Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Cross-disciplinary Perspective 9789048553921

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Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic

Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic A Cross-disciplinary Perspective

Edited by Hatem N. Akil and Simone Maddanu

Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: Abed Alkadiri, Hommage to Alwasiti (2014). Image copyright and courtesy of the artist. Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout isbn 978 94 6372 745 7 e-isbn 978 90 4855 392 1 doi 10.5117/9789463727457 nur 740 © The authors / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2022 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book. Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is advised to contact the publisher.



Table of Contents

Preface9 1. Connecting Modernities

A Global Update Simone Maddanu and Hatem N. Akil

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Part I Modernity as We Know It Narratives of Modernity across the Disciplines 2. Technology and the Texture of Modernity

37

3. Math and Modernity: Critical Reflections

61

4. Stranded Modernity

81

Alessandro Mongili

Lucio Cadeddu

Post-war Hiroshima as Discursive Battlefield Daishiro Nomiya

5. The (In)Compatibility of Islam with Modernity

105

6. The Missing Body

131

(Mis)Understanding of Secularity/Secularism in the Arab and Islamicate Worlds Housamedden Darwish

Figurative Representations in Islamic Iconography Hatem N. Akil

Part II Modernity under Fire Critiques, Challenges, and Revisions 7. Criticism of “Colonial Modernity” through Kurdish Decolonial Approaches Engin Sustam

159

8. Conflicting Modernities: Militarization and Islands

187

9. Project Modernity: From Anti-colonialism to Decolonization

207

Aide Esu and Simone Maddanu

Shumaila Fatima and David Jacobson

Part III In the Shadow of the Pandemic 10. Modernity and Decision-Making for Global Challenges

231

11. Public Health Confronts Modernity in the Shadow of the Pandemic

257

12. Human Identity and COVID-19

277

Elizabeth G. Dobbins

Richard Cooper

Space and Time in the Post-modern Era Rachid Id Yassine and Beatriz Mesa

Part IV Imagining New Global Frameworks Democracy and Modernity-to-Come 13. Environmentalism: A Challenge to Modernity

297

14. The Cognitive Immune System

321

15. Representative Democracy as Kitsch, and Artificial Intelligence’sPromise of Emancipation

349

16. Subjectivation, Modernity, and Hypermodernity

371

Antimo Luigi Farro

The Mind’s Ability to Dispel Pathological Beliefs Barry Mauer

Marius C. Silaghi

Alain Touraine

17. Toward a New Global?

Hatem N. Akil and Simone Maddanu

387

Index395

Preface This book is the product of years of a global conversation across many disciplines and many time zones between the editors and the contributors about the meaning of modernity today and the crises we all face in the form of globalization, climate crisis, technological advancement, populism, and now a global pandemic. We wanted to understand how scholars who work in different parts of the world and are engaged in disparate areas of research such as sociology, mathematics, philosophy, medicine, political science, artificial intelligence, visual theory, literary theory, etc., would respond to a call to share their disciplinary perspectives on the understanding and challenges of modernity today, and – most importantly – the opportunities and the alternatives they would propose. The following pages contain the results of these conversations. One of the unintended consequences of conducting a conversation across multiple disciplines, multiple languages, and multiple geographies is that one begins to realize the immensity of the methodological and linguistic disjunctions which still significantly demarcate our disciplines. As editors, we elected to respect the disciplinary and linguistic diversity of our contributors at the expense of consistency and conformity. We wish also and most of all to offer our deepest thanks and gratitude to our contributors for their hard work and inspired contributions. In addition, we want to recognize the contributions of all those who supported our project, directly or indirectly, particularly colleagues and friends whom we met all around the world since the beginning of this book journey in the summer of 2018 in Beijing and then in Orlando, Florida. We owe to them the essential spirit, inspiration, and curiosity that were necessary to achieve this work. In alphabetic order, we thank Debbie Barr, Patrick Blythe, Elizabeth Deans, David DiQuattro, Roger Downey, Michael Flaherty, Fayeza Hasanat, Baboucar Jobe, Louise Kaine, Michael Mendoza, Marwan Shaban, Debra Socci, Lisa Valentino, Adrienne Vivian, and Han Wen. The editors

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_pre

1.

Connecting Modernities A Global Update Simone Maddanu and Hatem N. Akil Abstract Editors’ introductory chapter delineates common threads among the volume’s cross-disciplinary contributions and connects these to the history of research on modernity as well as the most compelling issues confronting us today. The introduction discusses how the pandemic carries on the possibility (threat?) of a tabula rasa condition, a civilizational detour based on a foundation of global awareness of nature and society. The authors support the need for global problem-solving strategies, new global ethics, and a global resource management paradigm solidly cognizant of the commons and redistribution. The introduction explores the main hiatuses in today’s modernity and provides an update to the necessary assertion of a global modernity in the midst of political, ecological, and health crises. Keywords: connected modernities; pandemic COVID-19; global modernity; commons; social movements

The use terms and concepts like modernity, modernism, and modernization is a leitmotif and common denominator of various disciplines. However, modernity, modernism, and modernization are also controversial concepts that range from the theoretical to the empirical. Resurging in the last decades in the light of globalization, the climate crisis, technological advancement, and populism, the questioning of modernity begins to couple with questions of our present time and plans for the future. When and how did we start being modern? One may note that the attribution of specific characteristics of modernity traces back to a fundamental switch from one epoch to another: the dissociation with tradition; the

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch01

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adoption of secularism and religious disenchantment; the use of the scientific method as the predominant paradigm (as if never changing); the acceptance of the utter dominance of reason, rationality, and positivism; the emergence of the nation state; the assertion of universal human rights and universal values – and so on. Art, literature, fashion, mores, and hygiene concerns (the new manners as described by Norbert Elias, 1969) all become part of the rhetoric of modernity, leading to a self-celebratory promise of a new civilization. Since the 70s, the resurgence of modernity studies started to occupy the framework of a “post-” condition. French philosophers and sociologists such as Lyotard, Bell, and Touraine have interrogated the features of a fundamental change from an industrial society to a programmed or communication society (Touraine 1971 [1969]; Castells 1996, 1977) in which identities and information appear to be more emphasized than the classic conflicts surrounding labor issues and control of the means of production (Touraine 1977 [1973]). Social science has for too long delineated modernity as a European discovery, thus delivering a modernity that is uniquely Western (White 1980; Goody 2006; Mignolo 2000, 2007). Since the 70s, disenchantment with the ideas of Progress and Reason as vectors of social evolution (Habermas 1980; Touraine 1995 [1992]) have become pivotal to the critique of modernity along with general doubts about “Grand Narratives” (Lyotard 1984 [1979]). Although the focus of some scholars has been on analyzing a radicalized modernity, hyper- rather than post- (Giddens 1990), characterized by risk and reflexivity (ibid.; Beck 1992), the social sciences have more recently come to reconsider or refute modernity as a unique condition (Goody 2006). Postcolonial studies in particular have successfully exposed modernity’s dominant narratives – including the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, the nation state, and the processes of secularization – by reversing their crystallized ideas of uniqueness, exposing them as myths (Bhambra 2007). By theorizing multiple modernities (Göle 1996, 2000) and alternative modernities, Eisenstadt (2003) points out the need to consider contemporary interpretations of modernity and explore the connections between modernization and social and historical processes across the world. Global studies have likewise ushered in different perspectives based on connected history (Chakrabarty 2000) and connected sociology (Bhambra 2014). If one of the main points of critiquing modernity is the failure of the coupling Progress/Modernity vis-à-vis the environment, it is also undeniable that collective actions are responding to ecological challenges using and

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asserting the role of science and in doing so reaffirming modernity. At the same time, we are witnessing new approaches to the understanding of modernity that easily challenge and bewilder established certitudes about what we consider modern: the rise of religious fundamentalism, the indefatigability of tradition, the global diffusion of sociotechnical systems and their connections to the issues of global migrations and refugees, the prevalence of global conflicts and violence, the alarms over a certain “clash of civilizations,” the persistence of socio-economic inequities, the subversive relationships between scientific advancements and the environment (think fracking and Monsanto), between pharmaceuticals and wellness (Davis et al. 2014), and between social media and social connectivity (Turkle 2011; Castells 2012). The global consequences of this modernity, as Zigmund Bauman might argue (Bauman 1998), are valid issues for reconsidering our idea of progress so as to embrace the necessary and urgent changes that humanity needs right now. How can one def ine modernity today? Now that we’re f irmly in the twenty-first century and in the shadow of an age of globalization – and in the throes of a pandemic – what defines modernity? Is a definition possible, or even necessary? Bruno Latour’s question “are we really modern?” (1993) might stimulate a radical confutation of modernity and science. But what then is modernity after all? The global diffusion of sociotechnical systems of communication, including artificial intelligence (AI) with regard to democracy, is accompanied by a decline of classic institutions. By addressing the new challenge of democracy – and the role of “subjectivation” in affirming universal rights – Alain Touraine has asserted a renewed defense of modernity. As for the common use of the term modern, we believe that a global update would require a rapid acknowledgement of its practical use. If our approach is interdisciplinary, then we cannot exclude the phenomenology of modern and its meanings. Besides, a reflexive society cannot exclude the implication of the entanglement between philosophy, sociology, and the self-evident experiences of individuals and groups. Commonly, the terms modern and modernity have been used in contradictory ways that at times seem to confuse certain philosophical and historical interpretations. The term modernity itself carries an intractable burden in its Eurocentric semantics and colonial heritage. When students are asked about what modern and modernity mean to them, their answers reveal a partial but necessary conception of the word. Modern and modernity, as they are used and imagined in our everyday life, are associated with the idea of newness, transformation, and a continuous movement forward. Materially

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speaking, fashion, popular tastes, networked communication, AI, and applied technology also encompass the everyday sense of the term modernity. But this everyday usage also incorporates an imaginary of a better future, a constantly updated movement towards an unidentifiable something new. Among the connected generation, when the term modern is used in ordinary language today regardless of country, language, or culture, it seems to refer to the same universally-adopted meaning. Even if the specific referent of what is considered modern can vary (such as in fashion, taste, sense of style, and use of technology), ultimately the same signification is attached to the word in a way that refers to an imaginary of “novelty,” “innovation,” “transformation,” and being “unprecedented.” This simplistic and clichéd use of the term modernity cannot be brushed aside, though, as trivial and irrelevant in a holistic understanding of modernity today. Quite the opposite. Our argument here invites a more inclusive interpretation of modernity that is cognizant of different epistemological frameworks beyond just academic disciplinary debates. In this sense, Georg Simmel’s observation about fashion in his The Philosophy of Money connects with the modern and modernity as a constant dynamic flow that is both cultural and consumable. In a way, fashion trends become markers of a modern status that is adopted by social groups causing dynamic flows from one social group to another. We live in the modern. The modern penetrates all that we encounter, regardless of cultural differences, traditions, or political perspectives. Our connected world recognizes a form of modernity that applies to everybody at the same time, including religious or cultural communities, no matter how isolated they may be considered. In that sense, we can be modern by either producing modernity or by absorbing it – an idea reminiscent of Nilüfer Göle’s conceptualization of contact zones and their subsequent interpenetration (Göle 2015). The common intuition of the term modern evidences a transnational and transcultural recognition of its globality. Modernity might be seen as a decentralized process that can be accessed from anywhere, by anyone. It can be triggered, processed, and/or produced by random actors from anywhere – in Japan or China, Syria, or Eastern Europe, in the Global South or Australia. The ubiquitous nature of modernity can only be interrupted by failures in processes of communication and translation. This book aims to promote decentered and cross-disciplinary perspectives, a potentially multipositional stance that would help us in grasping and grappling with the tensions, contradictions, and ambiguities that

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characterize modernity at present. The book goes beyond theory by applying specific empirical and case-based research approaches in each contribution. The ultimate purpose of this work is to bring together diverse practical meanings of modernity, modernism, and modernization not as a single voice but a polyphony. As such, the reader, already under a modern condition that is ever changing, will find new tools/methodologies for understanding contemporary ethics, conflicts, religion, bureaucracy, literature, technology, science, and the environment. This project started when the “normal” world was characterized by rising forms of populism around the world, when skepticism about science and the political support in which it is cushioned became rampant, conspiracy theories proliferated on social media, and new forms of direct democracy were attempted through online platforms. As we write this, we are still witnessing the same phenomena. In the midst of the pandemic of the twenty-f irst century, we are still facing instability, societal fractures, and the affirmation of new modes of communication. Systemic global powers still dominate people’s everyday lives, benef iting from weak and underprepared local, national, regional, and global political institutions. We might identify these powers in (1) f inancial flows, (2) the allocation of investments on a global scale, and (3) technoscientif ic models as experienced in the fields of medicine and foodstuffs (Farro and Maddanu 2020). At the same time, other alternatives are gaining increasing recognition from civil society: from the common goods (Olstrom 2001; Harvey 2012) to sovereignty, from new environmental activism to pro-migrant movements, and so on. New superpowers like China or India have emerged, challenging Western dominance without introducing their own original model, but just playing in a more interdependent economy dominated by f inancial capitals that have brought new uncertainties among individuals, precariousness, and an eventual weakening of the fundamental basis of democracy. However, innovation and cultural trends can rise in different places in the world. Today, the global def ines a multiplicity of cultural practices (rational and spiritual), fashions and manners that are sedimenting a process of global “interpenetration” (to use Nilüfer Göle’s concept) and provincializing a Eurocentric modernization process (Chakrabarty 2000). Modernity itself lies in the making of a global hybridization of meaning and practices that could otherwise be def ined as disjunctive cultural f lows (Appadurai 1990, 1998). The COVID-19 pandemic and its widespread scope can be seen as an ultimate testbench of a global modernity.

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Pandemic and the Institution On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic. Its Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said, Pandemic is not a word to use lightly or carelessly. It is a word that, if misused, can cause unreasonable fear, or unjustified acceptance that the fight is over, leading to unnecessary suffering and death. Describing the situation as a pandemic does not change WHO’s assessment of the threat posed by this virus. It doesn’t change what WHO is doing, and it doesn’t change what countries should do. We have never before seen a pandemic sparked by a coronavirus. This is the first pandemic caused by a coronavirus. And we have never before seen a pandemic that can be controlled, at the same time.1

Epidemics throughout history have shown the connectedness of the human condition. The Black Death (1346–53) spread around the world by trade routes and travelers – from east to west, through the Silk Road and the Golden Horde, from port to port in the Mediterranean – leading to extraordinary social changes in different sectors, such as the economy, banking systems, medical knowledge and practice (Deming 2012), religious beliefs,2 women’s role, and worker opportunities.3 The very scope of that pandemic – including its high death rate and consequent population reduction (an estimated one-third of the European population died) – affected human relations, mentalities, and beliefs and altered social structures and roles (Gottfried 1 WHO Director-General 2020. 2 Apocalyptic and fatalist religious approaches made it harder for doctors and medical practitioners to prevent further spread of such epidemics. For instance, flagellism in Europe (Gottfried 1983, 63–69; Deming 2012, 17) or the fatalist acceptance of God-Will in the Islamic world (Gottfried, 74; Byrne 2006, 261–64). 3 Large demographic reductions caused by the plague in Europe, and especially in Italy, led to new labor relations, which resulted in more opportunities and better worker conditions. As noted by Robert Gottfried, “Any lord who hoped to keep his workers had to offer them better terms of tenure than they had had before the Black Death. By the 1360s, this had resulted in much lower rents in most of western Europe. This development was followed by the commutation of traditional labor and boon services, that is, the substitution of cash payments for old labor services. Then, in the course of the fifteenth century, most of the other labor services and many of the banalities were eliminated, replaced by money rates and long-term leases. In effect, while the lords still owned the land or held it of a higher lord, they did so with hired labor rather than unfree peasants holding on customary tenure” (Gottfried 1983, 118).

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1983; Byrne 2006; Cantor 2001). Even if one is to argue that exceptional epidemics, like the Black Death, were not the direct cause of all major societal changes at the time, there is no doubt that they certainly contributed to and accelerated many of those changes. Mentality and everyday life behaviors were obviously affected: according to Deming, the “dire circumstances reinforced cynicism, skepticism, and the pursuit of self-interest” (2012, 10), as a sort of fatalist mors tua vita mea. Although not the result of planned or pragmatic institutional reform, several fundamental societal changes were a posteriori effects or related outcomes of the pandemic, crystalizing new social practices including social manners and hygiene.4 Neither formal nor informal institutions of any kind were able to plan or configure these changes as a way out of the pandemic in its entirety. Even as public health concerns started to require exceptional powers, scientific failings and public skepticism continued to undermine efficacious solutions to the problem of countering epidemics. Medical practices remained intermingled with religious beliefs in early attempts at tackling epidemics. For instance, the definition of “quarantine” meaning “forty” days (in Italian quaranta) – indicating the time required for purification – was mostly based on language and practices found in Christian scriptures (Snowden 2019, 70). It was only after the appearance of the modern state and its apparatus that we start witnessing the first successful strategic measures to tackle plagues and prepare for their possible future threats: The outline of the antiplague system was established during the early epidemic cycles of the second pandemic, and it then became increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Initially, the weakness of the system was that it was local in scope. The quantum leap that made the system effective and led to success was taken in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the emerging early modern state, which backed the effort with bureaucratic and military power and extended coverage over a larger geographical area than one city alone. (Snowden 2019, 69)

Although large-scale epidemics usually engender terror, skepticism, and superstitions among the population, it is believed that epidemics also eventually lead to the affirmation of the use of reason and increased adoption of the scientific method (Gottfried 1983, 131–35). It could be said that epidemics 4

See Norbert Elias 1969.

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accelerate paradigmatic transition. However, it could not be argued that the dark times of a medieval age suddenly disappeared due to the pandemic or that it delivered the unexpected triumph of Reason. The affirmation of Reason remained contingent upon social acceptance – which was never consistent even at best. On the contrary, in almost every region affected by the plague, the people were reluctant in their acceptance of plague-fighting measures. Authorities’ restrictions of different social activities (stay-at-home quarantines, restrictions on funerals, gatherings, etc.) were challenged, in much the way modern public health measures are challenged, even today in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reactions and resistances to both scientific knowledge and political decisions are not a proof of a total rejection of Reason and the ideals of the Enlightenment. Even in a hypertechnological communications society (Castells 1996) in which we live today, we cannot claim with certainty that we have become a society that celebrates the supremacy of Reason, Science, and Justice. Maybe for the same reasons, we are unable to realize Habermas’s concept of ideal communication that would be capable of a restorative justice in the public sphere. Instead, we continue to witness the cyclical rise and eventual fall of authoritarian and Orwellian figures capable of mystifying reality and making millions of people believe in ready-made conspiracies or anti-scientific theories. The triad of Reason, Science, and Justice does not affirm its ontological universality automatically and per se, but must struggle to be culturally understood and socially legitimated. From the rats to the bats and the pangolins, the effects of urbanization and human mobility, both during the early industrialization and in the post-Fordist megacities, reveal new threats and old sins – in a sense, human ventures and environmental responsibilities.5 On December 31, 2019, Chinese authorities issued a statement to the media reporting a cluster of cases of pneumonia in Wuhan, Hubei province, which were eventually identif ied as a novel coronavirus strain. The discovery of the COVID-19 coronavirus ushered in a vast and unprecedented global reaction. It quickly became evident that the virus was a global problem that required global solutions. Responses all around the world have shown different approaches but common challenges. In January 2020, national authorities in China announced that even though the new coronavirus would be categorized as a Class B infectious disease, they would start 5 At the time we are writing (June 2021), there are still doubts about the cause that originally spread the virus in Wuhan.

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adopting Class A measures.6 Meanwhile, other Asian countries confirmed their f irst cases. Travel restrictions and border closures took place in several countries, such as Mongolia and Russia, followed by others in Europe weeks later. Drastic measures like the lockdown of entire cities and regions were initiated in various countries. Italy which, after facing the biggest outbreak in the world outside of China, declared a national lockdown on March 9, 2020. At that time, China’s public health off icials were received in Italy to share expertise and policies to counter the spread of the virus. Observers were not surprised to see Chinese citizens’ compliance with draconian government-imposed measures to counter the coronavirus epidemic. The Chinese bureaucratic apparatus mobilized securitarian measures implying a “state of exception” (Agamben 2005 [2003], 2009) to rationalize the control of bodies and space. Meanwhile in Italy for the first time ever, the authorities issued total lockdown measures in every city and region in the country. Here too, citizens were overwhelmingly quick to accept these measures in a display of a high level of compliance. The different forms of government as well as the respective cultural inclinations of China and Italy offer a unique opportunity for comparison. At that time, civil liberties took second place to public health in China as well as in Italy. After weeks of public solidarity among the populations under lockdown and support for such “courageous” measures, controversies and new alternative approaches began to gain visibility in public spheres. Throughout the world, a dichotomy emerged between civil liberties (and their economic ramifications) and public health measures.7 New skepticisms, some supported by scientific experts, started to call for reconsideration of restrictive measures (facemask mandates, business closures, restrictions on movement, public gatherings, etc.). Suspicious public reactions to government scientists’ inconsistent responses to COVID-19 threatened to undermine the already weakened public trust in scientific knowledge and the reliability of science. In fact, the gradual and not always consistent discoveries made by scientists about the ways in which coronavirus was being transmitted exposed a certain fragility in the foundations of scientific knowledge. It became increasingly clear that 6 “According to the Infectious Disease Prevention Act of China, the infectious diseases are classified into three types, namely, Classes A, B, and C, which are defined as legal infectious diseases. Legal infectious diseases are infectious diseases whose prevention, control, and treatment are guaranteed by laws.” (Liu et al. 2015). 7 Perhaps the most notorious case is Sweden, whose response model still encounters criticism and support.

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scientific discovery was a process and not a final conclusion. Moreover, public health management requires a form of scientific vulgarization that must be filtered through the logic of the daily news with its often misleading simplifications. As such, the scientist, as the face of public communication, must face the complex demands of balancing scientific ethics with public interest: for example, health officials minimizing the efficacy of facemasks in order to avoid a general rush on buying facemasks that could jeopardize adequate supplies of PPE (personal protective equipment) to the medical community. The seemingly changing and at times contradictory public statements by medical scientists relating to various aspects of the pathology and contagiousness of the coronavirus only serve to illustrate the dynamic nature of science itself as paradigmatically a process more than a fixed truth. On the opposite side of this issue, a self-educating public began to challenge the roles of institutions and the very status of scientific knowledge, exposing another side of the reflexivity of society. These challenges took the form of convulsive communication on alternative news sources and continuous flows of messages through social media. The constant massaging of the scientific communication to appease and appeal to the general public or government officials shows how science, even when operated by scientists, remains a social construct, a continuous adaptation of societal knowledge and expectations – as Bruno Latour would observe. This widening gap between science and its acceptance by society needs to be filled by ethical principles that can ensure the protection of life as fundamental to everything we do. Only a modern public health that combines scientific knowledge with the common good could fulfill this objective. By downplaying the dangers of COVID-19, certain segments of the population have directly challenged the ethical idea of public health. As such, we see groups of people openly opposing different generational interests, invoking individual privileges, and posing public risks. Indeed, statistics show a great divide in COVID-19 mortality and risk factors that are based on age.8 This divide enables certain societal groups to selfishly reject personal sacrifices that are quite necessary for public safety.9 Furthermore, the very 8 About 80 percent of all deaths related to COVID-19 have affected people who are 65 years or older; 60 percent are 75 years or older. For more details, see US CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), National Center for Health Statistics website, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/ vsrr/COVID_weekly/index.htm#AgeAndSex (accessed January 10, 2021). 9 Young people’s massive gatherings, parties, and raves (more or less secret) are registered all around the world, in some cases justified as a necessary way to cope with social isolation and containment measures.

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idea of the importance of public health and the common good is completely negated by a whole theatre of eugenics believers, conspiracy theorists, herd-immunity promoters, and plain old cynics.10 Along with that, concerns about the short-term effects of anti-COVID measures on the economy have repeated the same scenarios we have been dealing with since the beginning of the pandemic, namely environment/health vs. the economy. If these recurring trends reveal anything, it is that they are incapable of changing the status quo. While imagining new modern institutions, it is ironic, or maybe substantial and intrinsic to our crises, that current modern institutions in the Western world are facing an epochal challenge never witnessed since the end of World War II. The rise of conspiracy theories, alternative truths, and fake news and the deepfake are just some of the extremes of a prevalent trend. The perceptual distance between ordinary people and the so-called elite governments and state institutions continues to widen. At a time of accelerated communication and social-networked, even non-political institutions such as science, the media, and education – that is, the academic and intellectual spheres – become subject to discredit and skepticism, leading to an expansion and strengthening of populism. What we view as populism today is different from a traditional, rural, and agrarian populism (Canovan 1981) or from a sense of postcolonial nationalist pride, like what we might witness in Latin America (Germani 1978). Instead, the populism we face today embraces a popular sense of incertitude and instability. Scholars today distinguish left populism (Mouffe 2018; Gerbaudo 2017) from right-wing populism (Fitzi et al. 2019a). In most cases, a common “gut-feeling” takes comfort in authoritarian characters (Stockemer 2019; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018) who promise a return to the old homogeneous body that constituted society (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Farro and Maddanu 2020). Through social media and political leaders, this new populism spreads globally. Places like the Philippines, India, Brazil, the United States, Turkey, Eastern and Western Europe, and so on, all face trends of populism that oppose some principles of globalization, but also manifest an absence or a lack of control of one’s own life in a complex world. Populism builds its popularity on the overwhelming sense of uncertainty and anxiety that lies in a spinning globe. But what has been defined as “popular populism” refers to populism as a narrative, more than a specific political agenda (Farro and Maddanu 2020, 127). It is important to remark that the literature in the social sciences about 10 Among the most extravagant, the alleged correlation between the arrival of the 5G networks and COVID-19; or more simply, that COVID-19 does not exist. See Lewandowsky and Cook, 2020.

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populism has been increasing, considerably in the past few years, making this subject popular in engaging with the current crises of democracy (Fitzi et al. 2019b; Wallace and Smith 2007). Populism is a term that encapsulates the vanishing trust in “the elites” that is closely accompanied by the rise of the extended use of open networks and social media. However, when colossal companies that own communication platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Google, or Amazon began to elect themselves as censors of fake news and eventually rise as guardians of democracy, users started deserting these platforms for new and alternative outlets like Parler, Telegram, and Signal.11 The populist voice challenges social institutions in their certitudes and technical knowledge, including climate change, vaccines, and the use of cancer therapies. These new forms of populism highlight an ever widening gulf between the everyday life of ordinary people and the systemic forces created by neoliberal policies, financial flows, and technoscientific models. In a climate of constant crisis for representative democracy, the axiom “We the People” becomes the harbinger of authoritarian political figures who lead with a rhetoric of fear, hatred, and delusion in the name of the people. It is remarkable to observe that in that matrix, the descriptive “global” is commonly heard in the public sphere as the processing of a hypercommunication flow, inclusive of AI technologies (especially in financial markets), delocalization of the economy, and instability. Thus, these connections – which pair with laissez-faire and lack of political control, meaning states and their institutions – facilitate a pervasive financialization that takes over the total economy of the world. An alternative and more comprehensive sense of the global, then, gets locked into tangled systemic forces associated with today’s financial capitalism, leading to ever widening global inequalities (Piketty 2017, 574–84). Society still seems to be at the service of the economy, rather than the other way around. What we can observe is the detachment of the state and social systems from the workings of the economy itself. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic also expose the question of priorities in society where a false dichotomy brings economic interests to prevail over people’s health. Modern societies face a strain between people’s health and productivity. Whether they are at-risk workers in a highly polluting 11 In the aftermath of the attacks on the capitol in Washington during the election certification, Twitter suspended permanently the US president’s account (January 8, 2021), Facebook banned him until the end of his term (January 7, 2021), while Amazon terminated its services to Parler (January 11, 2021), a Trumper right-wing microblog and social network that was previously banned on both the Apple and Google App stores.

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factory or plant, or the local population surrounding these same areas, the dilemma between economic survival (corporate interests) and individual or environmental health is on the balance.

Connecting Modernities By theorizing multiple modernities and alternative modernities, contributors to this volume point out the need to consider contemporary interpretations of modernity, including religious and secular. Furthermore, they explore the connections between modernization and social and historical processes around the world, including the scope of the colonial endeavor in dominant practices, bureaucratized institutions, and ideologies. Part I – Modernity as We Know It: Narratives of Modernity across the Disciplines Part I of the book describes and situates classic applications and narratives of modernity and modernization in their empirical and ideological extents. Contributors engage with the concept of modernity from the respective coordinates of both their discipline and their geography. This part has been conceived as a descriptive laboratory of analysis of how modernity is transliterated into narratives and thus dominant ideologies, but also attitudes and visual perceptions. Maybe the most eclectic part of this collection, Part I invites scholars in mathematics, sociology of science, history, philosophy, and visual theory to contribute towards a foundation of a new cross-disciplinary corpus. These seemingly disparate and traditionally disconnected narratives could be envisioned as a preliminary opportunity to resituate possible disciplinary implications of the modern within the same intellectual milieu. In “Technology and the Texture of Modernity,” Alessandro Mongili retraces the distinction between traditional and modern technologies as a classical theme in social studies. Through the lens of science, technology, and society studies (STS), the author argues that technologies are not mere artifacts, but also “sociotechnical networks.” He observes that any multiple assemblage operates at a technical level through standardization, and at a human and social level through habits, conventions, and practices. In the vein of the classic scientific and philosophical debates around the observation of nature, truth, reality, and methods, Lucio Cadeddu introduces modern perspectives and narratives in mathematics. “Math and Modernity: Critical Reflections”

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explains the evolution, criticism, and rejection of modern mathematics and abstract mathematics in regard to research and education. In “Stranded Modernity: Post-war Hiroshima as Discursive Battlefield,” Daishiro Nomiya presents the case of Hiroshima in the post-World War II period. From a socio-historical perspective, high modernity considers that the modern nation state created an ultramilitary state that continues even after wartime. In this sense, some scholars think of the peacetime after World War II as a disjuncture. However, the unfolding of Japanese modernity faces opposition in the form of “anti-modern” forces, notably in the controversy about the city memorial in Hiroshima, the Atomic-Bomb Dome. Nomiya notes that in Japan, “Modernity did make progress, but was stranded.” Housamedden Darwish considers the age-old question of Islam and modernity in his chapter “The (In)Compatibility of Islam with Modernity: (Mis)Understanding of Secularity/Secularism in the Arab/Islamicate Worlds.” Darwish lays out the foundation of a theoretical and methodological framework for approaching the concept of secularity/secularism and draws upon the work of leading Arab scholars who are particularly interested in the relationship between secularity and democracy. Darwish proposes the civil-state concept “as a potential deconstructing concept” of the “secular state/religious state” dichotomy. In the “Missing Body: Figurative Representations in Islamic Iconography,” Hatem N. Akil considers the presumed absence of figurative representations in Islamic art which to some critics is yet another indication of Islam’s inability to face and represent reality (accept modernity) – as opposed to the body-centric esthetics of the Renaissance. Akil discovers that, on the contrary, Islamic history in fact overflows with one example after another of representations of sentient life. The connection between Islam’s figurative art (as an indicator of the secular) with abstract and geometric art (as an indicator of the sacred) should not be seen as a contradiction. Indeed, it should be “taken as evidence of a cultural simultaneity that reflects the diversity of cultures, languages, traditions, even theological beliefs that constitute lived Islam, which has always been both religious and secular at the same time.” Part II – Modernity under Fire: Critiques, Challenges, and Revisions Critiques of modernity come from decolonial and sociological approaches that engage with postcolonial studies and modernization theories, exposing modernity’s dominant narratives as forms of social, economic, and cultural control. Global studies likewise ushers in different perspectives based

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on connected history and connected sociology. Responding to ecological challenges, classic and contemporary social movements have asserted the role of science in order to face ecological issues. And by doing so, these movements are reaffirming modernity In Part II, we consider critiques, challenges, and revisions of modernity from the respective vantage points of different disciplines. The contributions collected in this part address modernity and modernization through the lenses of post-coloniality, decoloniality, and alter-modernity. The colonial aspect of modernity is entangled with the logics of bureaucratic institutions, political or military (Esu and Maddanu). The crucial significance of the case studies and essays in this part lies in their dissection of institutions and the structuration of society and its consequences in general. This includes the cultural aspects behind forms of hegemony, dependence, and marginality (Sustam) produced by the coupled modernity-modernization. Furthermore, Part II brings up more proactive criticism against modernization as a narrative of progress and development. A different challenge of what a global process of modernization has engendered also allows for critical reflection on anti-Western political and religious movements. By criticizing modernity as an exclusively-Western invention, these movements engage with a fight against modernity and its principles in order to support a postcolonial agenda (Fatima and Jacobson). Modernity is challenged – not only criticized – as a colonial invention, but also as a fundamental concept that nevertheless, if revised, could produce advancements towards a common good. These revisions might highlight other aspects of modernity that justify its reaffirmation. In Chapter 7, “Criticism of “Colonial Modernity” through the Kurdish Decolonial Approaches,” Engin Sustam invites us to “reread the colonial epistemes of modernity, whether or not focused on the West.” Sustam theorizes the Kurdish political movement in the way it defines a new interpretation of modernity based on the critique of colonialism and global capitalism, calling it democratic modernity. By analyzing the case of the military occupation of Sardinia, Aide Esu and Simone Maddanu posit rhetorics and narratives of modernity and modernization that accompany the settlement of military bases on different islands around the world. In their chapter “Conflicting Modernities: Militarization and Islands,” the authors explore two dimensions of militarization: the economic, on the one hand; and the social, cultural, and ideological dimension, on the other. They describe a conflictual public space between a bureaucratized form of control that includes colonial characteristics, and the local population’s claims for autonomy and an alternative modernity.

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In their chapter “Project Modernity: From Anti-colonialism to Decolonization,,” Shumaila Fatima and David Jacobson explore convergences and differences of three main anti-colonial and postcolonial movements around the world: nationalist, Marxist, and Islamist. In particular, the authors highlight how the role of education and the meaning of history are at the core of anti- or post-colonization processes, as seen in different perspectives and narratives. In some cases, the unfolding of these processes involves resistance and reaction to contemporary civic and political models, but also their embodiment. Part III – In the Shadow of Pandemic In Part III of this volume, we reflect on the new global challenges introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, a global threat that changed our everyday lives and pushed us to reconsider the way we live and the role of institutions vis-à-vis the individual. Chapters in this part directly engage with the very idea of modernity as it confronts a major threat to the species. Some of the most fundamental tenets of modernity are leitmotifs in these contributions: rationality, scientific values, ethical choices, and personal and public responsibilities. This part features reflections on the response of public health institutions to COVID-19 (Cooper), but also new questions called upon to address the themes of individual responsibility (Dobbins) as well as the fragility of the human condition in its confrontation with a pandemic (ID Yassine and Mesa). The entanglement of environmental sciences, biology, and social science is at the core of Elizabeth G. Dobbins’ chapter, “Modernity and DecisionMaking for Global Challenges.” Dobbins retraces the nature of previous epidemics and their extent, both from the scientific and human points of view. She observes that although human-created environmental crises and global pandemics are not unique to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, their recent, catastrophic manifestations (climate change and COVID disease) have their roots in modernity. Disregarding the optimistic approach that sees humans and science always oriented towards “the solution,” Dobbins argues that a communal solution requires a synergic effort from both individuals (i.e. individual responsibility) and from governmental or transgovernmental agencies (i.e. policymakers and decision-makers). She concludes that COVID-19 might lead to a redefinition of the individual’s role in modernity. In the chapter “Public Health Confronts Modernity in the Shadow of the Pandemic,” Richard Cooper addresses ethical questions about the role

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of public health in society and the priority of its global dimension. Dr. Cooper introduces an informed medical perspective that encompasses modern studies on genetics, cardiovascular disease and epidemiology. By criticizing the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Cooper operates in an interdisciplinarity that interweaves clinical knowledge, societal analysis, and ethical perspectives. He argues that “[a]s consumer societies move further toward the full embrace of individualism and technologically-based lifestyle, traditional public health has been marginalized and must contend with both the ethos of ‘personal choice’ and monopoly capital, and how those forces influence the priorities of the political elite.” By problematizing collective and individual identity and nature, Rachid ID Yassine and Beatriz Mesa approach the new dimensions of modernity that are arising in the midst of the pandemic. They see the emergence of a post-pandemic world, in which fragility, vulnerability, and uncertainty conquer every social group in society. According to ID Yassin and Mesa the contemporary idea of security has also collapsed in societies that no longer seem secure, predictable, and under control. Part IV – Imagining New Global Frameworks: Democracy and the Modernity-to-Come The last part of the book focuses on the urgency of finding new modalities of a democracy-to-come. Particularly, by retracing the social movements that have accompanied the critique of the exemptionalist Western paradigm, social movement studies underscores the need for another orientation of modernity that is cognizant of the issues of the environment (Farro). Following different approaches and objects of observation, the contributors in this part highlight ruptures, controversies, and conflictual aspects of a globalized society that have to do with accelerating flows of communication in the public sphere. From conspiracy theories to e-participation, institutions and individuals appear to struggle with the cacophony of a networked society. The political spectrum is now marred by messages that are in a constant state of shifts and changes. Users of social networks and other platforms can participate in producing and corrupting information in a constant state of growth and flux. In this context, populist leaders emerge as successful storytellers, who, by doing so, also seize, control, and transform the very tools of a modern democratic society. In the midst of a controversial public debate involving topics such as the individual vs. the collective, and liberty vs. control, the use of AI in the practice of direct democracy brings to light the potentials and limits of

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current platforms of communication and political participation (Silaghi). However, the same tools that grant wider access to public participation can also be co-opted by populist ferments that flagrantly undermine science and rationality (Mauer). Amid this crisis of the institutions of democracy, Part IV calls for a complete re-envisioning of the future, a future that is cognizant of the strength of a modernity-to-come. In this mode of modernity, dominated individuals and groups will f ind a path towards the “subjectivation of the self” as a creative process of liberation and ethical self-assertion (Touraine). Chapter 13 retraces the environmental movements from their beginning in the early 70s to the latest global experiences inspired by the teenage activist Greta Thunberg. Despite the idea of environmental and naturalist movements as a consequence of the decline of the idea of modernity and progress, Antimo Luigi Farro shows how these movements advocate the role of science in society and represent a critical consciousness of modernity. In Farro’s view, these considerations are even more appropriate in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic. In his chapter, “The Cognitive Immune System: The Mind’s Ability to Dispel Pathological Beliefs,” Barry Mauer introduces the theory of the cognitive immune system and discusses the affordances and limits of the metaphor to medical epidemiology. Mauer addresses the vulnerability of institutions to pathological beliefs and behaviors. He argues that the modern liberal approach to diagnosing and treating pathological beliefs and behaviors has failed. He cites as an example the assault of two pandemics: the coronavirus, a physical virus; and the right-wing cult, a cognitive virus. Mauer calls for a “cognitive” immune system to face dangerous beliefs, anti-science, and anti-truth. He concludes by proposing a heuristic approach to the world we will face during and after the pandemic. In the chapter entitled “Representative Democracy as Kitsch, and Artificial Intelligence’s Promise of Emancipation, and Artificial Intelligence’s Promise of Emancipation,” Marius Silaghi engages with the application of AI to online platforms for political participation. This platform, Democracy 2.0, constitutes a decentralized community of practice, an avant-garde and social media that challenges the current idea of representative democracy to move toward a more direct form democracy. Silaghi’s chapter explores relations between modernity and the decentralization of authority. He notes that “the system of representative democracy accompanying early modernity, by giving the masses an almost effortless sense of participation – features associated with kitsch[…] promises to become more genuine through the opportunities of electronic civic involvement.”

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Alain Touraine, author of The Post-industrial Society (1971) and Critique of Modernity, writes the final contribution to this volume. Touraine’s recent publication In Defense of Modernity (2018) posits modernity as necessary to protect the universal assertion of ethics. In his essay here, Touraine offers a unique reflection on the future of democracy and a glimpse at what he terms hypermodernity. After reminding social actors of “their responsibility and capacity to act,” Touraine analyses what he terms the four necessary domains of subjectivation: the rediscovery of the individual and the Subject of subjectivation, the question of women, the issue of refugees and migrants, and the domain of democracy and fundamental human rights. Touraine’s essay addresses our fundamental contemporary crisis and also shows the potential that subjectivation has in liberating the individual from forms of dominance. The “Subject” described in Touraine’s sociology is defined as “the assertion, whose forms vary, of human beings’ freedom and capacity to create themselves and to transform themselves individually and collectively” (Touraine 2007, 5).

Conclusions The ultimate purpose of this volume is to focus our reflections on the urgent need to update the shifting epistemological, social, cultural, and political meanings of modernity today. We discuss how the pandemic carries the possibility (threat? opportunity?) of a tabula rasa condition: the possibility of a civilizational detour based on a foundation of global citizenship, and the need for global problem-solving strategies, new global ethics, and a global resource management paradigm that is solidly cognizant of the commons and the need for redistribution. In our final remarks we will attempt to update a necessary assertion for a global modernity. The Touranian Subject and its related process of subjectivation can then be understood as the awakening force that liberates the individual and makes him/her/them the “creative” actor of a positive change of his/her/their present and future. However, in order to defend modernity, a clear distinction must be made between the mere process of modernization and the dream of harmonizing rationality, creativity, social justice, and spirituality. In the shadow of catastrophe and in the midst of predominant precariousness and uncertainty, a keen awareness of the universal ethics of justice and equity is called upon as the fundamental orientation and horizon of our human condition. This awakening – like in the “daydream” described in Ernst Bloch’s Principle of Hope – can be seen as the necessary creative, spiritual, and practical subjective assertion for a new global modernity, the modernity-to-come.

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References Agamben, Giorgio. 2005 (2003). State of Exception, translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 2009 (2006). What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Appadurai, Arjun. 1998. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ———. 1990. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy.” Theory, Culture & Society 7: 295–310. Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. Globalization: The Human Consequences. New York: Columbia University Press. Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2007. Rethinking Modernity Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2014. Connected Sociologies. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Beck, Ulrich. 1992 (1986). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. Byrne, P. Joseph. 2006. Daily Life during the Black Death. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Cantor, F. Norman. 2001. In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death & The World It Made. New York: Simon & Schuster. Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture: The Rise of the Network Society, vol. 1. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 2012. Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Chichester: Wiley. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Deming, David. 2012. Science and Technology in World History, vol. 3: The Black Death, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. Eatwell, Roger and Matthew Goodwin. 2018. National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy. Gretna, LA: Pelican. Eisenstadt, Shmuel. N. 2003. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities. Boston: Brill. Elias, Norbert. 1969. The Civilizing Process, vol. 1: The History of Manners. Oxford: Blackwell. Farro, Antimo L. and Simone Maddanu. 2020. “Popular Populism.” In Understanding Social Conflict: The Relationship between Sociology and History, edited by Liana M. Daher, 119–30. Sesto San Giovanni: Mimesis International. Fitzi, Gregor, Juergen Mackert, and Bryan. S. Turner, eds. 2019(a). Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, vol. 1: Concepts and Theory, New York: Routledge.

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———, eds. 2019(b), Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, vol. 2: Politics, Social

Movements and Extremism. New York: Routledge. Gerbaudo, Paolo. 2017. The Mask and the Flag: Populism, Citizenism, and Global Protest. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Germani, Gino. 1978. Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. London: Polity Press. Gottfried, Robert S. 1983. The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe. New York: Free Press. Göle, Nilüfer. 1996. The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. ———. 2000. “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities.” Daedalus 129, no. 1: 91–117 ———. 2015. Islam and Secularity: The Future of Europe’s Public Sphere. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Goody, Jack. 2006. The Theft of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 1980. Toward a Rational Society. London: Heinemann. Harvey, David. 2012. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. London: Verso. Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lewandowsky, Stephan and John Cook. 2020. The conspiracy theory handbook. Available Available at http://sks.to/conspiracy Liu, Bailu, Yang Xuhua, Lili Kong. 2015. “Classification of the Infectious Diseases.” In: Li H. (eds) Radiology of Infectious Diseases: Volume 1. Springer: Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9882-2_5 Lyotard, Jean-François. 1984 (1979). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mignolo, Walter D. 2000. Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2007. “Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality.” Cultural Studies 21, no 2: 449–514. Mouffe, Chantal. 2018. For a Left Populism. London: Verso. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piketty, Thomas. 2017 (2013). Capital in the 21st Century, translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Snowden, M. Frank. 2019. Epidemics and Society: From the Black Death to the Present. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Stockemer, Daniel. 2019. Populism Around the World: A Comparative Perspective. Springer: Charm. Touraine, Alain. 1971 (1969). The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow’s Social History; Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society. New York: Random House. ———. 1977 (1973). The Self-Production of Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 1995 (1992). Critique of Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 2007. A New Paradigm for Understanding Today’s World. Cambridge: Polity. ———. 2018. Défense de la modernité. Paris: Seuil. Turkle, Sherry. 2011. Alone Together : Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other. New York :Basic Books. Wallace, William, and Julie Smith. 2007. “Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent.” West European Politics 18, no. 3: 137–157. doi:10.1080/01402389508425095. White, Hayden. 1980. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Online articles WHO Director-General. 2020. Opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 on March 11. Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.who.int/ director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarksat-the-media-briefing-on-COVID-19---11-march-2020.

About the Authors Hatem N. Akil (Valencia College) is a visual culture researcher who is interested primarily in the perception and representation of Arabs and Muslims. He earned his PhD in Texts and Technology from the University of Central FL. Among his publications “Cinematic Terrorism,” “The Martyr’s Vision,” and the monograph The Visual Divide between Islam and the West (Palgrave, 2016). [email protected] Simone Maddanu (University of South Florida) earned his PhD at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales of Paris in 2009. His research interests focus on social movements, commons, migration, Islam in Europe, and global and postcolonial studies. He currently teaches sociology and contemporary

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social problems at the University of South Florida. He published several books and articles in different languages. [email protected]

2.

Technology and the Texture of Modernity Alessandro Mongili

Abstract This chapter introduces networks, contexts/ecologies, and innovations as the three main concepts that make technology pivotal for constructing contemporary societies, as well as many ideas of modernity. Technologies are not mere artifacts, but also sociotechnical networks made by distinct artifacts composed, in turn, by different elements belonging to various technical networks. Digitalization has exagerated and changed this process, which was present from the very beginning of modern technological history. Any multiple assemblage looks for its continuous existence in two different fields: at the mere technical level, on standardization and classification of elements and activities; and at a human and social level, on uses, habits, conventions, and practices. Keywords: technology; modernization; modernity; innovation; standardization.

Technology is not an outer condition or external factor for social life but pervades every activity, often as an iterative, collective, and continuous process of social and material change (Mongili and Pellegrino 2014, xxxvi; Suchman 2009, 1). Modernity has been closely associated with technological development and innovation; indeed, modernity is unthinkable without modern technology and its standardization across different use and handling patterns. In this chapter, we will analyze the radical intertwining of modernity and (modern) technology and how their relevance can be thematized. Proceeding from the distinction between traditional and modern technology, we go on to analyze standardization as a crucial feature of contemporary technologies, the role of the ubiquitous diffusion of devices in producing

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a practical texture across different social worlds, and the overlap between modern technology and innovation as ideology, practice, and politics. The claimed distinction between traditional and modern technology is a classical theme in social studies and is perhaps best delimited by two contrasting positions. In We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour (1993) spoke of this distinction, noting how the modern availability of standardized data ensured a certain robustness and coherence while circulating in different use sets. Latour (1987) also introduced the idea that technology can exist only within a network or collective of different elements that include materiality, functional mechanisms, scientific knowledge embedded in devices, funding and economics, juridical framing, discursive interpretation, task series delegated to humans, power and authority, and a history of diffusion (or, in his own terms, translation) of a single device in multiple use and handling sets, along with corresponding ongoing transformation of those same devices. The modes of existence of modern technologies are therefore understandable only by accepting that their constituent elements belong to different worlds, and their mise en contexte or context-setting (Latour 1996). Latour viewed machines, devices, and technologies as part of a hybrid collective rather than as a discrete techno-ensemble to be studied in terms of its activity, involving scientific, social, discursive political, and economic elements in a common course of action. This collective composition of technologies and material, discursive, and social relations was shown to follow the association or substitution of tasks within a convergent ensemble of participants. These tasks can be assigned to humans or machines, following the history of a device’s diffusion as a result of interaction or negotiation rather than any presumed nature of the element involved. Generally speaking, it is impossible to f ind a situation where objects and things subsist without being “full of people”; it is also difficult to find an incorporeal social process without an overlay of materiality and technology. As a contemporary example, the digital tracking devices developed to check and order people’s movements during the Covid-19 pandemic by tracking infected, asymptomatic, and paucisymptomatic (presenting few symptoms) people rely on the growing number of digital applications that can be downloaded to personal smartphones. These apps depend on human activity in order to function. Although things and people are distinguished in public discourse as belonging to two distinct realms, their interactions are completed by technologies. However, the role played by humans or non-humans in a sociotechnical network is decided by the history of a common sociotechnical process rather than by the presumed nature of the elements involved

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(Latour 1994). This position has proven important in the development of Social studies of Science and Technology. From an opposing perspective, Georg Simmel (1902) held that while traditional technologies were characterized by their similarity to their social (and anthropological) context, the exteriorized content of modern tech reflected their intellectualized character. Simmel contended that technology is only a means of fulfilling tasks and purposes related to human and social dynamics. In traditional societies, technology was essentially simple and durable in shape and use, reflecting group or individual needs. Modern society radically altered the nature of technical tools, which came to dominate humans, reducing them to a means for a technical purpose. Simmel shared a disdain for technology which was widespread in Europe at that time. He saw technology as a carrier, elevating materiality and low skills to the center of contemporary life. On this view, old technology presented no threat because it was a pure reflection or result of human and social processes. In contrast, modern technology reinforces the exteriorization of life, setting the refinement of things against the refinement of humans. Indeed, Simmel regarded exteriorization as a defining characteristic of modernity, arguing that modern technology is not a product of human processes but a consequence of abstraction and intellectualization, posing a threat to human interiority. In this proposition, we can see the traditional partitioning of social and technoscientific spheres by a clear boundary as constructed during the nineteenth century (Gieryn 1999). While both Latour and Simmel view intellectualization as a feature of modernity, their analytical conclusions contrast in ethical and theoretical terms, leading to radically distinct moral judgments and forecasts. In Latour’s account, now supported by extensive empirical research, intellectualization is reduced to a more precise irruption of technoscience in the standardization of technology and the centrality of scientific knowledge. There is no anti-human danger here given the hybrid nature of technology, which incorporates humanity at every level and mode of its existence. Among the many scholars and classical authors who reflected on the subject of technology and modernity, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Lewis Mumford (1885–1990) remain among the most important and influential. In Marx’s dialectic conception of history, he assigned a prominent role to technology as a productive force. However, his interest in technology extended beyond its instrumental role in the general advance of history to his analysis of the intertwined development of mechanized production and value creation. Specifically, as argued in the chapter “Machinery and Modern Industry” of Capital (1990 [1867]), Marx insisted that capital is not

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a thing but a form of human relation mediated through things, especially machines and technological devices. In this way, technology provides the material ground for relations between the social classes and with nature as substructural and not merely superstructural. Although he interpreted the evolution of “mechanization” in manufacturing as a result of social relations, and especially of class struggle, he recognized the presence of people and technology within the same course of action. He attributed two main characteristics to “mechanization”: as an organic, complex, automatized set, and as an objectification of the workforce (Marx 1990; 1973, 670–90). Lewis Mumford, on the other hand, situated technologies and “machines” in the context of their ties to societies and peoples, notably in his Technics and Civilization (1934). As part of an ensemble, he said, “technics” cannot be imagined in isolation from the other elements that constitute its ecology. He also emphasized the relevance of how different devices are aligned, anticipating the theme of standardization, which is central to contemporary studies of technology. Referring to this alignment as a technological complex, he argued that this serves as a continuous ordering activity for societies and provides regularity, predictability, and uniformity. Both of these classical authors understood the intimate relation between the development of technology and the features of agency in the modern era. Although it has a situated existence in local sets, modern technology is no longer an expression of a local group; devices tend to maintain everywhere their shape and mechanism, but in use, maintenance, and repair practices in any space and time of their existence, they are challenged by differences in approach and utility, playing different roles and occupying different positions in local activities and courses of action. Modern technology is especially affected by the constitutive presence of scientific knowledge, which often makes its existence possible and facilitates its extension as a heterogeneous and technological ensemble, as in the case of floating-point arithmetic for computing, materials science for textile and mechanical products, and so on (MacKenzie 1996). In addition, while interpretive practices commonly reduce technology to a single artifact (Bijker 1995), many studies have shown it to comprise a set of layered elements, performing differently in its different enactments (Latour 2012; Mol 2002; Simondon 2016). A single artifact may form part of a technological system; it may be bound to an infrastructure or embedded in a grid (T. Hughes 1983; Edwards et al. 2007). Since the digital turn in particular, devices employ differing software and protocols to share information, operating instructions, and energy and are embedded in more complex systems like the Internet and power grids (including water networks). Last

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but not least, articulation is subjugated to alignment with human and social use, including the delegation of certain tasks to humans to make the device function, and some learning. Any one of these elements can be unpacked and assembled in another device to perform differently. This differentiates modern technology from more traditional forms in terms of extension – its chain of users, mode of existence, and life course in time and space – and in terms of the heterogeneous classification of its elements as material, digital, biological, discursive, and human (Latour 1987; Haraway 1997). A device is always used for specific purposes; in modern societies, it is generally used in a similar form (and often the same shape) in different places and times, adopted by different groups of users to support a particular activity or practice. This adoption entails learning the device’s potential affordances, which may differ across contexts and use sets. This learning is often linked to some form of belonging – to an organization, an enterprise or company, a network of users, a social world, or a distributed network of people. Learning to use or to handle a device is often a collective experience as an important step toward membership of a collective, a group, or a community of practice (Wenger 1998; Lave 1988). The role played by devices in these multiple use and handling sets reveals that technology is a multilayered phenomenon whose existence is not reducible to a single project or a standardized set of data that supports its circulation, but is always in an essential tension with the multiplicity of local uses and interpretations of its role and ontology. This is the condition of local universality or situatedness endorsed in so many studies (e.g. Haraway 1988; Mol 2002; Timmermans and Berg 1997).

Modern Technology as Standardized Leaving aside this sprawling debate, the present analysis considers the intimate ties between societies and technologies in advancing heterogeneous activities and processes, and the nature of those ties in the modern era. As mentioned earlier, modern technologies are distinguished mainly by the presence of a set of standards and data in a given technological sample. Standardization grounds the industrial production of a device or its technical elements, facilitating its ubiquitous expansion into multiple use and handling sets. However conceptualized, modern technology is always standardized in shape and use. While the Industrial Revolution from its very beginning made it possible to standardize commodities in terms of size, length, and other dimensions, this character has been strengthened and multiplied by

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digitalization. Now, standardization requires only the scientific classification of systems, the discretization of every element of a process into data, and their integration into a device – from the data-processing algorithm’s spikes dimension to user-profiling protocols. Indeed, modern science itself is unthinkable without taking due account of standardized technological instrumentation and the presence of technicians (Barad 1996; Shapin 1989). The standardization of data and other essential elements of every device produces a twofold effect: facilitating circulation in different handling and use sets without loss to the technology’s coherence while also serving as a boundary object, bridging people and other things within a hybrid collective. This twofold capability to preserve device integrity while adapting to local use or handling represents the texturing character of modern technology at its best. In the use of science in standardization and of standards in science, technology and science become a seamless fabric of practices at a constitutive level, enabling modern devices to expand their use in diverse sets. A set of standards provides an assemblage of heterogeneous elements with a sort of identity. In themselves, standards can be understood as forms of classification, embedded as convention in a device following often diverse negotiations and agreements. A device’s mechanical or digital elements, as well as the people who use it, must behave according to these standards, which may relate to shape, form of energy, speed of release, color, exposure, format, or any other characteristics to be preserved across any context or use. The diffusion of standards ensures the device’s integrity across different users, user groups, or communities of practice, which may be very different, distant, or divergent (Star and Griesemer 1989; Timmermans and Berg 1997; Timmermans and Berg 2003). In short, standards are nothing but classifications adopted as a convention following a process. For example, following the classification of units of electricity as amperes, transmission as coulombs, and power as volts, national electricity grids distribute power according to different standards ranging from 100 to 240 volts, which are mandatory in some countries and merely a form of classification in others because they lack operativity.1 In this context, the link between classification and phenomena must be constructed and is subject to negotiation. As such negotiations typically involve diverse actors or bodies, their respective epistemologies, social judgments, social profiles, national traditions, and data cultures play an important role. In the statistical sciences, data classifications in different 1 To simplify this topic, I have omitted any reference to frequency, tension, and other aspects of the classification and standardization of electricity.

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countries assign populations to different taxa (Desrosières and Thévenot 1998). In medicine, classifications of disease include or exclude certain behaviors or illnesses (Bowker and Star 1999). As in biodiversity, datadiversity is the product of efforts to translate a new world into discrete data (Bowker 2000). In general, classification involves the translation of continuous processes into a set of discrete data, which is never neutral or uncontested. Many disputes, controversies, negotiations, and harsh conflicts center on the development and enactment of a classification filtered by relevant expert members of a professional culture with particular skills or interests. For that reason, such practices are characterized as classification work, representing a crucial junction in modern life and inescapable as a means of understanding technology and politics in our times. This practice alone supplies the standards for stabilizing devices. Following digitalization, classification work and standardization have become deeply enmeshed in data culture. While maintaining, repairing, or modifying mechanical devices depended on relevant groups of professionals, digital devices opened a further door to lay experts, hackers, power users, and others. In contemporary technological negotiations, data handling is a key expertise because of the crucial role of data, big data, and data sets (Bowker and Star 1999; Gitelman 2013). It also determines how devices are variously used, manipulated, forced, adapted, and interpreted in multiple and diverse situations. In this way, technology texturizes the modern world (Gherardi 2006). However, this is not a monolithic One-World, and modern phenomena do not conform to a single unique ontology but subsist in multiple forms of existence, in differences of power, and in sociotechnical and other processes. This issue is especially important in striving to understand those countries too often labeled as the Global South (despite their heterogeneity) at the edge of emplacement in these textures (Law 2015). In the West and in developed countries, the line is increasingly blurred between technology and designcentered innovation as a process that emerges from a project elaborated by tech-company professionals. How then are we to capture all the other practices that constitute most technology-related work? Most technological practices in the Global South fall outside this model, which is nevertheless central to the politics of innovation everywhere.

Technotextures: Convergence of Material and Social Aspects Today, the overlapping and interweaving of technologies and human activities are so intimate that they are largely taken for granted and do

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not receive due attention. From cooking to writing, from sexual desire to travel, from political organization to gossip, it is difficult to identify any f ield of activity where people are free from tools, and from digital tools in particular. Specialized apps for meditation, physical exercise, and the monitoring of entire populations during the pandemic confirm the increasing intertwining of human and technological elements in a seamless continuum. In particular, modern society exhibits the interweaving of human, technoscientific, and material activities in three ways: (a) the convergence of different elements around devices, whether extant or projected; (b) infrastructures and infrastructuring; and (c) the contexts or ecologies in-between devices or technological systems that interact and change with them. Convergence is a process that pools heterogeneous elements – social actors, design, money, materiality, knowledge, skill, case, situations, infrastructures, standards, forms of classification, data, duration, organizations, and norms and conventions – within a sociotechnical process. This texture of different elements is increasingly a feature of modern society as sociotechnical networks extend into every aspect of contemporary life. In the West, these developments are formally classified as projects but frequently lack denomination, especially in the Global South (Mongili 2015, 162–70). Although increasingly saturating certain environments, they are more often distributed among the “wires” of sociomaterial life. For example, a spacecraft is saturated and constituted by multiple technological systems; by comparison with its constituent devices, any human action is peripheral. Conversely, the multiple human, social, and material elements in an urban apartment exist in-between the various technologies (heating, electricity, cooking devices, wi-fi, etc.). Convergence does not necessarily correspond to a stabilized device or a technosystem; it is a process, often with no clear boundaries. As such, convergence cannot be viewed in terms of purpose or failure, as it has no clear fate but may lead to a stable novel assemblage through strong classification work and standardization or to the incorporation of new elements in a novel device. Its only fate may be to produce a demo for corporate management, or a complete failure, that is, it can be an ephemeral phenomenon or can originate some test. For that reason, it is important to differentiate convergence from interoperability, and interoperability from the stability of a device or of a technological system. Certainly, convergence can lead to the interoperability of different devices within a more complex system or to the stabilization of a device’s shape, use, and integration in a stable network. However, this outcome is far from guaranteed. From

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a sociological perspective, convergence is a precious concept because it relates to the texture of sociomaterial processes. Around the world, much ongoing work involves social, material, and technical convergences that are heterogeneous in terms of their elements’ character, ascription, and belonging. Like interactions, convergences produce many social and abstract objects (Blumer 1969) without consideration of their influence on diverse personal positions and performances. Convergences and sociotechnical processes also produce differing ontologies of the same devices, reflecting differences of interpretation, use, and handling. Weaving together all of these elements, they simultaneously produce a multiplicity of their own (Star 1999; Star et al. 2004). A more intimate and hugely signif icant tie is a product of the convergence of information artifacts or systems with human work and shared activity following digitalization. A panoply of modern activities – communication, writing, gaming, scientif ic research, chat, and social networking – are no longer thinkable as “only human” or “only social” but are possible only because they converge with some information artifact such as a mobile device or a digital platform in an inextricably intertwined whole. These hybrid phenomena are known as information infrastructures, in which information artifacts work with other entities to make activities flow – obviously including humans and their activities and works. These are in turn embedded in other social, material, and technical frames, and this modularity of humans, infrastructures, and devices is the very ground of sociotechnical texture. These infrastructures are usually transparent and taken for granted or naturalized until they break down or require maintenance, repair, or adaptation for other purposes through further infrastructuring. Across multiple situated spaces and times, this diffusion does not necessarily require different users of the infrastructure to share a common interpretation or use in distinct chronotopes. The main purpose of information infrastructures relates to the work to be done – writing, playing, working, and so on (Edwards et al. 2007; Mongili and Pellegrino 2014; Monteiro et al. 2013; Star 1999; Star and Ruhleder 1996). One important feature of infrastructured work is use of the same infrastructure to make the work flow. Switching on or off, maintenance, repair, mutual adaptation, learning, updating, forcing, and modification of information artifacts are now commonplace and support continuous change in personal and technological performance. People learn how to infrastructure their activity in progress through tutorials, dedicated online groups, handbooks and manuals, or by imitating their colleagues.

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Indeed, rather than being an individual activity, this is often linked to membership in a group, organization, or community of practice. These constant infrastructuring activities generate another level of texture in modern societies through the specialized technical subcultures that interconnect people across space and time, helping to naturalize multiple devices and technological systems in different situated sets. In reality, people must learn how to use these devices and information infrastructures to make the work flow while also taking them for granted in everyday activities. Resolving this double tension draws on a range of solutions; at either end of this spectrum, we observe the complete adaptation of humans and the complete transformation of devices, but these extremes are rare. More often in the lives of humans and devices, we observe various arrangements that transform human performance and continuously challenge the stability of devices and information artifacts and systems in terms of their form and use. This also means that any singular interpretation of their essence is very rare because there is no need for consensus. New versions of devices are released continuously, and their fluid existence vividly negates the very idea of technological crystallization or stabilization that has dominated many areas of technology studies (Haythornthwaite 2006; Lave 1988; Star and Ruhleder 1996; Wenger 1998). Following Leigh Star, it seems useful to promote a more ecological understanding of the relationship between humans and technology in order to conceptualize more precisely both the singularity and the universality of the modern technological condition. While technology defines the context for many or most contemporary human activities, any device or system must take a place or a time within human or other technological or material environments. The main consequences are fluidity of technical and human performance, belonging, and identity, and local occurrence of different “ontologies” (De Laet and Mol 2000). Conceptualizing this in terms of ecology helps to illuminate such phenomena by considering the spaces between sociotechnical networks or delimited collectives and taking account of everything in-between, not only as a silent context but as a set of elements that interact with sociotechnical networks, simultaneously modifying some of their behaviors, knowledges, and roles and some sociotechnical elements through their use, handling, care, or modification. This ecological understanding of technology can help to focus on processes and consequences, uses and articulation, in relation to other conceptualizations that privilege conditions or factors designated as causes, including design, purposeful action, and projects (Star 1995).

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Sociotechnical Change and Innovation Technology is perceived as an icon of modernity, particularly in respect of sociotechnical change. In public discourse, however, technology, modernity, and change overlap with an understanding of innovation as necessary and positive change (Suchman and Bishop 1999). This overlap cannot be avoided in light of the pervasive importance of technology for modernity. Science and technology scholars understand the inadequacy of the taken-for-granted narrative of the isolated genius who invents and innovates devices and technological systems (Mongili and Pellegrino 2014, xxxvii; Suchman et al. 2002, 164). Indeed, when people speak of innovation, a long series of works and phenomena is rendered invisible. In laboratory and social studies of science and the history of science, many scholars have highlighted the crucial role of technicians and instruments – for instance, in taking care of the tools and living organisms utilized in experiments – even though the popular account entirely neglects this reality. In the same way, the design and conception of devices is far from a pure invention or a brilliant idea (Shapin 1989; Knorr-Cetina 1999; Mongili 2014) and must instead be understood as a sociotechnical process rather than reducing its challenges or its success to the ingenious machinations of the inventor. Maintenance and repair studies provide meaningful accounts of the often invisible day-to-day work that keeps devices or technological systems functioning. This is a care activity but also a burden for those who do the “dirty work” that supports the activities of more prestigious and fashionable actors such as inventors or tech-company gurus. To understand the constitutive ties between the visible and the invisible, their work must also be investigated and acknowledged (Denis and Pontille 2015; E. Hughes 1971; Star 1991, 265; 1999; Star and Strauss 1999). This perspective invites us to think of our world as an arena of ongoing processes in which decay, vulnerability, the material and organizational fragility of things and systems, and the logic of care or fixing are at the core of everyone’s sociotechnical experience (Barad 2003; Denis et al. 2015; Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). This in turn obliges us to observe the world not only as an ordered phenomenon occasionally broken but as an effect of the endless uncertainty of composition in producing order and stability. Steven Jackson proposed the term broken-world thinking as a more realistic framing of sociotechnical processes in their fragility and impermanence, despite their idealization in the technophile’s eternity dream (Jackson 2014) as linear growth fueled by the hegemony of innovation. In fact, the prevailing ideology of innovation hinders conceptualization and analysis of the relationship between technology and modernity.

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Innovation need not correspond automatically to technology, and neither necessarily entails sociotechnical change; indeed, the mainstream view of innovation as the purposeful introduction of a sociotechnical process of change is at odds with the observed reality. If innovation is always a purposeful action – that is, a linear process based on an original idea, a project, and a design phase leading to diffusion – then we must exclude any changes in the distribution, use, and modification of devices and technological systems during diffusion or as a result of other forms of handling (Godin 2006; Suchman 2009; Sveiby 2017, 138). Another notable feature of technology is its longevity, as most devices or technological systems do not change for a generation or more. In short, not every important technology is novel; smartphones are now almost twenty years old, and the internal combustion engine was invented more than a century ago (Edgerton 1999, 2011). In that context, many scholars have highlighted the role in sociotechnical change of practices that include assembly, reconfiguration, interpolation of elements, correction, and adaptation as a result of actions related to maintenance, repair, reassembly, and task redistribution, as well as necessary modifications for operation or contingencies management (Denis et al. 2015, 9; Denis and Pontille 2014; Fukushima 2015, 59; Godin and Vinck 2017a; Graham 2010; Graham and Thrift 2007; Jackson 2014; Morita 2014, 10; Pipek and Wulf 2009, 458). Yet for all that, dramatic innovations and the emergence of new technologies as “inventions” attract more attention than the use, diffusion, imitation, and modification of extant devices or systems (Godin and Vinck 2017a). In general, then, it is difficult to accept the taken-for-granted identification of innovation and invention, innovation and diffusion, innovation and imitation, innovation and novelty, or indeed innovation and its consequences. Most inventions are never realized as innovations because they do not survive the diffusion phase, or because there is no relevant market, and a significant proportion of start-ups simply fail (Godin 2017). Michel Callon (1988) noted that only 20 percent of “applied researches” were viable at that time – in other words, the failure rate was 80 percent. Vinsel (2017, 263, 275) recently confirmed that many innovations involve only the addition or subtraction of a part, task, or use of an extant device rather than the complete overhaul of a device or technological system. In contrast, the public image of innovation rests on the assumption that sociotechnical change can be explained in terms of a good idea, project, or design, underestimating the realities of diffusion and articulation. As early as 1962, in his seminal work Diffusion of Innovation, Everett Rogers noted that only 0.2 percent of papers devoted to innovation analyzed diffusion

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and impact, and this situation seems not to have changed (Rogers 1962, 30; Sveiby 2017, 140). In itself, the concept of diffusion is not entirely useful as a means of describing and analyzing all the work of multiple actors in managing the many contingencies that arise during the life of a device. To capture the extended negotiations, rejections, and changes in the use, interpretation, and handling of both the device and the technological system, Leigh Star proposed the concept of articulation (Star 2015, 160). Articulation can be defined as “work done in real time to manage contingencies: work that gets things back on track in the face of the unexpected, that modifies action to accommodate unanticipated contingencies” (Bowker and Star 1999, 310). Unfortunately, this dimension is often entirely hidden or, when problematic, is characterized as the resistance of a backward public. Resistance to innovation is negatively construed and is often linked to retrograde mindsets or practices dismissed by dominant ideologies as “mindless, sub-rational, not seeing the common good for innovation and forgoing opportunities” (Godin and Vinck 2017a, 3). Innovation is indeed widely viewed as “always good,” which makes it difficult to investigate other characteristics of resistance. However, resistance has also been conceptualized as contributing to the improvement of devices and systems. Martin Bauer (1995a, b; 2017) argued that resistance “contributes to the innovation projects by focusing attention where needed” (2017, 159). This conception resembles the idea of anti-programme in Akrich (1992) and Latour (1994), which explains success and failure in terms of the ability of designers or enterprises to incorporate the “resistant” behaviors of users in material or digital devices. As an alternative to the narrative of neutral improvement or stabilization of a sociotechnical process, resistance can be also analyzed in terms of three forms of conflict in sociotechnical processes: interpretive negotiation, opposing technologies, and generation of alternative forms. Indeed neutral improvement cannot be the aim of resistance because this consequence is no more self-evident than its failure. Like resistance, failure need not be viewed in a negative way, but can serve as a resource for technological improvement by teaching designers or other relevant actors about limits or mistakes and push them to change, or at least not to repeat previous mistakes (Thomas et al. 2017, 183; Vinck 2017). The repurposing and resignification of innovation’s political framing is situated within a much wider ecology, where the spaces among sociotechnical networks are dense in signification and influence (Star 1995). No sociotechnical process is a zero-sum game; like any process, it is heterogeneous

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in content, and this condition influences many forms of resistance. For example, for many companies and enterprises, resistance can be viewed as a strategy. Despite their public claims, many companies prefer not to innovate, especially in the wake of the global crisis of 2007. These tactics have developed to become the mainstream pro-innovation framework. In fact, many companies invent traditions and vintage products or introduce superficial adaptations related to image, packaging, or denomination, leaving artifacts and systems untouched. These escape strategies allow companies to appear innovative without actually investing in innovation (Leitner 2017). Innovation studies have also identified processes labeled as innovation that change nothing, as well as processes that change individual or social structures, behaviors, and interactions and have a lot of consequences but are not characterized as innovation. Most public discourse, especially in peripheral areas, considers only innovation for itself – processes labeled as innovation for professional, political, or organizational reasons without necessarily driving sociotechnical change. In the same way, we must take account of sociotechnical processes of change that are not described as innovation either by participants or in public discourse, which we can define as innovation in itself. The main difference here resides in the shared interpretation and obviously in the label. Additionally, the latter form makes no reference to a design phase as a recognized professional step involving enterprises or actors, or eligibility for funding. Many studies have highlighted this difference using terms like technology-in-use or technology-in-innovation (Edgerton 1999), and some have criticized the conflation of the term innovation with invention, imitation, diffusion, novelty, increment, or subtraction (Godin and Vinck 2017a). As mentioned earlier, these definitions do not include other dimensions of sociotechnical change; of these, the most signif icant omission is articulation because it relates to all the steps of innovation other than design. Other important dimensions include care, maintenance, repair, assembly, reconf iguration, interpolation, correction, adaptation, and other forms of artful integration (Suchman and Bishop 1999). Many of these interventions themselves constitute innovation that originates in a local solution to breakdown, malfunction, or adaptation for local use, leading to breakthrough changes in devices or their use. These sociotechnical changes are often implemented by social actors who have no professional status or live in peripheral areas. The presence or absence of design is a crucial determinant of whether a practice is publicly labeled as innovation, especially in peripheral countries, where innovation is politicized as a process rooted in a design practice because funding is directed mainly to

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design and development and associated enterprises but not to innovation in itself. It follows that innovation is not only a matter of fact but also a matter of concern. As Godin (2015) argued, the word innovation has been completely redefined, especially during the twentieth century. Before that time, it was a vice; now, it is a word of honor. Innovation has increasingly been linked to technology, and technological change has been labelled as innovation tout court. After 1945, state policies centered increasingly on innovation, framed as finance-related initiatives and more recently by ideas like “national innovation systems” or innovation ecosystems grounded in public regulation. More recent science policies have focused on the politics of innovation, as technology embodies political constraints in its design or enactment (Mol 2002; Winner 1980) and eventually itself became the object of policy (Pfotenhauer and Juhl 2017). More generally, this association between technological innovation and change has shaped our idea of modernity. The evolution of science and technology indicators and their relabeling as innovation indicators alongside so-called best practices offers a useful perspective on this process of resignifying innovation. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development framing translates data into classifications that inform indicators commonly used by political bodies around the world. These rigid categories and classifications in turn inform data-gathering taxonomies and have a huge impact on “innovation” policies (Godin 2006, 660–64; 2012, 410). Best practices and associated rhetorics are widely applied in Europe; since 1960, Euopean Union technocracy has included them as a kind of mantra and, crucially, as a necessary condition of project funding. Briefly, these are understood as “principles from corporate governance” to be incorporated in public-sector entities “in order to achieve better public governance, guided by principles such accountability, integration and transparency” (Brandão and Bagattolli 2017, 50). Based on the ideal of scientific neutrality and the authority of modern expertise, their use grants political discourse and proposals a legitimacy that raw data and other arguments no longer provide, so investing technocratic discourse on innovation with values of efficiency, competition, and profit. However, this ideological strength does not always correspond to actual benefits, because a practice cannot be isolated from its context by transferring it elsewhere without losing its validity. In addition, sociotechnical processes are not uniform or linear, and innovation is not always an effective solution to social or economic challenges. In the dominant international milieux, however, best practices are seen as a means of pressing peripheral countries to adopt solutions that are often entirely at odds with their interests or capacities

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(Brandão and Bagattolli 2017). Indeed, innovation is a market ideology that stresses both the scientific origins of technology and its role in economic decision-making. This ideology admits its orientation following a simple allocation mechanism explained with its solely formal aspects. The market behavior of stakeholders describes a mechanism that connects determined means with given ends, reducing the innovation process to an algorithm (Cañibano et al. 2017).

Broken world or continuous innovation? As well as being an ideological construction that influences scholarship, innovation is the origin of multiple exclusions of phenomena that must be acknowledged if we are to correctly represent sociotechnical change. Perhaps the most important of these exclusions is the reduction of sociotechnical processes to innovation, and so to a linear logic enclosed by an origin and a finality. This reduction can be challenged on multiple grounds. First, imitation as a pivotal mechanism of technology diffusion is not necessarily passive but gradually introduces a practice in a new context, usually adapting, transforming, or reinventing it. People imitate and in so doing alter artifacts and systems (Godin 2017). The process of technology diffusion is cumulative, path-dependent, and reflexive, grounded in reflection, learning, negotiation, imitation, and closeness to technological contexts, where most devices and systems endure for a long time. Observation confirms that most technology-related activities involve maintaining and repairing old technologies to keep them going – using, reusing, and recycling rather than creating novel devices (Edgerton 2006; Vinsel 2017). As noted earlier, maintenance and repair are therefore much more relevant than innovation in seeking to understand sociotechnical processes, both empirically and theoretically. In this regard, Steven Jackson’s (2014) concept of broken-world thinking is more useful than innovation as a paradigmatic frame for analyzing the extant sociotechnical texture. Diffusion or articulation are also characterized by widespread and continuous practices of care, consolidating this idea of our world as an arena of ongoing processes of decay, vulnerability, and the material and organizational fragility of things and systems, placing the logic of care or fixing things at the very core of sociotechnical experience (Barad 2003; Denis and Pontille 2014; Denis et al. 2015; Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). A second mainstream exclusion is the idea of incremental innovation, referring to changes in some part of an otherwise unchanged technological system or device. Incremental innovation is deeply linked to maintenance

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and repair practices because during these activities, new solutions may be invented to address problems, damage, or breakdown (Graham and Thrift 2007, 5). These sociotechnical processes are also associated with the growth of regulatory activities in the proliferation of standards and standardization that drives the corresponding modification of devices. As well as stimulating adaptation, standards and standardization are an essential feature of the circulation and ongoing development of contemporary technologies (Star 2010; Star and Lampland 2009; Vinsel 2017). Mainstream ideas of innovation also exclude withdrawal or non-addition of elements to an extant device or system. These “subtractive” innovations are common in the food industry, where some items (e.g. sugar, gluten, palm oil) have been withdrawn from multiple products, so changing their content and structure (Goulet and Vinck 2017). Similarly, many products perform innovation through superficial changes in design or look, introducing an actual or invented “tradition” to strategically slow innovation activities with a view to deliberately escaping the race for innovation (Leitner 2017). In all such cases, the essential point is that the lack of novelty in sociotechnological change requires us to reconceptualize prevailing ideas of modern technology, which does not necessarily embody the innovation taken for granted in mainstream discourse and in policies and politics that assign a key role to innovation on the basis of standardized models. In peripheral regions, innovations that originate in more developed areas are perceived as inherently modern, and the local environment is classified as resistant because the prevailing politics recognizes only the products of “innovative” enterprises as innovation (Godin 2012). They share the premise that technology is alien to the social domain, according to its essence. In particular, innovation is seen to focus on design and projects, scaffolding an entire sociotechnical process that is eligible for funding, especially from public bodies, and ensures the prestige of professional innovators (Stuedahl and Smørdal 2015). In these peripheral regions in particular, the prevailing politics of innovation empowers conventional ideas of innovation and hinders bottom-up attempts to change technology and life. This politics is directly and genealogically linked to modernization dreams and the politics of development (Escobar 1995). This model purports to explain the general failure of this politics of innovation in terms of local backwardness and tradition-oriented behaviors, especially in peripheral areas. The identification of innovation with a top-down process helps to maintain and reproduce the ontological dualism between tradition and modernity, which is very useful in constructing the narrative of OneWorld domination. This worldview characterizes modernity as superior to tradition,

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which is represented as backward (Law 2015; Escobar 2018). The exclusion of already marginalized groups can be interpreted as a secondary effect of their presumed nature and their exclusion from the authoritarian topdown articulation of novel sociotechnical sets (Bauer 2017; Mongili 2015; Thomas et al. 2017). In the Global South and other peripheral areas, and in the technological practices of marginalized people, technical change differs visibly from mainstream innovation, often driven by people with no professional status, including workers, women, and members of minorities or other marginal groups. As discussed above, the overlap between innovation and sociotechnical processes can be challenged on several grounds. On close inspection, the identification of innovation and originality, innovation and imitation/ diffusion, innovation and novelty, and innovation and its consequences raises significant doubts about the linearity of the innovation process. Yet although most devices in current use are long established, and although most innovations are small, incremental, or subtractive, the ideology of innovation continues to strengthen (Vinsel 2017). Among scholars and in public discourse, dramatic breakthroughs and new technologies (“inventions”) continue to attract much greater interest than imitation or incremental change, technology-in-use, diffusion, or articulation. The thrust of this narrative further consolidates the hegemonic discourse around modernity, in which this version of innovation is a pivotal element. While many scholars agree that most inventions do not become innovations, the challenges of articulation impede change. Beyond this ideological construction, technology remains central to modern practices and narratives as the scapegoat for disasters, the promise of change, the dream of empowerment, and the nightmare of a diminished humanity. In our lives, technology is both juncture and actor, a texture impossible to conceive beyond humans and their activities, which are in turn unthinkable without technology.

References Akrich, Madeleine. 1992. “The De-scription of Technical Objects.” In ShapingTechnology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, edited by Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, 205–24. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Barad, Karen M. 1996. “Meeting the Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism without Contradiction.” In Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science, edited by Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson, 161–94. Dordrecht: Springer.

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———. 2003. “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How

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Mongili, Alessandro. 2014. “Designers as Users: Blurring Positions and Theories in Creative Practices.” In Information Infrastructure(s): Boundaries, Ecologies, Multiplicity, edited by Alessandro Mongili and Giuseppina Pellegrino, 2–25. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars. ———. 2015. Topologie postcoloniali: innovazione e modernizzazione in Sardegna. Cagliari: Condaghes. Mongili, Alessandro and Giuseppina Pellegrino. 2014. “The Boundaries of Information Infrastructures: An Introduction.” In Information Infrastructure(s): Boundaries, Ecologies, Multiplicity, edited by Alessandro Mongili and Giuseppina Pellegrino, xviii–xlvi. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars. Monteiro, Eric, Neil Pollock, Ole Hanseth and Robin Williams. 2013. “From Artefacts to Infrastructures.” Computer Supported Cooperative Work 22, no. 3: 575–607. Morita, Atsuro. 2014. “The Ethnographic Machine: Experimenting with Context and Comparison in Strathernian Ethnography.” Science, Technology and Human Values 39, no. 2: 214–35. Mumford, Lewis. 1934. Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt Brace. Pfotenhauer, Sebastian M. and Joakim Juhl. 2017. “Innovation and the Political State: Beyond the Myth of Technologies and Markets.” In Critical Studies of Innovation, edited by Benoît Godin and Dominique Vinck, 68–96. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Pipek, Volkmar and Volker Wulf. 2009. “Infrastructuring: Towards an Integrated Perspective on the Design and Use of Information Technology.” Journal of the Association of Information Systems 10, no. 5: 306–32. Puig de la Bellacasa, María. 2011. “Matters of Care in Technoscience: Assembling Neglected Things.” Social Studies of Science 41, no. 1: 85–106. Rogers, Everett M. 1962. Diffusion of Innovation. New York: Free Press. Shapin, Steven. 1989. “The Invisible Technician.” American Scientist 77, no. 6: 554–63. Simmel, Georg. 1902. “Tendencies in German Life and Thought since 1870.” International Monthly 1, no. 5: 93–111. Simondon, Gilbert. 2016. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Star, Susan Leigh. 1991. “The Sociology of the Invisible: The Primacy of Work in the Writing of Anselm Strauss.” In Social Organization and Social Process: Essays in Honor of Anselm Strauss, edited by David R. Maines, 265–83. Hawthorne, NY, Aldine de Gruyter. ———. 1995. Introduction to Ecologies of Knowledge: Work and Politics in Science and Technology, edited by Susan Leigh Star, 1–38. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. ———. 1999. “The Ethnography of Infrastructure.” American Behavioral Scientist 43, no. 3: 377–91.

