Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: The Art of Controversies (The New Synthese Historical Library, 60) 1402081901, 9781402081903

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GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ: THE ART OF CONTROVERSIES

The New Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy VOLUME 60

Managing Editor: Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki Associate Editors: Daniel Elliot Garber, Princeton University Richard Sorabji, University of London Editorial Consultants: Jan A. Aertsen, Thomas-Institut, Universität zu Köln Roger Ariew, University of South Florida E. Jennifer Ashworth, University of Waterloo Michael Ayers, Wadham College, Oxford Gail Fine, Cornell University R. J. Hankinson, University of Texas Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University Paul Hoffman, University of California, Riverside David Konstan, Brown University Richard H. Kraut, Northwestern University, Evanston Alain de Libera, Université de Genève John E. Murdoch, Harvard University David Fate Norton, McGill University Luca Obertello, Università degli Studi di Genova Eleonore Stump, St. Louis University Allen Wood, Stanford University

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ The Art of Controversies Translated and Edited, with an Introductory Essay and Notes by MARCELO DASCAL Tel Aviv University, Israel

with QUINT´IN RACIONERO AND ADELINO CARDOSO

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008920394

ISBN 978-1-4020-8190-3 (PB) ISBN 978-1-4020-5227-9 (HB) ISBN 978-1-4020-5228-6 (e-book)

Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

En un mot, l’art de conferer et disputer auroit besoin d’estre tout refondu. [In a word, the art of negotiating and disputing should be entirely redone.] Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (4.7.11)

[…] you have to find a way to put the extremes together, not necessarily by diminishing the extremity of each one, but to form the art of transition. […] You have to keep the extremes but find the link, always find the link, so that there is an organic whole. Daniel Barenboim (In Barenboim and Said 2004: 68-69)

Et qui publice loquitur, pati debet publice contradicentem. [And the person who speaks in public must bear to be contradicted in public.] Leibniz, Letter to Honoré Fabri (GP IV 246)

Contents

Abbreviations About the Apparatus Acknowledgements Introductory Essay 1. Vices of Mingled Disputes 2. The Controversy of Controversies 3. The Religion of a Peasant 4. The Elements of Thinking 5. The Balance of Law 6. Can there be an Obligation to Believe? A. First draft B. New version C. Final version 7. Controversies on Sacred Matters 8. The Judge of Controversies A. First draft B. Definitive version C. Richelieu and De Groot on controversies D. The utility of controversies E. The most useful kind of controversies F. Controversies 9. Towards a Heuristics for Litigation A. Preserving form in litigation B. All possible litigations C. A handbook of practical litigations D. Juridical commonplaces E. Brocardic principles F. The art of writing dialogues 10. The Method of Jurists and the Method of Doctors 11. Interpretation and Argumentation in Law A. Prolegomena B. On the interpretation, foundations, application and system of laws 12. Towards a Heuristics for Discovery A. The art of invention B. Tables, divisions, and the plurality of methods vii

xi xiii xv xix 1 7 25 29 35 41 42 44 44 49 55 57 58 60 61 61 62 65 65 66 67 68 70 72 75 77 78 79 93 94 98

viii

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

Contents

C. A principle of discovery D. A rule of discovery Estimating the Uncertain Towards a Numerical Universal Language The Encyclopedia and the Method of Discovery Towards a Heuristics for Persuading A. The power of persuading B. Concurrence of arguments C. Quickly defeating an adversary D. Words E. Paradoxes F. Wrongdoing G. How grave a sin is not saying the truth? H. The occasion for persuading I. Disputing until completion The Other’s Place Persuading a Skeptic On Controversies On Principles Two Prefaces to the General Science A. The instauration of the sciences: A preface B. Foundations and examples of a new general science Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia On the Creation of a New Logic New Openings Theology and the Principle of Contradiction Changing Religion Methods of Reunion An Ars Characteristica for the Rational Sciences ‘Characterizing’ Definitions and Demonstrating Propositions Advancing the Art of Discovery Correspondence with the Hamburg Jungians A. Leibniz to Placcius (March 1679) B. Leibniz to Placcius (January 1687) C. Leibniz-Vagetius-Leibniz (1686-1687) D. Leibniz to Placcius (1687) E. Leibniz to Placcius (April 1695) F. Leibniz to Placcius (May 1696) The Philosophical Sin Controversy

101 101 105 119 129 143 144 145 145 146 147 148 148 152 155 163 167 201 209 213 214 216 219 225 231 237 241 247 263 271 275 285 286 290 291 295 296 297 305

Contents

33. Confronting the Catholic Hardliners: Two Memoirs for Pellisson A. First memoir B. Second memoir 34. Defining what Pertains to Faith 35. Judgment of a Catholic Doctor 36. Presumptions and Fictions in Legal Argumentation: Correspondence with Johannes Werlhof A. Leibniz to Werlhof (July 1696) B. Leibniz to Werlhof (1687-1696) C. Werlhof to Leibniz (July 1696) D. Leibniz to Werlhof (July 1696) E. Werlho f to Leibniz (August 1696) F. Leibniz to Werlhof (August 1696) 37. The ‘Method of Establishments’: To Thomas Burnett of Kemeny 38. The Achievements of Logic and Beyond To Gabriel Wagner 39. Pacts, Contracts, and Natural Law 40. Approaching the Church of England A. Annotator’s preface (A) B. Annotations to the translator’s preface C. Synopsis 41. Dialectic Principles and their Application A. The strength and the weakness of reason B. Between Bayle and Le Clerc C. Letter to Jaquelot (October 1706) 42. The History and Tasks of Logic: To Cornelius Dietrich Koch 43. Bold Conjectures: To Louis Bourguet 44. The Dynamics of Formulating and Expounding the System: To Nicolas-François Remond 45. The Use of Logic against Skepticism: To Karl G. Ehler Biographical Notes References Subject Index Name Index

ix

309 309 315 325 329 341 342 343 347 349 350 352 359 373 391 399 400 405 406 419 420 420 422 429 435 445 451 455 473 483 509

Abbreviations

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About the Apparatus

In addition to the Introductory Essay, each Chapter comprises an Introduction that sketches its background, gives an overview of its contents, offers some interpretative suggestions, and indicates the Chapter’s significance in the context of the book. For multi-text Chapters, in most of the cases an Introduction is given for each of the individual texts too. The footnotes contain marginal additions or corrections by Leibniz as well as additional information on textual matters. The endnotes provide information about persons, events, concepts, and controversies mentioned in the text, which a 21st century reader is unlikely to be familiar with; they also include cross-references to other Leibniz texts (in this volume or elsewhere), references to relevant studies, and interpretative suggestions. The two kinds of notes have been distinguished in order to allow for a continuous reading of the text and its modifications, prior to considering the additional material given in the endnotes. The References contain only the titles referred to or made use of and is not intended as a bibliography on Leibniz’s Art of Controversies. Most of the references to writings Leibniz himself refers to are included in the endnotes of the Chapters, with the exception of a few classical works, which are listed in the References. Further information on authors Leibniz often mentions can be found in the Biographical Notes. These authors are marked with an asterisk in their first occurrence in each of the Chapters. A list of Abbreviations serves to refer to the most used editions of Leibniz’s works. A few Leibniz titles are included in the References. Spelling in the 17th century varied. In general, Leibniz’s spelling was respected. Proper names are rendered either in Latin or in the person’s national language. Words added to the translation in order to make it clearer are in square brackets. When necessary, words in the original language are given in italics, within parentheses. The nominative singular is used for Latin words. xiii

