Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective 9780804796569

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Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective

Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective Edited by Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski

Stanford Security Studies An Imprint of Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Regional missile defense from a global perspective / edited by Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski.   pages cm   Includes bibliographical references and index.   ISBN 978-0-8047-9064-2 (cloth : alk. paper) —   ISBN 978-0-8047-9635-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)   1. Ballistic missile defenses—United States.  2. Ballistic missile defenses.  3. United States—Military policy.  4. United States—Military relations.  I. Kelleher, Catherine McArdle, editor.  II. Dombrowski, Peter J., editor.   UG743.R435 2015  358.1'74—dc23 2015005111 ISBN 978-0-8047-9656-9 (electronic) Typeset by Thompson Type in 10/14 Minion

CONTENTS

List of Acronyms

vii

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski

1

PART I U.S. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS



1 Addressing the Missile Threat: 1980–2008 Susan J. Koch

17



2 U.S. National Missile Defense Policy James M. Acton

33



3 Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Concepts Amy F. Woolf

48



4 Technical Controversy: Can Missile Defense Work? George N. Lewis

63



5 Congress and Missile Defense Nancy W. Gallagher

84

PART II REGIONAL DYNAMICS



6 Europe and Missile Defense Gustav Lindstrom

107

vi  CONTENTS



7 Postcrisis Perspectives: The Prospects for Cooperation among the United States, NATO, and Russia on Ballistic Missile Defense Vladimir Dvorkin

121



8 From Dream to Reality: Israel and Missile Defense Ariel Levite and Shlomo Brom

137



9 Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf Michael Elleman and Wafa Alsayed

160



10 Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia Andrew Winner

180



11 Chinese Attitudes Toward Missile Defense Christopher P. Twomey and Michael S. Chase

197



12 Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense and “Proactive Pacifism” Saadia M. Pekkanen

217

PART III CRITICAL GLOBAL ANALYSES



13 Strategic Dead End or Game Changer? Brad H. Roberts



14 Evaluating the Opportunity and Financial Costs of Missile Defense Dov S. Zakheim

241

264

Conclusion: The Future of Ballistic Missile Defense Peter Dombrowski and Catherine McArdle Kelleher

283

Notes on Contributors

295

Index

301

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABL Airborne Laser ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ALPS Accidental Launch Protection System ALTBMD Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense AMDR Air and Missile Defense Radar AN/TPY-2 Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance AN/SPY-1 Army Navy/Water Radar Surveillance ASAT Anti-Satellite BMD Ballistic Missile Defense BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (originally SDIO, now MDA) BMDR Ballistic Missile Defense Review BPI Boost-phase intercept C2 Command and Control CBO Congressional Budget Office CFE Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty CPGS Conventional Prompt Global Strike CRS Congressional Research Service DOD Department of Defense DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DSB Defense Science Board DSP Defense Support Program EKV Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle vii

viii  LIST OF ACRONYMS

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach GAO Government Accountability Office GBI Ground-Based Interceptor GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GMD Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System GPALS Global Protection against Limited Strikes HASC House Armed Services Committee ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile KEI Kinetic Energy Interceptor PAA Phased Adaptive Approach PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 MDA Missile Defense Agency MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System MIRV Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle MKV Multiple Kill Vehicle MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization New START Treaty New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty NMD National Missile Defense NPR Nuclear Posture Review NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty NRC National Research Council PGM Precision-Guided Munition PTSS Precision Tracking Space System RV Reentry Vehicle SASC Senate Armed Services Committee SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (later renamed BMDO and then MDA) SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SM-2/3 Standard Missile-2/3 SRBM Short-Range Ballistic Missile

LIST OF ACRONYMS ix

STSS THAAD TMD UAV UEWR

Space Tracking and Surveillance System Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense Theater Missile Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Upgraded Early Warning Radar

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors gratefully acknowledge the support and advice of individuals who helped in the design and completion of this volume, including: Our contributors for their enthusiasm and patience; Our stalwart assistant from the onset, Eric Auner; Our talented translator, Anya Loukianova; Our readers and project friends, Judith V. Reppy, Frank Rose, Dennis Gormley, Jim Wirtz, Jon Glassman, and Peter Swartz; Our reviewers, including those from SUP; Our editors, Geoffrey Burn, James Holt, and John Feneron of SUP, and Sandra Kisner; Our participants in the two workshops held at Newport in 2011 and 2012. They also acknowledge and thank the institutions that provided crucial ­support: The Naval War College and Provost Mary Ann Peters; The Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College and Deans Barney Rubel and Thomas Culora; The Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and Director John Steinbruner; The Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland and Steven Kull; The Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, including Watson Director Rick Locke, who provided an intellectual home for Peter Dombrowski during the final stages of manuscript preparation. xi

Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective



INTRODUCTION Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski

A NEW WAVE OF REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile defense, and particularly regional missile defense, has returned to the spotlight after nearly a decade of relative obscurity. It has returned to the global policy agenda both because President Obama made regional missile defense a centerpiece of his national security strategy and because Russia’s aggressive foreign policy toward Ukraine and elsewhere has soured its relations with Europe and the United States. The new hallmark of Obama’s regional missile defense system, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), scheduled to be operational in 2020, has become a pawn in the larger game of resetting the West’s relations with Russia.1 Current uncertainties about missile defense in the European context have global implications, however. Regional missile defense has been a centerpiece of U.S. strategic diplomacy since the middle of the George W. Bush administration. Under President Obama the United States has pushed variants of the EPAA in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia as well. Meanwhile, Israel and other nations faced with missile threats are exploring both indigenous missile defense technologies and ways to link with the American systems. Greater spending on missile defense in response to renewed tensions with Russia or changes in American missile defense priorities (for example, regarding interceptor site locations or its overall systems architecture) could either spur activities in other regions or divert U.S. attention away from their specific challenges. For the last three decades, the necessity for an active missile defense policy has been a rallying cry for its supporters, often those most convinced of 1

2  KELLEHER AND DOMBROWSKI

the ultimate truth of Ronald Reagan’s SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars”) vision. For others, it represents the primacy of technology as a response to twenty-first-century security dilemmas, a military answer that would require fewer “boots on the ground” but clearly an instrument to be integrated with others, capable of deterrence when needed and defense when appropriate. Moreover, regional missile defense systems may be one of the most significant Obama legacies in national security: the deployment in regions critical to the United States of workable, tested systems, available quickly for deployment and reinforcement and contributing to crisis stability. American allies and friends have come to see these as a newly potent symbol of collective defense and shared values. This was in sharp contrast to the heated discussions and stark opposition that earlier missile defense programs had encountered in the past. Obama’s revision and expansion of George W. Bush’s plans provoked few of the dramatic congressional and electoral debates over missile defense that had taken place at several points since missile defense first entered that national security lexicon in the late 1950s. Criticism of the regional defenses and of the national “homeland” system came mostly from the small expert community, individual specialists, or think tanks. The range of regional attempts to explore and perhaps to establish regional defenses is near global, a tribute largely to American persuasiveness and example. Even in Europe, where debates only a decade before had raged over American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that had blunted earlier missile defense efforts, American allies and friends seemingly view missile defense as a symbol of collective defense and shared values. Our goal in this volume is to explain the origins, the evolution, and the implications of the regional approach to missile defense that has emerged since the presidency of George H. W. Bush. Under President Obama the overarching concept for American missile defense has focused on both a national system of limited ground-based defenses against limited intercontinental threats located in Alaska and California and regionally based missile defenses consisting of mobile ground-based technologies like the Patriot PAC-3 system and sea-based Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers. Eventually experts hope the entire system will comprise a set of layered conventional defensive missiles capable of protecting the U.S. homeland, allies, friends, and American forces stationed at sea or abroad from limited ballistic missile attacks. These compatible systems are bound together with advanced radars and sensors and

INTRODUCTION 3

responsive to Early Warning System alerts. They are designed to deter missiles fired from rogue states and possibly nonstate actors. U.S. regional missile defense systems have the potential to combine national systems of allies and friends, bilaterally managed forces, and NATO alliance forces in an architecture under bilateral and multilateral agreements with American systems and infrastructure. The themes reflected here are largely familiar from earlier debates about missile defense: the important technological challenges encased in a hard problem; the question of costs, both direct and those of trade-offs versus other elements in the overall defense structures of nations; the political context at home and abroad; and acceptance or rejection of present designs and future dreams. Some touch on more fundamental strategic issues: answers within the present and foreseeable global context of offense–defense trade-offs or the requirements of credibility and capability in a framework of less than total war or shrinking strategic numbers. Still others center on the nature of alliance relationships and the weaving together of challenges in burden sharing, decision sharing, and the divisibility of risk. Each state and region, we emphasize, has a different mix of answers and questions, of present solutions and future dreams. We have tried to focus on those we and our contributors find central and hope others will see the challenges for future research we pose. CHALLENGES TO REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

There are fundamental uncertainties and core constraints, generally and within each region touched by the chapters in this volume. The obvious first factor is cost. In the decades since President Reagan’s famous “Star Wars” speech, it has become clear that even modest missile defense capabilities are drastically more expensive and time consuming to develop than was originally anticipated. As technological failures accumulate and uncertainties continue, core technical problems remain stubbornly unsolved despite continuing investments. Reagan’s purported dream of a massive shield against a major Russian or Chinese attack now seems unaffordable, as well as technologically and politically inconceivable. In retrospect, even the scaled-back plans of the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations—which envisioned hundreds of Ground-Based Interceptors to deal with limited missile salvos—seem wildly ambitious, when compared to the total of forty-four Ground-Based Interceptors currently planned for deployment in California and Alaska before 2020.

4  KELLEHER AND DOMBROWSKI

Yet, as the chapters in this volume document, the evolution of missile defense technologies has continued both in the United States and across the globe despite repeated technical failures and periodic bouts of elite political opposition. The end of the Cold War lowered the sense of risk of great power war and thus attacks from large numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles possessed by the Soviet Union and its successor states. After decades under threat, U.S. leaders and citizens have become accustomed to a circumstance in which a Russian or Chinese ballistic missile could be launched against them with little or no warning. Over time the logic of deterrence combined with arms control and other diplomatic measures, as well as advanced technologies like early warning radar, helped mitigate the sense of doom prevalent early in the Cold War. Reports of Russian and Chinese missile modernization still make headlines, but few reputable analysts believe new capabilities will upset the existing balance, much less allow for an overwhelming “surprise” first strike. Susan Koch (Chapter 1) suggests that the George W. Bush administration saw an end to protracted public debate or at least the most public and contentious phase following President Reagan’s SDI speech. The Bush withdrawal from the ABM Treaty provoked little or no public Russian opposition and raised minimal public outcry in the United States or Europe; this suggested the dawn of a new post–arms control or post–post–Cold War era. The logic was clear: If Russia was a strategic partner, there was no longer the need to fear an arms race. China, while perhaps a near-peer competitor in the offing, was not yet there and probably wouldn’t be, at least at the strategic level, for many years. The basic strategic balances and the question of national defense were settled; the outlines of a relatively broad national consensus on missile defense, if not its content, fairly settled. Moreover, the earlier wars over missile defense technologies—ranging from battles over the effectiveness of specific system components to those over alternative concepts for defeating incoming missiles—had subsided. Not least was the increasingly acknowledged fact (but not one universally accepted) that decades of effective investment in missile defense technologies were paying off in terms of allowing for limited, but credible, systems.2 The United States and its partners, however, now face two strategic risks. On the one hand, a number of potential adversaries are increasing the numbers, range, and accuracy of their missiles. As the Rumsfeld Commission emphasized in the late 1990s, the most notable risks come from the so-called

INTRODUCTION 5

rogue states of Iran and North Korea. More recent analyses also stress a parallel trend in the nondeclared “new generation” nuclear states, such as India and Pakistan, possessing increasingly capable delivery systems including shortand intermediate-range missiles. More states thus have, or are projected to have in the indefinite future, the ability to strike the territory and forces of the United States and its allies. Strategists and planners believe that adversaries will use missile forces to limit U.S. access to strategic regions and resources, constrain U.S. freedom of action, and deter U.S. military intervention. For most policy makers, ballistic missile defense systems ranging from Ground-Based Interceptors to THAAD, Aegis, and PAC-3 are important tools for managing missile proliferation. They are attractive to political and military leaders because in the long run they appear to be comparatively inexpensive, depend on a limited physical footprint, are deployable at sea or on land, and are moveable and reconfigurable should new political or military circumstances arise. Most important, they offer the symbolic promise of protecting ordinary citizens without relying on the complex calculations of forces designed to ensure mutually assured destruction. A number of high-profile nonpartisan reports released during the Obama presidency fueled expert-level debate. Critiques of the Obama administration approach in particular came from the Defense Science Board (DSB) in 2011, the National Research Council/National Academies of Sciences in 2012, and several Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports from 2008 onward. All examined and found wanting significant parts of the current plans, including the underlying concepts, individual technologies, and planned deployments. Taken together these studies affirm the missile defense mission in one form or another but provide some encouragement for those who oppose missile defense on feasibility and cost grounds. Debates are likely to continue given the many technical challenges inherent in the Obama plans, including questions on the current sensor architecture, the capability of future interceptors, and the ability of the United States and its partners to effectively integrate present and future missile defense assets into the networks of command and communication. As the experts in this volume discuss, the most important technical controversies pose important questions. George Lewis (Chapter 4 in this volume), for example, examines how differing assessments of technological challenges, such as discriminating between rapidly moving objects and the impact of adversary countermeasures, have influenced political arguments favoring and

6  KELLEHER AND DOMBROWSKI

opposing missile defense basic research, research and development, acquisition programs, and, not the least, the actual deployment of systems whether working or not. Dov Zakheim and Brad Roberts illuminate the attempts to resolve these controversies. But in the end the major political question remains: Which approach to missile defense best serves the nation’s overall strategic interests? THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT: POLITICS AND PRIORITIES

Many officials and researchers assert that there is at present a consistent level of consensus in the United States about the broad concept of missile defense, the need first to develop and deploy protection of the U.S. homeland and second to help defend allies in critical regions. Some, as Nancy Gallagher (Chapter 5 in this volume) argues, do not. A somewhat smaller majority would agree on the relative attractiveness of the U.S. Navy’s SM-3 missile and Aegis system (both on board ships and with components based ashore) for providing a defense against regional missile threats. Technological and operational disagreements persist, of course, and there is an active debate among experts—scientists, military leaders, analysts, and politicians—on many aspects of missile defense, both national and regional. The most important question is what the balance should be of future investments against limited missile strikes between national defense programs or greater investments in layered regional systems. Successive Congresses and two presidents (with perhaps some help from a third) have supported an ambitious range of technology development and deployment. The particular focus has been to address concerns about general missile proliferation and threats from North Korea, Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, and Hamas in particular. President Obama retained the second President Bush’s national missile defense program, which included Ground-Based Interceptor sites in Alaska and California, but scaled down both the pace of the program and the search for a “third site” in Europe against the threat of long-range missiles. He announced the EPAA regional system to defend allies against short- and intermediate-range missile attacks, especially from Iran. The EPAA included sea- and land-based systems based on upgraded versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the Navy’s Aegis system. EPAA promised to be “smarter, stronger, and swifter.” It would cover many more countries than previous regional systems planned for Europe and rely on perhaps 100 or more interceptors. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the new plan

INTRODUCTION 7

also relied more on existing and proven technology than the approach to European regional missile defense proposed by President George W. Bush: “We can now field initial elements of the system to protect our forces in Europe and our allies roughly six to seven years earlier than the original plan.”3 Subsequently, the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) raised the significance of the “regionally based systems” like the EPAA to a status almost coequal to that of a national “homeland” missile defense and provided a fairly clear, technical perspective on the systems proposed and those under eventual consideration.4 Subsequent statements in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and in presidential national strategy pronouncements suggest EPAA’s role as a template of the possible and the integration of defensive systems against a range of threats and conflicts across the globe. But defense issues in general and missile defense issues in particular did not figure prominently in the 2012 American presidential election. One exception related to missile defense and the Russian “Reset.” Republicans made much of Obama’s “open mic” comment to Russian premier Medvedev; they have used it to suggest a postelection Obama “sellout” to Russian interests and demands. Other partisan criticisms of the current administration are used sparingly for targeted audiences—Obama “abandoning” U.S. allies (Poland in particular), “canceling” President George H. W. Bush’s programs (the Airborne Laser and a number of interceptors that had failed testing), and “inadequately” funding certain programs and priorities. For a few, but increasingly articulate, critics, Obama’s real aim is the scaling down of U.S. missile defense ambitions. These criticisms may revive at any time in response to further shifts in the Obama missile program, in international crises, and in conflicts or future arms control negotiations with the Russian and Chinese governments. Perhaps the most important domestic debate on missile defense came earlier in the public discussion of the last major U.S.–Russian arms control agreement, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). In April 2011, thirty-nine Republican senators sent a letter to the White House warning against giving the Russians a “veto” over American missile defense plans and expressing the opinion that sensitive data should not be shared with the Russians. The concerns expressed in this letter mirrored those expressed in the Senate debate over the 2010 New START treaty, the preamble of which contained an acknowledgment of a relationship between offenses and defenses. Republicans criticized the administration for including language that they saw as validating the Russian view that nuclear forces and missile ­defenses

8  KELLEHER AND DOMBROWSKI

should be limited within the same framework. Concerns over cooperation and data and technology continue to be expressed by right-wing critics of the administration, with a particularly persistent and vocal group within the House Republican caucus. But there are also Democrats in both houses attached to the concept of achieving some reliable measure of defense of the homeland and allies or with capabilities that give the president some options in a crisis other than immediate all-out war or nuclear use. To address this opposition, the president needed to articulate why an approach steeped in cooperative security principles would benefit American security interests. The more liberal wing of the Democratic Party, however, plays up the cost and technical problems involved and the deviation from what they believed was compatible with Obama’s pledge to draw down all the remnants of Cold War force posture, at home and overseas. Neither President Obama nor his party as a whole has assigned a “do or die” priority to nuclear issues such as strategic modernization, much less defense against ballistic missiles. If anything, the president was initially focused on arms control and the push for Global Zero to set a path toward eventual elimination of nuclear weapons entirely. THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

Yet, if the Obama administration’s approach to missile defense has not captured the attention of the American public, it has managed to convince leaders and security policy elites in other countries—largely allies, partners, and friends—that the American missile defense efforts have something to offer. In pursuing a layered-approach national missile defense with a major contribution from American missile defense systems deployed in regions central to U.S. national security, the Obama administration has created the conditions for closer military, diplomatic, and military cooperation on other fronts. No longer does the U.S. desire to field missile defense systems threaten to decouple the security of the American homeland from its military forces deployed at sea or in the territories of American allies. Moreover, with the theater defense systems relying largely, but not exclusively, on sea-based interceptors and mobile ground-based systems like PAC-3 rather than fixed-ground installations or space-based programs, the political and diplomatic costs of working with the U.S. military are reduced. This is especially true for those

INTRODUCTION 9

states whose domestic and strategic circumstances benefit from being seen as less beholden to, or cooperative with, the United States. But for others, and over the long term, increasingly successful missile defense systems, especially with dual and multiple uses (inferred by the term of art, “integrated air and missile defense,” for example), allow American allies ways to participate in the regional Phased Adaptive Approach or other cooperative efforts. Networking indigenous or imported early warning radars, battle management, and command and control (C2) systems with U.S. forces results in opportunities for defense industrial cooperation, technological diffusion and/or transfers, and closer military integration on issues not involving missile defense. There are pressures for continuous competitive upgrades and improvements, to match enemies but sometimes even allies or associates within the same regional grouping. As Obama’s second term comes to a close the concepts articulated in the BMDR and NPR appear to have withstood significant changes in the international threat environment in both Asia and Europe. So too have the implementing defensive systems—perhaps even more remarkably—that have enjoyed a relatively unique “protected” status in a very difficult political and budgetary environment that threatens core service programs and priorities. However much the across-the-board sequestration cuts begun in fiscal year 2013 are eventually reversed, regionally oriented missile defense’s priority status seems likely to continue. The Obama administration has consistently used “mobile and relocatable” missile defense assets, along with cooperative programs and investments, to shore up U.S. extended deterrence commitments and manage crises. NATO’s PAC-3 deployments to Turkey in response to chaos in Syria, deployments to Japan in the face of North Korean activities, and the various cooperative efforts with Israel in a series of attacks are recent examples. James Acton and Amy Woolf explore the Obama administration’s focus on regional ballistic defense in detail. The EPAA melded, for example, existing NATO and European national missile defense initiatives but clearly changed the focus. The concept taken broadly seemed readily adaptable to the requirements in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and potentially other theaters as well. Moving to a largely sea-based system (Aegis) with some Navy technologies located on land (Aegis Ashore), mobilizing and sometimes subsidizing allied participation, and proposing an aggressive schedule of science

10  KELLEHER AND DOMBROWSKI

and ­technology with research, development, testing, evaluation, and program development proved attractive factors to domestic and international supporters. The Range of Regional Cases

Iran and its potential missile development were the explicit focus of the EPAA as the administration sought to construct defenses against a potential limited capability poised to attack the United States, its forces, and its allies in Europe. A similar, though differentiated, approach is proposed for defense against Iranian potential from another side, through new cooperation in the Gulf and the greater Middle East, examined in this volume by Michael Elleman and Wafa Alsayed. In Asia, Japan and the United States have continued and expanded the already extensive investments in regional missile defense under agreements begun in the mid-1990s. They have sought to develop compatible systems against developments in North Korea and, although rarely declared, against the potential threats from China. President Obama’s approach has indeed exploited even limited missile defense capabilities to considerable diplomatic effect within crises (such as Japanese and U.S. alerts and deployments against North Korean test launches) and the rapid reinforcing deployment of defensive missiles to various crisis regions (for example, PAC-3 batteries to Turkey in the face of both Syrian and Hezbollah threats). Given the explicitly regional focus of the expanded U.S. missile defense strategy, the United States depends more than ever before on deep, continuous cooperation from allies and partner states. In many cases, these states must work with one another. As assessed by Gustav Lindstrom and Saadia Pekkanen, the cases of cooperation under the EPAA and the U.S.–Japan agreements are the most far-reaching and advanced. American–Israeli cooperation, based on a very different template, lags only slightly. Nonetheless, in all three cases, thorny issues relating to rising program costs in a time of constrained budgets, ongoing negotiations with Iran over the fate of its nuclear program, and the startling changes in strategic assumptions introduced by the Ukrainian crisis will almost surely lead to a more complex future set of arrangements. The Israeli experience with missile defense is especially informative because the country has unique operational experience with what Ariel Levite and Shlomo Brom (Chapter 8 in this volume) might term a “second-­ generation” missile defense and the policy, strategy, and operational choices

INTRODUCTION 11

it forces. U.S. cooperation in technology and doctrine with Israel is advanced, with the Japan connection perhaps the next nearest competitor. It includes joint technology development and system testing, as well as significant U.S. financial support for advanced technologies like the Iron Dome antirocket system. This bond is also one of the strongest examples of how missile defense can serve as a critical factor in extended deterrence, as both a set of military capabilities and as a physical down payment of a security and diplomatic commitment to another state. But cooperation is neither total nor fully satisfying for either side, the subject of continuing negotiation and debate. As Vladimir Dvorkin explains in Chapter 7, Russia is another special case in the context of thinking about national and regional missile defense because it possesses the largest and most capable arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons, as well as its own extensive history of developing missile defense systems. In keeping with the assumptions of the so-called Russia Reset, the Obama administration initially saw Russia itself as a potential missile defense partner. But even the earliest conceptions stressed cooperation and joint data/warning centers rather than the integrated system preferred by the Russian leadership. Very few in Washington were ready to support this division of labor, much less the full partnership demanded as their due by the Russian hard-liners, military and civilian. Russian opposition to EPAA has been adamant almost from the beginning and has increased over the interim. In the context of the current showdown over Ukraine, neither side seems inclined to new trust-rebuilding cooperation of any kind, let alone in missile defense, which has been the leading indicator of divergent interests. But whatever the outcome of the current era of tit-for-tat sanctions and discussions of a new Cold War, both Russia and the United States may still need to face the issues of future cooperation or at least deconfliction. We find the South Asia case offers a very different, more complex set of issues. Both India and Pakistan are modernizing their missile systems and nuclear weapons, but they have not, as of yet, pursued all-out missile defenses with any zest. Further, in many respects this is related only peripherally to the U.S.-led and dominated missile defense developments in other regions. In Chapter 10 of this volume, Andrew Winner concludes that India and Pakistan are engaging in what might be described as a slow-motion version of the Cold War arms race. Both sides are building varied and survivable nuclear forces as well as building up significant conventional land, air, and naval forces. India

12  KELLEHER AND DOMBROWSKI

has embarked on its own program to develop a layered, but geographically limited, missile defense system, an endeavor that Pakistan has not yet sought to match. Although defenses are unlikely to fundamentally restrike the strategic balance between India and Pakistan—or, for that matter, between India and China—they will introduce an additional layer of complexity to U.S. efforts to engage with tensions in the region. In East Asia, on the other hand, U.S. involvement is well established and based on alliances going back decades. China’s much-discussed assertiveness in the region is challenging traditional U.S. dominance and has included technology development efforts on the full range of military capabilities, including missile defense. How does missile defense fit into current Chinese strategic thinking? Michael Chase and Christopher Twomey argue in Chapter 11 that many in China already perceive missile defense cooperation with Japan and a potentially wider circle of Asian partners as threatening to degrade China’s relatively limited nuclear deterrent and its future evolution. U.S. protestations to the contrary are viewed with suspicion, if not outright disbelief, often paralleling the far louder assertions made by the Russian government. Indeed, there are increasing signs of joint opposition. Global Perspectives and Questions

We end our analyses by exploring fundamental “big picture” questions, the focus of analyses from prominent former U.S. defense officials from the most recent administrations. Brad Roberts addresses the question of whether missile defense is a “strategic dead end” or a “game changer.” His Chapter 13 is a reminder that defenses are not just a means of defending against a particular threat; they are components of broader frameworks of deterrence and reassurance. In his words, “The United States and its allies must have a credible answer to a new deterrence problem.” In Chapter 14, Dov Zakheim confronts the national/regional balance question, as well as the amount of financial resources devoted to missile defense versus other types of national security spending. He argues that theater or regional defenses have long enjoyed a high degree of bipartisan political support, whereas programs designed to defend the homeland posit both a higher standard of accuracy for success and for resilience and have been more controversial with regard to both technology and costs. Will the future be different? How should assessments of ultimate costs in future administrations take these differences into account?

INTRODUCTION 13

We conclude with our own perspectives on the challenges we see in the near and midfuture. We argue that the future resilience of missile defense programs will depend on critical factors—unproven technologies, unapproved budgets, the vagaries of political partnerships, and the pitfalls of alliance bounds, especially those involving technological change and dependence. But, despite these uncertainties, it seems clear to us that pursuing missile defense at the national and regional levels will remain popular with a significant percentage of the general population and, more important, with powerful senators and representatives, especially given continuing tectonic changes in the post–post–Cold War international system. And so the United States will continue to pursue missile defense in ways that will affect future strategic stability, the proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons, and the possibility of arms control. THE GOALS OF THIS VOLUME

We undertook this volume because, despite ongoing coverage and discussion of plans and deployments, a stunning quiet has attended the more fundamental conceptual shifts that undergird the present debates over missile defense. The requirements of a new strategic age have been left largely undebated. There are dominant figures in the debate, still passionate in their views but joined by fewer and fewer colleagues, most of whom rely on them for the relevant history or strategic calculus. This has been the case even in the wake of the recent Russian upending of security assumptions in Europe. There has been remarkably little public debate on the critical issues raised by the renewed and reimagined emphasis on missile defense in the United States and across the globe. It has been nearly a decade since scholars and practitioners have assessed the state of ballistic missile defense both as an effective response to potential missile attacks and as one critical component of American and international security strategies.5 With this volume we hope to help stimulate renewed debates over what we see as a serious gap in strategic studies and public policy circles. Written from a range of perspectives and encompassing many cross-chapter disagreements, the contributions that follow will provide a rich source for understanding the technologies, history, diplomacy, and strategic implications of the gradual evolution of American missile defense plans. As we look forward, we see a layered system consisting of a relatively modest deployment of national missile defense assets in Alaska and California and a much more impressive and

14  KELLEHER AND DOMBROWSKI

far-reaching set of theater-based systems designed to supplement the national system, protect American regional deployed forces, and defend America’s friends and allies who choose to participate. We have allowed some overlap among the chapters, to encourage scholars and students to dip into the text at any point. Experts and nonexperts alike who, for example, want to examine the offense-defense trade-offs anew, or are largely concerned with a policy update, or are interested in only one country or region can move quickly to a particular section or chapter. We have at least opened the door to debate but have not found or offered easy solutions. We believe there aren’t any. NOTES 1.  Although various U.S. lawmakers have discussed using missile defense as a response to Russian actions, Secretary of Defense Hagel and Pentagon officials have consistently emphasized that the EPAA is not aimed at Russia. See Richard Sisk, “US-UK: Expand Missile Defense in Eastern Europe,” Global Security Newswire (March 26, 2014), available at www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-says-missile-defenses-europecan-be-adjusted-amid-tensions-russia/. 2.  For an account of this history, see Steven A. Hildreth, Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview, Congressional Research Service, July 9, 2007. 3.  Kevin Whitelaw, “Obama’s Missile Plan Decision: What It Means,” National Public Radio (September 17, 2009), available at www.npr.org/templates/story/story .php?storyId=112909735. 4.  Robert Gates, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), available at www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026 JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf. 5. Exceptions include, but are not limited to, Andrew Futter, Ballistic Missile Defense and US National Security Policy: Normalization and Acceptance after the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2013); Jacques S. Gansler, Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2010); and Columba Peoples, Justifying Ballistic Missile Defense: Technology, Security and Culture (London: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

1

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 Susan J. Koch

this chapter will discuss u.s. ballistic missile defense policies and programs through four administrations, from President Reagan through the second President Bush. That history has been one of major change—in basic strategy, military aims, threat definition, technological focus, funding, and U.S. and international political salience. National missile defense (NMD) efforts, aimed at countering strategic ballistic missiles, were particularly subject to dramatic fluctuations over this period. Programs grew or contracted, and were emphasized or terminated, depending on several different factors. One major determinant was the changing perception of the primary strategic missile threats facing the United States. There were real differences on the nature of the ballistic missile threat, especially during much of the Clinton administration. However, for most of the period, the central controversies surrounding missile defense tended to be more about the feasibility and desirability of active defenses to counter those threats than about the threats themselves. The early Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), still in the Cold War, was to defend against a full-up Soviet ballistic missile threat. Over the years, with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of greater proliferation dangers, major focus changed, first to accidental or unauthorized Soviet launch, then to proliferant short- and medium-range threats, and finally to proliferant threats of all ranges. NMD proponents strongly objected to the initial shifts from the Reagan vision, but there is now near consensus that missile defenses can and should address only limited proliferant threats. Other factors were more controversial. As George Lewis discusses in Chapter 4 of this volume, arguments about the technical feasibility and 17

18  SUSAN J. KOCH

a­ ffordability of strategic missile defenses continue, even if they no longer create headlines. Controversy also surrounded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for decades, with some constituencies arguing that it must be preserved and others that it presented unacceptable obstacles to defenses required for U.S. security. That controversy essentially disappeared after the United States withdrew from the treaty in 2002. Finally, there were long-standing partisan political differences as to whether NMD would benefit U.S. security. Although the Clinton administration at first dramatically reduced NMD efforts, it ­adopted a quite different policy late in its first term, not least because of the Republican-controlled Congress. Although this chapter will address ballistic missile defense programs only from the Reagan through second Bush administrations, it is worth noting that the trend of major fluctuations to U.S. NMD policy and programs from one administration to the next leveled off in the Obama administration. Most important was the continuation of the limited Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) deployments begun by the George W. Bush administration, directed against North Korean missile threats. Still, the Obama administration reduced NMD budgets (although nowhere near as dramatically as the early Clinton administration had done) and canceled two important boost-phase intercept programs—the Airborne Laser and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor. As noted by George Lewis, analysts differ as to whether those programs were ended for political, affordability, technical, or a combination of reasons. The Obama administration also slightly reduced the planned Alaska deployments at first but restored the Bush numbers after the third North Korean nuclear test in 2013. Any effort to measure the precise impact of the decades-long fluctuations in U.S. NMD programs is necessarily a “what might have been” exercise that is difficult at best. Nonetheless, continual changes in policy emphasis, funding levels, and technical direction certainly did not provide a good foundation for effective, efficient progress. In contrast, as discussed by both George Lewis (Chapter 4) and Amy Woolf (Chapter 3) in this volume, U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) programs have benefited from more continuity. The level of attention paid to TMD compared to NMD did vary from administration to administration; most striking was the Clinton administration’s nearly exclusive focus on TMD. Nevertheless, TMD had many fewer programmatic starts and stops than did NMD. The result was a less turbulent (although certainly not smooth) development and deployment path for many TMD elements.

