Foreign Policy and Leadership in Nigeria: Obasanjo and the Challenge of African Diplomacy 9781350986473, 9781786732330

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Steve Itugbu received his PhD in Politics and International Studies from SOAS, University of London, where he now works as a teaching fellow. He was an aide to Nigeria’s former president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, advising on media and foreign policy.

‘There are very few accounts of Nigerian foreign policy told as adroitly and as knowledgeably as Steve Itugbu’s book. Dr Itugbu was at President Obasanjo’s side when many of his key directions on foreign policy were formed, and with him as they were executed. His analysis of what happened and why, and how, makes the book an invaluable contribution to foreign policy studies as a whole – as well as serving as an introduction to the high policy discussions and processes of one of the great African states.’ Stephen Chan, OBE, Professor of International Relations, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London ‘This book is a fascinating and authoritative “warts and all” study of President Obasanjo’s African policy, by an insider on Obasanjo’s staff with an unusual level of access both to key documents and to the process of decision making. The portrait Dr Itugbu paints is of a man with great achievements to his credit, who returned his country to democratic rule, earned a reputation as an international statesman, and believed passionately in Africa taking charge of its own destiny. His failure to capitalise on these achievements is attributed to Obasanjo’s authoritarian personality, his determination to treat Nigerian foreign policy essentially as a private preserve, and his distrust and marginalisation of the bureaucracy and foreign-service. This book will be essential reading for all students of Nigerian foreign policy and Africa’s recent diplomatic history.’ James Mayall, FBA, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, University of Cambridge and Fellow of Sidney Sussex College

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA Obasanjo and the Challenge of African Diplomacy

STEVE ITUGBU

Runo, Kome, Nero, Maro and Abieyuwa For everything considered little, but so significant; and for all your unceasing faith in me. I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2017 This paperback edition published 2020 Copyright © Steve Itugbu, 2017 Steve Itugbu has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. xi constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover image: Former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo addresses the media upon arrival in Harare on 27 July 2013. Obasanjo was in charge of a team of 60 African Union monitors for Zimbabwe’s 31 July 2013 election. (© ALEXANDER JOE/AFP/Getty Images) Cover design: Positive2 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7845-3210-9 PB: 978-0-7556-0106-6 ePDF: 978-1-7867-3233-0 eBook: 978-1-7867-2233-1 Series: International Library of African Studies Typeset by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Introduction Theoretical framework Book’s structure 1.

vii xi 1 2 4

Obasanjo, Nigeria and the AU Obasanjo’s early life Obasanjo in the military Obasanjo Farms President Olusegun Obasanjo Obasanjo’s foreign forays Obasanjo and Afrocentrism Nigeria’s crisis of nationhood and the roots of the personalisation of foreign policy-making Why Darfur? Nigeria as a regional hegemon Conclusion

7 7 8 11 12 13 18

2.

The Impact of Darfur

45

3.

The Ethical/Philosophical Motivation Driving Obasanjo’s Diplomacy on Conflicts in Africa

61

21 31 36 44

vi

4.

5.

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

Investigating Obasanjo and Darfur Interviews Data analysis of archival materials on the conduct of foreign policy under Obasanjo Afrocentrism Afrocentrism and Nigeria’s quest for a UN Security Council seat Diplomatic expectations Personalisation of foreign policy decision-making Peacekeeping Strong and failed states Undercurrents of diplomacy Analysing the Interviews: Using the Public View as Commentary on the Inside View Discernible patterns/continuity Collegial management/personalisation of foreign policy decision-making Ethical/philosophical concerns and motivations Future challenges Comments

69 70 71 72 85 86 100 105 116 117 121 149 157 187 188 201

Conclusion

203

Notes Bibliography Index

228 249 265

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD ADB AFRICOM AGOA AIDS ALF AMIS ANC APC APP APRM ASF AU BP BRIC CA CBN CDS CEO CIA CPA CSSDCA

Alliance for Democracy African Development Bank African Command African Growth and Opportunity Act Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome African Leadership Forum African Union Mission in Sudan African National Congress Armoured Personnel Carriers All People’s Party African Peer Review Mechanism African Standby Force African Union British Petroleum Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Group Constitutive Act Central Bank of Nigeria Chief of Defence Staff Chief Executive Officer Central Intelligence Agency Comprehensive Peace Agreement Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa

viii

DHQ DPA DRC DSTV ECOMOG ECOWAS EPG EU EXCOM FCT FDI FNLA G8 G20 GCFR GOC GSM IBB ICC ICGL ICJ IGAD IPPA ISF JEM LRA LURD MAMSER MCA MNF MONUC MOU MPLA NA

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

Defence Headquarters Darfur Peace Agreement Democratic Republic of Congo Digital Satellite Television Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Eminent Persons Group European Union Executive Committee Federal Capital Territory Foreign Direct Investment National Front for the Liberation of Angola Group of Eight Highly Industrialised Nations Group of Twenty – international forum for government and central bank governors from 20 major economies Grand Commander of the Federal Republic General Officer Commanding Global System for Mobile Communication Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida International Criminal Court International Contact Group on Liberia International Court of Justice Intergovernmental Authority on Development Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement International Stabilisation Force Justice and Equality Movement Lord’s Resistance Army Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Mass Mobilisation for Self Reliance, Social Justice and Economic Recovery Member of the Constituent Assembly Multinational Force UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Memorandum of Understanding Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Nigerian Army

LIST

NADECO NAF NAM NASS NEC NEPAD NIA NIF NIGCON NIIA NPN NUP OAU OECD OPEC OSCE PAC PDF PDP PSC R2P RCN SADC SADR SAF SAN SAP SLA SLM SPLM SPLM/A SSLM SWAPO TAC TCC UDFN UK UNAMID

OF ABBREVIATIONS

ix

National Democratic Coalition Nigerian Air Force Non-Aligned Movement National Assembly National Economic Council New Partnership for Africa’s Development Nigerian Intelligence Agency National Islamic Front Nigerian Contingents Nigerian Institute of International Affairs National Party of Nigeria National Unionist Party Organisation of African Unity Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Presidential Advisory Council People’s Defence Force People’s Democratic Party Peace and Security Council Responsibility to Protect Radio Communications of Nigeria Southern African Development Community Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Sudan Armed Forces Senior Advocate of Nigeria Structural Adjustment Programme Sudan Liberation Army Sudan Liberation Movement Sudan People’s Liberation Movement South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army South Sudan Liberation Movement South West Africa People’s Organisation Technical Aid Corps Troops Contributing Countries United Democratic Front of Nigeria United Kingdom United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur

x

UNAMSIL UNESCO UNIDO UNITA UNMIL UNOCI UNSC UPN US USRIO USSR VCD VP WNBF WO

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations Industrial Development Organization National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivoire United Nations Security Council Unity Party of Nigeria United States Under Secretary for Regions and International Organisations Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Video Compact Disc Vice President West Nile Bank Front Warrant Officer

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have not been able to find the exact words to express enormous appreciation to one visceral man, Professor Stephen Chan, for the mentoring, for the incredible patience and dedication, as well as for the impressive devotion to academic quality in providing guidance to arrive here. Thanks to Professor Laleh Khalili, who led me on journeys of intellectual discovery. I am also indebted to Lester Crook and Thomas Stottor at I.B.Tauris for their faith in this book. My gratitude also goes to Lawrence Olaseinde, Shehu Usman Iyal and Professor Tunde Adeniran for their unceasing support. Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their consistent encouragement and prayers; especially my mum, A.A. Itugbu, who passed on a few months after I obtained my doctorate degree, and my dad, who knew I would embark on this journey, was confident I would return successfully, and is unfortunately not here to savour this day. Adieu Isaacs!

INTRODUCTION

In February 2003 in Darfur, Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement began attacking government targets, whom they accused of oppressing the region’s non-Arab population. Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, responded to the uprising by mobilising the Arab Janjaweed militias, supported by military air raids. The killings reached genocidal proportions. The US and international human rights groups were the first to raise genocidal concerns, even though the UN referred to the developments only as ‘war crimes’. Broadly speaking, international intervention was not immediately forthcoming. While Chad made a diplomatic push to broker a ceasefire between the parties involved, the African Union (AU) initially refrained from denoting events as genocide. In addition, the AU at first failed to agree on sending a peacekeeping mission to Darfur. The difficulties surrounding African intervention in Darfur point to a broader problem of foreign policy decision-making in Africa. Aside from the political intrigues within the AU and its insistence upon assuming sole responsibility to resolve the conflict, events in Darfur demonstrated that many African states had strongmen leaders who personalised the conduct of foreign policy. This is perhaps best exemplified by Olusegun Obasanjo’s dual role as president of Nigeria and chairman of the AU. His reign represents a significant period where a penetrating analysis of foreign policy is both necessary and illuminating. Through a detailed study of Obasanjo and the crisis in Darfur based on archival materials, extensive interviews and the application of a wide range of international relations theory and philosophy, this book will

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reveal how foreign policy decision-making in Africa is often more erratic than the ideal. Can the policy-making process be strengthened and deepened, given all the problems caused by leadership that personalises foreign policy decision-making? Darfur, as the first conflict and first foreign policy test for the new AU, provided a comprehensive challenge to the power of the AU, the power of Nigeria and the doctrine of Afrocentrism. Indeed it was Nigeria under Obasanjo that led the AU’s intervention in Darfur, thereby representing a broader argument about the personalisation of foreign policy decisionmaking. While the real emphasis in a much-needed foreign policy decision metric should be on building a consensus, it may be assumed that Obasanjo’s key view was that consultation before making foreign policy decisions was a weakness. This failure to incorporate such consultation remains a serious mistake in Nigeria’s national strategy and is why successive administrations have misunderstood vital strategic foreign policy developments, misused their regional power influence and trivialised the handling of the Darfur crisis.

Theoretical framework This book will adopt Graham Allison’s timeless and active theoretical framework for examining a nation’s strategic foreign policy activities and apply it to Obasanjo’s response to the crisis in Darfur. Allison’s models offer a useful, and enlightening, vehicle for recreating and understanding the central puzzles of Obasanjo’s foreign policy decision-making, as well as highlighting the blurs/highpoints and exploring available assumptions and alternative explanations as to why the crisis festered. In his monumental study of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,1 Allison postulated three key models2 for use in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making. The first of these was the Rational Policy Model, which portrays actions as the purposive acts of unified national governments – governments being the primary actor and examining a variety of options before picking the path with the biggest ‘pay-off’. This model, for example, identifies the USSR’s actions in Cuba as reasonable, considering the strategic objectives. Allison demonstrated, however, that this model fails to take into account the complexity of many situations, and so also introduced the Organisational Process Model and Governmental Politics Model.

INTRODUCTION

3

These demonstrate that large acts are the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organisations in a variety of compatible conceptions of national goals and political objectives. Organisation theory consists of various ‘acts’ and ‘choices’ as the outputs of large organisations functioning according to certain regular patterns of behaviour. Government is made up of a conglomerate of semifeudal, loosely allied organisations, which perceives problems through organisational sensors and defined alternatives, and estimates consequences in the process. This process is similar to a large organisation where responsibilities are divided under a quasi-independent structure, partially coordinated by its leaders. The mechanisms are complex as the behaviour of many individuals must be coordinated through standard operating procedures – hence modifiers like ‘other things being equal’ and ‘under certain conditions’. Foreign policy decision-making therefore requires that problems be divided and distributed to various organisations for processing in order to save it from paralysis. However, failure in coordination between organisations is a major defect of the organisational process.3 The bureaucratic theory focuses on the internal politics of government, including events in foreign affairs, neither as ‘choices nor as outputs’. These are outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically. The key variables are perceptions, motivations, positions, power and manoeuvres of principal players from which outcomes emerge. This model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors focused on conflict, consensus-building, bargaining and compromise.4 These three models provide ‘alternative’ explanations of the Cuban Missile Crisis, specifically with reference to reaching a decision by a small group in the face of an ultimate threat. The Rational Policy Model constantly raises questions on intentions and objectives, such as the oddity of USSR’s colossal budget for the missiles against its de´tente policy. US president Lyndon B. Johnson pondered paradoxically why an ‘antiballistic missile system should be happening at a time when there is abundant evidence that mutual antagonism is beginning to ease’. The strategic missiles were due to the Soviet desire to overcome the existing large margin of US strategic superiority. The size of deployment and cost constituted a ‘value-maximising choice’.

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The US calmly deliberated the crisis and explored all options to avoid conflagration, given the immediate threat made it imperative for the US’s strategic objective to deflate whatever capital Khrushchev anticipated. A naval blockade became the best option, but this increased the tension over what should be the next move: escalation or deescalation. Although Allison’s deconstruction of the abstract nature of state actors in foreign policy decision-making was subjected to intense scrutiny and, at times, criticism,5 his models – replete as they are with specificity and theoretical rigour – highlight the importance of pluralist decision-making approaches and offer myriad explanatory and descriptive values to the study of the foreign policy process. In the words of Bendor and Hammond, a propos the models’ explanatory power, they incorporate ‘so many variables that it is an analytical kitchen sink. Nothing of possible relevance appears to be excluded.’6 It is this comprehensiveness that Allison’s models, Western-oriented as they are, can bring to foreign policy debates in the African context. This book therefore seeks to explore, scrutinise and determine the consistency of Allison’s models with regards to African realities, in the process shedding new light onto, specifically, AU intervention in Darfur and, in more general terms, the dynamics of the foreign policy process in Africa.

Book’s structure By way of background, Chapter 1 charts Obasanjo’s life and meteoric rise to international statesmanship, as well as providing a critical analysis of his foreign policy, especially its impact on Darfur. Chapter 2 offers an exposition of the issues problematised by the intractable characteristics of the Darfur situation, including the historical tensions between the diverse ethnic and religious groups in the region. The history of Darfur is crucial in the course of the analysis, in addition to finding explanations of the underlying causes of the conflicts (something that, arguably, the Obasanjo administration failed to take into account). Chapter 3 explores the theoretical and philosophical factors that motivated Obasanjo’s foreign policy interventions and exploits in the African continent. Chapters 4 and 5 are the core of the book. Drawing on a range of archival materials, including unstudied diplomatic exchanges between

INTRODUCTION

5

Obasanjo and several world leaders and internal memoranda, and exclusive interviews with officials, bureaucrats and key foreign policy experts, these chapters reinforce the fact that what obtained under Obasanjo was not ideal foreign policy decision-making as alluded to by Allison. The interviews provoke an interaction on the values, beliefs and decisions that determine international politics, and in turn serve to illuminate the internal mechanism of Nigeria’s foreign policy decisionmaking under Obasanjo. Both chapters also reveal how the existing foreign policy decision-making structure influenced the nature of the decision process and policy conclusions. The Conclusion reflects on Nigeria’s foreign policy under Obasanjo and offers normative and policy recommendations for the future. This book is intended as a wake-up call to Africa, Nigeria, its leaders and its citizens on the use of power. Through an analysis of the personalisation of foreign policy decision-making, it will be demonstrated that Nigeria needs to reconsider the decades of its dominance to advance its long-term national interests. Its major test will obviously be centred on how to build and develop a consensus on norms and principles that will allow Nigeria to work collectively. This dominance could be squandered sooner or later as a result of the leadership’s indifference, which exemplifies the personalisation of foreign policy decision-making. Sustaining this personalisation, the result of a strongman leader, will make Nigeria vulnerable and hasten the erosion of its dominance and pre-eminence.

CHAPTER 1 OBASANJO, NIGERIA AND THE AU

An historical account of Obasanjo’s life and time in government is imperative, and implicit in his ascendancy is the rich cast of individuals and panoply of factors that have impacted on Nigeria’s position in the international arena. Also important is the moral dilemma which motivated the intervention in Darfur, Sudan, making extensive use of historical evidence and detailing the conflict as the first of its nature after the transmutation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU). Importantly this explains the security dynamics of the continent, highlighting dispute resolution among member states and the framework used.

Obasanjo’s early life Olusegun Obasanjo was born on 5 March 1937 in the village of Ibogun near Abeokuta, Nigeria, into a Baptist family. Obasanjo, the first of nine children and one of only two to survive, alongside a younger sister, was educated at Baptist Boys’ High School, Abeokuta and in military institutions in the United Kingdom, India and Nigeria. Early accounts portray Obasanjo as a youth rooted in his Yoruba culture who also identified as a nationalist. Though too young to have taken a significant part in the nationalist movements during the colonial period, he played an active role from independence.1 His time as a young officer on the cusp of independence enhanced his commitment to nationalism because he loved the camaraderie within the military corps in comparison to that among politicians; he considered politicians unreliable.2

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Obasanjo in the military Obasanjo enlisted in the Nigerian Army in 1958 after attending high school. He received training at the Mons Officer Cadet School, Aldershot, UK and Royal College of Military Engineering, Poona. He also undertook military training at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London in 1974.3 Prior to all this, Obasanjo also trained at the Regular Officers’ Training School at Teshie in Ghana. On his return to Nigeria in 1959, he was posted to Kaduna as an infantry subaltern with the Fifth Battalion, which was Nigeria’s best. Obasanjo, after his commission into the Nigerian Army, participated in the UN Peacekeeping Force in the Congo between 1960 and 1961, serving in the eastern Kivu province with headquarters at Bukavu. His experience in the Congo enabled him to compare the effects of colonisation by two colonial powers – Britain and Belgium – and this heightened his pan-African fervour.4 Obasanjo served in various capacities and steadily advanced through the ranks in his two-decade military career, serving in key positions, one of which was his appointment as General Officer Commanding (GOC) 3 Marine Commando Division in May 1969, where he was particularly noted for inflicting severe damage to the Biafran insurgency that ended Nigeria’s civil war.5 In his autobiographical work, Obasanjo described this tumultuous period in Nigerian history, especially where, within the space of six months, he claimed to have turned a situation of low morale, desertion, and distrust within my division and within the Army into one of high morale, confidence, cooperation, and success [. . .] a nation almost torn asunder and on the brink of total disintegration was reunited and the wound healed.6 Obasanjo’s 3 Marine Commando Division rose from eight brigades and 23 battalions, to 32 battalions. Some of the brigades and battalions were commanded by inexperienced captains and lieutenants. As a result, the top command suffered, leading to the neglect of important military matters. Some formation commanders were away from their commands for weeks for social reasons. There was even a

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case where one commander spent most of his time reading for a law degree. In his account, Obasanjo claimed he was the war’s most successful divisional commander.7 He also wrote with ebullient self-confidence, taking General Murtala Mohammed to task for his failure to cross the Niger at Asaba in 1967, and further criticising the manner in which Mohammed gave up his divisional command. For Obasanjo, the issues at stake were not ambiguous: his opponents were rebels. In his book, Biafra appeared in quotation marks.8 Until the publication of his books, he received little publicity for his actual role in ending Nigeria’s civil war. In the mind of the public, the 3 Marine Commando Division was only linked to its first commander, Benjamin Adekunle. While General Yakubu Gowon occupied centre-stage at the end of the war, Obasanjo’s final campaign as the commander was, unfortunately, given a news blackout and so he had to return to routine soldiering. Also annoying to Obasanjo was the fact the first extensive account of the war came from the Biafran axis when its army commander, Alexander Madiebo, published his account in 1980 and failed to mention Obasanjo. But Obasanjo’s version in My Command became even more provocative because he was angry that his contribution had been overlooked. He wanted to re-launch his image, which remained unpopular within the Yoruba race given the manner of Shagari’s victory in the 1979 elections.9 Obasanjo’s two books, My Command and Nzeogwu, generated rebuttals from his contemporaries in the military. Obasanjo’s documentation of military rule was found to be written in a manner ‘somewhat more pleasant than it is in reality’ to achieve a re-construction of national history from the perspective of the military ruling class. The rebuttals concentrated on the perceived gaps in Obasanjo’s civil war narratives.10 In fact, ethnic schism, still prevalent, was what triggered the civil war, although Obasanjo never wavered in his commitment to nationalism. For this reason he blamed the origins of the civil war on narrow ethnic politics of the kind the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) pursued between 1979 and 1983.11 In the post-civil war era, Obasanjo moved to the Royal College of Defence Studies from where he was recalled to Nigeria in the later part of 1974 to take up the post of Federal Commissioner for Communication,

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and later for Works and Housing under Gowon before the latter was overthrown.12 In 1975 Obasanjo served as second-in-command to General Murtala Mohammed as attempts were made by the regime to restore public confidence in government. To achieve this, the junta dismissed more than 100,000 civil servants, police and members of the armed forces, the diplomatic corps and the judiciary for malpractice and corruption.13 Mohammed was assassinated in 1976 by military officers who were disgruntled by his sweeping, harsh policies.14 General T.Y. Danjuma, Alhaji M.D. Yusuf (the police chief at the time) and other top officials persuaded Obasanjo to assume leadership in spite of the damage the assassination had inflicted on Obasanjo’s mental and physical health.15 Obasanjo succeeded Mohammed on 15 February 1976.16 Obasanjo, who retained the trust of the military, pledged and continued the transition programme towards a civilian government originally set for 1979 by Mohammed and also agreed to continue the reform of the public service sector. Obasanjo’s regime drafted a new constitution that was adopted in 1979 which was similar to that of the US, with provision for a president, a senate and a house of representatives.17 Members of the Constituent Assembly (MCA) who deliberated on the new constitution favoured the American model of a strong president capable of promoting unity and peace among the ethnic groups of Nigeria. The MCA also wanted specific guarantees inserted into the constitution to protect the independence of the press even though many were opposed, arguing that would be dangerous for Nigeria’s stability.18 In this way, Obasanjo essentially adhered to the timetable proposed by Mohammed in 1975 and made possible the return of the military to their barracks.19 Obasanjo reinvigorated Mohammed’s political transition programme and foreign policy.20 This was reaffirmed by Obasanjo’s commitment to sustaining Mohammed’s foreign policy momentum, particularly with regard to decolonisation in Namibia and Zimbabwe and radically modifying South Africa’s apartheid. Furthermore, he also hosted the World Conference for Action against Apartheid in August 1977.21 Obasanjo’s policy thrust was in response to the UK having given permission to British Petroleum (BP) to start exporting North Sea and non-embargoed oil to South Africa and was ‘also designed to scotch

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Mrs Thatcher’s hopes of returning Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to legality in the way she wants’. On Zimbabwe, Obasanjo also damned the UK’s inflexibility by nationalising BP and threatening a boycott of British exports. The UK later backed down and supported the processes leading to independence, free elections and majority rule in Zimbabwe.22

Obasanjo Farms Obasanjo retired from the military to establish a large-scale farm, Temperance Farms Limited (which later became Obasanjo Farms) in his home state in 1979.23 He considered farming to be a fitting occupation and he wanted to use this commitment to agriculture and food production to set an example and encourage others to follow the same path. Obasanjo’s choice of land, although controversial, had deep roots in his Yoruba past. The land at Ota was close to his birthplace and it was 60 km south of Abeokuta and 40 km north of Lagos. The original settlers of the area were the Awori who also founded Lagos. The influence of the area became diminished in 1842 after it was colonised by the Egba people, which included Obasanjo’s ethnic group, the Owu.24 After the farm became functional, Obasanjo became an open critic of President Shehu Shagari’s government. He considered Shagari unfit to be president, suspecting that Shagari might have been pushed into power by those who wanted to use him. He also accused Shagari of being too weak to check the abuses of close friends and aides. But Shagari severely resented Obasanjo’s accusations and insisted that running a democratic government, which required strict adherence to the constitution,25 was different from military dictatorship. As his focus shifted to the economy, Obasanjo’s criticism of Shagari was unrelenting. Shagari later revealed that Obasanjo constantly expected him to consult him on governance, seemingly obsessed with the idea of having been a super-administrator, a super-diplomat and a military genius. But Obasanjo was right to criticise because at that time the economy had gone into a crisis precipitated by fluctuating oil prices.26 Relations between both deteriorated further until Shagari’s government was overthrown in another military putsch which brought Major-General Muhammadu Buhari into power in 1983.

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President Olusegun Obasanjo Obasanjo re-emerged several years later to be elected Nigeria’s civilian president in 1999 and also secured re-election in 2003. In 1999 Obasanjo pledged to restore the confidence of the international community and the faith of Nigerians in Africa’s most populous nation and West Africa’s economic power base. This became necessary given that 15 years of military rule had left Nigeria with a critical trail of corruption, a deepened religious and ethnic violence and the possible dismemberment of the nation.27 Prior to his election, Obasanjo was known to have demanded the termination of President Ibrahim Babangida’s regime for the annulled 1993 presidential elections that had increased Western diplomatic pressure on Nigeria.28 Obasanjo was later jailed by General Sani Abacha’s regime for alleged coup-plotting.29 Abacha nearly executed Obasanjo on this trumped-up charge of treason, but this was later converted to 15 years in prison.30 Co-accused Shehu Yar’Adua died in prison under mysterious circumstances. Both Obasanjo and Yar’Adua belonged to a wide grouping of military and civilian opponents of Abacha who were convicted in dubious trials.31 Obasanjo was released unconditionally after Abacha died. The death of Moshood K.O. Abiola, who many believed had won the annulled 1993 presidential election, opened a new window to the new military leader, who was ‘willing to take steps towards the long-awaited re-civilianisation of politics’.32 Abacha’s successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, released Obasanjo, outlined a short political transition timetable and drafted a new constitution in 1998 which retained the US political model. It was this new political transition that gave birth to the Obasanjo civilian government in 1999. It was protested by some that Obasanjo’s emergence as president in 1999 was a well-crafted payback arrangement for his democratic programme in 1979 that manoeuvred the northern-dominated National Party of Nigeria (NPN) into power. The decision by the military to support Obasanjo and the northern ruling clique was, therefore, seen as a guarantee against the demands for redress or retribution. Critics argued that what occurred had been orchestrated by the military’s impunitydriven electoral charade33 because the selective pardon granted to Obasanjo to participate in the political sphere was not extended to similar political prisoners.34

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Obasanjo shocked many when he joined the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and announced a $1.5 million donation to the party’s electioneering campaign fund. The shock arose from the fact that he was able to raise such a colossal sum of money even though he had just been released from Abacha’s jail. He later stated that the money was donated to him by friends. These were former generals and so the conclusion of some was that he had become the military’s candidate.35 Obasanjo later won the election because the PDP was consistent, better organised and well financed. In addition, the All People’s Party/Alliance for Democracy (APP/AD) alliance was also in shambles as major party members decamped to the opposition.36 Obasanjo’s opponent in the 1999 elections, Chief Olu Falae, challenged the outcome of the election but lost the appeal.37 Meanwhile, prior to 1999, Western governments’ responses to General Sani Abacha’s dictatorship were timid despite the considerable posturing by the US and the UK on measures to compel Nigeria’s military regime to comply with international norms of governance. The West was reluctant to impose any framework that would ‘jeopardise or disrupt bilateral relations with the most populous nation on the African continent despite the considerably tenuous mixture of quiet diplomacy and limited sanctions; it is evident that Washington does not quite know what to do about Nigeria’.38 Obasanjo’s election in 1999 therefore eased tension within Nigeria. Even though he was considered an ally of the West, he faced immediate domestic challenges, which included addressing the question of the military in Nigeria. As a retired general, there was the view that he was better positioned to control the military and prevent future coups. In contrast was the argument that this had not been the case when the government in which he was the second in command was almost overthrown in 1976. In addition, there was the contention that many in the military, particularly those in the Abacha junta, were unhappy over his election. Obasanjo also had to contend with the demand from some formidable groups like the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and the United Democratic Front of Nigeria (UDFN) for a sovereign national conference.39

Obasanjo’s foreign forays Internationally, Obasanjo also faced challenges given his intervention in Sierra Leone and his regional peacekeeping roles in Liberia, Sudan,

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Zimbabwe and other African countries, which drew instant recognition. In comparison to the UN, the EU and the AU, Nigeria always intervened vigorously. It was Obasanjo who also forced President Charles Taylor of Liberia into exile in Nigeria in 2003. Together with other African leaders like South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Obasanjo prepared the conditions needed to persuade Taylor to accept the offer of asylum. Matters went awry in 2006 when Taylor escaped from Calabar. He was later arrested and sent to The Hague for trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC).40 Obasanjo maintained and achieved international recognition for his cordial relations with world leaders across continents. Significant among these was that with President Jimmy Carter of the US, who opened a new turn in US– Nigerian relations. This came about during his time as the head of the military regime. Under Carter and an excellent team, made up of Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Andrew Young, the US began to recognise the unique identity of Africa instead of treating it simply as one part of the ‘Third World’. This rapprochement led to Obasanjo’s visit to the US on 10 October 1977. President Carter repaid the visit when he arrived in Lagos on the evening of 31 March 1978.41 Relations improved dramatically from the low point of Mohammed’s regime.42 As an elected president, Obasanjo also enjoyed a similar level of relations with world leaders such as US President Bill Clinton, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Benin’s Mathew Kerekou and so on. At that time, communist powers were resigned to the fact that the West had a grip on Nigeria; attaining socialism in Nigeria was impossible and the way forward was subordinating ideological adventurism to good relations.43 Other notable achievements for Obasanjo as a civilian president were that Nigeria paid off its huge debt, stabilised its currency, cut inflation down to single digits, expended foreign reserves tenfold, cracked down on money laundering, consolidated the highly profitable banking sector, won its first sovereign credit rating and established macroeconomic and fiscal policies that were both effective and enshrined in law by the landmark Fiscal Responsibility Act. Counter to these was an unstoppable campaign of sabotage in the oil-producing Niger Delta which cut Nigeria’s oil output by 25 per cent.44 Obasanjo was intent on resolving the issue of Africa’s debt burden. At every forum he highlighted the immorality of the debt even though

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locally the Niger Delta conflict was left unresolved. This threatened global economies given that the militants in the Niger Delta had lost sight of their original objective – to persuade recalcitrant local governments and the oil companies to improve the lot of the local people. Instead, they were terrorising foreign workers and locals, stealing oil and procuring weapons.45 Obasanjo’s presidency was notable for having worked with abrasive vitality to transform Nigeria’s economy, which had been considered by many to be several years behind schedule.46 Obasanjo superintended a Nigeria agonising from ‘a crisis of legitimacy and a state disconnected from society’.47 This ‘crisis of legitimacy’ wholly underpinned the 1999 elections that gave rise to the Obasanjo presidency and former US President Carter’s ‘reluctance to pronounce them free and fair’ was evident.48 The head of the EU observer team put forward a generally positive evaluation of the elections and stated that the encountered problems did not mar the credibility of the results as all the parties were guilty of gross violations of electoral rules. But other observers were less confident about the representative character of the election results, thus questioning the legitimacy of Obasanjo’s electoral victory.49 This scepticism was countered by the warm goodwill Obasanjo received from Nigerians, especially the major power groups, including the military leadership and also from the international community.50 The goodwill from the latter never translated into the financial support Obasanjo had hoped for, given the difficult economic situation. Although unpopular, engaging in a number of serious economic reform projects became Obasanjo’s only option. This included stressing a fundamental reform of a ‘chronically over-staffed, under-paid, inefficient and corrupt civil service’.51 The crisis of legitimacy was not helped either by Obasanjo’s dominant, combative leadership style [which] seems to frustrate any legitimacy that could emerge from a clear policy direction. Although less than sensitive, the leadership is self-assured as if it enjoyed a ninety per cent approval. This is a paradox, given that public support is apparently low and power is being eroded on all sides. This is a further deepening of the chasm between state and society. The most obvious outcome is that policy implementation becomes difficult with a low likelihood of success for reforms.52

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The crisis of legitimacy metamorphosed into the armed rebellion in the Niger Delta, where youths disrupted oil production. Obasanjo, under tremendous pressure to respond, opened direct negotiations with the armed groups, thus generating more cynicism.53 Obasanjo’s nature and temperament were legendary. His strong but near-fragile personality was obvious when under political pressure as president, which was repeatedly characterised by the attempts by one arm of the government to establish dominance over the other. Obasanjo’s preference to dominate the legislature matched his military training and experience as a ruler, and unlike Shagari’s administration, the ruling party had a majority. But it was a party without policy or discipline. Although he continued to insist he was a democrat, some saw Obasanjo’s understanding of democracy as beginning and ending with winning elections. The inference was that he wanted democracy without the interference of the people or their elected representatives. There was also friction since many in the legislature, because of their education and experience abroad, understood the presidential system of government far better than Obasanjo. His chief adversary in the legislature was the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na’Abba, who continued to maintain that democracy under Obasanjo was civilian autocracy. Obasanjo was forced to shift to cruder methods of controlling the National Assembly (NASS) when party loyalty failed and this involved controlling their re-election. On several visits to the NASS, Obasanjo often breached protocols by taking the chair, tactlessly asking senior senators to leave while holding a discussion. In many cases, he even marched uninvited into their meetings, often lost his temper and stormed out. The disputes were mainly about the size of supplementary budgets and the issue of leadership of the House and Senate.54 These traits were manifest in Obasanjo’s entire career, spanning his dictatorship to his days as a democratically elected president. Despite the facade of strong leadership, Obasanjo was humiliated when the intention to lengthen his tenure was revealed. The Senate rejected the proposed constitutional amendment that would have added an additional term of four years, but this outcome was marked by controversy and animosity. The results of the electoral process, in which Obasanjo’s successor Umaru Yar’Adua garnered more than 70 per cent of the vote, were condemned. The election organisers faced allegations of rigging and malpractice. Following this were calls for fresh elections or

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the installation of an interim government to oversee Nigeria.55 The 2007 elections were disastrous as they had even more rigging, violence, stolen ballot boxes, bogus vote counts and assassinations.56 So intense were the condemnations that Yar’Adua opted for reconciliation with the opposition and Nigeria’s diverse groups.57 The paradox of Obasanjo became even more evident: [. . .] General Olusegun Obasanjo, who returned Nigeria to democracy in 1979, and who has laboured with courage and vision to bring it back again. Obasanjo carried out Nigeria’s first transition from authoritarian to civilian rule: now he stands to benefit – and certainly to be challenged – by the second.58 Obasanjo had attempted to remain relevant after exiting power in 1979. He was a major critic of President Ibrahim Babangida’s regime over the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); and the Abacha regime over his political transition programme, which caused his incarceration. He was equally a critic of Shagari, who he installed in 1979. Obasanjo considered Shagari as unfit for the office of president. It was later revealed that Shagari felt undermined as Obasanjo expected to be consulted always due to his fixation on being an excellent bureaucrat, great diplomat and military intellect. Shagari believed he had a greater experience of civilian government than Obasanjo, who had no democratic experience. Obasanjo also attempted to control Yar’Adua, having found it difficult to let go of power.59 Nigeria was convulsed by the personality clash between Obasanjo and Yar’Adua. Obasanjo’s power base became diminished, and Yar’Adua’s administration had a totally different style. While the latter was a fervent believer in due process and wide consultation, Obasanjo was a corner-cutter. Yar’Adua had good reasons for his policies and nullified some of Obasanjo’s earlier decisions, such as the invitation extended to the Indian – British conglomerate Mittal to take over Nigeria’s moribund giant steel mill; the construction of a new railway from south to north; and the auction of oil concessions.60 It is important to take a broad look at his activities for more insight. There is also the need for rigorous analysis of the prevailing narratives that eulogise Obasanjo as an important figure of Nigerian and international history after successfully overseeing Nigeria’s transition to civilian

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democracy in 1979.61 Obasanjo in his post-1979 era gained international prominence after being nominated by the Zambian and Zimbabwean presidents as a member of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons that was empanelled to resolve the conflict in South Africa.62 Obasanjo, both as unelected and elected leader, largely dictated the pace of Nigeria’s foreign affairs. He devoted his first presidential term to restoring Nigeria’s international reputation and also to regaining its prominent role in the African continent.63 His grasp of foreign affairs exceeded his command of economics and he moved with remarkable ease into the world of international statesmen. Critics attributed his foreign policy successes to his subservience to the West, as shown by his presence at foreign summits and conferences and his many state visits. The value of his contribution to Nigeria’s foreign policy can be appreciated more fully when compared with the failings of his successor, President Yar’Adua. Yar’Adua became tagged by the Nigerian press as ‘Mr Go Slow’ and this immediately brought home the salient virtues of Obasanjo. Yar’Adua became too laidback and as Nigeria’s momentum slowed, Nigerians began to realise how much Obasanjo had achieved.64

Obasanjo and Afrocentrism Obasanjo’s motivation in large part arose from global concerns about Nigeria’s ills and a belief in an ‘Afrocentric’ foreign policy that placed Nigeria at the forefront of African matters.65 The term ‘Afrocentrism’ refers to a course of action that prioritises the African continent’s interests above the national interests of individual states. This is the case even when the national interests of individual states are in conflict with those of Africa writ large. Serie McDougal surmised that all African foreign policy must be Afrocentric: that is, prioritising the needs and concerns of African people first and also considering the long-term implications of any foreign policy decision for the wider African population. This further suggests that African foreign policy must be Afrocentric in its objectives.66 McDougal expands the concept of ‘Afrocentricity’ to include conceptualisation of the African world as Africans on the African continent as well as the African diaspora in their diverse circumstances and locations around the world. Thus, the African world extends to all of the non-African countries that African people have migrated to over the centuries, voluntarily and involuntarily.

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Consequently, forming strategic relationships with these populations and harnessing the human resources of Africans across the ‘African world’ is seen as critical to Africa’s future development. Moreover, the AU, through its several resolutions, has accepted and begun to act upon these highly valuable populations of African people.67 ‘Afrocentricity’ also has an American definition which defines the concept as a paradigm based on the understanding that African people should assert their agency in order to attain recognition. This began in the 1960s, when a group of African American intellectuals in the newly formed Black Studies departments at universities formulated novel ways of analysing information from a ‘black perspective’ against what was considered as the ‘white perspective’. The concept was seen as a ‘revolutionary shift in thinking tailored towards the constructural adjustment to black disorientation, de-centeredness, and lack of agency’.68 Ufot Inamete claims that Afrocentrism is one of the major principles guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour. This idea of Africa has therefore developed into a major concept in Nigerian foreign policy, greatly influencing the Nigerian foreign policy-making milieu.69 Nigeria adopted an Afrocentric approach to foreign policy that was ‘anchored on the Concentric Circle Theory’. The Afrocentric foreign policy posturing was emphasised by Jaja Wachukwu (1961) when he averred that Nigeria’s foreign policy was based on three basic pillars of being inherently African, neutral and aiming for peace: Nigeria [. . .] is part and parcel of the continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to that continent [. . .] We are independent in everything, but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa [. . .] The peace of Africa is the peace of Nigeria, its tribulations are our tribulations and we cannot be indifferent to its future.70 In line with an Afrocentric foreign policy, Nigeria, as a matter of principle, always supported African states. During the Mohammed– Obasanjo era, recognition was given to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, while South Africa and the US supported National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). Nigeria liquidated British economic interest by nationalising

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BP and Barclays bank over their refusal to support Zimbabwe’s independence. When eventually Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980, Nigeria gave ₦10 million to Zimbabwe to celebrate her independence and Major-General Muhammadu Buhari’s military regime also donated money to South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC).71 Other ways in which Nigeria has demonstrated her diplomatic Afrocentric credentials in the area of the liberation of Africa include that: In 1961, Nigeria played a crucial role in the events that led to the suspension of South Africa from the Commonwealth. Nigeria made generous donations to the Special Funds of the OAU Committee. Under the Gowon administration, South Africa received robust moral and financial support. This was the era Gambari aptly described as ‘Naira Spraying Diplomacy’.72 Afrocentrism was restrictive, not result-oriented and lacking in broader perspectives of wider emergent global politics. Furthermore, the concept was adopted to aid the leaders’ personal and political failings and subterranean machinations. It was effective, however, when Obasanjo in July 1977 urged the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to exert all its weight on influential Western powers to bring about change in South Africa by vigorously pursuing the sanctions agreed by the UN. If fully implemented, the calculation was that the South African apartheid regime would collapse. Obasanjo pursued this policy with characteristic vigour, especially against British companies – BP and Barclays bank.73 Afrocentrism has also been criticised because it negates economic diplomacy, which thrives on multilateralism. Over the past two decades, Nigeria has been benevolent to other nations while Nigerians are humiliated even among the contiguous States, subjected to xenophobic attacks abroad amidst apathy on the part of the home government. Nigeria exhibits false generosity abroad in order to create a wrong impression that the political economy is healthy. In Africa, Nigerians suffer rejection, deportation, imprisonment and other forms of maltreatment in other countries.74

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As a civilian president, foreign policy decision-making under Obasanjo underwent significant changes, as his diplomatic shuttles and political relationships yielded dividends beyond the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU. Obasanjo was part of a group of internationally activist presidents who sought a better deal for Africa from the G8. The result was the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Obasanjo, together with other presidents (Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdelaziz Bouteflika from Algeria and Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade), skilfully lobbied the G8 through what they called the African Action Plan.75 This may have aided debt cancellations in Africa by the Bretton Woods Institution and recovery of looted funds in Nigeria.

Nigeria’s crisis of nationhood and the roots of the personalisation of foreign policy-making Two decades after handing over power to Shagari, Obasanjo was democratically elected president. It spoke volumes of the zeitgeist crisis of nationhood that besets Nigeria. Obasanjo received the same instrument of office from the man who was the parade ground commander in the 1979 handover, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. The intervening years were turbulent for Nigeria. Obasanjo was a participant-victim in the saga of deceit and political subterfuge that made Nigeria unstable.76 The intervening years yielded a multitude of interesting analytical explanations on what underlay Nigeria’s crisis of nationhood. One such analysis is Adebayo Williams’ interpretation: Until the bubble burst with the late General Sani Abacha, Nigerian military rulers appeared to have honed to precision and perfection a strategy for warding off domestic and international pressure for democratisation: endless and increasingly farcical transition programmes which usually culminated in further democratic recession [. . .] the most elaborate, and certainly the most cynical, of these phantom democratisation programmes was the Babangida transition which ran from 1986 till 1993 and ended in a grand fiasco. Its failure and the fallout pushed Nigeria into its worst post-independence political crisis.77

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There is another narrative which focuses on the motif of distrust of the military upon Obasanjo’s re-emergence in 1999. Some argued that this was merely the latest episode in a never-ending game of musical chairs between a corrupt military establishment and an equally dissolute political class [. . .] that Obasanjo’s return to power has been neither under the circumstances of his choice, nor the manifestation of his personal wishes.78 A closer engagement with these narratives is necessary. Obasanjo’s emergence in 1999 contrasted with the wave of optimism that greeted the 1979 handover. In 1999, the general mood both within and outside Nigeria was low, largely due to a decaying infrastructure, collapsed institutions and a looted treasury, as well as a restless citizenry as a result of ethnic, religious and resource-based clashes. However, for the West, the return of Obasanjo was a welcome development. Prior to Obasanjo, foreign policy was crudely handled. The governments of generals Babangida and Abacha in particular plunged the country into pariah status, starting with the 12 June 1993 election.79 This was a marked departure from Nigeria’s early postcolonial era. Abubakar Balewa, Nigeria’s prime minister from 1960 to 1966, held to the Western values Nigeria had inherited from British colonialists. Balewa adopted a clear-cut, normative approach to foreign relations, comprising two competing options: support the West, or support the communist powers. According to Ogunbadejo, ‘non-alignment, the supposed foundation of Nigeria’s foreign policy, was nothing more than a facade’.80 There were others who argued that Nigeria’s foreign policy then was characterised by timidity, gradualism, opposition to communism, and subservience to the West [. . .] Nigeria rejected all forms of foreign assistance from the Eastern bloc, banned its nationals from travelling to socialist countries, opposed all militant anti-colonial moves in the continent, especially those initiated by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea, and interpreted the problem of apartheid in purely racial and moral terms.81

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It was within this context that the era of personalised foreign policy developed. Balewa’s control of foreign affairs had consequences: the foreign policy elite were prevented from actively formulating and implementing a more balanced and aggressive foreign policy.82 This was aggravated by the absence of a powerful parliamentary watchdog committee on foreign relations. Even when parliamentarians met, members lacked the necessary intellectual foundations, thus becoming ineffective. Some well-organised pressure groups, known to have articulated alternative views on the shape of Nigeria’s foreign policy, such as the Action Group Party and the National Youth Congress (which campaigned against the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact),83 were to a large extent ineffective in influencing policy direction under the Balewa administration. The roots of the intellectual deficiency and lack of strategy in foreign policy decision-making may also be traced to the tangled Nigerian parliament. Despite this, some forays into analysis have been useful. Of particular note is Henry Kissinger’s observation that ‘congress [parliament] is in no position to make coherent tactical decisions because its knowledge of the mosaic of foreign policy is so fragmentary’.84 In spite of Nigeria’s geopolitical weight, Ghana overshadowed it because its president, Kwame Nkrumah, was ‘certainly more articulate, more militant, and more ideologically committed, and he enjoyed greater global prominence than Balewa’.85 Following Balewa, the analysis becomes more difficult: the Ironsi administration did not last long and so need not be assessed. Shortly after Gowon assumed office, the civil war commenced. The only foreign policy articulations of that period were of Western powers’ wary postures, weighing the repercussions of various options at their disposal. These were mainly regarding ‘which side of the conflict to support; when to do so; the degree and extent of that support; and whether openly or covertly’.86 On assumption of office in 1999, Obasanjo visited many key presidents in a determined bid to erase Nigeria’s pariah status and undo the damage done to its reputation. The major thrust of his first term in office was to restore Nigeria to its enviable position in the world and to attract foreign investors. Obasanjo’s economic direction got further consolidation on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which President Bill Clinton signed into law in 2000. African leaders

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including Obasanjo followed this up with the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). President George W. Bush later signed an amendment to the 2000 Act in 2004. The AGOA is US’s Africa trade policy aimed to broaden the range of goods entering the US from Less Developed Countries.87 Regardless of Obasanjo’s busy shuttles, he continued to negotiate to bring peace and security to troubled African states. Obasanjo also spearheaded the quiet diplomacy by African governments to deal with Robert Mugabe in the Zimbabwean crisis. As a result, there was a split within the Commonwealth troika of Australia, Nigeria and South Africa that had the responsibility of mediating with Mugabe. Nigeria was caught between Australia, which was bent on a hard-line posture, and South Africa, which preferred a conciliatory attitude. African states within the Commonwealth opposed Secretary-General Don McKinnon for frustrating moves to lift Zimbabwe’s suspension. Africa saw this as a ploy to deny Mugabe a second term in office. Obasanjo, as chief host, was anxious to cut a respectable figure, anticipating that Zimbabwe would correct its errors.88 Then in 2005, Obasanjo, as chairman of the AU, appointed President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique to facilitate a process of dialogue between Mugabe and his political opponents. Chissano, however, announced the failure of this initiative on the grounds that the Zimbabwe government had rejected the talks. The UN secretary-general appointed former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa to a mediating role which was also stillborn. But a further mandate given to Mbeki by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to continue the mediation process had an added weight. This was because the effort was not dependent on the willingness of the Zimbabwean government to talk to the opposition, but, rather, Mugabe found it difficult to undermine the talks without risking losing the shield from international criticism and condemnation which his colleagues had consistently provided.89 Obasanjo also hosted peace meetings in Abuja regarding Darfur with the hope of restoring normalcy to that region.90 Sources at the UN had indicated that Nigeria had spent a colossal amount daily for the maintenance of its three battalions in Darfur. There was the reluctance of European and other developed states to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, even though there had been a substantial surge

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in demand for peacekeeping troops. The UN found it difficult in securing troops from developed member states. Though the developed states have been reluctant to provide troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, they have undertaken operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Cote d’lvoire as ‘coalitions of the willing’. The reluctance may not be unconnected to the rising cost of peacekeeping operations. The UN has spoken of a potential increase in the total number of troops to 80,000. In 2005, it was feared that the peacekeeping budget may rise to $4.5 billion, an amount unprecedented in UN history. The poorer countries are the greatest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations and even this is insufficient to meet rising demand.91 Intervention in Darfur was predicated on an invigorated Afrocentrism at the behest of Obasanjo, with a key role for Nigeria. However, Obasanjo’s move was challenged on the grounds that, first, South Africa was curiously absent in the initiative; second, Nigeria had an urgent domestic crisis to attend to; and third, given Nigeria’s economic situation, the cost of intervention was criticised as a waste of scarce resources. An indication of international support for the AU’s efforts came with the World Summit’s endorsement of a 10-year plan to build African capacity for peacekeeping. Since the UN Security Council spends over half its time discussing political crises in Africa, this development represents a recognition of the unique difficulties facing the African continent. Darfur endured grave circumstances because of the inability of the AU to deploy its peacekeepers in significant numbers. More so, the military backbone of AMIS came from just three states, Rwanda, Nigeria and Senegal. The AU mission also lacked the funds to cover its $465 million annual operating costs as well as adequate transportation and intelligence capabilities. In this sense, Africa’s capacity to keep the peace on the continent is still woefully short of what is required.92 Such perspectives have undergone consistent revisions and revivals in several recent academic discourses. However, Obasanjo often outlined his conundrum in what he regarded as challenges to Nigeria’s leadership in a rapid globalising world. These challenges were: the West African challenge, the continental challenge and the global challenge. The attempt was a Realist perspective, having acknowledged other continental powers such as South Africa, Egypt and Algeria. The key

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challenge apart from the three mentioned above was at the domestic level, where Nigeria was increasingly being confronted by several domestic security challenges which impacted negatively on its effectiveness in international affairs. Given the critical self-assigned role of Nigeria as ‘giant of Africa’ and leader of the black race and its responsibilities of superintending a security policy for the continent the capacity to protect the physical integrity of the Nigerian state was absent. Thus, Nigeria’s foreign policy adventures face strong domestic opposition because of the failure of its government to apply the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) domestically. This was especially at a time when the country continued to face all manner of security challenges.93 The outlined challenges also forcefully made the case for the importance and influence of Nigeria in the global arena. First, Nigeria and, broadly, Africa, was a vital part of the US’s fight against terrorism, offering an alternative to US dependence on Middle Eastern oil. A Dick Cheney Report in 2000 had stated that African countries provided 14 per cent of total US oil imports and this was equivalent to the percentage provided by Saudi Arabia. It was estimated that by 2015, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency that West Africa alone will supply 25 per cent of America’s imported oil. This was because many West African streams are lighter, higher-valued crude oils that are tailor-made for US East Coast markets, which also offer an alternative to Middle Eastern supply sources. This was the reason why the Bush Administration focused its attention on six African countries: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and Equatorial Guinea.94 Second, globalisation with emphasis on sustainable economic development has been a subject of national concern and also part of an international agenda. It is a widely held view that the literature on the role of globalisation in state politics comes with the assertion that globalisation entails the demise of the nation state. This has led to a situation whereby states have gradually lost control over their socioeconomic and political economies. This is irrespective of the debates on the two opposing perspectives: that of the ‘globalists’ led by Stiglitz, who contends that globalisation offers great opportunities of an assemblage of nations and people of the globe who interact with one another at multiple levels; and then the skeptics who consider the thesis of the globalists as politically naive since it underestimates the enduring power of national governments to regulate international economic

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authority.95 Third, it was argued that revitalisation of the Nigerian economy would reinvigorate West African economies and, in turn, strengthen the collective commitment to regional economic cooperation and integration. In this sense, ECOWAS remains a vital organ for the promotion of Nigeria’s national interest. It is imperative to explain the clash (and compromise) of interests leading to the transformation of the OAU to the AU. While there have been many studies on this transmutation, none have fully identified the variant clashing interests that drove the process. The AU was established to achieve three broad goals: to bring together the sub-regional institutions in Africa for continent-wide cooperation and integration; to create the conditions to engage in social, economic and political relations to reduce the chances of war; and to design an institutional framework for African states to participate more effectively in international negotiations.96 The re-emergence of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi into the international community in 1998 and the elections of Obasanjo and Mbeki in 1999 were a catalyst for the AU formation. While Obasanjo and Mbeki triggered the reform of the OAU to suit their new foreign policy interests, Gaddafi sought to use the OAU reforms as a platform to secure his rehabilitation into the international mainstream after years of isolation.97 Obasanjo, as chair of the Group of 77 South Summit in Havana, Cuba, had emphasised that the disparities between the North and South threatened international peace and security.98 Obasanjo’s opening speech stated that the summit was not another round of negotiations but a medium to send a clear message to the developed nations that the existing North – South disparities were an important threat to international peace and security since what existed in the Global South was the globalisation of poverty and underdevelopment.99 However, the AU’s creation can also be traced to the unfinished business of the pan-African ideals which motivated the formation of the OAU in the post-colonial era. These were similar to those canvassed in Havana. The ideals from 1963, however, failed to ‘lead to the establishment of strong continental institutional structure primarily because of the influence of ideas of modernisation, the effects of the Cold War, and the self-seeking interests of some of the ruling elites in Africa’.100

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As the main driver of the reforms leading to the establishment of the AU, Obasanjo canvassed for mutually acceptable guidelines on the conduct of governance in Africa. The other essential elements of the reforms were well articulated in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) as adopted at the Durban Summit in July 2002.101 Obasanjo’s African Leadership Forum (ALF), in collaboration with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), had earlier met in Paris in 1990 to explore the implications for Africa of the end of the Cold War. The first OAU summit to consider the CSSDCA document was hosted in Kampala, Uganda, after Obasanjo (then a former military ruler of Nigeria) had successfully lobbied OAU chairman Yoweri Museveni to discuss the document. The lobbying effort failed, and was made worse by Obasanjo’s imprisonment in Nigeria.102 Obasanjo later explained that the CSSDCA initiative failed because ‘it threatened the status quo and especially the power positions of a few governments whose domestic hold on unscrupulous power rendered them vulnerable and insecure’.103 But Obasanjo’s effort in making the reforms work at all costs was not unconnected to domestic pressures in Nigeria. There was intense opposition to Nigeria’s peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which cost more than a US$ 1 million a day. Obasanjo, therefore, sought a long-term policy which would prevent Nigeria from having to undertake such a huge burden of peacekeeping.104 The involvement of the AU was therefore vital for Nigeria, especially for the reduction of peacekeeping costs. The issue of burden-sharing as a priority for Nigeria also bore important lessons for similar cases involving the EU and the US, as the latter have always differed on questions of ‘partnership’, ‘burden-sharing’ and ‘exceptionalism’ in approaches to global economic management.105 Gaddafi repeatedly tried to sway the reforms in his favour by convening a special summit at Sirte, Libya, in an attempt to employ broader strategic and geopolitical goals aimed at cementing his full return to the geopolitics of Africa as well as renewing his consistent commitment to pan-Africanism.106 Gaddafi opened the summit by introducing a radically ambitious ‘United States of Africa’ agenda which would entail the creation of a continental presidency with a five-year term of office, a single military force and a common African currency to

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be approved in situ.107 This plan reinforced the intrigues between the three contending powers of the AU transmutation project. The AU finally came into being on 9 July 2002, while the Gaddafi plot remained a non-starter. Following Obasanjo’s tenure, Nigeria lacked a coherent strategic long-term framework. The absence of Nigeria at the London G20 Summit was symptomatic of the problem. Nigeria, the natural leader of Africa, did not meet the requirements for acceptance into the G20 despite its vast natural and human resources. With the optimisation of this capital, Nigeria ought to have made great waves in economic and scientific advancement. It was particularly unfortunate that, on the global stage, the G20 summit countries could determine the destiny of Nigeria and Africa even though these were absent from the table. In this absence, many financial and economic decisions were made that had severe effects on Nigeria and the rest of Africa. The G20 nations controlled about 80 per cent of the world GDP and trade.108 But Nigeria and other African countries were not alone; it was a general problem: While the inclusiveness of the G20 is undoubtedly better than the G8, there is still a glaring absence of smaller, lower income countries. Serious arguments can be marshalled to suggest that the G20 needs to be rethought to become fully legitimate in the eyes of those from less important countries.109 But who gets invited to the G20 summit and why is it controversial? The error of judgement on membership may be the reason why the G20 president each year invites about six guest countries to attend and participate in the summit. This is obviously a system of outreach to increase the legitimacy of the G20 as the ‘forum for international economic cooperation’ due to concerns about the G20’s limited and contentious membership.110 The G20 needs a larger constituency, where representatives from non-member states can participate in summits and working groups on issues of concern. Co-opting such nations on specific issues will help the G20 to defuse the criticism of exclusivity.111 While it is right to canvass for a stronger representation for Africa in the G20, it remains certain that the continent will remain on the

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margins as global leaders make decisions on the world economy. This is because since the Chairpersons of the African Union (AU) and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency who are usually invited as observers to G20 meetings change every year, it makes continuity and effective representation difficult [. . .] the Association of African Central Banks, unlike its peers in other regions, is not a member of the Financial Stability Board, another body comprising the Finance Ministers and central bankers of member countries, which meets regularly to take crucial decisions affecting the global economy [. . .] So Africa’s participation at the meetings often suffers due to uncertainty and inconsistency of its inputs. It is no surprise then that the continent’s priorities are not fully incorporated into the G20 agenda.112 Nigeria’s faltering democracy and a president who was unwell (throughout most of his tenure) may have rocked Obasanjo’s diplomatic momentum, but his ceding of Bakassi through the Greentree Agreement113 was unpopular because its inhabitants preferred Nigeria, something which would have been proven if only the international community had acceded to their request for a referendum to determine the future of the region. This is reinforced by the fact that, five years after the Greentree Agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon was signed, and after surrendering the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, Nigeria’s Senate still failed to ratify the agreement. In sharp contrast to the position of the Nigerian government the residents in Bakassi strongly contested the ICJ verdict as their political leaders and traditional rulers threatened to secede from Nigeria and create an independent Bakassi state, should the Nigerian government fail to protect their interests. In 2003, Mr Joe Atene, the Bakassi representative in the Cross River State House of Assembly, publicly declared that the Nigerian residents of Bakassi would regard a unilateral handing over of the peninsula by the Nigerian government to Cameroon as a serious betrayal. In May 2004, President Obasanjo warned the Bakassi community that he would not tolerate any separatist tendencies.114 The issue of refugees returning in multitudes to Cross River State in Nigeria failed to attract enough attention from international agencies despite the

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fact that the Bakassi issue was driven by the UN and urged on by the UK, the US and France.115 Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff’s (CDS) comments during the handing over of the Bakassi Peninsular revealed that the process was Obasanjo’s sole decision: Our gallant troops have been in this peninsula since 1975, which led to occasional skirmishes between us and our brothers from Cameroun. In fulfilment of 12 June 2006 Greentree Agreement and consequent upon the directions of our president, Commanderin-Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the process of pulling out the Nigerian military, which started some weeks ago is being concluded.116

Why Darfur? Obasanjo’s handling of Darfur was largely unsuccessful because the African leadership failed to acknowledge the delicate nature of Darfur prior to his assumption of office as AU chairman. Obasanjo’s main concern was the deteriorating situation in the Darfur region where the main contention was that political power was concentrated more in Khartoum and the Nile valley. The conflict was aided by the spillover of the violence from the war in neighbouring Chad and the competition for resources between its ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ citizens. Conditions became more precarious when the Sudanese government supplemented its army by mobilising the Janjaweed Arab militia that aimed to change the demography of Darfur and remove its African tribes. Obasanjo hosted a year-long AU peace negotiation in Abuja, with Salim Ahmed Salim as the chief mediator. The Sudanese government and Darfur rebels participated and adopted a five-point agenda for discussions mainly on the issue of security. Obasanjo’s main strategy was to mix disarmament with a political solution. Progress on this was poor because agreement was imposed by the mediators instead of reached via negotiation by the contestants. This was the status quo until Obasanjo’s tenure as AU chair expired.117 The problem, however, was that Sudan had earlier refused AU peacekeepers access to areas where atrocities had taken place. The AU’s helplessness was manifested when Obasanjo warned the world of the

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possibility of genocide in Darfur, indicating Africa’s inability and limited capacity to resolve the matter. The AU’s failure replicated the Rwandan genocide scenario, but this represented a template for testing Africa’s resolve to police its own continent. It showed hopeful signs of meeting the challenge, but it lacked sufficient resolve. The new AU Constitutive Act, which created 18 new organs, had two novel features. The first was the initiative by Obasanjo and Mbeki that closed membership to future military regimes; and the second was the specific right of collective intervention in the affairs of member states in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threat to legitimate order. But a lack of clarity on its implementation became the weakness of the Union.118 Its eventual response to Darfur was also due to the embarrassing international spotlight, backed by the financial intervention of the US and the EU who were frightened that conflict zones in Africa could become breeding grounds for terrorists. The AU also failed to ascertain whether President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan could be indicted for war crimes because of his refusal to allow UN deployment in Darfur.119 The AU was not consulted regarding alBashir’s referral to the ICC and was not allowed to articulate a position on the investigations, thereby questioning the West’s view of the AU as not an equal. The issue remained contentious because arresting serving leaders has consequences and may be prone to abuse by ambitious UN Security Council members. Obasanjo’s forays were aimed at receiving coveted international recognition. He craved power and dominance in his environment, which characterised the contest between the triptych of Obasanjo, Mbeki and Gaddafi over who would lead Africa. In alliance with Mbeki and Algeria’s Bouteflika, Obasanjo successfully initiated the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) strategic framework document that was adopted by the 37th Summit of the OAU in July 2001. NEPAD remains as a mandated initiative of the AU even though a close scrutiny of the structures of NEPAD and the AU, shows very little convergence between both. This may not be unconnected to the fact that there is visibly little AU control, or oversight over the NEPAD process; and increasingly evident is the lack of institutional linkage between the AU and NEPAD.120

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Darfur was important to Africa because it was the first conflict after the OAU’s transformation into the AU; thus it was a credibility issue and also the first major foreign policy test for the body. Militarily, it stretched Nigeria to the limit, given the absence of Western troops. Darfur provided a comprehensive challenge to the virility of the AU, Nigeria and the doctrine of Afrocentrism. Was Afrocentrism an exploding myth because its virility proved partly illusory, which displayed a dangerous diffidence when it came to Darfur? Western criticism of Darfur worried the AU. The West contended that the genocide should be halted by Africa with the world’s help.121 Nigeria, therefore, led the AU’s intervention. There is a need to briefly trace the origin of Obasanjo’s involvement in Darfur, highlighting four basic motivating factors: first, the emergence of government-backed militias, the involvement of the Janjaweed and its implication in ethnic cleansing in Darfur; second, an encroaching refugee crisis, as close to 200,000 people were displaced across the border in Chad; third, international pressure from bodies such as the UN, with Secretary-General Kofi Annan warning that, without action, there could be an even greater catastrophe; finally, the AU Peace and Security Council, under its chairman, Obasanjo, finally appeared ready to assert itself. Prior to this, the third summit of the AU, which was held on 4 – 8 July 2004 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that had 48 countries and 38 heads of state attending had elected Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria as the chairman of the AU. The summit took 18 decisions and issued two declarations on important political, economic and social issues of the continent. This included its decision on the vision, mission and strategic plan of the AU, 2004 – 7. The vision is woven around a peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa, driven by its people, a dynamic force in the global community. AU members thereafter agreed to set up through a phased manner by 2010, the African Standby Force will undertake peacekeeping operations, including military interventions across Africa. The force will be concerned with humanitarian operations, post-conflict reconstruction and eliminating the occurrence of unconstitutional changes of government across Africa. These changes became imperative because the continent faced serious crises related to the situation in Darfur in Western Sudan, which experienced the most catastrophic humanitarian situation ever known. Darfur was indeed a test for the African

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Union.122 Obasanjo was selected by his head-of-state colleagues to fill this role in view of the experience he was expected to bring to the crisis. There are constructivist narratives of the development of the AU’s security culture to deal with cases similar to Darfur, especially in light of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. The R2P is a global political commitment endorsed by all member states of the UN at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Theirs was a more sophisticated although similar approach, recognising that Africa was caught up in the ‘regionalisation’ of international security, wherein patterns of enmity, amity and relative material capabilities within particular ‘regional security complexes’ are crucial to understanding the continent’s security dynamics.123 R2P aimed at settling disputes without resorting to coercion. Governments in the region were to act in unison to ‘tackle common security challenges’ at a time when significant parts of Africa were embedded in common Lockean and Hobbesian cultures, wherein states viewed neighbours as rivals or enemies and common security solutions were a rarity.124 Arguably, such an account is problematic for empirical reasons. Realism’s emphasis on states as unitary, rational and pre-eminent actors is inappropriate for analysing Africa’s contemporary security dynamics. This obscures the importance of non-state actors and the problematic nature of statehood on a continent where the line between states and non-states is thin.125 But the AU was, and still is, determined to pre-empt conflict. Its mantra is to intervene when necessary in the affairs of member states, especially to prevent war crimes and genocide, as it aspires to become a lead agent for peace operations on the African continent. In this context, solid institutional organs were established to attain this: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Constitutive Act (CA). The PSC’s mandate is to authorise and legitimise AU intervention in internal conflicts and the CA spells out the AU’s right to intervene in member states with respect to grave circumstances, genocide and crimes against humanity.126 These are intended to be practicable and sustainable structures as the institutions enable African leaders to remain focused on commonalities rather than divisions.

