisions are treated more as a standard-setting tool for societal behavior. Both systems are presented as

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having their benefits and drawbacks, but both are superior to the “low-trust” societies of Russia (and China) where law is not functional and contracts can be easily changed or abolished (Hakamada 2000: 16–20). The “amazingly homogenous and harmonious” Japanese society in which “peace, harmony and stability” prevail is contrasted with Russian jingoism, instability and conflict (Kimura 2000: 26). Contrasted with Russia, Japan is also presented as a pluralistic democracy of an ideal type where the political chaos caused by excessive competition among political parties is avoided. Japan’s model is described as superior to two Western models: the US and the UK, where two main parties alternate in power; and France and Italy, where a multitude of political parties often leads to political instability (Kimura 2000: 64). Japan, a peaceful “merchant” nation that uses its political and economic power to contribute to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, is contrasted with autocratic and nepotistic Russia, where the basis for state power is military and its rationale purely political (Kawato 1995: 221–30). Compared with Russian cunning and such tactics as lies and pokazhukha (an impressive outward display with little real substance), the Japanese are portrayed as naive and sincere (Kimura 2000: 50–1). The territorial dispute which, during the Cold War years, has been an integral part of the broad “othering” of the Soviet Union, has become an important site for a self/other discourse through which Japan’s national uniqueness within the universal is produced. Thus, arguably, its ultimate importance for the foundations of Japan, as stated by Japanese commentators cited above. Namely, “Northern Territories” became not only a tool for affirming the belonging of the “national” to the “universal” (see Arai Sato-shi, House of Representatives, Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories, 27 March 1995 at NDL and Sato- 2005: 80–3) but also a locale where a reverse process takes place; that is, appropriation of the “universal” (such as the concepts of law, justice and historical facts introduced by both sides as guiding principles for the dispute) as means for preserving and producing national uniqueness. Bearing in mind this importance of the role of “Northern Territories” for the production of national identity, it is not surprising that the need to “enlighten” the Japanese people about the dispute has been perceived by the Japanese elites as equally if not more important than similar activities directed at the Russian population (for example, see statements by consecutive directors of the Management and Coordination Agency7 Yamaguchi Tsuruo at House of Councilors, Committee on Okinawa and NTs, 10 March 1995 and Muto- Kabun at House of Representatives, Committee on Okinawa and NTs, 19 February1998 at NDL and Yamamoto 2008). This process of reproduction and confirmation of Japan’s identity is most visible in the “no visa” program, one of the main frameworks that enable Japanese nationals to visit the disputed islands. The program, initially proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev during his visit to Tokyo as a means to facilitate mutual understanding between the two nations

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and promote a resolution of the territorial dispute, provides for organized exchanges of visits between Japanese nationals and the Russian residents of Northern Territories without the need to obtain an entrance visa. As such, it enables Japanese nationals to visit the islands without compromising Japan’s claim to sovereignty over the territory.8 From the Japanese side, the individuals who can participate in the program include the former residents of the islands and their relatives, members of the media, activists in the “return movement,” other related professionals and members of the Diet. From the Russian side, the program provides an opportunity to the current residents of the islands to visit their counterparts in Japan. According to the MoFA website, as of November 2005 over 6,500 Japanese citizens, among them 65 parliamentarians, have visited the islands and over 5,300 Russian citizens from the disputed islands have visited Japan through this program (www.mofa.go.jp). The official purpose of the “no visa” visits has been to enhance dialogue, mutual trust and understanding between the Russian residents of the islands and the Japanese people and, through this, to lay the groundwork for a solution to the territorial dispute (/www.vizanashi.net/index01.htm). In a pragmatic statement, one of Japan’s leading opposition politicians, Hatoyama Yukio-, noted that the main role of the “no visa” visits is to show to the Russian residents the bright future and economic development that awaits should the islands be returned to Japan (Hatoyama 2006: 41–2). This conception of the program is consistent with the broader policy vision developed by MoFA, which sees the incorporation of the islands into Japan’s “economic sphere,” or “Japanization”(nihonka seisaku) of the islands, as an important aspect of Japan’s Northern Territories policy (Sato- and Komaki 2003: 162–4). At the same time, however, as can be gleaned from the related literature, parliamentary discussions and statements by participants, the “dialogue”—actually conducted more in the form of a monologue—serves as a confirmation of the hierarchical relationship between Japan and Russia and, through this, of Japan’s identity (for example, see Kamisaka 2005). Thus, the main theme that dominates the parliamentary debates on the program is the need to correct the misperceptions and the insecurities of the Russian residents of the disputed islands (for example, Nomura Issei, Head of Eurasia Bureau, MoFA, at House of Councilors, Okinawa and Northern Territories Committee, 2 June 1993). The notion of “mutual understanding” (so-go rikai) is explained mainly in terms of mistrust and misunderstandings on the part of the Russian residents of the islands (for example Nakanishi MP, at House of Councilors, Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories, 7 May 1996.) This interpretation of the purposes of the program is also shared by local organizers. As one of the Japanese delegation leaders noted, the cultural exchange envisaged in the program is important. However, it is argued, the main purpose of the visit is to enhance understanding regarding the return of the islands among Russian residents (www.vizanashi.net/sub3/kisyakaken), or what another participant called an improvement of the “mental structure”(kokoro no infura seibi) of the residents (Yamamoto 2008, see also Ito- 2004). Thus,

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actual exposure to the islands and interactions with the Russian residents feature as an act of confirmation of Japan’s monopoly over historical truth and, through this, of Japan’s unique cultural identity, the product of this historical process. One of the parliamentarians who participated in visiting the islands has provided the most vivid illustration of this instance of confirmation of Japan’s identity. In a recollection of the trip, presented before the Diet Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories, Sasano Sadako explained that the visit made her realize the gap between Japan and Russia, not only in material terms, but also in terms of culture and science. Hence, she stated, it is much more important and meaningful for Russians to understand what Japan stands for, than for Japanese to understand Russia (Sasano Sadako at House of Councilors, Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories, 6 April 1998). Ironically, despite various references to non-material aspects of Japanese superiority, actual confirmation of the socio-cultural hierarchy through exposure to the “other” is presented almost exclusively in terms of the economic gap between Japan and the islands. The inferior economic conditions of the Russian residents and their dependence on Japanese aid for survival, the run-down infrastructure and observations that the islands look just as they did after the war, prevail in the narrative of Japanese visitors as confirmations of Japan’s superiority to Russia (for example, Jiji kaisetsu 2000, Kayahara 2004, Kamisaka 2005, Hatoyama 2006 and Yamamoto 2008). Thus, while the visits to the Northern Territories serve a site for actual confirmation of Japan’s uniqueness, at the same they contain the danger of undermining this construct by sliding into the realm of temporal difference discussed in the previous chapter, which enables mobility of the “other” and subsequent modifications in the “self/other” nexus. This is because the Northern Territories discourse and the abstract socio-cultural construction exist in a mutually dependent relationship in which the former presents a possibility for confirming the latter, but is also in need of a consistent re-creation of the exclusive hierarchy based on the immutable nature of national characteristics, unchanging over time. And this, in turn, is made possible only through the socio-cultural discourse.

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Proof Conclusion

In this book I have sought, by applying the “self/other” framework of analysis, to outline the role of the Soviet Union and Russia in post-war Japan’s political and socio-cultural identities and to examine the policy manifestations of this identity construction. In the process, this case study has identified a number of changes, but also certain significant continuities in contemporary Japan’s identity, which have remained generally invisible in the liberal constructivist scholarship. Importantly, this case study is not conceived in direct opposition to the current constructivist scholarship on Japan but as an alternative conception of Japan’s identity to the “militarist/pacifist” paradigm. Thus, the question and the nature of Japan’s post-war antimilitarism are not engaged directly in this work. Furthermore, by focusing on national identity I have sought to reintroduce the issue of the Ainu into the debate on the Northern Territories and Japan’s relations with Russia. As one of the rare accounts that attempts to bridge this lacuna has pointed out, the Ainu—the indigenous dwellers of the islands—and their relationship to the Northern Territories have been virtually absent from contemporary scholarship on Japan’s relations with Russia (Harrison 2007). In terms of Japan’s political identity, Chapter 3 explored how that country’s relation to Soviet communism not only was determined by the global Cold War but also was induced by domestic rivalry between the progressive and the conservative camps over Japan’s place within the bipolar rivalry. Chapter 6 examined the reconfiguration of this “self/other” nexus following the emergence of post-communist Russia. In this process, the ultimate “otherness” of the Soviet Union was replaced by a nation of temporal difference, with Russia as a nation that had only just embarked on the process of democratization and the introduction of a market economy. Through relations with postcommunist Russia, Japan’s identity as a mature capitalist democracy was reconfirmed. I have argued that there has been a fundamental difference in this process of reconfirmation of the political “self” between Japan on the one side and other leading Western capitalist democracies on the other: while the latter actively engaged in attempting to introduce democratic institutions into Russia, Japan’s identity was confirmed mainly through economic relations and humanitarian assistance.