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 19

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: 1981–1989 Earlier Efforts

Reagan administration policy on ballistic missile defense is primarily associated with the president’s March 23, 1983, speech announcing the SDI. Important though that speech was, it was neither the beginning of administration missile defense efforts nor the last word on them. The United States had long deployed air defenses, both nuclear and conventionally armed, throughout the country. In 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced the planned deployment of the Sentinel system, a thin antimissile defense to defend cities from an accidental Soviet launch or a Chinese attack. Two years later, President Richard Nixon changed that program to Safeguard, to protect land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from Soviet attack. The interceptors for both Sentinel and Safeguard were to be nuclear armed. With the 1972 signature of the ABM Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to maintain deterrence based on strategic offensive forces, prohibiting nationwide strategic ballistic missile defenses. Those defenses were limited to two 100-interceptor sites, one to protect an ICBM field, the other the national capital. The 1974 protocol to the treaty reduced per­mitted deployment to a single 100-interceptor site. The United States deployed its Safeguard site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, in 1975 but deactivated it just five months later. Some attribute the end of the Safeguard program to opposition to nuclear-armed defenses; others cite its high operating costs for very limited capabilities. The Soviets kept, and Russia continues to retain, the nuclear-armed ABM site outside Moscow. After Safeguard’s termination, the Army’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization focused research and development on hit-to-kill interceptor technology and, for the longer term, space-based defenses, especially using high-energy lasers. The aims were described as “preservation of cost effective defense options which could be developed and deployed rapidly to meet near-term objectives with low development risk; and . . . the maturation of advanced technology systems concepts which could counter projected Soviet threat growth and still be cost effective.”1 The “Astrodome”

Thus, President Reagan’s speech launching the SDI in March 1983 did not emerge in a technological vacuum. Moreover, in February 1983, the Joint

20  SUSAN J. KOCH

Chiefs of Staff had recommended greater attention to strategic missile defense, out of concern with growing Soviet ballistic missile capability. Still, the speech was a surprise. The mere fact of a presidential prime-time television address brought missile defense to the political forefront for the first time in over a decade. More important, the speech was breathtaking in its ambitions for defense dominance: What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? . . . I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.2

Two other important elements of the speech maintained continuity with existing policy and strategy. First, the president stressed repeatedly the need to retain an effective nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future to protect the United States and our allies. Second, the proposed strategic defenses would aim solely at countering “the awesome Soviet missile threat”; there was no mention of defenses against third parties or accidental or unauthorized launch. Reduced Ambition

Within two years, the Reagan administration began to be more cautious about near- and medium-term ballistic missile defense. In February 1985, Paul ­Nitze, special advisor to the president and secretary of state on arms control matters, outlined three criteria for missile defense deployment: feasibility, survivability, and cost-effectiveness at the margin (meaning that incremental additions to defenses would be less expensive than any offensive growth designed to defeat them). That third Nitze criterion was designed to counter arguments that strategic defenses would inevitably trigger an endless offense–defense arms race. In retrospect, however, it is difficult to imagine that any system aiming at defense dominance over Soviet forces could fully meet that standard. Thus, although the Nitze criteria remained official policy throughout the Reagan administration, they may have helped to set the stage for the decreased strategic defense ambitions that began to emerge. Two years after the Nitze speech, the Reagan administration endorsed limited initial defenses, while keeping to its ultimate goal of complete defense dominance. The January 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 21

stated that the SDI could “shift deterrence to a safer and more stable basis.” Those defenses would not overwhelm offensive forces but “inject greater uncertainties” into Soviet first strike calculations.3 In September 1987, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger approved a concept of phased SDI deployments. Phase I, in the mid-1990s, would include space- and ground-based interceptors as well as surveillance and tracking systems. Like the full-up SDI, it would be a layered defense, designed to intercept strategic missiles in all phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal. Subsequent deployment phases were not defined. Press reports said that Phase I would be designed to intercept about one-third of a 5,000-warhead Soviet attack. In a further effort to scale back SDI, Senator Sam Nunn in January 1988 proposed an Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS) to defend against accidental or unauthorized Soviet launches, while calling for research on advanced technologies that might provide a nationwide defense in the longer term. The Defense Science Board (DSB), a Pentagon advisory committee, endorsed ALPS as the first step in a six-step Phase I deployment process. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci did not explicitly accept the DSB recommendation but called in October 1988 for keeping open an ALPS option. In doing so, he may have been accepting political reality. In the last years of the Reagan administration, the Congress cut administration budget requests for SDI, and in the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act urged the secretary to direct the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to emphasize ALPS-type systems. Arms Control

The ballistic missile defense envisioned in the Reagan SDI speech would not be allowed under the ABM Treaty, even with extensive amendments. The strategic concepts underlying the two were completely antithetical. However, the Reagan administration SDI program kept to research and development that did not raise treaty compliance issues, even after adopting the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM treaty in October 1985. Agreed Statement D to the treaty provided that “in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles . . . are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.” The broad interpretation would allow development and testing of mobile and space-based directed energy (and some would argue kinetic energy) systems. Although the issue generated great controversy, neither the Reagan nor Bush

22  SUSAN J. KOCH

administration ever acted on the broad interpretation. The Clinton administration explicitly disavowed it in 1993. At the October 1986 summit in Reykjavik, President Reagan proposed a two-phase U.S.–Soviet agreement. Over a ten-year period, each side would eliminate its offensive ballistic missiles and abide by its interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Thereafter, each would be free to deploy missile defenses unless agreed otherwise. General Secretary Gorbachev counterproposed the elimination of all strategic offensive arms, including heavy bombers, and a ban on testing space-based defense components outside the laboratory. Finally, the Soviets would not explicitly endorse freedom to deploy defenses beyond those allowed by the ABM Treaty, although they did recognize the right of treaty withdrawal. At the Washington summit in December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to pursue a legally binding accord that would echo some of the Reykjavik themes but not the elimination of ballistic missiles (still less of all strategic offensive arms). Under the proposal, the sides would abide by the ABM Treaty “for a specified period of time.” Three years before the end of that period, they would engage in “intensive discussions of strategic stability,” after which, unless otherwise agreed, each would “be free to decide its course of action.”4 The sides appeared to envisage the proposed agreement as the defense counterpart of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), but nothing ever came of it. THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION: 1989–1993 Changing Threat Perceptions

Despite the reduction in near-term ambitions for ballistic missile defense and improvement in relations with the Soviet Union, SDI stayed focused during Reagan’s second term on countering Soviet forces. Its ultimate aim remained defense dominance in the U.S.–Soviet strategic relationship. Interim steps like Phase I and even ALPS were still directed against Soviet ballistic missiles, whether to “inject uncertainties” into attack plans or to protect against accidental or unauthorized launch. Work continued on TMD systems, especially Patriot, but those did not receive much policy or public attention. There was relatively little consideration of Chinese or potential rogue state strategic missile threats. Notwithstanding references to the possibilities of U.S.–Soviet technology sharing and a “cooperative transition” to defense dominance, the Reagan administration did not show much interest in practical missile defense cooperation with the Soviet Union. All of that would change greatly in the administration of George H. W. Bush because of a dramatically new strategic environment. Most important

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 23

was the disappearance of the Soviet threat, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and culminating in the USSR’s dissolution in December 1991. Newly independent Russia was viewed as a partner, not an actual or potential adversary. At the same time, regional theater missile threats gained new salience after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Patriot deployments to the region. Global Protection against Limited Strikes

In a significant shift, a review at the start of the Bush administration found that the most important missile threats came from unauthorized or terrorist attacks on the United States and from shorter-range attacks on allies and forces abroad. Still, the review found SDI policy to be sound. The most notable change to the program in 1989–1990 was the replacement of the Space-Based Interceptor (SBI) in the planned Phase I with Brilliant Pebbles. The latter was designed to be a space-based system, using small kinetic projectiles to intercept ballistic missiles in their boost phase. Then, in the January 1991 State of the Union address, President Bush announced a major refocus of SDI to “providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.”5 Although the Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program shared many characteristics with Reagan’s Phase I and Nunn’s ALPS, it also had major differences. First, GPALS was not an initial step, but the purpose of the program. More robust defenses would be pursued only with a new decision to expand the aims of the system. Second, GPALS was directed solely against accidental, unauthorized, or third-country missile threats. Finally, GPALS would integrate both TMD and NMD. Still, the GPALS architecture was substantial, both ground- and spacebased, designed for boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal intercept. It would include 1,000 Brilliant Pebbles, 750 GBIs, six ground-based radars, sixty Brilliant Eyes satellites. and advanced ground-based TMD interceptors. Many SDI supporters decried the end of the Reagan vision of rendering ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete, whereas opponents thought GPALS too ambitious and doubted its potential effectiveness. Views changed quickly, with the Patriot engagements of Iraqi Scuds in the January–February 1991 Gulf War, the military effectiveness of which were debatable even as their political importance to U.S. allies was clear. The December 1991 Missile Defense Act directed the secretary of defense to “aggressively pursue” several advanced TMD options, with deployment by the mid-1990s, and work to deploy by 1996 an ABM-compliant missile defense as the first step toward a system “capable

24  SUSAN J. KOCH

of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles.” Arms Control

In the Bush administration’s first year or so, it continued the Reagan administration approach to the U.S.–Soviet Defense and Space Talks, calling for a “cooperative transition” to a stable offensive-defense balance and offering transparency measures such as data exchanges, briefings, and site visits. After the GPALS announcement, the arms control focus shifted. In his Presidential Nuclear Initiative speech of September 1991, President Bush cited the growing missile proliferation threat and stressed that U.S. missile defenses would not affect the Soviet strategic deterrent. He called “on the Soviet leadership to join us in taking immediate, concrete steps, to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source, without undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces” and promised “additional incentives in the area of ballistic missile early warning.”6 In his October 1991 reply, President Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss the U.S. proposal and also “to examine the possibility of developing joint early warning systems of nuclear attacks with land- and space-based elements.”7 In early 1992, new Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed a Global Protection System (GPS) against limited ballistic missile attacks. At the June 1992 Washington summit, he and President Bush agreed to develop a GPS concept as part of a broader nonproliferation strategy and directed a high-level group to explore a center to share early warning information, cooperation with participating states to develop missile defense capabilities and technologies, and development of a legal basis for cooperation through new or amended treaties or agreements.8 The high-level group chaired by Ambassadors Dennis Ross and Georgiy Mamedov reportedly made progress but did not reach any specific agreements before its termination by the Clinton administration.9 In September 1992, the United States proposed amendments to the ABM Treaty that would permit several hundred GBIs and lift restrictions on sensors. The United States argued that sensors should “run free” because of their importance for multiple functions beyond missile defense. The United States did not call for immediate amendments to allow Space-Based Interceptors—an important further departure from the original SDI vision.

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 25

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: 1993–2001 Changing Priorities

In May 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced major changes to U.S. missile defense policy, symbolized in the renaming of the SDIO to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). NMD and TMD would no longer be integrated. The near-term focus would be on TMD development and deployment, to address regional threats. NMD would be a lower-priority research and development program, concentrating on ground-based components. The Department of Defense argued that there was no near-term military requirement for NMD because a rogue ballistic missile threat to the United States was far in the future. 3+3

The domestic political context for missile defense shifted significantly after the 1994 elections returned Republican majorities to the House and Senate. The Republican campaign manifesto, “Contract with America,” called for the earliest possible deployment of highly effective NMD and TMD. Congress doubled the administration request for the FY 1995 NMD budget; an attempted requirement for NMD deployment by 2003 was vetoed by the president. Probably more in response to domestic political pressure than to changed threat perceptions, the administration adopted a new “3 + 3” policy in February 1996. Over the first three years, the administration would develop a system of GBIs, radars, and space-based sensors to defend against limited rogue, terrorist, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats to the United States. If the president determined at the end of that three-year period that the system was feasible and warranted, it could be deployed in three more years. Secretary of Defense William Perry described this as “a hedge strategy . . . if an ICBM threat to our country were to appear on the horizon.”10 In January 1999, the 3 + 3 program slipped a few years, aiming at a final deployment decision in 2003 for initial operating capability in 2005. In 1998, U.S. threat perceptions changed decisively. First, in July the congressionally mandated Rumsfeld Commission concluded unanimously that Iran and North Korea could develop a ballistic missile threat to the United States within five years of a decision to do so; Iraq, hobbled by sanctions, would take ten years. This finding differed significantly from national intelligence estimates but was reinforced when North Korea launched a three-stage “satellite launch” in August 1998. Although the launch failed, it demonstrated

26  SUSAN J. KOCH

key advances in stage separation and solid-rocket motor technology. The CIA stated publicly that with the third stage and a lighter payload, the TaepoDong-2 probably could reach the continental United States.11 In July 1999, President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which provided: “It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.” In his signing statement, the president hedged that commitment by outlining the criteria on which he would base a deployment decision: “Any NMD system we deploy must be operationally effective, cost-effective, and enhance our security. In making our determination, we will also review progress in achieving our arms control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the ABM Treaty that may be required to accommodate a possible NMD deployment.”12 The first two criteria recalled Nitze’s (although cost-effectiveness is a less stressing criterion than cost-effectiveness at the margin); the link with arms control definitely did not. The following month, the president decided on a potential NMD architecture. The first phase would have 100 GBIs and one ABM radar in Alaska and five upgraded early-warning radars, to counter the North Korean threat. The second phase, to provide nationwide coverage, would include 250 interceptors at two sites (Alaska and probably North Dakota), a new radar network, and spacebased tracking sensors. That full system could take up to ten years to deploy. On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he would postpone a decision on NMD deployment. He found “that the NMD program is sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued development and testing, but that there is not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward with deployment.” The White House stated that the president considered the following criteria: threat, financial cost, technical feasibility, “and the impact overall on our national security.” The statement made clear, if indirectly, that the last criterion included efforts to agree with Russia on ABM Treaty “adaptation.”13 Arms Control

The Clinton administration devoted much more attention to missile defense arms control than did its predecessors. As with its policy on development and deployment, its arms control efforts changed significantly over time. In a December 1993 Presidential Decision Directive, the administration disavowed the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty and foreswore treaty

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 27

amendments to allow NMD deployments beyond those currently permitted (although it could revisit that decision in the future). Instead, the directive called for agreement with the other parties to allow advanced TMD while remaining compliant with the ABM Treaty. The administration proposed that a TMD system would not be subject to the treaty unless it had been tested against a strategic ballistic missile with a velocity above 5 kilometers per second. Finally, the directive called for “generic” technical missile defense cooperation with Russia to assist relations and overall nonproliferation strategy.14 At the May 1995 summit, the United States and Russia agreed that TMD could be deployed “which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.” Further, TMD systems would not be deployed against each other.15 In September 1997, the ABM Treaty parties signed Agreed Statements on Demarcation between ABM and TMD systems. Under the first, TMD interceptors with velocities under 3 kilometers per second would not be covered by the treaty if not tested against strategic ballistic missiles of more than 5 kilometers per second velocity and 3,500 kilometer range. The second provided that faster TMD interceptors could not be based in space or tested against strategic ballistic missiles; otherwise, each party could determine for itself whether a system was treaty compliant. Another agreement designated Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as successors to the ABM Treaty. The Senate insisted that the agreements be submitted for advice and consent to ratification. With their fate clear in a hostile Senate, the administration never did so. At the June 1999 summit, the Clinton administration and Russia jointly, if obliquely, mentioned the possibility of amendments to increase the viability of the ABM Treaty under new strategic circumstances. In January 2000, the United States proposed a draft protocol to the treaty that would allow the first NMD phase of 100 interceptors in Alaska. The two-site, 250-interceptor follow-on phase was not addressed; instead, the protocol called for negotiations on possible further treaty changes to begin in or after March 2001, at the request of any party. To induce Russian acceptance, the United States offered more sharing of early-warning information and missile defense technologies and included extensive verification measures in the draft protocol. The Russian government showed no interest in the U.S. proposal. In April 2000, the Duma linked START II ratification to ABM Treaty retention, and Foreign Minister Ivanov cited compliance with the Treaty of 1974 as a prerequisite to nuclear arms reductions. On the other hand, in the same month,

28  SUSAN J. KOCH

twenty-five Republican senators, including the majority leader and the chairmen of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, warned the president against concluding a limited agreement with Russia like the proposed protocol. The Clinton administration effort to amend the ABM Treaty to allow NMD deployment was effectively finished. Subsequent U.S.–Russia summit statements, in June, July, and September 2000, focused instead on possible TMD cooperation, data exchanges, and other missile defense–related confidence-building measures. THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION: 2001–2009 Arms Control

President George W. Bush made clear from the outset his lack of interest in ABM Treaty amendments. In a landmark speech in May 2001, he condemned the treaty as contrary to U.S. interests, preventing the deployment of defenses to meet contemporary threats. The president called for replacing the Treaty “with a new framework . . . premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation.” He also stressed that his administration would consult closely with friends and allies on missile defense, and that “Russia and the United States should work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security.”16 On December 13, 2001, President Bush gave formal notice of intent to withdraw from the treaty. In his response the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin characterized the U.S. decision as mistaken but said it did “not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation” and that the move enhanced the need for a formal treaty to reduce strategic nuclear forces to 1,500 to 2,200 warheads on each side. Thus, Putin’s response turned on its head the former (and future) Russian position on the relationship between missile defense and offense arms reductions. In May 2002, the United States and Russia completed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. One month later, U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty took effect, and Bush administration consideration of missile defense arms control issues was over. U.S. Missile Defense Deployments

In his May 2001 speech, President Bush made clear that he sought defenses against limited rogue state threats: “Today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these [the world’s least responsible] states.”

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 29

The December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate on ballistic missile threats reported that most intelligence agencies held that North Korean and Iranian ICBMs would be likely, and Iraqi ones possible, before 2015.17 In January 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld renamed BMDO as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Calling for an integrated system that erased NMD–TMD distinctions, he identified four priorities for missile defense:



• “To defend the United States, deployed forces, allies and friends from ballistic missile attack. • “To employ a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight (i.e., boost, midcourse and terminal) against all ranges of threats. • “To enable the Services to field elements of the overall BMDS as soon as practicable. • “To develop and test technologies, use prototype and test assets to provide early capability, if necessary, and improve the effectiveness of deployed capability by inserting new technologies as they become available or when the threat warrants an accelerated capability.”18

Rumsfeld thus outlined a priority on deployment, rather than the cautious approach of the Clinton “3 + 3” criteria. In December 2002, the president announced that he had directed the secretary to field initial missile defenses composed of ground- and sea-based interceptors in the 2004 to 2005 range, additional Patriot (PAC-3) missiles, and land-, sea-, and space-based sensors. In May 2003, the White House reported that subsequent improved defenses could include more interceptors and PAC-3, as well as “initial deployment of the THAAD and Airborne Laser system; development of a family of boostphase and midcourse hit-to-kill interceptors based on sea-, air-, and groundbased platforms; enhanced sensor capabilities; and development and testing of space-based defenses.”19 By the end of 2004, the United States had deployed an initial missile defense capability with six GBIs at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Aegis ships served as forward sensors; in 2005, their role expanded with initial deployment of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) midcourse interceptors. The first Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) fire unit, with substantially improved capability over PAC-3, was deployed in 2008. Forty-four GBIs were planned in Alaska and ­California,

30  SUSAN J. KOCH

but only thirty were actually deployed until the Obama administration decided in March 2013 to complete the originally planned Fort Greeley deployments. Critics claim that the GBI deployments were premature, given the system’s mixed test results. European Missile Defense Plans

In 2004, the Bush administration began planning for a European missile defense to protect against Iranian medium- and long-range missiles. Three years later, after considerable internal and interallied discussion, the president formally proposed separate negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic for the deployment on their territories of ten GBIs and a large X-band radar, respectively. Although the issue was controversial in both countries, agreement was reached with the Czech government in April 2008 and with Poland in August 2008. Poland’s approval was not explicitly linked to the Russian military action in Georgia that same month, but the timing appears more than coincidental. Neither agreement had been ratified by September 2009, when President Obama canceled the Bush European missile defense plans in favor of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Although Russia reacted little if at all to U.S. missile defense deployments in Alaska and California, the opposite was true for the European missile defense plans. Russia repeatedly rejected U.S. arguments that the planned defenses would not affect Russian deterrent forces. In June 2007, Putin proposed sharing early-warning data from the large phased-array radar in Azerbaijan, which could be linked to Aegis ships. The next month he offered, if necessary, to modernize the radar or build a new one in southern Russia. However, this cooperation would be a substitute for, not complementary to, the planned deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. By April 2008, the Sochi Summit declaration on the U.S.–Russia Strategic Framework expressed “interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners” and mentioned Russian appreciation for U.S.-proposed confidence-building and transparency measures. Still, the “Russian side has made clear that it does not agree with the decision to establish sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.”20 There were no further serious U.S.–Russian discussions on European missile defense in the Bush administration. The April summit was the last meeting between Bush and Putin, except for two limited encounters during the Beijing Summer Olympics in August 2008. The U.S. president met with new

ADDRESSING THE MISSILE THREAT: 1980–2008 31

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the margins of the July 2008 G-8 and November 2008 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summits, but there is no public record of substantive discussions. CONCLUSION

By the end of the Bush administration, much of the controversy over missile defense that emerged after the Reagan SDI speech was over. The ABM Treaty had been a political lightning rod, yet it disappeared quietly and easily. There were no longer sharp policy and strategy debates over the purpose of U.S. NMD deployments. Such debates would undoubtedly reemerge if the Executive Branch decided to pursue East Coast deployments, but those are not on the current agenda. Although differences remain over the effectiveness of the deployed GBIs, those objections receive comparatively little political attention. TMD to protect forces and allies against regional ballistic missile threats continues to receive broad support. Domestic and international differences over missile defense instead have found a major new focus—the purpose and composition of European deployments. The change in the political environment surrounding NMD was undoubtedly due in large part to the scaled-down ambitions of U.S. NMD efforts. Some would attribute that development to a recognition of the technological and financial obstacles to the Reagan vision or even to the Bush GPALS. Others would cite the dramatic shifts over the past decades in the threats that NMD programs were designed to counter. Although this author would ascribe much more weight to the second factor than to the first, others will disagree. The most important point is that a rough domestic and international consensus has developed over currently planned limited NMD deployments in the United States. Although not as solid as that concerning TMD, it nevertheless has greatly reduced the major fluctuations that long characterized NMD policies and programs. NOTES 1.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, Department of the Army Historical Summary, FY 1982 (Washington, DC: Author, 1988). 2.  Ronald W. Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,” March 23, 1983. 3.  White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Author, 1987).

32  SUSAN J. KOCH

4.  “Joint Statement at the Soviet–United States Summit Meeting,” December 10, 1987. 5.  George H. W. Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 29, 1991. 6.  George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons,” September 27, 1991. 7.  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 87–88. 8.  “Joint United States–Russian Statement on a Global Protection System,” June 17, 1992. 9.  The nearest successor in the Clinton administration to Ross–Mamedov was the group led by Mamedov and Special Advisor (later Deputy Secretary of State) Strobe Talbott. However, that forum had a much broader mandate than Ross–Mamedov and at least initially devoted less attention to missile defense. 10.  William J. Perry, “Protecting the Nation through Ballistic Missile Defense,” Prepared Remarks, Washington, DC. April 25, 1996. 11.  Robert D. Walpole, “North Korea’s Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” Prepared Remarks, Washington, DC, December 8, 1998. 12.  William J. Clinton, “Statement on Signing the Missile Defense Act of 1999,” July 22, 1999. 13. White House, “National Missile Defense,” Fact Sheet, September 1, 2000, available at http://clinton6.nara.gov. 14.  White House, “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-17,” December 11, 1993 (declassified August 1, 2008). 15.  “U.S–Russia Joint Statement on Missile Defense Systems,” May 10, 1995. 16.  White House, “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University,” May 1, 2001. 17.  National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2001). 18.  U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Establishes Missile Defense Agency,” Release No. 008-02, January 4, 2002. 19.  White House, “National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense,” Fact Sheet, May 20, 2003. 20.  “US–Russia Strategic Framework Declaration,” April 6, 2008.

2

U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY James M. Acton

in its february 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, the administration of President Barack Obama identified two fundamental policy goals: First, the United States will continue to defend the homeland from limited ballistic missile attack. These efforts are focused on protecting the homeland from a ballistic missile attack by a regional actor such as North Korea or Iran. . . . Second, the United States will defend U.S. deployed forces from regional missile threats while also protecting our allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.1

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, every U.S. administration has articulated similar objectives. This continuity may seem unremarkable. But it stands in stark contrast to the Cold War, which saw the United States adopt almost every policy on ballistic missile defense (BMD) imaginable, ranging from not having a policy to outright opposition to complete support to the qualified endorsement of limited defenses. This post–Cold War consensus has not been absolute. Inevitably, each administration has created its own distinctive policy formulation, and some differences in basic goals have emerged—most notably over the right balance between homeland defense and forward defense (in particular, for much of his time in office, President William Clinton opposed the deployment of homeland defenses). But these policy changes have been modest compared to those during the Cold War, and the shifts in missile defense technology pursued by different administrations are largely reflective of disagreements over means, not ends. 33

34  JAMES M. ACTON

This consensus represents an equilibrium between three different forces: external threats, domestic politics, and technological and financial realities. The first two forces have tended to put “upward pressure” on BMD programs (even if the magnitude of this pressure has ebbed and flowed over time). The scale of U.S. ambitions has, however, been kept in check by the cost and technical complexity of developing and deploying defenses. MAINTAINING A BROAD CONSENSUS

In spite of President Ronald Reagan’s enthusiasm for a comprehensive defense against even a large-scale ballistic missile attack, the program he created to develop such defenses—the Strategic Defense Initiative—never yielded anything approaching an affordable and technically plausible scheme. Moreover, as the program’s challenges became ever more apparent, the likelihood of a massive nuclear strike receded dramatically. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in January 1991, eleven months before the collapse of the Soviet Union, President George H. W. Bush called for the program to “be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source . . . [to] deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to our friends and allies.”2 His plan, known as Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS), borrowed technology from the Strategic Defense Initiative and, like Reagan’s plan, envisioned a multilayered system of land-, sea-, and space-based interceptors. But its objectives marked a distinct break from the past. In fact, to the extent that Bush’s missile defense policy resembled anything that came before it, it was probably closest to the policy adopted by the administration of President Lyndon Johnson of deploying a “thin” BMD system against China. Indeed, the Bush administration included China in a list of “Third World” missile threats.3 While the Bush administration was formulating its policy, it was not entirely clear that ballistic missile proliferation would be the main driver of BMD development. At the time, an accidental or unauthorized missile launch from a decaying Soviet Union was seen by many as an equal—and perhaps even more serious—threat. However, following the 1991 Gulf War and Iraq’s use of Scud missiles against Israel, the acquisition of ballistic missiles by what have variously been known as “terrorist states,” “rogue states,” and “regional adversaries” moved to the forefront of the debate and has remained there ever since, helping to sustain the consensus around limited missile defenses. The list of states of concern has evolved over time. In justifying GPALS, the Bush administration mentioned India and Brazil alongside China as fu-

U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY 35

ture threats.4 More recently, the conversation has been dominated by Iran and North Korea. Moreover, in an important policy shift, recent administrations have sought to convince Beijing that missile defenses deployed to protect the U.S. homeland would not be capable of undermining its nuclear deterrent. More generally, beyond potential threats posed by specific states, U.S. policy makers have also viewed BMD as a hedge against an uncertainty—both in terms of which states might attain ballistic missile technology and whether the United States would be successful in deterring them.5 Without question, the missile threat—particularly the likely timescale for the development by potential adversaries of missiles capable of reaching the homeland—has sometimes been exaggerated. The influential Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by at that time former and future Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, is a case in point. In July 1998, it predicted that North Korea could obtain an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability “within about five years of a decision to acquire” it.6 Pyongyang first tested ICBM technology (in the guise of a satellite launch vehicle) just a month after the report’s publication. More than fifteen years later, it has yet to demonstrate an ICBM capability in an end-to-end test. However close one believes that North Korea is to having an ICBM today, it is clear that a five-year time horizon was far too pessimistic. It is also true that skeptics have sometimes underestimated the threat. North Korea may not yet have demonstrated an ICBM capability, but in December 2012 it did place a satellite in orbit in what was widely perceived to be a test of many aspects of ICBM technology. This largely successful test undermined claims made just eight months earlier, following a failed North Korean satellite launch, about the “weakness” of Pyongyang’s missile program.7 Moreover, there is considerably less disagreement that there is a serious and growing threat from shorter-range ballistic missiles, in particular from Iran and North Korea. The change in threat perceptions—from fear of a Soviet missile strike to fear of missile proliferation—has also affected strategic thinking within the United States in a way that has bolstered the consensus around limited defenses. During the Cold War, there was a broad (but not universal) willingness to accept the inevitability of mutual vulnerability with the Soviet Union. Although few analysts or officials “liked” this state of affairs, a majority believed that any attempt to negate the threat from Soviet missiles would be extremely costly and ultimately futile. In particular, they argued that massive deployments of missile defenses would lead the Soviet Union to increase its offensive

36  JAMES M. ACTON

forces, thus denying the United States any advantage. By contrast, almost no one argues today that the United States should accept mutual vulnerability with North Korea or a nuclear-armed Iran. Instead BMD opponents argue that neither state is likely to develop missiles that could reach the United States in the near future and that, even if they did, U.S. defenses would be unlikely to prove effective. Whatever the merits of these arguments (and, for the record, this author finds the second argument much more persuasive than the first), the absence of a strong strategic opposition to limited ballistic missile defenses has also strengthened the current consensus. Domestic politics has also played a consistently important role. The natural desire to protect the United States from a ballistic missile attack has an undeniable and understandable resonance within the U.S. body politic. The influence of domestic politics was particularly evident during the Clinton administration. In May 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced “the end of the Star Wars era.”8 Later that year, a more detailed policy review concluded that the United States should refocus its efforts on combating an imminent threat from short-range missiles rather than a more distant ICBM threat and, as a result, decided “to emphasize protection of forward-deployed U.S. forces in the near term . . . combined with a more limited [national missile defense] technology program.”9 The Clinton administration was, at its outset, the one post–Cold War administration that did not endorse the principle of homeland defenses. Domestic pressure on Clinton to deploy such defenses did, however, grow throughout his two terms in office.10 Most notably, in 1994, the Republican Party gained control of the U.S. House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. Its electoral manifesto—the Contract with America—endorsed homeland missile defenses and sparked much more activism by Republicans in both the House and the Senate. This pressure led to Clinton’s signing the 1999 National Missile Defense Act, which states that “it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).”11 At the same time that domestic politics and an evolving threat environment have bolstered the case for BMD, technological and financial realities have ensured that U.S. policy goals have remained limited. In fact, these goals have become more limited over the course of the last twenty years as a result of ever-present technological challenges, which have been highlighted by testing

U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY 37

in particular. The George H. W. Bush administration defined a limited attack as “a few hundred warheads,”12 requiring the deployment of many hundreds of interceptors. By contrast, George W. Bush, who was in many ways more of an advocate for missile defenses than his father, ended up authorizing the deployment of just fifty-four interceptors for homeland defense (including ten based in Europe). MOVING FORWARD OR STAYING BACK?

In spite of the broad consensus, policy goals have not remained entirely constant. In particular, the relative emphasis that successive administrations have placed on homeland versus forward defense has shifted metronomically since the end of the Cold War, with Republican presidents emphasizing homeland defense and Democratic presidents emphasizing forward defense. An important distinction here is between point and area defenses. Missile defense systems, such as Patriot, that are capable of defending only relatively small areas are known as point defenses. They can be used to defend small high-value targets, such as military installations and troops and, when forward deployed, are sometimes known as theater missile defenses. These systems are generally uncontroversial, and their development has been supported by presidents of both parties. As technology has evolved, however, so interest has grown in area defense systems that would enable the territory of the United States and of friends and allies—and hence population—to be protected. It is in regard to these systems that policy shifts between successive administrations have occurred. GPALS, the plan proposed by the George H. W. Bush administration, was designed to provide for both homeland and forward defense. However, it placed a distinct emphasis on the former, envisioning a layered defense of the homeland.13 This emphasis was reversed under the Clinton administration. Although Clinton acquiesced to the 1999 Missile Defense Act and accelerated research and development into national systems, he successfully resisted authorizing the deployment of interceptors for homeland defense, deferring this decision to his successor. George W. Bush wasted little time in moving forward. Just under four months after taking office, citing the threat from missile and nuclear proliferation to states “for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life,” he articulated the goal of deploying missile defenses quickly to “protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and our allies.”14 He gave notice of the U.S.

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intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which (in its amended form) allowed the United States and Russia to deploy no more than 100 interceptors and at only one site. BMD deployments during the Bush administration prioritized homeland defense.15 In 2002, the fielding of Ground-Based Interceptors at two sites in Alaska and California was announced. When these went online in 2004, they constituted the first operational BMD system within the United States for almost thirty years. By contrast, plans for forward defense were more limited. During Bush’s first term, his administration initiated work on installing Standard Missile-3 interceptors on Aegis-equipped ships that could be deployed in a crisis, and he mentioned a “third site” in Europe to counter an expected Iranian threat. During his second term, his administration announced plans to place ten interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic, with the goals of defending parts of Europe on a full-time basis and bolstering the protection of the United States from possible future Iranian ICBMs. Under the Obama administration, the programmatic pendulum has swung back toward forward defense. Arguing that “there is some uncertainty about when and how [the ICBM] threat to the U.S. homeland will mature, but there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats,”16 the administration announced in 2010 that it would cap the installation of U.S.-based interceptors at thirty of the forty-four planned by the second Bush administration. Moreover, rather than deploying ten more Ground-Based Interceptors in Europe, it decided instead to field larger numbers of progressively more sophisticated Standard Missile-3 interceptors at sea and on land on a full-time basis in what it termed the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Similar phased adaptive approaches, tailored to regional needs, were also announced for North East Asia and the Middle East. Subsequent modifications to this plan did not really affect the overall balance between homeland and forward defense. Following North Korea’s December 2012 satellite launch—which was widely seen as cover for a test of ICBM technology—and its February 2013 nuclear test, the Obama administration reversed its earlier decision and decided to install fourteen more Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska for homeland defense.17 But it simultaneously canceled the development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB interceptor, which was intended to contribute to homeland defense by having some capability against ICBMs (as well as shorter-range missiles). Meanwhile, the

U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY 39

administration has repeatedly reemphasized its commitment to implementing the first three stages of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. IIB OR NOT IIB?

Should the United States scale down its missile defense plans if the perceived threat recedes? This question has arisen most frequently in the context of European BMD deployments and Iran’s ballistic missile program. Although there is plenty of room for debate about the likelihood of the Iranian threat abating, the United States has, on various occasions over the past few years, made statements about how it would adapt its missile defense plans to this eventuality. Intuitively, one might expect that the Obama administration would have expressed a greater willingness than its predecessor to scale back its plans should the threat recede; in practice the opposite has been true. The George W. Bush administration, especially during its second-term attempts to defuse the controversy with Russia surrounding forward-based defenses in Europe, indicated on various occasions that missile defense deployments in Europe would be scaled according to the evolving missile threat. For example, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting in Moscow in 2007 that the United States would consider “tying our missile defense deployments in Europe to development of the Iranian missile threat, including joint monitoring of Iranian developments and a commitment to make our system operational only when warranted by the evolving threat.”18 The following April, on another visit to Moscow, Gates publicly floated the same proposal.19 For a range of reasons, it’s clear that Moscow placed little value in these assurances.20 What’s interesting, though, is that the Obama administration, in spite of its interest in arms control, has not been willing to offer similarly clear promises—presumably because, like all Democratic administrations, it worries about being seen as weak on national security. The question of how the Obama administration would respond to a diminution of the missile threat was thrown into sharpest relief by its plans to deploy Standard Missile-3 Block IIB interceptors under phase four of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Although development of these interceptors was canceled for technical reasons in March 2013, the administration’s statements on this subject are nonetheless significant as they suggest its thinking about this issue more generally.

