Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan: Between Radicalism and the Search for Survival (African Governance) [1 ed.] 1138491462, 9781138491465

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Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan

Examining the role played by ideology, internal politics and key figures within Sudan after the 1989 coup, this book analyses policymaking in the Sudanese administration in-depth and studies its effect on international and domestic politics and foreign policy. The military coup undertaken in June 1989 by the Sudanese Islamist movement, known to them as the “National Salvation Revolution,” established Sudan as a central actor in the instability of the region. This book explores the foreign policy, international and domestic politics of the new government, from post-coup Sudan to the present day. The intriguing political issues in Sudanese foreign policy during the period pose many questions regarding the dynamics of the government’s domestic and international policymaking. Studying the fragmentation of the Islamist movement into various political bodies, this book examines the role of foreign policy as a contentious point of Sudanese domestic politics. Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan also looks at the major factors in the relations of Sudan, such as the civil war, terrorism and human rights issues. Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, African politics, human rights studies and Islamic studies. Mohammed H. Sharfi is currently working as a Senior Consultant at the Diplomatic Institute in the State of Qatar. He previously worked for the United Nations in Sudan and Switzerland as an Information Analyst and Human Rights Officer.

African Governance

Mauritania’s Colonels Political Leadership, Civil-Military Relations and Democratization Boubacar N’Diaye The Rwenzururu Movement in Uganda Struggling for Recognition Martin Doornbos South Sudan Post-Independence Dilemmas Edited by Amir Idris Institutional Legacies, Decision Frames and Political Violence in Rwanda and Burundi Stacey M. Mitchell Aid Relations and State Reforms in the Democratic Republic of the Congo The Politics of Mutual Accommodation and Administrative Neglect Stylianos Moshonas African Presidential Republics Jean Blondel Cultural Capital and Prospects for Democracy in Botswana and Ethiopia Asafa Jalata Soldiers and the State in Zimbabwe Godfrey Maringira Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan Between Radicalism and the Search for Survival Mohammed H. Sharfi For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/AfricanGovernance/book-series/AFRGOV

Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan Between Radicalism and the Search for Survival Mohammed H. Sharfi

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Mohammed H. Sharfi The right of Mohammed H. Sharfi to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-49146-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-03286-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To my parents, for their unmeasured depth of love.

“And lower to them the wing of humility, and say: ‘My Lord! Bestow on them your Mercy even as they cherished me in childhood’”. (Al Quran 17:24)

Contents

Prologue Introduction

viii 1

PART 1

Radical agenda

9

1

The radical foreign policy ideology in the 1990s

11

2

Backlash from an assassination attempt

22

3

Major foreign policy issues

42

PART 2

Foreign policymaking

61

4

Decision making in the initial years (1989–1999)

63

5

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011): the path to secession

79

6

Character matters: Al-Beshir grip on power

95

PART 3

The future

111

7

The future is coming: reflections on Sudan’s foreign policy

113

Conclusion: towards New Sudanese foreign policy parameters

128

Index

139

Prologue

Between the independence in 1956 and June 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF) evolved from a small political group struggling to impact Sudanese politics to the vital success of controlling the state. Historical links between the NIF and Islamists in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world started with the initiation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood in 1950s as a branch of the same faction in Egypt. Since independence through the three democratic systems (1956–59/1964–69/1985–89) and two military regimes (1959–64/1969–85), the Muslim Brothers adapted their political tactics according to the political environment, which enabled their ascendance to power. Internal conflicts erupted within the movement many times through the years over its objectives and direction. The central actors in this conflict were advocates of political engagement versus others who believed in concentrating on education and Islamic intellectual upbringing in society. Al-Turabi’s leadership dominated the movement’s direction from 1964 and guided the movement to tailor alternative strategies so as to adjust and engage during a cycle of parliamentary-military systems for achieving their ends of seizing political power. The coup d’état of 30 June 1989 prompted by the NIF was a new turn in postindependence Sudan’s political landscape. The commitment of the military cadres and the sponsors of the new regime to impose their version of Islam was unquestionable. The revival of Islamic principles as perceived by the movement was the driving force behind the military takeover. It is imperative to discuss the national programme of the NIF in order to understand its behaviour in world affairs. The domestic agenda, in turn, reflects the policy orientation of the regime’s foreign relations. Through the Islamisation programmes in Sudan, the movement attempted to present itself as a model for an Islamic state. In this manner, Sudan could inspire and lead the Islamic world to construct a similar model of its own. The leaders of the 1989 military coup hailed their venture as a revolution against the politics of sectarianism internally and the position of Sudan in international politics. The NIF elite perceived the international system as dominated by Western Christian forces determined to control and contain the spread of Islam and prevent an Islamic revolution. Their ideological Islamic outlook to the international system sought a new active role for Sudan in the external sphere in line with their moral commitment to their counterpart Islamist political movements.

Prologue

ix

Although the NSR was an extension of the complications in the Sudanese politics, the regime also had analogous qualities with revolutionary states.

The rise of the NIF The Muslim Brotherhood movement originated through contacts with the Egyptian Ikhwan (brotherhood). In the 1940s, the new wave of Islamic thought in Egypt had a considerable influence on some Sudanese students and propelled them into political activism on their return home. Their vision of Islam as a driving force in the political and social spheres was unlike the outlook advocated by traditional Islamic Sufi sects (Tariqqa) that dominate the social structure of Sudan. Sufism is mainly a socially inward Islamic experience rather than the outward message of Islam advocated by the Ikhwan. The willingness to use a violent approach to implement Ikhwan political and social objectives became clear with the NIF ascendancy to power in 1989. In its early stages of development, the Islamist movement in Sudan learned and benefited from the organisational methods used by other ideological political groups such as the Egyptian Ikhwan and the Communist movements. “Egyptian Ikhwan believed in violence as a tool to seize the State. Its history was characterised by many armed violent acts of explosions, assassinations, and persistent attempts to penetrate and polarize the Egyptian army.”1 This experience in other ideological movements was manifested in secret style activities and the drive to recruit cadres in Sudan’s armed forces in order to seize power in the future. Al-Rashid Al-Tahir, well known for his skilled political manoeuvres, was the dominant figure in the group before independence. Early divisions within the group emerged before independence about the purpose, activities and the structure of the organisation. In order to tackle these problems, the movement held its founding conference in August 1954, which “drew up its first charter and ruled over conflicting issues of naming the movement (Muslim Brothers), and its nature (educational movement of Islamic appeal and comprehensive reform).”2 The adoption of its name demonstrated the link with pan-Islamist aspirations in the international arena, although it became a Sudanese-based movement. After independence, the Muslim Brotherhood established an active organised group able to influence Sudan’s political environment. In December 1955, the movement formed the Islamic Front for the Constitution, a national front organisation with the Ikhwan at its helm calling for an Islamic constitution for the newly independent state.3 The commission, which was formed following independence to write down a constitution, rejected this proposal.4 This push for an Islamic constitution reflects the early dynamic political involvement of Ikhwan and their inattentiveness to the social and political realities of the country. The movement targeted the mobilisation of students in universities and schools, considering their potential to play a decisive future role in Sudanese domestic politics. By 1959, the Muslim Brotherhood dominated the student union of the University of Khartoum, the most important academic institution that produces most of the Sudanese elite.5

x

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Even during this early political life period, Ikhwan, led by its secretary general at the time, Al-Rashid Al-Tahir, conspired with five military officers in November 1959 to topple the military regime of President Abboud.6 The attempt was foiled, and Al-Tahir was imprisoned for five years. Al-Turabi stated the movement reacted with a sense of fear to the persistent political persecution of Ikhwan in Egypt under President Nasser’s regime, which led to its seclusion “almost to stagnation.”7 As a result, Ikhwan embarked on a period of internal debate about the social and political course that should be followed in its contribution to Sudanese society: For the first time, an organised methodological dialogue raised a number of questions. Some of it related to leadership . . . as well as education, its objective and the role of family in it. Also the goals of the movement, whether it was an organisation for political pressure, or a political party seeking governmental power, and the question of Ikhwan’s associations with politics and political forces.8 The debate over the critical question of the educational and political direction continued to cause disagreements within the movement and its leadership. Ikhwan became a major force among students, who were politically active against President Abboud’s regime and contributed considerably to its fall in 1964. The call for a dynamic political engagement emerged as the favourite option with the rise of Dr Hassan Al-Turabi, the new leader who had studied at London University and at the Sorbonne.9 His personality helped to trigger the public protests against Abboud’s military regime that culminated in the October 1964 revolution and gave the movement a new political energy.10 Al-Turabi established himself as the dominant figure in the politically oriented organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood when elected as its secretary general. In April 1965, the movement participated in the elections tactically under the banner of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) to attract wide support for its Islamic programme. The ICF won 7 of the total 173 parliamentary seats in the 1965 elections (5 seats in the 1968 elections), and Al-Turabi was appointed as a member of the committee responsible for drawing up the country’s constitution.11 Despite their small number of representatives in the Constituent Assembly, they were “able to push major political parties into adopting the 1967 draft constitution with its substantial Islamic features.”12 In 1965, the movement successfully induced the Constituent Assembly to expel the members of their ideological rival the Communist Party, accusing them of heresy, putting the country on the brink of a constitutional crisis.13 This period witnessed the Islamic movement’s initiation of various national organisations and unions for different purposes. By the end of the second parliamentary period, the old frictions within the movement between the “educational school” and the “political school” resurfaced, and culminated in a split. The educational approach school advocated distancing themselves from intense political involvement and formed their own group, “the Muslim Brotherhood,” led by Al-Sadiq Abdallah Abd-Almagid.

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The military coup of May 1969, partly sponsored by the Communist Party of Sudan and headed by Jaafar Nimeiri, was a huge disappointment for the ICF with its Islamic-oriented aspirations. The movement opposed the ideological course of the new military regime under president Nimeiri. Opposition in the university and the military were the tools utilised for resistance. Before the military coup in May 1969, the movement had won the majority in the University of Khartoum students’ union elections, and Ali Osman Mohammed Taha became the president for that term. The regime dissolved the university student union in order to avoid public unrest and the confrontation with the educational institute whose considerable political impact had proved to be successful in October revolution.14 The movement joined the National Front led by Imam Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi, which shared its extreme hostility to the May left-wing regime. In 1970, the National Front gathered in Gezira Abba and declared a Holy War Jihad against the May leftwing regime, which opened the way for military confrontation. President Nimeiri eliminated opposition to his regime through military means, and Imam Al-Hadi and many members of the Muslim Brothers were killed in the attack.15 The ideological line of the regime was anathema to the Islamic aim of Ikhwan in Sudan; hence, a continuation of the struggle against the May regime was unavoidable. The failed coup attempt of the Communist Party in July 1971 turned Nimeiri against his main political allies. President Nimeiri started to transform the direction of his government to win over new alliances. The Islamic movement was involved in two failed coup attempts in September 1975 and the beginning of 1976.16 The failure of the military operation on 2 July 1976, staged by the National Front composed of forces from traditional parties and Ikhwan in Khartoum, revealed the difficulty of attaining change against Nimeiri’s regime through military force.17 By the end of 1976, the regime unveiled the second programme for its government, displaying strong Islamic orientation and a commitment to implement Sharia.18 The new course in Nimeiri’s regime was a political sign towards cooperation with traditional and new forces championing Islamic government as the guiding force in the society. In 1977, the regime patched up politically with the Umma party and was joined by Ikhwan, which viewed in favourable terms the change of the regime’s leftist perspective into a national outlook with Islamic features. Dr Hassan Al-Turabi dissolved the Ikhwan organisation and joined the Sudanese Socialist Union party, the single party of the government. After a short period of time, Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar sect, abandoned the reconciliation arrangements and left the country, but Al-Turabi continued his alliance with Nimeiri embarking on a long-term strategy to achieve the interests of his group. Al-Turabi was appointed minister of justice and continued to serve in other prominent positions until he became the foreign policy advisor to the president. The attachment of the Muslim Brothers to the regime allowed them to infiltrate the country’s economic and political institutions. Al-Turabi called this phase in the movement’s political development the “reconciliation and advancement era 1977–1984,”19 while Haider Ibrahim depicted it as the period of Tamakkun—Empowerment—“the stage of enabling and leaping to power.”20

xii

Prologue

Ikhwan established various Islamic organisations to serve their agendas. Their domination of Faisal Islamic Bank strengthened commercially the cadres of the group to build a base for their future plans. Hassan Mekki, a prominent figure in the Muslim Brothers, summed up the advantages gained from joining Nimeiri’s regime as follows: 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

Emergence of missionary foundations and fronts for Islamic activities, such as the Islamic Call Organisation, the Islamic Thought and Culture Society, the African Islamic Relief Agency and the Society for Women Renaissance Pioneers Control of the direction of Islamic financial institutions, i.e. banks and companies Increase in their political weight among the students Prominence of their political voice in the forums and policies of the state (People’s Assembly, Council of Ministers and the Sudan Socialist Union) Association of the women’s movement with the Islamic agenda Expansion of the movement’s organisation internally and externally, and its adoption of decentralisation Weakening the secular elements in the regime, such as Mansour Khalid, Bedr Al-Din Suliman and Jamal Mohammed Ahmed 21

They encouraged President Nimeiri to impose Islamic laws’ Sharia in September 1983, thus fulfilling one of their long-awaited objectives. Despite the deteriorating economic situation and public antipathy towards the Islamic laws, the movement viewed the alliance with Nimeiri vital for their future grand design. However, in a later stage, Nimeiri viewed the rise of Ikhwan political power as a front to use the regime carrying out their objectives without being responsible for the consequences. In early 1985, alarmed at the threat to the damage and survival of his regime, President Nimeiri accused the Ikhwan (depicting them as brothers of the devil) of devising subversive plans against the regime. He blamed them for the deterioration in all aspects of life in Sudan. The leaders of the movement were imprisoned to avoid internal political turmoil. The public deplored Nimeiri’s tactics and demonstrations swept the country, beginning with the Islamic University in Omdurman, the stronghold of the Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri’s action against Ikhwan revived them politically in the multi-party system which followed Nimieiri’s collapse. In April 1985, the armed forces backed by civilian organisations overthrew Nimeiri, and a transitional government was formed for a year to arrange for the democratic transformation. The following year, elections were held, and the Muslim Brothers participated under the banner of the NIF. The Ikhwan avoided marginalisation in the political scene by the coincidental timing of their dispute with the May regime and its final collapse. The NIF won 51 out of 227 seats in the Constituent Assembly, thus becoming the third-largest party after Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).22 Their involvement with the May regime gave the party a financial and institutional leverage for contesting elections.

Prologue

xiii

The traditional parties faced strong opposition from the NIF on the freeze of the Islamic laws as a compromise for a peaceful solution with the rebels (SPLA/M) in the south. The economic deterioration and the southern problem led to the collapse of the coalition government of the Umma and DUP parties. The NIF took part in a broader coalition government. Al-Turabi was assigned as the minister of justice and two additional NIF ministers were appointed after the withdrawal of the DUP. Afterwards, Al-Turabi was appointed minister of foreign affairs in a cabinet reshuffle. The DUP withdrew from the coalition government as a result of the refusal of the Umma party of its initial agreement with the SPLA/M by the end of 1988 to stop the war in the south. This accord had been received with spontaneous public rejoicing. In March 1989, the NIF pulled out of the coalition government, enraged by the plans to reach a peaceful solution with SPLA/M in the south at the expense of the Sharia laws. The movement mobilised its supporters to protest against the DUP initial peace deal with the SPLA/M in order to impede the settlement process. It realised that the peace process would jeopardise its long-term objectives to impose its comprehensive Islamic political programme: By 1989, the older dynamics of shifting coalitions and rivalries had been reestablished. The level of violence in the civil war had increased, there were growing economic difficulties, and there was a little sense of political stability or direction in the central government.23 The determination to seize power culminated in a military coup orchestrated by NIF cadres in the armed forces. The execution of their domestic and external political programme stemmed from the movement’s ideology that necessitated a forceful system in a military government framework. On 30 June 1989, Brigadier Omer Al-Beshir, a long-time cadre of the movement, declared a military takeover by the National Salvation Revolution (NSR) and the abolition of the democratic institutions and political parties. A glimpse of Ikhwan historical external engagement The view adopted by some Islamic scholars (e.g. Hassan Albana and Al-Maududi) towards international relations as an unjust world order coloured the outlook of the movement’s elite. It has a firm ideological stance to support other Muslim groups that share the same values around the world. This position emanated from the principles of pan-Islamism advocating the establishment of Islamic order as a common cause. Despite the historical links with Ikhwan in Egypt, the movement in Sudan emphasised its autonomy but continued the ideological and organisational ties with the former. The implementation of Sharia in the state was the core of their political agenda in the domestic domain—a sign of its pan-Islamic philosophy aimed at the revival of Islam in the international sphere.24 The political activity of the Muslim Brothers focused on the Muslim northern part of the country, as they considered it their stronghold for achieving their political interests.

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Prologue

Ikhwan took a hostile position towards communism as well as the West due to their perceived enmity towards Islam. They condemned the 1958 Eisenhower Plan to combat the expansion of communism by using American aid due to the association of the West with the exploitation and negative involvement in the Muslim world. The movement opposed Nasser’s regime for its aggressive policy towards the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and its strong relations with the Soviet Union. They expressed their disapproval of the Abboud regime’s Western-oriented foreign policy and its reluctance to support Islamic resistance movements fighting imperialist-backed governments in Chad and Ethiopia. The Brotherhood contributed considerably to the fall of Abboud’s regime in October 1964 and persuaded the transitional government to sponsor the struggle of Islamic opposition groups against regimes in Ethiopia and Chad. The arrival of Nimeiri’s Communist regime in May 1969 drove the brothers to establish good relations with the conservative Arab states, which were dismayed by Communist expansion in the region. The shift of Nimeiri’s regime’s policies and their reconciliation with Nimeiri in 1977 gave Ikhwan the opportunity to establish strong ties in the external level. Links were initiated with various Islamic movements and the conservative Arab regimes in the Gulf. Financial support of the Gulf States intended to provide political and economic leverage for a movement with similar Islamic objectives, which would offer these states political leverage in Sudan.25 Their financial backing gave the Sudanese movement a full thrust to embark on their long-term strategy in the social, economic and political spheres for the purpose of seizing political power. Faisal Islamic Bank illustrated the fruitful links with Saudi Arabia injecting Ikhwan with the resources needed to boost its programme at the domestic level. Sudanese Ikhwan formed political and organisational ties with other Islamic groups in North Africa, especially with the Tunisian Islamic group. Ikhwan supported Rashid Al-Ganoushi, the leader of the Tunisian Islamic movement on his house arrest in 1984, as well as during the group’s conflict with President Bourgaiba.26 A book titled How Does Al-Turabi Think by a cadre in an Islamic movement in North Africa demonstrated the extent of links between the two experiences in both Sudan and North Africa.27 In 1982, while they were part of Nimeiri’s regime, the movement’s external relations secretariat, led by Al-Tigani Abugidiri, encouraged and backed Libyan Islamists.28 Ikhwan developed robust bonds with two Muslim countries in particular Pakistan and Iran after the success of the revolution in 1979. The impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution was huge on the Islamist groups since it was the first purely Islamic revolutionary regime in the Muslim world. Many delegations and cadres from the movement travelled to Iran after the revolution, which led to building bridges with the Iranian leadership and benefiting from their practical experience in organisation and political thought.29 Sharia and its legal application offered Ikhwan the opportunity to develop its relations with Pakistan. Al-Turabi was appointed as a legal consultant to revise Pakistan’s existing laws (derived from English law), while experts from Iran participated in a conference in 1984 to evaluate the 1983 implementation experience of Sharia law in Sudan.30

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The movement was able to form strong associations in Africa, especially with Uganda. Mohammed Abd-Allah Jar Al-Nabi, a prominent cadre within the movement, was able to establish a successful business in Uganda after the expulsion of Indians by President Idi Amin. His activities consolidated the movement’s links with Islamic communities in Uganda. An Islamic centre was inaugurated in Uganda by Al-Turabi and other leaders of the movement during the third democratic period.31 In the last multi-party system (1985–89), the NIF had an active unit for external relations that helped to increase links with the outside world.32 Dr Al-Turabi played a crucial role in presenting and shaping Ikhwan relations with the outside world. His perception was that Muslims are one entity, and should be bound together at different levels from smaller Muslim communities to the highest level of the house of Islam (Dar Al-Islam). The fall of the Ottoman Empire led to the domination of imperialist Europe over the destinies of the Muslim world, creating the secular and Western nation-state system. He believed the revival of Islam in the international environment required new strategies to respond to the imposed political systems led by the puppeteers of imperialism. According to him, once a truly Islamic state is created, the experience would diffuse all around the Muslim world and would be the centre point for the convergence of all pan-Islamists. Al-Turabi was a pragmatist in dealing with the outside secular world. He associated the ideals of his views to the reality of the world in order to survive and achieve the goals of the movement in the international arena. This pragmatic approach was also obvious in his position on the Southern Sudan problem, which was an obstacle to the establishment of his Islamic project, by endeavouring to accommodate the non-Muslim community in the south. This would enable the movement to expand its Islamic political order by becoming the spearhead of Islam in the African continent. The domestic agenda of the NIF Different slogans promoted by the regime domestically illustrate the dogma of the ruling elite. “Self-sufficiency” manifested in the slogan “Nelbes min ma Nasnaa wa Naakol min maa Nazra” (we wear what we make and eat what we grow), implies Sudan’s economic capability to survive the need for support from the outside world. The slogan demonstrates the regime’s desire for independence and to act freely in the international arena without any limitations. In the process, human rights violations were committed in the name of the revolution and became one of the principal issues in Sudan’s foreign relations. The West’s accusations in this respect hindered the regime’s ability to open up to the outside world. The NIF party machine did not publish much before the coup about the programmes to be implemented in the domestic sphere. Nevertheless, the importance of two policy spheres for the success of the new regime’s ideological scheme was obvious. First, it was crucial to control the state institutions which would ensure the survival of the political system. This would also consolidate NIF power and facilitate the implementation of their future agenda on the domestic and international level. Second, Islamisation and Arabisation of the society were the core

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concepts advocated by the NIF as a political movement. The necessity of establishing Sharia was after all the paramount factor in seizing the state by force. “For an Islamist movement with an emotive agenda of establishing a divinely guided political order, an Islamic state, power raises the all-important question of how this mammoth objective can be approached in reality.”33 For the NIF, it was inevitable to use coercive methods to institute their vision inside Sudan. Control of state institutions In the first proclamation, the commander of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Omer Al-Beshir, pinpointed democratic malpractice by the political parties as one of the main reasons for the coup d’état. Al-Beshir stated, In the previous period, we lived a forged democracy, ineffective constitutional establishments, and the will of people was faked through misleading and glittering slogans . . . the official government institutions were nothing but a theatre to present the verdicts of masters.34 The failure of democracy and pluralism, and their invalidity in the Sudanese context, were key themes in the rhetoric of the regime’s mass media approach. Following the takeover, laws governing political parties, unions and media were suspended, and all existing associations were dissolved. The regime imposed a state of emergency and arrested all politicians and union leaders. In August 1989, Sudanese judges presented a memo to the head of the RCC, reflecting their dismay at the government’s action in the judicial sphere: According to the decisions issued by your council, military courts were formed—which is a serious matter—since these novel practices demonstrate a decline and alienation of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary . . . the practices of these military courts have not been witnessed in Sudan in modern times.35 Consequently, 57 judges were expelled from the legal system as a result of this memo disapproving of the NSR’s practices. Many conferences were organised on issues such as national dialogue, trade unions and diplomacy to adopt policy recommendations in parallel with the NSR’s ideological convictions and strategy. Most of the participants in these meetings were members of the movement. One of the main goals behind these conferences was to undermine civil society organisations in Sudan. Trade, professional and student unions had proved to be vital in the removal of the two former military regimes in 1964 and 1985. Unions in Sudan were considered part of one of the most vibrant civil societies in Africa and the Middle East. For the NIF, they were “perceived as bastions of Western liberal standards or, worse, as Communists and Ba’athist of various hues.”36 The experience of successive governments in Khartoum demonstrated the importance of the armed forces for the survival of any regime in power. The

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military institution was targeted from the start to make certain no serious challenge existed against the NSR rule. Ibrahim Shamseldin, a young army officer, RCC member and committed cadre of NIF, whose participation in the coup was vital to its success, was given the responsibility of supervising the loyalty of the army. “Approximately 1800 officers were dismissed from the military service from a total of 5000 others.”37 These measures had political and military implications, significantly affects the professional ability of the armed forces to operate in a professional manner. In April 1992, the NSR executed 28 officers and more than 54 soldiers after a quick two-hour trial for plotting a military coup.38 There was no hesitation to viciously repress any attempt within the army against the regime. The formation of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) as a parallel institution to the armed forces was an endeavour to protect the movement and its political programme. The new forces were presented as a popular organisation aiming to defend the revolution and its ideals against any external or internal threat. The organisation’s framework was built upon the fight against the enemies of Islam who might intervene to threaten Muslim and Arab identity and culture. The government also formed popular committees entrusted with the distribution of food rations and services. The idea of the committees that was borrowed from the Libyan political system served as an agency to assure the security of the NSR. The regime adopted a policy of “ideology overrides quality” as an essential factor in pursuance of their objective to control the state. The “commitment rules out qualification” policy necessitated the replacement of people with expertise in public office whose political stances were suspected by loyal NIF members. Thousands of people in civil service (education, diplomatic corps, academia, health, police, justice, etc.) and military services lost their jobs. This led to major disruption, confusion and inefficiency in many government sectors. The unqualified loyal cadres who were newcomers to the existing institutions assumed their religious credo was sufficient as a qualification to perform efficiently. The foreign service was highly affected by these measures, as the committed and loyal to the NIF programmes in government bodies ensured its control over policy and implementation. Al-Turabi affirmed, The movement became a model of the whole society. It transformed and became the society itself . . . Its organs have become the organs of the society and its role in the state should be that of choosing the rulers and of advising and controlling them. It carries out those functions which rulers cannot handle.39 Intimidation, property confiscation, humiliation and the use of torture against opponents were established as a policy to attain the political, economic and social ends of constructing their ideal society. The regime identified the revolution’s legitimacy phase as the period which entails a forceful and aggressive course of action. This phase implied justifying the infringements of existing laws and customs. The regime labelled the following phase as the “constitutional legitimacy,” when they organised bogus local and presidential elections. Many human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

xviii Prologue (HRW) expressed their grave concern on the deterioration in human rights conditions. “Hundreds of suspected government opponents, including prisoners of conscience, were detained without charge or trial for periods ranging from a few days to several months.”40 The situation was reviewed annually by the UN Commission on Human Rights, and in 1992, the UN forum appointed Mr. Casper Biro as a Special Rapporteur to investigate and report back to the UN Third Committee of the General Assembly (humanitarian, social and cultural affairs) and the commission. Since then two successive Special Rapporteurs (Leonardo Franco and Gerhard Baum) have been appointed to examine the situation. The decision of the commission reflected serious concerns about the situation and the isolation of the Sudanese government within the international community. The banking sector, especially Islamic banks, was the main strength of Ikhwan as a result of their alliance with Nimieiri’s regime. Following the coup d’état, the NIF moved fiercely to dominate various sectors of the economy through the delivery of economic privileges to its members. The liberalisation of the economy boosted the power of the Islamic banks and businesses associated with the NIF. Charitable Islamic organisations, such as Dan Fudio and the Islamic Call Organisation, were given wider powers in many economic sectors, such as commodities and construction. Islamic charitable organisations had had very close links with the NIF for many years before the takeover.41 Privatisation of numerous public enterprises and projects had enormously benefited many NIF members. They were sold undervalued to the movement’s businessmen or in conjunction with foreign investors. Harsh measures were introduced to deter possession of hard currency, primarily for economic reasons, at the beginning of the coup and as a result three people were executed. Those measures were revoked 30 months later by Abdel-Rahim Hamdi, the finance minister and a high-ranking cadre of the NIF. This inconsistency in economic policies forced many merchants and businessmen to flee the country to seek investments abroad. Mass media was totally controlled by the regime since it is a crucial tool to impose its programmes and mobilise the population around its political agenda. NIF members were given key posts in the national TV and Radio Corporation and the newly established newspapers of Al-Sudan Al-Hadeeth (the Modern Sudan) and Al-Inqaz Al-Watani (the National Salvation). The mass media was the agency entrusted with the creation of new standards and shaping the perceptions of society according to Islamist doctrine. Islamisation and Arabisation The control of state institutions and the imposition of ideology were parallel and amalgamating processes that endeavoured to fulfil the NIF purposes. The survival of the regime and the shaping of the society according to the movement’s Islamic doctrine were the supreme goals. The war in the south was one of the main three reasons given by Al-Beshir for the military takeover (the other two were the deteriorating economic situation and Sudan’s isolation in the international arena). In its first few months, the regime did not reveal its radical viewpoint on the southern

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problem. Before the military coup in 30 June 1989, the NIF opposed the agreement between the junior partner in the coalition government in the parliamentary system, the DUP and the Sudanese People Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Ethiopia in November 1988. The agreement called for the freezing of the Sharia law, the lifting of the state of emergency and the abolition of all political and military pacts with other countries. They proposed a constitutional national conference should decide the relationship between religion and politics. The National Islamic Front was quick to condemn this agreement, reiterated its former position that it would oppose any move to freeze or abolish the sharia law, and organised a massive rally, attended by more than 100,000 in order to exert pressure on the Government.42 The movement considered the abolishing of Sharia as crossing the line; therefore, it instigated the coup in June 1989. The war in the south took on an extreme religious dimension with the NIF in power with its rhetoric of war against Islam and the brutal policy pursued at the domestic level. The conflict was represented by the NIF regime as a Muslim Jihad (holy war) against Khwarij, a Muslim term for outlaws. The regime portrayed the war as part of the SPLA/M endeavour to weaken the Islamic, Arab and cultural identity of the north, and that churches and international powers were backing the rebels in the south: Nothing serves the regime better than the continuation of the civil war. It provides a scapegoat and inflammatory rallying point; therefore, it is not surprising that NIF and its resulting regime have adamantly opposed all peace initiatives.43 According to Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, a high-ranking member of the NIF, the negotiations between the government and the SPLA/M concluded agreements on only two issues. They were the delivery of humanitarian aid and the specification of a date for the next negotiation round.44 The dogma of the movement considerably intensified the war, accompanied by severe famine and a displaced population in many parts of the south. The government policies of Islamisation increased hostilities in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur region. Their support for the Arab tribes against non-Arabs in Darfur brought havoc and led to instability in the area. Many human rights organisations reported and claimed systematic ethnic cleansing in the Nuba Mountains. One of the reasons for the escalation of the war was the domination by NIF cadres of military operations in the field. The grave situation in the Nuba Mountains led the UN to establish safe havens in two locations. The PDF were depicted by the NSR media as “the soldiers of God” who were defending the faith. It was compulsory for all entrants to higher education and civil servants to join the PDF. The identification of the war as a war between Islam and the non-Islamic world marginalised and intimidated the non-Muslim

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population in Sudan. There were calls by various southern politicians for separation of the south. The SPLA/M exploited the regime’s radical Islamic rhetoric to represent itself as an organisation credibly fighting for the fallen victims of the regime’s religious fanaticism. The SPLA/M gained international recognition and prestige for its calls for the establishment of a new plural and tolerant Sudan. Higher education was one of the major elements in the NIF’s long-term strategy to infiltrate wider sections of society. They had started the process of controlling educational institutions during Nimeiri’s regime, which gave them a free hand in the universities: The NIF obsessive concern with the student movement stems, first, from the elitist nature of its political philosophy and, second, from its failure so far to control professional associations and trade unions, all of which are firmly opposed to its policies.45 Student unions and religious charitable organisations were allowed to operate following the ban on associations by the new revolutionary council. In September 1990, a conference was organised by the government to discuss education policies in Sudan. Brigadier General Al-Zubair Mohamed Salih, the RCC deputy chairman and a NIF prominent member, was selected to supervise higher education, while Dr Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, a distinguished cadre of the movement, was appointed the chair of the National Council of Higher Education. These appointments reflected the importance placed on higher education in the agenda of the movement. It also demonstrated a systematic programme of continuing domination and the use of the education sector for the benefit of the movement. By the end of 1989, the government had announced three decrees with regard to higher education: establishing five new public and private universities, doubling of student numbers at old universities and, finally, using the Arabic language in higher education. The use of Arabic as the medium of instruction is a controversial issue within the academic community. Many scholars contended that the use of Arabic in higher education requires careful consideration of various aspects, such as resources, diversity, standards and job opportunities in order to obtain positive results from the process. The imposition of Arabisation was a necessity for the movement despite the serious practical issues that needed to be addressed. The decrees were part of the grand scheme to harmonise the society along the NIF’s ideological lines. The abrupt implementation of this education policy was justified in terms of cultural and traditional paradigms as defined by the movement: In the South, where English used to be the medium of instruction, elementary and secondary students and their teachers are being sent on open ended “vacations” to learn Arabic and become able to use it as a medium of instruction.46 Arabic language as a medium of instruction was imposed on the University of Juba with its predominantly southern students. Arabisation revealed exclusive

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religious and cultural policy that perceived Islam and Arabic as the sole reference point for the Sudanese identity. The appointment of the NIF deputy leader, Ali Osman Taha, as the minister of social planning demonstrates the priority given to the process of societal transformation. The slogan Al-Baath Al-Hadari (Civilisation Revival), used extensively by the regime, was trumpeted as the major cause of the NSR’s rise to power. This slogan was a dogmatic framework for the movement’s interpretation of a true Islamic society and formed the basis for all state policies. The government established two Centres for the Islamization of Knowledge in Gezira and Khartoum universities. The status of women deteriorated sharply—a phenomenon that contradicts the historically active role played by women in Sudanese society. Women faced a variety of restrictions in their daily lives, such as dress codes and limited opportunities for public office. Christians were forbidden from holding senior posts in the government, and two Christians were appointed to obscure positions. The domestic agenda is crucial for understanding the movement’s behaviour in the international arena. The ideology of the movement’s leaders influenced policymaking and implementation in the domestic sphere. On the other hand, coercive policies at the domestic level prompted international condemnation that led to the deterioration of Sudan’s relations with the outside world. These policies became relevant and a matter of concern for the international community following the end of the cold war. Democracy, human rights and governance became major themes and standards in the interaction between major powers and other states. The diversity of Sudanese society was at odds with the exclusive policies of the NIF emphasising the identity of the north over other parts of the country. The southerners were viewed as victims of a totalitarian regime by many neighbouring states ethnically interrelated with Sudan. Many neighbouring states to the south sympathised with the SPLA/M in its demand for self-determination.

Notes 1 Taha I M (2002), Al-Gaish Al-Sudani wa Al-Syyasa: Dirassah Tahleeliah Lil-inglabat Al-Askaryyah wa Mugawamat Al-Anzimah Al-Dictatoryah fi Al-Sudan (Sudanese Armed Forces and Politics: Analytical Study on Military Coups and the Resistance Against the Dictatorial Regimes). Cairo: Sudanese Studies Centre. 2 Al-Turabi H (1992), Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan: AlTatwur. Al-Manhaj, AlKasb, Al-Manhaj (The Islamic Movement in Sudan: The Development and Achievements). Khartoum: IRSS. 3 Esposito J L, and Voll J (1996), Islam and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 88. 4 Ibid. 5 Osman Abdalwahab A (1989), The Political and Ideological Development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan 1945–1986. PhD Thesis, University of Reading. 6 Taha, Al-Gaish Al-Sudani wa Al-Syyasa, op. cit., p. 220. Ikhwan focused on recruiting individuals from the army from an early stage, and their first cadres in the armed forces were Beshir Mohammed Ali, Abdullah Al-Tahir, Abdulrahman Farah and AbdulRahman Swar Al-Dahab. 7 Al-Turabi, Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan, op. cit. 8 Ibid., p. 28.

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9 Woodward P (1997), Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power, in Esposito J L, ed., Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reformism. London: Lynne Rienner. 10 Ibid., p. 96.0 11 Esposito and Voll, Islam and Democracy, p. 90. 12 Al-Turabi, Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan, op. cit., p. 30. 13 Osman, The Political and Ideological Development, op. cit. 14 Ibid. 15 Mekki H (1999), Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan 1969–1985: Tareekheha wa Khitabeha Al-Syyasi (The Islamic Movement in Sudan 1969–1985: Its History and Political Rhetoric). Khartoum: Al-Dar Al-Soudania. 16 Ibid., p. 80. The Islamic movement were implicated in these two failed military coups executed and led by military officers Hassan Hussein and Anas Omer both of whom had Islamic, racial and national affiliations. 17 Ibid., p. 86. 18 Ibid. 19 Al-Turabi, Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan, op. cit., p. 33. 20 Haider I A (2003), Azmat Al-Islam Al-Syyasi: Algabha Al-Islamyya Al-Gawmyyah fi Al-Sudan Numzajan (The Crisis of Political Islam: The NIF as an Example). Cairo: Sudanese Studies Centre. 21 Mekki, Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan, op. cit., p. 128. 22 Woodward, Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power, op. cit., p. 99. 23 Esposito, Islam and Democracy, op. cit., p. 94. 24 Sidahmed A (1997), Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. Richmond: Curzon Press, p. 213. 25 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, op. cit., p. 207. 26 Mekki, Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan, op. cit., p. 172. 27 Salim I (1990), Al-Ilagaat Al-Khargyya li-Ihda Al-Harakaat Al-Islamyyah Al-Sudanyyah (External Relations of One of a Sudanese Islamic Movement). Sudan’s Foreign Relations Workshop, 10–12 Mar. 1990, Afro-Asian Institute, University of Khartoum. 28 Ali, Azmat Al-Islam Al-Syyasi, op. cit. 29 Salim, Al-Ilagaat Al-Khargyya, op. cit., p. 18. 30 Ibid., p. 17. 31 Ibid., p. 22. 32 Al-Turabi, Al-Harakah Al-Islamyyah fi Al-Sudan, op. cit., p. 279. 33 Sidahmed A (1998), Sudan: Ideology and Pragmatism, in Sidahmed A and Ehtishami A, eds., Islamic Fundamentalism. Oxford: Westview Press. 34 First Proclamation of the NSR, 30 June 1989. 35 Uthman M H (2005), Lltareekh: Muzakira Alqudaat Llingaz fi Agustus 89 (The Judges Memo to the Head of the RCC, August 1989). Sudanile, 15 Sept. 2005. 36 Woodward, Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power, in Esposito, Political Islam, op. cit., p. 102. 37 Haider I A (1993), Al-Ikhwan wa Al-Askaar—qisat Al-Gabha Al-Islamyya wa Al-Sultah fi Al-Sudan (The Muslim Brothers and the Military: The Story of the NIF and Power in Sudan). Cairo: Arab Civilisation Centre. 38 Taha, Al-Gaish Al-Sudani wa Al-Syyasa, op. cit. 39 Hiwar Ma’a Al-Doktor Hassan Al-Turabi, Qira’at Siyasiyya (Political Reviews), Vol. 2/3, Summer 1991, pp. 6–7. 40 Amnesty Annual International Reports—1991, 1995, 1997. 41 The first proclamation of the coup d’état by Omar Al-Beshir that was aired in Sudan TV on 30 June 1989 was tape recorded in the Islamic Call Organisation one month before the takeover. 42 Salih K O (June 1990), The Sudan, 1985–89: The Fading Democracy. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 199–224.

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43 Abdelmoula A (1996), The Fundamentalist Agenda for Human Rights: The Sudan and Algeria. Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1. 44 This was stated by Dr Al-Tayeb Zein Al-Abdeen, a prominent Islamist and Academic, during an interview with the author in Khartoum, Nov. 2003. 45 Abbas A A (Sept.–Oct. 1991), The National Islamic Front and the Politics of Education. Middle East Report, Sudan, No. 172, pp. 22–25. 46 The Fund for Peace (28 May 1992), Abuses of Academic Freedom in Sudan, p. 4.

Introduction

Four things come not back—the spoken word, the sped arrow, the past life, and the neglected opportunity. Arabian Proverb

Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the Middle East, bounded by nine states from both regions. Its geo-strategic importance derives from its proximity to the vital Middle East oil reserves, its location in the Horn of Africa and in the Red Sea coast and its abundant agricultural and natural resources. These factors make Sudan a major player in regional security, stability and cooperation in both Africa and the Middle East. The multi-ethnic composition of Sudan, its geographical location and the state of the economy have a direct impact on the country’s foreign policy. The cycle of democratic-military systems produced different sets of policies for short-term advantage and disregard to formulate a strategy for achieving the long-term priorities of the state. The role of the leader is supreme in Sudanese foreign policy decision making, who seek support in the external sphere for survival of political regime in power. Lack of consensus among different Sudanese political factions created unstable political regimes and torn objectives in foreign policy. The civil war in the south had always influenced the external relations of Sudan in the Arab and African domains. The lack of a strategic vision in foreign policy (apart from the short period after the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972) between various Sudanese political forces steered them to sail in conflicting directions. Political Islam is an emerging phenomenon in world politics that has grown in importance since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ability of the NIF, inspired by political Islamist ideology, to seize power on 30 June 1989 posed many questions regarding the nature of the regime interactions with the outside world. As the only Islamist movement in the Muslim world to control a state since the Iranian revolution, it is important to examine how the movement dealt with Sudan’s international relations. This book endeavours to fathom the current Sudanese regime foreign policy during this crucial period in Sudanese domestic and international politics. Since 19898, the Islamist movement in power evolved into fragmented political bodies, and foreign policy constituted one of the causes of division.

2

Introduction

In this context, it is questionable whether the Islamist coup of 1989 and its consequences represent a revolutionary experiment in Sudan. International relations writers have used the phrase “revolution” to describe a broad range of events, such as social violent upheavals and military coups. The causes and effects of revolutions have a significant international dimension. Revolt of the subjugated against the dominant represents the broad context in which revolutions take place. David Armstrong has investigated the external behaviour of revolutionary states within the framework of “international society” paradigm. He views the notion of “international society” in terms of a group of independent states in a system of shared common rules, interests and institutions. Armstrong defined a revolutionary state as one that deliberately adopts a posture of confrontation with the society of states, or is objectively involved in such a confrontation by virtue of the external implications of its revolution, or is perceived by significant numbers of states to be in such a posture of confrontation.1 States with a revolutionary posture have exceptional foreign policies due to their objectives and the means they employ to achieve them. The threat they pose to the international system lies in their undertakings to transform social and political relations in other states, which they consider their mission and duty. The revolt against the West derived from a fierce backlash against colonialism and racism, as well as Western cultural imperialism and economic exploitation of the Third World’s wealth. Revolutions such as in China, Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua fit the external behaviour profile of a revolt against Western power. Revolutionary states recognise the dynamics of international relations taking place under multifaceted social, economic and political-legal structures. In the meantime, they simultaneously perceive these structures as mechanisms for continued Western domination and subjugation rather than as a common community. There is a strong link between revolutionary states’ domestic and foreign policies, since they seek to change past models of associations implemented by their former governing political foes. Such regimes also exploit foreign policy issues in order to unite competing political factions behind their leadership or to legitimise their actions. Armstrong noted four additional factors linking domestic politics and foreign policy in the third world: first, an external adversary connected to the colonial resistance struggle, or removal of a former imperialist puppet regime; second, attempts to modernise but with an anti-foreign sentiment (usually antiWestern) due to the role played by Western imperialism in underdevelopment; third, the charisma of a leader whose ideas sometimes attract people from outside his country; and fourth, the influence of the cold war which fuelled antagonism in the third world towards the United States as an imperialist state. Revolutionary states claim the moral high ground in the political, social and economic arenas with their confrontation of evil, the old or the tyrant. Armstrong also argues revolutionary states conduct and view diplomacy in a distinct manner unlike the conventional method undertaken and approached by the conformed members of the international society.