Acknowledgements

The idea of a collection of Leibniz’s texts on the art of controversies arose in 1995, in the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I had organized an international research group on “Leibniz the Polemicist” for a whole academic year, and the Institute accepted and financed the idea. As fellows of the Institute we maintained a weekly seminar on Leibniz and his controversies and held daily conversations and sometimes fierce discussion about the texts we studied together. In the course of that memorable year in Jerusalem, two of us – Quintín Racionero and myself – became convinced that this overlooked aspect of Leibniz’s work deserved to be brought to the attention of the learned public in the form of a book. This idea developed into the project, which after ten years of intermittent work throughout the world, new partners, countless modifications, and many other vicissitudes, comes now to fruition in the form of this volume. It has been a challenge that only persevering cooperative work, gracious support by many colleagues, friends and institutions, and a firm belief in the value of the effort could face. Let all those who made it be faced be thanked and explicitly mentioned, as far as my memory can be trusted. My first thanks go to the Institute’s head at the time, David Shulman, for recognizing the significance of the original research proposal and for supporting it, not only with a generous grant, but also with his active interest in the progress we were making. Thanks are also due to the Institute’s staff for providing all we needed and more – efficiency, sympathy, and care. Even the doorkeepers, who had no idea who is this Leibniz, contributed their share to the positive atmosphere, be it late at night or on Shabbat and holidays. The year-long fellows of the group, Gideon Freudenthal, Massimo Mugnai, Carl Posy, Quintín Racionero, Elhanan Yakira, as well as our short term visitors – Fernando Gil, Kuno Lorenz, Olga Pombo, Alan Gross, Maria Rosa Antognazza, Hans Burkhardt, Sergio Cremaschi, Nuno Nabais, Martha Spranzi, Alfredo Tomasquin, were wonderful companions, colleagues, and critics. So too the regular participants in our weekly seminar – Daniel Cook, Noa Zauderer xv

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Acknowledgements

Na’aman, Yaron Senderowicz, Galia Yanoshevsky, Daniel Mishori, David Heyd, Yaron Ezrahi, Ashraf Nur, Ora Gruengard, Rodica Amel. Their willingness to engage in an attentive and often controversial dialogue centered on controversies and on Leibniz was the stimulating background without which this book could not be born. Ever since that primordial research group dispersed, the enthusiasm it generated regarding the role of controversies in the history of ideas led to the creation of the International Association for the Study of Controversies. Many colleagues have since joined this Association, which has convened so far meetings in Tel Aviv, Madrid, Paris, Vercelli, Lugano, Pisa, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Taipei, Amsterdam, and is preparing further ones. IASC, inspired by the spirit of Leibniz’s art of controversies, stimulates fruitful debates that contribute to the advancement of knowledge, and thanks are due to its members for not despairing to see this book in print. The Spanish Ministry of Education granted me a research fellowship, thanks to which I could spend several months at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia in Madrid, devoting most of my time to this project. The Centre d’Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne (Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris) offered me a fellowship that allowed me to make use of the rich material in the libraries of Paris. Thanks to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, which granted me its prestigious prize, I could spend one fruitful year in Germany, pursuing my research on controversies and on Leibniz. Half of this year I was the Leibniz Professor at Leipzig University’s Institute for Advanced Studies thanks to Georg Meggle’s invitation, and the other half, a visiting professor at Giessen University, thanks to Gerd Fritz’s invitation. The Gulbenkian Foundation granted me, thanks to Olga Pombo, a Professorship at the Centro de Filosofia da Ciência, Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon, where I intensively worked with Adelino Cardoso in furthering the book. The Centro de Filosofia of the University of Lisbon contributed generously to the formatting and final preparation of the book for printing, which was expertly performed by Filipa Afonso. Tel Aviv University granted me the sabbaticals and leaves of absence for all the travel involved in the research. To all these institutions, I can only say that I have done the best in order to justify their support of this project. In the translation of some texts the cooperation of Leibniz scholars such as Gideon Freudenthal and Daniel Cook was extremely helpful. Daniel also read parts of the manuscript and suggested corrections. Bernardino Orio de Miguel read the whole manuscript and his remarks were always valuable. Pol Boucher thoroughly revised some of the juridical translations and provided useful historical and technical information. João Lopes Alves and José de Sousa e Brito also provided assistance regarding juridical terminology. Serhii Wakulenko helped to decipher and translate a

Acknowledgements

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difficult manuscript. Andreas Blank, during his stay at Tel Aviv University, co-conducted with me a seminar using the texts here collected, read and helped to improve most of the manuscript, and was a constant source of support and insight. So were my colleagues at Tel Aviv University, especially Noa Zauderer Naaman and Yaron Senderowicz, whose unfailing interest and challenging questions were always stimulating. Olga Pombo, an old friend in Leibniz, listened attentively to my lengthy speculations about this or that text at her home in Lisbon (where part of the work on this book was performed), making enlightening remarks and demonstrating unrestricted enthusiasm for the project. Cristina Marras was very helpful in collecting bio- and bibliographical information, locating original manuscripts, suggesting additional relevant texts, and discussing the material. Miguel Smid contributed to the first English version of several of the Latin texts. Iñigo Medina García contributed to the notes and made useful remarks on the translations. Mogens Laerke read carefully parts of the manuscript and detected some mistakes. And, last but not least, the graduate students in my annual Leibniz seminar in Tel Aviv, as well as in seminars and research workshops in several other universities, provided perceptive remarks that left their mark on this book, although they cannot be individually traced. The German-Israeli research group on “Controversies in the République des Lettres” (financed for three years by the German Israeli Research Foundation) was an attentive forum for discussing Leibniz’s art of controversies. Members of the group in Tel Aviv and Giessen provided valuable criticism of the Introductory Essay and made suggestions concerning some of the translations and notes. In particular I would like to thank Thomas Gloning and Gerd Fritz for their careful reading of several texts and for their helpful suggestions. The cooperation of the colleagues in the three hubs of the Academy Edition of Leibniz’s writings was essential for carrying out this project. I wish to extend, particularly, my warmest thanks for their generous help to Heinrich Schepers (Münster), Herbert Breger (Hanover), and Hartmut Rudolph (Potsdam). They have been extremely supportive and helpful in advice, criticism, finding the manuscripts, and helping in deciphering and interpreting them. Stephan Waldhoff (Potsdam) deserves my special thanks for his detailed and patient help in this respect. Philip Beeley (Münster) generously provided valuable missing information. Three women, whether they know it or not, are deeply involved in the completion of this project and deserve our gratitude: our wives – Varda, Lola, Isabel. Their wonderful hospitality and their tolerance for our eccentricities and oblivion of the rest of the world whenever we met (in Tel Aviv, in Madrid, in Jerusalem, in Lisbon, or elsewhere) to advance the

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project, was not of the passive, but of the very active, supportive, and stimulating kind. It is not easy, finally, to give appropriate expression to my gratitude to Quintín Racionero and Adelino Cardoso, without whom this book would not be now in your hands (or computer screen), dear reader. Quintín and I were partners of this project since its inception and shared its conception and most of its evolution. His unbelievable erudition and his vast knowledge of Leibniz have left their mark throughout this volume. He managed to fit his busy schedule to mine in order to take a week off, in Tel Aviv, Madrid, Lisbon, Giessen, Paris, for working together on a few chapters and notes at a time. He generously offered his home and the facilities of the UNED for our work when I was in Madrid. Unfortunately, due to personal reasons, Quintín had to interrupt his work on this project. But I hope the final result does justice to his spirit and to his belief in its importance, and will please him. When I first talked with Adelino about the project, he was immediately enthusiastic about it, and jumped on board without hesitating. He not only dedicated much of his time to it, but also obtained the financial support of the Centro de Filosofia, of which he is a leading member. His expertise in Leibniz contributed to valuable crossreferences and his special focus on the idea of mediation, which he considers central to leibnizianism, fits as a glove the key elements of Leibniz’s art of controversies; both enriched significantly the book. To both of you, dear friends, my profound gratitude for this wonderful cooperativecontroversial partnership of many years, which (how could it be otherwise?) both illustrates and confirms the essence of Leibniz’s art of controversies. Marcelo Dascal Tel Aviv, April 2006