40  JAMES M. ACTON

The administration’s most authoritative statement, which came from Obama himself, essentially indicated that all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach would be deployed under any circumstances. In December 2010, at the height of the ratification debate over New START, Obama stated in a letter to Mitch McConnell, the Senate minority leader, that . . . while advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of the later phases of the [European Phased Adaptive Approach] . . . I will take every action available to me to support the deployment of all four phases.21

The Obama administration has, however, not been entirely consistent. Even after this letter, senior officials sometimes appeared to imply that phase four might have been halted had the threat from Iran receded. For example, in March 2012, U.S. Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense Ellen Tauscher said that “should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran be reduced, our missile defense system can adapt accordingly.”22 On the same day, Obama made his notorious remark to outgoing Russian President Dmitri Medvedev that he would have “more flexibility” to deal with missile defense after the election, a comment that Gates interprets as intending to convey a similar message.23 Interestingly, just over a month later, Tauscher appeared to walk back her statement.24 This series of events suggests an internal debate within the administration or, at the very least, the absence of a clear policy line. TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY

The current broad consensus on BMD policy appears likely to hold for some time. However, the historical volatility of U.S. policy suggests that there are no guarantees this consensus will be sustained over the long term. Hovering below the surface of the BMD debate is the question of whether the United States should revert to Reagan’s policy of aiming to protect itself from any and all ballistic missile attacks. This debate has lain dormant for a while because, with current or foreseeable technology, even limited missile defenses are extremely challenging. However, it could be reawakened by, for example, a major technological breakthrough or the election of a president who, like Reagan, strongly believed in the need for a comprehensive missile defense. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. administrations have—with little success—sought to reassure Russia and, more recently, China that its BMD ef-

U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY 41

forts do not undermine their nuclear deterrents. Statements from the George W. Bush administration aimed at China had a grudging tone and carried the implication that U.S. goals might become more ambitious should technology improve.25 By contrast, the Obama administration has hinted at more enduring stability-related concerns associated with attempting to undermine the “strategic balance” with China or Russia.26 The goal of defending against a large-scale Russian or Chinese missile attack on the United States currently has little traction outside some of the more extreme elements of the Republican Party. If this notion were to gain in popularity, it would most likely be in connection with China for a couple of reasons. First, a U.S.–China conflict is more likely than a U.S.–Russia conflict. Second, China’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller than Russia’s, making the prospects of a defense against China, theoretically at least, marginally less daunting. Indeed, the seeds of the debate about the role that missile defense should play against China can be seen in the long-running but slow-boiling argument over whether the United States should “accept”—and, if so, acknowledge—mutual vulnerability with China.27 Against this background, it seems possible that, over the long term, the United States could readopt the goal of defending the homeland from a large-scale Chinese—and possibly Russian—missile strike (regardless of whether such a defense had any chance of being successfully realized). Even if the United States did not readopt the policy of attempting to defend against large-scale strikes from Russia or China, developments in technology could still complicate international relations. Historically, it has been possible to draw a reasonably clear distinction between homeland missile defense (also called national missile defense) and theater missile defense. All theater missile interceptors deployed to date have been too slow to catch ICBMs heading for the United States (or, for that matter, to provide territorial defense of U.S. allies). As a result, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could ban defenses capable of countering “strategic ballistic missiles” but permit theater defenses. In the 1990s, the United States accelerated research into more advanced forward-based defenses. Russia expressed concerns that these systems, which included the Navy Theater Wide program, the predecessor to today’s Standard Missile-3 system, could have some capability against ICBMs. To try to solve this problem, the Clinton administration negotiated a “demarcation agreement” with Russia to define what types of BMD were permitted under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.28 However, neither state ratified this agreement before the United States withdrew from the treaty under the George W. Bush

42  JAMES M. ACTON

administration, which publicly branded the distinction between theater and missile defenses as “outmoded.”29 It openly acknowledged that “some of the systems we are pursuing . . . are inherently capable of intercepting missiles of all ranges, blurring the distinction between theater and national defenses.”30 Although these statements probably alarmed Moscow, the controversy subsided for a while because, in practice, the Bush administration chose to focus on interceptors based in the United States. However, the demarcation problem has been reawakened by the Obama administration’s focus on increasingly capable forward-based defenses. Moscow has, for example, expressed concerns about not only the now-canceled Standard Missile-3 Block IIB interceptor, but also the Block IIA variant, which is advertised as being capable of countering short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles and is still under development.31 For all the noise coming out of Russia, however, Beijing’s more quietly expressed concerns about U.S. forward-based defenses are almost certainly more acute. In part, this is probably a reflection of the open U.S. acknowledgment that its missile defenses are intended to counter Chinese regional missiles (as well as all North Korean missiles). For example, the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report states baldly that “it is important that China understand that the United States will work to ensure protection of our forces, allies, and partners in East Asia against all regional ballistic missile threats.”32 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Chinese officials and experts worry that current deployments are merely the first step toward more comprehensive defenses. Beijing’s problem is partly of its own making. It has deployed mediumrange ballistic missiles, which the United States and Russia have forsaken under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Beijing’s arsenal includes the DF-21, which has conventional and nuclear variants. Countering the former is a major impetus for the U.S. development of forward-based missile defenses. In turn, these defenses feed Chinese fears that the ultimate U.S. goal is to counter Chinese nuclear-armed missiles. This dynamic is likely to be intensified by China’s pursuit of nonnuclear intermediate-range ballistic missiles.33 Assuming the United States attempts to counter these missiles with forward-deployed defenses, such as the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA interceptor (which is being jointly developed with Japan), Beijing’s perceptions that Washington ultimately seeks to undermine its ICBM force are likely to be reinforced. The Obama administration’s cancellation of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB interceptor may, in some small measure, have helped address Chinese and

U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY 43

Russian concerns. However, if there has been a respite, it is likely to be only temporary. This interceptor is just one of many technologies that the United States has investigated, over the past few decades, to try to counter ballistic missiles of all ranges by intercepting them early in flight. It seems likely that, sooner or later, a future U.S. administration will show renewed interest in deploying some kind of forward-based, early-intercept BMD system, thus increasing tensions with Russia and China. FUTURE CHALLENGES

For the next decade or so, there seems little prospect that U.S. policy goals will diverge significantly from defending the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks and protecting U.S. forces, allies, and friends from more substantial regional threats (although the relative emphasis placed on each of these objectives may continue to shift). However, while continuity in basic aims is likely, programmatics will probably continue to be characterized by change. Alterations to the homeland defense program seem most likely. From 2010 to 2013, three successive tests of Ground-Based Interceptors ended in failure and, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the program “will likely continue to experience delays, disruptions and cost growth.”34 A successful test in June 2014 snapped the losing streak and restored some lost credibility. But it still seems to be distinctly possible that a future administration may launch a major effort to supplement—or even replace—the GroundBased Midcourse system. A major challenge for U.S. policy makers in developing ballistic missile defenses will be staying on the right side of the cost-benefit trade-off. BMD has obvious and important benefits for assuring allies, deterring adversaries and, in extremis, saving lives. The costs are both financial and strategic. Over the last decade, the budget of the Missile Defense Agency has run to between $7 billion and $9 billion annually.35 Meanwhile, successive generations of American policy makers—both Democrats and Republicans—have worried that BMD might spark a buildup in Russian or Chinese offensive forces (or both). They have also recognized that BMD adds friction to Washington’s relationships with Moscow and Beijing, rendering other foreign policy objectives harder to achieve.36 Since the end of the Cold War, all U.S. administrations have tried to mitigate these risks by trying to convince Russia and, more recently, China that BMD does not threaten their nuclear deterrents. These attempts were not acts of geopolitical charity but manifestations of national self-interest.

44  JAMES M. ACTON

­ nfortunately, they have met with limited success. The United States is not U solely responsible for this failure; Beijing and Moscow often appear to have little interest in being reassured.37 Nonetheless, just because Beijing and Moscow must share the blame does not mean the potential strategic costs of BMD are lessened. The result is the risk that the United States will incur significant financial and strategic costs from BMD development but find itself with a homeland defense system that the leaders of both the United States and potential adversaries perceive to be unreliable. This is not an argument for abandoning the goal of limited homeland defenses but a call to manage the program more effectively to try to ensure the benefits outweigh the costs. One potential change would be to improve the acquisition process. To speed deployment, the Missile Defense Agency has adopted the practice of developing and manufacturing interceptors concurrently. The Government Accountability Office has described this approach as “a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems”38 and has called for a shift to a “knowledge-based approach” in which development precedes production. To lessen the strategic costs, U.S. policy makers could consider unambiguously relinking the deployment of missile defenses to the evolution of the threat. Although cooperative confidence-building measures would probably prove more effective, they are severely complicated by both international and domestic politics. In the long run, new opportunities for cooperation, and perhaps even arms control, may emerge, and even basic U.S. policy goals might change. For the time being, however, the political space for BMD policy is highly constrained, and realistically, policy innovation will have to be unilateral. NOTES 1.  U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010, 11, available at www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10% 200630_for%20web.pdf. 2.  George H. W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington, DC, January 29, 1991, available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3429. 3.  Strategic Defense Initiative, U.S. Department of Defense, The President’s New Focus for SDI: Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS), June 6, 1991, 2, available at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a338966.pdf. 4.  Ibid., 2–3.

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5.  See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 16 and 27; see also Roberts, Chapter 13 in this volume. 6.  Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive Summary, July 15, 1998, available at www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/toc .htm. 7.  Tim Schwarz, “North Korean Rocket Breaks up in Flight,” CNN, April 17, 2012, available at www.cnn.com/2012/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-launch/index.html. 8.  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), transcript of briefing with Les Aspin, May 13, 1993, available at www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ d930513.htm. 9.  Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, 47, available at www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/administration_and_Management/ other/515.pdf. 10.  Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack (New York: Public Affairs, 2003). 11.  National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Public Law 106-38, 106th Cong. (July 22, 1999), sec. 2, available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ38/pdf/PLAW-106 publ38.pdf. 12.  Strategic Defense Initiative, The President’s New Focus for SDI, 1. 13.  Ibid., 3. 14.  George W. Bush, “Speech on Missile Defense,” Washington, DC, May 1, 2001, available at www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/010501bush.html. 15.  Steven A. Hildreth, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, CRS Report for Congress, RL31111 (Congressional Research Service, July 19, 2005), available at www.fas .org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31111.pdf. 16.  U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, iii. 17.  Chuck Hagel, “Missile Defense Announcement,” March 15, 2013, Washington, DC, available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759. 18.  Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 164. 19.  Fred W. Baker III, “Gates, Rice Arrive in Russia to Discuss European Missile Defense,” American Forces Press Service, March 17, 2008, available at www.defense .gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=49293. 20.  For a detailed account of the disagreement see Richard Weitz, “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defence,” Survival 52(4) (August–September 2010). 21.  Letter from Barack Obama to Mitch McConnell, December 18, 2010, available at www.politico.com/static/PPM176_101218_letter_to_mcconnell.html.

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22.  Ellen Tauscher, “Ballistic Missile Defense: Progress and Prospects,” 10th Annual Missile Defense Conference, Washington, DC, March 26, 2012, available at www .state.gov/t/186824.htm. For similar comments see Defense Writers Group, transcript of briefing with Ivo H. Daalder, December 2, 2011, available at www.airforcemag.com/ DWG/Documents/2011/December%202011/120211Daalder.pdf. 23. Gates, Duty, 404. 24.  U.S. Department of State, transcript of press conference on missile defense with Ellen Tauscher, Madelyn Creedon, and Randall M. Hendrickson, Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2012, available at www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/189374.htm. 25.  For example, in his May 2001 speech, George W. Bush stated that any “nearterm [BMD] options” would only be effective “against limited threats”—a formulation that left the door open for more effective options in the longer term. Bush, “Speech on Missile Defense.” See also Brad Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, IDA Paper P-3826 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003), 1, available at www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf. 26.  U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 13. 27.  Elbridge A. Colby, Abraham M. Denmark, John K. Warden, et al., Nuclear Weapons and U.S.–China Relations: A Way Forward (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013), 18–20, available at http://csis.org/ files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf. 28. Amy F. Woolf, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues, CRS Report for Congress, 98-496 F (Congressional Research Service, April 27, 2000), available at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/ a478219.pdf. 29.  White House, “National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense,” Fact Sheet, May 20, 2003, available at web.archive.org/web/20040201123424/http://www.whitehouse .gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030520-15.html. 30. Ibid. 31.  Dmitri Medvedev, “Statement in Connection with the Situation Concerning the NATO Countries’ Missile Defence System in Europe,” Gorki, Moscow Region, November 23, 2011, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3115. 32.  U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 35. 33.  For a discussion of Chinese prompt, long-range precision strike efforts, see James M. Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), ch. 4, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. 34.  Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351, April 2014, 21, available at www.gao.gov/assets/670/662194.pdf.

U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY 47

35.  Missile Defense Agency, “Historical Funding for MDA FY 85-14,” available at www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/histfunds.pdf. 36.  See, for example, Gates, Duty, 157–167. 37.  For a summary of U.S. frustrations with Russia (and Russian frustrations with the United States), see Weitz, “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities,” 105. 38. Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486, April 2012, [unnumbered first page], available at www.gao.gov/assets/600/590277.pdf.

3

THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPTS Amy F. Woolf

the obama administration has adopted a concept known as the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to guide its deployment of defenses against theaterrange ballistic missiles.1 Under this approach, the United States will deploy missile defense architectures tailored to the needs of specific regions. It will deploy these capabilities over time, taking advantage of technological developments and improvements in its sensor and interceptor technologies. The phased approach will also allow the missile defense architectures to adapt and evolve in response to changes in the capabilities of an adversary’s theaterrange ballistic missiles. Since the end of the Cold War, the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have each put their own signatures on a concept for theater missile defense (TMD). Although one could expect each new administration to change the name of the program and adjust its funding, the three concepts display significant similarities and differences. Many of the differences were the result of partisan differences and changing priorities, but changes in threat assessments and developments in technology have also affected the programs. For example, all three administrations have highlighted the goal of defending U.S. allies against theater-range ballistic missile attacks and have pursued interceptors designed to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-­range missiles. But they have differed in how or whether they would integrate TMD capabilities with national missile defense (NMD) capabilities in a global architecture and in the emphasis placed on land-based versus sea-based systems. 48

THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPTS 49

With the PAA concept, regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities will combine with other U.S. military capabilities in regional deterrence architectures to support both military and political goals. As a military tool, they will be designed to protect critical assets by deterring an adversary from launching missile attacks, and, if such an attack does occur, by intercepting and destroying the attacking missiles. From a political perspective, they will contribute to U.S. efforts to assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their defense by protecting assets and populations on the ally’s territory. To be effective, TMD systems will have to combine capable sensors and interceptors with early warning and intelligence assets and sufficient resources for command and control. But the pursuit of both goals simultaneously may create tensions between the war-fighting needs of the combatant commanders and the political needs of allies and partners if the technologies that defend forces in the theater differ from those needed to protect allied assets and territory. In addition, as the United States and its allies deploy more capable systems to meet these goals, and as these systems blend and overlap into a global missile defense architecture, they could affect assessments, among both adversaries and allies, of regional and global stability. BACKGROUND

U.S. missile defense policy underwent major revisions between 1989 and 1991, in response to two distinct trends in the international security environment. First, the warming relationship with the Soviet Union followed by the disintegration of the Soviet empire virtually eliminated the threat of major war between the superpowers and, therefore, eased considerably concerns about U.S. vulnerability to Soviet missile attack. Second, Operation Desert Storm, when Iraq launched modified Scud missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel, heightened concerns about U.S. and allied vulnerability to ballistic missile attack in regional conflicts. Although this was not the first use of theater-range ballistic missiles in conflict—both Iraq and Iran had launched missiles against cities during their conflict in the 1980s—it was the first use of U.S. missile defense capabilities to counter that threat. In response, U.S. missile defense policy shifted away from the pursuit of technologies to defend against long-range ballistic missiles and toward those that could protect U.S. allies and forces overseas from theater-range ballistic missile attack. The George H. W. Bush administration initiated this shift with

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a missile defense architecture, known as Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS), that would have countered a small-scale attack launched by any adversary against targets anywhere in the world.2 But the shift accelerated after Desert Storm, with Congress insisting on even greater changes in the Missile Defense Act of 1991. This legislation supported continuing efforts to deploy “an anti-ballistic missile system capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles,” but it also called for efforts to provide “highly effective theater missile defenses (TMDs) to forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and to friends and allies of the United States.” The Clinton administration, therefore, placed a higher priority on the development of TMD systems. These would include lower-tier terminal defenses, upper-tier area defenses, and, possibly, boost-phased defenses to intercept shorter-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.3 A separate, limited, national missile defense system would have addressed threats to U.S. territory from longer-range missiles. CONTINUITY IN THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPTS

This basic structure remains in place today, with Ground-Based Interceptors deployed in Alaska and California to address threats from long-range missiles targeted on the United States and separate, regional architectures planned to address missiles launched by regional adversaries against U.S. forces and allies overseas. Moreover, although some technologies have advanced over the past twenty years, and others have fallen by the wayside, several technology programs, interceptor capabilities, and sensor systems have endured and remain central to the TMD effort. Although the U.S. reliance on sea-based systems has grown in recent years as the technology has matured, both the Army and the Navy continue to play a role in funding, supporting, and operating U.S. TMD assets. CONTINUITY IN ROLES FOR THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

The United States has long recognized the threats posed by the proliferation of medium- and longer-range missiles in regional conflicts. This has underscored the need to invest in the development of both terminal defenses that could protect discrete, critical assets on or near the battlefield and area defenses that could protect assets and populations beyond the battlefield. Ter-

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minal defenses might protect forward operating bases, deployed forces, and support facilities to ensure that missile attacks do not undermine the U.S. and allies’ ability to engage in military operations. Terminal defenses are not sufficient on their own, however, because the United States could lack enough defensive capability to protect all critical assets. Further, as U.S. adversaries have expanded the ranges of their theater ballistic missiles, terminal defenses, alone, lack the capability to track and engage the longer-range systems across the potential battle space and into the territories of allied and partner nations. Area defenses with more capable sensors and interceptors might, however, be able to disrupt such an attack and protect supporting facilities and civilian populations. U.S. officials have consistently recognized that two layers of missile defense could play a role in meeting the military objectives of TMD systems. The Clinton administration noted in 1993 that the United States would need “long-range, short-range, and close-in coverage” against theater-range ballistic missiles “because assets that need defending are spread over a theater, and there aren’t enough Patriots to provide point defense everywhere.” The George W. Bush administration also argued that “midcourse intercept capability provides wide coverage of a region or regions, while a terminal defense protects a localized area” but expanded the rationale to note that layered defenses could provide “multiple engagement opportunities along the entire flight path of a ballistic missile.”4 However, as is noted in more detail by Gallagher in Chapter 5 in this volume, the technologies developed for these programs have offered as much controversy as confidence over the years. Two layers of missile defense can also play a role in reassuring allies of the U.S. commitment to back them up in a crisis. In the absence of the ability to defend forces on the battlefield and supporting infrastructure from missile attacks, both allies and adversaries might question whether the threat of such attacks could limit or eliminate U.S. involvement. At the same time, although many existing shorter and medium-range ballistic missiles lack the accuracy needed for decisive attacks on military forces in the theater of operations, they could be launched against military, industrial, or civilian targets inside the territories of U.S. allies. If this type of threat affected the allies’ willingness to join or continue the conflict, it could complicate U.S. efforts to form or maintain a coalition. President George W. Bush stated in 2001 that regional adversaries seek ballistic missile capabilities “to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep the

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United States and other responsible nations from helping allies . . .”5 The Obama administration also noted that regional ballistic missile threats have “significant implications for our ability to project power abroad, to prevent and deter future conflicts, and to prevail should deterrence fail.” Hence, some argue that even if TMD systems lack the numbers or capabilities needed to intercept all attacking missiles, they could provide the United States with enough protection to project power abroad and prevail in future conflicts. TECHNOLOGIES FOR THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

Several interceptor and sensor technologies are integral to the TMD effort. The U.S. Army operates the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) and is developing the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to provide point defense of discrete targets in or near the battlefield. According to the Obama administration, PAC-3 batteries can provide terminal point defense against short-range ballistic missiles. They can also “transmit precision cueing data to other theater elements while simultaneously protecting system assets against short-range ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets, and air-breathing threats.” Further, PAC-3 is designed to work with the THAAD system “to provide an integrated, overlapping defense against missile threats in the terminal phase of flight.” Although PAC-3 is designed to intercept targets inside the atmosphere, THAAD is, according to MDA, “capable of shooting down a ballistic missile both inside and just outside the atmosphere.”6 Both PAC-3 and THAAD are based on land but can be moved in response to emerging threats. As a result, they can deploy with U.S. and allied forces during a conflict. The Army can also station them with other missile defense assets deployed outside the battlefield but within the territory of U.S. allies and partners. PAC-3 systems, in particular, may be mobile and agile enough to move into a region to defend other forward deployed missile defense assets in times of crisis. Each THAAD battery deploys with a large transportable X-band radar that can discriminate among objects and provide updated tracking data and fire control support to the system. This radar—known as the Army Navy/ Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control, or AN/TPY-2—can also be deployed independent of THAAD as a forward-based radar. It is intended to detect all types of ballistic missiles early in their flight and to provide precise tracking information to other sensors and interceptors in the missile defense architecture. Its multiple sensors would cover a wide area and “complicate an

THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPTS 53

enemy’s ability to penetrate the defense system.”7 Regardless of whether it is deployed with THAAD batteries or in separate locations, the U.S. Army will operate and sustain the AN/TPY-2 radars. In some circumstances, the Army may also need to deploy and operate PAC-3 systems to protect the radar from missile attack, which could add to the number of PAC-3 batteries and, particularly, to the Army’s operating costs for its missile defense systems. The Navy contributes to both area and terminal defense with the Aegis system. By FY2015, Aegis will be deployed on thirty-three cruisers and destroyers, with the ships split evenly between the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet. The system includes SM-3 interceptor missiles and the SPY-1 Radar to track and engage shorter and intermediate-range missiles. The Navy does not have enough of these assets to provide full coverage of all potential target areas all the time, although it could possibly move assets to a region during a crisis or prior to the start of hostilities. The Navy also will deploy and operate SM-3 interceptors in fixed sites on land, in Poland and Romania, in later phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Because these systems will be based onshore, the Army will probably provide operational support to these deployments. A more detailed explanation of this concept appears in the following pages. The Navy’s Aegis BMD ships can support a wide range of missile defense assets. For example, they report tracking data to other elements of the missile defense system, including PAC-3 and THAAD units, and other Navy BMD ships. The radars can also track longer-range ballistic missiles, helping to cue other missile defense sensors and providing fire control data to the GroundBased Midcourse Defense Interceptors that defend against longer-range ballistic missiles. However, as the Navy has a limited number of Aegis vessels, it may face trade-offs between its offensive missions and missile defense missions because it deploys offensive missiles and SM-3 interceptors in the same vertical launch system (VLS) tubes on its vessels. SERVICE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Although there has been a degree of continuity in both the rationale and technology developed for those U.S. TMD programs, the roles and responsibilities for the U.S. military services in operating these systems have changed over the years. During Operation Desert Storm, when Patriot batteries sought to intercept shorter-range missiles, the Army was responsible for protecting U.S. forces within the theater of operations. As sea-based concepts developed in

54  AMY F. WOOLF

later years, the Navy developed lower-tier capabilities to protect U.S. and allied naval forces. In other words, when TMD systems focused on protecting military assets in and near the theater of operation, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army were each responsible for operating the systems that would protect their own service assets. The introduction of longer-range interceptors and more capable sensors, along with the growing interest in protecting assets outside the theater of military operations, has broken the link between the service operating the system and the assets protected by the system. For example, in response to North Korean threats in early 2013, the United States has deployed a THAAD battery on Guam. This system could protect U.S. Army installations in Asia, but it might also intercept medium-range missiles targeted on U.S. naval bases or civilian populations in allied nations. Moreover, the AN/TPY-2 radar deployed with the THAAD battery could detect launches of all types of ballistic missiles and provide tracking information to other sea-based elements of the TMD architecture. Hence, the Army will operate systems designed to integrate with Navy systems, protect U.S. navy assets, and protect allied territory. This could lead to new challenges for the integration of command and control capabilities. The Navy plans to deploy SM-3 interceptor missiles on land, in Poland and Romania, as a part of the Aegis-ashore program. These systems will not be limited to protecting naval assets but will protect allied territories, civilian populations, and military assets outside the theater of battle. Moreover, because they will be deployed on land they are likely to require support from U.S. Army and allied land-based forces.8 This, too, could introduce new requirements for coordinated command and control. These developments demonstrate the “joint” nature of the missile defense mission and regional security architectures. Each component will contribute to the protection and operation of the total force. However, some have expressed concerns that the funding and resources needed to support the missile defense mission will not follow this model.9 For example, as the Navy takes on an increasing role in area defense with both sea-based and land-based assets, will the Army be relegated to support and maintain Navy assets, or will it continue to develop and expand its own missile defense capabilities? Moreover, if Army units are tasked with operating and maintaining land-based systems that protect naval missile defense assets, will they receive the necessary sup-

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port from missile defense budgets, or will the resources be drawn from other Army missions? DIFFERENCES IN CONCEPTS FOR THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Integrated versus Separate Architectures

Although each of the past four U.S. administrations has pledged to develop missile defenses that can defend both U.S. territory and U.S. forces and allies overseas, they have differed over whether these defenses should be designed as two separate systems or should be integrated into a global missile defense architecture. The George H. W. Bush administration initially sought to develop an integrated global architecture. But the Missile Defense Act of 1991 clearly sought the development of two separate architectures, a priority that was evident during the Clinton administration. But the separation between theater and national missile defenses was short lived. Republicans in Congress placed a higher priority on national missile defense after the 1994 elections. Moreover, concerns about the potential for long-range missile threats grew considerably later in the decade, following the publication of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report and 1998 launch of an intermediate-range missile from North Korea. As is noted in the preceding chapter by James Acton, these events led to a growing interest in national missile defenses, and the passage of the Missile Defense Act of 1999. The separation of national and theater missile defense programs also reflected concerns about compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty not only limited the numbers and locations of national missile defense assets, it also specified that theater missile defense systems could not be given capabilities to counter long-range strategic ballistic missiles and could not be tested “in an ABM mode.”10 The United States could not conduct tests that incorporated technologies from the two separate systems. It could not use TMD sensors to track long-range ballistic missiles or to provide cuing data to national missile defense interceptors. It also could not give interceptors designed to target theater-range ballistic missiles the capabilities needed to counter long-range ballistic missiles. This prohibition essentially limited the range and speed of U.S. interceptor missiles. The George W. Bush administration continued to pursue the missile defense technologies that were part of the Clinton administration’s TMD

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a­ rchitecture but did not maintain the distinct line between these systems and national missile defenses. Instead, it sought to develop an “integrated, layered defense that would be capable of attacking warheads and missiles in all phases of their flight and was expected to eventually provide global defenses against missiles of all ranges.”11 The Bush administration recognized that this endeavor would not be consistent with the restrictions in the ABM Treaty. In May 2001, President Bush argued that “we should leave behind the constraints of the ABM Treaty . . . that ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years.” After withdrawing from the treaty in June 2002, the United States could test and deploy sensors, like those in the Aegis BMD system, that were able to track both longer-range and theater-range ballistic missiles. The Obama administration reversed course again, by drawing distinct lines between defenses against long-range and theater-range ballistic missiles. It stated that it did not consider theater missile defenses to be part of a “globally integrated missile defense architecture that integrates allies into a uniform, global structure.” Instead, it indicated that “the United States will pursue regional structures sharing common assets that are . . . tailored to the unique requirements and opportunities within each region.” But this change in rhetoric was not matched by changes in programs, as the United States continues to develop sensors and interceptors that can be integrated into a global architecture. With PAA systems deployed in several regions, the United States could have hundreds of short-range GroundBased and Sea-Based BMD Interceptors, perhaps 500 or so medium- and intermediate-­range interceptors deployed on Aegis ships, and perhaps another 70 to 150 medium- and intermediate-range missiles deployed on land, as a part of the Aegis Ashore systems. Additionally, the United States might have at least sixty or more ICBM interceptors in Alaska, in California, and possibly on the East Coast. Moreover, although many of the sensors supporting the system will be deployed regionally, some will have a longer reach, with the ability to identify and track missiles, then pass that information along to sensors and interceptors in other regions. Although some parts of this system will be under NATO command and control, and others may be under a form of a regional command and control in other regions, they may also net together under a combined U.S. ballistic missile command authority. They could provide the United States with the ability to identify, track, and target attacking missiles

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around the world and lead the way to an integrated global network of missile defense systems by the middle of the 2020s. But this could create a complex set of command and control questions, particularly for the U.S. Navy. If Navy assets detect a missile launch in one region but pass that information to interceptors in another, will the Navy control the order to fire the interceptors, or will that task fall to a commander based in the region with the interceptors? Defending U.S. Forces, Allies, and Partners

Although the George W. Bush administration sought to address growing concerns with the potential threat of long-range ballistic missiles in Iran and North Korea, it continued to deploy Patriot batteries and develop the THAAD system to address the regional threat from shorter- and medium-range missiles. In addition, it expanded bilateral missile defense cooperation between the United States and Japan, which had begun in the 1990s. This resulted in increasing deployments of Aegis-equipped vessels with SM-3 interceptors that had some capability against shorter-range ballistic missiles, and SPY-1 radars that could track intermediate-range missiles, and, potentially, longer-range missiles. In Europe, the George W. Bush administration planned to deploy Ground-Based Interceptors and sensors that would help defend U.S. forces stationed in Europe, U.S. friends and allies in the region, and U.S. territory against long-range ballistic missile threats from Iran. The system would have included ten interceptors in Poland, an X-band tracking radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar that would have been deployed closer to Iran. This system would not, however, have protected European nations, nor all of the NATO allies, from shorter- or medium-range missiles. Instead, NATO was pursuing, on its own, a program known as the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD). This program, funded largely nationally, sought to develop lower- and upper-tier missile defense systems that would have defended deployed forces in regional conflicts outside NATO territory against shorter- and medium-range missiles. NATO expected to field this capability in several phases, in response to emerging threats. NATO also contemplated developing a territorial defense that was independent of the Bush administration’s plan. Like the Bush administration, the Obama administration singled out Iranian missiles as the source of much concern, but, unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administration focused its missile defense response on

58  AMY F. WOOLF

the pace and direction of developments in Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The administration concluded that U.S. forces and allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf would be vulnerable to these missiles long before the United States would face a long-range missile threat from Iran, so it canceled the Bush administration’s proposed missile defense site in Poland and announced plans to develop and deploy regional TMD systems. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that this new capability, based initially on expanding existing BMD sensors, communication systems, and interceptors into Europe, would be more responsive and adaptable to the growing threat from short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missiles. The capability would continue to evolve and expand to eventually defend all of Europe against medium- and longer-range Iranian missiles. At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the members of the alliance agreed formally that territorial defense, and protection of their populations, should be a NATO mission. As a result, NATO approved a plan to build a territorial BMD capability and integrate it with a U.S. initiative to deploy a European-based missile defense system. NATO announced, during its May 2012 summit in Chicago, that the first phase of the planned PAA system in Europe had established an interim capability. The United States has deployed existing Aegis systems in the Mediterranean to counter short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missile threats. It also deployed a forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. In the second phase, in the 2015 timeframe, the United States plans to deploy advanced sensors and an improved version of the Aegis BMD (SM-3 Block IB interceptor), to counter short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missile threats. This system is likely to include a combination of sea- and land-based configurations. In the third phase, in the 2018 timeframe, the United States would deploy more capable Aegis BMD interceptors (SM-3 Block IIA) in a combination of seaand land-based configurations to provide improved area coverage in Europe against medium- and intermediate-range Iranian ballistic missile threats.12 NATO expects to have complete coverage against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats by 2018. The United States has also expanded its deployment of BMD assets and associated sensors in East Asia, following a PAA, in response to the growing ballistic missile threat from North Korea. Many of the platforms and sensors required for a Phase 1 capability are already in place, with some owned and operated by U.S. partners in the region. These include SM-3 interceptors on

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Aegis-equipped destroyers, PAC-3 batteries operating in Japan and Taiwan, and early warning sensors on land (AN/TPY-2), at sea (floating X-band radar), and in space. Further, in response to North Korea’s threatening actions and statements in early 2013, DOD decided to deploy a THAAD battery to Guam two years ahead of schedule and is considering the possible deployment of a THAAD battery in South Korea. Following the PAA model, the Navy also expects its BMD capabilities to evolve over the next decade so that they can intercept more sophisticated medium- and intermediate-range missiles and eventually develop limited capabilities against long-range missiles. The United States is also pursuing missile defense cooperation in the Persian Gulf. According to Obama administration officials, the United States sees this as a “strategic imperative.” This effort includes both coordinated missile defense activities between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners and the acquisition of TMD systems by individual countries. For example, the United Arab Emirates has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries and has taken delivery of PAC-3 batteries. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are both upgrading their PAC-2 systems to PAC-3. The United States also plans to develop a coordinated missile defense architecture, although it has not yet committed to the deployment of any particular TMD systems. This architecture would also likely follow a PAA based on TMD sensor and interceptor platforms that are already in place in the region. IMPLICATIONS

The regional theater BMD systems pursued by the Obama administration could evolve into an integrated global BMD architecture. With hundreds of interceptors deployed on land and at sea, and with dozens of land-based and ship-borne sensors tracking threats and guiding interceptors towards targets, this architecture could alter the relationship between offenses and defenses in the conduct of war. Many who favor the widespread deployment of BMD support this outcome, arguing that proliferated defenses will undermine the value of offensive ballistic missiles and discourage regional adversaries from acquiring them and threatening their use. The defenses would not only protect critical assets and reassure U.S. allies and partners but also deter adversaries from challenging U.S. regional interests if they doubt that their threats or attacks will succeed. As a result, many who favor extensive defensive deployments believe these defenses will strengthen regional stability.

