How Ideology Influences Terror 1527557545, 9781527557543

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How Ideology Influences Terror

How Ideology Influences Terror By

Ranya Ahmed

How Ideology Influences Terror By Ranya Ahmed This book first published 2020 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2020 by Ranya Ahmed All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-5754-5 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-5754-3

Daliah, Laith, and Mae, may you live in a safer world.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables ......................................................................... ix 1. Introduction: What is terrorism? What is ideology? ............................... 1 2. Nationalist/Separatist Groups ............................................................... 21 3. Left-wing groups .................................................................................. 33 4. Right-wing groups ................................................................................ 47 5. Religious groups ................................................................................... 61 6. Environmental groups........................................................................... 77 7. Mixed groups ........................................................................................ 89 8. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 109 Bibliography ........................................................................................... 121 Appendix ................................................................................................ 131

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1-1: Terrorist incidents over time Figure 1-2: Deadly Four attacks over time Figure 2-1: OPM attacks over time Figure 3-1: Shining Path attacks over time Figure 4-1: Count of right-wing incidents over time Figure 5-1: Al-Shabaab attacks over time Figure 5-2: Al-Shabaab casualties Figure 6-1: Environmental incidents over time Figure 6-2: ALF attacks over time Figure 7-1: Séléka and ETA attacks over time Table 7-1: Examining the differences among group types Table 7-2: Updated models Table 7-1: Full model Table 7-2: Full model

Links to: https://public.tableau.com/profile/the.role.of.ideology.on.terror#!/ Please use this QR code or type the link into your browser to reach a page of visuals related to the context within this text. You will find all the visuals included in this text on that site, as well as many more interactive visuals.

1. INTRODUCTION

How does ideology affect terrorist group behavior? How does a guiding belief structure direct, or even compel groups? Can a worldview compel violence? Does it direct violence? Does it guide recruitment? What contextual factors may mitigate those actions? Is ideology simply a tool utilized by extremists to fulfill their goals? Do all members invest in group ideology equally? This text aims to explain the role and significance of ideology in terrorism. Specifically, this text aims to explain how ideology shapes the decisions, actions, and attacks of terrorist groups. It speaks to how ideologies guide terrorist groups even when mitigating factors arise. Group beliefs, values, and guiding principles are synonymous with group identity, and that identity is the foundation for a political or social platform. It would be naive to think that terrorist groups could truly be understood. Secretive organizations do not lend themselves to transparency. This is not to say that insight cannot be gained into the choices that these clandestine groups make. A better understanding of the role that ideology plays in groups’ activities has been made possible with the compilation of extensive data; with the use of these data, tactics, targets, recruitment, promotional strategies, and even longevity may be predicted based on the ideological make-up of a group. This information empowers counterterrorism operations, and allows nations to better prepare for the threats they may face. Before discussing the relationship between ideology and terrorism, these terms need to be defined. This chapter will define both terrorism and ideology within the scope of this text, and briefly preview the following chapters.

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1. Introduction

What is terrorism? Based on global news coverage of events, it is glaringly clear that there is no concrete definition of terrorism. 1 There is no consensus with the academic community, or even among the counterterrorism community. There are over 150 definitions of terrorism even within American federal law alone. 2 Consequently, the term has an inherent fluidity which allows for conjecture, misunderstanding, and confusion. In order to avoid confusion within this text, a single definition will be used. This definition is provided by the scholars Enders and Sandler (2000), The premeditated use or threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.

Terrorist acts are unique because they are committed with political or social objectives in mind. They are not perpetrated for monetary gain. They are not perpetrated in isolation. There is a wider, often ambitious goal. They aim to create a long-term, palpable impact using their acts. This is why terrorist attacks are not simply considered as crimes. They are far more expansive. Terrorist acts have been parsed from crimes in legal systems across the world because they are indeed unique, as their effects, both tangible and intangible, are lasting to the global community. Many argue that the roots of terrorism are, at their core, linked to grievances. 3 Essentially, individuals are brought together by a shared complaint, and seek violent means to reconcile their grievances. One could argue that the ultimate goal of terrorism is sowing fear and insecurity on a 1

Jack P. Gibbs, "Conceptualization of Terrorism," American Sociological Review 54, No. 3 (June 1989): 329-340; Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, "News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers," The International Journal of Press/Politics 13, No. 1 (January 2008): 52-74. 2 Nicholas J. Perry, "The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails," Journal of Legislation 30, No. 2 (May 2004): 249. 3 Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," International Political Science Review 14, No. 2 (April 1993): 161-201.

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mass scale. This environment of fear then creates the opportunity and space for perpetrators to demand concessions from governments; governments want to alleviate public fear and concern. Terrorism is most effective when it creates a daily sense of insecurity for the broader public. Does it impact your daily life? Do you make decisions based on fear for your safety? Do you worry when you go to a major airport, government building, or large city? If you’ve answered yes to any of the questions above, then in a way, terrorism is making its desired impact. It has pushed itself to become a part of your life – and your decisions – and they hope, your respective government’s decisions. Terrorism may not always assuage or scare governments into concessional behavior, but regardless, attacks impact the public long-term. However, terrorists are not a monolithic grouping of organizations and individuals. Their motivations and goals vary – consequently, their means vary, their targets vary, and their levels of lethality vary. 4 Furthermore, their capacity varies; some groups have stable, consistent sources of income, and others survive with ad hoc fundraising, or criminal behavior such as smuggling or trafficking. This diversity among groups provides further evidence that we need to examine groups on a more granular level. While terrorism may be domestic or international in nature, this text will be largely focused on transnational terrorism, which is also referred to as international terrorism. Transnational terrorism is yet another vague term, but fortunately there are defining criteria which are widely accepted. These criteria were set by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), a widely used source of terrorist incident data, which is hosted by the University of Maryland. A terrorist incident may be considered transnational if it meets the following criteria: 1. Perpetrators are nationals of countries other than where the incident took place, 2. Victims are nationals of various countries, and 3. The incident’s orchestration and planning took place in a different country

4

Ranya Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection," Journal of Applied Security Research 13, No. 3 (July 2018): 376-390.

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1. Introduction

from where the attack was perpetrated. 5 These criteria, while expansive, cover a more holistic picture of transnational terrorism. It is key to understanding another main difference: domestic terrorists seek a national, confined audience, while transnational terrorism seeks to speak to a wider audience. By this logic, insular groups which mostly seek a domestic based political end, may also be considered transnational. Even if it is unintentional, when groups perpetrate attacks which kill or injure foreign citizens, they become transnational by this definition (See Chapters 2 and 3). One may assert that the modern-day saliency of terrorism is due to transnational terror, even though domestic terror is more frequent and more commonplace, 6 it has not had an extreme global impact like the attacks of 9/11 in New York or the 7/7 attacks in London. On those days, the world stood at attention; the globe became a captive audience. To be clear, this does not diminish or dismiss the very real pain and anguish that come from acts of domestic violence. Attention does not mitigate severity or injury. This text will frequently utilize data from the GTD, so it is important to clarify that the definition the GTD uses does differ from that of Enders and Sandler. However, the definitions are congruent. The GTD definition is as follows: the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.

The GTD definition adds economic and religious goals to the political and social factors espoused by Enders and Sandler. Otherwise, the definitions are very similar. To ensure this difference does not bias the narrative of this text, it will use replication data which has updated GTD data. The replication

5 University of Maryland, Global Terrorism Database Code Book: Inclusion Criteria and Variables (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, October 2019), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf. 6 Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle, "Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence," Annual Review of Political Science 12 (June 2009): 3149.

How Ideology Influences Terror Figure 1-1: Terrorist incidents over time

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7

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

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1. Introduction

data have categorized each incident and group into the ideological group types discussed in the coming chapters. 8

Changing circumstances Previous scholarly works suggest that terrorist acts have occurred in a number of different circumstances: countries at peace, countries experiencing some armed conflict, and countries at war. Countries at war generally faced the highest level of terrorist activity, but that distribution has fluctuated over time. Recently, the trend has taken a dramatic turn. Since 2012, there has been a steep incline in terrorist activity within active war zones. 9 Countries at war now experience the overwhelming majority of terrorist activity. This is unsurprising, as the instability of war creates a vacuum of power and border insecurity.

Terrorism: A global, yet concentrated, phenomenon Terrorism has become a broad, global phenomenon, but its impacts are not equally distributed; the effects are especially concentrated in a small group of countries. In 2017, the Deadly Four (Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, the Taliban, and ISIS – also known as Daesh/IS/ISIL) were responsible for the majority of deaths resulting from terrorism. While these groups are less active than they were in 2016, their effect remains poignant and lethal. The five most impacted nations in 2017 were Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan. 10 Since 2014, Iraq has been the recipient of the most frequent terrorist attacks, with 1956 incidents in 2017. In 2016, Iraq experienced almost ten thousand deaths from terrorism, and in 2017, experienced approximately four thousand deaths. Even with this decline, largely due to 8

Ranya Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice," Journal of Applied Security Research 13, No. 1 (January 2018): 89-110. 9 Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, November 2018), http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index2018.pdf. 10 Ibid; Close behind were the nations of Somalia, Egypt, DRC, the Central African Republic, and India.

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the government reclaiming Mosul from ISIS, they remain atop the rankings. More specifically, in 2017, the majority of the deaths (approximately 83% 11) were caused by ISIS. Although Iraq experienced the most frequent terrorist attacks, Afghanistan experienced the deadliest attacks in 2017, with 4653 deaths and 5015 injuries. 12 The overwhelming majority of these deaths were due to the Taliban’s activities. Unlike Iraq, where ISIS concentrated its efforts in specific cities, the Taliban operates in approximately 70% of Afghanistan’s territory, making their defeat especially challenging. Unlike other groups, the Taliban has historically also had a governing role in Afghanistan. This grants the Taliban greater influence, control, and leverage in making gains and sowing fear. Well below the lethal threshold of Iraq and Afghanistan sits Nigeria, with 1532 fatalities in 2017. 13 This represents a notable drop from previous years, largely due to the national counter-insurgency response. 14 Two terrorist groups are responsible for 88% 15 of the deaths related to terrorism within Nigeria: Boko Haram and the Fulani extremists. As in Iraq, terrorist activity is limited to certain areas, most notably the Borno state (northeastern Nigeria), the area which Boko Haram calls home; it is an unfortunate irony that Borno’s motto is “Home of Peace”. 16 Syria is close behind Nigeria with a death toll of 1096 people in 2017 due to terrorist activity. Syria has been involved in a protracted conflict since 2011, and while the death toll from the war is unknown, the conflict has ravaged the country’s infrastructure, both institutionally and physically. The borders have become porous, and terrorist groups have taken advantage. ISIS, Hayat Al Tahrir Al Sham, and Jaysh Al Islam were responsible for the majority of deaths within Syria.

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Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018. Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 “Unrest in the Home of Peace: Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency,” The Economist, September 27, 2014, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2014/09/ 27/unrest-in-the-home-of-peace. 12

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1. Introduction

Following Syria, Pakistan was the 5th most impacted country by terrorism in 2017. However, 2017 was in fact the least deadly year since 2006 17 for Pakistan, with 852 casualties. Three groups, the TPP (Tehrik-ITaliban Pakistan), the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, and Lashkare-Jhangvi, were responsible for two-thirds of these deaths. As with Iraq and Nigeria, Pakistan experiences the majority of terrorist activity in limited areas, most notably the Balochistan province. 18 Three of the Deadly Four groups are accounted for within the top five most affected nations, so it is unsurprising that the 6th most affected nation is Somalia, as that is where Al-Shabaab (the fourth member of the Deadly Four) operates. 19 See Figure 1-2 for an illustration of the Deadly Four attacks. Although these groups are the deadliest, and these specific nations experience the majority of terrorist attacks, terrorism remains widespread nonetheless (see Figure 1-2). In fact, a new hotspot emerged in 2017: Southeast Asia. Myanmar and the Philippines both reported the highest number of terrorist casualties since 2002. One should recognize that as counterterrorism forces become more proficient and informed, they have been able to combat terrorism on a greater scale. Consequently, one must keep in mind that the figures describing incidents are relative to the number of potential attacks. These numbers are tracked by various agencies, including the FBI, Europol, and Interpol.

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Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018. Ibid. 19 Ibid. 18

How Ideology Influences Terror Figure 1-2: Location and density of Deadly Four attacks over time, 1970-2016

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Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

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1. Introduction

What is ideology? Ideology is the lens through which one sees and interprets one’s surroundings. It is a framework that shapes thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. It is a worldview. Ideologies can be held by individuals, and by collectives – including terrorist groups. The power of ideology lies in its completeness. It is a totalitarian force which rules over every aspect of one’s life and choices. It provides an answer to any question. It provides a guide when one is conflicted. It is such a wholesome force that it compels people to act within restricted boundaries and shifts perspectives. Loyalty to an ideology is often so complete, as in the case of many terrorists, that it allows for, or even encourages, violence to ensure complete compliance. People willingly follow and adhere to ideologies, making this force an unparalleled power. Within this text, ideology is asserted as a key driver of terrorist operational behavior. Only key, because ideology is not the only driver. Snow and Byrd (2007) state that ideology presents us with an “analytical utility” to study terrorist group choices and decisions. Not only is ideology a guiding force for beliefs or values, but rather it provides us with a means to examine any given group. 21 This text focuses on six ideological group types: 1. Nationalist/Separatist (NS), 2. Left Wing (LW), 3. Right Wing (RW), 4. Religious, 5. Environmental, and 6. Mixed groups. Specifically, two mixed group types will be profiled, NS/LW and NS/Religious. 22 The groups are defined in the following manner. Nationalist/separatist groups seek to overtake the system of government currently in place, or they are groups which seek self-determination and territorial autonomy from a given established, recognized country. Left-wing groups are defined as groups with revolutionary, and at times, communist ideologies; these groups generally support a socialist form of government. Right-wing groups defy left-wing concepts like communism and socialism, and lean toward fascist,

21

David Snow and Scott Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 12, No. 2 (July 2007): 119136. 22 Right-wing/Religious groups will also be discussed within this chapter, although the focus of the chapter will be NS/LW and NS/R groups.

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and at times, racist ideology. Religious groups claim to be guided in their actions by their given religion; this includes a wide spectrum of religions, including Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism. Environmental groups are guided by their missions to end any perceived animal cruelty or ecological destruction. Mixed groups are groups which hold more than one ideology, and in this text, two of these mixed typologies are discussed at length, as they are the most frequent combinations within the sphere of international terrorism: 23 nationalist/separatist and left-wing and nationalist/separatist and religious. For example, Séléka, a terrorist group operating in the Central African Republic, is guided both by the pursuit of a new government which would not oppress the Muslim community, as well as the desire to assert and impose their religious identity; their dual goal requires their classification as NS/Religious (see Chapter 7). Nonetheless, one must acknowledge that there are flaws with this categorization method. This categorization does not consider sub-groups of group types; for instance, this text considers right-wing groups, but it does not classify right-wing sub-groups of “racist” or “anti-communist” groups. Although this limits classification to broad groups, this was a deliberate choice, as it provides us with a more general frame to understand the variation among groups. These types allow us to delve into the role of ideology on groups’ decisions, actions, and operations. However, this is not the only means in which scholars have distinguished group types. Vasilenko (2005) 24 categorizes terrorist organizations into five group types: (1) political, (2) separatist, (3) nationalist, (4) religious, and (5) criminal. Although Vasilenko’s categories are quite comprehensive, they are missing an important category: environmental groups. Although environmental groups are less numerous than other groups, they still perpetrate attacks and should be acknowledged. Increased counterterrorism efforts directed towards environmental groups further convey the seriousness

23

Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.” V. I. Vasilenko, "The Concept and Typology of Terrorism," Statutes & Decisions 40, No. 5 (September-October 2004): 46-56. 24

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1. Introduction

of the threat of environmental terrorism; since 2002, the FBI has had a dedicated joint task force to combat these groups. 25 Boaz Ganor (2008) 26 created another classification system, using terrorist motivation and organizational capability to perpetrate attacks, rather than ideology. Ganor assumes that terrorism = motivation + operational capability. 27 Ganor suggests that, given a terror threshold period (which accounts for a period in time where an attack is more likely), the previously noted factors can predict terrorist attacks. Essentially, the suggestion is that these variables limit the operations of terrorist groups, so they are the best factors to classify groups. This classification system is highly focused on counterterrorism, but one must consider that terrorism is a clandestine activity, and this system is only effective with accurate and available information – which is quite frankly, rare. Wilkinson (1976) 28 argues that groups should be divided into four group types: (1) criminal, (2) psychological, (3) war, and (4) political. Criminal groups are those which use terrorist acts as a way to build material wealth, psychological groups are led by extreme religious beliefs, war groups attack ruthlessly to defeat an enemy, and political groups are described as groups which will use systematic violence to achieve their political goals. Wilkinson’s (1976) classification system does not solely conclude with these initial categories; he also introduces sub-types. For instance, political groups are further disaggregated into three group subtypes: (1) revolutionary, (2) sub-revolutionary, and repressive. While Wilkinson’s classification system is highly methodical and detailed, its greatest weakness is its complexity. His system requires a great deal of information and insight to work effectively, and given that terrorist groups are covert in nature, much of this information will be unavailable, or

25 James F. Jarboe, “Testimony Before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health,” FBI, accessed April 8, 2020, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism. 26 Boaz Ganor, "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, No. 4 (April 2008): 269283. 27 Ibid. 28 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: The Problems of Response (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976).

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unreliable. Moreover, the inclusion of a criminal classification contradicts much of the scholarly work defining the scope of terrorism. Although the classification systems noted above have their strengths and weaknesses, one could argue that the system used in this text – a general frame – allows one to examine group types only in a broad frame. A plethora of scholars have classified groups, and those classifications have largely been guided by their questions, as is the case in this text. This text seeks to examine the role of ideology on terror, and therefore the classification system is based on ideology.