Introduction 3 The military coup of June 1989 instigated by the Sudanese Islamist movement called the “NSR” seemed to establish Sudan as a central actor in regional instability. The NSR new rulers’ international outlook led to unprecedented events in Sudan’s contemporary history. For the first time since independence, Sudan was condemned and took a damaging centre stage in major international forums (the UN Security Council and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)). International sanctions were imposed due to the regime attitude in the regional and international domain. Another new dimension was the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), formed between major northern political forces and the southern rebel group the Sudanese People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) to depose the NIF regime. The regime’s interferences in the internal affairs of many states in Africa and the Middle East resulted in its effective isolation at the international level. The NSR ideological posture antagonised the West, which considered the NIF regime a threat to its vital interests in the region. Dr Al-Turabi, the eminence grise of the NIF, played central role in articulating the regime’s ideological basis and was a driving force in the implementation of policy. Despite external and domestic pressure, the regime was able to survive due to the domestic and external strategies they adopted, as well as the changes in regional and international political circumstances. These intriguing political issues in Sudanese foreign policy during the NSR poses many questions regarding the dynamics of the regime’s domestic and foreign policymaking. What were the ideological pillars of the movement that seized power in 1989, and what effect did they have on their external relations? What were the main internal and external themes that influenced and crystallised the regime’s foreign policy? How was decision making practised during this period? What were the strategies implemented by the Islamist regime in the international sphere to compensate for the consequences of its foreign policy behaviour? What were the nature and the dynamics of the NSR’s relations with regional states and major international powers? Was their political ideology conducive to the realisation of Sudan’s best interests, as well as the post 1999 context and its domestic and external implications? These were some of the interesting questions related to the belief system and how it affects decision making that this book is trying to examine, address and find answers to. In this context, the belief system lead us to the issue of ideology in foreign policy. Keohane and Goldstein suggest principled ideas are “road maps” for a policymaker and offer a clear picture of objectives and ends-means relationships.2 A description of the policymaker’s ideas and their outcomes is crucial in the political analysis of ideas. In so far as ideas put blinders on people, reducing the number of conceivable alternatives, they serve as invisible switchmen, not only by turning action onto certain tracks rather than others . . . but also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent’s view.3 World images that are fashioned by NSR decision makers moulded the regime agendas and influence outcomes. This dimension led to hindering development

4

Introduction

and furthering Sudan’s interest. Policy ideas of the regime were entrenched in rules and norms, and became institutionalised and therefore constrained public policy. The force of ideas and their history provide an insight into the impact of ideology on policy. “Ideology” is viewed as a political movement with a particular perception and image of the world and its various actors. Zbigniew Brezezinski defined ideology as a concept: An action programme suitable for mass consumption, derived from certain doctrinal assumptions about the general nature of the dynamics of social reality, and combining some assertions about the inadequacies of the past and/or present with some explicit guides to action for improving the situation and some notions of the desired eventual state of affairs.4 This concept serves as an appropriate explanatory tool for enquiry into the NSR foreign policy since decision makers ideological orientation provide them with particular understanding of engagement in the external level. “Ideology functions happily as a convenient and much used word for speaking not only about the nature and essence of foreign policy, or a major approach in its analysis, but also about significant factor determining its substance.”5 During the NSR initial years, ideology set the framework for policy objectives and its application in the practical level. In this regard, some scholars attribute policy as ideological to particular form of governments, while others are inclined to broaden the concept to most states foreign policies. The nature of ideological regimes’ policies, such as the NSR, is quintessentially revolutionary in their domestic and external outlook. Since its beginning, the Sudanese regime endeavour to pursue substantial transformation in the political, economic or social status quo. The NSR attempted to present their external and domestic policies as a manifestation of the core values of the Sudanese society. The image held by leaders and statesmen such as Woodrow Wilson, Ayatollah Khomeini, Fidel Castro or Dr Hassan Al-Turabi towards the international arena also offers an insight into their ideological pillars. Religion is also a vital growing dimension in present world politics. All the major theories of international relations and their methodologies do not take into account this powerful factor in foreign policy. Radical Islam constituted an important source of legitimacy for the NSR and played a dynamic role in a state’s domestic as well as external politics. Religious fundamentalist movements around the world have the common feature of defying modern values perceived as secular and anti-religion. This facet was viewed by the NIF as a threat to Islamic identity, and they yearned for a period of time to spread their agenda to others. As a transnational trend, terrorism is closely linked to fundamental religious groups such as the NIF. Their intent in the beginning of the NSR to transform the international system through violent means reflects their radical Islam ideology. This NSR ideology has a direct impact on the human rights situation, prompted to be one of the main dimensions in the regime interaction with the outside world. Human rights became an essential component of international institutions and could be a pretext for interference in other states’ sovereignty.

Introduction 5 The values articulated by NSR policymakers are critical in determining Sudanese foreign policy interests. Therefore, policymakers in general are affected by their own values in their views as to what constitutes the state national interest: A decision maker’s values may be expected to shape his or reactions and perceptions as a believer, perceiver, information processor, strategist, and learner [. . .] values constitute a significant part of the content of a belief system and play a central role in determining the structure of such a system. Basic values can obviously shape the definition of situations and contribute to the process of selective perception. In the information-processing stage, values function as screens and thereby produce selective exposure.6 The decision making process in foreign policy in the Sudanese context is confined to the president and his small circle of advisors, together with the prime minister and occasionally the foreign minister. Since independence, particular individuals have shaped and decided on the substance of Sudan’s foreign policy, which has long-term implications on Sudan’s international relations. In the parliamentary system, people like former prime ministers Ismail Al-Azhary and Al-Sadiq AlMahdi or the former foreign minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub had considerable impact on policy, while in President Nimeiri’s regime, foreign policy to a large extent was a “one man show.” The period between 30 June 1989 (the instigation of the military coup by the NSR) and December 1999 (the split between Dr Hassan Al-Turabi and President Omer Al-Beshir) represented a distinctive phase in Sudan’s external relations. The regime This book focus on the dynamics of Sudan’s foreign policy during this period, which was marked by international political transformation due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. It also explore the how the ideological orientation of the regime sponsored by the NIF, threatened Sudan’s key interests in the domestic and international domains. The revolutionary policies of the regime in its initial years reflected a radical posture that did not fit Sudan’s domestic context and the realities of the international system. Human rights, the civil war and terrorism are the major three issues that had a significant impact on the regime’s external relations. The process of policymaking involved constant conflict between radical and moderate figures within the government. The peak of its extreme irrational policies was the regime’s involvement in the assassination attempt on President Husni Mubarek of Egypt in Addis Ababa in 1996. This incident created a direct threat to the regime’s survival of and eventually led to adjustments in its external and internal outlook. The NSR regime presents a valid question articulated by Abdullahi Gallab: Everybody kept asking where, then, is the Islam in the regime’s Islamism? While in its actual practice of Islamism, Islam and its state metamorphosed into a dread system of violence and deceit as it was practised by that young generation, “the kittens” of Al-Turabi’s Islamists.7 The book is composed of three parts. Each of them discuss a particular issue. The first part has three chapters that focus on the NSR foreign policy in the period

6

Introduction

between 1989 and 1989. The first chapter examines the regime agenda in foreign spheres after seizing power. The implementation of these agendas was at the centre of the movement’s conceptual construct to Sudan as a state. The second chapter is concerned with three main issues that affected the evolution of the NSR’s foreign policy during the period between 1989 and 1999. These are human rights and democratisation, the civil war and terrorism. The NSR handled and managed them through manoeuvring and ideological modification of its position towards these themes. This enabled the regime to overcome the inherent problems by managing them according to its ideological stance. The third chapter explores the assassination attempt on President Mubarek in Addis Ababa in 1995 and its political significance for the regime. The behaviour of the regime in the international sphere attests to considerable change in the NSR’s foreign policy. The second part of the book tackles decision making during different periods since the start of the regime until now. Chapter 4 investigates and analyses the decision making process of the NSR from 1989 and 1999. Parallel formal and informal institutions existed alongside each other to formulate and implement foreign policy. Both pragmatic and ideological models were present in the regime’s foreign policy during this period. The discrepancy between these two tracks of policy becomes visible when dealing with major political crises related to foreign policy formulation. Chapter 5 examines the broad dynamics characterise policymaking in the international sphere in the power-sharing Government of National Unity (GNU) between the NSR and SPLM between 2005–11. It focuses on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) partners’ course of action in critical external related issues and the obstacles to formulate cohesive foreign policy. Chapter 6 investigates the character of President Omer Al-Beshir as the centre of power in NSR at present. It investigates the major issues that impact his outlook and the triggers in his decision making. The third part looks at the future of Sudanese foreign policy. Chapter 7 provides insight into bilateral relations and the issue of identity. And the final chapter provides some lessons to future Sudanese foreign policy. The book methodology included a large number of interviews with individuals who were involved directly or indirectly in the policymaking along with examination of government documents. It contends that in the Sudanese political context, this period offers powerful evidence of the precariousness inherent in adopting ideological rather than practical domestic and external policies. The institutionalisation of Sudanese foreign policy, which has been lacking in the state since independence, should be a priority to define and achieve vital national interests. The regime will eventually fell apart because it could not support itself ideologically or economically. Policy directions, descriptions of unpublicised actions and attitudes and the analysis of particular events and statements are derived from interviews conducted over different periods of time. These interviews were critical in identifying policy trends and the NSR government’s overall management of its external relations during various phases in the period of the study. Twenty-four interviews were conducted with individuals closely connected to decision making, including

Introduction 7 two RCC members, one foreign minister, two state ministers for foreign affairs and eight former ambassadors, along with a number of prominent NIF cadres, academics and independent observers. Many other interviews were carried out with various former and present personnel at different ranks of the diplomatic service, and their names were not mentioned as per their request. The interviews dealt with wide and sensitive subjects relevant to the Sudanese foreign policy at the time. The emphasis focused on individuals’ knowledge of the subject matter due to their involvement in the policies or issues at that point in time. Most of the individuals were still political actors when the interviews were conducted. Therefore, their self-representation must be understood in the context of the continued manoeuvring within Sudan’s ruling elite as they seek to establish new positions in rather fast-moving circumstances. Any information on the part of the individuals interviewed on particular vital events or analysis was ascertained through comparison with other sources, whether interviews with other officials or available documents. Information inaccuracy resulted from the attempts of the individuals interviewed to present a positive examination of past events or from their disagreement regarding decision making while holding official posts with the NSR in the past. Their re-interpretation of historical incidents is fully substantiated when two individuals with divergent political views concur. Numerous official reports, announcements and letters from the foreign ministry are used to analyse the course of policy and the methods taken to deal with the issues. I was fortunate to have access to a wide range of documents reports, and records of several meetings in the early 1990s since it is prohibited for academic researchers to explore such confidential data. Sensitive information was handled with care and discretion to construct a full picture of the Sudanese foreign policy since the foreign ministry represents one of the formal arms of the NSR. Some articles, books or academic works provide information on foreign policy during this political episode. The majority of the scholarly works give an overview or explication of both domestic and external policy, hence offering insufficient understanding of the NSR’s foreign policy.

Notes 1 Armstrong D (1993), Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary States in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2 Goldstien J, and Keohane R, eds. (1993), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. New York: Cornell University. 3 Ibid., p. 12. 4 Brezezinski Z (1967), Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. New York: Praeger. 5 Carlsnaes W (1986), Ideology and Foreign Policy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 6 Wilkenfeld J, Hopple G W, Ross P J, and Andrioli S J (1980), Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Inter-State Behaviour Analysis Model. London: Sage. 7 Abdullahi Gallab (2014), Their Second Republic: Islamism in the Sudan From Disintegration to Oblivion. Farnham: Ashgate.

Part 1

Radical agenda

1

The radical foreign policy ideology in the 1990s

Introduction Sudan’s interaction with many neighbouring states (nine before the secession of South Sudan) with different regimes and contradictory interests causes continuous difficulties in the choice of policy action. Probable threats related to economic, political or security interests were many in such a large country with a diverse multi-ethnic society. The inherent weakness of the economic, social and political bases required a pragmatic external policy to guarantee the achievement of national security objectives. However, ideology has always played a central role in the Sudanese domestic politics and is seen as an advantage in countering the external complications. Dunstan Wai presented in a case study of President Nimeiri’s regime the failure of “rhetorical radicalism” and the inherent internal impediments to its sustainability in the Sudanese context.1 Following the toppling of Ibrahim Abboud’s regime, the provisional government (October 1964 to June 1965) adopted a revolutionary posture by supporting progressive movements in the region viewed as a moral responsibility. Howel and Hamid argued, “This new adventurism and militancy in foreign policy was partly a reaction to past conservatism, but in the exultant aftermath of the revolution, popular demonstrators and the re-emerging left-wing press kept up demands for reappraisal of Sudan’s world role.”2 In this context, the NIF ascendance to power in June 1989 through what it labelled the NSR—another ideological political phase in foreign policy. In particular, the first five years of the regime have had lasting ramifications in the Sudanese state.3 The new regime belief system necessitated its engagement with other Islamic movements, sharing to a large extent the same political agenda with some variations. The NIF support for Islamist movements around the world aim to inspire them to follow the NIF model of political action was one of the foreign policy objectives.

The foreign policy agenda of the NIF The control of state institutions in parallel with Islamisation and Arabisation policies reflected the convictions of the NIF elite in constructing a model that could

12

Radical agenda

inspire other Islamic states. Decision makers advocate that the revival of Islamic glories in the international arena should begin with the implementation of domestic policies that would induce and mobilise Muslim communities around the Islamic agenda. The rigid and fundamentalist government policies contravened the diversity of Sudanese society and its tolerant nature, which required inclusive policies encompassing all existing cultures and traditions. It also demonstrated how the NIF elite looked towards the Islamic Umma as a united front in the effort to challenge the international system’s status quo. This outlook created a new direction in the form and shape of Sudanese engagement in the region and in the international sphere. The urge to back Islamist groups stemmed from the government’s objective to advance these groups politically in their respective countries. The NSR’s elite viewed the weakness of the Muslims around the world as having a direct link to the Christian West’s attempts to control and undermine Muslims. There are three crucial themes that need to be explored in debating the regime’s overarching external agenda at the time, including the regime’s revolutionary claims, the leadership of political Islam and the alternatives for political survival. These themes generated a new style of politics that the Sudanese state currently continues to endure. Revolutionary claims Woodward argues that the 1989 coup was “less revolution than a continuation of themes in Sudanese politics,” making his case from the standpoint of domestic politics dynamics.4 He refers to the role of Sudanese society with its heterogeneous composition as a major constraint on any revolutionary mobilisation. The control of the state has always been difficult for any regime in Sudan, unless it is able to bring together a “mixture of social bases.”5 As an ideological movement, the NIF did not have this versatile social base. In addition, Woodward points out that “a coup is not a revolution: it is what happens afterwards, and how different the situation becomes, that will be judged in deciding whether a revolution has taken place.” Based on this argument, the constraints confronted the NSR due to Sudan’s internal social and political traits raised some valid questions regarding the rationale of an external revolutionary agenda. Rose and Van Dusen argued that Sudan experienced a revolutionary regime in 1989, applying Stephen Waltz’s “balance of threat” theory to its external behaviour.6 They contended that the political change in 1989 was more than a “simple coup,” presenting their evidence through Waltz’s security competition analysis. They tested various aspects of Sudan’s foreign relations activities in relation to ideology and foreign intervention, taking the example of two neighbouring states (Egypt and Ethiopia). Sudan’s external policy was viewed as a threat to the stability of other states in the region, which intensified and triggered antagonistic atmosphere between its neighbours: Revolution causes security competition by means of two mechanisms: by altering perceived levels of threat between Sudan in the international sphere

The radical foreign policy ideology 13 and its neighbours, and by encouraging at least one of the sides to calculate that hostile actions could overcome the threat.7 David Armstrong maintains that revolutionary states represent the concept of “revolt against international society” defined in terms of established principles of non-intervention, sovereignty and respect for international law.8 States such as Libya, Cuba and Iran fit these criteria of revolutionary states with their radical foreign policy. The question of revolution as a political phenomenon from an external threat dimension raises the issue of the NSR’s intentions with its ideology of political Islam. The NSR foreign policy in practice exhibits a resemblance to revolutionary state behaviour as described by Armstrong. Rhetoric about the use of SPLA/M and traditional political parties as agents for external powers and hostility towards the United States, the imperial state with oppressive and unjust policies, were prevalent among NSR elite. Armstrong also referred to the existence of a political thinker as one of the features of any revolution. For example, Khomeini in Iran, Castro in Cuba and Gaddafi in Libya provided this model, while for the Sudanese regime, Dr Hassan Al-Turabi was regarded as the historical and spiritual guide. Al-Turabi was the eminence grise in raising the NIF to power; hence, his vision of how the political change in 1989 would position Sudan in the international sphere was the principal model for the new regime. Although the NIF did not come to power with a blueprint for foreign policy strategy, the movement viewed Islamic revivalism as the reference point for state identity and the principal determinant of Sudan’s position in the world. A cornerstone of the concept of “national interests,” as prescribed by the NIF, was the consolidation of Islamism in both the domestic and the international spheres through all the means available to the state: The international dimension of the Islamic movement is conditioned by the universality of Umma (community of believers) and the artificial irrelevance of Sudan’s borders. Therefore, the revolution is easily exportable. This is especially true in the relations of the Sudan to Black African neighbours.9 Revolutionary zeal does not imply a rebuff for pragmatic policy during this radically oriented period, but “realpolitik” was the exception in an overarching policy of ideology. Pragmatism could not make breakthrough in shaping policy due to internal and external factors. Internally, the NIF clique worldview dominated policy formulation and implementation. The new decision makers have no experience whatsoever in the sphere of public policy combined with uncompromising stands and a belief in their ability to deliver their ideals. Diplomacy: revolutionary features Diplomacy during the NSR early years bore a striking resemblance to the practice of revolutionary states. Armstrong demonstrates a similar diplomatic attitude

14

Radical agenda

distinguishing revolutions that contradicts standard conventions of diplomacy. These states perceive traditional diplomacy as belonging to a world dominated by such post-Westphalian assumptions as reason of state, the primacy of foreign policy, the right of great powers, and the importance of the balance of power . . . in its form, and its content; therefore, diplomacy could be seen as the antithesis of revolutionary values.10 One of the NSR’s first acts was to hold a conference on diplomacy in December 1989, which reflected the regime’s policy direction. Its ideological principles were stated as the main guidelines in the practice of Sudanese: The diplomat is a political representative who should not be neutral; and an authorised agent that should not be cautious [. . .] he is a personal representative for the revolution acting for powerful notion and confronting huge undertakings.11 During this period, the pragmatic policy strand represented by career diplomats was sidelined in the foreign ministry. Considered a third column, and lacking the revolutionary dedication needed to further the radical objectives abroad, a large number of Sudanese diplomats were purged. This has been a typical feature of revolutionary states since the Bolsheviks, Chinese, Iranians and other revolutionary regimes similarly flushed out significant numbers of diplomats due to a suspicion of their commitment to the values of the revolution.12 The NSR practice of diplomacy included peculiar aspects, such as stationing political watchdogs and “thought police” in embassies, the confrontational behaviour of its diplomats abroad and demonstrations against foreign embassies in Sudan and propaganda on the regime’s behalf. These were also distinctive characteristics of revolutionary states such as Iran, Libya, China and Cuba. According to a former ambassador during that period, high-ranking diplomats overseas feared junior cadres associated with the NIF who regularly reported to Khartoum the attitude and political commitments of personnel in different embassies. In many instances, the NSR abused diplomatic privileges, violated international norms of diplomatic conduct and used embassies for espionage activities. Militancy went as far as Ibrahim Al-Sanousi, a leading member in the NIF, threatening in a political rally to take Western diplomats as hostages, recalling the Iranian hostage crisis.13 The smuggling of arms to Egyptian Islamists who attempted to assassinate President Mubarek in Addis Ababa through Sudanese airlines by the regime’s intelligence agency exhibited similar facets of revolutionary diplomacy.14 This was similar measure to the use of diplomatic bags to import weapons by Libya, which led to the killing of a police officer in London in 1984, and “Cuban and Vietnamese diplomats expelled by Britain in 1988 for incidents involving guns” were parallel cases of diplomatic privilege abuse.15 Diplomacy was also utilised for surveillance and intelligence purposes against Sudanese communities abroad, which were viewed as a threat to the stability of the regime. This has led to deterioration in relations with different countries and the expulsion of Sudanese diplomats from countries such as

The radical foreign policy ideology 15 the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Tunisia and the United Kingdom. In the meantime, the NSR, like other revolutionary states, found diplomacy a valuable tool in engaging with the outside world as part of its overall agenda. The leadership of political Islam The regime deemed its ideological model implemented at the domestic level would provide the impetus to radiate its experience to the Islamic world. The NSR showed early interest in policy in the external realm when it established the strategic studies centre in 1990. A prominent Islamist stated that before the initiation of the military coup in June 1989, there was an unclear strategy about how to deal with the outside world. However, the NIF believed in the vitality of its core ideas and its strength to shape and formulate an effective external policy.16 The conviction is that the development and organisation of the NIF through different Sudanese political systems proved its ability to generate policies that serve and its long-term political Islam objectives. Initially, the movement did not reveal its sponsorship of the 1989 coup d’état due to its awareness of the regional and international consequences of an Islamist organisation in power. Neighbouring states that had their own conflicts with other domestic Islamic insurgents would view such a similar group taking power in Sudan as a viable threat. The West’s and the United States’ view of political Islam as an intolerant strand of Islam added more pressure to conceal the new regime’s identity. The dissimulation approach was the initial major NIF policy tactic in power and was intended to consolidate power gradually (Tamakeen) in the domestic level and to win trust in the external sphere. Due to the nature of its ideology, it was inevitable that a conflict would occur between the NSR and major actors in the region when the regime’s true ideology was revealed. The position from the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 substantiated the concerns of regional and international powers in the NSR and its agenda. The regime emphasised the need for foreign troops to leave Arab soil rather than the end of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The Western military presence was considered an imperial design to undermine Islam and to control Arab land. The government’s standpoint on the invasion was formulated purely on an ideological basis. The NIF started to implement its radical external agenda in public following its exposition in the Gulf War by establishing the Popular Islamic Arabic Conference (PIAC) in 1992. The PIAC was perceived by the NSR leadership as an alternative pan-Islamic non-governmental forum to the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and regarded as representing Islamic states dependent on the United States and the West. Al-Turabi had contemplated a different posture for Sudan in world politics. He believed Sudan has the potential to be a central point of departure for the resurgence of political Islam. In 1991, Al-Turabi stated, I advocate that Sudan should lead the free world to revolt against the UN, a revolution against a new media and economic order. I suggest for Sudan to

16

Radical agenda sponsor the revival of religion . . . and to be in a position of leadership especially of Islam, because the world needs to follow an example.17

Al-Turabi’s vision demonstrates a radical shift in Sudan’s foreign policy since the country’s independence. The support for Islamists insurgents around the world in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, other groups and Muslim minorities, as well as the importance given to establishing close ties with states such as Malaysia, Iran and Indonesia, aimed to reflect solidarity with Islamic community (Umma). The PIAC was the spearhead of the NIF’s overarching plan to back and support other Islamist movements for the realisation of their political ends in their respective countries. In 1992, Al-Turabi was appointed secretary general of the PIAC. He presented himself as the spokesperson and the coordinator for all Islamic political groups, and Khartoum became the meeting place for organisations from 80 countries. These included organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the Islamic Popular Islamic Front of Eritrea, the Islamic Nahda of Tunisia, the Algerian Islamic Front (FIS) of Algeria, dissidents representatives of Islamic Republic of Chechnya, the Palestinian Islamic Organisation (Hamas) and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, in addition to many Muslim groups in Europe, the United States, Africa and Asia. The organisation was portrayed as an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) and the government’s role was limited to facilitating the holding of such meetings. However, it was clear that the government provided the PIAC with all the needed financial and political support that underlines the regime’s ideological commitment. Through PIAC, the regime was active in negotiating a political deal between the Palestinian Islamic Movement (Hamas) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, and in the efforts to bring fragmented Afghani and Somali factions together. The stated foreign policy objectives illustrated the regime’s search for a major role in the region and in the world, stressing the Islamic and Arab identity of Sudan. Among these objectives, as stated in the national comprehensive strategy, were fifth: to make Sudan the centre for emancipation from tyrannical domination, Sixth: to acquaint the world with the original civilization model, Seventh: meeting Sudan’s obligations derived from the nature of its ethnical and cultural affiliations, its historical and geopolitical position.18 The regime’s inclination to punch above its weight by stressing its ability to influence international politics was a common feature among the NIF elite and is evident in the following citation: Who[ever] is able to influence Sudanese politics is able to cause an impact on Africa [. . .] the list of Sudan’s strategic capabilities include: the influence and the direct threat for navigation in the Red Sea, and the control of interests of Asian Sahel of the Red Sea especially Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf region, in addition to the direct influence on the situation in the Horn of Africa [. . .] and also direct influence on central and Eastern Africa, Chad, and

The radical foreign policy ideology 17 the control of Nile waters, and threat to Egypt’s national interests, hence the direct effect on Middle East politics.19 The presence of individuals such as Bin Laden, Sheikh Omer Abd-Elrahman and Carlos the Jackal in Khartoum was an apparent sign of the regime’s willingness to espouse an aggressive approach as part of its external agenda. Many Islamists were given Sudanese diplomatic passports to facilitate their movements, such as Rashid Al-Ganoushi and Omer Abd-Elrahman who entered the United States via Sudan. Military training camps were created in different locations for Arab Mujahedeen,20 who fought in Afghanistan, led by their mentor Bin Laden. The aim was to continue the message of Jihad against infidels in the United States and the West, and their followers in corrupt Arab and Islamic states. The regime’s involvement in aiding Islamist organisations was evident in some terrorist incidents around the world. Some elements in the intelligence apparatus provided logistical and financial support for President Mubarek’s assassination attempt in Ethiopia. Other reports suggested the Russian government threatened the NSR with substantial support for the SPLA/M if the regime continued its political and financial backing for insurgency in Chechenia.21 The US government accused a member of the Sudanese diplomatic mission in New York of assisting the bombing of the World Trade Centre in February 1993. According to the US State Department, growing evidence was gathered of the NSR’s involvement in supporting militant Islamic groups. Consequently, the American Centre in Khartoum announced that Sudan had been added to the list of nations supporting international terrorism, as follows: Sudan allows the use of its territory as sanctuary for terrorists including the Abu Nidal organisation and members of Hizballah and Palestine Islamic Jihad. We also believe safe houses and other facilities used to support radical groups are allowed to exist in Sudan with apparent approval of the Sudanese government’s leadership.22 The inclusion of the NSR in the list of countries supporting terrorism has longterm political implications. It became a major obstacle in the revival of regime relations with the outside world and continues to have a huge impact on the Sudanese economy up to the present. Alternatives for political survival The NIF’s radical policies threatened the stability and the continuity of the NSR in power. The confrontational policies with the West and the United States, as well as regional states isolated the regime. There was no choice but to find alternative alliances. The appeal for Islamic states sympathising with the government’s orientation was an obvious option. The prospect of bringing Islamic financial resources to Sudan was based on the argument that investment by Muslim states in an Islamic-oriented regime represents one of the principles of unity of

18

Radical agenda

the Islamic Umma. The economic, political and military support of these countries was of great value for the regime. Significant financial and military assistance was made available to the NSR by Malaysia and Iraq. One observer remarked that Malaysia donated US$200 million during a period of terrible economic decline.23 Iraq rewarded the regime for its position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and for its policy orientation in confronting the West and the United States. Military assistance from Iraq helped the NSR to become more active on many fronts in the war with the SPLA/M in the south. Another valuable ally was Iran, with its similar political outlook to the NSR in the international sphere and its efforts to avoid isolation. The Iranian agenda of spreading its version of Shia Islam in the region led to its containment, and it needed to open up to the outside world. For Iran, Sudan was in a strategic geopolitical position, which could be an advantage for its ambition to alter the balance of power in the face of its traditional rivals in the region: Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Meanwhile, the regime divergent Sunni version of Islam compounded with the state’s instability, made Iran cautious in its relations with Khartoum. Iran was discontent with the NSR’s support for Iraq—its long-standing enemy in the Gulf region—following its invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, the NSR found in Iran a valued financial and military substitute for its fading relations with the Gulf States and Egypt. Iran, with its abundant oil resources and military capabilities, could abet the regime to face the declining economic situation and the pressing civil war in the south. The move of Bin Laden to settle in Sudan in 1991 following the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan proved to be a financial blessing for the NSR. Bin Laden invested heavily in various sectors of the Sudanese economy at the time as a gesture of his solidarity with the Islamic regime in Khartoum: His Al-Hijra Construction Company employed 600 people for the construction of a major arterial road from Khartoum to Port Sudan. He opened a company office at Port Sudan to handle imports of everything from arms to farm equipment and exports of Sudan cotton, sesame, and wheat.24 The NSR perceived oil resources as an important strategic commodity for its survival. Chevron Corporation, an American oil company, was the first to start explorations in 1980 in the Unity and Heglig fields in the south-west of the country. The concession contained “estimated recoverable oil reserves at 600–800 million barrel ranges or an oil field containing 4–6 billion barrels.”25 However, the trigger of the civil war in 1983 led Chevron to sign an agreement to pull out of the country. Later on, a consortium of Canadian, Malaysian and Chinese companies started oil explorations. The regime was able to convince businessmen with Islamic inclinations from Canada, Malaysia and Qatar to invest in oil and various other sectors, such as hotels and agriculture. The potential to succeed in exploiting the oil sector would guarantee the flow of financial resources for the war efforts in the south and the revival of the stricken economy. In addition, it would enable the implementation of their domestic and foreign agenda.

The radical foreign policy ideology 19 Relations with China were viewed as strategic because the country was a superpower in the making with a keen interest in investment and trade. In addition, China’s non-intervention policies in internal affairs, such as democracy and human rights, presented a good opportunity for collaboration on the economic and political fronts. Economic and political cooperation during this period exceeded any other bilateral relations of the Sudanese regime. Investment and trade relations were boosted in every sector from oil to culture. Relations progressed from “exemplary relations” as described by Tchian Tche Chin, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister in January 1994, to relations of a “strategic dimension” as described by Jiang Xi Min, the Chinese president, in 1997.26 China found an opportunity in the Sudanese promising oil sector. Huge resources injected in this sector through China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), which succeeded in extracting oil. Considering the dire economic situation, the Chinese investment in the oil sector brought a breath of life to the regime by making it an important oil exporter.27 The regime endeavoured to make use of the available opportunities in the external sphere to break its isolation and maintain its political Islamic posture. The surrender of the international terrorist Carlos the Jackal to France in 1994 in exchange for economic and military assistance intended to prove that the regime does not condone terrorism. Millions of dollars were spent on public relations organisations for improving the image of the regime in the outside world. For example, the European Sudanese Public Affairs Council and Al-Mustagila magazine (both London based) were employed in their campaign. In 1992, Al-Turabi, posing as a liberal Islamic thinker, travelled to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada to improve the reputation of the regime. During his tour, he spoke a language of tolerance and openness to his international audience, which was different from his militant discourse at the domestic level. In 1995, serious allegations were raised related to the regime’s involvement in the assassination attempt on President Husni Mubarek of Egypt in Addis Ababa. At this juncture, the regime finally recognised the risks and complications involved in non-conformity with international rules and standards. For the first time since independence, the UN Security Council and the Organization of African Unity condemned the Sudanese government. The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions as well as measures aims at exerting political and diplomatic pressure through resolutions 1054 and 1087. The upper echelon of the regime realised the need to review and reshape foreign policy priorities to address the complications of its early radical strategy. The NSR put an end to the idea of exporting the Islamic revolution under the pressure of isolation and sanctions. The expulsion of Bin Laden in 1996 was the first major policy reversal with regard to Islamists in Khartoum. A change in immigration and citizenship regulations reflected a turning point in the government-avowed policy of support towards Islamist groups.28 The NSR tried to use informal channels to improve relations with the United States through Mansour Ijaz, an American Pakistani businessman and a personal friend of President Clinton when he approached the American administration with no results.29

20

Radical agenda

Notes 1 Wai D M (1979), Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 71–93. 2 Howell J, and Hamid M B (Oct. 1969), Sudan and the Outside World, 1964–1968. African Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 273, pp. 299–315. 3 The NIF and NSR are used interchangeably in the article referring to the same thing. 4 Woodward P (1994), Sudan: A New Political Character?, in Gordon C, ed., The Horn of Africa. New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 76–89. 5 Ibid. 6 Rose W, and van Dusen E (Autumn 2002), Sudan’s Islamic Revolutions as a Cause of Foreign Intervention in Its Wars: Insights From Balance of Threat Theory. Civil Wars, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 1–46. 7 Ibid., p. 43. 8 Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, op. cit. 9 Summary of a Lecture and round-table discussion with Hassan Al-Turabi (1992), Islam, Democracy, the State and the West. Middle East Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3. 10 Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, op. cit., p. 271. 11 See the Final report and recommendations of The Sudanese Diplomacy Conference in the Framework of National Dialogue on Peace Issues held on 7–12 Dec. 1989, notably p. 5 (viewed by author at Sudanese Foreign Ministry). 12 In this regard, “Following the French revolution, one of its senior diplomats received this note from his Minister, ‘It is important that those who are involved in the general administration of the republic do not serve merely with probity; it is necessary that the agents of the republic are its most zealous and ardent partisans . . . these considerations have determined me to send the agents of the republic in foreign countries some enlightened patriots who, having followed the whole progress of the revolution and contributed to the acceleration of its forward movement, will bring to them (the French envoys) knowledge of facts of which they cannot remain unaware and a gauge of the public spirit in France,’” cited in Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, op. cit., p. 254. 13 Burr J M, and Collins R O (2003), Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000. Leiden: Brill. 14 The Sunday Times, 14 Apr. 1996. 15 Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, op. cit., p. 267. 16 This was stated by Dr Hassan Mekki, prominent Islamist and academic during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 11 Dec. 2003. 17 This was stated in Al-Turabi’s address to the National Comprehensive Strategy Conference, ‘External Relations Sector, Seminar on Sudan’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Present and Future’, Friendship Hall, Khartoum, 21 Oct.–12 Dec. 1991. 18 Centre for Strategic Studies (Sept. 1992), The National Comprehensive Strategy, 1992– 2002 (Vol. 1). Khartoum: Centre for Strategic Studies. 19 General Bakri Abdalwahab (Aug. 1995), The Search for Peace in Southern Sudan. Dirasat Istratigya, No. 4. 20 The term refers to fighters for Islamic Jihad. The modern term Mujahedeen, referring to guerrilla outfits of radical Islamists, originates in the nineteenth-century opposition of the mountainous sect of men in Afghanistan who fought against British control. 21 This was stated by a former career diplomat in December 2003 in Khartoum during an interview. 22 The American Centre, Khartoum (18 Aug. 1993), Sudan Added to the List of Nations Supporting International Terrorism. News Release. 23 This is cited by Dr Hassan Mekki, a prominent Islamist and academic during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 11 Dec. 2003. 24 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan, op. cit., p. 71.

The radical foreign policy ideology 21 25 Ibid. 26 For a full account, see The Final Report of the Sudanese Ambassador in Beijing, Sept. 1993–June 1998 from The Sudanese Embassy in China (viewed by author at the Sudanese Foreign Ministry). 27 On 31 May 1999, Sudan started to export around 150,000 barrels of oil a day. CNPC financed 40% of the oil project, and the Chinese Company for Petroleum Engineering executed more than 90% of the oil pipeline (SUNA (4 Feb. 1999). China and Sudan: Forty Years of Distinctive Friendship and Relations, 1959–1999. Khartoum: Information and Research Department, p. 26). 28 In order to obstruct Islamists influx to Sudan, the citizenship legislation passed in the early 1990s changed since it stipulated that staying in Sudan for five years would entitle the right to citizenship, while Arabs would no longer need a visa to enter the country. 29 Mansoor Ijaz (5 Dec. 2001), Clinton Let Bin Laden Slip Away and Metastasize. Los Angeles Times.

2

Backlash from an assassination attempt

Introduction The involvement of some members of the Sudanese security service in a failed assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt on 26 June 1995 in Addis Ababa is a landmark event in the history of the Sudanese NSR regime. The episode posed political, security and economic challenges while it threatened the internal cohesion of the governing elite. The political system at the time had been entrenched an ideology of political Islam in its international outlook. The assassination attempt compelled the regime elite to reflect on their revolutionary shortcomings in dealing with the outside world. It was a crisis point, as it occurred during the peak of the NSR Islamic radicalisation. The NSR’s support for the Iraqi regime after its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 led to a quick deterioration in the regime’s relations with the outside world. The period following the first Gulf War witnessed the implementation of the NIF ideological foreign policy agenda. Support for radical Islamic groups on the basis of Islamic Umma presented regional states with the risk of destabilisation. During this time in April 1991, Dr Hassan Al-Turabi established the Popular Islamic and Arab Conference (PIAC) in Khartoum to mobilise Islamists across the Islamic world to confront the Western aggression and their collaborators from Middle Eastern states. PIAC was at the forefront of the government’s foreign policy, as it states in its charter “the conference strongly supports Sudan’s efforts for liberation from all kinds of foreign containment and for full expression of its own will and of the conscience of its Umma.”1 There were several indications of the NSR support for Egyptian radical Islamist groups, as many terrorist operations were carried out by individuals who had links with or had infiltrated from Sudan.2 The assassination of Rifaat Mahjoub, the speaker of the Egyptian Parliament, was executed by a man who was trained in Sudan.3 The NSR ideology of political Islam gave the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) considerable sympathy from the African states, which viewed it as a freedom fighters’ movement. The United States encouraged states bordering Sudan to take a hard line with the NSR as part of its policy to exert pressure on the economic and military fronts. The regime’s Islamic agenda intended to help Islamist movements rise to political power in regional states

Backlash from an assassination attempt 23 allied to major powers prompted a policy of containment. The European Union, in close cooperation with the United States, pushed for the adoption of the 1993 resolution in the UN Commission of human rights, as well as in the UN General Assembly to investigate the human rights situation in Sudan. By the end of April 1994, Uganda broke its diplomatic relations with Sudan due to its support for the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda. Eritrea also broke its relations with Khartoum in January 1994 for its alleged backing of opposition group Islamic Jihad. In January 1994, Ethiopia warned the NSR against “exporting ideology and creating trouble with the constant occurrence of incidents proving that Khartoum is meddling in the Ethiopian internal affairs.”4 In this context, the assassination attempt led to the isolation of the Sudanese government in the region and the outside world, while a regional alliance was formed to topple it. This forced the NSR to adjustments its foreign policy, which diverged from its Islamist ideological orientation in order to avoid catastrophic consequences. The assassination attempt played a critical role in altering the entire landscape of the NSR core elite, culminating in the removal of its ideologue Dr Hassan Al-Turabi in December 1999. This transformation continues to resonate among Sudan’s governing elite, as well as in the country’s domestic and international environment. A former NSR official described the failed attempt and its implications on the NIF internal and external political dynamics as “detrimental.”5 This episode presents vital questions related to its significance on the regime survival and the way the NSR dealt with ideological versus pragmatic options available in order to avoid the immense challenges caused by the crisis.

The magnitude of the assassination attempt on President Mubarak President Mubarak’s armoured limousine, third in the convoy, was about 70 m away when two or three gunmen sprang into the street and opened fire with AK-47 assault rifles. They killed two policemen on duty along the boulevard and then blazed away at the approaching cars. Bullets thumped repeatedly into the presidential limousine but did not penetrate it. As Mubarak’s driver screeched to a halt and started turning around, two Ethiopian and several Egyptian security men opened fire with rifles and pistols, downing two of the attackers. The others sped away.6 On 26 June 1995, on the eve of the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, President Mubarak encountered a plot to end his life. The president escaped unharmed and on his return to Cairo accused the Sudanese government of masterminding the attack. He asserted that the assailants travelled to Ethiopia on Sudanese passports. There was financial and logistical assistance from certain elements within the Sudanese intelligence service. Elements within the regime considered Egypt the spearhead of the march to undermine the Islamic project in Sudan. Its hostile attitude was reflected in its efforts to rally regional and international powers against the NSR.

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Radical agenda

Dr Al-Turabi, as the secretary general of the Islamic movement, was informed by his deputy Ali Uthman Taha that he and the high-ranking personnel of the intelligence apparatus helped Egyptian Islamists execute the failed assassination operation.7 The approval of the assassination and its execution was without the knowledge of President Al-Beshir and Dr Al-Turabi. The Sunday Times explained that it “was discovered that weapons and explosives used by the terrorists were flown into Ethiopia by the Sudanese state airliner. The label on the airfreight container holding the weapons helpfully listed the sender as the Sudanese Intelligence Bureau in Khartoum.”8 The Ethiopian government was infuriated, as the incident led to the failure of the OAU summit that it was hosting. It submitted two complaints against the government of Sudan to the OAU, with a claim that three suspects entered Sudan on Sudanese passports after the incident.9 In January 1996, the case was transferred to the UN Security Council (UNSC) with all possible consequences related to sanctions. Three UNSC resolutions were passed against the Sudanese government for its support for international terrorism, describing the event as a threat to international peace and security.10 Political, economic and military measures were imposed by the US government in coordination with regional states during this period to isolate and destabilise the NSR.11 The incident paradoxically came at a time of successive military victories over the SPLA/M in Southern Sudan. Yet following the failed assassination, the government had to confront three new major military fronts with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. The US administration tailored a new policy in the Horn to contain Sudan through providing its neighbours with US$20 million of military aid to confront the regime.12 As a result, tension rose between Sudan and neighbouring states apart from Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). Ethiopia established consistent cordial relations with the Sudan from the fall of President Mengistu until the failed attempt on President Mubarak. This new hostility towards Khartoum was an immense loss, for the regime had prioritised preserving good terms with Addis Ababa. The post-Mengistu government had denied the SPLA access to Ethiopia’s strategic location for military operations, which had been a major triumph and comfort to the NSR in its conflict against the rebel group. In Eritrea, the alliance of various northern Sudanese political forces alongside the SPLA/M, formed with an armed wing under the umbrella of the NDA, gained momentum. Uganda seized the opportunity to give explicit support to the SPLA/M in coordination with the United States. Egypt took control of the Sudanese Halayeb Triangle in reaction to the incident. These military fronts were now suddenly reactivated in order to bring the regime in Khartoum to collapse. Internally, President Al-Beshir’s unawareness of the participation of the security apparatus in the incident awoke him to the grave cost posed by the dual decision-making system shared by him and Al-Turabi, who also did not know of the preparation of the attack. A vacuum sprang from the twofold policies within the state, which allowed the execution of a highly perilous operation without the knowledge of the president and Al-Turabi. The incident reflected a hidden conflict within the upper ranks of the regime. During this period, a power struggle had

Backlash from an assassination attempt 25 erupted between the two men, ending with the removal of Al-Turabi in December 1999. The future fragmentation of the Islamic movement was directly linked to the attack in Addis Ababa, which heightened these dynamics of internal division. The clash between the two men took the form of a dispute over political organisation, yet the external dimension was strongly present in their calculations. Each group promoted an alternative approach to manage the crisis in order to overcome international pressures. After the attack, the discussion within the regime’s elite shifted to other issues. “The lightness of the ‘UN’ sanctions imposed on Sudan had an important consequence for domestic Sudanese developments.” Timothy Niblock has argued, “It has enabled the focus of debate over the country’s future to centre on the critical issues of human rights and democratisation.”13 Undoubtedly, the crisis deepened in terms of regime coherence and its confidence to proceed with a radical agenda.

Crisis management The NSR faced three major challenges that have evolved concurrently following the assassination attempt in June 1995 until the expulsion of Al-Turabi in December 1999. Parallel economic, security and political threats developed swiftly during this period, which required novel approaches to handle them. These delicate matters confronted the NSR’s foreign policy and its direction in an undulating political environment, both at the external and domestic levels. The management of these three dimensions has characterised this phase, resulting at last in signs of reversal in the regime’s agenda. The first phase was the referral of the assassination attempt to the OAU and the UNSC. It extended from September 1995 to February 1997, when the UNSC ceased the review of the case. The second phase was the economic and military problems from mid-1995 to mid-1998, with the start of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, the war in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the bombing of Al-shifa pharmaceutical factory. The third phase concerned the Turabi-Beshir split and how both leaders implemented different tactics to deal with the external dimension, as it was considered crucial to their survival. This period started with the aforementioned incident and finished with the split in the NSR leadership in December 1999. It is vital to discuss the NSR’s approach towards the three issues to demonstrate the gradual shift in the regime’s external attitude from radicalism to rationalism. The UNSC resolutions On the assassination attempt, President Mubarak commented, “This was an arrangement by the Sudanese government, and personally I think it is likely, or by Al-Turabi and his group.”14 The Egyptian government seized the opportunity to extract the maximum political benefit from the incident. President Al-Beshir held a press conference in Addis Ababa on the day of the incident to affirm Sudan’s condemnation of such terrorist acts.

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The Ethiopian government refrained for 32 days after the incident from officially accusing the Sudanese government; however, in a letter on 28 July to President Al-Beshir, Ethiopia demanded the surrender of the three suspects who had entered the Sudanese territories. On 11 September and 19 December 1995, Ethiopia tabled its accusation against Sudan to the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention and Management.15 The meetings issued two resolutions, demanding the extradition to Ethiopia of the three suspects hiding in Sudanese territories and called on Sudan to desist from supporting or facilitating terrorist activities.16 The time between the incident and its official referral to regional and international organs gave the Sudanese government the opportunity to reflect and formulate constructive measures. Awareness of the approaching risk among top officials strengthened the process of coordination between diplomatic efforts and domestic policy. To deter any harmful outcomes, the government followed two broad courses of action: strong condemnation of the attack and terrorism, and the attempt to contain the crisis at the regional level. Ethiopia did not take long to transfer the matter from the OAU to the UNSC. On 21 December 1995, the Security Council (SC) held an informal hearing session to listen to Tekda Almo, the Ethiopian deputy foreign minister, on developments regarding the assassination attempt.17 On 9 January 1996, Ethiopia presented its official complaint to the SC. A change in the UNSC membership that was not conducive to the regime’s position occurred at the same time.18 Despite its efforts to avoid the UNSC’s resolution, all odds were against the Sudan government. Ethiopia’s anger that the incident occurred within its territories, together with Sudan’s isolation in international forums, made it determined to push for a resolution. The United States considered the incident an opportunity to punish a rogue state accused of sponsoring terrorism. In their view, the regime’s agenda and its threat to the stability of Egypt necessitated an affirmative response to tame the NSR. Britain, which shared similar views with the US government toward the NSR, and had its ambassador in Khartoum expelled in December 1993, supported the resolution. The policies of the Sudanese regime prompted these countries to work together in the UN Security Council.19 On 31 January 1996, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1044, which requested that the Sudanese government undertake immediate action to extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects sheltering in the Sudan . . . (and to) . . . desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements and act in its relations with its neighbours and with others in full conformity with the charter of the United Nations and with the charter of the OAU.20 The resolution gave the secretary general 60 days to report to the SC on Sudan’s implementation of the resolution. Various policies were undertaken during this period in an attempt to correct the malfunction of state institutions and to show the goodwill of the government.