Introductory Essay

In one of several intellectual self-portraits Leibniz wrote in the course of his life, he describes a “man of religion” he met one day in Paris (K IV 452-454). This man had “meditated at length about controversies”. He enjoyed reading the Church Fathers, but his veneration for them was not excessive. By the age of 17 he had “penetrated so deeply the subtleness of the Schoolmen that he embarrassed his teachers”. Contrary to the current opinion that this kind of study was useless, he believed it had made him realize “up to what point the refinement of the human mind can go”. Their writings, he was sure, contained so many solid and beautiful things that they would be admired by all learned persons if they were formulated clearly and neatly – which he was capable to do, since he excelled in his singular ability of “explaining a passage and making its true sense apparent”. He was versed in history and the writings of the ancients, and he possessed a natural and simple style, yet strong and touching when necessary. One could say that he “mastered perfectly the humanities”. His studies of jurisprudence between the ages of 18 and 21 soon brought him fame and a position at a princely court, where up to 25 years of age he had “the occasion of studying controversies”. The rumors about the new discoveries in mathematics and physics motivated him to contribute to the advancement of science, leaving aside his earlier studies. In two years he became a famous mathematician, invented machines that were considered extraordinary and, in spite of being a foreigner, he was acclaimed for his achievements. It was at this time, Leibniz writes, that he met this man. He was surprised to see him “reading books of controversies”. His modest appearance and his ordinary way of speaking did not bear out his fame as a professional mathematician. Upon Leibniz’s manifestation of his surprise, the man told him that people were mistaken about him. His main concern, he said, was theological. He had applied himself to mathematics, as he had done to scholasticism, with the sole purpose of perfecting his mind and learning the art of inventing and of demonstrating – which he now thought to have achieved as far as anyone else. xix

xx

Introductory Essay ( 1

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1 ' Yet, while throughout his life he dealt with controversies, both theoretically and practically, this man never assembled in a single work his insights on this topic; nor did he elaborate a blueprint for such a work – as he did for many other ideas of his, even though he rarely carried out such projects; in short – he never actually wrote a systematic account that would deserve the name of ‘Theory of Controversy’. But this is not unusual in Leibniz’s modus operandi and we must pick up the glove. It is the task of his readers and interpreters, as so many similar tasks he left for posterity, to identify the relevant pieces and to recover from them the design of the mosaic he probably had in mind. This is what the painstaking collecting, translating, and commenting represented by the present volume purports to begin to do. Though the result perhaps does not reveal a full-fledged general theory, it certainly unearths enough shared goals, elements, principles, strategies, and argumentative practices, to be appropriately called ‘art of controversies’ – an enriched ars disputandi deserving a place next to the other pillars or Leibniz’s method, the ars inveniendi and the ars judicandi.

1. Introduction In all likelihood, Leibniz is the early modern thinker who maintained the largest and most varied network of correspondents, with whom he discussed an impressive array of topics, in a wide range of disciplines. He wrote several substantive letters a day and, although he condemned the ‘spirit of contradiction’ that animates some polemicists, he did not shy away from engaging in sustained debate in philosophy, law, theology, politics, or science – whenever he deemed them necessary and useful. In his major works he employed the dialogical form as a sharp critical tool, and he used the journals of his time as a forum where he criticized the theories of his contemporaries and defended his own views against his opponents. He also sought the criticism of others, which he deemed invaluable as a source of learning, and – somewhat naively – assumed

Introductory Essay

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others would rejoice in receiving his own serious and well-intentioned criticism. No wonder that he reflected and wrote quite a lot about the principles that should govern such a time-consuming praxis, in order to make sure that it would be not a waste of time but rather a tool in the construction of knowledge. The growth of knowledge, he believed, required the cooperation of many minds – and he worked for the creation of appropriate institutional frameworks (academies, societies, journals) for this purpose. Such cooperation would be best served by infusing it with a critical spirit that values the confrontation of opposed positions, not for the doubtful pleasure of winning, but for its potential contribution to advancing our knowledge. Rather than presuming harmony, knowledge should be built out of the variety of diverging views. In this spirit, objections should be praised and taken seriously as key contributions to conceptual clarification, and major efforts should be made to learn about opposed points of view, acknowledge their respective contributions to truth, detect their points of divergence, and seek to reconcile between them. Leibniz was a firm believer in the persuasive power of such an intellectual strategy not only in theoretical, but also in practical matters. 0

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In spite of Leibniz’s persistent inclusion in his projects of a “General Science” of a chapter devoted to the methods for solving controversies, Couturat – who dealt with this subject in his book La Logique de Leibniz (1901) – did not include in his 1903 edition of Leibniz’s unpublished texts those manuscripts that develop the theme. Mollat too, in both his editions of juridical texts (1885 and 1893), did not notice the relevance of the art of controversies, even though some of the texts he selected for publication clearly emphasize the value of the modes of argumentation employed by the early jurists in dealing efficiently with polemics. As for Grua’s 1948 edition, guided by his interest in Leibniz’s philosophy of law (cf. Grua 1953, 1956), it was no doubt instrumental in calling attention to Leibniz’s ideas on many other subjects as well, and included texts directly related to controversies. Grua, however, did not recognize the methodological significance of the texts he published on this topic – which is perhaps the reason why he didn’t single them out in a separate section of his edition. Baruzi (1909), interested mainly in Leibniz’s religious thought and politics (cf. Baruzi 1907), was perhaps the only

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Introductory Essay

range of Leibniz’s writings on the “art of controversies” – the art that is supposed to theorize about the praxis briefly described above – remains to this day largely unheeded to. Another reason for that is that these writings were, in general, not included in the “philosophical” series of the Academy edition, which led researchers to presume they had no philosophical interest. Furthermore, only a very small portion of it was available in translation. The unquestionable significance of this work is the motivation for this volume, which will provide the reader with a further piece of the “Leibniz puzzle” – a piece that offers a quite unusual perspective for appreciating his thought and action. In this introductory essay, we will first present the historical background explaining the rise of interest in negotiations, dialogue, tolerance, and the peaceful solution of controversies in the second half of the seventeenth century. We will then survey the intellectual sources that provided Leibniz with the materials for the development of an “art of controversies”. An overview of the contents of this art will then follow, in which the role of each of its components will be highlighted. Next, we will show how the principles and techniques of this art are part and parcel of Leibniz’s major fields of research and action – theology, law, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, and science. We will then highlight the significance of the art of controversies for Leibniz’s entire philosophical stance – a significance that ultimately lies in its essential role in Leibniz’s “rationalism”. Finally, we describe the criteria that guided us in the compilation of this volume.

2. Motivation The peace of Westphalia, which puts an end to the 30 years war in Europe is signed in 1648, two years after Leibniz’s birth. The peace of Utrecht, which puts an end to the 14-years long Spanish succession war, is signed in 1714, two years before Leibniz’s death. Both were “world wars” % E ' 20 th century editor of Leibniz’s unpublished writings who devoted special attention to Leibniz’s practice of and reflection about the art of controversies (he must be also credited with re-printing the self-portrait of Leibniz with which this Introductory Essay opens). 2 The Thirty Years War (1619-1648) was the first global war in Europe, as well as the most devastating one, especially in central Europe. Its last phase, the so-called FrancoSwedish period (1635-1648), was characterized by an absence of stable fronts, a situation where the only regular tactics was the systematic destruction of the territories through which the armies passed. The more reliable calculations mention the astronomic

Introductory Essay

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Between these two dates, European intellectuals and politicians were concerned with the ways of promoting peace and avoiding the devastating effects of these wars. This political and intellectual concern gave birth not only to intensive political negotiations, but also to an intensive reflection on the conditions for the achievement of peace in Europe, coupled with attempts by their proponents to persuade their intellectual colleagues in other countries and to muster their influence upon the political leaders for the implementation of such projects. In this, and other ways, the community of European intellectuals known as the “République des Lettres” played a key role. Pierre Bayle, an exile in the wake of Louis XIV’s anti-Huguenot policies, and a fighter for tolerance, was certainly aware of this role when he founded his journal Nouvelles de la République 'A ( intellectual communication, namely a supra-national forum for the