Other mitigating factors Terrorists have political and social goals, and they are therefore established with an objective or set of goals in mind. However, unlike other groups, they have chosen to deal with their grievances using violence. This distinguishing factor leads to many questions, one of which is what are the mitigating factors that drive groups to use these means to achieve their goals? It could be argued that it is the founding zealousness of their ideology. However, this is only a deciding factor as there are mitigating factors. One could argue that terrorist actors decide to employ violence because they are often outmatched by their opposition. One possibility is the absence of political means to achieve their goals because the given group lives within a non-democracy. Above, ideology was introduced as a key, guiding driver. However, one must acknowledge that there are additional drivers. While this text adamantly asserts that ideology is the main driver of operational behavior and choices, one must recognize that there are other mitigating factors that drive decision-making, both tangible and intangible. These are discussed at greater length below. Colonial legacy. The influence of colonial rule, and the legacy therein should be considered when examining terrorism. Violent terrorist action is not justifiable behavior, but to understand the root of the grievances listed by groups like the OPM (Free Papuan Movement), an NS group fighting perceived occupying, colonial powers (for further detail, see Chapter 2), one must recognize history. Understanding this context also allows for the assessment of risk. Post-colonial states or regions within

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states, may be at greater risk; terrorist groups seeking to rectify perceived past wrongs may be more likely to emerge. Interestingly, two of the most formidable colonizers of the 19th and 20th centuries – the French and British, face the greatest modern-day concentration of NS terrorist actions, according to the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report compiled by Europol. 29 There has been little systematic research regarding a colonial legacy’s correlation with terrorist activity, 30 but there are a plethora of theoretical studies, based on case studies, that assert a positive relationship. 31 Group age. Some terrorist groups are infamous and known worldwide, but many go unnoticed on a global scale. Groups are forming on a regular basis, but most of them do not survive for long. Most groups, approximately 68%, do not even survive more than one year after their initial attack, and only two-thirds of the survivors make it to their fifth year. 32 While it is true that young groups can be highly effective, historical evidence has shown a trend that groups need to pass the one-year critical time nexus to survive longer term. Competition. Within every ideological group type, there are a plethora of groups competing for attention, resources, and dominance. Groups need to assert their dominance and voice. Consequently, operational decisions may be made to send signals to other groups. Related closely to group age, group survival rates convey the competitive space in which

29

Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017 (The Hague: Europol, 2017), https://www.europol.europa.eu/tesat/2017/; Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (The Hague: Europol, 2018), https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-unionterrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018; Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019 (The Hague: Europol, 2019), https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situationand-trend-report-2019-te-sat. 30 Kelsey Renee Stephens, "Colonial History, Modernization and Terrorism: The Effect of Colonialism and Modernization on Transnational Ethnoseparatist Terrorism, 1968-2002" (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2010). 31 David Gandolfo, "The Past, Present and Future of Globalization: Colonialism, Terrorism, and the Need for Democratic Supranational Governance," Review Journal of Political Philosophy 7, No. 1 (2009): 45-74. 32 Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure," Perspectives on Terrorism 8, No. 2 (April 2014): 2-23.

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terrorist groups operate. Scholars argue that this is likely to be explained by the theory of outbidding. Outbidding essentially argues that groups, in an effort to gain the support of a target audience, seek to outperform other groups. Accordingly, groups which are in less competitive environments, are also more likely to survive longer; this effect varies by ideology. 33 It must be noted that while groups sometimes jockey for dominance, they have also been known to work together. 34 Groups learn from each other, share resources and information, and create formal alliances when group goals align. Consider Al-Shabaab’s open declaration of loyalty to Al Qaeda. The two groups’ worldviews and goals align, so they declared a formal alliance. Not much is known about the details of the alliance but given the open declaration to news outlets and social media, the global audience as well as their target audience was made aware of their newly founded partnership. Group capacity. To survive, groups need both financial and human resources. Terrorists, like any other politically motivated group, have a target audience. Their choices are guided by their audience. With audience approval or sympathy, they are able to collect financial resources. Operational decisions would rationally be guided by the latter. When groups cannot gain enough resources from their target audiences, they resort to other means of collecting resources, including trafficking (both goods and people), smuggling, and other criminal activities. Furthermore, continued operations require personnel, so terrorist organizations also prioritize recruitment. Recruitment is sometimes more selective, for example, Hezbollah will only accept recruits from southern Lebanon – they consider this exclusivity an asset to group unity as they are based in that area, and they assume that recruits from the area are truly dedicated and loyal to their mission. In fact, the group sends recruiters to each village, house by house, within their operating base to convince individuals to join the group. 35 Hezbollah also considers this make-up of 33

Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.” Stephen E. Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 87. 35 “Lebanon: Recruitment Practices of Hezbollah,” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, accessed September 14, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2015/09/29/lbn10463 8.e.pdf. 34

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recruits as an asset to cohesiveness within the group. Other organizations are much less discriminatory, such as ISIS, which takes to social media to promote their ideas and ask for recruits to join them or take action. ISIS even claims credit for an attack perpetrated by a follower without guidance from the organizational leadership. The latter means suggests a more decentralized structure, as they allow for cells to operate independently, whereas the former type is reflective of a more centralized, leadership-based organizational type. Groups vary in structure, and ideology is not a determinant of organizational hierarchy. Time. Terrorists in the 1970s made their decisions based on the context of the time period they were in, this may appear intuitive, but this context is critical. Televisions were present in most homes, and people often watched the news. Similarly, terrorists in 2019 made their decisions understanding that they have a global audience at their disposal, with the dominance of the internet to report news, and the exponential rise of social media prominence. It is essential to understand that the time in which a group emerges is indeed a mitigating factor; active groups which emerged before the internet needed to perpetrate highly visible, large-scale attacks to draw attention, but groups in the age of the internet and social media do not. Any event, small scale or otherwise, may reach a broad audience – with good marketing. This is not to say that groups operating in the current climate do not perpetrate highly visible or large-scale attacks, this is just an assertion that they do not need to in order to draw attention to their cause. Lack of legal political opportunity. Terrorist activity is present in both democracies and non-democracies, but it is more frequently prevalent in non-democracies. 36 Democracies provide an outlet for political dissent and expression; where these are absent, other outlets, including violence, are sought. This is an extension of the Democratic Peace Theory. This theory suggests that democracies do not seek war, because their nations are inherently more peaceful, given their representative government. This is not an absolute rule, because one must recognize that democracies have gone to war. It is a larger trend outlook, considering events over time. In essence,

36

Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, "Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments," International Studies Quarterly 55, No. 2 (June 2011): 357-378.

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on the whole, democracies are less likely to go to war, and political opportunity explains this. Power differential. Asymmetric conflict leaves groups with deep grievances and few options. They often do not have the capital or assets that states or international bodies possess, so their tactics and guerilla-like operations are used to fight powers which are far more resourced. This is similar to the previous category; where there is no route to legal, peaceful authority, groups understand the power differential between them and recognized governing bodies. However, unlike the previous category, terrorist groups may also pursue violence because they view their goals to be threatened by other influential factors in society, like a powerful religious influence in a country for example. Consider Saudi Arabia, while the country is a monarchy and governed by the Al Saud family, religious clerics have a notable concentration of power within the nation. Not all of the powerful entities within nations are governing bodies. Chaos = Opportunity. As previously discussed, the majority of recent terrorist acts are committed in countries at war, or in countries experiencing some armed conflict. This is supported by the figures, and both recent and historical data, but it is not reflected in media coverage. The most salient attacks have not been those perpetrated in Afghanistan or Iraq. Instead, attacks in the Western world have maintained salience and dominance over media coverage. Consider the Manchester bombings at the Ariana Grande concert or the attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, those attacks gained mass coverage on network and cable news for weeks, but higher casualty events occur on a regular basis in Pakistan or Nigeria and international coverage has been relatively minimal. Global pandemic. This is the perhaps the most surprising mitigating factor, one that has not yet been explored by empirical study. In late 2019 and 2020, Covid-19 upended the world on a scale one could not have previously imagined. The global pandemic has shaped everyone’s actions, including those of terrorists. Some terrorists have warned their groups to limit operations where the virus has been especially catastrophic. For instance, ISIS told its members and followers to avoid going to Europe

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in mid-March 2020 to avoid getting infected with the virus. 37 They even issued the same guidelines as global public health officials: to ensure that they wash their hands frequently and cover their faces when coughing or sneezing. This is perhaps the most shocking behavior, but this reaction is preferable considering that other terrorist groups and individuals have decided to capitalize on the crisis and attempt to weaponize Covid-19. In the last week of March 2020, Timothy Wilson, a white supremacist from Missouri, was killed by the FBI as they tried to arrest him; he planned on bombing a hospital during the pandemic to ensure maximum damage. He believed that the pandemic would heighten the attention to his attack, and his proclamation that ‘the Jews’ created the virus and unleashed it upon the world. 38 Al Qaeda has also decided to take advantage of the circumstances by creating propaganda materials and public statements, suggesting that this virus is the hand of god, coming down on the west. Covid-19 has claimed more lives than 9/11, and they suggest that this is indicative of god’s wrath on the United States. 39 Whether groups are directing their members to halt operations and take care of their health, or if they are trying to take advantage of the pandemic, this global event has even altered the actions and decisions of terrorists.

Discussion: Mitigating factors and ideology Making the argument that ideology is a key driver of terrorist choices is not to suggest that the mitigating factors noted here are irrelevant or 37

Aitor Hernandez-Morales, “How the Coronavirus Is Reshaping Terrorists' Attack Plans.” POLITICO, 3 Mar. 2020, www.politico.com/news/2020/03/27/coronavirusterrorism-justice-department-150870. 38 Pete Williams, “Missouri Man Planned to Bomb Hospital during Pandemic to Get Attention for White Supremacist Views,” NBC News, NBC Universal News Group, 30 Mar. 2020, www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/missouri-man-planned-bombhospital-during-pandemic-get-attention-white-n1172346; Paul Caine, “Right-wing Terrorists Looking to 'Weaponize' Pandemic, Says U of C Expert,” WTTW News, Public Broadcasting Service, 8 Apr. 2020, news.wttw.com/2020/04/08/right-wingterrorists-looking-weaponize-pandemic-says-u-c-expert. 39 James G. Meek, “Terrorist Groups Spin COVID-19 as God's 'Smallest Soldier' Attacking West,” ABC News, ABC News Network, 2 Apr. 2020, abcnews.go.com/International/terrorist-groups-spin-covid-19-gods-smallestsoldier/story?id=69930563.

How Ideology Influences Terror

19

insignificant. They play a significant role in the choices that groups make, or do not make. This text simply argues that ideology is the overwhelming driving force for groups. Ideology shapes the group’s identity, actions, and outward messaging. Groups are formed around ideas, values, and beliefs. These predate any operational planning. In essence, a group has to be built before it may take action. Mitigating factors are a consideration only after the group has been established, ideology in tow. Furthermore, while the discussion in this text largely centers around groups and group dynamics, it is of critical importance to note that terrorism is not limited to group perpetrators. There are many individuals who commit acts of terrorism, and one could also argue that ideology is the greatest driver of individuals’ behavior and choices, as shown by the case of Brenton Tarrant. Tarrant, a right-wing, racist, terrorist perpetrated an armed assault attack on two mosques in March 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand, killing 51 40 people. His manifesto and live stream of the attack affirm that his ideology was his motivation. Legal access to his utilized weaponry simply gave him the capability. Organization and group dynamics are not prerequisites to the consideration of ideology. Although this text seeks to establish ideology as the greatest mitigating factor for group decision-making, there are competing theories within the scholarly community. For instance, David Rapoport (2002) suggests that terrorism has come in waves. 41 Rapoport theorizes that there are four waves. The first being an anarchist wave which began in the 1880s, the second being the anti-colonial wave in the 1920s, the third being the left wave in the 1960s, and the fourth being the religious wave beginning in 1979. 42 In accordance with this theory, we are currently living within the fourth wave. Within this frame, each wave is associated with specific tactics, e.g. the first wave is associated with assassinations and bank robberies, while the fourth wave is 40

The New York Times, “More Than a Dozen Victims in Critical Condition After New Zealand Shootings,” The New York Times, March 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/16/world/asia/new-zealand-shooting.html. 41 David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Anthropoetics 8, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002), n.p. 42 Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11.”

20

1. Introduction

associated with bombings, kidnapping, and assassination. 43 In previously published scholarly work, this theory was tested empirically, and mixed support was found, 44 e.g. in the fourth wave kidnappings decreased, contrary to expectation, but bombings increased, in line with expectations. This frame is of use, but empirically, it does not hold in totality. Rapoport argued that it was time that guided operational decisions and group actions. One cannot dispute that context is key, including time, as noted above. Especially when one considers that changes in politics, technology, and the media have all contributed to the change of group behavior. However, fundamentally, guidance comes from the leading voice of the group – the core foundational element of the group – the group ideology. Ideology is the idea that binds the members of the group together. The following chapters will discuss each aforementioned ideology on an individual basis. Using both current and historical examples, this text will seek to convey the significance of ideology, and how it influences terror. Examples will first provide a brief summary of the respective group’s history before delving into the role of ideology on their actions or decisions. Chapters will include graphs and other visuals; to see more interactive versions of these visuals, as well as additional visuals, scan the QR code included at the beginning of this text.

43

Ranya Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice," Journal of Applied Security Research 13, No. 1 (January 2018): 89-110. 44 Given data restrictions, only the third and fourth waves could be empirically tested.

2. NATIONALIST/SEPARATIST (NS) GROUPS

There are numerous types of Nationalist/Separatist groups. Within this text, these groups are defined as groups which seek to change or overturn a standing and recognized ruling government. These are generally groups which seek to alter the course of a nation from outward looking to inward looking; this is often illustrated by countries’ isolationary foreign policy. For instance, the latter is categorized by a disdain for globalism. Moreover, this view is often accompanied by the assertion that the nation-state is the greatest sovereign authority. Nation-states are foremost accountable to themselves, and not international institutions or agencies. They are also groups which are seeking to create an independent, autonomous nation from an existing, recognized nation. They are groups which are seeking selfdetermination for political, historical, or cultural reasons. These classifications of terrorism are not to be confused with ultranationalism. The term is somewhat misleading, but ultra-nationalism certainly does not belong in the scope of NS groups described above. Within this text, a more fitting classification for them would be right wing. Ultranationalists generally espouse racially or ethnically motivated national sentiments. They do not seek to close off politically from the global community, but to “purify” their nation internally. Ultra-nationalism goes hand in hand with supremacism. This classification of terrorism will be further discussed in Chapter 4. Within the Global Terrorism Database, NS groups are the most modal. 368 out of 1167 groups represented an NS ideology, as defined above; 45 there are more NS groups than any other group type in the Global Terrorism Database, specifically when one accounts for terrorism which is international in nature. NS groups have been historically active and continue to be. Within the EU, there were 137 NS attacks in 2017, but this number

45

Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.”

22

2. Nationalist/Separatist Groups

dropped to 83 in 2018. 46 The latter number does not account for foiled NS attacks, so it is somewhat spurious. One could assert that it is unsurprising that NS groups are the most common group type of terrorism. Throughout the world, there are groups which seek independence from borders that they do not recognize or comprehend. Although self-determination is a right clearly embedded within Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, in practice, nations do not respond positively to a segment of their population wanting to splinter, for any reason. Groups displaced by the colonialist era, where lines were often arbitrarily drawn, often feel a right to self-rule and autonomy. Oppressed minorities within states also seek self-determination so that they may live in peace amongst their own people, where their history and culture are celebrated. These groups of people may have the option to peacefully attain their goals, but many do not, and turn to violence. Many that do have peaceful means at their disposal have pursued violence nonetheless; asymmetric conflict is viewed by many of these groups as a logical decision since their opposition is generally a well-armed, well-funded, publicly supported military. This chapter will detail The Free Papua Movement (OPM), an active group operating within the recognized borders of Indonesia. Arguably, colonialism sowed the seeds of the OPM. This is not to suggest that violence is justified, but rather to suggest that violence is often deepseated. This is especially the case for NS groups, where historical injustices are frequently used as justification for the use of violence.

NS profile: The Free Papua Movement (OPM) The Papuan people have long sought to gain independence from Indonesia, and previously, Dutch colonial rule. In 1828, the Dutch laid claim to New Guinea. However, their presence was not cemented with permanent posts until 1898. 47 During WW2, the Japanese took control over the territory, but it was returned to Dutch control at the conclusion of the war. Even after 46

Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019. Virginia Gorlinski, “Papua,” Encyclopædia Britannica, November 22, 2015, https://www.britannica.com/place/Papua. 47

How Ideology Influences Terror Figure 2-1: OPM Attacks over time, 1970-2016

48

48

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

23

24

2. Nationalist/Separatist Groups

recognizing Indonesia as a sovereign nation, the Dutch maintained control over New Guinea. Meanwhile, Indonesia considered it part of its territory. In 1962, the Dutch relented and relinquished control of New Guinea to the United Nations. In 1963, the UN recognized the area as Indonesian territory and therefore transferred it to Indonesian control. This was done with the condition that a referendum would be held in 1969, so that the people of the region may decide their future. The referendum ceded control to the Indonesian government. The results were in favor of joining Indonesia. The referendum was not considered to be a free or fair election. 49 As is the case with colonial territories, the transition to new leadership was not smooth, even before the referendum. Indonesian control was met with immediate opposition by The Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM). Over time, the native Papuan people had lost control over their lands and resources to the Dutch, the Japanese, and the Indonesian government. To be clear, many Papuans considered the continued Indonesian presence as an occupation of their historical lands. The OPM sought to gain influence and fight for a separate, independent state on behalf of their people. The OPM focused its attacks on security targets (military and police) of the Indonesian government. 50 Security targets are a natural target choice for an NS group. These targets represent the oppressive force perceived by the OPM as occupiers of their lands. Attacking the military and police strikes at the heart of their agenda. They are conduits for the state that is oppressing them. The Papuan people were given some measure of autonomy by the Indonesian government in 2001. However, under that ruling, Papuans did not gain control over their natural resources, nor did they gain true selfgovernance. To the OPM, this concession was merely insulting and insufficient. The OPM has also historically (yet infrequently) targeted businesses and private citizens, including an attack in 2017 on a copper 49

“United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP),” GlobalSecurity.org, last updated April 9, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/papua.htm. 50 “GTD Search Results: Perpetrators: Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka),” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=target&casualties_type= &casualties_max=&perpetrator=1878.

How Ideology Influences Terror

25

mine. This may seem counter to their mandate of gaining independence, but it is not. One of the OPM’s chief grievances is the pillaging of their natural resources, specifically by outsiders. Their natural resources could provide their region with wealth, and potentially enough resources to fight the Indonesian government. An attack on a mine owned by a foreign multinational corporation is therefore unsurprising, and in line with the group’s stated goals and ideology. As may be observed from Figure 2-1, the OPM has not been a highly active group. They are persistent, but their attacks peaked in 2012 at five attacks per year. One may also observe that the line graph does not go below one, meaning that there has been at least one attack per year for as long as the GTD has recorded information on the group. Given the group’s focus, OPM attacks were all perpetrated within the internationally recognized borders of Indonesia. One must note that although the attacks were within the borders of Indonesia, their casualties varied in nationality thus classifying the group as international in nature, based on the definition put forth in this text (see Chapter 1). Estimates place OPM membership at approximately 1000 members. The population of the region is approximately 3.5 million, of which only 1.8 million are indigenous Papuans, the remaining population is largely (non-Papuan) Indonesian. 51 Members are believed to be poorly armed, relative to the Indonesian special forces, the Kopassus. The Kopassus were sent to Papua to contain the insurgency. 52 The OPM could not battle the Indonesian government, or even the Kopassus, so they sought to utilize insurgent, guerilla tactics. This is an expected reaction to an asymmetric conflict. To quell the violence, the Indonesian government also made a decisive political move. They divided the region into three parts under President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie’s direction. This was part of a divide and conquer strategy. His successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid came to power and reunited the region almost immediately. However, this was 51

“West Papua,” Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization, October 15, 2014, https://unpo.org/members/7843. 52 Elaine Pearson, “Supporting Accountability, Not Separatism in Indonesia,” Human Rights Watch, August 22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/22/supporting-accountability-not-separatismindonesia.