Backlash from an assassination attempt 27 On 6 August 1995, Interior Minister Al-Tayeb Ibrahim Khair reintroduced entry visas for all Arab passport holders, a regulation which was abolished in 1993. This regulation intended to control the resultant influx of radical foreign Islamists into Sudan.21 President Al-Beshir’s realisation that he was not fully in control of the security apparatus convinced him of the importance of centralising the power of these crucial agencies under his hands, which led to a complete overhaul of the security forces, announced on 12 August 1995.22 This measure aimed not only to remedy organisational failures but also to defuse suspicions of the neighbouring countries’ regarding threats posed by the regime. Some observers within the NSR argued that the security reorganisation was a mistake at the time, because it effectively established the involvement of the security service in the incident.23 On the contrary, the post-assassination reorganisation in fact demonstrated that the regime had been incoherent and that two policy lines existed within the NSR, represented by Al-Turabi and Al-Beshir. Egypt played this card in an attempt to strengthen the military elements against the non-military radicals and eventually succeeded with the split between Al-Turabi and Al-Beshir in December 1999. There were various measures implemented at the domestic level by the government in its venture to present a picture of moderation, such as the release of political activists.24 Following resolution 1044, the Sudanese chief public prosecutor issued warrants for the arrest of the three accused suspects. On 26 April, after the 60 days stipulated in resolution 1044, and with the failure of the Sudanese government to surrender the three suspects, the SC issued resolution 1054, which considered the attack a threat to international peace and security. It stated, “Determining that the non-compliance by the government of Sudan with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996) constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”25 The resolution requested member states to reduce the number and level of Sudanese diplomatic missions and representation, to restrict the entry of government officials and not to convene regional or international conferences in Sudan. It allowed another 60 days to reexamine Sudan’s compliance with the provisions of the resolution. Following the resolution, additional measures were implemented to refute the accusations of supporting terrorism. On 24 June 1996, Ali Uthman Yassin, the Sudanese representative to the UNSC reported in a letter to the chair of the UNSC steps executed by the government with regard to the issue of terrorism.26 The letter referred to measures undertaken for the expulsion of four different groups of foreigners from the Sudanese territories.27 Bin Laden’s departure from Sudan was a clear sign of the huge pressure facing the government and the hostile international and regional political environment. Before the issuance of resolution 1054, an interview with the first suspect in Afghanistan was published in Alhayat newspaper on 21 April 1996. He asserted the non-involvement of the Sudanese government in masterminding or supporting the operation. The government pointed out this fact in a letter to the chair of the UNSC.28 In April 1996, the former state minister for defence, General AlFatih Erwa, was appointed as the permanent representative of Sudan to the United Nations, taking over from Ali Yassin. Erwa had good links with some quarters in

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the US intelligence since his time as a high-ranking intelligence officer for the former Sudanese president Jafaar Nimeiri.29 The NSR perceived his connections would enable the improvement of relations through assuring the US administration that the regime had disposed of the Afghan Arabs and other radical groups. There was disagreement between the United States and Egypt over the nature of the sanctions that should be imposed on the Sudanese government, even before resolution 1054.30 Egypt insisted on not imposing military or economic sanctions, fearing that it would jeopardise Sudan’s unity and the interests of Egypt military sanctions, should they have been imposed, could have disastrous implications on the war in the south, in addition to long-term damage to the historical relations between the peoples of Egypt and Sudan.31 The Egyptian assistant foreign minister for international and multilateral relations stated his government’s position was “to increase political pressure on the Sudanese regime so that it renounces terrorism and carries out the resolution on extraditing the suspects, without damaging the territorial integrity of Sudan or adding to the suffering of the Sudanese people.”32 This was contrary to the US government stance, which preferred the strengthening of sanctions. China and Russia supported the Egyptian position of lighter sanctions and assisted the Sudanese government in evading a stronger resolution in the SC. The government undertook huge efforts to improve relations with Egypt and Ethiopia since they were the main states concerned with the incident. A highranking official stated, “Although diplomatic relations were strained, the intelligence channels were always open. We maintained persistent efforts during the next three years following the incident, travelling to Cairo and Addis Ababa to address the crisis.”33 The breakthrough came with the meeting between President Al-Beshir and President Mubarak in June 1996 during the Arab summit held between 21 and 23 June 1996 in Cairo. Egypt’s security concerns were discussed between Bakri Hassan Salih, the Sudanese interior minister, and an Egyptian delegation.34 A high-ranking Egyptian intelligence delegation arrived in Khartoum on 3 July to discuss the concerns of both countries.35 Highly sensitive and diplomatic issues were tackled during this meeting to the satisfaction of the Egyptians, including submission of a list consisting of approximately 40 Egyptians present in Sudan. The media in Khartoum helped develop mutual relations by keeping away from its past hostile attitude towards Egypt. Tense relations continued with other neighbouring countries, including Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia. President Al-Beshir met with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia on 9 July 1996 at the African Summit held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, where leaders reiterated the importance of bilateral relations between the two countries.36 The expulsion of Bin Laden improved relations with Saudi Arabia, which was deeply concerned about its national security following the terrorist attacks in Riyadh. In its session to reassess sanctions, the UNSC issued on 16 August 1996 resolution 1070, citing the non-compliance of the government regarding the extradition

Backlash from an assassination attempt 29 of the three suspects, of whom Sudan denied having knowledge of their whereabouts.37 In his statement to the session, the Sudanese representative confirmed his government’s condemnation of terrorism and the non-presence of the three suspects in Sudan.38 He also cited the measures taken to prove the government’s genuine intentions to combat terrorism and improve relations with its neighbours. The statement warned of the effects of sanctions on the Sudanese people and indicated the government change of attitude: “We are now in a situation which we all acknowledge, that is, moving positively forward, hence insisting on imposition of sanctions in this case would make it evident that the end intention is to punish nations.”39 The resolution called for an air embargo on Sudan and for all member states to deny aircraft permission to take off from; land in, or fly over their territories if the aircraft is registered in Sudan, or owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of Sudan Airways or by any undertaking, wherever located or organised, which is substantially owned, or controlled by Sudan Airways, leased or operated by the government or public authorities of Sudan.40 These economic sanctions were to take effect 90 days after adopting the resolution, when the UN secretary general submits a report assessing Sudan’s compliance with the demands of the UNSC. The air embargo was expected to have serious and grave consequences on the humanitarian situation in the country. Following the adoption of the resolution, the government warned against the humanitarian effect of sanctions upon Sudan. The government emphasised the critical role of Sudan Airways in the humanitarian field, medical supplies and life-saving medicines and services to sick people seeking treatment outside the country.41 Concerns about the impact of an air embargo on channelling food to the areas affected by starvation in the south were expressed by many international charities.42 A report submitted by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs on the possible humanitarian impact of an air embargo was submitted to the UNSC in February 1997.43 The report was supportive of the Sudanese argument that the sanctions would have serious negative consequences upon the Sudanese people. It concluded that the air embargo will impair the capacity of the public health authorities to facilitate patients receiving special medical treatment outside the country [. . .] a flight ban could have serious impact on immunization program nationwide, domestic distribution of drugs, and on food production.44 Opposition from the UNSC members as a result of the humanitarian impact report ensured the non-execution of the air embargo and any further action against the Sudanese government. The conclusion of the report was a triumph for the government, which was able at last to escape the issue at the SC. It seemed the executive branches of the

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state were working with each other in relative harmony to overcome the catastrophic outcome of the assassination attempt. Diplomacy and the intelligence organs played a decisive role in managing the crisis. Crossing this chasm had instilled in the leaders of the regime a sense of the need to renovate the internal domestic political environment. The aim of sanctions against Sudan was above all “a symbol of international disapproval with the regime, and the only effective way for the regime to counter this was to attempt to show that its practices cohered with procedures and values maintained elsewhere.”45 It is certain the end result of this incident was the change in the government’s outlook on the outside world, reflected in the restraint of its revolutionary agenda and the return to a more pragmatic policy. Military and economic burdens In early 1995, the US administration initiated a policy strives to oust the NSR since it posed a threat to its wider regional interests. In February 1995, Anthony Lake, the national security advisor for President Clinton stated, We will be working with other governments in the region to see how we can best contain the influence of the Sudanese government until it changes its views and begins to behave in accordance with the norms of international behaviour that we think governments should follow.46 The assassination attempt was a solid proof to the US administration and states in the region that forceful measures were needed to overthrow the regime in Khartoum. Eritrea and Uganda were not on good terms with the regime even before the assassination attempt, having backed opposition groups in their efforts to destabilise the NSR. Ethiopia took the same hostile policy line and started to coordinate with the SPLA/M to attack Khartoum despite the regime’s consistent efforts to maintain normal relations. Following the failure of UNSC resolutions to destabilise the NSR, the strategy to fight Sudan through its neighbours was put into force. Endeavouring to encircle the regime, a meeting was held in Asmara on 23 June 1995 between various Sudanese political forces from the north and the south, including the SPLA/M.47 An agreement was concluded between all groups to settle the problematic issues of the south’s right to self-determination, the relationship between religion and the state and the form of government in the Sudan post-NSR era. This was a substantial change in the working method of the opposition groups, which was reflected in more political and military coordination. Another two meetings were held by the NDA in Asmara in January and October 1996.48 The conference gave the SPLA an essential political legitimacy to proceed strongly in its offensive with the support of three neighbouring countries. The American funding of US$20 million to Sudan’s neighbours in November 1996 was intended for the SPLA.49 The policies of the regime since its ascendance to power in 1989 made the formation of this regional-international coalition an inevitable outcome.50 At the beginning of 1997, three military fronts led by the

Backlash from an assassination attempt 31 SPLA assisted by neighbouring countries challenged the government. On 13 January 1997, an attack of the SPLA, along with forces from the NDA, was able to take large areas in the northern and southern Blue Nile, including Hamishkorib, Al-Kurmuk and Geissan on the eastern borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea.51 Prior to the attack of the NDA, the regime was keen to avoid the inclusion of Ethiopia in this alliance. On 12 January 1997, one day before the attack, the Sudanese president assured Ethiopia that “Sudan will not attempt to threaten Ethiopia’s security and stability, and that some Ethiopian opposition elements were deported recently.”52 The president also asserted “the inherent conviction of the Sudan to overcome all stains on the relations between the two countries, refuting the reports that Sudan has any links with or that it assists the Somali Islamic Jihad group.”53 In March 1997, Uganda and the SPLA/M attacked the Sudanese government troops in the borders. The military attack earned the government considerable sympathy in the Arab and Muslim world. This intensification of hostilities was perceived as an aggression coordinated by Israel and the United States against the identity of Northern Sudan. The government utilised these views through diplomacy, especially with Egypt exploiting its concern over the integrity of the Sudanese territories. The Nile waters as a top national security issue and the implications of an SPLA victory in the offensive indicated the prospect of rapprochement with Egypt. On 16 January 1997, Sudan’s vice-president, Al-Zubair Mohammed Salih, visited Cairo to discuss the aggression against the government and met key Egyptian officials such as Kamal Al-Janzouri, the Prime Minister; Amro Musa; and Usama Al-Bazz, the advisor to the president. They discussed for eight hours many issues that caused the deterioration between the two countries: the security issue; measures affecting some Egyptian educational institutions in Sudan; river transport; the terrorist elements Egypt accuses Sudan of harbouring; the role Egypt could play regarding peace in Sudan as a mediator; and the role of Egypt in Sudan’s foreign relations.54 The NSR realised that improved relations with Egypt would ease the political pressure and could change the US administration policy. Delegations were dispatched to Arab states to explain the threats posed by these military attacks. Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco and Saudi Arabia expressed concerns over Sudan’s unity.55 The government continued its attempts to settle its dispute with Ethiopia. The policy stressed Ethiopia’s strategic location and the willingness of its leadership to resolve the conflict. Ethiopia publicly stated it had no interest in toppling the regime, unlike Uganda and Eritrea, which had profound ideological differences with the NSR, and which continued to constitute a direct and imminent threat to the NSR’s security. To the south, the regime pursued a policy of supporting the LRA, and the government of President Laurent Kabila in Zaire/DRC in fighting the Ugandan-Rwandan alliance in its territories. It seems the NSR was trying to utilise the Anglophone-French conflict in the Great Lakes region, as the

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Ugandan-Rwandan attack against the Zaire/DRC was perceived by some French policy quarters as an intention to wipe out the French influence in the region.56 Internal political measures were implemented in order to ease the military pressure. The government exploited ethnic and tribal differences to divide opposition groups, which weakened their political and military strength. The regime accepted the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Declaration of Principles (DoP) as the basis of negotiations to settle the civil war in the south. On 21 April 1998, the government brokered a deal with Riek Machar and Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, leaders of two major rebel factions, and one-time rebel comrades of John Garang, leader of the SPLA/M.57 The agreement demonstrated the regime’s strategy of alliances, which would serve the NSR’s political goals at the time. The purpose of this agreement was to send signals to the outside world of the government’s keenness to achieve peace, albeit not a comprehensive peace without the inclusion of SPLA/M. The government also used the existence of an external threat to gain popular support at the domestic level. The government launched two campaigns under the slogans “Al-Difaa an Al-Aqeeda wa Al-Watan” (In defence of creed and homeland) and “Zaad Al-Mujahid” (Supplying Mujahdeen) in order to ensure the availability of reserves needed for combat.58 The necessity of financial resources against rising external hostility led it to focus on the oil sector. Hence, the NSR’s pursued the Asian alternative policy as a reaction to Western antagonism. Its policy towards China was stated as “the effort to shift the relations between the two countries from its traditional pattern to a strategic height.”59 This policy produced a considerable success on the economic arena and to a certain extent on the political front. Attempts to persuade Western companies to invest in the oil sector were a failure due to the political complications involved in this process. President Al-Beshir’s visit to China in September 1995 opened a new era of political, economic, cultural and technical cooperation between the two countries. China and Sudan signed a loan agreement for the oil exploration project.60 Chinese (as well as Malaysian) investment in oil exploration offered the NSR the political support that it sought in the international arena. In mid-1999, Sudan celebrated the inauguration of a 1,610-km oil pipeline and the export of 150,000 barrels per day, which would offer abundant finance for the regime. By August 1999, the International Monetary Fund took a decision that Sudan was no longer a non-cooperative country and regained its full membership in the fund.61 China and Russia supplied the regime constant need for military equipment. Economic interest rather than political issues attracted both countries. In the UNSC consultations leading to its resolutions, Russian support for Sudan in the council was clear and effective. Since 1996, China’s oil project in Sudan, along with excellent prospects for this venture, meant arms supply was crucial in securing and ensuring the viability of this business opportunity. Three events revived the NSR politically, and as a former ambassador stated, “Whenever the NSR is trapped in an inevitable predicament, fate turns around and saves this government out of the chasm.”62 The first event was the sudden eruption of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998, as a result of a dispute

Backlash from an assassination attempt 33 over a small town on the border between the two countries.63 The second was the conflict in the Great Lakes region, which brought heavy Ugandan political and military involvement that had a direct impact on Sudan’s security. The third was the bombing by the United States in August 1998 of Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum that brought wide domestic and international condemnation. These circumstances reinvigorated NSR’s relations with the outside world and consolidated its power at the domestic level. This context represented positive input in the return to pragmatic foreign policy, altering its aggressive direction to a more cooperative approach. A more mature outlook emerged among the upper echelon of the regime towards threats in the political, economic and security environment. The outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was an unanticipated event by the US government, which had considered the partnership between the two countries as crucial in its policy to overthrow the NSR.64 It was a blow for the United States and the Sudanese opposition, while it was an immense blessing to the NSR. The war diverted any security threats posed by Ethiopia and Eritrea, as their attention and efforts were dedicated to their ongoing conflict. In the meantime, this war opened a new window of opportunity for the NSR to reshape alliances in the region. Ethiopia established a link with the NSR, hoping to build an alliance of Eritrean dissidents that would include Islamist groups opposed to President Issais’s government.65 This change in Ethiopia’s relations dynamics forced Mr. Issias to mend ties with Sudan. In August 1998, the US embassies in Dar es Salam and Nairobi were devastated by a terrorist attack. The US government accused Bin Laden’s terrorist network of the attack and responded by launching missile attacks of 75 cruise missiles against Sudan and Afghanistan. The bombardment destroyed Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, which was alleged by the United States to be capable of producing chemical weapons and part of Bin Laden’s terror network in Sudan. In a letter to the UNSC, the Sudanese government stated the factory was privately owned and requested the convening of the SC to discuss the matter, and requested a technical fact-finding mission to verify American claims.66 It became clear from the media and testimonies of many scientists that the factory was intended to fulfil the pharmaceutical needs of the country.67 The baseless attack backfired on the US administration with this revelation.68 President Al-Beshir told the national assembly “it was the Sudan that has actually won, politically and diplomatically.”69 The government drew significant political gains in the domestic and external arenas from the American missile attack, presenting itself as a victim of the United States’ arrogance in the world stage. The internal split: incompatible external outlook Since the rise of the NSR in 1989, the dual leadership of the regime’s spiritual leader Al-Turabi and President Omer Al-Beshir had been a contentious subject

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among the ruling clique. Policy divergence took various forms and dimensions. Asharq Al-Awsat framed the question well: Does the state, represented by RCC—followed by an appointed president, then an elected president—have the primary responsibility for the state affairs and their management?; or is it that the Islamic movement represented by the Secretary General, then the political organ, and then the National Congress Party is the ruling organ of the state? The lack of clarity on who takes or owns the decision, (who is pulling the strings) led many times to contradictions in responsibilities and decisions.70 This arrangement presented the executive branch with many difficulties in policy formulation and implementation in the external sphere. The two leaders were able to maintain a coherent political partnership for over ten years, for each of them needed the other to attain the objectives of the NIF. Although rifts about approaches to policy in general were present behind closed doors, the two leaders opted for sustaining uniformity within the NIF since the regime’s survival was paramount. Foreign policy was a pivotal dimension in the escalation of the dispute, which polarised the various factions within the NIF. It was inevitable that this alliance would crack in reaction to a specific event with the accumulation of differences and contradictions over political postures and methods of achieving the regime’s objectives. The assassination attempt of Mubarak was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Egypt exploited the incident to make the regime conform to its wider interests, while exploiting the internal NSR differences between the military represented by Al-Beshir and the Islamist faction led by Al-Turabi. The hostile attitude of Al-Turabi towards Egypt after the assassination attempt benefited Egypt’s goal to inflame the NSR internal power struggle. The NSR’s position to support the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 upset its relations with the Gulf States. The powerful regional state Saudi Arabia grew uneasy with Al-Turabi’s Islamisation project as a rival to its authority in the Islamic world. These external factors added tension to the increasingly unsettled relations within the ruling Islamist. The NSR leadership realised the need to rethink how it dealt with and managed the foreign policy crisis presented by the UNSC resolutions and the security pressure. Al-Turabi and Al-Beshir viewed the external dimension from different perspectives. The president realised a reversal of past radical policies was crucial, both to improve relations with the outside world and to consolidate his power in the state. Internal measures were required to enable him to proceed in reformulating old policies. In the security institutions, the president moved to consolidate his power over it through the overhaul and control of the security structure. The assassination incident and the comments by foreign leaders reflected a perception that his status within the regime was second to Al-Turabi. “The Libyans seize the opportunity of any visit by Al-Beshir or his vice-president to criticise or complain about the NIF.”71 Following the attack, President Mubarak described Al-Beshir

Backlash from an assassination attempt 35 as Al-Turabi’s secretary. The personal dimension in the nature of the relationship between Al-Beshir and Al-Turabi is crucial, as anger was growing over AlTurabi’s domination over the state institutions. The liquidation PIAC was another sign of the internal rift, with different factions supporting each leader: “At the beginning of 1999, the ministry of interior rejected permission to hold the fourth round of PIAC which was due in February.”72 Al-Turabi attempted to bring about a new constitution that would be acceptable to the military represented by Al-Beshir, as well as many influential leaders in the NIF. He recognised the regime’s agenda had led to international isolation and a deeper divide in national unity with the opposition of the NDA. The gradual opening up of the political system was an option he favoured in order to solve the political context. The proposal for pluralism and freedom was presented to the party at the end of 1997, and Al-Turabi manoeuvred the party mechanisms to approve it.73 The important issue for the Secretary General was that without freedoms and under the totalitarian system invented by him, he will be the first victim of the regime; though Dr. Al-Turabi started to call for pluralism and broaden political freedoms, he proceeded implementing them in a calculated manner so things may not get out of his hands.74 In April 1998, the new constitution promoted by Al-Turabi that permitted the opening of the political system was approved after much legal and political wrangling. The divisions between the two men and their factions were manifested in an internal political conflict over the control of the party and the state.75 President Al-Beshir’s faction was convinced that the removal of Al-Turabi was the best solution to make the NSR acceptable once more to the outside world as well as to step out of his domineering character. Al-Turabi viewed a controlled path to political pluralism as the perfect approach to improve international relations— a change that emerged from within the NIF would be more acceptable than a change by force. The internal conflict within the regime reaching a turning point on 10 December 1998, when ten distinguished NIF members signed “the memo of ten” that called for reform in the Shura Council of the newly established National Congress Party (successor to the NIF). The objective of the memo was mainly to rein the supremacy of Dr Al-Turabi. The internal dynamics of this memo in the Shura Council led to a new structure in the leadership of the party and the state. This event came in a time of unhealthy relations between large numbers within the NIF ruling elite and represented “an outburst of accumulation and congestion started in 1995.”76 The new structure changed this political formula, since it made Al-Beshir the President of the state and the chairman of the party, hence the memo changes in the Shura council was a coup d’etat by all measures. It removes Dr. Al-Turabi from the leadership of the movement for the first time since 1965, and appointed a military man at the top of the party.77

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The external factor played key part in the repercussions of this memo, which led to the fragmentation of the NIF and the removal of Al-Turabi. This organisational modification aimed to counter and halt the move towards political progressiveness that Al-Turabi planned to introduce. One of the features of this event was that although the presenters of the memo raised the flag of Shura and institutionalisation, the medium-term result was a decline for Shura and freedoms. The group who benefited from the changes were not Shura and freedom enthusiasts.78 The two leaders’ squabble over political power aimed at enabling them to push forward with their agenda, whether to keep the status quo of military control or to press on with regulated pluralism. The dispute developed from a political one to a personal grudge between the two leaders while the ideology of how to shape the future of the country was at the centre of the dispute. In October 1999, Al-Turabi’s political manoeuvres led to more pressure upon Al-Beshir’s faction at the founding conference of the National Congress Party. The conclusion of the conference was a victory for Al-Turabi, who received a mandate to increase his powers as a secretary general. “The conference adopted attractive new slogans: strengthening the federal system, bringing about the reconciliation between all political affiliations, bringing into reality freedoms mentioned in the constitution, holding the next elections impartially and freely.”79 Following this success, Al-Turabi proposed various amendments to the national assembly, including the introduction of the office of the prime minister and the election of state governors. These measures would have considerably reduced the power of the president and led to the strengthening of the authority of AlTurabi in the state. When Al-Turabi ignored the president’s request to postpone the discussion of these amendments, the president declared a state of emergency on 12 December 1999 and dissolved the national assembly. Regardless of whether Al-Turabi’s proposed reforms were inspired by a desire for greater personal power or not—the reforms would have increased the power of parliament and, by extension, of its speaker (Al-Turabi)—they would still have been positive in creating more accountable, accessible and democratic government.80 The president used different constituencies within the regime to enable him to eject Al-Turabi, including not only military personnel around him but also prominent Islamists figures disgruntled by Al-Turabi’s authority, as well as others who had personal agendas. Control over the military and security apparatus had placed Al-Beshir in a stronger position to end the political battle in his favour. His association with Ali Uthman Taha, the vice-president, gave the president the edge in this rift. Ali Uthman was considered the second man in the NIF’s organisational structure and had participated in the executive branch since the NSR beginnings. With Al-Turabi removed, a new phase started in the foreign affairs of the regime.

Backlash from an assassination attempt 37 The president knew the removal of Al-Turabi would give him regional and international support. Pressure from Egypt and the Gulf States on the regime had triggered a deep reconfiguration of internal power balances, along with other states in the region, such as Uganda, Eritrea, Congo and Libya, which all agreed on the importance of eliminating the political influence of Al-Turabi. President Al-Beshir’s visit to Libya and Cairo on 23 and 24 December 1999 following the removal of Al-Turabi demonstrated the great relief felt in the region. The declared statement between Egypt and Sudan reflects the great importance Cairo places on substantial support for President Al-Beshir through the normalisation of relations, the immediate return of the Egyptian ambassador to Khartoum, developing mutual commercial and investment relations, and promoting reconciliation efforts between the government and opposition.81 The meeting of President Al-Beshir in Tripoli with the leaders of Libya, Uganda, Zaire/DRC and Eritrea in Libya was also a display of support for his measures against Al-Turabi.

Conclusion The period following the attack on President Mubarak witnessed an incisive reversal in the NSR foreign policy. Tremendous political and economic pressure was imposed on the regime, which necessitated a change in the NSR’s attitude at the internal and external levels. The condemnation of the UNSC resolutions exposed the vulnerability and the limitations of the NSR’s ideological policies in the international arena. It was the first time since Sudan’s independence that the country was denounced by the UNSC. Since its initiation in June 1989, the NSR had handled various threats in the domestic and external arenas; the scale of challenges because of the incident were overwhelming and amounted to an overall crisis. The government had to manage three vital issues following the assassination attempt: the UNSC resolutions, the economic and military pressure and the initiation of a split within the regime elite. Various measures were implemented to avoid the consequences of the UNSC resolutions, such as renunciation of the past radical policies that supported Islamist groups, which accelerated the NSR’s internal split. Pragmatism in both foreign and domestic triumphed over political Islam ideology. Embraced after the assassination attempt, this approach gave the regime another breath of life. The success of these policies was boosted by an external context that was growing more favourable, albeit slowly, to wider NSR interests. The Asian economic alternative started to reap its benefits for the regime with substantial investment by Malaysia and China, and their success in the oil sector. The NSR’s new course in the domestic and external spheres modified its position on the southern problem by accepting conflict resolution terms that had been unacceptable in the past. Egypt, as a major player in the region and a long-time actor in Sudanese politics was able to make use of the NSR’s internal divisions to

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achieve its interests. The regime’s political landscape had been transformed as the struggle between the NSR power centres grew more acute. Different perceptions of the appropriate domestic and external direction of the regime divided the NSR and led to the removal of Al-Turabi.

Notes 1 PIAC, 1991. 2 Deterioration took different forms, such as closing the Khartoum branch of Cairo University and the premises of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation in Khartoum, and the expulsion of diplomats. Egypt annexed the disputed Halayeb Triangle in order to provoke the regime in Khartoum. 3 Guardian Weekly, 9 Mar. 1992. 4 Cliffe L (1999), Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa,”. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 89–111. 5 This was stated by Dr Qutbi Al-Mahdi, ex-Sudanese Ambassador to Iran from 1993 to the end of 1996. He was appointed as the director of the National Intelligence Agency (1997–2000). prominent Islamist and academic during an interview with the author in Khartoum, June 2003. 6 On 10 July 1995, Time magazine. 7 Al Jazeera TV (Apr. 2016), Interview With Dr Hassan al-Turabi: With Ahmed Mansour. Witness to an Era, 16 Episodes, Aljazeera Media Network. [In Arabic]. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6ZBqA1caWs [Accessed 25 Mar. 2018]. 8 The Sunday Times, 14 Apr. 1996. 9 The names of the three suspects were Mustafa Hamza, Mohammed Siraj, Izzat/or Yassin. Most of those involved used aliases. 10 UNSC. S/RES/1044, January 1996—UNSC. S/RES/1054, April 1996—UNSC. S/ RES/1070, August 1996. 11 On 13–14 Mar. 1996, a summit of “peacemakers” on terrorism was held at Sharm Alshaykh, Egypt, co-hosted by President Clinton and President Mubarak. Twenty-nine delegations attended the meeting. The summit came in the context of terrorism and the Middle East process. 12 Nmoma V (2006), The Shift in United States-Sudan Relations: A Troubled Relationship and the Need for Mutual Cooperation.” The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 44–70. 13 Niblock T C (2000), Sanctions and Pariahood: The Case of Sudan. Paper Presented to the Conference of Sudan Studies Society of the United Kingdom, University of Durham, 30 Aug.–1 Sept. 2000. 14 The Independent, 28 June 1995. 15 MoFA, The African Affairs Department (27 Oct. 1997), Exceeding Multilateral Framework in the Regional and International Level. In the first meeting, Ethiopia exploited its chair of the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention and Management to forcibly introduce the issue, thereby violating the Cairo declaration, which stipulates the illegality of deliberating on any matter of that kind in the OAU mechanism without the approval of the parties to the conflict. It also ignored the mechanism’s regulation that required inviting all parties involved. The meeting was convened without inviting the government of Sudan. 16 Ibid. 17 Nmoma, The Shift in United States-Sudan Relations, op. cit. 18 The five non-permanent members were out of the council: Sultanate of Oman, Nigeria, Rwanda, Czech Republic, and Argentina—replaced by Guinea Bissau, Egypt, South Korea, Poland and Chile. Britain took the chair from Russia for the month of January.

Backlash from an assassination attempt 39 19 The resolution was coined by the Egyptian delegation in cooperation with Ethiopia, the United States and Britain. 20 UNSC. S/RES/1044, Jan. 1996. 21 Sudan Update, 24 Aug. 1995. 22 SUNA, Sudan News Agency. Mohammed Ahmed Mustafa Al-Dabi was appointed director of the foreign security organization, replacing Dr Nafie Ali Nafie; Brigadier Al-Hadi Abdallah replaced Gen. Hassan Dahawi as the director of the internal security organization; and Brigadier Bakri Hassan Salih was appointed Minister of the Interior, replacing Brigadier Al-Tayeb Ibrahim Mohammed Khair. 23 The Permanent Mission of Sudan (14 Feb. 1996), Report on the United Nations Security Council Resolution Regarding the Ethiopian Complaint. New York, p. 20. At the Security Council Informal meeting with the foreign minister Ali Uthman Taha on 17 January 1996, the US representative to the council pointed out that the intentions of the Sudanese government to remove the security officials was to punish them for their role in the operation. 24 “In September 1995, the government released Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the former prime minister, 32 political detainees, and 18 convicts in political cases.” Alhayat, 5 Sept. 1995. 25 UNSC. S/RES/1054, Apr. 1996. 26 Letter dated 24 June 1996 to the chair of the UNSC from Sudan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, S/1996/464. 27 The four groups were Egyptians, Afghan Arabs, Usama bin Laden and Palestinians. The letter reported that 37 Egyptians were deported and a list of them was handed to the Egyptian authorities. 28 Letter dated 24 June 1996 to the chair of the UNSC. 29 He was one of the main organizers of “operation Moses” to transfer the Falasha Jews from the Sudanese territories to Israel requested and coordinated by the American government. 30 Al-quds Al-arabi, 4 Apr. 1996. 31 Some diplomats reported that in an informal meeting with the Non-Alliance Caucus of the UNSC, the secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, reprimanded Egypt because the proposed resolution (1054) was weak. 32 Mideast Mirror, 3 Apr. 1996. 33 Cliffe, Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa, op. cit., p. 98. 34 Sudan Focus, June/July 1996. 35 Ministry of Social Planning. Humanitarian Affairs Commission, Sudan’s cooperation on UNSC resolution 1070, Memo to Lakhdar Ibrahim, the Representative of UN Secretary General in the Imposition of Sanctions on Sudan Airways through UNSC, 24 Oct. 1996, Khartoum. 36 Ibid. 37 The resolution was passed with 13 UNSC members in favor (Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Botswana, Poland, Republic of Korea, Chile, Guinea Bissau, France, Egypt, UK, Honduras and the United States), while Russia and China abstained. 38 UNSC. Session 3690, 16 Aug. 1996. 39 Ibid. 40 UNSC. S/RES/1070, Aug. 1996. 41 Ministry of Social Planning. Humanitarian Affairs Commission, op. cit. 42 Ibid. 43 Report of the Expert, Mr. Claude Bruderlein, resulting from his Mission to the Area from 18 Jan. to 8 Feb. 1997. Note From the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs Concerning Possible Humanitarian Impact of the International Flights Ban Decided in Security Council Resolution 1070 (1996), New York, 18 Feb. 1997. 44 Ibid.

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45 Niblock, Sanctions and Pariahood, op. cit. 46 Speaking before a conference organized by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. 47 The NDA was composed of northern opposition parties such as DUP, Umma Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, Beja Conference, the unions, Alliance Forces, Southern Parties Alliance (which included six groups) and the SPLA/M. Northern main political parties (Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party) objected to the transfer of military activities to the north since it denoted confrontation with the Sudanese armed forces, but they endorsed the merger of the military and political efforts. 48 Nmoma, The Shift in United States-Sudan Relations, op. cit. 49 Sudan Focus, 15 Nov. 1996. 50 According to a report published in the Washington Post, about US$20 million in arms and military equipment was to be sent to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda (10 Nov. 1996). The assistant secretary of state for African affairs, George Moose, reportedly said the armament were intended to assist the three governments “for their own defense” 51 Sudan Update, 27 Jan. 1997. 52 Al-Sudan Al-Hadeeth, 12 Jan. 1997. 53 Ibid. 54 Al-Sudan Al-Hadeeth, 3 Feb. 1997. 55 Sudan Focus, 15 Jan. 1997. 56 Simon M (Feb. 1998), Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, pp. 7–9. 57 The “Political Charter” was signed between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M, the Nasser group, and South Sudan Independent Movement. Both leaders in the dispute were ethnically different from John Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M—main faction. 58 This was stated by a former government official. 59 The Sudanese Embassy in China-Beijing (1995), The Mission Annual Report. 60 Ibid. 61 IMF (2000), Making the Global Economy Work for All. Annual Report, p. 17. 62 This was stated by ex-ambassador Jafaar Hassan Salih during an interview with the author in Khartoum, January 2005. 63 The conflict was over Badme, a border territory of 450 kilometers, but the conflict has other wider economic and political reasons. 64 Africa Confidential, 29 May 1998. 65 The Economist (8–14 May 1999), Africa’s Forgotten War. 66 MoFA (1998), Letter of H.E Bishop Gabriel Roric Jur, State Minister at the Foreign Ministry to the President of the UNSC on the Flagrant American Aggression Against Sudan. 67 Interviewing Henry Jobe of MSD Pharmaceutical Company, the American who designed the Al-Shifa factory stated, “We didn’t intend a dual use for it. We didn’t design anything extra in there. The design we made was for pharmaceuticals”— “Sudanese Plant Not Built for Weapons,” The Observer, 30 Aug. 1998. 68 The factory owned by Salah Idris, a Sudanese businessman close to the governing party. 69 Sudan Update, 20 Nov. 1998. 70 Asharq Al-Awsat, 24 Oct. 2004. 71 This was stated by ex-ambassador Abbas Ibrahim Al-Nour, former ambassador to Libya from 1990 to 1994 during an interview with the author in Khartoum, Dec. 2004, Khartoum. 72 Centre for Sudanese Studies (1999), Halat Al-Watan: The First Sudanese Strategic Report: 1999–2000. Cairo: Centre for Sudanese Studies, p. 231. 73 The leadership office of the party, the highest authority voted against the pluralism and freedoms framework suggested by Dr Turabi, the secretary general, by 11 votes. This decision was expected to be the party decision and direction for the political future, but

Backlash from an assassination attempt 41

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

Dr Turabi insisted on transferring the matter to the Shura Council, which he was able to convince to adopt the new political framework by 142 to 94 votes. Mekki H (Nov. 1999), Tetworat Aldakhil-Alinfraj Alsyasi wa Ilagat Albatin-Albatin (The Internal Development and Secret Relations in the Movement). Alrai Alaam. This internal dynamic of the NCP dispute is outside the scope of this chapter; however, in this part, we will explore the split link to the external dimension. Mahy Aldeen A (2012), Al-Turabi wa Al ingaz Siraa AlHawiyya wa Alhawa (Al-Turabi and the National Salvation Revolution: The Conflict of Identity and Interest). Khartoum: Dar Kahil for Studies and Publishing, p. 424. Al-Abdeen A (2004), Maqalaat on Al-Harakat Al-Islamyyah Fi Al-Sudan (Articles on the Islamic Movement in Sudan). Khartoum: University of Khartoum Publications, p. 10. Ibid., 13. Al-Abdeen, Maqalaat on Al-Harakat Al-Islamyyah Fi Al-Sudan, op. cit., p. 22. Bellucci S (June 2000), Islam and Democracy: The 1999 Palace Coup in Sudan. Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, No. 3, p. 172. Hassan Abutalib (2000), Mazza Yagry Fi Al-Sudan: Al-Azmah Wa Al-Mustagbal (What Is Happening in Sudan: The Crisis and Future), in Hassan Abutalib, ed., Kurassat Istratigyya, 10th Year-85. Cairo: Centre for Strategic Studies-Al-Ahraam.

3

Major foreign policy issues

Introduction The NSR military coup in 1989 coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, and a new set of problems attracted the attention of major international actors, such as human rights violations, lack of good governance, ethnic conflicts and terrorism. These issues were considered the new threats to international stability. Moral dimensions such as the spread of liberal democracy and human rights began to take precedence in the interactions of major powers with developing countries. Various approaches of political pressure were used to address these problems ranging from economic sanctions and severance of diplomatic ties to military intervention. The NSR internal political environment became a decisive factor in shaping its external sphere. The civil war marred by massive human rights violations, together with the NSR agenda of supporting radical Islamist groups were cornerstones in influencing interaction with the outside world. The end of the cold war altered the nature of Sudan’s relations with the USA, the only remaining superpower at the time. The NSR’s ideological policies between the instigation of the military coup in 1989 and the fragmentation of the NIF in 1999 prompted three central issues to affect the direction of its foreign policy during this period. Human rights, terrorism and the civil war were interrelated themes vital for international actors in the new context and their effect on their wider interests. The contradiction between the regime’s radical programme and the realities of Sudan led to a gradual change in domestic policies. Initially, the regime’s internal drive towards implementing its programmes did not take its implications into account. The changes in the attitude were directly related to the core of these issues since they formed a considerable force against the NSR. The importance of compatible internal policies with international norms became a crucial factor in addressing the NSR’s foreign relations and progress in economic development. There were differences within the NSR elite on the way to approach and tackle these concerns. A radical line that dominated the policy process in these areas in the preliminary phase tarnished the NSR’s image and caused significant damage in the long run.

Major foreign policy issues 43 The UN and regional organisations were heavily involved and condemned the NSR’s course of action on all three issues. In the meantime, major powers and regional states endeavoured to undermine the NSR’s legitimacy through these forums. The government’s handling of these concerns internally and externally established a constant negative response in the international forums. The pragmatic transformation of the NSR’s policies following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak in June 1995 was intended to address past radicalism. The delicate and intricate subject of Sudanese identity has always been a central dimension in articulating Sudan’s foreign policy. Identity as defined by the NIF was the guiding principle at the heart of the regime ties with the outside world. The centrality of Islamic and Arab culture in their ideology and the regime’s endeavour to harmonise other communities into it had a negative impact in the domestic and external spheres. The aggressive religious character led to irretrievably negative outcomes on human rights, civil war and terrorism. Understanding the impact of these three spheres on NSR’s foreign policy dynamics is crucial in the general analysis. Human rights Opposition groups and international civil organisations exposed the regime’s inhuman practices designed to force the NIF’s agenda into the society. Various allegations of slavery practices, religious persecution and ethnic cleansing, combined with the humanitarian crisis in the south, brought together a strong international urge to act. The regime argued strongly that these accusations of massive human rights violations were a deliberate campaign launched by the West to serve purely political purposes. The American ambassador in Khartoum stated, Sudan’s bad reputation is not just a figment of the media imagination, and is not just fabrication of the Egyptians [. . .] and it is not grossly inaccurate reporting by western embassies, and it is not just misinformation by some countries. The reputation is furthered on credible evidence from wider sources over a long period of time.1 External pressure on human rights The overthrow of the democratic system in June 1989 led the United States to stop all loans and grants to the Sudanese government. The measure, based on the US Congress resolution 513, requires the termination of all assistance to any military government that topples a democratic system. In 1992, the execution of Andrew Tchombé, a United States Agency for International Development employee, led the US government to push for a human rights resolution in the UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). In 1993, the human rights situation in Sudan was transferred from the confidential to the public procedure in the CHR, which entails the appointment of a Special Rapporteur.2 His mandate is to investigate the country’s situation in the

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form of fact-finding and report to the commission and the UN General Assembly in their public annual meetings. The procedure is a “naming and shaming” tactic intended to rectify the behaviour of the country in the human rights field. Under this procedure, the case of Sudan continued to be reviewed over the next years, which was renewed annually along with the mandate of the independent experts under the commission’s resolutions. Two independent experts were appointed between 1993 and 1999 who took different approaches ranging from hostility to cooperation. The first rapporteur appointed by the CHR was the Hungarian lawyer Gasper Biro who adopted a hostile manner during his tenure, which lasted for five years and ended with his resignation in 1998. Mr. Biro had submitted five reports regarding the human rights situation in Sudan to the CHR and five interim reports to the UN General Assembly.3 He was followed by Leonardo Franco, who was appointed in a time of moderation in the regime’s relations with the west. His appointment in the post-1995 political environment was characterised by more cooperation and a change of attitude on the part of the CHR towards the government of Sudan. The visits of Pope John Paul to Khartoum in February 1993 and the archbishop of Canterbury in 1995 to Southern Sudan were intended to highlight concerns over the human rights situation in Sudan on the international stage. The visit of the pope contributed to relaxing religious discourse, and the government repealed the 1962 missionary societies’ act, which put restrictions on preaching activities.4 In October 1994, an international conference was organised in Khartoum by the International Friendship Council under the banner of religious dialogue as an effort to present a softer government image on the issue of religious tolerance. The NSR’s endeavours to present a positive image of its human rights reputation were not accompanied by genuine reform at the domestic level. Ideological commitment in the initial years was stronger than any external pressure and led to further alienation of various Sudanese communities. Abel Alier, a leading Southern Sudanese figure and former vice-president, stated the following in a letter to President Al-Beshir: In the last seven years the conflict has been further fuelled by the new unhelpful policies such as a holy war (Jihad) in Southern Sudan and people in other parts of Sudan, and the establishment of an Islamic state that recognizes nonMuslims and non-Arabs in the Sudan as foreigners in their own land.5 Neighbouring countries to the South Sudan were convinced of the NSR’s determination to Islamise and Arabise Southern Sudan. Abel Alier’s statement was a conventional view strongly held by Sudan’s African neighbours. Over the years, Uganda and Kenya voiced their apprehension at the NSR’s domestic programmes that alienated and marginalised large sectors of its population in the south. Prominent international NGOs, such as Amnesty International and HRW, reported extensively on the human rights situation, bringing it to the world’s attention. After 1996, other civil society organisations (CSOs) in Europe and North America launched aggressive campaigns against multinational companies’ investment

Major foreign policy issues 45 in Sudan’s booming oil sector. The high profile of the human rights situation in Sudan gave them some success at lobbying the public and politicians to prevent such ventures: They tried to ensure that companies involved in oil development in Sudan were denied access to the US capital markets. The Canadian company Talisman, in particular had a great deal of pressure placed on its share price. At least half a dozen pension funds in the US sold millions of Talisman shares after heavy pressures from activists. After a long struggle and extensive negative publicity, the company decided to find a buyer for its Sudan holdings.6 In June 1997, the US Congress passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority based on accusations of religious persecution to prohibit all economic and trade relations with Sudan. In November of the same year, President Clinton issued an executive order that placed comprehensive commercial sanctions on the Sudanese government. The measure was an expression of the administration’s dissatisfaction with the NSR over a wide range of issues, including human rights and terrorism. In the words of the order, the policies and actions of the regime including continued support for international terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize neighbouring governments; and the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the US.7 The combination of these issues demonstrates the level of pressure on the government to reform its institutions and outlook. The wind of change in the government attitude Following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak in June 1995, the external pressure on the government to alleviate the human rights situation contributed to increased political openness. The government was implicated in this incident and was strongly condemned in the UN Security Council, a reaction which threatened the regime’s political future. Therefore, a reconsideration of the regime’s policies was needed without compromising control over the state. In the years following the attack, political freedoms and democracy were at the heart of internal NSR debate. Advocates of widening the NSR political system by being more inclusive of other political forces and granting more freedoms had domestic as well as external motives. These measures would invigorate Sudan’s relations with the United States and the West, who led the campaign to destabilise the regime. Human rights and political pluralism were central for any adjustment to revive the regime’s reputation. The introduction of these freedoms was directly linked to increasing opposition on the political and military fronts by the NDA, along with international

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willingness to support their call for democracy. After years of control over state institutions, Al-Turabi reached the conclusion that the Sudanese socio-political context requires some sort of democratic formula. Part of the NIF elite was against Al-Turabi’s argument based on their strong views over the failure of the multiparty system characterised by political sectarianism. The initial statement by the regime described the democratic system as “a sham and failed constitutional institutions, the will of the citizens was faked by glittering slogans.”8 The 1998 constitution represented a fresh start in the sphere of civil and political rights within a formula to ensure the continuation of NSR rule. The document guaranteed the protection of basic rights such as the right to life, freedom, privacy etc. A constitutional court was established and its jurisdiction included the interpretation of constitutional and legal clauses, receiving individual complaints and competency to hear disputes between federal state departments.9 The court verdicts were final and valid for all state institutions, so it appeared to be an important and effective legal institution since its decisions were binding on both the executive branch and individuals. Undoubtedly, this institution was restricted through provisions aimed at continuous NIF control over the political arena. The selection of the court judges by the national assembly and the president assured the appointment of loyal individuals to the regime agendas rather than independent persons. This legal development reflected an endeavour to align the domestic sphere with the new international relations of the regime. The agreement in 1997 with the SPLA’s Nassir faction encoded a “bill of rights” encompassing the rights contained in the international bill of rights. Steps were taken to find a permanent political solution to the civil war by accepting the IGAD initiative in 1998. The DoP, signed as a result of the initiative, included the right of self-determination for the people of the south. Settling the conflict in the south was vital to remedy the human rights situation since the war zone was the site of the majority of violations. These political developments were contradicted by the insincerity of the NSR to implement a genuine process of greater political freedoms. The fear of losing its grip over the state and the need to respond to external and domestic pressures led to incompatible statements and ambiguity on various pieces of legislation. The intention of this façade of reform and its vagueness was to allow the government to interpret contentious issues in its own interests and according to its agenda. This was apparent in the case of the right for political organisation and association, “the political association act,” designated by the Arabic term Tawaali Syassi. This term signifies an alternative system to democratic institutions by literally being part of the NSR regime: Inconsistency of the government position on regard to the political association act was not comparable to any other issue; not from phase to phase, not from official to another official, but from one official to the same one in the same phase. You hear him speaking on the issue in the morning while himself saying something contradictory in the evening.10

Major foreign policy issues 47 Differences within the NSR on the return of political pluralism or the preservation of the NSR prompted the final split between Al-Turabi and Al-Beshir. The civil war The war in the south has always been a decisive factor in the stability of consecutive Sudanese governments since independence. The substantial support from neighbouring countries to the rebels in the south was a vital factor in shaping Sudan’s regional relations. The initial statement by the NSR considered improving links with its neighbours as one of its priorities. General Omer Al-Beshir declared 1990 a “year for Africa” in Sudan to demonstrate the NSR’s intention to establish constructive relations with the continent. The regime was convinced that the lack of effort to connect with Africa under the former democratic system gave the SPLA/M the opportunity to develop a positive image for itself. The SPLA/M leader John Garang was treated in some African capitals as a head of state. In October 1989, the NSR issued a statement protesting at the official reception for the SPLA/M leader in Zimbabwe and Zambia.11 These efforts to improve relations with Africa were contradicted by the internal policies of the NSR. Neighbours viewed the NSR as posing a real threat to regional stability and security; therefore, its overtures to improve relations were received in a cautious manner. Major northern political opposition parties’ alliance with the SPLA/M under the umbrella of the NDA was another aspect in the isolation of the regime. The SPLA/M’s coalition with northern Muslim forces refuted the accusation of it being a racist or separatist movement and established greater political credentials for the rebel group. The declaration of Jihad and the mobilisation of young people to fight in the south were exploited by the SPLA/M in its bid to discredit the regime and gain substantial Western support. The political agenda and the conflict The objective of the regime was to find a solution for the conflict in its own terms. The NSR proposed a federal system which would exempt the south from the contentious issue of Islamic law (Sharia): The official negotiation position was worked out at a National Dialogue Conference on peace; held in Khartoum from 9 September to 21 October 1989 and chaired by RCC’s Muhammad Al-Amin Khalifa, with the 104 participants selected by the RCC.12 The conference conclusions were adopted as the basis for the government’s negotiation stance with the SPLA. The recommendations were in essence the NIF’s political outlook on the solution; however, it was presented as an issue of national consensus at the National Dialogue Conference composed of carefully selected individuals from different Sudanese regions. It was a political manipulation to give the impression of a unified national position in regard to the conflict.