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The examination of Japan’s socio-cultural discourse on Russia, conducted in Chapters 3, 5 and 7, showed how the otherness of Russia within the West has been employed in Japan’s discourse to construct a Japan belonging to the realm of universal civilization and, at the same time, processing a unique socio-cultural superiority—not only vis-à-vis Russia, but also vis-à-vis the “West.” It argued that this discourse, the origins and the structure of which can be traced to the early days of Japan’s modernization, has been an integral part of the broader debate on Japan’s uniqueness. In its structure, the construction of Japan as a society embodying the “universal” values of the West, through a narrative on Russian national character during the 1970s and 1980s was built on paradigms that were introduced into Japan when Meiji modernizers became exposed to Russia but, more importantly, into Western perceptions of Russia. As such, it resembled the early crystallization of this discourse: domestic debates of the time of the Russo–Japanese War, in which Japan was depicted as a civilized, Western nation battling the barbarian and Asiatic Russia. The role of this construct in Japan’s post-war identity, however, should be seen in relation to the contemporary nihonjinron discourse, as something complementing the narrative on Japan’s uniqueness created through juxtaposition with the West. Chapter 7 examined the changes that occurred in this discourse in light of the erosion of the Japan/West dichotomy—a process that has been accelerating since the second half of the 1990s—and argued the importance of the Northern Territories dispute for this construction. Like any other attempt to account for something as abstract and obscure as identity, this case study has a number of significant limitations. There are, for example, obvious dangers in making generalizations based on a single case study. It is perfectly possible that an inquiry into contemporary Japan’s “self”construction vis-à-vis different “others,” such as China or Korea (both North and South), would reveal different constructions of Japan’s identity. Also, I must point out that the identity discourse examined here is not that which prevailed in and continues to dominate Japan’s academic debates on the USSR/Russia. Japanese academia has been guided by the historical positivist framework of the new Left that originated in the 1960s student movement and has focused mainly on the revolutionary movement in Russia, the 1920s and the emergence of Stalinism. In the 1960s, as most scholars were sympathetic to the revolutionary cause, they attempted to “rescue” the Russian Revolution and thus focused on the years before Stalin or explored the causes of the emergence of Stalinism. The narrow scope of inquiry, lack of primary sources and the generally inadequate conditions for research have led many, perhaps most, contemporary authoritative scholars to pursue their studies overseas (Rozman 1992: 190–6). Many of the Left-oriented intellectuals who have consistently played a leading role in Japan’s social sciences in general and Russia-related scholarship in particular have been based at the prestigious Tokyo University (ibid.: 259). However, the sophisticated arguments of these Leftist scholars have had little visibility or impact outside

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academic circles. This is not to say that occasional attempts to emphasize the need to understand the Russian “other” and efforts to show similarities between Japan and Russia, Russian influence on Japan’s literature and culture, and other attempts to present a more complex understanding of reality have been entirely missing from recent Japanese debates on Russia (for example, Wada 1999 and Shimotomai and Shimada (eds) 2002). In this connection I would cite an editorial published in the liberal Asahi Shimbun drawing comparisons between post-Soviet Russia and post-war Japan. In both cases, the dominant value system changed overnight and the Western liberal-democratic model was imported to replace it. The relatively smooth transition that took place in Japan is presented not as a function of national character, but as a consequence of external factors, mainly the presence of such a supra-legal authority in the GHQ (the American occupation authorities). This is seen as the main factor in preventing a collapse into chaos and ensuring a smooth economic recovery. The article notes that, since post-Soviet Russia lacks the equivalent of the GHQ, so the people remain uncertain and confused regarding the optimal political and economic system, and the debates and uncertainties continue. The author of the editorial urges the Japanese to show understanding of the general confusion in Russia and the corresponding rise of nationalistic feelings (Asahi Shimbun 11 March 1992: 2). This rare attempt on the part of the Japanese media to extend an empathetic understanding to Russia based on similarities in historical experience demonstrates the possibilities of constructing a discourse of sameness in the context of the two nations. In general, however, the biggest failure of Leftist academia during and after the Cold War has been the inability to provide an effective counter-discourse to the conservative socio-cultural construction of Russia’s national otherness. As Harry Harootunian has perceptively noted in the context of Japanese discourse on the emperor, the domestic Left in general has not been able “to take seriously the discourse on culture” (Harootunian 2000: 625–6). In the context of Russia-related academic research, the Left side of the spectrum has been constrained by its own conception of proper scholarship, i.e. empiricist and materialist. It has thus failed to engage the conservative discourse on identity. One widely recognized expert on the Soviet Union, in his work on post-communist Russia, harshly criticizes the Japanese “popular view” of Russia (Shiokawa 1994). His text, however, limits itself to purely empirical analysis and provides little material that could be used to develop an alternative view with the kind of popular accessibility and appeal of those generated by the nihojinron-like literature. In other words, while offering quality empirical research on Soviet/Russian history, politics and society, as well as bilateral relations with Japan, and often examining the identity crisis in postcommunist Russia (for example, Shiokawa 1994 and Shimotomai 1999), these scholars have failed to engage the need for “collective images” (McSweeney 1999: 78) that afford an alternative vocabulary for explaining the differences between Japan and Russia such as have been successfully assembled and

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disseminated by the identity discourse. With few exceptions, neither did they engage in serious attempts to draw the general public’s attention to the similarities between Japan’s and Russia’s historical paths and their respective engagements in the Kuriles—the biggest stumbling bloc in improving bilateral relations. Furthermore, this book has focused solely on the Japanese side of bilateral relations. The exclusive focus on Japan may convey the impression that the author locates the Soviet/Russian otherness or the lack of progress in the territorial dispute solely in Japan’s discursive construction of the “self.” This is not the position I subscribe to. I believe that the behavior of the “other” is reflected in identity construction of the “self,” particularly when the construct belongs to the inclusive, and hence dynamic, type of identities. Japan’s discourse on Soviet/Russian difference has been, to a certain extent, a reaction to the actions of the “other” (such as, for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the militarization of the disputed islands in the late 1970s) that at times deepened and confirmed the existent construction and at times modified it. I hope that this allocation of certain subjectivity to the “other” is visible throughout the empirical chapters. This said, a thorough account of the role of Japan in Soviet/Russian construction of the “self” would be needed to gain a comprehensive and balanced account of bilateral relations based on the methods used here. Historical parallels in the engagement of both nations with the West not only offer the potential of generating interesting insights into a comparative study of national identity formation, but also can broaden our understanding of contemporary international relations, which, as is often noted, has been dominated by the Western experience. Regarding the absence of an account of Japan’s role in the construction of Russia’s identity, I can only plead the hackneyed but true excuse of a shortage of time and space. Despite these limitations, however, it is my hope that this case study has managed to suggest new possibilities for construing Japan’s identity within the disciplinary realm of International Relations. In contrast to the current constructivist scholarship on Japan’s identity, this account argues that the “domestic/international” dichotomy imposes excessive limitations on the study of the process of identity formation—which in fact takes place simultaneously in both realms. The twinned relationship between the two realms is visible in each of the empirical chapters. At the same time, however, the findings of this case study challenge a number of assumptions that exist in the post-structuralist scholarship on identity formation. One such challenge lies in recognizing that the agency of the “other” plays an important role in identity formation: actions of the “other” contribute to a particular identity construction of the “self.” More importantly, however, this investigation shows that an exclusive focus on one particular “self/other” nexus is too narrow to account for the full complexities of the process of identity formation; here I argue the need for a discursive linkage among different “self/other” nexuses such as “Japan/Russia,” “Japan/ Ainu” and, most importantly, “Japan/ the West.”

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The omnipresence of the “West” as well as the prevalence of Western modes of knowledge in the construction of Japan’s identity that emerges from this case study, as well as from other works on Japan’s identity reviewed in Chapter 2, point toward the need to address this aspect in the studies of the “self/other” constructions. There are probably a number of ways to bridge between the focus on the role of difference in identity construction and the structural elements that affect this construction, without falling back into the kind of constructivism that construes the state as a given by drawing a clear demarcation line between domestic (corporate) and socially acquired state identities (Wendt 1999). Arguably, one of these possibilities is an engagement with the notion of “international society,” as introduced by the English School, as the proponents of this school emphasize historical and sociological approaches to the studies of international relations, a stance generally favorable toward interpretativism (for example, Wight 1966 also Bellamy 2005) and view international relations more as a “diffuse, imprecise realm of culture” than as a structural “mechanics” (Epp 1998: 49). Critical investigations into identity constructions have generally eschewed the debates about international society and focused mainly on monologue-like relations that involve the construction of the “self” relative to the difference of an “other” or groups of “others.” It is probably the rationalist nature of the “international society” scholarship, its tendency towards structuralism as well the normative implications of inclusion that underlie notions of commonly shared interests, values, rules and institutions that have deterred critical constructivist scholars, driven by a post-structuralist epistemology and ontology of exclusion, from engaging the “international society” scholarship. However, to cite Barry Buzan somewhat out of context, the term “society” by itself does not carry any “necessarily positive connotation” (Buzan 2004: 145) and can simply mean that there is a certain form of societal relations among its members, which can involve such normatively negative aspects such as conflict, discrimination and domination. The dominance of Western modes of knowledge in Japan’s identity offers evidence that Fred Halliday (1992) is generally correct in arguing that there is a certain tendency towards the conformity of domestic social practices and political institutions to an internationally defined model. This understanding of Japan’s identity does not mean a subscription to the notion of “world society” which argues for an isomorphic nature of modern nation-states, shaped through worldwide cultural and associational processes (Meyer et al. 1997). This institutional approach, while correctly acknowledging the dynamic nature of national cultures, seems to gloss over the violence and resistance, on both domestic and international levels, that accompany the spread of “world-wide culture.” As Halliday (1992) points out, the process of homogenization is far from being a benign integration but is generally accompanied by resistance and multiple conflicts. Japan’s struggle, on both domestic and international levels, to achieve the status of “civilized nation” through political, legal and institutional reforms was examined by Gerrit W.