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It is hoped that the commonalities could reaffirm Africa’s own remedy to conflicts within the continent, providing African solutions to African problems, but this is arguably not feasible given that weak, authoritarian African governments lack the institutional capacity to manage factional struggles. They exclude majority or minority groups from power and suffer from poverty and gross income inequality. All of these tensions throw off sparks that can start a war.127 Inherent in these commonalities is the American-led war in Iraq, which gave greater urgency to the operation of a common defence and security policy. The thinking, especially in South Africa (with the consistent backing of Obasanjo) was that Africa’s aspiration for greater multilateralism and a collective response to global problems was being frustrated by the US going to war without a UN mandate.128 But this new threshold for intervention was necessary and wholly accepted once the action was seen as part of a broader strategy involving reliable regional partners. This was the case especially at a time when the US and the West were no longer keen on contributing troops for peacekeeping in Africa. The US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, while visiting Africa in 2000, told journalists that the US was ‘stretched so very thin’ militarily that Washington could not be expected to play a role in African peacekeeping missions. During this time, diplomatic activity was in frenzy over raising a UN force to implement the Lusaka Peace Accord for the Congo.129 But as a central thrust of Obasanjo’s foreign policy, Darfur provided an opportunity to prove his credentials on Afrocentrism.130 Again, Darfur illuminated the internal dynamics, the omissions and ambiguities, the successes, near-misses and failings of the concept of Nigeria’s doctrine of Afrocentrism. Darfur also offered detailed insights into the possibilities and dilemmas of conflict and intervention. Given the recurring conflicts in Africa, Darfur was an extreme case and a veritable template for understanding crisis patterns in Africa. Darfur also reveals why intervention in African conflicts is complex. Nigeria’s international relations, particularly during the Murtala Mohammed–Obasanjo era, were exceptional. While Gowon was patient, pragmatic and cautious, Murtala Mohammed was tough, inflexible and

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impetuous. While Gowon had by 1975 gained considerable political experience (with a considerable interest in and knowledge of international relations), Mohammed was politically inexperienced. This was because foreign policy was not his forte except in the eradication of colonialism, racism and apartheid in Southern Africa, which he pursued with the combative element of his soldiering profession. This was why there was a sense of alarm and crisis in London once it became obvious that Gowon’s government had been toppled.131 The regime had been a major proponent of Africa’s sovereignty as an unquestioned good insofar as colonialism and imperialism breached sovereignty. Obasanjo continued with this same philosophy after the demise of Mohammed, with Nigeria remaining the political mouthpiece and symbol of the black world in the bid to restore parity between Africa and the rest of the world. To Obasanjo, Darfur also represented an excellent opportunity to sustain the projection of Nigeria as a regional power; to show the world that African nations led by Nigeria could settle their own issues; and to show that Nigeria had taken on board the language of humanitarian intervention as a peacekeeping force. Intervention in Darfur was a utilitarian imperative with the realisation that a lasting peace achieved through military intervention would come at a minimal cost compared to the consequences of a prolonged conflict that could influence the spread of insurgencies across Africa.

Nigeria as a regional hegemon A good theoretical understanding of a hegemonic behaviour in international politics largely applies to Nigeria. In terms of its Greek origin, this refers to the leadership of one state over the other states in the international system. The type of leadership activities in which a hegemonic state engages involve expanding its influence and control and also to reap greater economic and security benefits. These expansive tendencies can be pursued through economic, political and military dominance. It succeeds mainly because it overwhelms lesser states and provides public goods and services that benefit other states. A hegemon always expand economically, politically and territorially because political power and economic growth do strategically reinforce each other. There is no doubt therefore that on the basis of this conceptual framework, Nigeria has established itself as the regional hegemon in the West African

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community. This is not unconnected to its massive population, a GDP of $30 billion, a strong military and a regionally and internationally active political leadership in the West African region.132 The discourse on regional powers is a phenomenon brought about by historical events such as the end of the Cold War, the routing of Iraq by US-led coalition forces, aid redirection, investment, interest in Eastern Europe and the realisation of a unified European market.133 These created new debates on the role of regional powers based on potentials and constraints in the context of assessing a new world order. The arguments supporting the assertion of Nigeria as a regional power are linked to its resources such as cash crops in the 1960s and, since the 1970s, oil, as well as its large population. From independence, Nigerian leaders have always been convinced of its manifest destiny to lead Africa, while the West acknowledged and hailed Nigeria as the cradle of democracy in Africa.134 The perception that Africa depended solely on Nigeria was strengthened as a result of the oil boom that enhanced the financial autonomy of the government and enabled it to achieve some measure of influence within and outside the region.135 Nigeria’s oil boom came with enhanced financial muscle, investor confidence and substantial economic growth. This coincided with a period in which a majority of African countries were burdened by energy bills. Thus, ‘Nigeria used this advantage to push its claim to regional power and also declared its readiness to use oil as a weapon of foreign policy, especially to put pressure on the great powers over African issues’.136 This was a departure from its initial timid foreign policy positions, such as when opposing great powers on the issue of South Africa’s apartheid, and endorsing Cuban forays in Angola. Nigeria’s foreign policies thereafter became more activist and intervention-based and it was thereby courted by the West and leaders of liberation struggles across Africa. Such claims about Nigeria as a regional power were endorsed by several analysts and scholars. Even in the UK, The Times stated: Nigerians, justifiably, see themselves as the giants of Africa. It is the one element they are agreed upon. And they are now seeking to use their oil and emerging industrial muscle to influence opinion and guide events [. . .] It is Nigeria’s foreign policy, more

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than that of any other black African country, that most determines Africa’s collective future [. . .] Nigeria is determined to play its natural leadership role in Africa, but also to build upon it.137 The concept of Nigeria as a regional power is also employed to emphasise its foreign policy objectives, especially pertaining to ‘upholding the dignity of the African, safeguarding his interests and promoting his well-being and protecting him from all forms of oppression’.138 This concept materialised when regional conflict, such as the one in Liberia, enabled Nigeria to produce an ‘indigenous regional mechanism for conflict management’.139 This mechanism is rooted in Nigeria’s experience of the 1960 civil war. The civil war changed its approach on two issues: an African-appropriate defence mechanism and nonintervention. Although it was greeted with scepticism, the lessons learnt reflected a broader African approach. Nigeria thus unveiled an initiative that reflected a widening ambition, of the pursuit of a piecemeal process of African security growth, beginning with sub-regional defence organs that could mature into a continental defence force. However, it launched Nigeria to greater heights at a time when the threat of conflicts and instability was growing more diverse, complex and dangerous. At the centre of Nigeria’s initiative was the idea of nurturing ECOWAS to a level where sub-regional unions could deter both external threats and internal conflicts.140 This focus on responsibility in the West African sub-region enhanced Nigeria’s status as a regional power. Added to this are Nigeria’s incremental sacrifices which no member states can contest. It has consistently convinced member states of its non-territorial ambition in the sub-region, Nigeria has succeeded in keeping its status as a power broker because of the crafty manner it has used to manage the existing differences in the sub-region between the Anglophone and Francophone (sometimes the Lusophone) states and within intraAnglophone and intra-Francophone conflicts.141 More than 55 per cent of West Africa’s population resides in Nigeria. The security of the sub-region thus has a significant impact on

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Nigeria’s own security. Further, despite France’s manipulative hand in the Francophone member states of ECOWAS and past South African (under apartheid rule) involvement in certain states of ECOWAS, Nigeria has always emphasised cohesiveness.142 To France, Nigeria remains a key rival for influence in the region. General de Gaulle was apprehensive of Nigeria, which he sought to dismember during the Biafra insurgency.143 The intention of France went beyond the problem of regime survival and the national integration of its former colonies. Rather, it was to preserve these former colonies as a privileged sphere of influence serving as ‘an instrument to the [global] power of France’.144 Nigeria’s cooperation with its neighbours is to ensure that such states are not used as areas of activities that could impair its national security. Given the interrelated socio-economic ties interlinking nations within the region, governments, particularly Nigeria’s, are aware what political disorder in one country might engender for their own internal security.145 Thus Nigeria, having been instrumental in establishing the Chad Basin Commission, the River Niger Authority and ECOWAS, has shown commitment to treating the sub-region as a special area of primary interest.146 Nigeria exerts influence beyond the West African sub-region in defining the regional security agenda. Additionally, Nigeria is acknowledged as a regional power by other powers in the region and beyond. Furthermore, most foreign policy literature has been rife with analysis depicting Nigeria’s international importance. Christopher Clapham gave this narrative an impetus, stating: It is considered almost axiomatic by Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike that Nigeria is Africa’s great or major power [. . .] Figures for her population, gross domestic product and domestic product and armed forces are readily adduced in support of the ‘leadership role’ which she may be expected to play in Africa and perhaps beyond.147 Clapham, however, raised the issue of growing doubts on whether ‘the impetus of the late 1970s could be maintained – doubts which by now would have resolved on the pessimistic side’.148 Similarly, in the post-Cold War era, Western hegemons showed considerable reluctance to intervene militarily in African countries. This was seen in the 1993

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US debacle in Somalia and France’s diplomatic setbacks in Zaire and Rwanda. Consequently, attention was shifted to South Africa and Nigeria to fill the security vacuum. Adebayo and Landsberg, for reasons of inherent military, political and economic constraints, preferred naming Nigeria and South Africa as potential hegemons rather than actual hegemons, describing both as ‘pivotal states’, given that ‘their respective sub-regions, possess disproportionate military and economic power and influence relative to other states’.149 Clapham had also based the criterion for attaining ‘international influence’ on factors which reflects its ‘capabilities’ measured in terms of such variables as economic and population size [which] have never fully applied to Africa, where regional powers have been remarkably slow to emerge [. . .] for a large state to throw its weight around has been not simply bad form, but in a continent of small states, positively counter-productive. But equally, size [. . .] has been a source of weakness quite as much as its strength since it implies a degree of ethnic and regional diversity and consequent domestic divisions which brought with them the weak government or high external dependence or both. The emergence of Nigeria in the mid-1970s as a major African power is thus an event of considerable significance for international relations of the continent.150 Reaffirming Nigeria’s strength, President George W. Bush in 2003 described Nigeria as a country of ‘great promise’ and praised Obasanjo for his regional leadership on key issues such as AIDS and the conflict in Liberia.151 Obasanjo’s November 2001 visit to President Bush consisted solely of pleas for Nigeria’s assistance in the resolution of conflicts on the African continent, particularly in Sierra Leone, Sudan, DR Congo, Burundi and the Great Lakes region.152 Much later, President Obama also acknowledged that ‘Nigeria is critical to the rest of the continent and if Nigeria does not get it right, Africa will really not make more progress’.153 Recently, there was a resurgence of oil-driven foreign policy when Nigeria’s late President Umaru Yar’Adua led South Africa and Libya in opposing US plans to deploy AFRICOM, its new African regional military command, on the continent.154 Nigeria also wrote off US$ 13

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million of Liberia’s US$ 43 million debt after Liberia withdrew its offer to host the new command. Protecting Africa’s sovereignty and preventing foreign incursions on a vital and strategic resource in its own backyard has been Nigeria’s core concern.155 While this account is prominent, also worth exploring is another contending view which posits that Liberia’s former president, Charles Taylor, only accepted exile in Nigeria after he ran out of options.156 Moreover, the conflict had conflagrated beyond Taylor’s control. The civil war in Liberia contributed to the conflict in Sierra Leone and to raids and instability in southern Guinea and western Coˆte d’Ivoire, thus bringing violence to the entire Mano River Union area.157 The ‘great power’ concept of a region is also being adopted to argue Nigeria’s case for a seat on the UN Security Council. The AU argues that Nigeria deserves a permanent seat based on its contributions to world affairs, especially those that affect Africa. What has been less noticed, however, is how Nigeria has used its regional strength to influence AU support for a seat. Nigeria manipulated and then supported the AU position that there should be two permanent seats for Africa in an enlarged Security Council and, with regard to the veto, supported the curtailment of its use by the permanent members. Nigeria also argued that the status quo through which current permanent members of the UN Security Council exercised veto powers should also be extended to the proposed new permanent members of the council.158 At the same time, Nigeria’s ‘big brother’ perspective in its dealings with African countries under Obasanjo was stretched to the limit, despite a minister of foreign affairs, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, who laboured to alter the balance within the continent. But Adeniji affirmed great power-posturing, confirming that Nigeria intended to make Africa the centrepiece of its foreign policy, though within the context of shifting towards economic determinism. In addition to these, he also put in place some modalities to encourage foreign direct investments and reintegrate Nigeria into the global economy. Obasanjo’s government had also invested in restoring infrastructures like roads, telecommunications and energy, amongst others, that would all work together to engender an enabling environment for prospective investors. In the interest of ensuring that Nigeria was safe for the investors to invest in, practical steps in ensuring the security of lives and property were also taken. Adeniji also pursued policies of reviving bilateral joint commission with nations that

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were identified as exporters of capital, Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement were signed.159 This was in contrast to one of Adeniji’s predecessors, Sule Lamido, who pursued a diplomacy that would bring food to Nigerians and improve their lot across the board. Termed ‘Roadside Diplomacy’, this had no place for Africa as its centrepiece. The success of this diplomacy is not the core issue, but, rather, that international politics is driven primarily by economic interests.160 This new foreign policy direction largely depended on the personal capacity of Obasanjo to expound it rather than allowing his ministers, especially Sule Lamido, to articulate the policies, as was expected of the chief diplomat of a modern state. No wonder then that the international clout and personality of Obasanjo turned Nigeria into a key broker in all UN and AU engagement in the conflicts of the continent. His engagement in Africa conflicts reached levels unprecedented since 1993 as his activism within the ECOWAS subregion and Africa as a whole boosted his credentials.161 Ideally, a foreign affairs minister should not merely be regurgitating their leader’s vision. The expectations are specific: a minister of foreign affairs should be articulate and capable of building strong bridges across international divides. For instance: he [Sule Lamido and, maybe, others after him] does not appear to have made any impact in foreign relations. The gains we have made presently are the result of our having to return the country to civil rule after a traumatised period of military rule. The only foreign minister we have now is the President [Obasanjo] himself.162 Nigeria’s posturing as a regional power has contradictions, especially in conceptualisation and the attempt to trim its diplomatic missions. This position is supported by a columnist, Imo Ukaeji, who argued: Nigeria’s great power posturing was the precursor of many a diplomatic blunder. But if you recognise that you are poor, then you can’t really have a plurality of missions. The solution from the realist perspective is that you have to cut down on self-imposed external responsibilities.163

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Ihonvbere argued that the assessment in which Nigeria concluded it was a ‘great power’ overlooked the distortions and disarticulations of the colonial experience, the legitimacy and weaknesses of the state, the domination of the economy by transnational corporations, the factionalisation and fractionalisation of the dominant classes, the virtually independent and conflicting foreign policy postures of the various regions, and the vulnerability of the country to external pressure, manipulation, and exploitation.164 Furthermore, there were also inherent contradictions in Nigeria’s influence, which arose mainly from oil. These are largely due to Nigeria’s total dependence on Western information technology, investment and marketing opportunities. The West was the only viable market for Nigeria’s oil, and Nigeria’s large domestic market was dominated by foreign goods and services. The country’s technological backwardness meant that it was absolutely reliant on the West for military and other technological inputs and supplies. These facts reduced the impact of Nigeria’s foreign policy pronouncements and postures. Threats to use the oil weapon were not taken very seriously by the West: it was obvious that the various governments were merely playing with words. Militarily, Nigeria was no threat either to South Africa or to the West.165 Moving away from contradictions, Nigeria, which regards itself as Africa’s largest democracy, has also been viewed as an emerging economic power, given its oil and gas reserves. Many oil multinationals have acquired substantial interests in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta region. In 2006, due to generous concessions on the part of its creditors, the Paris Club and the World Bank, Nigeria became one of the first in Africa to repay its debt. Yet, this economic progress poses a ‘cruel contrast to the backwardness evident elsewhere: 52 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line in Nigeria; child mortality rates are among the world’s highest as is illiteracy’.166 In 2010, African leaders, with Nigeria at the forefront, could not display the required political will to authorise the AU to intervene in Darfur. As the decisions relating to Darfur at the July 2004 and January

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2005 summits show, African leaders decided against taking action. Several African states are currently facing similar political crises which could lead to protracted violence, but resources and military manpower are insufficient to protect civilian populations in the countries in which the AU could intervene.167

Conclusion This chapter has provided an account of Obasanjo’s life and time in government, as well as his meteoric rise in the army, political and foreign policy history of Nigeria. This cuts across his early life and education, his conscription into the Nigerian Army, his distinguished career and accomplishments, and his rise to political power. Implicit in this ascendancy is the rich cast of individuals and panoply of factors that impacted on Nigeria’s position in the international arena. The chapter also espoused the moral dilemma and the ethical motivation which drove Obasanjo’s intervention in Darfur, Sudan, making extensive use of historical evidence, detailing the conflict as the first of its nature after the transmutation of OAU to AU. This was no doubt a daunting task for Africa. This section also explained the security dynamics of the continent, especially in settling disputes among member states, focusing on the frameworks instituted in the form of institutional disputesettling organs. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Darfur crisis provided Obasanjo an opportunity to prove his Afrocentric credentials, and also to restate Nigeria’s regional influence.

CHAPTER 2 THE IMPACT OF DARFUR

The Darfur tragedy arguably came about because of the complacency of the international community. As a result of the Cold War ending, none of the big powers intervened initially. The US, despite its unsurpassed global military power, was largely indifferent and unprepared to shape any intervention in Darfur. Furthermore, both Darfur and Sudan have a very complex history of conflicts, and the nature of this conflict made it difficult to prepare for the inherent problems associated with an intervention. It was therefore imperative to understand the historical dynamics of the area and its vulnerabilities; there is no escaping the influence of these factors on intervention. Not since the Rwanda genocide has one nation, Sudan, loomed so large above the other states of the African continent. This is not unconnected to the historical tensions within and between the diverse ethnic and religious groups in the area. The Darfur crisis was resistant to resolution because of the strategic failure of the intervening parties, particularly the AU chairman and member states and even the international community, to rely on expert analysis of the region and its history. Recognising this salient factor would have enabled Obasanjo and others to manoeuvre successfully among the various movements and factions, including the government of Sudan. A detailed history of Darfur and its complicated intrigue is important and could act as a guide to future interventions in conflicts. Darfur is characterised by the co-existence of diverse ethnic and religious groups. News media display a tendency to analyse the conflict in terms of two rival groups: Africans and Arabs. Available anthropological

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and sociological literature, however, rejects the simplicity of this notion. Peter Woodward traces the ease with which Islam suddenly dominated the area, recalling that the Christian kingdoms of Nubia previously existed there. The Fekis (Muslims) who settled there in the sixteenth century won converts and established a semblance of order with organisations, the most prominent of which was the Khatmiyya, founded by Mohammed Uthman al-Mirghani from Arabia. They participated in the independence movements after aligning with the National Unionist Party (NUP).1 Also, from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century, there was a trajectory towards state formation, an acceptance of Darfur as a single entity, but this never translated into an agreement over the identity or destiny of Darfur.2 Therefore, the process of state and identity formation only began through the ‘Sudanic model’. Darfur was hitherto an independent sultanate from about 1600 to 1916, but in-between, the sultanate suffered disruption from 1874 to 1898.3 David Hoile views Darfur through a geographic emphasis on the composition of the states of North, South and West Darfur, with capitals in Al Fasher, Nyala and Al Geneina, respectively. Darfur’s population is six million, roughly one-seventh of Sudan, with each area administered by a regional assembly and a governor.4 The Furs, mainly farmers, were the dominant ethnic group. The ethnic groups, however, were classified into four main groups: the Arabs, the fully Arabised; the partly Arabised and the non-Arabised. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal agree with Hoile regarding the Furs, but describe the other ethnic groups: the Tunjur, Meidob and Zaghawa in the north; the Berti and Birgid in the east; the Masalit in the west and other smaller groups. They also note that the Arab presence in Darfur, contrary to Woodward, began in the fourteenth century through scholars and traders from the Nile and Arabia, the Maghreb and West Africa and emphasise intermarriages and assimilation.5 There was also the cultural and ethnic complexity emerging as the result of Darfur’s strategic position in historic trade and pilgrimage between West Africa and the Middle East.6 The history of Darfur is complex; Darfur possibly first emerged as a socio-political entity after the 1650 Sultanate, which comprised the Furs and ethnic groups which had Arab roots. In 1874, al-Zubayr Rahma Mansur, the Ja’ali Arab slave trader from the Bahr al-Ghazal fiefdom in Southern Sudan, conquered the Sultanate and opened it up to the

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Baqqara Arab nomads until 1898, when the UK ended the revolutionary religious Mahdist state which had come into being in 1885. Ali Dinar, who inherited the title of Sultan in 1890, later restored the Fur sultanate,7 but this was short-lived, following his killing in 1916 by British forces. They, in turn, annexed it to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898– 1956) that had succeeded the Mahdist state in Sudan.8 Dinar’s two sons were also killed.9 The Condominium could be seen as a strategic aspect of the late nineteenth-century European diplomacy championed by British leader Lord Salisbury in 1896 to strengthen Anglo-Italian cooperation.10 But this was not Sudan’s first condominium: the Turco-Egyptian Condominium of 1820 in the same area fell to the Mahdists.11 The UK thereafter established the Sudan Political Service for graduates from Oxford and Cambridge universities to work in rural areas in order to develop the state.12 Peaceful coexistence was possible at first because local leaders always mediated and also increased intermarriages. But this eventually collapsed across Sudan due to various factors, ranging from the fact that identities became controversial, since defining one’s identity was based on race, speech, appearance or way of life;13 to the devastating drought in the 1980s which intensified ethnic clashes;14 increased ownership of weapons, underdevelopment and, finally, Darfur’s treatment as an unimportant backwater and a pawn in power games by successive rulers.15 The UK was also blamed for introducing political favouritism and for establishing an ineffective post-independence political system.16 Other notable factors included disaffection and resistance by the Anya Nya guerrilla groups who kept attacking military targets;17 mutiny by Southern troops in 1955; and wild rumours that almost truncated independence.18 These factors were the immediate triggers for the North–South civil war, which lasted until President Nimeiry initiated talks with Joseph Lagu’s South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), culminating in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement.19 This collapsed because of the northern elite’s determination to impose a radical, political Islam, thus introducing more complexities into the fray. Sudan’s independence in 1956 was stillborn, due to uncertainties about its future and unresolved questions,20 including ethnic mutiny and violence and massacres of northerners and, particularly, the flaring tension at Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal.21 The situation was succinctly

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captured by a northern official who wrote that Sudan was a ‘hopeless situation – an awakened south brought up and fed on bitterness, hatred and an uncompromising attitude’.22 There were many unresolved conflicts and an unresolved national question, especially along the north–south axis of the Nile valley’s divergent identities.23 The religious dimension seen in the 1960s civil war, as well as Nimeiry’s introduction of Sharia law in 1983, escalated tension.24 Nimeiry further exacerbated the situation with his book, The Islamic Way: Why?25 Enforcement of Islam in the South, such as changing the day of rest from Sunday to Friday, compulsory Arabic education, as well as unsettled constitutional problems on the question of Islamism, intensified the problem.26 In 1956, Britain left behind a disciplined, professional and patriotic Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) who intervened in 1958, 1969 and 1989 to counter incompetent and corrupt political leaders.27 For 16 years (1969–85) Sudan witnessed a decline under Nimeiry, as greed overrode national interest and, after the Islamist coup of 1989, the People’s Defence Force (PDF) was created, to make the army theologically correct.28 Hassan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF) had methodically recruited young officers at the military academy into the NIF, including Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir and other officers who jointly seized power on 30 June 1989, establishing the PDF to protect the revolution, suppress the rebellion in the South and ‘Islamise’ society.29 They implemented this through the NIF’s institutionalisation of tankim (hegemony) and da’wa al shamla (comprehensive call to God).30 The Arabisation policy began with the Janjaweed’s participation in the 1980s Arab–Fur war and the war against the Masalit of Darfur (1996– 8).31 Ethiopia had raised concerns over this development and warned Sudan against exporting this ideology. Even though both countries agreed to diplomatic dialogue to ease tensions,32 Ethiopia maintained its suspicion of Sudan, especially regarding the possibility of armed incursions and other interferences. This became tense after the assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt at an OAU meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1995. The attempt was attributed to Islamists from across the world that al-Bashir had sheltered in Sudan.33 This was also connected with Sudan’s religious indoctrination. The period also coincided with the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in northern

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Uganda in stepping up their terror campaigns with alleged covert support from Sudan that had also given them safe bases within Sudan. In response to this development, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia turned to the US to assist in checkmating Sudan’s comprehensive project that was aimed at destabilising the region.34 This fear was valid, amid doubts about Sudan’s real intentions as it oscillated between a defensive approach and the unsettling of internal and external insurgences. This was its policy on Darfur, accentuated by the manner in which Sudan pursued its goals there. The discovery of oil in 1983 and Libya’s determination to use Darfur as a military base to promote Arab supremacy further increased tensions.35 In the 1990s Libya plotted to amalgamate Darfur with its Kufra province and to use it as a base for its designs in the Sahel areas.36 The conflict has also been ascribed to external interests, in part due to the scheming for oil resources by France, the US and other powers.37 From 1991 to 1996 Sudan hosted Osama bin Laden and, as a result, it notoriously entered the spotlight of international politics as a haven for terrorists after the 1998 terrorist attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.38 Additionally, the 1995 assassination attempt on Egypt’s president was linked to bin Laden and the Afghan veterans who were domiciled in Sudan. Consequently, the terrorist attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya led to US reprisals against Sudan.39 President Bush’s policy on Sudan, ‘isolationism to engagement’, was due to the US ‘War on Terror’.40 In January 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).41 In 2003 the CPA triggered Darfur’s rebellion through the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) protesting against marginalisation. Seemingly, Darfur’s quest was initially for equitable development and not necessarily self-determination.42 In response to the rebellion, Khartoum reignited the Janjaweed militia, who used massacres and starvation as weapons against the rebels.43 The conflict is often misconceived as ‘Africans versus Arabs’ instead of the usual ‘North versus South’. This one was ‘perceived as a war between Arab and black/African Muslims’44 even though the rebellion is traceable to unresolved issues of Sudanese state formation that had led to the 1955 civil war and Islamic domination.45

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The Darfur conflict actually pitted forces based among the local Muslim population against pro-government militias, the Janjaweed. The conflict indicated that Sudan’s civil war was not entirely a north– south or a Muslim– Christian struggle; rather, it was a country-wide conflict which incorporated other Muslim populations. While the two main rebel groups of the Greater Darfur area were JEM and the SLM/A, it was curious that the Janjaweed were ‘largely of Chadian origin and finance themselves through plunder and pillage, reportedly enjoying implicit support from the government in Khartoum’.46 The Janjaweed wanted to settle scores with its long-term adversaries, attacking the rebels’ ethnic groups rather than the rebels themselves, chasing the Furs, Masalit and Zaghawa out of their homelands, leading to crime and a humanitarian crisis.47 This occurred with the government’s connivance.48 Its tactics involved seizing territory and conducting assetstripping raids to increase suffering, and expelling people, with some captured or enslaved.49 Al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi’s parting of ways in 1999 again stoked the conflict. With al-Turabi’s exclusion from the political mainstream in Khartoum, he naturally turned to his provincial base of Darfur for support where he founded the JEM, ostensibly to fight al-Bashir.50 The former UN commander in Darfur, General Martin Luther Agwai, likened the problem to the two factors, one ecological and the other political, which also affected UN African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) operations. Ecologically, Darfur is a desert facing problems of underdevelopment and lack of infrastructure, the latter also affecting the deployment of personnel and equipment for peacekeeping.51 Agwai questioned the general (but incorrect) perceptions of Darfur and advised that one needed to be on the ground to understand that no distinct features separated Arabs from Africans, as they were all black in complexion. A British officer once exclaimed in shock, ‘Arab tribe? I did not see any Arabs. They are not Arab looking, they are darker.’52 Thus, the ‘Arabs killing Africans’ perception is incorrect in part because of intermarriages. This line of thought is given further impetus by the fact that Darfur is home to some six million people and several dozen tribes. However, the region is split into two main groups: those who have claimed ‘African’ descent and practise sedentary agriculture and the others who claim ‘Arab’ descent and are mostly semi-nomadic livestock

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herders. The divisions between both are not neat as the African/Arab divide is far from clear. Technically speaking, all Sudanese are Africans. The people of Darfur are uniformly Muslim and ‘years of intermarriage have narrowed obvious physical differences between “Arabs” and “black” Africans’.53 The number of the rebelling factions proved to be a challenge: their extensive reach was puzzling as their operations, membership and support cut across more than three nations. For example, the Zaghawas range across the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan – President Idris Deby of Chad is a Zaghawa – and the SLM/A faction of Minni Minawi are Zaghawa. In most cases only a tiny river, such as that between Tine Chad and Tine Sudan, separated the Zaghawa towns between Chad and Sudan. Thus, for Agwai, Darfur is more of an ‘octopus’ or a ‘Hydra’, compounded by the CPA and John Garang’s funding of the SLM/A – a strategy to wear out Khartoum on two fronts. The conflict in Darfur is similar in characteristics to others in the continent, especially the conflict in the Horn of Africa. Almost all conflicts in the Horn of Africa since the 1970s have primarily internal origins, amplified by a pattern of ‘mutual intervention’. Thus, just as in Sudan, each government has sought to deal with its internal conflicts with some degree of support for insurgencies in neighbouring states.54 The opposition groups were inevitably driven to operate externally, organising movements and setting up governments in exile. Safe bases were set up and operated across the border back into the motherland, but only with the neighbouring regimes’ encouragement or support.55 The level of support, the depth and shifts of such policies and, most importantly, the external support have depended on the character of the insurgency – the strength and social base of its support and its strategic strength in comparison to that of the regime. In extreme cases, movements have depended on training, logistics, funds and arms from sponsors in the region and on bases and sanctuary in these neighbouring countries, and in most cases have mostly been the creation of those patron states.56 The nature of this support is not very different from the patterns that emerged in the Darfur conflict. The conflict in Darfur cannot be seen as a variant of this model of external involvement as there were instances in the 1980s when these clandestine methods caused tensions which later gave way to agreements to avoid interferences in each other’s internal

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crises, as well as to curb opposition movements, especially between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1988.57 As a matter of fact, four heads of state – those of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea – held a regional summit in Asmara on the occasion of Eritrea’s independence to agree on these lines.58 The conflict in Darfur could thus be interpreted through the prism of regional politics, particularly the complex relationship between Chad, Libya and Sudan. For instance, the Sudanese government has since 1960 supported groups opposed to the government in Chad. President Idris Deby of Chad is also known to share ethnic links to groups in Darfur that are opposed to Khartoum. Colonel Gaddafi also often shifted support back and forth between opposition groups and rebels against one of his neighbours. This was a somewhat muddled ambition of the three nation states. All three emerge from this state of affairs as sorcerer’s apprentices, both weak and venal, but also much too ambitious from a tactical point of view given their very limited capabilities and the huge difficulties of operating in a region with few roads, a horrendous climate, and complex tribal, religious, and environmental conditions.59 But conversely, conflicts in Africa cannot be pigeonholed, even though many share the conviction that African conflicts in the post-Cold War period are complex, multidimensional and protractedly intrastate, whereby peacekeeping missions based on the principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force seem an insufficient dressing for such large open wounds.60 It is also incontestable that the tradition of adopting single, grand theories for the analysis of African conflicts has failed to fully explain Africa’s myriad and complex problems. Between the neo-patrimonial state and political economy perspectives and everything in-between, no grand theory has offered durable and lasting solutions. Some merely address symptoms and manifestations rather than the causes of African crises.61 This may have been the reason why Sudan was reluctant to allow AU forces into Darfur for peacekeeping. The main imperative is to clarify why conflicts persist in Africa. Africa in the post-colonial era has experienced great contradictions and apparent unwieldiness, lacking a superimposing force. This is why Africa will continue to experience violent conflicts, civil wars and

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normative collapse, attributable to the fact that the continent’s long history of exploitation, predation and despotic rule plays no role in its present decrepitude. A further argument posits that the predicament is a deterministic process from such a history.62 The conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone when added together lead to one certainty: they are the result of the failure of governance, post-colonial mismanagement and greed.63 A further mitigating factor is the ‘endemic competition for resources: land; minerals; whatever. Man is always on the frontier in the struggle, in precolonial, colonial as well as post-colonial, Africa.’64 States in Africa have become manifestly weakened. Such outcomes are not difficult to discern, but a significant variant is the retreat of the former patrons of African despots: ‘The United States’ retreat from Somalia and Liberia contributed to the rapid decay of the regimes of Siad Barre and Samuel Doe respectively, just as the Soviet pullback from Ethiopia left Mengistu exposed’.65 A more candid explanation of this reality is in the absence of altruism and the Realist imperative of what Africa faces. The point of this book is not to excoriate Africa but to discuss the problem in a more open and transparent manner. Indeed, Africa is ‘a place of such chronic recidivism – crime mutating into worse crime, state embezzlers becoming warlords – that it is hard not to think of its bright spots as freakish’.66 It is also a truism that sources of conflicts in Africa can also be understood as based on nature and sources. First, conflict and security are envisaged in traditional Clausewitzian terms as a problem of interstate war in which conventional armies are involved in battles for territorial control. Second, violent warfare is a breakdown in the normally peaceful relations of states. Finally, there is the outcome of conflicts, such as post-conflict management through political settlements as opposed to the more idealistic conception of conflict resolution.67 This too is problematic on some scores, as international conflict has been fundamentally altered. First, there has been a shift from interstate conflict to that of intrastate. Second, many conflicts have created ‘war economies’ whereby violence performs a variety of functions in alternative systems of profit, power and protection.68 The US’s description of the conflict in Darfur as genocide contrasted with the UN’s conclusion that there were mass murders and rapes but

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not genocide as ‘intent appears to be missing’.69 In The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency, Mahmood Mamdani points out that occurrences in Iraq and Darfur are similar, especially with regard to civilian casualties, and similar as the killers have mainly been composed of paramilitaries associated with the official military. Mamdani questions why the violence in the two places is described differently: why were the events in Iraq called a cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency while those in Darfur were called genocide? The difference draws out Mamdani’s suspicion that naming is political. So who does the naming?70 Obasanjo agreed with the term ‘genocide’ in September 2004, but later aligned with UN’s view that ‘intent and definite plan were missing’.71 Meanwhile, much of the public debate didn’t focus on how to stop the crisis, but on how intervention often is very limited. The AU’s attempt was one of activity and motion but without movement. Prevarication on the part of the international community was so manifest. The one-sided media reportage of events in Darfur is also controversial. Many have reported acts of genocide by the Sudan authority, but hardly a word is said about the insurgency.72 The UN Genocide Convention has proven to be weak as it never galvanised international efforts to intervene in Sudan. Rather, the UN Security Council commissioned further studies and vaguely threatened economic sanctions against Sudan’s growing oil industry if Khartoum did not stop the violence. One of the imposed deadlines passed without incident.73 Despite the failure to intervene in Rwanda in 1994, the international community has once again demonstrated that it is slow and ineffective in responding to conflicts of the scale of Darfur. The systematic atrocities in Darfur raise a question about the role of the international community: has it been one of bystanding and denial, as in Rwanda, or has there been decisive action this time? In this case, the international community has been busy – though after a late start – but once engaged, it fumbled and took too long to achieve a united and sufficiently assertive response.74 But the delay in response is also attributable to the competing political priorities within Sudan, within the region and in the world at large which acted to distract and inhibit political response to what was happening in Darfur [. . .] constant concern

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about the competing peace process in Naivasha, where talks aimed at ending the civil war in Southern Sudan were at critical point, has been an important, sometimes immobilising factor.75 Additionally, reconciling French, British, Dutch and American positions and deciding and defining the various roles of the AU, the EU, the Chadian delegation and the UN was time-consuming.76 Again, China, the largest importer of oil from Sudan, was bent on frustrating any overly intrusive UN measures and, in collusion with Russia, was wary of such intervention in conflicts in a bid to avoid similar future intervention by the UN in Chechnya, Tibet or Xinjiang. The Arab League was opposed to any Western-led intervention and, because of this, decided to protect one of its own. The AU was able to operate in Darfur only after Sudan gave its consent.77 What changed the pace was sustained diplomacy, notably by the AU, which took over the official role of mediator from Chad, who made the initial mediatory intervention; and also that of the US, the UK and the EU. The above accounts, which espouse reasons for the delay in intervention, obscure another important point. This relates to the deficiencies in Western intervention in Africa. Western governments pay scant attention to Africa, even when crises in the continent periodically make world headlines. This is because Western opinion over the years since the end of the Cold War has vacillated between Afro-pessimism and Afro-optimism, neither of which reflects reality. The region has received neither the sustained analysis nor the political and economic commitment that other developing regions have enjoyed. Africa has indeed languished under Western ignorance and prejudice and also Africa’s own deep sense of hopelessness.78 A crucial element of this discourse is Wole Soyinka’s contention that Sudan belongs to two families of the world community – the Arab and the African – and these are structured, with global recognition, in the Arab League and the AU. Further, it has been depressing to note the studied indifference of one – the Arab family – to the criminality of one of its members. The African family, for its part, manifests a shaming impotence that permits a re-enactment of a history that forged the chains of colonial bondage.79 This argument also refers to the third overarching family, which is the UN, whose argument is that:

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when a deviant branch of that family flouts, indeed, revels in the abandonment of the most basic norms of human decency, is there really justification in evoking the excuse that protocol requires the permission of that same arrogant and defiant entity, one that is unambiguously indicted in the court of universal censure, before it goes to the rescue of its abused, violated and dehumanised victims?80 The answer to the above question lies with the UN, which repeatedly has been compelled to avow ‘never again’, but has ended up meeting in impotence and debate in sterility. Sealed indictments against identified violators of humanity are admirable, but they cannot replace the rigour and honour of prevention. Not one member of the UN family has expressed its displeasure by expelling Sudanese diplomats from its borders. Not one has demanded that sanctions be universally applied to the Sudanese cesspit of criminal impunity.81 The controversy arising on the matter of intervention illustrates the problem of relying on anecdotal evidence. The given narratives have to be analysed to evaluate the two arguments. The criteria for the arguments have to be expanded. There were those who saw Darfur as the opportunity to test the much-vaunted concept of R2P: that sanctions and international intervention are necessitated in grave matters involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide. The anticipated action, however, failed to move from rhetoric and degenerated into arguments about what was the right label for what was occurring in Darfur. The AU intervention in Darfur within the context of its new interventionist security regime was based on four reasons: first, to live up to its principles, especially the AU’s founding charter, the Constitutive Act, which gave it the right to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances. Second, there were lingering memories of the international failure, including Africa’s inability to respond to the Rwandan genocide that served as a strong imperative for the AU’s proactive engagement in Darfur. Third, the AU was keen to ensure that the Naivasha Peace Process that gave birth to the CPA between the

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parties to the North –South conflict, the government of Sudan and the SPLM was insulated from the conflict in Darfur. Finally, it had to respond to the pressure of civil society and human rights organisations that were requesting intervention in the Darfur crisis.82 The R2P became the centrepiece of efforts to reform the UN and the criteria for international response to conflicts worldwide. Its broad acceptance is an advance, but it has proven to be a tough test of political will.83 Especially for human protection, it is important to reach a consensus on the principles surrounding intervention. But unless political will is mustered to intervene, the issue of R2P will be merely academic.84 Concomitant with R2P is the duty to protect, taking the view that the prevailing rules on the use of force devised in 1945 and embedded in the UN Charter are inadequate. There is a growing recognition that maintaining peace in the twenty-first century requires that states be proactive rather than reactive – that UN members have responsibilities as well as rights.85 The real test for R2P is for states to recognise that they are bound to act in accordance with the obligation. Darfur became the first case where the gap between formal recognition and implementation was so manifest.86 The AU intervened and pushed for a negotiated settlement, leading mediation efforts in Abuja from September 2003, culminating in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006. In May 2006 the SLM/A’s Minni Minawi signed the peace agreement with Sudan in Abuja, Nigeria, but Abdul Wahid al-Nur’s faction did not sign the agreement. The talks were characterised by debates, particularly by Sudan’s chief negotiator, Majzoub al-Khalifa Ahmed, who relied more on pointscoring aimed at delivering the cheapest possible deal to al-Bashir87 as against the palpable disorganisation within the rebel movements. The G19 [prominent commanders] had to freeze out Abdul Wahid, as he had become a ‘quagmire of inflexibility, rigidity, grudge and division’. The group thereafter chose Khamis Abakir as its leader.88 This development instantly raised doubts about the viability of the peace agreement. On 15 May 2006 Abdul Wahid won a further concession from the AU of two weeks in which to either sign the DPA or be subjected to punitive sanctions under Security Council Resolution 1591.89 The leader of the AU talks in Abuja, Salim Ahmed Salim, threw in the towel and, worse still, the international community did nothing, alienating the two contending parties whose signatures were vital for

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peace.90 Getting Abdul Wahid to sign was a difficult but vital task, given that the alternative would be the failure of the DPA. The mediation effort thus required painstaking patience, especially in noting that for most Darfurians, Abdul Wahid, not Minni (Minawi) is the symbol of the revolution. If either of the two factional leaders has a political vision, it is Abdul Wahid, no matter how poor his leadership skills and how chaotic and unreliable his negotiating style.91 The share of territorial control between Minni Minawi and Abdul Wahid stood at 8 per cent and 26– 30 per cent, respectively. Ironically, some of the diplomats involved in the process admitted privately that Abdul Wahid’s demands were reasonable. His demands included an increase from the paltry US$ 30 million (6 per cent of its annual oil revenue) that Sudan had placed in the Darfur Compensation Fund; better safeguards for Darfurians attempting to return to their villages that had been taken over and occupied by settlers from other tribes; more seats in Darfur’s three state legislatures; and that those excluded from the Abuja talks, especially the Arab tribes from which most Janjaweed were recruited, be brought into the peace process. But Abdul Wahid was told in clear terms that the DPA could not be re-opened – demonstrating that the process was thus more important than the peace.92 Sudan knew from the outset that a deal with only Minni Minawi would exacerbate the conflict, so it discreetly maintained contacts with Abdul Wahid, and enticed breakaway SLM/A elements into the fold, manipulating the expulsion of the non-signatories from the AU-chaired ceasefire commission and branding them as outlaws. These measures helped polarise Darfur and escalated the fighting.93 There was, however, one key lesson about peacekeeping that was learnt by all the parties involved in the negotiations: that threats, ultimatums and deadlines are of limited use, and that the process of working through the issues and building confidence, especially on security issues, is a highly complex task and should not be rushed.94 The international response to Darfur was slow until the outgoing UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, called Darfur the ‘world’s greatest humanitarian crisis’ in March 2004.95

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More specifically, the UN’s role in the conflict was particularly patchy until the ICC shocked many when it filed ten charges of war crimes against al-Bashir (the first incumbent leader to be so charged) on 14 July 2008.96 It had been in March 2005 that the UN Security Council had formally referred the matter to the prosecutor for the ICC.97 In April 2007, arrest warrants were issued against the former minister of state for the interior, Ahmed Haroun, and a Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb, for crimes against humanity and war crimes.98 Sudan rejected these, questioning the ICC’s jurisdiction and vowed that it would on no account hand over any of those mentioned in the arrest warrants to the ICC.99 The AU had intervened early, but only after President Deby of Chad, conscious of the fact that the crisis could herald his own downfall, began mediation in September 2003, securing a 45-day ceasefire that neither party respected. The US and the EU pressured its reconvening in N’Djamena six months later. The AU attended first as witness and thereafter as co-mediator.100 Sudan also attempted to drag Chad into the conflict through a regime change aimed at cutting off the supply lines to the rebels.101 On 1 January 2008 there was a formal transfer of command from the AU to the UNAMID but still the conflict festered. ‘The sustainability of the DPA remains doubtful’, admitted General Agwai, who maintained that it would be naive of him to say that peace had been achieved, since his mandate was only to deploy and maintain the peace. He said the will was there in abundance, but the goal was not achieved as, due to constraints, only 85 per cent of troops were deployed: Darfur is only a region and not a country, so this was the first time a UN peacekeeping force is mainly deployed after a peace agreement, to a section of a country rather than the whole. However, in Darfur, the peacekeeping force was deployed in the midst of the conflict; the trial of a hybrid operation force in Darfur [made up of the AU and UN] was also a first in history and so it was natural to have lapses.102 Agwai looked to the future and rationalised that Darfur was a smaller problem compared with what would come later on. He warned that the referendum in the South would create a much bigger problem for the world. The ideal, he argued, would have been a national referendum where

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all sides in the conflict would vote on unity. Beyond this is the issue of Abyei, with Agwai questioning: ‘have we contemplated how likely it is the South and North would fight over Abyei because of oil?’103 More generally, there are differences regarding the DPA that may be due to reservations by those who saw it as a smokescreen behind which violence, destruction, displacement of people and rape of women would continue. There are three key issues which have made the DPA fragile: the uneven application of the previous CPA; the insurgencies in Darfur which are divided along tribal and ethnic lines (a reflection of the complexity of the ethnic, social and economic tensions of the area); and the fact that AU forces in Darfur are poorly led, under-equipped and have the mandate of being mere observers who cannot engage the combatants nor stop the bloodshed.104 That a credible peace has been elusive is attributable to the following: a lack of commitment by the Sudanese government and the rebel movements; the splintering of the armed groups into small and unwieldy factions without clear political agendas; and, finally, the conflicting and confusing signals from the international community, especially the ICC’s indictment of Omar al-Bashir.105 The arrest warrants were delivered to the Sudanese government, which did not recognise either the warrants or the ICC. The incongruity between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council over the indictment has been a threat to peace in Darfur. The AU repeated its request to the UNSC to suspend the prosecution of al-Bashir for one year by invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute. This request, however, was ignored, thus exposing the shaky foundation of a fragile partnership.106

CHAPTER 3 THE ETHICAL / PHILOSOPHICAL

MOTIVATION DRIVING OBASANJO ' S DIPLOMACY ON CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

The lively debates between cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches illuminate the ethical motivations driving Obasanjo’s diplomacy regarding conflicts in Africa. These approaches can help us understand the philosophical foundation of Obasanjo’s foreign policy, and thus are worth exploring here. When it comes to diplomatic interventions, two dominant modes of thought appear to govern conduct. Both hold that interventions should be judged on the basis of their consequences, although they differ in emphases. One perspective, cosmopolitanism, is founded on the principle which advocates the primacy of rights over political units, for instance, the State. The focus of this analysis is on the rights of the individual. The leading light within this school of thought is Immanuel Kant. A brief summary of his approach can be gleaned from Andrew Linklater’s statement: Kant considered the possibility that state power would be tamed by principles of international order and that, in time, international order would be modified until it conforms with principles of cosmopolitan justice.1 Cosmopolitan justice may be taken to mean what we now call ‘human rights’. On the other hand, communitarianism takes the opposite view:

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it argues that collective rights, embodied in the notion of community, take precedence. In this regard, rights are considered to emanate from the political units. Kymlicka outlines the core of the communitarian arguments: ‘It is a common place amongst communitarians [. . .] that liberalism is to be rejected for its excessive “individualism” or “atomism”, for ignoring the manifest ways in which we are “embedded” or “situated” in various social roles and communal relationships.’2 These opposing views characterise the nature of decision-making in foreign policy. Before proceeding to demonstrate how these two accounts play out or shape debates, it is useful to first explore their intellectual base. Communitarian assumptions orientate towards utilitarianism, which is based on the notion that the actions of governments should promote the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’.3 Two notable strands of the utilitarian principle are ‘act utilitarianism’, which emphasises the centrality of particular deeds to the greatest happiness, and ‘rule utilitarianism’, which justifies rules rather than specific acts.4 Meanwhile, the ‘continental’ strand stresses interpersonal relationships and responsibility towards the other, cross-referencing feminist ethical theory.5 In this perspective, the State is an instrument for guaranteeing that those rights are secured. Although both perspectives offer compelling arguments, it is important to point out that they have often been criticised for being Eurocentric, based on assumptions that originated from Enlightenment thought: that solutions to social and political issues can be resolved through the application of rationality and scientific logic.6 While contemporary theorists tend to be divided on issues regarding intervention, they mostly draw on Eurocentric ideas. This explains why the utilitarian concept of the State as an instrument for actualising or guaranteeing political goods has continued to be the norm. States are seen as ‘untouchable’. It is perhaps time to refer to the previous concerns raised over Eurocentric political thought that underlie the behaviour or morality of the State. Both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism have shortcomings which arise from ontological concerns and subsequent epistemological questions. Some epistemological questions might be better understood from an Afrocentric standpoint. Adopting this approach seems to have numerous implications for understanding contemporary political relations vis-a`-vis African states.

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First, it is perhaps unreasonable to discuss state interaction within the African continent and beyond in terms of Western conceptualisation. To consider the origin of the State from an Afrocentric perspective exposes the weakness in social contract theories. Furthermore, decolonised African states do not fit into the notion of the ‘contractarian framework of the West’. That the creation of states in Africa belies any such notion of agreement between the people and the State is well known. For example, as a consequence of colonialism, contemporary African countries inherited arbitrary boundaries which resulted in almost all member states having mixed and contested ethnic groups.7 It could then be argued that the notion of agreement between the people and the State is without strong foundation. Yet, this historical episode created a social and political context which has been used by African leaders to engage within and among them, using the State as a domain for such interactions. This should be no surprise, given that the concept of settled norms obliges African states to accept this arrangement, regardless of how it emerged. Zorgbibe, for example, has argued that the State is still the only settled norm through which a community gains access to international life in the exercise of its international functions; in the exercise of international functions, the State remains the privileged actor.8 If the socalled ‘settled norms’ have been so effective, why then are there so many problems in Africa? Could this have been a result of the ‘unsettling’ of settled norms? In essence, there are no settled norms in unsettled states. Nevertheless, the idea of the State in Africa presents opportunities and challenges. The issue of sovereignty has been used as an excuse for violating human rights in some African countries, such as Sudan, Libya and Coˆte d’Ivoire. While the State provided the platform for Africans to assert self-determination, it has inadvertently provided a cover for failures. As proponents of Afrocentrism would argue, the African sense of community obligation differs from that of the West. What is needed to achieve economic rights has not been addressed by the Eurocentric view. This leads us to explore the exact nature of the relationship between individuality and the community in a traditional African thought system. This includes the value placed on individuality vis-a`-vis the community, the community’s expectations of its members, which therefore represents the humanist foundation for communalism.9 Segun Gbadegesin argues

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that there is a limit to individualism due to the individual’s intrinsic relations with and dependence on others in the community. He further argues that the individual arises as a result of socialisation; his life is inseparable from that of the community. There is therefore a feeling of solidarity among members that discourages individualism,10 highlighted in the African proverb, ‘I am because we are; I exist because the community exists.’11 In African thought, individuals do exist and are recognised as such in the community, but they are only ‘valued in themselves as contributors to communal survival’.12 In African ethics, the members of a clan share the obligations to contribute to the life of the whole community through moral action. According to Bujo, only moral action leads to the building of the community. Although community leaders guard the common welfare and promote life, every member shares responsibility. Thus, an action is considered evil if it negates the fulfilment of the community and that of the individual life.13 In this light, it could be inferred that communitarianism in an African understanding does encapsulate respect for individual rights, dignity and liberties, but its legacies are mainly humanism and egalitarianism, which are founded on a mythologised ideal of African societies. Nevertheless, there is a concern that the attempt to give the concept a more substantial status in modern Africa, especially in relation to human rights, is a mere straw puppet.14 However, the defence of a communitarian ethos does mean that an emphasis on the following claims has been useful: (1) that the defining characteristics of African societies are communitarian; (2) that the community has ontological primacy over the individual; (3) that the nature of traditional African societies is egalitarian; and (4) that an African communitarian ethos accommodates respect for the dignity and liberties of the individual and thus incorporates individual human rights.15 Additionally, concern for human rights falls within two opposing schools. The first is the communitarian, which emphasises the value of being specifically communal and a public good that conceives of values as primarily rooted in communal practices. This is the opposite of the liberal argument which rests on the notion of human rights as the democratic basis for the civil and political rights of citizens, regarding all as individuals.16

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The communitarian ethos has become more acceptable to African scholars because it provides a solution for the alienation and disintegration of the ethical values and social institutions in modern African life. Supposedly, the roots of the communitarian ethos go back to indigenous African societies whose social structure was communitarian. The key features of African societies were principles of communality, the communal ownership of land, egalitarianism and solidarity of clans.17 Kwame Gyekye states that the communitarian features of African societies are the key defining characteristics of African culture. Thus, in being communal, he continued, communal beings are embedded in a context of interdependence, sharing the same common interests and values.18 The communal nature of African societies, through cultural upbringing, is not individualistic.19 Not everyone agrees with these views. First, there is the claim that it is implausible that pre-colonial societies remained static and unreceptive to change. Second, the critics also point to communities that were absorbed into, or overrun by other communities. Third, it is further argued that the common good of one community can be in conflict with the common good of another. Finally, the convoluted interpersonal stratification, particularly in claims to private ownership of land, and class difference between ‘big men’ and ‘serfs’, claimed to diminish the ‘communal’ arguments.20 From this standpoint, one can posit Obasanjo’s diplomatic intervention in conflict areas of Africa as a rich mix of communitarianism, influenced by both the Eurocentric and Afrocentric concerns. Though Eurocentric doctrines have been used for their explanatory purposes, this book argues that communitarianism is relevant to Afrocentrism. But what needs to be clarified is that the utopian feature of a Eurocentric communitarian view of a ‘social contract’ between the State and the people is impossible. This is because the only framework available in Africa is culture and community. Thus, in Obasanjo’s engagement with the rest of the world, he drew largely from the communitarian doctrine though emphasising a sense of community rooted in Africa’s perspective. This invariably means that there cannot be a quick fix in the form of some antidote to all the problems in Africa, as the Eurocentric approach would have us believe. Both continents are distinct, disparate and unique in their own right.