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Radical and dogmatic assertions over the future of Sudan complicated the conflict since forcing such an outlook on the whole of the population impeded any chances of conflict resolution. A peaceful solution was not an option in the NSR initial years, whether for the government or the SPLA, although negotiations were maintained intermittently between the two parties. Radicalism in Khartoum compelled the majority of political forces in the south to take secession of the south as an alternative for conflict resolution: With such a gulf separating the two parts of the country, Sudan will be condemned to perpetual war unless some drastic action is taken fairly soon. It is evident that the only feasible course of action to bring about peace is for all to accept the fact that the north and the south need . . . a period of time of separate existence.13 This new direction in southern politics derived directly from the continuous frustration at not finding middle ground with Northern Sudanese political forces. Persecution of southerners by Arab-Islamic ideology and the threat to regional stability were the winning arguments for the SPLA to draw regional and international attention to the southerners’ plight: Garang addressed each state or group of states with particular or familiar political language to them. He found it ideal in southern African states to propagate alleged persecution and discrimination due to the societal and psychological background of this block of states. While it was evident in his tour to the west his stress was on human rights issues and the inhumanity of Islamic laws.14 The discourse on Jihad and Islamism widened the divide and established selfdetermination as critical dimension in any settlement of the conflict. The external dynamics of the conflict The position on the Gulf War of 1990 exposed the NSR to hostile reception from international powers, manifested in attempts to topple the regime through its neighbours and the opposition groups. Iraq’s substantial military support for the war effort during the first few months of the NSR takeover had a significant influence on its position. The unwillingness of Arab states, especially in the Gulf, to assist the NSR in the beginning led to reliance on Libya, Iraq and Iran. Optimism about strategic relations with Iran in its early years was intended to boost its war effort parallel with its agenda of Islamic unity (the Umma). The unreliability of Iran as a major supporter altered the regime’s policy direction post-1995. The NSR tried to neutralise regional states in its conflict with the SPLM through the use of their insurgent groups as a destabilising factor. The collapse of Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime in May 1991 denied the SPLA/M a major political and military base. The victory of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in Addis Ababa and Asmara, with

Major foreign policy issues 49 the full support of Sudan, offered a new opportunity to the regime. Meanwhile, in December 1990, with the support of the NSR, Idriss Deby, the Chadian dissident based in Darfur, captured the capital N’Djamena, the Chadian capital. Sudan established constructive relations with Ethiopia, Chad and Eritrea, which declared its independence in 1993. In 1991, Ethiopia closed down all SPLA/M military bases and activities in its territories, and consequently the movement transferred its headquarters to Uganda. However, relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea did not remain on good terms for long since the two countries accused the NSR of meddling in their internal affairs. The US intervention in Somalia in 1993 cautioned the NSR of the possibility of repeating the experience in Southern Sudan.15 The US ambassador suggested to the SPLA and NSR the creation of safe havens for refugees and displaced persons in the conflict zone but failed to gain their approval. Intervention in Southern Sudan on humanitarian grounds was a viable option in the event that the Somali operation was successful and could eventually challenge the NSR’s continuation in power. In a testimony before the US Senate, fears were expressed over the aims and practicality of these sanctuaries: “Will not safe-havens be inextricably political, perceived as western initiatives intended to help a Christian minority in its battle against an Islamic regime?”16 The regime realised the failure of the US operation in Somalia would avert any chances for such undertaking. As a result, it helped and facilitated covert arms supply operations to some Somali groups since the NIF had historical relations with the leadership of different factions such as the Somali Islamic Unity Party (al-Ittihad al-Islami al-Somali) and General Mohammed Farah Aidid. The mobilisation of Egypt’s political pressure against the NSR, orchestrating the UN resolutions along with the United States, was crucial in intimidating the regime. In the meantime, Egypt’s vital interests’ in ensuring the integrity of the Sudanese territories saved the government from grievous implications. Egypt’s disagreement with the US administration over the toughness of the UN resolutions led to lighter sanctions. Extreme measures against the NSR, such as an arms embargo suggested by the US administration, would ultimately swing the balance of power in the civil war towards the SPLA. Such measures would entail grave consequences for Egypt’s interests in Sudan. The episode coincided with an attack by the SPLA assisted by Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda in 1997, which brought the regime sympathy from the Arab world and improved relations with Egypt. The reformed attitude towards Egypt and the outside world provided a renewed platform for diffusing the political crisis. Neighbouring countries to the south had different reasons for their sympathy with the rebels and their wariness of the NSR. Different tactics were implemented to deal with the inevitable support of neighbours for the SPLA. Sudan’s relations with its neighbours reflect an essential feature of political realities in the Horn of Africa, as Woodward articulates: Domestic stability has thus become a regional as well as a domestic concern. No state can feel confident of its own internal security while a neighbour is suffering the traumas of civil war.17

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The NSR exploited this dimension discretely as a policy tool over the years to stabilise or neutralise its relations in the region. The ability to exploit ethnic or political opposition groups is an available option for regional states in order to destabilise fragile governments. Support for such an endeavour involves the threat of reprisals through existing insurgent groups. Meanwhile, backing an insurgency does not rely solely on a “tit for tat” equation but rather on the domestic and wider regional and international political interests of the state. With the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, the United States decided to challenge the regime through its discontented neighbours. In 1996, the US administration announced its support for Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea with US$20 million to defend themselves against the threat posed by Khartoum. At the beginning of 1995, the head of the Eastern Africa Section in the US State Department, David Shin, declared a request for a naval blockade against Sudan was declined by the African countries.18 The use of force by the US administration through African neighbours and opposition groups was designed to exert significant economic and military pressure. In 1997, the military operations of the opposition under the umbrella of the NDA along with the SPLM resulted in the takeover of many towns in the south and the east such, as Kurmuk and Gaisan. The victories of SPLA mainstream under the leadership of John Garang led to the signing of the Khartoum peace agreement “Peace Charter” in 1997, including the SPLA-United, led by Dr Riek Mechar. This was a boost for the regime’s military effort and an enhancement for the NSR image in the international arena.19 The agreement was viewed as weakening the SPLA politically, morally and financially through sowing discord within southern political forces. Advocates of practical policies within the regime called for abandoning Islamist and nationalist slogans to overcome the political and economic crisis. They were able to influence policymaking and the relatively pragmatic policy broke to a degree the deadlock of the conflict. The signing of the DoP of the IGAD initiative with the SPLA mainstream by President Al-Beshir in July 1997 was a major breakthrough. The DoP guaranteed the right of self-determination to the south. In 1997, a presidential delegation was sent to 22 countries in Africa and Asia to explain the military campaign against Sudan, and no visits were undertaken to the United States or Europe.20 This diplomatic effort was intended to rally Arab and Islamic support, strengthen relations with south-eastern Asian countries and break isolation with its neighbours. The US policy to destabilise the regime through its neighbours failed with the outbreak of the regional wars between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998, as well as the Great Lakes region. The NSR backed the existing government of the Zaire/ DRC to exert pressure upon Uganda and isolate the SPLA. Another reason for assisting President Laurent Kabila of Zaire/DRC was to gain political favour with France, which opposed the rebel groups backed by Uganda and Rwanda. The French government was fearful of the erosion of their political leverage in Rwanda and Zaire/DRC in favour of Anglophone influence in the region led by Uganda. In addition, the trigger of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in 1998 offered the

Major foreign policy issues 51 regime another opportunity to transform the configuration of regional alliances. The informal stance of the regime in this war as favouring Ethiopia illustrates its strategic importance in the context of the conflict in the south. The alternative Asian strategy focused on economic investments and military supply was a direct response to the continued conflict in the south and the reluctance of the West to engage economically in such volatile political context. Substantial Chinese investment in the oil sector ensured the availability of a superpower’s political and economic leverage. In 1999, a 1,600 miles pipeline was opened from oil fields in the south to Port Sudan, exporting oil in significant quantities. The Chinese oil investment brought a new dimension to the conflict, with considerable financial resources available to the regime and a future potential incentive for a peaceful solution. Accusations were raised by international NGOs over reports of population displacement by the government with the increasing efforts to eliminate any insurgency in the oil concession areas. The oil investments guaranteed for the NSR the flow of arms for the war effort from a range of sources such as China and Russia. The peace process Various initiatives were presented by foreign mediators for conflict resolution; however, stark differences remained between the government and the SPLA/M. The lack of political clout with both sides made mediation efforts ineffective. Since the arrival of the regime in 1989, several peace initiatives were proposed by President Carter, the American government, Nigeria (Abuja I and Abuja II) and the IGAD.21 These peace processes reflected key disagreements between the two parties and possibilities for conflict resolution. Negotiations had tackled contentious issues related to the divergent core issues related to the SPLA’s advocacy for a united and secular Sudan, in contradiction to the NSR’s Islamist agenda. The IGAD process was influenced by the NSR’s relations with its mediators (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea) since the government accused some IGAD members of military and political support for the SPLA, and therefore considered unqualified to mediate a peaceful solution. The government’s position on the conflict changed over time in reaction to the domestic and external political context. The IGAD process provides an insight into the government’s changing position. In 1994, the NSR rejected the “right to self-determination” perceived as an endorsement of the dismemberment of Sudan. Mohammed Al-Amin Khalifa, the leading government negotiator declared, “If you want to separate the south from the north it will be done through the barrel of gun. We will fight for it to the last man.”22 The principle of self-determination asserts “the inalienable right of the people of South Sudan to freely determine their destiny” by means of “an internationally supervised referendum by the end of the interim period” in which they “shall freely choose from all options including independence.”23 With growing international pressure, the government accepted the principle in its agreement with different Southern Sudanese factions, followed by the signing in June 1997 of the IGAD DoP. The government negotiation team led

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by Al-Khalifa and Ali Al-Haj accepted the south could determine its future status within Sudan through an internationally supervised referendum.24 They were rebuked in a meeting held by the NIF’s leadership in Khartoum for taking such move. They were replaced by Ghazi Salah Din and Nafie Ali Nafie, NIF hardliners who refused in the next round to discuss self-determination and secularism.25 Sympathy towards the SPLA/M among most of the IGAD members and their international partners gave the rebel group the edge in the negotiation process. The accumulation of negative NSR policies towards the conflict through the years damaged its credibility in the international arena. The regime was consistent and determined in the negotiation process with regard to the implementation of Sharia law in the north. The establishment of the IGAD partners’ forum, composed of some Western governments, provided political and financial support for the initiative.26 The forum offered an impetus to the process due to the considerable importance of humanitarian issues in the foreign policies of these states: The emergence of the IGAD Partners’ Forum is also indicative of the international dimension of regionalism, for regionalism does not necessarily imply isolation, so much as a grouping of states with linked security concerns, and their significance for a wider international community beyond the particular region.27 Terrorism Two distinct phases characterised the association of the NSR with terrorism. The contrasting approaches during both phases had substantial impact on the NSR’s international relations. Crossing the line from its ideological programme to pragmatic undertakings stemmed from the inability to pursue radical ventures with its inherent and immediate risks. The first phase began with the trigger of the military coup in June 1989 and ended with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak on 26 June 1995, while the second phase started with this incident and continued until the removal of Al-Turabi in December 1999. The first phase was a triumph for the radical elements within the NSR aiming to assert its revolutionary agenda of supporting extremist Islamic groups and to consolidate the regime’s relations with rogue states. External and domestic threats to the survival of the NSR following President Mubarak assassination attempt led to the rise of pragmatism. Both phases dictated the direction of Sudan’s foreign policy between isolationism and openness with the outside world. Although the dominance of radicalism and pragmatism was an apparent feature in each period, both voices were strongly present among the regime’s elite during those periods. Relations with radical Islamist groups offered the regime unprecedented access to information and intelligence on them. Radical movements trusted the NSR since it was the first Islamic party to take control of a state in the Muslim world after Iran and had public international support for their aspirations. The government’s political, spiritual and financial backing in its initial years led many

Major foreign policy issues 53 fundamentalists to confide in the NSR. The intelligence apparatus acquired considerable knowledge and experience on the operations and command systems of these organisations. The government used its knowledge on these groups in the effort to break its regional and international isolation. In its bid to reconstruct its relations with Egypt after the assassination incident, the government was ready to divulge information on its former ideological allies. Pragmatic priorities dictated the NSR’s approach towards the issue of terrorism. At the international level, the recurrence of terrorist attacks by radical Islamic cells against Western interests, such as the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, created an atmosphere of urgency to deal with the issue. In the beginning, the US government was unwilling to cooperate, but the magnitude of the threat to its national security eventually led its administration in 2000 to start collaboration with the NSR. Cooperation on terrorism proved the NSR’s willingness to renounce the agenda of exporting the revolution. The mutual intelligence efforts supported the endeavour to improve relations with the wider world. Implementation of a vision Al-Turabi’s vision to lead Sunni Islam entailed establishing links to connect with the oppressed and marginalised groups of Islamic Umma as an alternative world order. The establishment of the Popular Islamic and Arabic Conference (PIAC) in 1991 was the first clear sign of a foreign policy direction. PIAC presented itself as an independent international Islamic organisation representing the aspirations of Islamic Umma countering the OIC that represented the official corrupt Islamic governments. Various Arab nationalists and radical Islamic movements participated in PIAC sessions. The presence of substantial numbers of militant Islamic groups in the conference and the material evidence of the NSR’s support alerted regional states and the outside world. Almost all Sudan’s neighbours and other countries in the Arab world accused the NSR of intervention in their internal affairs. The regime backed many Islamic opposition groups, such as Jihad and Jamaat al-Islamiyah of Egypt, Nahada of Tunisia, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) of Eritrea and the Algerian FIS. Financial and logistical support for these organisations was provided by the NIF cells and cadres who penetrated the state organs. Even distant countries with or without visible political or economic links, such as Russia or Philippines, were alerted to the dangers posed by PIAC: Uzbekistan, a secular state under attack by Islamist-Arabs in the Ferghana Valley, was the first of the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia to express concern about Turabi and his PIAC General Assembly and promptly banned the Uzbek Islamic Renaissance Party from attending.28 It was obvious that the conference was a political platform for extreme groups and a “state within the state.” It had wide and unlimited powers to force its course of action in the state institutions.

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Hostility towards Sudan in the international level was unprecedented since independence and attempts to rectify the situation by moderates were rebuffed by the outside world. The failure to improve relations was due to the inability of the NSR moderates to control domestic and foreign policies, along with the determination of radical elements to sustain their holy mission. In the first few years, the domestic environment of Islamist zeal led to a policy of “active Islamist revolutionary involvement” in the international arena. Following the establishment of PIAC, Sudan became the world epicentre of radical Islam, receiving Arab-Afghans and Mujahideen from all corners of the world by the end of the war in Afghanistan in April 1992 with the fall of Kabul. Internal measures were implemented to reflect the government open doors for militant Muslims with the removal of the visa requirement to enter Sudan’s territories. The presence and the activities of Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri, a prominent member of Egyptian Al-Jihad, and Osama bin Laden, who settled in Sudan, made Egypt and Saudi Arabia apprehensive of the NSR’s agenda. Sudanese passports were issued to fundamentalist figures, such as Omer Abdalrahman, the leader of Egypt Jihad and Rashid Al-Ghanoushi of the Tunisian group Al-Nahda. The ELF was allowed to operate from Sudanese territories after Issyas Afwerki established cordial relations with Israel following independence in 1993. Meanwhile, there was increasing concern in Ethiopia over the possibility of destabilisation due to NSR support for the Ethiopian Muslim Oromo movement. In Somalia, the NIF maintained links with Al-Ittihad Al-Islami Al-Somali and other factions, such as Mohammed Farah Aideed. The presence of large Muslim communities in the Horn of Africa triggered an ambitious NSR vision of the potential to establish similar Islamist political experiences. Sudan’s substantial contribution in the fall of Mengistu’s regime in Ethiopia was the momentum for carrying out the NSR vision. Eritrea filed a formal complaint with the UN against the Sudanese government and broke off diplomatic relations in 1994, which eventually led to significant Eritrean help for opposition groups. Relations with Ethiopia were strained, but not publicly since both countries were in need of each other to counter the activities of the rebel groups. The Islamic agenda in Sudan threatened Egypt’s national interest since Egyptian militant factions strove to destabilise its security with the help of the NSR. Egypt’s position as a major ally to the United States in the region, with substantial influence in the Arab world, gave it the capacity to isolate the NIF in the regional and international arena. Egypt reacted by occupying the Halayeb triangle, a Sudanese territory on the borders between the two countries. According to the US State Department, growing evidence was gathered of the NSR’s involvement in supporting militant Islamic groups. The regime threatened US interests in the region and, consequently, it was added to the list of countries supporting international terrorism: Sudan allows the use of its territory as sanctuary for terrorists including the Abu Nidal organisation and members of Hizballah and Palestine Islamic Jihad. We also believe safe houses and other facilities used to support radical

Major foreign policy issues 55 groups are allowed to exist in Sudan with apparent approval of the Sudanese government’s leadership.29 The inclusion of the NSR in the terrorist list had long-term political implications. It became a major stumbling block in the revival of Sudan’s relations with the outside world. The drive to counter terrorism In 1994, the Sudanese government extradited the international terrorist “Carlos the Jackal” to France.30 There were many questions surrounding his presence in Khartoum: whether the regime recognised him in its territories or if he were tricked into coming to Khartoum in order to be used as scapegoat in the future. The only certain fact was the deal with France to arrest him, and the arrest marked a new phase of collaboration between France and the NSR. The extradition offered the government the opportunity to improve its image which had been tainted by its alleged involvement in international terrorism. “The moment Carlos set foot on French soil the Sudanese Minister of Justice and Public Prosecutor Abdel-Azeez Shiddu asked the United States to drop its country from the terrorism list.”31 The NSR leadership used the arrest of a known terrorist who was a non-Islamist to refute terrorism allegations while breaking its diplomatic isolation by improving its relations with an international power. France gained many benefits from the NSR’s links with Islamic groups in Algeria; using Al-Turabi as a facilitator in the mediation efforts in the search for a breakthrough in the Algerian political crisis. France also urged the Sudanese to stop its Islamic infiltration attempts in the French sphere of influence in Africa, in particular Algeria, Chad, CAR, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria and Somalia.32 Another valuable factor was the help Sudan could offer to deter President Museveni ambitions, who provided substantial support to the Rwandan Patriotic Front in fighting the French protégé Juvenal Habyarimana, the former president of Rwanda. President Museveni was also seen by France as representing the Anglophone threat to Francophone influence in the Great Lakes region. As a result, France provided military, economic and political assistance to the regime. The Sudanese troops in the south were allowed to attack the SPLA/M by passing through the CAR and Zaire/DRC, two countries with significant French influence.33 The French intelligence agency Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE) provided the Sudanese army with satellite pictures. “The DGSE thought Sudan could not interpret the satellite pictures. This turned out to be a miscalculation. The Iraqi security service kindly helped in deciphering the images and making them operational.”34 The political, economic and military consequences of this assassination attempt were beyond the NSR’s ability to deal with. The incident was described by a

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high-ranking NIF and regime official as “the turning point in the history of the NSR.”35 The results of the attack led to a dramatic change in relations with regional and international states, and revived the SPLA after a series of defeats on the military front. At the domestic level, the incident had “shaken the NSR’s confidence in itself; hence it affected the internal coherency of the movement and the credibility of the NSR programme.”36 The NSR changed and modified its priorities in response to threats posed by the episode. The remedies of the economic situation, recovering relations with Egypt and Ethiopia, and dealing with the UNSC resolutions, were the focus of the government policies. The government made huge efforts to adjust its past radical policies with moderate elements taking control over policy formulation. Many radical factions were expelled, including the deportation in May 1996 of Osama Bin Laden and 300 of his associates. His influence led to the notorious attacks “on the Saudi national guard headquarters in Riyadh in November 1995, which killed five American soldiers, and on the United States military barracks in Khubar in June 1996, which killed 19 American soldiers.”37 It became obvious that Bin Laden’s presence in Sudan had become a heavy burden upon the NSR with its new pragmatic policy aimed at reforming its foreign policy. The survival of the NSR depended on demonstrating and delivering effective steps to counter the threat of terrorism. Many reports alleged the Sudanese government offered the US administration through intelligence channels the opportunity to place Bin Laden in US or Saudi Arabian custody. “The Clinton administration was riven by differences on whether to engage Sudan’s government or isolate it which influenced judgement about the sincerity of the offer.”38 The scenario which suggests that the Sudanese government was willing to hand over such a high-profile figure in the Muslim world is unlikely for many reasons. There was strong sympathy for Bin Laden among influential factions within the regime; hence, asking him to leave was a compromise acceptable to both the moderates and radicals within the regime. The surrender of Bin Laden would have been viewed as a disrepute to the NSR’s revolutionary claims among various political Islam groups in the Muslim world. Another factor was Bin Laden’s substantial financial investments in Sudan, which helped the NSR in a time of dire economic situation. The rejection of the offer, even if it was genuine, by the Americans and the Saudis was regarded as a blessing by the regime. Alfatih Erwa, a Sudanese general and then minister of state for defence, said in an interview, “In the end they said, ‘Just ask him to leave the country. Just don’t let him go to Somalia.’ We said he will go to Afghanistan, and they said, ‘let him go.’”39 Many observers believe Bin Laden’s continued presence in Sudan would have been far better in the effort to contain terrorism than letting him leave for Afghanistan: We gave “US officials” a piece of advice that they never followed. We told them: Don’t send him out of Sudan because you will lose control over him . . . Now the US has ended up with war with an invisible enemy.40

Major foreign policy issues 57 Intelligence cooperation was used as a tool in the new foreign policy strategy. The government was fully prepared to open its files on terrorism, a sign of the abandonment of the former revolutionary agenda. Tim Carney, the last US ambassador to Sudan whose posting ended in 1997, said, The fact is, they were opening the doors, and we weren’t taking them up on it. The US failed to reciprocate Sudan’s willingness to engage us on serious questions of terrorism. We can speculate that this failure had serious implications— at the least for what happened at the US Embassies (Kenya and Tanzania) in 1998.41 The depth and wealth of the regime’s intelligence on radical groups proved to be effective and crucial in challenging terrorism at a later stage. In 1998, two suspects in the bombings in East Africa flew to Khartoum following the attack and were arrested by the Sudanese government and offered for extradition to the United States for interrogation: The material gathered between 1991 and 1996 led the Mukhabarat to believe that the two men were members of al-Qaeda . . . the Mukhabarat cabled the FBI in Washington offering to extradite them. Without consulting the FBI, the US Departments of state and defence replied by bombing the al-Shifa factory in Khartoum . . . the Mukhabarat sent the suspects Abbas and Suliman to Pakistan, where they were promptly lost to view.42 The disagreement within the US administration over how to deal with the NSR led to continuous refusal of Sudanese approaches to cooperate on the issue of terrorism. It was clear that the lack of trust and the accumulation of hostile discourse on the part of the NSR since 1989 impeded the formulation of unified policy within the US administration. According to the Sudanese head of intelligence, offers were extended by the president and through informal channels to form “a mission tasked to investigate allegations that the government of Sudan trains or shelters terrorists, with freedom of movement and contact and unrestricted choice of suspected terrorist sites.”43 The attempts to cooperate helped the NSR to improve relations with the United States in the long run as an increasing number of terrorist attacks were linked to fundamentalist Islamic groups. The wind of change in Sudan’s foreign policy was directly linked to the shift in the frame of mind of the regime’s inner clique. Survival became the key for the policymakers and came with the cost of abandoning the earlier revolutionary agenda. Dealing with the terrorism issue became one of the factors in deepening the conflict within the NIF ruling elite that ended with the movement’s fracture in 1999. Many members within the regime felt the government went too far in its attempts to please the US administration, which contradicted the stance on the issues of Islamic Umma. The restriction on PIAC influence following the assassination attempt was aimed at cracking down on the most radical elements in the NIF.

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Conclusion There were three key themes in the foreign policy of the NSR that exposed the limitations and impediments of the endeavour to establish their political agenda. Two of these themes are the continuity of the domestic political problems and their ramifications in the external sphere. The themes of democracy and human rights and the civil war rose to a different level when the NIF took control of the state. Aggressive ideological policies in the domestic arena exacerbated the situation on both fronts and brought strong condemnation of the regime’s practices in the international arena. The regime’s support for terrorist groups resulted in the first international condemnation of Sudan since independence, with various resolutions in the UN Security Council and the OAU. The NSR’s sponsorship of terrorist groups stemmed from its ideology of pan-Islamism and the belief that Sudan should take a prominent role in promoting Islamic revivalism. These issues led to the isolation of Sudan at the regional and international levels, and crippled the state’s ability to further its national interests. The assassination attempt on President Mubarak was a landmark in transforming the domestic and external behaviour of the NSR. The period after the assassination attempt on President Mubarak witnessed an endeavour to tackle and address these issues, which were crucial for the regime’s survival. Limited reform was introduced in the political system, acceptance of certain terms that could facilitate a solution to the civil war and cooperation on terrorism. This reversal of policy domestically and externally, along with a change in the regional political environment to the regime’s advantage, revived the regime’s foreign relations. In the meantime, internal conflict started within the movement over its future direction, which led to the NIF fragmentation in 1999.

Notes 1 A Lecture by the US Ambassador in Sudan on the Sudanese-American Relations. Strategic Studies Centre, 7 June 1993, Khartoum. 2 The major difference between the 1235 public and the 1503 confidential procedures is that the discussion and decision taken in the latter regarding country situation is confidential. While 1235 public procedure offers two types of activities to tackle gross violations in public. It allows an annual public debate, which gives to different governments and NGOs the chance to bring attention to a particular human rights situation that deserves the commission’s consideration. Another activity is the commission study and investigation of a particular situation (or a particular case) through the use of the suitable technique (special rapporteur or representative, working group, envoy). 3 Amnesty Yearly International Reports: 1991 to 2002. 4 Hassan Ali Hassan (Feb. 2002), Reconciliation of Islamic Law with Constitutionalism: The Protection of Human Rights in Sudan’s New Constitution. Khartoum: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 ‘Plea to NIF’, a letter from Abel Alier, a former vice-president under Nimeiri, to General Omer Al-Beshir and Dr Hassan Al-Turabi, 1 Feb. 1997, Khartoum. 6 Korwa G A, Nyuot Yoh J G, and Maloka E (2005), The Internal and External Contexts of Oil Politics in Sudan: The Role of Actors, in The Sudan’s Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects. South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Major foreign policy issues 59 7 The White House, Executive Order, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan, 4 Nov. 1997, Khartoum. 8 RCC’s first Proclamation, 30 June 1989. 9 Omer Mohammed Alamin (1999), The Human Rights Situation Under the Constitutional Development in Sudan. Khartoum: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 Al-Tayeb Zein Al-Abdeen (2004), Al-Huryaat wa Syaagat Al-Dustoor, in Maqalaat fi Al-Syassah Al-Sudanyah. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Publications. 11 Burr J M, and Collins R O, eds. (1995), Requiem for the Sudan: War Drought and Disaster Relief on the Nile. Boulder: Westview Press. 12 Ibid. 13 SPLA United Manifesto, Sudan Update, 24 Sept. 1991. 14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (23 Oct. 1989), Minutes of the Political Committee Meeting, Khartoum. 15 The US “Operation Restore Hope” led to the killing of 18 US military servicemen and the withdrawal of its troops from Somalia. 16 The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (4 May 1993), Crisis in Sudan, Testimony of Nelson Kasfir Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subcommittee on Africa. 17 Woodward P (2000), Regional Security in North East Africa,”. Occasional Paper, University of Reading. 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), Chronology of the US-Sudanese Relations From Independence to September 1998. Paper submitted in the US-Sudanese Relations Conference, 7–8 Jan. 2003, The Centre for African and Middle Eastern Studies. Khartoum: Holliday Villa. 19 The SPLA United is a splinter group from the SPLA mainstream under the leadership of Garang. 20 The Sudanese Strategic Report (1997), Centre for Strategic Studies, p. 16. The countries visited by the delegation included Kenya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Chad, Ghana, Nigeria, Jordan, UAE, Sultanate of Oman, South Africa, Yemen, Iraq, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 21 President Carter’s initiative was held in Nairobi between 28 November–5 December 1989. The American administration initiative was presented by Herman Cohen assistant secretary of the state for African affairs in September 1990, the Nigerian initiative held two rounds of negotiations in Abuja between 26 May–4 June 1992 and the second round between 1–17 May 1993. The IGAD process started its first round on 17–23 March 1994 and continued to 1999. 22 Sudan Democratic Gazette, 51 Aug. 1994, p. 2. 23 Ibid. 24 Mohammed Al-Ameen Khalifa was RCC member and committed NIF cadre. Ali AlHaj is a prominent NIF member. 25 This was stated by a government official during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 16 Aug. 2003. 26 The IGAD partners were composed initially of the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, UK, Canada, USA and later joined by France, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Austria and Germany. 27 Woodward, Regional Security, op. cit. 28 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan, op. cit., p. 100. 29 The American Centre, Khartoum (18 Aug. 1993), Sudan Added to the List of Nations Supporting International Terrorism. News Release. 30 Illich Ramirez Sanchez, known as “Carlos the Jackal,” a Venezuelan-born fugitive, masterminded various high-profile terrorist attacks around the world in a two-decade span and claimed some 85 victims. 31 Pax Christi (1994), The French Connection: Report on the Political, Economic, and Military Collaboration Between Khartoum and Paris. Netherlands.

60 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

Radical agenda Africa Confidential, 4 Feb. 1994. Pax Christi, The French Connection, op. cit. Ibid., p. 7. Interview with Dr Ghazi Salah Deen, 24 Nov. 2004, Khartoum. Ibid. Lesch A M (May 2002), Osama Bin Laden “Business” in Sudan. Current History. Gellman B (3 Oct. 2001), Sudan Offered Up Bin Laden in 1996. The Washington Post. Ibid. Interview with Dr Qutbi Al-Mahadi, 3 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. Rose D (Jan. 2002), The Osama Files. Vanity Fair (New York), No. 497, pp. 50–56. Ibid. Ibid.

Part 2

Foreign policymaking

4

Decision making in the initial years (1989–1999)

Introduction Dr Hassan Al-Turabi, the ideologue of the Sudanese Islamic movement, the NIF, orchestrated the military coup of the NSR in 30 June 1989. Pan-Islamism was the core principle of the new regime interactions at the international level, and revolutionary fervour embodied its foreign policy. The regime’s support for international and regional Islamic radical groups, statements and slogans on issues related to foreign affairs reflected their radicalism. The NIF cadres who took control of the civil and military apparatus domestically enabled the control of policy direction. They created informal bodies alongside the state’s formal institutions in the initial stage; hence, the decision making process was conducted through their protégés in official posts or behind the scenes led by Al-Turabi. The absence of a clear definition of responsibilities between the state institutions and the NIF shadowy bodies created a challenging environment in the management of external relations. The presence of parallel structures led to constant contradictions and disagreement in policy implementation. Informal institutions had the upper hand over the formal since they were composed of the core historical and spiritual leadership of the NIF. During the first phase of NSR rule, Al-Turabi had an overall control over decision making without challenge. The dual leadership of Al-Turabi and President Al-Beshir and divergence over decision making generated subtle but powerful tension and confusion within the regime. Power centres within the NSR constrained the capacity to formulate cohesive policy in the international arena. The political dynamics in the external and internal domains produced power centres that perceived foreign policy through different lenses. Inconsistent signals became the norm in dealing with the outside world. Mustafa Ismail, the former foreign minister, indicated conflict over who would take important decisions concealed a crisis; from simple matters such as the appointment of ministers and governors; to strategic concerns, as well as political issues or positions whether internal or towards regional and international problems or the way to deal with a specific country.1 The gloomy consequences of President Mubarak assassination attempt in June 1995 obliged the NSR to change gear swiftly, curbing the government’s disorderly

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attitude in the international sphere. Foreign policy was critical issue in the battle between Al-Turabi and Al-Beshir since the external political context created a sense of urgency for broad foreign policy modifications.2 The control of the army and the state executive branch by Al-Beshir, along with Vice-President Ali Uthman, ensured the success of removing Al-Turabi in 1999. The implications of this period are still unfolding and pose pertinent questions on how this experience shaped present politics of Sudan.

Formal institutions A council of 15 military officers was appointed, headed by Brigadier Omer alBeshir following the success of the military coup in June 1989. The make-up of the RCC was intended to represent various Sudanese regions and ethnic groups, and to reflect different services within the armed forces. Five RCC members were committed NIF cadres and were involved in the NIF shadow council that controlled the state policies.3 The RCC members did not participate in the actual coup and were appointed to the council without knowing each other. Through this set up, Dr Al-Turabi ensured the control of the policy process within the RCC. Brigadier Uthman Ahmed Hassan was appointed as the head of the political committee which oversaw foreign policymaking. The committee had periodic meetings with representatives of the foreign ministry, security apparatus and military intelligence and were primarily to formulate, coordinate and implement policy.4 Although the head of the political committee was an NIF cadre, he strongly believed that control of policy should always be within the RCC, that is the military. His discontent with the NIF’s interference in policymaking manifested in the submission of three resignations over different political events. He asserted, “There was continuous internal squabble over decision making, but the winner was always the other side—referring to the NIF.”5 RCC member Faisal Madani Mukhtar reiterated, “From the beginning we felt that the RCC was a marginalised body, decisions were taken in other places.”6 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the first major event for the regime’s foreign policy. Uthman Ahmed Hassan attempted to control internal political directions, especially the media during this critical foreign event. He pointed out that orders were given to the information minister and the director of radio and TV not to meddle in this sensitive international crisis. Strict instructions were given that no statement on radio or TV regarding the ongoing Gulf conflict should be released without consultation with the head of the political committee. His primary objective was to avoid any damage in Sudan’s relations with the Gulf States.7 It was obvious that the internal management of this major international issue was not possible with the NIF elite’s ideological drive. Their dominance over all threads of policy made it hard to handle the crisis, and contrary to the official instructions, the media went into a hostile campaign. They attacked the existence of imperialist forces in the Gulf, while supporting Iraq’s position on the basis that it’s a foreign intervention. Mohammed Khojali Salheen, the director of radio and TV at the time, indicated the presence of individuals within his department who did things without his knowledge.8

Decision making in the initial years 65 In December 1990, on the eve of the Gulf War, Brigadier Uthman Hassan, head of the political committee submitted his second resignation (he had been persuaded to stay following the first one). In his resignation letter, he spoke of the primacy of informal bodies led by Al-Turabi, which override state officials in policymaking. His failure to command control in his realm led him to leave his position. RCC member Faisal Madani Mukhtar also submitted his resignation for similar reasons connected to the RCC’s weak role in policy.9 The regime’s reaction to international affairs reflects the low level of coordination process on vital policy matters between various state institutions. President Al-Beshir’s statement in August 1991 that applauds the military coup against President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, which failed later, reveals the lack of consultation with the foreign ministry. Traditionally, the ministry is cautious in its responses in international events of such magnitude. President Al-Beshir stated, “The peoples of the third world, including Sudan, are looking with an eye of satisfaction at what happened in the Soviet Union since it restores its credibility and achieve international balance and justice.”10 His statement is an expression of the regime’s elite revolutionary posture and a desperation for balance in the international system. It was a huge setback and an embarrassment for the NSR since President Gorbachev was restored as president. Sudan, Iraq and Libya were the only countries worldwide that welcomed the failed coup d’état. The announcement of Al-Turabi in February 1992—more than a year before the measure—that the RCC was going to be dissolved demonstrated his political powerful. President Al-Beshir became the other pillar in the regime power formula as the representative of the military establishment following the RCC disbandment in October 1993. His military background, along with his participation in the executive branch, allowed him to play a vital role in decision making. His status as the underdog in the NSR structure, and the international disenchantment over Al-Turabi gave him comparative advantage in the internal political rift. Internally and internationally, President Al-Beshir was viewed as just a disciple of Al-Turabi. This view was aired and reflected in his numerous meetings with leaders of regional states who used any opportunity to criticise Al-Turabi’s in his presence or Deputy President Al-Zubair Mohammed Salih’s. There was regional and international conviction that President Al-Beshir was the only figure who was able to turn the tables on Al-Turabi. International support for President Al-Beshir was considered a “safe bet” in any future political clash to strip Al-Turabi of his power. Following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, President Al-Beshir moved slowly to control the policy process. Relations with Egypt was one of the contentious matters with two competing policy tracks: one advocated a hostile posture while the other pushed to improve relations. Mustafa Uthman, the foreign minister, mentioned an incident related to the internal dispute after consultation with the president, it was agreed to summon the Sudanese ambassador Ahmed Abdul Alhalim from Cairo following Egyptian government stance and hostile statements in the 1990s. The National Congress Party (NCP) apparatus reacting to the event convened and decided to withdraw the

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Foreign policymaking ambassador before even informing him of this decision. I heard the NCP decision on TV as I was absent, which were reported to the state minister in the Foreign Ministry. State Minister Gabriel Rorij indicated to the NCP machinery he is obliged to inform the president of their decision for his approval. However, he was notified that the party was the ultimate decision maker and its decisions were for implementation not consultation. Despite the response, the State Minister informed the president of this development, and instructed Rorij not to execute the party decision, and cancelled the summoning of the Sudanese ambassador from Cairo.11

There were many similar incidents portrayed the disarray in decision making and the persistent struggle between two convictions in dealing with the outside world. Ali Sahlul, a career diplomat and non-NIF cadre, was the first foreign minister appointed by the regime after the takeover. The choice of a technocrat to head the ministry intended to project an image of a new government that has no political affiliation. The ministry flushed out its career diplomats believed to have divergent political views or personal behaviour to the NIF standards. In the second week of August 1989, 14 Ambassadors were expelled suddenly, and 26 Ambassadors and diplomats at different levels were purged in the three following months. Dismissal from the ministry continued in 1990/91 until the total number reached 100 personnel representing 40% of the effective foreign service.12 The removal of many career diplomats with long experience in the service has been highly disruptive and damaging to the work of the ministry. Policy formulation and implementation became increasingly incoherent when the new NIF inexperienced recruits took over the foreign service. The majority of the newly appointed personnel did not have the qualities required to serve as diplomats (minimum requirement of language knowledge or experience in foreign affairs), and lacked understanding of the forces at work of Sudan’s international relations. The new diplomats perceived their prime duty as to deliver the movement objectives rather than the state. Ambassador Al-Amin Abdelatif recalls that NIF diplomats abroad used to spy on embassy staff and report their personal conduct and loyalty to the NIF political apparatus in Khartoum. Sudanese foreign service under the NSR lost its excellent reputation with the relinquishment of its past high standard in the selection process of diplomats. The third secretary, as the lower level in the Sudanese foreign service, usually takes a quarter of a century to reach the position of an ambassador. This is a career development through long years of diplomatic postings in different parts of the world, along with advanced theoretical and practical training; however, this practice in the NSR was no longer the rule. The NSR hugely undermined the diplomatic corps with its envisioned ideological priorities and posture in the external sphere. In 1990, several diplomats, including ambassadors to Sweden, Yemen and

Decision making in the initial years 67 Morocco, joined the opposition or sought political asylum in protest at the NSR’s domestic and external practices.13 In the wake of the Gulf War, the remaining old guard in the diplomatic service viewed Sudan’s position from the crisis as harmful to the state interests. Ambassador Al-Amin Abdelatif, the head of the political affairs section in the ministry presented a long statement criticising the government Gulf policy to Brigadier Osman Ahmed Hassan, the head of RCC political committee. Foreign Minister Sahlul rejected the statement because it heavily attacked the policy; however, the language of the statement reflected the pragmatic face of the Sudanese diplomacy. The ambassador stated, The position of Sudan provoked internal and external questions; the main one was: where is the interest of Sudan in its current position [. . .] the government mixed up three issues together in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and did not separate between them. These issues were legitimacy, sovereignty—that is the freedom of state to choose its protection method and how to defend itself—and the foreign presence. The government muddled these issues; therefore, lost its role as an Arab Muslim party qualified to seek an Arab Muslim solution.14 The statement also reflect the disagreement over policy between career diplomats and the NIF cadres. During the crisis, the attitude of certain government departments was an insult to the historical and the long-standing contribution of Kuwait to the Sudanese economy. The Kuwaiti ambassador to Sudan, in his book Kunta Safeeran Bi Al-Sudan—I Was an Ambassador in Sudan—gave an account of the antagonistic attitudes towards his country in many occasions during this period.15 “Kazemia Province” the new name given to Kuwait by the Iraqi government following the invasion, was used by Sudan Airways in its correspondences with its agencies. Assets of the Sudanese-Kuwaiti construction and building company were confiscated by the government. The dominance of ideology over government’s mechanism led to the absence of pragmatic policy route beneficial to Sudan’s long-term interests. The regime’s decision makers disengaged the ministry as the institution with the requisite expertise to express the government’s point of view to the outside world. It was considered a secondary source in the formulation of policy and lacked an overview of Sudan’s vital interests. “There was a feeling all through that the control of decision making was outside the ministry.”16 Decisions were taken without wider consultation and with no consideration for other strategy options suggested by technocrats. Technocrats were regarded as indecisive and lack a broader outlook regarding Sudan’s exceptional role in the Islamic world. In January 1993, Dr Hussein Abusalih was appointed foreign minister in a government reshuffle that aimed at improving relations with Egypt.17 Dr Abusalih’s effort to advance relations with the outside world throughout his tenure as a minister has been derailed by the confrontational tactic used by the NIF radicals inspired by Dr Al-Turabi. During his two-year tenure as a minister, Abusalih visited Egypt

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seven times to revitalise its deteriorated relations with the NSR, but the minister was contradicted by his own staff in the ministry who were radical NIF preferring a hostile track. Dr Abusalih regarded Sudan’s relations with Egypt as crucial to its wider interests, but NIF elements perceive the Egyptian government as a traditional enemy to the Islamists. In September 1994, following a meeting with Amro Mousa, Egypt’s foreign minister, Abusalih stated the importance of opening dialogue between the two countries to normalise relations. However, “a daily newspaper published a statement by a senior official in the foreign ministry indicating the dialogue between Egypt and Sudan was useless since the Egyptian government continued its aggression on Sudanese territories, as well as hosting opposition groups.”18 Abusalih noted, While we started contacts with Saudi Arabia to rebuild the damage occurred as a result of the Gulf war, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs sent us 17 pieces from a newspaper called “al-Maseera” that reviled the Saudi government. It was obvious there was no control on the media. The confusion in policy-making left the ministry in the vulnerable position of being unable to maintain the consistency and continuity of its preferred strategy.19 Also, in October 1994, following the border tension between Iraq and Kuwait, the ministry issued a statement assuring Sudan’s ardent support for Kuwait’s security and safety, and reject the Iraqi threats. This statement was ignored by the media, while the official Alingaz Alwatani newspaper stated, “The statement of the foreign ministry does not express Sudan’s genuine position; hence no one was enthusiastic to take it up or adopt it.”20 Dr Abusalih pointed out to the clashes between PIAC (Popular Islamic and Arab Conference) and the foreign ministry as a result of difference in policy. Ahmed Sulieman, a former politician appointed ambassador to the United States stated, “I used to send two reports regarding our US policy and its progress and development, an official one to the ministry and another one in a form of a letter to Dr Al-Turabi.”21 The ambassador was very close to Al-Turabi, and he realised the key to influencing Sudan’s policy towards the United States was to use Al-Turabi’s informal channel rather than the formal institution. In his attempts to reconstruct relations with the United States, Abusalih met Donald Petterson, the US ambassador to Sudan who delivered a letter from his administration concerning cooperation on terrorism between the two countries. The radio released a statement the next day that revealed and heavily criticised the content of the letter from the US administration. This incident did great damage to relations between the two countries since the US government assumed that the minister was the source of the leak and hence involved in the radio verbal attack. Dr Abusalih stated, There was a confidential comprehensive report sent daily from the ministry to the president regarding external relations developments; it seems this report goes not only to the president goes but to other actors who were not supposed to receive it.22

Decision making in the initial years 69 The hardliners displeasure over Abusalih’s endeavour for rapprochement with Egypt and his challenge to the radical policy line of the NIF compelled them to press for changing him. The first two ministers under the regime were non-NIF cadres, and inevitably their influence was insignificant within the policy process. In February 1995, Ali Uthman Taha, the NIF deputy secretary general, was appointed as the foreign minister. The ascent of Ali Uthman allowed the ministry to restore its weight in decision making. The new minister was an influential cadre in the NIF inner clique; hence, power enabled him to control and curb excesses of radicals in shadowy bodies and various state departments. Since his appointment as a minister of social planning, Ali Uthman had been assuming the responsibilities of the prime minister, even in the presence of President Al-Beshir or his deputy Al-Zubair Salih, where he chaired the meetings in his party position and not the ministerial one. The second man in the movement had the final word in any meeting that Al-Turabi did not attend; therefore, no minister or RCC member objected to his leadership and decision making inside the Council of Ministers.23 Nevertheless, policymaking within the regime lacked cohesion and coordination, and was characterised by fragmented outlook to the interests of Sudan. According to Al-Turabi, his deputy in the NIF and foreign minister, Ali Uthman, and other elements in the intelligence apparatus planned the assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995 without his knowledge or the president’s.24 The decision to mastermind this serious act without consultation with the inner clique of the regime demonstrate the presence of various power centres within the NSR, yet Al-Turabi continued to take the centre stage. The assassination attempt led to extensive purges, demotions or transfers within security, and initiated irreparable damage to the NIF. This event had a significant impact in the unity of the NIF elite that eventually divided the regime into two adversarial camps: Al-Turabi and Al-Beshir. In February 1998, Mustafa Ismail became foreign minister following the appointment of Taha as a vice-president. The new minister was a long-time member of the Islamic movement and state minister in the foreign ministry at the time and headed the International Popular Friendship Council (IPFC) in the initial period of the regime. His assignment with the IPFC, an important arm of the regime’s foreign policy, acquainted him with all files connected to external relations. His appointment came during a time of considerable political, economic and diplomatic transformation in the NSR compared to its previous period. The context in the aftermath of the President Mubarak assassination attempt compelled the regime to open up and set the tone for a new foreign policy direction changing its past practices.