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Gong, as part of his inquiry into the role of the “standard of civilization” (Gong 1980 and 1984). Two important caveats need to be introduced before we can incorporate the notion of “international society” into our analysis. One is the importance of an actor-focused approach that allows for variation in the interpretation of the societal signals. While it is possible that international society is, just like domestic society, an objective reality, its signals are vague and at times contradictory. Thus, an inquiry that shifts the focus of analysis to actors’ understandings and reactions to systemic signals can provide clearer insights into the actual operation of the social structure of the “international” than can attempts to derive the broad structure from these interpretations. In other words, the focus should be “bottom up” and on the subjective and often contradictory readings of the signals by different nations, rather than try to draw a grand map of the objective contours of “international society.” In the context of Japan’s socialization into the international, this kind of approach was applied in Shogo Suzuki’s thought-provoking article on the relationship between late nineteenth-century Japan’s policy-making elites in their effort to create a “civilized” Japan on the one side, and Japan’s colonialism on the other (Suzuki 2005). The second modification to be made to the current “international society” scholarship on Japan regards the actual nature and the temporal scope of Japan’s socialization into international society. Most “international society” scholarship on Japan tends to treat the process of Japan’s socialization into “international society” from the second half of the nineteenth century as a transformation of an existing state through exposure to Western modes of knowledge (Gong 1980 and 1984, Suganami 1984 and Suzuki 2005). Arguably, however, this process should be construed not merely as a transformation but as a creation of modern Japan. As a nation-state, Japan did not exist prior to the formative years of Meiji, as the array of discursive practices that constitute modern Japan and define the “inside” of Japan, as opposed to the “outside,” were introduced and internalized during those years (for example, Ravina 2005: 87). Furthermore, the differentiation of the various peoples of what later became “East Asia,” who had long existed in a Chinese-centered world, occurred only with the advent of modernity (To-yama Shigeki cited in Tanaka 2002: 87). This does not mean that there were no important continuities between Tokugawa and modern Japan in terms of customs, traditions and even societal hierarchies. Obviously, Japan’s identity as a modern nation was not created from a scratch but involved the reinterpretation and reconstruction of already existing components. This process, however, occurred within fundamentally new meaning- and value-producing practices. Along with the construction of the modern Japanese state (through the introduction of institutions such as a national currency, a national taxation system, a national army and national symbols, all modeled on European examples), the construction of modern Japan’s national identity has also proceeded through the adoption of Western “practices of

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difference” as tools of national identity construction. The discourses on the “other” that constituted the Japanese “self” based on universalism and other modern master dichotomies (such as modern/barbarian, rational/irrational, and the quasi-medical discourse of normal/abnormal) were a product of Japan’s embrace of Western modes of thought and relation to difference. Thus, the replacement of “transformation” with “creation” of Japan through its socialization into international society is not simply an exercise in semantics. Rather, it suggests that the construction of the national has been intimately related to Japan’s interactions with the international since the beginning of the process of Japan’s socialization into the international. Another important aspect of Japan’s socialization is its temporal scope. Japan-related “international society” scholarship tends to focus on the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century as the time frame during which the process of Japan’s socialization in international society took place. Importantly, however, that socialization has been never completed. As Gong briefly notes, Japan’s place within “international society” has been continuously ambiguous (Gong 1984: 200). On the one hand, as English School scholarship points out, Japan became an integral part of international society and incorporated Western modes of thought, patterns of behavior and diplomatic culture. Arguably, even Japan’s disastrous war in the Asia-Pacific constituted an intra-societal conflict in which, generally, Japan and its foes shared the same language and ideational struggle. While works such as Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) argued for a unique Japan mentality, located outside of the universal, in general, the struggle was about the meanings of certain key paradigms, but not the paradigms themselves. Despite an array of exotic notions, and appeals to ancient texts used in defining the Japanese spirit, the domestic discourse, riddled with ambivalences and, at times, humorous contradictions (such as debating the destruction of the Anglo-Saxon culture in English [Shillony 1981: 150]), evolved within the discursive practices of Western knowledge (see Kushner 2002 and 2006, also Harootunian 2000). As to Japan’s post-war era, as John Dower noted, it has been dominated by a “tight embrace” with the US; not only in political, economic and military terms, but also culturally (Dower 2000: 518). At the same time, however, the West, which for Japanese intellectuals has been continuously synonymous with international society,1 has been Japan’s dominant “other.” As already noted in earlier chapters, throughout Japan’s modern history the West/Japan nexus has been one of the main locales where that country’s identity has been constructed and reconstructed. Over the course of 150 years of interaction, Japan and the “West” have represented each other as allies and as enemies, as superhuman and as subhuman, as simian and as demons, as teachers and as students, but the “otherness” narrated in racial, civilizational or socio-cultural terms has been preserved throughout (for example see, Dower 1986, Campbell 1992, Harootunian 1993, Littlewood 1996 and Hammond 1997).

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Arguably, this somewhat paradoxical relationship is what accounts for Japan’s ambiguous place within international society, noted by Gong. Namely, since the mid nineteenth century, Japan has been an integral part of international society in terms of dominant modes of knowledge. At the same time, however, it has been consistently dependent on difference with the West, which has been perceived as an embodiment of the very same society, for the construction of its distinct identity. Incidentally, a dichotomous distinction between the political and the cultural, visible, for example, in the argument that post-war Japan, while retaining its unique culture, has been politically integrated into the Western liberal order and embraced the dominant norms of the West (Deudney and Ikenberry 1993/94), while seeming to provide a simple explanation for this condition, is in fact rather misleading. Generally speaking, as Bull 1982, Wight (1966) and Watson (1984) remind us, modern political institutions are a product and quintessentially an embodiment of Western culture. In the context of Japan’s relations with the West, the symbiotic relationship between the political and the cultural has been an integral part of the nihonjinron literature, and as this book has argued, of its relations with Russia as well. I believe that it is within this contextualization of modern Japan’s identity, namely, as an integral part of “international society” while at same time residing in the difference between “self” and “international society” (the West), that the findings of this book should be understood. The construction of both strands of Japan’s post-war identity, the political and the socio-cultural, through contrast and comparison with the Soviet Union and Russia, evolved within the modes of knowledge of international society as understood by the Japanese elites; a social space in which market economy, democracy and technological progress have been the dominant paradigms for determining one’s position. Even Shiba Ryo-taro-’s explicit attempt to uncover the “original form” of Russia, based on what he supposed to be a uniquely Japanese knowledge of Russia, relied heavily on these paradigms in its narration of the hierarchical dichotomy between the inherent characteristics of the two nations. At the same time, the “otherness” of Russia within the Western discourse, not dissimilar to Japan’s own ambiguous position, provided for a particular role for the “Japan/Russia” nexus within the construction of Japan’s particularism vis-à-vis the West. From the 1970s through the early 1990s, Russia’s “otherness” reconfirmed Japan’s belonging to the universal, when Japan’s socio-cultural uniqueness, as produced in the “Japan/the West” nexus, dominated the debate about Japan’s identity. Since the mid 1990s, as I argued in the last two chapters, the difference residing in the “Japan/the West” nexus has been gradually eroding. This process of Japan’s “normalization” has had a dual effect on Japan’s identity; on the one hand it has stabilized Japan as an integral part of universal “international society.” On the other, it has weakened the construction of Japan’s uniqueness, which has been a fundamental part of that country’s conception of the “self.” Here, the Japan/Russia nexus has acted to reproduce Japan’s unique position within the

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realm of the universal, through a discursive shift towards juxtaposition of both Japan and Russia to the “West.” The Northern Territories problem, which throughout the Cold War years had been the symbol of the twinned “otherness” of the Soviet Union, became an important locus where Japan’s cultural uniqueness has been confirmed. It is important to remember that, unlike the West’s “Orient” as depicted by Edward Said in his celebrated Orientalism (1978), or its Japanese version analyzed by Stefan Tanaka (1993), the construction of Japan’s identity through “Russia” was not part of a colonial project. Neither did it involve actual physical domination of the Russian “other.” To a certain extent, it has been a liberating discourse that has enabled Japan to establish its position within international society, possibly at the expense of fully normalized, pragmatic relations with its powerful northern neighbor. This function of the “Japan/Russia” nexus, however, has been dependent on a continuous conception of Japan as a homogenous, unified nation and as the historical opposite of Russia. In this process, the Ainu, whose quest for recognition as an indigenous people undermined both of these fundamental premises, became the victims of this construction, built on the exclusion of their history and subjectivity.

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Proof Notes

1 Exploring Japan’s identity 1 This critical observation is directed mainly at North American scholarship and does not hold for the members of the English School of International Relations who explicitly rejected positivism and continued their pursuit of historical and interpretative analysis. The main paradigm of the English School, namely the notion of the International Society, as well as its relevance for the present study, is revisited in the Conclusion. 2 There have been other, theoretically innovative, accounts of Japan’s identity, which are not engaged here. Particularly interesting is Xavier Guillaume’s (2002) application of a Bakhtian dialogical approach to the notions of kokutai (national polity) and tenko- (conversion) in wartime Japan’s identity. 3 There is no doubt that many of the followers of either of the schools would be strongly dissatisfied with this inclusion of both strands under one umbrella. However, regardless of ontological differences and in spite of the often-voiced reluctance from both sides to be associated with each other and articulations of academic identity in opposition to each other (for example, Adler 1997, Campbell [1992] 1998: 207–27 and Zehfuss 2002), after all, this scholarship is united by its engagement with the role of ideas in International Relations. 4 In methodological terms there is a fundamental difference between conceiving ideational factors as constitutive of interests, or as a constraining factor. The former approach argues that definition of national interest belongs to the same discursive formation as ideas, while the latter approaches ideas as existing outside of the formation of national interest but having a causal relationship with it. The approach taken in the works examined is quite unclear, as on one side they argue that political culture or norms constituted Japan’s security policy (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 129, Katzenstein 1996: 5–39 and Berger 1998: 18–19). At the same time, however, their subscription to positivism leads them to draw a clear line between ideational discourse and policy formation, and seems to subscribe to the latter when conducting the empirical research, as they seek to explain how norms, ideas and culture influence the state’s conception of interests (Katzenstein 1996: 30 and Berger 1998: 20). 5 I am grateful to Andrew Gebert for this point. 6 Established as National Police Reserve in 1950 during the Occupation and transformed into Self Defense Force (SDF) in 1954. 7 I am grateful to Glenn Hook for this point. 8 An extended version of this survey was published in Asia Cultural Studies (33) March 2007 under the title of “Constructivism and Japan’s Identity and Foreign Policy: A Critique.”