3

proportion of 30% to 50% of population reduction within the Empire, with local variations related to the proximity to the battle zones (see Lutz 1982: I 24). Even though England didn’t take part in this war, its own revolutionary process, from 1621 (with the first conflicts between Charles I and the Parliament) to 1649 (with Cromwell’s victory and the king’s execution), evolved chronologically and involved an amount of devastation parallel to that of the continental war (Hill 1965). No doubt the period inaugurated with the Peace of Westphalia was not, strictly speaking, peaceful. But the wars undertaken by Louis XIV did not significantly modify the international status quo, which respected the stipulations of the peace treaty. The balance of power was altered by two events: on the one hand, the succession to the Spanish throne (which Carlos II’s will assigned to a grandson of Louis XIV) and, on the other, the ascension of Russia which challenged Sweden’s supremacy in the north. Under these conditions war became once more inevitable, this time reaching beyond Europe, due to the participation of the American colonies. The diversification of the fronts in the double war – the Spanish Succession War (1700-1716) and the Great Northern War (1700-1721) caused less devastation in any particular territory; but, as a whole, the result was as bloody as that of the Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, the period between the two wars yielded the basis for European stability, which, after the Treaties of Utrecht (1716) and Nystadt (1721), would not undergo significant changes until the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The journal was founded in 1684 and published in Rotterdam, where Bayle lived in exile. Each monthly issue included reviews of recently published books on theology, politics, philosophy, science, history and other subjects. The quality as well as the critical character of the reviews made the journal an obligatory reference for the intellectual life of the time, as well as a vehicle for debate. The earliest examples of this kind of journals were the Philosophical Transactions, published by the Royal Society of London since 1661 and the Journal des Sçavans, a private publication that begins to appear in Paris in 1665. But soon they were emulated, among many others, by the Acta Eruditorum of Leipzig (1682), the Miscellanea curiosa and the Ephemerides of Nürenberg, several Giornalli dei litterati, published in various Italian cities since 1685, and the Journal de Trévaux, a Jesuit publication that began to appear in 1701.

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exchange of ideas. Along with other journals and an intense private and semi-private correspondence, it contributed to create a vast network of contacts among intellectuals of all Europe, an achievement made possible by the favorable climate following the Peace of Westphalia. This network, that included also the newly created academies (which, though supported by each state, were in fact international in their membership), allowed for cooperation in the construction of knowledge and provided a framework wherein ideological conflicts could become the object of rational discussion. Without over-estimating the role played by this “République des Lettres” in political affairs, one should not under-estimate it either. Even though the actual influence of intellectuals upon political praxis was scant, their new forms of communication and debate permitted to remove several important topics from the exclusive area of confessional dispute. In this way, the République des Lettres contributed to the development of an autonomous realm of reason, independent of issues of faith. Its importance, from our point of view, lies in its decisive role in the emergence of an arena for debate, as well as in providing a living model of coexistence, and even cooperation, in spite of and through disagreement. Leibniz became a key node in this forum of debate and communication. He symbolized, perhaps more than any other savant of his time, the connection between knowledge and politics. As we shall see, his “Art of Controversies” is nourished by this double source, stemming from the intrinsic connection, in Leibniz’s thought, between science – whose ultimate aim is the happiness of humankind – and morality. The efforts to bring about peace through meetings, in which reasonable solutions to the theological and ecclesiastical issues in dispute were sought, preceded the Thirty Years War. In the first phase of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, a methodology of “colloquia” was put in place for this # = E ' refusal by the pope to convene an Ecumenical Council and by the Protestants to subscribe to any obedience formula, brought an end to the 4

This methodology relied upon the so-called politiques – most of them followers of Erasmus, who “not having sworn neither to the Pope nor to Luther, were only motivated by the glory of God and by the good of Christendom”. It employed the attempts to develop a syncretistic theology as a propaedeutic tool. The Diet of Augsburg (1530) convened by Charles V was the first major attempt of this sort. But Philip of Hesse had already made a similar experiment, when he organized a colloquium in Marburg, where Luther and Zwingli were invited to resolve doctrinal divergences. Also Maria of Medicis, France’s regent, employed the same procedure in the Poissy colloquium (1561), with the aim of reducing the divergences between Huguenots and Catholics.

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The colloquium of Thom, organized by the Jesuits in 1648, a few months before the Peace of Westphalia, when the situation in Poland was still uncertain, demonstrates the limits of the colloquia methodology prior to the Peace of Westphalia. Once the re-catholicization of Poland was assured, the Jesuits lost all interest in continuing the discussions. Their interest shifted to the application of the ius reformandi, whose principal victims would be the Calvinists and the Socinians. 6 The literature on the development and application of the principle of tolerance is considerable. See, among others, Chaunu (1984), Decobert (1988), Garrison (1991), Leclerc (1994), Kamen (1967), and Nederman and Laursen (1996). As far as we know, the many and laborious efforts of conciliation made in the 16th and 17th centuries have not been so far the object of a comprehensive study. See, however, Christin (1997), Turchetti (1984), and Hazard (1966), especially part II, chap. II, devoted to the LeibnizBossuet reunion attempt. 7 The final form of the lockean doctrine of tolerance is that of the four Letters Concerning Toleration. The first letter was published anonymously in Latin in 1689, the second and third, by the author, in 1690 and 1693, and the fourth, incomplete, postumously in 1706. All of them can be found in volume 6 of The Works of John Locke (London 1823; reprinted by Aalen Verlag, Hildesheim, 1963). It is well known that Locke didn’t always hold the views expressed in the Letters. As a young man he defended the right of the magistrates to prosecute religious dissidents – a position he argued for in his Two Tracts on Government. His change of opinion is usually attributed to the influence of Lord

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Ashley, first Earl of Shaftesbury, whose Whig government policy included “tolerance, commercial interest, individual freedom, Protestantism, and parliamentary supremacy”. This influence is now well documented with the publication of An Essay Concerning Tolerance, written by Locke in 1667 – the year he entered the service of Shaftesbury as his physician and confident. The best version of this unpublished and for the most part lost work is available in J. Locke: Scritti Editi e Inediti sulla Tolleranza, edited by C. Viano (Torino, 1961, pp. 81-107). There is no point here in referring the reader to the vast literature on Locke’s doctrine of tolerance. As for the influence of his model of argumentation on this issue, which has overshadowed the earlier – as well as many of the latter – models, it suffices to quote Nederman and Laursen (1996: 2): “A virtual consensus seems to exist in the English-speaking world that the first true theoretical defense of tolerance was proposed by John Locke”. 8 See Parker (1980: chap. 4). Nevertheless, the Edit de Nantes was a truly tolerant ordinance. For, within the limits established in its 94 overt and 57 covert articles, it permitted the realization of periodic national synods of the Reformed Church, as well as the teaching of Calvinism in three universities (Montauban, La Rochelle, and Nîmes). As demonstrated by ulterior events, the French authorities found ways to restrict quite drastically the conditions stipulated in the Edit, so as to make life for the Huguenots in France impossible. From the conquest of La Rochelle by Richelieu in 1628 until their final expulsion with the revocation of the Edit by Louis XIV in 1685, the number of Huguenot believers was reduced from 1250000 to a mere 80000. 9 Essay (4.16.14). In order to understand Locke’s argument in this paragraph, it is worthwhile noticing that, for him, it is precisely in virtue of their reliance upon divine revelation that religious beliefs should not be included among those propositions that are probable.