Informal institutions The Shura Council of the NIF authorised Hassan Al-Turabi before the coup in June 1989 to act exclusively on behalf of the council in all decisions related to the movement.25 It is the vision of Al-Turabi that inspired and thrust the NIF movement to power. The NIF formed a shadowy council after the coup, presided by

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Al-Turabi and composed of the most important civilian or military cadres in the movement to oversee the implementation of the movement’s strategy in the state. “The assembly of forty” was divided into several units that were responsible for various policy areas such as economics, security, foreign policy, etc.26 Foreign policy was under the direct supervision of Al-Turabi, Ali Uthamn, Mahdi Ibrahim and Ali Abdalrahman.27 Dr Al-Turabi held regular sessions with experienced diplomats in the foreign service for consultations and discussions. Sudan’s position in the Gulf War was the first international crisis encountered by the NSR, which exposed Al-Turabi’s dogmatic outlook and decisive authority in policymaking. The NIF leadership regarded the affair as a test of the regime’s commitment to its revolutionary and ideological ideals. Dr Al-Tayeb Zein Al-Abdeen, an academic and prominent Islamist, pointed out that on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an NIF prominent cadre, Mahdi Ibrahim, invited the regime inner clique for a meeting to discuss the crisis.28 The gathering was held shortly after the invasion and attended by individuals from outside and inside the government such as RCC members Mohammed Al-Amin Khalifa, Uthman Ahmed Hassan, Al-Zubair Mohammed Salih and a number of ministers in addition to Al-Turabi. During this meeting, the NIF deputy secretary general Ali Uthman, NIF prominent member Uthman Khalid Mudawi and Islamist academic Al-Tayeb Zein Al-Abdeen provided different presentations that assesses the implications of the invasion. In the first presentation, Ali Uthman, who had visited Iraq secretly a few days after the invasion, argued that the war would not take place, and there would be no international intervention. He maintained that the Iraqi government was very calm about the crisis and might be carrying out a calculated plan, or that President Saddam might have deterrent weapons. The second presentation was Uthman Mudawi giving an evaluation of the Western countries’ position. He pointed to his recent return from a visit to London and argued that the West would not tolerate the occupation of Kuwait, and he sensed the determination to remove Iraq even by force; therefore, Iraq should reconsider its actions. In the last presentation, Zein Al-Abdeen spoke of the role that Sudan could play in the crisis as an intermediary between Iraq and Kuwait. He referred to the success of Sudan as a go-between in similar crises, such as between King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and President Nassir of Egypt in 1967. The basis for mediation would be the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the return of the al-Sabah ruling family to Kuwait.29 Most of the people present in the meeting were against the government backing Iraq; however, they were not allowed voting to settle the policy stance towards the crisis. Dr Al-Turabi loomed large in the meeting and stated that the origin in Islam was the unity of Islamic Umma and that weak entities did not have the constituents of a state.30 He provided his rationalisation for the approval and the support for any undertaking intended to unite the Islamic world, even if it comes about by force; hence, Sudan should support the invasion. Mahdi Ibrahim, the chair of the meeting, backed the NIF secretary general’s justifications and ended the meeting without giving attendees the opportunity to comment on Al-Turabi’s viewpoint. Dr Al-Turabi’s views prevailed all the way, particularly in that early

Decision making in the initial years 71 stage of the military takeover. Although President Al-Beshir presented a moderate position in his speech to the Arab summit, the view of Al-Turabi was taken as the government policy.31 Dr Al-Turabi regarded relations with the United States as crucial in building constructive links with Egypt and the neighbouring countries. His trip to the United States and Europe in 1992 to explain the regime’s position in the international arena was a failure due to entrenched American suspicions of his radical Islamic ideology. During this trip, he spoke the language of moderation in the presence of foreign listeners while addressing domestic audiences with inconsistent radical rhetoric. Dr Al-Turabi’s contradicting public statements in the internal and external sphere perplexed policymakers in Europe, the United States and neighbouring countries and made them distrustful of the regime’s real intentions. Statements by Al-Turabi on foreign policy characterised by Islamist ideology stirred other influential NIF cadres to be more militant in their speeches and propaganda than their mentor. The extreme approach towards foreign relations enhances the standing of the NIF cadre and bring him closer to the inner circle of the regime. In February 1994, Ibrahim Al-Sanousi, a prominent NIF cadre, advocated in a public rally holding foreign ambassadors “hostages” in the interests of the Islamists [. . .] The speech precipitated a crisis within the government, which was resolved after the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Ghazi Salah al-Din intervened to reassure the diplomatic community it was not in danger.32 Dr Abusalih, the former foreign minister, described the regime’s attitude and rhetoric as “schizophrenic discourse.” It was not possible to restrain the NIF cadres at the domestic level since they were tailing their leadership in condemning infidels and their followers in the region. In July 1994, Al-Turabi, brokered a deal with France to extradite “Carlos the Jackal,” the international terrorist.33 There were many questions surrounding his presence in Khartoum: Did the regime recognise him in its territories, or was he tricked by Al-Turabi into coming to Khartoum in order to be used as scapegoat in the future? The only certain fact was the deal with France to arrest him, and the incident marked a new phase of collaboration between France and the NSR. The extradition offered the NSR the opportunity to improve its image tainted by its alleged terrorism involvement. “The moment Carlos set foot on French soil the Sudanese Minister of Justice and Public Prosecutor Abdel-Azeez Shiddu asked the US to drop its country from the terrorism list.”34 Dr Al-Turabi and the NSR used the arrest of a known terrorist—a non-Islamist—to refute terrorism allegations, while breaking its diplomatic isolation by improving its relations with an international power. In the meantime, France gained many benefits from the NSR’s links with Islamic groups in Algeria; using Al-Turabi as a facilitator in the mediation efforts in search of a breakthrough in the Algerian political crisis. France urged the NSR “to stop its Islamic infiltration attempts in the French sphere of influence in Africa, in particular Algeria, Chad, CAR, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria and

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Somalia”35 Another valuable factor was the help Sudan could offer at the time to deter President Museveni’s ambitions, who provided substantial support to the Rwandan Patriotic Front in fighting the French protégé Juvenal Habyarimana, the former president of Rwanda.36 The French intelligence agency Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE) provided the Sudanese army with satellite pictures to assist in the conflict with the southern rebel movement SPLA. “The DGSE thought Sudan could not interpret the satellite pictures. This turned out to be a miscalculation. The Iraqi security service kindly helped in deciphering the images and making them operational.”37 As part of Carlos brokered deal, Al-Turabi sought also the assistance of France to improve the NSR relations with international financial institutions.38 Dr Al-Turabi’s deal with France proved to be damaging as well as useful for the regime since it posed many questions regarding Carlos presence in Sudan and with it the validation of claims that the NSR is supporting international terrorism. Bin Laden was a different case from Carlos the Jackal since Bin Laden was considered by the regime as an important Islamist figure, who had fought in Afghanistan and shared his views on Islamic Umma. His status ensured his safe departure from Khartoum to Afghanistan; however, before his expulsion from Sudan, Al-Turabi tried to approach the Saudi royal family in order to grant him a Saudi pardon.39 Bin Laden was advised to write a personal letter to Crown Prince Abdullah expressing his good wishes and wishing him safe return home. Dr AlTurabi utilised informal channels to approach the prince through Sheraf al-Din Banaga, a state minister for architectural planning in Khartoum state, who worked in Saudi Arabia for many years. However, the intended plan for an unofficial talk with the crown prince ended in a formal encounter with Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister. Al-Faisal expressed his disappointment over the Sudanese authorities’ sheltering of Bin Laden and indicated that improving Saudi-Sudanese relations depended on measures to address this matter. The unexpected and confusing setting led the Sudanese minister to express the regime’s readiness to hand over Bin Laden to the Saudi authorities.40 An exit strategy needed to solve Bin Laden’s presence in Sudan acceptable for him and the NSR. During his stay, Bin Laden provided considerable financial support to the regime during a depressing economic situation. Dr Al-Turabi commented on the case of Bin Laden and its implications for Sudan’s relations with the outside world: I was subjected to international demands for the extradition of Bin Laden. I used to tell those seeking his extradition that I was more sensitive than they to the interests of Saudi Arabia and keen on good relations between Saudi Arabia and Sudan [. . .] At a later stage, the government made some special contacts with Saudi Arabia and the US concerning Osama bin Laden. However, when we realised that all parties were not interested in taking Bin Laden in whatever capacity—as a citizen or refugee or suspect—we put together a government plan allowing him, with due apologies, to leave Sudan.41

Decision making in the initial years 73 His remarks reflect the intense political pressure on the government to deal with Bin Laden and other the radical groups. The forthcoming sanctions of the UN Security Council as a result of the assassination attempt on President Mubarak entailed change in the shape of relationships with various radical groups present in Sudan; therefore, in May 1996, Bin Laden left the country to Afghanistan.42 In the early stage of the regime, the power of Al-Turabi was reflected in how his statements were considered a government position with no objection from any official or government entity. Dr Al-Turabi was heavily involved in the issue of oil exploration, a vital aspect in the continued existence of the NSR. “Oil was in the hands of Al-Turabi along with the oil minister Awad al-Jazz who reported to him regularly.”43 Al-Turabi was successful in placing “the Asian alternative” policy at the forefront of the regime’s economic, military and political agenda. Al-Turabi authorised Ali Uthman to take responsibility of the state executive apparatus, including the foreign ministry. This period gave—Ali Uthman—the feeling that he could control the state as a whole since decision making was centralised in the security group that includes Awad al-Jazz and Ibrahim Shams al-Din headed by him. At the time, there was no problem of trust, thus Al-Turabi gave him unparalleled authority.44 Ali Uthman wide ranging involvement in the formal and informal bodies gave him an advantage in exerting his influence on foreign policy while he became a vital element in the power struggle that later led to the removal of Al-Turabi. Dr Al-Turabi’s formation of PIAC during the Gulf War, was a response to a popular movement in the Arab and Muslim world against “the Western and Zionist agenda.” It was an ideal opportunity for Al-Turabi to promote his ideology through mobilising worldwide popular Islamic movements to challenge the formal OIC viewed as the submissive face of the Islamic and Arab states. When asked about the Arab League and OIC, Al-Turabi responded, “These establishments were transformed into bureaucracy that were overwhelmed by routine and complying with the interests of their bureaucratic personnel.”45 Dr Al-Turabi viewed informal public institutions as more important than the formal ones since they reflect the supremacy of society over the state, while minimising the state’s role. In his first speech to PIAC, he commented on the Gulf War: “The crisis dishonoured most of official governments; the formal legitimacies were undermined by growing contradictions between rulers and their people. Slogans were used with apparent inconsistencies between proclamations and actions.”46 The attainment of his political and personal ambition with the NSR regime in power convinced Al-Turabi of the potential to export his revolution to the whole of Islamic Umma. He ignored the limitations of the Sudanese state and could not escape the contradictions within his own government. The state institutions, especially the foreign ministry, were deeply irritated with these informal organisations as they intruded into the formal institutions’ sphere of defining, advancing and implementing the national interests of the state.

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Dr Al-Turabi’s appointment as PIAC secretary general propelled it to play an important role in the regime’s international agenda. The organisation became a vital part of the institutional mechanism to advance the objectives of the regime abroad. For the NSR, one of the main foreign policy goals was to “make Sudan the centre of liberty from the unjust western domination in balance of power and dealings, a shelter for the oppressed, a protection for the tyrannized ... and supporting subjugated Islamic minorities and nations.”47 In spite of the claim that PIAC was an NGO, various government departments were involved in the preparation of its annual convention and the implementation of its plans. The government’s denial that PIAC formed part of the policymaking process aimed to avoid backlash against its support for radical groups. President Al-Beshir stressed, “His government is not a member of the conference and does not interfere in its management or funding and it only provide facilities and our hospitality.”48 The state’s formal institutions endeavour to distance itself from PIAC reflect the extent of damage could be caused by the conference. The internal dynamics of the core NSR elites exposes the presence of two policy lines related to whether PIAC has a negative or positive role in the interests of the regime. The regime had given spiritual and materialistic support to many participant Islamist organisations and individuals in the conference. The NIF cadres in the informal and formal institutions carried out PIAC plans, sometimes without the knowledge of the state executive branch. In 1991, Brigadier Faisal Abusalih, the minister of interior, resigned from his post in protest at the issuing of passports to foreigners without his prior knowledge.49 Sudanese diplomatic passports were issued to Islamists, such as Sheikh Omer Abd-Elrahman of the Egyptian Jihad movement and Rashid Al-Ganoushi of the Islamic Nahda in Tunisia. Entry visas were revoked intentionally to open the door for radical Islamists. The NSR was accused in the international level of setting up camps to train terrorists and opposition groups to export its revolutionary agenda. PIAC was able to advance its objectives as a result of the regime commitment to its cause. The Council for International Peoples Friendship (CIPF) led by Mustafa Uthman Ismail, a long-standing cadre in the NIF, initiated PIAC with its invitation to the gathering in April 1991. CIPF was strongly connected with Islamist groups from various Muslim states. In 1993, the CIPF secretary general approved an operation for the Sudanese government to receive military supplies from Afghanistan.50 These weapons were transferred to Muslim fighters in Bosnia through the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a humanitarian organisation based in Vienna.51 The involvement of CIPF in this complex operation intended to avoid any allegations that links it with Al-Turabi and PIAC. From an early stage in its political development, the NIF considered Islamic CSO part of their strategy to advance their objectives. Foundations such as the International Call Organisation, International Islamic Youth and Shebab el-Bina (Youth for Reconstruction) were formed even before the NIF takeover in 1989. The first statement of the coup on the 30 June 1989 was recorded one week earlier in the studios of the International Call Organisation in Khartoum and kept in its premises.52

Decision making in the initial years 75 Civil organisations were viewed as valuable mechanisms in implementing clandestine activities that might be difficult to execute and could jeopardise the government stance on specific issues. Humanitarian NGOs such as Al-Birr, Da’wa Islamyya (Islamic Call Organisation) and the African Islamic Relief Agency played critical roles in fulfilling the regime objectives. They took an active part in the intelligence apparatus or the financial, political or social empowerment of the movement. There were many reports that linked the NIF humanitarian organisations with a variety of military, financial and intelligence assistance to various Somali factions during the UN presence followed by the US intervention. There was a sense within the regime that if the Americans executed an easy and successful operation in Somalia without any challenge, this would lead the US administration to promote safe-haven policy in Southern Sudan. “The Islamic relief agencies operating in the country have provided a convenient front for Khartoum’s agents to pass on intelligence reports and supplies to Aideed’s men. One such agency is the Sudanese-run African Islamic Relief Agency (AIRA).”53 There was a grey line between the responsibilities of such charity organisations and the formal institutions that enabled Islamic NGOs to cross their defined mandate. Many NIF cadres, who had operated in the underground for a long time before the takeover, whether in secret cells inside the military, trade, student unions or even those charity organs, were not accustomed to working with the formal state apparatus. This context led to huge difficulties in managing external relations, and foreign policy became the subject of ceaseless bickering between the different factions within the regime.

Decision making and the NIF split The fury over the NIF cadres constant interference and their overriding authority started early with the resignation of two RCC members in 1991. The NIF, led by Al-Turabi, did not take into consideration the formal role of President Al-Beshir who increased through time his power in the security and military apparatus. A major split within the regime was unsurprising due to the vague demarcation of responsibilities and control over policymaking. The assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt was the crucial point in bringing to light the confusion of the regime’s decision making. The event was the first sign of a major conflict within the NIF since the seizure of power. High-ranking intelligence officers who were NIF cadres provided logistical and financial support for Egyptian Islamists to conduct an assassination attempt of President Mubarak in Ethiopia. The action of the government personnel was implemented without the knowledge of Al-Turabi or the president. We could read the limited role of Sudan in the assassination attempt in the light of particular power centres’ efforts to consolidate their position with alTurabi. However, matters were out of hand, because the implicated personnel benefited from transformational circumstances where there was no management of ideology, and no careful supervision. In addition, there was no ability

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The episode demonstrated the incapacity of the executive branch headed by AlBeshir to control crucial government organs. While Al-Beshir realised the grave consequences of the incident upon the regime, Al-Turabi stated, “The Pharaoh of Egypt returned terrified from Addis Ababa after (Mujahdeen) the holy worriers confronted him, and they will leap to the land of Egypt to chase the Pharaoh.”55 President Al-Beshir held that an adjustment to the policies of the regime within the framework of its ideology was needed to deal with grave external challenges. International sanctions would undermine the capacity of the armed forces to fight the war in the south and would weaken the NSR’s grip on power. The president realised that Al-Turabi and his radical followers within the movement were the obstacle for any pragmatic change. In September 1995, media reports suggested the probability that Al-Beshir would initiate a request to transfer the headquarters of PIAC, headed by Al-Turabi, away from Sudan, a step which implied practically dissolving the conference (Alhayat, Sep. 1995). By 1997, the conference dissolution became evident with Al-Turabi being elected chairperson of the national assembly and the departure of top PIAC personnel, Ibrahim Al-Sanousi, the second man in the conference elected governor for Northern Kordofan and others were transferred as well.56 In 1996, President Al-Beshir overhauled the security services by removing the head of intelligence Dr Nafi Ali Nafi and his deputy. He separated the intelligence service into external and internal bodies, and put in place strong allies to him. President al-Beshir also removed Minister of Interior Tayeb Kheir and put in place Bakri Hassan Salih, another person loyal to the palace. Most of the new changes intended to give President Al-Beshir power over the crucial security bodies in the state. This move would enable him to manage them closely and supervise their actions. His control of the military and security apparatus facilitated the easy ejection of Al-Turabi and his followers in 1999.

Notes 1 Asharq Al-Awsat, Oct. 2004. 2 Policy in the external sphere was part of the internal conflict between al-Turabi and President al-Beshir, related to issues of power and the regime internal political restructuring. 3 Lieutenant General Omer al-Bashir, Major General al-Zubair Mohammed Salih, Major Ibrahim Shams al-din, Lt. Colonel Mohammed al-Amin Khalifa and Brigadier Uthman Ahmed Hassan. 4 This was stated by El-Amin Abd-Alteef, ex-ambassador to Egypt, head of the political committee in the Foreign Ministry and career diplomat, during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 8 Dec. 2003, Khartoum. 5 This was stated by Brigadier Uthman Ahmed Hassan, ex-RCC member, chair the Political Committee from July 1989 and state minister for defence from July 1990 until his resignation in Apr. 1991, during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 6 Dec. 2003. 6 This was stated by flight Brigadier Faisal Madani Mukhtar, ex-RCC member, who was appointed interior minister in July 1989 and submitted his resignation in Apr. 1991, during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 7 Dec. 2003.

Decision making in the initial years 77 7 Interview with Brigadier Uthman Ahmed. 8 Interview with Flight Brigadier Faisal Madani. 9 Following this resignation, he was summoned to a confidential meeting with the head of the RCC, General Omer al-Beshir, along with RCC member Major Ibrahim Shams al-Din, Ali Uthman Taha and Uthman Ahmed Hassan, to inform him that the NIF was in control. In this meeting, it was agreed that the RCC as a national council would look at the movement’s strategy and compare it with Sudan’s national interests. This agreement did not last, as it became obvious that “the RCC was just the movement’s kitchen to implement its agenda.” In 1991, RCC member Faisal Abusalih who was the Interior Minister at the time, along with RCC member Uthman Ahmed Hassan, opposed the execution of 28 military officers a failed coup attempt. Interview with Flight Brigadier Faisal Madani. 10 Sudan Update, Aug. 1991. 11 Asharq Al-Awsat, Oct. 2004. The NCP is ruling governing party in the new political arrangements introduced in 1998. 12 Farouk A (2015), Al Sudan wa Sanwat Al-Teeh Nisf Garn Lam Taktamil (Sudan and the Years of Loss: Half a Century Not Yet Complete). Cairo: Dar Jazeera al-Ward. 13 Sudan Update, Dec. 1990. 14 Ambassador Al-Amin Abdelatif, confidential statement titled The Gulf Crisis submitted to General Osman Ahmed Hassan on 11 Feb. 1991. 15 Khalid M (1990), The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elites in Sudan’s Political Evolution. London: Amin Kegan Paul International. 16 Interview with el-Amin Abd-Alteef. 17 Dr Hussein Suleiman Abusalih, a former minister at the parliamentary government 1986–1989, was a member of the Democratic Unionist Party historically enjoying strong ties with Egypt. 18 Asharq Al-Awsat, Nov. 1994. 19 This was stated by Dr Hussein Suleiman Abusalih, minister of social development 20 Jan. 1991 to 18 Jan. 1993, appointed minister of foreign affairs on 13 Feb. 1993 and was removed from office in Feb. 1995, during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 13 Dec. 2003. 20 Ibid. 21 This was stated by Ahmed Sulieman, ex-ambassador to USA from 1991 to Dec. 1995 (appointed during the NSR—not a career diplomat), during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 14 Dec. 2003. 22 Interview with D. Abusalih. 23 Al-Watan Al-Arabi, 1995. 24 Al Jazeera TV (Apr. 2016) interview with Dr Hassan al-Turabi: with Ahmed Mansour. Witness to an Era, 16 Episodes, Aljazeera Media Network. [In Arabic]. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6ZBqA1caWs [Accessed 25 Mar. 2018]. 25 Interview with Flight Brigadier Faisal Madani. 26 As it was called by the number of assembly members, although the number are less than this number. 27 Haider I Ali (1993), Al-ikhwan wa Al-askaar—qisat Al-gabha Al-islamyya wa Al-sultah fi al-Sudan (The Muslim Brothers and the Military: The Story of the NIF and Power in Sudan). Cairo: Arab Civilisation Centre. 28 This was stated by Al-Tayeb Zein Al-Abdeen, prominent Islamist and academic during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 11 Dec. 2004. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 President Al-Beshir’s speech at the Arab summit published once in one government newspaper on the third page. This implies that the speech does not represent the real position of the NSR. 32 Burr J M, and Collins R O (2003), Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000. Leiden: Brill.

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33 Illich Ramirez Sanchez, known as “Carlos the Jackal,” a Venezuelan-born fugitive, masterminded various high-profile terrorist attacks around the world in a two-decade span and claimed some 85 victims. 34 Pax Christi (1994), The French Connection: Report on the Political, Economic, and Military Collaboration between Khartoum and Paris. Netherlands. 35 Africa Confidential, 4 Feb. 1994. 36 President Museveni was also seen by France as representing the Anglophone threat to Francophone influence in the Great Lakes region. As a result, France provided military, economic and political assistance to the regime. The Sudanese troops in the south were allowed to attack the SPLA/M by passing through the CAR and Zaire/DRC, two countries with significant French influence. Pax Christi, The French Connection, op. cit. 37 Africa Confidential, 4 Feb. 1994. 38 The World Bank and IMF loans to the Sudanese government had stopped shortly after the arrival of the regime. 39 This was stated by Dr Seif Al-Deen Mohammed Ahmed, Islamist and the Director of the Centre for Strategic Centre-Khartoum (1991–1996), during an interview with the author, 7 Dec. 2004. 40 Ibid. 41 Al-Turabi H (Spring 2002), America Will Not Tolerate Islamic Movements, Even If They Are Peaceful. New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 59–64. 42 It was reported that Bin Laden and his entourage were armed to the teeth and ready for combat from Khartoum in the air plane which transferred him to Afghanistan. They only relaxed their fighting posture when informed they reached Afghanistan airspace. He feared the Sudanese regime would surrender or sell him to the Saudi government. 43 Interview with Seif al-Din. 44 Ibid. 45 Centre for Strategic Studies (2000), Halat al-Watan: The First Sudanese Strategic Report 1999–2000. Cairo: Centre for Strategic Studies. 46 PIAC (25–28 Apr. 1991), Dr Hassan Al-Turabi’s Speech to the Conference. Khartoum: Friendship Hall. 47 The Comprehensive National Strategy, 1992–2002, First Volume, Centre for Strategic Studies, Sept. 1992, Khartoum. 48 Alhayat, 11 Sept. 1995. 49 Lesch A M (1998), Sudan: Contested National Identities. Oxford: James Currey. 50 Sudan Democratic Gazette (Oct. 1993), Kabul Is Khartoum’s Latest Arms Supplier,” p. 6. On 22 August 1993, four days after the Department of State added Sudan to its list of state sponsoring terrorism, a Boeing 707 cargo plane arrived with arms from Afghanistan followed by four other flights in September. 51 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan, op. cit. 52 Haider I Ali, Al-ikhwan wa Al-askaar—qisat Al-gabha Al-islamyya, op. cit. 53 Sudan Democratic Gazette (Nov. 1993), Khartoum Has a Field Day Over US Problems in Somalia,” No. 42. 54 Mekki H (2001), Al-ingaz wa Bidaiaat Al-mogawmah Al-syasiyah. Rayaam Newspaper. 55 Alquds Al-arabi, Vol. 7, No. 1916, 6 July 1995. 56 Centre for Strategic Studies, Halat al-Watan, op. cit., p. 231.

5

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011) The path to secession

Introduction The political transition in Sudan following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) led in September 2005 to the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).1 The NCP, a successor to the NIF, is the ruling party, which portrayed itself as an Islamic movement that held power since 1989 and still sustained its grip on the state.2 The other partner SPLM/A is a guerrilla movement in the process of building itself into a wellorganised political party or state in case of separation following the stated referendum in the agreement.3 The vision of New Sudan promoted by Dr John Garang stipulate an alliance of Sudan marginalised regions pursuing a decentralised and fair distribution in the political structure. The significance of the CPA is in its anticipated restoration of the democratic multi-party system in Sudan with other political parties involved, including a major actor such as the SPLM through their participation in free and fair elections. The NCP which took power through military takeover will be part of all other political groups in the restoration of democratic system. However, in reality, this transformation process was commanded by the signatories to the CPA, the power holders in the north and south of Sudan. The different ideological outlook between the CPA power-sharing partners (NCP Islamism vs. SPLM secularism) led to continuous disagreement in the internal and external policymaking throughout the unity government period. This contradictory outlook has generated fragmented policymaking, as it advocates a divergent national and external agenda. The GNU was a non-homogeneous group of personalities who perceived the management of the Sudan external domain in different lenses. Inconsistent statements, actions and policy directions during this government internal conflict brought to light the absence of unified foreign policy strategy. The NCP and SPLM political manoeuvres and their tactics in managing the state through their power produced incoherence in foreign policymaking. The power sharing offered the two parties a mechanism to implement their conflicting political and economic objectives in the national sphere. The GNU was a milestone in Sudan political history since it created the context for a new political landscape with the separation of South Sudan from the north.

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The GNU lend many similar features related to the form and shape of powersharing experiences in Africa such as in Angola, Somalia and Rwanda. Power-sharing governments in the African context are a rare success, as indicated by Ian Spears who enumerate the different challenges facing this type of government.4 These practical problems include parties seeking total power over government, power sharing as a part of strategy to augment military and political power and the incompatibility of individuals and groups to cooperate. All these aspects are relevant to the GNU period in Sudan with the external actors play a central role in the dynamics of relations between the two CPA partners. Foreign policy decision making within the GNU involved the inner clique of both parties. Incompatible policy outlooks and approaches resulted in a lack of unified strategy to manage the external and domestic spheres. Spears concluded, “Power-sharing agreements are difficult to arrive at, even more difficult to implement, and even when implemented, such agreements rarely stand the test of time.”5 The GNU was a testimony to this statement with its failure to achieve its intended objectives by the end of it. The sudden death of Garang triggered profound suspicion and irreconcilable interests between the two parties (SPLM and NCP) over critical domestic and external matters deepened the crisis of policymaking. In the domestic level, continuous disputes over many CPA benchmarks including laws and legislations that form vital part of the CPA affected the relationship between the two parties, including Abyei, transitional areas, wealth sharing, redeployment of forces, the organisation of national elections and other bills and laws. In the external level, the government has to deal with critical issues in the state relation with the international community, such as the deployment of forces in Darfur (UNSC resolution 1706) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant to arrest President Al-Beshir.

GNU policymaking institution The formation of the GNU was based on the power-sharing protocol to oversee the implementation of the CPA in the interim period of six years. The CPA powersharing protocol allocated 52% for National Congress Party (NCP), 28% for Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), 14% for other northern political forces and 6% for other southern political forces in the national level.6 As per the CPA, the SPLM in the south held similar majority in the newly formed Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the right to self-determination in 2011. On 9 July 2005, six months after the signing of the CPA, the institution of the presidency was formed, and it included President Omer Al-Beshir, First Vice-President John Garang and the Second Vice-President Ali Uthman Taha. The presidency as a core CPA institution represent the collective leadership of the country. On 30 July 2005, three weeks after the GNU appointment, the CPA dealt a massive blow with the death of Dr Garang in an aeroplane crash, and on 11 August Salva Kiir Mayardiit replace him as first vice-president.7 The death of Garang had a devastating impact on the relationship between NCP and SPLM. The 18-month

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011) 81 negotiation process between the SPLM leader John Garang and First VicePresident Ali Uthman that led to the signing of the CPA fostered a strong connection between the two of them. This rapport helped in reaching consensus in many arrangements. The demise of Garang prompted Silva Kiir, who lacks depth and experience comparable to his predecessor to take the helm of the SPLM. The president has the sole responsibility over foreign policy; however, consensus with the first vice-president is required in decision making. According to the National Interim Constitution, “There shall be partnership and collegial decision making within the presidency in order to safeguard the stability in the country and implement the CPA” section 51 (2).8 The GNU institutions did not act or pursue the model of a “collegial decision-making process” projected by Dr Garang and Vice-President Taha, the principal negotiators of the CPA. From the start of the CPA, the GNU nurtured a long-term objective with the view of post-South Sudan referendum that aim to continue their grip on power in the breakaway north and the south states. This context had a detrimental impact on the policymaking institutions as they became ineffective and followed a contrary model to the one envisaged in the CPA. The presidency lacked the spirit of cooperative decision making—a critical aspect in its efficiency. The NCP-SPLM leaders involved in this mechanism have completely different ideological backgrounds, so long-term enmity and harmony are absent on the personal level. This has led to a rocky relationship between the two men with their engagement in continuous bitter criticism levelled by the two men at each other in the January 2007 commemoration of the signing of the CPA.9 The presidential system did not allow for collective leadership in the formulation of policies since the president was the dominant figure. Vice-President Silva Kiir’s leverage focused on issues related to Southern Sudan. The presidency meetings were particularly scarce, disagreements were expressed in public and both shunned internal deliberations. Both the NCP and the SPLM political conduct in this partnership, which lasted for five years, demonstrated their disinclination to synchronise their energies in government. The NCP and SPLM permitted each other to be in charge of his domain—the north and the south—as enacted in the structure of the agreement (the power-sharing protocol). This arrangement created policy division in the state institutions since both parties did not uphold the CPA spirit aimed at making unity of the country attractive. According to Machakos Protocol Provisions on Unity, “The parties shall work with the Commission (AEC) during the Interim Period with a view to improving the institutions and arrangements created under the agreement and making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan.” During the Interim Period, the NCP and SPLM have a negligible contribution in making the unity attractive for the people of the South. Political manipulation, continued hostilities and deliberate delays exhausted the time of the parties and hinder the effective implementation of key CPA benchmarks (Abyei, census, elections and legislations). This is an important dimension in affecting the GNU foreign policy cohesion. The radical NCP Islamists favoured the secession to fulfil their Islamisation scheme, while other segments within the NCP viewed separation as more challenging to the

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north than unity. They perceived separation as giving a platform and providing a model to other discontented regions in the north, while it would generate various economic, social and territorial problems.10 The SPLM pursued a posture that benefited their long objectives related to the north while adopting a firm posture in regard to the south in the domestic and external issues. The extensive politicisation in the foreign service with the arrival of the NSR in 1989 caused considerable damage in its professional capacity. The regime embraced the “loyalty above quality” policy that propelled the appointment of dominant number of dedicated cadres to the NIF political agenda. Following the CPA, the partisan make-up of the service continued to persist rather than creating a national character for this institution that was able to articulate and serve the state interests. Moreover, since the foreign ministry was not in full control of various policy issues since parallel organisations continued to encroach and interfere in this area whether in the palace, the security apparatus or the military. Dr Lam Akol and Deng Alor consecutively took the helm of the foreign ministry representing the SPLM based on the agreed distribution of GNU posts.11 Many in the SPLM regard Dr Akol implementing the foreign policy agenda of the NCP as his continued defence of President Al-Beshir’s position on Darfur. In March 2006, a group within the SPLM submitted a strongly worded memo to the SPLM chairman calling for the removal of Dr Lam Akol from his position as the foreign minister. This petition accused Dr Akol of pro-NCP foreign policy referring to “betrayal of the SPLM vision by his criticism of the EU and USA for its policy towards Darfur, in addition to his rejection to absorb more SPLM personnel into the Ministry.”12 The memo reflects the deep suspicion within some quarters in the SPLM towards the minister in contrast to the external agenda of the movement. Lam Akol played an important role during his tenure as a GNU foreign minister with his success to convene three major summits in Khartoum, the Arab League, African Union (AU) summit and Islamic summit. There was major difference between Deng Alor and Lam Akol in their capacity as foreign ministers regarding their policy approach. Deng Alor was more concerned with the southern issue, while Akol tried to portray himself as a national figure. The history of Lam Akol’s cooperation with the regime in the past, as well as his background in the Shilluk tribe, has a significant bearing on his position in the SPLM. His small tribe in the south, compared to the dominant Dinka over the SPLM, provide him with a little power within the dynamics of SPLM power politics; however, he is undoubtedly an important figure in Sudanese politics. In 2010, Ali Karti from the NCP, who served as a commander of the PDF in the 1990s, became the foreign minister. Following the formation of GNU in 2005, the former foreign minister Mustafa Uthman Ismail was appointed as a presidential advisor.13 His close association with President Al-Beshir offered him strong influence in policymaking and was considered the “NCP shadow foreign minister.” The intelligence apparatus has always played a prominent role in foreign policymaking since the initiation of the regime in 1989.14 Diplomatic and administrative cadres associated with the regime and assigned in various missions overseas were part of the intelligence

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011) 83 apparatus. These cells were present in neighbouring states in particular and took the upper hand in guiding policy with little sway from the foreign ministry. Further, the role played by security apparatus in Darfur conflict damaged the reputation of the GNU in contradiction to the international legitimacy obtained through signing the CPA. The mess of institutionalism in decision making within the GNU created a feeling of uncertainty to the outside world. Confusion and contradiction between various institutions and statements results in perplexing atmosphere for the international community endeavour to engage with vital issues that affect the CPA.

The CPA partners internal schism Since the NIF initiation of the NSR regime in June 1989, conflict was a recurring event within the influential members of the Islamist movement. These past internal squabbles involve the choice of policy and strategy in the external sphere responds to and supports the agenda of the regime better. Following the major split which took place between Dr Hassan Al-Turabi and President Omer Al-Beshir in 1999, policy currents within the NCP continued to advocate for particular point of views on major themes related to the state without a display of interparty collision. The majority of the elite who represent these trends are still active political actors in decision making one way or another. There were a range of approaches within the core elites in relation to the management of foreign policy, which led to grey lines of command in the policy process. These political currents within the NCP regarding the party’s general external outlook and course of action have largely influenced and reverberated in policy and decision making during the GNU. The first strand spearheaded by President Omer Al-Beshir supported by the security and military personnel as well as important figures in NCP.15 This group has a predominantly security mindset and perceive the international pressure on Sudan aimed at undermining the NCP. Their outlook was influenced by the implications of the Darfur conflict and the presence of many security and intelligence apparatus personnel within it. Elements within this group represented by the president himself prefer the separation of the south. The NSR security apparatus influence extended to foreign and domestic policies, and the Islamist fabric of the regime maintained their grip in the state during this period. It was a critical institution in guiding and implementing internal and external policies with the strong influence of its director at the time, Salah Gosh. The Justice and Equality Movement rebels’ attack on the capital Khartoum in May 2008 led by Khalil Ibrahim reflect the apparatus forces vital influence. The director of intelligence at the time, Salah Gosh, instructed the Sudanese Armed Forces not to intervene in the offensive against Khalil Ibrahim. The second strand was led by Second Vice-President Ali Uthman Taha and the technocrats who negotiated Naivasha.16 This group was a strong force in policymaking and held a largely pragmatic stance towards most issues affecting Sudan interactions with the outside world. They viewed the agreement as a way to break the isolation of the regime. His team could be considered advocates of Sudan

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unity; however, they were marginalised following the signing of the CPA.17 This part of the NCP clique realised the risk of open confrontation with the supporters of the other policy perspective since they both had an interest in the survival of the regime. An important event during the GNU demonstrated the inner dynamics of the NCP schism over major policy issues in the statement of Ali Uthman in the European Union conference on Darfur in Brussels on 7–9 March 2006. Taha’s statement regarding the transition of The African Union Mission in Sudan to UN after the conclusion of a settlement in Darfur generated furious reaction from the president and his team. When he return to Khartoum, the president and his team compelled Taha to withdraw in public his statement in Brussels. The second vice-president assented to their demand and reversed his statement. The ability of different competing policy strands to wield influence in policymaking depends on having the ear of President Al-Beshir. This context ushered the government foreign policy into confusion. A WikiLeaks document indicated “the mixed signals and messages” sent by Sudanese officials in their meetings with Special Envoy Senator Andrew Natsios regarding the situation in Darfur highlight the policy setting. His meetings with Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (and UN/AU hybrid negotiator) Mutriff Siddiq were “indicative of continuing tensions within the National Congress Party (NCP), government interlocutors offered conflicting views on necessary next steps on the hybrid in the UN Security Council.”18 The divergence within the NCP regarding engagement with the outside world was a recurring theme during the GNU. The appointment of US special envoy Andrew Natsios in September 2006 triggered contrasting views from the NCP express. Presidential Advisor Magzoub Al-Khalifa and the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jamal Mohamed Ibrahim provided completely different statements in the same daily newspaper Al Adwa. While Al-Khalifa said, “The Sudanese government would engage in a dialogue with any ‘power’ in an attempt to increase stability and to promote a peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict.” Ibrahim on the other hand called the appointment a “flagrant interference” in the internal affairs of Sudan.19 The main interest of the NCP in entering the CPA was to revamp its relations with the outside world. They believed this was the ultimate prize it would receive as a result of this historical agreement. There were strands within the NCP that perceived the CPA as a capitulation to many priority issues to the Islamists. One of the most important strands during this period was the Just Peace Forum, branched from the NCP, which adopted a hostile posture towards the SPLM. This perspective which represent a large segment within the NCP is led by Al-Tayeb Mustafa, the cousin of President Al-Beshir. The paradox of general direction within the Just Peace Forum which stipulates the enmity of the West and the SPLM is its harmony with the interest of both the west and SPLM. The forum prefers the separation of South Sudan and helped in preparing the public mood through its main platform, Alintibaha, to accept the separation of the south.

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011) 85 There were seven people, including the president within the NCP during the power-sharing government, who had the overall control over foreign policymaking. They included Nafie Ali Nafie, Majzoub Al-khalifa, Ali Uthman Taha, Awad Al-Jazz (minister of oil and energy), Salah Ghosh (chief of security apparatus) and Abd-Alraheem Mohammed Hussein (minister of defence). There were important individuals in the margin of this circle who had considerable impact on decisions in one way or another. It includes Ghazi Salah al-Din, Mustafa Uthman Ismail and Al-Zubair Beshir Taha (minister of interior). Each of these individuals symbolised a central pillar in maintaining the security of the regime. Ali Uthman was a symbol for the Islamic movement, Ghazi Salah din a symbol for intellectual prowess, Salah Gosh a symbol for security and Awad Al-Jazz a symbol for the oil sector. These characters embodied the various political arrays within the regime and had vested interest to stick together. The uncontested authority of the president made him the central figure in making a decision from a range of ideological options personified by the NCP core elites. The internal coherence of the NCP’s inner clique hung on the continual presence of a strong figure at the helm of the party. The president played this role as an equilibrium compromising the various power centres. The SPLM did not care much about foreign policy, while maintaining their diplomatic presence in foreign capitals. Silva Kiir, the leader of the SPLM had a minimal engagement with the presidency as an institution. In fact, many observers alluded that foreign policy did not change in substance following the formation of the GNU. The post-2005 GNU did not alter the form and shape of policymaking dominated largely by Islamist in the regime. The regime also divided the political parties during the GNU period, and this fragmentation helped the NSR to control the state dictate its external policy. On the other hand, the dominant SPLM ruling elite inclined towards secession and the creation of an independent state in the south. For strategic reasons, they did not voice this separatist position in public to avoid obstruction of its implementation and to not offend the international sponsors of the CPA. The “New Sudan” vision advocated by Dr John Garang has waned with his death. Policymaking within the movement moved away from the old guard’s strong belief in that vision. SPLM hawks who view partition as the best option for the south hijacked decision making. The death of John Garang at the interim period was the silver bullet for his New Sudan project. The new SPLM leadership under Salva Kiir, its new leader, was not interested in pursuing Garang’s aspirations of the “New Sudan” vision. Tension between Silva and the proponents of the New Sudan vision within the SPLM was a critical dimension in interparty politics during the GNU. SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, one of the prominent advocates of New Sudan vision, intended to leave the party and the GNU due to his rocky relationship with Vice-President Silva Kiir. Amum “cited irreconcilable differences exacerbated by ‘Salva’s own demons and insecurities’. . . . ‘Salva does not trust me—he believes I am favored by the party, favored by the Americans, favored by Bashir.’”20 Pagan even described his relationship with Al-Beshir compared to Silva: “We

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sit shoulder-to-shoulder at meetings, and Bashir jokes with me about others in the room—he respects me and my word. Silva does not have the psychological make-up to handle that closeness.”21 The fissures within the SPLM factions over the management of national and international issues accelerated the internal inclination towards separation. As a result, it became clear for many within the SPLM that the conclusion of the CPA is the secession of the country. One of the most important SPLM strands during this period was the “Sons of Abyei Group,” who stipulated the separation of the south and included important influential figures in the movement.22 Their influence was vital in SPLM’s external direction and policymaking in general towards the partnership with the NCP. However, for political tactics, Silva Kiir maintained in many forums that unity of Sudan is the way forward to rebuild the Sudanese state. Most of Kiir’s time with SPLM was spent in the military and was consistent in backing Garang through the years, which witnessed fragmentations and conflict within the SPLA in the early 1990s. Other SPLM influential personnel who espoused secession were Riek Mechar (deputy chairman of GoSS), Tabaan Deng and Tilar Deng Silva Kiir. According to the CPA, Silva Kiir has multiple key positions, including the head of the Government of South Sudan, first vice-president of the GNU and the commander in chief of the SPLA. These various assignments prompted his absence for long periods of time from the national policymaking institutions in Khartoum. The lack of commitment in the CPA power-sharing partners for policy consolidation resulted in taking contradictory direction in the external arena in their venture to achieve their different political objectives. The NCP pursued a posture that guaranteed its control of policy over issues related to the north, while the SPLM’s interest lies in commanding issues related to the south interest. There was an unwritten agreement between the power-sharing partners that the SPLM should not interfere in the north national issues in a proactive manner since any risk to the NCP authority in the north denote a threat to the SPLM control of the south. The CPA agreement provided them with a platform to support each other while maintaining their control over the north and the south. One of the indicators related to this area is that during the five years as first vice-president, Silva Kiir never visited any Northern Sudan province. When Yasir Arman ran for the presidential elections as the SPLM candidate, the NCP through, its strongmen Gosh and Ali Uthman explained that they were not ready to accept the candidacy of Arman. Fearing the possibility that Arman could win the election, Ali Uthaman travelled to Juba to inform Silva Kiir that the NCP was the only party that guaranteed the SPLM referendum and the independence of the south; hence, the SPLM should not interfere in the affairs of the north; therefore, they should withdraw their candidate in the presidential elections.23 Silva Kiir demanded guarantees, including the continuation of the SPLM as a political party in the north, and conducting the independence referendum on time. Accordingly, both parties had a gentleman agreement to withdraw Arman’s candidacy from the presidential race.