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9 The Japanese public has shown a strong opposition to the war in Iraq, with 79% against and only 14% have expressing support of the American invasion (TV Asahi poll 22 February 2003 at www.tv-asahi.co.jp), and the support for SDF presence in Iraq has decreased sharply following the revelations regarding the nonexistence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the growing Iraqi resistance to the occupation (for example, NHK polls regarding the Iraq War 2003, NHK homepage). 10 By this I do not intend to imply the lack of analytical merit of any kind of inquiry into the normative context of Japan’s security policy and related public and intellectual discourses. For example, the approach taken by Hook (1996) in his study of Japan’s post-war security policies and public attitudes is fundamentally different from the works discussed here, as he eschews the juxtaposition of pre-1945 “militarism” with similarly static post-war “anti-militaristic” Japan. Instead, Hook examines “militarization” of post-war Japan, defined as a “dynamic process of increasing military influence” (1996: 6), as well the changes in public attitudes towards the SDF, the Constitution and other relevant aspects of Japan’s security, and as a result provides a contextualized, dynamic and complex account of both Japan’s security policy and public attitudes in the post-war period. 11 The notion of identities as exclusive and inclusive is not dissimilar to the concept of bounded and unbounded seriality, introduced and explored by Benedict Anderson (1998) in his The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World. 12 The conceptual framework used here does not imply that the identity of every Japanese person is an antithesis of the Western, Russian or other “others.” As pointed out by Ashis Nandy in the context of analysis of knowledge frameworks in India, an average Indian does not depend on external “others” for the construction of its “self” identity (Nandy 1988: 73). However, the same can be said about any instance of societal knowledge, as with very few exceptions none can be claimed to be shared by all members of the society. As such, in the following chapters I examine narratives which I believe have been most widely diffused into society and, more importantly, shared by those who in one way or another played a role in Japan’s relations with the USSR/Russia. 13 In this film I had the dubious honor of playing a minor role as a Soviet labor camp guard sending the Japanese PoWs to their daily woodcutting labor in the freezing temperatures of Soviet Tatarstan (the film was shot on Hokkaido) and bullying the main hero.

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2 Constructions of Japan’s “self” 1 It seems that this research not only was driven by the “know thy enemy” paradigm but often tried to draw lessons for Japan’s own policy, like, for example, utilizing Russia’s experience of colonizing Siberia to strengthen Japan’s foothold in Manchuria (Nagaoka 1939). 2 Not to be confused with the famous political philosopher mentioned in the next chapter, whose Romanized name is also spelled as “Maruyama Masao” but in origin is written with different Chinese characters. 3 Japan’s “Soviet Union”, Japan’s “Russia“ 1 It seems also that even the “traitorous” Soviet breach of the neutrality pact, which later became one of the main arguments in the dominant narrative on relations with the Soviet Union, was viewed as a natural and even legal course by at least parts of the Japanese establishment during the last days of the war in Europe, when the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany became just a matter of time (see

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conversation with Councilor Matsuhira in Watanabe 1947: 268–9). Another important point to bear in mind is that while, during the war years, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union were usually debated in the context of the USSR–US– Japan triangle (for example, see Takeo 1941: 308–17), in the post-war years the Soviet declaration of war came to be narrated solely in the context of the bilateral neutrality treaty. The numbers do not indicate the percentage of respondents but are based on a numerical expression of choices made by respondents from a series of descriptive dichotomies (kind/unkind, honest/cunning, good-hearted/black-hearted etc.) presented to them. In order to put the results into a comparative perspective, I have included data on the perceptions of other nations. The votes for the Soviet Union among the conservative countryside dwellers of all age groups were substantially low, at 4–5%. After the 1955 merger between the Left- and Right-wing socialists, their total strength in the House of Councilors was 154 seats as opposed to 299 held by the united conservatives (in Borton et al. 1957, 25.) Until the mid 1960s, Japan’s Communist Party was generally pro-Soviet, but in the context of the Sino-Soviet split and Khrushchev’s reforms it embarked on an independent course, critical both of Soviet “revisionism” and of Chinese “dogmatism.” For a critique of Marxist dogmatism and the scientific basis of historical materialism, as well as the organizational structure of the Soviet Union, by Maruyama Masao, the leading and probably most influential progressive thinker of post-war Japan, see Maruyama [1956] 1995. Some evidence from the Soviet Communist Party archives suggests that, over the years, the JSP received substantial financial support from the Soviet Union (for example, Nagoshi 1994.) For example, Maruyama starts his examination of Russian national identity by noting that it has been perceived that Russia’s inventions are have been only samovar, pechka and troika, but goes on to argue that national character is changing and, as evidence, notes that samovar is changing to gas stove, pechka to steam heating and troika to a tractor (Maruyama [1941] 1942: 3–5). Shimizu (1979), underlining Russia’s cultural inferiority, argues that these three utilities are Russia’s only contribution to world civilization. The persistent cultural otherness of Japan in the Western discourse was most vividly present during the trade frictions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a number of opinion polls conducted during this period, an overwhelming majority of Americans pointed out Japan as the greatest threat to the US, greater than that of the Soviet Union. Numerous publications, including governmental ones, expressed serious worries about Japan’s “absolute desire to conquer the world” and her “amoral, manipulative and controlling culture,” to a large extent reproducing the earlier “yellow peril” discourse (Campbell 1992: 224–40 and Littlewood 1996: 208–10). Ken Kan Ryu (Hate the Korean Wave) by Yamano Sharin (2005).

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4 Ainu, Russia and Japan’s quest for “Northern Territories” 1 A recent MA thesis by Scott Harrison (2007) is probably the only academic work that is wholly devoted to examining the question of the Northern Territories in the context of the Ainu quest for recognition as an indigenous people. 2 The Ainu are not a monolithic group, but it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the linguistic and ethnic variations within it (see, for example, Siddle 1996 for details.) 3 In 1933, 7,000 and 5,800 residents on the largest islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu respectively. The population started to expand in early the 1910s, due to migration

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from the mainland—only in 1918 did almost 900 mainland Japanese relocate to Chishima, with most of the domestic immigrants to Hokkaido coming from the northeastern part of Honshu (Hokkaido Cho- 1919: 41–4). At the time of the Soviet occupation, the estimated population of the four islands was around 17,000 (Kimura 1980: 709). Furigana is kana (Japanese syllabary alphabet) placed over or beside a Chinese character to indicate pronunciation. Besides in texts for children, it is used when the Chinese character used or the particular reading is uncommon and the probability that the reader will know it is low. Earlier, in March 1951, when central Japanese newspapers reflected on a statement made by John F. Dulles regarding the belonging of the Habomais to Japan and speculated regarding the possibility of getting back some of the islands occupied by the Soviet Union, they occasionally referred to Shikotan as part of the Habomais or did not mention it all. The reasons for this are unclear, but possibly can be attributed to the limited knowledge of the non–Hokkaido reporters regarding the islands seized by the Soviet Union (for example, Mainichi, 2 March 1951 article and Yomiuri, 3 March 1951 editorial in Tomaru (ed.) 1993: 5–6). This is not surprising, as in purely administrative terms all of the Kuriles, including the northern part of the archipelago that came under Japan’s control as the result of the 1875 treaty and not disputed by Japan, were administered as part of Hokkaido. From 1903 onwards all of the Kurile islands, including Shikotan, were administered by the Nemuro Branch of Hokkaido Prefecture (Berton 1992). This conception is also confirmed in a preface written by the Head of Hokkaido Assembly, Bando- Hidetaro-, and by the leader of one of the early “return movement” organizations (Chishima Henkan Konsei Sokushin Renmei—,Alliance for Promotion and Appeal for the Return of Chishima [my translation]) Kobayashi Takeji, in a preface to one of the first texts aimed at mobilizing Japanese public opinion. As both proclaim that the “return of the Chishima islands along with Habomai archipelago” is the “earnest desire” of Hokkaido residents, we can conclude that it is only Habomai which is not included in the Chishima chain (in Kobayashi (ed.) 1950, iii–vi.) These polices were generally perceived as part of the modernization process and the Ainu received very little sympathy from contemporary intellectuals. A rare account of the disastrous effects of colonization on the Ainu, which shows respect to their culture and customs and criticizes the colonizers can be seen in writings of one of the leaders of the Jiyu-Minken (Liberty and Civil Rights) movement, Nakae Cho-min, who visited Hokkaido in 1892, and the journalist Hisamatsu Yoshinori (Nakae [1892] 1990 and Hisamatsu [1893] 1990). The revised convention (ILO 169), which argued for respect for the cultures and traditions of indigenous peoples, appeared only in 1989.