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and Information Technology.” In Boundary Objects and Beyond: Working with Leigh Star, edited by Geoffrey C. Bowker, Stefan Timmermans, Adele Clarke, and Ellen Barka, 143–67. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Orig. publ. by the GenderNature-Culture Feminist Research Network, Odense, 1994. Star, Susan Leigh and James R. Griesemer. 1989. “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907–39.” Social Studies of Science 19, no. 3: 387–420. Star, Susan Leigh and Martha Lampland. 2009. “Reckoning with Standards.” In Standards and Their Stories, edited by Martha Lampland and Susan Leigh Star, 3–24. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Star, Susan Leigh and Karen Ruhleder. 1996. “Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for Large Information Spaces.” Information Systems Research 7, no. 1: 111–34. Star, Susan Leigh and Anselm Strauss. 1999. “Layers of Silence, Arenas of Voice: The Ecology of Visible and Invisible Work.” Computer Supported Cooperative Work 8, no. 1: 9–30. Star, Susan Leigh, Geoffrey Bowker, and Laura Neumann. 2004. “Transparency beyond the Individual Level of Scale: Convergence between Information Artifacts and Communities of Practice.” In Digital Library Use: Social Practice in Design and Evaluation, edited by Ann Peterson Bishop, 241–69. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stuedahl, Dagny and Ole Smørdal. 2015. “Matters of Becoming, Experimental Zones for Making Museums Public with Social Media.” Co-Design 11, nos. 3–4: 193–207. Suchman, Lucy. 2009. “Agency in Technology Design: Feminist Reconfigurations, in Digital Cultures: Participation – Empowerment – Diversity.” Online Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Gender and ICT. www.informatik.uni.bremen. de/soteg/gict2009/page/proceedings.html. Suchman, Lucy and Libby Bishop. 1999. “Problematizing ‘Innovation’ as a Critical Project.” Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 3, no. 12: 327–33. Suchman, Lucy, Randall Trigg, and Jeannette Blomberg. 2002. “Working Artefacts: Ethnomethods of the Prototype.” British Journal of Sociology 53, no. 2: 163–79. Sveiby, Karl-Erik. 2017. “Unattended Consequences of Innovation.” In Critical Studies of Innovation, edited by Benoît Godin and Dominique Vinck, 137–58. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Thomas, Hernan, Lucas Becerra and Santiago Garrid. 2017. “Socio-technical Dynamics of Counter-Hegemony and Resistance.” In Critical Studies of Innovation, edited by Benoît Godin and Dominique Vinck, 182–200. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

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About the Author Alessandro Mongili (University of Padua) is an Assistant Professor at the University of Padua, where he teaches science, technology, and society. He received his doctorate at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris in sociology on Soviet science. His research interests include sociotechnical change in peripheral areas, information infrastructure studies, and minority languages standardization and development. [email protected]

3.

Math and Modernity: Critical Reflections Lucio Cadeddu

Abstract Besides the birth of new revolutionary concepts and methods, and of new areas of research, mathematicians, logicians, and philosophers have put into question the foundations of the discipline itself and the whole meaning of “mathematical truth.” Before then, at the end of the eighteenth century, mathematics was mainly concerned with explaining the “real world” and its laws. At the beginning of the “modern era” things started to change, sometimes slowly, other times abruptly. Abstract mathematics was no longer intimately related to the real world and its description. This abstract approach, both on research and on mathematical education, generated critical reactions in the mathematical community, and some “modern” ideas were rejected or neglected after several decades of experimentation. Keywords: math modernism; new math; Bourbaki approach; abstract mathematics

Science is the captain and application is the soldier. ‒ Leonardo da Vinci Neglect of mathematics works injury to all knowledge, since he who is ignorant of it cannot know the other sciences or the things of the world. ‒ Roger Bacon

Mathematics has always been part of Western history and tradition, and it has always been closely linked to its culture and its philosophy. We shouldn’t

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forget Plato’s Republic, for instance, where it is strongly suggested that philosophers study mathematics in order fully understand the ever changing world. In the sixteenth century, the Tuscan polymath Galileo Galilei claimed that “the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics; without its help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it.” (Pinker 1997, 359). Galileo’s greatest contribution was, indeed, the “mathematization” of science. On the other hand, Dutch philosopher Benedict Spinoza wrote “Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order” (in Latin: Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677), perhaps the most ambitious attempt to apply the rigorous method of Euclid to philosophy. The end of the eighteenth century, the age of the Enlightenment, is a dark and pessimistic period for the future of mathematics, though it has been claimed that the entire project of the Enlightenment was to achieve the rigor and the methods of mathematics and apply these everywhere by means of “analytic thinking.” Later, German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who sharply criticized science, believed the character of truth is purely mathematical. As we can see, the cultural impact of mathematical ideas on philosophy and even religion, especially when attacking difficult problems as formal reasoning, sets, zero, inf inity, logic, and abstract structures has been profound, often dramatic. On the other hand, mathematicians have always been deeply influenced by philosophy and cultural circumstances, by other sciences, and by poetry, style, politics, and by all the traditions to which these belong. Moreover, the creativity of mathematicians proves that mathematics is as much a science as it is an art in itself. According to Bertrand Russell, “mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty – a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show” (Russell 1919, 60). And this automatically leads to another remark. Usually, the term modernism is used to describe the changes that took place in the arts and literature in particular during the period from 1890 to 1930 in Europe, more precisely in France and Germany. In this period, radical and revolutionary cultural, political, societal, technological, and scientific changes took place all over the world. In 1924 Virginia Woolf proclaimed, “on or about December 1910 human character changed.” This change modified all human relations, “those between masters and servants, husbands and wives, parents and children. And when human relations change, there is,

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at the same time, a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature” (V. Woolf 1924, 4–5). The Collins dictionary describes “modernism” as a movement in the arts in the first half of the twentieth century that rejected traditional values and techniques and emphasized the importance of individual experience. Now, considering modernism “a movement in the arts,” can we use its characteristics to describe the development of modern mathematics? Is it true that mathematicians rejected traditional values and techniques during that period? Actually, besides the birth of new revolutionary concepts and methods, and of new areas of research, mathematicians, logicians, and philosophers put into question the foundations of the discipline itself, and the whole meaning of “mathematical truth.” Before then, at the end of the eighteenth century, mathematics was mainly concerned with explaining the “real world” and its laws. It was a science of the material world and could never be analyzed separately from it. At the beginning of the “modern era” things started to change, sometimes slowly, other times abruptly. Abstract mathematics was no longer intimately related to the real world and its description.

Modernism and Mathematics By the end of the nineteenth century, the content and the scope of mathematics and also its institutional and interpersonal setting had changed radically, and had been changing since the early 1800s. The mathematical “society” evolved dramatically, thanks to the birth and exponential growth of mathematical journals and academic departments. Even interpersonal scientific relations evolved during the century, thanks to the establishment of several national mathematical societies (associations of mathematicians of a given country), and international meetings and workshops for mathematicians. The first mathematical society to be established was the London Mathematical Society, founded in 1865, followed by the Société Mathématique de France, established in 1872. Then there was the birth of the Edinburgh Mathematical Society in Scotland, the Circolo Matematico of Palermo in Italy, founded in 1884 by Giovanni Battista Guccia, and the New York Mathematical Society, now renamed as the American Mathematical Society. In 1890, in Germany, the German Mathematical Society (Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung) was established, with Georg Cantor as first

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president. The Mathematical Association of America entered the scene at the close of 1915. The first international congress of mathematics was held in Zurich in 1897, during which 208 specialists from 16 countries took part. The official languages were French and German. It was on this occasion when the objectives for this type of meetings were established: to stimulate relations between mathematicians of different countries; to deliver reports on contemporary mathematical subjects; and to foster cooperation in fields such as terminology and bibliography. The second meeting, which took place in Paris in 1900, was particularly memorable because David Hilbert gave his historic lecture “Mathematische Probleme,” during which he outlined the principal mathematical problems to be tackled in the twentieth century, a series of twenty-three challenges that would provide the incentive for the next hundred years. Some of these are still unsolved today (we will return to this topic). These international meetings, despite facing deep cultural and political differences among participants, greatly helped the mathematics community to rapidly share their researches all around the world. Moreover, different areas of mathematics started to discover common underlying structures while the rapid developments in similar fields like physics, statistics, and computer science gave mathematicians support and inspiration for applications. Towards the beginning of the nineteenth century, mathematics became very self-conscious, and like the meditator in the First Meditation of Descartes, asked if it really knew anything. The calculus had happily gone forward, for example, with the presumption of the lavish and solid presence of continuous magnitude. According to the seventeenth-century rationalism, Rene Descartes, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the whole scope of mathematics was devoted to “pure reason.” Anyway, it seemed that this abstract “mere invention of the spirit” could be successfully applied to solve real-world problems. Theories and facts, reason and experience, had to be closely linked. A theory can be based on observation (of the outside world) and at the same time observations can justify the theory, building a kind of vicious (or virtual?) circle. This was indeed the way Descartes built the process known as “Cartesian circle.” In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, “unreasoned” facts were quite common in mathematics. The real problem was how to turn these “unreasoned” facts into “reasoned” ones. Cauchy and his followers attacked the problem by means of a kind of “translation-procedure” which corresponded to the inductive passage from

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facts to reasoned facts in the Cartesian circle. Isaac Newton also used an elaborate version of such a circle, regarded it as a proper method, and warned against those who did not apply it with due diligence. He used to say “I do not feign hypotheses!” In other words, (mathematical) truth does not belong to experience alone, but it cannot simply be generated by pure thought either. Newton, on the other hand, was not new to such “unscientific” meditations as he was both a master practitioner of science and a thinker with a penchant for the occult. Another school of thought, that of the British empiricists, like the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume, claimed that if mathematical truth is not based on “pure reason” or on circular methodology, then it should derive from an external source, and that derived by sensory experience. Hume believed that philosophy (and hence mathematics) cannot go beyond experience.

Applied or Abstract? Marx, Engels, and the Critique of Differential Calculus Not far from these guidelines, and many years after the discoveries of Newton and Leibniz and the discovery of differential calculus, Karl Marx independently developed his ideas on what seemed to him the abstractness of the approach taken to mathematics. Differential calculus was needed in economics, and that’s the reason why Marx was interested in studying it. His mathematical manuscripts, from around 1873–83, consisted mostly of attempts to understand the foundations of inf initesimal calculus. According to Hubert C. Kennedy (Kennedy 1977, 303–18) Marx seems to have been unaware of the advances being made by continental mathematicians in the foundations of differential calculus, including the work of Cauchy. While Marx’s analysis of the derivative and differential had no immediate effect on the historical development of mathematics, Engels’ claim that Marx made independent discoveries is certainly justified. Marx’s operational definition of the differential anticipated twentieth century developments in mathematics, and there is another aspect of the differential, that seems to have been seen by Marx, that has become a standard part of modern textbooks – the concept of the differential as the principal part of an increment.

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In some sense, Marx’s apparently naive ideas were the same ones that motivated the birth of nonstandard calculus. This is a branch of modern mathematical logic developed by Abraham Robinson in the 1960s. By coincidence, considering Marx’s interest in differential calculus originated with his need to understand economic laws, analysis has found its application in mathematical economics; for example, to describe the behavior of large economies and to give meaning to concepts that, classically, make no sense, such as certain products of infinitely many independent, equally weighted random variables. Marx was not alone in his studies. In a private letter, Engels deals with the concepts of science and technology, and the link between them: “If technology is chiefly dependent on the extent to which science is advanced then the latter is far more dependent on the degree to which technology has advanced as well as its requirements. If society has a need for a certain technology, then this does more to advance science than can ten universities” (quoted in Marx 1990, 39:205). Engels’ public declaration, in which he claimed to speak for Marx as well, states that knowledge of mathematics and natural science is essential to a conception of nature which is dialectical and at the same time materialist. As a consequence of this thought even Engels, after his retirement from business, started to study mathematics along with physics and chemistry as well. Following these same guidelines, in 1931 the Communist Academy in Moscow published a book titled the Struggle for Materialistic Dialectics in Mathematics (the authors remaining anonymous). It was a collection of articles which investigated the interplay between mathematics, philosophy, and history. The aim of these articles was to enable mathematicians to adopt the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels throughout their research activity. “Existence determines our consciousness” was the fil rouge of materialistic philosophy. In other words, in opposition to idealistic philosophy, matter dominates ideas. For mathematicians it was quite diff icult to decide which kind of philosophy to use during their work and research. Do mathematical entities (numbers, geometric shapes, etc.) really exist in … reality? Or are they just idealizations? And what would be the best way to teach mathematics? Experience easily proves that dogmatic prescriptions from the “outside world” do not help much. For example, in the introduction of the aforementioned book there was a clear attack on the so-called “reactionary Moscow mathematical school” because it used “analysis of continuous

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functions to counteract revolutionary theories, number theory as triumph of individualism and cabalism, and probability theory for purposeless events” (Lorentz 2002, 184). This kind of analysis was (and still is!) pure nonsense for mathematicians! Moreover, the introduction of the book continued to struggle even with the most basic ideas of mathematics: “Apparently the sequence of natural numbers 1, 2, … to infinity is not an objective notion but is a function of the head of the mathematician who is talking about it” (Lorentz 2002, 184). It has to be remarked that at the beginning of the twentieth century there were two different schools of thought in mathematics. On the one hand, there was the “formalist” school, introduced by Hilbert, where all mathematics can be reduced to rules for manipulating formulas without any reference to the meanings of the formulas. On the other hand, there was the “intuitionist” school of thought, introduced by L. E. J. Brouwer, following which the primary objects of mathematical studies are mental constructions governed by self-evident laws. Despite the fact there was a substantial difference (and disagreement) between these two schools of thought, they were considered similar, because they were based on idealistic philosophy (and not materialist, as the Communist Academy preferred). The book, indeed, contained a clear warning of the need to give a sound foundation to mathematics and to rebuild it on the basis of a theoretical understanding of the practical problems of constructing socialism. This approach would eventually be revamped twenty years later, during the early years of the Cold War era, by mathematician Aleksandrov, as we’ll see.

Modern Mathematics between 1900 and World War II: The “Hilbert Problems,” Tough Challenges for Mathematicians David Hilbert, founder of the “formalist” school of thought, is famous also for a list of twenty-three unsolved problems, known as “Hilbert’s problems.” Of the twenty-three appearing in total in the printed address, just ten were actually presented at the Second International Congress in Paris on August 8, 1900. More precisely, following the advice of Hurwitz and Minkowski, Hilbert reduced the spoken version of his talk so that it contained only ten of the twenty-three problems: 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, 19, 21, and 22. The complete list of twenty-three problems was published later, most notably in English translation in 1902 by Mary Frances Winston Newson in the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Hilbert 1902).

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Hilbert’s problems were designed to serve as examples for the type of problems whose solutions would produce real progress in the evolution of modern mathematics. Some of the topics Hilbert proposed weren’t strictly “problems,” but just vast areas of worthwhile investigation. Although Hilbert didn’t agree with the view that the concepts of arithmetic alone need a fully rigorous treatment, he supported the idea that the development of the arithmetical continuum by Cauchy, Bolzano, and Cantor was one of the two most notable achievements of nineteenth-century mathematics. For this reason, the first of his twenty-three problems concerned the structure of the real-number continuum. The second most notable achievement, according to Hilbert, was the development of the non-Euclidean geometry of Gauss, Bolyai, and Lobachevsky. Of the twenty-three problems, three are still unresolved, three were too vaguely formulated to be resolved, and six could be partially solved. Given the influence of the problems, the twenty-first century analogue of Hilbert’s problems is the famous list of seven Millennium Prize problems chosen in 2000 by the Clay Mathematics Institute. Each prize problem includes a million dollar bounty and this is the reason why these problems are known even outside the mathematical community. Of the three still unsolved problems, the most famous one is the Riemann hypothesis. Hilbert himself declared: “If I were to awaken after having slept for a thousand years, my first question would be: Has the Riemann hypothesis been proven?” (Clawson 1999, 98). The hypothesis is named after German mathematician Bernhard Riemann. It deals with a special function, the so-called Riemann zeta function. This function inputs and outputs complex-number values. The inputs that give zero as output are called zeros of the zeta function. Many of these zeros have already been found: the negative even integers are the “obvious” ones. This follows directly from Riemann’s functional equation. Many other (complex) zeros have been computed and they all have real parts equal to one-half. And here’s where the Riemann hypothesis takes place: do all the zeros have real parts equal to one-half? If this hypothesis could be proven to be correct, this would allow mathematicians to give a description of how the prime numbers are placed between whole numbers. We know from the Greeks (actually, Euclid proved it!) that there are inf initely many primes. What is still unknown is how they are distributed within the integers. If the Riemann hypothesis could be proven to be false, it would mean that the distribution of primes has more structure than anticipated or, perhaps, there’s a different type of structure, such as certain unexpected correlations.

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That could have an impact on security codes which are based on prime numbers, such as the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithm or other number-theoretic codes. Actually, it is false that proving the Riemann hypothesis (thus unveiling the distribution of prime numbers) would itself lead to a breakthrough on the RSA encryption algorithm. Possibly, the methods leading to the proof of the Riemann hypothesis could nonetheless make factoring easier (and the RSA algorithm is based on factoring large numbers).

From Hilbert to Abstraction: The Bourbaki Revolution, for a “New Math” Paradigm in Mathematical Research In some sense following Hilbert’s formalism, a group of French mathematicians gave birth (in 1930s) to a fictional character, more precisely a collective of anonymous individuals named Nicholas Bourbaki, who exerted considerable influence over the twentieth-century mathematics, confirming Herder’s hypothesis that the “mind is shaped by fictions.” The founders of this collective group were: Henri Cartan, Jean Coulomb, Claude Chevalley, Jean Delsarte, Jean Dieudonné, Charles Ehresmann, René de Possel, Szolem Mandelbrojt, and André Weil. This “individual” undertook the monumental task of rewriting all of mathematics in terms of pure and abstract structures. From this monumental work derived what was called “modern mathematics.” To some extent, Bourbaki’s ideas were closely linked to those of the Swiss physician, psychologist, and educationalist Jean Piaget. For him, the development of cognition has to be considered inseparable from the acquisition of operational knowledge (acquired “intuition”) of certain mathematical structures. Their goal was to ground all of mathematics on set theory, striving for rigor and generality. Their work led to the discovery of several concepts and terminologies still used today, and influenced modern branches of mathematics. This strong emphasis on rigor may be interpreted as a reaction to the ideas of Henri Poincaré, a French mathematician, theoretical physicist, engineer, and philosopher of science who believed that free-flowing mathematical intuition was of paramount importance, even at a cost of descriptive completeness. One of the founders, Jean Dieudonné, in his Mathematics – The Music of Reason (Dieudonné 1987, 203), wrote: “If I wished to sum up in one sentence the way in which ideas unfolded during this period [1800–1930], I would say that its essence was a progressive abandonment of the concept of ‘evident

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truths,’ first in geometry, and then in the rest of mathematics.” In other words, mathematics was making its own “linguistic turn,” moving toward the discrete, formal-computational approach that reflected a growing concern with language. The Bourbaki approach wasn’t always welcomed by the rest of the mathematical community. American mathematician Gian-Carlo Rota once wrote about the “pernicious influence of mathematics on philosophy” (Rota 1991, 165–78). More or less in the same vain were the opinions expressed by the French mathematician René Thom, which can be summed up in his famous and controversial article: “Modern Mathematics: Educational and Philosophical Error?” (Thom 1971, 695–99). Furthermore, Bourbaki’s books made only limited use of pictures in their presentation. French mathematician Pierre Cartier, an associate of the Bourbaki group, is quoted as later saying (Senechal 1998, 28): “The Bourbaki were Puritans, and Puritans are strongly opposed to pictorial representations of the truths of their faith.” In general, Bourbaki’s approach has been criticized for reducing geometry as a whole to pure and abstract algebra and soft analysis. In the longer term, Bourbaki’s ideas have had a def inite and deep influence. In secondary education, the New Math movement (see the section devoted to New Math) corresponded to teachers influenced by Bourbaki. Bourbaki’s direct influence has decreased over time. The group is however still active today as of 2020, organizing seminars, and it released a book in 2016.

The Effects of World War II on Modern Mathematics The rise of Hitler and the National Socialist Party in Germany heavily affected mathematical institutions all around the world. During the spring of 1933, numerous professors were dismissed or forced to leave German universities. Subsequently, the actions taken against individuals of Jewish background or opposing political beliefs caused a vast migration of scholars from Germany and even from German-occupied countries. Moreover, many of those who remained found their death. As a result, some of the most established mathematical centers of western and central Europe experienced a diminution of scholars. The same thing happened in the Soviet Union as well, blocking the growth of many centers of activity. In Poland the situation was even worse, with the closing of the universities after 1939. The University of Warsaw’s notable mathematical collection was

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destroyed, nearly 200 faculty members were removed from the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, and many professors were killed in Lvov in July 1941. For these reasons, many European mathematicians moved to the United States. Among the best known of these were Hermann Weyl, Emil Artin, Richard Brauer, and Emmy Noether; the analysts Richard Courant and Jacques Hadamard; the probability specialist William Feller; the statistician Jerzy Neyman; the logicians Kurt Gödel and Alfred Tarski; and the historian of mathematics Otto Neugebauer. Many mathematicians who weren’t subject to persecution left professional life, just to avoid conflict with the regime or to avoid affiliation with it. Among those who did not escape we can’t forget Hausdorff, who could no longer avoid being sent to an internment camp and committed suicide, together with his wife and his wife’s sister; Hartogs committed suicide in 1943 in Munich; Blumenthal, who was Hilbert’s first PhD student, and Tauber both died in Theresienstadt; and Saks, one of the main contributors to twentiethcentury integration theory, was killed by Gestapo in Warsaw (1942). In the United States, the American Mathematical Society (AMS) suspended plans for the envisioned 1940 International Congress of Mathematicians because of the German invasion of Poland in 1939. As war threatened to engulf Europe and beyond, the American mathematical community thought back to their experiences of the Great War. There was general consensus that a lack of coordination among American mathematicians had severely affected their contributions to the previous war effort. For this reason, military leaders couldn’t understand where mathematicians were needed, or even worse, where the needed mathematicians and mathematics experience could be found. An efficient means of joining together current technical problems and competent mathematicians was strongly needed. Combining their efforts, mathematicians heavily contributed to many of the United States’ wartime innovations in weaponry, aeronautics, provisioning, communications, and intelligence. AMS secretary Roland Richardson once said, “It may be a war of physics, but the physicists say it is a war of mathematics.” (Barany 2019, 201) Hence, the mathematicians played a fundamental role in defence during World War II, and the cryptanalysis of the German Enigma ciphering system, mostly due to the English mathematician Alan Turing, is probably the most famous. Generally, during World War II new challenges had to be met, because of the new needs in applied mathematics. As a result, the applications of mathematics to science grew in an exceptional way.

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Post-World War II: Evolution of Modern Mathematics during the Cold War Era During the early years of the Cold War era the debate around the role of modern mathematics (and science in general) was still quite open. Soviet mathematician Aleksandr Aleksandrov was in favor of a sort of “de-ideologization,” drawing a line between the “objective content” and “philosophical interpretation” of mathematical theories, and claimed that the inner core of mathematical and more generally scientific knowledge had to be independent from the social system or ideology. He was strongly against the aforementioned schools of thought, Hilbert’s formalism and Brouwer’s intuitionism, as he considered that these two approaches detached mathematics from material reality, from practice. In contrast to both these two schools of thought, Soviet mathematicians were more familiar with the postulates of dialectical materialism, verifying mathematical truths with practice, and were thus free of philosophical errors. Moreover, there was a sharp contrast with what was happening in the West, where idealistic interpretations of mathematical logic were taking place and gaining momentum. According to Aleksandrov, Soviet mathematicians had to develop the objective content of formal mathematical logic, since formal logical consistency was of paramount importance to improving the power of mathematical instruments and theories, which had to serve the development of science in general. Western science had to be defeated and overtaken, especially in military-related applications, and this should have been an easy task, considering the ideologically flawed foundations of Western scholarship in mathematics and science. The Iron Curtain between the two “empires” didn’t help much – that is, in either direction – as the real progress of science is based on the free exchange of ideas and scholars. This caused a sad slowdown in the development and diffusion of new ideas and results, both in mathematics and in science in general. The United States and the Soviet Union were in a tense and highly fragile relationship. Even though they eventually ended World War II as allies, the differences already outlined in ideologies and fundamental political and sociological values gave birth to a reciprocal resentment and distrust. It was clear that another war had to be avoided by all means. Nonetheless, both powers struggled for supremacy in economic productivity, development of science and technology, and of course the exploration of space. In the United States, this led to a cultural revolution in the field of the “mother of

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all sciences,” that is, mathematics. The following section is entirely devoted to the so-called “New Math.”

Post-World War II: “New Math,” The Rise and Fall of a “Modernist” Approach to Mathematical Education On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik I, the world’s first artificial satellite. It was a 58-centimeter (23-inch)-diameter polished metal sphere, around the size of a beach ball, with four external radio antennas to broadcast radio signals. It orbited for three weeks (each orbit took ninety-eight minutes to complete) before its batteries died. The Sputnik’s unexpected success precipitated the so-called American Sputnik crisis and gave birth to the “space race,” a significant part of the Cold War era. To the horror of many Americans, the space race was being won by communist scientists from the Soviet Union. As a reaction to the public uproar, the United States government accelerated the space exploration program and established NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) to prove the United States’ commitment to an aggressive and competitive space program. In the effort to boost, improve, and modernize science education and mathematical skills in the American population after the Sputnik crisis, the National Science Foundation was created in 1950 to promote basic scientific research; and then expanded in 1957, it began to revolutionize secondary school education in math (as well as in biology, chemistry, and the social sciences). According to Steven Schlossman, a historian at Carnegie Mellon University, this event elicited widespread fear that the United States was being undone in the quality of its schools and education. The general consensus was: How could it be that the Soviets had gotten there faster? They must have better schools training their kids to become scientists on a higher level. America now had to integrate schools into its thinking about national defense policy. But no single event rocketed homework back into the national conversation quite like the launching of Sputnik I. The response from the US federal government was swift. In 1958, just a year after Sputnik, congress passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), a billion-dollar spending package meant to bolster high-quality teaching and learning in science, mathematics, and foreign languages. A report from the House of Representatives supporting passage of the NDEA reads: “It is no exaggeration to say that America’s progress in many fields of endeavor in the years ahead – in fact, the very survival of our free country – may depend

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in large part upon the education we provide for our young people now” (Congressional Record 1958, 16745). Funding from the NDEA helped develop ambitious new high-school curricula, including what became known as the “New Math.” Top academics, scientists, and educational psychologists teamed up to create a new American public-education mandate that would later be called the “academic-excellence” movement. And homework was front and center. Just as the academic excellence movement promoted a deeper and more hands-on approach to math and science in the classroom, homework at all levels had to be more than memorization and mindless drills. It needed to promote creative problem-solving and analytical thinking. The NDEA investment had immediate effects. By 1962, 23 percent of high-school juniors reported doing two or more hours of homework a night, nearly twice as many as in 1957, the year of Sputnik. Still, the Sputnik homework bump didn’t last long. The counterculture movement of the late 1960s encouraged students to question authority, and nothing sticks it to “the man” quite like skipping your homework. By 1972, the percentage of high-schoolers doing two or more hours of homework a day dropped back below 10 percent. The result of the cultural revolution was the so-called “New Mathematics” or “New Math,” a radical and quite dramatic change in the way mathematics was taught in American grade schools. New topics, never taught before in high schools were introduced, such as modular arithmetic, algebraic inequalities, bases different from the usual 10, matrices, symbolic logic, Boolean algebra, and abstract algebra. The change also affected elementary schools, where bases different than 10 were introduced as well, but also basic set theory and the effort to distinguish “numerals” from “numbers.” Max Beberman, teacher at the University of Illinois, is considered the founder of New Math and his ideas on the new curriculum achieved nationwide fame long before the 1957 Sputnik crisis raised mathematics education to the level of a national priority. He said that a conceptual overhaul of math education was strongly needed and that mathematics should be taught as a language. For this reason, it had to be considered a liberal art, a kind of logic for solving social as well as scientific problems. In 1957, when the Soviets launched Sputnik, the small New Math experiment earned nationwide praise and success. By the mid-1960s more than half the nation’s high schools had adopted some kind of the new math curriculum. Ten years later the 85 percent of schools adopted this “new deal.” By 1965 Max Beberman himself reportedly said, “We’re in danger of raising a generation of kids who can’t do computational arithmetic.” (Kline 1973, 110) Two years later, the first international mathematics study compared math students

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from twelve countries, and US students ranked last in one age group and next to last in another. Those were the side effects of the new way of teaching “modern” mathematics. By 1973, the New Math program had largely been abandoned by school boards. Why did New Math fail? There were many different reasons, ranging from the limited time given to the new curricula to the absence of trained teachers who did not fully understand what they were teaching. But, most of all, it failed because, as Morris Kline wrote in his book, Why Johnny Can’t Add: The Failure of the New Math, “abstraction is not the first stage, but the last stage, in a mathematical development” (Kline 1973, 98). In other words, the trend to abstraction, fueled by Bourbaki’s approach, was almost impossible to apply to elementary-school pupils’ education, and it was even harder for high-school students. In 1965, Nobel Prize physicist Richard Feynman wrote at the end of his polemical essay “New Textbooks for the ‘New’ Mathematics”: “In the ‘new’ mathematics, then, first there must be freedom of thought; second, we do not want to teach just words; and third, subjects should not be introduced without explaining the purpose or reason, or without giving any way in which the material could be really used to discover something interesting. I don’t think it is worthwhile teaching such material” (Feynman 1965, 15). From time to time new attempts to reformulate the way mathematics is taught appear and earn praise and reputation. On the other hand, one should never forget the catastrophic failures of previous attempts. “Modern” does not always imply “better.” Moreover, one should never forget it is harder to teach concepts than algorithms. Today, starting from 2010, the United States has embraced the Common Core State Standards Initiative, a program – sponsored by the Council of Chief State School Off icers and the National Governors Association – which defines guidelines for what K-12 (kindergarten to grade 12) students should know in mathematics (and also in English-language arts) at the conclusion of each school grade. The stated goal of these new standards is to achieve greater focus and coherence in the curriculum. Actually, as of 2020, this initiative hasn’t been entirely adopted by all US states. In its first stage, it was adopted by forty-five states. As of March 2020, however, Indiana – one of the first states to adopt the Common Core – became the f irst to back out. In June, South Carolina and Oklahoma followed, and other states are reconsidering its implementation. In Louisiana and Wisconsin there’s a tendency to drop these new standards. Not surprisingly, as it happened with the New Math program, these new “standards” have drawn both support and criticism from analysts, politicians, teachers,

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families, and commentators, and many experts are doubtful about the results in terms of quality of mathematics education nationwide.1

New Math in Other Countries Soviet Union. At the time the New Math program was popular and adopted in the United States, the Soviet school system consisted of ten grades. The mathematics committee, under the famous mathematician A. N. Kolmogorov, issued a reform of the curriculum for grades 4–10. This committee believed that the New Math reform reform that was taking place in Western countries was simply unacceptable. As a result, the ubiquitous “set-theory” approach wasn’t included in school textbooks. Just some traces of the “geometric-transformation” approach could be found on some school textbooks, though certainly not at the level of sophistication that the New Math program required. United Kingdom. During the sixties, the School Mathematics Project (SMP), a developer of mathematics textbooks for secondary schools in the United Kingdom, began a research project inspired by a 1961 conference chaired by Bryan Thwaites at the University of Southampton. The aim was to adopt certain “new” ideas behind the New Math movement. Hence, the SMP research project dwelt on subjects such as set theory, graph theory and logic, non-Cartesian coordinate systems, matrix mathematics, affine transforms, vectors, and non-decimal number systems. This system failed to get nationwide diffusion but was taught up until the mid-eighties in some schools. Germany. The so-called Bildungsreform (educational reform) is the German name given to the attempt to change public education. In West Germany the changes in mathematics education were a part of this broader attempt to introduce new approaches in teaching. The inspiration, again, was the New Math movement, hence arithmetic was approached using set theory as a guideline, while the traditional “old” deductive Euclidean geometry was tentatively replaced by transformation geometry. As in other countries, this abstract approach proved to be less successful than expected and was gradually neglected. Italy and France. Just five years after the end of the World War II, a group of scientists, including Jean Piaget (psychologist) and Gustave Choquet (mathematician), founded the International Commission for the Study and 1 For a survey related to the mathematical part of the “Core,” see “Critiques of the Common Core in Early Math: A Research-Based Response” (Clements et al. 2019).

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the Improvement of Mathematical Education in France (Commission Internationale pour l’Etude et l’Amélioration de l’Enseignement Mathématique). During various international meetings – Royaumont (1959), Dubrovnik (1960), and Bologna (1961) – this commission proposed a deep reform for mathematics schoolbooks, under the name of the mathématique nouvelle (new math). The main ideas were, again, those supported by the Bourbakist abstract approach that served as the basis for the American “New Math” program. In Italy, these ideas were strongly criticized by schoolteachers, and as in other countries they were slowly abandoned. Japan. The New Math was apparently introduced in Japan to meet the needs of the industrial and economic world. Initially, the Ministry of Education had a rather positive view of the new trend. However, the private sector strongly criticized this new approach, because it was more interested in a learning path based on the standpoint of the learners. After just a few years, the Japanese version of New Math was neglected, and mathematics teachers tried to reorient mathematics education to the point of view of the learners. This movement was called Living Mathematics for Learning and totally replaced the New Math approach.

Conclusions Since the dawn of human civilization, technological breakthroughs have been developed hand in hand with progress in mathematics. We can say we now live in a highly mathematized society, and that mathematics is the basis for virtually all of modern life. Mathematics is, without doubt, the most generally applicable of all fields of human knowledge. This notwithstanding, progress in mathematics hasn’t always been closely linked to real-world applications. Or, at least, not immediately! Many important abstract results and mathematical theories found useful applications only centuries after initially being developed. As we have seen and discussed, attempts to revolutionize the way mathematics is taught, learned, and developed have been made over the centuries. From time to time a new, revolutionary “modern” approach is developed, both in research and education. Many of these attempts have failed, hence to be sure, the adjective “modern” does not apply well to mathematics. It is old and new at the same time.2 2 Developing new mathematics is a journey, as Leonard Woolf wrote in his book, The Journey, not the Arrival, Matters (L. Woolf 1969, 1).

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References Barany, Michael Jeremy. 2019. The World War II Origins of Mathematics Awareness in The Best Writing in Mathematics 2018, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 201. Clawson, Calvin. 1999. Mathematical Mysteries: The Beauty and Magic of Numbers. New York: Basic Books. Clements Douglas, Fuson Karen, and Sarama Julie. 2019. “Critiques of the Common Core in Early Math: A Research-Based Response.” Journal for Research in Mathematics Education 50, no. 1: 11–22. Congressional Record. 1958. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 104, pt. 13. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Dieudonné, Jean. 1987. Mathematics – The Music of Reason. Paris: Hachette. Feynman, Richard. 1965. “New Textbooks for the ‘New’ Mathematics.” Engineering and Science 28, no. 6: 9–15. Hilbert, David. 1902. “Mathematical Problems.” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 8, no. 10: 437–79. Kennedy, Hubert C. 1977. “Karl Marx and the Foundations of Differential Calculus.” Historia Mathematica 4, no. 3: 303–18. Kline, Morris. 1973. Why Johnny Can’t Add: The Failure of the New Math. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Lorentz, George Gunter. 2002 “Mathematics and Politics in the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1953.” Journal of Approximation Theory 116: 169–223 Marx, Karl. 1990 Marx Engels Werke. Berlin: Dietz. Pinker, Steven. 1997. How the mind works. New York, W. W. Norton & Company. Rota, Gian-Carlo. 1991. “New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” Synthese 88, no. 2: 165–78. Russell, Bertrand. 1919. The Study of Mathematics: Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Senechal, Marjorie. 1998. “The Continuing Silence of Bourbaki—An Interview with Pierre Cartier”, The Mathematical Intelligencer 1, 22-28 Thom, René. 1971. “Modern Mathematics: Educational and Philosophical Error?” American Scientist 59, no. 6: 695–99. Woolf, Leonard. 1969. The Journey, not the Arrival, Matters: An Autobiography of the Years, 1939–69. London: Hogarth Press. Woolf, Virginia. 1924. Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown: Collected Essays. London: Leonard Woolf; vol. 1, Hogarth Press.

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About the Author Lucio Cadeddu (University of Cagliari) is a professor of Calculus at the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science of the University of Cagliari. His research interests vary from global analysis, pure and applied PDEs (partial differential equations), especially in the field of biological applications, music and mathematics, to mathematical education/history. [email protected]

4. Stranded Modernity Post-war Hiroshima as Discursive Battlefield Daishiro Nomiya Abstract High modernity claims that the modernity project gave rise to institutional organs of modern nation states, culminating in an emergence of ultra-military states with wartime economy in the early twentieth century. It also argues that the same developmental pattern continued to dominate in the post-World War II period. This chapter examines this high-modernity thesis, employing Japan and Hiroshima as cases to be analyzed. Against the high-modernity thesis, many believe that Japan had a historical disjuncture in 1945, being ultramilitary before the end of World War II and a peaceful nation after. Examinations show that, while the modernity project controlled a large-scale historical process in Japan, it met vehement resistance, and became stranded in Hiroshima. Keywords: modernity; Japan; Hiroshima; atomic bomb

In late nineteenth century, Japan started its own invasive action toward neighboring East Asian countries. “It plunged into the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, then into the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1911 successively. In less than a decade from the domination of Korea, Japan entered itself in another large-scale war, World War I, which ended with the victory of Japan’s largely Western military alliance. Invasion and expansion were at the core of Japanese foreign policy in the early twentieth century. During this period, Japan’s invasions of neighboring countries resulted in massive land seizure by Japanese military forces and their domination of peoples residing in newly acquired territories. Extensive use of science and technology, together with the development of heavy industries, provided the foundation for construction of military arsenals

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch04

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and high-technology weapons. To the world in the early twentieth century, Japan was a rapidly emerging state that would soon rank with advanced Western powers. It was in this context that Japan’s aspiration to a stronger military presence led the country to participate in another war, this time World War II, the biggest war mankind has ever experienced. In the World War II, Japan lost. Not only did it lose the war, but it did so devastatingly – as exemplified by the total destruction of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US atomic bombs. The bombs turned two beautiful local-capital cities into barren lands, claiming to this date the death of more than 500,000 just in these two cities.1 A new transformation project took off immediately after the defeat in World War II. The next few decades were marked by a series of gigantic shifts in Japanese sociopolitical, economic, and cultural fields. Led by the GHQ (General Headquarters for the Allied Forces), which guided the occupation policy after Japan’s surrender in 1945, Japan officially discarded its autocratic military system, employing instead a democratic governmental system, even proclaiming in its new constitution to renounce war indefinitely. The post-war transformation project seemed to be complete. As much as post-World War II Japan appears totally different from its past, questions remain. How different is post-war Japan really from itself before 1945? How smooth was the transition? What had Japan done wrong? What did Japan have to learn from its defeat in the war, and how should it move forward into the future? This chapter revisits these dialogues and discussions; it does so, however, in a way different from previous studies. Past studies – including academic literature and school textbooks – tended to view post-1945 Japan as distinctively different from pre-1945 Japan (Maruyama 1956; Kamishima 1961; Ohtsuka 1969; Wada 2015; Sasayama et al. 2020). They argued that from late nineteenth century to the end of World War II, Japan was operating disfunctionally as a state; it was in an abnormal state strongly controlled by the military (Tominaga 1990, 67). Symbolized by the devastation caused by the atomic bombs, the defeat in 1945 awakened Japan, or stopped its march toward Westernization driven by the wartime economy. In between pre- and post-war Japan, there was a disjuncture, as post-war Japan took a different route from the one it had taken previously; 1 As of August 2019, the atomic bomb–related death toll counts close to 320,000 in Hiroshima, and over 180,000 in Nagasaki, according to the lists of atomic-bomb victims compiled by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (City of Hiroshima 2019; City of Nagasaki 2019).

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as a result, it would now become one of the most advanced and peaceful countries in the world. In this chapter I argue against this disjuncture thesis, claiming that the pre-war developmental pattern in Japan has been well preserved in postwar Japan. In so doing I base my argument on the high-modernity thesis. Secondly, I argue, however, that the modernity project in post-war Japan, together with its modern industrial and economic development, did not go as smoothly as its advocates might have desired. In fact, the modernity project was greeted in Japan with fierce opposition and resistance. I will look at the forms taken by this resistance and opposition and how these obstacles presented themselves in the perspective of the modernity project, citing controversies and arguments in the discursive sphere of the post-war Hiroshima. My use of Hiroshima and its discursive field as a subject for examination is not without reason. Hiroshima is the best possible case to be studied study for the unfolding of modernity. Hiroshima after August 6, 1945, was simply a devastated barren land, with nothing except a few half-torn-down buildings remaining on the horizon. Thus, in the post-war era, Hiroshima had to start its own reconstruction project from ground zero. In the effort to rebuild a city, we can observe how the idea of modernity crept in and was challenged by opposition groups. In the analysis, I examine discourses and arguments made during Hiroshima’s post-war reconstruction. Hard historical facts are useful in the understanding of the past. However, they do not show us what might have taken place otherwise. Often, a historical event is an end outcome of the complex interaction of diverse ideas and arguments constituting the decision-making process that eventually gave rise to the event. We would therefore expect to observe the interaction of modern and non-modern mentalities in the exchange of ideas, arguments, and controversies. In their discussions of Hiroshima’s exposure to the atomic bomb and the aftermath, many studies – including scholarly writings – touch on the disastrous condition of the bombed areas, as well as the massive death of the innocent and the grief and sorrow of atomic-bomb survivors (Naono 2015; Nakazawa 2007; Yoneyama 2005; Fujiwara 2001; Nagaoka 1977). While these facts are among the most important aspects of the incident Hiroshima experienced in August 1945, it is important not to allow the sheer impact of this traumatic incident and its emotionally-loaded memory blur our effort to bring a new analytical perspective to bear on the study of Hiroshima. Albeit small in number, studies also exist that describe the dropping of the atomic bomb and the aftermath from the perspective of modernity.

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These studies, however, tend to view the experience as a setback in the modernity project. Zwigenberg, for example, sees a complex feeling of unease and self-doubt prevaling in Hiroshima as an expression of “modernity’s failure” or a “challenge to modernity” (2014, 209 and 301). Likewise, Lennon and Foley speak of Hiroshima as “modernity’s own demise” (2000, 165). While these arguments are intriguing as they could possibly take us to another interpretive horizon, defining Hiroshima’s experience as a “pitfall” of modernity might nonetheless obscure our analytical focus. This is because such an interpretation brings us back to the popular idea that the modernity project had to have operated abnormally to result in such total destruction and mass death in Hiroshima. In this chapter I argue that the destruction of Hiroshima is the result of the very working of modernity – the ultimate product of the modernity project. Before going into the discussion of modernity and its unfolding in the historical process of pre- and post-war Japan and Hiroshima, we need to define the concept of modernity itself. Of diverse definitions and conceptualizations of modernity, I employ the concept of high modernity as an analytical axis to help detect the unfolding of modernity in the development of pre- and post-war Japan and Hiroshima.

High Modernity as an Analytical Guideline An abundant literature attempts to delineate the concept of modernity (Beck 2012; Hunt 2008; Wagner 2001; Heller 1999). To analyze and interpret the experiences of Japan and Hiroshima throughout the twentieth century, we need a concept of modernity that can satisfy the following three criteria: First, the concept has to have developed historically in advanced Western societies and resulted in the formation of modern nation states in recent centuries. Second, the concept of modernity employed here has to provide us with empirical indicators to identify elements of the working of modernity. Third, it has to explain the historical trajectory of the entire twentieth century, not merely part of it. This latter criterion is necessary because we must examine whether the spirit of modernity was common to both wartime and post-war Japan. Of the many conceptualizations of modernity, high modernity is the one that meets the above three conditions. The high-modernity perspective views our present social life as an extended consequence of successive applications of institutional principles established in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, arguing that the late twentieth century marks the

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start of “high modernity,” in which modernity took its paramount form in economic, political, and military institutions (Giddens 1990, 51–52). Beck argues that the latter half of the twentieth century is characterized by the presence of risk and its consequences in society. The risk society, as is called, involves the threat facing society becoming more than people can tolerate (Beck et al. 1994, 6). As seen in such instances as nuclear-power development, environmental degradation, and military expansion, we are increasingly experiencing conflicts and tensions with regard to the distribution of risk throughout the world. While Beck views risk as the core element in today’s modern world, Giddens elicits several institutional dimensions as central to modern society.2 They are capitalism, industrialism, surveillance, and control of the means of violence (Giddens 1990, 55–58). These institutional traits breed certain spiritual orientations. Capitalism nurtures competitive spirit and the tendency to reproduce itself on a progressive scale by way of continuous technological innovations. Industrialism is based on belief in science and progress leading to an increase in the production of machinery. Human activity is increasingly monitored to control the flow of information, which in turn contributes to the centralization of power. Finally, an increase in the control of the means of violence, backed by industrialism, leads to an increase in the production of high-technology weapons of war. All these institutional features become more evident as the nation state becomes solidified as the prototype of modern society, and its high capacity to control the flow and content of information and abundant socio-economic resources lead to centralized government control of capitalistic industry. Along with Bauman (1989), Giddens argues that these institutional principles unfolded explicitly before the two world wars (Giddens 1985, 222–54). In advanced European countries, an increase in international exchange and trade, along with the expansion of national borders, led to an accumulation of wealth, which in turn led to an increase in tax revenues that made further national military expansion possible. Such political and economic transformations eventually generated a self-proliferating process within advanced countries. In these countries, centralization of power, 2 Giddens continuously emphasizes the importance of industrialism in high modernity, while Beck observes a shift to a risk society from industrial society. In this chapter, I base my argument on Giddens’ definition of modern society, as, for one thing, his observation explicitly covers the entire period of the twentieth century, and, for another, even today capitalism and industrialism continue to provide the basic principles on which to organize our lives.

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information control, and the aspiration for growth and strength in politics and the economy led to the monopolization of the means of violence by military organizations and eventually to a totalitarian form of government (Giddens 1985, 294–310). World War I made heavy use of the arsenals and weapons made through successive applications of industrial technology to the manufacture of arms (Giddens 1985, 222–27). The incorporation of industrialism into the manufacture of arms gave rise to a prolonged battle in extended areas of the globe, with mass killing as its outcome (Giddens 1985, 231–32). In World War II, science and technology, industrial production, and military operations were further aligned to bring forth a new weapon the world had not seen before: the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb was the ultimate outcome of a mix of nuclear science, high-technology industry, and the operation of the military. According to the high-modernity thesis, the post-world war period has also been characterized by the same pattern of development as the pre-war nation state (Giddens 1985, 245–48). The only difference is that the post-war world order came to be regulated by the logic of the Cold War and the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Also, the world’s military capabilities continued to evolve with the development of a new nuclear weapon in the early 1950s – the nuclear-warhead missile. As seen above, the high-modernity thesis views the process of transformation of advanced countries throughout the twentieth century as a developmental trajectory established for modernity in preceding centuries. The high-modernity thesis views the occurrence of the two world wars and post-war developments as one historical continuum to be be explained by the same principle. In the next section, we will look broadly at the road Japan and Hiroshima took in the twentieth century. Our focus here is whether and how modernity unfolded itself to mold the developmental process of Japan and Hiroshima.

Japan and Hiroshima in the Working of Modernity In this section, we examine how modernity expressed itself in the history of Japan and Hiroshima, in particular in the twentieth century. Our examination in this section focuses only on the historical facts and incidents in themselves as the end results of complex processes of interaction of multiple historical forces. We first discuss historical incidents in the period prior to August 1945, and then go on to review the post-war period.

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Japan and Hiroshima before the End of the World War II Military expansion characterized Japan in the early half of the twentieth century. Frequent invasions and subsequent occupations of foreign lands were sustained by multiple factors. Among them was the development of sciences; especially engineering, chemistry, and physics played important roles in the advancement of military weapons. Industrialization and the development of heavy industry also contributed to the production of the state-of-the-art f ighter aircrafts and battleships. Continuous involvement in the war was also backed by the cultural and political apparatus: ideological propaganda and the secret police. Especially in 1930s and 40s, the dominant ideology of the time was that Japan would not be defeated, as it was the nation of a God. By linking military attack and the Japanese emperor, then considered God in popular belief, this ideological propaganda contributed to the continuation of the war. The secret police also helped Japan’s involvement in the war, as it silenced the voices opposed to military operations. With ideological propaganda and the secret police, Japan followed the path that had been paved by the then advanced Western countries. Its pursuit of economic prosperity was tied to militarization; conquest and appropriation of wealth of other countries became the engine of the economic development. The use of advanced science and technology, pursuit of economic development, and militarization coupled with resonant ideological propaganda and the secret police – all pushed Japan in the direction of unending wars. Developments in Hiroshima ran parallel to those in Japan. In the late nineteenth century, Hiroshima became the site of the headquarters for the Japanese military, providing the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy with a strategic naval port, supplying soldiers to war fronts in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Successive victories in the wars gave Hiroshima an immense economic boost, leading to the rise of a capitalistic manufacturing system. This is illustrated by a sharp increase in factories, first in cotton and silk spinning, casting, and later in heavy industries, such as metal, machinery, and arms and battleships manufacturing (City of Hiroshima 1959, 537–67; 1958, 599–603). This economic development attracted a new group of workers and merchants to Hiroshima, which further contributed to city’s economy. The early twentieth century saw the rise of a nationalistic sentiment in Japan. In 1905, the United States intervened in the Russo-Japan War to bring it to an end. After this, some Japanese citizens dissatisfied with the US conciliation plan started to raise their voices. They organized protests

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in Hiroshima and Tokyo, claiming that Japan should have gained much more out of the conciliation (City of Hiroshima 1958, 542). After World War I, the Japanese economy was increasingly put under state control. Small factories and firms were subsequently integrated into larger ones. These large firms then had capital unification with banks, making them gigantic enterprises monopolizing a huge amount of capital. These enterprises, with the backup of the state power, monopolized the market by forming cartels. State monopolization infiltrated Japanese society. Specifically, heavy industry as well as the electric power industry were run under a state monopoly. In Hiroshima, too, the military industry saw monopolistic expansion, giving heavy and chemical industries an important role in the economic development of Hiroshima (City of Hiroshima 1959, 546–64). During World War II, Japan had literally a wartime economy. Enterprises contributing to the production of commodities necessary for the continuation of the war thrived under strong military and state protection. Hiroshima was no exception. Even in difficult times, the city could run its economy, as it became a major site of subcontract factories for the production of weapons, military uniforms, medicine, and food for soldiers (City of Hiroshima 1959, 570–71). Thus seen, it is clear that Japan and Hiroshima ran side by side on a track to becoming a militaristic state. It was a desire for a military power coupled with economic development that put Japan in a position to pursue a series of conquests of foreign territories, and Hiroshima followed. In this sense, modernity had guided Japan and Hiroshima in the period prior to August 1945. Japan and Hiroshima after 1945 The strong military state system was altogether destroyed in August 1945, when the atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and they were totally destroyed. After the defeat, Japan was placed under the Allied occupation, where the GHQ strongly controlled speech as well as the political and economic policies of Japan. Under conditions, the world political structure, and Japan’s relationship with the United States strongly influenced the course of post-war development in Japan. In 1950s, the most decisive factor in the world political order was the Cold War. This led to the Korean War, in which US and Chinese military forces engaged in armed conflict in the Korean peninsula. Japan’s future development would be heavily influenced by the war. This influence took the form of an intense effort by the US government to incorporate Japan

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into its own sphere of influence, as Japan, geographically close to the Korean peninsula and mainland China, was considered as an important site for a US military base in the East Asian region. This effort on the part of the United States was gradually realized through a plan to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. The US intent was to bind Japan tightly to its own side through a treaty. The Japanese government agreed to this, hinting in a meeting with US diplomats that Japan would offer military bases to the United States. Many citizen’s and political groups, including socialists and communists, objected to the stance taken by the Japanese government, arguing that a peace treaty, if signed, should be a non-aggression pact with all countries, with no military bases on the Japanese territory. Despite strong opposition, a peace treaty with Japan was signed on September 8, 1951, with forty-eight other countries, with the omission of countries in the Eastern camp. On the same day, Japan signed another treaty with the United States, the US-Japan Security Treaty. This was a bilateral treaty that endorsed the US army’s stationing itself on Japanese territory. With these two treaties Japan’s history took a decisive turn. The two treaties signified Japan’s entrance into the Western camp in world politics. In all these developments in Japan, one could see a re-emergence of the modernity project. Just as the Axis powers and the Allied powers battled to gain ascendancy in World War II, the world after the war was again structured by the Eastern and Western camps who struggled against each other for supremacy. In the post-war era, hegemony through military aggression delineated the world political order, just as in the pre-1945 period. In only six years after its near complete destruction, Japan was again forced to immerse itself in a newly formed world military order. If a pre-1945 effort on the part of Japan to become a military giant was the product of modernity, then post-war Japan’s rearmament and its involvement in the Western camp had to be the same. Elements of modernity can also be detected in spheres other than politics. In the mid-1950s, Japan entered what is now thought to be its period of high economic growth. This upward trend in the economy was reflected in a longterm economic development plan (the Income Doubling Plan) in 1960, trade liberalization in the early 1960s, and participation to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1964 (Nakamura 1995, 32–23). Such rapid economic growth was the end result of a capitalistic mode of production and the country’s investment policy. During the period of its economic growth, Japan intensified its investments in the heavy and chemical industries. This in turn helped develop a trade pattern called

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“added-profit trade” or “processing trade,” in which Japan imported raw materials or semi-manufactured goods to process them into the finished products for export. The processing trade, a prototypical production pattern of a capitalist economy, brought in huge profits, enough for Japan to continue its high rate of economic development into the 1960s and to the point where Japan’s GNP became the second-largest in the world in 1968. Two factors made this rapid economic growth in Japan possible, both related to the war and the military. One was that Japan was under the military protection of the US armed forces. The rationale for the United States to protect Japan was supplied by the US-Japan Security Treaty. Under US protection, Japan diverts a huge portion of the national budget away from the Japanese military to policies to stimulate rapid economic growth. Second was the special procurement demands for the Korean War in the 1950s. The deployment of the United Nations forces, composed mainly of the US Armed Forces, to the Korean peninsula led to an unprecedented economic boom in Japan. During the war, Japan became a logistics base for US military equipment, receiving a vast number of orders for export to the United States. Prior to the war, Japan’s economy was heavily depressed. Within only a few months, however, this economic stagnation was completely reversed to result in an unprecedent “business boom.” This economic boom caused by the war reverberated throughout the world, leading to a new trend in military and trade expansion (City of Hiroshima 1984, 293) In these cases, one can easily see a coupling of military incursion and economic development, the same developmental pattern as seen in the period leading up to World War II. In Japan, the modernity project was operational both before and after the war. Not only Japan, but specifically the city of Hiroshima benefitted immensely from the Korean War. The destruction from the atomic bomb, together with a sharp post-war shrinkage of the munitions industry and other production industries, had put Hiroshima into a deep depression. This economic bust lasted for years. All this was changed, however, in only one month after the outbreak of the Korean War. In fact, before the war, no one would have believed the sudden sharp rise in all economic indicators for Hiroshima in the summer of 1950. All the crankshafts in Hiroshima’s economic cylinders suddenly began to move at a high speed, with the result that labor force employment rose by 36 percent in July and August alone (City of Hiroshima 1984, 297). This upward trend spread throughout the economy, most conspicuously, however, in the vehicle and vehicle parts, iron and steel, lumber, rayon, staple fiber, and cotton-fabric industries. Vehicle parts and iron production were developed mainly to meet the demand

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from the US military forces. This led to the revival of Hiroshima’s pre-war munitions industry. Export in trade in Hiroshima in 1950 was 5.4 times as large as in 1949. This unprecedented prosperity was enjoyed not only by heavy and chemical industries, however. New job opportunities in all industries in Hiroshima created added financial resources for its residents, which then led to an increase in their purchasing power. Especially textile and textile products were sold in abundance in retail stores. They satisfied an increased demand for the daily commodities among residents of Hiroshima city and prefecture. These stores increased their total sales by about 40 percent between 1949 and 1950 (City of Hiroshima 1984, 298). In the 1950s, a coupling of war and economic prosperity was again evident in Japanese history. Despite the country’s not being direstly involved in the Korean War, the war brought about an unprecedented economic boom in Japan. It did the same in post-war Hiroshima as the wars had done in the pre-war period. This is observable beyond the 1950s. The period of the 1960s also witnessed a similar developmental pattern, this time with the Vietnam War – again a period of high economic growth that this time pushed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world. Here again, warfare and capitalistic production meshed perfectly to generate the modern development of this country. Thus, in view of the history of Japan and Hiroshima from the early twentieth century through post-World War II, we may conclude that modernity influenced the development process of both the country and the city. In the next section, we will examine how modernity presented itself in people’s everyday lives in Hiroshima. Seen as a big picture, the history of Japan and Hiroshima was characterized by the advancement of modernity. We will turn our attention, however, to a microcosmic world, and examine how people felt and responded to these events.

Resisting Modernity: Hiroshima as a Battlefield In the preceding section, we observed how modernity largely materialized in the post-war development of Hiroshima. It is true that, if one looks at history as a collection of the end results of interactions of various forces occurring here and there, Hiroshima’s developmental process was controlled by the forces of modernity. However, if we look at minute interactions of forces working in the process of historical unfolding, then the whole picture looks different. Various forces that tried to push the modernity project

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forward were met with resistance from various anti-modernity groups and opposition parties; often the modernity project had to stop and withdraw from the battlefield. It would be a mistake to think that diverse ideas and opinions for post-war city planning had gradually coalesced into one big design that the majority of citizens would agree to. Instead, the whole picture looked more like an endless quarrel, or differing spirits and mentalities clashing against one another making up a huge discursive battleground of ideas and opinions. In fact, every time an issue popped up requiring a major decision, Hiroshima became a vigorously boiling melting pot of diverse opinions. In that melting pot, atomic-bomb survivors (“hibaku-sha”), sight-seeing agencies, commercial bodies, students, intellectuals, scientists, medical doctors, Christian and other religious groups, the city government of Hiroshima, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and the Japanese national government, all played out their roles to create a discursive field. In this discursive field, we find ideas and opinions emanating from both modern and non-modern spirits. In this section, by looking at discursive battles in Hiroshima in 1950s through 1960s we examine how the modernity project met with various resistance on its way to realizing itself. Of all the issues arousing intense battles of opinions and ideas, two stand highly visible in the history of Hiroshima: debate on the preservation of the Atomic-Bomb Dome and on the SDF’s entrance into Peace Memorial Park. The debate on the preservation/demolition of the A-Bomb Dome started when it became clear that the deterioration of the Dome had gradually progressed and presented the imminent risk of spontaneous collapse. The debate, involving civic organizations, labor unions, chamber of commerce, religious groups, political parties, and the city government, eventually developed into a huge discursive field where various and often contradictory ideas and arguments were exchanged to form a battlefield. The second prominent issue of debate suddenly popped up due to a proposal to allow the SDF to enter Peace Memorial Park. The SDF’s plan to bring troops into the park called forth passionate counterarguments from various civil groups and political organizations, thus creating again a huge discursive battlefield in the city of Hiroshima. Debate on the Preservation of the Atomic-Bomb Dome The Atomic-Bomb Dome (gen-baku doumu in Japanese), standing at the north-east edge of Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Park, is one of the very few

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architectural structures to narrowly escaped total destruction in the face of the atomic bomb. While well-preserved, the Dome today looks almost like a torn-down building with exposed metal framework on top and piled-up broken blocks underneath. Work to preserve the Dome was done in 1967. With two minor successive preservation efforts to stabilize the building, the Dome became what it is today. In 1996, the A-Bomb Dome was named as a World Heritage site, thus constituting one of the historical legacies of the world. The road to the preservation of the A-Bomb Dome was never a smooth one. The Dome itself was the subject of controversy in 1950s through 1960s. In 1949, the city of Hiroshima had the first opinion poll to gauge the general concensus of Hiroshima citizens as to the future handling of the Dome, as the Dome was expected to collapse soon if left unrepaired. To city’s surprise, a multitude of voices were heard. Some saw it as “ugly,” others felt in it a sentiment of sorrow and tragedy, while others found in the Dome the meaning of consolation for the dead in the war, still others sensed its commercial value as an important sight-seeing spot in light of the phenomenon of “dark” tourism. Before the city of Hiroshima finally decided to launch preservation work in late 1960s, the heated debates continued. A host of diverse attitudes and orientations are reflected in the arguments made in this series of debates. Hiroshima was, in a sense, divided into warring camps as to where it should be headed in the future. Varied and complex arguments were developed in the debate on the preservation/demolition of the A-Bomb Dome. What makes the debate more difficult to decipher is the differences in reasoning ellicited by the same sentiments about the Dome. For example, a shared feeling of sorrow and tragedy would yield two opposite arguments: to demolish the Dome so that we can forget the tragedy, and to preserve the Dome so as not to forget the tragedy. Within this discourse a variety of arguments are given for preservation. For some, the Dome should be preserved because it has huge commercial value for the tourist industry. The Dome is itself an atomic-bomb survivor; its torn-down architecture with exposed defective metal frame and broken bricks is a testimony to the explosive power of the atomic bomb. To feel the physical force and power that emanated from the nuclear explosion, there are no better places to visit than Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Among the earliest proponents of this argument were tourist agencies. As early as 1947, the Hiroshima City Tourist Association posted a picture of the Dome in the Hiroshima Guidebook; the same year, the Dome was also among thirteen sightseeing spots in the brochure titled the “Best 13 Scenic Spots for

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the Atomic Bomb” (Genn-baku jyuu-sann-kei). Also, in 1954 the Hiroshima Prefectural Tourist Association called out to a wider audience for the establishment of an alliance, the Alliance to Preserve and Regulate the Dome (Dome hozon kisei dou-mei; Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1997, 41). Along with these Hiroshima tourist associations, an Australian lieutenant commander, himself an advisor to the city of Hiroshima for the city reconstruction, claimed in 1948 that the Dome should be preserved as an indispensable sightseeing resource (Hamada 2014, 22). The reasoning behind this argument is clear: economic development through tourism. With what today is called “morbid” or “grief” tourism, the city of Hiroshima sought to obtain the financial resources needed to revitalize its dying economy. One may read in this argument the severity of financial difficulties Hiroshima had to face in the post-war era. In a way Hiroshima had to expose its huge scar to earn some financial support. However, there were people who only sought the box-office revenue from this otherwise unpleasant heritage of the war (City of Hiroshima 1983, 295). Another strand of the preservation argument is found in the symbolic meaning attributed to the deformed A-Bomb Dome. For some, the Dome symbolizes the destruction and agony the war created. It bears testimony to the horrible incident that occurred at the very center of the city; thus, it is a reminder of a tragedy that sent some hundreds of thousands to their instant death (City of Hiroshima 1983, 295; Hamai 2006, 265).3 Often, such a retrospective attribution of meaning is transformed into a prospective wishful thinking: the proponents of this argument claimed that the Dome should be a point where we all start our introspection by reflecting upon our past deeds in the war (Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Tosho Kannko Kyoukai 1969, 408).4 Thus, Jean-Paul Sartre mentioned, when he visited the Dome in October 1966, that this ruin represented our will to live and fight to keep such indiscriminate mass killing from taking place again in the future (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1997, 47). In a further extension of Sartre’s prospective interpretation of the meaning of the Dome, we f ind the “symbol-of-peace” discourse. The symbol-of-peace discourse clearly gives a new role to the Dome: pursuit of peace (Hamada 2014, 23; Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1997, 41). Unlike the 3 The first opinion poll to measure Hiroshima citizens’ general attitude toward the A-Bomb Dome was administered by the Hiroshima City Tourist Association in 1948, where about 80 percent responded in favor of the preservation of the Dome (Ebara 2016, 127). 4 The general opinion poll in Hiroshma in 1949 showed that 40 percent of respondents shared the idea that the Dome would prohibit or censure war (Hamada 2014, 23).

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previous arguments that read agony and sorrow in the deformed Dome, this discourse places more emphasis on the future. The future lies not only in the prevention of mass killing and tragedy, but in the creation of peace. Thus, Robert Jungk, a German writer, argued in his contribution to the Chugoku News in August 1959 that the dome gave a warning of the fate of mankind if nothing is done to prevent it in future, and that the Dome transformed its meaning from a symbol of horror and agony to one of peace (City of Hiroshima 1983, 296). Viewed so far, there are varied stances and reasons even within the group of Dome-preservation advocates; some argue for economic reasons, others for reflection on the past, still others for the future of mankind. A characteristically modern mentality is displayed in the tourist-attraction argument. This argument gives the utmost priority to the pursuit of economic gain and prosperity, despite the fact that its proponents often receive blame for promoting dark tourism.5 The tourist-attraction argument has a high affinity with the argument made earlier in Japan for continuing the war before 1945, as both arguments give priority to development and expansion in the physical and material world, and disregard the life and emotions of those wounded and dead in the war. The other reasons given for siding with Dome preservation are different in nature from the tourist-attraction argument. The tragedy-reminder and the symbol-of-peace arguments are similar in their mentalities. These arguments put aside considerations of economic prosperity and material advancement; instead, they are based on the sacrifice and sorrow the people of Hiroshima had to bear, with the symbol-of-peace argument referenced to the future unfolding of the fate of humanity. Interestingly, the more humanistic mentality found in these Domepreservation arguments appears to be shared by the opposite camp in the A-Bomb Dome debate. Many of those arguing for the demolition and removal of the dome make the opposite claim for exactly the same reason. They argue that the Dome had to be torn down because it would remind them of the tragedy and sorrow caused by the war and atomic bomb. The opinion poll administered by the city in October 1949, reveals that, of those arguing for the demolition and removal of the Dome, 61 percent answered that they would not want to be reminded of the tragedy (Hamada 2014, 23; Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1997, 40). For them, the Dome was a symbol of death and the tragic past (City of Hiroshima 1983, 295). In a way, the Dome 5 Tatsuo Morito, then president of Hiroshima University, criticized dark tourism as “selling the tragedy” (City of Hiroshima 1983, 295).

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had to be preserved and at the same time had to be demolished because it was a strong reminder of the experiences of agony and sorrow. This was not the only mental make-up found in the Dome-preservation camp in the debate. For some in this camp, the A-Bomb Dome was just an ugly object with little meaning attributable to it. Furthermore, the Dome was a troublesome occupant of a prime commercial location in the city of Hiroshima. They argued that the area where the Dome had been left standing would serve better under commercial zoning. The dome itself was of no use to any new commercial activity; a new facility, such as a shopping mall, would benefit the city and its residents much more, they argued. It is not difficult to see the discursive affinity between the new-commercial-area and tourist-attraction arguments. While these arguments belong to opposite camps in the Dome-preservation debate, they can be considered twin brothers born out of one mental thread: pursuit of economic gain through commercial activities. The new-commercial-area argument lies in a simple extension of the tourist-attraction argument. Again, one could read a modern mentality in the new-commercial-area argument. The debate ended with the city’s decision in July 1966 to preserve the A-Bomb Dome. Prior to the decision by the city, voices raised to preserve the Dome became louder as one social group after another started to make a statement in favor of preservation. Later, the city’s mayor Shinzo Hamai recalled that he had decided to side with the preservation of the Dome, having been touched by the volunteer fund-raising activities of boys and girls from the Hiroshima Crane Society to collect construction funds. The Hiroshima Crane Society was a Christian civil group that had been appealing for the preservation of the Dome in order to let future generations know of the horrible incident that took place in Hiroshima (Hamai 1967; Hiroshima Crane Society 1967). Thus one might read in this conclusion that the debate ended with the win for the anti-modernity groups. Debate on the SDF’s Plan to March into Peace Memorial Park In late October 1965, news broke out that Japan’s SDF (Self-Defense Forces) planned to enter Peace Memorial Park during its troop-inspection march along an avenue in Hiroshima city. Also it became apparent that the city government was in favor of this plan, having already given the SDF and its solders permission to enter the park. The march would consist of 1,600 soldiers, together with tanks, cannons, and other military vehicles. The city march by the SDF had been performed since 1962. The planned march in

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1965 was the first time, however, that the SDF’s soldiers intended to enter Peace Memorial Park. A heated debate ensued, involving Hiroshima citizens and civil groups, atomic-bomb survivors, politicians and political parties, religious groups, and the SDF. Behind this debate were the separate characteristics of the SDF and Peace Memorial Park. The roots of the SDF go back to 1950, when the National Police Reserve was established. Due to the change in international circumstances, the National Police Reserve was transformed into the SDF in 1954. Despite its name (the Self-Defense Forces), the SDF was a de facto military force, carrying weapons and equipment with which to attack and start battles. Peace Memorial Park, on the other hand, was designed to honor the victims of war and to pray for eternal peace, as its name suggests. In the monument placed at the center of the park, an oath is carved out that reads in part, “[…] we shall not repeat the mistake.” A sense of unease was aroused by the SDF’s plan to enter the park not only by the park’s holistic charater ; as well, a vast number of atomic-bomb victims, it is said, have been left buried under the ground of the park. In the eyes of Hiroshima’s citizens, those victims would have been downtrodden by the military forces again if the SDF had entered in the park. In the debate, some used these arguments to throw into doubt the legitimacy of SDF’s plan to bring soldiers and military equipment into Peace Memorial Park. Others claimed the SDF was an institution to protect people, not attack others, and thus there would be no problem in having the SDF enter the park. The debate intensified, turning itself into a possible physical altercation when some opposition groups and organizations threatened to resort to the use of force to stop the SDF if they dared to enter the park. As early as October 25, 1965, several university students started camping in front of the monument (cenotaph) in the park to express their resistance. One labor-union group, too, announced that it would start sit-ins in the park from October 29 mobilizing 10,000 supporters; on October 31, when the SDF planned to enter the park, the group would continue to stay there before going on to march in the street (Chugoku Newspaper Co1965, October 26). This debate ended with SDF’s concession to the opposing groups. On October 27, the SDF announced that it would send, not 1,600 soldiers, but only some representatives with no weapons to carry to the monument in the park. The opposition groups’ demand not to allow weapons or soldiers to enter Peace Memorial Park was, at least formally, respected. Probably, it would be easy to treat this debate as an unimportant passing event without much impact on the political configuration of the city of

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Hiroshima. Nonetheless, if seen as a discursive field, it vividly shows the clash of ideas and meanings attributed to Peace Memorial Park and to the SDF’s attempt to enter it. On one side of the discourse lies a claim by the SDF. Faced with a rapidly growing opposition, the headquarters of the Hiroshima SDF Division made an announcement on October 23, 1965, arguing that the SDF sought to attain peace by force, given the international situations at that time (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 24).6 This logic of peace by force continued to be employed in later years, as in April 3, 1974, when the headquarters of the SDF Hiroshima Division asked the opposition parties and Hiroshima citizens in general to reconsider what they should do as a nation, including a possible use of weapons, to maintain peace and security, and national independence in the real world (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1974). The SDF’s intent to attain peace through the use of force reverberated clearly with the Japanese military forces prior to the end of the World War II. Another strand of the argument in the debate came from the city government of Hiroshima. Against opposition groups calling on the government to cancel the permission given to the SDF to enter Peace Memorial Park, the mayor, Hamai, initially announced that the city would not cancel its permission. The mayor went on to explain the reason, saying that the SDF was not a military force that would challenge other nations (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 21). This statement by the mayor implied that SDF’s effort to protect the nation was permissible, while SDF’s act to attack others was not. This logic was further strengthened in later years when the city mayor Setsuo Yamada downplayed the power of the SDF, characterizing it as a “toy” unable to go into a real battle (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1972). Hiroshima city’s effort to conceal the offensive nature of the SDF by trivializing its physical forces, coupled with its effort to read the SDF as only protective mechanism, was intended to persuade opposition parties and possibly to transform the citizens’ perception of the SDF to a more positive one. Against the arguments made by the SDF and the city of Hiroshima, various groups and organizations began to raise their voices. Among all these groups, the beliefs, ideas, and sentiments behind their respective arguments varied substantially. One argument came from the groups of atomic-bomb survivors, who strongly disagreed with the troop-inspection march by the SDF. They claimed that Hiroshima’s citizens would not allow 6 In their effort to defend the legitimacy of their entry into the park, the SDF had made its first statement that it shared the spirit of seeking peace on October 20 (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 21).

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the SDF to perform the troop-inspection march with canons and tanks, adding also that Peace Memorial Park was designed to commemorate a commitment not to engage in wars in future (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 21). Behind this argument was a strong sense of opposition to war and to arming the military. This sense of refusal was also shared by the peace-movement groups and student bodies, who maintained that the troop-inspection march performed by way of Peace Memorial Park would constitute an act of sacrilige against Hiroshima citizens’ desire of eternal peace (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 21 and 26). Some religious groups, notably Hiroshima’s church branches and Christian organizations, issued a similar statement. They made it clear that they were against the use of Peace Memorial Park by the SDF, adding that the personnel from the SDF must disarm should they enter the park (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 27). The essence of their argument was that lethal weapons were incompatible with peace. The Socialist Party and prefectural labor unions reasoned that the SDF was a national organization and thus the march by the SDF would be a demonstration of national military power. They also argued that the military forces would never help attain or protect peace (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 24). A radical version of this argument was developed by the youth division of the Socialist Party, who vehemently opposed the existence of the SDF. For them, the SDF would even point their guns at the citizens (Socialist Party, Hiroshima Branch, and Japan Socialist Youth Alliance 1973). Their voice was also directed against the city mayor of Hiroshima, criticizing the mayor’s decision to give the SDF permission to use Peace Memorial Park as a thoughtless act. In essence, the Socialist Party, its youth division, and the labor unions opposed any national military force or its legitimation. With all these counterarguments made by various civil organizations and political groups, the SDF was pushed against the wall. On October 27, 1965, three days prior to the planned march, the SDF announced a change of plan. In the new plan, a small number of unarmed SDF personnel would enter Peace Memorial Park to join in worshipful service, and the troop-inspection march would take place away from the park (Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965, October 27). Behind this heated debate lay a special meaning that had been attributed to Peace Memorial Park. For many, the park meant a sanctuary, where citizens of Hiroshima lay underground as atomic-bomb victims. These victims were sacred as they died an innocent death; they were sacrificed, as it were, to end the war. The sacred victims were not to be violated or

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outraged by the renewed presence of military forces. Thus, the opposition groups argued against bringing any weapons into the park, displaying any show of military strength or of lethal force. For them, a military force’s act of entering the park would be a desecration of sacred soil. This attribution of meaning stood behind a majority of opposition discourses. Arguments and ideas issued by the opposition groups were based on the identification of the Peace Memorial Park with a sanctuary where the sacred were buried. This identification took over the discursive sphere of the debate. In this debate in 1965, one can see the modernity of both the pre- and post-1945 periods of Japan. The SDF’s intent to attain peace by the use of force, as exemplified by its plan to bring soldiers into Peace Memorial Park, may be easily compared with the attitude of the pre-1945 Japanese military, which had vigorously sought regional unification by the use of physical force. Against the working of modernity in the form of the SDF, citizens and social groups and political parties raised counterarguments from different perspectives, many of which were rooted in the emotions of everyday life. In 1965 Hiroshima, the counterarguments appeared to dominate a discursive battlefield. The modernity project met with abundant resistance and had to stop its march into Peace Memorial Park.

Conclusion This chapter sets out Hiroshima as a place to observe how modernity unfolds in a given historical context. The choice of Hiroshima as the observation point is intentional. After the atomic bomb fell in August 1945, Hiroshima was just barren land, with only a few ruins left on the ground. Thus, it had to start a totally new process of building human habitation. Theoretically a variety of ideas and orientations were wide open to the city to pick as the central principle of its new development. Under these circumstances, one could observe how modern and nonmodern ideas interact in a new city-building project. For those siding with the modernity project, this was an ideal opportunity to let the forces of modernity make their own way. For others, Hiroshima was a city totally destroyed by the forces of modernity, namely the atomic bomb, and thus the modernity project became the focus of resistance. At the outset, this chapter set two different levels at which to observe and trace the working process of modernity: historical incidents in the big picture and discursive fields. The former perspective focuses on the end outcome

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of complex historical processes, and the latter on the ideas and arguments that might or might not materialize in concrete historical reality. In the second section, “Japan and Hiroshima in the Working of Modernity,” we observed Hiroshima’s developmental process from the former perspective, while in the third section, “Resisting Modernity: Hiroshima as a Battlefield”, we examined it from the latter perspective. What we can get from these two observation points is rather interesting. We find two different faces of modernity, which would give different impressions as to how it unfolds. In the big historical picture, modernity forcefully marches on in its own way, while in the discursive field, modernity is greeted with fierce opposition, often giving way to resistance of social groups and political parties. Which face of the modernity is true? I would argue both are true. The modernity project controlled the big historical process in Hiroshima and Japan. Looking at this process of unfolding in more detail, however, the procession of the modernity project was not an easy one. Often it experienced setbacks and regressions. Modernity went forward on its own path, but was stranded from time to time. How could modernity control the entire developmental process of Japan and Hiroshima throughout the pre- and post-World War II? To this question, our observation on the A-Bomb Dome preservation/demolition dispute suggests one possible answer. This dispute ended with the victory of the preservation groups that claimed the Dome should become a constant reminder of the tragedy and sorrow that happened in Hiroshima. Now, one might see in this ending a loss for those appealing for the demolition of the Dome in order to proceed to a brighter future and those arguing for the dismantling of the Dome to create a new major commercial area to revitalize the city’s economy, namely the loss of modernity. This is not the case. If one looks at the dispute more carefully, one finds that another strand of modernity was given new life by the decision to preserve the Dome. That is, the preservation decision also favored an argument made by the sightseeing tourism industries that the Dome would become a special sightseeing spot that no other places would ever have, thus securing scarce financial resources. Modernity was not totally rejected in the A-Bomb Dome dispute; rather it found a way to stay alive even in the face of fierce opposition. Written this way, one might find a thorough toughness and resilience in the forces of modernity. Certainly, modernity was not to be given up by the citizens of the city of Hiroshima even if it had sent hundreds of thousands of the city’s people to their death. Far from it, it appears that

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modernity continued to be cherished by Hiroshima’s citizens. Looking at the modernity project from a different angle, however, one might also say that the modernity project was unable to march on gracefully. In a way, modernity just survived the massive criticism and disapproval voiced by the various proponents of the anti-modernity; it hid itself and stayed alive behind those who claimed that the A-Bomb Dome should be preserved as a negative legacy. In Hiroshima, modernity was not a loser; however, it was not a total winner. Modernity was stranded in Hiroshima.

References Bauman, Zygmunt. 1989. Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, Ulrich. 2012. An Introduction to the Theory of Second Modernity and the Risk Society. London: Routledge. Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. 1994. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. Chugoku Newspaper Co. 1965. Chugoku News [In Japanese], October 21, 24, 26, and 27. ———. 1972. Chugoku News [In Japanese], October 23. ———. 1974. Chugoku News [In Japanese], April 4. ———. 1997. The Atomic-Bomb Dome: UNESCO World Heritage: Witness into the 21st Century (Unesuko sekai isann gennbaku doumu nijyuu-isseiki heno shouninn). Hiroshima: Chugoku Newspaper Co. City of Hiroshima. 1958. A New Edition of Hiroshima’s History, vol. 2: Politics (Shinshu Hirosshima shi-shi, dai 2 kann, seiji-henn). Hiroshima: City Government of Hiroshima. ———. 1959. A New Edition of Hiroshima History, vol. 3: Society and the Economy (Shinshu Hirosshima shi-shi, dai 3 kann, shakai Keizai henn). Hiroshima: City Government of Hiroshima. ———. 1983. A New History of Hiroshima: Everyday Life (Shin Hiroshima shi: shimin seikatsu henn). Hiroshima: City Government of Hiroshima. ———. 1984. A New History of Hiroshima: Economy (Shin Hiroshima shi: keizai henn). Hiroshima: City Government of Hiroshima. ———. 2019. “List of Atomic Bomb Victims” [In Japanese]. Accessed on September 2, 2020. www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/atomicbomb-peace/15513.html. http://city.nagasaki.ajisai-call.jp/faq/show/3705?site_domain=default. Ebara, Sumiko. 2016. The Atomic-Bomb Dome: From Industrial Product Exhibition Hall to Hiroshima Peace Memorial [In Japanese]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan.

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Fujiwara, Ki-ichi. 2001. Remembering the War: Hiroshima, Holocaust, and the Present (Sennsou wo kioku suru: Hiroshima, holocaust to gennzai). Tokyo: Koudansha. Giddens, Anthony. 1985. The Nation-State and Violence, vol. 2 of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Cambridge: Polity Press. ———. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hamada, Takeshi. 2014. “The Preservation of War Heritage and the Production of the Space of Peace” (“Sennso isann no hozonn to heiwa kuu-kann no seisann”). Historical Review (Rekishi Hyouron) 772: 20–34. Hamai, Shinzo. 1967. Atomic Bomb Mayor: Together with the Atomic Bomb for Twenty Years(Gennbaku shicho – Hiroshima to tomoni njyuu-nenn). Osaka: Asahi Shimbun Publishing Co. ———. 2006. Atomic Bomb Mayor: Records of Reviving Ruins of Hiroshima (Gennbaku shicho – yomigaeru haikyo Hiroshima no kiroku). Hiroshima: Yoshikatu. Heller, Agnes. 1999. A Theory of Modernity. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Hiroshima Crane Society (Hiroshima Orizuru no Kai). 1967. Ground Zero: Amidst the Movement to Preserve the Atomic-Bomb Dome (Bakushinn-chi: gennbaku doumu hozonn undo no nakakara). Hiroshima: Hiroshima Orizuru. Hunt, Lynn. 2008. Measuring Time, Making History. Budapest: Central European University Press. Kamishima, Jiro. 1961. Spiritual Structure of Modern Japan (Kinnndai nihonn no seishinn kouzou). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Lennon, John J. and Malcolm Foley. 2000. Dark Tourism: The Attraction of Death and Disaster. London: Cengage Learning. Maruyama, Masao. 1956. Thoughts and Actions in Modern Politics, vols. 1 and 2 (Genndai seiji no shiso to koudou, jyou ge). Tokyo: Miraisha. Nagaoka, Hiroyoshi. 1977. A Popular History of the Atomic Bomb (Gennbaku minnshuu-shi). Tokyo: Miraisha. Nakamura, Masanori. 1995. “Japan in the 1950s and 60s: Rapid Economic Growth” (“1950–60 nenn-dai no nihon: koudo keizai seichou”). Pages 1–68 in Iwanami Lecture Series: Overview of Japanese History, vol. 20: The Modern Period, 1 (Iwanami kouza nihonn tsuushi dai 20 kann, genndai 1). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Nakazawa, Masao. 2007. Looking at the Trauma of the Atomic-Bomb Survivors (Hibakusha no kokoro no kizu wo otte). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Naono, Akiko. 2015. Atomic-Bomb Experiences and Postwar Japan: Memory Formation and Its Continuation (Gennbaku-takikenn to sengo nihon: kioku no keisei to keishou). Tokyo: Iwanami. Ohtsuka, Hisao. 1969. Human Foundations of Modernization, Ohtsuka Hisao Collection 8 (Kinndaika no ninngenn-teki kiso, Ohtsuka Hisao chosaku-shu dai 8 kann). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

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Sasayama, Haruo, Sato Shin, Gomi Fumihiko, and Kouso Toshihiko. 2020. Japanese History: An Expatiation, rev. ed. (Shousetu nihonnshi, kaitei-bann). Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppannsha. Socialist Party, Hiroshima Branch, and Japan Socialist Youth Alliance. 1973. The Nose of the Gun Is Pointing at You: Blocking the SDF March (Jyu-ko wa anata wo neratteiru: jiei-tai pareido soshi). Hiroshima: Socialist Party, Hiroshima Branch. Tominaga, Ken-ichi. 1990. Japanese Modernization and Social Change (Nihon no kinndai-ka to shakai hendou). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Wada, Haruki. 2015. Birth of a “Peaceful Country”: Origin and Transformation of Postwar Japan (“Heiwa kokka” no tannjyou: senngo nihonn no genntenn to henyou). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Wagner, Peter. 2001. Theorizing Modernity: Inescapability and Attainability in Social Theory. London: Sage. Yoneyama, Risa. 2005. Hiroshima: Politics of Memory. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Orig. publ. as Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialiectics of Memory (University of California Press, 1999). Zwigenberg, Ran. 2014. Hiroshima: The Origins of Global Memory Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

About the Author Dai Nomiya (Chuo University) is a professor in the Department of Sociology at Chuo University. He has his PhD in sociology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and has published numerous books and articles in the area of social movements and globalization. Currently he is the Vice-President of the East Asian Sociological Association. [email protected]

5.