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In this instance, therefore, Afrocentrism, which dwells on communal features of communitarianism, refers to political and economic settings within the African continent that are characterised by, according to Gyekye, ‘existence and acknowledgement of common roles, values, obligations, and meanings of understandings’.21 Community can be understood within the foundational values of the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional bodies in Africa that share common goals, values and interests and are strengthened by the communitarian notion of a community of mutuality. There is also the principle of reciprocity that links Afrocentrism to communitarianism. That is, all member states of the AU and subregional organisations uphold peace and harmony at all times. The notion of reciprocity enhances mutuality among members of diverse cultures and interests. Essentially, reciprocity among AU member states refers to the communitarian feature of mutual interdependence. Gyekye further stresses the importance of an ethic of responsibility as a principle of morality, which involves a caring attitude that should be adopted particularly with respect to the well-being of others.22 This stresses a leader’s sensitivity and concern to developments around him, as well as to the plight of the people. This was the foundation of Obasanjo’s concern for Africa. It was, above all, communal. Obasanjo’s key philosophical motivation may be situated within the context which Joseph Omorogbe pointed to regarding human experience as the source of reflective philosophy. This is interpreted on two scores: a man’s own experience of himself or his experience of the world around him (objectivity).23 Both are useful in explaining Obasanjo’s diplomatic intervention in conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, M.M. Agrawal introduces a moral discourse as a concern in attempting to justify an actual or proposed act of an individual, a group of persons or, directly, of an institution. But, as Agrawal argues, ‘to give a moral justification is, in principle, to provide an ultimate kind of justification, which presupposes the notion of ultimate value’.24 Even though Obasanjo derives his motivation from the AU/UN charters, he is still an individual. His interventions were a departure from the status-quo principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, which had been the traditional position of African states in diplomatic relations. This can be understood from the contention that formal political statehood will not guarantee rights and freedoms,

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especially as this could be subverted by the very nature of African leadership.25 Obasanjo’s ethical motivation therefore seems to have a connection to human rights and settled norms theories, as embodied in the UN and AU charters. Obasanjo’s involvement in conflict management activities in Africa is what Okon Akiba posits as a ‘continuation of the policy of commitment to ensuring political stability in Africa’,26 with credibility for Nigeria27 as a regional power. Afrocentrism was actively articulated by the Mohammed– Obasanjo regime when it became the rallying point for African freedom fighters.28 As a regional power, it then behoves Nigeria to meet certain expectations regarding conflict resolution, with an alternative approach that would be distinct from the Western liberal democratic models.29 Obasanjo embodies this ethical approach through his deployment of resources to stop conflicts in Africa.30 While sovereignty as an excuse is now untenable, intervention has become imperative, given the level of carnage in Africa. Consequently, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Obasanjo, in a cosmopolitan spirit, jointly declared that positive intervention is an international obligation for human rights – no longer an internal issue – as the world can no longer fold its hands while innocent people are consumed by barbarism.31 Therefore, Obasanjo’s foreign engagement is empathy-driven. Although it may be that foreign policy is characterised by expediency, policy-makers do adopt positions of harmony with accepted principles32 that are based on religion, honesty and sincerity and convictions for the ideal. Ethical choice remains uppermost in Nigerian foreign policy because it engages robustly in conflicts regardless of the cost. Oche too points out that Nigeria’s foreign policy enjoys support from the citizenry even when it has involved sacrifices.33 Furthermore, Inamete attributes this to a philosophy based on pan-Africanism.34 Thus, altruism has been the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy in contrast to that of the West and China. Obasanjo took this further: his ethical motivation draws on ‘Africanism’, which has permeated Nigeria’s foreign policy. It emphasises the geographical, physical, cultural ties of the African peoples.35 This finds expression in the spirit of good neighbourliness among African states.36 Obasanjo was receptive to the increasing normative consensus around a body of ever-thickening international moral norms, such as the statute

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of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This presupposes the motivation behind Obasanjo’s caving in to international pressure in handing over the former Liberian president, Charles Taylor, to the ICC. Obasanjo’s foreign policy, arguably, was not based on realist logic, whereby states define foreign policy based on interest. However, ethics are not only about convergence but also about how states like Nigeria deal with divergence. And ethics may be the negotiation of differences over contestations because they are matters of conflicting interests and competing moral choices.37 Obasanjo was sensitive to public opinion and civil society in foreign policy formulation. This point can be appraised in the light of positions which suggest that public opinion about international relations is crucial when making important decisions.38 This weighed considerably on Obasanjo’s decision regarding Darfur, but this never restrained him in ‘the moment of necessity’. Accordingly, explanations could be given as to why leaders act in such a manner. Statesmen have been found to echo the Corinthians’ call to action by justifying foreign policy undertakings with a rhetorical strategy and a form of argument that appeals to the exigencies of necessity.39 Pragmatism, therefore, commanded a place in Obasanjo’s foreign policy, particularly since there are conflicting interests in every situation and balancing these interests is difficult.40 The key argument was that Obasanjo was prepared to tilt the balance in favour of ethics and communal good, even if it meant unbalancing the claims of the State.

CHAPTER 4 INVESTIGATING OBASANJO AND DARFUR

Scepticism in drawing conclusions on the basis of foreign policy rhetoric has been prevalent in much of the foreign policy literature. This is further worsened by critically flawed analogies and incorrect perceptions. There are no distortions in this case given that the choice of Darfur as a case study is motivated by the depth of available archival materials, as well as the fact that it is a contemporary issue which illuminates the internal mechanisms of Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. Graham Allison’s conceptual framework of foreign policy decisionmaking, as demonstrated in the US during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, is essential in order to evaluate the similarities and differences in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Also salient is the rich trove of secondary literature and archival material, including official gazettes, memoranda, minutes of council meetings, bilateral and multilateral agreements and speeches, which provide detailed information on the organisational structure, as well as on the ideas underlying foreign policy decisions made by Nigeria. Indeed, the material available from these archives on central institutions offers valuable insight into the discursive framework through which the central questions of this book can be conceptualised. There are strong critiques of Nigeria’s foreign policy structure coming from retired and serving bureaucrats of the institutions that offered an alternative account of the actual state of Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. This promises to add a critical insight into the available foreign policy literature on Nigeria.

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Interviews The author has had access to Obasanjo and other major foreign policy actors in contemporary Nigerian history. I began by interviewing General Martin Luther Agwai, the man who commanded the UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur. Subsequently, key foreign policy personnel, notable politicians, the intelligentsia and key political office holders were also interviewed. Also interviewed were key civil servants and diplomats. Others interviewees include key personnel in consular services, bilateral and multilateral summits, AU affairs, ECOWAS and European, Commonwealth, Middle East and US departments. These interviews were undertaken to ascertain the level of their involvement in foreign policy decision-making: to unravel what really occurs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to evaluate the morale under Obasanjo. The participation of Nigeria’s military in intervention in conflicts in Africa, particularly in Darfur, was explored. This included materials on national security issues which explored the inner workings between the military and Nigeria’s foreign policy mechanism. The interviews accommodated key personnel in the defence and security sectors. The questions to this group were structured to assess the coherence and cohesiveness of the military – state relationship, and whether decisionmaking is a one-way or two-way process. This research includes renowned foreign policy experts such as Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria’s former minister of foreign affairs, and Professor Tunde Adeniran, Professor of Politics and Nigeria’s former ambassador to Germany, and is further enriched by accounts from top journalists who either covered the conflict in Darfur or were part of government delegations that participated in bilateral and multilateral peace negotiations. The object is to assess Obasanjo’s performance in foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria on the basis of the following analytical templates: a foreign policy characterised by collegial management versus arbitrary autocratic decisions; pragmatism versus a rule-based deontology approach; international pressure versus independent-minded or African political solidarity. These variables will assist in demonstrating how policy is adapted to each situation. Obasanjo’s foreign policy is contextualised by examining the similarities between his approaches to conflicts in Darfur with other

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conflicts in Africa, and how Nigeria’s leadership of the AU influenced its commitment in Sudan. However, it is already presupposed that Obasanjo as chair of the AU influenced events in Sudan and thus arguably added value to a foreign policy template for the conduct of other African leaders. The official documents obtained for the purpose of this research included official correspondence between Nigeria’s president and other leaders; official correspondence between Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those of other nations related to Darfur, Sudan; and, finally, official correspondence between Nigeria’s defence ministry and several key institutions. Private records from President Olusegun Obasanjo and other key participants were also obtained.

Data analysis of archival materials on the conduct of foreign policy under Obasanjo Insight into how Nigeria’s foreign policy is organised provides valuable first-hand information on the practice of the Nigerian foreign policy mechanism. What is revealed is not a strong state but a strong leader. It is not a strong state, as evidence reveals the absence of inclusive pragmatism in foreign policy decision-making under Obasanjo. Absent also is progressive politics, an ability to correctly read opinion polls, broad consensus and established principles. There is consistency in the wealth of evidence which depicts suppression and the collusion of foreign affairs ministers and aides alike in decision-making. Obasanjo singlehandedly made many policy decisions; he failed to develop a coherent, unified narrative on foreign policy decisions. From archival evidence, one sees that Obasanjo was dictatorial in decisionmaking. What occurred in Nigeria’s foreign policy was a disciplined instinct by officials to follow their leader rather than to contribute original opinions. Thus, their mission was seen only through the prism of Obasanjo’s imperative. This, however, proved to be counter-productive and showed bad diplomacy. In Nigeria, both the leaders and the people have little or no trust in political institutions. As such, civil society and advocacy groups have struggled as democracy is yet to come to full maturity. Nevertheless, Nigeria, though complex and flawed, is still dynamic in contemporary world politics and can be classified as future-oriented. Despite his

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shortcomings, there were positives under Obasanjo. The tone of his diplomatic engagement across the world was overtly conciliatory rather than aggressive. A range of analyses points to this, despite Nigeria’s missteps. It is anticipated that the inherent problems can be resolved rapidly, should a leader choose to do so. Data analysis of diplomatic exchanges between Obasanjo and several other world leaders establishes patterns of foreign policy decision-making. These include, among others, peacekeeping preparations, diplomacy, conflict investigation and mediation in Eritrea and Ethiopia and in Sudan; the engagement of international bodies, such as the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). In taking a critical look at his correspondence, there is a notable intellectual analysis in the debate over what constitutes a failed or weak state. It is a matter of moral or national interest as well as the introduction of an intellectual context to Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. Core features of his foreign policy are Afrocentrism, personalisation of decision-making and irrational decisions.

Afrocentrism Afrocentrism has been the major foreign policy perspective of African states since the 1960s. Afrocentrism was presented as the sole choice for a continent searching for a policy encapsulating its hopes and aspirations after a long history of colonialism and arising out of a mutual disappointment in a strategic partnership with the West. Obasanjo was a significant proponent of Afrocentrism, which places his decisions in the context of sustaining Africa’s unity. He perceives Afrocentrism to date as a soft place that requires continual tending. In a letter to Libya’s Gaddafi, Obasanjo wrote: I am convinced, Your Excellency, that collectively, we can achieve the laudable objective of providing a collective security and defence for our continent within the existing framework in the Constitutive Act of the new AU. In this respect, I am of the view that the speedy implementation and early coming into force of the Protocol on Peace and Security Council would be appropriate.1

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Obasanjo’s letter was in response to one received from Gaddafi, expressing similar pan-African sentiment on matters of mutual concern. Gaddafi wrote: I wish to point out, here, categorically, that I would like to refer to the suggestions we presented at the Durban Summit regarding the establishment of a United African Army and African Peace Keeping Force to deal with the disturbing situations and find everlasting solutions to the crisis and wars in the continent [. . .] the arrival of the European Forces recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which indicates our failure and weakness – despite our potential ability to end this bloody crisis. And, that is humiliation to our Continent and to the integrity of our countries, peoples and the AU that have the human and material capacity and the ability to take up the responsibility, because it is irrational for Africa to stick to the present stand. Therefore, the urgency of establishing the United African Army and an African Peace Keeping Forces, which would have the ability of quick intervention, is inevitable. We, as leaders, bear the full responsibility of what is going on in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and I have a great hope in bearing our responsibilities and not to allow this humiliation and shame to continue or the same to happen in another African country.2 Both leaders desired to establish a wholly African Peacekeeping Force for the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other conflicts. Gaddafi’s concerns represented the consensus in Africa that African states would be humiliated if Western forces came into the Congo for peacekeeping in a fundamentally African matter. In spite of the spirit of perceived unity and ‘oneness in diversity’, there also existed intrigues within the AU. This was the inherent scheming African states often employed to outwit one another whenever competition arose over any important position of influence became vacant internationally. To underscore this, in a memorandum to Obasanjo, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the absence of a substantive minister, had offered reasons why Obasanjo should join the campaign to occupy the chair of the AU.

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The points raised by the official were illustrative and represent the kind of splits which occur despite the facade of a united Afrocentrism: 1) I have the honour to respectfully bring to Mr President’s attention the arrangement under the previous OAU, whereby Madagascar was expected to host the 2004 Assembly. [. . .] 2) If Madagascar were to host the 2004 Assembly of the AU, it means that President Marc Ravalomana will become the Chair of the Assembly. Some questions would however be raised, if the manner of his accession to power, his little education, his closeness to France and the United States and lastly his country only ratified the Constitutive Act this month, making it the 52nd country and indeed, the last to do so. [. . .] 4) Mr President, the Consultative Group has recommended that Your Excellency should be requested to consider taking up this offer. [. . .] 5) Having considered the matter exhaustively, I humbly recommend Mr President’s favourable consideration of the possibility of taking up the post of Chair of the AU Assembly in 2004. [. . .] the prestige and profile of the position of Chair of AU is tremendous and will certainly further serve to consolidate Nigeria’s leadership position on the continent. I note however, that as AU Chair, a lot of time would have to be devoted to African and world issues, including the settling of disputes within the continent. These would certainly entail several travels. However, the prestige of the Office and the honour that it will bring to Nigeria will blunt critics of Mr President’s travels, which in this circumstance would be in the service of Africa.3 In response to the above, President Obasanjo wrote: ‘Perm. Sec. Foreign Affairs, Nigeria is not interested.’4 This was typical of Obasanjo’s pretence: to avoid overt interest even when interested. Eventually, Obasanjo got elected into the position of the chair of the AU, coincident with the Darfur crisis. With Afrocentrism also came debates coloured by intimidation and bullying. As the conflict in Liberia escalated, and there was reason for

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de-escalation, early indications from intelligence sources had suggested that the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) were being incited and funded by the Guinean president, General Lassana Conte. The official report of the meeting between Obasanjo and Conte summarises the extent of this intimidation. Bullying tactics are powerful tools in foreign policy. The official minutes of the meeting reveal the flattery within it: Mr President focused on Nigeria’s efforts: Nigeria has spent a lot of money and sacrificed many lives. The assignment was not completed. Nigeria has an abiding interest in peace and security in neighbouring states and has consulted widely within Africa and with the UN and the US. Nigeria was willing to send in troops along with Ghana and Mali before the end of July.

Personal Request Following a comprehensive briefing by Mr President, a personal request was put to the Guinean President: That he should call members of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) to order. Nigeria would not tolerate any attacks on her troops and the Guinean President would be held personally responsible were such an attack to take place or any Nigerian troop come to harm.

President Conte’s Reply 1) Appreciated Mr President’s visit. 2) Declared his respect for Mr President and that he has always trusted his judgement and leadership. 3) President Conte said he had worked with Mr President before and appealed that he should continue to have confidence in Guinea to do the right thing. 4) Declared his TOTAL SUPPORT for Mr President’s initiative on Liberia. 5) Guinea believes that Mr President has done a lot for Liberia and West Africa but must be prepared to do more. 6) Guinea would want West African troops on ground in Liberia before foreign troops arrive.

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Action Items 7) Contact with Guinean Foreign Minister to confirm that conversation has taken place with LURD. We need to get firm commitments from the LURD leadership. 8) General Abubakar Abdulsalami to urge Liberian stakeholders in negotiations to work with set timetable in mind as this has implications for the transition schedule.5 With Nigeria’s influence obviously in mind, Obasanjo acceded to requests made for Nigeria’s assistance as shown by his response to President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, which said, ‘granting this request will enhance Nigeria’s influence in Sudan’.6 Obasanjo had other expectations and competing interests. When the Ugandan leader, President Yoweri Museveni, wrote to Obasanjo on a very sensitive diplomatic matter, he was both setting an agenda for the AU and soliciting Nigeria’s support in Ugandan’s pursuits: I therefore wish to inform Your Excellency that my Government is sponsoring one of its prominent doctors, Professor Francis Omaswa as a candidate for this post, and hereby seeking Your Excellency’s support and through the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to support Uganda’s candidature.7 Afrocentrism also accompanied recognition and commendation whenever there were particular breakthroughs, especially those linked to developments which stretched the limits of AU’s pragmatism in disputes and crises. When the two parties in Sudan signed the protocol for a new path to peace, Obasanjo immediately wrote to Omar al-Bashir: On behalf of the entire people of Nigeria, I write to congratulate you on the historic protocol signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on power sharing. I salute you and your fellow countrymen and women for the courage and the visible desire to map out a new path to peace, inclusion, accommodation, tolerance and democratic governance. I have no doubts in my mind that this epoch-making protocol will serve as positive signal to the world that there is indeed a new

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dawn in Africa and that we are irrevocably committed to dialogue, negotiation, inclusion and democracy. Within our own continent, the agreement will send reverberations as to the quality and context of the on-going commitments and initiatives towards peace, conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-building as well as the consolidation of democratic values and institutions. My Dear Brother, be rest assured that we in the AU, are very excited at this development and we stand by you and your people as you strive to reconstitute values, rehabilitate institution, reconstruct infrastructure, rebuild confidence, and redefine national priorities.8 The instinct for dialogue was sustained to such an extent that whenever a request was made to Nigeria, Obasanjo was instinctively sympathetic to the African cause, always ready to oblige. This was always done to strengthen the AU and the concept of Afrocentrism. To foster such unity of purpose, Nigeria welcomed the request from Chad, who requested a sort of collaboration with the Nigerian Intelligence Agency: The invitation is within the framework of the good bilateral relations which the Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA) has been cultivating with its Chadian counterpart. In fact, our two Services already exchanged visits at lower levels in the past and we believe that these contacts hold out very good prospects for our joint efforts in tackling the problems of trans-border criminality as well as the recent incidents of involvement of Nigerian rebel activities and insurgency in Chad.9 Mediation was also a key feature of Afrocentrism. This also meant consultation among African leaders to collectively find solutions to the myriad of conflicts in Africa. A letter from President Obasanjo to President Mbeki demonstrates the frank and open manner in which African matters are tackled: I read, with deep interest, both your letter to me and the copy of the letter you addressed to His Majesty, the King of Morocco. In the letters, you explained, in graphic details, the circumstances that led your Government to withhold recognition of the SADR

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and why you have decided to accord such recognition to it now. I commend your country’s patience and spirit of give and take it has exhibited over years on an issue that almost wrecked our organisation in the 1980s. I am equally deeply worried about the unfolding events over the Sahrawi issue, especially following the report of the Secretary-General of the UN on the Peace Plan and the rhetoric coming from Rabat. Only recently, I was expressing this concern to the outgoing Moroccan Ambassador and urging his government to give full support to the achievements made under the Baker Peace Plan in order to find a lasting solution to the Sahrawi crisis. [. . .] I completely share your views that international agreements should be respected and as democratic governments, we should strive to respect these laws. We should, in addition, as respectful leaders of our continent and within the context of our Organisation, make some efforts to see that the Kingdom of Morocco sees reason on this matter so as to end its unnecessary isolation from African events and activities. I urge Your Excellency to give thought to how best we can bring the Kingdom back to the fold so that she resume playing her rightful role on the African scene. In your request to broker peace agreement on the question of Western Sahara, I also notice the invitation extended to Morocco and Polisario Front to attend a meeting in South Africa on 6 – 7 September, 2004. I commend your venture on the drive for negotiations towards a successful resolution of the dispute.10 Mediation remains the main diplomatic focus in the African continent whenever a new threat becomes potent and intractable. Obasanjo turned mediation into an art form, especially in the protracted disputes between Mauritania, Mali and Libya. In this instance, he wrote to Apha Oumar Konare, the chairperson of the AU Commission: This is to inform you that Mauritania sent an envoy to me about the alleged involvement of The Republic of Mali and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the recent alleged coup. [. . .]

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May I request you send a one-person fact-finding envoy to ascertain what has happened so that the AU can stem the tide of such actions and allegations in the future.11 The above letter from Obasanjo was also similar to the one he wrote to President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea: Thank you very much for your letter of 15 September 2004 on the need to highlight the issue of mercenaries in the world with special reference to Africa. As you know, the AU’s position on mercenaries and other extra-legal acts on the continent is quite clear: they will not be accommodated or tolerated in any form. Accordingly, you will be pleased to note that I raised the issue and specifically mentioned Equatorial Guinea in my address to the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly and it was very well received. I thank you for your kind words regarding my efforts at defending the interests of Africa. I trust that, as always, we can continue to work together to build a new Africa of our dreams.12 President Mbasogo had earlier written to Obasanjo emphasising the need for African states and the AU to hasten the necessary coordination of the AU actions so as to make an impact at the UN by presenting a united front. He underscored the fact that at the opening ceremony of the UN General Assembly, Jean Ping, minister of foreign affairs of the Gabonese Republic, had highlighted the issue of mercenaries and private military companies in the world, in particular with reference to Africa. This was a pressing issue, and he solicited diplomatic help from Obasanjo, Nigeria and the AU to intensify the pressure needed to achieve a UN resolution. The issue had previously been discussed in July 2004 in Addis Ababa, and a resolution adopted in connection with the acts against Equatorial Guinea. President Mbasogo had articulated in an earlier letter to Obasanjo what should be the focus of such an agenda: The President of the General Assembly expressed the desire that all African countries should mention this matter during the

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present session in order to obtain the UN solidarity and support in the favour of the AU position. Therefore, and having in mind the interests always shown by your country in defence of our continent’s cause, I would appreciate if this matter, a priority for my country in this General Assembly, could be highlighted by your Excellency in your speech to the General Assembly underlining the need to adopt a resolution condemning the mercenary phenomenon that could end its resurgence in Africa.13 Obasanjo frequently intervened, investigated and mediated in all conflicts. He refused to contemplate tampering with the doctrine of Afrocentrism, which put checks on both parties in Darfur. For this, he received commendations from many leaders, including Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada, who in a letter of 2 September 2004 congratulated him for efforts made by Nigeria in close collaboration with the AU to find a durable and comprehensive solution to the crisis in the region of Darfur. The words of encouragement were a further reminder that in rebuilding confidence and trust between warring parties, constructive dialogue and sincere engagement was imperative. This was after one month of peace talks in Abuja that resulted in demonstrable progress in the area of humanitarian issues, for which a protocol was agreed upon, spelling out actions to improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur. Obasanjo replied to Martin, promising ‘to keep on exhorting the dissenting parties to keep the dialogue going as many fundamental differences can eventually be resolved at peace talks instead of on the battle field’.14 Furthermore, Obasanjo exhibited magnanimity in relations with the conflicting parties in Darfur. Though difficult, he wanted to demonstrate that the AU under his command was a viable partner that was able to tackle conflicts on the African continent. His letter to Gaddafi, suspected to be involved in the conflict, clarifies this: Within the framework of our common desire to resolve the ongoing crisis in the Darfur region of the Republic of Sudan, I have the honour to send my trusted Special Envoy, Alhaji Abubakar A. Tanko, [and the] Honourable Minster of State for Foreign Affairs. [. . .]

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In this connection, I wish to propose that prior to the resumption of the Talks in Abuja, it would be appreciated if you could join hands with me to arrange a meeting of all stakeholders on the Darfur crisis, in Sirte, preferably any day between 8 and 15 October 2004. We should be able to take advantage of that meeting to prevail upon the Sudanese Authorities to demonstrate flexibility and understanding in order to find a lasting and comprehensive peace in the Darfur region. The meeting would also provide opportunity for concerned leaders of the troop-contributing countries, to chart a common course and programme of actions so that the Darfur issue may remain under the ambit of AU and no outside powers would hijack the process. [. . .] I wish to assure Your Excellency that my Special Envoy has my absolute confidence. I, therefore, implore that you give the due credence to what he will say to you on my behalf.15 While Darfur raged on, Obasanjo also placed emphasis on the Eritrea – Ethiopia crisis, thus maintaining a balance on various crises on the continent. One particular instance is shown in President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea’s letter to Obasanjo: As Your Excellency is aware, Eritrea and Ethiopia acting pursuant to the Algiers Agreements together appointed a Boundary Commission to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border which lies between them. Ethiopia has now rejected the final and binding decision which that jointly appointed commission announced unanimously in its 13 April 2002 Award. The AU has historically been a committed supporter of the principle of the respect of colonial boundaries. This was a founding principle of the OAU, as expressed in the 1964 Cairo Declaration. The consequences for peace and stability of allowing one state to flout colonial boundaries by imposing its will through force of arms are unthinkably grave. I believe it is vital that Your Excellency uphold justice and the rule of law, particularly at a time when you hold the current chairmanship of the AU. The moral authority of leading African nations and the AU is considerable indeed. In our view, this has

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to be summoned boldly and firmly. To accommodate injustice would be a grave error that would haunt Africa for generations to come.16 In a handwritten note Obasanjo directed: ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs, Draft reply and suggesting of what we should do’17 as against setting up a policy committee to tackle the problem. This omission was typical of Obasanjo. President Mbeki’s letter to President Obasanjo on his intervention in Coˆte d’Ivoire confirms shared Afrocentrism by African leaders: ‘I am honoured to submit this report, which arises from your request on behalf of the AU that we should urgently engage the issue of the Coˆte d’Ivoire.’18 Obasanjo was committed on Darfur, but was frustrated by common deceit in African diplomacy, particularly at the hands of Libya. Afrocentrism encourages frank talk between leaders and nations as Apha Oumar Konare made his opinions known to participating heads of states at the AU Peace and Security Council Summit held in Libreville, Gabon in January 2005: On Darfur, Professor Konare disclosed that he saw in Libya, about 700 members of the Sudanese government, all the resident movement leaders, not seen elsewhere including Chadian authorities, come to Libya. Insincerity with Nigeria is implied. In this respect, it was agreed that Muammar Al-Gaddafi’s nuisance and mischief value is still high over Darfur. Meanwhile he should be left to dissipate his energy on Darfur before President Obasanjo will handle him again. However, their negotiation in Abuja is to be postponed sine die.19 The disclosure regarding Libya did not extinguish Obasanjo’s enthusiasm as he took the decision to visit Darfur to witness things for himself. This showed his strength of character; but unfortunately the visit lacked the bureaucratic and strategic input from Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus underlining the argument that Obasanjo personalised his foreign policy. Notwithstanding, there were expectations of Obasanjo by both the government and rebels in Sudan. Part of the report is reproduced below:

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3) The commitment of President Obasanjo to Sudan was underscored by his several visits to Sudan for the past 30 years both in and outside Government. 4) President Obasanjo stressed the need to work in tandem and not at different directions. He therefore, gave ten recommendations on Darfur. [. . .] 5) The Darfur crises should be seen more as a political issue rather than a security one (as al-Bashir currently sees it). [. . .] 6) President Obasanjo and his entourage were received at Al Fasher airport in North Darfur by a mammoth [sic] crowd of Darfurian chiefs, children and musicians. Driving in an open jeep with his aides in a motorcade, hope and high respect in which the Darfur people hold President Obasanjo, were palpably demonstrated by the surging crowd and various placards, carried by both children and adults lining the dusty road. 7) There were a series of speeches by the governor of Darfur, Usman Muhammed Yusuf Kibir, and Dr Majthoub Al-Khalifa from Khartoum. [. . .] They expressed appreciation to Nigeria, especially to President Obasanjo revealing that the current Naivasha talks had its origin in Nigeria, back in 1994. 8) President Obasanjo, in his speech encouraged them to stop all hostilities and negotiate, stating that Sudan’s peace will ultimately depend on the Sudanese government and people. 9) There was a briefing session at the Governor’s lodge. It was revealed that there were at least 330,000 internally displaced persons. President Obasanjo and his entourage visited the Abu Shonek Camp with 50,000 refugees. After various briefings President Obasanjo promised to: – Include more Policemen in the Nigerian contingent and especially some Police women for Camp Order to protect women from rampant raping sprees. – Encourage other African countries to rapidly airlift their contingent to Darfur as their absence has hampered works of the AU Protective Force.

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10) The people of Darfur have placed so much hope in African solution in general and in particular Nigeria and specifically on President Obasanjo.20 A feature of Afrocentrism was the perception of Nigeria by other African nations as the ‘big brother’ of Africa, whereby a flood of institutional monies was intended to ensure more transparent programmes in African states. Many decisions by Obasanjo were not well thought through because of the following unilateral actions that were devoid of consultations: Please note that the Federal Government has approved the sum of US$ 5 million (five million US dollars only) to assist the Republic of Niger with improving security along its borders with Nigeria and to facilitate the control of smuggling activities along those borders.21 A similar case is that of former President Bedie of Coˆte d’Ivoire, who had planned to visit Nigeria: I have the honour to report that Mr Bedie has accepted to come to Abuja at a mutually convenient date. He has however requested the facilitation of this travel by way of air-tickets from Paris, where he is currently based, for his team of three persons.22 Here is an indication that Obasanjo tolerated and approved everything. It is worth noting that the AU’s member states rarely arrived at a diplomatic consensus, despite the doctrine of Afrocentrism. In Abuja, in January 2005, during the attempt to make sure an African clinched the post of director-general of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), futile attempts were made to present a sole candidate from the four states that indicated an interest in the election scheduled for June 2005. Following the AU’s inability to reach consensus, the Candidature Committee of the AU met in Addis Ababa on 8 March 2005. Since the four candidates (from Burkina Faso, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda) maintained their candidatures, the Committee had to resort to a decision by voting (in accordance with its rules of procedure). Kandeli Yumkella (Sierra Leone) received the most votes, but Ablasse

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Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso) refused to concede to the winner. Subsequently, Obasanjo wrote a letter to inform President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso that: The AU Executive Council, at its meeting in Addis Ababa on March 8, endorsed the report of the Candidature Committee and proposed that it be communicated to me so that I can contact Your Excellency for the purpose of seeking your cooperation in order to ensure that Africa can present a single candidate in the person of Dr Yumkella.23 Obasanjo’s letter was ignored, in spite of the spirit of Afrocentrism. The Darfur issue was a specific area where Obasanjo displayed proactive personal diplomacy, especially within the dictates of Afrocentrism. Predictably, the Nigerian minister of foreign affairs was not invited, even when his diplomatic intervention in Sudan found a way out of the ICC referral. In his place was a top civil servant in the presidency.24 This was one of the most coherent foreign policy initiatives by Obasanjo, displaying the intellectual content which could come to the fore in foreign policy decision-making. But this did not emanate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor was it the work of a think tank committee. Obasanjo wrote: ‘State House Counsel noted, Welldone! Let us wait for action from Sudan and/or ICC prosecutor.’25 Unfortunately, Sudan failed to act fast on this, and the problem persisted.

Afrocentrism and Nigeria’s quest for a UN Security Council seat Obasanjo’s foreign policy objective included lobbying for Nigeria’s membership of the proposed expansion of the UN Security Council. Obasanjo was resolute in the push for the most strategic position. To achieve this Nigeria played host to a variety of summits, backed by Obasanjo’s warm disposition to the West and his innate diplomatic savoir faire. Nigeria still had intense diplomatic challenges, with competition for the same seat coming from Egypt and South Africa. However, Nigeria’s diplomatic brinkmanship led to some positive results. At the meeting of the AU Commission of 15 on UN Reform, held in Swaziland on 20 –22 February 2005, the Committee agreed, after acrimonious

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debates, that Africa should support the proposal for two permanent rotating seats. This was a great victory for Nigeria and likeminded states that campaigned for Option A, which encompassed the proposal for two permanent rotating seats. The victory came with a number of revelations, one of which was the total solidarity of North African states with Egypt, which had been spearheading the campaign for rotating four-year seats. Besides the North Africans, however, the greater shock was the position taken by Senegal, contrary to the decision by ECOWAS for Option A. The Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed that Africa should neither support Option A nor B, but make a new proposal for three permanent seats. Senegal was not the only country that tried to sabotage the discussions by making new proposals at this late stage, with the argument that Africa was not bound to confine itself to only the two options proposed by the UN Secretary-General’s Panel. Nigeria’s minister of foreign affairs had reported in a memo: Those of us who spearheaded the campaign for Option A not only showed the fallacy in making another new proposal at this stage but also that the motive behind it could only be to postpone the reform process for another 40 years. The reference to 40 years was the period that has elapsed between the first expansion of the Security Council in 1965 and this year.26 The diplomatic gambit, dogged by frustrating debates, was aided by the renaissance of Afrocentrism. The dexterity displayed by Adeniji and his team revealed what could be the case, were they free to perform.

Diplomatic expectations Critics of Obasanjo frowned on his personalisation of foreign policy decision-making, even though he was globally acclaimed. His personality and one-dimensional policy calculation surprisingly attracted him to the West, even though he never hesitated to pose them moral questions, and his diplomatic style was also appreciated in Africa. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan held Obasanjo in high esteem and consulted and briefed him on countless issues and Obasanjo reciprocated. The US often consulted Obasanjo in an attempt to influence the policy direction of the AU. An instance was the period

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prior to the AU’s military intervention in Darfur when consultation came in different guises. Here is a communication from an adviser to President George W. Bush: I have the honour to report that Cindy COURVILLE (Dr), Special Adviser to President BUSH on African Affairs has sent the attached one page document titled ‘Recommended Action for the AU in Darfur’ for your attention sequel to your meeting with her last week in New York. [. . .] The US suggests that the Donor Community would be ready to work even with a scaled-back plan, incorporating these basic ingredients. They believe that a 5–6 page document explaining the requirements could meet the immediate expectation of the donors. The US would appreciate a response in good time, to enable her notify other donors by 3 October, 2004 of what is needed. COURVILLE also conveyed the readiness of the US to quietly discuss the list of the requirements with you before it is passed on. She, as well, conveyed the readiness of the US to get its planners to sit with AU and EU planners to jointly look into the requirements for the enlarged troops’ deployment.27 These kinds of letters between military generals were relevant because of the required urgency and sensitive nature of military intervention in the Darfur region of Sudan. Governments worldwide consulted Obasanjo as they knew he had influence over his fellow African heads of state as a worthy friend of the West. He received commendations and some also came with greater requests, as illustrated by the following letters. The first was from Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada to Obasanjo: I would like to congratulate you on your initiative, as the Chair of the AU, to host the AU led Inter-Sudanese Political Talks on the crisis in Darfur between the Government of Sudan and the opposition groups from Sudan. As I indicated to you during our recent telephone conversation, Canada believes these talks represent a meaningful and effective way to bring about resolution to this terrible conflict. Canada strongly supports the efforts of the AU to resolve this conflict,

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and in this regard, I am highly supportive of the efforts of your government to take leadership in urging the parties to the conflict to negotiate in good faith. I understand that despite some setbacks, the parties have made some progress since the talks began August 23. Such setbacks are likely to continue to take place as the parties enter into deeper discussion on the more intractable issues. It will be the responsibility of the AU and the international community to continue to urge all the parties to negotiate a speedy resolution to the conflict. [. . .] I am confident the Government of Nigeria will continue to take the lead in this regard. I look forward to meeting you in New York later this month, on the margins of the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly, during which time I am sure we will have more substantive discussions on the situation in Darfur.28 The second letter was from Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: I am writing to thank you for taking time to meet with me during the AU Summit and for the discussions we had on the situation in the Great Darfur. In this regard, I would like to congratulate the AU for its leadership role in response to the difficult human rights and humanitarian crisis in the Sudan. I have advised members of the advance team to provide all necessary technical support to the AU Monitors. I am confident that a collaborative effort between the AU and my Office could contribute immensely to the alleviation of the suffering of the people of Great Darfur.29 Third, President Jacques Chirac of France also wrote commending Obasanjo’s personal commitment and expressed concerns on the crisis in Darfur: France salutes your personal commitment and the mainspring part played by the African Union in order to stop the acts of violence thanks to the setting up of a monitoring mission of the cease-fire, which could be reinforced with the deployment of a protection

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force. It congratulates itself on the announcement of the resumption of the discussions on the 23 August in Abuja. As you are aware of, [France] brings a support to the monitoring mission of the AU in Darfur: financially, through the European Union, militarily, in carrying out the vice-presidency of the ceasefire commission as well as logistical support from its military system in Chad onwards.30 Obasanjo’s unusual directive in response was, ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs, Please draft a reply updating on Darfur’.31 Preparing letter drafts for the President became the main function of the ministry. This was the key moment of decline of the intellectual power of Nigeria’s ministry of foreign affairs in generating key policy direction. Detached from the ministry also was the obligation to respond strategically to foreign policy concerns. There was also the apparent incongruity between the Obasanjo administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lobby groups and the public on Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. There were also curious invitations as President Tran Duc Luong of Vietnam found Obasanjo interesting and invited him to Vietnam in order to further strengthen economic ties between Nigeria and Vietnam; and ‘also to discuss major international issues of mutual concern to the two countries’.32 This was a recognition and commendation letter as the Vietnamese leader wrote that: In pursuit of the foreign policy of peace, independence, sovereignty, openness, and multilateralisation and diversification of external relations, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam desires to deepen and expand its friendship and cooperation with the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Aspiring to further strengthen the friendship and cooperation between the two countries, especially in the fields of economics and trade, and to share views on international and regional issues of mutual concern, I have the honour to extend my official invitation to Your Excellency to pay a state visit to Vietnam at a time of your convenience.33 Obasanjo stopped over in Vietnam on his way to China on a state visit.

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Obasanjo confidently responded to the expectations of other leaders in the most contrite diplomatic tone. In his letter to the president of Eritrea he wrote: Thank you very much for your letter of 9 June 2004 in which you explained your serious concerns over the refusal by Ethiopia to honour and implement the decision of the Ethiopia–Eritrea Boundary Commission set up under the auspices of the 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement. Let me also thank you for all the previous communication on this matter. Your choice of addressing the matter in this manner clearly demonstrates your strong preference to have this important issue resolved peacefully without recourse to further hostilities. Excellency, I recall the strenuous efforts exerted by the international community to broker peace on the border dispute between your country and Ethiopia, a process that involved the OAU, the US, EU and Algeria as Chairman of our Organisation. I equally recall how relieved we all were when your country [Eritrea] and Ethiopia [had earlier] signed the Algiers Peace Agreement in December 2000; and more importantly, how we all hoped that the two countries would abide with the decision of the Boundary Commission set up with the mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial Treaty boundary based on pertinent colonial treaties and international law. Mr President and Dear Brother, the courage and magnanimity exhibited by the leadership of both countries in accepting to sign the Algiers Peace Agreement will have to be called upon once again to encourage the two parties to rise above entrenched positions to see where adjustments can be made to arrive at a proposal acceptable to both parties. I do appreciate the fact that in matters of border disputes, it is very difficult to cede any portion of the land in dispute to the other party. But we as leaders must rise above sentiments and country-ego, to see the reality on the ground. We must be able to take courageous decisions which in the long run will save our countries in border dispute, the horrendous loss in life and property, valuable material resources and time; as well as spare

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our citizens the destabilisation and huge displacement caused if border disputes were settled by military solution. [. . .] Allow me to use the case of Nigeria – Cameroon border dispute as an example. After the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of October 2002, Nigeria – Cameroon realised the futility of a military solution and decided to have peaceful negotiations to resolve the question. We have completed the implementation of the ICJ decision as it affected the land border especially around the Lake Chad area. We are progressing to the Bakassi Area and, very soon, we hope to complete all necessary adjustments in the Bakassi Peninsula. Mr President and Dear Brother, let me remind Your Excellency that what Africa needs is cooperation, peaceful conditions and enabling environments where our people can develop their full potentials, no matter where on the continent they choose to reside. Neighbours, in fact, brothers and sisters in Ethiopia and Eritrea should feel free and be happy to work and live at peace in any part of the two countries.34 Meetings on the sidelines between presidents during summits became a crucial tool of diplomacy as they led to far-reaching policy decisions without the formal foreign policy decision-making structure. Obasanjo used this frequently as heads of state invariably sought him during such summits. Such meetings thus assisted his personalisation of foreign policy since these meetings were held without his foreign ministers present. He also instigated some of the meetings, such as the surprise teˆte-a`-teˆte with President Bouteflika of Algeria on a range of topics: In his preparatory consultations for the AU Peace & Security Council Summit in Libreville, Gabon, as the AU Chairman, President Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR, paid a surprise visit to President Bouteflika of Algeria, as he was neighbour to the Nigerian president and their points of discussion were: Bakassi: President Bouteflika who had recently met and discussed with Paul Biya, congratulated President Obasanjo on the issue of Bakassi. He promised to continue to work at the solution with

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Presidents Biya and Chirac on the other. He however warned that President Biya was unpredictable. Darfur: President Obasanjo briefed Bouteflika on his recent visit to Darfur. Coˆte d’Ivoire: The Algerian leader advised that President Mbeki be allowed to continue in his peace/reconciliation move in Coˆte d’Ivoire. The Algerian leader hinted that the Angolan position is that there cannot be a solution without Gbagbo. For AU, Accra 3 and extension will be favoured. DRC: President Bouteflika disclosed that young President Kabila cannot hold power. Quadripartite Summit on DRC: President Obasanjo is going to organise a summit on DRC involving himself, Presidents Bouteflika, Mbeki and Kabila, having President Chisano as special enjoy. Multilateral Forum for DRC: A conference on the Congolese issue will be organised with UN, US, EU as participants and AU hosting it. French Document: A French document on Coˆte d’Ivoire was discussed on arms embargo to be imposed on Coˆte d’Ivoire. Resolution of the Ivorian crisis shall be on the Accra 3, which is ECOWAS plus extension basis. On the Security Council Permanent Seat reform, Africa should choose ‘Option A.35 Another meeting on the sidelines was at the 2005 AU Summit held in Abuja between the UN Secretary-General, the AU Commission chairman and Obasanjo. The meeting took place at the Opening of the UN House in Abuja and the details are as follows: – Need to commit more African troops – About 2,000 troops will be required for Somalia

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– African troops are preferred in both Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda – Urgent need to solve the problem of not having in place yet good command and control systems. This problem is more than just having a Chief of Army Staff. – To this end, the AU Commission Chairman agreed with President Obasanjo that the latter would find the appropriate military officer to assist in the wise. The current Chief of Defence Staff, Lt.-Gen. Alexander Ogomudia was praised by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan for his vast experience in this area, hence Professor Konare’s interest in him. However, President Obasanjo who foreclosed ceding his Chief of Defence Staff to the AU, though the CDS could give lectures on how to set up command and control, etc., for the AU, promised to look for equally good Generals as good as General Okonkwo, currently Force Commander in Sudan. – The UN Secretary-General invited AU to come to New York to learn from the UN, its structure and planning. – In the speech of President Obasanjo, as current AU Chairman, said a strong message should be sent to President al-Bashir of Sudan. Later at the pre-summit dinner hosted at the Aguda House for AU Bureau, Professor Konare advised that for evenhandedness, the Sudanese rebels should also be condemned for violating the agreement.36 Aside from the dinner hosted by Obasanjo for members of the AU Bureau (9.15– 10 p.m.), there were also similar meetings with policy outcomes: During consultation at the above dinner, held at Aguda House, the following decisions were taken: 1) At the closed Session, the D-G (NIA), Amb. Okeke will be invited to read the report on the African Intelligence Officer’s Conference. 2) The Government of Sudan will be condemned for stupidly bombing its people while the rebels will also be condemned for provoking such with their various attacks.37

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Obasanjo’s meeting with President Laurent Gbagbo of Coˆte d’Ivoire (9.25– 10.35 a.m.) followed: President Gbagbo who met President Obasanjo within the holding room of the International Conference Centre, stated as follows: a) President Thabo Mbeki is doing a good job in Coˆte d’Ivoire. b) On the question asked by President Obasanjo why G. Soro was not agreeing with him, President Gbagbo disclosed that he had difficulties in linking up with him. c) The Forces Nouvelles rebel group had declared that they would trust neither UNOCI nor the French troops but rather trust the African troops, because the two non-African troops had attacked them. The UN Secretary-General opined that this posture was strange. President Gbagbo requested President Obasanjo to please go to Bouake and tell off the following that enough was enough: Soro and Presidents Compaore and Chirac. On President Obasanjo’s enquiry as to what President Gbagbo would give in return, the Ivorian incumbent leader stated that he was ready to consider whatever demand the above-mentioned three leaders wanted provided it was reasonable.38 Obasanjo continued in consultation with the Somali President: On Tuesday, 1 February 2005, at the Residence, a day after the summit, President Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR, received the President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed. He came to brief the AU Chairman, with a view to seeking assistance for the re-emerging State of Somalia. The Somalia President (who was part of the North East Somali government about 6½ years ago) informed President Obasanjo that in Kenya, the organs of State had been formed such as the Parliament, Cabinet, the High Court and those they were ready to relocate to Somalia after 14 years of civil war and 2 years in Kenya. He further stated as follows:

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– About 2 million Somalis are now under arms, jeopardising the security situation in the country with so many terrorists operating in the country. – In order to foster reconciliation and stability, many people including erstwhile terrorists, opposition, etc. are involved in the new government.

Requests – There is need for AU Facilitation Force. Uganda is ready to send troops. The mandate of the AU troops will not be to disarm Somalis but to secure the seat of government and help train Somali security forces. – As for demands of the terrorists, they are mostly political seeking an Islamic Sharia State whereas Somalis are generally moderate Muslims. They obtain funds from religious leaders, and ransom from people, etc. – IGAD is ready to help the new Somali government but has no money. On the request for Nigeria to assist in monetary terms, President Obasanjo stated carefully that Nigeria would see what it could do. Currently, it has two battalions in Sierra Leone, three battalions in Liberia, more than one battalion in Darfur, and may send one battalion to Coˆte d’Ivoire. If (and only with a big IF) Nigeria be asked to help Somalia, at all, it may not be able to spare more than a battalion. Nigeria may be asked to give one battalion to DRC to help in the DRC/Rwanda INTERHAMWE Crisis. President Obasanjo observed that the following issues were very vital to the emerging Somali government: a) Security for the Government in order to be regarded as being credible. However, before achieving this, it has to be settled in Somalia. b) What to do with ‘Somaliland’ that had declared its secession – President Abdullahi Yusuff stated that his government policy is not to attack or invade them but to negotiate and win them back to join them.

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c) The US government does not appear to be enthusiastic about the Somali emerging government despite their democratic attempt. The UK is not enthusiastic either; apparently fearing war on Somaliland. The visiting Somali leader declared that he had assured the UK authorities. d) On a letter requesting audience with President Obasanjo by the Somaliland authorities, President Yusuff said that the AU Chairman can receive them, if only to persuade them to join the Somali government towards reconstruction. Meanwhile, the secessionists have gone to South Africa. e) A country that had not operated as a State for 14 years must have been destroyed structurally. In this light, President Obasanjo will call for an Africa Pledge Conference. f) Before the above conference, serious advocacy and lobbying must be done: – Prime Minister Tony Blair of UK will be seen in London to speak seriously to him in favour of Somalia; – The new US Secretary of State, Ms Condoleeza Rice will be approached (not President Bush); – The Germans will also be approached, although President Obasanjo does not have any more great friends in Germany like Helmut Schmidt; – On raising funds/pledges for the new Somalia government, advance lobbying and appeal must be made with the Libyan leader (who could give as much as US$ 50 million), then Algeria, South Africa. (President Obasanjo promised to raise this with the AU Commission Chairman, Professor Konare who was to see him afterwards). It was disclosed that President Yusuff Ahmed had some time ago had guerrilla training with the Libyan leader and is on good terms with him. g) On the request for government-to-government crude oil concession, President Obasanjo declared that such modus operandi had been discontinued but that another way

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of assistance could be studied. Nigeria, said President Obasanjo, had its own problems and hope. Furthermore, he advised that: – The Somalia government should not attack the Somaliland secessionists but rather seek reconciliation; – As soon as the new government gets to Somalia, it must be visibly seen to be doing something concrete there. It should raise funds; – Nigeria’s Embassy to Somalia, currently seeking refuge in Nairobi, Kenya, will be instructed to communicate with the Somali leader. Also, there is one of the contacts, Mr Femi Badejo, whom the Somali President is already in contact with.39 It is imperative to note that Nigeria’s minister of foreign affairs was not at any of the above-mentioned meetings. In essence, Obasanjo was proactive and the Minister was not. If this is incorrect, Obasanjo would not have needed to direct in his usual handwritten notes: ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs, Please note’.40 The expectations on Obasanjo were high at summits and meetings on the sidelines. There was also often behind-the-scenes scheming. One interesting example is a letter from John Garang of Sudan in which he attempted and largely succeeded in swaying Obasanjo’s judgement and support: The opening peace negotiations aimed at ending the Sudan conflict are drawing to a close and the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement is now imminent. That Agreement envisages deployment of a UN Peace Support Mission in Sudan as part of the immediate post-conflict measures designed to consolidate peace. The UN plans deployment of up to 10,000 troops in the area covered by the peace agreement: Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei. In view of the critical nature of this deployment and Your Excellency’s past and present personal involvement in the Sudan peace process, the SPLM/SPLA is extremely keen that Nigeria in particular and the African continent in general become an integral

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part of the implementation process. In this context, I would therefore like, on behalf of the SPLM/SPLA and the people of the New Sudan, to request Your Excellency’s intervention and support. I would like to specifically ask the Government of Nigeria to offer troops to both the International Monitoring and Force Protection components of the prospective UN Peace Support Mission in Sudan. We also find it expedient to request the use of your good offices to solicit on our behalf, similar offers of contribution to the UN Support Mission from other countries in the West African Region, so that at least half of the above force comes from the Region.41 This letter was not copied to the foreign office or its ministers, which illustrates how foreign policy decision-making was run under Obasanjo. Rather, Obasanjo simply requested in a handwritten note: ‘Minister of Defence . . . Can we provide a battalion if there is reduction in Sierra Leone?’42 The consultation, mediation and commendation made Obasanjo proud, but to him it was a collective effort. His responses to several letters acknowledged this much. In reply to the EU Secretary-General Javier Solana, he wrote: I write to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 10 January 2005 commending the successful conclusion of the negotiation process and subsequent peace accord signed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/Army. While I sincerely express my profound gratitude for your commendation, the Agreement has, no doubt, confirmed what we can achieve if we are focused and determined in all our endeavours.43 Javier Solana had earlier written Obasanjo, though it mainly concerned expectations on him: I warmly welcome the successful conclusion of the negotiation process between the GoS and the SPLM/A, a process which the EU and its member states have supported politically and financially. H.

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E. President al-Bashir and SPLM/A Chairman Dr John Garang are signing today a comprehensive agreement that is expected to bring durable peace to a region affected by the longest-running armed conflict in contemporary Africa, a conflict that has caused immense human suffering and obstructed social and economic development in large parts of the Sudan, not only in the South. The conclusion of the ‘Naivasha negotiations’ is an important success for IGAD, which has provided a framework and political guidance to the process. Today’s agreement is also an important landmark on the long and difficult road to peace in the Sudan. I commend the Kenyan Government for hosting and promoting the talks, and the Mediator, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, as well as his team and the international observers, for their untiring efforts to steer this process through its many ups and downs. I also commend the negotiations for the political courage of the decisions that have made this agreement possible. I use this occasion to appeal to the parties involved in the Darfur conflict to rigorously respect all their commitments made at N’djamena and Abuja, to cooperate fully with the AU mission in Darfur, and to return to the negotiation table without delay. I also appeal to the SPLM/A, which will join the new Government of Sudan to be established under this agreement, to use its influence and experience in order to assist in the resolution of the conflict in Western Sudan.44 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote praising Obasanjo and admonished him to remain focused on the task in Coˆte d’Ivoire: I have the honour to express my appreciation for your efforts, undertaking on behalf of the AU, to re-launch the peace and national reconciliation process in Coˆte d’Ivoire. I fully support the facilitation initiative being led by yourself and President Thabo Mbeki. I have taken note of the programme of action produced following President Mbeki’s consultation with the Ivorian parties for implementation of the Linas Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements. [. . .] At this critical juncture, there is an urgent need for the Ivorian parties to demonstrate their good faith in fulfilling commitments

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they made under the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements. Close cooperation between the AU, ECOWAS and UNOCI, together with other international partners, continues to be vital in providing all possible support towards that end.45

Personalisation of foreign policy decision-making Obasanjo was highly regarded for his foreign policies, even though his successes were not driven by pragmatic collectivism but by explicit personalisation. The practice was common knowledge, especially with respect to Obasanjo’s personal style. In spite of his unquestioning drive in foreign policy, many condemned Obasanjo’s approach. The stiffest criticism came from Ambassador Ignatius Olisemeka, a former minister of foreign affairs, who in a terse letter to Obasanjo wrote: I did not vote for you because of the way, I perceive, you have been running down the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You have not accorded the Ministry the prime role and position it rightly deserves in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations. You have shifted the focus, almost entirely, to the Presidency; thereby, emasculating the ministry. Rather than encourage the ministry to grow as an institution, you have sidelined it and contributed to its gradual decline; probably, in your haste and understandable impatience to achieve quick results; precisely, the same rational that motivates preferences for military rather than democratic rule. Please forgive me, but imagine how you would have felt, if at the point of being promoted Major-General, a complete nonprofessional is brought in from outside the ranks of the Armed Forces and made a Major-General, whatever his expertise. That is exactly how diplomatic career officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feel when, for one reason or the other, whatever the rationale or justification, outsiders are appointed to head diplomatic missions abroad as Ambassadors, in the process of dispensing political patronage. These political appointees, most of them untutored and untested in the field of professional diplomacy, displace experienced and capable officers who have been in the ministry for up to twenty-five or more years, and which had yearned to reach the peak of their career.