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5 Shiba’s original forms of Japan and Russia 1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as “Historical Memory and Shiba Ryo-taro-: Remembering Russia, Creating Japan,” in Saaler S. and Schwentker W. (eds) The Power of Memory in Modern Japan, Global Oriental, Folkestone, 2008. 2 The novels mentioned are Saka no ue no kumo (The Cloud on Top of the Hill) and Ryoma ga yuku (The Path of Ryoma). Information provided by the publishing house Bungei Shunju- to the author via e-mail, 22 March 2005. 3 Narita Ryu-ichi’s (2003) work is one of the rare attempts to provide a critical perspective on Shiba’s “history” by putting it in the context of a contemporary (1960s and 1970s) background which, Narita argues, influenced Shiba’s conception of modernizing Japan and resulted in glossing over negative consequences of the Russo–Japanese War for Japanese society.

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4 Donald Keene’s (2003) chapter on Shiba in his Five Modern Japanese Novelists and Nakao’s (2004) “The Legacy of Shiba Ryotaro” are the only two works in English that I found while conducting my research. 5 Most of the references made by Shiba refer to the nationalist ideology of the Mito school and Marxism, but also to Buddhism. His definition of “ideology” (shiso-) seems to refer to the broadly defined ideology as a system of thought that claims to explain the world and to prescribe proper behavior. At the same time, in his discussion of “original form”, Shiba positively examines religion (in case of China, Confucianism) as a tool used intentionally to “tame” the people, i.e. to unify them and to restrain their natural barbarianism with a certain moral code (Shiba 1998c). 6 Fukui Yuzo-’s 2004; 61–72) is one of the rare attempts to question the factual validity, the interpretations and the broad impact of Shiba’s work, focusing on Shiba`s description of the battle for Port Arthur in The Cloud on Top of the Hill. 7 My translation of Nanohana no oki. 8 In general, for Shiba, Edo Japan, while not being built on the principle of a “social contract” but rather through a policy of “taming the human beasts,” still represents the uniquely positive society where stability and peace have prevailed (Shiba 1976: 108). 9 Shiba notes briefly that “South Chishima” were “certainly a Japanese territory” (Shiba [1986] 2002: 149). 6 “Newly born Russia” and Japan 1 The Kursk was a nuclear submarine that sank with 118 sailors on board during military exercises in the Barents Sea in August 2000. Putin waited for a few days before breaking his summer vacation and commenting publicly on the incident. Furthermore, during the first crucial days in the aftermath of the incident, the Russian government refused rescue assistance offered by a number of Western nations. An early acceptance, some analysts argued, could have saved the lives of some crew members. 2 According to the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction website, Nippon Foundation spending in 2002, not including indirect costs, amounted to US$368 million, of which US$52 million were spent on overseas projects (www.unisdr.org/eng/sasakawa/sk-nippon-eng.htm). 3 This was pointed out in conversations with National Defense Academy staff (conducted in July 2005) and NIDS researcher (conducted in February 2006).

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7 The idea of Northern Territories 1 Here I refer to the gradual transformation of Japan’s Russia policy from “inseparability of politics and economics” (seikei fukabun), through “expanded equilibrium” (kakudai kinko-) that signified a softening in Japan’s insistence on progress in the territorial dispute prior to expansion of economic ties, to that “multilayered approach” (ju-so-teki apuroochi) adopted by Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1997, which basically meant a detachment of the territorial issue from other areas of bilateral relations. 2 On 9 February 2001 the Japanese high-school fishing training ship Ehime Maru was struck by the US nuclear submarine USS Greeneville off the coast of Hawaii while the submarine was demonstrating an emergency surfacing maneuver. As a result, nine crew members of Ehime Maru, including four high school students, died. Mori was playing golf at that time and, in spite of being informed about the accident, continued the round. 3 A group comprising academics, politicians and business leaders from both nations, co-chaired by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Japan’s ex-prime minister Yoshiro

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Mori, established by Prime Minister Koizumi and President Putin in 2004, with the purpose of strengthening bilateral relations and the search for a possible solution of the territorial issues. A number of publications have pointed out that this statement was taken out of context and purposefully leaked to the media by Suzuki’s enemies in MoFA (for example, Honda 2002.) For example, in November 2006 Russia received 19.2% as compared to North Korea (82.3%), China (29.5%), South Korea (16.5%) and the US (7.6%) (Jiji Tsu-shinsha 2006: 10) A certain residual fear of possible retributions by Rightist groups (uyoku), who are the most vocal defenders of the “national mission” harbored by Japanese politicians, reporters and other public intellectuals, has also been pointed out by a number of Japanese colleagues as a possible factor in sustaining the discourse in its present form. The Management and Coordination Agency has been one of the main government bodies in charge of Northern Territories-related activities. Since 2001, as part of a merger with other government agencies, it has become part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. In the case of Russian residents the visa waiver merely simplifies the procedures for travel. However, in the case of Japanese nationals the visa waiver plays an important role, as Japan does not recognize Russian sovereignty over the islands and officially prohibits visits to NTs, since the act of obtaining a visa can serve as implicit recognition of Russian sovereignty.

Conclusion

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1 This conflation of “international society” with the West in the cognition of Japan’s post-war elites is captured best in the General Policy Speech conducted by Prime Minister Yoshida, in which the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was presented as signifying Japan’s “return” to international society (Prime Minister Yoshida, Diet Policy Speech, 24 November1952 at TD). The treaty, as is well known, while b eing signed by forty-eight nations, was drafted by US officials, with some coordination with their British counterparts, and excluded the non-Western Soviet Union and communist China. Moreover, it came as part and parcel of a security treaty with the US which located Japan firmly within the Western alliance and provided for an unlimited extension of the American military presence on Japanese soil.

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Main internet resources MoFA – Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mofa.go.jp NDL – Japan National Diet Library, parliamentary interpolations database, http:// kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ TD–“Japan and the World” database provided by Professor Tanaka Akihiko lab, Institute of Oriental Cultures, Tokyo University, www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/ index.html Japanese language sources

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1. Main sources

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Wilbur, C. (1957) “Some Findings of Japanese Opinion Polls”, in Borton, H. et al. (eds) Japan between East and West, New York, Harper and Brothers, 299–312. Wilson, S. (1999) “The Russo–Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and Historical Memory”, in Wells, D. and Wilson, S. (eds) The Russo–Japanese War in Cultural Perspective 1904–1905, New York, St. Martin’s Press Inc., 160–93. —— (2002) Nation and Nationalism in Japan, London, RoutledgeCurzon. Wish, N. (1980) “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions”, International Studies Quarterly, 24, 532–54. www.doyukai.or.jp/policyproposals/ articles/2004/050208a.html. Accessed 12 May 2008. Yahuda, M. (2004) The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, Cornwall, Taylor & Francis. Yoshida, S. (1999) “Economic Links: A Japanese Perspective”, in Ivanov, V.I. and Smith, K.S. (eds) Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia, Westport, Praeger, 231–46. Yoshino, K. (1992) Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry, London, Routledge. —— (1999) “Rethinking Theories of Nationalism: Japan’s Nationalism in a Marketplace Perspective”, in Yoshino, K. (ed.) Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press. Yuan, J. (2005) “China Seethes at US–Japan “Meddling””, Asia Times Online, internet edn, Hong Kong, www.intell.rtaf.mi.th/Newsdetail.asp?IdNormal=20626. Accessed 22 June 2008. Zehfuss, M. (2001) “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison”, European Journal of International Relations, 7, 315–48. Zehfuss, M. (2002) Constructivism in International Relations: Politics of Reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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Proof

Proof Index

Abe, S. 120 Adler, E. 4, 134 n.3 Afghanistan 7 Soviet invasion of 37, 39, 40, 128 Agawa, N. 10 Ainu 18, 22, 50, 53–72, 79, 125, 133 as Japanese ‘other’ 50, 62–3, 67–8, 69 ethnic differences and 63–4, 65 nihonjinron discourse and 68–9, 82, 84 colonisation (‘pioneering’) of 51–2, 53–4, 55, 62, 65, 70 critical discourse 67, 69, 70, 137 n.8 culture re-evaluation narrative 66, 67–9 distinct identity argument 70 ‘inherent territory’ challenge 71–2, 83 Shiba Ryo-taro- and 73, 78, 79, 82, 83–4 1997 Act for Promotion of Ainu Culture 72, 73 politicisation/’liberation’ of 66–7 Ainu activism and 70–2 Shimoda Treaty (1885) 62 Shumushu forced relocation 71 territorial dispute and 51, 60, 62, 71–2, 109 see also Northern Territories, dispute Ainu Association 65 Akahata 31 Akamatsu, M. 75 Akimori, T. 54, 60 Akino, Y. 92 Akizuki, T. 22, 63 Akita, M. 55 Alliance Adrift 88 Anderson, B. 135 n.11

Ando-, I. 113 Ando-, N. 57 Anno, T. 19, 20 Aoki, T. 19–20 Arai, H. 90 Arai, S. 122 Arutyunov, S. A. 62 Asahi Shimbun 8, 9, 27, 31, 59, 66, 71, 87, 103, 106, 107, 111, 114, 115, 127 Asia Cultural Studies 134 n.8 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) 93–4 Aso-, T. 110 Austria 7 Axelbank, A. 10 Aydin, C. 6, 24