26

2. Nationalist/Separatist Groups

not long lived as his successor, President Megawati Sukarnoputri once again divided the region, this time into two parts. The region remains separated, Papua and West Papua. 53 These changes alone frustrated the collective Papuan people. Their government sought to control them by ripping their communities apart, repeatedly. The OPM capitalized on this frustration. They maintain a consistent presence because their people and nation keep getting piecemealed. The lack of consistency only further bolstered the OPM. Unsurprisingly, the group remains active. The OPM, by the stated Enders and Sandler definition within this text, would be considered a terrorist group. However, this case is marked with a complexity that is frequent in the use of the terrorism label. The Kopassus are notorious for their human rights violations, and they have been known to target any political dissent and mark it as terrorism. Non-OPM Papuan political activists were arrested and prosecuted under terrorism charges. This is a common tactic used throughout the (largely) nondemocratic world. Frequently, nations label dissidents as terrorists, so they may eliminate their opposition within the confines of their laws. Large-scale databases, like the Global Terrorism Database, are weary of this and seek to exclude these events. However, one must recognize that the OPM used violent means to achieve their goals, and therefore this specific case is less ambiguous.

Discussion The OPM profile conveys how deep-rooted a conflict may be. In this case, colonialism was at the heart of the grievances felt by the Papuan people. The Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesians have all laid claim to a place that is home to its own indigenous people. A people that maintains a strong, historic identity. They desire self-rule, and they have been denied that opportunity by multiple powers for generations. The OPM used this context and sought to exploit these circumstances to gain favor and resources from a sympathetic audience. This was especially effective considering that indigenous Papuans now only make up half the population in their homeland. In essence, they suggest that violence would be the only way to

53

Ibid.

How Ideology Influences Terror

27

gain independence, because the occupiers just kept coming. Resistance was required. The OPM’s campaign is one of focus, which is common for NS groups. Their grievances generally lay within their country, so they do not pursue international targets. However, this is not to say that international businesses are not targeted, or that foreign targets are not caught amidst the chaos of an attack. This is a rational calculation weighed by the OPM and other NS groups. In the case of the OPM, the perceived pillaging of their natural resources, including by international or multinational corporations has made those firms a target; not only are they taking their resources, but they are a symbol of the continued exploitation felt by the Papuan people. It should be noted that although the collective Papuan region is one of the poorest regions within the Indonesian territory, it has plentiful natural resources. The latter is what has made the region so attractive to occupying powers, and currently, the Indonesian government. Since the overarching goal of the group has not been achieved, the group remains active even though the region has gained some measure of autonomy over time. To be clear, some autonomy is not the goal of the group – this is a fight for true self-determination and independence. Perhaps until this goal is met, the OPM will not relent. There are nationalist groups which have operated for decades and continue to do so. In September 2019, violence escalated dramatically when a teacher was accused of making racist comments towards ethnically Papuan children. This sparked mass protests. Dozens of protestors were injured, and 32 people lost their lives, most of them protestors. 54 The latter was not an act of terrorism, but it is a reflection of the nationalist tension that exists within the Papuan region. It is essential to recognize context, because events such as this breed sympathy for terrorist groups, thus creating recruiting and fundraising opportunities for the OPM. To put this incident in even greater context, one should consider that only 10 months earlier, in December 2018, another burst of violence overtook the Papuan region when the OPM (suspected, not officially claimed) attacked a crew building a new development. An extreme 54

Febriana Firdaus, “Indonesia: Death Toll Mounts after New West Papua Clashes,” Al Jazeera, September 24, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/deathtoll-mounts-bodies-indonesia-west-papua-190924062406348.html.

28

2. Nationalist/Separatist Groups

Indonesian military crackdown ensued. Thirty-five thousand people fled because of the severity of the crackdown. 55 While this incident was sparked by a terrorist act, the reaction was, many argue, extremely disproportionate. Events such as this only further nationalist sentiment and resentment towards the Indonesian government. The OPM is not the only multi-generational NS group whose goal is rooted in historical events and marked by issues of national and ethnic identity. The PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan), a group seeking to establish an independent Kurdish state, has been active since 1984. Some suggest that they were established a decade earlier, but they were initially only a legitimate political party in Turkey. It is difficult to ascertain the transition time from party to terrorist organization. The Kurdish people are spread throughout the Eurasian/Middle Eastern region, in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, but the Kurds are seeking to unify and create a recognized state. Many Kurds were ruled by the British after the Ottoman empire, and then by the Iraqi state. To control, and dampen, the Kurdish people’s aspirations for independence, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against them within the borders of Iraq in the late 1980s. Specifically, in 1988, Hussein ordered an attack on Halabja, a Kurdish town; his forces used sarin gas. More than five thousand people were killed on the day of the attack, and more than twelve thousand people consequently died due to exposure.56 Hussein was ruthless and unapologetic. The attack only furthered the Kurdish desire for self-rule. Given the conflicts and power vacuum within the region, specifically the Iraq war beginning in 2003 and heightened terrorist activity, the Kurdish people have seized their opportunity and carved a semiautonomous region in northern Iraq 57 since 2005. This was two years after the United States began the first bombing campaign. As with the OPM, this was insufficient. Their goal was not and is not autonomy, but independence and recognition. For the Kurds and the PKK, the union of their people who 55

Firdaus, “Indonesia: Death Toll Mounts after New West Papua Clashes.” Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, “Remembering Halabja Chemical Attack,” Al Jazeera, March 16, 2016, www.aljazeera.com/amp/indepth/opinion/2016/03/remembering-halabja-chemicalattack-160316061221074.html. 57 “Iraqi Kurdistan profile,” BBC News, April 25, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147263. 56

How Ideology Influences Terror

29

are spread across internationally recognized borders is paramount. This is a battle won, but their fight goes on. 58 To ensure their ability to carry out terrorist attacks, the group held an annual fundraising campaign, a kampanya. They elicit donations from their target audience, sell merchandise, and sell their publications. Deep-seated conflicts are difficult to quell, and while the PKK has made progress towards their ultimate goal, the group continues to use violent means in their pursuit of independence and unity. Meanwhile, for groups like the OPM, the fight is especially fraught as they have made much less progress towards their people’s independence. These enduring grievances are not limited to any geographic area either. The OPM is in southeast Asia, the PKK in the Middle East, but another group with these characteristics and shared ideology is the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA is the oldest extremist group in Europe, albeit, it has evolved over time. In 1858, it was known under another name – the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). 59 Their grievances have remained largely unchanged over time. They seek to end British rule, gain true autonomy, and unify the Irish people. The IRB initially allied itself with Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone), an Irish nationalist political party, but in 1916 they escalated their effort when legitimate political means made insufficient gains. The IRB organized the “Easter Rising”. This coordinated act of rebellion sought to put on a demonstration so large in scale that it would force the hands of the British and lead to Irish autonomy and freedom. Sixteen hundred demonstrators took to the streets, and even managed to take control of key administrative buildings, and in the process, they declared a free Ireland. 60 The British, infinitely better resourced, quashed the rebellion, violently and succinctly. Two thousand people were killed in less than a week. The leaders of the rebellion were rounded up and executed.

58 One must acknowledge that while the overarching goal of the PKK is independence, they do also have leftist leanings, so one could claim them as a mixed (NS/LW) group. 59 Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. 60 History.com Editors, “Easter Rising,” History, January 25, 2019, https://www.history.com/topics/british-history/easter-rising.

30

2. Nationalist/Separatist Groups

After the rebellion, the IRB transformed and became the IRA. The group’s objectives remained the same. The IRA then fought against the new Irish government that was ushered in, not recognizing its authority or believing it to be the true representative body for, and of, the Irish people. The IRA ushered in a campaign of violence. In 1923, the IRA and the Irish government called for a ceasefire, and shortly after the initiation of the ceasefire, the IRA acknowledged the legitimacy of the government. 61 However, working with the government made them disheartened with politics yet again, so they walked away. The IRA cut ties with Sinn Fein and decided to become a clandestine organization. As a secretive organization, the IRA became an exceedingly violent force, largely using bombing campaigns to persuade the British to grant them autonomy. The era (1968 to 1998) became known as “The Troubles”, as countless civilian lives were disrupted by the violence. The violence has since been minimized, as the group has splintered and lost support. However, the group does remain active, and its goal of autonomy and desire for self-rule remain steadfast. If they are not forcefully quashed, many NS groups will not cease without truly achieving their goals, as they see the fulfillment of their goal as integral to protecting their identity and history. This is partly why these groups have great longevity. Consider the difficulty of splitting a nation or establishing a new one. It would be an astounding course of events in our current time. After both World War I and World War II, countries and borders were redrawn, but not since then has there been a large-scale reorganization of boundaries. When the UN was established, states entered into the organization and became recognized as they were. Selfdetermination may be a right enshrined within the UN, but the application of that right is difficult to fathom. Not impossible, but unlikely. After all, East Timor gained independence from Indonesia in 2002. Previously occupied by Portugal, Indonesian forces occupied the area within two weeks of the Portuguese withdrawal. The OPM seeks the same ending. Like the Papuans, the East Timorese see themselves as culturally distinct from the

61

Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups, 141-143.

How Ideology Influences Terror

31

population of Indonesia and wanted a state of their own. They too held a referendum for independence in 1999 that was not recognized by Indonesia. Approximately 80% of the voters supported independence. 62 Violence broke out immediately thereafter, when independence was not granted. In the midst of the chaos, the UN took control over the administrative duties of the nation in the interim. Due to that intervention and global focus, East Timor was able to become officially independent in 2002. The OPM was, together with the global public, a witness to this successful case of selfdetermination. Against their perceived oppressor, no less. However, unlike the Papuan people, the East Timorese had widespread international support by powerful states, including Australia and the UK. Political support and leverage are undoubtedly the greatest tools in circumstances such as this. The OPM chose the path of violence, not statesmanship. To be clear, the latter is yet another reason why the OPM sought terrorist activity. They viewed it as a viable way to ascertain their goals given, in part, the lack of international support. In the case of the East Timorese, the international support shifted the power dynamics between the parties. This was a political strategy, and it was effective. However, it was not an option afforded to the Papuan region. The UN ceded the referendum to the Indonesian government and did not step in when violence broke out. One cannot expect that the international community will respond uniformly to nationalist ambition, peaceful or violent. NS groups are a reflection of strong identities. NS groups resort to violence because they feel a need to protect their culture, history, and land. Some states have integrated a multiplicity of diverse communities, but others have not done so successfully. To be fair, some groups simply do not want to be integrated. Some populations, like the Papuan or Kurdish people demand their independence. They want official recognition of their cultures and languages. They want an end to second-class citizenship and excessive violence used against them. It is these sentiments that fuel NS terrorist groups all over the world. It is perhaps impossible to curb these views because some groups will always seek to splinter from states where they feel they do not belong.

62

“East Timor Country Profile,” BBC News, February 26, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14919009.

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2. Nationalist/Separatist Groups

Samuel Huntington published a seminal piece named The Clash of Civilizations, where he theorized that people’s tribes or cultural identities would always supersede any social or global constructs. 63 This includes political and economic systems. NS groups seem to espouse these beliefs. Many dismiss Huntington’s views as extreme, but they are congruent with NS group ideologies.

63

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" In Culture and Politics, 99118 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).

3. LEFT-WING (LW) GROUPS

Revolutionists, radicals, communists – these are terms one may associate with left-wing terrorist groups. They are groups on the extreme left of the political spectrum. The far end of that spectrum being communism. They are bound by worldviews asserting that the poor and working classes are being unfairly constrained by the upper classes. They seek to eliminate vast inequality and hierarchy within societies. They believe in wealth redistribution. This often translates into the desire to upend capitalist societies and remake them in a Marxist-Leninist vision. Left-wing groups have been geographically concentrated in their activity. Although left-wing terrorism has occurred all over the globe, there are three historical, regional hotspots. Firstly, South America, which is home to the highest density of left-wing attacks. Between 1970 and 2016, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) reported 5198 left-wing attacks in Colombia, 4703 in Peru, 1313 in Chile, and 281 in Argentina. Secondly, South Asia, where 4580 attacks occurred in India, and 5922 attacks occurred in Afghanistan. Finally, Western Europe, specifically in France and Spain. France experienced 1360 attacks while Spain experienced 602. 64 These concentrations are inextricably linked to each nation’s history. In essence, the contextual factors within these nations clarify this density. Leftist movements are born of disparities and anti-fascism. The countries named here have each dealt with these two overarching issues. As one would expect, left-wing groups are prevalent but not highly modal, given their geographic concentration. Within the GTD (1970-2013), there are 309 transnational left-wing groups recorded, out of a total of 1167 groups. 65 Over time, left-wing groups have greatly decreased in number; the GTD shows a dramatic decline in the frequency of left-wing groups over time. 66 The majority of the left-wing groups in the GTD emerged in the 64

Ibid. Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.” 66 See the QR code for further detail. 65

34

3. Left-wing groups

1970s. Rapaport called this period “the new left wave”; he suggested that this period began in the 1960s and continued until 1979, when he claims the fourth wave began (the religious wave, on the heels of the revolution in Iran). 67 He theorized that this period was characterized by hijacking and kidnapping, because those were the means most often employed by leftwing groups. There have been mixed empirical findings in relation to his theorization; results provided evidence that hijacking was used as a means during this period for instance, but the probability of its use decreased slightly over time. However, when examining various prolific groups within this period, the employment of kidnappings and hijackings, even without empirical evidence, does reveal itself anecdotally. This will become more evident in the examples discussed in the profile and the consequent discussion below. This chapter will delve deep into the story of The Shining Path, a left-wing group that has been active in Peru since 1970. This group roots its grievances in perceived historical inequality and sought to destroy the status quo in their favor. The discussion will also briefly feature the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.

Left-wing profile: The Shining Path Like many other organized groups, The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) began with a simple, yet grand idea in 1970: society in Peru was fundamentally unfair. The upper classes and the wealthy possessed control over the nation, and the poor were consequently suffering and voiceless. In essence, the “have-nots” were powerless. The Shining Path sought to offer a different vision of the nation to show society the way towards equality and a true proletariat-led democracy. The group was named after a quote by a known Peruvian Marxist and author, José Carlos Mariátegui. The extracted quote suggested that Marxism would offer “the shining path to revolution”. 68

67

Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11.” Daniel Masterson, "In the Shining Path of Mariátegui, Mao Zedong or Presidente Gonzalo? Peru's ‘Sendero Luminoso’ in Historical Perspective," Journal of Third World Studies 11, No. 1 (1994): 154-177. 68

How Ideology Influences Terror Figure 3-1: Shining Path attacks over time, 1970-2016

69

69

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

35

36

3. Left-wing groups

The Shining Path were unabashed in their determination, and they used violence unapologetically as they endeavored to ascertain their goals. After all, the group did consider the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Stalinist regime in Russia as models to aspire to. Abimael Guzman, also known as Comrade Gonzalo, was the founder and first leader of The Shining Path. Before he took up this mantel, he was a Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Christobal de Huamanga in Ayachucho. 70 His father was a wealthy businessman, so Comrade Gonzalo was actually born into affluence. 71 During his studies and time as a professor, he became enamored by leftist, specifically Maoist, ideology. This was partly fueled by the injustice and poverty that his largely indigenous students faced on a daily basis. 72 In fact, he even visited China multiple times to further his knowledge and understanding of the Maoist movement. 73 As he learned Maoist doctrine, he began to identify more and more with his students and the peasant class of Peru. He consequently decided to lead the fight to prosperity on their behalf – and so he did. Gonzalo even learned Quechua, the indigenous language of the Andes region, to further relate to the people he sought to incite. Unsurprisingly, Gonzalo also took a leading role in the Communist Party of Peru. Although Gonzalo was born into privilege, and raised within a democratic society, he sought violent means because he and his followers wanted to completely overhaul the system in place. They believed that the system needed a forceful shock. Indeed, their extremist ideology illuminated their path forward: The Communist Party of Peru was transformed from a political party to an insurgent terrorist group in 1980 under Gonzalo’s leadership. To ensure that Gonzalo led compliant members, any members opposing this new violent strategy were expelled from the group, and a military training-style camp was set up to prepare members for future attacks. In fact, Gonzalo required all members to sign an oath of loyalty. He ruled without mercy. He 70

Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups, 302-303; Ayachucho is in south-central Peru, in the eastern Andes. 71 Colleen Sullivan, “Abimael Guzmán,” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 2, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abimael-Guzman. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid.

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considered the ends to justify the means. He was ruthless with both his enemies and followers. In order to further ensure strict compliance, the group was highly organized and hierarchical in structure. Specifically, it was divided into three groups: the local guerilla force (local part-time force), the regional guerilla force (mobile full-time force), and the main force (full-time insurgent army). 74 Each cell was led by a commander with extensive experience. 75 Before committing their first attack, the group planned, recruited, and built infrastructure for an entire decade. They did not just attempt to seize control haphazardly. They aspired to have the necessary structure in place to overthrow and replace the government. The first attack by The Shining Path was perpetrated in Chuschi, a small village in the Ayachucho region, in 1980. The group destroyed all the ballot boxes in the village. 76 This was both a symbolic and practical assault on the town. They sought to discredit elections, which they deemed illegitimate while marking their emergence as a group. Although not insignificant, this attack would in no way foreshadow the violence or destruction that was to come. In 1983, in a single armed assault, the group killed 79 people in the town of Saccsamarca. 77 The escalation was extreme. Between the 1980s and early 1990s, the group perpetrated at least 200 attacks per year (see Figure 3-1). Most of these attacks were perpetrated with the use of guns and explosives. Highly indiscriminate tactics. The group was relentless. In sum, between 1978 and 2018, the Global Terrorism Database has a record of 4563 attacks perpetrated by The Shining Path. 78 The group 74

Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups, 302-303. 75 D. W. Hammack, "Understanding the Path of Terrorism," Security Management 37 (1993): 26-26. 76 Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups, 302-303. 77 “Incident Summary: 198305230059,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198305230059. 78 “GTD Search: Perpetrators: Shining Path (SL),” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&casualties_typ e=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=590&count=100.