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It is not just a matter of fulfilling career expectation or ambition. It is more fundamental than that. Such appointments gradually corrode the institution, stultify its growth and ultimately destroy it. In the long run, the nation stands to lose rather than gain. Like the tender democracy we have all embarked upon, such an institution, despite its perceived imperfections, if not carefully and patiently nurtured, will gradually decay and die. Your priority during the past four years of your administration, in the choice of Ambassadors, had been: first, political appointees; next, NIA personnel; ironically and lastly, career diplomatic officers. I hope and trust you will be able to check this trend and reverse this order – despite pressures – and help build up the institution of the Foreign Ministry during the next four years of your administration. Your prerogative as President remains absolutely unquestioned and fully taken into consideration. The United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, The Netherlands, India, Ghana, and few countries which have depended almost entire on trained career diplomats in the management of their foreign affairs, are noted for the stability and maturity of their foreign policy. Yes, it is true, and the country is lucky, that you have a special and exceptional flair for foreign affairs. However, think of the possibility of another President who is not so inclined and gifted. In either case, performance and the national interest would better be served by a well-nurtured and confident Foreign Ministry. Reforms, and yet more reforms, routinely embarked upon by successive administrations cannot be, and are not, the answer. The solution in my opinion principally lies: – in strengthening the institution of the Foreign Ministry by locating it in the centre of the web responsible for the formulation and conduct of foreign policy; – giving career diplomatic officers their just due, and encouraging capable and experienced officers to attain the peak of their career, rather than play second fiddle to political appointees; – recruiting the best available brains in the critical disciplines required in the Ministry for the conduct of external relations in this new age;

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– training and retraining such offices so recruited – Streamlining the over bloated staff of the Ministry.46 Obasanjo had in 2001 established the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) on International Relations under the chairmanship of Chief Emeka Anyaoku. The objective was to advise the President on effective ways to promote Nigeria’s interests and to ensure a more efficient foreign policy machinery. The PAC’s report and recommendations, contained in a government White Paper in September 2001, included the establishment of a new cadre of senior Foreign Service officers, known as under-secretaries. Their responsibilities covered African Affairs; Administration and Finance; Regions and International Organisations and Consular, Protocol, Legal Matters and Communications. The ministry had, since the release of the White Paper, implemented the recommendations, and the creation of the undersecretaries cadre had indeed enhanced the performance of the ministry’s statutory responsibilities. Based on these developments, the foreign minister had written to Obasanjo requesting the creation of a new office within the cadre: I wish, however, to inform that in the implementation of the new structure, it has been observed that the responsibilities assigned to the office of the Under Secretary for Regions and International Organisations (USRIO), are too varied and unwieldy for one Under Secretary to cope with. This is due largely to the fact that the schedule covers a wide cluster of countries which span the four continents of Asia, America, Europe and the Pacific, and the wide ranging issues that fall within the aegis of International Organisations. These observations and experience compel a need to create a fifth Office of Under Secretary, to take charge of International Organisations and International Economic Co-operation. This idea was extensively discussed during my meeting with members of the PAC on 2 October, 2003 and the proposal for a 5th Under Secretary received their endorsement.47 Obasanjo’s reply in a handwritten note had asked: ‘Minister, should we be expanding when our reform orientation is tailored at contracting?’48

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Could this have meant that Obasanjo may have been pressured into setting up the PAC? He was unwilling to trust the judgement of others and this frustrated the reforms. The personalisation of foreign policy by Obasanjo severely dislocated the command structure and operations of the foreign ministry and the consequences were dire. In one instance, his appearance at the UN was so bungled that a furious Obasanjo wrote to Nigeria’s ambassador to the UN, complaining: In terms of the programmes and schedule that you laid out for me, I would like to suggest that in future, it should be much lighter or spaced out with due attention to space and time. Because the programme was so crowded, there was little time to relax and effectively strategise between appointments and meetings. Perhaps, more importantly, it does not speak well for me to arrive late to appointments. We must do everything in future to avoid such situations. Let me also point out that in the future, logistics should be adequately addressed, especially in terms of transportation. I did notice that many of my aides had to rely on subways and taxis to get to meeting venues, at times quite late or had to leave certain events early in order to make it to other locations.49 The bureaucrats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may not have been involved in the planning. Team involvement would have dictated a collaboration between the foreign policy decision-making team and the permanent representative to the UN on the President’s schedule. Some of the letters were written in isolation, without input from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ideally, the chain of command meant that diplomats were answerable to the minister and were also expected to send their memorandums through the minster. But in cases like this, both Obasanjo and the ambassadors bypassed the ministry. A letter from Nigeria’s ambassador to the US confirms this: I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that CIA Director, Porter Goss, on 16 February, 2005, before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, named Nigeria among countries

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described as potential areas for instability. The Director was presenting to the Committee, the CIA’s global outlook for 2005 titled, ‘Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy.’ The specific reference to Nigeria was as follows: In Nigeria, the military is struggling to contain militia groups on the oil-producing South and ethnic violence that frequently erupts throughout the country. Extremist groups are emerging from the country’s Muslim population of about 65 million. Mr President, on the issue of UN Security Council Seat, we must insist on African initiative that is, AUs decision on who gets those two seats. The aim here is [was] to reduce or control extracontinental influence on deciding who gets the seat. However, on a positive note, some of the U.S. authorities who emphasise potentials for instability and insecurity in Nigeria also believe that the National Debates now going on in Nigeria equally have the potential to promote stability and increase sense of security within the country.50 In some of the processes there were elements of statesmanship but in most cases the problem of continuity persisted, and there were often cases where expenses were unnecessarily extravagant. Nigeria’s bid to secure one seat on an expanded UN Security Council necessitated the setting up of a Presidential Task Force made up of Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Ambassador B.A. Clark, Ambassador O. Akadiri, Ambassador N.U.O. Wadibia Anyanwu, Ambassador M.L. Metteden and Ambassador Segun Apata. The Task Force headquartered at the Presidential Advisory Council was serviced by Professor P.T. Ahire of the PAC, Mr Mark Egbe, Ambassador A. Rimdap and Mr C.N. Okafor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mandate of the Task Force included to: a) hold series of meetings in Abuja to elaborate on strategies and tactics; b) travel to designated countries whose influences are deemed to bear profoundly on the stated objective of securing a permanent

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seat for Nigeria on the expanded Security Council of the UN; and c) report as appropriate, to Mr President.51 The task force initially showed promise, given that this was the first time there was an attempt at coordination between the presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea, however, was dead on arrival. Such lack of coordination, worsened by the President’s personalisation of foreign policy, created mutual suspicion between the presidency and the ministry. This slowed down bureaucracy and consequently the President’s directives were sometimes ignored. On one occasion, Obasanjo forcefully wrote requesting a reply to a previous memo: Some time ago, I directed my Principal Secretary to liaise with the Permanent Secretary of your ministry with a view to obtaining from her detailed rendition of the expenditure incurred in connection with the last AU-Mid-Term Summit held in Abuja. I am aware that two deadlines for the submission of the final accounts has since been given. These have lapsed without the receipt of the final rendition of the accounts.52

Peacekeeping Peacekeeping operations often begin with preparations and deployment but often end with casualties. Peacekeeping is a very expensive project. Under Obasanjo, some of the decisions regarding peacekeeping were arbitrary, often not thought through. There was no central strategic task force to deal with the issues and, moreover, the mechanisms for verifying expenses were questionable. In one official memo to Obasanjo, the Minister of Defence outlined the expenditure needed to deal with unexpected fatalities from peacekeeping operations, sometimes overlooked during planning: Your Excellency may wish to be informed that the Defence Headquarters has forwarded a request for the settlement of death and disability claims of Nigerian soldiers who participated in UNAMSIL Operations in the last couple of years. The nominal roll of the deceased and disabled soldiers is attached for your perusal.

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The financial implication of the benefits to be paid to the various next-of-kins of the deceased and disabled soldiers is US$ 940,000.00 less US$ 100,000.00, being the entitlement of 63NA/179744, WO Jafaru Mohammed and 79NA/10931 Cpl. Usman Mohammed. This brings down the total amount to US$ 840,000.00. It would be recalled that the death benefit WO Jafaru Mohammed had earlier been included in my request for operational allowances for UNAMSIL troops Ref. No. TA/154 CON/T3/196 dated 29th January, 2004 forwarded to your office. Also, the payment to 76NA/10931 Cpl Usman Mohammed’s next-of-kin was effected in September, 2002 (copy of approval attached) 53 A memo from the Permanent Secretary of the Defence Ministry to Obasanjo meddled in issues in which Nigeria simply had no business: I wish to draw Mr President’s attention to the Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) which authorises the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (MNF) in Bunia (DRC), in close coordination with the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). This decision was adopted following the fighting and atrocities in Ituri, as well as the gravity of the humanitarian situation in the town of Bunia, coupled with the attendant negative effect of the situation on the on-going national political dialogue in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region. The Security Council has reaffirmed its full support for the political process initiated by the Ituri Pacification Commission, and has taken cognisance of the urgent need for a secure base to allow the full functioning of the institutions of the Ituri interim Administration, and in particular the Commitment of the Ituri parties to the process of cantonment and demilitarisation. The Interim Emergency Multinational Force is to be deployed on a strictly temporary basis allowing the Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC’s presence in Bunia. This reinforced UN presence is to be completed by mid-August 2003. Member States have therefore been called upon to contribute personnel, equipment and other necessary financial and logistic resources to the multinational force. Contributing member States

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are expected to notify the leadership of the Force and the SecretaryGeneral of the UN.54 Obasanjo’s response to this memo in a handwritten note said: ‘Perm. Sec. (Defence), We are not involved in this.’55 This response points to Obasanjo’s suspicion of a plot to siphon money, which he nipped in the bud. Thus, peacekeeping can provide an alternative revenue stream for corrupt officials, but troop contributions to peacekeeping operations were actually the sole prerogative of the president. A close examination of peacekeeping preparations would reveal that it requires readiness prior to intervention whether led by the UN or by any sub-regional bodies. The process is intensive, detailed and expensive. One memorandum from the Minister of Defence to Obasanjo demonstrates the level of detail put into the planning, preparation and the deployment of troops: RE: NAF AIR DEFENCE READINESS AND ITS ROLE IN UN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS References: A. B. C. D.

DHQ/801/5/DOPP dated 02 September 2004 NAF/942/CAS dated 24 August 2004 UN/DA/OPS/110/3/G dated 23 April 2004 DH/207 CON/I/VOL.I dated 31 August 2004

I am once again constrained to bring to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief two related issues regarding the status and operational readiness of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) in relation to the other two services in the event of a mission within or outside Nigeria. The two issues are: a) a request by the UN through the office of our defence adviser, Nigeria’s Permanent Mission at the UN in New York for Nigeria to deploy and sustain 8Nos. light combat helicopters in support of the UN Peace Keeping Operations in Coˆte d’Ivoire, thereby deriving maximum benefits from NAF’s participation in such operation, and

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b) the operational status and readiness of the NAF in consideration of the dateline of 15th September 2004 on Bakassi. Annexes A and B are a plea for urgent action on the critical requirements of the NAF to enable it to meet the challenges that may be thrown-up by September 15, 2004 dateline on Bakassi. This follows a meeting of the Service Chiefs and the Chief of Defence Staff held on 27 August 2004. Annex C above is an urgent request from the UN for the deployment of 2Nos Mi 35P (light combat) helicopters and 6Nos. Super Puma (Light combat and Logistic support) helicopters for Peace Keeping Operation in Coˆte d’Ivoire. The use of the transport aircraft such as the C-130H and G-222 as well as the helicopters for these operations is regularly reimbursed by the UN on the basis of approved generous rates. This scheme is a valuable source of hard currency which Nigeria and the NAF should exploit to full advantage. Ghana, for instance, is utilising this scheme effectively and generating appreciable revenue for the UN. Annex D is my recent letter to Your Excellency on the need to admit the G-222, Super Puma helicopter and F-7NI aircraft, in addition to the MiG021 reactivation/upgrade, into the 2005 budget. An appraisal of the present state of the operational readiness of the NAF reveals that NAF cannot meet the emerging challenges arising from our internal and external threat assessment. NAF priority needs and capabilities for air defences, close air support, maritime air operations, helicopter operations and airlifts are severely constrained. As Your Excellency is well aware, the following efforts on the air assets involved have continued for years without fruitful results: i) Air Defence: While the NAF, at present, does not have any serviceable aircraft for air defence operations, the ground-based air defence systems are obsolete. Efforts though are at hand to conclude arrangements for the procurement of one squadron [sic] of F-7N1 multi-role combat aircraft. These should however be complemented with ground-base defence systems and radars.

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ii) Close Air Support: Currently, the NAF has 3Nos. Alpha Jet and 3Nos. Mi 35P helicopters for this role. The 5Nos Super Puma are still awaiting Presidential directive for reactivation/upgrade estimated at E12, 994,000.00 (N2.1 billion). For this role to be effectively performed, a minimum of 4 squadrons of each aircraft type is required, particularly for helicopter operations in the area of troop tactical mobility, ground attacks, surveillance, search and rescue and medical evacuation. iii) Maritime Air Operations: For the protection and surveillance of Nigeria’s economic interests in the maritime environment and the Bakassi peninsula, no platform is available presently in the NAF. iv) Airlift: Whereas only one C-130H is serviceable, the 5Nos. G-222 has remained grounded requiring US$ 74.5 million for reactivation, as negotiations have been concluded. The C-130H available is complemented by only 2Nos. D 228 light transport aircraft out of 8Nos. All aircraft in this fleet should be sufficient if they were made serviceable. [. . .] Your Excellency, Nigeria has been a major player in regional security initiatives and also a major contributor to UN peace missions. The weight of this role will increase as the UN cedes responsibilities for conflict resolution and peace support operations to regional and sub-regional bodies, especially on the African Continent. The importance of Nigeria’s active participation in shouldering these responsibilities cannot be over-emphasised apart from the revenues that would be generated through the lease arrangement to support the scheme and, to some extent, other aircraft types. Aircraft serviceability would be guaranteed and funds would be available for the procurement of aircraft spares. [. . .] It is against this background that I respectfully invite Your Excellency’s attention to the ‘Combat Aircraft Airworthiness Restoration Plan’ which you graciously approved, and within which falls the aircraft-types desired by the UN for its operation, namely, G-222 light transport aircraft, Super Puma S332 helicopters and Mi 35P light combat helicopters. For this purpose also, I humbly wish Your Excellency would favourably consider my letter Ref. No.

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DH/207 CON/VOL.I of 31st August 2004 entitled ‘Special Consideration of the Nigerian Air Force Projects in the 2005 Budget’, Reference D, and specifically approve the projects for implementation in the 2005 budget. In addition, the issue of Mi 35P helicopters not covered in the earlier letter but which is now understood to be of immense interest to the UN for the above mentioned purpose should also be adequately catered for in the 2005 budget.56 The above is for the Nigerian Air Force (NAF). Below are three memos representing the requests from the Nigerian Army (NA) and the Nigerian Police; the first is from the Minister of Defence on behalf of the Chief of Army Staff: Your Excellency may wish to be informed that the Chief of Army Staff has forwarded request for the pre-induction activities and provision of logistics requirements for the deployment of 6 Battalion of the Nigerian Army to the Sudan, as part of the African Union intervention Mission in Darfur [. . .] The Chief of Army Staff is also seeking your kind approval of funds to procure the non-available equipment and selfsustainment items for the deployment of Signal Squadron to UNMIL, the items include: i) Pre induction activities 6 Battalion of NA for the Sudan – N12, 917, 05.00 ii) Logistics requirement for deployment of 6 Battalions of NA for the Sudan – N218, 392,666.00 iii) Logistics requirement for Deployment of Signal Squadron to UNMIL – N56, 643,844.00 Total

– N287, 953,560.00.57

This is from the Chief of Army Staff: When the Nigerian Army was deploying an independent Infantry Company to The Sudan in August 04 based on the request of the African Union (AU), we also forwarded a requirement for the

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following on deployment of 72 Para Battalion vide Reference A to the tune of N1,219,262,465/20 (One billion, two hundred and sixty five Naira and twenty Kobo only) and US$ 4,348,920.00 (Four million, three hundred and forty eight thousand, nine hundred and twenty Dollars only). Now that the US Government has prevented the deployment of that Battalion, it becomes necessary to now replace it with 6 Battalion, Abak, Akwa Ibom State. [. . .] In view of the limited time, the unit will only concentrate for a short time to train and to carryout pre-induction activities such as medical tests and crating of weapons/equipment before deployment. The pre-induction requirements have been computed accordingly to cover the activities. The total amount required is N12,917,050.00 (Twelve million, nine hundred and seventeen thousand, and fifty Naira only). Details are at Annex A. [. . .] The unit’s equipment and logistics requirements have also been computed bearing in mind the logistics support that will be provided by the AU in the mission area, based on the existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The requirement for ammunition has been deliberately omitted due to the arrangement made by Mr President to purchase ammunition in bulk for 5 battalions. In the meantime, ammunition will be sourced from the small stock available in our units and formations. The amount required for the outstanding equipment and logistics items is N218,392,666.00 (Two hundred and eighteen million, three hundred and ninety two thousand, six hundred and sixty six Naira only) are detailed at Annex B.58 Finally, this next memo is from Inspector General of Police Sunday G. Ehindero: We will need to procure the necessary equipment as the Unit is to be self-sustaining. The required equipment are as follows: i) Thirteen (13) Nos. patrol vehicles (pick up); ii) One (1) Ambulance and a specialise [sic] vehicle for support; iii) Three (3) Nos. APCs with at least one break through devices;

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iv) Three (3) Nos. Unimog; v) Anti-riot materials – Tear gas, Grenades, Thunder flash, Protective Helmets, Protective Shields, Bullet-proof vest, Riot gunners (long and short), Gas masks, Batons; vi) Eighty (80) Nos. Ak-47 rifles; vii) Seven (7) Nos. Pistols (small arms); viii) Five (5) Nos. Computers and printers; ix) Three (3) Nos. Photocopiers (Rank Zerox); x) Four (4) Nos. standard sizes T.V. (20 inches); xi) One (1) No. DSTV decoder fully subscribed; xii) Two (2) Nos. VCD players and xiii) Recreational equipment such as Table tennis board, Badminton equipment, Lawn Tennis equipment etc. Though the cost involved is refundable by the UN, the Force may require some financial assistance in the procurement of the above listed items to prepare the unit for the mission.59 Ehindero’s letter also revealed that the inducting units would require concentration for eight weeks of integration and intensive pre-induction training. The financial requirement for concentration, pre-induction training and other preparatory activities for the units will include transportation to the areas, logistics for the induction training, production of dog tags, medical tests and crating of arms and equipment. A summary of the financial requirements is as follows: AMIS units @ Bn 232 Tk Bn and 13 FER) ¼ ₦79,503,600.00 UNMIL units (149 Bn and 211 Tk Bn) ¼ ₦54,210,000.00 UNMIL Sig. Sqn ¼ ₦12,733,500.00 DHQ Ops/Staff Coordination ¼ ₦900,000.00 ¼ ₦147,347,100.00 Your Excellency may therefore wish to approve the sum of ₦147,347,100.00 (One hundred and forty-seven million, three hundred and forty-seven thousand, one hundred naira) only from the UN Account in New York for the reasons stated above.60 Instructively, the Nigerian Army made a request for ammunition but, in the same measure, failed to disclose an update on its stock. Nigeria,

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except in taking part in peacekeeping operations across the African continent, has not had any internal strife since the late 1960s. The accounting process in this kind of procurement remains shrouded in secrecy and structurally hindered. There was no foreign policy or peacekeeping task force to scrutinise budgets. There is also the communications aspect to peacekeeping preparations. The memorandum below from the Minister of Defence to President Obasanjo requested approval of payment for the supply of communication equipment by M/S RCN Nigeria Limited to the Nigerian contingent in the African Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan: Following your Excellency’s approval for the award of contract for the procurement of Communication Equipment among others, for the Nigerian Contingents (NIGCON) participating in the African Union Mission in Sudan – AMIS (please see attached copy as annex A) coupled with the urgent need to deploy the 6 Battalion with the COE, as requested by the Chief of Army Staff, the necessary contracts were awarded in line with the extant provisions on procurement. The urgency of the procurement is predicated on the standing threat to the fragile cease-fire/peace accord between the Sudanese Government and the rebel SPLA, by the activities of the JANJAWID militia men. To effectively implement the mandate of the African Union with minimal human casualty on the Troops Contributing Counties (TCC) effective ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications must be provided and sustained. This is to eliminate the element of surprise that could largely account for the failure of Peace Keeping Operations in a volatile area like the Darfur region. Arising from the foregoing, Your Excellency may wish to approve the payment of the sum of ₦164,000,000.00 (One hundred and sixty four million Naira) only from the Operations vote to Messr. Radio Communications (Nigeria) Ltd., for the supply of Communication Equipment to the Nigerian Contingent in Darfur, Sudan.61 This was approved by Obasanjo, without recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would have ascertained whether the UN had taken care of this to avoid duplication.

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Other memoranda also required urgent response, especially those that came directly from heads of regional or sub-regional bodies. The memorandum below was reported by the National Security Adviser after a meeting with the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, and represents the kind of skill Obasanjo attached to the issue of peacekeeping: I wish to report a meeting with the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas at 1030 hrs on 27 June, 2003. At the meeting, Dr Chambas impressed that the security and humanitarian situation in Liberia, particularly in and around Monrovia, was fast deteriorating, thus requiring an active consideration for the deployment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF). The Executive Secretary’s brief maintained that the composition and immediate deployment of an ISF will be the only way to forestall further loss of civilian lives in Liberia and give a new impetus to the ECOWAS sponsored peace talks in Accra. [. . .] Based on initial explanation, the ECOWAS scribe proposed that the composition of the ISF could be as follows:

Country a. The Federal Republic of Nigeria b. The Republic of Mali c. The Republic of Ghana d. The United States of America e. Royal Kingdom of Morocco f. Republic of South Africa g. The Republic of Senegal Total

Estimated Troops to be Contributed 1200 400 250 2000 1000 500 250 5,600 troops

[. . .] Dr Chambas also informed me that the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission, comprising Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Mediation and Security Council at the Foreign Minister’s level was scheduled to meet in Accra, Ghana on Thursday, 2 July 2003. The deployment of an ISF will be the main issue to be considered. The Executive Secretary also pleaded that Nigeria, being central to

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the quest for peace in sub-region, should attend at the appropriate level. [. . .] In view of the above, Mr President may wish to intensify consultations with the Chairman of ECOWAS, Chairman of the AU and other members of the ICGL regarding the urgent deployment of an ISF.62 To which Obasanjo directed: VP, CDS, Perm. Sec. Defence, provided the logistics and finance are provided, we should provide personnel. I would have preferred them giving us troops for communication, logistics and medical back while we in West Africa provide the fighting and peacekeeping force with a Nigerian commander.63 Again, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not taken into confidence. The issue of post-conflict political reconstruction is crucial in peacekeeping preparation, particularly the issue of possible donor conferences in the areas where peacekeeping interventions had taken place. A particular case is the diplomatic invitation from the Norwegian leader, Kjell Magne Bondevik, to Obasanjo, in appreciation of Nigeria’s peacekeeping efforts in Darfur: On behalf of the Government of Norway, it is a pleasure to invite your government to participate at the Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Nairobi on 9 January marked the start of a new era in the development of Sudan. The implementation of the agreement has already started, and it is essential that the international community comes forward to assist in the enormous task of reconstruction and development. Over last year, the UN and the World Bank have, together with the Sudanese parties, analysed needs and formulated plans for the development of all major sectors. Donors will be invited to pledge assistance for these sectors at the conference. The relevant documentation will be distributed prior to the conference.

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I firmly believe that the international donor community will give extensive support for the reconstruction of Sudan, both financial and in political terms. If not, we run the great risk of undermining the peace agreement which ended Africa’s longest civil war, and which lays the foundation for a democratic development of Sudan. The conference will take place in Oslo, Monday 11 April and Tuesday 12 April, subject to a positive development in all of Sudan, including in relation to Darfur. The conference will be at ministerial level.64 The letter demonstrated cooperation between the Norwegian presidency and Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This may have been the reason why Obasanjo, in his handwritten note, had directed: ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs, Your advice please. Remember Darfur is important to us.’65 Obasanjo should have written a directive requesting his minister of foreign affairs to attend on behalf of Nigeria given that the Norwegian letter had explicitly stated that the conference was ministerial.

Strong and failed states President Obasanjo also had the issue of failed states constantly in his peripheral vision, since Somalia was an open sore to Africa. This was a source of concern for African states because the concept of Afrocentrism could not put a stop to the escalation of the violence. It was Obasanjo’s desire, having acknowledged the danger of state failure, to put in place policies which sustained Nigeria’s strength, and so, even at a great cost, do all possible to avoid such failure. His main objective, through the prevention of war in the African continent, was to prevent a replication of Somalia. Obasanjo employed diplomatic and unnecessary theatrics in making this point known at all forums. One of those concerned was Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, who wrote to Obasanjo expressing similar sentiments: I fully share your vision of a safer and more caring world for which the UN stand. The need for a re-affirmation of the organisation’s central role in the search for solutions to these problems can

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therefore not be overemphasised. Of equal concern are inter-State and intra-State conflicts, the menace of international terrorism, the spread and devastating impact of pandemic diseases, illicit proliferation and trade in small arms and light weapons, as well as the consummation of the reform of the UN, all of which require painstaking and concerted efforts of member-States to address. [. . .] It is with this in mind that I write you. In September, the UN General Assembly opens its fifty-eight session. By this letter, I would like to thank you for planning to take part in person in the General Debate [. . .]66 Obasanjo reinforced this resolve in preventing the scourge of state failure by commissioning one of his aides to investigate and do a presentation on the matter, after due research. At the completion of the assignment, he was instructed by Obasanjo to circulate it to officials in the cabinet. His submission explains Obasanjo’s determination on the matter: [. . .] At the end of the day, the entire policy thrust of this administration is to make Nigeria, a strong, safe and prosperous State which is the very opposite of weak and failed States. I am currently developing this concept into an Index or a Matrix which can be used to measure or indeed calibrate our growing capacity to move away from weak state to Strong State [. . .]67

Undercurrents of diplomacy Archival materials reveal some undercurrents of Obasanjo’s diplomacy, bordering on weakness and lack of diligence in the bureaucracy, a fact reinforced by endless blunders in foreign policy decisions. The content of a memorandum from a career bureaucrat to the President reveals the absurd extent officials could go to bring disrepute to the service: I have the honour to seek your approval to dispatch Diplomatic Couriers to consign the recently introduced uniformed Machine Readable visa stickers to our Missions abroad. The request is predicated on the directive by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that the issuance of visas by rubber stamps should be stopped

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by 1 May 2003. Consequently, holders of visas issued with stamps after the date will not be allowed entry into the country. [. . .] To accomplish the assignment expeditiously and minimise the financial implication, the under listed dropping Centres have been created where Diplomatic Couriers will deliver the stickers for collection by various Missions. i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi)

Europe and America – London Asia – New Delhi Middle East & North Africa – Cairo Central Africa – Douala Southern Africa – Johannesburg East Africa – Nairobi [. . .]

Approve delivery of visa stickers by Diplomatic Couriers to designated collection centres abroad.68 It was equally absurd that Obasanjo, in a handwritten note, gave his approval: ‘Perm. Sec. Foreign Affairs, Approved.’69 It is ironic that, in this modern age, Nigeria was still sending diplomatic couriers to distribute visa stickers across the world, when there are many courier organisations whose reputation and ability is not in question. This obviously was not a well-thought-through directive. Another memorandum came from the same official and it reads: It is with deep concern that I wish to bring to Mr President’s attention, a distress call received from our charge´ d’affaires in Monrovia, Liberia regarding the takeover of the Chancery and Embassy premises by Nigerian nationals. All our officers have equally been held hostages. The reason for this action, I gathered, was the demand by these Nigerians to be immediately evacuated to Nigeria. [. . .] I have been informed that some unscrupulous Nigerians, who have now taken over the Chancery premises, could have left for Nigeria on that chartered plane. Rather, they dishonestly sold off the passes that would have given them access to board the chartered plane. This therefore confirms why foreigners,

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Ghanaians and Liberians inclusive, were evacuated from Liberia, as reported in our newspapers. Mr President, we are again in a dilemma. If nothing is done by the government to evacuate this new group of stranded Nigerians from Liberia, the government may be accused of insensitivity to the plight of its nationals abroad. Unfortunately, such critics may fail to know that the government did its best, promptly, but that the majority of these unscrupulous nationals sold off their tickets when they could have boarded the aircraft that was earlier sent.70 It is unusual for a trained diplomat to call his fellow citizens ‘unscrupulous’. This is intellectually insensitive of a diplomat of such standing. Other criticisms are of the same manner in which decisions were taken by Obasanjo. One such decision was not scrutinised, despite the due process mechanism which screened contracts in Nigeria. No US government would pay such a colossal amount to any US citizen for lobbying purposes. The memorandum to the President reads: I wish to invite Your Excellency’s attention to the contract between the Federal Govt. of Nigeria and Goodworks International LLC, Atlanta. Under Article 13 of the contract, the Federal Government is obliged to pay Messrs. Goodworks International US$ 83,333.33 monthly retainership for consulting services rendered to the Government. [. . .] Your Excellency may wish to note that no payment has been made this year. The purpose of this memo therefore, is to seek Your Excellency’s approval to purchase from the Central Bank of Nigeria the sum of US$ 499,999.98 (Four hundred and ninety-nine thousand, nine hundred and ninety-nine dollars, ninety-eight cents) representing the amount due for six months.71 These were the sort of approvals to which Obasanjo appended his signature, leading to concerns as to whether Obasanjo was actually obliged to give consent to these ambiguous memos. They were possible because of the incongruities in the foreign policy decision-making structure.

CHAPTER 5 ANALYSING THE INTERVIEWS: USING THE PUBLIC VIEW AS COMMENTARY ON THE INSIDE VIEW

The responses of officials and bureaucrats to Obasanjo’s grip on foreign policy were predictably a mixture of coldness and timidity. Dissent and wrangling was often loud, yet remained out of the earshot of the leader. Further, behind this wrangling lay a growing divergence, the existence of two broad but fundamentally incompatible views about Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. Interview responses reflected the psychological gap in the system, in contrast to a general assumption of excellence. But a tortuous decisionmaking mechanism makes that very assumption untenable. This was connected to a strong leader who sometimes supposedly treated his ministers and aides with contempt. While Obasanjo may be criticised for not allowing much serious discussion about foreign policy priorities, there is no doubt that his thinking about foreign policy was original, markedly distinct from other vicious regimes that have ruled by that seemingly larcenous brutality which encouraged conflicts across Africa. Amid searing criticisms, Obasanjo always eschewed the overly verbose grandiosity of his African presidential peers in favour of plain speaking. Every aspect of the revealing interviews can be considered as panoramic views of developments in the foreign policy decision-making arena. The two main schools of thought which fill this intellectual vacuum are based largely on either natural intellect or hereditary

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posturing. They are both divergent, given that they speak truth to power rather than clouding their meaning behind euphemisms and falsehoods. Their arguments fall into two categories: simplistic or comprehensive. This analysis covers those in government, including those who have occupied office and those outside the corridors of power. There is a connecting thread running through these two sources. Both sets of interviewees either favour or offer a critique of Obasanjo’s handling of foreign policy. What is crucial here are the debates emanating from this material – and there are many. It can be argued that Obasanjo succeeded in putting Nigeria unambiguously on the side of global visibility. His tenure was a catalyst for global recognition of Nigeria, ending a decade of pariah status. Those interviewed outside government unanimously agreed. Thus, Obasanjo’s brand of foreign policy represented an inexorable progress. The general public provided an in-depth criticism of foreign policy roles, leadership and the conflict between interests and ideas; in some instances these criticisms were interlaced with praise and commendations. One of the main debates is woven around Obasanjo’s personality and performance on foreign policy decision-making. I suggest that Obasanjo’s tenure as president of Nigeria and his handling of Nigeria’s foreign policy has a ‘sincerity gap’, notwithstanding his saintly posturing through grandiose speeches and exploits – a failure in ‘precise thinking’. According to an insider, Ad’Obe Obe, this was due to the laidback mentality of the majority of Nigerians. In running a proper decision-making machinery, policies, issues and things have to make sense to every discerning eye. This only explains the prevalence of Nigeria’s foreign policy which portrays finesse overseas in total contrast to the abundance of absurdities at home. In all honesty, there was some element of correctness in such songs like Nigeria jaga jaga [meaning Nigeria is a rubbish bin containing confusion].1 What this implies is that merit does not count in foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria. And if it really does count, the officials involved would not be found taking refuge in the refrain: ‘It is not me, it is the system’. It follows that those running Nigeria’s foreign policy lack moral character and physical discipline, missing the much-wanted

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quality of being ‘above reproach’. Again, Nigeria as a nation is presumed not to take into account the quality of leadership. In other contexts, a leader is supposed to have peers who can corroborate his/her ability, character and competence – an important tool of verification. The same interviewee uses this argument to question Obasanjo’s method of administering foreign policy in Nigeria: Did he run a successful foreign policy with nearly all of Nigeria’s embassies across the world in comatose state? After Obasanjo’s victory at the 1999 polls, we undertook a global tour where Obasanjo was sincere and did pray for ‘sincerity’ as the watch-word among members of his team. But was that put into practice? Did it lead to anything tangible?2 Obe hypothesised that Obasanjo ought to have begun by first articulating his foreign policy vision, but he failed to do so. Instead, he just got himself soaked in the euphoria of a nation in haste after a successful democratic transition and attempting to recover from its battered image as a pariah. ‘This was the only success of Nigeria’s foreign policy. But this was the natural consequence of weary citizens of the world who were already tired of the ills emanating from Nigeria.’3 Rebuilding Nigeria from its battered image was a notable area of success under Obasanjo. Diplomatic shuttles changed perceptions and indicated that Nigeria had re-emerged internationally, but Obasanjo failed to read public opinion, which wanted these foreign trips to be curtailed. Nothing, however, would stop Obasanjo from these. It is not surprising to find that Obasanjo visited 25 countries within three weeks, spanning the period between the election and his inauguration as president in 1999. The pre-inauguration tours were aimed at preventing a military coup d’e´tat before, during or after the inauguration in 1999 and were also intended to open discussion on Nigeria’s debt burden. The next element of criticism rested on the personalities Obasanjo picked to drive Nigeria’s foreign policy. The complaint of many interviewees was that those Obasanjo chose as ministers lacked charisma and courage, and were not the type of people capable of rebranding Nigeria’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Its pariah status made the job of improving Nigeria’s image into highly sensitive political posts, requiring diplomatic tact and knowledge.

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If Obasanjo was serious about foreign policy decision making, why put nonentities as foreign ministers? This is only possible because Nigerians don’t ask questions. No one has asked why debts are building up again after that cancellation/reduction. Is this not morally outrageous?4 The next major question was whether the intervention in Darfur could be considered a success or failure. It is the opinion of some that Nigeria ought to have done more to pressurise the government in Khartoum as it had a great deal of time for considering what to do about the situation in Darfur. Khartoum had the option to cooperate or not in considering the issue of human rights. Nigeria ought to have done more to mobilise for justice and put greater pressure to stop the massacres. There is the view that the pressure on Sudan was not as intense as it could have been, insofar as what was happening in Darfur had happened elsewhere in Africa – akin to the biblical saying, ‘let who has not sinned cast the first stone’. In essence, what al-Bashir was doing in Darfur was not any different from what Obasanjo had done in Odi and Zaki Biam in Nigeria. Tunde Adeniran maintains that this could be the case, were it not that key aspects differed: ‘the Odi campaign was condemned by Nigerians and it was done not as a policy adopted or accepted by Nigerians’.5 In a riposte to critiques, Lancelot Anyanya places emphasis on the need to understand and appreciate Obasanjo’s contributions, especially concerning the structure of Nigeria’s foreign policy. To him, what shaped the policy direction and mindset of the President was the fact that the government inaugurated debates on foreign policy using a wide range of sources and avenues. There was Liberia and now there is Darfur. We can agree that there is a lot of difference: there are marked differences in terms of context, at least the way both operations were set up. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), as everybody would admit, was largely a Nigerian initiative by virtue of the fact that Nigeria was the largest troop contributor. Different people and different schools of thought had their views pertaining to appropriateness – whether the framework was international or was generally within the

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framework of ECOMOG or ECOWAS – whether we need a provision for the kind of intervention that Nigeria made at the time. These are issues for debate. For Darfur, the closest to UN intervention would have been AU intervention. I do not think this has been robust for several reasons. I have lost colleagues in Darfur as I lost colleagues in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is sad. When you have the opportunity to engage with policy makers as an analyst, whether you like it or not that sense of personal connection or personal affinity to operations and actors tends to shake your sense of understanding and analysis of the issues.6 Conceptually, there are key differences. At the time Nigeria intervened in Liberia, it was under a military government. Thus, the traditional components of foreign policy, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the embassies, the Nigerian intelligence apparatus and the military were integrated into a single command structure. The decision-making organ in a democracy is very different as the formulation, interpretation and the execution of policy involves a range of actors, all contributing to debates on what constitutes the national interest. The national interest, however, is usually dependent on the kind of government that exists. Military government lends itself to faster decision-making than a democracy where several views and interests have to be aggregated and considered. Making swift decisions may have been the most fundamental challenge that Obasanjo had to bear in mind. There is no democratically elected government which would have the latitude or singular perspective of a military government. In the plainest analysis, it is the Nigerian head of state who decides it is in the interest of Nigeria to be in a particular conflict arena. Conversely, it is easier for a single leader to simply call his service chiefs and tell them a decision has been collectively taken. When your leaders agree with you, you give orders you don’t need to consult the country. In the more strategic terms, because we talk about the elements of power, you consider factors like your capacity to muster the will of the people. The will of the people is behind every particular action. It is true. In a more narrow sense, it is easier to move. ‘I want three battalions in this theatre’, and that

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would be done. With a democratically elected leader, this is different. This is because, first, you need the assent of the National Assembly (NASS), who happen to be the custodians of the people’s mandate at that time, to deploy troops. So this is the reality of presidential democracy. In most democracies, the president is governed by laws from which he derives his powers.7 Another counter-response to critics of Obasanjo came from Abdullahi Adamu, who recognised that Obasanjo took over the reign of leadership at a unique time in the history of Nigeria. In light of events prior to Obasanjo winning the 1999 presidential election: there is no doubt that his entry changed the fortunes of Nigeria. When you add this up to all his other achievements internationally, ranging from peacekeeping to conflict resolution, a fair assessment of Obasanjo would be an Aþ for excellence. Comparatively, I don’t think any other Nigerian leader has done better than he in this guise. His records are there for all to see.8 Concerning whether he was successful or otherwise, Adamu rejects the latter to underscore his arguments that: President Olusegun Obasanjo successfully attained all the objectives he set out to achieve, including the basic ones traditionally outlined in our foreign policy objectives from the 1960s, which primarily meant Africa as its centrepiece. But apart from that, he successfully opened new channels of engagement between Nigeria on the one hand (and most times carrying Africa along) with the world made up of Europe, US and Asia. Everywhere he went to, he was welcomed with delight. Fortunately, as a governor under his dispensation I felt proud being a member of some of his delegations.9 Adeolu Akande concurs with Adamu but further stresses the point that Obasanjo’s strength is rooted in his more than 30 years of international foreign experience, cutting across his membership of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) which contributed to the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. His role as a major player in the commonwealth,

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his participation in developing the agenda of the UN on development issues in the Global South and his role in decolonisation in Africa and so on cannot be overstated. When he came in – yes we have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs – but Obasanjo left nobody in doubt that he was the one running the show. The first minister was Sule Lamido, who had no background in foreign relations and if you witnessed the issues then, it was clear that it was the President who was driving the ministry. The Minister was hardly heard: the Minister didn’t have the kind of contacts Obasanjo had, he didn’t have a deep knowledge of foreign affairs, he had never worked in that sector before. Between 1999 and 2003, Obasanjo was in active domination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and during the first four years, one of the major criticisms of the Obasanjo presidency was that he stayed more outside the country than within.10 Criticisms of his style of diplomatic initiative grew when foreign policy was under his watch. It was a known fact that one of Nigeria’s fiercest critics, Gani Fawehinmi, together with the media and opposition politicians, took note of the number of times Obasanjo travelled out of Nigeria. And on one occasion, when Obasanjo’s foreign trips hit the 100 mark, Gani Fawehinmi issued a statement noting that the President had travelled 100 times outside Nigeria. Although many Nigerians agreed that Nigeria had challenges in foreign affairs, local issues were more important than foreign affairs. Obasanjo’s defence was that the travels were in order to correct Nigeria’s poor status, to secure foreign debt forgiveness and to look for foreign investment. These three components were the issues which drove Nigeria’s foreign policy within those four years and Obasanjo took personal charge of the ministry. Did he achieve any of the above three points (correcting Nigeria’s poor status, obtaining foreign debt forgiveness and foreign direct investment)? Even Obasanjo’s critics gave affirmative answers. By 2006, he was able to write off virtually all of Nigeria’s debts, although some people felt that it was wrong to have given US$ 12 billion in exchange for forgiveness of US$ 18 billion. On the issue of Nigeria’s poor status, he effectively improved its global reputation within the first year of his administration. Nigeria began to get more actively involved in issues of

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development in Africa, issues of democracy and issues of human rights, and it quickly regained the leadership of Africa. There is no doubt that Obasanjo was perceived as the leader of diplomacy in Africa from 1999 to 2003. At the time, this was easier because President Mandela was no longer in office in South Africa. He was also successful with regard to the third issue of attracting foreign investment. GSM telecommunications had an immense inflow of foreign capital and that can also be traced in part to the activities of Obasanjo as president. Continuing on this same line of thought, Joe Keshi – who had been a key official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – reminisced that prior to Obasanjo’s swearing-in as president in 1999, he had forewarned his colleagues on what to expect under an Obasanjo presidency. Keshi explained: Obasanjo has a very deep interest in foreign policy, Obasanjo also has knowledge, possibly one of the best of any Nigerian leader, as regards foreign policy, so it will be very difficult for us, if we do not step up the plate to be able to control him – bearing in mind that every president is his own foreign minister. My suggestion was that we should do an in-house seminar, strategic thinking and come out with an agenda that we sell to the President to focus on. Unfortunately that did not happen.11 At the outset, Obasanjo was faced with a number of challenges, particularly Liberia and Sierra Leone. He signalled that Nigeria should continue to take part in the peace process. The next issue became that of the debt burden, and after that Darfur. This immediate task indeed matched his considerable interest in African affairs, which was manifest in his days of being number two in Dodan Barracks. In order to be able to get other countries behind Nigeria’s position, Obasanjo was doing his own quiet shuttle diplomacy, approved by Murtala Mohammed, which meant that almost every night he was out of the country, returning in the morning. For Keshi: Only those of us in foreign ministry knew that this high-level consultation was going on. I know that one of those who respected him very much but in the end didn’t like him much was President Gaafar Nimeiry of Sudan. This was simply because President Nimeiry had opposed Obasanjo leaving office, as he wanted the

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military to stay on for so many reasons. On one of our visits, after the change of government, the coup took place and Shagari was installed.12 Nimeiry’s argument was centred on the idea that civilians lacked the capacity of the military to be a unifying factor for Africa. This was at a time when Nigeria’s relationship with Sudan was robust. It also coincided with Nigeria’s advice to Sudan to go into a federation, which meant breaking it up into a number of states with a constitution similar to that of Nigeria. Indeed, if that had been the case, the referendum in Southern Sudan would have been unnecessary. It was arguably the failure to listen that led to the referendum which split Sudan into two nations. The fate of Darfur is still in the balance. So while on the global scene, Nigeria organised two or three conferences on Sudan, where a push forced the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel groups into serious negotiations – even though it didn’t lead to anything substantial apart from that of maintaining peace. But with regards to Darfur, we were worried about the killing and our confirmation that the government was involved and was pretending that it was incapable of controlling, but you were the one arming them and so on. So our position was to work with the AU to put in a force, which was what we did. I think we had the largest contingent; this was to help end the crisis. Another thing you need to understand about Africa diplomacy is the fact that we do not openly criticise one another, but we try to help one another to resolve issues even when we don’t like it. Zimbabwe is a good example, Darfur is a good example and with his overpowering power at that time President Obasanjo was effective.13 This was dictated by diplomatic expediency. The fact is, if Nigeria did not step forward, there was no African country which had the capacity or capability to do so. Thus, the assertion that Nigeria uses its weight as a regional power was reaffirmed. But did the role Nigeria played in Sudan and Darfur reflect what Obasanjo stood for, given that he was known to have fought for

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pan-Africanism, spoke for Africa and championed African solutions to African problems? Nigeria has done very well in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance – in Darfur, Sierra Leone and Liberia. It was not about Obasanjo; rather, it was a policy choice which had been in existence for a long time. He merely reinvigorated what had been a dormant policy since Murtala Mohammed’s regime. Obasanjo kept in step with this to a large extent. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo argues: it is one thing to say I commit myself to implementing the existing policy, but like in everything, we are not proactive. That is the spiritism that I know; we allow the crisis to fester before moving and because, I think it is a failure or reflection of our own lack of dynamism in attending to even problems/disasters that happen here. So it is not a policy – it is just that we are often very slow in reacting to things; that is what it is, it is almost in our nature.14 This raises the contentious matter of whether or not Obasanjo’s international feats were a result of expediency or were strategically tailored as his thought-out blueprint. Adinoyi-Ojo argues thus: There was really nothing you could call a foreign policy blueprint. It was driven mainly by Obasanjo’s personality and interest. He would receive an invitation maybe to attend some event and instead of probably constituting a team that will sit down and look at this trip and say is this trip necessary, should we go here and if we go, what position are we going to canvass, what should we be saying? It was not that organised. He would minute to say maybe Chief of Staff, ‘put this in my diary or itinerary’. So it is left to the Chief of Staff to inform all security, inform foreign affairs, inform any other institution or agency of government that will be relevant to the trip, but not in the sense of meeting to say this trip will make it. And of course, ‘speech writer, do a speech’. This place we are going to, what should be the Nigerian position there? What should we be saying and how can we take maximum advantage of this? There wasn’t anything like that and it also reflects the chaos of his own domestic policy.

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His domestic policy was chaotic as he didn’t have what we call a blueprint or a master plan; he was just jumping from one thing to the other and allowing people with proposals to drive the government. It also reflected in his foreign policy and he enjoyed being there on the world stage. He enjoyed rubbing shoulders with great world leaders and he did so with the force of his own personality. Because of his presence, things got done for Africa, for Nigeria, perhaps not in terms of the force of his intellectual conviction, making a forceful argument for Nigeria or Africa, but it’s just that he was there. That is why his foreign policy was driven largely by his own personality.15 In summary, he proposes that Obasanjo achieved things for both Nigeria and Africa and that, most importantly, he was a respected figure in Africa. In fact, at most of the meetings he held, people knew in advance what he was going to discuss. But that is not very good for a country which wants to be taken seriously. Even the US president, Barack Obama, as important as he is, steps out into the foreign policy fray only after his strategy team has tied up the details. If he is to go to Africa, there will be an African team that will conduct research into what the main issues and policy ought to be. This begins with an agenda on policy direction and statements. This, however, was absent in Nigeria. It wasn’t organised in the same manner as the US system. It was disturbing that, not only was this absent, it was the personality of Obasanjo that was driving everything, as he was his own foreign minister. His foreign minister, Sule Lamido, was just content to follow him around. And at the ministry, he was unable to take a decision without first going to Obasanjo. Ordinary decisions like postings, promotions, Sule Lamido had to refer everything to Obasanjo, so things stalled, things couldn’t move well because Obasanjo was in charge. Both at home and abroad, he had his plate full. That’s the problem we had with him. He was micro-managing the country, he believed that he was infallible, that he knew everything. With every other person who worked with him, especially in key areas like foreign affairs, petroleum, finance, he felt he knew what should be done and he had to take orders from him. He didn’t give them freedom to chart their own course. Usually in governance, it is not CEO of Nigeria.

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What you do is to provide guidelines, this is where we should be going and allow the individual actors to implement, give them targets, monitor implementation, that’s all.16 It was ironic, as Adinoyi-Ojo recognised, that Obasanjo’s foreign policy strategy had more to do with foreign trips than foreign policy. ‘That is the case. He just wanted to be seen. He just wanted to rub shoulders with the high and mighty of the world. Sometimes he even went to some events and started sleeping.’17 John Chiemeka Ozoemena disagrees with this assessment by asserting that ‘Obasanjo’s foreign policy was reasonably successful but was largely without finesse’.18 Tunde Olusunle, continuing from Ozoemena’s standpoint, observes: My take on Obasanjo’s foreign policy from 1999 to 2007 – it was an offshoot of the foreign policy that was pursued by the Murtala Ramat Mohammed–Olusegun Obasanjo administration (1975– 79). Nigeria lost Murtala Mohammed in a 14 February 1976 coup and the better part of that administration was with Olusegun Obasanjo in charge as military head of state and commander-inchief. The foreign policy thrust of that administration was Afrocentric. It was predicated on Africa, that is, Africa linking up with the rest of the world. It was subsequently known as a project to join the world’s globalised nations.19 Olusunle made a comparison between Obasanjo’s first (1975– 9) and second (1999– 2007) periods of rule on the basis of: the multilayered foreign policy infrastructure that was put in place by Obasanjo in his second coming. It was under Obasanjo that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began the practice of having senior and junior ministers. This was a response to growing foreign policy challenges in Africa and across the world. Beyond that, for the first time ever, the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa was created, which was by its very designation an African-based ministry. Obasanjo also introduced the office of the Special Adviser on Conflict Resolution, because this was supposed to be the office responding to flashpoints across the African continent. Liberia was

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just getting out of its long war, which was fired by Charles Taylor who subsequently became the president of the country, which lasted from 1989 to 1999, and that war spread to the neighbouring country of Sierra Leone. Bits and pieces of this were also in Guinea, while there was residual unrest in Cote d’Ivoire. Remember also that there were all manner of coups and counter-coups in countries like Chad and Niger. And across Africa, the West Coast, there were also interventions by the conflict resolution arm of the presidency to flashpoints that were also coming up in East and Central Africa. Then, don’t forget that the President also had a special adviser on international relations, Patrick Dele Cole. So if you look at it, you will see that we couldn’t have had a more robust foreign policy infrastructure as we had. The Gulf of Guinea was one of the outstanding achievements of Obasanjo. It was made up countries from West Africa, Central Africa from that belt where decisions were taken to collaborate and to deploy the natural resources there, especially the maritime resources there for the growth and development of the area.20 While Olusunle argues that these successes stem from geographical contiguity, especially with respect to the Gulf of Guinea, Obasanjo’s performance in other regional organisations where Nigeria was a member, such as ECOWAS and NEPAD, confirms this idea. But being a government that had a reputation for activism, it was therefore expected that there would be continuity and that democracy would be sustained and nurtured, even beyond the Obasanjo years. As an activist country, Nigeria played a role in the restoration of popular democracy in Liberia, especially in the post-Taylor era, in the successes in Sierra Leone, in the intervention in Coˆte d’Ivoire and in the restoration of democracy in Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe after a military putsch. Indeed, Obasanjo reminded the armed forces of Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe of their role, which was specifically that of securing the territorial integrity of the country. Referring to Obasanjo’s other good deeds in the continent, Olusunle stated: I think it is worth mentioning the place of Obasanjo in global international affairs has continued. His experience and expertise

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has continued to be deployed, particularly on conflict resolutions missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Obasanjo was also actively involved in the multinational levels of the UN and the AU as a special envoy to Coˆte d’Ivoire, where there was an impasse following the November 2010 election, where Allasane Quattara was declared winner but the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down. So even post-office, Obasanjo has remained relevant in international politics, especially in Africa.21 Incidentally, the Nigerian Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa no longer exists, an indication that it was not a long-term initiative. It was the same initiator, Obasanjo, who took the decision to rationalise ministries in order to avoid proliferation and to encourage the streamlining of responsibilities. In essence, the ministry is now subsumed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under this structure, there is a senior minister and a junior minister, indicating that some policies may not have been well thought through. At a meeting hosted by Obasanjo with General Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, in attendance, he emphasised that mutual dialogue remained the key to conflict resolution across the continent, rather than arm-twisting tactics and manipulations. Olusunle correctly sums up alBashir’s response to Obasanjo’s admonition as a form of moderation of his conduct: Dialogue is probably what led Sudan to whatever successes that have been recorded recently. We recall for instance now that Southern Sudan by a popular referendum have agreed to secede from the bulk of Sudan. Indeed the landmass of Sudan, which is indeed three times the size of Nigeria, where Nigeria is diplomatically counted as the giant of Africa and it’s just one-third of the landmass of Sudan. The fact that the referendum was conducted peacefully over 98 per cent of the residents of Southern Sudan voted to be a country of their own, where just 1 per cent dissented, showed true sportsmanship. There was no court case. It shows that after all the loss of lives, the years and decades wasted in the fight, we still came back to the dialogue table to achieve the success that has been achieved.22

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Dialogue no doubt plays a key a role, but there were others who maintained that African leaders, including Obasanjo, were not firm enough with Sudan, which is why conflicts there persisted for so long – and thus the conflagration in Darfur. Olusunle disagreed: I think there is a limit to international intervention. In Sudan, we probably have a country that is split along geopolitical lines, the so-called Darfur people and the pseudo-Christian side. Resolutions of disputes including the possibility of a military option from experience are not as straightforward as we think. When Nigeria ventured into Liberia to stem the genocide there in 1989, nobody ever assumed that Nigeria would still have a residue of military presence there. Now there is a report which says that we actually have Liberian-Nigerians that we produced as a result of the war, maybe the population of the size of a small country in the world, over half a million. That is how much strife we impacted on the country. In coming back to Darfur now, I want to believe that on paper we have two troubled spots in the country: we have the Darfur problem and we have the Southern Sudan problem.23 Bolaji Akinyemi, brushing aside the issue of lack of resolve by African leaders on Darfur, hinted at a more deep-seated problem in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. Akinyemi would not agree that Nigeria under Obasanjo drifted in terms of strategy. Well, drifting may be too harsh a word for it. I think every head of state or minister comes into office with some ideas, what Nigeria should be like, its focus and then its relationship with the international community. Some come with ideas that are really still in the process of being concretised. Ask any Nigerian and he will tell you he wants Nigeria to be a great nation. What should we do finally to make it a great nation? We haven’t given it much thought. I think where my own case was different, is that obviously President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) was a man who was aware of the dictates of the international community and also was prepared to entrust the task of concretising those ideas to a scholar in the field, which I was, after eight years at the Nigerian Institute of

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International Affairs. I gave a lot of thought to where Nigeria should be moving to and what it will take to get us there and specific commitments on the ground running and for others who came after me. It was either they didn’t stay so long or in the case of when Obasanjo was in power, he felt he was the Alpha and Omega of the whole internet. Obasanjo is a very complex man. Obviously he succeeded in demystifying the military. Now as an arbiter in Nigerian polity, he was able to hold them from interfering in civilian politics for the eight years he was there. I think that could be regarded as a plus for him that he handed over power to another civilian government. He was neither here nor there. He was one of those who uplifted the electoral process in this country. I am not a supporter of the way and manner he cleared the Nigeria national debt; I don’t think there is any country that will pay in that manner.24 But Bola Akinterinwa’s analytical inspection of Obasanjo’s foreign policy contrasts with that of Bolaji Akinyemi: Foreign policy under Obasanjo’s administration was a success story because they have had a specific focus and efforts were made to achieve the objectives. First of all, in terms of regional peace and security, his foreign policy objective was to ensure the ECOWAS objective of ensuring that we keep crisis and conflicts at bay. Nigeria religiously followed it and it resulted in enhancing the principle of constitutional change of government, that which entails non-violent change and democratic and orderly political succession. Under Obasanjo, no regional leader tried to stay in power illegally, that is through non-peaceful means. He went to Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe and made it clear to the military leader there that ECOWAS regional position is that you cannot come to power through the barrels of guns/military putsch. So he compelled Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe to comply. That is an expression of success. In terms of economic development, he made efforts to make the financial institutions in the world write off Nigeria’s debts. This was done and thus an expression of success. Nigeria succeeded in many ways, especially in insisting on its own positions at the AU. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya proposed the AU

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governors, and they also worked towards one defence minister for the whole of Africa and one minister of foreign affairs for the whole of Africa. The Nigerian policy in turn prevailed and all African countries also were to take a cue from that. When you look at another area – in terms of the democratisation of the UN and in terms of the permanent membership – Olusegun Obasanjo played an active part here. When the AU was presided over by Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s foreign minister had to share meetings with AU executives, the foreign ministers of all the African states. It was Nigeria that chaired it and a committee of ten was set up to go round and campaign to ensure that Africa was given more seats in the event of enlargement of the Security Council. So when you take a look, there are many issues and when you take them one by one, you will discover that Obasanjo being a policy man himself. He had an interest in it even before he became head of state.25 Shehu Usman Iyal agrees with Akinterinwa’s assessment. This may not be unconnected to the fact that he is still deeply involved with the aviation sorties of the president’s diplomatic shuttles. Overall, if you put it on a scale, Obasanjo’s administration was a very successful administration, especially if you consider it against where Nigeria was coming from. Nigeria was at a point of breakup. He was that unifying power. Whatever it took, he started going out, preaching, talking etc. He brought us back to the world map. I think Obasanjo was the best foreign policy expert then.26 But when pressed on other details, especially in pinpointing what he thought were the negative aspects of the handling of foreign policy at the time, Iyal recoiled: I wouldn’t call them negative per se, because to start with, don’t forget I am an aviator and that is my area. I am not a foreign-affairs expert, neither am I a political expert. The only thing was that there was a lot of demand on my section, especially on the crew initially. On many of the shuttles, if I happen to be anywhere, it is by chance, not by design; it is just to be in attendance. That’s why

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I am telling you what I saw; he was able to mediate on some issues with other countries that brought us on in a very good light, even with the UN. They realise and reckon the potent values of his involvement and they are tapping his expertise. That is why there are quite a number of positions today that are given to Nigerians in the UN, like the commander in Darfur and other positions we were given in peacekeeping and other places. This is because he was constantly making the refrain that a Nigerian can do it and a Nigerian head of state has been doing it.27 Tony Eluemunor, an outsider, supports Ad’Obe Obe’s analysis, as well as that of the majority of the Nigerian media, dismissing the notion of success of Obasanjo’s foreign policy, insisting: Well, I am a card-carrying Obasanjo critic, it is very obvious, and the man himself knows it. Yet I will start with the damn good aspect. Coming into government in 1999 was returning to a very familiar turf. He was returning to problems he had left unfinished. This was because about the time he left power as head of state in 1979, he was not just head of state of Nigeria, and he was head of the region of Africa. It will be intellectually dishonest to do a good story on Obasanjo’s diplomacy in his second incarnation as head of government without going back to the first term, which is called the Obasanjo – Murtala regime. Everything began from there. Whatever he was trying to do on his second coming was to finish a job he left undone. That time he achieved quite a lot. By the time he returned, Mandela was out of the power equation in South Africa and he wanted to take it to another level and that is the beginning of the good and the bad. This is because there is always an extent to which a personality or one person can go [. . .] In his first administration, Obasanjo was not at it alone. The boys that pulled off that coup, Joe Garba and others, wanted to intervene on the South African question. They wanted to solve it because it was a big load on Nigeria. It touched Africans personally and those guys were on training abroad and that was the moment South Africa was getting crazy, bringing out the

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beast in us, and Obasanjo also wanted to confront that beast. So on that score, the policy on Southern Africa was not Obasanjo’s policy alone; it was a group thing masterminded by the coup plotter and they solved it.28 This should not be misconstrued as ‘collegial management’ but rather a condition the coup’s plotters forced upon its chosen leaders. It is necessary to dispel suggestions that the intervention in Southern Africa was a quick personal fix by Obasanjo. In contrast to Obasanjo’s position, South Africa was just Africa’s problem, but he deserves a large amount of credit for identifying one major problem: conflict resolution. Indeed, he appointed a fully fledged diplomat, Ambassador Ralph Uwechue, to confront that very problem. Eluemunor questions Obasanjo on this score while in the same breath puncturing the ideas of Ambassador Joe Keshi that there was a semblance of normalcy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This, according to him, was not unconnected to the absence of a mutually agreed description of work brief especially for one who was supposed to add value to Nigeria’s push for conflict resolutions across Africa. Did he give Uwechue a brief or did he cut a brief out for himself? I won’t fault Obasanjo, because Uwechue too was a master on that terrain, so that was a good work for Obasanjo – conflict resolution in Africa. Uwechue’s delegation visited Congo, Zaire, we saw Kabila. We saw Charles Taylor over the Sierra Leone issue. So I give Obasanjo high percentage on that.29 Under Obasanjo, Nigeria wanted to head the African Development Bank (ADB), but lost it during the precarious time that it was looking for Africa’s place in the Security Council. Traditionally, many African nations would indeed have left it for Nigeria, yet it would not leave the ADB and other smaller operations to other African nations. Nigeria was contesting everything, even when Obasanjo was head of the OAU on consecutive occasions. This was an illogical foreign policy, and it was ironic that Nigeria in the long run lost the headship of the ADB to Rwanda, causing a big fight as early as 2001. In evaluating Obasanjo’s appointments, one could say there was a shadow of tyranny, as there was little coordination. Obasanjo had

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assistants, advisers, ministers and bureaucrats, but none ever met for strategic planning. They were instead fighting over turf. This was a source of concern to both insiders and outside policy watchers. One of those outside government who recognised this development was Tony Eluemunor, who reveals: Ambassador Ralph Uwechue disagreed with Sule Lamido, the minister of foreign affairs, over Sierra Leone. The British government wrote a letter asking Nigeria to clarify its position on Sierra Leone and the British position on Sierra Leone. And Obasanjo sent the letter to Foreign Affairs Minister Sule Lamido. Nigeria said it wanted peace in Sierra Leone and wanted nonAfricans out, which perhaps indicated that this was an African problem that required African solutions. Britain sent that to Obasanjo for further clarification, who sent it to Sule Lamido who wrote that we didn’t mean that. Britain had been a very good associate of Nigeria since independence and we can never disagree with Britain. Before Obasanjo sent the letter, he sent it to Ralph Uwechue to cross-check, which is wrong. Ideally Obasanjo should have sent it to Ralph Uwechue first, then asked the minister. He was asking Ralph Uwechue to vet a minister. It should have gone the other way. Ralph Uwechue wrote clearly that, no, what Nigeria said is self-explanatory. Africa wants to solve Africa’s problem and that is where it became Nigeria’s position. I am sure Sule Lamido is not on talking terms with Ambassador Ralph Uwechue up till today. There was no meeting ground. I am not sure they ever met to take decisions.30 This demonstrates the core argument regarding the destructive discontinuities in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. These dislocations potentially endanger the progress of a nation. Diplomatically, this raised concerns, given the damage such a distortion could do to the system. Moreover, it reveals a pattern that would otherwise not be easily apparent to observers. Nigeria under Obasanjo did not pursue an interest-oriented strategy as foreign policy. There seemed to be no defined path, either for the immediate present or for the future at that time. Chuks Akunna traces this to Obasanjo’s mindset on assumption of office in 1999.