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Bando-, H. 137 n.7 Befu, H. 19, 20 Belenko, V. 39 Bellah, R. 45 Bellamy, A. J. 129 Beloff, M. 57 Benedict, R. 6, 44–5, 121, 131 Benyowsky, M. 22 Berger, P. L. 4, 13 Berger, T. 5–6, 10, 134 n.4 Berlin, I. 76 Berton, P. 25, 49–50, 57, 59, 60, 85, 137 n.6 Bird, I. 51, 53 Borton, H. 9, 32, 136 n.4 Brazil 95 Brennan, T. 14 Brezhnev, N. 46 British Council 96 Brooke, J. 13 Bukh, A.13, 118 Bull, H. 2, 132

Proof

170

Index

Proof

Bungei Shunju- 74 Bury, A. 95 Bushido, The Soul of Japan 10–11 Buzan, B. 129 Caiger, J. G. 117 Cairo Communiqué 65 Cambodia 66 Campbell, D. 3, 4, 12, 43, 80, 131, 134 n.3, 136 n.9 Canada 30 Chernomyrdin, V. 83 Chikappu, M. 70, 71–2 China 36, 80, 95 as Japan’s ‘Orient’ 22 Japanese relations with 25, 31, 35, 88, 92, 112, 116, 118 security and defense concerns 98, 99, 100–1, 103, 112 nuclear weapons development 7, 8 Russia/Soviet Union, relations with 38, 110 US-China ‘strategic partnership’ 88, 91 Chishima see Kurile Islands Chrysanthemum and the Sword, The 44–5, 131 Chu-o- Ko-ron 66, 113 Churchill, W. 56 Clammer, J. 20 Clark, G. 57 Cloud on Top of the Hill, The (Saka no ue no kumo) 74, 75, 78, 138 n.6 Clunan, A. 2 Cole, A. 34 communism 26–7, 29, 35 Japanese attitudes towards 31, 32, 34–5, 37, 40, 41 constructivism 2, 3, 4, 128 critical post-structuralist 4, 11, 12 liberal 4–5, 12 Culture and Imperialism 14 culture, study of 2, 3 Curtin, S. 101 Czeckoslovakia 36

Doty, R. 4, 12 Dower, J. 10, 120, 131 Drifte, R. 101 Dubcˇ ek, A. 36 Duedney, D. 132 Dulles, J. F. 73 Edamura, S. 92 Ehara, K. 67 Emori, S. 51, 54, 64 Engaging with Russia 97 Engels, F. 80 Epp, R. 129 Eto-, K. 96 Etorofu (Itrup) see Northern Territories, dispute European Union 12 Fabian, J. 64, 67 Falkenheim, P. 29 Ferguson, J. 85, 101, 102, 113 Fichte, J. G. 20 Foglesong, D. 87, 94, 96 France 31, 81 Freud, S. 20 Fujimoto, W. 29 Fujioka, N. 118 Fujita, C. 26, 27 Fujiwara, H. 114 Fukiura, T. 112 Fukuda, T. 10 Fukuda, Y. 98 Fukui, Y. 138 n.6 Fukuyama, F. 90 Fukuzawa, Y. 22–3 Funabashi, Y. 88 Funabiki, T. 73

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Dale, P. 19, 20–1 de Tocqueville, A. 20 Denmark 31 Deutsch, K. 2 Devetak, R. 3 discourse analysis 4 Doak, K. 27 Dobson, H. 93

Gaimusho- Cho-sabu 25 Gallicchio, M. 24 Garthoff, R. 60 Gayle, C. 118 Gebert, A. 134 n.5 Geneology of ‘Japanese’ Self-Images, A 16 Germany 11, 31 Glenn, J. 94 Gong, G. W. 129–30, 131, 132 Gorbachev, M. 37, 85, 86, 92, 106, 111, 115, 122–3 Goto-, S. 52–3, 61 Gow, I. 7 Guillaume, X. 134 n.2 Guzzini, S. 3

Proof

Proof Haas, E. 2 Habomai archipeligo see Northern Territories, dispute Hadfield, A. 14 Hagino, M. 69 Hakamada, S. 46, 47, 78, 90, 112, 117, 121, 122 Halliday, F. 10, 129 Hammond, P. 131 Han, J. 24 Hanazaki, K. 66–7, 69 Hando-, K. 55 Hanihara, K. 68 Hara, F. 24, 26, 27 Hara, K. 38, 39, 50, 55, 59, 112 Hara, Y. 61 Harootunian, H. D. 21, 43, 131 Harrison, S. 125, 136 n.1 Hasegawa, T. 7, 39, 50, 59, 60, 85, 86, 88, 106 Hashimoto, R. 75, 89–90, 93, 105, 107, 108, 138 n.1 Hashimoto, S. 64 Hata, T. 75, 88, 91 Hatanka, M. 30 Hatoyama, Y. 111, 123, 124 Hattori, M. 95 Hegel, G. W. H. 20 Heidegger, M. 20 Hellman, D. 59 Hill, C. 12 Hiraishi, N. 45 Hirano, K. 7 Hiranuma, T. 96 Hirayama, I. 71 Hirooka, M. 44 Hisamatsu, Y. 137 n.8 Hitachi, K. 98 Hitchcock, D. 29, 38 Hokkaido 39, 40, 49, 51, 57, 58, 59, 114 Assembly resolution (1950) 58, 113 colonization of 52–4 critical discourse of 67 ‘inherent territory’ discourse and 71, 113, 115 nihonjinron discourse 68 post-World War II 65 Russian relations and 82, 103 see also Northern Territories, dispute Hokkaido and Okinawa Development Agency 105 Hokkaido, C. 60, 136–7 n.3 Holsti, K. 2

Index

171

Honda, R. 24, 105, 114, 139 n.4 Hook, G. 7, 135 n.10 Hoppo-ryo-do mondai taisaku kyo-kai 62, 119 Hoshiyama, T. 104 Hosokawa, M. 88, 107 Hughes, L. 8 Huntington, S. 91 Hyo-do-, S. 102 Ichiro, S. 14, 46 identity, national 2, 11 concept of 2, 3, 6 construction of 11–12 critical constructivist approach 11 ‘difference’, creation of 4, 11 literature and art, role of 14 ‘the other’ and 11 see also Japan, identity, construction of; Russia, socio-cultural identity Ienaga, S. 71, 118 Ikenberry, J. 132 IMF 95 Imoto, T. 95 India 80, 95, 135 n.12 indigenous people, protection of 65, 66 international discourse on 66 ILO Convention 65 see also Ainu Inoue, H. 81 International Court of Justice 60 International Labour Organization 65 International Relations (IR) culture and 3 empirical study of 1–2, 129 national identity, concept of and 2, 3 ‘self/other’ analysis and 16, 128 theoretical models of 1, 2–3, 16 constructivist school of 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 128 rational choice, 2, 3 structuralist/post-structuralist 2, 4, 129 International Research Center for Japanese Studies 68 international society, scholarship of 129–30 Iraq war 7, 95 Japanese view of 7, 30–1, 91, 135 n.9 Ishihara, H. 74, 75 Ishikawa, T. 52 Ito-, K. 46, 47 Ivan the Terrible 79 Ivanov, V. 95

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Proof

172

Index

Proof

Iwashita, A. 59, 60, 109, 110, 114, 117 Izumikawa, Y. 6 Izuyama, M. 102 Japan Constitution 5, 11, 135 n.10 Council on National Security Problems 14 defense/security and 5–11, 98–104 China and 98, 99, 100–1, 103, 112 discourse of 7–8, 10, 99, 101 National Defense Academy 92 ‘new Russia’ and 98–100, 101–4 North Korea and 98, 99, 100, 103 Self Defense Forces (SDF) 5, 7, 9, 39, 134 n.6, 135 n.9, n.10 see also Japan, foreign relations/ policy Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 91, 111 Edo shogunate 22, 63, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83 foreign relations/policy 1, 5, 10 Afghanistan, participation in 7 Cold War era and 7, 9, 35, 88, 105 Iraq and 7, 135 n.9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) 55, 57, 89–90, 93 Northern Territories dispute and 105–6, 108–9 public opinion polls 116 Russia/Soviet Union and 14, 21–8, 39, 85–104, 135 n.12 ‘new Russia’ and 89–93 ‘normalization’ assistance/aid 94–5 trade and energy supply 95–6, 98 territorial disputes 29, 35–6, 39, 70, 85, 87, 88, 93, 94, 101, 105–24 Joint Declaration (1956) 88 Tokyo Declaration (1993) 88, 107 see also Ainu; Northern Territories, dispute U.S. relations and 8, 9, 33, 34, 35, 36, 88, 91 Post-War Occupation 29, 31–2, 34, 38, 117, 127 US–Japan Alliance 7, 9, 37–8, 40, 90, 91, 92, 101

US–Japan Defense Cooperation (1997–9) 91 US–Japan Security Treaty (1951) 33, 38, 88 identity construction see Japanese identity, construction of imperialism and colonialism and 13, 16–19, 24, 33, 49–73 critical discourse of 67, 70, 81, 117 historical narratives and 117–18 decolonization process 67 Great Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 24, 25 see also Ainu; Kurile Islands; Northern Territories, dispute LDP Party 89, 90, 91, 105, 110, 111, 120 Meiji era 23, 51, 52, 65, 74, 76, 77, 81, 119, 126, 130 nationalism in 8, 9, 18, 34 nuclear weapons and 8, 80 Sakigake Party 90 Showa era 77 Taisho Period (1911–25) 17 Tokugawa period 22, 25 World War II and see World War II Japan Association of Corporate Executives 89 Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) 92 Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) 55 Japan Science Council 34 Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 33, 34, 35, 36, 59, 60–1, 89, 91, 136 n.7 Japanese and the Jews, The 42 Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 94–5, 98 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 31, 32, 34, 136 n.5 Japanese identity, construction of 1, 5, 11, 16–19, 21, 125–33 antimilitarist/militarist dichotomy 5–7, 10, 125, 135 n.10 capitalist democracy, as 90–1, 93, 125 Cold War era 30–2, 33, 38, 41, 43–8, 56, 88 colonial expansion period (pre-1945) 50, 52, 54–5, 117, 119–20 East/West dichotomy and 17, 20–1 ‘economic’ success and 5, 70, 93, 119, 120