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Others argue the opposite, noting that missile defenses are so expensive, and their effectiveness so limited, that widespread deployments could encourage adversaries to acquire, stockpile, and possibly employ even greater numbers of less expensive offensive missiles. Moreover, a regional adversary facing U.S. or coalition forces with expansive defensive capabilities may see great value in striking early, and with greater force, to overwhelm the defenses. This could be particularly true in a region like the Persian Gulf, where distances are relatively small and decision times could be very short. In this view, missile defenses could spur arms races, exacerbate crises, and undermine regional stability. An integrated global missile defense architecture might also alter the balance between defensive systems and long-range offensive missiles. The Obama administration has insisted that U.S. missile defense programs are not directed against Russian or Chinese missiles. The United States does not plan to deploy large enough numbers of interceptors, or interceptors with enough range and capability, to undermine either nation’s strategic deterrent. However, Russia and China doubt this assertion. Russia, in particular, believes that the United States may eventually deploy greater numbers of more capable interceptors and fears that, if they were deployed in a global integrated architecture, they could provide enough capability to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. Russia has not only argued that it cannot reduce its offensive forces further without limits on U.S. missile defenses; it has also cited U.S. missile defense deployments to justify its investment in new types of long-range ballistic missiles. Russia believes it has found confirmation for its fears in calls, among some in the U.S. political community, for the early deployment of Aegis-ashore capabilities in Poland in response to Russia’s 2014 aggression against Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Although most who support this deployment see it as a symbolic response that will do more to assure U.S. allies than threaten Russia’s missiles, Russia sees it as confirmation that NATO will eventually turn these systems toward Russia’s strategic deterrent. Discussions about how U.S. TMD programs might affect regional and global stability reflect alternative views on how nations with offensive missiles might respond to expanding defensive deployments. If defenses discourage missile acquisition, proliferation, and use, then they could strengthen stability and help deter conflicts and defuse crises. On the other hand, if expanding missile defense deployments spur the acquisition of greater numbers of offen-

THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPTS 61

sive missiles, by either regional adversaries or global challengers, they could undermine stability and exacerbate crises. Over the past twenty years, official U.S. policy has seemed to incorporate the first view. However, given that emerging missile defense technologies may be more expensive than offensive ballistic missiles and may have limits to their effectiveness against even crude missile threats, the opposite may be true. Recent history contains many examples of cases where nations have sought to expand their offenses when faced with emerging defenses but few or no examples where emerging defenses have dampened interest in expanded offenses. NOTES The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of CRS or the Library of Congress. 1.  For details on the Obama administration’s missile defense program, see U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). 2.  This concept envisioned an integrated, global, land- and space-based architecture designed to protect the United States, its allies, and its forces overseas from short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles. U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Defense Initiative, Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1991), 1, available at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/ a338966.pdf. 3.  U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, 1993 Report to Congress on the Theater Missile Defense Initiative (TMDI) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1993), Ex-2. 4.  U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Testimony on Amended Fiscal Year 2002 Budget: Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 107th Congress (2001) (statement of Ronald R. Kadish, Director, Ballistic Missile defense Organization), available at www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_kadish19jul01 .pdf. 5.  Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at the National Defense University, May 1, 2001. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2001, 37 WCPD 685. 6.  U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, A System of Elements, available at www.mda.mil/system/elements.html. 7. Ibid. 8.  For a discussion about the role that the Army might play in maintaining and operating U.S. TMD systems, see Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden

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Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. October 2013, 27–31. 9.  Ibid., 36. 10.  Article VI of the treaty states the parties pledge not to “give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode.” See U.S. Department of State, “Treaties and Agreements, Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty),” available at www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm. 11.  In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in July 2001, General Ronald T. Kadish stated that “we have developed a research, development and test program that focuses on missile defense as a single integrated BMD system, no longer differentiating between theater and national missile defense.” See, also, Garry G. Gilmore, “U.S. Missile Defense Efforts Will ‘Move Beyond’ ABM Treaty,” American Forces Press Service, July 13, 2001, available at www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle .aspx?ID=44733. 12.  The fourth phase, scheduled for the 2020 time frame, was intended to provide capabilities against potential Iranian ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) threats, if they emerged. This system would have included more advanced Aegis BMD capabilities, based on land and at sea. However, the Pentagon announced in early 2013 that it was suspending this phase as a result of difficulties developing the technology.

4

TECHNICAL CONTROVERSY Can Missile Defense Work?

George N. Lewis

perhaps the most important and contentious question regarding ballistic missile defenses is a seemingly simple one: Can they work? However, the answer to this question is not simple and will depend on many factors, such as the type of defense, the nature of the attacking missiles, the circumstances of the attacks, and the standards by which the success or failure of the defense is judged. Broadly speaking, many supporters of ballistic missile defenses argue not only that they can work but that they have already demonstrated they will work. On the other hand, critics argue that not only is the effectiveness of defenses unproven but that there are fundamental reasons to believe that they will never be able to function effectively. This chapter reviews the arguments about effectiveness made by missile defense supporters and critics and then discusses the extent to which testing can address this issue. It concludes that, although it is likely that defenses can achieve some degree of effectiveness against shorter-range, conventionally armed missiles, for the key mission of defense against long-range nuclear-armed missiles, the potential effectiveness of missile defenses remains unproven. MIDCOURSE AND TERMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS

There are many ways to categorize ballistic missile defense systems. However, for the purposes of this chapter, a useful approach is to divide ballistic missile defenses into two broad although not all-inclusive categories.

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Midcourse-Phase, Exoatmospheric Defenses against Long-Range Missiles

Such defenses are the primary focus of this chapter. They operate above the atmosphere (exoatmospheric) and use hit-to-kill infrared-homing kill vehicles to destroy their target missiles’ warheads as they travel through the vacuum of outer space. The term midcourse refers to the part of the target’s trajectory after its booster rocket has burned out but before it begins to reenter the atmosphere. Midcourse defenses are in principle capable of defending large geographic areas, with dimensions of hundreds to thousands of kilometers. However, their exoatmospheric mode of operation makes them potentially vulnerable to defeat by a variety of lightweight above-the-atmosphere countermeasures. A primary objective of such defenses is countering nuclear-armed missiles, and in this role their effectiveness must meet very stringent criteria. During the Cold War such defenses would have been considered strategic defenses, although they now have regional roles as well. Important examples of such defenses include the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense (NMD) system and its Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Terminal-Phase Defenses against Relatively Short-Range Missiles

These defenses operate within or just above the atmosphere to counter missiles as they descend toward their targets. Such defenses can use aerodynamic forces for maneuvering and can also use atmospheric filtering to remove lightweight countermeasures. They cover relatively small areas (with dimensions of tens to hundreds of kilometers) against missiles with ranges up to a few thousand kilometers. In the U.S. context, defenses of this type are usually classified as theater or regional systems. They could be employed as stand-alone systems or could form a second layer of defenses operating behind midcourse defenses. Such defenses are primarily intended to counter conventionally armed missiles (and have been used in this role several times already), although they may also be called on against nuclear-armed missiles. They are often designed to engage both ballistic missiles and aircraft, including cruise missiles. Important examples of such defenses are the U.S. Army’s Patriot (both the PAC-2 and PAC-3 variants) and Israel’s Iron Dome. WHAT MUST AN EFFECTIVE MISSILE DEFENSE ACCOMPLISH? Claims about Defense Effectiveness

According to many missile defense proponents, effective ballistic missile defenses are already an established fact. In March 2013, in discussing the GMD

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NMD system, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that “the American people should be assured that our interceptors are effective.”1 Three months earlier, his predecessor, Leon Panetta, in response to a question about a potential North Korean missile attack, stated that “I’m very confident that American defense capabilities are able, no problem, to block a rocket like this one.”2 Missile defense supporters also cite Israeli claims that their Iron Dome system is already achieving success rates of as high as 85 to 90 percent against shortrange rockets as proof that missile defenses can work. Critics argue that ballistic missile defenses, particularly those that operate above the atmosphere, are vulnerable to defeat by a wide range of simple countermeasures and that this vulnerability has been known for decades yet remains an unsolved problem. They point out that missile defense test programs are highly artificial and scripted and reveal little about how well the defenses would work in the real world. In their view, the Iron Dome experience against short-range rockets has essentially no relevance to defenses against longer-range missiles. What Does It Mean to “Work”?

What does it mean to say a missile defense system can or does “work”? How effective must a defense be to meet its objectives? What fraction of attacking warheads should it be expected (or required) to destroy? There is no simple answer to these questions because any answer is highly circumstance dependent. Israeli experiences with missile defenses illustrate the complexity of this problem. The performance of Iron Dome in 2012 through 2014 has been widely hailed as a success for ballistic missile defenses and in particular for reducing the pressure on the Israeli military to respond to the rocket attacks in other potentially much more escalatory ways. However, a similar argument could be made that Patriot in 1991 was successful in preventing potentially coalition-­fracturing Israeli strikes against the Iraqi Scud launchers. Yet although Patriot was widely perceived during the Gulf War as being highly effective, its actual effectiveness in destroying Scuds was essentially zero.3 Recently, questions have also been raised about the effectiveness of Iron Dome.4 Moreover, few would argue that the claimed Iron Dome failure rate of about 10 to 15 percent would be adequate against an attack by more than a few nuclear-­armed missiles. However, statements from U.S. officials suggest that a system intended to counter nuclear-armed missiles would be considered highly effective if its predicted effectiveness is greater than about 90 percent. On June 16, 2009, just a

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week after Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told Congress that the current GMD NMD system was “fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat,” General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Senate committee that he assessed the effectiveness of the GMD system against a North Korean missile as “ninety percent, plus.”5 A year later, amid continuing statements by U.S. officials about their confidence in the effectiveness of the GMD system, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly told the House Armed Services Committee that the probability that the system could counter a single ICBM launched by Iran “would be well over into the high nineties.”6 Reliability and Operational Effectiveness

The fundamental question is not how well missile defenses can work in principle or on the test range but rather what is their operational effectiveness, that is, how well they can be expected to work on the battlefield, where unexpected circumstances and enemy efforts to defeat the defense (“countermeasures”) must be expected. The operational effectiveness of a defense system should be distinguished from its reliability. Current BMD intercept tests are essentially highly scripted demonstrations designed to verify simulations. As such, their success or failure primarily reflects the reliability of the systems being tested. Determining the operational effectiveness of a defense is a far more complex problem, which at a minimum would require establishing the ability of the defense to handle the full range of conditions, including plausible countermeasures, it could face in actual use. The problem of defeating countermeasures, often more narrowly described as one of “discrimination,” has been the most fundamental problem facing ballistic missile defenses from their beginning, and it remains so today. The actual and potential effectiveness of ballistic missile defenses are difficult to assess for a number of reasons. First, there is no single answer. For example, the issues involved in determining the effectiveness of defenses against short-range conventionally armed ballistic missiles are quite different from those involved in defenses against long-range nuclear-armed missiles. Second, we have little real-world experience with the use of ballistic missile defenses. The only actual uses of ballistic missile defenses are against short-range missiles and rockets, Patriot in 1991 and 2003 and Iron Dome in 2011 through 2014. Not only were the outcomes of these experiences mixed, but they likely have little relevance to defenses against longer-range missiles,

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which are the primary focus of the current debate over ballistic missile defenses. It is possible that there will never be a significant body of real-world experience with defenses against long-range ballistic missiles, particularly nuclear-armed ones. Third, there is no consensus on the nature of the threat, particularly regarding the potential use and effectiveness of countermeasures. For example, official claims of GMD effectiveness assume (sometimes stated explicitly, sometimes not) that the missile threat is the one existing today or in the near future—one that does not include any, or at least any effective, countermeasures. Missile defense critics argue that future missile threats must be expected to include simple yet highly effective countermeasures that will be difficult or impossible for existing or planned defenses to defeat. Missile defense supporters counter that effective countermeasures are not easy to employ and that future technical development of missile defenses will enable them to defeat countermeasures as they emerge. Fourth, BMD tests are complex and expensive. The cost and complexity of the tests limits the pace and number of the tests that can be conducted, thus making it difficult to test over the full range of circumstances that the defense might expect to encounter. Moreover, in this situation, a single test failure can cause severe setbacks for a test program. Fifth, the technical nature of ballistic missile defenses and the secrecy associated with some aspects of them inhibit informed public assessment and discussion of the actual and potential effectiveness of defenses. THE ISSUE OF MIDCOURSE DEFENSES

Midcourse defenses are the most discussed, debated, and arguably most important type of defense. The most prominent U.S. defenses, the GMD NMD system and the Aegis BMD system, are both exoatmospheric midcourse systems, and defenses of this type are the focus of Russian objections to U.S. missile defense plans. Although the possible deployment of such defenses has been the subject of vigorous debate since at least the 1960s, during most of this period only very limited deployments took place. In part, this situation reflected concerns that such defenses could lead to an offense-defense arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and could also create potential crisis (first-strike) instabilities. Perhaps more important, it was also widely recognized that highly effective midcourse strategic defenses were not technically

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feasible in the context of the U.S.–Soviet rivalry. This infeasibility was due both to the relative ease with which such defenses could be overwhelmed by offensive buildups and to the vulnerability of the defenses to countermeasures that could be taken by a missile attacker to reduce their effectiveness. In 1972, these factors led the United States and Soviet Union to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which permitted only token deployments of strategic defenses. Several developments over the past two decades have changed the nature of and the technical prospects for ballistic missile defenses. First, the size of the missile threat has greatly decreased. The potential effectiveness of the U.S. NMD system is no longer assessed with respect to Russian or even Chinese nuclear missile forces. Instead, it is measured versus the possible future development of much smaller intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces by countries such as North Korea or Iran. Against these much smaller, less technologically advanced adversaries, effective defenses may be more plausible. In particular, such countries may be less capable of developing countermeasures and are unlikely to be able to overwhelm a defense via an offensive buildup. This changed security environment also made it feasible for the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, which it did in 2002. Second, technological advances in sensors, computing, miniaturization, and other areas have changed the nature of defenses and made possible defenses capable of covering very large areas from one or a few interceptor sites. These defenses do not employ nuclear warheads, providing a huge increase in usability. Most modern U.S. ballistic missile defenses use hit-to-kill homing interceptors. This approach has significant advantages—the weight saved by eliminating a heavy warhead can enable the building of either faster and longer-ranged interceptors or smaller and more mobile interceptors. On the other hand, this approach also introduces new vulnerabilities that can potentially be exploited by countermeasure designers. New sensors, such as X-band radars and improved infrared arrays, potentially provide defenses with both greater detection and tracking ranges and more detailed information about targets, which could significantly increase discrimination capabilities. However, although such advances in sensor technology on balance favor the defense, they can also introduce potential new vulnerabilities. The higher operating frequencies of modern radars are more susceptible to stealth approaches such as shaping and radar-absorbing materials. Moreover, the reliance of midcourse hit-to-kill interceptors on infrared

TECHNICAL CONTROVERSY 69

sensors for their final guidance raises a potential new vulnerability that could be exploited by countermeasures (cooled shrouds). Third, there is now much more emphasis on theater (regional) missile defenses. The Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War emphasized the importance of such defenses, and the United States currently spends considerably more on regional defenses than it does on NMD. These defenses benefit from the same technological advances as do national missile defenses. Finally, large-scale deployments of ballistic missile defenses are now underway and are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Thus the central question is no longer simply one of whether such defenses should be deployed but is instead about the nature, feasibility, and consequences of ongoing and planned deployments. DEFENSE STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS Multiple Shots to Increase Reliability

Achieving high levels of effectiveness will generally require firing multiple interceptors at an incoming missile warhead. Even in the absence of countermeasures, a fundamental limit on a defense’s success rate will be set by the reliability of its interceptors. All current U.S. BMD systems, at least when employed independently of other defense systems, operate using a salvo firing doctrine. In this approach, a predetermined number of interceptors are fired at each incoming warhead, with some time separation between launches. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, the standard operating doctrine was to fire two Patriot interceptors, spaced about three seconds apart, at each incoming Scud target. If the reliability of each single interceptor was believed to be 80 percent, than salvo firing two interceptors would give a predicted overall reliability of 1 – (1 – 0.8)2 = 96 percent, and salvo firing three interceptors would give an overall reliability of 1 – (1 – 0.8)3 = 99.2 percent. Statements by MDA and other officials indicate that for the GMD system current plans call for firing about four interceptors at each attacking missile.7 In some situations, it may be possible to wait until the outcome of a first intercept attempt is known before deciding whether or not to fire more interceptors. This firing doctrine, known as “shoot-look-shoot” (S-L-S) is sometimes portrayed as providing a more effective defense. However, in many situations a S-L-S doctrine provides only a more efficient allocation of interceptors,

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rather than a more effective defense. For example, if each interceptor had a reliability of 70 percent, then using a two-shot salvo the overall effectiveness will be 1 – (1 – 0.7)2 = 91 percent, with an average use of two interceptors per target. Assuming there is time for a two-shot S-L-S approach, there will be only a 30 percent chance that second interceptor will be needed, so on average only 1.3 interceptors will be expended, but the overall effectiveness remains 1 – (1 – 0.7)2 = 91 percent. Multiple Layers for Increased Effectiveness

The simple arithmetical logic in the preceding paragraphs holds only if the failure probability of each intercept attempt is independent of the preceding ones, as would likely be the case for reliability or quality control failures. In real-world engagements, this may not be the case. For example, a failure of a defense system’s radar could cause all of the interceptors launched to fail (or even prevent any interceptors from being launched). As another example, if a particular countermeasure, such as the deployment of a large number of decoys, causes the first interceptor to fail, then there is a high probability that it will also cause subsequent interceptors to fail. The probability of such common mode failures can be reduced by employing multiple defense layers that operate in different ways. Provided that each layer operates independently from the other layers, each layer can be expected to have a reliability that is independent of the other layers. For example, for a system with three layers, such as a boost-phase layer, a midcourse layer, and a terminal layer, if each layer has an expected reliability of 80 percent, then the three layers together would have an overall reliability of 1 – (1 – 0.8)3 = 99.2 percent. Probably more important, if each layer operates in a different manner than the others, then the vulnerability of each layer to specific countermeasures is likely to be different, so that a countermeasure that might defeat one layer could fail against another. This appears to be particularly relevant to boost and terminal layers supplementing a midcourse layer because boost, midcourse, and terminal within-the-atmosphere defenses generally operate in significantly different ways. Improved Discrimination Sensors and Approaches

New types of sensors, such as X-band radars, can provide additional information that is potentially useful for discrimination. It may also be possible to use existing sensors in different ways to obtain additional discrimination data.

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For a sensor to provide useful discrimination information, it must have some capability to measure features of the target and any accompanying objects beyond just determining their position and velocity. The range resolution of a radar is the smallest distance between two objects at which the radar can distinguish them as separate objects or features. If a radar’s range resolution is sufficiently small, then it can potentially extract additional information about the target (such as its size) that may be useful for discrimination. However, the core sensors of the current U.S. GMD NMD system, the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), have very poor range resolution. Newer X-band radars have much better resolution, but the GMD system has only a single large X-band radar, the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar, and this radar was built primarily for testing purposes. Several smaller, AN/TPY-2 forward-­based X-band radars, such as those in Japan and Turkey, have also been incorporated into the GMD system but can observe only the early portion of an attacking missile’s flight. This gap in the discrimination capabilities of the GMD system is receiving increasing attention. The 2012 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report called for the deployment of five new ­X-band radars as discrimination radars. In July 2013 congressional testimony, when asked where he would spend any additional funding, MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring responded that “I would spend our next dollar on discriminating sensors, meaning radars, big radars west and east.”8 In February 2014, the MDA announced plans to deploy by 2020 a new long-range discrimination radar, most likely in Alaska, although no details about this radar have been publicly released. Alternatively, it may be possible to use existing sensors more effectively. In particular, the 2012 NAS Report points out that the GMD system’s current Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) cannot send back the images produced by its infrared detector array (similar to the detector array in a digital camera but operating in the infrared) as it approaches the target and the cluster of objects associated with it. This information could be potentially valuable for assessment and also for discrimination by subsequent intercept attempts (in an S-L-S approach) if the intercept attempt fails. However, with the current GBI this information is simply lost, and the NAS report accordingly recommended that any future new GMD interceptors be given the capability to send back this data, which SM-3 and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors already can do.

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THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER MIDCOURSE EFFECTIVENESS Arguments Made by Missile Defense Advocates

Missile defense supporters argue that developing and deploying countermeasures in actual practice is difficult, and they frequently cite past U.S. difficulties encountered in developing and deploying countermeasures. For example, according to the 2012 NAS report: “One should avoid overstating the ease with which countermeasures that are theoretically possible can actually be made to work in practice” and “It is perhaps noteworthy that U.S. (and U.K.) experience with the development of high-confidence penetration aids during the Cold War was of mixed success.”9 Missile defense advocates also point out that deployment of countermeasures will impose penalties in terms of payload, range, and/or reliability on missiles that may already have only marginal capabilities. Missile defense supporters also argue that countermeasures would require lengthy and visible testing programs that would allow time to develop counter-countermeasures. Responding to the 2000 Countermeasures report, MDA director Lt. General Ronald Kadish stated that a country “would not be capable of testing the chosen countermeasures without revealing telltale characteristics to the NMD system.”10 Missile defense supporters further argue that the current missile threat does not yet include anything but the simplest countermeasures, and the capability of missile defenses to cope with countermeasures will increase as they are further developed. In particular, they emphasize that the countermeasure–­ counter-countermeasure contest is an ongoing competition in which U.S. technological advantages will allow it to stay ahead of any country such as North Korea or Iran. Thus the 2012 NAS report concluded that “an adequate level of discrimination performance can—in the committee’s judgment—be achieved in the near term and provide a reasonable chance of keeping the United States generally ahead in the contest between countermeasures and counter-countermeasures over time, at least against emerging missile states like North Korea and Iran.”11 Missile defense supporters argue that strategies for structuring and operating defenses will enhance effectiveness; for example, multiple layers, multiple-­interceptor firing doctrines, and operating strategies such as S-L-S, as already discussed.

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Missile defense supporters also argue that advances in sensor technologies—in particular, wide bandwidth X-band radars and advanced infrared imaging sensors—will enable a defense to collect information to discriminate warheads. The 2012 NAS report conclusion about radar discrimination is that “by observation over the longest possible time by X-band radars,” an “adequate solution of the problem is possible.”12 More generally, the report concludes that, by using all possible sensor information over the longest time intervals possible, “an adequate level of discrimination performance can be achieved in the near term.”13 Missile defense supporters also frequently claim that critics do not have access to classified information that shows that defenses will be effective. Responding to the 2000 Countermeasures report, MDA Director Lt. General Kadish argued that “I would like to emphasize the fact that many of the discrimination technologies and techniques the proposed NMD system relies on cannot be discussed in an open forum.”14 Although the NAS report stated that the committee believed the problem of radar discrimination was solvable, the discussion justifying this conclusion was in a classified appendix.15 Finally, although missile defense supporters acknowledge the importance of realistic testing, they argue that with modern BMD systems the primary purpose of testing is to validate simulations, so extremely frequent testing is not required, nor is testing against all possible target configurations necessary. Arguments Made by Missile Defense Critics

Missile defense critics argue that the employment of potentially effective countermeasures must be expected. It is unreasonable to think that a country that is capable of building both a nuclear warhead small and rugged enough to be deliverable by a missile and an intercontinental ballistic missile and reentry system capable of delivering such a warhead will not be able to take relatively simple steps such as deploying the warhead inside a balloon along with a number of empty balloons. Given that nuclear weapons are likely to be an extremely limited and valuable resource to a country like North Korea or Iran, and given the known existence of ballistic missile defenses, such countries have powerful incentives to take steps to attempt to enhance the likelihood that they can penetrate a defense. Moreover, as far back as 1999 a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate stated that not only could countries such as North Korea and Iran develop countermeasures for long-range missiles using “readily available” technologies by the time they flight-tested such missiles but

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also that Russia and China had developed numerous countermeasures and were probably willing to sell the technologies.16 Such countermeasures are not just a hypothetical possibility. Every country that has deployed long-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles has also developed, and at least in some cases deployed, countermeasures for these missiles.17 Missile defense critics dismiss claims that the United States had significant problems developing countermeasures during the Cold War as irrelevant because such countermeasures would have had to defeat a nuclear-armed defense, a far more difficult problem than today’s countermeasures face. Moreover, even though limited to 1960s technologies, potentially very effective countermeasures were developed. An example is the countermeasures package planned in the late 1950s for the British Blue Streak medium-range ballistic missile, which was ultimately never deployed. Each missile was expected to carry twenty to forty decoys, which, together with electronic jammers, would be dispersed in a spherical cloud with a diameter of roughly thirty kilometers. According to one British defense scientist at the time, “As regards invulnerability it is so advanced that neither the U.S. nor ourselves can conceive of a counter to it.”18 In addition, missile defense critics point out that there are many possible types of countermeasures that can be used in many combinations. An attacker need only find one combination of countermeasures that it believes will be effective, whereas if a defense is to be relied on, it must be able to defeat all plausible countermeasures. Moreover, attacks by long-range, nuclear-armed missiles are likely to be extremely rare events. Thus not only must a defense work extremely well, but it must do so the first time it is ever used, a difficult criterion to meet. Critics also argue that it is unrealistic to expect countries such as North Korea to require anything like the same level of testing, reliability, or confidence in their systems that the United States would require in military systems. They note that the United States apparently already regards North Korean missiles as a serious threat to U.S. territory, even though North Korea has never successfully flight-tested a ballistic missile with intercontinental range. Although multiple layers operating using different approaches can in principle improve overall effectiveness, there are significant limitations in practice. As discussed in the following pages, no country has deployed or is likely

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to deploy a boost-phase layer, and a terminal within-the-atmosphere layer can cover only limited geographic areas relative to a midcourse defense. Thus although a geographically small country might be able to employ a multilayered defense, this would be much more difficult for a large country such as the United States. The current GMD NMD system consists of only a single layer, and there are no plans to deploy an additional layer. Finally, critics point out that the effectiveness of many types of countermeasures is based on fundamental physical principles (such as the inability of radar waves to penetrate even extremely thin metallic layers), and thus these countermeasures’ effectiveness does not rely on potentially classified engineering details. Discrimination requires making a measurement that unambiguously and uniquely identifies the actual warhead, and the objective of many countermeasures approaches is specifically to deny the defense the ability to do this. Thus, although it is highly desirable for the defense to gather all available measurement data, doing so does not guarantee that discrimination can be successfully accomplished. ALTERNATIVES TO MIDCOURSE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES: BOOST-PHASE AND TERMINAL-PHASE DEFENSES Boost-Phase Defenses

Defenses that attempt to destroy attacking missiles while they are still in powered flight are known as boost-phase defenses. If a missile’s rocket booster can be destroyed before it has completed powered flight, its warhead, even if it is not destroyed, will fall short of its intended target, although depending on the defense’s kill mechanism it could still explode. A boost-phase defense could use hit-to-kill interceptors, or, because rocket boosters are much more fragile than missile warheads, even beam weapons such as lasers. Boost-phase defenses have some significant advantages relative to midcourse defenses. First, the problem of countermeasures appears to be much less severe. It is not, for example, very practical to build inexpensive decoy rocket boosters. Although some types of countermeasures, such as various forms of trajectory modification (against homing interceptors) or reflective coatings (against lasers) are potentially feasible, their scope and effectiveness may be more limited than that of the wide range of potentially effective midcourse countermeasures.

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Second, boost-phase defenses are desirable against missiles equipped with multiple warheads because destroying a missile during boost-phase eliminates all of its warheads. The case of missiles armed with conventional, chemical, or biological submunitions is of particular relevance in this regard. If large numbers of submunitions are released immediately after the end of boost phase, they will simply overwhelm any midcourse or terminal defense. However, a severe drawback of boost-phase defenses is that the boost phase of a ballistic missile is at most a few minutes long. This means that a boostphase interceptor must have a very high speed and acceleration and must also be based relatively close to an attacking missile’s launch location. Even so, they are likely to be practicable only against liquid-fueled long-range missiles with long burn times. The need to be close to the launch site limits their potential utility to use against relatively small countries, such as North Korea or possibly Iran. Although Space-Based Interceptors or lasers have been proposed to get around this limitation, they would be prohibitively expensive. These considerations have so far prevented the deployment of any boostphase systems. The United States canceled its two most recent boost-phase development programs, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, which was too slow, and the Airborne Laser, which had inadequate range, among other problems, in 2009 and 2011, respectively. Terminal Phase Defenses

A terminal-phase defense attempts to intercept an attacking missile or warhead after it has begun its reentry into the atmosphere. Many such defenses, such as Patriot or Iron Dome, operate only within the atmosphere and are intended to be effective only against relatively short-range missiles and to defend only relatively small geographic areas. Other types of terminal defenses, such as the U.S. Army’s THAAD system, are also capable of intercepting at higher altitudes and can potentially defend much larger areas against longerrange missiles. A terminal defense system could operate independently or serve as a lower layer operating behind a midcourse defense. A terminal-phase defense has the significant advantage that the atmosphere potentially can be used to filter out lightweight midcourse countermeasures. On the other hand, having to wait for the atmosphere to strip out such countermeasures can greatly limit the area such defenses can cover. In addition, terminal defenses are potentially vulnerable to missiles using aerodynamic forces to make defense-evading maneuvers, which may be a rela-

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tively easy countermeasure to implement, particularly if the attacking missile is not required to be highly accurate. THEATER AND REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSES

The United States has developed and begun to deploy a number of defense systems intended primarily to protect U.S. forces deployed overseas as well as the territory of allies. Although the most capable and longest-ranged of these systems (such as Aegis BMD with its planned SM-3 Block IIA interceptors) operate in and have roles similar in many ways to strategic defenses, other systems face very different operating environments. Potential missile attackers such as North Korea or Iran already have large numbers of short-range missiles. The vast majority of these missiles are conventionally armed (or armed with chemical or biological warheads against which protective steps can be taken). Such missiles have been used in conflicts in the past, and the use of such missiles in the future is much more likely than the use of nuclear-armed missiles. Against such nonnuclear-armed missiles, a level of missile defense effectiveness much lower than what would be acceptable against nuclear-armed missiles can still be useful in reducing damage. Moreover, most (if not all) of these missiles likely do not have deliberate missile defense countermeasures built in. Given the relatively large existing numbers of such missiles and the relatively low cost of building new ones, a potential attacker may be unlikely to attempt to retrofit such missiles with countermeasures. Thus effective defenses against such missiles seem much more plausible than against longrange nuclear-armed ones. On the other hand, such missiles already exist in large numbers, and the defense may face the problem that an attacker could simply rely on sheer numbers to overwhelm a defense or to exhaust its supply of interceptors. TESTING

One possible way to establish the likely effectiveness of a missile defense system is through an extensive and realistic testing program. There is no dispute that rigorous, realistic testing is essential. What is debated is the extent to which such testing has been and can actually be carried out. The first actual combat use of a missile defense system, Patriot in the 1991 Gulf War, highlights the importance of realistic testing. Although Patriot had a perfect intercept test record prior to the Gulf War—seventeen successful

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missile intercepts in seventeen attempts—it failed completely against the Iraqi Al-Hussein missiles, which were both faster and more maneuverable than the targets it had been tested against. For midcourse defenses, the issue is no longer whether their basic concept of operation, hit-to-kill intercept in the midcourse, is feasible. “Hitting a bullet with bullet” has been demonstrated in dozens of tests beginning with the fourth and final intercept test of the Homing Overlay Experiment in 1984. There is no doubt that, with enough time, money, and effort, it is feasible to build a midcourse hit-to-kill defense system that is capable of successfully intercepting ballistic missile warheads in a benign, controlled test environment. In considering testing programs it is useful to again draw the distinction between reliability and operational effectiveness. An early objective of a testing program is to establish that the components of a specific missile defense system work reliably, that is, that the rate of failures due to manufacturing defects and other quality control problems is acceptably low. The ultimate, and much more challenging, objective is to establish that the system is operationally effective; that is, that it will be effective in actual use, where unanticipated circumstances and adversaries’ countermeasures must be expected. Once the basic operation of a baseline configuration of a missile defense system has been demonstrated, additional testing should then, at least in principle, be able to establish reliability for this baseline system. Additional tests against targets in differing circumstances and against targets employing plausible countermeasures could then be conducted to begin to assess the operational effectiveness of the defenses. Although this may sound like a straightforward approach, in practice, the cost and complexity of missile defenses tests, particularly of midcourse systems, and the wide range of possible countermeasures make it difficult to accomplish. A basic intercept test of the current GMD system now costs about $200 million, and this cost can easily exceed $300 million if complications, such as a test failure, occur.19 MDA has argued that GMD tests are so complex that testing the system more than once a year would actually slow the program’s development by preventing thorough analysis of the tests. According to MDA Director Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, “Conducting flight tests at a pace greater than once a year prohibits thorough analysis of pre-mission and post-mission flight test data and causes greater risk of further failure and setbacks to developing our homeland defense capability as rapidly as possible.”20 Factors such as these, together with the rush to deploy the GMD system, have

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Table 4.1. 

Outcome of U.S. high-altitude hit-to-kill intercept tests, 1995–August 2014. Year GMD Aegis 1995 X X 1996 1997 1998 1999 ✓ 2000 X X 2001 ✓ ✓ 2002 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ 2003 X ✓ 2004 X 2005 X ✓ ✓ 2006 ✓ ✓ X 2007 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2008 ✓ ✓ ✓ X X 2009 ✓ ✓ 2010 X X ✓ 2011 ✓ X 2012 ✓ ✓ X 2013 X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2014 ✓

THAAD X XX X X X✓✓

✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓

note: X = failure; ✓ = success. Aegis tests include 1995 Terrier-LEAP tests, but not three earlier LEAP tests (none of which hit its target). The destruction of a satellite by Aegis in February 2008 is included as a successful intercept test.

resulted in a situation in which, even though the GMD system has been deployed and operational since 2004, it has yet to establish that it can work reliably against even the simplest threat. Table 4.1 shows the outcome of intercept tests for the GMD system and for the Navy’s Aegis BMD system and the Army’s THAAD system. The table shows that the GMD system has been intercept-tested seventeen times, nine of which are claimed as successes by MDA. The first ten intercepts, through 2005, used prototype interceptors, often with surrogate components, and achieved a 50 percent success rate. The last seven intercept attempts (2006 through 2014) used operationally configured interceptors (that is, interceptors that are nominally the same as those deployed in silos) and achieved four claimed successes. With one exception (the second test in 2010) involving a design flaw, all of the failures appear to be due to reliability (quality control) failures. According to a

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2012 Government Accountability Office report, every GMD test has revealed problems requiring hardware or software fixes.21 Moreover, there is no discernable trend toward greater reliability. The situation with regards to realistic testing that might provide insight into the operational effectiveness of the GMD system is far worse. Although the GMD system is a defense against ICBMs, it has never been tested against an ICBM-range target. Although it is intended to operate in a salvo mode (multiple interceptors fired at a target), it has never been tested in such a mode. It has never been tested against more than one target at a time. It has only been successfully tested during the daytime when the target warhead was directly illuminated by the sun. Most significantly, there has only been a single successful intercept test of an operationally configured GMD interceptor against a target employing any countermeasures. Although several of the early intercept tests of prototype GMD interceptors included balloon “decoys,” these spherical balloons were either significantly smaller or larger than the conical warhead target and had essentially no chance of being mistaken for the actual target in the highly scripted tests. This is almost certainly also true for the only successful intercept test of an operationally configured GMD against a target with countermeasures (June 22, 2014), although no information about the countermeasures used in that test has been released. In summary, the testing record shows that nine years after becoming operational the GMD system had not yet established that it can work reliably in even a benign environment and had not yet begun the vastly more difficult process of demonstrating operational effectiveness. Table 4.1 also shows the intercept testing record for the Aegis and THAAD systems. Their significantly higher success rates can be directly attributed to their much more orderly and systematic development process relative to the GMD system. These programs, THAAD in particular, appear to have established at least a degree of test range reliability, with thirteen consecutive successful THAAD intercept tests and an Aegis success rate of about 81 percent in thirty-two tests since 2002. Compare that, however, to the 150 consecutive successful flight tests (as of June 2014) of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile since 1989. Although the Aegis and THAAD tests have been more realistic than the GMD tests in terms of factors such as the range of the targets, varying times of day, and the use of multiple targets and interceptors, there is no pub-

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lic evidence indicating that testing against targets employing any credible counter­measures has yet to begin or is even planned. Although several recent successful Aegis tests have been against targets described as “complex,” this term appears to simply refer to the presence of the final booster stage and of debris associated with deploying the target from this stage.22 SUMMARY

Large-scale deployments of ballistic missile defenses, and of wide-area midcourse systems in particular, are now underway and seem likely to continue indefinitely. However, these deployments are taking place in the absence of a consensus on how effective they might be. Most important, the vulnerability of these defenses to countermeasures designed to defeat them remains contentious. Advocates of defenses argue that the ability of countries such as Iran or North Korea to deploy countermeasures is exaggerated and that U.S. technological advantages will enable it to overcome any countermeasures that do appear. Critics argue that countermeasures have been the fundamental problem facing ballistic missile defenses from their very beginning, that they must be expected from any country capable of deploying long-range nucleararmed missiles, and that no solution to the countermeasure problem has yet to appear. In particular, they point out that essentially no testing against credible countermeasures has ever taken place. Given the secrecy associated with countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, and in particular with their testing, any consensus on the effectiveness of midcourse defenses will be difficult to achieve. NOTES 1.  U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon,” March 15, 2013, available at www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript .aspx?transcriptid=5205. 2.  Bradley Clapper, “U.S. Hesitant in Condemning North Korean Launch,” The Associated Press, December 13, 2012. 3.  George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “Video Evidence on the Effectiveness of Patriot during the 1991 Gulf War,” Science and Global Security 4(1) (1993), 1–64. 4.  Theodore A. Postol, “The Evidence That Shows Iron Dome Is Not Working,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 19, 2014, available at http://thebulletin.org/ evidence-shows-iron-dome-not-working7318. 5.  Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010, Hearing before Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 111th Congress 28

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(June 9, 2009); and Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010, Part 1, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 111th Congress 741 (June 16, 2009). 6.  Status of Implementing the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House Armed Services Committee, 111th Congress 32 (December 1, 2010). 7.  George Lewis, “Ballistic Missile Defense: How Many GMD Interceptors per Target,” Mostly Missile Defense, May 23, 2012, available at http://mostlymissiledefense .com/2012/05/23/ballistic-missile-defense-how-many-gmd-system-interceptors-pertarget-may-23-2012/#more-225. 8.  Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request for the Missile Defense Agency, Hearing before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 113th Congress 8 (July 17, 2013). 9.  National Research Council of the National Academies, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense Systems in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012), 134. 10.  Andrew M. Sessler, John M. Cornwall, Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, Sherman Frankel, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, and David C. Wright, Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists/MIT Security Studies Program, 2000), available at www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/missile_defense/ technical_issues/countermeasures-a-technical.html; and National Missile Defense: Test Failures and Technology Development, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 106th Congress 119 (2000) (statement of MDA Director Lt. General Ronald T. Kadish, Director, Missile Defense Agency). 11.  NAS, “Making Sense,” 10. 12.  Ibid., 134. 13. Ibid. 14.  Statement of Lt. Gen. Kadish, 116. 15.  NAS, “Making Sense,” 136. 16.  National Intelligence Council, “National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): Foreign Ballistic Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,” unclassified summary, September 1999. 17. See Chapter 5, “Countermeasure Programs in the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China,” in Sessler et al., Countermeasures, 35–37. 18.  Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States, and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64 (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 111–112.