The (In)Compatibility of Islam with Modernity (Mis)Understanding of Secularity/Secularism in the Arab and Islamicate Worlds Housamedden Darwish

Abstract This chapter examines the debate about the secularity/secularism concept from its formulation to the present in the Arab/Islamicate worlds. It highlights some theoretical and methodological problematics, as well as actual and potential misunderstandings of secularity/secularism as a thick normative concept. It also considers the ideological confrontation of the secular and religious, and the reservations of some scholars about raising the concept of secularism to the level of a slogan. To clarify these reservations, the relationship between secularity and democracy is discussed. Deconstructing the secular/religious dichotomy is seen as necessary to overcome negative dialectics. The civil-state concept is therefore proposed as a potential deconstructing concept for the “secular state/religious state” dichotomy. Keywords: secularity/secularism/secularization; civil state; democracy

Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many scholars and researchers in the Arab and Western worlds have been involved in the controversy around whether (political) religion/Islam is compatible with (political) modernity, democracy, secularity, etc. While some suspect that this question is posed incorrectly or refuse to answer it (Bishara 1994, 57–8; 2013, 7–9), there are generally speaking two camps in this respect: (1) those who deem that the compatibility of Islam with modernity is possible to the extent that one can talk about modern, democratic and secular Islam

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_pre

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(Hanafi and al-Jabri 1990, 38); and (2) others who completely disagree and say that Islam is hostile to modernity, because Islam is – in its core, and necessarily – incapable of separating religion from politics (Lewis 2002). Against this background, it could be argued that most of the basic concepts – including secularity, secularism, Islam and modernity – invoked in this debate have been objective sources of (mis)understanding when addressing this topic in the Arab and Islamicate world.1 For example, the concepts of secularity and secularism, as “thick normative concepts,” include description and evaluation (Kirchin 2017; 2013; Väyrynen 2013).2 This duality, between descriptive and evaluative, creates distinct theoretical and methodological problems, leading to misunderstandings or to a greater differentiation between understandings. It is also important to note that the terms “secularity,” “secularism” and “secularization” refer to different concepts, as clarified in the third section (pp. 000–00, “Secularity/Secularism between al-ʿAzmeh and el-Messiri”). This chapter, however, uses the term “secularity/secularism” in certain contexts, where intellectuals and scholars in the Arab and Islamicate world use one term to refer to the two concepts of “secularity” and “secularism.” This is because the meaning of the two concepts has not been genuinely developed by these scholars. This chapter aims to address some theoretical and methodological problematics, as well as actual and potential forms of misunderstanding related to the concept of secularity/secularism, as a “thick normative concept,” in the Arab and Islamicate world. To this end, the essay considers 1 There are two sources of misunderstanding: (1) “subjective” factors – which usually relate to the receiver: their attitude, prejudices, preconceptions, (un)willingness to understand, etc. (Gadamer 1989, 33); and (2) objective factors for misunderstanding – among which language comes to the fore. Objective sources lie within the language itself, in its vagueness, in polysemy and different connotations of words, the obscurity of the discourse, framing effects, etc. There is also the constant possibility of reconstructing the text, as the highest semantic unit of language, or re-understanding, and interpreting it in a different way. Given that “ethics of understanding” are indispensable for partially overcoming or avoiding the subjective factors of misunderstanding (Darwish 2016, 478–99), objective factors of misunderstanding appear to be more arduous to confront. The ethics of understanding are based on a set of principles, the most important of which are the “principle of hermeneutic fairness” (George Frederick Mayer and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten), the “principle of benevolence” (Neil Wilson, Willard van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson) and the “preconception of completeness” (Gadamer). 2 In this paper, the author uses the term “secularity/secularism” in some contexts, where the concepts of “secularity” and “secularism” have not been developed by scholars to the extent they can be clearly distinguished from one another. In other contexts, he uses only the term “secularity” or “secularism,” as they are different concepts, and a clear distinction can be made between them.

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early normative formulation of the concept of secularism which can be traced back to the writings of al-Bustani and al-Afghani. Furthermore, it critically examines the concept of secularity/secularism in the modern and contemporary debate involving al-Jabri, Tarabishi, al-ʿAzmeh, elMessiri and al-Azm. Within the context of the ideological debate on the concept of secularity/secularism, different forms of misunderstanding are highlighted, and the ideological confrontation or antagonism between the secular and the religious is thus highlighted. In addition, some scholars have reservations about raising the concept of secularity/secularism to the level of a slogan, because they consider it a political ideology that can be fascist or authoritarian. In explaining these reservations, the relationship between secularity and democracy is also discussed. Moreover, deconstruction is seen as necessary in order to overcome negative dialectics – the “secular/religious” dichotomy in general, and the “secular state/religious state” dichotomy in particular. In conclusion, the concept of the “civil state,” as a potential deconstructing concept for these dichotomies, is proposed.

Early Formulation of Secularism as a Normative Concept in the Arab and Islamicate World (al-Bustani and al-Afghani) Since the initial formulation of the concept of secularism in the Arab and Islamicate world, normative characteristics of this concept have become evident. A distinction can also be drawn between two contradictory standard concepts: (1) a positive normative perception of secularism that can be traced back to papers/pamphlets entitled Nafir Suriya (The Clarion of Syria) by Butrus al-Bustani (2019 [1860–61]); and (2) a negative normative formulation of secularism attributed to Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghani’s book Refutation of the Materialists (1968 [1881]). It is difficult to imagine a mutual understanding between two parties one of whom thinks secularism is closer to absolute good, and the other closer to absolute evil. Al-Bustani (2019) adopted the idea of “secularism” as an ideological concept and as a remedy for sectarianism, stressing the need for a separation “between leadership or spiritual authority, on the one hand, and politics or civil authority, on the other” (117). This separation is necessary because “the two authorities are distinct and incompatible […] [and] without separating both types of authority, it is no exaggeration to say that no civilization can exist, live, or grow” (al-Bustani 2019, 117). On the

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other hand, al-Afghani (1968) wrote his Refutation to compare or contrast the doctrine of the secularists and religion in general, and the effect of both matters on the structure of human society. He wrote at the end of his book that he “wished to explain about the evils and corruption of the neicheri3 path for the civilization and the social order, and the benefits of religions and of Islam” (1968, 174). In every line of al-Afghani’s text, the result of the comparison is clear: “Religion is the Mainstay of Nations and the Source of their Welfare. In it is their Happiness, and around it is their Pivot. Neicherriyya is the Root of Corruption and the Source of Foulness. From it comes the ruin of the Land and the Perdition of Man” (al-Afghani 1968, 132). Regrettably, there was no room for direct dialogue between al-Bustani and al-Afghani who had two contradictory notions of secularism. Nevertheless, their two perceptions of secularism have become common in the contemporary Arab and Islamicate world. We find al-Bustani’s perception – with its descriptive and normative contents, its arguments – present among many seculars/secularists, while al-Afghani’s perception of secularity/ secularism, and its normative rulings in this regard, is exceptional among Islamics/Islamists. Contemporary Arab history has witnessed a great number of debates between these two poles –supporters of secularity/secularism, on the one hand, and opponents, on the other. The difference between these two poles is not limited to the normative aspect, but extends to the descriptive aspect as well. The disparity between the two poles is therefore wide enough to ask whether the debate revolves around two perceptions of the same concept. To illustrate this difference, the following section considers some of the most common definitions of secularity/secularism in the Arab and Islamicate world.

3 It is worth noting that al-Afghani (1968) did not use the word “secularity” and its related derivations, but rather the terms “naturalism” and “al-Dahrāniyyah/materialism.” The word “materialism” – as an equivalent or translation of the word “secularism” – is still preferred by many Islamic thinkers and the opponents or critics of secularism, and it can be found evidently in contemporary Arab (Islamic) thought (Abd al-Rahman 2014). The term al-Dahrāniyyah is used to describe secularism among many non-Islamic thinkers, for example, Burhan Ghalioun (1996, 45). It is known that the term al-dahriyyīn is a Qur’anic term, which, along with “naturalists,” refers to “atheists” or “unbelievers” in Arab and Islamicate thought, notably in the works of Shahrastani, al-Ghazali, al-Zamakhshari, and Ibn Taimiyyah. Against this background, it is important to note that George Jacob Holyoake (1870) coined the word “secularism,” with a positive and standard meaning, as an alternative to the word “atheism,” which has negative connotations (8).

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The Concept of Secularity/Secularism between al-Jabri and Tarabishi Secularity is usually defined as the separation between church and state, between religion and state, between religion and politics, or between religious authority and political authority. Some scholars believe that secularity encompasses all previous types of separation, but there are others who embrace one type of separation while rejecting all others. This difference in the definition of secularity is one of the main causes of misunderstanding in debates concerning Arab and Islamicate culture. Abdel-Wahab el-Messiri (2000) viewed the term secularity/secularism as “one of the most common and exciting terms for division” (11), and that it is far from having definite meanings, dimensions and implications (ibid.). This too is what al-Jabri (2009) rightly emphasized where he wrote: “there is no motto adopted by modern Arab thought which has been a cause of ambiguity and misunderstanding like the slogan ‘al-ʿalmāniyyah’ (secularism)” (53). Al-Jabri’s stance on secularity/secularism represents a model of ambiguity per se and is a factor in the misunderstanding of this concept, because it embodies contradictory views. Al-Jabri (2009) clearly stated, more than once, that “the question of secularity/secularism in the Arab world is a false one” (55) and it refers to “an ambiguous term” (56), insisting that “we should remove the term ‘secularity/secularism’ from the dictionary of Arab thought and replace it with two words: ‘democracy’ and ‘rationality’” (56). On the other hand, al-Jabri (2009) stressed the need to “separate religion from politics, namely, to avoid the exploitation of religion for political purposes, as religion represents what is constant and absolute, while politics represents what is relative and changeable” (57). Al-Jabri’s statements raise several questions: How do we understand the two contradictory views expressed by al-Jabri? How does al-Jabri talk about the falsity of the question of secularism by stating that this term indicates needs which do not correspond to reality, and at the same time insists on the necessity of “separating religion from politics”? Is not this separation a definitive aspect of the concept of secularism? One could argue that there is no contradiction in al-Jabri’s thought since, for him, secularity/secularism is the separation of religion from state and not from politics. However, in his dialogue with Hassan Hanafi, al-Jabri himself stated that “the separation of religion from politics” is one of the meanings of secularity/secularism, while he insisted on the falsity of secularity/secularism in the same text (Hanafi and al-Jabri 1990, 44). In discussing “the Question of Religion and the State,” al-Jabri (2009) considered secularity/secularism a false problem if it referred to the separation

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of religion from the state (29–60). The duality of “religion and state” refers to the duality of “the church as an independent religious authority, and the state.” In his view, secularism exclusively means “the separation of religion/ religious authority from the state” (al-Jabri 2009, 54, 57).4 Consequently, it is meaningless to talk about secularity/secularism in Islam or in most countries of the Arab world, because there is no church or independent religious authority in Islam. Al-Jabri also selected the title “Islam is not a church to separate it from the state” (Hanafi and al-Jabri 1990, 39) for his text on the issue of Islam and secularity, in dialogue with Hanafi. According to al-Jabri (2009), the notion of secularity/secularism originated in Europe with a view to separating two existing institutions (the state and the church) (57) to avoid the establishment of a state within a state, one setting itself up against the other, or an authority conflicting with the state over its powers (57). However, it originated in the Arab and Islamicate world “in countries where religious sectarianism is one of the basic components of society” (51). Therefore, secularity is an issue related to Europe, or some countries that suffer from the problem of religious sectarianism, but it has no place in countries where this sectarianism does not exist as a social/political problem. George Tarabishi strongly disagreed with al-Jabri’s and Hanafi’s understanding of secularity/secularism. While seeking to define secularity/ secularism, Tarabishi (2006) asserted that it is incorrect to define secularity/ secularism as ‘separating the church from the state’ (67). Tarabishi (2006) considered al-Jabri’s reduction of the separation of religion from the state to a separation of the church from the state, as a “formalist trick” to deny the validity of saying that Islam as a religion also needs to be separated from the state (67). Tarabishi’s criticism of al-Jabri is not entirely well-grounded and lacks some plausibility, because al-Jabri’s stance on secularity/secularism is complex and not confined to pointing out the falsity of the question of secularity/secularism and the need to exclude it from the Arab and Islamicate discourse. In his harsh criticism of al-Jabri, Tarabishi (2006) argues for the separation of religious and political powers in Arab and Islamicate societies while pointing out many disadvantages in the process of “politics and the politicization of religion” in these societies (68). Tarabishi’s argument disregards al-Jabri’s own assertion of the fundamental differentiation of religion and politics, the need to separate or distinguish them, the dangers of employing religion in politics, and the possibility of civil wars arising as 4 This definition and its foundation are used by many Islamic thinkers, for example Hassan Hanafi in his dialogue with al-Jabri (Hanafi and al-Jabri 1990, 39).

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a result. Accordingly, Tarabishi clearly misunderstands al-Jabri’s position. The reasons behind this misunderstanding include al-Jabri’s formulations of his position, which appear to be self-contradictory. Another reason for this misunderstanding is Tarabishi’s unilateral and partial reading of al-Jabri’s position without regard for its complexity. Furthermore, given that the concept of secularity/secularism is itself primarily normative, problematic and debatable, this provides additional reason for the general misunderstanding of controversial ideological debates on secularity/secularism.

Secularity/Secularism between al-ʿAzmeh and el-Messiri ʿʿAziz al-ʿAzmeh declared that secularity/secularism is “an extremely complex, long-term historical process […] dealing with and affecting society, politics, thought, perception and knowledge” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 154, n.). Al-ʿAzmeh’s understanding of secularity/secularism came after extensively denouncing the contemporary Arab discourse on secularism and its controversial and superficial ideological approach to this subject (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 153). During the ideological debate that brought together al-ʿAzmeh and Abdel Wahab el-Messiri, al-ʿAzmeh strongly criticized the use of secularity in a vague, uncontrolled and inaccurate manner in contemporary Arab discourse in general (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 155–68). Al-ʿAzmeh also defines secularity: “it is not an idea, and not a list of signs whose presence or absence can be indicated” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 154). Al-ʿAzmeh’s work provides an important basis for making some conceptual distinctions that could help avoid misunderstandings on the question of secularity/secularism. The importance of al-ʿAzmeh’s work (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000) arises for various reasons, for example: (1) he provides, as he mentions (154), a summary of his main books with additions and updates;5 and (2) his work contains an important ideological and secular debate as well as a useful historical scholarly study the like of which is hard to find elsewhere in contemporary Arab thought. Most importantly, this particular work embodies some of the most important theoretical and methodological

5 Al-ʿAzmeh’s main books include: Dunya al-din fi hader al-aʿarab (The world of religion in the Arabs’ present; 1999); Al-ʿilmāniyyah min manzur mukhtalif (Secularism from a different perspective; 1998); and Al-asalat aw siyasat al-hurub min al-waqiʿ (Authenticity or policy of escaping from reality; 1992).

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linguistic/conceptual problematics that may create or generate confusion in the meaning of “secularity.” To avoid misunderstanding, it is of importance to distinguish between three (or four) basic concepts: secularity ʿalmāniyyah ‫علامنية‬, secularism ʿalmānawiyyah ‫علامنوية‬, and secularization taʿalmun ‫ ت َ َع ل ُم ن‬and ʿalmanah ‫( َع ل َم نة‬Kleine and Wohlrab-Sahr 2016).6 The analytical concept of secularity refers to an institutional and symbolic differentiation in reality as well as a conceptual distinction between religion/religious and non-religion/ non-religious. This concept could be used as a basis for describing and analyzing factual differentiations and theoretical distinctions, while striving as much as possible not to develop a normative/ideological view on these differentiations and distinctions. Without necessarily abandoning critical thought, the concept of secularism opens the door to developing a normative/ideological position. Secularism refers to a position supportive of the process of secularization, and highlights the advantages of this process. What is meant by secularization in turn is the intended or unintended differentiations that occur, in reality and thought, between religion/religious and non-religion/non-religious. These differentiations between secularity, secularism and secularization help us understand what al-ʿAzmeh means where he says it is necessary to move away from the secularist position and to understand secularity as an analytical concept to study the processes of secularization that have occurred in reality. The historical discourse that al-ʿAzmeh employs in his various texts “is a descriptive and analytical discourse” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 158). This discourse “uses categories through which it investigates the relationship of religion – ideas, conceptions, institutions and values – with the world in the paths of history […]” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 158). Al-ʿAzmeh also rejects the ideological/normative view that perceives secularity as “a list of defects, gains and advantages, depending on its palatability or lack of palatability, a list of which of its elements are said to be accomplished or that they do not exist” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 155). There are some conceptual/methodological ideas related to al-ʿAzmeh’s perspective that could constitute one of the objective sources of misunderstanding in relevant contexts. Although al-ʿAzmeh encourages precision in examining reality and formulating concepts, his texts and most similar texts in Arab thought lack 6 This chapter is based on the conceptual framework of the project of the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, beyond Modernities.”

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a well-defined distinction between the concepts of secularity, secularism and secularization.7 While implicitly making a distinction between these three concepts, al-ʿAzmeh uses one term “secularity” ‫ علامنية‬to refer to each of their meanings, and it is therefore unclear what he means precisely in some cases. Al-ʿAzmeh occasionally uses the term “being secularized” ‫تعلمن‬ and once the term “secularization” ‫ علمنة‬in his text (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 153–224 and 261–82), but he does not employ a specific term to clearly refer to the concept concerned. Furthermore, in al-ʿAzmeh’s perspective the term secularity denotes the historical reality, on the one hand, and the awareness of this historical reality, on the other. This implicit distinction is sometimes absent, whereby al-ʿAzmeh stresses that secularity is merely “an objective series of processes in history,” and is not secularism, that is, the “view, perspective and norm” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 270). Al-ʿAzmeh’s discourse on secularity as an objective reality makes it in many cases akin to fate, as there is no choice for consciousness but to be identical or correspondent to secularized reality. Therefore, consciousness is either progressive, that is, it corresponds to the historical movement of society and thought in the era of modernity, or regressive, because it is an awareness opposed to modernity and secularized reality. Secularity, from al-ʿAzmeh’s standpoint, is “a set of historical powers, metamorphosis, conceptions, and institutions”; it is not “a recipe or a ready-made formula that a certain historical group may choose to apply or reject” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 160) and it “is not an ideological choice as much as it is an objective and global history at the same time” (168). In contrast to secularization, where this concept is present but its precise term is absent, secularism is almost completely lacking as both a concept and a term. Al-ʿAzmeh seems to believe it is meaningless to speak about secularity as secularism, that is, as a dogmatic and ideological position. He insists that secularity “is just a mental and historical theory of values: it is not an ideological position, even if it is integrated with various beliefs, but it is an awareness of the historical and natural reality” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 267), or it is a social reality, and not a project that conflicts with the “Islamist project” (266). But in places al-ʿAzmeh does not deny the ideological characteristics or dimension of his “secularist” discourse. For 7 The distinction between the concepts “secularity” and “secularism” often occurs in the context of translating foreign texts, particularly written in French (Arkoun 1996, 74) and in English (Mahmood 2018). As for the absence of distinction, it even occurs in texts that aim to clarify the concept or term’s connotations and remove ambiguity in its primary, secondary, descriptive, and normative meanings.

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example, he indicates that the “ideological approach” is the most appropriate to the claims of Islamic political discourse (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 179). Thus, through the concept of “secularism,” this ideological concept should be distinguished from secularization as well as secularity, which is an analytical and descriptive concept. The secularism of ideological and normative discourse that defends secularity and secularization and stresses their reality, necessity and many advantages should not be denied. While secularity is not an ideological position, nor does it includes such a position, the concept of secularism certainly is. It would be difficult to understand how secularity does not include an ideological position without drawing a relative and partial separation between secularity and secularism. This separation remains partial and relative while not negating the existence of an ideological dimension in the analytical and descriptive concept, and the existence of an analytical and descriptive dimension in the ideological. The adoption of a Manichaean opposition is one of the signs of ideological thought, in which the two sides of a dispute cannot be combined: “either … or….” This also appears in al-ʿAzmeh’s writing, where he states “there is no middle ground between secularity and the hostility to secularity in which democracy or rationalism resides, as they are inseparable from the foundations of secularity” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 219). Based on the theoretical formulation of the ideological confrontation between secular/ secularists and Islamic/Islamists, al-ʿAzmeh criticizes “the reliance of the liberal and nationalist discourses on the Islamic discourse” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 223). He also criticizes Arab intellectuals who reconcile themselves to “Islamic intellectual foundations” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 221), and the seculars who are against secularity, because they “constitute forces auxiliary to forces that are objectively opposed to them” (224). Given the dominance of the issue of secularity in the ideological discourses of Arab thought, al-ʿAzmeh’s attempt to address this concept should be valued from an epistemological, historical, analytical and descriptive perspective, without actually abandoning the ideological approach to this issue. Accordingly, it is important to be beware of the merging or confusion of the two discourses: descriptive/analytical and normative ideological. Such confusion may result from the claim that secular/secularist thought merely means its correspondence to reality and to scientific and historical objectivity, and that non-secular or anti-secular thought refers only to a “mobilizing an aggressive ideological approach against reality” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 219). At the beginning of his text, al-ʿAzmeh praises a descriptive and analytical approach to secularity, and criticizes the ideological/normative

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view of secularity as “a list of flaws, gains and advantages, according to its palatability or lack of palatability” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 155), but shortly after, he becomes deeply involved in the ideological debate to such an extent that it is difficult to separate it from the descriptive approach. In summary, the approval of a descriptive analytical approach by alʿAzmeh and many other Arab thinkers, and their disapproval of a normative/ ideological approach, has not prevented them from engaging in the latter. Even when the matter is restricted to so-called description and analysis, this does not equate to the complete absence of evaluation and normative vision. The normative dimension is inherent to concepts related to secularity, as they are thick normative concepts. Against this background, there is a need to deconstruct the “descriptive/analytical vs. evaluative/normative” dichotomy, the “objective vs. subjective” dichotomy and the related either/ or of similar dichotomies. The deconstruction of such dichotomies can be observed in al-ʿAzmeh’s work, in which the presence of the normative evaluative and subjective dimension seems clear. This deconstruction remains necessary even where al-ʿAzmeh seeks to adopt a style of historical discourse based on the description and analysis of objective reality or the realistic historical process. At the beginning of his text, al-ʿAzmeh hastens to criticize what he describes as “the superficiality of contemporary Arab discourse on secularity” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 154). However, he quickly indulges in establishing a Manichaean dichotomy between a secularity based on the scientific view, rational consideration, freedom and a reasonable, enlightened perspective calling for renewal and advancement, in contrast to a religious/Islamic discourse based on belief and superstitious considerations, giving priority to faith over reason, relying on biblical heritage while seeking to revive the obsolete and fleeting past (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 155–56). This discourse on the duality between secularity and religion/Islam clearly embodies a normative dimension despite the claim that it is merely descriptive and analytical.

Islam and the “Modern Secular Humanist Paradigm”: Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm Discourse that is both ideological/Manichaean/normative and descriptive/analytical is strongly prevalent in contemporary Arab thought. Such discourse is evident, for instance, in most of Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm’s early texts (1970, 2007, 2015). Al-ʿAzm strongly criticizes religion in general, and Islam in particular, stating that it must be excluded from the public sphere

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because it is an obstacle to progress and opposed to science, democracy, secularity, modernity, etc. This discourse adopts the theory of secularization/ modernization which asserts the inevitable decline in the importance of religion to most people in society and the fading away of religion in societies in general, and in developed, modern and welfare societies in particular (Gauchet 1985). In recent years, both the epistemological and normative/ ideological approaches to religion have been strongly criticized (Casanova 1994). While many scholars point to “the return of religion,” others have stressed that “religion initially did not disappear or fade away in the first place,” and that it is “always” present (Roy 2008). Apart from anti-religious or anti-secular trends, there appears to be an increasing tendency to recognize the need for “post-secular society” to take into account the importance of secularity as well as the presence of religion, without fabricating conflict between the two parties (Habermas 2003, 101–15). These intellectual developments find resonance in the later work of al-Azm. He began to recognize the possibility of different interpretations of religion, ranging between the conservative-traditionalist, which is to be criticized, and the neo-modernist, which can be coexisted with, approved and even accepted. In a later stage of his writings (1997, 2004), al-Azm no longer considers religious thought to take a homogeneous form, and lends no legitimacy except to one color. Instead, he began to show marginal or relatively brief signs of the recognition that religious thought may include diversity, even to the point of contradiction between its parties. In the third phase of his work (al-ʿAzm 2005), and in the context of directly addressing the question of the harmony of Islam or its compatibility with modernity, enlightenment, democracy and secularity, al-Azm made a notable distinction between “textual and dogmatic Islam” and “historical Islam” as manifested in the beliefs and behavior of Muslims throughout history. Al-ʿAzm (2010) also distinguishes between three types of “historical Islam” in the contemporary struggle to define the meaning of “Islam” (13–23): (1) “the official Islam of the state” or “the Islam of absolutism”; (2) “the Islam of atonement and denotation”; and (3) “the Islam of the middle and commercial classes.” Through these conceptual distinctions of historical Islam, al-ʿAzm could provide more varied and accurate answers to the question of compatibility between Islam and what he calls a “modern secular humanist model.” This model embraces all matters “pertaining to rights and citizenship, human dignity, democracy, civil society, government accountability, and so on. […] It also comprehends both the set of values recognized above as well as the social and political institutions, practices and attitudes embodying and supporting those values” (al-Azm 2005, 10–12). Al-ʿAzm (2005) stresses that

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“Islam as a coherent, static ideal of eternal and permanently valid principles is, of course, compatible with nothing other than itself. As such it is the business of Islam to reject, resist and combat secularism and humanism to the very end” (30). On the other hand, al-ʿAzm indicates an initial ongoing possibility of conforming or adapting (one of the types of) “historical Islam” to developments and changes throughout history. Al-ʿAzm (2010) refers to “Islam of the middle and commercial classes” as a type of historical Islam that could conform to, approve and even accept the “secular paradigm” (14). He considers this type of historical Islam to be a “civil society Islam” and a “moderate and conservative Islam” which “has a vital interest in political stability and social peace, and […] is certainly not obsessed with polytheists, infidels, apostates and Magi” (ibid.). Furthermore, it is an Islam that tends to tolerance in public affairs, and to strictness in personal, individual and private matters. (ibid.). The conceptual distinction between “textual and doctrinal Islam” and “historical Islam” raises some theoretical and methodological issues. According to this distinction, there is a gap between “textual and doctrinal Islam” and “historical Islam” that cannot be bridged, and this gap results from the stagnation of “textual and doctrinal Islam” – the “simple Koranico-Prophetic Islam.” Against this background, a problem arises with the belief that this Islam has only one complete and established meaning and cannot therefore be interpreted or understood in new ways or in response to new historical developments. Accordingly, “historical Islam” diverges from “doctrinal Koranico-Prophetic Islam” and contradicts it insofar as it is “dynamic,” responsive to different environments, adaptive to fluctuating historical conditions, and “compatible with all major types of polities and varied forms of social and economic organization that human history produced and threw up in the lives of peoples and societies” (al-ʿAzm 2010, 14). This belief intersects, partly and relatively, with the “Salafi perspective,” which does not see “true or correct Islam” except in “the first Islam” or “the Islam of the prophet (and the Rightly Guided Caliphs).” Therefore, this perspective contradicts any hermeneutic view – underlining the permanent existence of the initial possibility for a multiplicity of interpretations, a change of perceptions and the emergence of new perspectives. Based on this hermeneutical understanding, which is partly and relatively missing in al-ʿAzm’s view mentioned above, we see that all kinds and manifestations of “historical Islam” are based on some reading of this “Koranico-Prophetic or first Islam,” and grounded on one of its possible meanings. “In all cases,” what defines the relationship of Islam with modernity, democracy and secularity relates specifically to “historical Islam,” and not to “Koranico-Prophetic or first

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Islam.” On this basis, we can understand Azmi Bishara’s insistence on distinguishing religion and religiosity, and his principled rejection of the question, which he deems false, of the compatibility of religion and democracy. From this perspective, the question should be about the relationship of democracy with religiosity, and not religion per se. Nevertheless, we believe that the concept of religion should be separated from the concept of religiosity, and thus prefer to talk about a first religion/ Islam and about religiosity as historical religion/Islam. We understand that some scholars reject the dichotomy of “religion and religiosity” and consider it a fallacy (Ahjij 2015, 1–23), but we believe that religion should not be reduced to religiosity, nor the text to its interpretations. Religion/ text has prospects beyond religiosity taken in the sense of an interpretation and historical practice.

On the Relationship between Secularity and Democracy Al-Azm’s discussion of the “secular paradigm” raises an important problematic with regard to the question of the relationship between democracy and secularity. Is secularity a feature of democracy, or is democracy a component of the so-called “secular paradigm”? What is the meaning or importance of this problematic? What are the potential consequences of the two perspectives – secularity a feature of democracy and democracy as a component of the “secular paradigm” – at the theoretical and practical levels? Understanding secularity/secularism as a separation of religion or religious authority from the state, politics or political authority suggests it is only a feature of democracy. (Liberal) democracy is based on the principle of citizenship and respect for individual rights, which means equality between citizens regardless of their religion, gender, color, race etc., and respect for individual rights to freedom of opinion, belief and expression. In this context within the state and the (liberal) democratic political system, secularity is concerned with equality – constitutional, legal and practical – among citizens, regardless of their religiosity or non-religiosity, and regardless of their lineage and/or their religious or sectarian affiliation. However, if the objective of secularism is democracy at the political level, does democracy necessarily require a (complete) separation between religion and the state and/or politics? The establishment of political parties on a religious basis may conflict with secularity, if it rests on a separation of religion from politics, but does not necessarily appear to clash with democracy. This is because the establishment of political parties could be based on general

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“religious values,” and not on strict and specific “norms.” These general religious values could favor the democracy of a certain political system, and still be consistent with the foundations and principles of democracy. The state may assume, for instance, the task of collecting zakat from those who wish to pay it, and distributing it to people who are in need without impacting negatively the democracy of the political system. The state may also restrict the authority of declaring jihad/war to the government, or only symbolically link it to religion. Therefore, the definition of secularity, as a condition of democracy, is not an arbitrary matter or mere terminology. Not only should this definition be based on linguistic meaning, historical origins, or ideological/normative biases, but it should also be grounded especially in a logical philosophical analysis of the type of separation required and its plausibility and desirability. For example, is it really true that voters are not influenced by their religious affiliations and culture when involved the political election process? How do we understand discussions of democracy and secularity in the political systems of some countries, such as United Kingdom and Germany, despite the lack of (total) separation of the state from the Anglican Church in the United Kingdom or of Lutheran Church in Germany (Darwish 2019, 277–84, 282)? In terms of the secular paradigm, some scholars, including al-Azm (2005) and el-Messiri (2002), provide another perception of the relationship between secularity/secularism and democracy. According to this perception, democracy is one of the elements of secularity/secularism, which is a model to be followed. Notwithstanding the differences in the contents of the secular paradigm between scholars, it is common to consider it leading to the creation of an ideological/normative polar contrast with the “religious/ Islamic paradigm,” particularly in Arab and Islamicate culture. This contrast, which can be found, for instance, in the work of al-ʿAzmeh, al-Azm and el-Messiri, takes the Manichaean normative form, with one pole representing absolute good and the opposite pole signifying absolute evil. Al-ʿAzmeh confirms that secularity “is not a project contrary to the Islamic project” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 266). However, he establishes a normative ideological bipolarity, in which secularity is based on knowledge, freedom, rational, enlightened consciousness, advancement, modernity and enlightenment, etc., while the opposite hostile discourse embodies the pole of faith, superstition, repressive tradition, obscurantism and the antiquated and fleeting past, etc. (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 155–56). The same bipolarity can also be found in the writings of al-Azm, especially in his texts published in the 1960s. In his recent discussion of the “secular paradigm,” one can also notice that al-Azm (2005) affirms all the

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“positive” values conventionally a​​ ttributed and traced back to the European Enlightenment in a “normative paradigm, of the notion of human rights and its accompaniments, such as civil liberties, citizens’ rights, democracy, freedom of expression, civil society, separation of state and religion” (10–2). A similar Manichaean normative dichotomy can be detected in the work of el-Messiri on the “secular paradigm” as “comprehensive secularism,” but there is a fundamental difference that should be noted. For el-Messiri, the “negative or undesirable pole” does not reside in the religious or anti-secular paradigm, but rather in the “comprehensive secularism paradigm.” This is because the latter model “separates all religious, moral and human values from all aspects of public life at first, and then from all private aspects of life at the end, until the world (man and nature) is completely desacralized” (el-Messiri 2002, 472). According to el-Messiri (2002), “partial secularity,” or secularity as a feature of the (democratic) political system, means a partial vision of reality that applies to the world of politics and perhaps the world of economics, and is usually expressed by separating the church/ clerical institutions from the state (471–72). Unlike “partial secularity,” “comprehensive secularism,” “nihilistic secularism” or “natural/material secularism” includes a comprehensive view of the universe and is not limited to separating religion from the state in the fields of politics and economics, but rather takes this separation to its ultimate limits to include all levels and fields of life. There are often negative consequences to ideological confrontation or antagonism between the secular and the religious, such as a negative reputation gained by the concept of “secularity/secularism” among large segments of the Arab and Islamicate world. One of the main consequences of this kind of conflict lies in the marginalization of democracy and prioritization of secularity/secularism at the ideological and political level. This leads a number of the most prominent Arab thinkers – such as Mohammed Abed al-Jabri (2009), Burhan Ghalioun (2007) and Azmi Bishara (2012) – to express their reservations about raising secularism to the level of a slogan. They absolutely reject the transformation of secularity/secularism into ideology. They reject secularity, as a slogan, not because they are “pledged to the party called Islamic,” as al-ʿAzmeh states while criticizing al-Jabri’s views in this regard (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 220), nor because they are anti-secularist “in a discourse that is objectively opposite to them, […] [such that] they form auxiliary forces to forces that are objectively opposed to them” (el-Messiri and al-ʿAzmeh 2000, 224). The reservation of these thinkers, and others, in terms of secularism as a slogan or a political doctrine or ideology, stems partly from their belief in the primacy of the

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democratic question. Moreover, they believe that secularism, as a political ideology, can be fascist or authoritarian. It can be used to justify alliances with tyrannical and dictatorial forces, and the existence of these forces, according to the logic of “the necessity of accepting the bad in order to avoid the worst.” According to a secularist logic, the worst is not embodied in tyranny or dictatorship, but rather in the presence of religion and religious forces, and its possible hegemony. It is common to defend tyranny in the Arab and Islamicate world by highlighting the importance of its actual or alleged secularism and by claiming that the only alternative to it is an “Islamic or Islamist ghoul.”

On the Necessity of Deconstruction In addition to the conceptual analysis of the relationship between Islam and modernity/Enlightenment, and the hermeneutical reading of relevant texts, it is beneficial, even necessary, to deconstruct the bipolarities or dichotomies these relevant texts deal with. These dichotomies include the “secular/religious (Islamic)” dichotomy in general, and “the secular state/ religious state” in particular, as well as the “Enlightenment (modernist)/ guidance (religious) dichotomy.”8 Rather than mutual exclusion of the two sides of a dichotomy, in the manner of the concepts of Islamists and secularists, and instead of negative dialectics – as in the Adornoian and 8 The “religious/secular” dichotomy may itself fall within the framework of deconstructing the relationship between modernity and Enlightenment on one hand, and religion and its guidance on the other. In this regard, it is necessary to consider the common normative foundations of the two discourses of Enlightenment and religious guidance, and to show the transcendent and foundational logic through which they speak and on which both discourses are often based. Enlightenment and guidance have more in common than we may imagine at first glance: they both possess a truth that tends to intolerance of those who contradict it or differ from it, and a failure to acknowledge the existence of any other truth, or of those who believe in another truth. Both seek to liberate people, individuals and groups from ignorance and backwardness. Both deal with the awareness of the other as being in crisis, sick or ignorant in terms of their own interests and what they must do in the first place. From this perspective it is necessary to enlighten or guide this awareness along the right path. Both discourses are devoid of tolerance, not to mention recognition, meaning willing and friendly acceptance of the differences of the other. Both view the other with a certain inferiority, as they consider them to be unbelievers and/or ignorant. They both believe they have the ability to detect illnesses of conscience in the other and to determine the appropriate medicine. This is why they impose a kind of guardianship over the other, like the guardianship of a doctor over a patient. To continue the metaphor, the patient should follow the prescriptions of Enlightenment or the fatwas of the sheikh, which will inevitably lead to recovery (Darwish 2013).

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Derridean way – it is essential to establish positive dialectics/compositions of the two sides of such dichotomies, given the actual and initial possibility of these dialectics. In what follows, we shall confine ourselves to demonstrating some aspects of the deconstruction of the “secular vs. religious” or the “religious state vs. the secular state” dichotomies through the concept of “civil or civil state”. Deconstruction, in the Derridean sense, means initially locating contradictory conceptual encounters (polarities, binaries, dichotomies or dualisms) and highlighting the implicit normative hierarchy. This hierarchy should then be reversed in a way that leads to a displacement and reconsideration of the relations between the two sides and shows where they overlap and depend on each other.

On the Deconstruction of the “Secular/Religious” Dichotomy The term “secular” refers, on first consideration, to the non-religious as contradictory to the religious. Likewise, the concept of “religious” refers to the non-secular, and thus each concept is understood through contrast or opposition to the other. This is not only a descriptive contradiction, but includes, as we have seen, a normative hierarchy that demotes or even demonizes one side and promotes or even glorifies the other. Secularists and Islamists alike define one side as demonic and the other as angelic, the difference between them is that what the Islamists demote or demonize is promoted or glorified by the secularists, and vice versa. There are therefore two types of contradictory, descriptive and normative hierarchies. Deconstructing the normative Islamist hierarchy of the religious/secular duality may occur through the revelation of the countless outstanding achievements of non-religious people and/or of non-religious sciences, as well as the development of other non-religious f ields. According to al-Afghani, the non-religious is seen merely as a feature of everything depraved. One should take into consideration the positive achievements of modern (non-religious) sciences, such as providing water, food, medicine, treatment and knowledge for religious and non-religious people alike. Furthermore, religion is not only a force for good. It can be used to justify tyranny. There are many cases where authoritarian regimes have relied on the support of religion. The Church gave support to the Nazi party in Germany for example and religious support increased the power of the Islamic State in the Middle East. Religion/religiosity can become an ally of despotism and tyranny when clerics rule directly, as in the case of

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Iran – Wilayat al-Faqih, for example – or their rule is based on the use of religious texts and vision to defend a political system, as in the case in Saudi Arabia. In parallel, the deconstruction of the normative secularity/secularism hierarchy of the religious/secular duality may be accomplished by pointing out the religious roots or foundations of secularity, the crimes committed in its name, and the countless negatives associated with it, especially when it turns into a belief against religion and religious people. The partial reliance on many religious people in demanding democratic, political and economic reform under the rule of non-religious/secular authoritarian regimes can be also emphasized. Furthermore, there are many religious people who have paid a huge price in defense of their just and legitimate claims. Religion has not only been the “opium of the people,” but also and especially, “the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions.” (Marx 1975, 244). The deconstruction of the normative contrast between the secular and the religious should also be accompanied by a deconstruction of the descriptive ideological distinction between the two sides. However, there is no necessary divergence between the religious and the secular – the religious can include what is secular and vice versa. Out of this comes the partial and relative plausibility of the term “religious secularism” or “secular religion.” It is quite common to say that secularity was possible in the “Christian West” because Christianity per se embraces a separation between what is “for Caesar” and what is for God. On the other hand, it is fair to say that Islam may include what is not religious, such as democracy and secularity, as is evident in writings on “secular Islam” and “democratic Islam” by Hassan Hanafi (0991) and Cheryl Benard (2003), for example. Against this background, what is being deconstructed is the ideological contrast – adopted by secularists as well as Islamists – between a religion rejecting everything that contradicts it, and an exclusionary secularity that considers religion a major enemy in the public sphere. The deconstruction of normative and descriptive dimensions therefore does not include a denial of secularity as an analytical concept, nor of the analytical conceptual distinction between the religious and its opposition. Nor does it include a denial of secularism and secularization, as they refer to the actual partial and relative distinction between the religious and non-religious. The processes of secularization and secularism are not limited to the state, the political side or the relationship of religion and state or politics, but regrettably the ideological struggle often focuses on this aspect. Thus, giving special attention to the contrast between the “secular state”

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and the “religious state” seems to be necessary when attempting such deconstruction in the Arab and Islamicate world. In the contrast between the “secular state” and the “religious state,” where no party – secular or religious – is def ined except by the negation of the other, the contrast between what is secular and religious takes on its strongest theoretical, political or ideological descriptive forms. In order to transcend the negative dialectics, as in the manner of Adorno and Derrida, we suggest the use of the term “civil state,” as it may play a role in combining the two opposite sides of the debate.

The Term “Civil State” as an Empty, Floating and Thick Signifier Generally speaking, the term “civil” madani ‫ ”مدين‬is positively loaded in Arab culture, allowing it to surpass the normative contrast between “secular” and “religious.” When considering a state civil, this undeniably excludes understanding it as a “religious state” or a “secular state” – hostile to religion – and rejects an exclusive choice of one over the other. Such a choice takes a completely intransigent form: it is either a secular state or a religious state, and there is no third option. Therefore, the “civil” would differ from the religious, without being hostile or contradictory to it. It may also partially correspond with or contradict the military, which is among the staunch enemies of democracy in a number of Arab countries. Furthermore, the term “civil” signifies the concepts of civilization and modernity, which are associated with the concepts of democracy, rationality, universal human rights, etc. Thus, the term “civil” is, in its nature, incompatible with the concepts of “barbarism” and “backwardness” and the like. The term “civil” as a characteristic (of the state) has enjoyed a relatively broad “Arab” acceptance from the Renaissance to the present time.9 The main problematic of the term “civil state” lies in its descriptive content. It is very fluid and ambiguous to the extent that it can be made synonymous with the concept of the “Islamic state” in one context (al-Ansari 9 Albert Hourani (2013) notes that the idea of “civilization” entered the Islamic world especially through the work of al-Afghani (114). During the Renaissance, the generally positive connotations of the term “civil” were prevalent among the religious and non-religious alike, such as Muhammad Abdo, Farah Antoun, Rashid Rida and Francis al-Marash. Aziz al-ʿAzmeh believes that the term “civilization” was often used to denote what we often mean today by the term “secularism/ secularity.” Furthermore, the word “secularism” replaced “civilization,” specifically so that its spread might lead to a partial and relative decline in the circulation and spread of the word “civilization” (al-ʿAzmeh 1998, 17).

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2014) or the concept of the “secular state” in others.10 This is one of the main reasons that the use of the term is strongly criticized. Al-Jaba‘ī, for example, labels it “an intellectual fabrication and political dress-up”11 which denotes “the ignorance of the secularists and the deception of the Islamists” (al-Jaba‘ī 2015). The epistemological justification for such strong criticism of the term is partly the fact that it is barely existent in philosophy and the social sciences (al-Jaba‘ī 2012a). Apart from Al-Jaba‘ī’s view (2012b) of the term “civil state” as “an empty slogan,” in the normative sense of the word, there is a possibility of relying partly on Ernesto Laclau (2014, 2005), Chantal Mouffe (2014) and Jef Huysmans (1998), and the understanding of it as an “empty signifier,” “floating signif ier” and/or “thick signif ier,” in the descriptive sense of the word. Despite the possibility of a contradiction between them, the meanings of these concepts are complementarily based on the duality of the signifier and the signified, coined by Ferdinand de Saussure. Moreover, linking the three features of the signifier mentioned (empty, floating and thick) with the term “civil state,” as indicative, means the denial of the existence of a fixed and substantial relationship between it and what it signifies. While the characteristic “thick” indicates that this signifier is associated with a large number of meanings, the “floating” characteristic specifies that the “waves” spread the signifier’s thick meanings, making them variable or changeable. Furthermore, the adjective “empty” asserts that the signifier has no fixed or dominant meaning. Consequently, there are no established and/or fixed meanings for concepts or terms related to political conflicts, particularly the “civil state.” The “emptiness” of this concept, and the contradiction of the meanings attributed to it, shows that the conflict has only been settled in part, but this settled part suggests the emptiness of the signifier is not complete. There is a primary foundation upon which to base the dialectical structure of the contradiction between the secular or the secular state and the religious or the religious state. Does talking about the emptiness of the signif ier, its floatiness and thickness increase the likelihood of misunderstanding in the relevant discussions? The answer may be “no” for at least two reasons. The first is that accepting the signifier is empty, floating and thick, acknowledges the need to construct and compromise the meaning, because it has not 10 For example, Ahmed Barqawi (2018) states: “If some people are not happy to use the term secularism/secularity, and prefer the term civilization, so be it. Thus, the terms secularism/ secularity and civilization will be synonymous, because they are one in essence.” 11 Perhaps we can largely exclude John Locke’s discourse on civil government (Locke 2003).

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been previously established. Against this background, construction and compromise are not only cognitive and related to individuals, but are also closely related to political and social situations and conflicts. The second is that the emptiness is not complete, and the float or change is not absolute. Furthermore, the thickness indicates the previous existence of what should be taken into account and started from. Meanings, in such contexts, are constructed, or ought to be constructed, but the construction process does not start from a void nor is it based on emptiness. It is of importance to extract the general discussions taking place in contemporary Arab thought from the framework of pure normative ideological partitions. These partitions divide the world into two – Manichaeism, what is right and wrong, good and evil. Leaving these partisanships behind, partially or relatively, does not mean denying the existence of an ideological dimension and/or basis for the discussions concerned. Instead, it should reveal ideological dimensions or foundations, control them, and search for epistemological justification. In turn this should allow for better selfunderstanding, and thus pave the way for mutual understanding with those who disagree with it epistemologically and ideologically. Based on this understanding, discussion with others and thus agreement or disagreement with them can be meaningful, at least at the epistemological level.

References Arabic sources Abd al-Rahman, Taha. 2014. Buʾs al-Dahraniyya: fi al-naqd al- al-iʾtimani li-fasl al-akhlaq ʿan al-din (The misery of materialism: on the trusteeship critique of the separation of ethics from religion). Beirut: Al-Shabkat al-ʿArabiyya li-al-Abhath wa-al-Nashr. Ahjij, Hassan. 2015. “Mughalatit thunaʾiyat al-din/al-tadyyun fi dawʾ nazariyyat al-mumarasah al-mustalhamah min falsafat Fitghnshtayn al-mutaʾakhirah” (The religion/religiosity fallacy: in light of a theory of practice inspired by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy). Mominoun without Borders, 1–31. https://www. mominoun.com/articles/2639-‫الدينالتدين‬-‫ثنائية‬-‫مغالطة‬. al-Ansari, Ahmed Bouachrine. 2014. “Mafhum al-dawlah al-madaniyyah fi al-fikr algharbi wa-l-islami: dirasa muqarnah li-baʿd al-nusus al-taʾsisiyyah” (The concept of the civil state in western and Islamic thought: a comparative study of some foundational texts). Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. https://www.

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dohainstitute.org/ar/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/document_45CD37F7. pdf. Arkoun, Mohammad. 1996. Al-ʿalmanah wa-l-din. al-islam, al-masīḥīh, al-gharb (Secularization and religion: Islam, Christianity and the West). 3rd ed. Beirut: Dar al-Saqi. al-ʿAzm, Sadik Jalal. 1970. Al-naqd al-dhdhati baʿd al-hazimah (Self-criticism after the defeat). 4th ed. Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿah. ———. 1997. Dhihniyyat al-tahrim. Salman Rushadi wa-haqiqat alʾadab (The tabooing mentality: Salman Rushdie and the truth of literature). 3rd ed. Beirut: Dar al-Mada. ———. 2004. Ma baʿed dhihniyyat al-tahrim: qiraʾah al-ʿayat al-shaytaniyyah’, radun wa-ta‘qib (Beyond the tabooing mentality: the satanic verses, a reply to critics). 2nd ed. Beirut: Dar al-Mada. ———. 2007. Al-hub wa-l-hub al-ʿudhri (Love and Platonic love). 8th ed. Beirut: Dar al-Mada. ———. 2010. “Al-dawlah al-ʿalmaniyyah wa-l-masʾalah al-diniyyah: Turkia namudhajan” (The secular state and the religious question: Turkey as a paradigm). Journal of Palestine Studies 82: 14–23. al-ʿAzmeh, ʿAziz. 1992. Al-asalat aw siyasat al-hurub min al-waqiʿ (Authenticity or policy of escaping from reality). Beirut: Dar al-Saqi. ———. 1998. Al-ʿilmaniyyah min manzur mukhtalif (Secularism from a different perspective). 2nd ed. Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdah al-ʿArabiyyah. ———. 1999. Dunya al-din fi hader al-aʿarab (The world of religion in the Arabs’ present). Beirut: Dar al- Taliʿah. al-Jabaʿi, Jad al-Karim. 2012a. “Al-dawlah al-madaniyyah: talfiq fikri wa-talbis siyasi” (The civil state is an intellectual fabrication and a political deception). Sudaress, July 23. https://www.sudaress.com/hurriyat/71590. ———. 2012b. “Al-ʿalmaniyyah min manzur al-dawlah al-wataniyyah” (Secularism from the perspective of the national state). ʾAafaq Center for Research and Studies, December 18. https://aafaqcenter.co/index.php/post/989. ———. 2015. “Baʿed thaqafat al-ʿabiyd taʾti thaqafat al-hurriyyah” (The culture of freedom comes after the culture of slaves). Interviewed by ʿAmmar al-Maʾmūn. Al-Arab Weekly, April 12. https://alarab.co.uk/‫الحرية‬-‫ثقافة‬-‫تأيت‬-‫العبيد‬-‫ثقافة‬-‫بعد‬-‫الجباعي‬-‫جادالكريم‬. Barqawi, Ahmed. 2018. “Qawl fi al-ʿalmaniyyah wa-al-madaniyyah” (An opinion about secularity and civilization). Al-Bayan, April 21. https://www.albayan.ae/ opinions/articles/2018-04-21-1.3243398. Bishara, Azmi. 1994. “Madkhal ila muʿalajat al-dimuqratiyyah wa-ʾanmat altadyyun” (An introduction for the study of democracy and patterns of religiosity). In Hawl al-khayar al-dimoqraṭi: dirasat naqdiyyah (On the democratic option:

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English and French sources al-Afghani, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din. 1968. “The Truth about the Neicheri Sect and an Explanation of the Neicheris.” In An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, translated by Nikki Keddie and Hamid Alger, edited by Nikki Keddie, 130–74. Berkeley: University of California Press. al-Azm, Sadiq Jalal. 2005. Islam und säkularer Humanismus (Islam and secular humanism). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ———. 2015. Critique of Religious Thought, translated by George Stergios and Mansour Ajami. Beirut: Gerlach Press. Benard, Cheryl. 2003. Civil, Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. al-Bustani, Butrus. 2019. The Clarion of Syria, translated by Jens Hanssen and Hicham Safieddine. Oakland: University of California Press. al-Jabri, Mohammed Abed. 2009. Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought. London: I.B.Tauris Casanova, José. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1989. “Text and Interpretation,” translated by Dennis J. Schmidt and Richard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction: The GadamerDerrida Encounter, edited by Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, 21–51. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Gauchet, Marcel. 1985. Le désenchantement du monde: une histoire politique de la religion. Paris: Gallimard. Habermas, Jurgen. 2003. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity Press. Holyoake, George Jacob. 1870. Principles of Secularism, 3rd rev. ed. London: Austin and Co. Hourani, Albert. 2013. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939, 22nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huysmans, Jef. 1998. “Security! What do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier.” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2: 226–55. al-Jabri, Mohammed Abed. 2009. Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought. London: I. B. Tauris. Kirchin, Simon. ed. 2013. Thick Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2017. Thick Evaluation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kleine, Christoph and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr. 2016. “Research Programme of the HCAS ‘Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities.’” Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, beyond Modernities. Centre for Advanced Studies

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in the Humanities and Social Sciences, March. https://multiple-secularities.de/ media/multiple_secularities_research_programme.pdf. Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso. Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 2014. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd ed. London: Verso. Lewis, Bernard. 2002. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. London: Phoenix. Locke, John. 2003. Two Treatises of Government, and A Letter concerning Toleration. edited by Ian Shapiro. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Marx, Karl. 1975. Early Writings. introduced by Lucio Colletti, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Roy, Olivier. 2008. La sainte ignorance: le temps de la religion sans culture. Paris: Seuil. Väyrynen, Pekka. 2013. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press.

About the Author Housamedden Darwish (University of Leipzig) is a senior researcher at the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Leipzig, and lecturer at the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Cologne. His work is related to modern and contemporary intellectual Arab thought as well as democracy, secularism, and political Islam in the Arab and Islamicate worlds. [email protected]

6. The Missing Body Figurative Representations in Islamic Iconography Hatem N. Akil Abstract This chapter considers the presumed absence of figurative representations in Islamic art, which to some is yet another indication of Islam’s inability to face and represent reality (accept modernity) – as opposed to the body-centric aesthetics of the Renaissance. It is discovered that Islamic history in fact overflows with examples of representations of sentient life. The contrast between Islam’s figurative art (as secular) and abstract and geometric art (as sacred) should not be seen as contradictory, but as a case of cultural simultaneity, which reflects an Islamicate daily life that has always been both religious and secular at the same time. Keywords: Islamic art; nachleben; Islamic iconography; bilderverbot; Islamic secularity; Islamic aniconism

Bilderverbot Who took the body out of Islamic iconography?1 The Quran does not have a clear or specific commandment against graven images – so why does it seem that we hardly witness the body anywhere in Islamic art?2 What is it about the Islamic body that calls for veiling? elision? and omission? But is it possible that the body has been always here – right at the center – staring us in the eye, seen but unnoticed? 1 Iconography here is used in the sense of “writing with images” or image as text. This concept includes all elements of image iconic and aniconic. 2 It is generally accepted that representation of sentient beings is not acceptable (frowned upon, rather than prohibited) in Islam on the basis of recorded Ḥadīth (Prophetic Sayings) rather than as stated explicitly in the Quran.

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_pre

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Towards the end of Tristes Tropiques, Claude Levi-Strauss asks (rhetorically, of course), Why did Moslem art collapse so completely once it had passed its peak? It went from the palace to the bazaar without any transitional phase. This must have been a result of the rejection of images. (2012, 400)

Aha, it is bilderverbot (aniconism) then, that Semitic iconophobia! Being deprived of all contact with reality, the Muslim artist has become incapable of representing the reality that surrounds him.3 Is this a result of an artistic failure? Or is it the restrictive prohibitions of his faith? “It was chiefly the presence of Islam which troubled me,” complained Levi-Strauss (2012, 397). French Orientalist Georges Marçais (1876–1962) seems to agree with Levi-Strauss that the issue with Islamic art lies in its rejection of images and incapability of verisimilitude. In a remarkable and densely-researched study on Islamic art entitled “Picasso the Muslim,” Finbarr Barry Flood, says Marçais “represented Arab creativity as a series of lacks that extends well beyond the realm of the visual arts, as symptomatic […] of the Arab inability to create ‘living fictions,’ among them narrative (as opposed to lyric) poetry or prose, or theater.” Likewise, French Orientalists Gaston Wiet and Louis Hautecoeur viewed Islamic art as “a rigid, joyless art characterized by an excess of unmajestic decoration, and conducive only to dreams and melancholy.” To them, “the interdiction on figural representation meant that Islamic artists rarely took their inspiration from nature, favoring the use of drawings over direct observation” (Flood 2017, 52). The same emphasis on Islam’s rejection of naturalistic images was also claimed by German art historian Wilhelm Robert Worringer (Flood 2017, 50). Social anthropologist Jack Goody, who had a keen interest in the world of Islam, once said of Islamic art, “Mimesis was aberrant; representation was not only worthless, it was blasphemous” (Goody 2004, 112). Could it be argued that the loss of the body in Islamic iconography – and by extension, the loss of nature – is related to an Islamic conception of art that rejects a relationship with the incorporeality of the Divine? To the Muslims, God is not male or female, not matter or spirit. God is transcendent: “There is nothing like Him.”4 But God is also immanent and omnipresent in 3 I am using the pronoun “he” to refer the Muslim artist as an arbitrary indicator. This is not intended to ignore the mostly undocumented role of Muslim women visual artists, particularly in textile arts and carpet making. 4 Holy Quran, Ash-Shura, 42.11.

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all things: “To God is the East and the West. Withersoever you turn, there is the face of God.”5 In most of the Christian conception of art, the body necessitates the iconic for reverence. The sacrament of the Eucharist brings to the present an almost metonymic connection with the body of Christ. In European art, the obsession of the materiality of the body becomes central. This is the kind of sensibility that could easily give us classic and Renaissance figurations where the body is both a measurement of beauty and a connection with the divine. No wonder European critics notice and (are perturbed by) first and foremost the absence of the body in Islamic art, and finding that there is no body present, their perception mostly crumbles because all that we are left with is seen as empty decorations. But in Islam, a faith that is solidly committed to the abstract notion of the Divine, mimesis becomes a problematic that is intractably associated with abstractions that are less about mimetic representations than about interpretation and presentation of the abstract notions of the Divine. Indeed, this is what Hegel appears to be arguing (although not without racist undertones) as he critiques an Islamic God whose physical, and unique body cannot be represented. Art should be able to articulate in images the “subjectivity and particularity” of an anthropomorphic God since the purpose of art is “the sensuous presentation of the Absolute itself.”6 Instead, the Muslim enunciation that there is No god but God is a dead abstraction of a subrational Understanding, according to Hegel.7 As such, Hegel privileges a God that materializes in the body – and therefore is visually capturable and representable – contrasted with the God of “the Jews and the Turks” that is abstracted and therefore short of verisimilitude: Such a God, not apprehended himself in his concrete truth, will provide no content for art, especially not for visual art. Therefore the Jews and the Turks have not been able by art to represent their God, who does not even amount to such an abstraction of the Understanding, in the positive way that the Christians have.8

The Muslim artist, because of his arid religion that controls every aspect of his life – in these perspectives – is thus thrown outside of nature, cursed with iconophobia. He is incapable of representation, imprisoned by his 5 Holy Quran, Al-Baqarah, 2.115. 6 Hegel’s 1821 lectures on aesthetics and fine art, quoted by Flood, 49. 7 Ibid. 8 Quoted by Flood, ibid.

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own rigid faith, producing rigid art with no narrative, no verisimilitude, no mimesis. Shut out of reality itself. At the moment of the birth of Islam in Arabia in the seventh century ce, most Arabs were polytheists worshipping a number of pagan idols, the most common among them (at least for the Arabs of Mecca, we’re told) being the three daughters of Hubal, the Syrian god of the moon. They were: Allāt (goddess of the underworld), al-’Uzzá (goddess of fertility), and Manāt (goddess of fate). Sculptures representing these idols were prevalent and profuse. It is said that the Kaaba at the time of the Mohammedan revelation had 360 idols and that every household in Arabia kept a personal idol at home.9 Although some of these sculptures could have been imported from Roman territories, it is also doubtless that there was a thriving community of artists who were making these statues right there in Arabia, Syria, and the whole region – as there had been for thousands of years before that. On the other hand, Christians who lived in the areas of Arabia, Syria, and Palestine also had a long history of Hellenistic and Byzantine art-making. One can still witness in Palmyra today (ISIS iconoclasm notwithstanding) exquisite examples of Arabian and Syrian Roman and late antique art. Coptic and Roman realistic artistic traditions in Egypt (stretching back from the Fayoum portraits to the Sinai icon traditions) also extended in some forms to the Islamic period. Before that, the Assyrians, Sumerians, the ancient Egyptians, and others have all left the world with remarkable traditions of monumental art, sculptures, reliefs, mosaics, and paintings. This is the physical world that the Arabs knew and inhabited before and after Islam. So, what happened to all the artists and the craftsmen who for generations produced all that art in the vast area of the nascent Islamic empire prior to the prophetic moment? Did they all suddenly disappear overnight? Have these traditions and professions suddenly ceased to exist along with the people who created them?

Qusayr ‘Amra About 80 kilometers outside of Amman in the vast and mostly barren Jordanian desert lies an unexpected remnant of a large structure that used to be a royal retreat of around 24 hectares, built sometime between ce 723 9

See Hoyland 2001.

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and 743 by Prince Walid Ibn Yazid in his frolicking years before his short reign as Calif al-Walid II (743–44). The retreat is comprised of a larger area that is mostly in ruins now, and a smaller section that used to function as a reception hall and a bathhouse. What is captivating about this building is that it breaks several myths surrounding what we commonly have come to accept about Islamic culture, particularly about its iconophobia and Islam’s interdictions against the representation of sentient beings in art forms. The structure is a desert castle and hunting lodge called Qusayr ‘Amra. It is one of many built by the Umayyads and represents a typical example of early Islamic art and architecture. It was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1985 “due to its extensive cycle of unique mural paintings.”10 Qusayr ‘Amra’s extraordinary frescoes cover the whole interior of the building (456 square meters) and unveil, at full display, aspects of Islamic art that remained unnoticed for a long time. As you step inside the building, a flood of images lunges at you from all directions, the walls, the ceiling, even the floors. A figurative image upon a figurative image, upon another, in different themes and styles, telling different stories, framed one next to the other – like a Manhattan apartment of an art collector gone mad, or a veritable Warburgian Bilderatlas Mnemosyne displayed panel after panel of different themes and styles.11 There are women dancing, acrobats jumping, musicians at play, people with children bathing, people drinking wine, political delegates, the king at court, Jonah goes in and out of the whale in three frames, the goddesses Nike and Charis (with Greek captions), even a jovial lute-playing bear. In the midst of all of that visual immersion, one cannot at the same time escape the deafening chaotic sounds that come from all of these images, all these vignettes, and all at once. The walls at Qusayr ‘Amra echo the sights and sounds of the raucous parties of al-Walid II. But one wonders if they also served as an inspiration for the world of play and hedonism that would unfold within them for al-Walid and his companions. Was the art of these frescoes a visual documentation of life at the place? Or was it a foretelling of the pleasures to come. Was life imitating art? or art documenting the physicality and temporality of the life of the playful future caliph? 10 For more information, including photographs of Qusayr ‘Amra, you may check the World Monuments Fund page, Qusayr ‘Amra, https://www.wmf.org/project/qusayr-amra (accessed January 1, 2021). 11 The apparent disparate meanings of the many mural panels might easily make us think of deploying Aby Warburg’s iconology of the intervals as a new way of reading Qusayr ‘Amra.

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These paintings divulge certain seldom spoken secrets about the culture that surrounded their production. Dominating the west wall at Qusayr ‘Amra is an imposing figure of a tall and beautiful woman wearing nothing except what seems to be a skimpy bikini bottom and readying herself for a dip in the bathing pool. Other women are looking at her curiously from the side; and a man to the other side likewise casts his gaze at the naked beauty. In his work Qusayr ‘Amra: Art and the Umayyad Elite in Late Antique Syria, Garth Fowden cites the unexpected free display of nude art as one of the striking features of this palace: Among the features of Qusayr ‘Amra that has always caught the attention of art historians is the abundance of naked, mainly female flesh displayed. On the east wall of the apodyterium, for example, a nude man and a half nude woman flank the window and look at each other, the woman seen frontally, the man from behind […] In the tepidarium, heavy buttocked women carrying buckets for drawing water bathe their children in what are probably Qusayr ‘Amra’s best-known images […] while in the main hall, in the middle of its west wall, a woman almost totally undressed emerges from a pool and is gazed at by a crowd of onlookers. (Fowden 2004, 57)

Naturalistic, f igurative, and vibrantly mimetic with a good deal of the imaginative, the murals of Qusair ‘Amra open up a secular space that seems to defy Islam’s religious edicts, but in reality stands side by side with them. The art of this palace discloses the lifestyle of its playboy patron as well as the cultural mindset of the Muslim ruling elite little more than a century after the birth of the religion. Al-Walid, an eloquent poet and possibly a musician, was known as the playboy of the Umayyad dynasty, and he spent his years pursuing carefree earthly pleasures while, as crown prince, he waited for his uncle Caliph Hisham to die. Fowden points to another figure: “on the corresponding soffit of the west arch, a female dancer clad in bikini bottom, bracelets, armlets, anklets, a necklace, and a body chain.” The chain stretches around the woman’s body in a way that accentuates her breasts. Such chains are usually connected with Greek goddesses, especially Aphrodite. According to Fowden, “Aphrodite was commonly shown wearing one, as in various Roman pottery figurines found in Jordan […] [These chains] also feature occasionally in Roman erotic art” (Fowden 2004, 65–66). The visual signature of Qusayr ‘Amra is a surprising effect that is not what we expect to see from the Islamic Umayyad court culture, not only in that

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there is a sense of a confusing array of styles and techniques used in the frescoes but also in the way that they all stack together inside a semi-official early Islamic building. Fowden describes this sense of the unexpected: [The frescoes] also present such a cornucopia of images that they are the nearest we come to a synthesis of Umayyad court culture. They make us vividly aware how late antique this milieu was. Studying them, I came to see the Umayyads if not as late antiquity’s culmination, then at least as its vigorous heirs – this much of the original project survived. (Fowden, xxii)

Indeed, Qusayr ‘Amra poses a question about what we have been led to expect from Islamic art. At the time of the construction of Qusayr ‘Amra, Islam was well over a century-strong religion and a flourishing empire that by then was ruling a vast stretch from Persia to Andalusia. But this Umayyad art seems confused and contradictory in its artistic disclosures that are not quite influenced but directly taken from hereditary traces that are late antique, Sassanid, Coptic, local Syrian, and Islamic Arab (Fowden 2004, 73). One wonders about the aim of all this synthesis, this visual anachronism. One might argue that Muslim historians do not seem to frequently mention Qusayr ‘Amra – probably in an attempt to elide this incongruent aberration of Islamic iconography, if not Islamic life. At best, the view of the rein of the Umayyads has been that it was already a corrupt and worldly monarchy that invented an Islamic hereditary kingship system and is known for its decadent opulence, hedonism, and all.12 But again, could this also be fake news and just Abbasid propaganda? On the other hand, one could claim that the figurative representations found at Qusayr ‘Amra were the one black swan that proves – despite the existence of endless white swans – that not all swans are white. Is this the proof that Islamic art is not iconophobic? The (relative) verisimilitude of the figurative images at al-Walid’s Qusayr ‘Amra palace is not the only cause for surprise. A simple scan of the images found at the palace clearly reveals that the different panels use a cornucopia of various artistic styles. For example, the bathing woman seems to have been painted in late antique, Sassanid, Byzantine/Arab styles and what seems to even harken to Renaissance art (her figure and pose is quite reminiscent of a Botticellian Venus). Further, inscriptions on the walls are both in Arabic and Greek, thus emphasizing the multicultural aspects of the design concept 12 For more on this, see Fowden’s preface, xx-xxvi.

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Fig. 6.1. Fresco of bathing woman at Qusayr Amra, Jordan. C. Vibert-Guigue (licensed under CC BY 2.0).

for the palace. Can we presume that the wall paintings at Qusayr ‘Amra were created by local artists and artisans as a reflection of a multicultural worldview that the Umayyads espoused and wanted to communicate as a public statement? Probably there is no more emphatic representation of this sense of the universal that the Umayyads espoused than the poem in which al-Waleed II’s uncle Caliph Hisham boasts:13 I am the son of Khosrow;14 My father is Marwan Cesar is my grandfather; my grandfather is Khagan.15

A contemporary observer might easily ignore the Umayyad palaces as simply the product of a degenerate dynasty that barely lasted one century 13 Hisham here is boasting of his own multicultural familial lineage but clearly also with a nod to his universal claim to the lands and diverse culture he rules. 14 Sasanian King of Kings of Iran. 15 Turkic emperor.

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Fig. 6.2. Bust of the standing caliph statue from Hisham’s Palace (Khirbat al-Mafjar) now at the Rockefeller Museum, Jerusalem (licensed under CC BY 2.0).

(out of Damascus),16 and which, from the beginning, was more worldly and profane than sacred and sanctimonious. It could also be argued that the Umayyads did not have the artistic mastery and innovation to create a new Islamic art and therefore needed to borrow from the arts of the Byzantines, the Christians, and the Sassanids. All of that could have made a convincing argument until we realize that probably the most important monuments of Islamic art, the prototypes of what we today still consider to be among the best in sacred Islamic art throughout history also came from the Umayyads: the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus, the Dome of 16 The Umayyads continued to rule in Andalusia for about another 300 years with the disintegration of the caliphate of Hisham III of Córdoba in 1031 into what is known as the kingdoms of al-Tawaif (Taifas).

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the Rock, and the Great Mosque of Córdoba. One can imagine that to the Umayyads, there was a place and an art for the sacred, and a place and an art for the secular.

Black Swans Everywhere Islamic figurative representation is the worst-kept secret in art history: “figural painting was common place,” asserts Marshal Hodgson (1964, 248) in “Islâm and Image.” Historians have for long known of the existence of such works at least in manuscript illustrations, murals, architecture, pottery, mechanical devices, government-struck coins that bear the image of the ruler, etc. Oleg Grabar, an authority on Islamic art, argues in correspondence with Hodgson, “That Islamic iconoclasm was somewhat ‘marginal’ to Islam must be repeated over and over” (Hodgson 1964, 260). Grabar divides Islamic interest in figurative representations along the lines of social classes. He finds that Islamic aristocracies developed a certain artistic expression that could be found in Umayyad palaces, Fatimid treasures, Ilkhanid or Timurid miniatures. These styles that were preferred by the aristocratic elite, argues Grabar, set the tone of an artistic taste that he says was rejected by the masses. Conversely, he explains, “[p]opulism and commercialism developed their own art, namely, Maqamat illustrations and Persian pottery” (Hodgson 1964, 260). In that sense, both classes seem to have a favorite form of figurative art. Syrian art historian Afif Bahnassi, who was a long-time general director of antiquities and museums in Syria, catalogued a vast heritage of figurative Islamic art that extends all the way back to Qusayr ‘Amra and before. In his Arab Aesthetics (1979), Bahnassi notes that figurative art in Islam has a long history and in many instances was state-sanctioned and commissioned by the head of state, the caliph. Bahnassi provides examples of Umayyad desert palaces from al-Heer palace in the Syrian desert, Khirbat al-Mafjar (Hisham’s palace), Qasr Mshatta (Winter palace), and others. These palaces put on full display amazing stone engravings of real and fantastical creatures as well as sculptures, frescoes, and mosaics representing humans, animals, and wildlife (Bahnassi 1979, 52). Caliph Hisham ben Abdel Malek is believed to have commissioned at least two statues of his likeness, one at the western al-Heer palace and the other at Khirbat al-Mafjar palace in Jericho. AlMshatta palace, like the other Umayyad palaces, displayed both figurative representations as well as abstract engravings, both inside and outside the structures (ibid., 56) – thus underscoring the public aspect of these palaces

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(which functioned mostly as semi-governmental edifices combing private and public interpretation of space). Bahnassi describes the exterior facade of Khirbat al-Mafjar palace: Atop the façade of the building is a row of statues, of which three are topless females. On a different side, we see sculptures of various animals including a leopard. By the right arch, we find the statue of a man resting on his right side and a woman sitting next to him in a style reminiscent of the funerary art of Palmyra. The Eastern wall facing inward was decorated with a sculpture of a horse-mounted warrior armed with a bow and arrow, next to it a man seated on a throne with his legs extended on a stool (only the lower parts of the statue remain). On the same side is a sculpture of an eagle with its extended wings. (Bahnassi 1979, 57)

Bahnassi mentions that among the sculptures was a statue showing a voluptuous woman in mid-movement clothed only by a transparent cover that seems closely fitting exposing her features. Another, among the many human statues, is one that depicts a woman who is shown topless with the head missing. The facades of the Umayyad palaces present an enigmatic situation to the observer. Usually, we tend to think of Islamic architecture as mostly an interior affair, where exciting things usually happen on the inside leaving the outside generally foreboding and uneventful. These facades are striking in that they fuse/ con-fuse the interior with the exterior and the public with the private. Can we speak of a new artistic vocabulary that is being constructed by princes who have come to Syria from the Arabian desert and managed to incorporate the arts and practices of their new subjects with a synthesis that expresses both their (multicultural) worldview as well as the passions of their new religion? Although the Umayyad aristocratic styles continued to keep their most precious treasures (and pleasures) on the inside, Umayyad princes were not shy nor embarrassed to put on full public display their artistic taste and their worldview. This dual private/public operation of state palaces is something that we will not see in Europe well until the Renaissance or even after. The public display of f igurative images of humans was a casual expression of taste for public art that seems completely ambivalent to the presumed religious general discomfort with images. But then – the Umayyads were quite notorious for being lax with religion and rather more worldly than devout. What about the Abbasids? They are surely

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more serious and reverent and would not engage in the monkey business of topless statues and public display of eroticism. The Abbasid’s claim to the caliphate was, after all, that they were direct descendants of the Prophet and as such more worthy of protecting the religion, delivering the faith, and leading the faithful. Nevertheless, the Abbasids too led massive architectural projects, especially after moving the capital of the caliphate from Baghdad to Samarra. According to Bahnassi, the Abassids built many grand palaces with exquisite architecture demonstrating examples of their own sense of Islamic art. One of these palaces was Beit al-Khilafa (state house), also known as Jawsaq al-Khaqani palace which was built by al-Mu’tasim in 836 and completed by his half-brother al-Mutawakkil (822–862), who was known to be a particularly pious ruler. Al-Mutawakkil also oversaw other large architectural projects in Samarra including the wonderful Samarra mosque with its famous swirling minaret. Jawsaq al-Khaqani palace is considered among the largest of its kind in Islamic history. Almost a small city, it extended for 700 meters along the Tigris river with large gardens, running water pathways, vast courtyards with a famed pond, a small garrison, a number of mosques, residential quarters, and possibly a prison. German archaeologist Ernst Emil Herzfeld (1879–1948) is credited with excavating much of Samarra’s Abbasid architecture (initially in 1911–13). Herzfeld was meticulous in preparing maps and floor plans for much of the site and provided copious records and photographs of the various artistic treasures of the palace. Jawsaq al-Khaqani included a number of administrative facilities and fulfilled a number of functions including being a public/private space. Al-Mutawakkil would hold court in the Throne Hall with the general public, who would enter through what is called Bab al-‘Amma (people’s gate) on a weekly basis. The Throne Hall (reception court) was a vast rectangular room covered by a domed ceiling. There were doors on each side of the room: one led to the caliph’s private oratory, another to a bathhouse, and another to the calif’s personal private quarters (harem). The Throne Hall, the harem, and the bath house all contained frescoes with nude female figures and hunting scenes. Other parts of the palace (publicly accessible) also had figurative frescoes, human statues, and paintings of birds, animals, dancing girls along with Arabic inscriptions, and Arabesques. In fact, the existence of figurative art was widespread and common enough that archaeologists would frequently find examples of murals, ceramics, and other works that casually show human representations in private citizens’ homes (Museum of Islamic Art, Berlin).

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The Body’s Disclosures One can only confront images from the standpoint of the present. An image constructed in a precise moment in time at a precise place is nevertheless born out of the sedimentation of the visual memories of its pasts and the spaces that extend it visually to all the geographies and chronologies leading to its reception today. Georges Didi-Huberman in Confronting Images observes that art historians fail to engage with the underside of images which harbors limits and contradictions. He calls for “an archaeology of things forgotten or unnoticed in works of art since their creation” (2005, 1). One might even call this a state of disclosure. And as an Umayyad mural or a sculpture discloses itself in the present, it becomes impossible to extricate the totality of the histories of art, of politics, and the geographies that strongly emanate from that work – defused, and certainly not a secret any longer. The figurative in Umayyad art not only confronts what the eye refuses to see about the history of Islamic art but violently pulls us deep into a complex and complicated visual memory that reaches the brims of historical self-doubt. The political move in 634 in Syria from Roman to Islamic rule did not create wholesale cultural identity shifts overnight. In fact, the area remained multi-ethnic and multireligious for hundreds of years thereafter (and continues to be so to this day, in fact). And, as the Muslims were inventing a new civilization, the creative, technical, and professional skills of the indigenous population did not suddenly morph into whole new modalities. Quite to the contrary, the artistic reverberations of the region’s multicultural sedimentations seem to have never stopped reverberating even as the radical new message from Arabia was taking hold. In anthropology, Edward Burnett Tylor coined the term “survivals” to refer to cultural phenomena that outlive the set of conditions under which they initially developed. Tylor describes survivals as processes, customs, and opinions, and so forth, which have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had their original home, and they thus remain as proofs and examples of an older condition of culture out of which a newer has been evolved. (Tylor 1920, 16)

In linguistics, the term refers to words that exist in a certain language but have no corresponding referent in their current geography and thus indicate that the language was born in a different geography, climate, etc.

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Survivals use the inconsistencies of language, geography, and culture to make disclosures about hidden narratives that otherwise lie out in the open – totally unnoticed. The problem of the nudes of Qusayr ‘Amra, of the human statues of Hisham’s palace, and of the lifelike representations of Samarra is not that they conflict with a visual narrative that we want to maintain about the cultural and visual life of Islam. It is not that Muslim clerics were happy to see frescoes with nude women all over public (Samarra) and semi-public buildings (western al-Heer, Khirbat al-Mafjar, etc.), nor is it that figurative paintings were allowed inside houses of worship. But what the presence of this figurative iconography discloses clearly is that there was an acceptance of a secular art practice alongside sacred arts. Hidden in plain sight, Islamic figurative wall art functioned like survivals in their disclosure of a pluralistic Islamic culture capable of creating a separation between the sacred and the secular, and hosting (not without a great deal of unease and strife) recurring manifestations of both the orthodox and the heterodox in art, philosophy, religion, and the sciences. However, Islamic figurative images cannot be easily described as survivals in an anthropological sense because they never departed, they never physically left “their original home,” as Tylor would say – except by force of ideological and political omission. They remain as iconographic evidence right inside the field of vision, albeit unintelligible, often molested but never fully erased.17 Not acknowledging Islam’s figurative art may be seen as an act of public active forgetting in which a culture hides its shame.18 But what happens when the (figurative) image is locked into a visual amnesia, in a form of dissociation or visual elision of sorts in which a culture becomes unable to acknowledge certain elements within its own history. The murals of Qusayr ‘Amra surface in the form of an afterlife, or nachleben. Aby Warburg theorized the afterlife of antiquity (Nachleben der Antike) as a way “to make sense of the survival of archaic practices into the present” (discussed in Georges Didi-Huberman2002, “The Surviving Image”).19 We can read the Islamic figurative representation of the Umayyads both as a survival of pre-Islamic cultural practices into the Islamic period, but also as an afterlife of these images in the aftermath of their elision by cultural historians thereafter. 17 Historians frequently speak of occasional effacement of f igurative art – but that would have been an exception more than the rule. 18 Friedrich Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals (1996 [1887]) argued for active forgetting as a way of “preserving mental order, calm and decorum” (39–40). 19 See Didi-Huberman 2002.

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From a wholly different perspective, one could observe that the thing about Islamic figurative art is that it strongly contradicts the philosophical, theological, and ontological underpinnings of Islam’s abstract art. But this contradiction might be precisely the point of being able to refer to Islamic art as a coherent concept. This bringing-to-the-present becomes an anachronism not only with the present but also with other art forms of the time of their creation, namely the sacred arts of Islam seen in calligraphy, arabesque, and geometrical designs. Figurative representation in Islamic cultures throughout their history articulate a certain dialectics of past and present, of the sacred and the secular, and a collision of cultural memories that are yet to be acknowledged. To acknowledge these collisions requires that we think of Islamic art as a constellation of multiple modes and forms that are rich and diverse enough that they are not necessarily consistent or generalizable. The Abstract in Islamic art history should be considered only in its conjunction with the figurative – not as a contradiction, but rather as a singular appearance, a cultural gesture that is in communion with the ontology of Islamic culture itself. Representation of sentient beings in the history of Islam goes well beyond painting of course. We see sculptures of humans and animal forms that go as far back as the Umayyad and Abbasid palaces, through the magnificent lions in Alhambra’s Court of the Lions (Patio de los Leones) in fourteenth-century al-Andalus to a whole consistent variety of objects of metal arts, wooden arts, textile art, even ivory arts. These so-called minor arts were engaged in producing usable daily art that was part of the daily lives of ordinary Muslims whether it was a water pitcher, a pencil box, or an incense burner, thus enveloping the Muslim in a vast repertoire of figural and beautiful objects that occasionally take the shape of a bird, a lion, a horse, and at times the shape of human and fantastical figures as well. It becomes doubtless that this missing body of Islamic art is not missing at all. Hasn’t it been there all the time? At different times and different geographies? and in different modes? If iconophobia is not a true factor here, then what is the cause of the claim that Islamic art is incapable of mimesis? Why has Islamic art not followed in the Renaissance tradition of the emphasis on natural representation? On the other hand, one might wonder even now – now that we have excavated the body in Islamic art – whether it is also true that this body is far from naturalistic, short of the verisimilitude and linear perspective bequeathed to us by the Renaissance? Why does Islamic art – even in its figurative forms – still seem stylized, caricatured, purposefully unnaturalized. Even at the point of mimesis,

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Islamic art seems more concerned with creating inspiring and abstract allusions than convincing and realistic illusions?

Geometry of the Soul In the avoidance of direct representations of the Divine, Islamic artists sought to create an alternative aniconic vocabulary that rejects the whole system of mimetic representation as the only form of visual expression. In discovering the power of non-representation to communicate complex and abstract ideas and ideals, Islamic art begins to free itself from the falsehoods of the imitation of nature (as a singular mode), and instead creates new non-mimetic, non-narrative, non-analog forms of visual expression that do not deceive the viewer by appearing to imitate reality. After all, all realistic art is a form of trompe l’oeil. Islamic art will draw upon intuition instead of recognition as a mode perception and will use geometry, mathematics, and calligraphy as fundamental components of a new art. Immanuel Kant considered the prohibitions against visual representations in Judaism and (presumably) Islam in his Critique of Judgment (1790). But, contrary to Hegel, Kant seemed to agree that the concrete representation of reality limited the artist’s ability to communicate “the experience of the sublime,” and considered “material images as childish devices that inhibit and limit the imagination.” To Kant, aniconism in Judaism and Islam typifies an abstraction that “manifests rather than impedes or frustrates the experience of the sublime.”20 Abstract art is based on the idea of the acceptance of the failure of perception – that what we see is not always what we get. There is a whole host of literature on the metaphysics of seeing, but generally, we often have to accept that we cannot rely purely on vision to determine meaning.21 Hence resorting to abstract creative expression, versus verisimilitude, liberates the concrete referent of representation altogether and goes straight to what lies beyond the outer appearance of the organic. Islamic art begins to develop new forms of expression rooted in the outer manifestations of language, in the written word (as a visual sign-vehicle that is used to signify Islam’s unseeable sacred truths and the eternal message of the Quran, a literary text), in mathematics, in geometry, and in the 20 See Flood 2017, 48. 21 See Akil 2016.

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construction of sacred spaces. This clothing of Islam’s spiritual truths in artistic abstraction becomes a form of veiling that unveils. It becomes the covering that enables us to see the contours of the non-observable, and as such, makes the unseeable visible. As the Muslim artist engages in a form of translation from the realm of the invisible to the visible realm, he actually engages in something like a digital pixilation that translates truths without getting stuck in naturalistic analogous copying. Islamic art’s use of abstract lines, calligraphy and geometric shapes has been repeatedly accused of being merely ornamental or decorative and that it only serves the excesses of empty visual intrigue. When Claude Levi-Strauss bemoaned in Triste Tropique “why did Moslem art collapse so completely […]?” his immediate response was not only that “[t]his must have been the result of the rejection of images,” and that Islamic art was “deprived of all contact with reality.” But his most contemptuous protestation was that Islamic abstractions were devoid of meaning, incapable of symbolism, and obsessed with gold. He says of the Muslim artist: “the artist perpetuates a convention which is so anaemic that it can be neither rejuvenated nor refertilized. Either it is sustained by gold or it collapses completely” (2012, 400). To Levi-Strauss, Islamic art in architecture was mere ornamentation that is abstract and unsatisfying – the structure itself reflects a spatial void and depends on disjointed abstractions. He says of his experience of the tomb of the Mughal emperor Nasir-ud-Din Muḥammad (1508–1556), known as Humayun, that the tomb “produced in the visitor the uneasy feeling that some essential element was lacking. The whole edifice created an impressive mass, every detail was exquisite, but it was impossible to discover any organic link between the parts and the whole” (2012, 397–398). Repeatedly, it seems that Levi-Strauss’s problem is not with Islamic art per se, but with Islam itself. He describes Islamic mausoleum architecture as a “niggardly abode” (401), and instead of accepting that Islamic art reveals the sacred truths of Islam (as Seyyd Hussein Nasr argues repeatedly),22 LeviStrauss believes that Islamic art conceals Islam’s moral and religious failings: This seems to be symbolic of Moslem culture which accumulates in the most subtle refinements – palaces made of precious stones, fountains of rose-water, dishes of food coated with gold leaf and tobacco mixed with pounded pearls – and uses them as a veneer to conceal rustic customs and the bigotry permeating Islamic moral and religious thought. (LeviStrauss 2012, 401) 22 See Nasr 1987.