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words, one has not to be an epistemological skeptic in order to be tolerant. So, Locke’s notion of tolerance is in fact a condescending attitude of “toleration” towards opinions about whose falseness there is no doubt whatsoever. They are tolerated on exclusively political grounds, i.e., in so far as they are not perceived as socially dangerous. Thus, although Locke’s model undoubtedly marks a progress in grounding the notion of tolerance in a reflection that goes beyond considerations of realpolitik, it remains however a minimalist model. For it seeks to ensure nothing more than the preservation of a peaceful coexistence within a given social fabric. There is nothing in this model suggesting the possibility of a reconciliation of the divergent opinions, and therefore the need to stimulate a rational debate between them. Error and truth are a priori assigned to one or to the other – which makes such a debate irrelevant and eventually also dangerous. The possibility – and need – of such a debate is precisely what other models developed after the Peace of Westphalia acknowledged. Leibniz is certainly the thinker that envisaged this possibility most seriously and undertook to shape such an alternative model. He was clearly not satisfied with Locke’s notion of tolerance. According to him, the conception of tolerance as a resting point ensuring political stability is insufficient. Rather, tolerance must be viewed as a starting point, capable of promoting the rational debate aimed at overcoming the differences, instead of taking them for granted. In Chapter 40A, Leibniz declares that he has a method by means of which “it is possible to go beyond mere tolerance”. He goes on to claim that tolerance should be viewed as moderation – something that is especially necessary in those issues in which controversy arises. In a letter to Molanus (22 February 1698; GR 412-415), he defines moderation as the attitude of “talking without condemning” (loquendum tantum de non condemnando – GR 415). Once this attitude is adopted, it paves the way for applying the “method ” Leibniz has in mind, namely “ placing in front of one’s eyes the weight of both sides’ arguments as if in a balance ” (Chapter 40A). Tolerance, t hus, is not a result of the endeavor to prevent confrontation. It is the necessary preamble for allowing for a true, passionless confrontation of reasons to take place: “… the powers should first agree as to mutual tolerance in order to sweeten the minds” (To the Landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels, February 1685; GR 190). Without this step it would be foolish to expect to achieve any results – not to mention a stable peace.

Consequently, any doubt concerning these beliefs can only come from a lack of understanding of what is revealed or from a defect in the believer’s faith.

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Whereas for Locke tolerance is an ethical-political requirement with which stability would be ensured without the need for any further dialogue or negotiation, for Leibniz it is a basic principle of the ethics of communication and debate, without which the negotiation, necessary for rationally weighing the positions and eventually overcoming the differences, would be impossible. Consequently, in his Synopsis (Chapter 40C), Leibniz distinguishes between two strategies for handling the solution of controversies: controversiae conciliatio per tolerantiam and per consensum. We should not mistakenly believe that the first of these strategies corresponds to the application of Locke’s “toleration”. For, such an application does not in fact solve a controversy – it just leaves it unsolved, while preventing its eventual harmful social consequences. The first strategy, in Leibniz’s view, simply leads to a solution in case the mere removal of mutual condemnation and passionate discourse reveals that there is no real opposition and thereby brings the debate to rest. The second strategy is required when moderation alone does not entirely remove the opposition. Nevertheless, moderation is required for it clears the ground for a dispassionate consideration of the arguments involved and allows the parties to seek (and eventually reach) an agreed upon solution. Leibniz’s “art of controversies” consists precisely in the ensemble of efforts by him to elaborate the conceptual framework and tools required for the use of this second strategy.

3. Sources Leibniz’s concern with controversies runs through his whole life. Among his earlier remembrances, he mentions the lively interest aroused in him by reading medieval disputationes – which he did read in spite of his teacher’s prohibition.10 Two months before his death, he is still concerned with the topic. He talks once more about the “judge of controversies” and keeps looking for the appropriate conceptual framework for analyzing and

10

“Leibniz’s life” (K I xxxv). This autobiographical fragment – written by Leibniz in 1676, presumably as a resumé intended to accompany his requests for employment in Germany after his sojourn in Paris – shows the role of controversies in his early education. Leibniz writes: “when as little more than a child I wandered casually through my father’s library, I stumbled upon some books of controversies […]; I then first began to realize that, in general, not all that is said is correct and that often people hold excessively passionate opinions about problems that do not always have much value. So that, before reaching the age of 17, I was working on an exact discussion of a certain controversy” (p. xl).

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solving controversies. His advice to the young Ehler is to persevere in this task, declaring that he has no doubt that it can be achieved (Chapter 45). As in most of the projects he considered of fundamental importance, Leibniz’s work on the art of controversies was intermittent and – as far as we know from his published manuscripts – did not reach the stage of a full mature formulation. The letter to Ehler shows that he is fully aware of the incompleteness of his work in this domain, but this does not prevent him to continue to have faith in its importance and feasibility, and to entrust its achievement to the next generations. The attention he devoted to the project, at different times in his life, was determined both by his commitment to other major intellectual endeavors and by the surrounding circumstances. Among the latter, the ups and downs of the reunification negotiations, as well as his mood regarding their prospects of success.11 In order to elaborate his art of controversies, Leibniz – following St. Paul’s advice to always work opportune et importune, i.e., taking advantage of each and every available clue (GR 190) – makes use of a variety of sources. The first of these sources was the practice and theory of disputations. Originally, the disputatio was an amplification of the expositio, i.e., the explication of a text through interlinear or marginal remarks. As such remarks grew in size, the expositio became a systematic and more or less independent commentary of the text. Given the diversity of possible interpretations, the commentaries had to argue against each other. The disputatio results from the codification of the rules for such disputes, including their proper order, the roles of the participants (defendens, arguens; proponens, opponens), the kinds of permitted moves (e.g., concedo, nego, distingo), and the questions that can be debated and those that cannot. From the 13th century onwards, the disputatio frees itself from the role of textual commentary, leaving room for debates about any chosen theme – quodlibet – which at first were permitted only once a week. Along with this thematic ‘freedom’, however, logical strictures developed concerning the moves the contenders were allowed to make. This was particularly emphasized in the variety of disputatio called obligatio, in 11

For the various stages and results of the negotiations for the reunification of the Christian churches, as well as for Leibniz’s involvement therein, see Racionero (2001). As a rule, Leibniz was aware of the difficulties in reaching a consensus in matters that depended to a large extent upon the varying interests of politicians. For this reason, he usually remained at the backstage, letting the official initiatives (e.g., the requests of the imperial representative, Rojas y Spínola, or the exploratory suggestions of the Elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm) play the leading role. In particular, he took care of the methodological, historical, and doctrinal aspects of the debates. He was, however, an important figure in such negotiations and spent an enormous amount of work in them.

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which each of the disputants was ‘obliged’ to reply in logically specified ways (see Yrjönsuuri 2001). In this respect, the art of disputing played the role of a procedure for teaching and exercising logic. The model of disputation, in its several varieties, became also a tool for conducting intra-religious as well as inter-religious debates (see Dascal 2004b). In the first decades after the Reformation, the disputatio was the prototype for the inter-confessional colloquia which, instead of solving the divergences between Catholics and Protestants, exacerbated them, as Leibniz pointed out (NE 4.7.11; A VI 6 417-418).12 Disputatio, which was still in use in Leibniz’s time, was well-known to him, and was to contribute significantly to the logical, dialectical, and rhetorical aspects of his art of controversies. His teacher, Jakob Thomasius had published in 1670 a manual of logic for beginners, which included, for adults, a large section on disputation (Erotemata Logica pro incipientibus, accessit pro adultis Processus disputandi; Leipzig: G. H. Frommann). In his letter to Thomasius of 2 September 1663 (GP I 7-18), he displays already at a young age his skill in this genre. As a man of his century, however, he soon became aware of the predominant mood of Early Modern thought – a pitiless criticism of ‘scholasticism’, which included the uncompromising dismissal not only of Aristotelian logic, but also of disputatio. The latter was viewed by thinkers such as Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Malebranche as consisting essentially in futile verbal skirmishes, which deviated the mind from real inquiry and was useless for the advance of knowledge. To be sure, Leibniz too criticized the disputatio model. But, in conformity with his tolerant outlook, he acknowledged also its potential usefulness. What is to blame – he argued against Locke , for example – is not the tool itself, but the bad use it is made of by some. Locke had argued that, in order to prevent “the running out of disputes into an endless train of syllogisms” (Essay 4.7.11), the Schoolmen had introduced “general propositions, most of them indeed self-evident, […] beyond which men in .%