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19.  George Lewis, “How Much Do GMD Tests Cost?,” Mostly Missile Defense, December 28, 2012, available at http://mostlymissiledefense.com/2012/12/28/ how-much-do-gmd-tests-cost-december-28-2012/#_ftn5. 20.  Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, Part 7, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 112th Congress 248 (April 25, 2012). 21. Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency (2012). 22.  Jason Sherman, “Raytheon Missile Hits Target, Back on Course for Major Production Decision,” Inside Defense SITREP, May 17, 2013.

5

CONGRESS AND MISSILE DEFENSE Nancy W. Gallagher

congress has been more involved in missile defense than it usually is on national security, but its motivations and impact are often misunderstood. One common misconception is that missile defense was intensely controversial during the twentieth century but now represents a rare area of stable consensus across party lines and between the Executive Branch and Congress. Another is that Congress has been unusually active on missile defense because the public strongly supports it and would punish politicians who did not. A deeper look shows that there is not, and never has been, a consensus about the feasibility and desirability of comprehensive missile defense nor on related questions such as how nuclear deterrence works and what, if any, role arms control should play in security policy. Since the end of the Cold War, advocates for both comprehensive and very limited missile defense have claimed that a consensus has been reached on their preferred approach, but such claims are often political tactics used to silence opposition. Public opinion has been consistently mixed over the decades, with majority support for the abstract idea of protection that declines sharply if cost, effectiveness, or impact on arms control is considered. Lack of true consensus and low public attention let members of Congress influence the shape, size, and speed of missile defense programs for reasons related as much to ideology and partisan politics as to national security. A brief review of congressional actions prior to 2001 shows a pattern in which Congress repeatedly pulled the Executive Branch closer to the middle from its preferred position of a more minimalist or maximalist approach. Political 84

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calculations, more than true consensus, also explain why Congress has acquiesced to the president’s budget requests and supported consistency in budgets and programs after September 11, 2001, choosing to debate implementation details rather than the overall desirability and feasibility of missile defense. The relative calm in Congress represents more of a truce than a true consensus. That quiescence could end again for technological, economic, strategic, or political reasons. CONGRESS AS A MODERATING FORCE IN DIVISIVE DEBATES OVER MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

As John Isaacs, a long-time observer of congressional debates on security policy, remarked, missile defense is “inherently and fundamentally political.”1 Over the decades, some members have tried to change missile defense policy because they disagreed with the president about the nature of the threat, the requirements for deterrence, the cost and feasibility of defensive technologies, and the utility of arms control. Others have been motivated more by domestic political considerations, attacking the opposing side’s approach as irresponsibly lax or belligerent or altering their own side’s stance to insulate it from attacks by the other side. Despite all this drama, though, before 2001 Congress mainly promoted incremental moderation in missile defense policy, pressuring reluctant administrations to do more and restraining ambitious ones from doing all they wished.2 Congress played both roles during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. By the mid-1960s, the Soviets were deploying nuclear-tipped interceptors around Moscow, but Johnson officials thought that antiballistic missile (ABM) defense would be difficult, expensive, and destabilizing. After congressional Democrats warned that an “ABM gap” could become an issue in the 1968 election, Johnson requested funds for long-lead work on a “thin” ABM system to protect a few cities against a small strike from an unsophisticated proliferator (for example, China). It also tried, unsuccessfully, to start ABM negotiations. The funding request energized opposition. Scientists, academics, and arms control activists sought to educate Congress about technical and strategic challenges with missile defense. Residents near prospective Sentinel sites protested that U.S. nuclear-tipped interceptors were more likely to damage than to protect their homes. Congress reacted negatively when the Nixon administration tried to circumvent public opposition by announcing that the first ABM sites would be

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located to protect nuclear missiles based far from population centers. Nixon and his top advisers thought that having some ability to limit the damage that the Soviets could do by attacking first would make deterrence more stable than relying solely on threats of mutual assured destruction, but many in Congress disagreed. Traditionally, only administration witnesses testified on defense policy, but congressional committees began to invite testimony from independent scientists opposed to missile defense. Congress also used its power of the purse to reduce the number of planned sites but allowed some work on missile defense as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations. Fear of losing all funds for missile defense explains why Nixon let the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty allow only two (later one) ground-based sites, although he wanted a higher limit. After the ABM Treaty entered into force and the first U.S. site became operational, Congress decided that Safeguard was too expensive, vulnerable, and ineffective, so it eliminated funds for operation. Missile defense was not highly contentious in Congress for a decade, until President Reagan announced plans for a multilayered defense against tens of thousands of Soviet weapons. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) involved quadrupling annual spending on research and development (R&D) in hopes of developing a comprehensive ground- and space-based system that could render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” A small group of missile defense advocates among military officers and weapons scientists had promised Reagan that American scientific ingenuity could end vulnerability to Soviet nuclear aggression. Most of Reagan’s security and political advisers did not believe that the United States could build a comprehensive space shield, but they supported SDI for whatever limited defense it could provide and to deflect popular pressure for arms control before the 1984 election. Thus, for a mix of ideological, political, and strategic reasons, professed support for overcoming all obstacles to comprehensive missile defense became a litmus test of Republican identity. The American public liked the abstract concept of a defensive shield and believed that U.S. scientists could eventually build one, but they knew few details about SDI. When asked whether it would facilitate or impede arms control, poll respondents were divided. Given an either/or choice, 53 percent of respondents preferred arms control over missile defense.3 During the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, Democrats in Congress fought to keep SDI within ABM Treaty limits. Rather than continue to question the desirability in principle of missile defense, they began

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proposing practical requirements for moving beyond R&D. Invoking criteria set by Paul Nitze, Reagan’s Special Advisor on Arms Control, Democrats warned that they would not approve funding for full-scale development and initial deployment until testing showed that the system would work under real-world conditions, that its components could survive a Soviet attack, and that it would be “cost effective at the margins” (that is, defenses could be deployed for less money than whatever countermeasures the adversary might attempt to overcome them). Members also reduced funds that the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) had to provide research contracts and thereby buy support or silence from scientists who might otherwise publicly question SDI’s feasibility, affordability, and impact on strategic stability. From FY1986 (the first budget request reflecting SDI) through FY1993 (the last request prepared by the first Bush administration), annual funding appropriated for strategic defense averaged 26 percent below the president’s request.4 For Congress to approve even that much, administration officials had to pursue substantial nuclear reductions, hence the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) in 1991 and 1992. They also had to convince Congress (incorrectly, it turned out) that U.S. advances in missile defense were necessary to get major Soviet concessions on their offensive weapons most feared by the West.5 Reagan officials initially rejected Nitze’s criteria and reinterpreted the ABM Treaty to exclude space-based lasers and other “exotic” technologies developed after the accord was signed. Only when Congress threatened to cut all SDI funding from the FY1988 budget did the Reagan administration reluctantly accept the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty’s scope, the Nitze criteria, and congressional control over a future deployment decision. It did not, however, heed Senator Sam Nunn’s call to build bipartisan support by reorienting SDI from comprehensive national defense against a premeditated Soviet first strike to cooperative nuclear risk reduction through development of an Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS) with only enough Ground-Based Interceptors to handle “several” errant missiles.6 George H. W. Bush tried to win over missile defense critics by renaming the program GPALS (for Global Protection against Limited Strikes) and offering to develop it cooperatively with the Soviets if they agreed to change the ABM Treaty. But he still sought a far more expensive, larger force than Congress was willing to support: 1,000 space-based “Brilliant Pebble” ­interceptors,

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750 to 1,000 long-range Ground-Based Interceptors at six sites, and transportable shorter-range missile defenses, estimated to cost $46 billion over fourteen years.7 In response, Congress passed the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which called for development of an ABM Treaty-compliant national missile defense (NMD) with 100 interceptors to protect against small accidental, unauthorized, or proliferator attacks without upsetting strategic stability, plus theater missile defense (TMD) and negotiations with the USSR. When President Clinton tried to scale back missile defense efforts even further, Congress pressed for more, especially after Republicans prevailed in the 1994 election. Their “Contract with America” focused mainly on domestic issues but also promised to defend the entire country against ballistic missiles. Starting in 1995, proponents began appropriating more money for NMD than Clinton had requested. Each year, they also tried to legislate accelerated deployment. To defeat these proposals without looking “weak on defense,” Clinton and congressional Democrats supported partial measures that they might not have otherwise favored. They increased funding for TMD, which seemed more achievable than NMD due to initial, highly exaggerated, claims that the Patriot missile defense system had been 80 to 100 percent effective during the 1991 Gulf War.8 They also approved more funds for R&D and committed to an initial NMD deployment decision in 2000. They did so not because the threat had increased or the technology had improved significantly but rather to blunt Senator Dole’s efforts to use missile defense in the 1996 presidential election as one of the few foreign policy issues where he differed from Clinton.9 The Clinton administration tried to reconcile missile defense and arms control by negotiating agreements that designated Russia and three other former Soviet states as successors for the ABM Treaty and that demarcated permitted TMD from prohibited NMD systems. A few Republicans who were ideologically opposed to negotiated constraints on U.S. military capabilities used these minor missile defense agreements to block further progress on arms control by including a condition in the resolution of ratification for the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty requiring that they be submitted for Senate advice and consent.10 Senator Helms, then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), wanted to raise broader questions about “that dangerous [ABM] treaty” in hopes that a Senate vote against ratification of the subsidiary agreements would “defeat the ABM Treaty, toss it into the dustbin of history, and thereby clear the way to build a national missile

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defense.”11 Rather than risk losing the ABM Treaty, the Clinton administration never submitted it to the SFRC. The cost of Helms’s maneuver was high because the Russians’ entry into force was a condition for entry into force of START II, which would have banned intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and eliminated all Russian heavy missiles. Congressional missile defense advocates also tried to pressure Clinton by heightening fears of proliferation. In 1998, a panel led by former Republican Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asserted that North Korea and Iran could have missiles able to reach the United States with nuclear or biological warheads within five years of an acquisition decision. At the same time, supporters toned down the language of their NMD deployment mandate to get enough votes for passage. Their failed 1995 legislation had required deployment in 2003 of an established system architecture and ABM Treaty withdrawal. The 1999 version simply said that it was U.S. policy both to deploy “as soon as is technologically possible an effective NMD system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack” and to “seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.”12 Some Democrats who had opposed previous NMD mandates decided to support the 1999 compromise version so that President Clinton would not have to veto a more ambitious missile defense bill before the 2000 election. They thought that the arms control language made the legislation “meaningless” because that objective would be impeded if the United States abrogated the ABM Treaty.13 They also knew that Congress would retain control over funding for missile defense, and future tests might never demonstrate that the technology could provide a reliable defense against even a small attack. This may have been a tactical miscalculation. Even if the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 did not require the president to do anything, the lopsided vote (97–3 in the Senate and 317–105 in the House) proved politically significant. Ever since, missile defense supporters have depicted it as evidence that large numbers of Democrats favor the “urgent and unqualified pursuit of strategic missile defenses.”14 Advocates used that claim to shift congressional debate from the net effect of missile defense on national security to the timing and characteristics of deployment. They did not, however, accept the corollary claim that by voting for the act, even more Republicans had shown strong support for arms control.

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When the deadline came, Clinton decided against deployment because two of his four criteria had not been met. He considered the threat to be real, and $25 billion for a 100-interceptor NMD system to be affordable, given federal budget surpluses. But feasibility remained unproven. Two of the first three NMD tests were failures, while countermeasures and critical component vulnerability still posed major challenges. Moreover, deploying a few interceptors of unknown capability against a threat that had not materialized would damage arms control, so Clinton judged that the net impact on national security would be negative. Clinton’s decision is unlikely to have hurt his party’s nominee in the 2000 presidential election. Candidate George W. Bush promised to “defend the American people” rather than rely on “outdated treaties” and to deploy missile defense “at the earliest possible date.”15 As before, the public still favored protection against ballistic missiles as an abstract policy objective, but few were paying attention to the issue or considered it an electoral priority. When asked more detailed questions, most respondents (including a majority of Republicans) wanted to spend money on missile defense only if there was clear evidence that it would work and if it did not detract from higher priorities, like military training and defense against terrorist attack. Fifty-six percent considered arms control a more reliable way to reduce nuclear risks than missile defense; only 27 percent preferred missile defense. They overwhelmingly supported Clinton’s decision not to begin deployment before resolving concerns about technical feasibility, arms control, and net impact on security (58 percent to 30 percent).16 NO CONGRESSIONAL CONSENSUS ON BUSH’S COMPREHENSIVE MISSILE DEFENSE EFFORTS

Before September 11, 2001, congressional Democrats tried to constrain Bush administration efforts to merge NMD research and TMD development into an ambitious open-ended and integrated BMD program. Rather than specifying a system architecture to be evaluated before making a deployment decision, Bush began rapidly developing technologies for ground-, sea-, air-, and space-based platforms that could be combined into a global system of “layered defenses, capable of intercepting missiles of any range at every stage of flight.”17 His FY2002 budget request raised spending for the renamed Missile Defense Agency (MDA) by 57 percent to $8.3 billion. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld also said planned tests would hit ABM Treaty limits “in months, not

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years,” although former officials testified that the treaty did not constrain the types of tests that would be more logical next steps.18 In response, House and Senate Democrats proposed major reallocations from MDA to other military programs. Moreover, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to prohibit spending money on tests that violated the ABM Treaty without congressional approval, regardless of whether Bush withdrew from it. In response to the terrorist attacks, Democrats removed these missile defense restrictions to show bipartisan solidarity and speed appropriation of more funding for defense. Proponents used September 11 to underscore U.S. vulnerability and demand more missile defense. Critics countered that preventing global terrorism required close international cooperation. If the United States tried to develop extensive and expensive NMD, it would alienate other countries but not stop the most likely forms of terrorist attack. Democrats planned to raise these objections in Congress when the context was more appropriate for partisan debate.19 Before the political environment returned to normal, though, the Bush administration announced it would leave the ABM Treaty, Congress passed a FY2003 defense appropriations bill that gave MDA more money than the president had requested, and Republicans regained control of the Senate. Arms control supporters in Congress disliked Bush’s December 2001 decision to leave the ABM Treaty but did not mount a major effort to block it. Bush framed the move as part of a strategy developed in close consultation with “my friend, Vladimir Putin” to leave behind “one of the last vestiges” of the Cold War and move from “mutual assured destruction” to “mutual cooperation.” The president promised to link progress on missile defense with unilateral reductions in U.S. strategic offense. He also said that Putin had agreed that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty “will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security,”20 even though Putin had also called Bush’s decision “mistaken.” U.S. and allied arms control experts knew their Russian counterparts saw the ABM announcement as showing gratuitous disregard for Russia’s security concerns after Putin had offered Bush unprecedented cooperation. But it was hard for them or allied leaders to object vociferously when Putin did not do so. Democratic Senators were “infuriated” that Bush had not asked for their advice and consent or even consulted them. But they deemed it “politically difficult” to challenge Bush while stressing national unity, especially when the early success of military operations in Afghanistan had boosted the

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­ resident’s popularity. Therefore, Democrats changed tactics from emphasizp ing ABM Treaty compliance issues to arguing that BMD funding requests should be evaluated by the same criteria used for other military programs.21 Rumsfeld issued new planning, budgeting, and reporting guidelines that ended congressional access to the types of data needed for meaningful evaluation. MDA had already shifted from standard “fly before you buy” acquisition rules to a “spiral development” model, in which systems are deployed while still being tested and modified. Under the new guidelines, MDA would no longer set performance objectives, timetables, or budget projections for missile defense projects, so Congress had no baseline to judge progress. MDA no longer needed approval to reallocate funds within its overall budget and was exempted from some reporting requirements normally used for major defense acquisitions. Rumsfeld also let MDA start classifying certain information about planned tests, such as whether decoys were included. The official rationale for these changes was to increase flexibility, speed innovation, and protect sensitive information. They also enabled Bush to claim that he had made good on his pledge to deploy missile defense for the United States before the 2004 election, without first demonstrating that it worked. Democrats objected that the new rules impeded congressional oversight, precluded independent review, stifled public debate, and hurt the prospects for effective, affordable missile defense.22 The committees that authorize defense spending tried to reimpose tighter reporting and review requirements. But Bush’s signing statement reserved the right to withhold required information to protect national security and its own decision-making processes. Thus, neither Congress nor voters knew whether the country was safer after MDA officials said in mid-October that they had “delivered the infrastructure for an initial capability.”23 Some top DOD officials were extremely optimistic; one had previously put the projected system’s effectiveness “in the ninety percent range.”24 In December 2004, though, the first test in two years failed, components needed to track incoming missiles still were not ready, and service members assigned to do operational testing told Congress that they lacked confidence the system would work if the United States was attacked.25 A year after initial deployment, the system had still not been declared operational. By that point, the MDA director would say only that the probability of intercepting an incoming ballistic missile was “better-than-zero” and that any further information about effectiveness was classified.26 The GAO criticized MDA for prioritizing rapid deployment “at the expense of cost, quality,

CONGRESS AND MISSILE DEFENSE 93

and performance goals.”27 But Rumsfeld brushed aside such concerns; in his view, simply announcing that the United States had a NMD system would “force U.S. adversaries to think twice before attacking.”28 Democrats regained control of Congress in 2007, but members who cared about foreign policy were mainly focused on the war in Iraq and other issues with more media and public resonance than missile defense had. Actions already taken by the Bush administration left missile defense skeptics with less leverage than they had last time the Democrats held the majority. Therefore, they no longer questioned whether rapid deployment of comprehensive BMD was an affordable, effective response to a near-term threat of ballistic missile attack, with a net positive effect on national security. Rather, they tried to make marginal changes to reduce damage caused by the program to their security priorities. With the overall defense budget rising, Democrats did not seek major cuts to Bush’s $9 billion MDA annual request, particularly because much of it was for limited GMD and two TMD systems that Clinton had also supported, the ship-based Aegis BMD and the ground-mobile Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). They did cut or constrain small amounts for futuristic technologies, like the Airborne Laser, and for activities most likely to stir up negative international reactions, such as testing for space-based defenses. After China demonstrated a rudimentary antisatellite (ASAT) capability by destroying its own defunct weather satellites in 2007, few in Congress objected when the Bush administration used the Aegis system to destroy the failed USA-193 spy satellite. The official objective was to protect public health, but a “side benefit” was to show that money spent for missile defense “had resulted in a very real capability.”29 Because it is easier to intercept a satellite than a missile, though, the only capability conclusively demonstrated was that of adapting missile defense for ASAT use.30 Congressional Democrats were able to use budget leverage to slow plans for a third GMD site in Europe. The Russians objected strenuously to Bush plans for interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic. They disliked the symbolism of U.S. missile defense on the territory of former Warsaw Pact allies, worried about whether interceptors could be used for offensive purposes, feared the foothold could be expanded and upgraded to have utility against their own deterrent, and saw domestic political benefits to opposing deployment. The third site plan was also highly controversial in Europe. Polish and Czech leaders wanted stronger ties to the United States,

94  NANCY W. GALLAGHER

but their publics largely opposed deployments. Western European leaders thought that the Bush administration was exaggerating the missile threat from Iran. They also worried that the planned third site would reduce Russian willingness to help control whatever nuclear and missile capabilities Iran had through multilateral diplomacy, without protecting all Europeans against the short- and medium-range missiles that Iran already had.31 Even Robert Gates (who had replaced Rumsfeld as defense secretary), questioned whether the value of activating the third site outweighed the likely damage to U.S.–­ Russian security relations.32 This international controversy, plus the 2008 financial crisis, created political space for Congress to reduce FY2008 and FY2009 appropriations for the third site. It also prohibited spending funds for construction until basing agreements had been secured and the interceptors passed “operationally realistic flight testing.” Some members still worried about the negative impact on U.S.–Russian relations. Putin rejected minor confidence-building measures (CBMs) that the Bush administration proposed, such as promising not to activate the third site until Iran had missiles capable of striking the United States or deep into Europe. Bush was similarly unimpressed by Russian suggestions for CBMs, such as using the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan instead of building one in the Czech Republic or stationing Russian observers at the European BMD locations. Russia’s August 2008 military incursion into Georgia increased Czech and Polish enthusiasm for close ties to the United States but not enough for the basing accords to be ratified before Bush left office. By the end of the Bush administration, a wide range of Congress members objected to its handling of missile defense. They mandated broad reviews from the secretary of defense, the Pentagon’s weapons testing agency, and the National Research Council (NRC). But consensus in Congress on the need for a new approach masked disagreements about what type of change was needed. One group wanted management reforms so MDA could provide a comprehensive layered defense faster, cheaper, and better. Another favored an equally vigorous, but more narrowly focused, effort to deploy limited proven defenses against near-term ballistic threats. A few members hoped the next president would ask fundamental questions about whether funds for missile defense could be better spent on cooperative nuclear risk reduction, or nonnuclear security priorities. On missile defense, as on most other nuclear-related issues, though, a growing number of Congress members and staff lacked strong opinions one way or another. One reason why missile defense became less

CONGRESS AND MISSILE DEFENSE 95

controversial after the Cold War is that fewer people have enough knowledge and interest to evaluate whether current and proposed programs are technically, economically, politically, and strategically sound. QUIESCENCE, NOT STABLE CONSENSUS, ON OBAMA PLANS FOR LIMITED MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile defense was rarely discussed during the 2008 campaign. Candidate Obama’s willingness to “support missile defense efforts if they are effective and not too costly” let each group hope he favored their preferred type of change. His first term actions could also be read as moving in very different directions. Andrew Futter maintains that Obama made cosmetic and tactical changes but kept Bush’s objective of deploying a global layered defense as quickly as possible.33 After Ellen Tauscher became Obama’s undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, she claimed that a bipartisan consensus had formed in Congress on a limited defense against near-term missile threats.34 Missile defense skeptics in Congress and the NGO community applauded Obama’s initial 16 percent reduction in funds requested for MDA, his cancellation of the third site, and his ability to keep missile defense disputes from blocking U.S.–Russian agreement on offensive cuts in the 2009 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Obama’s decision to retain Gates as secretary of defense ensured that the top-level DOD review mandated by Congress would affirm the need for missile defense and the value of the GMD capabilities that he had helped to deploy during the Bush administration. Gates and other Obama officials continued to say what they believed Congress and the public wanted to hear: that the homeland already had an effective defense against any long-range missile that North Korea might be able to launch in the foreseeable future.35 This claim was accepted at face value by different groups for different reasons. Democrats were willing to call the current GMD system satisfactory to help Obama shift emphasis from NMD back to theater missile defense. Republicans initially complained that they, and possibly the Europeans, were not consulted before the third site was canceled. But Gates reassured them that the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was his recommendation to facilitate earlier deployment of more mature capabilities that matched near-term threats, while evolving toward a global layered defense as soon as possible. Obama’s second missile defense restructuring caused little controversy for the same reason. In March 2013, Chuck Hagel (a former Republican senator

96  NANCY W. GALLAGHER

who had replaced Gates) announced plans to increase the number of GMD interceptors from thirty to forty-four, to deploy a second X-band radar in Japan, to conduct an environmental impact study for a possible East Coast missile defense site, and to cancel Phase Four plans for high-speed interceptors in Europe. Hagel presented this as a way to keep U.S. missile defense ahead of the North Korean threat, whose recent “irresponsible and reckless provocations” included a third nuclear test and work on road-mobile ICBMs. The reorientation pleased missile defense advocates who wanted to fix serious problems caused by the initial rush to activate GMD, although Hagel promised skeptics that no more interceptors would be deployed until MDA conducted a successful intercept test using the CE-II kill vehicle. Arms control advocates hoped that canceling the fourth phase of EPAA, the part that was most objectionable to the Russians, would facilitate further arms reductions. Few missile defense supporters decried cancellation because the 2008 NRC missile defense study had concluded that the fourth phase “is not necessary for theater defense and is at best less than optimal for homeland defense.”36 Finally, the environmental study split the difference between Democrats, who preferred not to think about a third site before fixing existing problems with GMD, and those Republicans who wanted interceptors at an East Coast site as soon as possible.37 The budget for missile defense during Obama’s first term has also been broadly accepted for different reasons. The average annual request for MDA was only slightly less in his first five budgets ($8.1 billion) than in those prepared by his Republican predecessor ($8.3 billion) despite the Great Recession and opposition to deficit spending.38 The appropriated amount was also very close to the requested amount. But Obama’s $8.5 billion request for FY 2015 was only about half as much as the Congressional Budget Office had predicted would be needed by then to fulfill Bush’s plans for global layered defense against missiles of all ranges.39 Budget stability was not maintained by shifting funds from GMD to Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot as the PAA announcement might have implied. Relative allocations changed little from 2002 through 2015.40 Instead, the budget has stayed stable despite cost growth in core programs due to deep cuts or cancellation of longer lead-time, less promising technology development efforts. Congress and its support agencies have still had difficulty assessing the current and future costs of missile defense, the rate of progress, and the capabilities achieved. The Obama administration has improved transparency and

CONGRESS AND MISSILE DEFENSE 97

accountability somewhat. Yet GAO and congressional committees complain that the information they get is still incomplete, unreliable, and difficult to understand.41 The biggest missile defense controversy of Obama’s first term occurred during the 2010 debate on New START ratification. The treaty’s preamble noted “an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms . . . [that] will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced” but did not define that relationship. U.S. administrations since Reagan (Republicans more enthusiastically than Democrats) have maintained that missile defense can preserve strategic stability with fewer deployed strategic offensive weapons on either side. But the Russian signing statement said that New START would only be “viable and effective” if the United States refrained from qualitative or quantitative improvements to missile defense that could undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Therefore, treaty opponents asserted that the Obama administration might hold back on missile defense for fear the Russians would use advances as an excuse to withdraw from New START. Democrats tried repeatedly to trade commitments on missile defense for Republican support on arms control. During the ratification debate, Obama requested, and Democrats in Congress approved, substantially more money for missile defense than they had the previous year. They let Richard Lugar, the ranking member of the SFRC, draft the resolution of ratification because he had told President Obama that including the right language on missile defense was essential for Republican support.42 It included numerous conditions, understandings, and declarations related to missile defense, most of which simply made explicit what Democrats believed to be already true. The twelfth condition, though, created a new impediment to future arms control. It required the president to initiate negotiations on a verifiable agreement to reduce Russia’s advantage in nonstrategic nuclear arms but prohibited those talks from including defensive missiles, the offsetting asymmetry most likely to interest the Russians in asymmetrical reductions.43 Senator James DeMint (R-SC), another Republican on the SFRC, wanted two additional provisions that would have gone well beyond existing policy. One averred that “‘mutually assured destruction’ or intentional vulnerability . . . [was] unacceptable over the long term.” The other committed the United States to construct a “layered missile defense capable of countering missiles of all ranges.” Democrats accepted a version of the DeMint ­amendment after

98  NANCY W. GALLAGHER

it was changed from an understanding to a declaration. The revised version added language about the U.S.–Russian common interest in “moving cooperatively . . . away from a strategic relationship based on mutual assured destruction.” Although reiterating that the United States “is and will remain free” to construct a layered missile defense system, it did not commit to anything more than the limited capability currently planned.44 Even with that amendment, though, DeMint did not support ratification. Missile defense proponents may get more future mileage out of a declaration in the resolution that received less attention. It said that “defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should deterrence fail; and further limitations on the missile defense capabilities of the United States are not in the [country’s] national security interest.”45 This does not impose a legal requirement to keep missile defense as a major component of U.S. security policy, nor a binding prohibition on negotiated limits. But, as with the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, advocates will try to use unanimous Democratic support for the New START resolution as evidence of a firm bipartisan consensus that unlimited missile defense is, and will forever be, an integral part of U.S. security policy. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Such claims would go well beyond what the evidence presented would support. Some long-time observers of Congress on missile defense do say that stable consensus has formed, but what they mean is that trench warfare has been replaced by a negotiated agreement built around a much more limited approach to missile defense. These terms entail spending around $9 billion per year on theater missile defense and enough GMD to intercept a small number of unsophisticated ballistic missiles launched by a potential proliferator such as North Korea or Iran but not an effective defense against Russian or Chinese ballistic missiles, with no BMD interceptors in space.46 If a deep and enduring political consensus had actually formed around such limited missile defense, then Russia and China would not need to worry about the United States building a more capable system that could eventually decrease confidence in their deterrent. It would be more accurate to say, though, that practical constraints provide more reliable reassurance than whatever degree of political consensus currently exists between the Executive Branch and members of Congress. The 2012 NRC report, a Defense Science Board study released the previous year, and a 2004 study by the American

CONGRESS AND MISSILE DEFENSE 99

Physical Society concur that immutable scientific laws create fundamental problems at each stage of flight for which there are no known solutions.47 If a comparable assessment were done of the strategic effects of missile defense, it would likely find little evidence that uncertainty about U.S. missile defense capabilities has had a dissuasive effect compared with indications that it has motivated potential adversaries to build more missiles, pursue countermeasures, and do less regarding arms control and nonproliferation than they otherwise would have if the United States had placed less emphasis on missile defense in its security policies. Even if Republicans controlled both Congress and the White House again, they would be unlikely to substantially increase missile defense spending in search of technological or strategic breakthroughs because spending constraints are much tighter now than during the Bush years. In a 2012 public budgeting exercise conducted by the Program for Public Consultation, threequarters of participants wanted to cut defense spending by an average of 23 percent for 2013, and a majority (including 47 percent of Republicans) wanted to reduce missile defense spending by an average of 14 percent. In short, despite spending over $165 billion on missile defense since Reagan’s SDI speech, proponents have not been able to resolve the basic questions about feasibility, vulnerability, cost-effectiveness, and net effect on national security that made missile defense so controversial in Congress during the Cold War. Russian and Chinese experts seem to know this. They cannot understand why American arms control proponents in Congress, the White House, and NGOs rarely raise these concerns anymore, preferring to minimize domestic controversy over missile defense at the expense of security cooperation with other countries.48 Democrats in Congress have been quiescent for tactical reasons that were often misguided in the past and that will likely make even less political sense in the future. As long as the defense budget was growing and they believed that there was strong public support for missile defense, they were willing to spend lavishly on missile defense even if core programs were behind schedule and over cost. Many did so in the mistaken belief that this was what most voters wanted or with the unrealized hope of gaining broad Republican support for arms control. As pressure to rein in defense spending grows, more intense scrutiny and acrimonious debate is likely to reoccur. Renewed debate in Congress would also raise awareness about what public priorities really are. Even relatively

100  NANCY W. GALLAGHER

successful and popular programs may become more controversial when the Navy has to pay for BMD-capable Aegis out of its own existing budget rather than receiving additional money from MDA for that purpose. If budget constraints force tough choices, the number of Republicans in Congress (and their lobbyists and constituents) who support missile defense at any cost would almost certainly be much smaller than those who prefer other military priorities. And, to the extent that U.S. allies become less enthusiastic about regional missile defense cooperation when they are expected to pay more of the bill, burden sharing will become another controversial question in Congress. One way for missile defense to become truly noncontroversial both in Congress and in future arms control negotiations would be for U.S., Russian, and Chinese policy makers to make a more concerted effort than they have so far to change their strategic relationship from deterrence to cooperative security. Relations have often moved in the opposite direction during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. Yet the idea that Russia, China, North Korea, or any other nuclear-armed state would launch a deliberate attack still seems more far fetched than it did when Reagan promised to build a defensive shield against Soviet aggression. His relationship with his Soviet counterpart changed unexpectedly for the better in a short time. The United States could do more than it has so far to reassure Russia and China about the current capabilities and future evolution of its missile defense programs without risking negative public opinion. A useful first step would be to start providing Congress and the public with much more complete and realistic information about what current capabilities actually are and what would need to be done before military commanders could have high confidence in their ability to intercept even a few long-range nuclear missiles under wartime conditions.49 When DOD officials testify that the United States already has such a capability, they are expressing optimism based on assumptions, extrapolations, and simulations, not empirical evidence from reliably successful tests under real operational conditions. Political and military leaders would not consider this to be an acceptable basis for high confidence regarding arms control verification or the reliability of weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Multiplying the number of interceptors fired against each incoming missile would still not provide high confidence because some of the most likely failure modes could affect all interceptors of a given design or all parts of the system relying on the same sensors, communication nodes, or analytical techniques.