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Levi-Strauss is not alone in his disparaging views of Islam as a religion incapable of modernizing its “rustic customs,” or of Islamic art as incapable of realism and iconographic representation. But could it be true that all these geometric designs, all the calligraphy, the patterns, are no more than an escape from mimesis, mere ornamentation, a sign with no signif ication except as an expression of the aridity and the void that Islam brings? French artist and theoretician, Albert Gleizes (1881–1953), uses Islamic art as an example of empty and pointless ornamentation. While also making indirect connections between Islamic art and modernist art, Gleizes cautioned cubist artists to “avoid reducing the picture merely to the ornamental value of an arabesque on an oriental carpet” (Flood 2017, 54). Lines of connection between Islam’s aniconic arts and modernist abstract art have been made frequently. This is not a new discovery. Kandinsky commented on the antinaturalism of Persian art, making “inevitable” comparisons between his work and “Muhammadan carpets.”23 But it was Le Corbusier who loathingly described cubism as no more than “revalorizing a nonrepresentational ornamental aesthetic, an antique mode of art-making common to ‘Mycenaeans, Orientals, and Negros.’”24 However, as modernists were discovering the failure of naturalistic representation as a form of meaningful expression, attempts were also being made to rediscover the meaning of Islamic aniconic art beyond ornamentation. In his essay on the subject, F. B. Flood states that “[t]he perceived flight from mimesis in Islamic art might still be condemned by some, but for others the abstraction of Islamic art now paved the way for its enthusiastic comparison with the burgeoning products of twentieth century Euro-American art” (53). Leading Islamic art historian Oleg Grabar argues in The Formation of Islamic Art that it is crucial to stress that Islamic art should never be thought of as mere ornamentation. He says that the mosaics we witness whether at the Umayyad palaces, the Grand Mosque of Damascus, or the Dome of the Rock, in effect represent abstract forms or expression even as they depict floral or geometric patterns (Grabar 1987, 189–90). It is true that many observers of art history have for long considered that Islam brought a halt to late antique art and that Islam’s supposed bilderverbot 23 F. B. Flood mentions further details of the comments by Franz Marc about comparisons between Kandinsky’s work and Persian carpet designs and colors upon his visit to the Masterpieces of Islamic Art exhibition in Munich in 1910 (Flood 2017, 53). 24 Ibid.

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emptied Islam of its ability to create adequate representational art. But on the opposite side, we also find assertions that Islamic art actually gives us new forms of representation. Austrian art historian Alois Riegl (1858–1905) finds that only a vibrant continuation and development by Islamic art could produce arabesque as an art form “in which the antinaturalistic and abstract quality of all early Islamic art emerges so perfectly.”25 Flood, who draws upon the work of Riegl in analyzing the development of art in Islamic cultures, finds that the Islamic ban on images “mitigated the triumph of the ornamental over the figurative” (Flood, 49). The modern classifying mind wants to comfortably allocate Islamic art to easy and consistent categories but the frequent lapses between aniconism and iconic representation seem to challenge the art historian. The birth of Islamic art, under the Umayyads, from the synthesis of existing local traditions with a new revolutionary pluralistic worldview was not an unattended transformation. We clearly see a continuation of mimetic representations in the art of the early Islam’s Umayyad palaces but at the same time cannot ignore the theoretical and aesthetic burgeoning of an aniconic abstractionism that was forming more complex vocabularies in arabesques, calligraphy, architecture, book arts, etc. The new visual aesthetics of Islam was bifurcated between a tenuous non-abandonment of mimetic iconography and a novel experimentation with abstract conceptualization as artistic expression, a type of expression that we will not get to see in full display until the rise of modernism in the twentieth century – abstract modernism, avant la lettre. Flood mentions that “Picasso and Pollock were and remain the most common points of comparison for the abstract qualities of medieval Islamic art” (58).

Modernism and Islamic Art The anticipation of modernist abstract art is also underlined by Marshall G. S. Hodgson in his 1964 study “Islâm and Image.” He says “[y]et I think there were some instructive anticipations of certain aspects of Modernity in Medieval Islamic society, and that Islamic iconophobia and its associated phenomena have some relation to those anticipations” (Hodgson 1964, 221). Whereas most scholars seem to either ignore Islamic f igurative art altogether or simply disregard its significance as heterodoxy, Hodgson 25 Cited in Flood 2017, 49.

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makes a remarkable observation about early Islamic art as a precursor to socialist realism: I suppose that if Modern populist factualism has its proper art, it is “socialist realism”– a sort of debasement of that already disemboweled art called “Academic” – which true artists will produce only if paid to do so, precisely because it has no symbolic nuance, whatever gross symbolism it may depend on. “Socialist realism” represents a kind of iconophobia just as much as does non-objective art, in its own painfully populist way. In its literalism it even answers to some elements of the Medieval Muslim artistic consciousness. (Hodgson, 251)

Hodgson’s point about socialist realism becomes clear only when we start realizing that even at its most representational form, Islamic art exhibits artistic stylizations that alter the image’s verisimilitude. What the Muslim artist gives us – both in abstraction and in figurative representative is the world, not as it is, but the world as God intended it to be; not the world as we see it, but the world beyond what we see. The realm of presence is only an icon for the realm of thereafter. Even with the evident (albeit unexpected) existence of figurative art throughout the history of Islam, one is inclined to agree with Hodgson that “Islamic iconophobia, if in some ways a marginal phenomenon, does represent a significant feature in Islamic culture: a matter of the tone of the culture, perhaps, rather than of the substance altogether” (Hodgson, 253–54). But what is that “tone of culture”? What does it tell us about the overall cultural economy that hosts contradictory forms of expression? Can one still speak of an Islamic iconophobia in a culture that does not shy away from the occasional iconic representation? Plus, how do we account for the overwhelming success of Islamic abstract art in its different modes alongside the presence of figurative representations? Those who are looking for a coherent and consistent answer that can abbreviate Islam’s 1,400year history across vast geographies and varied cultural and theological experimentations are clearly up for a disappointment.

The Sacred and the Secular One might argue that a fuller understanding of Islamic art in its totality must acknowledge the presence of Islamic abstract art only in as far as it is positioned alongside the continuous existence of figurative representation in

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Islamic art history. It might be argued further that Islamic art can therefore be understood through consideration of its two modes: a sacred mode that we have witnessed in the form of abstract representations, geometry, arabesque, calligraphy, and non-sentient figural representations in houses of worship and other sacred places; and a second mode that could easily be described as secular. This secular mode is found in private spaces (like bathhouse frescoes), in various manuscript illuminations and miniatures, in the design of everyday objects, and even in public art in state buildings with functions that are not exclusively religious.26 Some may be perturbed (or at least shocked) at the (obvious) idea of the existence of an Islamic secular life at all. Some may argue that an Islamic secular art is a contradiction in terms, at best. A prominent case in point is the amazing work by Seyed Hossein Nasr (1987) who constantly argues that Islamic art by definition is sacred art because it can only express the Islamic doctrine of Tawheed, which means that everything in the world is an aya (sign) of God’s immanent Truth. While Nasr acknowledges the presence of figurative representation in miniature art, he considers these arts as non-central. The purpose of this chapter is to argue that throughout the history of Islam, regardless of its temporal geography, Islamic culture has never been exclusively religious, and that despite popular assumptions, it is difficult to claim convincingly that Islam has controlled every aspect of life under its political control. Quite to the contrary, it is easier to prove that lived Islam has frequently fostered heterodox theories and practices, both religious and agnostic. This claim is clearly too large for this current article, and should be argued in further detail elsewhere, but even the most casual glance at Islamic history will record the various movements that developed in various degrees of popularity and dominance leading to a historical landscape that includes scores and scores of doctrines and creeds that grew since the birth of Islam. These movements would not have existed had it not been for a certain room for secularity within what we deem as Islamic society. In today’s terms, we could describe this presence of secular aspects of Islamic life in terms of plurality and diversity within the public understanding of the religion itself. 26 Examples of figurative art in state buildings include various semi-public Umayyad palaces, the Abbasid Caliphate House in Samarra, and Mogul state palaces. Nevertheless, there are those, like Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1987), who might argue that all Islamic space is a sacred space since in Islam any space could be used for prayers and is thus sanctified by its constant susceptibility of being a place for connection with the divine.

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However, for the purposes of this study, we are not too concerned with the diversity of religious movements that have sprung up throughout the history of Islam. Rather, the focus of this article remains on the existence of secular visual practices in Islamic life. These practices may be religiously ambivalent but are not to be viewed necessarily as anti-religious. In other words, the murals of Qusayr ‘Amra could not be argued to be decidedly anti-religious simply because they represent human figures or because some of the images are of nude women. As a matter of fact, it might be interesting to note the casual nature of the nude figurations at Qusayr ‘Amra, and that in the majority of these images, the visual tone is not erotic at all. In the nude fresco in the west hall, the painting casually represents a family of naked women with their children in a presentation that is so very matter-of-fact that it is even reminiscent of an innocent snapshot of a family bathroom. In that sense, the term Islamic culture is used in this article to denote the diverse types of art forms – both religious and secular – that have developed under political ruling systems that are self-described as Islamic. The point here is to emphasize that not all of what we consider today as cultural practices in the history of Islam are necessarily Islamic (relating to the doctrine per se). In other words, we can describe something as Islamic (or Islamicate) even though it does not communicate religious ideas by relating it to lived (or embodied) Islam: the cultural context of its inception. Hence, it can be claimed that Islamic culture tolerated, even fostered, many cultural manifestations that could be described as secular (ambivalent about Islam) or heterodox (critical or dismissive of religious doctrine or popular religious beliefs). This chapter is an attempt to highlight the practices of Islamic iconography as evidence of these practices in the visual arts. However, one can easily find similar practices in the music, fiction, philosophy, and most notably poetry of Islamic traditions. But what discernments can be made in the fissures between Islam’s public perception as a way of life where every aspect of its citizenry’s life is governed by laws of Sharia on the one hand, and the unexpected plurality and inclusivity of a secular Islamic culture? It is commonly accepted these days, especially among young Muslims, to think of Islam as a “way of life” that calls for a fatwa for every single daily practice of one’s life that may not be directly connected with rites or rituals: from what foot to use when entering a restroom to how long should a man keep his beard, to the length of one’s thobe, to what prayers to say when getting into an Uber, or whether it is permitted to send nude pictures on Facebook, etc.

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It is possible to also ask the elementary but essential question about the connections between Islamic art and Islam. Do we have to assume that all Islamic art is by definition Islamic? Or is it possible to posit the existence of a secular art within what we otherwise classify as Islamic or Islamicate? The desacralization of art that we eventually begin to witness with the European Renaissance, one might argue, has been predated by an art that came about in Islamic culture and that could be described as purposefully secular. In fact, there is a commonly accepted notion among Muslims that Islam’s bidlerverbot is only applicable (if at all) to the use of specific sacred iconography and only inside houses of worship. The purpose, naturally, is to avoid the worship of idols, or “shirk.” The Umayyad and Abbasid (as well as Mughal and Ottoman) rulers felt comfortable enough to commission all kinds of figurative works – while remaining the leaders of the faithful – simply because they, as well as their audiences, understood that this type of art had no religious purposes or connotations whatsoever. It was a secular art that was intended for secular purposes – unlike the art displayed in mosques, mausoleums, and other sacred spaces. Therefore, it cannot be ignored that there has always been – along with Islamic religious art forms – a rich, long-lasting, and unstoppable secular Islamic visual culture. Examples abound and can be evidenced in the fresco paintings of Umayyad palaces in the seventh century, the life-size human sculptures of Umayyad and Abbasid palaces of the seventh through the eighth century, the mechanical and industrial inventions and scientific manuscripts of the ninth through the thirteenth century, figurative representations in miniatures from the thirteenth century through the modern period, daily and architectural objects from door handles to water pitchers to the lions at Alhambra. In these cultures, there remained an occasional diversity of thought and practice that did not necessarily account for an effective role for religion. That Islam controlled every aspect of the daily lives of its citizens (which many rulers frequently attempted but not always successfully and never for long) is a belief that many in the Islamic world and outside hold strongly these days. But the majority of people under Islam carried on in their lives with practices that were either only indirectly influenced by religion, or not influenced at all. Although these heterodox or ambivalent practices are observed most clearly in poetry, which is Islam’s dominant art form, they can also be detected in a vibrant visual culture that went on using figurative representations along with abstract figurations with a true ambivalence towards true or assumed bilderverbot.

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One of the most captivating images at Qusayr ‘Amra is the mural entitled Six Kings. The painting depicts all the world leaders of the time having gathered to give respect to and to acknowledge the preeminence of Caliph Walid II as the first among kings. This is an almost Davos-like photo op featuring Caesar, the Byzantine emperor, the Visigothic King Roderic of Hispania, the Sasanian emperor, Khosrow, and the Negus of Aksum. We know these are the represented characters because their names have been inscribed in both Arabic and Greek on the mural. The remaining two kings are not clearly named, but have been hypothesized to be the rulers of China, India, or a Turkic leader. Although it is undeniable that the historical world of Islam has created a general worldview, we should also remember that historical Islam included multiple cultural, ethnic, and religious identities and extended from Spain to India through Africa, Central Asia, India, and occasionally parts of Europe. The Six Kings fresco shows the major kings of the known world showing allegiance to al-Walid II, who as a caliph would rule over not only a Muslim population but a world empire. There is no doubt that although the Umayyads ruled over an Islamic empire, their citizenry remained multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multifaith. The concept of the Ummah (or Nation) was understood and codified under the Prophet in the Medina Constitution specifically in ways that acknowledged the citizenry of both Muslims and non-Muslims under Islamic rule. The connection between Islam’s figurative art (as an indicator of the secular) and its abstract/geometric art (as an indicator of the sacred) should not be seen as a contradiction. To the contrary, this connection might easily be taken as evidence of a cultural simultaneity that reflects the diversity of cultures, languages, and traditions, even theological beliefs that constitute lived Islam, which has always been both religious and secular at the same time.

References Akil, Hatem N. 2016. The Visual Divide between Islam and the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Benneghrouzi, Fatima Z. 2019. “Beyond Literalism: Arberry’s Translating (in) Visibility of Imru al Qays’ Mu’allaqa through the Lens of Critical Discourse Analysis.” Arab World English Journal for Translation & Literary Studies 3, no. 1: 145–56. Didi-Huberman, Georges. 2002. “The Surviving Image: Aby Warburg and Tylorian Anthropology.” Oxford Art Journal 25, no. 1: 59–69. doi:10.2307/3600420.

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———. 2005. Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art.

University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. Flood, Finbarr Barry. 2017. “Picasso the Muslim: or, How the Bilderverbot became Modern, pt. 1.” Res: Anthropology and Aesthetics 67, no. 8: 42–60. Fowden, Garth. 2004.Qusayr ʿAmra: Art and the Umayyad Elite in Late Antique Syria. Berkeley: University of California Press. Goody, Jack. 2004. Islam in Europe. Oxford: Polity Press. Grabar, Oleg. 1987. The Formation of Islamic Art: Revised and Enlarged Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hodgson, Marshal G. S. 1964. “Islâm and Image.” History of Religions 3, no. 2: 220–60. Hoyland, Robert G. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. London: Routledge. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1996 (1887). On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, translated by Douglas Smith. New York: Oxford University Press. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 2012. John Weightman, Doreen Weightman, and Patrick Wilcken. Tristes Tropiques. New York: Penguin Books. Tylor, Edward Burnett. 1920. Primitive Culture, Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom. London: J. Murray.

About the Author Hatem N. Akil (Valencia College) is a visual culture researcher who is interested primarily in the perception and representation of Arabs and Muslims. He earned his PhD in Texts and Technology from the University of Central FL. Among his publications “Cinematic Terrorism,” “The Martyr’s Vision,” and the monograph The Visual Divide between Islam and the West (Palgrave, 2016). [email protected]

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Criticism of “Colonial Modernity” through Kurdish Decolonial Approaches Engin Sustam

Abstract Western modernity with its colonial application has created an identity trauma and patriarchal domination of the memory of colonized and oppressed peoples. Critiques from colonized territories encourage us to reread the colonial epistemes of modernity, whether or not centered on the West. The Kurdish political movement thus defines a new interpretation of modernity based on the critique of colonialism and global capitalism: “democratic modernity.” This chapter problematizes the relations between modernity, the nation state, the destruction of ecology, social confinement, the relationship of the forces of these relations, but above all the modalities by which it becomes possible to act on them to break the “stalemate” of the modernity of thought in the twenty-first century. Keywords: Kurdish space; Kurdish modernity; subaltern modernity; democratic modernity; decoloniality; stateless society

This article aims to question the complex reading of modernity in the Kurdish space and its critical decolonial approaches to the power and “knowledge”1 of “colonial modernity” in the Middle East, but especially in Turkey. The colonially-constructed entity known as Kurdistan involves a certain intellectual contradiction among the dominant societies in the Middle East (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria) which contributes to the practice of coloniality (Vali 2011, introd. and 1–25, and Hawzhen Rashadaddin, 1

See Wane and Todd 2018.

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch07

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2015). The intellectual thought of colonial modernity in the Middle East in regard to the Kurdish region follows and has one thing in common with the thought of colonial practice: an act of concealment and ignorance of Kurdish existence. Jacobin intellectuals of the dominant society regard the Kurds as a part of those dominant societies (Beşikçi 2013a; Eagleton 1963; Bozarslan 2001b; Henning 2018; Yeğen 2014 and 1999). In this approach, the reflection of dominant and colonial modernity lies in the political and cultural authoritarianism which marks racial relations and the balance of power over the Kurds and their territory. Indeed, using the terms “subaltern modernity” and “decoloniality” calls into question this expression of colonialism. That is to say, this questioning gives us another possibility by encompassing the past and present of a colonial racial power system in the Middle East based on a political-cultural denial and an epistemic interiorization of the “Other society” and its knowledge (the knowledge of aboriginal people). The multiple forms of this attempt at this domination by colonial thought (by its modernity, see for coloniality, alienation and freedom of the colonized Fanon, 2018) have effectively generated an abundant literature of all kinds on the denial of Kurdish existence (especially in Turkey and with the establishment of Kemalist rule,2 above all through the ways knowledge is developed; Alakom 1992; Beşikçi 2013c; Anter 1999 ; Gürgoz, 1997).3 But it is worth adding, “Like the Ottoman intelligentsia, a significant part of the Kurdish intelligentsia was Westernist,” as Hamit Bozarslan said towards the end of the Ottoman Empire (2003, 55–56). We could also speak of the exiled experience of the Kurds in Western public space which gave them an opportunity to engender their decolonial study.4 We believe that because of colonial denial, the Kurds had to go into exile for more than a century. This experience of exile in the European era gave the actors of the Kurdish resistance and the intellectuals an opportunity to question colonial modernity. The Kurds organized their first political activities in the diaspora during the post-1947 period.5 The first cultural, linguistic and intellectual activities of the Kurdish intelligentsia flourished in exile (Halkawt 1992; Sustam 2013; Bois 1965). All Kurdish resistance 2 See Ahmad 1993, 52–102; and in Iran establishment from the time of the Shah to the Iranian revolution of Khomeini, see Vali 2011. 3 See articles by Bozarslan 2001b, pp. 53–60; 2001a; 2003; and 1994. 4 See the analysis on the “decolonial” concept, Mignolo and Walsh 2018, and Mignolo, Walter D. 2021. The Politics of Decolonial Investigations. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 5 See articles by Adnan Celik. ‘Soğuk Savaş’ın İlk Yıllarında Avrupa’daki Kürt Aktivizmi: Kürt Gençlerinin Enternasyonal Öğrenci Ağlarına Katılımı ve Yeni Bir Kurtuluş Ufku Olarak Sovyet Komünizmi’ online : http://kurdarastirmalari.com/yazi-detay-oku-148

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movements and social movements have transformed exile into a place of revolt and creation. Exile can mean colonial history and memory in the memory of the Kurdish oppressed (Babakhan, 1994). Kurdish exile created the possibility of a policy of emancipation against the domination of colonial modernity which had blocked Kurdish visibility in its territory (Tejel Gorgas 2007 and 2017). Indeed, the exile of contemporary Kurdish literature and art gave birth to linguistic, pedagogical and artistic criticism to erase the traces of colonial modernity in the Kurdish memory (Sustam 2021). This reflection relieves the aggression of this dominant modernity which had destroyed at one time the geographical memory of the Kurdish space. It is a matter of grasping that the diaspora and exile are at the same time the places of the creation of Kurdish subaltern modernity. Contrary to the domination of Turkish, Iranian or Arab modernity (from Iraq and Syria), the Kurds had a decolonial perception in exile in the face of the overwhelming macro-nationalism of the Middle East. The Kurds have thus experienced the resistance of the African peoples and their anti-colonial approach. This connection with other subaltern modernities brings out new themes in the face of modernist domination in the Middle East. The decolonial criticism of the micro-narrative of the Kurdish space supports the affirmation of a political, territorial identity in emancipation. Abbas Vali adds that nationalism is the basis of this approach (2011, xv): “The modernity of the nation and national identity is the defining feature of all constructivist approaches to the origins of nationalism.” As for the methodological point of view of “colonial modernity” (Barlow 1997; Shin and Robinson 1999), we analyze an image of modernity which distorts minor identities under its cultural and political domination.6 Let us add that among the Kurds, this discussion does not take place simply as the criticism of modernity (Appadurai,1996), but criticism of the perception of modernity that rejects or denies the Kurdish identity. The historical connection between modernity and colonialism, and between dominant national, modern political institutions – including the nation state – and the character of the Ottoman Empire, participates in this “colonial modernity” as it is re-read in the decolonial Kurdish space. Colonial modernity conceived by the Kurds as an ideology of social Darwinism indeed includes a thought of progress and implies a nationalist aim of the colonial identity according to which the dominant societies (Turkish, Arab, Persian) would evolve rationally from the dominant identity nationalism in in response to other dominated minor identities (Chatterjee, 1986). If we also 6 See for the discussion on the concept of “colonial modernity,” Lee and Cho 2012; Mahadevan 2002; and Chrétien 2010.

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add, the decolonial approach among the Kurds carries an archival memory of “orientalist knowledge” (Bruinessen 2017, 11 and see Said, 1997), and begins after the 2000s following the sociopolitical change of the Kurdish question (Sustam 2016), then the term “colonial modernity” makes it possible to refer to literatures on territorial sovereignty, the identity of which it constitutes (especially the Turkishness in Turkey; see Zeydanlioglu 2008, 155–74), and to others so heavily informed by nationalist ideology (Bozarslan 2009, Vali, 2003 and 2020). This “colonial modernity” in Turkey had planned to “civilize” the Kurdish region through engineering interventions (the construction of dams, roads, etc.) based on the thinking of Turkish republican elitism (Göle 2008; Aktar 2018).7 This intervention of the engineering elites in Kurdish territoriality shows us how Turkish modernity excludes other identities (Keyman 2012) with its colonial perspective. It is precisely this connection of sovereignty between modernity and colonization that we propose to analyze in this article from the reading of the Kurdish question (Bozarslan, 1997, Jmor, 1994 and Chaliand, 1981). It is also pointed out that the micro-nationalist perspective of Kurdish resistance during the previous century dominated the critique of the modernity of the dominant society (Yilmaz 2013; Burkay 2001; Öcalan 1993; and PKK 1984).8

The Subaltern Approach of the Stateless Society It is clear that the criticism and discussion of modernity in the European space designates two entirely different approaches: nature and progress (humans and non-human; Latour 2006 and 2012). The triumph of modernity since the eighteenth century after the Enlightenment is thus analyzed as the mark of the supremacy of Western thought and of the dominant colonial culture which continues to colonize the knowledge of minor cultures. It is rather a question of underlining a difference of approach to modernity in the Kurdish space with the analyses, the dynamics and the stakes which lead to the point of the discussion. So many different experiences of the Kurdish space in modernity narration, so many dissonant visions of revolutionary emancipation (democracy, autonomy, women, gender and ecology) – but how to include this sociopolitical diversity in our study? Indeed, returning to a 7 See the critical article of Harris 2008, 1703. 8 See the chapters of Hawzhen Rashadaddin Ahmed’s thesis, “Representations of Occidentalist Constructions and Racialising the Other” and “Portraying Modernity’s Ambivalences, Nationalist Dualism and Ethnic Rejection,” in Ahmed 2015, 40–68 and 70–103.

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geopolitics of decolonial knowledge whose transformation of the Kurdish space in recent years has been marked by Kurdish emancipation and by its decolonial approach, this chapter underlines the scope of this transformation and the instrument and political language at the heart of the Kurdish identity struggle against the practice of colonial modernity of authoritarian states in the Middle East (see, ‘the Kurdish question’ in state discourse, Yeğen, 1999; Bozarslan, 2017). To better understand, it’s about emphasizing the Kurdish resistance which creates this decolonial contribution around “Kurdishness” (see ‘the memory of kurdology’ Bayrak, 1994). Before questioning modernity, we will recall the question of modernity among the Kurds, both as an “subaltern” approach and an approach of differentiation from the dominant culture which denies the Kurdishness of the stateless society. It’s about questioning the “Kurdish subaltern modernity” (like the “uncounted society,” “the inconsiderables” and “the ineffables”; Sustam 2016, 161). “Subaltern modernity” (or “decolonial modernity”) marks an ontological transcription of a minor epistemology on the basis of the contributions of the Kurds in resistance to colonial domination. It is necessary to broaden the conception of modernity in which the approach to progress is defined in relation to the dominant society of coloniality. The concept of “subaltern modernity” is a tool to visualize the Kurdish collective utterance. This political view of “subaltern” takes shape in denial and exclusion, which sometimes emphasizes the need for recognition of the minor culture. It is a question of analyzing, on the one hand, the colonized body politic; on the other, the ignorant position (history from below) of this “Kurdish subalternity” which is in a state of becoming through minority resistance. “Subaltern” is also a prefix which implies an idea of passage and motion in a continuum of the struggle for emancipation, a temporality and a heterotopic countercultural space.9 Outside of our conceptualization, let us add that this article questions another captivating notion: that of “democratic modernity” underlined by Abdullah Öcalan (Kurdish politician, an issue discussed below; see Öcalan 2010, 2011 and 2013). These different approaches to modernity in the Kurdish context highlight a dissensus policy which disfigures the devices of colonial power and forms a collective enunciation of the sensibility of micro-societies. It is a political narration of the emancipatory struggle which identifies the crisis of colonial modernity and shows a real odyssey of the balance of power of the exclusion implemented by the despotic apparatus of coloniality in Turkey, Iran, Iraq (until 1991, the autonomy of Southern-Başûr) and Syria 9 It is quite interesting to compare Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s analysis of the term “subaltern” (1988) and Spivak’s book, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999).

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(until 2012, the autonomous region of Western-Rojava). This amounts to an attempt to identify the question of the subject whose determined form of negation is criticized and this logocentric cultural hypothesis of modernity resulting from the colonial context. The position of the decolonial politics of the Kurdish spcae vis-à-vis Marxist modernity (from the dominant culture and framed between 1960 and 1995 for the Kurdish movements) and “capitalist modernity” (defined by Öcalan 2011) becomes more and more evident as we move from criticisms of Marx-Fanon to Foucault, Wallerstein, then to Bookchin in the face of the nationalist impasse of twentieth-century modernity (Öcalan’s analysis, 2010). This stage of modernity corresponds also to the emergence of the modern patriarchal subjectivity of colonial practice.

From Colonial to Decolonial Modernity The term “modernity” encompasses a multitude of concepts that are multifaceted (from reason to the arts). By the end of the 1970s, Lyotard (La condition postmoderne, 1979) had criticized the metanarratives of modernity associated with the reading of post-structuralism, that of the postmodern condition (Harvey, 1991. post-industrial society). And Foucault’s critiques of Western modernity had also given a new approach to the episteme of the nineteenth and the twentieth century (Foucault 1994, 562). Modernity conceived as an ideology of Enlightenment thought that involves a teleological view of history that human societies would evolve rationally without criticizing colonialism (Mbembe 2015) and developments that destroy nature and ecology (Bookchin 1982). It should however be noted that the modernity which appears today on the horizon of our concerns, our theory, our systems, is more than a philosophical perception; modernity itself, in Western experience, has a colonial history, and it is impossible to ignore this fatal interweaving of the time of colonial history. Homi Bhabha and Gayatri C. Spivak are among those whose postcolonial study becomes a focal point for reflections on the decolonial in our work.10 Western modernity and its colonial contexts, as the extension of a state’s sovereignty, created a trauma of identity and patriarchal domination in the memory of “oppressed peoples.” In this sense, the criticisms of colonized territories – oppressed in previous centuries – encourage us to reread the colonial epistemes of modernity, whether or not focused on the West. 10 Bhabha 1994; see also Dirlik 1994; Appiah 1995.

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In particular, intellectuals such as Césaire, Fanon, Said, Spivak, Bhabha, Chakrabarty and Mbembe also shifted the concepts of “rupture” and “difference” (with the reading of Derrida) to a reading focused on Europe or Western regions as that of Habermas’s modernity (Habermas, Jürgen. 2011, and see, a critical theory vis-à-vis Jürgen Habermas, Rosa 2015). This is the alternative decoding of modernity in the system of deterritorialized global capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 2009). It would be useful to problematize a transnational reading for the episteme of colonized or oppressed peoples and a new temporality on a world scale. In this context, critics who come from the ancient territories of colonialism and from an alternative reading in the face of modernity are also important to us and give us a varied interpretation of micro-sociological criticism. The environment of the territoriality colonized will have new concepts and principles of decolonial action in the face of modernist destruction. The illegitimate appropriation through “biopiracy” of the resources and products of “indigenous peoples” can serve as an example of the colonization of territorial culture (Merson 2000). Likewise, developing substitutes for the biodiversity resources of indigenous peoples as a means of colonial nationalism also shows the illegitimate use of the micro-cultural locality, harvesting the traditional organic construction of indigenous knowledge from the pulp of domination in the name of science. Moreover, colonial modernity is a cartographic practice of territoriality. The cartographic racism and the cultural plunder it made possible in Mesopotamia and Anatolia with its “imperial” ambitions since the Ottoman Empire, the Turkification of the local knowledge of the colonized peoples, can be read with this experience of biopiracy. Indeed, biopiracy for us is a reference of colonial modernity in the ecological question of oppressed peoples (and also of plants, animals, microorganisms in nature or the life of other living beings) that their traditional knowledge of biodiversity is appropriated in particular through the patents of this colonial modernity.11 We see the conceptual apparatus which introduces to the episteme of others and which creates an “archeology of knowledge” of colonial power (from the nineteenth to the twentieth century; Foucault 1966).12 The definition of today’s modernity is subject to many approaches and requires a different approach beyond the erroneous definition of the West and the East, that of a modernity that transcends the borders of the 11 See the analysis of Krinke and Prat 2017. 12 We propose here to read the Foucauldian analysis on the progressist thought of the Enlightenment; Michel Foucault, “Sur l’archéologie des sciences: réponse au cercle d’épistémologie,” in Foucault 1994, 696–731.

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West and of the nation state. The great goal of modernity that has obsessed the twentieth century has been this history of development and progress which threatens nature. Questions of topicality and philosophical novelty should make it possible to better define the critique of modernity which still arises with colonized and patriarchal thought. Therefore, in the first part we will rethink the criticism of the Kurdish space. To better measure the place of modernity in the Kurdish space in the questioning of colonial heritage, we will have to analyze the perception of resistance which creates in this context a new approach to modernity. Second, we will recall the Kurdish question, both as an explanatory cause for a differentiated approach and as a mark of a political transcription of the decolonial epistemology of Kurdish opposition to modernist coloniality.

Critique of Colonial Modernity through the Kurdish Question The Kurdish question in the Middle East is always expressed in a political puzzle of identity and territory.13 This chapter examines this question and proposes an ontological case study which consists of theorizing a change of political values in Kurdish-space life. It’s about the political emancipation that happens at the center of the Kurdish region in the Middle East. Scattered over four countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria), Kurdish society regularly occupies the forefront of international news because of their emancipatory desire and their resistance to the colonized identity (Beşikçi 2013a; Bruinessen 1991, ; Chaliand 1992; Yeğen 2014). Kurdish nationalism (Vali, Viii, 2020, see especially Kurdish nationalism ‘in the post-revolutionary era’ in Iran) since the start of the twentieth century (but especially since the 1960s) is based on the anti-colonial perception that the cultural, linguistic and literary visibility of the Kurdish space took on until the 2000s. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Kurds have persisted in their existence across four dominant modernities: from Kemalism in Turkey to the Baathist movement in Iraq (Barzani, 2005) and Syria and to the Shah’s regime and the esoteric Shiite movement after the revolution in Iran (Bozarslan 1997 and 2000, 16–18). This seems to us to imply that the failure of territorial separation among the Kurds somehow recognizes the political criticism of modernity within Kurdish political movements (from the 60s to today; White 2000 and Günes 2012). The Kurdish anti-colonial approach is based on the historico-cultural 13 For two parties in Kurdistan, see analysis of Bozarslan 1999, and 2014. Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield 2010.

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singularity of the Kurdish collective memory (Beşikçi 2013a; Bozarslan 1997, 2009). It creates relationships that are both fusional and chaotic which drive the history of separate territories and which epistemic facts bear witness to. This reflection is located in the sociopolitical performativity of the separate territories where each part of the Kurdish space expresses its own dominant modernity code (Turkish, Arab and Persian modernities, see, Vali, 2020: 1-11). It is quite clear that a caveat is in order here. It is arguably excellent to study the political psychology of “separated” Kurds around modernity according to the territorial context. After the founding of the Turkish Republic (1923), which was based on pan-Turkism and nationalist intervention, the post-Ottoman territory became Turkish territory. In the Turkish constitution, the Jacobins and pre-Kemalists of the time defined the territory as “a land of the Turks.” This definition completely excluded the Kurds (like the Armenians after the genocide 1915; Kévorkian, 2006, see Dorin, 2005 and Cigerli, 1999) and the other ethnicities out of the quest to establish the identity of the Turkish Republic (Clayer et al. 2018; Bozarslan 2013). We could consult the same colonialist intervention in the Iranian state from Pahlavi absolutism to Imam Khomeini (from Western secularism to the Islamic modernity of the Iranian Revolution). As Abbas Vali said before the Shiite revolution after reading on the capitalist interconnection of the Islamic revolution, urbanity and rural space (especially in Kurdistan of Iran; Vali 2011, 4): “The Constitution specified Persian as the official language of the nation, […] Persian thus became the language of the sovereign, of politics and power, the means of access to knowledge, and an instrument of modernity and progress.” This experience of modernity is based on the Darwinist social naturalism of “the ideology of Turkishness” (“Turcité” or the Turkish national ethos in “pan-Turkism”, see Gökalp,1968 and Beşikçi, 2013b) gradually applied to a double reality: the modernization of Turkish society on the one hand and its corresponding use of the arts and sciences, and thus the denial of the Armenian genocide (Kévorkian 2006; Akçam 2004) and Kurdish identity (Bozarslan 1997, 2009, 2013). The Kurdish question and Kurdish visibility criticize the practice of science related to colonialism, the racism and the social-Darwinist spirit in the approach of republican modernity in Turkey (Beşikçi, 2013a; Ekinci, 2004 and Burkay, 1978). This criticism elaborated by the Kurds has come to constitute the anti-colonial approach of decolonized Kurdish modernity. Turkish colonial modernity remains on the track of excluding “others” by conceptualizing republicanism (with and without the legacy of the Ottoman Empire), nationalism (against Armenians, Kurds, Greeks and Westerners), etatism, secularism (laicism facing the Islamic

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religion), and today Pan-Islamism in Turkishness (Göle 1997, 2008; Bozarslan, 2013 and Zeydanlioglu 2008). It must also be taken into account that modern Kurdish history (Bender, 2017) is part of a period characterized by the rise of Pan-Turkism after the founding of the Turkish Republic, but also of a “history of resistance” between the colonized and the colonizer as David McDowall has said (2007, 159, 295). At the origin of this colonial history, we find the Committee of Union and Progress, the political structure of a Jacobin and nationalist movement very popular in the ranks of the officers of Pan-Turkism (called “the Young Turk movement”; see Bora and Gültekingil 2007). The Young Turks movement, with its social sciences of modern Turkey and its colonial modernity, is based on the Armenian genocide and the rejection of Kurdish identity in its Darwinist social vision under the influence of the French Revolution (Bozarslan 2013).14 Consequently, Kurdish nationalism is in an antagonistic relationship with the dominant nationalisms of Turks, Persians and Arabs where Kurdish modernity takes an anti-colonial position of resistance to generate an identity perception of emancipation with the political vision of national self-determination in the Kurdish space (Romano 2006; Günes 2012). It seems important to us to see modernity explained by the Kurdish intelligentsia (Lescot &Bedir Khan,1991). It is indeed this first perception that is questionable in the Kurdish study. The Kurdish intelligentsia is building its political line in the diaspora (from Istanbul to Paris, from Damascus to Stockholm, etc.).15 The Kurdish intelligentsia has greatly influenced the question of coloniality among Kurdish national movements since the beginning of the twentieth century (Wahlbeck 1999). It is the standard-bearer for the linguistic and cultural creation of the Kurdish space, and of an idea of the discipline of Enlightenment thought for a colonized Kurdish society (Atsiz 2018, 2020). While post-Ottoman societies (like the Turks) were under the influence of a nationalism stemming from the thought of the French Revolution, the discourse on modernity has been received by the Kurdish intelligentsia as a means of generating political consciousness for Kurdish society by effectively paralleling science and the thought of progress. In this key, one of the most important players is the Bedirxan family (also transcribed Bedirkhan Bey, Bedir Khan, Emirate of Botan). The Bedirxan family is considered a major player in the history of Kurdish society and the first to have established a perception of an independent Kurdish state under the rubric of a secular society and Western modernity (Henning 2018, 75–147; Bedir Khan, 1992 14 Bozarslan, 1989. 15 See Tejel Gorgas 2006 and Bozarslan 2018.

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-1933: Bedir Khan family is one of the first elites of Kurdish modernity based on independence discourses under the influence of European modernity.). As Bozarslan says (1994, 6), the Kurdish intelligentsia plays an important role in Kurdish nationalism under the influence of “Enlightenment thought” (civilization, auto-governance, Nation State) and of thought with the right to resist oppression (and thus “the right of peoples to self-determination,” or “the right to self-determination”): “Indeed, the Kurdish, nationalist, ‘civilizationist’ intelligentsia constitutes, demographically and socially, only a tiny minority of society.” ‘Kurdish nationalism’ (Vali, 2020 :27-71, especially with regard to the experience of Iranian Kurds) is at the heart of the critique of colonial modernity and its domination for the Kurdish intelligentsia under the influence of European modernity (and self-determination theory of oppressed nations) at the beginning of the twentieth century. By drawing on a reading of “decolonial modernity” (or “subaltern modernity”) between national liberation and the struggle of the oppressed people in the twentieth century, the Kurdish intelligentsia has invented a dynamic of “Westernization” of Kurdish culture and language following the aim of legitimizing the source of Kurdish culture as a branch of this European culture (Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray 2006). We suddenly see a paradox in the modernist point of view which affirms both the immanence and the transcendence of Kurdish society. This reflection had already been generated by the “Young Turks” and their successor Kemalists in Turkish colonial nationalism and Turkish society (Insel 2009). Colonialism was not only the occupation of land, but also the imposition of modernity in terms of the Western idea of a nation state (Fanon 2002, 2006; Mbembe 2015). However, just because few studies use such terminology in regard to Kurdish modernity, this does not mean that the point made by this reflection on modernity has no reality. In the book Kürdistan Devriminin yolu (The path of the Kurdistan revolution: a manifesto), Öcalan questions colonialism and its ethnocentrism, and thus feels the need for armed struggle (Öcalan 1993, 31–45). We could consult the perception vis-à-vis Turkish, Arab and Persian colonialism (Bruinessen 1991, 2000; Vali 2011; Bozarslan 2013). This anti-colonial perception attacked colonial customs in the postcoup years in Turkey (before in the 70s and after September 12, 1980) and transformed the understandings of resistance that arose during the period of the launch of the armed struggle (the launch of the armed struggle since 1984 in Turkey). Therefore, the analyses of colonialism within the struggle allows us to rethink the critique of modernity in the colonial context with regard to dominant countries. The Kurdish movements since the 1970s have effectively kept the approach of anti-colonial criticism and questioned first of all the effects colonial imposition and its modernity in Kurdish society

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(White 2000). Especially after the 1970s, the Kurdish uprising (“Serhildan”) took place against the backdrop of colonialism and its heritage, poverty, identity discrimination, racism and exploitation. After the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey and four years of clandestine armed organization in exile (on Syrian soil), the Kurdish political movement, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party of Turkey (PKK 1984; see Günes, 2012), reached a consensus on anti-colonial criticism since 1978 by questioning the scientific approach taken by colonial modernity (see PKK 1984: Kemalism, Baathism and analyses of Turkish, Arab and Persian colonialism, of nationalism in the Middle East), which denies Kurdish society. An element of pro-racist ideology like that of the Turancilik (Pan-Turkism) is introduced, which refutes Western modernity (with the authoritarian reference of Kemalism; see Casier and Jongerden 2011), and creates its nationalist modernity based on a further colonialist intervention. The Armenian genocide thus formed a new stage of Turkish racism that emerged from the imaginary idea of empire (Atsız 2018, 2020). Turkish nationalism during the beginning of the twentieth century and in the Republican foundation is important enough to impose a re-reading of the birth of Turkish modernity. For example, one of the founders of Kemalist ideology, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the most important theorists of nationalism, especially in his writings on Kemalist modernity and rejection of Western modernism, may help us understand the sources of Turkish colonial modernity (Bozkurt 2015, 2006). However, it should be noted that in this discussion, the phenomenon of a Kurdish space (also Kurdiyetî, Kurdishness) is more important in capturing the perception of modernity among the Kurds (Bozarslan 2018, 15–19).16 It becomes quite clear that there must be a time when the decolonized modernity of the Kurdish space is identif ied with a pathography, with a legitimation of a micro-identity in the making, with a critique of the excessive ambitions of some types of social science in the face of different types of colonial modernity. We are not just talking about the nation-state crisis of these dominant modernities. It is a question of retracing the effects of colonial modernity in the neoliberal crisis seen on a world scale.

Decolonial Artistic Perception of Modernity The critique of art in the Kurdish space overlapped with the rise of the criticism of modernity in the 90s, which generated a micropolitical perception

16 For the analysis on the nationalist movement in Iraq and Iran, see Bruinessen 1992.

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with the discussion of declining post-coloniality.17 This did not happen in theoretical discussion, but in the practice of “uprising/counter”-culture and in works of literature and the arts. In this context, the term “Kurdish subalternity” constitutes a way of perceiving decolonized Kurdish modernity to be included in the struggle for emancipation, for political rights, identity in the decolonized corpus which also emerges from a cultural and artistic reflection (Sustam 2016, 19–78). The work traces a new condition of creation in which Kurdish artistic and cultural activity appears as an archaeology of the social bond (militarism and the symbols of biopower), and projects a multiplication of views on the complexity of colonial modernity, the conflict and the cultural crisis it engenders. The works of certain artists (Hiwa K., Sener Özmen, Ahmet Ögüt, Erkan Özgen, Berat Isik, Cengiz Tekin, Fatos Irwen, M. Ali Boran, Zehra Dogan, Nuveen M. Barwari, Savas Boyraz, Helîn Şahin, Serdar Mutlu, Sherko Abbas, Khadija Baker, etc.) criticize quite clearly the vision of the dominant modernity with its application of coloniality in the Kurdish space through war, occupation, militarization and conflict. Through certain works and productions (Özmen 2000), the arts become counterspaces (artistic ghettos) in the new world era. It is about the emergence and a micropolitics of an oppressed culture without a state that feeds popular culture (mass culture) and Kurdish resistance, which produces transgressive thinking in the modernity of the dominant culture and in its own popular culture, and defends a political position vis-à-vis a security system of colonial power. Thus, the work Heterotopia – Yok Ülke (The country that does not exist, 2015) by artist Şener Özmen is based on the critique of coloniality and on the absence of the Kurds on the map of the world. This “other space” in the artist’s work stems from a “non-place” that one could speak of as subversive and which simply defines the Kurdish subalternity of a territory, of a people. In a roundabout way, this work calls into question the territorial entity of the world map and its dominant modernity where Kurdistan does not exist and the borders of this invisible country are cut off by colonial modernity (Beşikçi 2013a). The body of the artist’s work obviously does not concern the definitions of an artistic reaction as an “avant-garde reaction” in the face of dominant modernity, but broadens the definition of decolonized art to criticize the balance of power of coloniality in Kurdish territory.18 17 See Sener Özmen, “All Over again: Is There such a thing as Kurdish Contemporary Art?” in Fabrica-Luciano Benetton Collection 2017, 64–75, and Erkan Özgen, “Kurdish Art in the Third Millennium,” in ibid., 54–62. 18 To see the analysis on decolonial art, Modernity/Coloniality Group in Latin America n.d. and the website of the Colonial, Postcolonial and Decolonial Working Group (under the auspices of the British International Studies Association), https://cpdbisa.wordpress.com/.

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This does not mean that the Kurds do not exist in history, memory and place; it is rather a matter of grasping the colonial practice which makes “invisible” and “ignores” (“so-called society”) the body of the Kurdish subalternity and its insurgent ontology. It should not be forgotten that the resistance and the struggle for the emancipation of the Kurds are the acts that make the insurgent visibility of the Kurds consistent. It is this whole hierarchy that is implemented by the reasoning of modernity itself on stateless societies. Pierre Clastres speaks anthropologically of another alternative opposition in the temporality of colonial modernity, that of the primitive stateless civilization constituting a modernity without the imposition of a social hierarchy (Clastres 2011). This interweaving of different modernities constitutes what we could very roughly call the hierarchical space of the view of Western civilization. From such a perspective, reading “subaltern modernity” uses irony as a subjective strategy of oppressed sociality in the face of elitist colonial culture. To also use the terms “subaltern” and “decolonial” therefore amounts to showing that the subaltern society is politically aware of a collective enunciation constituted between colonial domination and decolonial resistance. In this context, as I previously remarked in the book Art et subalternité Kurde (Art and Kurdish subalternity): “This is why some accounts from the history below help us understand how dominant societal values identify ‘others’ as a societal anomaly. This framework allows us to articulate the subalternity, the oppressed, and the ‘other’ using rhetorical zombies and monstrosity. The fascinating image of the Kurdish subalternity culture translates into discontinuity and subversion, in our opinion, a Gothic motif of ‘zombie’ in the turn of major society embodying cursed visibility according to the sovereign gaze of colonial culture. He is the actor of normality, one who is mostly ‘visible’ and invulnerable even if he is mortal, but not cursed either is excluded from the social order” (2016, 57). The identification of zombification with the interpretation of the other also gives us the discursive symbolic character of the analogy of power according to which the excluded always presents itself as an emblematic figure of social abnormality between the victim, visibility, invisibility and the rejection of social law. This is because the language of domination creates a figure of the other through the construction of the body of the excluded and the stereotypes that the zombie in a way expresses to repress the desire for social domination. In this climate, contemporary Kurdish art, for example by canonizing the art of Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi space, rather turns into decolonial and hybrid art in a conceptualization which deconstructs the chapel of dominant modernity. The practice of Kurdish art here makes space for revolt in a line of flight through

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the stateless society that plays a critical role in artists’ work. We can give, as an example, Mehmet Ali Boran in My Confession (2019), a video that criticizes colonial memory, the Armenian genocide and its traumatic traces, and Halil Altindere in Dance with the Taboos (1997) and One Turk Is Worth the World (1998), a series of images. The images of Kurdish artists in general interweave in a hybrid allegory criticizing the Eastern and Western views and breaking the boundary of cultural and religious allegory with their decolonial gaze. Another example in our analysis is the work Country for an Old Man, in 2010 by Fikret Atay. In this case, it should be noted that conceptually, the critique of this image follows the art movements of our time and gives birth to a post-exotic imaginary of “Turkish Orientalism.” Let us add that the paradox of an image, a thought and a stigmatized local place today generates this decolonial affection and proposes the critique of a post-Orientalist vision of the Kurds. This means that the tension between otherness and production is sliding towards artistic criticism of the “repressive regime.” In the 1990s, artists turned away from the question of “periphery and center” to enter the new artistic cultural period and problematize the positivist idea of modernity (Özmen 2000). They were Kurdish artists who producd an image and concept of decoloniality in the face of the stigma and racial discrimination of colonial modernity. The discussion of “periphery and center” revolving around the perspective of Turkish modernity as a break in memory gave the artists a real break from colonial narratives. It is the projections of artistic and scattered narrativities in present time that shatter the dominant cultural project of colonial modernity. Certain artistic forms clearly help to build up the decolonial sensibilities necessary to face new colonial imaginaries. More precisely, art helps us perceive the colonial memory of this dominant modernity through traces, archives and images. Contemporary Kurdish art is embodied in a bifurcation of decolonial knowledge and the perception of subaltern modernity and brings them back to the present.

Reading “Democratic Modernity” in the Middle East At the end of the 1990s, the Kurdish political movement abandoned the Marxist-Leninist theories of the liberation of the oppressed people and instead established a critique of the modernity for this present time, based on progress and the recovery of power (proletarian dictatorship).19 The 19 See, Gambetti 2009; Stefani and Ruge 2018; Sustam and Schaepelynck 2018, 27–36; Bookchin 1982; [Aslan] 2016; Yarkin 2011.

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reading of twentieth-century modernity in the Marxist movement, which was the main guardian of the idea of progress and the seizure of power, has been abandoned by Kurdish political movement for a new kind of politics based on libertarian ecology and the emancipation of women. It is possible today to say that criticism of modernity has a rhetoric and an attitude favorable to the priorities of Öcalan (2011). However, the discourse adapted by the Kurdish movement in Turkey and in Syria centers on an alternative political system, an ecological, communal one based on micro-identities in the face of “capitalist modernity” as characterized by Öcalan. The political transformation of the Kurdish political movement has given a critical reading of the Kurdish space in the vicinity of anti-colonial thinking. Öcalan completely transformed the political movement after his incarceration in Turkey (in 1999) to bring out the Marxist-Leninist heritage against the libertarian perception of Bookchin in a reflection on social ecology and female freedom in the face of a patriarchal colonial culture in Kurdistan and the Middle East (“Kurdistan as a colony, women as the oldest colony”).20 Öcalan is quite interesting to see on this point. Echoing the theory of a countermodernity, Öcalan says that “capitalist modernity” has imposed the centralization of the state (2011, 24): “Our project of democratic modernity is meant as an alternative […] to modernity as we know it. It builds on democratic confederalism as a fundamental political paradigm.” On this point, Paul White’s book Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers is quite captivating to read. It traces the ideological evolution of the PKK towards this concept after the 2000s. This evolution gradually responded to a dual reality in the Kurdish question and “Kurdicity,” with the modernization of stateless society and the corresponding reflections of the arts, political movements, new philosophy and literature of the struggle. After Öcalan, modernity in the Kurdish space takes on a kind of criticism of colonial science – an anti-colonial political spirit. Then democratic modernity at some point became identified with a pathography, with a legitimation of devolution, a critique of the excessive ambitions of the social-Darwinist science of colonial thought. Finally, an attack was made on the bureaucratic constraints of colonial thought. Though attempts are made to make social or scientific modernization coincide with the democratic modernity surrounding the women’s struggle and social ecology, the break with colonial historicity nevertheless remains the anti-colonial norm of this approach. Even if Öcalan himself does not insist on the 1980s reading of the political movement, where the PKK defined itself as engaging in 20 See “Jineoloji” 2019 and Biehl 2015 and 2014, and Tatort Kurdistan 2013.

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an anti-colonial and Fanonian armed struggle, we see such a Fanonian approach in the conceptualization of democratic modernity as a social alternative to war and ethnic conflict in the 2000s. After Öcalan’s book Democratic Nation and Democratic Modernity, this criticism attempts to reconstitute the trajectory of the political chronicler by taking into account a set of relevant transformations in the Kurdish space in Turkey, Syria and the diaspora: the morphology of the analysis of colonialism and the relative closure of capitalist bureaucracy in the first half of the transformation of the struggle for emancipation from colonial states. The conceptualization of modernity concludes with a critique of Öcalan’s biographical analysis to get out of colonial and capitalist modernity which often ratifies a solipsistic vision of military creation and a hermeneuticized conception of philosophical production based on Bookchin’s libertarian readings (1982). This reflection is now focused on sociopolitical performativity to capture the sociopolitical, cultural and economic factors linked to the crisis of the nation state and of modernity itself in a conceptualization led by the political milieu of resistance. The term “capitalist modernity” is itself found in his works. This political principle seeks to establish a multi-ethnic self-government which advocates an egalitarian, pluralistic society in the face of patriarchy – also emphasized today as an apparatus of the dominant modernity (Öcalan 2010 and Jineolojî Committee Europe 2018).21 In this discussion, Öcalan effectively questions masculinity in Kurdistanand gender and its patriarchal relationships under colonial influence within a broader framework of analysis.22 It is a question of interrogating the memory of the masculinity engendered by colonial modernity. This dissociation of masculinity in Kurdish space is at work in the scientific critique of capitalist modernity. In Öcalan’s theory, the colonial question is attached to the interrogation of capitalist modernity (2017). This reading of modernity is to be studied, it is suggested, to replace capitalist modernity with the concepts of “democratic modernity,” “democratic nation” or “democratic civilization” in the perspective of the Öcalanian theory of the Kurdish political movement (Öcalan 2016, 12–21). Let us add that the political philosophy of Öcalan and Bookchin were also applied in the Kurdish space in Syria after the social revolution of Rojava (July 19, 2012), which constitutes the crucial importance of this discussion of “democratic modernity.” In the Kurdish space, we do not often enough bring the critique of colonialist modernity to the analysis of capitalism and the nation state. Let us add 21 See also the analysis of the term of Öcalan: Network for an Alternative Ouest 2012 and 2015. 22 See gender analysis during the Ottoman Empire, Klein 2001.

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that, in contrast to the model of capitalist modernity underlined by Öcalan, there is the model of self-managed cooperatives led by women in Rojava (which applies the theory of democratic confederalism). The Öcalanian conceptualization proposes understanding current reality through a critique of modernity based on the problematic of capitalist society. We simply consider that, in the great vertigo of the modernity-based capitalist approach which affects our present “contemporaneity” (from colonial modernists to neo-colonial contemporaneists), coloniality continues to destroy nature and exploit labor, albeit more and more masked by integrated global capitalism (precariousness, debt, unemployment; Graeber 2011, 2018; Lazzarato 2008 and 2014). This “capitalist modernity” is becoming more and more entrenched by exploiting poverty, precariousness, pandemic and control in the societies of the planet. Graeber also speaks about the debt mechanisms of neoliberalism, emphasizing this debt as being poverty, human misery and therefore the destruction of the planet put in place by capitalism (2011, 5). At this point, it is useful to take a look at Bruno Latour’s approach to the modern, nature and ecology (see, 2012). Speaking of the unpredictable effects of life, Latour makes the following recommendation for nature in response to the capitalism of our century. In his book Face à Gaïa, Latour suggests we see the problem as concerning not only ecology, but also “civilization.” According to him, in the era of global capitalism (the era of the new Leviathan and the iconic “enemy” figure of Carl Schmitt), we will be drowned in binary opposition if we do not act and find faster solutions to ecological problems (2015, 29, 61, 117, 150, 283, 372). The main approach of Latour’s book lies in a critique of modernity, the opposition between nature and culture. According to him, modernity is already outdated and the thought of progress as well (“non-modernité,” 2006). At a time of transversal temporariness, groundlessness, rootlessness of identity, mistrustfulness of subaltern society, of the violence and of the armed conflict that dominate the Kurdish question and forced political immigration, the Kurdish space transforms the question of modernity its share of this liquid state of “democratic modernity.” Öcalan’s analysis of the colonialist approach to modernity also comes to the fore in the light of his sociological approach, as a beam of hope to illuminate an optimistic conception of the future. In this sense, the study deals with Öcalan’s argument for the diffusion of “democratic modernity” in order to build a “common world” view that includes not only the Kurdish question, but also those of other societies alienated by global capitalism, violence, and colonial power.

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Conclusion Finally, we could point out here a further issue and thus indicate a framework for questioning “subaltern modernity”: the vision of this modernity of oppressed society is considered by us as the epistemic reaction against the modernity of the dominant national culture. Our conceptualization of “subaltern modernity” gives rise to the Kurdish context in the making and its collective renunciation of the symbolic domination of coloniality established by sovereign macro-identity. This subversive visibility (of space, of actors, of networks) has allowed us to see a micropolitical reflection of “subaltern modernity” in the making. From this point of view, we have used a toolkit or a constellation of methods that uncovers the bifurcated language of the Kurdish space and the “rupture of reason” of countermodernity. This is why it was important to deploy the symbolization of zombies as a figure of the “other.” The Kurdish subalternity like “zombie” and “strange creature” is based on a rebellious micro-identity intended to bypass the history of the political hegemony of the colonial consensus and to rethink the microhistory of oppressed peoples in the process of becoming effective as a line of dissensus. The colonial era that the Kurdish people have lived through, with its own cultural codes and evolutionary theology, was exactly the story of the modernist or universalist ideology of Enlightenment thought in Turkey and in the Middle East. In our reading which broadens the term “subaltern” and no longer persists in the antagonistic reading of modernity, we rather question the complex relationship between the colonized and the colonizers. We use in this way “a black humor” of the decolonial pedagogy of minor cultures and the oppressed against the dominant national state and the discursive regime of biopolitical governmentality which Michel Foucault emphasized (Foucault 2004). Then “subalternity” attaches to the modernity of the “other” society. And it is in this context of criticism that we try to interpret the term “subaltern modernity” as a process of micro-resistance towards subversive and subaltern visibility in the zone of encounter and conflict in opposition to the victimizing clichés of the oppressed. What it is important to grasp: the Kurdish context decolonizing colonial knowledge and its type of scientific implications. Deconstructing the colonial heritage and the official situation, the Kurdish space proposes to get out of colonial or capitalist modernity (in the sense of Bruno Latour) which devastates our world and nature. Indeed, being homeless (exiled) is not just a metaphor among the Kurds, but rather describes the situation of an entire dynamic of insurgent decoloniality. The Kurds emerged from victimization in this other space and now have the

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power to speak of their own bodies as a new subjectivity. Moreover, the Kurdish space and its cultural productions present a counterspace and a counternarrative and question the public space in the Middle East by introducing a change of codes and the disruptive visibility of the minority corpus.

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Yilmaz, Özcan. 2013. La formation de la nation kurde en Turquie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Zeydanlioglu, Welat. 2008. “The White Turkish Man’s Burden: Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey.” Neo-colonial Mentalities in Contemporary Europe 4, no. 2: 155–74. ———. 2009. “Torture and Turkification in the Diyarbakır Military Prison.” In Rights, Citizenship and Torture: Perspectives on Evil, Law and the State, edited by Welat Zeydanlıoglu and J. T. Parry, 73–92. Oxford: Inter-disciplinary Press, pp..

About the Author Engin Sustam (University of Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis) received his PhD (2012) at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. He is currently an associate researcher at the Institut Français d’Études Anatoliennes in Istanbul and he has worked as a visiting scholar at the University of Geneva, the École des Hautes Études, École Normale Supérieure of Paris, and the University of Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis. He is also a member of the Scholars at Risk program of the New York University. He is the author of the book Kurdish Art and Subalternity between Violence and Resistance in Turkey (L’Harmattan, 2016). [email protected]

8.

Conflicting Modernities: Militarization and Islands Aide Esu and Simone Maddanu

Abstract This chapter mainly points out how militarization as a bureaucratic and discursive “apparatus” results in a colonial modernization. Furthermore, the chapter establishes a direct link between military settlements – by various occupations – and a narrative of modernization and modernity. Both military protocols and the scope of the military activities contribute to a form of colonization and dependence, economically as well as culturally. Militarization is a wider concept involving at least two dimensions: the economic and political factors sustaining the expansion of military spending; and the social, cultural, and ideological dimension. However, the master narrative of modernization clashes with rising claims to autonomy in the local population that assert an alternative modernity. Keywords: civil-military relations; military occupation; colonial modernization; autonomy; postcolonial islands; modernity and risk

Despite Mills’ (2010 [1956]) clear-cut examination of “lords of war,” militarism and modernity have been largely neglected in sociology avoiding any investigation of military power and modern industrialization (Giddens 1990, 9). Max Weber, disagreeing with militarism, looked at war and imperialism as suitable instruments of modernity (Mann 2018, 39). Studies on militarism highlighted how it is inherent to modernity, contributing to the consolidation of Western countries and to building post-colonial statehood in the twenty-first century. This chapter addresses some theoretical and empirical aspects of militarization and modernity by considering specifically the militarization of islands as the outcome of a colonization process undertaken by Western countries, culminating in the US and NATO (North Atlantic

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch08

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Treaty Organization) policies of geopolitical control of extended territories. Within the limits of our contribution, we aim to problematize the meanings, representations, and effects of the military bases in geographically and economically isolated territories. In the first section, we address the issue of modernity and the military, how modernity progressed by acquiring the monopoly of violence, and established social control over time, notably and progressively since World War II; thus, in late modernity the spending on technological weaponry became one of the more relevant factors. In the second section we present the case of Sardinia as a case study of the militarization of a peripheral territory, an example of many subjugated islands (Vine 2009) and as reflexivity on modernity. This discussion of the military occupation of islands allows us to bring forward our empirical analysis of modernity and modernization, with a specific focus on Sardinia, the Mediterranean island with one of the largest military settlements in Europe, where NATO Interforce and foreign military forces simulate war games and test new weapons systems. This case, like similar locations around the globe, shows the effects of militarization on the environment. After decades during which the military settlement implied economic development and a rhetoric of modernity versus tradition and inadequacy, the pollution generated by military activities and its spread in the environment has engendered harmful effects on both military personnel and civilians, calling attention to the “dark side” of modernity. The third section traverses classic critiques of modernity by focusing on the organized forms of control resulting from modernization. It is our understanding that the rhetoric of modernity and modernization through military bases contributes to more or less subtle forms of dependence and legal monopoly over land control. The extent of such forces, both political and bureaucratic, reveals a fundamental clash with other possible declensions of modernity. Particularly, in light of grassroots movements and self-awareness of island inhabitants, we suggest the use of the concept of autonomy, from Touraine’s reflections on a “new definition of modernity” (Touraine 1995 [1992], 222), which leads to the idea of Subject and subjectivations, also expressed in Touraine’s chapter in this volume as a necessary endeavor in “defense of modernity.” By participating and contributing to the making of the local public sphere, individuals and groups, social actors, and grassroots movements realize a paradigmatic change in perspective. Public health and environmental concerns that arose in public opinion require a modern “restorative justice,” in the Habermasian sense. The power of dependency, though, finds other ways to maintain privileges and unaccountability, so that a modern ideal communication cannot take place yet. Although dependency

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operates through a strict bureaucratic apparatus that is difficult to penetrate and be made accountable, a modern autonomous self-definition and a new social imaginary (Touraine 1995 [1992]; Taylor 2004) of the people might arise.

Modernity and the Military The idea of post-modernity and the postmodern that arose in the 60s and 70s encompasses different philosophical and sociological reflections on major social changes, at first in Western societies and eventually around the world. But they also contemplate the awakening of a different life perspective in society. The new human dimension cannot be separated from global events, identity and cultural claims, and a new ecological posture. During the next decades, tangential reflections on post-modernity recentered attention on a new ecological paradigm (Catton and Dunlap 1980), as well as societal change through reflexivity and risk (Giddens 1990; Beck 1992; and Beck et al. 1994). In general, the decline of the idea of Progress was associated with disenchantment vis-à-vis the positivist idea of human evolution and the “exceptionalist” idea magnifying technological discoveries, and the positive role of rationality and science as a bridgehead towards uncharted territory. This by-now classic critique of Modernity coincides with rising questions about environmental concerns, reflexivity on progressive economic development, and the role of the state and its institutions over citizens. Social institutions are also at the core of other postmodern perspectives – or interpretations – which seemingly suggest a “liquefaction” of previous society (Bauman 2000) or the restrictions of state control and the rise of international assemblages and institutions (Sassen 2006), or the decline of state institutions (Dubet 1998, 2002). Furthermore, the postmodern reveals other intrinsic applications of the suffix post, such as post-Fordism and post-industrial (Bell 1973; Harvey 1990; 1996), the post-World War II (Bell 1982) and the nuclear danger, the post-Cold War, and finally the larger umbrella of the post-colonial, which crosses the interdependence observed in Emmanuel Wallerstein’s world-system theory (Frank 1998) by exploring, at least intellectually, the internal (Gonzalez Casanova 1965; Mbembe 2000) and global phenomena of post-coloniality (Appadurai 1996; Spivak 1999; Bhambra 2007; Mignolo 2007). The entanglements between modernity and militarism are based on the pillars of militarism as a “historical, social process by which investments in military institutions […] have shaped global human life” (Lutz 2018, 1). Modernity organizes the monopoly of force in the Weberian

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state foundation, shaping the Western nation state and establishing the civil-military relations that organize society “for the production of violence” (Geyer 1989, 79). The history of modernization is the history of militarization as a source of power to create the bodies used to defend state borders, as well as a belligerent force to expand power and to control new territories. Looking at domestic violence, the monopoly is seized by means of physical, institutionalized, and symbolic power. Internally, the creation of the monopoly of force acts in accordance with the goal of mastering uncontrolled violence. State formation is a ceaseless process of governing and restraining uncontrolled violence in order to build a unique source of legitimate power. The formalization of required standard behaviors is codified and translated into juridical codes assigning credits or punishments to deviant behaviors disregarding social expectancies. The achievement of the monopoly of force conveys two distinct directions: the formalization of law and the system of punishment by the creation of judicial codes and the prison system (Foucault 1975), and by the creation of a national military body to defend state borders. The enactment of French Revolution principles and rationality increased human capability over nature fortifying the Enlightenment belief in the human faculty to triumph over the darkness of the Middle Ages. The achievement of the rational pursuit of the monopoly use of force is generally interpreted as a way to maintain order in society and to contain violence. If we look at the implementation of this process we can f igure out how violence took different configurations, casting multiple forms of expression, being featured as a political violence (revolutionary/counter-revolutionary), symbolic violence, institutionalized violence, crime, state violence in support of colonial expansion, and war. Triumphant modernity did not overcome state violence: the age of modernity traverses devastating wars engendering the largest displacement of Western population and destruction. In late modernity, wars multiplied generating new forms of armed conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and ethnic cleansing (Kaldor 2012). Indeed, Michael Mann (2018) recently suggested that wars have not declined. Rather, current trends go in the opposite direction stimulated by following two relevant transformations: civil wars in the Global South succeeding interstate war; and the escalation of technological weaponry production and so-called dual-use production (military-civilian). After September 11, issues related to security (Agamben 2005; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008) pushed up the production of goods, software, and technology with a high potential for so-called dual use, opening up a new frontier in the civilian-military relationship (Olsson 2008, 157–69), including applied research on new

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technologies like 3D printers, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and surveillance systems. The growth of these technologies opens up questions related to impacts on research, weapon industries, ethics, and judicial guarantees on privacy rights and personal freedom. Technical advancement in weaponry occurs with industrial progress in a way coherent with the principle of colonial rationality. Therefore, industrial growth and the war industry evolve in the same direction, but if industrial patents are under legal regulation, industrial production of weaponry and military equipment are not only subject to the market but also strongly dependent on political decisions and international relations. Mills (2010 [1956]) made clear how the technology of US military power rose in the post-World War II era thanks to the interconnection of politics, capitalism, and research acquiring a global dimension by forging the modern idea of security, extending power through military alliances in global colonial control of islands and territories (Vine 2009). The “buddy system” (Mills 2010, 202), a triangulation of political-industrial-research connections, is, since post-World War II, the master stroke of world militarization. In the aftermath of Yalta, the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were engaged in a weapons-proliferation competition (investing resources and human capital), in proxy wars supporting regional conf licts, psychological warfare, technological competition, and the space race. They acted virtually in agreement as winners of World War II, but carrying out and sustaining indirect wars and conflicts. According to Bruneau and Goetze “the cold war (1945–1991) def ined the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies and enemies; furthermore, it also defined virtually all security relationships, including domestic security, throughout the world” (2006, 73). Militarization is a wider concept involving at least two interrelated dimensions: the economic and the sociocultural. Economic and political actors keep up the expansion of military spending; and social, cultural, and ideological dimensions entangle values’ transformation and social acceptance of the military and of war (Lutz 2001). From the economic point of view, the military sector represents a relevant portion of national GDP: among NATO countries, the average is between 15 (Italy, France) and 35 percent (United States). Military spending consists of personnel spending, maintenance (including missions of peacekeeping), equipment, building new sites, and research and development. Predominantly, weaponry expenses represent one-third of the total amount, which includes industrial arms production and economic flux between arms transfers. As

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established by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) research, international arms transfer is not a transparent process due to international embargos and agreements between states. Therefore, they suggest the adoption of the Trend Indicator Value to measure the volume of arms transfers. Generally speaking, from the economic point of view the SIPRI researcher drew attention to transparency, accountability, dual-use, and military cost of public health in non-conflicting territories (2021). The issues of transparency and accountability remind us of how modernity works and how the institutionalization of democracy has been shaped. In fact, military decisions are taken in defense offices out of parliamentary control; military personnel dislike political intrusion; security and secrecy are sometimes employed to avoid democratic bodies’ control. The recurrent question of military-civil relations – who guards the guardians – reveals the importance of the impasse. If we agree on a general assessment of the military being at the service of civilian institutions and their bodies, we should also recall the Weberian analysis of bureaucratic organizations. The exceptionalist system of the command chain defines the military as the bureaucratic system par excellence, showing, as Bruneau and Goetze remind us (2006), its technical superiority over any other form of organization: “Military bureaucracies are among the slowest to change, because of the time-honored nature of their missions, the entrenched career-promotion structures, and the huge investments and lead time needed to develop new equipment and strategies” (80–81). In this perspective, and in light of new technological systems of surveillance and intrusive data collection, it is easy to imagine the risks implied by new forms of control and the invisibility of power. Even under a civil control of the military, the military can enjoy a privileged status as a de facto goal-oriented, independent institution, no matter what the form of government. Parts of the strategic technostructure of the military, internal bureaucracy, and chain of command operate as forms of biopower and contribute to the control of the truth in case of accidents or disasters of various kinds by enjoying some level of secrecy and eventually unaccountability. Questioning the military would result in questioning the state itself, and not merely symbolically. Military expenditure is considered an essential asset for many countries, sometimes regardless of their imperialist vocation or geopolitical strategies. By treating the national defense as “a pure public good” (Elveren 2019, 7), military expenditures can be considered a strategic investment for the national economy. In that sense, the military-industrial complex (MIC) has been analyzed through a Keynesian approach, cognizant of

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the role of the state in supporting a liberal economy. As Adem Yavuz Elveren noted, the MIC is a coalition of vested interests within the state and industry, promoting the interests of this symbiotic coalition in the name of “national security,” although this may not necessarily overlap with the interest of the general public. The MIC, in this sense, has established itself as a sort of autonomous structure within the state, a structure of permanent pressure for increasing milex [military expenditure], justified by perceived or actual external threats. (Elveren 2019, 28)

In order to maintain an economic equilibrium between private and public investments that could in a long-term perspective intertwine private ventures with a national interest, these approaches attempt to define the public importance of military expenditures. Thus, MIC can be analyzed as a strategic necessity that couples the symbolic role of the military with its socio-economic role, in so far as it produces positive economic repercussions for civilians while maintaining dynamics suitable to the capitalist system (Griffin et al. 1982). According to this perspective, the military enjoys a double legitimation in modern institutions: symbol of unity and sacred defense in a post-World War II world; and a national economic agent for the purpose of the common good. With the exception of China (Gallagher 1987; Cordesman et al. 2019), the current military spending and military bases for training combine statebureaucratic institutional support with the privatization of technological innovation for both military and civilian purposes (Brömmelhörster and Paes 2003; Sheez 2003, 21–30). The “acceleration” of the capitalist system – which goes with a lack of governmental control – transforms the Keynesian perspective1 on the military as a welfare institution (Elveren 2019, 28–32) into a neoliberal apparatus. This process started even before Thatcherism (Mouffe 2018, 25–27) and Reaganism deregulation. In reviewing the state of the art for military spending and its role in modern societies, Elveren (2019, 73) reminds us that In O’Connor’s analysis [O’Connor 1973], the capitalist economy consists of three distinct sectors: the state and two parts of the capitalist entity – the monopoly sector and the competitive sector. The monopoly sector refers 1 Maynard Keynes’ perspective here must be understood as a rejection of laissez-faire (Keynes 2010, 272–90), extensible to the military-spending sphere.

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to the dominant, innovative sector in a capitalist economy, with well-paid, mostly secure jobs, while the competitive sector refers to the remainder of this core part of the economy, associated with small-scale capital and insecure jobs for the reserve army of unemployed. In this picture, the state has a double (and contradictory) role: to help the monopoly sector in capital accumulation (accumulator) while legitimising this role for the rest of the society (legitimator).

Even if, as it has been observed by Alan Wolfe in the afterword of the new edition of the Power Elite (Mills 2010 [1956], 373–75), military spending has constantly been reduced by US governments since the publication of Wright Mills in 1956, this framework is largely valid to explain the military ascendency and confirm the economic role of the military as a “power-elite” institution (Ibid.).2 However, the evolution of the neoliberal economy around and within the military would require a different kind of thinking today, especially in terms of civil control and civil-military relations (Croissant and Kuehn 2017; Bruneau and Goetze 2006; Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2006; Born et al. 2006).

Modernizing or Colonizing? The Rhetoric of Modernity The history of militarization overlaps with the political strategy of extending the state’s territory. The Cold War inaugurated a new policy of territorial control by the strategic alliances between countries or regional subordination to the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union or the United States. Since the Roman Empire, military bases have guaranteed territorial control. Islands are at the core of the new NATO and US geopolitical strategy. This is exemplified in the case of World War II losers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, that became subject to forceful US and NATO military control.3 Clearly, Italian and Japanese islands have gotten involved in a process of double colonialism (Akibayashi and Takazato 2009) by the United States and NATO,

2 In 2019 the United States spent around 718.69 billion US dollars on its military, including development of new military technologies, and new aircraft and weaponry. But also salaries for its professionals, military and civilians. Data (SIPRI 2021) confirm similar expenditures in the last fifteen years. New superpowers like China, Brazil, India and Pakistan show a constantly increasing trend in military expenditure in the last decades. 3 In the aftermath of World War II, the United States settled 54 US bases in Italy, 154 in Japan and 176 in Germany.

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foreign countries, and the national military apparatus, thus becoming a “colony of colony” (McCaffrey 2002, 10). As David Vine reports (2009, 42), by the end of World War II, the nation [the United States] had more than 30,000 installations at more than 2,000 base sites globally. Today the United States has what is likely the largest collection of military bases in world history, totaling more than 5,300 globally and an estimated 1,000 bases outside its own territory of the 50 states and Washington, DC.

Our empirical case is inscribed in the post-World War II Mediterranean strategy of territorial control through military installations. Military settlements in Sardinia were conveyed in post-war economic recovery through modernization narratives. The master narrative of militarization came to light in the local press – the same that operated as a megaphone for the modernizing Italian state rhetoric – and it is a role played by several subaltern local actors. In the post-war debate around the political idea of the island’s autonomy, local autonomist and independentist actors address modernity and modernization from different perspectives, but always from a subordinate role vis-à-vis the state. In our previous work (Esu and Maddanu 2018, 2020), we focused on local media representation of the military presence throughout these decades of social and cultural change – local, national, and global. Since the aftermath of World War II to 2015, thoughts, mentality, collective actions, perceptions, and more structural elements of Sardinia island have obviously changed. However, military rhetoric, internal logics, bureaucracy and procedures, communication and military-civil relations … not so much. Due to its transitional situation, from a traditional economy to exogenous industrialization through the growth poles, Sardinia fits with the island military-base model: a poor economy and a mild hostility of the population perceived as avoidable by implementing the rhetoric of modernity. On the one hand, its traditional rural economic system and lack of modern infrastructure justified the state intervention, which engendered praise in public opinion.4 On the other hand, the spread of rural landscape and a so-perceived likely domestication of the autochthones facilitated an intense, massive, and even unique military settlement that has no comparison in twentieth-century Western Europe. While increasing its efforts to secure a sustainable economy in tourism, Sardinia remains occupied by several military bases, which correspond to 60 percent of all military installations 4

By public opinion here we are referring to the local media and regional politician’s circles.

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in Italy.5 Two different modern forces dwell in this cohabitation: (1) a governmental modernization force that employs its bureaucratic apparatus and sovereignty exception; (2) a local civil society that aims at redefining its autonomy, sovereignty, and economic development. In between, a local public sphere plays a crucial role in normalizing and problematizing the past, present, and future of Sardinia, even if not achieving a Habermasian restorative justice. Over the years, a major shift has been triggered by environmental and public health concerns generated by military activities. Alarms have been raised in public opinion, especially after 2000. Military activities, including weaponry experiments, have been at the center of these concerns that eventually reached the level of judicial inquiry and trial for the environmental damages and health effects engendered by the military activities. The trial has not clarified causes and responsibilities, keeping in place a bureaucratic shield for the military secrecy while spreading uncertainty about land reclamation and the future safety for the local population (although at the time of writing, the trial is still open; Esu and Maddanu 2018, 2020). By analyzing the local-press news and information about the major military base in Sardinia from 1956 to 2013 (Esu and Maddanu 2018, 2020), we observed a pervasive journalist language of modernization and positivism which portrayed the military as a modernizing actor and a source of pride. The positivist narrative lies in the fascination for the tryptic science/ technology/superiority that encompasses an enchanted idea of modernity: thanks to the worldwide attention to military activities and experiments at the base, Sardinia would f inally be at the center of progress, which would eventually carry the island to the coveted economic development and a bright future. However, the expected economic spin-off remained ideal and limited to a few correlated activities. Meanwhile, criticism of vanishing economic hopes was raised even in the “military-embedded” press. Nonetheless, after decades of military presence, we can still observe a positivist narrative that now turns the image of the military base (in the last decades strongly criticized in the local media) into a technological hub for the space race. Two long articles in 1996 (June 28) and in 2000 (March 3) appeared in the most read local newspaper relating the triumph of the military base and its benefits for the Sardinian people in terms of prestige and opportunity. 5 With a total 35,000 hectares of military land use and 20,000 square kilometers by the sea (ARS 2011).

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The first article (Mameli 1996) celebrates “40 years of rockets”; the second, technology and space programs for future generations: “Foghesu6 in Space” (Melis 2000). Like many others that have been enthusiastically supportive of the military base, both articles use the classic narrative of the modernizer, a panoply of images about “progress,” modernity,” and “success.” In the portrayal of the twentieth-century ideal of modernity, we perceive the ineluctability of the exogenous force in its modernizing endeavor. According to this idyllic vision, if before only ignorance and poverty existed in the island, then technological advancement, money, and new goal for the future would turn on the light of modernity: [T]he missile – best example of technology and speed – the idea of Wernher Von Braun, ended up on an ox-cart, prehistoric Prometheus’ and grandchildren’s idea. The missile arrived at the Polygon [military base in Perdasdefogu] after three hours during which Natale sang a bucolic song “man cannot progress without cows” […] The same day professor Cesare Cremona gave the order to fire four other missiles, all successful. Here progress, at least the modern one, arrived with the missiles. Before them, in 1954, Giovanni Palmas, aka Piricciòlu, opened an industrial bakery […]. Giovanni spent six years and a half in the Army, where he learned baking. Smart and proactive, he became the first manager of Foghesu [Perdasdefogu]. Until then, the town was just misery and poverty, no electricity, no water, no house with a bathroom inside; young people used to study by candlelight or carbide lamp. […] Then the Polygon [the military base] came, with General Adalberto Zanchi and General Egidio Costa. They build a good relationship with the village. Money started circulating; the houses became modern (often, terribly modern). The Polygon became the emergency room of the inhabitants; sick people had an ambulance for urgent care to the hospital.7

In this exemplary recent narrative, which echoes the early phase of modernity rhetoric in the first decades of the military settlement in Sardinia at the beginning of the Cold War (Esu and Maddanu 2018, 426–27), we can still perceive the ineluctability of dependence. In order to cope with misery and underdevelopment – sometimes perceived as backwardness – the external intervention, even by means of the military, arose as a 6 Foghesu refers to the inhabitants of Perdasdefogu, the town hosting one of the military bases in Sardinia. 7 Mameli 1996, 1 and 27 (translated by the editors).

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liberating force of progress. After losing support in the local public sphere as a strategic institution, especially in the late 90s, the Polygon resurfaced with more civil-related projects. Space programs emerge as eco-friendly and younth-centered projects – in a way that would apply to NASA and its successful worldwide reputation. In the article “2001, Foghesu in the Space” we can read The town of missiles is getting ready to nurture dreams of space. The satisfaction of the Mayor Walter Carta, who is also Army officer at the Polygon, is understandable: “The European Space Agency – the Mayor says – has chosen Perdasdefogu as a perfect site for research activities, due to favourable meteorological conditions on the ground and at altitude, as the Polygon statistical data would confirm after 50 years of activities.” Thus, Perdasdefogu is about to experiment with a new youth, after having achieved a reputation in the 50s for hosting the firsts European missiles launch on space research. […] The Hale project (High Altitude Long Endurance Platforms) also includes a second phase of sales promotion for all scientific components resulting from the experimentations. After all, Perdasdefogu is familiar with “close encounters of the third kind” with the most advanced technology. (Melis 2001)

By combining military occupation (and related activities) with technological advancement and space travel, the military base(s) elevate themselves to the “essence” of modernity as technological progress. Not only do they embody the unity of the nation state, but also the triumph of mankind in regard to the universe and nature. The representation of the military as a vector of technological advancement, future, and positive/profitable discovery transformed the military activities into a sort of necessary risk, explorative institution that by definition would be allowed to experiment, even in secret, to ensure progress. Here, progress – more than a civilizational meaning – encompasses the idea of collective economic success, social mobility, and defeat of the miserable poverty implied in the ideas of rurality and underdevelopment. The “language of modernity” (Velasco Guerrero 2018) as a dominating substratum for every expression of development, economic, political, and finally cultural, has exploited the use of the military force – or just its presence, as occupying force – as a symbolic marker of control. It is exactly the new trajectory, quite independent of the cultural and social development, that remains at stake in the combat to oppose military occupation for a

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societal renewal: individuals and groups are more and more concerned about their autonomy and the future role of military institutions. More generally, local legitimation of the military presence in the islands switches from a civilizational rhetoric of innovation and modernization into one of strictly economic dependence. In the absence of this utilitarian element, the military bases in the islands today would cease to represent a symbol of strategic defense or national unity for the local population, especially after the Cold War period. The economy of the military base appears to be at stake, not unlike any other industrial compound. In many cases, the military represents the “executive declension” of a bureaucratic agent of “control and defense” that implies economic ventures and classical imperial prospects. The military, as a national institution, perpetuates – and in some ways reinforces – its role in the containment of violence by crystallizing the legitimate use of force (from each country’s point of view), but also leads, accompanies, or “protects” space programs and an interconnected neoliberal economy, including distributive public spending. Thus, dependency is constructed through the promise of a publicly necessary “social role” of the military bases on some islands, like Sardinia. The military bases imply secrecy, technological experimentation, and applied science. In some cases, they come with a panoply of triumphant narratives of modernity, modernization, and progress. Almost all cases of military-occupied islands are exemplary of colonial (or postcolonial) appropriations (Lutz 2009; Vine 2009, 2019; Davis 2011; Ireland 2010; McCaffrey 2002), in which military technologies, as well as imported spin-offs, temporarily elevate these islands from their Global South status. In a sense, the military bases include the islands nolens volens in geostrategic and “civilizational” projects. However, the islands remain peripheral and suffer from a self-decentralization process, a subalternity of their culture, economy, and society (Lutz 1984; Mongili 2015). The dependence that dictates a one-way approach to modernity, as well as a technological, colonial-based modernization process is kept going by militarization. On the one hand, militarization installs technical devices and exceptional procedures that aim to organize a secured system of control for the territory to protect military activities from external threats. On the other, in order to establish a good military/local population relationship, these forms of control require the construction of consensus on adopting the frame of modernity, homeland security, and of specific narratives around the military bases.