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3. Left-wing groups

even assassinated fellow left-wing activists who did not pledge loyalty to them. They also notably performed executions via stoning. 79 In 1999, 8 peasants were shot by the group because they were accused of being spies for the Peruvian army. 80 Moreover, they were shot publicly to ensure the community’s compliance in the future. These were punitive sentences reserved for perceived enemies and wavering supporters. There were no trials or variations thereof. The group considered themselves justified. Revolution is costly. Although the group’s membership was concentrated in the rural areas, the level of violence was so extreme that daily lives across Peru were disrupted and threatened on a regular basis. The Shining Path mounted a true campaign of sustained terror. Attacks were however largely focused on the Peruvian government. In turn, the government attempted to quell the group without success for years. The insurgent tactics and broad coverage of the Shining Path were difficult to dampen. Accordingly, the government chose another strategy. The government decided to focus their efforts on capturing the leadership, and they did so with some success. Peruvian anti-terrorism forces began surveilling Gonzalo around the clock. In 1992, their efforts came to fruition as the anti-terrorism forces raided a home in suburban Lima. Gonzalo was captured and imprisoned, along with five of his lieutenants. 81 Gonzalo did not take his life sentence with fortitude; in fact, he asked his followers to suspend their campaign. This angered his followers, and his image within the group was tarnished. His call went unheeded. Soon after Gonzalo was captured, he was succeeded by Oscar Ramirez Durand. It was not a quick transition, as Gonzalo did not expect to be arrested. Durand, like Gonzalo, also went by a nom de guerre, Comrade Feliciano. The government immediately turned their attention to capturing Feliciano, and they succeeded in 1999. Before Feliciano’s capture, the public perceived the group as demoralized, mostly because of Gonzalo’s capture and his consequent 79

Ibid. “Incident Summary: 199906130002,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199906130002. 81 Ibid. 80

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attitude in prison. The Peruvian president at the time, Alberto Fujimori, decided to wage his own brutal campaign against the group in this perceived moment of weakness. To do so, President Fujimori took extreme measures; he dissolved parliament and the courts. 82 Although both Gonzalo and Feliciano were captured during his tenure, the Peruvian public and political opposition grew weary of his tactics – even with this success. His authoritarian tactics were not tolerated for long. In this attempt to concentrate power and eliminate The Shining Path, Fujimori inadvertently re-energized the group. They became united against him. Even after President Fujimori was replaced by President Alejandro Toledo, The Shining Path maintained their campaign, united. However, after President Fujimori’s crackdown, the group never regained its level of activity. They perpetrated far fewer attacks. Consequently, to some, President Fujimori left office with a tarnished legacy, while others lauded his efforts because he did dampen the group’s activity. The government maintained its strategy of targeting leadership under the new President. Leaders in the movement continued to be arrested and sentenced. Currently, the group is led by Victor Quispe whose nom de guerre is Comrade Jose. The United States Department of State has a 5million-dollar bounty on his head. 83 The group became well adept at reorganizing and replacing its leadership, as it was now well aware of the government’s plan to target leadership. As time went on, it became a formality to the group. However, as one may expect, this was not sustainable in the long term, especially considering the hierarchical nature of the group. In 2009, after four decades of protracted conflict, a selection of The Shining Path membership base petitioned to form a new, recognized political party under a new name: Movadef. They were denied. Principally because the group supported terrorism. The group’s guise did not fool the government. Many of Movadef’s members were previously imprisoned for terrorism charges, specifically for crimes they committed while working under the auspices of The Shining Path. Violence did not bring about the

82

“Alberto Fujimori Profile: Deeply Divisive Peruvian leader,” BBC News, February 20, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439. 83 “Victor Quispe-Palomino,” U.S. Department of State, March 28, 2017, https://www.state.gov/victor-quispe-palomino/.

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3. Left-wing groups

goals envisioned by the group, so they attempted to seek a legitimate path to power. Unsurprisingly, their audacity was thwarted. Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2001-2003), set up by President Toledo, found that The Shining Path was responsible for approximately 30,000 deaths, or approximately 54% of all conflict-related deaths from 1980 to 2000. 84 This number has been disputed, and many other sources place the count at a much higher figure.

Discussion Left-wing groups, including The Shining Path, generally seek revolutionary change. This type of fundamental change can only be brought about by a dramatic shock to a nation’s system. One could argue that political tactics and strategy could accomplish this, but The Shining Path believed that only sustained, protracted violence could bring this about. This is ironic given that they eventually turned to legitimate means to attempt the fulfillment of their goals. A ruthless violent campaign spanning four decades, and their ultimate goal eludes them still. They are still active as at the compilation of this text, but they are active in a much more minimal capacity, relative to the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 3-1). The day-to-day governance of Peru used to be affected by the presence and attacks of The Shining Path, but this is no longer the case. Many groups maintain some of their infrastructure but perpetrate significantly fewer attacks. This may be due to diminished resources or the diminished support of their target audience. The spirit of leftist activism sparked by The Shining Path is difficult to extinguish. For a period, the group severely disrupted the state and controlled large swaths of territory, but they never gained complete control over the state. They were not able to take the reins and govern the nation. They have persisted despite this. Moreover, the lifespan of this group is rare, as most groups do not last more than a year. 85 Although most groups see violence as the only means in which they may fulfill their goals, The 84 “Truth Commission: Peru 01,” United States Institute of Peace, July 13, 2001, https://www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01. 85 Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure.”

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Shining Path sought two (political and violent), simultaneously (arguably congruently). They attempted to refocus their efforts by becoming a legitimate entity without officially disbanding their terrorist agenda. This is perhaps due to a splinter within the group, or simply fatigue. Given the secretive nature of the group, it is difficult to discern why the group decided to pivot. The Shining Path was not the only left-wing group in South America to terrorize its host for decades. The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) was a left-wing terrorist group formed in 1964. They were active until their official surrender in 2016. FARC was established as a group espousing a Marxist-Leninist ideology. They promoted agrarianism and held an anti-imperial outlook; the group was founded by farmers and land workers who were greatly concerned by the inequality within Colombia. This is also why the group was mainly based in rural, agrarian areas in Colombia, not unlike The Shining Path. They did have members residing in urban centers, but the majority of their force and influence was concentrated in rural areas. Small units governed by “the Secretariat” (the leadership) were spread across Colombia. 86 The group was hierarchical, but flatter in nature compared to The Shining Path as their cells were more widespread. The origin of the group was rooted in deep-seated grievances and a single event which served as the straw that broke the camel’s back. Before the foundation of FARC, some of the founders-to-be were in Marquetalia, a town in rural Colombia, establishing an agricultural commune. The members of the commune were violently attacked by the army and disbanded. The landowners of Marquetalia, and the state, viewed their commune as a legitimate communist threat. FARC was born of this attack. One should note that even before FARC was founded, Colombia had already lived through a decade-long civil war. 87 Violence often begets violence.

86

“Who are the Farc?,” BBC News, November 24, 2016, www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-latin-america-36605769. 87 Ibid.

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3. Left-wing groups

FARC, like The Shining Path, brought terror and disruption to the public for decades. Although previous studies have shown that relative to other groups, left-wing groups are more likely to use kidnapping as a means of employing terror, FARC was truly infamous for kidnapping. Everyday people, local or foreign, regardless of background, feared kidnapping for ransom when in Colombia throughout the lifetime of FARC. The US Department of State consistently issued warnings to travelers, and tourists were cautioned to take protections to guard their safety. FARC created an atmosphere of sustained fear. Not only was the tactic effective in sowing fear, but it was also highly lucrative. Kidnappings sponsored their organization and members. Between 2008 and 2011, FARC sustained tough losses that would mark the beginning of the end of the group. One of the group’s founders, Manuel Marulanda Vélez (also known as Sure Shot), died from heart failure. Jorge Briceño (also known as Mono Jojoy), a key leader, was killed in an air strike led by the Colombian military. Alfonso Cano (also known as Saenz Vargas), the leader of the group, was also killed during a raid. These blows were enough to sustain permanent damage to the group’s infrastructure and sustainability. The group announced it would no longer employ kidnapping and retreated in 2012. In that same year, the group came to the negotiating table with the Colombian government. In 2016, the group signed a peace agreement, thus formally deactivating the group. President Santos of Colombia earned a Nobel Peace Prize for his ability to successfully broker the deal and end decades of violence. In the case of both The Shining Path and FARC, the public, even the target audience, grew weary of the violence. Although there are other factors, this is a key contributing factor to their decline. They are anomalies; studies have shown that groups generally do not survive past the one-year mark or even the five-year mark, and yet these groups were active for decades. Most importantly, they share the same ideology. This begets questions: would a younger group be able to survive, should they emerge today? Would they be even more prolific, having learned from The Shining Path, FARC, and others? Would they also target businesses and civilians? Would they use kidnapping as a tactic of terror? Another example may shed some light.

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In 2002, The Revolutionary Front (also known as “RevFront”) was established in Sweden. This group professed a leftist, and ardently antifascist agenda. The rise of right-wing politicians in Sweden and across Europe spurred the group into action. They seek to destroy fascism by any means necessary. 88 The group is highly secretive, and their organizational structure is largely unknown, but arrests have shed some light. One of their leaders stabbed a self-declared fascist in the back and was charged with attempted murder. 89 Like both The Shining Path and FARC, they are unapologetic. They filmed their attacks on private property (vandalism), specifically the homes, of fascists and racists. The films were uploaded online. They made public threats to terrorize their prospective victims. The RevFront members were all masked and could not be identified from the videos. However, two members did speak to Vice News, where they identified their ideology as leftist and anti-fascist. They claimed that violence was not preferable, but a “tool” to utilize in this “war”. 90 After additional arrests, the group is believed to have disbanded in 2015. The website they had established went from an active forum to an archive. RevFront was a socialist group established in Western Europe. Unlike the South American Shining Path and FARC, RevFront was a relatively much younger group, and only survived for a fraction of the time. However, during their 13-year lifespan they were extremely violent, and openly and unapologetically so. Although RevFront attacked civilians like The Shining Path and FARC, they did specifically seek fascists or racists to target. They did not use indiscriminate tactics. They did not declare or divulge any details concerning their group structure. However, they did limit their activity to Sweden. As in the case of The Shining Path and FARC, RevFront was concerned with matters within their own borders. The Shining Path, FARC, and RevFront vary in their goals, but their ideological similarities have guided them to a similar projection. They have drawn collective lines. They are willing to attack civilians, they are willing to commit highly visible attacks, and they deplore capitalism – and the inevitable, consequent inequality. 88

VICE News, “The Rise of Sweden’s Far-Left Militants,” VICE, May 29, 2014, www.vice.com/amp/en_us/article/av47y4/the-rise-of-swedens-far-left-militants. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid.

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It must be noted that some of the differences between FARC/The Shining Path and RevFront may simply be a product of time. The internet and social media have transformed how the general public learns about events. Lower scale events may now elicit the same reaction, or coverage, that a large-scale attack used to elicit. Attention can be manipulated and guided with a savvy online strategy. In the 1970s, kidnappings were partly committed because of their relatively high ability to draw attention, and at the time, groups were wholly reliant on television and radio. They needed shocking attacks in order to wield those mediums. It is imperative to note time as a contextual factor. One should expect similarities among left-wing groups but understand that their decisions will vary based on the time of their emergence. This is one reason there are so many remarkable parallels between The Shining Path and FARC. Time is most certainly a factor, but there are still common threads among leftist groups. Although The Shining Path, FARC, and RevFront each has a unique history, background, and experience, they share operating practices. Operational decisions are certainly an indication of group strategy. They convey a respective group’s voice to the world. They are deliberative, outward messages. They are a reflection of the group’s ideology. Left-wing groups seek to fundamentally shift their nations politically, and therefore have no qualms about attacking civilian targets, as noted above. Moreover, they generally deplore capitalism, so one would expect attacks on businesses as they are symbols of a system they oppose, and scholarly work has indeed provided evidence that they are more likely to attack business targets. 91 This collective behavior among left-wing groups is unsurprising, but still interesting because groups do have unique histories, and yet their like-minded goals guide their decision-making. In essence, findings convey that there is some uniformity amongst left-wing groups. However, these findings do not point towards the future of leftwing terrorism. Rapoport theorized that the left wave of terrorism began in the 1960s and ended in 1979. This is understandable considering that many 91

Ibid.

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of the leftist terrorist groups of that period have now dissolved and disarmed, as in the case of the FARC. However, it would be unwise to consider this type of terrorism as simply “terror of the past”. In many developed and developing countries, inequality has grown starkly over the last few decades. The global community is acutely aware of the threat that inequalities pose to their economies and general stability. This is perhaps why Goal 10 of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals is the reduction of inequalities. This goal extends both across and within nations. Yet nations may be underestimating the nature of the issue. In 2019, 1% of the wealthiest individuals owned 44% of the world’s wealth. 10 billionaires (all men) possessed the wealth of Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Turkey, Taiwan, Poland, Sweden, Belgium, Thailand, and Iran, combined. 92 This trend of growing global inequality only adds to the sentiments that leftist groups use to recruit new members. The world is changing, and with it, wealth continues to concentrate. This is only further exasperated by the emergence of Covid-19 as millions lost their sources of income. The grievances which propelled the left-wing terrorist groups of the 1960s and 1970s are reappearing. To be clear, left-wing activity is still a current reality. In 2018, left-wing terrorist attacks continued to be reported; Spain reported 3 attacks, Greece reported 10 attacks, and Italy reported 6 attacks (these figures include foiled plots). 93 Nations should remain vigilant. As long as the root grievances remain and continue to grow, the threat is ever-present.

92

Institute for Policy Studies, “Global Inequality,” INEQUALITY.org, https://inequality.org/facts/global-inequality/. 93 Ibid.

4. RIGHT-WING (RW) GROUPS

Right-wing groups are driven by fascist or racist ideologies; they represent an extreme end of the political spectrum. Consider the spectrum flanked on the left by communism and flanked on the right by fascism; right-wing groups espouse ideologies near or at the end of that right flank. They are groups which, like left-wing groups, seek societal scale change, but their means vary greatly. Their grievances also vary greatly. Unlike other groups, there are no unifying, big picture ideas among rightwing groups. Left-wing groups generally seek to combat inequality and fight for the working class. Nationalist/Separatist groups generally seek autonomy or regime change. Right-wing groups are difficult to generalize. Some seek to eliminate any power held by racial minorities, some seek to punish perceived influential wrongdoers (politicians, bureaucrats, etc.), and some have anarchist tendencies – wanting simply to disrupt the status quo which was perceived to be veering too far left or center. More recently, right-wing terrorism in the West has centered around white supremacy groups. Empirical research has shown that they use assassination as a means of achieving their goals. They have used other means, but evidence has been provided to convey that assassination is the most probable tactic for this group type. 94 Although they seek societal change, they use a smaller impact tactic. While assassination may be a smaller scale attack type, it does shock the consciousness and elicit attention, especially when the target is known and influential. Right-wing terrorism is also on the rise within the United States; incidents increased from 0 in 2002, to 36 in 2017. 95 However, this number

94

Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.” Wesley Lowery, Kimberly Kindy, and Andrew Ba Tran, “In the United States, Right-wing Violence is on the Rise,” The Washington Post, November 25, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-the-united-states-right-wing95

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4. Right-wing groups

may be misleading. Many right-wing extremist incidents in the United States are small-scale, and sometimes counted under the umbrella of hate crimes or other crimes, when they are in fact a result of an organized group’s ideological directives. The FBI hate crime database shows that in 2018, there were 1943 anti-Black incidents, 835 anti-Jewish incidents, and 1179 anti-LGBT incidents. 96 Moreover, single-person attacks are frequently categorized as hate crimes even though they would technically meet the definition of terrorists within this text; they are non-state actors who commit violence in order to attain a political or social goal. Consequently, one could assert that the reported figures of right-wing terrorist attacks are undercounts of incidents occurring within the United States. The difference between hate crimes and terrorism is a blurry one. 97 It is a contested issue complicated by media coverage and statements from public leaders. If an incident were to be labeled terrorism by the media, there is political pressure to label it accordingly within the legal system. The same may occur when elected officials make statements declaring an event an act of terrorism. In essence, hate crimes are terrorist acts, depending on the audience. This is one consequence of poor definitional standards. Given the increase in incidents, the United States is also taking the international right-wing terrorist threat more seriously; in April 2020, the United States officially designated the Russian Imperialist Movement as a terrorist organization. 98 This marks the first time that a white nationalist organization has earned this classification, conveying the seriousness of the threat of this transnational ideology. Racist groups such as these are

violence-is-on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a-deb4-11e8-85df7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8978abd0b339. 96 FBI. “Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders,” 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018/tables/table-1.xls. 97 Helen Taylor, "Domestic Terrorism and Hate Crimes: Legal Definitions and Media Framing of Mass Shootings in the United States," Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 14, No. 3 (2019): 227-244. 98 Charlie Savage, Adam Goldman, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Will Give Terrorist Label to White Supremacist Group for First Time,” The New York Times, April 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/terrorist-label-white-supremacyRussian-Imperial-Movement.html?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_NN_p_20200406& instance_id=17375&nl=morning-briefing®i_id=95564106§ion=what Else&segment_id=23997&te=1&user_id=89e6cef18b14d92b51b74f92fb7f7317.

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classified as right-wing groups within this text, but they are also known by another moniker, ultranationalists. Right-wing violence has become even more pronounced as Covid19 has emerged within the United States. The renowned terrorist scholar Robert Pape, based at the University of Chicago, issued a stern warning to the United States of the danger posed by right-wing terror during the pandemic. Pape issued this warning after the failed hospital bombing attempt by Timothy Wilson, a white supremacist espousing a widely (online) circulated belief that “Jews” were responsible for the pandemic. Right-wing groups have been encouraging individuals and groups online to weaponize themselves and eliminate the groups they despise. 99 Interestingly, in the Global Terrorism Database (1970-2016), right-wing groups had not used biological weapons in any attacks whatsoever. This was perhaps due to lack of opportunity. Ring-wing violence and rhetoric in Europe have also become more pronounced. The election of extreme right-wing politicians across Europe has allowed for this climate. This includes political parties like the Golden Dawn of Greece. The Golden Dawn, while a recognized, legal political group, eerily echoes the Nazi party of 1940’s Germany. They are fiercely anti-immigrant, their symbols look almost exactly like Nazi emblems, and they even call their founder, “Fuhrer”. They have not maintained consistent support, but their presence is akin to a barometer of the country’s sentiments. As these political parties gain power, an environment has been fostered where right-wing rhetoric has proliferated. However, even though right-wing terrorist arrests have increased in Europe (44 in 2018, compared to 20 in 2017, and 12 in 2016), attacks have technically decreased, with only one reported incident in 2018, compared to 5 in 2017. 100 However, it must be noted that these numbers are somewhat misleading, as 44 attacks were foiled in 2018, most of them in France. 101 Furthermore, right-wing violence 99 Paul Caine, “Right-Wing Terrorists Looking to 'Weaponize' Pandemic, Says U of C Expert,” WTTW News, Public Broadcasting Service, 8 Apr. 2020, news.wttw.com/2020/04/08/right-wing-terrorists-looking-weaponize-pandemicsays-u-c-expert. 100 Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019. 101 Ibid.

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4. Right-wing groups

– not rising to the level of terrorism, is also on the rise within a number of European countries, including Sweden and the UK. Charges like physical assault and property damage were brought against the many perpetrators. 102 On a transnational scale, right-wing groups make up a small number of terrorist organizations. Only 84 out of the 1167 transnational groups within the Global Terrorism Database claim a right-wing ideology. 103 It should be noted that although there is only a small cadre of right-wing transnational groups, there are many more right-wing groups that identify as domestic, as they are perpetrated by actors from the respective country, within their respective country, and target their fellow countrymen. Moreover, unlike left-wing groups, there is not a contained period in which activity is high, but generally, right-wing activity is on the rise (See Figure 4-1). Right-wing incidents have fluctuated over time, with spikes in 1975, 1982, 1995, and 2000 within the GTD (2017). Nonetheless, these variations do not disable group-level findings, but they do convey the need for granularity and context. This chapter will highlight Combat 18. This neo-Nazi group was founded within the UK. Its grievances are rooted within their perception of a society lost; a society which became overly tolerant and provided prosperity for people they did not view as equals.