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I will say that when Obasanjo was coming into power, having being in power from 1976 to 1979, he must have had a wrong mental picture of Nigeria. There were things he unmistakably must have seen that the Nigeria of 1999 was the same Nigeria he left in 1976. He seemed to have made a fatal mistake, because people had thought that, coming from prison, and the way he emerged, he was going to be a stooge of the North. But Obasanjo being sworn in began policies which were interpreted to be anti-North, and because of that, the powers-that-be in the North, those that drafted him into the presidential race, also did not mince words about the fact that they meant business. So from the dawn of his administration, it was from one crisis to another. Some consider it a very crucial period of political flirtation for Nigeria. At some point, people felt that Nigeria had come to the brink and at the verge of disintegration. But for those who have known Obasanjo, those who studied him from near and afar, he seems the picture of somebody who is a very fearless man – some say because of his childhood, and his experience in the military. He commanded the third marine commandos and he was responsible for accepting the surrender of the Biafrans on behalf of the Nigerian government. That will be the biggest honour for any general: to accept the symbol of surrender. Having said that, Obasanjo became very overbearing. He went into overdrive and in the process carved an image of a very fearless leader, who didn’t care whose ox was gored. But one very big mistake he made as a leader was that he never cared about posterity, about what the media said. Points of opinion never mattered to him. What mattered to him was what he felt was right at that moment. Today, he remains perhaps the most hated or misunderstood expresident of Nigeria. Sometimes, we wonder if those things now bother him. What took the greatest shine off Obasanjo was that he bided for tenure elongation, where he obviously underestimated the strength of the opposition and the media. And in drafting Yar’Adua into the presidential race is still considered as one of the greatest mistakes he made. Drafting a presidential candidate in less than two months and dumping off somebody you already knew. How mistaken he was! And from that time until today, for Nigeria, things have not remained the same.31

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Akunna’s censure of Obasanjo stems from the manner of his handover of power to Yar’Adua. He agrees with Adinoyi-Ojo’s view that Obasanjo’s micro-managing, through his characteristic trait of considering himself infallible, all-conquering and all-knowing, set Nigeria back: Nigeria had Yar’Adua, who hardly left Abuja. That also became a problem. We had international forums and he wouldn’t attend. So it was a problem of how to draw the line between excessive travelling and undertravelling. Obasanjo ought to have known better, being a well-travelled diplomat. There were some other things Obasanjo could be criticised for, especially what he didn’t do well in his foreign policy adventures – like Zimbabwe. It is a minus that even several years after he had gone, the crisis has not been solved. I thought that as head of state, he played a key role in the independence of Rhodesia, but he’s gone, and the crisis is still there. There are some positives too. In Sudan, today they are talking about a referendum, so I will say he scored an ‘A’ there, for Sudan to agree to negotiate with Southern Sudan. OK, let’s go for a referendum; it doesn’t come easy. I think that’s a plus. Then the crisis in the Congo, that’s also a plus for him. Even Liberia has a democracy; Sierra Leone, even Ivory Coast you talk about today, because we didn’t have a strong follow-up. That’s why we are having this problem now.32 Adinoyi-Ojo attributes the absence of a foreign policy blueprint to strategies driven by Obasanjo’s personality and interest, but Akunna aligns with Olusunle’s summation that Obasanjo was a success story given the multilayered foreign policy infrastructure he established. There were notable gains Akunna attributed to Obasanjo: He was successful in foreign policy. Obasanjo is a very intelligent person. If you read his books and if you see Obasanjo’s memos, he is a very thorough person. If you watch him debate, he is a very brilliant person, and don’t forget that he has a lot of friends around the world. Unfortunately, Nigerians did not really appreciate or feel the impact of his domestic policies in contrast to the world stage, particularly on the African continent where he really played a strong role in conflict resolution.33

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In contrast, Sola Atere perceives this pattern as a continuation of a tradition from independence, whereby the focus of Nigerian foreign policy has always been Afrocentric, and each government had maintained that. Because the foreign policy of Nigeria was geared towards the African region, that probably accounted for why Nigeria was very visible in the liberation struggle to the extent that Nigeria was made a frontline state despite the thousands of kilometres’ distance between Nigeria and Southern Africa and since then, each government that came in has always keyed into that policy. More so, that Afrocentric policy was played off highly during the Murtala– Obasanjo military administration. And you will know that the military administrations that came thereafter tried to identify with that particular administration as their selling point and they tried to key very much into that African-centred policy. President Ibrahim Babangida’s foreign affairs minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, even came up with this concentric principle of foreign policy, with Africa being the core and expanding from Africa to other regions. That tells you that Africa had always been the foreign policy focus of the Nigerian government. Of course, what will you expect, Obasanjo was part of the policy-making organ at the time the policy was actually put to a serious test. So you will expect that Obasanjo under a democratic administration will continue on that tempo. That was why Obasanjo was very visible on everything Africa and was one of the architects of the political aspect of Africa’s development becoming a settled matter. Independence had been granted all over the place, so the focus had to be on economic development and empowerment of the people of the continent. Economic diplomacy now played the major roles and that accounted for why when he came back and saw the scenario that Africa had retarded economically, he became one of the architects. Obasanjo, Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa and the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, formed NEPAD, essentially a socio-economic platform for fast tracking development in Africa. He played a major role, because they believed that conflict can equally impede their objectives. Obasanjo was very much involved in the resolution of the little conflicts that were evolving again to bring Africa back from the economic developmental programme

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and of course he was equally trying to use the ECOWAS integration principle. Though there had been the 1980 Lagos plan of action, which was economic-dominated, but the thing was not actually implemented the way it should have been. So it was NEPAD, championed by these three leaders that tried to bring about accelerated economic integration among African states and not losing sight of political stability because that is very essential. And up till now subsequent administrations have continued focusing very much on Africa’s stability and economic development.34 Atere considers Obasanjo a successful leader in terms of foreign policy decision-making, and also doubts anyone can justifiably label Obasanjo’s regime as a failure on this score. This hinged on the fact that Obasanjo’s personality has always been considered to be global in outlook rather than local. Obasanjo brought this international outlook to bear each time diplomacy was involved, whether as a military or democratically elected leader. That is why he was more involved in Darfur and Coˆte d’Ivoire when they were having all those problems. That probably accounted for why he travelled a lot. Outside Nigeria, some looked at it as if Nigeria was trying to impose itself. The truth is Obasanjo realised that Nigeria itself cannot stand alone, and he always had this anecdote that you cannot stand by and see the roof of your neighbour on fire and you pretend as if it is their own problem. If you are not careful, that fire will come and consume you. That has always been his approach; he thinks Nigeria may be perceived as a great nation, but like the people from my part of the country will say, a wealthy man in the midst of poverty-stricken millions is equally a poverty-stricken person. In any case, if you are rich and you are surrounded by hungrylooking people, your life is in danger, so you cannot even enjoy your wealth in the first instance. The first thing is to make sure that everybody is carried along one way or the other so the wealth can be distributed. It may not be equal, but let everybody feel the impact of the wealth. That is part of the propelling force of Obasanjo, that for Nigeria to actually achieve its desired status, the surrounding countries – and that means the African countries

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must be carried along by Nigeria. To him, God has placed Nigeria as a leader, and so Nigeria cannot look sideways and allow crises right, left and centre. This is because at the end of the day if there is a serious refugee problem, Nigeria too will go under. In essence Nigeria was very successful under Obasanjo in terms of international relations, in conflict resolution. There’s no doubt about that, because that has always been his strength.35 Obasanjo largely succeeded, and strategically too, according to Atere: In resolving conflicts, he was open to any style, but the bottom line is to ensure that that conflict does not manifest beyond. Contain it was always the main task, given the consequences of a conflict going out of control. Obasanjo has never pretended not to be an African, so he employed – if you like it – both the Western approach and the African approach. Obasanjo from the onset was an international figure, both in practice and in mind. Obasanjo was his own foreign minister, even as a military leader. For a military leader to go into the world of international affairs, meeting with democratically elected Western leaders, and for him to be acceptable means he has something upstairs to contribute. The man knew the direction and knew what he wanted to achieve, but of course he cannot be everywhere. So he has to appoint a foreign minister and give him proper briefing so that they can approach the international issues. Everybody knows in foreign relations, your domestic interest comes first.36 But how true was this regarding domestic interests? The process of comparing Obasanjo’s foreign gambits with those at the domestic level does not go well. It was the domestic anger at his performance which fuelled the protests against his foreign shuttles. The economic fortunes of Nigerians were in decline, much to the chagrin of the citizenry and the once-popular direction of his administration had become incoherent. Atere maintains that Nigerians should understand how the international political system operates – that there must always be shifts in emphasis between domestic and foreign policies. This, to him, was what Obasanjo took into account in reaching policy decisions to intervene in both the Sudan conflict and other conflicts across Africa.

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To Atere, therefore, Obasanjo did not necessarily deliberately abandon the home front. Any Nigerian leader must be involved in the Darfur issue, because there are so many Darfurees or Sudanese who are of Nigerian origin. Nigeria could not sit by and allow some other people to hijack the Sudan or Darfur problem, blow it out of proportion to an extent that they may not be able to handle it. And then there is the refugee problem. What Obasanjo did was to move in and try as much as possible to contain it. Nigeria has always been involved in the Sudan problem, even when John Garang was the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLA/SPLM) leader. Nigeria needed to prevent the crisis rather than causing a crisis. He tried his best, because even within that period, though they still had some problems because the president of that country was a little bit adamant. That was why he ran afoul of international law and the International Criminal Court started looking for him. Omar al-Bashir has in the long run received wise counsel. Obasanjo was effective in dealing with the Sudanese crisis, given what transpired at the AU summit held in Khartoum. The practice in all such summits had been for the host president to assume the chairmanship position of the AU, but Obasanjo championed the lobby in preventing al-Bashir [to be] right in the lion’s den, and this was a big blow to the man. Trying to make alBashir see reasons why certain things shouldn’t be done, especially as the Sudan crisis was becoming a serious wound to the African continent. The man was recalcitrant and so he had to be humiliated diplomatically to show that the other leaders didn’t approve his conduct. He saw the handwriting on the wall, and his government started attending with seriousness all the peace talks. In essence Obasanjo succeeded to a very large extent. Obasanjo 2 – you have an aging person, though very agile for his age and the intelligence was there. Post Obasanjo 1, there were so many crises all over the African continent and at the time he left, Nigeria was still basking in the euphoria of liberating Mozambique and Angola. At that time, he was just 40 years [old] compared with now, but he is still being used by the AU to solve all these small problems. Some said the election in 2007 damaged

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his integrity. Look at Kofi Anan, the former UN secretary-general and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki. How many times have you been hearing about them? They are not being heard much more than Obasanjo and you must realise the fact that some other leaders with big stature have evolved from Africa and were big players on the international scene. This job has to be distributed, as it cannot be Obasanjo alone. Obasanjo has always been involved in solving conflicts. That the 2007 elections damaged his credibility does not come into this, because this is conflict and not even a democratic issue. After 2007, that you just mentioned, that some people say damaged his credibility – is it not after that that he was asked to come and wade into the Congo thing? So what are they talking about?37 Atere, all the same, outlined Obasanjo’s shortcomings: Well, the thing is over the decades, when Nigeria moves into a place to resolve a conflict; it is like Nigeria goes to sleep. They don’t access that advantage. To the extent that you see some of these people that have been assisted working against Nigeria at international fora. Obasanjo’s regime continued at a high tempo, especially on the Afrocentric foreign policy and you saw what he did in Liberia and Sierra Leone. He was able to resolve that and installed democratic structures. What happened after that? Nigeria always goes back to sleep. When these people needed assistance in terms of economic development, which maybe the private sector in Nigeria could have come in to bridge the gap, you don’t see [anything happening]. Surprisingly, I cannot explain it; it has always been the problem, to the extent that some other people will come and start taking credits. America doesn’t do that. In Iraq, even after the Gulf War and even under the junior Bush, they took over the oil sector, reconstruction and everything. Nigeria doesn’t; it’s like we just help them to put out the flame when we need to be involved in reconstruction or subsequent development, Nigeria does not seem to get too much involved and some other people will move in and dominate and they will be rewriting the history, trying to take credit for it.38

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Remi Okunlola’s assessment of Obasanjo’s foreign policy is rooted in a twofold analysis, drawing from Bola Akinterinwa and Tunde Olusunle on the positive side, and then from Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo on the negative. Adinoyi-Ojo’s position is that foreign policy under Obasanjo did not arise as a result of the force of his intellectual conviction, and left confusion in its trail. To Okunlola, the Obasanjo era is based primarily on international perception of the character of the nation and government he inherited. Obasanjo’s foreign policy, in his first term, was founded on the imperative primarily to reshape Nigeria’s image around the world but also to exert Nigeria’s military and economic influence across Africa. By his second term, some confusion had set in and Nigeria’s foreign policy became somewhat less discernible.39 Similarly, Simon Kolawole, who absolutely agrees with Abdullahi Adamu’s assumptions that Obasanjo had tremendous achievements internationally, ranging from peacekeeping to conflict resolution, believes a fair assessment of Obasanjo’s foreign policy would reveal a robust, active and proactive foreign policy. It was largely successful as many conflicts and crises in the continent were resolved peacefully. And it was a plus that Obasanjo always got invited to big international events and mediation teams several times.40 Michael Kehinde counters such a positive assessment by insisting Obasanjo’s brand of foreign policy decision-making was characterised by general inconsistency! This Ministry of Integration and Cooperation in Africa was almost invisible throughout his tenure, and it is thus little wonder that the ministry was scrapped. As foreign policy is the extension of domestic policy, did Obasanjo’s foreign policy reflect the character of Nigeria’s domestic policy? Nigeria is touted as one of the best in multilateral peacekeeping missions, yet at home, Nigeria is as unstable as one can get. Furthermore, if foreign policy is guided by the national interest, Obasanjo was not so directed: the ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon remained a point of contestation. Obasanjo’s travelling diplomacy,

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which accounted for his spending more time on the ‘run’ than in actual governance, especially during his first term, was intended to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to Nigeria, but has been far from successful. Reasons for this are not far-fetched: political instability, economic instability, insecurity, corruption and bad governance.41 Antonia Obeya’s appraisal of Obasanjo’s performance also suggests dashed hopes: Obasanjo had a good one when he first came on board, the country was quite hopeful in 1999 and the expectations were quite very high and it is quite disappointing that he wasn’t able to fulfil what was expected of him. His pursuit of a third term agenda just destroyed everything despite being able to get the debt relief, particularly the Paris Club. Achievements such as the debt cancellation, however, were blighted by the third term agenda. My initial thought was that Obasanjo did things right, Nigeria was no longer a pariah state, as many nations welcomed Nigeria back into the comity of nations. However, after a while, his foreign trips just became junky. After a while going to the United States, he couldn’t even see the president anymore because President Bush was tired of seeing him and he was not achieving anything. Many thought his shuttle was aimed at running away from problems or troubles at home.42

Discernible patterns/continuity There were discernible patterns in Obasanjo’s foreign policy exploits. This can be seen in answers given to direct questions on this issue. One example was on whether Obasanjo pandered to specific concerns such as local or international groups, or, rather, to peer pressure. Norbert Esenwah argues: He was very conscious of his image internationally. That was a key reason and he never really bothered about his perception locally which I thought was not proper. For me, a man should be revered at home first. It is on the basis of this reverence and credibility that you seek foreign recognition. But he had a knack for details.

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He read documents from cover to cover and criticised them. He read widely too. When you talk about success, you have to look at it from the Nigerian context. In Nigeria, how do you define success? We have the misfortune of not having leaders in the real sense of the word. You want to compare Obasanjo with whom? Perhaps Buhari would have been . . . if he had more time to stamp his authority on development. There is no basis for such comparison to leaders like Shagari, Babangida. Obasanjo stands out in the midst of other Nigerian leaders. Obasanjo has become the cut-off mark for Nigeria’s leadership.43 Abdullahi Adamu identified a pattern in Obasanjo’s policy regarding intervention, peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa: Sure. Obasanjo wanted Nigeria to be at the forefront of every issue concerning the African continent. He wanted Nigeria to be the driving force of the continent and never as a second fiddle. This included every intervention, peace-keeping and conflict resolution in the continent. Nigeria was exemplary in all from Liberia to Sierra Leone, Congo, NEPAD – you just name it.44 Comparing Obasanjo’s foreign policy decisions as a military leader and as a democratic leader is central to this research. As Tunde Adeniran explains: A military regime did not necessarily have a manifested foreign policy in the same direction. There is usually the tendency to look at Nigeria’s foreign policy decision making from two perspectives: the period under the military regime and that under the civilian period. What I have seen generally is that there seems to be some consistency in certain areas and also there have been some changes in some areas. This is in the area of our relationship with African countries, particularly the way we have been reacting to the issues of apartheid, issues of decolonisation and the period when SaroWiwa was killed. You see that our regimes then were very concerned. But whether civilian or military, the commitment was there and the emphasis was on liberation. We wanted to liberate

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other areas to join the liberation struggle, even though the input of what we contributed varied. What mattered most was that the input, even though varied, was more under the Murtala– Obasanjo regime than that under the Balewa. And of course we moved on from there to economic issues. We were changing from just wanting to be one country that wanted to collaborate with other countries on economic issues to that of a country that want to assert itself as a country. This manifested in two particular instances: the progressive crystallisation of our economic resources as a result of being a member of OPEC to that of asserting our sovereignty. The collaboration we effected at that time was informed by the perspective our leaders had at that time on what our foreign policy should be. In other words, our foreign policy should be used to protect our economic interest. At the same time, one would expect that that this would have been taken to the logical conclusion by ensuring that those economic policies that will militate against our sovereignty and self-assertion are pursued. We have not succeeded because [. . .] that is preventing Nigeria from becoming a dumping ground. Part of our foreign policy should have been to guarantee economic growth and development in such a way that some of the things we still import are produced locally. Moreover, we are talking about the local content now. This is long overdue. This ought to have taken place long ago. And even right now, there are certain opportunities we have not taken advantage off. The US came with this policy of what you call the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). We believe that it is better for us to take advantage of that than to wait until such a time to do some other things. In other words, our local entrepreneurs should have been encouraged to take advantage of such opportunity. One is the consistency that you have in the area of peacekeeping. We have been doing this in some African countries and even outside Africa. Nigeria has not only been advocating peace but also contributed to peacekeeping efforts all over. The aspect of it which I consider not too encouraging, which has not brought benefit which Nigeria could have derived from such policy, is the cost implication. This is unlike the United

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States. Whatever they invest in peace, they reap dividends. When you invest in a peace process you have to derive some benefits, especially when we go out to some of these areas, we invest heavily in terms of men and materials. At the same time, we believe that it is necessary for others to complement our efforts. In other words, there should be some other countries contributing – moreover those countries benefitting from the peace. Take the case of the US and European countries; there are areas where they would have been so helpful to us – say like our effort in Sudan. Sudan had consequences for them and so they should have contributed more than they did, even if it was in the transportation of our people there. Some of our forces, the air force, ought to have benefitted, even in equipment. At the same time there is also the possibility that at the end of the day, Sudan would provide some opportunity.45 The foreign policy thrust of administrations – defined on the basis of consistencies and inconsistencies between them and their policies, together with intellectual content – is difficult to evaluate. The question, however, is which of these administrations had done more in terms of foreign policy initiatives. Again, Adeniran offers some explanation: We started by being very cautious because Nigeria in the 1960s had not mastered the terrain. We were cautious because those in charge of foreign policy had limited knowledge of what was involved, and so were not able to make such impact. But subsequently the Murtala regime was quite promising in making a mark. I believe under the General Ibrahim Babangida administration we were able to achieve a lot simply because of the input at that time, especially experimenting with a number of issues. You know the ‘Concert of Medium Powers’ came about even though it was not sustained. But it drew attention and we were able to start something which people have not given thought to. This idea is what people call the Peace Corps, but is called the Technical Aids Corps (TAC). And the TAC shot up the image of Nigeria and enabled Nigeria to impact on some of the countries we interacted with. It is a major achievement in Nigeria’s foreign policy. If you look at other areas like peacekeeping and on our position on apartheid, you could see that

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the various administrations will share in whatever credit or blame that we are looking at. The peace initiative was far-reaching and that again is the period when the issue of economic diplomacy came to be. In the last administration and the one that followed, the Obasanjo regime also had a lot of opportunities. But what ought to have been achieved was not achieved for two reasons: one, I think, was the over-personalisation of policy in the process; the second is that some areas where opportunities came, in our characteristic haste, we did not really examine the areas’ ‘where and how’, for example, in our efforts to settle some of the crises. We did well in coming in, but we had to enter in order to prevent disaster. But our intervention should have been in such a way that we should not have drawn the lines by creating problems that will resurface in the future. The intellectual input was limited and that interpretation also created some problems. In other words, we did some firefighting without necessarily trying to create the type of environment that they lack, which in the long term would lead to total resolutions.46 A fundamental and potentially controversial policy was the arbitrary appointment of ministers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While many have criticised the quality of some of the appointments, others hold a differing view. Lancelot Anyanya offers rare insight into the issue: If I am in the position of voting on the screening, what I would ask myself is whether to vote to confirm an individual for ministerial appointment or not. I would say, ‘wait a minute; this individual has the qualifications to go to any portfolio available, from health to foreign affairs to defence. Do I find this man capable of bringing sufficient value to my constituents and to the entire country?’ That’s the way I would look at it. ‘Sir, Mr. President: we would like to have a clear idea as to where this individual is going.’ But once the individuals are screened for office, do not forget that practices and conventions in several countries differ. Once they are screened, the president is at liberty to deploy them as he deems fit. He can organise the office at the executive branch as he deems fit. In view of what our constitution provides for, I am very hesitant to run down any individual. At the end of the day, there are people who

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will tell you that an administration assumes the character of the president. If you bring in an individual who stops performing, the expectation of the president is that he has the right to drop that individual. So for an academic argument I will not pin down any foreign policy triumphs or flaws to the action or inaction of a single individual.47 The debate on the success or failure of the internal mechanisms of Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making under Obasanjo seems unending. When compared with others, there are some key challenges unique to his tenure. While some commentators contend that the situation can still be ideal in real-life situations, others maintained that Nigerian leaders, including Obasanjo, have not really striven to achieve significant improvements in foreign policy decision-making. There are fundamental reasons why this is so – not unconnected to Abdullahi Adamu’s revealing insights: There is room for improvement and this should be a joint task for all practitioners. I am only worried by the fact that most bureaucrats in the ministry see their role there not as an avenue to move the nation forward but as an avenue, or what you call a corridor, to see the world. There still needs to be a change in people’s mentality. I think the place still largely requires intellectual experts to rev up the tempo again to the heights of its 1970 status.48 Keshi reinforced this fact from a different perspective: The fundamentals of Nigerian foreign policy basically remain the same. What you see happening is that each leader comes with his own style. You may have an aggressive character like Obasanjo, and of course you know the role he played in the establishment of NEPAD. Some might just be laid back or quiet as a result of a number of issues. Yar’Adua’s major challenge was his health, so it was difficult for him to even travel, but he received virtually anybody who came into Nigeria and really endeavoured to spend time to discuss some of these issues. He himself really couldn’t step out, but guess what? Apart from the last visit he made to the US for the Middle East peace conference, Mubarak has not

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travelled for a long time. So when you do that, what therefore happens is that you strengthen the foreign policy mechanism to be strong and effective, so that they cover the fact that you are not present. If you are going to send the vice president (VP) to a meeting, you give him all the powers so that when you get there, this is not just our position, which is reflected in the brief written by the minister of foreign affairs, but that, look, I want you to aggressively fight for this position. So the VP, or whoever is the leader of the delegation, goes there with the full mandate. No leader or prime minister wants to go there, fight for a position and then the next day when you come back, your boss is not happy. In a particular case, one head of state had phoned his representative at a summit to say that they don’t like the way he spoke. The fundamentals of our foreign policy remain the same, but every leader comes with his style. No leader anywhere in the world has ever won an election based on putting foreign policy first. But the irony of it is that they now get into office and find out that an issue they never thought of, and they are less interested in, becomes the greatest challenge they have. So, invariably, they turn around and begin to show far more interest than they originally planned because the issues just keep coming. For a country like Nigeria everybody expects so much from a leader, notwithstanding the immense challenges. With the political impasse in Coˆte d’Ivoire, people were talking about an ECOWAS force, but these countries have no money to put in a force. They are looking up to Nigeria. The international community wants something to be done in Coˆte d’Ivoire and they are talking to Nigeria. The last time we met the President I told him that, ‘sir, you need to keep an eye on Sudan because of the possible implication of the referendum in a country like this.’ And why we need to do that is that government must be proactive and arm itself against people in this country, saying why don’t we have a referendum on whether we want to stay together or not. But again, I say to you our foreign policy is fairly robust, doing well, we have very good, young, competent officers doing their best. But only the president makes the decision, and whatever he decides we follow, and very often it is not too different from where we are. But we focus more on African issues and there is always

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that sentiment, such as when people object that we are not invited to the G20, they blame it on our foreign policy. I laugh; it has nothing to do with our foreign policy. Things are a little bit fair now: we are looking more at developmental issues and managing same and everybody is concerned. This is why they say we don’t have a foreign policy. Is it OK we are now in Darfur? We are helping the people of Darfur too. If the Darfur crisis ends peacefully and tomorrow a Nigerian goes to Darfur and wants to do business, and runs into some difficulties, Nigerians will say ‘oh, why were we even there and our country doesn’t even know what they were doing?’ They will say we just went there, wasted money and now we are not getting anything. Yes, they may be right, just as they point out we are not getting anything from Liberia, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Angola, Namibia etc. But this has nothing to do with our foreign policy. I start by saying to everybody who reads the fundamentals of our foreign policy: you won’t see where we put reciprocity. But we define this on a basis of certain issues. For example, we talked of the security of the West African sub-region, we talked of good neighbourliness, and we talked about peace. How could it affect us? If we had not arrested the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it could have been dangerous for Nigeria. Nigeria checkmated it. In fact, the first bulk of the increase in armed robbery and ammunition into this country was from Liberia as a result of the war. Charles Taylor had allowed arms to flow from Burkina Faso to Liberia and ECOMOG was blocking the roads. If ECOMOG blocks this border to prevent arms from coming here, now those who have collected arms and are waiting to cross, if they find out that they cannot go into this thing, they begin to use it and sell it. That was what happened, the bulk of the arms that the other groups started using came from the arms caches that they had before in that country. That is why they are heavily armed. So we say to our people that when we go to some of those countries, we went there to do this thing, we have achieved that.49 Compared to the insiders, the public group of interviewees were less at ease in contributing to the discourse on such an important issue like the discernible pattern of Nigeria’s foreign policy under Olusegun Obasanjo,

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especially with reference to intervention, peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa. Those who did, however, were candid. Michael Kehinde noted: This is the only plane where Obasanjo’s foreign policy showed some consistency and direction. Apparently given his role in the military and antecedents in peacekeeping operations as military personnel, Obasanjo pursued peacekeeping with uncommon vigour. This may actually be driven by his perceived international statesman status.50 Simon Kolawole is in agreement with Kehinde: after reflecting on the nature of the detailed debates involved in foreign policy decision-making, he concludes that Obasanjo’s timing in intervention, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution was indeed a ‘proactive and prompt response’.51

Collegial management/personalisation of foreign policy decision-making Nigerian leaders are notorious for their arbitrary breaches of official protocol. Due to clientelism and sycophancy, there has been no conscious effort to elevate the relationship between leadership and ‘followership’. The system continues to fail, while there is no attempt to conform to generally accepted standards of governance as there is a notable absence of collegial management in the operation of foreign policy. When this is in operation, there is a sort of aberration in its structure which is confusing to the discerning, given that what ought to have been collegial management has been replaced by the personalisation of policy-making. In Nigeria, it reached the stage whereby several ministers of foreign affairs under Obasanjo’s administration were openly referred to as nonentities. Ad’Obe Obe explains why: To know this, you may as well judge the policy by its purpose and its aims. Was it not vague? Obasanjo made no secret about it that he was his own foreign affairs minister. Indeed, there was no foreign affairs minister and no foreign policy under Obasanjo. If you are to consummate all the activities between Obasanjo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what could be deduced is lots of activities in the foreign scene. In essence, there was no foreign

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policy under Obasanjo. This was, if you like it, building on personal connections that were very important for him. The names were endless: Helmut Kohl, McNamara and others.52 There is no doubting that Obasanjo enjoyed tremendous goodwill from notable world leaders. He was a well-known international statesman, given his successes in foreign policy initiatives in the 1970s. As mentioned earlier, he belonged to key international groups such as the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), as well as the UN Group of Former Leaders, made up of the most charismatic leaders of the 1970s. But he got there first as a member of the EPG, mandated to visit Mandela in prison. The Commonwealth funded this group which Obasanjo led and helped him avoid the political Siberia Obasanjo was consigned to on handing over power in 1979. Besides Obasanjo’s successes in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola, there was a key factor that has not been taken into account in the foreign policy literature. According to Ad’Obe Obe: His was distinct because he was the only former head of state whose reputation was still intact. This was especially at a time most of his contemporary heads of state had been removed from power via coup d’e´tat rather than a peaceful transition. Fortunately for Obasanjo, there weren’t many African leaders in this category except him, and so Obasanjo stood out because the club of former leaders with credibility in Africa was an empty club. Obasanjo seemed to be the only former leader at that time with a measure of credibility. All the former leaders were pushed out by coups. They were either killed in the act or they have run to exile. So there was no former leader with a reputation intact.53 Obasanjo seized the opportunity of being the only member of an empty club as a launch pad for international statesmanship. He tidied up his act, taking into account the fact that his contacts internationally needed to be accessed. This worked perfectly, and was also useful while establishing a group made up of distinguished personalities such as Lady Chalker, Robert McNamara and the chief executive of Mercedes, who were chosen to help drive investments into Nigeria from 1999. However, this initiative unfortunately became an abysmal failure.

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Obasanjo enjoyed it as he had no other task to perform. Having personalised foreign policy in the absence of a collegial management bureaucracy, he carried on. The ministers of foreign affairs under him had no control, as they were mere appendages to Obasanjo’s whims and caprices. On the quality of Nigeria’s foreign affairs ministers, Ad’Obe Obe in a witty manner recounted: What I am trying to tell you is that you judge the quality of a policy by comparing it with the intentions. Now by purpose, what do we aim to achieve? But the whole thing is so vague. First of all, Obasanjo made no secret about it that he was his own foreign affairs minister. He had a foreign minister but still travelled abroad every following week. So what is foreign policy in this? When you add all the activities that took place under Obasanjo, then you will see that his brand of foreign policy does not add up as a real policy. All the activities on the foreign scene, especially his more than 390 trips outside Nigeria, were all about activities in the foreign scene and not a policy.54 But many have regarded his foreign exploits as global feats, despite his usurping of his foreign affairs ministers. Norbert Esenwah argues: You cannot divorce Obasanjo’s altruistic persona from his antecedent as a former soldier and a former military leader who as a general ended the Nigeria Civil War. That gave him the opportunity to project himself as a national hero. Beyond that, when he took over government after the death of General Murtala Mohammed, he still needed to project that image. In that light, he became a national leader. In going forward, in 1999 when he came in, he has always been a reluctant leader going by his antecedence and his relationship with military dictatorship. The reluctance is based on the fact that in two critical periods of Nigeria’s history when there was a vacuum, he was called upon to take over the saddle of leadership. He showed reluctance, but this will require psychologists to interpret why [there was] the reluctance or whether it was based on the fact that he never wanted or shied away from leadership. To that extent he could be categorised as one who

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wanted to put Nigeria first before anything. But at the end of second term, one is not very sure if he fitted strictly into that kind of categorisation. Obasanjo’s support as a major driver of foreign direct investment I thought was a good one, but how far he succeeded I do not know. But as a leader he gave so much support to driving investment promotion and even went further to set up an Honorary Presidential Advisory Council on Investment that was chaired by Baroness Lynda Chalker. Membership was drawn from international heavyweights. How far they succeeded I do not know. He was always ready to attend every forum that showcased Nigeria’s investment potentials. There was no interference. Everything was seamless.55 Esenwah shed more light on the controversial nature of Obasanjo’s personalisation of foreign policy and the absence of a collegial management. This focused on the notion that Obasanjo cowed his aides and ministers as a strategy to neuter any possible dissent. From my experience, Obasanjo as a human being had no problem with confronting dissenting opinions so long as they were properly marshalled and backed by facts. If you give him an argument backed with superior facts, the best he could do was back down without giving the impression that he capitulated. About the aides, based on the little experience I had, most of them wanted to be seen to be confronting him. Most of them sometimes couldn’t even back up what they were saying. Government cannot be run by hearsay. Consequently, Obasanjo knew that and exploited it. Most of them were just coming there to talk about themselves and what they will benefit from it. With that situation he found such discussions intolerable, so he ended up doing alone what ought to have been their jobs. Whereas if the aides were confident with their own opinions and knew the roadmap, perhaps they would have been able to hold their ground on issues that seems to disagree with Mr President’s point of view. Many of them knew nothing and had no good knowledge of the issues they were canvassing. This was because when you confronted him with ideas backed with facts he agreed. There was an absence of these kinds of ideas by most of the aides. There wasn’t any robustness of ideas due

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mainly to the ranka-dede mentality in the policy process. Everyone kowtowed to him. ‘Yes, sir, Yes, sir.’ There was no basis for this. If you were competent, you say ‘No, Sir, because of xyz.’ This was not an ideal situation. This was what led him to become a one-man riot squad.56 Esenwah assessed the strategy, in order to take a position on whether this tactic worked for Obasanjo, and concluded: That depends on the definition of success, because as president he depends on a lot of people and subordinates to get work done. But what quality, knowledge and assistance was he getting from the office of the vice president? None. So the man was just there drifting. The pattern was not discernible and the structure was fundamentally defective.57 Ideally, it is accepted practice all over the world that a leader is expected to change his team as soon as he discovers that his administration is not getting the required results. In Obasanjo’s case, why did he fail to change them? Esenwah offers an explanation: It is not only about the team. It is all about the problem conceptualisation and someone failing to put a proper structure in place to attain success. It comes back to one issue that has been very dear to my heart. In Nigeria, there are no proper definitions and distinctions of job boxes, right from the president down to the sweeper in the street. Let us define the office of the president. What are the requirements, terms of qualification and temperament and knowledge? Nobody has done this in Nigeria. We all have to sit down and define the work basis and description. Whoever aspires to this office must have these qualities and these should cover not only the president but all other office holders, vice president, senate president etc. The structure should be discernible to all so that every average person that gets to the position of power must be able to work.58 In reality, political succession has always been a problem in Nigeria, as its history reveals. There is a distinctive pattern of the

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perennial selection of the second-best to lead its multiethnic and heterogeneous society. Tunde Adeniran redirects the focus of the discourse to the matter of the usurpation of the duties of the ministers of foreign affairs, backing his argument with historical analysis. President Obasanjo was his own foreign minister. The foreign affairs ministers he had were not assertive; they were not really in charge. They carried messages. We never had foreign affairs ministers who could initiate and come out with programmes like people who had clear visions like Professor Bolaji Akinyemi [Concert of Medium Powers], General Ike Nwachukwu [economic diplomacy] etc. In Obasanjo’s second term, it was difficult to really say how strong the machinery was; I do not believe there was much opportunity for its impact to be felt because, like I said, much of the power resided in the president and in the person who was in charge [Obasanjo]. My personal view is that because of his imperial nature, many people who would have been able to assert themselves got cowed in one way or the other and so he eventually took over those functions. His domineering presence also created problems for those who could have done far better. But one thing you have to concede to him was that he respected those who put their foot down and asserted themselves. He was also open to suggestions and ideas, and once he saw that you have a superior argument or something that could help him achieve his goal particularly, he went along with it. But then in many areas, this was absent. I can say from personal experience that in the educational sector when the idea of basic education came in, he endorsed it and followed it.59 The struggle between intellectuals and sycophants within and around the corridors of power under Obasanjo’s administration was real and not imagined, as Adeniran further reveals: I think the difference between Obasanjo’s administration and General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime was that IBB loved intellectuals and was ready to learn. He himself was a solid man and more solid intellectually than people knew. From my position

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as a member of the political bureau and as director of Mass Mobilisation for Self Reliance, Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), I was able to know the type of man he was and the type of person he is. But with Obasanjo, he had this problem of assuming that he had answers to everything. But if you have the courage to make your case, he could be receptive to ideas. My suspicion is that in most cases when you see him running all the show is that people cave in, allow him to take over in all ways. Obasanjo’s administration never had any semblance of collegial management bureaucracy in the management of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Oh no!!! It was not a collegial management, it was ‘individual-think’. And whatever we see as achievement was input from some sectors like finance to the economy. He dominated everything.60 Lancelot Anyanya, however, disagrees with Adeniran: I disagree with these statements that Obasanjo operated more or less like a dictator in the handling of Nigeria’s foreign policy. We are adults enough to understand at least from the public domain of what went on. There is no doubt that foreign policy is led by the character, the temperament and personality of the leader. That is easy to appreciate. So, to the extent that Obasanjo had a military background that would have influenced his temperament, that would have influenced his outlook and that would have influenced the style of his policy choice. I do agree. Did he take decisions as a result of his being in the military? We must make a distinction here between the personality style of individual leaders and the framework for decision making. Those two things play a very critical role in shaping the foreign policy choices that every nation makes. But don’t forget that out of office Obasanjo actively engaged in foreign policy advocacy in the continent. He had the African leadership foundation which kept him busy even after his days in office as a military leader. Clearly, you would have found that this was an individual leader that had clear thoughts, clear ideas on roles Nigeria and other African countries should play with regard to conflict resolutions in the continent. So can you dismiss that from his view and construct of

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what Nigerian foreign policy should look like? No. I think it is the same thing all over the world. You find even in the United States, where we borrowed our current style of government, you find that a Republican government goes with a particular style of foreign policy issues and a Democrat government goes with a particular style on issues. But again, it doesn’t take away the fact that the fundamental aspects of foreign policy are all virtually the same.61 Anyanya raises a rhetorical question and, at the same time, lines up reasons for the shortcomings in Nigeria’s foreign policy decisionmaking. What are the sentiments and feelings of the people at a particular time? Don’t forget that he came into power this time around not as a military leader but as a democratically elected leader. So for any decision he took he would require some funding to back it up and resources to back it up. As a democratically elected leader, are you going to work without this? Even your foreign trips have to be budgeted for by the National Assembly. I think the mistake had been made in 1999 when government was being formed. Nigeria was coming out of the wood after several years. As a result, resources were not fully deployed; the kind of robust foreign policy, the kind of activities threshold that people would have loved to see in terms of vibrancy that should happen in different organs of government to create the consensus for foreign policy as you would see in a matured democracy – you obviously wouldn’t have expected that from an emerging democracy. It was a ‘returnee’ democracy as it were.62 Anyanya also argued that government is a continuum everywhere in the world: Government is a committed institution and thus a continuum. We already had troops in Liberia and so you are not going to say you won’t take a decision on that because the policy was not started by you. You have been sworn in and you have to take decisions. Everyday signals came in, soldiers either died or people

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lost their lives. You just have to authorise executions and implementations, such as responding to troop expenditure in Liberia and any other theatre where we are. These are things that cannot wait for all the necessary structures to evaluate. Put yourself in his shoes: if you are the commander-in-chief you need to make some contingency expenditure. And you have your chief of army staff or defence staff walk in and tell you that unless we deploy logistics or equipment worth more than five million dollars, we will lose troops. Are you going to say wait until I go through due process? These are some of the issues that I think from my own humble position that the president has to deal with which people must empathise with and show appreciation for.63 Though understandable, how conceivable was this in practice? Could it be that Obasanjo had a profound understanding of these processes and so used it to his advantage by dominating his appointees? Anyanya again answers: I think if you ask Obasanjo if he dominated his foreign policy terrain or not, even if he did so, I am sure he would not use those same words. There were media insinuations that Obasanjo was his own foreign minister. But don’t forget that the number one agent for foreign policy for every nation is the president. So ministers are appointed to help the president, assist in executing his functions in different respects. Presidents come with their natural strengths. Obasanjo, being a former head of state and post-office someone who was active in foreign policy, may have come with a slightly stronger hand when it came to foreign policy issues – maybe with a more coherent understanding of the issues and more concrete ideas on what needs to be done. Dominance in the foreign policy terrain, I would say ‘yes’. But don’t forget that foreign ministers were appointed at the pleasure of Mr President to help him execute assignments. If you ask those ministers whether they felt the President was too dominant, again that would be a different ball game. But my attitude is that if a man appoints me as a foreign policy advisor or foreign affairs minister, my understanding is that I am just here to help. I cannot complain when the man becomes very visible and very active.64

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This correlates with answers given by Sule Lamido, Nigeria’s erstwhile minister of foreign affairs, who served in that capacity during Obasanjo’s first term under democratic rule: I was there to serve and help fashion out a direction as dictated by President Obasanjo. He was the one that had the mandate and the one who also had the constitutional role to appoint. Thus the master must dictate the tone. So the role of every minister was to help achieve a collective goal. The president also has the sole prerogative to take advice from any quarter he so chooses. This does not hinder the activities of the ministry or minister who anyway is there to complement the vision of the president. It is absolutely wrong for any minister to overstep his bound. A good illustration of the consequences of overstepping one’s brief is Vice President Atiku Abubakar. He was ambitious and ready to sacrifice and bend the rules of government for his selfish and blind ambition.65 Anyanya continues: Secretary Clinton, for instance, was a strong character in her own right but it didn’t stop the administration from pushing in Vice President Biden to pay unscheduled visits to Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It doesn’t stop President Obama from popping up here and there. I think the entire gambit of foreign policy for a country with significant population like Nigeria would even be executed through a certain traditional means alone. But if we are doing an academic, analysis, on the leadership style of leaders and foreign policy, I will agree with you that Obasanjo was very active, he did a lot of travelling pursuant to his foreign policy agenda. Don’t forget that there was a lot of reason for that at the time. And the good thing about that was that Nigeria was coming out of many years of military rule and also with the toga of a pariah state. And you needed a bit of more fire power in the foreign policy arena at least to reintegrate the country.66 This author disagrees with this, and elucidates the inadequacy of the above portrayal of Senator Hillary Clinton. What largely occurs in the West is both the presidents and their foreign affairs ministers finding

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congruence in decision-making. This has been absent in Nigeria, due mainly to the prevalence of appointees who mostly pander to the president’s mindset on matters of state. This contrasts with norms where appointments to certain offices are supposed to be based on precedents. For this reason the veracity of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined under Obasanjo. When people elect a president, they do so not necessarily because he is the best individual in that country. Rather, they are elected on the basis of capability, out of a select group of candidates who have offered themselves. It is equally true that part of the collective mandate includes the appointment of ministers to aid in the different functions of governance. This book hypothesises that in foreign policy arena, the critical function of governance is crucial to the very existence of the modern state, and is not a matter that any president or any sovereign should take lightly. Yes, there may be issues regarding the specific choice of candidates to that department, but a leader should realise that his own assessment is subject to the stability of his government because, in the final analysis, the president or the sovereign is liable for the success or failure of governance. It is thus imperative that when the president makes those choices, he chooses those he deems best able to attain not only his vision but also the national one, as, frequently, personal vision may cloud national vision. This is why there has to be congruence in foreign policy decision-making and those appointed should bring a minimum standard to bear. People nominated to the office of foreign affairs must have their portfolio scrutinised, so that they can be appraised on the basis of performance. It is regrettable that in Nigeria this is not the case. It is for this reason that US presidents have always been pragmatic regarding the foreign policy decision-making process. There is the ongoing debate that in the US, every agency and every interest are in most cases consulted, given that members of the process have his or her integrity at stake. This is the reason why the outcome of most crises are to a large extent positive. The processes leading to foreign policy and diplomatic intervention should involve meetings, analysis and evaluations. It is out of place for any responsible government to make decisions without consultation. Arbitrary personalisation of foreign policy decisions by Obasanjo is linked to why Bakassi was ceded without consultation. This generated uproar in Nigeria to the extent that it became one of the grounds the

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National Assembly listed for impeaching Obasanjo. He was accused of not consulting with the people of Bakassi, or even NASS before that, but acting in a unilateral matter. This is in addition to a number of complaints from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the fact that they were being excluded from that decision process. Another example was when Obasanjo was on a state visit to the US for what many thought was going to be a continuation of the diplomatic negotiation on the issue, but, instead, morphed into the Greentree Agreement. Most frustrating to many was that the area was ceded in spite of the fact that military boots were still on ground. Lancelot Anyanya had a different view: The way government is run: I am not sure I will agree to that and my reasons are simple. Decision-making takes place in a variety of ways. It may not necessarily follow the patterns of formal meetings. Presidents reserve the right to consult by the means they choose. Leaders have all the rights. Even if they want to bring in extra means like clairvoyance, that’s fine. But at the end of the day it really depends on what school of thought you subscribe to. Whilst we can learn a lot from history, we must learn in a very surgical way, we must be contextually correct if using the lessons of history for our contemporary exigencies or challenges. I don’t think the information on Bakassi is correct. Let me explain how it works. The soldier with boots on the ground is an instrument of foreign policy. The military leadership may have the privilege to make input. I also know from my modest military experience that the military has the means to make input when called for specifically or if they feel that they have a strong view on an issue or feel that this could have implications or ramifications that could impact on the military. I know that happens. If everyone that is within our foreign policy architecture whether defence, foreign affairs – you name it – says that Obasanjo went to sign the agreement without consulting them, I would find it extremely hard to believe. I tell you why. I do know that in certain circles there is a tendency by people to disown decisions that they were part of, especially when they know that decision has not gone well. I also know that presidents and leaders at that level are elected to make difficult decisions. I don’t think anyone compelled Obasanjo

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to sign an agreement. No one can. He was a leader elected as a president to interpret what constitutes our national interest and if in his judgement, considering all factors including national interest as at that time, he would sign the Greentree Agreement on the basis of the facts available to him. Some of these may not have been available to some of his advisers. I think that is why he was elected as a president. That’s why I said when we elect a man as president we ascribe to him certain measures and the capacity to interpret what is best for the aggregate of our national interest. So I imagine that in any case in our constitution for the Greentree Agreement to have the full force of law in Nigeria it must be ratified by the Senate. Did they not ratify the Greentree Agreement?67 It was an irony that, despite threats of impeachment, the NASS would eventually ratify the Greentree Agreement. This is notwithstanding the fact that they hold the constitutional power to deprive the presidential decision of the necessary legitimacy provided by their ratification. But ratification by the NASS has been observed more in the breach. There were several instances where troops were deployed internally without ratification, especially in Ondo, where they were used to intimidate the opposition. Most pro-government personnel are quick to explain what they term ‘a misconception’ by arguing that it is not every deployment that requires ratification by the NASS. It is further argued that there are caveats spelt out in the constitution which allow the president, as commander-in-chief, to take decisions for public safety, national defence and security. These things are clear, but Nigeria is a nation of laws, and every aspect of its national life should be governed by laws, including its foreign policy. Anyanya further explains: Unfortunately, not many NASS members have been courageous enough to say to the president, ‘We have this reservation on this foreign policy choice or action. Mr President is about to commit our young men or women in harm’s way.’ Ultimately, however, there is never a time where the whole nation speaks with one voice on one matter and that is the essence of consensus building. It is easy to imagine that, at the time, only President Obasanjo felt that

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Nigeria should sign the Greentree Agreement. But the actions of leaders do come under public scrutiny. At the time leaders make decisions, they may look right or look wrong but history often takes a different viewpoint. A case in point, for example, is President Carter’s decision in the hostage crisis in Iran, which some felt cost him re-election. But didn’t President Reagan also have his own foreign policy blunders, like the Contragate scandal?68 These were foreign policy flaws ascribable to both administrations. In foreign policy, what is crucial for modern states like Nigeria is the principal preoccupation of the citizenry in deciding who governs and in deciding whom to elect as president. Those are the things political leaders ought to consider seriously, in shaping consensus around a particular individual who is to drive Nigeria’s foreign policy. The person and his team must be intellectually sound, with a capacity to process a wealth of information thrown at them in crisis. The president listens to his technical team, looks at possible policy choices and then moderates those decisions in a way which is popularly acceptable. These pathways were all absent under Obasanjo, and some have claimed that this may have been due to his intemperate nature. Lancelot Anyanya explains why this can be an effective tool in foreign policy process. ‘At the end of the day there will never be a time when all the interest groups and segment of the society agree on what constitutes a national interest. The primary driver ideally of foreign policy direction is the president.’69 A further rationalisation is offered by Abdullahi Adamu: In his own right, he was an expert in foreign policy given his pedigree as a military leader in the 1970s. Everyone is familiar with what foreign policy was in the 1970s at the time of liberation movements in Southern Africa. But that is not the reason for his being assertive in the foreign policy turf. He was assertive and did truly breathe heavily on his foreign ministers and aides for one crucial reason – the bulk of blame or success ends with him. Every leader is restive until there are results on the table, especially when there are herculean problems on the table. And so getting the required answers may require driving aides to the hilt or breaking

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point. This is what many presume to be autocratic. If the administration fails, it won’t be blamed on the foreign minister but on Obasanjo. So therefore it is not wrong to conclude that whoever pays the piper must dictate the tune. I have not seen a situation where a foreign affairs minister can single-handedly tackle a bellicose nation without the input of his boss, the president. The minister can brief the president, but the only person who can order deployment is the president and not vice-versa.70 If this is the case, then why appoint ministers and how important is the key issue of teamwork? The benefits of teamwork diminish whatever gain there is in a personalised foreign policy decision-making process. Many agree with this school of thought, that the personalisation of foreign policy machinery by Obasanjo was a blot on foreign policy development in Nigeria. The normal course of action would have been to build an institution, so that if Obasanjo exited, the institution would still be able to carry on consolidating his achievements. However, with the exit of Obasanjo and the inauguration of Yar’Adua, Nigeria’s foreign policy became incoherent. This, then, was a major weakness of his approach when he was there: because he had the personality and the exposure and the connections, he was able to achieve his objectives; but the moment he left, Nigeria went down again, showing that Obasanjo and past leaders failed to build institutions. Everyone knows that an individual will not be available forever. This is in contrast to the ideal theoretical situation where institutions are built and leaders use the advantage of their exposure, their contacts and experience to strengthen institutions. In such a situation, when the leader exits, the larger society does not suffer. Adeolu Akande subscribes to this school of thought, and insists that the modus operandi adopted by Obasanjo was deliberate, even though he knew it was a fruitless exercise. According to Akande, the gambit was the result of the unintended consequences of Obasanjo’s style of leadership: that he intended that with his exit, Nigeria’s foreign policy would go down. Obasanjo pursued an agenda of elongation, which at some point he never imagined himself out of power. He probably thought he

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would be there for a longer period. If he would be there forever as president, he wouldn’t need to build institutions to maintain that profile. So the problem was that at some point, he thought he would be there for a longer time than the constitution allowed and that probably explained why he didn’t build institutions. This is because what happened in foreign policy also happened in so many other aspects of governance when he was there. His leadership style helped us to get those achievements within eight years, but immediately he exited, we had gone back to almost where we were in 1999, which is a challenge.71 But was Obasanjo’s leadership style ideal for a country like Nigeria, given its inherent complexity? Akande countered: No, I won’t say that. Any leadership style that is worthwhile has to be one that is sustainable, whose policies, initiatives, programmes can be sustained, so that you can see those policies living to the achievement of its goals and the consolidation of those goals. But if you personalise, that is not an attribute. The moment the leader who has that charisma exits, then you don’t have an institution that would continue the good work. If you fail to build an institution, it gets back to you so quickly and I think part of the problem in Nigeria’s political setting is clearly a fallout of Obasanjo’s leadership style. After ten years of democracy, we should not be having this kind of succession crisis. Because of his personalised system of governance – where he thought he could pick his own successors; he could reformulate; he could create the party in his own image; he could amend the constitution to serve his own whims and caprices etc. At the end of the day, most of the issues we thought had been settled by the time he was there, came back to us and we are just facing all the issues all over again, so that is a failure of building institutions to help the society to stand the test of time.72 The issue of building institutions is debatable. The missing ingredient in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is leadership. A definition of the objectives of a foreign ministry is clear. Nigeria’s foreign policy over time has been centred on Africa, but to determine in specific terms

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what Nigeria set out to achieve depends on the leader. That Nigeria’s foreign policy is Afrocentric has been an accepted fact since independence, but this notion is unhelpful as most leaders, Obasanjo included, have been unable at critical points to identify which parts to emphasise and which to downplay. Nigeria’s foreign policy history has also depended on the charisma, the exposure, the vision of those who come in and handle the ministry, as well as how the institution itself has been built over time: this is in terms of the capacity of the personnel, the institutional arrangements and the strength of the legislature to formulate foreign policy and foreign programmes. Those institutions are mostly not there, and when existent are often weak. The foreign civil service reflects more of the Nigerian civil service, which has emphasised capacity-building, has a very high turnover of experienced staff and has always facing the problem of being underresourced. When all these issues are aggregated, one discovers that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not been able to play the pivotal role it ought to have. If the ministry were developed fully, it would become irrelevant who the minister was, because the institution would be strong enough to guide the minister. Obasanjo relied solely on his charisma, his contacts and his experience, and so thought he could galvanise the ministry to work alongside him. However, when he left, in haste he foisted on the ministry an incapable successor in the person of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua who, to the disappointment of many, upon his visit to the US, admitted it was his first. That moment negatively impacted on the credibility of the ministry and the administration in projecting Nigeria’s foreign policy. Previous foreign ministers were lawyers in a country where there are hundreds of enlightened diplomats who can fill the gap and assist the government in achieving its foreign policy objectives. No one has been able to pinpoint what the foreign policy focus of Nigeria is. There is an evident disconnect, and it is clearly not working as it should. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs a lot of restructuring; it needs to be built into an institution, so that whether you have a president who has been to the US or not, Nigerian foreign policy will not suffer. There is a need to build capacity in the ministry so that, irrespective of who is president or minister, the ministry can function. The ministry also needs resourcing. One intermittently hears how Nigerian missions abroad run into

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financial crises, owing salaries to staff and local contractors. There cannot be a seamless foreign policy mechanism when staff are not paid their wages. These are some of the challenges that the government will need to face, and they are compounded when you now have leaders without exposure to Foreign Service. There is also the contention that it has been difficult to separate the office of the president from that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because the majority of the work lands on the president’s table. The success or otherwise of his foreign policy depends on the president, rather than the foreign ministry. There has been a consistent hijacking of foreign affairs’ functions and thus the absence of coherent policy. By its nomenclature, both offices are distinct and separate. The problems, therefore, are with the personalities. Adeolu Akande expands on this: Well, it is true, but in established democracies, in established societies, regardless of who becomes the American president, foreign policy is a solid issue of governance and they have institutions. They have the ministry, they have the council of foreign affairs, and they have the CIA. The armed forces are also an instrument of foreign policy and they have the economic councils. By the time all these people do their jobs, the president will have a solid background on which to base his decisions. When the foreign policy institution is weak, a weak leader worsens it, like the case of Nigeria. For instance, before Obasanjo, Nigeria’s rating was down, but in his eight years, the rating went up; Yar’Adua came and we were back there. So that simply shows that there is no institution that can checkmate the weaknesses of the president impacting negatively. The third process which is missing is the institution. Foreign policy has become a routine affair, like the way they govern Niger-Delta or Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Ministry or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There is nothing fundamental coming out of the foreign ministry in Nigeria. So you don’t even know what purpose our foreign policy is there to serve. Is it to promote democracy? Is it to promote economic development? Is it to promote the president himself? Is it to promote Africa? It is not defined, so we don’t even know where we are.73

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Akande’s postulation is consistent with the argument of this book: that collegial management in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making is missing. But Keshi contends: No, I won’t say there is no collegial management. You also need to always bear in mind that over the years, we have had the fundamentals of our foreign policy clearly laid out. When you say Nigeria has no foreign policy, what exactly are you saying? Look, every country has a foreign policy, which is simply a set of objectives they want to achieve. In the 60s we came out with a set of objectives. If you look at it, we have virtually achieved all those objectives. Yes there has not been that intellectual depth in foreign policy decision making. It is not only in foreign policy, it permeates the entire federation. It is worse at the university level. The system has not thrown up new intellectuals to help free Nigeria from this cycle. I am asked to do a programme and I say to myself I need to talk to somebody on international affairs and suddenly I realise that I have no idea of where to get an expert on international affairs from any university in Nigeria. In the 70s, they were available. This was because you heard their voices in the Daily Times. Today, just take any of our newspapers and magazines and you will not see any voice from the universities. Then when you now go to the university itself and then you meet these so-called experts, you will be very disappointed. You guys surprise me: in 2010 you are still talking of the neo-colonialism writing and blaming everything on the neo-colonial state? This is a phase that has passed and you can attribute this to the breakdown of our educational system. Our educational system has broken down completely and bear in mind that between the 70s and the early part of this century, a number of Nigerian intellectuals left this country. That vacuum has not been filled up, for a long time. In almost all our universities, you can count the number of PhDs; everybody lecturing there were Masters or Bachelor degree holders. This was the case until the university system was introduced to reforms. Now, if you don’t have a PhD, you cannot lecture and many of them are now trying to go back to school. That is the point I am

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making. So whatever you say in relationship to the fact that there is no more intellectual breadth in Nigeria’s foreign policy is correct. When Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria’s former foreign affairs minister came up with the Concert of Medium Power and then the theory that silence should be a policy over Libya, he was vehemently challenged by the radical progressives and left wings of Nigeria. They gave Akinyemi a headache because Akinyemi was seen as capitalist oriented and western oriented as against the socialists. Even the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) does not provide leverage. I sit down with the NIIA people and they are so plebeian, their analysis is so watery. They just give you the answer; they don’t give you that intellectual research. It’s like they just read a couple of newspapers and bring everything they’ve read in the newspapers into it. But the foreign policy decision-making structure and process is still there. By and large the foreign ministry still formulates the policies, they analyse and make recommendations, and the presidency still takes the decision. The only thing we don’t have is that foreign policy does not occupy its rightful place. It is not one of the core issues. For example, virtually every issue in this country, including security and internal affairs, goes to the Federal Executive Council. As a permanent secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I tried to force foreign policy issues to be debated by getting some memos to the council. It was like this was for our information, so they left foreign policy issues to foreign affairs and the president, forgetting that in those days, that is especially the 70s and 80s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also to some extent in charge of some issues abroad, such as managing immigration, providing advice on the economy and providing economic reports. But as other ministries came of age, they fought to take away some of these functions, including trade negotiations.74 The issue that continuously comes up in this discourse is the search for the reason why Obasanjo opted for personalisation rather than collegial management in his foreign policy pursuits. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo looked at it from a psychological perspective and concluded that:

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Obasanjo is an autocrat, he was a dictator. Very few people could stand up to him, especially in Nigeria, because government is the dominant player in our lives. People needed a job; a job conferred a lot of importance. It is also the quickest means to material improvement. He knew that and he capitalised on that to intimidate people, knowing that very few people could say no to him. Only a few could say ‘take your job, get out of here’. So that’s the kind of thing that happened. Obasanjo wants to dominate his environment; he wants to be in control. Obasanjo can’t be a passenger; he has to be in the driver’s seat. There was a time Pat Utomi coined a word ‘Kabiyesi-democracy’ [that is monarchical democracy]. That is what we were practising and it’s true. Obasanjo is your typical African monarch; everything flows from him down, not the other way round. He had to be in charge. I heard of people who took memos to him and the memo would be successful if you start with what they call the ‘Abacha-memo style’ – the ego massaging, how wonderfully he’s been doing, how he has come to save this country called Nigeria. And whatever idea you are bringing in, you have to tie it to something that he had done. ‘Your Excellency, you recall that on a certain occasion you made mention of this, and it is in line with this that I am bringing this idea.’ Even if he had nothing to do with it, you have to tie it to him as the originator of this marvellous idea that you are bringing forward. That’s the only thing that appeals to him. I know of somebody who sent a memo to him, that didn’t say that, didn’t do the ego massage thing and the thing was sent back. When he was told, he rewrote it, put all those things there and Obasanjo approved. So he is not a great leader. When I say this people say ‘you have problem with him, that’s why’. I used to admire him greatly and I thought we were together. I am like a boy to him. So I thought he was going to do a wonderful job. I thought he had the answers to most of our problems, but I discovered that we overrated him. He wasn’t organised, he didn’t believe in planning, blueprints, system – he was just driving everything by the force of his personality, that’s what I discovered.75 The prevalence of ‘personalisation’ of foreign policy by Obasanjo has had severe consequences. There was a lack of coherence in policies;

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it was not particularly clear what Nigeria stood for except that cliche´ of Africa being the centrepiece of its foreign policy. Even when Nigeria began taking a dominant role in peacekeeping, that was not necessarily reflected in its policy. There was no particular document tying it together, especially its objectives. One factor that limits Nigeria’s foreign policy is the lack of an appropriate response to calamities in the African global south. Nigeria under Obasanjo was only content to play a leadership role in Africa; Obasanjo did not extend this role to embrace the entire African diaspora, which would include nations like Haiti. Obasanjo failed to grasp the whole picture: everything was disjointed and without coherence because he did not articulate his foreign policy or clearly state his aims and objectives, nor how to achieve the maximum benefits from them. It is commonplace for many to reject the above conjectures by contending that the gains Nigeria made on debt cancellation under Obasanjo were due to his handling of foreign policy decision-making. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo attempted to determine whether such an argument is rational: Of course there will be occasional successes, fine. He earned Nigeria debt relief but you also know that Obasanjo said once that he had gone all over the world in search of foreign investment. He said it publicly, that it hadn’t come. He said it out of frustration. Again, his other fundamental error is that he thought that the solution to the Nigerian problem was out there, so he did not spend enough time in Nigeria to make sure that he got the place in order before asking outsiders to help in embellishing it. That was a fundamental error. He made 400 trips in the eight years he spent in office and some of them, more than half of those trips, were just aimless, and they had no objectives, nothing. One ridiculous one was when Obasanjo visited a Japanese prime minister and the man was about to leave office. And the man said ‘thank you, you are the only world leader who has come to greet me to say good-bye to me’. So it was an aimless tour of the world.76 Chiemeka Ozoemena agrees that Obasanjo’s autocratic nature arose as a result of his military background and that this affected his governance.