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The Wish for Another Modernity: Resisting Militarization Studies of civil-military relations in modern liberal democracies (Croissant and Kuehn 2017) have established the primary role of civilians in the use of their representative bodies to guard the guardians. However, in fact, other systemic forces interfere in the process and facilitate a self-preserving bureaucratic structure that guarantees the military is the elective group that “guards the guardians.” The analysis of civil-military relations can be misleading by defining the primary powers of civilians as those of first decision-makers. As far as the structure of internal power and responsibility are concerned, bureaucracy is difficult to question or to be made accountable. Basic characteristics of bureaucracy, like impersonality and replaceability, keep their Weberian meaning. The military, even under formal civil control (by the minister of defense, for example, in representative democracy), still enjoys legal advantages over individuals and the private sector, for instance when it comes to environmental protection. In the case of Italy, even the public sector may take advantage of similar exceptions, enjoying the privileges of their strategic role in the state (for instance, the case of Ilva in Taranto, and Porto Marghera in Venice).8 In some cases, these exceptions are supported by a verbal or silent majority of the local population (economically dependent on these unsafe jobs). In other cases, companies’ accountability in a court case is nullified by controversial scientific certitudes, which play down their respective responsibility (De Ghantuz Cubbe 2014). The rhetoric of modernity discloses a legitimation process for a factual colonization of the island: the construction of a public discourse of pride has the function of building consensus. From a decentralized position, the island is presented as being at the core of modern innovation in contributing to the advancement of the latest generation weaponry. This narration appears to function as an acceptable expedient for the status of dependency. In the language of the military, the institution follows a constant process of innovation cognizant of the geopolitical context, environment, and social opportunities. However, strategic choices internal to the military organization are sometimes at odds with public opinion and the underlying cultural processes. When the military faces criticism from local institutions, social actors, and the general public, then the rhetoric of the “bureaucratic world” sounds out of synch at the very least: a cultural clash arises in the public sphere in which we also value and prioritize public health, the environment, transparency, and the autonomy of subjects. 8

See two exemplary works on these cases: Mannino et al. (2015), and Lai et al. (2019).

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We can define autonomy as, on the one hand, an assertion of individual and collective dignity; on the other, as an anti-colonial front, cognizant of an affirmative self-definition aiming at redefining present and future. In a time of formal civil control of the military in democratic systems, a unidirectional analysis in terms of biopower, apparatus orders, and state of exception must be nuanced. However, the military keeps their role as a defense pillar, as well as the grandeur of their endeavor, project, or civilizational dream. From the strict logic of military control for warlike programs, occupied islands switch to a combination of bureaucratic, economic, and colonial outposts. Characterized by a dependent economy and limited administrative status, these islands are on the edge of a hybrid modernization, which is the fate of all globalized places. However, they remain subject to a bureaucratized monopoly of violence and suspension of their rights over their own lands. In addition, these islands represent the best option for logistic reasons: military training needs large tracts of land (especially for long-range weaponry), military fencing, and the occupation of wide spaces, both on land and sea. In these areas, as we observed in the case of Sardinia, the military attempts to control information and impose secrecy by limiting transparency about the military activities and their effects. The empirical case considered in our study can be seen as an example of double dependency, in which the military bases take parts of the territory out of alternative economic uses while promising positive repercussions for the local economy through military spending, innovative developments in technology, and programs to share new technologies and job-related skills. On the one hand, however, military occupation “freezes” some parts of the island for other opportunities and residents’ sovereignty. On the other hand, its representatives convey a rhetoric of modernization and economic success. Since its first settlement, the military base offers a dream of heterogeneous bureaucratized progress, while being part of a neoliberal economy, but actually ostracizes local autonomous impulses and decolonial consciousness. By assuming the role of the military as “national patriotic symbol” (Bruneau and Goetze 2006, 80) that maintains the legal use of violence – which distinguish the military “as a bureaucracy from other state bureaucracy” – we might argue that protesting and challenging the legitimacy of the military in a democracy ultimately addresses criticism against the functioning of the democratic national-state itself, thus the modern institution that maintains and defends national unity. For this reason, the process of liberation from dependency must use an alternative modern front, a democratic resistance that puts forth the autonomy and self-determination of citizens.

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This chapter establishes a direct link between military settlements – by the means of different occupations – and a narrative of modernization and modernity. Both military protocols and the extent of the military activities contribute to a form of colonization and dependence, economically as well as culturally, of the local population. In our previous works we observed the anti–military base activism, which mobilizes social protests in deconstructing the representation of an exogenous modernity process. As shown by the history of anti–base movements around the globe (Vine 2019; Davis 2015; Lutz 2009; McCaffrey 2002), activists aim to have a significant political, economic, and sociocultural impact at different levels. In the Sardinian case, this activism has intertwined local and international anti-militarization with environmental movements that arose at the end of the 60s. As with other military-occupied islands around the world, Sardinia too presents some cultural and ethnic specificities (language and history). All these components address modernization’s failures and by their resilience reshape the significance of modernity. We see a “modern clash” between the logic of an “authoritarian modernization” (Touraine 1995 [1992], 233) through the military presence, and civil society’s resistance and resilience, which reorganizes public opinion and public debate from a new cultural and political perspective, cognizant of the challenge for a new modernity. In this new perspective, public opinion and its actors can introduce a new role for citizenship in regard to military occupation. Finally, this work criticizes the construction of a rhetoric of modernity that encapsulates the classic idea of modernization and bureaucratization, both of which present a vision of modernity that couples the military with the economy – and by extension, today, neoliberalism. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new social movements, and a new public opinion cognizant of the environmental risks of industrialization and the weaponry industry scale down the role and image of the military and their relative expenditure. The military still maintains a supremacy of bureaucratic force, but new claims to autonomy and alternative modernity continue to arise from occupied islands around the world.

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About the Author Aide Esu (University of Cagliari) completed a PhD in sociology at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris) in 1986, and was a Fulbright Distinguished Chair at the University of Pittsburgh in 2014. She is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Cagliari. She directed the interdisciplinary research team of Israeli (Tel Aviv University) and Palestinian scholars (Al Quds) on conflict intractability. [email protected]

9. Project Modernity: From Anticolonialism to Decolonization Shumaila Fatima and David Jacobson

Abstract This chapter considers anti-colonial and postcolonial movements as modernizing and globalizing, particularly the three main streams: nationalist, Marxist, and Islamist. Nationalist and Marxist movements convere with the Western project, as represented in their vocabulary and emphasis on development, science, and self-determination. All anti-colonial and postcolonial societies have faced the task of reimagining their history. Education has played a key role, as both a product of colonial history and a response to it. The Islamic movements of interest to us represent a more versatile narrative. Led by leaders such as Qutb in Egypt and Ilyas in India and though grounded in anti-modern and anti-Western principles, these movements mostly evolved to embody modern and contemporary civic and political models. Keywords: Islam; Marxism; nationalism; anti-colonialism; education; meaning of history

Education – its epistemology, organization in schools and universities, its pedagogy – has been at the nexus of “project modernity.” This is equally true for seminal anti-colonial leadership. From Sun Yat-sen, leading China’s first revolution in 1911, to Jomo Kenyatta leading the struggle for Kenya’s independence from British colonial rule, most anti-colonial leaders were trained in Western universities. Or they received their education in colonial schools, often set up by Christian missionaries, based on Western pedagogic principles. And, so today, the debate on decolonization – as in the decolonization of history, or of the curriculum – takes place in our universities.

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch09

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But the anti-colonial elites, by and large (with some exceptions, including possibly Franz Fanon), would have found much (but not all) of the decolonization argument in present-day Western universities puzzling. This is because in large part the anti-colonial elite embraces the project of modernity that has emerged in the West. They largely rejected their own traditional elite’s rule and norms, from the Confucian literati in China to the tribal elders in Kenya. They embrace modernity’s core concepts of science and progress, while of course rejecting the hegemony, conquest and racism of the imperial powers. When reading of “decolonization” in today’s universities, in public discourse decolonization is presented as a process in which colonized voices from Asia, Africa and Latin America have been sidelined, and in which historically the voices before colonization need to be retrieved (Newbigin 2019). Even ostensibly postcolonial states, or the constructions of colonial powers such as “Nigeria” or even “Africa,” can be presented as just a continuation of the colonial project – a neocolonial manifestation (Smith 1999). “Modernity,” and even science, is itself suspect in this context. In the public mind at least, the image that emerges of a decolonizing argument is one that presents discrete cultures, races and peoples whose views, approaches and histories have been suppressed, lost or marginalized. It comes across, furthermore, as a zero-sum struggle over power, resources and epistemic hegemony, which devolves in universities into concerns such as hiring and having different “voices” represented in curricula. However, there are more modulated, scholarly approaches to decolonization which are largely absent in the public discussion. They reject the notion that this movement should seek “de-Westernization” but rather argue that the Western knowledge system is hegemonic and what are termed Western methodologies are accepted as the only legitimate path. Instead, it is argued, the “problem is not the absence of the majority world, but its epistemological subordination within the mainstream economy of knowledge” (Connell 2016, 3; see also Lo 2011 and Altbach 2014). Most of those in the formative anti-colonial movements were not seeking to reject the idea of modernity or science as such, which was generated in Western schools and universities, albeit some theories at the time that came under the rubric of “science” were false and racist. Rather, they were talking about the social organization of knowledge, starting with Western control of the colonies themselves. But the question arises of what “decolonization” meant for the actual movements of liberation, primarily in the twentieth century. What did leaders like Kenyatta, Sun Yat-sen and various Marxist leaders make of

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decolonization and its relationship to the West and of the idea of modernity – or for that matter, of education? The answer such leading figures provided was on the whole very distinct from our contemporary discussions. In this chapter we argue that the anti-colonial movements of global import demonstrated (and in some cases still demonstrate) three broad approaches to project modernity, ideologically: what we can refer to as nationalist (with varying levels of commitment to liberal democratic principles); Marxist; and Islamic. Within these approaches there is considerable diversity. The Marxist approach can range from democratic socialism, African socialism, Arab socialism, Marxist-Leninist to totalitarian variants from Maoism to Stalinism. Within Islamic approaches, we see a range from civic engagement, Muslim nationalist (as in Pakistan), moderate Islamist to extremist Islamist. In the Chinese case, nationalist movements have ranged from the democratically-minded leadership of Sun Yat-sen to the more authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang. Clearly, these approaches can overlap, for example in the cases of African or Arab socialism, or Zionism, we see a varying mix of Marxist, nationalist and democratic commitments. Muslim approaches are of particular interest because, in part, they have received less attention as anti-colonial movements – despite their salience in global politics today. For that reason, we will pay more attention to them in this chapter. Part of the reason they are overlooked as anti-colonial movements is that on a global level, their political influence is mostly felt later. In the Middle East, for example, the first stage of postcolonial states is more marked by nationalist and Arab socialist approaches (or, in the case of Persian Iran, a kind of monarchist nationalism under the Shah). Muslim anti-colonial movements are also of note in that, unlike secular anti-colonial movements, they generally do not adopt Western notions of progressive history towards a future “golden age” (from communism to the End of History and the triumph of liberalism). For Muslim groups the golden age to emulate in varying ways is in the past, namely in the period of the first three generations after the Prophet Muhammad. Furthermore, Muslim movements differ remarkably in their approaches, from civic minded to (at the extremist side) violent and eliminationist engagement with the ideas and politics of project modernity. Also of note: in most anti-colonial cases, the traditional precolonial elites (that is, before colonial governance) were rejected by the liberating, anti-colonial leaders. In some of the most salient cases – China, Russia, Cambodia – precolonial elites and privileged classes were killed on genocidal levels, in the tens of millions. To a shocking degree, from the Russian aristocracy, the Confucian literati, and local landowners to the university educated, in demographic

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terms the past was largely wiped out. This level of genocidal-scale murder was not the case in the Muslim majority world, even if violent oppression against targeted Muslim movements and clerics (and many others) was amply present in the postcolonial Middle East. We conclude with brief reflections on the debate in universities regarding “decolonization” in the light of the history of anti-colonial movements.

The Anti-colonial Context The colonial period is not simply “history” but, to adapt a phrase from Faulkner, not even past. The colonial period lives on in one form or another in the social institutions and schisms of all postcolonial societies. The different anti-colonial movements, and the colonial legacies themselves, are of course distinct, with different ideologies, and they each carry different baggage from the past. Some postcolonial societies have adapted rather well, at least in economic terms, like Singapore. Many others struggle on an ongoing basis – Burkina Faso, for example. But across these anticolonial movements, into and including in the postcolonial period, two sets of challenges present themselves in constituting new forms of society, intellectual and sociological. The historical trajectories, and the very understanding of the history of colonized societies, have been violently interrupted. Indeed, what constituted the boundaries and social workings of communities is thoroughly uprooted by the colonial experience. The sense of place of the colonized – geographically, politically and sociologically – was equally upturned, be it as China’s Middle Kingdom or tribes in the Ottoman Middle East. The colonizing powers themselves had different models of colonial rule – say, France’s mission civilisatrice or Great Britain’s “indirect rule.” All colonial and postcolonial societies have faced the task of reimagining the meaning of history, and their place of it. It is a struggle no less traumatic than an individual waking up with their assumptions broken in Kafkaesque fashion. That struggle does not necessarily stop for decades, especially insofar as some of these societies are governmentally dysfunctional and trail the West and other postcolonial societies economically. This “self-reflection” is reinforced by the curiously psychological underpinnings of the state system, legally as well as in discourse, emphasizing national self-determination or the right to self-defense, portraying states and peoples as having some kind of unitary “personality” where “Washington admonishes Tehran” or the “austerity-minded Germans criticize the lax

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economic policies of the Greeks.”1 Indeed, international law treats states as legal personalities. This psychological disposition is further compounded by the status competition explicitly in United Nations tables of, say, human development statistics or the actual league tables of countries in various sports, notably in football. Just as individuals may reflect on themselves in these ways within their own networks, so people as members of nations reflect on the same possible insecurities or self-satisfaction writ global – with much larger implications. Hence the Russians, to take one example, roil the international order with adventures driven primarily by the desire to re-establish a more glorious, respected past. What the social psychologist Cooley (1902) described as the “looking-glass self” at the level of individuals is writ global with powerful effect. For those inside the Western orbit, the global narrative of economic and social progress flows seamlessly from the Western experience of history. For those outside that orbit, especially if their story is one of poverty, cultural loss and military defeat (as in the Middle East), the self-reflection vis-à-vis the global “looking glass” brings about struggle, contention, self-doubt and a desire to find pathways toward dignity and self-respect. Movements such as the Pan-Africanist – leading to, inter alia, the African Union – emerged from this looking glass, represented with the ambitions of new nations seeking their own forms of self-determination and dignity.2 The fissures between East and West and North and South have, however, reflected the fact that the states system was a Western and European invention. The image of the world of non-Western countries that have been drawn into the states system (including Russia) is a product of continually reconciling past history and present realities, national identity and global criteria of legitimacy. These tensions are inherent in the partial integration of non-Western countries into what has been an essentially Western world order. Furthermore, the world order institutionalizes these tensions through the principles of sovereignty, equality and self-determination. Self-determination is paradoxical. To “belong” to the family of nations (as historically it is phrased) a “people” must express its sense of nationhood. The assertion of nationhood implicitly demands a degree of continuity with the past – a nation is a nation only insofar it has historical antecedents to define it. Yet, to be integrated into the world order requires “modernity.” Political institutions need to reflect certain international criteria (such as parliaments or imputably representative bodies, and foreign ministries). 1 2

This following part of this section draws from Jacobson 1994. For detailed history, background and evolution refer to Murithi 2005.

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Technological, industrial and scientific self-sufficiency is deemed necessary for national self-respect. Elements of tradition need to be discarded. Change is necessary. For example, China’s attempts to assert itself as a nation and to reconcile traditional history with modern circumstances are consequently reflected (and reinforced) in the world order itself. Sinologists are continually debating the issue of continuity and change. Was Maoism – it was asked in one debate – a manifestation of Confucian China in a modern guise? Ideologies and concepts like Marxism, Leninism, Three Worlds, democracy, manifest destiny, Middle Kingdom and the “New World Order” all contain images of the world, in some cases more explicit than others. A detailed analysis of such concepts and idioms in the context of national histories provides us with a means to map the world order. A relationship to the world-at-large is conveyed in these idioms. An idiom also projects the constitution of the collective self. Sociologically speaking, no clear distinction between the domestic and international planes is evident. If there is a conflict with the world-at-large, it is about a dissonance between how the collective self is constituted vis-à-vis how the world-at-large is constituted. In this regard, it is remarkable that in periods of historical and global transition, international uncertainty is mirrored by internal conflict. As in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, so today, the transformation in international politics is matched by exceptional civil strife. The anti-colonial and postcolonial challenge is at once both intellectual and sociological in that new postcolonial elites need to define a narrative that addresses these key questions of history and place in a way that gives their “people” both an imputed, or at least promised, agency and dignity. Sociologically, these narratives have to take account of the social, economic and political circumstances of the indigenous conditions that these societies find themselves in from precolonial, to colonial and finally postcolonial stages. The intellectual challenge revolves in important respects around education. In broad swaths of the world, the societal challenge concerns societies that are characterized by varying levels of tradition, patriarchy and even tribalism. These terms are fraught with angst in the modern world – for good reason, as not infrequently colonial powers exploit internal divisions for divide-and-rule policies and, equally problematic, portray such social “systems” as inferior and retrograde. The baggage of that colonial past is still with us, both internally to these societies (for example the neo-patriarchy introduced into some postcolonial states), and externally in the still present

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levels of racism and disdain in other parts of the world. Still, the response to these travails is not to in effect internalize the disdain of the West by denying the existence of the institutions of the tribe, for example, as post-colonialists do by claiming that they are a Western invention. We need to understand those institutions, as one part of our effort to understand social change and the emergence of movements and ideologies – such as Islamism.

Liberating Education Education is key here, in the experiences of both the indigenous colonial and postcolonial elites, in two senses: their own, personal education and in the use of schools and universities in the postcolonial reform of their societies. Since Christian missionaries played such a key role in establishing colonial schools, when given the opportunity (the colonizing governments did not always cooperate), religious frictions all the more came to the fore. Take the example of China. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the first postConfucian state, the Republic of China founded in 1912 (and displaced in 1949 after the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP), who studied medicine at the University of Hawaii. As such he assimilated ideas of “progress,” nationalism and democracy. Yet he personally suffered discrimination in the United States and, worse, witnessed the depredations of colonial powers in Confucian China. He rejected both the traditional elite, the Confucian literati, and the colonizing elites of the West. But like many anti-colonial elites he did use the Western idiom of nationalism, sovereignty and self-government to craft an independent Chinese path while (ideologically) integrating China into an essentially Western world of nation states. Marxists, and more so “Leninist-Marxists” in China (and in many other colonial societies) took this a step further. Most students in the early interwar period of Chinese communism read Lenin rather than Marx. This revolutionary elite received its education in Japan as well as Western countries. Mao himself was in large part self-taught, immersing himself in the reading of Western thinkers such as Adam Smith, Darwin, Mill and Rousseau as well as the communist canon (Pantsov and Levine 2012). Students were in the vanguard of the anti-colonial struggle, notably the May Fourth movement that had its beginning in the protests of 1919. Leninist-Marxism was attractive in China. It was attractive to Chinese students and revolutionaries – and equally in myriad other anti-colonial struggles – as it was seen

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as anti-imperialist yet “scientific,” modern and progressive in its view of history. As such, Leninist-Marxism provided the new anti-colonial elites with a framework to distinguish themselves from the West while being in essence the West (Levenson 1968). Marx’s vision was born of the history of Western Europe. Lenin finessed Marxism to give it a global, anti-imperialist tint – the colonized of the world became the new proletariat. And Marx’s five stages of history – “primitive” or clan, slave, feudal, capitalist and communist – were purportedly universal, that is, not Western as such. China’s history was shoehorned into a Marxist historiography, while Chinese communist ideologists claimed that Marxist historiography was endogenous to China and took place quite independently of Western history. In the Marxist fashion, the Confucian period, for example, was now framed as being part of China’s feudal period (Levenson 1968). We should not forget that the anti-colonial struggle was not only against the West but between the indigenous elites themselves – the latter internecine battle for power often much more violent than the struggle against the colonial powers. The Maoists ultimately wiped out or expelled the Confucian literati, as well as what they termed the capitalist bourgeoisie (while the ultranationalist Kuomintang fled to Taiwan). The Soviets did the same to the white Russians and aristocracy, killing those who did not manage to flee. Sundry others were tarred with the brush of capitalism and the bourgeoisie (whether accurate or not) and they suffered the same fate – or at best were brutally “reformed” through so-called re-education camps. The killing did not stop, and under Stalin continued into the 1950s and under Mao into the 1970s – essentially until their respective deaths. Tens of millions, as we now know only too well, were murdered and many others suffered untold cruelty in the gulags in the Soviet Union and in the forced collectivization campaigns in China. Which brings us to the different experience of much of Muslim majority regions, notably in the Middle East, North Africa and Indonesia and for that matter anywhere Muslims have made up a minority or substantial part of the population, such as in Nigeria. Whereas the “reactionary” elements (in the technical sense of status quo ante in the period before the arrival of colonial powers) were eviscerated in China and Russia, this was not true in those regions. This is not to suggest the colonial authorities did not engage in substantial violence and killings – which they most certainly did. The Dutch and Belgians, among others, were notable in their scale of killing in the colonies, in their conquest of the region and in their suppression of liberation movements in, respectively, Indonesia and Congo. However,

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substantial traditional and religious populations (and their leadership and clergy) remained in place. As elsewhere in the postcolonial world, secular leadership was the norm in key countries in the Middle East and North Africa, from the Arab socialism of Nasser in Egypt to Baathists in Syria and Iraq, while traditional and religiously sanctioned leaders ruled in countries such as Saudi Arabia (the only country in the world named after a family, the Sauds), Jordan and Morocco. But beyond this mix, religious clergy and religiosity more broadly was deeply ensconced across the region, even at the height of Nasser’s panArab popularity in the early 1960s. In addressing Muslim movements, we draw out two major examples, that of the Muslim Brotherhood and Tablighi Jamaat. The Muslim Brotherhood took on a statist approach, in some cases seeking to appropriate the modern state and the idea of modernity, for Islamist purposes (as succeeding streams of Muslim Brotherhood defined it). Tablighi Jamaat takes an apolitical approach but, we argue, displays in some countries a “civic” model of citizenship engagement while keeping at arm’s length from the broader secular environment. It needs to be emphasized that these movements are highly diverse internally, so our claims are generalized and selective – what we say of Tablighi Jamaat is more true in Western democracies for example than, say, the Gambia. We here expand on the Tablighi Jamaat and Muslim Brotherhood.

Postcolonial Islamic Movements During and following the colonial period, several Islamic movements emerged in response to the need to secure Islam and the Muslim communities from ill-treatment by the colonial powers as well as shielding them from the influence of regionally and globally dominant ideologies. Such movements include Jamaat-e-Islami, Tablighi Jamaat, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda. What at inception were efforts to guide local communities evolved to become transnational movements of varying natures, some with millions of adherents from around the globe (example: Tablighi Jamaat and Muslim Brotherhood) and with widespread sociological impacts. As a result, these movements differ in their methods, objectives and ideologies. For example, while some groups formed with a goal of eventually attaining political power, others formed simply to guide people to the ways laid out by Prophet Muhammad and the four Caliphs. In addition to regional needs, the diversity among these groups is contributed by varying

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interpretations of the Islamic texts and sects within Islam. Some variations and similarities between the Islamist movements emerging in the colonial period are observed in the movements’ perspectives on education, modernity and politics. Modern Islamist movements need to be understood in the anticolonial and postcolonial context – not just in terms of the anti-Western foundations, but in disputes with other anti-colonial movements. One cross-cutting theme among all the movements is that they are built on (1) Islamic revivalism – the ideas of reminding Muslims of the golden age of Islam – and (2) alternative universalism, which Connell (2016, 3) defines as “knowledge systems intended to have general and not just local application, whose logic and authority do not derive from the Eurocentric knowledge economy.” The three lenses – education, modernity and politics – also reveal much about the evolution and survival strategies of the Islamist movements in the postcolonial era. Further representing Islamic modernism is a revolutionary phenomenon that challenges the domination of Western ideologies in knowledge production following the colonial era.

Muslim Brotherhood The Society of Muslim Brothers (Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) was founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt. Al-Banna, a schoolteacher then, initiated the group as he grew critical of the influence and exercise of power of the British over Egyptians, which he deemed as humiliating for a community that could perform strongly if it followed Islamic principles. Using the slogan “Islam is the Solution,” al-Banna recruited members through grassroots activism and word of mouth (Danahar 2013). In its first two decades, the Muslim Brotherhood attracted followers from within and outside Egypt. A mutual linking of its followers was the strong rejection of colonial influence in the governance of the Arab countries. Despite constraints on the spread of religious teachings in the postcolonial era, the Muslim Brotherhood – heavily committed to imparting Islamic principles – garnered support mainly because it was not led by any ulama or group of scholars, whose actions at the time might be under scrutiny. Rather, the grassroots activism by secular-educated middle-class individuals served to steer the movement towards becoming a transnational and political body. By embracing and preaching elements of democracy and those of reverting to Islam’s golden age, the Muslim Brotherhood became

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a strong political entity that advocated for Sharia law as the state’s guide in Egypt and Tunisia, albeit their advocacy received more support in Egypt than Tunisia due to Tunisia’s already existing liberal population. In the neighboring states of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood became a pervasive political opposition. Whereas in other states around the world, minor groups continued to practice their social agendas, the vast membership naturally resulted in factions within the organization; as the organization grew, al-Banna sought “help to run it, and then the ‘help’ began to have ideas of their own” (Danahar 2013, 61). The ideologies within the Muslim Brotherhood branched out so wide and varied that while it is regarded as a peaceful, moderate Islamic movement in some states, it is regarded as a terrorist organization in others. Muslim Brotherhood’s Revolution through Education Hassan al-Banna’s role as a teacher and his use of community engagement manifest the significant role of education in the Muslim Brotherhood. Since its inception, it has regarded education as an effective tool to transform societies. Unlike many other Islamist movements that disdain secular education and focus solely on Islamic studies, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood acknowledges the importance of obtaining and balancing secular education with Islamic teachings. Hassan al-Hudaybi, the former director general of the movement in Egypt, regarded education as crucial towards transformation and “gradual development of societies from within” (Zollner 2009, 4). Perhaps an even more substantial example of the movement’s stance on education can be seen through Sayyid Qutb’s work and perspectives on secular education. Regarded as one of the most radical members of the movement for his pro-violence and offensive jihad advocacy, Qutb also advocated for modernizing education, by which he meant keeping up with evolving education systems and obtaining secular education for the purpose of social and economic stability (Qutb 2003). It must also be noted that a significant portion of the membership of the Muslim Brotherhood is made up of the educated middle class. Support for secular education does not necessarily contribute to the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderation, however. Instead, it demonstrates a unique trajectory of an Islamist movement that is attempting to imbibe modern secular education for the purpose of restoring an ideal version of society – a precarious ambition that raises questions and challenges. Zollner (2009, 155) points to Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb’s secular education to indicate “that a large number of those being attracted by

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the Islamist trend do not have a background in theological training.” This observation leads to the hypothesis that Islamic institutions failed to produce revolutions and competing ideologies in the postcolonial era. The weakness of Islamic institutions has also been evident in the fact that graduates of traditional Islamic institutions of learning, even celebrated institutions like Al-Azhar University, could not compete for state positions. As Brekke (2012:228) puts it, “their knowledge was useless in the civil service or the army.” Such inconsistencies between Islamic institutions and Islamic movements not only attracted leaders of the movements to secular education but also engendered complex views on secularity and modernity. Muslim Brotherhood as an Exemplar of Islamic Modernism The Muslim Brotherhood’s view on education provides a neat segue into the movement’s perspectives on modernity. Dalacoura (2018, 313) by defining secularity “as the process whereby faith becomes one option among others and religion becomes an identifiable set of beliefs seen as guidelines for reform,” regards the Muslim Brotherhood “similarly to other Islamist entities as a phenomenon of a ‘secular age.’” Modernity, secularity and state formation played crucial roles in the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as a national as well as transnational movement. The movement does not oppose the notion of modernity but rather opposes Western ideology’s domination of modernity. It employs the teachings of Salafism, more specifically political Salafism, an ideology that attempts to combine modernity with faith to form a political system based on Islamic principles, which they believe to be superior to Eurocentric culture. The extremist approaches of some factions of the Muslim Brotherhood make it difficult to regard it as a moderate movement overall. Nonetheless, the employment of Islamic modernity to purge society of its omnipresent factions makes the movement an exemplar of the attempt to balance Islamism with modernity. Muslim Brotherhood as a Political Movement The Muslim Brotherhood has come a long way from being a social movement to becoming a strong revolutionary force in several Arab states. Though not successful, the movement’s role in the transition of Egypt and Tunisia from monarchies to democracies speaks vividly of its political agendas and support for democratic principles, at least in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliate Ennadha movement in Tunisia. Given the social foundations of the movement, it lacks the experience and expertise in serving

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as a powerful political entity. Although the movement’s past experiences of surviving in the shadows and adapting to regime changes makes it capable of navigating political tensions and connecting with communities, its lack of direct political participation may be attributed to its naivety as a leading political party. Amr Darrag, the former secretary-general of the Egyptian Constituent Assembly acknowledged these weaknesses which made it susceptible of being overthrown only a year after assuming leadership. He additionally noted that it has been atypical for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to be under the spotlight and to be guiding a nation after being treated as a banned group for decades (Danahar 2013). The movement’s support for democracy and attempts to strengthen the use of democracy as an albeit weak medium must not be taken for granted. It is almost unique in a way that it effectively combines or at least attempts to combine “a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political activism” (Leiken and Brooke 2007, 108). The movement’s view in favor of democracy and against undemocratic Arab states is well reflected in the words of Adbul-Moneim Aboul-Fotouh, an influential member of the Muslim Brotherhood: “Those who spread the myth that democracy is against Islam are the oppressive regimes and monarchies [in the Gulf] […] All the basic principles of democracy are in harmony with Islam” (Danahar 2013, 51). Through this approach, the Muslim Brotherhood diverged from the failures of secular governments (e.g. under the Shah of Iran, Nasser and Pan-Arabism or the Baathists in Syria and Iraq) and set precedence for democratic revolution and anti-colonialism in the Arab states by Islamist movements.

Tablighi Jamaat Another Islamist movement that has its roots in colonialism is Tablighi Jamaat. It is one of the largest religious movements in the world and perhaps the largest Islamist movement with over 10 million adherents spread across almost every country where Muslims live. Tablighi Jamaat was founded by Mohammad Ilyas Kandhalawi in 1926 in the Mewat province of India, with the objective of guiding the people of Mewat in the ways of Islam, who were otherwise less educated and living in ignorance, combining practices of Hinduism and Islam. Ilyas laid out a clear and simple objective of preaching to non-practicing Muslims and increasing them in faith. The threat to the Muslim community is not so much the European ideology but every force that detracts Muslims from righteous ways. European ideology is only one

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such force. Others include Hinduism in India, secularism in Indonesia, and traditional, tribal practices in parts of Africa. It is difficult to regard Tablighi Jamaat as a tangible entity, as it lacks a written constitution and its membership is only associated through principles that do not “require” even periodic attendance. Rather, it functions on mutually-accepted ideologies of preaching through practice. One member explains Tablighi Jamaat as having nothing to do with politics, “our focus is on non-practicing Muslims, we invite everyone to join and visit every mosque that is willing to host us.”3 Tablighi Jamaat members famously tout the policy of “no literature, no talk, no expenditure” (na parcha, na charcha, na kharcha) – a belief passed down from Ilyas, the founder of the movement. Motives behind this policy include but are not limited to maintaining the practicality of their mission without limiting preaching to paper, avoiding any unnecessary attention from the government that may cause them to come under surveillance, and avoiding any administrative expenses (Sikand 2006). Tablighi Jamaat is different from many other Islamist movements not only in the size of its membership but also for the reasons that have contributed to this vast following. Since its foundation to this day, Tablighi Jamaat functions with only one core objective: to bring Muslims out of ignorance, jahiliya, and reorient them to the Islamic way of life by communicating with them directly. Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, Tablighi Jamaat has branched out to form a multitude of groups around the globe. But unlike the Brotherhood, the core principles of Tablighi Jamaat have remained and variations are mainly observed in the regional context in which Tablighi Jamaat operates. In Muslim-majority states like Pakistan, Tablighi Jamaat can focus on strengthening and expanding its missionary work. Groups from such places are also able to dedicate more time to traveling abroad. On the contrary, in countries where Muslims are a minority, like India and England, Tablighi Jamaat must navigate the political bureaucracies that do not welcome their missionary activities, which compels them to modify their approaches to meet their objectives. The Role of Education in Tablighi Jamaat Certain orthodox strains of Islam and Judaism share an emphasis on education, notably religious education. Tablighi Jamaat has its roots in religious schooling and remains animated by the core importance of education. Formal religion, after all, involves doctrine, catechism, interpretive texts, 3

Sana Chaudhry, Islamic Society of Tampa Bay, personal interview.

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practices and ritual, which need to be propagated and learned. As with most other theological groups, religious teaching for Tablighi Jamaat is widely deemed important for the development of character, even the promise of salvation. To carry out their mission of guiding non-practicing Muslims, Tablighi Jamaat relies on formal and informal educational practices, indicating the central role of education in the movement. In the context of Tablighi Jamaat, education is of two types: Islamic and secular. Secular education is not opposed to Islamic, but an emphasis is placed on Islamic education as the means to success; while secular education may contribute to one’s success in this world, Islamic education will contribute to success in the hereafter – the ultimate goal that every Muslim prepares for. Every activity undertaken by Tablighi Jamaat, from preaching at door fronts to hosting larger conventions, to establishing madrasas, is conducted with the purpose of imparting Islamic education. Ilyas was opposed to the idea of endowing the ulama with the responsibility of teaching the Muslim masses or confining education to institutions and mosques. Instead, he argued that “every Muslim by virtue of simply being a Muslim could educate fellow Muslims in the fundamentals of the faith” (Pieri 2019, 369). A more contemporary concern for Tablighi Jamaat is the growing influence of the West and migration of Muslims to Western countries. In the early years, Ilyas worried about the influence of Hinduism on less-educated Muslims who adopted Hindu practices in the name of culture. A similar fear is shared in the present day with the influence of Western secularization of educational institutions. For Muslim children in the West or children elsewhere attending schools that offer Western style curriculum, it is feared that “minority Muslims would lose their religious identities in the wave of Western education and cultural dominance that would follow” (Pieri 2019, 367). In response to this fear, Tablighi Jamaat has both established and endorsed madrasas that assume responsibility for imparting Islamic and in some cases secular education. The conservative nature of Tablighi Jamaat’s ideals emphasizing gender segregation does not place a constraint on girls’ education. Educational institutions that are run by or associate with Tablighi Jamaat host separate classes for girls and boys; this is especially relevant in South Asia where madrasas for girls play a crucial role in providing education to girls from low-income families and families that oppose secular education. Some madrasas also incorporate core subjects – English, mathematics and science – in their curriculum along with Deeni talim (Islamic education) in an effort to provide their pupils with basic literacy skills (Borker 2020). The impact of Tablighi Jamaat activism on education in South Asia is yet to be

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assessed; it is among the cases, Connell (2016, 4) notes, “where groups of knowledge workers in the South have created distinctive research agendas, schools of thought, and curriculum change.” Navigating Modernity, Preserving Principles One of the most complex dimensions of the movement is its relationship with modernity. Some participants even regard the present Muslim societies in Western nations as modern-day Meos – the community for which Ilyas founded Tablighi Jamaat because he deemed them to be living in jahiliya under the influence of Hindu practices. Tablighi Jamaat combined the approach of Islamic revivalism and modernism to remind Muslims of the ways taught by the Prophet and their duties towards fellow Muslims. The movement’s approach towards modernity is intriguing in ways that it explicitly rejects the notion of modernity but unknowingly uses elements of modernity (such as technology), and contributes to modern ideas and addresses issues of modernity, such as discrimination based on race and socio-economic status (Metcalf 1993). Although the foundational leadership of Tablighi Jamaat emphasized strict adherence to the ways of the Prophet Mohammed, expectations of the contemporary leadership have evolved as they now preach following the ways as much as possible. This is especially the case for many participants who attend Jamaat activities occasionally; while trying to maintain asceticism, they feel compelled to engage with modernity in their day-to-day lives. Tablighi Jamaat’s relationship with modernity is best understood from the fact that the movement functions differently in different locations. Tablighi Jamaat continues to critique elements of modernity fearing that Muslims, including scholars and elites, may find irresistible comfort in the luxurious lifestyles that modernity offers, risking abandoning their obligations to Allah (Pieri 2019). Such critiques can lead to the rejection of clerics who are often themselves unsure of the boundaries between permissible and impermissible elements of modernity. Yet, ironically, rejection of clerics is itself a postcolonial ideology, a part of the modern era. Additional ways in which Tablighi Jamaat functions within the realms of modernity include changing the primary language of sermons from Urdu to English in many Western countries, the use of media and technology to educate masses about their activities, and the adoption of modern selfhoods that emphasizes a responsible citizenry. With differences across regions, Tablighi Jamaat has become highly decentralized in the modern era. To an extent, some participants of jamaat

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or “congregational” activities are no longer associated with Tablighi Jamaat;4 instead, they regarded these activities as the rescue or salvation of oneself from worldly affairs and as service to the community. Nonetheless, core ideologies remain the same. At the core of the movement’s modern selfhood is learning how to practice Prophet Muhammed’s ways in the modern world without deviating towards unnecessary worldly affairs. This does not necessarily mean detaching from the modern world; instead, it emphasizes the importance of differentiating between the permissible and impermissible in an increasingly complex world. By adopting modern selfhoods, Tablighi members or people who abide by Tablighi principles assume identities and responsibilities that overlap with modern-day ideologies. At the outset, three such ideologies are evident: rejecting traditional elites, acting in socially responsible ways, and redefining gender roles. Participation in Tablighi Jamaat activities is deemed a quest for self-improvement. While in jamaat, men engage in activities that are generally “duties” of women at home, such as cooking, organizing and cleaning. Upon their return, they and their family members observe a greater sense of responsibility towards domestic duties as well as towards their society. By doing so, Tablighi members are actively denouncing and redefining gender roles as well as acting as responsible members of an ideal society they aspire to create. Tablighi Jamaat Politics and Contribution to Citizenship Ilyas once said, “the aims of modern political authority and Islam do not coincide” and that “if Islam were to make any progress it must be divorced from politics” (Sikand 2006, 176). At the time of its foundation, both the Indian government and colonial rulers remained neutral to Tablighi Jamaat’s missionary work because it never sought political power or aimed to proselytize the Hindu community. To this day, many of the movement’s members refrain from politics with the same rationale, but some have come to acknowledge the existence of politics as an internal as well as an external 4 Eight out of the ten individuals interviewed for the purpose of this chapter shared that they do not regard themselves as Tablighi Jamaat members. They held other professions (two doctors, three engineers and three university students) and attended three-day jamaat once or twice in their lifetime. Their reasons for attending the jamaat were to leave the worldly tasks for a period of time and fulfil their responsibility for da’wah (in the case of Tablighi, it is reminding fellow Muslims to pray, also known as tabligh, and follow the correct ways, rather than inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam). Additionally, they held both positive and negative opinions on jamaat activities. They chose to adopt the elements they concur with and ignore the ones they do not, instead of fully aligning with Tablighi Jamaat.

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influence. Since the time Ilyas made the above statement, the movement has evolved and now recognizes the importance of politics for the sake of survival. Politics does not always imply state politics; ‘Sa’eed Ahmad Khan, a leading Indian Tablighi ideologue, insists that “[i]n order to turn the hearts of the people towards Allah you need the politics of the Prophet. Through the politics of the Prophet people develop the qualities of inner reliance and piety” (Sikand 2006, 176). Tablighi Jamaat’s pragmatic stance with regard to politics has allowed its groups more mobility to carry out their missionary activities. But with recent events surrounding the friction between state and religion in many countries, shifts have been observed in the movement’s political affinities. Tablighi Jamaat’s opinions on political issues are built on the belief that Islam does not endorse any specific political system or provide a universally accepted, concrete design for creating a political utopia, rather it emphasizes on virtues and values (Sadowsky 1996). Despite the absence of an explicit political vision, critics and scholars aim to uncover the movement’s political thoughts and agendas by observing the political implications of Tablighi Jamaat activities and interactions of its members with the political systems. This however is a difficult task as the nature of Tablighi Jamaat’s political participation varies based on geopolitical context and is heavily impacted by the need to survive and defend Islam. For example, Tablighi Jamaat has worked closely with political candidates in the United Kingdom while seeking permission to build London’s largest mosque. Although they worked closely in the process, they refrained from stating their opinions on UK politics (Pieri 2015). A very different example is local Tablighi groups’ condemnation of India’s ruling government, Bhartiya Janata Party, for its exploitation of power to amend the Indian Constitution in ways that marginalize the Muslim population in India.5 An often-overlooked political impact is the role of Tablighi Jamaat members in promoting responsible citizenship and creating a model of civic engagement. The dissociation of Tablighi Jamaat from state politics does not imply their disobedience to, or disengagement from, the state. On the contrary, their neutral stance has allowed them to act as agents in the education of responsible citizens and the creation of models of civic engagement. Tablighi Jamaat members claim that when young men join jamaat activities they are refraining from the evils of society and returning with better morals. According to Pieri (2019), participants are developing modern selfhoods through their missionary activities in various places. 5

Hidayat, Tablighi Jamaat member, personal interview.

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These experiences transform their worldviews and make them “modern,” responsible agents, whose contributions to governance go beyond statehood. This is witnessed through their dedication to shaping their identities through social as well as religious duties. Through their missionary activities, Tablighi Jamaat members learn to govern themselves in accordance with the principles of Islam, a part of which lays emphasis on being responsible and law-abiding members of the society.

Conclusion The current public discourse on decolonization in universities has diverged from the main trajectory of the original anti-colonial movements, for example, by promoting identity politics and attacking the epistemological bases of knowledge. It has become, in effect, an “anti-modern” project – even when “modernity” is defined in pluralistic ways (Eisenstadt 2000). In the spirit of the seminal anti-colonialism, decolonization efforts today would be better served (and serve humanity more broadly) by taking on the challenge the social organization of knowledge (in disciplines, universities, some metrics of assessment), without creating a balkanized politics or hegemonic battles. Epistemologically, humanity, South and North, is better served by taking an interactive, “seamed,” mutually supportive approach to knowledge production, and as such creating a constellation of knowledge development more horizontal and based less on hierarchy. The “mutual” of course means that dominant educational institutions also have to find ways to build up the social organization of research in the developing world in ways that support broader populations not just the elites.

References Altbach, Philip G. 2014. “MOOCs as Neocolonialism: Who Controls Knowledge?” International Higher Education 75: 5–7. Borker, Hem. 2020. “Talim, Dindari aur Shaadi (Education, Religiosity and Marriage): Choosing Madrasa Education for Girls.” Social Change 50, no. 2: 236–53. doi:10.1177/0049085720920235. Brekke, Torkel. 2012. Fundamentalism: Prophecy and Protest in an Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Connell, Raewyn. 2016. “Decolonising Knowledge, Democratising Curriculum: For University of Johannesburg Discussions on Decolonisation of Knowledge.”

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University of Johannesburg, Sociology, 1–11. www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/ sociology/PublishingImages/Pages/Seminars/Raewyn%20Connell%27s%20 Paper%20on%20Decolonisation%20of%20Knowledge.pdf. Cooley, Charles Horton. 1902. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Dalacoura, Katerina. 2018. “Islamism, Secularization, Secularity: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a Phenomenon of a Secular Age.” Economy and Society 47, no. 2: 313–34. doi:10.1080/03085147.2018.1458944. Danahar, Paul. 2013. The New Middle East: The World after the Arab Spring. New York: Bloomsbury Press. Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 2000. “Multiple Modernities.” Daedalus 129(1) (Winter): 1–29. Jacobson, David. 1994. Introduction to Old Nations, New World. New York: Routledge. Leiken, Robert and Steven Brooke. 2007. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2: 107–22. Levenson, Joseph. 1968. Confucian China and its Modern Fate. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lo, William Yat Wai. 2011. “Soft Power, University Ranking and Knowledge Production: Distinctions between Hegemony and Self-Determination in Higher Education.” Comparative Education 47, no. 2: 209–22. doi:10.1080/03050068.2 11.554092. Metcalf, Barbara D. 1993. “Living Hadith in the Tablighi Jama’at,” Journal for Asian Studies 52(3): 584–608. Murithi, Timothy. 2005. The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development. London: Routledge. N e w b i g i n , E l e a n o r . 2 0 1 9 . “ D o We N e e d t o D e c o l o n i s e H i s t o r y ? A n d I f S o , H o w ? ” Hi s t o r y E x t r a , B B C , M a r c h  2 5 . A c cessed Ja nua r y 4 , 2021 . w w w.h istor yex t ra .com/per iod/moder n/ decolonise-history-curriculum-education-how-meghan-markle-black-study/. Pantsov, Alexander V. and Steven I. Levine. 2012. Mao: The Real Story. New York: Simon & Schuster. Pieri, Zacharias. 2015. Tablighi Jamaat and the Quest for the London Mega Mosque: Continuity and Change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019. “Daily Ritual, Mission, and the Transformation of the Self: the Case of Tablighi Jamaat.” Numen 66: 360–80. Qutb, Sayyid. 2005. Milestones. Houston: Islamic Book Services-SIME. Sadowsky, Yahya. 1996. Just a Religion: For the Tablighi Jama”at, Islam Is Not Totalitarian. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Sikand, Yoginder. 2006. “The Tablighi Jama’at and Politics: A Critical Re-appraisal.” Muslim World 96: 175–97.

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Smith, Linda T. 1999. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. London: Zed Books. Zollner, Barbara H. E. 2009. The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudayni and Ideology. New York: Routledge.

About the Authors Shumaila Fatima (University of South Florida) is a doctoral student at the University of South Florida, in the Sociology Department. She received her master’s in international affairs from Penn State and BA in international affairs from the University of South Florida. Her research interests lie at the intersections of citizenship, gender, education, migration, and peacebuilding. She was awarded a UNESCO fellowship in Preventing Violent Extremism. [email protected] David Jacobson (University of South Florida,) is Professor of Sociology at the University of South Florida, as well as a 2017–18 Fulbright research fellow, and visiting fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo. He received his graduate training at the London School of Economics and Princeton University. His most recent book (monograph) is Of Virgins and Martyrs: Woman’s Status in Global Conflict (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014). [email protected]

10. Modernity and Decision-Making for Global Challenges Elizabeth G. Dobbins

Abstract There are competing views on modernity. Some focus on the isolation of the individual, bereft of traditions and rituals, while others optimistically espouse the power of globalization, technology, and science to support progress and enhance human life. The challenges created by emerging diseases and human environmental impacts allow a new appreciation of the power of coordinated human responses while highlighting the limitations of globalization, technology, and science. Both climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate that science and technology provide rapidly updated information, but immediate solutions reside in aggregate changes in personal behavior supported by regulation and governmental or trans-governmental agencies. These requirements for personal responsibility challenge individual powerlessness and highlight the necessity of communal responses to global challenges. Keywords: COVID-19; climate change; ethical decision-making; global change processes; pandemics, prevention and control; limits of technology.

In the Western mind, science and modernity are inextricably linked in a positive feedback loop. Science begat modernity and the optimistic logical positivism of modernity provided the platform for further scientific endeavor and the development of increasingly complex technology. The interaction between inherent optimism, scientific thought, and technology shapes modern decision-making. This chapter uses the lens of emerging diseases such as COVID-19 and environmental stressors (i.e., climate change) to consider how modern societies address global challenges.

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch10

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Modernity, Technology, Progress, and Decision-Making Decision-making is influenced by societal values. Societies that value modern approaches favor technological solutions. Modern theories of decisionmaking like game theory predict that an individual or group would make rational choices, which require complete information (Askari et al. 2019). To make a complicated decision, there are numerous domains that require accurate data, including economic, psychological, social, emotional, and environmental (Ueda et al. 2009). Without full knowledge, individual and organizational choices are limited to known, but not necessarily salient, information (Hernandez and Ortega 2019) influenced by factors external to the process (Ueda et al. 2009) and constrained by inherent risk-aversion (Lane and Cherek 2000). In a world of limited understanding, decisionmaking will be influenced by fiscal, technological, or political biases. Times of crisis are particularly challenging for decision-making. Individuals and organizations are required to make rapid decisions with minimal data. Epidemics and pandemics are emblematic of this challenge. In a pandemic, models for ethical outcomes are critical because decisions cannot be ad hoc and must be guided by “preventive ethics” (Thompson et al. 2006, 4). The first step in epidemic decision-making is discerning whether to respond (Lipsitch et al. 2011), which requires awareness, surveillance, testing, and a robust public health program. The pandemics response model for the state of Oregon emphasizes “social solidarity, professionalism, and justice” (Tuohey 2007, 1). A ten-factor model developed by the Province of Ontario encompasses these same categories and adds “trust,” an emergent metaproperty of the other three (Thompson et al. 2006, 7). The consistent inclusion of social-justice components in these models indicates that community understanding is necessary to guide the decision-making process in a health-care crisis. Epidemics and pandemics, once attributed to divine forces, have shaped human history. An epidemic of Tularemia beginning in 1715 bce changed the sociopolitical structure of Egypt (Trevisinato 2004). The combination of bubonic plague and climate change contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire (Harper 2017).1 The expert science, rationality, and technology of the modern era, however, provide the ability to identify, detect, and combat emergent and recurrent diseases. Modern processes also increase human population size and density, accelerate deforestation, intensify urbanization,

1

Late antique Little Ice Age (450–700 ce; Harper 2017, 15).

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enhance globalization, and trigger climate change – all of which aid in the development and spread of viruses.

Coronaviruses and Their Effects on Human Populations The spread of coronaviruses depends on a sufficient density of infected host individuals and numerous interactions between infected and unaffected individuals. The recipient individuals with secondary and tertiary infections must also develop robust viral infections and encounter naive potential hosts. It is the ultimate pyramid scheme, aided in the case of COVID-19 by the long (five-day average) latency between infection and symptoms, the long infection period with viral shedding for up to five and a half weeks (Tan et al. 2020), and the large number of infected people who are asymptomatic.2 A recent review of the literature by Pascarella and colleagues (2020) suggested that 80–90 percent of COVID-19 cases were mild or asymptomatic. Such apparently uninfected individuals provide a viral reservoir that keeps infection spreading within a community. In lightly populated places or isolated communities, an individual, family, or town may suffer from the disease, but viral transfer is limited by the number of interactions an infected individual has. Because the immune system develops antibodies to infectious agents that protect the host from subsequent exposure, the members (or survivors) in a small community are more likely to rapidly develop herd immunity.3 Diseases like measles that spread rapidly can require over 90 percent exposure and immunity within a population.4 Herd immunity was the decay mechanism for epidemics in premodern societies and the societal costs were astronomical. The percentage of a population that must be exposed, and immune, to COVID-19 to prevent viral spread is currently unknown but estimated to be at least 67 percent (Kwok et al. 2020). Since the population of the United States is 331 million,5 population immunity would require that 221 million people be exposed. Before the development of vaccines, health officials speaking for Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom (Horton 2020) and Donald 2 For more information on COVID-19, see CDC 2021. 3 Herd immunity describes the situation where a critical fraction of a community has been exposed to a viral antigen and developed robust immunoglobulin (IgG) antibody responses. 4 For more information on COVID and herd immunity, see Mayo Clinic 2021. 5 On December 12, 2020, the US Population Clock estimated the US population to be 330,700,444. For updated information, see “US and World Population Clock,” United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/popclock/.

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Trump in the United States (Fearnow 2020) suggested herd immunity as an operable mechanism to fight COVID-19. This suggestion is an almost apocryphal example of disastrous decision-making. Among those who have tested positive for the disease the death rate is 2 percent, suggesting a catastrophic loss of life to achieve global herd immunity.6 To achieve this elusive goal by exposure, over 4.4 million people would be expected to die in the United States, 6 million in the European Union, and more than 18 million in China and India. Beyond the death toll, many individuals who survive COVID-19 suffer devastating long-term consequences including cardiac injury (Mitrani et al. 2020), lung and respiratory distress (Fraser 2020), and stroke and other neurological problems (Heneka et al. 2020) including dementia and neurodegenerative diseases (Butler and Barrientos 2020). One third of all COVID-19 patients have inflamed cardiac muscle (viral myocarditis) and produce traveling clots (microemboli), which suggests that survivors are at risk of heart failure, strokes, and sudden death in a “post–COVID-19 cardiac syndrome” (Mitrani et al. 2020, 1). Extensive vaccination programs can create herd immunity and mitigate both the mortality and morbidity associated with viral epidemics. Vaccines rely on technology to upgrade a premodern solution (exposure, with potential death) to a benign injection that creates antibodies. These modern solutions are not perfect. Viruses can rapidly mutate, which is why the flu vaccine must be re-engineered each year, and why – even thirty years after the identification of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) – there is no vaccination against HIV and the disease of AIDS.7 Even with a robust vaccine, there are individuals, like neonates and the immune-compromised, who cannot be vaccinated. There are also challenges related to our general lack of understanding of COVID-19: Does the virus have the potential to reinfect individuals? Do pets serve as potential reservoirs for the virus? Would companion animals need to be immunized to prevent community spread? Will all immunized people develop a robust antibody response? Early results indicate that 10–20 percent of symptomatically infected people have little or no detectable antibody to the virus (Tan et al. 2020). This is 6 On December 12, 2020, the total reported US deaths since January 21, 2020, were 294,535 out of 15,718,811 reported cases. For updated US information, see CDC, COVID Data Tracker, https:// covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/. Worldwide, there were 1,588,854 deaths out of 69,808,588 confirmed cases. For updated global information, see “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard,” World Health Organization, https://covid19.who.int/. 7 For more information on vaccine development, particularly with reference to AIDS, see CPP 2021.

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dangerous to those individuals and a potential obstruction to the successful development of population immunity. To be effective for COVID-19, or similar pandemics, vaccination programs will not just have to effectively immunize 67 percent of the global population, but also reach at least two-thirds of the people in each region of the world. This will require intensive economic investment, excellent supply chains, precise training for those who will handle, deliver, and administer the vaccine and extensive coordination between governments. If the global community does not respond with forethought there will be unvaccinated regions in which the virus becomes endemic, providing reservoirs for mutation and future epidemics and pandemics. Diseases associated with poorer regions are rarely the focus of vaccine-development initiatives as the process is time- and resource-intensive and the results are limited to a single virus. After resolution of a pandemic, there is often a collapse of interest in what Yong (2017) calls the “panic-neglect cycle of funding.” To plan for further emerging viruses there needs to be a focus on bioinformatic-based genetic analysis of small viral outbreaks, modeling technology, public health personnel, updated laboratories, and predictive vaccine design. In addition to these engineering and design skills associated with modern solutions, there needs to be an emphasis on the softer skills of surveillance, public education, preventive health care, and adequate nutrition. The short attention span of modern societies allows the rapid transmission of viruses from the most poorly-protected communities onto the world stage.

Influences of Modernity on the Emergence and Transmission of Viruses Globalization and urbanization are hallmarks of modernity that expand opportunities for the development and transmission of viruses. The demand for consumer goods increases extraction of resources, deforestation, expansion of trade routes, transportation of high volumes of material in containers appealing to rodents and arthropods,8 transmission of bilge water into novel ecosystems, and deposition of wastes. Soaring human populations and economic incentives fuel incursions into previously undisturbed ecosystems. The expansion of roads, mines, logging ventures, farms, and settlements into these environments increases the proximity of humans with animals 8 Arthropods are invertebrates with jointed legs. Relevant arthropod disease vectors include fleas, lice, mosquitos, midges, blackflies, and ticks.

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that contain novel viruses (Dobson et al. 2020).9 Mammals harbor at least 40,000 viruses (many yet undescribed) with approximately 10,000 capable of transmission to humans (Carlson et al. 2019). Since 2000, at least three novel coronaviruses made the transition from other mammals to humans. All three originated from bat coronaviruses with different intermediate hosts (Zhou et al. 2020).10 The current coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, also has an ancestral bat host, but the intermediate host is not yet established.11 A common feature of coronaviruses is that the spikes on the outside of the virus bind to angiotensin converting enzyme-2 (ACE2) receptors for entry into cells (Li, Moore et al. 2003). The SARS-CoV spikes recognize ACE2 receptors from “human, monkey, macaque, marmoset, hamster, cat, civet, raccoon dog, ferret, mouse, and bat” (Lu et al. 2015, 471). The implications are alarming. Genetic similarity among the ACE2-receptor family provides reservoirs for dangerous viruses and exposure pathways for humans that interact with these animals. Urbanization and mobility accelerate animal-to-human viral transfer. The aggregation of humans and animals in the unsanitary conditions of cities creates an optimal incubator for disease and disease spread. Eating wild animals (bushmeat) and the wildlife trade exposes humans to novel pathogens. In China alone, the wildlife trade was an estimated at 20 billion US dollars before the emergence of COVID-19 (Tollefson 2020). All three SARS coronavirus outbreaks of the early twenty-first century emerged from meat markets in southern China. Historically, the great flea-borne plague (Yersinia pestis) originated in China, expanded in cities, and spread along trade routes (Achtman 2012). The best-understood third plague of the nineteenth century began in Yunnan province in southern China, progressed to Canton and Hong Kong, multiplied in these port cities, and spread to the world (Pryor 1975). This phenomenon of background cases in rural areas and viral epidemics in cities exists in modern Madagascar where plague is endemic to the rural highlands. The disease remains sporadic, with an average fourteen to twenty cases per year, until it crosses into urban areas. In 2017 there was an outbreak of plague in two cities, 9 Conversion of undisturbed ecosystems to human-dominated land uses increases the abundance of three groups of animals (rodents, bats and passerine [perching] birds) most likely to transfer pathogens to humans (Gibb et al. 2020). 10 The first coronavirus epidemic (SARS-CoV-1) appeared in 2002 to 2003 in Guangdong, China with civets as intermediate hosts (Li, Shi et al. 2005). The intermediate host for MERS-CoV, which appeared in Saudi Arabia in 2012, was camels while the original host was an African bat (Corman et al. 2014). 11 Candidate intermediate hosts include snakes, pangolins, and turtles (Liu et al. 2020).

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resulting in over 2,000 confirmed cases, that was traced to one rural-tourban trip (Randremanana et al. 2019). Although plague is carried by fleas, direct human-to-human transmission is possible if it invades the lungs and becomes primary pneumonic plague. Crowded conditions facilitated transmission of pneumonic plague in two Manchurian epidemics (Kool and Weinstein 2005). In many areas of human habitation, rodents are both primary and secondary sources of human infection. Not only do rodents directly cause infection through bites, urine, and feces (as in arenaviruses and hantaviruses), but they are also vectors of indirect spread by contaminating human food supplies and carrying arthropods (fleas, ticks, and lice) that harbor arboviruses, tick-borne encephalitis, and poxviruses (Meerburg et al. 2009). The concentration of rodents in locations where humans congregate and store food is a particular challenge for public health. Since rodent fecundity and population density are dependent on “bottom up” resources, particularly food availability (Flowerdew et al. 2017), cohabitation with humans is beneficial for rodents, if not for their human landlords. There are at least sixty-six known diseases from rodent-to-human transmission (Meerburg et al. 2009, table 1). Rodents are highly adaptable, move freely between wild and urban settings, and expose humans and domestic animals to diseases from novel ecosystems. Rodents, like mosquitos, are adept at utilizing human transportation to expand their ranges and globe-trotting rodents carry arenaviruses, hemorrhagic fevers, and hantaviruses (Gonzalez et al. 2018). At every stage of human development, viruses exploited the opportunities offered by changing circumstances. The development of agriculture and storage of grain and seeds provided rich havens for rodents, as did the concentration of humans in cities. The domestication of animals located animal hosts of novel viruses near or in human habitations. The desire to acquire new foods and materials led to the expansion of trade routes and the exchange of goods, materials, and viruses between disparate human populations, with rodents, fleas, lice, mosquitos, and other disease vectors joining the party. The search for raw materials pushed humans into isolated environments. The desire for new territory put millions of humans into contact with novel viruses that already had human hosts. As each of these processes expanded human interactions with viruses, climate conditions modified the outcomes. Current rapid climate warming will allow the development and transmission of novel, and potentially devastating, diseases in humans, domestic animals, and agricultural crops. The south-eastern Gulf coast of the United

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States, Central Asia, the Colombian Amazon, East and South Africa, and all of Australia are already experiencing warmer and wetter summers (Mahony and Cannon 2018). Warm, wet climates augment viral spread by increasing the viability of rodent and arthropod vectors, providing standing water, and changing ecosystem dynamics (e.g., reducing insectivores). Fifty years of data from Central Asia indicate that plague infections increased by 50 percent in gerbil hosts during early, warm springs and wet summers (Stenseth et al. 2006). Schmid and colleagues (2015) postulate that the centuries-long waves of Black Death in Europe were due to cyclical reintroduction correlated with periodic warming in Central Asia.

Climate Change and Human Society Climate change is a part of the long history of the Earth (Hansen and Saito 2011; Hessler 2011) and the comparatively short history of human societies (Brooke 2014). For the last 2.5 billion years, life on Earth and global climate have been dance partners. The rise of aerobic bacteria during the Precambrian period may have precipitated the first ice age by decreasing methane-producing bacteria and reducing the greenhouse-gas blanket (Hessler 2011). Warm seas were the cradle for the Cambrian explosion of diverse life forms. Oscillations in climate that led to the rise and fall of lakes and rapid changes from humid, tree-dominated to dry, grass-dominated ecosystems provided the backdrop for human evolution in East Africa (Trauth et al. 2007). A catastrophic cooling due to a massive volcanic explosion 70,000 years ago may have caused a genetic bottleneck in early humans (Ambrose 1998).12 Small variations in climate have produced multiple dramatic effects on human civilizations. Climate cooling and disruptions in annual Nile flooding weakened Ptolemaic Egypt (305–330 bce) and contributed to its eventual capitulation to the Roman Empire (Manning et al. 2017). Six centuries later cooling temperatures set Central Asian and Northern European tribes on south-western migrations toward more hospitable Mediterranean climes. The hordes (and attendant viruses) precipitated the fall of Rome (Harper 2017). The Little Ice Age (1350 to 1800 ce) may have contributed to the collapse of human populations and societies on islands as disparate as Greenland (Diamond 2005), Easter Island (Rapa Nui), Fiji, and Palau (Nunn 2007). 12 This was Mount Toba in Indonesia. For more information on the volcano and its three historic eruptions, see OSU 2011.

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The climate of the last 10,000 years is unusual in the history of the Earth with the recent millennia providing a climatically stable “Goldilocks period.” Although the temperature in the last 65 million years has varied widely (up to 25 degrees Celsius), the range of variability in the last 10,000 years was less than 1 degree C (Scott 2014). The cooling period of the Little Ice Age, for example, had a strong impact on society with an average annual decrease in temperature in the northern hemisphere of only 0.6 degrees C (Owens et al. 2017). This luxury of a stable climate has vanished with modernity. Greenhouse gases from human activity accumulated,13 and global temperatures increased. The five hottest years since 1880 were 2014–18 (Arguez et al. 2020) and global temperatures in 2019 and 2016 were 1 degree C greater than the twentieth-century average (NOAA 2020). Updated models predict that every year in the next decade will be in the “top-ten” hottest with new hotter years displacing previous record-breakers (Arguez et al. 2020) and there will be an additional four to thirty-four extreme “heatwave” days for every 1 degree C increase (Perkins-Kirkpatrick and Gibson 2017, 1). The duration and intensity of ocean warming also increased substantially over the last ninety years and there are now 54 percent more “annual marine heatwave days” (Oliver et al. 2018, 1). Climate change wreaks havoc on even well-prepared societies. In 2200 bce a robust Mesopotamia agricultural civilization that proactively stored grain and water was destroyed by extended arid conditions (Weiss et al. 1993). The Maya managed water but could not withstand drought (Hodell et al. 2005; Kennett et al. 2012). Loss of precipitation caused desertification in areas of the current south-western United States, abandonment of Anasazi cliff dwellings, and relocation of the population to pueblo settlements along rivers (Labrador 2001). Climate change is particularly devastating to marginal economies. Particularly in already warm areas, increased temperatures reduce agricultural and economic activity, cause heat and disease stress, decrease individual work capacity, and result in a smaller, less productive workforce (Heal and Park 2015; Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019). Heat-related impacts on workers may mean a 10-percent drop in average annual GDP during this century for tropical countries in Southeast Asia (UNFCC 2014). Regions subjected to climate extremes are less habitable and become vulnerable to social fragmentation as people are forced to relocate. These 13 In 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change conf irmed that greenhouse gases from human activity (carbon dioxide, CO2, methane, CH4; nitrous oxide, N2O; and sulfur hexafluoride, SF6) were the biggest contributors to climate change. See IPCC 2014.

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social dynamics create the potential for mass migration.14 Current best-case projections are that climate change will internally displace millions by 2050, with up to 20 percent of them migrating, while worst-case scenarios predict over 200 million climate migrants (Brown 2008). This is more than fifteen times the total number of migrants,15 who stressed European housing, health care, governmental services, and politics in the decade from 2005 to 2015.

Effects of COVID-19 on Climate Change Although governments have not effectively combatted climate change, the social isolation necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in sustained declines in global economic activity, unprecedented decreases in energy demand, and reductions in global greenhouse-gas emissions.16 Global daily carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 17 percent in the first four months of 2020 compared with 2019, with much of the change driven by decreased transportation use (Le Quéré et al. 2020). The annual global CO2 emissions for 2020 may be reduced by 8 percent from 2019 levels or 2.6 billion tons (IEA 2020). This, however, is only one-tenth of the total reductions in global CO2 emissions needed to restrict global warming to 1.5 degrees C (IPCC 2019; “CAT Emissions Gaps” 2019). To limit global warming to 1.5 degrees C, the global community would need to make additional COVID-equivalent reductions in CO2 emissions every future year for the next decade. Changes in surface greenhouse-gas emissions operate on a short time course, but atmospheric greenhouse gases regulate over long periods. The 14 After hurricane Maria 140,000 people (4 percent of the population) left Puerto Rico (CNN December 19, 2018, www.cnn.com/2018/12/19/health/sutter-puerto-rico-census-update/index. html). Back-to-back hurricanes in East Africa in 2019 devasted the regions with over 4 million people suffering from long-term food shortages (United States Agency for International Development, United States Agency for International Development, “Southern Africa – Tropical Cyclones,” fact sheet 14, for 2019, www.usaid.gov/documents/1866/southern-africa-tropicalcyclones-fact-sheet-14-fy-2019) and housing loss (UNIOM 2020). 15 An average of 1.3 million migrants/year for ten years (UN DESA 2016). 16 The concentration of CO 2 and N2O in Beijing dropped by 25 percent in February and March compared with recent years (“Analysis: Coronavirus Temporarily Reduced China’s CO2 Emissions by a Quarter,” Carbon Brief, February 19, 2020, www.carbonbrief.org/analysiscoronavirus-has-temporarily-reduced-chinas-co2-emissions-by-a-quarter), but rebounded in May to exceed 2019 levels by 4–5 percent (“Analysis: China’s CO 2 Emissions Surged Past Pre-coronavirus Levels in May,” Carbon Brief, June 29, 2020, www.carbonbrief.org/ analysis-chinas-co2-emissions-surged-past-pre-coronavirus-levels-in-may).

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striking reduction in 2020 global emissions have not been reflected in atmospheric greenhouse gases. There was no diminution of global atmospheric CO2 or other greenhouse gases measured at the Mauna Loa Observatory.17 Instead, there was an increase of 2.64 parts per million (ppm) in average monthly atmospheric CO2 from July 2019 (411.74 ppm) to July 2020 (414.38 ppm).18 This elevation in atmospheric CO2 in the midst of an economic shutdown was counter-intuitive, but consistent with CO2 kinetics that demonstrate peak warming ten years after the release of a molecule and lingering effect for decades (Ricke and Caldeira 2014). If the lessons and behaviors learned from COVID-19 (i.e., reduced transportation use) are sustained, the global community might limit global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C (Le Quéré et al. 2020).

Decision-Making for COVID-19 and Climate Change To successfully combat a global challenge like COVID-19 or climate change requires substantive aggregate action and changes in individual behavior. Climate change and COVID-19 are complex problems that appear penetrable to science and amenable to the tools of modernity: rationality and technology. The decisions on global challenges are embedded in social understanding, however, and may not reflect rationality. Decision-making on COVID-19 or climate change have been mired in political wrangling, both nationally and internationally. At the time of writing, climate realities, mask use, potential cures, and vaccines have become politicized and President Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate Accord and the World Health Organization. 17 Global atmospheric CO2 is measured near the summit (3,400 meters) of Mount Mauna Loa, Hawaii. This site was chosen in the 1970s by Dave Keeling to represent the air mass of the northern hemisphere, which contains most of the CO2 in the global atmosphere and most of the CO2 fluctuation. For more information see ESRL 2018. 18 Calculations based on data from the Global Monitoring Laboratory for monthly in situ average CO2 at MLO (Mauna Loa). For information, see “Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide,” Earth Systems Research Laboratories, Global Monitoring Laboratory, www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ ccgg/trends/. Since CO2 varies in a consistent cycle throughout the year, increasing in the cool months of the northern hemisphere (October to May) and decreasing in that hemisphere’s growing season (May to October), it is critical to compare average monthly CO2 between the same months across years. To download data, see “GML Data Finder,” Earth Systems Research Laboratories, Global Monitoring Laboratory, www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/dv/data/index.php?cate gory=Greenhouse%2BGases¶meter_name=Carbon%2BDioxide&type=Insitu&frequenc y=Monthly%2BAverages&site=MLO.

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Societal perturbations like COVID-19 or climate change generate a variety of possible solutions from which decisions are made. Resilient solutions that are acceptable and applicable to a society combine rigorous application of the scientific method, multiple levels of analysis, direct input from representatives of all members of society, and consider the impacts on the natural world. The widest field of potential solutions are fertilized by sufficient funding with robust community involvement, which can be achieved through deliberative democracy (Romero 2020). The first round of solutions does not usually provide the answer or even an answer. Like the evolutionary process, each round of exploration produces intermediaries on which subsequent solutions can be built and raises questions for relevant communities. There is an inherent tension between the desire to focus on “the solution” and the reality that multiple first-order solutions will develop more options. Choosing one solution or approach before rigorous verification and extensive community involvement not only limits final outcomes but may promote ineffective or inoperative implementation of otherwise promising solutions. Despite the modern preference for technological fixes, effective solutions do not necessarily involve electronics, drugs, or artificial intelligence, though all these tools may contribute to results. In pandemics, social distancing and barriers to viral transmission are effective at attenuating disease spread. With climate change simple shifts in transportation options (carpooling, biking, walking, and using public transportation), telecommuting, meat production and consumption, and limits to heating or air conditioning can modulate greenhouse-gas emissions. For such tools to be effective there must be governmental incentives – or sometimes disincentives – to promote and reward desired behaviors and build the social contracts that will sustain them. Individuals and social groups must also be willing to participate. Governments react and people respond to problems based on a sense of imminence and threat. The Italian government’s response to COVID-19 demonstrated both an initial laissez-faire approach followed by piecemeal attempts at containment, and only when disaster was evident, complete lockdown (Pisano et al. 2020). The rapid spread of COVID-19 in Italy was abetted by regional differences that allowed people to flee (carrying the virus) from the controlled northern provinces to the as-yet unregulated south. Even within the north of Italy there were difference in provincial responses that determined the trajectory of the disease. The provinces of Lombardy and Veneto were exposed early and had an immediate surge in cases. As Pisano and colleagues (2020) note, Veneto instituted basic

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public health mechanisms that reduced the rapidity of transmission and the infection and death rates while Lombardy did not. The success in Veneto combined modern technology (tests) with the low-technology solutions of tracing, quarantining, and home care (Pisano et al. 2020). Other simple, low-tech, pre-industrial solutions that are effective rely on avoiding human interaction. These are not novel ideas. The use of masks, social distancing, and outdoor examining rooms were effective in preventing transmission of pneumatic plague in Manchuria in 1910 and 1920 (Kool and Weinstein 2005). Social distancing is also an ancient concept, although it was often meant conf ining the sick in isolation or institutions. Those with leprosy and tuberculosis (TB), which were untreatable before wide-spread availability of antibiotics in the 1940s, were isolated in leper colonies beginning in the fourth century ce (Grzybowski et al. 2016) and in TB sanatoria from the nineteenth century (Murray et al. 2015). The structure of a society can also affect the course of the disease. Places with high social capital (a pre-industrial virtue), where people are more socially integrated and interactive, were more quickly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe (Italy), North America (Canada), and the United States (New York), but recovered more quickly (Gopnik 2020).19 Gopnik argues that social engagement provides the motivation to care for neighbors and community and the willingness to maintain restrictions on personal liberty. Decision-making in pandemics and climate change are mirrors that allow one to evaluate the effectiveness of modern societies at internalizing and integrating the Enlightenment ideals of social equality. Black Americans have been disproportionately affected by COVID-19 due to systemic discrimination in housing, employment, and health care (Price-Haywood et al. 2020). Recent extreme weather events in the United States exposed racial and socio-economic disparities in housing and health care in New Orleans (Hurricane Katrina; Colten 2007), Houston (Hurricane Harvey; Collins et al. 2019), and San Diego (heat stress; Guirguis et al. 2018). The countries most impacted by climate change in the last twenty years are Pakistan, Myanmar, Philippines, and Haiti, the poorest country in the Western hemisphere (Iberdrola 2020). The 19 According to the CDC COVID Data Tracker for December 12, 2020, New York City had an infection rate of 4.3 percent, which was less than that in thirty-f ive states and Guam, while New York State, with an infection rate of 3.6 percent, is one of the ten least affected states. For updated information, see CDC, COVID Data Tracker, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/.

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already impoverished Southeast Asian nations of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are projected to lose 1.8 percent in average annual GDP by 2050 and 9 percent by 2100 due to climate warming (UNFCC 2014). This warming trend will increase monsoon flooding, damage rice crops, intensify food insecurity for poor women and children, and expand public health challenges in flood plains and coastal areas (Mirza 2011). Equatorial islands may disappear as habitable places, destroying unique cultures and devastating biodiversity (Veron et al. 2019).

The COVID Test for Functional Governance The challenges associated with climate change are multifaceted and have a foreshortened time course. Nations will need effective leadership to plan, refocus energy use, and help with the economic and human suffering that will result from escalating climate warming. I propose a simple mechanism to evaluate this leadership: the Consensus-Oriented Vision for Informed Decision-Making (COVID) test for functional governance. The COVID test would allow rapid evaluation of whether a current government has the skills and foresight to address a complex global problem. The quality of the actual response to the COVID-19 pandemic is an indirect measure of competent decision-making. Governmental responses are based on identifying a problem, creating solutions informed by current science and the complex needs of the society, and translating those solutions into coherent policies. Like Tolstoy’s description of happy families, there should be commonalities in well-regulated countries. The unhappy countries with the highest caseloads per capita and highest death rates suffer in various ways. In the COVID crisis the countries with the ten highest infection rates range from very small (Andorra, landlocked between Spain and France) to enormous (United States). The United States and Brazil are first and third, respectively, in total number of COVID-19 cases, first and second in the number of deaths, and are unequaled in community transmission (WHO 2020). These data are not isolated from governance, but are the products of errors of judgement, mismanagement, and lack of concern. Governmental responses to COVID-19 in the United States and Brazil were bizarre and uncoordinated. As Ed Yong wrote in his August 2020 Atlantic article, “almost everything that went wrong with America’s response to the pandemic was predictable and preventable” (1). President Trump’s unhelpful communications included:

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denial,20 suggestions to return to work when sick,21 down-playing the benefits of testing,22 outright falsehoods,23 and blatantly dangerous misinformation.24 Trump also supported unsubstantiated treatments of hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine as “one of the biggest game changers in the history of medicine” (Donald J. Trump, @realDonaldTrump, March 21, 2020, 9:13 a.m.) after having read a tweet by Elon Musk, despite concerns by scientists, including those on his COVID-19 team (Piller 2020). Despite the crisis in the United States and the dangerous leadership vacuum, a poll four months into the pandemic (July 2020) indicated that 32 percent of the population and 68 percent of the president’s party supported his handling of the pandemic (Bice 2020). This support is surreal in the face of the massive loss of life, social upheaval, and economic collapse. Ed Yong (2020) deftly identifies the broader context of the US response, “the COVID‑19 debacle has also touched – and implicated – nearly every other facet of American society: its shortsighted leadership, its disregard for expertise, its racial inequities, its social-media culture, and its fealty to a dangerous strain of individualism” (1). President Bolsonaro of Brazil also mismanaged the COVID-19 pandemic and was cavalier about the truth, but polls in August 2020 indicate that 38 percent of the country viewed his performance as “good or great” (Reuters 2020). Like Trump, Bolsonaro discouraged testing, opposed effective social distancing, refused to wear a face mask, dissembled about the reality of the pandemic, and fired health officials for challenging his lack of leadership on isolation measures (Phillips 2020). Bolsonaro argued that “almost every Brazilian will eventually contract COVID-19, that the great majority will suffer mild symptoms” (Reeves 2020, 1), because COVID is a “little flu” 20 “This is going to go away without a vaccine. It is going to go away,” May 8; “It’s going away,” June 23 (“Timeline of Trump’s Coronavirus Responses” 2020). 21 “Thousands or hundreds of thousands of people that get better just by, you know, sitting around and even going to work – some of them go to work, but they get better,” March 4 (“Timeline of Trump’s Coronavirus Responses” 2020). 22 “Could be that testing’s, frankly, overrated. Maybe it is overrated,” May 14; “When you do testing to that extent, you’re going to find more people, you’re going to find more cases, so I said to my people, ‘Slow the testing down, please,’” June 20 (“Timeline of Trump’s Coronavirus Responses” 2020). 23 “Coronavirus deaths are way down. Mortality rate is one of the lowest in the World,” June 25; “I think we have one of the lowest mortality rates in the world,” July 19; “we have among the lowest numbers,” August 4 (“Timeline of Trump’s Coronavirus Responses” 2020). 24 “Many of those cases are young people that would heal in a day,” July 19; “If you look at children, children are almost – and I would almost say definitely – but almost immune from this disease,” August 5 (“Timeline of Trump’s Coronavirus Responses” 2020).

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(Phillips 2020, 1), and that “shutting down Brazil’s economy does more harm than the virus itself” (Reeves 2020, 1). A fired former health minister said the response to Covid-19 was, “fatally compromised by Bolsonaro’s ‘utter contempt for science’” (Phillips 2020, 1). Bolsonaro’s indifference to the realities of COVID-19 led to his own infection and to rampant disregard for social isolation among Brazilians. In protest, Brazilian Catholic bishops released an open letter accusing President Bolsonaro of incompetence and of “‘systematic’ use of ‘unscientific arguments’” while over 1 million Brazilian health workers filed suit against Bolsonaro in International Criminal Court for “intensifying the pandemic by repeatedly opposing social isolation measures” and committing “a crime against humanity by reacting to the outbreak with ‘contempt, neglect and denial’” (Reeves 2020, 1). Against the backdrop of chaos, Bolsonaro touted the ineffective and potentially dangerous antimalarial drugs chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine (Phillips 2020; Reeves 2020), which were also supported by Trump (Piller 2020). Even the advent of a vaccine could not prevent Brazil, a country with a previously robust public health system, from plunging into further chaos because of political infighting, regulatory stalemates, and bureaucratic incompetence (Londoño et al. 2020).

Conclusions The governments of presidents Bolsonaro and Trump have repeatedly failed to lead their countries in a coordinated, effective response to COVID-19. It is safe to predict that governments that fail the COVID challenge would be ineffective at addressing climate change. Leaders who saw COVID-19 emerge in China and could not grasp the necessity of an immediate response are unlikely to address a problem on the scale of decades. Indeed, the Trump administration weakened or removed twenty-seven laws that reduced greenhouse-gas emissions from power plants and vehicles (Popovich et al. 2020), while removing the United States from the Paris Climate Accord. Bolsonaro is an open climate skeptic. Although Brazil reduced greenhouse-gas emissions by 70 percent in the decade from 2005 to 2015, Bolsonaro immediately changed course and slashed regulations on agribusinesses and forest-products industries (da Silva 2019). Deforestation skyrocketed in the Amazon, one of the world’s great carbon sinks (Casado and Londoño 2019), and the country is no longer predicted to meet its Paris climate goals. The Trump and Bolsonaro administrations appear caught in a limited economic model that prioritizes short-term economic gains and unrestricted resource extraction.

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This leadership failure reflects one of the great challenges of modernity – that decision-making, ideally based on rational examination of economic, psychological, social, emotional, and environmental outcomes, has been overinfluenced by fiscal concerns. Modernity itself is often confounded with unexamined capitalism. Capitalism developed as Western Europe mechanized, urbanized, and centralized. Economic capital facilitated the transition from rural to urban life and provided a measurable business result. Modernity valued the rational and analytical. In situations with complex input, money becomes an easy metric, a short-hand substitute for diverse analyses. Although modern societies claim to value science, they often value technology – the interesting, marketable products of science. The recent engagement with COVID-19 clearly illustrates that Western nations have valued maintaining an open economy that leaves people at the mercy of a terrible virus and succumbed to the lure of technology-as-savior in the form of medicines, machines, and vaccines. Technology is a boon to modern life, but it is not technology per se that creates solutions and solves problems. Solutions arise from the rational analysis of problems, rigorous application of the scientific method, and extensive evaluations that represent the diverse needs of individual communities, global society, and the Earth-systems that create our common home.

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About the Author Elizabeth G. Dobbins (Samford University) is a professor of biological and environmental sciences and director of the STEM Scholars Program at Samford University. Her research interests are the impacts of human activity on aquatic systems, climate change, environmental justice, and the role of media in public perceptions of science. She recently co-edited, with Maria Lucia Piga and Luigi Manca, Environment, Social Justice, and the Media in the Age of the Anthropocene (Lexington Books, 2020).

11. Public Health Confronts Modernity in the Shadow of the Pandemic Richard Cooper

Abstract Empirical science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries transformed public health. Improvement in nutrition and living conditions were the driving forces, linked to basic sanitation. The principles of public health also proved highly effective in prevention of chronic disease, such as cardiovascular disease and cancer. However, the dominant force in biomedicine has become genomics and “precision medicine,” both of which ignore the role of environmental exposures, and focus on individual, not collective risk. Genetic determinism and technological solutions have narrowed the scope of research aimed at improving population health, and reduced the benefits that biomedical science and public health could provide. The COVID-19 pandemic is the same story in bold print. Keywords: public health; COVID-19; genomics; prevention.

What is a good society? How do we measure progress toward a more fulfilling and healthy life? From the early stages of the Western philosophical tradition in Greece every society has sought to define goals and criteria to answer these questions as the basis for an intellectual and spiritual framework that can give meaning to their collective social experience. Historical context and first principles handed down by an ideological or religious tradition inevitably constrain the metrics that are used, and those metrics are in turn subject to endless debate and revision. Population health has unique advantages when choosing the critical measures of a good society and the basis on which to assert that progress is being made. Accepting for the moment a division between physical and mental health, a very substantial proportion of all public health outcomes that are considered desirable across

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cultures are objective and universally accepted. Successful reproduction, low infant mortality, long life expectancy, and freedom from disability are prized above all of life’s other gifts. Of course, there is more to human self-actualization than good physical health, but the desire for a “sound mind in a sound body” has been articulated under some guise in all cultural traditions. This chapter will focus on physical well-being. While this focus is not intended to dismiss the importance of mental and spiritual health, an assessment of the hierarchy of metrics that should be given to the needs of the spirit and the mind, and a comprehensive definition of good mental health and emotional fulfillment would take us far beyond the intended limits of this discussion.