102 103

Ibid. Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.”

How Ideology Influences Terror Figure 4-1: Count of right-wing incidents over time, 1970-2016

104

104

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

51

52

4. Right-wing groups

Right-wing profile: Combat 18 (C18) Combat 18 (C18) is a right-wing, neo-Nazi terrorist group founded in the United Kingdom, in 1992. 105 The group was formed as a consequence of a singular demonstration; after an anti-Nazi demonstration disrupted a meeting of the British National Party (BNP) – a legitimate British political party, the BNP formed C18 as a “self-defense group”. 106 The group evolved from a protection unit to a clandestine terrorist organization. C18’s first leader, Paul Sargent – also known as Ginger Pit, was a former drug dealer from North London. Their choice of leader was unsurprising given that C18 relied on an illicit drug trade and white power music (known as the “Blood and Honor” genre) to raise funds for its operations. The group was dedicated, and expected loyalty and presence from its members. Members were expected to meet other members of the group each Saturday as a continued show of solidarity. 107 Moreover, members were expected to contribute to regular, small-scale operations on a daily basis. They were to call and threaten a plethora of targets to elicit fear. One of their meeting news sheets stated the following: We expect every one of you to help in this crusade. NO EXCUSES. At least make one phone call a day to one of the numbers listed, keep in awkward hours too if possible, really early or late. 108

Unsurprisingly, C18’s targets included political leftists, mixed-race couples, people of color, gay bars, the Jewish community, and anti-apartheid activists; 109 the group undoubtedly selected its targets based on its ideology. However, the overarching goal of the group was simple: start a race war. They even thought they were on the verge of success in 2001 when they gathered a group of men to attack the Asian (specifically Pakistani) community in Glodwick. They created such disruption and violence that hundreds of people were on the streets engaged in a campaign of violence –

105

Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Ibid. 107 Nick Lowles, White Riot: The Violent Story of Combat 18 (England: Milo Books, 2014), Kindle. 108 Ibid. 109 Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. 106

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the genesis of which was a report of a white woman being assaulted by Asian men. 110 Much to the disdain of the group – this incident, as large scale as it was, did not lead to a race war. With the growing violent terrorist actions, the BNP, in an effort to become a mainstream, more popular, party, began distancing itself from C18. The name of the group is based on Adolf Hitler’s initials, A being the 1st letter in the alphabet, and H being the 8th. 111 Their motto is an apt summary of their ideology, Whatever it takes, oderint dum metuant, White Revolution is the only solution.

Oderint dum metuant translates, from the Latin, to “let them hate, so long as they fear”. To further bolster the group, Harold Covington, a lauded American neo-Nazi activist, was sought out as a Technical Advisor; 112 groups that are in ideological alignment often assist each other. In fact, Sargent formed an alliance with another neo-Nazi group, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), but this relationship was short-lived as the UDA did not trust Sargent and suspected him of being an agent of the British government. 113 In fact, botched alliances are what led to the conviction and imprisonment of Sargent. Disputes over the profits from the white power music business put Sargent at odds with other C18 leaders. To settle this matter, a meeting was called, where Sargent’s ally, Martin Cross, killed the other attending leader, Chris Castle. Cross and Sargent were found guilty of Castle’s murder, and so began the implosion of the group. 114 C18 managed to hold on to its organization for a few more years. In 1997, Strikeforce, a C18 magazine, began publication under new leadership; its publication signaled a renewed group mandate. However, more disbandment followed, as many of C18’s members splintered from the

110

Lowles, White Riot. “BNP: Under the Skin,” BBC News, accessed April 10, 2020, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/programmes/2001/bnp_special/roo ts/1992.stm. 112 Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 111

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group to form the White Wolves in 1999; another right-wing, racist organization. Although the organization retained approximately two dozen members, Scotland Yard no longer perceived them as a significant threat given their menial numbers. 115 When the group was waning, C18 decided to expand to Denmark, – a country with limited CCTV and less government oversight of their activities, relative to the UK. They even bought weapons from Poland to perpetrate attacks in Denmark, 116 marking a new level of their international operations. The group waned nonetheless, even with this attempt at salvation and a broader “Europe for whites” mandate. While C18 did not survive as an entity for an extended period of time, they caused chaos, sowed fear, and perpetrated a plethora of attacks targeting a wide swath of society. They were a brutalizing force in the UK, and within Europe. To be clear, the group has not officially disbanded, but its waning numbers and lack of operations suggest that it is, in practice, disbanded. From the splinter, the White Wolves emerged as a formidable threat – a group which published a manifesto envisioning mass nail bombings 117 in black and Asian neighborhoods in London. 118 They even issued a warning to non-whites and Jews living in the UK: leave or die. In 1999, there were three attacks in London that targeted minority communities. Three people were killed, and more than 100 people were injured. 119 David Copeland, an engineer, was arrested for the crime and proudly proclaimed his racist, right-wing agenda. 120 The White Wolves claimed credit, but authorities dispute the claim. Regardless, Copeland did 115

Ibid. Lowles, White Riot. 117 Nail bombs are bombs which contain nails, making the blast more deadly and harmful. 118 Jamie Wilson and Nick Hopkins, “The Threat of the White Wolves,” The Guardian, April 25, 1999, https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/uk/1999/apr/26/jamiewilson. nickhopkins. 119 Alan Cowell, “Man Charged in London Attacks Aimed at Minorities,” The New York Times, May 3, 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/03/world/man-chargedin-london-attacks-aimed-at-minorities.html. 120 “‘White Wolves’ linked to Soho bomb,” BBC News, April 30, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/05/99/the_nail_bomb_terror/33288 5.stm. 116

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espouse the same ideology as the White Wolves. He sought to expel racial minorities and Jews, and therefore chose his targets carefully. Copeland did not seek to elicit wide public fear, but rather targeted fear. By selecting minority neighborhoods, and waiting approximately a week between targets, he sowed extreme anxiety. He targeted a predominantly Afro-Caribbean neighborhood at first, followed by an Asian neighborhood, and finally, he attacked a gay neighborhood. This is an expected path based on his ideology. Although he had limited resources and made relatively crude weapons – nail bombs – he still selected his targets based on his ideology. Resources and human capacity were a factor in these attacks, but the guiding force was his conservative, racist ideology. C18 is not an anomalous group, many groups cannot sustain themselves for extended periods of time, especially when groups splinter multiple times.

Discussion C18 exemplifies how ideology is the guiding hand of terrorist groups. The group did not attack white, straight civilians. In fact, they viewed themselves as protectors of white European people. They instead focused their attacks on individuals or groups which countered their ideal society. Leftists, people of color, and the gay community, to name a few. They attacked these populations because they threatened the realization of their worldview of white dominance and the necessary separation within society. Ideology not only guided their operations and targets, but also their general activities. They mandated regular participation in group tasks, such as harassment phone calls, to ensure that the members were committed to and rooted in the ideology of the group. They also mandated regular attendance at gatherings; this offered an opportunity for members to continue to air their grievances and convey their allegiances. 121 In essence, ideology informed more than just who and how they attacked, but how they ran their organization generally. These actions convey the depth of commitment that members had to their guiding worldview.

121

Lowles, White Riot.

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4. Right-wing groups

Right-wing groups are not necessarily racist, they might simply be anti-leftist. As noted in the introduction, there are variations and diversity even within the ideological classifications set in this text. C18 happens to be both racist and anti-leftist simultaneously, but this is not the case for other right-wing groups. This multiplicity in objectives makes achieving success more difficult; this is arguably one of the contributing factors that led to the splintering of the group. C18 sought to segregate society, as well as ensure a right-wing regime for (initially) the British government. This is a broad mandate and a reach, even for a group invested in its ideology, given its limited resources. However, this did not deter them. They believed success was possible if they continued their tactics and ruthless campaign. Although C18 has not been active for quite some time, there has been a steady uptick of right-wing terrorism in the past few years – notably within the Western world, as noted earlier in this chapter. Most notably, terrorism espousing white supremacy has increased. This is illustrated by a plethora of large-scale events, including the targeted shooting of Muslims at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, where 51 people were killed. The perpetrator was a 28-year-old white supremacist from Australia. Although he was himself an immigrant, he thought of Muslims as unwelcome immigrants to New Zealand. He views the Western world as a white one – he could move within it, but “others” could not come into it. In his mind, it was a matter of birthright. To others, this might seem ironic, particularly since New Zealand is not a native homeland of white people, but he viewed New Zealand as part of the Western world, and therefore he had a claim – and a right – to it. He is not alone in his radical views. In 2015, a 21-year-old white supremacist went to a church in Charleston, South Carolina and shot 9 black church members – simply because they were black. Although these two incidents occurred in places of worship, religion was not a motivator for either perpetrator. Rather, the people of color attending the services were the objects of their ire. Right-wing, racist terrorism is not a new concept, but with largescale incidents such as these in the global purview, its presence has become more salient. It is evident that in Europe especially, white supremacist activists have increased their activity within the public domain – both in the political and social realms. Consider the football match between England and

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Bulgaria in October 2019. Black English players were met with monkey chants and Nazi salutes (in unison) from wide swaths of the audience, who wore black. 122 To be clear, this does not amount to an act of terrorism, but to terrorist groups which espouse racist beliefs, this is an indication of a supportive target audience. Incidents such as this convey a window of opportunity and funding for potential right-wing terrorist groups. Generally, groups cannot survive without an empathetic target audience and the consequent resources they provide. However, racist right-wing activity is not limited to white supremacists, or the Western world. The Shiv Sena of India, a current, recognized Hindu political party, is rooted in its hatred for immigrants, specifically Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, and “Untouchables” – the lowest people in the hierarchy of the traditional caste system. 123 The group, founded by a political cartoonist named Bal Thackeray, was established in 1966 to eliminate “foreign elements” from Bombay. One of their campaigns resulted in the deaths of 800 Muslims, but the group had so much influence that Thackeray and his members were not even prosecuted. With an empathetic target audience, they continue to maintain domestic support. Their rhetoric is similar to that of white supremacists. They “other” any group that they do not identify with. This is a phenomenon that is not restricted to any geographic region. As noted previously, the Shiv Sena is an official political party, but they are also recognized as a terrorist group by the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. 124 This is not unique – many other groups around the world have gained a terrorist designation before, during, or after their tenure as recognized political entities; consider that C18 was born of the BNP. To be clear, while Shiv Sena’s efforts are focused on India, they have attacked Pakistani targets in Kashmir. While political activism or new social norms have inspired the emergence of some right-wing terrorist groups, other groups form due to more deep-rooted issues within society. In 2002, in Soweto, South Africa, 122 Mark Ogden, “Bulgaria-England Halted under UEFA Racism Protocol,” ESPN, October 14, 2019, https://www.espn.com/soccer/england-eng/story/3965118/ englandbulgaria-halted-under-uefa-racism-protocol. 123 Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups, 303-304. 124 “Shiv Sena,” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/shiv-sena.

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the Boer Nation Warriors (BNW) set off a series of bombs. One person was killed, one man was injured, but the damage to property was in the millions. They claimed responsibility, and they did so proclaiming their grievances; they represented the white anger and disillusionment with the majorityblack African National Congress party leading the country. 125 They also demanded that 35 of their fellow group members be released from prison in the wake of the attacks. 126 The historical context is intrinsic both to the formation of the group, and the attacks they perpetrated; the BNW sought to restore power to whites in South Africa. These attacks occurred only eight years after the end of apartheid. The country was still in a period of transition, when power had dramatically shifted between the black and white communities. Moreover, a few years earlier, in nearby Zimbabwe, white farmers’ lands were systematically seized, and many white residents fled the country as a consequence. Tensions were high in the region. In Myanmar, an ultranationalist monk by the name of Ashin Wirathu is infamous for his hatred for the Rohingya, an ethnic and religious minority. The Rohingya are Muslim, and many of them were living in the overwhelmingly Buddhist nation. Many have fled to Sri Lanka in an effort to escape the violence. The monk is so notorious in his inciteful leanings that he has been dubbed the “Buddhist Bin Laden”. 127 The motivations of C18, Shiv Sena, the BNW, and Wiranthu vary, but they share distinct commonalities which allow them to be grouped within this ideological category. They each espouse views that would fall on the extreme right of the political spectrum; C18 espouses neo-Nazism, Shiv Sena espouses ethnonationalism, and the BNW espouses white nationalism. These ideologies, coupled with the use of violence, unite these groups. One could argue that further granularity is needed to understand right-wing political violence. This is a valid argument. Granularity is 125

Michael Dynes, “South Africa Fears Terror Threat of White Extremists,” The Times, November 12, 2002, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/south-africa-fearsterror-threat-of-white-extremists-pbnk0j28z2h. 126 Ibid. 127 Holly Robertson, “Buddhist Extremism: Meet the Violent Followers of a Religion Widely Known for Its Pacifism,” ABC News, 20 Oct. 2018, www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-21/buddhist-extremism-meet-the-religions-violentfollowers/10360288.

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certainly helpful in understanding groups within this category as there is such a great diversity within the group type. However, these groups’ commonalities do allow for a broader grouping. This is another limitation that must be acknowledged. This is however, a limitation that is shared by all of the group types discussed within this text. Further granularity will always allow for greater understanding, but what this text argues is that the ideological group type is one step closer to understanding terrorist group choices.

5. RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Religious groups are those which claim any religion as the guiding path for their actions, i.e. ISIS espousing Islam or the Jewish Defense League espousing Judaism. They are groups which claim a divine mandate and seek to fulfill a sanctified set of objectives. This definition is utilized for the purpose of this text, but it is not standard. Among scholars, there is discord about the definition of religious terrorism. Some scholars suggest that the term is muddied by the abuse of national or regional sentiment; in other words, religious terrorism is sometimes masked by actors who are employing religion as a means of building support for their cause. 128 When considering suicide bombing for instance, it has been argued that the tactic has very little to do with Islamist terrorists’ agenda or their willingness to die for their cause. Rather it is a shocking tool which provokes attention to their cause. 129 Religious terrorists employ it, but so do secular groups, including the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka who were an NS group seeking an autonomous state. Overall, the argument, while compelling, is difficult to discern. Religious terrorist groups, like other terrorist groups, are at least somewhat covert. Understanding whether a group is simply employing religion, or whether religion is a true driver is not possible for most groups. Certainly not on a general scale. One must accept this as a limitation, one that may be more easily overcome by smaller case studies, but not (easily) by large-scale quantitative studies. Within the context of this text, the classification of religious groups is taken at face value: whatever the group espouses, they are categorized accordingly. This is undoubtedly a limitation, as noted above, but it is more generalizable. One should nevertheless consider that 128

Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson, "What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?" Critical Studies on Terrorism 4, No. 3 (2011): 369-388. 129 Robert Anthony Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House Incorporated, 2006).

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recruits are only aware of the outward facing messaging. They seek any given group because it openly espouses beliefs that they share. Even if a leader were simply exploiting religion to fulfill political or social goals, the individuals who follow them have sought membership because of their beliefs. Groups would not be able to retain members if religion was not integral to the group’s identity. Arguably, out of all the classifications, religious terrorism is the most salient and publicized. Since Al Qaeda, an Islamist – specifically a Salafi Jihadist group, perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, the world’s attention has been captured. The attacks on the twin towers in New York, the Pentagon in Arlington, and the failed attempt on the Capitol building created a paradigm shift. While terrorism has been occurring throughout history, 9/11 abruptly shocked the consciousness of the world, and the global public has been captivated ever since. 130 Within the Global Terrorism Database, religious groups make up a significant number of the transnational terrorist organizations; 276 out of 1167 groups represent a religious classification. 131 Although NS groups are the most modal, religious group incidents are higher, notably since 9/11, compared to any other group types. Basically, as of late, religious groups perpetrate more attacks than other groups (See the QR code for an accompanying site). This has only increased their visibility. Religious terrorist actions are frequently discussed on news channels and in newspapers whereas environmental attacks, for instance, are often ignored. It should also be noted that religious terrorism has indeed been occurring historically in nations across the world. This is not a new phenomenon. In India, tensions between Hindus and Muslims have led to a slew of terrorist activity between the two groups; to be clear, groups espousing both Hinduism and Islam were formed and perpetrated attacks. Al Qaeda and ISIS have garnered much of the media attention since 9/11, but they are far from being the only religious perpetrators. There are prolific Buddhist terrorists such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) in Sri Lanka who seek to destroy and remove Muslims, Tamils, and Christians from their society. Essentially, a myriad of religions, all over the world, 130

This is also attributable to the emergence of the internet and the growth of social media. 131 Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.”

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have been used as justification for politically and socially motivated violence. Consider the case of the Brit HaKanaim (also known as the Covenant of the Zealots); they were a Jewish terrorist organization operating in Jerusalem in the 1950s. They sought to attack the Israeli government for requiring women to be drafted into the military, stating that this was counter to Jewish law. Their ultimate objective was to form a holistic Jewish society whereby Jewish law was honored; their battle was one against secularism. 132 There is a unique consideration that must be made when examining religious terrorism. Other group types follow an ideology – a collective of ideas – that was formed by individuals or groups of people. These are ideas born of circumstances and grievances. Religious terrorism is singular and far more consequential, because religious terrorist groups seek to command a collective of sanctified ideas followed by large swaths of people and alter them. These ideas shape and form their followers’ lives in a profound way. Religious terrorists manipulate, or arguably misinterpret, peaceful and divine ideas and use them to justify violence. Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Jews, and others have had their religions bastardized by extremists. It is therefore necessary to be more cautious when discussing terrorist groups espousing religiosity. Calling a group “Muslim” or “Jewish” is misleading, and quite unfair to the billions of people who are believers of these religions. This text is therefore highly conscious of the descriptions of these groups and does not suggest that any of the groups discussed below act as representatives of the religions they are espousing. It is fair to argue that there is no need to give deference to religious groups, compared to other group types. After all, all ideologies are followed with devotion by large groups of people. However, this text chooses nonetheless to distinguish between religious ideologies and other ideologies because of the negative and inflammatory connotations attributed to religions (and their followers) based on these extremist groups. This chapter will profile Al-Shabaab, a religious terrorist group espousing an Islamist, specifically Salafi, ideology. They operate mainly in the Horn of Africa. At the time that this text was authored, the group

132

Profile: Brit HaKanaim. Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, www.trackingterrorism.org/group/brit-hakanaim.

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remained active. Given the active nature of the group, it is very possible that events may have shifted as you read this chapter. However, given their saliency and level of activity, they are a group worth examining. In 2017, four groups accounted for the majority of terrorist activity: Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, the Taliban, and ISIS, 133 thus earning themselves the moniker of the Deadly Four. While these groups have varying objectives, they do account for the largest share of deaths (See Chapter 1).