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dispute could not retreat”; he thus made disputatio directly responsible for stopping inquiry at vacuous generalities, rather than stimulating the search for the true “foundations whereon the sciences [are] built” (ibid.). For Leibniz, however, the bad use of the ‘maxims’ or ‘principles’ “should not lead to blaming their use in general; all truths are subject to the inconvenience that, when they are joined to falsities, one can draw false conclusions and even contradictory ones” (NE 4.7.12; A VI 6 422). The same is true of disputation. He willingly admits the misuses to which it is subject, and attributes these in part not only to the incompetence of the disputants and to their tendentious motives, but to the fact that it is “illgoverned” (malreglé), which is why “often one does not conclude anything or concludes wrongly” (NE 4.7.11; A VI 6 418). None of this means, however, that “the art of disputing or of combating by reasons” cannot be improved; in fact it must be corrected, developed, and, ultimately, “redone” (tout refondu), for it is “very big and very important” (ibid.). In fact, the chapters of this book illustrate the variety of ways in which Leibniz – ever more aware of the importance of this art – endeavored, from his youth, to fulfill the task of re-creating it on sounder grounds. From early on, he pointed out that the formal dialectical structure of disputatio was insufficient to capture what is at stake in most significant controversies and per se did not provide a method ensuring a wellgrounded, non-arbitrary decision of the debated issue (Chapter 1). He noticed the insufficiency of deductive logic alone to deal with issues of interpretation (Chapter 11) and for drawing probabilistic and presumptive inferences that involve uncertainty (e.g., Chapters 5, 36, 38). He sought to improve the medieval model by introducing the idea of a ‘balance of reason’ (e.g., Chapter 2). And he also kept some of the features of this model, such as the rules which distribute asymmetrically the onus probandi of opponent and proponent – dialectical rules that play in fact a crucial role in his argumentation against Bayle, for example (Chapter 41; see also Théodicée, Discours Préliminaire; Dascal 1987: Chapter 6). Naturally, logic was to play a key role in Leibniz’s art of controversies – to wit his often mentioned ideal of devising a method for solving any controversy as it were ‘arithmetically’ (e.g., Chapters 14, 28). But, as mentioned above, the logic of disputatio was not enough for fulfilling such a dream. On the one hand, it was necessary to transform it in a real calculus. And Leibniz indeed contributed significantly to the systematization of syllogistic logic and created new extensional and intensional calculi – thereby in fact articulating for the first time the modern concept of formalization (cf. Dascal 1978). On the other, he soon realized the insufficiency of traditional logic for his purposes, and looked

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Leibniz’s appreciation for Joachim Jungius, as well as the latter’s influence upon the genesis and development of Leibniz’s logical thought, are generally acknowledged, but scarcely studied in detail (see, however, Kangro 1969). It can be conjectured that Jungius’s empiricist ideas regarding natural science also influenced Leibniz. In a 1679 letter to Christian Philip, recalling the conversation they had in Hamburg, Leibniz linked his criticism of Cartesian mechanics with Jungius’s views, whom he credits with a better understanding of “the general analysis of concepts” than Descartes (A II 1 495). The same link is established in Chapter 14, where Leibniz argues that, if Jungius’s work had been better known, the reform of the sciences would have gone well beyond Descartes. Although it is difficucult to assess the hypothesis of a direct influence of Jungius’s physics upon Leibniz, the influence of his logic and epistemology is beyond doubt. Leibniz was familiar with the first edition (1638) of the Logica Hamburgensis, which he quotes in the above mentioned letter to J. Thomasius, as well as with the second one (1681), a copy of which he owned and kept in his private library. His abundant annotations on this and other works of Jungius are now available (A VI 4 1048-1090). On Jungius’s logic, see Scholz (1931) and Ashwort (1967). On the place of logic in Jungius’s and Leibniz’s systems, see Schupp (1980). For further references to Jungius, see Chapter 31. 14 Many recent studies address the logical difficulties posed by relations for Leibniz. Most of them seek to contest or at least to amend the standard account, due to Russell, according to which Leibniz had reduced all relational predicates to monadic ones. Among the most influential of these studies, mentioned in chronological order: Parkinson (1965), Rescher (1967), Hintikka (1972), Ishiguro (1972), Mates (1984), Mugnai (1992). For an assessment of the problem and its interpretations, see Racionero (1999).

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probabilities.15 This encounter was extremely influential in the development of Leibniz’s own studies in the field of probabilities (Chapter 13). With a rigorous treatment of probabilities, Leibniz expected to overcome the limitations of the purely deductive method of solving controversies. The latter could only be applied to matters subjected to strict necessity – the realm of “eternal truths”. With the addition of a calculus of probabilities, the way would be paved for treating disputes about contingent or factual matters with comparable rigor.16 This would permit the application of the art of controversies to a much wider variety of domains. The thus extended Characteristica, Leibniz boasts, “will give us the means to calculate in all matters as in arithmetic, in order to determine either certitude, when there are enough data for it, or at least the degrees of probability” (To JeanFrédéric, April 1679; A II 1 557). In this spirit, Leibniz undertook to formalize probabilities through the study of various types of games. Most of the studies about Leibniz’s work on probabilities focus on its formal-mathematical aspect, overlooking the fact that it involved other aspects as well – those for which the name ‘dialectical’ is appropriate. Couturat himself observed that the restriction of Leibniz’s views on probability to their mathematical aspects was inaccurate. “For the mathematicians – he says – the theory of probabilities was nothing but an occasion to formulate and solve purely mathematical problems, whereas for Leibniz, it was really a part of logic” (Couturat 1901: 248-249). He further identified this “part of logic” with “the true Topics or Dialectics” (ibid.). And indeed, this is the constant point of view held by Leibniz, from his earliest writings such as the Nova Methodus (1667) and Chapter 15 (1679), to the more mature texts such as Chapter 37 (1697) and Chapter 9E (1711). As far 15

16

Leibniz became acquainted with Pascal’s thought through Arnauld, who put him in contact with the Jansenist circles. He had shown interest in Pascal since the early 70’s, with the publication of Pascal’s Pensées (To Jean-Frédéric, 21 May, 1671; A II 1 112). Thanks to des Billettes and to the Perrier family, Leibniz consulted Pascal’s manuscripts on geometry, where – as he admitted many years later (GM V 399) – he found the “light beam” that led him to the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus. As late as December 1696, Leibniz asks des Billettes about the fate of these manuscripts, but the latter is unable to inform him (GP VII 464). He also studied Pascal’s manuscripts on probabilities, this time through Nicole and Pascal’s sisters, Mmes de Saint-Amour and de Roannez. Pascal had proposed solutions to the problems the Chevalier de Meré had submitted to Huygens, Fermat and himself (GP IV 570). Apparently, it is from these solutions that Leibniz obtained all the information he needed for establishing the foundations of his own calculus of probabilities, as developed in Chapter 13, which in fact consists in a generalization of Pascal’s theorems. “Thus, the form of disputation has been shown to be necessary in necessary matters, where eternal truths occur, but not in contingent matters where the most probable must be chosen” (Chapter 38).

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17

The nature and use of probabilities was also a controversial issue in theology, where “probabilists” and “canonists” maintained a long controversy on this subject. See Chapter 5, note i. Leibniz studied and annotated this literature, as shown by his highlighting passages such as the passage of Baronius’s Manuductio, where four degrees of probability are distinguished (A VI 4 C 2006).