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011) 87 The NCP-SPLM’s continuous standoff during the GNU period was encouraged by their parallel political agendas. The SPLM in its pursuit to unify and strengthen various political groups in the margin looked for support of their cause from African states and the West. However, their emphasis is that Islamism as the base of the NCP vision runs counter to the SPLM outlook of secular state construct. Another dilemma was that the diversity of Sudanese society was at odds with the exclusive policies of the NIF emphasis on Islam and Arabism as the main identity of the state. Many neighbouring states ethnically interrelated with South Sudan, and the West viewed the southerners as victims of a totalitarian NSR regime. Many neighbouring states to the south sympathised with the SPLA/M in its demand for selfdetermination. The NCP sought to rally the support of the conventional northern political opposition parties, while they continued to mobilise the Chinese, Russian and Arab states. These contradictory perspectives had a negative impact on the cohesiveness and efficiency of the GNU foreign policymaking. The SPLM was distracted by the internal structural problems as well as the breadth of issues it had to deal with in the south. The SPLM objective was to bolster its network and allies in the external level with the growing bitter and destabilising splits opening up at the top of the NCP and SPLM leadership. While the SPLM struggled with a lack of internal cohesion, SPLM hardliners made an effort to obstruct any US-NCP rapprochement, taking advantage of the US internal divisions on Sudan.

The dynamics of external engagement There was a lack of collective resolve to bring about consensus in foreign policy. Both the contrasting language they used and the decision they made ran counter to the very spirit of the CPA. The agreement was stripped of its spirit, which aimed to preserve the integrity of the state and shape the post-civil war political context. For the NCP regime, the agreement was an opportunity to open up to the international community since its external relation encountered a huge damage due to its early hostile radical policies. On the other hand, the SPLM was determined to use the CPA to cement its links and engagement in the region and the international realm in order to establish its own future state in Southern Sudan. These dynamics led to a mishmash of statements, a patchwork of policies that are contradictory, incoherent and fragmented. The absence of institutionalism has direct repercussions in the outsiders’ confusion over the GNU foreign policy decision making. The NCP, with its ideological leanings, made an effort during this period to portray itself as the protector of Islamic values in the fabric of Sudanese society. President Al-Beshir and segments within the NCP presented themselves as the anti-American camp, especially with the surge of the Darfur conflict. The president employed the negative societal emotions against the American policies in the region at the time, whether the invasion of Iraq or the situation in Palestine. He continuously used these sentiments in his rhetoric to strengthen the regime’s grip on power and denounce his power-sharing partner.

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The CPA provided massive political advantages to the CPA parties. The agreement delivered recognition for the NCP on the international level, which was critical to repair its reputation as a rogue state. In the meantime, the CPA provided a historical opportunity for the SPLM with the right to self-determination through the referendum. Moreover, it provided a legitimate platform for both CPA parties as the principal political powers in the north and the south of Sudan. The NCP recognised the international enthusiasm for the agreement to reach a successful conclusion; however, the Darfur crisis complicated the political context. By the end of the interim period, many within the NCP lost faith in the United States to improve its relations. In a WikiLeaks document, Yahia Babiker, an NCP cadre, said to the American chargé d’affaire to Sudan Alberto Fernandez, Terrorism cooperation, the CPA? All for nothing. We received no recognition from the U.S., and you treat Southern Sudan as a sovereign country. Personally, in the last 15 years, I have learned how to work with the U.S., but by day I am losing confidence in our relationship.24 This comment represent the general sense felt within the NCP regarding the US policy towards the GNU. The NSR viewed its relations with China as economic and political alternative to the antagonistic west. China tried to ease the UN resolutions against the Sudanese regime, and in the ICC, it abstained in the UNSC and did not use the veto. China expressed its concern during various meetings of its officials with the Sudanese government of the constant spats between the CPA parties due to its oil interest. During this period, China embarked on establishing strong links with the SPLM, despite the NCP’s efforts to hinder such cooperation.25 In September 2008, it opened its consulate in Juba, which embarked on an effort to form new economic, political and cultural cooperation between China and South Sudan. The Chinese consulate became an independent channel from the official institutions of the Sudanese central government.26 This Chinese measure was in preparation for the pending separation of South Sudan. The SPLM opened 16 separate SPLM diplomatic offices in African, European and Arab countries, and several countries have initiated liaison offices and consulates in Juba.27 The SPLM active engagement in the international level was a clear sign of the movement preparations for the post-referendum independent South Sudan. Silva Kiir travelled to the USA numerous times, reflecting the movement’s distinctive relations with the United States. The visit in February 2006 to the USA of Rebecca Garang, the wife of the late SPLM John Garang, and the GoSS minister of transport at the time caused controversy within the GNU. Her meeting with the US president and her criticism of the NCP’s role in slowing implementation of the CPA led to speculations regarding the direction of the SPLM was taking in the national level. Silva Kiir stated that the visit was conducted through SPLM arrangements, hence without the knowledge of the Sudanese embassy in Washington, and the ambassador did not attend Rebecca Garang’s high-level meetings.28

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011) 89 Her visit intensified internal conflict between the NCP and SPLM, and triggered a debate on the issue of secession vs. unity. Silva Kiir’s first visit to the USA in October 2005 as a vice-president occurred after the death of John Garang. Foreign Minister Lam Akol did not travel with him, as he attended the non-alliance movement summit with President Al-Beshir. Lam Akol was heavily criticised in the SPLM conference for this move. The second visit of President Silva on the end of November 2005 was attended by Akol. The travel arrangements and the way the visit was conducted reflected the fragmentation within the CPA partners. Silva Kiir travelled from Juba to Nairobi and then to New York, and was received by the SPLM office in the US. The Sudanese ambassador was blocked from attending Silva’s meeting with President Bush. Visits to Washington by SPLM officials were good indicators of the different directions in agenda of the two parties. The lack of coordination and discord between the two partners over the management of foreign policy was visible in many critical issues. The expulsion of the special representative of the UN secretary general to Sudan (SRSG) Mr. Jan Pronk demonstrated the unilateral nature of decision making within the GNU. In October 2006, the president decided to expel the UN envoy, following remarks he made that provided more information on the Sudanese armed forces morale following two major defeats in the Darfur region at Um Sidir to the north of the main town El Fasher and again near the Chadian border.29 The armed forces called for the UN’s special envoy to be thrown out of the country, indicating that he is “waging war against the armed forces” and that his presence in Sudan “negatively affects the work of the armed forces.”30 The decision to expel the SRSG was made by President Al-Bashir in order to conciliate the armed forces, which were furious about the SRSG statement. The expulsion decision was made without consulting the SPLM or the foreign ministry. The SPLM declared that no consultation was made to expel the UN envoy and criticised the decision.31 The SPLM questioned his expulsion at the ministerial council in the presence of President Al-Beshir and felt that the first vice-president was not consulted in this measure.32 Prominent SPLM ministers at the GNU, including Deng Alor, Malik Agaar and Kuol Manyang Juuk, the minister of transport, roads and physical infrastructure, protested the expulsion. The president settled the debate at the meeting, indicating that foreign policy is the sole responsibility of the president, and he is the ultimate authority in any issue related to this sphere. He further said that he made the decision because he viewed Pronk as a threat. Deng Alor, in many forums during his tenure as a foreign minister, “expressed his deep frustration of the NCP marginalization of the SPLM on a national and international level in matters large and small.”33 The Sudanese government’s cooperation with the ICC provided another good example of the inconsistency in the government actions. The government initially declared it would collaborate with the international court without allowing suspects to appear at the Hague. It contended that the Sudan judiciary was able and keen to hold fair trials for the suspects. Shortly after this statement, the president

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headed a special meeting that decide to reject cooperation with the ICC and assure the independence of Sudanese judiciary. President Al-Beshir contradicted the government attorney general when he stated that one of the ICC suspects Mohammed Ahmed Haroun (state minister for humanitarian affairs) will not be investigated or forced to resign from his post. When Deng Alor made statements in Europe that contradicts the NCP position on the ICC, Al-Beshir told him, “You are my foreign minister and you have to represent my position,” he rebuked Alor. Deng responded, “How can I do that when we are a government of national unity? Your position is not a consensus position.”34 Al-Beshir requested from the foreign ministry to provide a recommendation of what Sudan should do next. Alor gathered his staff, including NCP stalwarts Ali Karti and Mutriff Siddi and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Al-Samani al-Wasila. . . . the consensus was for engagement with the ICC and the West. Actual hardliner Ali Karti, Alor’s other State Minister, led the charge saying that Sudan “has no choice but to engage, maybe not directly, through a law firm or a third party, but we have to find a way.”35 However, the ministry recommendation was rejected by the high-level committee headed by Vice-President Ali Uthman: “Where it had encountered bitter opposition by many, led by Justice Minister Sabdarat, a former Communist and opportunist who threw in his lot with the NCP years ago.” In the end, the NCP was successful in enrolling the SPLM in its efforts to challenge the ICC as the SPLM justify their position on the basis of maintaining peace and security in Sudan. The SPLM was afraid of chaos and instability as a result of the ICC and its use by NCP hardliners to derail the CPA. Arman indicated these concerns when he warned, “Sometimes the international community takes decisions on Sudan, but it doesn’t look into the totality the decisions’ consequences.” “We do not have illusions about the NCP’s capabilities—we know what they are capable of doing,” said Arman. The ICC has created a new situation, and all variables and factors are out of our hands—anything can happen. The NCP is fragile now, and Sudan is a huge country . . . and Arman likened the NCP to a small boy playing with fire— either he can burn the house down or be convinced to put the fire out.36 In July 2009, both the GNU Council of Ministers and the National Assembly refused the ICC indictment against the president. The GNU established a crisis management committee to deal with the ICC issue both politically and legally. The absence of a mutual policy line, especially on whether and how to deal with the ICC, added more tension to the already problematic relationship between NCP and SPLM. While the NCP reluctantly accepted the presence of the AU/UN hybrid force, the SPLM has been positive in the UN engagement in Darfur. Friction emerged

The GNU foreign policy (2005–2011) 91 openly within the GNU in tackling the external dimension of Darfur crisis, especially the contentious theme of deploying international forces. The chairman SPLM indicated the need for these troops to stem violence and prevent the continuation of the humanitarian crisis. Salva Kiir said during the inauguration of UN radio in Juba, the SPLM does not have any problem with the coming of the UN to Darfur. We accepted deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission and we do not see any differences between the UN forces in the South their presence in western Sudan. If there is anything the NCP is afraid of in Darfur this is their problem. The SPLM spokesman, Yassir Arman, also indicated that the SPLM was not consulted by the NCP in formulating the government’s position. “Our position is that the SPLM wants dialogue between Sudan the international community.” He denied that the GNU discussed the issue of deployment of UN forces.37 This position was in a clear contradiction to the NCP stance at the time. However, foreign policy towards Darfur during the GNU was dominated by the NCP posture, while the SPLM was considered a mere spectator. The crisis underlined the divergence within the GNU since members of both parties in the presidency and the cabinet openly express contrasting opinions. The expulsion of 13 INGOs in April 2009 was one of the highlights during the power-sharing government. Foreign Minister Deng Alor, in an event at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said that he was not consulted about the government’s decision to expel 13 INGOs from the country in March. He revealed that he knew about the measure from the media “like anybody else” and even the minister for humanitarian affairs who represents the SPLM at the GNU read about it in the newspapers.38 The SPLM and the NCP discussed the issue of the shocking NGO expulsions during a crisis management meeting on 5 March. During the latter meeting, the SPLM expressed anger that it was not consulted on the decision and that its ministers first learned of the decision from the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States in Sudan Alberto Fernandez rather than through their NCP partners.39 The expulsion is a joint decision taken by the president and the intelligence apparatus according to the foreign minister. Alor also said at the same event that SPLM ministers in the GNU are struggling to get their powers as ministers and noting that the position of SPLM ministers is much better than that of other ministers who do not belong to the NCP. In March 2010, when the IGAD invited the two CPA partners to attend a summit aimed at discussing the difficulties facing the CPA, both parties had completely different positions. The NCP represented by President Al-Beshir refused to attend, stating that there was no need for external mediation in the disputes between the two parties. “The NCP has long expressed misgivings about IGAD’s role in Sudan. It knows that its powerful members are supportive of the South and does not see it as a forum that will secure its interests.”40 However, the SPLM accepted the invitation with enthusiasm since the IGAD adopted the peace negotiations.41 This situation reflected the NCP sense that the IGAD countries, which

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include Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, were sympathisers to SPLM. In the meantime, these countries were concerned about the implications of the secession that might have led to instability similar to Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia.

Conclusion There was a lot of optimism that the signing of the agreement to end the longest civil war in Africa would provide new opportunities for nation building, democratic transformation, transparency and accountability in Sudan. The implementation of the CPA with its end result referendum of South Sudan was the prime objective of the SPLM. This has led to embracing a largely pragmatic posture that aimed to preserve the GNU since it was the main mechanism to reach a successful conclusion. Although the SPLM portrayed an image of an advocate for justice, human rights and the needs to cooperate with ICC regarding Darfur, they recognised the difficulty of implementing the CPA by shunning President Al-Beshir. Darfur crisis provided a platform for the SPLM radical elements espouse separation. The divergent views in the power-sharing government played an important role in reaching a conviction of the difficulty to maintain Sudan as a united country.

Notes 1 WThe CPA have six political protocols (Naivasha, 26 May 2004), which established four levels of government (national, South Sudan, states and local government). It provides for elections at all levels of government within three years; details provisional power-sharing percentages for GoS, SPLM and other political forces north and south; and provides for a president from the north, a first vice-president from the south and sets out special arrangements for conflict areas in central Sudan (Abyei, Nuba Mountains/Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile). 2 The National Congress Party (NCP) is the ruling party with a majority representation in the Executive and the Parliament (i.e. the National Assembly and the Council of States). It is also responsible for the north (i.e. Eastern Sudan, Central and Northern Sudan and Darfur). While the NCP appears to be in control of Central and Northern Sudan, the unending conflict in Darfur constitutes a serious problem both militarily and politically. 3 The dilemma continued with the joining of a new partner, the Sudan Liberation Movement/MM following the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). 4 Spears I (2000), Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp 105–118. 5 Ibid. 6 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Power-Sharing Protocol. 7 First Vice-President Garang’s helicopter went missing on the way from Entebbe, Uganda, to New Site, Southern Sudan. Garang departed Entebbe on 30 July 2005; however, his Ugandan military helicopter crashed due to bad weather. 8 The Interim National Constitution of Sudan, Part III, Chapter II, Composition of the Presidency, 2005. 9 At the ceremony to celebrate the second anniversary of the signing of the CPA on 9 Jan. 2007, President A-Bashir and First Vice-President Silva Kiir traded accusations over the slow pace of CPA implementation. Kiir accused the NCP of destabilizing the

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10 11 12 13

14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

south and delaying border demarcation in order to withhold oil revenues, while President Bashir blamed the SPLM for delays in appointing personnel to CPA bodies in Khartoum. These issues include cattle herders’ access to grazing areas in the south, share of oil revenues and installations, nationality, foreign debts, Nile water, borders and share of government assets. Dr Lam Akol, Shilluk. His appointment could be viewed in the proportionate representation within the SPLM of various tribes in the south. Al-Sahafa, 4 Feb. 2006, No. 4546. Dr Mustafa Ismail is the minister of external relations from April 1998 till the formation of the GNU in 2005—NCP member. He negotiated the East Peace Agreement, special envoy for the president as the chair of the Arab summit of 2006–07, as well as different roles related to Darfur. Cooperation with the US administration on terrorism in the 1990s offered the intelligence apparatus crucial access to the US decision-making quarters as well as a reputation of being an efficient and competent organization. This group includes figures such as Nafie Ali Nafie (presidential assistant) and Majzoub Al-khalifa (advisor to the president). This camp includes Al-dirdiri Mohammed Ahmed (Abyei Borders Commission member and MP), Mutraf Sidiq (undersecretary of the ministry of foreign Affairs), Saied Al-khateeb (director of strategic studies centre) and Idris Mohammed Abd-algader (minister in the presidency). These figures include Idris Abdalgadir, Mutraf Sidig, Saied Alkhateeb and Mutraf Sidig. WikiLeaks (13 July 2007), Sudan Officials Differ on Darfur PKO, Political Process in Meetings With Senator Natsios. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 07KHARTOUM1090_a.html WikiLeaks (21 Sept. 2006), NCP Divisions on US Special Envoy Natsios. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KHARTOUM2319_a.html WikiLeaks (15 May 2008), Pagan Amun Threatens to Leave GNU Cabinet. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KHARTOUM740_a.html Ibid. Prominent figures from Abyei includes Francais Deng, Deng Alor and Edward Leno. This was stated by Dr Mohammed Yusuf Ahmed Al-Mustafa, an academic and SPLM former GNU minister of state for labour, during an interview with the author in Khartoum, 2 Jan. 2017. WikiLeaks (26 Mar. 2009), Angry NCP “Moderate” Signals an Unbending Regime: Tells Us What He Really Thinks About Us. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/09KHARTOUM427_a.html Jaafar Karrar (2016), Sudan-China Relations, 1956–2011. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, p. 288. Ibid., p. 289. This includes the United States, UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Eritrea, Egypt, South Africa, China, Libya, Kenya, Uganda, India and Ethiopia. Alsahafa, 12 Feb. 2006, No. 4554. In his weblog, Mr Pronk’s wrote, “The losses seem to have been very high.” Reports speak about hundreds of casualties in each of the two battles with many wounded and many taken as prisoner. The morale in the government army in north Darfur has gone down. “Some generals have been sacked; soldiers have refused to fight. The government has responded by directing more troops and equipment from elsewhere to the region and by mobilizing Arab militia. This is a dangerous development. Security council resolutions which forbid armed mobilization are being violated. The use of militia with ties with the Janjaweed recalls the events in 2003 and 2004. During that period of the conflict systematic militia attacks, supported or at least allowed by the

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Foreign policymaking SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces), led to atrocious crimes.” The Guardian (23 Oct. 2010), Sudan Expels UN Official for Blog Revealing Darfur Military Defeats. Available at: www.theguardian.com/society/2006/oct/23/internationalaidanddevelopment.sudan BBC (20 Oct. 2006), Expel UN Envoy, Sudan Army Says. Available at: http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/africa/6069188.stm McDoom O (22 Oct. 2006), Sudan Orders Top U.N. Envoy to Leave. Available at: http:// uk.reuters.com/article/uk-sudan-idUKL2274772920061022 This was stated by Dr Mohammed Yusuf Mustafa. WikiLeaks (18 Mar. 2009), NCP Itself Doesn’t Know What Is Next, Warns Foreign Minister. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KHARTOUM379_a.html WikiLeaks (8 Sept. 2008), Bashir Tells FM “I Have Decided to Fight ICC to the Last,”. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KHARTOUM1374_a.html Ibid. WikiLeaks (8 Mar. 2009), NGO Expulsions Further Damage SPLM-NCP Relations. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KHARTOUM321_a.html WikiLeaks (3 July 2006), Sudan/Darfur: SPLM Rejects Bashir’s Position on UN PKO, Revealing Clear NCP-SPLM Split on Key Issue. Available at: https://search.wikileaks. org/plusd/cables/06KHARTOUM1559_a.html Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 3 Apr. 2009, No. 11084. WikiLeaks, NGO Expulsions Further Damage, op. cit. ICG (6 May 2010), Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence. Report No. 159. Al-Sahafa, 9 Mar. 2010, No. 5983.

6

Character matters Al-Beshir grip on power

Introduction President al-Beshir plays a vital role in drawing public policy in current Sudan. His dominant role in policy shaping dictates the direction of foreign and domestic policies. It is difficult to understand the present NSR interaction with the outside world without examining his character and the issues that influence his decisions. His personal concerns, preferences and subjective point of views feed into the delineation of the state national interest. This personal style of decision making in the external arena is a constant attribute of the NSR since its initiation. Presidents are normal humans, too, a combination of contrasting levels of morality, ego, ambition, self-image, and anger; however, these characteristics are concealed behind their formal position. James Barber indicates, The degree and quality of president’s emotional involvement in an issue are powerful influences on how he defines the issue itself, how much attention he pays to it, which facts and persons he sees as relevant to its resolution, and, finally, what principles and purposes he associates with the issue.1 At present, it is an agreed fact between all observers of current Sudanese political dynamics that the president rules the country unchecked and has free rein over decision making. This dimension is the main highlight of the NSR decision making following the removal of Dr Al-Turabi. He was able to marginalise the NCP various power centres and the Islamic movement. President Al-Beshir and his clique disregard the basic tenets of law and order, freedom and respect. The regime through its security apparatus censor the media, suppress CSO and political parties, and constantly detain opposition figures. After 30 years on power, Al-Beshir rules on the basis of false promises that drive to deceitful lengths to preserve the appearance of success but are destined to failure. There was various speculation of the scenarios that could out the NSR whether in a military coup or overthrown in a popular uprising. There is no doubt that the end of the current regime is the only alternative for the reversal of the slippery slope of their policies and the harm caused in all political economic and social domains. In this context, the president will not make a virtue of necessity and leave voluntarily his position. President

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Al-Beshir’s erratic political behaviour and outlandish remarks became nothing out of the ordinary in Sudanese politics. It takes time for perspective to form in order to judge the legacy of any regime or a leader in power. Historians will measure President Al-Beshir by how well or poorly he managed the domestic, regional and international challenges of his time, his leadership type and the moral and social legacies he left for future generations. However, the long-term consequences of the regime accumulated policies reveal the significant negative impact on the Sudanese geopolitical context. The separation of South Sudan, the Darfur conflict, the collapse of civil service and the unparalleled international isolation are just few aspects of the state decay. Sudan is living through its worst political and economic crisis since independence. The economy faces enormous failure since the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 with the loss of three-quarters of its oil production to South Sudan. The economic situation combined with the protracted civil and political unrest, and conflict led to dependency on foreign sources to sustain the state finances. The budget focus on the security and defence sectors even before the secession of Southern Sudan point to the regime security mindset and the regime pursuit for survival. The enduring conflicts in the Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur regions and their political and security implications are considerable burden on the president and the regime. The solidification of the military and security institutions put the government under huge financial burden. The president faces policy challenges related to the problematic relations with the international community, particularly the West on several internal and external issues, including human rights, Darfur conflict and terrorism. These issues are major impediments to boost the economic outlook. One of the main problems facing current Sudan is the absence of accountability in the political system. At present, all the political powers are concentrated in President Al-Beshir, and this necessitates the examination of the president’s character. Some might argue that any human, particularly a political leader, is complex; therefore, it is not easy to write about President Al-Beshir’s character since it does not allow for fair assessment. However, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a realistic portrait of some facets of his character that are taken from his public engagement in policy, rhetoric and knowledge of people around him and political observers. The collapse in all areas of the political, economic and social arenas in the Sudanese context indicates an utter failure of vision and leadership. The president as a moral model for his nation should uphold high standards of political values and principles. Therefore, the chapter is trying to question some traits in Al-Beshir’s character, such as integrity, trustworthy, prudence and loyalty. It looks at the main themes that influence President Al-Beshir’s character in order to gauge his decision and policymaking modus operandi. The attempt to highlight the president flaws does not detract from other good acts or intentions President Al-Beshir might have. The portrait that emerges from interviews with prominent journalists, former and current government officials, political allies and academics suggest a president’s mindset formed by the post Al-Turabi period, the ICC implications and who feel free to disregard institutions. There is also a fascinating

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piece by Fathi Al-Dao in his book Al-Taoon (The Plague), which provides an excellent expose of Al-Beshir’s character.2

President Al-Beshir: an insight into his character President Al-Beshir has been a committed NIF cadre, and although he was not the preferred candidate, he presided over the NSR RCC, which was created on the eve of the military coup on 30 June 1989. The political affiliation of the coup d’état was identified in a very early stage linking Al-Beshir to NIF. In mid-July 1989, two weeks after the coup d’état, the first media report regarding the Islamic orientation of the new military regime was in the French newspaper Le Monde.3 The French Journalist Jean Gueyras gave a range of reasons for considering the coup as supported and organised by the NIF. He referred to a report in the Londonbased Al-Dastur magazine’s report in October 1985, naming General Al-Beshir as “a Muslim Brother charged with organising a coup by Nimeiri’s supporters on behalf of Hassan Al-Turabi.” According to Dr Al-Turabi, Al-Beshir was not the favourite officer within the NIF cadres to head the RCC; however, due to the death of Mukhtar Mohamadain, a high-ranking officer and committed cadre in the movement, Al-Beshir was chosen for the assignment.4 Dissimulation of the new government political attachment was a paramount objective of the Islamist movement. On 3 July, in an address to military officers and soldiers, Al-Beshir stated, Some people will strive to spread rumours. their intention is to split the armed forces and if they are able to do that, Sudan is doomed . . . the only thing I would like to bring to your attention is not to listen to such hearsay, they will say those people (NSR) have specific political affiliation. We are against parties of all orientation.5 This statement would camouflage the new regime and provide the political legitimacy essential for survival, which addresses the various aspirations of Sudanese society. From that early stage, President Al-Beshir started to learn the art of political deception from his mentor Al-Turabi and how to play his foes. Millon and Davis defined personality in brief as a complex pattern of deeply embedded psychological characteristics that are largely non-conscious and not easily altered, expressing themselves automatically in almost every facet of functioning. Intrinsic and pervasive, these traits emerge from a complicated matrix of biological dispositions and experiential learning’s, and ultimately comprise the individual’s distinctive pattern of perceiving, feeling, thinking, coping, and behaving.6 Many people assert certain traits in President Al-Beshir’s character that distinguish him based on their observation of his personal and political behaviours. There is a shared consensus among various observers and sources close to the president’s social and political circles on three characteristics which distinguish

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him. The first characteristic is that he is pitiless with no affection towards others. The killing of around 200 demonstrators in two days during September 2013 protests against the removal of subsidies of fuel prices demonstrate his ruthlessness and the lack of this human sentiment.7 Most people question his sensitivity to the worries of ordinary Sudanese. The former US special envoy to Sudan, Andrew Nstasios, described this cult of NCP as follows: They are prepared to kill anyone, suffer massive civilian casualties, and violate every international norm of human rights to stay in power, no matter the international pressure, because they worry (correctly) that if they are removed from power, they will face both retaliation at home and war crimes trials abroad, divide and rule, but they have sought no way out of the mess they have created.8 The second characteristic is that he thrives in deception and has a strong penchant for telling lies. His continuous denial of the fact that the economy is in tatters, rebuffing news related of corruption and condemnations of the West for his own mess reflects disconnect from reality. An observer commented that the president believed in telling lies so big that their very large scale left some residue of credibility.9 It is reflected in his discourse regarding vital issues to the regime survival, such as promises of the revitalisation of the economy or the end of conflicts in different parts of the country runs counter to the reality in the ground. His discourse of defiance and promises, and his regime’s political grandiose are largely for political consumption and do not carry real significance in the practical level. In March 2005, celebrating the newly inaugurated Merowe Dam in Northern Sudan, he boasted that the project represents the end of poverty in Sudan,10 while in November 2017, the government stated in a report that two-thirds of the country is under the line of poverty. In 2006, he threatened to turn Darfur into a “graveyard” for those who target his country, rejecting foreign intervention through what he called “the gate of Darfur”;11 however, he finally allowed the international forces to be present in Darfur. Following the 2012 Israeli bombing of the Yarmouk military complex in Khartoum, the president stated that the response to Israel will be painful, but for sure, he does not have the capability to do so.12 He has demonstrated more bark than bite in many of these cases. Al-Beshir constantly misleads the Sudanese public and various political forces about actions of his government and its officials. Policy deception is a persistent quality in his rhetoric and decision making, declaring he is doing something when in fact he is doing something else. His invitation in January 2014 to Sudanese political forces known as the leap speech in order to reach a consensus for political reform and address the crisis facing Sudan illuminates this fact. Khitab Al wathba was instigated by the massive protests of September 2013, which led to a large number of casualties and shook the confidence of the NSR. The Sudanese public and various political forces were optimistic by the prospects of the national dialogue initiative. The forum discussed six critical political reform issues: peace and unity, economy, the identity, foreign relations, freedom and basic rights and

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governance. “The committees’ 648 members have met 312 times, discussed 523 working paper over 1,154 hours of dialogue and made 981 recommendations for Sudan’s political transformation.”13 However, Al-Beshir motive from the initiative was to portray political openness on the domestic level, sending a political signal to the regional and international powers welcomed national dialogue. There was nothing of substance at the political reform ground has come out of the national dialogue. There were intentional delays and manipulations of the process, which is still ongoing in order to continue control of political power. The journalist Faisal Mohammed Salih indicated the reasons for failure, which include the lack of political will, negotiating with bad faith, lack of appropriate mechanism, lack of inclusiveness, constitutional amendments and the state intolerance. Despite several statements by President Al-Beshir and senior officials about their commitment to implement the recommendations of the national dialogue, it turned out that the recommendations of the dialogue are not obligatory to the various state organs, including the parliaments.14 The third characteristic is President Al-Beshir’s dislike for long and complicated briefings and that he finds reading reports or public policy analysis papers burdensome. This feature makes such a leader undisciplined in policy-related issues, and he can make decisions based on a snap judgement rather than lengthy deliberations. In the meantime, many people assert that he has a very good memory regarding the views and opinions of policy among his advisors. Dr Al-Turabi remarked in a WikiLeaks document that “President Al-Bashir has real power but is indecisive and his decisions reflect the views of the last person he talked to, rather than any ordered analysis of the problem.”15 Al-Beshir does not have charisma as a natural attribute, but he’s always trying to invent himself as a statesman while his personal traits do not help in this regard. Some people stated that he is stubborn in his views, and this does not allow for flexibility in the formulation of policy or its direction. Identity plays an important role in President Al-Beshir’s ideological make-up. According to many insiders, the president has similar views to Al-Tayeb Mustafa of the Just and Peace Forum, and he leads the strand that prefers the separation of Southern Sudan within the NCP. According to many sources, Al-Beshir has an inferior look and racist propensities towards certain segments in the Sudanese society. Dr Al-Turabi’s infamous story about the president’s remarks to one of the members of the national fact-finding committee on allegations of human rights violations committed by armed groups in Darfur reflect his bleak views on identity. A committee member confided to Al-Turabi that the president remarked during a meeting in a racist tone, “If a Jaali man (from the Jaaleen Tribe in the north) forced a woman in the western part of the country to have sex, do we consider this as rape? It should be considered an honour for her.”16 Dr Al-Turabi also describes President Al-Beshir in a WikiLeaks document as a racist, narrow-minded and sees only his clan, and gave an example of Al-Beshir’s request from Bin Laden when

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in Sudan to a pave a road to his village north of Khartoum.17 Dr Al-Turabi’s opinion is reiterated by various sources referring to his use of racist language during conversations. President Al-Beshir is different in comparison to former President Jaafar Nimeiri who does not tie himself to affiliations. This is important to him since the NSR created different state institutions with the Islamists’ influence deeply impeded in the fabric, and this could pose a risk for President Al-Beshir’s rule. The state institutions during Nimeiri such as the military, intelligence and public service remains largely intact of politicisation, and this set up was changed particularly during the initial years of the NSR. The president of any state should be a symbolic figure who represents the emotions and diversity of the society. Al-Beshir does not have the deep convictions of Sudan as a juncture between different cultures or as a melting pot of cultures. Ali Mazrui noted, One could see Sudan as a bridge between Arabic-speaking Africa and Englishspeaking Africa; between the Africa of the homogenized mass nation-states of the future and the Africa of the deep ethnic cleavage of the present; and finally between West Africa as a cultural unit and Eastern Africa.18 The conviction in diversity is critical for any Sudanese leader pursuing national unity, while being able to articulate a foreign policy parameters that represent the societal composition. His social and cultural background, in addition to his political formation, bestowed him with restrictive attributes, attitudes and values in relation to cultural diversity. His ideological background being part of the NIF did not bestow him with the depth and conviction of the uniqueness of the Sudanese social context as one of the most heterogeneous states in the world. The NIF as a political movement stresses the link with pan-Islamism and advocates Islamisation and Arabisation of the society as central notions; the president has unwavering belief in those concepts. Following the SPLM seizure of Heglig oilfield in 2012, President AlBeshir made an incendiary remark at a rally in the NCP headquarters describing the SPLM as “insects” that needed to be eliminated.19 His ideological formation was reflected in his infamous speech in a public rally on 19 December 2010 in Ghadarif, east of Sudan, celebrating the national harvest season. President Bashir said that after the secession of the south (if it happens), the national constitution will be amended to state that the Sharia laws would be the only source of legislation and Arabic the official language of the country. He stressed that there will be no more room for “nonsense,” such as “cultural diversity.”20 He also criticised the police and judiciary for initiating an investigation on the flogging of a female, saying that the woman was tried and convicted according to Sharia. The president does not have political prudence when it comes to long-term interests of the state. He does not take disciplined reason in making decisions or rhetoric, and this could have long-term consequences on the Sudanese political setting. Al-Beshir comments in Russia that his country needs protection from the United States, adding, “We need protection from the U.S. aggressive actions,ˮ while the US administration was in the process of lifting sanctions highlights this

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feature.21 His contradictory statements regarding his association with the Muslim Brotherhood movement also reflect this inappropriate risk or means to accomplish his political goals. While he described in an interview with Emirati newspaper in February 2015 that the Brotherhood was a “threat,”22 he stated in August 2018 that they are fully an Islamic movement. Each of these contradictory statements has its own political objective. Unquestionably, the president is loyal to the people around, which is clear in the presence of the same figures around him. It is imperative to pose a question regarding Al-Beshir integrity looking at his engagement in Sudanese politics. The level of corruption has consistently proven it has no modern equivalent since the independence of Sudan. There were many revelations with documentary evidence of the widespread corruption in sectors, such as telecommunication, Sudan air, infrastructure, oil and banking. Some observers indicated that he is at ease with the large scale of corruption within his family and inner circle. The exploitation of the state resources by public officials, such as the former director of his offices Lieutenant General Taha Osman (bank transfers of hundreds of millions of dollars to his account)23 or the former defence minister Abdalrahim Mohammed Hussain (his involvement in the collapse of the Ribat University building) or his brothers through their association with the president are widely known facts in Sudan. While consecutive reports of the auditor general exposed the high level of corruption and squandering of public funds, Al-Beshir challenged all political parties or any external party to prove institutional corruption in Sudan.24 The lack of truth and integrity values at the top level of government led to the decay of critical state institutions, such as the public service and even the justice system. Al-Beshir announced in July 2018 that he will fight “the fat cats” and opened a special unit for investigating corruption, which is part of the security and intelligence apparatus. However, the step is clearly a cover-up by the president to his associates as the legal expert Nabil Adeeb stated, Granting security authorities, police or justice department jurisdiction over the fight against corruption is of no use, because they are part of the executive branch, and they themselves should be subject to efficient oversight bodies, for example, a corruption commission should be formed and given wide jurisdiction so it could work without interest or intimidation from anybody.25 And added, You cannot fight corruption within an atmosphere of oppression and suppression of political and press freedom, the first phase in fighting corruption is uprooting the environment it flourishes in, which is darkness and suppression, freedoms must be accessed along with urging people to talk about corruption and leaving room for the press to act as whistle-blowers and address corruption foci that proliferate day after day. No doubt, the president lost the battle to leave a legacy of integrity particularly in such a critical issue in the Sudanese context. His survival depends on such corrupt

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system as Alex De Wall put it, “Bashir’s particular talent is an extraordinarily detailed memory of individuals, their networks, and their material demands. He is a skilled manager of a political business plan that relies on retail patronage. Sudan’s contemporary political system relies on patrimonial governance”26 The president failed to keep his promise not to run for 2020 presidential elections in fear of his future. In the past, he declared he would not run for the 2020 presidential elections; however, he was not serious about his promise. His promise breaking undermines his credibility and the public faith in his government as a whole. Al-Beshir’s self-interest led to the lack of a consistent approach in Sudan external relations, ambiguity about his relations with the Islamists and unwillingness to admit to the huge levels of corruption. Most of his decisions are based on expediency for temporary personal or political benefits. During the GNU, AlBeshir failed to display real leadership and pursue a policy prevent the secession of South Sudan and to keep the country intact. Needless to say, he did not show real concern over his legacy as the president who led the fragmentation of the largest country in Africa. His paramount interest at the time was to maintain political power in the north. The secession of South Sudan established his incompetence since the critical objective of any leader is to preserve the integrity of the state.

Disrespect of institutions The lack of a synchronised strategy and action in the state institutions for the purpose of effectiveness policymaking is one of the formidable problems that confronts Sudan’s foreign policy. The president does not exert tangible effort with the state institutions to provide sound judgement and consultation of the advantages and disadvantage of different policies. The overriding dimension of Al-Beshir’s personality hampered the input of the state apparatus in articulating Sudan’s interests. His disrespect for institutions is an apparent feature in his management approach that undercuts and undermines their areas of responsibilities. According to Greenstien, “Political institutions and processes operate through human agency. It would be remarkable if they were not influenced by the properties that distinguish one individual from another.” Al-Beshir assigns exclusive responsibility of important Sudanese external relations portfolios to trusted figures from outside the foreign ministry. Those individuals approach their assignment without consultation or coordination with the ministry, which complain of continuing interference in its work.27 In the beginning of 2016, Al-Bashir issued a decree appointing Dr Awad Ahmed al-Jaz, a prominent NIF figure and former energy minister, in charge of overseeing relations with China at the rank of assistant president. Al-Jazz was also responsible for relations with Turkey and appointed as the head of a high committee to manage relations with the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).28 The president also entrusted the Gulf relations to General Taha Osman who announced the participation of the regime in Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen, even before the knowledge of the foreign ministry officials. The dissolution of the advisory for national security under the leadership of Presidential

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Security Advisor Salah Gosh in October 2010, less than one year after its creation, reflects this pattern. Gosh was a former director of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), and the advisory was created particularly to pacify him following his dismissal from NISS. The advisory efforts to initiate national dialogue led to infighting within the ruling party and prompted the president’s decision to disband it.29 The creation of the paramilitary forces of the rapid support forces, a parallel military force of the Sudanese Armed Forces, also reflects the pattern of his disrespect for institutions and his obsession over his future. Since 1989, Al-Beshir learned and adopted the Islamist movement practice of choosing loyalty over competency of people in his circle. This fatal mistake led to the damage of all spheres of public policy in Sudan, including the diplomatic corps. Al-Beshir entrusted multiple critical responsibilities to a closed circle who were unprepared, with no experience and knowledge. They include figures such as Abdelrahim Mohammed Hussein and Bekri Hassan Salih, with their military backgrounds, and Taha Al-Hussein, who does not have policy credentials, and others how do not have the prerequisite abilities and qualities to serve in a leading role of public office. This situation prompted an environment of secrecy and lack of transparency, and instigated significant domestic and external policy failures, including the unequalled corruption in the country. In June 2017, the president dismissed the firmest supporters of the Saudi led axis in the war in Yemen from his position. General Taha Osman Al-Hussein, the state minister to the presidency, the director of the president’s office and Gulf envoy has the president’s ears for long years and played a key part in overhauling Sudan relations with the Saudi Arabia and UAE. Both countries exploited the considerable clout of General Taha over the president in order to follow their regional strategy by manipulating the NSR political and economic drawbacks.30 General Taha seizes the opportunity of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman political rise in Saudi Arabia to play the role of an agent for the Saudi Arabia and UAE, furthering their interests in Sudan. He was able to steer foreign policy according to their preferences translated in Sudan participation in the Yemeni civil war and the expulsion of the Iranians from Sudan. The president’s absolute trust in his inner clique led General Taha engagement in unmatched corruption when he funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars from the state coffers according to various documents revealed in the Sudanese media.31 General Taha was granted Saudi citizenship while he was undertaking his highprofile position at the Sudanese presidency.32 The absurdity is his statement that he acquired the Saudi citizenship with the knowledge of the president.33 This was part of the Saudi-UAE effort to protect their protégé and achieve their objectives. According to the Arabi21 news site, his sacking came on the eve of the revelation that he offered to assist Saudi Arabia and the UAE to implement a military coup in Qatar to overthrow its government. The plan was in process without any knowledge from the Sudanese security services or even the president.34 This episode reflects the sidelining of the state institutions, such as the foreign ministry, since most of the crucial foreign policy files were in the hand of individuals from outside the ministry. Due to the chaotic situation of handling Sudan foreign policy,

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Ibrahim Gandour, who served as a foreign minister for a period of time, felt there was ongoing rivalry with other NSR figures concerning the foreign policy conduct. One of the main motives that led him to offer his resignation to the president in January 2018 was his displeasure over his failure to manage external relations issues, thus marginalising his ministry to the benefit of individuals.35 The disconnection between the presidential palace and the foreign ministry seems intentional, leaving ambassadors in impossible position, infuriated and bewildered. The president also surrounded himself with family members who have vested interests in his survival to protect their vast wealth through corrupt means. AlBeshir’s principle of employing and promoting on the basis of loyalty allowed in the process those cronies to amass huge wealth while he protects them from indictment. He built a shield around them as they were accumulating millions of dollars. In many well-known cases, he suppressed investigation reports that indicted some of his associates. It has been rumoured that he has a huge fortune hidden away, held by family and these associates. Sudan is considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world according to the transparency international corruption index and continued to score very low on the index in the last few years. Al-Beshir uses the standard autocratic approach to maintain a tight grip on power through trust in a small circle of people. This dimension arises from the paranoia that power obsession generates, and the egotistical conviction that no one can do things better. Most people view Al-Beshir as an unpopular president with questionable legitimacy, accused of widespread violations of human rights and corruption. Two crucial political events during the NSR profoundly influenced Al-Beshir’s current political outlook: the post dispute with Dr Al-Turabi and the ICC indictment.