Religious group profile: Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab was established in 2006 in Somalia. In Arabic, the group’s name translates to “The Youth”. Al-Shabaab has a plethora of aliases, so others may know them by an alternative name, including The Youth or the Mujahidin Youth Movement. 134 Their initially stated goals were defined and brief: make Somalia an Islamic (Wahhabi) state and expel any foreign forces from Somalia. 135 Expelling foreign forces would enable the group to govern the country in the Wahhabi tradition without interference. However, they soon became more ambitious. Al-Shabaab did not rise on its own. The group’s roots lay within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 136 a collective of militant tribes across central and southern Somalia. 137 When the ICU lost power and influence in the region, Al-Shabaab established itself as an autonomous power. Previously, it was the enforcement wing of the ICU, not unlike C18’s role within the BNP (See Chapter 4). The group was able to capitalize upon the historical context of the country to recruit fighters – using the Somali identity and collective anger towards failed governments and occupying powers. Ethiopian forces invaded 133

Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018. “Al-Shabaab,” Australian National Security, accessed April 11, 2020, https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/AlShabaab.aspx. 135 Project on Violent Conflict, “Al-Shabaab,” START, last updated May 2015, https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/al-shabaab. 136 “Al Shabaab,” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, accessed April 11, 2020, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/al-shabaab. 137 Ibid., 21. 134

How Ideology Influences Terror Figure 5-1: Al-Shabaab attacks over time, 1970-2016

138

138

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

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Somalia during the period 2006-2009, and the people of Somalia were expectedly incensed. Given that one of the principal goals of Al-Shabaab is to expel foreign forces, recruits were drawn to their cause. This was partly because the Somali identity of the recruits was inextricably linked to their religious identity, and their desire to live within a state that reflected their religion. Recruitment was not the only way the political instability assisted the group to establish and expand its presence in Somalia. The group seized control of the chaos and gained control over significant physical territory. They managed to take control of a number of municipalities. They even began fulfilling the duties of the government, including repairing streets and establishing a justice system. 139 They became governors. This granted the group audience with a captive and grateful target population. Their religious views shaped their process; even the justice system they developed was based on Sharia tenets. The group went to great lengths to ensure compliance from their people. They banned the BBC (British Broadcasting Service) in 2010, accusing the channel of being a promotor of colonialism and anti-Muslim ideas. 140 The group has made multiple policy decisions to convey their seriousness about governing the country; for instance, the group condemned the logging industry, and banned single use plastics to protect the environment of Somalia. This policy also gave them the standing, they believed, to criticize US environmental policy. 141 In essence – two birds, one stone; showing their dedication to good governance and criticizing their enemy without a countering voice being broadcast into their communities’ homes. However, the group is not only concerned with the presence of Western powers, they also seek to evict AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia), the African peacekeeping mission, from Somalia. They seek to expel any and all of the foreign presence. One must note that while Al139

Paula Cristina Roque, “Situation Report: Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab,” Institute for Security Studies, June 3, 2009, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SABAAB040609.PDF. 140 Mapping Militant Organizations, “Al Shabaab,” Stanford University, last modified January 2019, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/alshabaab#highlight_text_13349. 141 Ibid.

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Shabaab seeks to expel foreign forces, they are also simultaneously protecting their territory. AMISOM has previously been able to take territorial control away from Al-Shabaab, thus minimizing their land holdings and control over the public. Although they disagree with having a foreign presence, they have nonetheless taken their fight outside Somali borders to seek a larger Islamic-controlled territory. 142 Uganda and Kenya have been victims of many of these international attacks. One of Al-Shabaab’s most egregious attacks occurred outside Somalia, in Nairobi, Kenya in January 2019. For 19 hours, the group took over a luxury hotel, and killed 21 people. 143 The besiegement gained international attention, and the group claimed that the attack was retaliation against President Trump’s increased airstrikes in Somalia and for the movement of the American Embassy to Jerusalem. 144 Their violence has since intensified. The group believes it has a mandate from god, and its members are consequently unencumbered by the prospect of death or killing. This makes the group extremely dangerous and deadly; they do not fear indiscriminate tactics that may include collateral, themselves included. They use bombs and armed assaults, the most violent and indiscriminate means, to perpetrate their attacks. In fact, relative to NS groups, religious groups are statistically more likely to use bombings and hijackings. 145 This is unsurprising. Their audience, both sympathetic and unsympathetic, grows with each large-scale attack. This is especially the case with attacks leading to a high number of casualties and injuries (See Figure 5-2). The sympathetic audience contributes to the cause, and the outraged audience increases the scale of the attention given to any attack. To be clear, the hotel attack in Kenya was a prolonged attack, but it is nowhere near the deadliest attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab. In 2010, the group killed 74 people watching the Soccer World Cup in Uganda, and in 2013, Al-Shabaab killed 74 shoppers in Kenya. In 2017, Al-Shabaab committed the deadliest terrorist attack in the world. The group detonated a

142

Ibid. Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.” 143

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truck bomb outside a hotel in Somalia and killed 587 people. 146 Hundreds more were injured. The hotel attacks in both Kenya and Somalia are two of the many high-scale, high-casualty attacks. They are part of an unmistakable pattern of potent violence. The GTD has a record of 3298 terrorist incidents attributed to AlShabaab 147 (See Figure 5-2). The group has momentum, and there is no seeming end in sight. To combat their expansion, President Obama increased airstrikes targeting Al-Shabaab’s leadership. President Trump has increased the airstrikes further. The airstrikes, facilitated with the use of drones, did make a serious dent in the group’s leadership base. In February 2019, the group’s intelligence chief, Abdi Nur Mahdi, was killed by a drone. Previously, in 2014, the group’s leader, Ahmed Godane, was killed by a drone strike. Many other members have been targeted and killed by drones, and while these actions have managed to take out many high value targets, the group simultaneously uses these attacks for propaganda and recruitment. Their recruitment is so expansive that they have been able to recruit people in Western Europe. Jihadi John, the infamous London terrorist, left the UK and traveled to Tanzania to join Al-Shabaab. He was refused entry for rowdy behavior with security personnel. Although he later joined ISIS because of his ill-fated attempt to get into Tanzania, this made Al-Shabaab even more prominent as coverage of Jihadi John (and his story) grew exponentially after he beheaded the famed fallen journalist James Foley. At the time this text was authored, the group remained (highly) active.

146

Ibid. “GTD Search Results: Perpetrators: Al-Shabaab,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 11, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20036.

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How Ideology Influences Terror Figure 5-2: Al-Shabaab casualties. 1970-2016

148

148

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

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Discussion The saliency of current religious terrorism, specifically radical Islamist terrorism, has led to a captive global audience. The current religious terrorist landscape is quite crowded, so groups have to go to extraordinary means to draw attention. These include attacks on their competition, or in this space – their rivals. Relative to other ideological groups, religious groups are more likely to attack rivals, studies have provided evidence to that effect. 149 This is partly due to the jockeying for attention in the global media, and partly due to groups signaling to each other, as they are trying to establish their dominance. Not only are they seeking dominance in territory and attacks, but in messaging – in other words, outbidding (See Chapter 1). Although outbidding helps to explain how terrorists operate within a competitive environment, the variation in rival target attacks further conveys the role of ideology on terror. Religious groups do not simply seek dominance, they seek singularity. A religious mandate gives them the perceived authority to do so. This is why religious groups are unashamed to claim credit for attacks that kill or injure civilians, and why they use indiscriminate tactics, like bombings, to perpetrate their attacks (see the QR code for an accompanying site). They want to eliminate their competition, seize the global audience’s attention, and convert others to support their cause and follow their path. Moreover, studies have found that relative to NS groups, religious groups target civilian and rival targets. 150 Al-Shabaab has held to this pattern. These findings are unsurprising given the group’s mandate to create an Islamic state. Civilian targets draw the most attention – and arguably, the most impact, and rivals need to be eliminated because they endanger the goals of the group. Ideology gives them their mandate, and their religious mandate is to be followed, wherever that may lead. According to Al-Shabaab, the ultimate goal of Islamic rule guides their actions and decisions. Although there are anti-colonial influences, and resource constraints, the group maintains its focus and effort towards governing Somalia and expanding

149 150

Ibid. Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.”

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Islamic rule beyond their borders. Establishing an Islamic caliphate is at the forefront of their goals. Moreover, religious terrorism may seem like a new phenomenon in a post-9/11 world, but it is most certainly not. The Ismaili-Naziris (also known as the Hashashins or the Assassins) were active from 1090 to 1275 in modern-day Iran and Syria. 151 Their objective was relatively simple, they sought to protect Shia Islam. They believed that there were members of society who violated Islam as they interpreted it (as Shia). Their stated goal was simple: they sought to “purify” Islam and consequently, improve political and societal welfare. To do so, they decided to make a statement – they killed prominent violators on Muslim holy days. They did this to draw attention and sympathy for their cause. During this time, assassinations of prominent figures were greatly consequential. Not only because they elicited attention. There were also practical considerations. When a Sultan died, his forces were disbanded and released.152 Their attacks were strategic. Moreover, they did not perpetrate these assassinations exclusively within their communities – they traveled to get to their targets. They were an international force. The Ismaili-Nazairis aggregated so much power that they formed their own small, autonomous state. This facilitated the group’s longevity. 153 Eventually, Arab and Mongol forces uprooted the group and their state, but their story has become legendary. Even the word assassin is based on the group’s name. They managed to shock society and drew a great deal of attention (and sympathy) to their cause with vastly asymmetric resources, like many terrorist groups of the modern age. However, many scholars trace the genesis of modern terrorism to France in 1793 under Maximillian Robespierre’s leadership. His “reign of terror” was secular in nature, but it does convey the longevity and persistence of terrorism as a means to fulfill political goals. In Chapter 1, time was listed as a mitigating factor for terrorism. Specifically, the discussion focused on the internet and social media, but 9/11 is also a mitigating factor for religious groups that were active after the 151

David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” The American Political Science Review 78, No. 3 (September 1984): 658-677. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid.

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9/11 attacks. In fact, scholars even control 9/11 in longitudinal studies to ensure that it does not bias their results since it was such an anomalous event. Religious groups have also learned from the 9/11 attacks, as they understand that high casualty events, combined with symbolic significance, are more likely to draw attention. Consider the 2019 Sri Lanka bombings, when 265 people were killed in church during the Easter service by radical Islamist terrorists. The coverage was immense, not simply because the casualty figures were so high, but also because the attack was perpetrated on one of the holiest days of Christianity, the religion of the west. It may be difficult to comprehend, but terrorism is a highly rational, methodical endeavor. Not only do groups understand the impact of attacks, they also recognize non-violent opportunities to capture the world’s attention at any stage. This is why it is unsurprising that Al Qaeda and ISIS have both capitalized on the world’s attention being on the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead of changing their orders and plans internally, they publicly made statements, and published articles, informing their members on how to proceed. ISIS told their members to wash their hands and cover their faces. Both Al Qaeda and ISIS have told their members to avoid targeting the Western world – not as a move of compassion because of the shared suffering experienced due to Covid-19, but rather to protect themselves. They have also declared this pandemic as the wrath of god. They claim he is attacking the west. They suggest that since the highest number of casualties, at least by August 2020, lay in the west (specifically in the United States), this is God's punishment. This is a highly successful publicity stunt. One may find this appalling, but nonetheless, they managed to garner headlines at a time when the world appeared singularly focused. Their methods are not haphazard or desperate. Strategy is involved. Organization is involved. Communication is viewed as a vital tool to propagate their messages. If anyone should doubt the rationality of groups, one need only examine ISIS’ Twitter feed. It is quite prolific. Even as Twitter has sought to shut down accounts, ISIS has managed to maintain a presence on the platform. A study by The Brookings Institute found that “official” accounts

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averaged over six thousand followers. 154 There is also a plethora of unofficial accounts. As of 2015, they placed the estimate of total ISIS Twitter accounts at 46,000. The group even employs bots to help promote their material. Unintentionally, Twitter has passively assisted the group’s promotion on Twitter. Twitter’s recommendation engine offered ISIS supporters information about fellow accounts which were sympathetic to the group’s cause. In essence, Twitter offered ISIS supporters more propagandist material to consume. While ISIS has arguably utilized the platform more successfully than other groups, they are not the only religious group to do so. Al-Shabaab has even live-tweeted some of their prolonged attacks, narrating events as they occur. Groups have fully weaponized this technology to meet their needs. It is precisely this attention that creates a false narrative about the various religions that are involuntarily represented by these groups. AlShabaab, ISIS, and Al Qaeda make light of a religion followed by over a billion people, presenting to the world an image of Islam as violent and oppressive. While a billion people practice peacefully, this minority creates so much buzz that they project a louder voice than those billion souls. This is only worsened by considering that all of the Deadly Four (Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, the Taliban, and ISIS) are religious terrorist groups. More specifically, they are all Islamist terrorist groups. While religious terrorism has been studied extensively, there is still much to be explored. It has been argued that religious terrorist groups are formidable because their members maintain strong bonds. Marc Sagemen, a United States foreign service officer who served in Islamabad, Pakistan in the late 1980s, worked with Afghani Mujahideen in the course of his work. Through this contact, as well as with biographical information from 172 Islamist jihadis, he used network analysis and found that poverty or lack of education is irrelevant to the motivation of religious terrorists. Instead, his findings suggest that bonds of family and friendship are what drive individuals to join. He argues that religion is indeed a motivating factor, but that relationships precede that ideological incentive. One should at least

154

J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census.” The Brookings Institute, March 20, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf.

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consider that social networks and relationships may be an effective way to examine, and even unravel, religious terrorist groups. 155 Hezbollah, an Islamist group based in southern Lebanon, even begins initiating children within their community at a young age. Children are told stories about fallen Hezbollah martyrs by their families. Children of supporters are also taught very strict Islamist teachings. At these schools, children pray for fallen martyrs. A Hezbollah fighter is both a myth and aspirational figure to the children of the community. They grow up idolizing fighters. When recruits are in the first stage of initiation, they are sent to a month-long bootcamp. When recruits complete their initial training, they are allowed to select the unit they would like to join. This extensive lifelong recruitment and indoctrination makes for dedicated, passionate members. The entirety of a person’s social bonds is wrapped up within the group. When Hezbollah fighters officially join the group, they pose for their martyr picture. The picture which is disseminated when they fall. Their families, their friends, and their network all espouse the same ideas. 156 Their ties to the group are inextricably linked to the totality of the relationships. It would be difficult to imagine that these relationships are not at the heart of why people will join the group and commit attacks willingly. Hezbollah is not alone in the use of these maneuvers to create dedicated fighters. ISIS has a camp for training children. Whereas Hezbollah will not accept boys under thirteen, ISIS has been known to provide military training to boys as young as eight. The children have been dubbed the “cubs of the caliphate”. These children would grow with the organization and become “lions of tomorrow”. 157 The children are not just trained, they have been active participants in battles, and frequently used as suicide bombers. 158 Like Hezbollah, family members of the fallen, including children, are glorified. This only reinforces the significance of social and familial bonds.

155

M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 156 N. Blanford (2015, March 30). Joining Hezbollah. Retrieved February 08, 2020, from https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/joining-hezbollah/. 157 Sara Mahmood, "‘Cubs of the Caliphate’ The Islamic State’s Focus on Children," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, No. 10 (2016): 9-12. 158 Ibid.

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One should consider that the study of social relationships within groups may offer an answer to the question regarding the strategic utilization of terrorism or the espousal of religion as a true guide and motivator for groups. This is why scholarship should continue to pursue single-group case studies. Dedicated research to a single group may grant significant insight into the formation, organization, and recruitment strategies of that group. As of yet, there is little understanding as to how groups utilize religion.

6. ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS

Environmental terrorist organizations are defined, within this text, as groups that are guided by the need to end any perceived ecological destruction or animal cruelty. They are groups that protect, promote, and advocate for both the natural environment and animal rights, and use both violent and destructive means to meet their social and/or political ends. Although environmental groups have carried out lethal attacks, generally speaking, they avoid harm to life. They instead target property, i.e. they would target an animal-testing lab building, but not the lab staff or animals therein. Harming life violates their ethos. However, attacks are unpredictable, and there are often unintended consequences – or collateral damage, which has led to loss of life. Environmental groups are also notoriously decentralized; their structures are often leaderless and without any form of hierarchy. This is part of the culture of this extremist movement, it allows for anyone to pick up the banner without impediment. Members can create cells or make up the entire cell themselves. Compared to other transnational terrorist groups, transnational environmental groups are the most infrequent type. Within the Global Terrorism Database, only 15 out of the 1167 groups possess an environmental ideology. 159 To be clear, this low number is largely due to environmental terrorists generally being domestic actors; there are significantly more domestic environmental groups compared to transnational ones. In fact, the scholar João Raphael da Silva (2019) finds evidence suggesting that there was a “wave” of environmental terrorism from 1980 to 2012. 160 Earlier chapters discussed the work of Rapoport (2004). Da Silva’s work echoes that of Rapoport; Rapoport suggests that terrorism generally occurs in waves 159 160

Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.” De Silva calls environmental terrorists ecoterrorists.

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Figure 6-1: Number of environmental terrorist incidents over time, 1970-2012

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161

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

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However, the wave that da Silva suggests actually coincides with Rapoport’s religious wave. 162 To be clear, Rapoport did not explicitly argue that waves could not coincide. This is one explanation for the concentration of attacks in this time period. As can be observed from Figure 6-1 there is support for da Silva’s theory of a wave. The observations from the GTD convey that environmental terrorism was active from 1970 to 2012, with the concentration of that activity occurring in 2012 with 2692 incidents. This chapter will highlight a group which formed within this timeframe. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is perhaps the most notorious environmental terrorism group worldwide.

Environmental group profile: Animal Liberation Front (ALF) In 1976, the Animal Liberation Front was formed in the United Kingdom by Ronnie Lee. 163 Lee was training to a solicitor's clerk. He was also a vegan and an ardent supporter of animals. While his choices and lifestyle choices have no connection to terrorism or violence, he radicalized his lifestyle into a crusade. He founded ALF to fight against individuals or commercial entities that harmed animals, and he was not hesitant to use extreme and violent means. In fact, he only founded ALF after being imprisoned for arson when he was a member of another animal rights group, the Band of Mercy. 164 After his imprisonment, Lee reoriented his thinking. He understood that his activities, and those of his followers, needed to be clandestine. This would allow for a consistent, more long-term group operation. Survival became a key consideration. While the ALF was founded by Lee, he did not anoint himself the leader. Technically, the group has no leader. Any decisions are made among the collective membership, or within a given cell. Membership can only be earned – one must perpetrate an act against an individual or business that 162

João Raphael da Silva, “The Eco-Terrorist Wave,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, November 5, 2019. 163 Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. 164 Ibid.