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Proof

Proof history, competing narratives of 117–18 homogeneity discourse and 17–18, 91 Western membership and 91–2 normalization discourse 119–21, 132 Northern Territories dispute and see Northern Territories dispute pre-1945 6, 29, 33, 52 self/other analysis and 16, 18–19, 21, 26, 41–3, 48, 69, 98, 120, 126, 128, 131, 132–3 Ainu and see Ainu China and 22, 33, 120, 126 mixed nation theory and 18–19 nihonjinron discourse 19–21, 41–3, 44, 45, 66, 67, 69, 84, 119, 120, 127, 132 see also Ainu Shiba Ryo-taro- and ‘original form’ 14, 73–7, 79, 80, 84, 87, 132 Japan/Russia juxtaposition 78–84 Soviet Union /Russia and 22, 25–7, 32–4, 37, 39–41, 46, 62, 63, 78–84, 88, 119, 120, 121–2, 125, 126–7, 132–3 conservative attitudes 32, 33, 37–41, 66 discourses on 16, 25–7, 29, 85, 126 Gorbachev’s reforms, effect on 85–6 Left/Socialist relations with 33–7, 38, 40, 44, 90–1 ‘newly born’ Russia, changes to 88–9, 93–6, 98 socio-cultural differences 12–13, 16, 21, 23, 41–4, 88, 90 ‘West’ and 20–1, 22, 69, 88, 90–1, 126, 128–9, 131–2 as ‘other 119–21, 126 Russia as contrast and 120, 121, 122, 133 Japanese Newspaper and Publisher’s Association 31, 32, 91 Japan’s Orient 16 Jepperson, R. 4 Jiji Tsu-shin 116, 139 n.5 Jiyu-minshuto- Seimu Cho-sakai 62 Johnson, C. 10, 120 Jorden, W. 7, 8–9

Index

173

Kaifu, T. 86 Kaiho, Y. 71 Kaizo- 54 Kakuyama, S. 119 Kamchatka Peninsula 49 Kamisaka, F. 113, 119, 123, 124 Kang, S. J. 74 Kase, Y. 7, 8 Katsuhiko, T. 106 Katsumata, S. 35, 36 Katzenstein, P. 2, 3, 4, 5–6, 8, 11, 134 n. 4 Kawai, K. 103 Kawakami, T. 102 Kawara, T. 102 Kawato, T. 98, 121, 122 Kayahara, I. 124 Kayano, S. 70, 71, 72 Keal, P. 66 Keene, D. 14, 74, 138 n.4 Keidanren 95, 97 Keohane, R. 3, 4 Khrushchev, N. 136 n.5 Kiga, K. 30 Kimura, H. 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 62, 72, 85, 112, 114, 122, 136–7 n.3 Kishi, N. 9, 38 Kishino, H. 98–9 Kitahara, R. 67 Kitaoka, S. 120 Kitaro, N. 20 Kiyokawa, Y. 30 Kobayashi, T. 58, 113, 137 n.7 Kobayashi, Y. 47 Koike, Y. 114 Koizumi, J. 7, 74, 75, 101, 105, 109, 138–9 n.3 Koizumi, T. 83–4, 119 Komaki, A. 86, 89, 93, 97, 106, 107, 108, 109, 123 Konishi, M. 23, 27 Koo, M. 113 Korea, South 18 Japan, relations with 70, 117, 118 annexation of 18, 47, 52, 55 Japanese attitudes and 30, 31, 47, 53, 116, 118, 126 territorial disputes 112 see also North Korea Korean War 31 Kosaka, M. 26, 38, 62 Kowner, R. 20 Koyama, K. 40 Kozyrev, A. 106

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Proof

174

Index

Proof

Krasner, S. 3, 4 Kratochwil, F. 1, 3 Kruzenshtern, I. 83 Kunashiri (Kunashir) see Northern Territories, dispute Kunio, A. 95 Kurile Islands 22, 39, 49, 51, 54, 79 Ainu ‘inherent territory’ narrative and 71 Japanese imagery and 54–5, 112 Russian relations with 79, 82, 111 Soviet occupation of 55–6 territorial dispute over 56–61, 111–12, 128 Yalta summit and 56, 57, 83, 111 Treaty of Shimoda 51 World War II, effect of on 51–2 see also Ainu; Northern Territories, dispute Kuroiwa, S. 54, 57, 58, 113 Kushner, B. 10, 26, 31, 131 Landor, A. 54 Langer, P. 32 Laos 66 Lapid, Y. 3 Lavrov, S. V. 111 Leander, A. 3 Lenin, V. I. 35, 79 Liebersohn, H. 68 Littlewood, I. 131, 136 n.9 Litvinenko, A. 97 Luckmann, T. 4, 13 Lyne, R. 97

Matsuura, Y. 102 Maull, H. 120 Mendel, D. 29, 33, 59 Mendelson, S. 94 Meyer, P. F. 88 Micronesian Islands 54 Mii, M. 100, 104 Milliken, J. 12 Minshuto- 33 Mitsubishi 98 Mitsui 98 Miyahara, A. 86, 100 Miyashita, A. 6 Miyazawa, K. 89 Miyoshi, O. 39 Moltz, J. 94 Monbusho- 52, 54 Mongolian People’s Republic 25, 83 Mori, Y. 108–9, 138–9 n.3 Morimoto, Y. 44, 45, 46, 121 Moriya, T. 104 Morley, J. 29, 113 Morris-Suzuki, T. 51, 54, 63, 64 Murayama, T. 89, 90–1 Muto-, K. 122 Myoshi, M. 43 Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, The 20

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McCormack, G. 10, 13 McDowell, E. 88 Machimura, N. 110 McSweeney, B. 127 Maeshiba, K. 30 Mainichi Shimbunsha 30, 56, 60 Manchukuo 25 Manchuria 29, 52, 53, 55, 135 n.1 Manchurian Railway Company 25, 53 Maritime Province, Russia 1 Mark, E. 26 Maruyama, M. 11, 27–8, 30, 42, 45, 46, 74, 76, 136 n.6, n.8 Marx, K. 80 Marxism-Leninism 26–7 Masuko, Y. 65, 70 Matsui, H. 67 Matsumoto, S.14, 37, 59, 73, 84 Matsumura, M. 24

Nagoshi, K. 136 n.7 Naikaku Jo-ho-bu 25 Naito-, M. 26, 55 Najita, T. 21 Nakae, C. 137 n.8 Nakagawa, T. 113 Nakajima, M.77, 76 Nakamura, K. 7, 9, 23 Nakamura, M. 74 Nakamura, N. 115, 116 Nakanishi, T. 86, 87, 123 Nakano, J. 100 Nakao, H. 138 n.4 Nakasone, Y. 8, 33, 39, 99 Nakayama, M. 62 Nakayama, Y. 106, 108 Nanbara, S. 34 Nandy, A. 135 n.12 Narita, R. 70, 71, 137 n.3 Nasu, D. 74, 75 nationalism 3, 14 Natsubori, M. 113 NATO 92 Nelson, J. K. 13 Nemuro 113–14 see also Northern Territories dispute

Proof

Proof Netherlands, The 31 Neumann, I. 3, 11, 16, 22 New York Times 25, 88 Nihon Ho-so- Kyo-kai (NHK) 15, 135 n.9, 54, 74 Nihon Keizai Shimbun 116 Nihon Shakaito- Chu-? Honbu 61, 62 Niigata Province, Japan 1 Nimmo, W. 85, 87 Nippon Foundation 96, 138 n.2 Nishi, T. 6, 10 Nishihara, M. 39, 92 Nishimura, K. 57, 90 Nishino, R. 65 Nitobe, I. 10 Nixon, R. 38 Nomura, G. 71 Nomura, I. 123 Nomura Research Institute 19 Nonaka, H. 110 Norota, H. 101 North Korea 92, 98, 99, 100 nuclear weapons and 100, 103, 116 Northern Territories, dispute 49–73, 105–24 China and 83 ‘inherent territory’ narrative 50, 59–61, 62, 71, 72, 84, 112, 118 Japanese public opinion and 114–15 domestic history debate and 118, 119 Ainu challenge 70–2, 73 irredentist movement in 53, 57–8, 59–60, 61–2, 71, 72, 112–13, 114, 119 Japan’s economic interests and 112–13, 114 Japan’s position 105–8, 110–11, 114, 117 national sentiment and 113–14 1997 multi-layered approach 107 ‘no visa’ program and 123 public opinion and 116–17 2006 compromise, rejection of 110–12, 117 dominant concepts in discourse 112–13, 117 Japanese identity discourse and 50, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60–1, 105, 118, 120, 122, 123–4, 126 conservative construct 61, 62, post-Suzuki affair 109–10 self/other nexus and 120, 122, 124, 125