On Microorganisms and Pandemics Before the development of settled agriculture, human societies were unable to provide the sustained resources required for large population growth (Wood 1998). From the dawn of archeological and written records through the beginning of the twentieth century undernutrition, inadequate shelter, and infectious diseases were the primary causes of death (McKeown 1988). Even when basic needs for food and shelter could be met, close human contact ensured that microorganisms – such as tuberculosis, malaria, and cholera – remained endemic, fluctuating across levels of intensity (McKeown 1966). In Europe, with gradual expansion of trade and migration first into Asia and then the Americas, new waves of infection swept back and forth, from both source populations in the East – such as the plague – and from Europe outward to the western hemisphere – pre-eminently through spread of viruses – sometimes killing up to two-thirds of the newly contacted populations in the space of a decade (Zietz and Dunkelberg 2004). While crude quarantine measures were adopted in the Middle Ages, especially for the plague, the history of modern public health and the implementation of effective disease control programs only began with the growth of large cities and the early stages of the Industrial Revolution (Zietz and Dunkelberg 2004). During the first hundred years of transformation to industrial production agricultural workers were being driven off the land into crowded urban areas and life expectancy and nutritional status deteriorated (McKeown 1988). Urban epidemics were rampant. The advance of biological science in the nineteenth century – in, for example, the discovery of microorganisms and the role of person-to-person transmission of disease – finally made it possible to establish rational principles to control infectious diseases

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(Ringen 1979). In central Europe beginning around 1850, for example, Rudolf Virchow – a progressive physician, scientist, and political activist in the Bismarck regime – developed the fundamental principles of “sanitary movement” (Schultz 2008). As lead investigator on a government mission to discover the cause of a typhus epidemic in Silesian weavers, he recognized both the role of the microorganism itself and the joint effect of profound immiseration: squalid living conditions, long hours of factory work, and near starvation diets (Brown and Fee 2006). His report called for sweeping social reforms, primarily better housing, education, and wages sufficient to provide adequate nutrition. His mantra, which became the core idea of all subsequent public health science, stated that “mass disease means society is out of joint.” In essence, Virchow recognized that our species is well adapted to life on this planet in terms of the oxygen content of the atmosphere – an aqueous metabolic milieu interieur – and the basic micro- and macronutrient requirements. The spread of contagion to a large proportion of the population must therefore result from near universal exposure to a pathogenic agent, driven by the inability of society to provide either safe or resource-sufficient living conditions. In other words, the causal process leading to all common disease is in the end a failure of the social structure to provide the basic needs of the majority of the population, or to protect it from noxious exposures. In the same period, for example, work by John Snow and others in London provided crucial empirical evidence in support of this theory. Snow proved that cholera epidemics were the result of fecal-oral transmission of a microorganism from studies of the Thames as London’s primary water supply, while being simultaneously used as a repository for raw sewage (Paneth 2004). These straightforward theories and observations, among many others of a similar character, have been the foundation for public health ever since. In the nineteenth century, however, the technology and low level of production of goods and services made it difficult to offer the bulk of the population access to good health. Progress was made against some of the most egregious sanitary conditions; however, infectious diseases continued to rage through all classes of society, with tuberculosis being the most common cause of death. Just as major improvements in living conditions finally began in industrializing countries, the world ran headlong into the first truly global pandemic – the influenza outbreak of 1917–18. Rough estimates suggest that 500 million people were infected in this two-year period, and at least 50 million people died (CDC 2018). The capacity for accurate diagnosis and epidemiologic surveillance was of course limited, but it is generally

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assumed that the dispersion of troops from battlefields in Europe and the associated mass migration that occurred at the end of World War I both accelerated the course of this pandemic and greatly enlarged its geographic reach (Taubenberger and Morens 2006). One crucial feature of the history of the 1918 flu pandemic has puzzled epidemiologists ever since; despite the magnitude of this calamity, within a matter of years the whole event was consigned to oblivion (CDC 2018). Various commentators have suggested that the world was obsessed with the desire to move on from the horrors of trench warfare and its senseless brutality that shattered faith in the innate virtue of the “civilized world.” At the same time, the profound sense of helplessness imposed by this alien disease also challenged the notion that advanced societies of Europe were finally achieving domination over the natural world through rapid advances in science and technology. The world was more than ready to be quit of that era. Whatever the explanation, there is no doubt that – except for experts in the field – the true lesson of the 1918 pandemic was never learned, and what was learned was almost forgotten. From 1920 forward, however, the decline in infant mortality resumed and life expectancy improved steadily in the United States and Europe; this trend even accelerated during the Great Depression (Tapia Granados and Diez Roux 2009). By the late 1940s almost ten years had been added to life expectancy at birth, and the terrible toll exacted by tuberculosis had been greatly diminished, long before the introduction of effective drug therapy (McKeown 1966). A fundamental transition was about to occur that subsequently became known as “the epidemiologic transition” (Omran 1971; McKeown 1966, 13–17). By 1945 infectious diseases had yielded their priority as causes of death to chronic degenerative disorders of adulthood (McGinnis and Foege 1993). Over the subsequent two decades there was a growing awareness that the burden of coronary heart disease (CHD) and cancer was increasing dramatically. Despite the urge to ascribe this transition to lengthening life span, it soon became apparent that this wave of chronic diseases was indeed a new phenomenon, and it was killing more and more middle-aged adults. For example, in the 1960s the average age of onset of CHD – either fatal or non-fatal – was 52 (Stamler 1967). Most disturbing was the high rate of sudden death from CHD, presenting as the first manifestation of disease in a third of all cases; it seemed to strike without warning and leave no opportunity for therapeutic intervention. In addition, a sharp increase in lung cancer – a uniformly fatal condition – emerged, driven in large part by smoking among veterans of World War I who had been generously

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supplied with cigarettes during the war (McGinnis and Foege 1993). For a decade around 1960 life expectancy stagnated, despite continued declines in infant mortality. Building on the fragmentary evidence then available from previous small-scale animal and clinical studies, pioneering research projects launched in the 1950s explored the large contrasts in the CHD observed among industrializing societies and identif ied nutrition – specif ically diets high in animal fat and cholesterol – as the sine qua non for the mass occurrence of CHD (Konstantinov et al. 2006; Chazov 1976; Stamler 1967). For example, the post-war generation in Finland had CHD rates ten times higher than in Japan and southern Italy (Keys 1980). The contrasts in diet composition were striking – 60 percent of calories in Japan were derived from rice, 40 percent from olive oil in parts of the Mediterranean, supplemented by fish and other vegetables, while the Finns ate large amounts of whole-fat dairy products and meat (Keys 1980). Correspondingly serum cholesterol levels were 300 milligrams/deciliter in Finland and 150 in Japan (Keys 1980). The cholesterol-CHD risk association was also seen within populations such as the US and UK. Likewise, in short order epidemiologic studies documented the tenfold risk of lung cancer among smokers, a fourfold increase in CHD, and supported the conclusion that fully 30 percent of all deaths among adults could be attributed to tobacco use (Levy and Brink 2005). In the 1960s the United States had a fairly robust public health workforce comprised of a strong contingent of academic researchers with a progressive political perspective that reflected their formative years in the Depression and the anti-fascist war (Stamler 1967). Large-scale prevention campaigns against CHD were mounted in the United States and most of Western Europe and by the turn of the century death rates had fallen 75 percent, preventing or postponing approximately 20 million deaths over the intervening fifty years, and finally cancer – most notably lung cancer – had declined dramatically (Cooper et al. 1978; Ford et al. 2007). Life expectancy had reached historic levels – exceeding 80 for both men and women in many countries. By 1990 lung-cancer mortality also turned down sharply in the United States, and overall cancer mortality fell 30 percent over the next two decades (ACS 2021).

Prologue to Pandemic Response In the last half of the twentieth century – no less in biology than other disciplines of science – the development of the computer and electronic data storage transformed both the practice of biomedical research and

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the overarching theoretical framework. As noted by many observers, the relationship between biology and the age of the computer has been a story of bilateral exchange. Early conceptual models of the computer were described self-consciously as an attempt to create something comparable to the human mind, leading eventually to the concept of “artif icial intelligence” (AI; Cobb 2020). At the same time, the vast divide between what ever more sophisticated machines could do and the true marvels of the input-output analysis of the human brain were still undeniable to all but the most ardent futurists; not only is their capacity on totally different planes, the process used by these imaginary siblings to actually “think” is totally different. As recently summarized in a popular book entitled The Idea of the Brain, “It is true that while most researchers in AI drew inspiration – or a challenge – from biology, there are few cases of these kinds of models shedding light on biological processes” (Cobb 2020, 275). Essentially the computer as yet tells us nothing meaningful about how the brain works, what consciousness is or what the underlying biochemical processes are. We know the mind is a product of the brain and that conscious is a holistic function, but those insights have been articulated by some schools of philosophy for centuries. Arriving at a coherent description of “what” we are – that is, observing consciousness as we observe other external phenomena – runs headlong into the same wall of mystery that repelled the ancient Greeks. Germ-line DNA as a “code,” much like computer programming, emerged as a second tightly intertwined theme in the last three decades linking machines and biology. The capacity of contemporary genomic technology to finally decipher the entire code in our DNA – as demonstrated by the 3 billion base pairs enumerated in the Human Genome Project (HGP) – led to facile assumptions that we were on the threshold of an era where life-course development could be predicted, and indeed altered to suit our desires, by analyzing and manipulating the DNA molecule. Finally, it was announced, we could “read the book of life.” One early triumphalist summary, offered by James Watson, co-discoverer of the double-helix structure of DNA, was a declaration that “[w]e used to think that our fate was in our stars, but now we know that, in large measure, our fate is in our genes”. (Time, March 20, 1989). Instead we have a list 3 billion base pairs which provide extraordinary insight into many aspects of metabolism, including assembly of proteins and regulatory processes, but tell us nothing useful about “fundamental rules” or how organisms function as a coherent whole. At the completion of the HGP, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) launched the National Human Genome Research Center with the clinically relevant goal of predicting disease risk and unraveling the cause of many

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pathologic processes that remained poorly understood or untreatable. The leadership behind this work predicted in 2001 that a brave new future was on the visible horizon; “Genome science will have a real impact on all our lives. It will revolutionize the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of most, if not all, human diseases.”1 This project later became formalized under the rubric of “precision medicine,” based on the assumption that assessment of individual (i.e. genetic) risk would make it possible to predict disease occurrence and response to therapy with a high degree of accuracy. Unrestrained declarations of enthusiasm have continued for the last two decades as enormous investments have been made in all aspects of precision medicine to advance the technology, launch cohort studies of millions of participants, and create niche medical service programs at leading hospital centers (Paneth and Joyner 2018). This field has attracted hundreds of thousands of scientists, focused on every conceivable disease or behavioral trait known to medical science, and has led to a virtual tsunami of publications. Collins, now Director of NIH, stated in 2017 that “[w]ith sufficient resources […] the full potential of precision medicine can ultimately be realized to give everyone the best chance at good health.” (@NIHDirector, May 5, 2017. Much of the hope for precision medicine was placed – reasonably so – on conditions where little therapeutic progress had been made in the last two or three decades, notably cancer and Alzheimer’s, as outlined in this recent commentary summarizing the near-term hope for major advances: In coming years, doctors increasingly will be able to cure diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, diabetes and cancer by attacking their genetic roots […] Patients with leukemia and breast cancer already are being treated in clinical trials with new drugs that precisely target the faulty genes and cancer cells, with little or no risk to healthy cells. (Ibid.)

Some long-standing common disease challenges were also considered targets, however, like Type 2 diabetes (T2D), in part to ensure widespread applicability of the technology. The rationale to support a precision-medicine strategy for the study of common disease often involved convoluted logical exercises. While it is well recognized that 85 percent of cases of T2D are ultimately caused by long-term obesity, our inability as a society to restrain age-related weight gain has led some biomedical researchers to assume that prevention is beyond our reach, and only a detailed understanding of the molecular processes leading the disordered glucose metabolism will yield 1

Collins 2018.

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major advances. This desire to solve the problem of causality for T2D led the prominent AI researcher Eric E. Schadt to propose the following hopeful scenario for the contribution of genomic science: Identifying genetic loci that associate with disease and intermediate molecular phenotypes that respond more proximally to these loci and in turn cause disease are excellent first steps to uncovering the drivers of disease. However, the view of disease becoming clear from the large-scale genomic studies is that common forms of disease are emergent properties of networks whose states are affected by a complex interaction of genetic and environmental factors. (Schadt 2009, 220)

Genes were now openly characterized as the “cause” and “first steps driving disease” which were in fact patently a consequence of environmental exposure. Reliance on the enigmatic phenomenon of “emergent properties” was also required to explain why causal relationships remained obscure. Schadt further suggested that the task of unraveling the whole chain of causation – from external exposure through physiologic dysregulation – was becoming a practical reality: “Recent successes in programming machines to mine complex data to derive the fundamental laws of motion perhaps represent a glimpse into the future of biology, in which machines may be able to derive fundamental rules in complex living systems, given large-scale data sets”(ibid.). In effect, this reversal of causal understanding, which discounts external, socially-mediated environmental exposures and gives precedence to individual, innate (i.e. genetic) risk is a radical departure from the assumptions underlying public health in the twentieth century (Bayer and Galea 2015). Equally apparent, it adopts wholesale the framework of “fundamental laws of motion” that have been central to mathematics, physics, and many related disciplines of “hard science” other than biology. Historically biologists have viewed living systems as a complex set of interlocking processes, with many layers of dialectical interactions, which have appeared over millions of years through an accidental, haphazard process of evolution. The systems we observe are usually not thought to reflect abstract universal principles but are the implementation of “rough and ready” solutions to practical challenges of survival, consisting of layers of redundant and alternative pathways (Kamin et al. 1984). In essence living organisms “self-create” their functional internal milieu, at the same time as they create and mold their external environment. Living systems are therefore self-evidently fundamentally different from non-living matter, because they must utilize

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energy through a continuous exchange of fuel and waste byproducts with the external world to increase complexity of both structure and function, that is, they constantly function in a dynamic state. This movement away from fixity to controlled fluidity, movement, healing capacity, and directional development over the life course is all fundamentally different from the properties of chemical reactions, the physics of light, and quantum mechanics (ibid.). While physics was colloquially known as the “king of science” in the twentieth century, some now choose to refer to biology as the “queen of science” in the twenty-first. That succession has also been characterized by some continuation of the bloodline – that is, the desire to describe the “fundamental rules” in living systems. As stated, however, this construct runs headlong into all the basic assumptions of biology – there are no “fundamental rules” and biochemistry cannot be reduced to chemistry. DNA tells us no more about how an organism functions than a computer tells us what consciousness is. To pursue this line of argument to its conclusion, it is easy to understand why public health in the classic framework that has proven so successful has lost favor within the more advanced sectors of “high science.” In 2005 the journal Science published candidates for the grand challenges for science in the coming century (Kennedy and Norman 2005). Heading the list were topics such as “What is the universe made of?” “What is the biological basis of consciousness?” Also included prominently was the question, “To what extent are genetic variation and personal health linked?” No other questions related to biomedicine or human health were thought worthy of mentioning.

Genomics, Technology and Precision Medicine Have Woefully Underperformed as Tools to Control Common Disease Against this background of priorities and theory, we have now accumulated two decades of experience in the application of genomics and precision medicine to improving human health. At the outset, it was clear that the introduction of genomics into the mainstream of biomedical research violates an important historical precedent. Though technology has clearly played a key role in helping build the current medical armamentarium – from imaging to clinical chemistry to drug development – with rare exception those technological advances emerged from focused research on a disease challenge (vaccines), had self-evident utility at the moment of discovery (the Roentgenogram), or were imported from outside the medical enterprise as a tool for a narrow function (lasers, fiber optics). Scientific

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advances that have led to improved health have nearly always been the result of research that matched technologies to specific human health problems and their clinical solution. While we know many advances in science take centuries to mature, as noted above genomics research has the accumulated experience of some twenty-f ive years, with a few projects even reaching back as far as the 1970s. Anything approaching a broad summary of this rapidly evolving science is clearly beyond our scope here. However, an empirical basis for our concerns is required, and several conclusions have now achieved general consensus in the academic community. First, however, it is necessary to reaffirm what no one disputes – that adequate support for all branches of science is an essential investment in the infrastructure of modern society. Nor can those investments be limited to science that promises near-term benefits. For genomics at the present, this trade-off was articulated by former National Cancer Institute director Harold Varmus’s sentiment that “genomics is a way to do science, not medicine” (Wade 2010). Second, the advent of genomic technology has already generated a huge array of new tools beyond DNA sequencing that have transformed many lab sciences and advanced public health, for example contributing crucially to our understanding of the spread of viruses in epidemics and the evolution of drug resistance in microorganisms, to new diagnostic assays, and to immunotherapy for cancer. Major changes in population health, and the extension of healthy years of life, however, belong to a dimension far removed from these incremental, niche advances, as beneficial as they are for many patients (Paneth and Joyner 2018). Enthusiasm for genomics and precision medicine builds on expectations for major scientific and medical progress in at least five major areas. (1) Enabling disease prediction. Although thousands of familial, genetic syndromes had been catalogued in the pre-genomic era, it is now possible to define the DNA sequence variations in great detail, and early success with cystic f ibrosis, the so-called BRCA (breast cancer gene) complex related to breast cancer, and Huntington’s disease offered the promise of much wider translational success for genomics. As noted, however, for most diseases the impacts for specific genetic factors are small, and studies of unprecedented size were required. Many of these have now been completed – at enormous cost, needless to say – and a robust literature exists for common disorders such as CHD, diabetes, hypertension, obesity, and other metabolic traits.

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Focusing on two pressing public health concerns of the moment, CHD and diabetes, we have conclusive evidence regarding risk prediction from DNA markers. Collectively representing cohorts of almost half a million patients, four major studies have now published virtually identical results (Khan et al. 2020). As is well known, the odds of dying from CHD are driven by four major risk factors: elevated cholesterol, cigarette smoking, high blood pressure, and diabetes. After accounting for these easily measured traits, DNA markers offer trivial additional information, perhaps identifying 2–3 percent of individuals who might be reclassified as at low or high risk. (2) Providing critical new insights into molecular pathways. The rise of genomics has encouraged the view that once the DNA mutations underlying a trait have been identified, no matter how small, downstream metabolic consequences would be revealed and, along with them, targets for clinical intervention. Efforts to define cell-based pathways using molecular technology have in fact met with some success. We now know, for example, much more about immune function, control of fetal hemoglobin, and lipid regulatory mechanisms in large part through the application of genetic and molecular technology. However, most metabolic networks are so intricate, redundant, and multidimensional that following Ariadne’s thread is mere child’s play compared with an attempt to move from identifying a mutation to tracing that mutation to a specific physiological outcome. The complexity involved in the inference from genotype to organism has been evident for years. In sickle-cell anemia, for example, an apparently simple genetic change – the single nucleotide substitution of adenine for thymine in the hemoglobin gene – produces strokes, pulmonary hemorrhage, painful bony crises, and enhanced susceptibility to the pneumococcus bacteria. The linkage of genetic change to clinical manifestation is sufficiently complex that six decades after the underlying molecular basis of the disorder was discovered, we still have no specific therapy. (3) Isolating genetic mutations that predispose patients to severe adverse drug reactions. Pharmaceutical agents are essentially foreign bodies that, as far as our species is concerned, evolution has never been called on to resist. It should be unsurprising, then, that many drugs have side effects, as well as some variation in absorption, metabolism, or effect depending on the individual. Genetic predisposition therefore can play a role in modulating individual-level response. Some important successes have been achieved, especially in the identification of people at risk for severe adverse reactions. Early in the experience of so-called pharmacogenomic testing, variation in

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the efficacy of drugs used to prevent blood clots was identified. The added value of characterizing the relevant genes has now been studied in clinical trials. The most important examples are warfarin and clopidogrel, drugs that inhibit clotting by modifying platelet function. Both have significant side effects. Clopidogrel requires further metabolic conversion in the liver to make the active compound, and individual-level variation in enzyme function produces the genetic effect. (4) Identifying targets for new drugs. At the very earliest stages of the genomic revolution, the pharmaceutical industry and innumerable start-up companies invested heavily in the search for “novel targets” that could be identified through DNA-association studies. Though some new agents discovered from genetic research are in clinical trials (for example, an angiopoietin-like protein 3 inhibitor for elevated triglycerides and an RNA-interference blocker for fatty liver disease), these efforts have yielded surprisingly little. In fact, a crisis has emerged with a drastic reduction in new drugs coming to market in the past two decades. An important exception relates to drugs influencing immune response, including autoimmune diseases. And there may well be drugs in the pharmaceutical pipeline based on genomic research that could yet translate into useful products. (5) Unlocking at long last the secrets of cancer. Cancer, according to the current dominant theory, is a genetic disorder. Despite years of intense, well-funded research, progress toward effective treatment, let alone cure, of most cancers remains an elusive goal. To oversimplify the general proposition, harmful DNA mutations at least at some stage may drive the growth of tumor cells, and ultimately the metastases that prove fatal. Identifying “driver mutations” and blocking their effects could thus possibly offer cures. Unfortunately, the results across all these hope-filled propositions have, in sum, been dismal. From a historical perspective genomics is a young science, and the unexpected will occur with time. However, for some hypotheses, accumulating research is asymptotically approaching a null result. The dominant theory in cancer biology remains gene-centric: either somatic mutations (occurring in the absence of known external cause) allow a clone of cells to escape from normal control of cell replication and death, or pathologic mutations act in some less-defined way at the earliest stages to drive growth and metastasis of tumor cells. Whereas it is incontrovertible that carcinogenic agents of diverse types – including viruses, ionizing radiation, and aromatic hydrocarbons – do cause pathologic mutations, a vigorous debate continues within oncology as to whether this is actually

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the process that triggers and sustains cancer development. For example, recent work demonstrates that normal tissue adjoining tumors harbors the same mutations as the tumors themselves; conversely, tumors transplanted from one model organism to another usually do not survive. In other words, the mutations themselves are clearly not the sole actors, or perhaps not even the causal drivers of tumor growth (Paneth and Joyner 2018). Thus, a complementary “field theory” has been proposed that emphasizes tissue-level factors, particularly cell-to-cell communication (ibid.). Recent experimental evidence now conclusively shows that at least some of these abnormal functional states unexplained by mutations must exist for tumors to propagate locally and more importantly to metastasize. Though this brief summary hardly does justice to a complex, rapidly evolving field, we hope it begins to communicate why large-scale sequencing projects of tumors have not delineated clear causal pathways, and more importantly why agents developed to block driver mutations have usually not met expectations, or, if they succeed, they seem to act through entirely unexpected and independent mechanisms. Precision medicine fails because its core theory is wrong; common disease results from common exposure to external causes, not defective genes.

Anthony Fauci’s nightmare Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the NIH for four decades, was widely known to the medical community through his leadership in the fight against HIV/AIDS in the 1980s. In 2019, before he had risen to national prominence as part of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, Fauci was asked in an interview, “What is your worst nightmare scenario for infectious diseases?” Based on his experience with the “near-miss” pandemics of influenza H1N1, SARS, and MERS, he described a virus that was easily transmissible by aerosolized droplets, had a sufficiently low mortality rate that many asymptomatic carriers could spread the disease, yet was associated with a case fatality in the range 0.5 to 1 percent, compared with 0.1 percent for seasonal flu. Needless to say, he was precisely characterizing SARS Cov-2, now circulating worldwide, with the greatest impact in affluent countries being felt in the United States. As of this writing (December, 2020), the United States is well on its way to a cumulative mortality of 400,000, with community transmission occurring in large parts of the country at an increasing rate and no plausible strategy for

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near-term control in sight. After the first report of the novel viral pneumonia from Wuhan, China, the NIH began to mobilize all its resources to generate the genome sequence of the virus, develop strategies to produce a vaccine, and initiate clinical trials on potential therapies for hospitalized patients. Indeed, remarkable progress has been made, with multiple vaccines now being deployed across the world, and others in field trials, and therapies available that improve survival rates of very sick patients significantly. The failure of course lay elsewhere.

The Destruction of Public Health in the United States As is now widely recognized, there has been significant disinvestment in the public health infrastructure in the United States in the last several decades, which accelerated dramatically during the recession of 2004 (Bayer and Galea 2015). At the same time, numerous academic and government panels issued detailed reports describing the potential for another pandemic and laying out the preparedness requirements. One prominent report from the National Academy stated: Virtually every expert on influenza believes another pandemic is nearly inevitable, that it will kill millions of people […] and a virus like 1918, or H5N1, might kill a hundred million or more – and it could cause economic and social disruption on a massive scale. This social disruption itself could kill as well. […] Every public health official involved has two tasks: first, to do his or her work, and second, to make political leaders aware of the risk. The preparedness effort needs resources. Only the political process can allocate them. (Knobler et al. 2005)

A full explanation of the egregious failure of the United States to meet the challenge of the SARS Cov-2 pandemic is well beyond the scope of this discussion. However, the key points are straightforward (Cooper 2020). As noted in the quotation above, “Every public health official” must “do his or her work.” But “where are the people to do this work” many are now asking? Although it is correct to say that one of the many striking deficiencies of the US health system has been an extremely weak public health infrastructure, that fails to characterize the issue correctly. The United States has by far the largest agency to support biomedical research in the world, namely the NIH, with an annual budget of 38 billion dollars. As is also well known,

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the country spends roughly twice as much per capita on medical care, accounting for 18 percent of the GDP. The CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) is commonly referred to as the “lead public health agency” but is in fact primarily tasked with conducting surveys, promulgating guidelines, maintaining reference laboratories, and providing training. The CDC has essentially no capacity at the federal level to implement public health programs. Basic functions like water quality and food safety are left in the hands of local agencies, and broader campaigns for tobacco control and prevention of cardiovascular disease (CVD) are left to philanthropies and professional societies. Unlike other countries, the United States does not have, and never has had, a national public health agency. The federal structure of the country and the highly individualistic ethic related to health behavior, together with general lack of commitment to social welfare and the “safety net” structure, have combined to leave this aching void. Long before the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic, public health in the United States was an orphan, undervalued, underfunded, and based on principles that are in great part antithetical to the dominant stream of thinking in biomedical research, medical care, and public administration. Public health is a social science, in the sense that it reflects the population’s collective understanding and willingness to act to preserve the common good, it functions as a tightly-interwoven multicomponent process (Koetke 2011). Science must establish the principles and technology; the political structure must fund and implement social policy in accordance with scientific advice; and the population must trust the science and the government and accept individual responsibility to abide by the scientific imperatives. All three of these elements are missing the United States. These deficiencies have been illuminated as if with a stroke of lighting by the emergence of SARS Cov-2, and they are all deeply embedded in US culture and institutions.

Concluding Remarks Modernity and the emergence of rigorous empirical science transformed public health practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While it is true that general improvement in nutrition and living conditions were the driving force in reducing child mortality and extending life expectancy through the mid-twentieth century, on many levels – from the rapid identification of microorganisms and their causal role in epidemic disease to the vast panoply of technology now available in clinical medicine – there

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continue to be important contributions to health and well-being coming into routine practice on a daily basis through clinical science. The core principles of public health, as enunciated above, have also proven to be highly effective in the design and implementation of prevention strategies for common chronic diseases such as CVD and cancer. The primary axis of contention for public health is striking a balance between the deleterious effects of the hyperconsumption of late capitalism and the drive for greater profits and ever increasing through-put in the production-consumption cycle. Tobacco remains the paradigmatic example – the most profitable agricultural product ever developed, it still remains the cause of roughly 25 percent of premature adult mortality, despite many years of efforts to constrain its access to the market. Air pollution, high-fat animal-based food products, alcohol, excess calorie intake, and similar environmental exposures can be shown to account for at least 60 percent of other major diseases in consumer economies. The application of the principles of “rationality,” as articulated within the framework of the ideology of modernity, has now become a battle between monopoly capital, the push-pull dynamic of the consumer market, and state-imposed regulation. As consumer societies move further toward the full embrace of individualism and technologically-based lifestyle, traditional public health has been marginalized and must contend with both the ethos of “personal choice” and monopoly capital, and how those forces influence the priorities of the political elite. It is inevitable that public health has atrophied and proven wholly inadequate to the challenge the SARS-Cov-2. The infrastructure for training, implementation, and access to policymaking no longer has the force that was readily available for campaigns to reduce malnutrition and improve sanitation. Among advanced consumer economies, the United States has the weakest formal public health structure, in concert with the prevailing center-right view of individual responsibility and rule of the market. Within this context the dominant force in biomedical research has become genomics and precision medicine, both of which ignore the role environmental exposures and focus on individual, not collective, risk. A further casualty of these trends has been the willingness to acknowledge the rare but catastrophic potential consequences that would occur in the contemporary interconnected global economy with the emergence of a new and highly pathogenic microorganism. These events were prologue to the SAS Cov-2 pandemic, and the tremendous blow it has dealt to the global economy and the well-being of every population. The wide range of outcomes that resulted from the strategies adopted by different societies in the face the COVID pandemic is a result of a

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number of factors – ranging from geography to historical readiness, to a wellmanaged state response using traditional public health measures – and they all demonstrate that the best weapon is still basic public health surveillance, quarantine, and exposure mitigation. The dramatic outlier, of course, has been the United States, where all the disabilities that inhibit a coordinated response – a corrupt, incompetent leadership, privatized medical care and other social services, a weak public health infrastructure, and a highly individualistic culture – have conspired to make the pandemic response an unmitigated disaster. The United States, however, is not categorically different from most other large consumer societies, rather it throws in sharp relief all of the inherent contradictions of neoliberal culture. The new era of genomics and molecular medicine has proven to be of little value in the public campaign to control COVID-19, other than as a tool for diagnostic testing and its role in the development of vaccines. This failure to meet expectations is part of a larger whole. Ironically, two decades into the genomics revolution life expectancy in the United States has declined for three consecutive years, the reduction in CVD rates has leveled off, and a surge of opioid deaths has devastated many communities. These adverse events have no direct relationship to genomics or precision medicine, but just as clearly we have not observed the promised bonus of “more effective prevention of many diseases, fewer diagnoses of serious illness, and an extension in health span.” We could, of course, be accused of making a grossly premature judgment. Two decades is a reasonable interval, however, to demonstrate, at a minimum, proof-of-concept, and there is no evidence of that modest milestone having been reached. More to the point, it can be argued that “genes as a cause” and precision medicine as the “cure” violate basic precepts of health and medicine. Biomedical science should be reoriented and reprioritized to expand its scope in accord with what we actually know about health and disease, and to expand the benefits of science for all. Though the history of science will have the final word on this era, large segments of the biomedical community, supported by tens of billions of public dollars, appear to be headed down the wrong road – if not into a cul-de-sac. In tandem with transformational change in many aspects of US society, an entirely new orientation to population health will be required. To understand this assertion, it is essential to recognize the distinction between “transformational change” and “widespread niche advances.” The concern that we have addressed here lies singularly with population health, with benefits accruing to millions. Scientific understanding of both the reasons for enormous gains in population-wide health and the origins

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of disease are being largely displaced by a reductionist, technology- and theory- (and career- and profit-)driven approach to health and medicine that remains largely unproven (and wildly expensive). Of course we want to explore and pursue many new research avenues, but the powerful legacy of genetic determinism and the devotion to technological solutions have narrowed the scope of research aimed at improving population health, and thus narrowed and reduced the benefits that biomedical science and public health could and should be providing, right now. The SARS Cov-2 pandemic is merely the same story in bold print.

References ACS (American Cancer Society). 2021. “Cancer Facts and Statistics.” https://www. cancer.org/research/cancer-facts-statistics.html. Bayer, Ronald and Sandro Galea. 2015. “Public Health in the Precision-Medicine Era.” New England Journal of Medicine 373: 499–501. Brown, Theodore M. and Elizabeth Fee. 2006. “Rudolf Carl Virchow: Medical Scientist, Social Reformer, Role Model.” American Journal of Public Health 96: 2104–5. CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 2018. “History of the 1918 Flu Pandemic,” March 21. Accessed August 25, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/flu/ pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/1918-pandemic-history.htm. Chazov, E. I. 1976. Myocardial Infarction. Moscow: MIR Publishers. Cobb, Matthew. 2020. The Idea of the Brain: The Past and Future of Neuroscience. New York: Basic Books. Collins, Francis S. 2001. “Remarks at the Press Conference Announcing Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome.” National Human Genome Research Institute, February 12. Accessed August 25, 2020. www.genome.gov/10001379/ february-2001-working-draft-of-human-genome-director-collins. Cooper, Richard. 2020. “The Virus that Tells Us Who We Are.” Issues Science and Technology (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine), 10 March. https://issues.org/the-virus-that-tells-us-who-we-are/. Cooper, Richard, Jeremiah Stamler, Alan Dyer, and Dan Garside. 1978. “The Decline in Mortality from Coronary Heart Disease, USA, 1968–1975.” Journal of Chronic Diseases 31: 709–20. Ford, Earl S., Umed A. Ajani, Janet B. Croft, Julia A. Critchley, Darwin R. Labarthe, Thomas E. Kottke, Wayne H. Giles, and Simon Capewell. 2007. “Explaining the Decrease in US Deaths from Coronary Disease, 1980–2000.” New England Journal of Medicine 356: 2388–98. Time, March 20, 1989

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Heni, Robin Marantz. 2000. “The Gene Genie: We Used to Think that Our Fate Was in Our Stars, Now We Are Told that It Is in Our Genes; Kenan Malik on the Implications of the Human Genome Project; A Monk and Two Peas, The Story of Gregor Mendel and the Discovery of Genetics.” New Statesman, July 3. Kamin, Leon, Richard Lewontin, and Steven Rose. 1984. Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature. New York: Pantheon Books. Kennedy, Donald and Colin Norman, eds. 2005. “What We Don’t Know,” 125th anniversary issue of Science 109 (July 1). Keys, Ancel, ed. 1980. Seven Countries: A Multivariate Analysis of Death and Coronary Heart Disease. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Khan, Sadiya, Richard Cooper, and Philip Greenland. 2020. “Do Polygenic Risk Scores Improve Patient Selection for Prevention of Coronary Artery Disease?” Journal of the American Medical Association 323, no. 7: 614–15. Knobler, Stacey L., Alison Mack, Adel Mahmoud, and Stanley M. Lemon, eds. 2005. The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready? Workshop Summary (Institute of Medicine Forum on Microbial Threats). Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Koetke, Thomas E. 2011. “Medicine Is a Social Science to Its Very Bone and Marrow.” Mayo Clinic Proceeding 86: 930–32. Konstantinov, Igor E., Nicolai Mejevoi, and Nikolai M. Anichkov 2006. “Nikolai N. Anichkov and His Theory of Atherosclerosis.” Texas Heart Institute Journal 33: 417–23. Levy, Daniel and Susan Brink. 2005. A Change of Heart: How the People of Framingham, Massachusetts, Helped Unravel the Mysteries of Cardiovascular Disease. New York: Knopf. Mayerl, Christina, Melanie Lukasser, Roland Sedivy, Harald Niederegger, Ruediger Seiler, and Georg Wick. 2006. “Atherosclerosis Research from Past to Present – On the Track of Two Pathologists with Opposing Views, Carl von Rokitansky and Rudolf Virchow.” Virchows Archiv 449: 96–103. McGinnis, Michael and William Foege. 1993. “Actual Causes of Death in the United States.” Journal of the American Medical Association 270: 2207–12. McKeown, Thomas. 1966. Medicine in Modern Society: Medical Planning Based on Evaluation of Medical Achievement. London: George Allen & Unwin. ———. 1988. The Origins of Human Disease. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Omran, Abdel R. 1971. “The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change.” Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 49, no. 4: 509–38. Paneth, Nigel. 2004. “Assessing the Contributions of John Snow to Epidemiology: 150 Years after Removal of the Broad Street Pump Handle.” Epidemiology 15, no. 5: 514–16.

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Paneth, Nigel and Michael J. Joyner, eds. 2018. “The Precision Medicine Bubble.” Special issue, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 61, no. 4. Ringen, Knut. 1979. “Edwin Chadwick, the Market Ideology, and Sanitary Reform: On the Nature of the 19th-Century Public Health Movement.” International Journal of Health Services 9, no. 1: 107–20. Schadt, Eric E. 2009. “Molecular Networks as Sensors and Drivers of Complex Diseases.” Nature 46: 218–26. Schultz, Myron G. 2008. “Rudolf Virchow.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 14, no. 9 (September): 1480–81. Stamler, Jeremiah. 1967. Lectures in Preventive Cardiology. New York: Grune & Stratton. Tapia Granados, José A. and Ana V. Diez Roux. 2009. “Life and Death during the Great Depression.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no. 41 (October 13): 17290–95. Taubenberger, Jeffery K. and David M. Morens. 2006. “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 12, no. 1: 15–22. Wade, Nicholas. 2010. “A Decade Later, Genetic Map Yields Few New Cures.” New York Times, July 12. Wood, James W. 1998. “A Theory of Preindustrial Population Dynamics Demography, Economy, and Well‐Being in Malthusian Systems.” Current Anthropology 39, no. 1 (February): 99–135. Zietz, Bjön P. and Hartmut Dunkelberg. 2004. “The History of the Plague and the Research on the Causative Agent Yersinia pestis.” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 207, no. 2: 165–78. doi:10.1078/1438-4639-00259.

About the Author Richard Cooper (Loyola University Chicago) is Emeritus Professor of Public Health Sciences at Loyola University, Medical School of Chicago. He received training in clinical cardiology, and cardiovascular prevention, epidemiology, and nutrition. His major research focus has been a description of the evolution of cardiovascular disease across the course of the African diaspora and he has published more than 500 papers. [email protected]

12. Human Identity and COVID-19 Space and Time in the Post-modern Era Rachid Id Yassine and Beatriz Mesa Abstract This chapter bases itself on the premise that the society that will emerge from this COVID-19 health crisis will inevitably differ from the current one. People have become more vulnerable, and this sense of vulnerability, fragility, and uncertainty has spread throughout society, and is no longer limited to certain social groups. The contemporary idea of security has also collapsed in societies that no longer seem secure, predictable, or under control. This situation of a weakened society is the first paradigm shift, brought forth alongside the notion of identity linked to time, space, and humanity. To that end, we carry out a review of the events which triggered the crisis in Europe and Africa. Keywords: humanity; identity; modernity; pandemic; COVID-19

Revisiting Time and Space after COVID-19 If space can give individual or collective identity a certain immobility, time obliges it to take into account not only the movement and the change which it supposes, but also and above all the finitude which in particular characterizes life, human or otherwise. Regardless of what I am, here (space), I will not be, forever (time). Identity is therefore projected in time and comes from space, and vice versa. Identity thus expresses itself in two different orders which, like its individual and collective dimensions, are neither separate nor assimilated. On the contrary, transcendence and contingency complement each other and are interdependent. The transcendent identity emerges from the questioning of the individual’s very nature, and his belonging to the natural environment which human

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch12

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consciousness seems to isolate it from. Human beings think of nature as an element that can be controlled through advances and developments in knowledge. The modern individual represents a rupture in historical consciousness, characterized by a desire to complete the reign of all spirituality. However, present times seem yet to acknowledge the return to it in most identity debates. Having said that, contingent identity is constructed from this awareness and this power to transform nature, and develop culture as its original product. The world therefore appears under the domination of human beings who, being self-permitted to appropriate it, will also seek to dominate fellow humans through the exchange of material possessions, among other things. Social relations are equally present in these economic relationships through collectively shaped and expanded (to some degree) systems of exchanges and transactions. Another distinction is given, not by the magnitude (individual or collective) that it can occupy, but by the projection that the identity phenomenon can embrace, because of the dynamics induced by the course of time. If space can give a stationary effect to the identity of an individual or a community, time commits the discussion by forcing the perspective to take into account the change and the transience characterizing all forms of life. As we are constantly developing and evolving, the passage of time is essential in sociology to come to a definition and construction of the concept of identity. The pandemic (COVID-19) supposes a transformation of our own identity from a space perspective (i.e. the ways in which we change and remain the same after COVID-19) and the perspective of time (i.e. the ways in which the virus has changed some parameters of modernity that seemed settled). Identity thus presents itself in two different orders which, like the previous ones, are neither separate nor assimilated. This reflection brings us to see how “this discovery of the expansion of the universe may be considered as one of the great intellectual revolutions of the twentieth century” (Hawking 2001, 76) which has contributed to social science studies. Now, we are faced with another universal discovery (COVID-19); it has no limit in space and time and it too is transforming many situations in social sciences. Time and space are changing rapidly because of the virus, and so too is our identity. Could we then conceive, with the imaginary time of physicists, that even for identity, “it can be that the universe has no limit in space and in time” (Hawking 2001, 82)? All through life, and even before, the individual discovers an undetermined number of identities which mold him. Whether it starts at birth, before birth – at the moment of conception where one sperm in a billion

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reaches an ovum to form a zygote – or even before that, at the boy meets girl moment when the two people responsible for the individual’s conception first come together, the chain of causation can always go back. The facts and factors that enable the birth of an individual are as elusive as the moment preceding the big bang. That being said, however many years that one’s lifetime spans, it is at birth that the individual is affected by the smallest number of identities. From then onwards, whenever she encounters another individual and a relationship is established, another set of identities get attributed to her (both the ones ascribed to her by this other individual, and the ones she derives for herself from said individual), until she has as many identities as social relations.

Is Humanity Still the Master of the World? This process of identity multiplication is not completely random but obeys conditions that precede it. It is derived from previously established collective identities.1 We have seen this where individual identity is part of the formation of collective identities, which in turn are used by individuals to identify themselves and one other. Thus, even upon the death of the individual, his personal identity still continues to exist. If identities are brought to fall into the “black hole” of history or memory, others will have a service life spanning several millennia and will continue to mark and influence social reality. Some may even, after a period of time, resurface like the Neanderthal hero. Indeed, talking about the construction and resurfacing of new identities which emerge from birth or get re-born with time, it would seem that our collective identity is making a return to the 90s in educational, social and economic terms. Regarding this, Bill Gates has pointed out that there are many indicators – from maternal and infant mortality, to hunger and education – whose gains have already been reversed after decades of progress. COVID-19, which escapes human control, is transforming not only our identity but also our environment, nature and other social dynamics, forcing us to carry out a profound revision of the concepts of time and space. While over the last two decades, the predominant feeling among individuals was that of lacking time, a feeling they tried to resolve by resorting to highly sophisticated technological instruments, today they are aware 1

See Rachid Id Yassine 2015.

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that they are no longer masters of their own time, thus creating massive uncertainty in their lives. Now individuals seem to be lost: calendars and watches – smart or otherwise – are valueless. The way we project ourselves into the future or organize projects has dramatically changed. The COVID-19 crisis presents a huge obstacle to our individual and societal way of life, leading us to involuntarily pause and question the speed at which we were moving. Now, everything depends on one external factor, the evolution of the pandemic, a freak of nature in the face of which our expansive knowledge is proving futile. We are therefore entering a phase of global deceleration that would be the opposite of sociologist Hartmut Rosa’s definition of the essence of modernity – “acceleration” – rather, we find ourselves in a phase of “petrified time” (Rosa 2013). The speed gathered by societal evolution in the twentieth century began with two industrial revolutions, and then grew and solidified with an unstoppable technological revolution. However, this global health crisis originating from one of the most industrialized countries and appears to have pumped the braked on this speedy evolution, therefore fissuring the relationship between time and individuals that has shaped new configurations of identity during the post-modern period. The world, always in motion, has somehow come to a standstill, and with it, time. The consequences have been multiple in all aspects of life, and although we might have thought that the world’s efforts and hordes of knowledge would be effective in slowing down the pandemic, the contrary seems to be closer to the truth. The international community has only been able to momentarily douse the effects of this disease but has failed to stop it in its spread, let alone extinguish its flames. Against the threat COVID-19, the enemy is invisible and impalpable. We can only “touch it” or “feel it” when those people infected by COVID-19 develop symptoms, or much worse, become ill, and for some of them, succumb to death. Though this virus is not a sentient being, and is incapable of thought, many world leaders still allude to open warfare in their numerous public “call to arms” against the virus. Political leaders have taken to sprinkling metaphors of war in their public speeches. And though this is the case, the fight against COVID-19 is not an armed conflict, and cannot and should not be seen as a war. There is no point in trying to humanize COVID-19. It is just a virus. Journalists, analysts and politicians have been debating who might be responsible for the suffering and the loss of lives caused by this coronavirus. They ask for those who delayed the deployment of preventive measures and made mistakes in the containment phase to be held accountable. But approaching the pandemic as a political issue highlights the difficulties

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for public authorities and world societies to manage this crisis. Therefore, seeking to direct responsibility for the pandemic has not been the most appropriate approach. It has given rise to all manner of speculation for months, with one theory accusing China of promoting this international disease due to its status as ground zero for the outbreak. The United States under the Trump administration took to mixing geopolitics in their fight against the pandemic and exploited this narrative as an effort to combat the natural threat which it sees in China.

Return to Our Humanity! This chapter posits that by rejecting this way of viewing the fight against COVID-19 in warfare terms, we can take on a more hopeful tone. Those who die at the hand of this disease cannot be mourned at funerals, not even by their immediate family. People die alone and are cremated, rather than interred as is customary for most Europeans. Conventional wars can be and often are more deadly than COVID-19, and yet, the victims are buried with the appropriate rituals, and friends and family are given a chance to say goodbye. Despite the artillery and the bombings, children born in war times are still greeted with gatherings and celebrations. COVID-19 does not allow for that (Mesa 2020). Wars leave a legacy of deep trauma and divisions that are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile. Yet the coronavirus crisis has forged new solidarities among citizens. Family bonds are often stronger now than they used to be before the pandemic. The question is whether this dynamic will remain over time. In record time, the coronavirus crisis has forged new ties among citizens across the globe. Family relations are often much stronger than they were prior to COVID-19. Sons and daughters call their parents every day and help them stay isolated with relative material and social comfort. The elderly, increasingly living in large anonymous blocks of flats, now receive surprise calls from their neighbors, with gifts of food or other basic necessities. This pandemic has awakened a new consciousness of solidarity among the population especially during the weeks of home conf inement in which the necessity of making a personal contribution in order to protect the broader societal health was impressed upon the population. As an example, groups of people, collectives or associations altruistically manufactured masks which, at the beginning of the epidemic, were scarce and hordes of citizens decided to support health-care workers with demonstrations of affection (from a distance). In some European

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countries, windows or balconies were a gathering place for thousands of people and the scene of general applause dedicated to the healthcare workers. However, the great social inequalities in Europe were also visible during the weeks and months of conf inement due to the disparity in housing conditions. The conf inement was not experienced in the same way by all. High-income people with access to open spaces had a very different reality from those with lower incomes forced to remain isolated for long periods of time in small, cramped flats with hardly any windows. This reality impressed upon the minds of Europeans and citizens across the globe the importance of public service, and the need for protection, responsibility and solidarity towards the health-care system. In order to protect it and lessen the burden on existing health-care infrastructure, people often avoided hospital admissions for minor pathologies or illnesses, leaving the way open for urgent COVID-19-related cases. Individualism seems to have been replaced by a new sense of solidarity and collectivism where the need to preserve the society is greater than saving the individual. Solidarity initiatives have multiplied to cover new and growing needs. Solidarity and aid from civil society has become decentralized and grown in volume, service, distribution modes, and geographic coverage. The persistent activity of dedicated people has paid off, enabling the acquisition of a larger number of resources. This has meant assistance for more, and more resources to meet the growing demand. Consequently, the balance is less skewed today than it was a few months ago. We have become donors, with little and decreasing capacity, for many more beneficiaries with greater needs. Faced with multiple requests to act in solidarity, the individual who is not only available to help, but wants to exercise this power, is changing her behavior. The individual has a heightened sense of awareness of the predicament of others and her position in relation to them. She has become aware that the problems are close, tangible, and unlike in other times, they have a face, name and surname. This situation leads us to be more sensible and aware of solidarity action. The world must think in collective terms. Although, over time the death has normalized after numerous human losses due to the pandemic. The new acts of solidarity by the population have awakened new hopes in a society hardly criticized for the consumption model in which it is steeped. Societies and by extension the individuals within them have become the ultimate consumers of products and goods, foot soldiers in a massive and uncontrolled production system that not only threatens the

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sustainability of the planet, but is also destructive of human relations and increases inequality between people. The advent of COVID-19 brought on the questioning and subsequent overhaul of this value system, with people rearranging their priorities and realizing the importance of the health sector and the need to prepare it for this pandemic and future ones. Even people who held strong economic power have lost their lives. With this pandemic, socio-economic differences are dissolved because the shadow of death stalks everyone equally. After decades of social fragmentation brought about by what Zygmunt Bauman called “liquid modernity” these are all positive signs that, despite being in the midst of tragedy, a more humane society built on solidarity rather than money, on empathy rather than greed, is possible (Bauman 2012). Whether or not these are just temporary trends, only time will tell. Probably it is the moment to envisage the modern human, one that is completely capable of solidarity and notions of community. In this sense, Jean-Pierre Boutinet admirably demonstrates the ambivalence of our contemporary modernity. He writes that: We always vehemently wish to remain modern even if, in fact, we have more and more difficulty to recognize ourselves in environments where fluidity, inconsistency, or even inconsistency and artificiality escape from us: if some of our contemporaries are still clinging to modernity in subjecting the latter to some contortions so that it f its better the current reality, others feel lost facing a universe that seems less and less familiar because less and less rationalizable. In fact, temporalities that we organize manifest a growing difficulty to fit within modernity; because we are no more trying to oppose our current lifestyles to the past; we are instead often on the lookout and sometimes in a frenetic way, for shreds of legacy, heritage, memory to legitimize a vanishing sense of identity. […] In seeking to elucidate the new dominant temporal organizations which are now ours, we will risk to stand in this controversy around modernity. We consider that recourse to the concepts of over-modernity, of hypermodernity, or even of late modernity, as incomplete, too conservative, or even defensive formulations which aim to conceal the evidence for the sake of continuing to sacrifice to the cult of modernity. We will here take the party that we have entered in an afterlife of modernity that we discover step by step; this beyond of modernity in its specific features, as they currently seem to emerge, will be provisionally called post-modernity, taking only a descriptive way. (Boutinet 2004, 4–5)

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If we also accept this position, we will choose to do so by writing postmodern or postmodernism as a single word, to distinguish it from the various postmodernism paradigms (Touraine 1992, 216–26). We will also be limited to a descriptive attitude which takes note of the era beyond modernity we are experiencing, and which also lends itself to the debate around multiple modernities (Knöbl 2006).

Circulating in the Post-modern Era The analysis also needs a revision of another notion that together with time is key in modernity and post-modernity: space. This has been questioned in its physical and virtual dimensions. Forced physical distancing represents one of the most visible consequences of this virus because the individual has had to build new mechanisms and settle for other ways of social contact. There are some societies more affected by physical distancing than others. It is dramatic to stop visiting family, friends or colleagues. It takes a toll and has a hard impact on the affective life, the relationships. It also hurts not being able to be with our loved ones when they are sick or pass away. The abrupt loss of these social relationships brings one to question whether the population will lose social references as a result. After all, the cultural condition is a product of the collective consciousness which emerges from human interactions and socialization. We can find this idea in the iterations of Alex Mucchielli who, in order to go over this breaking of approaches and definitions of identity [tries to] relocate the concept in the new paradigm of human sciences: the paradigm of complexity, [and is thus committed to] show that the foundation of identity of an actor for others (or himself) are found in the other identities of these other actors (or the first actor himself). This proposal is not tautology or a tour of intellectual sleight. It is indeed a consequence, quite full of meaning, of theories of complexity. (2007 [1986], 5)

The culture of the individual consists of all the elements he absorbs from the communities granted to him which he enriches bycontributions. So, it is too early to predict the consequences of physical distancing in this time of the coronavirus pandemic and how (if at all) they will affect the way individuals interact or relate. While these exchanges, social relations and identities fit into the economic field broadly construed, it is possible

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that post-COVID-19 we can begin to see another way to communicate, and set the scene for social relations where the economic field does not occupy the same importance. The economic interest in social relations was alluded to by Emile Durkheim who wrote that the man education has to carry out within ourselves, is not man as nature makes him, but as the society wants him to be; and it wants him as his domestic economy wants him” (1992, 100). We therefore understand how culture exercises power by maintaining or promoting a hierarchy that can structure the social field. For UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientif ic and Cultural Organization), it will be to speak preferentially of cultural heritage. Capital and heritage are economic concepts, and culture itself gets subjected to economic pressures which, in our liberal societies, have never been as important as they are now. It becomes a sector of the economy and will focus on the material (sites, building, monuments, etc.) and immaterial (oral tradition, folklore, rituals, etc.) creations developed over human history and formed as wealth. The art market strives to give these artifacts a market value. This commodification of culture by a true cultural industry will be systematic, with cultural consumerism and the jobs it generates, bringing about the emergence of a cultural economy and policy as fully devoted disciplines. The economy of culture thus grew, gradually extending its territory and its methods, to obtain institutional recognition […]. Three factors have contributed to this recognition: the development in front of a propensity to generate flows of income or employment, the need for assessment of cultural decisions and, at the theoretical level, the development of political economy to new fields (economy of non-market activities, revision of the presupposition of rationality, economy of organizations, economics of information and uncertainty). (Benhamou 2004, 5)

The pandemic and the way in which it has affected millions of people in the whole world in a short period of time has provoked, among other things, a review of the state of health care. There is a huge global debate around the future of health care in order to avoid and better contain future pandemics. The increase in the number of patients due to the coronavirus crisis has put a lot of pressure on health-care systems worldwide, and in some cases they have been on the verge of the collapse. Images of patients crowded onto stretchers in the corridors of hospitals across Europe (Spain, France, Italy) have shed light on the deficient public infrastructure, especially within the public health system, one of the prides of European democracies.

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Space remains the most controversial element of the pandemic because it marks a new paradigm of social reality. Administrations, shops, banks, restaurants, schools and hospitals require appointments in order to manage space and comply with social distancing in the face of COVID-19. Crowds are a source of health insecurity because of the manner in which this disease spreads, and the most effective way to prevent its transmission is to take extreme measures of social distancing in any public or private place. The pandemic has led to widespread distrust among people as everyone is seen as a potential carrier of the virus. Thus, the population becomes the new threat on which rulers must act by restricting freedoms. This is happening, for example, in some Asian countries where citizens were already under the strict control of the authorities well before the disease was a threat. With the COVID-19 crisis, these restrictions to freedoms are being tightened even further. With hardly any room for “private space,” the individual becomes the property of the ruling powers. In many of such spaces, the individual is under twenty-four-hour surveillance, and instances of contact with other people are recorded. This, according to the authorities, is done in the interest of “public safety,” which makes no concession to individual privacy. The curtailment of fundamental freedoms has been accepted by citizens. This is with the understanding that when normalcy is restored, freedom shall also be restored; otherwise, this pandemic will have served to capitalize on power and strengthen authoritarian systems. Space has not only changed in its physical, but also in its virtual dimension. Before the arrival of the pandemic, strong criticism was directed at the weakness of social boundaries in our society. Outside spaces were replaced by an inner, virtual dimension, with the forced isolation of children and adults allowing them to discover a new actor: the technological universe. The teacher disappeared from the classroom, as well as the papers and pencils. A screen is now enough to carry on teaching and continue a school year. Education was not the only sector affected by the new reality of confinement and human isolation. This model, which threatens the world of physical space, was repeated in many other areas. Physical contact with people has been reduced to such an extent that we even wonder whether it is necessary for our own survival. This thinking is prevalent in post-COVID-19 society where questions arise about forms of work or recruitment and the digital divide, as this could mean the selection of only those with access to adequate spaces and digital resources to work.

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Time and Space on Two Levels The reconceptualization of time and space in the post-COVID-19 period differs between countries, in particular between the so-called Northern developed countries and the Southern emerging or underdeveloped countries. For example, the extraordinary acceleration of Western societies where the individual seeks greater isolation which results in the relegation of the familial or social space is in general far from the reality on the African continent and other Southern regions. Speed as a marker of productivity in modern societies where performance prevails over the individual is incongruous with expectations in many African countries where the parameters are quite different. The notion of time changes, as does the sense of speed because the person takes precedence over productivity. These are other cultural codes that many European companies do not understand when they begin operations on the continent. The rhythms are different. COVID-19 shows that the current development model built by humans to obtain more money in the shortest possible time does not always work. The pandemic as we have been reflecting on it paralyzed the world and showed us that doctors, nurses and hospital beds are more important than footballers and weapons. And much has been learned from this by Africans hit by terrible shortages even before the pandemic, who are now confronted with scarce medical supplies while Western forces continued and continue today to inject public money into security mechanisms to prevent or deal with other (terrorist) threats that affect populations in a very limited way. Priorities seem to be misplaced to say the least. Utilizing physical-distancing measures as a prevention mechanism can be effective, necessary and useful in the West, but not in African countries where the individual is part of the whole, and nourished by contact with the other. Humane treatment forms the essence of these populations where survival depends almost exclusively on conviviality. Confinement in the West means clinical death for the African continent. So, there has been much discussion about adapting isolation to countries where the population structure and the informal nature of housing and economic activity mean that the application of barriers is not a viable solution. Beyond what is imposed by the state, it is the citizens who have to embrace their civic responsibility in order to avoid massive contagion. Physical space therefore constitutes the very identity of the African individual. The virtual space which Westerners occupy without any great damage is different. In Africa, the use of technology is more problematic due to the characteristics of cities and the lack of high-quality infrastructure, which

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means quick and clean access to virtual spaces is not possible for all. This reveals the great inequalities of the digital divide between African citizens, because only the elite can afford to use technological devices. Moreover, the majority of the population uses the public highway for informal business or crowded means of communal transport to cover the commuting distance to major African capitals and city centers. These are two scenarios in which the population has insufficient resources. Those with enough purchasing power on the other hand use a taxi or personal vehicles for their daily mobility and can typically afford to simply stay at home. This tragic health crisis shows great inequalities, the narrowing of which should be the first objective set by the international community. Inequality in public health is one of the huge injustices of our time and now more than ever, we need to change and rethink our priorities. While this is happening, the uncertainty of tomorrow is affecting the whole planet, which is also trapped by the feeling of fear. The health crisis is serving as a lesson in humility and revealing the fragility of the human condition. As the sociologist Edgar Morin says, “[…] we try to surround ourselves with as many certainties as possible, but to live is to navigate in a sea of uncertainties.” And to this he adds: “Perhaps this is the moment to disassociate ourselves from the whole cultural industry whose vices are known, it is the moment to detoxify. Perhaps it is also the opportunity to become aware of the human truths that we all know but are rejected by our subconscious: love, community and solidarity. […]” (Morin 2020, 18)

The Loss of Autonomy and Modern Humanity Post-COVID-19 Without any doubt, public health measures based on social distancing have allowed us to nuture our use of the virtual space that has been thoroughly exploited, achieving an increasingly numerical and intelligent society. Yet humankind has ceased to be a community of collectively shared goals and objectives, rather becoming an “aggregate of atomized individuals narcissistically oriented towards infinite gratification of desires and interests” (Barcellona 1996, 33). This is one of the markers of the individualism that dominates the society of the twenty-f irst century and announces itself as a greater evil. It is another way of being identified in society and it implies the destruction of any idea of community. The pandemic, on the one hand, arguably accentuates the tragedy individualization has

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wrecked on the modern individual who only exists because she consumes. As the philosopher Barcellona explains, the individual believes he has “an exclusive right to govern his life and defend at all costs a vague instinct to fight for his well-being (anchored in the futile and immediate pleasures of consumerism)” (Barcellona 1996, 207). In fact, there is an interplay between galloping consumerism of the individual and boredom. “As an emotion that emerges in everyday life, boredom can adequately be addressed with the notion of practices” (Rogge 2011, 288). The practice of consumerism is considered to be one of the “bodily mental routines” which increased during the pandemic process and became a pathology. It is interesting to note that “[t]he very phenomenon of agentic boredom [“as symptomatic of the era of late modernity”] goes back to our increased possibility and need to constantly choose and decide what to do, and to the decreased clarity of what we are to do” (Rogge 2011, 297). But, on the other hand, with COVID-19, the same individual has retrieved a certain sense of collectivism. The indirect benefit of this crisis is the greater interdependence of people in global terms due to all people’s encountering the same phenomena and forming the same identity, a collective identity. In actuality, we are not simply marked by cultural (sexual, ethnic, linguistic) and economic (social, professional) identity as contingent identities that allow “the individual to find himself in the social system and to be socially marked” (Cuche 2010, 98). With COVID-19 we begin to recognize ourselves (in collective terms) by our fight against COVID-19. The virus places us all on the same footing because there are no sexual, ethnic, linguistic, social or professional boundaries to its spread. COVID-19 attacks all people equally and in so doing creates a community, and the identity it forges from itself and the references shared by a group of individuals is both the medium and means through which the individual identifies and is identified. The references that we are sharing currently are related to uncertainty and fear. These elements belong to current individual identity in a collective reality, and this identity evolves over time. “Each individual is aware of having an identity with variable geometry, depending on the size of the group to which he refers in any particular situation. […] But if the identity is multidimensional, it did not lose its unity” (Cuche 2010, 110). This unity is not a frozen idealization or a reductive essentialism, but a dynamic that combines recognition and autonomy. This is a feature of contingent identities which, historically, follow and thus assume the changes to which we are subject. Also, the “human entity tends to be autonomous: the individual in his family in a territorial community, the territorial State, the sovereign State in a federation of States, and in humanity, humanity compared to nature

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[…]” (Verbunt 2006, 142). As for the quest for recognition, it is considered to be a “totally new social phenomenon” (Caillé 2007, 73). The modern attitude rests on the principle of autonomy. As self-awareness of the new, the modern attitude indicates the emergence of a morally autonomous subject that erects its own identity by opting for its own freedom of action. Foucault defined the modern attitude by its break from the ties of tradition imposed by the seduction of the new, with criticism as expression and choice as a solution to contingency (Mozere 2007). Currently, the modern individual impacted by a universal virus has problems developing his own autonomy and is confined to the loss of freedoms as mentioned in the lines above. COVID-19 and its myriad of effects show us, in the words of Bruno Latour, that “we have never been modern” (Latour 2006, 7–22). From his readings of the press where varying and diverse aspects of nature and social orders mingle and intertwine, he noted that “these hybrid articles […] draw imbroglios of science, policy, economy, law, religion, technology and fiction. If reading the daily newspaper is the prayer of modern man, then this is a very strange man who prays today by reading these unclear cases. All culture and nature are intermingled every day” (Latour 1997, 9). There is a return to the unity of the world, but it is a seductive impression because it simplifies social reality by proposing a return to a certain traditionalism or spiritualistic revival which, in both cases, is unproductive and regressive. However, everything suggests that contemporary individualism, after severely criticizing modernity, turns its back on it, not to go backwards, but to go forward. Or, if “thinking is only modern when it renounces the idea of a general order, both natural and cultural, of the world, when it combines determinism and freedom, innate and acquired, nature and subject” (Touraine 1992, 252), it seems that is no longer the case nowadays. Placing the individual at the base of the social structure of our contemporary societies has reactivated a questioning of his nature and his condition, and a return to the spirit. In the absence of an end to religion, we see the expression of religious modernity as an “exit from religion.” Although resolutely modern, the thesis of Marcel Gauchet, as transcendental “anthroposociology” (1985, 239), cannot make the use of economy to the religion that he himself assumes in writing that “it takes the detour to religion, key to our past, to weigh the novelty of our present” (233). The contemporary individual, as a social subject, fell from the pedestal on which modernism thought to install her. As one cannot firmly deny ambient individualism, neither can one admit that while she constituted herself within a social structure, the individual became aware of her limitations, more humble, with the knowledge that she is not above everything. COVID-19

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is the clearest illustration of this reflection. Humans, above all those from “the first world,” are aware of all their limitations and weaknesses.

Conclusions The consequences of the health crisis are profound and are already laying the foundation for a new society, as well as paving the way for the construction of a new universal identity attached to concepts of time and space. Given the uncertainty of the evolution of this virus, existential reflections emerge in a strongly globalized population. Although pandemics seemed bearable in developed and resource-endowed countries, the modern individual becomes aware that he is also beatable. Western egocentrism has failed in times of coronavirus and faces moral, social, economic or cultural dilemmas that it improvises to resolve. Throughout this chapter we have analyzed some of the ways the pandemic has affected methods of work, imposing telework for example as a solution to the processes of confinement and reconfinement, but this solution directly affects the space that needs to be adapted to these circumstances. The ways people relate to each other, as well as human mobility, are undergoing a radical transformation that affects the autonomous processes of the individual, an individual haunted by incalculable limitations. All this implies a paradigm shift in modern society. Our current modernity, understood as an individualistic character consciousness, divorced from the old or traditional era, detached from each other, and steeped in consumerism is beginning to crumble. Humanity is much more interrelated than we could have imagined, and COVID-19 has revealed precisely that level of interdependence between individuals, thus recovering and reinstilling our collective sense of identity.

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Cuche, Denys. 2010. La notion de culture dans les sciences sociales. Paris: La Découverte. Durkheim, Émile. 1992. Éducation et sociologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Gauchet, Marcel. 1985. Le désenchantement du monde: une histoire politique de religion. Paris: Gallimard. Hawking, Stephen. 2001. L’Univers dans une coquille de noix. Paris: Odile Jacob. Id Yassine, Rachid. 2015. Rethinking Identity. Halfa: Perpignan. Knöbl, Wolfgang. 2006. “Max Weber, as múltiplas modernidades e a reorientação da teoria sociológica.” Dados 49, no. 3: 483–509. Latour, Bruno. 1997. Nous n’avons jamais été modernes. Paris: La Découverte. Liane, Mozère. 2004. “Le ‘souci de soi’ chez Foucault et le souci dans une éthique politique du care.” Le Portique 13–14: 1–12. http://journals.openedition.org/ leportique/623. Mesa, Beatriz. 2020. “Spain Is Not at War with Covid-19.” Corona Times [blog], April 25. www.coronatimes.net/spain-is-not-at-war-with-covid-19/. Morin, Edgar. 2020. Changeons de voie: les leçons du coronavirus. Paris: Denoël. Mozère, Liane. 2007. “In early childhood: What’s language about?” Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (3): 291-299. Mucchielli, Alex. 2007 [1986]. L’Identité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Rosa, Harmut. 2013. Accélération, une critique sociale du temps. Paris: La Découverte. Rogge, Benedikt. 2011. “Boredom, the Life Course, and Late Modernity: Understanding Subjectivity and Sociality of ‘Dead Time’ Experiences.” BIOS – Zeitschrift für Biographieforschung, Oral History und Lebensverlaufsanalysen 24, no. 2: 284–99. Touraine, Alain. 1992. Critique de la modernité. Paris: Fayard. Verbunt, Gilles. 2006. La modernité interculturelle: la voie de l’autonomie. Paris: L’Harmattan.

About the Authors Rachid Id Yassine (Gaston Berger University, Saint-Louis, Senegal) is Senior Lecturer at Gaston Berger University’s Saint-Louis campus, Senegal. He completed his PhD at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris) and is a visiting professor at Sciences Po Lyon and researcher and administrator in the Research Laboratory on Societies and Powers Africa/ Diaspora. He recently published a book, Rethinking Identity (Halfa, 2015). [email protected]

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Beatriz Mesa (International University of Rabat) has a PhD in political science from Grenoble University (France). She is a professor at the International University of Rabat, and a member of Research Laboratory on Societies and Powers Africa/Diaspora. Her areas of interest are security, migration, identities, political Islam, conflicts, armed groups, and criminal economy in the Maghreb and Sahel region. [email protected]

13. Environmentalism: A Challenge to Modernity Antimo Luigi Farro

Abstract This chapter discusses the environmental movement vis-à-vis modernity in the last century. Starting in the early 70s, the contemporary environmental movement consists of articulated collective action opposing polluting agents in different areas of the world, and pursuing a new planetary natural equilibrium. This movement aims to construct a new more balanced model for natural development by scientific and technical means. This movement doesn’t pursue a romantic project to protect nature against modernity and modernization, nor a denial of modernity, nor modernity as a crisis, but a new way to understand and change the world. The environmental movement produces a critical consciousness of both itself and modernity. Keywords: modernity; social movements; environment; Greta Thunberg; Covid-19 pandemic

Environmentalism concerns how the various elements of nature – human beings and their societies, other living animals and plants, and minerals – relate to one another. How the environment is viewed is intrinsically linked to modernity, a process whereby not only the known world is organized in a rational way through science and technology, but where human beings, as uniquely sexualized subjects endeavoring to control the development of their very existence, require their rights to be understood and recognized. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, in the West, the protection of nature was an objective mainly set by social actors using scientific and technical knowledge to persuade political institutions to promote the protection of living beings and minerals from industrial and urban expansion.

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch13

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A more rational approach to the protection of the environment began on a political level with a gradual allocation of even large areas of territory as natural parks in America, in Europe and in areas of other continents colonized by Western powers. On the other hand, practices making reference to nature, but using science and technology to conduct studies on human beings, denying their basic rights, are to be considered anti-modernist. In the first half of the twentieth century, European and American research centers produced essays and set up research projects with the aim of establishing different genetic heritages of human beings, if not the existence of different human races, with the pre-eminence of one – the Nordic race. In the same period, the growth of scientific knowledge, along with new technological and technical applications, enabled scientists and technicians to discover and knowingly use nuclear power drawn from the uranium atom in previously unprecedented ways. This led to the A-bomb, a new form of weapon which represented a devastating denial of the most basic human right, the right to life, but which was nonetheless launched by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The period after World War II witnessed the construction of nuclear power plants, capable of producing electricity for economic and social development. But, since the sixties, scientists, experts, individuals and groups have criticized not only the use of certain technologies (not necessarily safer than those related to nuclear power) to further develop contemporary societies, but also the idea of unlimited development. Criticisms of the use of the uranium atom to produce electricity were mainly voiced through anti-nuclear movements active in various parts of the world. To a certain extent, the Club of Rome, founded in the early 1970s, was responsible for initiating criticism of unlimited development, by publishing studies based on scientif ic comparison and encouraging public debate. Last of all, at the beginning of the new millennium, we are witnessing a proliferation of groups and collective movements which, especially in Western countries and in other democratic nations across the world, question the development models pursued by human societies, which lead to the depletion of natural areas and resources. Aiming to promote the rebuilding and preservation of a new harmony between natural forces, these collective movements have provoked significant public debate, with the mobilizations of young people, first in northern Europe, then spreading to various parts of the West and other areas of the planet.

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Neglect or insufficient regard for the protection of nature on the part of the scientific community and the political class may have caused the Covid-19 pandemic, indicating the grave risks of ignoring environmentalism.

Industrialism, Urbanization and Environment In the West, in modern times, the first major interventions and analyses conducted on the environment and its protection date back to the second half of the nineteenth century. In a period of scientif ic and industrial development, these initiatives sprang from cultural, social, economic and political changes typical of modernization. However, although subject to public debate, protection of the environment and natural areas was not among the central issues emerging in Western social life, which focused instead on other important systemic changes. Starting in England, followed by the rest of the United Kingdom, other European countries, and the United States, the seventeenth century witnessed intense industrial development, which had significant ramifications throughout society, both culturally and socio-economically. Countries worked at improving industrial protection, extending production, expanding trade, opening up new markets (Findlay and O’Rouke 2007, 330–64, 378–434), and extending imperial influence – the policy pursued by Great Britain (Hobsbawm 1969, 134–53). Social issues then emerged regarding the conditions of the working class, leading to collective action, the setting up of associations, unions and the founding of political parties to represent workers’ interests. A part of these workers movements and organizations attempted to work within the system to reform society and the prevailing political system, while another aimed to overthrow the system entirely through revolution.1 During the nineteenth century in Western countries, cultural, economic and political changes led to both environmental and socio-economic issues, as science and technology advanced in various fields in terms of theory, experimental practice and application, building on a scientific revolution

1 In the United States, industrial and social issues particularly concerned tailors, railway workers and other skilled as well as unskilled workers in a labor movement which led to the founding of the Knight Of Labor in 1869 (Weir 2000, 18–46). During the nineteenth century, the German trade union movement gradually established the Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands in 1890 (Moses 1982; Welskopp 2019). In France, the working-class movement developed particularly in the late nineteenth century (Shorter and Tilly 1974), as it did in Italy, though here it was then outlawed from 1926 onwards during the fascist dictatorship (Levy 2000).

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dating back to the sixteenth century through to the eighteenth century (Burns 2016). The onset of the Industrial Revolution, and the subsequent expansion of industry and economy, also entailed a continual increase in the exploitation of mineral and biological resources. In the second half of the nineteenth century, these issues began to be addressed in the United States and in Europe with individual initiatives or groups promoting rational interventions to protect these resources both in America and Europe, along with other areas of the planet colonized by Western powers. Interventions were made to protect natural areas of particular interest, safeguarding them from neglect and from urban expansion due to industrialization.

Initial Measures to Safeguard the Environment The first major studies concerned with environmental protection began in the nineteenth century in the United States. They underlined the need to rationally modify human intervention held responsible for endangering and depleting natural resources, with actions such as deforestation ultimately risking the desertification of vast territorial areas (Marsh 1865). To tackle the issues raised by these studies, the first rational environmental protection projects and interventions were set up. Boundaries of territorial areas to be protected were traced, with a view to safeguarding them from neglect, irrational expansion of infrastructural installations, and urbanized areas. Reserves and national parks were created in America, Europe and other territories of the planet under the imperial influence of Western powers. Conversely, however, colonial presence also led to the inhuman cruelty of the submission of individuals and groups of indigenous populations to colonial rule. The first national park was created in the United States in Yellowstone, in 1872, in the western part of the country (Jones 2012). In Europe, the vast reserve of the Forest of Fontainebleau was established in France in the Parisian area in 1853, including a village which had become the seat of a community of artists (from 1820; Stevenson 1895 , 201–26). Engadin Park, the first European national park, was established in Switzerland in 1914, followed by others, with two established in Italy, the Gran Paradiso in 1922 and the Abruzzo in 1923. At the end of the nineteenth century, in colonized areas under, for example, France and United Kingdom, natural reserves and national parks were created (Ford 2012; Gissibl et al. 2012), such as those in Australia (Sydney,

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1879), Canada (Banff, 1885) and New Zealand (Tongariro, 1887), in territories of the British Empire. Finally, the celebration and admiration of nature, as an object to be cherished and nurtured, was expressed through the Romantic movement involving both writers and artists. In Europe, the protection of nature also became the cultural objective of a movement of young people from the wealthy classes (Pepper 1984, 79–81).

Antiscience, Nature and Race During the nineteenth century in northern Europe, definitions of nature were proposed in various quarters as a driving force behind the diversity in the cultural heritage of peoples (Lowenthal 2006). Such definitions were used in essentially non-scientific studies asserting the role of heritage as a cultural modeling factor capable of determining a nation’s borders, as in Sweden (Sundin 2006). According to other sources, however, heritage could mold extended areas culturally beyond national borders, such as the territory of Scandinavia (Germundsson 2006). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, references to natural discriminatory factors, including genetic differences – essentially non-scientific but considered scientifically founded by some researchers – were used to explain so-called racial differentiations across human beings. In the early years of the twentieth century, in the United States, and in northern and southern Europe (Ericsson 2021), particularly in Italy (Businio et al. 1938) a view of nature, supposedly based on scientific findings, was promoted whereby biological factors were thought to determine racial superiority of individuals compared to others in a given population. In 1921, a northern European institute was established (active until 1935), with the aim of scientifically demonstrating the superiority of the members of the “Nordic race” over all other members of the human race (Ericsson 2021).2 This unscientific notion of the natural superiority of the “Nordic race” over others was also proposed in the United States by established essayists, who made a distinction between Americans of northern European descent 2 The Swedish State Institute for Race Biology was founded in 1921 and immediately became the most important institution for racial science in Sweden. We know a great deal about the history of the institute until 1935, when right-wing director Herman Lundborg retired and was replaced by the left-wing, anti-fascist Gunnar Dahlberg (Ericsson 2021).

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and those of non-European descent, considered to be somehow inferior (Grant 1916). At the same time, certain American citizens and inhabitants were taken to be even more inferior, such as blacks, native Americans and people originating from certain other countries across the globe (Jackson 2005). Though these classifications of human beings were often claimed to have scientific grounding by their promoters, research by leading scientists negated such views (Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer 1971; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981).

World Wars, Human and Environmental Disasters The two world wars of the twentieth century led to unprecedented destruction of human life and of the environment. World War I (1914–1918) caused an estimated 15 to 17 million deaths (Clodfelter 2002), partly due to the application of scientific and technological knowledge in the use of chemical, mechanical and electronic weapons, resulting in previously unknown levels of human loss and devastation of the environment. World War II (1939–1945) saw even greater destruction through the employment of more advanced technologies, with an estimated 70 million lives lost (Clodfelter 2002), and immense environmental devastation affecting vast areas of the planet. The 1945 launching of the A-bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be seen as the culmination of this human and environmental disaster. These events show that some human beings make use of science and technology and natural resources – the uranium atom – to invent a powerful tool, the bomb, with which to destroy fellow human beings, other living beings of the animal kingdom, as well as plants and mineral resources. Such human experiences of modernization go against the very principles of modernity. In Western Europe, following World War II and its subsequent human, biological, social and economic disasters, supranational political institutions were set up to rebuild the continent. Initially, only a few countries were involved, aiming at jointly relaunching both the use of energy resources and industrial development. This included the European Coal and Steel Community. This post-war process continued into the following decades, finally culminating in the constitution of the European Union, which in the 2000s brought together a large number of the countries of Western Europe, as well as others following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, and then the socialist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. This process of political development led to the integration of twenty-eight countries in

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the European Union, although following United Kingdom’s exit in 2021, the number is now twenty-seven. These European political events, which fostered the further development of modernity, appear to go hand in hand with other political proceedings of global importance in the second post-war period. Heads of state and other leaders of Western countries promoted initiatives to study and apply peaceful uses of atomic energy – the “Atom for peace” projects. The West was mainly behind this move in attempting to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, though the USSR was also involved (Fischer 1997). However, the military use of nuclear energy continued, and represented the primary factor in East-West relations. Moreover, from the second postwar period up to the Soviet implosion of 1991, atomic weapons constituted the central stake of the Cold War, which mainly saw the Western bloc, led by the United States on the one side, and the USSR, on the other (Westad 2017). This nuclear arms race aroused continual protests and appeals for non-proliferation from important intellectuals and scientists alike, essentially constituting the conscience of modernity. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the race for the proliferation of nuclear weapons caused, for example, Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, together with other scientists and intellectuals, to sign and launch an appeal addressed to politicians, scientists and all citizens of the world, urging them to speak out against the proliferation of nuclear weapons that threatened the end of biological life on the planet (Russell and Einstein 1955). From the early years of the second post-war period, another political, scientific and technological movement began in America and Europe aimed at harnessing the power obtained from the uranium atom and other sources to produce energy, through the use of appropriate scientific and technological tools. The first commercial nuclear power plant was set up in the United States at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, in 1958. In the following years, nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors were constructed in various parts of the country, with several being active at the end of 2019.3 In Western Europe, the production of nuclear energy began in the postwar years, starting in the United Kingdom in 1956 at the Calder Hall plant, Sellafield, in north-west England. In the following decades of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the European Union installed nuclear power plants both in France and in Germany, as well as in other countries, to 3 At the end of December 2019, the United States had ninety-six operating commercial nuclear reactors in fifty-eight nuclear power plants installed in twenty-nine states (EIA 2021).

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produce non-fossil energy needed for economic and social development.4 At present, many European Union states are continuing to improve the usage of nuclear power. However, its employment in the United States, European Union and in other countries across the world has been criticized by different political forces, associations, individuals, and anti-nuclear collective movements, especially after the April 1986 accidental explosion of a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR).

Development, Resilience and Silent Spring In the early seventies of the last century, a team of scholars produced a research report commissioned by the Club of Rome concerning the prospects of nuclear development on a world scale.5 Through the use of a computer model, the research carried out an analytical test simulation on the future consequences for the planet of humanity’s exploitation of natural resources. Since the simulation revealed a rapid depletion of natural resources in the near future, the research team suggested both limiting growth and safeguarding present resources (Meadows et al. 1972). To protect the Earth and nature – the human species included – the scientists suggested developing a form of strategic resilience, involving science and society working together to achieve a balance between existing natural resources and the potential for their exploitation (Meadows et al. 1972). Around forty years later, the Club of Rome is still working towards promoting and achieving this aim (see the Club of Rome homepage, www.ClubofRome.org). Approached by the Club of Rome from a scientific perspective, strategic resilience constitutes an attempt to find modern ways to limit pollution and protect biological and mineral resources by establishing a balance between human society with its perceived needs and other forces of nature, to limit pollution and protect biological and mineral resources. During the last decades of the last century and the early years of this century, in many parts of the globe, various environmental movements throughout the globe 4 In 2020, European Union saw nuclear electricity being produced by reactors in Belgium (7), Bulgaria (2) , Czech Republic (6), Finland (1), France (56), Germany (6), Hungary (4), Netherlands (1), Romania (2), Slovakia (4), Slovenia (1), Spain (7), Sweden (7), out of a total of 107 reactors on a world scale (World Nuclear Association 2021). 5 The Club of Rome was founded in Rome (hence the name) in 1968, by the Italian industrialist, Aurelio Peccei, and the Scottish scientist, Alexander King.

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have used scientific data to make their claims, generally heavily criticizing the present state of affairs. These calls for change and a sustained protection of the environment found support in science as early mid-twentieth century, with the publication of Silent Spring. Written by the American marine biologist Rachel Carson, this text highlights the consequences of the use of synthetic pesticides, which heavily pollute the environment and prove particularly harmful to humans and other living beings (Carson 1962).

Anti-nuclear Mobilizations The peaceful use of nuclear energy carried out by Western states and the Soviet bloc since World War II has resulted in the construction of thermonuclear power plants in various parts of the planet (cf. 4). Their installation has provoked concern from individuals and groups of citizens who, referring to scientific data, warn of the potentially two dangers – the risk of radioactive pollution of surrounding areas, and the threat of accidents or explosions with devastating consequences for nearby populations and territories alike. Collective anti-nuclear mobilizations by citizens have contested both the presence and intended installation of nuclear reactors in certain territories. Such anti-nuclear demonstrations began in the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Back then, action was made by small local groups, in an attempt to protect the population and territory in the vicinity of power plants. Given their limited scope, these mobilizations did not have national or international repercussions. From the early 1970s onwards, however, individuals and groups of citizens began mobilizing against the presence or installation projects of power plants in the United States, Western Europe and other parts of the world, denouncing the risks of environmental pollution, with or without accidents occurring in the plants. These initiatives developed into an important collective anti-nuclear movement (Touraine et al. 1983; Farro 1991) during the mid-seventies. Basing their position on available scientific data, these actors did not see the dangers of nuclear power plants as outweighed by the advantages of an electricity supply to citizens across a large expanse of territory. Even citizens residing in areas far from nuclear plants had no scientific proof that they would not be exposed to waste pollution or other consequences of accidents. The anti-nuclear movement grew in importance in the United States during the mid-seventies, leading to public debate on nuclear power in states such as Washington, Colorado and Ohio. In 1974, the first national

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anti-nuclear conference was organized, called the “Critical Mass,” in Washington, DC. In the same year, a campaign of anti-nuclear activists demanded that greater control should be given to competent institutions over the use of nuclear power in the states of Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Arizona, Montana and Ohio. Again in 1974, other important demonstrations also took place, such as the protest against the arrest of a member of the Montague farm commune, Massachusetts, who, in a symbolic act of civil disobedience, had tampered with devices intended for the construction of a nuclear power plant. Other important anti-nuclear mobilizations occurred during the seventies, such as the occupation of the Seabrook plant located in New Hampshire by the Clamsbell Alliance, made up of anti-nuclear forces from New Hampshire and other New England states. Following the model of the Clamsbell Alliance, similar associations were founded in various parts of the country, such as the Abalone Alliance in California and the Crabshell Alliance in Washington. By 1978, sixty-five similar organizations were estimated to be operating in various parts of the country. From 1975 to 1978, occupations of areas and other protests against the installation of nuclear power plants continued, specifically in California, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Colorado and South Carolina (Nelkin 1981a, 1981b; Nelkin and Pollak 1982; Meier et al. 1979; Sandman and Paden 1979). In Europe, the first major protests denouncing the dangers of nuclear power stations date back to the early 1970s, when an important mobilization began against the construction of a plant in Wyhl, part of the Federal Republic of Germany, as it was then. Further demonstrations in Western Europe then took place, followed by protests in other continents, thus creating an anti-nuclear global movement in various parts of the world. This growth was spurred on by a number of accidents in America, Asia and Europe with severe environmental consequences. Two notable accidents were, first, the one in 1979 in the United States, at Three Mile Island in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, and then, later in April 1986, the accident in the USSR (as it was then), in Chernobyl, Ukraine, where a reactor exploded in a power plant, causing extensive infrastructure damage, victims and other disastrous consequences for the health of the inhabitants, other forms of life and other natural resources in the affected region. The radioactive pollution caused by the explosion also affected other areas of the USSR, neighboring countries and even countries not bordering on Soviet territory, such as those of Western Europe (UNSCEAR 2021). In Asia, following an earthquake and a tsunami in March 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan suffered serious damage, causing extensive radioactive pollution across large swathes of territory, and the

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onset of various types of pathologies afflicting their respective inhabitants (Lipscy et al. 2013). Following these events and others, further collective bodies were constituted, mainly operating as local and national committees (Nelkin and Pollak 1982; Touraine et al. 1983), organizations or organizational networks active in individual countries of different continents (Rucht 1990; Farro 1991; Nomiya 2019) but organized through international associative networks, as well as organizations working on a planetary scale, such as the Friends of the Earth. Hence, the use of nuclear energy has become the object of mounting criticism, given the scientific evidence of the related dangers for the environment and the population in the immediate vicinity of power plants, as well as for ecosystems and the inhabitants of other areas, territories and countries at risk. As a result, governments, political forces, companies, scientists and technicians are looking for alternatives to nuclear power, as well as to fossil fuels and any energy source considered pollutant.