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The logic employed by jurists to estimate the value of different kinds of presumptions is a recurrent theme in Leibniz’s correspondence with the Bernouilli brothers about the calculus of probabilities. As against the purely mathematical treatment the latter proposed for the Ars conjectandi, Leibniz insists on the relevance of the juridical and political approach: “I have also reflected on these matters in the past, especially as they are used in jurisprudence and politics; I call it the doctrine of the degrees of probability” (To Jacques Bernouilli, 5 March 1697; GM III 377). In another letter, he lists different kinds of proof that can be extracted from juridical logic in order to estimate probabilities: “Since my youth I dealt with this kind of argument when I first wrote about law, discussing conjectures, indications, presumptions and incomplete, semi-complete, complete, and similar degrees of proof. In fact, no one has elaborated this kind of argument better than the jurists” (To Jean Bernouilli, 6 June 1710; GM III 850). A similar list of kinds of proof can be found in Chapter 5 and in NE (4.16.5). On the sources of this hierarchy of proofs in the tradition of penal law, see Chapter 36, note z. 19 Jurists are not the only ones who rely on presumptions. For example – as Leibniz points out (Chapter 10) – a physician engaged in diagnosis employs the same kind of logic in his reasoning (see also NE 4.16.9).

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As far as we know, the first Leibniz scholar to call attention to the centrality of the concept of presumption in Leibniz’s ars disputandi was the late Ezequiel de Olaso (1975, 1990). The importance of hermeneutics in those domains (e.g., theology, jurisprudence) where historical knowledge is required is emphasized by Leibniz in Chapter 37.

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Leibniz never gives a complete list of the dialectical and rhetorical means that can be used in the ars inveniendi. His lists of such means vary in his different formulations of this art. They include, among others, the “art of interrogating”, i.e., of eliciting testimony and checking one testimony against another (Chapter 38); the “art of experimenting”, which is nothing but the art of interrogating nature (GP VII 126); the “art of conjecturing” or of forming hypotheses (C 174); the “art of deciphering” cryptograms as well as any proposition comprising fragmentary data; and the “art of guessing” the meaning of enigmas, which consists in the ability to ask intelligent questions, combining the useful data and excluding the wrong and superfluous ones (ibid; see also C 162). All these “arts” are accompanied by an arsenal of formal or quasi-formal heuristics, appropriate for different purposes (cf. Chapters 9, 12, 16), which Leibniz on one occasion subsumes under what he calls ars formularia (Chapter 15). The plurality and openness of the means that constitute the network-like structure of the ars inveniendi suggests that Leibniz believes that only a plurality of methods and a rich and multiply accessible data-base can serve as a satisfactory tool for discovery. For, not only truth can be found in a variety of ways, but it can also be approximated, estimated, partially found, etc. – for all of which purposes “the best method is to make as many comparisons as one can” (A VI 4 961).

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Leibniz’s typology further excludes from the domain of “controversies” the “way of dispute or discussion”, where the contenders proceed in a completely disorderly way, employing at will arguments, invectives, evasion, and all sorts of stratagems. In this kind of clashes, the objections and proposals of the adversary are not subjected to serious scrutiny, and there is no concern for, nor possibility of advancing towards a solution based on reasons. The dispute resembles the Hobbesian pre-contractual war of all against all, where nobody can win – certainly not rationally. Here, the parallel with war lies at the procedural level: “there are no rules that disputants are obliged to follow rigorously” (Chapter 27). The need of methods for avoiding the “vices” that transform controversies into disputes was one of the first theoretical concerns of the young Leibniz in this matter (Chapter 1). Reasons, as well as orderly procedure, are no doubt present in another of the “ways” Leibniz considers as not deserving the title “controversy”. This is the “way of accommodation” (la voie de l’accommodement), which “leads to a blind alley” (Chapter 27). It leads to a blind alley because its purpose is merely devising an ad hoc means of neutralizing the opposition between the contenders. Therefore, instead of addressing the deep reasons underlying the conflict, the solutions this way proposes are short-lived because they remain at a rather superficial level. The reasons used in such an approach are typical of the instrumental use of reason, where the ultimate ends (Max Weber’s Zweckrationalität) are not under discussion. In warfare, the “way of accommodation” is comparable to the establishment of occasional pacts, not based on the real, long-term strategical interests of the partners. Sometimes, the desire for compromise may lead to what Leibniz calls “the way of condescending” (la voie de la condescendence), where a contender makes concessions to the demands of the opponent, forgetting that there are points “in which concessions are impossible” (ibid.). Condescending in fact amounts to yielding to the opponent without seriously considering the implications of this act. In this respect, it differs

pending the progress of the negotiations. Bossuet (June/October 1693) rejects altogether Leibniz’s definition of the issue, arguing that infallibility is not a matter of fact, so that the only admissible starting point for the Catholics is that “the church cannot be mistaken”. Consequently, “there is no hope for a reunification if one wishes to suppose that the decisions on matters of faith of the Council of Trent may remain suspended” (FC I 501). One can see that, while Leibniz was correct theoretically by rejecting the “way of authority” as blocking a true discussion of the issues (i.e., a true “controversy”), he failed in practice, for he should have known that the Catholics would not give up the prerogatives granted them by the principle of authority as a basis for the negotiations. For an analysis of the Leibniz-Bossuet controversy, see Frémont (Forthcoming).

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The historical method could be generalized in terms of the principle that a dispute could be solved if we could reconstruct the shared past of the present contenders, so as to find out exactly the historical point where divergence arose. We could then eliminate the divergence by going back to the point where agreement prevailed. Leibniz’s critique has in view not so much the fallibility of historical knowledge as the lack of available methods capable of grounding it. If such methods were available, they would certainly permit to establish the truth of revealed religion, for “it is grounded upon facts of ancient history” (To Nicaise, 30 April 1697; GP II 57). But this would require much more time than what one could dispose of in the pressing problem of the reunification of the Christian churches. Another difficulty Leibniz discerned in the application of the historical method to controversies was that, even if it were secure, the formulations yielded by it would always be poorer in content than those required for the suppression of divergences, because they would be unable to capture the additional contents highlighted by these divergences.27 Furthermore, the use of the historical method in a situation of controversy could not ensure that the reconstruction of the past by the present contenders would be agreed upon. The present dispute is rather likely to project itself onto the past. That is to say, the “historical” reasons adduced run the risk of being not “real” reasons, but rather merely apparent or “ideological” ones.28 In order to avoid this, the “historical method” would have to become a “critical” one, as we have seen. In particular, it would have to be coupled with a rigorous hermeneutic methodology that would provide the “controls” necessary to avoid fanciful interpretations of the past.29 the church in standing by error and its desire to repress the dissidents fiercely (see Calov’s Systema locorum theologicorum, 1655-1677). 27 To Seckendorff (1683; A II 1 533-534), where he again mentions Huet. 28 Leibniz was familiar with – and also somewhat guilty of – such obstinate “misunderstandings” where historical interpretations often became ideological confrontations. The correspondence with Bossuet, for instance, displays numerous examples of this kind of abuse of history. In his letter of 1691, Leibniz had made use of the case of the Bohemian Utraquists, whom the church had admitted as true Catholics, in spite of the fact that they did not follow the resolutions of the Council of Konstanz about the administration of the sacraments of the Eucharist (FC I 344). But Bossuet rejected this example as a precedent that fits the situation of the Protestants vis-à-vis the Council of Trent, making use of many other historical references (FC I 495). What is instructive in this case is the fact that both Leibniz and Bossuet display a remarkable historical erudition, which does not lead them, however, to doctrinal agreement. 29 As the historian of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Leibniz was naturally interested in the problem of transforming this discipline into a science. He may be rightly considered one of the founders of modern historical methodology. He viewed “history”, conceived in a broad sense, as one of the central tools for the Encyclopedia, which