The post-Turabi era: hunger for power The split between Al-Turabi and Al-Beshir in 1999, which led to the marginalisation of Al-Turabi, had a considerable influence on the president’s outlook. During the dual leadership of President Al-Beshir and Al-Turabi, constant comments by foreign leaders reflected a perception that his status within the regime was second to Al-Turabi’s. “The Libyans seize the opportunity of any visit by Al-Beshir or his vice-president to criticise or complain about the NIF.”36 Following the failed attempt on his life, President Mubarak described Al-Beshir as Al-Turabi’s secretary. President Al-Beshir was always confronted in the international forums before the removal of Al-Turabi by the question of who is really running the country. This international and regional imbedded perception left him humiliated and determined to revenge. The departure of Al-Turabi from the equation of power in the regime in 1999, initiated unruly appetite for power in President Al-Beshir as he amassed unparalleled political power. His endeavour to dominate the regime can be seen as a reaction against his past legacy as a subordinate to Dr Al-Turabi, as an effort to reverse it or leave it behind. Three phases could be identified in the emergence of President Al-Beshir as the central figure in the regime. The first period between 1989 and 1999, Al-Beshir

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was considered a stooge of Al-Turabi’s. The second period between 2000 and 2005 was marred by a cloudy political context with various internal and external dynamics. This includes the rise of the Dr Al-Turabi Popular Congress Party (PCP) and its threat to the regime, the Darfur conflict and the Naivasha negotiations. During these events, there was relative economic stability with various NSR power centres actively engaged in decision making. Following the death of John Garang in July 2005, the influence of Ali Utman waned the president started to gradually control all powers in the state. As Southern Sudan voted for separation, President Al-Beshir commanded the whole sphere of decision making. He exerted a lot of efforts to undermine the NCP and the Islamic movement in Sudan in order to be the central figure in decision making. There were various power centres in the NSR post-Turabi period including figures such as Ali Uthman, Nafie Ali Nafie and Awad Al-Jazz. However, Vice-President Taha gained increasing influence and became a centre figure in the political equation. The significant contribution of Taha in the CPA at the time was part of his ambitious drive. The settlement of the conflict augmented his political position internally and offered him backing in the international level.37 President Al-Beshir, who was the dominant force in the regime, perceived Taha’s rising power as a challenge to his dominant role; however, he has the card of other power centres adversary to Taha and competes with him. The internal dynamics between the pragmatists vs. hardliners were used by the president to enhance his control over the state. The presence of the UN troops in Darfur illuminates this dichotomy between those strands; Taha represents the moderates, while Al-Beshir represents the hardliners rejecting its presence. While Taha endeavoured to exploit his image being the main intermediary in reaching the CPA with the international community, AlBeshir considered the UN presence an “external conspiracy” against Sudan. He exploited the prevalent anti-American sentiment portraying himself as the nationalist who stands firm against the “almighty US pressure”38 Through time, Al-Beshir was able to get rid of most power centres by playing the divided ruling elite with the fragmentation of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. Those public figures who represents different agendas are shrewd and ruthless Islamist politicians as a WikiLeaks cable titled “The National Congress Party— Sudan’s Brutal Pragmatists” described them: They are brutal pragmatists, well-educated but toxic cosmopolitans, ready to negotiate, to deal, to compromise in order to tighten their grip on the real levers of power in Sudan or to escalate into mass murder and outright defiance if that is called for . . . their motivation is Islamic the same way the God father’s Corleone family’s motivation is Catholic.39 The power struggle between “the team of rivals” including NCP figures and military personnel over the control of state and party allowed President Al-Beshir to be the central figure in the regime. The intriguing internal dynamics within the regime led to the marginalisation of political heavyweights, such as Vice-President Ali Uthman, the deputy chairman of the NCP Dr Nafi A. Nafi, Dr Ghazi Salah Eldin,

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the head of intelligence Salah Gosh and others. The president used the enmity between those figures to dominate policy and decision making in the internal and external spheres.

The ICC factor The indictment of President Al-Beshir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur is a major factor in shaping President Al-Beshir’s mindset in the interaction with outside world. The ICC indictment for Al-Beshir was the first for a sitting head of state. President Al-Beshir is one of a handful of heads of state under international sanctions, including Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, Zimbabwe’s former President Robert Mugabe and former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. While all major political parties in Sudan, with the exception of the PCP, have expressed their support to the Government of Sudan and President Al-Bashir, the ICC remains a milestone around his neck. The ICC led Al-Beshir to seek a political exit from the presidency without the threat of being surrendered to the ICC, a vital component in the NSR foreign policy front. The president views the Gulf States as a potential route for political exit from the ICC debacle. Undoubtedly, the ICC had a considerable impact in shaping the Sudanese domestic and international setting. The president emerged as the principal figure in the regime with the internal breakup following the falling out with Dr Hassan Al-Turabi in 1999. His grip on power while indicted by the ICC demonstrates his fears for his safety and family over any future political change in Sudan. The ICC obliges the state party to the Rome Statute to execute the arrest warrant, provided President Bashir is on their territory. This procedure prompts Al-Beshir to travel extensively to present an image of a defiant leader in the face of the international court. The ICC entrenched a high sense of conspiracy toward the president, while the case became a rallying cause for populist rhetoric. One of the few options available for the president to evade the ICC indictment was the leverage of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with their economic and political power in the West, which could find him a political exit or a future sanctuary. His personal anxiety over the ICC instigated unpredictability in the president political behaviour. His visit to Russia in December 2017 and the way he conducted himself provided strong evidence of his disregard for institutions. Without any consultation with the foreign ministry or even his advisors, in his encounter with President Putin, Al-Beshir requested “protection” from Russia against the “aggressive” acts of the United States. This remark came amidst the US government process of lifting sanctions against Sudan.40 His deep-seated discontent with the US administration stems from its reluctance to support dropping the ICC charges against him. In his discourse, President Al-Beshir routinely invokes the West’s conspiracy against the regime calling the ICC a “colonial court.” Another aspect that triggered his erratic statement in Russia is the United States’ rejection of him running for the 2020 presidential elections. There is a personal bitterness over his inability to easily meet with international leaders and his treatment in the

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international forums as a rogue figure. The extreme nature of the charges and the allegation that Al-Bashir was personally in total command of the state security apparatus made it much easier for the NCP to persuasively portray the charges as politically-motivated. He was disappointed over the Chinese decision not to block a UN Security Council resolution in March 2005, referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. The president perceives China as a strong ally that is able to protect the regime in such situation. The president has Chinese assurances that resolution 1593 would not be passed, and the cabinet was informed of the Chinese position.41 This action led the president not to tie his future and the regime with China since they failed him in such decisive political juncture. The ICC has influenced his outlook to the regime inner clique internal dynamics and the potential in the international spheres that can provide him with an exit for the ICC indictment. External forces were able to influence and manoeuvre Sudan’s international relations through the manipulation of central figures in the regime. The ICC negatively affected the political context by adding more complications related to the future of President Al-Beshir. The ICC became a decisive factor in his desire to continue as the president and tied up his political future with the state interest. In this context, Helen Cobban, who argued that international courts are not always helpful in complex political contexts, makes a valid point in the case of current Sudan.42 Cobban indicated that “the assumption that ‘war crimes tribunals’ advance human rights rests on a deep failure to recognize the nearly all of today’s atrocities are committed in the anarchic, violent atmosphere of war zones.” She added, “In some instances, threats of prosecution can actually impede peace peacemaking, prolong conflict, and multiply the atrocities associated with them.” The initiation of the ICC indictment in the middle of the CPA prompted suspicion among the political elite of the West’s intention to fragment the Sudanese state. On the eve of the triggering of the ICC case, the SC was divided on the ICC issues. The Russian Federation, China, Libya, Burkina Faso, South Africa, Indonesia and Vietnam are understood to support the idea of suspension of proceedings against President Al-Bashir. Others, including Italy, Croatia, Belgium, Panama and Costa Rica, remain concerned with justice and accountability, and oppose what they describe as SC interference in the ICC proceedings.43 The AU and the Arab League pronounced concerns about the ICC warrant. There were efforts through the AU, Arab League and Organization of the Islamic Conference for SC action under article 16 of the Rome Statute to no avail. Under this provision, the SC may request a suspension of ICC proceedings for one year, renewable through a Chapter VII-type UNSC Resolution. The ICC made the president more determined to hold on power and made him suspicious of any future new political formula since it could jeopardise his personal safety and the security of his own family. There could be more conducive scenarios to reaching a political compromise for the future of Sudan without the ICC indictment. The indictment was a contributing factor in the secession of Southern Sudan since it entrenched the southerners’ conviction that it is better to

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leave a chaotic state with an indicted president. The ICC’s “Africa bias” asserts the widely spread mistrust and suspicion toward the court.44 This has led the AU in 2008 to pass a resolution that states that the charging of African heads of state was an affront to the “sovereignty and integrity of the continent.”45

Conclusion Many people will ask in future whether the leadership of President Al-Beshir helped plant the seeds of forces now tearing apart the Sudanese state. During his presidency, extraordinary events occurred, including the conflict in Darfur, the separation of South Sudan, the unparalleled level of corruption, the steady collapse of public sector institutions and the military institution. On his watch, he oversaw all policies and decisions related to these catastrophic events and dynamics. Through time, Al-Beshir failed to instil a sense of national unity among all segments of the country’s population. The implications of these issues on the Sudanese state will be his defined legacy, and he will also be judged by what comes next. One early legacy of Al-Beshir and one of the most important is the rupture of social cohesion in the Sudanese society. The Sudanese society is severely fractured under his leadership, which instigated constant conflicts in different parts of the state. After 30 years in power, Al-Beshir has grown surer of his own judgement and more cut off from anyone else than at any point since 1989.

Notes 1 James B D (2008), The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. New York: Routledge. 2 Al-Dao Fathi (2018), (The Plague) Al-Taoon: The Penetration of the State Security and Intelligence in Sudan. Cairo: Jazeerat Al-Ward Publishers. 3 Le Monde, 13 July 1989. 4 Al Jazeera TV (16 June 2016), Interview with Dr Hassan al-Turabi: With Ahmed Mansour, Witness on Time—Part 9, Aljazeera Media Network. Available at: https://bit. ly/2yNthW6 [Accessed 21 Oct. 2018]. 5 The chair of the RCC speech to the military officers and soldiers—Wadi Sayydna Military District, 3 July 1989. 6 Millon T, and Davis R D (1996), Disorders of Personality: DSM–IV and Beyond (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley. 7 HRW (21 Apr. 2014), We Stood, They Opened Fire,”. Available at: https://bit.ly/1SFynr5 [Accessed 4 Dec. 2018]. 8 Nstasios A (May/June 2008), Beyond Darfur Sudan’s Slide Towards Civil War. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://fam.ag/2PyMt52 [Accessed 6 Dec. 2018]. 9 Interview with prominent Sudanese Journalist, Nov. 2018. 10 Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) (20 Mar. 2005), al-Beshir: Merowe Dam Represents the End of Poverty in Sudan. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Et5twP [Accessed 18 Oct. 2018]. 11 AlJazeera.net (26 Feb. 2006), al-Bashir Vows to Turn Darfur into a Cemetery for Foreign Intervention. Available at: https://bit.ly/2RWVHWr [Accessed 18 Oct. 2018]. 12 France 24 (9 Nov. 2012), President Omar al-Bashir “I Am Well and Our Response to Israel Will be Painful.” Available at: https://bit.ly/2EtZTuc [Accessed 18 Oct. 2018]. 13 Salih Faisal M (2017), The National Dialogue in Sudan: A Dream that Didn’t Come True, Conference on “Dialogue in the Two Sudans.” The Sudanese Programme, St Anthony’s College.

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14 Ibid. 15 WikiLeaks (21 Mar. 2008), Hassan Al-Turabi on NCP Dynamics. Available at: https:// bit.ly/2PsAfGY [Accessed 8 Oct. 2018]. 16 Speech by Dr al-Turabi in a Public Rally in Haj Yusuf Area (28 Mar. 2010). Available at: https://bit.ly/2AoJvXC [Accessed 24 Oct. 2018]. 17 Dr Turabi Speaks in a Seminar in al-Shuruq Newspaper—Egypt (14 Nov. 2011). Available at: https://bit.ly/2AsVHH1 [Accessed 25 Oct. 2018]. 18 Ali Mazrui (1985), The Multiple Marginality of the Sudan,” in Yusuf Fadl. Hasan, ed., Sudan in Africa. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, p. 240. 19 BBC (19 Apr. 2012), Sudan President Seeks to ‘Liberate’ South Sudan. Available at: https://bbc.in/2CEmuS3 [Accessed 25 Oct. 2018]. 20 Reuters (19 Dec. 2010), Sudan’s Bashir Sees Islamic Law, Defends Flogging. Available at: https://bit.ly/2DTTdmZ 21 AP (23 Nov. 2017), Sudan’s President Visits Russia, Asks for Protection From US. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Q3YRKJ [Accessed 2 Dec. 2018]. 22 Interview with President Al-Beshir (23 Feb. 2015), We Reject the International Character of the Muslim Brotherhood and Support All Actions. Available at: https://bit. ly/2QrT2WU [Accessed 2 Dec. 2018]. 23 The rank was given to Taha Osman as being part of the security apparatus without any formal credentials, and this also reflects the level of corruption in the state institutions. 24 Alintibaha Newspaper, 11 Mar. 2010. 25 Altaghyeer (07 Aug. 2018), “Fat Cats” and Albashir’s Internal and Regional Game. Available at: https://bit.ly/2BRDlAe [Accessed 8 Oct. 2018]. 26 De Waal A (2016), Sudan: A Turbulent Political Marketplace, in Kamrava M, ed., Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East. London: Hurst & Co. 27 Interview with prominent Journalist. 28 Sudan Tribune (15 Jan. 2018), Sudan’s Foreign Minister Change His Mind Regarding Resignation After Mediation. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Nv1pvf [Accessed 8 Oct. 2018] 29 Gabrallah O E (2017), Alsudan Siraa Alnukhab Almutaalma (The contest among the Educated Elite: The Disbandment of the National Security Advisory). Khartoum: Daar Azza Publications. 30 Interview with a Sudanese Academic, Khartoum, 4 Jan. 2018. 31 Al-Amin A (12 Aug. 2016), How Did Taha and the Mafia Steal $110 Million From a Qatari Deposit and Buy Stolen Oil Without Documents? Alrakoba. Available at: https:// bit.ly/2MIPYzG [Accessed 19 Sept. 2018]. 32 Following his sacking, he was appointed as an advisor to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. 33 Al-Tayyar Newspaper (7 July 2017), General Taha: I Hold the Saudi Citizenship. Available at: https://bit.ly/2rkwt8l [Accessed 19 Sept. 2018]. 34 Abdalsalam M (28 June 2017), Details of the Overthrow of the Director of the Office of the Sudanese President and Its Relationship with Riyadh. Arabi21. Available at: https://bit.ly/2PHKg2X [Accessed 19 Sept. 2018]. General Taha discussed the costs and expenses with the Saudis and Emiratis, inviting a delegation to give them an idea of the ability of the required forces and its readiness to implement the invasion plan. All these moves were behind the scenes without the knowledge of President Bashir; however, all these details were monitored for some time by the security apparatus. However, after making sure of the dangers of the plan, the security apparatus presented General Taha telephone conversations to the shocked policy makers in the presidency. 35 Interview with Khalid Al-Tijani, Editor in Chief Ilaf Newspaper, Khartoum, 18 July 2018. 36 Interview with Abbas Ibrahim Al-Nour, 22 Dec. 2004, Khartoum. 37 After the removal of Dr Ghazi from the negotiations, Al-Bashir assigned Ali Uthman Taha to head the government delegation to the talks. 38 Another fact which played in favor of the “hardliners” was the dramatic events in Lebanon in May–June 2006 and the debate over the UN troops in Lebanon.

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39 WikiLeaks (9 Mar. 2008), The National Congress Party—Sudan’s Brutal Pragmatists. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Pl9vaE [Accessed 5 Dec. 2018]. 40 France 24 (23 Nov. 2017), Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for ‘Protection’ From ‘Aggressive’ US. Available at: https://bit.ly/2xw9idO [Accessed 17 Sept. 2018] 41 Interview with Gazi Salah Deen, a prominent Islamist, Khartoum, Jan. 2018. 42 Cobben H (Mar./Apr. 2006), Think Again: International Courts. Foreign Policy. 43 Security Council Report (29 Sept. 2008), Monthly Forecast October 2008. Available at: https://bit.ly/2rrHhSk [Accessed 8 Dec. 2018]. 44 All of the eight of countries where the ICC initiated investigations thus far have been in Africa. However, half of these cases were referred to the court by African states, while others originated with the UN Security Council or the court’s chief prosecutor. 45 Verini J (22 June 2016), The Prosecutor and the President. The New York Times. Available at: https://nyti.ms/2pVrvht [Accessed 17 Sept. 2018].

Part 3

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The future is coming Reflections on Sudan’s foreign policy

On foreign policy and identity Political elites are central to the formation of the state national identity and how this moulding is reflected in the international level. They construct the state identity based on their beliefs, which could sometimes be in contrast with the identity fostered by the society. The meaning of nationhood bestow legitimacy on the nature of foreign policy and definition of national interest, and this dimension has always triggered controversy over what are the central constituents that construct the character of the society and its history. The identity outlook of the political elite in government feed into the process of engagement in the international arenas and steer foreign policy in a particular direction. In this context, identity has always played a critical role in Sudanese foreign policy action that is how decision makers apply certain policy, direction or a decision in the external sphere. The belief system that frame Sudanese identity as primarily Arab Muslim during the last three decades represent a top-down process ignoring the societal realities. Since its initiation in the 1945s, the political action of the Muslim Brotherhood focused on the Muslim northern part of the country and consider it as their stronghold for the achievement of their political interests. The implementation of the NIF programme in the domestic sphere since 1989 involved ignoring civil and political liberties in one of the most heterogeneous states in the world. Their implementation of Sharia was the core of their political agenda, a sign of its panIslamic ideology aimed at the revival of Islam in the international sphere.1 The movement did not have a clear agenda in the foreign policy domain, but their early statements and political development indicate a steady dogmatic pattern of antagonism towards the West. Most writers on Sudanese politics emphasise the predicament faced by foreign policymakers with their distinct outlook on domestic and external policies. Academics on Sudan have depicted the inherent economic, political and social weaknesses in the Sudanese state in different ways, such as Gehad Auda’s “fragmented polity par excellence”2 or Peter Bechtold’s “the politics of factionalism.”3 They stipulate that the political condition of the Sudanese state compels any regime in power to use foreign policy as a vital tool for survival, abandon in the process any concept of long-term national interests. Ann Mosely Lesch encapsulates

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the continuing themes of political cleavages and the state drawbacks that distinguished Sudan external relations in terms of “in search of Arms, Aid, and allies.”4 Undoubtedly, the dominant force policies in Sudan’s domestic political arena reflects the state external posture. Ideology and revolutionary influence since independence is an intermittent trend, reacting to the domestic political environment. These phenomena’s also endeavour to adapt to the state context and the external realities to fulfil the aspirations of the new ruling elite. In a case study of President Nimeiri’s regime, Dunstan Wai exposes the failure of “rhetorical radicalism” and the inherent internal impediments to its sustainability in the Sudanese context.5 The apparent lack of consensus in Sudan’s internal politics resulted in the inconsistency of foreign policymaking and in the formulation of its objectives. Mansour Khalid in The Government They Deserve illuminates the unqualified failure of the Sudanese elite to articulate and to reach the least requisite agreement on issues of national priority.6 The performance of successive regimes in the international level reveal the perceptions and interests of the governing elite or the leader in power. Historical development of Sudanese political parties in democratic systems has been decisive in the process of policymaking; while the president and his inner circle have the upper hand in military regimes. The cold war had its effect on Sudan with the two superpowers tussling each other for allies in the region. The international and regional political milieus influenced Sudan’s politics and its interaction with the outside world. Changes in governments constantly altered the management of foreign policymaking and behaviour. The domestic political dynamics is evidently vital dimension in understanding policy since the manoeuvre of internal opponents for political gain is an overriding factor all political group. This dimension led Sudan to continue playing a marginal role in world politics. The secession of Southern Sudan in July 2011 presents numerous questions regarding the future determinants of Sudan foreign policy. It poses many questions related to possible substantive changes that impact Sudan’s external engagement strategy. It also instigated a debate on Sudan identity and foreign policy with advocates of Arabism vs. Africanism lying at the heart of it. Since independence, consecutive governments struggled to react to the Sudanese social composition context through its foreign policy. Before the secession, Sudan was one of the most diverse countries in the world composed of a myriad of ethnic groups in different parts of the state. This multicultural setting continues to be the bedrock of North Sudanese society after the south separation. This is the societal reality despite the NSR regime elite rhetoric on this issue, and President Al-Beshir’s statement in December 2010 in Ghadarif, east of Sudan, pointed out after the secession of the south that there will be no more room for “nonsense,” such as “cultural diversity”7 Sudan witnessed a constant crisis of identity since independence. The political class associate themselves along the dividing lines of ethnic/tribal or north/south. Policymakers in the north failed to promote concepts of Sudan as a “melting pot” or “terramedia” defines the country as a bridge between the Arab world and the African continent. Rigid views linking Sudan to either the Arab or the African world were instrumental in the state’s instability and the separation of South Sudan. Mahjoub Al-Basha pointed out in his thesis Multi-ethnicity and Sudan’s

The future is coming 115 Foreign Afro-Arab Policy the domination of the Northern and Central Sudanese, which influenced the content of foreign policy and the lack of consensus over identity.8 As a result, civil war erupted in the south to contest the Arab-Islamic North domination and their definition of state identity. The continuing debate on identity and its implications in the policy sphere increased instability. This has crippled the ability to establish a functional state able to achieve the goals of economic development and integration between Sudan’s diverse communities. This war of visions, as recognised by Francis Deng, which is still a valid argument even after secession for North Sudan has implications for the external behaviour. The ruling elite in government strongly correlates their policies with the Arab world at the expense of Sudan’s African identity: Two principal patterns of correlation between domestic and foreign policies emerge from the country’s experience since independence: one, essentially the dominant theme, is the degree to which the Arab-Islamic identity has been the principal foundation on which Sudan’s foreign policy has been predicated; the other is the way the reconciliation of the African and Arab identities through the Addis Ababa Agreement enabled the Sudan to play a bridging and moderating role in the Afro-Arab region.9 Consecutive government’s failure to manage foreign policy and identity led to appalling consequences on the social, economic and political fronts. John Garang, the leader of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement, articulates this dilemma as follows: Our major problem is that Sudan has been looking and is still looking for its soul; for its true identity. Failing to find it [Northern] Sudanese take refuge in Arabism; failing this they find refuge in Islam as a uniting factor. Others [i.e., southerners] get frustrated as they fail to see how they could become Arabs when their Creator thought otherwise. And they take refuge in separation. In all this there is a lot of mystification and distortion to suit the various sectarian interests [. . .] there is no sharpness in our identity.10 Safwat Fanos examined the endeavour to establish the concept of “unity in diversity” on the domestic level and its successful role in Afro-Arab cooperation following the peace agreement in 1972.11 President Nimeiri’s government pursued a domestic policy stressing Sudan’s Afro-Arab characters that signify a constructive strategy for achieving national interests’ principles. One of the first acts in this policy was the rejection of an invitation to join the Federation of Arab Republics, including Egypt, Libya and Syria in 1970. Ratification of such an agreement would make “southerners fear the prospects of increased Arab influence and domination in the Sudan, the very situation against which they fought.”12 This designation of Sudan as a bridge between the two worlds was emphasised in article 1 of Sudan’s 1973 permanent constitution. “The Democratic Republic of the Sudan is a unitary, democratic, socialist and sovereign republic, and is part of

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both the Arab and African entities.”13 The previous constitution did not articulate the importance of Sudan being part of the African continent. In debating the draft constitution suggestions were tabled to add “part of Islamic identity” or “Islam is the official religion of the state,” but the committee responsible did not accept these proposals. The justification for refusing the inclusion of these phrases was expressed by committee member Jaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit as follows: We want to build a state based on citizenship and not on religion. Loyalty should be to the Sudanese soil and not to religion. If the country adopts a religion for itself then it will be connected to something that does not unite all the Sudanese. This issue was a source of suspicion between the North and the South in the past and we do not want to raise these suspicions.14 The strategy for an all-encompassing society reaped international diplomatic respect and economic benefits from the Arab world to Sudan.15 One of the characteristics of Sudan’s foreign policy since independence is its fragmentation between the political class perception of the state identity and its population. This dissimilarity between the fabric of the society and its representation in foreign policy behaviour led to a catastrophic impact in the domestic and external spheres. The national identity of Sudan as it exists is scarcely represented in foreign policy formulation, and partial set of values were imposed to depict the society. Most of the Sudanese government since independence never pursue to implement suitable policies or provide a conducive context that represent the diversity of the society. The NSR rule remain a powerful point of reference for the risks associated with deformed representation of Sudanese identity in foreign policy. It is critical for any upcoming government to reinvent Sudan’s reputation abroad, after the NSR regime enormously distorted Sudanese self-image through proper depiction of the fabric of the society. The NSR ignored and cast aside many dynamic institutions and values that are a source of Sudanese national pride in the past and all people identify with education at home or neutrality in foreign policy. In the future, the political class has a responsibility to redefine the state encompassing relationships with the Arab world and the African continent. They have to challenge, reexamine and possibly relinquish the sagas of unique relationships as long as this lies at the heart of Sudan’s national interests. The sense of the diversity, melting pot or a bridge between Africa and Arab world of the Sudanese government is crucial for it distinguish what are the special characteristics of Sudan as a state. Therefore, foreign policy is part of the mechanism in the pursuit for the state identity. In many cases, Sudanese policymakers failed to engage efficiently with the predicaments surrounding the state’s position in the contradictory politics of the African and the Arab worlds. This has led to Sudanese exposure to the complications and contradictions of both regions. The presence of different states from both regions, with various interests and politics, added constraints and decreased the opportunities available to any Sudanese government in power. Sudan is bound

The future is coming 117 by virtue of its location to have to respond to developments in different milieus: the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the African Sahel and the Middle East. This context is still the case after the secession of the south.

On relations with South Sudan South Sudan is one of the most important neighbouring states for Sudan. Relations between the two states hold at its centre immense accumulations of passions and sentiments. Both states were one country during colonialism and after independence from 1956 until 2011 with intensive social, political and economic interactions during this period. They share the longest borders in the African continent (more than 2,000 km) inhabited by population with interconnected social economic and cultural interests. For a large number of North and South Sudanese, the issue of separation brings a lot of sad emotions. Many in both states continue to feel that they can understand each other better than any other people in neighbouring countries. The realities of history and geography, in addition to mutual interests, determine the nature of relations between states; however, culture, emotions, history and language play an important part in forming relationship. In theory, no neighbouring country to South Sudan is better positioned to play a favourable role in its economic and political dynamics than Sudan because of all the above. However, that potential has been stunted in Sudan because of the mindset and nature of the NSR regime. In the meantime, both sides are to blame, with ideology persistently seizing the high ground since the separation of the south. The regimes in both countries demonise each other in a struggle to please their constituents and maintain power. The Sudanese geopolitical context following the separation of the south is a new decisive development in the future formulation of foreign policy. Relation with South Sudan is strategic despite the daunting array of security and political challenges. The social interlinks between the south and the north border line will be central in future economic development and political stability. Following the separation, the Sudanese government was the first country in the international community to recognise South Sudan, which sent a positive signal for the future. The legacy of the past characterize the outlook of many political elites of both countries that led to the ongoing vexed relations. Meanwhile, this legacy shouldn’t preclude bilateral engagement. South Sudan government embraces a foreign policy direction that bring it closer to Anglophone East African nations, such as Kenya and Uganda. It is important to note that most of the SPLM leaders were base in East Africa during the civil war. It also adopted English language as the state official language in the 2011 interim institution, although the majority of South Sudanese speak “Juba Arabic.”16 Laura Kasinof indicated in an article the problem of English language as a unifying factor in the new state after seven years of independence: “The failure to turn English into a unifying force did not destroy the country, but it is one among many failures.”17 This could be viewed in the context of a backlash for the new nation relations with its former radical Islamist country in the north. Hostility and tension have distinguished relations between

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the two countries since 31 July 2011, and war erupted in April 2012 after SPLA attack on Heglig. Although, both government signed nine cooperation agreements in September 2012 in different vital spheres including security arrangements, the status of nationals of the other state, borders, trade, economy and oil. The only agreement which was implemented after seven years is the Transitional Financial Arrangement related to the resumption of production of oil by South Sudan and the transit fees for Sudan.18 The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) will persist to be the leading player in Southern Sudan, irrespective of the frequent critique of its misgovernment, corruption instability and lack of basic services. The eruption of conflict in 2013 between South Sudan government forces under the leadership of Silva Kiir and the opposition groups under Riek Machar threatened the development of constructive relations between the two countries. This has led to the positive contribution from Sudan in the peaceful resolution in the Revitalized Agreement of the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan in August 2015 and in a later stage the revitalisation process following the renew of conflict. The deep nature of relationship could create a considerable market for different industrial and agricultural products. Cooperation on oil sector is also vital for both countries. The future leadership in both countries should recognise the fundamental interest in working together on immensely significant critical matters, especially Abyei, borders and oil. Cooperation in a proactive manner is simply the only available option for effectively tackling wide ranging challenges. The reinvigoration of bilateral relations and the decrease of tension require the implementation of agreements signed between the two countries, including oil, security arrangements and citizenship. There are many thorny issues which require intensive mutual efforts and compromise to disentangle bilateral relations. The manipulation of the tribal context in South Sudan will continue to have a negative impact on Sudan’s interests in the long run. The maintenance of constructive relation would provide the opportunity for Sudan foreign policy to play its former role of a bridge between the Arab world and Africa. Undoubtedly, historical relations and the Sudanese political class broad knowledge of the tribal, political dynamics and the networks of Sudanese people with South Sudan society give Sudan an edge in being a major mediator in South Sudan internal political rifts. However, the two states historical and political links with opposition groups in different areas of both countries could negatively mould bilateral relations. During the civil conflict with the north, the SPLA was able to build political capital in the political elite of the three areas of Southern Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei, exploiting it as a leverage in its relations with the north. On the other hand, Sudan exploit the antipathy towards the domination of the Dinka of South Sudan political space, as well as rallying the major tribes of Misseriya and Rizeighat in the border area with South Sudan. In this context, the level of interference in each state internal affairs will be critical in building conducive relations as the South and North Sudan have a wide scope of prospects for political, social and military meddling. The continuation of this political and military immersion

The future is coming 119 in the internal affairs of both countries would lead to destabilisation in both countries. This context has poisoned relations since the secession of the south. Abyei constitute a major stumbling block in shaping strong sustainable relations. The decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in July 2009 that delineates the Abyei area still faces many challenges. The court conclusions strived to enable conflict resolution on the future status of Abyei as being part of the north or the south of Sudan. However, the Misseriya’s displeasure with the PCA ruling, stagnation on the border demarcation and unresolved controversial issues are related to the definition of Abyei’s resident.19 The development of a framework agreement for soft border that allow cross-border arrangements, ensure certain rights and the formation of local mechanisms for dialogue and conflict resolution is a paramount in the area and could move the situation forward. Both countries recognition of the interdependence of communities on the border would augment the efforts to settle the Abyei dispute. Both communities in the south and north of the borders should be allowed free movement weather for services, commodities, markets or grazing pastures and waters. In the future, Abyei should be a model for cooperation and integration; therefore, considerable investment by both countries should be allocated to the benefit of all border communities. It is crucial that both countries put their differences aside and establish a productive relationship to address these existential challenges. The dynamics of relationship gets set at the top, therefore future Sudanese and South Sudanese needs to work out their current disputes within a framework that prioritise cooperation. This will lead to the achievement of vital national interests; however, the form of relations is bleak at present with the NSR regime in power and the fragmented political context in Southern Sudan. The NSR antipathy towards the south stems from ideological reasons, and this will continue to hinder any potential for strategic relationship. In the south, the fragmentation of the political elite within the SPLM and other political forces continue to be the key difficulty for national unity. Political elites in the south exploit ethnic, tribal and regional, and depend on these constituencies to influence internal political dynamics. This will remain a central challenge to building a common identity in the south as well as the north. There is no doubt that more democratic governments in both countries is to be desired. The post-NSR state in Sudan could provide a future momentum for a fresh start in the relationship between the two states. A new political system in Sudan will open the door for resolving the outstanding issues and dispose of the NSR ideological legacy. This new context should inevitably be able to identify reasonable solutions, recognise the common interests in a sustainable constructive relationship and act accordingly. As a landlocked state, Sudan should encourage the use of its ports by its southern neighbour, and transportation networks should be established to foster trade and social links. Issues such as population growth, the development agenda and food insecurity will propel Nile waters to take a central stage in future regional and bilateral relations. The common interest of both countries and some of the upstream Nile

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River basin countries on the Nile waters will foster strategic interest in development cooperation. This cooperation would have a considerable resonance in regional stability and, undoubtedly, sound bilateral relations will depend on the broad regional dynamics. The outlook of future stable South Sudan will eventually increase rivalry between regional states for trade, commercial and investment opportunities. For example, proposals were surfaced by Kenya in the past of possible erection of a rail and a road linkage to connect South Sudan with Kenya and the port of Mombasa. Parallel to this is also the prospect of oil pipeline through Kenya, which could compete with the current pipeline through Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Uganda, Ethiopia, China and Western countries as well are looking for the huge economic and investment potential in Southern Sudan. Sudan and South Sudan future friendship could serve as the backbone to economic alliance in East Africa, while no doubt other countries in this block could look warily at the formation of such a strong friendship between the two countries. Sudan should tailor future cooperation policies with the south that embrace and take into consideration regional competition. In the meantime, both countries should deepen their economic cooperation through rail and other infrastructure connections, strengthen ties between populations through cultural exchanges and language lessons and coordinate closely in global forums.

On relations with Egypt Egypt’s powerful position in the Arab and international politics and its historical links with Sudan grants unrivalled political clout to influence Sudan. After independence, Egypt continued to infiltrate Sudanese politics for maintaining its strategic interests. It exploited the internal divisions of the domestic political process, whether between Khatmiyya and Mahdiyyah, between the military and civilians or even between government officials: Sudan continuously lived in the shadows of Egypt and is influenced by what is happening to it due to its political, economic and leadership capabilities that were always far bigger than Sudan’s. As for Egypt, its main concern is its national security based on its hypothesis that its security is dependent on Sudan’s security. This factor prompted Egypt to seek stable, allied Sudanese government that has no hostile or impeding aspirations.20 All political parties were faced during the independence period with the choice between the unity of the Nile Valley and independence, including parties representing Al-Mahadiyya and Al-Khatmiyya Tariqas. The Sudanese Islamic Sufi Tariqa of Al-Mahadiyya and Al-Khatmiyya are the dominant social and political forces in the north.21 Each of them was historically developed to symbolise a particular orientation towards Egypt, Sudan’s powerful neighbour to the north. While Al-Khatmiyya, represented by the DUP, prefers stronger ties with Egypt, the Umma party acting for the Al-Mahadiyya Tariqa dislike Egypt’s paternalistic

The future is coming 121 attitude towards Sudan. The antagonism of the Umma party towards Egypt originated from the Mahdist revolt against Turkish-Egyptian rule in Sudan in the late nineteenth century. The political orientations of both parties are reflected in their slogans during independence with the DUP calls for “the unity for the Nile Valley” and the Umma party calls for “Sudan is for the Sudanese.” Islam and Arabism are the core ideology of these parties in the north, which impeded the formation of a wider nationalist perspective encompassing various multi-ethnic and less developed political movements in other parts of the country. Foreign policymaking became a reflection of the distribution of power among political groups rather than an instrument for national unity. The Nile is a strategic security issue for Egypt considering it as the lifeline for its population, and its importance was reflected in the determination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt to construct the Aswan High Dam. The construction was completed after an agreement with Sudan over the share of the Nile waters in 1959 without the participation of other Nile Basin countries. Since independence, many in the circles of Sudanese elite and policymakers created a legend of the unity of the Nile Valley. This sentimental view is also widespread among many Sudanese people especially segments of the ruling class and mirrored by the Egyptian complete and utter focus on economic and political interests. The Sudanese elite deployed magnificent edifice of rhetoric regarding fraternal association and special relationship, yet in private through time, these same politicians fumed and railed about the ruthlessness of the Egyptian policies. Halayeb dispute continued to be a thorn in the bilateral relations since the conflict started in 1958 and continued from time to time until 1992, when Egypt seized Halayeb by force. Until today, the Sudanese government continued to renew a complaint to the UN Security Council each year. Egypt refuses international arbitration to be presented in the International Court of Justice on the issue which requires the consent of both parties. The two countries have signed the four freedoms agreements (movement, residence, work, own property) with its application falters on the Egyptian side in spite of repeated complaints from the Sudan. The consecutive Egyptian governments never displayed the smallest interest in the fortunes of Sudan. None of what presented earlier intend to represent a protest of nationalist self-pity. Egypt has always conducted its foreign policy on the principle that dictates actions of all governments including Sudan: furtherance of national interest, while the Sudanese political class in their anxiety to sustain Egyptians goodwill, gave away many things too cheaply. In 1959, Sudan agreed to the construction of the Aswan High Dam in exchange of ill-defined promises of creating new city instead of the submerged city of Halfa. In a series of articles about the negotiation between Sudan and Egypt on the high dam, Dr Salman Mohammed Salman, a former world bank legal expert exposed the gradual concessions made by various Sudanese delegations between 1954–59 to the Egyptian government and failed to come up with good deal for Sudan.22 Salman demonstrated how the Sudanese elite failure to preserve and protect the state interests has often generated humiliation and rational questions about Sudan outlook of its relations with its neighbour in the north. He

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indicated the amount claimed by Sudan for the resettlement of the people of Halfa was 35 million Egyptian pounds (EGP), which was reduced, and Sudan finally received only 15 million EGP. However, the final cost of the resettlement amounted to around 37 million EGP. The end results of negotiations led to massive irreparable losses to Sudan, including not only the flooding of Wadi Halfa city and 27 villages to its south and north as part of Aswan Dam, but it had also lost nearly 200,000 acres of fertile agricultural land, and approximately a million palm and citrus trees. Sudan also lost Dal and Samna waterfalls, which were submerged in the High Dam Lake, which could have generated more than 650 megawatts of electric power, as well as the loss of antiquities and minerals in the area.23 The agreement caused wide public anger in Sudan due to the resettling of 52,000 Nubians from their historical land in the north to Khashm Algirba in the eastern part of the country and led to the collapse of Abboud regime. Abboud regime’s non-interference policy had defied Nassir’s involvement policy in ideological conflicts in Congo and Yemen, which later worsened relations between the two countries. By the end of Abboud’s regime, Sudan’s independent external stance, and the outraged domestic atmosphere over the reluctance of Egypt to pay its dues for the Nubian relocation plans, deteriorated the relations between the two countries. Neutral policy was implemented towards African neighbours of not backing any rebel groups on the principle of respect for neighbouring states sovereignty. President Abboud’s neutral posture sparked wide criticism from both Sudanese intellectuals and the radical African states, especially from Nasser of Egypt and Nkrumah of Ghana. Sudan had been regarded as an ideal bridge for arms supply to Patrice Lumamba’s leftist rebel group fighting against the Congo government. The urban educated groups who steered the wheel of revolution against Abboud’s regime in 1964 snubbed its former conservative policies in the international arena. As a reaction to the non-interference policies of Abboud’s regime, a new radical approach was adopted of supporting revolutionary movements in neighbouring countries. The head of the new government, Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa, emphasised the unique relations with Egypt, shifting away from the cold links towards the end of Abboud’s regime. The new government in place publicly supported the Simba Congolese rebels and the ELF against Haile Selassie’s regime in Ethiopia. They allowed the use of Sudan as a base to attack the Ethiopian and the Congolese governments, and facilitated the transportation of the Egyptian and Algerian arms supply. The supply of arms to the Congolese rebels coincided with their retreat across Sudanese borders to escape the Congolese army. The Anya Nya movement took advantage of the circumstances buying arms from the Congolese rebels in return for food, which strengthened their military position in the south.24 During Nimeiri’s regime, relations took a different turn since Egypt become a central pillar in Sudanese foreign policy orientation. “In the pre-1969 period,

The future is coming 123 Sudan had kept on reasonable terms with all Arab states—a stance which had made it acceptable to all sides as mediator in inter-Arab conflicts.”25 Hamid and Howell call the new trend in Sudan foreign policy the “Finlandisation” similar to the relationship of Finland with the Soviet Union. “The setting in of ‘Finlandisation’ should not be taken to imply that Sudan has abdicated its sovereignty or that Cairo now dictated Sudan’s foreign policy: such a situation is the function of a ‘satellite’ rather than a ‘Finlandized’ relationship.”26 They indicated this direction was considered a significant change with past traditions of Sudanese foreign policy that sustained autonomous foreign policy direction, with constant impartial position. Since independence, Egypt secured its interests in Sudan by signing different agreements more often contradicts the national interests of the Sudanese state. The Aswan High Dam represented a clear example of this dichotomy with the social, archaeological and economic negative impact for Sudan, while it provided huge economic benefits for Egypt. According to detailed benefit-cost analysis carried out by the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation, the total cost of construction amounted to Egyptian £450 million. The then Irrigation Minister, Abdul Azim Abul-Atta, estimated that this cost was recovered within only 2 years, since the dam’s annual return to national income was estimated at E£255 million, consisting of E£140 million from agricultural production, E£100 million from hydropower generation, E£10 million from flood protection and E£5 million from improved navigation.27 The joint defence agreement signed in November 1977 threatened the endeavour to settle the civil war in Sudan and provoked a debate on identity, while Egypt endeavours to maintain the “Finlandisation” pattern through this agreement. The four freedoms accords signed in September 2004 is another example of the Egyptian policy towards various Sudanese governments.28 Since the signing of the accords, Sudan implemented fully all its terms for the benefit of Egypt. in the other hand, Egypt is unwilling to implement the terms of the mentioned freedoms. Sudan exempts all Egyptians from visas to enter the country; the Sudanese cannot travel without entry visas, and Egypt imposes complex procedures for residence, treating the Sudanese as foreigners in owning property or obtaining work permits. The visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem in l977 that initiated a normalisation process with Israel received an immense rejection from the Arab world. On the other hand, Sudan supported the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt, and did not severe diplomatic relations with Egypt, in contrast to almost all Arab countries. This posture challenged the interests of the Sudanese state with the Arab world, which led to it to the imposition of economic sanctions, such as the cut of Iraqi oil supplies from Sudan in March 1978.29 The Egyptian government welcomed the coup d’état in June 1989 in Khartoum due to the removal of the former prime minister during the parliamentary political system, Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi the leader of Umma party. Al-Sadiq pursued a hostile policy towards Egypt and worked closely with Iran and Libya. The regime understood the importance of Egypt for its consolidation in power. Egyptian

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endorsement of the NSR carried a considerable weight in opening the doors to acceptance by the international community. More often, Egyptians perceive military governments in Sudan as more capable and find it easier to deal with army officers than with the politicians of traditional parties. Egypt did not envisage a challenge to its national security with the arrival of the NSR, until the end of 1989 and the beginnings of 1990 when Egypt started to feel a threat to its stability. There were several indicators that proved the link of the NSR with the NIF, such as the influx of Egyptian Islamists to Sudan, increase in terrorist activities (e.g. the assassination attempt on the information minister, the assassination of the writer Farej Fouda and the Parliament Chair Rifaat AlMahjoub), in addition to the composition and the slogans of the regime. The Islamist orientation of the NSR was viewed by Egypt as a major threat to its national security and instability. The Gulf War proved the fears of Egypt regarding the intention of the NSR to follow an independent line of policy challenges and undermine Egypt’s leadership in the Arab world. There were three main issues that influenced relations between the two countries: the presence of terrorist organisations in Sudan, Sudanese opposition groups in Cairo and the Halayeb Triangle. Relations between the two countries plunged to their lowest level since independence after Sudan’s abstention at the Arab League summit on the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait. A diplomatic tug of war characterised the bilateral relations between the NSR and Egypt since 1989 over different issues. Successive Sudanese governments since independence were always expected to align their policies with Egypt, and in the case of divergence, Egypt pursued a policy to bring Sudan back to its fold by any available means. The Sudanese politicians should stop being sentimental about relationship with Egypt. The Egyptian Sudanese relationship unloose a fresh torrent of clichés about “the unity of the Nile Valley” and “sons of the Nile” between Sudan and Egypt. Large numbers of Sudanese politicians write in a euphoric vision of this Egyptian Sudanese relations. Their remarks betray a deep ignorance about the Egyptian people, the Egyptian perspective towards their interest in Sudan and indeed the history of the Sudanese. It is never very easy for the Sudanese to understand that a very large number of Egyptians, if they think about them at all, do so with a various degree of disinterest and contempt. Although no contemporary opinion polls support this view; however, perspective could be discerned in the cultural and media scene. The portrayal of the Sudanese in the Egyptian media landscape whether films, TV comedy or theatre reflect the embedded prejudice in the Egyptian social memory. A negative image of the Sudanese is presented with conceptions, such as primitive, backward, ridiculous and other intolerable qualities. TV talk shows are full of subjects, headlines and keywords that evoke superiority, provocation and sarcasm. In general, this trend increases normally during political tension between the two countries. However, few rational voices in the Egyptian media rebuff such vile rhetoric and warns of its impact in damaging common interests. The historical dynamics of relations between the two countries demonstrate a persistent and steady Egyptian foreign policy strategy that endeavour to weaken the power of any government in Sudan. The key principle of this strategy is to

The future is coming 125 maintain the Sudanese government fragility in order to maintain it in its satellite and follow its foreign policy direction. This policy approach will fulfil the Egyptian political and economic interests in Sudan. For example, Egypt continued to support most opposition groups through different means. Undoubtedly, this Egyptian strategy was a contributing factor in the secession of South Sudan. Egypt’s policy towards Sudan is formulated and dictated by the intelligence and security apparatus and not the foreign ministry. Egyptian foreign policy can be looked at on the basis of two major components: official rhetoric and actual practices. Since independence, there is a clear contradiction between these two components that complement each other and play determinant role in the pursuit of policy. The majority of the Egyptian ambassadors served in Sudan since independence comes from these institutions reflect the nature of policy direction in Egypt. In contrast, the Sudanese military and the political class provided strong backing to Egypt during its wars with Israel, while Egypt never lend significant support to Sudan in military skirmishes with neighbours such as Uganda, Ethiopia or Chad. This portrait of the Sudanese Egyptian relations does not mean that there are no people within the consecutive Egyptian governments with no interest in this “special relationship.” The events of the past 65 years are familiar to historians and diplomats. What is surprising is that most of the Sudanese political class nonetheless, cling to expectations of gratuitous Egyptian goodwill and complain when this was unforthcoming. Many Sudanese diplomats who worked in Egypt express frustration that in a range of bilateral negotiations for which little or no progress was being made. The new breed of Egyptian policymakers does not for a moment view Sudan in an emotional or sentimental outlook. The Sudanese political class should not delude themselves that Egypt will do us favours; however, they must always treat Egypt and its leaders with respect, even when they fail to reciprocate. The prominence of the country, its history and geopolitical position demand it. Sudan should sustain mutual working relationship vital to the national interest of the Sudanese state in the first place. Therefore, the Sudanese policymakers should press down their emotions and sentiments, and on no account expect that their Egyptian counterparts will benefit the Sudanese because of these reasons. It is critical for Sudan to formulate a cohesive policy towards Egypt that achieves the state interests and send a clear signal that Egypt should interact with Sudan in an equal terms. Egypt needs to understand Sudan is central to its future prosperity, while it would compromise its interests if it continues to pursue a foreign policy of self-interest towards its neighbour to the south.