CONGRESS AND MISSILE DEFENSE 101

The more members of Congress think about these problems, the more interested they are likely to become in cooperative prevention—that is, protecting their constituents by using diplomacy, arms control and nonproliferation agreements, security guarantees, systematic transparency arrangements, and other measures to minimize both the number and capability of ballistic missiles being stockpiled by other countries, as well as the reasons why they might ever be used against the United States, its allies, or anyone else. There are no historical or empirical reasons to believe that cooperative prevention could be 100 percent effective, any more than there are for similar guarantees under missile defense or deterrence. But it is not hard to imagine that a well-informed Congress that cared as much about national security as it did about domestic politics might conclude that moderating U.S. missile defense policy enough to no longer impede other forms of nuclear risk reduction would be both more effective and more popular with the public than keeping all options open for the future evolution of missile defense. This could take the form of renewed willingness to consider incorporating some limits that are already informally accepted by most members of Congress (such as foregoing Space-Based Interceptors) into a future comprehensive strategic arms control agreement, rather than categorically declaring that any limits on U.S. missile defense capabilities would not enhance national security.50 In the near term, though, even renewed congressional willingness to ask tough questions, insist on greater transparency and accountability, and debate fundamental issues would reassure the public, U.S. allies, and other countries that future U.S. missile defense decisions will be made according to technical, economic, strategic, and political criteria that they can understand. NOTES 1.  Andrew Futter used Isaac’s quote to encapsulate a core argument of Ballistic Missile Defense and U.S. National Security Policy: Normalization and Acceptance after the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2013), 1. 2.  David P. Auerswald, “The Domestic Politics of Missile Defense under the Bush Administration,” Defense Studies 1(2) (2001): 3. 3.  “U.S. Public Opinion Generally Favors ‘Star Wars,’” Christian Science Monitor (November 21, 1985). 4.  “Historical Funding for MDA, FY85–14,” available at www.mda.mil/global/ documents/pdf/histfunds.pdf.

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5.  SDI actually hurt Gorbachev’s efforts to get internal support for arms control concessions. See Aleksandr’ G. Savel’yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995). 6.  Senator Sam Nunn, “Arms Control in the Last Year of the Reagan Administration,” Arms Control Today (March 1988): 3–7. 7.  “The President’s New Focus for SDI: Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS),” Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (June 6, 1991). 8.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) later judged that its real success rate was below 10 percent. See Victoria Sampson, American Missile Defense: A Guide to the Issues (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 98; and Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions: A Review of the Historical Record,” CRS report R41251 (May 25, 2010), 18. 9. Futter, Ballistic Missile Defense and U.S. National Security, 60–69. 10. Amy F. Woolf, “Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues” (updated April 27, 2000). 11.  Quoted in “Helms Sets June Deadline for ABM Agreements,” Arms Control Today (January/February 1999), 28. 12.  National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Public Law 106-38, July 22, 1999. 13.  Quoted in Auerswald, “The Domestic Politics of National Missile Defense,” 62. 14.  Greg Thielmann, “The National Missile Defense Act of 1999,” Arms Control Today (July/August 1999). 15.  George W. Bush, “Acceptance Speech at Republican Convention,” Philadelphia, PA, August 3, 2000. 16.  Mark S. Mellman with Adam Burns and Sam Munger, “No Pressure from the People,” Arms Control Today (October 2000), 19–20 and 23. 17.  MDA Director General Kadish, quoted in Steven A. Hildreth, “Missile Defense: The Current Debate,” CRS report RL3111 (updated July 19, 2005). 18.  Wade Boese, “Bush Administration Aims to Get Rid of ABM Treaty,” Arms Control Today (September 2001). 19.  Senator Carl Levin, “A Debate Deferred: Missile Defense after the September 11 Attacks,” Arms Control Today (November 2001), 3–5. 20.  “President Bush’s Remarks Regarding U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,” December 13, 2001, reprinted in Arms Control Today (January/February 2002): 21. 21.  “Bush’s Move to Void ABM Pact Has Democrats Looking for Options,” CQ Weekly (December 15, 2001): 2986–2988. 22. Gary J. Pagliano in Hildreth, “Missile Defense: The Current Debate,” CRS-13–17. 23.  MDA Official quoted in Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Still on Hold,” Arms Control Today (December 2004).

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24.  Undersecretary of Defense Edward Aldrich, in testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2003. 25.  “Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability,” highlights of GAO-04-409 (April 2004); and Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Still on Hold.” 26.  Wade Boese and Miles A. Pomper, “Defending Missile Defense: An Interview with Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering,” Arms Control Today (November 2005). 27.  “Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but Falls Short of Original Goals,” GAO-06-327 (March 2006). 28.  Jonathan S. Landay, “Rumsfeld Makes His Case for Building Missile Defense,” Knight Ridder Newspapers (January 12, 2001). 29.  Fred W. Baker III, “Missile Defense Works, Gates Says,” American Forces Press Service (February 21, 2008). 30. Brian Weeden, “The Space Security Implications of Missile Defense,” The Space Review (September 28, 2009). 31.  Philip Coyle and Victoria Samson, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why the Proposed U.S. Missile Defense in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics and International Affairs 22:1 (Spring 2008). 32.  Michael Abromowitz and Walter Pincus, “Administration Diverges on Missile Defense,” The Washington Post (October 24, 2007). 33.  Andrew Futter, “The Elephant in the Room: US Ballistic Missile Defence under Barack Obama,” Defense & Security Analysis 28:1 (March 2012): 3–16. 34.  Ellen Tauscher, remarks at the 2013 Atlantic Council Missile Defense Conference (March 12, 2013). 35.  George Lewis, “Updated List of Claims about GMD Effectiveness” (July 10, 2013), available at http://mostlymissiledefense.com. 36. NRC, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2012). 37.  Tom Z. Collina, “Hill to Fix, Not Expand, Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today (January/February 2014). 38.  “Historical Funding for MDA, FY85–14.” These figures are in then-year dollars, which makes Obama’s requests appear closer to Bush’s than they actually have been. Comparing funding levels for SDIO, BMDO, and MDA also undercounts total missile defense spending because some activities are in other parts of the defense budget. 39.  “Long Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2008,” CBO (December 2007), 23–24. 40.  Interview with Steven A. Hildreth, Congressional Research Service, May 7, 2014.

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41.  “Missile Defense: Mixed Progress Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving Accountability” (April 2014), GAO-14-351. 42.  David P. Auerswald, “Arms Control,” in Congress and the Politics of National Security, ed. David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 199–200. 43.  U.S. Senate, Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty, December 22, 2010. 44.  Elaine M. Grossman, “As ‘New START’ goes to Senate Floor, Panel Strikes Compromise on Missile Defense,” Global Security Newswire (September 17, 2010). 45.  “New START Treaty: Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification,” State Department, December 22, 2010, available at www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/153910.htm. 46.  Hildreth and Woolf, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions,” 19–20. 47.  Philip E. Coyle, “Back to the Drawing Board: The Need for Sound Science in U.S. Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today (January/February 2013). 48.  For examples of these views, see Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Natalia Bubnova, eds., Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013). 49.  Coyle, “Back to the Drawing Board,” lists recommendations from the NRC report and Defense Science Board task force that “would add large but unknown costs to U.S. missile defense programs” without resolving the fundamental technical problems those reports identify. 50.  For innovative early thinking about how missile defense could be integrated into post–Cold War arms control, see Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security 26(1) (Summer 2001), 40–92.

6

EUROPE AND MISSILE DEFENSE Gustav Lindstrom

this chapter assesses american missile defense initiatives in Europe over the last ten years. Specifically, it reviews missile defense priorities under the George W. Bush administration for a “third site” in Europe and the follow-on initiative for a European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) unveiled by the Obama administration. The chapter examines some of the principal policy debates in Europe concerning missile defense and how these currently shape the evolution toward an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. The chapter ends with an overview of issues for future consideration, including how developments in other regions might have an impact on the future evolution of missile defense in Europe. THE ORIGINS AND EARLY POLICY THINKING ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

When the United States formally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, it cleared the path for a more advanced U.S. regional missile defense system. Although the U.S. exit from the ABM Treaty was largely unexpected, the timing was not. There had been multiple signals suggesting that the United States was looking to boost its missile defense system to counter vertical and horizontal ballistic missile proliferation—especially in the Middle East. To illustrate, in January 2002—during his first State of the Union address—President George W. Bush identified the threat posed by an “axis of evil” (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) that would require, among other measures, that the United States develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United States and its allies from a sudden attack. In 107

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the fall of 2002, the U.S. National Security Strategy identified “the crossroads of radicalism and technology” as the gravest danger facing the country—requiring defenses against ballistic missiles.1 In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration also voiced concern over the possible transfer of ballistic missile technology to nonstate actors or other groups that would not respond to traditional deterrence. The perceived threat posed by Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal was of particular concern to the United States. Although existing Ground-Based Interceptors based in Fort Greely (Alaska) and at Vandenberg Air Force Base (California) were deemed to be effective protection against a ballistic missile attack from North Korea, their effectiveness against ballistic missiles launched from Iran was much more limited. To boost their defensive capabilities, the United States put forward the idea of a “third site” missile defense system in Europe to complement existing U.S.-based interceptors. Following informal discussions, U.S. officials began negotiations with the Polish government in early 2007 on the deployment of ten two-stage variants of the interceptors already based in the United States, to be located near Koszalin. They also sought agreement with government officials in the Czech Republic to explore the feasibility of installing an associated X-band tracking and discrimination radar in the Brdy district. The idea of a third site in Europe sparked an intense debate in Europe. Although many policy makers were positively inclined because it would strengthen transatlantic ties, especially in the countries that would host the platforms, public opinion across the continent was lukewarm, as illustrated in Table 6.1. They were skeptical of the need for such a project and flagged a number of practical concerns, ranging from the prospects of missile debris falling over Europe to increased risks of being targeted by third countries.2 Table 6.1. 

Selected poll results on support/opposition to missile defense in Europe (as percentages). Support Oppose Not sure

France

Germany

22 58 20

Italy

Spain

United Kingdom

19 35 19 71 49 61 11 16 20

30 44 26

source: Harris Interactive Poll, March 28, 2008. Available at www.harrisinteractive.fr/news/2008/ hi_fr_nato_synthese_28mar08_uk.pdf. note: The survey question posed was, “How much do you support or oppose the plan by the United States to install an antimissile defence system in Eastern Europe?”

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In the Czech Republic, three polls carried out between January and June 2009 suggested a level of support of ranging from 26 to 29 percent, with those opposing the construction of a “missile defence shield base in the Czech Republic” hovering from 65 to 70 percent.3 A similar picture emerged in Poland, where 22 percent of polled respondents were in favor of the deployment of an “antimissile shield in Poland” compared to 53 percent against (with 25 percent not sure).4 MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY DEBATES IN EUROPE

As missile defense took shape in the late 2000s, several policy and security issues came to the forefront. These would yield extensive debates, highlighting diverging views on missile defense in Europe. To a large extent, many of these policy debates are still alive today or likely to reemerge in the future. The most prominent issues raised at that time included: • Is missile defense a “European” concern or a bilateral affair between the United States and a select number of European countries? Although the concept of missile defense dates back several decades, few European policy makers had a firm position on missile defense in 2007–2008. Even fewer had thought about its costs and benefits when applied to Europe. As a result, there was no common denominator or sense of collective ownership when the initiative for missile defense in Europe was introduced. Exacerbating this tendency was the “bilateral” nature of the project whereby the United States negotiated bilaterally with Poland and the Czech Republic.   Diverging views on missile defense in Europe were also evident when questions arose as to whether it should be generally dealt with under the umbrella of NATO, the European Union (EU), or both organizations—even though the linchpins were the bilateral agreements between the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Those in favor of NATO as one of the organizations could point to its existing involvement in missile defense activities. In addition, the North Atlantic Council had just received a missile defense feasibility study on May 14, 2006, authored by a consortium of companies with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in the lead. It concluded that missile defense was technically feasible within the limits and parameters of the study, opening the door for further NATO work in this area. Those pointing toward the

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EU wanted to highlight the political character of missile defense and how it could have an impact on geopolitics or relations with third countries (such as Russia). An EU position, to the extent feasible, would thus be more appropriate when considering the likely evolution of missile defense in Europe. The vestiges of this ambiguity mean there are still limited discussions of missile defense at the political level across European countries. • Does missile defense provide an equal level of protection to the United States and all European allies? An initial area of contention was whether missile defense in Europe resulted in equal protection for all European states. Simulations suggested that, with interceptors emplaced in Poland, some parts of Europe would not be appropriately covered. Specifically, a large swath in the southeastern part of Europe, including Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey, was projected to fall outside its protective umbrella. The perceived inability of missile defense to protect all European/NATO member states equally raised additional questions concerning the project.   In the end, this concern was largely resolved when it became clear that other options, including reliance on NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD)—which was established in September 2005 and focuses on the protection of deployed NATO forces against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles—could come into play if need be. It was also deemed that the exposed areas in the southeastern part of Europe were too close to Iran to be targeted by its long-range missiles. • Is missile defense in Europe feasible when public opinion is generally unfavorable? A number of opinion polls were conducted in 2008 and 2009 to gauge popular sentiment toward missile defense in Europe. As noted earlier, the results showed that even in the countries hosting the system—Poland and the Czech Republic—respondents tended to be negatively inclined toward missile defense infrastructures. The mostly skeptical response to missile defense made it easy for politicians across several European countries to rally against the project. Moreover, there have been limited follow-on surveys over the past few years to gauge acceptance of current missile defense activities, notably the introduction of the EPAA. Currently, there may be a misperception that missile defense is no longer applicable to

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Europe with the departure of the Bush administration. For members of European societies who may be aware of the EPAA, missile defense may now seem an issue dealt with exclusively by the United States and Russia. This exacerbates the perception that there is limited space for national reflection on the subject, the possible exceptions being Turkey and Poland, which are examining national missile defense solutions. Given weak economic growth and persistent levels of high unemployment, missile defense was no longer on the front burner of policy makers’ political agendas in Europe. But this may be changing now as a result of recent events in the Ukraine. • What impact might missile defense in Europe have on international treaties and/or relations with other countries? In July 2007, Russia decided to suspend its adherence to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. One of the explanations for the suspension, although it was not formally stated, was Russian displeasure with U.S. missile defense plans in Europe. Another expression of discontent was visible when Russia signaled that it would not renew the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program due to its concerns over a missile defense system in Europe.5   For some Europeans, this raised the question as to whether the project could affect European relations with other countries, place the continent in a precarious situation concerning U.S.–Russian disagreements, or possibly affect a series of international treaties that in particular might undergird European security. Exemplifying such concerns was the April 2007 statement of Luxembourg’s foreign minister, Jean Asselborn, who declared that “we don’t want to be a football in between Russia and the United States.”6 There was also speculation as to whether missile defense efforts in Europe might encourage other countries—notably Russia—to take precautionary measures.7 Some at the time even wondered if the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between Russia and the United States and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—then set to expire in late 2009—might be affected. In hindsight, it is clear that missile defense in Europe affected and continues to affect relations between the United States and Russia. The arduous road faced by New START, which finally entered into force in February 2011, suggests that this issue remains relevant today. Additional aspects, such as

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Russian demands for a legally binding agreement that the EPAA is not targeted against Russia, have and likely will continue to complicate future U.S.–Russian negotiations. • What are possible unintended security consequences of missile defense in Europe? As a catchall category, policy makers were also interested in potential unintended consequences. Examples of issues raised by the think-tank community included questions such as: • Might missile defense systems increase the likelihood of a short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile attacks? • Could missile defense result in a shift toward greater arsenals of short- to intermediate-range missiles? • How might missile defense affect the use of asymmetric warfare? • How might missile defense positively contribute toward the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons should there be a movement toward “Global Zero”?

TOWARD A EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

The 2008 U.S. presidential election caught the attention of the world, and Europe was no exception. After eight years of the Bush administration, which had been unpopular in many parts of Europe, there were high hopes for change and refreshed transatlantic relations. When then-Senator Obama came to Germany during the presidential campaign, an estimated 200,000 individuals came to listen to him in Berlin.8 It was an unprecedented welcome, befitting a sitting president and strongly signaling a desire for change. Thus, when Obama was elected president in November 2008, many believed that missile defense in Europe would be discontinued given the controversies it had stirred under the Bush administration. The weak outlook for missile defense was highlighted by several Obama officials, who early on indicated the need for overhauling existing missile defense plans. Consistent with these signals, on September 17, 2009, the Obama administration announced that it would discontinue the Bush-era missile defense plan. What caught many Europeans by surprise, however, was the simultaneous announcement that the United States would continue with its missile defense efforts, albeit in a different form. Consistent with the findings of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (carried out from March 2009 to January 2010), it was highlighted that the ballistic missile threat was growing both quantitatively and qualitatively, requiring some form of response. The new

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system, known as the EPAA, would be based on a “proven, cost-effective system using land- and sea-based interceptors against Iran’s short- and medium-­ range missile threat.”9 Under the EPAA, all NATO territory, European and North American, would be covered. Under the new arrangement, the Department of Defense (DOD) was to deploy increasingly capable elements and interceptors, with many of the components being mobile (sea based) and adaptable to current threats. Although European partners played a central role in the George W. Bush administration’s missile defense plans, they play an expanded role in the EPAA in at least three ways. First, there is a clear link between the Obama EPAA and NATO’s BMD for the protection of NATO European territory, populations, and forces. When the EPAA was announced in September 2009, it was made clear that the system would be integrated with NATO members’ existing and planned missile defense capabilities. NATO’s evolving command and control network, known as the ALTBMD system, will likewise be associated with the EPAA. Current projections see the ALTBMD linked with the EPAA during its second phase starting in 2015, with NATO member countries providing radars and interceptors, while NATO provides the communications, command and control, and battle management software infrastructure.10 Second, besides its closer links to NATO territorial missile defense, a larger number of European states contribute to the EPAA than foreseen in the Bush-era missile defense plans. Table 6.2 provides an overview of expected contributions in support of a future NATO BMD capability. As shown in Table 6.2, four countries will host elements of the EPAA platforms: Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey. Their contributions include the basing of “Aegis Ashore” elements and an advanced tracking radar. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands are contributing by either upgrading or making their systems available for NATO’s BMD capability. Other European countries are pursuing their own initiatives to improve BMD. A well-known example is France’s plans to develop an early-warning system (Spirale) for the detection of ballistic missiles. NATO’s ALTBMD would in the future be able to draw on this capability.11 France, together with Italy and the United Kingdom, is also moving forward with the Aster family of missiles. The Aster Block 2/ BMD may be a potential contributor to the upper layer of NATO ALTBMD.12 Third, there is a degree of transatlantic financial burden sharing to establish the future NATO BMD capability. Although the United States will shoulder the majority of the costs for the implementation of the EPAA, there

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Table 6.2. 

European contributions to a nascent EPAA/NATO BMD capability. Location (if applicable)

Date

Hosting of a land-based SM-3 ballistic ­missile defense interceptor site

Redzikowo

2018

Romania

Hosting of a land-based SM-3 BMD ­interceptor site

Deveselu Air Base

2015

Spain

Basing of four U.S. Aegis missile defense ships

Naval Station Rota

2014

The Netherlands

Upgrading of four air-defense frigates with extended long-range missile defense early-warning radars; availability of Patriot air and missile defense systems

Turkey

Hosting of an AN/TPY-2 radar

Proximity of Diyarbakir

2011

Country

Asset

Germany

Availability of Patriot air and missile defense systems

Poland

source: NATO. See www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_10/20121008_mediabackgrounder_Missile-Defence_en.pdf.

is agreement at the political level that NATO will pay for the development of ALTBMD/theater missile defense. Like the EPAA, ALTBMD will fall under the general umbrella of NATO BMD capability. Since 2006, NATO has spent €250 million ($321 million) on building elements of the command and control system. The additional cost foreseen, €550 million ($707 million) will be spread over the coming decade. NATO allies have also collectively spent a little under €200 million ($257 million) to widen the theater missile defense system so it can cover all NATO territory. The combined costs, which add up to nearly €1 billion ($1.28 billion), are divided among the twenty-eight NATO allies.13 OUTSTANDING ISSUES

Looking ahead, there are at least six issues for consideration. First, there is still uncertainty over what impact the financial crisis may have on the evolution of missile defense in Europe. In an era of “smart defense” and “pooling and sharing,” there may be rising concerns over the mounting costs of missile defense, especially if there are geopolitical changes that decrease tension. So far, there is limited evidence that the financial crisis is affecting missile defense efforts. The only exception to this might be the discontinuation of U.S. funding for the Medium Extended Air and Missile Defense System (MEADS) program. Intended to replace the PATRIOT missile system, MEADS is a ground-mobile

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air and missile defense system initiated by the United States, Germany, and Italy. In early 2011, the United States signaled that it would complete the design and development effort but not procure the system. The announcement had led to increasing concerns on the European side. Policy makers in Italy and Germany have lobbied to maintain the program, arguing that its termination would send the wrong signals vis-à-vis transatlantic cooperation and lay to waste millions of dollars contributed by the three partners.14 To date, no partner country has signaled that it will provide funding for procurement of the system. Second, there are still vestigial concerns over the manner in which missile defense in Europe has been approached. There is still a perception that some European states are pursuing their own bilateral relations with the United States with respect to setting up the missile defense infrastructure in Europe. Besides stoking the question over whether missile defense is a European project or a bilateral affair between some European countries and the United States, there seems to be a discrepancy between what is decided in the NATO framework and what is actually being pursued in national European foreign policies. An obvious result is that some of the bilateral agreements made with the U.S. are perceived as inconsistent with NATO guidance, such as the goal of not alienating Russia. To illustrate, some analysts argue that the U.S.–­Romanian Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement, signed in September 2011, envisions neither cooperation with Russia—in the form of joint missile defense collaboration between separate systems—nor does it take into account the fact that certain Russian concerns have not yet been addressed.15 As missile defense platforms mature, this issue is likely to become more prominent, especially in the political sphere. A third issue concerns the future implications of the elimination of the EPAA Phase IV announced in March 2013. Although there is no official US statement on why the fourth (and final) phase was discontinued—explanations range from the need to assuage Russian concerns over the numbers and velocity of the future SM-3 Block IIB interceptors to the advancing U.S. goal of strengthening homeland missile defense—it is still too early to gauge the effects.16 For example, although it was expected that Russia would have reacted positively to the news, there was no perceived clear “reset dividend.” On the U.S. side, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis there have been calls to accelerate Phase III by two years and to implement a range of other proposals in response to differences with Russian President Putin over Ukraine.17

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A more directly observable result might be a strengthening of Poland’s decision in August 2012 to pursue its own missile defense system. An ardent supporter of missile defense, Poland—and other Baltic and Central European states—may view President Obama’s postponement of Phase IV as a sign of declining U.S. political commitment to Europe, raising the need for new or strengthened national defensive systems. Poland announced shortly after the U.S. decision to cancel Phase IV that it would spend €33.6 billion ($43.2 billion) over the next decade to set up its own missile shield and upgrade its armed forces.18 Given current tensions in Ukraine, the Polish Ministry of Defense recently announced plans to speed up the missile defense plan. Although it is unclear what proportion of the financial envelope will be used to develop early warning systems or procure interceptors specifically related to missile defense, it is likely to be a substantial sum. This trend, if replicated to a small degree in other European countries, could complicate the goal of enhancing pooling and sharing, as well as “smart defense” (which already has gotten off to a slow start), and raise additional questions on how defense budgets are being spent across Europe. However, one could also argue that the pursuit of national systems might be a step forward for NATO BMD, as these assets may eventually be pooled into the NATO system. Needless to say, this does not apply to systems that are not interoperable with NATO infrastructures, a case in point being the Turkish decision to lean toward buying a Chinese air and missile defense system to maximize coproduction and technology transfer opportunities (after Western pressure, Turkey is currently rethinking its choice).19 Fourth, as NATO’s BMD capability evolves, it is likely to raise questions as to how it might relate or connect to other missile defense efforts, in particular those under development in parts of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The concept of a phased adaptive approach (PAA) to missile defense is not limited to the European continent. There was always an implicit understanding that a PAA could be applied to other regions, such as the Middle East. To date, it could be argued that the initial elements of a PAA are slowly taking root in specific parts of the Gulf region and in the Asia-Pacific region. In the Gulf, several countries are investing in radar, early warning capabilities, and interceptors, whereas Israel has activated its Iron Dome missile defense system and codeveloped interceptor missiles such as Arrow 2 and David’s Sling. In the Pacific theater, Japan is working closely with the United States to develop the Aegis system, including joint technology for a next generation interceptor.

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As these systems evolve and new ones are developed in different parts of the world, it will increasingly raise the question whether some of the regional components can be interlinked, essentially opening the door for a global missile defense system. Although this projection is far into the future, it may be worth considering its implications and the corresponding questions it might raise. For example, how might countries such as Russia and China react to a more robust missile defense system, especially if they are not part of it? The issue might be particularly sensitive for China, which has a relatively small stock of long-range ballistic missiles. If they perceive their nuclear deterrent to be under threat by “joined-up” regional systems, what kinds of countermeasures might they consider? Fifth, there is still an open question as to how NATO’s missile defense capability—especially the EPAA component—might evolve should there be positive geopolitical changes in other regions. The need for a robust missile defense system is often associated with the necessity to address rising ballistic missile threats originating from North Korea and Iran. Although the expectations for improved relations with North Korea did not materialize with the transition of power to Kim Jong-un, there are indications that dialogue with Iran might be more productive under the presidency of Hassan Rohani. It is too early to tell if the P5 + 1 dialogue with Iran over its nuclear program will reach more tangible results, but there is a recognition that if Iran steps back from its nuclear program—or takes steps that irrevocably demonstrate its civilian nature—it may have an effect on the EPAA. Because the development of missile defense systems is predicated on long planning windows to develop, test, and procure complex platforms and systems, it may be difficult to “ratchet back” current missile defense plans, even if the geopolitical context would in theory support it. Although this issue is likely to remain on the back burner given developments in Ukraine, it might be difficult for policy makers to completely neglect it should there be substantial geopolitical shifts toward less international friction. Under such a scenario, there could be more international pressure on missile defense efforts in Europe or under the NATO umbrella to adapt accordingly. To prepare for such a possibility, policy makers need to examine contingency plans for the evolution of missile defense systems in Europe. Lastly, a critical issue that is unlikely to be clarified any time soon is the nature of possible U.S./NATO-Russian cooperation on missile defense. At the NATO summit meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010, participating heads

118  GUSTAV LINDSTROM

of state and government invited Russia to cooperate on the development of a missile defense capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory, and forces. In spite of the political agreement, there are persistent divisions as to how such cooperation should be practically implemented on both sides. According to the 2009–2014 chair of the NATO–Russia Council Missile Defense Working Group, “the project exploring NATO–Russia missiledefence is not only suspended, but has probably reached its end.”20 This follows the suspension of all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia since April 2014 given developments in Ukraine. With this in mind, the manner in which collaboration is now imagined and is ultimately pursued—or not—will have implications for the future evolution of missile defense in Europe. Among the most obvious dimensions that may be influenced by collaboration patterns are the technical capacity of key components (for example, direction and range of radars), emplacement of missiles (proximity to Russia being a key factor), and links to other missile defense systems. CONCLUSION

Missile defense in Europe, albeit a rather new development, represents more than the pursuit of an operational system to protect NATO allies. With the transition from a U.S. push for a third site in Europe under the George W. Bush administration to the EPAA under the Obama administration, missile defense is now a core project for Europe and NATO, effectively strengthening the relationship between NATO and the United States. And although missile defense in Europe is still in its infancy, it increasingly serves as an expression of NATO’s pursuit of collective defense. In addition, given its political and economic dimensions, it is also becoming a weather vane for gauging the state and “temperature” of transatlantic relations. Given the political and operational weight attached to missile defense efforts in Europe, especially under the NATO umbrella, it is likely to remain a key element for preserving collective security in Europe over the long run. NOTES 1.  White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Author, 2002). 2.  The gradual shift toward sea-based defenses is likely a welcome development, as it strengthens the perception that debris is less likely to fall on European territory. Some European policy makers may also perceive sea-based defenses as less provoca-

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tive to Russia, as fewer fixed infrastructure components are needed on the continent. Ironically, sea-based defenses have raised “hypothetical” concerns in Russia, especially should many of the Aegis cruisers and destroyers be located in the Baltic or Arctic Sea (the argument being that they would be in a better position to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, affecting their strategic deterrent capability). 3.  CVVM Poll cited by Angus Reid Global Monitor, “Czechs Still Wary of U.S. Missile Defence Shield,” July 20, 2009. 4.  CBOS Poll cited by Angus Reid Global Monitor, “U.S. Missile Shield Rejected in Poland,” April 2, 2009. 5. Peter Baker, “Obama Calls on Russia to Renew Weapons Pact,” New York Times, December 4, 2012. 6.  Kristin Roberts, “Russian Official Dismisses U.S. Shield Cooperation,” Reuters, April 24, 2007. 7.  The purported Russian decision in November 2011 to deploy Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad is a case in point. 8. Gregor Peter Schmitz, “Obama’s Berlin Speech: People of the World, Look at Me,” Spiegel Online International, July 25, 2008, available at www.spiegel.de/ international/world/obama-s-berlin-speech-people-of-the-world-look-at-me-a567932.html. 9.  “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A ‘Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe,” The White House, September 17, 2009, available at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-APhased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe. 10.  For more information on ALTBMD, see “NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD),” NATO Media Fact Sheet, August 2011. 11. For more information, see the July 2011 report “Ballistic Missile Defense: Military Shield or Strategic Challenge?” French Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and the Armed Forces, available at www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2010/r10733-notice.html. 12. See www.mbda-systems.com/products/gbad/aster-block-2-bmd/2-2/ for additional information. 13.  “NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD),” NATO Media Backgrounder, October 2012, available at www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_10/20121008_ media-backgrounder_Missile-Defence_en.pdf. 14.  “Germany and Italy Warn Washington over Missile Defence Funding,” Daily Telegraph, June 14, 2012, available at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ germany/9330831/Germany-and-Italy-warn-Washington-over-missile-defencefunding.html. 15.  Gustav Lindstrom (Rapporteur), “Developments and Implications of Missile Defence,” Geneva Papers No. 25, Conference Series, March 2012.

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16.  The SM-3 IIB missile defense interceptor program—the core element of EPAA Phase IV—will be restructured into a technology development program. Frank Rose, “Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach,” Remarks at the Polish National Defense University, April 18, 2013, available at www.state.gov/t/avc/ rls/2013/207679.htm. 17.  Daryl G. Kimball and Tom Z. Collina, “Senate Bill Includes Counterproductive Proposals on U.S.–Russian Arms Control,” Arms Control Association, April 30, 2014. 18.  “Poland Guarantees Funds for Missile Shield,” Agence France-Presse, April 12, 2013, available at www.defensenews.com/article/20130412/DEFREG01/304120012/ Poland-Guarantees-Funds-Missile-Shield. 19.  For more on Turkey’s choice, see Zachary Keck, “Why Turkey’s Buying Chinese Missile Systems,” The Diplomat, September 30, 2013, available at www.thediplomat .com/2013/09/why-turkeys-buying-chinese-missile-systems/. 20.  Roberto Zadra, “NATO, Russia, and Missile Defence,” Survival 56(4) (August–­ September 2014): 51.

7

POSTCRISIS PERSPECTIVES The Prospects for Cooperation among the United States, NATO, and Russia on Ballistic Missile Defense

Vladimir Dvorkin

THE TASK IS TO PRESERVE PRECRISIS PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION

The last few years have seen an increase in the disagreements between Russia and the West on the further reduction of strategic nuclear forces, on the control of tactical nuclear weapons, the development of strategic conventional weapons, and in the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD). These disagreements have brought negotiations to a dead end. The obstacles to cooperation on BMD have included the inability of the two sides to agree on the urgency of missile threats, on zones of responsibility to defend individual sections of territory from missile attack, and on the effect of BMD in Europe on the Russian deterrent potential; also cited were U.S. and NATO objections to Russia’s demand for legally binding guarantees that the new system would not be aimed against the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (RSNF). Despite the continued implementation of the terms of the U.S.–Russian New START agreement, there have been no discussions or negotiations of further reduction of nuclear weapons, as required by the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The sudden downturn in relations due to the events in Ukraine has ceased even the most anemic bilateral conversations on these issues. This is especially the case for BMD cooperation, which would have been able to transform the relationship among Russia, the United States, and NATO into the framework of allies, an outcome that now seems like science fiction.

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However, these problems, as well as the urgency of joint cooperation on countering mutual threats, have not disappeared, and this decline in focus could further complicate the chances of their positive resolution after the end of the current crisis. It may be useful to recall that, even during the time of Cold War confrontation, the discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive forces were ongoing. The political relationships among states and coalitions undergo cyclical fluctuations. During these fluctuations, it can be challenging to recover the positive organizational and technical results that were achieved earlier in the aforementioned areas. And the task of their recovery rests first and foremost with the independent expert community and not with politicians. The following analysis thus presents a discussion of the possibilities of BMD cooperation among Russia, the United States, and NATO, given the forecasted changes in this area. NUCLEAR AND MISSILE THREATS

During earlier discussions of missile threats to Europe and Russia from the south, especially from Iran, there were disagreements about their urgency. The premise that Europe is not currently under missile threat from the south is valid to exactly the same extent as it is true that there is no BMD system at present capable of defending the whole of Russia and Europe. It would be a strategic mistake to begin establishing such a system only after such a missile threat had become a reality. From 2009 to 2010, under the framework of the East-West Institute and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), an evaluation of the missile threat from Iran and North Korea was undertaken by qualified Russian and American experts, who produced a detailed study on the current state and potential development of Iranian and North Korean ballistic missiles and spacecraft launch vehicles. On this basis, predictions can be made of the amount of time it will take them to create longer-range ballistic missiles. In 2011, the IISS experts carried out an additional series of studies confirming that the upgraded Shahab-3M (Ghadr-1) Iranian missile with turbocharged engines and a high-precision control system can reach a range of 2,000 kilometers with a payload of 750 kilograms.1 It is worth noting that reducing the payload for this class of missile to 500 kilograms would result in an additional 200 kilometers of range. Moreover, the launch vehicle that

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Iran had used to launch a 27 kilogram satellite cannot be transformed into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) due to the insufficient power of its second stage. In general, those who believe that countries such as Iran and North Korea would have only limited-range missiles based on the Soviet Scud are profoundly mistaken. It should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union had developed the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, having ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, respectively, at the end of the 1950s. There is currently no information of any ground tests being conducted on liquid-fuel engines comparable in power to those of such missiles. However, it would be a dangerous delusion to believe that such technology is still not available to other states. Apart from that, at that time the Soviet Union did not possess the solid-fuel missile technology that Iran has already developed now. The updated IISS materials indicate that the Iranian mobile two-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile Sajjil-2 has a 2,200 to 2,400 kilometer operational range with a payload of 750 kilograms. The successful flight tests of these missiles came as a complete surprise to many experts, demonstrating significant advances by Iranian engineers and technicians in the production of solidfuel engines. As the evaluation demonstrates, continual improvements in the materials used for the production of missile airframes and engine enclosures (including the use of composite materials) have helped to increase their operational range to 3,500 kilometers.2 In addition, there are no serious obstacles to developing a three-stage missile of this type, which would increase range even further. Thus, the time that Iran would need to develop longer-range ballistic missiles is quite comparable to the planned deployment schedule for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons that would arm its missiles depends to a great extent on the achievement and implementation of a comprehensive P5 + 1 deal with Iran on its nuclear program. The goal of this deal is to finally close Iran’s “nuclear dossier” and guarantee the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. If no agreement is reached, independent experts assess that Iran would be capable of creating a nuclear device within approximately one year. Although it is felt that the Iranian leadership would need to make a political decision on the issue before this could occur, it must be remembered that if Iran were to make such a decision, it would probably not report it; as a matter of fact, it cannot be ruled out that it may have already been made.