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He did not understand the tenets of good governance and was largely considered to be a pseudodemocrat. He knew everything and understood the philosophy of all leaders. This knows-all attitude did not give room for others to make informed contributions to foreign relations issues. There was the tendency to go ad hoc on foreign relations issues and as a result decisions were made at the state house before the foreign ministry could digest their ramifications.77 Olusunle defers, basing his argument on the existing structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: You will recall that the structure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is such that after the minister, the director and deputy director, the permanent secretary, every region in the ministry has a full package of undersecretaries. So you will find there is a full undersecretary, an office of the undersecretary of South Africa, Asia and so on. I believe that they were not just artificial creations; I think a lot of the paperwork goes on there to guide the president in foreign policy directions.78 But Olusunle does not deny that majority of these functionaries and structures which exist in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are idle and based on insider information and that the crucial details of an intellectual contribution are not there. I don’t think too many decisions were taken unilaterally. Rather, I think a lot of input came from even beyond, in a lot of reaching out. The office of the National Security Adviser is a major point for gathering information for the government. Don’t forget that as an extension of our foreign affairs department, we have a department of the Nigerian Intelligence Agency, which also generates some data in the system. So I believe that, yes, the President had his own temperament, but I don’t think it was as much so as to disable other government functionaries from functioning. If you look at it from another perspective, how come that the administration, irrespective of its constraints, was also credited with some of the successes that are still being carried forward, some of the reforms

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and some of the developments that are still being carried out today?79 Bola Akinterinwa takes issue with such a view: I don’t agree with that. I was personal adviser to Minister of Foreign Affairs Olu Adeniji. I was also special adviser to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ojo Maduekwe. So I was two times a special adviser. I was also special adviser to the Minister of the Interior. So it is not a question of theorising, I knew what was involved. You see, it is not just the foreign ministers that are doing all these things. The ministry people, the careerists, the directors there, they also came up with many ideas that were good. So it is not just always a one-man show, but approaches differ.80 Was it actually the case that Obasanjo’s robust activities in the foreign scene were the result of collegial management? This is debatable, although Akinterinwa portrays a convergence between the office of the president, the minister of foreign affairs and government bureaucracy. If there was a collegial management, why was it that the offices and their functionaries never showed any synergy in the foreign policy decisionmaking process? Bolaji Akinyemi volunteers reasons: I will agree that there’s no head of state of a developing country that would have enough time to think through the complexities of foreign affairs. The domestic affairs will have taken almost all his time. And that’s why you must have in the ministry somebody who knows his left from his right; somebody whom you trust and you then give him or her a chance. Obviously policies must be cleared with the head of state, but let the minister be the initiator. Of course the minister must persuade the president and if the president feels uncomfortable, then you change your minister. But to take over that portfolio is to land Nigeria in a wonderland foreign policy posture.81 However, all these arguments are outweighed by the truth that Obasanjo as a president could motivate everybody to work. He had the ability because he was a forceful leader. He knew what he wanted. He was a

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retired military general and, by his military training, was proactive. He expected that when he gave orders, they would be carried out – a fundamental difference between him and other leaders. His was a forceful personality; though he was meek, he knew exactly what he wanted and how he could get it. The issue of collegial management and the personalisation of foreign policy machinery generated stimulating discourse. There were analytical comments, which highlight several perspectives from the public terrain. They are sometimes condemnatory but not at all at odds with the positive comments of pro-establishment personalities. Tony Eluemunor’s narrative is undoubtedly rooted in the critiques by Ad’Obe Obe, Tunde Adeniran, Adeolu Akande, Onukaba AdinoyiOjo and Bolaji Akinyemi on the lack of collegial management and Obasanjo’s personalisation of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Eluemunor scrutinised the workings of Nigeria’s foreign policy and offered his observations: The foreign ministry have many inputs. There you have lots of brains, beginning with the Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA). I think I am the only Nigerian journalist to have been given a tour of the NIA; you have brains there. The NIA works like the CIA, and many of them work in foreign affairs; they go abroad for four years and come back. There are experts from the media and other professions. With the best brains there, you could run a country from there. Just give them a task, they give a response to you, then you can sift the answer. Obasanjo will give you the problem and then you have to go solve it. Obasanjo was using the intellectual capital he brought with him from outside back to government in 1999. There was no input, he did not grow and he did not search for other inputs from other people. He personalised it. Very often it worked, but when it didn’t work, it was disastrous. For instance, we still have the Darfur crisis, and I know that Nigeria spent millions, if not billions, hosting the peace talks. I was the bureau chief for the Daily Independent, and I think I was the only bureau chief that opted to cover it because I wanted to understand the problem of the Darfur crisis and see the problems being worked out. I thought it was getting over, when they brought in the former OAU secretary, Salim Ahmed Salim. I saw and discussed

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with him in Tom Ikimi’s house. I saw the black book, the atrocities committed against the blacks by those people fighting at the time.82 Eluemunor details with clarity some of the salient reasons Obasanjo’s strategy failed, along with his limitations. Obasanjo did not have a grip on the major issue of power-sharing in Sudan. For the first time, black Africa was confronting Arabic Africa. What happened in Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) Africa was different – when a set of Arabs picked up arms and fought Morocco or the Spanish for freedom from their colonial masters. The number of blacks in government in Khartoum at any given time has been less than 1 per cent, but blacks make up the majority of the population. Obasanjo’s failure in Sudan is not any different from his similar failure against Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda. He failed to act then as a military ruler, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania had to go there in his place to do the right thing. Nigeria couldn’t help, but Abiola sent Nyerere money and both of them saved Africa from that mess. Obasanjo ought to have told al-Bashir that if he failed to accept peace, there would be war. Perhaps there would have been a time frame, and Nigeria would have been ready to back it up, but, regardless, there is little wrong in Nigeria sending troops to save lives in Sudan. Obasanjo, after being OAU chairman, still coveted and sought to be re-elected as OAU chairman, so that he will be an African leader by the time he is looking for a second term. But Obasanjo didn’t need the OAU chairmanship to meet certain things and after the first term he went for the second term. After all they’ve done, the Darfur crisis is still there. Sometimes you need to fight it out. Nigeria needed to use some subterranean methods.83 Suddenly the much-discussed acts of corruption in the peacekeeping process started to add up. This is revealing and triggers questions on whether this may be the reason why Nigeria has been too eager to intervene in peacekeeping. Again, Eluemunor lays it bare: As a peacekeeper, Nigeria is supposed to speak for the black world and was leading the peacekeeping and will not be involved. We are carrying these things too far because of the money.

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The peacekeeping effort everywhere is because of the cash involved. The UN will pay this, Nigeria will pay that. There was a big scandal that didn’t come up in the end because I didn’t report it. This mighty scandal led to the retirement of the whistle-blower General Ovo. They pay a certain amount if you take in a tank. Then there was a dirty proposal: Nigeria’s army will go buy this and that at a special rate to keep especially for peacekeeping as if they knew how much crisis will be on in the world stage. It was a gold mine for certain persons in authority. These are things that offices don’t keep tabs on. Everybody profits from conflict resolutions. With the Darfur crisis, there were times we needed to take a stand, of course. Nigeria engaged the South African government in talking. Nigeria should have pushed Sudan on. Sudan knew that Nigeria had a little sympathy, even from internal affairs, but it has come to the AU. Nigeria could have taken a position, while trying to bring peace. We didn’t do it there. I think Nigeria, as the biggest nation in Africa, owed a measure of commitment to the blacks in Darfur.84 So far, the interviews have, to some extent, revealed insightful analyses of Nigeria’s foreign policy under Obasanjo. This is especially the case as they argued the point that there was little robustness in Nigerian foreign policy under Obasanjo. Without coordination, there will be no robustness. Even when capacity exists to achieve 90 per cent of your objectives, once coordination is lacking, there is the probability that such a government will achieve less than 30 per cent. It was a total failure under Obasanjo, given the amount of energy, time and money put into his foreign shuttles, as well as his visibility on the international circuit, hosting conferences because the world press would be there. Sometimes he would arrest public officials for corruption in order to grab media attention whenever a foreign head of state was visiting. He loved the razzmatazz of power. Why was this case? Eluemunor answers: When nations give you that kind of reverence, there should be some commitment, too, from you to keep that kind of something going. You shepherd them, you help them realise their own dreams too, you don’t go fighting them every point in time. [Others’] elections we couldn’t handle, and some of them also

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knew the kind of role Nigeria played during Obasanjo’s administration. They didn’t like it. There’s no way an African can justify the way Nigeria treated Charles Taylor. We did not only give him up, we even lied about how it happened. Nigeria could not handle its own affairs. Obasanjo’s public personality does not meet with the public image. Even when he was trying to solve problems of some countries, he was not even straightforward. We have not been able to explain, for instance, that of Liberia where the lady didn’t win the election. Nigeria called George Weah to give him back his money. Nigeria needed a Harvard economist so that the United States could accept the election. The revolution that was taking off from Liberia was lost – not just to Liberia but to West Africa. It would have spread, that anybody could just come up and run and win an election. When you went there, nobody mentioned Nigeria in spite of the fact that Obasanjo did the inauguration.85 The contention that Obasanjo was brash because of his military career may be wrong after all, if the comments of Chuks Akunna are anything to go by, having adduced that: ‘Obasanjo had a very strong personality. If he hadn’t spent a day in the military, I am sure he wouldn’t have behaved differently, he is a very tough person.’86 This toughness may have cowed aides and ministers into submission, eventually leading to a situation where there was no collegial management. He was ordering people to do things. If there were a collegial management, some aides could have contributed. Akunna again aligned with this contention but put forward reasons why this may have been the case: This is somebody who came and felt that we could run this country together and tried to carry people along. But he fell by the wayside when he discovered that it wasn’t going to be possible. That may have made him retrospect and withdraw. He now believed more in himself. He must have discovered the difference between idealism and reality and in some moment of desperation, he may have withdrawn to himself and felt that he couldn’t trust people’s judgement. As he may well discover, most times people are interested in how to line their pockets. This may have also

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contributed to his autocratic nature and stubbornness with him believing he is always being right all the time.87 Many who had been in the system at one time or another, like Ambassador Joe Keshi, Lancelot Anyanya, Tunde Olusunle and Bola Akinterinwa, were against such contentions that Obasanjo dominated foreign policy because the ministry was redundant and ineffective, explaining that this was an incorrect assumption. Sola Atere supported the above pro-establishment group when he asked: How can the ministry be redundant when you have career, seasoned diplomats who are there working and you have seasoned diplomats who became foreign affairs ministers? How can the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be docile when you have a president moving up and down all over the world, interacting with world leaders, getting involved in so many global issues? Which ministry will provide the network? Is it the works ministry or the finance ministry or the internal affairs ministry? Obviously it has to be the Foreign Affairs Ministry. If somebody is an arrowhead of an administration and he is going about, he cannot do it alone. Some people must provide the network and it can only be the seasoned diplomats from the foreign ministry. Obasanjo does not have a miniature foreign ministry within the presidency, so how could he have done it? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was getting more involved in research, their deep thoughts rather than the razzmatazz. That was why people thought they were not active. Instead of flaunting themselves all over the place, attending cocktail parties and so on, they were deeply involved in doing research because they have to provide position papers. There was no foreign trip that we went that I wasn’t getting position papers, which helped me in reporting. They came from the foreign ministry and it was part of the brief that they were giving President Obasanjo.88 But Atere’s narrative fails to fully counter the contention that collegial management was not practised because of Obasanjo’s tempestuous nature, under which an atmosphere of collegial

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management could not hold sway. Obasanjo’s temperament is the reason why his close aides were cowed. This elicited responses from some other interviewees, especially from the public. Michael Kehinde suggests that: this question is best answered by those who had close contact with him. However, I can only suppose that his nature played a significant role, not only per foreign policy, but with his general disposition in office. I remember a quote attributed to Obasanjo at the swearing in of some aides. Paraphrased: though you are designated advisers, it does not mean that your advice would play any meaningful role in the direction of governance. Sure, Obasanjo from his many utterances was a despot in democratic garb. Given Obasanjo’s nature and disposition, as well as Nigeria’s culture of the ‘big man’, collegial management would at best be sycophantic! Given Obasanjo’s antecedents and general disposition, foreign policy decision making under Obasanjo could not have been ideal!89 Simon Kolawole traces Obasanjo’s tempestuous and intemperate nature as follows: his personality was strong, so that could be part of it. He appeared autocratic and his military background might have contributed. But African leaders are generally autocratic with or without a military background. But under Obasanjo, there was some consistency and method.90 However, Antonia Obeya takes a slightly different view in the debate on collegial management: This existed but it was limited in the beginning. There was collegial management when he brought together this group of people advising him, but as time went on, I don’t know if it was because of the years he spent in the wilderness or the time he spent in jail, but he got comfortable and started marching towards that path of dictatorial tendencies and that eventually killed whatever was left of collegial management.91

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Ethical/philosophical concerns and motivations Interesting extracts from the interviews touch on the explanations given regarding the ethical and philosophical concerns which motivated Obasanjo’s intervention in conflicts, especially in Africa. Two key interviews were particularly insightful. Abdullahi Adamu attributed Obasanjo’s concerns to: his ever undying passion for Nigeria and Africa and also to a large extent for Third World nations. He was furtive but that strengthened his moral convictions in the face of adversities in the continent. This is the case even though many have missed the obvious reason why Obasanjo treated every issue regarding Africa with respect and not disdain. There were indeed difficult times, especially in the conflict arena. Even at that, Nigeria under Obasanjo struggled to strengthen Africa’s position despite uninspiring contortions.92 Tunde Olusunle similarly adds: I think it is just the fact that Obasanjo has always seen himself first and foremost as an African, who by circumstances of birth is a Nigerian. So to that extent, his vision is of Africa as one family, which is supposed to be together, you know. The embattled head of state of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi has his own concept of United States of Africa, one family and one home, which inspires his intervention. Back home in Nigeria, during one of the presidential media chats, he gave an example of his own state, Ogun State. How do you serve for instance the people of Ogun State who are neighbours of the people of Benin Republic where, for instance, the sitting room of somebody is in Nigeria, while the bedroom is on the Benin lower side? So I think his belief is that we are close and intertwined in Africa and that we must continue to find an amicable meeting ground for resolving our problems.93 It is already a given that the conduct and practice of Nigeria’s foreign policy is in a dysfunctional state. It is also equally a given that relations between states and within states in Africa have been drenched in

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animosity, deceit and bloodletting. In most cases, many of these nations have often accepted initiatives from bigger nations like Nigeria. This is as a result of its size and regional influence. Obasanjo’s involvement in interventions has been extraordinary. While many believe that Obasanjo’s ethical motivation can be traced to his Afrocentrism, there are others who think that the internal mechanisms of Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making under Obasanjo was not well structured when compared to other nations. This reflects a broader scepticism, especially in diverse and dangerous times. Remi Okunlola explains what ought to have been the ideal, leading to an understanding of Obasanjo. In a more structured society, policy formulation at the executive level is driven by a combination of party political philosophy and cabinet thinking. These philosophies and thinking are generally founded on long-term thinking. Sadly, in environments such as ours, where long-term thought and planning is weak and absent, nations and governments rely on the whims and caprices of men of power. In the case of Obasanjo, the clarity that he brought to a long-term sustainable policy worked positively. Individual whim hasn’t, however, generally been a source of good for Africa.94 Okunlola also rationalises the ethical/philosophical concerns that motivated Obasanjo’s intervention in African conflicts, especially those leading to major decisions. This is within the purview that ethics in Africa is observed more in the breach by African leaders and, moreover, that it is a continent populated by strongmen leaders and bereft of lasting institutions. ‘For a military man, Obasanjo is instinctively libertarian.’95 For Tony Eluemunor, ‘Obasanjo lost it; there was nothing like ethical motivation. In the end, all that was just personal glory and his pocket.’96

Future challenges All those interviewed offered an overwhelming consensus concerning the challenges and the way forward for Nigeria’s foreign policy decisionmaking, pointing to a possible renaissance. This is based on the collective agreement that Nigeria’s foreign policy structure is severely impeded and faces challenges from personalisation; and this requires

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urgent tackling. Ad’Obe Obe, having examined the problems, indicated a way out: The mindset has to involve everybody. Everybody has been implicated. We have all compromised ourselves at one point or the other. When you saw things that are not right and you didn’t stand up to them, then you allowed yourself to be compromised. When you are in a hurry to get what you want and you waive that right when you know things are not done properly, then you have been compromised. So we are all equally guilty. We all equally have that responsibility to start the process within ourselves. Now it has gotten to a point whereby to change it, we have to make sacrifices, but it is what every individual leader has to subscribe to.97 Tunde Adeniran accepts the popular view that what took place under Obasanjo was not foreign policy as such, but a Nigeria merely partaking in many foreign meetings. He reasoned that there must be a reversal of the way foreign policy decision-making is conducted in Nigeria: There was no conceptualisation of goals. What we had was events taking place and people trying to pigeonhole them into some level of foreign policy. For example, when we had Ambassador Adeniji as foreign affairs minister, he tried to locate, to place what we have done so far and what we wanted to do. That is about the idea of a concentric foreign policy. Let us rethink what we have been doing; and one good thing at that time was that of being able to identify that we are doing so many things and rather pigeonholing. In retrospect, this could be appreciated when you realise that Ambassador Adeniji who became foreign affairs minister was one of the key people behind the Murtala/Obasanjo foreign policy success story in the 1970s. He was a key foreign policy operative and one of the driving forces used to actualise the visions of Nigeria’s foreign policy at that time. The absence of intellectuals who used to brainstorm on Nigeria’s foreign policy under Professor Bolaji Akinyemi is a great loss to Nigeria. They would have by now defined the parameter of choice to Nigeria in the area of foreign policy. And I could recall that my view of the Chadian crisis was sharpened by such conferences. At the conference on

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Congo, we had top military men who participated in the exercise of the campaign, civil servants who were policy handlers and of course those of us from the academia interacting, brainstorming and preferring solutions as to the way forward.98 Joe Keshi suggests: the major problems of the foreign ministry are that most of the key players, particularly at the presidential level, don’t understand the intricacies of foreign policies and they allow politics to become the major thing. For example, up to halfway down Babangida’s era, the bulk of those who were Nigerian ambassadors were career officers, very knowledgeable, well-trained and dedicated officers. But politics not only got involved, particularly from civilians and federal characters who also got involved, which brought a lot of demoralisation to the staff of the ministry. And we are still suffering from that today, where you find a relatively junior officer becoming ambassador because they are the only ones from that state and you find highly senior officers preparing to retire without serving as ambassador. That is a bit of a demoralising sign for the ministry. Over the years, too, the ministry has suffered from a lack of effective replacement of its capacity. There was a time that an embargo was placed on recruitment, so now you find a service that is aging and very little trained manpower at the middle. They are really overwhelmed today with so many things and they do not have the capacity like it used to be before. Again, sometimes, particularly under Obasanjo, you only knew he was travelling because the ministry had to do some international arrangement and so on. It was difficult for the ministry to keep up, because some of them had little or nothing to do. The president takes off to go and give a lecture; you got to know it from the embassy. This also happened sometimes because of the weakness of the minister. In order to get things done faster, they just contact the embassies direct and so on. But the fundamental structure of foreign policy decision making is still there. The good thing is that nobody has destroyed it, but it is weakened. There is no way anybody that is coming now will say the foreign minister will still advise the president to see ABCD or not to see ABCD. Of course, some

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people arrange it behind, but somehow, the foreign ministry still gets involved, even in the meetings. The foreign ministry processes all the reports and sends them to the president. What is happening is that if you have a strong president, who is knowledgeable about foreign policy anywhere in the world, he virtually takes over the whole structure. But the structure, because of the way it has been created, survives. This is because in our own structure and a number of structures, there is already what you call division of labour. So they send something to you, based on an issue. In fact, some ministers will complain if you ask them to come and travel to somewhere. They say this is not foreign affairs business. That division of labour is very clear. So we need to pull in, so the structure itself is there, the structure of the foreign ministry being the foreign policy formulation institution and also responsible for execution. We do not take the final decision, but we recommend and, very often, they go by our recommendation.99 Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo suggests ways in which Nigeria’s foreign policy can have some semblance of organisation. I believe that we ought to, very early in Obasanjo’s regime, have gotten together some of our foreign policy experts, retired ambassadors, look at the old ones. And then, eventually, go region by region, including all the sub-regions in Africa and clearly define what should be the role of Nigeria in these places. Nigeria should also clearly define what it expects from her partners in the international community; review its membership of various international organisations; and fashion out how to derive enough benefits from these organisations. Should we continue to be members of these organisations? These are the things we should put in a policy document that will guide our actions. For the eight years Obasanjo spent there, he didn’t have that. We have none and he was just floating, policy-wise. In fact your standing in the world is closely related to your domestic resources, so he didn’t run a good country and it impacted on the way we were rated out there. If he conducted the kind of election he conducted in 2007, why would anybody take him seriously? So that’s the thing. He didn’t run a good country, and so even as he tried to project himself at par

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with some of the people he was trying to rub shoulders with, he just didn’t get there. He didn’t have it because he didn’t do his homework well.100 Adinoyi-Ojo equally mulls over the challenges and concludes that they are not enough to warrant an outright scrapping of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No, not necessarily scrapping it, but a lot of people you find in Nigeria, a lot of people in an establishment are very good. But in most cases you find that they are in the background. They are not just in the background; they have also been hampered by the civil service rules and regulations. You are just there. You will be seen but never heard. And so in most cases, the politicians who come in as the ministers and the politicians who get appointed as ambassadors, they take over and our foreign affairs officers are good readers of people. Once they know that this is where the politician wants to go, they follow, without being bold and courageous enough to say something different. This is the way things are done. We don’t have an ideal situation. Some of them are well trained, but they are frustrated by the politicians coming to head them and the system does not allow the best of the brightest to be of merit.101 John Chiemeka Ozoemena proposes citizen diplomacy as the solution to the challenges in Nigeria’s foreign policy. In this instance, that would mean ‘ensuring that our voice as a nation is respected through robust domestic policies that ensure the provision of basic amenities to the citizens and enhancing the rule of law’.102 Olusunle believes the major challenge is rooted in the challenge of continuity. You will be surprised at the turnover that we’ve had in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since the beginning of democracy in 1999, I won’t be surprised if the Ministry of Sports within these 12 years has sprung up a minimum of 10 ministers. The situation may not be as bad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it may be such that we have had too many turnovers. Under the Yar’Adua/Jonathan administration, we’ve

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had Chief Ojo Maduekwe flagging off the headship of the ministry in 2007. By last year; we’ve had Hon. Henry Odein Ajumogobia SAN moved there. Within this past four years, there’s been a semblance of stability. Over the years, the turnover had been high. When that happens, there is, of course, a lack of continuity in foreign policies, in programmes and initiatives by the administration. But the future of Nigeria’s foreign policy remains bright. I believe that because we have an in-built system of retrieving and refocusing, Nigeria will continue to hold out for foreign policy in Africa.103 Akinyemi was particularly concerned about installing a structural process of collegial management. I think that we’ve already talked on that. Let the president pick somebody who is an authority on foreign affairs by borrowing a leaf from the United States. We tend to borrow a leaf from Great Britain. The British attitude is any jack can do any job. Those are the ones who have run into problems in articulating what they really stand for in terms of foreign policy. An American once described Britain as a country that lost an empire and is still trying to look for a role in the world. In the case of Nigeria, appoint someone for your foreign ministry; somebody who knows his onions; who is an authority in that area. Number two, at the beginning of an administration, it is imperative to have some clearly set out goals as to what you want to do in the foreign policy field. And that is a heavy task because the problems in West Africa are enormous. The problems in Africa itself are enormous, and then you have the United Nation’s global political system, which we were dragged into. If Nigeria has the largest black population after Brazil, I think it should see to what extent black populations all over the world could become an asset for Nigeria. This is because that basically would be a sympathetic audience. Then you can go out to cultivate them, so that when there is a resurgence of Afrocentrism amongst blacks abroad, the whole continent of Africa, they have a country like Nigeria that actually reaches out to them in terms of culture and all that. Then when they think of Africa, they will always think of Nigeria in a positive way. This is

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what I tried to do with the Technical Aids Corps (TAC) scheme, by sending out Nigerian technical experts to Pacific, African and Caribbean countries. This is the case so that Nigeria is concretised in these peoples’ conscience by the Corps members they have met: the doctors, the nurses, the engineers that can even teach them the African literature. Those are the kind of things that [you do] at the beginning of your administration. And then of course there are things that you wouldn’t do, that nobody really likes. This is like what is going on in the Middle East now. Even the United States did not anticipate it, so you must also have that capacity to read signals and try and be on top of the situation in as much as it affects Nigeria’s national interest.104 Akinterinwa re-emphasised citizen diplomacy to buttress the fact that the controversy over the issue of continuity is a non-issue. There is no problem of discontinuity at all. Even the current minister of foreign affairs as yesterday granted an interview in which he explained that the policies are there, but he amplified it to say there are many dimensions to citizen diplomacy. Citizen diplomacy is the core because it’s at the centre of everything. There are other areas, other factors that have impacted on it. For instance, diplomacy, which means putting citizens at the core of whatever you are doing. When you put citizens at the centre, then the next thing is that the citizen must reciprocate. So the economic aspect, economic growth and development, what do you do with that? Then what about security of the stomach? What about the physical security of the State, territorial integrity, the defender too? What about the particular obligation that you have to pay your debts? [If there are] membership obligations, you settle your bills. These are also foreign policy interests that cannot be abandoned. Citizen diplomacy is there, but at the end of the day, you need to put the economic environment right. In terms of continuity, it’s still there. Citizen diplomacy is there, because the many pillars of citizen diplomacy are there. You have many pillars of it; you now discover that one major pillar is preventing the deaths arising from conflicts/uprisings, which is happening in Egypt and Libya. The way Nigerians were returned

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to Nigeria – you can see that even if any Nigerian has committed an offence, we are not saying they should not be punished, but we should go to ensure their rescue, and ensure that they should be tried and that there is no denial of justice.105 The above foreign policy experts have all spoken about the positives, but there are still some challenges that need to be tackled. The problem is that foreign policy is underfunded in Nigeria. The moment one removes the factor of underfunding, the ministry can have well-trained diplomats who have acquired experience and knowledge when posted abroad, and therefore are well exposed. The issue is that attempts at fostering national interest often run into difficulties because of constraints. One constraint is the non-coordination of foreign policy activities. Many ministries and institutions are involved in many aspects of foreign policy. For instance, UNESCO deals with educational questions, so Nigeria’s Ministry of Education works directly with UNESCO in science. Now, in terms of international cultural cooperation, UNESCO covers that too, and Nigeria is a signatory and a member. Thus, many foreign policy experts believe all these need to be coordinated, discussed at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When you look at nuclear energy, the Convention on Nuclear Cooperation was signed in Vienna. However, now the Ministry of Defence deals more directly with the issue of nuclear safety as a security issue, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is particularly engaged with the diplomatic procedures and negotiations. Foreign policy stakeholders need to be involved. When you look at it in terms of constraints generally, Nigeria under normal circumstances should not have a problem since diplomats exist in abundance. Under no circumstances should Nigeria lack diplomatic personnel. The diplomatic personnel are multilingual; they speak virtually the all the main languages of the UN. Similarly, the issue of the dysfunctional nature of the foreign affairs apparatus was unanimously identified by all interviewees. This was in addition to finding answers to several difficult questions on foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria. To gauge the difficulty of the challenge, finding a path out of the quagmire remains the concern of many. But the challenges can be taken seriously only if all the parties acknowledge that the root causes of the problem are deeply historical, and that fractiousness has long been the issue.

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Tony Eluemunor’s argument reinforces the view of Ad’Obe Obe, which suggests that the first course of action is to accept collective guilt; Tunde Adeniran posits that there was no conceptualisation of goals; Joe Keshi suggests the restructuring of the fundamentals of foreign policy; while Adinoyi-Ojo’s argument is that Nigeria’s foreign policy should be organised. All of these when joined together indicate that all has not been well with Nigeria’s foreign policy. It is just unfortunate that those in the foreign affairs department will not want to talk. Nigeria should go back to the 1980s when Bolaji Akinyemi and others were plotting the movement for Nigeria. Unfortunately, there is no Nigerian position on anything. Even Bolaji Akinyemi actually took a stand in his time when he was talking of a black bomb. So based on this, we should retrace our steps.106 Jideofor Adibe also agreed with the above aspects of the dysfunctional state of affairs relating to foreign policy. His scrutiny was substantive, intellectual and intuitive. He agrees a great deal with the multifaceted critique on the subject matter by both internal and external interviewees. The difference was subtle, yet substantial. Adibe had a strong reaction to news that Nigeria was determined to engender a shift in its foreign policy. This is related to the proposal which indicated that the National Economic Council (NEC) was set to alter Nigeria’s foreign policy. In a 2010 report, the NEC took the decision that Nigeria would no longer play ‘big brother’ to countries in trouble without getting anything in return, and that henceforth the nation’s foreign interventions and assistance would be guided by ‘national interest’. To Adibe this was simply wrong-headed. The NEC’s resurgent ‘nationalism’ raises a number of issues: One, it is difficult to know the notion of ‘national interest’ which NEC was espousing, or how it came to the conclusion that the country’s foreign policy has not been guided by ‘national interest’. The truth is that the national interest of a country is often multifaceted and dynamic. For a country like Nigeria, the ‘national interest’ includes keeping Nigeria as one united and peaceful country, with economic development, respect for human rights, protecting the

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country’s democracy, internal peace and security, peaceful relations with the country’s neighbours, commanding the respect of other African countries (both for our ego needs and to leverage such in our relations with the big powers) and ensuring political stability among the country’s neighbours (to prevent potential influx of refugees). It is germane to note that what one regime may prioritise as ‘national interest’ may be seen differently by another regime. Two, it is wrong to assume that playing ‘big brother’ to other African countries means that the country’s ‘national interest’ is not being projected. Suggesting that any relations must bring immediate economic gratification is not only ‘cowboyism’ but also short-sighted. At a time when the notion of ‘soft power’ – commanding influence through co-option and attraction (or ‘winning hearts and minds’) – has become ascendant in the foreign policy thrust of the major powers, to nurse a nostalgia for the discredited mercantilist approach to foreign policy is an error of judgment. Three, it is understandable that some Nigerians are frustrated that countries we helped in their times of need, such as South Africa during its struggle against apartheid and Liberia and Sierra Leone during their civil wars, do not seem to show us the desired respect. However, the truth is that a nation’s respectability in international relations is not wholly contingent upon its past benevolence, but often more on the current leverages it could bring to the table. Additionally, a nation’s standing in the comity of nations cannot be divorced from its domestic circumstances, including its performance in such critical indices as transparency of elections, human rights record, security, good governance and poverty alleviation. Moreover, it is not exactly true that Nigeria has not benefited from playing ‘big brother’ because apart from the country’s profile being raised during the acts, the number of Nigerians that moved to South Africa at the end of apartheid and to Liberia and Sierra Leone at the end of the wars also increased. So what does Nigeria really expect these countries to do? It is true that if America or Britain had played similar roles, they would have ensured that British and American companies would corner

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the bulk of the reconstruction contracts. If Nigeria was unable to leverage its contributions in Liberia and Sierra Leone to win reconstruction contracts for Nigerian companies, then we are talking of the failure of economic diplomacy, not of foreign policy. It is unrealistic to expect countries to come prostrating to us, or fail to defend their own ‘national interest’ in their relations with us simply because we rendered some help to them in the past. Four, the decision to jettison the country’s ‘big brother’ role is an indirect abandonment of the notion of Africa being the centrepiece of the nation’s foreign policy. This is quite unfortunate because the Afrocentric nature of our foreign policy has never precluded relations with other countries, multilateral agencies or other actors. In fact, it can be argued that the country’s strategic political importance to the world is hinged on its influence in the continent – just as Egypt is regarded as a strategic partner of the West largely because of its ability to leverage the West’s relations with the Arab world. It will therefore be wrong for Nigeria to abandon the source of its potential strength in the world – paradoxically at a time it is campaigning for a permanent seat in the Security Council of the UN using the leverage it has in Africa as a key argument. Additionally, even when Nigeria ‘develops’, it will discover, as South Africa has done, that other African countries, not the West or Asia, will be the major market for its goods, because such goods will for a long time be too weak to compete at the global level. Five, it was a monumental error on the part of the NEC to openly declare that it would henceforth get involved with other countries only if there was specific economic benefit for the country. While national interest always guides foreign policy (the French expression ‘raison d’e´tat’ – meaning ‘reason of the State’ – captures this well), it is usually masked in morally acceptable language such as the need to ‘civilise the natives’ (used to justify colonialism) or the need to find and destroy Saddam Hussein’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (used to justify the Iraq War) . . . Even companies rarely tell customers they set up businesses to make profit – but to provide needed goods and services and create jobs. Now the NEC has chosen to throw diplomatese to the winds by impliedly announcing that the country will henceforth be

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guided by ‘cowboyism’ in its international relations. With all due respect, this is misplaced nationalism.107 In essence, part of the challenges Nigeria faces in foreign policy, according to Adibe among others, includes the following: that the national interest ought to be multifaceted and made more dynamic; that Nigeria should have a differing articulation of national interest from time to time; that Nigeria’s ‘big brotherism’ should transmute to ‘soft power’; and that Nigeria’s foreign policy should be hinged more on current leverages rather than on past goodwill. To Michael Kehinde, any discussion on the challenges facing Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making must take into account the level of its collapse, and then invest in a variety of tools, beginning with the following: 1) Making Nigeria’s foreign policy a reflection of domestic aspirations. 2) This would be achieved by getting professionals to be in charge of foreign policy decision-making, rather than politicians and; 3) This is a major challenge as it has the potential for charting an effective course for Nigeria’s foreign policy. Again, foreign policy must be guided by rational considerations of the National Interest, rather than the whim of a powerful politician.108 Antonia Obeya provides an alternative: Honestly the only way I think Nigeria can move forward is starting on a clean slate, especially having new young thinkers leading the country. I don’t want to use the word ‘revolutionary’, but it will take a radically type of person, somebody who has not been involved in the rot that is called government and politics in Nigeria.109 At this point, there is the need to systematise the notable contrasts and similarities between the inside and outside views. The interviews are a modest attempt to fill in the seeming gaps in trying to explain the actual state of Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. It is selective, but the outcome is an exhaustive analysis which constructs an empirical framework which can be tested. Postulations from both inside and

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outside attempt to trace causal factors behind the elusive state of the ideal in foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria, and at the same time articulate the next necessary steps to establish the preconditions for that ideal. My first concern is with the points of convergence from all the respondents: .

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Obasanjo succeeded in putting Nigeria unambiguously on the side of respectability and visibility, and thus was a catalyst for a secured global presence for Nigeria. He stands out tall in the midst of former Nigerian leaders. Obasanjo left no one in doubt that he was the one running the show when it came to foreign affairs. He actively dominated and personalised foreign policy decision-making; thus, collegial management was absent. There was a failure of precise thinking and an absence of policy synthesis under Obasanjo. A dysfunctional status quo existed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That the ethical/philosophical concerns motivating Obasanjo were his undying passion for Nigeria, Africa and the Global South. It was an established fact that Obasanjo saw himself first and foremost as an African, which links to Afrocentrism and libertarianism, which he has professed at all times. That the existing structure of the ministry and other organs of foreign policy in Nigeria is stale, having suffered largely from a sustained personalisation of foreign affairs across time. There is a need for a change of foreign policy conduct from individualism to collectivism, with the introduction of an articulated foreign policy direction, a definition of expectations of partners in the international community and the institutionalisation of a structural process of collegial management.

There were also multiple areas of divergence in the responses. The first pertains to whether Obasanjo’s international feats were the result of expediency or a proper foreign policy blueprint. While many outsiders and some insiders agreed that foreign policy during the time frame under consideration was all about Obasanjo’s personality and interest, quite a significant few among the insiders argue that the administration was an

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offshoot of the Murtala Mohammed–Obasanjo administration. The argument was that it had a multilayered foreign policy infrastructure, made up of senior and junior ministers, as well as a retinue of aides. Another area of divergence is in the attempt to locate a discernible pattern of his appointments, as many criticised the quality of his appointments to the office of minister of foreign affairs. The criticism is understandable, given that Obasanjo’s intent was obvious. While those from the outside contend that the quality of the ministers was deplorable, those on the inside blamed the National Assembly for the failure to engage with the President on such appointments. The argument is that a failure to engage gives the president the opportunity to deploy appointees as and when he deems fit. The insiders also posit that since every leader brings his own style to office, it should be noted that no leader in the world has won an election on the basis of foreign policy.

Comments This book takes exception to inflated descriptions of a multilayered foreign policy structure under the Obasanjo administrations. Even a multilayered structure can be made impotent by a dominant leader. This book has argued that the contentious issue is not whether there was an existent multilayered structure or not, but whether an enabling environment was present. There is no doubt, therefore, that the deepseated problem of the Obasanjo era was his personality, his selfevaluation and his micro-management style. The points of convergence align with the argument of this book in that success in the international arena does not necessarily mean that the method deployed was correct. In essence, an exceptional flair for foreign affairs, which Obasanjo displayed extensively, is not a good enough reason to personalise foreign policy decision-making. Such an idea poses grave dangers for successive administrations, especially when successive leaders are not equally inclined and gifted. Hence, administrations in the post-Obasanjo years have appeared, and still appear to be, rudderless in the foreign policy arena. The majority of interviewees agreed that a nation’s national interest would be better served by a well-nurtured foreign policy decisionmaking structure. A well-nurtured structure would eradicate the problem of a dysfunctional status quo at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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and engender good thinking and the synchronisation of foreign policy in Nigeria. This is the case because the benefits associated with collectivism and collegial management, embedded with conceptualism, far outweigh those of individualism. But such reforms cannot stand the test of time under a fractured institution. A precondition for the new era can only be sustained by training, collective accountability to a political body, all organs of foreign policy decision-making coming under greater supervision and then eradicating acts that can potentially undermine its credibility. In analysing the ‘public view’ as a running commentary on the ‘insider view’, this chapter has detailed the feedback from the factfinding interviews. This encompassed interesting accounts from both insider officials and from the public on Obasanjo’s handling of foreign policy decision-making. The primary concern of this book is to find out if Obasanjo’s style of handling foreign policy is compatible with the widely held view of his personalisation of foreign policy decisionmaking in Nigeria. This is also concerned with exploring whether Obasanjo’s professed foreign policy achievement in Darfur and elsewhere was in accord with an ideal foreign policy decision-making setting as illustrated by Graham T. Allison’s rendition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Obasanjo’s style, as this chapter reveals, was not as dynamic as many were made to believe. This is not unconnected to the constraints and distortions in the foreign policy decision-making.

CONCLUSION

Nigerian foreign policy ought to represent an unambiguous and progressive mechanism whose process transcends the narrow boundaries of making a connection between Nigeria, Africa and the rest of the world. Central to this are the revelations from the book that call for a rethinking of the key elements of foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria. The literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy has been constant in its refrain that, prior to Obasanjo’s return as civilian president, foreign policy was crudely mishandled by the Babangida and Abacha regimes, who in particular gave the country its pariah status following the annulment of the 12 June 1993 election. While Obasanjo’s presidency marked a departure from Nigeria’s post-colonial foreign policy decision-making, it has been demonstrated that the two despots provided a better domestic performance than Obasanjo. Furthermore, Babangida is credited with the creation of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that is still being used for peacekeeping interventions in West African conflict zones. The key details of Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making system, and the reprehensible way in which it has been conducted, were also explored, assessing the core debates, providing the historical context and delineating the personality of Obasanjo. Following this was an overview of the system’s failures and the framing of the broader theoretical debates in actual foreign policy situations. There was also the need to challenge the one-dimensional characterisation of foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria. The accounts of those interviewed pointed to a much more complex reality.

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Consequently, it is imperative to understand and assess why leaders like Obasanjo sometimes played overlapping or seemingly contradictory roles in foreign policy decision-making. An assessment of the roots of the apparent gap in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making leads to the primacy of the personality factor of the leader: there was a near absence of interdependencies between Obasanjo and what ought to have been his government’s key foreign policy structures. What arose under Obasanjo’s watch was a hegemonic structure that promoted his own personality and eliminated any dependencies. This gave rise to fault-lines in policy-making – with Obasanjo at the head of the structure never permitting contests or debates. The foreign policy apparatus became isolated and marginal, as it was continually faced with a strong and experienced leader who knew how to use the influences of foreign policy for his own ends. As a result, Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making lacked any real ideological character and direction. Even the usual strength of what ought to have been a burgeoning alliance between disparate structures was totally absent. Under a normal democratic setting, such a gap ought to have led to stern questioning, indicative of a strong opposition from within and without. This is, however, dependent on the existence of a political space that allows debate. Historically, there has been no attempt to alter this balance; nor is there any sign this will occur in any contemporary political setting. In summary, there are grounds to conclude that this pattern will, in spite of all its flaws, persist. This is largely due to the unclear nature of the administrative frontiers inherited and sustained since colonialism, aggravated by the weaknesses of leaders and a reciprocal distrust by the public. These considerations reveal the limits of how far contextual factors can explain the self-debilitating nature of a leader personifying the state. It is also suggested that the character of the state is often seen as emanating from an authoritarian leader, a majority of whose policy statements from such a structure will predictably be irrational. The volume of such irrational decision-making for the period under review is substantial. The conceptual framework that was developed for this further explains and offers insight into why this was the case. The fundamental defect is the absence of a collegial setting in Nigeria’s foreign policy, thus revealing an established pattern of personalised

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foreign policy. The autocratic control of foreign affairs damaged foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria, given that career civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were rarely allowed to use their talents in the active formulation and implementation of pragmatic policies. Ministers should normally be allowed to articulate national foreign policy directions; this would be the accepted role of a chief diplomat of a modern state. Ministers should be in charge of their brief and bring their personal accomplishments to the job, whether in the Foreign Service or otherwise. Unfortunately, this is absent in Nigeria and other African states. The absence of collegial management is further aggravated by an ineffective national assembly which lacks the intellectual capacity to understand its place in a democracy. Obasanjo simply ceded Bakassi under the Greentree Agreement rather than strategically mounting diplomatic pressure on the UN to conduct a referendum to determine the future status of the disputed area. The absence of pragmatism in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy has led to the abandonment of a process largely driven by the UN and urged on by the UK, the US and France. Another factor is the absence of well-organised pressure groups capable of articulating diverse and differing views on the shape and form of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Even where they existed, arguments were timid and ineffective in influencing Nigeria’s foreign policy from the grip of Obasanjo. This intellectual and strategic gap remains as a demonstration of key structural deficiencies which lead to an inability to make coherent, tactical decisions on foreign policy. A counter argument in defence of the Obasanjo style of foreign policy decision-making could be advanced, albeit weakly; US president John F. Kennedy bypassed foreign policy bureaucracy by setting up an Executive Committee (EXCOM) made up of trusted aides and got himself excluded from its proceedings. This argument could be based on the assumption that Obasanjo created a similar committee. If he ever did, the suspicion would be that he was the only member; and his conviction from the onset was that he could take on and override the bureaucracy by the sheer impact of his personality. The African continent was close to Obasanjo’s heart, and so his foreign policy concerns were focused in that direction, particularly on the Darfur question. Obasanjo hosted year-long peace meetings in

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Abuja, Nigeria, with the hope of restoring normalcy to that region. Again, these amounted to little due to intellectual and strategic gaps prior to that intervention. Furthermore, Obasanjo, as Nigeria’s president and chairman of the African Union, failed to consider the history of Darfur and its salient features before the intervention. If this had been done with calm deliberation, this, arguably, might have influenced decision-making in a different way. Millions of dollars were sunk into the project at the expense of serious domestic needs. Independent sources and UN technocrats indicated that Nigeria was spending close to US$ 1.5 million daily for the maintenance of its three battalions in Darfur, thus amounting to almost US$ 540 million for a year, although much of this may have been siphoned away through corruption. A coherent tactical policy should have emphasised burden-sharing by all parties involved, from the AU, the EU, right through to the UN. This ought to have been the case rather than Obasanjo simply caving in to pressure from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who had pressed for a swift, peaceful end to the situation, warning that without action there could be an even greater catastrophe. President George W. Bush, alongside AU colleagues, wanted Obasanjo to fill this role in view of the diligence, humility and experience he was expected to bring to a crisis like Darfur. Although diligence, humility and experience were essential, they would not be enough unless sustained by a result-oriented strategy. It is true that Darfur was important to Africa and Nigeria, a fact not helped by Nigeria’s headship of the AU, which placed it at the forefront of the challenge to conjecture on the virility of the AU’s doctrine of ‘Afrocentrism’. Nigeria went into action despite its lack of strategic pragmatism. This was emblematic of Obasanjo’s personalised foreign policy. This sentiment is reflected in several narratives, a majority of which are animated by a mixture of both idealistic and pragmatic dispositions. However, Nigeria’s foreign policy failed to take this into consideration as it attempted to fashion a ‘pragmatic’ policy response to developments in Sudan. The third absence in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making is a strategic long-term framework. No leader since independence has sought to remedy this – the constant change in the leadership notwithstanding. The absence of such a framework has negatively impacted on Nigeria, beginning with Nigeria’s lack of an invitation to the London G20 Summit to tackle the global economic recession. Nigeria, in spite of its influence in

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the region and economic strength, was ignored. This was diplomatically damaging to Nigeria. Further symptomatic of the problem is Nigeria’s non-inclusion in the BRICS group – a conglomeration of emerging economic powers comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Additionally, Nigeria’s faltering democracy and an ailing President Yar’Adua may have undercut Obasanjo’s diplomatic momentum. Finally, from its initial gradualist and timid foreign policy positions to that of a more activist and intervention-based position courted by the West, the various transitions in the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and constantly shifting direction on foreign policy positions have all hindered progress. It is illustrative to note here that contemporary Nigeria is losing her diplomatic influence in Africa, not having been consulted by the West on Tunisia, Egypt or Libya, the so-called Arab Spring states. The postulated basis of Nigeria as a regional power is surreal when its intervention in conflict zones is taken into consideration. These conflicts provided Nigeria with a key platform to exploit the concept, beginning with the Liberian conflict which enabled Nigeria to produce a homegrown, regional response mechanism for intervention and conflict management. This, no doubt, was steeped in Nigeria’s experience of the civil war of the 1960s, which broadly meant it was ready to confront the challenge of balancing an African defence mechanism with the principle of non-interference. The sophistication of the initiative had the potential to launch Nigeria to even greater heights, given the complex nature of conflicts in Africa, if elements of collegial management had been introduced to its foreign policy apparatus. This initiative, however, will fade into insignificance if the reign of strongmen in foreign policy continues. Again, a pragmatic approach would go a long way in reducing Nigeria’s heavy financial burden, assumed in a majority of these interventions. Drawing from the above, there was no doubt that Obasanjo’s foreign policy was characterised by arbitrary autocratic decisions rather than one emanating from a collegial setting. These failings negatively impacted on the diplomatic initiative that led to Charles Taylor’s presence in Nigeria, which, at that time, was perceived, albeit wrongly, as a consummation of Afrocentrism. A pragmatic approach would have enabled a contemplation of the possible long-term implications of the diplomatic gambit on that offer of asylum. The diplomatic volte-face

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over Taylor would have been unnecessary if the thought process leading to the decision had been simply pragmatic. The book has emphasised that there has been a pattern in Nigeria’s foreign policy whereby all its leaders since independence have persistently held to Western values, inherited from the country’s British colonial masters. However, there has been no clear-cut approach on how to deal with Nigeria’s off-and-on relations with its two supposed allies: the communist Soviets (now Russia) and the non-alignment group. Although Nigeria is a key member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), its foreign policy has been arguably little more than a pretence in that direction, given its continuous alignment with the West. Also illuminated were the structural factors aiding or impeding individual – or collective – management of foreign policy in Nigeria. However, in some cases, the actual conduct of its foreign policy decisionmaking reveals deep-seated deficiencies in these theories, especially as they simply do not take into account the way foreign policy decisions are made in Africa. Hermann, Hermann and Hagan were spot-on in their analysis regarding the influence of the domestic and international factors that are channelled through the political structure of government.1 This feature correlates with a need for the flexibility of a network of foreign policy structures in a government. Unfortunately, under Obasanjo, the reverse was true: what existed was the rigidity of a strongman who ran foreign policy without recourse to the usual structures. There was simply nothing to channel through the political structure of government. The foreign policy decision-making structure as espoused by Hermann et al., especially politburos, cabinets, interagency groups, coalitions and parliaments, were either non-existent or ineffective in Nigeria, especially in the policy calculations on Darfur and others – thanks to Obasanjo’s personalisation of foreign policy decision-making. This view is further reinforced by Hermann’s argument that the nature of foreign policy decision-making structures influences the outcome of foreign policy conclusions.2 In Nigeria, Obasanjo was a domineering leader with a small, subordinate and pliable staff; an authoritarian over individuals who had some autonomy and may have represented the views of some groups. There were indeed subordinates (although mostly sycophants) who served to reinforce Obasanjo’s views

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(even when wrong and not strategic). There is no evidence to date which suggests that there was any dissenting view on Darfur among his key aides. If there were, there would have been reports of an intensified crackdown on any evident dissent. Although Hermann could be correct to assert that this was an example of a sharp policy output, especially on the grounds of efficiency, over and against democratic slow-downs, this was, however, not representative of democratic norms – nor was it a collegial management product. Snyder et al. had argued that ‘the key to explaining why a state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision-makers as actors define their situation’.3 This places emphasis on the term ‘decisionmakers’, over and above a decision-maker in the singular. Against the above hypothesis, there were no established relationships between events, objects, conditions or other actors organised around a focus. Thus, there were no linkages among the actions, reactions and the interactions of variables focusing on the objectives and activities of a decision unit. Rosenau highlights the location of causation in international affairs ‘as both an early step toward explanation of specific empirical events and a general orientation toward all events’.4 This depicts a series of ‘if-then’ propositions which allow for a useful comparison of the behaviour of countries. This view illuminates another deficiency in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making because, technically speaking, there was no such strategy in Obasanjo’s foreign policy calculations. Taken collectively, Allison’s recreation of various scenarios of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that detailed the inner workings of US foreign policy decision-making5 illuminates the foreign policy failures and the central puzzles of Obasanjo’s response to Darfur, both as Nigeria’s president and the AU’s chairman. There were concealments, and both high points and low points, many revealed when exploring present assumptions and alternative explanations as to why the crisis in Darfur persisted. The technical lapses in foreign policy decision-making under Obasanjo were part of a pattern of arbitrary autocratic decisions, and so only Obasanjo can provide answers to questions such as: what happened? Why did the event happen and what will happen? His style and policy direction became easily predictable to foreign policy experts when determining the ‘contemplative’ direction of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

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Thus, Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour became easily explainable and predictable. Even when Allison’s Rational Policy Model is brought into the equation to provide an explanation for Obasanjo’s foreign policy, what is revealed is a gaping void characterised by the operational absence of the other two models, the Organisational Process Model or Governmental Politics Model, based on the idea that important policy events have causes. Large acts are the consequence of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various bureaucratic levels, in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organisational goals and political objectives. The goals and objectives are there, but conflicting smaller actions of individuals, possibly represented by the career civil servants in Nigeria’s foreign affairs bureaucracy, remained inconsequential under Obasanjo. And in contrast to Allison’s Organisational Process Model, Obasanjo’s foreign policy did not consist of ‘acts’ and ‘choices’ as the outputs of a large organisation functioning according to certain regular patterns of behaviour. Acts and choices only occur when there is a pragmatic stratagem in the foreign policy structure. The Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the relevant organisations and displayed the patterns of organisational behaviour from which actions emerged. It emphasises governmental behaviour whereby an action is chosen by a unitary, rational decision-maker, centrally controlled, completely informed and maximising value. This was missing in the decision by Nigeria to intervene in Darfur. Such a structure was simply not there. There were no routines and no coordination, as there was nothing to coordinate. Worse still, the idea that an ideal foreign policy decision-making mechanism requires that problems be cut up and distributed to various organisations for processing in order to save it from paralysis was alien to Nigeria under Obasanjo. The key variables missing in many of Obasanjo’s foreign policy decisions were the perceptions, motivations, positions and manoeuvres of principal players from which the outcome emerged. Obasanjo acted only as a unitary actor as against many actors. Obasanjo ought to have been the ‘superpower’ (as postulated by Allison) among many lesser but considerable powers. Ordinarily, the process structure emphasises

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conflict and consensus-building similar to legislative processes. Unfortunately, this was also alien to Obasanjo’s foreign policy process. Furthermore, in scrutinising Allison’s models, one can conclude that it remains the most popular framework in political literature, having deconstructed the abstraction of the State in foreign policy decision-making – except in Nigeria. A scrutiny of Allison’s models, though quintessentially historical, is frankly unworkable in Nigeria as there was neither bargaining nor compromise, as these were subsumed under the actions of a strongman. And such a policy has prevailed not only in Nigeria but across a wide spectrum of Global South nations and even, ridiculously, in some developed nations. In the UK, the hearings during the Chilcot Inquiry into the invasion of Iraq in 2003 revealed that the erstwhile British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had approved war plans irrespective of dissent among key aides. It therefore follows that the ultimate decision-maker will churn out policies without objection from his hand-picked ‘yes-men’, who often outnumber incisive and dissenting aides. It is notable that Allison’s models are Western-oriented and he has failed to take into account other settings like Nigeria. Consequently, foreign policy decision-making within the context of what really occurs in Africa may ultimately provide the platform for a reassessment of Allison’s theories. Also necessitating answers is the question of why there was an impasse in the policy intervention in Darfur – a long-term crisis in comparison to the short-spanned Cuban Missile Crisis. The answer to this lies in the intricacies of African realities, where policy formulation is awkward because of its dysfunctional character – a common African feature where presidents take near absolute control over foreign policy functions. What was expected when Obasanjo developed his own machinery as a counterpoise to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and replicated this same practice from 1999 to 2007? His intrusion was not crisis-laden. Obasanjo’s diplomacy during conflicts in Africa may not have been in sync with Allison’s theory, but some parallels emerge, especially in the linkage between communitarianism and Afrocentrism – the core of Obasanjo’s foreign policy. Furthermore, there is no doubt that Mervyn Frost’s exposition on communitarianism helps explain the ethical considerations which motivated Obasanjo’s intervention into areas of

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conflict on the African continent. This pattern of behaviour in foreign policy is found across the continent, due to the Afrocentric concerns which unify Africa. Frost’s communitarianism points to the predictability of influences on foreign policy actions of leaders in Africa. It is an agreed fact that foreign policy in this instance should lie at the intersection of communitarianism and Afrocentrism, as they are complementary. This is because, as earlier noted, Afrocentrism has dictated the course of action by African states, especially in arriving at a collective political consensus on all matters related to Africa. Such an understanding prioritises salient African interests above individual national interests. This aligns with the communitarian view, which argues for the collective right, embedded in the notion of the wider community. Afrocentrism also orientates towards a key feature of communitarianism: a utilitarianism which promotes the greatest happiness for the greatest number of African people. Sovereignty is conditioned upon the capacity of a state to meet certain values, that is, key settled norms such as human rights, the rule of law and adherence to international law. Others norms include antiimperialism, the balance of power, patriotism, protecting the interests of the State, collective security and economic sanctions.6 From the outset, it is imperative to locate how Obasanjo sought settled norms for Africa. Such were the issues that, Obasanjo, in his triple role as head of state, president and AU chairman sought to achieve for Africa. This is exemplified in his multiple diplomatic interventions in conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Guinea, Sudan and Liberia; the struggle for statehood in SADR, South Africa, Mozambique, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia and Zimbabwe; in the transmutation of the OAU to the AU, which came with sweeping reforms; the establishment of the NEPAD and its arm, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); and also then in the newly established AU Constitutive Act, which spells out the right to intervene in a member state with respect to grave circumstances such as genocide and crimes against humanity. This further supports the idea that Obasanjo was prepared to shift the balance in favour of ethics and communal good, even if it meant unbalancing the claims of the State. Next is the matter of the so-called ‘settled norms’. If settled norms have been so effective, why then are there so many problems in Africa? This is as a result of the ‘unsettling’ of these ‘settled norms’.