Notes 1 Sidahmed A (1997), Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. Richmond: Curzon Press, p. 213. 2 Auda G (1991), The Foreign Policy of Fragmented Polity: The Case of Sudan,” in Korany B and Dessouki A H, eds. The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change. Oxford: Westview Press. 3 Bechtold P (1976), Politics in the Sudan: Rule in an Emerging African Nation. New York: Praeger.

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4 Lesch A M (1991), Sudan’s Foreign Policy: In Search of Arms, Aid, and Allies,” in Vol J O, ed., Sudan: State and Society in Crisis. Washington: Indiana University Press. 5 Wai D M (1979), Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 71–93. 6 Khalid M (1990), The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elites in Sudan’s Political Evolution. London: Kegan Paul. 7 Reuters (19 Dec. 2010), Sudan’s Bashir Sees Islamic Law, Defends Flogging. Available at: https://bit.ly/2DTTdmZ 8 Al-Basha M (1998), Multi-Ethnicity and Sudan’s Foreign Afro-Arab Policy. PhD Thesis, Keio University, Faculty of Law, Japan. 9 Deng F M (1995), War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in Sudan. Washington: The Brookings Institute, p. 348. 10 Ibid. 11 Fanous S S (1979), The Role of Sudan in Afro-Arab Relations. MSc Thesis, University of Khartoum, Department of Political Science. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. As an example, in Nov. 1973, President Nimeiri, a Muslim, headed a delegation consisting of Emperor Hailie Selassie (Christian Orthodox), a representative of the Liberian president (Christian Protestant) and representative of Zambian president (Christian Catholic) that visited Rome and had an audience with Pope Paul VI to discuss the future of the Holy City of Jerusalem. President Nimeiri expressed Africa’s concern over Israel’s continuing occupation of the Holy City and was able to secure a declaration from the Vatican calling for Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem. Also, Arab aid to Sudan increased from US$ 33 million in 1972 to US$ 220 million in 1974. 16 Arabic Juba is an Arabic dialect of simplified Arabic often used for social interaction and named for the South Sudanese capital. 17 Kasinof L (14 Nov. 2018), For South Sudan, It’s Not So Easy to Declare Independence From Arabic. Foreign Policy. 18 BBC (27 Sept. 2012), Sudan and South Sudan ‘Agree Oil Deal’. Available at: https:// bbc.in/2QS0yGs [Accessed 16 Jan. 2019]. 19 The Abyei protocol in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement does not offer a welldefined description of an Abyei resident eligible to vote in the referendum. The definition states the residents of Abyei as the Dinka Ngok community and other Sudanese residing in the area. 20 Beshir M O (1991), Al-Sudan Bayn Al-Tajmoaat Al-Iglymyya wa Tajmu Doual Houd Al-Neel,” in Ahmed H O and Ahmed M M, eds., Ilagaat Al-Sudan Al-Kahrgyya: AlBuad Al-Arabi Al-Afreegi (Sudan External relations: The Arab-African Dimension). Khartoum: Centre for African and Asian Studies. 21 A traiqa is not quite the same as a sect. The word literally means a “path” and is applied to certain organizations of religiously minded people united by a common faith in the virtue of some particular teacher and practicing a common ritual of prayer and devotion. The differences between them are not matters of faith and doctrine but of organization and ritual. In Duncan J S R (1952), The Sudan: A Record of Achievement. London: William Blackwood. 22 Dr Salaman A S (23 Dec. 2012), Secret and Mysteries of the Nile Water Agreement 1959. Alrakoba.ne. Available at: https://bit.ly/2RhGtOd [Accessed 25 Dec. 2018]. 23 Ibid. 24 Howell J, and Hamid M B (Oct. 1969), Sudan and the Outside World, 1964–1968. African Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 273, pp. 299–315, p. 302. 25 Hamid M B (1986), Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy: ‘Splendid Isolation’,” Radicalisation and ‘Finlandisation’, in Woodward P, Abdalrahim M, Badal R, and Hardallo A, eds., Sudan Since Independence. London: Gower.

The future is coming 127 26 Ibid. 27 Biswas A K, and Tortajada C (2011), Impacts of the High Aswan Dam, in Tortajada C, Altinbilek D, and Biswas A K, eds., Impacts of Large Dams: A Global Assessment. New York: Springer. 28 The agreement allows Egyptians and Sudanese to both freely move across the border and live, work or own property in either country without a permit. 29 Hamid, Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy, op. cit.

Conclusion Towards New Sudanese foreign policy parameters

Introduction The June 1989 military coup conducted by the NIF signalled the launch of a new era in Sudanese foreign policy. The commitment of the military cadres and the sponsors of the new regime to impose their version of Islam was unquestionable. The revival of Islamic principles as perceived by the movement was the driving force behind the military takeover. The domestic agenda, in turn, reflects the policy orientation of the regime’s foreign relations. Through the Islamisation programmes inside Sudan, the movement attempted to present itself as a model for an Islamic state. In this manner, Sudan could inspire and lead the Islamic world to construct a similar model of its own. The leaders of the 1989 military coup hailed their venture as a revolution against the politics of sectarianism internally and in the position of Sudan in international politics. The NIF elite perceived the international system as dominated by Western Christian forces determined to control and contain the spread of Islam and prevent an Islamic revolution. Their ideological Islamic outlook to the international system sought a new active role for Sudan in the external sphere, in line with their moral commitment to their counterpart Islamist political movements. Although the NSR was an extension of the complications in the Sudanese politics, the regime also had analogous qualities with revolutionary states. The NIF’s ascendance to power necessitated its engagement with other Islamic movements, broadly sharing the same political agenda with some variations. Inspiring other Islamist movements worldwide to follow the Sudanese model of political action was one of the regime’s foreign policy objectives. The regime’s radical ideological course of action challenged the international political environment would inevitably threaten the survival of the regime. Political realism was eventually invoked in a later stage of the NSR regime to avoid the consequences of radical policies. The ideological approach of NSR foreign policy antagonised the West, which considered the NIF regime a threat to its vital interests in the region. Dr Al-Turabi, the eminence grise of the NIF, played a central role in articulating the regime’s ideological basis and was a driving force in the implementation of policy. Despite external and domestic pressure, the regime was able to survive due to the domestic and external strategies adopted by the NSR, as well as the changes in regional and

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international political outlook. The reversal of the regime’s foreign policy to pragmatism following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt led to the adoption of measures helpful in improving its image. The removal of Bin Laden and other alleged terrorist groups aimed at sending a signal of its intention to engage in constructive dialogue with the regional states and the United States. Although the NIF did not come to power with a blueprint for its external strategy, political Islam was the basis for interaction with the outside world. “Missionary diplomacy”—that is, to advocate for their Islamist agenda—was used in this context to engage with the outside world. Undoubtedly, the concept of “national interests” was viewed by the NIF as the restoration of Islam as the ultimate reference point for state identity and the principal determinant of Sudan’s position in the world. The central point in the concept of national interest as prescribed by the NIF was the revival of Islam in the domestic and the international sphere through all the means available to the state. Upon reflection of the catastrophic NSR foreign policy, there were important lessons for the future. These were the perils of political ideology, the necessity of pragmatism and the need to institutionalise foreign policy.

The perils of political ideology The failure of the regime foreign policy goes to the heart of the NSR’s initial agenda at the international level and its ineptness at managing Sudan’s economic, political and social environment. The implementation of these ideological programmes by maintaining power over the state was the ultimate objective of the NIF throughout its evolution under successive Sudanese political systems following independence. Its use of force to take control of the state in June 1989 and its subsequent policies demonstrated the movement’s dogmatic nature, which contradicted the inherently tolerant character of the Sudanese society. In his analysis of the disposition of the Sudanese society, Abu Saleem stated, As a result of the existence of diverse entities and successive religions and their various forms, the Sudanese character acquired religious tolerance and its behaviour is characterised by moderation and also the disinclination towards radicalism, violence and subjugation.1 The NIF took a totally different approach to carry out its agenda at the domestic and external levels. Foreign policy from the start of the coup in June 1989 to the NIF’s split in December 1999 progressed through three central phases: initially, political dissimulation and then the NSR plunges into agenda implementation and, finally, the turn to pragmatism. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was the juncture between the strategy of political cover-up and the disclosure of their political motives, while the 1995 assassination attempt was the turning point from extremism to pragmatism. The first six years of the NSR (1989–1995) were characterised by these two major policy frameworks: the necessity of political dissimulation and

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the unveiling of its ideological agenda. The NIF decided to hide its initial sponsorship of the regime to avoid a domestic and international backlash. The dissimulation was successful in consolidating the NSR’s internal political control and the launch of healthy relations in the external arena. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait put an abrupt end to this phase with the regime’s stance on the crisis and revealing the political agenda. Following the assassination attempt, the diplomatic offensive by the NSR to improve its reputation, along with measures undertaken to rebuff the terrorism accusations, improved Sudan’s relations with the Arab states. The NSR was able to overcome the tension with major states in the region over the NSR’s position on the Gulf War. Each of these phases was distinguished by the fusion of radical and mundane politics within the regime but the domination of one of these lines defined the political scene of the period in question. Pan-Islamism was the core principle of the movement’s interactions at the international level. The international relations of the NSR following its military takeover reflected intrinsic hostility and suspicion towards the west. Protests over the structure of the international system dominated by the West took the form of radical policies in the external sphere: The revival of Islam seems to clash with the prevailing order precisely because this order embodies the usurpation and subversion of Islamic history, and represents the nadir of the progressive decline of the Muslim Umma.2 The revolutionary fervour in the initial stage of the regime was manifested in substantial support for Islamist movements around the world. National interests were identified as the fulfilment of political Islamic goals while aspiring to challenge the structure of the international system. Realpolitik was not an option in this ideological venture. Meanwhile, the efforts to implement rational policies corresponding with Sudan’s interests were derailed by the force of revolutionary zeal. The isolation of the regime at the regional and the international levels continued with international sanction imposed due to the accumulation of negative ideological policies. The West and the USA continue to perceive the NSR government as a rogue state remaining since October 1993 on the list of state-sponsored terrorism. The point of crisis came as the confrontation with the international system reached its climax with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak. Return of realpolitik was inevitable to deal with the threats to the NSR’s survival created by its wild agenda. Pragmatism in the external sphere and to a certain extent at the domestic level during this stage proved to be the successful way out from the political abyss. There are other issues related to political reform and human rights issues deepened with the indictment of President Al-Beshir in the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur. Three critical themes challenged the NSR’s relations with its external environment arose from the ideology of political Islam: the civil war in the south, terrorism and human rights and democratisation. These issues complicated the domestic environment by acutely dividing major political forces. As a result, Sudan’s poor

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reputation gained a high profile on the international stage whether in bilateral or multilateral forums. The regime’s elite were in a state of denial over Sudan’s status in the external sphere and were blinded by their revolutionary fantasies. A sharp schism existed within the regime over the way to tackle these issues, between the moderate elements who perceived the rational choice in politics as the only way forward, and the radical bloc preferring the maintenance of the ideological thrust. Policymaking was a morass of formal and informal mechanisms that lacked clarity and provided a portrait of confusion as to how decision making operated. The presence of two policymaking lines served the regime to a certain extent in its foreign policy since it allowed evasion of a full brunt of international pressure. Regional states’ knowledge of this dilemma within the NSR gave them the opportunity to help drive a wedge between the radicals and the advocates of practical policies. The regime concurrently used this framework to balance its radical acts and to give an impression of various course of actions that did not represent the government. The current domestic and external landscape has been shaped to a large extent by the consequences of the NSR’s early agendas. Survival continues to be key for the policymakers and necessitates renouncing the earlier revolutionary agenda. The abandonment of radical agendas was directly linked to the shift in the frame of mind of the regime’s inner clique. However, certain quarters within the regime felt the government went too far in its attempts to improve relations with the US administration, which contradicts the stance on the issues of Islamic Umma. This early fragmentation within the ruling political movement still and will continue to reverberate forcefully within Sudanese political dynamics. One of the outcomes of the internal political rift is the disintegration of the NIF and the creation of a new force in Sudanese politics—the PCP—opposing the leadership of the regime led by former ideologue Dr Al-Turabi. This split was one of the factors that triggered the ongoing Darfur crisis with the political, financial and ideological support of the PCP for the Justice and Equality Movement in its early insurgence in 2003. Since independence, there have been voices among the Southern Sudan elite calling for separation from Northern Sudan; however, the dominant rhetoric in the south was to preserve the integrity of the Sudan with different modalities. Due to the NSR’s dogma, the majority of the Southern Sudan elite increasingly became convinced of the impossibility of being a unified state. The Islamization and Arabisation-oriented policies were the final nail in the coffin of unity. The objective of the government’s willingness to negotiate with the SPLA/M, which led to the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, was to resurrect relations with the outside world, especially with the West and the United States. The overwhelming outcome of the January 2011 poll regarding the independence of South Sudan— 99.57%, according to the referendum commission—reflected the degree of discontentment, frustration and the unfeasibility of preserving the integrity of the country. The initiation of armed groups still fighting the NSR in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile that espouse a new political vision is an indication of the catastrophic nature of the regime’s repulsive policies. The NSR’s early radical

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orientation in the 1990s impacted significantly on the current deep fragmentation of the domestic political landscape. The survival of current regime through abetting the security apparatus, ensuring the loyalty of its cadres, shoring up military conflicts in different parts of the country and penetrating opposition political forces to cause further disintegrations led to catastrophic impact in the economy. The huge financial resources from oil revenues from 1999 until the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 was lost to such depraved policies rather than the country economic development. Survival of the regime continues to be the key for the policymakers that came with the cost of abandoning the earlier revolutionary agenda. The current dire economic situation confronts the regime with one of its most critical socio-economic and political challenges since its initiation in 1989. The conduct of the regime in power now reflects its conviction that pragmatic policies were the only approach to overcome the burden of past radical policies and to give sense to Sudan’s national interests. The government’s recent reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and its severing relation with Iran in 2015 in the context of regional conflicts reflect this pragmatic policy trend. The regime focuses on the economy, the revival of which depends on dealing objectively with the realities in the external sphere. The Sudanese economy has faced huge challenges since the South Sudan separation in July 2011, with the loss of three-quarters of its oil output. This context calls for the rejection of any ideological predispositions, which dispute the international system. “Just as an oligopolistic market imposes certain imperatives on firms, the international system creates necessities for states. Businesses risk bankruptcy if they disregard market imperatives and overextend themselves in unprofitable investments.”3 For the decision maker, this argument is vital, since any deviation from engaging fully with the international system to unearth accessible economic and political opportunities puts at risk the state’s interest. Sound understanding of the geopolitical position of Sudan can provide guidelines for taking advantage of its potential and dealing with its limitations at the regional and international levels.

The necessity of pragmatism Since the independence of Sudan there have been periods of revolutionary postures in its foreign policy. These periods were influenced by the domination of certain ideological frameworks over policy or by a reaction to the regional and international environment. An orientation based on political ideology in Sudan’s external relations during these phases substantiated the case for preserving pragmatism as the hub of Sudan’s foreign policy. In each of these periods (the government that followed the collapse of Aboud’s government, the first years of Nimeiri’s regime and the radical policies of the NSR), the policies advocated proved to be disastrous for achieving the objectives of national interest and impeding the vital economic development goals of foreign policy. It is evident that after each one of these governments, a modification in policy towards more pragmatic policies was

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the only way to overcome the burden of past radical policies and to give sense to Sudan’s national interests. Political breakthrough always comes with a practical policy framework that focuses on Sudan’s national interests in terms of its domestic setting and deals objectively with the realities of the external sphere. President Nimeiri’s successful domestic and foreign policies of “unity in diversity” and his agreement with the Anya Nya southern rebels in 1972 followed a period of radicalism. It can be argued that the NSR’s pragmatic undertaking following the assassination attempt on President Mubarek enabled its survival. The abandonment of support for radical groups, the opening of the political system and the oil exploration through the Asian alternative were all part of a pragmatic policy approach. These were political avenues intended to deal in a realistic manner with international and domestic pressures while trying to attain the goals of economic development. In contrast to the former ideological orientation, these policies represent a realist perspective that argues, “To ignore vital interests when acting in the name of moral principles is to ‘confuse foreign policy with philanthropy.’”4 Hence, dealing with Sudan’s external sphere required an objective outlook on the international system in relation to the dynamics of its national interests. This argument denotes the rejection of any revolutionary tendencies embraced generally by ideological movements, which challenge the idea of international society: Just as an oligopolistic market imposes certain imperatives on firms, the international system creates necessities for states. Businesses risk bankruptcy if they disregard market imperatives and overextend themselves in unprofitable investments.5 For Sudan, this argument is vital, since any deviation from engaging fully with the international system to unearth accessible economic and political opportunities puts at risk the security and interests of the state. Sound understanding of the geopolitical position of Sudan can provide guidelines for taking advantage of its potential and dealing with its limitations at the regional and international level. Issues such as the social composition, the political environment, geographical location, borders, refugees and natural resources determine the shape of Sudan’s interactions with the outside world. Another new vital dimension in Sudan’s foreign policy is the success of the oil exploration venture due to the alternative economic strategy tailored by the NSR. Oil would change the future geo-strategic standing of Sudan on the world stage as it holds such a powerful attraction for international powers. This new facet, which has political and economic resonance in Sudan’s domestic and external environments, requires careful and thoughtful strategies to turn it into a blessed prospect rather than a doomed opportunity. Sudan could be susceptible to “the curse of oil” in terms of internal instability and civil conflicts over this valuable natural resource. As an oil state, the domestic and external political landscape of Sudan might prove to be more complex to manage

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than past experiences. On the other hand, oil is a substantial force for the much needed aim of development which should be articulated in customised policies at the domestic and external levels. Exploiting this natural resource in genuine national development strategies embracing the benefit of all the Sudanese communities would enhance Sudan’s status in the region and worldwide. The domestic environment in terms of political consensus and democratic processes is vital in Sudan’s international relations since it rallies the population behind its government in the external arena. There is another concept that strongly represents Sudan’s national interests in the international and domestic realms as well: “terramedia,” with its portrayal of a bridge between the Arab region and Africa. Sudan still has the potential to be a role model for Afro-Arab relations. The marginality of Sudan in the Arab world and the African continent is an enormous advantage for the country if sensible policies are implemented internally and externally to demonstrate genuinely a Sudanese Afro-Arab character. The revolutionary NIF’s conduct in the international sphere raised various questions about ideology in Sudan’s foreign policy. The implications of this period are still unfolding and pose pertinent questions on how this phase shaped the future political landscape of Sudan. What is the future political outlook of the Islamic movement in Sudan? How does its internal split provide an opportunity to weaken the movement’s ideological propensity? How are these political factions going to engage in future Sudanese politics as a result of their reflections during this period? Does it still have the political and economic capabilities to manipulate and extract support from sections of the populations? What are the lessons learned by the various Sudanese political forces from this political phase? Is there any uniform change in their attitude to the domestic and external spheres? Is there any possibility for the return of revolutionary or ideological foreign policy as a result of another political venture in the domestic arena? A feature of revolutionary states stipulated by realists in international relations is the inevitable return of pragmatism. The NIF regime demonstrated a similar dynamic after the 1995 assassination attempt on Mubarak. Armstrong described the process of pragmatism in foreign policy as the “socialisation process,” whereby men consciously or unconsciously conform to the conventions of the society in which they live in order to function more effectively within it and whereby an increasing entanglement within an existing structure of relationships brings about an increasing degree of adaptation to the normal behaviour patterns of that structure.6 In this context, the government realised the damage caused to its relations with Saudi Arabia by its political links with Iran since the Saudi government considers Iran to be a major adversary in the region. This has led the NSR to take a minimalist engagement with Iran and rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, given that its political priorities required constructive relations with regional and international powers. The NSR’s relations with Iran became problematic with the expansion of Iranian-sponsored Shia activities in a Sunni Islam-dominated Sudanese society, as well as the other economic and political factors related to the domestic and regional contexts. This has led, in September 2014, to the closure

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of Iranian cultural centres and the expulsion from Sudan of the people in charge of them.

The need to institutionalise foreign policy Decision making during the NSR echoed relevant features of successive Sudanese regimes, exhibited in the lack of institutionalisation of foreign policy. This crucial area of government policy requires coordinated efforts between various departments in the state and meticulous investigation of the pros and cons of each course of action. Personalisation is rife in this policy sphere and as a result the mechanisms within different Sudanese political systems were robustly shackled to formulate and deliver effective policy. This is a typical attribute of third world politics that rebuffs institutional structures and promotes the role of the leader. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the assassination attempt on President Mubarak as major political events during the NSR’s rule demonstrate the imperative value of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In both events, the professional diplomats of this ministry provided evidence of its ability to identify and avoid risks if the political leadership sanctioned its freedom of action. Advice was given to the NSR not to side with Iraq from individuals inside and outside this ministry who perceptively evaluated the consequences of such a political posture. Their insightful observation of international politics stemmed from long experience and exposure to the dynamics of regional and international politics. The active part played by the ministry in managing the crisis confronting the NSR in the UNSC and international forums following the assassination attempt demonstrated its capacity to articulate and communicate Sudan vital interests with the outside world. These events offer a useful lesson in regard to foreign policymaking in the Sudanese context, which is distinguished by the complexity of its geo-politics. The intricacy of Sudan’s domestic and external environments calls for collective and parallel policy tracks among crucial elements of state apparatus that combine to accomplish the national interests of the state. Government departments, such as the foreign ministry, security, military intelligence, the interior ministry, the Council of Ministers and the presidency, should closely collaborate to handle vital foreign policy matters. Foreign policy should be based on a transparent decision making process, conventional Sudanese neutral diplomacy, the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of neighbours and other states and the peaceful settlement of disputes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take entire responsibility for policy formulation and planning that takes the form of short, medium and long-term courses of actions.7 The formal foreign policy institutions during the NSR continued to be undermined as the decision making became the exclusive responsibility of small clique within the regime led by President Al-Beshir. There is no coordination in relation to foreign policy between different state institutions, such as the foreign ministry, security apparatus and the presidency for the effective management of policy. The foreign ministry remains sidelined on vital issues concerning national interest. The

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current Sudanese foreign service, which is at the forefront of preserving the state national interest, is also undergoing huge problems. The loyalty principle to the regime overrides qualification and quality of personnel selected to serve as diplomats. Those loyalists at the diplomatic apparatus wield great power within the institution. Ineptitude in delivering the service and articulating the state interests is prevalent at the foreign ministry, as it became a dumping ground for political conciliation, or connection to the regime. Until now, one of the critical problems facing Sudan foreign relations is the quality of the present foreign service since it is formed largely by diplomats from outside this professional service associated with the NIF who lacked the needed diplomatic skill. Intricacies of Sudan’s domestic and external environments call for collective and parallel policy tracks among crucial elements of state apparatus to accomplish the national interests of the state. Foreign policy during this regime has been on a long list of inflicted wounds: position from the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait, the assassination attempt on Mubarak, supporting radical Islamist groups, etc. The regime failed to deal with critical national security crises, such as the secession of South Sudan and Darfur conflict. Senior officials were never prepared to deal with such significant issues to Sudan’s interests as they lacked substance, experience, character or the intelligence to provide constructive policy options to pursue. There were no outstanding senior officials in the decision making, and figures such as Musatfa Ismail, the former foreign minister; Taha Uthman, the director of the president office; or Ali Karti, former foreign minister were not in the right place to manage and deal with such critical area of public policy. In the past, remarkable foreign ministers, such as Ahmed Kheir, Mubarak Zaroug, Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub, Mansur Khalid or Jamal Mohammed Ahmed served as something of a check on the president or the prime minister, while the current coterie does not have the character or the weight to play this role with the president. The presence of power centres during certain times caused major confusion in the international sphere of the regime real intent. There was a lack of coordination between state institutions, and the policies undertaken by the regime were in contradiction to Sudan’s national interest. The proper choice of an agent to represent a country in the field of international negotiations is an ultimate priority for its constructive relations with the outside world. Diplomacy is a matter of high policy for the state that determines its public interests, taking into consideration its necessity in matters of peace and war in the international arena. Francois de Callieres’s essay on the manners of diplomacy “De la maniere de negocier avec les Souverains” eloquently presented the qualities necessary for success for a good negotiator or “diplomat”: An observant mind, a spirit of application which refuses to be distracted by pleasures or frivolous amusements, a sound judgement which takes the measure of things as they are, and which goes straight to its goal by the shortest and most natural paths without wandering into useless refinements.8 The importance and sensitivity of diplomacy does not tolerate incompetent men, a phenomenon that was widespread in Sudanese diplomacy in recent years. Many

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serious problems took place in Sudan’s relations with the outside world during the period between 1989 and 1999 as a result of blunders caused by some Sudanese diplomats. De Callieres stated, It is a crime against the public safety not to uproot incapacity wherever it is discovered, or to allow an incompetent diplomatist to remain one moment longer than necessary in a place where competency is sorely needed.9 His main thesis in this essay in regard to the choice of diplomats is at the core of the NSR’s and other Sudanese government’s policies since independence. The sheer significance of state agents in the external sphere requires the choice of men with inherent qualities who are extensively trained for the practice of diplomacy. The diplomat is the embodiment of his country’s culture, history and heritage; hence, he should be carefully selected to better represent his country’s courteousness and interests. Both the prince himself and his ministers must steel themselves to resist the pressure of friends and relations who seek employment for unworthy persons. In diplomacy, the best minds, the most sagacious and instructed of public servants, should be appointed to the principal foreign posts regardless of the personal affairs of the prince himself or the party attachments of the chosen ambassadors.10 Another important aspect of the devising of policy frameworks is making the best use of Sudanese academics and experts in different areas relevant to Sudan foreign policy, such as borders, ethnic composition or refugees. Policymakers and academics have conflicting views of each other since academics view government policies with considerable misgiving, while government officials perceive academia as an extraneous field for policy: For officials, the objective of action is to resolve or manage a problem. Their motives are operational, not intellectual. Often under intense pressure, they are engaged in reconciling domestic and foreign politics, resources, and realities abroad and hammering these factors into workable policy. The scholar, less pressed by time, is basically an observer, endeavouring to discover in an event or a series of events verities that may apply to other situations.11 This divergence between the two fields does not imply non-cooperation in the analysis of foreign policy. Since both are prone to constraints on information sources, many countries around the world, such as the United Kingdom and the USA use research centres, and academic sources to achieve as effective a policy as possible. The NSR’s experience reveals substantial erosion of the functions of the formal machinery of the state. Their revolutionary zeal blinded decision makers to the value of involving state institutions in favour of following the ideological structure of the NIF in foreign policy. When these institutions took part in policymaking and harmony with the government’s political tendency, it was conducive in avoiding the jolts of political ideology. It would be interesting to see if this period provides any future lessons that allow genuine restructuring in the way policy is

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formulated and implemented. Al-Turabi’s contribution to decision making might be summed up by this quote: A true intellectual is bored by the routine character of institutionalization, which is better left to those with the requisite patience and humility. Moreover, history teaches that playing an active role in the implementation of your ideas too often resembles presiding over the murder of your children.12 Revolutions, as recurring phenomena in international relations, have led many scholars to identify particular shared characteristics common to revolutionary states. Although there are many studies of the social contexts and internal dynamics of these particular states, research into their behaviour at the international level is not as extensive as it should be. The NSR’s foreign policy conduct has many parallels to the statements and actions of revolutionary states. Ideology as a “belief system” is reflected in the preference of the regime policies. The result of the NSR cumulative policies provides a lesson for future decision making of how dogma, essentially political Islam ideology, could jeopardise vital state interests and security. The regime in power still endures the brunt of the disasters of this period in question. The policy during those initial years continues to echo in the present outlook of Sudanese politics. The harm on the international reputation of the country, the national milieu and the state institutions was unrivalled since the independence in 1956.

Notes 1 Abu Saleem M I (2004), Fi Al-Shakhsiyya Al-Sudanyya (On Sudanese Character). Khartoum: Abu Saleem Studies Centre. 2 Al-Affendi A (1991), Who Needs an Islamic State. London: Grey Seal, p. 63. 3 Raymond G A (Winter 1998–1999), Necessity in Foreign Policy,”. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 673–688. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., p. 678. 6 Armstrong D (1993), Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary States in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 7 “There are three essential requirements for the future effectiveness of Sudanese diplomacy which are: the expansion of diplomatic missions, training and the skills development of diplomats and a focus on developing expertise within the diplomatic personnel” (regions, organisations, themes, etc.). Interview with a Sudanese Diplomat, Nov. 2003, Khartoum. 8 Francois de Callieres (1963), On the Manners of Negotiating with Princes. Published at Paris by Michel Brunet at the Mercure Galant, 1716. Translated from French by A. F. Whyte. Washington, DC: University Press of America. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Newsom D D (Winter 1995/96), Foreign Policy and Academia. Foreign Policy. 12 Fuller S (2005), The Intellectual. London: Icon Books.

Index

Abboud, Ibrahim x, xiv, 11, 122 Abdalrahman, Omer 54, 70 Abdelatif, Al-Amin 66–67 Abd-Elrahman, Omer 17, 74 Abugidiri, Al-Tigani xiv Abusalih, Faisal 74 Abusalih, Hussein 67–68, 71, 74, 77n9 Afghanistan 17–18, 20n20, 27, 33, 54, 56; and decision making in the initial years 72–73, 78n42 African Union (AU) 82, 84, 90, 107–108 Aidid, Farah 49 Al-Abdeen, Al-Tayeb Zein 70 Al-Beshir, Omer xiii, xvi, xvii, xxiin41, 5–6, 114; and backlash from an assassination attempt 24–28, 32–37; and decision making in the initial years 63–65, 69, 71, 74–76, 77n9; and disrespect of institutions 102–104; and the GNU foreign policy 80, 82–87, 89–92; grip on power 95–97; and the ICC factor 106–108; insight into the character of 97–102; and major foreign policy issues 44, 47, 50; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 130, 135; in the post-Turabi era 104–106 al-Din, Ghazi Salah 71, 85 al-Din, Ibrahim Shams 73, 76n3, 77n9 al-Faisal, Saud 72 Al-Ganoushi, Rashid xiv, 17, 54, 74 Al-Haj, Ali 52, 59n24 al-Jazz, Awad 73, 85, 102, 105 Al-Jihad 54 Al-Khalifa, Magzoub 84–85, 93n15 Al-Khalifa, Sirr Al-Khatim 122 Al-Mahdi, Al-Hadi xi Al-Mahdi, Al-Sadiq 39n24, 123 Al-Mahdi, Qutbi 38n5 Al-Mahjoub, Rifaat 124 Al-Mustagila 19

Al-Nabi, Mohammed Abd-Allah Jar xv Al-Nahda 54 Al-Nour, Abbas Ibrahim 40n71 Alor, Deng 82, 89–91 al-Qaeda 57 Al-Sanousi, Ibrahim 14, 71, 76 Al-Tahir, Al-Rashid ix–x Al-Turabi, Hassan viii, x–xi, xiii–xv, xvii, 3–5; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 95–97, 99–100, 104–106; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22–25, 27, 33–38; and decision making in the initial years 63–65, 67–76; and foreign policy ideology in the 1990s 13, 15–16, 19; and the GNU foreign policy 83; and major foreign policy issues 46–47, 52–53, 55; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 128, 131 Al-Zawahiri, Ayman 54 Amin, Idi xv Amnesty International xvii, 44 Angola 80 Arabisation xv–xvi, xviii–xxi, 11–12, 100, 131 Arabism 87, 114–115, 121 Arab League 73, 82, 107, 124 Arman, Yasir 86, 90–91 Armstrong, David 2, 13, 135 assassination ix, 124; see also Mubarak, Husni, assassination attempt on Auda, Gehad 113 Banaga, Sheraf al-Din 72 Bechtold, Peter 113 Bin Laden, Osama 17–19, 27–28, 33, 54, 56, 72–73, 78n42; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 99–100; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129 bin Salman, Mohammed 103 Bol, Kerubino Kwanyin 32 Burkina Faso 107

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Canada 18–19 Carlos the Jackal 17, 19, 55, 71–72 Castro, Fidel 4, 13 Central African Republic (CAR) 24, 55, 71, 78n36 Chad xiv, 16, 24, 49, 55, 71, 125 China 2, 14, 19, 51, 88, 120; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 102, 107; and backlash from an assassination attempt 28, 32, 37 Christianity viii, xxi, 12, 49, 126n15, 128 civil society organisations (CSOs) xvi, 44, 74, 95 civil war i, xiii–xix, 1, 5–6, 18, 115–117, 123; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 103; and backlash from an assassination attempt 32; and major foreign policy issues 42–43, 46–52; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 130 Clinton, Bill 19, 30, 45, 56 Cobban, Helen 107 communism ix–xi, xiv, xvi, 90 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 6, 79–82, 92n1, 92–93n9, 105, 107; internal schism 83–92 Costa Rica 107 Cuba 2, 13–14 Darfur xix, 49; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 96, 98–99, 105–108; and the GNU foreign policy 80, 82–84, 87–92, 92n2, 93n29; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 130–131, 136 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 92n3 Da’wa Islamyya (Islamic Call Organisation) xii, xxiin41, 75 decision making 1–7, 63–64, 80–83, 87–89; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 95, 98, 105–106; and formal institutions 64–69; and informal institutions 69–75; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 131, 135–138; and the NIF split 75–76 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 25, 31–32, 37, 50, 55, 78, 122 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) xii–xix, 120–121 Direction Generale de la Securite (DGSE) 55, 72 Djibouti 92 economic burdens 30–33 Egypt viii–x, xiii–xiv, 5, 115; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22–28,

31, 34, 37, 38n2, 39n19; and decision making in the initial years 65, 67–71, 74–76; and foreign policy ideology in the 1990s 12, 14, 16–19; and major foreign policy issues 43, 49, 53–54, 56; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129; relations with 120–125; see also Ikhwan Eritrea 16, 23–25, 28–33, 37, 48–54, 92 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 53–54, 122 Ethiopia xiv, 12, 17, 75, 92, 120–122, 125; and backlash from an assassination attempt 23–33, 38n15; and major foreign policy issues 48–51, 54–56 European Sudanese Public Affairs Council 19 external engagement xiii–xv, 87–92 Faisal (King) 70 Faisal Islamic Bank xii, xiv Fernandez, Alberto 88, 91 formal institutions 63–69, 73–75 Fouda, Farej 124 France 19, 20n12, 50, 55, 71–72, 78n36 Gaddafi 13 Gallab, Abdullahi 5 Gandour, Ibrahim 104 Garang, John 32, 47–50, 105, 115; and the GNU foreign policy 79–81, 85–86, 89 Garang, Rebecca 88 Gorbachev 65 Gosh, Salah 83, 85–86, 103, 106 Government of National Unity (GNU) 6, 79–80, 102; and the CPA partners internal schism 83–87; and the dynamics of external engagement 87–92; policymaking institution 80–83 Gulf States xiv, 18, 34, 37, 106 Gulf War 15, 22, 48, 124, 130; and decision making in the initial years 65, 67–68, 70, 73 Habyarimana, Juvenal 55, 72 Hassan, Uthman Ahmed 64–67, 70, 77n9 Horn of Africa 1, 16, 24, 49, 54, 117 human rights i, xv, xv–xxi, 4–6, 19, 92; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 96–99, 104, 107; and backlash from an assassination attempt 23–25; and major foreign policy issues 42–48, 58; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 130 Human Rights Watch (HRW) xvii–xviii, 44

Index Ibrahim, Haider xi Ibrahim, Jamal Mohamed 84 Ibrahim, Khalil 83 Ibrahim, Mahdi 70 ideology see ideology, political; ideology, radical ideology, political 3, 129–132, 137 ideology, radical 11–19 Ijaz, Mansour 19 Ikhwan ix–xii, xviii, xxin6; and historical external engagement xiii–xv IMF 78 Indonesia 16, 107 informal institutions 6, 63, 69–75 institutions see formal institutions; informal institutions; institutionalisation; state institutions institutionalisation 4, 36, 83, 87, 129, 135–138 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 52, 59n21, 91; Declaration of Principles (DoP) 32, 46, 50–51 International Criminal Court (ICC) 80, 88–90, 92, 96, 104, 106–108 International Friendship Council 44 Iran xiv, 1–2, 13–18, 103, 123, 132–135; and major foreign policy issues 48, 52 Iraq 15, 18, 22, 34, 87, 123–124; and decision making in the initial years 64–72; and major foreign policy issues 48, 55; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129–130, 135–136 Islam ix–xxii, 1–5, 18–19, 113–117, 120–121, 124; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 95–97, 100–107; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22–27, 31–37; and decision making in the initial years 67–75; and the GNU foreign policy 79–87; Islamic revivalism 13, 58; and major foreign policy issues 42–44, 47–58; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 128–131, 134–138; panIslamism ix, xiii, 15, 58, 63, 100, 130; radical Islam 4, 22, 42, 52, 54, 117, 136; see also Islamisation; political Islam Islamic Call Organisation see Da’wa Islamyya Islamisation viii, xv, xviii–xxi, 11, 34, 81, 100, 128 Jamaat al-Islamiyah 53 Jihad xi, xix, 16–17, 20n20, 23, 31, 74; and major foreign policy issues 44, 47–48, 53

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Jordan 31 Just Peace Forum 84 Kabila, Laurent 31, 50 Kenya 44, 51, 53, 57, 92, 117, 120 Khair, Al-Tayeb Ibrahim 27 Khalid, Mansour xii, 114, 136 Khalifa, Muhammed Al-Amin 47, 51–52, 59n24, 70 Khomeini, Ayatollah 4, 13 Khwarij xix Kiir, Silva 80–81, 85–91, 92–93n9, 118 Kuwait 15, 18, 22, 34, 64, 67–70, 124; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129–130, 135–136 Lesch, Ann Mosely 113–114 Libya xiv, xvii, 13–14, 34, 37; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 104, 107; and decision making in the initial years 65; and the GNU foreign policy 80, 88; and major foreign policy issues 48, 56 Lord Resistance Army (LRA) 23, 31 Machar, Riek 32, 118 Malaysia 16, 18, 32, 37 Mazrui, Ali 100 Mekki, Hassan xii military burdens 30–33 Morocco 31, 67 Mubarak, Hosni 38n11; see also Mubarak, Hosni, assassination attempt on Mubarak, Hosni, assassination attempt on 22–23, 43, 45, 50–58; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 104; and crisis management 25–38; and decision making in the initial years 63, 65, 69, 73, 75; magnitude of 23–25; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129–130, 134–136 Mudawi, Uthman Khalid 70 Mukhtar, Faisal Madani 64–65 Museveni (President) 55, 72, 78n36 Muslim Brotherhood viii–ix, 16, 101 Nafie, Nafie Ali xix, 52, 84–85, 105 Nahada 53 Nassir (President) 70, 122 National Congress Party (NCP) 65–66, 79–91, 95, 98–100, 105, 107 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 3, 24, 30–31, 35, 40n47, 45–47, 50 National Dialogue Conference 47

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National Islamic Front (NIF) viii, 1, 3–5, 7, 113, 124; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 97, 100, 102, 104; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22–23, 34–36; and decision making in the initial years 63–64, 66–71, 74–75, 77n9; foreign policy agenda of 11–19; and the GNU foreign policy 79, 82–83, 87; and major foreign policy issues 42–43, 46–47, 49, 52–54, 56–58; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 128–131, 134, 136–137; rise of ix–xxi; the split of 75–76 National Salvation Revolution (NSR) ix, xiii, xvi–xxi, 3–7, 11–20, 114–119, 124; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 95, 97–98, 100, 103–106; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22–25, 37–38; and the civil war 47–52; and crisis management 25–33; and decision making in the initial years 63, 65–74, 76; and the GNU foreign policy 82–83, 85, 87–88; and human rights 43–47; and the internal split 33–37; and major foreign policy issues 42–43; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 128–135, 137–138; and terrorism 52–58 New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 135 Nicaragua 2 Nimeiri, Jaafar xi–xiv, xx, 5, 11, 28, 114–115, 122n15; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 97, 100; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 132–133 non-governmental organisation (NGOs) 16, 44, 51, 58n2, 74–75, 91 Omer, Ibrahim Ahmed xx operation Moses 39n29 Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 15, 53, 73 Pakistan xiv, 57 pan-Islamism see under Islam peace process xiii, 51–52 policymaking, foreign 3, 6, 54, 64–65, 79, 82–83, 87, 114, 121, 135; policymaking institution 80–83; see also decision making political ideology see ideology, political political Islam 1, 12–13, 15–17, 22, 37, 56; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129–130, 138 Popular Congress Party (PCP) 105–106, 131

Popular Islamic Arabic Conference (PIAC) 15–16, 22, 35, 53–54, 57; and decision making in the initial years 68, 73–74, 76 pragmatism xv, 13, 37, 52, 105, 129–130, 132–135 Pronk, Jan 89, 93n29 Qatar 18, 103 religion xix, 4, 16, 30, 116, 129; religious fundamentalism 4, 12, 53–54, 57; see also Christianity; Islam Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) xvi–xvii, xx, 7, 34, 47; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 97; and decision making in the initial years 64–65, 67, 69–70, 75, 77n9 Russia 17, 28, 32, 51–53, 87, 100–102, 106–107 Russian Federation 107 Rwanda 31–32, 50, 55, 72, 80 Salih, Al-Zubair Mohamed xx, 31, 39n22, 65, 69–70, 99 Salih, Bakri Hassan 28, 76, 103 Salih, Faisal Mohammed 99 Salman, Salman Mohammed 121 Sanchez, Illich Ramirez see Carlos the Jackal Saudi Arabia xiv, 16–18, 28, 31, 34, 54, 59, 68–72, 103, 106, 132–134 secession 11, 48, 114–115, 117–119, 125; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 96, 100–102, 107; and the GNU foreign policy 81, 85–86, 89, 92; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 132, 136 Shamseldin, Ibrahim xvii Sharia xi–xvi, xix, 47, 52, 100, 113 Somalia 49, 54–56, 72, 75, 80, 92 Somali Islamic Unity Party (al-Ittihad al-Islami al-Somali) 49, 54 South Africa 102, 107 South Sudan 44, 51, 125; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 96, 102, 108; and the GNU foreign policy 79, 81, 84, 86–88, 92; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 131–132, 136; relations with 117–120 South Sudan Independent Movement 40n57 Soviet Union xiv, 1, 5, 18, 42, 65, 123 Spears, Ian 80 Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA) 30–31, 48–50, 56, 59n19, 72, 86, 118;

Index see also Sudanese People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) Sudanese People Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) xiii, xix–xxi, 3, 13, 17–18, 118; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22, 24, 30–32, 40n47, 40n57; and major foreign policy issues 46–52, 55–56; and decision making in the initial years 72, 78n36; and the GNU foreign policy 79, 86–87; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 131 Sudanese Socialist Union Party xi Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) xix, 6, 48, 50, 117–119; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 100; and the GNU foreign policy 80–82, 84–92, 92n1, 93n9, 93n11, 93n23; see also Sudanese People Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) state institutions xv, 11, 26, 35, 46, 53; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 100–103; control of xvi–xviii; and decision making in the initial years 63–65, 73; and the GNU foreign policy 81; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 135–138 Suliman, Bedr Al-Din xii, 57 Sweden 66 Syria 31, 106, 115 Taha, Ali Uthman 24, 36, 69–70, 73, 80–86, 90, 105 Talisman 45 Tanzania 53, 57 terrorism 4–6, 17–19, 124; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 96; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22, 24–29, 31, 33; and decision making in the initial years 68, 71–72, 74; and the GNU foreign policy 88, 93n14; and major foreign policy issues 42–43, 45, 52–58;

143

and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129–130 Tunisia xiv, 15–16, 53–54, 74 Uganda xv, 117, 120, 125; and backlash from an assassination attempt 23–24, 28, 30–33, 37, 40n50; and the GNU foreign policy 92; and major foreign policy issues 44, 49–51 Umma xi–xiii, 12–13, 16–18, 22, 120–123; and decision making in the initial years 70–73; and major foreign policy issues 48, 53, 57; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 130–131 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 15, 103, 106 United Kingdom 14–15, 26, 38n18, 39n19, 137 UN Security Council (UNSC) 24–30, 32–34, 37, 56, 80, 88; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 107; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 135 United States (US) 2, 13, 15–19; and Al-Beshir’s grip on power 100–101, 105–106; and backlash from an assassination attempt 22–24, 26, 28, 30–31, 33; and decision making in the initial years 68, 71–72; and the GNU foreign policy 84, 87–89, 91, 93n14; and major foreign policy issues 43, 45, 49–50, 53–58; and New Sudanese foreign policy parameters 129, 131 Vietnam 14, 107 WikiLeaks 84, 88, 99, 105 Wilson, Woodrow 4 World Bank 78n38 Yemen 16, 31, 66–67, 102–103, 122 Zaire 31–32, 37, 50, 55, 78n36