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THE THREAT POSED TO RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES BY BMD IN EUROPE

Representatives of official Moscow have repeatedly stated that the core of the unified BMD system to defend the United States and Europe will consist of four different modifications of the sea-based and land-based Standard SM-3 interceptor missiles, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems and the X-band (three-centimeter wavelength) radars, and Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missiles, together with the Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW) radars. In such a form, Russian authorities regard the system as being a threat to the Russian nuclear deterrent potential. An analysis of the capabilities of the BMD system being deployed in Europe in terms of intercepting Russian ICBMs was presented at the “Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation” conference held April 8, 2013, at the Carnegie Moscow Center. This work details how the European BMD would largely be unable to threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent potential. The following may additionally be said. The extent to which such a threat would be realistic can be determined by using the assessments of the capabilities of the U.S. BMD system in Europe to intercept Iranian missiles presented in reports by the research centers previously mentioned with the participation of a group of independent international experts. In particular, it was shown that for the exoatmospheric flight phase, the high resolution (up to 15 centimeters) of X-band radars permit detection not only of warheads but of some of the decoy returns as well, although there is no guarantee that they would be able to distinguish between the two. If even relatively simple countermeasures were taken, it could lower the effective reflective area of a warhead from 0.03 to 0.01 square centimeters, which would significantly reduce the likelihood of its detection. Even in the best case, if the number of X-band radar radiating elements were increased to 80 thousand units, the detection range would be approximately 1,300 kilometers, while the minimum range required would be about 2,000 kilometers. On the average, a total of five interceptor missiles would be needed to intercept a single Iranian warhead. There can be no doubt that Russian ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have been equipped with significantly more advanced penetration aids that have been developed over several decades and continue to be upgraded and adapted to the latest BMD systems. As the evaluations by American and Russian independent experts previously cited have shown, the GBI strategic missiles that the Bush administration had planned to de-

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ploy in Poland could theoretically have been able to intercept Russian ICBMs launched from its European territory toward the U.S. mainland, but all ten of the GBI missiles planned for deployment would need to be fired to intercept a single warhead. In this light, it would appear absolutely irrational to plan for their use just to intercept a single warhead. As was shown in the “Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation” presentation, the evaluation of the potential threat was based on the assumption that the ground-based variant of the SM-3 Block IIB missiles (with a speed of 5.5 kilometers per second) would be deployed in Poland, and that the Russian ICBMs would be launched from Vypolzovo (Topol-class missiles), Tatishchevo (SS-19-class missiles), or the Orenburg Oblast (SS-18 missiles). Here it will be noted only that for the case of Russian missiles launched from RSNF bases near Vypolzovo or Tatishchevo and from the Orenburg Oblast in a northwest direction, accounting for the time required to detect the launch and to launch interceptor missiles, the flight paths would not intersect because the interceptors flying at 5.5 kilometers per second would be unable to overtake the Russian warheads. Once the U.S. Space Tracking and Surveillance system (SSTS) has been deployed, the time for launching the interceptors would be shortened significantly, and in that case it would technically be possible to intercept Russian warheads. However, this does not mean that it would be possible to destroy the Russian ICBM warheads, as they move in a cloud of hundreds of light and heavy false targets, active radar jammers, and chaff. In addition, the United States would not know the characteristics of the penetration aids because they are tested in secret. Thus, the new BMD architecture in Europe will have essentially no impact on Russian nuclear deterrence capabilities in relation to the United States. This applies to all phases of the BMD deployment in Europe, despite the fact that plans call for the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missile and its landbased version (which will be even more effective against intermediate-range ballistic missiles) to be deployed in Northern Europe during the third phase (2018). The new SM-3 class interceptor being developed will have greater operational range due to its increased amount of solid fuel (the second and third stages will be increased in diameter by a factor of 1.5, from 34.3 to 53.3 centimeters). Finally, during the fourth stage, the SM-3 may again be modernized so as to have the capability of intercepting ICBMs; modernization of the SM-3 (the Block IIB version) was originally scheduled to be available for 2020, but the program was canceled in 2014. Some believe it may be revived.

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At the same time, it is quite likely that the increased velocity of the interceptors would give them the ability to destroy longer-range Iranian missiles during their boost phase (if ships equipped with the Aegis system are deployed in the Mediterranean Sea). Periodically, the hypothetical scenario is raised under which the United States would relocate its mobile sea-based and land-based BMD systems to the United States to form a relatively tight defense of its territory against a Russian retaliatory strike. However, such a scenario is not realistic, for many reasons. One of the main problems with it is that the process of BMD relocation would be prolonged and could not be accomplished clandestinely. The goal of such relocation would unambiguously be seen as preparation for a disarmament strike by the United States. In that case, even during a large-scale nonnuclear war, a preemptive Russian nuclear strike would become highly probable. For such reasons, this scenario appears absolutely unrealistic. Russia may also be concerned over the deployment of U.S. BMD ships in northern waters. SM-3 interceptors would theoretically be capable of intercepting Russian SLBMs during the boost flight phase, especially liquid-fuel missiles launched from coastal waters or directly from the base. This capability may continue to improve as the velocity characteristics of the interceptors increase. The U.S. space-based early warning system is guaranteed to detect a missile in its boost phase within approximately fifty seconds after launch, and from that very time the potential low-orbit STSS system would be able to identify the SLBM’s trajectory parameters with sufficiently high precision and to develop a preliminary target designation that would then be sent to the guiding radars aboard Aegis ships. In this way, liquid-fuel SLBMs launched from submarines in coastal waters could theoretically be intercepted during their second stage flight beginning at a distance of 300 kilometers from the launch point until the end of the boost phase at altitudes of 200 to 300 kilometers, which is well within the SM-3 interceptor’s reach. Due to its design advantages, the solid-fuel Bulava missile has a boost phase much shorter in duration and lower in altitude than the liquid-fuel SLBMs. Absent the necessary preliminary data, the likelihood of its interception during the boost phase cannot be discussed here. Some U.S. representatives have asserted that the SM-3 interceptor missiles were not designed to intercept missiles during the boost phase and would be able to destroy the warheads only after separation. This is due to the characteristics of the interceptor guidance module and the fact that warheads travel

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along ballistic trajectories, which are easier to predict. Supposedly, this would be much more difficult to accomplish if the interceptor has locked in on a missile that is accelerating rapidly. However, it would not appear to be technically difficult to adjust the sensitivity of the sensors and predict the missile’s trajectory while it is still in its boost phase. Moreover, the boost phase trajectories of Russian missiles have been well studied because the telemetric data and corresponding deciphering equipment were exchanged under the START-I Treaty. If the Americans have mastered the kinetic “bullet-to-bullet” intercept (when the interceptor destroys a warhead just by colliding with it), then it is unlikely for it to be more difficult to strike a carrier of much larger dimensions. In addition, an airborne weapons system armed with a laser designed to destroy any type of missile during its boost phase is also currently at the stage of development and full-scale testing in the United States. Despite a number of unsuccessful tests, including recently, there is currently no information to indicate that this program might be suspended. Aircraft armed with laser weapons could be relocated and deployed relatively closer to the missile bases of an adversary, accompanied by several strike, refueling, and air cover aircraft at combat readiness. It is unlikely that such a complex weapons system would be used for intercepting ballistic missiles launched from bases deep within an adversary’s territory, which are effectively protected by air defense. However, air patrols in the deployment and patrol areas of Russian strategic submarines would be able to threaten any ballistic missiles they might launch. There has been widespread criticism of this BMD program in the United States. A number of technological problems remain unresolved.3 To deploy and maintain this system at combat readiness would cost too much. This may be true for the present U.S. administration, which faces an unprecedented budget deficit, but it is also felt that, no matter which administration is in power, it will still be fighting to overcome the deficit. However, a massive deployment of BMD ships together with support and supply ships in the vicinity of Russian submarine bases or their patrol areas, or a deployment of laser-equipped aircraft (such as in the scenario under which the mobile European BMD systems would be relocated to U.S. territory) would also create the risk of a Russian preemptive strike. Russian strategic nuclear forces could realistically become vulnerable only following a massive deployment of land-, sea-, air-, and space-based missile

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defenses capable of intercepting warheads at any phase of flight, as had been planned under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This implies a return to a Cold War mode and the resumption of an accelerated arms race. For both political and economic reasons, the likelihood that U.S.–Russian relations would take such a radical turn is very low. However, even with such a density of BMD, the U.S. system would be unable to prevent the catastrophic consequences of a Russian retaliatory strike. The conclusion that neither the European BMD system nor missile defense based on U.S. territory would have much impact on Russian deterrent potential is true only with respect to the bilateral strategic balance between the two nuclear superpowers. Apart from that, the Russian nuclear deterrent strategy should logically also extend to the European NATO members, which not only enjoy considerable superiority in terms of conventional forces but also count among them two nuclear powers, France and Great Britain. Therefore, it can be assumed that Russian military strategy would provide for its strategic nuclear forces to be used against European administrative, industrial, and military areas. Once the European sea- and land-based BMD warning and combat facilities acquire the theoretical capability to intercept ICBMs, they will begin to have a relatively greater effect on Russian deterrent capabilities. However, considering the extremely high efficiency of the current and potential penetration aids used by the Russian ICBMs and SLBMs, the strength of a Russian retaliatory strike on European territory would be reduced by no more than a few percent, which would be absolutely unacceptable for NATO. PRECRISIS OPTIONS FOR COOPERATION

Moscow’s earlier proposals to cooperate equally in the creation of BMD in Europe and deploy it under the so-called sectoral principle contained an overestimate of Russia’s real potential. At that point, Russia had the A-135 BMD system that was created to defend the Moscow region. The final modification of this system that entered service in 1995 may be further modernized in the future. However, the high-altitude 51T6 interceptor missiles have been removed from the inventory, whereas to use nuclear interceptor missiles (such as the remaining 53T6 interceptor missiles) against warheads with unknown explosive charge (or with no charge at all in case of a provocative launch of one or several missiles) has long since ceased being acceptable in the new military and political environment. The use of such interceptors over Europe would be even more unacceptable. As

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early as 1976, the U.S. Senate decided to dismantle a similar BMD system and all of its interceptor missiles protecting the Grand Forks ICBM base. The S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) system at that point was equipped only with antiaircraft missiles, and no information was available about any successful tests against actual ballistic targets. Progress with the creation and testing of the S-500 Vityaz system (planned for development by 2015) remained very uncertain. A successful test series would consist of at least ten launches of target missiles, which, with the exception of the Topol-E, are not yet in existence. Afterwards, mass production of the S-500 system would need to be organized. At the same time, it must be noted that testing of the U.S. THAAD and Aegis systems continued for ten to fifteen years, yet independent American experts consider their effectiveness highly questionable. Due to numerous problems, a test series for the Russian BMD systems would take no less time. Therefore, it would not be realistic to expect that by the end of the present decade Russia would be able to initiate the mass production and deployment of BMD systems that would be at least comparable with current American systems. However, the absence of Russian interceptor systems for the foreseeable future in the European BMD system planned by the U.S./NATO will not be an impediment to cooperation. Significant opportunities would remain in the field of information systems for ballistic missile defense. According to numerous independent American experts, integration of U.S. and Russian BMEW systems would enhance the ability to detect missile launches by 30 to 70 percent. Due to the current condition of Russian space-based early warning satellites, their contribution is unlikely to be significant at the present stage and for the near future. Besides, the U.S. space-based early warning system has a better ability to predict the trajectories of ballistic missiles after their launches have been detected. However, the likelihood of missile launches being detected by space-based systems would depend on the cloud cover at the launch site and thus cannot be 100 percent. The most reliable means for detecting missile launches and calculating their subsequent trajectories are the U.S. and Russian early warning radars. American experts are very familiar with the unique capabilities of the Russian radar stations near Armavir for detecting missile launches from Iran. The radar near Armavir has been able to detect test launches of Iranian missiles from the northern test range in a southeast

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direction within 110 to 115 seconds after launch and even sooner if the missile is launched in combat mode in a northwest direction. No American BMEW system radar would be capable of such performance. Also important is the fact that in the field of systems and hardware for missile interception, Russian experience in developing advanced and unique software capable of detecting incoming missiles and differentiating warheads from a background of decoys and interference could be put to good use. Russia also possesses the kind of advanced testing and experimental infrastructure (including a network of radar, electro-optical, and telemetry stations) that has no counterpart in Europe. THE FEATURES OF COOPERATION

Even before the downturn in Russo–Western relations because of the Ukrainian crisis and with the stalemate in U.S.–Russian discussions on cooperation in the field of European BMD, one of the proposed steps (which would satisfy the Russian demand for equal cooperation) involved the integration of the U.S. and Russian Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems by creating a data exchange center (DEC). This had been the intent of the 1998 decision by the U.S. and Russian presidents, which for a variety of reasons was not realized. The two presidents reiterated this intention at the 2009 summit in Moscow. Over the long term, it would be useful to transform the DEC into a global center for missile launch monitoring and early warning operating in real time and based in Moscow and Brussels. In this regard, the 2010 Russian proposal of a sectoral approach to BMD would appear to be poorly thought out. A unified early warning system connected to a center for missile launch monitoring and early warning cannot be divided into sectors. It was created for the purpose of more efficiently approaching the resolution of a common problem. Information from any system that has detected a missile launch is transmitted to the center, where all data are processed. Duplicate information from multiple sources only increases the effectiveness of detection. In the future, when Russia has acquired an interception capability that is comparable to that of the United States, the principle must remain the same: The target should be attacked by any interceptor missiles that are in position to destroy the target, and if both Russian and American interceptors have been fired at a target simultaneously, it would only increase the effectiveness of the interception, which will always be under 100 percent. At the same time

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it must be remembered that the BMD system has to be fully automatic because the timing is a matter of minutes or even seconds, and only such a system would be able to choose the optimal means for intercepting the target. There would be no time for the command center to figure out which sector would be responsible. For this reason, particular attention will need to be devoted to the issue of the sovereignty of Russia and the NATO states in the context of cooperation on BMD. The West has insisted that each participating party should be responsible for the defense of its own territory. At the same time, separate protocols could be negotiated to allow one party to intercept a missile overflying its territory but aimed at the territory of another party. Arguments in favor of such provisions (in particular the statements of the secretary general of NATO and representatives of the new Eastern European members of the alliance) have been based on the famous Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack on one NATO member would be considered an attack on them all. Such an argument would be valid for a truly unified BMD system, such as the Russian side had proposed with the sectoral approach. In fact, it had gone even farther than Article 5, inasmuch as it suggested that none of the parties should cover zones that another party was already covering (for example, the Baltic states under the protection of Russian BMD). In other words, for the defense of their citizens against nuclear missile attack, the NATO states would need to depend on the effectiveness of Russian BMD systems, and vice versa. This would entail an extremely close military alliance between Russia and NATO or a merger of NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (the latter treaty contains a similar Article 4). However, because these proposals were not discussed during the negotiations, the “sectoral” project was seen by NATO as either totally ill conceived and off the cuff or as a bluff that the other side deliberately intended to be rejected. Article 5, however, should not be seen as being a sacred cow or to be used to impede any reasonable and practical steps toward cooperation on BMD. As long as no military association exists between Russia and NATO, cooperation must be encouraged in every possible way, not so as to make one side totally dependent on the other but for their mutual benefit in improved collective security. Cooperation of exactly this type has been proceeding under the “Afghan Transit” project for many years and continues to expand. In June 2011, Russian and NATO fighter aircraft participated in the joint Vigilant Skies 2011 counterterrorism exercises with support from two

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c­ oordination centers in Moscow and Warsaw and local coordination sites in Norway, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. Polish fighter jets joined Russian fighters in intercepting and escorting an “intruder” aircraft in common airspace without mention of the infamous sovereignty issue. Russian fighter jets also took part in other similar exercises with Turkish fighter jets. Article 5 would present no impediment to carrying out exchanges of operational information among the security services for purposes of counterterrorism, for continuing the technical maintenance of the Russian military equipment and armaments that are still in service with the military forces of Eastern European states, for jointly developing new aircraft systems, or for concluding huge contracts relating to military and technical cooperation (such as the Russian purchase of French amphibious landing ships and technologies). In other words, since the end of the Cold War, both NATO members and Russia have provided for their own security with help from others. It is even more baseless to cite the North Atlantic Treaty in forming and planning a joint BMD system. As already noted, BMD systems must function in automatic mode without intervention from any “sovereign” command and control centers to calculate the optimal solution for intercept by the weapons (regardless of affiliation) that would be most likely to strike the target. THE INTEGRATION OF BMD INFORMATION SYSTEMS

As already noted, a first step in organizing cooperative efforts could be to develop and coordinate the architecture for integrating information systems. A significant amount of research in this direction has recently been carried out by U.S.–Russian projects under the framework of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and the IMEMO with the Brookings Institution. The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) has worked intensely on this subject, turning to experts from Russia, the United States, and the European NATO states. The authors of these projects have gained a reasonably stable understanding of the architecture needed for a joint European BMD system and the first steps to take. Aside from the U.S. and Russian Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems and hardware, it would also be useful for Russia to include the quite advanced and highly effective radars belonging to the Moscow A-135 BMD system: the Don-2N, Dunay-3U, and Dunay-3M radars. These radars facilitate target detection at ranges of up to 6,000 kilometers, target tracking, and missile guid-

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ance. The United States, in turn, could include the BMD radars that it plans to deploy in Europe. Special attention should be given to the possibility of finding a compromise solution for the Russian demand that it be provided with legal guarantees that the European missile defense system would not be aimed against its nuclear deterrent potential. The versions of the joint European missile defense system for each of its deployment phases that had been planned by American, European, and Russian experts (and presented on April 4 and 5, 2012, in Munich) under the completed EASI project could be seen as a basis for compromise.4 In particular, the proposed versions of the joint European BMD system do not provide for any American BMD ships to be deployed in the Arctic, Baltic, or Black Seas. Such an eventuality had been of particular concern for the Russian leadership. If such proposals on the joint BMD architecture could be officially coordinated, it could completely dispense with the matter of guarantees that the European BMD system would not be aimed against Russia. This is what a joint BMD system could be in the future. For now, however, as a compromise, it would be possible to form two separate systems with coordinated capabilities and operations. To this end, two structures of the joint BMD could be created: The first would consist of Russian and NATO satellite and radar data integration centers, and the second would be a center staffed by Russian and Western officers to perform around-the-clock planning and operational coordination between the two BMD systems. The first center would in essence represent the revival at a new stage of the previous Moscow data exchange center that the presidents of the United States and Russia had decided to create in 1998, the bulk of work for which was done but for a variety of minor reasons was not completed. One such reason is known to have been the intention of the American side to filter out some of its early warning system information. In the new environment, the issue of data filtration should be addressed separately. It would be permissible, of course, for each side to individually filter false signals out of the early warning system data at their respective command and control centers, but in that case, at a minimum, the algorithms for filtering the data before transmission to the joint center would need to be agreed on in advance. It would, however, appear more useful if the filtering of the early warning information coming from both sides was done in the joint center, without worrying about large numbers of false alarms. It would be more important to avoid overlooking the signal of an actual missile launch

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than it would be to avoid having to jointly process a large number of false missile launch warnings. The United States has considered the idea of forming a so-called virtual DEC in contrast to the one that had been agreed on previously. Rather than having joint U.S.–Russian military duty detachments present on site, it was proposed that information be exchanged between duty watches of the two countries over a secure Internet connection. There would be both advantages and disadvantages to such an arrangement, but considering all of the plusses and minuses in terms of the reliability of the information received and the potential for misunderstandings to occur, as well as for political reasons, the face-to-face option seems the better choice. Another important area of cooperation would have to be in resuming the series of U.S.–NATO–Russia joint computer exercises on TMD that were previously interrupted and subsequently extending them beyond the theater of war. A total of nine training sessions were carried out in the U.S.–Russia and U.S.– NATO–Russia format. It is important that this practice be resumed, inasmuch as it has already led to some success in developing the conceptual foundation and increasing compatibility between the BMEW and interception systems. The interruption of such exercises has led to a decline in experience levels due to the emergence of new technologies and to staff rotation. It would also be useful to conduct joint research studies for moving away from computer-­based exercises to full-fledged military exercises involving command officers and, in the future, to the use of actual U.S. and Russian ballistic defense systems, for example at a Russian testing range. Russia possesses a developed test range infrastructure that includes a network of radar, electro-optical, and telemetry stations, the likes of which do not exist in Europe. To proceed with this arrangement, preliminary predesign research will need to be carried out by experts from Russia, the United States, and other NATO states. Thus, the precrisis discussions regarding the opportunities for Russia’s cooperation with the US/NATO in the development of European BMD were useful in establishing the foundation and the rationale for various architecture options as well as the features of how a joint BMD system, with its increased effectiveness of intercepting single and multiple missiles, would function. As this chapter was written, it was impossible to forecast the further escalation or deescalation in the crisis of relations between Russia and the West. If the peak of this crisis passes, and its deescalation is swift, then the rebuilding

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of mutual trust may take a long time. Either way, it is practical to preserve the detailed assessments of cooperation in this important and sensitive area. In summary, the following key conclusions can be made: 1. The BMD system in Europe that is planned for deployment would not pose a threat to the Russian deterrent potential against the United States at either of its phases. A slight decline in Russian deterrent potential with respect to the NATO states cannot be ruled out once the European sea- and land-based interceptors have acquired the theoretical capability to intercept ICBMs. However, the consequences of a Russian retaliatory strategic nuclear strike against European territory would still be totally unacceptable for the United States and its allies. 2. The Iranian missile capability is improving quite rapidly. Iranian missile scientists made an unexpected breakthrough in creating solid-fuel missiles, leaving no apparent obstacles to increasing the operational range of the Sajjil-2 missile to 3,500 kilometers or more, perhaps by improving the structural materials used for its manufacture. It must also be remembered that even liquid-fuel missiles built using 1950s–1960s technology can have operational ranges of up to 5,000 kilometers. The time it takes for Iran to produce long-range ballistic missiles will be commensurate with the amount of time it will take to deploy the BMD system in Europe. 3. Significant opportunities remain for cooperation among the United States and NATO and Russia in the field of information technology for Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems. A first step could be to integrate the U.S. and Russian BMEW systems and BMD radars within Russia and the European NATO states. In this regard, it would be useful to create two joint centers in Moscow and Brussels to integrate data coming from Russian and NATO radars and satellites conducting global monitoring for missile launches and ballistic missile attack early warning in real-time mode. Another DEC staffed with Russian and NATO officers will be needed to plan and coordinate the two BMD systems. 4. A compromise solution for the Russian demand to be provided with legal guarantees that European BMD will not be aimed against its nuclear deterrent potential may be found based on versions of the architecture for European BMD that were proposed by American, European, and Russian experts under the framework of the completed EASI

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project. These versions propose in particular that only Russian BMD ships are to be deployed in the Baltic, Barents, Black, and Norway Seas. If these proposals on a joint BMD architecture are officially accepted, the issue of guarantees that European BMD is not aimed against Russia will be fully resolved. 5. The interrupted series of joint computer exercises with the United States and NATO on theater missile defense must be resumed, with a subsequent expansion of such exercises beyond the theater of war. It will be important to resume this practice, which has yielded some positive results in developing the conceptual foundation and compatibility of the information and interception systems. 6. The results of this analysis conclusively suggest that the chief disagreements and obstacles in the path of Russia’s cooperation with U.S./ NATO in the construction of BMD have little to do with the military security of both sides and are instead largely political in nature. These disagreements are based in the lack of mutual trust and an insufficient qualification of official participants in the decision-making process. 7. In the postcrisis period, as the political decision to cooperate in BMD is being made, it would be useful to consider that it could play a crucial role in advancing a real strategic partnership among the two superpowers and the leading European NATO states (including nuclear countries). Such cooperation would spread to other security spheres and would provide the Euro-Atlantic security architecture with viable programs. Such collaboration will be critical for the constructive transformation of mutual nuclear deterrence, which is useless under the new system of military and political relations between Russia and the U.S./NATO; twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it does not best serve their security interests. NOTES 1. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment” (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010). 2. Ibid. 3.  Viktor Myasnikov, “Hyperboloid inzhenera Boinga” [Boeing Engineer’s Hyperboloid], Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 19, 2010 [in Russian]. 4.  “Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm/EASI: Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/WGP_MissileDefense_FINAL.pdf.

8

FROM DREAM TO REALITY Israel and Missile Defense

Ariel Levite and Shlomo Brom

israeli missile defense capability dates back to humble experimental beginnings in the early 1990s. It originated with an innovative concept driven by the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense as a daring industrial research and development response to the growing ballistic threat against Israel traumatically experienced during the first Gulf War. But in a mere two decades it has evolved into a mainstay of the Israeli security doctrine and force structure and an integral part of virtually any armed confrontation between Israel and its neighbors. This chapter reviews the evolution of the missile threat against Israel and the emergence of the indigenous Israeli and collaborative U.S.–Israeli missile defense response. It highlights the remarkable success achieved by the Israeli missile defense program, not only in tests and simulations but in combat. It also goes on to present and briefly analyze some of the vexing dilemmas, such as who and what should get a higher level of protection, that have grown precisely as a result of these remarkable technological advances in missile defense. It concludes with a brief discussion of key implications of the Israeli introduction and operation of a multilayered missile defense system. Although some of these dilemmas and implications are specific to Israel, others may have broader relevance for other nations seriously considering the implications of missile defense.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE BALLISTIC THREAT TO ISRAEL AND ITS MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Artillery rockets entered the arsenals of Arab armies in the Middle East in the 1950s when several states in the region, led by Egypt, turned to the Soviet Union for their main source for supply of arms and military doctrine. In the Red Army’s military doctrine, implemented massively in World War II, artillery in general and artillery rockets in particular had played a major role as an essential element of the counterforce firepower in the air–land battle. The Israeli response to this Arab emphasis on quantitatively superior land-based firepower was a combination of offensively oriented maneuvering armored units and air power that quickly attained air supremacy to offset the overall capability of the far larger Arab standing armies and their massive artillery and subsequently also rocket advantage. That was to prove quite effective in the wars and other campaigns with Arab armies taking place between 1956 and 1982. Yet a new threat emerged in parallel, one presented by nonstate actors, with assistance from several state sponsors. Initially its main embodiment was the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which launched low-scale terrorism and armed confrontation with Israel beginning in the mid-1960s. Following the overwhelming Israeli victory in the Six-Day War (1967) and its eviction from Jordan in Black September (1970), the PLO chose to turn Lebanon into its main base for armed attacks against Israel. Finding it increasingly difficult to infiltrate Israel proper and politically counterproductive to engage in terrorism abroad against Israeli targets, the PLO turned elsewhere. Employing standoff artillery rockets received from its Arab sponsors as well as from out-of-region sources emerged as its primary tool for menacing Israel. Standoff firepower was thus put to use in a different capacity and context. The context was asymmetric war between Israel and these nonstate actors, and the rockets were used as countervalue instruments—that is, to hurt and harass the civilian population residing in the northern part of the country. Still, the military capabilities that were originally developed to engage in conventional interstate wars were considered by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to be suitable also for dealing effectively with this new threat. They could deter the perpetrators initially by the threat of punishment and also subsequently, when necessary, through suppression. Egypt had tried to indigenously develop (albeit with the help of German scientists) ballistic missiles in the early 1960s, a project that ultimately failed.

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Following the 1967 war and the overwhelming display of Israeli air superiority, both Egypt and Syria begun to search for external suppliers for rockets and ballistic missiles, redoubling these efforts as part of their arms buildup for the 1973 war. Egypt and Syria eventually succeeded in obtaining both ballistic missiles and heavy rockets (Scud B and Frog 7 respectively) from the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. The Scuds were hardly used operationally by Egypt during the 1973 war but were employed effectively as a deterrent, actually dissuading Israel from attacking high-value targets inside Egypt. Syria, on the other hand, used its Frogs operationally with some success, targeting Israel’s main northern airbase but causing only collateral damage. In response Israel proceeded to exercise its deterrent threat, employing its preeminent air power to attack Syrian national infrastructure assets, signaling Syria that it was not willing to tolerate such inaccurate standoff attacks that caused collateral damage to civilians. That message appeared to have been well understood by the Syrians, who indeed ceased those attacks immediately. This in turn reinforced the Israeli conception that the existing capabilities of the IDF were adequate to deal with the growing ballistic missile and rocket threat. The accelerated buildup of the IDF’s capabilities, and specifically those of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) following the 1973 war, culminated in a renewed demonstration of the overwhelming supremacy of the IAF in the 1982 war in Lebanon. The rapid proliferation of rockets and ballistic missiles in the Arab military forces and Iran thereafter seems to suggest that Israel’s regional foes walked away from this duel convinced that their air power and even ground air defense (which earlier seemed to have worked well) would be no match for the IAF’s air power. This, in turn, served in their eyes to further enhance the appeal of ballistic missiles and long-range rockets. These would from now on be viewed both as the primary means for balancing IAF superiority and endowing Arab militaries with the ability to use standoff fire in the battlefield under conditions of Israeli air supremacy. The result was the introduction into the arsenals of Israel’s foes (Arabs and Iranians) of imported missiles and rockets in growing numbers and diversity, coupled with the buildup of indigenous development and production infrastructure in cooperation with similarly minded states, particularly North Korea. That also enabled development of longer-range missiles with better accuracy. Thus Iraq developed the Al-Hussein ballistic missile with a range of about 650 kilometers, making it possible to reach Israel by decreasing the size of the warhead of the Scud missile and adding instead more fuel.

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Another milestone was crossed in the 1980s when Arab (and subsequently also Iranian) militaries launched projects aimed at making ballistic missiles also into platforms for delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although this had probably already been the concept underlying Egypt’s failed missile program in the 1960s, the idea was dropped, only to resurface in the 1980s. Syria started an extensive program for development and production of chemical weapons. In its framework, warheads with chemical weapons were adapted to Scud B missiles and their longer-range derivatives designed to serve as strategic weapons.1 Subsequently, chemical warheads were also adapted to its shorter-range artillery rockets as tactical weapons. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein followed the same path on chemical weapons2 but viewed these weapons and their missile delivery mostly as an interim step, until Iraq’s more ambitious nuclear weapons program bore fruit. Naturally, the delivery platform of choice was ballistic missiles, and the program aimed at producing nuclear warheads and modifying its ballistic missiles.3 These developments did not go unnoticed in Israel, prompting it to reconsider the utility of defensive solutions as part of the response to the growing ballistic missiles challenge. The opportunity for Israel to move ahead on missile defense emerged when President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative program; Israel seized on the opportunity and asked to join the program. The U.S. administration responded positively, in part because the program was domestically controversial, which made expression of support by U.S. allies important to the administration. Thus, on May 6, 1985, a memorandum of understanding establishing Israel’s inclusion and role in the larger U.S. ballistic missile defense program was signed. A year later Israel and the United States agreed that within this framework Israel’s role would be to develop an antiballistic missile defense system, while the United States financed 80 percent of the cost. This was the beginning of the development of the Arrow system. At that time the concept of antiballistic missile defense was controversial within the Israeli defense community. Many in the IDF believed that it made no sense to shoot down ballistic missiles with missiles that were more expensive then the target missile. These views were reinforced by some operations research studies that belittled the significance and the impact of the threats. There were also doubts concerning the ripeness of antimissile defense technology. The IDF generally believed that with the combination of passive defense and the offensive air force capabilities that were already available it could provide an adequate solution to the problem. Yet the Israeli Ministry of Defense

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(IMOD) under the directorship of David Ivry had different considerations, viewing such a project not only as an essential pillar of the response to the growing threat but also as a golden opportunity to enhance strategic cooperation with the U.S. defense community while fostering the development of indigenous defense research and development (R&D) and production in Israel.4 Eventually the latter considerations prevailed and Israel started the program as an IMOD program outside the IDF’s budget. Then, in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and in January 1991 the first Gulf War started. Saddam Hussein retaliated by launching Al-Hussein missiles at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Thirty-nine missiles in all were launched at Israel. With the exception of one or two missiles that were launched in the direction of Israel’s nuclear research reactor in Dimona, all the other targets were major cities in Israel, semiparalyzing life in its major urban centers and causing significant trauma. Luckily these missiles caused very limited damage and no direct casualties in Israel (one civilian was killed by a Patriot missile that tried to intercept a warhead and followed it until it hit the ground). Yet the vulnerability of Israel’s heartland to missile strikes was exposed for all. So too was the total failure of U.S. Patriot antiaircraft missile batteries (both Israeli forces as well as the U.S. Army hurriedly deployed in Israel once the war broke out) to intercept even one incoming warhead.5 One of the main reasons for the failure was the inability of the Patriot system available at the time to distinguish between debris of the Iraqi missiles that broke off during the flight and the warheads themselves. In spite of the limited damage inflicted by the Iraqi missiles, this episode nonetheless proved to be traumatic for Israelis, who had been largely spared similar experiences in previous wars since Israel’s War of Independence (1948–1949). Seeking refuge, many had temporarily fled Tel Aviv and adjacent cities targeted by the missiles, paralyzing life and economic activity. After the war, Israel drew an important lesson from this, painfully familiar to those from the blitz on London in World War II. Although (inaccurate) conventionally armed ballistic missiles may cause only limited physical damage, they do harass the civilian population and prevent them from leading a normal life. Moreover, unless stopped, they also drive home a painful political reality: the failure of the state attacked to fulfill one of its main obligations to its citizens, namely to provide them with security. Notwithstanding this chilling experience, the implications for missile defense remained controversial in Israel.