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Figure 6-2: ALF attacks over time, 1982-2016

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165

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

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mistreats animals, and if the group approves of the action, the individual is granted membership. 166 Previous means towards earning membership include lab raids to free animals being used for testing and burning department stores selling animals or animal-based products. This practice ensures that members are equally committed to the mission of the group, and it allows members to trust each other completely – as they are all complicit. Estimates of membership range between 300 and 400 individuals, with a financial support base of over 3000 individuals. 167 However, while the group operations remain clandestine, they also maintain a public face – including a Public Relations officer. Robin Webb, a former civil servant of the British government, held this position at the time this text was authored. 168 Webb is unapologetic in his support of the ALF. However, he is ardent in his view that he does not condone any actions that harm or kill individuals; in fact, the ALF has not killed or gravely harmed people in any of their operations. 169 Terrorism is not restricted to perpetrators that only injure or kill. Arson and theft are still tools of terrorist perpetrators. Especially so given the ideology of groups such as the ALF, where the sanctity of life – all life, is intrinsic to their worldview. In December 2012, an inn in Virginia was called by members of an ALF cell. They were instructed to stop serving fois gras – generally duck or goose liver which is intentionally fattened via gavage – force-feeding of the bird. This is considered cruel treatment by animal activists. The inn was told that if they did not comply, their property would be painted red and would be burned to the ground. The harassment continued, as the callers later demanded that the inn also stop serving rabbit. 170 The inn and the

166

Ibid. Ibid. 168 Paul Kelso and Steven Morris, “Haphazard Army with the Scent of Victory,” The Guardian, January 17, 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jan/18/paulkelso.stevenmorris. 169 “GTD Search Results: Perpetrators: Animal Liberation Front (ALF),” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 11, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=291. 170 Jason Leopold, “Inside the Animal Rights Organization the FBI Considers a Terrorist Group,” VICE, May 9, 2017, 167

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employees were all threatened and told that the group knew where each of them lived. The FBI took over the case. The inn was not attacked, but the threat of violence incited fear and anxiety within the small community of Washington, VA, even though ultimately, the threats were not acted upon; this is why unarmed terrorism is still taken seriously. The ALF’s message soon resonated outside the UK, eventually gaining members and activities across the world. It is estimated that the group is active in over 40 countries. Robin Webb is no longer the only spokesperson for the ALF. In the United States, spokespeople include Jerry Vlaska (a board-certified surgeon), Gary Yourofsky (a vegan diet activist), and Gregston Van Pukeston (a journalist). 171 It would be shocking if any other type of terrorist group were to have offices or public figures, but their non-lethality enables them to do so. Imagine a scenario where Al Qaeda or the FARC had PR personnel who readily spoke with the media and claimed attacks. It is a radical undertaking, and it is only more so when one considers the relativity to other group types. Although the ALF’s means are illicit and controversial, they have claimed success towards the fulfillment of their objectives. For instance, animal lab testing has declined since the founding of the group. The ALF claims responsibility for bringing the issue to the forefront and creating a social consciousness that is widely unaccepting of animal testing. Interestingly, the ALF has claimed credit for this changing norm within society although they cannot prove to their target audience, or the global audience, that they are truly, or solely, responsible for it. This is unsurprising. Environmental groups such as the ALF are largely decentralized in structure and exist in small covert cells. In order to communicate to other members of the group, as well as their audience, they claim credit for both their operations and what they believe to be the consequences of their actions, including the decline in animal lab testing. This is a signal to their fellow members and to their broader target audience.

https://www.vice.com/amp/en_us/article/vvabpy/foia-docs-reveal-an-fbiinvestigation-into-an-animal-rights-organization-it-considers-a-terrorist-groupv24n4. 171 “North American Animal Liberation Press Office,” North American Animal Liberation Press Office, accessed April 11, 2020, www.animalliberationpressoffice.org.

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The group has even gained the support of PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). 172 PETA touts the ALF’s non-lethal methods in their publicly accessible view of the group. They recognize that ALF’s methods are illegal, but they still view them as justifiable since they are done with the aim of fighting for animal rights. PETA claims that ALF actions have unearthed serious abuses against animals, abuses that would not be detected by officials or the public had the ALF not targeted them. In essence, the ends justify the means. PETA views the ALF as illicit, but of great utility, but to the FBI, they are simply a terrorist organization.

Discussion According to recent scholarship, 173 environmental groups operate differently than other group types. Relative to other groups, environmental groups claim credit for their attacks on a much more frequent basis. This is due to a number of factors, but primarily one could assert that it is the general structure of the groups, as well as a group’s effort not to harm any lives when perpetrating their attacks. 174 Environmental groups tend to be decentralized, and operate with numerous, often independent, cells. This allows for greater anonymity, and for a greater opportunity to perpetrate attacks without the need for instruction. Central tenets notwithstanding, attacks could be carried out by any sized cell; generally, central tenets mandate an effort to avoid harm to any life. The ALF follows these patterns. Their highly visible, public messaging – complete with spokespeople, is a result of their effort to avoid harm to life and inform their public of their cause. The latter is also a key objective to the group, as their mission informs the public about hazards they believe to be affecting society at large. Moreover, their decentralized structure requires signaling. They use methods such as arson, and they target infrastructures and businesses, in non-office hours. This is similar to the 172

“What’s PETA’s position on the Animal Liberation Front (ALF)?,” PETA, accessed April 11, 2020, https://www.peta.org/about-peta/faq/whats-petas-positionon-the-animal-liberation-front-alf/. 173 Brittnee Carter and Ranya Ahmed, "The Strategic Logic of Environmental Terrorism: Linking Terrorist Ideology to Credit Claiming Behavior,” Journal of Applied Security Research 15, No. 1 (November 2019): 1-21. 174 Ibid.

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theory of outbidding discussed in the religious terrorism chapter. The difference is competition. Environmental groups send signals to each other, to convey solidarity and momentum for their movement – as well as to inspire and recruit additional members. When groups are outbidding, they are vying for attention and singularity. Environmental groups rely on signaling to send messages and to coordinate attacks which build upon previous operations. In line with this logic, environmental groups understand their attacks as outward messages to the broader public. Environmental groups are so fervent in their quest to end animal cruelty and ecological destruction that many of them have press offices which regularly release updates and claim attacks. They understand that communication is key to the fulfillment of their goals and widespread understanding of their doctrine. They speak out not only about their own activities, but comment on local, regional, and global events relative to their cause. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the ALF made public comments relating to Covid-19. Since the pandemic has been traced to a wet market in Wuhan, China, the group capitalized on this as further evidence that humans should not be consuming animals or animal products. 175 It increases access to disease. This timely press release, which was accompanied by graphic images, was meant to provoke audiences to sympathize with their objectives. Given the type of attacks that environmental groups perpetrate, an argument has been made that these actions are more akin to criminality, rather than terrorism. This is because they plan not to kill or injure any members of the public. However, what distinguishes groups such as the ALF from criminals is their political agenda. To be clear, not all environmental groups aim to avoid casualties or injuries. In 2018, a member of the Mavroprasini Midenistes (also known as the Blackgreen Nihilists) bombed a butcher’s shop in Athens, Greece; the group sought to bring attention to animal rights via their attack. 176 While environmental groups

175 “On the Covid-19 Virus and Animal Liberation,” Animal Liberation Front, North American Animal Liberation Front Press Office, April 11, 2020, https://animalliberationpressoffice.org/NAALPO/2020/04/11/on-the-covid-19virus-and-animal-liberation/. 176 Ibid.

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share an ideology, they are not all structured in the same manner, nor do they all abide by the same ethos. In the 2017 Christmas season, supermarkets in Greece were forced to remove a plethora of animal products from their stores because a group called the Blackgreen Arsonists threatened to contaminate the stock with acid, thus poisoning the customers. 177 They even sent a video documenting their threat, showing them injecting food products with acid. 178 Consequently, the threats were taken seriously. Their methods are extreme, but arguably – they enjoyed a measure of success. The supermarkets relented and removed the stock. This in no way guarantees that customers did not consume animal products. They could have patronized another supermarket and bought the products they desired. However, the fear could have also (temporarily or permanently) altered consumer behavior, in those particular stores. Environmental groups may generally seek to avoid harm, but some groups think the cost justifies the end. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) also believed in more extreme measures to attain their objectives. SHAC was established in the UK in 1999 to fight a specific lab which performed animal testing. The company they targeted, Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), tested a myriad of products on a plethora of animals, including dogs and primates. 179 Approximately 75,000 animals were used for tests each year in this facility.180 The group began with protests and picketing. They then were able to penetrate the facilities and secure footage showing the workers were abusing the animals, specifically a group of dogs. The local news picked up the footage. The company did not deny the events took place but did state that the workers were dismissed for their actions. SHAC’s outrage was unabated. Members were encouraged to perpetrate attacks, not just targeting the facility – but also the facility’s employees, and any additional 177

Rick Noack, “Eco-terrorists Threatened to Put Hydrochloric Acid into Supermarket Products in Greece,” The Washington Post, December 21, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/21/eco-terroriststhreatened-to-put-hydrochloric-acid-into-supermarket-products-in-greece/%3 foutputType=amp. 178 Ibid. 179 “A Controversial Laboratory,” BBC News, January 18, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1123837.stm. 180 Ibid.

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partners/investors related to the facility. The decentralized, leaderless structure of SHAC led to a smattering of attacks using numerous tactics – explosives, arson, and harassment. Members and sympathizers from Europe and the United States also became involved with the movement and aided attacks against HLS. The group was unrelenting, so much so that HLS lost significant business and lost their favorable status in the stock market. The CEO of HLS facilitated a private sale 181 – HLS could no longer function as a public company given SHAC’s endeavors. Essentially, environmental groups are not monolithic, thus conveying the need for granularity wherever possible. As a collective, they may seek to avoid harm, but as individuals, their operations and decisions are far less generalizable or predictable. Moreover, given the higher probability of environmental groups being less structured and decentralized, individual actors may be sought as opposed to the group as a whole. Consider the case of Daniel Andreas San Diego, one of the FBI’s most wanted. 182 San Diego was born in Berkeley, California and converted to a vegan diet in his adulthood; this change was the beginning of his activism. 183 He soon converted his views of animal and ecological protection into a mission. San Diego is alleged to have perpetrated two bombing attacks in 2003 in California, targeting two companies which he perceived as being perpetrators of animal cruelty. The companies were also both linked to HLS. The two bombs, while designed to be quite destructive – did not kill a single individual. However, they were timed devices, so San Diego could not have known whether his bombs were going to injure or kill anyone. Although San Diego was linked to a group – the Animal Liberation Brigade – the group is not on the FBI’s most wanted list, only San Diego is. This is partly due to the authorities’ understanding that San Diego built and 181

“LSR goes Private in Lion Holdings Takeover,” William Reed Business Media, Dec. 1, 2009, https://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Article/2009/12/01/LSR-goesprivate-in-Lion-Holdings-takeover. 182 FBI Most Wanted Terrorists, “Daniel Andreas San Diego,” accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/daniel-andreas-san-diego. 183 Riya Bhattacharjee, “Berkeley-Born ‘Most Wanted’ Terrorist Daniel San Diego Sought by Honolulu FBI,” NBC Bay Area, March 12, 2014, https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/berkeley-born-most-wanted-terroristdaniel-san-diego-sought-by-honolulu-fbi/91727/.

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placed the bombs, but it may also be attributed to his prominence and identification as an activist, rather than as a devoted member of the Animal Liberation Brigade. San Diego, at the time this text was authored, remains at large. His ascension to the FBI’s most wanted list does however convey how serious the US government takes environmental terrorism; they placed San Diego on the most wanted list even though his attacks have never killed anyone. This is a message which one should pay heed to – although environmental groups’ attacks generally do not lead to injury or death, they still pose a grave threat. However, one cannot also ignore the political reality in which the FBI operates. The biomedical industry was especially vocal in lobbying the government to rid them of the “Green Scare” which had cost them highly valuable facilities and other resources. These targets were connected and influential, but that just conveys the risk that environmental terrorists are willing to take. Deputy Assistant Director John E. Lewis has repeatedly testified before congress that environmental terrorist groups are a serious threat, and he specifically named three groups: the ALF, ELF, and SHAC. 184 The FBI placed (and continues to place) significant effort in the capture of environmental terrorists. In 2005, shortly after Deputy Assistant Lewis’ comments, Operation Backfire was established. 185 The operation was based in Portland, Oregon, and the main targets of the operation were the ALF, the ELF, and The Family; these groups are not mutually exclusive. The Family was theorized to be composed of members of both the ALF and ELF, and while the latter two groups were related, but individual organizations, the small cell structure of the groups avoided information sharing and the true creation was of another individual, operational group – The Family. The FBI concentrated efforts to clamp down on these groups, and to do so, they worked in congruence with other agencies like the ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). 184

John E. Lewis, “Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,” FBI, May 18, 2004, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/animal-rights-extremism-andecoterrorism. 185 Nick Deshpande and Howard Ernst, Countering Ecoterrorism in the United States: The Case of 'Operation Backfire’ (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, September 2012), https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_EffectivenessofLECountermeasuresOper ationBackfire_Sept2012.pdf.

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Operation Backfire had many successes. They were able to capture a plethora of environmental terrorists over time. They were also able to successfully prosecute cases against them. There are still many targets that have eluded capture, but the task force behind the operation maintains its diligence. The FBI understands the risk that these groups pose. Moreover, given increased discussions about the devastating effects of climate change, one would expect these groups to take advantage of a more sympathetic, and global, target audience. Arguably, these groups pose a greater threat now than ever before. It is only 100 seconds to midnight according to the Doomsday clock. 186 Climate change is a large contributing factor for our collective march to the precipice. The damage to the climate, as well as the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic, may motivate environmental terrorists to seize the moment. Although environmental terrorism has not yet seen a surge, environmentally related criminal and political behavior have. Businesses selling animal products have experienced greater volumes of vandalism, protestors have barricaded entrances to companies which sell or promote animal products, and mines have experienced human blockades. 187 Perhaps, without mitigation, this is only the beginning.

186

David Welna, “The End May Be Nearer: Doomsday Clock Moves Within 100 Seconds Of Midnight,” NPR, January 23, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/23/799047659/the-end-may-be-nearer-doomsdayclock-moves-within-100-seconds-of-midnight. 187 Ibid.

7. MIXED GROUPS

Mixed groups claim more than one ideology. Within the Global Terrorism Database, the majority of transnational mixed groups have two ideologies, 188 and most fall into two categories: (1) Nationalist/Separatist and Religious (NS/R) and (2) Nationalist/Separatist and Left Wing (NS/LW). 189 Out of the 1167 transnational groups within the Global Terrorism Database, 80 identify as NS/R and 35 identify as NS/LW. 190 Although some groups may have single prevailing ideologies, others have more. Ideologies are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may coexist with complementary world views. Mixed groups are more difficult to categorize for analytical purposes; in essence, they are a reflection of the complexity of societal grievances. Often, multiple objectives lead groups to violence. This text has sought to convey the complexity and utility of group categorization. This is further tested when examining groups with mixed ideologies. One wonders, which ideologies are complementary? Which are not? One could argue that this is a group-based judgment. Left-wing groups would not align with right-wing ideology, and environmental groups are unlikely to align with right-wing ideology, but one could imagine left-wing groups aligning with environmental ideology. There are some “natural fits” for mixed groups, and there are highly unlikely combinations, but this will remain a group-based decision – logic notwithstanding. This chapter will dedicate the first example to NS/R groups, and the second to NS/LW groups, with a discussion following. RW/R groups will also be briefly discussed; they are much less modal than the other two mixed groups, but they do further illustrate the distinctiveness of mixed groups from their component parts. 188

Using my coding scheme. Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.” 190 They are a minority within the database, but they do claim thousands of observations. 189

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NS/Religious (NS/R) Out of all the mixed group variations, the most modal is NS/R. These groups seek objectives which fulfill both their nationalistic/separatist and religious ideologies. However, NS/R groups can vary greatly. They may be composed of separatists and claim a Jewish ideology. They may be seeking autonomy and the creation of a Buddhist state. The potential combinations are plentiful. This chapter will focus on Séléka, a terrorist group in the Central African Republic. Given the limited information, we cannot truly discern whether there are primary and secondary ideologies with this group. This is undeniably a limitation of examining mixed groups.

NS/R Profile: Séléka (also known as the Séléka Coalition) Séléka, or the Séléka Coalition, is an active group formed in the Central African Republic. The name translates to “Alliance” in English; the group’s name is in Sango, one of the country’s two national languages. 191 There is conflicting information concerning the group’s date of establishment. The Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) asserts that the group was formed in 2007, 192 the BBC stated that the group became active in 2013, 193 and other sources claim the group was established in 2012. 194 As with other clandestine groups, this uncertain history and conflicting information are to be expected. As a group that is less globally recognizable, Séléka’s biography has many gaps. However, there is enough available information to be able to profile the group’s ideology, as they have been outspoken about their goals and intent. Before one can examine Séléka, one must first have a better understanding of the Central African Republic. The country has been 191

The other national language of the Central African Republic is French. “Seleka Coalition Central Africa Republic,” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/Séléka-coalition-central-africa-republic. 193 “CAR Seleka Rebels Kill Many in Bangui Church Attack,” BBC News, 28 May 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27614401. 194 Thomas E. O’Toole, Tamara Lynn Giles-Vernick, and Jan S. F. van Hoogstraten, “Central African Republic,” Encyclopædia Britannica, October 24, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic/The-21st-century. 192

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plagued by decades of instability, coups, and widespread protest. The past three Presidents have been ousted, and the country is gripped by poverty. The country ranks 188th out of 189 in terms of the UN Human Development Index; life expectancy is poor, education rates are low, and gender equality indicators are exceedingly dire. 195 The country is also situated amongst other conflicts. Its eastern borders are shared with Sudan – now South Sudan. The conflict in the Darfur region often crossed into the territory of the Central African Republic. To their south, the nation borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been the base of operations for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is a notorious terrorist group which was originally established in Uganda. Their operations do not respect borders, and they have consequently perpetrated attacks in the Central African Republic. The nation has been, and continues to be, bombarded by crises both within and around them. It is within this context that Séléka emerged. Although the exact date of their formal establishment is disputed, the beginning of their active operations is less ambiguous. In 2011, there was a contested Presidential election between General Bozizé and the incumbent President Patassé. General Bozizé was victorious, but there were accusations of an impartial election. This is particularly significant since President Patassé was ousted from his previous administration, and Bozizé became the interim leader for the country at that time. The history between these two leaders was, put simply, complex. Within a year of Bozizé’s term, Séléka began operations in the northern part of the country. The reason the group chose the name is because it is a group made of many parts. Specifically, they united from three separate rebel forces: The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), and the Union of Republication Forces (UFR). 196 This is perhaps why the date of establishment is disputed. Each of the component groups has a different date of establishment. With only a thousand fighters, Séléka was able to seize 195

“The World Bank In Central African Republic,” The World Bank, last updated November 25, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview. 196 Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, “Seleka Coalition Central Africa Republic.”