xlii

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On the basis of what controversy is not, we may now try to delineate its leibnizian identi-kit. A controversy is an orderly (rather than random) debate where reasons (rather than power) are the decisive tools. These reasons should address the deep and general (rather than superficial and ad hoc) issues; they should consider seriously (rather than condescendingly) the opponent’s views; and they should be based on strict methodological control (rather than on ideologically-prone free interpretation). In spite of this emphasis on the role of reasons, one should not forget the initial parallel with war. Contenders engage in a controversy because they have a reasonable hope to win. Therefore, the “serious aim” of a contest of this sort – just as in other warlike games – is to put an end to the contest (Chapter 7; see also Chapter 1). Controversy’s prize, unlike in other warlike games, is the persuasion “either of the adversary himself or else of some other listener” and “a full victory is the one that subjugates declared enemies also in their minds”, by the force of reasons alone (ibid.). Such reasons, however, are always contextually given, plural, and motivated. “Thus, in order to understand in depth how controversies can arise … we must take into account the person of the contestants, the contest’s prize, the hope of success according to the laws of competing, and finally the reasons used in the contest” (ibid.); we should not overlook either the situation in which the controversy takes place (Chapter 16H). It is the need to take into should contain “the general inventory of our public treasure”. As such it would include a historia rerum (containing all the observations already performed about physical, psychological and social facts) as well as a historia locorum et temporum, comprising geography and history in the usual sense (De ratione perficiendi Encyclopaediam Alstedii; D V 183; cf. Couturat 1901: 158, 570-571). The methods of these two “histories”, natural and civil (Historia universalis, id est tam naturalis quam civilis, K I 51), are essentially analogous, for in both cases one has to establish the reliable data from which one can go on to discover general truths (C 524). Their difference lies in the different types of observation involved in each. In history, the crucial point is how to determine the reliability of the various kinds of “testimony”. Hence his insistence on the combination between history and criticism and on the need of a comparative method, as mentioned above. The “art of criticism”, he says, consists in “the examination and use of the ancient monuments” (To Nicaise, 1697; GP II 567). This must be done through a comparative approach applied to at least three levels or domains of historical research: to the ‘archaeological’ domain, where the task is to copy and examine all kinds of documents (letters, diplomas, seals, etc.) or monuments (ruins, clothes, habits, etc.); to the “philological” domain, where the main topic of research is the etymological and comparative study of languages; and to the “hermeneutic” domain, where the objective is to clarify the meaning of the texts or obscure expressions through its comparison with other similar texts or expressions (cf. his correspondence with Koch on some Greek philosophers; GP VII 469-481). Leibniz’s contributions to all three domains were considerable. See Davillé (1909), Conze (1951), Spitz (1952), Racionero (1991), and De Mauro and Formigari (1990).

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account so many variables that explains why the art of controversies cannot be reduced to a narrow conception of logic. As far as we know, no single leibnizian text expounds the various components of this art. We can find, however, scattered in the many writings here collected, written in virtually all the periods of his life, elements of this art that correspond to the components of the above definition. At what might be called the tactical level, we find a series of methods designed both to avoid the negative properties and to promote the positive ones. In the earliest systematic text in our collection – significantly called “Vices of a mingled dispute” (Chapter 1) – Leibniz classifies the causes and types of disorder and confusion that affect controversies. The avoidance of such causes not only prevents controversies to lapse into noncontroversies; it is coupled with positive suggestions as to the forms of organization and conduct of a controversy. The capital importance of the order of the arguments in a controversy leads Leibniz to propose various ways of conceiving of and preserving ‘form’ in a controversy. ‘Form’, referring to controversies, is sometimes conceived by Leibniz as a reduction to a symbolic language, the Characteristica Universalis, which will allow then the solution of the controversy by mere calculation (Chapters 14, 21). It may also merely mean the observation of an “art of disputing” (Kunst aus zu disputieren, Chapter 16I), i.e., the ‘syntactic’ structure of a dispute – a procedure that should at least assure its ‘completion’ in the sense that all arguments and counter-arguments presented by the contenders are put in their proper place and thus taken into account. It may rather refer to the nature of the arguments presented, with a view to ensuring their relevance to the step in the debate in which they are presented, and avoiding undue interference not only in the procedure but also in the content of other, independent arguments (Chapter 9A). And this is only a sample of the forms in which ‘form’ – whose absence is, as stated in the opening sentence of Chapter 1, the major vice of a controversy – is interpreted by Leibniz, and illustrated in many other chapters. 7 ', '7 + ..& 0'0 '

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The image of a “balance of reason” is central in Leibniz’s art of controversies, and appears, explicitly or implicitly, in many of the chapters of this book. It is associated with the idea of a rationality that, in the absence of deductive certainty, contents itself with ‘inclining’ reasons. See Dascal (2001, 2003b, 2004a, 2005). In fact, the “suspension” tactic had been designed by Rojas y Spínola. The bishop’s idea was to obtain a provisional reunification, setting aside difficult – but not essential – issues of a theological nature, until the return of a climate of confidence would permit their calm discussion within a reunited church. Leibniz had been favorable to this tactic, both in the negotiations between Protestants and Catholics and between the Lutherans and the Reformed. But he was aware of the difficulty in establishing an agreed upon list of issues that could be set aside. While Rojas y Spínola had in mind problems such as the Virgin’s conception, the Protestants wanted to include in the list the problem of papal infallibility – which the Catholics obviously were not prepared to “suspend” even provisionally (cf. the echoes of these debates, not at all hypothetical in Chapter 27).

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disapproved by anyone; second, it would lead to the end, furnishing a sure means to arrive at a conclusion”. Leibniz’s proposal in fact grants the notion of moderation a new tactical role. Whereas, as a component of tolerance, it was a precondition for a rational debate to take place, here it acquires the further role of endowing the controversy with a – so to speak – “rational dynamics”. Leibniz clearly discerns this dual role of moderation: “… there is nothing that makes a dispute more commendable than the moderation of the disputants; well, I claim that this moderation will be manifest here in a quite special and indisputable way”. Such a way consists in providing a structure for the debate such that it will force the contenders to be moderate. The central piece of this structure is the active participation of a rapporteur (expounder), whose function – unlike that of the judex controversiarum of Leibniz’s earlier writings – is not that of a judge nor of a conciliator. His function is to maintain the order of the debate and, especially, to reformulate and summarize the contenders’ positions and arguments so that the whole “economy of the issue” emerges unmistakably. The rapporteur thus functions as “a palpable sign of moderation and equity”. The figure of the rapporteur represents in fact a procedure intended to permit the comparison of the opposed positions in a controversy regarding the points they share and those where they actually diverge. This is achieved through a process of reformulation, analysis, and synthesis, which gradually modifies the contenders’ perspectives on the issues under dispute. The general principle of this change of perspectives is the rule “Put yourself in the place of the other!”, whose epistemic import is pointed out by Leibniz: “one has to think calmly, after having placed oneself in the place of the other, because this provides considerations that are appropriate to know better the consequences of what oneself does” (Chapter 17). In this way one would be less prone to commit the mistakes that all too often occur in controversies: “One sticks to personal matters, to the readings and considerations that are favorable to a certain party; one does not pay attention to what the opposed party puts forth; and through these and a thousand other maneuvers one employs unintentionally and unawares, one manages to mislead oneself or at least to change, converting or perverting oneself according to what one has met” (NE 2.21.22; A VI 6 182).32 The importance Leibniz attributed to this rule for the proper conduct of controversies is manifest in the fact that, in the heat of the irenic 32

In addition to its tactical and strategic role in the conduct of controversies, the principle “Put yourself in the place of the other!” has not only an epistemological use, but is a fundamental principle of interpretation, as well as an ethico-political use in Leibniz (cf. Dascal 1993, 1995; Naert 1964; Racionero 1995).

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He employs this expression in the synopsis through which he sums up the themes treated by G. Burnet in An Exposition of the thirty nine Articles of the Church of England (Chapter 40). Leibniz’s formula distinguishes between two ways of resolving controversies or of conciliation: per consensum and per tolerantiam.

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