Ecology and Politics In the second half of the twentieth century and in the twenty-first century, the issue of environmental protection has grown in importance as a subject of public debate in various parts of the world. A central issue concerns the relationship between human social life and other natural entities, living and mineral, as seen in scientific terms. Important scientists and social and political actors from across the globe have aimed to avoid ecological catastrophes by encouraging a society, including themselves, to adopt a new balance between the forces of nature. This can be achieved, they maintain, by using relevant scientific and technical skills and economic resources, together with individual and group behavior working towards the same goal (cf. 6). Environmental practices need to be encouraged and maintained by political choices to provide the necessary financial support to implement them, both in individual countries and at a supranational level. Such political choices and resulting practices could either extend the democratization of society or, on the contrary, lead to new affirmations and strengthening of authoritarian powers. Anti-nuclear mobilizations, other collective environmental groups, and local, national and international associations active in the United States, in the countries of the present European Union, and in other areas and states in the southern and northern hemispheres have developed multiple

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initiatives around these issues. Diverse organizations at a local, national or global level, such as Greenpeace, are also working in this direction. Particularly in the second half of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first, at a more directly political and institutional level, environmental awareness has been expressed through, first, the constitution of Green parties, with exponents standing for election (when electoral regulation allows it) and even covering government roles at different institutional levels,6 and second, the inclusion of the issue of environmental protection in the programs of various political parties across institutions and countries. During the first decades of the new century, environmental issues have come to the forefront in politics internationally, involving a large part of the world. In January 2016 representatives of 196 nations signed the Paris Agreement on the Convention on Climate Change.7 Furthermore, besides the existing Green parties, other political parties and groups of various political leanings have begun to place protection of the environment at the center of their programs and initiatives, both in the West and in other parts of the world.

Political and Environmental Issues Compared with other political leanings, the center and left are generally more active promoters of interventions on environmental issues. At the time of writing, a significant example of this is the Labor Party at the head of the government in New Zealand, which enacts a policy of sustainable development (Ministry for the Environment 2021). Right-wing governments, however, have also pursued policies of environmental protection. For instance, in 2020 in the European Union, the Austrian government headed by a center-right chancellor of the ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei), worked 6 The candidature of the ecologist René Dumont in the French presidential elections of 1974 was the first indication that environmentalists and Green organizations wished to play a significant role at a political level in the West and in various parts of the world. Since then, Green parties and other political environmental organizations have been elected members of the European Parliament and have also held various governmental posts at different levels in EU countries such as Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Different Green parties also actively participate in political systems in European non-EU countries. Green political parties are also present in political systems of different countries of North America (Canada, Mexico and United States), Asia, like Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, of Central and South America, such as Brazil and Chile. 7 cf. Paris Agreement-United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

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with the environmentalist party (Die Grünen-Die Grüne Alternative) to enact measures to protect the environment. In other political contexts, on the other hand, right and left or center-left alignments have clashed on the question of environmental protection, seen as one of the most important issues, such as in the United States during the presidential elections of 2020. The Democratic Party leader, Joseph (Joe) Biden, elected as president at the beginning of 2021, intends to promote initiatives which are in line with a Green New Deal (Chohan 2019), as announced in his program. He began enacting these policies immediately after his inauguration at the White House in early 2021. However, his electoral opponent, Donald Trump, the outgoing president then defeated, intends to continue to promote the policy pursued during his administration, favoring the economy over environmental protection and coping with resource depletion.8 A similar opposition between political positions can be found in Brazil, where Jair Bolsonaro, exponent of the right-wing Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal), defeated Fernando Haddad, candidate of the leftwing Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) in the 2018 ballot. The new Brazilian president promotes economic policies based on maximum exploitation of natural resources, supporting – contrary to his opponent, Haddad, defeated in the elections – interventions in the Amazon freed from international conditions set for environmental protection. Notably, after his inauguration, Jair Bolsonaro did not oppose entrepreneurial actions and other interventions involving the destruction of important areas of Amazonian forests to favor economic gains over ecological protection (even if this involves supporting illegal practices). Following the inauguration of Joe Biden at the White House, however, President Bolsonaro wrote a long personal letter to the new US president, calling upon him to work together to “protect the environment” (Rosati and Adghirni 2021), indicating a shift in position. 8 Joe Biden’s electoral program included important interventions geared towards sustainable development and issues concerning climate. His first measures after taking office at the White House (Davenport and Friedman 2021; Friedman 2021) are in line with program. In 2017, the then president Donald Trump announced the United States’ exit from the Paris climate agreement, which was ratified in 2019 (McGrath 2020). Instead, one the first acts of President Biden after his inauguration, was to write to the United Nations to formally initiate the reintegration of the United States into the 2016 Paris Agreement (Hodgson 2021). During the 2020 presidential campaign, Trump fervently opposed Biden on issues of environmental protection, reflecting his presidency, giving priority to good economic results rather than protecting the environment (Jacobo 2020).

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Meanwhile, in Latin America and in other parts of the world, various associations and other organizations are carrying out various activities in defense of the Amazon area and the rainforest, as well as of the human rights of the Amazonian indigenous population, farmers and other inhabitants. Climate change on a planetary scale has significant consequences for life and the environment in Africa. The rise in temperatures is compromising agriculture, particularly the production of wheat, and increasingly compromising water supply. Some areas, however, such as those of South Egypt and the Sudanese territory, avoid such problems, being water-rich through their vicinity to the Nile (FAO-ECA 2018). Nonetheless, in a vast geographical area covering a number of countries, including Egypt and Sudan, tensions have risen between states over the control of water, with South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt opposing Ethiopia. They are contesting Ethiopia’s move to harness a considerable water supply in the basin of a large dam under construction, destined to produce electricity for the part of the Ethiopian population which is presently without this form of energy (De Filippis 2020). In other areas of the planet there are contradictory situations regarding environmental protection. During the 2000s in the People’s Republic of China (CPR), high levels of pollution were recorded in different parts of its vast territory (Vennemo and Aunan 2018), a problem created by both intense industrial development over the last twenty years of the twentieth century (Findlay and O’Rouke 2007; Brandt et al. 2008) and urbanization of the population (Chan et al. 2008). The leaders of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the state intend to tackle the issue with their own methods of intervention, by regulating economic, social and technological development in such a way as to allow the country to be pollution-free by the 2030s (Frangoul 2020). The construction in the area of the capital of the Beijing Daxing International Airport, inaugurated in September 2019, constitutes a step in this direction. The new large structure relies on ecologically friendly equipment, such as solar panels installed to produce electricity, for the functioning of the airport complex. Low-ecological-impact structures have also been built or are under construction, such as the rail transport network designed to connect the airport with the center of the capital and other areas of the country. With the construction of this airport structure, the leaders of the CCP and the Chinese state are pursuing, with their own management methods, a process of development of a country that aims to play an increasingly central role on the world stage among the main powers.

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Greta Attention to issues related to climate change and protection of the environment, and the urgent need for a civic conscience and action by all of us, was almost forced upon the world in August 2018 when a 16-year-old girl by the name of Greta Thunberg was refusing to attend school lessons, and had set up a picket in front of her school in Stockholm, proclaiming a “Skolstrejk för klimatet” (School strike for the climate). Together with other young people, Greta also demonstrated in front of the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, for three weeks, calling for immediate action against climate change and denouncing the lack of initiatives on the part of Sweden itself. Media and social networks enabled news and images of the protest to rapidly spread globally. The protest underlined the inefficient measures implemented by individual countries and international and intercontinental bodies to tackle the global-warming crisis. Greta Thunberg and her companions then made a direct appeal to other young people across the globe, inviting them to join the mobilization against global warming. As a result, Greta launched the first Fridays for Future, an event which was then repeated every Friday in various parts of the world, over the two months leading up to the Global Strike for the Future on Friday 15 March 2019. Students from around ninety countries across the world took part in the strike.9 The student mobilizations had immediate repercussions on the governments of individual countries and related institutions. Their main leader, Greta Thunberg, was invited in September 2019 to speak in New York, at the UN Climate Action Summit, where heads of state and other leaders of member countries of the United Nations were present. Thunberg then spoke in Brussels at a meeting of the European Parliament’s environment committee, in March 2020. She even had meetings with heads of state or prime ministers, some being only fleeting, as was the case with Trump at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York. But others proved more in-depth, as with Justin Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister, in Montreal in September 2019, just before the start of the climate march. These meetings and interventions by Greta Thunberg indicate the importance of environmental movements inspired by young people, not only for initiating social action, but also in terms of influencing governmental and institutional action nationally and internationally, involving bodies such as 9 A total 1.6 million people, students and other young people took part in the strike against climate change, in 1,600 towns, in over 125 countries.

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the European Union and the United Nations. However, besides the political significance of these youth initiatives, cultural issues also come into play. Such mobilizations can be seen to represent a cultural break with those institutional actors, entrepreneurial enterprises and groups or individuals who contribute to environmental pollution (sometimes even unconsciously), despite scientific evidence attesting to the dangers. Actions such as those initiated by Thurnberg are mainly cultural interventions, designed to sound the alarm on the state of the planet and to put the protection of the environment center stage in twenty-first-century society. Instead, political actors and the programs they promote often approach the question of the environment in generic and deferential, if not contradictory, terms. In the West, for instance, conflicting arguments have been produced by opposing parties, whether or not in direct response to issues specifically raised by youth mobilizations. As mentioned, Donald Tramp, the forty-fifth president of the United States from 2017 to 2021, considers the environmental issue irrelevant, if not non-existent. Instead, he takes the view that political action entails boosting the economy, not protecting the environment. Biden, on the other hand, elected as president in January 2021, considers the environmental issue of major importance in the twenty-first century. Most EU leaders generally share a similar attitude, as do political leaders in Australia and New Zealand. In other areas of the world, such as the Far East, the leaders of the CPR also see themselves as promoters of an ecological approach to politics, within the perspective of an authoritarian leadership.

The Covid-19 Pandemic: An Environmental Challenge At the beginning of 2020, outbreaks of Covid-19 (or coronavirus, as it was first called), due to the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, began to be recorded in various countries, signaling the beginning of a new pandemic. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), this new virus first appeared as cases of lung infections in December 2019 in Wuhan, a large and modern metropolis of the PCR.10 Up until the time of writing (mid-February 2021), the WHO commission sent to Wuhan to determine the progress of the pandemic has not yet been able to determine the origins of the virus, given the data and information so far collected. Notably, though the commission 10 “COVID-19 is the disease caused by a new coronavirus called SARS-CoV-2. WHO f irst learned of this new virus on 31 December 2019, following a report of a cluster of cases of ‘viral pneumonia’ in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China” (www.World Health Organization).

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has claimed there is insufficient data to assert or deny that the pandemic originated in Wuhan, they recognize patient number 1 to be a permanent Wuhan resident, who has never made trips outside the metropolis (Cohen 2020; Shi 2020).11 Whatever its origin, the virus spread rapidly, affecting people of both sexes, particularly those over the age of 20, in Wuhan and in the rest of China as well, and then spread to other areas of the world. Children and young people under 20 have been less affected than adults and are often asymptomatic (Davies et al. 2020). It also appears that people of various social status are affected, including prime ministers such as Boris Johnson (UK Prime Minister from 2019), and presidents of states such as Donald Trump (US President from 2017 to 2021). There are nonetheless significant disparities in the different areas of the planet regarding the resources available to deal with the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Despite errors and delays, developed countries have coped with the pandemic with relative efficiency, due to the widespread presence of public or private health structures such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, pharmacies and nursing offices across the territory. Vaccination centers have been quickly set up to compensate for the organizational problems of existing health structures. In countries such as the United States of the Biden presidency, Canada, the EU states, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and other European nations such as Norway, the pandemic has emphasized the importance of the role played by public institutions, governments and state apparatus bodies in the direction and management of the health emergency. The Covid-19 emergency has also been dealt with quickly in countries with different political systems, such as China, where the state and public services have to deal with the health needs of a vast territory, as in Russia under Putin. Conversely, studies and research have revealed difficulties in organization and implementation of practical vaccination initiatives in other areas of 11 Initially, inquiries by journalists indicated a Wuhan research laboratory specializing in the study of bats as the place of origin of the virus. The scientif ic director of the laboratory denied that this could have taken place. According to other explanations, the transmission of the virus started from the Wuhan Huanan Seafood market (Kang et al. 2020). In February 2021, “Investigators from the World Health Organization (WHO) looking into the origins of coronavirus in China have discovered signs the outbreak was much wider in Wuhan in December 2019. The lead investigator for the WHO mission, Peter Ben Embarek, told CNN in a wide-ranging interview that the mission had found several signs of the more wide-ranging 2019 spread. Ben Embarek, who has just returned to Switzerland from Wuhan, told CNN: ‘The virus was circulating widely in Wuhan in December, which is a new finding’” (Paton Walsh 2021).

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the globe, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America, due to a lack of resources, in terms of health facilities and access to vaccines (UNPD 2020).12 Consequently, different societies of the planet are facing the invisible propagation of COVID-19 with varying means and ways. Ultimately, the pandemic is a natural process involving human beings, elements of nature who fight the spread of another element of nature, the virus, using modern sciences and techniques to create vaccines and administer them through the interventions of political institutions. How these institutions operate varies from Western to Eastern Europe, to Asia, and PCR being the most important power. Hence, the fight against Covid-19 can be seen as an environmental challenge with certain elements of nature (human beings) fighting other elements of nature (the Covid-19 virus with its variants).

Conclusions The issues related to the environment began to be addressed rationally in the nineteenth century with the creation of parks of various sizes, with the intention of safeguarding natural elements of territories under threat from expanding industrial installations and urbanization. At that time, progress was interpreted as the subjugation of the forces of nature to the demands of human societies. Around the middle of the last century, on the other hand, alarms were sounded by various scientists concerned with the impact of pollution on the environment, and the depletion of natural resources. Based on scientific findings, environmental activists called for both a limit to development, and a clearly managed future to protect the natural environment. Anti-nuclear movements arose, denouncing the dangers of nuclear power plants in the production of electricity, as verified by accidents such as Chernobyl. More generally, mobilizations concerning scientifically-based projects for environmental protection are developing, promoted not only by citizens, but also by their political representatives mainly from green parties, now with seats in Western parliaments and in other countries with open political systems. 12 In reference to epidemic data from China, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Canada and South Korea, a Research Team (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine), affirms “We estimate that susceptibility to infection in individuals under 20 years of age is approximately half that of adults aged over 20 years, and that clinical symptoms manifest in 21% (95% credible interval: 12–31%) of infections in 10- to 19-year-olds, rising to 69% (57–82%) of infections in people aged over 70 years” (Davies et al. 2020).

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In the course of the twenty-first century, the environmental issue has become moreover a theme of cultural importance and political action (also in terms of organization and management), with important collective mobilizations against climate change achieving institutional attention. However, the issue of the protection of nature has not been confined to contexts with open political systems, but is also seen as a major challenge for the future in countries such as China under the CCP, where a large solar-powered infrastructure is being built. Environmental issues have gradually become central to economic, cultural, social and political life in many states and areas of the planet. It remains to be seen whether and how research initiatives for the preservation of nature carried out by social and political actors of different human societies will interact with the democratic process, which is itself being redefined.

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Herken, Gregg. 2002. Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Hobsbawn, Eric J. 1969. The Pelican Economic History of Britain, vol. 3: From 1759 to Present Day, Industry and Empire. New York: Penguin. Jackson, J. P. 2005. Science for Segregation: Race, Law, and the Case Against Brown v. Board of Education. New York: New York University Press. Jones, Karen R. 2012. “Unpacking Yellowstone: The American National Park in Global Perspective.” In Civilizing Nature: National Parks in Global Historical Perspective, edited by Bernhard Gissibl, Sabine Höhler, and Patrick Kupper, 31–49. New York: Berghahn Books. Levy, Carl. 2000. “Currents of Italian Syndicalism before 1926.” International Review of Social History 45: 209–50. Lipscy, Phillip Y., Kenji E. Kushida, and Trevor Incerti. 2013. “The Fukushima Disaster and Japan’s Nuclear Plant Vulnerability. Comparative Perspective.” Environmental Science & Technology 47, no. 12: 6082–88. Lowenthal, David. 2006. Natural and Cultural Heritage. In The Nature of Cultural Heritage, and the Culture of Natural Heritage, edited by David Lowenthal and Kenneth Olwig, 78–90. New York: Routledge. Lowenthal, David and Kenneth Olwig, eds. 2006. The Nature of Cultural Heritage, and the Culture of Natural Heritage. New York: Routledge. Marsh, George P. 1865. Man and Nature: or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action. New York: Charles Scribner. Moses, John A. 1982. Trade Unionism in Germany from Bismarck to Hitler, 1869–1933, 2 vols. Towota, NJ: Barnes and Noble. Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jergen Randers, and William W. Behrens III. 1972. The Limits to Growth: A report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books. Meier, P. M., D. Morell, and P. F. Palmedo. 1979, “Political Implication of Clustered Nuclear Siting.” Energy System and Policy 3, no. 1: 17–36. Nelkin, Dorothy. 1981a. “Antinuclear Connection: Power and Weapons.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37, no. 4 (April): 36–40. ———. 1981b. “Some Social and Political Dimensions of Nuclear Power: Examples from Three Mile Island.” American Political Science Review 75, no. 1 (March): 132–42. Nelkin, Dorothy and Michael Pollak. 1981. The Atom Besieged: Extraparliametary Dissent in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Nomiya, Daishiro, Isamu Sugino, and Risa Murase. 2019. “Social Movements as Networks of Meanings: Constructing a Mental Map of the 2012 Antinuclear

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Newspapers, Radio, TV Businco, Lino, Cipriani Lidio, Arturo Donaggio, Leone Franzi, Guido Landra, Nicola Pende, Marcello Ricci, et al. 1928. “Il fascismo e i problemi della razza.” Il Giornale d’Italia, July 14. Carrington, Damian. 2019. “School Climate Strikes: 1.4 Million People Took Part, Say Campaigners.” UK Guardian, March 19. Davenport, Coral and Lisa Friedman. 2021. “The Battle Lines Are Forming in Biden’s Climate Push.” New York Times, January 26. De Filippis, Alberto. 2020. “La guerra dell’acqua oppone l’Etiopia a Egitto e Sudan.” Euronews, July 24. Frangoul, Anmar. 2020. “Sustainable Energy: President Xi Tells UN that China Will Be ‘Carbon Neutral’ Within Four Decades.” CNBC, September 23. Friedman, Lisa. 2021. “Biden Launches Climate Change Efforts.” New York Times, January 27. Gerretsen, Isabelle. 2019. “Global Climate Strike: Record Number of Students Walk Out.” CNN, May 24. Glenza, Jessica, Alan Evans, Hannah Ellis-Petersen, and Naaman Zhou. 2019. “Climate Strikes Held around the World – As It Happened.” UK Guardian, September 15. Hodgson, Camilla. 2021. “What the US Rejoining the Paris Accord Means for Climate Policy: Executive Orders Aim to Roll Back Trump-Era Loosening of Environmental Rules.” Financial Times, January 22.

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Jacobo, Julia. 2020. “Trump vs. Biden on the Issues: Climate Change and the Environment: The 2020 Candidates Toe the Party Lines when it Comes to the Environment.” ABC News, September 29. Kang, Dake, Maria Cheng, and Sam McNeil. 2020. “China Clamps Down in Hidden Hunt for Coronavirus Origins.” AP Associated Press, December 30. Kifner, John. 1974. “Toppler of A‐Plant Tower Shocks New England Town with Protest.” New York Times, February 3. ———. 1977. “2 Reconvicted in Seabrook, NH, Nuclear Protest.” New York Times, November 11. McGrath, Matt. 2020. “Climate Change: US Formally Withdraws from Paris Agreement.” BBC News, November 4. NY Times News Service. 1977. “Reactor Makers Fear Collapse of Industry.” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 21. Paton Walsh, Nick. 2021. “CNN Exclusive: WHO Wuhan Mission Finds Possible Signs of Wider Original Outbreak in 2019.” CNN, February 15. Rosati, Andrew and Samy Adghirni. 2021. “Bolsonaro Extends Olive Branch to Biden on Inauguration.” Bloomberg, January 21.

About the Author Antimo Luigi Farro (Sapienza University of Rome) is a Professor of Sociology, Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, and Centre d’Analyse et d’Intervention Sociologique, at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. He has published several books and articles on environmental studies, social movements, migration, and urban studies. [email protected]

14. The Cognitive Immune System The Mind’s Ability to Dispel Pathological Beliefs Barry Mauer Abstract How do we know when a belief or behavior qualifies as pathological? Are institutions vulnerable to pathological beliefs and behaviors? Nicolas de Condorcet sought answers to these questions using Enlightenment reason. This chapter argues that Condorcet’s modern liberal approach to diagnosing and treating pathological beliefs and behaviors (1) didn’t go far enough, and (2) contained significant blind spots that we are only now coming to appreciate through scientific discoveries. Currently the United States and much of the world is crippled by two pandemics: the coronavirus (a physical virus) and the right-wing cult (a cognitive virus). This chapter introduces the theory of the cognitive immune system and discusses the affordances and limits of the metaphor to medical epidemiology. Keywords: Enlightenment; epidemiology; cults; COVID-19; delusion; extremism.

In 2020, the US Department of Defense elicited research that “would look at audience vulnerability to suasory discourses, as delivered by a variety of authentic and inauthentic actors and at methods to improve audience resilience to malign and deceptive information attacks” (DoD 2020, 48). This chapter argues that malign and deceptive information fosters pathological belief systems. Why are pathological beliefs still a modern problem after centuries of the Enlightenment project? Enlightenment thinkers, such as French Revolutionary leader Nicolas de Condorcet, predicted that progress would lead to reason’s triumph, benefitting all humanity. Condorcet claimed that human beings would perfect their reasoning abilities and abandon their prejudices (Condorcet

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch14

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1795). But the Enlightenment project fell short for two reasons: (1) it contained significant blind spots; and (2) It didn’t go far enough. Condorcet’s most signif icant blind spot was his belief that human progress was a natural law. He wrote, “that no bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above the controul of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us.” He added that human progress was not only inevitable, but also irreversible; “The course of this progress may doubtless be more or less rapid, but it can never be retrograde” (11–12). Condorcet acknowledged that struggle was necessary to achieve the project by identifying three groups of people who were enemies of reason, prone to “error” and “prejudice”; “If the prejudices of philosophers be impediments to new acquisitions of truth, those of the less enlighted classes retard the propagation of truths already known, and those of esteemed and powerful professions oppose like obstacles” (21–21). Condorcet, however, assumed their inevitable defeat by progress. Condorcet’s mission – to separate reason from error and thus to benefit humanity – has been adopted by many modern institutions that link scientific progress with human well-being. For example, the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) 1946 Constitution includes a preamble that declares: “Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity,” and “The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and related knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health.” Condorcet predicted that we could reach an end goal; “It is manifest that the improvement of the practice of medicine, become more efficacious in consequence of the progress of reason and the social order, must in the end put a period to transmissible or contagious disorders, as well to those general maladies resulting from climate, aliments, and the nature of certain occupations. Nor would it be difficult to prove that this hope might be extended to almost every other malady, of which it is probable we shall hereafter discover the most remote causes” (289–90). But not all scientific progress leads to human well-being and there is no guarantee that an end point of well-being can or will be reached. By assuming progress to be a natural law, Condorcet failed to consider that the enemies of reason might claim ultimate victory. For instance, Condorcet did not anticipate that the rise of dangerous mass cults, like

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the Trump-supporting QAnon,1 would emerge centuries later and threaten to reverse hard-won gains in human well-being. QAnon followers believe Hillary Clinton runs a pedophile ring out of a pizza parlor basement and that the COVID-19 pandemic is caused by 5G cell-phone towers as part of a plot to depopulate the earth (Heilwell 2020). Many Trump supporters also “proclaim the pandemic to be a ‘hoax’ or a ‘fraud’ and protest that they are being ‘oppressed’ by public health laws designed to save lives” (DeVega 2020a). Pathological beliefs and behaviors such as these continually emerge and evolve, and often become virulent and deadly. Because victory over pathological thinking is never guaranteed, we must continually modify our cognitive and social defensive structures. Many cognitive pathologies affecting individuals also affect groups. Delusional disorder in groups is known as folie a communiqué (communicated madness; Baillarger, 1860, cited in Lasègue), folie à deux and folie à famille (madness of two and family madness; Lasègue and Falret 2016 [1877]), folie à millions (madness of millions; Fromm 1955), and folie à culte (cult madness; Reznek 2010).2 Fromm wrote, “The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make these vices virtues, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same forms of mental pathology does not make these people sane” (Fromm 1955). Lawrie Reznek explains how delusion can be induced or imposed onto another person; “In Shared Psychotic Disorder, a person who is closely associated with someone else with some Psychotic Disorder ‘buys into’ the delusional system. Although this diagnosis is rarely made, it apparently is more likely when the individual with the original delusions exercises substantial power over the other person” (119). When autocratic leaders promote pathological beliefs, their authoritarian followers tend to adopt them. Bandy X. Lee, a forensic psychiatrist, has described Trump’s followers as suffering from “induced delusion” (Lee 2020). Since the rise of Trump, many mental health professionals, led 1 QAnon core beliefs are now mainstream Republican beliefs: 23 percent of Republicans believe “the government, media, and financial worlds in the US are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex traff icking operation”; 28 percent believe “[t]here is a storm coming soon that will sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders”; and 28percent believe that “[b]ecause things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country” (PRRI 2021). 2 Gralnick lists four subtypes: Folie imposée (imposed madness; Lasègue and Falret), Folie simultanée (simultaneous madness; Régis), Folie communiquée (communicated madness; Marandon de Montyel), and Folie induite (induced madness; Lehman) – cited in Gralnick 1942, 491–520.

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primarily by Lee, have raised alarms about mass mental illness.3 As Yale historian Timothy Snyder has argued, the modern liberal state, founded on Enlightenment reason, is collapsing into fascism,4 a catastrophic form of mass delusion ( folie à millions or folie a culte). Why now? Could it have been prevented? Is it too late to effectively intervene? Theories of cognitive pathology and cognitive immunity can help us answer these questions. I define a pathological belief as one that is likely to be false, to produce unnecessary harm, and to be held with conviction and tenacity in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is likely false and will produce unnecessary harm. Individuals and group subjects (Althusser’s state and ideological apparatuses) have cognitive immune systems that protect them from pathological beliefs, and these systems can be either resilient or compromised. Cognitive immune systems consist of both internal (cognitive) and external (physical) barriers (Bjola and Pappadakis 2020). When external barriers are weakened, “malign and deceptive information attacks” are more likely to reach people, and when internal barriers are weakened, people are more likely to be vulnerable – even attracted – to the pathological beliefs carried by these messages. Once pathological beliefs take hold within a person or group, they hijack cognitive immune systems and use them to attack corrective healthy beliefs. Reasoning can be an effective cognitive defense against pathological beliefs, but a compromised cognitive immune system substitutes rationalization, or faulty reasoning meant to justify a pathological belief. Reason, by contrast to rationalization, makes wise distinctions among beliefs, evaluating them against one another and crediting or discrediting beliefs based on critical thinking practices. A common belief about beliefs 3 WMHC 2020. 4 Quoted in DeVega 2017. “The straight-on confrontation with the truth is at the center of the fascist worldview. The attempt to undo the Enlightenment as a way to undo institutions, that is fascism. Whether he realizes it or not is a different question, but that’s what fascists did. They said, ‘Don’t worry about the facts; don’t worry about logic. Think instead in terms of mystical unities and direct connections between the mystical leader and the people.’ That’s fascism. Whether we see it or not, whether we like it or not, whether we forget, that is fascism. Another thing that’s clearly fascist about Trump were the rallies. The way that he used the language, the blunt repetitions, the naming of the enemies, the physical removal of opponents from rallies, that was really, without exaggeration, just like the 1920s and the 1930s. And Mr. [Steve] Bannon’s preoccupation with the 1930s and his kind of wishful reclamation of Italian and other fascists speaks for itself.” Yale philosopher Jason Stanley, quoted in DeVega 2020b: “This coalition of the business elite, right-wing Christian evangelicals, and white nationalists and other white supremacists is very dangerous. Fascism is ultimately a death cult.”

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– one that a majority of my students express every semester – is that all beliefs are equally valid. My students likely answer this way from either a misguided sense of fairness or they confuse the notion that everyone deserves to be heard with the notion that everyone deserves to be believed. In universities, we rely on established methods for granting credibility to claims that withstand proper assessment. These assessment methods can be summarized as “razors”: – Popper’s razor (named for Karl Popper): a better theory is more powerful, meaning it explains more data than its rival; – Ockham’s razor (named for William of Ockham): a better theory is simpler and requires fewer ad hoc hypotheses or assumptions to bolster it; – Hume’s razor (named for David Hume): a better theory is more probable: the fewer miracles required, the better; – Whewell’s razor (named for William Whewell): a better theory is consistent with other good theories;5 – Sagan’s razor (named for Carl Sagan): extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence; – Hitchens’ razor (named for Christopher Hitchens): claims made without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.6 No razor is perfect, but when used in combination they become powerful critical tools. Pathological beliefs spread for numerous reasons. One reason, familiar to those who study viral memes and fake news, is that pathological beliefs are “catchier” than healthy beliefs, since they tend to elicit responses such as fear, disgust, and resentment. State agencies in Russia and elsewhere have taken advantage of such “catchiness” to spread propaganda to targeted populations (Tucker et al. 2018). Compounding the problem, people who are easily fooled are typically the least constrained from sharing and reposting disinformation. Epidemiological models can help us understand why some groups are more susceptible to cognitive pathogens, just as some are to biological pathogens. “Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of health-related states or events in specified populations, and the application of this study to the control of health problems” (Last et al. 2001, emphasis in original, 61). Epidemiologists consider the health of both individual people 5 The first four razors are from Reznek, 43–44. 6 The last two razors are from Wikipedia (2020b).

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and of communities; “The epidemiologist uses the scientific methods of descriptive and analytic epidemiology as well as experience, epidemiologic judgment, and understanding of local conditions in ‘diagnosing’ the health of a community and proposing appropriate, practical, and acceptable public health interventions to control and prevent disease in the community” (Spellman and Stoudt 2013, 127). Understanding the spread of propaganda and pathological beliefs similarly requires us to evaluate the vulnerability and resilience of groups.7 While epidemiological studies add signif icantly to our knowledge of cognitive pathologies, they do not adequately explain why cognitive pathogens take hold and prove so tenacious and diff icult to treat in some populations but not others. For additional insight, I turn to studies of disease pathology, in particular to Stephen Paget’s 1889 “seed and soil” theory of cancer. Paget explained why cancer did not metastasize centrifugally in nearby tissue, but rather established new tumors in distant organs. Bones were a frequent site of metastasis in breast cancer – but not every bone was equally susceptible. “Who has ever seen the bones of the hands or the feet attacked by secondary cancer?” he asked. Paget coined the phrase “seed and soil” to describe the phenomenon. The seed was the cancer cell; the soil was the local ecosystem where it flourished, or failed to. Paget’s study concentrated on patterns of metastasis within a person’s body. The propensity of one organ to become colonized while another was spared seemed to depend on the nature or the location of the organ – on local ecologies. Yet the logic of the seed-and-soil model ultimately raises the question of global ecologies: why does one person’s body have susceptible niches and not another’s? Paget’s way of framing the issue – metastasis as the result of a pathological relationship between a cancer cell and its environment – lay dormant for more than a century. (Mukherjee 2017)

To make a more hospitable “soil” for pathological beliefs, malign actors “prime” people and groups. Robert Cialdini calls this process of preparing the audience pre-suasion (Cialdini 2016). “Seeds” are more likely to germinate when the soil is prepared and the pathogenic beliefs are designed for that 7 Kucharski 2016, and Felten and Nelson 2019, 52–60. Additional studies show that geopolitical actors are weaponizing the relationship between biological and cognitive pathogens; see Bernard et al. 2020.

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soil. A test case is Q-Anon, the bizarre and dangerous right-wing cult that believes a cabal of pedophiles rules the world and that Trump is fighting against it.8 Forty-six percent of Trump voters polled just after the 2016 election (Jensen 2016) believed or were unsure whether Hillary Clinton was connected to a child sex trafficking ring run out of the basement of a pizzeria in Washington, DC. Among Democrats, beliefs this wrong are less pervasive.9 The cognitive immune systems of right-wing groups are weaker for a reason. For decades, autocratic actors have subjected right-wing groups to attacks aimed at weakening their reasoning ability. Cognitive pathologies like QAnon are catchier because they are sensationalistic, outlandish, and arouse strong emotions like fear and outrage. In addition, these cognitive pathologies create a sense of belonging among people who believe they have special knowledge.10 The soil most conducive to the pathological seed is delusional disorder, which is an advanced form of denial, and the cult, which is an organization premised on delusion. A delusion is “a belief, held with conviction, in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence” (Reznek, xvi). A cult is a group devoted to protecting and advancing its shared delusions. The ideal soil for pathological beliefs is a mind that has been weakened in one or several ways. For example, those who are likely to believe in conspiracy theories tend to have “a greater need for cognitive closure (the desire to find an explanation when explanations are lacking) [Marchlewska et al.] and to be unique [Lantian et al.]. They’re more likely to have a cognitive bias called hypersensitive agency detection [Douglas et al.] or teleologic thinking (whereby events are overattributed to hidden forces, purposes, and motives) [Wagner-Egger et al.]. Some research has also found that conspiracy beliefs are associated with lower levels of education [Douglas et al.] and analytic thinking [Swami et al.]” (Pierre 2019). Pathological beliefs establish themselves by hijacking the mind’s cognitive immune system and repurposing its defensive capabilities in service 8 The Hillary Clinton pedophile-ring conspiracy theory persists despite a total lack of evidence for it and while there is evidence implicating Trump in the sexual abuse and even rape of children (Levine and El-Faizy 2019). 9 For example, “Close to half (48 percent) of Republicans, compared to 25 percent of Democrats, say COVID-19 is no more serious than the common flu. Republicans are also more likely to believe that ‘Hydroxychloroquine is a safe and effective way to treat COVID-19,’ (42 percent vs. 5 percent)” (Cox and Halpin 2020). 10 Trump routinely barrages his followers with pathological beliefs: “Trump is not concerned with anyone’s dignity, even his own, and will readily deploy lies and distortions when they serve as applause lines […] Yet Trump refuses to correct himself and, instead, ups the ante” (D’Antonio 2015).

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to the pathological belief and in opposition to contrary evidence, logical reasoning, and healthy beliefs. This cognitive hijacking resembles the process that metastatic cancer uses to hijack the body’s immune system. “Molecular and cellular features of the tumor microenvironment act to license tissue-repair mechanisms of macrophages, fostering angiogenesis, metastasis and the support of cancer stem cells. We illustrate how tumors induce, then exploit trophic macrophages to subvert innate and adaptive immune responses capable of destroying malignant cells” (Williams et al. 2016, 1). When a defensive system is overwhelmed, a tipping point occurs in which metastatic agents turn defensive mechanisms to their own ends. The Cancer Treatment Centers of America note that “cancer cells exert tremendous sway over some innate and adaptive immune cells and recruit them to help cancer grow and travel […] Using deceptive signaling, cancer cells stifle the growth of MDSCs [myeloid-derived suppressor cells] and use them to help tumors spread.”11 Pathological beliefs develop two kinds of defenses: filters (physical defense) and epistemological bubbles (cognitive defense) (Bjola and Papadakis 2020). Filters inhibit the passage of information. Healthy societies use such filters to protect vulnerable people, such as children, from propaganda. Cults, however, use f ilters to defend delusional belief from conflicting information. In an epistemological bubble, subjects encounter contrary information but discredit and dismiss it. Inoculation occurs when the subject first encounters a small dose of contrary information, making them resistant to larger doses of contrary information (McGuire 1962). A resilient mind inoculates itself against pathological beliefs while a sick mind inoculates itself against healthy beliefs. McGuire notes the way vaccines, as weakened forms of pathogens, stimulate the body’s immune system to defend against a stronger attack from the pathogen. Right-wing media inoculates its audience from counterattack by planting straw man arguments, such as the false claims that conservatives are under attack from liberals (Walsh 2018) rather than the actual case: that conservatives attack marginalized people and vital social institutions (Bartels 2020). The right wing’s “culture wars” 11 “‘These cells are essential to successful cancer metastasis,’ Georgia Cancer Center’s Dr. Hasan Korkaya told Science Daily. ‘There is a very intricate balance in the immune system that is usually anti-tumorigenic, meaning it eliminates tumors, but in some cases, if this balance is altered, these cells may actually help tumors grow and develop into full-blown metastatic disease’” (CTCA 2017).

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(Hunter 1994) are premised on the inoculation theory. Alternatives to right-wing ideas get framed as unjustif ied and as existential threats to a sacred “way of life.” Once engaged in culture-war battles, rightwingers are invested and involved. Michael Pfau def ines involvement as “the importance or salience of an attitude object for a receiver” and is “among the most important and widely employed concepts in the scholarly literature on persuasion” (Pfau 1997, 190). Deep involvement with a belief system makes the pathological inoculation process more effective. Early education can help, however, in blocking this pathological process. Research demonstrates how such interventions can inoculate healthy people against pathological messages (Roozenbeek and Van der Linden 2019) by “supporting media literacy and source criticism, encouraging institutional resilience, and promoting a clear and coherent strategic narrative capable of containing the threat from inconsistent counter-messaging” (Bjola and Pamment 2016, 1). QAnon churches, such as the Omega Kingdom Ministry (a church that offers QAnon conspiracy theories along with biblical passages), provide examples of how groups employ filters in pathological ways to block outside information: “Wagner and Bushey [the leaders] have taught their congregation to stop listening to any media – even Fox News – because they’re are [sic] all ‘Luciferian.’ What they provide instead is a road map to QAnon radicalization comprised of QAnon YouTube channels for the congregation’s daily media diet, the Qmap website that lists new QAnon conspiracy theories and Twitter influencers” (Argentino 2020). Cult possession results from “undue influence” (Hassan and Shah 2019); people become estranged from themselves and assume a false identity (Fig. 14.1). Just as bone-marrow and the lymphatic system produce and regulate immune cells, healthy civic institutions, such as education and the press, build and maintain healthy cognitive immune systems in both individuals and groups. Right-wing propaganda, however, has produced a massive, virulent, and extremely dangerous cult, organized currently around Donald Trump (Hassan 2019). Consequently, the United States, and much of the world, is damaged from the assault of two pandemics: the coronavirus (biological) and rightwing delusion (cognitive). A vaccine will mitigate devastation from the coronavirus. No cognitive resilience strategy, though, is powerful enough to defeat the right-wing cult, nor are major institutions devoting serious effort to implementing a cognitive resilience strategy. Barring such a strategy, right-wing cults will make the Earth uninhabitable. The Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists warns, “Humanity

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Fig. 14.1 QAnon chart, Influence Continuum. Using the BITE Model: Behavior, Information, Thought, and Emotional Control. Steven Hassan and Freedomofmind.com (used with permission of Steven Hassan).

continues to face two simultaneous existential dangers – nuclear war and climate change – that are compounded by a threat multiplier, cyberenabled information warfare, that undercuts society’s ability to respond” (SASB 2020). Rachel Bronson, president & CEO of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, adds In the United States, there is active political antagonism toward science and a growing sense of government-sanctioned disdain for expert opinion, creating fear and doubt regarding well-established science about climate change and other urgent challenges. Countries have long attempted to employ propaganda in service of their political agendas. Now, however, the internet provides widespread, inexpensive access to worldwide audiences, facilitating the broadcast of false and manipulative messages to large populations and enabling millions of individuals to indulge in their prejudices, biases, and ideological differences.

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The threats posed by nuclear war, climate change, and information warfare are driven primarily by right-wing policies, and the erosion of “the international political infrastructure for managing them” is due mostly to right-wing attacks. Some readers may object to my labeling the right wing as the primary source of cognitive pathologies and the greatest threat to the planet.12 David Brooks, who for decades helped build the modern Republican Party, argues that we should respect political opponents because polarization, rather than error and prejudice, is the primary pathology threatening humanity. “The polarization over the past decades has not been about us disagreeing more; it’s been about us hating each other more. This has required constant volleys of dehumanization” (Brooks 2020). Brooks’ polarization frame is flawed, however, because cognitive pathology is less the result of polarization than its cause. Pathological beliefs do not arise from differences of opinion, harsh rhetoric, or failure to compromise. Pathological beliefs lead to polarization because healthy people will oppose those who try to enact their pathological beliefs. The polarization frame ignores how consensus, especially against a demonized other, can be pathological; examples include the white supremacist consensus that formed after Reconstruction and wars throughout the past century premised on American exceptionalism. These periods of consensus were profoundly pathological because they were premised on false beliefs, unnecessarily harmed others, and were held with tenacity in the face of overwhelming evidence that they were false and harmful. In the United States, two groups live mostly in two “realities.” One group, ranging from leftists to liberals, is more in reality and is correctable. The other group – right-wingers – is more delusional and incorrigible. “While any group can come to believe false information, misinformation is currently predominantly a pathology of the right, and extreme voices from the right have been continuously attacking the mainstream media” (Benkler et al. 2017, emphasis in original). “Both-siderism” (Ward 2020) – the “curse on both their houses” approach to understanding polarization – is thus an error, itself pathological, that draws a false equivalence. 12 One of this chapter’s readers complained that my labeling of QAnon and Republicans as delusional was “an abusive generalization.” No doubt it would be abusive to characterize large groups of people in this way without sufficient grounds, but there are sufficient grounds. See Dickson 2019. Additionally, a CNBC/Change Research poll found that only 3 percent of Trump voters fully accept the reality that Joe Biden is the legitimate winner of the election (Pramuk 2020). The margin of error in this poll is 2.83 percent, making it possible that the percentage of Trump voters in reality could be as low as 0.17 percent.

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Readers may object to my labeling right-wing beliefs with the medical term “pathological.” Critics such as Susan Sontag (2013) have opposed the use of disease as metaphor; much of this opposition arises from the medical establishment’s history of unjust and abusive treatment of people merely for being different. Indeed, the medical establishment has abused women, nonconformists, homosexuals, and political dissidents in systemic ways. Such abuses, however, do not invalidate medical models of social behavior because we can correct the frame. Sontag objects to using disease as a metaphor for human thought and behavior: “it could be argued that the cancer metaphors are in themselves implicitly genocidal” (83–4). Sontag objects that disease metaphors, particularly those relating to cancer, are disguised military metaphors meant to control people. But in the case of weaponized information (Bergman and Kenney 2017), military metaphors are apt. Sontag’s desire to understand things not as metaphors but “as themselves” ignores the underlying structures of language. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) demonstrate, language is structured metaphorically. We are responsible for selecting the most appropriate metaphors and for thinking critically about their affordances, limits, and consequences. Simply avoiding metaphors is too limiting and may not be possible. Additionally, the metaphor between biological and cognitive maladies has emerged because mental health is a recognized part of medicine. Furthermore, a branch of medicine called behavioral health deals with pathological beliefs and the behaviors associated with them, such as those involving addiction. The discourses that structure both sides of this metaphor (biological/cognitive) are already deeply imbricated in one another and have been at least since the time of Plato. Unsupported conspiracy theories are pathological since “People who believed in one conspiracy were more likely to also believe in others” (Goertzel 1994, 731). Alan Bensley stated, “It has been known for some time that people who tend to accept one false conspiracy theory, such as the claim that the 911 attack was an inside job, are also more likely to accept others, as well” (quoted in Dolan 2019). Elsewhere Bensley writes, “We found that measures of generic conspiracist ideation, specific fictitious conspiracy theory, and false conspiracy theory beliefs were all strongly and positively intercorrelated” (Bensley et al. 2020, 16). Once adopted, a meritless conspiracy theory turns the cognitive immune system against healthy beliefs. These theories spread not only through fringe groups but also through politicians and mass media outlets. In 1903, anti-Semites published a fabricated text, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, about a plan for Jewish world domination. Though exposed as a fraud in

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1921, the text was continually reproduced and cited as justification for persecuting Jews.13 At least since the early 1990s, the GOP has traff icked in conspiracy theories. GOP conspiracy theories about the Clinton family during Bill Clinton’s presidency were intended to destroy the Democratic Party and create a GOP one-party state (Coppins 2018). These theories claimed, among other things, that the Clintons had murdered dozens of people (Snopes 1998). As Clinton conspiracy theories persisted over the past two decades, their focus shifted from Bill to Hillary with Benghazi, pedophile rings, and many others, aimed at destroying Hillary Clinton’s political career and more broadly at discrediting the Democratic Party. Anti-Clinton conspiracy theories, airing on Fox News, talk radio, and later through online sources from Breitbart to Infowars, coincided with ones aimed at President Obama: that he was a secret socialist Muslim born in Kenya. Mainstream media outlets often treated these bogus right-wing claims seriously while millions of people fervently believed them. The most infamous conspiracist succeeded Obama as president. Why is there such a large audience for toxic material? Wikipedia, in its article on “Conspiracy Theory” (2020a), discusses a number of reasons but fails to state that conspiracism thrives on the right more than it does on the left. One study showed that “Conspiracy Mentality” showed substantial correlations with RWA (Right Wing Authoritarianism) (Bruder et al. 2013, 9-10). The transformation of the GOP into a party driven by conspiracy theories marked a shift in American politics. Though it had roots in earlier decades, this shift occurred most dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s when right-wing leaders decided on a scorched earth strategy to win at any cost (History Commons 2020). Their tactics would have had little effect, however, if there were not a mass audience predisposed to believe wild conspiracy theories. Tens of millions of people were conditioned to gleefully accept lies and to turn their rage on the subjects of those lies. The audience for conspiracy theories became active agents in their spread (Shugerman 2018).

Externalities and Limits Weaponized ideas spread like metastatic cancer and turn people’s cognitive defenses against themselves, challenging our notions of autonomous subjects 13 In 2020, Michelle Malkin collaborated with Milo Yiannopoulos to create a book list for college-aged people that includes “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” (Holt 2020).

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possessing free will and free speech rights. Weaponized ideas, like vaccine denialism, have high externalities (Pigou 1932), which are costs borne by people not involved in the immediate transaction. In 2019, the WHO declared that the anti-vaccine movement (part of the broad category they label “vaccine hesitancy”) is itself a public health threat (2019): the first time, to my knowledge, that a major public health organization identified a belief as a public health threat. If pathological beliefs pose public health threats, it follows that we should monitor and block them if necessary. The United States already puts limits on speech; for example, “whites only” signs are forbidden and “no smoking” signs are required in many public places. Additionally, tobacco marketing is banned from television and from audiences composed of children. The government has concluded that the externalities associated with racism and smoking are too great. Anti-vaccine messages might be subject to the same calculations. Ideally, social institutions, such as education, should provide prophylactic barriers against pathological beliefs, but they too have been weakened by sustained right-wing attacks. For several decades now, a large faction of Americans, led by corporate misinformation, have put anti-science, anti-education leaders into power. With climate change, vaccinations, reproductive rights, these elected officials have insisted on discrediting and ignoring the people who research, study, and create knowledge about these subjects […] These very same leaders have threatened and continue to threaten the way our universities maintain themselves as leaders in global research that enriches our daily lives through technologic advances, medical research, arts, understanding of the Earth, and, in general, free thought. State universities, in particular, have been beset with funding cuts, lack of subsidies to educate citizens of those states, and meddlesome operational legislation that forces many person-hours of administrative work to comply. Those leaders are afraid of the free thought at our universities, and that is the mark of a totalitarian society. (Rosenheim 2020)

Once institutional cognitive barriers are weakened, vulnerable minds are more exposed to pathological ideas. Right-wing brains are more vulnerable to pathological ideas because they have much greater fear and revulsion responses than leftist brains do, which makes them easier to manipulate (Hibbing et al. 2014). Paul Rosenberg comments: “Conservative fears of nonexistent or overblown boogeymen – Saddam’s WMD, Shariah law, voter

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fraud, Obama’s radical anti-colonial mind-set, Benghazi, etc. – make it hard not to see conservatism’s prudent risk avoidance as having morphed into a state of near permanent paranoia, especially fueled by recurrent ‘moral panics,’ a sociological phenomenon in which a group of ‘social entrepreneurs’ whips up hysterical fears over a group of relatively powerless ‘folk devils’ who are supposedly threatening the whole social order” (2014). Once right-wingers adopt a pathological belief, they hold to it with tenacity even in the face of overwhelmingly disconfirming evidence: “Even after Donald Trump Jr. admitted to meeting with Russian operatives promising dirt on Clinton, only 45 percent of Trump voters would agree that such a meeting had taken place. A July 2017 poll found that only 9 percent of Republican voters admit that Russia tried to influence the US election, even though that’s been verified by both independent analysis and US intelligence services. Worse, that number was down from 18 percent of Republicans accepting the truth in April. The more facts about Russia’s involvement come out, the less Republicans are willing to believe them” (Marcotte 2018, 173-74). Right-wingers are significantly more vulnerable to pathogenic beliefs: “We found that ideologically conservative users are significantly more likely to follow disinformation accounts, compared to liberal users […] conservatives retweeted Russian troll accounts 31 times more often than liberals in the 2016 US election campaign” (Hjorth and Adler-Nissen 2019, 170). Authoritarians in general are primed to believe conspiracy theories. Mass rallies and right-wing media turn targets into rage junkies; “Trump is like a drug dealer who has addicted his followers to fear and rage and keeps supplying it in constant doses. His supporters have become rage-junkies for whom he can do no wrong” (Blow 2018). But the relationship is reciprocal. “The trouble with laying the addiction at the feet of Trump is that it absolves white Republican voters of their responsibility […] White Republican voters weren’t nice people who were corrupted by Trump, they were nasty assholes that kept voting for the most racist politicians they could find” (Rosario 2018). Right-wing propaganda has become profoundly eliminationist. Eliminationism consists of discourses, actions, and social policies that seek to suppress, exile, or exterminate perceived opponents.14 Right-wingers corrupt public forums when they claim free speech rights to spread eliminationist rhetoric on any platform. Leftists protecting these public forums from eliminationist rhetoric risk damaging them, just as doctors risk damaging a patient’s immune system by treating a cancerous tumor with chemotherapy. 14 Goldhagen 1996 and Neiwert 2009.

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Misleading free speech arguments create a double bind; eliminationist rhetoric corrupts forums by making them platforms for hate and lies; but opposing eliminationist rhetoric leads to false charges of “left-wing fascism.” Failure to confront pathological beliefs most often results in their growth, however, just as failing to respond to cancer rarely has good results. Cognitive pathology on the left exists but is far more limited than it is on the right. Left-wing militias in the United States are much smaller or virtually non-existent (Hesson 2020). Left-wing mass media in the United States is virtually non-existent (Alterman 2003). We can thus reject the primary claim made by “both-siderists.” As Mann and Ornstein explain, the Republican Party is “an insurgent outlier; ideologically extreme; contemptuous of the inherited social and economic policy regime; scornful of compromise; unpersuaded by conventional understanding of facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition.” They add, “Both sides in politics are no more necessarily equally responsible than a hit-andrun driver and a victim; reporters don’t treat them as equivalent, and neither should they reflexively treat the parties that way” (2012). Political analysts have shown that the GOP has become ideologically similar to neo-fascist parties such as Alternative for Germany (Lewis et al. 2020). Why is extremism so one-sided? Ezra Klein writes: “Put simply, Democrats can’t win running the kinds of campaigns and deploying the kinds of tactics that succeed for Republicans. They can move to the left – and they are – but they can’t abandon the center or, given the geography of American politics, the center-right, and still hold power” (2020). The right cares about power and understands it primarily in terms of dominance and humiliation, bullying and impunity, resentment and retaliation (Golec de Zavala and Keenan 2021). The right-wing assault against reason and social institutions has led to a debilitating breakdown of peoples’ basic trust in social institutions. As Anthony Giddens writes, “The trust which the child, in normal circumstances, vests in its caretakers […] can be seen as a sort of emotional inoculation against existential anxieties – a protection against future threats and dangers which allow the individual to sustain hope and courage in the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront.” By destroying basic trust, right-wing propagandists destroy cognitive immunity. “Basic trust is a screening-off device in relation to risks and dangers in the surrounding settings of action and interaction. It is the main emotional support of a defensive carapace of protective cocoon which all normal individuals carry around with them as the means whereby they are able to get on with the affairs of the day-to-day life” (Giddens 1991, 38-39).

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While the right-wing assaults trust in healthy social institutions, it builds trust in pathological counter-institutions, which then create pathological counter-publics. Trust can be misplaced, especially in childhood when children are stuck with a pathological caretaker, at which point they are prone to be inoculated against criticism of the caretaker’s flaws. This emotional inoculation is at the root of authoritarianism persisting into adulthood. Digital media makes the predicament worse. Applied to the case of digital propaganda, four testable propositions follow from the arguments […] about the conditions under which disinformation may lead to the “digital feudalisation” of the public sphere. First, disinformation deforms the public sphere by corrupting the epistemological basis for truth-claim validation. Conditions for establishing epistemic agreement simply vanish when subjectivity is imposed as quasistandard of objectivity. Second, disinformation assists the constitution of counterpublics by creating a space for discussion in the micro-sphere of topics of high emotional intensity. Emotions drive interests, which in turn facilitate identity connections. Third, disinformation infiltrations from the micro- to the macro-sphere require the presence of actively outward-oriented counterpublics. Not all counterpublics are the same, and the systematic use of disinformation is one important attribute that sets them apart. Fourth, the more extreme the disinformation attempt to infiltrate the macrosphere, the less likely it is to be accepted by the system and by consequence, the more vocal or radicalised the counterpublic becomes. (Bjola and Pappadakis 2020, 10)

This process of radicalization on the right reached a critical point long ago.

Cognitive Resilience Inoculation against pathological beliefs works for some people better than others. Educated authoritarians, for instance, use their knowledge to defend pathological beliefs with greater intensity. Chris Mooney labels this phenomenon the “smart idiot effect”: “The politically sophisticated or knowledgeable are often more biased, and less persuadable, than the ignorant” (46). A 2008 Pew poll showed the vast divide in public opinion over global warming. 29% of Republicans accepted the fact that humans are causing

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it vs. 58% of Democrats. The poll showed that among noncollege educated Republicans, 31% accepted the facts, but among college educated Republicans, only 19% accepted the facts. Educated Democrats and independents, however, accepted the facts at rates 23% higher than noncollege educated ones. (46)

The cognitive immune systems of right-wing authoritarians who have had higher education are more compromised than those without. Right-wing authoritarians misuse the materials and methods of knowledge to reinforce their cognitive pathologies and to undermine knowledge. Cognitive resilience results from education, critical thinking, and basic trust.15 “Cognitive resilience is arguably easier to develop when physical resilience is strong, but it becomes even more important when the latter is difficult to achieve. The way in which they work together resembles the logic behind a viral infection. Digital propaganda could be seen as an ‘outside virus’ that invades the ‘informational body’ of the target country and then uses the ‘chemical machinery’ of the host to keep itself alive and to replicate itself. Physical resilience plays the role of the antiviral drugs, which like the medical response to the AIDS pandemic, do not destroy the virus but inhibit its development. Cognitive resilience, on the other hand, works as a vaccine and seeks to produce enough antibodies so that further viral infections can be prevented” (Bjola and Pappadakis 2020, 6). A potent innovation in the field of propaganda, pioneered by Vladislav Surkov, is to discredit media sources, a tactic that Maria Bustillos labels “dismediation.”16 It aims at destroying basic trust in sources of information. Bustillos provides the following distinctions: 1. Information: John Kerry is a war hero who was awarded three Purple Hearts, a Bronze Star and a Silver Star; 2. Misinformation: John Kerry was never wounded in the Vietnam War; 15 “People […] do have the potential for resisting false ideas, but this potential can only be realized when the person has (a) logical ability, (b) correct information, and (c) motivation and cognitive resources. It is interesting to note that the acquisition of logical skills and true beliefs is primarily a function of education and is therefore under the control of society, whereas motivation and cognitive capacity are either fixed or under the control of the individual” (Gilbert et al 1993, 21). 16 “Vladislav Surkov, once the deputy prime minister of Russia and now top personal advisor to Vladimir Putin, aims to make coherence impossible by creating fragmentary and contradictory pictures. The target population no longer believes or trusts in anything. this confused and demoralized population thus gives its consent to a strongman who seems capable of bringing stability out of chaos” (Mauer 2020, 124).

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3. Disinformation: John Kerry is a coward; 4. Dismediation: “‘Swift Boat Veterans for Truth”‘ are disinterested sources of information about John Kerry, equivalent in integrity to any other source that might be presented on the evening news.” (Bustillos 2016) One strategy of dismediation is called “flooding the zone.” Sean Illing writes, “Steve Bannon, the former head of Breitbart News and chief strategist for Donald Trump […] reportedly said: ‘The Democrats don’t matter. The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal with them is to flood the zone with shit.’” Illing continues, “The goal of zone-flooding is simple: introduce bullshit stories into the information bloodstream, sit back while the media feverishly covers them (from all sides), and then exploit the chaos that results from the subsequent fog of disinformation” (2020). Can cognitive resilience stand up to the “firehose of falsehood” aimed at our information sphere?17 The struggle is especially difficult because the personality traits of liberals and leftists work against their efforts. Liberals and leftists tend to be open minded, believe in free expression, tolerance (often including tolerance to the intolerant), and diversity of opinion. They believe in the humanity of others (even those who act inhumanely); they are optimistic, believing people can change upon hearing facts and reason, and they don’t like to label or pathologize. They value nuance, want to find middle ground, and reach win-win outcomes. They want to be liked and prefer dialogue over conflict (Mooney 2012). Right-wingers, by contrast, engage in name-calling, lying, gaslighting, goalpost shifting, bullshitting, arguing in bad faith, and refusing to agree on a shared reality or shared logic. Right-wingers do not believe in the values liberals do, like open-mindedness, fairness, or tolerance; they seek only win-lose or lose-lose outcomes, never win-win ones. They show no remorse and no pity for their victims. Sometimes we need a blog post to get a sense of what we face: They are the enemy because they have spent the past 40 years […] making themselves the enemy [emphases in original]. They’re proud of their 17 Illing. “We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as ‘the firehose of falsehood’ because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, ‘[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.’ It’s an approach that thrives on conventional journalistic norms around objectivity and fairness […] reporting on deliberately misleading stories in ostensibly objective ways serves only to reward the bad-faith actors spreading the nonsense in the first place” (emphases in original).

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ignorance, their sadism and their bigotry – they revel in their bile and believe it to be a virtue […] When an enemy has declared their singular goal to be the destruction of everything you hold dear, when they have spent decades marshaling their forces, amping up the white nationalist hysteria of their foot soldiers and relentlessly crippling one democratic institution after another, it is long past time to stop trying to appease them. As long as the GOP has one, filthy finger on one lever of power anywhere, officially sanctioned fraud, corruption, vengeance and show trials will never end. (Driftglass 2020)

The two sides of our metaphor are colliding in the COVID-19 epidemic; the biological pathogen and the cognitive pathogen operate in concert. “On the right these days, we hear a lot of talk about ‘courage’ and not ‘living in fear’ of the virus – usually from people who reject even easy safety measures like wearing masks or maintaining social distance. But what they’re promoting isn’t courage at all, it’s a combination of denial and self-centeredness” (Muder 2020). Denial held long enough becomes delusion. Delusion that unnecessarily harms others and is held tenaciously enough becomes pathological. Pathological beliefs have become a pandemic in the right wing, systematically undermining the cognitive resilience of millions of people and of vital social institutions. Without a concerted effort to undo the damage, we face catastrophe.

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About the Author Barry Mauer (University of Central Florida) is Associate Professor of English at the University of Central Florida. His recent book is Deadly Delusions: Right-Wing Death Cult (2020). He has published numerous articles and book chapters on citizen curating, which brings ordinary people into the production of exhibits, both online and in public spaces. [email protected]

15. Representative Democracy as Kitsch, and Artificial Intelligence’sPromise of Emancipation Marius C. Silaghi

Abstract The chapter explores relations between modernity and the decentralization of authority, kitsch and partial centralization, the avant-garde and social media. Decentralization is identified as an important expression of modernist philosophy in current technology. As a characteristic of current directions of social progress, authority-opposing trends of modernism and post-modernism find significant support in new technology via less falsif iable decentralization based on crypto-currencies, blockchain, social media, search engines, and other products of the internet era. The scalability of classic athenian democracy to large societies is not yet accomplished by technology. Against the early modernity tendency to cheaply give the masses an almost effortless sense of participation (features associated with kitsch), the system of representative democracy promises to become more genuine through opportunities for electronic civic involvement. Keywords: AI; democracy; post-modernism; kitsch; participation; decentralization

As a characteristic of current directions of social progress, authorityopposing trends of modernism and post-modernism find significant support in new technology including crypto-currencies, blockchain, social media, search engines, massive open online courses, and other products of the Internet era, many of these earning their clout partly through a largely

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch15

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accepted assumption that their decentralization components leads to less falsifiable outcomes.1 The calls to coherently address global challenges like pandemics, travel hiatuses, and economic meltdowns, without resorting to authoritarian centralized solutions that excessively restrict individual freedoms and thereby further contract the world economy, put a new focus on the sophistication in expectations and aspirations of society. In this context, an increase in digital skills brought by intensive use of online education prepares the potential for the advent and adoption of major innovations. The organization of societies, like architecture, is an art. Whether actually older or not, the origins of the concept of democracy pass through its most famous and universally appreciated instance known as Athenian democracy, as recounted by Herodotus (Herodotus 2003; Narcisse 2012). He described a system of organization allegedly designed by a ruler called Cleisthenes and practiced in Athens between 507 and 460 bc. The system is based on the sovereign body of all available constituents, named the ekklesia (the assembly), deliberating and issuing laws through a simple majority of people attending their almost weekly meetings. These took place on the Pnyx, a hill in the western part of the city. The day-to-day business was carried on by paid functionaries who formed the “Boule ” (executive). These were chosen by lottery to serve a term limited to one year to avoid influence on the choice by the fame that can be created by wealth. A similar principle was used for the system of judges, called the dikasteria (the judiciary), who were chosen daily by lottery. The scalability for classic Athenian democracy to large societies is not yet accomplished by technology. However, the system of representative democracy accompanying early modernity, by giving the masses an almost effortless sense of participation – features associated with kitsch (Calinescu 1987) – , promises to become more genuine through the opportunities of electronic civic involvement. Electronic forums, polls, and citizen initiative portals experiment with ideas for the future. For a part of human history, technology shaped society faster than what pure ideas could achieve (Bartlett 2018). This may have changed with the advent of social media, which provides ideas with powerful presentation platforms. Effects and challenges raised by technological imperfections are visible in the fake-news hype and recurrent perceptions of stasis in e-participation technology (Bright and Margetts 2016; Susha and Gronlund 1 Acknowledgments for a significant background reference go to Radu Moraru, and acknowledgments for editing feedback goes to Mircea and Viorel.

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2014; Rosenberg 2018). Nevertheless, the victim of cultural industrialization may still be eventually provided a passage to genuine participatory democracy (Smith and Tolbert 2004). Entering the much trumpeted Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab 2017), emergent scalable artificial intelligence (AI) support for mastering big data in group decision systems nurtures hopes for the possibility of surpassing Athenian-like participation in the administration of society (Bright and Margetts 2016), a dream that caters to post-modernist aesthetics. For better or worse, computer games, Second Life, Zoom, Facebook, and Google Earth bring about a surrogate social life, giving masses a debatable sentiment of fulfillment (Young 2010). Recent progress in technology for more efficient airplanes and route search has balanced a forceful immersion in virtual endeavors with fragile but more affordable opportunities of real travel to enrich oneself with direct exposure to real cultures and landscapes. Improved social networks and participatory opportunities in the future could help to further break down the isolation created by industrialization and pandemics, helping humanity compensate for the loss of classical social life and purpose with genuinely valuable experiences (Tosun 2019; Lee et al. 2011).

Decentralization Opposition to authority is a common point of reference for modernism and post-modernism (Calinescu 1987). Modernism sees in “authority” an evil, while post-modernism stresses its relativity and therefore also tends to undermine authority. One of the main recent manifestations of opposition to authority is the ever wider popularity and acceptance of decentralization (Zyskind et al. 2015; Swan 2015). While older types of opposition to authority were characterized by opposition to its rules and culture, technology has brought about the possibility of substituting central authority with decentralization. For centuries decentralization was written off as an idealistic dream with its feasibility confined to minuscule problems (Narcisse 2012), an extrapolation of the perceived tininess of Greek Athens of the past.2 Early technology like the printer, the radio, and the television lowered the bar on the ability to share and disseminate opinions, but still only few people, other than authority figures, could effectively be disseminators. 2 In fact, the size of Athens at the time with its 40,000 eligible constituents was in the range of many contemporary towns.

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The tornado of change was first ignited by the advent of the Internet. This new technology succeeded in lowering the entry bar to information dissemination in ways not touched by previous technological revolutions. Virtually every human being was given the opportunity to easily share their ideas on a large scale and with minimal cost. This gives rise to new decentralization designs in the economy, media, politics, and general methods of decentralization. The economy. Crypto-currency is a flagship of decentralization (Nakamoto 2008). The transactions and value of the new type of currency is the result of negotiation by actors with powers def ined by custom-made properties such as spent work, acquired share, or votes. While state entities test these technologies for application to management of trans-national and trans-organizational trust, large swathes of the society have embraced the crypto-currency decentralization bandwagon to claim freedom from traditional economic authority. The media. Social networks, search engines, and blogs have been hailed as the democratization of the media. The promise is that everyone can write blogs or other entries on social media, and these can be instantly disseminated and made searchable for the rest of humanity, feeding everyone’s thirst for a purpose. Certainly, the tricks for manipulating search-engine criteria and piercing the glass ceiling to real visibility are not yet purely democratic and the number of real influencers is limited, but merit and fairness are the compass pulling the technological trend (Kim and Yoon 2019). Politics. Crowned with president Obama’s initiatives website “We the People,” the last decades have seen large numbers of projects for supporting e-participation, even if none of them has yet achieved significant success (Rosenberg 2018). These range from simple fora, citizen initiative portals, to virtual town halls. Political party–dedicated, and thereby controversial, emerging software claims the ability to measure and represent popular intentions as illustrated by Pirate Parties’ Liquid-Democracy or by Italy’s Five Star movement. Some mechanisms are fully decentralized, including systems for eliciting population initiatives based on blockchain (DemocracyOS; Mancini 2015) and on unstructured peer-to-peer automated gossip (DirectDemocracyP2P; Silaghi et al. 2013). Methods of decentralization. The management and competition of ideas in a global market without authority is in itself a significant simultaneous

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technological and philosophical challenge. The buzzwords ruling these efforts refer to collaborative filtering, polls, or e-voting (Shardanand and Maes 1995). Such technologies are in themselves subject to scrutiny, being continuously analyzed to detect and reduce framing, manipulations, and various security attacks (Curseu and Schruijer 2008).

Representative Democracy as Kitsch Kitsch, is seen as a facet of modernity, and by some as the final degraded state of modernism (Lazare 1999). It is related to the concepts of aesthetic inadequacy, or the aesthetic lie, characteristics highlighted by Calinescu (Calinescu 1987), of cultural identity theft identified by Holliday and Potts (2012) – in a target moving with each generation. Independently of whether the term originally comes from a German art traders’ transformation of the English word “catch,” “sketch,” or a German synonym for “cheap,” the concept represented by the term promotes a negative connotation of fake through inadequate purpose or context. Modernity and kitsch are concepts discovered in the arts and architecture before subsequently being adopted by philosophy, reinforcing the foundational position of aesthetics as basis of value judgment. In philosophy, kitsch is associated less with objects than with such falsification processes. Technological advances contemporary with modernism made it easier and commercially viable to create faux architectural features and objects in shapes resembling purposeful masterpieces, but devoid of their content or meaningful context. Whether the culprit for the shallowness is the lack of uniqueness, the low costs of production, or the poor fit with the context, these views evolved over time with the manifestations of these cultural identity thefts, and with the depth of their identification. The effect is cultural homogeneity in superficiality, described by Calinescu as infantile regression of adults and accelerated development of children. Born as a revolution against traditional culture and authority, modernism was accused of eventually morphing itself into kitsch, as another channel to convey authority. The counterculture became mainstream, and through a selective lack of seriousness, a tool for rewarding political quiescence and discouraging demystification of power (Lazare 1999; Greenberg 1939). Thus, kitsch is a democratization of values through copies characterized by low education costs and “aesthetic lies” in the sense of claiming, for show, to replicate value without actually containing it, duping consumers to feel art ownership without the deep value of art being actually present.

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Athenian democracy is classically seen as a value based on time-taking effort, an ideal that would be difficult to accomplish in the context of the size and complexity of current societies. It is studied and admired as an object of art that is difficult to create (Narcisse 2012). In relation to Athenian democracy, representative democracy can be described as kitsch, with its name inducing the consumer to feel like having conquered democracy. However, real Pnyx democracy as in Athens requires effort to make one’s opinions heard on each issue, which is not easily scalable to large organizations. Representative democracy is the replica whose consumers, with little or no effort, select a representative to think for them. The effect is quite different, its relation to democracy limited to the name, a vain boast of having democracy, and it makes an excellent example of kitsch as an “aesthetic lie.” The difference in effect is not only in terms of the quality of governance but much more in terms of personal fulfillment in citizens’ lives.

Is Postmodernism’s Non-falsifiability, “Decentralization”? One of the main characteristics of post-modernism is the drive for nonfalsifiability, and from this perspective decentralization can indeed be identified as the epitome of the promise of non-falsifiability. In a world where economic, political, and social leaders can be suspected of falsity, decentralization shelters the absolute, the authentic personal will. Looking further into telltale signs, one of the major advantages advertised by the recent blockchain technology is its verifiability. Everyone has access to the ledger with its records and can redo all the computations to establish the truth independently (Nakamoto 2008), testifying to the perception of decentralization as aligned to post-modernism’s non-falsifiability.3 However, confirming the fear that kitsch avoidance is a moving target, society is confronted with another awakening as the non-falsifiability is still a fata morgana despite perceived decentralization. This is very visible now, as social media brought forward the concept of fake news and people are occasionally drawn to invest in false blockchain schemes, like OneCoin! Current solutions chosen by the decentralization techniques employed in 3 As a short technological introduction, the blockchain technology generates a database of records where new items are appended grouped in blocks that are chained to the previous state of the databases. The chain of blocks, also called the ledger, is under collective supervision by a group of collaborating participants. Only one of these participants can append a block at a time, as decided by a proof of work or proof of share. Ties are broken by a vote implicit in the selection of a version of the ledger and its submission for extension by others.

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media match more the spirit of avangardism than post-modernism.4 Namely, the Twitter and Facebook movements were embodied in revolutions which are violent and enthusiastic – characteristic of avangardism –, rather than deep, introspective, and integrative. They are dead-ending in a stasis, namely a state where new efforts are continuously placed and new e-participation sites and revolutions are started without leading to a sense of real global advance towards the valued classic Athenian-like democratic society (Bright and Margetts 2016, Toots 2019). Several decentralized technologies prove to simply cultivate a mob rather than a society, stumbling over the intention-outcome gap that is a major concern of post-modernist philosophy. It is therefore natural that doubts are expressed on whether is it even possible for technology to solve “all humanity’s problems.” The current Google CEO, Sundar Pichai, expressed his lack of belief in definitive technological solutions (Gelles 2018), but nevertheless acknowledges that many researchers still work on it. Lowering our sights from “all problems of humanity” to the specific case of Athenian democracy, it is worth noting that current dogma still asserts that Athenian democracy is not scalable. But could technological advances bring scalable and even better versions of democracy? Before this question can be answered, humanity has to address an even harder ontological challenge: What better democracy do we want? Addressing such questions requires an inquisitive spirit to break the chains of previous thought and take the courage needed to shrug off superficial dogmas and to question, innovate, and evaluate novel ideas, despite all the trends in favor of a kitschy comfort in political quiescence. Such an evaluation is not easy, since alternatives correspond to challenging trade-offs. Can desired solutions respect the fragile cultural ecosystems while offering comfort and progress? Certainly, while there are humans happier to accomplish their purpose in life by preserving the past, others would rather contribute to progress, and still others measure their happiness by the comfort they have achieved. The ability to match problems and solutions is one of the promises of AI technology. Until the necessary AI support technology is perfected, it can be noted that global upheavals like the ones generated by recent pandemics did give people opportunities to think about alternatives. The resulting search process is most visible in large protests and unusual movements of 2020, 4 Avangardism is a facet of modernity (Calinescu 1987) characterized by trends emphasizing enthusiasm in a rushed push to experiment with radical novelty and to f ight tradition. It is commonly seen as the opposite of relativist self-reflexive post-modernism.

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which while controversial and seemingly only half-baked, prove interest in improvement, whether or not they may actually find a path to progress.

Who Drives Progress? It is claimed that the sustainable progress of the past was achieved by technology, as phrased in Kenneth R. Bartlett’s Development of European Civilization (Bartlett 2018). The examples he provides for this generalization are based on the fact that technology not only helped free serfs through the power of the city bourgeoisie it made possible, but also eventually raised the quality of life of city workers through the efficiency generated by the Industrial Revolution. These successes of technology make for a strong contrast with earlier unsuccessful efforts and bloody revolts kindled by similar humanist ideas. We can however appreciate the position of those same humanist philosophers as visionaries and prophets of the ethical direction of society. It is heralded that today we experience a Fourth Industrial Revolution, namely the rise of AI to automate ever more complex activities (Schwab 2017). This is occurring after the steam-power, mass production, and the digitization revolutions. Will this AI revolution bring emancipation from kitsch democracy? Philosophers are certainly still among the early harbingers of this type of progress, since it is their vocation. But, will they this time succeed in actually effecting change before the technology? Given the nature of the accomplishments of the previous industrial revolutions, in particular the recent advent of the Internet with its powerful communications paradigms, stronger tools than ever can support the exchange of ideas and the education of the masses. Massive Open Online Courses exemplif ied by Coursera and Udemy provide customized support to the most underserved parts of the Earth. Still, due to the intrinsic complexity of human societies, more technological advances may not only be required but may also be the most sensitive ingredient in the mix. As technological complexity explodes, philosophy needs to scrutinize low-level choices of system configurations to avoid fake news–style bloopers. Fortunately, advances in education can help philosophers get more easily involved and contribute to the avalanche of technological developments. Many AI researchers look for ways in which technology can solve the problems of humanity, but given the nature of this technology, this time humanity may be able to get more involved at the helm of progress.

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The Mob and Society The United States boasts one of the most developed civil societies, built on a deeply entrenched culture of civilized discussion in town halls, designed on the example of parliamentarian proceedings. However, history contends that the development of this currently advanced civil society has passed through a primitive early period where town halls and church meetings were marred by scandal and undue influence. The primitive town hall needed a technology booster to morph into a refined society. This need was described and acted upon by Henry Robert in 1876, when he started to develop the well-known “Robert’s Rules of Order,” built by adjusting to the town-hall setting the parliamentarian traditions of the United Kingdom and the United States (Robert 1915). As a recipe ingredient, his Rules of Order were the salt that transformed the mob into a society. These rules act as restrictions on behavior, but can also be described as algorithms of interaction, related to the communication protocols of AI-enabled group decision-making systems. To improve understanding by drawing parallels to another similar historical development, one can note that systems of rules such as ISBN-maintenance procedures were created by publishers to ensure that books do represent the message of their authors, despite availability of technologies created to deceive. Do the digital media systems of the future need to place restrictions on human interactions? The history discussed above suggests this to be the case. However, such restrictions do not need to be content-limiting. Just as with face-to-face meetings where the Robert’s Rules allow any topic to be discussed but only impose sequences to ensure the opportunity to clarify the subject, technology-supported societies may need to discover their own parliamentarian-level procedures (Prakken 2001; Silaghi et al. 2013). Form-limiting guides, like Robert’s Rules, can be powerful in supporting structure for clarifying content and helping to ensure convergence towards a conclusion. Currently, digital speech suffers from susceptibility to a manipulated response rate, trolls, and unrestrained framing, as well as from violent anonymous menaces. Other than appealing to discussion moderators, action that would break the very promise of decentralization, modern technology is trying to exploit collaborative filtering, which consists of helping society to self-regulate through local inhibition signals to boost or reduce the visibility of messages (Willson 2014). AI research is heavily invested in designing and tuning the corresponding communication mechanisms to provide various properties such as fairness and incentives for responsible inputs. Rigid but enabling rules of order in a transparent

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society are key to releasing the “local antibodies” of purgative collaborative filtering to sanitize digital speech.

Decentralization Dimensions in the Technological Fabric of Society As decentralization proceeds to meet the aspirations of authenticity and fulfilling life purposes, more opportunities arise to shape new dimensions of development. The number of directions in which decentralization is possible may not be itself finite, as only the most currently salient of them might have been conscientized. Decision-making is a complex process whose stages, like fractals, multiply upon closer inspection. The easily visible tip of the iceberg here consists in the decentralization of the selection between available choices, as in modern voting and elections. One also knows well the slightly deeper decentralization of decision-choices formulation, as in the Athenian Pnyx deliberations. However, recent efforts, even if only slightly scratching the surface, have led to a whole new world of decentralization challenges (Silaghi et al. 2013). In the particular case of the decentralization of decision-making, a next level consists in the process of defining the assembly (i.e. ekklesia, constituency, or the voter’s list). An example is illustrated by regions where residing aliens can participate in decision-making while non-residing citizens are excluded, and where local decisions of eligibility differ from the rules at federal level of the same country (Earnest 2003). The next philosophical question is how deep can this type of decentralization go? May each individual have her own definition of the ekklesia whose deliberations she considers authoritative on a given problem? May the relevant ekklesia be different for each problem addressed? Can technology even support such dynamism and can human societies and practice adjust to such ethical developments (Qin et al. 2013)? Since these issues will be solved by some technological tool, this naturally raises the question of which technological tool to use, who can develop the technological tools, and who may maintain them. These are just as much themselves decisions that call for decentralization when the sustainability of decentralization is seriously considered. The coexistence of multiple technologies with competing developers raises further questions of who may recommend and when to adopt such technologies, questions that actually started to be addressed as soon as decentralization software began to be widely used (Alhamed et al. 2013; Nikitin et al. 2017).

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But the means of communication themselves raise the challenge of continuous centralization in technical management structures, even as partial decentralization is already introduced by the Internet. Certainly, this issue has not escaped the inquisitive eye of humanity in its thirst for decentralization and purpose, as extensive work is put into exploiting ad-hoc networks that become more and more needed and supported in the vehicular message-exchange setting. Already autonomous vehicles can disseminate information without having to rely on potentially failed infrastructures, bottlenecks, and single points of failure. Humans may profit from the creation of technology by being able to reliably communicate without the need for centralizing service providers (Dhannoon et al. 2013). While the process of going deeper into technological details provides continuously new philosophical questions with decentralization ramifications, other similar challenges are seen at the higher level of information selection and dissemination. Media is a major factor in shaping decisions and the quality of such information has become the battlefield of modern times. While the call is for tagging and filtering of news by social-media providers to increase the voice of professionals and experts against fake news, efforts are also starting to ensure the decentralization of the process of certifying such experts and professionals (Boutet et al. 2013). Further, dissemination is just part of this subproblem, since a separate set of efforts aims to present the data in ways that factor out framing and maximize objectivity in both display and editing incentives through structures and limitations (Roussev and Silaghi 2017). In summary, issues appearing when decentralizing decision-making with technology include decentralized decisions of citizenship, of census, of electoral structure, of decision-making rules, of the means and priorities of communication, of incentives for supporting infrastructure, of software development, dissemination, reviewing, and maintenance, of news and media, of items of deliberation, of arguments and their presentation, of voting, and of the presentation of information and translation into the languages and idioms of the constituents. Among the multiple efforts in all these directions and many others, those developed in conjunction with the DirectDemocracyP2P system (Silaghi et al. 2013) are different from the family of efforts in the blockchain community, both in technology and in the level of integration.

Decentralized Census, Citizenship, and Constituency Deciding on the group of people to have the right to vote in decision-making is a far from trivial issue, even for organizations that are space-contained,

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like countries, towns, or neighborhoods. The challenge only becomes more intuitive in the case of virtual communities, like diasporas and the indigenous populations and tribes of Canada or the United States. The whole concept of organization is heavily interlinked with the concept of constituency, since the constituents define the constitution of the organization and the constitution defines the constituency. However, the constituency is limited by the constitution, and therefore constitutional change can be seen as a transition between two distinct organizations, just as it has been observed with crypto-currency forks. The old constitution/organization may stubbornly decide to exist while most constituents migrate onto a new one, with orderly resources migration controlled by the original constitution (setup). We witness times when even space-bounded organizations, like towns, can define voting eligibility in radically flexible ways, like Lausanne where foreign non-state citizens can vote after living a given number of years in the town, while its traveling locally born citizens lose such privileges. The main difference in the mechanism of constituency definition is made by the nature of the final decision-making strategy. Constitutions can define constituents in more or less rigid ways, but a constant is that written rules have ambiguity and require a deciding court as a final authority. When such a deciding court is amenable to a referendum by the same constituency, the organization is labeled in DirectDemocracyP2P as “democratic.” Other finaldecision mechanisms on constituency memberships are supported in DirectDemocracyP2P and corresponding organizations are labeled as “authoritarian”. Complex organizations like countries – where the supreme court is a separate final decider but may be controlled indirectly by referendum over multiple generations – can be modeled in DirectDemocracyP2P as an authoritarian organization. When an external group can decide constituency membership, this membership is Boolean and is uniquely agreed on by all members. However, when the constituency votes in a referendum on its own membership, the outcome depends on the hypothesis of who the members are, namely on the outcome of the referendum itself. Therefore any fix-point of this referendum (see the mathematical concept of fix-point of a function) namely where the result is consistent with simple-majority voting5 on its own members, makes a legal decision constituency = membership_referendum(constituency) 5 While DirectDemocracyP2P currently supports only simple majority, other voting strategies could be theoretically used.

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Multiple such fix-points can exist, and they can define overlapping communities, and be adopted by different members. Therefore, the actual constituency may be different for distinct members, and may infer different rules and outcomes as results of the organization’s decision-making. While such an outcome is actually observed as emergent chaotic and undesirable behaviors in certain areas of the world with failed states, it can make sense for organizations such a political parties, which search their own constituency, to achieve a majority of support for a presidential candidate or for polling a promising political platform. When the constituency is defined for large organizations, it generally has to be split into a hierarchy of electoral districts and precincts, or polling divisions. While such divisions are sometimes used for warping vote counts, a procedure known as gerrymandering, they are also particularly useful for improved voting verifiability and constituency membership auditing. The definition of neighborhood hierarchies as polling divisions is made in DirectDemocracyP2P with a decentralized process itself, based on votes by the current constituency, with a fix-point definition. The dynamic electoral districts obtained in this way enable scalable constituency membership management and auditing that is necessary for decentralized management. Probabilistic reasoning is used to aggregate and propagate information about constituents based on all possible sources and peer-support or alarms, to inform each user of the best estimate of constituency composition given personal values and interpretations of the constitution of the organization.