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two-thirds of the country in late 2012. 197 They tore through the North, mainly relying on armed assaults. Reports of extreme violence, including rape and torture, became commonplace. They attacked military, business, and civilian targets indiscriminately as they made their march. 198 Séléka’s grievances were rooted in their desire to seize control from President Bozizé, who they viewed as incompetent, and to eventually recreate the government in an Islamic image. They were nationalists, but also ardent Islamists. Muslims are a small minority within the Central African Republic, making up only 15% of the estimated 5.7 million population. 199 Given their minority status, there has historically been a power differential between the majority Christian, and the minority Muslim communities. There has been prolonged violence between the communities, specifically within the city of Bangui. The violence was so extreme that Muslims fled to neighboring countries. 200 Séléka considered the religious injustice, as well as the poor governance of the country, reason enough to attempt to seize territory and even the Presidency. In fact, the nation has a law requiring religious communities to register. Should they be viewed as “disruptive” to the country, they are required to disband. Séléka viewed the religious persecution in their country as intolerable, especially given the legal, existential vulnerability of any religious minority. The violence committed by Séléka was not only directed towards the government that they believed persecuted them, but also to the Anti-Balaka forces, a Christian group of fighters who sought to avenge Christian losses and extinguish any Islamist influence from the nation. 201

197

Ibid. “Incident Summary: 201405010070,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201405010070. 199 Office of International Religious Freedom, 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Central African Republic (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2018), https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ central-african-republic/. 200 Ibid. 201 “Global Conflict Tracker: Violence in the Central African Republic,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated April 15, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-centralafrican-republic. 198

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Both Séléka and Anti-Balaka have been accused of crimes against humanity by the UN. By the end of 2012, Séléka had grown so powerful that the government was willing to negotiate with the group to stop its advancement. The negotiations were completed by January 2013, and the two parties agreed to a ceasefire. As part of the agreement, there were prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of foreign armed forces, and the selection of a new Prime Minister. President Bozizé would remain in power and complete his term. 202 The peace was not long lived. In a matter of months, Séléka reneged and decided that the deal was insufficient. Hostilities began again. The unleashed chaos was so severe that the Central African Republic had its membership to the African Union rescinded. This did not stop Michel Djotodia, one of Séléka’s leaders, from naming himself as the new head of state – the first Muslim head of state. 203 He immediately began to dismantle the state’s institutions, including the National Assembly. Djotodia’s ascent did nothing to stop his group’s continued pillaging of the country; including continued attacks on perceived Christian enemies. Djotodia could not secure power, and he was ousted within a year – even after he attempted to disband Séléka. Séléka is not a hierarchical group, and therefore his proclamation of disbandment meant little to the group. In 2015, after the ousting of Djotodia, other Séléka members declared an autonomous state – the Republic of Logone. The state was not recognized, but it caused yet another layer of conflict within the Central African Republic.204 Another election occurred in 2016, and although the National Assembly was reconvened, the country remained unstable and in the throes of sectarian violence, largely due to the now persistent cycle of violence between Séléka and the Anti-Balaka forces. Séléka is clearly a dual ideological group, and although one cannot discern the dominance or equality of these ideologies, their biography, as 202

O’Toole, Giles-Vernick, and van Hoogstraten, “Central African Republic.” “Profile: Central African Republic's Michel Djotodia,” BBC News, January 11, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21938297. 204 Hippolyte Marboua, “Muslim Rebels Declare Autonomous State in North,” The Washington Post, December 15, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/central-african-republic-rebels-declareautonomous-state-in-north/2015/12/15/8efdd3a8-a380-11e5-ad3f991ce3374e23_story.html. 203

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one may understand it, is that of an Islamist, nationalist terrorist group which is heavily reliant on armed assaults, but occasionally resorts to assassinations and hostage taking. 205 Their grievances are rooted in their minority status within the Central African Republic. As a religious minority, they were persecuted by their government. They perceived the solution to be a government takeover, which would catapult them and their religion to the country’s forefront. Their two goals are intertwined intimately. As stated in the introduction, terrorist groups often seize upon unstable situations. Séléka was aided in their pursuit by the armed conflict present within the Central African Republic. The chaos bred opportunity. Over time, the Central African Republic has experienced multiple coups, the mass firing of civilian government workers, and conflicts seeping in from the borders around them. Séléka capitalized on this instability to take root. They have only further contributed to further chaos within their nation.

NS/LW The second most modal mixed group type in the GTD is NS/LW. This congruence of ideas has been referred to by numerous names in the political sphere: national socialism, socialist nationalism, or leftist nationalism. To many, these two ideologies clash. 206 Their coupling is not intuitive, but the very existence of these groups suggests otherwise. It would seem more likely for nationalism to be coupled with right-wing groups, as they are generally more inward facing. The pairing of nationalism and right-wing ideologies results in many ethno-nationalist ideologies. Ethno-nationalists are groups rooted in racism, and they stringently believe in isolationist national policies. Left-wing nationalism is instead rooted in social equality; they seek to upend the status quo and reconstitute society in a more egalitarian image. They are adamantly opposed to imperialism and (generally) fiercely prioritize local welfare above international action. The latter highlights the core of their nationalist ideology. These groups seize upon national identity and dream of greater, more just societies. For many 205

“GTD Search Results: Seleka,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&search=seleka. 206 Ibid.

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of these groups, politics have failed to deliver their desired objectives, so they chose another path. Violence. This will be demonstrated by the examples profiled in this chapter. Specifically, ETA (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) will be profiled below. They are an NS/LW group. To be clear, this classification is controversial. Many scholars categorize ETA as purely nationalist, but the group was born of a socialist student movement. The group has publicly declared, on multiple occasions, their ultimate desire to be an “independent, socialist state”. 207 As stated earlier, this text cannot assume a dominance of one ideology over another, since we have incomplete, imperfect information. In the case of ETA, information available to the public conveys it as a principally nationalist group. However, ETA’s well documented history also speaks to its leftist roots. Simply put, one cannot ignore its dual ideologies, it would be an oversimplification of the group, and even their genesis.

NS/LW Profile: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) also known as Basque Fatherland and Freedom Before one may understand ETA, one must become familiar with the Basque people and region, the community from which the group emerged. There are seven Basque provinces in northern Spain and southern France, and they are culturally and linguistically different from the rest of Spain and France. While there are seven provinces, there are three main administrative regions; Iparralde, the French Basque region; Euskadi, the Spanish Basque region; and Navarre, the autonomous Basque region. ETA was born of the Spanish Basque region, as is evident by their full name, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. To be clear, ETA claimed to represent the totality of the Basque region. The Basque region encompasses two countries within its declared borders, but its people do not view themselves as separate, but rather as one

207

Carlta Vitzthum, “Outlawing of Basque Party Fails to Spark Popular Outcry.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, September 18, 2002, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1032288723761300075.

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people with thousands of years of shared history – caught among the borders of two nations. Their culture, traditions, and laws have further protected both the property and family orientation of traditional Basque society over time. With a strict inheritance tradition, where only a single heir may inherit the family household, including the home, family and other property, estates are kept intact across the generations. 208 This deliberate step, among others, has maintained and preserved the culture, property, and language of the Basque people. The Basque people are fiercely protective of their culture, history, and people. It is consequently unsurprising that they sought independence. This plight led to the creation of ETA by an anguished minority within the community. Dependent on both the sympathy and financial support of their community, they began a violent campaign with the aim of achieving their independence from both Spain and France. The group was formed in the 1960s by socialist students. This was partly in response to General Franco’s brutal, fascist dictatorship in Spain. General Franco was Spain’s Head of State from 1939 to 1975. 209 Franco, like many dictators before (and after) him, imprisoned thousands of political prisoners. Franco set up an extensive spy network and created a society rooted in fear. For instance, people could only practice Catholicism – all other religions were outlawed. He also banned all regional languages of Spain, including the Basque language. 210 This was a cruel and oppressive time in Spain, and while Franco eased his grip over time, for the Basque people, the offenses were irreparable. Even during his rule, both the Basque people and ETA resisted Franco’s rule, vigilantly. 211 However, ETA did not end its fight with Franco’s death in 1975, even as democracy was being ushered in, and even though the Basque region gained great autonomy in this period. The newly autonomous Basque government established a separate (and recognized) parliament, security

208 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Basque,” Encyclopædia Britannica, February 27, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Basque. 209 History.com Editors, “Francisco Franco,” History, last updated June 7, 2019, https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/francisco-franco. 210 Ibid. 211 “What is Eta?,” BBC News, April 8, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11183574.

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forces, and maintained control over educational content. 212 This concession from the Spanish government was still insufficient for the group. ETA kept lobbying for full independence and sovereignty. Autonomy, for them, was simply not enough. They wanted a free, socialist Basque country. The violence continued. ETA’s targets were largely Spanish security forces, and politicians who opposed their independence. They primarily used bombings and kidnappings in their operations. Increased violence over time did eventually wear the public down, including their target audience. In 1997, Miguel Angel Blanco, a young council member from the Spanish Populist Party was kidnapped by ETA. ETA demanded that the Spanish government release 460 prisoners in exchange for the safe return of Blanco. The Spanish government did not comply. ETA responded by shooting Blanco twice in the head. He died approximately 12 hours later. 213 The response to the brutality of his slaying was immediate. Six million people took to the streets in Spain to call for an end to the violence. Blanco’s death was a turning point for ETA because they had truly angered their base. ETA had no choice but to call for a ceasefire. The ceasefire, unsurprisingly, was overturned in 1997. The Spanish government refused to even discuss Basque independence, yet again.214 The violence recommenced. The group continued to attack security forces but was not gaining ground. Violence continued to be perceived negatively, even by their base. They declared a second ceasefire in 2011, but the group would not disband for seven more years. ETA operated for over forty years. In that time, they killed more than 800 people, injured thousands more, and created great instability for the Basque region. 215 The Global Terrorism Database recorded a total sum of 2024 incidents attributed to ETA. 216 After their disbandment, the Spanish

212

Ibid. Ibid. 214 Ibid. 215 Ibid. 216 “GTD Search Results: Perpetrators: Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA),” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 13, 2020, 213

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government offered the group nothing in return. They had lost all leverage. ETA was intently focused on gaining independence and establishing a socialist state. This is evident as the region gained more and more autonomy, but the group did not relent. The group continued to attack security forces and political oppositionists, even with concessions being made to them. The group could have considered a separate parliament and a separate police force as major concessions, but ETA nonetheless found these concessions insufficient. Their stated goal was the independence and true self-rule, not the autonomy, of the Basque people. Their leftist socialist ideologies guided their actions and decisions. They were absolutists. However, their operations and survival were mitigated by their target audience. They could no longer use high-scale, large casualty attacks to achieve their goals. Those tactics cost them their base and leverage. Overall, ideology guided ETA, but they could not continue to exist without the support of their target audience. In essence, the mitigating factors are crucial to the equation in this case study. The Basque people are not the only people within the borders of Spain who have historically sought independence. The people of Catalonia, in Northeastern Spain, have also been seeking self-determination for decades. In October 2017, multiple Catalonian leaders were sentenced to long-term prison sentences, between nine and thirteen years, because they enacted a referendum to vote on independence. 217 The Spanish government deemed the action illegal and decided to prosecute the Catalonian leaders. Initially, they sought even longer sentences. ETA considered violence as a necessary means to achieving their goals. Political solutions were not considered viable. The treatment of the Catalonians only furthered their belief. ETA came apart, but they did so reluctantly. They did not want to make peace before they had fulfilled their goals. In May 2018, the group https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type =&casualties_max=&success=yes&perpetrator=316&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page =21&count=100#results-table. 217 Pamela Rolfe and James McAuley, “Spanish Supreme Court Sentences Catalan Separatists to Prison, Sparking Protests,” The Washington Post, October 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/spanish-supreme-court-sentences-catalanseparatists-to-jail/2019/10/14/a0590366-ee59-11e9-89ebec56cd414732_story.html.

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finally relented. They released a public statement declaring their official disbandment. The government did not take the group’s word, unsurprisingly given previously overturned ceasefires. They continued to seek members out and search for their weapons. They were successful. Three large caches of weapons and explosives, along with internal group documents, were found. These weapons and documents provided the government with the evidence needed to solve 300 outstanding cases.

Discussion As can be observed by Figure 7-1, ETA was highly active from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Towards the end of the group’s life, there was a marked difference in the level of activity; this unsurprising considering the botched kidnapping of Miguel Blanco in 1997. This is the least active era until their demise. Meanwhile, the younger, still active Séléka pales in comparison in terms of the number of attacks committed. As of yet, the height of their marked activity is 19 incidents per year (2014). ETA perpetrated over 160 attacks at the height of their activity. Mixed groups are more difficult to understand than singular ideology groups. They are inherently more complex. With some mixed groups, one ideology appears more dominant over another, and in others, there is not enough available information to provide any insight concerning their priorities. One must concede this limitation because terrorist groups are inherently clandestine. Some groups are widely understood because of the longevity of their operation, and some are simply more outspoken. Many groups have outward facing social media accounts, or even newsletters. These communications grant additional insight into the operations of groups. However, many groups are extremely secretive, and what is known about them is consequently much more limited. Although there is a plethora of mixed groups – with many varying combinations of ideology – this text focuses on two. This is due, as previously stated, to the modality of these group types within the Global Terrorism Database. These two combinations are the most frequent perpetrators over time (1970-2013). However, even within the GTD, there are other mixed group types, including RW/R groups which will be briefly discussed below.

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Figure 7-1: Séléka and ETA attacks over time, 1970-2016

218

218

Source: Ahmed, "Terrorist Group Types and Tactic Choice.”

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This chapter began with the example of Séléka which is both an Islamist and nationalist group. The outward image of Séléka does not grant us insight into the role or dominance of their claimed ideologies, besides the acknowledgment of the importance of both. As stated previously, this text assumes equality among the ideologies even while acknowledging that this is unlikely to be an accurate portrayal. Any assertion to the contrary is speculation. This is undoubtedly a limitation. The next mixed group highlighted is ETA. Many scholars classify ETA exclusively as an NS group. However, one cannot be selective of history because it is more convenient. ETA’s political leanings are a guiding force for their actions and choices, as was their fight for independence. One must consider that the group was formed within a leftist movement. The complete picture must be considered. Any less, and our consequent theories or findings would be incomplete or biased. However, dominance or equality of ideology aside, mixed groups do show unique characteristics from their component parts. For instance, there are statistically significant differences when one compares NS groups’ operational decisions to those of both NS/R and NS/LW groups. For instance, relative to NS groups, NS/R groups were significantly more likely to attack infrastructure targets, whereas religious groups did not show any significant likelihood of attacking infrastructure targets. 219 Relative to NS groups, NS/LW groups are more likely to attack security targets whereas left-wing groups are likely to do so. 220 Their choices are unique. Their actions vary. Groups with multiple ideologies do not act in line with either ideology that makes up their groups, they act like different, third entities. The combination of ideologies creates a new type of group; a type that must be recognized. This is why it is overly simplistic (and inaccurate) to label ETA as an exclusively NS group. Limiting its classification alters the findings. One must consider the totality of the available information when classifying groups, because it is evident that these entities make different decisions and take different actions. If one is to further one’s understanding of groups, one must consider all available details.

219 220

Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection.” Ibid.

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The statistical difference between mixed groups and the single group types that combine to make them provides evidence of these new, third entities. In this case, two halves do not make a whole – they make a new picture. Consider Séléka, would they pursue regime change and maintain their minority status? Would ETA gain independence and establish a right-wing regime? These groups’ goals are inextricably linked – and intertwined. Removing one piece of the puzzle changes the image entirely. However, not unlike other group types, mixed groups have political or social agendas, and grievances that they have chosen to address with violence. Their grievances are generally more layered, thus the issuance of the mixed group label. Séléka chose their path not simply because they believed their government to be corrupt and inefficient, but because they wanted to battle against the religious persecution their communities faced, on both an institutional and social level. Those individual grievances may stand on their own, but instead, they were combined in the view of the group and used as justification for using violence. Since there is no single, resounding objective, groups may be misunderstood or mischaracterized, but just as with individuals, the complexities and even contradictions of groups must be examined in order to better understand them. Put simply, these dual ideologies make these mixed groups’ objectives and actions unique from their individual ideologies. To be clear, this is not limited to NS/R or NS/LW groups. Consider the Army of God (AOG), a right-wing, religious group. This anti-abortion group claims a divine Christian mandate. The group was active in the United States and Canada from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. Their chief goal was to target doctors who performed abortions, and the clinics where they provided those services. They thought that by targeting doctors and clinics they would also disincentivize women from seeking abortions. The AOG believed that they had a divine mandate to stop abortions, including with the use of violence. This may seem counterintuitive given that their goal is supposedly to save unborn lives. However, like other terrorist groups, they have rationalized their violence; they consider their actions “godly” and therefore justified, and not akin to other acts of

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violence. 221 In fact, the group even distributed manuals promoting their acts of violence against abortion providers and clinics, and also against businesses catering to the LGBT community. 222 The group’s most notable attack was the bombing of the Olympic village in Atlanta, in 1996. On that day, the AOG killed one person, and injured over one hundred people. 223 There were approximately sixty thousand people in attendance on the day of the attack; the attack was not meant to be discriminatory. The bomber, Eric Rudolph, an Army veteran, was tried and convicted for the attack, but he had previously bombed an abortion clinic and an LGBT bar. 224 He claimed his anti-abortion and antigay views as justification for the attack, even though he pled guilty. Like other terrorists, Rudolph and the AOG are rational actors. They use means they think will deliver them their objectives. Their grievances motivate and justify their actions. Like other religious terrorist groups, the AOG believed that their divine mandate made their actions acceptable, and even celebratory. Like other right-wing terrorist groups, the AOG believed their family values doctrine was imperative. To be clear, this text is asserting that the emergence of a new group type – regardless of the component ideologies, morphs into a new entity; put simply, any combination group is a group unique from the ideologies which make it up. However, this is not an assertion that these new groups will not share any similarities to their component parts. On the surface, this may seem intuitive, but until now, the statistical significance of the difference between these groups and their component parts was not tested. The models below illustrate the changes. They are a series of

221

Jerome P. Bjelopera, Domestic Terrorism: An Overview (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 21, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf, 34-35. 222 Ibid. 223 “Incident Summary: 199607270003,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199607270003. 224 Ibid.

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logistic models, 225 displayed in odds ratios. 226 Table 7-1 provides evidence for the distinct decisions of mixed groups. Using replication data from previous publications, these models were tested to convey the statistical difference between mixed group types and their component parts regarding tactic choice and target choice. 227 Table 7-1: Examining the differences among group types, 1970-2013

Left wing

Right wing

Religious

Environmental

NS/Religious

RW/Religious

Observations

Armed assault

Bombing

Civilian target

Political target

Rival target

0.775***

1.562***

0.877**

0.690***

0.88

-0.0507

-0.0626

-0.047

-0.0291

-0.44

0.485***

0.555***

1.039

2.185***

2.238

-0.0836

-0.0458

-0.105

-0.164

-1.819

0.749***

1.953***

1

0.805***

9.339***

-0.053

-0.101

-0.0576

-0.0463

-4.004

-

0.157***

1.201

1.222*

-

-0.0313

-0.142

-0.137

1.223***

1.979***

2.257***

0.504***

17.66***

-0.0862

-0.108

-0.134

-0.0344

-7.214

0.605**

0.469***

8.435***

0.218***

4.584

-0.127

-0.0811

-1.327

-0.0537

-5.128

19,648

20,063

20,063

20,063

19,648

Reference: NS groups

*** p