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Global responses to conflicts in African states have not been encouraging, leaving the sole responsibility of intervention to regional powers like Nigeria. Further analysis of the regional powers explains why Nigeria is inevitably at the forefront of leadership in the continent. It is within this context that Obasanjo’s intervention in Darfur can be traced to a desire to help fellow Africans. Thus, in contrast to cosmopolitanism, which has a broader objective in being people-centred, Obasanjo naturally would identify more with Africa rather than other, distant continents. He was still driven by private ethical considerations, as he took the initiative in trying to establish a precedent in diplomatic interventions in Africa. To sum up, Obasanjo’s ethical motivation has a direct connection to Mervyn Frost’s concept of human rights and settled norms, as embodied in the UN and AU charters, and also in accordance with the moral rules of deontology – that is, ethical conduct on the basis of consequences via a variety of utilitarianism within its greatest happiness principle, particularly act utilitarianism. Obasanjo’s role was a warning to other African leaders of the emerging repercussions for erring leaders like Milosevic undergoing trials for human rights abuses. Gordon further corroborates this by referring to the uniqueness of African leadership being deeply rooted in African cosmology, especially religion and philosophy, the family, ageism, kinship and tribalism.7 Obasanjo’s foreign engagement was thus empathy-driven. Ethical choice remains uppermost, as Obasanjo engaged in conflicts irrespective of cost. These insights lend credence to the view that Obasanjo, as the ultimate leader, saw absolute dominance as the only necessary tool and so pursued that path ruthlessly. There were no major actors contending with him or debating the issues for nuanced results, nor was there compromise or the allocation of responsibility. Obasanjo’s style and methodology were particularly vacuous when acting as the ‘Guardian of the Republic’. For a start, the so-called Guardians of the Republic are not always as enduring as they appear, even when those on the other side of the equation – ranging from politicians and technocrats, to the media and the public – have all clamoured for an institution to be rescued and brought to the ideal. This is the case even though these groups may be weak at evaluating what ought to be the ideal foreign policy. The vigour of Nigeria’s democratic institutions and relevant personnel are still in transition. Policy-making is dominated by people

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who lack moderation, sometimes probity and, above all, education. Obasanjo’s sense of ‘exaggerated pride in Nigeria’s strength’ was concerned only with enforcing and promoting his authoritarianism, substituting irrational pessimism for irrational exuberance. Consequently, there remains a residual wave of gridlock in Nigeria’s foreign policy bureaucracy. As experts debate about how to deal with this, another concept has crept into the policy debate: diplomatic repression. African countries, including Nigeria, have been mired in dictatorship and poverty, having seen no significant advance in democracy over recent years. This has spawned backward-looking and violent ideologies, some of which still persist. The mood in Abuja was not lifted under Obasanjo, as policymakers continued to see reason for alarm on issue after issue, as it was evident that the various parts of the Abuja establishment were pulling in different directions, despite the authoritarian approach. There is no doubt that Obasanjo restored Nigeria’s reputation in the comity of nations, placing it unambiguously in the role of a diplomatic heavyweight, insisting at all times that Nigeria remain the main actor for action in Africa and thus ending decades of military misrule. In the centrepiece of this thrust, however, Obasanjo never sought to redefine Nigeria’s foreign policy structure, nor did he articulate or even develop a foreign policy doctrine. The acceptance of Nigeria as a suitable hegemon by other African nations is beset by mistrust even from within Nigeria. Internally, the public and officials recognise that repression diminishes collective approaches, only offering false promises of stability. Thus, it is to be expected that officials often distance the foreign affairs apparatus from Obasanjo’s approach to foreign policy, which failed to dictate outcomes outside Nigeria. This has led to Nigeria continually facing a diversity of challenges. This is further compounded by the absence of an effective left-wing opposition as well as the absence of debate in cabinet meetings. This lack of alternative to Obasanjo’s approach has been part of a broader intellectual vacuum. Sovereignty is not monolithic, and every leader like Obasanjo thinks he has done some things better than others, and defends such strengths with special vigour. But are Nigerians proud of their foreign policy decision-making system, its intervention in conflict areas or their long history of democratic self-government? The answer to all of these is ‘no’.

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This answer may be dismissed as merely the relentless mutterings of Obasanjo’s critics, but Obasanjo not only hectored those who were constitutionally empowered as members of the decision-making structure but also psychologically intimidated them. No one has to date acknowledged, established or identified Obasanjo’s own intellectual reputation as a great thinker. At no time did he ever emphasise dialogue with foreign policy intellectuals; rather than proposing his ideas to Nigerians, he sought to impose them. Thus, there was no robust or respectful exchange between the leader and his people. The reciprocity simply wasn’t there and continued to remain absent. This suggests the administrative approach was uncoordinated. The unfortunate consequences of Obasanjo’s actions outweighed whatever successes he claimed to have made. Although he exuded power through strength among his peers, the frequent criticism of his style was based on the fact that he was trapped between his personal instincts and the negative perceptions others had. Though it is argued that he was consumed by the ‘fierce urgency of now’, which was bolstered by his visibility in international forums, he failed to change and improve his foreign policy model. This engendered fault lines between the three arms of government, the military and other key stakeholders in mapping out the role Nigeria could play in making sure all parts of Nigeria’s administration ‘faced the right way’ in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. The public and opposition ought to have made Nigeria do more in a persistent manner, particularly in curbing the activities of leaders in Obasanjo’s mould. The working assumption was that Obasanjo’s government was split and had limited control. There is, however, no reason whatsoever to suggest that he had a support network. Even if it did exist, no one has been able to ascertain the extent of that network, and so it is valid to seek answers as to why this was the case. Such conclusions illustrate the tensions between Obasanjo and foreign policy experts at the ministry – a group many deem as strategically vital but also deeply unreliable. Even in the glow of bipartisan moments, the political divide continued. This left Nigeria faced with an altered strategic outlook and grave doubts. The bigger challenge is that contemporary Nigeria faces a series of political and economic difficulties, which are growing rapidly due to unsettled foreign policy objectives. This has been exacerbated by a

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number of gaps within Nigeria, encapsulating a nation whose institutions have steadily declined and reinforcing the view that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is irrelevant, idle and suffers from impotency. Worse, they suggest that there has been a perpetual misuse of the institutions of power. Nigeria, no doubt, is strategically important in Africa – in part because of its influence and backed by its own oil reserves and its record as a regional power of considerable influence. The almost decade-long rule of Obasanjo ushered in an era of blindeye firewalls to the activities of his peers in the African continent, especially Sudan and Liberia. Nigerians were encouraged to feel assured that whatever Obasanjo was doing, it was in the best strategic interests of the country. But this was without informing them of the details which were to sour relations with Nigeria’s key allies. Although confidence is vital to success, overconfidence often backfires. The policy process should be delinked from the complex narratives organised to attain extraordinary foreign policy outcomes. Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making ought to be concerned with reconciling contrasting segments and structural unevenness. Pragmatism is a necessity in this case. Nigeria’s foreign policy needs to be framed in its historical context, rather than on the dictatorial tendencies of a single leader. Its foreign policy goals should be strategic and place national interest above that of Afrocentric concerns. This must begin with dismantling the structures of despotism, engendering genuine change and democratisation of the foreign policy process, especially incorporating people who are keen on shaping a brand-new Nigerian foreign policy process. It is hoped that these pragmatists will maintain Nigeria’s hegemonic grip on Africa. This is the only way Nigeria can exert its influence within the continent and beyond. Though this possibility may be challenging, as there are no certainties that Nigeria will move towards attaining a pragmatic mindset in foreign policy decision-making. Given Nigeria’s domineering leaders, who historically have drowned out its quietly effective foreign policy experts, this may be particularly difficult. The inability of the experts, opinion-moulders, society and intelligentsia to employ pressures to put Nigeria’s president on the back foot is also noticeable. The contributions from those interviewed revealed an absence of a convergence of views between President Obasanjo and his Ministry of

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Foreign Affairs. There was never a broad consensus regarding the structure of the foreign policy process, nor was there any particular point where Obasanjo outlined his foreign policy perspectives. A meeting with the foreign affairs experts and bureaucrats would have offered a rare opportunity to gauge the level of his knowledge. The absence of such a meeting, which is the norm in an ideal foreign policy setting, accounts for Obasanjo’s central position within the foreign policy process. He ignored crucial foreign policy options that emanated from the foreign affairs bureaucracy to his office. This operational setting in Nigeria’s foreign policy has itself raised a number of issues, central to which is the problem of access to the president as the main decision-maker and the ineffective nature of a vast and overlapping organisational structure. Thus, the main problem is the conflicting nature of belief systems, personalities and decision-making processes. Obasanjo’s achievements in the foreign policy arena certainly existed, but these were sporadic achievements, arising not from a thought-out, strategic position but from that of dominance. A strategic plan would have yielded a singular grand theme for Nigerian foreign policy, attaining a comprehensive foreign policy outlook. Obasanjo’s grandiose interventionist prescriptions in all areas of conflict within the African continent were neither intellectually contrived, nor did they express the right convictions. There is, therefore, the need for Nigeria’s foreign policy process to be future-oriented, especially toward a future in which a leader with global perspectives can use these lessons to halt the decline in Nigeria’s influence, profoundly evident in the post-Obasanjo years. In suggesting the way forward, it is incumbent to reintroduce the matter of the ceding of Bakassi as a key illustration of how foreign policy decisions can go awry. The Bakassi issue was one of Obasanjo’s worst foreign policy legacies. So contentious was the ceding that the ratification of such a decision by the Senate of the National Assembly of Nigeria has still not been made, as required by the constitution. This is without precedent in the world. India and Pakistan have been in continuous dispute over Kashmir, and neither has ceded any part to the other. Obasanjo’s unmitigated diplomatic blunder came as a result of intense pressure from the West. This would have been absolutely avoidable if an ideal foreign policy structure had been in place and operationally effective. Such a structure would have advocated a UNbacked referendum to enable the inhabitants to make their own decision.

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The decision Obasanjo made was condescending; Nigeria is seen as giving up on its people and allowing them to be treated as slaves. There is the pretence that Nigeria’s foreign policy has inputs from foreign policy experts. The truth is that the decision on Bakassi was nothing less than the whim of a strongman president. Foreign policy has not reflected the aspirations of the people of Nigeria but has always reflected the personal desires of strongmen leaders. Nigeria may be unable to articulate a foreign policy until there is a convergence with domestic expectations. The Afrocentric bond among African nations, which is the most intricate relation between states, does not in any way suggest a longterm and committed relationship between Nigeria and other African states. Collectivism is markedly absent as a result of the debates and differences within the AU; there has been little or no desire to protect the foundation upon which these ideals have been built, especially in difficult and competing situations. The scramble for the UN Security Council seat, the aspiration for the leadership of international organisations allocated to Africa and African states taking sides in conflicts within the continent, reveals the AU as a barren coalition, whose coherence its members are unable to establish, let alone explain. The AU cannot be effective if member states are only bound together by principles that members find difficult to articulate, let alone adhere to. Nigeria is said to have spearheaded reforms in the AU, but the result of these supposed reforms are still up in the air. Leadership – and partnership – in this arena has never been more urgently required. These reforms in the AU, spearheaded by Nigeria, have been meaningless because its own foreign policy decision-making needs to acquire some form of theoretical grounding and structured thought. The decline in mutual trust, the distorted reactions to conflicts in Africa and a distinct lack of active participation in peacekeeping operations within Africa are the consequences of the problematic nature of the AU. This is evidently due to polarisation along economic lines being prevalent in Africa between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, the privileged and the underprivileged. Thus, it is incongruent for Nigeria to continue to play ‘big brother’ to African states. Nigeria’s altruistic role in Africa that earned it the nickname of ‘the giant of Africa’ contrasts with domestic reality. It is true that Africa is the centrepiece of its foreign policy pursuits, but Nigeria should be able to draw a line at the appropriate

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time, given that the struggle for the decolonisation of Africa has since ended. Thus, foreign policy and domestic policy have to be pursued simultaneously. Nigeria’s foreign policy must therefore be tailored to produce results for its people. This, ideally, should be the sine qua non of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The culture of offering assistance to nations and groups without economic gains being tied to such help is old-fashioned. Nigeria ought to have drawn key lessons from the US, which places its own interests at the forefront of its dealings with the rest of the world. This is the concept of economic determinism as the cornerstone of foreign policy, which is, however, managed subtly, so is difficult for even discerning minds to comprehend the undertones. This can be replicated by Nigeria going further in defending the national interest, and by being feared by Africa in the same manner that the US is feared by the rest of the world. A sound foreign policy decision-making process should be able to identify any growing distrust, not only within Africa and the AU, but within the wider context of the international community. This is a potential factor working against foreign direct investment. The seeming distrust by a wide spectrum of the international community is fostered by inconsistent government policies, competing interests, domination and bungling diplomacy. Nigeria’s ‘great power’ posturing in Africa continues, and has assumed high proportions following its intervention in crises such as that in Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe, in restoring the deposed president and the granting of asylum to former President Charles Taylor of Liberia; and intervention in conflict zones in Africa, particularly in Darfur. Although this interventionist diplomacy has received accolades from near and far, Nigeria’s ‘big brother’ status and ‘great power’ posturing since independence in 1960 has never been reciprocated internationally. The ‘great power’ posturing is thus decidedly unsuitable – Nigeria cannot be a great power as it does not have the requirements to be one. In particular, it has failed to project and protect its national interests in the international arena. Nigeria should first of all consolidate its foreign policy around a core of economic realism and determinism before aspiring to be a great regional power. The economic determinist approach, in conjunction with the principle of reciprocity, which remains a central theme in bilateral and multilateral relations, should be at the forefront of its pursuits, rather than assuming in arrogance that all

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is well. Growing poverty in Nigeria and a failing infrastructure have no place in a foreign policy doctrine that espouses Nigeria as a great power. Again, there is also the argument that since no nation can successfully pursue its foreign policy objectives without success in its domestic arena, questions on these gaps will persist: how can a nation be successful in Darfur when it has internally displaced persons at home? Nigeria’s internal political dynamics remain in a state of shambles due mainly to the inability to use its oil wealth to lay a solid foundation for self-sustaining growth and development, to promote science and technology, to encourage the strengthening of the market and the productive base of the economy or to create conditions for political stability, democratisation or governmental accountability for the people. This situation has weakened the effectiveness of Nigeria’s foreign policy and contributed to the undermining of its influence abroad, despite its regional power posturing. Oil wealth continues to be squandered through corruption, with agriculture and rural areas neglected. Politics has become a kind of warfare, while the elite revel in decadence and waste, and the poor majority are alienated from the State. As such, Nigeria’s foreign policy continues to be rhetoric and propaganda rather than a consistent, systematic and well-articulated programme for advancing Nigeria’s interests. All this is further compounded by mismanagement, misplaced priorities and a wasteful use of resources that has bled the country dry, alongside a mounting foreign debt, seen largely as an entrapment policy of the West. Since solutions to the majority of crises would naturally rely on Western support, attacking Western policies has simply disappeared from foreign policy pronouncements by Nigeria and other African nations. Talk of liberating Africa and the black race all over the world and working for world peace has been toned down. Nigeria’s generosity to its neighbours, seen in the oil boom era, has dwindled. The country is beginning to suffer several challenges regarding influence over its neighbours. Nigeria seems to have come full circle, from timidity and a pro-Western position to a militant and radical pro-Africa posture and now back to a less independent and more pro-Western position. Paradoxically, in spite of the generally dismal conditions in the continent of Africa, Nigeria has managed to remain Africa’s most influential, if not its most powerful, country. Obasanjo’s knowledge of foreign affairs, his courage in decision-making and responsibility for

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major policies were never in doubt. What was in doubt was his own definition of a geopolitical standpoint for Nigeria’s foreign policy, and the alien tactic he adopted in executing it without integrating a collective conceptual framework. This is mainly due to Obasanjo’s failure in compartmentalising what he termed his diplomatic objectives into regional and functional bureaus. Even when he established the Ministry of Integration and Cooperation in Africa, it failed to materialise into something concrete. Nigeria does not enjoy serious clout in international politics. Its influence, even sporadic in nature, is tied to its financial muscle in hosting summits at short notice without turning to donor nations as many African nations do. As a result, hosting the Darfur peace talks in Abuja was possible. Nigeria’s important international political initiatives, apart from advancing the aforesaid reforms in the AU and interventionist policy in conflicts within the continent though consistently laced with the Afrocentric doctrine, are showing signs of weakening. This will be the case in the near future unless there is a change in approach. Nigeria’s ‘coalition of the willing’ in the AU, apart from South Africa and Algeria, was minimal and insignificant. Nigeria under Obasanjo was a benign power with hazy and unclear strategic intentions, which constrained its potential internationally. A foreign policy decisionmaking process should be robust, having hawks and doves debating, defining and defending policy options in a bureaucratic bargaining game, after espousing beliefs about what they offer to advance Nigeria’s goals, restore its influence externally (after internal repairs), re-establish her standing, and show the ability to lead Africa. Nigeria’s foreign policy approach to resolving disputes within Africa, particularly the Darfur talks in Abuja, was not pragmatic. This is particularly evident in the haste with which the mediation and agreement was rushed through, using acts of intimidation. The victims of the inconclusive process are the people of Darfur, who continue to suffer due to the elusiveness of sustainable peace. The inconclusive mediation led to flawed agreements since they were not accepted by all the parties to the conflict. When this is the case, enforcing such agreements is problematic and may not be binding. It therefore presupposes that, by the same token, such a development has undermined the AU in general and Nigeria in particular. As part of a

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new bargain with allies in the AU, Nigeria must re-engage in what is rightly considered as the cornerstone for a lasting transformation of the African continent. Darfur offered the opportunity for such a transformation, but this has now faded. Nigeria, by its own actions, lacked a coherent operational policy towards the Darfur conflict, as it had no foundation upon which a policy could be built, except that of hosting and funding the peace talks. Nigeria, by default, was a staunch ally of Sudan on the basis of the doctrine of Afrocentrism and as such could not be regarded as an honest broker between all parties to the conflict. Ideally, Nigeria should have been seen as leading the international community in offering a realistic vision of how peace ought to be articulated for Darfurians, if the rebels were to accept and respect the peace agreement. Nigeria did not use every foreign policy tool at its disposal to prevent threats of conflict in Africa until military intervention became the only option. The problem is that military operations have not been synchronised into the foreign policy architecture. Aside from its peacekeeping operations, Nigeria’s army must be structured to ensure that it develops and sustains a force with training and appropriate weaponry to combat insurgencies, safeguard public security and protect civilians in the African continent. If there is one lesson Nigeria should have learned in the past decades, it is that Nigerian regional power projection would be resisted even by its friends, especially when such projection is applied solely for selfpreservation, and not for common purposes. Thus, national interest can be countered by African interest. It should have been imperative for Obasanjo to treat domestic matters as more than backwater issues in foreign policy. Lessons can be drawn from Asia, where there has been a systematic disengagement of US influence in the region. Prior to now, the US dictated the economic pace of the region. The reverse is now the case, with China in the driving seat having successfully transformed most of South East Asia, including Australia, into economic allies. Its economy has grown beyond the imagination of the West. China’s diplomatic challenge began with its strengthening of domestic interest. Likewise, Russia and India have also asserted themselves in Asia as key regional players, thanks to crude oil/gas reserves and information technology, respectively. Nigeria has to replicate this in order to earn the regional power status. Until this is done, all aspects of its foreign

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pursuits should be regarded as mere posturing. Nigeria ought to have used its expeditions into conflict areas as an opportunity to expand its economic frontiers. Yet the Obasanjo administration largely ignored suggestions to pursue internal development and never once was there a comprehensive strategy on growth similar to those countries articulated above. Rather, Obasanjo preferred actions on the global stage which drew opportunities and encomiums to him alone. Even with limited success, Nigerian regional power projection, when directed to internal concerns, can serve the common good. An inward focus does not mean neglecting foreign policy. Rather, such pursuits could champion trade as part of a long-term strategy for growth in line with the common good. The priority of domestic interests is imperative as a means of ensuring national security. This incorporates the idea that domestic interests should first be concerned with individuals and groups within the State before progressing to the interests of the State as a whole, then move on to sub-regional concerns, and, finally, take on an international dimension. Although it is true that these are, to a degree, interdependent, their order of importance nevertheless needs to be established. Nigeria’s future presidents ought to rely more on such a plan to achieve Nigeria’s foreign policy goals, backed up with the usual behind-the-scenes political conciliation between the government in power and the opposition, the intelligentsia, students and the media. Mutual support between these groups could, in time, lead to Nigeria’s resurgence. The question remains, however, whether these can be institutionalised to harness the political will to build regional frameworks for security – beginning with the internal and moving to the external. The answer is, as argued here, that foreign policy should always be driven by domestic interests and priorities. The ad hoc nature of foreign policy conduct in Nigeria is a significant problem, cutting across bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as Nigeria’s intervention in the foreign arena. This ad hoc approach points to the frustration during the Obasanjo administration. Any debate between the pragmatists and ideologues was kept outside the corridors of power. Those within were ineffective because of the domination of President Obasanjo. Whatever the reality was, it was nothing short of a miracle that Nigeria under Obasanjo remained the central actor in Africa’s international issues. It was nevertheless patchy, and lacked

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connection with other actors as well as formal alliances. This raises the question: does Africa really have a common cause? Nigeria’s regional framework can contribute important extra dimensions to peacemaking in Africa, only if it drives other regional groupings or regional powers in the continent. This is especially true of the Greater Horn area (made up of the Great Horn and Great Lakes), perennially beset by conflicts and demonstrating that Nigeria cannot unilaterally intervene in all conflicts in the African continent. Another regional power in the Greater Horn region should be able to counterbalance whatever Nigeria is offering. The next obvious alternatives are the sub-regional security organisations in the continent, such as ECOWAS in West Africa and, of course, the AU and the UN. All of these, when efficiently managed and devoid of division, can involve themselves in diplomatic and military intervention initiatives to resolve problems in Africa. The absence of a regional hegemon in the shape of Nigeria in the Greater Horn region makes a lot of difference to the AU’s pursuit of security and peace. Only a hegemon can inspire mutual intervention when conflicts arise in the region. A hegemon can collectivise action by nations in the region. The offshoot of such a diplomatic drive may be successful at employing ‘communal repression’ to discipline member states if they go astray, like Sudan on Darfur. Also addressed was the gap in the AU’s effectiveness regarding its own concept of security. Historically, there has been no established tradition of what influences the AU to respond to security threats in the continent. Afrocentrism is both the key and the problem. Further, there is no established set of options available to the AU, thereby exacerbating already difficult cases like Darfur. The gap here is the AU’s failure to define its doctrine on governance in Africa: how to deal with internal grievances, ranging from political and economic exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion, to authoritarian leadership enmeshed in corruption. What have the AU, NEPAD or its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) done with their much-lauded structures, intended to prevent conflicts in Africa? When these structures are ineffective, what further escalation of conflict does the world need before it intervenes? The AU suffers from a lack of expertise and the technical capacity to deliver critical diplomatic results whenever conflicts intensify in Africa.

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The AU’s intervention in Darfur through Nigeria failed to demonstrate its value, either in its doctrine or implementation. Thus, it is not yet an effective player in crisis management, although there is the political will. The failure, to a large extent, is understandable for a number of reasons: its first peacekeeping effort in Africa after its transmutation from the OAU was beset by problems like naivety, inadequate preparation, lack of funding, troops in short supply (only Nigeria and Rwanda were bold enough to send troops to Darfur when needed), inadequate equipment and dispute over the exact interpretation of the peacekeeping mandate, compounded further by the absence of an enforcement capacity in the mandate. In the AU, there is often disagreement among member states, given the historical divisions between anglophone and francophone states. Member states often do not agree on procedures of negotiation and cooperation, leading to a constancy of stalemates. The AU also has room to improve in the area of technical capacity through the establishment of a multifaceted bureaucracy for the analysis of Africa’s problems, particularly with regard to internal conflicts and state failure. Further research into these questions may provide a better analysis of African conflicts and even shape future interventions. As a former military head of state, Obasanjo held consultative meetings through his organisation, the African Leadership Forum (ALF), which collaborated with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris in 1990 to explore the implications for Africa of the end of the Cold War. Thus, in November 1990, the ALF, in partnership with the secretariat of the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa, further assembled academics, civil society groups and business elites to discuss the relevance of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for Africa. Interestingly, the policy communique´ became the blueprint for the African version of OSCE. It is curious to note that the type of assemblage and calculating input seen in ALF was never employed in Obasanjo’s government from 1999 to 2007. Obasanjo’s failure in this regard could be explained away by the urgent need to develop a new foreign policy and its frustration by domestic political pressure – in particular, the strong opposition to Nigeria’s peacekeeping missions in West Africa. However, for any longterm policy to be successful, intellectual input in the manner of the ALF

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is necessary. A long-term foreign policy approach would have prevented criticisms of Obasanjo’s unilateralism and perhaps in its place established a doctrine of pre-emptive action, which cuts down the cost of peacekeeping. It should have been imperative for Obasanjo to develop an agenda that was pro-Nigerian despite being subjugated to the imperatives of Afrocentrism. Nigeria’s policy of peacekeeping intervention has often been taken for granted, providing an opportunity for many nations to benefit excessively from Nigeria’s financial support. This aspect of foreign policy needs overhauling – supplanting unilateralism with multilateralism. Unilateralism only highlights potential vulnerabilities when it is obvious that Nigeria lacked broad-based support and legitimacy. Unilateralism is an urgent imperative to counter the instigators of conflict, requiring the nation intervening to demonstrate resolve. The only nation that has been able to conduct itself in this manner internationally is the US. Obasanjo’s unilateralism was that of non-consultation with key stakeholders, before reaching foreign policy decisions often made without research or strategic planning. Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore needs greater flexibility and resources to initiate deterrent diplomacy, including mediation at the initial stage of conflicts, and to technically assist with democracy-building programmes in areas that are vulnerable to conflicts. The executive can then sift through these policy options before reaching a decision. The main positive aspects of Obasanjo’s administration were that it held firmly to its policy of supporting peaceful diplomatic solutions. Black Africa witnessed several events, the significance of which cannot be ignored internationally. Nigeria, being one of the most important countries in the continent, successfully completed a gruelling journey from military dictatorship to civilian rule, culminating in the election of Obasanjo in 1999. These developments triggered a reawakening inside black Africa, giving rise to a new sense of hope in Africa’s search for political permanence. One of the major obstacles to a proactive Nigerian diplomacy pursuit in Africa was the backlash from African states weighed down by economic crises, alongside the web of political complexities between many states in the AU. Again, there was no powerful ‘watchdog’ parliamentary committee on foreign relations – a fact exacerbated by revelations that Nigeria’s parliament rarely met to discuss foreign policy.

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This was the case when members of parliament had a limited grasp of its role in foreign policy decision-making in a democracy. Just as under the Balewa administration, there were some powerful pressure groups and experts who articulated diverse, and at times contradictory, views to counterbalance Obasanjo’s foreign policy direction. Unfortunately, these contributions were ineffective in influencing policy directions, a fact not helped by the fragility of the system. A nation’s foreign policy success involves details and nuances – ingredients still missing in Nigeria. Additionally, the little energy displayed at international forums was wasted, due largely to the wider problem of ambiguity in its conduct. More specifically, Obasanjo’s foreign policy doctrine was not strategically positioned in a longer historical perspective. If Obasanjo’s foreign forays ever did bring benefits to Nigeria, these were time-bound and limited. Foreign policy decisionmaking should be seen ultimately as something to be managed by means of thorough, painstaking and professional work.

NOTES

Introduction 1. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Harper Collins, 1971). 2. See also: Graham T. Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, American Political Science Review LX11, No. 3 (1969), pp. 689 – 718. 3. Ibid., pp. 10 – 11. 4. Ibid. 5. See, for example: Ole R. Holsti, ‘Review of Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, The Western Political Quarterly Vol. 25 (1972), p. 139; Stephen Krasner, ‘Are Bureaucracies Important? Or Allison Wonderland’, Foreign Policy No. 7 (1972), p. 160; Desmond J. Ball, ‘The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory’, Australian Outlook No. 28 (1974), pp. 84, 87 – 8; Wilfred L. Kohl, ‘The NixonKissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S. European Relations: Patterns of Policy Making’, World Politics No. 28 (1975), p. 4; Dan Caldwell, ‘Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making’, American Behavioral Scientist No. 21 (1977), p. 96; Christopher Jones, ‘Toward a Third Generation Model: Rethinking Governmental Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago (2007), pp. 1 – 44. 6. Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, ‘Rethinking Allison’s Models’, American Political Science Review No. 86 (1992), p. 318.

Chapter 1 Obasanjo, Nigeria and the AU 1. John Iliffe, Obasanjo, Nigeria and the World (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 7 –13. 2. Ibid.

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3. Sam Iroanusi, Nigeria’s Head of State and Government (Lagos, 1997), p. 61. 4. Illife, Obasanjo, pp. 12 – 15. 5. Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War (Ibadan, 1980), p. xii. 6. Ibid., pp. xii – xiii. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Iliffe, Obasanjo, p. 108. 10. Gbemisola R. Adeoti, ‘Narrating the green gods: Nigerian military rulers and the genre of (auto) biography’, a paper for CODESRIA’s 30th Anniversary Conference, Dakar, Senegal 8 – 11 December 2003. 11. Iliffe, Obasanjo, p. 108. 12. Olajide Aluko, ‘Nigeria and Britain after Gowon’, African Affairs lxxvi/304 (1977), pp. 303 – 20. 13. Lizzie Williams, Nigeria (The Globe Pequot Press, Guilford, Connecticut, 2008), p. 19. 14. Ibid. 15. Olusegun Obasanjo, Not My Will (Ibadan, 1990). 16. Ibrahim Gambari, Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy Making (Atlantic Heights, 1989). 17. Williams, Nigeria, p. 19. 18. Ibid. 19. Stephen Wright, ‘Towards civilian rule in Nigeria’, World Today xxxv/3 (1979) pp. 110 –17. 20. Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy (London, 1981), p. 212. 21. Oye Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria’s foreign policy under military rule 1966– 79’, International Journal xxxv/4 (1980), pp. 748– 65. 22. Ibid. 23. J. Kayode Fayemi, ‘Military hegemony and the transition program’, A Journal of Opinion xxvii /1 (1999), pp. 69 – 72. 24. Iliffe, Obasanjo, p. 99. 25. Ibid., p. 102. 26. Ibid., p. 103. 27. Karl Maier, ‘Critical condition’, World Today lix/2 (2003), pp. 23 – 5. 28. See Ike Okonta, ‘The disease of elephants: oil-rich “minority” areas, Shell and international NGOs’, in Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (eds), Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Cape Town, 2008), p. 122. Babangida later installed an interim administration led by an interim president, Ernest Adegunle Oladeinde Shonekan, on 26 August 1993. He lasted only three months until General Sani Abacha toppled him in a palace coup on 17 November 1993. 29. Williams, Nigeria, p. 19. 30. Cameron Duodu, ‘Confounding the prophets of doom’, World Today lv/2 (1999), pp. 10 – 12.

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31. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, ‘The Nigerian transition: third time lucky or more of the same’, Review of African Political Economy xxvi/60 (1999), pp. 277 – 91. 32. Claude E. Welch, ‘Transition without end: Nigerian politics and civil society under Babangida’, Journal of Developing Areas xxxiii/2 (1999), pp. 291 – 2. 33. Peyi Soyinka-Airewele, ‘Collective memory and selective amnesia in a transmutational paradox’, Journal of opinion, xxvii/1 (1999), pp. 4429. 34. Ibid. 35. Duodu, ‘Confounding the prophets’, pp. 10 – 12. 36. Mustapha, ‘The Nigerian transition’, pp. 277 – 91. 37. Soyinka-Airewele, ‘Collective memory’, pp. 442 9. 38. Adonis Hoffman, ‘Nigeria: the policy conundrum’, Foreign Policy 101/Winter (1995 – 6), p. 146. 39. Julius O. Ihonvbare, ‘The 1999 presidential elections in Nigeria: the unresolved issues’, Journal of Opinion xxvii/1 (1999), pp. 59 – 62. 40. Jonathan Power, ‘Forward Nigeria’, World Policy Journal xxv/2 (2008), pp. 69 – 74. 41. Oye Ogunbadejo, ‘A new turn in US –Nigerian relations’, World Today xxxv/3 (1979), pp. 117 – 26. 42. Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria’s foreign policy’, pp. 748– 65. 43. Ibid. 44. Power, ‘Forward Nigeria’, pp. 69 – 74. 45. Ibid. 46. Steve Itugbu, America’s War on Terror (London, 2008). See also Steve Itugbu, ‘Shuttling for economic prospects’, Guardian (Nigeria), 20 August 2000. 47. Pat Utomi, ‘On the edge of chaos’, World Today lx/11 (2004), pp. 22– 3. 48. Ibid. 49. Axel Harneit-Sievers, ‘Nigeria after the presidential elections report on a conference in Bonn, March 22, 1999’, Africa Spectrum xxxiii/3 (1999), pp. 351 –8. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Iliffe, Obasanjo, pp. 225– 8. 55. Editorial, ‘Nigeria: Unhappy Transition’, Economic and Political Weekly xlii/17 (2007), pp. 1476– 7. 56. J. Herskovits, ‘Nigeria’s rigged democracy’, Foreign Affairs lxxxvi/4 (2007), pp. 115 –30. 57. ‘Nigeria: Unhappy Transition’. 58. Welch ‘Transition without end: Nigerian politics and civil society under Babangida’. 59. Ibid., p. 103.

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60. Power, ‘Forward Nigeria’, pp. 69 – 74. 61. Nelson Mandela, ‘Leader, statesman and friend’, in Hans d’Orville (ed.), Beyond Freedom: Letters to Olusegun Obasanjo (New York, 1996), p. 27. 62. Malcolm Fraser and Olusegun Obasanjo, ‘What to do about South Africa’, Foreign Affairs lxv 1 (1986), pp. 154– 62. 63. Iliffe, Obsanjo, p. 217. 64. Power, ‘Forward Nigeria’, pp. 69 – 74. 65. Helmut Schmidt, ‘One of the most important voices of the African continent’, in Hans d’Orville (ed.), Beyond Freedom: Letters to Olusegun Obasanjo (New York, 1996), p. 33. 66. Serie McDougal, ‘African foreign policy: a question of methodology’, Journal of Pan-African Studies ii/9 (2009), p. 66. 67. Ibid., p. 67. 68. Molefi Kete Asante, ‘What is Afrocentricity?’, in Ama Mazema (ed.), The Afro-Centric Idea (Philadephia, 1998); Molefi Kete Asante (ed.), The Afrocentric Paradigm (Philadelphia, 2003). 69. Ufot B. Inamete, ‘The conceptual framework of Nigerian foreign policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History xxxix/1 (1993), p. 72. 70. John Agreen Idumange (2010), ‘The Problematic of Redefining Nigeria’s National Interest in the Context of Global Diplomacy’, SSA Research & Social Media, available at www.ssaresearchandsocialmedia.wordpress.com [accessed 24 September 2016]. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Iliffe, Obasanjo, pp. 81 – 3. 74. Idumange, ‘The Problematic’. 75. Thomas Cargill, ‘G8 and aid In Africa: party over’, World Today lxv/6 (2009), pp. 16 – 18. 76. Adebayo Williams, ‘Briefing: Nigeria: a restoration drama’, African Affairs xcviii/392 (1999), p. 407. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. Eniola Bello, ‘This season of unreason’, This Day (Nigerian daily newspaper, 5 July 2006, back page). 80. Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria’s foreign policy’, pp. 748– 65. 81. Julius Ihonvbere, ‘Nigeria as Africa’s great power: constraints and prospects for the 1990s’, International Journal xliii/3, Regional Powers (Summer) (1991), pp. 516 –17. 82. Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria’s foreign policy’, pp. 748– 65. 83. Ibid., p. 750. 84. David Watt, ‘Kissinger’s track back: White House years by Henry Kissinger’, Foreign Policy 37/Winter (1979– 80), p. 63. 85. Ihonvbere, ‘Nigeria as Africa’s great power’, p. 517. 86. Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria’s foreign policy’, pp. 748– 65.

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87. S.U. Fwatshak, ‘The AGOA and Nigeria’s Non-Oil Experts’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 17 (2007), pp. 151– 68. 88. James Mayall, ‘Resetting the Compass’, World Today lix/12 (2003), pp. 18 – 19. 89. Fernando Goncalves, ‘Moment for action’, World Today lxiii/5 (2007), pp. 20 – 1. 90. Ibid. 91. Christine Gray, ‘Peacekeeping and Enforcement Action in Africa: The Role of Europe and the Obligations of Multilateralism’, Review of International Studies 31 (2005), pp. 207– 23. 92. Paul D. Williams, ‘The African Union: Prospects for Regional Peacekeeping after Burundi & Sudan’, Review of African Political Economy 33.108 (2006), pp. 352 –57. 93. Warisu O. Alli, ‘The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Abuja, 2012), p. 73. 94. Daniel Volman, ‘The Bush Administration & African Oil: The Security Implications of US Energy Policy’, Review of African Political Economy 30.98 (2003), pp. 573 – 84. 95. David O. Omagu, ‘State, Politics, and Globalisation’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 21 (2012), 70 –98. 96. Thomas Kwasi Tieku, ‘Explaining the clash and accommodation of interest of major actors in the creation of the African Union’, African Affairs ciii/411 (2004), pp. 249 – 67. 97. Ibid., p. 251. 98. Ibid. 99. David Gonzales, ‘Africa at the first South Summit in Havana’, Review of African Political Economy xxvii/84 (2000), pp. 341 – 46. 100. Tieku, ‘Explaining the clash’. 101. Ibid. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, ‘Hegemony, institutionalism and US foreign policy: theory and practice in comparative historical perspective’, Third World Quarterly xxvi/7 (2005), p. 1183. 106. Tieku, ‘Explaining the clash’, p. 261. 107. Ibid., p. 261. 108. Emeka Chiakwelu, ‘G-20 summit: Where is Nigeria the giant of Africa?’, available at www.modernghana.com/new/210700 [accessed 15 April 2012]. 109. Colin I Bradford Jr., ‘G20 SUMMIT: The G force’, World Today lxv/3 (2009). 110. Susan Harris Rimmer, ‘Explainer: Who gets invited to the G20, and why’, The Conversation (2 November 2014). 111. Mui Pong Goh, ‘The G20: short of steam’, World Today lxi/6 (2010), pp. 23 – 4.

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112. Emmanuel Nnadozie, ‘Africa needs stronger representation at G20’, PANAPRESS In-Depth Specials, 16 November 2014. 113. The 12 June 2006 Greentree Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria was the formal treaty which resolved the Cameroon-Nigeria border dispute over the oil- and natural gas-rich Bakassi Peninsula. 114. Piet Konings, ‘The Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria Boundary: Opportunities and Conflicts.’ African Affairs 104.415 (2005), pp. 275 – 301. 115. Ibid. 116. ‘Nigerian Army Hands over Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon’, Guardian (Nigeria), 18 August 2006. 117. Iliffe, Obasanjo, pp. 282– 4. 118. Ibid., p. 221. 119. The International Criminal Court on 4 March 2009, through a press release, issued a warrant of arrest for Omar Al-al-Bashir, President of Sudan for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 120. Osita Agbu, ‘NEPAD: Origin, Challenges and Prospects’, The Indian Journal of Political Science 64.1/2 (2003), pp. 97 – 115. 121. Christopher Preble, ‘Let the African Union intervene in Darfur’. This article appeared on Reason.com, 13 April 2006, available at http://www.cato.org/ publications/commentary/let-african-union-intervene-darfur [accessed 30 April 2012]. 122. Kuruvilla Mathews, ‘Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The African Union’, India International Centre Quarterly 31.4 (2005), pp. 143– 55. 123. Paul D. Williams ‘From non-intervention to non-indifference: the origins of the African Union’s security culture’, African Affairs cvi/423 (2007), p. 254. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid. 126. Linnea Bergholm, ‘Who can keep the peace in Africa?’, African Affairs cvi/422 (2006), p. 149. 127. John Stremlau, ‘Ending Africa’s war’, Foreign Affairs lxxix/4 (2000), p. 117. 128. Omar A. Touray, ‘The common African defence and security policy’, African Affairs civ/417 (2005), p. 641. 129. John Stremlau, ‘Ending Africa’s war’, p. 123. 130. Nigeria’s Western friends pressured her because of fears Darfur could become a breeding ground for terrorists. 131. Olajide Aluko, ‘Nigeria and Britain after Gowon’, African Affairs lxxvi/304 (1977), pp. 303 – 20. 132. ‘Hegemonic Participation in Peace-keeping Operations: The Case of Nigeria and ECOMOG [with Comment and Rejoinder]’, International Journal on World Peace 13.2 (1996), pp. 31 – 66. 133. Ihonvbere, ‘Nigeria as Africa’s great power’, pp. 511– 12. 134. Ibid., p. 512. 135. Ibid., p. 513.

234 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149.

150.

151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

160.

NOTES TO PAGES 37 –42 Ibid., pp. 518 – 19. Ibid., pp. 514 – 15. Ibid., p. 516. Gani J. Yoroms, ‘ECOMOG and West African regional security: a Nigerian perspective’, Journal of Opinion xxi/1– 2 (1993), p. 84. Ibid., p. 84. Ibid., p. 85. Ibid. Emeka Nwokedi, ‘Sub-regional security and Nigerian foreign policy’, African Affairs lxxxiv/335 (1985), p. 197. Ibid.. p. 199. Ibid., p. 196. Ibid., p. 197. Christopher Clapham, Review Article: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projection, Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (eds), African Affairs lxxxiv/336 (1985), pp. 465 – 6. Ibid. Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, ‘South Africa and Nigeria as regional hegemons’, in Mwesiga Laurent Baregu and Chris Landsberg (eds), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenge (Boulder, 2003), pp. 171 –2. Christopher Clapham, ‘Review article of: Nigeria and the World: Readings in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy by A.B. Akinyemi; Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1975 by O. Oyediran; Nigeria’s Leadership Role in Africa by J. Wayas’, African Affairs Vol. 8. No. 322 (1982), pp. 140– 2. US President George Bush’s speech during visit to Nigeria. See OPEC Bulletin (July/August 2003), p. 24. National Interest of Nigeria, 11 November 2001, p. 13. Ike Okonta, ‘Nigeria looks to oil boost its regional power’, Taipei Times, 22 January 2008, p. 9. Ibid. Ibid Mary H. Moran and M. Anne Pitcher, ‘The “basket case” and the “poster child”: explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique’, Third World Quarterly xxv/3 (2004), p. 502. Ibid., p. 505. Ibid. Faith O. Oviasogie and Adekunle O. Shodipo, ‘Personality, Foreign Policy and National Transformation: An Assessment of the Olusegun Obasanjo’s Administration (1999– 2007)’, Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs Vol. 1, No. 2 (2013), pp. 192– 212. Sule Lamido, ‘Challenges of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria: An Insider’s Perspective’, Lecture presented by Sule Lamido, CON (Foreign Minister of The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 – 2003),

NOTES

161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167.

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Organised by Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA) in Collaboration with Friedrich Elbert Stiftung (FES) Nigeria, Protea Hotel, Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria, on 31 October 2012. Daniel C. Bach, ‘Nigeria’s ’Manifest Destiny’ in West Africa: Dominance without Power’, Africa Spectrum 42.2 (2007), pp. 301 –21. Editorial, National Concord, 30 May 2000. Imo Ukaeji, ‘Questioning Nigeria’s Diplomatic Posturing’, Guardian (Nigeria), 17 August 2003. Ihonvbere, ‘Nigeria as Africa’s great power’, pp. 512– 13. Ibid., p. 522. ‘Nigeria: Unhappy Transition’, pp. 1476 –7. Waranya Moni, ‘The UN Report on Darfur: What role for the AU?’, Pambazuka News, 10 February 2005.

Chapter 2 The Impact of Darfur 1. Peter Woodward, ‘Islam and politics’ in Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward (eds), Sudan Since Independence (Aldershot, 1986), p. 1. 2. Alex de Waal, ‘Who are the Darfurians and African identities, violence and external engagement’, African Affairs civ/415 (2005), p. 182. 3. Ibid. 4. David Hoile, Darfur: The Road to Peace (London, 2008), p. 12. 5. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (London, 2008), pp. 7 – 8. 6. Martin W. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 1 –2. 7. Robert O. Collins, ‘Disaster in Darfur: historical overview’, in Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (eds), Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan (New York and London, 2006), pp. 3 – 4. 8. Ibid. 9. Editorial, ‘Darfur: A Brief History’, New Internationalist Issue 401, 1 June 2007. 10. Peter Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism (London, 1979), pp. 1 – 2. 11. Peter Woodward, Sudan 1898– 1989: The Unstable State (London, 1990), p. 13. 12. Woodward, Condominium, pp. 2 – 3. 13. Ibid. 14. Collins, ‘Disaster in Darfur’, p. 7. 15. ‘Darfur: A Brief History’. 16. Woodward, Sudan 1898– 1989, p. 107. 17. Ibid.

236 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

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Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, p. 177. Ibid., p. 205. Woodward, Condominium, p. 166. Ibid., p. 153. Ibid., p. 156. Alex de Waal, ‘Sudan: the turbulent state’, in Alex de Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (Cambridge, Massachussets, 2007), p. 1. Woodward, ‘Islam and Politics’, p. 1. Woodward, Sudan 1898– 1989, p. 157. Woodward, ‘Islam and Politics’, p. 1. Collins, ‘Disaster in Darfur’. Ibid. Ibid., p. 8. de Waal, ‘Sudan: the turbulent state’, p. 13. Global IDP, Profile of Internal Displacement: Sudan. Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council as at 29 October 2005, available at www.internal-displacement.org [accessed 8 July 2011]. Lionel Cliffe, ‘Regional dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa’, Third World Quarterly xx/1 (1999), p. 98. Ibid. Ibid., p. 99. Dwight D. Murphey, ‘Do something about Darfur: a review of the complexities’, Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies Summer (2008), p. 5. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, p. 259. Ibid., p. 3. Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil War (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2003), p. 102. Andrew S. Natsios, ‘Moving beyond the sense of alarm in genocide’, in Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (eds), Darfur, Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan (New York and London, 2006), p. 7. Steve Itugbu, America’s War on Terror (London, 2008), pp. 15, 190. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Nairobi, Kenya, 9 January, 2005. Amir H. Idris, Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan (New York, 2005), p. 78. Ibid. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 83. Ulrich Mans, ‘Sudan: the new war in Darfur’, African Affairs (2004) ciii/411, p. 291. Adam Azzain Mohammed, ‘The comprehensive peace agreement and Darfur’, in Alex de Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (Cambridge, Massachussets, 2007), p. 211.

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48. Julie Flint, ‘Darfur: dying for peace’, Review of African Political Economy xxxiii/108 (2006). 49. Johnson, The Root Causes, p. 151. 50. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, pp. 170– 1. 51. General Martin Luther Agwai, Nigeria’s former Chief of Defence Staff, former Chief of Army Staff and former UN Commander in Darfur, spoke to the author at his residence in Maitama, Abuja, Nigeria on 7 January, 2010. 52. Ibid. 53. Scott Straus, ‘Darfur and the genocide debate’, Foreign Affairs lxxxiv/1 (2005), p. 126. 54. Lionel Cliffe, ‘Regional Dimensions’, p. 89. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., p. 90. 57. Ibid., p. 91. 58. Ibid., p. 92. 59. Nicholas van de Walle, ‘Darfur: the long road to disaster’, Foreign Affairs lxxxvi (2007), p. 179. 60. Bergholm, ‘Who can keep the peace in Africa?’, p. 147. 61. Alade W. Fawole, ‘A continent in crisis: internal conflicts and external interventions in Africa’, African Affairs ciii/411 (2004), p. 302. 62. Lansana Gberie, ‘Africa: the troubled continent’, African Affairs civ/415 (2005), p. 338. 63. Ibid. 64. Peter Woodward, ‘War or peace in Africa’, African Affairs xcviii/393 (1999), pp. 579 –83. 65. Ibid., p. 582. 66. Gberie, ‘Africa, the troubled continent’, p. 340. 67. Richard Jackson, ‘Conflict resolution in Africa: intervention, indifference, and indigenous solutions’, African Affairs c/399 (2001), pp. 321– 2. 68. Ibid., p. 322. 69. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General (PDF), UN, 25 January 2005. 70. Mahmood Mamdani, ‘The politics of naming: genocide, civil war, insurgency’, London Review of Books xxix/5 (2007). 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Straus, ‘Darfur and the genocide debate’, p. 124. 74. Hugo Slim, ‘Dithering over Darfur? A preliminary review of the international response’, International Affairs lxxx/5 (2004), p. 811. 75. Ibid., p. 812. 76. Ibid., p. 823. 77. Nick Grono, ‘Darfur: the international community’s failure to protect’, African Affairs cv/421 (2006), p. 628.

238

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55 –60

78. Marcus Mabry, ‘Africa’s ailing giant: chaos reigns in Nigeria’, Foreign Affairs lxxix/5 (2000), p. 123. 79. Wole Soyinka, ‘The avoidance word still screams its name’, Transition 97, xiii/3 (2007), p. 11. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid., pp. 13 – 14. 82. Sarjoh A. Bah, ‘Understanding the Africa and international response to the ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’, Harvard African Policy Journal vi (2009– 10), p. 94. 83. Grono, ‘Darfur: the international community’s failure to protect’, p. 621. 84. Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun, ‘The responsibility to protect’, Foreign Affairs lxxxi/6 (2002), p. 108. 85. Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A duty to prevent’, Foreign Affairs lxxxiii/1 (2004), p. 137. 86. Grono, ‘Darfur: the international community’s failure to protect’, p. 624. 87. Flint and de Waal, Darfur: A New History, p. 201. 88. Ibid., p. 203. 89. Flint, ‘Darfur: dying for peace’, p. 325. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid., p. 326. 93. Alex de Waal, ‘Darfur’, Review of African Political Economy xxxiii/110 (2006), pp. 737 –8. 94. Ibid., p. 737. 95. United State Congress. House Subcommittee on Africa, ‘Sudan: Peace Agreement around the Corner?’ Subcommittee Hearing on Africa of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress. Second Session, 11 March 2004. Serial No. 108– 79. 96. Sarah Williams and Lena Sherif, ‘The arrest warrant for President alBashir: immunities of incumbent heads of state and the International Criminal Court’, Oxford Journal of Conflict and Security Law xiv/1 (2009), pp. 71 – 92. 97. ‘Security Council refers situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court’. UN Press Release SC/8351, 31 March 2005. 98. Statement by Luis Moreno Ocampo, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), International Criminal Court, 5 June 2008. 99. ‘Sudan defiant on Darfur Suspects’, BBC, 27 February 2007. 100. Flint and de Waal, Darfur: a New History, p. 173. 101. Ibid., p. 206. 102. The author spoke to General Martin Luther Agwai, former UN Commander in Darfur, at his residence in Maitama, Abuja, Nigeria on 7 January, 2010. 103. Ibid.

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104. Rene V. Wadlow, ‘The Darfur Peace Agreement is not peace’, International Journal on World Peace xxiii/1, March (2006), pp. 86 – 8. 105. Sarjoh A. Bah, ‘Understanding the African and international response’, p. 94. 106. Ibid., p. 95.

Chapter 3 The Ethical/Philosophical Motivation Driving Obasanjo’s Diplomacy on Conflicts in Africa 1. Richard Devetak, ‘Critical theory’, in Burchill et al. (eds), Theories of International Relations, 2nd Edition (New York, 2001), p. 164. 2. Will Kymlicka, ‘Liberalism and communitarianism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy xviii/2 (1998), pp. 181– 204. 3. John Morrow, History of Political Thought: A Thematic Introduction (New York, 1998), p. 37. 4. Chris Brown, ‘Ethics, interests and foreign policy’, in Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 2001), p. 20. 5. Ibid. 6. Morrow, History of Political Thought, p. 270. 7. Adeno Addis, ‘Individualism, communitarianism and the right of ethnic minorities’, Notre Dame Law Review lvii/615 (1991 – 2), pp. 615– 76. 8. Charles Zorgbibe, ‘Liberal illusions and unequal exchange?’, African Geopolitics Quarterly 24 (2006), pp. 155– 6. 9. Segun Gbadegesin, ‘Yoruba philosophy: individuality, community, and the moral order’, in E. Eze (ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford, 1998), p. 130. 10. Ibid., p. 131. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Be´ne´zet Bujo, The Ethical Dimension of Community: The African model and the Dialogue between North and South (Nairobi, 1998), p. 27. 14. International Humanist and Ethical Union on ‘A Commonwealth Ethos, Equality and Human Rights in Africa’ by IHEU, available at www.iheu.org/ communitarian-ethos-equality-and-human-rights-africa [accessed 15 October 2011]. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Kwame Gyekye, ‘Persons and community in African thought’, in K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye (eds), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies 1 (Washington DC, 1992), p. 102. 19. Okolo Chukwudum, ‘The African person: a cultural definition’, Indian Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1988), pp. 99 – 107.