Decentralized Communication Robust decentralization assumes that users can communicate and disseminate decision-making information in ways that guarantee the democracy of the overall system. Just as Athenian democracy was not anchored in secret arguments but in public deliberation, secrecy of messages is not a requirement of a democratic system and may not even be desirable for public organizations as it minimizes dissemination, trust, and accountability. While many social networks focus on offering end-to-end encryption and privacy, such networks are not focused on public deliberation, in the Swiss Landesgemainden (canton assemblies), opinions not cried out loud are useless from the perspective of the process. Comparatively, the use of non-repudiation of statements through use of digital signatures and appropriate key distribution means is essential to the integrity of democracy.

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While communication could use a centralized digital blackboard, like a website or a dedicated server, it is natural to expect that such a unique point of failure would not be a strength for a large-scale democracy. Common decentralized communications schemes are based on overlay networks or ad-hoc wireless/radio meshes. Decentralized contacts are commonly used by most social networks, with peer-to-peer contact initialization based on phone numbers, QR-codes, and directory lookup of unique names. In DirectDemocracyP2P, the contacts can also be initialized using media address containers, typically images or pictures of peers that embed contact addresses invisibly (“steganographically”; Silaghi et al. 2013). With overlay networks, points of encounter are needed for mobile peers to contact each other and pierce network-address translation mechanisms that isolate intranets in most user homes. Such points of encounter are offered mostly by volunteers incentivized with multiple schemes. These include: friendship-based, spontaneous service to community, reputation-building efforts, and utilitarian motivation with a direct monetary payment or with advertisement-based revenue (Alhamed and Silaghi 2014). In overlays, the basic communication schemes are based on distributed hash tables (Maymounkov and Mazieres 2002), distributed consensus (Nakamoto 2008), or gossip broadcast protocols (Silaghi et al. 2013). In the support of ad-hoc mesh communication, mechanisms to disseminate civic involvement data are specialized for vehicular ad-hoc networks, aka VANETs (Dhannoon et al. 2013). The individual peer agents can select to broadcast information on highways according to plans that maximize the utility of the sender in terms of usefulness of disseminated data, as computed based on the surrounding vehicles’ speed and their users’ interests.

Decentralized Software Maintenance It is unrealistic to expect any significant fraction of users to understand and verify all significant functions of the type of advanced software capable of providing the services needed for democracy. Standardization of such software, however, would undermine the decentralization goals of the whole exercise. Once communication protocols are winning terrain, multiple providers of software can cooperate to ensure users obtain software well personalized to their goals and needs. Many of these software efforts are expected to consist

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of free and open-source software developed and maintained by volunteers. The auditing and review of such software is needed to avoid malicious attacks by the many special interest groups with stakes in democratic processes. The DirectDemocracyP2P system has an embedded module to support a decentralized meta-recommender system that suggests to individual peers the groups of reviewers who could maximize overall system robustness. It works by maximizing proximity and diversity of adopted reviewers. Software updates and migration are recommended by the software to users based on ratings from reviewers adopted by each peer. The metarecommendation suggests reviewers to novice users based on input from users who expertly configure their systems. The mechanism is tuned to reduce the number of casualties, namely peers coaxed into migrating to attacked software that can change their votes or manipulate their user interface. Such attacked software could otherwise easily penetrate the markets as in the recently published case of Crypto AG (Miller 2020). Namely, Crypto AG is a company registered in a neutral country that was bough over by an actor in the cold war and that was employed for decades to coax the opposed countries to upgrade their secret communication devices to compromised versions.

Decentralized News/Media The availability of correct information is essential for democracy and valuable decision-making. Fake-news worries are prevalent in current electoral processes for good reason. Appropriateness of decisions cannot be expected to be better than the quality of the information upon which they are based. While people will continue to get information through traditional channels in media and social networks, it can be expected that powerful new technology will provide better means to present constituents with all sides of an issue, even if their truth evaluation will have to be individual and potentially swayed by trusted “expert” voices. Experts can prove their expertise in the quality of their arguments, and the value of enabling all voices is upheld in the United States by the First Amendment. It is remarkable that the dissemination of news and of their evaluation and ranking can be made with the same technologies as used to manage constituencies and their deliberations, since attacks against news based on Sybils, intimidation, and response-rate manipulation are similar for these situations.

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Decentralized Deliberation The hallmark of deliberation in the United States is the structuring of the process into formal parliamentary-style motions and arguments. While various redefinitions of these procedures were made for electronic deliberations, the concepts of motions and arguments were largely retained. Motions are formal proposals with clear voting choices of the type yes/no/abstain. Proposals with more alternatives, for the most reputable decision mechanisms like Condorcet voting, were shown to be equivalent with sequences of binary motions under majority voting whenever a stable preference exists. In parliamentary deliberations, arguments are sequential as an audience has to listen to them one by one. Long arguments are known as ways of attacking such deliberations, in so-called filibusters. Online systems can enable parallel argument submission and can thereby prevent filibusters, but they raise the specter of enabling a spamming of debates with large numbers of comments to reduce visibility and access to opposing opinions – a kind of e-filibuster. As a way to reduce possibility of e-f ilibusters, DirectDemocracyP2P introduces a limit of one active argument per constituent per motion. Constituents can continuously edit and improve their argument text, but the requirement to structure it as a single coherent piece is designed to help users detect changes lacking substance and reduce the waste of resources in e-f ilibusters. Text length can also be controlled, as done by Twitter, to improve readability, but it goes against the empowerment of strong, well-argued positions. Argument editing and improvement in a decentralized system is done by maintenance of a coherent order in changes, using declared dates where ties are broken with secure hashing algorithms and third-party attacks are thwarted using strong digital signatures. In order to help users in structuring fairly the large amounts of information that can be generated in large organizations even with the restrictions on numbers of active arguments, a decentralized collaborative filtering process is also used to generate rankings and classifications of arguments, letting constituents detect and declare relations found between positions. Such relations of support, opposition, and similarity between positions are disseminated securely in a way similar to the arguments themselves. The software agents of the constituents can use data-processing techniques to provide personalized and objective rankings of the available information based on the aforementioned relations, helping to maximize access to all sides of each issue (Silaghi et al. 2017; Roussev and Silaghi 2017).

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Decentralized Voting Unlike with voting in a booth, it is in general diff icult to ensure privacy and therefore security and protection from vote-buying when the ballots are cast comfortably in everyone’s home. Certainly countrywide elections require more secure settings with booths and peer verif ication. However, decentralized voting with software on mobile devices has its valid application in cases of signature gathering for petitions and citizen initiatives, or for lower prof ile voting exercises on committees, boards, and societies where security is not commonly enforced with voting booths. Further, in some democratic organizations, namely those where constituency membership is user-dependent, each constituent gets a different interpretation of the vote, resulting in different counts based on their definition of what the constituency is and on their interpretation of the constitution of the organization. As such, the results of votes in such situations cannot be used to establish agreed rules that have to be unique to a country, but rather can be used to poll the opinions of like-minded people or of people that “matter” in order to make personal decisions, such as how to vote in a different organization. For example, a vote in a decentralized society may help users to decide how to vote in a classical vote in one’s country.

Decentralized Translations When organizations are multilingual, as in the case of multilingual countries or transnational boards, software texts and messages have to be presented in the language of the readers. However, translations can introduce nuances and errors that can pervert the nature of conveyed information. Therefore leaving the translation task to automated systems or unscrutinized volunteers introduces potential dangers. An alternative supported in DirectDemocracyP2P is to have expert users propose their own translations, or contribute to fixing and promote existing ones, using a collaborative filtering approach to refine the default translations proposed to novice users of the various languages involved. This mechanism has been generalized such that complete widget sets for graphical user interfaces usable in decentralized decision-making are integrated with collaborative filtering capabilities (Silaghi et al. 2013).

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Adoption of Decentralization The final and pressing question that has to be addressed concerns the way in which the population can be educated to understand and get the skills to handle such radically different and complex concepts as those used by consistent decentralized systems. The answer will likely come with the gradual adoption by youth and workers of applications for the management of student governments, unions, committees, boards, and remote project management. Pressure brought by pandemics to move many activities online accelerates the advent of opportunities for such education.

Will AI Take Our Jobs? The idea that “automation takes jobs” is a modern fear that has been raised and discussed for centuries. AI can certainly replace many of the current jobs, but opens equally many new avenues of employment, just as computers changed the employment landscape by removing many repetitive and boring jobs and replacing them with creative software development positions. One of the reasons for which Athenian democracy was viable is that the enfranchised citizenry was free from menial duties to consider and discuss matters of state. In Athens this in turn required disenfranchised slaves. Today, engagement in democracy is one of those tasks that is important but frequently left aside due to the daily worries of life. The fact that AI can replace us in productive tasks may leave us more time to better dedicate ourselves to rewarding e-citizen endeavors. While the slavery of Athens was a moral flaw of their society, having AI take on the role of slaves in our own times may be seen as a strength. The role of the e-citizen, one of those that the new changes promise to promote, is arguably among the most fulfilling of occupations. Or, are not all of us able to rise to that height? Hopefully technology will provide the stepping stool each of us needs! Researchers have concluded that the opportunity to participate more in government has in itself contributed to an increase in the level of education and civic maturity of citizens (Tolbert et al. 2009). This was intuitively argued since Socrate’s Allegory of the Cave (Plato 2014) suggested that personal investigative action is essential for emancipation from inherited political doctrines, and was reinforced when the experiment on two kittens (Held and Hein 1963) reared together from birth in a yoke that only one of them could move showed that thereby it was the only one which learned spatial cues. But placing people in charge before

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they are mature enough is also a risk, similar to the one we have to take with each new young generation. Keeping one’s children at home to guarantee their safety has to be balanced with the assignment of responsibilities to let them mature. As part of the process of the emancipation of humanity, technology promises to allow us take responsibilities back into our own hands, away from the patronizing assistance of nanny representatives in current representative democracy. In the future people may have time and tools to philosophize, argue, and negotiate efficiently, directly, and fairly about what democracy they want. We do not know if that is going to be called direct democracy.

References Alhamed, Khalid and Marius C. Silaghi. 2014. “User Freedom: To Be or Not to Be a ‘Supernode.’” 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 1–5. New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Alhamed, Khalid, Marius C. Silaghi, Ihsan Hussien, Ryan Stansifer, and Yi Yang. 2013. “Stacking the Deck Attack on Software Updates: Solution by Distributed Recommendation of Testers.” Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence (WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT), vol. 2, 293–300. Washington, DC: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Computer Society. . Bartlett, Kenneth R. 2018. Development of European Civilization. The Great Courses. https://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/development-ofeuropean-civilization. Boutet, Antoine, Davide Frey, Rachid Guerraoui, Arnaud Jegou, and Anne-Marie Kermarrec. 2013. “Whatsup: A Decentralized Instant News Recommender.” 2013 IEEE 27th International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing, 741–52. New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Bright, Jonathan and Helen Margetts 2016. “Big Data and Public Policy: Can It Succeed Where E-Participation Has Failed?” Policy & Internet 8, no. 3: 218–24. Calinescu, Matei. 1987. Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Curseu, Petru Lucian and Sandra Schruijer. 2008. “The Effects of Framing on Inter-group Negotiation.” Group Decision and Negotiation 17, no. 4: 347–62. Dhannoon, Osamah, Rahul Vishen, and Marius C. Silaghi. 2013. “Content Dissemination over VANET: Boosting Utility Based Heuristics Using Interests.” 2013 International Conference on Connected Vehicles and Expo (ICCVE), 106–13. New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers/World Academy of Connected Vehicles.

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Earnest, David. 2003. “Noncitizen Voting Rights: A Survey of an Emerging Democratic Norm.” Paper presented at the 2003 Annual convention of the American Political Science Association, August 28–31, Philadelphia. Gelles, David. 2018. “Sundar Pinchai of Google: Technology Doesn’t Solve Humanity’s Problems.” New York Times, November 8. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/ business/sundarpichai-google-corner-office.html. Greenberg, Clement. 1939. “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.” Partisan Review 6, no. 13: 34–49. Held, Richard and Hein Alan. 1963. “Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behavior.” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 56, no. 5: 872–6. Herodotus. 2003. The Histories. London: Penguin Classics. Holliday, Ruth and Tracey Potts. 2012. Kitsch! Cultural Politics and Taste. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kim, Byeowool and Yongik Yoon. 2019. “Journalism Model Based on Blockchain with Sharing Space.” Symmetry 11, no. 1: 19. doi:10.3390/sym11010019. Lazare, Daniel. 1999. “Modernism as Kitsch: Hilton Kramer’s Thirty-year Culture War.” Baffler 13: 27–33. Lee, Gyudong, Jaeeun Lee and Soonjae Kwon. 2011. “Use of Social-Networking Sites and Subjective Well-Being: A Study in South Korea.” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 14, no. 3: 151–55. Mancini, Pia 2015. “Why It Is Time to Redesign Our Political System.” European View 14, no. 1: 69–75. Maymounkov, Petar and David Mazieres. 2002. “Kademlia: A Peer-to-Peer Information System Based on the Xor Metric.” International Workshop on Peer to-Peer Systems, 53–65. Berlin: Springer. Miller, Greg. 2020. “The Intelligence Coup of the Century.” Washington Post, February 11. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ 2020/world/national-security/ cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/. Nakamoto, Satoshi. 2008. “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.” Accessed October 31, 2018. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. Narcisse, Tiky. 2012. “The African Origins of the Athenian Democracy.” Paper presented at the 43rd National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), March 14–17, Las Vegas, NV. Nikitin, Kirill, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Philipp Jovanovic, Nicolas Gailly, Linus Gasser, Ismail Khoffi, Justin Cappos, and Bryan Ford. 2017. “CHAINIAC: Proactive Software-update Transparency via Collectively Signed Skipchains and Verified Builds.” Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17), 1271–87. Berkeley: USENIX: The Advanced Computing Systems Association. Plato. 2014. The Republic. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

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Prakken, Henry. 2001. Formalizing Robert’s Rules of Order An Experiment in Automating Mediation of Group Decision Making. Technical Report 10.5555/869694. Sophia Antipolis: European Research Consortium for Informatics and Mathematics at FHG. Qin, Song, Marius C. Silaghi, Toshihiro Matsui, Makoto Yokoo, and Katsutoshi Hirayama. 2013. “Addressing False Identity Attacks in Action-Based P2P Social Networks with an Open Census.” 2013 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence (WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT), vol. 3, 50–57. Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society. Robert, Henry Martyn. 1915. Robert’s Rules of Order Revised for Deliberative Assemblies. Chicago: Scott, Foresman. Rosenberg, Eli. 2018. “The White House Has Finally Restored a Petitions Site that Is Critical of President Trump.” Washington Post, February 1. https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/31/the-white-house-promisedto-restore-a-petitions-site-that-was-critical-of-trump-it-hasnt/. Roussev, Roussi and Marius Silaghi. 2017. “A Logic for Making Hard Decisions.” Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, edited by Vasile Rus and Zdravko Markov, 712–16. Palo Alto, CA: AAAI Press. Schwab, Klaus. 2017. The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Redfern, NSW: Currency. Shardanand, Upendra and Pattie Maes. 1995. “Social Information Filtering: Algorithms for Automating ‘Aord of Mouth.’” Chi 95: 210–17. Silaghi, Marius, Roussi Roussev, and Badria Alfurhood. 2017. “Why Do They Vote That?” Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, edited by Vasile Rus and Zdravko Markov, 128–33. Palo Alto, CA: AAAI Press. Silaghi, Marius C., Khalid Alhamed, Osamah Dhannoon, Song Qin, Rahul Vishen, Ryan Knowles, Ihsan Hussien, et al. 2013. “DirectDemocracyP2P – Decentralized Deliberative Petition Drives.” IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings, 1–2. IEEE Xplore. doi:10.1109/P2P.2013.6688733. Smith, Daniel and Caroline Tolbert. 2004. Educated by Initiative: The Effects of Direct Democracy on Citizens and Political Organizations in the American States. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Susha, Iryna and Åke Grönlund. 2014. “Context Clues for the Stall of the Citizens’ Initiative: Lessons for Opening up E-participation Development Practice.” Government Information Quarterly 31, no. 3: 454–65. Swan, Melanie. 2015. Blockchain: Blueprint for a New Economy. E-book. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media. Tolbert, Caroline J, Daniel A Smith, and John C Green. 2009. “Strategic Voting and Legislative Redistricting Reform: District and Statewide Representational Winners and Losers.” Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 1: 92–109.

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Toots, Maarja. 2019. “Why E-participation systems fail: The case of Estonia’s Osale. ee” Government Information Quarterly 36, no. 3 (July): 546–59. Tosun, Leman Pınar. 2019. “Use of Social Networking Sites and Subjective WellBeing.” Current Approaches in Psychiatry/Psikiyatride Guncel Yaklasimlar 11, no. 3 (November): 304–17. Willson, Michele. 2014. “The Politics of Social Filtering.” Convergence 20, no. 2: 218–32. Young, Jeffrey R. 2010. “Woodbury U. Banned from Second Life, Again.” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 21. https://www.chronicle. com/blogs/wiredcampus/ woodbury-u-banned-from-second-life-again. Zyskind, Guy, Oz Nathan, and Alex “Sandy” Pentland. 2015. “Decentralizing Privacy: Using Blockchain to Protect Personal Data.” 2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops, 180–84. IEEE Xplore. doi:10.1109/SPW.2015.27.

About the Author Marius C. Silaghi (Florida Institute of Technology) is a Professor of Computer Science at the Florida Institute of Technology. He was awarded his PhD in 2002 by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology at Lausanne for a dissertation on decentralization supported by artificial intelligence. His research and teaching have been focused on democracy-supporting technology, group decision-making, artificial intelligence techniques, privacy, and cryptographic protocols. [email protected]

16. Subjectivation, Modernity, and Hypermodernity Alain Touraine

Abstract Modernity is an action, a work (deed) that transforms the relation between a human group and its environment. The notion of “subjectivation” is the way I define human societies’ discovery and their creative capacity. Meanwhile the nation/states’ withdrawal into themselves, the closure of the borders to the full scope of globalization, and the acceptance or refusal of migrants become the central issue of all sociopolitical conflicts, replacing the previous labor-based conflicts that have been at the core of the industrial society. Sociological analysis today addresses the fundamental issue: What is the future of democracy? The answer lies in criticism visà-vis the idea of states and institutions as agents of democracy, and the assertion of a social definition of democracy. Keywords: subjectivation; hypermodernity; desocialization; modernity and sexuality; refugees

What best defines what I call “hypermodernity” is an advanced acknowledgement of the Self, individual or collective, as a subject – also definable as the subjectivation of the self.1 It is for this reason that I have insisted that all sociologists should replace the topic of “fraternity” from the famous French national motto of “liberty, equality, fraternity” – which has bolstered the most extremist stances, those of Hébertists, for example – with the topic of “dignity,” meaning the acknowledgement of subjectivation within the individual. Of course, we should not interpret subjectivation as only an individual or individualist process. As I have noted before,2 the topic of subjectivation might indeed be associated with “desocialization” – but one must not take this idea too far, as we must always keep a firm distance 1 In Touraine 2007; Toraine def ines the concept of subject as “the assertion, whose forms vary, of human beings’ freedom and capacity to create themselves and to transform themselves individually and collectively” (5). 2 Touraine, 2018, 252–60.

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between the individual and the subject. This is not just an analytical detail, but a fundamental assertion about the very nature of subjectivation. Indeed, my main intention has always been the reintroduction into sociological analysis – strongly, and almost violently – of the notion of the subject, following a long period defined by the ideological exclusion of this concept. Reintroducing the logic of subjectivation at an individual level is certainly a key characteristic of our post-industrial era. This element contrasts with approaches which can be defined as Marxian, and which we find in most working-class movements and particularly within communist currents that attach a great importance to the party. The significance of human rights at an individual level cannot be overestimated in terms of its importance for the topic of subjectivation. Nonetheless, we should not think that populist, collective emotional reactions cannot affect global politics. On the contrary, we note that political figures, as well as populist movements, even if relatively unconstructed ideologically, have featured prominently in the past. It was true under Mussolini in Italy; it is still true today with Modi in India, Erdogan in Turkey, or Putin in Russia.

Four Necessary Domains of Subjectivation Actors, whether individual or collective, must be aware of their responsibility and capacity to act: only then will we see the emergence of a committed subject – the willingness to be and to act as a subject. That would be the first step of what we might call the subjectivation of the self. Thus, agency does not create the actor, but it is the actor that creates agency: there is no democracy without love of liberty. With this in mind, I will take a stand on four issues encompassing the theme of subjectivation. The first issue is partially linked to the rediscovery of the individual, in whom I wish to find the Subject of subjectivation. Second, I feel the need to deepen my reflection regarding the question of women, for it is through this topic that we can touch upon the relation between nature and culture in our society. Third, I will address the issue of refugees and migrants. On this matter, I will try not to drive a wedge between the victims of an economic situation and those that endure social and cultural domination. In the end, I wish to answer the following question: How can we reintroduce the topic of democracy and fundamental human rights into countries that after colonization have refused – in increasing numbers – to adopt the political model of the colonizers but locked themselves into authoritarian,

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even totalitarian forms of government feeding on hate of their former colonizers and rage at the extent of their domination?

Subjectivation and Desocialization Is it possible to talk about new actors in the hypermodern age? Exclusion is perceived as the greatest fear that people are rightly concerned about today. It is a growing threat that keeps increasing as long as communities and their “natural” relationships weaken and leave the individual isolated under economic, climate, and political crises that cannot be predicted or avoided. On the one hand, the counterpart of this fragility is mobility, which is itself also experienced as an exclusion; on the other hand, it facilitates relationships and exchanges, cooperation and solidarity. Contemporary Italian sociologists have noted how family solidarity and religious organizations are still important and visible in large cities. But we also know that within industrialized societies states play the most important role through combining the political will to redistribution with the recognition of workers’ rights and the recognition of individualized relations. Sometimes, these relations convey yesteryear’s “patronage” by occasionally uniting an adult and a child, or many people among whom one will effectively take care of the others’ life, not only economically. Those relations can easily turn into exploitation, even sexual exploitation. They also show the continuation of unequal as well as personalized ancient social relations. Through mention of these forms of social relations that have become marginal, I want to protect us from a brutal evolutionism that would suggest that in one kind of civilization there is no other type of social relations, no interindividual, no economic activities, or other representations of self, beliefs, and knowledge. In the meantime, we must at the same time give priority to personal or collective experiences and be aware of the always more-or-less manipulated ideological constructions of cultural, social, and political leaders. These ideologies lead to artificial constructions unveiled by the “psychologies of peoples” based on unfortunate examples. For this reason, since no society could produce such mechanical material or behavior, we must always pay attention to surprising observations – surprising because they seem to contradict the context in which they arise. Even if we must challenge all biases as well as the idea that only one type of personality exists for each civilization, it is important to highlight the resisting forces that display a desire of individualization and go against dominant norms.

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At the same time, I want to combine, as strongly as possible, the topic of individualization with subjectivation. I do that on account of the fact we have to discover the human subject within the individual’s experience as well as within institutions, or in the image of our own creativity at a societal level. The path toward subjectivation generally starts with self-reflection as a subject. This has nothing to do with the individualist well-being and the topic of “difference” which makes it possible to play a double game: in other words, to defend an idea or a community while giving the impression that one is looking for isolating mechanisms and forms of subjectivation. Yet, self-reflection can happen in any form of experience. In some European countries, the number of people living alone or as a couple but without any statutory recognition has not stopped growing. In Sweden and France, we even observe the occurrence of new births being more numerous outside the institutionalized forms of couples and families. Due to family breakdown and the rise of new single-parent households – which we know to be almost always composed of a woman and her children – family protection has decreased. Negative stereotypes about single women, hastily accused of falling into prostitution or criminality, are being replaced by a different broader understanding of the conditions that led to this situation, including the efforts made by these women in order to offer better opportunities and life chances to their children. As for outcasts, the search for integration must combine the conservation of cultural belonging as well as personal projects. Actions previously aimed at addressing solidarity with workers are now often replaced by “urban policies,” specifically targeting men and women who are suffering. Some countries, mostly social-democratic ones, have been outstandingly successful in this respect, including medical and psychological care for the elderly and people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the track record of these urban policies is disappointing most of the time, or even negative, as shown in many national and international reports. But what appears to be “bad” is the situation concerning the young population, including in countries that claim to care about the modernization and integration of their population. We know that they are the ones who suffer most from unemployment. They are also nevertheless most affected in the subjectivation process. These concerns show the inadequacy of our social policies regarding the current situation of ordinary people during the construction of the first hypermodern societies. It shows the gap between current policies and the real needs and claims of social actors, and this constitutes a serious cultural and social crisis.

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Modernity and Sexuality Among our contemporaries, many women and men want to go beyond a kind of feminism that claims equal rights (economically, socially, and culturally) for all. Their claims are not merely limited to breaking the “glass ceiling,” which restricts women’s career opportunities and equal pay. The reality is very different. Actually, while men participate more in activities involved in the production of society as well as its transformation, women are considered as figures of what we can define as “natural” life, in which sexuality is the most important element. Conversely, many women observe that the frequently described gender equality not only does not exist but, on the contrary, tends to maintain relations of violence and also of domination, especially in societies that are founded on the domination of nature, its resources, as well as its plants, animals, and all categories of humanity, which are identified (visibly or not) with natural resources to be utilized by such humanity whose creative side is automatically associated with the masculine world. The most basic demands of women pertain to the question of equal opportunities. These are not only far from being satisf ied, but appear totally inadequate when contrasted with the levels of violence that women face and endure. Moreover, addressing all these topics in an abstract way – including those that involve nature/culture relations – seems impossible. From the perspective of subjectivation, we need to acknowledge f irst and foremost that we stand voluntarily beyond a f ictional recognition of equality – we are questioning our own general representation of the relation between nature and culture in a way that leads to a positive evaluation of women’s role. By taking this point of view, we are following a typical path: in every f ield of thought as well as social action, we see two ideas of reform facing each other. One aims to erase inequalities, thus particularism. The other attempts to turn what appears as inferiority into superiority – thus a compensatory force. This second approach fed European thought in the nineteenth century since Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, which leads me to the question: How could the natural side of feminine life, so strongly debated by Antoinette Fouque in Gravidanza, be mobilized to establish what I call “feminine superiority”? It is the acknowledgement that women, more than men, are able to combine many kinds of life, different ways of being. Nothing should hinder this shift, aiming to replace the notion of the interiorization of women – related to their functions of reproduction and care – with the assertion of their superior attitude toward subjectivation. This attitude is exactly what is

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required in a “communication society,” while the dominant male model tallies better with industrial society. However, this acknowledgement finds many obstacles on its way. Following this path, we fear that we may have to wipe out everything we used to stand for, and eventually face the need for a sort of “naturalization” of social life. How can one clear these obstacles without coming back to the old feminism which only claimed equal rights but never questioned the nature of the obstacles that must be faced throughout the process? First of all, we should keep in mind that subjectivation is not the result of techniques and calculations: it is about a process of self-assertion as a Subject, a self-consciousness, which makes us capable of being transformed, ourselves and our environment, in a much more profound way than in previous societies – particularly in industrial society. This notion of subjectivation appears to be more feminine than masculine because it corresponds better to a communication society and can also trigger a counterbalance to total powers. Following the portrait that I gave of the elements of modernity, is it not about the move from a conception of creation as a product of a superior human world to a conception that we might spontaneously describe as humanist? In other words, it is a conception that sees in the human being the origin of creation and understands the idea of human creativity to be initially limited to the intellect, subsequently applied to the juridical and political domains of regulations, norms, and obligations and then further extended to the individual and society as an energy and a force for work, as well as science and consciousness. From this starting point, how can one resist going forward to introduce the consciousness of the Other – as well as myself – as Subject into human creativity? By way of subjectivation, we introduce feelings, relationships, and the recognition of the other as a Subject. Furthermore, in order to succeed in that extension, we can assert that women are called upon to be active agents more than men, first of all because man has identified himself with force, energy, work, and especially domination, so much so that he has reduced the role of women to one of a dependent and passive entity while denying his own expression of feeling. How can a vision that is both “primitive” and repressive persist while man has deprived himself of a part of his own emotions and the representations most indispensable to his creativity? By identifying with a world of technology and domination, men have condemned themselves to recognizing the greater culturally creative role of women. This approach is not so different from the one I chose myself by distinguishing two aspects of social action, that of the rulers and that of the

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ruled – but at the time I was thinking in social and political terms –, less complementary than conflicting. People at the top as well as people at the bottom can create movements and become social actors, even if they also act with each other in a contentious way. People at the bottom use their anti-establishment force in opposition to the rulers’ power, while the latter use their capacity to innovate in opposition to the excessively defensive behaviors of resourceless people. Often, both social categories step back from their roles as creators and only aim for their own interests and desires, thus in opposition to creativity and human subjectivity. That happens when they both submit themselves to their personal interests and desires to the detriment of universal human rights which are the creative force of subjectivation. In my view, it is possible to express this reasoning as something close to the idea we should have about “women’s liberation,” which would not be reduced to equal opportunities but also convey the idea of self-construction as a human subject “completely and directly.” The more we move towards the conception of our creativity and the assertion of ourselves as human subjects, the more we tend to stand on our own feet – as history shows us – completely and directly as Subjects. Neither men nor women can totally fulfil their own subjectivation without getting rid of male domination and without undertaking the self-subjectivation process. We must acknowledge that men and women can live as subjects only by achieving freedom, as accomplished long ago by citizens and then workers. In a few words, modernity’s main tendency is the acknowledgement of the interdependence of every stage of human behavior. Moreover, economists were right when they tied the search for interest and profit – that is, utilitarianism – to rationality and the creation of knowledge; for we must express our will to subjectivation in all the different forms of our behavior, including the desire and the consciousness (complete and direct) of our existence as a human subject. At the same time, we should be careful not to get pulled into a reductive role of subjectivation as a simple well-being associated with good social integration. We want neither to adopt a Platonist conception of love, nor to be satisf ied with “feeling good” and safe. The women’s liberation movement cannot accept the demand that women choose a future as men without a phallus. Women can keep their full place in a hypermodern society only by contributing to the transformation of our general idea of modernity, by replacing the domination of reason and masculine energy over affectivity and feminine desire with the reconstructive force of a human being as a whole. Women will be able to recreate a

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diverse construction of personality for this whole human being, ridding us of domineering relationships. Accepting that human sexuality is par excellence the meeting point between nature and culture – between desire, feelings, and emotions and the discovery of the self as subject – raises another question: Is the encounter of desires and feelings with subjectivation the same liberating experience for both women and men? Or, on the contrary, is society imposing men’s representation of feminine sexuality on women? Traditionally, women’s function is reduced to one of biological reproduction and the societal role of childcare, whereas my standpoint is that the whole personality must be expressed – in hypermodern societies – in the activity of every aspect of human life through a subjectivation which is mostly formed across intersubjectivities. The main goal of social thought must thus be to destroy the subordination of women-nature to men-culture, as well as of emotions to reason – as discussed by Antonio Damasio. Today, while feminism seems capable of leading strong advocacy campaigns against masculine violence, it is necessary to go beyond these goals – which are still defensive – and accept that the recognition of feminine desire cannot be separated from the assertion of the dominant role of women within the subjectivation process. In any case, what must be absolutely avoided is a new confinement of women by the means of their submission to masculine desire under the pretext of promoting the free expression of feminine desire.

Reception of Refugees and Defense of Territories We must adopt the same approach to another issue of crucial importance, which is too often considered today to be one solely of humanitarian action. Through attributing an extreme importance to the topic of refugees’ reception, theoretically as well as politically, I wish to revisit the central conflict arising in hypermodern society: the opposition between universal human rights and the defense of particular identities and communities. Rather than letting entire regions split from the nation state, we must encourage those territories to implement policies to develop new activities, the acquisition of new responsibilities; and what we call the “reception” of migrants and refugees is needed to combat marginality as well as desertification in the overall fight against rising inequalities between territories – a phenomenon even more dramatic than the one affecting social classes. It is essential to generate huge programs, like the Tennessee Valley Authority

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established by President Roosevelt, or the one started in Lorraine and supported by the European Union.3 In this hypermodern society, the role of communication may lead to the creation of total powers like those of financial markets as well as dictatorial regimes or to antisocial communitarian movements destructive of universal human rights. Thus, we must acquire a clear awareness of these new forms of domination as soon as possible. These forms are as predominant as were social classes, founded on interest-bearing capital at the time of industrial society or financial capital and profit during market-driven societies at the beginning of modern era. Everywhere in the world, we are witnessing the alliance or fusion of authoritarian regimes and communitarian identities pregnant with xenophobia. It is necessary to defend universal human rights against this domination of identities and centralized systems. However, it must be done within the scope of defending territories that are themselves at risk of losing the ability to create, and therefore to act, as a result of globalization and neoliberalism. These processes aim to abolish every protective measure – whether social, political, or cultural – opposed to the drive to maximize profit. Do not be misled, particularly in the Western world, by those who claim that the problems we are facing do not require our generosity and solidarity. This is a dangerous point of view. It reflects a xenophobia in the service of new monopolies, extensive enough to bring into question our own freedom and respect for our dignity. We first have to acknowledge the urgency of our obligation to prevent ecological disasters, notably because they will engender massive population displacements as well as major upheavals in economic activity. Particularly, we must acknowledge that a large part of humanity is at risk, depending on their geographical and climatic area. By considering only the situation of refugees and refusing to take into consideration the economic reasons – which are also linked to political factors – behind the displacement of migrants, some observers are hiding behind the evidence and misleading us. In the last fifty years, we have seen local inhabitants emptying out rural Latin America, including small villages, whereas São Paulo metropolitan area and the entire State are growing at a breakneck pace. Meanwhile, Mexico City gathers more than 20 million Mexicans and Central Americans heading to the United States (now more numerous in the United States than African-Americans), particularly the big “global cities” near the Mexican border. 3

The ERDF-ESF Programme for Lorraine and Vosges.

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The greatest upheavals are not only taking place in remote continents. They appear to be at our gates and sometimes are already haunting our territories. Nowadays, the defense of territories can neither be understood in terms of citizenship, as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nor in terms of social classes. This defense must be imagined in line with a worldwide “call for life,” a global civic engagement where social actors make progressive choices for a changing world. If we are successful in profoundly changing our ways of interpreting this issue, rather than reducing it to a problem for the immigrants, we will realize it is about our own collective future. We should also stop blaming the United States or even police brutality. The reality is that the working class, which is often severely hit by deindustrialization as part of the effects of economic globalization, is rising up against refugees and migrants, particularly in Europe and in the United States – but not in Canada, which has resisted the most dangerous tendencies more actively. Long-term unemployment – particularly among younger workers – has provoked the swell of xenophobic populisms that have shaken the political spheres of many industrialized countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The only beneficiaries of the withdrawal of the working class and trade unions as a counter-political force are dominant economic and financial forces, which gladly accept the price of national deindustrialization while seizing the profits of globalization. Even more important: we must realize that the only effective response to the triumph of total powers is to create, activate, and rapidly reinforce new social movements and new political forces to bring their motivation and agency to all levels of political life. In any case, it is imperative that the issue of refugees’ and immigrants’ reception not be separated from one of caring for the other “victims” of economic and social transformations and forces of dominance, as I have observed, starting with young people. Multiplying perspectives is not enough per se: for example, the disappearance of peoples’ national movements in Latin America has been to the benefit of a strong comeback of the internationalized capitalism (expanded to China) that operates – in countries like Chile – through mere institutional means; sometimes even through corruption, such as in Brazil today. For these reasons, we must take every opportunity to show the global nature of these phenomena. Furthermore, we must recognize that the social movements of the industrial age no longer have any future. In fact, they have disappeared in the same way as the republican’s and the citizen’s movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – including the ideas of the French

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Revolution. These came to an end, leaving room for authoritarian monarchies and republicans who had become staunch defenders of colonialism, social inequalities, or “compassionate” nationalism. From this point of view, all those who take part in the analysis of modern societies should embrace the main task of increasing awareness of the extent, the globality, and the urgency of the problems that are sweeping the world: in the aftermath of national and European reconstructions, Europe and the United States have moved into politics that are increasing their domestic inequalities, while attempting in vain to re-establish their global dominance. We have to add another cause for concern here. In the same way as in France when Napoleon III came to power thanks to the massive support of peasants and the rural world, today xenophobic populisms rely on working-class people and suburban lower-income classes living in regions that face crises and decline. The very same populisms are providing precious support to the new masters of world economy by undermining the role of the more progressive political parties and unions, which were already weakened in terms of their capacity to protect the working classes in industrial society. The unity of global interest that new monopolies and xenophobic populisms share, in addition to the definitive powerlessness of revolutionary enthusiasm – which is mostly focused on the past rather than the future – are altogether creating a general global situation in which forces of active entry (i.e. modernizing and conflicting at the same time) are experiencing a situation of serious weakness. In fact, there is no chance of seeing the unemployment rate decrease without reindustrializing regions and participating in the global economy. That is the larger and more important question we are called upon to consider at the beginning of this twenty-first century when totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are more numerous than in the previous century. It is true that many observers, especially those who analyze China and its massive modernization processes, are hoping that the level of skills will rise as well as the demand for freedom and access to consumer activity in countries that are lifting people out of poverty. Those same countries have been favored to reinforce the role of the state over their entire population. But it is also clear that new communist political leaders are absolutely opposed to these perspectives. In 2017–18, the supreme leader Xi Jinping has undertaken, as a major goal of his supreme power – which will probably last indefinitely –, to reinforce the Communist Party’s state control, the same party that has controlled Chinese society since 1949. The very nature of these totalitarian regimes seems to exclude any possible self-conscious evolution that would complement their economic

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development, increment and diversify people’s expectations, and drive a new rising middle class towards new demands for a more consistent autonomy or even rights. Nevertheless, the “normal” evolution of the economy will more likely result in increased domestic tensions. In short, in the current state of affairs, the repeated attempts to enforce fundamental human rights or to defend ideas or plans that openly contradict the orthodoxy that was approved by a particular one-party rule have almost no chance of succeeding. The enormous impact of the Covid-19 pandemic makes it necessary, in particular for Western Europe, to increase by a huge amount the role of state intervention to avoid the destruction of public services and local commercial activity; however, there is an opposing logic that is more directly favorable to the creation of a new planetary bourgeoisie. The most important expression of the latter is the very active development of GAFA companies (= Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon), especially Amazon. We observe the equally rapid development of online work among managers and particularly top-level managers who are the agents of the digital revolution, while less highly skilled categories of workers are subjected to daily contact with supervisors and managers or may not live in conditions which are conducive to online work. We must be ready to witness inequality among wage earners in private firms as well as in state companies, or companies which require massive state intervention, but we can imagine that the new working class will more or less directly create new political forces. The most important and visible example is the left-wing of the US Democratic Party, which is supported by various leading economists. These new sectors of public opinion are not yet able to control the Democratic Party, but they will have a large influence over unions and municipal organizations in the years to come. As for the near future, the main danger lies in the strong trend towards an increasing exclusion which can lead to uprisings such as those we have already observed in France with the gilets jaunes and more dramatic responses to violent repression such as that which buried the Paris Commune in 1871, both by the means of mass murder and deportation to remote countries. If leftist forces are weak, it is because most governments and leading social groups are convinced of the necessity of entering rapidly into a post-industrial society, into which some Asian countries – not only China, but Korea, Japan, and Singapore also – are already entering fast, while center-left ecological parties are unable to take the lead in this runaway process of modernization. This is the main danger; if in France or in the United Kingdom governments are unable to make an alliance with left-wing political parties and movements, there is a very threatening possibility

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of the kind of mass exclusion which will provoke a popular revolt and be followed by brutal repression. However, this pessimistic conclusion might be counterbalanced by the ability of certain countries, for example in Latin America and Africa, to penetrate the management system of the global economy, which is dominated by China and the United States. The meaning of this important point is that the global economy is not run by a single group: in fact, it is also the result of an agreement between democratic regimes, totalitarian regimes, and authoritarian nationalist regimes. Thus, in the Far East – at the expense of Japan – it will depend on China’s ability to negotiate and on the United States’ determination to get involved in the defense of some countries. It should be noted that past events have shown that the United States is not unconditionally inclined to protect Taiwan (which is still not recognized by communist China and therefore could not be granted international recognition), even though this East Asian island is unquestionably recognized by everybody as an economic and scientific powerhouse. Acknowledging the existence of an international regulatory organization such as the G20 is an important asset. In fact, it reduces the risk of war between the two components that dominate both economics and politics in the world, the United States and China. This will lead to, on the one hand, the Chinese communist party’s unequivocal attempts to gain absolute control over its population, and on the other, communist China’s inability to build its fortress – which would guarantee untouchability – vis-à-vis other powers, especially the United States, Japan, and Korea. This pragmatic conclusion appears to match what the realist and well-informed Chinese power is planning to accept or refuse, regardless of the price to be paid in terms of public opinion. No matter what, new “Greats” will rise in the decades to come. India and Brazil are already on the way. It is time that Europe gets into the game too by using its assets. Obviously, subjectivation cannot create armored divisions but has already won many victories over past totalitarianisms, and it may continue to win against current and future total powers. Why not? The victory of evil is not assured. The fact that our voices may be heard again depends upon us. Let us take the floor again!

Conclusion We must not underestimate populist movements based on the fact that they seem confused and disorganized. Are we not living in a period

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in which conf licts between opposite kinds of populism have more historical reality than customary def initions in terms of right and left within the main political parties in many countries? One of the most important aspects of populism lies in the chance it provides to change the course of history through leaders that we could call, according to the Weberian tradition, “sultans.” It would be more diff icult to name classic constitutional political leaders than others who can be more or less accurately def ined as populists. Although I refuse, for instance, to name the president of France, Macron, a “populist” – since he seems to me to be def initely an anti-populist – we cannot deny the populist cast of Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and obviously Viktor Orbán in Hungary, or Salvini in Italy (although he has, at the time of writing this article, left the government). It may seem surprising to attribute such an importance to issues of populism while mentioning hypermodern societies. However, the list of names I cited (to which I could add some more) demonstrates why it is essential to address these issues. Since the creation of authoritarian regimes between the two world wars, we have become used to understanding the importance – both at leadership level and among the masses – of the excesses of classic oligarchic elites and the misbehaviors of extremely personalized popular movements, revolutionaries, and nationalists that have dominated the twentieth century and still play an important role at the beginning of the twenty-f irst. We have to recognize that while the coherence of the ideas of the most consummate characters so far is far from clear, it does not prevent them from strongly impacting world history, even more so than the political members of old European countries’ social elite. We should remind ourselves of how Soviet leaders were considered more important than the Chinese – especially due to the Moscow Trials through which Stalin got rid of them. Now we recognize that many of them deserve our interest, more than leaders of centrist parties from less influential countries who appear insignif icant by comparison.

References Touraine, Alain. 2007. A New Paradigm for Understanding Today’s World, translation by Gregory Elliot. Malden, MA: Polity. ———. 2018. Défense de la modernité. Paris: Seuil.

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About the Author Alain Touraine (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris) is Emeritus Director of Studies at the École des Hautes Études of Paris, and founder of the Centre d’Analyse et d’Intervention Sociologique. He led several empirical studies in Europe and published more than fifty books (monographs) translated into several languages. His research has covered several sociological areas such as social movement studies and modernity studies. [email protected]

17. Toward a New Global? Hatem N. Akil and Simone Maddanu Yet the daydream, because it is common property, extends both into the broad and into the deep expanse, into the non-sublimated, but in fact concentrated expanse, into that of the utopian dimensions. And this automatically posits the better world also as the more beautiful, in the sense of completed images, the like of which have not yet been seen on earth. Through planning or forming, windows are hewn in deprivation, hardness, rawness, banality, with distant prospects, full of light. The daydream as a stepping-stone to art so very obviously intends worldimprovement, has this as its robustly real character. (Bloch 1995 [1959], 94)

Abstract This chapter unifies cross-disciplinary references, analysis, and conceptualizations of modernity and modernization, highlighting a clear distinction between the spirit of both modernization and modernity. As we saw from different perspectives and criticisms, although modernization operates as a levelling process, modernity still appears to be worth a potential update. From coloniality to pandemic, by connecting modernities and histories, modernity can now represent a global necessity, where awareness of injustice, inequality, and human and environmental crises would create the possibility of a modernity-to-come. Keywords: modernity-to-come; modernity; modernization; pandemic; social movements

A cross-disciplinary volume is an invitation and a challenge to discover and appreciate the diverse disciplinary approaches and methodologies used in dealing with a single general subject. The book lays out an intellectual landscape that can lead to concord and harmony through the very disciplinary discords it avails its readers. In a way, we, as editors, follow a humanist tradition of representing all perspectives, approaches, and

Akil, H.N. and S. Maddanu (eds.), Global Modernity from Coloniality to Pandemic: A Crossdisciplinary Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022 doi 10.5117/9789463727457_ch17

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voices on a single stage. We are merely proposing potentials. It is only with the reader’s response that dialogues and dialectics will begin to emerge. Nevertheless, throughout the contributions, the book displays common concerns for justice, democracy, well-being, and the planet. Although not in one voice, the contributors call – in different measures and within different contexts – for a modernity that has been missing, the modernity-to-come. The book is structured to cover four seemingly discreet but interrelated parts. In Part I of the book, we saw how the classic concepts and narratives of modernity have produced paradigmatic questionings in different parts of the world and in fields such as science and technology, mathematics, philosophy, and visual arts. In Part II, modes of modernization and modernity are exposed as sedimented forms of domination, hierarchization, and oppression. In this part, criticism of modernity is utilized as a useful lens to reframe modernity within different non-Eurocentric perspectives. In Part III, the contributors show how a global awareness of human identity and social change is important during periods of increasing risk, threat, and uncertainty. A call for institutional and individual responsibility becomes an essential reaffirmation of modernity in the shadow of a pandemic. In Part IV, contributors evaluate and put forward diverse formulations of novel forms of modernity that benefit often but not always from science, technological applications, and ethics. New ways of reviving democracy are introduced as the foundation for a modernity-to-come. The idea of transnational processes and transnational institutions is certainly nothing new. It has been raised from different perspectives (Sassen 1996; Beck 2006) and has encountered significant success in explaining the effects and plausible outcomes of globalization in terms of normativity and “glocal” assemblages (Sassen 2008, 66–67). However, it must be asserted again that these analyses lead to sociopolitical considerations of new global social movements and global social actors who reposition themselves and their field of action at a global scale (McDonald 2006; Castells 2012; Farro and Rebughini 2008). During and before the current pandemic, the same global issues have been filling up the agendas of social activists around the world: from environmental local action to the international combat against climate change, from domestic social stratification challenges to global inequalities, from local minorities’ segregation and marginalization to systemic racism and cross-border refugee issues all around the world, from Occupy Wall Street in New York to Tahrir Square in Cairo or Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kiev or Taksim in Istanbul or Hong Kong. Domestic causes like Black Lives Matter and the Me Too movement quickly become adopted as universal causes and rallying cries everywhere in the world. It becomes abundantly

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clear that all round the globe, social actors are engaging in global/local and cross-sectional protests which display the same or overlapping symbols, languages, and practices (Flesher et al. 2013; Farro and Lustiger-Thaler 2014). Even locally-oriented collective actions are connected to the global as models, partners, or in the form of solidarity. Nothing that is worthy of being challenged and changed by collective actions is only local anymore. Will the global connectedness of social movements be the measure of the social change that the world would experience in its “next” modernity? In the meantime, rights claims and messages of justice (the environment, racial inequalities, violence, social and political rights) rebound in mainstream media and social media platforms, amplifying and mirroring different local and global realities. Claimsmakers are not losing their local or national character. Although, whether they are collective groups or recognized leaders, they nevertheless become transnational references and might be seen as representative of the youth generation worldwide.1 The public recognition of the priority of transnational approaches represents the conditio sine qua non of a new process of modernity inclusive of all political and cultural spectra. While attending to social and cultural peculiarities as well as sustainable local interests, a new global modernity would consider the major crises that organized society must face. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the common ground as considered above suggests that international institutions, scientific communities, and non-profit organizations would encompass and incarnate a new rational-ethical approach cognizant of the common good. If the next modernity was to adopt a process towards social organization that is based on rational discourse, then it would necessitate a pragmatic ethical approach to global threats – that is, climate change, pandemics, and global inequalities. Global modernity today implies a sense of “entirety” for the human condition and by extension a sense of global risk as well. As for the solutions, it would be obvious to think in similar terms. This common ground represents our idea of global modernity today: a global awareness of the extent of contemporary and future challenges for humanity, although one remains equally aware that solutions to these challenges are only complementary to the historic process 1 The Fridays for Future movement, for instance, has been inspired by a teenager, Greta Thunberg. In the United States, the March for Life movement was organized by students who survived the Parkland shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida. Both examples show a particularly proactive young generation (from 15 to 17) able to inspire and guide major protests and the public attention about already popular social problems like the environmental, anti-gun, and antiviolence movements – which all count diverse generations of activists.

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of global awareness without which we would remain stuck in the midst of the crisis. Although modernity itself might be seen as a concept that directly engages with the ideals of social progress entangling universalism and particularism (Taylor 2004), the concept of modernization remains def ined by economic endeavor and bureaucratic patterns. If modernity today can be claimed as an inclusive framework in which ethics and the common good might be aff irmed globally, modernization still preserves its colonial heritage. Intractably connected to its formal apparatus, most forms of modernization follow a path of technological advancement through the principles of competition, profit, and control (Agamben 2009). Because of its bureaucratic structure, modernization proceeds as a cold and dry force. It is fed by the need to improve systemic powers rather than engage with uncomfortable cultural, ethical, or spiritual questions. As it has been noted by some of the contributors to this book, modernization operates as a levelling process that aims to fulf il imperialistic projects, the economic expectations of certain classes, and the application of systemic forms of control. Modernization can be “led to,” but cannot lead a social process that aims at integrating multiple modernities, cultural specificities, and the claims of creativity and subjectivity. Every process of modernization, from colonialism to the rising power of China, represents not a conduit but a corruptive threat to the realization of the human yearning for the common good. With new ways of reading and understanding modernity coming from, among others, postcolonial and decolonial perspectives, modernity can no longer be conceived of as an exclusively European product. Further, one cannot ignore the contributions from various parts of the globe to this new sense of global modernity. If there were a concept worthy of a categorical update today, it must be modernity. However, the question remains, can modernity be the driving ethical force to reinvent the path of future local and global modernizations?

Dreaming of Modernity Most studies in social sciences have approached the meaning of modernity from different perspectives through the overlap of the concepts of the modern and modernization. While exploring modernity as praxis, we are more or less able to define its meaning and turn it into something concrete, observable, criticizable, and perfectible. As a condensation of different

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features of modernity, we propose to claim modernity as the capacity to create an imaginary “something” better. The “something,” though, must also include a “social” imperative that is cognizant of different identities and moralities, culturally-processed histories, and life experiences (Taylor 1989, 1992), which must start by abandoning the “Western case” of modernity as a unique model (Taylor 2004). In a sense, modernity is the renewal of the idea of utopia, a better space, a better place, a better mindset, a better organization, a better human realization that can only be achieved if it incorporates the multiple and the collective into the idea of a common good. Modernity is ultimately the societal, the individual, and the collective – all at once. It is also the capacity to conceive an eu-topia, a better place to live. The imaginary aspect, again, does not mean the impossible or the ideal. It means a concrete effort to see where the future goes and what is our best move – as a species – to make it hospitable, but this time taking into account our own flaws and our ongoing debts to the planet. This imaginary represents, by definition, the capacity to surpass a situation of crisis. When new connected generations face common global crises, their responses, although local, inevitably result in global collective actions, shareable symbols and emotions. Updating global modernity calls for a recognition of the human condition in its time and space, in which different actors around the world are creating a common history. Why is it important to update the meaning and theoretical use of modernity coupled with global? If not global, then there is no modernity at all. What we are left with is only the remnant of Western narratives and myths, Occident and Orient, North and South. If not global, then the signifier of modernity will only encompass domination and subalternity, center and periphery, domination and division. The global underscores the unavoidably connected experience of modernity hic et nunc. Connected history2 and connected sociology3 are necessary intellectual frameworks that come out of the postcolonial dismantling of dominant narratives and subsequently inform our current understanding. By thinking of modernity as a decolonial act, we ought to point out that the West from which these analyses are produced is now incontrovertibly in a global loop, which not only connects the present but also shapes a new whole. The emergence of other actors (social and institutional), cultural symbols, and technologies – used and produced on a global scale for a global public – reveals not just global consequences (Bauman 1998) but also the global making of modernity. 2 3

See Subrahmanyam 2005 and Douki and Minard 2007. See Bhambra 2014.

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After the postcolonial, the global perspective, in our view, represents the only way that might legitimize such a term today. The hic et nunc of such a global modernity asserts the awakening of a common condition. Similar perspectives have been raised by ideological views, anticipations, and predictions – all of which call for a collective consciousness around a common struggle (Hardt and Negri 2003; Dardot and Laval 2014). We also note other conceptualizations of a common global condition in terms of cosmopolitanism and glocalism (Beck 2006; Robertson 1992; Featherstone et al. 1995), which follow the question of universalism and cultural particularism (Walzer 1990; Taylor 1992), transnationalism and the end of national methodology (Beck 2007). Despite all the predictions of the end of nationalism, the rise of the global village, and the dominance of international institutions, we still observe closed identitarian groups, nationalist sovereignty claims, and separatist border claims. Furthermore, the rise of “popular populism” all around the world encompasses xenophobic sentiments and the return of an “imaginary homogeneous social body” (Farro and Maddanu 2020, 128). Global modernity, as we suggest it here, does not ignore reactionary movements, even in their delusional versions. Taking into account current crises, uncertainties, and difficult challenges, an update to the understanding of modernity should also consider the common human dimension that emerges as a necessity in the shadow of catastrophe. Social movements around the world share the same challenges, although they fight different systems of power, technocratic systems, and fading institutions. Even if cultural and economic divides remain in each geographical experience, fundamental challenges are nevertheless still rooted in the same core: environment, equality, dignity, and subordination (i.e. the dependent relation of power that maintains subaltern subjects, including cultural identities and the self). Although none of these issues is new, the only modernity that can encompass global issues today must be centered in the recognition of global matters. The awakening that characterized the “modern man,” as the producer of the present and imaginary of the future, now incorporates an awareness of its own global scope. In Principle of Hope, Ernst Bloch differentiates between different phases of a dream. Each dream contemplates different limits, visions, possibilities, and states of mind. The waking dream supersedes the not-yet-become (Bloch 1995 [1959], 116) and represents a new state of mind, a new kind of hope in which a human being dreams open-eyed. The daydream, as opposed to the not-yet-become sketches new realizable imaginaries. We see it as a possible utopia, a nourishment for a possible modernity that is focused on the human rather than on the doctrinal. A global modernity as a planetary project must

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play a central role in the future of humanity. In this sense a principle of hope represents the driving force for a modern change. If modernity finally represents the capacity to imagine and to pursue a better future, it will be firmly situated in the global dimension of existence. The modernity-to-come starts with a dream towards its actualization.

References Agamben, Giorgio. 2009 (2006). What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. Globalization: The Human Consequences. New York: Columbia University Press. Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2014. Connected Sociologies. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Beck, Ulrich. 2006. Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press ———. 2007. “The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails.” Theory, Culture and Society 24, nos. 7–8: 286–90. Bloch, Ernst. 1995 (1959). The Principle of Hope, vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Castells, Manuel. 2012. Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Chichester: Wiley. Dardot, Pierre and Christian Laval. 2014. Commun: essai sur la révolution au XXIe siècle. Paris: La Découverte. Douki, Caroline and Philippe Minard. 2007. “Global History, Connected Histories: A Shift of Historiographical Scale?” Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 54–4 bis, no. 5: 7–21. Farro, Antimo L. and Henry Lustiger-Thaler, eds. 2014. Reimagining Social Movements: From Collective to Individuals. London: Routledge. Farro, Antimo L. and Simone Maddanu. 2020. “Popular Populism.” In Understanding Social Conflict: The Relationship between Sociology and History, edited by Liana M. Daher, 119–30. Sesto San Giovanni: Mimesis International. Farro, Antimo L. and Paola Rebughini. 2008. Europa alterglobal: componenti e culture del “movimento dei movimenti” in Europa. Milan: Franco Angeli. Featherstone, Mike, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds. 1995. Global Modernities. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Flesher Fominaya, Christina and Laurence Cox, eds. 2013. Understanding European Movements: New Social Movements, Global Justice Struggles, Anti-Austerity Protest. New York: Routledge. Hardt, Michael and Toni Negri. 2009. Commonwealth. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

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McDonald, Kevin. 2006. Global Movements: Action and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing control? Sovereignty in An Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press. ———. 2008. “Neither Global nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights.” Ethics & Global Politics 1, no. 12: 61–79. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 2005. Explorations in Connected History: From the Tagus to the Ganges. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1992. Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition,” edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2004. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Walzer, Michael. 1990. Nation and Universe, edited by Grethe B. Peterson. Tanner Lectures on Human Values 11. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

About the Author Hatem N. Akil (Valencia College) is a visual culture researcher who is interested primarily in the perception and representation of Arabs and Muslims. He earned his PhD in Texts and Technology from the University of Central FL. Among his publications “Cinematic Terrorism,” “The Martyr’s Vision,” and the monograph The Visual Divide between Islam and the West (Palgrave, 2016). [email protected] Simone Maddanu (University of South Florida) earned his PhD at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales of Paris in 2009. His research interests focus on social movements, commons, migration, Islam in Europe, and global and postcolonial studies. He currently teaches sociology and contemporary social problems at the University of South Florida. He published several books and articles in different languages. [email protected]

Index Abbasid 137, 141–42, 145, 151, 153 absolutism 116, 167 activism 15, 202, 216, 219, 221 activists 28, 202, 259, 306, 314, 388–89 actor 29, 54, 172, 196, 284, 286, 363, 372 aesthetic 148–49, 353–54 agrarian 21 algebra 70, 74 algebraic 74 algorithm 42, 52, 69 anachronism 137, 145 aniconic 131, 146, 148–49 aniconism 131–32, 146 antagonism 107, 120, 330 antagonistic 168, 177 anthroposociology 290 antibiotics 243 antinaturalism 148 antinaturalistic 149 antiplague 17 antisocial 379 antiviral 338 apolitical 215 apostates 117 apparatus 17, 19, 87, 163, 165, 175, 187, 189, 193, 195–96, 201, 313, 390 Arab 5, 24, 105–112, 114–15, 119–121, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 137, 140, 154, 161, 167, 169–70, 209, 215–16, 218–19, 226 arabesque 145, 148–49, 151 Arabia 134, 143, 155, 215, 236 Arabian 134, 141 Arabic 126, 129, 137, 142, 154 Arabs 32, 111, 127, 134, 155, 168, 394 Arabism 219 arboviruses 237 arenaviruses 237 aristocracy 209, 214 aristocratic 140–41 arithmetic 40, 68, 74, 76 arithmetical 68 Armenian 167–68, 170, 173, 178 armlets 136 army 89, 194, 218 art 24, 62, 74, 87, 131–137, 139–54, 161, 170–73, 193, 252, 285, 350, 353–54, 387 artful 50 arthropod 235, 238 artist 4, 132–33, 146–48, 150, 171 artistic 132, 134, 137, 139–43, 147, 149, 150, 161, 171, 173 asceticism 222 assays 266 assemblage 23, 37, 42, 44 Assyrians 134

Athenian 350–51, 354–55, 358, 361, 366, 368 austerity 210 authoritarian 18, 21–22, 54, 107, 121–23, 163, 170, 202, 209, 286, 307, 312, 350, 360, 372, 379, 381, 383–84 authoritarianism 160, 337 autochthones 195 autocratic 82, 323, 327 autoimmune 268 automation 366 automatized 40 autonomy 25, 162–63, 178, 18–88, 195, 196, 19–202, 289–90, 382 autonomist 195 autonomous 164, 189, 193, 201, 28–91, 333, 359 avangardism 355 vanguard 213 Baathism 170 Baathist 166 biology, 26, 73, 26–62, 264–65, 268 biologists 264, 305 biomedical, 257, 261, 263, 265, 270–4 bioinformatic 235 biomedicine 265 biopiracy 165 biopolitical 177 biopower 171, 192, 201 biotechnology 191 blockchain 349, 352, 354, 359 boogeymen 334 border 19, 379, 388, 392 bordering 306 bureaucracies:15, 175, 192, 195, 200–01 bureaucratic 17, 19, 25, 174, 187–89, 192–93, 196, 199–202, 246, 390 bureaucratization 202 bureaucratized 23, 25, 201 byproducts 265 cabal 327 cabalism 67 Caliph 136, 138, 140, 154 caliphate 139, 142 cancer 22, 257, 260–63, 266, 268–69, 272, 274, 326, 328, 332–33, 336, 342 cancerous 335 leukemia 263 tumor, 268–69, 328, 335 capitalism 22, 25, 85, 159, 165, 175–76, 191, 214, 247, 272, 380 capitalist 90, 164, 167, 174–177, 193–194, 214 capitalistic 85, 87, 89, 91 Cartesian 64–65, 76

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catastrophes 29, 307, 340, 392 centralization 85, 174, 349, 359 centralized 85, 247, 362, 379 centralizing 359 Chernobyl 304, 306, 314, 318 China 14–15, 18–19, 87, 89, 154, 193, 194, 203–04, 207–10, 212–14, 226, 234, 236, 240, 246, 270, 281, 310, 312–15, 318–20, 380–83, 390 Chinese 18, 19, 88, 209, 213–14, 310, 315, 381, 383–84 cholera 258–59 chronotopes 45 citizen 89, 215, 347, 350, 352, 365–66, 380 citizenry 152, 154, 222, 366 citizenship 29, 116, 118, 202, 224, 227, 359, 380 civic 26, 28, 92, 207, 209, 215, 224, 287, 311, 329, 349, 350, 362, 366, 380 civilization 12, 77, 107–08, 124–25, 127, 143, 169, 172, 176, 239, 367, 373 civilizational 11, 29, 198–99, 201 civilize 162 civilized 260, 357 clandestine 170 climate change 22, 26, 231–33, 239–44, 246, 256, 311, 315, 330–31, 334, 388–89 cognition 69, 346 cognitive 28, 126, 321, 323–29, 331–34, 336, 338–40 cohabitation 196, 237 coexistence 358 collective action 12, 195, 297, 299, 389, 391 collectivism 282, 289 collectivization 214 colonial 13, 23, 25–26, 159–78, 183, 185, 187, 189–91, 199, 201, 207–10, 21–16, 223, 225, 300, 335, 390 colonialism 6, 25, 26, 159, 160–61, 16–165, 167, 160–70, 175, 194, 207, 219, 225, 381, 390 colonialist 167, 170, 175–76 colonization 26, 162, 165, 187, 200, 202, 208, 372 coloniality 25, 31, 159, 160, 163, 166, 168, 171, 176–77, 189, 205, 387 colony 174, 195 common good 15, 20, 21, 25, 49, 193, 271, 389–91 commons 11, 29, 32, 394 commonalities 244 communal 26, 174, 231, 288 communism 209, 213 communist 73, 213–14, 372, 381, 383 communitarian 379 communities 14, 42, 210, 215, 219, 233, 235, 242, 247, 273, 284, 326, 360, 373, 378, 389 community 20, 28, 41, 46, 61, 64, 68, 70–71, 134, 216, 217, 219, 222, 223, 233, 234, 235, 240–244, 266, 269, 273, 278, 280, 283, 288–300, 326, 342, 359, 362, 374

computer 64, 261–262, 265, 304, 351 computing 40 confederalism 174, 176 connectedness 16, 389 connectivity 13 conscience 121, 303, 311 conscious 64, 262, 381 consciousness 28, 66, 113, 119, 150, 168, 201, 262, 265, 278, 281, 284, 291, 297, 376–77, 392 conscientized 358 conspiracy 15, 21, 27, 31, 327, 329, 332–33, 335 conspiracist 332–33 contagion 259, 287 contagious 322 contagiousness 20 contaminating 237 contemporaneity 176 contemporary 12, 15, 23, 25–27, 29, 32, 37–40, 43, 44, 46, 53, 64, 107–08, 111, 115–16, 126, 130, 138, 161, 172, 207, 209, 221–22, 262, 272, 277, 283, 290, 297–98, 339, 351, 353, 375, 389, 394 coronaviruses 233, 236 cosmopolitanism 392 counterculture 74, 353 countermodernity 174, 177 counternarrative 178 counterpublic 337 counterspace 178 crisis 9, 11, 22, 28, 29, 50, 73, 74, 121, 163, 170, 171, 175, 232, 244–45, 268, 277, 280–81, 285–86, 288–89, 291, 297, 311, 374, 390–91 cryptanalysis 71 crypto 349, 352, 360, 368 cult 28, 283, 321, 323–24, 327, 329, 342 cyber 330 Darwinism 161 Darwinist 167–68, 174 daydream 29, 387, 392 decentralizing 359 decolonial 24, 159, 160–166, 169, 171–173, 177, 183, 201, 390–91 decoloniality 25, 159, 160, 173, 177 decolonization 207–10, 225 decolonized 167, 170, 171 decolonizing 177, 208 deepfake 21 deforestation 232, 235, 248, 300 dehumanization 331 deindustrialization 380 delusion 22, 321, 323–24, 327, 329, 340 delusional 323, 327–28, 331, 392 democracy 13, 15, 22, 24, 27–29, 105, 107, 109, 114, 116–20, 123–24, 127–128, 130, 162, 192, 200–01, 212–13, 216, 219, 242, 342, 349–51, 354–56, 361–63, 366–67, 370–72, 388 democratization 307, 352–53

397

Index

dependence 25, 187–88, 197, 199, 202 dependency 188, 199–201 depredations 213 deprivation 132, 147, 376, 387 deregulation 193 desacralization 153 desacralized 120 desecration 100 desocialization 371 despotic 163 devolution 174 diaspora 160–61, 168, 175, 276 dictatorship 121, 173, 299 dictatorial 121, 379 digitalization 42, 43, 45 digitization 356 dignity 116, 201, 211–12, 327, 371, 379, 392 direct democracy 15, 27, 367 disaster 242, 273, 302 discrimination 170, 173, 213, 222, 243 disenchantment 12, 189 disinformation 325, 335, 337, 339 disobedience 224, 306 disparities 243, 313, 318 disparity 108, 282 dissidents 332 distrust 72, 286 dominance 12, 15, 29, 114, 151, 221, 336, 380–81, 392 dominant 12, 23, 24, 49, 51, 87, 125, 153, 159–64, 166–73, 175, 177, 194, 215, 225, 257, 268, 271–72, 283, 373, 376, 378, 380, 391 dominate 15, 39, 81, 100, 176, 278, 383 dominated 15, 28, 46, 161–62, 236, 238, 383–84 dysregulation 264 ecologies 37, 40, 44, 46, 49, 159, 162, 164, 174, 176, 326 ecological 11, 12, 25, 46, 165, 174, 176, 189, 307, 309, 310, 312, 379, 382 ecosystem 238, 326 eliminationist 209, 335, 336 elitist 172 emissions 240, 241, 242, 246, 248 enlightenment 116, 119 environmentalism 299 environmentalist 309 epidemics 16, 17, 19, 26, 232–237, 258–59, 266, 271, 281, 314, 340 epidemiologic 259 261, 326 epidemiology 27, 28, 321, 326 equality 118, 211, 243, 371, 375, 392 equity 29 essentialism 289 ethics 11, 15, 20, 29, 106, 126, 191, 232, 271, 388, 390 ethical 20, 26, 27, 28, 39, 231, 232, 356, 358, 389, 390 ethos 27, 167, 272

Eurocentric 13, 15, 218, 388 evolution 12, 24, 40, 51, 68, 174, 189, 194, 211, 216, 238, 264, 266–67, 276, 280, 291, 381, 382 evolutionary 177, 242 evolutionism 373 existential 291, 329–30, 336 exploitation 109, 170, 224, 300, 304, 309, 373 exploited 198, 237, 281, 288 exploiting 176, 359 extinguish 280 Facebook 22, 152, 351, 355, 382 falsifiable 350 falsifiability 354 falsification 353 falsity 109, 110, 354 fascism 324, 336, 342 fascist 107, 121, 261, 299, 301, 324, 336 fashion 12, 14, 47, 210, 214 fatwa 152 feminism 375, 376, 378 Fordism 189 Fordist 18 genetic 235, 238, 263–68, 274, 298, 301 genotype 267 globalization 9, 11, 13, 21, 104, 231, 233, 371, 379–80, 388 globalized 27, 201, 291 glocal 388 glocalism 392 Google 22, 351, 355, 382, governmental 26, 82, 141, 193, 204, 231, 240, 242, 308, 311 governmentality 177 governmentally 210 grassroots 188, 216 greenhouse 238–42, 246, 248 Greenland 238, 275 hackers 43 harem 142 health 11, 17–23, 26–27, 188, 192, 196, 200, 232–33, 235, 237, 240, 243–46, 257–59, 261, 26–67, 270–74, 277, 280–83, 285–86, 288, 291, 306, 313–14, 318, 322–23, 325–26, 332, 334, 347 healthcare 282 hedonism 135, 137 hegemonic 54, 194, 208, 225 hegemony 25, 47, 89, 121, 177, 208 hermeneutic 106, 117 hermeneutical 117, 121 heterodox 144, 151–53 heterodoxy 149 heterotopic 163 heuristic 28 hierarchy 122–123, 172, 225, 258, 285, 361 hierarchization 388

398 

Global Modernit y from Colonialit y to Pandemic

Hindu 221–23 Hinduism 219–21 historicity 174 HIV 234, 248, 269 human 12, 16, 18, 23, 26, 29, 37–41, 43–46, 62, 77, 100, 108, 116–17, 120, 124, 141–42, 144–45, 152–53, 162, 164, 176, 189–91, 211, 231–32, 234–39, 243, 244, 256, 258, 262, 263, 265–66, 274, 277–79, 282–86, 288–89, 291, 297–98, 300–02, 304, 307, 310, 314–15, 321–23, 332, 341, 350, 352, 356–58, 371–72, 374, 376–79, 382, 387–92 humanism 117, 129 humanize 280 humanitarian 378 hybrid 38, 39, 42, 45, 172–173, 201, 290 hybridization 15 hygiene 12, 17 sanitation 257, 272 sanitize 358 hyperconsumption 272 hypermodern 373–74, 377–79, 384 hypermodernity 29, 283, 371

Islamicate 5, 24, 105–10, 119–21, 124, 130–31, 152–53 Islamism 168, 213, 218, 226 Islamist, 26, 113, 121–22, 207, 209, 215–20

iconoclasm 134, 140 iconography 131–32, 137, 144, 149, 152–53 iconophobia 132–33, 135, 145, 149–50 idealistic 66, 67, 351 idealization 47, 289 identity 27, 42, 46, 143, 159, 161–64, 166–68, 170–71, 176–77, 184, 189, 211, 225, 277–80, 283–84, 287, 289–91, 329, 337, 353, 388 Ilkhanid 140 imagination 146, 205 immune 28, 233–34, 245, 267–68, 321, 324, 327–29, 332, 335, 338, 342 immunity 21, 233, 234–35, 235, 249, 252, 324, 336 imperial 165, 192, 199, 208, 214, 299, 300 imperialism 187 imperialistic 390 indigenous 143, 165, 212–14, 300, 310, 360 individualism 27, 67, 245, 288, 290 individualist 371, 374 individualistic 271, 273, 291 individualization 288, 373–74 industrialism 85, 86 inequality 283, 382, 387 inequities 13, 245 infrastructures 40, 44–46, 195, 266, 270, 272–73, 285, 287, 306, 315, 331, 359 intellectual 21, 23, 114, 116, 125, 127, 130, 159, 160, 210, 212, 257, 278, 284, 391 intellectualization 39 Islam 5, 24, 31–32, 105–06, 108, 110, 115–18, 121, 123, 127–37, 140, 144–55, 180, 207, 215–16, 219–20, 223–26, 293, 394 Islamic 5, 16, 24, 31, 108, 110, 114–15, 119–22, 124, 126, 129, 131–37, 139–55, 167, 207, 209, 215–22, 226

labor, 12, 16, 90, 92, 97, 99, 176, 299, 371 leftist, 334, 382 Leninism, 212 Leninist, 173–74, 209, 213–14 liberalism, 209 liberalization, 89 lockdown, 19, 242 logocentric, 164 Lutheran, 119

Jacobin 160, 168 Jagiellonian 71 jahiliya 220, 222 jihad 119, 217 justice 18, 29, 188, 196, 232, 256, 269, 388–89 Kemalism 166, 170, 180 Kemalist 160, 170 Keynesian 192–93 kitsch 28, 349, 350, 353–354, 356 kitschy, 355 Kurdicity, 174 Kurdishness, 163, 170 kurdology, 163 Kurdish, 5, 25, 159–64, 166–78, 180–85 Kurdistan, 159, 166–67, 169–71, 174, 178, 180, 182–84 Kurds, 160–63, 166–67, 169–73, 177, 182, 184–85

Maoism 209, 212 Maoists 214 Marxism 183, 207, 212–14 Marxist 26, 164, 173–74, 204, 207–209, 214 Marxian 372 mask 241, 245 masked 176 materialism 66, 72, 108, 126 materialist 66, 67 materialistic 66 materiality 38, 39, 44, 133 mathematics 9, 23, 24, 61–77, 79, 146, 221, 264, 388 mathematization 62 mathematized 77 mechanization 40 mechanized 39, 247 medicine 9, 15, 43, 88, 121–22, 213, 245, 257, 263, 265–66, 269, 271–274, 322, 332 metanarratives 164 metaproperty 232 metonymic 133 metropolis 312–13 megacities 18 metropolitan 379

399

Index

micropolitics 170, 171, 177 migration 15, 32, 70, 221, 227, 240, 248, 255, 258, 260, 293, 320, 360, 363, 394 immigration 176 military, 17, 25, 71, 81, 82, 85–91, 96, 97, 98–100, 175, 187–202, 211, 303, 332 militarism, 171, 187, 189 militarization 25, 87, 171, 187, 188, 190, 194–95, 199, 202, 204 misinformation 245, 331, 334, 342 mistrustfulness 176 modernism 11, 15, 61–63, 149, 170, 216, 222, 284, 290, 349, 351, 353–55 modernist 116, 121, 148, 149, 161, 165–66, 169, 177, 298, 349, 351, 355 modernities 5, 6, 11, 23, 25, 30, 31, 112, 129, 187, 226, 393 modernity 9, 11–15, 23–29, 37, 39, 47, 51, 53, 54, 81, 83–86, 88–92, 96, 100–02, 105–06, 113, 116–17, 119, 121, 124, 128, 131, 159–77, 182, 187–90, 192, 195–200, 202, 207–09, 211, 215–16, 218, 222, 225, 231, 235, 239, 241, 247, 272, 277–78, 280, 283–84, 289–91, 297, 302, 303, 349–50, 353, 355, 371, 376–77, 385, 387–93 modernization 11, 12, 15, 23–25, 29, 37, 53, 116, 167, 174, 187–88, 190, 195–96, 199, 201–02, 297, 299, 302, 374, 381–82, 387–88, 390 modernize 73 modernizer 197 monarchies 137, 218–19, 381 monarchist 209 money 16, 44, 197, 247, 283, 287 monetary, 362 monopolies 27, 88, 188–90, 193–94, 201, 272, 379, 381 monopolization, 86, 88 multicultural 137–38, 141, 143 multifaith 154 multireligious 143 Muslim Brotherhood 215-20 Nakazawa 83, 103 nation 12, 24, 74, 81, 84–87, 98, 159, 161, 166–67, 169, 170, 175, 185, 190, 195, 198, 211–13, 219, 301, 371, 378 nationalism 161, 165–70, 207, 209, 213, 381, 392 nationalist 21, 26, 114, 161–62, 164, 167–70, 207, 209, 340, 383, 392 nationalistic 87 nationhood 211 native 302 NATO 187, 188, 191, 194 naturalistic 132, 145, 147–48 naturalism 108, 167 naturalist 28 neocolonial 208 neoliberal 22, 170, 193–94, 199, 201, 273 neoliberalism 176, 202, 379

obscurantism 119 oligarchic 384 oppression 169, 210, 388 oppressed 123, 159, 161, 164–65, 169, 171–73, 177, 323 opulence 137 Orientalism 173, 185 pandemic 9, 11, 13, 15–18, 21, 22, 26–29, 38, 44, 176, 231–32, 235, 240, 243, –46, 249, 255, 257, 259–60, 270–74, 277–78, 280–89, 291, 297, 299, 312–14, 323, 338, 340, 342, 382, 387–89 particularism 375, 390, 392 pathogenic 259, 272, 326, 335 peace 89, 94, 95, 97–100, 102, 117, 191, 303 peacekeeping 191 peacetime 24 pharmacogenomic, 267 plague 16, 18, 232, 236–38, 243, 258 bubonic 232 pollution 22, 188, 272, 297, 304–07, 310, 312, 314 polymath 62 populism 9, 11, 15, 21, 22, 384, 392 populist 22, 27, 28, 150, 372, 383784 positivism 12, 231 positivist 173, 189, 196 postcolonial 21, 24–26, 32, 164, 187, 199, 207–10, 212, 213, 215–16, 218, 222, 390–92, 394 postmodern 164, 189, 284 postmodernism 284 poverty 170, 176, 197–198, 211, 381 powerless 335 powerlessness 231, 381 precariousness 15, 29, 176, 217 precolonial 209, 212 privileges 20, 46, 133, 188, 192, 200, 209, 360 QAnon 323, 327, 329, 331, 340, 342, 346 quarantine 17, 258, 273 quarantining 243 racial 160, 173, 243, 245, 301, 389 racism 165, 167, 170, 208, 213, 334, 388 racist 133, 170, 208, 335 radiation 268 radioactive 305, 306 radical 13, 37, 62, 74, 99, 143, 217, 264, 291, 335, 337 radicalization 329, 337 rationalism 64, 114 rationality 12, 26, 28–29, 109, 124, 189, 190–91, 232, 241, 272, 285, 377 rationalizable 283 rationalization 324 reform 17, 76, 77, 123, 213, 218, 299, 375 refugee 388

400 

Global Modernit y from Colonialit y to Pandemic

religion 15, 62, 63, 105, 106, 108–12, 115–16, 118–24, 126–30, 133, 136–37, 141–42, 144, 148, 151, 153, 168, 218, 220, 224, 290, 292 religiosity 118, 122, 126–128, 215 religiously 152, 215 Renaissance 12, 24, 30, 124, 131, 133, 137, 141, 145, 153 responsibilities 18, 26, 29, 196, 200, 221, 223, 231, 271–72, 281–82, 367–78, 287, 335, 372, 388 responsibility: revolt 161, 172, 383 revolution 72, 74, 160, 166–67, 169, 175, 183, 207, 213, 219, 268, 273, 280, 299, 353, 356, 382 risk 12, 20, 22, 85, 92, 187, 189, 198, 232, 234, 257, 26–64, 267, 270, 272, 283, 305, 307, 335, 367, 379, 383, 388–89 rural 21, 167, 195, 236–37, 247, 379, 381 rurality 198 Salafi 117 Salafism 218 sanitary 259 SARS 236, 251, 269–72, 274, 312 science 9, 12, 13, 15, 19–23, 25–26, 28, 40, 42, 47, 51, 60, 62–66, 69, 71–74, 81, 85–87, 116, 165, 167–68, 170, 174, 182, 189, 196, 199, 207–08, 231–32, 241, 244, 246–47, 249–51, 253, 255–61, 263–66, 268, 271–74, 278, 290, 297–99, 301–02, 304–05, 330, 334, 336, 376, 388 scientist 20, 259, 304 secular 23, 24, 105, 107, 109, 111, 114, 116–25, 127–29, 131, 136, 140, 144–45, 151–54, 168, 209, 215–19, 221 secularism, 12, 24, 105–14, 117–25, 128, 130, 167, 220 secularist 112–114, 120–121 secularity 24, 105–20, 123–25, 127–28, 131, 151, 218 secularization 12, 105–06, 112–16, 123, 221 segregation 221, 388 sexuality 371, 375, 378 sexualized 297 sexual 44, 289, 327, 373 skepticism 15, 17, 21 slave 214, 375 slavery 366 social media 13, 15, 20, 21, 22, 28, 349, 350, 352, 354, 389 socialism, 67 209, 215 socialist 150, 209, 302, 333 sociocultural 191, 202 sociomaterial 44–45 sociopolitical 82, 162, 167, 175, 232, 371, 388 sociotechnical 13, 23, 37, 38, 43–54 sovereignty 15, 162, 164, 196, 201, 211, 213, 392 sovereign 167, 172, 177, 289, 350

spiritual 15, 29, 85, 107, 147, 257–58, 390 spirituality 29 spiritualistic 290 Stalinism 209 statehood 187 stateless 159, 163, 172–74 stratification 388 subaltern 159–61, 163, 169, 172–73, 176–77, 195, 392 subalternité 172, 184 subalternity 163, 171–72, 177, 199, 391 subjectivity 133, 164, 178, 337, 377, 390 subjectivation 13, 28, 29, 371–72, 374–78, 383 superpowers 15, 191, 194 supranational 302, 307 supremacist 331 surveillance 85, 191–92, 220, 232, 235, 259, 273, 286 sustainability 204, 283, 358 sustainable 195, 308–09, 356, 389 Tablighi Jamaat 215, 219–26 technocracy 51 technocratic 51, 392 technology, 14, 15, 23, 37–43, 46–48, 50–54, 60, 66, 72, 81, 82, 85–87, 190–91, 196–97, 201, 222, 231–35, 241, 243, 247, 259–260, 262–63, 265–67, 271, 274, 287, 290, 297–99, 302, 349–52, 354–59, 363, 366–67, 370, 388 technophile 47 technoscience 39 technoscientific 15, 22, 39, 44 technostructure 192 technosystem 44 telecommuting 242 telework 291 Thatcherism 193 total powers 376, 379, 380, 383 totalitarian 86, 209, 334, 373, 381, 383 totalitarianisms 383 traditional 16, 21, 23, 27, 37, 38, 39, 41, 63, 76, 165, 195, 208–09, 212–13, 215, 218, 220, 223, 272–73, 291, 352–53, 363 traditionalism 290 traditionalist 116 transcultural 14 transgovernmental 26 transience 278 Turkification 165 Turkish, 161–62, 167–170, 172–73, 178, 183–185 Turkishness 162, 167–168 Turkism 167–68, 170, 181 tyranny 121–22 ulama 216, 221 ultramilitary 24, 81 ultranationalist 214 undemocratic 219

401

Index

unemployment 176, 374, 380–81 universalism 216, 390, 392 universalist 177 universality 18, 41, 46 unnaturalized 145 unscientific 65, 246, 301 urbanization 236, 299 urban, 44, 236–37, 247, 258, 297, 300, 320, 374 urbanity 167 utilitarian 199, 362 utilitarianism 377 utopia 224, 391, 392 utopian 387 vaccine 234–35, 245–46, 251, 270, 329, 334, 338 vaccination 234–235, 313, 347 violence 13, 85, 86, 176, 184, 188, 190–199, 201, 214, 217, 323, 375, 378, 389 violent, 209, 210, 214, 355, 357, 382

viruses 16, 18, 19, 28, 233–38, 242, 246–47, 258, 266, 268–70, 274, 278, 280, 284, 286, 289–91, 312–14, 321, 338, 340 viral 233–236, 238, 242, 270, 312, 325, 338 vulnerability 27, 28, 47, 52, 277, 321, 326 vulnerable 239, 277, 321, 324, 328, 334–35 war 5, 24, 71, 72, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 119, 171, 175, 187, 188, 190, 191, 195, 201, 261, 280, 281, 292, 302, 303, 329, 330, 331, 338, 341, 342, 363, 383 Western 12, 15, 21, 25, 27, 61, 72, 76, 81–82, 84, 87, 89, 105, 130, 159–60, 162, 164–65, 167–70, 172–73, 187, 189, 190, 195, 207–09, 211, 213–16, 218, 221–22, 231, 243, 247, 257, 261, 287, 291, 298–300, 302–03, 305–06, 314, 379, 382, 391 Westernization 82, 169, 208 xenophobia 379 xenophobic 380–81, 392