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Opponents of missile defense seized on the failure of the Patriot system to fundamentally challenge the viability of active missile defense.6 The developers of the Arrow system were subsequently subjected to tough and protracted questioning of their claims that the abysmal performance of missile defense in 1991 was system dependent. Ultimately they prevailed, convincing the civilian IMOD leadership that the Arrow system would prove far superior. In September 1992 the first test launch of the Arrow 1, the technology demonstrator, was performed successfully. The first operational system, the Arrow 2 block 1 (capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers), reached the stage of initial operational capability (IOC) on November 1999 when the first Arrow battery was deployed, and a few months later reached its full operational capability (FOC). As a result Israel is currently the only nation that has an operational national missile defense system that covers all the essential areas of the state. New blocks of the current operational system, Arrow 2, were subsequently developed to enhance the system’s performance against longer-range ballistic missiles (over 1,000 kilometers). They were designed to respond to the growing role of Iranian ballistic missiles in Israel’s threat perception, as well as to its improved missile capabilities. Drawing on massive assistance from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran has succeeded in developing a liquid-fueled Shahab-3 missile that can reach Israel while also developing solid-fuel ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel and beyond. The Iranian nuclear program is forcing Israel to face the possibility that some of these missiles could ultimately be armed with nuclear warheads. In response, in 2009 development of a new system, Arrow 3, was launched. It is designed to intercept incoming missiles outside the atmosphere. Early interception decreases the probability that an unconventional warhead will cause some damage even after a successful interception and allows more opportunities for the engagement of the incoming missile, thereby increasing the probability of successful interception. Additionally, since the late 1990s Israel and the United States have also engaged in a cooperative R&D program that involves future development and refinement (risk mitigation) of the Israeli Boost Phases Intercept System (IBIS) concept, which aims to destroy tactical ballistic missiles in the boost phase of flight, before engine cutoff, preferably while over enemy territory. This project was based on the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) armed with onboard interceptors to provide the means to destroy enemy missiles in their

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boost phase of flight. The concept was found at the end of the 1990s to be feasible but did not mature into full development because of cost considerations and the need to await technological advances.7 Although Israel was focusing on building defenses against missiles from neighboring states, Israel’s asymmetric conflicts with nonstate actors, mainly Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, highlighted the need for active defense against short-range rockets. In 1996 Israel and the United States signed an agreement on the development of Nautilus, or Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL), to intercept short-range rockets. But the laser technology available at the time had not matured to the point of facilitating fielding of an effective ground-based laser missile defense system. Although a technology demonstrator that was developed did demonstrate the capacity of groundbased laser–based systems to intercept and destroy incoming rockets, the system proved too big, cumbersome, and immobile; consumed excessive energy resources; and also exposed some of the technology’s limitations under certain battlefield conditions. Consequently the two states decided to abandon its further development. Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000 decreased the threat of rockets launched from South Lebanon. Consequently the interest of the Israeli defense community in active rocket defense systems correspondingly declined, and the subject was dormant for a number of years. Israelis in towns adjacent to the Gaza Strip were still occasionally harassed by rockets (and mortar fire) launched from the Gaza Strip, but the scope of the threat was limited. The number of the launched rockets was small, and most of them were initially of the primitive type produced indigenously in rudimentary local workshops that are highly inaccurate, with very short ranges and small ineffective warheads. Israel reawakened to this rocket threat in the Second Lebanon War in August 2006, when Hezbollah used rockets to attack Israeli cities, causing forty-four civilian casualties. After the war the IMOD initiated an emergency program for the development of antirocket defense systems. A competition among different Israeli defense companies produced two selectee systems. One was Iron Dome, developed by RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems against short-range rockets below the range of seventy kilometers. The second was David’s Sling (also called Magic Wand), also developed by RAFAEL, targeting rockets and short-range missiles with ranges varying from 40 to 250 kilometers. Iron Dome development was concluded successfully, and it

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e­ ntered operational service with the IAF in 2012. As of this writing, nine Iron Dome batteries are operational. The system has been tested widely in combat, first during operation “Pillar of Defense” in November 2012, a real-life test that was deemed a stellar success. In this campaign, between 1,500 and 1,600 rockets were launched. Iron Dome was able to discriminate from among all those rockets those that had a chance of hitting valuable targets, engaged 480 rockets deemed relevant, and successfully intercepted more than 80 percent of them.8 This success, coupled with the growing threat, has accelerated the pace of introducing further upgrades to Iron Dome and operational deployment of additional batteries. Presently both the David’s Sling system and the Arrow 3 are still under development. Iron Dome demonstrated its maturity in operation “Protective Edge” (July–August 2014) when it was pitted against rocket barrages around the clock from the Gaza Strip aimed against cities across Israel. The array of (initially six, and over time growing to nine) Iron Dome batteries provided almost hermetic protection against the rockets. According to statistical data provided to Aviation Week by the IMOD during this campaign, 4,594 projectiles (both rockets and mortar bombs, but the majority were rockets) were launched at targets in Israel. Around 25 percent of the rockets were deemed to be threatening populated or other sensitive areas and were thus engaged by Iron Dome batteries. More than 90 percent of these (665) were intercepted successfully, whereas the remaining 70 (less than 10 percent) succeeded in getting through.9 Unsurprisingly, the number of fatalities resulting from the rocket attacks was correspondingly very small (two), whereas far fewer mortar attacks (against which hardly any interception was possible) killed no fewer than twelve others. In conclusion, this small number of batteries proved capable of covering effectively almost all the populated areas of the State of Israel. The stellar performance of Iron Dome in the course of a campaign lasting fifty days proved exceptionally reassuring to most of Israel’s population, to the point that it largely felt confident enough to go on with its daily life even when faced with occasional rocket attacks. In fact, the contribution of missile defense in this regard can be measured against the behavior of the population in the one area where no effective missile defense was available. The Israeli population living very close (within ten kilometers) to the Gaza Strip was consistently subjected to a barrage of shorter–range rockets and mortars. Their abundance and shorter flying time stretched Iron Dome’s capabilities to the limit, result-

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ing in far more modest success in interception (though Iron Dome did amazingly succeed in intercepting even a small number—ten—of the mortar shells. This sobering reality gradually persuaded the population living in this area to vacate their settlements and move out of range of the shorter-range threats and into the effective range of Iron Dome interceptions, and they refused to return home until assured by the government that the fighting was over. Another striking measure of missile defense contribution was provided by Ben Gurion International Airport, Israel’s main gateway to the external world. The fear of a rocket falling near the airport led the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to issue a travel advisory that immediately brought all U.S. carriers and most others to cease their service to Israel. Although Hamas derived great satisfaction from this move and kept on threatening to target the airport further, a massive persuasion effort by the Israeli civil aviation authority, in which Iron Dome ranked prominently, managed to have the travel advisory rescinded, and most flights resumed within a day. This incident demonstrated the indispensability of missile defenses for the maintenance of a quasi-normal life style in Israel even in times of adversity. THE WIDER DEBATE AND IMPLICATIONS

In Israel, typical rapid emergency development of weapon systems and fast deployment of operational units in response to acute threats usually precedes the conceptualization of a doctrine that specifies the role these systems should play and their integration in the basic defense concept. Naturally missile defense has been no exception. Yet missile defense has become part and parcel of a most significant conceptual change even before its battlefield performance was proven. It occurred following the 2006 report of a committee headed by Dan Meridor that was nominated by the minister of defense (with the prime minister’s blessing) to reexamine the Israeli security doctrine. One of its main recommendations was to add to the three long-standing cornerstones of the classic Israeli security doctrine—deterrence, early warning, and victory through transfer of war to the enemy’s territory—a fourth leg: defense, in which missile and rocket defenses capture a major place.10 Although politics ultimately got in the way of formally endorsing the Meridor committee’s report (falling victim to the same vicious dynamics that have beset previous attempts to produce such a formal security doctrine), its recommendation on the defensive pillar has nevertheless gained much traction.

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The two most recent campaigns in Gaza have largely sealed the conceptual debate over missile defense, though the budgetary one is sure to linger on. Although temporarily eased by massive additional U.S. support for the procurement of Iron Dome batteries and missiles, the rapidly escalating financial burden associated with the development, procurement, and operation of a multilayered arsenal of missile defense assets poses acute policy dilemmas for Israel at a time of increased pressure on the Israeli defense budget. On the one side stands a faction that argues that Israel has gone too far in changing the balance between offense and defense and eventually “can kill itself through too much defense.” They point to the undermodernization of Israel’s ground forces as one victim of such skewed resource allocations. Their opponents argue that the defense of the civilian population should get the highest priority and that all places should be equally protected because the state cannot discriminate between one group of civilians and another. This debate has obviously assumed a strong populist undertone and has inevitably become politically charged, making future capping of the missile defense budget more difficult to contemplate. Although defense against conventionally armed rockets and missiles originally assumed center stage (much as it is now for all practical purposes over), the role missile defense might play in an environment in which Israel has to face a nuclear rival is not seriously debated. Perhaps this is partially the case because the gradual development of the Arrow family of missile defenses has been going on for so long with massive U.S. support and assistance. But undoubtedly at least part of the explanation resides in the public, political, and bureaucratic reluctance to seriously examine sensitive subjects linked to the prospect of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. This comes out of concern that such discussion might be interpreted as political acquiescence with such a scenario, whereas Israel remains steadfast in its determination to prevent it from coming about. Overall, though, probably the most important lesson that the Israeli experience in missile defense offers us is that the coming of age of missile defense, rather than simplifying the decision-making process, has, if anything, complicated it. Much of the earlier debate focused on the uncertainty surrounding its technical viability coupled with the ideological, almost mythical, debate about the desirability of its introduction in terms of both strategy and resource allocation. Yet precisely when these issues appear to have been settled, and with missile defense repeatedly proving both its prowess and indispens-

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ability, a whole slew of new dilemmas has come to the fore. And these seem to be as acute and intractable as their predecessors, if not even more so. Israel has been working its way through these issues, gradually coming to terms with the answers. But the process is instructive enough to merit a review in the following section. WHAT (AND WHEN) TO DEFEND?

One hallmark of the current Israeli approach toward missile defense is that it does not aim to build an astrodome around Israel, only a selective multilayered defense system. The selectivity is undoubtedly indispensable if one wishes to make it both viable and affordable, even assuming that the procurement costs are borne by U.S.–Israeli cost-sharing arrangements. Consistent with such an approach, the natural inclination of the defense establishment has been to accord a high priority to protection of strategic and military assets. Yet the political impulse has proven to be different, increasingly oriented toward the deployment of a missile defense shield also over population centers. Moreover, as the rocket and missile threat increasingly brings into range most of Israel’s territory and population centers and the belief in the capability of these systems to intercept incoming threats continues to grow, so do the public outcry and concomitant political impulse to broaden its scope. Thus missile defense is gradually extended to smaller and more peripheral population centers. In fact, once the protection is extended to the population, this tension over the prioritization in the allocation of the missile defense resources grows much greater. Assuming, as one ought to, that at any time the threats Israel faces in this domain greatly exceed the available missile defense assets, there is no escape from confronting (explicitly, or at the very least implicitly) additional issues of priority in resource allocation. Should one accord every population center an equal degree of protection? Or should one prioritize such protection, and then on what basis: definition of the threat? Its physical or symbolic centrality? Fortuitous colocation of defense assets nearby? What makes matters far worse is that the problem is no longer confined to wartime. As has increasingly become apparent in recent years, missile defense has also become an operational issue in the so-called peacetime. Nonstate actors (such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, and on occasion even their more skeletal counterparts) fire rockets and missiles at Israel with considerable frequency, at times in response to real or imagined grievances against

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400

361

Rocket Launches

350 300 250

241

257 196

200

145

150

149 125 87

100 50

1

8

1

1

0 Jan. Feb. March Apr. Figure 8.1.  Monthly

May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

rocket fire toward Israel from Gaza, 2008.

source: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, “Summary of rocket fire and mortar shelling in 2008,” 6.

Israel and at other times out of the blue for purely internal reasons, but in most cases outside an all-out confrontation. Naturally they threaten to do so even more frequently. Figure 8.1 describes a typical year of rocket launches from Gaza that combines continuous harassment with outbreaks of more intensive fighting.11 The combination of a mounting missile threat against Israel’s heartland and the availability of an effective missile defense capability has made the Israeli public increasingly adamant that missile defense be deployed to protect them at times of tension well short of war. This was the case recently when Syria threatened to respond to prospective punishment by the United States and its allies for employing chemical weapons against its citizens. This public pressure further reinforced the incipient political realization that deployment of missile defense assets dramatically increases their freedom of maneuver as to whether, when, and how to respond to missile or rocket firings against Israel. Thus, operational reasons and political reassurance requirements presently combine to make missile defense into an ever more indispensable ele-

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ment of prudent defensive planning whenever the prospect for friction arises. But the unintended consequence is that the mere deployment of these batteries in nonroutine spots or times now immediately gives rise to public speculation about an imminent threat. How to reconcile such mounting (and conflicting) demands over missile defense is far from clear, as is also the question of who ought to be entrusted to adjudicate such charged issues. The politicians are predictably trying to relegate the decision making to the military authorities, implying that the latter are best equipped to handle such “operational issues.” Yet the military that initially relegated such issues further down the chain of command to the professional missile defense staff is learning the hard way, especially after a series of previous incidents, that some of their decisions inevitably have heavy political overtones. The challenge is further aggravated should the missile defense stockpiles fall low following extensive use, requiring reprioritization of defense and employment policy. AFFORDABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS

Even among those who have long believed that missile defense could indeed prove technically feasible, there have been many that remained skeptical over its cost-effectiveness. The detractors of missile defenses in Israel, very much like their similarly minded colleagues elsewhere, have consistently seized on the disparity between the costs of producing rockets to disparage their utility and affordability. The conflicts in Gaza have indeed illustrated this disparity, with a single Iron Dome Tamir interceptor rocket (in serial production) reputedly costing roughly $50,000, whereas the average Hamas rocket costs no more than a few hundred dollars. The insights gained in the course of the extensive and prolonged fire exchange between Iron Dome interceptors and Hamas rockets in Protective Edge seem to reaffirm the impression originally derived from operation Pillar of Defense that such straightforward cost calculation is misleading. They suggest that the relative utility of the investment in interceptors is greatly enhanced by both operational and strategic considerations. On the operational side they point to the capacity of sophisticated missile defense systems to make sound real-time judgments of which incoming rockets to engage, resulting in engagement of only those rockets deemed threatening, facilitating dramatic cost savings and a far more effective exchange ratio.

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On the strategic side of the equation the Israeli case points to the need to factor in the considerable physical, economic (direct and indirect-­nationwide), and psychological damages the enemy rockets could otherwise inflict, not to mention the benefits of enabling military restraint and the cost savings inherent therein. Naturally these costs are not easy to calculate. Naturally the conclusion certainly cannot be a blank check for open-ended investment in missile defense. But on balance the Israeli experience to date does suggest that the equation is far less one sided than had been prima facie assumed to be the case. THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE

The public perception in Israel, by now widespread, is that missile defense in general and its most visible present symbol, the Iron Dome batteries, have proven to be highly effective in protecting population centers against incoming rockets and missiles. This has nonetheless made the discourse about its deployment and employment into a public matter as well as a political issue. This is all the more true given the large footprint that the deployment of such batteries, necessarily in proximity to population centers, entails. Every incident involving the use and even the mere deployment of such assets now draws a fair amount of attention. The exceptionally high public expectations (at times unrealistically so) for success of such assets, especially after the remarkable performance of Iron Dome in recent encounters, greatly intensify the public interest in securing itself missile defense coverage in times of tension. During the latest conflict with Hamas, for example, Israeli Bedouins living near Dimona have inferred from several incidents in which they suffered casualties from Gaza-fired rockets that their settlements lay outside the Iron Dome defense perimeter. This led them to lobby the government to extend to them the same level of missile defense protection. Yet how does one communicate, let alone explain decisions on missile defense asset deployment, allocation, and employment to a skeptical public that sees itself on the front line and is less inclined than ever to trust the wisdom in governmental decisions affecting its own well-being? And how can one reassure the public, in fact, that the government has its interests at heart and is treating fairly the entire population nationwide? Or at a minimum defend the wisdom of missile defense decisions made at the strategic and operational levels without compromising valuable military information? This clearly is a

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challenge that has yet to be successfully addressed and is likely to grow even more severe over time. Another, somewhat unexpected, challenge emerging from Israel’s missile defense capability has been its creation of a strong, partially misplaced, state of complacency among the Israeli public about its vulnerability to missile attacks. A milder version of this moral hazard problem originally surfaced a decade earlier when Israel first introduced a faster and far more accurate system of warning its population of incoming missiles. That system inadvertently inspired complacency that interpreted the absence of concrete warning as an absence of threat and as a license to disregard precautionary steps recommended by the civil defense authorities. Now with the people’s perception that they are not only outside the immediate danger zone but are also protected by missiles, their sense of invulnerability reaches new heights. Although such complacency is positive insofar as it facilitates people to keep on living their normal life (which is vital in an often-targeted country like Israel), it is also misplaced and even dangerous as it is based on the fully successful performance of systems in quite limited scenarios. A realization of the gravity of this challenge has led the Israeli Home Front command to launch (during the recent Operation Protective Edge) a massive public education campaign to fight off such complacency. This campaign proved relatively successful, aided by the public daily realization that they could be harmed not only by Hamasfired rockets but also by debris from successful interceptions of such rockets. The moral hazard problem is further compounded by the apparent Hamas belief that Israel’s ability to intercept rockets frees its hands to fire rockets at Israel at will, expecting the Israeli retaliation most probably will be mild.12 Events during the first days of Operation Protective Edge seemed to reinforce the Hamas perception to that effect. Finally, a related layer of challenges is bound to emerge should situations occur in which missile defense were to prove less effective than it has been to date. This could potentially happen in the context of a confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel because the former has an inventory of missiles an order of magnitude larger than the one that existed in Gaza and its arsenal is also far more diverse and sophisticated. Under these circumstances, would a more modest success rate of missile defense still prove at all reassuring, or conversely would the exposition of its limitations be publicly viewed as a failure, leading to a breakdown of trust and panic? Would expectations of poorer

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­ erformance and related public anxiety lead to a different escalation synp drome? Would the expectation of a far more intense exchange among rockets, missiles, and interceptors force different doctrinal decisions on employment of the missile defense assets in such a conflict? And if so, how would that in turn affect the impact of missile defenses on the public? READJUSTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

Over time missile defense has become the most salient example of the growing tension between the IDF’s defensive and offensive elements of operational doctrine. Although the IDF has always adhered to a defensive strategy (in an effort to preserve the status quo), its operational doctrine has nevertheless been predominantly offensively oriented. The underlying logic has been all along that, notwithstanding Israel’s strong desire to avoid conflict, Israel’s narrow security margins require it to act rapidly and decisively to move the war into the enemy’s territory and to win resoundingly if and when war does occur (at times even to the point of preempting when confrontation looks imminent).13 This strong offensive bias has clearly manifested itself in the IDF’s preference for the acquisition of capabilities that can best serve offense. Clearly missile defense, let alone a system solely intended for territorial defense, does not fit in. Yet since the 1991 Gulf War and with greater emphasis since the early 2000s, the IDF has repeatedly found itself subject to political pressure to increasingly divert scarce resources to acquire defensive capabilities in various domains ranging from defenses against chemical and biological warfare (CBW) to border fences, but nowhere more so than in the realm of missile defenses. It has found its doctrinal expression in the never-approved but widely subscribed to formulation of the new Israeli defense doctrine by the 2006 Meridor commission, which added defense as a fourth pillar to the Israeli military doctrine.14 But although the early emphasis on missile defenses could somehow initially be rationalized (and separately budgeted) as a defense industrial undertaking, or even a bilateral U.S.–Israeli strategic project, recent developments have clearly elevated it to the center of the military and politicomilitary planning and defense budgeting. The Israeli missile defense arsenal is expected to expand a lot further in coming years, with more Iron Dome batteries coming online and David’s Sling (also known as Magic Wand) and Arrow 3 entering service alongside a beefed-up early warning and command and control network. Such a formi-

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dable arsenal inevitably becomes a head-on rival to offensive capabilities over scarcer defense outlays. Obviously cofinancing arrangements with the United States have somewhat eased the financial burden in the procurement phase, but at the same time they have also introduced rigidity into the budget regarding the Israeli commitment to fund its share in the development and procurement phase and to absorb the rapidly escalating costs of its training and operation. Just as significantly, on the operational level such developments consistently underscore the new doctrinal and operational balance evolving between offense and defense in the IDF. ARMS RACE

It is undoubtedly important to assess the impact of the massive introduction of missile defense by Israel on regional proliferation and arms race stability. It is naturally exceedingly difficult to establish a causal link between missile defense and a rocket and missile arms race for multiple methodological problems. Although Israel’s missile defense effort has been publicly known for two decades, clear public images of the efficacy of missile defenses were on display only during Pillar of Defense, whereas none were evident during previous skirmishes in Lebanon and Gaza. The massive acquisition of rockets and missiles by all of Israel’s regional foes (Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran) has long preceded the Gaza operation and may have been driven by both operational requirements and supply opportunities (such as the easy access to rockets following the collapse of the Khadafy regime in Libya). It may also have been affected by realization of Israel’s offensive capabilities against long-range rockets, as demonstrated in its 2006 operation in Lebanon, and Pillar of Defense (2012) and Protective Edge (2014) in Gaza. But all of Israel’s foes undoubtedly manifest acute awareness of the entry of missile defense into the equation. And judging by some of their statements and actions, they are also bent on piling up many more rockets and missiles, as well as more diversified and sophisticated arsenals, and developing modes of operation aimed at saturating the missile and rocket defense system by launching large salvos of missiles and rockets. It thus seems fair to speculate that a growing share of these activities is designed to make up for Israel’s demonstrated missile defense prowess. By the same token it seems even safer to suggest that Israel, for its part, has clearly been racing ahead (albeit with U.S. assistance) to offset the improving missile and rocket capabilities of its foes. It does so by dramatically scaling up

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the size of its deployed missile defense arsenal (most evident with decisions concerning Iron Dome), constantly upgrading the capabilities of deployed and planned assets, and also diversifying its arsenal. It is important to add that in this respect Israel clearly seems to be responding to rocket and missile developments occurring among all of its foes, presumably arms racing against many rather than one. It is acquiring Iron Dome against the rocket threat mainly from Hezbollah and Hamas, David’s Sling (also known as Magic Wand) mainly against more massive threats from longer-range rockets and missiles from Syria as well as Hezbollah, and the Arrow system in response to long-range missiles from Iran (both conventional Arrow 2) and down-theroad nuclear as well (primarily Arrow 3). Additionally, the Israeli capabilities are increasingly tweaked to address not just rocket and missile attacks but also cruise missiles as well as UAVs (where Patriot batteries come into play). What gives these developments the true hallmarks of an arms race are the corresponding developments among Israel’s foes. The stellar performance of Iron Dome in 2012 seems to have caught Hamas (and its Iranian technological backers) by surprise. A few days of largely futile rocket attacks have thus yielded understandings practically codifying a return to the status quo ante. By the time Protective Edge came about in mid-2014 Israel was far better equipped, with a far larger arsenal upgraded to Iron Dome, but Hamas (and the far smaller Islamic Jihad that nonetheless maintains, with massive Iranian assistance, its indigenous rocket capabilities) also seemed to have made important adjustments. These were not confined to dramatically increasing the size and range of its arsenal of rockets (increasingly through indigenous activity within Gaza), modestly increasing their capacity to launch salvos of rockets simultaneously but also enhancing their survivability to Israeli Air Force attacks (mostly by making even more extensive use of colocation of their offensive assets within or in close proximity to private homes, schools, hospitals, mosques, and UN facilities). They have also endeavored to improve their capacity to launch offensive operations against Israel by other means. Primary among them were numerous cross-border offensive tunnels and shorter-range mortars (aimed against the Israeli settlements close to the border), as well as an embryonic UAV force. Hamas was thus able to keep on fighting and sustain (albeit at a far more modest scale) its rocket-firing capability throughout the intense confrontation lasting more than fifty days. Naturally the missiles and rockets versus missile defense arms race is not confined to Israel and Hamas. The significance of Israel’s missile defense

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buildup has not been lost on Hezbollah and its Iranian patron. They, in turn, have been similarly trying to upgrade Hezbollah’s missile and rocket arsenal by extending its range, accuracy, diversity, and robustness, similarly building up an arsenal of UAVs and cruise missiles while possibly also exploring options for cross-border tunnels. Obviously such developments could put the Israeli missile defense architecture to an even more acute test. CRISIS AND WARTIME STABILITY

Things seem somewhat clearer with respect to the relationship between missile defense and crisis stability. The availability of an effective missile shield has repeatedly proven to have a moderating effect on Israeli decision making, allowing its decision makers to exercise discretion in responding to acute missile and rocket threats: to “tolerate” some modest rocket attacks against it, respond only selectively and moderately against most others, and often avoid preemption even in response to credible warnings about imminent rocket attacks. Similarly, Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s somewhat lower expectations of possible gains in a modest rocket confrontation with Israel seems to have added to their anxiety about the probable efficacy of the offensive Israeli response to disincentivize them from casually lobbing rockets against Israel. Given the tense relationships prevailing and complicated balance of interests operating at any given time between these parties, the benefits of missile defense crisis stability should not be underestimated. The impact on wartime stability, on the other hand, seems not only more complicated to assess given that we thus far have only two real cases to look at—Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge—vis-à-vis Cast Lead—but also potentially more sobering. On the one hand the capacity of Israel to minimize the impact of hundreds of rockets lobbed by Hamas at its most populous heartland, dramatically lowering damage and casualties, has undoubtedly been indispensable to Israel’s ability to refrain from launching a ground offensive in Gaza (the comparison here to Cast Lead in 2008–2009 when Israel totally lacked such capacity is quite striking) or to withstand powerful political pressure and hold back from launching such a ground offensive for quite a while (ten days in the case of Protective Edge) in the hope of reestablishing a cease-fire. It further allowed the Israeli cabinet to deliberate at length on the need and scope of escalation and subsequently (when the cease-fire proved elusive) to limit the scope of the ground offensive it had felt compelled to undertake.

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Unfortunately, the impact of missile defense on Hamas’s behavior may have been quite the reverse. It seems to have encouraged Hamas to escalate its attacks on Israel’s cities in the hope of both demonstrating its remaining vibrancy and desperately scoring a symbolic victory after all. Perhaps the Israeli missile defense capability may have thus inadvertently created another moral hazard, whereby Hamas, eager as it has been to score symbolic hits against Israel, felt that it stood little to lose from launching numerous indiscriminate attacks against Israeli population centers. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN WMD WARHEADS ENTER THE EQUATION?

The missile defense deliberations in Israel have predominantly centered on the prospects of a conventional confrontation with a neighboring entity, usually a nonstate one. But the prospects of nonconventional arms entering the scene, be it in the form of chemical weapons or nuclear arms, obviously is never too far from the collective consciousness. How do these affect the missile defense debate? A particularly heated debate centers on the likely impact of the introduction of an active defense architecture against non-conventional attacks, specifically, whether it could operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy because it might imply a degree of tolerance toward such threats. Put differently, does deterrence by denial in this case undermine (or conversely enhance) the deterrence by punishment that has been the mainstay of the Israeli defense posture? As one may recall, a similar debate has also taken place in Israel around passive defense measures, specifically prior to every round of decisions on the acquisition and distribution of gas masks to the population. In both the chemical and nuclear cases the argument that one ought to refrain from legitimizing such acquisition let alone use has had considerable resonance, only to ultimately give way to prudent defense planning coupled with measures to reassure an anxious public with long historical memories (going back to the Holocaust and the gas chambers). Missile defenses have increasingly been seen in Israel as complimentary to passive defense and generally conducive to deterrence by adding the denial dimension to the preexisting punishment one, even against nonconventional attacks. But their positive impact is generally regarded to be far greater because they add a layer of protection to the means of retaliation against such threats and because they give the political leadership more elbow room (and precious

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time) on how to respond to such unsettling developments, in part because it is also able to reassure the public of its capacity to defend against them. But the unease of navigating through this political, strategic, and operational maze hardly goes away, and there is no easy way around this conundrum. This explains why the general tendency has been and remains to relegate discussion of this issue to the margins, whenever possible, usually hiding behind a discussion of the conventional missile and rocket threat, and where discussion of capabilities against the nonconventional threats is largely divorced from the broader strategic deliberations. CONCLUSIONS

It is now more than two decades since missile defenses have entered the Israeli scene, initially as a daring defense R&D project, more recently as a mainstay of the Israeli security doctrine and force structure. The overall assessment in Israel is that its foray into this field has been necessary, in fact indispensable. Its many successes have ranged from technical accomplishments and operational successes to strategic gains. Yet the game is not over, and the dilemmas are never far below the surface. Resource allocation (in an era of diminishing overall defense resources), calibration of expectations, and the longer-term implications of an arms race probably are the most prominent challenges facing missile defense. But doctrinal and political issues never lurk far below. The development of Israel’s missile defense capabilities was and still is closely integrated with and highly dependent upon the United States. The United States finances an important part of the development, as well as production costs of the systems. The two sides share critical technologies (for example, infrared sensor technology), notwithstanding basic conceptual differences between their systems. And the two parties are not only sharing operational experience and technical insights (where Israel is the de facto test bed for advanced missile defense architecture) but also planning and training for working together in times of crisis. Thus, Israel allowed the deployment of a U.S. missile detection radar system in Israel, and the Israeli missile defense command, control, and communications system receives missile detection information from U.S. sources, including the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites system. Furthermore, Israel has invested heavily in the interoperability with the United States of its missile defenses to facilitate joint operations whenever the United States deploys its assets in the Middle East. The result is a strong interdependence of the two sides that also lays the basis

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for the possible establishment of a regional missile defense system if and when the political environment in the region would allow for it. Ultimately it seems quite ironic that precisely the technical success of missile defense constitutes the end of one chapter but the opening of a new one. This comes as no surprise to anyone who thinks historically about evolution in military affairs. But such perspective hardly diminishes the difficulty and anxiety associated with the vexing contemporary dilemmas presented by the maturation of missile defense technology. It only means that the original question of whether missile defense ought to be part of one’s military arsenal has now given way to the follow up question: How so? NOTES 1.  M. Zuhair Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1997): 105, available at http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/diab51.pdf. 2.  “Iraq, Chemical Weapons Programs: History,” available at www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/iraq/cw/program.htm; last updated on November 8, 1998. 3. “Iraqi Nuclear Weapons,” available at www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/ program.htm, last updated on May 31, 2012. 4.  As Jean-Loup Samaan describes it: “At first, the political class in Jerusalem justified development of missile defense in the name of pragmatism and opportunism. . . . It was also an opportunistic move, because Israel was taking advantage of the early impetus in Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Within this cooperation framework, the burden of developing the systems was mostly taken on by the United States.” Jean Loup Samman, “From War to Deterrence? Israel–Hezbollah Conflict since 2006” (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, May 2014), 23. 5.  Based on research conducted by the Israeli Air Force. See also George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War: American Physical Society Panel Correctly Rejects Criticisms of Analysis Showing Patriot Failed to Destroy Scud Warheads,” Science & Global Security 8(3) (2000): 315–356. 6.  In the media, a campaign was launched against missile defense by the defense commentator, Dr. Reuven Pedazur, who published articles on the subject in the Haaretz daily. He summed up his campaign against missile defense in a booklet: ­Reuven Pedazur, “The Arrow System and Missile Defense—Challenges and Questions” (Tel Aviv: The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1993). 7.  David A. Fulghum, “Missile Killing Interceptors Eyed by Israel, US,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 23, 2010.

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8. Uzi Rubin, “Cold War Mentality—Missile Defense Foes Ignore Iron Dome Success,” Defense News, March 31, 2013, available at www.defensenews.com/article/ 20130331/DEFFEAT05/303310011/Cold-War-Mentality. 9.  Alon Ben David, “Iron Dome Blunts 90% of Enemy Rockets,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 1, 2014, available at http://aviationweek.com/defense/ iron-dome-blunts-90-enemy-rockets. 10.  Khilik Sofer, “The Rear Is the Front,” Maarakhot, 431, June 2010, 75 (in Hebrew), available at http://maarachot.idf.il/PDF/FILES/2/112772.pdf. 11.  Summary of rocket fire and mortar shelling in 2008, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at ITCC, January 1, 2009, available at www.terrorism-info .org.il/data/pdf/PDF_19045_2.pdf. 12.  For a discussion of the moral hazard problem in the context of the last massive fire exchange in Gaza, see Jonathan Shimshoni and Ariel E. Levite, “Win-Win Warfare in Gaza,” Haaretz, December 22, 2012. 13.  For a comprehensive review of the core tenets of the Israeli doctrine, see Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense of Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). 14.  The other three pillars are deterrence, early warning, and (battlefield) decision.

9

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION IN THE ARABIAN GULF Michael Elleman and Wafa Alsayed

one of the least well known of the regional missile defense efforts encompasses the Arabian Gulf nations, primarily those allied with or friendly to the United States, who all face a new strategic landscape in the twenty-first century. For almost a decade, the United States has been laboring to construct an integrated and layered missile defense architecture in the Gulf, one that networks the sensors and interceptor missiles of all its Gulf allies and partners into a unified command, control, battle management, and communications system to maximize efficacy and cooperation with American programs nearby. Washington’s efforts have encountered numerous hurdles. Although the Gulf states share a common history, ethnicity, religion, and geography, they also harbor jealousies and suspicions, most born out of lingering border disputes, family and tribal rivalries, and divergent national priorities. The United States first deployed missile defenses to the Arabian Gulf in early 1991 to counter Scud-B and al-Hussein ballistic missile attacks by Iraq. Today, almost two decades later—with Iran, not Iraq, seen as the primary ballistic missile threat in the region—the United States deploys Patriot airand missile-defense batteries in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and has on patrol in Gulf waters two or three ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia operate their own Patriot PAC-2 batteries, and the UAE has acquired Patriot PAC-3 systems. Advanced missile defense systems, including capability upgrades, PAC-3, and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) have been purchased or are

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Table 9.1. 

Missile defense systems in the Gulf.

Country

U.S. deployments

Bahrain

PAC-3 (2 batteries)

Kuwait

PAC-3 (2 batteries)

Deployed or awaiting delivery PAC-2 upgrade to PAC-3

Oman Qatar

In acquisition or considering

THAAD PAC-3 (2 batteries); FBX radar

Saudi Arabia

PAC-3; THAAD; FPS-132 Block 5 Radar PAC-2 upgrade to PAC-3

United Arab Emirates

PAC-3 (2 batteries)

Gulf Theater

Aegis SM-3

THAAD/Aegis Ashore

PAC-3; THAAD

being evaluated for possible procurement by Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (see Table 9.1). However, the rapidly shifting security landscape in the Middle East may allow the Arab monarchies of the Gulf to overcome their aversion to multilateral cooperation on vital security matters, including air and missile defense. The perceived need for a robust missile defense capability is unlikely to change, even if an international agreement with Iran on its nuclear program is realized. MISSILE THREAT

Many countries in the Middle East possess ballistic missiles. Most, however, maintain friendly relations with the United States, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. Others, such as Yemen and Egypt, hold limited supplies of obsolete missiles that pose little or no threat to the United States and its allies in the Gulf. Iraq eliminated its ballistic missile stockpile during the 1990s, as mandated by the UN Security Council. Syria has amassed hundreds of SS-21 Tochka and Scud-type short-range ballistic missiles capable of threatening its immediate neighbors in the Levant. But these missiles lack the range needed to strike targets in the Gulf, except possibly remote portions of Saudi Arabia’s northern desert. Iran, on the other hand, has assembled the largest, most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets in the Middle East and can strike targets throughout the Gulf and beyond (see Table 9.2).1

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Table 9.2. 

Middle East rockets and ballistic missiles.

Country

Missile

Range (km)

Status

Bahrain

ATACMs (MGM-140)