240

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65 –73

20. International Humanist and Ethical Union on ‘A Commonwealth Ethos, Equality and Human Rights in Africa’ by IHEU, available at www.iheu.org/ communitarian-ethos-equality-and-human-rights-africa [accessed 15 October 2011]. 21. Gyekye, ‘Persons and community in African thought’, p. 43. 22. Ibid., p. 66. 23. Joseph I. Omorogbe, ‘African philosophy: yesterday and today’, in E. Eze (ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford, 1998), p. 3. 24. M.M. Agrawal, ‘Morals and the value of human life’, in African Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford, 1998), p. 146. 25. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London, 1965), p. 305. 26. Okon Akiba, Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa: Continuity and Change (New York, 1998), p. 93. 27. Ibid., p. 106. 28. Thomas A. Imobighe, ‘The long road to Nigeria’s Africa-centred foreign policy’, in Nigeria’s African Policy in the Eighties (Kuru, 1981), p. 15. 29. Olayiwola Abegunrin, Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966– 1999 (London, 2003), p. 196. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Paul P. Izah, Continuity and Change in Nigerian Foreign Policy (Zaria, 1991), p. 43. 33. Ogaba Oche, ‘Principles of international relations’, in R.A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate (eds), Selected Readings on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations, NIIA Enlightenment Course Series, Vol. 1, Number 1 (Ibadan, 2000), pp. 13 – 14. 34. Inamete, Foreign Policy Decision Making in Nigeria (Rosemont, London), p. 65. 35. Mae C. King, Basic Currents of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Washington DC, 1996), p. 105. 36. Ibid. 37. Joel H. Rosenthal, ‘The United States: the moral nation?’, Lecture No. 6, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 15 May 2001. 38. Andrew Z. Katz, ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: the Nixon administration and the pursuit of peace with honour in Vietnam’, Presidential Studies Quarterly xxvii/3 (1997), pp. 496– 516. 39. Gregory A. Raymond, ‘Necessity in foreign policy’, Political Science Quarterly cxiii/4 (1998– 99), pp. 678– 88. 40. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light, Introduction, Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 2001), p. 3.

Chapter 4 Investigating Obasanjo and Darfur 1. Letter by President Obasanjo to Col. Muammar Gaddafi, 3 July 2003. 2. Letter by Col. Gaddafi to President Obasanjo, 23 June 2003.

NOTES

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241

3. Letter from Ambassador T. Daniel Hart, OON, Permanent Secretary to President Obasanjo, 20 June 2003. ‘Reg. 2004 Assembly of the African Union: Possibility of Nigeria Showing Interest in Being Elected Chair of the Assembly’. 4. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes, 3 July 2003. 5. Report of President O. Obasanjo’s Trip to Guinea: Meeting with BrigadierGeneral Lansana Conte, President, Republic of Guinea, 13 July 2003. 6. Letter from Lieutenant General Aliyu Gusau. Mohammed GCON (rtd), Nigeria’s National Security Adviser to President Obasanjo, 3 December 2003. 7. Letter from President Yoweri K. Museveni of the Republic of Uganda to President Obasanjo, 1 October 2003. 8. Letter from President Obasanjo to President Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 3 June 2004. 9. Letter from Ambassador Uche O. Okeke to President Obasanjo, 13 September 2004. 10. Letter by President Obasanjo to President Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa, 17 September 2004. 11. Letter from President Obasanjo to Professor Alpha Oumar Konare, 20 September 2004. 12. Letter from President Obasanjo to President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 27 September 2004. 13. Letter from President Mbasogo to President Obasanjo, 15 September 2004 [the author’s translation]. 14. Letter from President Obasanjo to Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada, 27 September 2004. 15. Letter from President Obasanjo to Col. Gaddafi, 27 September 2004. ‘Reg. Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur Abuja, Nigeria: Proposal for Preparatory Meeting’. 16. Letter from President Isaias Afewerki of the State of Eritrea to President Obasanjo, 11 August 2004. 17. President Obasanjo in a handwritten directive to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 October 2004. 18. Letter from President Mbeki to President Obasanjo, cc. Alpha Omar Konare, Chairperson of the AU Commission, 10 November 2004. Re: Visit to Coˆte d’Ivoire, 27 December 2004. 19. African Union Peace and Security Council Summit Held in Libreville, Gabon, 10 – 11 January 2005. Briefing Given by AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare. Summary Report by Lawrence Obisakin, State Protocol, Abuja, 12 January 2005. 20. Visit of President Obasanjo to Sudan, 8 January 2005, Report by Lawrence Obasakin, State Protocol, 12 January 2005. 21. Letter from President Obasanjo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2005. ‘Reg. Assistance to Niger Republic’.

242

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84 –97

22. Letter from Ralph Uwechue, Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary, Special Presidential Envoy (Conflict Resolution) to President Obasanjo, 10 March 2005. 23. Letter from President Obasanjo to President Blaise Compaore of the Republic of Burkina Faso, 11 March 2005. 24. Office of Chief of Staff to the President 18 May 2005 by Kabir A. Mohammed, State House Counsel. 25. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 10 June 2005. 26. Oluyemi Adeniji, CON, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to President Obasanjo, 25 February 2005. 27. Letter by Ambassador Uche O. Okeke, OFR (Director-General) to Lt. Gen. A. Mohammed GCON (rtd.), National Security Adviser, Three-Arms-Zone, Abuja, 30 September 2004. ‘Reg. United States Government forwards Recommended Action for the African Union in Darfur’. 28. Letter from Prime Minister Martin to President Obasanjo, Ottawa, 2 September 2004. 29. Letter (Fax) from Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to President Obasanjo, 13 July 2004. 30. President J. Chirac to President Obasanjo [official transl. into English], 13 August 2004. 31. President Obasanjo’s handwritten directive, 10 October 2004. 32. Letter from Ariyo A.C. to State Chief of Protocol, State House, Abuja, 7 February 2005. 33. Letter from President Tran Duc Luong of Vietnam to President Obasanjo, 22 December 2004. 34. Letter by President Obasanjo to President Afewerki of the State of Eritrea, Asmara, Eritrea, 26 July 2004. ‘Reg.: Ethiopia and Eritrea Border Dispute Decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission’. 354 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Abuja, 30/31 January 2005. 35. Teˆte-a`-teˆte Between Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Bouteflika of Algeria. Held at TRHE Lodge of the Algerian President, Libreville, Gabon on 10 January 2005, 9.30–9.55. 36. Lawrence Obisakan, 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Abuja, 30/31 January 2005. Meetings held in the margin by President Obasanjo, GCFR, Summaries of Decisions and Commitments, Summary by Lawrence Obisakin, Interpreter/Note taker of above meeting, State House Protocol, Abuja, 31 January 2005. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Lawrence Obisakin, Current African Union Chairman, President Obasanjo, GCFR, Consultations with Heads of Government in Abuja on 1 February 2005, With President of Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Mr Abdullah Yusuff Ahmed at the Residence, State House, 17.40–18.07, Summary by Lawrence Obisakin, Note Taker, State Protocol, Abuja, 2 February 2005.

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243

40. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 16 February 2005. 41. Letter from John Garang de Mabior, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM to President Obasanjo, 23 December 2004. 42. President Obasanjo’s written notes/directive, 2 March 2005. 43. Letter from President Obasanjo to Javier Solana, Secretary-General/High Representative, Council of European Union, 4 March 2005. 44. Letter by Javier Solana to President Obasanjo, 10 January 2005. 45. Letter from Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, to President Obasanjo, 20 December 2004. 46. Letter from Ignatius C. Olisemeka, Ambassador, former Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister, to President Obasanjo, 15 May 2003. 47. Letter from Ambassador Olu Adeniji, CON, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to President Obasanjo, 1 December 2003. 48. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes, 22 December 2003. 49. Letter by President Obasanjo to Alhaji Aminu Wali, Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN, 27 September 2004. 50. Letter by Professor George A. Obiozor, Ambassador, to President Obasanjo, 17 February 2005. ‘Reg. CIA Director Porter Goss Names Nigeria amongst Countries Described as Potential Areas for Instability’. 51. Unreadable memo dated 22 March 2004. 52. Letter from President Obasanjo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, cc. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2005. 53. Letter from Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, Nigeria’s Minister of Defence, to President Obasanjo, 19 March 2004. 54. Letter by Dr B.K. Kaigama, FIPA, Permanent Secretary, to President Obasanjo, cc. Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, 25 June 2003. ‘Reg. Security Council Resolution for Deployment of Multinational Force in Bunia (DRC)’. 55. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 3 July 2003. 56. Letter by FNSE Honourable Minister of Defence Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso to President Obasanjo, 20 September 2004. 57. Letter by FNSE Honourable Minister of Defence Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso to President Obasanjo, 22 October 2004. ‘Reg. Cost of Induction Activities and Logistics Requirements for 6 Battalions of NA to the Sudan and Requirement for Deployment of Signal Squadron to UNMIL (Liberia)’. 58. Letter by ML Agwai, Lieutenant General, Chief Army Staff to Hon. Minister of Defence, 21 October 2004. ‘Reg. Deployment of 6 Battalion to the Sudan’. 59. Letter by Sunday G. Ehindero, NPM, fwc, AG. Inspector-General of Police, to President Obasanjo, 8 February 2005. ‘Reg. UN Request for the Deployment of Formed Nigeria Police Unit to Democratic Republic of Congo’. 60. Letter by FNSE Honourable Minister of Defence Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso to President Obasanjo, 12 December 2005. ‘Reg. Financial Requirements for the Induction of 6XNA Units to UNMIL and AMIS’. 61. Letter by FNSE Honourable Minister of Defence Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso to President O. Obasanjo, 17 January 2005. ‘Reg. Request for Approval of

244

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

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113 –126

Payment for the Supply of Communication Equipment by M/S Rcn Nig. Ltd, to the Nigerian Contingent (Nigcon) in African Union Mission in Darfur – Sudan (Amis)’. Letter by A. Mohammed, GCON, Lieutenant General (rtd), National Security Adviser, to President Obasanjo, 27 June 2003. ‘Reg. ECOWAS Proposes International Stabilisation Force (ISF) for Liberia’. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 30 June 2003. Letter by Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik of Norway to President Obasanjo, 2 March 2005. ‘Reg. Oslo Donor’s Conference on Sudan, 11– 12 April 2005’. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 14 April 2005. Letter by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, UN, New York, to President Obasanjo, 23 July 2003. Letter from Chief Ojo Maduekwe to President Obasanjo, 7 September 2004. Letter from Ambassador T. Daniel Hart to President Obasanjo, 24 June 2003. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 20 June 2003. Letter from Ambassador T. Daniel Hart, OON, Permanent Secretary to President Obasanjo, 25 June 2003. Letter from Stephen Oronsaye, Principal Secretary to the President, to President Obasanjo, 23 December 2003.

Chapter 5 Analysing the Interviews: Using the Public View as Commentary on the Inside View 1. Ad’Obe Obe, a former Special Adviser on International Relations to President Obasanjo and then Chief Executive of SERVICOM when he spoke at his residence in Abuja on 27 July 2010. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Tunde Adeniran, a university professor and a retired diplomat, spoke at his Abuja residence on 4 August 2010. 6. Lancelot Anyanya, a retired military officer and key adviser in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), Abuja, Nigeria, was interviewed in his office in Abuja on 10 August 2010. 7. Ibid. 8. Abdullahi Adamu, a former governor of Nasarawa State of Nigeria, former minister and key official who represented Nigeria’s late head of state, General Sani Abacha, at various international summits spoke to me at his residence at Keffi, Nasarawa State on 12 August 2010. 9. Ibid.

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10. Adeolu Akande, a former Special Adviser to former Vice President Atiku Abubakar and a former senior lecturer at the University of Ibadan spoke to me at the Atiku Abubakar campaign headquarters, Abuja on 28 September 2010. 11. Ambassador Joe Keshi, a retired diplomat and past permanent secretary of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke to me at his office in Abuja on 9 January 2011. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo, a former Special Adviser to Vice President Atiku Abubakar, a former Managing Director of Daily Times of Nigeria and a renowned author spoke to me at the Atiku Abubakar campaign headquarters on 28 September 2010. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. John Chiemeka Ozoemena, a serving general in the Nigerian Armed Forces and a key official at the Nigeria Defence Ministry, spoke to me at his office in Abuja on 9 February 2011. 19. Tunde Olusunle, a former Special Adviser to President Obasanjo on public communications spoke to me at his home in Maitama, Abuja on 22 February 2011. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, former Nigeria’s minister of foreign affairs was interviewed on 11 May 2010. 25. Professor Bola Akinterinwa, a former adviser to two Nigerian foreign ministers and director-general of the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, spoke to me at the INEC office in Lagos on 22 April 2010. 26. Shehu Usman Iyal, Special Adviser to the President on Aviation from 1999 to date, spoke to me at his residence on 2 October 2010. 27. Ibid. 28. Tony Eluemunor, former editor of Daily Independent Nigeria and former chief press secretary to the governor of Delta State, spoke to me on 17 September 2010. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Chuks Akunna, former editor of This Day newspaper, was also former chief press secretary to the former governor of Anambra State. He spoke to me on 12 January 2011. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid.

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34. Sola Atere is director of news, Nigeria Television Authority (NTA). He was also chief correspondent of NTA at the Presidential Villa, Abuja and travelled everywhere with the presidential entourage. He spoke to me on 17 January 2011. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Remi Okunlola is a successful legal practitioner and business magnate in Lagos, Nigeria. He is a public commentator on a myriad of national issues. He spoke to me on 18 January 2011. 40. Simon Kolawole was the daily editor of This Day newspaper in Lagos. He spoke to me on 2 July 2011. 41. Michael Kehinde Postdoctoral Fellow at the Pennsylvanian University, US. He spoke to me on 31 January 2011. 42. Antonia Obeya is an administrator and public commentator. She spoke to me on 24 February 2011. 43. Ibid. 44. Abdullahi Adamu, 2010. 45. Tunde Adeniran, 2010. 46. Ibid. 47. Lancelot Anyanya, 2010. 48. Abdullahi Adamu, 2010. 49. Joe Keshi, 2011. 50. Michael Kehinde, 2011. 51. Simon Kolawole, 2011. 52. Ad’Obe Obe, 2010. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Norbert Esenwah, 2010. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Tunde Adeniran, 2010. 60. Ibid. 61. Lancelot Anyanya, 2010. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Sule Lamido, former minister of foreign affairs and incumbent governor of Jigawa State, spoke to me in his office at Government House, Dutse, Jigawa State on 28 September 2011. 66. Lancelot Anyanya, 2010. 67. Ibid.

NOTES 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

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Ibid. Ibid. Abdullahi Adamu, 2010. Adeolu Akande, 2010. Ibid. Ibid. Joe Keshi, 2011. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo, 2010. Ibid. John Chiemeka Ozoemena, 2011. Tunde Olusunle, 2011. Ibid. Bola Akinterinwa, 2011. Bolaji Akinyemi, 2011. Tony Eluemunor, 2010. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Chuks Akunna, 2011. Ibid. Sola Atere, 2011. Michael Kehinde, 2011. Simon Kolawole, 2011. Antonia Obeya, 2011. Abdullahi Adamu, 2011. Tunde Olusunle, 2011. Remi Okunlola, 2011. Ibid. Tony Eluemunor, 2010. Ad’Obe Obe, 2010. Tunde Adeniran, 2010. Joe Keshi, 2010. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo, 2010. Ibid. John Chiemeka Ozoemena, 2011. Tunde Olusunle, 2011. Bolaji Akinyemi, 2011. Bola Akinterinwa, 2011. Tony Eluemunor, 2010 Jideoffor Adibe, ‘NEC was wrong on new foreign policy proposal’, Sahara Reporters, 3 November 2010. 108. Michael Kehinde, 2011. 109. Antonia Obeya, 2011.

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Conclusion 1. Margaret G. Hermann., Charles F. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, ‘How decision units shape foreign policy behaviour’, in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and James N. Rosenau (eds), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, 1987), pp. 309– 36. 2. Charles F. Hermann, ‘Decision structure and process influences on foreign policy’, in Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann (eds), Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspective for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, 1978), pp. 69 –102. 3. Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and B. Sapin, ‘Decision-making as an approach to the study of international relations’, in Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Brock and Burton Sapin (eds), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, An Approach to the Study of International Politics, 2nd edition (Glencoe, 1962). 4. James N. Rosenau, ‘Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy’, in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, 1966). 5. G.T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (London, 1971), p. 13. 6. Mervyn Frost, ‘Constituting a new world order: what states, whose will, what territory?’, Global Society viii/1, Summer (1994), pp. 13 – 14. 7. Jacob U. Gordon, African Leadership in the Twentieth Century: An Enduring Experiment in Democracy (New York, 2002).

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Gonzales, D., 2000. ‘Africa at the first South Summit in Havana’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. xxvii No. 84, pp. 341 – 6. Gray, C., 2005. ‘Peacekeeping and Enforcement Action in Africa: The Role of Europe and the Obligations of Multilateralism.’ Review of International Studies 31. Grono, N., 2006. ‘Darfur: the international community’s failure to protect’, African Affairs, Vol. 105 No. 421. Harneit-Sievers, A., 1999. ‘Nigeria after the Presidential Elections Report on a conference in Bonn, March 22, 1999’, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 33 No. 3. Hensley, T.R. and G.W. Griffin, 1986. ‘Victims of groupthink: The Kent State University Board of Trustees and the 1977 Gymnasium Controversy’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 30 No. 3. Herman, C.F., 1999. ‘Beyond groupthink: political group dynamics and foreign policy-making’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 No. 3. Herskovits, J., ‘Nigeria’s rigged democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. lxxxvi No. 4, pp. 115– 30. Hoffman, A., 1995– 6. ‘Nigeria: the policy conundrum’, Foreign Policy, Washington Newsweek Interactive, LLC No. 101. Hollis, M. and S. Smith, 1986. ‘Roles and reasons in foreign policy decision making’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16 No. 3. Holsti, Ole R., 1972. ‘Review article of Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, The Western Political Quarterly. No. 25. Hudson, V., 2005. ‘Foreign policy analysis: actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 1. Hudson, V.M. and C.S. Vore, 1995. ‘Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today and tomorrow’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39 (Supplement 2). Ihonvbere, J., 1991. ‘Nigeria as Africa’s great power: constraints and prospects for the 1990s’, International Journal, Canadian International Council, Vol. 46 No. 3. Ihonvbare, J.O., 1999. ‘The 1999 presidential elections in Nigeria: the unresolved issues’, Journal of Opinion, Vol. xxvii No. 1, pp. 59 –62. Inamete, U.B., 1993. ‘The conceptual framework of Nigerian foreign policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 39 No. 1. International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), ‘A Commonwealth Ethos, Equality and Human Rights in Africa’, International Humanist and Ethical Union, available at www.iheu.org/communitarian-ethos-equality-and-humanrights-africa [accessed 15 October 2011]. Itugbu, S., 2011. ‘Obasanjo, Nigeria and the World’, The Round Table, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 100 No. 416. Jackson, R., 2001. ‘Conflict resolution in Africa: intervention, indifference and indigenous solutions’, African Affairs, Vol. 100. Jones, C., 2007. ‘Toward a third generation model: rethinking governmental politics and foreign policy analysis’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, Chicago. Katz, Andrew Z., 1997. ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: The Nixon administration and the pursuit of peace with honour in Vietnam’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27 No. 3. Kirk-Green, A., 1997. ‘Leadership for Africa: in honour of Olusegun Obasanjo on the occasion of his 60th birthday’, African Affairs, Vol. 96 No. 384.

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Newspapers and Magazines Adibe, Jideoffor, 2010. ‘NEC was wrong on new foreign policy proposal’, Sahara Reporters, 3 November 2010. BBC, 2007. ‘Sudan defiant on Darfur suspects’, BBC News, London, 27 February 2007. Bello, Eniola, 2006. ‘This season of unreason’, This Day, 5 July 2006. Emelumadu, C., 2010. ‘How Important is Nigeria to Africa’, BBC, London, available at www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/Africahaveyoursay/2010/06 [accessed 24 September 2011]. Idumange, John Agreen, 2010. ‘The problematic of redefining Nigeria’s national interest in the context of global diplomacy’, Pointblank News, available at www. pointblanknews.com [accessed 24 September 2016]. Itugbu, S., 1999. ‘Nigeria’s reach out options’, This Day, 1 September 1999. ——— 2000. ‘Significance of Obasanjo’s visit to France’, Guardian (Nigeria), 12 March 2000. ——— 2000. ‘Shuttling for economic prospects’, Guardian (Nigeria), 20 August 2000. ——— 2001. ‘Nigeria and the United States’, National Interest, 11 November 2001. ——— 2001. ‘Re-engineering Nigeria – US relations’, Guardian (Nigeria), 11 September 2001. ——— 2002. ‘Nigeria’s official visit to Germany’, Guardian (Nigeria), 2 January 2002. ——— 2002. ‘Issues that Shaped NEPAD’, Daily Champion, 27 May 2002. Okonta, Ike, 2008. ‘Nigeria looks to oil to boost its regional power’, Taipei Times, Tuesday 22 January 2008.

Presidential Letters . .

. . .

Letter from Ignatius C. Olisemeka, Ambassador, formerly Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to President Obasanjo, 15 May 2003. Letter from Ambassador T. Daniel Hart, OON, Permanent Secretary to President Obasanjo, 20 June 2003, Reg. 2004. ‘Assembly of the African Union: Possibility of Nigeria Showing Interest in Being Elected Chair of the Assembly’. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 20 June 2003. Letter by Col. Muammar Gaddafi to President Obasanjo, 23 June 2003. Letter from Ambassador. T. Daniel Hart to President Obasanjo, 24 June 2003.

BIBLIOGRAPHY . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

261

Letter from Ambassador T. Daniel Hart to President Obasanjo, 25 June 2003. Letter by Dr B.K. Kaigama, FIPA, Permanent Secretary, to President Obasanjo, cc. Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, 25 June 2003, ‘Reg. Security Council Resolution for Deployment of Multinational Force in Bunia (DRC)’. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 3 July 2003. Letter by President O. Obasanjo to Col. Muammar Gaddafi, 3 July 2003. Letter by Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, to President Obasanjo, 23 July 2003. Letter from President Yoweri K. Museveni of the Republic of Uganda to President Obasanjo, 1 October 2003. Letter from Ambassador Olu Adeniji, CON, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to President Obasanjo, 1 December 2003. Letter from Stephen Oronsaye, Principal Secretary to the President, to President Obasanjo, 23 December 2003. Letter from Lieutenant General Aliyu Gusau. Mohammed GCON (rtd), Nigeria’s National Security Adviser to President Obasanjo, 3 December 2003. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes, 22 December 2003. Letter from Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, Nigeria’s Minister of Defence, to President Obasanjo, 19 March 2004. Letter from President Obasanjo to President Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 3 June 2004. Letter (Fax) from Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to President Obasanjo, 13 July 2004. Letter by President Obasanjo to President Afewerki, 26 July 2004, ‘Reg. Ethiopia and Eritrea Border Dispute Decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission’. Letter from President Isaias Afewerki of the State of Eritrea to President Obasanjo, 11 August 2004. President J. Chirac to President Obasanjo [official transl. into English], 13 August 2004. Letter [Fax] by Prime Minister Martin to President Obasanjo, 2 September 2004. Letter from Chief Ojo Maduekwe to President Obasanjo, 7 September 2004. Letter from Ambassador Uche O. Okeke to President Obasanjo, 13 September 2004. Letter from President Mbasogo to President Obasanjo, 15 September 2004 [author’s translation]. Letter by President Obasanjo to President Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa, 17 September 2004. Letter by FNSE Honourable Minister of Defence Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso to President Obasanjo, 20 September 2004. Letter from President Obasanjo to Professor Alpha Oumar Konare, 20 September 2004. Letter from President Obasanjo to President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 27 September 2004.

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Letter by President Obasanjo to Alhaji Aminu Wali, Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN, 27 September 2004. Letter from President Obasanjo to Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada, 27 September 2004. Letter from President Obasanjo to Col. Muammar Gaddafi, 27 September 2004. ‘Reg. Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur Abuja, Nigeria: Proposal for Preparatory Meeting’. Letter by Ambassador Uche O. Okeke, OFR (Director-General) to Lt. Gen. A. Mohammed GCON (rtd.), National Security Adviser, Three-Arms-Zone, Abuja, 30 September 2004, ‘Reg. United States Government forwards Recommended Action for the African Union in Darfur’. President Obasanjo’s handwritten directive, 10 October 2004. President Obasanjo’s handwritten directive to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 October 2004. Letter from President Mbeki to President Obasanjo, cc. Alpha Omar Konare, Chairperson of the AU Commission, 10 November 2004. Re: Visit to Cote d’Ivoire, 27 December 2004. Letter from Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, to President Obasanjo, 20 December 2004. Letter from President Tran Duc Luong of Vietnam to President Obasanjo, 22 December 2004. Letter from John Garang de Mabior, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM to President Obasanjo, 23 December 2004. Letter from Ariyo A.C. to State Chief of Protocol, State House, Abuja, 7 February 2005. Letter by Sunday G. Ehindero, NPM, fwc, AG. Inspector-General of Police, to President Obasanjo, 8 February 2005, ‘Reg. UN Request for the Deployment of Formed Nigeria Police Unit to Democratic Republic of Congo’. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 16 February 2005. Letter from Oluyemi Adeniji, CON, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to President Obasanjo, 25 February 2005. President Obasanjo’s written notes/directive, 2 March 2005. Letter from President Obasanjo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2005, ‘Reg. Assistance to Niger Republic.’ Letter by Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik of Norway to President Obasanjo, 2 March 2005, ‘Reg. Oslo Donor’s Conference on Sudan, 11–12 April 2005’. Letter from President Obasanjo to Javier Solana, Secretary-General/High Representative, Council of European Union, 4 March 2005. Letter from Ralph Uwechue, Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary, Special Presidential Envoy (Conflict Resolution) to President Obasanjo, 10 March 2005. Letter from President Obasanjo to President Blaise Compaore of the Republic of Burkina Faso, 11 March 2005. President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 14 April 2005.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

263

Letter from State House Counsel Kabir A. Mohammed of the Office of Chief of Staff to President Obasanjo, 18 May 2005. . President Obasanjo’s handwritten notes/directives, 10 June 2005. . Letter from President Obasanjo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, cc. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2005.

.

Interviews – – – – – – –

– – –

– – –

General Martin Luther Agwai, former UN Commander in Darfur, at his residence in Maitama, Abuja, Nigeria on 7 January 2010. Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, former Nigeria’s minister of foreign affairs was interviewed on 11 May 2010. Professor Bola Akinterinwa, a former adviser to two Nigerian foreign ministers and director-general of the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, spoke to me at the INEC office in Lagos on 22 April 2010. Ad’Obe Obe, a former Special Adviser on International Relations to President Olusegun Obasanjo and then Chief Executive of SERVICOM when he spoke at his residence in Abuja on 27 July 2010. Tunde Adeniran, a university professor and a retired diplomat, spoke at his Abuja residence on 4 August 2010. Lancelot Anyanya, a retired military officer and key adviser in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), Abuja, Nigeria, was interviewed in his office in Abuja on 10 August 2010. Abdullahi Adamu, a former governor of Nasarawa State of Nigeria, former minister and key official who represented Nigeria’s late head of state, General Sani Abacha, at various international summits spoke to me at his residence at Keffi, Nasarawa State on 12 August 2010. Tony Eluemunor, former editor of Daily Independent Nigeria and former chief press secretary to the governor of Delta State spoke to me on 17 September 2010. Adeolu Akande, a former Special Adviser to former Vice President Atiku Abubakar and a former senior lecturer at the University of Ibadan spoke to me at the Atiku Abubakar campaign headquarters, Abuja on 28 September 2010. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo, a former Special Adviser to Vice President Atiku Abubakar, a former Managing Director of Daily Times of Nigeria and a renowned author spoke to me at the Atiku Abubakar campaign headquarters on 28 September 2010. Shehu Usman Iyal, Special Adviser to the President on Aviation from 1999 to date, spoke to me at his residence on 2 October 2010. Michael Kehinde, Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, spoke to me on 1 January 2011. Ambassador Joe Keshi, a retired diplomat and past permanent secretary of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke to me at his office in Abuja on 9 January 2011.

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Chuks Akunna, former editor of This Day newspaper, was also former chief press secretary to the former governor of Anambra State. He spoke to me on 12 January 2011. Sola Atere is director of news, Nigeria Television Authority (NTA). He was also chief correspondent of NTA at the Presidential Villa, Abuja and travelled everywhere with the presidential entourage. He spoke to me on 17 January 2011. Remi Okunlola is a successful legal practitioner and business magnate in Lagos, Nigeria. He is a public commentator on a myriad of national issues. He spoke to me on 18 January 2011. John Chiemeka Ozoemena, a serving general in the Nigerian Armed Forces and a key official at the Nigeria Defence Ministry, spoke to me at his office in Abuja on 9 February 2011. Tunde Olusunle, a former Special Adviser to President Obasanjo on public communications spoke to me at his home in Maitama, Abuja on 22 February 2011. Antonia Obeya is an administrator and public commentator. She spoke to me on 24 February 2011. Simon Kolawole was the daily editor of This Day newspaper in Lagos. He spoke to me on 2 July 2011. Sule Lamido, former minister of foreign affairs and incumbent governor of Jigawa State, spoke to me in his office at Government House, Dutse, Jigawa State on 28 September 2011.

INDEX

Abacha, Sani, 12 – 13, 17, 21, 177, 203 Abak, Akwa Ibom, 111 Abakir, Khamis, 57 Abdulsalami, Abubakar, 12, 21, 76 Abeokuta, 7– 8, 11 Abiola, Moshood K.O., 12, 182 Abu Shonek Camp, 83 Abubakar, Vice President Atiku, 166 Abuja, 24, 57, 80, 82, 84, 92, 104, 214, 221 Abyei, 60, 97 Accra 92, 99, 100, 114 Action Group Party, 23 Adamu, Abdullahi, 126, 148, 150, 170, 187 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 33, 47, 48, 79, 84, 85 Adebayo, Adedeji, 40 Adekunle, Benjamin, 9 Adeniji, Olu, 41–2, 86, 180, 189 Adeniran, Tunde, 70, 124, 150, 152, 162, 163, 181, 189, 196 Adibe, Jideofor, 196, 199 Adinoyi-Ojo, Onukaba, 130, 132, 142, 148, 176, 178, 191–2, 196 Afewerki, Isaias, 81 Afghanistan, 166 Afghan veterans, 49

Africa, 2, 4 – 5, 12, 14, 18 – 21, 24 – 30, 32 – 44, 51, 56, 61, 63 – 68, 71 – 5, 77 – 80, 82, 84 – 6, 91 – 2, 96, 99, 116, 121, 124, 126 – 34, 137 – 40, 143 – 5, 147 – 50, 157 – 8, 170, 172, 174, 178, 182 – 3, 187 – 8, 191, 193, 198, 200, 203, 206 – 8, 211 – 14, 216, 218, 226 black Africa, 38, 226 Great Horn, 224 Great Lakes region, 40, 106, 224 Greater Horn, 224 Gulf of Guinea, 133 Lake Chad area, 91 Niger Delta, 14– 16, 43 Nile Valley, 31, 48 Southern Africa, 36, 118, 139, 143, 170 West Africa, 12– 13, 25 – 7, 36 – 9, 46, 75, 98, 115, 124, 184, 193, 203, 214, 225 West Coast, 133 Africa Pledge Conference, 96 African Action Plan, 21 African Affairs, 87, 128 African American, 19 African Command (AFRICOM), 40 African Development Bank (ADB), 139

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African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 23 – 4, 151 African Leadership Forum (ALF), 28, 225 African National Congress (ANC), 20 African Peace Keeping Force, 73 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 212, 224 African Standby Force, 33 – 4 African Union (AU), 1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 19, 21, 24 – 5, 27 – 34, 41 – 5, 50, 52, 54 – 6, 58 – 60, 66 – 7, 70 – 4, 76 – 89, 91 – 6, 99 – 100, 104 – 5, 110 – 11, 113, 115, 125, 129, 134, 136 – 7, 146, 183, 206, 209, 212 – 13, 218 – 19, 221 – 2, 224 – 6 Candidature Committee, 85 Commission, 78, 85, 92 – 3, 96 Constitutive Act, 32, 34, 72, 74, 212 Executive Council, 85 Mid-Term Summit, 105 Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 25, 112– 13 Peace and Security Council, 33, 34, 60, 72, 82, 91 Peace and Security Council Summit, 34, 60, 72, 82 Protective Force, 83 Afrocentrism, 2, 18 – 20, 25, 33, 35, 44, 63, 62 – 3, 65 – 7, 72, 74, 76 – 7, 80, 82, 84 – 6, 116, 132, 143, 147, 173, 188, 193, 198, 200, 206– 7, 211– 12, 216, 218, 221– 2, 224, 226 Afro-optimism / Afro-pessimism, 55 Agrawal, M.M., 66 Agwai, Martin Luther, 50 – 1, 59 – 60, 70 Ahire, P.T., 104 Ahmed, Majzoub al-Khalifa, 57 Ajumogobia, Henry Odien, 193 Akadiri, O., 104

Akande, Adeolu, 126, 171– 2, 174– 5, 181 Akiba, Okon, 67 Akinterinwa, Bola, 136– 7, 148, 180, 185, 194 Akinyemi, Bolaji, 70, 135 – 6, 143, 162, 176, 180– 1, 189, 193, 196 Akunna, Chuks, 140, 142, 184 Al Fasher, 46, 83 Al Geneina, 46 Algeria, 21, 25, 32, 90–2, 96, 143, 221 Algiers Peace Agreement, 81, 90 All People’s Party (APP) / Alliance for Democracy (AD), 13 Allison, Graham T., 2, 4 – 5, 69, 202, 209–11 Amin, Idi, 182 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 47 Anglo-Italian cooperation, 47 Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, 23 anglophone, 38, 225 Angola, 19, 26, 37, 53, 92, 146, 156, 158, 212 Annan, Kofi, 33, 67, 86, 93, 99, 116, 206 antiballistic missile system, 3 Anya Nya guerrilla groups, 47 Anyanya, Lancelot, 124, 153, 163 – 6, 168–70, 185 Anyaoku, Emeka, 102, 104 apartheid, 10, 20, 22, 36, 37, 39, 126, 150, 152, 197 Apata, Segun, 104 Arab League, 55 Arab Spring states, 207 Arbour, Louise, 88 Asia, 102, 118, 126, 179, 198, 222 Asmara, 52 Association of African Central Banks, 30 Atene, Joe, 30 Atere, Sola, 110, 143– 7, 185 Australia, 24, 222 Awori, 11

INDEX Babangida, Ibrahim Badamasi (IBB), 12, 17, 21 – 2, 135, 143, 150, 152, 162, 190, 203 Badejo, Femi, 97 Bahr al-Ghazal, 46, 47 Bakassi Peninsula, 30 – 1, 91, 108– 9, 148, 167– 8, 205, 217– 18 Baker Peace Plan, 78 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 22 – 3, 151, 227 Baptist Boys’ High School, Abeokuta, 7 Baqqara Arab Nomads, 47 Barclays Bank, 20 bargaining games, 3 Barre, Siad, 53 al-Bashir, Omar, 1, 32, 48, 50, 57, 59 – 60, 76, 83, 93, 99, 124, 134, 146, 182 battalions, 8, 24, 95, 98, 110–11, 113, 125, 206 Bedie, President Henry Konan, 84 Belgium, 8 Berti, 46 bin Laden, Osama, 49 Birgid, 46 Biya, President Paul, 91, 92 Blair, Tony, 96, 211 Blue Nile, 97 Bondevik, Kjell Magne, 115 Bouake, 94 Bouteflika, President Abdelaziz, 21, 32, 91 – 2, 143 Brazil, 193, 207 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Group (BRICS), 207 Bretton Woods Institutions, 21 Britain/British, 8, 10 – 11, 19, 20, 22, 47, 48, 50, 55, 140, 193, 197, 208, 211 British Petroleum (BP), 10–11, 20 Buhari, Muhammadu, 11, 20, 150 Bujo, Benezer, 64 Bukavu, 8 bureaucratic theory, 3, 82, 210, 221

267

Burkina Faso, 84 – 5, 156 Bush, George W., 24, 26, 40, 49, 87, 96, 147, 149, 206 Cairo Declaration, 81 Cambridge University, 47 Cameroon, 30, 91, 148 Canada, 80, 87 Carter, President Jimmy, 14 – 15, 170 Castro, President Fidel, 14 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 119 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 26, 103–4, 174, 181 Chad, 1, 26, 31, 33, 39, 50 –2, 55, 59, 77, 82, 89, 91, 133, 189 Chad Basin Commission, 39 Chalker, Baroness Lynda, 158, 160 Chambas, Ibn, 114 Chechnya, 55 Cheney, Dick, 26 Chief of Army Staff, 93, 110, 113, 165 Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), 31, 93 Chilcot Inquiry, 55 China, 55, 67, 89, 207, 222 Chirac, Jacque President, 88, 92, 94 Chissano, President Joachim, 24 citizen diplomacy, 192, 194 civil war, 8 – 9, 23, 38, 47 – 50, 52, 54– 5, 94, 116, 159, 197, 207 Clapham, Christopher, 39 – 40 Clark, B.A., 104 Clausewitzian, 53 Clinton, Hillary, 166 Clinton, President Bill, 14, 23 Cohen, William, 35 Cold War, 27 – 8, 37, 39, 45, 52, 55, 225 Cole, Patrick Dele, 133 collegial management, 70, 139, 157, 159–60, 163, 175– 6, 180–1, 185–6, 193, 200, 202, 204– 5, 207, 209 Commonwealth, the, 18, 20, 24, 70, 126, 158

268

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

communitarianism, 61 – 2, 64 – 5, 211– 12 Compaore, Blaise, 85, 94 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 49, 97, 99, 115 Concentric Circle Theory, 19, 153, 189 Concert of Medium Powers, 152, 162, 176 Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), 28 conflict, 2, 7, 15, 18, 23, 31 – 3, 35 –6, 38, 40 – 1, 44 – 5, 49 – 53, 59 – 60, 65, 67, 70, 72, 74, 88, 97, 99, 109, 115, 122, 125–6, 132, 134, 139, 142– 3, 145, 147– 50, 157, 163, 187, 203, 207, 211 –12, 214, 217, 219, 222– 4 conflict resolution, 53, 67, 109, 126, 132, 134– 5, 139, 142, 145, 148, 150, 157, 163 Congo-Brazzaville, 26 consensus, 2, 3, 5, 57, 67, 71, 73, 84, 164, 169– 70, 188, 211– 12, 217 Constituent Assembly (MCA), 10 constitutional amendment, 16 consultation, 2, 17, 77, 84, 87, 91, 93 – 4, 98, 115, 128, 167, 226 Conte, Lassana, 75 contiguous states, 20 Contragate, 170 Convention on Nuclear Cooperation, 195 corruption, 10, 12, 149, 182 – 3, 206, 220, 224 cosmopolitanism, 61 –2, 67, 213 Coˆte d’Ivoire, 25, 133 coup, 12 – 13, 48, 78, 123, 129, 132–9, 158 Courville, Cindy, 87 Cross River State, 30 Cuban Missile Crisis, 2, 69, 202, 209– 11

Daily Independent, 181 Daily Times, 175 Danjuma, T.Y., 10 Darfur, 1, 2, 4, 7, 24 – 5, 31 – 6, 43 – 60, 68– 71, 73 – 5, 77, 79 – 85, 87 – 9, 91– 3, 95, 97, 99, 110, 113, 115–16, 124 –5, 128– 30, 135, 138, 144, 146, 156, 181– 3, 202, 205–6, 208– 11, 213, 219–22, 224–5 Peace Agreement (DPA), 57– 60 Talks, 221 de Gaulle, Charles, 39 de Mabior, John Garang, 51, 97, 99, 146 de Waal, Alex, 46 debt, 14, 21, 41, 43, 123 – 4, 127– 8, 136, 149, 178, 194, 220 Deby, Idris, 51 – 2, 59 decolonisation, 10, 127, 150, 219 defence adviser, 107 democracy, 16– 18, 30, 37, 43, 71, 75, 77, 101, 125– 6, 128, 133, 142, 164, 172, 174, 177, 192, 197, 205, 207, 214, 226– 7 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 8, 25, 35, 40, 73, 92 – 3, 106, 134, 139, 142, 147, 150, 190, 212 deployment, 3, 32, 50, 67, 87 – 8, 97, 105–8, 110– 11, 114– 15, 169, 171 dictatorship, 11, 13, 16, 71, 159, 163, 177, 186, 214, 216, 226 Dinar, Ali, 47 diplomacy, 13, 20, 24, 42, 47, 55, 61, 71 –2, 82, 85, 91, 100, 117, 123, 128– 9, 138, 143– 4, 148, 153, 162, 192, 194, 198, 211, 219, 226 diplomatic courier centres, 18 diplomatic exchanges, 4, 72 diplomatic shuttles, 21, 123, 137 dispute resolution, 7

INDEX Djibouti, 52 Doe, President Samuel, 53 dominance, 5, 16, 32, 165, 213 donors, 87, 115– 16, 221 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 21, 27, 38 – 9, 42, 66, 70, 86, 92, 100, 114– 15, 125, 133, 136, 144, 155, 224 Defence and Security Commission, 114 Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 124– 5, 156, 203 economy, 11, 15, 20, 27, 30, 41, 43, 52, 153, 176, 220, 222 Egba, 11 Egbe, Mark, 104 Egypt, 25, 48– 9, 85– 6, 194, 198, 207 Ehindero, Sunday G., 111 – 12 elections, 9, 11 –13, 15– 17, 27, 147, 183, 197 Eluemunor, Tony, 138– 40, 181– 3, 188, 196 Eminent Persons Group (EPG), 18, 158 Equatorial Guinea, 26, 79 Eritrea, 49, 52 – 3, 72, 81, 90 – 1, 212 Esenwah, Norbert, 149, 159–61 Ethiopia, 33, 48, 49, 52 –3, 72, 81, 90 – 1, 212, 243 Ethiopia– Eritrea Boundary Commission, 90 ethnic violence, 12, 104 Eurocentric idea, 62 – 3, 65 Europe, 24, 37, 102, 118, 126, 142, 225 European Union (EU), 14 – 15, 28, 32, 55, 59, 87, 90, 92, 98, 206 observer team, 15, 30, 60, 99, 140 Executive Committee (EXCOM), 205 failed states, 116– 17 Falae, Olu, 13 Fawehinmi, Gani, 127

269

Federal Executive Council, 176 Fekis, 46 financial requirement for concentration, pre-induction training and preparatory activities, 112 Financial Stability Board, 30 Fiscal Responsibility Act, 14 Flint, Julie, 46 Forces Nouvelles rebel group, 94 foreign direct investment, 41, 127, 149, 160, 219 foreign investment, 127– 8 foreign policy, 1 –5, 21, 70, 72, 85, 91, 98 100, 103, 119, 121, 122, 135, 140, 148, 154, 157, 167, 171, 173, 175– 6, 178, 189, 199– 204, 206, 208– 11, 216, 218– 19, 227 Foreign Service, 102, 174 France, 31, 39 – 40, 49, 55, 74, 88 – 9, 92, 94, 101, 198, 205 francophone, 38 – 9, 225 Frost, Mervyn, 211– 13 furs, 46, 50 G8, 21 G20 Summit, 29– 30, 156, 206 Gabon, 26, 79, 82, 91 Gaddafi, Muammar, 27 – 9, 32, 52, 72– 3, 80, 82, 136, 187 Gambari, Ibrahim, 20 Garba, Joe, 138 Gbadegesin, Segun, 63 Gbagbo, President Laurent, 92, 94, 134 genocide, 1, 32– 4, 45, 53 – 4, 56, 135, 212 Germany, 70, 96, 101 Ghana, 8, 22 – 3, 75, 101, 108, 114, 119 Global South, 27, 127, 178, 200, 211 globalisation, 26 – 7 Goodworks International LLC, Atlanta, 119 Goss, Porter, 103

270

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

governance, 11, 13, 28, 53, 76, 131, 149, 157, 167, 172, 174, 178, 179, 186, 207, 224 Gowon, Yakubu, 9 –10, 20, 23, 35 – 6 Great Darfur, 88 Greentree Agreement, 30 – 1, 168– 70, 200 Group of 77, 27 Guinea, 22, 41, 75 – 6, 133, 212 Gulf War, 147 Gyekye, Kwame, 65 – 6 Haiti, 178 Haroun, Ahmed, 59 Havana, Cuba, 27 Hermann, M.G., Hermann, C.E., and Hagan, J.D., 208– 9 Hoile, David, 46 Hussein, Saddam, 198 Ihonvbere, Julius, 43 Ikimi, Tom, 182 India, 7, 17, 101, 207, 217, 222 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 95, 99 Interhamwe Crisis, 95 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 30, 91 International Criminal Court (ICC), 14, 32, 59 – 60, 68, 72, 85, 146 International Monitoring and Force Protection, 98 International Organisations and International Economic Cooperation, 102 International Stabilisation Force (ISF), 114 intervention, 1 – 2, 4, 7, 13, 25, 32– 38, 44 – 5, 51, 54 – 7, 61 – 2, 65, 67, 70, 73, 82, 85, 87, 98, 107, 110, 115, 124– 5, 133, 135, 139, 150, 153, 157, 167, 187–8, 196, 203, 206– 7, 211– 14, 217, 219, 221– 6

Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA), 42 Iraq, 35, 37, 54, 147, 166, 198, 211 Iraq War, 198 Ironsi, Aguiyi, 23 Islamic Sharia State, 95 Ituri Pacification Commission, 106 Iyal, Shehu, 137 Ja’ali Arab, 46 Janjaweed militias, 1, 31, 33, 48 – 50, 58– 9, 113 Japanese prime minister, 178 Johnson, President Lyndon B., 3 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 1, 49, 50 Kabila, President Joseph, 92, 139 Kant, Immanuel, 61 Kapila, Mukesh, 58 Kashmir, 217 Kehinde, Michael, 148, 157, 186, 199 Kenya, 49, 84, 94, 97, 99 Kerekou, Mathew, 14 Keshi, Joe, 128, 139, 154, 175, 185, 190, 196 al-Khalifa, Majthoub, 83 Khartoum, Sudan, 31, 49– 52, 54, 83, 124, 146, 182 Khatmiyya, 46 Kibir, Muhammed Yusuf, 83 Kissinger, Henry, 23 Kivu province, 8 Kohl, Helmut, 158 Kolawole, Simon, 148, 157, 186 Konare, Alpha Oumar, 78, 82, 93, 96 Kushayb, Ali, 59 Kymlicka, Will, 62 Lagos, 11, 14, 44 Lagu, Joseph, 47 Lamido, Sule, 42, 127, 131, 140, 166 Landsberg, Christopher, 40

INDEX Liberia, 13, 14, 25, 28, 38, 40, 41, 53, 68, 74 – 6, 95, 114, 118– 19, 124– 5, 128, 130, 132– 3, 135, 142, 147, 150, 156, 164– 5, 184, 197– 8, 207, 212, 216, 219 Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), 75 – 6 Libreville, Gabon, 82, 91 Libya, 28, 40, 49, 52, 63, 72, 78, 82, 96, 136, 176, 187, 194, 207 Lina-Marcoussis, 99, 100 Linklater, Andrew, 61 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 48 Luong, President Tran Duc, 89, 243, 264 lusophone, 38 Madagascar, 74 Madiebo, Alexander, 9 Maduekwe, Ojo, 180, 193 Mali, 75, 78, 114 Mamdani, Mahmoud, 54 Mandela, Nelson, 14, 128, 138, 158 Mano River Union, 41 Mansur, al-Zubayr Rahma, 46 Martin, Prime Minister Paul, 80, 87 Masalit, 46, 48, 50 Mass Mobilisation for Self Reliance, Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), 163 Mbasogo, Obiang Nguema, 79 Mbeki, Thabo, 14, 21, 24, 27, 32, 77, 82, 92, 94, 99, 143, 147 McKinnon, Don, 24 McNamara, Robert, 158 Mediation and Security Council, 114 Meidob, 46 Metteden M.L., 104 military putsch, 11, 133, 136 military rule, 9, 12, 21, 28, 42, 166, 182 military training, 8, 16, 181 Milosevic, Slobadan, 213 Minawi, Minni, 51, 57– 8

271

Ministry of Education, 195 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 70, 82, 85, 89, 100, 103– 5, 115– 16, 125, 127–8, 132, 134, 139, 153, 157, 167–8, 172– 4, 176, 179, 185, 192, 195, 200– 1, 205, 211, 226 Ministry of Internal Affairs, 117, 174, 176, 185 Ministry of Sports, 192 Mittal, 17 Mkapa, Benjamin, 24 Mohammed, Jafaru, 106 Mohammed, Murtala, 9 – 10, 14, 19, 35– 6, 67, 128, 130, 132, 138, 143, 151– 2, 159, 189, 201 Mohammed, Usman, 106 Mohammed –Obasanjo era, 19 Monrovia, 114, 118 Mons Officer Cadet School, Aldershot, UK, 8 Morocco, 77, 78, 114, 182 Mozambique, 146, 158, 212 Mubarak, Hosni, 48, 154 Mugabe, Robert, 24 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement, 42 multinationals, 43 Multinational Force (MNF), 106 Museveni, Yoweri, 28, 76 Na’Abba, Ghali Umar, 16 Naira Spraying Diplomacy, 20 Naivasha Peace Process, 55, 56, 83, 99 Namibia, 10, 156, 212 National Assembly (NASS), 16, 126, 164, 168– 9, 201, 205, 217 National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), 13 National Economic Council (NEC), 196, 198 National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), 19 National Islamic Front (NIF), 48

272

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

national interest, 5, 18, 27, 48, 72, 101, 125, 148, 169, 170, 194– 9, 201, 212, 216, 219, 222 National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 12 National Security Adviser, 114, 179 National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), 19 National Unionist Party (NUP), 46 National Youth Congress, 23 nationalism, 7, 9, 196, 199 N’Djamena, 59 Netherlands, 101 Neto, Agostinho, 19 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 21, 24, 30, 32, 133, 143– 4, 150, 154, 212, 224 Nigeria, 1 –2, 4 – 5, 7 – 31, 33, 35 – 44, 57, 67, 69, 71 – 2, 74 – 80, 82 – 6, 88 – 9, 91, 95, 97 – 8, 102– 19, 121– 51, 154– 61, 163– 4, 166– 7, 169– 84, 186– 200, 202– 9, 211, 213– 27 army/military, 8, 44, 110, 112 debt, 14, 21, 41, 43, 123– 4, 127–8, 136, 149, 178, 194, 220 Nigerian Air Force (NAF), 107 – 10 Nigerian Contingents (NIGCON), 113 Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), 176 Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA), 77, 101, 179, 181 Nigerian Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa, 134, 148, 221 Permanent Mission at the UN, 107 senate, 10, 30, 161, 217 Nimeiry, Gaafar President, 47, 48, 128– 9 Nkrumah, Kwame, 22 – 3 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 208 Norway, 115–16 Nuba Mountains, 97

al-Nur, Abdul Wahid, 57 – 8 Nwachukwu, Ike, 162 Nyala, 46 Nyerere, Julius, 14, 182 Obama, President Barack, 40, 131, 166 Obasanjo, Olusegun President, 1 – 5, 7– 37, 39 – 45, 54, 61, 65– 103, 105–7, 109, 111, 113– 19, 121–54, 156 –63, 165 –74, 176–8, 180– 9, 191, 200, 201–18, 220, 222– 3, 225–7 Obasanjo Farms, 11 Obe, Ad’Obe, 122– 3, 138, 157– 9, 181, 189, 196 Obeya, Antonia, 149, 186, 199 Oche, Ogaba, 67 Odi, 124 Ogomudia, Alexander General, 93 Ogun State, 187 Ogunbadejo, Oye, 22 oil, 10, 15 – 17, 26, 37, 43, 49, 54 – 5, 147, 216, 220 Okafor, C.N., 104 Okeke, Uche, 93 Okonkwo, General Festus, 93 Okunlola, Remi, 148, 188 Olisemeka, Ignatius, 100 Olusunle, Tunde, 132–5, 142, 148, 179, 185, 187, 192 Omaswa, Francis, 76 Omorogbe, Joseph, 66 Ondo, 169 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 7, 20, 27 –8, 32, 44, 48, 74, 81, 90, 139, 181– 2, 212, 225 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 28, 225 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 151 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 225

INDEX Oslo Donors’ Conference, 115 –16 Ota, 11 Ouegraogo, Ablasse, 84 – 5 Ovo, Adekegba, 183 Owu, 11 Oxford University, 47 Ozoemena, John Chiemeka, 132, 178, 192 Pakistan, 217 Paris Club, 43, 149 parliamentary committee on foreign relations, 226 peace negotiation, 31, 70, 97 peacekeeping, 1, 8, 13, 25, 28, 33, 35 – 6, 52, 58 – 70, 73, 105, 107, 113, 115, 126, 130, 138, 148, 150– 2, 157, 182– 3, 203, 218, 222, 225– 6 People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 13 personalisation, 2, 5, 21, 72, 86, 91, 100, 105, 153, 157, 160, 167, 171, 176– 7, 181, 188, 200, 202, 208 Polisario Front, 78 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 19 population, 38, 40, 43, 46, 50, 104, 135, 166 Ping, Jean, 79 Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations (PAC), 102, 104 Quattara, President Allasane, 134 Rabat, 78 Radio Communications (RCN) Nigeria Limited, 113 Ravalomana, President Marc, 74 Reagan, President Ronald, 170 realist perspective, 25, 42, 53, 68, 222 rebels, 9, 31, 49, 50, 52, 59, 82, 93, 222

273

refugees, 30, 83, 197 regional hegemon, 36, 224 regional power, 2, 36 – 40, 42, 67, 129, 207, 213, 216, 219– 20, 222–4 Regular Officers’ Training School, Teshie, Ghana, 8 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 26, 34, 56– 7 Rhodesia, 11, 142 Rice, Condoleeza, 96 Rimdap, A., 104 River Niger Authority, 39 Roadside Diplomacy, 42 Rome Statute, 60 Rosenau, James N., 209 Royal College of Defence Studies, London, 8 Royal College of Military Engineering, Poona 8 Russia/Soviet Union/USSR, 2, 3, 53, 55, 101, 207– 8, 222 Rwanda, 25, 32, 40, 45, 54, 56, 93, 95, 139, 225 Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 78, 182, 212 Salim, Salim Ahmed, 31, 57, 181 Salisbury, Lord, 47 Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe, 133, 136, 219 Schmidt, Helmut German Chancellor, 96 Senegal, 21, 25, 86, 114 Shagari, Shehu, 9, 11, 16 – 17, 21, 129, 150 Sharia, 48, 95 Sierra Leone, 13, 40 – 1, 53, 84, 95, 125, 128, 130, 133, 139 – 40, 142, 147, 150, 156, 197– 8, 212 Sirte, Libya, 28, 81 Snyder, R., Bruck, H.W., and Sapin, B., 209 Solana, Javier, 98 Somalia, 40, 52 – 3, 92, 94 – 7, 116

274

FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

Somaliland, 95 – 7 Soro, G., 94 South Africa, 10, 20, 35, 40, 53, 114, 138– 9, 143, 197– 8, 212 South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), 47 South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), 20 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 24 Southern Sudan, 46, 55, 97, 129, 134, 142 sovereignty, 36, 41, 63, 67, 89, 151, 212, 214 State House Counsel, 85 Stiglitz, Joseph, 26 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 17 strongmen leaders, 1, 188, 207, 218 Sudan, 1, 31– 2, 45, 47 – 9, 51 – 2, 54 – 5, 57 – 9, 71, 76, 83, 85, 87, 93, 97 – 9, 110, 113, 115, 124, 129, 134– 5, 142, 145– 6, 152, 155, 182– 3, 212, 216, 222, 224 Government of Sudan (GoS), 45, 57, 76, 87, 93, 115 Inter-Sudanese Talks, 87 Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), 48 Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) / Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), 1, 47, 49– 51, 57 – 8 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), 57, 115 Sudan Political Service, 47 Sudanic model, 46 Sumbeiywo, Lazaro, 99 Tanko, Abubakar A., 80 Taylor, Charles, 14, 41, 68, 133, 139, 156, 184, 207– 8, 219 Technical Aid Corps (TAC), 152, 194 Temperance Farms, 11 Thatcher, Margaret, 11 Third World, 14, 187

Tibet, 55 Times, The, 37 Tine Chad, 51 Tine Sudan, 51 Toure, Sekou, 22 Troops Contributing Countries (TCC), 113 Tunisia, 207 Tunjur, 46 al-Turabi, Hassan, 48, 50 Turco-Egyptian Condominium, 47 Uganda, 28, 49, 76, 84, 95, 172 Ukaeji, Imo, 42 Under Secretary for Regions and International Organisations (USRIO), 102 United African Army, 73 United Democratic Front of Nigeria (UDFN), 13 United Nations (UN) African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 50, 59 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 195 General Assembly, 79 House in Abuja, 92 Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 84 Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 110, 112 Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 105 Operation in Coˆte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 100 Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 106 Peace Keeping Operations in Coˆte d’Ivoire, 107 Peace Support Mission in Sudan, 97 – 8 Peacekeeping Force, 8, 25, 59 Secretary-General, 24, 67, 86, 92 – 4, 99, 116, 137, 206

INDEX Security Council (UNSC), 25, 41, 59 –60, 72, 85, 104 Security Council Resolutions, 57 United Kingdom (UK), 7–8, 10–11, 13, 31, 37, 47, 55, 96, 101, 205, 211 United States (US), 1, 3– 4, 10, 13– 15, 19, 24, 26, 28, 31 – 2, 35, 37, 40 – 1, 45, 49, 53, 55, 58 – 9, 69 – 70, 74 – 5, 84, 86 – 7, 90, 92, 96, 102– 3, 106, 111, 114, 119, 126– 7, 131, 149, 151– 2, 154, 168, 173, 184, 187, 193– 4, 206, 209, 219, 222, 226 embassies, 49 government, 96, 111 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 103 Uthman al-Mirghani, Mohammed, 46 Utomi, Paul, 177 Uwechue, Ralph, 139– 40 Vance, Cyrus, 14 Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 89 Wachukwu, Jaja, 19 Wade, Abdoulaye, 21 Wadibia, Anyanwu N.U.O., 104 war crimes, 1, 32, 34, 56, 59 War on Terror, 49 Washington, 13, 35 Wau, 47

275

West, the, 13 –14, 22, 33, 35, 37, 43, 46, 67, 85, 166, 198, 207 Western governments, 13, 55 Western hegemons, 39 Western troops, 33 Western Sahara, 78 West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), 48 Williams, Adebayo, 21 Woodward, Peter, 46 World Bank, 43 Xinjiang, 55 Yar’Adua, Shehu, 12 Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa, 16 – 18, 40, 141–2, 154, 171, 173– 4, 192, 207 Yoruba, 7, 9, 20 Young, Andrew, 14 Yumkella, Kandeli, 84 – 5 Yusuf, M.D., 10 Yusuff, Ahmed Abdullahi, 95 – 6 Zaghawa, 46, 50 –1 Zaki Biam, 124 Zambia, 18 Zarie, 40, 139 Zbigniew, Brzezinski, 14 Zimbabwe, 10 –11, 14, 18, 20, 24, 129, 142, 158, 212 Zorgbibe, 63