Index

175

Shiba and 83 socialist narrative 60–1 1956 Declaration 111 1993 Tokyo Declaration 88, 107 1998 Kawana summit 107–8 Russian/Soviet position 105–8, 111, 122 ‘no visa’ program 122–3 occupation of 51, 55–6 Suzuki Muneo affair (2001) 105–6, 108–9, 110, 139 n.4 US position 106–7 see also Ainu; Hokkaido; Kurile Islands Northern Territories Problem Countermeasures Association 56 Norway 31 Nozaki, Y. 118 Obuchi, K. 75, 94, 105, 108 Ochiai, N. 86 Ogawa, K. 29, 38, 67 Ogawa, S. 102, 103 Oguma, E. 9, 10, 11, 16, 17–19, 21, 24, 34, 52, 64, 66 Ogura, T. 24, 26 Okawara, N. 5, 6, 7, 134 n.4 Okazaki, K. 121 Okinawa 8, 61, 64, 118, 122 Omori, N. 118 On Russia-The Original Form of the North 78, 83 Onuf, N. 2, 3 Oohira, M. 42 Oono, S. 60 Oota, K. 8, 23 Oouchi, S. 26, 42 Open Sea of Rape Blossoms, The 78 Orient/Orientalism 6, 16–17 Japanese creation of 17, 22 Orientalism 14, 133 Orr, J. 117, 118 ‘otherness’, political construction of 11, 64, 128, 129 normal/pathological dichotomy 80 see also Japanese identity, construction of Owl’s Castle (Fukuro no shiro) 73 Ozawa, I. 91, 120 Ozkirimili, U. 14

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Pandey, R. 10 Panov, A. 39 Plaza Accord 7

Proof

176

Index

Proof

Politkovskaya, A. 97 Pollack, D. 14 positivism 3, 4, 12, 134 n.1, n.4 Potsdam Declaration (1945) 65, 111 Primakov, Y. Russian Foreign minister Putin, V. 90, 97, 101, 108, 111, 138–9 n.3 Pyle, K. 39, 118 Rangsimaporn, D. 92 rational choice theory 3–4 Ravina, M. 130 Rodionov, I. 101 Roosevelt, F. D. 56 Rose, C. 118 Rozman, G. 13–14, 118, 126 Rumelili, B. 4, 11, 12, 48 Russia Chechnya war 97 Chernobyl nuclear accident 96 economic growth 95–6, 103–4 energy supply/ resource diplomacy 98 Japanese bi-lateral relations 94–6 assistance policy 94–5 defense and security 101–4 Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan (1997) 94 Japan-Russia Action Plan (2003) 94 trade with 95–6, 98 military threat of 21–2, 99–100, 102–4 post Soviet changes 98–104 Mongolian rule of 80, 81, 83 Shiba Ryo-taro- writings on 77–84 ‘original form’ of 79, 80, 81, 87 socio-cultural identity and 14, 41–4, 45–8, 88, 90 ‘new Russia’ and 89–92, 93 Japanese identity discourse, convergence 94, 96 Western perceptions of 22–3, 25–6 see also Japan, foreign relations/ policy; Soviet Union Russo–American Company (1799–1867) 79, 83 Russo–Japanese War 14–15, 23–4, 46, 74, 75, 76, 77, 126, 137 n.3 Ryukyuans (Okinawans) 18

Sakhalin 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 71, 83 San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) 30, 49, 57, 59, 60, 61, 111, 139 n.1 Sankei Shimbun 73, 110, 121 Sarkisov, K. 90, 101 Sasahara, J. 75 Sasamori, G. 51, 54, 60 Sasano, S. 124 Sassa, A. 103 Sato-, E. 8, 61 Sato-, K. 89, 93, 97, 106, 107, 108, 109, 123 Sato-, M. 44, 106, 109, 122 Sekai 59, 66 Seki, N. 100 Seki, Y. 34, 35 Sekikawa, N. 46, 73, 74, 76, 78, 81 Shevarnadze, E. 71 Shiba, R.14, 15, 50, 72, 73–84 Ainu culture, promotion of 73 historical interpretation of 74–6, 77 ideology, view of 76, 77 Japanese identity construction and 73 ‘original form’ of Japan 14, 73–7, 79, 80, 84, 87 Russia, writings on 77–84 Shikotan see Northern Territories, dispute Shillony, B. 25, 26, 27, 42, 131 Shimada, H. 127 Shimauchi, K. 79 Shimazu, N. 24 2005 Shimizu, H. 21, 41, 44, 45, 136 n.8 Shimomura, H. 54 Shimotomai, N. 56, 85, 86, 96, 110, 127 Shiobara, T. 98 Shiokawa, N. 127 Shiratori, M. 95 Shumushu see Kurile Islands Siberia 38, 78, 79, 135 n.1 Russian conquest of 82, 84 Siddle, R. 51, 53, 54, 63, 65, 66, 72, 73 Singh, B. 92 Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978) 39 Smith, W. B. 29 Snow, H. 51 Soiya, Y. 104 Sonda, H. 24, 26, 27 Soren Kenkyu- 58 So-rifu 31 Soviet Union Bolshevik Revolution 24, 35 Cold War era 13

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Saaler, S. 13 Said, E. 14, 133 Saito-, T. 109 Sakaguchi, I. 98 Sakai, N. 118 Sakamoto, Y. 9, 10, 35

Proof

Proof dissolution of 85, 87, 88, 92, 94, 98, 99, 100 foreign policy 44, 47, 87, 99–101 Gorbachev’s reforms 85–6 Japanese foreign relations and 7, 9, 24–5, 38–9, 85–104 attitudes towards 30–1 Japanese Socialist Party and 34–7 Left intellectuals and 126–7 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and 38, 40, 43 Tanaka-Brezhnev summit, 1973 38 national identity 44–8 perestroika 37 Prague Spring 1968 36, 37 ‘self”, construction of 26–7 World War 11, effects on 30, 54 Japanese territorial occupation 55–6 Yalta agreement 55, 56 see also Kurile Islands; Northern Territories, dispute; Russia Stalin, J. 56, 58, 79, 83 Stephan, J. J. 49, 52 Stockwin, J. 34 structuralism and post-structuralism 3, 4, 13 Suetsugu, I. 109, 110, 112, 119 Suganami, H. 130 Suzuki, M. 89, 105–6, 108, 114 Suzuki, S. 42, 63, 130 Swing, J. M. 65 Switzerland 7, 31

Index

177

Tantoku, S. 29 Taoka, R. 65 Tatebayashi, C. 61 Terashima, M. 54, 60 Thayer, J. 7 Theory of International Politics 2 Todorov, T. 63 Togawa, T. 22, 56 To-go-, K. 6, 95, 109 Toichi, T. 95, 96 Tolischus, O. D. 25–6 Tolstoy, L. 23, 75–6 Tomaru, H. 59, 137 n.5 To-yama, S. 130 Trenin, D. 97 Tsurumi, S. 75, 77 Uchida, K. 96 Ueno, T. 112 Umehara, T. 64, 68–9 Umemori, N. 8, 52 United Kingdom 31 United Nations Japanese membership of Security Council 90 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 66 United States 12 Iraq war 7 Japan and 7, 30–1, 33, 34, 35, 36, 91, 116, 131, 139 n.1 see also Japan foreign relations/ policy Russian/Soviet relations 99 US-Japan Alliance 7, 9, 37–8, 40, 90, 91, 92, 101 US-Japan Defense Cooperation (1997–9) 91 US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) 33, 38, 88, 108 Usui, H. 101

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Taiwan 18, 101 Japanese colonialism and 52, 53, 55 territorial dispute 112 Takagaki, T. 96 Takahashi, S.13, 68 Takakura, S. 53, 63, 79 Takano, Y. 60, 61 Takemae, E. 32 Takeo, H. 26, 135–6 n.1 Talbott, S. 97 Taliaferro, J. W. 8 Tamamoto, M. 10 Tamba, M. 44, 46, 62, 86, 89, 90 Tamotsu, A. 19 Tamura, H. 55 Tanaka, K. 39 Tanaka, M. 105, 109, 110–11 Tanaka, S. 16–17, 19, 21, 22, 82, 130, 133 Tanihata, R. 45 Tanizawa, E. 75

Valliant, R. 102 Vietnam 11 War 66 Vogel, E. 120 Wada, H. 6, 8, 22, 24, 40, 59, 109–10, 127 Wada, T. 55 Wakaizumi, K. 8 Walker, R. B. J. 2, 68 Waltz, K. 2 Warsaw Pact 36

Proof

178

Index

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Washington Post 39 Watanabe, A. 2 Watanabe, K. 92, 97 Watanabe, M. 30, 106, 108, 135–6 n.1 Watson, R. G. 52, 132 Watsuji, T. 20 Weldes, J. 3 Wendt, A. 2, 3, 4, 12, 129 White, J. W. 42 Wight, M. 129, 132 Wilbur, C. 7, 31 Wish, N. 2 Wittgenstein, L. 20 World of Our Making 2 World War I 54 World War II Japan and 18, 29, 43, 55, 77, 118 nuclear bombing of 118 defeat of 5, 11, 65, 75, 76 Pearl Harbour Attack 25

Yalta Agreement (1945) 56, 57, 83, 111 Yamaguchi, T. 122 Yamamoto, E. 122, 123, 124 Yamamoto, H. 25 Yamamoto, K. 71, 72 Yamamoto, S. 42 Yamano, S. 136 n.10 Yamato 68 Yamauchi, M. 25 Yamazaki, M. 46, 74 Yasumaru, Y. 10 Yeltsin, B. 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 103, 107–8 Yomiuri Shimbun 59, 60, 87, 116 Yoshida, S. 10, 32, 39, 59, 60, 62, 79, 95, 139 n.1 Yoshida, Y. 96 Yugoslavia 3 Yu-ki, S. 70, 71 Zehfuss, M. 3, 4, 11, 134 n.3

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